[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. COAST GUARD'S LEADERSHIP ON ARCTIC SAFETY, SECURITY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
=======================================================================
(117-62)
REMOTE HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 7, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
50-409 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, SAM GRAVES, Missouri
District of Columbia ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas BOB GIBBS, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
JOHN GARAMENDI, California JOHN KATKO, New York
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., BRIAN BABIN, Texas
Georgia GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
DINA TITUS, Nevada MIKE BOST, Illinois
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
JARED HUFFMAN, California DOUG LaMALFA, California
JULIA BROWNLEY, California BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
MARK DeSAULNIER, California JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts Puerto Rico
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
GREG STANTON, Arizona DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois TROY E. NEHLS, Texas
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire NANCY MACE, South Carolina
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas
JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia MICHELLE STEEL, California
KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii Vacancy
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
Florida
------ 7
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Chair
RICK LARSEN, Washington BOB GIBBS, Ohio
JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts, RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
Vice Chair MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland Vacancy
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation, opening statement..................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation, opening statement..................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 9
WITNESSES
Panel 1
Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations,
U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement............................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Hon. Michael Sfraga, Ph.D., Chair, U.S. Arctic Research
Commission, oral statement..................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, oral statement.......................... 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Panel 2
Rebecca Pincus, Ph.D., Director, Polar Institute, Wilson Center,
oral statement................................................. 45
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Martha Grabowski, Ph.D., Professor, Le Moyne College and
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board,
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, oral
statement...................................................... 52
Prepared statement........................................... 54
APPENDIX
Question from Hon. Bob Gibbs on behalf of Hon. Garret Graves to
Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for
Operations, U.S. Coast Guard................................... 65
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December 1, 2022
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``U.S. Coast Guard's
Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and Environmental
Responsibility''
_______________________________________________________________________
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
will hold a hearing on Wednesday, December 7, 2022, at 10:00
a.m. EST in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom to
examine the implementation of the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic
Strategy. The Subcommittee will hear testimony from the U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG), the U.S. Arctic Research Commission
(USARC), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Polar
Institute of the Wilson Center, and Le Moyne College.
BACKGROUND
The Arctic region has transformed on multiple fronts in the
decade since the release of the USCG's 2013 Arctic Strategy.\1\
Geophysically, the surface temperature of the Arctic is warming
2-3 times faster than the world as a whole,\2\ altering snow
cover, ice cover, and trends in extreme storm events.\3\
Between 1971 and 2019, the by-month average extent of sea ice
in the Arctic declined in all months of the year but especially
September (43 percent decline from 1971 to 2019), with climate
models predicting that the first ice-free September in the
Arctic could occur as soon as 2040.\4\ This extended summer has
created novel opportunities for maritime transit, broadening
the stage for commercial activities such as shipping, passenger
cruises, energy development, and mineral extraction (Fig.
1).\5\
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\1\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/
5pw/Arctic%20Policy/USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-
330, accessed November 8, 2022; USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/
Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
\2\ Arctic Council, 2021. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/
bitstream/handle/11374/2621/
MMIS12_2021_REYKJAVIK_AMAP_Arctic-Climate-Change-Update-2021-Key-
Trends-and-
Impacts.-Summary-for-Policy-makers.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; IPCC,
2021. https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/plan/introduction-and-
background.html, accessed November 8, 2022.
\3\ IPCC, 2021. https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/plan/
introduction-and-background.html, accessed November 8, 2022.
\4\ Arctic Council, 2021. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/
bitstream/handle/11374/2621/
MMIS12_2021_REYKJAVIK_AMAP_Arctic-Climate-Change-Update-2021-Key-
Trends-and-
Impacts.-Summary-for-Policy-makers.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed
November 14, 2022.
\5\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and
Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S.
Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460,
accessed November 27, 2022.
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LFigure 1. Increase in vessel traffic in USCG District 17 Arctic area
of interest, 2009-2019.\6\
LSource: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data. GAO-20-460
LNote: The USCG District 17 Arctic area of interest is defined as north
of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east to Banks Island in the
Canadian Arctic, and west into Russia to the New Siberian Islands.
Geopolitically,\\ the Arctic has been a region of
increasing focus for the eight Arctic nations (U.S., Canada,
Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Russia),
and self-proclaimed ``Near Arctic'' states including the
People's Republic of China (Fig. 2).\7\ The USCG, the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. White House each
released updated strategic plans within the past three
years.\8\
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\6\ Id.
\7\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/
-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
\8\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/
-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022; U.S.
White House, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/
10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf, accessed November 27,
2022; USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
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Russia's renewed aggression toward Ukraine has heightened
geopolitical tensions, and previous efforts to work
cooperatively in the Arctic are suspended until further notice,
heightening risk and creating new uncertainty in USCG
operations.\9\
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\9\ DOS, 2022. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-
council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/, accessed
November 27, 2022.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
LFigure 2. Map of the Arctic region as defined by the Arctic Research
and Policy Act of 1984 (ARPA),\10\ highlighting two transit routes
(Northwest Passage, Northeast (``Northern'') Passage) of high interest
to the U.S.\11\ \12\
I. USCG\\ STRATEGY\\ IN\\ THE ARCTIC
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\10\ ARPA, 2006. https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/
arpa_amended.pdf, accessed November 27, 2022.
\11\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
\12\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-
1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
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The USCG's vision for operating in the Arctic region is,
``Ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime
activity in the Arctic.'' \13\ Safety, security, and
environmental stewardship capture the spectrum of the USCG's
primary duties under section 102 of title 14, U.S. Code.\14\ In
a place as vast and remote as the Arctic, the USCG accomplishes
this diverse mission set via multi-agency partnerships and
multi-purpose assets and infrastructure.\15\ In this way, USCG
activity in the Arctic can be viewed as an example of how the
USCG optimizes use of its limited resources for its priority
missions.
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\13\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed
November 8, 2022.
\14\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, cited by USCG, 2022. https://
www.history.uscg.mil/Home/Missions/, accessed November 28, 2022.
\15\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed
November 8, 2022.
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As an illustration of scale, Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian
Islands is currently the closest U.S. deep draft port to the
Arctic; roughly 1,100 nautical miles from Point Barrow (the
northernmost point in the U.S.).\16\ Construction for the Deep
Draft Port Project, which was authorized at $333 million in the
2020 Water Resources Development Act included in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, is expected to begin
in Spring 2023 and will provide a new deep draft port option in
Nome, Alaska, still approximately 500 nautical miles from
Barrow.\17\ Likewise, the closest USCG Air Station to Barrow is
in Kodiak, Alaska, located approximately 945 nautical miles to
the south.\18\
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\16\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed
November 8, 2022.
\17\ Alaska Public Media, 2022. https://alaskapublic.org/2022/11/
18/nomes-arctic-deep-draft-port-project-approaches-milestone/, accessed
November 28, 2022.
\18\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed
November 8, 2022.
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USCG Arctic operations are primarily based out of the USCG
District 17 Command Center in Juneau, Alaska, and Base Kodiak,
which is the largest USCG command in the entire Pacific
Area.\19\ District 17 encompasses 3.9 million square miles and
over 47,300 miles of shoreline throughout Alaska and the
Arctic, from north of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east
to the Banks Island in the Canadian Arctic, and west to Russia
to the New Siberian Islands.\20\
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\19\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022.
\20\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022; GAO, 2020. ``Maritime
Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and Interagency Leadership Could
Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S. Arctic'', available at https://
www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460, accessed November 27, 2022.
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A. SAFETY
Safety encapsulates four of the ``non-homeland security''
missions of the USCG: Marine Safety; Search and Rescue; Aids to
Navigation; and Ice Operations.\21\ During an average month,
USCG District 17 saves 22 lives and over $1.65 million in
property (includes onshore); reports and investigates 25 marine
casualties; services 93 buoys and fixed aids to navigation;
performs 143 commercial fishing vessel safety exams; teaches
375 kids about life jacket wear; and performs 95 marine
inspections.\22\
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\21\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, cited by USCG, 2022. https://
www.history.uscg.mil/Home/Missions/, accessed November 28, 2022.
\22\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022.
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B. SECURITY
Security encapsulates all five domestic security missions
of the USCG: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Drug
Interdiction; Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness; and
Other Law Enforcement.\23\ In the context of the Arctic region,
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security and Defense Readiness
are key functions of the USCG as it works in coordination with
the DOD to stabilize the region geopolitically while
safeguarding U.S. interests.\24\ Particularly, the USCG's non-
homeland security missions, e.g., Search and Rescue, give the
USCG visible presence and allows it to interact in non-
confrontational ways. As such, the USCG--an armed service--is
uniquely qualified to initiate and enhance partnerships between
the U.S. government and others, be it local Alaskan
communities, private commercial enterprises, or foreign
nations.
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\23\ Section 468, Title 6, U.S.C. https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?req=(title:6%20section:
468%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-
section468)&f=treesort&
edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true, accessed November 28, 2022.
\24\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-
1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
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C. ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP
The Alaskan commercial fishing industry is estimated to
have a $3 billion impact on the U.S., and fished species are
expected to shift northward within and into the Arctic as sea
water temperatures rise,\25\ creating potential new enforcement
challenges for the USCG to the current international
prohibition on commercial fishing in the central Arctic
Ocean.\26\
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\25\ Huntington et al., 2020. ``Evidence suggests potential
transformation of the Pacific Arctic ecosystem is underway'', available
at https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0695-2, accessed November
28, 2022.
\26\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
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The USCG also plays a vital leadership role in responding
to oil spills and other environmental pollution incidents.\27\
This role is expected to require more of the USCG's time and
resources as maritime traffic increases with the melting of the
Arctic sea ice.\28\ However, it is worth noting that techniques
to physically remove oil from ice-heavy landscapes are still
underdeveloped.\29\ Oil pollution, along with the region's
changing ecology, make federally and internationally protected
marine mammals and other endangered species more vulnerable to
extinction,\30\ and put Alaskan communities that depend on
local food resources at increased risk.\31\
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\27\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and
Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S.
Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460,
accessed November 27, 2022.
\28\ USARC, 2012. ``Oil Spills in Arctic Waters'', available at
https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/oil_spills_2012_hi.pdf, accessed
November 30, 2022.
\29\ NAS, 2022. ``Oil in the Sea IV'', available at https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26410/oil-in-the-sea-iv-inputs-fates-
and-effects, accessed November 28, 2022.
\30\ Id.
\31\ CRS, March 2022. ``Changes in the Arctic: Background and
Issues for Congress'', available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R41153, accessed November 28, 2022.
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D. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE USCG
Complimentary to the USCG's statutory missions listed in
section 468 of title 6, U.S. Code, are seven statutory duties
listed under section 102 of title 14, U.S. Code. Together,
these statutes codify the necessity of the multi-purpose
approach of USCG. For example, two duties that are particularly
relevant to the Arctic strategy are the directives to develop
and operate icebreaking facilities pursuant to international
agreements, and to engage in oceanographic research of the high
seas and in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.\32\
So, in addition to having the ability to perform nine of the 11
statutory missions, polar icebreakers shall also engage in
oceanographic research. The White House's National Strategy for
the Arctic Region emphasizes a commitment ``to a whole-of-
government, evidence-based approach'' \33\--a principle which
further emphasizes the planned use of icebreakers as multi-
mission platforms.\34\
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\32\ Section 102, Title 14, U.S.C. https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?hl=false&edition=
prelim&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title14-
section102&num=0&saved=%7CKHRpdGxlOjE0
IHNlY3Rpb246MTAyIGVkaXRpb246cHJlbGltKSBPUiAoZ3JhbnVsZWlkOlVTQy1
wcmVsaW0tdGl0bGUxNC1zZWN0aW9uMTAyKQ%3D%3D%7CdHJlZXNvcnQ%3D%7C%7C0
%7Cfalse%7Cprelim, accessed November 28, 2022.
\33\ U.S. White House, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf, accessed
November 27, 2022.
\34\ CRS, September 21, 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
(Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'',
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391,
accessed November 28, 2022.
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E. PARTNERSHIPS, THE POLAR CODE, AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY
The USCG's most recent Arctic guidance, the USCG Arctic
Strategic Outlook (2019), offers three immediate lines of
effort: 1) Enhance capability to operate effectively in a
dynamic Arctic; 2) Strengthen the rules-based order; and 3)
Innovate and adapt to promote resiliency and prosperity. These
efforts are to be guided by the underlying principles of
partnership, unity of effort, and culture of continuous
innovation.\35\ To carry out these efforts, partnerships exist
between the USCG and other U.S. federal agencies (e.g.,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Arctic
Research Commission), Alaska state agencies, Alaska local and
indigenous communities, non-governmental organizations,
academic institutions, and foreign-based entities.\36\
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\35\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
\36\ Id.
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International cooperation in the Arctic has been
facilitated largely through the Arctic Council (Council),
established in 1996.\37\ The Council is made up of the eight
Arctic nations, six Indigenous Peoples' organizations
(Permanent Participants), and a variety of other governmental
and nongovernmental partners (Observers).\38\ In 2009 the
Council called upon the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) to formulate and adopt the International Code for Ships
Operating in Polar Waters, referred to as the ``Polar Code.''
The Polar Code went into effect on January 1, 2017, and enacts
mandatory requirements intended to improve vessel safety and
prevent pollution from vessels transiting in the Arctic,
including ship construction, navigation, crew training, and
ship operation.\39\ The Polar Code applies to passenger and
cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in international
voyages.\40\
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\37\ Arctic Council, 2022. ``About the Arctic Council'', available
at https://www.arctic-council.org/about/, accessed November 30, 2022.
\38\ Id.
\39\ IMO, 2022. ``Shipping in polar waters'', available at https://
www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Polar-default.aspx, accessed
November 30, 2022.
\40\ Id.
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The Council is a consensus-based, intergovernmental forum
that works to promote environmental, social, and economic
aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic. Russia was
scheduled to chair the Council from 2021-2023, but since
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, the seven other
Arctic state members (including the U.S.) jointly declared a
suspension of their participation from Council activities.\41\
The future of the Council remains unclear.
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\41\ DOS, March 2, 2022. ``Joint Statement on Arctic Council
Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine'', available at
https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-
following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/, accessed November 8, 2022.
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II. DOCUMENTED CHALLENGES TO USCG ARCTIC OPERATIONS
A. INFRASTRUCTURE
Numerous governmental and academic reports have identified
infrastructure and operational challenges to maritime
transportation in the U.S. Arctic. Liabilities include limited
satellite coverage and architecture to support voice and data
communications, hazardous weather and ice conditions, and the
lack of channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids to
navigation (for which installation is not always possible due
to continuously moving ice sheets).\42\ In addition, to
ensuring safe and efficient maritime transportation in the
region, it is necessary to conduct surveys to improve nautical
charts, improve communications capabilities, improve weather
forecasting and modeling, and develop community and regional
emergency response networks in preparation for vessel and
aircraft accidents and environmental damage related to
increased ship traffic and industrial development.\43\ In many
cases, data exist or are actively being collected, but the lag
between data collection, communication, and operational use by
the USCG is severe.\44\
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\42\ Arctic Council, 2009. ``Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment'';
U.S. White House, 2013. ``National Strategy for the Arctic Region'';
GAO, 2014. ``Maritime Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial
Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade''; Alaska Arctic
Policy Commission, 2015. ``Final Report''; U.S. Committee on the Marine
Transportation System, 2016. ``A Ten-Year Prioritization of
Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic''; Council on Foreign
Relations, 2017. ``Arctic Imperatives, Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on
America's Fourth Coast''; Center for Strategic and International
Studies, 2017. ``Maritime Futures, the Arctic and the Bering Strait
Region''.
\43\ Id.
\44\ Simonee et al. 2021. ``Sila Qanuippa? (How's the Weather?):
Integrating Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit and Environmental Forecasting
Products to Support Travel Safety around Pond Inlet, Nunavut, in a
Changing Climate'', available at https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-20-
0174.1, accessed November 16, 2022.
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In addition to known infrastructure requirements, the USCG
has explored the need for the creation of new vessel routing
measures to reduce the risk of marine casualties and increase
the efficiency and predictability of vessel traffic in the U.S.
Arctic.\45\ The USCG is also conducting several Arctic-focused
research projects in collaboration with academia at the Arctic
Domain Awareness Center, including methodologies to minimize
environmental damage from spilled oil in extreme cold, enhanced
navigational capabilities in the Arctic, establishing exposure
limits for Search and Rescue team members in extreme cold, and
developing a classification system of ice conditions.\46\ Other
efforts to improve Arctic capabilities include the
International Arctic Ocean Buoy Program, which maintains an
international network of drifting buoys in the Arctic Ocean to
provide meteorological and oceanographic data for real-time
operational and research through the U.S. Integrated Ocean
Observing System.\47\
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\45\ USCG, 2016. ``Port Access Route Study: In the Chukchi Sea,
Bering Strait, and Bering Sea. Preliminary Findings'', Number USCG-
2014-0941 and USCG-2010-0833; USCG, 2018. ``Port Access Route Study:
Alaskan Arctic Coast'', available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2018-12-21/pdf/2018-27604.pdf, accessed November 28, 2022.
\46\ USCG, 2018. ``FY18 RDT&E Project Portfolio'' in Acquisition
Directorate. Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; Examples: Next
Generation Arctic Navigational Safety Information System (proj #6211),
Arctic Operations Support (proj #6210), Robust Maritime Arctic
Communications (proj #6213), Safety Parameters for ICE Operations (proj
#5301), Response to Oil in Ice (proj #4701), Ice Condition Risk
Assessment Tool (proj #6512), and Arctic Technology Evaluation 2018
(proj #62101).
\47\ IOOS, 2022. https://ioos.noaa.gov/regions/aoos/, accessed
November 28, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. ASSETS
While several U.S. agencies have a physical presence and
substantial interests in the Arctic, the USCG's experience,
material assets, and installations located throughout Alaska
establish it as a key presence in the region. However, with no
assets permanently stationed above the Arctic Circle, the USCG
is restricted to a seasonal presence via mobile command and
control platforms such as large cutters and ocean-going ice-
strengthened buoy tenders, and establishing seasonal air and
communications capabilities by leasing facilities.\48\ Compared
to Russia's six Arctic bases and 14 newly built icebreakers,
the USCG is forced to stretch assets and capabilities to secure
a wide mission set with limited resources.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and
Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S.
Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460,
accessed November 27, 2022.
\49\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently
consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, which
carries out its primary mission, the resupply of McMurdo
Station, in the Antarctic, and one medium polar icebreaker,
Healy, which carries out its primary mission, scientific
research, in the Arctic (Fig. 3).\50\ A decade-long effort to
expand USCG capabilities in the Arctic found footing in
Congress with the establishment of the USCG Polar Security
Cutter (PSC) program and a Joint Program Office with the U.S.
Navy in 2016.\51\ Authorization for the acquisition or
procurement of a market-available icebreaker is included in the
Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022, as is
authorization for a third Polar Security Cutter (PSC; heavy
polar icebreaker) and evaluation of the USCG's acquisition of
three Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs; medium polar icebreakers).
The USCG PSC program received a total of $1.8 billion in
procurement funding through FY 2021, including $300 million
that was provided through the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding account
(FY 2017-2018).\52\ With the funding the USCG PSC program
received through FY 2021, PSCs 1 and 2 are fully funded.\53\
Construction of the first PSC is anticipated to begin in Spring
2023 for an on-time delivery in FY 2025,\54\ though a delay
appears probable at this time.\55\ Delivery of a heavy polar
icebreaker will mark the U.S.'s first new heavy icebreaker in
nearly 50 years.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ CRS, September 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
(Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'',
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391,
accessed November 28, 2022.
\51\ Id.
\52\ U.S. Naval Institute, January 7, 2022. https://news.usni.org/
2022/01/07/report-to-congress-on-coast-guard-polar-security-cutter-16,
accessed November 28, 2022.
\53\ Id.
\54\ USCG, July 29, 2022. ``Q3 FY2022 USCG Surface Acquisition
Update--CG&MT'', briefing to CGMT.
\55\ Katz, J., November 14, 2022. ``Why a small shipyard merger
could signal bigger problems for the US military'', available at
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/why-a-small-shipyard-merger-could-
signal-bigger-problems-for-the-us-military/, accessed on November 29,
2022.
\56\ CRS, September 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
(Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'',
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391,
accessed November 28, 2022.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
LFigure 3. Coast Guard Cutter Healy, a 420-foot medium endurance
icebreaker/research vessel, is the only icebreaker currently dedicated
to Arctic operations. No other U.S. military service branch operates
icebreakers.\57\
The\\ mixed fleet (three PSCs, three ASCs) arrangement
currently under consideration will help close four major gaps
in USCG Arctic capabilities that were identified by the
Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center--unreliable
communications, lack of adequate maritime domain awareness,
scarcity of available assets (especially ice-resistant air
support and icebreakers) and supporting infrastructure, and
institutional difficulty to identify, articulate, and close
capability gaps.\58\ The report states that if these capability
gaps are not closed by the 2030s, the USCG risks facing
substantial vulnerabilities in several of its missions in the
Arctic including search and rescue, marine safety, ice
operations, marine environmental protection, and ports,
waterways, and coastal safety.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Photo credit: USCG, 2022. https://www.history.uscg.mil/Our-
Collections/Photos/igphoto/2002136680/, accessed November 27, 2022;
Lind, 2018. ``USCG Cutter Healy Deploys for the Arctic'', available at
https://www.passagemaker.com/trawler-news/uscg-cutter-healy-deploys-
for-the-arctic#: :text=In%20mid-
July%20the%20United%20States%20Coast%20Guard
%20Cutter,vessel%20operated%20by%20the%20USCG%2C%20measuring%20420%20fee
t, accessed November 28, 2022.
\58\ Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, 2018.
``Identifying Potential Gaps in the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic
Capabilities'', available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR2310.html, accessed on November 29, 2022.
\59\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS
The Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022, which
is expected to be included the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2023, includes key support for the USCG to
continue implementing its Arctic Strategic Outlook. Title I,
Authorizations, would authorize $167.2 million for a third PSC,
$150 million for the acquisition or procurement of an available
icebreaker, and $20 million for icebreaking cutters for
operation in the Northeast, Arctic, and Great Lakes (FY 2023).
Additionally, Title I would authorize $1 million for the USCG
to evaluate design requirements for the ASC (FY 2023-2024).
Title II dedicates an entire Subtitle to provisions
affecting USCG operations in the Arctic region. Building on
Title I authorizations, Title II would establish a medium
icebreaker (i.e., ASC) program office within the USCG so that
the it can conduct a PSC/ASC fleet mix analysis, and establish
the conditions under which an available icebreaker may be
acquired. Title II would also extend the timeline of the
Pribilof Island Transition Completion Act of 2016 (Public Law
114-120) and require an update to Congress on the USCG's
activities and infrastructure needs at St. Paul Island, Alaska.
WITNESS LIST
PANEL I
LVice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant
for Operations, United States Coast Guard
LHon. Michael Sfraga, Chair, United States Arctic
Research Commission
LMr. Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical
Infrastructure Team, Government Accountability Office
PANEL II
LDr. Rebecca Pincus, Director, Polar Institute,
Wilson Center
LDr. Martha Grabowski, Professor, Le Moyne College
and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board,
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
U.S. COAST GUARD'S LEADERSHIP ON ARCTIC SAFETY, SECURITY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2022
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon.
Salud O. Carbajal (Chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present in person: Mr. Carbajal, Mr. DeFazio, Mr.
Larsen of Washington, Mr. Auchincloss, Mr. Gibbs, Mr. Graves of
Missouri, Mr. Weber of Texas, and Mr. Garamendi.
Members present remotely: None.
Mr. Carbajal. This subcommittee will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions.
Without objection, so ordered.
As a reminder, please keep your microphones muted unless
speaking. Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I
will respectfully request that the Member please mute their
microphone.
And to insert a document into the record, please have your
staff email it to [email protected].
Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing entitled,
``U.S. Coast Guard's Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and
Environmental Responsibility.''
Before we get started, I would like to acknowledge that
today's hearing will be both Chairman DeFazio's and Ranking
Member Gibbs' last hearings as Members of Congress. Both have
decided to retire. For 36 years, the House of Representatives
has been a better place because of Chairman DeFazio's
leadership and insight. This institution will miss him, and I
will miss his friendship.
Mr. DeFazio, thank you for your leadership, your
mentorship, and your service to our country.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Salud.
Mr. Carbajal. And, Mr. Gibbs, I want to thank you for your
partnership and expertise as we worked through this year's
bipartisan Coast Guard reauthorization. I appreciated the
bipartisan collaboration that we developed to do our
subcommittee's work, and I appreciate the friendship we
developed along the way. Thank you for your 10 years of service
to our country as well.
Today also marks 81 years since the attack on Pearl Harbor
that led our Nation to declare war within a day. To all of our
veterans and active military families, thank you for your
sacrifice and service to our country.
Global peace is always tenuous. Today, we will hear
testimony from five witnesses who are experts on the Arctic, a
region where security and geopolitics are both at play. Today,
we have experts before us to focus on the national security
issues that are on the top of our minds, while others will
enlighten us on the Coast Guard's leadership on maritime safety
and environmental stewardship.
Nearly 10 years ago, the Coast Guard published its first
strategic plan for the Arctic region. The Service updated this
plan in 2019 to reflect its coordination with the White House,
Department of Defense, and the Department of State, which
showed a new level of interest in the status of the United
States as an Arctic nation.
With Russia's recent aggression towards Ukraine, the
geopolitical significance of the Arctic is even more
pronounced. Although the Coast Guard security missions are
critical, the Service continuously executes numerous other
critical missions.
The Coast Guard is responsible for maritime safety--that
is, search and rescue, and aiding mariners in safe navigation
by breaking ice, marking channels, and communicating real-time
weather hazards.
The Coast Guard must also enforce environmental laws in the
Arctic. This will become more and more important as melting sea
ice means more shipping traffic, more oil pollution, and
migrating commercial fish stocks.
Coast Guard partnerships with Alaskans and indigenous
peoples, with private corporations, the State of Alaska, other
Federal agencies, and other countries have met a gold standard
in the last 10 years. Coordination and cooperation are not
optional at the North Pole.
To help us appreciate the importance of all the Coast
Guard's Arctic missions, Admiral Gautier will be joined on a
panel by the Honorable Michael Sfraga, the presidentially
appointed Chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, and Mr.
Andrew Von Ah, Director of the Physical Infrastructure team at
the Government Accountability Office.
The USARC is working hard to draw attention to the critical
gap between the collection of data in the Arctic--weather, sea
state, coastal mapping--and the Coast Guard's ability to use
this information in its everyday operations.
Similarly, the GAO has completed a number of studies in
recent years that measure the success of, and gaps in, the
Coast Guard's Arctic operations.
Today's second panel will feature an Arctic strategic
defense expert, Dr. Rebecca Pincus, director of the Polar
Institute; and Dr. Martha Grabowski, a professor at Le Moyne
College and a past chair of the Marine Board in the National
Academies of Sciences.
The Coast Guard has proven to be a nimble and resourceful
leader for the U.S. in the Arctic. It can only fully implement
its strategic plan if we fully grasp the form and severity of
the challenges Coasties face operating in such a harsh, remote
part of the world.
The Coast Guard plays a multidimensional leadership role in
the Arctic. Fortunately, we have five witnesses before us with
multidimensional expertise.
Let's begin.
[Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation
Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing on ``U.S. Coast
Guard's Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and Environmental
Responsibility.''
Before we start, I'd like to acknowledge that today's hearing will
be Chairman DeFazio's last as a Member of Congress. For 36 years, the
House of Representatives has been a better place because of his
leadership and insight. This institution will miss him and I will miss
his friendship. Mr. DeFazio, thank you for your leadership and service
to our country.
Today also marks 81 years since the Attack on Pearl Harbor that led
our Nation to declare war within a day. To all of our veterans and
active military families, thank you for your sacrifice and service.
Global peace is always tenuous. Today, we will hear testimony from
five witnesses who are experts on the Arctic, a region where security
and geopolitics are both at play. Today, we have experts before us to
focus on the national security issues that are on the top of our minds,
while others will enlighten us on the Coast Guard's leadership on
maritime safety and environmental stewardship.
Nearly 10 years ago, the Coast Guard published its first Strategic
Plan for the Arctic region. The Service updated this plan in 2019 to
reflect its coordination with the White House, Department of Defense,
and the Department of State, which showed a new level of interest in
the status of the United States as an Arctic nation.
With Russia's recent aggression toward Ukraine, the geopolitical
significance of the Arctic is even more pronounced. Although the Coast
Guard's security missions are critical, the service continuously
executes numerous other critical missions.
The Coast Guard is responsible for maritime safety--that is, Search
and Rescue, and aiding mariners in safe navigation by breaking ice,
marking channels, and communicating real-time weather hazards.
The Coast Guard must also enforce environmental laws in the Arctic.
This will become more and more important as melting sea ice means more
shipping traffic, more oil pollution, and migrating commercial fish
stocks.
Coast Guard partnerships with Alaskans and indigenous peoples, with
private corporations, the State of Alaska, other federal agencies, and
other countries have met a gold standard in the last 10 years.
Coordination and cooperation are not optional at the North Pole.
To help us appreciate the importance of all of the Coast Guard's
Arctic missions, Admiral Gautier will be joined on a panel by the
Honorable Michael Sfraga, the presidentially appointed Chair of the
U.S. Arctic Research Commission, and Mr. Andrew Von Ah, Director of the
Physical Infrastructure Team at the Government Accountability Office.
The USARC is working hard to draw attention to the critical gap
between the collection of data in the Arctic--weather, sea state,
coastal mapping--and the Coast Guard's ability to use this information
in its everyday operations.
Similarly, the GAO has completed a number of studies in recent
years that measure the success of, and gaps in, the Coast Guard's
Arctic operations.
Today's second panel will feature an Arctic strategic defense
expert, Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director of the Polar Institute, and Dr.
Martha Grabowski, a professor at Le Moyne College and a Past Chair of
the Marine Board in the National Academies of Sciences.
The Coast Guard has proven to be a nimble and resourceful leader
for the U.S. in the Arctic. It can only fully implement its Strategic
Plan if we fully grasp the form and severity of the challenges Coasties
face operating in such a harsh, remote part of the world.
The Coast Guard plays a multi-dimensional leadership role in the
Arctic. Fortunately, we have five witnesses before us with multi-
dimensional expertise. Let's begin.
Mr. Carbajal. First, I would like to recognize Chairman
DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the
kind words, and thank you for holding this hearing.
We ignore the changes that are rapidly coming to the Arctic
North at our own peril. And I am pleased to see that we have a
number of proactive plans in place, but more is certainly going
to need to be done.
Although some deny that climate change exists, we are
seeing extraordinary extended periods of ice retreat navigable
waters throughout the Arctic region. We are now going to see,
obviously, more transit of freighters, even tour ships in that
area, which is obviously going to put burdens on the United
States Coast Guard for their duties both for security and for
protection of life and property.
I am pleased, after many years of struggle, that we have
two Polar Security Cutters fully funded, and we are going to
authorize another one in the Don Young Coast Guard
Authorization Act.
We are also going to authorize the temporary utilization of
an existing commercial icebreaker under lease so that we can
enhance our capabilities. We have the Healy, and then we have
the one remaining--and I always get them mixed up, Polar Star
and Polar Sea, but whichever one we have--which is it, Admiral?
Admiral Gautier. Polar Star.
Mr. DeFazio. Polar Star. Good. OK. That was the one I was
on. It is just too close together; I can never remember--which
is patched together every year after it does its major duty and
run to McMurdo Sound.
It is interesting that, I mean, I guess they are still
harvesting circuit boards and things that we don't make anymore
with transistors off of the old Polar Sea, or they have been
stockpiled somewhere, but it is pretty pathetic. I mean, Russia
has 40. China, not even an Arctic nation, has two, and they are
building more.
This is going to be an era and an area of international
competition, and potential issues will arise. I mean, there are
resources and claims being extended. The idiots in the Senate
have been unable to approve the Law of the Sea Treaty, so, we
don't have full standing to object to Russia continually
extending claims further and further into the Arctic region.
But nothing can be done about the idiots in the Senate.
So, with the Don Young bill, which will be hopefully
tonight or this afternoon as part of the Water Resources
Development Act--which is now the Water Resources Development
Act, National Defense Authorization, Coast Guard Authorization,
and God only knows what else is in that piece of legislation.
And then there are other issues: bases. You are pretty
distant from the more northern--because we only went there on a
seasonal basis. I understand that we are looking at an enhanced
deep-draft harbor. Our Coast Guard air station is, again,
pretty far away, so, we are going to have to be looking at
shoreside and seaside facilities to give us more proximity and
less travel time to get into that area.
As the chairman noted, this is my last hearing after 36
years. I started down there somewhere, right about there I
think, many years ago. This has been the honor of my life, to
serve on this committee. I had great mentors. Particularly Jim
Oberstar was an extraordinary mentor to me. And I hope I have
mentored some of the next generation.
And I wish Sam Graves, who I fully expect to be the next
chairman, well on this committee. Sam is balanced and wants to
get things done, so, I am looking forward to see that this
committee will still be productive.
And to Bob, congratulations. I am calling this the ``Year
of the Great Retirement.'' A lot of people are retiring, and we
are joining that crowd, although I am not going away, though I
am going to be officially retired from Congress.
And I want to thank my absolutely incredible staff. I can't
name them all, but they have done so much great work over the
years. A Member of Congress and this committee are only as good
as the fabulous staff we have, whether it is legislative,
investigative, or just organizational. This is the biggest
committee in Congress. It is a little bit unwieldy, but I think
we do pretty damn well.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this morning's hearing to
highlight the important role the Coast Guard serves in the Arctic. Of
its many mission sets and various responsibilities, no role is more
rapidly evolving than the Coast Guard's mission in the Arctic.
The Coast Guard does not have the privilege of ignoring the
significant and consequential impacts that climate change is having on
our environment. Its servicemembers operate in the harsh terrain of the
Arctic and bear witness to the full effects of a warming planet in that
region. The fact is we all see it and we all experience it; from
extreme weather events to coastal erosion, climate change is not
something we can continue to ignore. We have to provide resources to
the Coast Guard so they can mitigate the effects of climate change in
their operational planning.
As polar ice steadily decreases, new trade routes will emerge,
linking Asia, North America, and Europe. The retreat of sea ice and the
opening of navigable sea routes will only serve to accelerate the
demands placed on this once inaccessible and remote region. This,
inherently, will drive increased demand for Coast Guard services in the
Arctic. That translates to more search and rescue response, more
regulation of commercial fishing activity, more pollution response,
more scientific data collection, and more icebreaking to facilitate
commercial ships traversing Arctic waters. Indeed, the Coast Guard will
need to augment its presence in this region if we, as a nation, are
serious about protecting U.S. life and sovereignty in the Arctic.
The Coast Guard operates the nation's only heavy polar icebreaker,
the Polar Star. In years prior, Congress rightly recognized the need to
expand Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic and authorized $1.8
billion toward that effort. With two Polar Security Cutters fully
funded and a third authorized in the Don Young Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2022, we have a modest start.
The Coast Guard is the nation's most prominent Arctic presence, but
I fear we risk losing our dominance as an Arctic state if we don't take
more aggressive action. If the construction timeline for the Polar
Sentinel--the first of three new Polar Security Cutters to be built--
holds, we'll have a grand total of three polar icebreakers by the end
of 2025. By comparison, Russia has 40 active icebreakers in the Arctic
alone. China, which is not even a polar nation, currently operates two
icebreakers, with plans to build more. Clearly, we have some catching
up to do.
I look forward to Congress passing the Don Young Coast Guard
Authorization Act, which includes an authorization of $150 million to
acquire a commercial icebreaker to fill the gap until the arrival of
Polar Sentinel.
I'll note, however, that recapitalizing our icebreaker fleet is
just one of many steps needed to fill the capability gap in the Arctic.
We also need to address the communications gap experienced in this
frontier. Communications are key to any mission, but in the Arctic
communications are especially strained and data transmission is very
limited. Further, every Coast Guard mission starts on land. While the
Coast Guard has a presence in Alaska, Congress needs to ensure that the
personnel stationed in remote locations are fully supported with robust
housing, childcare, and medical facilities. Coast Guard cutters and
aircraft do not operate themselves so we must do better to improve the
lives of Coast Guard servicemembers.
Finally, we cannot ignore the ongoing war in Ukraine and the impact
it has had on diplomacy in the Arctic. The pause of the U.S.
involvement in the Arctic Council and the associated loss of
international cooperation in the Arctic is troubling, and the long-term
consequences of such are unknown. The U.S. does not yet have a clear
path forward in this new, non-cooperative geopolitical arena. We need
to bolster our Arctic capabilities so we are prepared for any scenario,
threat, or hazard that may emerge.
Today's hearing is timely, and the array of witnesses before us
boast impressive resumes and expertise in the Arctic domain. I look
forward to their testimony.
I'd also like to mention that today will be the last hearing of the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee for the year, and my last
hearing before I retire at the end of the 117th Congress. Being Chair
of the Committee over the past four years has been the highlight of my
36-year career. I wish Sam Graves the best as he prepares to take over
the gavel at the beginning of the 118th Congress. I hope and expect he
will continue the bipartisanship and productivity that this committee
is known for. Thank you.
Mr. DeFazio. So, with that, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now I would like to recognize Ranking Member Graves.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the witnesses, too, for being here, and I
appreciate you being here.
I particularly want to add my thanks and respect to both
Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Gibbs. This is their last
committee hearing, and their hard work and expertise from both
of you are going to be missed on the committee overall and this
subcommittee.
I very much appreciated serving with both of you, and you
have both done a lot of good things for the country when it
comes to jurisdictions under this committee. And I can only
hope that Oregon and Ohio will be just as well represented as
you move on. But thanks for your service.
I do know this is an Arctic hearing, but I do want to thank
Admiral Gautier for what you are doing. And I want to remind
you of the importance of getting the Barbers Point aviation
facilities completed. That is something that means a whole lot
to me when it comes to the next generation of aircraft and
making sure that those maintenance facilities are up to date.
And I look forward to working with the Coast Guard to obviously
complete whatever is needed there at the Barbers Point Station
in particular.
I know that Arctic shipping routes are only available,
unfortunately, for about 3 months during the summer along the
Northern Sea Route or the Northwest Passage. And I do know the
changing conditions in the Arctic have made maritime
transportation in the region much more feasible, but I do know
there are significant challenges associated with increasing
vessel traffic in the U.S. Arctic and the Arctic Ocean overall.
And I do know that, sadly, the U.S. is woefully unprepared
for the increased traffic that we are going to see. But I look
forward to hearing from you all today and reading your
testimony, and, again, I appreciate you being here. The Coast
Guard means a lot to me, and I know it does to the country. And
so, I want to make sure that you all have everything that you
need.
[Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
I know this is an Arctic hearing, but I want to thank Vice Admiral
Gautier for your work and remind you of the importance of getting the
Barbers Point facilities fully ready for the next generation of Coast
Guard aircraft. I look forward to working with the Coast Guard to
complete the needed upgrades at that Air Station.
Historically, Arctic shipping routes were only available for up to
three months in the summer along the Northern Sea Route or the
Northwest Passage. Changing conditions in the Arctic have made maritime
transportation in the region more feasible. However, there are still
significant challenges associated with increasing vessel traffic in the
U.S. Arctic and the Arctic Ocean as a whole.
Sadly, the U.S. is woefully unprepared for this increased vessel
traffic. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on the
potential for increased Arctic maritime transportation and how to
manage that growth effectively.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks. I yield back.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
I now will recognize Ranking Member Gibbs.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to also thank
you for your kind words, and then, Chairman DeFazio, for your
kind words.
And one of my fondest memories I have of Chairman DeFazio
is, when I was looking for offices, like, 4, 5, or 6 years ago
in the Rayburn Building, I stumbled across Chairman DeFazio's
office, and he was gracious enough to show me his nice big
balcony.
Which, I don't know if they let you out there anymore on
that. I heard----
Mr. DeFazio. [Inaudible.]
Mr. Gibbs. Yes. But you were so gracious to do that, other
side of the aisle. I appreciated that. That is a fond memory I
have. You probably don't even remember when that happened.
And I want to thank Ranking Member Graves for his kind
words. And I am sure that the T&I Committee will be in good
hands starting January 3rd, but I will be watching from afar. I
will let you know how you are doing, if you mess up too bad.
But I have been on this committee since 12 years ago when I
first came to Congress, and I was privileged enough to be
chairman of the Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee
for 6 years. And I enjoyed working with the Army Corps and now
the Coast Guard. And such memorable experiences, and I learned
a lot. And I didn't know a whole lot when I started those chair
positions and ranking member, but it has been wonderful. So, I
will treasure those memories. I really appreciate it.
So, Chairman DeFazio, I wish you well. I don't know how
many years you were here, but you have had an esteemed career,
and I am sure you will do fine out on the west coast.
Mr. DeFazio. Thirty-six.
Mr. Gibbs. Thirty-six years. So, I wish you well.
Today, the subcommittee will hear testimony on the need for
increased United States infrastructure to facilitate safe and
efficient maritime transportation in the Arctic.
For the first time in recorded history, more portions of
the Arctic each year are becoming navigable. Vessel transits
through the area covered by the Polar Code on shipping
increased 25 percent between 2013 and 2019 and are expected to
continue.
It is critical that we understand current traffic flows and
the steps that need to be taken to ensure that both vessels and
mariners and the environment are properly protected. One way to
ensure better Arctic access is to increase the U.S. icebreaker
presence in the U.S. Arctic.
The Coast Guard has contracted to acquire a new class of
Polar Security Cutter, the first heavy icebreakers built in the
U.S. since 1977. Though this is a good first step towards more
fully implementing an active U.S. presence in the Arctic, these
cutters are officially 1 year, and unofficially 2 years, behind
their original construction timeline.
The vessels will fall at least 1 more year behind their
stated timeline, which was never realistic. In addition, the
first cutter will conduct an Antarctic breakout and will not be
available for work in the Arctic. So, they are going to
Antarctica first, I guess, and then back to the Arctic, so,
there will be more delays for up there. In other words, we are
nearly a decade away from increased U.S. icebreaker presence in
the Arctic.
I look forward to the Coast Guard providing us a realistic
timeline for when we can expect to see additional icebreaking
capacity in the Arctic and what interim capacity measures the
Coast Guard plans until then. However, while icebreakers
provide important capabilities, there are many other issues
that must be addressed to ensure safe and efficient Arctic
navigation.
Additional infrastructure and operational challenges to
maritime transportation in the Arctic include: limited
satellite coverage and architecture to support voice and data
communications; the lack of a deep-draft port accommodating
ships that will draft up to 35 feet; unpredictability in flow
patterns of icebergs in shipping lanes; the lack of channel-
marking buoys and other floating visual aids which are not
possible due to continuously moving ice sheets; and scant
hydrographic surveying and other data needed for safe
navigation and resource protection and management.
The United States is not alone in our efforts to facilitate
safe commerce in the Arctic. We are part of the Arctic Council
along with other Arctic nations like Canada, Russia, and the
Nordic countries. However, the Council's activities have been
in abeyance since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia holds
the Council's chairmanship in 2022 and 2023, and it is not
clear what the Council's future is after that.
Working together in a consensus-based intergovernmental
forum allowed Arctic nations to promote environmental, social,
and economic aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic.
The Council was also critical to successfully implementing the
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters--the
Polar Code. If the Council cannot be revived, we need to find
other mechanisms to ensure international cooperation on these
issues.
This Arctic really is the last frontier, the portion of our
Nation's waters about which we still have much to learn.
However, unless we can get the U.S. Coast Guard and other
agencies assets into the area--an expensive and time-consuming
challenge--we will not be able to use these areas
strategically.
[Mr. Gibbs' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation
Today the Subcommittee will hear testimony on the need for
increased United States infrastructure to facilitate safe and efficient
maritime transportation in the Arctic. For the first time in recorded
history, more portions of the Arctic each year are becoming navigable.
Vessel transits through the area covered by the Polar Code shipping
increased 25 percent between 2013 and 2019 and are expected to
continue.
It is critical that we understand current traffic flows and the
steps that need to be taken to ensure that both vessels and mariners,
and the environment, are properly protected. One way to ensure better
Arctic access is to increase the U.S. icebreaker presence in the U.S.
Arctic.
The Coast Guard has contracted to acquire a new class of Polar
Security Cutter, the first heavy icebreakers built in the U.S. since
1977. Though a good first step toward more fully implementing an active
U.S. presence in the Arctic, the PSCs are officially one year, and
unofficially two years, behind their original construction timeline.
The vessels will fall at least one more year behind that stated
timeline, which was never realistic. In addition, the first PSC will
conduct the Antarctic break out, and will not be available for work in
the Arctic. In other words, we are nearly a decade away from increased
U.S. icebreaker presence in the Arctic.
I look forward to the Coast Guard providing us a realistic timeline
for when we can expect to see additional icebreaking capacity in the
Arctic, and what interim capacity measures the Coast Guard plans until
then. However, while icebreakers provide important capabilities, there
are many other issues that must be addressed to ensure safe and
efficient Arctic navigation.
Additional infrastructure and operational challenges to maritime
transportation in the U.S. Arctic include limited satellite coverage
and architecture to support voice and data communications; the lack of
a deep-draft port; unpredictability in flow patterns of icebergs in
shipping lanes; the lack of channel marking buoys and other floating
visual aids, which are not possible due to continuously moving ice
sheets; and scant hydrographic surveying and other data needed for safe
navigation and resource protection and management.
The United States is not alone in our efforts to facilitate safe
commerce in the Arctic. We are part of the Arctic Council, along with
other Arctic nations like Canada, Russia, and the Nordic countries.
However, the Council's activities have been in abeyance since Russia's
invasion of the Ukraine. Russia holds the Council's chairmanship in
2022 and 2023, and it is not clear what the Council's future is after
that.
Working together in a consensus based, intergovernmental forum
allowed Arctic nations to promote environmental, social, and economic
aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic. The Council was also
critical to successfully implementing the International Code for Ships
Operating in Polar Waters--the Polar Code. If the Council cannot be
revived, we need to find other mechanisms to ensure international
cooperation on these issues.
This Arctic really is the last frontier--the portion of our
nation's waters about which we still have much to learn. However,
unless we can get U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies assets into the
area--an expensive and time-consuming challenge--we will not be able to
use these areas strategically.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman Carbajal, for your work here
on the committee, and I wish you all the best in the future.
I yield back.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Representative Gibbs.
I would like to now welcome our first witness panel: Vice
Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations at
the United States Coast Guard; the Honorable Michael Sfraga,
Chair of the United States Arctic Research Commission; and Mr.
Andrew Von Ah, Director of Physical Infrastructure at the
Government Accountability Office.
Thank you for being here today, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record.
Since your written testimony has been made part of the
record, the subcommittee requests that you limit your oral
testimony to 5 minutes.
Vice Admiral Gautier, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PETER W. GAUTIER, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; HON. MICHAEL SFRAGA, Ph.D.,
CHAIR, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION; AND ANDREW VON AH,
DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Admiral Gautier. Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking
Member Gibbs, Chairman DeFazio, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee.
I am really pleased and thank you for inviting me here
today to update you on the Coast Guard's efforts on our Arctic
strategy to promote safety, security, and environmental
protection for the Arctic.
And I would like to take a minute to add the Coast Guard's
sincere appreciation, Chairman, for the service of Chairman
Peter DeFazio, for his distinguished service to the United
States Coast Guard, as well as the ranking member,
Representative Bob Gibbs.
The Coast Guard owes a debt of gratitude to you both and to
your distinguished and dedicated staffs. Under your leadership,
the House passed two Coast Guard authorization acts, and we
were also included on two hurricane supplementals, CARES Act
funding, as well as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
and many other things that have helped the Coast Guard.
And before I left for here today, Admiral Fagan, our
Commandant, asked to express her personal thanks to you both.
The Coast Guard is better for your support of us.
The Arctic is undergoing a dramatic transformation of its
physical, operational, and geostrategic environment. We are
witnessing firsthand how the impact of climate change is
opening up new access to Arctic waters. This drives greater
activity in the Arctic region and, with it, risk across the
maritime sector. And the Coast Guard is deeply concerned about
the rising strategic risk to our Nation as Russia and China
compete with diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage and
influence in the Arctic.
While our missions in the high latitudes have evolved since
we first started operating in Alaska and the Arctic in 1867,
the Coast Guard's commitment to the region has not. We are
operating forward to address the safety and security of our
Arctic residents and mariners who make their living there,
homeporting new cutters, investing in infrastructure and
capabilities, prioritizing our operations, supporting research,
and strengthening our international partnerships.
Changing conditions in the Arctic are driving an increased
demand for Coast Guard services; there is no question about
that. And we have a sense of urgency to make sure we can
deliver now and well into the future.
Our actions are supported by the 2022 U.S. National
Strategy for the Arctic Region and its four interconnected
pillars. And this strategy is fundamentally supported by our
2019 Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook.
Despite the geographical remoteness and logistical
challenges inherent to all Arctic operations, the Coast Guard
is meeting service demand through our flexible and
expeditionary approach.
This year, in our Operation Arctic Shield, we increased
seasonal presence in the U.S. Arctic to provide Coast Guard
services across 65 remote communities. Together with Federal,
State, Tribal, and local stakeholders, we responded to Typhoon
Merbok to ensure numerous impacted communities could receive
critical fuel and supplies ahead of the winter freeze. And, in
October, the Coast Guard cutter Healy reached the North Pole
for the second time to conduct important scientific research.
Strategic competition across the Arctic is also driving
demand for our leadership. Last year, Coast Guard cutters
intercepted four Chinese military vessels operating together in
the U.S. exclusive economic zone off the Aleutians. And, in
September, we intercepted a combined Russian-Chinese task group
of seven ships in a similar location. In both instances, the
Coast Guard met presence with presence to ensure these ships
operated in accordance with international law.
The Coast Guard's strategic influence extends beyond the
U.S. Arctic. We routinely conduct engagements with other Arctic
nations and partners. And despite the absence of Russia in the
Arctic Council and Arctic Coast Guard Forum, we continue to
work with like-minded nations to advance shared interests in
safety, environmental stewardship, and responsible governance.
We appreciate deeply the continued support from Congress
and this committee in particular to build the next generation
of Coast Guard capability for the Arctic. A top acquisition
priority is the Polar Security Cutter, and we are working hard
to advance that effort.
We have asked for funding in this year's budget to increase
near-term presence in the Arctic through acquisition of a
commercially available medium icebreaker. With Congress' help,
we are moving forward on this.
Never before has Coast Guard leadership been more important
to the Arctic.
Thank you again, Chairman, for this opportunity, and I look
forward to your questions.
[Admiral Gautier's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant
for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
Good morning, Chair Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here
today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in advancing national interests
in the Arctic. The United States is one of only eight Arctic coastal
States with both sovereign rights and sovereign responsibilities to
safeguard our respective and shared interests. As climate change and
strategic competition increasingly affect the geography, stability, and
security of the Arctic region, U.S. Coast Guard presence and leadership
have never been more critical.
Arctic activity is increasing and evolving at a rapid pace, from a
surge in oil and gas exploration a decade ago to growth in types and
locations of vessel transits, including a significant expansion of
environmental tourism over the past five years. The dynamic and
accelerated changes in the Arctic environment make Arctic waters more
accessible, creating new opportunities and challenges, and increasing
multinational strategic competition.
The Arctic's dynamic evolution magnifies the importance of U.S.
national security across the region and intensifies the demand for the
Coast Guard's services and leadership. In a region where presence means
not only influence, but also security, the U.S. Coast Guard has been a
key leader and interagency partner in shaping the Arctic security
environment for over 150 years. I understand the significant level of
investments required to further champion our Nation's efforts in the
Arctic, and I embrace the trust Congress and the American people have
placed in the U.S. Coast Guard. The Service will continue to prioritize
actions that safeguard U.S. interests while promoting safe, secure, and
environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.
National Security Drivers Across the Arctic
The 2022 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) sets
the vision for the Arctic as peaceful, stable, prosperous, and
cooperative. The four pillars to achieve that vision are security,
which encompasses both homeland security and national defense, climate
change and environmental protection, sustainable economic development,
and international cooperation and governance. These pillars are
interconnected in terms of domestic and international risks, effects,
and mitigating actions. They require coordination with the State of
Alaska and across a broad spectrum of Arctic stakeholders including
Indigenous communities, partners and allies, domestic and international
bodies, academics, scientists, and the private sector. Our 2019 Coast
Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook and its three lines of effort--enhancing
capability to operate effectively, strengthen the rules-based order,
and innovate and adapt to promote resilience and prosperity--support
the four NSAR pillars.
Peace and prosperity depend on adherence to the rules-based
international order, particularly in the maritime domain. As we see
around the globe, state and non-state malign actors take advantage of
any governance gaps to poach natural resources or attempt to intimidate
others through incursions into sovereign waters. Meeting these
challenges requires the United States to be present, collaborate with
others, and model professional behavior at sea. With our unique
combination of authorities as an armed service, a law enforcement
agency, a regulatory agency, and a humanitarian service, the Coast
Guard is an ideal tool for the Nation to govern the U.S. Arctic
maritime environment responsibly. The Coast Guard has excelled and will
continue to excel in all of these elements, to include setting an
example of responsible governance and reinforcing the rule of law
through operational presence and strategic leadership.
Pillar 1: Security and Capability
The geopolitical environment in the Arctic continues to evolve as
state and non-state actors seek to advance their interests in the
region. Allies, partners, and competitors increasingly contend for
diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage and influence. Russia and
China exemplify this competition. Both have declared the Arctic a
strategic priority; both have made significant investments in new or
refurbished capabilities; and both are attempting to exert direct or
indirect influence across the region using all of their instruments of
national power.
As the only U.S. armed force with both military and law enforcement
authorities, and as a member of the Intelligence Community, the Coast
Guard seamlessly employs multi-mission assets and cross-trained
personnel to advance U.S. Arctic priorities. The Coast Guard serves as
a critical bridge between the power of the Department of Defense and
the diplomacy of the State Department, cultivating strong international
relationships and building coalitions among Arctic partners based on
mutual interests and values. These relationships enhance safety,
maritime governance, and prosperity across the region, which in turn
strengthen both national security and regional stability.
The Coast Guard is directly observing increased strategic
competition in the U.S. Arctic. Through the operations of its
Seventeenth District, which is responsible for Coast Guard activities
for an over 3,853,500 square mile area including Alaska and the Arctic,
the Coast Guard meets presence with presence both to counter
competition and positively influence behavior. Over the past two years,
the Coast Guard has intercepted a Chinese military Surface Action
Group, as well as a combined Russian-Chinese Task Group, operating in
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. In both instances, the Coast Guard's
visible forward presence ensured that both groups operated in
accordance with international law. The Coast Guard will continue to
exhibit model governance grounded in international law, rules, norms,
and standards, including freedom of navigation, in the U.S. Arctic and
empowering like-minded partners and allies to do the same in their
Arctic waters.
Pillar 2: Climate Change and Environmental Protection
The effects of climate change span the Arctic's physical,
operational, and strategic environments. These pronounced effects
threaten the stability of Arctic communities and natural resources, the
traditional lifestyles of Alaska Natives, and national sovereignty
across the region. Addressing these impacts begins with an informed
understanding of how, when, and where the physical environment is
changing, which enables evidenced-based decision-making to reduce the
operational and strategic consequences. Scientific research within the
Arctic, in general, will require investments and a coordinated whole-
of-government approach to inform policy decisions. The Coast Guard
looks forward to supporting Arctic research endeavors through its
robust partnerships with institutions like the National Science
Foundation, U.S. Arctic Research Commission, Polar Institute, National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Navy, and U.S.
National Ice Center. The Coast Guard has long provided Arctic access by
including interagency and international scientists aboard the USCGC
Healy to conduct critical scientific research. This research, and the
understanding it affords, has enabled the Coast Guard, along with our
national and international partners, to protect the maritime
environment, build community resilience, and shape the security
environment.
While long-term trends indicate a more consistently navigable
Arctic, near-term conditions are less predictable and thus more
dangerous. In September 2022, Typhoon Merbok hit more than 1,000 miles
of Alaska's west coast with hurricane-force winds, wave heights over 50
feet, and storm surges that were the highest recorded in almost 50
years. Storms of Merbok's magnitude usually occur in October and
November after the formation of shoreside (first-year) ice that offers
protection for coastal communities. However, unusually warmer waters in
the Bering Sea enabled this storm's formation much earlier in the
season. Merbok also hit during the fall subsistence harvest, damaging
or destroying hunting and fishing boats and camps along the coasts and
forcing immediate repairs to homes, businesses, and camps at the
expense of harvest activities necessary to ensure winter food security
in these communities.
In the face of Merbok's dangerous and challenging conditions, the
Coast Guard provided critical value to the region by proactively
advancing community resilience. As a visible, agile, and adaptive
force, the Coast Guard helped to coordinate the Federal, Tribal, State,
and local response. The Service conducted damage assessments in 32
remote communities, focusing on bulk fuel facilities, and connecting
waterways to ensure communities could receive their fuel shipments and
other critical supplies ahead of the winter freeze-up. Natural
disasters like Merbok are only expected to increase in frequency and
severity as a result of climate change, and the Coast Guard will be
increasingly called upon to respond.
Pillar 3: Sustainable Economic Development
As Arctic accessibility increases, so does the potential for new
economic opportunities. The Arctic currently supplies roughly 10
percent of the world's oil and 25 percent of its natural gas, but it is
estimated to hold 22 percent of the Earth's undiscovered oil and
natural gas supply. It also contains significant deposits of minerals
essential to technology supply chains; at present, Alaska has the
world's largest zinc mine and the largest known graphite deposit in the
United States. Today, Alaska's top export is its seafood, topping $6
billion in labor income annually, $15 billion in economic output, and
accounting for over 40% of the total U.S. seafood exports and a
significant portion of global seafood supply.
These valuable resources are driving increased maritime activity in
the U.S. Arctic. Oil and gas exploration has surged, as has
environmental tourism. During the 2022 operating season, at least eight
transits of adventure tour ships were planned from Greenland to Nome.
As another means of enabling sustainable development, the Coast Guard
supports scientific research, such as NOAA studies on the distribution
of impacts to the region's fish and marine mammal stocks as well as
other aspects of wildlife ecology. These studies also help inform our
domain awareness and operational risks across the region. For example,
understanding where fish stocks are moving and how commercial,
recreational, and subsistence harvesters are responding enables the
Coast Guard to proactively manage the waterways as well as protect both
the mariners and the environment.
Since 2009, the Coast Guard has influenced Arctic governance and
sustainable development through Operation Arctic Shield. This Operation
demonstrates the Coast Guard's operational capability, asserts
leadership and models responsible international governance in a region
of key geostrategic importance. The annual Operation includes three
task forces--National Security and Enforcement, Aviation, and Marine
Safety. Through these task forces, the Coast Guard, along with its
Federal, Tribal, state, and Arctic Nation partners, protects
sovereignty, enhances domain awareness, and regulates commercial
activity. This year's operational highlights included the Coast Guard's
interception of a Russian vessel fishing illegally in U.S. waters. The
Coast Guard notified our counterparts in the Russian Border Guard who,
at our request, investigated the incident and fined the vessel. The
Coast Guard also conducted spill response and mass rescue exercises
with Arctic hub communities, industry partners, and various other
Tribal, state, and local stakeholders. These exercises enable our
ability to not only protect people and the environment but also enhance
our ability to maintain the Arctic's waterways and marine
transportation system, the primary transportation mechanism across the
region. This operational presence and responsible model of governance
positions the Coast Guard as a central U.S. leader in influencing,
shaping, and protecting sustainable economic development, subsistence
lifestyles, and cultural traditions in the Arctic across the
international landscape.
Pillar 4: International Cooperation and Governance
The Coast Guard's unique authorities, experience, and leadership
distinguish it from the other Armed Services and traditional military
instruments of national power. Leveraging these skills and
characteristics provides the ability to both model responsible
governance and compete below the level of armed conflict across the
Arctic landscape. A key tenant of the new NSAR and the 2019 Coast Guard
Arctic Strategic Outlook is asserting international leadership to
advance cooperation that upholds international law, rules, norms, and
standards for the Arctic coastal states and other non-Arctic flag
States whose ships sail in Arctic waters. Upholding this strategic
initiative, the Coast Guard consistently asserts its leadership and
provides guidance and direction through such preeminent multilateral
forums as the Arctic Council and the International Maritime
Organization (IMO).
The Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) similarly acts as a bridge
between diplomacy and operations. This forum continues to serve as an
independent, but complementary, body to the Arctic Council, with an
operational focus on safe and environmentally responsible Arctic
maritime activity. Since 2017, the Coast Guard has conducted multiple
exercises with partner Arctic nations through the ACGF. These exercises
enhance interoperability and provide a platform for direct dialogue
among the Arctic agencies fulfilling Coast Guard functions. In 2021,
the Arctic Council and the ACGF issued a joint statement of cooperation
to enhance collaboration on both search and rescue and oil spill
preparedness and response. This cooperation includes joint exercises,
such as the 2021 ARCTIC GUARDIAN exercise, conducted under Iceland's
Chairmanship, which explored both large-scale search and rescue and oil
spill response protocols to a cruise ship incident in Arctic waters.
Despite Russia's illegal war against Ukraine, the Coast Guard
continues to bolster international cooperation and leadership
commitments with the other Arctic Nations. The Coast Guard continues to
participate in bi-lateral and multi-lateral Arctic exercises and
patrols throughout the Arctic region with like-minded partners. This
cooperation highlights that all other Arctic nations are aligned in
upholding international law, rules, norms, and standards for those
operating in the region. Participation in these activities enables the
Service to build experience operating across the region, expand
response capacity with international partners, and strengthen these
strategic relationships.
Building Arctic Capacity
The ability for the United States to protect U.S. national
sovereignty, safeguard our homeland, and lead in the Arctic hinges on
physical presence and access. U.S. operational presence and influence
in the Arctic are founded on Coast Guard polar icebreakers. These ships
provide assured, year-round access to the Polar Regions not only for
Coast Guard missions, but also in support of critical activities of
other agencies and Tribal Nations that protect key economic,
environmental, and national security interests in the high latitudes.
Thanks to Congressional support for the Coast Guard's Polar
Security Cutter (PSC) program, which includes our Fiscal Year (FY) 2023
President's Budget request of $167.2 million for PSC program management
and production activities, Coast Guard presence will continue well into
the future. The PSC is a top acquisition priority for the Coast Guard
and the Navy and is vital for the U.S. to continue to project
sovereignty and protect national security interests in the Polar
Regions. The PSC is the capability the Nation needs to ensure
persistent presence and robust domain awareness in the Arctic and
Antarctic regions. The integrated Coast Guard-Navy Program Office
continues to work actively with the prime contractor to mitigate
schedule risks and ensure effective and efficient use of U.S. taxpayer
dollars to deliver this critical capability. With Congress's continued
support, the Nation is closer than we have been in over 40 years to
recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet. Continued investment is key to
meeting our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and dynamic
Polar Regions.
The FY 2023 President's Budget also requests $150 million to
support the acquisition of a commercially available polar icebreaker,
including initial modifications, crewing, and integrated logistics
support required to reach initial operating capability. The U.S. has
vital national interests in the Polar Regions and the purchase of a
commercially available polar icebreaker is a viable strategy to
accelerate U.S. presence in the polar regions in the near-term and
increase capacity in the long-term.
In addition to recapitalization of our icebreakers, the Coast Guard
also needs adequate Arctic-capable surface and aviation assets,
properly trained and equipped personnel, enhanced communication and
domain awareness capabilities, and logistics resources. As outlined in
the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook, closing gaps in these
areas requires a whole-of-government approach coupled with consistent
investment to meet not only the challenges the Arctic presents, but
also the opportunities.
Conclusion
The Coast Guard has served and shaped national security in the
Arctic for over 150 years and continues to play a critical role in the
whole-of-government approach to secure national interests in the Polar
Regions. The Coast Guard, and the Nation, must remain committed and
agile in the rapidly evolving geopolitical and operational Arctic.
The continued support of the Administration and Congress for a
modernized and capable polar fleet and increased Coast Guard Arctic
capacity and capabilities will fortify the Nation's position in this
age of Arctic prominence. Coast Guard leadership is essential in
maintaining a coalition of like-minded partners to shape the Arctic
domain as a region of strategic cooperation. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today and for your actions to support
the members of the Coast Guard. I look forward to answering your
questions.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Vice Admiral Gautier.
Dr. Sfraga, you may proceed.
Mr. Sfraga. Thank you.
Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, Chairman DeFazio,
and members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to
address you today.
I am Mike Sfraga. I am the Chair of the United States
Arctic Research Commission. It is an independent Federal agency
that advises Congress and the White House on issues related to
Arctic research and related policies. I also sit before you as
a resident of America's Arctic, the State of Alaska.
I begin my remarks today by noting the U.S. Coast Guard and
its forerunner, the Revenue Cutter Service, have a long history
of supporting scientific research, starting with the
environmental observations of the noted naturalist John Muir
soon after the 1867 purchase of Alaska from Russia.
Our Nation requires the Coast Guard's enduring support of
Federal research to protect and defend America's Arctic
interests, to better understand the changing Arctic landscape
and its implications, to inform prudent economic development,
and to foster peaceful, stable, and a prosperous North.
I note that while oceanographic research is not among the
11 statutory missions of the Coast Guard, it is indeed their
sixth statutory primary duty.
The Coast Guard advances scientific understanding of the
polar regions in two fundamental ways. First, the Coast Guard
itself supports a broad range of relevant basic and applied
research, development, testing, and evaluation. And, second,
Coast Guard icebreakers provide scientists--supported by many
Federal agencies--direct access to the Arctic. These vessels
also have modern scientific tools and enhanced capabilities,
much of which have been provided by other Federal agencies.
The U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region emphasizes
two guiding principles relevant to today's discussion: first,
plan for long-term investments, which means icebreakers;
second, commit to a whole-of-Government approach.
Clearly, icebreakers that may cost $600 million apiece are
significant national investments and assets, requiring
interagency efforts for long lead time for planning,
construction, and outfitting.
I turn my attention now to one of our Nation's two
icebreakers, the Healy. Over the past 20 years, most of the
Healy's time at sea has been in support of research, but two
challenges loom just over the horizon.
First, in recent years, Healy has become less available to
the scientific community because there has been an increase in
missions and patrols directly related to priorities of the
Department of Homeland Security. Clearly, these missions are
critical to our Nation's security and must continue.
This inherent push/pull on the Healy's time in the Arctic
demonstrates the ever-growing demands the Coast Guard has on it
and that one single agency has upon it. This rebalancing of
Healy's missions profile provides few alternatives to U.S.
researchers other than to rely on foreign icebreakers for
support.
Second, Healy is now 23 years old, with an original service
life of 30 years. Healy will undergo a 5-year service
extension, but decommissioning is not far off. What vessel will
replace the Healy? Will it be another Coast Guard vessel,
perhaps an Arctic Security Cutter, for which there is no yet
program of record?
While the Healy's decommissioning may seem far off, it is
sooner than we think, particularly for those of us who think in
icebreaker years. Planning for replacement takes time, given
the complexities of identifying interagency requirements,
seeking authorizations and appropriations, procurement,
construction, outfitting, sea trials, and so on. So, my message
today to you is: Let's start now.
And, finally, I want to shift the focus and describe the
soft-power diplomacy that results from international scientific
research and its value.
Coast Guard icebreakers have long served as platforms for
international scientific collaboration. By addressing common
problems and sharing data when appropriate, the U.S. builds
constructive relationships with like-minded nations in and
outside of the Arctic, which strengthens the international
rules-based order, the transatlantic alliance, U.S. and Canada,
U.S. and Nordic cooperation, and cooperation throughout North
America. The U.S. also benefits through access to new ideas,
technologies, databases, and research partnerships.
So, in conclusion, I offer four suggestions:
Government planning to ensure continued and enduring access
to the Arctic Ocean needs to begin now, given the long lead
time before delivery.
Two, when the Government procures new icebreakers, it
should consider the broad mission sets and requirements of all
applicable Federal departments and agencies, and when feasible,
incorporate them into vessel designs in order to advance the
full range of our Nation's Arctic interests.
Three, specifically, multibeam sonar systems should be
standard hydrographic equipment installed on all U.S.
icebreakers, because the charts that they create reveal the
depth and shape of the sea floor and provide information
critical to safe navigation, economic development, weather
prediction, coastal hazard assessment, coastal change analysis,
fisheries habitat, and resource development.
And, finally, continue to support research enabled by the
Coast Guard in order to reap the international benefits of
soft-power diplomacy.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Gibbs, thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today, and I do look forward to
your questions.
Thank you.
[Mr. Sfraga's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael Sfraga, Ph.D., Chair, U.S. Arctic
Research Commission
Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished members
of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on the United
States Coast Guard's (USGC) leadership on Arctic safety, security, and
environmental responsibility. I am Dr. Mike Sfraga and I am honored to
appear before you today as the presidentially appointed Chair of the
United States Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to discuss these
urgent set of issues.
The US Arctic Research Commission
The USARC is an independent federal agency established by the
Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984 as amended.
Our agency's mission is to advance Arctic research on behalf of and
to the benefit of the U.S.
There are eight commissioners, seven of whom are directly appointed
by the President. The eighth is the Director of the National Science
Foundation (NSF) who serves as a non-voting ex officio member.
The current members of the Commission are:
Dr. Mike Sfraga, Chair; filling an academic/research
seat, the founding director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute,
former director, Global Risk and Resilience Program, Wilson Center, and
currently serving as chair and distinguished fellow, Polar Institute,
Wilson Center.
Dr. Nikoosh Carlo; filling an academic/research seat, the
founder and chief strategist at CNC North Consulting.
Elizabeth Qaulluq Cravalho; filling an industry seat, the
vice president of lands for NANA Regional Corporation, an Alaska Native
Corporation.
David Kennedy; filling an academic/research seat, the
current Global Fellow at the Wilson Center's Polar Institute, Board
Member of the World Maritime University, and Chairman of the External
Advisory Board of the School of Marine Science and Ocean Engineering at
the University of New Hampshire.
Dr. Mark Myers; filling an industry seat, the principal
of Myenergies.
Dr. Jacqueline Richter-Menge; filling an academic/
research seat, a research affiliate with the University of Alaska
Fairbanks, 34 years of experience with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory.
Deborah Vo; filling the Indigenous seat, Program Officer
with the Rasmuson Foundation.
Dr. Sethuraman Panchanathan; Director, NSF.
The Commission releases a biennial report to the White House and to
Congress on Arctic research goals and objectives to advise the
president, Congress, guide the Interagency Arctic Research Policy
Committee (IARPC) five-year plan, and to inform overall U.S. Arctic
research efforts. The Commission also assists IARPC in establishing a
national Arctic research program plan every five years to implement
Arctic research policy.
In addition to the above tasks, the Commission's duties, assigned
by law, include:
Facilitating cooperation between the Federal Government
and State and local governments with respect to Arctic research;
Reviewing Federal research programs in the Arctic and
recommending improvements in coordination among programs;
Recommending methods to improve logistical planning and
support for Arctic research;
Recommending methods for improving efficient sharing and
dissemination of data and information on the Arctic among interested
public and private institutions;
Offering other recommendations and advice to the IARPC as
it may find appropriate;
Cooperating with the Governor of the State of Alaska and
with agencies and organizations of that State which the Governor may
designate with respect to the formulation of Arctic research policy;
and
Recommending to the IARPC the means for developing
international scientific cooperation in the Arctic.
The USARC is a statutory member of the North Pacific Research Board
and the North Slope Science Initiative. The USARC is also a member,
participant, liaison, or observer on the IARPC, the Interagency
Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, the National Ocean
Council, the Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, the Study of
Environmental Arctic Change (SEARCH), the Civil Applications Committee,
the Scientific Ice Expeditions Interagency Committee (Navy submarines),
the Arctic Icebreaker Coordinating Committee of the University National
Oceanographic Laboratory System, the Alaska Ocean Observing System, the
Department of State's Arctic Policy Group, the Arctic Research
Consortium of the United States, the International Permafrost
Association, and the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.
US Coast Guard's statutory Arctic responsibilities include research
The USCG has several statutory responsibilities in the Arctic that
are pertinent to USARC's mission, which is to advance Arctic research
in support of national Arctic policy and strategy.
I start with the Coast Guard's research-focused Arctic statutory
duties.
Of the seven primary duties assigned to the Coast Guard in 14 USC
102 \1\, three are relevant to today's discussion.
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\1\ 14 U.S.C. 102, Title 14--Coast Guard, Subtitle I--
Establishment, Powers, Duties, and Administration, Chapter 1--
Establishment and Duties
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Section 102(4) directs the Coast Guard to develop,
establish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements
of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking
facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on,
under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States;
Section 102(5) directs the Coast Guard to, pursuant to
international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate
icebreaking facilities on, under, and over waters other than the high
seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Section 102(6) directs the Coast Guard to engage in
oceanographic research of the high seas and in waters subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.
In addition to these duties, the Coast Guard was assigned 11
statutory missions \2\ by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. Law
107-296, November 25, 2002). Section 888(a)(1)(F) of that Act includes
``ice operations'' among the non-homeland security missions.
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\2\ 6 U.S.C. 468(a) Definitions, Title 6--Domestic Security;
Chapter 1--Homeland Security Organization; Subchapter VIII--
Coordination with Non-Federal Entities, Inspector General, United
States Secret Service, Coast Guard, General Provisions; Part H--
Miscellaneous Provisions
The USCG's ``non-homeland security missions'' include:
(A) Marine safety.
(B) Search and rescue.
(C) Aids to navigation.
(D) Living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement).
(E) Marine environmental protection.
(F) Ice operations.
The USCG's ``homeland security missions'' include:
(A) Ports, waterways and coastal security.
(B) Drug interdiction.
(C) Migrant interdiction.
(D) Defense readiness.
(E) Other law enforcement.
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In light of these responsibilities, I note, as a simple
observation, and as a curiosity, that while ``oceanographic research''
is the sixth statutorily defined ``primary duty'' of the Coast Guard,
``oceanographic research'' is not mentioned as a statutorily defined
``mission.''
I also note, from a historical perspective, that the USCG and its
forerunner, the Revenue Cutter Service, led by Captain Michael A.
Healy, supported the conduct of natural science and the gathering of
environmental observations since soon after the 1867 purchase of Alaska
from Russia. This federal activity has long been part of the proud
history of the Coast Guard.
And more recently, such as on page 23 of its own 2013 ``Arctic
Strategy,'' the Coast Guard astutely recognized that ``limited
operational resources . . . underline the need for increasing
collaboration in the region,'' and that ``[t]he Coast Guard must also
collaborate with academia and non-governmental partners to incentivize
Arctic research . . .''
Research implications of federal policy on Coast Guard operations
As mentioned above, federal policy has implications for the Coast
Guard's operational support of Arctic scientific research.
The foundation for national Arctic policy is the National Security
Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25
(NSPD66/HSPD25, ``Arctic Region Policy,'' \3\ released in January 2009
by President Bush and subsequently reaffirmed by President Obama. A
directive of this policy is to ``[e]nhance scientific monitoring and
research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.''
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\3\ NSPD66/HSPD25, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm
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Building upon that policy, the White House recently released an
updated NSAR, and the White House Arctic Executive Steering Committee
\4\ and National Security Council are currently developing an
implementation plan for the NSAR that is scheduled for release in 2023.
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\4\ Arctic Executive Steering Committee, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ostps-teams/climate-and-environment/arctic-
executive-steering-committee-aesc/
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To fulfill the nation's vision for the Arctic, and to address the
strategic pillars of the NSAR, the United States must have the critical
infrastructure provided by science-capable polar icebreakers.
Broadly speaking, the role of icebreakers and the relevance of
research can be connected to all four pillars, which are:
Pillar 1--Security: Develop Capabilities for Expanded
Arctic Activity
Pillar 2--Climate Change and Environmental Protection:
Build Resilience and Advance Adaptation, while Mitigating Emissions
Pillar 3--Sustainable Economic Development: Improve
Livelihoods and Expand Economic Opportunity
Pillar 4--International Cooperation and Governance:
Sustain Arctic Institutions and Uphold International Law
Progress on many of the ``strategic objectives,'' beneath each
pillar, requires icebreakers and scientific research.
For example:
Strategic Objective 1.1 Improve Our Understanding of the
Arctic Operating Environment. This requires scientific research to
improve Arctic observing, mapping and charting; weather, water, and sea
ice forecasting; and subseasonal and seasonal predictions.
Strategic Objective 2.3: Expand Research to Better
Understand Climate Change and Inform Policy Decisions. Of all the
strategic objectives in NSAR, this is most directly related and
important to Arctic scientific research, and to the need for icebreaker
access to the high Arctic.
The NSAR also emphasizes two guiding principles relevant to today's
discussion. They are:
Plan for Long-Lead Time Investments, which mentions
procuring additional icebreakers and investing in scientific research.
Commit to a Whole-of-Government, Evidence-Based Approach,
which emphasizes that responsibilities in the Arctic region extend
beyond any single government agency, and that ``U.S. Federal
departments and agencies will work together, through coordinating
bodies like the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the National
Security Council, to provide the resources, support, and expertise
required to implement this strategy.''
Clearly, vessels that are anticipated to cost over $600M to build
are significant national investments, requiring long lead-times for
planning, construction, and outfitting. The USCG currently has
intentions of constructing and operating up to six icebreakers.
Separately, the National Science Foundation is currently developing
the design for a Polar Class 3 icebreaker, a new Antarctic Research
Vessel \5\, which, if fully funded, is expected to be delivered by mid-
2031. Should this vessel come to fruition, NSF intends to operate it
exclusively in the Southern Hemisphere as a science-dedicated vessel.
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\5\ https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=305919&org=OPP
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Consistent with the NSAR guiding principles of (a) ``plan for long-
lead time investments'', and (b) ``commit to a whole-of-government,
evidence-based approach,'' White House leadership, coordination, and
guidance of all departments and agencies requiring icebreaker
capabilities will be instrumental in ensuring the continued judicious
and fiscally responsible use of taxpayer funds.
US Coast Guard's support for polar scientific research
The US Coast Guard is a critically essential and successful partner
in advancing scientific understanding of the polar regions for two
reasons.
First, the Coast Guard itself supports a broad range of Arctic-
relevant basic and applied research, development, testing, and
evaluation at the USCG Research and Development Center, the US National
Ice Center, the International Ice Patrol, and through partnerships,
such as with the Department of Homeland Security's Arctic Domain
Awareness Center.\6\
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\6\ Arctic Domain Awareness Center, https://
arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org
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Second, USCG's icebreakers provide direct scientific access to the
Arctic. Much of the time that Coast Guard icebreakers are at sea, they
are supporting scientific research missions by providing physical
access with ships that have scientific and technical capabilities, much
of which is funded by other federal agencies.
For example, according to the USCG's annual cruise reports, over 90
percent of the time that USCG Cutter HEALY (WAGB-20) operated at sea
over the past 20 plus years, including transit time, it did so in
support of scientific research.
The Coast Guard's icebreakers are the only vessels owned and
operated by the United States government that enable US scientists and
their international collaborators to access and investigate regions at
both poles that are infested with multi-year ice. The icebreakers are,
in short, essential research infrastructure.
The access provided by icebreakers enables scientists, funded by a
wide range of government agencies, to study, understand, and explain
how the polar regions serve as ``Earth's refrigerators,'' and how these
regions are warming and changing rapidly. For example, scientists now
report that Arctic air temperatures are warming four times faster than
the global average \7\, and Arctic waters are acidifying at three to
four times of non-Arctic waters.\8\
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\7\ https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-022-00498-3#Sec6
\8\ https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/science.abo0383
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These changes, and their implications on weather, marine
ecosystems, food supplies, transportation, tourism, and resource
development are critically important to understand as the US advances
its priorities noted in the NSAR and NSS. Knowledge and insights gained
from basic and applied research: (a) informs responsible stewardship of
the Arctic region, the ancestral home of Indigenous Peoples; and (b)
advances our understanding of the opportunities to wisely develop
America's Arctic renewable resources, such as fish, and timber, and
non-renewable resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals.
Most of this research has been sponsored (i.e., financially
supported) by a wide range of federal partners and stakeholders, such
as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR),
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of
Interior entities, such as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
(BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and
the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the Department of State, among
others.
These agencies have reimbursed Coast Guard many millions of dollars
for ``ship time'' on icebreakers for the scientists, engineers,
researchers, and investigators that these federal partners support.
Here are a few scientific highlights of Arctic research conducted
aboard HEALY:
Over many oceanographic expeditions, NOAA, USGS, and
State Department supported the seafloor and sub-seafloor mapping of the
US's Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) in the Arctic region, consistent
with international law. This has been a critically important process in
determining US sovereign rights on and beneath this seabed, beyond the
US's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Based on the scientific results,
the size of the US's entire ECS is about two times the size of
California, and half of that area surrounds Alaska.
HEALY recently returned from an extended and highly
successful expedition, partially funded by the NSF, that reached the
North Pole. Academic scientists collected data as part of an
internationally coordinated, multi-ship sampling campaign during 2020-
2022, named ``Synoptic Arctic Survey,'' to study pan-Arctic ocean
circulation, biogeochemical cycles and marine ecosystems. Notably, this
research cannot be conducted from remote sensing platforms, or from
electronic moored or autonomous devices. Physical presence, provided by
icebreakers, is required. This research can also be considered an early
US contribution toward our treaty obligation to help establish a
``Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring'' by June 2023 as
per the international Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas
Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean.
NOAA has been the primary sponsor of multiple HEALY
expeditions in support of US participation in an international
initiative referred to as the ``Distributed Biological Observatory,''
which consists of a series of eight sampling locations, spanning from
the Bering Sea to the Beaufort Sea, offshore Alaska. These sites serve
as a ``change detection array'' where scientists can observe variations
in physical and oceanographic conditions, such as biodiversity,
productivity and food webs, which impact Alaska's fisheries. According
to a report from the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute, Alaska
produces more seafood than all other U.S. states combined and provides
two-thirds of the nation's wild-caught fish and shellfish. Alaska
seafood is sold in 100 countries and is the State's top export, in
excess of $3 billion, annually. Food web changes also impact walruses,
seals, and ducks, which, in turn, are harvested by US citizens living
in small, vulnerable Indigenous communities in Alaska's coastal areas.
As a result, icebreakers are essential to understand food web changes
which are linked to food security issues.
The Office of Naval Research has funded both basic and
applied Arctic research conducted aboard HEALY that directly support US
Navy operations, and concurrently addresses USCG missions associated
with homeland and national security and domain awareness. Examples
include the ``Stratified Ocean Dynamics of the Arctic Ocean'' (SODA)
initiative, and an ``Innovative Naval Prototype program aimed at
engineering a networked Arctic Mobile Observing System (AMOS). These
research programs require access to the ice-covered central Arctic,
some of which contain ``multi-year'' (thick and old) accessible only
with ``medium'' and ``heavy'' icebreakers.
One of the important steps in addressing the NSAR
strategic objective of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in the
Arctic is to observe and understand the natural exchanges of carbon
dioxide between the Arctic Ocean and overlying atmosphere that is
associated with physical processes and the marine ecosystem. While gas
exchange can be monitored remotely, and on broad scales, by satellites,
detailed in situ measurements, aboard oceanographic vessels, fill a
critical gap in observations and improve efforts to quantify ocean
uptake of carbon dioxide, and hence our ability to model and predict
future climate scenarios. To that end, NSF has funded research programs
to equip HEALY and use the vessel as a ``ship of opportunity,'' on a
not-to-interfere basis, to make such measurements and contribute them
to global databases.\9\ Additional measurements, of other needed
atmospheric and surface ocean observations (long and short wave
radiation, air temperature, wind speed, humidity, sea surface
temperature, etc.) could also be collected, and would also help inform
domain awareness and the global forecast system.
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\9\ https://www.socat.info
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Current and future challenges and opportunities
Increasing demand for HEALY
The demand for HEALY to conduct missions prioritized by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has increased significantly over
the last few years, thereby reducing HEALY's availability for
scientific research missions, which are also increasing.
Greater demand for the vessel, and prioritization of DHS missions,
has had an outsized impact on Arctic research because HEALY is the only
asset in the US fleet capable of providing access to the high Arctic
Ocean. The rebalancing of HEALY's mission profile toward security and
international search and rescue efforts provide few options to US
researchers other than to rely on foreign icebreakers for support,
which will impact both the amount and the nature of science that US
investigators can achieve. In addition, federal science agencies remain
responsible for ongoing operational costs for the scientific and
technical equipment and capabilities they have installed on HEALY, even
when such capabilities are not being used.
HEALY replacement
Commissioned in 1999, USCGC HEALY is now 23 years old, and has a
designed service life of 30 years, with an anticipated five-year
Service Life Extension Project beginning in FY 2026. A replacement will
be needed for the HEALY by about 2034, suggesting that construction of
the new vessel will need to begin no later than 2031, which is the same
year that NSF anticipates delivery of the Antarctic Research Vessel.
In short planning for the HEALY replacement, to operate in the
Arctic Ocean, must start in the next couple of years, if not now.
This situation raises many questions, such as:
How will the US government provide that icebreaker, which
is essential to meet our obligations and needs in the North?
Will the USCG provide one of its three ``medium''
icebreakers, referred to as an ``Arctic Security Cutter''--consistent
with the Coast Guard's ``High Latitude Mission Analysis Report
recommending three ``medium'' and three ``heavy'' vessels, as part of
USCG's ``Polar Security Cutter'' Program? \10\
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\10\ Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, https://s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/22275439/coast-guard-polar-security-cutter-polar-icebreaker-
program-background-and-issues-for-congress-aug-30-2022.pdf
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If so, will that vessel be designed and constructed in a
manner that reflects the requirements of multiple missions, including
scientific research?
How will the requirements for those various missions,
from other agencies, be identified, coordinated with the USCG, and
incorporated into the overall design requirements?
What government entities will be provided with the
responsibilities and necessary budgets to identify, procure, install,
operate and maintain the scientific and technical capabilities and
equipment of the vessel, such as with multibeam sonar systems?
Will there be White House leadership and coordination,
including of budgets (e.g., from Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
National Security Council (NSC), and Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP)) to ensure a whole-of-government approach to this
process?
Other U.S. government vessels that operate in ice-infested waters
R/V Sikuliaq
The R/V Sikuliaq, owned by the NSF and operated by the College of
Fisheries and Ocean Sciences at the University of Alaska Fairbanks,
with support from the NSF, provides excellent scientific access to
waters covered with thin ice, up to 2.5 feet thick. This vessel,
commissioned in 2015, is outfitted with a wide range of modern science
capabilities and has proven most successful in addressing key research
questions. The Sikuliaq, however, is not an icebreaker, and is not
capable of accessing large regions of the Arctic, where thicker ice is
encountered.
Antarctic research vessel
Last year, the NSF announced \11\ funding for the design of an
Antarctic Research Vessel (ARV) \12\, which would essentially serve as
a replacement for the R/V Nathanial B. Palmer and possibly also the R/V
Laurence M. Gould that NSF charters from Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc.
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\11\ https://future.usap.gov/new-antarctic-vessel-approved/
\12\ https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=305919&org=OPP
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The ARV will be designed as a modern, world-class, ice-breaking
research vessel outfitted with first-rate scientific equipment and
enhanced capabilities. If the project is approved by NSF for
construction and fully funded by Congress, the ARV is expected to be
delivered to the NSF by mid-2031, only three years before HEALY is
anticipated to be decommissioned.
Notably, the NSF would operate the ARV exclusively in the Southern
Hemisphere, in support of Antarctic research. To my knowledge, the NSF
has no current plans for a similar icebreaking research vessel for the
Arctic region, and I also don't know whether the NSF is in discussion
with the US Coast Guard regarding the opportunities to outfit Coast
Guard vessels, beyond HEALY (i.e., the ``commercially available polar
icebreaker'' USCG has requested in its FY23 budget request, or any of
the three heavy icebreakers considered in the Polar Security Cutter
program), with scientific research tools and capabilities to advance
scientific research objectives in the Arctic region. Regardless, my
overarching recommendation is that, consistent with the NSAR's guiding
principle of a ``whole-of-government'' approach, any icebreaker owned
and operated by the US government should consider mission requirements
of the broader interagency user community, not just one department or
agency.
Autonomous platforms
While ship-based observing will remain a critical pillar of Arctic
research, the use of autonomous platforms will continue to expand,
providing access to remote regions and to spatial and temporal scales
that have previously been impractical or impossible to sample.
Research-capable icebreakers could support new networks of autonomous
instruments--both to deploy and recover instruments and to service
critical supporting infrastructure, such as acoustic beacons that will
provide `underwater GPS' for accurately geolocating assets operating
under sea ice.
Soft power diplomacy
Finally, I would also like to highlight the soft power diplomacy
advanced by Arctic scientific research that is often associated with
international scientific parties aboard icebreakers both domestic and
foreign.
Over many decades, USCG icebreakers (HEALY, POLAR STAR and POLAR
SEA) provided platforms for international science collaboration that
allowed key interactions by scientists to move forward even when
political differences of various countries strained relations in other
areas. Ongoing climate change issues warrant continued and expanded
international research programs and USCG icebreakers are essential
assets for such activities.
Let me provide some specifics. In the recently released ``State of
Arctic Science,'' \13\ the International Arctic Science Committee
refers to the Distributed Biological Observatory and the Synoptic
Arctic Survey research programs, of which, as mentioned above, US
leadership has been a central element. These programs require
icebreaker access to the high North. The UN Decade for Ocean Science
and Sustainable Development will have a focus on the Arctic Ocean.
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\13\ https://iasc.info/about/publications-documents/state-of-
arctic-science
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By addressing common problems and data sharing where appropriate,
the US builds constructive relationships with, Canada, Iceland, the
Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands), our Nordic
partners, and scientists and research organizations in non-Arctic
nations in Europe and Asia. The US benefits through access to new
ideas, technologies, and data bases, research partnerships, and it
encourages, supports, and reinforces the international rules-based
order. Enabling joint international research, international search and
rescue operations, ensuring interoperability with vessels and crews
from other nations, and working closely with other Arctic and non-
Arctic nations in areas such as the North Atlantic and Barents Sea,
also serves to reinforce the transatlantic alliance at a time of
geopolitical uncertainty; specifically, as this uncertainty ripples
globally to include the Arctic.
And looking even longer term, Russia's presence in the Arctic
cannot be ignored. Because of Russia's war on Ukraine, relations with
Russia are the worst they have been since the Cold War. We do not know
when the war will end, or when relations with Russia will begin to
rebalance. But at some point in the future, scientific research in the
Arctic region could be one step forward in rebuilding a more
comprehensive understanding of the region and perhaps serve as a
foundational effort to rebuild relations between Russia and the
West.\14\
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\14\ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
2154896X.2022.2137091
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Summary of recommendations
On behalf of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, I recommend:
1. Federal agencies should continue to, where feasible, ensure
that icebreakers procured by the United States, consider the broad
mission sets of several agencies.
2. Multibeam sonar systems on icebreakers that reveal the depth
and shape of the seafloor can provide information critical to safe
navigation, economic development, weather prediction, coastal hazard
assessment, coastal change analysis, habitat studies, and resource
development, among many other activities. It is a requirement before
declaring any potential marine protected areas, or the United States'
extended continental shelf. As called out on page 4 of the US Arctic
Research Commission's last ``Goals report,'' Arctic marine charts are
suboptimal in that only 4.1 percent of the US maritime Arctic is
charted to modern international standards.\15\
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\15\ https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/usarc_goals_2019-
2020_low.pdf
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Gibbs, thank you again for the
opportunity to testify before you and this Subcommittee on the United
States Coast Guard's leadership in the Arctic. As I have stated, the US
Coast Guard is a critically essential and successful partner in
advancing scientific understanding of the polar regions and advancing
our nation's interests in the region. It must continue to be so even
with increasing and competing demands for icebreaker missions. I am
confident the recommendations offered in this testimony will help
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achieve that.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Sfraga.
Next, Mr. Von Ah, you may proceed.
Mr. Von Ah. Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss our work on Federal efforts to address gaps in maritime
infrastructure in the Arctic.
Climate change has led to record-low levels of sea ice,
making Arctic waters navigable for longer periods of time,
leading to increased shipping activity. Data show more transits
of the Bering Strait in 2021 than ever before.
Increased shipping of natural resources extracted from the
Arctic, growing demand for tourism and destination cargoes, and
greater interest in trans-Arctic routes that can reduce travel
times may continue to drive activity in the region.
These potential economic opportunities also bring safety
and environmental risks, particularly given that the U.S.
Arctic does not have the typical elements of a Marine
Transportation System, such as a deep-draft port, comprehensive
charting of waterways, and robust communications
infrastructure.
These gaps in infrastructure exacerbate the inherent
challenges of maritime activity in the Arctic--vast distances,
dangerous weather, and unpredictable ice conditions--which pose
risks to mariners as well as the fragile Arctic ecosystem.
My statement today is based on reports we issued in 2020
and 2016 which had findings and recommendations related to
addressing these gaps.
In our 2020 report, we found that Federal efforts in the
Arctic lacked a current strategy with goals and measures, as
well as interagency leadership. We therefore recommended that
the Executive Office of the President develop and publish a
strategy to address gaps in Arctic maritime infrastructure and
designate an interagency mechanism responsible for leading
Federal efforts, given that several Federal agencies have key
roles and responsibilities in the Arctic.
In response to the recommendations, the White House
reactivated the Arctic Executive Steering Committee as the
mechanism to advance U.S. interests and coordinate Federal
actions in the Arctic. In doing so, it appointed an executive
director and convened its first meeting in December 2021.
Since then, the steering committee has met several times
and has developed and approved eight interagency initiatives.
One of the eight initiatives, to advance safe and secure Arctic
shipping, is led by the Coast Guard.
In addition, in October 2022, the White House issued a
National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which identifies
needed improvements to maritime capabilities in the Arctic,
including enhanced communications, mapping, charting, and
navigational capabilities, as well as the need for a deep-draft
harbor in Nome, Alaska, and additional icebreaking
capabilities.
While the strategy establishes a vision for Arctic
capabilities, it does not provide details on steps needed to
achieve that vision or establish goals or measures for
addressing gaps in Arctic maritime infrastructure, as we had
recommended.
For example, although the strategy calls for investments in
telecommunications infrastructure and the development of ports,
it does not specify how agencies should prioritize these
investments, nor does it identify measures to assess progress.
In November, the executive director told us that the
process of developing an implementation plan for the strategy
was underway. Encouragingly, he noted that for each major
action of the strategy, the implementation plan should identify
lead and supporting agencies, and the plan should also identify
investment priorities and resources to implement the actions
and a way to measure progress.
By completing this plan and establishing goals and metrics,
the Federal Government should have the tools to demonstrate the
results of its efforts and decisionmakers could gauge progress
in addressing these gaps.
Our report in 2016 found that, although the Coast Guard was
taking some actions to implement its Arctic strategy, it did
not have a systematic way to assess how its actions will help
mitigate Arctic capability gaps. We therefore recommended that
the Coast Guard, as it develops an implementation plan for its
strategy, also develop measures for assessing its progress.
As of December 2022, the Coast Guard is continuing to
update its implementation plan. The plan is expected to provide
the foundation for assessing its efforts, although Coast Guard
officials have not identified a timeline to complete the plan.
Better understanding its progress and addressing capability
gaps will be important given the Coast Guard's recent and
planned investments in icebreaking capabilities. The Coast
Guard plans to invest an estimated $13.3 billion to acquire,
operate, and maintain three heavy polar icebreakers. And by
tracking its progress in addressing its icebreaking and other
capability gaps, the Coast Guard will be better positioned to
understand how to support these assets and what level of
infrastructure and support investments are ultimately needed.
Moreover, the Coast Guard has an important opportunity to
coordinate the completion of its plan with the recently
released National Strategy. The Coast Guard's multimission role
and its presence in the region gives it a central role to many
Federal efforts. Taking such action will position the Coast
Guard to understand how to allocate its resources and
prioritize activities to help achieve the national goals in the
Arctic region.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy
to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[Mr. Von Ah's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure,
U.S. Government Accountability Office
Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on Arctic
maritime infrastructure. As we have previously reported, climate change
has led to widespread effects, including warming in the Arctic that has
exceeded the warming in the rest of the world. Since 1900, the Arctic
region has warmed by about 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit--double the rate of
the global temperature increase--leading to a significant decline in
sea ice cover over the last four decades.\1\ Record low levels of sea
ice have made Arctic waters navigable for longer periods of time and
have increased opportunities for shipping in the region. This change
presents potential economic opportunities as well as safety and
environmental risks, particularly given the lack of maritime
infrastructure in the region. In particular, the U.S. Arctic does not
have the typical elements of a marine transportation system, such as a
deep-draft port,\2\ comprehensive waterways charting, and robust
communications infrastructure. These gaps in infrastructure exacerbate
the inherent challenges of maritime activity in the Arctic--vast
distances, dangerous weather, and unpredictable ice conditions--that
pose risks to mariners as well as to the fragile Arctic ecosystem.
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\1\ Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth
National Climate Assessment, Volume II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Global
Change Research Program, 2018).
\2\ The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers defined a deep-draft port as
one that can accommodate large vessels such as big cargo ships with a
water depth greater than 35 feet. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic Port System Study (March 2013). The closest
deep-draft port is Dutch Harbor in the southern Bering Sea and is over
800 miles from the Bering Strait.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the United States, there are a number of stakeholders
involved in maritime infrastructure in the Arctic, and they include
several federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service that is
responsible for maritime safety and security, environmental protection,
and national security, among other responsibilities. Given the growing
expanse of navigable waters and human activities, the Coast Guard faces
expanding responsibilities for implementing and enforcing maritime
policy in the region.
We have previously made five recommendations to strategically plan
and assess progress in federal efforts to address gaps in Arctic
maritime capabilities and infrastructure. As described in greater
detail in this statement, we are pleased to report that the U.S.
Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) and the Executive
Office of the President have addressed two of the three recommendations
in our April 2020 report.\3\ Specifically, the CMTS--a federal
interagency coordinating committee focused on the maritime
transportation system--has addressed our recommendation to assess the
risks posed by gaps in U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure. In
addition, the Executive Office of the President has addressed our
recommendation to designate a group responsible for leading and
coordinating federal Arctic maritime efforts. The Executive Office of
the President has partially addressed our other April 2020
recommendation to develop a strategy to address U.S. Arctic maritime
infrastructure that identifies goals and objectives, performance
measures to monitor agencies' progress. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard has
not yet implemented our two June 2016 recommendations: (1) to develop
measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic
capability gaps and (2) to design and implement a process to
systematically assess its progress.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and
Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S.
Arctic, GAO-20-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2020).
\4\ GAO, Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could
Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps,
GAO-16-453 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2016). In addition, GAO has
issued several other reports on federal priorities in the Arctic. See
GAO, Arctic Capabilities: Coast Guard is Taking Steps to Address Key
Challenges, but Additional Work Remains, GAO-20-374T (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 5, 2020); GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program
Needs to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO, GAO-18-600
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018); and GAO, Arctic Planning: Navy
Report to Congress Aligns with Current Assessments of Arctic Threat
Levels and Capabilities Required to Execute DOD's Strategy, GAO-19-42
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My statement today will address:
1. trends in maritime shipping in the U.S. Arctic since 2009,
2. the extent to which federal actions to address maritime
infrastructure have been informed by risk, and
3. government-wide and Coast Guard strategies to address maritime
infrastructure and assess outcomes.
This statement is based primarily on our April 2020 report on U.S.
Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps and June 2016 report on the Coast
Guard's Arctic capabilities.\5\ For the reports cited in this
statement, among other methodologies, we reviewed Arctic strategies,
interviewed selected agencies involved with maritime infrastructure and
capabilities, and compared efforts to leading practices. Since the
issuance of these reports, we received and reviewed information from
the White House and the Coast Guard on the actions taken in response to
our recommendations. In addition to our prior work, for this statement
we spoke to the Executive Director of the Arctic Executive Steering
Committee (AESC) and collected updated Arctic shipping data from the
Coast Guard. Based on our review of these data for anomalies, outliers,
or missing information and our previous assessment of such data for our
April 2020 report, we determined that these data were sufficiently
reliable for our purposes of describing Arctic shipping trends since
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The term ``Arctic'' refers to the entire region north of the
Arctic Circle. We define the ``U.S. Arctic'' as bounded by a line at 60
degrees north that crosses the Bering Sea. This definition was set by
the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations agency
responsible for the safety and security of shipping.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found
in the reports cited in this statement. We conducted the work on which
this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Maritime Shipping in the U.S. Arctic Has Increased from 2009 through
2021 despite Challenging Safety Conditions
Coast Guard data indicate that both the number of vessels in the
U.S. Arctic and the number of transits through the Bering Strait
increased from 2009 through 2021. Specifically, the number of vessels
in the U.S. Arctic more than doubled from 130 in 2009 to 347 in 2021
(see fig. 1). Given that a single vessel can make multiple trips per
shipping season, the Coast Guard also measures maritime activity by the
number of transits that vessels make per year through the Bering
Strait, a key convergence point for trans-Arctic routes to the Pacific
Ocean. According to that data, the number of transits through the
Bering Strait increased from 280 in 2009 to 545 in 2021. The Coast
Guard attributed increased cargo traffic levels in 2016 to the
construction of a liquefied natural gas facility on the Yamal peninsula
and, in subsequent years, identified Russian shipments from the
facility as a driver of Bering Strait vessel traffic.
Figure 1: Number of Vessels in the Coast Guard Arctic Area of Interest,
2009 2021
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. GAO-23-106411
Note: The Coast Guard District 17 Arctic area of interest extends
north of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east to Banks Island in
the Canadian Arctic, and west to the New Siberian Islands in Russia.
Although warming over the past decades has made trans-Arctic
maritime routes more accessible, Arctic sea ice extent remains
seasonal, with most shipping occurring during a narrow window extending
from summer to early fall. Arctic sea ice typically reaches its maximum
extent in March and its minimum in September each year; as a result,
the shipping season is typically from June through October. As shown in
figure 2, the extent of sea ice in September 2019 had a much smaller
coverage area than the median September extent from 1981 to 2010.
Meanwhile, the contraction of sea ice over time has increased
accessibility to the Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago
and the Northern Sea Route along the northern border of Russia. These
two trans-Arctic maritime routes enable shipments between non-Arctic
destinations, such as between Asia and Europe.\6\ However, most traffic
in the U.S. Arctic is destinational, meaning it transports goods to and
from the U.S. Arctic. Such traffic includes shipping supplies to U.S.
Arctic communities, as well as transporting natural resources extracted
from the U.S. Arctic to the global marketplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Coast Guard officials note that because of more ice and much
shallower draft restrictions, the Northwest Passage contains far less
marine traffic than the Northern Sea Route.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2: Trans-Arctic Maritime Routes and Arctic Sea Ice Extents from
March and September 2019 Compared with the September Median, 1981 to
2010
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Sources: GAO analysis of National Snow and Ice Data Center; Office of
Naval Intelligence; Map Resources. GAO-23-106411
Although diminished sea ice has prolonged the shipping season and
opened up shipping routes, environmental changes have also resulted in
less predictable conditions, with more volatile weather and sea ice. In
April 2020 we reported that stakeholders told us variation in ice
conditions from year to year makes planning Arctic voyages difficult to
do with reasonable accuracy.\7\ The unpredictable and harsh weather and
ice conditions--combined with the vast distances and lack of maritime
infrastructure--pose safety risks that stretch the region's already
limited search and rescue capabilities and slow incidence response,
according to stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO-20-460.
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Federal Agencies' Actions to Address Arctic Infrastructure Gaps Have
Not Been Informed by a Government-wide Assessment of Risks
We have previously identified gaps in maritime infrastructure that
can exacerbate inherent challenges to shipping in the Arctic.\8\ For
example, since all of the Coast Guard's permanent assets are based well
below the Arctic Circle, the agency is constrained by the time for
surface vessels and aircraft to travel the vast distances to support
operations above the Arctic Circle.\9\ See table 1 for examples of
maritime infrastructure gaps in the U.S. Arctic identified by the U.S.
Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) and other federal
agencies as we reported in April 2020.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO-20-460.
\9\ GAO-16-453.
\10\ CMTS is a federal interagency coordinating committee focused
on the maritime transportation system.
Table 1: Examples of Maritime Infrastructure Gaps in the U.S. Arctic as
GAO Reported in April 2020
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Status in the U.S.
Infrastructure Category Examples Arctic
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental information....... Charting and GAO reported in
mapping. April 2020 that
less than 5
percent of the
U.S. maritime
Arctic had been
comprehensively
surveyed to
modern standards
for nautical
chart updates,
according to the
National Oceanic
and Atmospheric
Administration
(NOAA).
---------------------------------------
Weather and sea NOAA's National
ice forecasting. Weather Service
and the U.S.
National Ice
Center--a
partnership among
NOAA, the U.S.
Navy, and the
Coast Guard--
produce sea ice
and weather
forecasts. NOAA
has previously
noted that
observations that
are needed for
timely forecasts,
such as for wind
and clouds, are
very limited in
the Arctic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response services............... Search and rescue. There is limited
infrastructure to
support aviation-
based search and
rescue
operations. The
nearest Coast
Guard air station
to Utqiagvik, on
Alaska's northern
coast, is about
945 miles away in
Kodiak.
---------------------------------------
Oil spill response NOAA, Coast Guard,
Interior, and the
State of Alaska
have roles in
this area. Their
ability to
respond to oil
spills is
affected by the
communications
limitations in
the region and
the vast
distances over
which responders
and their
equipment must
travel.
---------------------------------------
Icebreakers....... The Coast Guard's
medium polar
icebreaker Healy
was commissioned
in 2000 and is
the primary polar
icebreaker used
in the U.S.
Arctic. The only
Coast Guard heavy
polar icebreaker,
the Polar Star,
was commissioned
in 1976 and is
typically used in
Antarctica to
support McMurdo
station.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating environment and Communications.... Communications,
Navigation. which are
sufficient to
support voice and
data needs in the
Bering Sea but
limited at higher
latitudes, are
necessary for
vessels to
receive weather
and sea ice
information or
request emergency
services.
---------------------------------------
Deep-draft port... The closest deep-
draft port is
Dutch Harbor in
the southern
Bering Sea and is
over 800 miles
from the Bering
Strait.
---------------------------------------
Harbors of refuge. A harbor of refuge
is a port, inlet,
or other body of
water normally
sheltered from
heavy seas by
land in which a
vessel can safely
moor during
severe conditions
or when it needs
repairs. The U.S.
Arctic lacks such
a harbor
designated by the
International
Maritime
Organization
(IMO).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of federal agency information. GAO-23-106411
In 2020, we found that federal agencies had taken some actions to
address gaps in U.S. Arctic infrastructure. For example, the Coast
Guard reported that it had taken a flexible approach to addressing
infrastructure gaps by establishing seasonal, forward operating bases
in the U.S. Arctic as needed to provide search and rescue support in
areas where major shipping activity is occurring. In addition, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported in 2019 that
it had acquired nearly 1,500 square nautical miles of Arctic
hydrographic survey data over the past 3 years. This, however, is a
small percentage of the over 200,000 square nautical miles significant
to navigation in the U.S. Arctic.
We also found in 2020 that the agencies' actions were not based on
a government-wide assessment of the economic, environmental, and safety
risks posed by maritime infrastructure gaps to inform investment
decisions in the U.S. Arctic. Rather, agency officials said that they
based Arctic infrastructure decisions on their agency-specific
missions, strategies, and collaborative efforts. Agency officials said
that securing the resources to address U.S. Arctic infrastructure is
challenging because such projects must compete with other established
agency mission areas. For example, officials told us that
infrastructure investments may not compete well against other agency-
established priorities in other parts of the country, in part, because
the Arctic is an emerging region and because of the considerable costs
of developing infrastructure in the harsh Arctic environment.
We reported that without a government-wide assessment of the
economic, environmental, and safety risks posed by maritime
infrastructure gaps, agencies lack assurance that their investments are
addressing the highest-priority risks.\11\ Risk management is a widely
endorsed strategy for helping policymakers decide about allocating
finite resources and taking actions in conditions of uncertainty.\12\ A
government-wide risk assessment could better enable agencies to
evaluate potential U.S. Arctic infrastructure expenditures and assess
the extent to which these expenditures will mitigate identified risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO-20-460.
\12\ GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005). See also
GAO, Enterprise Risk Management: Selected Agencies' Experiences
Illustrate Good Practices in Managing Risks, GAO-17-63 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 1, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We noted that the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation
System (CMTS) was well suited to conduct such an assessment based on
the committee's statutory role to coordinate the establishment of
domestic transportation policies in the Arctic and its past work in
this area. Therefore, we recommended that the CMTS complete a
government-wide assessment of the economic, environmental, and safety
risks posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic to
inform investment priorities and decisions. In 2022, we confirmed that
CMTS had taken several actions that, taken together, addressed the
intent of this recommendation.\13\ As a result, the federal agencies
responsible for addressing gaps in U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure
will have more useful information to better inform their investment
decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ In March 2022, CMTS published its ``U.S. Arctic Marine
Transportation System Infrastructure Risk Resource Compendium,'' which
addresses a range of risks, including the economic, environmental, and
safety issues affected by Arctic infrastructure gaps. While this
compendium does not represent a government-wide assessment of all risks
posed by the infrastructure gaps, it provides useful information to
federal agencies responsible for addressing gaps in U.S. Arctic
maritime infrastructure to better inform their investment decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Government-wide and Coast Guard Strategies Lack a Means to Measure
Progress in Addressing Infrastructure
In April 2020, we found that government-wide interagency efforts to
address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure lacked an up-to-date
strategy and consistent interagency leadership to guide agency
actions.\14\ In particular, in our April 2020 report we recommended
that the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the
President, including the Office of Science Technology and Policy
(OSTP):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ GAO-20-460.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Develop and publish a strategy for addressing U.S. Arctic
maritime infrastructure that identifies goals and objectives,
performance measures to monitor agencies' progress over time, and the
appropriate responses to address risks.
2. Designate the interagency group responsible for leading and
coordinating federal efforts to address maritime infrastructure in the
U.S. Arctic that includes all relevant stakeholders.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ OSTP is an office within the White House that leads
interagency science and technology policy coordination efforts.
As of December 2022, the Executive Office of the President has
addressed our recommendation to designate a group responsible for
leading and coordinating federal Arctic maritime efforts. It did so in
September 2021 by announcing the White House would reactivate the
Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) as a mechanism to advance
U.S. interests and coordinate federal actions in the Arctic, including
maritime infrastructure.\16\ In doing so, the White House appointed an
executive director who convened the first meeting in December 2021. As
of December 2022, according to the Executive Director of the AESC, the
group has met several times and has developed and approved eight
interagency initiatives. One of the eight initiatives--to advance safe
and environmentally secure Arctic shipping--is led by the Coast Guard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The AESC is chaired by the Director of the OSTP and it
includes members from more than 20 other federal departments and
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, as of December 2022, the Executive Office of the
President has partially addressed our April 2020 recommendation to
develop a strategy to address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure. In
October 2022, the White House issued a National Strategy for the Arctic
Region, which updated the previous National Strategy for the Arctic
Region, issued by the Obama Administration in May 2013.\17\ OSTP
officials told GAO that they had participated in this work, which had
been led by the National Security Council (NSC). The updated strategy
covers the period from 2022 to 2032, and establishes four ``pillars''
to address both domestic and international issues in the U.S. Arctic.
They are: (1) security; (2) climate change and environmental
protection; (3) sustainable economic development; and (4) international
cooperation and governance. The strategy identifies needed maritime
capability improvements in the U.S. Arctic, including for enhanced
communications, mapping, charting, and navigational capabilities, as
well as the need for a deep draft harbor in Nome, Alaska.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Our April 2020 report noted that agency officials and
stakeholders regarded the 2013 strategy as outdated, given the changes
in conditions in the region. In particular, agency officials said
national security was a growing concern in the Arctic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the current strategy does not establish goals and measures
specifically to addressing Arctic maritime infrastructure as GAO
recommended in April 2020. For example, although the strategy
identifies an objective to invest in infrastructure such as supporting
the development of a deep draft harbor, the strategy does not specify
how agencies should prioritize these investments or identify goals and
measures to assess progress. In November 2022, the AESC Executive
Director told GAO that the White House--including OSTP and NSC--is
early in the process of developing an implementation plan for the
strategy. The AESC Executive Director noted that for each major action
in the strategy, the implementation plan should identify lead and
supporting agencies as well as a way to measure progress and to
identify investment priorities and resources necessary to implement
these actions. By completing this plan and establishing goals and
associated performance measures, the federal government would have the
tools to demonstrate the results of its efforts, and decision makers
could gauge the extent of progress in addressing maritime
infrastructure gaps.
In addition, in June 2016, we found that the Coast Guard identified
various gaps in its U.S. Arctic capabilities but had not assessed its
progress in addressing these gaps.\18\ For example, the Coast Guard
polar icebreaking fleet comprises two operational polar icebreakers--
the Polar Star and Healy--of which only the Healy is currently
operating in the Arctic. However, we found that, although the Coast
Guard was taking some actions related to maritime in the Arctic, the
Coast Guard had not assessed how its actions helped to mitigate its
Arctic capability gaps. We noted that such an assessment--which would
include developing measures for gauging its progress, when feasible--is
critical to the Coast Guard's understanding of its progress toward
addressing these gaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ GAO-16-453.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard (1) develop
measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic
capability gaps and (2) design and implement a process to
systematically assess its progress.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ GAO-16-453.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of December 2022, however, the Coast Guard had not yet
implemented these two recommendations. The Coast Guard is currently
updating its implementation plan for the Arctic strategy it published
in 2019. The plan is expected to provide the foundation for assessing
efforts to address Arctic capability gaps. Coast Guard officials stated
that they are also developing a strategic metrics framework for
measuring progress in addressing the capability gaps. Coast Guard
officials did not identify when they plan to complete the plan and
framework, stating that these are longer-term efforts.
Developing a means to measure progress in addressing capability
gaps is especially important given recent and planned investments in
Coast Guard capabilities. For example, the Coast Guard, in
collaboration with the Navy, plans to invest an estimated $13.3 billion
for the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of three heavy polar
icebreakers--also known as the Polar Security Cutters--over their
entire 30-year life cycle.\20\ The Coast Guard initiated procurement of
the first Polar Security Cutter, awarding a $746 million contract for
design and construction in April 2019. By assessing and measuring how
its actions have helped to mitigate capability gaps, the Coast Guard
will be better positioned to plan its Arctic operations more
effectively, including prioritizing activities to target gaps and
allocating resources.
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\20\ This estimate is the acquisition program baseline as of May
2021. See GAO, DHS Annual Assessment: Most Acquisition Programs Are
Meeting Goals Even with Some Management Issues and COVID-19 Delays,
GAO-22-104684 (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Von Ah.
We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing
myself.
Vice Admiral Gautier, I understand that the closest deep-
draft port to the Arctic is in the Aleutian Islands, some 800
miles from the Bering Strait and some 1,000 miles from the
northern population center in Barrow.
That means that, unless an icebreaker happens to be nearby,
a Coast Guard cutter or aircraft would have to travel over
1,000 miles to a potential maritime search and rescue case.
That clearly won't work.
Please give us a sense of the magnitude of the investments
that would be necessary for the Coast Guard to establish a
year-round Arctic base and also what the benefits may be to
doing so versus the Coast Guard's current seasonal operating
approach.
Admiral Gautier. Mr. Chairman, so the Coast Guard's Alaska
home port that launches our Arctic operations is Kodiak. And we
deeply appreciate Congress' support to continue the build-out
of Kodiak.
I think the port you are referring to is Dutch Harbor, and
we do operate forward pretty frequently from Dutch Harbor,
Alaska.
The Coast Guard currently hasn't identified a specific
deep-water port that we require as a home port, but we are
really encouraged by sort of a whole-of-Government or
interagency thoughts in terms of building additional Arctic
infrastructure like Nome that was mentioned in the new National
Strategy for the Arctic Region. We will use those locations for
our Coast Guard operations if those are built.
The further you get north, sir, to answer your first
element of your question, the more expensive things get.
Mr. Carbajal. I kind of figured that.
Dr. Sfraga, in your written testimony, you discuss how the
Coast Guard's engagement with scientific research may be used
to advance soft-power diplomacy.
How do you gauge the importance of the Coast Guard's
diplomacy and soft power in a region where Russia and China
have taken such publicly aggressive actions?
Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As the Admiral noted, presence does a lot of things,
including influence and match our presence to others. The Coast
Guard really is the tip of the spear for us in the north,
whether we are talking about the Bering Sea or the Barents, on
either side of the North American continent.
So, to have the Coast Guard patrolling in those areas, my
home off the coast of Alaska, or with allies in Europe off the
coast of Iceland and Greenland, north of Norway in the Barents,
it shows that the United States is engaged. Most of the time,
we are engaged with our allies.
This is a signal. It is not unlike a signal that NATO
provides, where we have multiple partners. The United States
enjoys partnerships and allies. Russia does not enjoy that.
China does not enjoy that. We do.
And so, to bring together our Coast Guard with others does
a number of things: interoperability--tyranny of distance in
the north is a thing to overcome, unlike others. So, together,
we can incorporate our interoperability. Two, having the
presence there. Three, understanding that domain better.
Although our Coast Guard has a long history, that domain is
changing as we speak.
So, to have a presence there most of the year, all year
around, just projects U.S. national interests and projects our
sovereignty over that area.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Mr. Von Ah, to what extent has the Arctic maritime
transiting season been lengthened due to melting sea ice? Can
you expand on how this lengthened season increases risk for the
United States in terms of maritime safety and environmental
stewardship? For example, how has this affected the personnel
needs and resource allocations of the Coast Guard?
Mr. Von Ah. Thanks for that question, Chairman Carbajal.
So, recent data that we looked at shows that it has
increased from--it used to be more around 3 months. For several
years, it was looking like it was 5 months that there was
access to that region. And, most recently, that increased to 7
months, based on the information we saw.
So, obviously, that puts pressure on the Coast Guard and
puts demand on services for Coast Guard, whether it is
potentially for inspecting new vessels crossing the Bering
Strait to see that they are outfitted correctly, incident
response, or just for general security and safety in the
region.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
I now would like to recognize Ranking Member Gibbs.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman.
Vice Admiral, in the National Defense Authorization Act,
which I guess we are going to vote on today I think, there is a
request for authorization for an icebreaker and then also an
existing icebreaker. The measure will waive certain contracting
requirements that apply to construction of these new vessels.
Assuming these funds are provided for the requested
acquisition, how long do you expect this acquisition to take?
And what additional funds will be required to refit this vessel
for Coast Guard use in the Arctic? And when do you expect such
a vessel to be available for service?
Admiral Gautier. First off, Ranking Member, we really enjoy
the congressional support that we are getting on the commercial
icebreaker acquisition and for the relief needed in order to
field it more quickly.
So, our plan for this--and it is a bit of a voyage of
discovery. We just haven't purchased commercially. In the Coast
Guard, we traditionally don't do that--is, once we can get the
money to acquire it, is to do a phased-in approach so we can do
some just very initial work on it to make it a basic Coast
Guard cutter. So, some basic damage control, basic command and
control, and a paint job and staffing to make it a Coast Guard
cutter so we can field it in the Arctic as quickly as possible.
We think that in a phased-in approach over 2 years we can
make it, then continue to build it out into the type of Coast
Guard cutter that we need it to be, with the full suite of
requirements met, so that we can then homeport it in a location
where it will be operable in the Arctic.
Mr. Gibbs. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Sfraga--did I say that right?
Mr. Sfraga. ``Sfraga.''
Mr. Gibbs. ``Sfraga.'' OK. Thank you.
The issues the Coast Guard, with the icebreaker--the Coast
Guard kind of pretends the Healy's replacement is an unrelated
topic, but designing an Arctic Security Cutter, also a Great
Lakes icebreaker. Do you believe that the Coast Guard cutter
Healy, which is used for Arctic research, should be
recapitalized by providing for a fourth Polar Security Cutter,
assigning an Arctic Security Cutter to the mission, designing a
purpose-built research icebreaker, or using an array of
unmanned platforms and other investments to deal with that
issue?
Do you understand?
Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Ranking Member. If I understand the
question correctly, it is Arctic Security Cutter versus
unmanned----
Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Some of that, yes.
Mr. Sfraga. OK.
Mr. Gibbs. And then I think, too, more Polar Security
Cutters.
Mr. Sfraga. And more Polar Security Cutters.
Well, the hearing today is about the Arctic, and I know the
Polar Security Cutters, the heavies, will likely go down to the
Antarctic. It doesn't preclude them from going north, but, in
terms of the research community, we really do need those assets
north. So, we would advocate for an Arctic Security Cutter to
be outfitted to support research to head north sometime sooner
rather than later.
As I said, the Healy is going to phase out in a very short
period of time in the icebreaker life. So, we are concerned
about what happens then. Not that you should take away from the
portfolio of a Polar Security Cutter program, but the fact is,
our Nation needs a reliable Arctic Security Cutter, something
like the Healy. If we do not have the Healy, we will not have
capacity----
Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. OK. So, I guess what you are
saying, you favor the Arctic Security Cutter instead of having
a polar research vessel to operate in both Antarctica and the
Arctic? You want the other vessel to be just operating in the
Arctic?
Mr. Sfraga. The research community would like to have a
dedicated icebreaker in the north that we could rely on to
conduct our research.
Mr. Gibbs. OK.
Vice Admiral, I want to bring this up. Our late esteemed
chairman, Don Young, represented Alaska for almost 50 years and
had an issue up at St. George. There was a facility that was
housing a helicopter for search and rescue, I believe. And I
think anything close to that was more than 400 miles. And the
Coast Guard had a lease agreement, and the locals didn't
maintain the roof, and things kind of fell apart.
What's the status--it seems to me that the environment up
there and the distances, that it is probably a pretty important
thing to have that capability of that helicopter for rescue
missions and so on. Is the Coast Guard planning on reentering a
lease and making sure that the facility is kept up? What are
your thoughts on what your plans are?
Admiral Gautier. It is important for the Coast Guard to
that have that location in Saint Paul Island with the hangar so
we can pre-stage helicopters out of that location. Especially
as we see fish stocks migrating further north and the fishing
fleet that is following that, Saint Paul Island is just an
important location where we can conduct our missions more
readily with the fishing fleet.
So, we understand that in the draft authorization bill
there is some language that might provide us a degree of relief
that will enable us to continue to use that, and we do commit
to using that facility.
Mr. Gibbs. Will you commit to, prior to January 31st of
next year entering a lease, that you will brief the
subcommittee staff on that issue, before you enter into a
lease?
Admiral Gautier. So, if I understand the question, with the
relief provided under the auth bill, that we would continue the
leasing of that hangar so we can operate helicopters out of----
Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Yes, I think what the
subcommittee staff is looking at is a briefing from your folks
prior to signing the lease, I think, to understand what the
plan is.
Because I think the concern is, when you are entering a
lease, that the incident that happened with the damaged hangar
won't happen again, and we won't be left without having that
capability in that area.
Admiral Gautier. Right. Yes, we really look forward to a
future where we can resolve the issues so that we can use a
hangar that is appropriate----
Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Yes, I understand that. I think
the subcommittee staff wants to be kept up to speed----
Admiral Gautier [interposing]. Absolutely.
Mr. Gibbs [continuing]. And make sure that--they want input
and to make sure the lease is what is going to work.
Admiral Gautier. Certainly.
Mr. Gibbs. I think that is--I yield back.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs.
I now would like to recognize Chairman DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Admiral, you weren't around then, but I objected to
the icebreaker contract with Halter that had never, ever built
anything like that before. And I said, this is a really dumb
idea. I still don't know why it happened.
And, luckily, they have now been taken over by a company
that actually has built and can continue to build ships and has
built a bunch of Coast Guard boats with never a single defect.
So, I just caution, if we--I am hoping that the Coast Guard
will finish its evaluation on the ASCs. I don't see how you are
going to get by without them. The Healy is kind of getting old
and could use some modern replacements, and I think there is
going to be a lot of work coming.
How far away do you think you are on finishing an
evaluation of the need for the ASCs?
Admiral Gautier. Well, certainly, your counsel is
incredibly valuable, given your history on this topic.
Our focus is on the Polar Security Cutters at the moment,
as you said. We do intend on forming a program of record in the
future where we can examine requirements for a follow-on Arctic
Security Cutter, a medium icebreaker, to provide us the sort of
fleet mix and flexibility that we think we need.
That is out in the future while we continue to focus on our
preeminent acquisition, the PSC, plus now, with the support of
Congress, bringing on this commercial medium icebreaker into
the fleet.
Mr. DeFazio. Right. Well, I mean, the PSCs, they are going.
I mean, all you needed was to oversee it, and now you have
someone who can actually build ships. So, it is not going to
take a lot of work, unlike that other company.
But the commercial--I think you have already addressed the
commercial acquisition and the potential for that. And I
understand that is going to take some time. But I would hope
then you immediately move on to ASCs. I have some sense of
haste.
I just really think, even when we finally get to three
functional, modern, major icebreakers, I mean, you still have
the Antarctic mission and other things. I think the flexibility
that the smaller ones afford is going to be absolutely
necessary. And I just hope that there will be a real focus on
that.
I am also wondering, are you looking at interesting or new
technologies for the region, whether that would be some
unmanned aviation surveillance or things like that to extend
your look in that region?
Admiral Gautier. Yes, we certainly are, Mr. Chairman. I
think the use of UAS is going to expand the eyes and ears that
will just help us perform our mission that much better.
The other thing that we continue to actually make some
progress on is communications in the high latitude, which has
been a historical challenge given just the nature of operating
up there. And we are making progress along those lines, too.
Mr. DeFazio. So, in the Arctic region, satellite
communication is--I mean, just because of where you are at,
there is no real good satellite communication?
Admiral Gautier. Actually, there has been progress that is
being made both with the Department of Defense and commercial
industry. Space Force just launched two satellites that can
provide us some secure communications and improvements in the
high latitudes. And there are a number of commercial concerns
that continue to launch constellations that will cover the high
latitudes. So, actually, we are quite encouraged along those
lines.
Mr. DeFazio. Great. Great. That is going to fill in some
gaps.
That is it, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
time. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Next, I will recognize Representative Weber.
Mr. Weber of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I, too, want to add my word of thanks to Peter DeFazio
for chairing the committee. And he is not paying attention, so,
I will have to kill time here, which is OK for a Congressman.
We have a saying, ``Why use four words when eight will do?''
And so, Mr. Chairman, I was just saying we are going to
miss you. I went on a codel with you and Myrnie over to Europe,
the T&I Committee. It was great fun, and it was very well
organized and very well done. I think Kathy probably had a lot
to do with that. But I wish the best for you.
And, Bob Gibbs, we are going to miss you. I remember when I
was a freshman and came up here the first time, I parked in
your parking space, because I didn't know better. And you were
very gracious. And I have never recovered from that, because I
am getting paid back. Every time there is a new crew, they seem
to park in my parking space.
But, anyway, thank you all. Congratulations for a job well
done.
A couple of questions, if I may, I guess to you, Vice
Admiral.
We have a company called GulfLink that is working on a
project in Missouri City. And at a previous hearing in April of
this year, MARAD Acting Administrator Lessley stated on the
record that the USCG environmental review and MARAD record of
decision for Texas GulfLink--you may have to do a little
checking on that, Texas GulfLink--would be completed at the
early part of 2023.
And, of course, their question, as you might have supposed,
is: Are we on track with that? Do you have any knowledge of
that?
Admiral Gautier. I do have knowledge of that. And that is
right; the Coast Guard is tightly coordinated with MARAD in
their lead Federal agency role in the permitting of this
project. We are providing MARAD with information so they can
conduct the environmental analysis.
On our side, the Coast Guard has responsibility for doing
things like reviewing their operations plan and making sure
they comply with the safety and security regulations. They
needed to do a risk analysis and some other things.
So, those efforts will continue on the Coast Guard side
without delay, sir.
Mr. Weber of Texas. All right. I appreciate that.
And, secondly, on November 17th, Representative Babin and
myself wrote the Coast Guard a letter with questions regarding
VT Halter.
Does the contract that the Coast Guard approved for VT
Halter require that U.S. law is followed in all aspects?
Admiral Gautier. It does.
Mr. Weber of Texas. It does?
Has the Coast Guard contacted VT Halter to instruct the
company that they need to resolve the question of proper
licensing for the use of patented technology?
Admiral Gautier. I think, in general, in working with VT
Halter, we reinforced the fact that they need to comply with
law.
I think on the particular instance that you might be
referring to, my understanding is that there might be a
complaint about a certain patent infringement. To date, the
Coast Guard nor DoD or the Navy have received through channels
a complaint on any patent infringements, but we understand that
something might be out there. And if and when we receive
something, we will act appropriately and take it seriously.
Mr. Weber of Texas. So, you know that it is out there, and
during the recent purchase of VT Halter by Bollinger
Shipyards--and you all did a review of that purchase, right?
Admiral Gautier. We haven't actually received a patent
infringement complaint, sir.
Mr. Weber of Texas. Nothing at all? Well, you are aware of
that patent licensing issue. So, was that included in the Coast
Guard review of the sale? The possibility, if nothing else.
Admiral Gautier. Not to my knowledge specifically.
Mr. Weber of Texas. OK. Do you know when we could
anticipate an answer to these questions? Could you look into
that? You said not to your knowledge.
Admiral Gautier. Well, certainly, sir, we could. But I
think it is important that any entity that might have a patent
infringement complaint needs to make that complaint to the
Federal Government through channels.
Mr. Weber of Texas. OK, but you are aware of it; it just
has not come through the right channels to you?
Admiral Gautier. It has not been received by the Navy or
the Coast Guard through our Integrated Program Office.
Mr. Weber of Texas. OK. Well, I appreciate that and
appreciate your response.
I appreciate what you all do. My oldest and longest--well,
my youngest and longest living uncle, Vernon Weber, was a
Coastie. And he is 92 and living up in Woodville, Texas. And
so, we appreciate you guys.
And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Weber.
I will now recognize Representative Larsen.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Admiral, first for you, this is somewhat related to Mr.
DeFazio's questions, but I wonder if you could be more
specific.
In 2018, the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center
identified a number of interrelated capability gaps that could
challenge the Coast Guard's ability to operate in the Arctic,
including voice and data communications and sensor coverage.
And I was curious what steps the Coast Guard has taken to
address those gaps, and is there anything yet that needs to be
done?
Admiral Gautier. Sir, we have issued a contract for second-
generation Coast Guard communications capabilities across the
entire fleet of Coast Guard cutters, not just the ones that
will be operating in the Arctic.
And, as part of this, we continue to work closely with DoD,
like in the Space Force example that I mentioned, where they
are providing some additional coverage through their
constellation in the polar regions for military-specific secure
communications.
In addition to that, working directly with other commercial
providers and then other entities like DHS Science and
Technology, we are exploring efforts for commercial satellite
provision. In fact, the Polar Star, which is a couple of days
out of Australia, headed down to Antarctica, is carrying a
commercial satellite receiving capability on it for operation
in Antarctica.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Is that going to be--is that
experimental? Is that prototyping? Or is this a----
Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. It is. We are essentially
experimenting with a couple of different options, and this one
is just an easy, commercially available one. It will enable the
crewmembers to communicate back with their families and things
like that.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. With regards to Space Force
capability, without getting too far into this in this setting,
is that strictly a military communications capability for
national security uses only?
Admiral Gautier. To my knowledge, it is.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. To your knowledge. OK, yes.
So, in terms of commercial or safety, environmental
purposes, your communication and sensors--you haven't developed
those capabilities to address these other missions of the Coast
Guard in the Arctic region?
Admiral Gautier. Congressman, we are improving. We are not
necessarily where we want to be or need to be. We still think
that we have gaps, but the good news here is that, in
particular, the commercial capability is being fielded pretty
quickly to be able to close those gaps.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. And so, related to that, the
commercial fishing industry supports a lot of jobs in my State,
and in Alaska, obviously. A lot of folks, they live in the
Pacific Northwest during the winter and fish up north in the
summer for obvious reasons. The Coast Guard plays a pretty key
role, though, in responding to spills and other environmental
pollution incidents that have an impact on the quality of
fishing.
There are techniques to remove oil from ice-heavy
landscapes, but those are still underdeveloped. Is the Coast
Guard taking any action to put any work into developing those
techniques?
Admiral Gautier. We are. Through our research--the Coast
Guard's research and development programs and the network we
then have through other elements like DHS Science and
Technology and other research institutions, the Coast Guard has
been working on some solutions. In particular, for ice-covered
waters in the Arctic, we recently tested an underwater remote
vehicle that can detect oil sub-ice. And so, things like that
we are proceeding at so we can close some of those gaps.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Mr. Von Ah, your testimony
recommends that the Coast Guard develop measures for assessing
how its actions have helped mitigate capability gaps and design
and implement a process to address progress.
Are there specific gaps that can be addressed more quickly
if recommendations are implemented?
Mr. Von Ah. Thank you for that question, Representative
Larsen. I don't know if we have done the work to say whether or
not there are certain gaps that could be addressed more
quickly. Certainly, what we are looking for in our
recommendations is the ability for these agencies to be able to
prioritize their investments relative to the goals that we are
trying to achieve in the Arctic, that are laid out in the
Arctic maritime strategy and, in the Coast Guard's case, in
their own agency Arctic strategy.
So, we haven't seen an implementation plan yet from them in
terms of how they are going to go about--what specific plans
and what goals they have. We understand it is still being
developed. And so, it is hard to say exactly which ones could
go more quickly, but I think that is sort of what we are hoping
to see in their plan.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. With that, thank you. I will
yield back.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
I will now recognize Representative Auchincloss.
Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
I would like to focus on the Arctic Council and what
Russia's war in Ukraine means for the alliance. The Arctic
Council, as you all know, is a consensus-based
intergovernmental forum made up of the eight Arctic nations,
six indigenous peoples organizations, and a variety of other
Government and nongovernmental partners. Russia was scheduled
to chair the Council from 2021 to 2023, but was suspended from
all participation due to its invasion of Ukraine.
Vice Admiral, a question for you. Accepting as a premise
that the Arctic Council is an important international convenor
for the maritime community and serves U.S. security and
economic interests, what is the Coast Guard planning to do to
fill the void of leadership left by Russia at the Arctic
Council?
Admiral Gautier. The Arctic Council is indeed an important
international forum to maintain the sorts of free and open and
stable Arctic waters that we all hope to enjoy. So, when Russia
invaded Ukraine, Arctic Council activities were suspended for a
time, but then the remaining Council members got together,
absent Russia, and put together a work plan with some projects
to continue as they can, as we can, to move forward on some of
those items.
So, Norway becomes the chair of Arctic Council in April of
next year, and there are discussions about what a work program
moving forward might look like for the Arctic Council in the
future.
Mr. Auchincloss. The Coast Guard has no assets permanently
stationed above the Arctic Circle, compared to Russia's 6
Arctic bases and 14 newly built icebreakers. So, given these
limitations, what can Congress do to support us asserting our
leadership with this vacuum that is being created in the Arctic
Council?
Admiral Gautier. Well, in terms of not having a home port,
so to speak, by the Arctic Council, continued support for the
types of investments that we have requested in terms of basing
of our Polar Security Cutters, in terms of other home ports.
Things like you supporting in Kodiak are tremendously
important.
So, the State Department leads our delegation to the Arctic
Council, and I think just general Government congressional
support of what U.S. Government does in the Arctic Council is
helpful.
Likewise, we have a more preeminent role in the Arctic
Coast Guard Forum, which is different but related to that. And
our conversations with respect to oilspill response, search and
rescue, and other things that we do in the Arctic Coast Guard
Forum, we hope to move forward under Norway's chairmanship in
the future, too.
Mr. Auchincloss. Good. So, in addition to Russia being
increasingly aggressive, they released a naval doctrine in
August that emphasized the Arctic Ocean's importance to the
country, and I already talked through their assets that they
have.
China is also increasing the assertive. In February 2022,
Beijing and Moscow pledged in a joint statement to increase
cooperation on sustainable development in the Arctic. In
September, Chinese and Russian warships conducted a joint
exercise in the Bering Sea. In September, the USCG cutter
Kimball was on patrol when it identified a Chinese-guided
missile cruiser about 75 nautical miles north of Alaska's Kiska
Island.
How are you redistributing your assets and patrols given
increased activity and demonstrated interest by the CCP in
operating in the Arctic?
Admiral Gautier. So, our Coast Guard District 17 commander
has created an operation called Frontier Shield. And what we
have done is--so, with the decommissioning of our High
Endurance Cutters, or 378s, we have operated more National
Security Cutters in the region in addition to the Coast Guard
cutter Healy. And we are on patrol in a way where we can get,
through intelligence means and the Department of Defense, sort
of an advanced warning of where we might be confronting or
seeing these surface action groups so we can position ourselves
the right way so we can meet their presence with our presence
to make sure everyone is complying with international rules and
norms.
Mr. Auchincloss. We need to make it absolutely clear, and
not just in the South China Sea, but also clearly in the Arctic
as well, that the United States Navy and Coast Guard is going
to ensure that international waters are a global commons that
are to be navigated free of incursions by CCP. It needs to be
absolutely unequivocal. To the extent that you need support
from Congress in doing so, I hope that you will be forthcoming.
Admiral Gautier. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Auchincloss.
Next, I will recognize Representative Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
the privilege of joining your committee for this hearing.
The Arctic should be on all of our minds. I know the Coast
Guard has been trying to provide the necessary activities in
the Coast Guard for a long time, and, unfortunately, has not
been able to develop the necessary vessels, basically
icebreakers of various kinds, to do the job. I want to focus on
the icebreaker issue, which was discussed earlier. So, I am
going do it again.
What is the current status of the one heavy icebreaker that
soon will be under construction? When do you expect it to be
completed?
Admiral Gautier. Sir, you are referring to the Polar Star,
I believe. The status of the Polar Star, actually, a few days
out of Australia on its way to----
Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. No. No, no. I am sorry. Not
that. That one is the only one you have, but the new one that
you intend to----
Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. Oh, on the Healy or the----
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. Well, let me put it more----
Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. On the Polar Security
Cutter, my apologies.
Mr. Garamendi. You are authorized and you have money to
build an icebreaker. What is the status of that project?
Admiral Gautier. Forgive me, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. That is OK.
Admiral Gautier. I understand the question.
So, in terms of the Polar Security Cutter progress, in
terms of construction, we do know that it is taking longer than
we anticipated to complete, for the shipyard to complete, the
detailed design phase of the Polar Security Cutter project.
This is a crucial phase that needs to happen right, especially
on the first-of-class icebreaker before we can move together
with construction of the first PSC.
So, having said that, it is unlikely, sir, that the lead
PSC will be delivered during fiscal year 2025, which I think
might have been the latest update from the Coast Guard on that.
And that's what is in the contract. And, in fact, we assess
that there is considerable schedule risk even for delivery in
fiscal year 2026.
Mr. Garamendi. So, we are looking beyond 2025?
Admiral Gautier. We are.
Mr. Garamendi. Any idea how far beyond? You say there is
risk in the schedule.
Admiral Gautier. Sir, we want to give you a precise
estimate of what that looks like, and we won't----
Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. You have not been precise in
the past, so, just give me a range. Are we talking 2030?
Admiral Gautier. We need to evaluate what this detailed
design phase, how long it is going to take.
Mr. Garamendi. When will you come to us with that
evaluation?
Admiral Gautier. We are at risk to be into fiscal year
2027, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. So, what do you intend to do between now and
then, that being, what, 6 years from now?
Admiral Gautier. We are continuing to compress the schedule
wherever we can on the acquisitions. We have asked, as you
know, for funding in this fiscal year to purchase a
commercially available medium icebreaker.
Mr. Garamendi. And what is the status of that purchase? I
assume that is the Chouest.
Admiral Gautier. Pending the fiscal year 2023 budget
passage, sir, we intend on doing a quick evaluation and moving
forward on an acquisition for that, and then moving into a
phased-in process so we can get that into the Arctic as quickly
as we possibly can.
Mr. Garamendi. And your proposed schedule to accomplish
that is?
Admiral Gautier. We think it will be a phased-in 2-year
schedule before we can have it homeported, permanently
homeported and operational. We hope that we will be able to
actually operate that particular icebreaker sooner than 2 years
from now.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you have a specific work plan to
accomplish that?
Admiral Gautier. We have, honestly, a lot of details to be
filled in on that. We need to take a deeper look at the
icebreaker that----
Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. You have not yet done a deep
look at it?
Admiral Gautier. Sorry?
Mr. Garamendi. You have not yet done a deep look at that
icebreaker?
Admiral Gautier. We have done an initial evaluation of this
particular icebreaker, but pending an acquisition, it will
enable us to put together a much more----
Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Please. Understand, this
committee, for at least the decade that I have been involved in
it, wants you to have icebreakers. Don't dance with us. Give us
the specific information we need to make it happen. You are
going to need law. You are going to need money. You are going
to need acquisition authority. You have got to give us the
precise information. Don't dance around. You are very good at
dancing. You haven't given me a solid answer on anything yet.
But you have got to be very, very precise.
This ship has been before you for more than a year, and yet
you have not done a detailed look at what it is going to take,
or maybe you are not willing to give us the information we need
so that we can help make it happen.
Now, there are other icebreakers that are available from
foreign countries, specifically Finland and Sweden, that have
offered to lease--long-term lease--icebreakers to the United
States. Have you looked at that possibility?
Admiral Gautier. We have looked at that possibility
previously. Obviously, we need to have some statutory relief to
Buy American in order to do something like that.
Mr. Garamendi. We understand that. We know the law. We
write the law. We understand. We also understand we have got a
very serious problem in the Arctic. We don't have the ability
to patrol the Arctic unless the Healy is available, and it is
going to go into a shipyard and won't be available until just
towards the end of the Arctic summer season, correct? That's
standard.
I will just tell you I am very disappointed. I am very,
very disappointed. We have been at this 10 years, and the Coast
Guard is still dancing around. You have got to come to us with
a solid plan. Here is what we need. We need it by this date.
Here is how we can get it done. And yes, you are going to need
authority to do that, but you are not going to get authority
until we know what it is and how the plan works. So, please, I
am 10 years into this. I am pretty damn tired of the dancing
around. OK.
Now, what is the followup for the heavy icebreaker that is
perhaps going to be done sometime between 2027 and 2030? What
is the plan for the next followup?
Admiral Gautier. So, we intend on opening up a program for
a follow-on icebreaker, the Arctic Security Cutter is what we
are calling it, as you know, a medium icebreaker.
Mr. Garamendi. And you intend to?
Admiral Gautier. We intend on creating a program of record
in order to do that. Our focus is really on the Polar
Security----
Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Sir, if I might, 30 seconds?
So, have you communicated with this committee about what
that plan is?
Admiral Gautier. I don't think we have provided details yet
because, quite frankly, we need to develop those details.
Mr. Garamendi. I yield back.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses
from our first panel and will now call up panel 2. Thank you
very much.
Welcome. I would now like to welcome our next panel of
witnesses: Dr. Rebecca Pincus, director of the Polar Institute
at the Wilson Center; and Dr. Martha Grabowski, professor at Le
Moyne College and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute--I hope I
pronounced that right--and former chair of the Marine Board at
the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
Thank you for being here today, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record. As with the previous panel, since your
written testimony has been made part of the record, the
subcommittee requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5
minutes.
Dr. Pincus, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF REBECCA PINCUS, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, POLAR INSTITUTE,
WILSON CENTER; AND MARTHA GRABOWSKI, Ph.D., PROFESSOR, LE MOYNE
COLLEGE AND RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE; PAST CHAIR,
MARINE BOARD, NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND
MEDICINE
Ms. Pincus. Thank you.
Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished
members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you
today as director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute.
In keeping with the global, policy-focused work of the
Wilson Center, I offer the following comments on the U.S. Coast
Guard's Arctic missions in the context of U.S. national
interests and objectives in the Arctic and beyond.
My argument is threefold. First, that in the global context
of long-term strategic competition, the Coast Guard is an
effective means for strengthening relationships with allies and
partners and for competing with adversaries via the integrated
deterrence framework established in the National Defense
Strategy.
Second, that the U.S. has clearly identified the Indo-
Pacific as the priority theater and Europe as the secondary
theater of strategic importance, and the Arctic must be
understood in that strategic hierarchy.
And third, for a number of practical reasons, the Coast
Guard is a cost-effective means to pursue multiple national
interests in the Arctic.
The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic take place in the
global context of geopolitical competition, with China as the
pacing threat, while Russia is broadly viewed as an acute
threat. The 2022 National Defense Strategy establishes the
concept of integrated deterrents as the chief means of engaging
in holistic competition with both China and Russia. The Coast
Guard can play a unique role in integrated deterrence.
In the Arctic and beyond, the Coast Guard is a welcome
partner on a host of issues of shared concern. From search and
rescue, to fisheries enforcement, to drug interdiction, the
Coast Guard is a partner welcomed by countries around the
world. The top maritime concerns of many partner nations are
bread-and-butter U.S. Coast Guard missions: enforcing fisheries
regulations, interdicting crime and terrorism at sea, and
maritime safety and response. Coast Guard international
partnerships enhance partner capacity, pave the way for U.S.
access, and embody the vision of integrated deterrents
enshrined in the NDS.
In addition, clear identification I referenced above of the
Indo-Pacific as the first priority and Russia and Europe as the
second priority helps place the Arctic in context. In light of
these priorities, the Department of Defense has identified
stability in the Arctic as its desired objective, and is taking
a requirements-driven approach to calibrating its posture in
the Arctic.
In pursuit of stability in the Arctic, the Coast Guard has
an important role to play in the National Defense Strategy
concept of campaigning. Defined in the NDS as the conduct and
sequencing of logically linked military initiatives aimed at
advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time,
campaigning in the Arctic should not contribute to escalation.
The Coast Guard is well-positioned to campaign without
escalating, as white-hulled Coast Guard vessels are inherently
less escalatory than Navy warships.
Finally, given the extra costs associated with achieving
and maintaining U.S. Government presence in the Arctic, it is
imperative to achieve maximum results for the investment of
taxpayer dollars. In the Arctic, the U.S. needs Swiss Army
knife solutions: cheap, durable, and useful for accomplishing
many different tasks. On a single patrol, a U.S. Coast Guard
icebreaker might demonstrate sovereignty, respond to a search
and rescue case, and support scientific research.
The ability of Coast Guard assets to perform multiple
missions in the Arctic simultaneously advances multiple
national interests, in the spirit of the National Strategy for
the Arctic Region's emphasis on whole-of-Government solutions.
In conclusion, there are both strategic and practical
reasons to fully resource the Coast Guard's Arctic missions.
The Coast Guard is a highly useful tool for conducting
integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engaging in strategic
competition. For example, the Coast Guard could partner with
Denmark and Greenland to build capacity and enhance Maritime
Domain Awareness, strengthening our relations with these
important allies.
More importantly, the Coast Guard should develop a strategy
for conducting and resourcing integrated deterrents and
campaigning operations. The Arctic region provides an ideal
test bed for developing and implementing integration concepts
with global applicability.
The Coast Guard is a useful means of meeting the complex
threats to U.S. security interests and to ensuring a stable and
open international system, but only if it can clearly identify
a path forward and justify additional resources. The Coast
Guard should be asked to proactively articulate a coherent,
specific, and a rigorous strategic vision for its role in
advancing U.S. strategic ends in the Arctic.
Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts, and
I look forward to your questions.
[Ms. Pincus' prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Pincus, Ph.D., Director, Polar Institute,
Wilson Center
Introduction
Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished members
of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on the United
States Coast Guard's (USCG) leadership on Arctic safety, security, and
environmental responsibility. I am Dr. Rebecca Pincus and I am honored
to appear before you today as the Director of the Wilson Center's Polar
Institute to discuss these issues.
Prior to directing the Polar Institute, I served on the faculty of
the U.S. Naval War College, in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
From 2020-2022, I was detailed from the Naval War College to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, first to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development office and
later the newly established Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Arctic and Global Resilience. Before joining the Naval War College, I
served on the faculty of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and led research
for the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy.
Woodrow Wilson Center's Polar Institute
The Polar Institute was established as a program within the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2017. Since then, it has
become a premier forum for discussion and policy analysis of Arctic
issues. The Polar Institute holistically studies the central policy
issues facing these regions, with an emphasis on Arctic governance,
climate change, economic development, scientific research, security,
and Indigenous communities. Our nonpartisan analysis and findings are
communicated to policymakers and other stakeholders.
The Polar Institute is holding a series of public events on the
recently-released 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR).
Our first event, in October, provided an opportunity for speakers from
the Arctic Executive Steering Commission, National Security Council,
Department of Defense, and Department of State to unpack the NSAR and
discuss their agencies' work. Our next event will be a deep-dive into
the work of the Department of Homeland Security in the Arctic. In
February 2023, we will hold an event focusing on science and research
in the Arctic. Events are livestreamed, and recordings are available on
our website.
In addition, we have ongoing work streams on Nordic and European
Union security perspectives on the Arctic, critical minerals and the
green energy transition in the Arctic, and maritime security and
stewardship.
We do this work within the administrative context of the Woodrow
Wilson Center, which was chartered by Congress in 1968 as the official
memorial to President Woodrow Wilson. The Wilson Center is the nation's
key non-partisan policy forum for tacking global issues through
independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for
the policy community.
The Coast Guard as a Strategic Means to Accomplish National Ends
In keeping with the global, policy-focused work of the Wilson
Center, I offer the following comments on the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic
missions. By framing the USCG missions in the context of U.S. national
interests and objectives in the Arctic and beyond, I will underscore
the valuable contributions made by the Coast Guard and its value as a
tool of national power.
In brief, my core argument is threefold: first, that in the global
context of long-term, strategic competition, the Coast Guard is an
effective means for strengthening relationships with Allies and
partners and for competing with adversaries via the integrated
deterrence framework established in the National Defense Strategy
(NDS); second, that the U.S. has clearly identified the Indo-Pacific as
the priority theater, and Europe as the secondary theater of strategic
importance, and therefore the Arctic must be understood in that
strategic hierarchy; and third, for a number of practical reasons, the
Coast Guard is a cost-effective means to pursue multiple national
interests in the Arctic.
1. Global context: long-term, strategic competition
The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic take place in the global
context of geopolitical competition, with China as the pacing threat.
For several years, there has been bipartisan consensus in the United
States on the importance and scale of the challenge posed by China,
while Russia is broadly and accurately viewed as an ``acute'' threat.
The 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies share similar language on
the threats posed by China and Russia:
(2018) ``Long-term strategic competitions with China and
Russia are the principal priorities for the Department . . .''
(2022) ``The 2022 NDS advances a strategy focused on the
PRC [People's Republic of China] . . . as our pacing challenge . . .
also accounts for the acute threat posed by Russia . . .''
The 2022 NDS establishes the concept of integrated deterrence as
the chief means of engaging in holistic competition with both the PRC
and Russia: in the words of Secretary of Defense Austin, ``to develop,
combine, and coordinate our strengths to maximum effect . . . in close
collaboration with our counterparts across the U.S. Government and with
Allies and partners.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Defense, ``2022 National Defense Strategy,'' pp.
iv. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-
NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF
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The Coast Guard can play a unique role in integrated deterrence. It
can serve as a fulcrum between the DoD and DHS, able to leverage the
authorities and missions of both federal departments. It partners with
State, local, and Tribal entities; with the private sector in the
global maritime industry; and with its foreign counterparts. In this
regard, the Coast Guard is a unique national tool for working across
jurisdictions and functions.
The Coast Guard is useful in forging strong relationships with
Allies and partners, in the Arctic and around the world. As a law-
enforcement agency, it is also key to upholding the rules-based order
that all countries rely upon. It is an important component of strategic
competition with Russia and China.
In the Arctic and beyond, the Coast Guard is a welcome partner on a
host of issues of shared concern. From search and rescue to fisheries
enforcement to drug interdiction, the Coast Guard is a partner welcomed
by countries around the world. The top maritime concerns of many
partner nations are bread-and-butter USCG missions: enforcing fisheries
regulations, interdicting crime and terrorism at sea, and maritime
safety and response. The Coast Guard's Mobile Training Teams train over
1000 international military students each year, in over 40 countries,
in both bi- and multilateral formats.\2\ International training covers
the range of Coast Guard missions, and is tailored to specific national
or regional needs. Coast Guard international partnerships enhance
partner capacity, pave the way for U.S. access, and embody the vision
of integrated deterrence enshrined in the NDS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For more information, see the website of the U.S. Coast Guard
Office of International Affairs and Foreign Policy, https://
www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Director-of-International-Affairs-
and-Foreign-Policy-CG-DCO-I/.
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Consider U.S. interests in forging closer ties with Greenland. As
part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and host of the U.S. Air Base Thule,
Greenland also holds important strategic mineral resources. In 2020,
the U.S. reopened a consulate in Nuuk, Greenland, and work is ongoing
to broaden and deepen the relationship between the U.S. and
Greenland.\3\ The U.S. Coast Guard should be a more significant part of
these efforts. According to the Greenlandic government, the fishing
industry is responsible for more than 85% of exports and over 20% of
employment. USCG is ideally poised to partner with Greenland and
Denmark on maritime domain awareness, enforcement, and safety: issues
of top concern to Greenland's leaders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ U.S. Department of State, ``The United States and Greenland.''
https://dk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/u-s-greenland/.
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In the Arctic, the U.S. Coast Guard is also able to navigate
sensitive relationships. The most obvious example is along the U.S.-
Russia maritime boundary in the Bering Sea, where USCG has maintained a
professional and functioning working relationship with the Russian
Border Guard throughout the current crisis driven by Russia's further
invasion of Ukraine. For example, even in 2022, we saw just one
incident in which a Russian fishing vessels crossed the boundary line
to fish illegally in U.S. waters; when the U.S. Coast Guard reported
the vessel, the Russian Border Guard responded.
Another, less obvious example is Canada: the U.S. and Canada do not
agree on the international status of the Northwest Passage, and the
maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea is unresolved. Despite these
differences, the U.S. Coast Guard has partnered with its Canadian
counterparts to conduct two transits of the Northwest Passage recently,
in 2017 and 2021. In 2021, the icebreaker Healy carried officers from
the British Royal Navy and the Dutch Navy on its transit, and used its
onboard multibeam sonar system to provide Canada with high-resolution
hydrographic survey data in the approach to the hamlet of Resolute, in
Nunavut, which will be used by the Canadian Coast Guard to identify a
safe shipping lane. This transit and associated activities are evidence
of the mission's contribution to strong relationships with allies and
partners in the Arctic and beyond.\4\
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\4\ Melody Schreiber, ``US icebreaker departs on a voyage that will
transit the Northwest Passage.'' Arctic Today, August 26, 2021. https:/
/www.arctictoday.com/us-coast-guard-science-joint-mission-northwest-
passage/.
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In addition to building relationships with allies and partners, the
U.S. Coast Guard contributes to integrated deterrence through
fortifying the rules-based order and demonstrating U.S. sovereignty and
resolve in the Arctic.
In September 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Kimball encountered
a flotilla of PLA Navy and Russian Navy vessels in the Bering Sea,
inside the U.S. exclusive economic zone.\5\ The combined naval exercise
in the Bering followed another encounter in 2021, when USCG encountered
four PLAN warships, also in the U.S. EEZ.\6\ In 2020, a Russian Navy
flotilla conducted operations in an active fishing area inside U.S.
waters.\7\ Chinese icebreakers Xue Long and Xue Long II regularly
conduct research in the Arctic.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Maggie Nelson, ``Coast Guard spots Chinese and Russian military
ships together in Bering Sea.'' Alaska Public Radio, September 27,
2022. https://alaskapublic.org/2022/09/27/coast-guard-spots-chinese-
and-russian-military-ships-together-in-bering-sea/.
\6\ Dylan Simard, ``Coast Guard encountered Chinese warships in the
Aleutians in August.'' Alaska Public Radio, September 14, 2021. https:/
/alaskapublic.org/2021/09/14/coast-guard-encountered-chinese-warships-
in-the-aleutians/.
\7\ Nathaniel Herz, `` `Move out of the way': Bering Sea fishing
boats report close encounter with Russian military.'' Alaska Public
Radio, August 27, 2020. https://alaskapublic.org/2020/08/27/move-out-
of-the-way-bering-sea-fishing-boats-report-close-encounter-with-
russian-military/.
\8\ Atle Staalesen, ``Chinese icebreaker sails to North Pole,
explores remote Arctic ridge.'' Arctic Today, August 12, 2021. https://
www.arctictoday.com/chinese-icebreaker-sails-to-north-pole-explores-
remote-arctic-ridge/.
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Without U.S. Coast Guard patrols in these waters, the Russian and
Chinese warships would have symbolic free rein. USCG presence to
identify and monitor these activities ensures the safety of U.S.
citizens and interests in the Arctic.
In November 2022, the Federation Council of Russia approved a law
restricting vessel traffic in the Northern Sea Route. According to the
new law, foreign military vessels traveling in the NSR must request
permission from the Russian government 90 days before the date of
passage. Further, no more than one foreign warship or other state
vessel may be in the NSR at a time. Foreign submarines must surface
while in the NSR. The law allows for the suspension of passage of
foreign state vessels.\9\
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\9\ TASS, November 30, 2022. [Cyrillic text] https://tass.ru/
ekonomika/16462331 (tass.ru).
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The new Russian legislation is likely to increase calls for a
freedom of navigation exercise by the U.S. While Russia designates the
Northern Sea Route as internal waters, the U.S. holds that key parts of
the passage are international straits, where restrictive measures are
not permitted under the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS).
Given the maritime hazards present in the NSR, icebreaker support
for a FONOP, particularly in the eastern stretches, is advisable. USCG
vessels may be considered less inflammatory to the Russians.
2. The Arctic is not the priority theater in U.S. strategy
The clear identification of the Indo-Pacific as the first priority,
and Russia/Europe as the second priority, helps place the Arctic in
context. The Department of Defense has not yet achieved its desired
posture and balance of forces in the Indo-Pacific. Military support to
Ukraine and reassurance of NATO Allies have placed further demands on
the DoD. In light of these urgent priorities, the DoD has identified
stability in the Arctic as its desired objective and is taking a
requirements-driven approach to calibrating DoD posture in the Arctic.
DoD's priority in the Arctic is homeland defense and early warning.
The 2022 National Security Strategy seeks to ``Maintain a peaceful
Arctic'' and states: ``We will uphold U.S. security in the region by
improving our maritime domain awareness, communications, disaster
response capabilities, and icebreaking capacity . . . We will exercise
U.S. Government presence in the region as required, while reducing risk
and preventing unnecessary escalation.'' \10\ The 2022 National Defense
Strategy notes that ``The United States seeks a stable Arctic region
characterized by adherence to internationally-agreed upon rules and
norms.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The White House, ``National Security Strategy,'' October 2022.
Pp. 44-45. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-
Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
\11\ 2022 NDS, pp. 16.
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In pursuit of stability in the Arctic, the Coast Guard also has a
role to play in the NDS concept of campaigning. Defined as ``the
conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives aimed
at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time,''
\12\ campaigning in the Arctic should not contribute to escalation. The
Coast Guard is well-positioned to campaign without escalating, as
white-hulled Coast Guard vessels are inherently less-escalatory than
Navy warships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ 2022 NDS, pp. 1.
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Stability in the Arctic, and a lower priority relative to the Indo-
Pacific, does not mean the region is not important to the United
States. The U.S. has significant territorial equity and sovereignty
interests, including northern and western parts of Alaska, as well as
the Aleutian Island chain and the Bering, Beaufort, and Chukchi Seas
adjacent to Alaska, which are all included in the definition of Arctic
provided in the 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act.\13\
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\13\ Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, Section 112,
``Definition.'' Available from US Arctic Research Commission at https:/
/www.arctic.gov/legislation/.
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The U.S. has economic interests in the Arctic maritime, including
fisheries, energy, shipping, and tourism. The Alaskan fishing industry
harvests two-thirds of the nation's seafood, according to an industry
group, and generates over $15 billion in direct and secondary economic
outputs.\14\ The cruise industry calls Alaska ``the premier cruise
destination market in the United States.'' In 2019, Alaska received
almost two-thirds of all cruise passenger visits at U.S. ports,
producing $1.2 billion in income in Alaska and 23,000 jobs.\15\ Cruise
traffic is rebounding from the pandemic and trends prior to 2020
indicate strong growth across the industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Alaska Seafood, ``Updated Report Affirms Alaska's Seafood
Industry is Essential Driver of State Economy.'' January 12, 2022.
https://www.alaskaseafood.org/news/for-release-2022-
economic-value-of-alaskas-seafood-industry-report/
#: :text=Nationally%2C%20the%20Alaska
%20seafood%20industry,%248.6%20billion%20in%20multiplier%20effects.
\15\ Business Research and Economic Advisors, ``The Contribution of
the International Cruise Industry to the U.S. Economy in 2019.'' Cruise
Lines International Association (CLIA). Pp 51-52. https://
www.alaskatia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019-USA-Cruise-EIS.pdf.
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U.S. Arctic waters may also be affected by activities in adjacent
Russian waters. While Russia's war in Ukraine has dampened shipping
activity through the Northern Sea Route, Russia continues to ship LNG
from its Arctic developments in Yamal. These LNG shipments are
increasingly heading east, to Asia, transiting the Bering Strait and
increasing environmental and maritime risks in the region. Less
dramatic, but more frequent, are environmental impacts from garbage and
pollutants that regularly wash into U.S. Arctic waters from Russia,
including petroleum products and industrial debris. In 2020, large
amounts of garbage washed ashore in the Bering Strait region, covering
miles of shoreline and including hazardous waste (insecticide,
lubricants, butane) and large amounts of plastic debris, as well as
dead seabirds. Russian text and logos were identified on the marine
debris, much of which was related to commercial fisheries.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ G. Sheffield, et al. ``2020 Foreign Marine Debris Event--
Bering Strait.'' NOAA Arctic Report Card 2021. https://arctic.noaa.gov/
Report-Card/Report-Card-2021/ArtMID/8022/ArticleID/952/2020-Foreign-
Marine-Debris-Event%E2%80%94Bering-Strait.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reductions in sea ice and warming conditions in the Arctic enable
increased maritime activity. Changing weather conditions create
uncertainty. The combination of increased maritime activity and less-
predictable weather conditions generate maritime hazards. Fishing
vessels, cruise ships, and other vessels are all subject to the
maritime hazards present in Arctic waters. Climate change is
anticipated to increase need for search and rescue in the region.\17\
Whatever the cause or origin, when an accident occurs in the Arctic--
particularly in the Bering Strait, the narrow body of water separating
the U.S. and Russia--there may be consequences in U.S. waters.
Proximity to Russia raises the stakes for humanitarian or environmental
disaster response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Fourth National Climate Assessment, ``Chapter 26: Alaska.''
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/26/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
From a military perspective, Alaska and the U.S. Arctic are
important to homeland defense, as forward locations for early warning
detection and interdiction systems. New delivery systems from vectors
in Eurasia make investments in U.S. and NORAD missile early warning and
defeat systems critical, as outlined in the NDS. Alaska is also an
important location for its proximity to the Indo-Pacific theater. As
such, it hosts the largest concentration of fifth-generation fighter
aircraft in the world. However, the NDS demands that the DoD focus
ruthlessly: ``we must not over-exert, reallocate, or redesign our
forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to
preparedness for our highest strategic priorities.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ 2022 NDS, pp. 22.
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3. Practical benefits of Coast Guard missions in the Arctic
There is an Arctic cost premium: whether building infrastructure,
maintaining vehicles, or buying milk, it's more expensive, often
significantly so. In rural Alaska, a gallon of gas may often cost $10-
15, and a gallon of milk will be similarly expensive.\19\ Shipping in
goods raises costs. U.S. Government operations are not immune to the
additional costs inherent to remote, harsh environments like the
Arctic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See, for example: Zachariah Hughes, ``Fuel in the Alaska
village of Noatak was $16 a gallon. The costs are more than just
money.'' Anchorage Daily News, May 18, 2022. https://www.adn.com/
alaska-news/rural-alaska/2022/05/18/fuel-in-the-alaska-village-of-
noatak-was-16-a-gallon-the-costs-are-more-than-just-money/; Ann
Schmidt, ``Extreme grocery prices in rural Alaska shock TikTok: `$18
for milk'.'' Fox Business, December 3, 2021. https://
www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/rural-alaska-grocery-store-prices-viral.
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Given the extra costs associated with achieving and maintaining
U.S. Government presence in the Arctic, it is imperative to achieve
maximum results for the investment of taxpayer dollars. In the Arctic,
the U.S. needs Swiss Army knife solutions: cheap, durable, and useful
for accomplishing many different tasks. On a single patrol, a Coast
Guard icebreaker might demonstrate sovereignty, respond to a search and
rescue case, and support scientific research. The ability of Coast
Guard assets to perform multiple missions in the Arctic simultaneously
advances multiple national interests, in the spirit of the National
Strategy for the Arctic Region's emphasis on whole-of-government
solutions.
The Coast Guard's practical application in the Arctic contrasts
with the U.S. Navy, which is confronting several significant strategic
and operational challenges that defy quick solutions, and which make
additional missions in the Arctic potentially costly, in both financial
and strategic terms. Its shipbuilding and future fleet plans reflect
the challenges of responding to the current and future threats posed by
Chinese military advances, new technologies including unmanned systems,
and budget issues. Its 30-year plan for shipbuilding has been
characterized as requiring annual appropriations that the Congressional
Budget Office describes as ``unprecedented since World War II.'' \20\
It faces serious challenges in maintenance and repair at yards \21\,
including at Navy submarine yards.\22\ In recent years, the Navy has
experienced a string of accidents \23\ and scandals \24\ that further
complicate its ability to reposition itself to meet future demands.
Adding further demands, for operations in a region that is famously
harsh, does nothing to help the Navy. Moreover, it does not reflect the
broader national and defense strategies that enshrine cost-effective,
whole-of-government, integrated solutions. The Coast Guard has a strong
track record of achieving maximum effects with minimum resources,
leading some experts to take a hard look at transferring Navy budgets
for small combatant funding to USCG.\25\
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\20\ Congressional Budget Office, ``An Analysis of the Navy's
December 2020 Shipbuilding Plan.'' April 2021. https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/57091.
\21\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Naval Shipyards:
Ongoing Challenges Could Jeopardize Navy's Ability to Improve
Shipyards.'' May 10, 2022. GAO-22-105993.
\22\ Congressional Budget Office, ``The Capacity of the Navy's
Shipyards to Maintain its Submarines.'' March 2021. https://
www.cbo.gov/publication/57083.
\23\ Robert Faturechi, et al. ``Years of Warnings, then Death and
Disaster.'' ProPublica, February 7, 2019. https://
features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/us-navy-crashes-japan-cause-
mccain/.
\24\ Blake Herzinger, ``Fat Leonard Cost the US Navy More than
Money.'' October 24, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/24/fat-
leonard-us-navy-corruption-scandal/.
\25\ See, for example, Craig Hooper and Bryan Clark, ``Fed Up,
Congress Considers Giving Coast Guard the Navy's Small Ship Funding.''
Forbes, May 23, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/05/
23/fed-up-congress-considers-giving-coast-guard-navys-small-ship-
funding/.
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So what can the Coast Guard do better?
In conclusion, there are both strategic and practical reasons to
fully resource the Coast Guard's Arctic missions. The Coast Guard is a
highly useful tool for conducting integrated deterrence, campaigning,
and engaging in strategic competition. It is an agency with a
remarkably high degree of trust around the world. Through its capacity-
building work with partner nations on fisheries enforcement, drug
interdiction, and search and rescue, the Coast Guard helps the U.S. win
partners and future allies. By building maritime law enforcement
capacity around the world, the Coast Guard contributes to the U.S.
effort to establish and uphold the global rules-based order that our
prosperity and peace depend upon.
In the Arctic, the Coast Guard could partner with Denmark and
Greenland to build capacity and enhance maritime domain awareness,
strengthening our relations with these important allies. While USCG
already engages with the Danish Joint Arctic Command (JACO) in
Greenland via the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and has participated in
international maritime exercises, expanding and deepening the
relationship could yield benefits.
More importantly, the Coast Guard should develop a strategy for
conducting and resourcing integrated deterrence and campaigning
operations. This is important in the Arctic and beyond. The Coast
Guard's 2022 Strategy and 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook are valuable
documents, but do not match the National Defense Strategy in terms of
specificity, prioritization, and an overarching strategic framework to
guide decision-making. The 2020 Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, which
was jointly signed out by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard,
provides an example of an integrated approach to naval and maritime
strategy. The Arctic region provides an ideal test bed for developing
and implementing integration concepts across the Navy-Marines-Coast
Guard, as well as with Allies and partners.
The Coast Guard in the Arctic--and beyond--can play a unique role
in integrated deterrence and campaigning as defined in the NDS. Through
strengthening relationships with Allies and partners, and assisting in
security cooperation, the Coast Guard can advance national objectives
and minimize escalation. The Coast Guard is an important means of
meeting the complex threats to U.S. security interests, and to ensuring
a stable and open international system: only if it can clearly identify
a path forward and justify additional resources. The Coast Guard should
be asked to proactively articulate a coherent, specific, and rigorous
strategic vision for its role in advancing U.S. strategic ends in the
Arctic.
Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you
today, and for your support for the Coast Guard family. I look forward
to your questions.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Pincus.
Dr. Grabowski, you may proceed.
Ms. Grabowski. Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking
Member Gibbs, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today in this hearing
addressing Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic.
I have had the privilege of being associated with the
National Academies for 30 years, and I just completed my second
tour as chair of the Marine Board and the Transportation
Research Board. In 2014, I chaired the NASEM study sponsored by
the Coast Guard and seven other organizations that focused on
the Nation's ability to respond to a catastrophic oilspill in
the Arctic. I am also a member of the current NASEM committee
examining the adequacy of Coast Guard statutory authorities to
respond to novel uses of the maritime environment. Our
committee work is in process at present, and I am not going to
comment on it today.
My focus today, however, are on three areas important for
Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic: Maritime Domain
Awareness, support for Coast Guard operations and personnel,
and Coast Guard's needs for a resilient physical,
technological, and human infrastructure.
Coast Guard needs to support U.S. missions in the Arctic
depend on effective Maritime Domain Awareness, which for the
Coast Guard requires improved visibility of and access to
vessel traffic information, as well as current nautical charts.
Important to this is the Coast Guard's increasing need to adopt
current and future-facing information technology and systems,
as was highlighted in several recent GAO reports.
Several studies have addressed the Coast Guard's risks and
challenges in the Arctic. Few efforts, however, have adopted
systematic processes and advanced analytics with multiparty
Arctic stakeholders to determine the impact and the risks of
the accelerating changes that the Coast Guard is facing in the
Arctic today and in the future.
Operationally, changing Arctic traffic and environmental
conditions will increase needs for Coast Guard emergency
response, vessel safety, and environmental protection
capabilities. Maritime resources and other rescue equipment and
supplies for response are limited in the Bering Strait region,
and as we have already heard, the Coast Guard is far from
possible incident locations.
Arctic missions are also going to require, as we have
heard, new technology, certification, training, proficiency,
and experiences, as the Coast Guard increasingly adopts and
regulates the use of uncrewed and autonomous maritime systems.
Underlying effective operational support are robust,
secure, and available communications; data and infrastructure;
real-time and longitudinal sea ice, charting, navigation, and
shoreline effects data; efficient and enterprisewide data
systems; and advanced analytics capabilities; all of which are
going to be a challenge for the Coast Guard.
Coast Guard needs to support their environmental protection
mission and oilspill response activities are significant. Some
of the NASEM 2014 recommendations that were in that report have
been addressed, such as a call for traffic evaluation in the
Bering Strait and oilspill and emergency response training
programs for local entities so that the Coast Guard and the
communities can develop trained response teams in the local
communities. But others, such as the call for increased Coast
Guard presence and performance capability in the Arctic,
establishment of a comprehensive, collaborative long-term
Arctic oilspill R&D program, and increased oilspill response
infrastructure and marine facilities in the Arctic have not
been.
Finally, Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic depends on
resilient physical, technological, and human infrastructure.
Historically, investments in the Arctic have not grown with
expanded Coast Guard responsibilities. As important will be the
required investments in Coast Guard technology and human
infrastructure that are important for a robust and resilient
Coast Guard today and in the future.
Coast Guard Arctic operations occur in a unique social and
cultural setting that is reliant on partnerships with
neighboring countries, Arctic nations, and the Arctic Council,
as well as on partnerships with local organizations, the Arctic
communities, and strong bonds within the Arctic communities and
with Arctic stakeholders. The coproduction of knowledge,
policies, regulations, and programs with local stakeholders,
indigenous groups, and community leaders is critical for Coast
Guard success in the Arctic.
Ultimately, a robust and resilient maritime infrastructure
requires significant, long-term, and interdisciplinary Arctic
research with partners that can benefit the Coast Guard, as
well as all of its Arctic partners.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
before you on these important issues about Coast Guard
leadership in the Arctic. The Coast Guard is a critical leader
and a partner in the Arctic, with increasing demands and
missions stretching their capability and capacity. Your support
of the Coast Guard's critical mission needs is essential for an
effective Coast Guard today and in the future.
Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your
questions.
[Ms. Grabowski's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martha Grabowski, Ph.D., Professor, Le Moyne
College and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board,
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to testify today in this hearing addressing Coast Guard leadership on
Arctic safety, security and environmental responsibility, and I thank
you for your continued support of the United States Coast Guard.
I am a professor of Information Systems at Le Moyne College in
Syracuse, New York, and a senior research scientist in the Department
of Industrial Engineering at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy,
New York. I am a 1979 graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at
Kings Point, in the 2nd class of women to graduate from a federal
service academy. Upon graduation, I was licensed by the Coast Guard as
a Third Mate, and ultimately as Second Mate, and I sailed on tankers,
liquefied natural gas carriers, and ocean-going integrated tugs and
barges carrying super phosphoric acid to Russia.
I have been licensed by the Coast Guard, my research has been
funded by the Coast Guard, and my research, exploring technology
impacts in safety-critical systems and the marine transportation
system, is important to the future of the marine transportation system.
I'm currently investigating the impact of advanced visualization
and artificial intelligence technology on maritime safety, decision-
making, communications and agility in a series of simulator experiments
using Google Glass with the Staten Island Ferry. My earliest research
developed and tested an artificial intelligence ship navigation system
aboard Trans Alaskan Pipeline Service (TAPS) Trade tankers sailing into
and out of Valdez, Alaska. My current research takes me further north
in Alaska, with funding from the National Science Foundation, as our
research team develops resource allocation models, and addresses the
challenges and needs for resilient maritime infrastructure in the
Arctic, with benefits for Arctic communities.
Most recently, several weeks ago, I was in Fairbanks, Alaska with
my students, having met with Coast Guard Sector Anchorage and with
researchers at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, on our research
projects that use uncrewed aerial systems in Arctic search and rescue,
and for Arctic maritime infrastructure data gathering and analysis. We
flew out as Typhoon Merbok blew in, and the impacts of the Typhoon and
the onslaught of the increasingly impactful series of major storms and
maritime events besieging the Arctic and Western Alaska are both
impressive and frightening to consider.
I have had the privilege of being associated with the National
Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) for 30 years,
and just completed my 2nd tour as Chair of the National Academies'
Transportation Research Board/Marine Board. I have also chaired or co-
chaired five NASEM studies and served on four other NASEM committees.
In 2014, I chaired the NASEM study sponsored by the Coast Guard, the
U.S. Arctic Research Commission, the American Petroleum Institute, the
Department of Interior/Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Marine Mammal
Commission, NOAA, and the Prince William Sound Oil Spill Recovery
Institute. That study assessed the nation's ability to respond to a
catastrophic oil spill in the Arctic. The nation's capability to
respond in 2014 was not strong, and in 2022, it has not measurably
improved.
I am also a member of the current NASEM committee examining the
adequacy of Coast Guard statutory authorities in light of novel uses of
the maritime environment, including foreseeable developments such as
aquaculture, autonomous systems, decarbonization of maritime vessels
and systems, offshore energy, fishing, migration and commercial space
operations. Our committee's work is in process at present, and I will
not comment on its process, deliberations, conclusions or
recommendations, except to note that Coast Guard Arctic activities and
missions are some of the `foreseeable developments' noted in the
committee's statement of task.
My focus today will be on three areas important for Coast Guard
leadership in the Arctic: maritime domain awareness, support for Coast
Guard operations and personnel, and Coast Guard needs for resilient
physical, technological and human infrastructure in the Arctic.
Background
The United States is an Arctic nation, and the United States Coast
Guard serves as the nation's first maritime responder and the lead
federal agency for homeland security, safety, and environmental
stewardship in the Arctic. Coast Guard roles have expanded in the
Arctic to include representing American interests as a leader in the
international bodies governing navigation, search and rescue, vessel
safety, fisheries enforcement, and pollution response across the entire
Arctic.
The types of challenges that the Coast Guard is called upon to
address in the Arctic are wide-ranging and significant, stretching from
traditional missions in vessel navigation; emergency and oil spill
prevention, response and mitigation; search and rescue; vessel safety,
inspection and compliance; shoreside facilities' safety and inspection;
fisheries; migration; offshore energy; and managing a talented but
stretched workforce in a tight employment market across an enormous
Area of Responsibility (AOR); as well as growing non-traditional
missions supporting national geopolitical and humanitarian needs in
remote locations.
Arctic maritime activities and transits are increasing due, in
part, to changing climatic and environmental conditions, such as rising
sea surface temperatures and declines in sea ice extent. As an example,
Bering Strait transits totaled 262 in 2009, but doubled in 2021 to 555
(Marine Exchange of Alaska, 2022). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker,
cruise ship, and fishing vessel traffic in the Arctic region is
increasing. As the region continues to open and strategic competition
drives more actors to look to the Arctic for economic and geopolitical
advantages, the demand for Coast Guard leadership and presence will
continue to grow. Geopolitical developments and tensions among other
nations operating in the region, which are often unpredictable, are
constant considerations in U.S. Arctic priorities and operations.
Future geopolitical, fisheries, law enforcement, security and
national security interests will bring more and larger vessels of
different types to Western Alaska, the Arctic, and through the Bering
Strait. With the movement of sea ice through the Bering Strait,
occurrences of storms and rough sea waves are also likely to increase,
as are maritime navigation risks and the likelihood of vessel
accidents. Increases in shipping traffic also bring heightened
environmental risks.
Pollution from shipping and human waste is increasing in the Bering
Strait. Vessel navigation exposes the Arctic ecosystem to dangers from
vessel strikes, noises, and contamination, as well as dangers after
accidents, such as oil spills and other hazardous releases. Cleaning up
oil spills in the Arctic presents distinct challenges, as conditions
such as lack of daylight, remoteness, and ice-cover can complicate
response strategies and impact their effectiveness. Furthermore,
historic storms exacerbated by climate change are also damaging the
Arctic's fragile existing maritime infrastructure, its vulnerable
gravel shores, and its power and water facilities, which are often
built close to unprotected shorelines.
These effects, coupled with aging fuel tanks located near critical
water supplies, melting permafrost, and an increasing number of
tsunamigenic landslides near coastal communities and cruise vessel
ports, are forcing Arctic communities to relocate, causing shipping and
cruise vessel operators to review schedules and port visits, and are
occasioning the Coast Guard to consider personnel and workforce
assignments.
As oil and gas, shipping, and tourism activities increase, the U.S.
Coast Guard will need an enhanced presence and performance capacity in
the Arctic, including area-specific training, icebreaking capability,
improved availability of vessels for responding to oil spills or other
emergency situations, and aircraft and helicopter support facilities
for the open water season and eventually year-round. Arctic assignments
for trained and experienced personnel and tribal liaisons could benefit
by being of longer duration, to take full advantage of their skills.
Operational and personnel support for the Coast Guard's Arctic Area
of Responsibility is thus critical, given the size and scope of the
Coast Guard's AOR in Alaska, which encompasses over 3.8 million
(3,853,500) square miles, and over 47,300 miles of shoreline. Sustained
funding and leadership commitment is required to increase the presence
of the Coast Guard in the Arctic and to strengthen and expand the Coast
Guard's ongoing and future Arctic missions.
1. Maritime Domain Awareness
Coast Guard needs to support effective U.S. missions in the Arctic
center depend on effective maritime domain awareness, which for the
Coast Guard requires improved visibility and access to transit and
destination vessel traffic information. The 2014 NASEM report
highlighted Coast Guard needs to obtain broader satellite monitoring of
Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals in the Arctic through
government means or from private providers. The NAS Committee's
recommendation that the Coast Guard expedite its evaluation of traffic
through the Bering Strait to determine if vessel traffic monitoring
systems, including determining if an internationally recognized traffic
separation scheme was warranted, was followed by 2018 action by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO)'s Maritime Safety Committee,
which adopted new and amended ships' routing measures in the Bering Sea
and Bering Strait, aimed at reducing the risks of incidents--the first
measures adopted by the IMO for the Arctic region where the Polar Code
applies.
Intrinsic to effective maritime domain awareness is the Coast
Guard's increasing need to adopt current and future-facing information
technology and systems, as highlighted in several recent GAO reports
(U.S. GAO, 2020; 2022). Limited Arctic communications, networks and
connectivity, a perennial challenge, impact Coast Guard maritime domain
awareness, operational effectiveness and the Coast Guard's ability to
interact with its partners in the Arctic.
Key to effective maritime domain awareness is the development of
and requirement for data standards for nautical charting, water level,
vessel transit and safety data, among others. Recent efforts, such as
the multi-agency work led by the Department of Homeland Security and
NOAA, the U.S. Committee on the Maritime Transportation System (CMTS)
and the U.S. Department of Transportation/Maritime Administration in
their Data Harmonization project--in which the Coast Guard was a
participant--are an important step forward in this area.
Current nautical charts for the increasing number of vessels
transiting the Arctic, and to support Coast Guard missions in the
Arctic, are a persistent challenge and NOAA prioritization and
resources to accomplish accelerated bathymetric surveys and nautical
charting are critical in this regard.
Several studies have addressed Coast Guard risks and challenges in
the Arctic. Few efforts, however, have adopted systematic processes and
advanced analytics with multiparty Arctic stakeholders to determine the
impact and risks of the accelerating technological, industry, climate,
geopolitical and economic changes currently facing the Coast Guard or
envisioned in the future Arctic. The Coast Guard could benefit from a
comprehensive assessment of the risks it confronts in the Arctic,
similar to the multi-party, shared decision processes and analyses
followed in the Coast-Guard led and supported maritime risk assessments
in Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, and the Aleutian Islands, and
similar to the processes that were followed in the State of
Washington's two Vessel Traffic Risk Assessments, and the vessel
traffic risk assessments currently underway, led by the Washington
State Department of Ecology.
A national risk framework that informs Arctic priorities is
important as the Coast Guard and Department of Defense increasingly
operate in the Arctic and update their Arctic strategies in light of
evolving geopolitical forces. A structured approach consistently
followed would guide strategic investments, promote transparency and
accountability, and include assessment of existing and future Arctic
policies and programs.
2. Support for Coast Guard Operations and Personnel
Changing Arctic traffic and environmental conditions will increase
needs for Coast Guard emergency response, vessel safety and
environmental protection capabilities. Maritime resources and other
rescue equipment and supplies for response are limited in the Bering
Strait region, with the U.S. Coast Guard far from possible incident
locations. As Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) tankers, ore and gravel
carriers, and government, research and cruise vessels make more
transits, the Coast Guard will likely need to expand its capacity to
monitor compliance with transit and environmental regulations in the
Arctic region. Ensuring environmental response infrastructure is
sufficient and foreign vessels transiting international straits are
complying with regulations will be increasingly important over the next
decade, as will promulgation of pollution control or mitigation
measures, and measures imposed internationally by the Polar Code.
Coast Guard Arctic missions require new technology, skills,
certifications and experience. As the Coast Guard increasingly adopts
and regulates the use of uncrewed and autonomous maritime systems--in
the air, on the water's surface and under the sea--Coast Guard needs
for operational policies, procedures, certification, training and
performance measurement with these new technologies will be required.
Autonomous systems and uncrewed aerial systems are being tested, used
and evaluated by the Coast Guard, by industry and by academia to assist
with Coast Guard missions in vessel inspection; search and rescue; oil
spill response; maritime infrastructure protection; and fisheries
management. Training, certification and re-certification policies and
procedures are thus important needs for the Coast Guard in the Arctic,
and increasing use of autonomous and uncrewed systems will require the
Coast Guard to adapt their operations, training and certification
policies and procedures.
Key to effective operational support are robust, secure and
available communications and connectivity, a perennial Arctic
challenge. As important are the data, storage, retrieval, management,
security and analytical issues associated with new types of structured
(text, numbers, statistics) and unstructured (video, audio, simulation,
pdfs, augmented and virtual reality) data being collected in the Arctic
with autonomous and uncrewed systems.
Accelerating changes in the Arctic region increase the Coast
Guard's needs for data and data infrastructure. Real-time and
longitudinal data on sea ice, charting and navigation data, and
shoreline effects data are needed. New missions and operations, such as
the use of autonomous and uncrewed systems for vessel and facility
inspections; oil spill prevention and response; support for U.S.
geopolitical activities; border protection; humanitarian response; and
fisheries management, among others, will require secure data, server,
cloud storage and networks, as well as efficient enterprise-wide data
and information storage, retrieval and management, and advanced
analytic techniques, all of which will be a challenge for the Coast
Guard. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and resources to support this
need, and/or arrangements with sister maritime and data agencies are
lacking, resulting in gaps and lost opportunities to leverage new
technology, data and visualization of Arctic baseline and trend data.
Coast Guard needs to support their environmental protection mission
and oil spill response activities, including drills, simulations, and
use of new technology, are significant. The 2014 NASEM report
Responding to Oil Spills in the Arctic Marine Environment, (https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/18625/responding-to-oil-spills-in-
the-us-arctic-marine-environment) addressed challenges in the U.S.
capability to respond to a catastrophic Arctic oil spill, including
needs for oil spill response capabilities, research, logistics,
infrastructure, training and international coordination.
Some of the NASEM 2014 report recommendations have been addressed--
such as a call for evaluation of traffic in the Bering Strait and oil
spill and emergency response training programs for local entities so as
to develop trained response teams in local villages--but others, such
as (1) the call for increased Coast Guard presence and performance
capability in the Arctic, (2) establishment of a comprehensive,
collaborative, long-term Arctic oil spill research and development
program, or (3) increased oil spill response infrastructure and marine
facilities in the Arctic, have not.
In addition, the technology, data and scientific infrastructure
required for effective Arctic oil spill response noted in the NASEM
2014 report still needs significant bolstering. This includes (1) an
improved real-time oceanographic-ice-meteorological forecasting system
and (2) high resolution satellite and airborne imagery coupled with up-
to-date high resolution digital elevation models that are updated
regularly to capture the dynamic, rapidly-changing U.S. Arctic
coastline.
3. Coast Guard Needs for Resilient Physical, Technological and Human
Infrastructure
Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic depends on resilient physical,
technological and human infrastructure. The rapid and often
unpredictable changes occurring in the Arctic are likely to increase
pressure on Arctic infrastructure and Coast Guard resources over the
next decade. Historically, investments in Arctic infrastructure have
not grown with expanded Coast Guard responsibilities. Coast Guard
Evergreen strategic planning exercises have identified challenges in
and lack of investment in communications, situation and domain
awareness capabilities, resource availability and allocation hurdles,
and lack of political and institutional will (Tingstad, et al., 2018).
The resources available through the Nome Deep Draft Port project will
bring new attention to and opportunities to invest in resilient
maritime physical infrastructure. As important will be the required
associated investments in Coast Guard technology and human
infrastructure that are essential elements in a robust and resilient
Coast Guard in its Arctic operations.
Developing and strengthening partnerships in the Arctic is a
critical Coast Guard leadership role. Effective Coast Guard Arctic
missions rely on communications, information sharing and partnerships
with neighboring countries and provinces, as well as on international
policy developments at the IMO, among Arctic nations, and at
consultative and deliberative groups such as the Arctic Council.
Coast Guard Arctic operations occur in a unique social and cultural
setting that is reliant on local and traditional knowledge and on
strong bonds within and with communities and across Arctic
stakeholders. Co-production of knowledge, policies, regulations,
programs, and activities from the inception of those activities, in the
planning stages through completion and project monitoring, with local
stakeholders, indigenous partners and community leaders, as well as
knowledge sharing, are crucial for the Coast Guard's effectiveness. In
addition, the Coast Guard's partnerships with industry, classification
societies, international partners, and R&D institutions are also
extremely important for Coast Guard Arctic operations, and in
developing improved Arctic maritime domain awareness.
Ultimately, a robust and resilient maritime infrastructure requires
significant, long-term and interdisciplinary Arctic research. Research
partnerships could clearly benefit the Coast Guard and its Arctic
missions. Agencies such as the Arctic Research Commission, the polar
and Arctic programs at the National Science Foundation (NSF), the
National Institutes for Health (NIH), the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), FEMA, NOAA and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, along with the State of Alaska, industry partners
and coalitions, incorporated and unincorporated Arctic boroughs, Alaska
Native Corporations, non-governmental organizations, academia,
environmental groups, and community leaders are natural partners.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
on the U.S. Coast Guard's leadership in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast
Guard is a critical leader and partner in the Arctic, with increasing
demands and missions stretching their capacity and capability. Your
support of the Coast Guard's critical mission needs, including maritime
domain awareness, operations and personnel, and for a resilient
physical, technological and human maritime infrastructure in the
Arctic, is essential for an effective U.S. Coast Guard today and in the
future.
Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you
today and for all that you do for the men and women of the United
States Coast Guard. I look forward to your questions.
References
Marine Exchange of Alaska (2022), quoted in Banshchikova. I. 2022.
Crossing the Line: How the Increase in Shipping Traffic Threatens
the Bering Strait. World Wildlife Fund, 26 October. https://
files.worldwildlife.org/wwfcmsprod/
files/Publication/file/
30k7kbwrud_Crossing_the_Line_brochure_proof3.pdf?_
ga=2.190909484.746421881.1668270313-1793220812.1668270312,
Retrieved 1 December 2022.
National Academies of Science, Engineering & Medicine (NASEM). 2014.
Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment.
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/18625/responding-to-oil-spills-
in-the-us-arctic-marine-environment, retrieved 1 December 2022.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017.
Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the
Nation's Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
https://doi.org/10.17226/24834.
Tingstad, A., Savitz, S., Van Abel, K., Woods, D., Anania, K., Ziegler,
M. D., Davenport, A.C. & Costello, K. 2018. Identifying Potential
Gaps in US Coast Guard Arctic Capabilities. RAND Corporation.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2310.html, retrieved 1
December 2022.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2020. Coast Guard: Actions
Needed to Ensure Investments in Key Data System Meet Mission and
User Needs. Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, GAO
Report 20-562, July. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-562,
retrieved 1 December 2022.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2022. Coast Guard: Actions
Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation. Washington, D.C.:
Government Accountability Office, GAO Report GAO-22-105092, July.
Retrieved 7 October 2022. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-
105092, retrieved 1 December 2022.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Grabowski.
We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing
myself.
Dr. Pincus, the United States will not be able to match
Russia's fleet of 40 Arctic icebreakers, nor should we try to
as a Nation with a shorter northern coastline and a more
diverse fleet of subsurface and air transportation assets.
What is a better metric by which to gauge the U.S. whole
Arctic capacity than simply the number of icebreakers? And in
addition to their investment in icebreaking assets, how would
you rate the United States investments in the emerging Arctic
to that of Russia and China?
Ms. Pincus. You are starting with an easy question. Thank
you.
I appreciate your note that the U.S. will not and should
not look for parity in terms of Russian icebreakers. The vast
majority of Russian icebreakers are with a commercial purpose,
and they are operated by Rosatomflot, which is a Russian state-
owned corporation. They have commercial purpose. Although they
could certainly be used in the event of a military contingency
to provide logistic support to naval vessels, their purpose is
commercial. And it is not a good comparison for what the U.S.
Coast Guard icebreakers do in the Arctic.
Nevertheless, the U.S. does need robust icebreaking
capability. As a global power, we need to be able to project
our power and presence around the world at the time and place
of our choosing, including in both the Arctic and Antarctica.
The fact that the two polar regions are very far apart means
that to achieve both polar presences and to have sufficient
redundancy to be able to respond in the event of any
contingency affecting one of our icebreakers is the true
metric. Do we have presence in both polar regions at the time
and place of our choosing, year-round access, and do we have
sufficient redundancy? And I believe those are the metrics the
Coast Guard has used in developing its proposals for the Polar
Security Cutter program.
The follow-on Arctic Security Cutter program, I believe,
will be more responsive to activity in the region. We are
seeing ice diminish faster than scientific predictions had
forecasted. So, measured ice reductions are happening faster
than our models had projected. That changes requirements for
icebreaker access. With shrinking sea ice, we may be able to
get by with lower powered icebreakers or a mix of ice-hardened
and icebreaking vessels. So, I think that Arctic Security
Cutter program will be in response to ice reductions as well as
projections in activity.
Looking holistically at investments in the Arctic region, I
think we need to toggle to the strategic ends that we are
trying to achieve. When it comes to securing U.S. waters,
securing U.S. citizens and people under our protection for
maritime activity, that's an important metric. Can the Coast
Guard observe, monitor, control, and respond to maritime
activity, to growing maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic?
We are seeing important growth in cruise tourism. The
larger and larger vessels are coming into the region more
frequently. That poses scale risks to our missions. We are also
seeing changes in the seasonality and location of fishing. So,
fishing fleets are another important source of maritime
casualties. There's increased air traffic in the region. So,
making sure that the Coast Guard can respond to human security
is critically important.
In addition, the Coast Guard needs to be able to exert
domain awareness and assert sovereignty, as we saw with the
Chinese and Russian naval vessels incurring into our EEZ. We
need to be able to respond, to communicate that that activity,
that foreign activity in our EEZ, does not have free reign.
Nevertheless, I would emphasize that the Arctic is not the top
U.S. strategic priority. Our priority is the Indo-Pacific and
it is Europe. As a secondary theater, every investment is going
to be toggled within that framework. Again, I believe that
argues well for Coast Guard presence.
But I would encourage Congress to look at U.S. capabilities
in the Arctic in light of our global priorities, and scale them
to respond to our multiple national objectives: human security,
environmental security, securing economic assets, asserting
sovereignty. And I believe that is the framework within which
we could accurately make those measurements.
Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much for that very thorough
answer.
Dr. Grabowski, we know commercial traffic has been and will
continue to increase in the Arctic as the icecaps melt. Would
you please expound on the consequence of underfunding the Coast
Guard for its environmental missions, such as fisheries
enforcement and pollution response?
Ms. Grabowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
So, the consequences of underfunding the Coast Guard in its
Arctic mission are seen at multiple levels. At a local level, a
failure to fully fund the Coast Guard for its oilspill response
and vessel response capabilities has an impact at the local
level. Indigenous populations and Arctic villages across the
Arctic depend on clean air and clean water and the animals and
species that live in the air, on the land, under the water, and
on the water. And so, there is a risk to the local population
of underfunding Coast Guard missions.
At a national level, it is important for the Coast Guard to
be fully funded with respect to its environmental
responsibility capabilities, because if it is not, tradeoffs
occur. And the question then becomes, which of the 11 statutory
Coast Guard missions is more important? And so, when tradeoffs
occur because of underfunding, the missions of the Coast Guard
are not met fully, and the Nation suffers.
And then, finally, globally there is an impact if we don't
fulfill our missions with respect to environmental
responsibility, because the voice of the United States within
international fora with respect to environmental response is
the voice of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is our voice of
the Nation; at the International Maritime Organization; at the
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities, where
vessel safety and vessel navigation, standards, and regulations
are established; and within the oilspill and the fisheries
communities.
So, at many different levels, underfunding the Coast Guard
with respect to oilspill responsibilities has impacts locally,
for the Nation, and then globally.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
I will now recognize Representative Gibbs.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to kind of tie two questions together. I will
start with Ms. Pincus. Your answer there, you covered a lot of
it, but I guess I am really concerned about what the future
holds with Russia and China. And you talked a lot about the
commercial interests, and we don't have a lot of redundancy or
resilience up there, and our infrastructure needs help.
And from a national security standpoint, what do you think
are actions this administration could undertake to counter some
of these activities of Russia and China in the Arctic, and what
is your biggest fear? You talked a lot about commercial, but
also from the strategic interest.
And then tying that in with the Arctic Council, and Dr.
Grabowski can answer too. We see with Russia that the Council
has kind of been suspended, I guess, because of the Ukrainian
situation. What do you see moving forward with that and how
that ties in with our relationship with Russia and China in the
Arctic? Just kind of put your glasses on and see what you
anticipate and what maybe we should be looking for in the
future, legislativewise or our administration, to address these
issues with especially Russia and China.
Ms. Pincus. Thank you for the question. To lead off, when
it comes to the Arctic Council, I think I have been reassured
in speaking with Norwegian counterparts in the last few weeks,
while there had been some concern about the transition from the
Russian chairmanship to the Norwegian chairmanship, which is
going to take place in May of this year, Norwegians seem less
anxious than they were. They seem to feel fairly confident that
that transition will happen and happen smoothly, which
reassures me that we will soon be in an Arctic Council led by
Norway where there will be more opportunities available to
continue its important work.
When it comes to Russia and China, I think that is the
$64,000 question. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, of
Crimea in 2014, the imposition of Western sanctions in 2015, we
saw a very clear pivot by Russia east towards partnering with
China, taking Chinese investment, using Chinese ships to ship
through their Northern Sea Route. It was sort of an unintended
second-order effect of that sanctions package.
Following the imposition of sanctions this year, Russia's
further invasion of Ukraine, China has been less--it has, to a
large extent, complied with these sanctions, particularly its
larger banks and state-owned corporations have been in
compliance. No Chinese vessels have sailed through the Northern
Sea Route in 2022. That is significant.
Mr. Gibbs. Wait. Say that again. No Chinese vessel has
what?
Ms. Pincus. No Chinese vessels have sailed through Russia's
Northern Sea Route in 2022.
Mr. Gibbs. Oh, OK.
Ms. Pincus. So, that's really interesting.
Russia is trying to win back that Chinese investment and
partnership in developing its Arctic. It needs outside capital
and technical know-how to do so. It has also been seeing
alternate partners. So, it has been seeking partnership with
India and Vietnam and other non-Arctic states.
The extent to which the Chinese-Russia relationship deepens
or not in the next year or two is very significant. That's what
I am watching. It is hard to tell where that relationship is
going. We have seen some mixed messages.
Obviously, there was the declaration of ``no limits''
friendship in January of last year, which immediately preceded
Russia's invasion. Since then, there have been some mixed
messages. Should a more full-fledged relationship between them
appear, should their joint military exercises deepen into
something closer to a military relationship or alliance, we
could have a significant challenge in the Arctic region and
beyond, of course. But as of yet, I think we have some reason
to hope that the natural frictions in that relationship
continue to keep them at arm's length. Nothing unites like a
common enemy, so, it is important for U.S. foreign policy that
we watch that relationship very carefully.
Thank you.
Mr. Gibbs. Dr. Grabowski, do you want to comment on the
Arctic Council?
Ms. Grabowski. Thank you for the second half of the
question.
Clearly, our partnerships with the Arctic Council, with
Arctic nations, and with all our partners across the Arctic are
very important. And so, monitoring developments as
relationships develop and wax and wane is clearly important.
It is significant to note that, even though there have been
disconnects at the Arctic Council, the operational working
relationships where people on the ground with respect to
oilspill response, for instance, have continued to develop.
And so, District 17 and Sector Anchorage, the Coast Guard
representatives in the Arctic, will tell you that those
conversations still exist despite the discussions that are
occurring at higher levels. That's reassuring from an
environmental responsibility because, as we all know, oil
doesn't respect international boundaries, and if there is an
event, it is important that all hands show up.
Thank you.
Mr. Gibbs. Thank you for your answers. Thanks for being
here.
I yield back.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs.
I now recognize Representative Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Ms. Pincus, you were responding to a question from the
chairman that analyzed the role of the Coast Guard in the
Arctic, and as I was trying to follow along on your responses,
you were suggesting there's a series of things that need to be
done.
The Coast Guard has its Arctic strategy. The Air Force, the
Army, and the Navy have an Arctic strategy, which, perhaps you
agree with me or not, are sophomoric, maybe freshman.
I would appreciate your analysis of those strategies in
detail and your recommendations on what would be a fulsome
strategy for the United States in the Arctic, including the
environmental issues, which have been discussed here, and also
the international competition issues. So, if you can deliver
that to this committee--I don't know--maybe Friday of this
week, we really need to know.
We really need to lay out an Arctic--we need to force those
agencies to develop a good, strong, comprehensive Arctic
strategy that, as you said, that coordinates. So, if you can do
that in the remaining 1\1/2\ minutes or provide a paper on it,
it would be very, very helpful. You heard the conversation I
had with regard to icebreakers. So, help us.
Ms. Pincus. Thank you. I appreciate your analysis, and I
agree. I think the Service strategies can be improved. And I
would point to the National Defense Strategy and the classified
portions of the NDS as providing a realistic framework that
prioritizes top-level priorities and deprioritizes and accepts
risk for lower level priorities. And that's really important.
And the classified version contains additional metrics by which
those priorities and success or failure can be measured. And I
think that is also very useful.
And perhaps Arctic strategy, Service strategies, Coast
Guard strategies should have more significant classified
sections that would permit a more frank analysis, but that
frank analysis is necessary because of the cost involved and
because of the competing priorities that must be adjudicated.
I think there is good reason why the Coast Guard is a
value-added way to achieve national objectives in the Arctic
given urgent DoD priorities. But I would agree with you, that
is a strategy. And a robust, specific, measurable strategy that
includes yardsticks and timelines is the first step before any
other resourcing, because that's what justifies the resources
and that is--a Service can be held accountable.
And I would be happy to provide further analysis to your
office, absolutely. Thank you very much.
Mr. Garamendi. I would appreciate that, but I think the
members of the committee would also, and certainly the
chairman. So, please. Thank you.
Ms. Pincus. Absolutely. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Not seeing any more questions, that concludes our hearing
for today.
I would like to once again thank all the witnesses for
their testimony today. The contributions to today's discussion
have been very informative and helpful.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
writing.
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for additional comments and information submitted
by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's
hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Appendix
----------
Question from Hon. Bob Gibbs on behalf of Hon. Garret Graves to Vice
Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast
Guard
Question 1. Vice Admiral Gautier, in April of this year, Acting
MARAD Administrator Lessley committed to the timely processing of
Deepwater Ports Act permits. In regards to the Texas GulfLink project,
Administrator Lessley stated that MARAD was working with Coast Guard
partners to develop a detailed timeline for the environmental review
and estimated the completion of a Record of Decision by early 2023.
What action is the Coast Guard taking to ensure the application stays
on schedule and to maintain the commitment for a Record of Decision by
early next year?
Answer. The Coast Guard continues to work with the Maritime
Administration (MARAD) to develop a legally sufficient Final
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), per the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). As required by NEPA, the Coast Guard and MARAD are
actively reviewing and methodically responding to approximately 1,600
public comments received during the public comment period on the
Supplemental Draft EIS, which closed on November 30, 2022. The Coast
Guard continues to diligently support MARAD's deepwater port licensing
process during and after Final EIS development.
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