    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                         PROTECTING COMMUNITIES FROM INDUSTRIAL
                          ACCIDENTS: REVITALIZING THE CHEMICAL
                          SAFETY BOARD

    =======================================================================

                                 HYBRID HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                  SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                     OF THE

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 29, 2021

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 117-49

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

         Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                       govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
                            energycommerce.house.gov

                                    ________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    53-670 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                         FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
                                     Chairman
    BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
    ANNA G. ESHOO, California              Ranking Member
    DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              FRED UPTON, Michigan
    MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
    G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California          BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
    KATHY CASTOR, Florida                DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
    JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
    JERRY McNERNEY, California           H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    PAUL TONKO, New York                 BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York           BILLY LONG, Missouri
    KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
    TONY CARDENAS, California            MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
    RAUL RUIZ, California                RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
    SCOTT H. PETERS, California          TIM WALBERG, Michigan
    DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan             EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
    MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
    ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire         GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
    ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois, Vice       NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
        Chair                            JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
    NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California    DEBBBIE LESKO, Arizona
    A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia         GREG PENCE, Indiana
    LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware       DAN CRENSHAW, Texas
    DARREN SOTO, Florida                 JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania
    TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona              KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota
    KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York
    ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
    KIM SCHRIER, Washington
    LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
    LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
                                     ------

                               Professional Staff

                       TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Staff Director
                     WAVERLY GORDON, Deputy Staff Director
                      NATE HODSON, Minority Staff Director
                  Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

                            DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
                                      Chair
    ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire         H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
    KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York             Ranking Member
    JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    PAUL TONKO, New York                 DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
    RAUL RUIZ, California                BILLY LONG, Missouri
    SCOTT H. PETERS, California, Vice    NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
        Chair                            JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania
    KIM SCHRIER, Washington              GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
    LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts           CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
    TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona                  (ex officio)
    FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
        officio)

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Colorado, opening statement.................................     2
        Prepared statement...........................................     5
    Hon. H. Morgan Griffith, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Virginia, opening statement....................    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    11
    Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................    12
        Prepared statement...........................................    14
    Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of Washington, opening statement.....................    15
        Prepared statement...........................................    16

                                   Witnesses

    Katherine A. Lemos, Ph.D., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
      Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.................    18
        Prepared statement...........................................    21
        Answers to submitted questions...............................    87

                               Submitted Material

    Letter of May 20, 2021, from Mr. Pallone, et al., to Katherine A.
      Lemos, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chemical Safety
      and Hazard Investigation Board, submitted by Ms. DeGette.......    48
    Letter of June 10, 2021, from Katherine A. Lemos, Chairman and
      Chief Executive Officer, Chemical Safety and Hazard
      Investigation Board, to Mr. Pallone, et al., submitted by Ms.
      DeGette........................................................    53
    Letter of July 8, 2021, from John Paul Smith, United
      Steelworkers, et al., to Katherine A. Lemos, Chairman and Chief
      Executive Officer, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
      Board, submitted by Ms. DeGette................................    69
    Letter of September 28, 2021, from Chris Jahn, President and
      Chief Executive Officer, American Chemistry Council, and Chet
      M. Thompson, President and Chief Executive Officer, American
      Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, to Ms. DeGette and Mr.
      Griffith, submitted by Mr. McKinley............................    85

      PROTECTING COMMUNITIES FROM INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS: REVITALIZING THE
                             CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD

                                  ----------

                         WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2021

                      House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
                              Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m., in
    the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building,
    and remotely via Cisco Webex online video conferencing, Hon.
    Diana DeGette (chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Members present: Representatives DeGette, Kuster, Rice,
    Schakowsky, Tonko, Ruiz, Peters, Schrier, Trahan, Pallone (ex
    officio), Griffith (subcommittee ranking member), Burgess,
    McKinley, Long, Palmer, Dunn, Joyce, and Rodgers (ex officio).
        Staff present: Austin Flack, Policy Analyst; Waverly
    Gordon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel; Tiffany
    Guarascio, Staff Director; Perry Hamilton, Clerk; Fabrizio
    Herrera, Staff Assistant; Rebekah Jones, Counsel; Zach Kahan,
    Deputy Director, Outreach and Member Service; Chris Knauer,
    Oversight Staff Director; Will McAuliffe, Counsel; Elysa
    Montfort, Press Secretary; Kaitlyn Peel, Digital Director; Tim
    Robinson, Chief Counsel; Nikki Roy, Policy Coordinator; Andrew
    Souvall, Director of Communications, Outreach and Member
    Services; Benjamin Tabor, Junior Professional Staff Member;
    Sarah Burke, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Jerry Couri,
    Minority Deputy Chief Counsel for Environment; Marissa Gervasi,
    Minority Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Brittany
    Havens, Minority Professional Staff Member, Oversight and
    Investigations; Nate Hodson, Minority Staff Director; Emily
    King, Minority Member Services Director; Bijan Koohmaraie,
    Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight and Investigations Chief
    Counsel; Clare Paoletta, Minority Policy Analyst, Health; Alan
    Slobodin, Minority Chief Investigative Counsel, Oversight and
    Investigations; and Michael Taggart, Minority Policy Director.
        Ms. DeGette. The Subcommittee on Oversight and
    Investigations hearing will now come to order.
        Today the committee is holding a hearing entitled
    ``Protecting Communities from Industrial Accidents:
    Revitalizing the Chemical Safety Board.'' This hearing will
    examine the ongoing mission, governance, staffing, and other
    challenges at the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations
    Board.
        Due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, Members can
    participate in today's hearing either in person or remotely via
    online conferencing. Members who are participating in person
    must wear a mask. Such Members may remove their mask when they
    are under recognition and speaking from a microphone. Staff and
    press who are present in the committee room must also wear a
    mask at all times.
        For Members participating remotely, your microphones will
    be set on mute for the purpose of eliminating inadvertent
    background noise. Members participating remotely will need to
    unmute your microphone each time you speak--something you'd
    think we'd be used to by now.
        Please note that, once you unmute your microphone, anything
    that is said in Webex will be heard over the loudspeakers in
    the committee room and subject to be heard by livestream and C-
    SPAN.
        House Members are participating from different locations at
    today's hearing. All recognition of Members, such as for
    questions, will be in the order of subcommittee seniority.
        If at any time during the hearing I'm unable to chair the
    hearing, the vice chair of the subcommittee, Mr. Peters, will
    serve as Chair until I can return.
        Documents for the record can be sent to Austin Flack at the
    email address we have provided to staff, and all documents will
    be entered into the record at the conclusion of the hearing.
        The Chair now recognizes herself for purposes of an opening
    statement.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DeGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

        Good morning. Today's oversight hearing covers one of our
    small but incredibly important independent agencies, the
    Chemical Safety Board, or CSB.
        Although many of you have never heard of it, the CSB plays
    a vital role in protecting American workers and communities.
        We are all familiar with the role of the National
    Transportation Safety Board. When a plane falls from the sky,
    we want to understand not just why it happened but also how we
    can prevent it from happening again.
        And that's the role that CSB plays when it comes to
    industrial accidents. The CSB improves the safety of American
    workers, communities, and the environment by investigating the
    root causes of these tragic events and making recommendations
    to prevent them in the future.
        While many Americans may not know the CSB by name, they are
    certainly familiar with some of the critical incidents that it
    has investigated.
        Please display the first slide.
        [Pause.]
        Ms. DeGette. They did practice this in advance.
        [Pause.]
        Ms. DeGette. We have some kind of a technology problem, but
    I hope we can fix it, because the first slide was a photo of
    the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster.
        And we all remember the Deepwater Horizon, a sudden
    explosion and fire on an offshore rig that took the lives of 11
    workers and seriously injured 17 others.
        It also triggered a massive oil spill into the Gulf of
    Mexico that lasted for 87 days, one of the worst environmental
    disasters in U.S. history.
        In fact, this subcommittee held a field hearing in
    Louisiana to assess the local impact of the spill, and then I
    and Ranking Member Waxman later sent a letter to CSB requesting
    that they further examine the root cause of the accident. This
    was a disaster.
        In 2005, there was the BP America Refinery explosion in
    Texas City, just outside of Houston. In that incident, 15
    workers were killed and 180 more were injured during the
    restart of a unit at the refinery.
        In 2013, Texas saw yet another tragedy, this time at a
    fertilizer storage and distribution facility in the town of
    West. A fire within a storage facility triggered a massive
    explosion of ammonium nitrate. Twelve emergency responders and
    three members of the public died, over 260 people were injured,
    and more than 150 homes and businesses were damaged, resulting
    in hundreds of millions of dollars of property destruction.
        More recently, in 2019, there was a massive fire at the
    Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery in Philadelphia,
    Pennsylvania, where a vapor cloud including potentially deadly
    hydrofluoric acid ignited.
        The quick actions of a control room operator to rapidly
    drain the remaining hydrofluoric acid prevented a massive
    release of more of the harmful gas which would have placed the
    highly populated surrounding communities at tremendous risk.
        These are just a few examples of the critical incidents
    that CSB has deployed to over the past several years.
        The devastating impacts that these accidents have had on
    facilities, workers, and surrounding communities are obvious,
    and the CSB safety recommendations that have come out of these
    and other investigations are directly responsible for improved
    safety conditions within many U.S. industries.
        CSB's work has saved lives and protected communities, and
    those of us with industrial facilities in our districts
    understand the stake in CSB's work. We want to see this agency
    flourish.
        But despite the positive impacts, there have been
    challenges at the agency since its inception. In recent years,
    Board vacancies, unfilled staff positions, employee morale
    issues, and most recently the COVID-19 pandemic have led to
    unproductivity at the agency.
        We were pleased to see that the CSB published two new final
    investigation reports last Friday, but there are still
    currently 18 open investigations, some dating back to incidents
    that occurred in 2016 and 2017.
        This is the biggest backlog of investigations that the
    agency has ever had--one of them.
        The timeliness of these reports matter. When CSB isn't
    expeditiously sharing its findings, it cannot effectively
    prevent future incidents and fulfill its mission to protect
    people and the environment.
        Now, we are aware of the many challenges that I have
    already mentioned today, and they were inherited by our witness
    today, Chairman and CEO Katherine Lemos. But we're also here
    today not to focus on CSB's past, but the present and future.
        And so the questions are straightforward:
        How does the CSB intend to finish and close the many
    important investigations it's opened, and when can we expect to
    see the vital recommendations that come from that work?
        How will the CSB take on important new work if it can't
    close the many investigations that remain incomplete?
        When will the CSB fill key staffing vacancies to its
    investigative mission?
        And, finally, what's the plan to address how the important
    governing board operates and to avoid the dysfunction it's
    suffered from in the past?
        In short, we need to understand the Chair's strategic plan
    to move this agency forward.
        I'm pleased that part of the solution is already underway.
    The Chairman will soon have reinforcements on the Board.
    President Biden has nominated three new Board members who we
    hope to see confirmed soon, seeing as right now we only have
    one Board member and she is sitting right here.
        We look forward to the increased activity that we expect to
    see when they are on board. But we also know new Board members
    alone will not solve all of the agency's problems, and that's
    why we're holding the hearing today.
        I want to thank the Chairwoman for being here today, and I
    look forward to the discussion so that we can ensure CSB has
    the leadership, strategic plan, and resources needed in order
    to execute on its vital mission. American workers and
    communities are simply counting on it.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. DeGette follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. DeGette. The Chair is now very pleased to recognize the
    ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes
    for an opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, A REPRESENTATIVE
             IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

        Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Chair DeGette, for holding this
    hearing.
        As you said, the Chemical Safety Board is an independent,
    nonregulatory Federal agency. According to its enabling
    statute, the leading charge of the Chemical Safety Board is to
    investigate and determine the cause of any accidental release
    resulting in a fatality, serious injury, or substantial
    property damage.
        It has been described, as Chairwoman DeGette described it,
    as the equivalent of the National Transportation Safety Board
    but for chemical spills as opposed to transportation accidents.
        Unfortunately, the Board has been criticized for falling
    short of accomplishing this primary responsibility.
        The Chemical Safety Board was created by the Clean Air Act
    Amendments of 1990, but it did not become operational until
    1998.
        Since then, it has been saddled with functioning
    challenges. In 2000, just 2\1/2\ years after its inception, the
    Government Accountability Office identified management
    challenges and investigative backlog.
        Now, 21 years later, we share the same concerns as our
    colleagues of Congresses past.
        Since May 1, 2020, the Chemical Safety Board has operated
    with only one of its five Board seats filled.
        Chair Lemos, I understand that under your leadership you
    have been disadvantaged with a short staff and a sharp learning
    curve. The vacancies in Board member positions impede the
    agency from making substantial progress on benchmarks. Board
    members are vital for facilitating and closing out
    investigations, including participating in site visits and
    approving investigative reports.
        The Chemical Safety Board certainly faces challenges in
    recruiting and retaining qualified staff. The quality of
    investigations hinges on the ability of experts to conduct
    complete, unbiased investigations. These investigators should
    have solid backgrounds in chemical engineering or industrial
    process safety.
        We understand it is difficult to compete with industry to
    find such specialized skill sets, but we are hopeful the Board
    is taking actions to recruit these kinds of candidates for
    vacant investigator positions, and we would like to see that
    progress continue.
        I believe that Chemical Safety Board investigations can
    benefit industry, but I have ream concerns how this work is
    being conducted.
        Due to the ongoing challenges with management over the
    years, investigation processes are somewhat unclear. The Board
    should establish unbiased criteria for selecting incidents to
    investigate as well as protocols to determine when to deploy an
    investigative team.
        Uniform procedures would help to ensure objectivity and
    balance in the Board's investigative work, especially as staff
    turnovers occur.
        Based on the data and analysis of an investigation,
    investigative reports usually include recommendations. Yet
    these recommendations have no legal standards. They lack
    cohesiveness from one report to the next. And an absence of
    standardized criteria allows for investigative reports to
    include agenda-setting recommendations that advance a
    particular viewpoint.
        This is not the job of the Chemical Safety Board. The job
    of the Chemical Safety Board is to determine the root cause of
    an accident.
        When recommendations are made, they should focus on
    measures to minimize the consequences of an accidental release.
    That is their purpose, as outlined in the statute. And
    recommendations should not need to be rewritten if new staff is
    placed on an investigation.
        The Chemical Safety Board should not set expectations that
    are unreachable. It is not practicable to eliminate all
    chemical accidents, and the law does not mandate that.
        Above all, the role of the Chemical Safety Board is to play
    fact finder in these incidents and to provide regulators with
    information they need to create policy. The Board should not
    seek out investigations or issue recommendations simply to
    spotlight disfavored technology or preferred new practices.
        Finally, the Chemical Safety Board must focus on completing
    outstanding investigations as quickly as possible. To gain the
    trust of stakeholders and the public, the Board must conduct
    its operations in a timely and a transparent manner, and
    communications between the Chemical Safety Board and industry
    must improve to repair the reputation of the Board.
        Today I hope we will focus on what the Chemical Safety
    Board can and should do in the upcoming months to close out
    high quality investigations in both an expeditious and an
    efficient manner. We need to hear from the Board on how they
    will improve internal processes and allocate resources
    judicially to complete rigorous and instructive investigations.
        I thank you for representing the Chemical Safety Board,
    Chair Lemos, and being here today, and we look forward to your
    testimony.
        I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. H. Morgan Griffith

        Thank you, Chair DeGette for holding this hearing.
        The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is an independent, non-
    regulatory federal agency. According to its enabling statute,
    the leading charge of the CSB is to investigate and determine
    the cause of any accidental release resulting in a fatality,
    serious injury or substantial property damages.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) Sec. 7412(r)(6).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Unfortunately, though, the Board has historically been
    criticized for falling short of accomplishing this primary
    responsibility. CSB was created by the Clean Air Act Amendments
    of 1990, but it did not become operational until 1998. Since
    then, the CSB has been saddled with functioning challenges.
    Back in 2000, two and a half years after its inception, the
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified management
    challenges and an investigative backlog. Now, 21 years later,
    we share in the same concerns as our colleagues of Congress'
    past.
        Since May 1, 2020, CSB has carried on with only one of its
    five board seats filled. Chair Lemos, I understand that under
    your leadership you have been disadvantaged with a short staff
    and sharp learning curve. The vacancies in Board member
    positions impede the agency from making substantial progress on
    benchmarks. Board members are vital for facilitating and
    closing out investigations, such as participating in site
    visits and voting on investigative reports.
        The CSB also faces challenges in recruiting and retaining
    qualified staff. The quality of investigations hinges on the
    expertise of investigators to conduct complete, unbiased
    investigations. These investigators should have solid
    backgrounds in chemical engineering or industrial process
    safety. We understand it is difficult to compete with the
    industry to find such a specialized skill set. But we are
    hopeful that CSB is taking actions to recruit these kinds of
    candidates for vacant investigator positions; and we would like
    to see that progress continue.
        I believe CSB investigations can have a beneficial value to
    the industry, but I have real concerns with how this work is
    being conducted. Due to the ongoing challenges with management
    over the years, the Board has not created standardized
    processes for its investigations. The Board has finite
    resources and needs to establish unbiased criteria for
    selecting incidents to investigate and protocols to determine
    when to deploy an investigative team. The Board needs policies
    and procedures in place to ensure its objectivity and balance
    in its investigative work.
        Based on the data and analysis of an investigation,
    investigative reports usually include recommendations. Yet,
    these recommendations have no legal criteria. They are lacking
    in cohesiveness from one report to the next. When
    recommendations favor a position, the report loses its
    independent, investigative aspects. A lack of standardized
    criteria allows for investigative reports to include agenda-
    setting recommendations that advance a viewpoint.
        This is not the job of the CSB. The job of the CSB is to
    determine the root cause of an accident. Any periodic
    recommendations should suggest measures to minimize the
    consequences of an accidental release-their purpose as outlined
    in the statute. They should not need to be rewritten each time
    turnover places new staff on an investigation.
        A ``nation safe from chemical accidents'' is a nation of
    closed chemical industrial plants. It is not practicable to
    eliminate all chemical accidents, the law doesn't mandate it,
    and the CSB should not set expectations that are unreachable.
    First and foremost, the CSB must play the fact finder in these
    incidents. The Board should not seek out investigations or
    issue recommendations simply to spotlight disfavored technology
    or preferred, new process safety practices. What the Chemical
    Safety Board must do is focus on completing the outstanding
    investigations as soon as possible. To gain the trust of
    stakeholders and the public, the Board must remain transparent,
    and communications between CSB and industry should improve to
    repair the reputation of the Board. Today, I hope we will focus
    on what CSB can and should do in the upcoming months to close
    out high-quality investigations in both an expeditious and
    efficient way. We need to hear from the CSB on how they will
    improve internal processes and allocate resources judiciously
    to complete rigorous and instructive investigations. Thank you,
    Chair Lemos, for representing the CSB here today. We look
    forward to hearing your testimony. I yield back.

        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
    committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE
                IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
        Today we are conducting an oversight of a little-known but
    important Federal agency, the Chemical Safety Board. Coming
    from a State with a large number of industrial facilities, I
    have been involved with the CSB since its inception, helping to
    create and secure appropriations for the agency back in 1998.
        Since that time, CSB has conducted vital investigations
    into industrial chemical accidents. Its mission is to find
    answers and provide recommendations to prevent future
    incidents.
        For example, in my district, CSB investigated the 2005
    Acetylene Service Company gas explosion in Perth Amboy, which
    killed three workers. From its findings, CSB made
    recommendations that addressed the dangers of flammable gas
    accumulation and how to prevent similar incidents in the
    future.
        But despite its good work, CSB has faced numerous
    challenges in recent years. This past May the committee sent a
    bipartisan letter to CSB outlining our concerns, including a
    backlog in investigations, understaffing, and management
    challenges. And these concerns are shared by Members on both
    sides of the aisle, and I'm pleased that we're here today to
    continue this important bipartisan oversight.
        One of my biggest concerns is that CSB has been slow to
    finalize its reports and provide critical safety
    recommendations in recent years.
        For instance, CSB has yet to release its investigative
    report on the 2019 Philadelphia Energy Solutions refinery fire
    and explosions which involved the release of hydrofluoric acid,
    a highly toxic chemical.
        Fortunately, because of built-in safety protocols at the
    plant and the heroic action of the workers, the worst potential
    outcomes for both the workers and the surrounding Pennsylvania
    and New Jersey communities were narrowly avoided.
        It has been 2 years now since this incident, and CSB still
    has not released its investigative findings. It's imperative
    that we understand the root causes of these types of incidents
    so that we can safeguard workers, protect communities, and
    prevent future incidents.
        And I look forward to hearing from Chairperson Lemos on her
    plan to close this and other investigations.
        The CSB also plays an important strategic role in
    preventing future incidents in the face of climate change and
    extreme weather. Industrial facilities across the country are
    at increasing risk. You need to look no further than this most
    recent hurricane to see that.
        Earlier this month, Hurricane Ida dumped record rainfall in
    New Jersey, flooding the Raritan River and devastating
    communities throughout the State. The Environmental Protection
    Agency is still assessing the damage at oil sites, chemical
    facilities, and Superfund sites, including one completely
    inundated Superfund site that was previously home to a large
    chemical plant.
        Meanwhile, in Louisiana, 138 industrial facilities were in
    regions that fully or partially lost power due to Hurricane
    Ida. This is problematic considering that some of these
    facilities use electricity to contain hazardous materials. We
    don't know yet the full extent of chemical spills, oil leaks,
    and toxic air releases in the State.
        And to its credit, CSB has warned industrial facilities
    about the safety hazards posed by extreme weather events,
    particularly hurricanes. For example, CSB highlighted the 2017
    Arkema chemical plant fire near Houston, Texas, and found that
    the company was unprepared for the flooding levels experienced
    during Hurricane Harvey.
        Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner testified before the
    subcommittee in March that the Houston region, which is home to
    countless petrochemical and other industrial facilities,
    experienced three 500-year floods in 3 years. And recent
    analysis shows that 2,500 chemical sites in the U.S. lie in
    moderate- to high-risk flood zones.
        So there is no question that floods and other extreme
    weather events are getting worse. I look forward to hearing how
    the Chairperson is positioning the agency to address these
    growing strategic challenges.
        In my view, getting the CSB back to functioning at the
    highest level is the first step, and the goal of today's
    hearing is to help get CSB back on track. And I hope that we
    can all come back together to revitalize this critical agency.
    It really is critical.
        And I thank the chairperson for having this hearing, which
    I think is very important.
        Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.

        Today we are conducting oversight of a little known but
    important federal agency, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB).
        Coming from a state with a large number of industrial
    facilities, I have been involved with the CSB since its
    inception, helping to create and secure appropriations for the
    agency back in 1998. Since that time, CSB has conducted vital
    investigations into industrial chemical accidents. Its mission
    is to find answers and provide recommendations to prevent
    future incidents.
        For example, in my district, CSB investigated the 2005
    Acetylene Service Company Gas Explosion in Perth Amboy which
    killed three workers. From its findings, CSB made
    recommendations that addressed the dangers of flammable gas
    accumulation and how to prevent similar incidents in the
    future.
        Despite its good work, CSB has faced numerous challenges in
    recent years. This past May, the Committee sent a bipartisan
    letter to CSB outlining our concerns, including a backlog in
    investigations, understaffing, and management challenges. These
    concerns are shared by members on both sides of the aisle, and
    I am pleased that we are here today to continue this important
    bipartisan oversight.
        One of my biggest concerns is that CSB has been slow to
    finalize its reports and provide critical safety
    recommendations in recent years. For instance, CSB has yet to
    release its investigative report on the 2019 Philadelphia
    Energy Solutions Refinery Fire and Explosions, which involved a
    release of hydrofluoric acid, a highly toxic chemical.
        Fortunately, because of built-in safety protocols at the
    plant and the heroic actions of workers, the worst potential
    outcomes for both the workers and the surrounding Pennsylvania
    and New Jersey communities were narrowly avoided.
        Yet it has been two years now since this incident and CSB
    still has not released its investigative findings. It is
    imperative that we understand the root causes of these types of
    incidents so that we can safeguard workers, protect
    communities, and prevent future incidents. I look forward to
    hearing from Chairperson Lemos on her plan to close this and
    other investigations.
        CSB also plays an important strategic role in preventing
    future incidents in the face of climate change and extreme
    weather. Industrial facilities across the country are at
    increasing risk. You need to look no further than this most
    recent hurricane to see that.
        Earlier this month, Hurricane Ida dumped record rainfall in
    New Jersey, flooding the Raritan River and devastating
    communities throughout the state. The Environmental Protection
    Agency is still assessing the damage at oil sites, chemical
    facilities, and Superfund sites, including one completely
    inundated Superfund site that was previously home to a large
    chemical plant.
        Meanwhile, in Louisiana, 138 industrial facilities were in
    regions that fully or partially lost power due to Hurricane
    Ida. This is problematic considering that some of these
    facilities use electricity to contain hazardous materials. We
    do not yet know the full extent of chemical spills, oil leaks,
    and toxic air releases in the state.
        To its credit, CSB has warned industrial facilities about
    the safety hazards posed by extreme weather events,
    particularly hurricanes. For example, CSB highlighted the 2017
    Arkema Chemical Plant Fire near Houston, Texas, finding that
    the company was unprepared for the flooding levels experienced
    during Hurricane Harvey.
        Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner testified before this
    Subcommittee in March that the Houston region, which is home to
    countless petrochemical and other industrial facilities,
    experienced three ``500-year'' floods in three years. And
    recent analysis shows that 2,500 chemical sites in the United
    States lie in moderate- to high-risk flood zones.
        There is no question that floods and other extreme weather
    events are getting worse, and I look forward to hearing how the
    Chairperson is positioning the agency to address these growing
    strategic challenges.
        In my view, getting the CSB back to functioning at the
    highest level is the first step. The goal of today's hearing is
    to help get CSB back on track, and I hope that we can all come
    together to revitalize this critical agency.

        Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chair will now recognize the ranking member of the full
    committee, Mrs. Rodgers, for 5 minutes for an opening
    statement.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, A
        REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

        Mrs. Rodgers. Good morning, Madam Chair. Thank you.
        The chemical industry is one of the largest manufacturing
    sectors in the U.S., serving both a domestic and global
    marketplace. Our chemical industries help stimulate the economy
    by providing materials that we use in our everyday life.
        But when major chemical accidents occur, it can result in
    devastating impacts, including death, serious injury, and
    significant property damage. These accidents pose a significant
    risk not only for workers but for surrounding communities.
        In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress took a
    three-faceted approach to address the potential risk from these
    significant events, using the Occupational Safety and Health
    Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the
    Chemical Safety Board.
        To understand the role of the CSB, it is essential to
    understand the landscape in which the Board operates, including
    its main players and their designated roles.
        The EPA has a primary role in addressing accidental
    releases. The 1990 amendments required the EPA to publish
    regulations and guidance for chemical accident prevention,
    preparedness, and response activities at facilities using
    substances that pose the greatest risk of harm from accidental
    releases. This act placed EPA in charge of requiring qualifying
    companies to develop their own risk management plans.
        To protect workers from injury resulting from accidental
    releases, the 1990 amendments provided OSHA with standard
    setting and enforcement authority concerning process safety
    management. OSHA also provides training, outreach, education,
    and assistance in this area.
        Unlike EPA and OSHA, the CSB by law is an independent,
    nonregulatory body established to provide objective knowledge.
    The Board's primary purpose, as stated in the conference
    report, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, is to investigate
    the root causes of accidental releases.
        This is an important function. Without an independent
    investigative body searching for the answers, the industry will
    not have all the valuable information needed to reduce the risk
    of a chemical accident that causes substantial damage.
        Unfortunately, though, the CSB has recently failed in
    fulfilling this mission. Right now the CSB has a backlog of 18
    investigations, not including the 2 investigations that were
    closed last Friday, with the oldest open investigation from
    2016.
        Let me be clear: Waiting more than 5 years to close out
    these timely and important investigations simply is not
    acceptable. These investigations help companies understand what
    went wrong to help prevent future accidents. Something must be
    done to improve the investigative process and end the waiting
    game for owners and operators of these facilities.
        I recognize the CSB must have all of its parts working to
    ensure functionality, otherwise it cannot address its
    investigative backlog and new investigations.
        A key building block here is quality investigators. They
    must have chemical or process safety expertise to analyze
    accidental releases and discover their root causes.
        It is also crucial that investigators have proper
    experience and the relevant scientific qualifications to make
    technically feasible and practical recommendations about how to
    reduce risks from chemical accidents.
        The Board's statutory responsibilities include
    investigating chemical accidents and providing Congress,
    Federal, and State authorities with periodic reports that
    contain recommendations to improve chemical safety.
        Unfortunately, CSB is not fulfilling those
    responsibilities. Importantly, the CSB should not be seeking
    ways to expand its jurisdiction into EPA's or OSHA's
    authorities.
        The testimony mischaracterizes, quote, ``safety
    recommendations'' as part of a root cause investigation. While
    it seems reasonable CSB suggest steps to address a specific
    accident, its statute seems to suggest something different.
        Under the law, ``safe'' is a feature that may be explicitly
    covered in CSB's periodic reports, not root cause
    investigations; moreover, the majority of the law's reference
    isn't to recommendations, suggested changes, and regulations.
        The CSB should channel its resources into conducting
    investigations, especially looking for ways to meet the
    baseline. It should not use its investigations and the
    recommendations in its report to push certain agendas.
        My hope is that the Board will resist the urge to become
    distracted with other priorities and focus on the main task at
    hand: demonstrating it can color inside the lines by focusing
    on investigations. Ultimately, workers, communities, and our
    manufacturing sector depend on it.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mrs. Rodgers follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers

    LANDSCAPE OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES
        The chemical industry is one of the largest manufacturing
    sectors in the U.S., serving both a domestic and global
    marketplace.
        Our chemical industries help stimulate the economy by
    providing raw materials that we use in our everyday life.
        But when major chemical accidents occur, they can result in
    devastating impacts including death, serious injury, and
    significant property damage.
        These accidents pose a serious risk not only for workers,
    but surrounding communities.
        In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress took a
    three-faceted approach to addressing the potential risks from
    these significant events, using the Occupational Safety and
    Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and
    the Chemical Safety Board.
        To understand the role of the CSB, it is essential to
    understand the landscape in which this Board operates,
    including its main players and their designated roles.
    EPA
        The EPA has a primary role in addressing accidental
    releases.
        The 1990 Amendments required the EPA to publish regulations
    and guidance for chemical accident prevention, preparedness,
    and response activities at facilities using substances that
    pose the greatest risk of harm from accidental releases.
        It is also the EPA's role to build upon existing industrial
    codes and standards and require qualifying companies to develop
    their own Risk Management Program under Clean Air Act.
    OSHA
        To protect workers from injury resulting from accidental
    releases, the 1990 Amendments also provided OSHA (Oh-sha) with
    standard setting and enforcement authority concerning process
    safety management.
        OSHA also provides training, outreach, education, and
    assistance in this area.
    PURPOSE OF CSB
        Unlike, EPA and OSHA, the CSB, by law, is an independent,
    non-regulatory body established to provide objective knowledge.
        The Board's principal role is to investigate the root
    causes of accidental releases.
        Without an independent, investigative body searching for
    the answers, the industry will not have all the valuable
    information needed to reduce the risk of a chemical accident.
        Unfortunately, though, CSB has recently failed in
    fulfilling its mission.
        Right now, the CSB has a backlog of 18 investigations, not
    including the two investigations were closed last Friday. with
    the oldest open investigation from 2016.
        Let me be clear: waiting more than 5 years to close out
    these timely and important investigations simply is not
    acceptable.
        These investigations help companies understand what went
    wrong to help prevent future accidents,
        Something must be done to improve the investigative process
    and end the waiting game for owners and operators of these
    facilities.
    FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CSB
        The CSB must have all its working parts to ensure
    functionality. Otherwise, CSB will be unable to address its
    investigative backlog, while also addressing new
    investigations. A key building block of CSB work is quality
    investigators. They must have chemical or process safety
    expertise to analyze accidental releases and discover their
    root causes.
        It is crucial that investigators have proper experience and
    the relevant scientific qualifications to make technically
    feasible and practical recommendations about how to reduce
    risks from chemical accidents.
    EXPANDING AUTHORITY
        The Board's statutory responsibilities include
    investigating chemical accidents and providing Congress,
    federal, and state authorities with periodic reports that
    contain recommendations to improve chemical safety.
        Unfortunately, the CSB is not fulfilling those
    responsibilities.
        Importantly, the CSB should not be seeking ways to expand
    its jurisdiction into EPA's or OSHA's authorities. The Board
    conflates ``safety recommendations'' as part of a root cause
    investigation. ``Safe'' is a feature that may be covered in
    CSB's periodic reports, not root cause investigations. The CSB
    should channel its resources into conducting investigations,
    especially looking for ways to meet the baseline.
        Similarly, the CSB should remain independent in its work.
    It should not use the findings and recommendations in its
    reports to push certain agendas.
        My hope is the Board will resist the urge to become
    distracted with other priorities outside its statutory
    authority and focus on the main task at hand--demonstrating it
    can color inside the lines. Ultimately, workers, communities,
    and our manufacturing sector depend on it.
        Thank you, I yield back.

        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
        The Chair now asks unanimous consent that the Members'
    written opening statements be made part of the record. And
    without objection, so ordered.
        I now want to introduce our witness for today's hearing,
    the Honorable Katherine A. Lemos--am I pronouncing that
    correctly? ``Lemm-ohs.'' OK, thank you.
        Dr. Lemos. ``Lemm-ohs'' is correct.
        Ms. DeGette. Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer, U.S.
    Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.
        We really want to thank you for appearing today. And I know
    you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative
    hearing, and when we do so, we have a practice of taking the
    testimony under oath.
        Do you have any objections to testifying under oath?
        Dr. Lemos. No, ma'am.
        Ms. DeGette. Let the record reflect the witness responded
    no.
        The Chair then advises you that under the rules of the
    House and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be
    accompanied by counsel.
        Do you desire to be accompanied by counsel today?
        Dr. Lemos. No, ma'am.
        Ms. DeGette. Let the record reflect the witness has
    responded no.
        And so, if you would, would you please rise and raise your
    right hand so you may be sworn in?
        [Witness sworn.]
        Ms. DeGette. And let the record reflect the witness
    responded affirmatively.
        And you are now under oath and subject to the penalties set
    forth in Title 18, Section 1001 of the United States Code.
        And at this time the Chair will now recognize you for 5
    minutes to provide your opening statement.
        Before we begin, I want to explain the lighting system. In
    front of you are a series of lights. The light will initially
    be green. Then it turns yellow when you have 1 minute
    remaining. We would ask that you try to wrap up at that time,
    start wrapping up. And the light turns red when your time
    expires.
        And so, Chairperson Lemos, you are now recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Just move it a little closer, I think.

     STATEMENT OF KATHERINE A. LEMOS, Ph.D., CHAIRPERSON AND CHIEF
          EXECUTIVE OFFICER, U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD
                          INVESTIGATION BOARD

        Dr. Lemos. Thank you. Good morning. I'm Dr. Katherine
    Lemos, and I'm proud to serve as the Chairperson and CEO of the
    United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
    or CSB.
        As you know, and as you stated, our mission is to ``drive
    chemical safety change through independent investigations to
    protect people and the environment.'' This is a critically
    important mission and one to which we are fully committed.
        We achieve this mission through three strategic goals: to
    advocate for safety, to prevent the recurrence of significant
    chemical incidents, and to maintain an engaged and high-
    performing workforce.
        I would like to address each of these.
        First, our strategic goal to advocate for safety, which
    involves achieving change through recommendations, outreach,
    and education.
        In total, CSB has released 860 safety recommendations; 742
    of those are closed. In fiscal year 2021, CSB has issued 19 new
    safety recommendations, in comparison to zero for fiscal year
    2020.
        A major focus of CSB in fiscal year 2021 has been advancing
    and closing previously issued recommendations, because this is
    a key driver to realizing positive safety change.
        In fiscal year 2021, CSB advanced 46 recommendations; 28
    closed successfully. In comparison, in fiscal year 2020, CSB
    advanced only 15 recommendations; 4 closed successfully.
        Another strategic goal is to prevent recurrence of
    significant chemical incidents through independent
    investigations.
        Over the years, CSB deployed to 146 incidents. Even through
    the pandemic, following our COVID Safety Plan, which we
    implemented very early on in my tenure, CSB has continued to
    efficiently deploy to meet our mission.
        In fiscal year 2021, CSB made a commitment to increased
    transparency, and we have demonstrated this through initiating
    live Board meetings upon completion of our investigations.
        In fiscal year 2021, utilizing this new transparency
    process, we completed three investigations: Aghorn, AB
    Specialty Silicones, and Evergreen Packaging. This compares to
    only one completed investigation in fiscal year 2020.
        We are working diligently to complete the remaining 18 open
    investigations. Due to enhanced internal processes developed
    this year, we are poised to complete investigations more
    efficiently moving forward.
        Our third goal, it is to create and maintain an engaged,
    high-performing workforce. After accepting this role last year,
    I was shocked to learn of how low the staff numbers actually
    were.
        Our agency is critical to the safety and the well-being of
    our workers, the public, the communities, and our environment.
        To address this, we have prioritized hiring a robust,
    diverse, and engaged Mission Product Team. And by year end
    fiscal year 2023, our plan is to have an all-time high number
    of investigation and technical specialists on the Mission
    Product Team.
        We have also increased technical contractor support, with
    expertise in specialized fields such as metallurgy, blast
    modeling, and equipment testing.
        To create more stability at the agency, we are hiring key
    support staff and leadership at the career level.
        Finally, CSB looks forward to onboarding new Board members.
    These appointees are critical to our mission. They bring unique
    subject matter expertise and additional perspectives that helps
    to ensure the integrity of our products while enhancing our
    advocacy.
        Ultimately, we are committed to the CSB mission, we are
    committed to its growth, and we are committed to ensure that we
    can respond and react properly to catastrophic chemical events.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Lemos follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Chairperson Lemos.
        The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes for
    questioning.
        And as I said in the opening statement, today's discussion
    is really focused on where the agency is right now and what we
    need for it to do for it to function going forward.
        And so I just want to ask you a series of questions,
    Chairperson, and if you can, if you can answer as briefly as
    you can, that would help because, of course, we each only have
    5 minutes to question.
        Now, as we all talked about on both sides of the aisle, CSB
    investigates some of the most consequential industrial
    accidents in the United States. Is that correct?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. DeGette. And the purpose of those investigations is to
    identify the root causes and then make corresponding safety
    recommendations to prevent future incidents. Isn't that
    correct?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. DeGette. So conducting these investigations and then
    informing the public of its findings is really the bread and
    butter of CSB's work, and I know that you agree with that.
        So let's talk for a minute about the investigation backlog,
    which I know you are striving mightily to reduce. But as many
    of us on both sides of the aisle said, there are 18 open
    investigations, some which go back to 2018.
        So my first question to you, Chairperson Lemos, is, do you
    currently have a strategic plan and scheduled timeline to close
    each of the 18 open investigations?
        Chairperson, do you have a plan to close each of those 18
    investigations?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes, Chairwoman, we have a plan. And I'm looking
    for my specific notes on the data for that right now.
        Ms. DeGette. OK.
        Dr. Lemos. So hold just a moment.
        Ms. DeGette. The ranking member points out the plan is with
    the slide.
        Do you have that there? You know what, what I'm going to--
    OK. Do you have it now?
        Can you turn your mike on, please?
        Dr. Lemos. So sorry. I actually have two different aspects.
        First of all, our top priority is to focus on the mission.
        Ms. DeGette. Yes, OK. But do you have a plan for closing
    those 18 open investigations? Yes or no?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes.
        Ms. DeGette. And can you give me a copy of that plan?
        Dr. Lemos. We can provide a copy of the plan, as we have
    discussed or as we have exchanged information with your staff--
    --
        Ms. DeGette. OK. If you can give me a copy of that plan,
    then I will put it into the record.
        And the other point that I want to ask in my time
    remaining, that's transparency of the agency. CSB's regulations
    require that each quarterly public meeting include a review of
    the Board of the schedule for completion of all open
    investigations.
        Now, I understand that the schedule has not always been
    made public in the past. So will you commit to providing this
    schedule of completion for all open investigations at your
    quarterly public meetings going forward?
        Dr. Lemos. So, first of all, I would like to address one of
    the questions you asked before.
        Ms. DeGette. OK. But, first of all--and I will have time
    for you to do that, but let's answer this question.
        Can you provide the schedule of completion for all open
    investigations at your quarterly meetings? So if you have a
    quarterly meeting, you can say which ones you are planning to
    close.
        Dr. Lemos. I can tell you right now which four are the next
    to come up.
        Ms. DeGette. OK. But do you plan to release those at your
    quarterly meetings?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes, we plan to release those.
        Ms. DeGette. OK.
        Dr. Lemos. And we have actually recently, in the last two
    meetings, said which ones will be up for finalization.
        Ms. DeGette. Super. Thank you.
        And then you can go back to your--I've got 45 seconds, so
    you can answer my previous question.
        Dr. Lemos. Understand. Yes, we have a plan. We have got
    early phase, mid-phase, and late phase.
        Ms. DeGette. Super.
        Dr. Lemos. And I can tell you the four right now that are
    up for legal review, which is the final phase before the Board
    receives them----
        Ms. DeGette. Great.
        Dr. Lemos [continuing]. Are Sunoco, Didion, BioLab, and Loy
    Lange. And I would give you all of the details on that except
    you have limited time.
        Ms. DeGette. That's OK. We have a lot of Members that can
    ask.
        And then what about the rest of the investigations? Do you
    have a plan for completion of those?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes, we do, and we will provide that to you.
        Ms. DeGette. I so appreciate it. Thanks.
        And, again, I really appreciate the yeoman's work that you
    are doing in a very tough situation. But we all agree on the
    mission here. We just have to get this agency working to
    protect the safety of our constituents.
        With that, I will yield to the ranking member 5 minutes for
    his questioning.
        Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.
        According to its statutory authority, the Chemical Safety
    Board can incorporate recommendation measures into
    investigative reports. But I have been told investigators
    sometimes may write investigative reports that incorporate
    their own background or biases when developing recommendations.
        If they are doing so, that might challenge the independent
    investigatory jurisdiction of the Chemical Safety Board to
    determine the root cause of an accident.
        Does the Board have standardized requirements for its
    recommendations?
        Dr. Lemos. The Board has standardized requirements which
    are in the process of being codified, and that is exactly what
    we're trying to address in our internal process improvement.
        Mr. Griffith. And when do you anticipate that that will be
    codified? I know you are the only member of the Board, so it
    makes it more difficult, but when do you anticipate that would
    be completed?
        Dr. Lemos. Within months.
        Mr. Griffith. So if we check back in 6 months, it either
    ought to be done or pretty darn close? Is that what you're
    saying?
        Dr. Lemos. It should be prior to that. We actually have
    drafts written, and it would be nice to have other Board
    members to weigh in on that as well.
        Mr. Griffith. Thank you. I don't disagree with that.
        Dr. Lemos. OK.
        Mr. Griffith. And do appreciate that you have been carrying
    this load yourself. So I don't want to underscore that with any
    of my----
        Dr. Lemos. We've already drafted it.
        Mr. Griffith. I don't want to undermine that or neglect to
    say that, because I'm going to ask some tough questions. I
    understand you have got some handicaps.
        Do you think it would be a good idea to establish legal
    criteria? So you're going to codify these standardized
    requirements, but do you think it would be a good idea to
    establish legal criteria so we can have a greater
    standardization among recommendations and reduce the chance of
    agenda setting through recommendations?
        Dr. Lemos. So everything that we process currently under my
    tenure undergoes legal review, every recommendation, every
    report, every safety bulletin, every safety alert. That was not
    the case prior.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. So I guess that's, in essence, a yes.
        Dr. Lemos. Yes.
        Mr. Griffith. All right.
        In your message in ``The Chairman's FY 2020 Chemical Safety
    Board Impact Report,'' you state, ``The U.S. Chemical Safety
    Board has successfully carried out its core mission work in
    fiscal year 2020 despite an unprecedented impact from COVID-
    19.''
        The Board's mission is to ``drive chemical safety change
    through independent investigations to protect people and the
    environment.'' But that language is not actually found in the
    statute.
        Is the Chemical Safety Board's mission different from its
    statutory requirements?
        Dr. Lemos. Per my understanding, they are exactly the same.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. We might disagree on that. We can talk
    about that later.
        In determining the success of carrying out its mission for
    a fiscal year, does the Board factor in how many investigations
    were closed during that year?
        Dr. Lemos. Can you please repeat that question one more
    time?
        Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am. In determining the success of
    carrying out its mission for a fiscal year, does the Board
    factor in how many investigations were closed during that year?
        Dr. Lemos. In the past, performance has not been a measure
    that has been held accountable, that the Board has been
    accountable to, and I've instituted that. We have included that
    information in budget requests. But that is something that I am
    working strongly to institute.
        Mr. Griffith. So that should be a part of the determination
    as to whether or not you've had a successful year?
        Dr. Lemos. Absolutely.
        Mr. Griffith. OK.
        The impact report also states that a top priority for the
    Board is to continue delivering high-quality safety products to
    the community. Can you explain what ``high-quality'' means in
    this case?
        Dr. Lemos. This means they're all cause, they investigate
    to the degree that the safety impact is warranted, and we apply
    our resources accordingly, and that the outcome is sound.
        Mr. Griffith. All right. What were prior Chemical Safety
    Board products lacking that caused you to establish different
    standards to improve the quality of the work product?
        Dr. Lemos. As mentioned, there have been widely varying
    product types and product integrity levels. Having come from
    the NTSB and having been at the FAA receiving those
    recommendations and reports, it's really important that you
    have consistency in your logic flow from the facts to the
    findings to the conclusions to the recommendations. And that is
    something that we have been working on vehemently this past 6
    months to a year.
        Mr. Griffith. All right. Thank you very much.
        I yield back.
        Dr. Lemos. Thank you.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
    committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
        I wanted to focus on CSB's strategic role in addressing
    climate change risk to industrial facilities.
        As you know, thousands of our chemical and petrochemical
    facilities are in low-lying areas that are vulnerable to
    flooding. Just this past month, Hurricane Ida caused a serious
    risk of power outages and flooding at a number of facilities in
    my State, Louisiana, and New York.
        And I'm pleased that CSB's guidance and recommendations
    began to address climate change and extreme weather following
    Hurricane Harvey and the resulting Arkema chemical plant fire
    in 2017, but we have to do more. Many facilities seem to be
    caught off guard by catastrophic events driven by climate
    change.
        So let me ask the Chairperson: What more should industrial
    facilities be doing to prepare for a changing climate, in your
    opinion?
        Dr. Lemos. So just to repeat, what more should facilities--
    --
        Mr. Pallone. What more should you think that industrial
    facilities should be doing to prepare for a changing climate?
    What are your suggestions?
        Dr. Lemos. So based on the Arkema report, we recommended
    that CCPS put out comprehensive guidance, which is how to
    prepare for extreme weather events. As we have seen with Ida,
    behind me, Managing Director David LaCerte is from Louisiana,
    Baton Rouge, lived through that. And a lot of our--we
    anticipate seeing more and more of these events, so it's going
    to become even more of a challenge for chemical industry moving
    forward.
        So we have interacted with GAO in extreme weather, in
    making sure that we collect the information and trending and
    tracking and which incidents in the past and the future have
    occurred due to extreme weather to try to find some causal
    factors.
        But in terms of what plants or facilities can be doing,
    following guidance that is out there to ensure that they are
    not just preparing for today's historical, but tomorrow's,
    based on recent history, and predicted future level of extreme
    events.
        Mr. Pallone. Well, I appreciate that you are, you know,
    putting out recommendations, and hopefully there will be more.
    But I did want to ask, I want to make sure that CSB, that its
    Board members, staff, and specialists are relying on sound
    science.
        Let me just ask you, Chairperson, has the Board identified
    a set of scientific resources that it draws upon to help assess
    the impacts of increased sea levels, rise in storm surge, storm
    intensity, or other extreme weather events? Have, you know,
    what are the scientific resources that you draw upon?
        Dr. Lemos. So I'm glad that you mentioned that the CSB is
    an independent and scientifically based agency.
        We, as we mentioned to the GAO--and a report is forthcoming
    in a few months--we focus on the extreme weather events. And
    it's more responsive.
        There are other agencies that are responsible for
    predicting what might occur. What we need to do is ensure
    facility resiliency and ensure that there is guidance that is
    adequate to help facilities prepare for these extreme weather
    events.
        Mr. Pallone. But, I mean, have you identified a set of
    scientific resources that you draw upon to assess the impacts
    of this climate change?
        I mean, there is that, and then there is also, like, the
    challenge with staffing. So, you know, having the right mix of
    experts to do these assessments.
        So I guess I'll just repeat, if you've identified a set of
    scientific resources to draw upon or you're considering
    bringing on additional investigators to examine the nexus
    between climate change and industrial preparedness?
        Dr. Lemos. That's a wonderful point. And in terms of
    staffing and our ability to conduct scientific studies, first
    of all, we need to partner with our Federal agencies as our
    enabling legislation encourages, because at this point we don't
    have the staff to conduct that level of safety study and
    analysis.
        So we need to rely on a range of our Federal partners and
    outside entities to be able to identify what could be done and
    what should be done in the chemical community.
        Mr. Pallone. I mean, I know you can't lobby us for
    additional resources, but it sounds like you do need additional
    resources. So I'll take that to mean you do need additional
    resources and you would like to see additional resources for
    more staffing.
        Dr. Lemos. Um, I'm certainly not lobbying. I'm telling you
    that there's only so much that we can do with the resources
    that we have. And I would--we would appreciate fully funding
    what we have requested. I believe that we're in an upward
    trend. We have hired more staff. They are joining. We're likely
    to get more Board members. I believe that that's an upward
    trend, and we're going to maintain that staff and engage them.
        But to be able to conduct all of the activities in our
    enabling legislation, which is to conduct safety studies in
    addition to investigations--although investigations is the
    primary--we would need that additional staff to be able to
    carry that out effectively and fully.
        Mr. Pallone. Thank you. Thank you so much.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Dr. Lemos. You're welcome.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes Mrs. McMorris Rodgers for 5
    minutes.
        Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I believe it's important that we focus on the mission of
    this Board, the Chemical Safety Board. And before we start
    talking about more people and more resources, let's make sure
    that the Board is actually even fulfilling the mission as
    currently stated in the statute.
        And I think it's clear that Members on both sides of the
    aisle have concerns about the effectiveness and the outcomes of
    the Board with the current staff and current levels of funding.
        On the CSB website, it states that the investigative
    process generally takes 6 to 12 months to complete, and a draft
    report is then submitted to the Board for consideration.
    Reports may be adopted through a written vote of the Board or
    in a formal public meeting during the incident site or in
    Washington, DC.
        Dr. Lemos, can you walk us through the investigative
    process currently and if we can expect new investigations to be
    completed within the stated timeline of 6 to 12 months?
        Dr. Lemos. I think, to answer your question, 6 to 12
    months, if you look at our history, that's not the timeline
    that things have been closing. But the community and our agency
    is accountable to actually meet a more rigorous timeline.
        If you look at our counterpart, the NTSB, it's about 2\1/2\
    years for a major investigation. Part of the problem or part of
    the challenge is that our agency has moved to an all-or-nothing
    full investigation, 160-page report, or not at all.
        And part of what I'm trying to do is return to what the CSB
    used to do and what the NTSB does and provide a range of
    products such that we can get out immediate safety
    recommendations and products within that timeframe.
        Mrs. Rodgers. So do you believe that the 6 to 12 months is
    the right timeline? Or, if it's not the right timeline, then do
    you think Congress needs to evaluate the timeliness of CSB's
    work?
        Dr. Lemos. So I believe that the enabling legislation says
    1 year. One year is very aggressive, especially for a major
    investigation. I believe that less than that is very reasonable
    for a minor investigation.
        Mrs. Rodgers. The oldest investigation in the backlog is
    from 2016. Do you think that the recommendations for that
    report, assuming the investigation is closed at some point, if
    implemented, would be outdated or carry less weight as these
    recommendations would have a year or so after the incident?
        Dr. Lemos. There's no doubt that the delay has a negative
    impact on the safety.
        Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
        Dr. Lemos. But we do have the ability to issue urgent
    safety recommendations, if identified, any phase of the
    investigation.
        Mrs. Rodgers. OK. And ``The Chairman's FY 2020 Chemical
    Safety Board Impact Report'' states that one investigation was
    closed. If there's a backlog of 18 investigations, does it mean
    it would take 18 years to address only the backlog? Or do you
    have a plan for an accelerated process for backlogged
    investigations?
        Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
        We absolutely have a plan for accelerated closure. We've
    already executed on that. We did three, we completed three this
    year versus one last year. There were different reasons for
    that.
        And I've already committed to six in the coming year. And
    we've already identified four that will be coming to the Board
    before the end of the year or early in the next year.
        I would like to have other Board members to vote on those
    with me. But that would close the three oldest, plus one of the
    newer.
        Mrs. Rodgers. The statutory purpose of the CSB in the Clean
    Air Act is to investigate root causes of accidental releases.
        Have you discussed providing alternative types of work
    product, besides an investigative report, that identifies the
    root cause in a condensed bulletin report form?
        Dr. Lemos. I'm so glad you mentioned that, because that's
    exactly what the CSB used to do and what the NTSB does.
        And so, by providing a range of products, a safety
    bulletin, a safety case, one of the most impactful reports I've
    ever read was from 1998, two events in 8 pages in a safety
    bulletin unrelated, but they both--unrelated industries--but
    they both dealt with management of change.
        Those were out, I believe, within 6 to 8 months. That is
    what we need to be able to accomplish.
        Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
        I yield back, Madam Chair.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
        The Chair now recognizes Miss Rice for 5 minutes.
        Miss Rice. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Lemos, if we could just go down, I'd just like to talk
    about the nuts and bolts of the agency.
        Ms. DeGette. Miss Rice, you're fading in and out.
        Miss Rice. OK. Can you hear me now?
        Ms. DeGette. Yes.
        Miss Rice. OK. Great.
        Ms. Lemos, I'd like to get to the nuts and bolts of the
    purpose for this agency and remind everyone that, while it was
    created in 1990 and authorized by the Clean Air Act Amendments
    of 1990, it wasn't funded until 1998 as a result of a series of
    industrial accidents led to a renewed impetus to secure
    appropriations for the organization.
        So now it's my understanding there are presently four
    vacancies on a five-member Board, and President Biden has made
    three nominations that are sitting in the Senate waiting for
    confirmation.
        So I'm sure that that is providing an enormous amount of
    difficulty for you to actually carry out the mission of this
    organization since you're the only Board member out of a five-
    member Board.
        And I would ask--I'm sure that I will get the agreement of
    my Republican colleagues on this committee, to ask their
    Republicans colleagues in the Senate to move these nominations
    as quickly as possible so that this Board can be fully
    constituted and get going.
        So that's number one.
        Number two, I understand that there are or were 40 full-
    time employees, 20 of whom were investigators. I believe that
    there are unfilled positions for those investigators.
        Dr. Lemos, what I would like to ask you is, who else makes
    up your staff? I mean, it's all well and good to talk about the
    outcome of certain investigations, but if we don't have an
    agency that is fully staffed with the appropriate personnel and
    a specific mission, then the result of investigations are
    surely going to be delayed and questioned.
        So I just want to get into the nuts and bolts of who else
    are your employees, other than investigators?
        And I also want to ask you, if you could--I know this is a
    very long question, but I'm just trying to understand the
    makeup here: Is there a specific enough description of what the
    responsibilities and duties are of each individual Board
    member?
        So first tell me who your employees are, and then speak
    about the specific responsibilities of the Board, if you would.
        Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
        So the first part of that is who our employees are, and
    I'll talk about the Mission Product Team. I have trouble seeing
    you on the screen, so I'll just look up here at the Chair.
        So the Mission Product Team is comprised of investigators
    who actually go out to the sites, do the followup, do the
    investigation. They oversee the testing and whatnot.
        We have also on the Mission Product Team recommendations
    staff that are assigned to help identify the gaps in guidance,
    regulation, procedures, policies that are related to the
    contributing factor.
        So those are important elements of that team, as well as
    the recommendations staff and advocacy team to provide
    materials.
        In terms of support staff, that includes human resources,
    general counsel, contracting, all of the other things--
    administration--all of the other things--IT--that are required
    to support and feed our investigative and Mission Product Team.
        Miss Rice. Can I just interrupt you for 1 second? Are up
    to--do you have the staff that you need? Yes or no?
        Dr. Lemos. Not yet, but we are getting there.
        So we just hired a contracting manager, and we just hired a
    new human resources director. We will be hiring a career
    managing director as well as replacing our general counsel.
        Miss Rice. And the responsibility of the Board again--I'm
    running out of time--could you just tell me, do you feel that
    the mission, the responsibility of the individual Board
    members, is specific, or does it need to be more--better
    defined?
        Dr. Lemos. So I believe you've asked whether or not--so
    what the roles and responsibilities of the Board members are
    and whether that needs to be better defined. Is that correct?
        Miss Rice. Yes.
        Dr. Lemos. OK. So Board Order 28, that discussion,
    specifically discusses the roles and responsibilities of Board
    members versus vis-a-vis the staff.
        So as the OIG reported out, mentioned in several management
    challenges reports, we needed to settle this. So we have in
    writing and already passed roles and responsibilities that are
    clear so that Board members can focus on their mission.
        And what their mission is in technical reviews, they review
    reports, they review recommendations, they vote. They engage in
    stakeholder collaboration and community outreach.
        They are our technical--they lend their technical expertise
    and perspectives to the products, and they also assist with the
    strategy and the mission of the agency.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much. The gentlelady's time has
    expired.
        Staff has asked me, Chairperson Lemos, if you can mute your
    microphone when you're not talking. I guess it's causing
    feedback.
        And the Chair will now next recognize Mr. Burgess for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair. And I thank our witness for
    being here with us this morning.
        I apologize for not being there in person. We have a Rules
    Committee hearing going on at the same time. But through the
    miracle of the hybrid hearing, I'm able to participate in this
    one.
        And it was important to me because a little bit south of
    the district that I represent in Texas, back in 2013, a
    fertilizer plant blew up in the town of West, Texas.
        [Audio malfunction.]
        Ms. DeGette. Dr. Burgess, we've lost your audio.
        We've lost Mr. Burgess. So we're going to go to Mr.
    McKinley, and if Mr. Burgess can get back on, then we will have
    him after Ms. Schakowsky.
        So, Mr. McKinley, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
        We apologize profusely, Chairperson Lemos.
        Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        If we could start, I would like to enter into the record a
    statement from the American Chemistry and the American Fuel and
    Petrochemical Manufacturers in support of the CSB.
        Ms. DeGette. Without objection.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Mr. McKinley. Dr. Lemos, the role of the CSB is to
    investigate--I've heard all the testimony before--investigate
    accidents and determine the conditions and circumstances that
    led up to those accidents and identify the cause or causes so
    that similar events might be prevented.
        For the record, is that a fair assessment?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir.
        Mr. McKinley. OK. But according to the CSB's website, its
    mission is to, quote, ``drive chemical safety change through
    independent investigations.'' That's worded slightly
    differently than the statute.
        And the phrase, quote, ``drive chemical safety change''
    seems to suggest some form of an attempt to regulate chemical
    safety, which we've heard testimony that's really the
    responsibility of the EPA. The CSB should only be making
    recommendations to them.
        Now, the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee
    recently considered, as we've talked about, the three Democrat
    nominees to fill the vacancies at the CSB.
        These chairmen do have different backgrounds. One of them,
    however, has focused her work on ``advocating for
    regulations,'' close quote, and in a recently deleted Tweet
    targeted the Trump EPA and her inability to work in a technical
    and in an unbiased manner.
        So given the nominees' background and the extensive backlog
    for accident investigations and staffing shortages, and with
    the full awareness that you're under oath, can you ensure us
    that the committee--that the CSB will not attempt to take on
    the role of a regulatory agency and remain focused on its
    statutory mission of independent investigations and
    recommendations?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir. Our mission and our mandate is to be
    free from political interference and to not regulate.
        Now, the gaps identify recommendations and safety gaps, but
    they have to--we are not a regulator.
        Mr. McKinley. Were you concerned that this nominee has
    expressed such strong opinions about wanting to regulate? Was
    that a concern to you?
        Dr. Lemos. I would prefer not to express my opinion
    regarding statements of nominees that have not been confirmed.
    But I can commit to you that I will maintain what I committed
    to the Senate, that we are a nonpolitical agency, we're not
    regulatory, and our job is to be safety focused and to call out
    the safety gaps.
        Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schakowsky for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And thank you, Ms. Lemos. And I want to thank you, begin by
    thanking you--some positive news--that the Chemical Safety
    Board approved its investigation report of a May 2019 AB
    Specialty Silicones explosion that took place in my State of
    Illinois.
        It was very serious. The incident killed four workers and
    caused serious damage to the town of Waukegan, Illinois.
        So I'm very grateful for that. But I want to talk about the
    abilities that you have to answer the enormous issues that face
    you.
        So exactly how many or approximately how many a year of
    these incident reports do you get?
        Dr. Lemos. Are you asking how many incident reports meet
    our reporting criteria?
        Ms. Schakowsky. I mean when someone calls up and says there
    has been a problem, how many of those?
        Dr. Lemos. Twenty thousand to 30,000 per year.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Twenty thousand or 30,000 per year. But we
    know--in fact, in your testimony you said you were shocked to
    learn about the low staffing numbers. We've been talking about
    that. I understand that about 30 to 40 percent of the
    investigative positions were vacant this year.
        And so my understanding is that you also noted in your
    testimony that by year's end of this year that you plan to have
    an all-time high number of investigators and technical
    specialists, et cetera, on the Mission Product Teams. And I
    wonder if we're going to be able to get there. And what is your
    plan to get there?
        Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question, because more staff
    are certainly needed to address more of these events.
        So the all-time low in staffing in recent years was in
    2019, which was eight investigators. And currently we have 14.
    Two new persons just joined us this past week.
        So we're on track by the end of fiscal year 2023, so the
    end of the next fiscal year, with your support and
    appropriations, to have an all-time high across the Mission
    Product Team, and that includes the recommendations staff and
    advocacy, technical writers, and others that are required to
    put together that full report in an efficient manner and with
    integrity.
        Ms. Schakowsky. So how many more people does that mean? How
    many more people do you have to have at that point?
        Dr. Lemos. I believe--well, so on the Mission Product Team
    or the entire staff?
        Ms. Schakowsky. Well, the entire staff. You can divide it
    any way you like.
        Dr. Lemos. I believe the entire staff, we just submitted
    for 61 positions by the end of fiscal year 2023. My belief,
    that's low.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Is there any way to speed this up so that
    we can get even more sooner?
        Dr. Lemos. So there's a scaling issue as well. Currently
    most of our investigators are 12 months to 18 months new to the
    agency, despite them having a lot of experience. So that's why
    we've been investing in the processes so much to ensure a
    consistency.
        Is there a way to speed it up? We can ramp up a plan to do
    that. If we were able to and funded to do so, absolutely.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Let me ask you this. You said you get tens
    of thousands now of calls about toxic or accidents that need to
    be investigated.
        How do you make the decision of what comes first,
    especially with this current shortage and limitation on the
    staff? What's the process?
        Dr. Lemos. So that's a good question.
        So of the 20,000 to 30,000 reports per year that we
    receive, I'll just say from the reporting event, since the
    reporting criteria last year, March of last year at the end, 88
    actually qualified.
        So we determine that based on the criteria of fatality,
    injuries, environmental impact. There is whether or not it's a
    critical driver on our list, and the potential safety impact
    that it has.
        However, our attempt to take a range approach of our
    products will allow us to address all of those 88.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Twenty thousand to 30,000, and you're
    saying that 88 actually qualified? That's it? None of those
    others your agency can address in any way? That's the max that
    gets qualified?
        Dr. Lemos. So it's important--well, it's important for us
    to be able to track and trend incidents and to be able to
    identify high risk areas.
        But 20,000 to 30,000 incidents, which may not meet our
    reporting criteria but are reported to us, based on what we
    request, are important, and I do know that the regulatory
    agencies also track these events.
        Ms. Schakowsky. OK. I'm out of time. I appreciate that.
    Thank you.
        And I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Long for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Long. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And, Ms. Lemos, are desk investigations different from
    regular investigations? And if so, how?
        Dr. Lemos. So I'll first take your question regarding desk
    investigations. Desk launches are what I'm referring to, and
    that's actually not a formal name. We don't have that. We're
    still exploring the model and the method by which to have a
    more agile approach to addressing the range of events that we
    see.
        Mr. Long. OK. And why might an accidental release not
    warrant a deployment of investigators to that site?
        Dr. Lemos. We have to prioritize the limited resources. We
    can't deploy to every single accident, nor is it necessary to
    deploy personally to each and every incident.
        Mr. Long. Given a backlog of 18 investigations and new
    incidents occurring to investigate or need to be investigated,
    can work be done at the desk to determine whether or not to
    deploy to an ordinance, allocate resources that might be
    impactful for investigations to the industry?
        Dr. Lemos. So we're maintaining an agile approach moving
    forward. Again, we have to codify it with the staff. I would
    like other Board members to weigh in as well.
        But with the staff we are taking this approach that, if
    you're familiar with the NTSB, who we were crafted after, they
    complete hundreds of accidents through the help of their
    Federal counterparts. And in my confirmation hearing and
    process, it was encouraged upon me to reconsider the degree to
    which we utilize our Federal counterparts to help us carry out
    our investigations.
        Mr. Long. And what's your personal role in closing out
    investigative reports? And how will this shift or change if the
    three CSB Board nominees are confirmed by the Senate?
        Dr. Lemos. Just to make sure I heard the question, if they
    are not confirmed?
        Mr. Long. Pardon?
        Dr. Lemos. Just to confirm the question, you are asking
    what is going to be the impact if they are not confirmed?
        Mr. Long. No, if they are confirmed.
        Dr. Lemos. We will continue forward just as we are now with
    closing investigations. There will be some training time and
    some education when you have three new Board members at the
    same time. Obviously, that's a challenge to take on. But we
    will have increased advocacy and community engagement, and
    that's critical to the success of our agency.
        Mr. Long. OK. So I'm going to repeat the question to make
    sure that you got it and I got it, and that might have been the
    way that you answered.
        But my question was, what is your personal role in closing
    out investigative reports, and how will this shift if the three
    CSB Board nominees are confirmed by the Senate? What's your
    personal role in that?
        Dr. Lemos. My personal role, the difference when there's
    just a Board of one versus a Board of four, correct?
        Mr. Long. Uh-huh.
        Dr. Lemos. I will have other perspectives. We will debate
    the matters in a live forum. We will have other perspectives.
    That's going to be the difference in closing those out.
        Mr. Long. OK. I'm having a little trouble with the sound
    system in here picking up everything you're saying, but I
    appreciate it.
        The CSB needs the five Board members mandated in your
    enabling statute, and the Board members should have a broad
    range of applicable experience and expertise, including
    experience in the operations, processes, and procedures
    typically applicable in commercial chemical facilities.
        If you could create the most well-qualified Board, what
    applicable experience and expertise do you seek out in those
    Board members?
        Dr. Lemos. So the question is--and I'm trying to speak
    louder and into the mike, I moved it. If you can hear me?
        Mr. Long. It's part on my end, but that's fine. I've got an
    issue, so that's fine.
        Dr. Lemos. Excellent.
        So the type of experience that is mentioned in our enabling
    legislation really just describes the range: safety management
    systems, human factors, toxicology, those familiar with
    chemicals. It takes a range of backgrounds, and it's very rare
    for someone to have all of those together.
        Mr. Long. OK. Thank you. And I appreciate your being here
    today.
        And I yield back, Madam Chair.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Tonko for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And certainly as the subcommittee chair on the standing
    committee of Environment and Climate Change, I have great
    interest in the operational qualities of CSB.
        So despite its significant impact on the safety of workers
    and communities, CSB has a history of governance challenges.
    Specifically, Board infighting and long stretches without
    steady leadership have undermined the agency, to say the least,
    over the years.
        These Board-level issues have led to significant challenges
    for staff at the agency, including high attrition, low morale,
    and difficulty attracting new hires. As we have heard today,
    three new Board members will hopefully soon be joining this
    agency.
        So, Chairperson Lemos, I know you would like to prevent
    history from repeating itself. So how do you intend to
    integrate and involve these new members so that the agency does
    not fall into that power-sharing squabbling that has hamstrung
    it in the past?
        Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question, which I believe is
    how do I intend to prevent a repeat of what has been occurring
    for--since the inception, really, of the CSB.
        I met the CSB at a time when it seemed to be more stable,
    around the 2005-2006 timeframe, and appreciated how they worked
    as colleagues together.
        So the first thing that I did when I joined the agency was
    realize that we have a pressing need to address the OIG's
    management challenges, and that was my top priority last year,
    and we finalized that, which was to provide the structure for
    the Board members to know what their roles and responsibilities
    are, to provide them the support staff, and to help them
    execute that. That is what I did.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
        And, Chairperson Lemos, I assume you have examined some of
    the root causes of the friction that has undermined the
    functionality in the past.
        So can you share some of your insights into why the Board
    has had these management problems in the past and what you
    intend to do so that these mistakes are not repeated under your
    leadership, particularly given that new Board members will be
    arriving and arriving soon?
        Dr. Lemos. Well, it's possible that memorializing these
    changes in CFRs, such as the NTSB has, would help.
        In our benchmarking we use the DNFSB, we use the NTSB and
    other agencies in terms of how we structure decision making and
    budget making. Perhaps codifying that would allow for these
    Board orders, which are internal policy, to settle them.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
        Earlier this year, you approved a revised Board Order 28,
    which set new terms for Board member responsibilities,
    budgeting power, and other related areas.
        While I understand that this new Board order was intended
    to respond to some of the criticisms of CSB identified by EPA's
    Office of Inspector General, some of your critics have called
    this a power grab because the action was undertaken during a, I
    quote, ``quorum of one.''
        Will you revisit Board Order 28 once the new members are on
    Board?
        Dr. Lemos. So the question is whether we will revisit Board
    Order 28 once new Board members join.
        I want to establish that our Board orders, as I found them
    when I joined, were not in alignment with our enabling
    legislation. They were not empowering the Board members to
    actually carry out their functions and staff to carry out their
    functions.
        So what I did, if someone says it's a power grab, the
    changes in Board Order 28 have nothing to do with a quorum of
    one. It's simply allowing the Board to carry out their
    functions successfully and staff to carry out, with
    responsibility, their functions.
        Mr. Tonko. OK. So then let me ask this: Will you commit to
    ensuring that the new members are empowered to both carry out
    their duties and revise Board orders by a majority vote?
        Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. Board orders should be a democratic
    process.
        Mr. Tonko. So that you would commit to ensuring that
    they're all recognized and having their input?
        Dr. Lemos. All Board orders should be in compliance with
    the law and should be voted on to the extent that we have the
    room, right?
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Yes, thank you.
        Look, we all want to avoid the issues that have prevented
    CSB from performing effectively in the past. So I do look
    forward to seeing the agency get back to excellence.
        And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now announces that the committee will be in
    recess for 10 minutes.
        [Recess.]
        Ms. DeGette. The committee will come to order.
        And the Chair now will note that Mr. Burgess has solved his
    technology problems by appearing in person, and she will
    recognize him for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair.
        Thank you, Dr. Lemos, for being here with us today. I will
    tell you, I have been looking forward to your appearance today
    because the experience I had with--it's not in my district, but
    just outside my district in the town of West, Texas, several
    years ago. I was interested in your responses to Mr. Tonko's
    questions, because that was largely the type of question I had.
        When I visited West, Texas, shortly after the accident, I
    mean, you name the Federal agency and they were on site. So you
    had the FBI, you had DOJ, you had ATF, you had--I didn't see
    Customs and Border Protection, but I suspect they were there
    somewhere. FEMA was very much in evidence.
        And all of these agencies collected at this Emergency
    Operations Center, and there's no Chemical Safety Board. And
    yet they were there, but they didn't interact with the other
    agency personnel who were there doing the investigation and
    taking--getting the evidence.
        In fact, when FEMA took me on an automobile trip through
    the neighborhoods that were affected, and seeing all the houses
    in an unusual type of situation because the roofs were lifted
    off the houses and they came right back down so there was no
    vertical--it was only the vertical displacement, no horizontal
    displacement. But, obviously, the houses were destroyed in that
    process.
        The Chemical Safety Board was not part of that, but they
    were in a trailing car, like several cars behind, and I never
    understood quite why, why we wouldn't all be working to the
    same end.
        Presumably, if the FBI finds something interesting, then
    the Chemical Safety Board might find it interesting as well, or
    the Chemical Safety Board might have a question that would be
    important for the law enforcement branch of the Federal
    Government to know.
        So can you help me there? Are you more aligned now where
    there's less likely to be that silo? Because it was almost like
    there was a physical silo around the Chemical Safety Board that
    day.
        Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
        The siloing, just to repeat, the siloing, why was the CSB
    not working intimately with the other Federal agencies and
    local, and why was their presence not noticed? And that is
    something we have been focusing on by building stronger
    coalitions with our Federal counterparts and local.
        I did not understand that as well. When I joined the
    agency, it was very foreign to me as a process. So I can't
    explain why that had occurred in the past.
        But I can tell you that moving forward we have already
    started to interact much more closely, not just with our
    Congress and the local representatives, the local responders,
    immediately to ensure. And OSHA and EPA, we have contacts we
    started last year to say who's the regional, who's the Federal,
    here are the phone numbers. And that's the type of connection
    that we are building moving forward.
        Mr. Burgess. One of our counsels here on the subcommittee--
    I don't think he is here today--but referred to the Chemical
    Safety Board, when I asked him a question about it many, many
    years ago, he said it's like the NTSB for chemical accidents.
        So you have the National Transportation Safety Board if
    there's an airline accident or train accident. The Chemical
    Safety Board performs that same function if there's a chemical
    incident, which seemed like a good idea.
        But if indeed patterned after the NTSB, they probably work
    pretty well with their counterparts in law enforcement, and in
    the case of air traffic, with the air traffic controllers and
    everyone who would be involved in providing them the data. It
    seems like that's a good model to follow.
        Dr. Lemos. Absolutely, the NTSB is a good model to follow
    in that respect.
        One difference I will point out: In the chemical industry,
    it's much more distributed in terms of the regulation oversight
    than the aviation industry is.
        So if you look at the other transportation domains, you
    will see some of the same fragmentation and extra effort
    required to pull those entities together. Like a bridge
    collapse or a pipeline explosion, you're going to have other
    local entities.
        But it's a great model. We need to have that presence. We
    need to have that collaboration and strengthen it.
        Mr. Burgess. Well, I appreciate your testimony today and
    your service to the Safety Board.
        And I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Peters for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Some of our colleagues, we're hearing them say that the CSB
    should not be using its scarce staff resources to make
    recommendations or issue regulations to protect public health
    and public welfare. But that's a key component of the CSB's
    mission, and preventing future incidents has to remain a top
    priority.
        Prior to my time in public office, I worked at EPA for a
    short time on toxic substances and later spent 15 years as an
    environmental lawyer. I've got a keen interest in CSB's role in
    updating EPA's Risk Management Plan, or RMP, requirements.
        Under the RMP, known also as the Chemical Disaster Rule,
    industrial facilities are required to follow rules that help
    prevent accidental releases of chemicals that can cause death,
    injury, property or environmental damage, or require evacuation
    of surrounding communities.
        Now, EPA is now in the process of updating the RMP rule,
    and given CSB's years of identifying the root causes of exactly
    the kinds of chemical disasters the RPM is intended to prevent,
    I think CSB has an important role to play.
        Chair Lemos, I understand you sent a letter to EPA in July
    with high-level recommendations for how to update the RMP. Are
    you preparing to give more detailed recommendations during the
    public comment period on the proposed RMP rule?
        Dr. Lemos. I want to make sure I hear you correctly because
    it's a little bit muffled. But you're asking me if I'm prepared
    to make more specific recommendations to RMP than we have in
    the past? I know that we----
        Mr. Peters. Yes, as part of the public comment period.
        Dr. Lemos. So we were engaged in the listening sessions--
    I'm hoping I'm understanding your question correctly--but we
    were engaged in the listening sessions over the past several
    months. I understand that OSHA is also going to have similar
    listening sessions for PSM. We reiterated three specific
    recommendations that have been open with regards to RMP for a
    long time and that are critical: two on chemical reactives and
    one on inherent safety design in the PSM process.
        Mr. Peters. OK. Among other things, I understand that you
    recommended that EPA consider mandating evaluations for
    inherent safety, which I gather means implementing inherently
    safer product technologies and practices that permanently
    eliminate or reduce potential hazards; for example, minimizing
    the amount of chemicals on a site. And I imagine that CSB has a
    long list of inherently safer technologies and practices.
        Are you prepared to provide all that information to the
    EPA?
        Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. In fact, in preparation for the
    letter to the EPA regarding inherent safety, which we
    reiterated--and I'm a strong believer in the life cycle and
    design in inherent safety at all levels of the process--I
    counted how many--or I worked with our staff to count how many
    recommendations we've made to entities, industry, any
    recommendation that was related to inherent safety, and that
    sort of data I think would be very useful and powerful.
        Mr. Peters. Great. So closely related to the RMP program is
    the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's, OSHA's,
    Process Safety Management program. That PSM program is
    similarly focused on preventing the mishandling or release of
    highly hazardous chemicals. To my knowledge, OSHA has not
    announced its intention to update its program the way EPA is
    updating its RPM program.
        In the absence of an active effort by an agency to update a
    program like this, what do you see is the advocacy role for CSB
    to push for regulatory changes that could reduce the risk of
    chemical disasters for workers?
        Dr. Lemos. So some of the efforts--you're asking about
    specifics for PSM that we have been recommending, just to
    confirm?
        Mr. Peters. Yes. How would you want to effect the PSM,
    right.
        Dr. Lemos. So we, last year, myself and some of the new
    staff met with OSHA and EPA to speak about both of their
    programs and the most highly prioritized recommendations. After
    the explosion in Beirut, we also reiterated some of our
    recommendations for PSM that came out of the West, Texas,
    event.
        So that is the PSM modernization, and to take into account
    similar things that we're asking for EPA to account for as
    well, to include reactives.
        So we will do a comprehensive analysis. We have an advocacy
    team. And we will also look at what are the gaps in the PSM. We
    already have an analysis on that. I don't have it in front of
    me, but I would be absolutely pleased to provide it to you.
        Mr. Peters. I would love if you could provide it to the
    subcommittee. I just urge you to work closely with EPA as they
    update the rule and make sure they have all of the relevant
    information to prevent future chemical incidents.
        And my time has expired. I yield back. Thank you.
        Ms. DeGette. I surely thank the vice chair.
        I'm now pleased to recognize Mr. Palmer for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Ms. Lemos, my colleague Mr. Peters was talking about the
    EPA, and I want to ask some questions related to that in the
    context of who investigates the investigators.
        The EPA was involved in a couple of major chemical spills,
    the Gold King Mine in Colorado--which, frankly, the remedy that
    should have been afforded to the people impacted by that hasn't
    yet been afforded them. But there was another EPA-caused spill
    in Georgia along the--in Greensboro, Georgia, that EPA I think
    attempted to cover up.
        Does the Chemical Safety Board have a role or even a
    responsibility to engage in the investigations of spills like
    that where it's caused by another Government agency?
        Dr. Lemos. So I want to make sure I understand your
    question. I'm having a little difficulty hearing.
        Mr. Palmer. Yes, it was really long.
        Dr. Lemos. So you're asking if the CSB has a role in
    investigating accidents--and I didn't hear the rest of the
    sentence. Sorry.
        Mr. Palmer. Accidents caused by another Federal agency. In
    this case, the EPA, they caused the Gold King Mine spill that
    dumped millions of gallons of toxic water and polluted zinc and
    other chemicals, cadmium, lead, down the Animas River, that
    impacted Indian reservations, impacted everything pretty much
    downstream.
        A few weeks after that they were involved in another spill,
    in Greensboro, Georgia, which my understanding is they
    attempted to cover that up. It was just a few weeks, like I
    say, after the Gold King Mine spill.
        So who investigates the investigators? Would the Chemical
    Safety Board have a role in going in to investigate something
    like that?
        Dr. Lemos. So I don't know all the particulars for the
    events that you're describing, but if it meets our rules for
    deployment or in our scope, in the CSB scope, it is an
    inadvertent release that has significant impact for----
        Mr. Palmer. Reserving my time.
        Ms. DeGette. Would the gentlelady suspend?
        Please, all Members online, please make sure you're on
    mute.
        The gentleman may continue.
        Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Well----
        Dr. Lemos. I can answer.
        So the Chemical Safety Board has the responsibility to
    investigate. That doesn't mean the EPA does not investigate as
    well, similar to the NTSB and the FAA. I worked on both sides
    of the fence.
        But the CSB is an independent investigation that is not
    focused on the oversight or punitive element. It is to
    determine the root cause, as we've heard many of you say today.
        Mr. Palmer. Well, in the case of the EPA, they denied
    responsibility I think for the Greensboro spill. And I would
    just think that the Chemical Safety Board would have some
    responsibility. It might be a jurisdictional issue that would
    be argued.
        But sometimes it might not be a bad idea for those who are
    responsible for that, who normally would be investigating, to
    be at least under the--in some way under the investigative
    powers of another agency.
        Dr. Lemos. So there are some circumstances--and we're
    facing some of those today--where some parts of the EPA have
    jurisdiction because it could be of a criminal nature. Just as
    if there is a malicious intent, ATF would take over.
        So I'm not positive, but there are some circumstances where
    we defer to other Federal agencies in those circumstances. We
    still continue to investigate.
        Mr. Palmer. Well, I know you're a Board of one right now,
    but I think you may have been on the Oversight Committee when
    we were looking into the employee dissatisfaction, what was
    going on with the Board, and the retaliation against
    whistleblowers.
        Are there any plans in place to improve employee
    satisfaction, to protect whistleblowers and others who work at
    the Chemical Safety Board?
        Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. In terms of employee engagement and
    maintaining, I believe that having career staff stability,
    stability at the Board member level, stability at the
    leadership level, and commitment for funding from Congress is
    super important to helping staff members feel appreciated for
    their contributions and feel that their progress is meaningful
    to the world.
        Mr. Palmer. I thank you for your answers.
        Madam Chairman, in regard to my line of questioning about
    who investigates the investigators, I do think it's something
    that this committee might ought to consider looking into,
    considering the fact that I'm not sure that the remedies that
    were expected as a result of the Gold King Mine spill have been
    implemented to the satisfaction of the people who were impacted
    by it.
        And with that, I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman for the suggestion, and
    Mr. Griffith and I will discuss that.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schrier for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Schrier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And thank you for being here today, Chair Lemos.
        CSB has a long history of working with other agencies to
    conduct its investigations, as we've been discussing today. In
    fact the EPA, OSHA, Department of Homeland Security, DHS, all
    have some jurisdiction over chemical facility management. So
    it's critical that CSB maintain productive relationships with
    those agencies.
        However, CSB's role to investigate the root causes of these
    incidents is unique and distinct from the roles of EPA, OSHA,
    and others. So while there may be opportunities for
    efficiencies in working together, I am concerned that CSB's
    understaffing has led to an overreliance on findings from other
    agencies.
        So could I ask you, Chair Lemos, how do you see CSB's role
    versus that of the EPA, OSHA, and DHS when it comes to
    industrial safety?
        Dr. Lemos. The roles are very different. Working together
    and collecting information, each of those investigations are
    for different purposes, and the role of the Chemical Safety
    Board is an independent, nonregulatory investigation.
        This model works very well at the NTSB, where you take the
    information from the company, from the different Federal
    agencies. You don't rely on them for their conclusions. You
    take the facts, and with those facts, we come up with our own
    findings and conclusions.
        Ms. Schrier. And do you feel like you have the appropriate
    support to take that information and come up with independent
    findings? And I understand the fact finding together, but I
    would imagine you have slightly different angles. Can you talk
    about that a little bit, EPA versus OSHA versus DHS?
        Dr. Lemos. I don't know why I'm having a little bit of a
    challenge hearing. So the question is, can I talk about the
    difference in the perspective of the findings for those three
    different agencies?
        Ms. Schrier. Well, so if you go in together and you gather
    facts together, do you feel like--you're the only person on the
    Board--do you feel like you have enough support to
    independently come up with the recommendations?
        I mean, I guess here is how I would state that question:
    Like, how do you balance the efficiencies of working together,
    gathering that data together, and working with other agencies
    while also ensuring your own independence? And do you have
    enough support to do that?
        Dr. Lemos. We certainly are asking for more support. That's
    the theme that we gather today. I hope that everybody gathers
    that we need more support. OSHA and EPA certainly have far more
    staff to carry out their work.
        We exchange information. If we collect information, for
    example, and interview together, the information that we ask is
    not used for punitive purposes. So it has to be collected
    separately by those other agencies.
        Our staff is incredibly knowledgeable. They are able to
    sift through the facts and the circumstances, and they continue
    to ask additional questions. So it's not relying on any one
    source of report when we are working together and collaborating
    with our Federal counterparts, despite the fact that they're
    regulators.
        Ms. Schrier. Just because of my time constraints, also I
    just wanted to touch on the importance of public comment. And I
    wondered if you could comment on reinstating public comments,
    because we have heard that, according to the July 2021
    stakeholder letter, that United Steelworkers and other
    organizations did not have opportunities to provide public
    comment at two recent meetings, March 5 and April 2.
        Can you touch on that, tell us if that is true or not? Are
    you providing notice of your meetings? And if not, why not? And
    also, can you commit to providing a 60-day notice for when your
    meetings are coming up so that there is transparency and public
    comment?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes. So I'll be efficient.
        Two things. One is the notice. Sixty days is in our
    internal policies. I believe it's 2 days or 10 days, I think 2
    days in our CFRs. We have been doing a better job at providing
    advance notice.
        In terms of public comment, it's important, and, in fact,
    even during public meetings, we have been receiving public
    comments and responding to them, just not in the verbal format.
    We have emails when we respond to their questions.
        So I think it's really important to distinguish between a
    public meeting where we discuss Board issues, business issues,
    which is unheard of at the NTSB, frankly, and Board meetings
    where the public can have insight, similar to this meeting
    where the public can view and have insight into the process but
    not be weighing in.
        So I do believe in enhanced transparency, and that's what
    our public meetings are doing. We have been putting all of our
    public meeting notes and comments on the website, the
    transcripts in verbatim, my specific notes that we speak.
        So we will be addressing that, and I believe that
    additional Board members will help with that community
    engagement and public voice.
        Ms. Schrier. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dunn for 5 minutes
        Mr. Dunn. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I yield my time to the ranking member, the Honorable Morgan
    Griffith.
        Ms. DeGette. The gentleman is recognized.
        Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that. Thank you. I appreciate
    it.
        Oh, let's go ahead and finish up that last question. Part
    of the question dealt with steelworkers, and you dealt with all
    kinds of things, but you didn't talk about that specific
    situation.
        Could you--because I think my colleague would like to
    know--can you specifically reference the complaint by the
    steelworkers that they didn't have an opportunity to be heard?
        Dr. Lemos. So I have had numerous engagements with the USW
    via stakeholder meetings on video as well as through letter. I
    haven't heard a complaint specifically, only from the USW, that
    they were not allowed to comment.
        Mr. Griffith. I suspect there will probably be some
    questions, followup, because it wasn't my area that I had
    prepared for, but I suspect there will be some questions after
    this hearing in regard to that matter.
        Let me move on. At the beginning of the questions, you were
    asked by Chair DeGette about your plans for removing the
    backlog and addressing incoming cases. You promised to submit
    that plan for the record.
        I'm curious about this plan. Did you approve some of it?
    Did you approve all of it? What was your role in preparing this
    plan to deal with the backlog?
        Dr. Lemos. Thank you.
        I have been pushing for a resource allocated plan since I
    joined the agency, and because it's important and because the
    community, not just our leaders here, but the community and the
    stakeholders deserve our accountability to the plan.
        Mr. Griffith. So as a part of that then, you did approve
    this plan that's coming forward?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Griffith. And can you share with us any of the details
    you remember of the plan that you approved?
        Dr. Lemos. Well, I can tell you the four that are coming up
    for closure, and I've tasked this plan and am working that with
    my managing director, who is sitting right behind me, who will
    be presenting that to you all.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. I appreciate that.
        Regarding extreme weather, setting aside that the statute
    is agnostic about causes that you investigate, how much is the
    climate extreme weather work you told Chair Pallone that you're
    doing--how much is that taking away from the investigations
    that you need to do and to complete?
        Dr. Lemos. So today we've only had one completed
    investigation that was attributed to extreme weather, which was
    Arkema. There are other investigations in the past that we
    could go back and find. We have one other currently which was
    due to extreme weather that's under investigation. That's
    BioLab.
        So as they come up, we're going to attend to them. So I
    can't say that we're--we're not taking a--time away from any
    other investigation.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. So I guess my--and maybe I misunderstood,
    That's certainly possible, which is why we have hearings to try
    to sort this stuff out.
        My understanding was that you all were also working on some
    things that people ought to be doing, recommendations to
    prevent extreme weather having consequences in the future for
    other facilities. Was I correct in that?
        Dr. Lemos. So there are no staff that are currently tasked
    to studying extreme weather or any other specific thing
    because----
        Mr. Griffith. Except as an outgrowth of the two
    investigations you just mentioned?
        Dr. Lemos. I'm sorry?
        Mr. Griffith. Except as an outgrowth of the two
    investigations you just mentioned?
        Dr. Lemos. Correct, correct, and our GAO report which we
    had--the GAO report which we had to engage with, and their
    report is coming out, and that involves extreme weather,
    climate change, and the EPA and the CSB and a number of other
    agencies.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. I just wanted to get that clarified.
        With that, I will yield back to my colleague, Dr. Dunn.
        Mr. Dunn. Madam Chair, I have no further questions. I yield
    back the remainder of my time.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Joyce for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair DeGette, for having this
    subcommittee hearing today.
        And thank you to Chair Lemos for appearing today.
        Government entities, like the U.S. Chemical Safety and
    Hazard Investigation Board, keep our constituents safe from
    industrial and environmental accidents. That is why it is so
    critical for the missions of these institutions to be well
    defined so that they can execute the tasks that are given to
    them.
        Chair Lemos, the CSB's mission--and I'm quoting from your
    mission statement--``is to drive chemical safety change through
    independent investigations to protect people and the
    environment.'' That's a fairly broad mission statement.
        What is CSB's process for writing a mission statement?
        Dr. Lemos. So I believe that mission statement, along with
    the strategy, was crafted by a previous Board member, and that
    this goes back to the process of the mission, the vision, and
    the strategy. Then that is up for renewal, in which case I
    sincerely hope to have other Board members to work through that
    with me.
        I can't tell you the genesis of that particular mission
    statement, but I will work on that, and I can get back to you.
        Mr. Joyce. Thank you. I would appreciate the followup in
    that regard.
        My question--my second question for you, is that the
    government works best when it is small and yet effective.
    Attempts at government expansion or overreach inevitably end up
    in waste, low productivity, and failure of the original
    mission, even an ill-defined mission.
        I want to be clear that CSB's mission is critical, which is
    why it needs to be narrowly and clearly defined to give the
    best chance for success.
        If President Biden's three new CSB member nominees are
    confirmed, how do you see them changing the mission statement,
    as you just addressed, on the CSB-based backgrounds of the
    three new appointees?
        Dr. Lemos. I can't speak to how they will influence the
    mission statement, in which ways, because I haven't personally
    met them, but I can tell you that I will ensure a nonpolitical
    process and ensure that the mission is scoped appropriately,
    because already now, as you know, we need to prioritize which
    events we focus on.
        Mr. Joyce. Couldn't it be problematic that maintaining this
    wide-ranging mission statement could be interpreted by
    different members, depending on what the new member's agenda
    might be?
        Dr. Lemos. It's possible, yes.
        Mr. Joyce. Do you think it is imperative that a new mission
    statement is crafted, a concise and narrowly focused mission
    statement?
        Dr. Lemos. I believe that we need to be in alignment with
    our enabling legislation, which is pretty broad. I believe that
    through specifically scoping and detailing what we will
    prioritize will help the entire community.
        Mr. Joyce. On that note, the Senate legislative history
    states: ``The principal role of the new Chemical Safety Board
    is to investigate accidents to determine the conditions and the
    circumstances that led up to the event and to identify the
    cause or causes so that similar events might be prevented.''
        Do you believe that the CSB is effectively carrying out
    that role currently?
        Dr. Lemos. I believe that we are working towards fulfilling
    our mission, but that we have a long way to go to fulfill that
    completely.
        Mr. Joyce. I concur. It seems like there is a long way to
    go.
        And we've already heard in this hearing about the backlog
    of accident investigations and the continued need for them
    going forward.
        Would the CSB, as it is currently proposed to be made up,
    be effective for those responsibilities along with the current
    obligations?
        Dr. Lemos. So the question is, if we staffed up according
    to the staffing plan, which we will provide, will we be
    effective in meeting our mission?
        Mr. Joyce. Yes.
        Dr. Lemos. Yes.
        Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair DeGette. I think this is an
    important hearing. I thank you for convening it. I yield my
    remaining time.
        Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman, and I thank all of the
    Members.
        This now concludes the hearing. And I want to thank--again,
    I want to thank the witnesses for participating in this
    hearing.
        I want to remind Members that, pursuant to committee rules,
    you have 10 business days to submit additional questions for
    the record to be answered by witnesses who appeared before the
    subcommittee.
        And I'll ask the witness to respond promptly to any
    questions should you receive any and also to the commitment you
    made to submit the various plans.
        We want to insert in the record by unanimous consent a
    letter from the ACC and AFPM to me and to Representative
    Griffith dated September 28, 2021; a letter from Representative
    Pallone and others to the CSB dated May 20, 2021; a letter to
    the CSB to Representative Pallone and others dated June 10,
    2021; and a letter from 22 labor, environmental, community, and
    scientific organizations to CSB dated July 8, 2021. This is the
    letter several Members referred to as the steelworkers letter.
        And without objection, so ordered.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Ms. DeGette. Chairperson Lemos, the letter from the 22
    organizations is comprehensive in their recommendations to many
    of the challenges you're facing at CSB. Does the agency plan to
    provide a formal response to that letter?
        Dr. Lemos. Yes. Thank you for clarifying that point,
    because that certainly helps the questions.
        We have already responded to them, but we would not respond
    prior to our continuing our conversation with you and being
    here today. Knowing that this was up and coming, we feel like
    that you are our priority to communicate with.
        But we already have responded and engaged back. In fact, we
    had engagements with them several times this spring and last
    fall. So I--we told them that we looked forward to continued
    engagement with them.
        Ms. DeGette. Super. I would ask if you could, please,
    Chairperson Lemos, if you do respond in writing to the
    organizations, if you could provide a copy to this committee,
    that would help us in our investigation.
        Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. We can immediately provide you a
    copy of our response after we receive the letter and any
    details moving forward.
        Ms. DeGette. We appreciate that. And, again, we appreciate
    your agency's continued cooperation. As you can see from both
    sides of the dais, we're all eager to help you in fulfilling
    your important public safety mission.
        And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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