[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                   WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           NOVEMBER 15, 2022

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-73

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

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        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                               
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
50-981 PDF               WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas            John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island      Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey     Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California           Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan             Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri            Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas                      Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Yvette D. Clarke, New York           Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Eric Swalwell, California            Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey    Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Kathleen M. Rice, New York           Peter Meijer, Michigan
Val Butler Demings, Florida          Kat Cammack, Florida
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California    August Pfluger, Texas
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey          Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia            Mayra Flores, Texas
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York, Vice 
    Chairman
                       Hope Goins, Staff Director
                 Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
                          Natalie Nixon, Clerk
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     4
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Texas:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     9

                               Witnesses

Hon. Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    12
  Prepared Statement.............................................    14
Mr. Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of 
  Investigation:
  Oral Statement.................................................    29
  Prepared Statement.............................................    31
Ms. Christine Abizaid, Director, National Counterterrorism 
  Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................    41
  Prepared Statement.............................................    43

                                Appendix

Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Secretary 
  Alejandro Mayorkas.............................................   101
Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for Honorable 
  Alejandro Mayorkas.............................................   101
Questions From Honorable Nanette Barragan for Honorable Alejandro 
  Mayorkas.......................................................   102
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Honorable Alejandro 
  Mayorkas.......................................................   102
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christopher A. 
  Wray...........................................................   105
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christopher A. Wray.   106
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christine Abizaid   108
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christine Abizaid...   108

 
                   WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE HOMELAND

                              ----------                              


                       Tuesday, November 15, 2022

                     U.S. House of Representatives,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson 
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Langevin, 
Payne, Correa, Slotkin, Green, Clarke, Swalwell, Titus, Watson 
Coleman, Rice, Demings, Barragan, Gottheimer, Torres, Katko, 
McCaul, Higgins, Guest, Bishop, Van Drew, Miller-Meeks, 
Harshbarger, Gimenez, LaTurner, Meijer, Cammack, Pfluger, 
Garbarino, and Flores.
    Chairman Thompson. Good morning. Today, the committee is 
holding its annual hearing to examine ``Worldwide Threats to 
the Homeland.'' We are pleased to have Secretary of Homeland 
Security Alejandro Mayorkas, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and 
NCTC Director Christine Abizaid before the committee once 
again.
    Two years ago, the committee convened its Worldwide Threats 
hearing during some of the darkest days of the pandemic. Last 
year, the panel testified before the committee in the immediate 
aftermath of the attack on the U.S. Capitol. No matter the 
circumstances, the committee and the American people have 
benefited from the witnesses' frank assessment of the threats 
facing the homeland, both foreign and domestic. More than 20 
years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 20 
years this month since the Department of Homeland Security was 
established in law, we recognize the witnesses, their 
predecessors, and men and women of their agencies for their 
tireless efforts to prevent another 9/11-style attack. That 
said, we know that the threat posed by foreign terrorist 
organizations has not gone away. It has evolved and persisted, 
just as our efforts to combat it have. At the same time, 
domestic violent extremists now pose the greatest threat to our 
homeland. The Biden administration has put new focus on 
combatting this rising threat, issuing the first-ever National 
Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, establishing a 
domestic terrorism analytic branch within DHS's Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis, and designating domestic violent 
extremism as a ``National Priority Area'' for homeland security 
grants.
    More work remains, as extremists are increasingly willing 
to engage in targeted violence, whether at a synagogue in 
Pittsburgh, a Walmart in El Paso, or a supermarket in Buffalo. 
I hope to speak to our witnesses today about their assessment 
of the current threat from terrorism and targeted violence and 
what their agencies are doing to protect the homeland.
    Beyond terrorism, I remain concerned about cyber threats, 
particularly from Russia, China, and Iran. In response to these 
threats, the Biden administration has raised our cybersecurity 
posture by issuing an Executive Order on Improving the Nation's 
Cyber Security, leading global efforts to confront ransomware 
threats, and launching a groundbreaking public-private 
collaboration to help secure industrial control systems. I want 
to hear from our witnesses about how they assess the current 
threat to cyber and critical infrastructure, what progress we 
have made, and what more we can do.
    Meanwhile, other homeland security challenges remain, like 
preparing for natural disasters, dealing with climate change, 
responding to the pandemic, securing our skies and waterways, 
addressing the increased number of migrants arriving at our 
borders, and protecting our very democracy and its 
institutions. Our discussion will undoubtedly touch on many of 
these issues today, and I look forward to a robust but 
respectful dialog.
    As the 117th Congress draws to a close, I want to take a 
moment to reflect on the committee's work over the last 2 
years, because together we have accomplished a great deal. 
Today marks our 25th full committee hearing this Congress, and 
our subcommittees have held more than 50 hearings, conducting 
oversight of some of the most pressing homeland security issues 
facing our Nation. We enacted critical legislation, 
particularly in the area of cybersecurity, creating a mandatory 
cyber incident reporting framework, providing cybersecurity 
grants to State and local governments, and improving the 
Federal Government's visibility into malicious activity on 
industrial control systems.
    Historically, much of this committee's best work and many 
of its greatest successes have been the result of strong 
bipartisan effort. That has certainly been true this Congress 
with the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, as Ranking Member. 
Early in his time on this committee, Ranking Member Katko 
became a leader and innovator on aviation security, and more 
recently, he has made his mark on the committee's cybersecurity 
work. Perhaps most importantly, he was a true partner on 
efforts to stand up a commission to examine the January 6th 
attack on the Capitol, putting country before politics. The 
Ranking Member and I did not always agree, but we agreed when 
we could. When we disagreed, we tried not to be disagreeable 
about it. As he departs Congress, I want to thank him for his 
important work over the years on this committee and, on a 
personal note, for his friendship. I wish him the very best in 
the new year and beyond.
    Likewise, I want to extend my thanks to all Members for 
their work in the 117th Congress, and especially those who are 
moving on to other endeavors next year: The gentleman from 
Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. 
Rice, the gentlewoman from Florida, Mrs. Demings, the gentleman 
from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski, the gentlewoman from Virginia, 
Mrs. Luria, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Meijer, and the 
gentlewoman from Texas, Mrs. Flores. Your contributions to the 
committee's work this Congress and throughout your tenure are 
recognized and appreciated.
    Again, I thank the witnesses for being here and I look 
forward to the hearing.
    With that, I recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman 
from New York, Mr. Katko, for an opening statement.
    [The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
                           November 15, 2022
    Today, the committee is holding its annual hearing to examine 
world-wide threats to the homeland. We are pleased to have Secretary of 
Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, FBI Director Christopher Wray, 
and NCTC Director Christine Abizaid before the committee once again.
    Two years ago, the committee convened its world-wide threats 
hearing during some of the darkest days of the pandemic. Last year, 
this panel testified before the committee in the immediate aftermath of 
the attack on the U.S. Capitol. No matter the circumstances, the 
committee and the American people have benefited from the witnesses' 
frank assessment of the threats facing the homeland, both foreign and 
domestic.
    More than 20 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001--and 20 years this month since the Department of Homeland Security 
was established in law--we recognize the witnesses, their predecessors, 
and men and women of their agencies for their tireless efforts to 
prevent another 9/11-style attack. That said, we know that the threat 
posed by foreign terrorist organizations has not gone away. It has 
evolved and persisted, just as our efforts to combat it have. At the 
same time, domestic violent extremists now pose the greatest threat to 
our homeland.
    The Biden administration has put new focus on combatting this 
rising threat, issuing the first-ever National Strategy for Countering 
Domestic Terrorism, establishing a domestic terrorism analytic branch 
within DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and designating 
domestic violent extremism as a ``National Priority Area'' for homeland 
security grants. More work remains, as extremists are increasingly 
willing to engage in targeted violence, whether at a synagogue in 
Pittsburgh, a Walmart in El Paso, or a supermarket in Buffalo. I hope 
to speak to our witnesses today about their assessment of the current 
threat from terrorism and targeted violence and what their agencies are 
doing to protect the homeland.
    Beyond terrorism, I remain concerned about cyber threats, 
particularly from Russia, China, and Iran. In response to these 
threats, the Biden administration has raised our cybersecurity posture 
by issuing an Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cyber Security, 
leading global efforts to confront ransomware threats, and launching a 
ground-breaking public-private collaboration to help secure industrial 
control systems. I want to hear from our witnesses about how they 
assess the current threat to cyber and critical infrastructure, what 
progress we have made, and what more we can do.
    Meanwhile, other homeland security challenges remain, like 
preparing for natural disasters, dealing with climate change, 
responding to the pandemic, securing our skies and waterways, 
addressing the increased number of migrants arriving at our borders, 
and protecting our very democracy and its institutions. Our discussion 
will undoubtedly touch on many of these issues today, and I look 
forward to a robust but respectful dialog.
    As the 117th Congress draws to a close, I also want to take a 
moment to reflect on the committee's work over the last 2 years, 
because together we have accomplished a great deal. Today marks our 
25th full committee hearing this Congress, and our subcommittees have 
held more than 50 hearings--conducting oversight of some of the most 
pressing homeland security issues facing our Nation.
    We enacted critical legislation--particularly in the area of 
cybersecurity--creating a mandatory cyber incident reporting framework, 
providing cybersecurity grants to State and local governments, and 
improving the Federal Government's visibility into malicious activity 
on industrial control systems. Historically, much of this committee's 
best work and many of its greatest successes have been the result of 
strong bipartisan effort. That has certainly been true this Congress 
with the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko, as Ranking Member.
    Early in his time on this committee, Ranking Member Katko became a 
leader and innovator on aviation security, and more recently, he has 
made his mark on the Committee's cybersecurity work. Perhaps most 
importantly, he was a true partner on efforts to stand up a commission 
to examine the January 6th Attack on the Capitol, putting country 
before politics. The Ranking Member and I did not always agree, but we 
agreed when we could. When we disagreed, we tried not to be 
disagreeable about it. As he departs Congress, I want to thank him for 
his important work over the years on this committee and, on a personal 
note, for his friendship. I wish him the very best in the new year and 
beyond.
    Likewise, I want to extend my thanks to all Members for their work 
in the 117th Congress, and especially those who are moving on to other 
endeavors next year: The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin; the 
gentlewoman from New York, Miss Rice; the gentlewoman from Florida, 
Mrs. Demings; the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski; the 
gentlewoman from Virginia, Mrs. Luria; the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. 
Meijer; and the gentlewoman from Texas, Mrs. Flores. Your contributions 
to the committee's work this Congress and throughout your tenure are 
recognized and appreciated.

    Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that the 
committee is holding this important hearing. I think it is 
vitally important to look at these issues on a routine basis 
and we have always done that as our Nation faces these growing 
and continuous changing threats posed by foreign adversaries, 
criminal and terror organizations, and the crisis at the 
Southwest Border, to name a few.
    In the first 2 years of the Biden administration, we have 
seen a disturbing trend become a catastrophic humanitarian 
crisis at the border. In 2020, CBP had 500,000 migrant 
encounters at the Southwest Border. In 2021, the first year of 
the Biden administration, in pull magnets they created, these 
migrants encounters have tripled to well over 1.7 million. In 
the last fiscal year, Customs and Border Protection reported a 
record-breaking 2.3 million migrant encounters. Mr. Wray, I 
know you at FBI, that has got to be a concern for you.
    While the vast majority of these migrants may be coming to 
find work or more prosperous opportunities, we cannot ignore 
the evident security threat that looms beneath the surface of 
that crisis.
    CBP reported over 29,000 illegal immigrants who have known 
criminal records and 751 documented gang members, including the 
312 affiliated with the notorious MS-13 gang, among those 
accounted at the Southwest Border. Those are the ones we know 
about, not the ones we don't.
    Even more troubling is that these numbers only account for 
those that were located by law enforcement, not the 600,000 
that are estimated to have evaded officers at the border in 
2022 alone. How many dangerous criminals and gang members 
entered undetected? How many were smuggling deadly drugs, like 
fentanyl, into our communities? The truth is we have no way of 
knowing, but these reports demonstrate it is almost certainly 
an elevated and fast-growing number.
    In addition, a still darker threat lies within the data, in 
something that is central to our mission here at Homeland 
Security. In 2020 CBP located 3 individuals--3--who were on the 
terrorist screening data set or watch list attempting to enter 
the United States along the Southwest Border points of entry. 
These were deemed to be a potential threat to our homeland, 
including known or suspected terrorists or their affiliates. In 
2021 the number grew to 15. In the last reported year, 98 
potential terrorists or affiliates were discovered between our 
ports of entry attempting to evade law enforcement and enter 
the country. Again, that is just the ones we know about.
    Sadly, the increased risk to our Nation's security is not 
the only consequence of this crisis. The migrants attempting 
passage are also experiencing brutal conditions that I saw 
first-hand, including child exploitation, rape, and death. The 
U.N. International Organization for Migration has labeled the 
Southwest Border as ``the deadliest land crossing in the 
world'' and migrant deaths from 2022 are reported to be over 
850, breaking the grim record for deaths set just last year.
    There are counties in Texas and in Arizona and California 
where they have had to cut their budgets to deal with the 
number of dead bodies they encounter on the border. I don't 
understand that.
    We are reminded of these tragedies almost daily with 
reports of families drowning in the Rio Grande River or dying 
of heat exhaustion crossing the inhospitable desert, often 
abandoned by smugglers who care only about profits.
    I would like to recognize the brave men and women who stand 
guard at our Nation's borders constantly under siege by drug 
cartels, human smugglers, and this ever-increasing humanitarian 
crisis. These honorable brave Americans work day and night, 
holidays and weekends, in some of the most unforgiving 
environments. I know, Secretary Mayorkas, you know that for 
sure. They routinely face danger and even death, all while 
being villainized by some for fulfilling their duties to 
protect our homeland from those that wish us harm. In this 
difficult position, it is truly tragic but unsurprising that 
many of them bear scars, both mental and physical, from the 
burden that they shoulder. My heart goes out to the families of 
the heroic men and women that have given all protecting our 
country, as well as those that suffer the mental toll of 
prolonged exposure to this crisis, including the alarming rise 
in the number of suicides amongst the agents who are 
despondent.
    Another threat to our country illuminated by the Inspector 
General last year was a vetting shortfall experienced during 
the evacuation and resettlement of more than 79,000 Afghans as 
part of Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome. 
It has now become even ever clearer that the Biden 
administration facilitated the transfer and relocation in the 
United States of many Afghans that were known at the time to 
have potentially significant security concerns. Both Homeland 
Security and the Department of Defense IGs found that 
information used to vet evacuees was not complete, reliable, or 
always accurate. We understand it was a fire drill, we 
understand we had to protect those who helped us, but we have 
to do better with vetting refugees. I am a very strong 
supporter of having refugees coming into our country because I 
think they are properly vetted by and large.
    We must also not lose sight of the challenges to our 
virtual borders. State-sponsored cyber actors continue to 
utilize a cyber environment to penetrate computer networks for 
espionage, suppression campaigns, the spread of disinformation, 
and to steal intellectual property and technology, to bolster 
their own defenses at the expense of industry, government, and 
everyday Americans. We must remain vigilant to the efforts of 
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, to name a few, who seek 
advantage in tactical capabilities in the virtual environment 
that bring risk to our security.
    In addition to state-sponsored adversaries, organized 
criminal cyber thieves devise formidable attacks and fraud 
schemes. Ransomware attacks were up 188 percent in 2021, 
costing businesses an estimated $1.2 billion and were focused 
on schools and health care organizations primarily, including 
many in my district.
    I look forward to the collective insight of our witnesses 
today on how we can further address the most prevalent and 
concerning cyber threats impacting both our communities and 
National security.
    Additionally, along with many Americans, I am sad to say 
that I am very concerned about reporting that an FBI agent, 
Timothy Thibault--if I said that correctly--may have depressed 
derogatory information relevant to on-going investigations 
relating to Hunter Biden. He has a long history of partisanship 
and he was quickly--left the agency when these allegations came 
to light. As a career law enforcement professional, I know I 
found these revelations to be deeply troubling, as did many 
others in law enforcement.
    Similarly, Mr. Wray, you have publicly acknowledged, and I 
applaud you for that, that you were troubled by the allegations 
at a recent Senate Judiciary hearing. While today's hearing is 
focused primarily on threats to the homeland security, I have 
to say I am concerned about the overall state of the Bureau and 
increasingly partisan perception, right or wrong, of the 
Bureau. I say that from someone, who for 20 years worked day 
and night on the highest and most violent and dangerous 
criminals in the world as a Federal organized crime prosecutor 
in El Paso, Texas and San Juan, Puerto Rico and up-State New 
York. Every time I had FBI agents by my side, they did the best 
wire taps, they did the best organized crime cases, they were 
by far what I considered to be the A Team when you did those 
major cases. I know those agents, because they are still 
friends of mine, are heartbroken by the perception of the FBI 
today. I hope in the days and years going forward that you can 
turn that ship around because our Nation deserves it. When our 
Nation loses faith in law enforcement, that is a terrible 
thing. You are the premier law enforcement agency and I hope 
you can turn this ship around.
    Mr. Chairman, as you alluded to, this is in all likelihood 
my last full committee with this hearing. Of all the decisions 
I have had to make about whether to retire or not, this was the 
toughest one by far because I have had more joy and more 
satisfaction with this agency because it was like a bastion of 
bipartisanship. We don't conduct a lot of the antics and the 
cheap theatrics a lot of the other committees do. We get our 
job done because we care about this Nation, whether a 
Republican or a Democrat, and we love our Nation and we want to 
keep it safe. I commend you for the time that you have been 
Chairman and the way you have conducted yourself and the way we 
have become friends and the way we have been able to keep our 
eyes focused on the mission despite all of the partisan rancor 
that seems to be higher than ever these days.
    So good for you for what you have done for this committee 
and good for all of you Members here who have put your 
partisanship aside when we come in this room and do what is 
right for this country. That to me is a very important thing.
    We may often disagree, and sometimes even strongly, Mr. 
Chairman, but I believe this committee has demonstrated our 
passion for securing the country's bipartisan steadfast.
    I want to thank my committee staff who has spent countless 
hours developing oversight legislation and policy to secure the 
United States from all manner of threats. I am incredibly 
grateful for their service and dedication to the mission. Many 
of them are with me here today. I am not going to single them 
all out, but there is one I will single out. This person has 
been with me from the beginning, is now my staff director. The 
entire 8 years I have been in Congress I have worked with him 
side by side on homeland security matters, and that is Kyle 
Klein who is right behind me. I want to say thank you to him. 
He has been a true professional. He is a bipartisan person. He 
cares about this country and loves this country and wants to 
keep it safe. So, Kyle, thank you very much and I just want to 
say thank you to you.
    With that happy note, I yield back.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
                 Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased that the committee is holding 
this important hearing today, as our Nation faces growing and 
continuously-changing threats posed by foreign adversaries, criminal 
and terror organizations, and the crisis at the Southwest Border.
    In the first 2 years of the Biden administration, we have seen a 
disturbing trend become a catastrophic humanitarian crisis at the 
border. In 2020, CBP had 500,000 migrant encounters at the Southwest 
Border. In 2021, the first year of the Biden administration, these 
migrant encounters tripled to well over 1.7 million, and in this last 
fiscal year, CBP reported a record-breaking 2.3 million migrants 
encounters.
    While the vast majority of these migrants may be coming to find 
work or more prosperous opportunities, we cannot ignore the evident 
security threat that looms beneath the surface of this crisis. CBP 
reported over 29,000 illegal migrants who had known criminal records 
and 751 documented gang members, including 312 affiliated with the 
notorious MS-13 gang, were among those encountered at our Southwest 
Border.
    Even more troubling is that these numbers only account for those 
that were located by law enforcement, not the 600,000 that are 
estimated to have evaded officers at the border in 2022. How many 
dangerous criminals and gang members entered undetected? How many were 
smuggling deadly drugs like Fentanyl into our communities? The truth is 
we have no way of knowing, but these reports demonstrate it is almost 
certainly an elevated and fast-growing number.
    In addition, a still darker threat lies within the data. In 2020 
CBP located three individuals who were on the Terrorist Screening 
Dataset or ``watch list'' attempting to enter the United States along 
the Southwest Border between ports of entry. These were people deemed 
to be a potential threat to our homeland, including Known or Suspected 
Terrorists or their affiliates. In 2021, the number grew to 15. In the 
latest reporting for 2022, 98 potential terrorists or affiliates were 
discovered between our ports of entry in attempting to evade law 
enforcement and enter the country.
    Sadly, the increased risk to our Nation's security is not the only 
consequence of this crisis, the migrants attempting passage are also 
experiencing brutal conditions including child exploitation, rape, and 
death. The U.N. International Organization for Migration has labeled 
the Southwest Border as the ``deadliest land crossing in the world'' 
and migrant deaths for 2022 are reported to be over 850, breaking the 
grim record for deaths set just last year. We are reminded of these 
tragedies almost daily with reports of families drowning in the Rio 
Grande River or dying of heat exhaustion crossing the inhospitable 
desert, often abandoned by smugglers who care only about profits.
    I would like to recognize the brave men and women who stand guard 
at our Nation's borders, constantly under siege by drug cartels, human 
smugglers, and this ever-increasing humanitarian crisis. These 
honorable Americans work day and night, holidays and weekends, in some 
of the most unforgiving environments. They routinely face danger and 
even death, all while being villainized by some for fulfilling their 
duties to protect our homeland from those that wish us harm. In this 
difficult position, it is tragic but unsurprising, that many of them 
bear scars both mental and physical from the burden that they shoulder. 
My heart goes out to the families of the heroic men and women that 
given all protecting our country as well as to those that suffer the 
mental toll of prolonged exposure to this crisis.
    Another threat to our country, illuminated by Inspector General 
reporting this year, was the vetting shortfall experienced during the 
evacuation and resettlement of more than 79,000 Afghans as part of 
Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome. It is now 
becoming ever clearer that the Biden administration facilitated the 
transfer and relocation into the United States of many Afghans that 
were known at the time to have potentially significant security 
concerns. Both the DHS and DoD IGs found that information used to vet 
evacuees was not complete, reliable, or always accurate.
    We must also not lose sight of the challenges to our virtual 
borders. State-sponsored cyber actors continue to utilize the cyber 
environment to penetrate computer networks for espionage, suppression 
campaigns, the spread of disinformation, and to steal intellectual 
property and technology to bolster their own defenses at the expense of 
industry, Government, and everyday Americans. We must remain vigilant 
to the efforts of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, who seek 
advantage and tactical capabilities in the virtual environment that 
bring risk to our security.
    In addition to state-sponsored adversaries, organized criminal 
cyber thieves devise formidable attacks and fraud schemes. Ransomware 
attacks were up 188 percent in 2021 costing U.S. businesses over $1.2 
billion dollars and were focused on schools and health care 
organizations. I look forward to the collective insight of our 
witnesses today on how we can further address the most prevalent and 
concerning cyber threats impacting both our communities and national 
security.
    Additionally, along with many Americans, I am concerned by 
reporting that an FBI agent, Timothy Thibalt, may have suppressed 
derogatory information relevant to on-going investigations related to 
Hunter Biden, and has a long history of partisanship. As a career law 
enforcement professional, I know I found these revelations to be deeply 
troubling, as did many others in law enforcement. Similarly, you have 
publicly acknowledged that you were troubled by the allegations at a 
recent Senate Judiciary hearing. Director Wray, while today's hearing 
is focused primarily on threats to homeland security, I have to I am 
concerned about the overall state of the Bureau and the increasingly 
partisan perception of the agency.
    Mr. Chairman, in all likelihood, this will be the last full 
committee hearing of the Congress and, for me, as Ranking Member. 
Serving alongside you and all of our colleagues has been the honor of 
my career, and I am forever grateful to the service and dedication to 
our national security by you and Members of this committee on both 
sides of the aisle. While we may often disagree--even strongly 
disagree--I believe this committee has demonstrated that our passion 
for securing the country is bipartisan and steadfast. I also want to 
thank my committee staff, who have spent countless hours developing 
oversight, legislation, and policy to secure the United States from all 
manner of threats. I'm incredibly grateful for their service and 
dedication to the mission.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman yields back. Honestly, I 
already expressed my thoughts on your leadership as well as the 
Members who will be departing, and thank you much.
    Mr. Katko. We are on the same page.
    Chairman Thompson. Other Members of the committee are 
reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be 
submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]
               Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
                           November 14, 2022
    Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Katko, for 
convening this hearing and affording us, the Homeland Security 
Committee, the opportunity to hear testimony on ``Worldwide Threats to 
the Homeland.''
    I welcome today's witnesses and look forward to their testimony:
   The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department 
        of Homeland Security;
   The Honorable Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau 
        of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice; and
   The Honorable Christine Abizaid, Director, National 
        Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence.
    This hearing is the committee's annual opportunity to examine 
threats to the U.S. homeland, both foreign and domestic, with leaders 
of the Department of the Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
    The committee is holding this hearing not only to examine existing 
and emerging homeland threats, but also to reflect on the progress that 
has been made to secure the homeland over the last two decades and 
assess challenges that remain.
    No matter what other challenges might emerge, we must never forget 
that one of our Nation's greatest threats comes from our struggle 
against violent extremism that began on September 11, 2001 and has 
extended to violent extremists living among us who use political 
affiliation as a justification for acts of terror.
    These risks to our homeland have been compounded in recent years by 
the agitation and incitement of domestic extremists who in many cases 
have resorted to violence to manifest their delusional ideologies.
    September 11, 2001, remains a tragedy that defines our Nation's 
history, but the final chapter will be written by those who are charged 
with keeping our Nation and its people safe while preserving the way of 
life that terrorists sought to change.
    Today, the loved ones of the victims continue to grieve over the 
deaths of so many of our fellow citizens who were their fathers, 
mothers, grandparents, children, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, cousins, 
co-workers, friends, and neighbors.
    Initially after September 11, 2001, it was a priority of our Nation 
to prevent terrorists who would do Americans harm from boarding flights 
that could lead to another 9/11 catastrophe. The Transportation 
Security Administration, or TSA, was created in that era for that 
purpose, and has been indispensable ever since.
    Over the 20 years since enactment of the Homeland Security Act, the 
mission of the Department of Homeland Security has expanded to include 
cyber defense of civilian, governmental, and private-sector networks; 
protecting critical infrastructure in the form of the Nation's electric 
grid, water delivery systems, transportation networks and Federal 
election systems; and, most recently managing and protecting assets, 
operations, and personnel during the COVID-19 pandemic.
    The committee's annual hearings on Worldwide Threats to Homeland 
Security have covered a range of topics from activities of foreign 
terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIS, to home-grown violent 
extremism perpetrated by lone wolves and white supremicists.
    Today's government witnesses will provide insight into terrorism 
threats and how the Federal Government is addressing those threats to 
protect the homeland.
    The nearly 3,000 people who died on September 11, 2001 who were the 
initial driving force of our committee will always be central to our 
focus and actions, so as to prevent another attack on United States 
soil.
    This hearing provides Members of the committee with the opportunity 
to reflect on the past, and to take a hard look at the present day, to 
acknowledge the real threats we face from domestic terrorism.
    My primary domestic security concerns are how to protect the Nation 
by:
   preventing foreign fighters and foreign-trained fighters 
        from entering the United States undetected;
   countering domestic and home-grown violent extremism;
   preserving Constitutional rights and due process for all 
        persons;
   addressing the uncontrolled proliferation of assault 
        weapons;
   sensible gun legislation to prevent mass shootings;
   protecting critical infrastructure from physical and cyber 
        attack;
   creating equity and fairness in our Nation's immigration 
        policies; and
   strengthening the capacity of the Department of Homeland 
        Security and the Department of Justice to meet the challenges 
        posed by weapons of mass destruction.
    The list of 2022 threats to the homeland is further expanded to 
include:
   emerging threats of viral pandemics;
   rapid onset of the effects of climate change;
   political violence fueled by misinformation and 
        disinformation;
   the rise of extremist right-wing militia groups like QAnon 
        and Boogaloo--that act on misinformation, disinformation, and 
        conspiracy theories; and
   efforts by terrorist groups to reemerge or reorganize 
        following our Nation's efforts in battling ISIS and al-Qaeda.
                         emerging viral threats
    As you recall, Chairman Thompson, on March 11, 2020, the World 
Health Organization declared that COVID-19 was a pandemic, which had by 
that date reached at least 114 countries, sickening over 100,000 
people, and killing more than 4,000 people.
    We have traveled a long road since that time, developing vaccines, 
treatments, and strategies to stop the spread of the virus. Tragically, 
prior to the innovation and implementation of remedial measures, the 
coronavirus claimed over 1 million American lives and over 6 million 
lives globally.
    Today, over 220 million Americans, or 68 percent of the U.S. 
population, are considered fully vaccinated, enabling life to return to 
close to normal pre-pandemic conditions. This success has proven that, 
by working together, we can protect ourselves from viral threats.
    However, we cannot let our guard down.
    We must continue to present the public with opportunities--and 
encourage them--to take the booster vaccines and to urge people with 
co-morbidities to continue to wear masks and to use social distance.
    We must implement the lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic 
and put them into action to prevent future epidemics.
    There are other viral threats like monkeypox, that if left 
unchecked, threaten to become the next pandemic.
    In addition to monkeypox, this year's flu season is expected to be 
one of the worst on record because people are coming out of quarantine 
without getting a flu shot.
    We must continue to develop vaccines and treatments, and work 
together to stop the spread of these and other diseases.
    It's important that we also remain vigilant against emerging viral 
threats.
threats to democracy: paramilitary groups, threats and acts of violence
    There is no question that threats to democracy in the United States 
continue to grow.
    Since the 2016 Presidential election, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the number of conspiracy theories circulating on-line. Many 
of these theories have been promulgated by groups like QAnon that prey 
on the uninformed, trade in fabrications, and are fueled by paranoia.
    In 2019, the FBI issued an Intelligence Bulletin that designated 
QAnon as a ``domestic terror threat'' because of its potential to 
incite extremist violence.
    On January 6, 2021, a violent mob of rioters stormed the U.S. 
Capitol in an attempt to overturn the results of the 2020 Presidential 
election. In the midst of the chaos, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was 
targeted by the mob. They broke into her office, vandalized it, and 
defiled the Capitol.
    In the past few weeks, Paul Pelosi, the husband of Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi, was violently attacked by an assailant who stated that he 
viewed Speaker Pelosi as '``leader of the pack of lies told by the 
Democratic Party'' and that he wanted ``to use Nancy to lure another 
individual''.
    This violence and the threats of violence against elected officials 
and their families are a heinous attempt to hold democracy hostage.
    Violence is intended to suppress participation in the democratic 
process, but we can never allow it to negate the voice of the people.
    In recent years, there have been a number of paramilitary groups 
have been stockpiling weapons and preparing for violence.
    The New York Times reports that of the more than 440 extremism-
related murders committed in the past decade, more than 75 percent were 
committed by right-wing extremists, white supremacists, or anti-
Government extremists.
    The threats against Members of Congress are more than 10 times as 
numerous as they were just 5 years ago.
    These incidents are a stark reminder that conspiracy theories can 
have very real and--very dangerous consequences. If left unchecked, 
they could pose a serious threat to democracy in the United States.
    Other brands of ideological extremism are being proliferated by 
groups that call themselves Oath Keepers, the Proud Boys, the Boogaloo 
Bois, the Three Percenters, the Wolverine Watchmen.
    Some of these groups equate themselves. to militias, reminiscent of 
the Ku Klux Klan that used diabolical deceit and self-glorification to 
terrorize Black Americans and others to achieve oppressive ends.
 geopolitical threats: russia's war against ukraine, competition from 
                           china, cyber hacks
    Not only must we remain cognizant of domestic threats, we must also 
recognize that several geopolitical threats are urgent.
    In particular, peer competition from China and the Russian war with 
Ukraine pose serious challenges to our security.
    Russia increasingly shows its unwillingness to accept global norms, 
not only militarily but also by its cyber intrusions. Russia is well-
known to have repeatedly interfered with elections and democratic 
processes in many countries, perhaps most obviously by their cyber hack 
of the Democratic National Committee.
    This attack not only exposed sensitive information, but it also 
undermined public trust in our Government and elections.
    China has been especially notorious for its cyber hacking of 
corporate America, and stealing trade secrets with which it reverse-
engineers our products and leverages an unfair economic edge in global 
trade.
    Both countries have sophisticated cyber hacking capabilities.
    Once in our systems, Russian and China can remain in the systems 
for years expanding their access and going undetected.
    We must be vigilant in defending our homeland against these 
threats.
    We must continue to invest in our cybersecurity infrastructure.
       global climate change: winter storm uri and infrastructure
    Global climate change continues to cause extreme weather events 
that highlight the urgent need for action.
    ``Winter Storm Uri'' is a stark reminder of the devastation that 
extreme weather can cause. Not only did the storm lead to wide-spread 
power outages and water shortages, it also caused billions of dollars 
in damage to infrastructure.
    Winter Storm Uri was one of the most severe winter storms to hit 
Texas in recent memory. From February 13-17, 2021, the storm caused 
wide-spread damage and power outages across the State. In some areas, 
temperatures dropped below freezing for extended periods of time, 
causing pipes to freeze and burst.
    I have seen first-hand, and hear from my constituents, the 
devastating effects caused by flooding from major hurricanes, and their 
destruction of whole homes and neighborhoods, as inflicted by Hurricane 
Harvey.
    While the physical and economic damage caused by Hurricane Harvey 
was staggering, nearly the emotional toll of the storm was equally 
severe. Many people are still struggling to cope with the loss of loved 
ones and homes.
    We must invest in more resilient infrastructure and develop smarter 
strategies to confront climate change, which intensifies each of the 
natural disasters that occur. Only by taking these steps can we hope to 
minimize the damage caused by future storms.
                   battle to defeat isis and al-qaeda
    We must never forget this committee's origins: September 11, when 
2,977 men, women, and children were murdered by 19 hijackers. Those of 
us serving in Congress then did not know if there was another plane 
heading our way.
    Yet, in the true spirit of Americans, we stood on the East Front 
steps of the Capitol later that day--150 Members of Congress--singing, 
with unity and purpose, ``God Bless America.''
    The American people needed to know that their Government was still 
here ready to serve and protect them from harm.
    We did not have a President of the United States dividing Americans 
and pitting us against each other with wild conspiracies or aggravating 
old wounds based upon race, ethnicity, or religion.
    We needed unity and we received it. It made us stronger together.
    Over the past two decades, we have learned a great deal . . . and 
have also forgotten much of what we, as a Nation, learned. The United 
States is stronger when unified, and this committee's mandate includes 
rooting out the forces that divide us.
    Those who wish to do us harm can come from any race, religion, 
ethnicity, or political persuasion.
    We are better when we are one nation prepared to face these 
challenges against a common foe.
    That sense of unity has been under assault by forces within and 
outside of the country.
    I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses and the 
question and answer opportunity that will follow.
    Thank you. I yield back the remainder of my time.

    Chairman Thompson. Members are also reminded that the 
committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by 
the Chairman and Ranking Member in our February 3, 2021 
colloquy regarding remote procedures.
    I welcome our panel of witnesses.
    Our first witness is Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of 
Homeland Security. Our next witness will be Christopher Wray, 
director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Our third and 
final witness will be Christine Abiziad, director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center.
    Without objection, the witnesses' full statement will be 
included in the record.
    I now ask Secretary Mayorkas to summarize his statement for 
5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY

    Secretary Mayorkas. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member 
Katko, distinguished Members of this committee, thank you for 
inviting me to join you today.
    Next week marks the 20th anniversary of the Homeland 
Security Act being signed into law. This Act brought together 
many components of the Federal Government to safeguard the 
United States against foreign terrorism in the wake of the 
devastation wrought on September 11, 2001. It remains the 
largest reorganization of the Federal Government's national 
security establishment since 1947. It is a testament to the 
great threat we faced as a Nation from terrorism brought to our 
shores by foreign actors and foreign terrorist organizations.
    Congress created a department that has significantly 
reduced the foreign terrorism threat posed to the homeland.
    Chairman Thompson. Mr. Secretary, will you pull your mic a 
little closer to you?
    Secretary Mayorkas. How is that?
    Chairman Thompson. Well--all right. Let us hear how that 
goes.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congress created a department that has 
significantly reduced the risk foreign terrorism poses to the 
homeland by increasing our capacity to prepare for and respond 
to those events.
    Foreign terrorist organizations remain committed to 
attacking the United States from within and beyond our borders. 
They use social media platforms to amplify messaging intended 
to inspire attacks in the homeland. They have adapted to 
changing security environments, seeking new and innovative ways 
to target the United States. The evolving terrorism threat to 
the homeland now includes lone actors fueled by a wide range of 
violent extremist ideologies and grievances, including domestic 
violent extremists, U.S.-based individuals who seek to further 
political or social goals wholly or in part through violence, 
without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group 
or foreign power.
    From cyber attacks on our critical infrastructure to 
increasing destabilizing efforts by hostile nation-states, the 
threats facing the homeland have never been greater or more 
complex. Flouting internationally-accepted norms of responsible 
behavior in cyber space, our adversaries, hostile nations and 
non nation-state cyber criminals, continue to advance in 
capability and sophistication. Their methods vary, but their 
goals of doing harm are the same. Hostile nations like Russia, 
the People's Republic of China, Iran, and North Korea, and 
cyber criminals around the world, continue to sharpen their 
tactics and create more adverse consequences. Their ransomware 
attacks target our financial institutions, hospitals, 
pipelines, electric grids, and water treatment plants 
attempting to wreak havoc on our daily lives. They exploit the 
integrated global cyber ecosystem to sow discord, undermine 
democracy, and erode trust in our institutions, public and 
private.
    These cyber operations threaten the economic and national 
security of every American and many others around the world. In 
particular, China is using its technology to tilt the global 
playing field to its benefit. They leverage sophisticated cyber 
capabilities to gain access to the intellectual property, data, 
and infrastructure of American individuals and businesses. 
Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine intensified the risk of 
a cyber attack impacting our critical infrastructure earlier 
this year. Nation-state aggression is creating a heightened 
risk of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related 
threats to Americans as well.
    While fast-emerging technologies, like unmanned aerial 
systems, artificial intelligence, internet communications, and 
cryptocurrencies are helping societies be more productive, 
creative, and entrepreneurial, they also are introducing new 
risks. Transnational criminal organizations are deploying these 
technologies to commit a wide array of crimes as they continue 
to grow in size, scale, sophistication, and lethality.
    With respect to unmanned aerial systems in particular, it 
is vital that Congress act before the end of this year to 
extend our C-UAS authorities in order to protect the American 
people from malicious drone activity.
    The risk of targeted violence perpetrated by actors abroad 
and at home is substantial. Emerging technology platforms allow 
individuals and nation-states to fan the flames of hate and 
personal grievances to large audiences and are encouraging 
people to commit violent acts. Those driven to violence are 
targeting critical infrastructure, soft targets, faith-based 
institutions, institutions of higher education, racial and 
religious minorities, government facilities and personnel, 
including law enforcement and the military and perceived 
ideological opponents.
    Addressing these threats requires a whole-of-society 
approach across Federal, State, and local governments, the 
private sector, nonprofits, academia, and most importantly, 
every citizen.
    Congress may not have predicted the extent of today's 
threat environment when our department was created 20 years 
ago, but our mission has never been more vital, our components 
have never collaborated more closely, our extraordinary work 
force has never been more capable, and our Nation has never 
been more prepared. We must harness the same deliberative and 
bipartisan spirit in which this department was created to 
combat the vast threats Americans face today.
    I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Majorkas follows:]
            Prepared Statement of Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
                           November 15, 2022
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and distinguished Members 
of this committee: Thank you for inviting me to join you today. Next 
week marks the 20th anniversary of the Homeland Security Act being 
signed into law, which brought together many components of the Federal 
Government in a determined National effort to safeguard the United 
States against foreign terrorism in the wake of the devastation wrought 
on September 11, 2001. It remains the largest reorganization of the 
Federal Government's National security establishment since 1947 and a 
testament to the grave threat we faced as a Nation from terrorism 
brought to our shores by foreign actors and foreign terrorist 
organizations.
    Thanks to extensive deliberation and cooperation from both sides of 
the aisle, Congress created a department that significantly reduced the 
risk foreign terrorism poses to the homeland by increasing our capacity 
to prepare for and respond to those events. However, foreign terrorism 
remains a persistent threat that DHS combats every day. Foreign 
terrorist organizations remain committed to attacking the United States 
from within and beyond our borders. They use social media platforms to 
amplify messaging intended to inspire attacks in the homeland and have 
adapted to changing security environments, seeking new and innovative 
ways to target the United States. Foreign terrorists will continue to 
expand their networks, cross international borders, raise funds, and 
organize to improve their ability to target the homeland.
    Rapidly emerging technologies, evolving cyber capabilities, and 
increasing economic and political instability around the world are 
contributing to a heightened threat environment at home. From cyber 
attacks on our critical infrastructure and increasing destabilizing 
efforts by hostile nation-states, to the rise of domestic violent 
extremism, the threats facing the homeland have never been greater or 
more complex.
    Flouting internationally-accepted norms of responsible behavior, 
transparency, and accountability in cyber space, our adversaries--
hostile nations and non-nation-state cyber criminals--continue to 
advance in capability and sophistication. Their methods vary, but their 
goals of doing harm are the same. Hostile nations like Russia, the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), Iran, North Korea, and cyber 
criminals around the world continue to sharpen their tactics and create 
more adverse consequences. Their ransomware attacks target our 
financial institutions, hospitals, pipelines, electric grids, and water 
treatment plants to wreak havoc on our daily lives. They exploit the 
integrated global cyber ecosystem to sow discord, undermine liberal 
democracy, and erode trust in our institutions, public and private. 
These cyber operations threaten the economic and National security of 
every American, and many others around the world.
    In particular, the PRC is using its technology to tilt the global 
playing field to its benefit. They leverage sophisticated cyber 
capabilities to gain access to the intellectual property, data, and 
infrastructure of American individuals and businesses. Russia's 
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine intensified the risk of a cyber attack, 
impacting our critical infrastructure earlier this year. Nation-state 
aggression is creating a heightened risk of chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear-related threats to Americans as well.
    Fast-emerging technologies like unmanned aerial systems, artificial 
intelligence, internet communications, and cryptocurrencies are helping 
societies be more productive, creative, and entrepreneurial. They also 
are introducing new risks. Transnational criminal organizations are 
deploying these technologies to commit a wide array of crimes as they 
continue to grow in size, scale, sophistication, and lethality.
    The risk of targeted violence, perpetrated by actors abroad and at 
home, is substantial. Emerging technology platforms allow individuals 
and nation-states to fan the flames of hate and personal grievances to 
large audiences and are encouraging people to commit violent acts. 
Those driven to violence are targeting critical infrastructure; soft 
targets such as sports venues, shopping malls, and other mass 
gatherings; faith-based institutions, such as churches, synagogues, and 
mosques; institutions of higher education; racial and religious 
minorities; Government facilities and personnel, including law 
enforcement and the military; and perceived ideological opponents.
    Addressing these threats requires a whole-of-society approach 
across Federal, State, and local governments, the private sector, 
nonprofits, academia, and--most importantly--every citizen. Congress 
may not have predicted the extent of today's threat environment when 
our Department was created 20 years ago, but our mission has never been 
more vital, our components have never collaborated more closely, and 
our Nation has never been more prepared. We must harness the same 
deliberative and bipartisan spirit in which this Department was created 
to combat the vast threats Americans face today.
               combating terrorism and targeted violence
Foreign Terrorism Threats
    Since the inception of this Department, the threat landscape has 
evolved dramatically, and DHS has remained vigilant against all 
terrorism-related threats to the homeland. In the years immediately 
following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Department focused on 
foreign terrorists located overseas who sought to harm us within our 
borders and threaten our interests abroad. This focus evolved to 
include home-grown violent extremists (HVEs): Individuals in America 
whose ideologically-motivated terrorist activities are primarily 
inspired by Foreign Terrorist Organization's (FTOs) political or social 
objectives.
    Our assessments indicate that FTOs will maintain a highly-visible 
presence on-line and prioritize messaging focused on inspiring HVEs to 
conduct attacks in the United States. Media branches of al-Qaeda and 
the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) have continued to 
celebrate perceived victories over the United States pointing to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on their anniversaries and the 
U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan to encourage the use of 
violence by their supporters. ISIS media and its supporters have also 
sought to revitalize ISIS's image as a global enterprise and to portray 
the group as the true vanguard of resistance against the United States 
and its allies. ISIS and its supporters continue to call for attacks in 
the United States, and supporters often share on-line tactics and 
techniques for reducing the likelihood of being detected by law 
enforcement.
    Some terrorist-associated individuals maintain a presence in the 
Western Hemisphere, and could be leveraged to support extremist 
activities, possibly involving the homeland. For example, al-Qaeda-
associated individuals in Brazil are involved in financial support 
through businesses they manage in the country, transferring funds in 
support of extremist-related activities, and involved in the printing 
and purchasing of counterfeit currencies in support of al-Qaeda's 
global efforts.
    We continue to see Iran and its partner, Lebanese Hezbollah, pose 
an enduring threat to the homeland, evidenced by Iran's public 
statements threatening retaliation in the United States for Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem 
Soleimani's death and historical arrests of IRGC and Hezbollah members 
plotting operations in the United States. In the past several years, 
U.S. law enforcement has arrested numerous individuals for spying on 
Iranian dissidents in the United States and for acting as agents of 
influence for the Iranian Government. In August, Federal prosecutors 
unsealed charges against an IRGC member for plotting to assassinate a 
former U.S. official. Given its capabilities, Iran could advance an 
attack plot targeted at the United States with little to no warning. 
DHS continues to work closely with other law enforcement agencies and 
the intelligence community to stay aware of on-going threat streams and 
take preventative actions as appropriate.
    DHS works closely with our law enforcement, National security, and 
intelligence community partners to improve our ability to identify 
individuals who pose a National security or public safety threat and 
who seek to travel to the United States or receive an immigration 
benefit. In fiscal year 2022, the National Vetting Center (NVC), 
managed by DHS, enhanced its ability to support vetting for DHS and 
Department of State. Through technology advancements, the NVC has 
increased efficiencies in vetting processes, improving our ability to 
identify potential threats. We continue to build partnerships with 
foreign governments, to include increasing our information sharing and 
vetting capabilities. DHS is increasing our ability to engage in 
biometric comparison with our foreign partners, and most recently 
amended requirements for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) to require 
participation in the Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP). Under 
EBSP, DHS will be able to conduct biometric checks against VWP member 
countries' biometric data to authenticate VWP travelers' identities to 
quickly receive immigration and criminal history information.
    As a key part of the interagency approach to countering these 
threats, DHS provides timely and accurate intelligence to the broadest 
audience at the lowest classification level possible. DHS will continue 
to leverage our deployed intelligence professionals to ensure the 
timely sharing of information and intelligence with our State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners, including the National Network 
of Fusion Centers, in accordance with applicable law and DHS privacy, 
civil rights, civil liberties, and intelligence oversight policies.
Domestic Violent Extremism and Targeted Violence
    The evolving terrorism threat to the homeland now also includes 
those fueled by a wide range of violent extremist ideologies and 
grievances, including domestic violent extremists (DVEs). DVEs are 
U.S.-based individuals who seek to further political or social goals 
wholly or in part through violence, without direction or inspiration 
from a foreign terrorist group or foreign power. These actors are 
motivated by various factors, including biases against racial and 
religious minorities, perceived Government overreach, conspiracy 
theories promoting violence, and false or misleading narratives often 
spread on-line. Today, these U.S.-based individuals, who are inspired 
by a broad range of violent ideologies, pose the most significant and 
persistent terrorism-related threat to the homeland.
    The intelligence community assesses that racially or ethnically 
motivated violent extremists (RMVEs), who advocate for the superiority 
of the white race, and militia violent extremists (MVEs), a component 
of the anti-Government/anti-authority violent extremism threat 
category, present the most lethal DVE threat in the homeland. In many 
cases, DVE actors have spent inordinate amounts of time on-line viewing 
extremist, violent materials and engaging with like-minded individuals. 
RMVEs are the DVE actors with the most persistent and concerning 
transnational connections, because individuals with similar ideological 
beliefs exist outside of the United States. These RMVEs communicate 
with and seek to influence each other. Such connectivity with overseas 
violent extremists might lead to a greater risk of U.S. RMVEs 
mobilizing to violence.
    A June 2022 DVE assessment \1\ by DHS, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
determined that the threat from DVEs is likely to persist for the 
coming months, with heightened tensions surrounding the 2022 elections, 
continued perceptions of Government overreach, and immigration-related 
developments or potential new legislation and court rulings; all 
presenting potential flashpoints that could serve to encourage or 
inspire acts of violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ DHS, NCTC, FBI, June 17, 2022 (U) Wide-Ranging Domestic Violent 
Extremism Threat to Persist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To prepare for this threat, the Department has embraced a 
community-based approach to prevent terrorism and targeted violence by 
building trust, partnerships, and collaboration across every level of 
government, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and the 
communities we serve, while respecting First Amendment protections. We 
focus on reducing the threat of violence. We must make it harder to 
carry out an attack and reduce the potential for loss of life by 
preventing mobilization to violence.
    DHS's Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) is at 
the forefront of the Federal Government's prevention efforts. 
Established in 2021, CP3 provides technical, financial, and educational 
assistance to help communities build local prevention capabilities. In 
addition to supporting State-level prevention strategies, CP3 supports 
local efforts to establish community support systems--bringing together 
mental health providers, educators, faith leaders, public health 
officials, social service providers, nonprofits, public safety 
officials, and others--to create programs that connect individuals with 
the help they need. CP3 relies on the expertise of DHS's Privacy and 
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties professionals to ensure all 
public-facing prevention resources, web content, and training materials 
are protective of Americans' privacy rights and civil rights and civil 
liberties.
    As part of this effort, DHS has invested more than $50 million over 
the past 3 years in communities across the United States, to help 
prevent acts of targeted violence and terrorism through the Targeted 
Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program. DHS recently 
announced 43 TVTP grant awards to entities in 20 States, totaling $20 
million, for fiscal year 2022. Managed by CP3 and the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), the TVTP Grant program provides funding for 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, nonprofits, 
and institutions of higher education, to establish or enhance 
capabilities to prevent targeted violence and terrorism. This year's 
awards fulfill the grant program's focus on prioritizing the prevention 
of domestic violent extremism, as well as efforts to counter 
mobilization to violence that occurs on-line, while respecting privacy, 
civil rights, and civil liberties.
    DHS provides security funding to support facility hardening and 
other operational and physical security enhancements for nonprofit 
organizations at risk of terrorist attacks through the Nonprofit 
Security Grant Program (NSGP). I am grateful that this critically 
important program has seen a funding increase this past fiscal year of 
$70 million from fiscal year 2021 levels, for a total of $250 million. 
The fiscal year 2023 President's Budget request proposes another 
increase to $360 million.
    These funds are in addition to the resources provided by DHS to our 
State and local partners through the Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP), in which DHS has designated ``Combating Domestic Violent 
Extremism'' as a ``National Priority Area'' for both fiscal year 2021 
and fiscal year 2022. This means that between fiscal year 2021 and 
fiscal year 2022, States and local governments across our Nation will 
spend over $111 million in grant funding on capabilities to detect and 
protect against these threats.
    Through the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000, Congress 
formally authorized the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to establish the 
National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) to conduct research, training, 
and consultation on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted 
violence. NTAC leads the field of targeted violence prevention by 
producing world-class research examining all forms of targeted 
violence, including domestic terrorism, mass-casualty attacks, and 
attacks against K-12 schools. NTAC's experts provide training and 
guidance for professionals from a wide range of agencies and 
institutions on establishing threat assessment frameworks and targeted 
violence prevention programs unique to their organization's missions 
and needs. In fiscal year 2022, NTAC delivered over 280 trainings and 
briefings to over 28,000 participants, including State and local law 
enforcement, government officials, educators, mental health 
professionals, faith-based leaders, and workplace security managers. 
The number of events and participants reached by NTAC in fiscal year 
2022 represent the highest totals in the Center's history.
    DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) works 
closely with public and private-sector partners to build security 
capacity to mitigate cyber and physical risks, including threats posed 
by terrorism and targeted violence. Through trainings, tools, 
exercises, and best practices, CISA supports organizations in enhancing 
security holistically and in countering the most prevalent threats, 
including active shooters. Protective Security Advisors--a cadre of 
more than 140 security subject-matter experts located across the 
country--provide direct and tangible support to facilities by 
conducting security assessments and advising on enhanced protective 
measures.
Gender-Based Violence
    Gender-based violence (GBV) is any harmful threat or act directed 
at an individual or group based on their actual or perceived biological 
sex, gender identity, gender expression, sexual orientation, or 
difference from social norms related to masculinity or femininity. 
Gender-based violence is rooted in structural gender inequalities and 
power imbalances. The DHS Council for Combatting Gender-Based Violence 
(CCGBV) works to identify and build consensus and best practices around 
combatting GBV, including initiatives focused on domestic violence, 
forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C), on-line 
abuse and harassment, and trafficking in persons. The work of the CCGBV 
comes at an inflection point for the health, safety, and well-being of 
women and girls, as the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated a pre-
existing ``shadow pandemic'' of gender-based violence, as well as 
economic, health, and caregiving crises that disproportionately 
impacted women and girls long before the pandemic struck.
    Women and girls are particularly vulnerable and may be specifically 
targeted for acts of gender-based violence (GBV) as a part of terrorist 
activities, requiring specific protection measures. This includes 
safeguarding women's human rights during disaster and crisis 
situations, displacement, and other scenarios, in order to counter the 
effects of extremist violence. The USSS's NTAC has also identified the 
specific threat posed by misogynistic extremism, men who identify 
themselves as involuntary celibates or ``incels'' and target women for 
violence.
                             cyber threats
    Our interconnectedness and the technology that enables it--the 
cyber ecosystem--exposes us to a dynamic and evolving threat 
environment, one that is not contained by borders or limited to 
centralized actors, one that impacts governments, the private sector, 
civil society, and every individual. As a result, cyber threats from 
foreign governments and transnational criminals remain among the most 
prominent threats facing our Nation. Hostile nations like Russia, the 
PRC, Iran, and North Korea, as well as cyber criminals around the 
world, continually grow more sophisticated and create more adverse 
consequences.
    Within the past 2 years, we have seen numerous cybersecurity 
incidents impacting organizations of all sizes and disrupting critical 
services, from the SolarWinds supply chain compromise to the wide-
spread exploitation of vulnerabilities found in Microsoft Exchange 
Servers. Further, ransomware incidents--like those affecting a major 
pipeline company, JBS Foods, Kaseya, and CommonSpirit hospital system--
continue to increase. As of February 2022, CISA, the FBI, and the 
National Security Agency observed incidents involving ransomware 
against 14 of the 16 U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, and victims 
in the first half of 2021 paid an estimated $590 million in ransoms, 
compared to $416 million over all of 2020. We continue to believe there 
is significant under-reporting of ransomware incidents.
    Russia will likely remain a significant threat to U.S. networks, 
data, and critical infrastructure as it refines and employs 
sophisticated cyber espionage, influence, and attack capabilities, 
particularly in response to international pressure following its 
invasion of Ukraine. Russia has previously targeted critical 
infrastructure in the United States and allied countries to hone--and 
in some cases demonstrate--its ability to inflict damage during a 
crisis. Last February, Russia conducted a cyber attack against 
commercial satellite communications, impacting families and businesses 
across Europe.
    The PRC poses a highly advanced cyber threat to the homeland. The 
PRC continues to leverage increasingly sophisticated, large-scale cyber 
espionage operations against a range of industries, organizations, and 
dissidents in the United States. The PRC uses cyber means to illicitly 
obtain U.S. intellectual property, personally identifiable information, 
and export-controlled information. The PRC launches cyber espionage 
operations against the United States via People's Liberation Army and 
Ministry of State Security cyber actors. PRC-backed hackers are among 
the most active groups targeting governments and critical 
infrastructure this year--including across Southeast Asia. They are the 
most active group targeting businesses around the globe. Just one PRC 
hacking group, known as APT41, has stolen intellectual property from at 
least 30 multinational companies in the pharmaceutical, energy, and 
manufacturing sectors, resulting in hundreds of billions of dollars of 
lost revenue.
    Iran has a robust cyber program that targets networks in nearly 
every sector, and conducts offensive cyber operations in the United 
States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and via other regional adversaries. 
Iranian cyber attacks recently caused severe harm to government 
networks in Albania, limiting access to essential services. These 
attacks include disruptive and destructive cyber attacks such as 
website defacements and data deletion. Iranian cyber espionage is a 
high-frequency, wide-spread threat, and Iran may choose to leverage its 
cyber access for disruptive or destructive attacks.
    In the last 2 years alone, North Korea has largely funded its 
weapons of mass destruction programs through cyber heists of 
cryptocurrencies and hard currencies totaling more than $1 billion.
    We assess that ransomware attacks targeting U.S. networks will 
increase in the near and long term because cyber criminals have 
developed effective business models to increase their financial gain, 
likelihood for success, and anonymity. In recent years, ransomware 
incidents have become increasingly prevalent among U.S. SLTT government 
entities, and critical infrastructure organizations, with ransom 
demands in 2020 exceeding $1.4 billion in the United States. The 
Healthcare and Public Health Sector was also a popular target for 
ransomware threat actors.
    The Department is committed to keeping Americans safe from the 
devastating effects of cyber crimes. Cyber criminals' primary 
motivation is financial gain and criminals show little regard for whom 
they target. DHS's investigative components, the USSS and Homeland 
Security Investigations (HSI), are dedicated to stopping criminal acts, 
identifying and arresting the criminals, and working to seize and 
return stolen funds to the victims. Cyber crimes are often 
transnational with the criminal actors, their infrastructure, and their 
victims, spread across the globe. The USSS and HSI partner with Federal 
and SLTT law enforcement and with international and foreign law 
enforcement in combating cyber crimes.
    It is the Department's responsibility to help protect our Nation's 
critical infrastructure from these attacks. The private sector, which 
owns and operates most of the Nation's critical infrastructure, plays a 
vital role in working with CISA to ensure that we are aware of new 
campaigns and intrusions. That awareness in turn helps CISA advise 
other potential victims--increasing the Nation's collective cyber 
defenses through our collaborative efforts.
    In March 2022, President Biden signed the Cyber Incident Reporting 
for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA) into law. CIRCIA marks 
an important milestone in improving America's cybersecurity. The 
information received from our private-sector partners' reports will 
enable CISA, along with other Federal agencies such as the FBI, to 
build a common understanding of how our adversaries are targeting U.S. 
networks and critical infrastructure. This information will fill 
critical information gaps and allow us to rapidly deploy resources and 
render assistance to victims suffering attacks, analyze incoming 
reporting across sectors to spot trends, and quickly share that 
information with network defenders to warn other potential victims. We 
are grateful to Congress for passing this historic bipartisan 
legislation, marking a critical step forward in the collective 
cybersecurity of our Nation.
Cyber Threat Mitigation and Resilience
    To respond to evolving cyber threats and increase our Nation's 
cybersecurity and resilience, DHS has taken several steps, including:
   In July 2021, with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other 
        Federal partners, DHS launched StopRansomware.gov--the first 
        whole-of-Government website that pools Federal resources to 
        combat ransomware and helps private and public organizations of 
        all sizes mitigate cyber risk and increase their resilience.
   In August 2021, CISA announced the creation of the Joint 
        Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) to develop and execute joint 
        cyber defense planning with partners at all levels of 
        government and the private sector, to prevent and reduce the 
        impacts of cyber intrusions, and to ensure a unified response 
        when they occur.
   In February 2022, DHS launched the Cyber Safety Review Board 
        (CSRB), a groundbreaking public-private partnership dedicated 
        to after-action review of significant cyber threats. The CSRB 
        published its first report this summer addressing the risk 
        posed by vulnerabilities in the widely-used ``Log4j'' open-
        source software library.
   In February 2022, recognizing the heightened risk of 
        malicious cyber activity related to the Russia-Ukraine 
        conflict, CISA launched a new campaign called ``Shields Up'' to 
        amplify free cybersecurity resources and guidance for how 
        organizations of every size and across every sector can 
        increase their cybersecurity preparedness.
   In accordance with CIRCIA, DHS established the Cyber 
        Incident Reporting Council (CIRC) this past summer. The CIRC, 
        which includes approximately 30 representatives from Sector 
        Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs) and independent regulators, 
        has convened several times to discuss opportunities to 
        coordinate, deconflict, and harmonize Federal cyber incident 
        reporting requirements, including those issued through 
        regulation. To facilitate this effort, DHS has inventoried all 
        Federal cyber incident reporting requirements and held one-on-
        one consultations with over 20 CIRC members.
   In September 2022, CISA and FBI launched the Joint 
        Ransomware Task Force (JRTF) to coordinate a whole-of-
        Government effort to combat the threat of ransomware. A major 
        objective of the JRTF is to coordinate efforts among Federal 
        agencies and private-sector and SLTT partners to improve our 
        Nation's response to ransomware incidents, including efforts to 
        increase our Nation's cyber resiliency.
   In September 2022, the Department announced the State and 
        Local Cybersecurity Grant Program (SLCGP) to help States, local 
        governments, rural areas, and territories address cybersecurity 
        risks and cybersecurity threats to information systems. In 
        fiscal year 2022, $183.5 million was made available under the 
        SLCGP, with varying funding amounts allocated over 4 years from 
        the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.
   In October 2022, the Department released the Cybersecurity 
        Performance Goals (CPGs), voluntary practices that outline the 
        highest-priority baseline measures businesses and critical 
        infrastructure owners of all sizes can take to protect 
        themselves against cyber threats. By clearly outlining 
        measurable goals based on easily understandable criteria such 
        as cost, complexity, and impact, the CPGs are designed to be 
        applicable to organizations of all sizes.
   The disruptive ransomware attack on a major pipeline company 
        in May 2021 revealed a continuing significant National security 
        risk with critical vulnerabilities in the transportation sector 
        that previous voluntary efforts did not sufficiently mitigate. 
        Since the attack in 2021, the Transportation Security 
        Administration (TSA) has issued security directives mandating 
        that surface transportation owners and operators implement 
        several critically important and urgently-needed cybersecurity 
        measures such as designating a cybersecurity coordinator, 
        reporting cybersecurity incidents, implementing a cybersecurity 
        response plan, completing a cybersecurity vulnerability 
        assessment, and identifying cybersecurity gaps. TSA recently 
        updated these directives to focus requirements on achieving 
        security outcomes, rather than on prescriptive measures. 
        Through security program amendments, TSA issued several similar 
        requirements to larger airports and air carriers, with 
        additional measures under consideration. DHS continues to 
        consider what additional directive action might be necessary to 
        address urgent cyber threats in transportation and other 
        critical infrastructure sectors and will continue to work 
        closely with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the 
        U.S. Department of Energy, and other Sector Risk Management 
        Agencies.
                      emerging technology threats
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Threats
    The rapid proliferation of drones and their expanded utilization by 
hobbyists, professionals, and threat actors have required DHS to shift 
its response efforts to mitigate smaller, more agile, and less 
attributable dangers across all its mission areas, while still 
supporting the lawful use of these advanced technologies within our 
Nation. Drones have conducted kinetic attacks with payloads of 
explosives or firearms, caused dangerous interference with manned 
aviation, disrupted airport operations (causing significant economic 
harm), disrupted and damaged critical infrastructure, and nearly every 
day, transnational organized criminal organizations (TCOs) use drones 
to convey illicit narcotics (including fentanyl) and contraband across 
U.S. borders and conduct hostile surveillance of law enforcement.
    Congress extended the law that provides DHS's current counter-UAS 
(C-UAS) authority through December 16, 2022, under the continuing 
resolution. Ensuring that the existing authority does not lapse, and 
the C-UAS activities currently being performed by DHS do not cease, are 
critically important to our missions protecting the President and Vice 
President, along the Southwest Border, securing sensitive Federal 
facilities, and safeguarding the public. DHS has successfully executed 
C-UAS operations at mass gatherings and Special Security Assessment 
Rating (SEAR) and National Special Security Events (NSSEs), including 
the 2022 World Series, the Super Bowl, the Indianapolis 500, the U.N. 
General Assembly, the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, 
and the State of the Union address. At all times, DHS engages in these 
activities in a manner that protects individuals' privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties consistent with the requirements of the 
current law and DHS policy.
    To ensure that the Department can continue its C-UAS activities, 
the administration has requested that Congress pass a 2-year, clean 
extension of existing C-UAS authorities in the NDAA or another 
legislative vehicle before these authorities expire. Any lapse in or 
narrowing of DHS's C-UAS authority would entail serious risks for 
homeland security, as DHS would have to cease or curtail existing C-UAS 
operations that protect the homeland, including at the Southern Border 
where drones are being used to traffic fentanyl and other dangerous 
contraband. Rather, the authority should be expanded to address 
critical gaps in the current law, such as a lack of protection for U.S. 
airports from drones, the lack of authority for DHS to partner with 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement, enabling them to 
detect and mitigate threats themselves, and the inability of critical 
infrastructure owners and operators to detect drones operating near 
their facilities or request Federal mitigation assistance.
    Congressional action is urgently required, as DHS's authority to 
detect and counter drone threats will expire on December 16, 2022. A 
lapse in this authority could have catastrophic implications for 
homeland security.
5G/6G
    In the cyber ecosystem--which underpins the unprecedented 
interconnectedness we've achieved as a Nation and across the globe--
emerging technology and innovation can also expose us to a dynamic and 
evolving threat environment. For example, communications advancements 
in 5G and 6G technology continue to be a high security priority for the 
Department.
    The PRC is using its technology to tilt the global playing field to 
its benefit, capitalizing on the world-wide demand for communications 
technology and luring customers with improved telecommunications 
networks at a low cost. However, Beijing often requires large PRC-based 
companies to share and store data from their networks in-country and to 
provide that data to the Government when requested by authorities. It 
is our belief that our essential telecommunications networks should not 
be owned or operated by companies who will either sell or provide 
information to a foreign government, and we are championing to 
international partners that cheap telecommunications technology is not 
worth the price of citizens' privacy, their national security, or their 
sovereignty.
    For several years, DHS has worked closely with the interagency 
efforts to secure 5G and to mitigate possible malicious use by PRC 
technology. At CISA, our 5G team provided supply chain risk analyses 
that were a significant contribution to the Federal Government's 
response to this issue. However, today we are looking beyond 5G to the 
next frontier in 6G. 6G is still around 8-10 years away but the process 
to create the standards for 6G roll out is beginning today. This is a 
technology standardization process that has geopolitical implications 
as Beijing is already positioning itself to dominate the standards 
process. We see this as a potential threat to our homeland and economic 
security and are taking steps to educate our partners about the 
importance of this issue.
Cryptocurrency
    While most cryptocurrency is used legitimately, cryptocurrency has 
attributes that have already been exploited by criminals, terrorists, 
and adversaries to facilitate their operations. Most notably, as it has 
become easier to access and more widely used in general commerce, many 
transnational ransomware operations are using the cryptocurrency 
ecosystem to obfuscate illicit requests and receipt of ransoms.
    Many components within DHS are focused on the rising illicit use of 
digital assets, developing and providing training, investigating, 
collaborating with interagency partners, and conducting research. 
Pursuant to the President's Executive Order 14067, Responsible 
Development of Digital Assets, the Department contributed to the whole-
of-Government effort to address concerns with respect to digital 
assets.
    For example, with domestic and international law enforcement 
partners, the U.S. Secret Service has achieved notable successes in 
combatting cyber-enabled financial crimes, including dismantling two 
centralized virtual currency providers that supported extensive 
criminal activity and successfully investigating a Russia-based 
criminal scheme attempting to defraud cryptocurrency exchange customers 
of $16.8 million.
    U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI) has offices in over 50 countries and works to 
combat cyber crimes, including through training to international 
partners and analytical assistance in tracing digital assets. HSI 
investigations related to virtual assets have risen from one criminal 
investigation in 2011 to over 530 criminal investigations in fiscal 
year 2022--seizing over $4 billion in virtual assets this last fiscal 
year. HSI has also trained law enforcement partners in more than 20 
countries on dark web and cryptocurrency investigations, and regularly 
works with victims to remediate vulnerabilities before they are 
exploited.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
    AI encompasses several different technologies, notably natural 
language processing, computer vision, generative AI, and more. It is 
imperative for DHS to take a proactive role in the use of AI systems 
and to contribute to the National conversation on the secure use of 
this transformative technology. Malicious actors are using increasingly 
advanced AI, powered by more data, increasingly accessible computing 
resources, and advancements in machine learning algorithms. Our own 
prudent use of AI can help us more effectively and efficiently 
accomplish our mission to secure the homeland.
   Over the past several years, DHS has been engaged in AI 
        conversations across the Federal Government on AI ethics, 
        governance, and use policies.
   We are taking a strategic approach to mitigate and counter 
        adversary AI efforts by tracking evolving adversary AI 
        capabilities that could be used to exploit or overcome security 
        measures at our physical borders, in cyber space, in election 
        systems, and beyond.
   We are working with other responsible partners--domestically 
        and internationally--on sharing best practices and developing 
        standards.
Quantum
    The future development of quantum computers capable of breaking 
current cryptography presents a tremendous threat to the way we store 
and move sensitive Government, critical infrastructure, financial, and 
personal data. DHS recognized this threat and established a productive 
partnership with the National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST) within the Department of Commerce to produce actionable steps 
that our critical infrastructure and State, local, Tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) partners can take to prepare themselves for the 
coming transition to new post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. DHS 
played a leading role in reflecting this work--and complementary 
efforts--in the whole-of-Government and whole-of-society effort on 
quantum computing captured in the President's recent National Security 
Memorandum on quantum computing.
Smart Cities and Connected Communities
    The convergence of a number of emerging technologies such as 5G, 
Internet of Things, AI, and cloud computing in our municipalities is 
creating exciting opportunities for efficient transportation, equitable 
delivery of Government services, and energy efficiency in the form of 
``connected communities.'' This issue presents a unique cybersecurity 
challenge for critical infrastructure, with the introduction of 
potentially tens of thousands of new internet-connected devices. DHS 
has been working this issue for over a year to ensure that our 
municipalities, large and small, can capitalize on this impressive 
technology in a safe and secure manner.
                  transnational criminal organizations
    Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) continue to pose a 
threat to the United States, particularly U.S. public health, as well 
as our economic and National security. Over recent years, they have 
grown in size, scale, sophistication, and lethality. According to a 
2018 estimate, the U.S. Treasury Department estimated drug-related 
crime alone generated over $100 billion in proceeds in the United 
States. These profits also come with a high toll on human life; the 
opioid drugs these TCOs traffic were responsible for the majority of 
the over 100,000 U.S. overdose deaths between April 2020 and April 
2021, according to CDC reporting. Mexico-based TCO criminal activity is 
not limited to drug trafficking; they engage in wide variety of other 
criminal activity. TCOs also facilitated and profited from smuggling 
migrants into the United States and their illicit trade activity led to 
the seizure of over $2.14 billion in Intellectual Property violations 
in fiscal year 2021. TCOs are adept at changing their illicit drug 
supply chains, shifting human smuggling routes and tactics, and using 
various money-laundering techniques to evade law enforcement. TCOs 
operating in Mexico, specifically the Sinaloa Cartel and New Generation 
Jalisco Cartel, almost certainly will continue to dominate illegal drug 
trafficking--including trafficking of methamphetamine, fentanyl, 
cocaine, and heroin--into the United States.
    Other TCOs, some working with Mexico-based TCOs, also pose a 
growing threat to the homeland. TCOs in the PRC launder money for or 
sell precursor chemicals to TCOs in Mexico, while Central American 
gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street Gang, 
largely serve as cross-border couriers, smuggling drugs and people for 
Mexico-based TCOs. Asia-, Africa-, and Balkans-based TCOs are involved 
in a range of criminal activities that affect the homeland, such as 
money laundering, financial fraud, human smuggling, and racketeering.
    To confront TCOs and other threat networks, DHS has embraced an 
approach that leverages U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)'s 
unique authorities, data holdings, Intelligence Enterprise, and 
interagency partnerships to illuminate, disrupt, degrade, and dismantle 
networks that pose a threat to the homeland and its interests. CBP's 
international collaboration and integration with the interagency 
optimizes the collective global effort, which identifies options for 
intelligence-driven, risk-mitigating responses. Our success at 
identifying, degrading, and disrupting transnational networks relies on 
CBP front-line agents, officers, trade, and intelligence professionals 
working hand-in-hand with the whole of Government, as well as 
international partners. Developing these relationships and capabilities 
enables CBP to proactively identify and stop threats before they arrive 
at U.S. borders.
Counternarcotics
    DHS employs a multi-layered approach to countering narcotics 
trafficking. The shift in the illicit drug market toward synthetic 
drugs, primarily fentanyl, its analogues, and other opioids, led CBP to 
develop and implement the CBP Strategy to Combat Opioids. With the 
support of Congress, CBP continues to make significant investments and 
improvements in drug detection and interdiction technology to detect 
the presence of illicit drugs, including illicit opioids, in all 
operating environments. CBP's extended border and foreign operations 
mission involves collaborating with U.S. and international partners to 
conduct joint maritime operations in the source, transit, and arrival 
zones of the Western Hemisphere. In collaboration with Joint 
Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S), CBP operates aircraft 
throughout North and Central America, conducting counter-narcotics 
missions to detect and interdict bulk quantities of illicit narcotics. 
CBP seized 11,200 pounds of fentanyl in fiscal year 2021 and 14,700 
pounds in fiscal year 2022. This compares to 2,804 pounds in fiscal 
year 2019. CBP's National Targeting Center uses advanced analytics and 
targeting capabilities to identify critical logistics, financial, and 
communication nodes and exploit areas of weakness in opioid trafficking 
networks.
    CBP seeks to prevent drug trafficking through ports of entry, which 
is where most drugs enter the United States. Personal vehicles remain 
the primary method of conveyance encountered for illicit drugs entering 
the country by volume over land, with notable increases within 
commercial truck conveyances for methamphetamine. The Non-Intrusive 
Inspection (NII) Systems Program deploys technologies to inspect and 
screen conveyances or cars, trucks, railcars, sea containers, as well 
as personal luggage, packages, parcels, and flat mail through either X-
ray or gamma-ray imaging systems. CBP Officers use NII systems to help 
them effectively and efficiently detect and prevent contraband, 
including drugs, unreported currency, guns, ammunition, and other 
illegal merchandise, as well as inadmissible persons, from being 
smuggled into the United States, while having a minimal impact on the 
flow of legitimate travel and commerce.
    CBP also robustly enforces the Synthetics Trafficking and Overdose 
Prevention (STOP) Act to prevent trafficking by mail. CBP operates 
within major international mail facilities to inspect international 
mail and parcels arriving from more than 180 countries. Additionally, 
CBP and the U.S. Postal Service are working to increase the amount of 
advance electronic data (AED) received on international mail. This 
advance information enables ICE and other agencies to identify networks 
of foreign suppliers and domestic importers that are responsible for 
smuggling fentanyl into the United States.
    HSI also plays a critical role in countering narcotics trafficking 
by exchanging information, coordinating investigations, and 
facilitating enforcement actions with law enforcement partners abroad 
to deter the ability of TCOs to smuggle drugs, people, and contraband 
into and out of the United States. Preliminary fiscal year 2022 
statistics reveal HSI conducted 11,535 criminal arrests and seized 
roughly 1.87 million pounds of narcotics, which included 20,980 pounds 
of fentanyl, in fiscal year 2022. Additionally, in fiscal year 2022, 
HSI agents seized more than $210 million in total currency and assets 
through their narcotics enforcement efforts.
    One of HSI's most significant tools to combat TCOs engaged in 
fentanyl trafficking are the Border Enforcement Security Task Forces 
(BESTs). BESTs eliminate the barriers between Federal and local 
investigations and close the gap with international partners in 
multinational criminal investigations. BESTs continue to be a primary 
vehicle used to carry out HSI's comprehensive, multi-layered strategy 
to address the National opioid epidemic.
    The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) leads maritime interdictions of 
narcotics in the Western Hemisphere. The USCG disrupts illicit 
trafficking where it is most vulnerable: At sea in the transit zones, 
often far from U.S. shores before bulk quantities are divided for 
distribution. The Coast Guard is continuing to expand cooperation with 
partner nations in South and Central America to combat the flow of 
narcotics before they reach U.S. shores. In fiscal year 2022, the USCG 
removed approximately 140 metric tons of cocaine, 60,000 pounds of 
marijuana and 8 metric tons of other narcotics, including 
methamphetamines, fentanyl, heroin, and hashish.
    The Department welcomes Congress' support for extending the 
statutory authority to establish and operate Joint Task Forces (JTFs). 
JTFs provide a direct operational coordination layer to enhance the 
multi-faceted challenges facing DHS. Today, JTF-East is responsible for 
ensuring Departmental unity of effort in the southern maritime approach 
to the United States and demonstrates the tangible, positive impacts 
that JTFs can have on enhancing DHS coordinated operations.
Human Smuggling
    Migration is a hemispheric challenge, one not limited to the United 
States. Displacement and migration are higher than at any time since 
World War II. At our Southwest Border, we are experiencing historic 
levels of encounters. The demographics of the population have also 
changed, with more than triple the number of Venezuelans, Cubans, and 
Nicaraguans than last year, as people flee repressive governments and 
lack of economic opportunity. In September 2022, Venezuelans, Cubans, 
and Nicaraguans accounted for almost half of unique encounters at the 
Southwest Border--triple their share from 1 year ago. Reporting from 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) suggests that 
nearly 1 in 4 Venezuelans have fled their home since 2014, 
approximately 7 million people. At least 1 in 3 of those who have fled 
from Venezuela have settled in Colombia. Additionally, the Office of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has reported 
that Costa Rica is hosting more than 200,000 Nicaraguan migrants, equal 
to nearly 4 percent of their total population.
    We assess that global food and water shortages, poor economic 
conditions, and other socio-political factors will continue to drive an 
increase in cross-border migration. TCOs that specialize in human 
smuggling increasingly exploit and financially benefit from the 
continued growth in global migration trends. TCOs in Mexico play an 
influential role in human smuggling, increasingly facilitating illicit 
migration to and across the border. These groups control large sections 
of territory just south of the U.S. border and have traditionally taxed 
human smugglers to move migrants through their areas of operation.
    Disrupting human smuggling is a top priority for our Department, 
and we have invested significant time and resources in the effort to 
disrupt and dismantle the TCOs that support human smuggling. In April 
2022, DHS launched a first-of-its-kind effort, unprecedented in scale, 
to disrupt and dismantle human smuggling networks. So far, this 
campaign has resulted in the arrest of over 6,400 smugglers and the 
disruption of over 6,750 smuggling operations. This work includes 
raiding stash houses, impounding tractor-trailers that are used to 
smuggle migrants, and confiscating smugglers' communications 
technology.
    On October 16, I wrote to the United States Sentencing Commission, 
urging that the guidelines for smuggling offenses be updated to address 
the seriousness of the offenses. According to the Sentencing 
Commission's own data, in fiscal year 2021, the average sentence 
smuggling drugs (average 74 months) was almost 5 times longer than for 
smuggling human beings (average of just 15 months). These lower 
sentences negatively affect prosecutors' ability to negotiate plea 
agreements and obtain co-operation of co-conspirators; as a result, 
human smuggling organizations survive and thrive, as key members are 
rarely severely penalized for their heinous crimes.
    The United States cannot do this work alone; hemispheric challenges 
require hemispheric solutions. We are strengthening our relationships 
with partners in Mexico and Central and South America and taking 
unprecedented actions as a result. In October 2022, DHS announced joint 
actions with the government of Mexico, reinforcing our coordinated 
enforcement operations to target human smuggling organizations and 
bring them to justice. That campaign includes new migration 
checkpoints, additional resources and personnel, joint targeting of 
human smuggling organizations, and expanded information sharing related 
to transit nodes, hotels, stash houses, and staging locations.
    We are matching the unprecedented migration challenge we face with 
unprecedented and innovative solutions to secure the border. We are 
surging resources and increasing efficiency, prioritizing smart border 
security solutions, making historic investments in technology, taking 
the fight to cartels and smugglers, and doing more with our regional 
partners than ever before. CBP has 23,000 agents and officers working 
along the Southwest Border and is seeking another 300 agents in the 
fiscal year 2023 budget request.
    We have hired and contracted for over 1,000 Border Patrol 
Processing Coordinators to get agents back into the field to perform 
their essential law enforcement mission. Through the Southwest Border 
Coordination Center, established in February 2022, we are coordinating 
a whole-of-Government approach to humanely prevent and respond to 
increases in irregular migration by surging and coordinating our border 
security and law enforcement resources. We are also supporting border 
communities as well as interior cities--both local governments and 
NGO's--that are responding to a surge in migration, including through 
the Emergency Food and Shelter Program.
    We are prioritizing smart border security solutions, grounded in 
evidence rather than rhetoric, and making historic investments in 
technology. We have incorporated mobile intake and en route processing 
to begin processing non-citizens in the field; integrated digital case 
review saving over 70,000 hours of agent time; and advanced capacity by 
leveraging virtual processing capabilities.
    In addition to our digitization efforts, we are also installing 
effective technology like linear ground detection systems and automated 
surveillance towers. We have also made historic investments in non-
intrusive inspection technology to be deployed at ports of entry to 
increase our interdiction of illicit drugs, because we know that 
traffickers seek to smuggle drugs through the ports of entry in all 
modes of transportation.
Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Theft of Intellectual Property
    The Department continues to facilitate legitimate trade by 
investigating TCOs that profit from the sale of counterfeit goods and 
the theft of Intellectual Property (IP). To this end, HSI's 
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center) brings 
together 30 Federal and international agencies to combat IP theft. In 
fiscal year 2022, HSI initiated more IP theft cases; affected more 
criminal arrests, indictments, and convictions; and seized a higher 
value of counterfeit goods, more than $1.1 billion worth, than in 
fiscal year 2021.
    HSI's Operation Chain Reaction targets counterfeit goods entering 
the U.S. Government supply chain, including that of the Armed Services. 
As an example of HSI's impact, the agency recently indicted one of the 
largest importers of counterfeit network routers. These routers, worth 
more than $1 billion had they been genuine, were destined to sensitive 
end-users, including in the Department of Defense, the FBI, government 
aerospace contractors, and medical facilities. In another example, HSI 
recently secured a guilty plea from an importer of counterfeit military 
uniforms destined to be sold to the Department of Defense. These 
counterfeit uniforms failed fire-resistance testing and failed to hide 
the wearer's radiation levels, making them detectible to enemy optics. 
Had these counterfeit goods not been seized, they would have imperiled 
the safety of our warfighters and exposed our service members to harm.
Human Trafficking and Child Sexual Exploitation
    Combatting the abhorrent crimes of human trafficking and child 
sexual exploitation and abuse is a top priority for the Department. 
These crimes target the most vulnerable among us, offend our most basic 
values, and threaten our personal and public safety. Nearly every 
component within DHS is involved in combating human trafficking. We 
employ a victim-centered approach across our policies and programs, 
striving to support and protect victims. We lead criminal 
investigations into sex trafficking and forced labor, with HSI 
initiating nearly 1,400 investigations in fiscal year 2022 alone and 
helping achieve hundreds of Federal and State-level convictions each 
year against traffickers. We develop leading-edge technologies to 
identify and locate victims and perpetrators. We shine a light on these 
dark crimes through the Blue Campaign, our signature public awareness 
and education effort. We train our personnel to recognize and respond 
to human trafficking in the course of their daily responsibilities, 
delivering 53 training and outreach events to 5,927 participants in 
fiscal year 2022. These efforts are streamlined and strengthened 
through the DHS Center for Countering Human Trafficking, the first 
Department-wide operational coordination center for combating human 
trafficking and the importation of goods produced with forced labor.
    Combating trade in illicit goods produced with forced labor is also 
a critical part of our counter-trafficking mission. Recent studies 
estimate that upwards of 27 million people around the world are trapped 
in forced labor bondage, many of whom are members of racial, religious, 
and ethnic minority groups. Working to end these horrific practices not 
only promotes respect for human rights and dignity, but also benefits 
U.S. National security and other interests overseas. CBP is charged 
with rooting out forced-labor-made goods from our supply chains by 
preventing the entry of these illegal goods into the U.S. market. CBP 
carries out this mission by investigating allegations of forced labor 
in supply chains and, where allegations are corroborated, issuing 
Withhold Release Orders (WROs) and forced labor findings.
    This year, DHS led the interagency Forced Labor Enforcement Task 
Force (FLETF) in its successful implementation of the Uyghur Forced 
Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), which was enacted by Congress and signed 
into law at the end of 2021. Going forward, CBP will continue to 
enforce the new law, and DHS, as FLETF Chair, will continue to lead the 
interagency in updating the UFLPA enforcement strategy, including the 
list of entities subject to the UFLPA's rebuttable presumption.
    The scope and severity of on-line child sexual exploitation and 
abuse (CSEA) has increased dramatically in recent years. Reports of on-
line child sexual abuse material (CSAM) to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children, the Nation's clearinghouse for CSAM, 
increased by more than 35 percent between 2020 and 2021 (to nearly 30 
million reports), and 2022 year-to-date numbers foreshadow an even 
greater increase this year. Increasingly, the victims of these horrific 
crimes are infants and toddlers, and the abuse has become more violent. 
New forms of CSEA have also emerged and grown exponentially, including 
the live streaming of child sexual abuse and sophisticated sextortion 
and grooming schemes.
    That is why I am redoubling the Department's efforts in this space. 
We are strengthening our Cyber Crimes Center (C3), including HSI's 
Child Exploitation Investigations Unit (CEIU), a global leader in 
counter-CSEA law enforcement operations. Every day, the extraordinary 
men and women of C3 and HSI field offices around the country and the 
globe work tirelessly to locate and apprehend offenders, identify and 
rescue victims, and share information with our partners in this fight. 
In fiscal year 2021, CEIU identified and/or rescued 1,177 child victims 
in child exploitation investigations. During this same period, CEIU 
arrested 3,776 individuals for crimes involving the sexual exploitation 
of children and helped to secure more than 1,500 convictions. In fiscal 
year 2022, HSI Victim Assistance Specialists assisted 3,326 victims of 
crimes, of which 1,138 were child exploitation victims. HSI Forensic 
Interview Specialists conducted 1,836 trauma-informed forensic 
interviews, of which 1,238 were in support of bringing perpetrators of 
child exploitation crimes to justice.
    We are also building policy, public-education, and strategic-
engagement infrastructure to elevate and enhance the Department's 
counter-CSEA capabilities. DHS remains steadfast in advancing and 
leveraging its full breadth of authorities and resources to end these 
heinous crimes, and we urge you to support our efforts to expand our 
work to fight all forms of human trafficking and child sexual abuse.
  chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives threats
    The overall chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 
explosives (CBRNE)-related threat environment in the homeland will 
likely remain unpredictable over the next 12 months. Terrorists remain 
interested in acquiring and using WMD in attacks against U.S. interests 
and the U.S. homeland. Separately, factors including the spread of 
dual-use CBRNE-related technologies, materials, environmental change, 
advances in computer and related technology that lower technical 
barriers, and global expansion in the number and sophistication of 
biological laboratories will likely continue to influence threat trends 
in the coming years, especially the proliferation of CBRNE threats by 
non-state actors.
    The United States assesses that Russia maintains an offensive 
biological weapons program and that other potential state adversaries 
engage in activities that raise concerns regarding compliance with the 
Biological Weapons Convention. Having seen the human and economic 
devastation resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, our adversaries are 
more aware of the significance of biological threats. Additionally, a 
global desire to mitigate the consequences of future pandemics is 
likely to expand global interest in leveraging and advancing biological 
technology capabilities, including technologies used for biosafety and 
biosecurity. The dual-use nature of these capabilities complicates the 
ability to discern civil medical research from malign biological 
weapons development and heightens the risks of accidental release of 
biological hazards due to lacking biosafety and biosecurity.
    DHS continues to monitor chemical-related threats, including the 
development and use of chemical weapons and the potential for non-state 
actors, lone actors, and criminals to pursue a range of chemical 
substances to use domestically. The use of chemical agents by Russia 
and North Korea in targeted attacks outside their borders in recent 
years reaffirms our commitment to monitor for and defend against 
similar attempts in the homeland. Similarly, chemical accidents of 
varying severity remain common and of enduring concern. Over time, 
these trends could manifest as an increased domestic threat.
    Traditional radiological and nuclear threats to the homeland remain 
low. Due to material security and other factors, the likelihood of a 
large-scale radiological attack in the homeland is very low. 
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the risk of unsecured or vulnerable 
fissile and other source materials in the United States. While the 
United States has expressed concern with Russian nuclear saber-
rattling, we do NOT anticipate that a nuclear detonation in Europe 
would have any direct health consequences on the homeland.
    The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) leads the 
Department's efforts to safeguard the United States against CBRNE 
threats by collecting and analyzing CBRNE threat data, conducting risk 
analysis, and enhancing and implementing capabilities to prevent, 
detect, prepare for, and respond to the range of CBRNE incidents. This 
includes collaborating with Federal entities to monitor biological 
threats in cities across the country, providing radiological and 
nuclear detection equipment to SLTTC partners in urban areas, providing 
surge support to protect special events, and equipping DHS operational 
components with radiological and nuclear detection equipment to prevent 
smuggling at the border. Additionally, CWMD works closely with campus 
jurisdictions to enhance their capabilities to address these threats 
and ensure a coordinated, National response.
    The Office of Health Security (OHS) promotes a unified approach 
through partnerships that protect the health of our workforce and the 
health security of the homeland. In the face of an ever-expanding and 
complex National health security mission, OHS enhances integration of 
Federal and SLTTC public safety and health security partners, leads the 
Department's engagements related to medical countermeasures 
prioritization and policy development, and coordinates food, 
agriculture, and veterinary defense activities. Recent domestic and 
global threats such as pandemics, supply chain disruptions, resurgence 
of zoonotic and transboundary diseases, climate change impacts, and 
cybersecurity incidents all underscore the important nexus between 
agro-defense, food protection, and food security with the National 
security, National economic security, and National public health and 
safety of the United States.
          extreme weather events and climate change resilience
    The impacts of climate change pose an acute and systemic threat to 
the safety, security, and prosperity of the United States, and have 
already led to changes in the environment, such as rising ocean 
temperatures, shrinking sea ice, rising sea levels, and ocean 
acidification. As our climate continues to warm, the United States will 
experience more climate-related disasters such as heat waves, droughts, 
wildfires, coastal storms, and inland flooding. This year, we have 
already seen the devastating impacts from Hurricane Fiona in Puerto 
Rico and Hurricane Ian in Florida, and Typhoon Merbok in Alaska. 
Natural disasters occur both seasonally and without warning, subjecting 
affected communities to insecurity, disruption, and economic loss. 
Natural disasters include all types of severe weather that have the 
potential to pose a significant threat to human health and safety, 
property, and critical infrastructure.
Preparedness and Resilience
    Under the Biden-Harris administration, DHS is engaged in climate 
change adaptation and mitigation efforts to make the Department and the 
Nation more prepared, more secure, and more resilient:
   In 2021, DHS established a Climate Change Action Group 
        (CCAG) to coordinate DHS response to climate-related Executive 
        Orders and track implementation of actions and progress toward 
        DHS climate change priorities. During the first year, the group 
        was critical in coordinating a Strategic Framework to Address 
        Climate Change and hold the first Department-wide exercise on 
        extreme heat.
   DHS is leading the charge among Federal agencies to 
        transition its fleet vehicles from internal combustion engines 
        to zero-emission electric vehicles and is the first Federal 
        agency to upfit a battery electric vehicle for law enforcement 
        use. As the Nation's third-largest Federal agency and largest 
        law enforcement agency, DHS has an inventory of more than 
        50,000 vehicles, with law enforcement vehicles making up 60 
        percent of its fleet.
   DHS made available more than $3 billion for the fiscal year 
        2022 Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) 
        and Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant programs which seek 
        to help SLTT governments address high-level future risks to 
        natural disasters such as extreme heat, wildfires, drought, 
        hurricanes, earthquakes, and increased flooding to foster 
        greater community resilience and reduce disaster suffering.
   FEMA continues to evolve mitigation grant programs to be 
        more equitable, reduce complexity, and address climate 
        resilience. FEMA is focused on reducing barriers to access 
        funding faced by those who need it the most and building 
        capacity and capability to deliver mitigation grant programs.
   FEMA announced the expansion of BRIC non-financial Direct 
        Technical Assistance (DTA), increasing the number of 
        communities receiving this community resilience planning and 
        project development assistance from 20 in fiscal year 2021 to 
        40 in fiscal year 2022, to help communities design 
        transformational projects that address multiple hazards and 
        accelerate community resilience.
   FEMA has also developed a Nature-Based Solutions Guide to 
        help communities identify and engage the staff and resources 
        that can be used to implement nature-based solutions to build 
        resilience to natural hazards, which may be exacerbated by 
        climate change. Nature-based solutions can help reduce the loss 
        of life and property resulting from some of our Nation's most 
        common natural hazards. These include flooding, storm surge, 
        drought, and landslides. As future conditions, like climate 
        change, intensify these hazards, nature-based solutions can 
        help communities adapt and thrive.
                          nation-state threats
    The United States faces an evolving and increasingly complex threat 
from nation-state adversaries, including the PRC, Russia, Iran, and 
North Korea, each of which views the United States as a strategic 
adversary. These adversaries employ a combination of traditional and 
non-traditional intelligence tradecraft, predatory economic and 
cultural outreach, and cyber and traditional espionage to seek illicit 
access to U.S. critical infrastructure and steal sensitive information, 
technology, and industrial secrets. These governments--and a growing 
number of others who are learning from their tactics--conduct overt and 
covert influence campaigns spreading misinformation and disinformation 
to sow and exploit divisions in our society, undermine confidence in 
our democratic institutions, and weaken our alliances. In some cases, 
they surveil, harass, and otherwise seek to suppress perceived 
dissidents and regime opponents overseas, including those now living in 
the United States.
    The global availability of technologies with intelligence 
applications--such as biometric devices, unmanned systems, high-
resolution imagery, enhanced technical surveillance equipment, advanced 
encryption, and big data analytics--and the unauthorized disclosure of 
cyber tools have enabled a wider range of actors to obtain 
sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Threat actors are using these 
capabilities against an expanded set of targets and vulnerabilities. 
Foreign Intelligence Entities are targeting most U.S. Government 
departments and agencies, to include DHS, as well as National 
laboratories, the financial sector, the U.S. industrial base, and other 
private-sector and academic entities. These activities put at risk the 
homeland security enterprise, as well as State and local partners, and 
private-sector critical infrastructure providers.
    We assess that the PRC will continue to exploit professors, 
scholars, and students visiting the United States from the PRC as 
nontraditional collectors to steal sensitive information and 
technology. Some collectors are unwittingly providing information back 
to the PRC, while others are aware of their roles and have admitted to 
stealing research from U.S. institutions to support Chinese military 
ambitions. We expect the threat from these actors will increase as 
international students return to U.S. universities after a hiatus due 
to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Russia embeds intelligence officers in its diplomatic posts inside 
the United States. While in the United States, Russia's intelligence 
officers try to establish front companies and recruit Russian emigres 
and American citizens to steal sensitive U.S. academic, Government, and 
business information. Russia continues to circumvent U.S.-imposed 
sanctions to acquire sensitive/dual-use technology for use in military 
weapons and aviation industry.
    We assess that for the foreseeable future, Iran probably will 
present an enduring counterintelligence threat to the homeland as it 
seeks to advance its goals in the Middle East. During the past several 
years, U.S. law enforcement has arrested numerous individuals for 
spying on Iranian dissidents in the United States and for acting as 
agents of influence for the Iranian government.
Election Security
    The security and resilience of our Nation's election infrastructure 
is one of the highest priorities for DHS. As demonstrated in recent 
election cycles, we continue to face a wide range of threats targeting 
U.S. election infrastructure and voters by sophisticated, State-
sponsored cyber threat actors, such as the PRC, Russia, and Iran. In 
many cases, the foreign threat actors who are attempting to breach our 
election systems are the very same ones who are conducting influence 
operations that seek to sow discord in our country. Their influence 
operations often utilize information obtained illicitly through cyber 
activity, or they make false or exaggerated claims of cybersecurity 
breaches. These foreign threat actors advance their own disinformation 
narratives about U.S. elections, as well as amplify existing domestic 
disinformation narratives. Protecting election infrastructure is a 
whole-of-Government effort. DHS works closely with the U.S. Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC), DOJ, the intelligence community, and other 
agencies to help accomplish this goal.
    Throughout the 2022 primary and general elections, DHS has worked 
to ensure that election officials and their private-sector partners 
have the necessary information and tools to successfully manage risk 
and build resilience into the Nation's election infrastructure. DHS 
works to protect and safeguard elections by:
   Sharing Intelligence and Information.--DHS shares timely and 
        actionable intelligence and information with our Federal, 
        State, local, Tribal, and territorial government and private-
        sector partners about threats and risks to election 
        infrastructure, including foreign disinformation efforts 
        concerning elections.
   Providing Services and Resources.--CISA maintains an 
        Election Security Resource Library to equip State and local 
        governments, election officials, and others with no-cost tools 
        they can use to secure election-related assets, facilities, 
        networks, and systems from cyber and physical risks. This 
        includes Cybersecurity Advisors located throughout the country 
        and more than 100 Protective Security Advisors in all 50 States 
        who provide cybersecurity expertise, conduct physical security 
        assessments, and share guidance and best practices. Through 
        2022, CISA facilitated multiple Classified and un-Classified 
        threat briefings, engaged thousands of election officials and 
        SLTT partners for cybersecurity and physical security services, 
        assessments, trainings, and tabletop exercises, including 
        CISA's 2022 Tabletop the Vote exercise, a 3-day exercise that 
        engaged over 1,000 stakeholders across 40 States. CISA also 
        provides funding to the Election Infrastructure Information 
        Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), which now includes all 
        50 States and more than 3,400 local jurisdictions. This is the 
        main mechanism for sharing alerts with the election's 
        community. DHS also provides funding for enhancing election 
        security through FEMA grants.
   Combating Disinformation Around Elections.--State, local, 
        Tribal, and territorial officials are the most trusted sources 
        of election information in communities across our Nation: DHS 
        partners with them to help ensure that voters receive accurate 
        information. DHS assists with addressing disinformation by 
        being transparent about identified foreign malign influence 
        campaigns, amplifying facts shared by State, local, Tribal, and 
        territorial officials with the public, and encouraging 
        individuals to maintain digital and media literacy to recognize 
        and build resilience.
                               conclusion
    While DHS was created in response to a singular threat, in the 2 
decades since 9/11 the Department has evolved to address multiple 
unforeseen complex challenges. Through it all, our workforce has 
demonstrated exceptional skill and an unwavering commitment to keeping 
our country safe.
    I am grateful to this committee for your continued support of DHS, 
both from a resource perspective and the provision of key authorities 
that allow the Department to adapt to an ever-changing threat 
landscape. I look forward to our continued work together and to 
answering your questions. Thank you.

    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
    The Chair recognizes Director Wray to summarize his 
statement for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
                         INVESTIGATION

    Mr. Wray. Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member 
Katko, Members of the committee. I am honored to be here today 
on behalf of the FBI's 38,000 men and women to discuss some of 
the most pressing threats facing our homeland.
    When it comes to our current threat landscape, what makes 
our current situation, at least in my career, unique is--and 
particularly serious, I would add--is the fact that we have so 
many different threat areas all elevated at the same time. I am 
proud of the work that the FBI's agents, analysts, and 
professional staff are doing all over the country and all over 
the world every single day to rise to those challenges and to 
protect the American people.
    Protecting the American people from terrorist attack 
remains the FBI's No. 1 priority. As I have said before, the 
greatest threat we face on the terrorism front here in the 
homeland is from what are effectively lone actors, or small 
cells. Whether it is a domestic violent extremist acting in 
furtherance of some ideological goal or a home-grown violent 
extremist looking to advance the interest of a foreign 
terrorist organization, these actors often move quickly from 
radicalization to action and often use easily obtainable 
weapons--think a gun, a knife, a car, a crude IED--against soft 
targets, which is just intelligence community speak for 
everyday people living everyday lives.
    Overseas ISIS and al-Qaeda still aim to inspire, to plan, 
and to launch attacks against the United States and our allies, 
both abroad and here at home. As the al-Zawahiri strike this 
summer in Kabul reinforces, the threat of foreign terrorist 
organizations like al-Qaeda attempting to reconstitute in 
Afghanistan following our withdrawal remains very real. Our 
ability to gather valuable intelligence on the ground inside 
Afghanistan has been reduced. That is just a reality. All of 
that places a premium on our continued collaboration with our 
partners, both within the U.S. Government and internationally. 
We have got to stay on the balls of our feet and use all of the 
tools available to us.
    On top of that, countries like China, Russia, Iran, and 
North Korea are growing more aggressive, brazen, and capable. 
They are coming at us from all angles to undermine our core 
democratic institutions, our national security, and our rule of 
law.
    Of those countries, the greatest long-term threat to our 
Nation's ideas, innovation, and economic security, our national 
security, is that from China. The Chinese government aspires to 
equal or surpass the United States as a global superpower and 
influence the world with a value system shaped by undemocratic 
authoritarian ideals. We are confronting that threat head-on. 
Just 3 weeks ago, for example, we unsealed charges against 13 
individuals, 10 of them Chinese intelligence officers and 
government officials, for a variety of criminal efforts to 
exert influence right here in the United States to benefit 
Beijing. The FBI has scores of investigations open into the 
China threat in all 56 of our field offices.
    On the cyber front, China's vast hacking program is the 
world's largest and they have stolen more of American's 
personal and business data than every other nation combined. 
But, of course, China is not our only challenge in cyber 
space--not even close. The FBI's cyber investigations are 
growing in frequency, scale, and complexity consistent with the 
evolution of the threat. We are investigating over 100 
different ransomware variants and each one of those with scores 
of victims, as well as a whole host of other novel threats 
posed by both cyber criminals and nation-states alike. It is 
becoming more and more difficult to discern where the cyber 
criminal activity ends and the nation-state activity begins, as 
the line between those two continues to blur.
    Just last month, for example, we announced the indictment 
of three Iranian nationals for their roles in a multi-year 
scheme to compromise the networks of hundreds of organizations, 
many of which offer services Americans rely on every day. To 
those sorts of actors, nothing is off limits, not even, for 
example, Boston Children's Hospital, which they set their 
sights on in the summer of 2021. Now, fortunately, before they 
could successfully launch their attack, we received a tip from 
a partner and working closely with the hospital, we were able 
to identify and defeat the threat, protecting both the network 
and the sick children who depend on it.
    Our opponents in this space are relentless, so we have got 
to keep responding in kind. I can assure you that we are going 
to continue to be aggressive and creative as we run joint 
sequenced operations with our partners against these 
adversaries, removing their malware, taking down their botnets, 
and hunting them down all over the world.
    That is just a snapshot of some of the many threats we are 
tackling, and it doesn't even include things like our efforts 
to combat violent crime, where this summer, working with our 
State and local partners, we arrested on average 50 violent 
criminals every single day. Or our continued focus on human 
trafficking, where this August, through our annual Operation 
Cross County, for instance, the FBI and our partners located 
more than 200 victims of human trafficking, many of them little 
kids. Or the work of our transnational organized crime section 
that it is doing in partnership with agencies like DHS to 
investigate the movement of people, drugs, guns, and money into 
the United States across our Southern Border.
    The breadth and depth of the threats that the FBI's 
dedicated men and women are tackling each and every day is 
staggering. I continue to be inspired by their commitment to 
our mission of protecting the American people and upholding the 
Constitution. I know we will continue to answer the call.
    So thank you again for having me here again today and I 
would be happy to address your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wray follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Wray
                           November 15, 2022
    Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members 
of the committee. Today, I am honored to be here, representing the 
people of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI''), who tackle 
some of the most complex and most grave threats we face every day with 
perseverance, professionalism, and integrity. Sometimes at the greatest 
of costs. I am extremely proud of their service and commitment to the 
FBI's mission and to ensuring the safety and security of communities 
throughout our Nation. On their behalf, I would like to express my 
appreciation for the support you have given them in the past and ask 
for your continued support in the future.
    Despite the many challenges our FBI workforce has faced, I am 
immensely proud of their dedication to protecting the American people 
and upholding the Constitution. Our country continues to face 
unimaginable challenges, yet, through it all, the women and men of the 
FBI have unwaveringly stood at the ready and taken it upon themselves 
to tackle any and all challenges thrown their way. The list of diverse 
threats we face underscores the complexity and breadth of the FBI's 
mission: To protect the American people and uphold the Constitution of 
the United States. I am prepared to discuss with you what the FBI is 
doing to address these threats and what the FBI is doing to ensure our 
people adhere to the highest of standards while it conducts its 
Mission. I am pleased to have received your invitation to appear today 
and am looking forward to engaging in a thorough, robust, and frank 
discussion regarding some of the most critical threats facing the FBI 
and the Nation as a whole.
                       key threats and challenges
    Our Nation continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving 
threats ranging from home-grown violent extremists to hostile foreign 
intelligence services and operatives, from sophisticated cyber-based 
attacks to internet-facilitated sexual exploitation of children, from 
violent gangs and criminal organizations to public corruption and 
corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant 
challenge for the FBI. As an organization, we must be able to stay 
current with constantly-evolving technologies. Our adversaries--
terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminals--take 
advantage of modern technology, including the internet and social 
media, to facilitate illegal activities, recruit followers, encourage 
terrorist attacks and other illicit actions, to spread misinformation, 
and to disperse information on building improvised explosive devices 
and other means to attack the United States. The breadth of these 
threats and challenges are as complex as any time in our history. The 
consequences of not responding to and countering threats and challenges 
have never been greater.
    The support of this committee in helping the FBI do its part in 
thwarting these threats and facing these challenges is greatly 
appreciated. That support is allowing us to establish strong 
capabilities and capacities to assess threats, share intelligence, 
leverage key technologies, and--in some respects, most importantly--
hire some of the best to serve as special agents, intelligence 
analysts, and professional staff. We have built, and are continuously 
enhancing, a workforce that possesses the skills and knowledge to deal 
with the complex threats and challenges we face today and tomorrow. We 
are building a leadership cadre that views change and transformation as 
a positive tool for keeping the FBI focused on the key threats facing 
our Nation.
    Today's FBI is a National security and law enforcement organization 
that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each 
FBI employee understands that, to defeat the key threats facing our 
Nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more 
effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must 
the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist, nation-
state, and criminal threats to our National security, our economy, and 
indeed our communities. These diverse threats underscore the complexity 
and breadth of the FBI's mission: To protect the American people and 
uphold the Constitution of the United States.
                           national security
Terrorism Threats
    Protecting the American people from terrorism--both international 
and domestic--remains the FBI's No. 1 priority. The threat from 
terrorism is as persistent and complex as ever. We are in an 
environment where the threats from international terrorism, domestic 
terrorism, and state-sponsored terrorism are all simultaneously 
elevated.
    The greatest terrorism threat to our homeland is posed by lone 
actors or small cells of individuals who typically radicalize to 
violence on-line, and who primarily use easily accessible weapons to 
attack soft targets. We see the lone offender threat with both Domestic 
Violent Extremists (``DVEs'') and Home-grown Violent Extremists 
(``HVEs''), two distinct threats, both of which are located primarily 
in the United States and typically radicalize and mobilize to violence 
on their own. Individuals based and operating primarily within the 
United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from 
a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seek to further 
political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of 
force or violence are described as DVEs, whereas HVEs are individuals 
of any citizenship who have lived and/or operated primarily in the 
United States or its territories who advocate, are engaged in, or are 
preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities 
(including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political 
or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but 
are acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist 
organization (``FTO'').
    Domestic and Home-grown Violent Extremists are often motivated and 
inspired by a mix of social or political, ideological, and personal 
grievances against their targets, and more recently have focused on 
accessible targets to include civilians, law enforcement and the 
military, symbols or members of the U.S. Government, houses of worship, 
retail locations, and mass public gatherings. Lone actors present a 
particular challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
These actors are difficult to identify, investigate, and disrupt before 
they take violent action, especially because of the insular nature of 
their radicalization and mobilization to violence and limited 
discussions with others regarding their plans.
    The top domestic terrorism threat we face continues to be from DVEs 
we categorize as Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists 
(``RMVEs'') and Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists 
(``AGAAVEs''). While RMVEs, who advocate for the superiority of the 
white race were the primary source of lethal attacks perpetrated by 
DVEs in recent years, AGAAVEs, specifically Militia Violent Extremists 
and Anarchist Violent Extremists were responsible for 3 of the 4 lethal 
DVE attacks in 2020. Notably, 2020 included the first lethal attack 
committed by an Anarchist Violent Extremist in over 20 years. More 
recently, in 2021, DVEs committed at least 4 lethal attacks, resulting 
in 13 deaths. DVEs with mixed or personalized ideologies committed 2 of 
the 4 attacks. The other 2 lethal attacks were committed by RMVEs--one 
who advocated for the superiority of the white race and one who 
allegedly used his interpretations of religious teachings to justify 
the murder of a police officer. The number of FBI domestic terrorism 
investigations has more than doubled since the spring of 2020, and as 
of the end of fiscal year 2022, the FBI was conducting approximately 
2,700 domestic terrorism investigations.
    We are approaching the 2-year anniversary of the January 6 siege of 
the U.S. Capitol, which has led to unprecedented efforts by the 
Department of Justice, including the FBI, to investigate and hold 
accountable all who engaged in violence, destruction of property, and 
other criminal activity on that day. To date, the Department has 
arrested and charged more than 880 individuals who took part in the 
Capitol siege.
    The FBI uses all tools available at its disposal to combat domestic 
terrorism. These efforts represent a critical part of the National 
Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which was released in June 
2021, and which sets forth a comprehensive, whole-of-Government 
approach to address the many facets of the domestic terrorism threat.
    The FBI assesses HVEs are the greatest, most immediate 
international terrorism threat to the homeland. HVEs are people located 
and radicalized to violence primarily in the United States, who are not 
receiving individualized direction from FTOs but are inspired by FTOs, 
including the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham 
(``ISIS'') and al-Qaeda and their affiliates, to commit violence. An 
HVE's lack of a direct connection with an FTO, ability to rapidly 
mobilize without detection, and use of encrypted communications pose 
significant challenges to our ability to proactively identify and 
disrupt potential violent attacks.
    The FBI remains concerned about the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan 
and the that the intent of FTOs, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda and their 
affiliates, intend to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the 
United States. Despite its loss of physical territory in Iraq and 
Syria, ISIS remains relentless in its campaign of violence against the 
United States and our partners--both here at home and overseas. ISIS 
and its supporters continue to aggressively promote its hate-fueled 
rhetoric and attract like-minded violent extremists with a willingness 
to conduct attacks against the United States and our interests abroad. 
ISIS's successful use of social media and messaging applications to 
attract individuals is of continued concern to us. Like other foreign 
terrorist groups, ISIS advocates for lone-offender attacks in the 
United States and Western countries via videos and other English 
language propaganda that have, at times, specifically advocated for 
attacks against civilians, the military, law enforcement, and 
intelligence community personnel.
    Al-Qaeda maintains its desire to both conduct and inspire large-
scale, spectacular attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded 
some of the group's senior leadership, we assess that, in the near 
term, al-Qaeda is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its 
international affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable 
attacks in regions such as East and West Africa. Over the past year, 
propaganda from al-Qaeda leaders continued to seek to inspire 
individuals to conduct their own attacks in the United States and other 
Western nations.
    Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia 
militant groups, continue to attack and plot against the United States 
and our allies throughout the Middle East in response to U.S. pressure. 
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (``IRGC-QF'') 
continues to provide support to militant resistance groups and 
terrorist organizations. Iran also continues to support Lebanese 
Hizballah and other terrorist groups. Hizballah has sent operatives to 
build terrorist infrastructures world-wide. The arrests of individuals 
in the United States allegedly linked to Hizballah's main overseas 
terrorist arm, and their intelligence collection and procurement 
efforts, demonstrate Hizballah's interest in long-term contingency 
planning activities here in the homeland. Hizballah Secretary-General 
Hassan Nasrallah also has threatened retaliation for the death of IRGC-
QF Commander Qassem Soleimani. This threat was exemplified in 2022, 
when the Department charged an Iranian national and member of the IRGC, 
working on behalf of the Qods Force, with a plot to murder a former 
National Security Advisor.
    The terrorism threat continues to evolve, but the FBI resolve to 
counter that threat remains constant. As an organization, we 
continually adapt and rely heavily on the strength of our Federal, 
State, local, Tribal, territorial, and international partnerships to 
combat all terrorist threats to the United States and our interests. To 
that end, we use all available lawful investigative techniques and 
methods to combat these threats while continuing to collect, analyze, 
and share intelligence concerning the threat posed by violent 
extremists, in all their forms, who desire to harm Americans and U.S. 
interests. We will continue to share information and encourage the 
sharing of information among our numerous partners via our Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces across the country, and our Legal Attache offices 
around the world.
Cyber
    Throughout these last 2 years, the FBI has seen a wider-than-ever 
range of cyber actors threaten Americans' safety, security, and 
confidence in our digitally connected world. Cyber-criminal syndicates 
and nation-states keep innovating ways to compromise our networks and 
maximize the reach and impact of their operations, such as by selling 
malware as a service or by targeting vendors to access the networks of 
the vendors' customers.
    These criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise 
our networks, steal our property, extort us, and hold our critical 
infrastructure at risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the 
last few years, we have seen--and have publicly called out--the 
People's Republic of China (``PRC''), the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea (``DPRK''), and Russia for using cyber operations to target 
U.S. COVID-19 vaccines and research. We have seen the far-reaching 
disruptive impact a serious supply chain compromise can have through 
the Solar Winds-related intrusions, conducted by the Russian SVR. We 
have seen the PRC working to obtain controlled dual-use technology and 
developing an arsenal of advanced cyber capabilities that could be used 
against other countries in the event of a real-world conflict. As these 
adversaries become more sophisticated, we are increasingly concerned 
about our ability to detect and warn about specific cyber operations 
against U.S. organizations. One of the most worrisome facets is their 
focus on compromising U.S. critical infrastructure, especially during a 
crisis.
    What makes things more difficult is that there is no bright line 
that separates where nation-state activity ends and cyber criminal 
activity begins. Some cyber criminals contract or sell services to 
nation-states; some nation-state actors moonlight as cyber criminals to 
fund personal activities; and nation-states are increasingly using 
tools typically used by criminal actors, such as ransomware.
    So, as dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of 
focusing on them alone. In the past year, we also have seen cyber 
criminals target hospitals, medical centers, educational institutions, 
and other critical infrastructure for theft or ransomware, causing 
massive disruption to our daily lives. Such incidents affecting medical 
centers in particular have led to the interruption of computer networks 
and systems that put patients' lives at an increased risk, at a time 
when America faces its most dire public health crisis in generations.
    We have also seen the rise of an ecosystem of services dedicated to 
supporting cyber crime in exchange for cryptocurrency. The effect is 
that what were once unsophisticated criminals now have the tools to 
engage in destructive behavior--for example, deploying ransomware to 
paralyze entire hospitals, police departments, and businesses--and the 
means to better conceal their tracks. It is not that individual 
malicious cyber actors have become much more sophisticated, but--unlike 
previously--they are able to rent sophisticated capabilities.
    We must make it harder and more painful for malicious cyber actors 
and criminals to carry on their malicious activities. The FBI, using 
its role as the lead Federal agency for threat response, with its law 
enforcement and intelligence responsibilities, works seamlessly with 
domestic and international partners to defend their networks, attribute 
malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take the fight to our 
adversaries overseas. We must impose consequences on cyber adversaries 
and use our collective law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to 
do so through joint and enabled operations sequenced for maximum 
impact. And we must continue to work with the Department of State and 
other key agencies to ensure that our foreign partners are able and 
willing to cooperate in our efforts to bring the perpetrators of cyber 
crime to justice or otherwise disrupt such perpetrators' activities.
    An example of this approach is the international seizure in April 
2022 of Hydra Market--the world's largest and longest-running darknet 
market. Hydra was an on-line criminal marketplace that enabled users in 
mainly Russian-speaking countries to buy and sell illicit goods and 
services, including illegal drugs, stolen financial information, 
fraudulent identification documents, and money laundering and mixing 
services, anonymously and outside the reach of law enforcement. 
Transactions on Hydra were conducted in cryptocurrency and Hydra's 
operators charged a commission for every such transaction. In 2021, 
Hydra accounted for an estimated 80 percent of all darknet market-
related cryptocurrency transactions, and since 2015, the marketplace 
had received approximately $5.2 billion in cryptocurrency. The seizure 
of the Hydra servers and cryptocurrency wallets containing $25 million 
worth of bitcoin was made in Germany by the German Federal Criminal 
Police (the Bundeskriminalamt), in coordination with the FBI and our 
other Federal partners in the Drug Enforcement Administration, the 
Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Homeland 
Security Investigations, and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task 
Forces. The FBI used technical expertise and legal authorities, and, 
most importantly, our world-wide partnerships to significantly disrupt 
this illegal marketplace.
    In March, the FBI conducted a successful court-authorized operation 
to remove botnet malware known as Cyclops Blink from the botnet's 
command and control devices, cutting off the Russian Main Intelligence 
Directorate's (GRU) control over thousands of infected devices--mainly 
in small to mid-sized businesses--world-wide. The GRU had been building 
this malicious botnet, which ultimately spanned the globe, as early as 
June 2019, as a replacement for the VPNFilter malware we exposed and 
disrupted in 2018. Over several months, the FBI worked closely with 
WatchGuard Technologies, the developer of many of the infected devices, 
to analyze the malware, and WatchGuard developed detection tools and 
remediation techniques. In February, before the FBI's technical 
disruption, the FBI, NSA, CISA, and the United Kingdom's National Cyber 
Security Centre proactively released an advisory identifying the 
Cyclops Blink malware. That same day, WatchGuard released the detection 
and remediation tools. This latest disruption, in addition to 
highlighting the benefits of close public-private partnerships, proves 
that success against cyber threats doesn't only involve arrests and 
convictions.
    In total, we took over 1,100 actions against cyber adversaries last 
year, to include arrests, criminal charges, convictions, 
dismantlements, and disruptions, and enabled many more actions through 
our dedicated partnerships with the private sector, foreign partners, 
and with Federal, State, and local entities. We also provided thousands 
of individualized threat warnings and disseminated more than 100 public 
threat advisories by way of Joint Cybersecurity Advisories, FBI Liaison 
Alert System (``FLASH'') reports, Private Industry Notifications 
(``PINs''), and Public Service Announcements (``PSAs'')--many of which 
were jointly authored with other U.S. agencies and international 
partners.
    With our partners in the interagency, we have been putting a lot of 
energy and resources into all those partnerships, especially with the 
private sector. We are working hard to push important threat 
information to network defenders, but we have also been making it as 
easy as possible for the private sector to share important information 
with us. For example, we are emphasizing to the private sector how we 
keep our presence unobtrusive in the wake of an incident; how we 
protect information that the private sector shares with us, including 
their identities. We are also committed to providing useful feedback 
and improving coordination with our government partners so that we are 
speaking with one voice. But we need the private sector to do its part, 
too. We need the private sector to come forward to warn us--and warn us 
quickly--when they see malicious cyber activity. We also need the 
private sector to work with us when we warn them that they are being 
targeted. The recent examples of significant cyber incidents--
SolarWinds, Cyclops Blink, the Colonial pipeline incident--only 
emphasize what I have been saying for a long time: The Government 
cannot protect against cyber threats on its own. We need a whole-of-
society approach that matches the scope of the danger. There is no 
other option for defending a country where nearly all of our critical 
infrastructure, personal data, intellectual property, and network 
infrastructure sits in private hands.
    In summation, the FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat 
cyber threats, from improving threat identification and information 
sharing inside and outside of the Government to examining the way we 
operate to disrupt and defeat these threats. We take all potential 
threats to public and private-sector systems seriously and will 
continue to investigate, disrupt, and hold accountable those who pose a 
threat in cyber space.
Foreign Intelligence Threats
            Top Threats
    We see nations such as China, Russia, and Iran becoming more 
aggressive and more capable in their nefarious activity than ever 
before. These nations seek to undermine our core democratic, economic, 
and scientific institutions. They employ a growing range of tactics to 
advance their interests and to harm the United States. Defending 
American institutions and values against these threats is a national 
security imperative and a priority for the FBI.
    With that, the greatest long-term threat to our Nation's ideas, 
innovation, and economic security is the foreign intelligence and 
economic espionage threat from China. It's a threat to our economic 
security--and by extension--to our National security. The Chinese 
government aspires to equal or surpass the United States as a global 
superpower and influence the world with a value system shaped by 
undemocratic authoritarian ideals. The pursuit of these goals is often 
with little regard for international norms and laws.
    When it comes to economic espionage, the PRC uses every means at 
its disposal against us, blending cyber, human intelligence, diplomacy, 
corporate transactions, and pressure on U.S. companies operating in 
China, to achieve its strategic goals to steal our companies' 
innovations. These efforts are consistent with China's expressed goal 
to become a national power, modernizing its military and creating 
innovative-driven economic growth.
    To pursue this goal, China uses not only human intelligence 
officers, co-optees, and corrupt corporate insiders, but also 
sophisticated cyber intrusions, pressure on U.S. companies in China, 
shell-game corporate transactions, and joint-venture ``partnerships'' 
that are anything but a true partnership. There's also nothing 
traditional about the scale of their theft--it's unprecedented in the 
history of the FBI. American workers and companies are facing a 
greater, more complex danger than they've ever dealt with before. 
Stolen innovation means stolen jobs, stolen opportunities for American 
workers, stolen national power, and stolen leadership in the 
industries.
            National Counterintelligence Task Force (``NCITF'')
    As the lead U.S. counterintelligence agency, the FBI is responsible 
for detecting and lawfully countering the actions of foreign 
intelligence services and organizations as they seek to adversely 
affect U.S. National interests. The FBI recognized the need to 
coordinate similar efforts across all agencies, and therefore 
established the National Counterintelligence Task Force (``NCITF'') to 
create a whole-of-Government approach to counterintelligence. The FBI 
established the National-level task force, or NCITF, in the National 
Capital Region to coordinate, facilitate, and focus these multi-agency 
counterintelligence operations, and to programmatically support local 
Counterintelligence Task Force (``CITF'') operations. Combining the 
authorities and operational capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community; Federal, State, and local law enforcement; and local CITFs 
in each FBI field office, the NCITF coordinates and leads whole-of-
Government efforts to defeat hostile intelligence activities targeting 
the United States.
    The Department of Defense has been a key partner in the NCITF since 
its founding in 2019. While the FBI has had long-term collaborative 
relationships with DoD entities such as the Air Force Office of Special 
Investigations, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and Army 
Counterintelligence, the NCITF has allowed us to enhance our 
collaboration with each other for greater impact. We plan to emphasize 
this whole-of-Government approach moving forward as a powerful formula 
to mitigate the modern counterintelligence threat.
            Transnational Repression
    In recent years, we have seen a rise in efforts by authoritarian 
regimes to interfere with freedom of expression and punish dissidents 
abroad. These acts of repression cross national borders, often reaching 
into the United States. It's important to note countries like China, 
Russia, and Iran, stalk, intimidate, and harass certain people in the 
United States. This is called transnational repression. It's illegal 
and the FBI is investigating it.
    Transnational repression can occur in different forms, including 
assaults and attempted kidnapping. Governments use transnational 
repression tactics to silence the voices of their citizens, U.S. 
residents, or non-citizens connected to the home country. This sort of 
repressive behavior is antithetical to our values as Americans. People 
from all over the world are drawn to the United States by the promise 
of living in a free and open society--one that adheres to the rule of 
law. To ensure that this promise remains a reality, we must continue to 
use all of our tools to block authoritarian regimes that seek to extend 
their tactics of repression beyond their shores.
            Foreign Malign Influence
    Our Nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats seeking to 
both influence our National policies and public opinion, and cause harm 
to our National dialog and debate. The FBI and our interagency partners 
remain concerned about, and focused on, foreign malign influence 
operations--which include subversive, undeclared, coercive, and 
criminal actions used by foreign governments in their attempts to sway 
U.S. voters' preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, 
increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American 
people's confidence in our democratic institutions and processes.
    Foreign malign influence is not a new problem, but the 
interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of 
the internet, have changed the nature of the threat and how the FBI and 
its partners must address it. Foreign malign influence operations have 
taken many forms and used many tactics over the years. Most widely 
reported these days are attempts by adversaries--hoping to reach a wide 
swath of Americans covertly from outside the United States--to amplify 
existing stories on social media in an attempt to discredit U.S. 
individuals and institutions.
    The FBI is the lead Federal agency responsible for investigating 
foreign malign influence threats. Several years ago, we established the 
Foreign Influence Task Force (``FITF'') to identify and counteract 
foreign malign influence operations targeting the United States. The 
FITF is led by the Counterintelligence Division and comprises agents, 
analysts, and professional staff from the Counterintelligence, Cyber, 
Counterterrorism, and Criminal Investigative Divisions. It is 
specifically charged with identifying and combating foreign malign 
influence operations targeting democratic institutions and values 
inside the United States. In all instances, the FITF strives to protect 
democratic institutions, develop a common operating picture, raise 
adversaries' costs, and reduce their overall asymmetric advantage.
    The FITF brings the FBI's National security and traditional 
criminal investigative expertise under one umbrella to prevent foreign 
influence in our elections. This better enables us to frame the threat, 
to identify connections across programs, to aggressively investigate as 
appropriate, and--importantly--to be more agile. Coordinating closely 
with our partners and leveraging relationships we have developed in the 
technology sector, we had several instances where we were able to 
quickly relay threat indicators that those companies used to take swift 
action, blocking budding abuse of their platforms.
    Following the 2018 midterm elections, we reviewed the threat and 
the effectiveness of our coordination and outreach. As a result of this 
review, we further expanded the scope of the FITF. Previously, our 
efforts to combat malign foreign influence focused solely on the threat 
posed by Russia. Utilizing lessons learned since 2018, the FITF widened 
its aperture to confront malign foreign operations of the PRC, Iran, 
and other global adversaries. To address this expanding focus and wider 
set of adversaries and influence efforts, we have also added resources 
to maintain permanent ``surge'' capability on election and foreign 
influence threats.
    In addition, the domestic counterintelligence environment is more 
complex than ever. This Nation faces a persistent and pervasive 
National security threat from foreign adversaries, particularly Russia 
and China, conducting sophisticated intelligence operations using 
coercion, subversion, malign influence, disinformation, cyber and 
economic espionage, traditional spying and non-traditional human 
intelligence collection. Together, they pose a continuous threat to 
U.S. National security and its economy by targeting strategic 
technologies, industries, sectors, and critical infrastructures. 
Historically, these asymmetric National security threats involved 
foreign intelligence service officers seeking U.S. Government and U.S. 
intelligence community information. The FBI has observed foreign 
adversaries employing a wide range of nontraditional collection 
techniques, including the use of human collectors not affiliated with 
intelligence services, foreign investment in critical U.S. sectors, and 
infiltration of U.S. supply chains. The FBI continues to adjust its CI 
priorities and posture to address the evolving and multifaceted threat.
                            criminal threats
    We continue to face many criminal threats, from complex white-
collar fraud in the financial, health care, and housing sectors to 
transnational and regional organized criminal enterprises to violent 
crime and public corruption. Criminal organizations--domestic and 
international--and individual criminal activity represent a significant 
threat to our security and safety in communities across the Nation.
Violent Crime
    Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals 
and communities. Many of today's gangs are sophisticated and well-
organized and use violence to control neighborhoods, and boost their 
illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun 
trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution rings. These gangs do 
not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or 
communities. The FBI is able to work across such lines, which is vital 
to the fight against violent crime in big cities and small towns across 
the Nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with 
Federal, State, local, territorial, and Tribal officers and deputies on 
joint task forces and individual investigations.
    Like the FBI's work combatting gangs, the FBI also investigates the 
most serious crimes in Indian Country--such as murder, child sexual and 
physical abuse, violent assaults, domestic violence, drug trafficking, 
public corruption, financial crimes, and Indian gaming violations. As 
you are aware, there are 574 Federally-recognized American Indian 
Tribes in the United States, and the FBI has Federal law enforcement 
responsibility on 188 Indian reservations. The FBI coordinates and 
collaborates with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (``BIA''), Office of 
Justice Services; and other Federal, State, and Tribal partners across 
the United States to investigate crimes in Indian Country.''
    Over the past 2 years, the FBI's work in Indian Country increased 
significantly due to the July 9, 2020, Supreme Court ruling in McGirt 
v. Oklahoma, which determined that the original boundaries of the 
Muscogee Creek Nation (``MCN'') were never disestablished. This 
decision had the practical effect of requiring all land within MCN's 
territorial boundaries to fall under Federal Indian Country 
jurisdiction, thus expanding the FBI's responsibility for investigating 
felony offenses committed by or against an Indian. The principles of 
the McGirt decision also apply to Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, 
Seminole, and Quapaw Tribal territories in Oklahoma. Combined, all 6 
reservations encompass approximately 32,000 square miles, or 45 percent 
of the State of Oklahoma. The total population within the combined 
borders is roughly 1.9 million, of which approximately 420,000 are 
enrolled Tribal members.
    This drastic increase in FBI jurisdiction has significant and long-
term operational and public safety implications given the increased 
number of violent criminal cases now under Federal jurisdiction within 
Oklahoma's Indian Country. Since this decision, the FBI's Oklahoma City 
Field Office (``OC'') has seen a drastic increase in the total number 
of Indian Country investigations and now has the FBI's largest 
investigative responsibility. Since the Federal court ruling in the 
McGirt case, the FBI's Oklahoma City field office, which previously 
investigated approximately 50 criminal cases a year involving Native 
Americans, has managed thousands of Indian Country cases, prioritizing 
cases involving the most violent offenders who pose the most serious 
risk to the public.
    To effectively conduct these investigations, the FBI has conducted 
temporary duty (``TDY'') rotations of Special Agents, Intelligence 
Analysts, Victim Specialists, and other professional staff to the 
Muskogee and Tulsa RAs, the offices most impacted by the decision. The 
FBI has also expanded State, local, and Tribal participation on task 
forces to assist with response and investigative efforts. To support 
the U.S. Attorney's effective prosecution of these crimes, the FBI must 
have the capability to sustain an enhanced presence in FBI OC.
    The FBI is committed to its mission of protecting Tribal 
communities through its Indian Country investigative program. With more 
than 150 Special Agents and 23 Safe Trails Task Forces around the 
country, the FBI has demonstrated its commitment to the safety and 
security of indigenous people by vigorously investigating the most 
serious crimes facing their communities. The FBI works to enhance its 
effectiveness by leveraging its relationships with its State, local, 
and Federal partners, both on and off the reservations.
    The 2020 McGirt decision significantly increased the FBI's 
investigative responsibilities in Oklahoma by dramatically increasing 
both its territorial jurisdiction and caseload requirements. 
Furthermore, the decision created a jurisdictional gap, in that a large 
number of general crimes affecting Native American victims became 
unaddressed. In response the FBI surged National resources to ensure it 
was able to address its mission requirements to investigate major 
crimes in the newly designated Tribal Territory. These surges 
subsequently caused resource strains on other investigative programs 
and threats. The Castro-Huerta decision began to relieve that pressure 
and has the future potential to reduce FBI caseloads by an estimated 15 
percent-20 percent in Oklahoma, while bridging the jurisdictional gap 
by allowing State authorities to address certain general crimes. This 
would free FBI resources to return to other National threat issues, 
while still providing Tribal communities with the FBI law enforcement 
services they've historically relied on.
    The FBI fully recognizes and supports Tribal sovereignty while 
still seeking innovative ways to service the law enforcement needs of 
indigenous communities. The FBI believes ensuring public safety is a 
top priority and Castro-Huerta provides an avenue of bolstering that 
safety with the addition of State law enforcement services, while 
relieving resource burdens on the FBI. The FBI therefore supports the 
underlying policy as established in Castro-Huerta and would be opposed 
to legislation to abrogate the decision.
Transnational Organized Crime (``TOC'')
    More than a decade ago, organized crime was characterized by 
hierarchical organizations, or families, that exerted influence over 
criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or States. But organized 
crime has changed dramatically. Today, international criminal 
enterprises run multi-national, multi-billion-dollar schemes from start 
to finish. Modern-day criminal enterprises are flat, fluid networks 
with global reach. While still engaged in many of the ``traditional'' 
organized crime activities of loan-sharking, extortion, and murder, 
modern criminal enterprises are targeting stock market fraud and 
manipulation, cyber-facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, drug 
trafficking, identity theft, human trafficking, money laundering, human 
smuggling, public corruption, weapons trafficking, extortion, 
kidnapping, wildlife and timber trafficking, illegal fishing, illegal 
mining, and other illegal activities. TOC networks exploit legitimate 
institutions for critical financial and business services that enable 
the storage or transfer of illicit proceeds. Preventing and combating 
transnational organized crime demands a concentrated effort by the FBI 
and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners.
    While the FBI continues to share intelligence about criminal groups 
with our partners and combines resources and expertise to gain a full 
understanding of each group, the threat of transnational crime remains 
a significant and growing threat to national and international security 
with implications for public safety, public health, democratic 
institutions, and economic stability across the globe. TOC groups 
increasingly exploit jurisdictional boundaries to conduct their 
criminal activities overseas. Furthermore, they are expanding their use 
of emerging technology to traffic illicit drugs and contraband across 
international borders and into the United States.
Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking
    It is unthinkable, but every year, thousands of children become 
victims of crimes, whether it is through kidnappings, violent attacks, 
sexual abuse, human trafficking, or on-line predators. The FBI is 
uniquely positioned to provide a rapid, proactive, and comprehensive 
response; identify, locate, and recover child victims; and strengthen 
relationships between the FBI and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 
international law enforcement partners to identify, prioritize, 
investigate, and deter individuals and criminal networks from 
exploiting children.
    But the FBI's ability to learn about and investigate child sexual 
exploitation is being threatened by the proliferation of sites on-line 
on the Darknet. For example, currently, there are at least 30 child 
pornography sites operating openly and notoriously on the Darknet, 
including the Tor network. Some of these child pornography sites are 
exclusively dedicated to the sexual abuse of infants and toddlers. The 
sites often expand rapidly, with one site obtaining 200,000 new members 
within its first 4 weeks of operation.
    The FBI combats this pernicious crime problem through 
investigations such as Operation Pacifier, which targeted the 
administrators and users of a highly sophisticated, Tor-based global 
enterprise dedicated to the sexual exploitation of children. This 
multi-year operation led to the arrest of approximately 350 individuals 
based in the United States, the prosecution of 25 American child 
pornography producers and 51 American hands-on abusers, the rescue or 
identification of 55 American children, the arrest of 548 international 
individuals, and the identification or rescue of 296 children abroad.
    The FBI has several programs in place to arrest child predators and 
to recover missing and endangered children. To this end, the FBI funds 
or participates in a variety of endeavors, including our Innocence Lost 
National Initiative, Innocent Images National Initiative, Operation 
Cross Country, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team, Victim Services, 
over 80 Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Forces, over 50 
International Violent Crimes Against Children Task Force Officers, as 
well as numerous community outreach programs to educate parents and 
children about safety measures they can follow. Through improved 
communications, the FBI also has the ability to quickly collaborate 
with partners throughout the world, which plays an integral role in 
crime prevention.
    The Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Team is a rapid response team 
comprised of experienced investigators strategically located across the 
country to quickly respond to child abductions. Investigators are able 
to provide a full array of investigative and technical resources during 
the most critical time period following the abduction of a child, such 
as the collection and analysis of DNA, impression and trace evidence 
and the processing of digital forensic evidence.
    In addition to programs combating child exploitation, the FBI also 
focuses efforts to stop human trafficking. The FBI works 
collaboratively with law enforcement partners to combat all forms of 
human trafficking through Human Trafficking Task Forces Nation-wide.
    The majority of human trafficking victims recovered during FBI 
investigations are United States citizens, but traffickers are 
opportunists who will exploit any victim with a vulnerability, 
including foreign nationals and victims of all ages, by subjecting them 
to forced labor or sex trafficking. We take a victim-centered, trauma-
informed approach to investigating these cases and strive to ensure the 
needs of victims are fully addressed at all stages. To accomplish this, 
the FBI works in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and 
victim specialists on the local, State, Tribal, and Federal levels, as 
well as with a variety of vetted non-Governmental organizations. Even 
after the arrest and conviction of human traffickers, the FBI often 
continues to work with partner agencies and organizations to assist 
victims and survivors in moving beyond their exploitation.
Civil Rights
    The FBI remains dedicated to protecting the cherished freedoms of 
all Americans. Civil rights crimes are among the most egregious 
violations of Federal law--they include color of law violations, hate 
crimes, Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (``FACE'') Act 
violations, and voter suppression. These crimes cause long-term, 
enduring damage to communities and economic infrastructure, compromise 
law enforcement and judicial system capabilities, and provoke wide-
spread fear and trauma. We also support the work and cases of our State 
and local partners, as needed.
    The investigation of hate crimes is the No. 1 priority within the 
FBI's civil rights program due to the devastating effect these types of 
crimes can have not just on the victims and their families, but also on 
entire communities. A hate crime is a criminal offense against a person 
or property motivated in whole or in part by the perpetrator's bias 
against a race, religion, disability, ethnic/national origin, sexual 
orientation, gender, or gender identity. While the First Amendment to 
the Constitution allows for the free expression of both offensive and 
hateful speech, this protection does not extend to criminal acts, even 
those done to express an idea or belief. The First Amendment also does 
not protect someone who issues a true threat to inflict physical harm 
on individuals or groups, or who intentionally solicits others to 
commit unlawful acts of violence on his or her behalf. The FBI remains 
dedicated to investigating these types of crimes.
    Beyond investigative work, the FBI recognizes proper and thorough 
handling of civil rights crimes does not begin the moment they are 
reported--it begins before they occur, with a solid and trusting 
relationship between the community and law enforcement. Each FBI field 
office will be taking specific actions to combat civil rights crimes in 
their area of responsibility (``AOR'') to encourage systemic change. 
These actions include identifying appropriate partner agencies and 
local groups to develop outreach relationships at all levels, 
especially those that will spark institutional change; increasing civil 
rights-focused working groups and task forces with Federal, State, 
local, private, public, and non-profit partners; and providing 
increased training for State and local agencies and community groups 
centered on color of law investigations and hate crimes statutes to 
provide education about civil rights violations, promote increased 
reporting of hate crimes, and rebuild community trust in law 
enforcement.
    Furthermore, we are focused on working with our State and local 
partners to collectively do a better job of tracking and reporting hate 
crime and color of law violations to fully understand what is happening 
in our communities and how to stop it. Our ability to address 
significant National issues, such as the use of force and officer-
involved shootings and jurisdictional increases in violent crime, 
depends on fuller statistical understanding of the underlying facts and 
circumstances. Some jurisdictions fail to report hate crime statistics, 
while others claim there are no hate crimes in their community--a fact 
that would be welcome, if true. We are dedicated to working vigorously 
with our State and local counterparts in every jurisdiction to better 
track and report hate crimes, in an accurate, timely, and publicly 
transparent manner.
            Lawful Access
    The FBI remains a strong advocate for the wide and consistent use 
of encryption. Protecting data and privacy in a digitally-connected 
world is a top priority for the FBI, and we believe that promoting 
encryption is a vital part of that mission. Encryption without lawful 
access, though, does have a negative effect on law enforcement's 
ability to protect the public. As I have testified previously, when the 
FBI discusses lawful access, we mean putting providers who manage 
encrypted data in a position to decrypt it and provide it to us in 
response to a legal process. We do not mean for encryption to be 
weakened or compromised so that it can be defeated from the outside by 
law enforcement or anyone else. Unfortunately, too much of the debate 
over lawful access has revolved around discussions of this concept that 
the FBI would not support.
    The problems caused by law enforcement agencies' inability to 
easily access electronic evidence continue to grow. Increasingly, 
commercial device manufacturers have employed encryption in such a 
manner that only the device users can access the content of the 
devices. Similarly, more and more communications service providers are 
designing their platforms and apps such that only the parties to the 
communication can access the content. This is generally known as ``end-
to-end'' encryption. The proliferation of end-to-end encryption is a 
serious issue that increasingly limits law enforcement's ability, even 
after obtaining a lawful warrant or court order, to access critical 
evidence and information needed to disrupt threats, protect the public, 
and bring perpetrators to justice.
    For example, even with our substantial resources, accessing the 
content of known or suspected terrorists' data pursuant to court-
authorized legal process is increasingly difficult. The often on-line 
nature of the terrorist radicalization process, along with the insular 
nature of most of today's attack plotters, leaves fewer dots for 
investigators to connect in time to stop an attack, and end-to-end 
encryption increasingly hide even those often precious few and fleeting 
dots.
    In one instance, while planning--and right up until the eve of--the 
December 6, 2019, shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola that killed 3 
U.S. sailors and severely wounded 8 other Americans, deceased terrorist 
Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani communicated undetected with overseas al-
Qaeda terrorists using an end-to-end encrypted app. Then, after the 
attack, encryption prevented the FBI from accessing information 
contained in his phones for several months. As a result, during the 
critical time period immediately following the shooting and despite 
obtaining search warrants for the deceased killer's devices, the FBI 
could not access the information on those phones to identify co-
conspirators or determine whether they may have been plotting 
additional attacks.
    This problem spans international and domestic terrorism threats. 
For example, subjects of our investigation into the January 6 Capitol 
siege used end-to-end encrypted communications.
    We face the same problem in protecting children against violent 
sexual exploitation. End-to-end encryption frequently prevent us from 
discovering and searching for victims, since the vital tips we receive 
from providers only arrive when those providers themselves are able to 
detect and report child exploitation being facilitated on their 
platforms and services.
    When we are able to open investigations, end-to-end encryption make 
it much more difficult to bring perpetrators to justice. Much evidence 
of crimes against children, just like the evidence of many other kinds 
of crime today, exists primarily in electronic form. If we cannot 
obtain that critical electronic evidence, our efforts are frequently 
hamstrung.
    This problem is not just limited to Federal investigations. Our 
State and local law enforcement partners have been consistently 
advising the FBI that they, too, are experiencing similar end-to-end 
encryption challenges, which are now being felt across the full range 
of State and local criminal law enforcement. Many report that even 
relatively unsophisticated criminal groups, like street gangs, are 
frequently using encrypted smartphones and end-to-end encrypted 
communications apps to shield their activities from detection or 
disruption. As this problem becomes more and more acute for State and 
local law enforcement, the advanced technical resources needed to 
address even a single investigation involving end-to-end encryption 
will continue to increase.
                               conclusion
    Finally, the strength of any organization is its people. The 
threats we face as a Nation have never been greater or more diverse and 
the expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher. Our fellow 
citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from all threats, 
and the people of the FBI continue to meet and exceed those 
expectations, every day. I want to thank them for their dedicated 
service.
    Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am happy 
to answer any questions you might have.

    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes Director Abizaid to summarize her 
statement for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE ABIZAID, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
  COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                          INTELLIGENCE

    Ms. Abizaid. Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, 
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today to discuss the overall terrorism 
landscape.
    Now, despite significant progress in diminishing the 
terrorist threat to the United States, the country continues to 
face a diversified transnational, and in many ways, 
unpredictable threat environment, both at home and abroad. An 
array of actors, whether foreign terrorist organizations, state 
sponsors of terrorism, or lone actors, are shaping the nature 
of today's threat. This changed environment exists amid an on-
going transition for the counterterrorism community where CT, 
while critical, is one of many competing priorities that the 
U.S. national security community must be postured to address.
    In today's testimony I will start by giving an overview of 
the terrorist threat to the homeland, I will turn to the 
overseas threat, and then end with some comments on the 
importance of our continued CT focus.
    Regarding the threat to the United States homeland, 
terrorist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda remain 
committed to attacking the United States. However, unlike 21 
years ago, the threat today is more likely to take the form of 
an individual attacker inspired by these groups rather than a 
highly networked hierarchically-directed terrorist plot. In 
fact, since 9/11 37 of the 45 ISIS or al-Qaeda-linked attacks 
in the homeland have been inspired by these groups rather than 
centrally managed by them. This trend toward lone actor threats 
inside the United States extends beyond ISIS and al-Qaeda, it 
also characterizes the threat we face from domestic actors, 
such as racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, 
militia violent extremists, or anarchist violent extremists.
    In particular, the U.S.-based racially and ethnically 
motivated violent extremist, or REMVE threat, has the most 
obvious links to transnational actors whose plots and professed 
ideology encourage mobilization to violence by those vulnerable 
to their messaging. This threat is fluid, it is fragmented, it 
lacks in hierarchical structures, and it has proponents around 
the globe and in the United States framing actions around the 
concept of leaderless resistance.
    Transitioning to the overseas environment, Sunni- and Shia-
driven terrorist movements world-wide continue to dominate the 
threat to Americans. ISIS and al-Qaeda continue to aspire to 
attack the United States and other Western targets overseas, 
though they have been more effective at pursuing operations 
against regional and local adversaries. For its part, ISIS in 
Iraq and Syria remains an intact centrally-led organization 
that will most likely continue to pose both a global threat and 
a local one, despite the death of its Emir in February, Hajji 
Abdullah.
    While significantly weaker than at its peak in 2015 through 
2017, ISIS leaders from Iraq and Syria have been successful at 
spurning branches and networks across Africa and as far as 
South and East Asia with its two most effective branches 
currently operating out of West Africa and Afghanistan.
    Likewise, al-Qaeda maintains its regional affiliate 
structure, positioned effectively in parts of North and East 
Africa, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent, South Asia. 
The July death of long-time al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
was a strategic and symbolic setback for al-Qaeda, but it does 
not put an end to the organization. In particular, in the 
Middle East, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is a 
destabilizing actor in Yemen and remains among the most 
intrepid al-Qaeda affiliates intent on attacking the United 
States homeland.
    Two other prominent al-Qaeda affiliates also stand out, 
both for their growing regional influence and their significant 
capabilities. The Sahel-based al-Qaeda affiliate, JNIM, and the 
Somalia-based affiliate, al-Shabaab.
    Transitioning from Sunni terrorism to threats emanating 
from Iran, its partners and proxies, Iran continues to plan, 
encourage, and support plots against the United States, both at 
home and in the Middle East, where we have a significant U.S. 
military presence. Iran and its proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah, have 
sought to plot attacks against former U.S. officials to 
retaliate for the death of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps' 
Qods Force commander Qasum Solomani, raising the threat both at 
home and abroad for those that Iran deems responsible.
    In closing, I would just highlight that the complexity of 
the terrorism environment that I just outlined continues to 
demand a collaborative, agile, and sufficiently resourced CT 
effort to mitigate terrorist threats to the United States. It 
is clear that the significant CT pressure brought to bear 
against terrorist groups over the last 2 decades, along with 
investment in effective CT defenses here at home, has resulted 
in a diminished threat to the United States homeland.
    NCTC and its CT partners across the Government are working 
toward a sustainable and enduring level of support to this 
mission that maintains that strategic success even as other 
National security priorities drive our National strategy.
    Finally, I want to assure this committee that the 
interagency enterprise of CT practitioners remains committed to 
this mission and are working behind the scenes every day to 
protect the American people, both at home and abroad. I thank 
them for their service and their dedication to this country.
    With that, I welcome your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Christine Abizaid
                           November 15, 2022
    Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members 
of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the overall 
terrorism landscape, the threat posed to the homeland and U.S. persons 
and interests overseas, and the state of the U.S. counterterrorism (CT) 
enterprise.
           u.s. faces a persistent, evolving terrorist threat
    Despite significant progress in diminishing the terrorist threat to 
the United States, the country continues to face a diversified, 
transnational, and, in many ways, unpredictable threat environment both 
at home and abroad. An array of actors, whether foreign terrorist 
organizations (FTOs), state sponsors of terrorism, or lone actors, is 
shaping the nature of today's terrorism landscape. This persistent 
threat environment exists amid an on-going transition for the CT 
community where CT, while still critical, is one of many competing 
priorities the U.S. national security community must be postured to 
address.
    Internationally, Russia's invasion of and war in Ukraine, China's 
growing economic and security assertiveness, Iran's destabilizing 
activities in the Middle East and beyond, North Korea's confrontational 
behavior, and the growing capabilities of a number of cyber actors, for 
example, are among the most consequential challenges to U.S. National 
security.
    At the same time, violent extremism continues to fuel threats 
against the West from a growing swath of territory from the African 
Sahel to Southeast Asia and contributes to worsening humanitarian 
conditions in regions like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Notably, 
this diffusion of the threat, while challenging, has resulted in a less 
concentrated and effective terrorist capability directed inside the 
homeland.
    Terrorist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda and other aligned 
violent extremists take advantage of developing nations, political 
instability, and undergoverned territory to entrench themselves in 
difficult operating environments and ingratiate themselves to local 
populations. These movements remain committed to attacking U.S. persons 
and facilities world-wide even as they balance those goals against 
local gains. These groups represent the most urgent threat to U.S. 
interests overseas.
    In the homeland, we remain concerned about al-Qaeda and ISIS 
threats but assess the threat these groups pose here is less acute than 
at any other time since 9/11, a judgment consistent with what we 
expressed last year. In fact, the most likely threat in the United 
States is from lone actors, whether inspired by violent extremist 
narratives, racially or ethnically motivated drivers to violence, or 
other politically-motivated violence.
    Against the backdrop of this threat landscape, whether overseas or 
at home, NCTC remains focused on uncovering and disrupting 
transnational networks from which threats to Americans and America are 
likely to emerge. Even as we monitor the threat, we also must evaluate 
the state of the CT community's ability to address it. This role is 
even more critical as resources shift away from CT and we need to 
account for the sustained ability to meet the threat, however it 
evolves.
                the main threat inside the united states
    Unlike 21 years ago, the American public today is more likely to 
experience a terrorist attack by an individual attacker than a highly 
structured terrorist organization. Today's lone-actor threats can 
mobilize in unpredictable ways based on a variety of motivations. These 
individuals almost certainly mobilize to violence independently without 
direction from specific groups.
    Since 9/11, there have been 37 attacks in the homeland inspired by 
al-Qaeda or ISIS, compared to 8 that involved a direct connection to 
these groups. Similarly, during the last 12 years, all of the 17 
racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (RMVE) attacks by 
actors espousing the superiority of the white race were by individuals 
who radicalized at least in part on-line and who mobilized to violence 
as lone actors.
FTOs inspiring lone actors
    Even as our concern grows about the threat from U.S.-based RMVEs 
and other domestic violent extremists, we remain concerned and vigilant 
regarding the threat from lone actors and small groups inspired by 
FTOs. Since 2001, the threat emanating from these individuals has 
evolved from one defined by complex, large-scale attacks directed by an 
FTO to mostly simple, self-initiated attacks inspired by an FTO. 
Messaging directed at these individuals to conduct attacks has 
decreased, although they continue to draw inspiration from historical 
publications such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) Inspire 
magazine or ISIS's messaging directed at these individuals.
Domestic violent extremists
    Since 2018, drawing on our significant knowledge of transnational 
terrorism, NCTC has regularly supported the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to 
understand the threat in the homeland posed by domestic violent 
extremists. Within this category of threat actors, acts of violence by 
U.S.-based RMVEs, militia violent extremists (MVEs), and anarchist 
violent extremists (AVEs) stand out. The RMVE threat has the most 
obvious links to transnational actors whose plots and professed 
ideology encourage mobilization to violence by those vulnerable to 
their messaging. The RMVE threat is largely fluid, fragmented, and 
lacking in hierarchical structures, with proponents framing actions 
around the concept of leaderless resistance.
    U.S.-based RMVEs' linkage to foreign counterparts mostly involves 
the bidirectional sharing of violent extremist messaging, mutual 
grievances, manifestos of successful attackers, and encouragement for 
lone-actor violence, such as by the alleged Buffalo shooter. As with 
other terrorism challenges, RMVEs anywhere can operate transnationally 
by exploiting a world connected by social media and other on-line 
platforms. Even as technology companies improve their capabilities to 
detect and respond to violent extremist content on-line, RMVEs and 
their supporters find new methods to spread their message.
    Additionally, the lethal threat from MVEs remains elevated, 
primarily toward Government and law enforcement personnel. MVEs are 
willing to use violence to redress perceived Government overreach and 
other sociopolitical grievances, judging from an increase in MVE 
plotting, disruptions, and FBI investigations since 2020.
    AVEs also present a threat of sporadic violent physical assaults 
and property crimes affecting critical infrastructure most often 
directed at people or institutions seen as representing authority, 
capitalism, and oppression. Developments that heighten perceptions of 
inequality or social injustice might further embolden AVEs to commit 
acts of violence.
Disrupting terrorist travel and securing the border
    In addition to supporting DHS and FBI efforts to disrupt threats 
inside the United States NCTC also supports efforts to prevent 
terrorist's infiltration of the homeland. Identifying known or 
suspected terrorists or their affiliates who seek to infiltrate U.S. 
borders by land, sea, or air is central to the U.S. Government's CT 
strategy. NCTC collaborates regularly with its partners, and on their 
behalf, State and local partners, to build a common threat picture to 
enable operating partners to protect the U.S. border. In particular, 
NCTC continues to support the U.S. Government's screening and vetting 
enterprise and plays a critical role in refugee and immigration 
processing by identifying any connections to international terrorism, 
not only for the applicant, but also appropriate members of the 
applicant's family.
           the terrorist threat overseas continues to evolve
    Turning to the overseas environment, foreign terrorist movements 
world-wide continue to inspire followers and enable attack plotting 
against the United States, Americans, and other Western countries. ISIS 
and al-Qaeda, the two leading foreign terrorist threats to U.S. 
interests, continue to aspire to attack U.S. and other Western 
interests but have been more effective at pursuing operations against 
regional and local adversaries. CT pressure by the United States and 
foreign partners, during the last 15 years, has been critical in 
degrading the capability of these groups, particularly in disrupting 
experienced leaders and operatives and exacting sustained pressure 
against key networks.
ISIS's global enterprise
    ISIS in Iraq and Syria remains an intact, centrally-led 
organization that will most likely continue to pose a global threat to 
U.S. and other Western interests as well as local populations. Despite 
losing more than a dozen senior leaders during the past 3 years, it 
continues to wage a low-level insurgency in Iraq and Syria since its 
territorial defeat in 2018 and commands a cohesive global network that 
has allowed the group to sustain its influence--and in some areas, such 
as in Africa, expand its recruitment and operations. We assess that in 
February, after a raid that killed its overall amir, ISIS transitioned 
seamlessly to a new amir. ISIS members readily accepted the new leader 
and we see no signs of fissures or splintering by the branches and 
networks despite limitations the group faces in Iraq and Syria.
    Even under new leadership, ISIS remains committed to its long-term 
goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate and continues to exploit 
undergoverned areas in Iraq and Syria, where it currently operates as a 
clandestine insurgency. This year, ISIS prioritized and attacked a 
detention facility in northeastern Syria that housed key ISIS leaders 
and experienced fighters. While we assess most of the high-value 
detainees were either recaptured or killed as local forces responded to 
the attack, the operation itself signifies ISIS's ability to stage 
high-profile attacks and prioritize efforts to replenish its dwindling 
ranks. We have witnessed subsequent calls and efforts, including by 
ISIS branches as far away as West Africa, to free imprisoned members. 
ISIS's capabilities and trajectory will remain dependent upon the level 
of counterterrorism pressure it faces, particularly by CT actors who 
continue to routinely disrupt ISIS's facilitation networks and 
operations.
    One of ISIS's primary mechanisms to threaten the West is through 
its media, even as the group's overall media capabilities have declined 
from the group's early years. Despite this decline, ISIS's most 
prolific threat to the United States or other Western countries is 
through inspired attackers who are vulnerable to influence by ISIS 
messaging. The group's ability to inspire violence was most recently 
demonstrated by an ISIS supporter who carried out an attack in Oslo in 
June, which killed 2 and injured 21. Pro-ISIS supporter groups have 
also helped augment ISIS's media presence by creating, archiving, 
translating, and disseminating multilingual propaganda on-line. One 
such group supporting ISIS-Khorasan published English-language media 
focused on delegitimizing the United States and denigrating the 
Taliban.
    While we have seen a decline in the number of ISIS-inspired attacks 
in the West since peaking in 2017, such operations remain a priority 
for the organization. The group also still aspires to deploy operatives 
to the West, and we continue to monitor for threats against high-
visibility, attractive regional targets that would have similarly high 
impact and provide propaganda value and publicity, such as the 2022 
FIFA World Cup in Qatar. More broadly, ISIS has continued to grow its 
global enterprise, which now includes approximately 20 branches and 
networks, through which ISIS leaders' project strength and dispel the 
narrative of its defeat. In March, ISIS recognized its newest branch--
ISIS in the Sahel--and, in July, the branch claimed responsibility for 
an attack on Nigeria's Kuje prison--located 27 miles away from the U.S. 
Embassy--in which almost 1,000 prisoners were released, including some 
terrorists.
    ISIS has also used its branches and networks to choreograph global 
attack campaigns since 2019, the most recent of which was in April to 
avenge the death of the group's overall amir. ISIS in Iraq and Syria 
led in the number of attack claims and were boosted by ISIS-West Africa 
and ISIS-Khorasan, the branches we consider to be among the group's 
most capable.
    This year, ISIS-Khorasan expanded its ambitions outside Afghanistan 
with a handful of cross-border rocket attacks against Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan and a foiled plot in India. Its ambitions for attacking the 
West--possibly including the homeland--remains a top intelligence 
priority, notwithstanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Afghanistan last August.
    ISIS is also exploiting uneven local CT pressure in Central, East, 
and Southern Africa to expand its presence, increase connectivity, and 
develop new capabilities beyond its traditional strongholds in North 
and West Africa. ISIS's expansion in Mozambique increasingly threatens 
Western-led energy projects there, while signs of ISIS's influence in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, and elsewhere in the 
region demonstrate the group's growing appeal across the continent.
Al-Qaeda post-Zawahiri
    The death of al-Qaeda's longtime leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, this 
past July in Kabul, Afghanistan, dealt an important strategic and 
symbolic blow to the al-Qaeda network, which he led from relative 
isolation for more than a decade. Zawahiri was a respected ideological 
leader among the al-Qaeda global network who strove to enhance 
interconnectivity across al-Qaeda's dispersed regional affiliates. The 
network now finds itself without an obvious leader, but how quickly it 
will adapt to Zawahiri's loss remains to be seen.
    Three months past the operation that killed him, the group has yet 
to publicly announce a successor. Among the remaining al-Qaeda veterans 
are several Iran-based senior leaders, most notably Sayf al-`Adl and 
Abd-al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, who probably continue to provide ideological 
and strategic guidance to the global network. We expect they both will 
continue to have important roles in the years ahead, despite the irony 
of their location in Iran, another of al-Qaeda's sworn enemies. Other, 
less prominent al-Qaeda leaders--who have been featured in globally- 
and regionally-focused media--are in charge of the regional affiliates 
and likely consult across a distributed leadership team about the 
direction of the al-Qaeda network.
Al-Qaeda's global network
    Al-Qaeda's Iran-based senior leaders oversee the global network, 
which includes regional affiliates in Africa, the Middle East, and 
South Asia as well as various local networks that support the 
affiliates.
    Starting in West Africa, al-Qaeda's Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam al-
Muslimin (JNIM) is increasingly threatening capital cities in the Sahel 
while combatting local militaries, ISIS's Sahel province, and Russian 
paramilitary forces in Mali. In July of this year, the group attacked 
Mali's largest military camp, located just outside of Bamako, 
underscoring both its capabilities and growing boldness in the region. 
JNIM probably hopes to exploit the departure of French forces from Mali 
earlier this year to accelerate its growth and entrenchment, including 
into littoral West African states such as Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and 
Togo. CT concerns in the region have further led to instability fueling 
nondemocratic transitions of power, most recently last month in Burkina 
Faso.
    In the Horn of Africa, we remain concerned about the continued 
threat that al-Shabaab poses to U.S. citizens and Western interests. 
Al-Shabaab is the wealthiest and most lethal of all al-Qaeda 
affiliates, controls large portions of southern Somalia, and has 
demonstrated the capability to carry out successful operations across 
the region, including against U.S. service members.
    In North Africa, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has 
experienced setbacks from CT pressure since early 2018, but probably 
provides guidance to other al-Qaeda elements in the region, 
particularly JNIM. As of 2020, Algerian Yazid Mebrak was serving as 
AQIM's leader and was playing a key role in al-Qaeda's management of 
global operations, including the abductions and killing of Americans.
    Turning to the Middle East and Yemen, AQAP is intent on conducting 
operations in the West and against U.S. and allied regional interests. 
It has proven itself to be among the al-Qaeda network's most creative 
branches but has faced significant CT pressure in recent years, 
creating hurdles for the group's external operations planning.
    In June 2021, AQAP published its sixth issue of Inspire Guide, 
which provides operational guidance for would-be attackers in the 
homeland and suggests the group still maintains a viable media 
capability, despite the death last year of its key propagandist.
    In Syria, al-Qaeda elements under the banner of Hurras al-Din have 
struggled to stabilize their footing and experienced numerous 
leadership losses and pressure from rival group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. 
However, these elements could use their traditional safe haven in 
opposition-controlled territory to target U.S. and other Western 
interests in the region.
    Finally, in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda's South Asia affiliate, al-Qaeda 
in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS), is the weakest group in the 
organization's global network. Al-Qaeda remains intent on striking U.S. 
interests and inspiring its followers to do so but currently lacks a 
capability to direct attacks against the United States from 
Afghanistan. Separate from AQIS, there are probably fewer than a dozen 
al-Qaeda legacy members with historical ties to the group located in 
Afghanistan, and some may have been there prior to the fall of Kabul; 
we have no indication that these legacy members remaining in 
Afghanistan are involved in external attack plotting.
                  iranian threat to the united states
    Transitioning to threats emanating from Iran and its partners and 
proxies, Iran continues to encourage and support plots against the 
United States at home and abroad, especially in the Middle East. Iran 
and Lebanese Hizballah have remained intent on retaliating for the 
death of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) 
Commander Soleimani, with Iran plotting attacks against former U.S. 
officials.
    Iran is pursuing a diverse campaign that employs legal, financial, 
and lethal action in pursuit of its revenge. Tehran has publicly 
threatened to conduct lethal operations including against former 
President Donald Trump and former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, 
and has recently increased its threats of lethal action in the 
homeland. In August 2022, an Iran-based IRGC member was charged with 
attempting to arrange the murder of former National Security Advisor 
John Bolton in the United States.
    Iran also pursues a campaign against anti-Iranian regime dissidents 
around the world, including in the United States. In July 2021, U.S. 
law enforcement charged an Iranian intelligence official and four 
others with attempting to kidnap an Iranian-American journalist in New 
York and forcibly returning her to Iran. At the end of July 2022, a man 
with a loaded assault weapon was arrested after behaving suspiciously 
outside the same journalist's home.
    Iran has also demonstrated its willingness to engage in terrorism 
in the Middle East, as evidenced in June when Turkish authorities 
arrested members of an Iranian cell planning to kidnap and assassinate 
Israeli citizens in Istanbul. The plot was intended as retaliation for 
an alleged Israeli operation in Tehran. Separately, Iran-backed 
militants in Iraq and Syria target U.S. forces with unmanned aircraft 
systems and indirect fire attacks as they try to compel their 
withdrawal from the region.
                       evolving the ct enterprise
    The complexity of the threat just outlined continues to demand a 
collaborative, agile, and appropriately-resourced CT effort to mitigate 
terrorist threats to the United States. In the 21 years since 9/11, the 
U.S. Government has developed just that: A highly integrated, 
innovative, and successful CT enterprise that continues to adapt to the 
nature of the threat. CT practitioners work behind the scenes every day 
to ensure that interconnected CT operations and programs are 
effectively used and employ a wide range of tools, including identity 
intelligence, diplomatic security, sanctions, law enforcement 
investigations, high-value target operations, and partner capacity-
building efforts.
    Even as other priorities demand attention from the U.S. National 
security community, CT remains foundational to our National security. 
The CT enterprise must preserve CT fundamentals--such as collection, 
warning, analysis, disruption, information sharing, and key 
partnerships--that ultimately give the National security community the 
time and space to focus on non-CT priorities. NCTC and its CT partners 
throughout the U.S. Government are working toward a sustainable and 
enduring level of support to this mission that maintains our strategic 
success and creates space for investments in other National security 
priorities.
    CT in a time of competing priorities requires very purposeful and 
transparent decisions about when and where resource shifts can be made 
to retain as much of the hallmark interconnectivity and efficiency of 
the CT community as possible. The goal is to work with Congress to 
realize efficiencies while preserving the core capabilities required 
for the enduring mission. A key task for the CT community is ensuring 
those decisions are made deliberately and with a clear understanding as 
to the impact across the CT enterprise.
                             looking ahead
    Maintaining an efficient and effective CT architecture is an on-
going mission, and our progress during the past 21 years has been a 
whole-of-Government effort, enabled by Congress' support. As we look to 
posture for evolving threats and National security priorities, we must 
ensure that we capitalize on the CT infrastructure and relationships 
built since 9/11 in support of other National security efforts. An 
interconnected threat environment fueled by great power competition, 
regional conflicts, and humanitarian emergencies has the potential to 
escalate threats quickly. We must ensure that our CT enterprise, 
including our international and U.S.-based partners, retains the 
ability to stop threats and to stay abreast of a continually-evolving 
threat picture.
    Let me end by thanking the incredible community of intelligence, 
diplomatic, military, and law enforcement professionals whose 
dedication to the CT mission has done so much to protect this country 
and its citizens from a persistent and amorphous adversary. It is a 
privilege to be part of today's CT enterprise and to work on behalf of 
the American people.

    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
    I thank the witnesses for their testimony.
    I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to 
question the witnesses.
    I will now recognize myself for questions.
    Secretary Mayorkas, last year you said that ``domestic 
violent extremism poses the most lethal and persistent 
terrorism-related threat to our country today.'' Is that still 
true?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, that continues to be our 
assessment in the Department of Homeland Security, that 
domestic violent extremism, particularly through lone actors or 
small groups loosely affiliated, are spurred to violence by 
ideologies of hate, anti-Government sentiments, personal 
grievances, and other narratives propagated on on-line 
platforms.
    Chairman Thompson. Director Wray, what results on this 
domestic terrorism threat are you seeing from the lens of the 
FBI?
    Mr. Wray. Well, certainly we have seen over the last 
several years, really going back to maybe the summer of 2019, 
an increase in domestic violent extremism. We are concerned 
about the lethality, especially of racially motivated violent 
extremists, and then the spike that started in 2020 of anti-
Government, anti-authority violent extremism. So we have very 
active investigations really all over the country through our 
joint terrorism task forces in all 56 field offices and it is a 
growing problem. You know, this committee is well aware of the 
whole phenomenon of connecting the dots and the importance of 
that. It is the very reason why agencies like NCTC and DHS 
exist in many ways. But with the lone actors and these small 
cells, the real problem there is there are not a lot of dots 
out there to connect and there is very little time in which to 
connect them. So that presents a whole new type of challenge 
for law enforcement and the intelligence community and puts a 
premium on our engagement with the public, with our State and 
local law enforcement partners in particular, who really become 
the eyes and ears that are so critical, because any one of them 
could have the one dot that we need.
    Chairman Thompson. Ms. Abizaid, you talked about the 
pressure that we have applied to our international terrorist 
community and the results that have benefited from that 
pressure. Is it something that we need to increase the 
investment in that or increase the relationships with other 
governments? How do you see that going forward?
    Ms. Abizaid. I think a sustained investment in our 
international counterterrorism enterprise is very important to 
be able to sustain the pressure against international groups 
going forward.
    I agree with my colleagues' assessments here about the 
relative threat from domestic violent extremist actors here in 
the homeland versus international actors. Those international 
actors are continuing to plot and if they had an opportunity to 
infiltrate the United States, they would certainly look to 
exploit it. It is our international partners, our array of law 
enforcement, intelligence relationships and capabilities that 
enable us to stay on top of this international threat, even as 
we are dealing with some of those dynamics that Director Wray 
talked about here in the homeland that make it difficult for us 
to deal with a lone actor threat.
    Chairman Thompson. Director Wray, about a third of the 
historically Black colleges in this country over the last year 
have received bomb threats. Can you enlighten us on the FBI's 
attempt to mitigate or capture those individuals responsible 
for those threats?
    Mr. Wray. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    Needless to say, we take these threats very seriously. 
Frankly the idea of causing the fear and disruption that they 
have caused is just really outrageous and unacceptable. We have 
joint terrorism task forces working on it, 30 field offices, 
multiple headquarters divisions. It is very much on-going. I 
think what I could say for purposes of today is that we have 
recently, with respect to the first big traunch of the threats, 
investigation has identified an underage juvenile subject and 
because of the Federal limitations on charging juveniles with 
Federal crimes, we have worked with State prosecutors to ensure 
that that individual is charged under various other State 
offenses which will ensure some level of restrictions and 
monitoring and disruption of his criminal behavior.
    Since that big traunch that we believe that individual was 
responsible for, there have been two other traunches and we are 
very actively investigating those, but there is not much I can 
say on those on-going active investigations, those other 
investigations at this time. But we have been very engaged with 
HBCUs all over the country, we have done sort-of national 
conference calls and so forth with them to try to update them 
wherever we can. We recognize the fear and anger that this 
quite rightly causes in those communities and we are determined 
to see this through.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
    The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
    Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 
your testimony today. As you were speaking it just occurred to 
me how important this committee is and how important each of 
your respective work is. It is our job to do oversight and 
sometimes it is unpleasant. But the bottom line is we must 
never forget that you are at the head of keeping this country 
safe. I appreciate all the efforts of all of you. Sometimes you 
stumble like we all do, but it is also time to say thank you 
for what you do and how you do it.
    You know, when you hear about all the threats, it is hard 
to really distinguish one as the ubiquitous threat, but it 
seems to me that one of the most pervasive threats that exists 
now that wasn't really on our radar 8 years ago when I came in 
to Congress was a cyber issue. What we have done with respect 
to cyber with this committee is commendable, especially working 
with Chairman Thompson standing up CISA as an agency and making 
them at the--I like to call it the quarterback on the domestic 
front, and how well you have worked with the other agencies, 
like the FBI in that realm is great. But when you have cyber 
attacks, like on a water plant in Florida, which if successful 
would have killed thousands of people, you realize what a 
pervasive and probably the most ubiquitous threat we have in 
the United States is cyber.
    So in that realm, I am very heartened to see how CISA has 
stepped up working in conjunction with the private sector as a 
partnership. It is not a regulatory-type setting, it is more of 
an exchange of information and how well you work with the other 
agencies, including the FBI as well. So that is great.
    So, Chairman Mayorkas, I just want to ask you, what is your 
vision for CISA going forward, given the current threat 
environment and how important it is that we make sure CISA is 
strong and grows?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Ranking Member Katko, let me just thank 
you for your co-leadership of this committee and your service. 
I also want to express my thanks to this entire committee for 
its support of our cybersecurity mission, not only in the 
creation of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency, but also in the new legislation, the cyber incident 
reporting requirements, which I think are going to really 
strengthen the cybersecurity of this entire Nation.
    I think, Ranking Member Katko, you set forth a very 
important blueprint for CISA and the Cybersecurity 2025. What 
we need to do is to strengthen--only strengthen the public-
private partnership that really defines the cybersecurity 
ecosystem. The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative that CISA has 
launched is really a tremendous success. It is not just 
domestic, but our JCDC, as it is known by its acronym, in our 
international relationships and the partnerships are going to 
be increasingly vital as adverse nation-states only seek to 
perpetuate harm through the virtual world.
    Just a few weeks ago I was in Singapore for one of the 
world's preeminent cyber conferences and I spoke very starkly 
about the threat that China poses in the cybersecurity arena 
and how dangerous and perilous it is for countries to allow 
China to actually create their cyber infrastructure and how we 
need to combat that and create a level playing field. A 
competition of fairness is of course how we define ourselves, 
but to deal with a country that violates norms and does not act 
responsibly is something that we have to address.
    So the public-private partnership, the international 
relationships, the sharing of information is so vital and that 
is really where we are headed.
    Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Directors Wray and 
Abizaid.
    Every day you wake up probably thinking the same thing I do 
and I look at my phone and see if there was an attack that 
evening or somewhere around the world, and often times, sadly, 
there has been. So the threat of terrorist groups, ISIS and al-
Qaeda and all the others, is still very real. I know you spent 
a lot of time with that.
    Now, I just wish you could comment real quick and tell me 
if that threat matrix has changed since we left Afghanistan. Is 
Afghanistan becoming a breeding ground again? Is it more of a 
concern again?
    I will start with Ms. Abizaid, please. Briefly.
    Ms. Abizaid. Yes, I would say that from Afghanistan the 
threat that I am most concerned about is actually from the ISIS 
affiliate, the ISIS Khorasan affiliate. That is a group that 
has demonstrated very significant capability against the 
Taliban in Afghanistan right now. They have conducted some 
attacks outside of Afghanistan and the immediate environs and I 
am worried about their ambition for greater and wider-spread 
attacks.
    So it is a top priority for us.
    Mr. Katko. Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. I would share Director Abizaid's concern about 
ISIS-K in the immediate term. I would just add that we are very 
concerned about al-Qaeda, the prospect of al-Qaeda 
reconstituting, given the relationship with the Taliban and 
that is the flip side of finding Zawahiri right in the middle 
of Kabul.
    Mr. Katko. Exactly.
    Mr. Wray. Then I would add to that, we are concerned about 
the possibility that either al-Qaeda or ISIS-K could inspire 
attacks here in the United States or against Americans 
elsewhere.
    Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair will now recognize other Members for questions 
they may wish to ask witnesses. The Chair will recognize 
Members in order of seniority, alternating between Majority and 
Minority. Members that are participating virtually are reminded 
to unmute themselves when recognized for questioning and then 
to mute themselves once they have finished speaking and to 
leave their cameras on so they are visible to the Chair.
    The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the gentlelady from 
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 
Payne, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Payne. I want to thank everybody for their testimony 
today.
    Please bear with me a minute, I lost my----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman--Mr. Payne, we hear you.
    Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you.
    Just a few weeks ago an armed man broke into the San 
Francisco home of Speaker Pelosi in what appeared to be an 
assassination attempt. Although Speaker Pelosi was not home, 
the intruder violently attacked the Speaker's 82-year-old 
husband, putting him in the hospital. This attack occurred at a 
tense time for our Nation with extreme rhetoric suggesting 
violence against public officials.
    Director Wray, your own agency has also been subjected to 
such attacks after executing a search pursuant to a lawful 
warrant on the former President's residence as we saw with the 
incident outside an FBI office in Ohio.
    To the panel, how do you assess the current threats against 
elected and Government officials and how do your agencies 
proactively protect against this violence?
    Mr. Wray. I will start off and see whether Secretary 
Mayorkas may want to chime in.
    The phenomenon that you are describing, Congressman, I 
think has two pieces of it. The first is related toward 
violence toward all sorts of individuals in Government kind-of 
across the spectrum, and the second is law enforcement-
specific.
    On the first, we have seen a trend over the last several 
years of people more and more in this country when they are 
upset or angry about something turning to violence as the way 
to manifest it. That is a very, very dangerous trend. There is 
a right way under the First Amendment to express how angry and 
upset you are about something or with somebody, but violence 
and violence against Government officials is not it. But that 
is something that we have been seeing across the political 
spectrum now for quite a number of years.
    Second, I mentioned law enforcement. It is a reality that 
the already dangerous profession, namely law enforcement, has 
become more dangerous. Last year was the highest number of law 
enforcement officers shot and killed in the line of duty since 
9/11. I know personally because we have had agents shot and 
killed, we had a task force officer shot and killed, ambushed 
right outside one of our small offices in Terre Haute, Indiana. 
I call--one of the things I did when I started in this job was 
that I said I was going to call--every time an officer is shot 
and killed anywhere in the country in the line of duty, I was 
going to call the chief or the sheriff myself and express my 
condolences. I have made way north of 200 of those calls. It 
often is one a week and each one of those officers killed 
leaves behind a family, a department, and a community that will 
never be the same.
    So the phenomenon that you described affects both 
Government officials as victims across the spectrum, but also 
law enforcement uniquely. It is a trend that we should all as 
Americans be concerned about.
    Mr. Payne. Secretary Mayorkas.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Let me echo what the director said 
about what a tragically difficult year it has been for law 
enforcement.
    I want to reference one additional statistic, which is this 
year has seen the greatest number of ambushes against law 
enforcement officers. There is no more noble profession than 
the law enforcement profession. I know a number of you on this 
committee have served in that capacity.
    One of the areas of emphasis that the director and I have 
had is to be sure to disseminate timely and actionable 
information to State, local, Tribal, territorial, and campus 
law enforcement so that we equip our local communities to 
understand the threat landscape before them and prevent violent 
acts from occurring in the first instance.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you. That was a quick 5 minutes and I will 
yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas for 5 
minutes, Mr. McCaul.
    Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all 
three of you for your service. As Mr, Katko mentioned, I know 
it is not an easy job.
    I chaired this committee, you know, back in the day and I 
want to--you know, in my position being a leader now on foreign 
affairs, with the collapse of Afghanistan, what I have seen is 
a rise in our foreign nation adversary states. And the threat, 
quite honestly. The way it was done with the Taliban in charge 
of the evacuation, in charge of HKIA, a suicide bomber coming 
in and killing 13 service men and women, leaving Americans 
behind, leaving Afghan partners behind, getting Afghans on the 
planes that shouldn't have been on the airplanes, and got into 
the United States because it was so chaotic. Now, that doesn't 
really fall onto either of you-all's jurisdiction--perhaps 
Secretary Mayorkas to the extent of the screening coming in 
from the planes.
    But then we saw Putin invade Ukraine and now we see a 
rising China, communist China threatening Taiwan. We see an 
Ayatolla close to a nuclear bomb and Kim Jong-un is firing 
rockets off again, now over Japan.
    I argue that the world is getting more dangerous and I know 
that you are more domestic, but you have to look at the world 
and threats. It is a world-wide threat hearing to determine can 
those threats get into the homeland? That has always been the 
question, whether it be through ports and airports, which is 
the more typical way they do this, or what worries me now is 
the situation at the border. The fact that it is wide open. The 
combination of the Taliban taking over, Mr. Haqqani, a wanted 
terrorist, being their minister of interior, now minister--
really of security is what he is, harboring Al-Zawahiri, who is 
Bin Laden's top lieutenant in his own house. I applaud the 
administration for targeting him and taking him out, but we 
don't have eyes and ears anymore. We have lost access to 
Bagram, and now China is in there with the lithium and we will 
probably get access to Bagram, that being the end result.
    My question is maybe to the director of the FBI, what is 
your concern of the threat combination of this unmanaged wide-
open border situation and the threat from al-Qaeda and ISIS 
coming out of Afghanistan, not to mention the fentanyl and all 
the other bad stuff? Then, last, the terror watch list, as I 
understand it, there was 98 of them. When I was Chair of this 
committee we would get briefed on those individuals. Not just 
the numbers. It is my understanding this committee is not 
getting the full briefing on who are these people that have 
attempted to get into the United States, much less the ones 
that already have.
    Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, you raised a number of I think 
very legitimate and important issues.
    When it comes to the border in particular, it is a very 
significant and important challenge. There is a whole wide 
array of criminal threats that come in terms of drugs, money, 
guns, violence, and you mentioned some of that in your 
comments. There is also of course got concern from a national 
security perspective, any port of entry is a possible vector 
that a terrorist organization could choose to exploit.
    Now, historically--historically, foreign terrorist 
organizations have not chosen illegal immigration as the way to 
seed operatives, as they have usually preferred to either 
recruit somebody here or send somebody in legally, just because 
of the risks. But we have seen, you know, over the last 5 
years, an increase in the number of KSTs who have been 
encountered who have attempted to cross. So that is obviously 
something we remain very concerned about. You may have seen 
last--early summer we announced the indictment of an individual 
who was trying to bring foreign nationals in in a plot to kill 
former President Bush.
    Mr. McCaul. Thanks for bringing that up. That was one other 
thing. My time is getting ready to expire.
    But I guess the point for this committee to really evaluate 
the threat to respond on a policy basis, we don't know who 
these 98 people are, where they are from. We don't really have 
any identifying information to know who they are, where they 
are coming from, how they--what was their motivation to get 
into the United States. So I would ask that maybe, Mr. 
Chairman, that we--I think this committee, as when you and I--
when I was Chair and you were Ranking Member, we got that 
information.
    Chairman Thompson. Yes. We will proceed to get it this 
time.
    Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. 
Langevin, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for their testimony today and thank the Chairman for 
his kind words in his opening remarks on my leaving the 
committee at the end of this year. It has been a pleasure 
serving with everyone and I will miss the work and the people. 
But I thank our witnesses for being here.
    So it has been 1 year since the Department submitted its 
report evaluating PPD 21 as required by Section 9002 of the 
2021 NDAA. In a letter last week concurring with that review, 
President Biden acknowledged that the United States ``lacks a 
comprehensive way to establish mandatory minimum cybersecurity 
requirements across our critical infrastructure and current 
approaches differ by sector''. He also committed to working 
with Congress to fill gaps in statutory authorities.
    So to all of our witnesses, what gaps should we be looking 
to fill related to improving the cybersecurity of critical 
infrastructure?
    Then, Secretary Mayorkas, in particular the letter mentions 
a focused effort to help sector risk management agencies 
identify systemically important critical entities in their 
sector. How is DHS approaching this task?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman. I 
believe I caught the gist of your question.
    We are doing quite a number of things to address 
cybersecurity and specifically in the critical infrastructure 
arena. Of course, the mandatory cyber incident reporting 
legislation that you and other Members of this committee 
championed is going to be so vitally important and quite 
frankly a model for other countries to follow.
    TSA, the Transportation Security Administration, for the 
first time used its regulatory authority following the Colonial 
Pipeline attack to promulgate security directives to really 
require stakeholders in that sector to employ some of the more 
basic cyber hygiene mechanisms.
    Just in the last few weeks, CISA, the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, promulgated its voluntary 
cybersecurity performance goals, which really make cyber 
hygiene far more understandable and accessible to a broad 
spectrum of industry leaders and industry participants where we 
recommend particular measures. We identify the cost of each 
measure, the prioritization of each measure, the complexity of 
implementation, and the benefits to be gained.
    One of the areas--as I mentioned in response to Ranking 
Member Katko's question, one of the areas where we are also 
pressing very, very hard--and this touches upon Congressman 
McCaul's point--is the need for international collaboration, 
not only because of the increasingly global footprint of 
companies, but because of the fact that we are dealing more and 
more with adverse nation-states and their potential impact on 
the homeland.
    Mr. Langevin. All right. Thank you, Secretary.
    Let me go to another area. The Russian invasion of the 
Ukraine was in some ways galvanized--it galvanized 
collaboration among CISA, FBI, and other Federal agencies to 
respond to the heightened cyber threats environment. In this 
case they quickly partnered with security firms and critical 
infrastructure stakeholders to help prepare for potential 
retaliatory Russian attacks.
    Director Wray, how would you characterize the on-going 
threat of retaliatory Russian cyber attacks to U.S. critical 
infrastructure as the landscape of the war in Ukraine continues 
to change?
    Secretary Mayorkas, how can we build on lessons learned 
earlier this year through efforts like Shields Up or the Joint 
Cyber Defense Collaborative to make critical infrastructure 
owners and operators continue to stay engaged and vigilant?
    Mr. Wray. Well, when it comes to critical infrastructure, I 
think I will say it has become an increasingly crowded field of 
threat actors targeting critical infrastructure, whether it is 
ransomware or some other kind of malicious cyber activity. One 
of the things we are particularly concerned about during the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict is the possibility that, for example, 
the Russian intelligence services, which have long targeted our 
critical infrastructure for espionage purposes, could choose to 
use the same access for more destructive purposes. It has put a 
premium on the kind of private-sector partnership that I know 
CISA, as well as the FBI, have engaged in very strongly. The 
private-sector partnership is the critical ingredient to 
defending critical infrastructure in this country. I think we 
have made very significant progress. There is also a lot more 
work to be done, but we are very much on the right path in my 
view.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes----
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. The gentleman from 
Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, a major threat to our homeland is clearly the 
arterial bleed at our Southern Border and the disintegration of 
our sovereignty down there. The top threat to individual rights 
and freedoms of Americans from sea to shining sea, Mr. Wray, is 
the weaponization of the FBI against the American citizens that 
you have sworn to serve.
    Secretary Mayorkas, for the record, are you aware or have 
you authorized CBP agents to release illegal aliens into 
American without identifying, screening, or vetting them 
properly? Or harvesting even basic biometric data, like 
fingerprints?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, our Nation's sovereignty 
stands strong and our brave men and women in the Border Patrol 
and throughout U.S. Customs----
    Mr. Higgins. Are you aware or have you authorized CBP 
agents to release illegal aliens into America without having 
properly vetted, identifed them, or collected at least basic 
biometric data, like fingerprints?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
    Mr. Higgins. I mean you got millions coming across.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, our----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from--Mr. Higgins, allow 
the Secretary to answer.
    Mr. Higgins. It is my time, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. Well----
    Mr. Higgins. If I want to reclaim my time, I will.
    Chairman Thompson. Well----
    Mr. Higgins. I am going to move on without an answer, Mr. 
Chairman, are you asking for me to yield you time?
    Chairman Thompson. No, you--I am the Chair.
    Mr. Higgins. Then I am going to reclaim my time.
    Chairman Thompson. No.
    Mr. Higgins. Look, we don't----
    Chairman Thompson. Moving on now----
    Mr. Higgins. Secretary Mayorkas----
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman from----
    Mr. Higgins. Are you interrupting my time, Mr. Chairman? Or 
are you requesting me to yield you time?
    Chairman Thompson. I am trying--I am trying to make sure 
that we conduct----
    Mr. Higgins. You are interfering with my 5 minutes, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. Well, then the gentleman will get----
    Mr. Higgins. If you request me to yield you time, I will 
give you time.
    Chairman Thompson. No, but that is not the procedure.
    Mr. Higgins. But that is the procedure.
    Chairman Thompson. It is not. It is not.
    Mr. Higgins. Yes, it is.
    Chairman Thompson. So----
    Mr. Higgins. Of course it is.
    Chairman Thompson. Look----
    Mr. Higgins. I reclaim my time and I want this time back.
    Secretary Mayorkas----
    Chairman Thompson. Look----
    Mr. Higgins. Have you used your authority to suppress 
exculpatory evidence----
    Chairman Thompson. Mr. Secretary----
    Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Presented----
    Chairman Thompson. Mr. Secretary----
    Mr. Higgins [continuing]. By CBP agents who have come under 
public attack and condemnation by DHS and the Biden 
administration? Have you used your authority to suppress 
exculpatory evidence presented by CBP agents who have come 
under public attack and condemnation by you and the Biden 
administration?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Two points, if I may, Congressman.
    No. 1, in response to your second question, I don't even 
know what you are referring to. With respect to your first 
question----
    Mr. Higgins. I will take that as that you are on the record 
as saying no.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. U.S. customs----
    Mr. Higgins. That you have not----
    Secretary Mayorkas. U.S. customs----
    Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Used your authority to suppress 
exculpatory evidence. If you are an honorable man, then 
obviously you should be able to say no to that. Who would 
suppress exculpatory evidence? Is your answer no?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I don't even know what you are 
referring to, Congressman.
    Mr. Higgins. You will.
    Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, in response----
    Mr. Higgins. Secretary Mayorkas, have you used your 
authority to retaliate against DHS agents who served on special 
details during the Trump administration, agents identified by 
your administration as conservatives or Trump supporters?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Once again, Congressman, I don't even 
know what you are referring to.
    Mr. Higgins. You are before Congress. I am going to take 
that as a no.
    Through your authority, Secretary Mayorkas, have you 
encouraged your chain of command to suppress basic law 
enforcement actions at the border and harass and victimize or 
intimidate experienced front-line law enforcement agents at the 
border using internal investigations and threats of 
disciplinary action or transfer in order to force those agents 
to comply with DHS policies that actually injure the security 
of our homeland and are contrary to the sworn oath of those 
agents? Is that the culture you have created?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I don't even know what you 
are referring to.
    Mr. Higgins. You will.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am building a culture----
    Mr. Higgins. Secretary Mayorkas, final question, good sir.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Of honor and service and--
--
    Mr. Higgins. It has been rumored----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. And nobility throughout 
the Department of Homeland Security. That is----
    Mr. Higgins. You represent----
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is why----
    Mr. Higgins [continuing]. Nobility, Secretary Mayorkas?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, that is what I am 
dedicated to.
    Mr. Higgins. It has been rumored, Secretary, that you are 
going to resign prior to January 3. Is there any truth to those 
rumors?
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is a false rumor.
    Mr. Higgins. All right. We look forward to seeing you in 
January.
    Director Wray, does the FBI have confidential human 
sources--did the FBI have confidential human sources embedded 
within the January 6 protestors on January 6, 2021?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, as I am sure you can 
appreciate, I have to be very careful about what I can say 
about when----
    Mr. Higgins. Even now--because that is what you told us 2 
years ago.
    Mr. Wray. May I finish? May I finish? About when we do and 
do not and where we have and have not used confidential human 
sources.
    But to the extent that there is a suggestion, for example, 
that the FBI's confidential human sources or FBI employees in 
some way instigated or orchestrated January 6, that is 
categorically false.
    Mr. Higgins. Did you have confidential human sources 
dressed as Trump supporters inside the Capitol on January the 
6th prior to the doors being open?
    Mr. Wray. Again, I have to be very careful of what I----
    Mr. Higgins. It should be a no. Can you not tell the 
American people no, we did not have confidential human sources 
dressed as Trump supporters positioned inside the Capitol on 
January 6?
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wray. You should not read anything into my decision not 
to share information----
    Chairman Thompson. Director Wray----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. About confidential human sources.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. The gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Thompson. All of our witnesses are here today as 
guests of the committee to discuss threats to the homeland. As 
our guests, we owe our witnesses respect. The subject matter of 
today's hearing deserves thoughtfulness. The Chair encourages 
all Members to be polite and to take today's worldwide threats 
hearing seriously.
    Mr. Katko. Mr. Chairman, may I add from--I just have to--
briefly.
    Chairman Thompson. Yes.
    Mr. Katko. Just so I understand, my colleagues on my side 
of the aisle, if the Chairman speaks he has the authority to 
speak at any time he wants. If he speaks, we will make sure you 
get your time back. So going forward, just understand that, OK?
    Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
honored guests today for this most important discussion.
    Mr. Wray, Mr. Mayorkas, Ms. Abizaid, thank you for being 
here.
    Secretary Mayorkas, talking about counterterrorism threats 
to the homeland, really threats to Americans on a world-wide 
basis. We need strong allies around the world to protect the 
homeland. When Secretary Kelly was there in your position a 
number of years ago, I asked him about border security. We 
acknowledged, we agreed that border security does not begin and 
end at the border. If a threat gets to the border, we have got 
a problem.
    So my question to you is do you feel like we have enough or 
do we need additional resources to be able to coordinate intel 
for the benefit of security of all Americans around the globe?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, we are working more 
closely than ever before with our partners----
    Mr. Correa. So if I may interrupt you, next week is World 
Cup--Qatar. Thousands of Americans will be there. I presume my 
questions to you and of course Mr. Wray, are we coordinating 
enough with the government of Qatar to make sure Americans will 
be safe there?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We certainly, Congressman, have been 
working with the Qataris in advising them with respect to how 
to enhance security to protect----
    Mr. Correa. Director Wray.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Americans there.
    Mr. Wray. I would just agree with Secretary Mayorkas that 
we have been providing significant assistance and support to 
the Qataris in their efforts to secure the World Cup.
    Mr. Correa. You would disagree we have?
    Mr. Wray. No, I said I would agree with Secretary Mayorkas.
    Mr. Correa. You would agree. Thank you.
    So I guess the next step is lessons learned. In 4 years we 
will have the World Cup in the United States. So any breach--I 
mean the government of Qatar, we hope, will have 100 percent in 
terms of defense there, no lapses. I hope we are there to learn 
their lessons because we are going to have to apply those in 
the United States in 4 years. Are we shadowing what they are 
doing?
    Mr. Wray. That is an important part of why we are providing 
the assistance and the support. It is not just because it is 
the right thing to do to help the Qataris and the----
    Mr. Correa. It is the right thing for American citizens 
around the world.
    Mr. Wray. It is also the right thing for America, because--
--
    Mr. Correa. To make sure we protect----
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Mr. Correa. Ms. Abizaid, any thoughts on how we can enhance 
security of Americans around the globe?
    Ms. Abizaid. So just on the World Cup point, I would say, 
you know, the Qataris are very good partners. It is a 
partnership that we are engaged in from an intelligence 
community side. We have a threat integration cell that is 
stationed there, as we do for all major events. The Qataris 
actually learned from us before we are going to be able to 
learn from them, when they came out during the Superbowl in Los 
Angeles to understand how we in the United States do security 
for major events like this.
    So it is an on-going conversation, on-going partnership.
    I would just say from an international perspective, those 
partnerships that you mentioned are absolutely critical to 
being able to secure the country here.
    Mr. Correa. Mr. Mayorkas.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I concur with that.
    I should say, Congressman, that we have a very, very well 
exercised and trained methodology to address major events. That 
is throughout the interagency in the Federal Government, and we 
work very closely with State and local partners. This is a very 
evolved architecture that we have built that others learn from 
and we of course are in an on-going learning process.
    Mr. Correa. In my last 67 seconds I would ask all of you 
really that--I ask of you, which is what else can we do as a 
committee to make sure that we are coordinating with our allies 
and friends--and maybe even our unfriends around the world to 
make sure we stop catastrophic events like 9/11? You know, we 
talk about border security and 9/11, the terrorists that 
perpetrated 9/11 entered this country legally. We continue to 
focus on the border, on refugees, when the bigger issue is 
working with our allies around the world and other unfriends to 
make sure we stop those threats from happening again.
    What do you need from us to make sure that that type of 
coordination exists and is enhanced moving forward?
    Mr. Wray. Well, one thing--obviously it would be a long 
list and we welcome the discussion, but the top thing on my 
list would be to urge Congress to reauthorize Section 702 when 
it comes up for renewal at the end of next year, because that 
is the critical tool to understanding foreign threats which may 
have--again, foreign threats that may have an impact on the 
United States.
    Mr. Correa. Mr. Mayorkas. My 6 seconds left.
    Secretary Mayorkas. We have one imminent reauthorization 
that is very much needed, and that is our countering unmanned 
aerial systems authority. I think that our budget is something 
that is very, very important to pass to provide us with the 
resources to advance our international partnerships.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recogizes the gentleman from Mississippi, for 5 
minutes, Mr. Guest.
    Mr. Guest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Mayorkas, as we here today speaking on threats to 
the homeland, these threats are magnified by our unsecure 
border. A few moments ago Director Wray in response to a 
question by Mr. McCaul stated the border is a challenge. He 
referred to drugs, money laundering, guns, and violence. You 
referenced some of the same information in your report. On page 
13 you say that transnational criminal organizations continue 
to pose a threat to the United States. You speak of drug-
related crime, money laundering, human smuggling. Then on page 
15 in further detail, as it relates to human smuggling, you 
said at our Southwest Border we are experiencing historic 
levels of encounters. We know that those are numbers that you 
refer to are borne out by the statistics that your agency puts 
out each and every month.
    Now, for the eighth straight month we have had more than 
200,000 encounters along our Southwest Border. Physical year 
2022, those number were more than 2,378,000, physical year 
2021, 1,734,000. Compare those numbers to the last year of the 
prior administration, physical year 2020, those numbers were 
458,000. So we see that during a 2-year period the number of 
encounters along our Southwest Border has increased over 520 
percent.
    Just taking 2022 and 2021 combined, those 2 years in which 
you have been in charge of this agency, we see a number that 
exceeds 4 million. To put that number in perspective, that is a 
number larger than 23 of the States that comprise the United 
States of America.
    So looking at that, you have previously stated that the 
border is closed, the border is secure, and that we have not 
lost operational control of the border.
    I ask you once again today, do you still stand by your 
statement based on those statistical figures, that the border 
is closed, the border is secure, and that we have not lost 
operational control?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman Guest, let me share a few 
thoughts, because I think it is very important to put the 
challenge at our Southern Border--and it is a very serious 
challenge--in proper context.
    It is a challenge that is not specific or exclusive to our 
Southern Border. This is a challenge that exists throughout the 
hemisphere.
    Let me give a very powerful example.
    Mr. Guest. Mr. Mayorkas, I am not trying to interrupt you. 
I have very limited time and so I would like to focus my 
question on the Southwest Border. If we would like to meet 
outside this committee meeting when we have additional time--
you and I have met before and I would be happy to meet with you 
again. But since I am now down to 2 minutes I want to focus my 
questioning specifically on the Southwest Border.
    You have said when you have appeared before this committee 
that you need additional time--your agency needs additional 
time to get this crisis under control. We see--as Congress, we 
see no evidence that the situation along the Southwest Border 
is getting better. As a matter of fact, looking statistically, 
it seems like the border is getting worse. We can say these 
number of immigrants, we know that of these number of 
immigrants that we see here that have come across our border, 
we have statistics here that 98 people on that list--of those 
individuals were on the terrorist watch list.
    So we as a committee, we as Congress, we as the American 
public, we want to have faith that you and your agency are 
seeking to get this challenge under control. But I am looking 
at statistics and statistics tell me that that is not the case. 
Statistics tell me that the border is only getting worse and 
that since this administration has taken control, that the 
policies that you have put in place have failed and that they 
have failed miserably. We know that Commissioner Magnus 
recently was forced to resign from office. I applaud you for 
removing him. I thought he did a terrible job. I hope that 
there are other people that you will remove and that you will 
work with a Republican-controlled Congress to find a way to 
secure the border.
    So what I am hoping and what I am asking here--and I will 
give you the last 30 seconds of my time--is what will you do in 
your current position to help us secure the border? Because 
that is what we all want, Republicans, Democrats, we want a 
secure border, we clearly do not have that now. What will you 
help us do to make sure we get back to the levels that we saw 
in physical year 2020?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman Guest, I very much look 
forward to working with you and this entire committee to 
enhance the security of our border.
    Let me give two examples of things that we are doing and 
two things that I think Congress can do.
    No. 1, we are taking it to the smugglers and the 
transnational criminal organizations at an unprecedented level. 
We have a disruption campaign, interagency disruption campaign 
that has led to more than 6,000 arrests, working not only in 
the itneragency, but with our international partners. We are 
taking it to them at an unprecedented level. No. 1.
    No. 2, if one takes a look at the program that we recently 
implemented with respect to Venezuelan nationals, which were 
the highest number of encounters we were experiencing, the 
demographics at our Southern Border have changed dramatically 
over the last several years. If one takes a look at that 
program at its early phase, we were experiencing approximately 
1,100 encounters of Venezuelan nationals a day, and since the 
implementation of the program, that is now approximately 300 
per day. That is an example of the things that we are doing to 
enhance the security of our border.
    Two things that Congress can do. No. 1 is pass our budget, 
which provides for additonal resources to the Department of 
Homeland Security and others to enhance our border security, 
including for the first time since 2011 300 more Border Patrol 
agents.
    No. 2, once and for all, pass immigration reform, 
including, for example, much-needed reform to our asylum 
system. Everyone agrees the system is broken and we need it 
fixed.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson 
Lee.
    The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. 
Slotkin.
    Ms. Slotkin. Best State in the Union, Michigan.
    Thanks for being here. I just--he has departed the room, 
but I just wanted to appreciate John Katko, my friend who is 
departing this committee, and the tone he has set in this 
committee. It is my fervrent hope that as the other side of the 
aisle seems poised to take over, that we keep this focused on 
homeland threats and not making this a place of political 
theater. That is my desperate hope and I think that is the 
message that was sent by the voters last week. I hope they hear 
it and continue in that spirit.
    Second, I just want to talk a little bit about the threats 
that you all have talked about today, whether it is domestic 
terrorism and home-grown threats, the threats coming through 
our border, cybersecurity and the threats of ransomware, 
information and disinformation coming from, you know, places 
like Russia and China.
    What has really struck me is how the threats that are most 
prominent for Americans today are really affecting civilians. 
They are not going after law enforcement agents, they are not 
going after our military, they are going after civilians in our 
K-12 shcools, in our hospitals, through our water treatment 
plants. The threats are much more personal and they are much 
more sort-of for the average American and they desperately want 
to know what we are doing to protect them.
    Now, I was in the CIA and the Pentagon for many, many years 
and we are all--have to be careful not to fight the previous 
war and to make sure that we are adapting to today's threats.
    Particularly on cyber, I am worried that we have had--you 
know, as we remember 9/11, we had the attacks in Kenya, we had 
the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole, and then we had 9/11. I feel 
like on our cyber attacks we have had our U.S.S. Cole, we have 
had the Colonial Pipeline, we have had our meat processing 
facility, we have had SolarWinds. So we all thought about what 
would we have done if we could have imagined the threat of 9/
11, what would we have done to better prepare.
    So, Secretary Mayorkas, please tell me the two or three 
things that you wish you could do--either you need the 
resources or you need the attention of the American people--to 
prevent a cyber 
9/11.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, in my opening remarks I 
talked about the threat landscape and how in fact the goal of 
our adversaries is indeed to disrupt our way of life. I think 
you captured that very well in your opening remarks.
    We have done a great deal to enhance the security of the 
cyber ecosystem. When I say we, it is not just the Department, 
but of course working very closely with our partners. That is 
No. 1, to equip the private sector with information and to 
educate them on the tools to advance cyber hygiene. We have 
done that for the civilian population as well.
    If we take a look at some of the very accessible sites that 
we have created on the web, stopransomware.gov, CISA.gov, some 
of the very simply measures that people can take, whether it is 
multifactor authentication, backing up one's systems, using 
safe and secure passwords. These are the things that we need to 
do and continue to do. The more that we can amplify 
collectively--we in the Government, in Congress--the imperative 
of maintaining cyber hygiene, raising the alertness of the 
average citizen to the imperative, especially in the 
increasingly interconnected world, I think that is one critical 
goal.
    Ms. Slotkin. Yes. I would offer, it would be useful if we 
had a list of specific things, your asks, right. We all want to 
prevent these cyber attacks. I think cyber issues are very 
bipartisan in this Congress and have been and hopefully will be 
in the future Congress. So please be assertive with what you 
need in order to protect the American people, because they feel 
like they don't know what is defending them.
    Second, Director Wray, I was heartened to hear your story 
of calling all the families of fallen law enforcement that have 
been killed over the past year or time that you have been in 
service. I am very worried. Just coming out of campaign season, 
the number of people who think that the FBI is a political 
tool, as we heard even raised in questions here today.
    Can you please talk to the American people about the FBI 
and explain in your words why they should trust their Federal 
law enforcement?
    Mr. Wray. So there are a lot of opinions out there about 
the FBI, just like there are about everything. By my opinion, 
the window that I get to see into our work force is unique. I 
have visited all 56 of our field offices at least twice, I have 
spoken with law enforcement from all 50 States on countless 
occasions, I have met with judges, prosecutors, community 
leaders, victims and their families, and the FBI that I see 
every single day and that I hear about from all of them, is an 
FBI that does the right thing in the right way with rigor, with 
professionalism, with objectivity, with skill. I will stack our 
work force up against anywhere in the world any time. The 
Americans should have deep confidence in those people.
    I will add that when it comes to perceptions of the FBI 
that the number of Americans all across this country applying 
to be special agents in the FBI has been going up--up 
significantly over the past 3 years, at a time when as I hear 
all the time, law enforcement all over this country is having 
the opposite experience. I think that speaks very well of 
Americans in every State represented on this committee.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
    The Chair recognzies the gentleman from North Carolina for 
5 minutes, Mr. Bishop.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Mayorkas, Mr. McCaul said the border is wide 
open, Director Wray testified about an elevated threat of guns 
and money and drugs across the border. Mr. Guest laid out a lot 
of the details about the record-breaking numbers. He ended up 
having to talk more than get an answer from you on something.
    I just want to ask you--I have heard you in the Judiciary 
Committee recently in the summer testify that the border is 
secure. Secretary Mayorkas, do you continue to maintain that 
the border is secure?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes. We are working day in and day out 
to enhance its security, Congressman.
    Mr. Bishop. All right. Thank you, sir.
    Secretary Mayorkas. We have----
    Mr. Bishop. Sir, I----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Remarkable----
    Mr. Bishop. I get it. I just wanted to make sure that that 
still is your assessment.
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is very----
    Mr. Bishop. Director Wray----
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is and it is very important--if I 
may.
    Mr. Bishop. Well, I don't--I know, there is just not enough 
time for a lot of explanation and you have got written 
testimony and so forth. I just wanted to understand that is 
your position still. I think it is a position that denies 
reality, respectfully. But I wanted to give you the opportunity 
to say no, I think the situation has changed or something like 
that.
    Director Wray, do you believe that the border is secure?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I can only speak to border security from 
our narrow lane, but I can speak to it from that lane. What I 
would say is that we see significant criminal threats coming 
from south of the border, whether it is guns, drugs, money, 
violence. We see transnational criminal organizations that are 
sending their drugs here and that are using street gangs here 
to distribute it, and that contributes to the violent crime 
crisis here. We have had takedowns just in the last few months 
that I could give you as an example.
    You know, I will give you just one quick one. You know, in 
Phoenix we had a takedown working with CBP, who are phenomenal 
partners I should add, where we seized in one vehicle 
interdiction enough fentanyl to kill the equivalent of the 
entire State of Pennsylvania.
    Mr. Bishop. Yes, that is very troubling.
    Mr. Wray. Just one vehicle interdiction.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Director Wray.
    Director Abizaid, does the NCTC asses a significant threat 
from the historic level of uncontrolled crossing at the 
Southern Border?
    Ms. Abizaid. Thank you.
    We don't actually. Border security is really important. If 
we look at the nature of the threat and how it has evolved here 
in the United States homeland, it has been striking how the 
evolution to lone actors actually reflects how much more 
difficult it is for terrorists to enter into the United States.
    We look historically at the kind of attacks we have 
experienced here in the homeland. None of them have been 
connected to major illegal crossings or otherwise from the 
Southwest Border.
    Mr. Bishop. Right.
    Director Wray----
    Ms. Abizaid. That said, it remains a top intelligence 
priority.
    Mr. Bishop. Director Wray spoke to that earlier about what 
has historically been true. It makes me mindful of the 9/11 
report, that chapter that said the system was blinking red. It 
was a failure of the U.S. Government agencies to anticipate a 
threat that should have been obvious to everyone.
    So it troubles me that the official response is we don't 
think that is much of a threat. We have an unprecedented number 
of people coming across the border, a lot of them are being 
interdicted, but released into the United States without enough 
scrutiny. A whole lot more apparently coming in without being 
interdicted at all. The official answer is, hmm, we don't think 
there is a terrorism problem there. Just hasn't happened in the 
past.
    I think unfortunately we are going to find out if it 
happens in the future.
    Mr. Bishop. Reporting from the Intercept focused on the 
Department of Homeland Security--and I guess CISA has been the 
focal point for it--interactions with social media companies.
    One thing it related was that DHS sent an email to Twitter 
about a Twitter account that could imperil election system 
integrity. The user had 56 followers and a bio that indicated--
had references to weed shops.
    Secretary Mayorkas, does that kind of--and the level of 
interaction with social media platforms and that one 
specifically, that anecdote, not suggest that DHS is engaged 
with egregious overreach that threatens the First Amendment?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would note that the 
Intercept article focuses attention on the disinformation 
activities that preceded our administration. Let me assure you 
that our work to address disinformation, which is a tool that 
our nation-state adversaries seek to employ to sow discord in 
this country, is something that is very, very respectful of the 
civil rights and civil liberties of individuals, as well as 
their privacy rights.
    Mr. Bishop. You maintain that always, but let me just ask, 
when you say it is respectful, are you attempting to conduct 
censorship by proxy as a means of evading the First Amendment?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We absolutely do not.
    Mr. Bishop. My time is expired.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, 
for 4 minutes.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the Ranking 
Member as well and appreciate greatly the commentary that you 
both gave earlier with reference to collegiality and an effort 
to get the optimum from this committee based upon the things 
that we can agree upon. I thank you both.
    Mr. Chairman and Members, I am on a mission of mercy today. 
I am on a mission of mercy because of immigration laws and a 
need for comprehensive immigration reform. Please allow me to 
call to your attention, Mr. Secretary, the case of one Mr. 
Jaime Abavos Rosales. I would like to have additional 
conversations with you about this because there is no way for 
me to give you the intelligence necessary at this time, the 
entirety of it.
    In 1996 Mr. Avalos came to this country at the age of 1 
year. In 2013 he received DACA. He graduated from a high school 
in Houston, Texas, Bellarie High, 2014. No criminal record, Mr. 
Secretary. Married his wife, Yarianna, and they now have a 
child who is approximately 1 year of age.
    Mr. Secretary, pursuant to the laws, he went back to 
Mexico, to Juarez, to the consulate in an effort to submit 
himself for re-entry into the country in a lawful fashion. The 
law permits this. It was discovered that he was brought back to 
Mexico at about the age of 7. Came at the age of 1, taken back 
at the age of 7. Because he was taken back to Mexico at the age 
of 7, a child, he is now barred from this country for 10 years. 
He had an appointment with the consulate, went there in good 
faith. Came here as a child, went back as a child, and because 
he went back as a child he is now barred for 10 years.
    Won't be with his baby, won't have Christmas with the 
child. A very sad circumstance that if it doesn't impact one's 
heart, I am just sorry for the lack of sympathy and empathy 
that some people may have.
    So I am appealing for some help. He is not a criminal. He 
didn't bring himself here, he didn't come on his own volition, 
he came as a child. I am trying my best to bring him home. I am 
going to Mexico to visit with him. I will be taking his wife 
and his baby. She is an American citizen, the baby was born in 
this country. They will be going with me. I would like to bring 
him home and I would like to ask as much help as I could get 
from you and from our Government.
    Let me say this before you give a brief response. I 
appreciate President Biden. He inherited a tough, tough job, a 
tough position. But he knew what he was inheriting and he has 
taken up the challenge admirably--admirably. I compliment you 
on doing the best that you can under the circumstances that 
exist and the laws that exist. The border is about as secure as 
it can be given the laws that we have. It is lawful for people 
to ask for asylum. That is lawful. It is lawful for us to 
consider the request. About as secure as it can be given the 
laws that we have. You can't change the laws, but we can. That 
is why we, many of us, keep in insisting on comprehensive 
immigration reform, so that we can deal with the situations 
that include Mr. Jaime Avalos Rosales. This needs to be dealt 
with. Shouldn't be banned because his mother took him home to 
register his birth as a child of 7 years. There is a law that 
requires persons who leave the country, once you are here, to 
go back to your consulate and then apply and be given 
consideration. But if you leave and come back to the country 
prior to your making that application, you are banned.
    So I am hoping that we can do something to help him. I 
would like to know if I can visit with you, talk more with you 
about this, and many other cases of course. But I would like to 
visit with you.
    I yield to you, sir, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I am of course not 
familiar with the case that you have described. I can say that 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the agency that 
deals with administration of our legal immigration system, 
receives on almost a weekly basis cases that present tremendous 
heartbreak and sadness because of how broken indeed our system 
is. Those pleas for mercy, come from both sides of the aisle.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey for 5 
minutes, Mr. Van Drew.
    Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you Ranking 
Member.
    Just very briefly, I respect Mr. Green very much and I feel 
for his passion. I would like to say though that there are a 
lot of people right now in the United States of America that 
are going through their own personal hells for many reasons, 
whether it is drug addiction, whether it is homelessness, 
whether it is problems that our Americans who live here and 
work here and try to function to here have, and I think our 
immigration system, respectfully, we are not doing as good as 
we could do. I believe that we could do much, much better. 
Quite frankly, we were doing much, much better.
    Secretary Mayorkas, when you testified before this 
committee in September of last year, you stated that DHS 
continues enforcing our immigration laws and to my surprise you 
said that we were responsibly managing our border. In the last 
fiscal year, there were over 2.3 million recorded migrant 
encounters at the Southwest Border, which included 98 non-U.S. 
citizens who were on the terrorist screening dataset. As you 
know, these figures do not represent those who avoided 
detection, which was estimated to be around 600,000. To attempt 
to combat the crisis on the border, you have deployed highly-
trained and highly-skilled Federal air marshals to the border 
to perform non-law enforcement duties, such as hospital watch, 
transportation, and welfare checks. There have even been 
reports that marshals are performing janitorial duties.
    I have the largest air marshal training center in the 
United States of America in my district and I have seen first-
hand how talented and capable they are. DHS is removing 
hundreds of air marshals from the skies during one of the 
busiest travel seasons of the year, even though have stated 
that America's aviation infrastructure is a very high threat 
and is a target.
    Furthermore, DHS is even classifying how many high-risk 
flights are not being covered due to your decision to deploy 
air marshals to the border. How do you justify this deployment? 
Don't you think it would make more sense to hire more Border 
Patrol agents who are trained for this and finish the wall--
yes, finish the wall--rather than to continue to mishandle the 
crisis? But now, we are mishandling it at the expense of 
aviation security. So where we had one problem, which is a 
terrible problem--and I disagree with you thoroughly that there 
isn't a problem. That we can turn the TV on now on just about 
any news station and you can see what is going on. This is not 
rocket science, it is not complicated. The American public can 
see it, everybody can see it. It affects the whole country. But 
instead of having just one problem, now we have two problems 
because what we are doing to the air marshals. Enough is 
enough. Why can't we just do the right thing, the simple thing, 
and the functional thing? Why can't we go back to where we were 
where we had so much less of a problem?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, a few thoughts.
    First of all, thank you for accurately describing the 
expertise, the professionalism, and the bravery of our Federal 
Air Marshals. Of course it is false that they are deployed to 
the border to conduct janitorial services. We have contract 
personnel to do that.
    You make a very, very important point. You asked the 
question why can we not hire more Border Patrol agents out in 
the field. I think that is a very appropriate question and 
there is a very compelling answer for that. You know, for the 
first time since 2011 we have presented to Congress a budget 
that seeks to plus-up our Border Patrol agent personnel. We 
requested a budget to re-fund 300 more Border Patrol agents. 
Every single year since 2006 I believe it is, the Department of 
Homeland Security has relied on the Department of Defense to 
augment its resources to address the challenges at the border. 
So this is not something new.
    I look forward to working with you to see what we can do to 
pass a budget that calls for additional resources for the 
Department of Homeland Security to address the challenges not 
only at the Southern Border, but all of the challenges we are 
describing.
    Mr. Van Drew. Secretary, I appreciate that and I don't mean 
to interrupt you, but I have like 5 seconds here.
    The problem with the budget is there is so many unpalatable 
unacceptable other parts to it that. As you know, it is the old 
game that is always played in politics, jam a budget or jam a 
bill, or whatever it is with all kinds of other issues and 
initiatives that a lot of people don't want to see. If we had a 
stand-alone appropriation to do this, to fund this, you would 
see it go through in a second.
    So if you want to fight for that, I will fight by your side 
to get more Border Patrol agents, I will talk to the President, 
as I know that you would, and let us see what happens. But it 
shouldn't be jammed with all kinds of other initiatives that we 
don't want.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson 
Lee, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chair and the Ranking Member 
for this very important hearing and oversight assessment. Let 
me add my appreciation to Ranking Member Katko for the years of 
service we have had to work together in a mutual commitment to 
securing the homeland. Thank you for your service to the 
Nation. As well continue to thank you for your previous 
service. I thank the Chairman again for bringing us together 
around this important issue.
    To our witnesses, let me acknowledge the 20th year of 
Homeland Security and the men and women who worked under that 
umbrella to thank them for that service.
    Director Wray, let me also affirm the admiration and 
respect of the FBI, and I would frankly say law enforcement 
around the Nation and express my concern for the violent 
incident that happened in Cincinnati and appreciate the fact 
that--safety of those men and women.
    Let me build on the tragedy that fell upon the second-in-
line to the Presidency, the Speaker of the House, and ask the 
question about the depth and intenseness of political violence. 
Again, our time is brief, but I would like to yield to the 
Secretary first, Director Wray, and to Director Abizaid if we 
might. I do have other questions, so let me just quickly yield. 
Just the depth of political violence, which means speech 
driving people to violence.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we of course are engaged 
to when in fact there is a connectivity between an ideological 
view, a political view, and violence. That is when we get 
involved and we all--the Director and I in our opening 
statements and in response to preliminary questions spoke of 
the gravity of the threat that the lone actors and small cells 
pose when they are driven to violence because of a political 
ideology, ideologies of hate, anti-Government sentiments, 
personal grievances, and other narratives propagated on on-line 
platforms. This is one of the greatest terrorism-related 
threats we face in the homeland.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congresswoman, as I mentioned earlier, we 
have seen a clear trend in this country over the last several 
years of people across the political spectrum choosing to 
express their anger or upset at someone or about something 
through violence. That is a very alarming trend. As Secretary 
Mayorkas referenced, it is exacerbated on-line, but it is a 
clear phenomenon that we are having to contend with that 
started several years ago.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. It is going up?
    Mr. Wray. It is going up.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Director.
    Ms. Abizaid. I would concur with my colleagues. You know, 
as we look at the numbers since 2010, we see that domestic 
violent extremism accounts for 47 attacks, over 152 deaths. 
That actually pales in comparison to the 45 attacks that we 
have seen since 
9/11 by foreign terrorist organizations.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just--can I get a yes or no answer 
on this, because I have some other questions? Is a cyber threat 
coming from China and Russia intense, continuing, and on-going?
    Ms. Abizaid. Cyber threat, I will defer to my colleagues in 
the FBI and DHS.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Director Wray.
    Mr. Wray. Yes.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Director Mayorkas, let me try to--my understanding is that 
immigration, defense of the border, protection of the border, 
is a Federal responsibility. Is that not correct?
    Secretary Mayorkas. That is correct.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Have you see any positive impact from the 
$4 billion that has been spent by Governor Abbott of the State 
of Texas who continues to malign the work of the Federal 
Government and, to some extent, interfere with it and cause the 
National Guard, some of whom have committed suicide, to--Texas 
National Guard to be strained? I am going to ask that question 
in the context of what Director Wray said in terms of an answer 
to the question about security at the border. I think it is 
important to distinguish between even though we want to stop 
that flow, to distinguish fleeing families with children from 
Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, et cetera, from the work, the strain of 
cartels, of smuggling, of human smuggling, smuggling of 
fentanyl. Those criminal elements, we are all fighting I assume 
to bring that down.
    Can you distinguish and tell me whether you have seen any 
impact from the $4 billion that one State happens to be using 
of State tax dollars taken away from the needs of the people of 
Texas that has impacted the work that you are doing as a 
Federal officer to protect the border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, let me answer the 
question this way. We advance law enforcement mission when we 
work collectively, collaboratively, and in a coordinated way. 
When there is a deliberate effort to not coordinate, it can and 
indeed has been quite counterproductive.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady's time----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Chairman Thompson [continuing]. Has expired.
    The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-
Meeks, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chair, thank you, Ranking 
Member Katko.
    First I would also like to thank all of our witnesses for 
coming before the committee today. I am glad we are finally 
having the ability to seriously discuss the threats we are 
facing, particular along our Southwest Border.
    Let me also say that prior to January 20, 2021, we had 
lawful operational control of the Southern Border.
    The number of unaccompanied alien children, UACs, 
encountered along the Southwest Border has nearly doubled since 
2019 and continues to increase, surpassing a record high in 
fiscal year 2021, approaching nearly 153,000 this fiscal year. 
We have heard reports of children being sent alone--I have 
encountered them when I have made trips to the border--across 
dangerous terrain with nothing but a relative's name and 
address pinned on their shirt. Some of these children so young 
as to not know their own name or to whom they are supposed to 
be sent. We have seen Border Patrol agents bravely fight to 
save young kids and infants in medical distress and in crossing 
the river.
    When we have encountered these families--and I distinctly 
remember an occasion with Representative Carlos Gimenez and 
Representative Maria Salazar, who spoke their language, asking 
them specifically whether or not the Biden administration's 
policies, often cited directly by these migrants crossing the 
border, encouraged foreign nationals to send their children to 
seek entry into the United States despite dire conditions at 
the border.
    Secretary Mayorkas, are the Biden administration's policies 
encouraging and increasing the pull factor for unaccompanied 
minors, UACs, to come into this country?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, a few thoughts, if I 
may.
    First of all, thank you very much for capturing the 
vulnerability of unaccompanied children that migrate from their 
countries of origin and seek safety, not only in the United 
States, but elsewhere in the hemisphere, as I said at the very 
outset. I don't know----
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Sir, I want to be respectful. I have 
limited time, so.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes. This is a challenge that we are 
experiencing throughout the hemisphere.
    I also want to thank you for recognizing the bravery of the 
Border Patrol.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much. I am going to 
relate back to my instances of appearing at the border and 
hearing directly from people crossing the border that the 
administration's policies in fact are a pull factor.
    Given that, what actions are being taken at the Department 
to keep these kids safe and stem the flow of UACs crossing 
illegally into the United States across dangerous terrain?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So a few things. Of course I disagree 
with the premise of the pull factor.
    As I was saying, this is a hemispheric challenge. We are 
seeing a tremendous amount of upheaval throughout the Western 
Hemisphere, authoritarian regimes, poverty, violence, 
corruption, and the like. We are doing a number of things, and 
let me give you two examples.
    No. 1 is we are taking it to the smugglers in an 
unprecedented way. Throughout the Department of Homeland 
Security, throughout the interagency, and with our partner 
countries to the south of our border. We have in the last year 
conducted more than 6,000 arrests in an unprecedented 
disruption effort to attack the smuggling organizations that 
seek to exploit the vulnerable.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas. But, No. 2----
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. I can say that when I have been----
    Secretary Mayorkas. No. 2----
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks [continuing]. To the border and talked 
with the agents, the cartels seem to have tremendous control 
over what happens.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Yes, if I may, Congressman, just--I----
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Sir, I only have 1 minutes 16----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman----
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks [continuing]. Seconds left. After being 
apprehended by the DHS, unaccompanied alien children are 
transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement within the 
Department of Health and Human Services. While this is supposed 
to occur within 72 hours of arrival, decrease in the amount of 
time children reside in CBP facilities, many unaccompanied 
children have remained in CBP facilities longer than the time 
allotted under Federal law. Is the large scale of UACs crossing 
the border contributing to these overstays in CBP facilities? 
How is this being addressed, No. 1? No. 2, how is the DHS 
managing the threat of sexual predators at the border, during 
CBP facilities detentions, as well as during the transfer of 
children to different locations?
    If you don't have time to answer, you can respond to us 
in----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are also building 
lawful pathways, such as the Central American Minors Program. 
So children do not place, and their parents do not place, their 
lives in the hands of exploitative smugglers.
    The information that you have with respect to the length of 
stay in the Border Patrol facility is I think quite dated. That 
was certainly a challenge that we faced in March 2021, but we 
have taken considerable measures to meet the 72-hour time 
frame. I look forward to providing you with further 
information.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Chair, I yield my time.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
    Pursuant to the order of the committee of today, the 
committee stands in recess for approximately 5 minutes.
    [Recess.]
    Chairman Thompson. The committee will be in order.
    The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York, for 5 
minutes, Ms. Clarke.
    Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like so many of my 
colleagues, I would like to thank Mr. Katko for his service. My 
colleague from New York. His commitment to bipartisanship and 
his commitment to the work of this committee has been 
uplifting. To all of our public servants seated here today, 
thank you for your service and commitment to the American 
people.
    My question is really around cybersecurity. That is 
something that I really had a keen, keen interest in. We have 
recently this year passed legislation that I authored requiring 
the reporting of major cyber incidents to CISA. Although CISA 
has 3\1/2\ years to issue a final rule, Mr. Secretary, none of 
us want to wait that long. My hope is that swift implementation 
will yield important security benefits, eliminate duplicative 
reporting frameworks, and encourage harmonization across the 
interagency.
    Toward that end, I have two questions for you. What is DHS 
doing to support--and more specifically--expedite this rule 
making so we don't have to wait years to see results? How is 
DHS working with the SEC and other regulators to harmonize new 
requirements through, for example, the Cyber Incident Reporting 
Council established in CIRCIA?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you so much for 
championing this critical security effort, cybersecurity 
effort.
    We are already engaging with the private sector in 
preparation for the promulgation of the regulations that will 
implement the new legislation. It is vitally important, as you 
and other Members of this committee know who have championed 
this imperative, public-private partnership is the bedrock, the 
foundation of the cybersecurity ecosystem. So we already have 
begun to engage with the private sector in anticipation of the 
regulations that we will issue. No. 1.
    No. 2, we have a council that we are chairing that is 
working across the interagency to ensure to the best of our 
abilities, harmonization of the reporting requirements. I 
should say that we have also taken that critical harmonization 
need and expanded it in the international domain, speaking with 
our international partners and seeing what we can do--given the 
multinational footprint of so many of our companies--to see 
what we can do to harmonize the landscape internationally as 
well as domestically.
    Ms. Clarke. Well, I am happy to hear that, you know, we are 
sort-of prepping, but do you have a sense of whether we can 
expedite the rule making so that it doesn't take us the 3\1/2\ 
estimated years to get to the final rule?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So I believe that there are set time 
frames in the statutory regime with respect to the promulgation 
of regulation. I think we have, if I am not mistaken--and I 
will correct myself subsequently if I am--that we have 18 
months. We have what I would respectfully submit is the 
preeminent regulatory team to ensure the swift promulgation of 
the necessary implementing regulations.
    Ms. Clarke. In addition to the cyber incident reporting, I 
see the Cyber Safety Review Board, the CSRB, is another 
innovative way this administration has tried to better 
understand cyber threats. Does the administration intend to 
seek authorization for the CSRB? If so, what should those 
authorities entail and what does the CSRB plan to study next?
    Secretary Mayorkas. So that is--Congresswoman, thank you so 
much for recognizing the tremendous value of the Cyber Safety 
Review Board. It is very important to emphasize that that is a 
board that is not focused on accountability, but is focused on 
the diagnosis of the challenge and remediation of any potential 
harm that the challenge presents. Its first project was the 
Log4j Vulnerability. It is now preparing to issue a report. One 
of the things that we are considering is the authorization of 
the CSRB and what further support we can receive from Congress. 
We are very appreciate of the support we have received to date.
    Ms. Clarke. Mr. Secretary, in response to Congresswoman 
Slotkin's question, you raised the issue of cyber hygiene and 
the work that is being done from the administration's 
standpoint, certainly from the Congressional standpoint. I 
would like to include the private sector.
    One of the things that I have been concerned about is that 
we can't amplify enough the need for there to be a National 
movement around cyber hygiene. Every weak link presents a 
vector for our adversaries to take us down. So I want to put on 
your radar as you speak with the private sector, perhaps 
looking at some public service announcements so that there is 
an educational campaign that is consistently out there in the 
public and that we grow up with the habit, like putting on our 
seatbelts, of regularly addressing our cyber hygiene.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlelady yields back.
    The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, Mrs. 
Harshbarger, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the 
witnesses for being here today.
    I am going to read a statement. This is for all the 
witnesses. Late last month Forbes and other press reported that 
TikTok's parent company ByteDance planned to use TikTok to 
monitor the physical location of specific Americans for the 
purposes of surveilling individual U.S. citizens. As you know 
TikTok is close to signing a CFIUS contract and the Treasury 
Department has been assessing the National security risk of 
foreign ownership of TikTok, including its CCP ties of whether 
the platform enables the Chinese government to access U.S. 
person's data.
    The first question is a yes or no. It is: Do you assess 
that TikTok is a significant National security threat given the 
accusations that the company specifically targets U.S. persons 
and given the ByteDance and TikTok ties to the CCP?
    The second part of that question is yes or no. Is the CCP 
leveraging the application as a tool to collect information 
about U.S. citizens for the purposes other than targeted ads 
and content?
    Anyone on the panel.
    Mr. Wray. Congresswoman, taking the first question, I would 
say we do have National security concerns, at least from the 
FBI's end, about TikTok. They include the possibility that the 
Chinese government could use it to control data collection on 
millions of users or control the recommendation algorithm, 
which could be used for influence operations if they so chose 
or to control software on millions of devices, which give it 
opportunity to potentially compromise personal devices. So 
there are a number of concerns there.
    As to what is actually happening and actually being done, 
that is probably something that would be better addressed in a 
closed Classified setting. I could see what information we 
might be able to share that way. But there is probably not much 
more that I could add to that, other than to say it is 
certainly something that is on our radar and we share your 
concerns.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes. Thank you for that. I would love to 
have that close briefing.
    Has ByteDance responded to allegations that their internal 
auditing system specifically targeted any members of the U.S. 
Government, activists, public figures, or generalists? Yes or 
no.
    Mr. Wray. I will have to see if we can get back to you on 
that. I am not sure that I can give the answer right here at 
this moment.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. Are you informing the Treasury's view 
through the CFIUS process of the National security threat it 
poses?
    Mr. Wray. I'm sorry, ma'am, I didn't----
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Sir?
    Mr. Wray. Repeat the question. I just couldn't hear you 
very well.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Are you informing Treasury's view through 
the CFIUS process of the National security threat it poses to 
the United States?
    Mr. Wray. Yes. The FBI's foreign investment unit working 
through the Department of Justice is part of the CFIUS process 
and would be relevant. Our input would be taken into account in 
any agreements that might be made to address the issue.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. OK. Last part of that question is what is 
currently being done to investigate the CCP's involvement in 
TikTok ownership, direction, and/or access? The reason I ask 
that is there was a current 60 Minutes segment highlighting the 
stark differences between the Chinese-owned TikTok company that 
allows kids in China to view a totally different app, a clean 
app, and what is shown in the United States--they call it an 
``opium version''--that is designed to hook American children 
on an unsafe version of the video-based platform, you know, 
offering a healthier version and a limited viewing of 40 
minutes for those children in China, which is unacceptable and 
parents need to know this. But what is currently being done to 
investigate the CCP's involvement in TikTok?
    Mr. Wray. Well, as to any specific investigative work, I 
could see whether some of that could be incorporated into the 
Classified briefing I referred to. There are obviously limits 
on what I can share in terms of discussing a specific on-going 
investigation.
    But what I would say is that you have highlighted two very, 
very important threats. One, of course, something we are all 
concerned about, which is the threat to our youth on-line. But 
the second----
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes.
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. Is the threat specifically from the 
Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party and the ways 
in which their laws are used as an aggressive weapon against 
both U.S. companies and Chinese companies. Under Chinese law, 
Chinese companies are required to essentially--and I am going 
to shorthand here--basically do whatever the Chinese government 
wants them to in terms of sharing information or serving as a 
tool of the Chinese government.
    So that is plenty of reason by itself to be extremely 
concerned.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Absolutely. Well, I look forward to the 
Classified briefing and I appreciate your time.
    With that, Chairman, I yield back.
    Ms. Demings [presiding]. The gentlewoman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Swalwell, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. To the witnesses and the people in 
law enforcement that you represent, you are owed our thanks to 
your service to our country. You are not owed the bitter, 
divisive, cruel, violent rhetoric we heard from our colleague 
from Louisiana. That is a rhetoric that the voters rejected, an 
extreme rhetoric that voters rejected last Tuesday. Our 
Chairman of the committee, Mr. Thompson, was also not owed that 
display.
    Director Wray, antisemitism is on the rise across America. 
The White House has recently proposed $360 million for 
nonprofit security grants that can assist community centers--
and also Secretary Mayorkas. We funded that to the tune of $250 
million in this committee and it was also a partnership between 
Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Katko. But if we provided 
additional funding, what would that mean for combatting 
antisemitism in America?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congressman 
Swalwell.
    You know, the Nonprofit Security Grant Program when I first 
addressed it was funded at $180 million and we are grateful for 
the support of this committee in funding it at the level of 
$250 million. What we would do if that funding increased to 
$360 million, which we certainly advocate that it does, is 
enable us to also fund target-rich resource or institutions 
that are vulnerable to attacks. That includes places of worship 
that guard against antisemitism. It is true of churches, 
synagogues, mosques, all sorts of nonprofit organizations, 
including historically Black colleges and universities that 
have seen a tremendous uptick in bomb threats, as Director Wray 
referenced earlier. That is much-needed funding because there 
are target-rich but resource-poor institutions, schools, places 
of worship that need to enhance their security against an ever-
increasing threat.
    Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you, Secretary.
    Director Wray, many of my Republican colleagues have run on 
a defund the FBI platform. They have made t-shirts, hats to 
fund their campaigns. If the FBI was defunded, would that hurt 
or help terrorism investigations?
    Mr. Wray. It would hurt. Just in the last several years, 
the FBI has thwarted terrorist attacks in places like Las 
Vegas, Tampa, New York, Cleveland, Kansas City, Pittsburgh--and 
those are just the ones I can think of off the top of my head. 
So we need more funding for those efforts, not less.
    Mr. Swalwell. If the FBI was defunded, would that hurt or 
help child exploitation investigations?
    Mr. Wray. It would hurt. We have a very, very active 
violent crimes against children program. We are literally 
arresting thousands of child predators and rescuing hundreds 
and hundreds of kids. So, again, we need more funding for that, 
not less.
    Mr. Swalwell. If the FBI was defunded, would that hurt or 
help COVID fraud investigations for money that went into the 
communities during the time of COVID?
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, it would hurt. We have a very active 
COVID fraud investigative program working with other agencies 
as partners, the Department of Justice Inspector General, et 
cetera. Given the remarkable amount of monies that were 
involved, courtesy of this Congress, it is important that we 
ensure the integrity of that spend so that it not be wasted 
on--I have been briefed by agents on cases involving, you know, 
violent gangs that have tapped into some of the COVID fraud 
money.
    Mr. Swalwell. Thank you.
    Secretary Mayorkas, do you support the GOP plan for the 
border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I very much look forward 
to working in a bipartisan way to address the need to enhance 
our border security.
    Mr. Swalwell. I guess do you know what the GOP plan is for 
the border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I do not. I want to work in a 
bipartisan way to address what is a unanimously understood to 
be a broken immigration system.
    Mr. Swalwell. I agree, Secretary.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I want to work----
    Mr. Swalwell. My point is I have not heard a plan, I have 
just heard grievances.
    Finally, Director Wray, last week the ``parliament in 
Iran'' voted to execute 15,000 protestors, many of them 
teenagers and women. One of those members of parliament is 
actually in the United States right now at the United Nations, 
presumptively under diplomatic cover. Do we need more resources 
or should we reconsider who we allow to come to the United 
States? You know, after you have voted for such an atrocity, it 
just really concerns me that people could be enjoying 
themselves in New York after signing, you know, a death warrant 
for 15,000 innocent Iranians who just want freedom.
    Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Director, you answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. Well, what I would say is that the Iranian regime 
across multiple vectors has become more aggressive, more 
brazen, and more dangerous. I would just point everything just 
in--again, just in maybe the last 18 months, a cyber attack on 
a children's hospital, an attempt to assassinate the former 
U.S. National security advisor in the United States, and an 
attempt to kidnap a journalist from right smack in the middle 
of New York City. So if that is not enough to convince us that 
the regime is a threat, I don't know what is.
    Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Director.
    Ms. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to echo 
the thoughts of some of my colleagues that Mr. Katko--I know he 
is gone--but certainly a great Ranking Member and the way that 
this committee has conducted its business in a bipartisan 
manner, that is to be commended.
    Mr. Wray, I read in your testimony that you consider 
domestic violent extremists to be the greatest threat to our, 
you know, health and well-being here in the United States. Do 
you stand by that?
    Mr. Wray. Well, let me just make a slightly finer point on 
it, because precision is important here.
    The greatest threat to us in the homeland is the lone 
actors and small cells, typically radicalized on-line, using 
easily accessible weapons against soft targets. That group 
included two categories, both domestic violent extremists and 
home-grown violent extremists, which are foreign terrorist-
inspired. So they are very similar, but it is two big buckets.
    Mr. Gimenez. Do you know how many fatalities we had in 2020 
from DVEs?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have the number of deaths off the top of 
my head, but I know that in 2020 the most lethal attacks--or 
the lethal attacks that we had came from what we categorize as 
anti-Government, anti-authority violent extremism, which 
includes both anarchist violent extremism, as well as militia 
violent extremism.
    Mr. Gimenez. Yes, I think I read there was something like 
four. Four is too many, you know, that is--you know, for the 
four people that died.
    Do you know how many people died per day from fentanyl 
overdose?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have that figure.
    Mr. Gimenez. Would it shock you to say over 200 die daily 
from fentanyl overdoses?
    Mr. Wray. I know the numbers are eye-popping.
    Mr. Gimenez. Eye-popping. Who controls that trade? Who is 
pouring in this deadly drug into the United States?
    Mr. Wray. Transnational criminal organizations, especially 
the cartels.
    Mr. Gimenez. Which ones? From where?
    Mr. Wray. Typically from Mexico.
    Mr. Gimenez. Would you consider that to be a terrorist act?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I certainly consider it to be a major, 
major law enforcement threat and a major, major security 
threat. Whether I would call it a National security threat gets 
into sort-of terminology. But certainly it is a major threat to 
the homeland of almost epidemic proportions.
    Mr. Gimenez. So an organization that is killing over 200 
Americans every single day, you have difficulty in saying that 
they are not terrorizing us?
    Mr. Wray. Well, again, in my world terrorism has a very 
specific legal definition. It is certainly a National security 
threat.
    Mr. Gimenez. So what are we doing about it? So we know we 
have an organization across the border--they are not some far 
away land, they are right across the border, they are killing 
tens of thousands of Americans every year. What exactly are we 
doing about that?
    Mr. Wray. Well, as to true border security, obviously I 
would, you know, defer to Secretary Mayorkas. But on our end, 
to deal with the transnational criminal organizations, there 
are a number of things we are doing.
    First, we have transnational organized crime task forces 
with not just agents, but lots and lots of State and local law 
enforcement officers who work with us to go after the cartels. 
Second, we have safe streets task forces, which deal with a 
related part, which is the violent gangs that work with those 
cartels and going after those. Third, we have border liaison 
officers in all of the field offices that we have that are on 
the border. I have visited all of them myself and walked around 
not just with our people, but with the CBP officers. Those 
folks ensure cross-border assistance. We have legats, which is 
legal attache offices in Mexico. In fact last year we were able 
to apprehend two of the FBI's top ten most wanted fugitives, 
which is progress.
    So those are some of the things we are doing, but it is a 
major, major concern for sure.
    Mr. Gimenez. Have we done anything with the government of 
Mexico, warned them, et cetera, that they need to step up their 
war against these cartels? Because, again, these cartels are 
killing tens of thousands of Americans.
    You know, a foreign group in 2000 killed about 3,000 
Americans and we responded by waging war for about 20 years 
halfway around the world. There are foreign groups right now 
across the border that are killing tens of thousands of 
Americans every single year and we don't seem to be doing much 
about it. Frankly, I am upset about that. We seem to be focused 
on domestic violent extremists, which we should, OK, but we 
are--which kill four people in 2020, and we seem to be turning 
a blind eye to organizations that are killing tens of thousands 
of Americans. We also seem to be doing not much about stopping 
the flow of this drug coming into the United States through our 
Southern Border.
    Thank you.
    My time is up and I yield back.
    Ms. Demings. The gentleman yields back.
    Let me just correct the record, 2019 most lethal year for 
DVE attacks. DVEs were responsible for 32 deaths in 2019.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Nevada, Ms. 
Titus, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you very much.
    At first let me thank the Department and Secretary for 
extending the TPS protections to Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Sudan, and Nepal. I have a very diverse district, 
many people from Central America, who will be benefiting from 
this and I just want to thank you. I appreciate that effort.
    My first question though will go to the Secretary, and it 
is pretty specific about my district. I apologize if it is too 
parochial. But Las Vegas is very excited to be getting a 
Formula One event for next November. They are going to be 
racing for 3 days up and down the strip, they are going to be 
close to all these major hotels, a lot of people are going to 
be there watching this race. I want to make sure that the event 
receives the appropriate--SEAR I think is the acronym--Special 
Event Assessment Rating. I just heard the director mention that 
Las Vegas is a place where they are always looking for 
terrorists, or we have seen terrorist threats.
    So could you talk about how the criteria for these SEAR 
designations work, how it has been updated, how today differs 
from what is in the past that would accommodate the event in 
Las Vegas?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are evaluating right 
now the Formula One race that is scheduled to occur in Las 
Vegas to identify the appropriate SEAR rating that it deserves.
    Please forgive me, but I must--I must respond to the 
Congressman's statement that preceded your question. It is 
candidly outrageous to say that we are not doing anything to 
address the transnational criminal organizations. We have 
incredibly brave law enforcement officers every day risking 
their lives to battle the criminality of those TCOs. I look 
forward to sharing with the Congress everything that we are 
doing in that regard.
    Congresswoman, I would be pleased to share with you what we 
are doing to refine the SEAR rating process, that is a rating 
process that we use to identify the security level of 
particular events in the United States. We actually just met as 
a group and discussed this yesterday. So I look forward to 
sharing with you some details. That review is under way.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much. We want it to be a 
fun environment, but we also want it to be a very safe 
environment for all the people who come to enjoy this kind of 
race.
    Related to this, Mr. Secretary, tourism is coming back, 
international tourism. We want to encourage that because such a 
big part of our economy--foreign tourists stay longer, they 
spend more, they visit regional areas, not just downtown Las 
Vegas. I wonder what is going on as you all try to accommodate 
this increase in tourism again. Whether it is with TSA or with 
Customs or COVID, all of those kind of considerations.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are incredibly 
excited about the fact that travel to the United States has 
resumed in full force. In fact, I think the latest figures 
exceed the patterns of 2019 before the COVID-19 pandemic 
gripped this country and the world in full force.
    The TSA personnel have emphasized the PreCheck process, 
which of course really assists us and supports us in 
approaching travel security in a risk-based manner. We are 
seeing more than 15,000 enrollments per day in the TSA PreCheck 
process. Our Border Patrol personnel are also working on new 
technologies and innovations to facilitate the travel process, 
as is TSA. There was quite a robust article just a couple of 
weeks ago in the Washington Post that described some of the 
technological innovations that TSA specifically has displayed. 
We have a partnership with Apple, for example, that we are of 
course open to other vendors accessing and using for a mobile 
driver's license identification process. We are looking at 
innovation and technology and the capabilities to further 
facilitate the travel experience and to enhance security at the 
very same time.
    Ms. Titus. Is staffing improving in terms of needing 
additional personnel?
    Secretary Mayorkas. One of the things that we hope Congress 
passes is our request to provide pay parity for our TSA 
personnel. The disparity that our TSA personnel suffer in pay 
makes recruiting and retention very difficult. So we hope that 
Congress passes the much-needed legislation to provide pay 
fairness for our TSA personnel.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    I know my time is up, but I would certainly support that 
and I know the Chairman of this committee has been working hard 
on that issue.
    Thank you and I yield back.
    Ms. Demings. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from Florida, Mrs. 
Cammack, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and good 
afternoon. Thank you all for being here with us this afternoon.
    With so many threats to deal with, as has been pointed out 
today, it is really a shame that we have a major one that we 
have to contend with. It is completely unnecessary and 
manufactured. So we will just jump right in on that one.
    Secretary Mayorkas, you have stated that you believe that 
the Southwest Border is secure. Giving me just the number and 
nothing else, no additional commentary, tell me how many 
gotaways there were for fiscal year 2022. Just the number 
please.
    Secretary Mayorkas, I have a litany of questions, just the 
number please.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Six hundred thousand.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you. You are correct, it is 600,000. 
Now, can you answer definitely with data backing up your answer 
that none of the 600,000 individuals who are now in the United 
States amongst our communities that got away are gang members 
or criminals?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Your question highlights precisely why 
we have sought to prioritize national security and public 
safety threats----
    Mrs. Cammack. I am so glad to hear you say that.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. In our Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement apprehension and removal efforts.
    Mrs. Cammack. I am really glad to hear you say that.
    I am going to have to reclaim my time, because I have got a 
lot to get through.
    So as you know, probably then, in fiscal year 2022 CBP 
arrested nearly 30,000 illegals attempting to enter the country 
who were previously convicted of a crime. Now, of those 
arrested--and just the number, no additional commentary--how 
many have claimed asylum?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, I will have to get back 
to you with----
    Mrs. Cammack. OK.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Specific numbers.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you.
    Now, officially there have been 2.4 million illegals that 
have been encountered at the Southwest Border in fiscal year 
2022. That doesn't include the 600,000 gotaways. So giving me 
just the number, and again, no additional commentary, can you 
tell me how many illegals have been released into the United 
States that were encountered at the Southwest Border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Putting aside your terminology, may I 
correct you? Because you have actually cited inaccurate facts 
in your question.
    Mrs. Cammack. Well, this is actually from your webiste.
    Secretary Mayorkas. No, it isn't.
    Mrs. Cammack. It is. I would be happy to provide it to you.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, 2.4 million or between 2.3 
and 2.4 million encounters is different than 2.3, 2.4----
    Mrs. Cammack. But I think you are missing the point of the 
question. How many----
    Secretary Mayorkas. If I may, Congresswoman----
    Mrs. Cammack [continuing]. Have been released into the 
United States?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, if I may, because you 
are mistaken, factually mistaken.
    Mrs. Cammack. So your data is incorrect?
    Secretary Mayorkas. No. No, you are misunderstanding our 
data.
    Mrs. Cammack. No.
    Secretary Mayorkas. If I----
    Mrs. Cammack. OK. I am going to reclaim my time because 
based on the information from your website--from your website, 
from your Department, officially there have been of all those 
encounters 1.4 million--and that is a conservative number--that 
your Department states have been released into the United 
States.
    So I know you guys have done this really fun renaming, 
rebranding thing, calling it enforcement removal proceedings, 
but today in fiscal year 2022, you have now released over 1.4 
million illegals into the United States. My question to you now 
is can you guarantee that none of those people have criminal 
records?
    Secretary Mayorkas. This enforcement work is not fun, 
Congresswoman. This is a noble profession in which people risk 
their lives to conduct it. You know that very well.
    Mrs. Cammack. All the righteous indignation. Here we go.
    So I want to make sure that you understand that per your 
own data and statistics, they have pointed out that in fact you 
hold the record as Secretary of Homeland Security for the most 
encounters and subsequent releases into the United States in 
history. Your own former boss, Secretary Jeh Johnson, said that 
1,000 a day is considered a crisis. Today we are encountering 
7,000 a day. The facts and figures make the point for me.
    So is the border secure based on your feelings or facts?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, let me have the 
opportunity to correct a misstatement.
    Two-point-three to 2.4 million encounters includes the fact 
that under Title 42, the Public Health Authority, individuals 
can actually be repeat offenders. They can try again. So there 
are actually approximately 1.7 million unique individuals whom 
we have encountered at the border. So when you say 2.4----
    Mrs. Cammack. But based on your reporting----
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am actually--if I may----
    Mrs. Cammack. Based on your reporting, these folks are here 
in the United States and there has been no proper vetting of 
these people. Then we don't even have the agreements in place 
to deport the folks that you are claiming under Title 42. 
Nicaragua is a great example of that.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I hope you realize that we 
have removed or expelled more individuals from the United 
States than ever before.
    Mrs. Cammack. Just to clarify, as a final question, with 
all of this data that has been presented, based on your own 
Department's releases, you still believe that the border is 
secure?
    Ms. Demings. The gentlewoman's time has expired. You may 
answer the question, Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we remain committed to 
enhancing the security of our border every single day.
    Mrs. Cammack. That is not an answer.
    Ms. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from 
New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank 
you to the witnesses for appearing before us today.
    Secretary Mayorkas, I wanted to ask you a question about 
Coast Guard operations. Our country faces many pressing threats 
across the domestic and international landscape, several which 
we have discussed here today, obviously. However, we must not 
lose track of the threats we face over the long term, such as 
increased aggression by China and Russia within international 
waters. China is aggressively pursuing increased influence 
across the Indo-Pacific and a Coast Guard cutter recently found 
Chinese and Russian ships carrying out joint maneuvers in the 
Arctic less than 100 miles off of Alaska.
    Mr. Secretary, how important to the U.S. interests are the 
Coast Guard's efforts to counter Chinese aggression in the 
Indo-Pacific and maintain a rule-based maritime order? 
Likewise, how critical are the Coast Guard's plans to build in 
and acquire new icebreakers to enable increased maritime 
presence in the Arctic?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you very much.
    It is vitally important that our United States Coast Guard 
be fully resourced to address what we all today have described, 
and accurately so, as an only increasing threat from China and 
other adverse nation-states. I was actually in Singapore and 
Japan several weeks ago to speak about the need to enhance our 
security partnerships. One of the main lines of effort in my 
bilateral discussions was in fact increased cooperation with 
our United States Coast Guard to address the increasing threat 
in the Indo-Pacific Region.
    Of course, the United States Coast Guard also has an Arctic 
strategy that it is executing and that Arctic strategy includes 
increasing its aging fleet and replacing some of its most aged 
vessels. So we look forward to Congress' support for that 
necessary funding.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Are there any other resources that we 
should be considering to support you in that endeavor?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we of course have 
presented our fiscal year 2023 budget, which includes much-
needed resourcing of the United States Coast Guard. We do hope 
that our budget is implemented very quickly. Every day that 
passes fails to advance our security mission. We are of course 
working on our budget plans for the years beyond.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
    I want to just mention that I am totally in support of the 
questions raised by Congressman Swalwell as it related to 
antisemitism. I mean New Jersey has had a very unique 
experience just a week ago where someone was threatening 
synagogues in the State of New Jersey. We have a large Jewish 
population and we want all of our population to be safe. So to 
you and to Director Wray, we very much look forward to your 
diligence, your intelligence, and your proaction as well as 
reaction.
    Finally, I have exactly a minute and 34 seconds left. I am 
wondering, Mr. Mayorkas, if you had any follow-up response to a 
former question or questions that you have been asked that you 
would like to share here?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, thank you so much.
    You know, we maintain data with respect to the challenge at 
the border. That data informs our operational actions and it is 
vitally important that that data be cited with precision and 
accuracy. We demand that of ourselves so that the operational 
decisions that we make are best tailored to address the 
challenges that we confront.
    I look forward to working in a bipartisan way with this 
committee to address the myriad of threats that we as a country 
face and to really enhance the security of the American people 
in every regard.
    Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. Demings. The gentlewoman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. 
LaTurner, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Thank you Mr. Secretary, for being here today.
    Secretary Mayorkas, you said ``our message has been clear 
that the border is in fact not open''. According to public data 
from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which you yourself 
oversee, we had 227,000 migrant encounters at the Southwest 
Border in September of this year alone, bringing the yearly 
total to almost 2.4 million, which is the highest number ever 
recorded. Do you believe that indicates a border that is not 
open?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thanks for your question.
    Please, it is very important that the American people 
understand that the individuals whom we encounter who are not 
expelled under the Public Health Authority of Title 42 are 
placed in immigration enforcement proceedings and are subject 
to removal if they do not qualify for the relief that they laws 
of this country provide them.
    Mr. LaTurner. Respectfully----
    Secretary Mayorkas. I do not think----
    Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary----
    Secretary Mayorkas. If I may----
    Mr. LaTurner. No, hang on. I have a limited amount of time 
and several questions. If you just give me a quick answer, I 
would really appreciate it.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Sure.
    Mr. LaTurner. Among those nearly 2.4 million encounters, we 
had 98 non-U.S. citizens listed on the terrorist watch list who 
were caught trying to enter the homeland between ports of 
entry. This is approximately five times the number of terrorist 
encounters from the last 5 years combined. Do you believe this 
indicates a border that is not open?
    Secretary Mayorkas. What this indicated, Congressman, is 
the fact that we have extraordinary personnel in the United 
States Border Patrol risking their lives every day to apprehend 
individuals at the border. We work----
    Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary, you are not going to answer 
the question. In fiscal year 2022 we had an estimated 600,000 
gotaways. Do you believe this indicated a border that is not 
open?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would respectfully posit 
that I don't think that the 1.4 million people who were either 
removed or expelled----
    Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. From the country would 
consider----
    Mr. LaTurner [continuing]. Please----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Would consider the border 
open.
    Mr. LaTurner. I am going to take back my time.
    In May Kansas City law enforcement seized more than 15,000 
counterfeit fentanyl pills. This fiscal year alone CBP has 
seized enough fentanyl to kill almost 2.9 billion people, over 
8 times the entire population of the United States. Do you 
believe this indicates a border that is not open?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, do you realize that the 
majority of the fentanyl that is sought to be smuggled into the 
United States comes through the ports of entry? Our 
interdiction efforts have been more successful than ever 
before. I should note that----
    Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary, in my home State----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Year over year since 
2018----
    Mr. LaTurner. Excuse me. Mr. Secretary, you have done this 
all day. When you don't like a question, you filibuster.
    In my home State of Kansas, the State Health Department saw 
a 54 percent increase in drug overdoses in the first half of 
2021, nearly half of which were caused by fentanyl, primarily 
supplied by the cartels. Nation-wide, the CDC reported that 
over 107,000 Americans died of drug overdoses in 2021, with 66 
percent of those related to synthetic opioids like fentanyl--
300 Americans a day are dying from fentanyl. It is the 
equivalent of an airliner going down every day. Do you think 
this indicates a border that is not open?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, the fight against the 
scourge of fentanyl and the devastation that it is wreaking, is 
a years-long fight that we in the U.S. Government, with our 
State and local partners have been fighting. Do you realize 
that the number of overdose deaths from fentanyl has been 
increasing year over year since at least 2018? Certainly this 
is not a new phenomenon. It is----
    Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary, you clearly----
    Secretary Mayorkas. It is not a new tragedy.
    Mr. LaTurner. Mr. Secretary, you clearly don't understand 
the problem.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I clearly do.
    Mr. LaTurner. This has--excuse me--this has nothing to do 
with politics. This is about kids across the country dying 
every single day from fentanyl overdoses because people in 
Washington can't get their act together. This is about an 
overwhelmed Border Patrol. This is about migrants being 
victimized by the drug cartels. My concern and the concern of 
my constituents back home is how can you begin to solve the 
problem if you don't even acknowledge the depth and breadth of 
it?
    Here is a question for you.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, I would respectfully----
    Mr. LaTurner. Have you had discussions----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Disagree with you.
    Mr. LaTurner. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary. Have you had 
discussions with the President or anyone in the Biden 
administration about stepping down from your current role?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I have not.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Not a conversation with anyone in the 
administration?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me be very clear.
    Mr. LaTurner. Yes or no.
    Secretary Mayorkas. May I answer your question?
    Mr. LaTurner. No, you--yes or no. Have you had----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman----
    Mr. LaTurner [continuing]. That conversation with anyone in 
the administration?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I am very proud of what we have 
accomplished. I am very committed to----
    Mr. LaTurner. Sir----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Accomplishing more.
    Mr. LaTurner [continuing]. Answer the question. Have you 
had a conversation with anyone in the administration about 
stepping down from your current role?
    Secretary Mayorkas. I have not.
    Mr. LaTurner. I hope for the sake of the safety of the 
American people that that conversation happens very soon.
    I yield back my time.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam----
    Ms. Demings. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Secretary, you may respond.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Madam Acting Chair, thank you very much 
for the opportunity.
    Congressman, I look forward to sharing information with you 
so that you understand the threat that fentanyl poses and how 
it is smuggled into the country. Everything that we are doing 
to fight the transnational criminal organizations across the 
Federal enterprise, with our partners to the south, and to 
disabuse you of misunderstandings that you have with respect to 
the fentanyl crisis, because they are grave. I look forward to 
not only sharing information with you, but hopefully sharing 
information with the American public.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Demings. I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    In the Ranking Member's absence, I do want to thank him for 
his leadership and his civility.
    I am hoping that this committee moving forward understands 
the importance of both of those things. I have heard a lot 
today and seen a lot, but there is one thing that I just cannot 
ignore, and I don't have to, of the performance of the 
gentleman from Louisiana earlier was an embarrassment. I am 
hoping that it was not reflective of the caliber of this 
committee and the very important work that you all have to do 
between the Members and staff moving forward.
    See, I just happen to believe that we can in the interest 
of the country be our better selves. I just happen to believe 
that we can on this committee be examples of America's 
exceptionalism. That example for our children and our 
grandchildren. I just happen to believe that we can work to 
keep our homeland safe, all at the same time.
    Director Wray, in June 2019, or somewhere around there, you 
talked about that you had--FBI had elevated the racially and 
ethically motivated violent extremism to your highest level--or 
highest threat priority, on the same level of ISIS and home-
grown violent extremists. Is that still the case today? Why or 
why not?
    Mr. Wray. Yes, Congresswoman, it is still a National threat 
priority and that is reflective of the lethality that we saw 
over the years leading up to that designation and that have to 
some extent continued since then.
    Ms. Demings. How does the caseload for cases falling into 
that category look today?
    Mr. Wray. I don't have exact numbers here, but I can tell 
you that the number of both domestic violent extremism cases in 
general has been growing over the last 4 or 5 years.
    Ms. Demings. Would you say it has doubled?
    Mr. Wray. Depends on when you--what your starting point is.
    Ms. Demings. Last 5 years.
    Mr. Wray. Before the end of calendar year 2020 it had gone 
up by say 50 percent. Since then it has gone up yet again quite 
substantially. That is domestic violent extremism overall, of 
which racially and ethnically violent extremism is one part.
    But I should say that along with racially and ethnically 
motivated violent extremism, we also saw starting in 2020 and 
continuing to the present, a lot of anti-Government, anti-
authority violent extremism, which includes everything from 
militia violent extremism to anarchist violent extremism. While 
that hasn't resulted in as many lethal attacks, the sheer 
volume of it caused us to elevate that as well more recently to 
a National priority.
    Ms. Demings. Would you say that that is the result of a 
lone domestic violent extremist? You talked about the threat 
of--I used to say the lone wolf. I guess we don't say that 
anymore, but would you say that the increase that you just 
talked about is a result of these individual people out there 
who are influenced by an array of different things?
    Mr. Wray. We are certainly seeing a trend that is magnified 
on-line of people using a mix, a hodgepodge of different 
personal beliefs and ideologies and grievances as justification 
for violence. That is an alarming trend that has continued, 
again, for the last let us say 4 or 5 years. It something we 
have to be concerned about. Certainly the social media 
dimension is one of the ways in which gasoline is poured on the 
fire, if you will. But there are a lot of other things that 
contribute to it.
    Ms. Demings. You have also said that China and Russia have 
basically piggybacked on the unrest that is here, the division 
within our country. What did you mean by that? In what ways?
    Mr. Wray. Well, a number of our foreign adversaries, a 
number of nation-states, Russia initially, but since then not 
just Russia but China and Iran as well have capitalized on the 
same toxic politically-charged violence that occurs in this 
country these days to try to pit us against each other, to sow 
divisiveness, to amplify tensions that are already there and 
make it worse. We saw that----
    Ms. Demings. Yes. They must be----
    Mr. Wray [continuing]. Not just with Russia----
    Ms. Demings. They must be smiling right now.
    Let me just end with this. I want to thank all of you for 
the commitment that you have to protecting our Nation. You have 
tough jobs. Some day I wonder why you have answered the call, 
but on behalf of this committee, we are sure glad that you did.
    At this time the Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
Michigan, Mr. Meijer, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to our 
witnesses who are here today. I know we all prize truth and 
accuracy.
    One thing for Director Abizaid, before we begin, Mr. 
Swalwell had mentioned the Iranian parliament voting I think he 
said the death penalty for 15,000 protestors. Is that strictly 
speaking an accurate statement that he made?
    Ms. Abizaid. I don't have details on exactly what the 
Iranian parliament actually did. We can certainly get back to 
you on that. I mean I will say in the spirit of this question 
and in the spirit of Director Wray's response, the Iranian 
government is a state sponsor of terrorism. We have seen them 
assume multiple different inroads into the United States and 
elsewhere. It is a regime that raises significant concerns from 
a security perspective.
    Mr. Meijer. Thank you. The public reporting that I had seen 
said that the Iranian parliament had voted in a super majority 
to enact tougher, swifter punishments up to and including the 
death penalty. But I think it is important when we are talking 
about adversaries to be clear. Then, again, I know you are well 
aware of this from your own work. But I just want to make sure 
that those statements and exaggerations don't go unanswered.
    I guess on the realm of that notion of exaggeration and 
jumping to false conclusions, you know, Secretary Mayorkas the 
September 19, 2021 incident in Del Rio, Texas, with the three 
mounted CBP officers, can--I know you had initial statements 
defending them last year. There were then, you know, a little 
bit of a walking back and President Biden making some very 
sweeping assumptions, accusing those officers of using their 
reins to whip or otherwise physically assault migrants who were 
coming across the border illegally. Then over the summer there 
was an investigation that essentially I believe clarified that 
it was cord split reins that were being used to control the 
horses. They never came into contact with migrants or the 
migrants didn't come into contact with those agents in that 
sense.
    Do you have anything else to add, you know, in terms of 
your current assessment of that situation now that we are a 
year and change onwards from it.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, thanks so much.
    From the very outset, I was actually in Del Rio the day 
that those photographs were first published. From that very 
afternoon in Del Rio at a press conference and ever since, I 
have spoken of the fact that the facts would be adduced in an 
objective, fair, and thorough investigation conducted by the 
Office of Professional Responsibility. The career personnel of 
the Office of Professional Responsibility did indeed conduct 
such an investigation and their thorough and extensive report 
speaks for itself.
    Mr. Meijer. I believe there are still three CBP members and 
a supervisor that are currently in an investigatory process. So 
they haven't--is that an accurate understanding? Just using 
media reports because there hasn't been too much forthcoming.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, to be precise----
    Mr. Meijer. Yes, please.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To your point, I believe 
the investigation is concluded. The report has been submitted, 
and now the disciplinary process----
    Mr. Meijer. Correct.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Is under way. That can 
take some time because of course the agents are afforded due 
process rights.
    Mr. Meijer. I appreciate hearing that, because so often the 
narrative gets far ahead of the facts. By the time, you know, 
the erroneous tweet gets a million likes and then the 
correction follow-up gets 15. Making sure that we are applying 
that same standard at 24-hour rapid news cycles, important as 
the narrative gets baked in and people have a misunderstanding 
and misapprehension.
    I guess very quickly, because I am running a little bit out 
of time, the four Secret Service agents in April of this year 
who were found to have been taking gifts, free apartment 
rentals, a number of kind-of high-value items that were being 
given to them by individuals that they believed were DHS 
agents, Department of Homeland Security agents, but were 
instead just cosplay artists. I mean characters who were 
ingratiating themselves. All credit to the United States Postal 
Investigation Service that uncovered it. Is that essentially a 
personnel matter? Because that is the response that the 
Department has been giving to our committee when we are 
inquiring how such a glaring security lapse could occur.
    Secretary Mayorkas. So, Congressman, I can't speak to the 
facts because they are under review, there is a process there. 
But I can say this with tremendous conviction, that I am 
intensely proud of the men and women of the United States 
Secret Service and the manner in which they execute their 
message. I am a beneficiary of their willingness to risk their 
lives for the safety and security of others.
    Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Torres, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Torres. So my question is directed toward the director. 
I am the future Congressman for Riverdale and the Bronx. 
Riverdale happens to be home to the Russian Diplomatic 
Compound, which stands as one of the highest buildings at one 
of the highest points in the Bronx. It is both literally and 
metaphorically a structure of surveillance, towering over the 
Bronx. The compound is so shrouded in secrecy that not even the 
fire department could gain access when a fire broke out more 
than a decade ago. According to a retired FBI special agent, 
Robert Dreeke it is an open secret that there are Russian spies 
disguised as diplomats residing at the Russian Diplomatic 
Compound.
    In 2015 the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District 
arrested and charged Evgeny Buryakov with conspiring to act as 
an agent of the Russian Federation on American soil. Mr. 
Buryakov lived in Riverdale in close proximity to the Russian 
Diplomatic Compound.
    So in the FBI's view, does the Russian Diplomatic Compound 
pose a homeland security threat?
    Mr. Wray. Well, Congressman, I think we may have provided a 
Classified briefing to you on this topic. But if we can 
supplement that, I would be happy to do that. I will say that 
the Russian intelligence services are perhaps the most active 
and aggressive on U.S. soil and in no place more so than in the 
city of New York.
    Mr. Torres. Would you consider that a homeland security 
threat?
    Mr. Wray. I consider the Russian intelligence services 
activity here in the United States to be a homeland security 
threat.
    Mr. Torres. Under the Foreign Mission Act, the FBI has the 
authority to reject on homeland security grounds the citing of 
a new embassy or consulate. Section 4305(d)(2) reads as 
follows: ``After December 22, 1987 real property in the United 
States may not be acquired by or on behalf of the foreign 
mission of a foreign country if in the judgment of the FBI 
director the acquisition of that property of that country might 
substantially improve the capability of that country to engage 
in intelligence activities directed against the United 
States.'' Do you think the Russian Diplomatic Compound, in the 
words of the Foreign Mission Act, substantially improves the 
capability of Russia to engage in intelligence activities 
directed against the United States Government?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I would be more comfortable taking this up 
in a Classified session. I am not an expert on the legality 
parts of the interaction here, but what I will tell you is that 
I know that the FBI's concerns from a counterintelligence 
perspective with respect to the Russian intelligence services 
are something that we discuss with the State Department, which 
has an important role here, quite frequently. I am very proud 
of the work, for example, that we were able to do together to 
ensure the closing, for example, of the San Francisco consulate 
for many of the same kinds of reasons that you are alluding to.
    Mr. Torres. I just want to be clear, I am not asking for 
confidential numbers or information, I am simply asking, you 
know, does the public have a right to know the FBI's view on 
whether a compound in their backyard poses a threat to the 
security of the homeland?
    That could be answered without divulging highly sensitive 
information.
    Mr. Wray. Well, I can answer in a general sense, which is 
that we are concerned about the Russian intelligence service's 
activity in the United States, including in New York, and their 
ability to exploit their diplomatic presence to accomplish 
that. More than that, I think I would have to wait and have us 
brief you on that, as I think we have to some extent already in 
closed session. It is not because I don't absolutely--as 
somebody whose parents still live in New York--care deeply 
about the issue that you are concerned about.
    But I just want to be careful about how I answer the 
question.
    Mr. Torres. Suppose the Russian Diplomatic Compound had 
never been built in Riverdale in the 1970's, if the Russian 
government were proposing to build the Russian Diplomatic 
Compound today, would the FBI reject it under the Foreign 
Mission Act?
    Mr. Wray. Well, I am reluctant to engage in hypotheticals, 
other than to say, as I have said, that we have seen a long 
history of the Russian intelligence services abusing and 
exploiting their diplomatic presence in the United States, 
including in New York, for purposes that are not in the 
interests of the United States. We will continue to express our 
views fairly forcefully in the interagency in that regard.
    Mr. Torres. I suspect the answer is no, that we would never 
allow this structure of surveillance to be built in 2022 in 
Riverdale. The fact that, you know, espionage in the Russian 
Diplomatic Compound has essentially been grandfathered in, is 
as indefensible to me as it is inexplicable.
    I will leave it at that.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. 
Pfluger, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    So we have the FBI, the National Counterterrorism Center, 
and the Homeland Security Departments here, the three agencies 
that have largely been entrusted with the safety and security 
of--every American has entrusted your agencies with their 
safety and security. This is your legacy. This is the legacy 
that you are going to leave behind. It has already been 
mentioned today that this year we have 98 people--and that 
doesn't include the 9, Secretary Mayorkas, that were reported 
by your Department yesterday, in October. So over 100 people 
have matched the terror watch list--100 people. That is a 500 
percent increase from the encounters of the previous year. 
Regardless of your testimony today under oath, that our border 
is secure, Americans can look at the numbers. We can look at 
the numbers right here and see from 2017 to 2021 and all the 
way into 2022, fiscal year 2022, over 100 people matched the 
terror watch list. All of you have testified today that you are 
worried about terrorism. Really?
    You see here the gotaways. Secretary Mayorkas, you have 
told me several times under oath that we have operational 
control of the Southern Border. I assume that you maintain that 
because you testified earlier today. How many of these people 
match the terror watch list? How many of the 600,000 known 
gotaways match the terror watch list?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, your question points to 
the very reason why we prioritize National security and public 
safety in our immigration enforcement efforts. Why on September 
30 of 2021----
    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, can I reclaim just a minute--I 
am going to reclaim my time.
    I think that is false. I have been to the Southern Border 
and I have talked to your Border Patrol agents. You know what 
they tell me? That on any given shift 70 percent of them are 
relegated to administrative duties. They are not in the field 
doing the National security mission.
    How many of these 600,000 people--can you assure the 
American people that not a single one of these 600,000 people 
are a threat to our safety? That they don't match the terror 
watch list, that they are not part of a criminal or 
transnational organization?
    That is what your agents have told me personally. So I am 
just taking their word for it.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I have the benefit of a vantage point 
of what the entire border represents, as well as what we are 
doing about it.
    One of the things that we have done about the fact that 
Border Patrol agents were too often behind computers----
    Mr. Pfluger. Secretary, answer the question.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Processing cases----
    Mr. Pfluger. How many of the 600,000 people--no, we have 2 
minutes left.
    Secretary Mayorkas. I know, but I feel compelled to----
    Mr. Pfluger. You don't have the time to do that. I want to 
know how many of the 600,000 people match the terror watch 
list?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Well, Congressman, by definition they 
are gotaways.
    Mr. Pfluger. OK. So you don't know. So how can you say that 
the border is secure? The American people aren't buying it. We 
are not buying it because the deaths that are happening in our 
communities--I have invited you to come with me. I was in Del 
Rio the day before you got there when the 15,000 Haitians were 
there. I have been to El Paso, I have been to the Rio Grande 
Valley. You are going to hear more on that later.
    Let us put up another slide because you are not going to 
answer that question, but I don't--while we are putting up the 
next slide, do you maintain that we have operational control of 
the Southern Border?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, let me just say one thing 
very briefly and then I will answer your question.
    It is very difficult to answer your question when I am not 
given the opportunity to do so, No. 1.
    Mr. Pfluger. As my colleagues have said----
    Secretary Mayorkas. No. 2, I do feel compelled to correct 
inaccuracies that are contained in your question for the 
benefit of the American people.
    Mr. Pfluger. The accuracies are--the facts that I have 
stated are reported by you and your Department.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, so we are dedicated to 
resourcing the United States Border Patrol with additional 
personnel----
    Mr. Pfluger. OK.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. With additional 
technology, using barriers advisedly where they are most 
beneficial----
    Mr. Pfluger. OK. That is not my question.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. To deliver enhanced 
security at our border.
    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Secretary, thank you for that.
    I have heard you say, and President Biden--and this is your 
legacy, OK--the American people can count. We can count. There 
is a humanitarian crisis at our Southern Border. I have been 
down there. You and President Biden have continued to ignore 
this problem. Fiscal year 2022 was the deadliest year on 
record. More than 800 migrants died. Do you remember the 53 
that died in a tractor trailer in the heat of July south of San 
Antonio, Texas? This is the legacy.
    The American people are demanding that you secure the 
border.
    You have testified under oath today that it is secure. It 
is not.
    Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. 
Gottheimer, for 5 minutes.
    Let me just remind the Members that we do have a vote on 
the floor, 5 minutes is 5 minutes. You are all entitled to it, 
but just know that there is a vote on the floor.
    Mr. Gottheimer.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    I have called for a National carjacking car theft task 
force as a result of a rising number of car thefts impacting my 
district, the State of New Jersey overall, and of course the 
Nation. However, these threats reach our ports a well, 
according to CBP's own reporting thousands of vehicles have 
been illegaly exported through tri-State area ports, including 
the Port of Newark, bound for overseas destinations including 
West Africa and the Dominican Republic.
    Last year in New Jersey there were more 14,000 vehicles 
reported stolen, a shocking 22 percent increase compared to 
2020, and 2020 numbers were already up from the year before. 
Year after year these crimes continue to grow, there has been a 
19 percent increase in New Jersey through the first 8 months of 
2022, including in the county in my district, Bergen County, as 
seen a 54 percent increase in car thefts this year.
    I have called this committee to hold a hearing on the issue 
of auto theft and port security, as well as for Secretary 
Mayorkas to appear to answer questions about DHS's failing to 
take what I believe are adequate steps to address this issue. I 
believe DHS must do more to crack down.
    However, I am concerned this issue is not being addressed 
in an urgent manner from the Department.
    Mr. Secretary, despite repeated efforts, officials from DHS 
refused to answer my questions or publicly speak out on what 
measures are being taken in response to these alarming numbers 
of stolen vehicles being taken to our ports. I reached out to 
your office multiple times over multiple months to invite you 
or a senior official from DHS to come to Jersey to address this 
issue and you refused. Which, as you might imagine, is very 
frustrating for the people that I represent.
    Clearly this is a serious issue.
    Can I ask you, Mr. Secretary, do you think this is a 
serious issue? Why aren't you communicating more to the public, 
why aren't you taking more serious steps, and what is your plan 
there?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, forgive me, I am 
unfamiliar with your request to speak with me directly about 
what is clearly a homeland security issue. I would be pleased 
to speak with you subsequent to this hearing. I will 
proactively reach out to your office.
    I was actually in one of our ports on the East Coat working 
with our homeland security investigations and our customs 
office personnel addressing stolen vehicles and the 
implications for our security, the effort to smuggle narcotics 
through our ports of entry in stolen vehicles and other 
methods. I can share some insights in that regard and also 
learn from you with respect to the methodologies that you think 
we should employ to address this criminal threat.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Well, I appreciate that.
    Yes, just so you know, I personally left messages for you. 
We reached--spoke to your--the departments at Homeland. They 
refused to come, despite repeated requests, which is very 
frustrating because it was over many months. This has been a 
huge challenge and I think this should be front and center as 
an issue that you consider. I hope that somebody, obviously in 
addition to our conversation, from DHS will come to the port to 
actually investigate, to look, to see what other steps can be 
taken working with local and State law enforcement to address 
this issue.
    So I hope that will happen. I hope that I have your word 
that that will happen please. Sir?
    Secretary Mayorkas. We look forward to working with you.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you.
    If I can turn to Director Wray. In October, Director, I 
helped host a full committee field hearing on countering 
violent extremism and terrorism and antisemitic threats in New 
Jersey. The ADL's--antisemitic incidents reported a record 
2,717 acts of assault, vandals, and harassment, averaging more 
than 7 incidents a day of antisemitic incidents in Jersey, up 
25 percent in the last year. We have a huge issue. Just 
recently the FBI alerted the State and warned of the threats--a 
broad threat to synagogues for which an extremist individual 
was ultimately arrested. It is a clear reminder to the Jewish 
community and place of worship are vulnerable.
    Director, what is the FBI doing to counter antisemitic 
threats and violence in New Jersey and around the country? If 
you mind just addressing that please.
    Mr. Wray. Absolutely. I am obviously pleased that we were 
able to make an arrest in the case in New Jersey that you 
mentioned. I was actually speaking to all of ADL on this topic 
just last week more broadly.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Great.
    Mr. Wray. Certainly antisemitism and violence that comes 
out of it is a persistent and present fact. Numbers that we 
have seen, about 63 percent of religious hate crimes overall 
are motivated by antisemitism, and that is targeting a group 
that just makes up about 2.4 percent of the American 
population. So it is a community that deserves and desperately 
needs our support because they are getting hit from all sides.
    We are trying to address it through a combination of 
things. No. 1, on the terrorism side, the domestic terrorism 
side, through our joint terrorism task forces. No. 2, on the 
hate crime side, through our civil rights program. We have 
elevated that to a National threat priority. We have created, 
third, a domestic terrorism hate crime fusion cell, which 
brings together those two programs that I just mentioned, 
domestic terrorism and hate crimes, to try to be more 
proactive. In fact, that fusion cell has already had results. 
We were able to bring a proactive hate charge to prevent an 
intended attack on a synagogue in Colorado as a result of it.
    But then on top of that we are engaged in a very aggressive 
outreach campaign that is designed to kind-of raise awareness, 
help people know how to report, what to be on the lookout for. 
Because we need to tap into the eyes and ears that are in the 
community. That has included, for example, not far from you in 
New York, translating some of the materials into Yiddish, for 
example, and Hebrew to make it more accessible to certain parts 
of the Jewish community.
    Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Gottheimer. Thank you.
    Ms. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
New York, Mr. Garbarino, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garbarino. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary and the director, director for 
coming today.
    I want to start off first with Secretary Mayorkas. Fiscal 
year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, which was enacted 
January 1, directed the administration to develop a continuing 
of the economy plan. As we came upon the 1 year--and they are 
supposed to finish it by the end of this year--as we came upon 
the 1-year mark last year I sent a letter to you as well as 
Director Easterly, expressing, you know, my immense concern 
about the lack of progress. I never received a response.
    Then 15 months after the Authorization was done, the 
President finally handed over the authority to CISA, pretty 
much setting up the agency for a failure. We are now over a 
little bit of a month before the deadline and we have yet to 
receive any information on where CISA or the Department is on 
the development of the continuation of the economy plan.
    Again, we sent that letter and we still have received no 
response. You talked about cybersecurity in your opening 
remarks. The development of the continuation of the economy 
plan is a National security imperative for the safety, 
security, and prosperity of the U.S. economy. So can we please 
have an update where we are on the development of this plan, 
which is due in less than 2 months?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman Garbarino, I will look 
forward to following up on that for you and responding swiftly. 
I will have to look in that.
    Mr. Garbarino. Well, I mean----
    Secretary Mayorkas. Where the report that is due to you is.
    Mr. Garbarino. OK. Well, the report is due in 2 months, but 
we--I have sent two letters, both to you and Director Easterly, 
and I have received no response at all. When can I expect a 
response?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Let me follow up with you very quickly 
on that, Congressman.
    Mr. Garbarino. OK. I appreciate that.
    I have another question for you, Mr. Secretary, because you 
also talked about it a little bit in your opening statement. 
Earlier this summer Canada became the last member of Five Eyes 
intelligence pooling alliance to bar or restrict the use of 
Huawei equipment within its 5G telecom network. In addition, 
Canada's ban also includes equipment made by ZTE, which is one 
of China's biggest tech companies and one that is state-owned. 
The United States and Canada work in partnership at and beyond 
our borders to enhance security, sharing critical 
infrastructure.
    So it is critically important that the United States can 
trust Canada's or any of our allies' 5G equipment and software 
will not threaten our National security, economic security and 
privacy, or intellectual property. As the world becomes 
increasingly connected via the rise of 5G networks, how can 
vulnerabilities brought on by other nation's 5G networks, such 
as those with Huawei equipment, how can we make sure they don't 
pose a National security risk?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, your question is so very 
important. Let me share with you. No. 1, Canada is a very, very 
close security partner with us. We have a robust information-
sharing architecture with them. They are one of the 
participants in our regular dialogs in the area that you have 
identified and in so many other homeland and National security 
areas.
    I was just in Singapore about 3 weeks ago speaking about 
the very issue that you have identified and really 
communicating a very clear and stark call to countries in the 
Indo-Pacific Region about the vulnerabilities that are created 
when we allow China, the People's Republic of China to control 
some of the architecture infrastructure----
    Mr. Garbarino. Can I ask you what their response----
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Such as 5G.
    Mr. Garbarino. What was their response when you brought--
because we are already doing it, but our allies, you know, 
there are some of them that aren't doing it and some of them 
that will not have updated--you know, the put these plans in 
place and they haven't updated current infrastructure with 
Huawei technology.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congressman, it is our responsibility 
to communicate information, to communicate accurate information 
with respect to the perils of having infrastructure, 
communications infrastructure in the hands of nation-states 
that don't protect freedoms and rights as do we.
    Mr. Garbarino. OK. Well, I think though if some of our 
allies are not willing to, you know, protect their 
vulnerabilities like we are, especially with Huawei, we should 
maybe be a little more careful in the future deciding what we 
are going to share with them, just because, you know, we don't 
need the enemy knowing what we know.
    I have a final question for Director Wray. According to an 
August 2019 U.N. report, North Korea has generated an estimated 
$2 billion for its weapons of mass destruction program using 
cyber attacks. Again, we had--just in April North Korea hackers 
stole $620 million in cryptocurrency from video game Axie. You 
know, they have been doing this for a very long time and they 
are getting a little aggressive. What are we doing to stop 
these hackers? You know, what actions have been taken?
    Ms. Demings. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The witness may answer the question.
    Mr. Wray. Well, you are right that I think North Korea 
sometimes gets--and I think dangerously so--overlooked as a 
significant cyber threat, because we spend so much time, very 
rightly, talking about China, Russia, and Iran. But North Korea 
has a growing espionage in addition to the theft and attack 
capability. In some ways sort-of similar to Iran in recent 
years in particular. Especially targeting, as you say, 
financial institutions, cryptocurrency exchanges, and so forth 
because they need it to fund their regime because of the 
effectiveness of the sanctions that otherwise exist.
    So we are actively investigating any number of North Korean 
threat actor groups when we are able to catch somebody who is 
working with them in a country that we can extradite from. That 
is a very important part, both in terms of insuring 
accountability, but also in terms of disrupting their efforts 
and in terms of learning valuable intelligence about their 
techniques, tactics, and procedures.
    In addition to that, it helps us figure out how to further 
tighten the sanctions regime to make it harder for them to find 
loopholes, which they are always looking for.
    Ms. Demings. The Chair now recognizes the gentlewoman from 
Texas, Ms. Flores, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Flores. Thank you, Madam. Thank you to Chair Thompson 
and Ranking Member Katko for holding this hearing today. To all 
the witnesses, thank you for taking the time to speak to us 
today. We really appreciate it.
    Our country is currently facing never-before-seen levels of 
illegal immigration, drug smuggling, and child sex trafficking. 
To Secretary Mayorkas, as someone who lives the reality of our 
Southern Border every day, saying that the border is secure, 
you are lying to the American people. According to the CBP our 
country has experienced 2.7 million migrant encounters to our 
border during the fiscal year of 2022. This does not include 
the 900,000 gotaways. Further, there has been 98 people 
apprehended crossing the border who appear on the terrorist 
screening data set.
    This administration's horrendous border policies will 
continue to threaten our National security because a secure 
border is National security.
    This week has been a very difficult week for us in South 
Texas. Our Border Patrol agents, the ones who dedicate their 
lives to protect us, are not receiving the support that they 
need from this administration. One of the top things I have 
heard from our Border Patrol agents across the Southern Border 
is the lack of action from the DHS leadership in addressing 
Border Patrol morale. Our Border Patrol agents are 
understaffed, not provided with the resources that they need to 
succeed, and are spending time processing asylum claims instead 
of doing the job that they signed up to do.
    Tragically, in the last week in the RGV sector, two Border 
Patrol agents took their own lives, leaving behind families and 
creating a hole in our communities.
    Question No. 1. Secretary Mayorkas, the historic level of 
illegal alien apprehension and crossings at the border, 
combined with the limited resources and personnel to handle the 
large influx of migrants has caused a steep decline in morale 
among the Border Patrol work force. In no other department is a 
mental health crisis more visible than Customs and Border 
Protection, Border Patrol Division, our agents and our 
officers. One life is too many. And in 1 week.
    What are your plans to support the mental health for your 
work force and address the troubling increase of suicide among 
the front-line personnel?
    Secretary Mayorkas. Congresswoman, may I have a minute to 
answer your question? Because you have touched on very, very 
important matters. I first, at the outset, should thank you for 
your service, because I know you have a Border Patrol agent in 
your family and I know very well that it is the family that 
serves.
    Ms. Flores. Mm-hmm.
    Secretary Mayorkas. Our prayers and thoughts are with the 
families of the agents who took their lives.
    Our Border Patrol agents, our heroic Border Patrol agents--
--
    Ms. Flores. Mm-hmm.
    Secretary Mayorkas [continuing]. Are indeed under intense 
pressure and indeed under intense challenge. We are very 
dedicated to providing them with the resources and support that 
they need to fulfill their responsibilities and to ensure their 
wellness. That is a commitment that we have and it is an 
unwavering one and our highest priority.
    We have surged resources to the border to get more Border 
Patrol agents out in the field. We are taking it to the 
smuggling organizations and the transnational criminal 
organizations in an unprecedented way. We are working with our 
partners to the south, the countries that need to enforce their 
borders and enforce their laws of humanitarian relief. This is 
a challenge that is not specific to the United States, that is 
not specific to our Southern Border, that is something that has 
gripped the Western Hemisphere.
    Let me take the example of Venezuela alone. There are 
approximately 25-28 million people in the country of Venezuela. 
Approximately 8 million Venezuelans have left their country. 
Colombia is hosting 2.4 million Venezuelans, Chile is reported 
to host over 1 million Venezuelans. It is not Venezuela alone. 
Costa Rica is hosting hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans. We 
are seeing a migration in the Western Hemisphere and in fact 
across the world that is unprecedented. There are more 
displaced along our border.
    But with respect to our border, please rest assured, 
Congresswoman, and please have your family rest assured that we 
are dedicated to enhancing the security of our Southern Border 
and taking care of our extraordinary and brave personnel who 
secure it every day.
    Ms. Demings. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    I want to thank the witnesses for your testimony and the 
Members for your questions. The Members of the committee may 
have additional questions for the witnesses and we ask that you 
respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.
    The record will remain open for 10 business days. Also that 
there is a vote on the floor.
    Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

  Questions From Secretary Sheila Jackson Lee for Honorable Alejandro 
                                Mayorkas
    Question 1a. The midterm elections resulted in a highly secure 
election in which Americans can be confident.
    What is your assessment of the threat of cybersecurity breaches and 
intrusions during the 2022 midterm elections and the response to them?
    Question 1b. What DHS efforts do you believe were most effective in 
securing this year's elections?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2a. We have seen a sustained rise in the use of influence 
operations to sway U.S. policy, manipulate elections, weaken the United 
States' geopolitical standing, and attempt to contravene our democratic 
process.
    What changes have you seen in the frequency, magnitude, and impact 
of misinformation and disinformation operations since last year?
    Question 2b. In what ways, and to what extent, do DHS and the FBI 
work together through such means as coordinating strategies, personnel, 
and other resources to combat the threat of influence operations?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. Human trafficking and child exploitation are often 
spoken about as if they are separate crimes committed by separate 
parties.
    In what ways, and to what extent, are human trafficking and child 
exploitation interrelated? Are the same perpetrators undertaking both 
crimes?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4a. Secretary Mayorkas' testimony that was provided prior 
to the hearing referenced a Climate Change Action Group that DHS began 
recently. My district has been impacted by extreme climate events that 
have greatly affected my constituents, including large-scale flooding 
from Hurricane Harvey and wide-spread infrastructure damage from Winter 
Storm Uri.
    What specific climate change threats to homeland security has your 
Climate Change Action Group identified? What proactive and remedial 
measures has the group identified and recommended?
    Question 4b. How is DHS investing in Community Resilience?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
  Questions From Honorable James R. Langevin for Honorable Alejandro 
                                Mayorkas
    Question 1a. Secretary Mayorkas, it has been 1 year since the 
Department of Homeland Security submitted its report evaluating PPD-21, 
as required by section 9002 of the 2021 NDAA. In a letter last week 
concurring with that review, President Biden acknowledged the United 
States ``lacks a comprehensive way to establish mandatory minimum 
cybersecurity requirements across our critical infrastructure, and 
current approaches differ by sector.'' He also committed to ``working 
with Congress to fill gaps in statutory authorities.''
    What gaps should we be looking to fill related to improving the 
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure?
    Question 1b. The letter mentions a focused effort to help Sector 
Risk Management Agencies identify Systemically Important entities in 
their sector. How is DHS approaching this task?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
   Questions From Honorable Nanette Barragan for Honorable Alejandro 
                                Mayorkas
    Question 1. I was happy to hear that the President's Interagency 
Task Force on the Reunification of Families that you chair has 
successfully reunified more than 500 children who were cruelly 
separated from their parents or family during the Trump administration. 
What strategies is DHS taking to reunite the remaining families and to 
remedy the harms of the past administration on these children and 
families?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2a. When I visited Puerto Rico as part of a Congressional 
delegation in September, residents and local officials highlighted how 
microgrids and solar power that helped keep power on after Hurricane 
Fiona hit. As we rebuild in Puerto Rico, does FEMA have the authority 
to approve clean energy projects with the Federal disaster recovery 
funding authorized by Congress after Hurricane Maria?
    Question 2b. If yes, will FEMA prioritize clean energy projects to 
build a more decentralized power system?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. We are not only falling short of our goal to scan 100 
percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, but it is also my understanding 
that multi-energy portal scanners leave a sizable blind spot with the 
containers we do scan, because they have a very limited ability to 
penetrate dense cargo. This is a major security concern for the Port of 
Los Angeles in my district, and for many of our Nation's seaports. Are 
there alternative scanners that may produce better results? And, if so, 
does DHS plan on utilizing these alternatives at our seaports?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. As of July 2022, the Port of Los Angeles has been hit 
with almost 40 million cyber attacks per month, with most attacks 
coming from Europe and Russia. What precautions have DHS and the FBI 
taken to combat against these potential cyber threats, particularly 
those that could harm or disrupt the flow of cargo at our Nation's 
busiest seaport?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
   Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Honorable Alejandro 
                                Mayorkas
    Question 1a. Due to botched screening and vetting efforts during 
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) admitted or paroled dozens of evacuees with derogatory 
information into the country, including one individual who had been 
liberated by the Taliban from an Afghanistan prison and another who was 
determined to be a National security threat by the FBI 3 months after 
being granted entry to the United States.
    Provide the total number of individuals with derogatory information 
who were transported into the United States as a result of Operation 
Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.
    Question 1b. What is the current status of these individuals? Have 
all of these individuals been apprehended? What is being done with them 
once apprehended?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. What are the overall impacts of the Afghanistan 
relocation effort as viewed by your agency? What continuing impacts 
should we anticipate both in the homeland, as evacuees assimilate to 
the United States, and abroad, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(FTOs) continue to flourish in the post-withdrawal climate?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic 
People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Iran have all been 
involved in malicious cyber attacks against the United States, harming 
our critical infrastructure sectors, attempting to influence our 
democratic processes, and compromising Government projects.
    Explain your agency's work to mitigate these threats, especially in 
conjunction with the cyber nexus of other threat vectors, including 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and FTOs?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4a. More than a year has passed since the conclusion of 
Operation Allies Refuge and the height of Operation Allies Welcome, 
allowing us time to analyze and reflect on the challenges each 
operation faced.
    In September 2022, the DHS OIG released a report highlighting DHS's 
screening and vetting failures. This included issues from falsely 
recording dates of birth for evacuees to failure to collect biometric 
information such as fingerprints. What is DHS doing to remedy these 
failures?
    Question 4b. The committee was notified by a source from the 
Department of State that DHS, along with partner agencies assisting in 
the evacuation, would issue identification cards/papers to evacuees who 
did not present identifying paperwork, basing information on the cards/
papers (which included name and date of birth) solely on the word of 
the evacuee. How many of these cards/papers were issued during the 
operations?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. On August 24, 2022, following the recommendation of the 
Homeland Security Council, you terminated the DHS Disinformation 
Governance Board. However, according to reports published at the end of 
October, DHS and the FBI have continued policing speech, even 
pressuring private companies to do so on your behalf. Has DHS requested 
that tech and social media companies remove or label posts as 
misinformation, disinformation, or malinformation in the lead up to the 
2020 election?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6a. Please discuss in detail what the Department plans to 
do to help alleviate the devastating migration crisis we face.
    Ninety-eight non-U.S. citizens listed on the terrorist watch list 
were caught attempting to enter the homeland between ports of entry. 
Please discuss the challenges our brave Border Patrol agents face in 
apprehending these individuals as well as the threats those who evade 
detection present to homeland security.
    Question 6b. Given your record over the last 2 years, how can the 
American people expect you to prioritize the security of the Southwest 
Border throughout fiscal year 2023?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7a. On October 12, 2022, the Department announced a new 
legal entry path specifically targeting Venezuelan migrants. This path 
would be a fully on-line process for up to 24,000 qualifying 
Venezuelans. Under this new policy, Venezuelan migrants who cross into 
the United States illegally will be returned to Mexico.
    Please explain the reason why this new policy targets Venezuelans 
and no other nationality? Does the Biden administration intend to 
expand this program beyond Venezuelans?
    Question 7b. The National Border Patrol Council has stated there 
will be a daily cap on the number of Venezuelans that Mexico will 
receive as part of this initiative. What is that daily total cap? What 
will happen to Venezuelan nationals once that cap is exceeded?
    Question 7c. It is already evident the Department's new policy may 
increase the potential number of Venezuelan gotaways. How does the 
Department intend to address this potential increase?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 8. At the beginning of November, the U.S. Border Patrol 
reported a more than 500 percent increase in encounters with Cuban 
migrants in South Florida since the same time last fiscal year. South 
Florida has seen more than 800 migrants arrive since October 1, 2022 in 
more than 50 landings. At the same time, the number of U.S. Coast Guard 
personnel recruitments has plummeted, with the USCG offering unheard-of 
$50,000 signing bonuses to encourage enlistments.
    Do you believe our maritime security readiness is in jeopardy in 
the face of these recruitment issues and increased maritime-based 
migration? Please describe how you plan on addressing this critical 
shortage of personnel and what you are doing, other than the signing 
bonus, to bolster Coast Guard recruitment.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 9a. As of the end of September 2022, Immigration Court 
judges dismissed a total of 63,587 cases because Border Patrol agents 
are not filing the ``Notice to Appear'' (NTA) with the Immigration 
Court. Without a filed NTA, a case cannot proceed, meaning that 1 out 
of every 6 Court cases were thrown out for this reason in the past 
fiscal year, and the migrant tied to that case is unaccounted for.
    What is the Department doing to ensure that all NTAs are filed with 
Immigration Court to ensure that thousands of migrants are not left in 
limbo and are not lost in the interior of our homeland?
    Question 9b. Are you aware of the reasons why Border Patrol agents 
are not filing NTAs with the Immigration Court System?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 10a. Under the Biden administration's policies, ICE 
removals have plummeted to a fraction of the normal levels.
    Provide a monthly breakdown of interior enforcement actions--
arrests, detentions, and removals--which ICE has effectuated since 
January 2019.
    Question 10b. As the number of migrants attempting to enter the 
United States continues to surpass historic records, growing in tandem 
with an increasing flow of illegal narcotics, human trafficking, and 
transnational crime in the U.S. homeland, has the Department considered 
any alternative policy options regarding deportation?
    Question 10c. How do you reconcile President Biden's weakened 
enforcement priorities with the fact that because of these policies, 
fewer serious criminals are being removed?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 11. Over the past several years, supply chain attacks have 
greatly increased and have the potential to impact thousands of victims 
simultaneously. What steps has the Department taken to ensure a robust 
commercial cyber incident response capacity that could be called upon 
in times of need?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 12a. While many illicit drugs are seized at a port of 
entry, we also know that drugs like fentanyl are coming across the 
border between ports of entry:
    Provide an estimate of the quantity (in pounds) of fentanyl that 
has been transported into the United States through the southwest land 
border, northern land border, and otherwise entered the interior broken 
down by each of these respective locations, as well as by month, from 
Jan. 2021 to present.
    Question 12b. What are your plans to provide CBP personnel with the 
technology and resources to intercept a larger percentage of illicit 
drugs flowing across our border?
    Question 12c. Due to the influx of migrants, CBP officers and 
agents are being pulled away from their primary mission to assist with 
processing individuals into the United States. With the lack of front-
line officers and agents patrolling the border, how is this hampering 
CBP's ability to intercept these deadly drugs?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 13a. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine earlier 
this year, CISA developed the Shields Up campaign to bolster cyber 
defenses across public and private sectors and throughout all sectors 
of our economy.
    What more is CISA and the Department doing to prepare critical 
infrastructure owners and operators to mitigate Russian cyber threats 
stemming from the conflict?
    Question 13b. As we brace for the potential of escalatory actions 
by the PRC in Taiwan, what is CISA and the Department doing to mitigate 
cyber risk based on the intelligence community's assessment of the 
PRC's specific tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 14. To attempt to combat the crisis on the Southwest 
Border, you have deployed highly-trained and highly-skilled Federal Air 
Marshals (FAMs) to perform non-law enforcement duties such as hospital 
watch, transportation, and welfare checks. DHS is removing hundreds of 
FAMs from the skies during one of the busiest travel seasons of the 
year to send them to the border, even though you have stated that 
America's aviation infrastructure is a very high threat and a target. 
How many high-risk flights are not being covered due to your decision 
to deploy FAMs to the border? How many FAMs have already been sent to 
the border, or are scheduled to be sent, who have not volunteered for 
the deployment?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 15. In the case Texas v. Biden (Case 2:21-cv-00067 N.D. 
Tx), DHS was filing monthly status reports with the court reporting on 
six distinct topics. Those updates ended in August (covering the July 
reporting period). Provide the monthly data, in the form it was 
provided to the Court, to be current through November 2022.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 16. Provide an estimated number of gotaways who have 
crossed the southwest land border, northern land border, and otherwise 
entered the interior broken down by each of these respective locations, 
as well as by month, from Jan. 2021 to present.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 17. Provide the monthly total, from January 2019 to 
present, of all Southwest Border encounters--both at and between Ports 
of Entry--delineated by citizenship/nation of origin. Provide the 
citizenship/nation of origin, from January 2019 to present, of all 
Southwest Border encounters subsequently determined to be present 
within the Terrorist Screening Dataset.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 18. How does DHS anticipate the granting full legal status 
to 11 million unlawful migrant aliens present in the United States will 
affect the total number of future apprehensions, arrests, detentions, 
and removals at the Southwest Border? How did DHS formulate this 
prediction? How does DHS anticipate the granting full legal status to 
11 million unlawful migrant aliens present in the United States will 
affect the time line and backlog of adjudicating new cases at the 
Southwest Border? How did the Department formulate this prediction?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 19. Provide the Department's working definition of the 
below terms. What is the basis for each of these respective 
definitions? What is the authority for each of these respective 
definitions? What is DHS's statutory authority to determine each of 
these respective definitions? Explain how a DHS employee, or an 
employee of any DHS component, determines if information qualifies as 
each of these respective definitions. What training does DHS provide 
employees to make this determination? Are there written guidance 
documents? If so, please provide them.
   Misinformation
   Disinformation
   Malinformation
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 20. What entities, companies, executives, and other 
contacts are DHS's largest private-sector partners in its 
Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation efforts? What 
entities, agencies, officials, and other contacts are DHS's largest 
Government partners in its Misinformation, Disinformation, and 
Malinformation efforts?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 21. What non-governmental organizations, contacts, and 
sources of information do DHS employees and contractors rely on to help 
determine whether something is Misinformation, Disinformation, and/or 
Malinformation? In which countries are those non-governmental 
organizations, contacts, and/or sources of information based? From what 
sources--including but not limited to the U.S. Government and/or non-
U.S.-based entities, organizations, or governments--do those 
organizations receive funding?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 22. Rank the 5 greatest threats posed by the PRC, in 
order, as you see them.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 23. How is DHS ensuring that foreign students from the PRC 
who pose counterintelligence risks are not admitted into the United 
States? How is DHS preventing Chinese nationals from gaining access to 
sensitive research at universities or other publicly-funded 
institutions? How does DHS discourage State and local governments from 
continuing to procure Chinese tech that is banned from Federal 
procurement, including from companies like Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, 
Dahua, and Hytera?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 24. How will DHS support the National Biodefense 
Strategy's objective to update and upgrade National and SLTT 
capabilities for contact tracing, including digital technologies to 
facilitate contact tracing, to enable the containment of infectious 
pathogens during future biological incidents? How will DHS support the 
National Biodefense Strategy's objective to detect, report, and respond 
to diseases brought across the Nation's open borders? How will DHS 
support the National Biodefense Strategy's goal to ``Promote Evidence-
Based Health Communication to the Public,'' including the increasing 
vaccine uptake rates and its objectives to coordinate information?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 25. With the surge of migrants along the Southwest Border, 
what specific efforts is DHS taking to ensure the vetting and screening 
of each individual who is encountered at a port of entry and between 
ports of entry? Where are DHS resources and capabilities lacking in 
terms of vetting and screening? What is being done to handle these 
inefficiencies?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 26. With no confirmation on the credibility of migrant 
biographical data provided by other countries, how does DHS ensure the 
accuracy of their screening systems? How is DHS verifying that the data 
used for these processes is accurate, up-to-date, and objective?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
  Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christopher A. Wray
    Question 1a. We have seen a sustained rise in the use of influence 
operations to sway U.S. policy, manipulate elections, weaken the United 
States' geopolitical standing, and attempt to contravene our democratic 
process.
    What changes have you seen in the frequency, magnitude, and impact 
of misinformation and disinformation operations since last year?
    Question 1b. In what ways, and to what extent, do DHS and the FBI 
work together through such means as coordinating strategies, personnel, 
and other resources to combat the threat of influence operations?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence found that ISIS and al-Qaeda remain 
the greatest Sunni terrorist threats to U.S. interests overseas but 
that ``U.S.-based Lone Actors and Small Cells with a broad range of 
ideological motivations pose a greater immediate domestic threat.''
    How can the U.S. Government use policy and law to address the rise 
in groups seeking to organize themselves as militias that use 
intimidation and force to influence the political process?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. Human trafficking and child exploitation are often 
spoken about as if they are separate crimes committed by separate 
parties.
    In what ways, and to what extent, are human trafficking and child 
exploitation interrelated? Are the same perpetrators undertaking both 
crimes?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christopher A. Wray
    Question 1a. Due to botched screening and vetting efforts during 
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) admitted or paroled dozens of evacuees with derogatory 
information into the country, including one individual who had been 
liberated by the Taliban from an Afghanistan prison and another who was 
determined to be a National security threat by the FBI 3 months after 
being granted entry to the United States.
    Provide the total number of individuals with derogatory information 
who were been transported into the United States as a result of 
Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.
    Question 1b. What is the current status of these individuals? Have 
all of these individuals been apprehended? What is being done with them 
once apprehended?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. What are the overall impacts of the Afghanistan 
relocation effort as viewed by your agency? What continuing impacts 
should we anticipate both in the homeland, as evacuees assimilate to 
the United States, and abroad, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(FTOs) continue to flourish in the post-withdrawal climate?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic 
People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Iran have all been 
involved in malicious cyber attacks against the United States, harming 
our critical infrastructure sectors, attempting to influence our 
democratic processes, and compromising Government projects.
    Explain your agency's work to mitigate these threats, especially in 
conjunction with the cyber nexus of other threat vectors, including 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and FTOs?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4. The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) strategy of 
``Military Civil Fusion'' aims to establish the People's Liberation 
Army (PLA) as a globally dominant military force by 2049. To achieve 
this goal, the CCP has worked to obtain cutting-edge technology, often 
through theft. This theft has come in many forms, including through the 
infiltration of American research and aggressive talent recruitment 
programs. Could you please explain to the committee the various ways 
the CCP pursues its goals through theft and espionage and how the FBI 
has worked to mitigate this threat?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. You have expressed concern over potential terrorist 
attack on U.S. soil emanating from Afghanistan given the growing 
intelligence gaps since the U.S. withdrawal last August. Could you 
please elaborate on this concern given our new understanding of the 
vetting challenges cited in the DHS OIG report on Operation Allies 
Welcome?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. The United States' global competition with the PRC 
presents one of the greatest challenges the United States will face 
this century. You yourself have said ``the greatest long-term threat to 
our Nation's information and intellectual property, and to our economic 
vitality, is the counterintelligence and economic espionage threat from 
China.'' Could you please elaborate on this statement?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7a. The 2022 Annual Threat Assessment states, 
``Transnational cyber criminals are increasing the number, scale, and 
sophistication of ransomware attacks, fueling a virtual ecosystem that 
threatens to cause greater disruptions of critical services world-
wide.''
    As the threat of ransomware cascades across all sectors of our 
Nation's economy, and threatens to disrupt global services, what 
practical steps do you recommend critical infrastructure owners and 
operators as well as small business owners implement to mitigate this 
risk?
    Question 7b. Who is the first person a small business owner should 
contact if they experience a ransomware attack?
    Question 7c. How does the FBI work with other interagency partners 
to create situational awareness of reported ransomware attacks across 
the Federal Civilian Executive branch?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 8a. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is 
charged with the mission to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with 
the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland 
safe. I&A's customers and partners include DHS leadership, DHS 
components, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector 
partners, and the IC. Could you please describe the nature of your 
organization's relationship with I&A?
    Question 8b. How often does your organization collaborate with I&A 
on an issue area or arising threat?
    Question 8c. How often does your organization receive an I&A 
product that is used to bolster your organization's mission?
    Question 8d. What challenges have you experienced in your 
collaboration with I&A?
    Question 8e. Are there any aspects of I&A's collection or analysis 
processes that you think could be improved? If so, how?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 9a. At the World Wide Threats hearing in 2020 you stated 
``DVEs pose a steady and evolving threat of violence and economic harm 
to the United States. Trends may shift, but the underlying drivers for 
domestic violent extremism--such as perceptions of government or law 
enforcement overreach, sociopolitical conditions, racism, antisemitism, 
Islamophobia, misogyny, and reactions to legislative actions--remain 
constant.'' How has this threat evolved since your testimony in 2020? 
Please provide annual statistics from 2016 through present for the 
following.
    How many DVE threats were identified arising from sociopolitical 
conditions? How does the FBI define ``sociopolitical conditions'' in 
the above context? How many DVE threats were identified arising from 
racism? How does the FBI define ``racism'' in the above context? How 
many DVE threats were identified arising from antisemitism? How does 
the FBI define ``antisemitism'' in the above context? How many DVE 
threats were identified arising from islamophobia? How does the FBI 
define ``islamophobia'' in the above context? How many DVE threats were 
identified arising from misogyny? How does the FBI define ``misogyny'' 
in the above context? How many DVE threats were identified arising from 
reactions to legislative actions? How does the FBI define ``reactions 
to legislative actions'' in the above context?
    Question 9b. How many white RMVEs committed ideologically-motivated 
incidents and violence against Black individuals? How many white RMVEs 
committed ideologically-motivated incidents and violence against Asian 
individuals? How many Black RMVEs committed ideologically-motivated 
incidents and violence against white individuals? How many Black RMVEs 
committed ideologically-motivated incidents and violence against Asian 
individuals? How many Asian RMVEs committed ideologically-motivated 
incidents and violence against white individuals? How many Asian RMVEs 
committed ideologically-motivated incidents and violence against Black 
individuals?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 10. In September 2021, the Attorney General circulated a 
memo labeling parents at school board meetings ``domestic terrorists'' 
and directing the FBI to collaborate with U.S. Attorneys and other 
local officials to address this alleged issue. Explain all actions the 
FBI has taken in the implementation of this memo. Explain, for each 
field office, all actions they've taken to implement the Attorney 
General's memo.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 11. The FBI has recently conducted a series of 
investigations and arrests related to FACE Act violations at abortion 
providers. At the same time, it appears that a spate of attacks at pro-
life pregnancy resource centers have led to no arrests and limited 
investigation. Provide the number of reported FACE Act violations 
stemming from actions at abortion providers. Provide the number of 
reported FACE Act violations stemming from actions at pregnancy centers 
which do not provide abortion services. Provide the number of open 
investigations into alleged FACE Act violations stemming from actions 
at abortion providers. Provide the number of open investigations into 
alleged FACE Act violations stemming from actions at pregnancy centers 
which do not provide abortion services. Provide the number of FACE Act 
arrests stemming from actions at abortion providers. Provide the number 
of FACE Act arrests stemming from actions at pregnancy centers which do 
not provide abortion services.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 12. Rank the 5 greatest threats posed by the PRC, in 
order, as you see them.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 13. How is the FBI ensuring that foreign students from the 
PRC who pose counterintelligence risks are not admitted into the United 
States? How is the FBI preventing Chinese nationals from gaining access 
to sensitive research at universities or other publicly-funded 
institutions? How does the FBI discourage State and local governments 
from continuing to procure Chinese tech that is banned from Federal 
procurement, including from companies like Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, 
Dahua, and Hytera?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 14. Did the FBI have any Confidential Informants present 
at any polling place or voting location during the midterm election?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 15. What internal FBI procedures exist to ensure that 
retaliation against whistleblowers does not occur? What steps has the 
FBI taken to protect whistleblowers from retaliation?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 16. How has the FBI ensured compliance with the Attorney 
General's policy prohibiting Justice Department political appointees 
from participating in campaign-related activities in any capacity? How 
many violations occurred?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 17. What steps have you taken to ensure that politically-
driven individuals such as Timothy Thibault are not tasked with 
investigating cases of corruption or other politically-related matters? 
What initial and continuous vetting for political bias is done by the 
FBI regarding these agents and investigators?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
   Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Christine Abizaid
    Question 1a. The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence found that ISIS and al-Qaeda remain 
the greatest Sunni terrorist threats to U.S. interests overseas but 
that ``U.S.-based Lone Actors and Small Cells with a broad range of 
ideological motivations pose a greater immediate domestic threat.''
    What is the National Counterterrorism Center's assessment of the 
scope and severity of the current threat of domestic violent extremism?
    Question 1b. In what ways does NCTC distinguish between and assess 
domestic violent extremist groups that characterize themselves as 
militias and who, in some cases, stockpile weapons?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
     Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Christine Abizaid
    Question 1a. Due to botched screening and vetting efforts during 
the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) admitted or paroled dozens of evacuees with derogatory 
information into the country, including one individual who had been 
liberated by the Taliban from an Afghanistan prison and another who was 
determined to be a National security threat by the FBI 3 months after 
being granted entry to the United States.
    Provide the total number of individuals with derogatory information 
who were transported into the United States as a result of Operation 
Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome.
    Question 1b. What is the current status of these individuals? Have 
all of these individuals been apprehended? What is being done with them 
once apprehended?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. What are the overall impacts of the Afghanistan 
relocation effort as viewed by your agency? What continuing impacts 
should we anticipate both in the homeland, as evacuees assimilate to 
the United States, and abroad, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
(FTOs) continue to flourish in the post-withdrawal climate?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. The People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic 
People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK), Russia, and Iran have all been 
involved in malicious cyber attacks against the United States, harming 
our critical infrastructure sectors, attempting to influence our 
democratic processes, and compromising Government projects.
    Explain your agency's work to mitigate these threats, especially in 
conjunction with the cyber nexus of other threat vectors, including 
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) and FTOs?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4a. The DoD OIG discovered that Afghan evacuees were not 
vetted by the NCTC using all available data prior to entering the 
United States because CBP enrollments were compared against DHS data, 
which did not initially include all biometric data held by the DoD.
    What steps have been taken to mitigate this issue?
    Question 4b. Could you please discuss the efforts, if any, the NCTC 
has made in partnership with DHS to ensure proper data sharing is in 
place to prevent such an issue going forward?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5a. Foreign terrorism remains a persistent threat to the 
United States, both in the homeland and abroad. Following the U.S. 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the country quickly returned to its status 
as a safe haven for terrorism. Are you concerned about this?
    Question 5b. How concerned are you with the lack of visibility we 
have into the Taliban-run country?
    Question 5c. Is the NCTC aware of any terrorist training camps 
currently existing in Afghanistan?
    Question 5d. How do you perceive the withdrawal from Afghanistan 
will impact the threat landscape over the next decade?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. Iran remains committed to its terrorist activities 
against the United States, both directly and via proxy attacks. In 
August 2022, the DOJ disclosed one such attack in which an Iranian 
national attempted to arrange the murder of former National Security 
Advisor John Bolton in retaliation for the death of Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem 
Soleimani. Please describe to the committee the on-going threats 
presented from Iran.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7. The U.S. Border Patrol reported 98 encounters with 
people on the U.S. Government's terrorist watch list along the 
Southwest Border in fiscal year 2022. What are your concerns for this 
enormous increase in such encounters, especially with the context that 
there was an estimated 600,000 gotaways in fiscal year 2022?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 8a. The DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is 
charged with the mission to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with 
the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland 
safe. I&A's customers and partners include DHS leadership, DHS 
components, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector 
partners, and the IC. Could you please describe the nature of your 
organization's relationship with I&A?
    Question 8b. How often does your organization collaborate with I&A 
on an issue area or arising threat?
    Question 8c. How often does your organization receive an I&A 
product that is used to bolster your organization's mission?
    Question 8d. What challenges have you experienced in your 
collaboration with I&A?
    Question 8e. Are there any aspects of I&A's collection or analysis 
processes that you think could be improved? If so, how?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

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