[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-73
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
50-981 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Eric Swalwell, California Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Dina Titus, Nevada Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Peter Meijer, Michigan
Val Butler Demings, Florida Kat Cammack, Florida
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California August Pfluger, Texas
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Mayra Flores, Texas
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York, Vice
Chairman
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Witnesses
Hon. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Ms. Christine Abizaid, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Secretary
Alejandro Mayorkas............................................. 101
Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for Honorable
Alejandro Mayorkas............................................. 101
Questions From Honorable Nanette Barragan for Honorable Alejandro
Mayorkas....................................................... 102
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Honorable Alejandro
Mayorkas....................................................... 102
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christopher A.
Wray........................................................... 105
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christopher A. Wray. 106
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christine Abizaid 108
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christine Abizaid... 108
WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND
----------
Tuesday, November 15, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Payne, Correa, Slotkin, Green, Clarke, Swalwell, Titus, Watson
Coleman, Rice, Demings, Barragan, Gottheimer, Torres, Katko,
McCaul, Higgins, Guest, Bishop, Van Drew, Miller-Meeks,
Harshbarger, Gimenez, LaTurner, Meijer, Cammack, Pfluger,
Garbarino, and Flores.
Chairman Thompson. Good morning. Today, the committee is
holding its annual hearing to examine ``Worldwide Threats to
the Homeland.'' We are pleased to have Secretary of Homeland
Security Alejandro Mayorkas, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and
NCTC Director Christine Abizaid before the committee once
again.
Two years ago, the committee convened its Worldwide Threats
hearing during some of the darkest days of the pandemic. Last
year, the panel testified before the committee in the immediate
aftermath of the attack on the U.S. Capitol. No matter the
circumstances, the committee and the American people have
benefited from the witnesses' frank assessment of the threats
facing the homeland, both foreign and domestic. More than 20
years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 20
years this month since the Department of Homeland Security was
established in law, we recognize the witnesses, their
predecessors, and men and women of their agencies for their
tireless efforts to prevent another 9/11-style attack. That
said, we know that the threat posed by foreign terrorist
organizations has not gone away. It has evolved and persisted,
just as our efforts to combat it have. At the same time,
domestic violent extremists now pose the greatest threat to our
homeland. The Biden administration has put new focus on
combatting this rising threat, issuing the first-ever National
Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, establishing a
domestic terrorism analytic branch within DHS's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, and designating domestic violent
extremism as a ``National Priority Area'' for homeland security
grants.
More work remains, as extremists are increasingly willing
to engage in targeted violence, whether at a synagogue in
Pittsburgh, a Walmart in El Paso, or a supermarket in Buffalo.
I hope to speak to our witnesses today about their assessment
of the current threat from terrorism and targeted violence and
what their agencies are doing to protect the homeland.
Beyond terrorism, I remain concerned about cyber threats,
particularly from Russia, China, and Iran. In response to these
threats, the Biden administration has raised our cybersecurity
posture by issuing an Executive Order on Improving the Nation's
Cyber Security, leading global efforts to confront ransomware
threats, and launching a groundbreaking public-private
collaboration to help secure industrial control systems. I want
to hear from our witnesses about how they assess the current
threat to cyber and critical infrastructure, what progress we
have made, and what more we can do.
Meanwhile, other homeland security challenges remain, like
preparing for natural disasters, dealing with climate change,
responding to the pandemic, securing our skies and waterways,
addressing the increased number of migrants arriving at our
borders, and protecting our very democracy and its
institutions. Our discussion will undoubtedly touch on many of
these issues today, and I look forward to a robust but
respectful dialog.
As the 117th Congress draws to a close, I want to take a
moment to reflect on the committee's work over the last 2
years, because together we have accomplished a great deal.
Today marks our 25th full committee hearing this Congress, and
our subcommittees have held more than 50 hearings, conducting
oversight of some of the most pressing homeland security issues
facing our Nation. We enacted critical legislation,
particularly in the area of cybersecurity, creating a mandatory
cyber incident reporting framework, providing cybersecurity
grants to State and local governments, and improving the
Federal Government's visibility into malicious activity on
industrial control systems.
Historically, much of this committee's best work and many
of its greatest successes have been the result of strong
bipartisan effort. That has certainly been true this Congress
with the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, as Ranking Member.
Early in his time on this committee, Ranking Member Katko
became a leader and innovator on aviation security, and more
recently, he has made his mark on the committee's cybersecurity
work. Perhaps most importantly, he was a true partner on
efforts to stand up a commission to examine the January 6th
attack on the Capitol, putting country before politics. The
Ranking Member and I did not always agree, but we agreed when
we could. When we disagreed, we tried not to be disagreeable
about it. As he departs Congress, I want to thank him for his
important work over the years on this committee and, on a
personal note, for his friendship. I wish him the very best in
the new year and beyond.
Likewise, I want to extend my thanks to all Members for
their work in the 117th Congress, and especially those who are
moving on to other endeavors next year: The gentleman from
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, the gentlewoman from New York, Ms.
Rice, the gentlewoman from Florida, Mrs. Demings, the gentleman
from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski, the gentlewoman from Virginia,
Mrs. Luria, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Meijer, and the
gentlewoman from Texas, Mrs. Flores. Your contributions to the
committee's work this Congress and throughout your tenure are
recognized and appreciated.
Again, I thank the witnesses for being here and I look
forward to the hearing.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
November 15, 2022
Today, the committee is holding its annual hearing to examine
world-wide threats to the homeland. We are pleased to have Secretary of
Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, FBI Director Christopher Wray,
and NCTC Director Christine Abizaid before the committee once again.
Two years ago, the committee convened its world-wide threats
hearing during some of the darkest days of the pandemic. Last year,
this panel testified before the committee in the immediate aftermath of
the attack on the U.S. Capitol. No matter the circumstances, the
committee and the American people have benefited from the witnesses'
frank assessment of the threats facing the homeland, both foreign and
domestic.
More than 20 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001--and 20 years this month since the Department of Homeland Security
was established in law--we recognize the witnesses, their predecessors,
and men and women of their agencies for their tireless efforts to
prevent another 9/11-style attack. That said, we know that the threat
posed by foreign terrorist organizations has not gone away. It has
evolved and persisted, just as our efforts to combat it have. At the
same time, domestic violent extremists now pose the greatest threat to
our homeland.
The Biden administration has put new focus on combatting this
rising threat, issuing the first-ever National Strategy for Countering
Domestic Terrorism, establishing a domestic terrorism analytic branch
within DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and designating
domestic violent extremism as a ``National Priority Area'' for homeland
security grants. More work remains, as extremists are increasingly
willing to engage in targeted violence, whether at a synagogue in
Pittsburgh, a Walmart in El Paso, or a supermarket in Buffalo. I hope
to speak to our witnesses today about their assessment of the current
threat from terrorism and targeted violence and what their agencies are
doing to protect the homeland.
Beyond terrorism, I remain concerned about cyber threats,
particularly from Russia, China, and Iran. In response to these
threats, the Biden administration has raised our cybersecurity posture
by issuing an Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cyber Security,
leading global efforts to confront ransomware threats, and launching a
ground-breaking public-private collaboration to help secure industrial
control systems. I want to hear from our witnesses about how they
assess the current threat to cyber and critical infrastructure, what
progress we have made, and what more we can do.
Meanwhile, other homeland security challenges remain, like
preparing for natural disasters, dealing with climate change,
responding to the pandemic, securing our skies and waterways,
addressing the increased number of migrants arriving at our borders,
and protecting our very democracy and its institutions. Our discussion
will undoubtedly touch on many of these issues today, and I look
forward to a robust but respectful dialog.
As the 117th Congress draws to a close, I also want to take a
moment to reflect on the committee's work over the last 2 years,
because together we have accomplished a great deal. Today marks our
25th full committee hearing this Congress, and our subcommittees have
held more than 50 hearings--conducting oversight of some of the most
pressing homeland security issues facing our Nation.
We enacted critical legislation--particularly in the area of
cybersecurity--creating a mandatory cyber incident reporting framework,
providing cybersecurity grants to State and local governments, and
improving the Federal Government's visibility into malicious activity
on industrial control systems. Historically, much of this committee's
best work and many of its greatest successes have been the result of
strong bipartisan effort. That has certainly been true this Congress
with the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, as Ranking Member.
Early in his time on this committee, Ranking Member Katko became a
leader and innovator on aviation security, and more recently, he has
made his mark on the Committee's cybersecurity work. Perhaps most
importantly, he was a true partner on efforts to stand up a commission
to examine the January 6th Attack on the Capitol, putting country
before politics. The Ranking Member and I did not always agree, but we
agreed when we could. When we disagreed, we tried not to be
disagreeable about it. As he departs Congress, I want to thank him for
his important work over the years on this committee and, on a personal
note, for his friendship. I wish him the very best in the new year and
beyond.
Likewise, I want to extend my thanks to all Members for their work
in the 117th Congress, and especially those who are moving on to other
endeavors next year: The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin; the
gentlewoman from New York, Miss Rice; the gentlewoman from Florida,
Mrs. Demings; the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski; the
gentlewoman from Virginia, Mrs. Luria; the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Meijer; and the gentlewoman from Texas, Mrs. Flores. Your contributions
to the committee's work this Congress and throughout your tenure are
recognized and appreciated.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that the
committee is holding this important hearing. I think it is
vitally important to look at these issues on a routine basis
and we have always done that as our Nation faces these growing
and continuous changing threats posed by foreign adversaries,
criminal and terror organizations, and the crisis at the
Southwest Border, to name a few.
In the first 2 years of the Biden administration, we have
seen a disturbing trend become a catastrophic humanitarian
crisis at the border. In 2020, CBP had 500,000 migrant
encounters at the Southwest Border. In 2021, the first year of
the Biden administration, in pull magnets they created, these
migrants encounters have tripled to well over 1.7 million. In
the last fiscal year, Customs and Border Protection reported a
record-breaking 2.3 million migrant encounters. Mr. Wray, I
know you at FBI, that has got to be a concern for you.
While the vast majority of these migrants may be coming to
find work or more prosperous opportunities, we cannot ignore
the evident security threat that looms beneath the surface of
that crisis.
CBP reported over 29,000 illegal immigrants who have known
criminal records and 751 documented gang members, including the
312 affiliated with the notorious MS-13 gang, among those
accounted at the Southwest Border. Those are the ones we know
about, not the ones we don't.
Even more troubling is that these numbers only account for
those that were located by law enforcement, not the 600,000
that are estimated to have evaded officers at the border in
2022 alone. How many dangerous criminals and gang members
entered undetected? How many were smuggling deadly drugs, like
fentanyl, into our communities? The truth is we have no way of
knowing, but these reports demonstrate it is almost certainly
an elevated and fast-growing number.
In addition, a still darker threat lies within the data, in
something that is central to our mission here at Homeland
Security. In 2020 CBP located 3 individuals--3--who were on the
terrorist screening data set or watch list attempting to enter
the United States along the Southwest Border points of entry.
These were deemed to be a potential threat to our homeland,
including known or suspected terrorists or their affiliates. In
2021 the number grew to 15. In the last reported year, 98
potential terrorists or affiliates were discovered between our
ports of entry attempting to evade law enforcement and enter
the country. Again, that is just the ones we know about.
Sadly, the increased risk to our Nation's security is not
the only consequence of this crisis. The migrants attempting
passage are also experiencing brutal conditions that I saw
first-hand, including child exploitation, rape, and death. The
U.N. International Organization for Migration has labeled the
Southwest Border as ``the deadliest land crossing in the
world'' and migrant deaths from 2022 are reported to be over
850, breaking the grim record for deaths set just last year.
There are counties in Texas and in Arizona and California
where they have had to cut their budgets to deal with the
number of dead bodies they encounter on the border. I don't
understand that.
We are reminded of these tragedies almost daily with
reports of families drowning in the Rio Grande River or dying
of heat exhaustion crossing the inhospitable desert, often
abandoned by smugglers who care only about profits.
I would like to recognize the brave men and women who stand
guard at our Nation's borders constantly under siege by drug
cartels, human smugglers, and this ever-increasing humanitarian
crisis. These honorable brave Americans work day and night,
holidays and weekends, in some of the most unforgiving
environments. I know, Secretary Mayorkas, you know that for
sure. They routinely face danger and even death, all while
being villainized by some for fulfilling their duties to
protect our homeland from those that wish us harm. In this
difficult position, it is truly tragic but unsurprising that
many of them bear scars, both mental and physical, from the
burden that they shoulder. My heart goes out to the families of
the heroic men and women that have given all protecting our
country, as well as those that suffer the mental toll of
prolonged exposure to this crisis, including the alarming rise
in the number of suicides amongst the agents who are
despondent.
Another threat to our country illuminated by the Inspector
General last year was a vetting shortfall experienced during
the evacuation and resettlement of more than 79,000 Afghans as
part of Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.
It has now become even ever clearer that the Biden
administration facilitated the transfer and relocation in the
United States of many Afghans that were known at the time to
have potentially significant security concerns. Both Homeland
Security and the Department of Defense IGs found that
information used to vet evacuees was not complete, reliable, or
always accurate. We understand it was a fire drill, we
understand we had to protect those who helped us, but we have
to do better with vetting refugees. I am a very strong
supporter of having refugees coming into our country because I
think they are properly vetted by and large.
We must also not lose sight of the challenges to our
virtual borders. State-sponsored cyber actors continue to
utilize a cyber environment to penetrate computer networks for
espionage, suppression campaigns, the spread of disinformation,
and to steal intellectual property and technology, to bolster
their own defenses at the expense of industry, government, and
everyday Americans. We must remain vigilant to the efforts of
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, to name a few, who seek
advantage in tactical capabilities in the virtual environment
that bring risk to our security.
In addition to state-sponsored adversaries, organized
criminal cyber thieves devise formidable attacks and fraud
schemes. Ransomware attacks were up 188 percent in 2021,
costing businesses an estimated $1.2 billion and were focused
on schools and health care organizations primarily, including
many in my district.
I look forward to the collective insight of our witnesses
today on how we can further address the most prevalent and
concerning cyber threats impacting both our communities and
National security.
Additionally, along with many Americans, I am sad to say
that I am very concerned about reporting that an FBI agent,
Timothy Thibault--if I said that correctly--may have depressed
derogatory information relevant to on-going investigations
relating to Hunter Biden. He has a long history of partisanship
and he was quickly--left the agency when these allegations came
to light. As a career law enforcement professional, I know I
found these revelations to be deeply troubling, as did many
others in law enforcement.
Similarly, Mr. Wray, you have publicly acknowledged, and I
applaud you for that, that you were troubled by the allegations
at a recent Senate Judiciary hearing. While today's hearing is
focused primarily on threats to the homeland security, I have
to say I am concerned about the overall state of the Bureau and
increasingly partisan perception, right or wrong, of the
Bureau. I say that from someone, who for 20 years worked day
and night on the highest and most violent and dangerous
criminals in the world as a Federal organized crime prosecutor
in El Paso, Texas and San Juan, Puerto Rico and up-State New
York. Every time I had FBI agents by my side, they did the best
wire taps, they did the best organized crime cases, they were
by far what I considered to be the A Team when you did those
major cases. I know those agents, because they are still
friends of mine, are heartbroken by the perception of the FBI
today. I hope in the days and years going forward that you can
turn that ship around because our Nation deserves it. When our
Nation loses faith in law enforcement, that is a terrible
thing. You are the premier law enforcement agency and I hope
you can turn this ship around.
Mr. Chairman, as you alluded to, this is in all likelihood
my last full committee with this hearing. Of all the decisions
I have had to make about whether to retire or not, this was the
toughest one by far because I have had more joy and more
satisfaction with this agency because it was like a bastion of
bipartisanship. We don't conduct a lot of the antics and the
cheap theatrics a lot of the other committees do. We get our
job done because we care about this Nation, whether a
Republican or a Democrat, and we love our Nation and we want to
keep it safe. I commend you for the time that you have been
Chairman and the way you have conducted yourself and the way we
have become friends and the way we have been able to keep our
eyes focused on the mission despite all of the partisan rancor
that seems to be higher than ever these days.
So good for you for what you have done for this committee
and good for all of you Members here who have put your
partisanship aside when we come in this room and do what is
right for this country. That to me is a very important thing.
We may often disagree, and sometimes even strongly, Mr.
Chairman, but I believe this committee has demonstrated our
passion for securing the country's bipartisan steadfast.
I want to thank my committee staff who has spent countless
hours developing oversight legislation and policy to secure the
United States from all manner of threats. I am incredibly
grateful for their service and dedication to the mission. Many
of them are with me here today. I am not going to single them
all out, but there is one I will single out. This person has
been with me from the beginning, is now my staff director. The
entire 8 years I have been in Congress I have worked with him
side by side on homeland security matters, and that is Kyle
Klein who is right behind me. I want to say thank you to him.
He has been a true professional. He is a bipartisan person. He
cares about this country and loves this country and wants to
keep it safe. So, Kyle, thank you very much and I just want to
say thank you to you.
With that happy note, I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that the committee is holding
this important hearing today, as our Nation faces growing and
continuously-changing threats posed by foreign adversaries, criminal
and terror organizations, and the crisis at the Southwest Border.
In the first 2 years of the Biden administration, we have seen a
disturbing trend become a catastrophic humanitarian crisis at the
border. In 2020, CBP had 500,000 migrant encounters at the Southwest
Border. In 2021, the first year of the Biden administration, these
migrant encounters tripled to well over 1.7 million, and in this last
fiscal year, CBP reported a record-breaking 2.3 million migrants
encounters.
While the vast majority of these migrants may be coming to find
work or more prosperous opportunities, we cannot ignore the evident
security threat that looms beneath the surface of this crisis. CBP
reported over 29,000 illegal migrants who had known criminal records
and 751 documented gang members, including 312 affiliated with the
notorious MS-13 gang, were among those encountered at our Southwest
Border.
Even more troubling is that these numbers only account for those
that were located by law enforcement, not the 600,000 that are
estimated to have evaded officers at the border in 2022. How many
dangerous criminals and gang members entered undetected? How many were
smuggling deadly drugs like Fentanyl into our communities? The truth is
we have no way of knowing, but these reports demonstrate it is almost
certainly an elevated and fast-growing number.
In addition, a still darker threat lies within the data. In 2020
CBP located three individuals who were on the Terrorist Screening
Dataset or ``watch list'' attempting to enter the United States along
the Southwest Border between ports of entry. These were people deemed
to be a potential threat to our homeland, including Known or Suspected
Terrorists or their affiliates. In 2021, the number grew to 15. In the
latest reporting for 2022, 98 potential terrorists or affiliates were
discovered between our ports of entry in attempting to evade law
enforcement and enter the country.
Sadly, the increased risk to our Nation's security is not the only
consequence of this crisis, the migrants attempting passage are also
experiencing brutal conditions including child exploitation, rape, and
death. The U.N. International Organization for Migration has labeled
the Southwest Border as the ``deadliest land crossing in the world''
and migrant deaths for 2022 are reported to be over 850, breaking the
grim record for deaths set just last year. We are reminded of these
tragedies almost daily with reports of families drowning in the Rio
Grande River or dying of heat exhaustion crossing the inhospitable
desert, often abandoned by smugglers who care only about profits.
I would like to recognize the brave men and women who stand guard
at our Nation's borders, constantly under siege by drug cartels, human
smugglers, and this ever-increasing humanitarian crisis. These
honorable Americans work day and night, holidays and weekends, in some
of the most unforgiving environments. They routinely face danger and
even death, all while being villainized by some for fulfilling their
duties to protect our homeland from those that wish us harm. In this
difficult position, it is tragic but unsurprising, that many of them
bear scars both mental and physical from the burden that they shoulder.
My heart goes out to the families of the heroic men and women that
given all protecting our country as well as to those that suffer the
mental toll of prolonged exposure to this crisis.
Another threat to our country, illuminated by Inspector General
reporting this year, was the vetting shortfall experienced during the
evacuation and resettlement of more than 79,000 Afghans as part of
Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome. It is now
becoming ever clearer that the Biden administration facilitated the
transfer and relocation into the United States of many Afghans that
were known at the time to have potentially significant security
concerns. Both the DHS and DoD IGs found that information used to vet
evacuees was not complete, reliable, or always accurate.
We must also not lose sight of the challenges to our virtual
borders. State-sponsored cyber actors continue to utilize the cyber
environment to penetrate computer networks for espionage, suppression
campaigns, the spread of disinformation, and to steal intellectual
property and technology to bolster their own defenses at the expense of
industry, Government, and everyday Americans. We must remain vigilant
to the efforts of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, who seek
advantage and tactical capabilities in the virtual environment that
bring risk to our security.
In addition to state-sponsored adversaries, organized criminal
cyber thieves devise formidable attacks and fraud schemes. Ransomware
attacks were up 188 percent in 2021 costing U.S. businesses over $1.2
billion dollars and were focused on schools and health care
organizations. I look forward to the collective insight of our
witnesses today on how we can further address the most prevalent and
concerning cyber threats impacting both our communities and national
security.
Additionally, along with many Americans, I am concerned by
reporting that an FBI agent, Timothy Thibalt, may have suppressed
derogatory information relevant to on-going investigations related to
Hunter Biden, and has a long history of partisanship. As a career law
enforcement professional, I know I found these revelations to be deeply
troubling, as did many others in law enforcement. Similarly, you have
publicly acknowledged that you were troubled by the allegations at a
recent Senate Judiciary hearing. Director Wray, while today's hearing
is focused primarily on threats to homeland security, I have to I am
concerned about the overall state of the Bureau and the increasingly
partisan perception of the agency.
Mr. Chairman, in all likelihood, this will be the last full
committee hearing of the Congress and, for me, as Ranking Member.
Serving alongside you and all of our colleagues has been the honor of
my career, and I am forever grateful to the service and dedication to
our national security by you and Members of this committee on both
sides of the aisle. While we may often disagree--even strongly
disagree--I believe this committee has demonstrated that our passion
for securing the country is bipartisan and steadfast. I also want to
thank my committee staff, who have spent countless hours developing
oversight, legislation, and policy to secure the United States from all
manner of threats. I'm incredibly grateful for their service and
dedication to the mission.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. Honestly, I
already expressed my thoughts on your leadership as well as the
Members who will be departing, and thank you much.
Mr. Katko. We are on the same page.
Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
November 14, 2022
Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Katko, for
convening this hearing and affording us, the Homeland Security
Committee, the opportunity to hear testimony on ``Worldwide Threats to
the Homeland.''
I welcome today's witnesses and look forward to their testimony:
The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security;
The Honorable Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice; and
The Honorable Christine Abizaid, Director, National
Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
This hearing is the committee's annual opportunity to examine
threats to the U.S. homeland, both foreign and domestic, with leaders
of the Department of the Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
The committee is holding this hearing not only to examine existing
and emerging homeland threats, but also to reflect on the progress that
has been made to secure the homeland over the last two decades and
assess challenges that remain.
No matter what other challenges might emerge, we must never forget
that one of our Nation's greatest threats comes from our struggle
against violent extremism that began on September 11, 2001 and has
extended to violent extremists living among us who use political
affiliation as a justification for acts of terror.
These risks to our homeland have been compounded in recent years by
the agitation and incitement of domestic extremists who in many cases
have resorted to violence to manifest their delusional ideologies.
September 11, 2001, remains a tragedy that defines our Nation's
history, but the final chapter will be written by those who are charged
with keeping our Nation and its people safe while preserving the way of
life that terrorists sought to change.
Today, the loved ones of the victims continue to grieve over the
deaths of so many of our fellow citizens who were their fathers,
mothers, grandparents, children, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, cousins,
co-workers, friends, and neighbors.
Initially after September 11, 2001, it was a priority of our Nation
to prevent terrorists who would do Americans harm from boarding flights
that could lead to another 9/11 catastrophe. The Transportation
Security Administration, or TSA, was created in that era for that
purpose, and has been indispensable ever since.
Over the 20 years since enactment of the Homeland Security Act, the
mission of the Department of Homeland Security has expanded to include
cyber defense of civilian, governmental, and private-sector networks;
protecting critical infrastructure in the form of the Nation's electric
grid, water delivery systems, transportation networks and Federal
election systems; and, most recently managing and protecting assets,
operations, and personnel during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The committee's annual hearings on Worldwide Threats to Homeland
Security have covered a range of topics from activities of foreign
terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS, to home-grown violent
extremism perpetrated by lone wolves and white supremicists.
Today's government witnesses will provide insight into terrorism
threats and how the Federal Government is addressing those threats to
protect the homeland.
The nearly 3,000 people who died on September 11, 2001 who were the
initial driving force of our committee will always be central to our
focus and actions, so as to prevent another attack on United States
soil.
This hearing provides Members of the committee with the opportunity
to reflect on the past, and to take a hard look at the present day, to
acknowledge the real threats we face from domestic terrorism.
My primary domestic security concerns are how to protect the Nation
by:
preventing foreign fighters and foreign-trained fighters
from entering the United States undetected;
countering domestic and home-grown violent extremism;
preserving Constitutional rights and due process for all
persons;
addressing the uncontrolled proliferation of assault
weapons;
sensible gun legislation to prevent mass shootings;
protecting critical infrastructure from physical and cyber
attack;
creating equity and fairness in our Nation's immigration
policies; and
strengthening the capacity of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Justice to meet the challenges
posed by weapons of mass destruction.
The list of 2022 threats to the homeland is further expanded to
include:
emerging threats of viral pandemics;
rapid onset of the effects of climate change;
political violence fueled by misinformation and
disinformation;
the rise of extremist right-wing militia groups like QAnon
and Boogaloo--that act on misinformation, disinformation, and
conspiracy theories; and
efforts by terrorist groups to reemerge or reorganize
following our Nation's efforts in battling ISIS and al-Qaeda.
emerging viral threats
As you recall, Chairman Thompson, on March 11, 2020, the World
Health Organization declared that COVID-19 was a pandemic, which had by
that date reached at least 114 countries, sickening over 100,000
people, and killing more than 4,000 people.
We have traveled a long road since that time, developing vaccines,
treatments, and strategies to stop the spread of the virus. Tragically,
prior to the innovation and implementation of remedial measures, the
coronavirus claimed over 1 million American lives and over 6 million
lives globally.
Today, over 220 million Americans, or 68 percent of the U.S.
population, are considered fully vaccinated, enabling life to return to
close to normal pre-pandemic conditions. This success has proven that,
by working together, we can protect ourselves from viral threats.
However, we cannot let our guard down.
We must continue to present the public with opportunities--and
encourage them--to take the booster vaccines and to urge people with
co-morbidities to continue to wear masks and to use social distance.
We must implement the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic
and put them into action to prevent future epidemics.
There are other viral threats like monkeypox, that if left
unchecked, threaten to become the next pandemic.
In addition to monkeypox, this year's flu season is expected to be
one of the worst on record because people are coming out of quarantine
without getting a flu shot.
We must continue to develop vaccines and treatments, and work
together to stop the spread of these and other diseases.
It's important that we also remain vigilant against emerging viral
threats.
threats to democracy: paramilitary groups, threats and acts of violence
There is no question that threats to democracy in the United States
continue to grow.
Since the 2016 Presidential election, there has been a dramatic
increase in the number of conspiracy theories circulating on-line. Many
of these theories have been promulgated by groups like QAnon that prey
on the uninformed, trade in fabrications, and are fueled by paranoia.
In 2019, the FBI issued an Intelligence Bulletin that designated
QAnon as a ``domestic terror threat'' because of its potential to
incite extremist violence.
On January 6, 2021, a violent mob of rioters stormed the U.S.
Capitol in an attempt to overturn the results of the 2020 Presidential
election. In the midst of the chaos, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was
targeted by the mob. They broke into her office, vandalized it, and
defiled the Capitol.
In the past few weeks, Paul Pelosi, the husband of Speaker Nancy
Pelosi, was violently attacked by an assailant who stated that he
viewed Speaker Pelosi as '``leader of the pack of lies told by the
Democratic Party'' and that he wanted ``to use Nancy to lure another
individual''.
This violence and the threats of violence against elected officials
and their families are a heinous attempt to hold democracy hostage.
Violence is intended to suppress participation in the democratic
process, but we can never allow it to negate the voice of the people.
In recent years, there have been a number of paramilitary groups
have been stockpiling weapons and preparing for violence.
The New York Times reports that of the more than 440 extremism-
related murders committed in the past decade, more than 75 percent were
committed by right-wing extremists, white supremacists, or anti-
Government extremists.
The threats against Members of Congress are more than 10 times as
numerous as they were just 5 years ago.
These incidents are a stark reminder that conspiracy theories can
have very real and--very dangerous consequences. If left unchecked,
they could pose a serious threat to democracy in the United States.
Other brands of ideological extremism are being proliferated by
groups that call themselves Oath Keepers, the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo
Bois, the Three Percenters, the Wolverine Watchmen.
Some of these groups equate themselves. to militias, reminiscent of
the Ku Klux Klan that used diabolical deceit and self-glorification to
terrorize Black Americans and others to achieve oppressive ends.
geopolitical threats: russia's war against ukraine, competition from
china, cyber hacks
Not only must we remain cognizant of domestic threats, we must also
recognize that several geopolitical threats are urgent.
In particular, peer competition from China and the Russian war with
Ukraine pose serious challenges to our security.
Russia increasingly shows its unwillingness to accept global norms,
not only militarily but also by its cyber intrusions. Russia is well-
known to have repeatedly interfered with elections and democratic
processes in many countries, perhaps most obviously by their cyber hack
of the Democratic National Committee.
This attack not only exposed sensitive information, but it also
undermined public trust in our Government and elections.
China has been especially notorious for its cyber hacking of
corporate America, and stealing trade secrets with which it reverse-
engineers our products and leverages an unfair economic edge in global
trade.
Both countries have sophisticated cyber hacking capabilities.
Once in our systems, Russian and China can remain in the systems
for years expanding their access and going undetected.
We must be vigilant in defending our homeland against these
threats.
We must continue to invest in our cybersecurity infrastructure.
global climate change: winter storm uri and infrastructure
Global climate change continues to cause extreme weather events
that highlight the urgent need for action.
``Winter Storm Uri'' is a stark reminder of the devastation that
extreme weather can cause. Not only did the storm lead to wide-spread
power outages and water shortages, it also caused billions of dollars
in damage to infrastructure.
Winter Storm Uri was one of the most severe winter storms to hit
Texas in recent memory. From February 13-17, 2021, the storm caused
wide-spread damage and power outages across the State. In some areas,
temperatures dropped below freezing for extended periods of time,
causing pipes to freeze and burst.
I have seen first-hand, and hear from my constituents, the
devastating effects caused by flooding from major hurricanes, and their
destruction of whole homes and neighborhoods, as inflicted by Hurricane
Harvey.
While the physical and economic damage caused by Hurricane Harvey
was staggering, nearly the emotional toll of the storm was equally
severe. Many people are still struggling to cope with the loss of loved
ones and homes.
We must invest in more resilient infrastructure and develop smarter
strategies to confront climate change, which intensifies each of the
natural disasters that occur. Only by taking these steps can we hope to
minimize the damage caused by future storms.
battle to defeat isis and al-qaeda
We must never forget this committee's origins: September 11, when
2,977 men, women, and children were murdered by 19 hijackers. Those of
us serving in Congress then did not know if there was another plane
heading our way.
Yet, in the true spirit of Americans, we stood on the East Front
steps of the Capitol later that day--150 Members of Congress--singing,
with unity and purpose, ``God Bless America.''
The American people needed to know that their Government was still
here ready to serve and protect them from harm.
We did not have a President of the United States dividing Americans
and pitting us against each other with wild conspiracies or aggravating
old wounds based upon race, ethnicity, or religion.
We needed unity and we received it. It made us stronger together.
Over the past two decades, we have learned a great deal . . . and
have also forgotten much of what we, as a Nation, learned. The United
States is stronger when unified, and this committee's mandate includes
rooting out the forces that divide us.
Those who wish to do us harm can come from any race, religion,
ethnicity, or political persuasion.
We are better when we are one nation prepared to face these
challenges against a common foe.
That sense of unity has been under assault by forces within and
outside of the country.
I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and the
question and answer opportunity that will follow.
Thank you. I yield back the remainder of my time.
Chairman Thompson. Members are also reminded that the
committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by
the Chairman and Ranking Member in our February 3, 2021
colloquy regarding remote procedures.
I welcome our panel of witnesses.
Our first witness is Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of
Homeland Security. Our next witness will be Christopher Wray,
director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our third and
final witness will be Christine Abiziad, director of the
National Counterterrorism Center.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be
included in the record.
I now ask Secretary Mayorkas to summarize his statement for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
Katko, distinguished Members of this committee, thank you for
inviting me to join you today.
Next week marks the 20th anniversary of the Homeland
Security Act being signed into law. This Act brought together
many components of the Federal Government to safeguard the
United States against foreign terrorism in the wake of the
devastation wrought on September 11, 2001. It remains the
largest reorganization of the Federal Government's national
security establishment since 1947. It is a testament to the
great threat we faced as a Nation from terrorism brought to our
shores by foreign actors and foreign terrorist organizations.
Congress created a department that has significantly
reduced the foreign terrorism threat posed to the homeland.
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Secretary, will you pull your mic a
little closer to you?
Secretary Mayorkas. How is that?
Chairman Thompson. Well--all right. Let us hear how that
goes.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congress created a department that has
significantly reduced the risk foreign terrorism poses to the
homeland by increasing our capacity to prepare for and respond
to those events.
Foreign terrorist organizations remain committed to
attacking the United States from within and beyond our borders.
They use social media platforms to amplify messaging intended
to inspire attacks in the homeland. They have adapted to
changing security environments, seeking new and innovative ways
to target the United States. The evolving terrorism threat to
the homeland now includes lone actors fueled by a wide range of
violent extremist ideologies and grievances, including domestic
violent extremists, U.S.-based individuals who seek to further
political or social goals wholly or in part through violence,
without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group
or foreign power.
From cyber attacks on our critical infrastructure to
increasing destabilizing efforts by hostile nation-states, the
threats facing the homeland have never been greater or more
complex. Flouting internationally-accepted norms of responsible
behavior in cyber space, our adversaries, hostile nations and
non nation-state cyber criminals, continue to advance in
capability and sophistication. Their methods vary, but their
goals of doing harm are the same. Hostile nations like Russia,
the People's Republic of China, Iran, and North Korea, and
cyber criminals around the world, continue to sharpen their
tactics and create more adverse consequences. Their ransomware
attacks target our financial institutions, hospitals,
pipelines, electric grids, and water treatment plants
attempting to wreak havoc on our daily lives. They exploit the
integrated global cyber ecosystem to sow discord, undermine
democracy, and erode trust in our institutions, public and
private.
These cyber operations threaten the economic and national
security of every American and many others around the world. In
particular, China is using its technology to tilt the global
playing field to its benefit. They leverage sophisticated cyber
capabilities to gain access to the intellectual property, data,
and infrastructure of American individuals and businesses.
Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine intensified the risk of
a cyber attack impacting our critical infrastructure earlier
this year. Nation-state aggression is creating a heightened
risk of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related
threats to Americans as well.
While fast-emerging technologies, like unmanned aerial
systems, artificial intelligence, internet communications, and
cryptocurrencies are helping societies be more productive,
creative, and entrepreneurial, they also are introducing new
risks. Transnational criminal organizations are deploying these
technologies to commit a wide array of crimes as they continue
to grow in size, scale, sophistication, and lethality.
With respect to unmanned aerial systems in particular, it
is vital that Congress act before the end of this year to
extend our C-UAS authorities in order to protect the American
people from malicious drone activity.
The risk of targeted violence perpetrated by actors abroad
and at home is substantial. Emerging technology platforms allow
individuals and nation-states to fan the flames of hate and
personal grievances to large audiences and are encouraging
people to commit violent acts. Those driven to violence are
targeting critical infrastructure, soft targets, faith-based
institutions, institutions of higher education, racial and
religious minorities, government facilities and personnel,
including law enforcement and the military and perceived
ideological opponents.
Addressing these threats requires a whole-of-society
approach across Federal, State, and local governments, the
private sector, nonprofits, academia, and most importantly,
every citizen.
Congress may not have predicted the extent of today's
threat environment when our department was created 20 years
ago, but our mission has never been more vital, our components
have never collaborated more closely, our extraordinary work
force has never been more capable, and our Nation has never
been more prepared. We must harness the same deliberative and
bipartisan spirit in which this department was created to
combat the vast threats Americans face today.
I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Majorkas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
November 15, 2022
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members
of this committee: Thank you for inviting me to join you today. Next
week marks the 20th anniversary of the Homeland Security Act being
signed into law, which brought together many components of the Federal
Government in a determined National effort to safeguard the United
States against foreign terrorism in the wake of the devastation wrought
on September 11, 2001. It remains the largest reorganization of the
Federal Government's National security establishment since 1947 and a
testament to the grave threat we faced as a Nation from terrorism
brought to our shores by foreign actors and foreign terrorist
organizations.
Thanks to extensive deliberation and cooperation from both sides of
the aisle, Congress created a department that significantly reduced the
risk foreign terrorism poses to the homeland by increasing our capacity
to prepare for and respond to those events. However, foreign terrorism
remains a persistent threat that DHS combats every day. Foreign
terrorist organizations remain committed to attacking the United States
from within and beyond our borders. They use social media platforms to
amplify messaging intended to inspire attacks in the homeland and have
adapted to changing security environments, seeking new and innovative
ways to target the United States. Foreign terrorists will continue to
expand their networks, cross international borders, raise funds, and
organize to improve their ability to target the homeland.
Rapidly emerging technologies, evolving cyber capabilities, and
increasing economic and political instability around the world are
contributing to a heightened threat environment at home. From cyber
attacks on our critical infrastructure and increasing destabilizing
efforts by hostile nation-states, to the rise of domestic violent
extremism, the threats facing the homeland have never been greater or
more complex.
Flouting internationally-accepted norms of responsible behavior,
transparency, and accountability in cyber space, our adversaries--
hostile nations and non-nation-state cyber criminals--continue to
advance in capability and sophistication. Their methods vary, but their
goals of doing harm are the same. Hostile nations like Russia, the
People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, North Korea, and cyber
criminals around the world continue to sharpen their tactics and create
more adverse consequences. Their ransomware attacks target our
financial institutions, hospitals, pipelines, electric grids, and water
treatment plants to wreak havoc on our daily lives. They exploit the
integrated global cyber ecosystem to sow discord, undermine liberal
democracy, and erode trust in our institutions, public and private.
These cyber operations threaten the economic and National security of
every American, and many others around the world.
In particular, the PRC is using its technology to tilt the global
playing field to its benefit. They leverage sophisticated cyber
capabilities to gain access to the intellectual property, data, and
infrastructure of American individuals and businesses. Russia's
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine intensified the risk of a cyber attack,
impacting our critical infrastructure earlier this year. Nation-state
aggression is creating a heightened risk of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear-related threats to Americans as well.
Fast-emerging technologies like unmanned aerial systems, artificial
intelligence, internet communications, and cryptocurrencies are helping
societies be more productive, creative, and entrepreneurial. They also
are introducing new risks. Transnational criminal organizations are
deploying these technologies to commit a wide array of crimes as they
continue to grow in size, scale, sophistication, and lethality.
The risk of targeted violence, perpetrated by actors abroad and at
home, is substantial. Emerging technology platforms allow individuals
and nation-states to fan the flames of hate and personal grievances to
large audiences and are encouraging people to commit violent acts.
Those driven to violence are targeting critical infrastructure; soft
targets such as sports venues, shopping malls, and other mass
gatherings; faith-based institutions, such as churches, synagogues, and
mosques; institutions of higher education; racial and religious
minorities; Government facilities and personnel, including law
enforcement and the military; and perceived ideological opponents.
Addressing these threats requires a whole-of-society approach
across Federal, State, and local governments, the private sector,
nonprofits, academia, and--most importantly--every citizen. Congress
may not have predicted the extent of today's threat environment when
our Department was created 20 years ago, but our mission has never been
more vital, our components have never collaborated more closely, and
our Nation has never been more prepared. We must harness the same
deliberative and bipartisan spirit in which this Department was created
to combat the vast threats Americans face today.
combating terrorism and targeted violence
Foreign Terrorism Threats
Since the inception of this Department, the threat landscape has
evolved dramatically, and DHS has remained vigilant against all
terrorism-related threats to the homeland. In the years immediately
following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Department focused on
foreign terrorists located overseas who sought to harm us within our
borders and threaten our interests abroad. This focus evolved to
include home-grown violent extremists (HVEs): Individuals in America
whose ideologically-motivated terrorist activities are primarily
inspired by Foreign Terrorist Organization's (FTOs) political or social
objectives.
Our assessments indicate that FTOs will maintain a highly-visible
presence on-line and prioritize messaging focused on inspiring HVEs to
conduct attacks in the United States. Media branches of al-Qaeda and
the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) have continued to
celebrate perceived victories over the United States pointing to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on their anniversaries and the
U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan to encourage the use of
violence by their supporters. ISIS media and its supporters have also
sought to revitalize ISIS's image as a global enterprise and to portray
the group as the true vanguard of resistance against the United States
and its allies. ISIS and its supporters continue to call for attacks in
the United States, and supporters often share on-line tactics and
techniques for reducing the likelihood of being detected by law
enforcement.
Some terrorist-associated individuals maintain a presence in the
Western Hemisphere, and could be leveraged to support extremist
activities, possibly involving the homeland. For example, al-Qaeda-
associated individuals in Brazil are involved in financial support
through businesses they manage in the country, transferring funds in
support of extremist-related activities, and involved in the printing
and purchasing of counterfeit currencies in support of al-Qaeda's
global efforts.
We continue to see Iran and its partner, Lebanese Hezbollah, pose
an enduring threat to the homeland, evidenced by Iran's public
statements threatening retaliation in the United States for Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem
Soleimani's death and historical arrests of IRGC and Hezbollah members
plotting operations in the United States. In the past several years,
U.S. law enforcement has arrested numerous individuals for spying on
Iranian dissidents in the United States and for acting as agents of
influence for the Iranian Government. In August, Federal prosecutors
unsealed charges against an IRGC member for plotting to assassinate a
former U.S. official. Given its capabilities, Iran could advance an
attack plot targeted at the United States with little to no warning.
DHS continues to work closely with other law enforcement agencies and
the intelligence community to stay aware of on-going threat streams and
take preventative actions as appropriate.
DHS works closely with our law enforcement, National security, and
intelligence community partners to improve our ability to identify
individuals who pose a National security or public safety threat and
who seek to travel to the United States or receive an immigration
benefit. In fiscal year 2022, the National Vetting Center (NVC),
managed by DHS, enhanced its ability to support vetting for DHS and
Department of State. Through technology advancements, the NVC has
increased efficiencies in vetting processes, improving our ability to
identify potential threats. We continue to build partnerships with
foreign governments, to include increasing our information sharing and
vetting capabilities. DHS is increasing our ability to engage in
biometric comparison with our foreign partners, and most recently
amended requirements for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) to require
participation in the Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP). Under
EBSP, DHS will be able to conduct biometric checks against VWP member
countries' biometric data to authenticate VWP travelers' identities to
quickly receive immigration and criminal history information.
As a key part of the interagency approach to countering these
threats, DHS provides timely and accurate intelligence to the broadest
audience at the lowest classification level possible. DHS will continue
to leverage our deployed intelligence professionals to ensure the
timely sharing of information and intelligence with our State, local,
Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners, including the National Network
of Fusion Centers, in accordance with applicable law and DHS privacy,
civil rights, civil liberties, and intelligence oversight policies.
Domestic Violent Extremism and Targeted Violence
The evolving terrorism threat to the homeland now also includes
those fueled by a wide range of violent extremist ideologies and
grievances, including domestic violent extremists (DVEs). DVEs are
U.S.-based individuals who seek to further political or social goals
wholly or in part through violence, without direction or inspiration
from a foreign terrorist group or foreign power. These actors are
motivated by various factors, including biases against racial and
religious minorities, perceived Government overreach, conspiracy
theories promoting violence, and false or misleading narratives often
spread on-line. Today, these U.S.-based individuals, who are inspired
by a broad range of violent ideologies, pose the most significant and
persistent terrorism-related threat to the homeland.
The intelligence community assesses that racially or ethnically
motivated violent extremists (RMVEs), who advocate for the superiority
of the white race, and militia violent extremists (MVEs), a component
of the anti-Government/anti-authority violent extremism threat
category, present the most lethal DVE threat in the homeland. In many
cases, DVE actors have spent inordinate amounts of time on-line viewing
extremist, violent materials and engaging with like-minded individuals.
RMVEs are the DVE actors with the most persistent and concerning
transnational connections, because individuals with similar ideological
beliefs exist outside of the United States. These RMVEs communicate
with and seek to influence each other. Such connectivity with overseas
violent extremists might lead to a greater risk of U.S. RMVEs
mobilizing to violence.
A June 2022 DVE assessment \1\ by DHS, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
determined that the threat from DVEs is likely to persist for the
coming months, with heightened tensions surrounding the 2022 elections,
continued perceptions of Government overreach, and immigration-related
developments or potential new legislation and court rulings; all
presenting potential flashpoints that could serve to encourage or
inspire acts of violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ DHS, NCTC, FBI, June 17, 2022 (U) Wide-Ranging Domestic Violent
Extremism Threat to Persist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To prepare for this threat, the Department has embraced a
community-based approach to prevent terrorism and targeted violence by
building trust, partnerships, and collaboration across every level of
government, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and the
communities we serve, while respecting First Amendment protections. We
focus on reducing the threat of violence. We must make it harder to
carry out an attack and reduce the potential for loss of life by
preventing mobilization to violence.
DHS's Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) is at
the forefront of the Federal Government's prevention efforts.
Established in 2021, CP3 provides technical, financial, and educational
assistance to help communities build local prevention capabilities. In
addition to supporting State-level prevention strategies, CP3 supports
local efforts to establish community support systems--bringing together
mental health providers, educators, faith leaders, public health
officials, social service providers, nonprofits, public safety
officials, and others--to create programs that connect individuals with
the help they need. CP3 relies on the expertise of DHS's Privacy and
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties professionals to ensure all
public-facing prevention resources, web content, and training materials
are protective of Americans' privacy rights and civil rights and civil
liberties.
As part of this effort, DHS has invested more than $50 million over
the past 3 years in communities across the United States, to help
prevent acts of targeted violence and terrorism through the Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program. DHS recently
announced 43 TVTP grant awards to entities in 20 States, totaling $20
million, for fiscal year 2022. Managed by CP3 and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the TVTP Grant program provides funding for
State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, nonprofits,
and institutions of higher education, to establish or enhance
capabilities to prevent targeted violence and terrorism. This year's
awards fulfill the grant program's focus on prioritizing the prevention
of domestic violent extremism, as well as efforts to counter
mobilization to violence that occurs on-line, while respecting privacy,
civil rights, and civil liberties.
DHS provides security funding to support facility hardening and
other operational and physical security enhancements for nonprofit
organizations at risk of terrorist attacks through the Nonprofit
Security Grant Program (NSGP). I am grateful that this critically
important program has seen a funding increase this past fiscal year of
$70 million from fiscal year 2021 levels, for a total of $250 million.
The fiscal year 2023 President's Budget request proposes another
increase to $360 million.
These funds are in addition to the resources provided by DHS to our
State and local partners through the Homeland Security Grant Program
(HSGP), in which DHS has designated ``Combating Domestic Violent
Extremism'' as a ``National Priority Area'' for both fiscal year 2021
and fiscal year 2022. This means that between fiscal year 2021 and
fiscal year 2022, States and local governments across our Nation will
spend over $111 million in grant funding on capabilities to detect and
protect against these threats.
Through the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, Congress
formally authorized the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to establish the
National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) to conduct research, training,
and consultation on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted
violence. NTAC leads the field of targeted violence prevention by
producing world-class research examining all forms of targeted
violence, including domestic terrorism, mass-casualty attacks, and
attacks against K-12 schools. NTAC's experts provide training and
guidance for professionals from a wide range of agencies and
institutions on establishing threat assessment frameworks and targeted
violence prevention programs unique to their organization's missions
and needs. In fiscal year 2022, NTAC delivered over 280 trainings and
briefings to over 28,000 participants, including State and local law
enforcement, government officials, educators, mental health
professionals, faith-based leaders, and workplace security managers.
The number of events and participants reached by NTAC in fiscal year
2022 represent the highest totals in the Center's history.
DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works
closely with public and private-sector partners to build security
capacity to mitigate cyber and physical risks, including threats posed
by terrorism and targeted violence. Through trainings, tools,
exercises, and best practices, CISA supports organizations in enhancing
security holistically and in countering the most prevalent threats,
including active shooters. Protective Security Advisors--a cadre of
more than 140 security subject-matter experts located across the
country--provide direct and tangible support to facilities by
conducting security assessments and advising on enhanced protective
measures.
Gender-Based Violence
Gender-based violence (GBV) is any harmful threat or act directed
at an individual or group based on their actual or perceived biological
sex, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, or
difference from social norms related to masculinity or femininity.
Gender-based violence is rooted in structural gender inequalities and
power imbalances. The DHS Council for Combatting Gender-Based Violence
(CCGBV) works to identify and build consensus and best practices around
combatting GBV, including initiatives focused on domestic violence,
forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), on-line
abuse and harassment, and trafficking in persons. The work of the CCGBV
comes at an inflection point for the health, safety, and well-being of
women and girls, as the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated a pre-
existing ``shadow pandemic'' of gender-based violence, as well as
economic, health, and caregiving crises that disproportionately
impacted women and girls long before the pandemic struck.
Women and girls are particularly vulnerable and may be specifically
targeted for acts of gender-based violence (GBV) as a part of terrorist
activities, requiring specific protection measures. This includes
safeguarding women's human rights during disaster and crisis
situations, displacement, and other scenarios, in order to counter the
effects of extremist violence. The USSS's NTAC has also identified the
specific threat posed by misogynistic extremism, men who identify
themselves as involuntary celibates or ``incels'' and target women for
violence.
cyber threats
Our interconnectedness and the technology that enables it--the
cyber ecosystem--exposes us to a dynamic and evolving threat
environment, one that is not contained by borders or limited to
centralized actors, one that impacts governments, the private sector,
civil society, and every individual. As a result, cyber threats from
foreign governments and transnational criminals remain among the most
prominent threats facing our Nation. Hostile nations like Russia, the
PRC, Iran, and North Korea, as well as cyber criminals around the
world, continually grow more sophisticated and create more adverse
consequences.
Within the past 2 years, we have seen numerous cybersecurity
incidents impacting organizations of all sizes and disrupting critical
services, from the SolarWinds supply chain compromise to the wide-
spread exploitation of vulnerabilities found in Microsoft Exchange
Servers. Further, ransomware incidents--like those affecting a major
pipeline company, JBS Foods, Kaseya, and CommonSpirit hospital system--
continue to increase. As of February 2022, CISA, the FBI, and the
National Security Agency observed incidents involving ransomware
against 14 of the 16 U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, and victims
in the first half of 2021 paid an estimated $590 million in ransoms,
compared to $416 million over all of 2020. We continue to believe there
is significant under-reporting of ransomware incidents.
Russia will likely remain a significant threat to U.S. networks,
data, and critical infrastructure as it refines and employs
sophisticated cyber espionage, influence, and attack capabilities,
particularly in response to international pressure following its
invasion of Ukraine. Russia has previously targeted critical
infrastructure in the United States and allied countries to hone--and
in some cases demonstrate--its ability to inflict damage during a
crisis. Last February, Russia conducted a cyber attack against
commercial satellite communications, impacting families and businesses
across Europe.
The PRC poses a highly advanced cyber threat to the homeland. The
PRC continues to leverage increasingly sophisticated, large-scale cyber
espionage operations against a range of industries, organizations, and
dissidents in the United States. The PRC uses cyber means to illicitly
obtain U.S. intellectual property, personally identifiable information,
and export-controlled information. The PRC launches cyber espionage
operations against the United States via People's Liberation Army and
Ministry of State Security cyber actors. PRC-backed hackers are among
the most active groups targeting governments and critical
infrastructure this year--including across Southeast Asia. They are the
most active group targeting businesses around the globe. Just one PRC
hacking group, known as APT41, has stolen intellectual property from at
least 30 multinational companies in the pharmaceutical, energy, and
manufacturing sectors, resulting in hundreds of billions of dollars of
lost revenue.
Iran has a robust cyber program that targets networks in nearly
every sector, and conducts offensive cyber operations in the United
States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and via other regional adversaries.
Iranian cyber attacks recently caused severe harm to government
networks in Albania, limiting access to essential services. These
attacks include disruptive and destructive cyber attacks such as
website defacements and data deletion. Iranian cyber espionage is a
high-frequency, wide-spread threat, and Iran may choose to leverage its
cyber access for disruptive or destructive attacks.
In the last 2 years alone, North Korea has largely funded its
weapons of mass destruction programs through cyber heists of
cryptocurrencies and hard currencies totaling more than $1 billion.
We assess that ransomware attacks targeting U.S. networks will
increase in the near and long term because cyber criminals have
developed effective business models to increase their financial gain,
likelihood for success, and anonymity. In recent years, ransomware
incidents have become increasingly prevalent among U.S. SLTT government
entities, and critical infrastructure organizations, with ransom
demands in 2020 exceeding $1.4 billion in the United States. The
Healthcare and Public Health Sector was also a popular target for
ransomware threat actors.
The Department is committed to keeping Americans safe from the
devastating effects of cyber crimes. Cyber criminals' primary
motivation is financial gain and criminals show little regard for whom
they target. DHS's investigative components, the USSS and Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI), are dedicated to stopping criminal acts,
identifying and arresting the criminals, and working to seize and
return stolen funds to the victims. Cyber crimes are often
transnational with the criminal actors, their infrastructure, and their
victims, spread across the globe. The USSS and HSI partner with Federal
and SLTT law enforcement and with international and foreign law
enforcement in combating cyber crimes.
It is the Department's responsibility to help protect our Nation's
critical infrastructure from these attacks. The private sector, which
owns and operates most of the Nation's critical infrastructure, plays a
vital role in working with CISA to ensure that we are aware of new
campaigns and intrusions. That awareness in turn helps CISA advise
other potential victims--increasing the Nation's collective cyber
defenses through our collaborative efforts.
In March 2022, President Biden signed the Cyber Incident Reporting
for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) into law. CIRCIA marks
an important milestone in improving America's cybersecurity. The
information received from our private-sector partners' reports will
enable CISA, along with other Federal agencies such as the FBI, to
build a common understanding of how our adversaries are targeting U.S.
networks and critical infrastructure. This information will fill
critical information gaps and allow us to rapidly deploy resources and
render assistance to victims suffering attacks, analyze incoming
reporting across sectors to spot trends, and quickly share that
information with network defenders to warn other potential victims. We
are grateful to Congress for passing this historic bipartisan
legislation, marking a critical step forward in the collective
cybersecurity of our Nation.
Cyber Threat Mitigation and Resilience
To respond to evolving cyber threats and increase our Nation's
cybersecurity and resilience, DHS has taken several steps, including:
In July 2021, with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other
Federal partners, DHS launched StopRansomware.gov--the first
whole-of-Government website that pools Federal resources to
combat ransomware and helps private and public organizations of
all sizes mitigate cyber risk and increase their resilience.
In August 2021, CISA announced the creation of the Joint
Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) to develop and execute joint
cyber defense planning with partners at all levels of
government and the private sector, to prevent and reduce the
impacts of cyber intrusions, and to ensure a unified response
when they occur.
In February 2022, DHS launched the Cyber Safety Review Board
(CSRB), a groundbreaking public-private partnership dedicated
to after-action review of significant cyber threats. The CSRB
published its first report this summer addressing the risk
posed by vulnerabilities in the widely-used ``Log4j'' open-
source software library.
In February 2022, recognizing the heightened risk of
malicious cyber activity related to the Russia-Ukraine
conflict, CISA launched a new campaign called ``Shields Up'' to
amplify free cybersecurity resources and guidance for how
organizations of every size and across every sector can
increase their cybersecurity preparedness.
In accordance with CIRCIA, DHS established the Cyber
Incident Reporting Council (CIRC) this past summer. The CIRC,
which includes approximately 30 representatives from Sector
Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) and independent regulators,
has convened several times to discuss opportunities to
coordinate, deconflict, and harmonize Federal cyber incident
reporting requirements, including those issued through
regulation. To facilitate this effort, DHS has inventoried all
Federal cyber incident reporting requirements and held one-on-
one consultations with over 20 CIRC members.
In September 2022, CISA and FBI launched the Joint
Ransomware Task Force (JRTF) to coordinate a whole-of-
Government effort to combat the threat of ransomware. A major
objective of the JRTF is to coordinate efforts among Federal
agencies and private-sector and SLTT partners to improve our
Nation's response to ransomware incidents, including efforts to
increase our Nation's cyber resiliency.
In September 2022, the Department announced the State and
Local Cybersecurity Grant Program (SLCGP) to help States, local
governments, rural areas, and territories address cybersecurity
risks and cybersecurity threats to information systems. In
fiscal year 2022, $183.5 million was made available under the
SLCGP, with varying funding amounts allocated over 4 years from
the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
In October 2022, the Department released the Cybersecurity
Performance Goals (CPGs), voluntary practices that outline the
highest-priority baseline measures businesses and critical
infrastructure owners of all sizes can take to protect
themselves against cyber threats. By clearly outlining
measurable goals based on easily understandable criteria such
as cost, complexity, and impact, the CPGs are designed to be
applicable to organizations of all sizes.
The disruptive ransomware attack on a major pipeline company
in May 2021 revealed a continuing significant National security
risk with critical vulnerabilities in the transportation sector
that previous voluntary efforts did not sufficiently mitigate.
Since the attack in 2021, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has issued security directives mandating
that surface transportation owners and operators implement
several critically important and urgently-needed cybersecurity
measures such as designating a cybersecurity coordinator,
reporting cybersecurity incidents, implementing a cybersecurity
response plan, completing a cybersecurity vulnerability
assessment, and identifying cybersecurity gaps. TSA recently
updated these directives to focus requirements on achieving
security outcomes, rather than on prescriptive measures.
Through security program amendments, TSA issued several similar
requirements to larger airports and air carriers, with
additional measures under consideration. DHS continues to
consider what additional directive action might be necessary to
address urgent cyber threats in transportation and other
critical infrastructure sectors and will continue to work
closely with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the
U.S. Department of Energy, and other Sector Risk Management
Agencies.
emerging technology threats
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Threats
The rapid proliferation of drones and their expanded utilization by
hobbyists, professionals, and threat actors have required DHS to shift
its response efforts to mitigate smaller, more agile, and less
attributable dangers across all its mission areas, while still
supporting the lawful use of these advanced technologies within our
Nation. Drones have conducted kinetic attacks with payloads of
explosives or firearms, caused dangerous interference with manned
aviation, disrupted airport operations (causing significant economic
harm), disrupted and damaged critical infrastructure, and nearly every
day, transnational organized criminal organizations (TCOs) use drones
to convey illicit narcotics (including fentanyl) and contraband across
U.S. borders and conduct hostile surveillance of law enforcement.
Congress extended the law that provides DHS's current counter-UAS
(C-UAS) authority through December 16, 2022, under the continuing
resolution. Ensuring that the existing authority does not lapse, and
the C-UAS activities currently being performed by DHS do not cease, are
critically important to our missions protecting the President and Vice
President, along the Southwest Border, securing sensitive Federal
facilities, and safeguarding the public. DHS has successfully executed
C-UAS operations at mass gatherings and Special Security Assessment
Rating (SEAR) and National Special Security Events (NSSEs), including
the 2022 World Series, the Super Bowl, the Indianapolis 500, the U.N.
General Assembly, the Democratic and Republican National Conventions,
and the State of the Union address. At all times, DHS engages in these
activities in a manner that protects individuals' privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties consistent with the requirements of the
current law and DHS policy.
To ensure that the Department can continue its C-UAS activities,
the administration has requested that Congress pass a 2-year, clean
extension of existing C-UAS authorities in the NDAA or another
legislative vehicle before these authorities expire. Any lapse in or
narrowing of DHS's C-UAS authority would entail serious risks for
homeland security, as DHS would have to cease or curtail existing C-UAS
operations that protect the homeland, including at the Southern Border
where drones are being used to traffic fentanyl and other dangerous
contraband. Rather, the authority should be expanded to address
critical gaps in the current law, such as a lack of protection for U.S.
airports from drones, the lack of authority for DHS to partner with
State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, enabling them to
detect and mitigate threats themselves, and the inability of critical
infrastructure owners and operators to detect drones operating near
their facilities or request Federal mitigation assistance.
Congressional action is urgently required, as DHS's authority to
detect and counter drone threats will expire on December 16, 2022. A
lapse in this authority could have catastrophic implications for
homeland security.
5G/6G
In the cyber ecosystem--which underpins the unprecedented
interconnectedness we've achieved as a Nation and across the globe--
emerging technology and innovation can also expose us to a dynamic and
evolving threat environment. For example, communications advancements
in 5G and 6G technology continue to be a high security priority for the
Department.
The PRC is using its technology to tilt the global playing field to
its benefit, capitalizing on the world-wide demand for communications
technology and luring customers with improved telecommunications
networks at a low cost. However, Beijing often requires large PRC-based
companies to share and store data from their networks in-country and to
provide that data to the Government when requested by authorities. It
is our belief that our essential telecommunications networks should not
be owned or operated by companies who will either sell or provide
information to a foreign government, and we are championing to
international partners that cheap telecommunications technology is not
worth the price of citizens' privacy, their national security, or their
sovereignty.
For several years, DHS has worked closely with the interagency
efforts to secure 5G and to mitigate possible malicious use by PRC
technology. At CISA, our 5G team provided supply chain risk analyses
that were a significant contribution to the Federal Government's
response to this issue. However, today we are looking beyond 5G to the
next frontier in 6G. 6G is still around 8-10 years away but the process
to create the standards for 6G roll out is beginning today. This is a
technology standardization process that has geopolitical implications
as Beijing is already positioning itself to dominate the standards
process. We see this as a potential threat to our homeland and economic
security and are taking steps to educate our partners about the
importance of this issue.
Cryptocurrency
While most cryptocurrency is used legitimately, cryptocurrency has
attributes that have already been exploited by criminals, terrorists,
and adversaries to facilitate their operations. Most notably, as it has
become easier to access and more widely used in general commerce, many
transnational ransomware operations are using the cryptocurrency
ecosystem to obfuscate illicit requests and receipt of ransoms.
Many components within DHS are focused on the rising illicit use of
digital assets, developing and providing training, investigating,
collaborating with interagency partners, and conducting research.
Pursuant to the President's Executive Order 14067, Responsible
Development of Digital Assets, the Department contributed to the whole-
of-Government effort to address concerns with respect to digital
assets.
For example, with domestic and international law enforcement
partners, the U.S. Secret Service has achieved notable successes in
combatting cyber-enabled financial crimes, including dismantling two
centralized virtual currency providers that supported extensive
criminal activity and successfully investigating a Russia-based
criminal scheme attempting to defraud cryptocurrency exchange customers
of $16.8 million.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) has offices in over 50 countries and works to
combat cyber crimes, including through training to international
partners and analytical assistance in tracing digital assets. HSI
investigations related to virtual assets have risen from one criminal
investigation in 2011 to over 530 criminal investigations in fiscal
year 2022--seizing over $4 billion in virtual assets this last fiscal
year. HSI has also trained law enforcement partners in more than 20
countries on dark web and cryptocurrency investigations, and regularly
works with victims to remediate vulnerabilities before they are
exploited.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
AI encompasses several different technologies, notably natural
language processing, computer vision, generative AI, and more. It is
imperative for DHS to take a proactive role in the use of AI systems
and to contribute to the National conversation on the secure use of
this transformative technology. Malicious actors are using increasingly
advanced AI, powered by more data, increasingly accessible computing
resources, and advancements in machine learning algorithms. Our own
prudent use of AI can help us more effectively and efficiently
accomplish our mission to secure the homeland.
Over the past several years, DHS has been engaged in AI
conversations across the Federal Government on AI ethics,
governance, and use policies.
We are taking a strategic approach to mitigate and counter
adversary AI efforts by tracking evolving adversary AI
capabilities that could be used to exploit or overcome security
measures at our physical borders, in cyber space, in election
systems, and beyond.
We are working with other responsible partners--domestically
and internationally--on sharing best practices and developing
standards.
Quantum
The future development of quantum computers capable of breaking
current cryptography presents a tremendous threat to the way we store
and move sensitive Government, critical infrastructure, financial, and
personal data. DHS recognized this threat and established a productive
partnership with the National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) within the Department of Commerce to produce actionable steps
that our critical infrastructure and State, local, Tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) partners can take to prepare themselves for the
coming transition to new post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. DHS
played a leading role in reflecting this work--and complementary
efforts--in the whole-of-Government and whole-of-society effort on
quantum computing captured in the President's recent National Security
Memorandum on quantum computing.
Smart Cities and Connected Communities
The convergence of a number of emerging technologies such as 5G,
Internet of Things, AI, and cloud computing in our municipalities is
creating exciting opportunities for efficient transportation, equitable
delivery of Government services, and energy efficiency in the form of
``connected communities.'' This issue presents a unique cybersecurity
challenge for critical infrastructure, with the introduction of
potentially tens of thousands of new internet-connected devices. DHS
has been working this issue for over a year to ensure that our
municipalities, large and small, can capitalize on this impressive
technology in a safe and secure manner.
transnational criminal organizations
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to pose a
threat to the United States, particularly U.S. public health, as well
as our economic and National security. Over recent years, they have
grown in size, scale, sophistication, and lethality. According to a
2018 estimate, the U.S. Treasury Department estimated drug-related
crime alone generated over $100 billion in proceeds in the United
States. These profits also come with a high toll on human life; the
opioid drugs these TCOs traffic were responsible for the majority of
the over 100,000 U.S. overdose deaths between April 2020 and April
2021, according to CDC reporting. Mexico-based TCO criminal activity is
not limited to drug trafficking; they engage in wide variety of other
criminal activity. TCOs also facilitated and profited from smuggling
migrants into the United States and their illicit trade activity led to
the seizure of over $2.14 billion in Intellectual Property violations
in fiscal year 2021. TCOs are adept at changing their illicit drug
supply chains, shifting human smuggling routes and tactics, and using
various money-laundering techniques to evade law enforcement. TCOs
operating in Mexico, specifically the Sinaloa Cartel and New Generation
Jalisco Cartel, almost certainly will continue to dominate illegal drug
trafficking--including trafficking of methamphetamine, fentanyl,
cocaine, and heroin--into the United States.
Other TCOs, some working with Mexico-based TCOs, also pose a
growing threat to the homeland. TCOs in the PRC launder money for or
sell precursor chemicals to TCOs in Mexico, while Central American
gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street Gang,
largely serve as cross-border couriers, smuggling drugs and people for
Mexico-based TCOs. Asia-, Africa-, and Balkans-based TCOs are involved
in a range of criminal activities that affect the homeland, such as
money laundering, financial fraud, human smuggling, and racketeering.
To confront TCOs and other threat networks, DHS has embraced an
approach that leverages U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)'s
unique authorities, data holdings, Intelligence Enterprise, and
interagency partnerships to illuminate, disrupt, degrade, and dismantle
networks that pose a threat to the homeland and its interests. CBP's
international collaboration and integration with the interagency
optimizes the collective global effort, which identifies options for
intelligence-driven, risk-mitigating responses. Our success at
identifying, degrading, and disrupting transnational networks relies on
CBP front-line agents, officers, trade, and intelligence professionals
working hand-in-hand with the whole of Government, as well as
international partners. Developing these relationships and capabilities
enables CBP to proactively identify and stop threats before they arrive
at U.S. borders.
Counternarcotics
DHS employs a multi-layered approach to countering narcotics
trafficking. The shift in the illicit drug market toward synthetic
drugs, primarily fentanyl, its analogues, and other opioids, led CBP to
develop and implement the CBP Strategy to Combat Opioids. With the
support of Congress, CBP continues to make significant investments and
improvements in drug detection and interdiction technology to detect
the presence of illicit drugs, including illicit opioids, in all
operating environments. CBP's extended border and foreign operations
mission involves collaborating with U.S. and international partners to
conduct joint maritime operations in the source, transit, and arrival
zones of the Western Hemisphere. In collaboration with Joint
Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), CBP operates aircraft
throughout North and Central America, conducting counter-narcotics
missions to detect and interdict bulk quantities of illicit narcotics.
CBP seized 11,200 pounds of fentanyl in fiscal year 2021 and 14,700
pounds in fiscal year 2022. This compares to 2,804 pounds in fiscal
year 2019. CBP's National Targeting Center uses advanced analytics and
targeting capabilities to identify critical logistics, financial, and
communication nodes and exploit areas of weakness in opioid trafficking
networks.
CBP seeks to prevent drug trafficking through ports of entry, which
is where most drugs enter the United States. Personal vehicles remain
the primary method of conveyance encountered for illicit drugs entering
the country by volume over land, with notable increases within
commercial truck conveyances for methamphetamine. The Non-Intrusive
Inspection (NII) Systems Program deploys technologies to inspect and
screen conveyances or cars, trucks, railcars, sea containers, as well
as personal luggage, packages, parcels, and flat mail through either X-
ray or gamma-ray imaging systems. CBP Officers use NII systems to help
them effectively and efficiently detect and prevent contraband,
including drugs, unreported currency, guns, ammunition, and other
illegal merchandise, as well as inadmissible persons, from being
smuggled into the United States, while having a minimal impact on the
flow of legitimate travel and commerce.
CBP also robustly enforces the Synthetics Trafficking and Overdose
Prevention (STOP) Act to prevent trafficking by mail. CBP operates
within major international mail facilities to inspect international
mail and parcels arriving from more than 180 countries. Additionally,
CBP and the U.S. Postal Service are working to increase the amount of
advance electronic data (AED) received on international mail. This
advance information enables ICE and other agencies to identify networks
of foreign suppliers and domestic importers that are responsible for
smuggling fentanyl into the United States.
HSI also plays a critical role in countering narcotics trafficking
by exchanging information, coordinating investigations, and
facilitating enforcement actions with law enforcement partners abroad
to deter the ability of TCOs to smuggle drugs, people, and contraband
into and out of the United States. Preliminary fiscal year 2022
statistics reveal HSI conducted 11,535 criminal arrests and seized
roughly 1.87 million pounds of narcotics, which included 20,980 pounds
of fentanyl, in fiscal year 2022. Additionally, in fiscal year 2022,
HSI agents seized more than $210 million in total currency and assets
through their narcotics enforcement efforts.
One of HSI's most significant tools to combat TCOs engaged in
fentanyl trafficking are the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces
(BESTs). BESTs eliminate the barriers between Federal and local
investigations and close the gap with international partners in
multinational criminal investigations. BESTs continue to be a primary
vehicle used to carry out HSI's comprehensive, multi-layered strategy
to address the National opioid epidemic.
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) leads maritime interdictions of
narcotics in the Western Hemisphere. The USCG disrupts illicit
trafficking where it is most vulnerable: At sea in the transit zones,
often far from U.S. shores before bulk quantities are divided for
distribution. The Coast Guard is continuing to expand cooperation with
partner nations in South and Central America to combat the flow of
narcotics before they reach U.S. shores. In fiscal year 2022, the USCG
removed approximately 140 metric tons of cocaine, 60,000 pounds of
marijuana and 8 metric tons of other narcotics, including
methamphetamines, fentanyl, heroin, and hashish.
The Department welcomes Congress' support for extending the
statutory authority to establish and operate Joint Task Forces (JTFs).
JTFs provide a direct operational coordination layer to enhance the
multi-faceted challenges facing DHS. Today, JTF-East is responsible for
ensuring Departmental unity of effort in the southern maritime approach
to the United States and demonstrates the tangible, positive impacts
that JTFs can have on enhancing DHS coordinated operations.
Human Smuggling
Migration is a hemispheric challenge, one not limited to the United
States. Displacement and migration are higher than at any time since
World War II. At our Southwest Border, we are experiencing historic
levels of encounters. The demographics of the population have also
changed, with more than triple the number of Venezuelans, Cubans, and
Nicaraguans than last year, as people flee repressive governments and
lack of economic opportunity. In September 2022, Venezuelans, Cubans,
and Nicaraguans accounted for almost half of unique encounters at the
Southwest Border--triple their share from 1 year ago. Reporting from
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) suggests that
nearly 1 in 4 Venezuelans have fled their home since 2014,
approximately 7 million people. At least 1 in 3 of those who have fled
from Venezuela have settled in Colombia. Additionally, the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has reported
that Costa Rica is hosting more than 200,000 Nicaraguan migrants, equal
to nearly 4 percent of their total population.
We assess that global food and water shortages, poor economic
conditions, and other socio-political factors will continue to drive an
increase in cross-border migration. TCOs that specialize in human
smuggling increasingly exploit and financially benefit from the
continued growth in global migration trends. TCOs in Mexico play an
influential role in human smuggling, increasingly facilitating illicit
migration to and across the border. These groups control large sections
of territory just south of the U.S. border and have traditionally taxed
human smugglers to move migrants through their areas of operation.
Disrupting human smuggling is a top priority for our Department,
and we have invested significant time and resources in the effort to
disrupt and dismantle the TCOs that support human smuggling. In April
2022, DHS launched a first-of-its-kind effort, unprecedented in scale,
to disrupt and dismantle human smuggling networks. So far, this
campaign has resulted in the arrest of over 6,400 smugglers and the
disruption of over 6,750 smuggling operations. This work includes
raiding stash houses, impounding tractor-trailers that are used to
smuggle migrants, and confiscating smugglers' communications
technology.
On October 16, I wrote to the United States Sentencing Commission,
urging that the guidelines for smuggling offenses be updated to address
the seriousness of the offenses. According to the Sentencing
Commission's own data, in fiscal year 2021, the average sentence
smuggling drugs (average 74 months) was almost 5 times longer than for
smuggling human beings (average of just 15 months). These lower
sentences negatively affect prosecutors' ability to negotiate plea
agreements and obtain co-operation of co-conspirators; as a result,
human smuggling organizations survive and thrive, as key members are
rarely severely penalized for their heinous crimes.
The United States cannot do this work alone; hemispheric challenges
require hemispheric solutions. We are strengthening our relationships
with partners in Mexico and Central and South America and taking
unprecedented actions as a result. In October 2022, DHS announced joint
actions with the government of Mexico, reinforcing our coordinated
enforcement operations to target human smuggling organizations and
bring them to justice. That campaign includes new migration
checkpoints, additional resources and personnel, joint targeting of
human smuggling organizations, and expanded information sharing related
to transit nodes, hotels, stash houses, and staging locations.
We are matching the unprecedented migration challenge we face with
unprecedented and innovative solutions to secure the border. We are
surging resources and increasing efficiency, prioritizing smart border
security solutions, making historic investments in technology, taking
the fight to cartels and smugglers, and doing more with our regional
partners than ever before. CBP has 23,000 agents and officers working
along the Southwest Border and is seeking another 300 agents in the
fiscal year 2023 budget request.
We have hired and contracted for over 1,000 Border Patrol
Processing Coordinators to get agents back into the field to perform
their essential law enforcement mission. Through the Southwest Border
Coordination Center, established in February 2022, we are coordinating
a whole-of-Government approach to humanely prevent and respond to
increases in irregular migration by surging and coordinating our border
security and law enforcement resources. We are also supporting border
communities as well as interior cities--both local governments and
NGO's--that are responding to a surge in migration, including through
the Emergency Food and Shelter Program.
We are prioritizing smart border security solutions, grounded in
evidence rather than rhetoric, and making historic investments in
technology. We have incorporated mobile intake and en route processing
to begin processing non-citizens in the field; integrated digital case
review saving over 70,000 hours of agent time; and advanced capacity by
leveraging virtual processing capabilities.
In addition to our digitization efforts, we are also installing
effective technology like linear ground detection systems and automated
surveillance towers. We have also made historic investments in non-
intrusive inspection technology to be deployed at ports of entry to
increase our interdiction of illicit drugs, because we know that
traffickers seek to smuggle drugs through the ports of entry in all
modes of transportation.
Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Theft of Intellectual Property
The Department continues to facilitate legitimate trade by
investigating TCOs that profit from the sale of counterfeit goods and
the theft of Intellectual Property (IP). To this end, HSI's
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center) brings
together 30 Federal and international agencies to combat IP theft. In
fiscal year 2022, HSI initiated more IP theft cases; affected more
criminal arrests, indictments, and convictions; and seized a higher
value of counterfeit goods, more than $1.1 billion worth, than in
fiscal year 2021.
HSI's Operation Chain Reaction targets counterfeit goods entering
the U.S. Government supply chain, including that of the Armed Services.
As an example of HSI's impact, the agency recently indicted one of the
largest importers of counterfeit network routers. These routers, worth
more than $1 billion had they been genuine, were destined to sensitive
end-users, including in the Department of Defense, the FBI, government
aerospace contractors, and medical facilities. In another example, HSI
recently secured a guilty plea from an importer of counterfeit military
uniforms destined to be sold to the Department of Defense. These
counterfeit uniforms failed fire-resistance testing and failed to hide
the wearer's radiation levels, making them detectible to enemy optics.
Had these counterfeit goods not been seized, they would have imperiled
the safety of our warfighters and exposed our service members to harm.
Human Trafficking and Child Sexual Exploitation
Combatting the abhorrent crimes of human trafficking and child
sexual exploitation and abuse is a top priority for the Department.
These crimes target the most vulnerable among us, offend our most basic
values, and threaten our personal and public safety. Nearly every
component within DHS is involved in combating human trafficking. We
employ a victim-centered approach across our policies and programs,
striving to support and protect victims. We lead criminal
investigations into sex trafficking and forced labor, with HSI
initiating nearly 1,400 investigations in fiscal year 2022 alone and
helping achieve hundreds of Federal and State-level convictions each
year against traffickers. We develop leading-edge technologies to
identify and locate victims and perpetrators. We shine a light on these
dark crimes through the Blue Campaign, our signature public awareness
and education effort. We train our personnel to recognize and respond
to human trafficking in the course of their daily responsibilities,
delivering 53 training and outreach events to 5,927 participants in
fiscal year 2022. These efforts are streamlined and strengthened
through the DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking, the first
Department-wide operational coordination center for combating human
trafficking and the importation of goods produced with forced labor.
Combating trade in illicit goods produced with forced labor is also
a critical part of our counter-trafficking mission. Recent studies
estimate that upwards of 27 million people around the world are trapped
in forced labor bondage, many of whom are members of racial, religious,
and ethnic minority groups. Working to end these horrific practices not
only promotes respect for human rights and dignity, but also benefits
U.S. National security and other interests overseas. CBP is charged
with rooting out forced-labor-made goods from our supply chains by
preventing the entry of these illegal goods into the U.S. market. CBP
carries out this mission by investigating allegations of forced labor
in supply chains and, where allegations are corroborated, issuing
Withhold Release Orders (WROs) and forced labor findings.
This year, DHS led the interagency Forced Labor Enforcement Task
Force (FLETF) in its successful implementation of the Uyghur Forced
Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), which was enacted by Congress and signed
into law at the end of 2021. Going forward, CBP will continue to
enforce the new law, and DHS, as FLETF Chair, will continue to lead the
interagency in updating the UFLPA enforcement strategy, including the
list of entities subject to the UFLPA's rebuttable presumption.
The scope and severity of on-line child sexual exploitation and
abuse (CSEA) has increased dramatically in recent years. Reports of on-
line child sexual abuse material (CSAM) to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, the Nation's clearinghouse for CSAM,
increased by more than 35 percent between 2020 and 2021 (to nearly 30
million reports), and 2022 year-to-date numbers foreshadow an even
greater increase this year. Increasingly, the victims of these horrific
crimes are infants and toddlers, and the abuse has become more violent.
New forms of CSEA have also emerged and grown exponentially, including
the live streaming of child sexual abuse and sophisticated sextortion
and grooming schemes.
That is why I am redoubling the Department's efforts in this space.
We are strengthening our Cyber Crimes Center (C3), including HSI's
Child Exploitation Investigations Unit (CEIU), a global leader in
counter-CSEA law enforcement operations. Every day, the extraordinary
men and women of C3 and HSI field offices around the country and the
globe work tirelessly to locate and apprehend offenders, identify and
rescue victims, and share information with our partners in this fight.
In fiscal year 2021, CEIU identified and/or rescued 1,177 child victims
in child exploitation investigations. During this same period, CEIU
arrested 3,776 individuals for crimes involving the sexual exploitation
of children and helped to secure more than 1,500 convictions. In fiscal
year 2022, HSI Victim Assistance Specialists assisted 3,326 victims of
crimes, of which 1,138 were child exploitation victims. HSI Forensic
Interview Specialists conducted 1,836 trauma-informed forensic
interviews, of which 1,238 were in support of bringing perpetrators of
child exploitation crimes to justice.
We are also building policy, public-education, and strategic-
engagement infrastructure to elevate and enhance the Department's
counter-CSEA capabilities. DHS remains steadfast in advancing and
leveraging its full breadth of authorities and resources to end these
heinous crimes, and we urge you to support our efforts to expand our
work to fight all forms of human trafficking and child sexual abuse.
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives threats
The overall chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and
explosives (CBRNE)-related threat environment in the homeland will
likely remain unpredictable over the next 12 months. Terrorists remain
interested in acquiring and using WMD in attacks against U.S. interests
and the U.S. homeland. Separately, factors including the spread of
dual-use CBRNE-related technologies, materials, environmental change,
advances in computer and related technology that lower technical
barriers, and global expansion in the number and sophistication of
biological laboratories will likely continue to influence threat trends
in the coming years, especially the proliferation of CBRNE threats by
non-state actors.
The United States assesses that Russia maintains an offensive
biological weapons program and that other potential state adversaries
engage in activities that raise concerns regarding compliance with the
Biological Weapons Convention. Having seen the human and economic
devastation resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, our adversaries are
more aware of the significance of biological threats. Additionally, a
global desire to mitigate the consequences of future pandemics is
likely to expand global interest in leveraging and advancing biological
technology capabilities, including technologies used for biosafety and
biosecurity. The dual-use nature of these capabilities complicates the
ability to discern civil medical research from malign biological
weapons development and heightens the risks of accidental release of
biological hazards due to lacking biosafety and biosecurity.
DHS continues to monitor chemical-related threats, including the
development and use of chemical weapons and the potential for non-state
actors, lone actors, and criminals to pursue a range of chemical
substances to use domestically. The use of chemical agents by Russia
and North Korea in targeted attacks outside their borders in recent
years reaffirms our commitment to monitor for and defend against
similar attempts in the homeland. Similarly, chemical accidents of
varying severity remain common and of enduring concern. Over time,
these trends could manifest as an increased domestic threat.
Traditional radiological and nuclear threats to the homeland remain
low. Due to material security and other factors, the likelihood of a
large-scale radiological attack in the homeland is very low.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the risk of unsecured or vulnerable
fissile and other source materials in the United States. While the
United States has expressed concern with Russian nuclear saber-
rattling, we do NOT anticipate that a nuclear detonation in Europe
would have any direct health consequences on the homeland.
The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) leads the
Department's efforts to safeguard the United States against CBRNE
threats by collecting and analyzing CBRNE threat data, conducting risk
analysis, and enhancing and implementing capabilities to prevent,
detect, prepare for, and respond to the range of CBRNE incidents. This
includes collaborating with Federal entities to monitor biological
threats in cities across the country, providing radiological and
nuclear detection equipment to SLTTC partners in urban areas, providing
surge support to protect special events, and equipping DHS operational
components with radiological and nuclear detection equipment to prevent
smuggling at the border. Additionally, CWMD works closely with campus
jurisdictions to enhance their capabilities to address these threats
and ensure a coordinated, National response.
The Office of Health Security (OHS) promotes a unified approach
through partnerships that protect the health of our workforce and the
health security of the homeland. In the face of an ever-expanding and
complex National health security mission, OHS enhances integration of
Federal and SLTTC public safety and health security partners, leads the
Department's engagements related to medical countermeasures
prioritization and policy development, and coordinates food,
agriculture, and veterinary defense activities. Recent domestic and
global threats such as pandemics, supply chain disruptions, resurgence
of zoonotic and transboundary diseases, climate change impacts, and
cybersecurity incidents all underscore the important nexus between
agro-defense, food protection, and food security with the National
security, National economic security, and National public health and
safety of the United States.
extreme weather events and climate change resilience
The impacts of climate change pose an acute and systemic threat to
the safety, security, and prosperity of the United States, and have
already led to changes in the environment, such as rising ocean
temperatures, shrinking sea ice, rising sea levels, and ocean
acidification. As our climate continues to warm, the United States will
experience more climate-related disasters such as heat waves, droughts,
wildfires, coastal storms, and inland flooding. This year, we have
already seen the devastating impacts from Hurricane Fiona in Puerto
Rico and Hurricane Ian in Florida, and Typhoon Merbok in Alaska.
Natural disasters occur both seasonally and without warning, subjecting
affected communities to insecurity, disruption, and economic loss.
Natural disasters include all types of severe weather that have the
potential to pose a significant threat to human health and safety,
property, and critical infrastructure.
Preparedness and Resilience
Under the Biden-Harris administration, DHS is engaged in climate
change adaptation and mitigation efforts to make the Department and the
Nation more prepared, more secure, and more resilient:
In 2021, DHS established a Climate Change Action Group
(CCAG) to coordinate DHS response to climate-related Executive
Orders and track implementation of actions and progress toward
DHS climate change priorities. During the first year, the group
was critical in coordinating a Strategic Framework to Address
Climate Change and hold the first Department-wide exercise on
extreme heat.
DHS is leading the charge among Federal agencies to
transition its fleet vehicles from internal combustion engines
to zero-emission electric vehicles and is the first Federal
agency to upfit a battery electric vehicle for law enforcement
use. As the Nation's third-largest Federal agency and largest
law enforcement agency, DHS has an inventory of more than
50,000 vehicles, with law enforcement vehicles making up 60
percent of its fleet.
DHS made available more than $3 billion for the fiscal year
2022 Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC)
and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant programs which seek
to help SLTT governments address high-level future risks to
natural disasters such as extreme heat, wildfires, drought,
hurricanes, earthquakes, and increased flooding to foster
greater community resilience and reduce disaster suffering.
FEMA continues to evolve mitigation grant programs to be
more equitable, reduce complexity, and address climate
resilience. FEMA is focused on reducing barriers to access
funding faced by those who need it the most and building
capacity and capability to deliver mitigation grant programs.
FEMA announced the expansion of BRIC non-financial Direct
Technical Assistance (DTA), increasing the number of
communities receiving this community resilience planning and
project development assistance from 20 in fiscal year 2021 to
40 in fiscal year 2022, to help communities design
transformational projects that address multiple hazards and
accelerate community resilience.
FEMA has also developed a Nature-Based Solutions Guide to
help communities identify and engage the staff and resources
that can be used to implement nature-based solutions to build
resilience to natural hazards, which may be exacerbated by
climate change. Nature-based solutions can help reduce the loss
of life and property resulting from some of our Nation's most
common natural hazards. These include flooding, storm surge,
drought, and landslides. As future conditions, like climate
change, intensify these hazards, nature-based solutions can
help communities adapt and thrive.
nation-state threats
The United States faces an evolving and increasingly complex threat
from nation-state adversaries, including the PRC, Russia, Iran, and
North Korea, each of which views the United States as a strategic
adversary. These adversaries employ a combination of traditional and
non-traditional intelligence tradecraft, predatory economic and
cultural outreach, and cyber and traditional espionage to seek illicit
access to U.S. critical infrastructure and steal sensitive information,
technology, and industrial secrets. These governments--and a growing
number of others who are learning from their tactics--conduct overt and
covert influence campaigns spreading misinformation and disinformation
to sow and exploit divisions in our society, undermine confidence in
our democratic institutions, and weaken our alliances. In some cases,
they surveil, harass, and otherwise seek to suppress perceived
dissidents and regime opponents overseas, including those now living in
the United States.
The global availability of technologies with intelligence
applications--such as biometric devices, unmanned systems, high-
resolution imagery, enhanced technical surveillance equipment, advanced
encryption, and big data analytics--and the unauthorized disclosure of
cyber tools have enabled a wider range of actors to obtain
sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Threat actors are using these
capabilities against an expanded set of targets and vulnerabilities.
Foreign Intelligence Entities are targeting most U.S. Government
departments and agencies, to include DHS, as well as National
laboratories, the financial sector, the U.S. industrial base, and other
private-sector and academic entities. These activities put at risk the
homeland security enterprise, as well as State and local partners, and
private-sector critical infrastructure providers.
We assess that the PRC will continue to exploit professors,
scholars, and students visiting the United States from the PRC as
nontraditional collectors to steal sensitive information and
technology. Some collectors are unwittingly providing information back
to the PRC, while others are aware of their roles and have admitted to
stealing research from U.S. institutions to support Chinese military
ambitions. We expect the threat from these actors will increase as
international students return to U.S. universities after a hiatus due
to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Russia embeds intelligence officers in its diplomatic posts inside
the United States. While in the United States, Russia's intelligence
officers try to establish front companies and recruit Russian emigres
and American citizens to steal sensitive U.S. academic, Government, and
business information. Russia continues to circumvent U.S.-imposed
sanctions to acquire sensitive/dual-use technology for use in military
weapons and aviation industry.
We assess that for the foreseeable future, Iran probably will
present an enduring counterintelligence threat to the homeland as it
seeks to advance its goals in the Middle East. During the past several
years, U.S. law enforcement has arrested numerous individuals for
spying on Iranian dissidents in the United States and for acting as
agents of influence for the Iranian government.
Election Security
The security and resilience of our Nation's election infrastructure
is one of the highest priorities for DHS. As demonstrated in recent
election cycles, we continue to face a wide range of threats targeting
U.S. election infrastructure and voters by sophisticated, State-
sponsored cyber threat actors, such as the PRC, Russia, and Iran. In
many cases, the foreign threat actors who are attempting to breach our
election systems are the very same ones who are conducting influence
operations that seek to sow discord in our country. Their influence
operations often utilize information obtained illicitly through cyber
activity, or they make false or exaggerated claims of cybersecurity
breaches. These foreign threat actors advance their own disinformation
narratives about U.S. elections, as well as amplify existing domestic
disinformation narratives. Protecting election infrastructure is a
whole-of-Government effort. DHS works closely with the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission (EAC), DOJ, the intelligence community, and other
agencies to help accomplish this goal.
Throughout the 2022 primary and general elections, DHS has worked
to ensure that election officials and their private-sector partners
have the necessary information and tools to successfully manage risk
and build resilience into the Nation's election infrastructure. DHS
works to protect and safeguard elections by:
Sharing Intelligence and Information.--DHS shares timely and
actionable intelligence and information with our Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and territorial government and private-
sector partners about threats and risks to election
infrastructure, including foreign disinformation efforts
concerning elections.
Providing Services and Resources.--CISA maintains an
Election Security Resource Library to equip State and local
governments, election officials, and others with no-cost tools
they can use to secure election-related assets, facilities,
networks, and systems from cyber and physical risks. This
includes Cybersecurity Advisors located throughout the country
and more than 100 Protective Security Advisors in all 50 States
who provide cybersecurity expertise, conduct physical security
assessments, and share guidance and best practices. Through
2022, CISA facilitated multiple Classified and un-Classified
threat briefings, engaged thousands of election officials and
SLTT partners for cybersecurity and physical security services,
assessments, trainings, and tabletop exercises, including
CISA's 2022 Tabletop the Vote exercise, a 3-day exercise that
engaged over 1,000 stakeholders across 40 States. CISA also
provides funding to the Election Infrastructure Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), which now includes all
50 States and more than 3,400 local jurisdictions. This is the
main mechanism for sharing alerts with the election's
community. DHS also provides funding for enhancing election
security through FEMA grants.
Combating Disinformation Around Elections.--State, local,
Tribal, and territorial officials are the most trusted sources
of election information in communities across our Nation: DHS
partners with them to help ensure that voters receive accurate
information. DHS assists with addressing disinformation by
being transparent about identified foreign malign influence
campaigns, amplifying facts shared by State, local, Tribal, and
territorial officials with the public, and encouraging
individuals to maintain digital and media literacy to recognize
and build resilience.
conclusion
While DHS was created in response to a singular threat, in the 2
decades since 9/11 the Department has evolved to address multiple
unforeseen complex challenges. Through it all, our workforce has
demonstrated exceptional skill and an unwavering commitment to keeping
our country safe.
I am grateful to this committee for your continued support of DHS,
both from a resource perspective and the provision of key authorities
that allow the Department to adapt to an ever-changing threat
landscape. I look forward to our continued work together and to
answering your questions. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes Director Wray to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
Mr. Wray. Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member
Katko, Members of the committee. I am honored to be here today
on behalf of the FBI's 38,000 men and women to discuss some of
the most pressing threats facing our homeland.
When it comes to our current threat landscape, what makes
our current situation, at least in my career, unique is--and
particularly serious, I would add--is the fact that we have so
many different threat areas all elevated at the same time. I am
proud of the work that the FBI's agents, analysts, and
professional staff are doing all over the country and all over
the world every single day to rise to those challenges and to
protect the American people.
Protecting the American people from terrorist attack
remains the FBI's No. 1 priority. As I have said before, the
greatest threat we face on the terrorism front here in the
homeland is from what are effectively lone actors, or small
cells. Whether it is a domestic violent extremist acting in
furtherance of some ideological goal or a home-grown violent
extremist looking to advance the interest of a foreign
terrorist organization, these actors often move quickly from
radicalization to action and often use easily obtainable
weapons--think a gun, a knife, a car, a crude IED--against soft
targets, which is just intelligence community speak for
everyday people living everyday lives.
Overseas ISIS and al-Qaeda still aim to inspire, to plan,
and to launch attacks against the United States and our allies,
both abroad and here at home. As the al-Zawahiri strike this
summer in Kabul reinforces, the threat of foreign terrorist
organizations like al-Qaeda attempting to reconstitute in
Afghanistan following our withdrawal remains very real. Our
ability to gather valuable intelligence on the ground inside
Afghanistan has been reduced. That is just a reality. All of
that places a premium on our continued collaboration with our
partners, both within the U.S. Government and internationally.
We have got to stay on the balls of our feet and use all of the
tools available to us.
On top of that, countries like China, Russia, Iran, and
North Korea are growing more aggressive, brazen, and capable.
They are coming at us from all angles to undermine our core
democratic institutions, our national security, and our rule of
law.
Of those countries, the greatest long-term threat to our
Nation's ideas, innovation, and economic security, our national
security, is that from China. The Chinese government aspires to
equal or surpass the United States as a global superpower and
influence the world with a value system shaped by undemocratic
authoritarian ideals. We are confronting that threat head-on.
Just 3 weeks ago, for example, we unsealed charges against 13
individuals, 10 of them Chinese intelligence officers and
government officials, for a variety of criminal efforts to
exert influence right here in the United States to benefit
Beijing. The FBI has scores of investigations open into the
China threat in all 56 of our field offices.
On the cyber front, China's vast hacking program is the
world's largest and they have stolen more of American's
personal and business data than every other nation combined.
But, of course, China is not our only challenge in cyber
space--not even close. The FBI's cyber investigations are
growing in frequency, scale, and complexity consistent with the
evolution of the threat. We are investigating over 100
different ransomware variants and each one of those with scores
of victims, as well as a whole host of other novel threats
posed by both cyber criminals and nation-states alike. It is
becoming more and more difficult to discern where the cyber
criminal activity ends and the nation-state activity begins, as
the line between those two continues to blur.
Just last month, for example, we announced the indictment
of three Iranian nationals for their roles in a multi-year
scheme to compromise the networks of hundreds of organizations,
many of which offer services Americans rely on every day. To
those sorts of actors, nothing is off limits, not even, for
example, Boston Children's Hospital, which they set their
sights on in the summer of 2021. Now, fortunately, before they
could successfully launch their attack, we received a tip from
a partner and working closely with the hospital, we were able
to identify and defeat the threat, protecting both the network
and the sick children who depend on it.
Our opponents in this space are relentless, so we have got
to keep responding in kind. I can assure you that we are going
to continue to be aggressive and creative as we run joint
sequenced operations with our partners against these
adversaries, removing their malware, taking down their botnets,
and hunting them down all over the world.
That is just a snapshot of some of the many threats we are
tackling, and it doesn't even include things like our efforts
to combat violent crime, where this summer, working with our
State and local partners, we arrested on average 50 violent
criminals every single day. Or our continued focus on human
trafficking, where this August, through our annual Operation
Cross County, for instance, the FBI and our partners located
more than 200 victims of human trafficking, many of them little
kids. Or the work of our transnational organized crime section
that it is doing in partnership with agencies like DHS to
investigate the movement of people, drugs, guns, and money into
the United States across our Southern Border.
The breadth and depth of the threats that the FBI's
dedicated men and women are tackling each and every day is
staggering. I continue to be inspired by their commitment to
our mission of protecting the American people and upholding the
Constitution. I know we will continue to answer the call.
So thank you again for having me here again today and I
would be happy to address your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Wray
November 15, 2022
Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members
of the committee. Today, I am honored to be here, representing the
people of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI''), who tackle
some of the most complex and most grave threats we face every day with
perseverance, professionalism, and integrity. Sometimes at the greatest
of costs. I am extremely proud of their service and commitment to the
FBI's mission and to ensuring the safety and security of communities
throughout our Nation. On their behalf, I would like to express my
appreciation for the support you have given them in the past and ask
for your continued support in the future.
Despite the many challenges our FBI workforce has faced, I am
immensely proud of their dedication to protecting the American people
and upholding the Constitution. Our country continues to face
unimaginable challenges, yet, through it all, the women and men of the
FBI have unwaveringly stood at the ready and taken it upon themselves
to tackle any and all challenges thrown their way. The list of diverse
threats we face underscores the complexity and breadth of the FBI's
mission: To protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of
the United States. I am prepared to discuss with you what the FBI is
doing to address these threats and what the FBI is doing to ensure our
people adhere to the highest of standards while it conducts its
Mission. I am pleased to have received your invitation to appear today
and am looking forward to engaging in a thorough, robust, and frank
discussion regarding some of the most critical threats facing the FBI
and the Nation as a whole.
key threats and challenges
Our Nation continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving
threats ranging from home-grown violent extremists to hostile foreign
intelligence services and operatives, from sophisticated cyber-based
attacks to internet-facilitated sexual exploitation of children, from
violent gangs and criminal organizations to public corruption and
corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant
challenge for the FBI. As an organization, we must be able to stay
current with constantly-evolving technologies. Our adversaries--
terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminals--take
advantage of modern technology, including the internet and social
media, to facilitate illegal activities, recruit followers, encourage
terrorist attacks and other illicit actions, to spread misinformation,
and to disperse information on building improvised explosive devices
and other means to attack the United States. The breadth of these
threats and challenges are as complex as any time in our history. The
consequences of not responding to and countering threats and challenges
have never been greater.
The support of this committee in helping the FBI do its part in
thwarting these threats and facing these challenges is greatly
appreciated. That support is allowing us to establish strong
capabilities and capacities to assess threats, share intelligence,
leverage key technologies, and--in some respects, most importantly--
hire some of the best to serve as special agents, intelligence
analysts, and professional staff. We have built, and are continuously
enhancing, a workforce that possesses the skills and knowledge to deal
with the complex threats and challenges we face today and tomorrow. We
are building a leadership cadre that views change and transformation as
a positive tool for keeping the FBI focused on the key threats facing
our Nation.
Today's FBI is a National security and law enforcement organization
that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each
FBI employee understands that, to defeat the key threats facing our
Nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more
effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must
the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist, nation-
state, and criminal threats to our National security, our economy, and
indeed our communities. These diverse threats underscore the complexity
and breadth of the FBI's mission: To protect the American people and
uphold the Constitution of the United States.
national security
Terrorism Threats
Protecting the American people from terrorism--both international
and domestic--remains the FBI's No. 1 priority. The threat from
terrorism is as persistent and complex as ever. We are in an
environment where the threats from international terrorism, domestic
terrorism, and state-sponsored terrorism are all simultaneously
elevated.
The greatest terrorism threat to our homeland is posed by lone
actors or small cells of individuals who typically radicalize to
violence on-line, and who primarily use easily accessible weapons to
attack soft targets. We see the lone offender threat with both Domestic
Violent Extremists (``DVEs'') and Home-grown Violent Extremists
(``HVEs''), two distinct threats, both of which are located primarily
in the United States and typically radicalize and mobilize to violence
on their own. Individuals based and operating primarily within the
United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from
a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seek to further
political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of
force or violence are described as DVEs, whereas HVEs are individuals
of any citizenship who have lived and/or operated primarily in the
United States or its territories who advocate, are engaged in, or are
preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities
(including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political
or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but
are acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist
organization (``FTO'').
Domestic and Home-grown Violent Extremists are often motivated and
inspired by a mix of social or political, ideological, and personal
grievances against their targets, and more recently have focused on
accessible targets to include civilians, law enforcement and the
military, symbols or members of the U.S. Government, houses of worship,
retail locations, and mass public gatherings. Lone actors present a
particular challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
These actors are difficult to identify, investigate, and disrupt before
they take violent action, especially because of the insular nature of
their radicalization and mobilization to violence and limited
discussions with others regarding their plans.
The top domestic terrorism threat we face continues to be from DVEs
we categorize as Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists
(``RMVEs'') and Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists
(``AGAAVEs''). While RMVEs, who advocate for the superiority of the
white race were the primary source of lethal attacks perpetrated by
DVEs in recent years, AGAAVEs, specifically Militia Violent Extremists
and Anarchist Violent Extremists were responsible for 3 of the 4 lethal
DVE attacks in 2020. Notably, 2020 included the first lethal attack
committed by an Anarchist Violent Extremist in over 20 years. More
recently, in 2021, DVEs committed at least 4 lethal attacks, resulting
in 13 deaths. DVEs with mixed or personalized ideologies committed 2 of
the 4 attacks. The other 2 lethal attacks were committed by RMVEs--one
who advocated for the superiority of the white race and one who
allegedly used his interpretations of religious teachings to justify
the murder of a police officer. The number of FBI domestic terrorism
investigations has more than doubled since the spring of 2020, and as
of the end of fiscal year 2022, the FBI was conducting approximately
2,700 domestic terrorism investigations.
We are approaching the 2-year anniversary of the January 6 siege of
the U.S. Capitol, which has led to unprecedented efforts by the
Department of Justice, including the FBI, to investigate and hold
accountable all who engaged in violence, destruction of property, and
other criminal activity on that day. To date, the Department has
arrested and charged more than 880 individuals who took part in the
Capitol siege.
The FBI uses all tools available at its disposal to combat domestic
terrorism. These efforts represent a critical part of the National
Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which was released in June
2021, and which sets forth a comprehensive, whole-of-Government
approach to address the many facets of the domestic terrorism threat.
The FBI assesses HVEs are the greatest, most immediate
international terrorism threat to the homeland. HVEs are people located
and radicalized to violence primarily in the United States, who are not
receiving individualized direction from FTOs but are inspired by FTOs,
including the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
(``ISIS'') and al-Qaeda and their affiliates, to commit violence. An
HVE's lack of a direct connection with an FTO, ability to rapidly
mobilize without detection, and use of encrypted communications pose
significant challenges to our ability to proactively identify and
disrupt potential violent attacks.
The FBI remains concerned about the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan
and the that the intent of FTOs, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda and their
affiliates, intend to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the
United States. Despite its loss of physical territory in Iraq and
Syria, ISIS remains relentless in its campaign of violence against the
United States and our partners--both here at home and overseas. ISIS
and its supporters continue to aggressively promote its hate-fueled
rhetoric and attract like-minded violent extremists with a willingness
to conduct attacks against the United States and our interests abroad.
ISIS's successful use of social media and messaging applications to
attract individuals is of continued concern to us. Like other foreign
terrorist groups, ISIS advocates for lone-offender attacks in the
United States and Western countries via videos and other English
language propaganda that have, at times, specifically advocated for
attacks against civilians, the military, law enforcement, and
intelligence community personnel.
Al-Qaeda maintains its desire to both conduct and inspire large-
scale, spectacular attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded
some of the group's senior leadership, we assess that, in the near
term, al-Qaeda is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its
international affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable
attacks in regions such as East and West Africa. Over the past year,
propaganda from al-Qaeda leaders continued to seek to inspire
individuals to conduct their own attacks in the United States and other
Western nations.
Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia
militant groups, continue to attack and plot against the United States
and our allies throughout the Middle East in response to U.S. pressure.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (``IRGC-QF'')
continues to provide support to militant resistance groups and
terrorist organizations. Iran also continues to support Lebanese
Hizballah and other terrorist groups. Hizballah has sent operatives to
build terrorist infrastructures world-wide. The arrests of individuals
in the United States allegedly linked to Hizballah's main overseas
terrorist arm, and their intelligence collection and procurement
efforts, demonstrate Hizballah's interest in long-term contingency
planning activities here in the homeland. Hizballah Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah also has threatened retaliation for the death of IRGC-
QF Commander Qassem Soleimani. This threat was exemplified in 2022,
when the Department charged an Iranian national and member of the IRGC,
working on behalf of the Qods Force, with a plot to murder a former
National Security Advisor.
The terrorism threat continues to evolve, but the FBI resolve to
counter that threat remains constant. As an organization, we
continually adapt and rely heavily on the strength of our Federal,
State, local, Tribal, territorial, and international partnerships to
combat all terrorist threats to the United States and our interests. To
that end, we use all available lawful investigative techniques and
methods to combat these threats while continuing to collect, analyze,
and share intelligence concerning the threat posed by violent
extremists, in all their forms, who desire to harm Americans and U.S.
interests. We will continue to share information and encourage the
sharing of information among our numerous partners via our Joint
Terrorism Task Forces across the country, and our Legal Attache offices
around the world.
Cyber
Throughout these last 2 years, the FBI has seen a wider-than-ever
range of cyber actors threaten Americans' safety, security, and
confidence in our digitally connected world. Cyber-criminal syndicates
and nation-states keep innovating ways to compromise our networks and
maximize the reach and impact of their operations, such as by selling
malware as a service or by targeting vendors to access the networks of
the vendors' customers.
These criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise
our networks, steal our property, extort us, and hold our critical
infrastructure at risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the
last few years, we have seen--and have publicly called out--the
People's Republic of China (``PRC''), the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (``DPRK''), and Russia for using cyber operations to target
U.S. COVID-19 vaccines and research. We have seen the far-reaching
disruptive impact a serious supply chain compromise can have through
the Solar Winds-related intrusions, conducted by the Russian SVR. We
have seen the PRC working to obtain controlled dual-use technology and
developing an arsenal of advanced cyber capabilities that could be used
against other countries in the event of a real-world conflict. As these
adversaries become more sophisticated, we are increasingly concerned
about our ability to detect and warn about specific cyber operations
against U.S. organizations. One of the most worrisome facets is their
focus on compromising U.S. critical infrastructure, especially during a
crisis.
What makes things more difficult is that there is no bright line
that separates where nation-state activity ends and cyber criminal
activity begins. Some cyber criminals contract or sell services to
nation-states; some nation-state actors moonlight as cyber criminals to
fund personal activities; and nation-states are increasingly using
tools typically used by criminal actors, such as ransomware.
So, as dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of
focusing on them alone. In the past year, we also have seen cyber
criminals target hospitals, medical centers, educational institutions,
and other critical infrastructure for theft or ransomware, causing
massive disruption to our daily lives. Such incidents affecting medical
centers in particular have led to the interruption of computer networks
and systems that put patients' lives at an increased risk, at a time
when America faces its most dire public health crisis in generations.
We have also seen the rise of an ecosystem of services dedicated to
supporting cyber crime in exchange for cryptocurrency. The effect is
that what were once unsophisticated criminals now have the tools to
engage in destructive behavior--for example, deploying ransomware to
paralyze entire hospitals, police departments, and businesses--and the
means to better conceal their tracks. It is not that individual
malicious cyber actors have become much more sophisticated, but--unlike
previously--they are able to rent sophisticated capabilities.
We must make it harder and more painful for malicious cyber actors
and criminals to carry on their malicious activities. The FBI, using
its role as the lead Federal agency for threat response, with its law
enforcement and intelligence responsibilities, works seamlessly with
domestic and international partners to defend their networks, attribute
malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take the fight to our
adversaries overseas. We must impose consequences on cyber adversaries
and use our collective law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to
do so through joint and enabled operations sequenced for maximum
impact. And we must continue to work with the Department of State and
other key agencies to ensure that our foreign partners are able and
willing to cooperate in our efforts to bring the perpetrators of cyber
crime to justice or otherwise disrupt such perpetrators' activities.
An example of this approach is the international seizure in April
2022 of Hydra Market--the world's largest and longest-running darknet
market. Hydra was an on-line criminal marketplace that enabled users in
mainly Russian-speaking countries to buy and sell illicit goods and
services, including illegal drugs, stolen financial information,
fraudulent identification documents, and money laundering and mixing
services, anonymously and outside the reach of law enforcement.
Transactions on Hydra were conducted in cryptocurrency and Hydra's
operators charged a commission for every such transaction. In 2021,
Hydra accounted for an estimated 80 percent of all darknet market-
related cryptocurrency transactions, and since 2015, the marketplace
had received approximately $5.2 billion in cryptocurrency. The seizure
of the Hydra servers and cryptocurrency wallets containing $25 million
worth of bitcoin was made in Germany by the German Federal Criminal
Police (the Bundeskriminalamt), in coordination with the FBI and our
other Federal partners in the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Homeland
Security Investigations, and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Forces. The FBI used technical expertise and legal authorities, and,
most importantly, our world-wide partnerships to significantly disrupt
this illegal marketplace.
In March, the FBI conducted a successful court-authorized operation
to remove botnet malware known as Cyclops Blink from the botnet's
command and control devices, cutting off the Russian Main Intelligence
Directorate's (GRU) control over thousands of infected devices--mainly
in small to mid-sized businesses--world-wide. The GRU had been building
this malicious botnet, which ultimately spanned the globe, as early as
June 2019, as a replacement for the VPNFilter malware we exposed and
disrupted in 2018. Over several months, the FBI worked closely with
WatchGuard Technologies, the developer of many of the infected devices,
to analyze the malware, and WatchGuard developed detection tools and
remediation techniques. In February, before the FBI's technical
disruption, the FBI, NSA, CISA, and the United Kingdom's National Cyber
Security Centre proactively released an advisory identifying the
Cyclops Blink malware. That same day, WatchGuard released the detection
and remediation tools. This latest disruption, in addition to
highlighting the benefits of close public-private partnerships, proves
that success against cyber threats doesn't only involve arrests and
convictions.
In total, we took over 1,100 actions against cyber adversaries last
year, to include arrests, criminal charges, convictions,
dismantlements, and disruptions, and enabled many more actions through
our dedicated partnerships with the private sector, foreign partners,
and with Federal, State, and local entities. We also provided thousands
of individualized threat warnings and disseminated more than 100 public
threat advisories by way of Joint Cybersecurity Advisories, FBI Liaison
Alert System (``FLASH'') reports, Private Industry Notifications
(``PINs''), and Public Service Announcements (``PSAs'')--many of which
were jointly authored with other U.S. agencies and international
partners.
With our partners in the interagency, we have been putting a lot of
energy and resources into all those partnerships, especially with the
private sector. We are working hard to push important threat
information to network defenders, but we have also been making it as
easy as possible for the private sector to share important information
with us. For example, we are emphasizing to the private sector how we
keep our presence unobtrusive in the wake of an incident; how we
protect information that the private sector shares with us, including
their identities. We are also committed to providing useful feedback
and improving coordination with our government partners so that we are
speaking with one voice. But we need the private sector to do its part,
too. We need the private sector to come forward to warn us--and warn us
quickly--when they see malicious cyber activity. We also need the
private sector to work with us when we warn them that they are being
targeted. The recent examples of significant cyber incidents--
SolarWinds, Cyclops Blink, the Colonial pipeline incident--only
emphasize what I have been saying for a long time: The Government
cannot protect against cyber threats on its own. We need a whole-of-
society approach that matches the scope of the danger. There is no
other option for defending a country where nearly all of our critical
infrastructure, personal data, intellectual property, and network
infrastructure sits in private hands.
In summation, the FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat
cyber threats, from improving threat identification and information
sharing inside and outside of the Government to examining the way we
operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We take all potential
threats to public and private-sector systems seriously and will
continue to investigate, disrupt, and hold accountable those who pose a
threat in cyber space.
Foreign Intelligence Threats
Top Threats
We see nations such as China, Russia, and Iran becoming more
aggressive and more capable in their nefarious activity than ever
before. These nations seek to undermine our core democratic, economic,
and scientific institutions. They employ a growing range of tactics to
advance their interests and to harm the United States. Defending
American institutions and values against these threats is a national
security imperative and a priority for the FBI.
With that, the greatest long-term threat to our Nation's ideas,
innovation, and economic security is the foreign intelligence and
economic espionage threat from China. It's a threat to our economic
security--and by extension--to our National security. The Chinese
government aspires to equal or surpass the United States as a global
superpower and influence the world with a value system shaped by
undemocratic authoritarian ideals. The pursuit of these goals is often
with little regard for international norms and laws.
When it comes to economic espionage, the PRC uses every means at
its disposal against us, blending cyber, human intelligence, diplomacy,
corporate transactions, and pressure on U.S. companies operating in
China, to achieve its strategic goals to steal our companies'
innovations. These efforts are consistent with China's expressed goal
to become a national power, modernizing its military and creating
innovative-driven economic growth.
To pursue this goal, China uses not only human intelligence
officers, co-optees, and corrupt corporate insiders, but also
sophisticated cyber intrusions, pressure on U.S. companies in China,
shell-game corporate transactions, and joint-venture ``partnerships''
that are anything but a true partnership. There's also nothing
traditional about the scale of their theft--it's unprecedented in the
history of the FBI. American workers and companies are facing a
greater, more complex danger than they've ever dealt with before.
Stolen innovation means stolen jobs, stolen opportunities for American
workers, stolen national power, and stolen leadership in the
industries.
National Counterintelligence Task Force (``NCITF'')
As the lead U.S. counterintelligence agency, the FBI is responsible
for detecting and lawfully countering the actions of foreign
intelligence services and organizations as they seek to adversely
affect U.S. National interests. The FBI recognized the need to
coordinate similar efforts across all agencies, and therefore
established the National Counterintelligence Task Force (``NCITF'') to
create a whole-of-Government approach to counterintelligence. The FBI
established the National-level task force, or NCITF, in the National
Capital Region to coordinate, facilitate, and focus these multi-agency
counterintelligence operations, and to programmatically support local
Counterintelligence Task Force (``CITF'') operations. Combining the
authorities and operational capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence
Community; Federal, State, and local law enforcement; and local CITFs
in each FBI field office, the NCITF coordinates and leads whole-of-
Government efforts to defeat hostile intelligence activities targeting
the United States.
The Department of Defense has been a key partner in the NCITF since
its founding in 2019. While the FBI has had long-term collaborative
relationships with DoD entities such as the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Army
Counterintelligence, the NCITF has allowed us to enhance our
collaboration with each other for greater impact. We plan to emphasize
this whole-of-Government approach moving forward as a powerful formula
to mitigate the modern counterintelligence threat.
Transnational Repression
In recent years, we have seen a rise in efforts by authoritarian
regimes to interfere with freedom of expression and punish dissidents
abroad. These acts of repression cross national borders, often reaching
into the United States. It's important to note countries like China,
Russia, and Iran, stalk, intimidate, and harass certain people in the
United States. This is called transnational repression. It's illegal
and the FBI is investigating it.
Transnational repression can occur in different forms, including
assaults and attempted kidnapping. Governments use transnational
repression tactics to silence the voices of their citizens, U.S.
residents, or non-citizens connected to the home country. This sort of
repressive behavior is antithetical to our values as Americans. People
from all over the world are drawn to the United States by the promise
of living in a free and open society--one that adheres to the rule of
law. To ensure that this promise remains a reality, we must continue to
use all of our tools to block authoritarian regimes that seek to extend
their tactics of repression beyond their shores.
Foreign Malign Influence
Our Nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats seeking to
both influence our National policies and public opinion, and cause harm
to our National dialog and debate. The FBI and our interagency partners
remain concerned about, and focused on, foreign malign influence
operations--which include subversive, undeclared, coercive, and
criminal actions used by foreign governments in their attempts to sway
U.S. voters' preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies,
increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American
people's confidence in our democratic institutions and processes.
Foreign malign influence is not a new problem, but the
interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of
the internet, have changed the nature of the threat and how the FBI and
its partners must address it. Foreign malign influence operations have
taken many forms and used many tactics over the years. Most widely
reported these days are attempts by adversaries--hoping to reach a wide
swath of Americans covertly from outside the United States--to amplify
existing stories on social media in an attempt to discredit U.S.
individuals and institutions.
The FBI is the lead Federal agency responsible for investigating
foreign malign influence threats. Several years ago, we established the
Foreign Influence Task Force (``FITF'') to identify and counteract
foreign malign influence operations targeting the United States. The
FITF is led by the Counterintelligence Division and comprises agents,
analysts, and professional staff from the Counterintelligence, Cyber,
Counterterrorism, and Criminal Investigative Divisions. It is
specifically charged with identifying and combating foreign malign
influence operations targeting democratic institutions and values
inside the United States. In all instances, the FITF strives to protect
democratic institutions, develop a common operating picture, raise
adversaries' costs, and reduce their overall asymmetric advantage.
The FITF brings the FBI's National security and traditional
criminal investigative expertise under one umbrella to prevent foreign
influence in our elections. This better enables us to frame the threat,
to identify connections across programs, to aggressively investigate as
appropriate, and--importantly--to be more agile. Coordinating closely
with our partners and leveraging relationships we have developed in the
technology sector, we had several instances where we were able to
quickly relay threat indicators that those companies used to take swift
action, blocking budding abuse of their platforms.
Following the 2018 midterm elections, we reviewed the threat and
the effectiveness of our coordination and outreach. As a result of this
review, we further expanded the scope of the FITF. Previously, our
efforts to combat malign foreign influence focused solely on the threat
posed by Russia. Utilizing lessons learned since 2018, the FITF widened
its aperture to confront malign foreign operations of the PRC, Iran,
and other global adversaries. To address this expanding focus and wider
set of adversaries and influence efforts, we have also added resources
to maintain permanent ``surge'' capability on election and foreign
influence threats.
In addition, the domestic counterintelligence environment is more
complex than ever. This Nation faces a persistent and pervasive
National security threat from foreign adversaries, particularly Russia
and China, conducting sophisticated intelligence operations using
coercion, subversion, malign influence, disinformation, cyber and
economic espionage, traditional spying and non-traditional human
intelligence collection. Together, they pose a continuous threat to
U.S. National security and its economy by targeting strategic
technologies, industries, sectors, and critical infrastructures.
Historically, these asymmetric National security threats involved
foreign intelligence service officers seeking U.S. Government and U.S.
intelligence community information. The FBI has observed foreign
adversaries employing a wide range of nontraditional collection
techniques, including the use of human collectors not affiliated with
intelligence services, foreign investment in critical U.S. sectors, and
infiltration of U.S. supply chains. The FBI continues to adjust its CI
priorities and posture to address the evolving and multifaceted threat.
criminal threats
We continue to face many criminal threats, from complex white-
collar fraud in the financial, health care, and housing sectors to
transnational and regional organized criminal enterprises to violent
crime and public corruption. Criminal organizations--domestic and
international--and individual criminal activity represent a significant
threat to our security and safety in communities across the Nation.
Violent Crime
Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals
and communities. Many of today's gangs are sophisticated and well-
organized and use violence to control neighborhoods, and boost their
illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun
trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution rings. These gangs do
not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or
communities. The FBI is able to work across such lines, which is vital
to the fight against violent crime in big cities and small towns across
the Nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with
Federal, State, local, territorial, and Tribal officers and deputies on
joint task forces and individual investigations.
Like the FBI's work combatting gangs, the FBI also investigates the
most serious crimes in Indian Country--such as murder, child sexual and
physical abuse, violent assaults, domestic violence, drug trafficking,
public corruption, financial crimes, and Indian gaming violations. As
you are aware, there are 574 Federally-recognized American Indian
Tribes in the United States, and the FBI has Federal law enforcement
responsibility on 188 Indian reservations. The FBI coordinates and
collaborates with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (``BIA''), Office of
Justice Services; and other Federal, State, and Tribal partners across
the United States to investigate crimes in Indian Country.''
Over the past 2 years, the FBI's work in Indian Country increased
significantly due to the July 9, 2020, Supreme Court ruling in McGirt
v. Oklahoma, which determined that the original boundaries of the
Muscogee Creek Nation (``MCN'') were never disestablished. This
decision had the practical effect of requiring all land within MCN's
territorial boundaries to fall under Federal Indian Country
jurisdiction, thus expanding the FBI's responsibility for investigating
felony offenses committed by or against an Indian. The principles of
the McGirt decision also apply to Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw,
Seminole, and Quapaw Tribal territories in Oklahoma. Combined, all 6
reservations encompass approximately 32,000 square miles, or 45 percent
of the State of Oklahoma. The total population within the combined
borders is roughly 1.9 million, of which approximately 420,000 are
enrolled Tribal members.
This drastic increase in FBI jurisdiction has significant and long-
term operational and public safety implications given the increased
number of violent criminal cases now under Federal jurisdiction within
Oklahoma's Indian Country. Since this decision, the FBI's Oklahoma City
Field Office (``OC'') has seen a drastic increase in the total number
of Indian Country investigations and now has the FBI's largest
investigative responsibility. Since the Federal court ruling in the
McGirt case, the FBI's Oklahoma City field office, which previously
investigated approximately 50 criminal cases a year involving Native
Americans, has managed thousands of Indian Country cases, prioritizing
cases involving the most violent offenders who pose the most serious
risk to the public.
To effectively conduct these investigations, the FBI has conducted
temporary duty (``TDY'') rotations of Special Agents, Intelligence
Analysts, Victim Specialists, and other professional staff to the
Muskogee and Tulsa RAs, the offices most impacted by the decision. The
FBI has also expanded State, local, and Tribal participation on task
forces to assist with response and investigative efforts. To support
the U.S. Attorney's effective prosecution of these crimes, the FBI must
have the capability to sustain an enhanced presence in FBI OC.
The FBI is committed to its mission of protecting Tribal
communities through its Indian Country investigative program. With more
than 150 Special Agents and 23 Safe Trails Task Forces around the
country, the FBI has demonstrated its commitment to the safety and
security of indigenous people by vigorously investigating the most
serious crimes facing their communities. The FBI works to enhance its
effectiveness by leveraging its relationships with its State, local,
and Federal partners, both on and off the reservations.
The 2020 McGirt decision significantly increased the FBI's
investigative responsibilities in Oklahoma by dramatically increasing
both its territorial jurisdiction and caseload requirements.
Furthermore, the decision created a jurisdictional gap, in that a large
number of general crimes affecting Native American victims became
unaddressed. In response the FBI surged National resources to ensure it
was able to address its mission requirements to investigate major
crimes in the newly designated Tribal Territory. These surges
subsequently caused resource strains on other investigative programs
and threats. The Castro-Huerta decision began to relieve that pressure
and has the future potential to reduce FBI caseloads by an estimated 15
percent-20 percent in Oklahoma, while bridging the jurisdictional gap
by allowing State authorities to address certain general crimes. This
would free FBI resources to return to other National threat issues,
while still providing Tribal communities with the FBI law enforcement
services they've historically relied on.
The FBI fully recognizes and supports Tribal sovereignty while
still seeking innovative ways to service the law enforcement needs of
indigenous communities. The FBI believes ensuring public safety is a
top priority and Castro-Huerta provides an avenue of bolstering that
safety with the addition of State law enforcement services, while
relieving resource burdens on the FBI. The FBI therefore supports the
underlying policy as established in Castro-Huerta and would be opposed
to legislation to abrogate the decision.
Transnational Organized Crime (``TOC'')
More than a decade ago, organized crime was characterized by
hierarchical organizations, or families, that exerted influence over
criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or States. But organized
crime has changed dramatically. Today, international criminal
enterprises run multi-national, multi-billion-dollar schemes from start
to finish. Modern-day criminal enterprises are flat, fluid networks
with global reach. While still engaged in many of the ``traditional''
organized crime activities of loan-sharking, extortion, and murder,
modern criminal enterprises are targeting stock market fraud and
manipulation, cyber-facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, drug
trafficking, identity theft, human trafficking, money laundering, human
smuggling, public corruption, weapons trafficking, extortion,
kidnapping, wildlife and timber trafficking, illegal fishing, illegal
mining, and other illegal activities. TOC networks exploit legitimate
institutions for critical financial and business services that enable
the storage or transfer of illicit proceeds. Preventing and combating
transnational organized crime demands a concentrated effort by the FBI
and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners.
While the FBI continues to share intelligence about criminal groups
with our partners and combines resources and expertise to gain a full
understanding of each group, the threat of transnational crime remains
a significant and growing threat to national and international security
with implications for public safety, public health, democratic
institutions, and economic stability across the globe. TOC groups
increasingly exploit jurisdictional boundaries to conduct their
criminal activities overseas. Furthermore, they are expanding their use
of emerging technology to traffic illicit drugs and contraband across
international borders and into the United States.
Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking
It is unthinkable, but every year, thousands of children become
victims of crimes, whether it is through kidnappings, violent attacks,
sexual abuse, human trafficking, or on-line predators. The FBI is
uniquely positioned to provide a rapid, proactive, and comprehensive
response; identify, locate, and recover child victims; and strengthen
relationships between the FBI and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
international law enforcement partners to identify, prioritize,
investigate, and deter individuals and criminal networks from
exploiting children.
But the FBI's ability to learn about and investigate child sexual
exploitation is being threatened by the proliferation of sites on-line
on the Darknet. For example, currently, there are at least 30 child
pornography sites operating openly and notoriously on the Darknet,
including the Tor network. Some of these child pornography sites are
exclusively dedicated to the sexual abuse of infants and toddlers. The
sites often expand rapidly, with one site obtaining 200,000 new members
within its first 4 weeks of operation.
The FBI combats this pernicious crime problem through
investigations such as Operation Pacifier, which targeted the
administrators and users of a highly sophisticated, Tor-based global
enterprise dedicated to the sexual exploitation of children. This
multi-year operation led to the arrest of approximately 350 individuals
based in the United States, the prosecution of 25 American child
pornography producers and 51 American hands-on abusers, the rescue or
identification of 55 American children, the arrest of 548 international
individuals, and the identification or rescue of 296 children abroad.
The FBI has several programs in place to arrest child predators and
to recover missing and endangered children. To this end, the FBI funds
or participates in a variety of endeavors, including our Innocence Lost
National Initiative, Innocent Images National Initiative, Operation
Cross Country, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team, Victim Services,
over 80 Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Forces, over 50
International Violent Crimes Against Children Task Force Officers, as
well as numerous community outreach programs to educate parents and
children about safety measures they can follow. Through improved
communications, the FBI also has the ability to quickly collaborate
with partners throughout the world, which plays an integral role in
crime prevention.
The Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team is a rapid response team
comprised of experienced investigators strategically located across the
country to quickly respond to child abductions. Investigators are able
to provide a full array of investigative and technical resources during
the most critical time period following the abduction of a child, such
as the collection and analysis of DNA, impression and trace evidence
and the processing of digital forensic evidence.
In addition to programs combating child exploitation, the FBI also
focuses efforts to stop human trafficking. The FBI works
collaboratively with law enforcement partners to combat all forms of
human trafficking through Human Trafficking Task Forces Nation-wide.
The majority of human trafficking victims recovered during FBI
investigations are United States citizens, but traffickers are
opportunists who will exploit any victim with a vulnerability,
including foreign nationals and victims of all ages, by subjecting them
to forced labor or sex trafficking. We take a victim-centered, trauma-
informed approach to investigating these cases and strive to ensure the
needs of victims are fully addressed at all stages. To accomplish this,
the FBI works in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and
victim specialists on the local, State, Tribal, and Federal levels, as
well as with a variety of vetted non-Governmental organizations. Even
after the arrest and conviction of human traffickers, the FBI often
continues to work with partner agencies and organizations to assist
victims and survivors in moving beyond their exploitation.
Civil Rights
The FBI remains dedicated to protecting the cherished freedoms of
all Americans. Civil rights crimes are among the most egregious
violations of Federal law--they include color of law violations, hate
crimes, Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (``FACE'') Act
violations, and voter suppression. These crimes cause long-term,
enduring damage to communities and economic infrastructure, compromise
law enforcement and judicial system capabilities, and provoke wide-
spread fear and trauma. We also support the work and cases of our State
and local partners, as needed.
The investigation of hate crimes is the No. 1 priority within the
FBI's civil rights program due to the devastating effect these types of
crimes can have not just on the victims and their families, but also on
entire communities. A hate crime is a criminal offense against a person
or property motivated in whole or in part by the perpetrator's bias
against a race, religion, disability, ethnic/national origin, sexual
orientation, gender, or gender identity. While the First Amendment to
the Constitution allows for the free expression of both offensive and
hateful speech, this protection does not extend to criminal acts, even
those done to express an idea or belief. The First Amendment also does
not protect someone who issues a true threat to inflict physical harm
on individuals or groups, or who intentionally solicits others to
commit unlawful acts of violence on his or her behalf. The FBI remains
dedicated to investigating these types of crimes.
Beyond investigative work, the FBI recognizes proper and thorough
handling of civil rights crimes does not begin the moment they are
reported--it begins before they occur, with a solid and trusting
relationship between the community and law enforcement. Each FBI field
office will be taking specific actions to combat civil rights crimes in
their area of responsibility (``AOR'') to encourage systemic change.
These actions include identifying appropriate partner agencies and
local groups to develop outreach relationships at all levels,
especially those that will spark institutional change; increasing civil
rights-focused working groups and task forces with Federal, State,
local, private, public, and non-profit partners; and providing
increased training for State and local agencies and community groups
centered on color of law investigations and hate crimes statutes to
provide education about civil rights violations, promote increased
reporting of hate crimes, and rebuild community trust in law
enforcement.
Furthermore, we are focused on working with our State and local
partners to collectively do a better job of tracking and reporting hate
crime and color of law violations to fully understand what is happening
in our communities and how to stop it. Our ability to address
significant National issues, such as the use of force and officer-
involved shootings and jurisdictional increases in violent crime,
depends on fuller statistical understanding of the underlying facts and
circumstances. Some jurisdictions fail to report hate crime statistics,
while others claim there are no hate crimes in their community--a fact
that would be welcome, if true. We are dedicated to working vigorously
with our State and local counterparts in every jurisdiction to better
track and report hate crimes, in an accurate, timely, and publicly
transparent manner.
Lawful Access
The FBI remains a strong advocate for the wide and consistent use
of encryption. Protecting data and privacy in a digitally-connected
world is a top priority for the FBI, and we believe that promoting
encryption is a vital part of that mission. Encryption without lawful
access, though, does have a negative effect on law enforcement's
ability to protect the public. As I have testified previously, when the
FBI discusses lawful access, we mean putting providers who manage
encrypted data in a position to decrypt it and provide it to us in
response to a legal process. We do not mean for encryption to be
weakened or compromised so that it can be defeated from the outside by
law enforcement or anyone else. Unfortunately, too much of the debate
over lawful access has revolved around discussions of this concept that
the FBI would not support.
The problems caused by law enforcement agencies' inability to
easily access electronic evidence continue to grow. Increasingly,
commercial device manufacturers have employed encryption in such a
manner that only the device users can access the content of the
devices. Similarly, more and more communications service providers are
designing their platforms and apps such that only the parties to the
communication can access the content. This is generally known as ``end-
to-end'' encryption. The proliferation of end-to-end encryption is a
serious issue that increasingly limits law enforcement's ability, even
after obtaining a lawful warrant or court order, to access critical
evidence and information needed to disrupt threats, protect the public,
and bring perpetrators to justice.
For example, even with our substantial resources, accessing the
content of known or suspected terrorists' data pursuant to court-
authorized legal process is increasingly difficult. The often on-line
nature of the terrorist radicalization process, along with the insular
nature of most of today's attack plotters, leaves fewer dots for
investigators to connect in time to stop an attack, and end-to-end
encryption increasingly hide even those often precious few and fleeting
dots.
In one instance, while planning--and right up until the eve of--the
December 6, 2019, shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola that killed 3
U.S. sailors and severely wounded 8 other Americans, deceased terrorist
Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani communicated undetected with overseas al-
Qaeda terrorists using an end-to-end encrypted app. Then, after the
attack, encryption prevented the FBI from accessing information
contained in his phones for several months. As a result, during the
critical time period immediately following the shooting and despite
obtaining search warrants for the deceased killer's devices, the FBI
could not access the information on those phones to identify co-
conspirators or determine whether they may have been plotting
additional attacks.
This problem spans international and domestic terrorism threats.
For example, subjects of our investigation into the January 6 Capitol
siege used end-to-end encrypted communications.
We face the same problem in protecting children against violent
sexual exploitation. End-to-end encryption frequently prevent us from
discovering and searching for victims, since the vital tips we receive
from providers only arrive when those providers themselves are able to
detect and report child exploitation being facilitated on their
platforms and services.
When we are able to open investigations, end-to-end encryption make
it much more difficult to bring perpetrators to justice. Much evidence
of crimes against children, just like the evidence of many other kinds
of crime today, exists primarily in electronic form. If we cannot
obtain that critical electronic evidence, our efforts are frequently
hamstrung.
This problem is not just limited to Federal investigations. Our
State and local law enforcement partners have been consistently
advising the FBI that they, too, are experiencing similar end-to-end
encryption challenges, which are now being felt across the full range
of State and local criminal law enforcement. Many report that even
relatively unsophisticated criminal groups, like street gangs, are
frequently using encrypted smartphones and end-to-end encrypted
communications apps to shield their activities from detection or
disruption. As this problem becomes more and more acute for State and
local law enforcement, the advanced technical resources needed to
address even a single investigation involving end-to-end encryption
will continue to increase.
conclusion
Finally, the strength of any organization is its people. The
threats we face as a Nation have never been greater or more diverse and
the expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher. Our fellow
citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from all threats,
and the people of the FBI continue to meet and exceed those
expectations, every day. I want to thank them for their dedicated
service.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy
to answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Director Abizaid to summarize her
statement for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE ABIZAID, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Ms. Abizaid. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko,
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss the overall terrorism
landscape.
Now, despite significant progress in diminishing the
terrorist threat to the United States, the country continues to
face a diversified transnational, and in many ways,
unpredictable threat environment, both at home and abroad. An
array of actors, whether foreign terrorist organizations, state
sponsors of terrorism, or lone actors, are shaping the nature
of today's threat. This changed environment exists amid an on-
going transition for the counterterrorism community where CT,
while critical, is one of many competing priorities that the
U.S. national security community must be postured to address.
In today's testimony I will start by giving an overview of
the terrorist threat to the homeland, I will turn to the
overseas threat, and then end with some comments on the
importance of our continued CT focus.
Regarding the threat to the United States homeland,
terrorist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda remain
committed to attacking the United States. However, unlike 21
years ago, the threat today is more likely to take the form of
an individual attacker inspired by these groups rather than a
highly networked hierarchically-directed terrorist plot. In
fact, since 9/11 37 of the 45 ISIS or al-Qaeda-linked attacks
in the homeland have been inspired by these groups rather than
centrally managed by them. This trend toward lone actor threats
inside the United States extends beyond ISIS and al-Qaeda, it
also characterizes the threat we face from domestic actors,
such as racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists,
militia violent extremists, or anarchist violent extremists.
In particular, the U.S.-based racially and ethnically
motivated violent extremist, or REMVE threat, has the most
obvious links to transnational actors whose plots and professed
ideology encourage mobilization to violence by those vulnerable
to their messaging. This threat is fluid, it is fragmented, it
lacks in hierarchical structures, and it has proponents around
the globe and in the United States framing actions around the
concept of leaderless resistance.
Transitioning to the overseas environment, Sunni- and Shia-
driven terrorist movements world-wide continue to dominate the
threat to Americans. ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to aspire to
attack the United States and other Western targets overseas,
though they have been more effective at pursuing operations
against regional and local adversaries. For its part, ISIS in
Iraq and Syria remains an intact centrally-led organization
that will most likely continue to pose both a global threat and
a local one, despite the death of its Emir in February, Hajji
Abdullah.
While significantly weaker than at its peak in 2015 through
2017, ISIS leaders from Iraq and Syria have been successful at
spurning branches and networks across Africa and as far as
South and East Asia with its two most effective branches
currently operating out of West Africa and Afghanistan.
Likewise, al-Qaeda maintains its regional affiliate
structure, positioned effectively in parts of North and East
Africa, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent, South Asia.
The July death of long-time al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
was a strategic and symbolic setback for al-Qaeda, but it does
not put an end to the organization. In particular, in the
Middle East, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is a
destabilizing actor in Yemen and remains among the most
intrepid al-Qaeda affiliates intent on attacking the United
States homeland.
Two other prominent al-Qaeda affiliates also stand out,
both for their growing regional influence and their significant
capabilities. The Sahel-based al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM, and the
Somalia-based affiliate, al-Shabaab.
Transitioning from Sunni terrorism to threats emanating
from Iran, its partners and proxies, Iran continues to plan,
encourage, and support plots against the United States, both at
home and in the Middle East, where we have a significant U.S.
military presence. Iran and its proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah, have
sought to plot attacks against former U.S. officials to
retaliate for the death of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps'
Qods Force commander Qasum Solomani, raising the threat both at
home and abroad for those that Iran deems responsible.
In closing, I would just highlight that the complexity of
the terrorism environment that I just outlined continues to
demand a collaborative, agile, and sufficiently resourced CT
effort to mitigate terrorist threats to the United States. It
is clear that the significant CT pressure brought to bear
against terrorist groups over the last 2 decades, along with
investment in effective CT defenses here at home, has resulted
in a diminished threat to the United States homeland.
NCTC and its CT partners across the Government are working
toward a sustainable and enduring level of support to this
mission that maintains that strategic success even as other
National security priorities drive our National strategy.
Finally, I want to assure this committee that the
interagency enterprise of CT practitioners remains committed to
this mission and are working behind the scenes every day to
protect the American people, both at home and abroad. I thank
them for their service and their dedication to this country.
With that, I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christine Abizaid
November 15, 2022
Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members
of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the overall
terrorism landscape, the threat posed to the homeland and U.S. persons
and interests overseas, and the state of the U.S. counterterrorism (CT)
enterprise.
u.s. faces a persistent, evolving terrorist threat
Despite significant progress in diminishing the terrorist threat to
the United States, the country continues to face a diversified,
transnational, and, in many ways, unpredictable threat environment both
at home and abroad. An array of actors, whether foreign terrorist
organizations (FTOs), state sponsors of terrorism, or lone actors, is
shaping the nature of today's terrorism landscape. This persistent
threat environment exists amid an on-going transition for the CT
community where CT, while still critical, is one of many competing
priorities the U.S. national security community must be postured to
address.
Internationally, Russia's invasion of and war in Ukraine, China's
growing economic and security assertiveness, Iran's destabilizing
activities in the Middle East and beyond, North Korea's confrontational
behavior, and the growing capabilities of a number of cyber actors, for
example, are among the most consequential challenges to U.S. National
security.
At the same time, violent extremism continues to fuel threats
against the West from a growing swath of territory from the African
Sahel to Southeast Asia and contributes to worsening humanitarian
conditions in regions like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Notably,
this diffusion of the threat, while challenging, has resulted in a less
concentrated and effective terrorist capability directed inside the
homeland.
Terrorist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda and other aligned
violent extremists take advantage of developing nations, political
instability, and undergoverned territory to entrench themselves in
difficult operating environments and ingratiate themselves to local
populations. These movements remain committed to attacking U.S. persons
and facilities world-wide even as they balance those goals against
local gains. These groups represent the most urgent threat to U.S.
interests overseas.
In the homeland, we remain concerned about al-Qaeda and ISIS
threats but assess the threat these groups pose here is less acute than
at any other time since 9/11, a judgment consistent with what we
expressed last year. In fact, the most likely threat in the United
States is from lone actors, whether inspired by violent extremist
narratives, racially or ethnically motivated drivers to violence, or
other politically-motivated violence.
Against the backdrop of this threat landscape, whether overseas or
at home, NCTC remains focused on uncovering and disrupting
transnational networks from which threats to Americans and America are
likely to emerge. Even as we monitor the threat, we also must evaluate
the state of the CT community's ability to address it. This role is
even more critical as resources shift away from CT and we need to
account for the sustained ability to meet the threat, however it
evolves.
the main threat inside the united states
Unlike 21 years ago, the American public today is more likely to
experience a terrorist attack by an individual attacker than a highly
structured terrorist organization. Today's lone-actor threats can
mobilize in unpredictable ways based on a variety of motivations. These
individuals almost certainly mobilize to violence independently without
direction from specific groups.
Since 9/11, there have been 37 attacks in the homeland inspired by
al-Qaeda or ISIS, compared to 8 that involved a direct connection to
these groups. Similarly, during the last 12 years, all of the 17
racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (RMVE) attacks by
actors espousing the superiority of the white race were by individuals
who radicalized at least in part on-line and who mobilized to violence
as lone actors.
FTOs inspiring lone actors
Even as our concern grows about the threat from U.S.-based RMVEs
and other domestic violent extremists, we remain concerned and vigilant
regarding the threat from lone actors and small groups inspired by
FTOs. Since 2001, the threat emanating from these individuals has
evolved from one defined by complex, large-scale attacks directed by an
FTO to mostly simple, self-initiated attacks inspired by an FTO.
Messaging directed at these individuals to conduct attacks has
decreased, although they continue to draw inspiration from historical
publications such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) Inspire
magazine or ISIS's messaging directed at these individuals.
Domestic violent extremists
Since 2018, drawing on our significant knowledge of transnational
terrorism, NCTC has regularly supported the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
understand the threat in the homeland posed by domestic violent
extremists. Within this category of threat actors, acts of violence by
U.S.-based RMVEs, militia violent extremists (MVEs), and anarchist
violent extremists (AVEs) stand out. The RMVE threat has the most
obvious links to transnational actors whose plots and professed
ideology encourage mobilization to violence by those vulnerable to
their messaging. The RMVE threat is largely fluid, fragmented, and
lacking in hierarchical structures, with proponents framing actions
around the concept of leaderless resistance.
U.S.-based RMVEs' linkage to foreign counterparts mostly involves
the bidirectional sharing of violent extremist messaging, mutual
grievances, manifestos of successful attackers, and encouragement for
lone-actor violence, such as by the alleged Buffalo shooter. As with
other terrorism challenges, RMVEs anywhere can operate transnationally
by exploiting a world connected by social media and other on-line
platforms. Even as technology companies improve their capabilities to
detect and respond to violent extremist content on-line, RMVEs and
their supporters find new methods to spread their message.
Additionally, the lethal threat from MVEs remains elevated,
primarily toward Government and law enforcement personnel. MVEs are
willing to use violence to redress perceived Government overreach and
other sociopolitical grievances, judging from an increase in MVE
plotting, disruptions, and FBI investigations since 2020.
AVEs also present a threat of sporadic violent physical assaults
and property crimes affecting critical infrastructure most often
directed at people or institutions seen as representing authority,
capitalism, and oppression. Developments that heighten perceptions of
inequality or social injustice might further embolden AVEs to commit
acts of violence.
Disrupting terrorist travel and securing the border
In addition to supporting DHS and FBI efforts to disrupt threats
inside the United States NCTC also supports efforts to prevent
terrorist's infiltration of the homeland. Identifying known or
suspected terrorists or their affiliates who seek to infiltrate U.S.
borders by land, sea, or air is central to the U.S. Government's CT
strategy. NCTC collaborates regularly with its partners, and on their
behalf, State and local partners, to build a common threat picture to
enable operating partners to protect the U.S. border. In particular,
NCTC continues to support the U.S. Government's screening and vetting
enterprise and plays a critical role in refugee and immigration
processing by identifying any connections to international terrorism,
not only for the applicant, but also appropriate members of the
applicant's family.
the terrorist threat overseas continues to evolve
Turning to the overseas environment, foreign terrorist movements
world-wide continue to inspire followers and enable attack plotting
against the United States, Americans, and other Western countries. ISIS
and al-Qaeda, the two leading foreign terrorist threats to U.S.
interests, continue to aspire to attack U.S. and other Western
interests but have been more effective at pursuing operations against
regional and local adversaries. CT pressure by the United States and
foreign partners, during the last 15 years, has been critical in
degrading the capability of these groups, particularly in disrupting
experienced leaders and operatives and exacting sustained pressure
against key networks.
ISIS's global enterprise
ISIS in Iraq and Syria remains an intact, centrally-led
organization that will most likely continue to pose a global threat to
U.S. and other Western interests as well as local populations. Despite
losing more than a dozen senior leaders during the past 3 years, it
continues to wage a low-level insurgency in Iraq and Syria since its
territorial defeat in 2018 and commands a cohesive global network that
has allowed the group to sustain its influence--and in some areas, such
as in Africa, expand its recruitment and operations. We assess that in
February, after a raid that killed its overall amir, ISIS transitioned
seamlessly to a new amir. ISIS members readily accepted the new leader
and we see no signs of fissures or splintering by the branches and
networks despite limitations the group faces in Iraq and Syria.
Even under new leadership, ISIS remains committed to its long-term
goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate and continues to exploit
undergoverned areas in Iraq and Syria, where it currently operates as a
clandestine insurgency. This year, ISIS prioritized and attacked a
detention facility in northeastern Syria that housed key ISIS leaders
and experienced fighters. While we assess most of the high-value
detainees were either recaptured or killed as local forces responded to
the attack, the operation itself signifies ISIS's ability to stage
high-profile attacks and prioritize efforts to replenish its dwindling
ranks. We have witnessed subsequent calls and efforts, including by
ISIS branches as far away as West Africa, to free imprisoned members.
ISIS's capabilities and trajectory will remain dependent upon the level
of counterterrorism pressure it faces, particularly by CT actors who
continue to routinely disrupt ISIS's facilitation networks and
operations.
One of ISIS's primary mechanisms to threaten the West is through
its media, even as the group's overall media capabilities have declined
from the group's early years. Despite this decline, ISIS's most
prolific threat to the United States or other Western countries is
through inspired attackers who are vulnerable to influence by ISIS
messaging. The group's ability to inspire violence was most recently
demonstrated by an ISIS supporter who carried out an attack in Oslo in
June, which killed 2 and injured 21. Pro-ISIS supporter groups have
also helped augment ISIS's media presence by creating, archiving,
translating, and disseminating multilingual propaganda on-line. One
such group supporting ISIS-Khorasan published English-language media
focused on delegitimizing the United States and denigrating the
Taliban.
While we have seen a decline in the number of ISIS-inspired attacks
in the West since peaking in 2017, such operations remain a priority
for the organization. The group also still aspires to deploy operatives
to the West, and we continue to monitor for threats against high-
visibility, attractive regional targets that would have similarly high
impact and provide propaganda value and publicity, such as the 2022
FIFA World Cup in Qatar. More broadly, ISIS has continued to grow its
global enterprise, which now includes approximately 20 branches and
networks, through which ISIS leaders' project strength and dispel the
narrative of its defeat. In March, ISIS recognized its newest branch--
ISIS in the Sahel--and, in July, the branch claimed responsibility for
an attack on Nigeria's Kuje prison--located 27 miles away from the U.S.
Embassy--in which almost 1,000 prisoners were released, including some
terrorists.
ISIS has also used its branches and networks to choreograph global
attack campaigns since 2019, the most recent of which was in April to
avenge the death of the group's overall amir. ISIS in Iraq and Syria
led in the number of attack claims and were boosted by ISIS-West Africa
and ISIS-Khorasan, the branches we consider to be among the group's
most capable.
This year, ISIS-Khorasan expanded its ambitions outside Afghanistan
with a handful of cross-border rocket attacks against Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan and a foiled plot in India. Its ambitions for attacking the
West--possibly including the homeland--remains a top intelligence
priority, notwithstanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan last August.
ISIS is also exploiting uneven local CT pressure in Central, East,
and Southern Africa to expand its presence, increase connectivity, and
develop new capabilities beyond its traditional strongholds in North
and West Africa. ISIS's expansion in Mozambique increasingly threatens
Western-led energy projects there, while signs of ISIS's influence in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, and elsewhere in the
region demonstrate the group's growing appeal across the continent.
Al-Qaeda post-Zawahiri
The death of al-Qaeda's longtime leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, this
past July in Kabul, Afghanistan, dealt an important strategic and
symbolic blow to the al-Qaeda network, which he led from relative
isolation for more than a decade. Zawahiri was a respected ideological
leader among the al-Qaeda global network who strove to enhance
interconnectivity across al-Qaeda's dispersed regional affiliates. The
network now finds itself without an obvious leader, but how quickly it
will adapt to Zawahiri's loss remains to be seen.
Three months past the operation that killed him, the group has yet
to publicly announce a successor. Among the remaining al-Qaeda veterans
are several Iran-based senior leaders, most notably Sayf al-`Adl and
Abd-al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, who probably continue to provide ideological
and strategic guidance to the global network. We expect they both will
continue to have important roles in the years ahead, despite the irony
of their location in Iran, another of al-Qaeda's sworn enemies. Other,
less prominent al-Qaeda leaders--who have been featured in globally-
and regionally-focused media--are in charge of the regional affiliates
and likely consult across a distributed leadership team about the
direction of the al-Qaeda network.
Al-Qaeda's global network
Al-Qaeda's Iran-based senior leaders oversee the global network,
which includes regional affiliates in Africa, the Middle East, and
South Asia as well as various local networks that support the
affiliates.
Starting in West Africa, al-Qaeda's Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam al-
Muslimin (JNIM) is increasingly threatening capital cities in the Sahel
while combatting local militaries, ISIS's Sahel province, and Russian
paramilitary forces in Mali. In July of this year, the group attacked
Mali's largest military camp, located just outside of Bamako,
underscoring both its capabilities and growing boldness in the region.
JNIM probably hopes to exploit the departure of French forces from Mali
earlier this year to accelerate its growth and entrenchment, including
into littoral West African states such as Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and
Togo. CT concerns in the region have further led to instability fueling
nondemocratic transitions of power, most recently last month in Burkina
Faso.
In the Horn of Africa, we remain concerned about the continued
threat that al-Shabaab poses to U.S. citizens and Western interests.
Al-Shabaab is the wealthiest and most lethal of all al-Qaeda
affiliates, controls large portions of southern Somalia, and has
demonstrated the capability to carry out successful operations across
the region, including against U.S. service members.
In North Africa, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has
experienced setbacks from CT pressure since early 2018, but probably
provides guidance to other al-Qaeda elements in the region,
particularly JNIM. As of 2020, Algerian Yazid Mebrak was serving as
AQIM's leader and was playing a key role in al-Qaeda's management of
global operations, including the abductions and killing of Americans.
Turning to the Middle East and Yemen, AQAP is intent on conducting
operations in the West and against U.S. and allied regional interests.
It has proven itself to be among the al-Qaeda network's most creative
branches but has faced significant CT pressure in recent years,
creating hurdles for the group's external operations planning.
In June 2021, AQAP published its sixth issue of Inspire Guide,
which provides operational guidance for would-be attackers in the
homeland and suggests the group still maintains a viable media
capability, despite the death last year of its key propagandist.
In Syria, al-Qaeda elements under the banner of Hurras al-Din have
struggled to stabilize their footing and experienced numerous
leadership losses and pressure from rival group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.
However, these elements could use their traditional safe haven in
opposition-controlled territory to target U.S. and other Western
interests in the region.
Finally, in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's South Asia affiliate, al-Qaeda
in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS), is the weakest group in the
organization's global network. Al-Qaeda remains intent on striking U.S.
interests and inspiring its followers to do so but currently lacks a
capability to direct attacks against the United States from
Afghanistan. Separate from AQIS, there are probably fewer than a dozen
al-Qaeda legacy members with historical ties to the group located in
Afghanistan, and some may have been there prior to the fall of Kabul;
we have no indication that these legacy members remaining in
Afghanistan are involved in external attack plotting.
iranian threat to the united states
Transitioning to threats emanating from Iran and its partners and
proxies, Iran continues to encourage and support plots against the
United States at home and abroad, especially in the Middle East. Iran
and Lebanese Hizballah have remained intent on retaliating for the
death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
Commander Soleimani, with Iran plotting attacks against former U.S.
officials.
Iran is pursuing a diverse campaign that employs legal, financial,
and lethal action in pursuit of its revenge. Tehran has publicly
threatened to conduct lethal operations including against former
President Donald Trump and former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo,
and has recently increased its threats of lethal action in the
homeland. In August 2022, an Iran-based IRGC member was charged with
attempting to arrange the murder of former National Security Advisor
John Bolton in the United States.
Iran also pursues a campaign against anti-Iranian regime dissidents
around the world, including in the United States. In July 2021, U.S.
law enforcement charged an Iranian intelligence official and four
others with attempting to kidnap an Iranian-American journalist in New
York and forcibly returning her to Iran. At the end of July 2022, a man
with a loaded assault weapon was arrested after behaving suspiciously
outside the same journalist's home.
Iran has also demonstrated its willingness to engage in terrorism
in the Middle East, as evidenced in June when Turkish authorities
arrested members of an Iranian cell planning to kidnap and assassinate
Israeli citizens in Istanbul. The plot was intended as retaliation for
an alleged Israeli operation in Tehran. Separately, Iran-backed
militants in Iraq and Syria target U.S. forces with unmanned aircraft
systems and indirect fire attacks as they try to compel their
withdrawal from the region.
evolving the ct enterprise
The complexity of the threat just outlined continues to demand a
collaborative, agile, and appropriately-resourced CT effort to mitigate
terrorist threats to the United States. In the 21 years since 9/11, the
U.S. Government has developed just that: A highly integrated,
innovative, and successful CT enterprise that continues to adapt to the
nature of the threat. CT practitioners work behind the scenes every day
to ensure that interconnected CT operations and programs are
effectively used and employ a wide range of tools, including identity
intelligence, diplomatic security, sanctions, law enforcement
investigations, high-value target operations, and partner capacity-
building efforts.
Even as other priorities demand attention from the U.S. National
security community, CT remains foundational to our National security.
The CT enterprise must preserve CT fundamentals--such as collection,
warning, analysis, disruption, information sharing, and key
partnerships--that ultimately give the National security community the
time and space to focus on non-CT priorities. NCTC and its CT partners
throughout the U.S. Government are working toward a sustainable and
enduring level of support to this mission that maintains our strategic
success and creates space for investments in other National security
priorities.
CT in a time of competing priorities requires very purposeful and
transparent decisions about when and where resource shifts can be made
to retain as much of the hallmark interconnectivity and efficiency of
the CT community as possible. The goal is to work with Congress to
realize efficiencies while preserving the core capabilities required
for the enduring mission. A key task for the CT community is ensuring
those decisions are made deliberately and with a clear understanding as
to the impact across the CT enterprise.
looking ahead
Maintaining an efficient and effective CT architecture is an on-
going mission, and our progress during the past 21 years has been a
whole-of-Government effort, enabled by Congress' support. As we look to
posture for evolving threats and National security priorities, we must
ensure that we capitalize on the CT infrastructure and relationships
built since 9/11 in support of other National security efforts. An
interconnected threat environment fueled by great power competition,
regional conflicts, and humanitarian emergencies has the potential to
escalate threats quickly. We must ensure that our CT enterprise,
including our international and U.S.-based partners, retains the
ability to stop threats and to stay abreast of a continually-evolving
threat picture.
Let me end by thanking the incredible community of intelligence,
diplomatic, military, and law enforcement professionals whose
dedication to the CT mission has done so much to protect this country
and its citizens from a persistent and amorphous adversary. It is a
privilege to be part of today's CT enterprise and to work on behalf of
the American people.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony.
I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to
question the witnesses.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
Secretary Mayorkas, last year you said that ``domestic
violent extremism poses the most lethal and persistent
terrorism-related threat to our country today.'' Is that still
true?
Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, that continues to be our
assessment in the Department of Homeland Security, that
domestic violent extremism, particularly through lone actors or
small groups loosely affiliated, are spurred to violence by
ideologies of hate, anti-Government sentiments, personal
grievances, and other narratives propagated on on-line
platforms.
Chairman Thompson. Director Wray, what results on this
domestic terrorism threat are you seeing from the lens of the
FBI?
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly we have seen over the last
several years, really going back to maybe the summer of 2019,
an increase in domestic violent extremism. We are concerned
about the lethality, especially of racially motivated violent
extremists, and then the spike that started in 2020 of anti-
Government, anti-authority violent extremism. So we have very
active investigations really all over the country through our
joint terrorism task forces in all 56 field offices and it is a
growing problem. You know, this committee is well aware of the
whole phenomenon of connecting the dots and the importance of
that. It is the very reason why agencies like NCTC and DHS
exist in many ways. But with the lone actors and these small
cells, the real problem there is there are not a lot of dots
out there to connect and there is very little time in which to
connect them. So that presents a whole new type of challenge
for law enforcement and the intelligence community and puts a
premium on our engagement with the public, with our State and
local law enforcement partners in particular, who really become
the eyes and ears that are so critical, because any one of them
could have the one dot that we need.
Chairman Thompson. Ms. Abizaid, you talked about the
pressure that we have applied to our international terrorist
community and the results that have benefited from that
pressure. Is it something that we need to increase the
investment in that or increase the relationships with other
governments? How do you see that going forward?
Ms. Abizaid. I think a sustained investment in our
international counterterrorism enterprise is very important to
be able to sustain the pressure against international groups
going forward.
I agree with my colleagues' assessments here about the
relative threat from domestic violent extremist actors here in
the homeland versus international actors. Those international
actors are continuing to plot and if they had an opportunity to
infiltrate the United States, they would certainly look to
exploit it. It is our international partners, our array of law
enforcement, intelligence relationships and capabilities that
enable us to stay on top of this international threat, even as
we are dealing with some of those dynamics that Director Wray
talked about here in the homeland that make it difficult for us
to deal with a lone actor threat.
Chairman Thompson. Director Wray, about a third of the
historically Black colleges in this country over the last year
have received bomb threats. Can you enlighten us on the FBI's
attempt to mitigate or capture those individuals responsible
for those threats?
Mr. Wray. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Needless to say, we take these threats very seriously.
Frankly the idea of causing the fear and disruption that they
have caused is just really outrageous and unacceptable. We have
joint terrorism task forces working on it, 30 field offices,
multiple headquarters divisions. It is very much on-going. I
think what I could say for purposes of today is that we have
recently, with respect to the first big traunch of the threats,
investigation has identified an underage juvenile subject and
because of the Federal limitations on charging juveniles with
Federal crimes, we have worked with State prosecutors to ensure
that that individual is charged under various other State
offenses which will ensure some level of restrictions and
monitoring and disruption of his criminal behavior.
Since that big traunch that we believe that individual was
responsible for, there have been two other traunches and we are
very actively investigating those, but there is not much I can
say on those on-going active investigations, those other
investigations at this time. But we have been very engaged with
HBCUs all over the country, we have done sort-of national
conference calls and so forth with them to try to update them
wherever we can. We recognize the fear and anger that this
quite rightly causes in those communities and we are determined
to see this through.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
your testimony today. As you were speaking it just occurred to
me how important this committee is and how important each of
your respective work is. It is our job to do oversight and
sometimes it is unpleasant. But the bottom line is we must
never forget that you are at the head of keeping this country
safe. I appreciate all the efforts of all of you. Sometimes you
stumble like we all do, but it is also time to say thank you
for what you do and how you do it.
You know, when you hear about all the threats, it is hard
to really distinguish one as the ubiquitous threat, but it
seems to me that one of the most pervasive threats that exists
now that wasn't really on our radar 8 years ago when I came in
to Congress was a cyber issue. What we have done with respect
to cyber with this committee is commendable, especially working
with Chairman Thompson standing up CISA as an agency and making
them at the--I like to call it the quarterback on the domestic
front, and how well you have worked with the other agencies,
like the FBI in that realm is great. But when you have cyber
attacks, like on a water plant in Florida, which if successful
would have killed thousands of people, you realize what a
pervasive and probably the most ubiquitous threat we have in
the United States is cyber.
So in that realm, I am very heartened to see how CISA has
stepped up working in conjunction with the private sector as a
partnership. It is not a regulatory-type setting, it is more of
an exchange of information and how well you work with the other
agencies, including the FBI as well. So that is great.
So, Chairman Mayorkas, I just want to ask you, what is your
vision for CISA going forward, given the current threat
environment and how important it is that we make sure CISA is
strong and grows?
Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Katko, let me just thank
you for your co-leadership of this committee and your service.
I also want to express my thanks to this entire committee for
its support of our cybersecurity mission, not only in the
creation of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, but also in the new legislation, the cyber incident
reporting requirements, which I think are going to really
strengthen the cybersecurity of this entire Nation.
I think, Ranking Member Katko, you set forth a very
important blueprint for CISA and the Cybersecurity 2025. What
we need to do is to strengthen--only strengthen the public-
private partnership that really defines the cybersecurity
ecosystem. The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative that CISA has
launched is really a tremendous success. It is not just
domestic, but our JCDC, as it is known by its acronym, in our
international relationships and the partnerships are going to
be increasingly vital as adverse nation-states only seek to
perpetuate harm through the virtual world.
Just a few weeks ago I was in Singapore for one of the
world's preeminent cyber conferences and I spoke very starkly
about the threat that China poses in the cybersecurity arena
and how dangerous and perilous it is for countries to allow
China to actually create their cyber infrastructure and how we
need to combat that and create a level playing field. A
competition of fairness is of course how we define ourselves,
but to deal with a country that violates norms and does not act
responsibly is something that we have to address.
So the public-private partnership, the international
relationships, the sharing of information is so vital and that
is really where we are headed.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Directors Wray and
Abizaid.
Every day you wake up probably thinking the same thing I do
and I look at my phone and see if there was an attack that
evening or somewhere around the world, and often times, sadly,
there has been. So the threat of terrorist groups, ISIS and al-
Qaeda and all the others, is still very real. I know you spent
a lot of time with that.
Now, I just wish you could comment real quick and tell me
if that threat matrix has changed since we left Afghanistan. Is
Afghanistan becoming a breeding ground again? Is it more of a
concern again?
I will start with Ms. Abizaid, please. Briefly.
Ms. Abizaid. Yes, I would say that from Afghanistan the
threat that I am most concerned about is actually from the ISIS
affiliate, the ISIS Khorasan affiliate. That is a group that
has demonstrated very significant capability against the
Taliban in Afghanistan right now. They have conducted some
attacks outside of Afghanistan and the immediate environs and I
am worried about their ambition for greater and wider-spread
attacks.
So it is a top priority for us.
Mr. Katko. Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. I would share Director Abizaid's concern about
ISIS-K in the immediate term. I would just add that we are very
concerned about al-Qaeda, the prospect of al-Qaeda
reconstituting, given the relationship with the Taliban and
that is the flip side of finding Zawahiri right in the middle
of Kabul.
Mr. Katko. Exactly.
Mr. Wray. Then I would add to that, we are concerned about
the possibility that either al-Qaeda or ISIS-K could inspire
attacks here in the United States or against Americans
elsewhere.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions
they may wish to ask witnesses. The Chair will recognize
Members in order of seniority, alternating between Majority and
Minority. Members that are participating virtually are reminded
to unmute themselves when recognized for questioning and then
to mute themselves once they have finished speaking and to
leave their cameras on so they are visible to the Chair.
The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Payne, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. I want to thank everybody for their testimony
today.
Please bear with me a minute, I lost my----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman--Mr. Payne, we hear you.
Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you.
Just a few weeks ago an armed man broke into the San
Francisco home of Speaker Pelosi in what appeared to be an
assassination attempt. Although Speaker Pelosi was not home,
the intruder violently attacked the Speaker's 82-year-old
husband, putting him in the hospital. This attack occurred at a
tense time for our Nation with extreme rhetoric suggesting
violence against public officials.
Director Wray, your own agency has also been subjected to
such attacks after executing a search pursuant to a lawful
warrant on the former President's residence as we saw with the
incident outside an FBI office in Ohio.
To the panel, how do you assess the current threats against
elected and Government officials and how do your agencies
proactively protect against this violence?
Mr. Wray. I will start off and see whether Secretary
Mayorkas may want to chime in.
The phenomenon that you are describing, Congressman, I
think has two pieces of it. The first is related toward
violence toward all sorts of individuals in Government kind-of
across the spectrum, and the second is law enforcement-
specific.
On the first, we have seen a trend over the last several
years of people more and more in this country when they are
upset or angry about something turning to violence as the way
to manifest it. That is a very, very dangerous trend. There is
a right way under the First Amendment to express how angry and
upset you are about something or with somebody, but violence
and violence against Government officials is not it. But that
is something that we have been seeing across the political
spectrum now for quite a number of years.
Second, I mentioned law enforcement. It is a reality that
the already dangerous profession, namely law enforcement, has
become more dangerous. Last year was the highest number of law
enforcement officers shot and killed in the line of duty since
9/11. I know personally because we have had agents shot and
killed, we had a task force officer shot and killed, ambushed
right outside one of our small offices in Terre Haute, Indiana.
I call--one of the things I did when I started in this job was
that I said I was going to call--every time an officer is shot
and killed anywhere in the country in the line of duty, I was
going to call the chief or the sheriff myself and express my
condolences. I have made way north of 200 of those calls. It
often is one a week and each one of those officers killed
leaves behind a family, a department, and a community that will
never be the same.
So the phenomenon that you described affects both
Government officials as victims across the spectrum, but also
law enforcement uniquely. It is a trend that we should all as
Americans be concerned about.
Mr. Payne. Secretary Mayorkas.
Secretary Mayorkas. Let me echo what the director said
about what a tragically difficult year it has been for law
enforcement.
I want to reference one additional statistic, which is this
year has seen the greatest number of ambushes against law
enforcement officers. There is no more noble profession than
the law enforcement profession. I know a number of you on this
committee have served in that capacity.
One of the areas of emphasis that the director and I have
had is to be sure to disseminate timely and actionable
information to State, local, Tribal, territorial, and campus
law enforcement so that we equip our local communities to
understand the threat landscape before them and prevent violent
acts from occurring in the first instance.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. That was a quick 5 minutes and I will
yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all
three of you for your service. As Mr, Katko mentioned, I know
it is not an easy job.
I chaired this committee, you know, back in the day and I
want to--you know, in my position being a leader now on foreign
affairs, with the collapse of Afghanistan, what I have seen is
a rise in our foreign nation adversary states. And the threat,
quite honestly. The way it was done with the Taliban in charge
of the evacuation, in charge of HKIA, a suicide bomber coming
in and killing 13 service men and women, leaving Americans
behind, leaving Afghan partners behind, getting Afghans on the
planes that shouldn't have been on the airplanes, and got into
the United States because it was so chaotic. Now, that doesn't
really fall onto either of you-all's jurisdiction--perhaps
Secretary Mayorkas to the extent of the screening coming in
from the planes.
But then we saw Putin invade Ukraine and now we see a
rising China, communist China threatening Taiwan. We see an
Ayatolla close to a nuclear bomb and Kim Jong-un is firing
rockets off again, now over Japan.
I argue that the world is getting more dangerous and I know
that you are more domestic, but you have to look at the world
and threats. It is a world-wide threat hearing to determine can
those threats get into the homeland? That has always been the
question, whether it be through ports and airports, which is
the more typical way they do this, or what worries me now is
the situation at the border. The fact that it is wide open. The
combination of the Taliban taking over, Mr. Haqqani, a wanted
terrorist, being their minister of interior, now minister--
really of security is what he is, harboring Al-Zawahiri, who is
Bin Laden's top lieutenant in his own house. I applaud the
administration for targeting him and taking him out, but we
don't have eyes and ears anymore. We have lost access to
Bagram, and now China is in there with the lithium and we will
probably get access to Bagram, that being the end result.
My question is maybe to the director of the FBI, what is
your concern of the threat combination of this unmanaged wide-
open border situation and the threat from al-Qaeda and ISIS
coming out of Afghanistan, not to mention the fentanyl and all
the other bad stuff? Then, last, the terror watch list, as I
understand it, there was 98 of them. When I was Chair of this
committee we would get briefed on those individuals. Not just
the numbers. It is my understanding this committee is not
getting the full briefing on who are these people that have
attempted to get into the United States, much less the ones
that already have.
Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, you raised a number of I think
very legitimate and important issues.
When it comes to the border in particular, it is a very
significant and important challenge. There is a whole wide
array of criminal threats that come in terms of drugs, money,
guns, violence, and you mentioned some of that in your
comments. There is also of course got concern from a national
security perspective, any port of entry is a possible vector
that a terrorist organization could choose to exploit.
Now, historically--historically, foreign terrorist
organizations have not chosen illegal immigration as the way to
seed operatives, as they have usually preferred to either
recruit somebody here or send somebody in legally, just because
of the risks. But we have seen, you know, over the last 5
years, an increase in the number of KSTs who have been
encountered who have attempted to cross. So that is obviously
something we remain very concerned about. You may have seen
last--early summer we announced the indictment of an individual
who was trying to bring foreign nationals in in a plot to kill
former President Bush.
Mr. McCaul. Thanks for bringing that up. That was one other
thing. My time is getting ready to expire.
But I guess the point for this committee to really evaluate
the threat to respond on a policy basis, we don't know who
these 98 people are, where they are from. We don't really have
any identifying information to know who they are, where they
are coming from, how they--what was their motivation to get
into the United States. So I would ask that maybe, Mr.
Chairman, that we--I think this committee, as when you and I--
when I was Chair and you were Ranking Member, we got that
information.
Chairman Thompson. Yes. We will proceed to get it this
time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for their testimony today and thank the Chairman for
his kind words in his opening remarks on my leaving the
committee at the end of this year. It has been a pleasure
serving with everyone and I will miss the work and the people.
But I thank our witnesses for being here.
So it has been 1 year since the Department submitted its
report evaluating PPD 21 as required by Section 9002 of the
2021 NDAA. In a letter last week concurring with that review,
President Biden acknowledged that the United States ``lacks a
comprehensive way to establish mandatory minimum cybersecurity
requirements across our critical infrastructure and current
approaches differ by sector''. He also committed to working
with Congress to fill gaps in statutory authorities.
So to all of our witnesses, what gaps should we be looking
to fill related to improving the cybersecurity of critical
infrastructure?
Then, Secretary Mayorkas, in particular the letter mentions
a focused effort to help sector risk management agencies
identify systemically important critical entities in their
sector. How is DHS approaching this task?
Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman. I
believe I caught the gist of your question.
We are doing quite a number of things to address
cybersecurity and specifically in the critical infrastructure
arena. Of course, the mandatory cyber incident reporting
legislation that you and other Members of this committee
championed is going to be so vitally important and quite
frankly a model for other countries to follow.
TSA, the Transportation Security Administration, for the
first time used its regulatory authority following the Colonial
Pipeline attack to promulgate security directives to really
require stakeholders in that sector to employ some of the more
basic cyber hygiene mechanisms.
Just in the last few weeks, CISA, the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency, promulgated its voluntary
cybersecurity performance goals, which really make cyber
hygiene far more understandable and accessible to a broad
spectrum of industry leaders and industry participants where we
recommend particular measures. We identify the cost of each
measure, the prioritization of each measure, the complexity of
implementation, and the benefits to be gained.
One of the areas--as I mentioned in response to Ranking
Member Katko's question, one of the areas where we are also
pressing very, very hard--and this touches upon Congressman
McCaul's point--is the need for international collaboration,
not only because of the increasingly global footprint of
companies, but because of the fact that we are dealing more and
more with adverse nation-states and their potential impact on
the homeland.
Mr. Langevin. All right. Thank you, Secretary.
Let me go to another area. The Russian invasion of the
Ukraine was in some ways galvanized--it galvanized
collaboration among CISA, FBI, and other Federal agencies to
respond to the heightened cyber threats environment. In this
case they quickly partnered with security firms and critical
infrastructure stakeholders to help prepare for potential
retaliatory Russian attacks.
Director Wray, how would you characterize the on-going
threat of retaliatory Russian cyber attacks to U.S. critical
infrastructure as the landscape of the war in Ukraine continues
to change?
Secretary Mayorkas, how can we build on lessons learned
earlier this year through efforts like Shields Up or the Joint
Cyber Defense Collaborative to make critical infrastructure
owners and operators continue to stay engaged and vigilant?
Mr. Wray. Well, when it comes to critical infrastructure, I
think I will say it has become an increasingly crowded field of
threat actors targeting critical infrastructure, whether it is
ransomware or some other kind of malicious cyber activity. One
of the things we are particularly concerned about during the
Russia-Ukraine conflict is the possibility that, for example,
the Russian intelligence services, which have long targeted our
critical infrastructure for espionage purposes, could choose to
use the same access for more destructive purposes. It has put a
premium on the kind of private-sector partnership that I know
CISA, as well as the FBI, have engaged in very strongly. The
private-sector partnership is the critical ingredient to
defending critical infrastructure in this country. I think we
have made very significant progress. There is also a lot more
work to be done, but we are very much on the right path in my
view.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes----
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. The gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, a major threat to our homeland is clearly the
arterial bleed at our Southern Border and the disintegration of
our sovereignty down there. The top threat to individual rights
and freedoms of Americans from sea to shining sea, Mr. Wray, is
the weaponization of the FBI against the American citizens that
you have sworn to serve.
Secretary Mayorkas, for the record, are you aware or have
you authorized CBP agents to release illegal aliens into
American without identifying, screening, or vetting them
properly? Or harvesting even basic biometric data, like
fingerprints?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, our Nation's sovereignty
stands strong and our brave men and women in the Border Patrol
and throughout U.S. Customs----
Mr. Higgins. Are you aware or have you authorized CBP
agents to release illegal aliens into America without having
properly vetted, identifed them, or collected at least basic
biometric data, like fingerprints?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
Mr. Higgins. I mean you got millions coming across.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, our----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from--Mr. Higgins, allow
the Secretary to answer.
Mr. Higgins. It is my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Well----
Mr. Higgins. If I want to reclaim my time, I will.
Chairman Thompson. Well----
Mr. Higgins. I am going to move on without an answer, Mr.
Chairman, are you asking for me to yield you time?
Chairman Thompson. No, you--I am the Chair.
Mr. Higgins. Then I am going to reclaim my time.
Chairman Thompson. No.
Mr. Higgins. Look, we don't----
Chairman Thompson. Moving on now----
Mr. Higgins. Secretary Mayorkas----
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from----
Mr. Higgins. Are you interrupting my time, Mr. Chairman? Or
are you requesting me to yield you time?
Chairman Thompson. I am trying--I am trying to make sure
that we conduct----
Mr. Higgins. You are interfering with my 5 minutes, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. Well, then the gentleman will get----
Mr. Higgins. If you request me to yield you time, I will
give you time.
Chairman Thompson. No, but that is not the procedure.
Mr. Higgins. But that is the procedure.
Chairman Thompson. It is not. It is not.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, it is.
Chairman Thompson. So----
Mr. Higgins. Of course it is.
Chairman Thompson. Look----
Mr. Higgins. I reclaim my time and I want this time back.
Secretary Mayorkas----
Chairman Thompson. Look----
Mr. Higgins. Have you used your authority to suppress
exculpatory evidence----
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Secretary----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Presented----
Chairman Thompson. Mr. Secretary----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. By CBP agents who have come under
public attack and condemnation by DHS and the Biden
administration? Have you used your authority to suppress
exculpatory evidence presented by CBP agents who have come
under public attack and condemnation by you and the Biden
administration?
Secretary Mayorkas. Two points, if I may, Congressman.
No. 1, in response to your second question, I don't even
know what you are referring to. With respect to your first
question----
Mr. Higgins. I will take that as that you are on the record
as saying no.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. U.S. customs----
Mr. Higgins. That you have not----
Secretary Mayorkas. U.S. customs----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Used your authority to suppress
exculpatory evidence. If you are an honorable man, then
obviously you should be able to say no to that. Who would
suppress exculpatory evidence? Is your answer no?
Secretary Mayorkas. I don't even know what you are
referring to, Congressman.
Mr. Higgins. You will.
Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, in response----
Mr. Higgins. Secretary Mayorkas, have you used your
authority to retaliate against DHS agents who served on special
details during the Trump administration, agents identified by
your administration as conservatives or Trump supporters?
Secretary Mayorkas. Once again, Congressman, I don't even
know what you are referring to.
Mr. Higgins. You are before Congress. I am going to take
that as a no.
Through your authority, Secretary Mayorkas, have you
encouraged your chain of command to suppress basic law
enforcement actions at the border and harass and victimize or
intimidate experienced front-line law enforcement agents at the
border using internal investigations and threats of
disciplinary action or transfer in order to force those agents
to comply with DHS policies that actually injure the security
of our homeland and are contrary to the sworn oath of those
agents? Is that the culture you have created?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I don't even know what you
are referring to.
Mr. Higgins. You will.
Secretary Mayorkas. I am building a culture----
Mr. Higgins. Secretary Mayorkas, final question, good sir.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Of honor and service and--
--
Mr. Higgins. It has been rumored----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. And nobility throughout
the Department of Homeland Security. That is----
Mr. Higgins. You represent----
Secretary Mayorkas. That is why----
Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Nobility, Secretary Mayorkas?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, that is what I am
dedicated to.
Mr. Higgins. It has been rumored, Secretary, that you are
going to resign prior to January 3. Is there any truth to those
rumors?
Secretary Mayorkas. That is a false rumor.
Mr. Higgins. All right. We look forward to seeing you in
January.
Director Wray, does the FBI have confidential human
sources--did the FBI have confidential human sources embedded
within the January 6 protestors on January 6, 2021?
Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, as I am sure you can
appreciate, I have to be very careful about what I can say
about when----
Mr. Higgins. Even now--because that is what you told us 2
years ago.
Mr. Wray. May I finish? May I finish? About when we do and
do not and where we have and have not used confidential human
sources.
But to the extent that there is a suggestion, for example,
that the FBI's confidential human sources or FBI employees in
some way instigated or orchestrated January 6, that is
categorically false.
Mr. Higgins. Did you have confidential human sources
dressed as Trump supporters inside the Capitol on January the
6th prior to the doors being open?
Mr. Wray. Again, I have to be very careful of what I----
Mr. Higgins. It should be a no. Can you not tell the
American people no, we did not have confidential human sources
dressed as Trump supporters positioned inside the Capitol on
January 6?
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wray. You should not read anything into my decision not
to share information----
Chairman Thompson. Director Wray----
Mr. Wray [continuing]. About confidential human sources.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. All of our witnesses are here today as
guests of the committee to discuss threats to the homeland. As
our guests, we owe our witnesses respect. The subject matter of
today's hearing deserves thoughtfulness. The Chair encourages
all Members to be polite and to take today's worldwide threats
hearing seriously.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Chairman, may I add from--I just have to--
briefly.
Chairman Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Katko. Just so I understand, my colleagues on my side
of the aisle, if the Chairman speaks he has the authority to
speak at any time he wants. If he speaks, we will make sure you
get your time back. So going forward, just understand that, OK?
Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
honored guests today for this most important discussion.
Mr. Wray, Mr. Mayorkas, Ms. Abizaid, thank you for being
here.
Secretary Mayorkas, talking about counterterrorism threats
to the homeland, really threats to Americans on a world-wide
basis. We need strong allies around the world to protect the
homeland. When Secretary Kelly was there in your position a
number of years ago, I asked him about border security. We
acknowledged, we agreed that border security does not begin and
end at the border. If a threat gets to the border, we have got
a problem.
So my question to you is do you feel like we have enough or
do we need additional resources to be able to coordinate intel
for the benefit of security of all Americans around the globe?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we are working more
closely than ever before with our partners----
Mr. Correa. So if I may interrupt you, next week is World
Cup--Qatar. Thousands of Americans will be there. I presume my
questions to you and of course Mr. Wray, are we coordinating
enough with the government of Qatar to make sure Americans will
be safe there?
Secretary Mayorkas. We certainly, Congressman, have been
working with the Qataris in advising them with respect to how
to enhance security to protect----
Mr. Correa. Director Wray.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Americans there.
Mr. Wray. I would just agree with Secretary Mayorkas that
we have been providing significant assistance and support to
the Qataris in their efforts to secure the World Cup.
Mr. Correa. You would disagree we have?
Mr. Wray. No, I said I would agree with Secretary Mayorkas.
Mr. Correa. You would agree. Thank you.
So I guess the next step is lessons learned. In 4 years we
will have the World Cup in the United States. So any breach--I
mean the government of Qatar, we hope, will have 100 percent in
terms of defense there, no lapses. I hope we are there to learn
their lessons because we are going to have to apply those in
the United States in 4 years. Are we shadowing what they are
doing?
Mr. Wray. That is an important part of why we are providing
the assistance and the support. It is not just because it is
the right thing to do to help the Qataris and the----
Mr. Correa. It is the right thing for American citizens
around the world.
Mr. Wray. It is also the right thing for America, because--
--
Mr. Correa. To make sure we protect----
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Mr. Correa. Ms. Abizaid, any thoughts on how we can enhance
security of Americans around the globe?
Ms. Abizaid. So just on the World Cup point, I would say,
you know, the Qataris are very good partners. It is a
partnership that we are engaged in from an intelligence
community side. We have a threat integration cell that is
stationed there, as we do for all major events. The Qataris
actually learned from us before we are going to be able to
learn from them, when they came out during the Superbowl in Los
Angeles to understand how we in the United States do security
for major events like this.
So it is an on-going conversation, on-going partnership.
I would just say from an international perspective, those
partnerships that you mentioned are absolutely critical to
being able to secure the country here.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Mayorkas.
Secretary Mayorkas. I concur with that.
I should say, Congressman, that we have a very, very well
exercised and trained methodology to address major events. That
is throughout the interagency in the Federal Government, and we
work very closely with State and local partners. This is a very
evolved architecture that we have built that others learn from
and we of course are in an on-going learning process.
Mr. Correa. In my last 67 seconds I would ask all of you
really that--I ask of you, which is what else can we do as a
committee to make sure that we are coordinating with our allies
and friends--and maybe even our unfriends around the world to
make sure we stop catastrophic events like 9/11? You know, we
talk about border security and 9/11, the terrorists that
perpetrated 9/11 entered this country legally. We continue to
focus on the border, on refugees, when the bigger issue is
working with our allies around the world and other unfriends to
make sure we stop those threats from happening again.
What do you need from us to make sure that that type of
coordination exists and is enhanced moving forward?
Mr. Wray. Well, one thing--obviously it would be a long
list and we welcome the discussion, but the top thing on my
list would be to urge Congress to reauthorize Section 702 when
it comes up for renewal at the end of next year, because that
is the critical tool to understanding foreign threats which may
have--again, foreign threats that may have an impact on the
United States.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Mayorkas. My 6 seconds left.
Secretary Mayorkas. We have one imminent reauthorization
that is very much needed, and that is our countering unmanned
aerial systems authority. I think that our budget is something
that is very, very important to pass to provide us with the
resources to advance our international partnerships.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recogizes the gentleman from Mississippi, for 5
minutes, Mr. Guest.
Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mayorkas, as we here today speaking on threats to
the homeland, these threats are magnified by our unsecure
border. A few moments ago Director Wray in response to a
question by Mr. McCaul stated the border is a challenge. He
referred to drugs, money laundering, guns, and violence. You
referenced some of the same information in your report. On page
13 you say that transnational criminal organizations continue
to pose a threat to the United States. You speak of drug-
related crime, money laundering, human smuggling. Then on page
15 in further detail, as it relates to human smuggling, you
said at our Southwest Border we are experiencing historic
levels of encounters. We know that those are numbers that you
refer to are borne out by the statistics that your agency puts
out each and every month.
Now, for the eighth straight month we have had more than
200,000 encounters along our Southwest Border. Physical year
2022, those number were more than 2,378,000, physical year
2021, 1,734,000. Compare those numbers to the last year of the
prior administration, physical year 2020, those numbers were
458,000. So we see that during a 2-year period the number of
encounters along our Southwest Border has increased over 520
percent.
Just taking 2022 and 2021 combined, those 2 years in which
you have been in charge of this agency, we see a number that
exceeds 4 million. To put that number in perspective, that is a
number larger than 23 of the States that comprise the United
States of America.
So looking at that, you have previously stated that the
border is closed, the border is secure, and that we have not
lost operational control of the border.
I ask you once again today, do you still stand by your
statement based on those statistical figures, that the border
is closed, the border is secure, and that we have not lost
operational control?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman Guest, let me share a few
thoughts, because I think it is very important to put the
challenge at our Southern Border--and it is a very serious
challenge--in proper context.
It is a challenge that is not specific or exclusive to our
Southern Border. This is a challenge that exists throughout the
hemisphere.
Let me give a very powerful example.
Mr. Guest. Mr. Mayorkas, I am not trying to interrupt you.
I have very limited time and so I would like to focus my
question on the Southwest Border. If we would like to meet
outside this committee meeting when we have additional time--
you and I have met before and I would be happy to meet with you
again. But since I am now down to 2 minutes I want to focus my
questioning specifically on the Southwest Border.
You have said when you have appeared before this committee
that you need additional time--your agency needs additional
time to get this crisis under control. We see--as Congress, we
see no evidence that the situation along the Southwest Border
is getting better. As a matter of fact, looking statistically,
it seems like the border is getting worse. We can say these
number of immigrants, we know that of these number of
immigrants that we see here that have come across our border,
we have statistics here that 98 people on that list--of those
individuals were on the terrorist watch list.
So we as a committee, we as Congress, we as the American
public, we want to have faith that you and your agency are
seeking to get this challenge under control. But I am looking
at statistics and statistics tell me that that is not the case.
Statistics tell me that the border is only getting worse and
that since this administration has taken control, that the
policies that you have put in place have failed and that they
have failed miserably. We know that Commissioner Magnus
recently was forced to resign from office. I applaud you for
removing him. I thought he did a terrible job. I hope that
there are other people that you will remove and that you will
work with a Republican-controlled Congress to find a way to
secure the border.
So what I am hoping and what I am asking here--and I will
give you the last 30 seconds of my time--is what will you do in
your current position to help us secure the border? Because
that is what we all want, Republicans, Democrats, we want a
secure border, we clearly do not have that now. What will you
help us do to make sure we get back to the levels that we saw
in physical year 2020?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman Guest, I very much look
forward to working with you and this entire committee to
enhance the security of our border.
Let me give two examples of things that we are doing and
two things that I think Congress can do.
No. 1, we are taking it to the smugglers and the
transnational criminal organizations at an unprecedented level.
We have a disruption campaign, interagency disruption campaign
that has led to more than 6,000 arrests, working not only in
the itneragency, but with our international partners. We are
taking it to them at an unprecedented level. No. 1.
No. 2, if one takes a look at the program that we recently
implemented with respect to Venezuelan nationals, which were
the highest number of encounters we were experiencing, the
demographics at our Southern Border have changed dramatically
over the last several years. If one takes a look at that
program at its early phase, we were experiencing approximately
1,100 encounters of Venezuelan nationals a day, and since the
implementation of the program, that is now approximately 300
per day. That is an example of the things that we are doing to
enhance the security of our border.
Two things that Congress can do. No. 1 is pass our budget,
which provides for additonal resources to the Department of
Homeland Security and others to enhance our border security,
including for the first time since 2011 300 more Border Patrol
agents.
No. 2, once and for all, pass immigration reform,
including, for example, much-needed reform to our asylum
system. Everyone agrees the system is broken and we need it
fixed.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms.
Slotkin.
Ms. Slotkin. Best State in the Union, Michigan.
Thanks for being here. I just--he has departed the room,
but I just wanted to appreciate John Katko, my friend who is
departing this committee, and the tone he has set in this
committee. It is my fervrent hope that as the other side of the
aisle seems poised to take over, that we keep this focused on
homeland threats and not making this a place of political
theater. That is my desperate hope and I think that is the
message that was sent by the voters last week. I hope they hear
it and continue in that spirit.
Second, I just want to talk a little bit about the threats
that you all have talked about today, whether it is domestic
terrorism and home-grown threats, the threats coming through
our border, cybersecurity and the threats of ransomware,
information and disinformation coming from, you know, places
like Russia and China.
What has really struck me is how the threats that are most
prominent for Americans today are really affecting civilians.
They are not going after law enforcement agents, they are not
going after our military, they are going after civilians in our
K-12 shcools, in our hospitals, through our water treatment
plants. The threats are much more personal and they are much
more sort-of for the average American and they desperately want
to know what we are doing to protect them.
Now, I was in the CIA and the Pentagon for many, many years
and we are all--have to be careful not to fight the previous
war and to make sure that we are adapting to today's threats.
Particularly on cyber, I am worried that we have had--you
know, as we remember 9/11, we had the attacks in Kenya, we had
the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole, and then we had 9/11. I feel
like on our cyber attacks we have had our U.S.S. Cole, we have
had the Colonial Pipeline, we have had our meat processing
facility, we have had SolarWinds. So we all thought about what
would we have done if we could have imagined the threat of 9/
11, what would we have done to better prepare.
So, Secretary Mayorkas, please tell me the two or three
things that you wish you could do--either you need the
resources or you need the attention of the American people--to
prevent a cyber
9/11.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, in my opening remarks I
talked about the threat landscape and how in fact the goal of
our adversaries is indeed to disrupt our way of life. I think
you captured that very well in your opening remarks.
We have done a great deal to enhance the security of the
cyber ecosystem. When I say we, it is not just the Department,
but of course working very closely with our partners. That is
No. 1, to equip the private sector with information and to
educate them on the tools to advance cyber hygiene. We have
done that for the civilian population as well.
If we take a look at some of the very accessible sites that
we have created on the web, stopransomware.gov, CISA.gov, some
of the very simply measures that people can take, whether it is
multifactor authentication, backing up one's systems, using
safe and secure passwords. These are the things that we need to
do and continue to do. The more that we can amplify
collectively--we in the Government, in Congress--the imperative
of maintaining cyber hygiene, raising the alertness of the
average citizen to the imperative, especially in the
increasingly interconnected world, I think that is one critical
goal.
Ms. Slotkin. Yes. I would offer, it would be useful if we
had a list of specific things, your asks, right. We all want to
prevent these cyber attacks. I think cyber issues are very
bipartisan in this Congress and have been and hopefully will be
in the future Congress. So please be assertive with what you
need in order to protect the American people, because they feel
like they don't know what is defending them.
Second, Director Wray, I was heartened to hear your story
of calling all the families of fallen law enforcement that have
been killed over the past year or time that you have been in
service. I am very worried. Just coming out of campaign season,
the number of people who think that the FBI is a political
tool, as we heard even raised in questions here today.
Can you please talk to the American people about the FBI
and explain in your words why they should trust their Federal
law enforcement?
Mr. Wray. So there are a lot of opinions out there about
the FBI, just like there are about everything. By my opinion,
the window that I get to see into our work force is unique. I
have visited all 56 of our field offices at least twice, I have
spoken with law enforcement from all 50 States on countless
occasions, I have met with judges, prosecutors, community
leaders, victims and their families, and the FBI that I see
every single day and that I hear about from all of them, is an
FBI that does the right thing in the right way with rigor, with
professionalism, with objectivity, with skill. I will stack our
work force up against anywhere in the world any time. The
Americans should have deep confidence in those people.
I will add that when it comes to perceptions of the FBI
that the number of Americans all across this country applying
to be special agents in the FBI has been going up--up
significantly over the past 3 years, at a time when as I hear
all the time, law enforcement all over this country is having
the opposite experience. I think that speaks very well of
Americans in every State represented on this committee.
Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognzies the gentleman from North Carolina for
5 minutes, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mayorkas, Mr. McCaul said the border is wide
open, Director Wray testified about an elevated threat of guns
and money and drugs across the border. Mr. Guest laid out a lot
of the details about the record-breaking numbers. He ended up
having to talk more than get an answer from you on something.
I just want to ask you--I have heard you in the Judiciary
Committee recently in the summer testify that the border is
secure. Secretary Mayorkas, do you continue to maintain that
the border is secure?
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes. We are working day in and day out
to enhance its security, Congressman.
Mr. Bishop. All right. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Mayorkas. We have----
Mr. Bishop. Sir, I----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Remarkable----
Mr. Bishop. I get it. I just wanted to make sure that that
still is your assessment.
Secretary Mayorkas. It is very----
Mr. Bishop. Director Wray----
Secretary Mayorkas. It is and it is very important--if I
may.
Mr. Bishop. Well, I don't--I know, there is just not enough
time for a lot of explanation and you have got written
testimony and so forth. I just wanted to understand that is
your position still. I think it is a position that denies
reality, respectfully. But I wanted to give you the opportunity
to say no, I think the situation has changed or something like
that.
Director Wray, do you believe that the border is secure?
Mr. Wray. Well, I can only speak to border security from
our narrow lane, but I can speak to it from that lane. What I
would say is that we see significant criminal threats coming
from south of the border, whether it is guns, drugs, money,
violence. We see transnational criminal organizations that are
sending their drugs here and that are using street gangs here
to distribute it, and that contributes to the violent crime
crisis here. We have had takedowns just in the last few months
that I could give you as an example.
You know, I will give you just one quick one. You know, in
Phoenix we had a takedown working with CBP, who are phenomenal
partners I should add, where we seized in one vehicle
interdiction enough fentanyl to kill the equivalent of the
entire State of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Bishop. Yes, that is very troubling.
Mr. Wray. Just one vehicle interdiction.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Director Wray.
Director Abizaid, does the NCTC asses a significant threat
from the historic level of uncontrolled crossing at the
Southern Border?
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you.
We don't actually. Border security is really important. If
we look at the nature of the threat and how it has evolved here
in the United States homeland, it has been striking how the
evolution to lone actors actually reflects how much more
difficult it is for terrorists to enter into the United States.
We look historically at the kind of attacks we have
experienced here in the homeland. None of them have been
connected to major illegal crossings or otherwise from the
Southwest Border.
Mr. Bishop. Right.
Director Wray----
Ms. Abizaid. That said, it remains a top intelligence
priority.
Mr. Bishop. Director Wray spoke to that earlier about what
has historically been true. It makes me mindful of the 9/11
report, that chapter that said the system was blinking red. It
was a failure of the U.S. Government agencies to anticipate a
threat that should have been obvious to everyone.
So it troubles me that the official response is we don't
think that is much of a threat. We have an unprecedented number
of people coming across the border, a lot of them are being
interdicted, but released into the United States without enough
scrutiny. A whole lot more apparently coming in without being
interdicted at all. The official answer is, hmm, we don't think
there is a terrorism problem there. Just hasn't happened in the
past.
I think unfortunately we are going to find out if it
happens in the future.
Mr. Bishop. Reporting from the Intercept focused on the
Department of Homeland Security--and I guess CISA has been the
focal point for it--interactions with social media companies.
One thing it related was that DHS sent an email to Twitter
about a Twitter account that could imperil election system
integrity. The user had 56 followers and a bio that indicated--
had references to weed shops.
Secretary Mayorkas, does that kind of--and the level of
interaction with social media platforms and that one
specifically, that anecdote, not suggest that DHS is engaged
with egregious overreach that threatens the First Amendment?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would note that the
Intercept article focuses attention on the disinformation
activities that preceded our administration. Let me assure you
that our work to address disinformation, which is a tool that
our nation-state adversaries seek to employ to sow discord in
this country, is something that is very, very respectful of the
civil rights and civil liberties of individuals, as well as
their privacy rights.
Mr. Bishop. You maintain that always, but let me just ask,
when you say it is respectful, are you attempting to conduct
censorship by proxy as a means of evading the First Amendment?
Secretary Mayorkas. We absolutely do not.
Mr. Bishop. My time is expired.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green,
for 4 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking
Member as well and appreciate greatly the commentary that you
both gave earlier with reference to collegiality and an effort
to get the optimum from this committee based upon the things
that we can agree upon. I thank you both.
Mr. Chairman and Members, I am on a mission of mercy today.
I am on a mission of mercy because of immigration laws and a
need for comprehensive immigration reform. Please allow me to
call to your attention, Mr. Secretary, the case of one Mr.
Jaime Abavos Rosales. I would like to have additional
conversations with you about this because there is no way for
me to give you the intelligence necessary at this time, the
entirety of it.
In 1996 Mr. Avalos came to this country at the age of 1
year. In 2013 he received DACA. He graduated from a high school
in Houston, Texas, Bellarie High, 2014. No criminal record, Mr.
Secretary. Married his wife, Yarianna, and they now have a
child who is approximately 1 year of age.
Mr. Secretary, pursuant to the laws, he went back to
Mexico, to Juarez, to the consulate in an effort to submit
himself for re-entry into the country in a lawful fashion. The
law permits this. It was discovered that he was brought back to
Mexico at about the age of 7. Came at the age of 1, taken back
at the age of 7. Because he was taken back to Mexico at the age
of 7, a child, he is now barred from this country for 10 years.
He had an appointment with the consulate, went there in good
faith. Came here as a child, went back as a child, and because
he went back as a child he is now barred for 10 years.
Won't be with his baby, won't have Christmas with the
child. A very sad circumstance that if it doesn't impact one's
heart, I am just sorry for the lack of sympathy and empathy
that some people may have.
So I am appealing for some help. He is not a criminal. He
didn't bring himself here, he didn't come on his own volition,
he came as a child. I am trying my best to bring him home. I am
going to Mexico to visit with him. I will be taking his wife
and his baby. She is an American citizen, the baby was born in
this country. They will be going with me. I would like to bring
him home and I would like to ask as much help as I could get
from you and from our Government.
Let me say this before you give a brief response. I
appreciate President Biden. He inherited a tough, tough job, a
tough position. But he knew what he was inheriting and he has
taken up the challenge admirably--admirably. I compliment you
on doing the best that you can under the circumstances that
exist and the laws that exist. The border is about as secure as
it can be given the laws that we have. It is lawful for people
to ask for asylum. That is lawful. It is lawful for us to
consider the request. About as secure as it can be given the
laws that we have. You can't change the laws, but we can. That
is why we, many of us, keep in insisting on comprehensive
immigration reform, so that we can deal with the situations
that include Mr. Jaime Avalos Rosales. This needs to be dealt
with. Shouldn't be banned because his mother took him home to
register his birth as a child of 7 years. There is a law that
requires persons who leave the country, once you are here, to
go back to your consulate and then apply and be given
consideration. But if you leave and come back to the country
prior to your making that application, you are banned.
So I am hoping that we can do something to help him. I
would like to know if I can visit with you, talk more with you
about this, and many other cases of course. But I would like to
visit with you.
I yield to you, sir, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I am of course not
familiar with the case that you have described. I can say that
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the agency that
deals with administration of our legal immigration system,
receives on almost a weekly basis cases that present tremendous
heartbreak and sadness because of how broken indeed our system
is. Those pleas for mercy, come from both sides of the aisle.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey for 5
minutes, Mr. Van Drew.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you Ranking
Member.
Just very briefly, I respect Mr. Green very much and I feel
for his passion. I would like to say though that there are a
lot of people right now in the United States of America that
are going through their own personal hells for many reasons,
whether it is drug addiction, whether it is homelessness,
whether it is problems that our Americans who live here and
work here and try to function to here have, and I think our
immigration system, respectfully, we are not doing as good as
we could do. I believe that we could do much, much better.
Quite frankly, we were doing much, much better.
Secretary Mayorkas, when you testified before this
committee in September of last year, you stated that DHS
continues enforcing our immigration laws and to my surprise you
said that we were responsibly managing our border. In the last
fiscal year, there were over 2.3 million recorded migrant
encounters at the Southwest Border, which included 98 non-U.S.
citizens who were on the terrorist screening dataset. As you
know, these figures do not represent those who avoided
detection, which was estimated to be around 600,000. To attempt
to combat the crisis on the border, you have deployed highly-
trained and highly-skilled Federal air marshals to the border
to perform non-law enforcement duties, such as hospital watch,
transportation, and welfare checks. There have even been
reports that marshals are performing janitorial duties.
I have the largest air marshal training center in the
United States of America in my district and I have seen first-
hand how talented and capable they are. DHS is removing
hundreds of air marshals from the skies during one of the
busiest travel seasons of the year, even though have stated
that America's aviation infrastructure is a very high threat
and is a target.
Furthermore, DHS is even classifying how many high-risk
flights are not being covered due to your decision to deploy
air marshals to the border. How do you justify this deployment?
Don't you think it would make more sense to hire more Border
Patrol agents who are trained for this and finish the wall--
yes, finish the wall--rather than to continue to mishandle the
crisis? But now, we are mishandling it at the expense of
aviation security. So where we had one problem, which is a
terrible problem--and I disagree with you thoroughly that there
isn't a problem. That we can turn the TV on now on just about
any news station and you can see what is going on. This is not
rocket science, it is not complicated. The American public can
see it, everybody can see it. It affects the whole country. But
instead of having just one problem, now we have two problems
because what we are doing to the air marshals. Enough is
enough. Why can't we just do the right thing, the simple thing,
and the functional thing? Why can't we go back to where we were
where we had so much less of a problem?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, a few thoughts.
First of all, thank you for accurately describing the
expertise, the professionalism, and the bravery of our Federal
Air Marshals. Of course it is false that they are deployed to
the border to conduct janitorial services. We have contract
personnel to do that.
You make a very, very important point. You asked the
question why can we not hire more Border Patrol agents out in
the field. I think that is a very appropriate question and
there is a very compelling answer for that. You know, for the
first time since 2011 we have presented to Congress a budget
that seeks to plus-up our Border Patrol agent personnel. We
requested a budget to re-fund 300 more Border Patrol agents.
Every single year since 2006 I believe it is, the Department of
Homeland Security has relied on the Department of Defense to
augment its resources to address the challenges at the border.
So this is not something new.
I look forward to working with you to see what we can do to
pass a budget that calls for additional resources for the
Department of Homeland Security to address the challenges not
only at the Southern Border, but all of the challenges we are
describing.
Mr. Van Drew. Secretary, I appreciate that and I don't mean
to interrupt you, but I have like 5 seconds here.
The problem with the budget is there is so many unpalatable
unacceptable other parts to it that. As you know, it is the old
game that is always played in politics, jam a budget or jam a
bill, or whatever it is with all kinds of other issues and
initiatives that a lot of people don't want to see. If we had a
stand-alone appropriation to do this, to fund this, you would
see it go through in a second.
So if you want to fight for that, I will fight by your side
to get more Border Patrol agents, I will talk to the President,
as I know that you would, and let us see what happens. But it
shouldn't be jammed with all kinds of other initiatives that we
don't want.
Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chair and the Ranking Member
for this very important hearing and oversight assessment. Let
me add my appreciation to Ranking Member Katko for the years of
service we have had to work together in a mutual commitment to
securing the homeland. Thank you for your service to the
Nation. As well continue to thank you for your previous
service. I thank the Chairman again for bringing us together
around this important issue.
To our witnesses, let me acknowledge the 20th year of
Homeland Security and the men and women who worked under that
umbrella to thank them for that service.
Director Wray, let me also affirm the admiration and
respect of the FBI, and I would frankly say law enforcement
around the Nation and express my concern for the violent
incident that happened in Cincinnati and appreciate the fact
that--safety of those men and women.
Let me build on the tragedy that fell upon the second-in-
line to the Presidency, the Speaker of the House, and ask the
question about the depth and intenseness of political violence.
Again, our time is brief, but I would like to yield to the
Secretary first, Director Wray, and to Director Abizaid if we
might. I do have other questions, so let me just quickly yield.
Just the depth of political violence, which means speech
driving people to violence.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we of course are engaged
to when in fact there is a connectivity between an ideological
view, a political view, and violence. That is when we get
involved and we all--the Director and I in our opening
statements and in response to preliminary questions spoke of
the gravity of the threat that the lone actors and small cells
pose when they are driven to violence because of a political
ideology, ideologies of hate, anti-Government sentiments,
personal grievances, and other narratives propagated on on-line
platforms. This is one of the greatest terrorism-related
threats we face in the homeland.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. Well, Congresswoman, as I mentioned earlier, we
have seen a clear trend in this country over the last several
years of people across the political spectrum choosing to
express their anger or upset at someone or about something
through violence. That is a very alarming trend. As Secretary
Mayorkas referenced, it is exacerbated on-line, but it is a
clear phenomenon that we are having to contend with that
started several years ago.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is going up?
Mr. Wray. It is going up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Director.
Ms. Abizaid. I would concur with my colleagues. You know,
as we look at the numbers since 2010, we see that domestic
violent extremism accounts for 47 attacks, over 152 deaths.
That actually pales in comparison to the 45 attacks that we
have seen since
9/11 by foreign terrorist organizations.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just--can I get a yes or no answer
on this, because I have some other questions? Is a cyber threat
coming from China and Russia intense, continuing, and on-going?
Ms. Abizaid. Cyber threat, I will defer to my colleagues in
the FBI and DHS.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Director Wray.
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Director Mayorkas, let me try to--my understanding is that
immigration, defense of the border, protection of the border,
is a Federal responsibility. Is that not correct?
Secretary Mayorkas. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Have you see any positive impact from the
$4 billion that has been spent by Governor Abbott of the State
of Texas who continues to malign the work of the Federal
Government and, to some extent, interfere with it and cause the
National Guard, some of whom have committed suicide, to--Texas
National Guard to be strained? I am going to ask that question
in the context of what Director Wray said in terms of an answer
to the question about security at the border. I think it is
important to distinguish between even though we want to stop
that flow, to distinguish fleeing families with children from
Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, et cetera, from the work, the strain of
cartels, of smuggling, of human smuggling, smuggling of
fentanyl. Those criminal elements, we are all fighting I assume
to bring that down.
Can you distinguish and tell me whether you have seen any
impact from the $4 billion that one State happens to be using
of State tax dollars taken away from the needs of the people of
Texas that has impacted the work that you are doing as a
Federal officer to protect the border?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, let me answer the
question this way. We advance law enforcement mission when we
work collectively, collaboratively, and in a coordinated way.
When there is a deliberate effort to not coordinate, it can and
indeed has been quite counterproductive.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-
Meeks, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chair, thank you, Ranking
Member Katko.
First I would also like to thank all of our witnesses for
coming before the committee today. I am glad we are finally
having the ability to seriously discuss the threats we are
facing, particular along our Southwest Border.
Let me also say that prior to January 20, 2021, we had
lawful operational control of the Southern Border.
The number of unaccompanied alien children, UACs,
encountered along the Southwest Border has nearly doubled since
2019 and continues to increase, surpassing a record high in
fiscal year 2021, approaching nearly 153,000 this fiscal year.
We have heard reports of children being sent alone--I have
encountered them when I have made trips to the border--across
dangerous terrain with nothing but a relative's name and
address pinned on their shirt. Some of these children so young
as to not know their own name or to whom they are supposed to
be sent. We have seen Border Patrol agents bravely fight to
save young kids and infants in medical distress and in crossing
the river.
When we have encountered these families--and I distinctly
remember an occasion with Representative Carlos Gimenez and
Representative Maria Salazar, who spoke their language, asking
them specifically whether or not the Biden administration's
policies, often cited directly by these migrants crossing the
border, encouraged foreign nationals to send their children to
seek entry into the United States despite dire conditions at
the border.
Secretary Mayorkas, are the Biden administration's policies
encouraging and increasing the pull factor for unaccompanied
minors, UACs, to come into this country?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, a few thoughts, if I
may.
First of all, thank you very much for capturing the
vulnerability of unaccompanied children that migrate from their
countries of origin and seek safety, not only in the United
States, but elsewhere in the hemisphere, as I said at the very
outset. I don't know----
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Sir, I want to be respectful. I have
limited time, so.
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes. This is a challenge that we are
experiencing throughout the hemisphere.
I also want to thank you for recognizing the bravery of the
Border Patrol.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much. I am going to
relate back to my instances of appearing at the border and
hearing directly from people crossing the border that the
administration's policies in fact are a pull factor.
Given that, what actions are being taken at the Department
to keep these kids safe and stem the flow of UACs crossing
illegally into the United States across dangerous terrain?
Secretary Mayorkas. So a few things. Of course I disagree
with the premise of the pull factor.
As I was saying, this is a hemispheric challenge. We are
seeing a tremendous amount of upheaval throughout the Western
Hemisphere, authoritarian regimes, poverty, violence,
corruption, and the like. We are doing a number of things, and
let me give you two examples.
No. 1 is we are taking it to the smugglers in an
unprecedented way. Throughout the Department of Homeland
Security, throughout the interagency, and with our partner
countries to the south of our border. We have in the last year
conducted more than 6,000 arrests in an unprecedented
disruption effort to attack the smuggling organizations that
seek to exploit the vulnerable.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas. But, No. 2----
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. I can say that when I have been----
Secretary Mayorkas. No. 2----
Mrs. Miller-Meeks [continuing]. To the border and talked
with the agents, the cartels seem to have tremendous control
over what happens.
Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, if I may, Congressman, just--I----
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Sir, I only have 1 minutes 16----
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman----
Mrs. Miller-Meeks [continuing]. Seconds left. After being
apprehended by the DHS, unaccompanied alien children are
transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement within the
Department of Health and Human Services. While this is supposed
to occur within 72 hours of arrival, decrease in the amount of
time children reside in CBP facilities, many unaccompanied
children have remained in CBP facilities longer than the time
allotted under Federal law. Is the large scale of UACs crossing
the border contributing to these overstays in CBP facilities?
How is this being addressed, No. 1? No. 2, how is the DHS
managing the threat of sexual predators at the border, during
CBP facilities detentions, as well as during the transfer of
children to different locations?
If you don't have time to answer, you can respond to us
in----
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are also building
lawful pathways, such as the Central American Minors Program.
So children do not place, and their parents do not place, their
lives in the hands of exploitative smugglers.
The information that you have with respect to the length of
stay in the Border Patrol facility is I think quite dated. That
was certainly a challenge that we faced in March 2021, but we
have taken considerable measures to meet the 72-hour time
frame. I look forward to providing you with further
information.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chair, I yield my time.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
Pursuant to the order of the committee of today, the
committee stands in recess for approximately 5 minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman Thompson. The committee will be in order.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, for 5
minutes, Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like so many of my
colleagues, I would like to thank Mr. Katko for his service. My
colleague from New York. His commitment to bipartisanship and
his commitment to the work of this committee has been
uplifting. To all of our public servants seated here today,
thank you for your service and commitment to the American
people.
My question is really around cybersecurity. That is
something that I really had a keen, keen interest in. We have
recently this year passed legislation that I authored requiring
the reporting of major cyber incidents to CISA. Although CISA
has 3\1/2\ years to issue a final rule, Mr. Secretary, none of
us want to wait that long. My hope is that swift implementation
will yield important security benefits, eliminate duplicative
reporting frameworks, and encourage harmonization across the
interagency.
Toward that end, I have two questions for you. What is DHS
doing to support--and more specifically--expedite this rule
making so we don't have to wait years to see results? How is
DHS working with the SEC and other regulators to harmonize new
requirements through, for example, the Cyber Incident Reporting
Council established in CIRCIA?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you so much for
championing this critical security effort, cybersecurity
effort.
We are already engaging with the private sector in
preparation for the promulgation of the regulations that will
implement the new legislation. It is vitally important, as you
and other Members of this committee know who have championed
this imperative, public-private partnership is the bedrock, the
foundation of the cybersecurity ecosystem. So we already have
begun to engage with the private sector in anticipation of the
regulations that we will issue. No. 1.
No. 2, we have a council that we are chairing that is
working across the interagency to ensure to the best of our
abilities, harmonization of the reporting requirements. I
should say that we have also taken that critical harmonization
need and expanded it in the international domain, speaking with
our international partners and seeing what we can do--given the
multinational footprint of so many of our companies--to see
what we can do to harmonize the landscape internationally as
well as domestically.
Ms. Clarke. Well, I am happy to hear that, you know, we are
sort-of prepping, but do you have a sense of whether we can
expedite the rule making so that it doesn't take us the 3\1/2\
estimated years to get to the final rule?
Secretary Mayorkas. So I believe that there are set time
frames in the statutory regime with respect to the promulgation
of regulation. I think we have, if I am not mistaken--and I
will correct myself subsequently if I am--that we have 18
months. We have what I would respectfully submit is the
preeminent regulatory team to ensure the swift promulgation of
the necessary implementing regulations.
Ms. Clarke. In addition to the cyber incident reporting, I
see the Cyber Safety Review Board, the CSRB, is another
innovative way this administration has tried to better
understand cyber threats. Does the administration intend to
seek authorization for the CSRB? If so, what should those
authorities entail and what does the CSRB plan to study next?
Secretary Mayorkas. So that is--Congresswoman, thank you so
much for recognizing the tremendous value of the Cyber Safety
Review Board. It is very important to emphasize that that is a
board that is not focused on accountability, but is focused on
the diagnosis of the challenge and remediation of any potential
harm that the challenge presents. Its first project was the
Log4j Vulnerability. It is now preparing to issue a report. One
of the things that we are considering is the authorization of
the CSRB and what further support we can receive from Congress.
We are very appreciate of the support we have received to date.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. Secretary, in response to Congresswoman
Slotkin's question, you raised the issue of cyber hygiene and
the work that is being done from the administration's
standpoint, certainly from the Congressional standpoint. I
would like to include the private sector.
One of the things that I have been concerned about is that
we can't amplify enough the need for there to be a National
movement around cyber hygiene. Every weak link presents a
vector for our adversaries to take us down. So I want to put on
your radar as you speak with the private sector, perhaps
looking at some public service announcements so that there is
an educational campaign that is consistently out there in the
public and that we grow up with the habit, like putting on our
seatbelts, of regularly addressing our cyber hygiene.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, Mrs.
Harshbarger, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses for being here today.
I am going to read a statement. This is for all the
witnesses. Late last month Forbes and other press reported that
TikTok's parent company ByteDance planned to use TikTok to
monitor the physical location of specific Americans for the
purposes of surveilling individual U.S. citizens. As you know
TikTok is close to signing a CFIUS contract and the Treasury
Department has been assessing the National security risk of
foreign ownership of TikTok, including its CCP ties of whether
the platform enables the Chinese government to access U.S.
person's data.
The first question is a yes or no. It is: Do you assess
that TikTok is a significant National security threat given the
accusations that the company specifically targets U.S. persons
and given the ByteDance and TikTok ties to the CCP?
The second part of that question is yes or no. Is the CCP
leveraging the application as a tool to collect information
about U.S. citizens for the purposes other than targeted ads
and content?
Anyone on the panel.
Mr. Wray. Congresswoman, taking the first question, I would
say we do have National security concerns, at least from the
FBI's end, about TikTok. They include the possibility that the
Chinese government could use it to control data collection on
millions of users or control the recommendation algorithm,
which could be used for influence operations if they so chose
or to control software on millions of devices, which give it
opportunity to potentially compromise personal devices. So
there are a number of concerns there.
As to what is actually happening and actually being done,
that is probably something that would be better addressed in a
closed Classified setting. I could see what information we
might be able to share that way. But there is probably not much
more that I could add to that, other than to say it is
certainly something that is on our radar and we share your
concerns.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes. Thank you for that. I would love to
have that close briefing.
Has ByteDance responded to allegations that their internal
auditing system specifically targeted any members of the U.S.
Government, activists, public figures, or generalists? Yes or
no.
Mr. Wray. I will have to see if we can get back to you on
that. I am not sure that I can give the answer right here at
this moment.
Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. Are you informing the Treasury's view
through the CFIUS process of the National security threat it
poses?
Mr. Wray. I'm sorry, ma'am, I didn't----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Sir?
Mr. Wray. Repeat the question. I just couldn't hear you
very well.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Are you informing Treasury's view through
the CFIUS process of the National security threat it poses to
the United States?
Mr. Wray. Yes. The FBI's foreign investment unit working
through the Department of Justice is part of the CFIUS process
and would be relevant. Our input would be taken into account in
any agreements that might be made to address the issue.
Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. Last part of that question is what is
currently being done to investigate the CCP's involvement in
TikTok ownership, direction, and/or access? The reason I ask
that is there was a current 60 Minutes segment highlighting the
stark differences between the Chinese-owned TikTok company that
allows kids in China to view a totally different app, a clean
app, and what is shown in the United States--they call it an
``opium version''--that is designed to hook American children
on an unsafe version of the video-based platform, you know,
offering a healthier version and a limited viewing of 40
minutes for those children in China, which is unacceptable and
parents need to know this. But what is currently being done to
investigate the CCP's involvement in TikTok?
Mr. Wray. Well, as to any specific investigative work, I
could see whether some of that could be incorporated into the
Classified briefing I referred to. There are obviously limits
on what I can share in terms of discussing a specific on-going
investigation.
But what I would say is that you have highlighted two very,
very important threats. One, of course, something we are all
concerned about, which is the threat to our youth on-line. But
the second----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. Is the threat specifically from the
Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party and the ways
in which their laws are used as an aggressive weapon against
both U.S. companies and Chinese companies. Under Chinese law,
Chinese companies are required to essentially--and I am going
to shorthand here--basically do whatever the Chinese government
wants them to in terms of sharing information or serving as a
tool of the Chinese government.
So that is plenty of reason by itself to be extremely
concerned.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Absolutely. Well, I look forward to the
Classified briefing and I appreciate your time.
With that, Chairman, I yield back.
Ms. Demings [presiding]. The gentlewoman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Swalwell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. To the witnesses and the people in
law enforcement that you represent, you are owed our thanks to
your service to our country. You are not owed the bitter,
divisive, cruel, violent rhetoric we heard from our colleague
from Louisiana. That is a rhetoric that the voters rejected, an
extreme rhetoric that voters rejected last Tuesday. Our
Chairman of the committee, Mr. Thompson, was also not owed that
display.
Director Wray, antisemitism is on the rise across America.
The White House has recently proposed $360 million for
nonprofit security grants that can assist community centers--
and also Secretary Mayorkas. We funded that to the tune of $250
million in this committee and it was also a partnership between
Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Katko. But if we provided
additional funding, what would that mean for combatting
antisemitism in America?
Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman
Swalwell.
You know, the Nonprofit Security Grant Program when I first
addressed it was funded at $180 million and we are grateful for
the support of this committee in funding it at the level of
$250 million. What we would do if that funding increased to
$360 million, which we certainly advocate that it does, is
enable us to also fund target-rich resource or institutions
that are vulnerable to attacks. That includes places of worship
that guard against antisemitism. It is true of churches,
synagogues, mosques, all sorts of nonprofit organizations,
including historically Black colleges and universities that
have seen a tremendous uptick in bomb threats, as Director Wray
referenced earlier. That is much-needed funding because there
are target-rich but resource-poor institutions, schools, places
of worship that need to enhance their security against an ever-
increasing threat.
Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you, Secretary.
Director Wray, many of my Republican colleagues have run on
a defund the FBI platform. They have made t-shirts, hats to
fund their campaigns. If the FBI was defunded, would that hurt
or help terrorism investigations?
Mr. Wray. It would hurt. Just in the last several years,
the FBI has thwarted terrorist attacks in places like Las
Vegas, Tampa, New York, Cleveland, Kansas City, Pittsburgh--and
those are just the ones I can think of off the top of my head.
So we need more funding for those efforts, not less.
Mr. Swalwell. If the FBI was defunded, would that hurt or
help child exploitation investigations?
Mr. Wray. It would hurt. We have a very, very active
violent crimes against children program. We are literally
arresting thousands of child predators and rescuing hundreds
and hundreds of kids. So, again, we need more funding for that,
not less.
Mr. Swalwell. If the FBI was defunded, would that hurt or
help COVID fraud investigations for money that went into the
communities during the time of COVID?
Mr. Wray. Well, again, it would hurt. We have a very active
COVID fraud investigative program working with other agencies
as partners, the Department of Justice Inspector General, et
cetera. Given the remarkable amount of monies that were
involved, courtesy of this Congress, it is important that we
ensure the integrity of that spend so that it not be wasted
on--I have been briefed by agents on cases involving, you know,
violent gangs that have tapped into some of the COVID fraud
money.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas, do you support the GOP plan for the
border?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I very much look forward
to working in a bipartisan way to address the need to enhance
our border security.
Mr. Swalwell. I guess do you know what the GOP plan is for
the border?
Secretary Mayorkas. I do not. I want to work in a
bipartisan way to address what is a unanimously understood to
be a broken immigration system.
Mr. Swalwell. I agree, Secretary.
Secretary Mayorkas. I want to work----
Mr. Swalwell. My point is I have not heard a plan, I have
just heard grievances.
Finally, Director Wray, last week the ``parliament in
Iran'' voted to execute 15,000 protestors, many of them
teenagers and women. One of those members of parliament is
actually in the United States right now at the United Nations,
presumptively under diplomatic cover. Do we need more resources
or should we reconsider who we allow to come to the United
States? You know, after you have voted for such an atrocity, it
just really concerns me that people could be enjoying
themselves in New York after signing, you know, a death warrant
for 15,000 innocent Iranians who just want freedom.
Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
Director, you answer the question.
Mr. Wray. Well, what I would say is that the Iranian regime
across multiple vectors has become more aggressive, more
brazen, and more dangerous. I would just point everything just
in--again, just in maybe the last 18 months, a cyber attack on
a children's hospital, an attempt to assassinate the former
U.S. National security advisor in the United States, and an
attempt to kidnap a journalist from right smack in the middle
of New York City. So if that is not enough to convince us that
the regime is a threat, I don't know what is.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Director.
Ms. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to echo
the thoughts of some of my colleagues that Mr. Katko--I know he
is gone--but certainly a great Ranking Member and the way that
this committee has conducted its business in a bipartisan
manner, that is to be commended.
Mr. Wray, I read in your testimony that you consider
domestic violent extremists to be the greatest threat to our,
you know, health and well-being here in the United States. Do
you stand by that?
Mr. Wray. Well, let me just make a slightly finer point on
it, because precision is important here.
The greatest threat to us in the homeland is the lone
actors and small cells, typically radicalized on-line, using
easily accessible weapons against soft targets. That group
included two categories, both domestic violent extremists and
home-grown violent extremists, which are foreign terrorist-
inspired. So they are very similar, but it is two big buckets.
Mr. Gimenez. Do you know how many fatalities we had in 2020
from DVEs?
Mr. Wray. I don't have the number of deaths off the top of
my head, but I know that in 2020 the most lethal attacks--or
the lethal attacks that we had came from what we categorize as
anti-Government, anti-authority violent extremism, which
includes both anarchist violent extremism, as well as militia
violent extremism.
Mr. Gimenez. Yes, I think I read there was something like
four. Four is too many, you know, that is--you know, for the
four people that died.
Do you know how many people died per day from fentanyl
overdose?
Mr. Wray. I don't have that figure.
Mr. Gimenez. Would it shock you to say over 200 die daily
from fentanyl overdoses?
Mr. Wray. I know the numbers are eye-popping.
Mr. Gimenez. Eye-popping. Who controls that trade? Who is
pouring in this deadly drug into the United States?
Mr. Wray. Transnational criminal organizations, especially
the cartels.
Mr. Gimenez. Which ones? From where?
Mr. Wray. Typically from Mexico.
Mr. Gimenez. Would you consider that to be a terrorist act?
Mr. Wray. Well, I certainly consider it to be a major,
major law enforcement threat and a major, major security
threat. Whether I would call it a National security threat gets
into sort-of terminology. But certainly it is a major threat to
the homeland of almost epidemic proportions.
Mr. Gimenez. So an organization that is killing over 200
Americans every single day, you have difficulty in saying that
they are not terrorizing us?
Mr. Wray. Well, again, in my world terrorism has a very
specific legal definition. It is certainly a National security
threat.
Mr. Gimenez. So what are we doing about it? So we know we
have an organization across the border--they are not some far
away land, they are right across the border, they are killing
tens of thousands of Americans every year. What exactly are we
doing about that?
Mr. Wray. Well, as to true border security, obviously I
would, you know, defer to Secretary Mayorkas. But on our end,
to deal with the transnational criminal organizations, there
are a number of things we are doing.
First, we have transnational organized crime task forces
with not just agents, but lots and lots of State and local law
enforcement officers who work with us to go after the cartels.
Second, we have safe streets task forces, which deal with a
related part, which is the violent gangs that work with those
cartels and going after those. Third, we have border liaison
officers in all of the field offices that we have that are on
the border. I have visited all of them myself and walked around
not just with our people, but with the CBP officers. Those
folks ensure cross-border assistance. We have legats, which is
legal attache offices in Mexico. In fact last year we were able
to apprehend two of the FBI's top ten most wanted fugitives,
which is progress.
So those are some of the things we are doing, but it is a
major, major concern for sure.
Mr. Gimenez. Have we done anything with the government of
Mexico, warned them, et cetera, that they need to step up their
war against these cartels? Because, again, these cartels are
killing tens of thousands of Americans.
You know, a foreign group in 2000 killed about 3,000
Americans and we responded by waging war for about 20 years
halfway around the world. There are foreign groups right now
across the border that are killing tens of thousands of
Americans every single year and we don't seem to be doing much
about it. Frankly, I am upset about that. We seem to be focused
on domestic violent extremists, which we should, OK, but we
are--which kill four people in 2020, and we seem to be turning
a blind eye to organizations that are killing tens of thousands
of Americans. We also seem to be doing not much about stopping
the flow of this drug coming into the United States through our
Southern Border.
Thank you.
My time is up and I yield back.
Ms. Demings. The gentleman yields back.
Let me just correct the record, 2019 most lethal year for
DVE attacks. DVEs were responsible for 32 deaths in 2019.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Nevada, Ms.
Titus, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much.
At first let me thank the Department and Secretary for
extending the TPS protections to Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Honduras, Sudan, and Nepal. I have a very diverse district,
many people from Central America, who will be benefiting from
this and I just want to thank you. I appreciate that effort.
My first question though will go to the Secretary, and it
is pretty specific about my district. I apologize if it is too
parochial. But Las Vegas is very excited to be getting a
Formula One event for next November. They are going to be
racing for 3 days up and down the strip, they are going to be
close to all these major hotels, a lot of people are going to
be there watching this race. I want to make sure that the event
receives the appropriate--SEAR I think is the acronym--Special
Event Assessment Rating. I just heard the director mention that
Las Vegas is a place where they are always looking for
terrorists, or we have seen terrorist threats.
So could you talk about how the criteria for these SEAR
designations work, how it has been updated, how today differs
from what is in the past that would accommodate the event in
Las Vegas?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are evaluating right
now the Formula One race that is scheduled to occur in Las
Vegas to identify the appropriate SEAR rating that it deserves.
Please forgive me, but I must--I must respond to the
Congressman's statement that preceded your question. It is
candidly outrageous to say that we are not doing anything to
address the transnational criminal organizations. We have
incredibly brave law enforcement officers every day risking
their lives to battle the criminality of those TCOs. I look
forward to sharing with the Congress everything that we are
doing in that regard.
Congresswoman, I would be pleased to share with you what we
are doing to refine the SEAR rating process, that is a rating
process that we use to identify the security level of
particular events in the United States. We actually just met as
a group and discussed this yesterday. So I look forward to
sharing with you some details. That review is under way.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much. We want it to be a
fun environment, but we also want it to be a very safe
environment for all the people who come to enjoy this kind of
race.
Related to this, Mr. Secretary, tourism is coming back,
international tourism. We want to encourage that because such a
big part of our economy--foreign tourists stay longer, they
spend more, they visit regional areas, not just downtown Las
Vegas. I wonder what is going on as you all try to accommodate
this increase in tourism again. Whether it is with TSA or with
Customs or COVID, all of those kind of considerations.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are incredibly
excited about the fact that travel to the United States has
resumed in full force. In fact, I think the latest figures
exceed the patterns of 2019 before the COVID-19 pandemic
gripped this country and the world in full force.
The TSA personnel have emphasized the PreCheck process,
which of course really assists us and supports us in
approaching travel security in a risk-based manner. We are
seeing more than 15,000 enrollments per day in the TSA PreCheck
process. Our Border Patrol personnel are also working on new
technologies and innovations to facilitate the travel process,
as is TSA. There was quite a robust article just a couple of
weeks ago in the Washington Post that described some of the
technological innovations that TSA specifically has displayed.
We have a partnership with Apple, for example, that we are of
course open to other vendors accessing and using for a mobile
driver's license identification process. We are looking at
innovation and technology and the capabilities to further
facilitate the travel experience and to enhance security at the
very same time.
Ms. Titus. Is staffing improving in terms of needing
additional personnel?
Secretary Mayorkas. One of the things that we hope Congress
passes is our request to provide pay parity for our TSA
personnel. The disparity that our TSA personnel suffer in pay
makes recruiting and retention very difficult. So we hope that
Congress passes the much-needed legislation to provide pay
fairness for our TSA personnel.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
I know my time is up, but I would certainly support that
and I know the Chairman of this committee has been working hard
on that issue.
Thank you and I yield back.
Ms. Demings. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida, Mrs.
Cammack, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and good
afternoon. Thank you all for being here with us this afternoon.
With so many threats to deal with, as has been pointed out
today, it is really a shame that we have a major one that we
have to contend with. It is completely unnecessary and
manufactured. So we will just jump right in on that one.
Secretary Mayorkas, you have stated that you believe that
the Southwest Border is secure. Giving me just the number and
nothing else, no additional commentary, tell me how many
gotaways there were for fiscal year 2022. Just the number
please.
Secretary Mayorkas, I have a litany of questions, just the
number please.
Secretary Mayorkas. Six hundred thousand.
Mrs. Cammack. Thank you. You are correct, it is 600,000.
Now, can you answer definitely with data backing up your answer
that none of the 600,000 individuals who are now in the United
States amongst our communities that got away are gang members
or criminals?
Secretary Mayorkas. Your question highlights precisely why
we have sought to prioritize national security and public
safety threats----
Mrs. Cammack. I am so glad to hear you say that.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. In our Immigration and
Customs Enforcement apprehension and removal efforts.
Mrs. Cammack. I am really glad to hear you say that.
I am going to have to reclaim my time, because I have got a
lot to get through.
So as you know, probably then, in fiscal year 2022 CBP
arrested nearly 30,000 illegals attempting to enter the country
who were previously convicted of a crime. Now, of those
arrested--and just the number, no additional commentary--how
many have claimed asylum?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I will have to get back
to you with----
Mrs. Cammack. OK.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Specific numbers.
Mrs. Cammack. Thank you.
Now, officially there have been 2.4 million illegals that
have been encountered at the Southwest Border in fiscal year
2022. That doesn't include the 600,000 gotaways. So giving me
just the number, and again, no additional commentary, can you
tell me how many illegals have been released into the United
States that were encountered at the Southwest Border?
Secretary Mayorkas. Putting aside your terminology, may I
correct you? Because you have actually cited inaccurate facts
in your question.
Mrs. Cammack. Well, this is actually from your webiste.
Secretary Mayorkas. No, it isn't.
Mrs. Cammack. It is. I would be happy to provide it to you.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, 2.4 million or between 2.3
and 2.4 million encounters is different than 2.3, 2.4----
Mrs. Cammack. But I think you are missing the point of the
question. How many----
Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, Congresswoman----
Mrs. Cammack [continuing]. Have been released into the
United States?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, if I may, because you
are mistaken, factually mistaken.
Mrs. Cammack. So your data is incorrect?
Secretary Mayorkas. No. No, you are misunderstanding our
data.
Mrs. Cammack. No.
Secretary Mayorkas. If I----
Mrs. Cammack. OK. I am going to reclaim my time because
based on the information from your website--from your website,
from your Department, officially there have been of all those
encounters 1.4 million--and that is a conservative number--that
your Department states have been released into the United
States.
So I know you guys have done this really fun renaming,
rebranding thing, calling it enforcement removal proceedings,
but today in fiscal year 2022, you have now released over 1.4
million illegals into the United States. My question to you now
is can you guarantee that none of those people have criminal
records?
Secretary Mayorkas. This enforcement work is not fun,
Congresswoman. This is a noble profession in which people risk
their lives to conduct it. You know that very well.
Mrs. Cammack. All the righteous indignation. Here we go.
So I want to make sure that you understand that per your
own data and statistics, they have pointed out that in fact you
hold the record as Secretary of Homeland Security for the most
encounters and subsequent releases into the United States in
history. Your own former boss, Secretary Jeh Johnson, said that
1,000 a day is considered a crisis. Today we are encountering
7,000 a day. The facts and figures make the point for me.
So is the border secure based on your feelings or facts?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, let me have the
opportunity to correct a misstatement.
Two-point-three to 2.4 million encounters includes the fact
that under Title 42, the Public Health Authority, individuals
can actually be repeat offenders. They can try again. So there
are actually approximately 1.7 million unique individuals whom
we have encountered at the border. So when you say 2.4----
Mrs. Cammack. But based on your reporting----
Secretary Mayorkas. I am actually--if I may----
Mrs. Cammack. Based on your reporting, these folks are here
in the United States and there has been no proper vetting of
these people. Then we don't even have the agreements in place
to deport the folks that you are claiming under Title 42.
Nicaragua is a great example of that.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I hope you realize that we
have removed or expelled more individuals from the United
States than ever before.
Mrs. Cammack. Just to clarify, as a final question, with
all of this data that has been presented, based on your own
Department's releases, you still believe that the border is
secure?
Ms. Demings. The gentlewoman's time has expired. You may
answer the question, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we remain committed to
enhancing the security of our border every single day.
Mrs. Cammack. That is not an answer.
Ms. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank
you to the witnesses for appearing before us today.
Secretary Mayorkas, I wanted to ask you a question about
Coast Guard operations. Our country faces many pressing threats
across the domestic and international landscape, several which
we have discussed here today, obviously. However, we must not
lose track of the threats we face over the long term, such as
increased aggression by China and Russia within international
waters. China is aggressively pursuing increased influence
across the Indo-Pacific and a Coast Guard cutter recently found
Chinese and Russian ships carrying out joint maneuvers in the
Arctic less than 100 miles off of Alaska.
Mr. Secretary, how important to the U.S. interests are the
Coast Guard's efforts to counter Chinese aggression in the
Indo-Pacific and maintain a rule-based maritime order?
Likewise, how critical are the Coast Guard's plans to build in
and acquire new icebreakers to enable increased maritime
presence in the Arctic?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you very much.
It is vitally important that our United States Coast Guard
be fully resourced to address what we all today have described,
and accurately so, as an only increasing threat from China and
other adverse nation-states. I was actually in Singapore and
Japan several weeks ago to speak about the need to enhance our
security partnerships. One of the main lines of effort in my
bilateral discussions was in fact increased cooperation with
our United States Coast Guard to address the increasing threat
in the Indo-Pacific Region.
Of course, the United States Coast Guard also has an Arctic
strategy that it is executing and that Arctic strategy includes
increasing its aging fleet and replacing some of its most aged
vessels. So we look forward to Congress' support for that
necessary funding.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Are there any other resources that we
should be considering to support you in that endeavor?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we of course have
presented our fiscal year 2023 budget, which includes much-
needed resourcing of the United States Coast Guard. We do hope
that our budget is implemented very quickly. Every day that
passes fails to advance our security mission. We are of course
working on our budget plans for the years beyond.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
I want to just mention that I am totally in support of the
questions raised by Congressman Swalwell as it related to
antisemitism. I mean New Jersey has had a very unique
experience just a week ago where someone was threatening
synagogues in the State of New Jersey. We have a large Jewish
population and we want all of our population to be safe. So to
you and to Director Wray, we very much look forward to your
diligence, your intelligence, and your proaction as well as
reaction.
Finally, I have exactly a minute and 34 seconds left. I am
wondering, Mr. Mayorkas, if you had any follow-up response to a
former question or questions that you have been asked that you
would like to share here?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you so much.
You know, we maintain data with respect to the challenge at
the border. That data informs our operational actions and it is
vitally important that that data be cited with precision and
accuracy. We demand that of ourselves so that the operational
decisions that we make are best tailored to address the
challenges that we confront.
I look forward to working in a bipartisan way with this
committee to address the myriad of threats that we as a country
face and to really enhance the security of the American people
in every regard.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Demings. The gentlewoman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr.
LaTurner, for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you Mr. Secretary, for being here today.
Secretary Mayorkas, you said ``our message has been clear
that the border is in fact not open''. According to public data
from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which you yourself
oversee, we had 227,000 migrant encounters at the Southwest
Border in September of this year alone, bringing the yearly
total to almost 2.4 million, which is the highest number ever
recorded. Do you believe that indicates a border that is not
open?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thanks for your question.
Please, it is very important that the American people
understand that the individuals whom we encounter who are not
expelled under the Public Health Authority of Title 42 are
placed in immigration enforcement proceedings and are subject
to removal if they do not qualify for the relief that they laws
of this country provide them.
Mr. LaTurner. Respectfully----
Secretary Mayorkas. I do not think----
Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Mayorkas. If I may----
Mr. LaTurner. No, hang on. I have a limited amount of time
and several questions. If you just give me a quick answer, I
would really appreciate it.
Secretary Mayorkas. Sure.
Mr. LaTurner. Among those nearly 2.4 million encounters, we
had 98 non-U.S. citizens listed on the terrorist watch list who
were caught trying to enter the homeland between ports of
entry. This is approximately five times the number of terrorist
encounters from the last 5 years combined. Do you believe this
indicates a border that is not open?
Secretary Mayorkas. What this indicated, Congressman, is
the fact that we have extraordinary personnel in the United
States Border Patrol risking their lives every day to apprehend
individuals at the border. We work----
Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary, you are not going to answer
the question. In fiscal year 2022 we had an estimated 600,000
gotaways. Do you believe this indicated a border that is not
open?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would respectfully posit
that I don't think that the 1.4 million people who were either
removed or expelled----
Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. From the country would
consider----
Mr. LaTurner [continuing]. Please----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Would consider the border
open.
Mr. LaTurner. I am going to take back my time.
In May Kansas City law enforcement seized more than 15,000
counterfeit fentanyl pills. This fiscal year alone CBP has
seized enough fentanyl to kill almost 2.9 billion people, over
8 times the entire population of the United States. Do you
believe this indicates a border that is not open?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, do you realize that the
majority of the fentanyl that is sought to be smuggled into the
United States comes through the ports of entry? Our
interdiction efforts have been more successful than ever
before. I should note that----
Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary, in my home State----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Year over year since
2018----
Mr. LaTurner. Excuse me. Mr. Secretary, you have done this
all day. When you don't like a question, you filibuster.
In my home State of Kansas, the State Health Department saw
a 54 percent increase in drug overdoses in the first half of
2021, nearly half of which were caused by fentanyl, primarily
supplied by the cartels. Nation-wide, the CDC reported that
over 107,000 Americans died of drug overdoses in 2021, with 66
percent of those related to synthetic opioids like fentanyl--
300 Americans a day are dying from fentanyl. It is the
equivalent of an airliner going down every day. Do you think
this indicates a border that is not open?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the fight against the
scourge of fentanyl and the devastation that it is wreaking, is
a years-long fight that we in the U.S. Government, with our
State and local partners have been fighting. Do you realize
that the number of overdose deaths from fentanyl has been
increasing year over year since at least 2018? Certainly this
is not a new phenomenon. It is----
Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary, you clearly----
Secretary Mayorkas. It is not a new tragedy.
Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary, you clearly don't understand
the problem.
Secretary Mayorkas. I clearly do.
Mr. LaTurner. This has--excuse me--this has nothing to do
with politics. This is about kids across the country dying
every single day from fentanyl overdoses because people in
Washington can't get their act together. This is about an
overwhelmed Border Patrol. This is about migrants being
victimized by the drug cartels. My concern and the concern of
my constituents back home is how can you begin to solve the
problem if you don't even acknowledge the depth and breadth of
it?
Here is a question for you.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would respectfully----
Mr. LaTurner. Have you had discussions----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Disagree with you.
Mr. LaTurner. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. Have you had
discussions with the President or anyone in the Biden
administration about stepping down from your current role?
Secretary Mayorkas. I have not.
Secretary Mayorkas. Not a conversation with anyone in the
administration?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me be very clear.
Mr. LaTurner. Yes or no.
Secretary Mayorkas. May I answer your question?
Mr. LaTurner. No, you--yes or no. Have you had----
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
Mr. LaTurner [continuing]. That conversation with anyone in
the administration?
Secretary Mayorkas. I am very proud of what we have
accomplished. I am very committed to----
Mr. LaTurner. Sir----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Accomplishing more.
Mr. LaTurner [continuing]. Answer the question. Have you
had a conversation with anyone in the administration about
stepping down from your current role?
Secretary Mayorkas. I have not.
Mr. LaTurner. I hope for the sake of the safety of the
American people that that conversation happens very soon.
I yield back my time.
Secretary Mayorkas. Madam----
Ms. Demings. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Secretary, you may respond.
Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Acting Chair, thank you very much
for the opportunity.
Congressman, I look forward to sharing information with you
so that you understand the threat that fentanyl poses and how
it is smuggled into the country. Everything that we are doing
to fight the transnational criminal organizations across the
Federal enterprise, with our partners to the south, and to
disabuse you of misunderstandings that you have with respect to
the fentanyl crisis, because they are grave. I look forward to
not only sharing information with you, but hopefully sharing
information with the American public.
Thank you.
Ms. Demings. I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
In the Ranking Member's absence, I do want to thank him for
his leadership and his civility.
I am hoping that this committee moving forward understands
the importance of both of those things. I have heard a lot
today and seen a lot, but there is one thing that I just cannot
ignore, and I don't have to, of the performance of the
gentleman from Louisiana earlier was an embarrassment. I am
hoping that it was not reflective of the caliber of this
committee and the very important work that you all have to do
between the Members and staff moving forward.
See, I just happen to believe that we can in the interest
of the country be our better selves. I just happen to believe
that we can on this committee be examples of America's
exceptionalism. That example for our children and our
grandchildren. I just happen to believe that we can work to
keep our homeland safe, all at the same time.
Director Wray, in June 2019, or somewhere around there, you
talked about that you had--FBI had elevated the racially and
ethically motivated violent extremism to your highest level--or
highest threat priority, on the same level of ISIS and home-
grown violent extremists. Is that still the case today? Why or
why not?
Mr. Wray. Yes, Congresswoman, it is still a National threat
priority and that is reflective of the lethality that we saw
over the years leading up to that designation and that have to
some extent continued since then.
Ms. Demings. How does the caseload for cases falling into
that category look today?
Mr. Wray. I don't have exact numbers here, but I can tell
you that the number of both domestic violent extremism cases in
general has been growing over the last 4 or 5 years.
Ms. Demings. Would you say it has doubled?
Mr. Wray. Depends on when you--what your starting point is.
Ms. Demings. Last 5 years.
Mr. Wray. Before the end of calendar year 2020 it had gone
up by say 50 percent. Since then it has gone up yet again quite
substantially. That is domestic violent extremism overall, of
which racially and ethnically violent extremism is one part.
But I should say that along with racially and ethnically
motivated violent extremism, we also saw starting in 2020 and
continuing to the present, a lot of anti-Government, anti-
authority violent extremism, which includes everything from
militia violent extremism to anarchist violent extremism. While
that hasn't resulted in as many lethal attacks, the sheer
volume of it caused us to elevate that as well more recently to
a National priority.
Ms. Demings. Would you say that that is the result of a
lone domestic violent extremist? You talked about the threat
of--I used to say the lone wolf. I guess we don't say that
anymore, but would you say that the increase that you just
talked about is a result of these individual people out there
who are influenced by an array of different things?
Mr. Wray. We are certainly seeing a trend that is magnified
on-line of people using a mix, a hodgepodge of different
personal beliefs and ideologies and grievances as justification
for violence. That is an alarming trend that has continued,
again, for the last let us say 4 or 5 years. It something we
have to be concerned about. Certainly the social media
dimension is one of the ways in which gasoline is poured on the
fire, if you will. But there are a lot of other things that
contribute to it.
Ms. Demings. You have also said that China and Russia have
basically piggybacked on the unrest that is here, the division
within our country. What did you mean by that? In what ways?
Mr. Wray. Well, a number of our foreign adversaries, a
number of nation-states, Russia initially, but since then not
just Russia but China and Iran as well have capitalized on the
same toxic politically-charged violence that occurs in this
country these days to try to pit us against each other, to sow
divisiveness, to amplify tensions that are already there and
make it worse. We saw that----
Ms. Demings. Yes. They must be----
Mr. Wray [continuing]. Not just with Russia----
Ms. Demings. They must be smiling right now.
Let me just end with this. I want to thank all of you for
the commitment that you have to protecting our Nation. You have
tough jobs. Some day I wonder why you have answered the call,
but on behalf of this committee, we are sure glad that you did.
At this time the Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Michigan, Mr. Meijer, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to our
witnesses who are here today. I know we all prize truth and
accuracy.
One thing for Director Abizaid, before we begin, Mr.
Swalwell had mentioned the Iranian parliament voting I think he
said the death penalty for 15,000 protestors. Is that strictly
speaking an accurate statement that he made?
Ms. Abizaid. I don't have details on exactly what the
Iranian parliament actually did. We can certainly get back to
you on that. I mean I will say in the spirit of this question
and in the spirit of Director Wray's response, the Iranian
government is a state sponsor of terrorism. We have seen them
assume multiple different inroads into the United States and
elsewhere. It is a regime that raises significant concerns from
a security perspective.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you. The public reporting that I had seen
said that the Iranian parliament had voted in a super majority
to enact tougher, swifter punishments up to and including the
death penalty. But I think it is important when we are talking
about adversaries to be clear. Then, again, I know you are well
aware of this from your own work. But I just want to make sure
that those statements and exaggerations don't go unanswered.
I guess on the realm of that notion of exaggeration and
jumping to false conclusions, you know, Secretary Mayorkas the
September 19, 2021 incident in Del Rio, Texas, with the three
mounted CBP officers, can--I know you had initial statements
defending them last year. There were then, you know, a little
bit of a walking back and President Biden making some very
sweeping assumptions, accusing those officers of using their
reins to whip or otherwise physically assault migrants who were
coming across the border illegally. Then over the summer there
was an investigation that essentially I believe clarified that
it was cord split reins that were being used to control the
horses. They never came into contact with migrants or the
migrants didn't come into contact with those agents in that
sense.
Do you have anything else to add, you know, in terms of
your current assessment of that situation now that we are a
year and change onwards from it.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thanks so much.
From the very outset, I was actually in Del Rio the day
that those photographs were first published. From that very
afternoon in Del Rio at a press conference and ever since, I
have spoken of the fact that the facts would be adduced in an
objective, fair, and thorough investigation conducted by the
Office of Professional Responsibility. The career personnel of
the Office of Professional Responsibility did indeed conduct
such an investigation and their thorough and extensive report
speaks for itself.
Mr. Meijer. I believe there are still three CBP members and
a supervisor that are currently in an investigatory process. So
they haven't--is that an accurate understanding? Just using
media reports because there hasn't been too much forthcoming.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, to be precise----
Mr. Meijer. Yes, please.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To your point, I believe
the investigation is concluded. The report has been submitted,
and now the disciplinary process----
Mr. Meijer. Correct.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Is under way. That can
take some time because of course the agents are afforded due
process rights.
Mr. Meijer. I appreciate hearing that, because so often the
narrative gets far ahead of the facts. By the time, you know,
the erroneous tweet gets a million likes and then the
correction follow-up gets 15. Making sure that we are applying
that same standard at 24-hour rapid news cycles, important as
the narrative gets baked in and people have a misunderstanding
and misapprehension.
I guess very quickly, because I am running a little bit out
of time, the four Secret Service agents in April of this year
who were found to have been taking gifts, free apartment
rentals, a number of kind-of high-value items that were being
given to them by individuals that they believed were DHS
agents, Department of Homeland Security agents, but were
instead just cosplay artists. I mean characters who were
ingratiating themselves. All credit to the United States Postal
Investigation Service that uncovered it. Is that essentially a
personnel matter? Because that is the response that the
Department has been giving to our committee when we are
inquiring how such a glaring security lapse could occur.
Secretary Mayorkas. So, Congressman, I can't speak to the
facts because they are under review, there is a process there.
But I can say this with tremendous conviction, that I am
intensely proud of the men and women of the United States
Secret Service and the manner in which they execute their
message. I am a beneficiary of their willingness to risk their
lives for the safety and security of others.
Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Torres, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Torres. So my question is directed toward the director.
I am the future Congressman for Riverdale and the Bronx.
Riverdale happens to be home to the Russian Diplomatic
Compound, which stands as one of the highest buildings at one
of the highest points in the Bronx. It is both literally and
metaphorically a structure of surveillance, towering over the
Bronx. The compound is so shrouded in secrecy that not even the
fire department could gain access when a fire broke out more
than a decade ago. According to a retired FBI special agent,
Robert Dreeke it is an open secret that there are Russian spies
disguised as diplomats residing at the Russian Diplomatic
Compound.
In 2015 the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
arrested and charged Evgeny Buryakov with conspiring to act as
an agent of the Russian Federation on American soil. Mr.
Buryakov lived in Riverdale in close proximity to the Russian
Diplomatic Compound.
So in the FBI's view, does the Russian Diplomatic Compound
pose a homeland security threat?
Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I think we may have provided a
Classified briefing to you on this topic. But if we can
supplement that, I would be happy to do that. I will say that
the Russian intelligence services are perhaps the most active
and aggressive on U.S. soil and in no place more so than in the
city of New York.
Mr. Torres. Would you consider that a homeland security
threat?
Mr. Wray. I consider the Russian intelligence services
activity here in the United States to be a homeland security
threat.
Mr. Torres. Under the Foreign Mission Act, the FBI has the
authority to reject on homeland security grounds the citing of
a new embassy or consulate. Section 4305(d)(2) reads as
follows: ``After December 22, 1987 real property in the United
States may not be acquired by or on behalf of the foreign
mission of a foreign country if in the judgment of the FBI
director the acquisition of that property of that country might
substantially improve the capability of that country to engage
in intelligence activities directed against the United
States.'' Do you think the Russian Diplomatic Compound, in the
words of the Foreign Mission Act, substantially improves the
capability of Russia to engage in intelligence activities
directed against the United States Government?
Mr. Wray. Well, I would be more comfortable taking this up
in a Classified session. I am not an expert on the legality
parts of the interaction here, but what I will tell you is that
I know that the FBI's concerns from a counterintelligence
perspective with respect to the Russian intelligence services
are something that we discuss with the State Department, which
has an important role here, quite frequently. I am very proud
of the work, for example, that we were able to do together to
ensure the closing, for example, of the San Francisco consulate
for many of the same kinds of reasons that you are alluding to.
Mr. Torres. I just want to be clear, I am not asking for
confidential numbers or information, I am simply asking, you
know, does the public have a right to know the FBI's view on
whether a compound in their backyard poses a threat to the
security of the homeland?
That could be answered without divulging highly sensitive
information.
Mr. Wray. Well, I can answer in a general sense, which is
that we are concerned about the Russian intelligence service's
activity in the United States, including in New York, and their
ability to exploit their diplomatic presence to accomplish
that. More than that, I think I would have to wait and have us
brief you on that, as I think we have to some extent already in
closed session. It is not because I don't absolutely--as
somebody whose parents still live in New York--care deeply
about the issue that you are concerned about.
But I just want to be careful about how I answer the
question.
Mr. Torres. Suppose the Russian Diplomatic Compound had
never been built in Riverdale in the 1970's, if the Russian
government were proposing to build the Russian Diplomatic
Compound today, would the FBI reject it under the Foreign
Mission Act?
Mr. Wray. Well, I am reluctant to engage in hypotheticals,
other than to say, as I have said, that we have seen a long
history of the Russian intelligence services abusing and
exploiting their diplomatic presence in the United States,
including in New York, for purposes that are not in the
interests of the United States. We will continue to express our
views fairly forcefully in the interagency in that regard.
Mr. Torres. I suspect the answer is no, that we would never
allow this structure of surveillance to be built in 2022 in
Riverdale. The fact that, you know, espionage in the Russian
Diplomatic Compound has essentially been grandfathered in, is
as indefensible to me as it is inexplicable.
I will leave it at that.
Thank you.
Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Pfluger, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Madam Chair.
So we have the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center,
and the Homeland Security Departments here, the three agencies
that have largely been entrusted with the safety and security
of--every American has entrusted your agencies with their
safety and security. This is your legacy. This is the legacy
that you are going to leave behind. It has already been
mentioned today that this year we have 98 people--and that
doesn't include the 9, Secretary Mayorkas, that were reported
by your Department yesterday, in October. So over 100 people
have matched the terror watch list--100 people. That is a 500
percent increase from the encounters of the previous year.
Regardless of your testimony today under oath, that our border
is secure, Americans can look at the numbers. We can look at
the numbers right here and see from 2017 to 2021 and all the
way into 2022, fiscal year 2022, over 100 people matched the
terror watch list. All of you have testified today that you are
worried about terrorism. Really?
You see here the gotaways. Secretary Mayorkas, you have
told me several times under oath that we have operational
control of the Southern Border. I assume that you maintain that
because you testified earlier today. How many of these people
match the terror watch list? How many of the 600,000 known
gotaways match the terror watch list?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, your question points to
the very reason why we prioritize National security and public
safety in our immigration enforcement efforts. Why on September
30 of 2021----
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, can I reclaim just a minute--I
am going to reclaim my time.
I think that is false. I have been to the Southern Border
and I have talked to your Border Patrol agents. You know what
they tell me? That on any given shift 70 percent of them are
relegated to administrative duties. They are not in the field
doing the National security mission.
How many of these 600,000 people--can you assure the
American people that not a single one of these 600,000 people
are a threat to our safety? That they don't match the terror
watch list, that they are not part of a criminal or
transnational organization?
That is what your agents have told me personally. So I am
just taking their word for it.
Secretary Mayorkas. I have the benefit of a vantage point
of what the entire border represents, as well as what we are
doing about it.
One of the things that we have done about the fact that
Border Patrol agents were too often behind computers----
Mr. Pfluger. Secretary, answer the question.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Processing cases----
Mr. Pfluger. How many of the 600,000 people--no, we have 2
minutes left.
Secretary Mayorkas. I know, but I feel compelled to----
Mr. Pfluger. You don't have the time to do that. I want to
know how many of the 600,000 people match the terror watch
list?
Secretary Mayorkas. Well, Congressman, by definition they
are gotaways.
Mr. Pfluger. OK. So you don't know. So how can you say that
the border is secure? The American people aren't buying it. We
are not buying it because the deaths that are happening in our
communities--I have invited you to come with me. I was in Del
Rio the day before you got there when the 15,000 Haitians were
there. I have been to El Paso, I have been to the Rio Grande
Valley. You are going to hear more on that later.
Let us put up another slide because you are not going to
answer that question, but I don't--while we are putting up the
next slide, do you maintain that we have operational control of
the Southern Border?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me just say one thing
very briefly and then I will answer your question.
It is very difficult to answer your question when I am not
given the opportunity to do so, No. 1.
Mr. Pfluger. As my colleagues have said----
Secretary Mayorkas. No. 2, I do feel compelled to correct
inaccuracies that are contained in your question for the
benefit of the American people.
Mr. Pfluger. The accuracies are--the facts that I have
stated are reported by you and your Department.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, so we are dedicated to
resourcing the United States Border Patrol with additional
personnel----
Mr. Pfluger. OK.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. With additional
technology, using barriers advisedly where they are most
beneficial----
Mr. Pfluger. OK. That is not my question.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To deliver enhanced
security at our border.
Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, thank you for that.
I have heard you say, and President Biden--and this is your
legacy, OK--the American people can count. We can count. There
is a humanitarian crisis at our Southern Border. I have been
down there. You and President Biden have continued to ignore
this problem. Fiscal year 2022 was the deadliest year on
record. More than 800 migrants died. Do you remember the 53
that died in a tractor trailer in the heat of July south of San
Antonio, Texas? This is the legacy.
The American people are demanding that you secure the
border.
You have testified under oath today that it is secure. It
is not.
Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Gottheimer, for 5 minutes.
Let me just remind the Members that we do have a vote on
the floor, 5 minutes is 5 minutes. You are all entitled to it,
but just know that there is a vote on the floor.
Mr. Gottheimer.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I have called for a National carjacking car theft task
force as a result of a rising number of car thefts impacting my
district, the State of New Jersey overall, and of course the
Nation. However, these threats reach our ports a well,
according to CBP's own reporting thousands of vehicles have
been illegaly exported through tri-State area ports, including
the Port of Newark, bound for overseas destinations including
West Africa and the Dominican Republic.
Last year in New Jersey there were more 14,000 vehicles
reported stolen, a shocking 22 percent increase compared to
2020, and 2020 numbers were already up from the year before.
Year after year these crimes continue to grow, there has been a
19 percent increase in New Jersey through the first 8 months of
2022, including in the county in my district, Bergen County, as
seen a 54 percent increase in car thefts this year.
I have called this committee to hold a hearing on the issue
of auto theft and port security, as well as for Secretary
Mayorkas to appear to answer questions about DHS's failing to
take what I believe are adequate steps to address this issue. I
believe DHS must do more to crack down.
However, I am concerned this issue is not being addressed
in an urgent manner from the Department.
Mr. Secretary, despite repeated efforts, officials from DHS
refused to answer my questions or publicly speak out on what
measures are being taken in response to these alarming numbers
of stolen vehicles being taken to our ports. I reached out to
your office multiple times over multiple months to invite you
or a senior official from DHS to come to Jersey to address this
issue and you refused. Which, as you might imagine, is very
frustrating for the people that I represent.
Clearly this is a serious issue.
Can I ask you, Mr. Secretary, do you think this is a
serious issue? Why aren't you communicating more to the public,
why aren't you taking more serious steps, and what is your plan
there?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, forgive me, I am
unfamiliar with your request to speak with me directly about
what is clearly a homeland security issue. I would be pleased
to speak with you subsequent to this hearing. I will
proactively reach out to your office.
I was actually in one of our ports on the East Coat working
with our homeland security investigations and our customs
office personnel addressing stolen vehicles and the
implications for our security, the effort to smuggle narcotics
through our ports of entry in stolen vehicles and other
methods. I can share some insights in that regard and also
learn from you with respect to the methodologies that you think
we should employ to address this criminal threat.
Mr. Gottheimer. Well, I appreciate that.
Yes, just so you know, I personally left messages for you.
We reached--spoke to your--the departments at Homeland. They
refused to come, despite repeated requests, which is very
frustrating because it was over many months. This has been a
huge challenge and I think this should be front and center as
an issue that you consider. I hope that somebody, obviously in
addition to our conversation, from DHS will come to the port to
actually investigate, to look, to see what other steps can be
taken working with local and State law enforcement to address
this issue.
So I hope that will happen. I hope that I have your word
that that will happen please. Sir?
Secretary Mayorkas. We look forward to working with you.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you.
If I can turn to Director Wray. In October, Director, I
helped host a full committee field hearing on countering
violent extremism and terrorism and antisemitic threats in New
Jersey. The ADL's--antisemitic incidents reported a record
2,717 acts of assault, vandals, and harassment, averaging more
than 7 incidents a day of antisemitic incidents in Jersey, up
25 percent in the last year. We have a huge issue. Just
recently the FBI alerted the State and warned of the threats--a
broad threat to synagogues for which an extremist individual
was ultimately arrested. It is a clear reminder to the Jewish
community and place of worship are vulnerable.
Director, what is the FBI doing to counter antisemitic
threats and violence in New Jersey and around the country? If
you mind just addressing that please.
Mr. Wray. Absolutely. I am obviously pleased that we were
able to make an arrest in the case in New Jersey that you
mentioned. I was actually speaking to all of ADL on this topic
just last week more broadly.
Mr. Gottheimer. Great.
Mr. Wray. Certainly antisemitism and violence that comes
out of it is a persistent and present fact. Numbers that we
have seen, about 63 percent of religious hate crimes overall
are motivated by antisemitism, and that is targeting a group
that just makes up about 2.4 percent of the American
population. So it is a community that deserves and desperately
needs our support because they are getting hit from all sides.
We are trying to address it through a combination of
things. No. 1, on the terrorism side, the domestic terrorism
side, through our joint terrorism task forces. No. 2, on the
hate crime side, through our civil rights program. We have
elevated that to a National threat priority. We have created,
third, a domestic terrorism hate crime fusion cell, which
brings together those two programs that I just mentioned,
domestic terrorism and hate crimes, to try to be more
proactive. In fact, that fusion cell has already had results.
We were able to bring a proactive hate charge to prevent an
intended attack on a synagogue in Colorado as a result of it.
But then on top of that we are engaged in a very aggressive
outreach campaign that is designed to kind-of raise awareness,
help people know how to report, what to be on the lookout for.
Because we need to tap into the eyes and ears that are in the
community. That has included, for example, not far from you in
New York, translating some of the materials into Yiddish, for
example, and Hebrew to make it more accessible to certain parts
of the Jewish community.
Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you.
Ms. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
New York, Mr. Garbarino, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and the director, director for
coming today.
I want to start off first with Secretary Mayorkas. Fiscal
year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, which was enacted
January 1, directed the administration to develop a continuing
of the economy plan. As we came upon the 1 year--and they are
supposed to finish it by the end of this year--as we came upon
the 1-year mark last year I sent a letter to you as well as
Director Easterly, expressing, you know, my immense concern
about the lack of progress. I never received a response.
Then 15 months after the Authorization was done, the
President finally handed over the authority to CISA, pretty
much setting up the agency for a failure. We are now over a
little bit of a month before the deadline and we have yet to
receive any information on where CISA or the Department is on
the development of the continuation of the economy plan.
Again, we sent that letter and we still have received no
response. You talked about cybersecurity in your opening
remarks. The development of the continuation of the economy
plan is a National security imperative for the safety,
security, and prosperity of the U.S. economy. So can we please
have an update where we are on the development of this plan,
which is due in less than 2 months?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman Garbarino, I will look
forward to following up on that for you and responding swiftly.
I will have to look in that.
Mr. Garbarino. Well, I mean----
Secretary Mayorkas. Where the report that is due to you is.
Mr. Garbarino. OK. Well, the report is due in 2 months, but
we--I have sent two letters, both to you and Director Easterly,
and I have received no response at all. When can I expect a
response?
Secretary Mayorkas. Let me follow up with you very quickly
on that, Congressman.
Mr. Garbarino. OK. I appreciate that.
I have another question for you, Mr. Secretary, because you
also talked about it a little bit in your opening statement.
Earlier this summer Canada became the last member of Five Eyes
intelligence pooling alliance to bar or restrict the use of
Huawei equipment within its 5G telecom network. In addition,
Canada's ban also includes equipment made by ZTE, which is one
of China's biggest tech companies and one that is state-owned.
The United States and Canada work in partnership at and beyond
our borders to enhance security, sharing critical
infrastructure.
So it is critically important that the United States can
trust Canada's or any of our allies' 5G equipment and software
will not threaten our National security, economic security and
privacy, or intellectual property. As the world becomes
increasingly connected via the rise of 5G networks, how can
vulnerabilities brought on by other nation's 5G networks, such
as those with Huawei equipment, how can we make sure they don't
pose a National security risk?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, your question is so very
important. Let me share with you. No. 1, Canada is a very, very
close security partner with us. We have a robust information-
sharing architecture with them. They are one of the
participants in our regular dialogs in the area that you have
identified and in so many other homeland and National security
areas.
I was just in Singapore about 3 weeks ago speaking about
the very issue that you have identified and really
communicating a very clear and stark call to countries in the
Indo-Pacific Region about the vulnerabilities that are created
when we allow China, the People's Republic of China to control
some of the architecture infrastructure----
Mr. Garbarino. Can I ask you what their response----
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Such as 5G.
Mr. Garbarino. What was their response when you brought--
because we are already doing it, but our allies, you know,
there are some of them that aren't doing it and some of them
that will not have updated--you know, the put these plans in
place and they haven't updated current infrastructure with
Huawei technology.
Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, it is our responsibility
to communicate information, to communicate accurate information
with respect to the perils of having infrastructure,
communications infrastructure in the hands of nation-states
that don't protect freedoms and rights as do we.
Mr. Garbarino. OK. Well, I think though if some of our
allies are not willing to, you know, protect their
vulnerabilities like we are, especially with Huawei, we should
maybe be a little more careful in the future deciding what we
are going to share with them, just because, you know, we don't
need the enemy knowing what we know.
I have a final question for Director Wray. According to an
August 2019 U.N. report, North Korea has generated an estimated
$2 billion for its weapons of mass destruction program using
cyber attacks. Again, we had--just in April North Korea hackers
stole $620 million in cryptocurrency from video game Axie. You
know, they have been doing this for a very long time and they
are getting a little aggressive. What are we doing to stop
these hackers? You know, what actions have been taken?
Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
The witness may answer the question.
Mr. Wray. Well, you are right that I think North Korea
sometimes gets--and I think dangerously so--overlooked as a
significant cyber threat, because we spend so much time, very
rightly, talking about China, Russia, and Iran. But North Korea
has a growing espionage in addition to the theft and attack
capability. In some ways sort-of similar to Iran in recent
years in particular. Especially targeting, as you say,
financial institutions, cryptocurrency exchanges, and so forth
because they need it to fund their regime because of the
effectiveness of the sanctions that otherwise exist.
So we are actively investigating any number of North Korean
threat actor groups when we are able to catch somebody who is
working with them in a country that we can extradite from. That
is a very important part, both in terms of insuring
accountability, but also in terms of disrupting their efforts
and in terms of learning valuable intelligence about their
techniques, tactics, and procedures.
In addition to that, it helps us figure out how to further
tighten the sanctions regime to make it harder for them to find
loopholes, which they are always looking for.
Ms. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from
Texas, Ms. Flores, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Flores. Thank you, Madam. Thank you to Chair Thompson
and Ranking Member Katko for holding this hearing today. To all
the witnesses, thank you for taking the time to speak to us
today. We really appreciate it.
Our country is currently facing never-before-seen levels of
illegal immigration, drug smuggling, and child sex trafficking.
To Secretary Mayorkas, as someone who lives the reality of our
Southern Border every day, saying that the border is secure,
you are lying to the American people. According to the CBP our
country has experienced 2.7 million migrant encounters to our
border during the fiscal year of 2022. This does not include
the 900,000 gotaways. Further, there has been 98 people
apprehended crossing the border who appear on the terrorist
screening data set.
This administration's horrendous border policies will
continue to threaten our National security because a secure
border is National security.
This week has been a very difficult week for us in South
Texas. Our Border Patrol agents, the ones who dedicate their
lives to protect us, are not receiving the support that they
need from this administration. One of the top things I have
heard from our Border Patrol agents across the Southern Border
is the lack of action from the DHS leadership in addressing
Border Patrol morale. Our Border Patrol agents are
understaffed, not provided with the resources that they need to
succeed, and are spending time processing asylum claims instead
of doing the job that they signed up to do.
Tragically, in the last week in the RGV sector, two Border
Patrol agents took their own lives, leaving behind families and
creating a hole in our communities.
Question No. 1. Secretary Mayorkas, the historic level of
illegal alien apprehension and crossings at the border,
combined with the limited resources and personnel to handle the
large influx of migrants has caused a steep decline in morale
among the Border Patrol work force. In no other department is a
mental health crisis more visible than Customs and Border
Protection, Border Patrol Division, our agents and our
officers. One life is too many. And in 1 week.
What are your plans to support the mental health for your
work force and address the troubling increase of suicide among
the front-line personnel?
Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, may I have a minute to
answer your question? Because you have touched on very, very
important matters. I first, at the outset, should thank you for
your service, because I know you have a Border Patrol agent in
your family and I know very well that it is the family that
serves.
Ms. Flores. Mm-hmm.
Secretary Mayorkas. Our prayers and thoughts are with the
families of the agents who took their lives.
Our Border Patrol agents, our heroic Border Patrol agents--
--
Ms. Flores. Mm-hmm.
Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Are indeed under intense
pressure and indeed under intense challenge. We are very
dedicated to providing them with the resources and support that
they need to fulfill their responsibilities and to ensure their
wellness. That is a commitment that we have and it is an
unwavering one and our highest priority.
We have surged resources to the border to get more Border
Patrol agents out in the field. We are taking it to the
smuggling organizations and the transnational criminal
organizations in an unprecedented way. We are working with our
partners to the south, the countries that need to enforce their
borders and enforce their laws of humanitarian relief. This is
a challenge that is not specific to the United States, that is
not specific to our Southern Border, that is something that has
gripped the Western Hemisphere.
Let me take the example of Venezuela alone. There are
approximately 25-28 million people in the country of Venezuela.
Approximately 8 million Venezuelans have left their country.
Colombia is hosting 2.4 million Venezuelans, Chile is reported
to host over 1 million Venezuelans. It is not Venezuela alone.
Costa Rica is hosting hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans. We
are seeing a migration in the Western Hemisphere and in fact
across the world that is unprecedented. There are more
displaced along our border.
But with respect to our border, please rest assured,
Congresswoman, and please have your family rest assured that we
are dedicated to enhancing the security of our Southern Border
and taking care of our extraordinary and brave personnel who
secure it every day.
Ms. Demings. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony and the
Members for your questions. The Members of the committee may
have additional questions for the witnesses and we ask that you
respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.
The record will remain open for 10 business days. Also that
there is a vote on the floor.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Secretary Sheila Jackson Lee for Honorable Alejandro
Mayorkas
Question 1a. The midterm elections resulted in a highly secure
election in which Americans can be confident.
What is your assessment of the threat of cybersecurity breaches and
intrusions during the 2022 midterm elections and the response to them?
Question 1b. What DHS efforts do you believe were most effective in
securing this year's elections?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. We have seen a sustained rise in the use of influence
operations to sway U.S. policy, manipulate elections, weaken the United
States' geopolitical standing, and attempt to contravene our democratic
process.
What changes have you seen in the frequency, magnitude, and impact
of misinformation and disinformation operations since last year?
Question 2b. In what ways, and to what extent, do DHS and the FBI
work together through such means as coordinating strategies, personnel,
and other resources to combat the threat of influence operations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Human trafficking and child exploitation are often
spoken about as if they are separate crimes committed by separate
parties.
In what ways, and to what extent, are human trafficking and child
exploitation interrelated? Are the same perpetrators undertaking both
crimes?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. Secretary Mayorkas' testimony that was provided prior
to the hearing referenced a Climate Change Action Group that DHS began
recently. My district has been impacted by extreme climate events that
have greatly affected my constituents, including large-scale flooding
from Hurricane Harvey and wide-spread infrastructure damage from Winter
Storm Uri.
What specific climate change threats to homeland security has your
Climate Change Action Group identified? What proactive and remedial
measures has the group identified and recommended?
Question 4b. How is DHS investing in Community Resilience?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for Honorable Alejandro
Mayorkas
Question 1a. Secretary Mayorkas, it has been 1 year since the
Department of Homeland Security submitted its report evaluating PPD-21,
as required by section 9002 of the 2021 NDAA. In a letter last week
concurring with that review, President Biden acknowledged the United
States ``lacks a comprehensive way to establish mandatory minimum
cybersecurity requirements across our critical infrastructure, and
current approaches differ by sector.'' He also committed to ``working
with Congress to fill gaps in statutory authorities.''
What gaps should we be looking to fill related to improving the
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure?
Question 1b. The letter mentions a focused effort to help Sector
Risk Management Agencies identify Systemically Important entities in
their sector. How is DHS approaching this task?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Nanette Barragan for Honorable Alejandro
Mayorkas
Question 1. I was happy to hear that the President's Interagency
Task Force on the Reunification of Families that you chair has
successfully reunified more than 500 children who were cruelly
separated from their parents or family during the Trump administration.
What strategies is DHS taking to reunite the remaining families and to
remedy the harms of the past administration on these children and
families?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. When I visited Puerto Rico as part of a Congressional
delegation in September, residents and local officials highlighted how
microgrids and solar power that helped keep power on after Hurricane
Fiona hit. As we rebuild in Puerto Rico, does FEMA have the authority
to approve clean energy projects with the Federal disaster recovery
funding authorized by Congress after Hurricane Maria?
Question 2b. If yes, will FEMA prioritize clean energy projects to
build a more decentralized power system?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. We are not only falling short of our goal to scan 100
percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, but it is also my understanding
that multi-energy portal scanners leave a sizable blind spot with the
containers we do scan, because they have a very limited ability to
penetrate dense cargo. This is a major security concern for the Port of
Los Angeles in my district, and for many of our Nation's seaports. Are
there alternative scanners that may produce better results? And, if so,
does DHS plan on utilizing these alternatives at our seaports?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. As of July 2022, the Port of Los Angeles has been hit
with almost 40 million cyber attacks per month, with most attacks
coming from Europe and Russia. What precautions have DHS and the FBI
taken to combat against these potential cyber threats, particularly
those that could harm or disrupt the flow of cargo at our Nation's
busiest seaport?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Honorable Alejandro
Mayorkas
Question 1a. Due to botched screening and vetting efforts during
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) admitted or paroled dozens of evacuees with derogatory
information into the country, including one individual who had been
liberated by the Taliban from an Afghanistan prison and another who was
determined to be a National security threat by the FBI 3 months after
being granted entry to the United States.
Provide the total number of individuals with derogatory information
who were transported into the United States as a result of Operation
Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.
Question 1b. What is the current status of these individuals? Have
all of these individuals been apprehended? What is being done with them
once apprehended?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What are the overall impacts of the Afghanistan
relocation effort as viewed by your agency? What continuing impacts
should we anticipate both in the homeland, as evacuees assimilate to
the United States, and abroad, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs) continue to flourish in the post-withdrawal climate?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic
People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Iran have all been
involved in malicious cyber attacks against the United States, harming
our critical infrastructure sectors, attempting to influence our
democratic processes, and compromising Government projects.
Explain your agency's work to mitigate these threats, especially in
conjunction with the cyber nexus of other threat vectors, including
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and FTOs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. More than a year has passed since the conclusion of
Operation Allies Refuge and the height of Operation Allies Welcome,
allowing us time to analyze and reflect on the challenges each
operation faced.
In September 2022, the DHS OIG released a report highlighting DHS's
screening and vetting failures. This included issues from falsely
recording dates of birth for evacuees to failure to collect biometric
information such as fingerprints. What is DHS doing to remedy these
failures?
Question 4b. The committee was notified by a source from the
Department of State that DHS, along with partner agencies assisting in
the evacuation, would issue identification cards/papers to evacuees who
did not present identifying paperwork, basing information on the cards/
papers (which included name and date of birth) solely on the word of
the evacuee. How many of these cards/papers were issued during the
operations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. On August 24, 2022, following the recommendation of the
Homeland Security Council, you terminated the DHS Disinformation
Governance Board. However, according to reports published at the end of
October, DHS and the FBI have continued policing speech, even
pressuring private companies to do so on your behalf. Has DHS requested
that tech and social media companies remove or label posts as
misinformation, disinformation, or malinformation in the lead up to the
2020 election?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6a. Please discuss in detail what the Department plans to
do to help alleviate the devastating migration crisis we face.
Ninety-eight non-U.S. citizens listed on the terrorist watch list
were caught attempting to enter the homeland between ports of entry.
Please discuss the challenges our brave Border Patrol agents face in
apprehending these individuals as well as the threats those who evade
detection present to homeland security.
Question 6b. Given your record over the last 2 years, how can the
American people expect you to prioritize the security of the Southwest
Border throughout fiscal year 2023?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7a. On October 12, 2022, the Department announced a new
legal entry path specifically targeting Venezuelan migrants. This path
would be a fully on-line process for up to 24,000 qualifying
Venezuelans. Under this new policy, Venezuelan migrants who cross into
the United States illegally will be returned to Mexico.
Please explain the reason why this new policy targets Venezuelans
and no other nationality? Does the Biden administration intend to
expand this program beyond Venezuelans?
Question 7b. The National Border Patrol Council has stated there
will be a daily cap on the number of Venezuelans that Mexico will
receive as part of this initiative. What is that daily total cap? What
will happen to Venezuelan nationals once that cap is exceeded?
Question 7c. It is already evident the Department's new policy may
increase the potential number of Venezuelan gotaways. How does the
Department intend to address this potential increase?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. At the beginning of November, the U.S. Border Patrol
reported a more than 500 percent increase in encounters with Cuban
migrants in South Florida since the same time last fiscal year. South
Florida has seen more than 800 migrants arrive since October 1, 2022 in
more than 50 landings. At the same time, the number of U.S. Coast Guard
personnel recruitments has plummeted, with the USCG offering unheard-of
$50,000 signing bonuses to encourage enlistments.
Do you believe our maritime security readiness is in jeopardy in
the face of these recruitment issues and increased maritime-based
migration? Please describe how you plan on addressing this critical
shortage of personnel and what you are doing, other than the signing
bonus, to bolster Coast Guard recruitment.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9a. As of the end of September 2022, Immigration Court
judges dismissed a total of 63,587 cases because Border Patrol agents
are not filing the ``Notice to Appear'' (NTA) with the Immigration
Court. Without a filed NTA, a case cannot proceed, meaning that 1 out
of every 6 Court cases were thrown out for this reason in the past
fiscal year, and the migrant tied to that case is unaccounted for.
What is the Department doing to ensure that all NTAs are filed with
Immigration Court to ensure that thousands of migrants are not left in
limbo and are not lost in the interior of our homeland?
Question 9b. Are you aware of the reasons why Border Patrol agents
are not filing NTAs with the Immigration Court System?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10a. Under the Biden administration's policies, ICE
removals have plummeted to a fraction of the normal levels.
Provide a monthly breakdown of interior enforcement actions--
arrests, detentions, and removals--which ICE has effectuated since
January 2019.
Question 10b. As the number of migrants attempting to enter the
United States continues to surpass historic records, growing in tandem
with an increasing flow of illegal narcotics, human trafficking, and
transnational crime in the U.S. homeland, has the Department considered
any alternative policy options regarding deportation?
Question 10c. How do you reconcile President Biden's weakened
enforcement priorities with the fact that because of these policies,
fewer serious criminals are being removed?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. Over the past several years, supply chain attacks have
greatly increased and have the potential to impact thousands of victims
simultaneously. What steps has the Department taken to ensure a robust
commercial cyber incident response capacity that could be called upon
in times of need?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12a. While many illicit drugs are seized at a port of
entry, we also know that drugs like fentanyl are coming across the
border between ports of entry:
Provide an estimate of the quantity (in pounds) of fentanyl that
has been transported into the United States through the southwest land
border, northern land border, and otherwise entered the interior broken
down by each of these respective locations, as well as by month, from
Jan. 2021 to present.
Question 12b. What are your plans to provide CBP personnel with the
technology and resources to intercept a larger percentage of illicit
drugs flowing across our border?
Question 12c. Due to the influx of migrants, CBP officers and
agents are being pulled away from their primary mission to assist with
processing individuals into the United States. With the lack of front-
line officers and agents patrolling the border, how is this hampering
CBP's ability to intercept these deadly drugs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13a. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine earlier
this year, CISA developed the Shields Up campaign to bolster cyber
defenses across public and private sectors and throughout all sectors
of our economy.
What more is CISA and the Department doing to prepare critical
infrastructure owners and operators to mitigate Russian cyber threats
stemming from the conflict?
Question 13b. As we brace for the potential of escalatory actions
by the PRC in Taiwan, what is CISA and the Department doing to mitigate
cyber risk based on the intelligence community's assessment of the
PRC's specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14. To attempt to combat the crisis on the Southwest
Border, you have deployed highly-trained and highly-skilled Federal Air
Marshals (FAMs) to perform non-law enforcement duties such as hospital
watch, transportation, and welfare checks. DHS is removing hundreds of
FAMs from the skies during one of the busiest travel seasons of the
year to send them to the border, even though you have stated that
America's aviation infrastructure is a very high threat and a target.
How many high-risk flights are not being covered due to your decision
to deploy FAMs to the border? How many FAMs have already been sent to
the border, or are scheduled to be sent, who have not volunteered for
the deployment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 15. In the case Texas v. Biden (Case 2:21-cv-00067 N.D.
Tx), DHS was filing monthly status reports with the court reporting on
six distinct topics. Those updates ended in August (covering the July
reporting period). Provide the monthly data, in the form it was
provided to the Court, to be current through November 2022.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 16. Provide an estimated number of gotaways who have
crossed the southwest land border, northern land border, and otherwise
entered the interior broken down by each of these respective locations,
as well as by month, from Jan. 2021 to present.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 17. Provide the monthly total, from January 2019 to
present, of all Southwest Border encounters--both at and between Ports
of Entry--delineated by citizenship/nation of origin. Provide the
citizenship/nation of origin, from January 2019 to present, of all
Southwest Border encounters subsequently determined to be present
within the Terrorist Screening Dataset.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 18. How does DHS anticipate the granting full legal status
to 11 million unlawful migrant aliens present in the United States will
affect the total number of future apprehensions, arrests, detentions,
and removals at the Southwest Border? How did DHS formulate this
prediction? How does DHS anticipate the granting full legal status to
11 million unlawful migrant aliens present in the United States will
affect the time line and backlog of adjudicating new cases at the
Southwest Border? How did the Department formulate this prediction?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 19. Provide the Department's working definition of the
below terms. What is the basis for each of these respective
definitions? What is the authority for each of these respective
definitions? What is DHS's statutory authority to determine each of
these respective definitions? Explain how a DHS employee, or an
employee of any DHS component, determines if information qualifies as
each of these respective definitions. What training does DHS provide
employees to make this determination? Are there written guidance
documents? If so, please provide them.
Misinformation
Disinformation
Malinformation
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 20. What entities, companies, executives, and other
contacts are DHS's largest private-sector partners in its
Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation efforts? What
entities, agencies, officials, and other contacts are DHS's largest
Government partners in its Misinformation, Disinformation, and
Malinformation efforts?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 21. What non-governmental organizations, contacts, and
sources of information do DHS employees and contractors rely on to help
determine whether something is Misinformation, Disinformation, and/or
Malinformation? In which countries are those non-governmental
organizations, contacts, and/or sources of information based? From what
sources--including but not limited to the U.S. Government and/or non-
U.S.-based entities, organizations, or governments--do those
organizations receive funding?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 22. Rank the 5 greatest threats posed by the PRC, in
order, as you see them.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 23. How is DHS ensuring that foreign students from the PRC
who pose counterintelligence risks are not admitted into the United
States? How is DHS preventing Chinese nationals from gaining access to
sensitive research at universities or other publicly-funded
institutions? How does DHS discourage State and local governments from
continuing to procure Chinese tech that is banned from Federal
procurement, including from companies like Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision,
Dahua, and Hytera?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 24. How will DHS support the National Biodefense
Strategy's objective to update and upgrade National and SLTT
capabilities for contact tracing, including digital technologies to
facilitate contact tracing, to enable the containment of infectious
pathogens during future biological incidents? How will DHS support the
National Biodefense Strategy's objective to detect, report, and respond
to diseases brought across the Nation's open borders? How will DHS
support the National Biodefense Strategy's goal to ``Promote Evidence-
Based Health Communication to the Public,'' including the increasing
vaccine uptake rates and its objectives to coordinate information?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 25. With the surge of migrants along the Southwest Border,
what specific efforts is DHS taking to ensure the vetting and screening
of each individual who is encountered at a port of entry and between
ports of entry? Where are DHS resources and capabilities lacking in
terms of vetting and screening? What is being done to handle these
inefficiencies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 26. With no confirmation on the credibility of migrant
biographical data provided by other countries, how does DHS ensure the
accuracy of their screening systems? How is DHS verifying that the data
used for these processes is accurate, up-to-date, and objective?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christopher A. Wray
Question 1a. We have seen a sustained rise in the use of influence
operations to sway U.S. policy, manipulate elections, weaken the United
States' geopolitical standing, and attempt to contravene our democratic
process.
What changes have you seen in the frequency, magnitude, and impact
of misinformation and disinformation operations since last year?
Question 1b. In what ways, and to what extent, do DHS and the FBI
work together through such means as coordinating strategies, personnel,
and other resources to combat the threat of influence operations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence found that ISIS and al-Qaeda remain
the greatest Sunni terrorist threats to U.S. interests overseas but
that ``U.S.-based Lone Actors and Small Cells with a broad range of
ideological motivations pose a greater immediate domestic threat.''
How can the U.S. Government use policy and law to address the rise
in groups seeking to organize themselves as militias that use
intimidation and force to influence the political process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Human trafficking and child exploitation are often
spoken about as if they are separate crimes committed by separate
parties.
In what ways, and to what extent, are human trafficking and child
exploitation interrelated? Are the same perpetrators undertaking both
crimes?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christopher A. Wray
Question 1a. Due to botched screening and vetting efforts during
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) admitted or paroled dozens of evacuees with derogatory
information into the country, including one individual who had been
liberated by the Taliban from an Afghanistan prison and another who was
determined to be a National security threat by the FBI 3 months after
being granted entry to the United States.
Provide the total number of individuals with derogatory information
who were been transported into the United States as a result of
Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.
Question 1b. What is the current status of these individuals? Have
all of these individuals been apprehended? What is being done with them
once apprehended?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What are the overall impacts of the Afghanistan
relocation effort as viewed by your agency? What continuing impacts
should we anticipate both in the homeland, as evacuees assimilate to
the United States, and abroad, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs) continue to flourish in the post-withdrawal climate?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic
People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Iran have all been
involved in malicious cyber attacks against the United States, harming
our critical infrastructure sectors, attempting to influence our
democratic processes, and compromising Government projects.
Explain your agency's work to mitigate these threats, especially in
conjunction with the cyber nexus of other threat vectors, including
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and FTOs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) strategy of
``Military Civil Fusion'' aims to establish the People's Liberation
Army (PLA) as a globally dominant military force by 2049. To achieve
this goal, the CCP has worked to obtain cutting-edge technology, often
through theft. This theft has come in many forms, including through the
infiltration of American research and aggressive talent recruitment
programs. Could you please explain to the committee the various ways
the CCP pursues its goals through theft and espionage and how the FBI
has worked to mitigate this threat?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. You have expressed concern over potential terrorist
attack on U.S. soil emanating from Afghanistan given the growing
intelligence gaps since the U.S. withdrawal last August. Could you
please elaborate on this concern given our new understanding of the
vetting challenges cited in the DHS OIG report on Operation Allies
Welcome?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. The United States' global competition with the PRC
presents one of the greatest challenges the United States will face
this century. You yourself have said ``the greatest long-term threat to
our Nation's information and intellectual property, and to our economic
vitality, is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from
China.'' Could you please elaborate on this statement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7a. The 2022 Annual Threat Assessment states,
``Transnational cyber criminals are increasing the number, scale, and
sophistication of ransomware attacks, fueling a virtual ecosystem that
threatens to cause greater disruptions of critical services world-
wide.''
As the threat of ransomware cascades across all sectors of our
Nation's economy, and threatens to disrupt global services, what
practical steps do you recommend critical infrastructure owners and
operators as well as small business owners implement to mitigate this
risk?
Question 7b. Who is the first person a small business owner should
contact if they experience a ransomware attack?
Question 7c. How does the FBI work with other interagency partners
to create situational awareness of reported ransomware attacks across
the Federal Civilian Executive branch?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8a. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is
charged with the mission to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with
the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland
safe. I&A's customers and partners include DHS leadership, DHS
components, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector
partners, and the IC. Could you please describe the nature of your
organization's relationship with I&A?
Question 8b. How often does your organization collaborate with I&A
on an issue area or arising threat?
Question 8c. How often does your organization receive an I&A
product that is used to bolster your organization's mission?
Question 8d. What challenges have you experienced in your
collaboration with I&A?
Question 8e. Are there any aspects of I&A's collection or analysis
processes that you think could be improved? If so, how?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9a. At the World Wide Threats hearing in 2020 you stated
``DVEs pose a steady and evolving threat of violence and economic harm
to the United States. Trends may shift, but the underlying drivers for
domestic violent extremism--such as perceptions of government or law
enforcement overreach, sociopolitical conditions, racism, antisemitism,
Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to legislative actions--remain
constant.'' How has this threat evolved since your testimony in 2020?
Please provide annual statistics from 2016 through present for the
following.
How many DVE threats were identified arising from sociopolitical
conditions? How does the FBI define ``sociopolitical conditions'' in
the above context? How many DVE threats were identified arising from
racism? How does the FBI define ``racism'' in the above context? How
many DVE threats were identified arising from antisemitism? How does
the FBI define ``antisemitism'' in the above context? How many DVE
threats were identified arising from islamophobia? How does the FBI
define ``islamophobia'' in the above context? How many DVE threats were
identified arising from misogyny? How does the FBI define ``misogyny''
in the above context? How many DVE threats were identified arising from
reactions to legislative actions? How does the FBI define ``reactions
to legislative actions'' in the above context?
Question 9b. How many white RMVEs committed ideologically-motivated
incidents and violence against Black individuals? How many white RMVEs
committed ideologically-motivated incidents and violence against Asian
individuals? How many Black RMVEs committed ideologically-motivated
incidents and violence against white individuals? How many Black RMVEs
committed ideologically-motivated incidents and violence against Asian
individuals? How many Asian RMVEs committed ideologically-motivated
incidents and violence against white individuals? How many Asian RMVEs
committed ideologically-motivated incidents and violence against Black
individuals?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. In September 2021, the Attorney General circulated a
memo labeling parents at school board meetings ``domestic terrorists''
and directing the FBI to collaborate with U.S. Attorneys and other
local officials to address this alleged issue. Explain all actions the
FBI has taken in the implementation of this memo. Explain, for each
field office, all actions they've taken to implement the Attorney
General's memo.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. The FBI has recently conducted a series of
investigations and arrests related to FACE Act violations at abortion
providers. At the same time, it appears that a spate of attacks at pro-
life pregnancy resource centers have led to no arrests and limited
investigation. Provide the number of reported FACE Act violations
stemming from actions at abortion providers. Provide the number of
reported FACE Act violations stemming from actions at pregnancy centers
which do not provide abortion services. Provide the number of open
investigations into alleged FACE Act violations stemming from actions
at abortion providers. Provide the number of open investigations into
alleged FACE Act violations stemming from actions at pregnancy centers
which do not provide abortion services. Provide the number of FACE Act
arrests stemming from actions at abortion providers. Provide the number
of FACE Act arrests stemming from actions at pregnancy centers which do
not provide abortion services.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. Rank the 5 greatest threats posed by the PRC, in
order, as you see them.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13. How is the FBI ensuring that foreign students from the
PRC who pose counterintelligence risks are not admitted into the United
States? How is the FBI preventing Chinese nationals from gaining access
to sensitive research at universities or other publicly-funded
institutions? How does the FBI discourage State and local governments
from continuing to procure Chinese tech that is banned from Federal
procurement, including from companies like Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision,
Dahua, and Hytera?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14. Did the FBI have any Confidential Informants present
at any polling place or voting location during the midterm election?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 15. What internal FBI procedures exist to ensure that
retaliation against whistleblowers does not occur? What steps has the
FBI taken to protect whistleblowers from retaliation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 16. How has the FBI ensured compliance with the Attorney
General's policy prohibiting Justice Department political appointees
from participating in campaign-related activities in any capacity? How
many violations occurred?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 17. What steps have you taken to ensure that politically-
driven individuals such as Timothy Thibault are not tasked with
investigating cases of corruption or other politically-related matters?
What initial and continuous vetting for political bias is done by the
FBI regarding these agents and investigators?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christine Abizaid
Question 1a. The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment by the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence found that ISIS and al-Qaeda remain
the greatest Sunni terrorist threats to U.S. interests overseas but
that ``U.S.-based Lone Actors and Small Cells with a broad range of
ideological motivations pose a greater immediate domestic threat.''
What is the National Counterterrorism Center's assessment of the
scope and severity of the current threat of domestic violent extremism?
Question 1b. In what ways does NCTC distinguish between and assess
domestic violent extremist groups that characterize themselves as
militias and who, in some cases, stockpile weapons?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christine Abizaid
Question 1a. Due to botched screening and vetting efforts during
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) admitted or paroled dozens of evacuees with derogatory
information into the country, including one individual who had been
liberated by the Taliban from an Afghanistan prison and another who was
determined to be a National security threat by the FBI 3 months after
being granted entry to the United States.
Provide the total number of individuals with derogatory information
who were transported into the United States as a result of Operation
Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.
Question 1b. What is the current status of these individuals? Have
all of these individuals been apprehended? What is being done with them
once apprehended?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What are the overall impacts of the Afghanistan
relocation effort as viewed by your agency? What continuing impacts
should we anticipate both in the homeland, as evacuees assimilate to
the United States, and abroad, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations
(FTOs) continue to flourish in the post-withdrawal climate?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic
People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Iran have all been
involved in malicious cyber attacks against the United States, harming
our critical infrastructure sectors, attempting to influence our
democratic processes, and compromising Government projects.
Explain your agency's work to mitigate these threats, especially in
conjunction with the cyber nexus of other threat vectors, including
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and FTOs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. The DoD OIG discovered that Afghan evacuees were not
vetted by the NCTC using all available data prior to entering the
United States because CBP enrollments were compared against DHS data,
which did not initially include all biometric data held by the DoD.
What steps have been taken to mitigate this issue?
Question 4b. Could you please discuss the efforts, if any, the NCTC
has made in partnership with DHS to ensure proper data sharing is in
place to prevent such an issue going forward?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5a. Foreign terrorism remains a persistent threat to the
United States, both in the homeland and abroad. Following the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country quickly returned to its status
as a safe haven for terrorism. Are you concerned about this?
Question 5b. How concerned are you with the lack of visibility we
have into the Taliban-run country?
Question 5c. Is the NCTC aware of any terrorist training camps
currently existing in Afghanistan?
Question 5d. How do you perceive the withdrawal from Afghanistan
will impact the threat landscape over the next decade?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Iran remains committed to its terrorist activities
against the United States, both directly and via proxy attacks. In
August 2022, the DOJ disclosed one such attack in which an Iranian
national attempted to arrange the murder of former National Security
Advisor John Bolton in retaliation for the death of Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem
Soleimani. Please describe to the committee the on-going threats
presented from Iran.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. The U.S. Border Patrol reported 98 encounters with
people on the U.S. Government's terrorist watch list along the
Southwest Border in fiscal year 2022. What are your concerns for this
enormous increase in such encounters, especially with the context that
there was an estimated 600,000 gotaways in fiscal year 2022?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8a. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is
charged with the mission to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with
the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland
safe. I&A's customers and partners include DHS leadership, DHS
components, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector
partners, and the IC. Could you please describe the nature of your
organization's relationship with I&A?
Question 8b. How often does your organization collaborate with I&A
on an issue area or arising threat?
Question 8c. How often does your organization receive an I&A
product that is used to bolster your organization's mission?
Question 8d. What challenges have you experienced in your
collaboration with I&A?
Question 8e. Are there any aspects of I&A's collection or analysis
processes that you think could be improved? If so, how?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
[all]