[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING COMMUNITIES FROM INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENTS: REVITALIZING THE CHEMICAL
SAFETY BOARD
=======================================================================
HYBRID HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-49
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
energycommerce.house.gov
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-670 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Chairman
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
ANNA G. ESHOO, California Ranking Member
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado FRED UPTON, Michigan
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
DORIS O. MATSUI, California BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
KATHY CASTOR, Florida DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
JERRY McNERNEY, California H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
PAUL TONKO, New York BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York BILLY LONG, Missouri
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
TONY CARDENAS, California MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
RAUL RUIZ, California RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
SCOTT H. PETERS, California TIM WALBERG, Michigan
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois, Vice NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
Chair JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California DEBBBIE LESKO, Arizona
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia GREG PENCE, Indiana
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware DAN CRENSHAW, Texas
DARREN SOTO, Florida JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
KIM SCHRIER, Washington
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
------
Professional Staff
TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Staff Director
WAVERLY GORDON, Deputy Staff Director
NATE HODSON, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
Chair
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York Ranking Member
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
PAUL TONKO, New York DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
RAUL RUIZ, California BILLY LONG, Missouri
SCOTT H. PETERS, California, Vice NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
Chair JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania
KIM SCHRIER, Washington GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona (ex officio)
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Colorado, opening statement................................. 2
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. H. Morgan Griffith, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Virginia, opening statement.................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Washington, opening statement..................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Witnesses
Katherine A. Lemos, Ph.D., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board................. 18
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Answers to submitted questions............................... 87
Submitted Material
Letter of May 20, 2021, from Mr. Pallone, et al., to Katherine A.
Lemos, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chemical Safety
and Hazard Investigation Board, submitted by Ms. DeGette....... 48
Letter of June 10, 2021, from Katherine A. Lemos, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board, to Mr. Pallone, et al., submitted by Ms.
DeGette........................................................ 53
Letter of July 8, 2021, from John Paul Smith, United
Steelworkers, et al., to Katherine A. Lemos, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board, submitted by Ms. DeGette................................ 69
Letter of September 28, 2021, from Chris Jahn, President and
Chief Executive Officer, American Chemistry Council, and Chet
M. Thompson, President and Chief Executive Officer, American
Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, to Ms. DeGette and Mr.
Griffith, submitted by Mr. McKinley............................ 85
PROTECTING COMMUNITIES FROM INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS: REVITALIZING THE
CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2021
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m., in
the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building,
and remotely via Cisco Webex online video conferencing, Hon.
Diana DeGette (chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives DeGette, Kuster, Rice,
Schakowsky, Tonko, Ruiz, Peters, Schrier, Trahan, Pallone (ex
officio), Griffith (subcommittee ranking member), Burgess,
McKinley, Long, Palmer, Dunn, Joyce, and Rodgers (ex officio).
Staff present: Austin Flack, Policy Analyst; Waverly
Gordon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel; Tiffany
Guarascio, Staff Director; Perry Hamilton, Clerk; Fabrizio
Herrera, Staff Assistant; Rebekah Jones, Counsel; Zach Kahan,
Deputy Director, Outreach and Member Service; Chris Knauer,
Oversight Staff Director; Will McAuliffe, Counsel; Elysa
Montfort, Press Secretary; Kaitlyn Peel, Digital Director; Tim
Robinson, Chief Counsel; Nikki Roy, Policy Coordinator; Andrew
Souvall, Director of Communications, Outreach and Member
Services; Benjamin Tabor, Junior Professional Staff Member;
Sarah Burke, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Jerry Couri,
Minority Deputy Chief Counsel for Environment; Marissa Gervasi,
Minority Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Brittany
Havens, Minority Professional Staff Member, Oversight and
Investigations; Nate Hodson, Minority Staff Director; Emily
King, Minority Member Services Director; Bijan Koohmaraie,
Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight and Investigations Chief
Counsel; Clare Paoletta, Minority Policy Analyst, Health; Alan
Slobodin, Minority Chief Investigative Counsel, Oversight and
Investigations; and Michael Taggart, Minority Policy Director.
Ms. DeGette. The Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations hearing will now come to order.
Today the committee is holding a hearing entitled
``Protecting Communities from Industrial Accidents:
Revitalizing the Chemical Safety Board.'' This hearing will
examine the ongoing mission, governance, staffing, and other
challenges at the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations
Board.
Due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, Members can
participate in today's hearing either in person or remotely via
online conferencing. Members who are participating in person
must wear a mask. Such Members may remove their mask when they
are under recognition and speaking from a microphone. Staff and
press who are present in the committee room must also wear a
mask at all times.
For Members participating remotely, your microphones will
be set on mute for the purpose of eliminating inadvertent
background noise. Members participating remotely will need to
unmute your microphone each time you speak--something you'd
think we'd be used to by now.
Please note that, once you unmute your microphone, anything
that is said in Webex will be heard over the loudspeakers in
the committee room and subject to be heard by livestream and C-
SPAN.
House Members are participating from different locations at
today's hearing. All recognition of Members, such as for
questions, will be in the order of subcommittee seniority.
If at any time during the hearing I'm unable to chair the
hearing, the vice chair of the subcommittee, Mr. Peters, will
serve as Chair until I can return.
Documents for the record can be sent to Austin Flack at the
email address we have provided to staff, and all documents will
be entered into the record at the conclusion of the hearing.
The Chair now recognizes herself for purposes of an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DeGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO
Good morning. Today's oversight hearing covers one of our
small but incredibly important independent agencies, the
Chemical Safety Board, or CSB.
Although many of you have never heard of it, the CSB plays
a vital role in protecting American workers and communities.
We are all familiar with the role of the National
Transportation Safety Board. When a plane falls from the sky,
we want to understand not just why it happened but also how we
can prevent it from happening again.
And that's the role that CSB plays when it comes to
industrial accidents. The CSB improves the safety of American
workers, communities, and the environment by investigating the
root causes of these tragic events and making recommendations
to prevent them in the future.
While many Americans may not know the CSB by name, they are
certainly familiar with some of the critical incidents that it
has investigated.
Please display the first slide.
[Pause.]
Ms. DeGette. They did practice this in advance.
[Pause.]
Ms. DeGette. We have some kind of a technology problem, but
I hope we can fix it, because the first slide was a photo of
the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster.
And we all remember the Deepwater Horizon, a sudden
explosion and fire on an offshore rig that took the lives of 11
workers and seriously injured 17 others.
It also triggered a massive oil spill into the Gulf of
Mexico that lasted for 87 days, one of the worst environmental
disasters in U.S. history.
In fact, this subcommittee held a field hearing in
Louisiana to assess the local impact of the spill, and then I
and Ranking Member Waxman later sent a letter to CSB requesting
that they further examine the root cause of the accident. This
was a disaster.
In 2005, there was the BP America Refinery explosion in
Texas City, just outside of Houston. In that incident, 15
workers were killed and 180 more were injured during the
restart of a unit at the refinery.
In 2013, Texas saw yet another tragedy, this time at a
fertilizer storage and distribution facility in the town of
West. A fire within a storage facility triggered a massive
explosion of ammonium nitrate. Twelve emergency responders and
three members of the public died, over 260 people were injured,
and more than 150 homes and businesses were damaged, resulting
in hundreds of millions of dollars of property destruction.
More recently, in 2019, there was a massive fire at the
Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, where a vapor cloud including potentially deadly
hydrofluoric acid ignited.
The quick actions of a control room operator to rapidly
drain the remaining hydrofluoric acid prevented a massive
release of more of the harmful gas which would have placed the
highly populated surrounding communities at tremendous risk.
These are just a few examples of the critical incidents
that CSB has deployed to over the past several years.
The devastating impacts that these accidents have had on
facilities, workers, and surrounding communities are obvious,
and the CSB safety recommendations that have come out of these
and other investigations are directly responsible for improved
safety conditions within many U.S. industries.
CSB's work has saved lives and protected communities, and
those of us with industrial facilities in our districts
understand the stake in CSB's work. We want to see this agency
flourish.
But despite the positive impacts, there have been
challenges at the agency since its inception. In recent years,
Board vacancies, unfilled staff positions, employee morale
issues, and most recently the COVID-19 pandemic have led to
unproductivity at the agency.
We were pleased to see that the CSB published two new final
investigation reports last Friday, but there are still
currently 18 open investigations, some dating back to incidents
that occurred in 2016 and 2017.
This is the biggest backlog of investigations that the
agency has ever had--one of them.
The timeliness of these reports matter. When CSB isn't
expeditiously sharing its findings, it cannot effectively
prevent future incidents and fulfill its mission to protect
people and the environment.
Now, we are aware of the many challenges that I have
already mentioned today, and they were inherited by our witness
today, Chairman and CEO Katherine Lemos. But we're also here
today not to focus on CSB's past, but the present and future.
And so the questions are straightforward:
How does the CSB intend to finish and close the many
important investigations it's opened, and when can we expect to
see the vital recommendations that come from that work?
How will the CSB take on important new work if it can't
close the many investigations that remain incomplete?
When will the CSB fill key staffing vacancies to its
investigative mission?
And, finally, what's the plan to address how the important
governing board operates and to avoid the dysfunction it's
suffered from in the past?
In short, we need to understand the Chair's strategic plan
to move this agency forward.
I'm pleased that part of the solution is already underway.
The Chairman will soon have reinforcements on the Board.
President Biden has nominated three new Board members who we
hope to see confirmed soon, seeing as right now we only have
one Board member and she is sitting right here.
We look forward to the increased activity that we expect to
see when they are on board. But we also know new Board members
alone will not solve all of the agency's problems, and that's
why we're holding the hearing today.
I want to thank the Chairwoman for being here today, and I
look forward to the discussion so that we can ensure CSB has
the leadership, strategic plan, and resources needed in order
to execute on its vital mission. American workers and
communities are simply counting on it.
[The prepared statement of Ms. DeGette follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. The Chair is now very pleased to recognize the
ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes
for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Chair DeGette, for holding this
hearing.
As you said, the Chemical Safety Board is an independent,
nonregulatory Federal agency. According to its enabling
statute, the leading charge of the Chemical Safety Board is to
investigate and determine the cause of any accidental release
resulting in a fatality, serious injury, or substantial
property damage.
It has been described, as Chairwoman DeGette described it,
as the equivalent of the National Transportation Safety Board
but for chemical spills as opposed to transportation accidents.
Unfortunately, the Board has been criticized for falling
short of accomplishing this primary responsibility.
The Chemical Safety Board was created by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, but it did not become operational until
1998.
Since then, it has been saddled with functioning
challenges. In 2000, just 2\1/2\ years after its inception, the
Government Accountability Office identified management
challenges and investigative backlog.
Now, 21 years later, we share the same concerns as our
colleagues of Congresses past.
Since May 1, 2020, the Chemical Safety Board has operated
with only one of its five Board seats filled.
Chair Lemos, I understand that under your leadership you
have been disadvantaged with a short staff and a sharp learning
curve. The vacancies in Board member positions impede the
agency from making substantial progress on benchmarks. Board
members are vital for facilitating and closing out
investigations, including participating in site visits and
approving investigative reports.
The Chemical Safety Board certainly faces challenges in
recruiting and retaining qualified staff. The quality of
investigations hinges on the ability of experts to conduct
complete, unbiased investigations. These investigators should
have solid backgrounds in chemical engineering or industrial
process safety.
We understand it is difficult to compete with industry to
find such specialized skill sets, but we are hopeful the Board
is taking actions to recruit these kinds of candidates for
vacant investigator positions, and we would like to see that
progress continue.
I believe that Chemical Safety Board investigations can
benefit industry, but I have ream concerns how this work is
being conducted.
Due to the ongoing challenges with management over the
years, investigation processes are somewhat unclear. The Board
should establish unbiased criteria for selecting incidents to
investigate as well as protocols to determine when to deploy an
investigative team.
Uniform procedures would help to ensure objectivity and
balance in the Board's investigative work, especially as staff
turnovers occur.
Based on the data and analysis of an investigation,
investigative reports usually include recommendations. Yet
these recommendations have no legal standards. They lack
cohesiveness from one report to the next. And an absence of
standardized criteria allows for investigative reports to
include agenda-setting recommendations that advance a
particular viewpoint.
This is not the job of the Chemical Safety Board. The job
of the Chemical Safety Board is to determine the root cause of
an accident.
When recommendations are made, they should focus on
measures to minimize the consequences of an accidental release.
That is their purpose, as outlined in the statute. And
recommendations should not need to be rewritten if new staff is
placed on an investigation.
The Chemical Safety Board should not set expectations that
are unreachable. It is not practicable to eliminate all
chemical accidents, and the law does not mandate that.
Above all, the role of the Chemical Safety Board is to play
fact finder in these incidents and to provide regulators with
information they need to create policy. The Board should not
seek out investigations or issue recommendations simply to
spotlight disfavored technology or preferred new practices.
Finally, the Chemical Safety Board must focus on completing
outstanding investigations as quickly as possible. To gain the
trust of stakeholders and the public, the Board must conduct
its operations in a timely and a transparent manner, and
communications between the Chemical Safety Board and industry
must improve to repair the reputation of the Board.
Today I hope we will focus on what the Chemical Safety
Board can and should do in the upcoming months to close out
high quality investigations in both an expeditious and an
efficient manner. We need to hear from the Board on how they
will improve internal processes and allocate resources
judicially to complete rigorous and instructive investigations.
I thank you for representing the Chemical Safety Board,
Chair Lemos, and being here today, and we look forward to your
testimony.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. H. Morgan Griffith
Thank you, Chair DeGette for holding this hearing.
The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is an independent, non-
regulatory federal agency. According to its enabling statute,
the leading charge of the CSB is to investigate and determine
the cause of any accidental release resulting in a fatality,
serious injury or substantial property damages.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) Sec. 7412(r)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, though, the Board has historically been
criticized for falling short of accomplishing this primary
responsibility. CSB was created by the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, but it did not become operational until 1998. Since
then, the CSB has been saddled with functioning challenges.
Back in 2000, two and a half years after its inception, the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified management
challenges and an investigative backlog. Now, 21 years later,
we share in the same concerns as our colleagues of Congress'
past.
Since May 1, 2020, CSB has carried on with only one of its
five board seats filled. Chair Lemos, I understand that under
your leadership you have been disadvantaged with a short staff
and sharp learning curve. The vacancies in Board member
positions impede the agency from making substantial progress on
benchmarks. Board members are vital for facilitating and
closing out investigations, such as participating in site
visits and voting on investigative reports.
The CSB also faces challenges in recruiting and retaining
qualified staff. The quality of investigations hinges on the
expertise of investigators to conduct complete, unbiased
investigations. These investigators should have solid
backgrounds in chemical engineering or industrial process
safety. We understand it is difficult to compete with the
industry to find such a specialized skill set. But we are
hopeful that CSB is taking actions to recruit these kinds of
candidates for vacant investigator positions; and we would like
to see that progress continue.
I believe CSB investigations can have a beneficial value to
the industry, but I have real concerns with how this work is
being conducted. Due to the ongoing challenges with management
over the years, the Board has not created standardized
processes for its investigations. The Board has finite
resources and needs to establish unbiased criteria for
selecting incidents to investigate and protocols to determine
when to deploy an investigative team. The Board needs policies
and procedures in place to ensure its objectivity and balance
in its investigative work.
Based on the data and analysis of an investigation,
investigative reports usually include recommendations. Yet,
these recommendations have no legal criteria. They are lacking
in cohesiveness from one report to the next. When
recommendations favor a position, the report loses its
independent, investigative aspects. A lack of standardized
criteria allows for investigative reports to include agenda-
setting recommendations that advance a viewpoint.
This is not the job of the CSB. The job of the CSB is to
determine the root cause of an accident. Any periodic
recommendations should suggest measures to minimize the
consequences of an accidental release-their purpose as outlined
in the statute. They should not need to be rewritten each time
turnover places new staff on an investigation.
A ``nation safe from chemical accidents'' is a nation of
closed chemical industrial plants. It is not practicable to
eliminate all chemical accidents, the law doesn't mandate it,
and the CSB should not set expectations that are unreachable.
First and foremost, the CSB must play the fact finder in these
incidents. The Board should not seek out investigations or
issue recommendations simply to spotlight disfavored technology
or preferred, new process safety practices. What the Chemical
Safety Board must do is focus on completing the outstanding
investigations as soon as possible. To gain the trust of
stakeholders and the public, the Board must remain transparent,
and communications between CSB and industry should improve to
repair the reputation of the Board. Today, I hope we will focus
on what CSB can and should do in the upcoming months to close
out high-quality investigations in both an expeditious and
efficient way. We need to hear from the CSB on how they will
improve internal processes and allocate resources judiciously
to complete rigorous and instructive investigations. Thank you,
Chair Lemos, for representing the CSB here today. We look
forward to hearing your testimony. I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
Today we are conducting an oversight of a little-known but
important Federal agency, the Chemical Safety Board. Coming
from a State with a large number of industrial facilities, I
have been involved with the CSB since its inception, helping to
create and secure appropriations for the agency back in 1998.
Since that time, CSB has conducted vital investigations
into industrial chemical accidents. Its mission is to find
answers and provide recommendations to prevent future
incidents.
For example, in my district, CSB investigated the 2005
Acetylene Service Company gas explosion in Perth Amboy, which
killed three workers. From its findings, CSB made
recommendations that addressed the dangers of flammable gas
accumulation and how to prevent similar incidents in the
future.
But despite its good work, CSB has faced numerous
challenges in recent years. This past May the committee sent a
bipartisan letter to CSB outlining our concerns, including a
backlog in investigations, understaffing, and management
challenges. And these concerns are shared by Members on both
sides of the aisle, and I'm pleased that we're here today to
continue this important bipartisan oversight.
One of my biggest concerns is that CSB has been slow to
finalize its reports and provide critical safety
recommendations in recent years.
For instance, CSB has yet to release its investigative
report on the 2019 Philadelphia Energy Solutions refinery fire
and explosions which involved the release of hydrofluoric acid,
a highly toxic chemical.
Fortunately, because of built-in safety protocols at the
plant and the heroic action of the workers, the worst potential
outcomes for both the workers and the surrounding Pennsylvania
and New Jersey communities were narrowly avoided.
It has been 2 years now since this incident, and CSB still
has not released its investigative findings. It's imperative
that we understand the root causes of these types of incidents
so that we can safeguard workers, protect communities, and
prevent future incidents.
And I look forward to hearing from Chairperson Lemos on her
plan to close this and other investigations.
The CSB also plays an important strategic role in
preventing future incidents in the face of climate change and
extreme weather. Industrial facilities across the country are
at increasing risk. You need to look no further than this most
recent hurricane to see that.
Earlier this month, Hurricane Ida dumped record rainfall in
New Jersey, flooding the Raritan River and devastating
communities throughout the State. The Environmental Protection
Agency is still assessing the damage at oil sites, chemical
facilities, and Superfund sites, including one completely
inundated Superfund site that was previously home to a large
chemical plant.
Meanwhile, in Louisiana, 138 industrial facilities were in
regions that fully or partially lost power due to Hurricane
Ida. This is problematic considering that some of these
facilities use electricity to contain hazardous materials. We
don't know yet the full extent of chemical spills, oil leaks,
and toxic air releases in the State.
And to its credit, CSB has warned industrial facilities
about the safety hazards posed by extreme weather events,
particularly hurricanes. For example, CSB highlighted the 2017
Arkema chemical plant fire near Houston, Texas, and found that
the company was unprepared for the flooding levels experienced
during Hurricane Harvey.
Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner testified before the
subcommittee in March that the Houston region, which is home to
countless petrochemical and other industrial facilities,
experienced three 500-year floods in 3 years. And recent
analysis shows that 2,500 chemical sites in the U.S. lie in
moderate- to high-risk flood zones.
So there is no question that floods and other extreme
weather events are getting worse. I look forward to hearing how
the Chairperson is positioning the agency to address these
growing strategic challenges.
In my view, getting the CSB back to functioning at the
highest level is the first step, and the goal of today's
hearing is to help get CSB back on track. And I hope that we
can all come back together to revitalize this critical agency.
It really is critical.
And I thank the chairperson for having this hearing, which
I think is very important.
Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Today we are conducting oversight of a little known but
important federal agency, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB).
Coming from a state with a large number of industrial
facilities, I have been involved with the CSB since its
inception, helping to create and secure appropriations for the
agency back in 1998. Since that time, CSB has conducted vital
investigations into industrial chemical accidents. Its mission
is to find answers and provide recommendations to prevent
future incidents.
For example, in my district, CSB investigated the 2005
Acetylene Service Company Gas Explosion in Perth Amboy which
killed three workers. From its findings, CSB made
recommendations that addressed the dangers of flammable gas
accumulation and how to prevent similar incidents in the
future.
Despite its good work, CSB has faced numerous challenges in
recent years. This past May, the Committee sent a bipartisan
letter to CSB outlining our concerns, including a backlog in
investigations, understaffing, and management challenges. These
concerns are shared by members on both sides of the aisle, and
I am pleased that we are here today to continue this important
bipartisan oversight.
One of my biggest concerns is that CSB has been slow to
finalize its reports and provide critical safety
recommendations in recent years. For instance, CSB has yet to
release its investigative report on the 2019 Philadelphia
Energy Solutions Refinery Fire and Explosions, which involved a
release of hydrofluoric acid, a highly toxic chemical.
Fortunately, because of built-in safety protocols at the
plant and the heroic actions of workers, the worst potential
outcomes for both the workers and the surrounding Pennsylvania
and New Jersey communities were narrowly avoided.
Yet it has been two years now since this incident and CSB
still has not released its investigative findings. It is
imperative that we understand the root causes of these types of
incidents so that we can safeguard workers, protect
communities, and prevent future incidents. I look forward to
hearing from Chairperson Lemos on her plan to close this and
other investigations.
CSB also plays an important strategic role in preventing
future incidents in the face of climate change and extreme
weather. Industrial facilities across the country are at
increasing risk. You need to look no further than this most
recent hurricane to see that.
Earlier this month, Hurricane Ida dumped record rainfall in
New Jersey, flooding the Raritan River and devastating
communities throughout the state. The Environmental Protection
Agency is still assessing the damage at oil sites, chemical
facilities, and Superfund sites, including one completely
inundated Superfund site that was previously home to a large
chemical plant.
Meanwhile, in Louisiana, 138 industrial facilities were in
regions that fully or partially lost power due to Hurricane
Ida. This is problematic considering that some of these
facilities use electricity to contain hazardous materials. We
do not yet know the full extent of chemical spills, oil leaks,
and toxic air releases in the state.
To its credit, CSB has warned industrial facilities about
the safety hazards posed by extreme weather events,
particularly hurricanes. For example, CSB highlighted the 2017
Arkema Chemical Plant Fire near Houston, Texas, finding that
the company was unprepared for the flooding levels experienced
during Hurricane Harvey.
Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner testified before this
Subcommittee in March that the Houston region, which is home to
countless petrochemical and other industrial facilities,
experienced three ``500-year'' floods in three years. And
recent analysis shows that 2,500 chemical sites in the United
States lie in moderate- to high-risk flood zones.
There is no question that floods and other extreme weather
events are getting worse, and I look forward to hearing how the
Chairperson is positioning the agency to address these growing
strategic challenges.
In my view, getting the CSB back to functioning at the
highest level is the first step. The goal of today's hearing is
to help get CSB back on track, and I hope that we can all come
together to revitalize this critical agency.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair will now recognize the ranking member of the full
committee, Mrs. Rodgers, for 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mrs. Rodgers. Good morning, Madam Chair. Thank you.
The chemical industry is one of the largest manufacturing
sectors in the U.S., serving both a domestic and global
marketplace. Our chemical industries help stimulate the economy
by providing materials that we use in our everyday life.
But when major chemical accidents occur, it can result in
devastating impacts, including death, serious injury, and
significant property damage. These accidents pose a significant
risk not only for workers but for surrounding communities.
In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress took a
three-faceted approach to address the potential risk from these
significant events, using the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
Chemical Safety Board.
To understand the role of the CSB, it is essential to
understand the landscape in which the Board operates, including
its main players and their designated roles.
The EPA has a primary role in addressing accidental
releases. The 1990 amendments required the EPA to publish
regulations and guidance for chemical accident prevention,
preparedness, and response activities at facilities using
substances that pose the greatest risk of harm from accidental
releases. This act placed EPA in charge of requiring qualifying
companies to develop their own risk management plans.
To protect workers from injury resulting from accidental
releases, the 1990 amendments provided OSHA with standard
setting and enforcement authority concerning process safety
management. OSHA also provides training, outreach, education,
and assistance in this area.
Unlike EPA and OSHA, the CSB by law is an independent,
nonregulatory body established to provide objective knowledge.
The Board's primary purpose, as stated in the conference
report, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, is to investigate
the root causes of accidental releases.
This is an important function. Without an independent
investigative body searching for the answers, the industry will
not have all the valuable information needed to reduce the risk
of a chemical accident that causes substantial damage.
Unfortunately, though, the CSB has recently failed in
fulfilling this mission. Right now the CSB has a backlog of 18
investigations, not including the 2 investigations that were
closed last Friday, with the oldest open investigation from
2016.
Let me be clear: Waiting more than 5 years to close out
these timely and important investigations simply is not
acceptable. These investigations help companies understand what
went wrong to help prevent future accidents. Something must be
done to improve the investigative process and end the waiting
game for owners and operators of these facilities.
I recognize the CSB must have all of its parts working to
ensure functionality, otherwise it cannot address its
investigative backlog and new investigations.
A key building block here is quality investigators. They
must have chemical or process safety expertise to analyze
accidental releases and discover their root causes.
It is also crucial that investigators have proper
experience and the relevant scientific qualifications to make
technically feasible and practical recommendations about how to
reduce risks from chemical accidents.
The Board's statutory responsibilities include
investigating chemical accidents and providing Congress,
Federal, and State authorities with periodic reports that
contain recommendations to improve chemical safety.
Unfortunately, CSB is not fulfilling those
responsibilities. Importantly, the CSB should not be seeking
ways to expand its jurisdiction into EPA's or OSHA's
authorities.
The testimony mischaracterizes, quote, ``safety
recommendations'' as part of a root cause investigation. While
it seems reasonable CSB suggest steps to address a specific
accident, its statute seems to suggest something different.
Under the law, ``safe'' is a feature that may be explicitly
covered in CSB's periodic reports, not root cause
investigations; moreover, the majority of the law's reference
isn't to recommendations, suggested changes, and regulations.
The CSB should channel its resources into conducting
investigations, especially looking for ways to meet the
baseline. It should not use its investigations and the
recommendations in its report to push certain agendas.
My hope is that the Board will resist the urge to become
distracted with other priorities and focus on the main task at
hand: demonstrating it can color inside the lines by focusing
on investigations. Ultimately, workers, communities, and our
manufacturing sector depend on it.
Thank you. I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Rodgers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers
LANDSCAPE OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES
The chemical industry is one of the largest manufacturing
sectors in the U.S., serving both a domestic and global
marketplace.
Our chemical industries help stimulate the economy by
providing raw materials that we use in our everyday life.
But when major chemical accidents occur, they can result in
devastating impacts including death, serious injury, and
significant property damage.
These accidents pose a serious risk not only for workers,
but surrounding communities.
In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress took a
three-faceted approach to addressing the potential risks from
these significant events, using the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
the Chemical Safety Board.
To understand the role of the CSB, it is essential to
understand the landscape in which this Board operates,
including its main players and their designated roles.
EPA
The EPA has a primary role in addressing accidental
releases.
The 1990 Amendments required the EPA to publish regulations
and guidance for chemical accident prevention, preparedness,
and response activities at facilities using substances that
pose the greatest risk of harm from accidental releases.
It is also the EPA's role to build upon existing industrial
codes and standards and require qualifying companies to develop
their own Risk Management Program under Clean Air Act.
OSHA
To protect workers from injury resulting from accidental
releases, the 1990 Amendments also provided OSHA (Oh-sha) with
standard setting and enforcement authority concerning process
safety management.
OSHA also provides training, outreach, education, and
assistance in this area.
PURPOSE OF CSB
Unlike, EPA and OSHA, the CSB, by law, is an independent,
non-regulatory body established to provide objective knowledge.
The Board's principal role is to investigate the root
causes of accidental releases.
Without an independent, investigative body searching for
the answers, the industry will not have all the valuable
information needed to reduce the risk of a chemical accident.
Unfortunately, though, CSB has recently failed in
fulfilling its mission.
Right now, the CSB has a backlog of 18 investigations, not
including the two investigations were closed last Friday. with
the oldest open investigation from 2016.
Let me be clear: waiting more than 5 years to close out
these timely and important investigations simply is not
acceptable.
These investigations help companies understand what went
wrong to help prevent future accidents,
Something must be done to improve the investigative process
and end the waiting game for owners and operators of these
facilities.
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CSB
The CSB must have all its working parts to ensure
functionality. Otherwise, CSB will be unable to address its
investigative backlog, while also addressing new
investigations. A key building block of CSB work is quality
investigators. They must have chemical or process safety
expertise to analyze accidental releases and discover their
root causes.
It is crucial that investigators have proper experience and
the relevant scientific qualifications to make technically
feasible and practical recommendations about how to reduce
risks from chemical accidents.
EXPANDING AUTHORITY
The Board's statutory responsibilities include
investigating chemical accidents and providing Congress,
federal, and state authorities with periodic reports that
contain recommendations to improve chemical safety.
Unfortunately, the CSB is not fulfilling those
responsibilities.
Importantly, the CSB should not be seeking ways to expand
its jurisdiction into EPA's or OSHA's authorities. The Board
conflates ``safety recommendations'' as part of a root cause
investigation. ``Safe'' is a feature that may be covered in
CSB's periodic reports, not root cause investigations. The CSB
should channel its resources into conducting investigations,
especially looking for ways to meet the baseline.
Similarly, the CSB should remain independent in its work.
It should not use the findings and recommendations in its
reports to push certain agendas.
My hope is the Board will resist the urge to become
distracted with other priorities outside its statutory
authority and focus on the main task at hand--demonstrating it
can color inside the lines. Ultimately, workers, communities,
and our manufacturing sector depend on it.
Thank you, I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now asks unanimous consent that the Members'
written opening statements be made part of the record. And
without objection, so ordered.
I now want to introduce our witness for today's hearing,
the Honorable Katherine A. Lemos--am I pronouncing that
correctly? ``Lemm-ohs.'' OK, thank you.
Dr. Lemos. ``Lemm-ohs'' is correct.
Ms. DeGette. Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer, U.S.
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.
We really want to thank you for appearing today. And I know
you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative
hearing, and when we do so, we have a practice of taking the
testimony under oath.
Do you have any objections to testifying under oath?
Dr. Lemos. No, ma'am.
Ms. DeGette. Let the record reflect the witness responded
no.
The Chair then advises you that under the rules of the
House and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be
accompanied by counsel.
Do you desire to be accompanied by counsel today?
Dr. Lemos. No, ma'am.
Ms. DeGette. Let the record reflect the witness has
responded no.
And so, if you would, would you please rise and raise your
right hand so you may be sworn in?
[Witness sworn.]
Ms. DeGette. And let the record reflect the witness
responded affirmatively.
And you are now under oath and subject to the penalties set
forth in Title 18, Section 1001 of the United States Code.
And at this time the Chair will now recognize you for 5
minutes to provide your opening statement.
Before we begin, I want to explain the lighting system. In
front of you are a series of lights. The light will initially
be green. Then it turns yellow when you have 1 minute
remaining. We would ask that you try to wrap up at that time,
start wrapping up. And the light turns red when your time
expires.
And so, Chairperson Lemos, you are now recognized for 5
minutes.
Just move it a little closer, I think.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE A. LEMOS, Ph.D., CHAIRPERSON AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD
INVESTIGATION BOARD
Dr. Lemos. Thank you. Good morning. I'm Dr. Katherine
Lemos, and I'm proud to serve as the Chairperson and CEO of the
United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
or CSB.
As you know, and as you stated, our mission is to ``drive
chemical safety change through independent investigations to
protect people and the environment.'' This is a critically
important mission and one to which we are fully committed.
We achieve this mission through three strategic goals: to
advocate for safety, to prevent the recurrence of significant
chemical incidents, and to maintain an engaged and high-
performing workforce.
I would like to address each of these.
First, our strategic goal to advocate for safety, which
involves achieving change through recommendations, outreach,
and education.
In total, CSB has released 860 safety recommendations; 742
of those are closed. In fiscal year 2021, CSB has issued 19 new
safety recommendations, in comparison to zero for fiscal year
2020.
A major focus of CSB in fiscal year 2021 has been advancing
and closing previously issued recommendations, because this is
a key driver to realizing positive safety change.
In fiscal year 2021, CSB advanced 46 recommendations; 28
closed successfully. In comparison, in fiscal year 2020, CSB
advanced only 15 recommendations; 4 closed successfully.
Another strategic goal is to prevent recurrence of
significant chemical incidents through independent
investigations.
Over the years, CSB deployed to 146 incidents. Even through
the pandemic, following our COVID Safety Plan, which we
implemented very early on in my tenure, CSB has continued to
efficiently deploy to meet our mission.
In fiscal year 2021, CSB made a commitment to increased
transparency, and we have demonstrated this through initiating
live Board meetings upon completion of our investigations.
In fiscal year 2021, utilizing this new transparency
process, we completed three investigations: Aghorn, AB
Specialty Silicones, and Evergreen Packaging. This compares to
only one completed investigation in fiscal year 2020.
We are working diligently to complete the remaining 18 open
investigations. Due to enhanced internal processes developed
this year, we are poised to complete investigations more
efficiently moving forward.
Our third goal, it is to create and maintain an engaged,
high-performing workforce. After accepting this role last year,
I was shocked to learn of how low the staff numbers actually
were.
Our agency is critical to the safety and the well-being of
our workers, the public, the communities, and our environment.
To address this, we have prioritized hiring a robust,
diverse, and engaged Mission Product Team. And by year end
fiscal year 2023, our plan is to have an all-time high number
of investigation and technical specialists on the Mission
Product Team.
We have also increased technical contractor support, with
expertise in specialized fields such as metallurgy, blast
modeling, and equipment testing.
To create more stability at the agency, we are hiring key
support staff and leadership at the career level.
Finally, CSB looks forward to onboarding new Board members.
These appointees are critical to our mission. They bring unique
subject matter expertise and additional perspectives that helps
to ensure the integrity of our products while enhancing our
advocacy.
Ultimately, we are committed to the CSB mission, we are
committed to its growth, and we are committed to ensure that we
can respond and react properly to catastrophic chemical events.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lemos follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Chairperson Lemos.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes for
questioning.
And as I said in the opening statement, today's discussion
is really focused on where the agency is right now and what we
need for it to do for it to function going forward.
And so I just want to ask you a series of questions,
Chairperson, and if you can, if you can answer as briefly as
you can, that would help because, of course, we each only have
5 minutes to question.
Now, as we all talked about on both sides of the aisle, CSB
investigates some of the most consequential industrial
accidents in the United States. Is that correct?
Dr. Lemos. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. DeGette. And the purpose of those investigations is to
identify the root causes and then make corresponding safety
recommendations to prevent future incidents. Isn't that
correct?
Dr. Lemos. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. DeGette. So conducting these investigations and then
informing the public of its findings is really the bread and
butter of CSB's work, and I know that you agree with that.
So let's talk for a minute about the investigation backlog,
which I know you are striving mightily to reduce. But as many
of us on both sides of the aisle said, there are 18 open
investigations, some which go back to 2018.
So my first question to you, Chairperson Lemos, is, do you
currently have a strategic plan and scheduled timeline to close
each of the 18 open investigations?
Chairperson, do you have a plan to close each of those 18
investigations?
Dr. Lemos. Yes, Chairwoman, we have a plan. And I'm looking
for my specific notes on the data for that right now.
Ms. DeGette. OK.
Dr. Lemos. So hold just a moment.
Ms. DeGette. The ranking member points out the plan is with
the slide.
Do you have that there? You know what, what I'm going to--
OK. Do you have it now?
Can you turn your mike on, please?
Dr. Lemos. So sorry. I actually have two different aspects.
First of all, our top priority is to focus on the mission.
Ms. DeGette. Yes, OK. But do you have a plan for closing
those 18 open investigations? Yes or no?
Dr. Lemos. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. And can you give me a copy of that plan?
Dr. Lemos. We can provide a copy of the plan, as we have
discussed or as we have exchanged information with your staff--
--
Ms. DeGette. OK. If you can give me a copy of that plan,
then I will put it into the record.
And the other point that I want to ask in my time
remaining, that's transparency of the agency. CSB's regulations
require that each quarterly public meeting include a review of
the Board of the schedule for completion of all open
investigations.
Now, I understand that the schedule has not always been
made public in the past. So will you commit to providing this
schedule of completion for all open investigations at your
quarterly public meetings going forward?
Dr. Lemos. So, first of all, I would like to address one of
the questions you asked before.
Ms. DeGette. OK. But, first of all--and I will have time
for you to do that, but let's answer this question.
Can you provide the schedule of completion for all open
investigations at your quarterly meetings? So if you have a
quarterly meeting, you can say which ones you are planning to
close.
Dr. Lemos. I can tell you right now which four are the next
to come up.
Ms. DeGette. OK. But do you plan to release those at your
quarterly meetings?
Dr. Lemos. Yes, we plan to release those.
Ms. DeGette. OK.
Dr. Lemos. And we have actually recently, in the last two
meetings, said which ones will be up for finalization.
Ms. DeGette. Super. Thank you.
And then you can go back to your--I've got 45 seconds, so
you can answer my previous question.
Dr. Lemos. Understand. Yes, we have a plan. We have got
early phase, mid-phase, and late phase.
Ms. DeGette. Super.
Dr. Lemos. And I can tell you the four right now that are
up for legal review, which is the final phase before the Board
receives them----
Ms. DeGette. Great.
Dr. Lemos [continuing]. Are Sunoco, Didion, BioLab, and Loy
Lange. And I would give you all of the details on that except
you have limited time.
Ms. DeGette. That's OK. We have a lot of Members that can
ask.
And then what about the rest of the investigations? Do you
have a plan for completion of those?
Dr. Lemos. Yes, we do, and we will provide that to you.
Ms. DeGette. I so appreciate it. Thanks.
And, again, I really appreciate the yeoman's work that you
are doing in a very tough situation. But we all agree on the
mission here. We just have to get this agency working to
protect the safety of our constituents.
With that, I will yield to the ranking member 5 minutes for
his questioning.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.
According to its statutory authority, the Chemical Safety
Board can incorporate recommendation measures into
investigative reports. But I have been told investigators
sometimes may write investigative reports that incorporate
their own background or biases when developing recommendations.
If they are doing so, that might challenge the independent
investigatory jurisdiction of the Chemical Safety Board to
determine the root cause of an accident.
Does the Board have standardized requirements for its
recommendations?
Dr. Lemos. The Board has standardized requirements which
are in the process of being codified, and that is exactly what
we're trying to address in our internal process improvement.
Mr. Griffith. And when do you anticipate that that will be
codified? I know you are the only member of the Board, so it
makes it more difficult, but when do you anticipate that would
be completed?
Dr. Lemos. Within months.
Mr. Griffith. So if we check back in 6 months, it either
ought to be done or pretty darn close? Is that what you're
saying?
Dr. Lemos. It should be prior to that. We actually have
drafts written, and it would be nice to have other Board
members to weigh in on that as well.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you. I don't disagree with that.
Dr. Lemos. OK.
Mr. Griffith. And do appreciate that you have been carrying
this load yourself. So I don't want to underscore that with any
of my----
Dr. Lemos. We've already drafted it.
Mr. Griffith. I don't want to undermine that or neglect to
say that, because I'm going to ask some tough questions. I
understand you have got some handicaps.
Do you think it would be a good idea to establish legal
criteria? So you're going to codify these standardized
requirements, but do you think it would be a good idea to
establish legal criteria so we can have a greater
standardization among recommendations and reduce the chance of
agenda setting through recommendations?
Dr. Lemos. So everything that we process currently under my
tenure undergoes legal review, every recommendation, every
report, every safety bulletin, every safety alert. That was not
the case prior.
Mr. Griffith. OK. So I guess that's, in essence, a yes.
Dr. Lemos. Yes.
Mr. Griffith. All right.
In your message in ``The Chairman's FY 2020 Chemical Safety
Board Impact Report,'' you state, ``The U.S. Chemical Safety
Board has successfully carried out its core mission work in
fiscal year 2020 despite an unprecedented impact from COVID-
19.''
The Board's mission is to ``drive chemical safety change
through independent investigations to protect people and the
environment.'' But that language is not actually found in the
statute.
Is the Chemical Safety Board's mission different from its
statutory requirements?
Dr. Lemos. Per my understanding, they are exactly the same.
Mr. Griffith. OK. We might disagree on that. We can talk
about that later.
In determining the success of carrying out its mission for
a fiscal year, does the Board factor in how many investigations
were closed during that year?
Dr. Lemos. Can you please repeat that question one more
time?
Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am. In determining the success of
carrying out its mission for a fiscal year, does the Board
factor in how many investigations were closed during that year?
Dr. Lemos. In the past, performance has not been a measure
that has been held accountable, that the Board has been
accountable to, and I've instituted that. We have included that
information in budget requests. But that is something that I am
working strongly to institute.
Mr. Griffith. So that should be a part of the determination
as to whether or not you've had a successful year?
Dr. Lemos. Absolutely.
Mr. Griffith. OK.
The impact report also states that a top priority for the
Board is to continue delivering high-quality safety products to
the community. Can you explain what ``high-quality'' means in
this case?
Dr. Lemos. This means they're all cause, they investigate
to the degree that the safety impact is warranted, and we apply
our resources accordingly, and that the outcome is sound.
Mr. Griffith. All right. What were prior Chemical Safety
Board products lacking that caused you to establish different
standards to improve the quality of the work product?
Dr. Lemos. As mentioned, there have been widely varying
product types and product integrity levels. Having come from
the NTSB and having been at the FAA receiving those
recommendations and reports, it's really important that you
have consistency in your logic flow from the facts to the
findings to the conclusions to the recommendations. And that is
something that we have been working on vehemently this past 6
months to a year.
Mr. Griffith. All right. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Dr. Lemos. Thank you.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
I wanted to focus on CSB's strategic role in addressing
climate change risk to industrial facilities.
As you know, thousands of our chemical and petrochemical
facilities are in low-lying areas that are vulnerable to
flooding. Just this past month, Hurricane Ida caused a serious
risk of power outages and flooding at a number of facilities in
my State, Louisiana, and New York.
And I'm pleased that CSB's guidance and recommendations
began to address climate change and extreme weather following
Hurricane Harvey and the resulting Arkema chemical plant fire
in 2017, but we have to do more. Many facilities seem to be
caught off guard by catastrophic events driven by climate
change.
So let me ask the Chairperson: What more should industrial
facilities be doing to prepare for a changing climate, in your
opinion?
Dr. Lemos. So just to repeat, what more should facilities--
--
Mr. Pallone. What more should you think that industrial
facilities should be doing to prepare for a changing climate?
What are your suggestions?
Dr. Lemos. So based on the Arkema report, we recommended
that CCPS put out comprehensive guidance, which is how to
prepare for extreme weather events. As we have seen with Ida,
behind me, Managing Director David LaCerte is from Louisiana,
Baton Rouge, lived through that. And a lot of our--we
anticipate seeing more and more of these events, so it's going
to become even more of a challenge for chemical industry moving
forward.
So we have interacted with GAO in extreme weather, in
making sure that we collect the information and trending and
tracking and which incidents in the past and the future have
occurred due to extreme weather to try to find some causal
factors.
But in terms of what plants or facilities can be doing,
following guidance that is out there to ensure that they are
not just preparing for today's historical, but tomorrow's,
based on recent history, and predicted future level of extreme
events.
Mr. Pallone. Well, I appreciate that you are, you know,
putting out recommendations, and hopefully there will be more.
But I did want to ask, I want to make sure that CSB, that its
Board members, staff, and specialists are relying on sound
science.
Let me just ask you, Chairperson, has the Board identified
a set of scientific resources that it draws upon to help assess
the impacts of increased sea levels, rise in storm surge, storm
intensity, or other extreme weather events? Have, you know,
what are the scientific resources that you draw upon?
Dr. Lemos. So I'm glad that you mentioned that the CSB is
an independent and scientifically based agency.
We, as we mentioned to the GAO--and a report is forthcoming
in a few months--we focus on the extreme weather events. And
it's more responsive.
There are other agencies that are responsible for
predicting what might occur. What we need to do is ensure
facility resiliency and ensure that there is guidance that is
adequate to help facilities prepare for these extreme weather
events.
Mr. Pallone. But, I mean, have you identified a set of
scientific resources that you draw upon to assess the impacts
of this climate change?
I mean, there is that, and then there is also, like, the
challenge with staffing. So, you know, having the right mix of
experts to do these assessments.
So I guess I'll just repeat, if you've identified a set of
scientific resources to draw upon or you're considering
bringing on additional investigators to examine the nexus
between climate change and industrial preparedness?
Dr. Lemos. That's a wonderful point. And in terms of
staffing and our ability to conduct scientific studies, first
of all, we need to partner with our Federal agencies as our
enabling legislation encourages, because at this point we don't
have the staff to conduct that level of safety study and
analysis.
So we need to rely on a range of our Federal partners and
outside entities to be able to identify what could be done and
what should be done in the chemical community.
Mr. Pallone. I mean, I know you can't lobby us for
additional resources, but it sounds like you do need additional
resources. So I'll take that to mean you do need additional
resources and you would like to see additional resources for
more staffing.
Dr. Lemos. Um, I'm certainly not lobbying. I'm telling you
that there's only so much that we can do with the resources
that we have. And I would--we would appreciate fully funding
what we have requested. I believe that we're in an upward
trend. We have hired more staff. They are joining. We're likely
to get more Board members. I believe that that's an upward
trend, and we're going to maintain that staff and engage them.
But to be able to conduct all of the activities in our
enabling legislation, which is to conduct safety studies in
addition to investigations--although investigations is the
primary--we would need that additional staff to be able to
carry that out effectively and fully.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Dr. Lemos. You're welcome.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. McMorris Rodgers for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I believe it's important that we focus on the mission of
this Board, the Chemical Safety Board. And before we start
talking about more people and more resources, let's make sure
that the Board is actually even fulfilling the mission as
currently stated in the statute.
And I think it's clear that Members on both sides of the
aisle have concerns about the effectiveness and the outcomes of
the Board with the current staff and current levels of funding.
On the CSB website, it states that the investigative
process generally takes 6 to 12 months to complete, and a draft
report is then submitted to the Board for consideration.
Reports may be adopted through a written vote of the Board or
in a formal public meeting during the incident site or in
Washington, DC.
Dr. Lemos, can you walk us through the investigative
process currently and if we can expect new investigations to be
completed within the stated timeline of 6 to 12 months?
Dr. Lemos. I think, to answer your question, 6 to 12
months, if you look at our history, that's not the timeline
that things have been closing. But the community and our agency
is accountable to actually meet a more rigorous timeline.
If you look at our counterpart, the NTSB, it's about 2\1/2\
years for a major investigation. Part of the problem or part of
the challenge is that our agency has moved to an all-or-nothing
full investigation, 160-page report, or not at all.
And part of what I'm trying to do is return to what the CSB
used to do and what the NTSB does and provide a range of
products such that we can get out immediate safety
recommendations and products within that timeframe.
Mrs. Rodgers. So do you believe that the 6 to 12 months is
the right timeline? Or, if it's not the right timeline, then do
you think Congress needs to evaluate the timeliness of CSB's
work?
Dr. Lemos. So I believe that the enabling legislation says
1 year. One year is very aggressive, especially for a major
investigation. I believe that less than that is very reasonable
for a minor investigation.
Mrs. Rodgers. The oldest investigation in the backlog is
from 2016. Do you think that the recommendations for that
report, assuming the investigation is closed at some point, if
implemented, would be outdated or carry less weight as these
recommendations would have a year or so after the incident?
Dr. Lemos. There's no doubt that the delay has a negative
impact on the safety.
Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
Dr. Lemos. But we do have the ability to issue urgent
safety recommendations, if identified, any phase of the
investigation.
Mrs. Rodgers. OK. And ``The Chairman's FY 2020 Chemical
Safety Board Impact Report'' states that one investigation was
closed. If there's a backlog of 18 investigations, does it mean
it would take 18 years to address only the backlog? Or do you
have a plan for an accelerated process for backlogged
investigations?
Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
We absolutely have a plan for accelerated closure. We've
already executed on that. We did three, we completed three this
year versus one last year. There were different reasons for
that.
And I've already committed to six in the coming year. And
we've already identified four that will be coming to the Board
before the end of the year or early in the next year.
I would like to have other Board members to vote on those
with me. But that would close the three oldest, plus one of the
newer.
Mrs. Rodgers. The statutory purpose of the CSB in the Clean
Air Act is to investigate root causes of accidental releases.
Have you discussed providing alternative types of work
product, besides an investigative report, that identifies the
root cause in a condensed bulletin report form?
Dr. Lemos. I'm so glad you mentioned that, because that's
exactly what the CSB used to do and what the NTSB does.
And so, by providing a range of products, a safety
bulletin, a safety case, one of the most impactful reports I've
ever read was from 1998, two events in 8 pages in a safety
bulletin unrelated, but they both--unrelated industries--but
they both dealt with management of change.
Those were out, I believe, within 6 to 8 months. That is
what we need to be able to accomplish.
Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes Miss Rice for 5 minutes.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Lemos, if we could just go down, I'd just like to talk
about the nuts and bolts of the agency.
Ms. DeGette. Miss Rice, you're fading in and out.
Miss Rice. OK. Can you hear me now?
Ms. DeGette. Yes.
Miss Rice. OK. Great.
Ms. Lemos, I'd like to get to the nuts and bolts of the
purpose for this agency and remind everyone that, while it was
created in 1990 and authorized by the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990, it wasn't funded until 1998 as a result of a series of
industrial accidents led to a renewed impetus to secure
appropriations for the organization.
So now it's my understanding there are presently four
vacancies on a five-member Board, and President Biden has made
three nominations that are sitting in the Senate waiting for
confirmation.
So I'm sure that that is providing an enormous amount of
difficulty for you to actually carry out the mission of this
organization since you're the only Board member out of a five-
member Board.
And I would ask--I'm sure that I will get the agreement of
my Republican colleagues on this committee, to ask their
Republicans colleagues in the Senate to move these nominations
as quickly as possible so that this Board can be fully
constituted and get going.
So that's number one.
Number two, I understand that there are or were 40 full-
time employees, 20 of whom were investigators. I believe that
there are unfilled positions for those investigators.
Dr. Lemos, what I would like to ask you is, who else makes
up your staff? I mean, it's all well and good to talk about the
outcome of certain investigations, but if we don't have an
agency that is fully staffed with the appropriate personnel and
a specific mission, then the result of investigations are
surely going to be delayed and questioned.
So I just want to get into the nuts and bolts of who else
are your employees, other than investigators?
And I also want to ask you, if you could--I know this is a
very long question, but I'm just trying to understand the
makeup here: Is there a specific enough description of what the
responsibilities and duties are of each individual Board
member?
So first tell me who your employees are, and then speak
about the specific responsibilities of the Board, if you would.
Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
So the first part of that is who our employees are, and
I'll talk about the Mission Product Team. I have trouble seeing
you on the screen, so I'll just look up here at the Chair.
So the Mission Product Team is comprised of investigators
who actually go out to the sites, do the followup, do the
investigation. They oversee the testing and whatnot.
We have also on the Mission Product Team recommendations
staff that are assigned to help identify the gaps in guidance,
regulation, procedures, policies that are related to the
contributing factor.
So those are important elements of that team, as well as
the recommendations staff and advocacy team to provide
materials.
In terms of support staff, that includes human resources,
general counsel, contracting, all of the other things--
administration--all of the other things--IT--that are required
to support and feed our investigative and Mission Product Team.
Miss Rice. Can I just interrupt you for 1 second? Are up
to--do you have the staff that you need? Yes or no?
Dr. Lemos. Not yet, but we are getting there.
So we just hired a contracting manager, and we just hired a
new human resources director. We will be hiring a career
managing director as well as replacing our general counsel.
Miss Rice. And the responsibility of the Board again--I'm
running out of time--could you just tell me, do you feel that
the mission, the responsibility of the individual Board
members, is specific, or does it need to be more--better
defined?
Dr. Lemos. So I believe you've asked whether or not--so
what the roles and responsibilities of the Board members are
and whether that needs to be better defined. Is that correct?
Miss Rice. Yes.
Dr. Lemos. OK. So Board Order 28, that discussion,
specifically discusses the roles and responsibilities of Board
members versus vis-a-vis the staff.
So as the OIG reported out, mentioned in several management
challenges reports, we needed to settle this. So we have in
writing and already passed roles and responsibilities that are
clear so that Board members can focus on their mission.
And what their mission is in technical reviews, they review
reports, they review recommendations, they vote. They engage in
stakeholder collaboration and community outreach.
They are our technical--they lend their technical expertise
and perspectives to the products, and they also assist with the
strategy and the mission of the agency.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much. The gentlelady's time has
expired.
Staff has asked me, Chairperson Lemos, if you can mute your
microphone when you're not talking. I guess it's causing
feedback.
And the Chair will now next recognize Mr. Burgess for 5
minutes.
Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair. And I thank our witness for
being here with us this morning.
I apologize for not being there in person. We have a Rules
Committee hearing going on at the same time. But through the
miracle of the hybrid hearing, I'm able to participate in this
one.
And it was important to me because a little bit south of
the district that I represent in Texas, back in 2013, a
fertilizer plant blew up in the town of West, Texas.
[Audio malfunction.]
Ms. DeGette. Dr. Burgess, we've lost your audio.
We've lost Mr. Burgess. So we're going to go to Mr.
McKinley, and if Mr. Burgess can get back on, then we will have
him after Ms. Schakowsky.
So, Mr. McKinley, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
We apologize profusely, Chairperson Lemos.
Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
If we could start, I would like to enter into the record a
statement from the American Chemistry and the American Fuel and
Petrochemical Manufacturers in support of the CSB.
Ms. DeGette. Without objection.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. McKinley. Dr. Lemos, the role of the CSB is to
investigate--I've heard all the testimony before--investigate
accidents and determine the conditions and circumstances that
led up to those accidents and identify the cause or causes so
that similar events might be prevented.
For the record, is that a fair assessment?
Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir.
Mr. McKinley. OK. But according to the CSB's website, its
mission is to, quote, ``drive chemical safety change through
independent investigations.'' That's worded slightly
differently than the statute.
And the phrase, quote, ``drive chemical safety change''
seems to suggest some form of an attempt to regulate chemical
safety, which we've heard testimony that's really the
responsibility of the EPA. The CSB should only be making
recommendations to them.
Now, the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee
recently considered, as we've talked about, the three Democrat
nominees to fill the vacancies at the CSB.
These chairmen do have different backgrounds. One of them,
however, has focused her work on ``advocating for
regulations,'' close quote, and in a recently deleted Tweet
targeted the Trump EPA and her inability to work in a technical
and in an unbiased manner.
So given the nominees' background and the extensive backlog
for accident investigations and staffing shortages, and with
the full awareness that you're under oath, can you ensure us
that the committee--that the CSB will not attempt to take on
the role of a regulatory agency and remain focused on its
statutory mission of independent investigations and
recommendations?
Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir. Our mission and our mandate is to be
free from political interference and to not regulate.
Now, the gaps identify recommendations and safety gaps, but
they have to--we are not a regulator.
Mr. McKinley. Were you concerned that this nominee has
expressed such strong opinions about wanting to regulate? Was
that a concern to you?
Dr. Lemos. I would prefer not to express my opinion
regarding statements of nominees that have not been confirmed.
But I can commit to you that I will maintain what I committed
to the Senate, that we are a nonpolitical agency, we're not
regulatory, and our job is to be safety focused and to call out
the safety gaps.
Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schakowsky for 5 minutes.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Ms. Lemos. And I want to thank you, begin by
thanking you--some positive news--that the Chemical Safety
Board approved its investigation report of a May 2019 AB
Specialty Silicones explosion that took place in my State of
Illinois.
It was very serious. The incident killed four workers and
caused serious damage to the town of Waukegan, Illinois.
So I'm very grateful for that. But I want to talk about the
abilities that you have to answer the enormous issues that face
you.
So exactly how many or approximately how many a year of
these incident reports do you get?
Dr. Lemos. Are you asking how many incident reports meet
our reporting criteria?
Ms. Schakowsky. I mean when someone calls up and says there
has been a problem, how many of those?
Dr. Lemos. Twenty thousand to 30,000 per year.
Ms. Schakowsky. Twenty thousand or 30,000 per year. But we
know--in fact, in your testimony you said you were shocked to
learn about the low staffing numbers. We've been talking about
that. I understand that about 30 to 40 percent of the
investigative positions were vacant this year.
And so my understanding is that you also noted in your
testimony that by year's end of this year that you plan to have
an all-time high number of investigators and technical
specialists, et cetera, on the Mission Product Teams. And I
wonder if we're going to be able to get there. And what is your
plan to get there?
Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question, because more staff
are certainly needed to address more of these events.
So the all-time low in staffing in recent years was in
2019, which was eight investigators. And currently we have 14.
Two new persons just joined us this past week.
So we're on track by the end of fiscal year 2023, so the
end of the next fiscal year, with your support and
appropriations, to have an all-time high across the Mission
Product Team, and that includes the recommendations staff and
advocacy, technical writers, and others that are required to
put together that full report in an efficient manner and with
integrity.
Ms. Schakowsky. So how many more people does that mean? How
many more people do you have to have at that point?
Dr. Lemos. I believe--well, so on the Mission Product Team
or the entire staff?
Ms. Schakowsky. Well, the entire staff. You can divide it
any way you like.
Dr. Lemos. I believe the entire staff, we just submitted
for 61 positions by the end of fiscal year 2023. My belief,
that's low.
Ms. Schakowsky. Is there any way to speed this up so that
we can get even more sooner?
Dr. Lemos. So there's a scaling issue as well. Currently
most of our investigators are 12 months to 18 months new to the
agency, despite them having a lot of experience. So that's why
we've been investing in the processes so much to ensure a
consistency.
Is there a way to speed it up? We can ramp up a plan to do
that. If we were able to and funded to do so, absolutely.
Ms. Schakowsky. Let me ask you this. You said you get tens
of thousands now of calls about toxic or accidents that need to
be investigated.
How do you make the decision of what comes first,
especially with this current shortage and limitation on the
staff? What's the process?
Dr. Lemos. So that's a good question.
So of the 20,000 to 30,000 reports per year that we
receive, I'll just say from the reporting event, since the
reporting criteria last year, March of last year at the end, 88
actually qualified.
So we determine that based on the criteria of fatality,
injuries, environmental impact. There is whether or not it's a
critical driver on our list, and the potential safety impact
that it has.
However, our attempt to take a range approach of our
products will allow us to address all of those 88.
Ms. Schakowsky. Twenty thousand to 30,000, and you're
saying that 88 actually qualified? That's it? None of those
others your agency can address in any way? That's the max that
gets qualified?
Dr. Lemos. So it's important--well, it's important for us
to be able to track and trend incidents and to be able to
identify high risk areas.
But 20,000 to 30,000 incidents, which may not meet our
reporting criteria but are reported to us, based on what we
request, are important, and I do know that the regulatory
agencies also track these events.
Ms. Schakowsky. OK. I'm out of time. I appreciate that.
Thank you.
And I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Long for 5 minutes.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, Ms. Lemos, are desk investigations different from
regular investigations? And if so, how?
Dr. Lemos. So I'll first take your question regarding desk
investigations. Desk launches are what I'm referring to, and
that's actually not a formal name. We don't have that. We're
still exploring the model and the method by which to have a
more agile approach to addressing the range of events that we
see.
Mr. Long. OK. And why might an accidental release not
warrant a deployment of investigators to that site?
Dr. Lemos. We have to prioritize the limited resources. We
can't deploy to every single accident, nor is it necessary to
deploy personally to each and every incident.
Mr. Long. Given a backlog of 18 investigations and new
incidents occurring to investigate or need to be investigated,
can work be done at the desk to determine whether or not to
deploy to an ordinance, allocate resources that might be
impactful for investigations to the industry?
Dr. Lemos. So we're maintaining an agile approach moving
forward. Again, we have to codify it with the staff. I would
like other Board members to weigh in as well.
But with the staff we are taking this approach that, if
you're familiar with the NTSB, who we were crafted after, they
complete hundreds of accidents through the help of their
Federal counterparts. And in my confirmation hearing and
process, it was encouraged upon me to reconsider the degree to
which we utilize our Federal counterparts to help us carry out
our investigations.
Mr. Long. And what's your personal role in closing out
investigative reports? And how will this shift or change if the
three CSB Board nominees are confirmed by the Senate?
Dr. Lemos. Just to make sure I heard the question, if they
are not confirmed?
Mr. Long. Pardon?
Dr. Lemos. Just to confirm the question, you are asking
what is going to be the impact if they are not confirmed?
Mr. Long. No, if they are confirmed.
Dr. Lemos. We will continue forward just as we are now with
closing investigations. There will be some training time and
some education when you have three new Board members at the
same time. Obviously, that's a challenge to take on. But we
will have increased advocacy and community engagement, and
that's critical to the success of our agency.
Mr. Long. OK. So I'm going to repeat the question to make
sure that you got it and I got it, and that might have been the
way that you answered.
But my question was, what is your personal role in closing
out investigative reports, and how will this shift if the three
CSB Board nominees are confirmed by the Senate? What's your
personal role in that?
Dr. Lemos. My personal role, the difference when there's
just a Board of one versus a Board of four, correct?
Mr. Long. Uh-huh.
Dr. Lemos. I will have other perspectives. We will debate
the matters in a live forum. We will have other perspectives.
That's going to be the difference in closing those out.
Mr. Long. OK. I'm having a little trouble with the sound
system in here picking up everything you're saying, but I
appreciate it.
The CSB needs the five Board members mandated in your
enabling statute, and the Board members should have a broad
range of applicable experience and expertise, including
experience in the operations, processes, and procedures
typically applicable in commercial chemical facilities.
If you could create the most well-qualified Board, what
applicable experience and expertise do you seek out in those
Board members?
Dr. Lemos. So the question is--and I'm trying to speak
louder and into the mike, I moved it. If you can hear me?
Mr. Long. It's part on my end, but that's fine. I've got an
issue, so that's fine.
Dr. Lemos. Excellent.
So the type of experience that is mentioned in our enabling
legislation really just describes the range: safety management
systems, human factors, toxicology, those familiar with
chemicals. It takes a range of backgrounds, and it's very rare
for someone to have all of those together.
Mr. Long. OK. Thank you. And I appreciate your being here
today.
And I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Tonko for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And certainly as the subcommittee chair on the standing
committee of Environment and Climate Change, I have great
interest in the operational qualities of CSB.
So despite its significant impact on the safety of workers
and communities, CSB has a history of governance challenges.
Specifically, Board infighting and long stretches without
steady leadership have undermined the agency, to say the least,
over the years.
These Board-level issues have led to significant challenges
for staff at the agency, including high attrition, low morale,
and difficulty attracting new hires. As we have heard today,
three new Board members will hopefully soon be joining this
agency.
So, Chairperson Lemos, I know you would like to prevent
history from repeating itself. So how do you intend to
integrate and involve these new members so that the agency does
not fall into that power-sharing squabbling that has hamstrung
it in the past?
Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question, which I believe is
how do I intend to prevent a repeat of what has been occurring
for--since the inception, really, of the CSB.
I met the CSB at a time when it seemed to be more stable,
around the 2005-2006 timeframe, and appreciated how they worked
as colleagues together.
So the first thing that I did when I joined the agency was
realize that we have a pressing need to address the OIG's
management challenges, and that was my top priority last year,
and we finalized that, which was to provide the structure for
the Board members to know what their roles and responsibilities
are, to provide them the support staff, and to help them
execute that. That is what I did.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
And, Chairperson Lemos, I assume you have examined some of
the root causes of the friction that has undermined the
functionality in the past.
So can you share some of your insights into why the Board
has had these management problems in the past and what you
intend to do so that these mistakes are not repeated under your
leadership, particularly given that new Board members will be
arriving and arriving soon?
Dr. Lemos. Well, it's possible that memorializing these
changes in CFRs, such as the NTSB has, would help.
In our benchmarking we use the DNFSB, we use the NTSB and
other agencies in terms of how we structure decision making and
budget making. Perhaps codifying that would allow for these
Board orders, which are internal policy, to settle them.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
Earlier this year, you approved a revised Board Order 28,
which set new terms for Board member responsibilities,
budgeting power, and other related areas.
While I understand that this new Board order was intended
to respond to some of the criticisms of CSB identified by EPA's
Office of Inspector General, some of your critics have called
this a power grab because the action was undertaken during a, I
quote, ``quorum of one.''
Will you revisit Board Order 28 once the new members are on
Board?
Dr. Lemos. So the question is whether we will revisit Board
Order 28 once new Board members join.
I want to establish that our Board orders, as I found them
when I joined, were not in alignment with our enabling
legislation. They were not empowering the Board members to
actually carry out their functions and staff to carry out their
functions.
So what I did, if someone says it's a power grab, the
changes in Board Order 28 have nothing to do with a quorum of
one. It's simply allowing the Board to carry out their
functions successfully and staff to carry out, with
responsibility, their functions.
Mr. Tonko. OK. So then let me ask this: Will you commit to
ensuring that the new members are empowered to both carry out
their duties and revise Board orders by a majority vote?
Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. Board orders should be a democratic
process.
Mr. Tonko. So that you would commit to ensuring that
they're all recognized and having their input?
Dr. Lemos. All Board orders should be in compliance with
the law and should be voted on to the extent that we have the
room, right?
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Yes, thank you.
Look, we all want to avoid the issues that have prevented
CSB from performing effectively in the past. So I do look
forward to seeing the agency get back to excellence.
And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now announces that the committee will be in
recess for 10 minutes.
[Recess.]
Ms. DeGette. The committee will come to order.
And the Chair now will note that Mr. Burgess has solved his
technology problems by appearing in person, and she will
recognize him for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair.
Thank you, Dr. Lemos, for being here with us today. I will
tell you, I have been looking forward to your appearance today
because the experience I had with--it's not in my district, but
just outside my district in the town of West, Texas, several
years ago. I was interested in your responses to Mr. Tonko's
questions, because that was largely the type of question I had.
When I visited West, Texas, shortly after the accident, I
mean, you name the Federal agency and they were on site. So you
had the FBI, you had DOJ, you had ATF, you had--I didn't see
Customs and Border Protection, but I suspect they were there
somewhere. FEMA was very much in evidence.
And all of these agencies collected at this Emergency
Operations Center, and there's no Chemical Safety Board. And
yet they were there, but they didn't interact with the other
agency personnel who were there doing the investigation and
taking--getting the evidence.
In fact, when FEMA took me on an automobile trip through
the neighborhoods that were affected, and seeing all the houses
in an unusual type of situation because the roofs were lifted
off the houses and they came right back down so there was no
vertical--it was only the vertical displacement, no horizontal
displacement. But, obviously, the houses were destroyed in that
process.
The Chemical Safety Board was not part of that, but they
were in a trailing car, like several cars behind, and I never
understood quite why, why we wouldn't all be working to the
same end.
Presumably, if the FBI finds something interesting, then
the Chemical Safety Board might find it interesting as well, or
the Chemical Safety Board might have a question that would be
important for the law enforcement branch of the Federal
Government to know.
So can you help me there? Are you more aligned now where
there's less likely to be that silo? Because it was almost like
there was a physical silo around the Chemical Safety Board that
day.
Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
The siloing, just to repeat, the siloing, why was the CSB
not working intimately with the other Federal agencies and
local, and why was their presence not noticed? And that is
something we have been focusing on by building stronger
coalitions with our Federal counterparts and local.
I did not understand that as well. When I joined the
agency, it was very foreign to me as a process. So I can't
explain why that had occurred in the past.
But I can tell you that moving forward we have already
started to interact much more closely, not just with our
Congress and the local representatives, the local responders,
immediately to ensure. And OSHA and EPA, we have contacts we
started last year to say who's the regional, who's the Federal,
here are the phone numbers. And that's the type of connection
that we are building moving forward.
Mr. Burgess. One of our counsels here on the subcommittee--
I don't think he is here today--but referred to the Chemical
Safety Board, when I asked him a question about it many, many
years ago, he said it's like the NTSB for chemical accidents.
So you have the National Transportation Safety Board if
there's an airline accident or train accident. The Chemical
Safety Board performs that same function if there's a chemical
incident, which seemed like a good idea.
But if indeed patterned after the NTSB, they probably work
pretty well with their counterparts in law enforcement, and in
the case of air traffic, with the air traffic controllers and
everyone who would be involved in providing them the data. It
seems like that's a good model to follow.
Dr. Lemos. Absolutely, the NTSB is a good model to follow
in that respect.
One difference I will point out: In the chemical industry,
it's much more distributed in terms of the regulation oversight
than the aviation industry is.
So if you look at the other transportation domains, you
will see some of the same fragmentation and extra effort
required to pull those entities together. Like a bridge
collapse or a pipeline explosion, you're going to have other
local entities.
But it's a great model. We need to have that presence. We
need to have that collaboration and strengthen it.
Mr. Burgess. Well, I appreciate your testimony today and
your service to the Safety Board.
And I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Peters for 5 minutes.
Mr. Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Some of our colleagues, we're hearing them say that the CSB
should not be using its scarce staff resources to make
recommendations or issue regulations to protect public health
and public welfare. But that's a key component of the CSB's
mission, and preventing future incidents has to remain a top
priority.
Prior to my time in public office, I worked at EPA for a
short time on toxic substances and later spent 15 years as an
environmental lawyer. I've got a keen interest in CSB's role in
updating EPA's Risk Management Plan, or RMP, requirements.
Under the RMP, known also as the Chemical Disaster Rule,
industrial facilities are required to follow rules that help
prevent accidental releases of chemicals that can cause death,
injury, property or environmental damage, or require evacuation
of surrounding communities.
Now, EPA is now in the process of updating the RMP rule,
and given CSB's years of identifying the root causes of exactly
the kinds of chemical disasters the RPM is intended to prevent,
I think CSB has an important role to play.
Chair Lemos, I understand you sent a letter to EPA in July
with high-level recommendations for how to update the RMP. Are
you preparing to give more detailed recommendations during the
public comment period on the proposed RMP rule?
Dr. Lemos. I want to make sure I hear you correctly because
it's a little bit muffled. But you're asking me if I'm prepared
to make more specific recommendations to RMP than we have in
the past? I know that we----
Mr. Peters. Yes, as part of the public comment period.
Dr. Lemos. So we were engaged in the listening sessions--
I'm hoping I'm understanding your question correctly--but we
were engaged in the listening sessions over the past several
months. I understand that OSHA is also going to have similar
listening sessions for PSM. We reiterated three specific
recommendations that have been open with regards to RMP for a
long time and that are critical: two on chemical reactives and
one on inherent safety design in the PSM process.
Mr. Peters. OK. Among other things, I understand that you
recommended that EPA consider mandating evaluations for
inherent safety, which I gather means implementing inherently
safer product technologies and practices that permanently
eliminate or reduce potential hazards; for example, minimizing
the amount of chemicals on a site. And I imagine that CSB has a
long list of inherently safer technologies and practices.
Are you prepared to provide all that information to the
EPA?
Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. In fact, in preparation for the
letter to the EPA regarding inherent safety, which we
reiterated--and I'm a strong believer in the life cycle and
design in inherent safety at all levels of the process--I
counted how many--or I worked with our staff to count how many
recommendations we've made to entities, industry, any
recommendation that was related to inherent safety, and that
sort of data I think would be very useful and powerful.
Mr. Peters. Great. So closely related to the RMP program is
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's, OSHA's,
Process Safety Management program. That PSM program is
similarly focused on preventing the mishandling or release of
highly hazardous chemicals. To my knowledge, OSHA has not
announced its intention to update its program the way EPA is
updating its RPM program.
In the absence of an active effort by an agency to update a
program like this, what do you see is the advocacy role for CSB
to push for regulatory changes that could reduce the risk of
chemical disasters for workers?
Dr. Lemos. So some of the efforts--you're asking about
specifics for PSM that we have been recommending, just to
confirm?
Mr. Peters. Yes. How would you want to effect the PSM,
right.
Dr. Lemos. So we, last year, myself and some of the new
staff met with OSHA and EPA to speak about both of their
programs and the most highly prioritized recommendations. After
the explosion in Beirut, we also reiterated some of our
recommendations for PSM that came out of the West, Texas,
event.
So that is the PSM modernization, and to take into account
similar things that we're asking for EPA to account for as
well, to include reactives.
So we will do a comprehensive analysis. We have an advocacy
team. And we will also look at what are the gaps in the PSM. We
already have an analysis on that. I don't have it in front of
me, but I would be absolutely pleased to provide it to you.
Mr. Peters. I would love if you could provide it to the
subcommittee. I just urge you to work closely with EPA as they
update the rule and make sure they have all of the relevant
information to prevent future chemical incidents.
And my time has expired. I yield back. Thank you.
Ms. DeGette. I surely thank the vice chair.
I'm now pleased to recognize Mr. Palmer for 5 minutes.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Lemos, my colleague Mr. Peters was talking about the
EPA, and I want to ask some questions related to that in the
context of who investigates the investigators.
The EPA was involved in a couple of major chemical spills,
the Gold King Mine in Colorado--which, frankly, the remedy that
should have been afforded to the people impacted by that hasn't
yet been afforded them. But there was another EPA-caused spill
in Georgia along the--in Greensboro, Georgia, that EPA I think
attempted to cover up.
Does the Chemical Safety Board have a role or even a
responsibility to engage in the investigations of spills like
that where it's caused by another Government agency?
Dr. Lemos. So I want to make sure I understand your
question. I'm having a little difficulty hearing.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, it was really long.
Dr. Lemos. So you're asking if the CSB has a role in
investigating accidents--and I didn't hear the rest of the
sentence. Sorry.
Mr. Palmer. Accidents caused by another Federal agency. In
this case, the EPA, they caused the Gold King Mine spill that
dumped millions of gallons of toxic water and polluted zinc and
other chemicals, cadmium, lead, down the Animas River, that
impacted Indian reservations, impacted everything pretty much
downstream.
A few weeks after that they were involved in another spill,
in Greensboro, Georgia, which my understanding is they
attempted to cover that up. It was just a few weeks, like I
say, after the Gold King Mine spill.
So who investigates the investigators? Would the Chemical
Safety Board have a role in going in to investigate something
like that?
Dr. Lemos. So I don't know all the particulars for the
events that you're describing, but if it meets our rules for
deployment or in our scope, in the CSB scope, it is an
inadvertent release that has significant impact for----
Mr. Palmer. Reserving my time.
Ms. DeGette. Would the gentlelady suspend?
Please, all Members online, please make sure you're on
mute.
The gentleman may continue.
Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Well----
Dr. Lemos. I can answer.
So the Chemical Safety Board has the responsibility to
investigate. That doesn't mean the EPA does not investigate as
well, similar to the NTSB and the FAA. I worked on both sides
of the fence.
But the CSB is an independent investigation that is not
focused on the oversight or punitive element. It is to
determine the root cause, as we've heard many of you say today.
Mr. Palmer. Well, in the case of the EPA, they denied
responsibility I think for the Greensboro spill. And I would
just think that the Chemical Safety Board would have some
responsibility. It might be a jurisdictional issue that would
be argued.
But sometimes it might not be a bad idea for those who are
responsible for that, who normally would be investigating, to
be at least under the--in some way under the investigative
powers of another agency.
Dr. Lemos. So there are some circumstances--and we're
facing some of those today--where some parts of the EPA have
jurisdiction because it could be of a criminal nature. Just as
if there is a malicious intent, ATF would take over.
So I'm not positive, but there are some circumstances where
we defer to other Federal agencies in those circumstances. We
still continue to investigate.
Mr. Palmer. Well, I know you're a Board of one right now,
but I think you may have been on the Oversight Committee when
we were looking into the employee dissatisfaction, what was
going on with the Board, and the retaliation against
whistleblowers.
Are there any plans in place to improve employee
satisfaction, to protect whistleblowers and others who work at
the Chemical Safety Board?
Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. In terms of employee engagement and
maintaining, I believe that having career staff stability,
stability at the Board member level, stability at the
leadership level, and commitment for funding from Congress is
super important to helping staff members feel appreciated for
their contributions and feel that their progress is meaningful
to the world.
Mr. Palmer. I thank you for your answers.
Madam Chairman, in regard to my line of questioning about
who investigates the investigators, I do think it's something
that this committee might ought to consider looking into,
considering the fact that I'm not sure that the remedies that
were expected as a result of the Gold King Mine spill have been
implemented to the satisfaction of the people who were impacted
by it.
And with that, I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman for the suggestion, and
Mr. Griffith and I will discuss that.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schrier for 5 minutes.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you for being here today, Chair Lemos.
CSB has a long history of working with other agencies to
conduct its investigations, as we've been discussing today. In
fact the EPA, OSHA, Department of Homeland Security, DHS, all
have some jurisdiction over chemical facility management. So
it's critical that CSB maintain productive relationships with
those agencies.
However, CSB's role to investigate the root causes of these
incidents is unique and distinct from the roles of EPA, OSHA,
and others. So while there may be opportunities for
efficiencies in working together, I am concerned that CSB's
understaffing has led to an overreliance on findings from other
agencies.
So could I ask you, Chair Lemos, how do you see CSB's role
versus that of the EPA, OSHA, and DHS when it comes to
industrial safety?
Dr. Lemos. The roles are very different. Working together
and collecting information, each of those investigations are
for different purposes, and the role of the Chemical Safety
Board is an independent, nonregulatory investigation.
This model works very well at the NTSB, where you take the
information from the company, from the different Federal
agencies. You don't rely on them for their conclusions. You
take the facts, and with those facts, we come up with our own
findings and conclusions.
Ms. Schrier. And do you feel like you have the appropriate
support to take that information and come up with independent
findings? And I understand the fact finding together, but I
would imagine you have slightly different angles. Can you talk
about that a little bit, EPA versus OSHA versus DHS?
Dr. Lemos. I don't know why I'm having a little bit of a
challenge hearing. So the question is, can I talk about the
difference in the perspective of the findings for those three
different agencies?
Ms. Schrier. Well, so if you go in together and you gather
facts together, do you feel like--you're the only person on the
Board--do you feel like you have enough support to
independently come up with the recommendations?
I mean, I guess here is how I would state that question:
Like, how do you balance the efficiencies of working together,
gathering that data together, and working with other agencies
while also ensuring your own independence? And do you have
enough support to do that?
Dr. Lemos. We certainly are asking for more support. That's
the theme that we gather today. I hope that everybody gathers
that we need more support. OSHA and EPA certainly have far more
staff to carry out their work.
We exchange information. If we collect information, for
example, and interview together, the information that we ask is
not used for punitive purposes. So it has to be collected
separately by those other agencies.
Our staff is incredibly knowledgeable. They are able to
sift through the facts and the circumstances, and they continue
to ask additional questions. So it's not relying on any one
source of report when we are working together and collaborating
with our Federal counterparts, despite the fact that they're
regulators.
Ms. Schrier. Just because of my time constraints, also I
just wanted to touch on the importance of public comment. And I
wondered if you could comment on reinstating public comments,
because we have heard that, according to the July 2021
stakeholder letter, that United Steelworkers and other
organizations did not have opportunities to provide public
comment at two recent meetings, March 5 and April 2.
Can you touch on that, tell us if that is true or not? Are
you providing notice of your meetings? And if not, why not? And
also, can you commit to providing a 60-day notice for when your
meetings are coming up so that there is transparency and public
comment?
Dr. Lemos. Yes. So I'll be efficient.
Two things. One is the notice. Sixty days is in our
internal policies. I believe it's 2 days or 10 days, I think 2
days in our CFRs. We have been doing a better job at providing
advance notice.
In terms of public comment, it's important, and, in fact,
even during public meetings, we have been receiving public
comments and responding to them, just not in the verbal format.
We have emails when we respond to their questions.
So I think it's really important to distinguish between a
public meeting where we discuss Board issues, business issues,
which is unheard of at the NTSB, frankly, and Board meetings
where the public can have insight, similar to this meeting
where the public can view and have insight into the process but
not be weighing in.
So I do believe in enhanced transparency, and that's what
our public meetings are doing. We have been putting all of our
public meeting notes and comments on the website, the
transcripts in verbatim, my specific notes that we speak.
So we will be addressing that, and I believe that
additional Board members will help with that community
engagement and public voice.
Ms. Schrier. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dunn for 5 minutes
Mr. Dunn. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I yield my time to the ranking member, the Honorable Morgan
Griffith.
Ms. DeGette. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that. Thank you. I appreciate
it.
Oh, let's go ahead and finish up that last question. Part
of the question dealt with steelworkers, and you dealt with all
kinds of things, but you didn't talk about that specific
situation.
Could you--because I think my colleague would like to
know--can you specifically reference the complaint by the
steelworkers that they didn't have an opportunity to be heard?
Dr. Lemos. So I have had numerous engagements with the USW
via stakeholder meetings on video as well as through letter. I
haven't heard a complaint specifically, only from the USW, that
they were not allowed to comment.
Mr. Griffith. I suspect there will probably be some
questions, followup, because it wasn't my area that I had
prepared for, but I suspect there will be some questions after
this hearing in regard to that matter.
Let me move on. At the beginning of the questions, you were
asked by Chair DeGette about your plans for removing the
backlog and addressing incoming cases. You promised to submit
that plan for the record.
I'm curious about this plan. Did you approve some of it?
Did you approve all of it? What was your role in preparing this
plan to deal with the backlog?
Dr. Lemos. Thank you.
I have been pushing for a resource allocated plan since I
joined the agency, and because it's important and because the
community, not just our leaders here, but the community and the
stakeholders deserve our accountability to the plan.
Mr. Griffith. So as a part of that then, you did approve
this plan that's coming forward?
Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir.
Mr. Griffith. And can you share with us any of the details
you remember of the plan that you approved?
Dr. Lemos. Well, I can tell you the four that are coming up
for closure, and I've tasked this plan and am working that with
my managing director, who is sitting right behind me, who will
be presenting that to you all.
Mr. Griffith. OK. I appreciate that.
Regarding extreme weather, setting aside that the statute
is agnostic about causes that you investigate, how much is the
climate extreme weather work you told Chair Pallone that you're
doing--how much is that taking away from the investigations
that you need to do and to complete?
Dr. Lemos. So today we've only had one completed
investigation that was attributed to extreme weather, which was
Arkema. There are other investigations in the past that we
could go back and find. We have one other currently which was
due to extreme weather that's under investigation. That's
BioLab.
So as they come up, we're going to attend to them. So I
can't say that we're--we're not taking a--time away from any
other investigation.
Mr. Griffith. OK. So I guess my--and maybe I misunderstood,
That's certainly possible, which is why we have hearings to try
to sort this stuff out.
My understanding was that you all were also working on some
things that people ought to be doing, recommendations to
prevent extreme weather having consequences in the future for
other facilities. Was I correct in that?
Dr. Lemos. So there are no staff that are currently tasked
to studying extreme weather or any other specific thing
because----
Mr. Griffith. Except as an outgrowth of the two
investigations you just mentioned?
Dr. Lemos. I'm sorry?
Mr. Griffith. Except as an outgrowth of the two
investigations you just mentioned?
Dr. Lemos. Correct, correct, and our GAO report which we
had--the GAO report which we had to engage with, and their
report is coming out, and that involves extreme weather,
climate change, and the EPA and the CSB and a number of other
agencies.
Mr. Griffith. OK. I just wanted to get that clarified.
With that, I will yield back to my colleague, Dr. Dunn.
Mr. Dunn. Madam Chair, I have no further questions. I yield
back the remainder of my time.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Joyce for 5 minutes.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair DeGette, for having this
subcommittee hearing today.
And thank you to Chair Lemos for appearing today.
Government entities, like the U.S. Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board, keep our constituents safe from
industrial and environmental accidents. That is why it is so
critical for the missions of these institutions to be well
defined so that they can execute the tasks that are given to
them.
Chair Lemos, the CSB's mission--and I'm quoting from your
mission statement--``is to drive chemical safety change through
independent investigations to protect people and the
environment.'' That's a fairly broad mission statement.
What is CSB's process for writing a mission statement?
Dr. Lemos. So I believe that mission statement, along with
the strategy, was crafted by a previous Board member, and that
this goes back to the process of the mission, the vision, and
the strategy. Then that is up for renewal, in which case I
sincerely hope to have other Board members to work through that
with me.
I can't tell you the genesis of that particular mission
statement, but I will work on that, and I can get back to you.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you. I would appreciate the followup in
that regard.
My question--my second question for you, is that the
government works best when it is small and yet effective.
Attempts at government expansion or overreach inevitably end up
in waste, low productivity, and failure of the original
mission, even an ill-defined mission.
I want to be clear that CSB's mission is critical, which is
why it needs to be narrowly and clearly defined to give the
best chance for success.
If President Biden's three new CSB member nominees are
confirmed, how do you see them changing the mission statement,
as you just addressed, on the CSB-based backgrounds of the
three new appointees?
Dr. Lemos. I can't speak to how they will influence the
mission statement, in which ways, because I haven't personally
met them, but I can tell you that I will ensure a nonpolitical
process and ensure that the mission is scoped appropriately,
because already now, as you know, we need to prioritize which
events we focus on.
Mr. Joyce. Couldn't it be problematic that maintaining this
wide-ranging mission statement could be interpreted by
different members, depending on what the new member's agenda
might be?
Dr. Lemos. It's possible, yes.
Mr. Joyce. Do you think it is imperative that a new mission
statement is crafted, a concise and narrowly focused mission
statement?
Dr. Lemos. I believe that we need to be in alignment with
our enabling legislation, which is pretty broad. I believe that
through specifically scoping and detailing what we will
prioritize will help the entire community.
Mr. Joyce. On that note, the Senate legislative history
states: ``The principal role of the new Chemical Safety Board
is to investigate accidents to determine the conditions and the
circumstances that led up to the event and to identify the
cause or causes so that similar events might be prevented.''
Do you believe that the CSB is effectively carrying out
that role currently?
Dr. Lemos. I believe that we are working towards fulfilling
our mission, but that we have a long way to go to fulfill that
completely.
Mr. Joyce. I concur. It seems like there is a long way to
go.
And we've already heard in this hearing about the backlog
of accident investigations and the continued need for them
going forward.
Would the CSB, as it is currently proposed to be made up,
be effective for those responsibilities along with the current
obligations?
Dr. Lemos. So the question is, if we staffed up according
to the staffing plan, which we will provide, will we be
effective in meeting our mission?
Mr. Joyce. Yes.
Dr. Lemos. Yes.
Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair DeGette. I think this is an
important hearing. I thank you for convening it. I yield my
remaining time.
Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman, and I thank all of the
Members.
This now concludes the hearing. And I want to thank--again,
I want to thank the witnesses for participating in this
hearing.
I want to remind Members that, pursuant to committee rules,
you have 10 business days to submit additional questions for
the record to be answered by witnesses who appeared before the
subcommittee.
And I'll ask the witness to respond promptly to any
questions should you receive any and also to the commitment you
made to submit the various plans.
We want to insert in the record by unanimous consent a
letter from the ACC and AFPM to me and to Representative
Griffith dated September 28, 2021; a letter from Representative
Pallone and others to the CSB dated May 20, 2021; a letter to
the CSB to Representative Pallone and others dated June 10,
2021; and a letter from 22 labor, environmental, community, and
scientific organizations to CSB dated July 8, 2021. This is the
letter several Members referred to as the steelworkers letter.
And without objection, so ordered.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Ms. DeGette. Chairperson Lemos, the letter from the 22
organizations is comprehensive in their recommendations to many
of the challenges you're facing at CSB. Does the agency plan to
provide a formal response to that letter?
Dr. Lemos. Yes. Thank you for clarifying that point,
because that certainly helps the questions.
We have already responded to them, but we would not respond
prior to our continuing our conversation with you and being
here today. Knowing that this was up and coming, we feel like
that you are our priority to communicate with.
But we already have responded and engaged back. In fact, we
had engagements with them several times this spring and last
fall. So I--we told them that we looked forward to continued
engagement with them.
Ms. DeGette. Super. I would ask if you could, please,
Chairperson Lemos, if you do respond in writing to the
organizations, if you could provide a copy to this committee,
that would help us in our investigation.
Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. We can immediately provide you a
copy of our response after we receive the letter and any
details moving forward.
Ms. DeGette. We appreciate that. And, again, we appreciate
your agency's continued cooperation. As you can see from both
sides of the dais, we're all eager to help you in fulfilling
your important public safety mission.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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