[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




     U.S. COAST GUARD'S LEADERSHIP ON ARCTIC SAFETY, SECURITY, AND 
                      ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

=======================================================================

                                (117-62)

                             REMOTE HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            DECEMBER 7, 2022

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure




                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]






     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation



                                 ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

50-409 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023








             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                     PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair



ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,			SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 
  District of Columbia			ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas		BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      
RICK LARSEN, Washington			DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              
GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California		THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee			SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey			RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               
JOHN GARAMENDI, California		JOHN KATKO, New York                 
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 	BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   
Georgia					GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             
ANDRE CARSON, Indiana			DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         
DINA TITUS, Nevada			MIKE BOST, Illinois                  
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York		RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           
JARED HUFFMAN, California		DOUG LaMALFA, California             
JULIA BROWNLEY, California		BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas            
FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida		BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey	MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California		BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   
MARK DeSAULNIER, California		JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,            
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts		  Puerto Rico                        
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California		TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland		PETE STAUBER, Minnesota              
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey		TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              
GREG STANTON, Arizona			DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota          
COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas			JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       
SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair	MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi           
JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois	TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire		NANCY MACE, South Carolina           
CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania		NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York         
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts		BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas                
JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts		CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           
CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia		MICHELLE STEEL, California           
KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii			Vacancy                              
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington		                                            
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia		                                            
MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois			                                            
TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana		                                            
SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, 		                                            
Florida					                                            
                                ------                                7

        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                  SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Chair

RICK LARSEN, Washington              BOB GIBBS, Ohio
JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts,     RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
  Vice Chair                         MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York       JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey
ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California        NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           Vacancy
CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire          SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex 
    Officio)







                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
  Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     7
Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
  Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................     9

                               WITNESSES
                                Panel 1

Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations, 
  U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement...............................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    12
Hon. Michael Sfraga, Ph.D., Chair, U.S. Arctic Research 
  Commission, oral statement.....................................    16
    Prepared statement...........................................    17
Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government 
  Accountability Office, oral statement..........................    24
    Prepared statement...........................................    26

                                Panel 2

Rebecca Pincus, Ph.D., Director, Polar Institute, Wilson Center, 
  oral statement.................................................    45
    Prepared statement...........................................    46
Martha Grabowski, Ph.D., Professor, Le Moyne College and 
  Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board, 
  National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, oral 
  statement......................................................    52
    Prepared statement...........................................    54

                                APPENDIX

Question from Hon. Bob Gibbs on behalf of Hon. Garret Graves to 
  Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for 
  Operations, U.S. Coast Guard...................................    65


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                            December 1, 2022

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``U.S. Coast Guard's 
Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and Environmental 
Responsibility''
_______________________________________________________________________


                                PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
will hold a hearing on Wednesday, December 7, 2022, at 10:00 
a.m. EST in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom to 
examine the implementation of the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic 
Strategy. The Subcommittee will hear testimony from the U.S. 
Coast Guard (USCG), the U.S. Arctic Research Commission 
(USARC), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Polar 
Institute of the Wilson Center, and Le Moyne College.

                               BACKGROUND

    The Arctic region has transformed on multiple fronts in the 
decade since the release of the USCG's 2013 Arctic Strategy.\1\ 
Geophysically, the surface temperature of the Arctic is warming 
2-3 times faster than the world as a whole,\2\ altering snow 
cover, ice cover, and trends in extreme storm events.\3\ 
Between 1971 and 2019, the by-month average extent of sea ice 
in the Arctic declined in all months of the year but especially 
September (43 percent decline from 1971 to 2019), with climate 
models predicting that the first ice-free September in the 
Arctic could occur as soon as 2040.\4\ This extended summer has 
created novel opportunities for maritime transit, broadening 
the stage for commercial activities such as shipping, passenger 
cruises, energy development, and mineral extraction (Fig. 
1).\5\
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    \1\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/
5pw/Arctic%20Policy/USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-
330, accessed November 8, 2022; USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/
Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
    \2\ Arctic Council, 2021. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/
bitstream/handle/11374/2621/
MMIS12_2021_REYKJAVIK_AMAP_Arctic-Climate-Change-Update-2021-Key-
Trends-and-
Impacts.-Summary-for-Policy-makers.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; IPCC, 
2021. https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/plan/introduction-and-
background.html, accessed November 8, 2022.
    \3\ IPCC, 2021. https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/plan/
introduction-and-background.html, accessed November 8, 2022.
    \4\ Arctic Council, 2021. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/
bitstream/handle/11374/2621/
MMIS12_2021_REYKJAVIK_AMAP_Arctic-Climate-Change-Update-2021-Key-
Trends-and-
Impacts.-Summary-for-Policy-makers.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed 
November 14, 2022.
    \5\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and 
Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S. 
Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460, 
accessed November 27, 2022.


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 LFigure 1. Increase in vessel traffic in USCG District 17 Arctic area 
                       of interest, 2009-2019.\6\

       LSource: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data. GAO-20-460

LNote: The USCG District 17 Arctic area of interest is defined as north 
  of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east to Banks Island in the 
   Canadian Arctic, and west into Russia to the New Siberian Islands.

    Geopolitically,\\ the Arctic has been a region of 
increasing focus for the eight Arctic nations (U.S., Canada, 
Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Russia), 
and self-proclaimed ``Near Arctic'' states including the 
People's Republic of China (Fig. 2).\7\ The USCG, the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. White House each 
released updated strategic plans within the past three 
years.\8\
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    \6\ Id.
    \7\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/
-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
    \8\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/
-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022; U.S. 
White House, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/
10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf, accessed November 27, 
2022; USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
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    Russia's renewed aggression toward Ukraine has heightened 
geopolitical tensions, and previous efforts to work 
cooperatively in the Arctic are suspended until further notice, 
heightening risk and creating new uncertainty in USCG 
operations.\9\
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    \9\ DOS, 2022. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-
council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/, accessed 
November 27, 2022.

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 LFigure 2. Map of the Arctic region as defined by the Arctic Research 
  and Policy Act of 1984 (ARPA),\10\ highlighting two transit routes 
(Northwest Passage, Northeast (``Northern'') Passage) of high interest 
                          to the U.S.\11\ \12\

I. USCG\\ STRATEGY\\ IN\\ THE ARCTIC
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    \10\ ARPA, 2006. https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/
arpa_amended.pdf, accessed November 27, 2022.
    \11\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
    \12\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-
1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
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    The USCG's vision for operating in the Arctic region is, 
``Ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime 
activity in the Arctic.'' \13\ Safety, security, and 
environmental stewardship capture the spectrum of the USCG's 
primary duties under section 102 of title 14, U.S. Code.\14\ In 
a place as vast and remote as the Arctic, the USCG accomplishes 
this diverse mission set via multi-agency partnerships and 
multi-purpose assets and infrastructure.\15\ In this way, USCG 
activity in the Arctic can be viewed as an example of how the 
USCG optimizes use of its limited resources for its priority 
missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed 
November 8, 2022.
    \14\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, cited by USCG, 2022. https://
www.history.uscg.mil/Home/Missions/, accessed November 28, 2022.
    \15\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed 
November 8, 2022.
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    As an illustration of scale, Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian 
Islands is currently the closest U.S. deep draft port to the 
Arctic; roughly 1,100 nautical miles from Point Barrow (the 
northernmost point in the U.S.).\16\ Construction for the Deep 
Draft Port Project, which was authorized at $333 million in the 
2020 Water Resources Development Act included in the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, is expected to begin 
in Spring 2023 and will provide a new deep draft port option in 
Nome, Alaska, still approximately 500 nautical miles from 
Barrow.\17\ Likewise, the closest USCG Air Station to Barrow is 
in Kodiak, Alaska, located approximately 945 nautical miles to 
the south.\18\
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    \16\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed 
November 8, 2022.
    \17\ Alaska Public Media, 2022. https://alaskapublic.org/2022/11/
18/nomes-arctic-deep-draft-port-project-approaches-milestone/, accessed 
November 28, 2022.
    \18\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed 
November 8, 2022.
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    USCG Arctic operations are primarily based out of the USCG 
District 17 Command Center in Juneau, Alaska, and Base Kodiak, 
which is the largest USCG command in the entire Pacific 
Area.\19\ District 17 encompasses 3.9 million square miles and 
over 47,300 miles of shoreline throughout Alaska and the 
Arctic, from north of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east 
to the Banks Island in the Canadian Arctic, and west to Russia 
to the New Siberian Islands.\20\
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    \19\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022.
    \20\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022; GAO, 2020. ``Maritime 
Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and Interagency Leadership Could 
Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S. Arctic'', available at https://
www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460, accessed November 27, 2022.
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A. SAFETY

    Safety encapsulates four of the ``non-homeland security'' 
missions of the USCG: Marine Safety; Search and Rescue; Aids to 
Navigation; and Ice Operations.\21\ During an average month, 
USCG District 17 saves 22 lives and over $1.65 million in 
property (includes onshore); reports and investigates 25 marine 
casualties; services 93 buoys and fixed aids to navigation; 
performs 143 commercial fishing vessel safety exams; teaches 
375 kids about life jacket wear; and performs 95 marine 
inspections.\22\
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    \21\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, cited by USCG, 2022. https://
www.history.uscg.mil/Home/Missions/, accessed November 28, 2022.
    \22\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022.
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B. SECURITY

    Security encapsulates all five domestic security missions 
of the USCG: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Drug 
Interdiction; Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness; and 
Other Law Enforcement.\23\ In the context of the Arctic region, 
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security and Defense Readiness 
are key functions of the USCG as it works in coordination with 
the DOD to stabilize the region geopolitically while 
safeguarding U.S. interests.\24\ Particularly, the USCG's non-
homeland security missions, e.g., Search and Rescue, give the 
USCG visible presence and allows it to interact in non-
confrontational ways. As such, the USCG--an armed service--is 
uniquely qualified to initiate and enhance partnerships between 
the U.S. government and others, be it local Alaskan 
communities, private commercial enterprises, or foreign 
nations.
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    \23\ Section 468, Title 6, U.S.C. https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?req=(title:6%20section:
468%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-
section468)&f=treesort&
edition=prelim#=0&jumpTo=true, accessed November 28, 2022.
    \24\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-
1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
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C. ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP

    The Alaskan commercial fishing industry is estimated to 
have a $3 billion impact on the U.S., and fished species are 
expected to shift northward within and into the Arctic as sea 
water temperatures rise,\25\ creating potential new enforcement 
challenges for the USCG to the current international 
prohibition on commercial fishing in the central Arctic 
Ocean.\26\
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    \25\ Huntington et al., 2020. ``Evidence suggests potential 
transformation of the Pacific Arctic ecosystem is underway'', available 
at https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0695-2, accessed November 
28, 2022.
    \26\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
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    The USCG also plays a vital leadership role in responding 
to oil spills and other environmental pollution incidents.\27\ 
This role is expected to require more of the USCG's time and 
resources as maritime traffic increases with the melting of the 
Arctic sea ice.\28\ However, it is worth noting that techniques 
to physically remove oil from ice-heavy landscapes are still 
underdeveloped.\29\ Oil pollution, along with the region's 
changing ecology, make federally and internationally protected 
marine mammals and other endangered species more vulnerable to 
extinction,\30\ and put Alaskan communities that depend on 
local food resources at increased risk.\31\
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    \27\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and 
Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S. 
Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460, 
accessed November 27, 2022.
    \28\ USARC, 2012. ``Oil Spills in Arctic Waters'', available at 
https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/oil_spills_2012_hi.pdf, accessed 
November 30, 2022.
    \29\ NAS, 2022. ``Oil in the Sea IV'', available at https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26410/oil-in-the-sea-iv-inputs-fates-
and-effects, accessed November 28, 2022.
    \30\ Id.
    \31\ CRS, March 2022. ``Changes in the Arctic: Background and 
Issues for Congress'', available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R41153, accessed November 28, 2022.
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D. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE USCG

    Complimentary to the USCG's statutory missions listed in 
section 468 of title 6, U.S. Code, are seven statutory duties 
listed under section 102 of title 14, U.S. Code. Together, 
these statutes codify the necessity of the multi-purpose 
approach of USCG. For example, two duties that are particularly 
relevant to the Arctic strategy are the directives to develop 
and operate icebreaking facilities pursuant to international 
agreements, and to engage in oceanographic research of the high 
seas and in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.\32\ 
So, in addition to having the ability to perform nine of the 11 
statutory missions, polar icebreakers shall also engage in 
oceanographic research. The White House's National Strategy for 
the Arctic Region emphasizes a commitment ``to a whole-of-
government, evidence-based approach'' \33\--a principle which 
further emphasizes the planned use of icebreakers as multi-
mission platforms.\34\
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    \32\ Section 102, Title 14, U.S.C. https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?hl=false&edition=
prelim&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title14-
section102#=0&saved=%7CKHRpdGxlOjE0
IHNlY3Rpb246MTAyIGVkaXRpb246cHJlbGltKSBPUiAoZ3JhbnVsZWlkOlVTQy1
wcmVsaW0tdGl0bGUxNC1zZWN0aW9uMTAyKQ%3D%3D%7CdHJlZXNvcnQ%3D%7C%7C0
%7Cfalse%7Cprelim, accessed November 28, 2022.
    \33\ U.S. White House, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf, accessed 
November 27, 2022.
    \34\ CRS, September 21, 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter 
(Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'', 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391, 
accessed November 28, 2022.
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E. PARTNERSHIPS, THE POLAR CODE, AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

    The USCG's most recent Arctic guidance, the USCG Arctic 
Strategic Outlook (2019), offers three immediate lines of 
effort: 1) Enhance capability to operate effectively in a 
dynamic Arctic; 2) Strengthen the rules-based order; and 3) 
Innovate and adapt to promote resiliency and prosperity. These 
efforts are to be guided by the underlying principles of 
partnership, unity of effort, and culture of continuous 
innovation.\35\ To carry out these efforts, partnerships exist 
between the USCG and other U.S. federal agencies (e.g., 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Arctic 
Research Commission), Alaska state agencies, Alaska local and 
indigenous communities, non-governmental organizations, 
academic institutions, and foreign-based entities.\36\
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    \35\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
    \36\ Id.
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    International cooperation in the Arctic has been 
facilitated largely through the Arctic Council (Council), 
established in 1996.\37\ The Council is made up of the eight 
Arctic nations, six Indigenous Peoples' organizations 
(Permanent Participants), and a variety of other governmental 
and nongovernmental partners (Observers).\38\ In 2009 the 
Council called upon the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) to formulate and adopt the International Code for Ships 
Operating in Polar Waters, referred to as the ``Polar Code.'' 
The Polar Code went into effect on January 1, 2017, and enacts 
mandatory requirements intended to improve vessel safety and 
prevent pollution from vessels transiting in the Arctic, 
including ship construction, navigation, crew training, and 
ship operation.\39\ The Polar Code applies to passenger and 
cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in international 
voyages.\40\
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    \37\ Arctic Council, 2022. ``About the Arctic Council'', available 
at https://www.arctic-council.org/about/, accessed November 30, 2022.
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ IMO, 2022. ``Shipping in polar waters'', available at https://
www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Polar-default.aspx, accessed 
November 30, 2022.
    \40\ Id.
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    The Council is a consensus-based, intergovernmental forum 
that works to promote environmental, social, and economic 
aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic. Russia was 
scheduled to chair the Council from 2021-2023, but since 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, the seven other 
Arctic state members (including the U.S.) jointly declared a 
suspension of their participation from Council activities.\41\ 
The future of the Council remains unclear.
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    \41\ DOS, March 2, 2022. ``Joint Statement on Arctic Council 
Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine'', available at 
https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-
following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/, accessed November 8, 2022.
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II. DOCUMENTED CHALLENGES TO USCG ARCTIC OPERATIONS

A. INFRASTRUCTURE

    Numerous governmental and academic reports have identified 
infrastructure and operational challenges to maritime 
transportation in the U.S. Arctic. Liabilities include limited 
satellite coverage and architecture to support voice and data 
communications, hazardous weather and ice conditions, and the 
lack of channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids to 
navigation (for which installation is not always possible due 
to continuously moving ice sheets).\42\ In addition, to 
ensuring safe and efficient maritime transportation in the 
region, it is necessary to conduct surveys to improve nautical 
charts, improve communications capabilities, improve weather 
forecasting and modeling, and develop community and regional 
emergency response networks in preparation for vessel and 
aircraft accidents and environmental damage related to 
increased ship traffic and industrial development.\43\ In many 
cases, data exist or are actively being collected, but the lag 
between data collection, communication, and operational use by 
the USCG is severe.\44\
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    \42\ Arctic Council, 2009. ``Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment''; 
U.S. White House, 2013. ``National Strategy for the Arctic Region''; 
GAO, 2014. ``Maritime Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial 
Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade''; Alaska Arctic 
Policy Commission, 2015. ``Final Report''; U.S. Committee on the Marine 
Transportation System, 2016. ``A Ten-Year Prioritization of 
Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic''; Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2017. ``Arctic Imperatives, Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on 
America's Fourth Coast''; Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 2017. ``Maritime Futures, the Arctic and the Bering Strait 
Region''.
    \43\ Id.
    \44\ Simonee et al. 2021. ``Sila Qanuippa? (How's the Weather?): 
Integrating Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit and Environmental Forecasting 
Products to Support Travel Safety around Pond Inlet, Nunavut, in a 
Changing Climate'', available at https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-20-
0174.1, accessed November 16, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to known infrastructure requirements, the USCG 
has explored the need for the creation of new vessel routing 
measures to reduce the risk of marine casualties and increase 
the efficiency and predictability of vessel traffic in the U.S. 
Arctic.\45\ The USCG is also conducting several Arctic-focused 
research projects in collaboration with academia at the Arctic 
Domain Awareness Center, including methodologies to minimize 
environmental damage from spilled oil in extreme cold, enhanced 
navigational capabilities in the Arctic, establishing exposure 
limits for Search and Rescue team members in extreme cold, and 
developing a classification system of ice conditions.\46\ Other 
efforts to improve Arctic capabilities include the 
International Arctic Ocean Buoy Program, which maintains an 
international network of drifting buoys in the Arctic Ocean to 
provide meteorological and oceanographic data for real-time 
operational and research through the U.S. Integrated Ocean 
Observing System.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ USCG, 2016. ``Port Access Route Study: In the Chukchi Sea, 
Bering Strait, and Bering Sea. Preliminary Findings'', Number USCG-
2014-0941 and USCG-2010-0833; USCG, 2018. ``Port Access Route Study: 
Alaskan Arctic Coast'', available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/FR-2018-12-21/pdf/2018-27604.pdf, accessed November 28, 2022.
    \46\ USCG, 2018. ``FY18 RDT&E Project Portfolio'' in Acquisition 
Directorate. Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; Examples: Next 
Generation Arctic Navigational Safety Information System (proj #6211), 
Arctic Operations Support (proj #6210), Robust Maritime Arctic 
Communications (proj #6213), Safety Parameters for ICE Operations (proj 
#5301), Response to Oil in Ice (proj #4701), Ice Condition Risk 
Assessment Tool (proj #6512), and Arctic Technology Evaluation 2018 
(proj #62101).
    \47\ IOOS, 2022. https://ioos.noaa.gov/regions/aoos/, accessed 
November 28, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. ASSETS

    While several U.S. agencies have a physical presence and 
substantial interests in the Arctic, the USCG's experience, 
material assets, and installations located throughout Alaska 
establish it as a key presence in the region. However, with no 
assets permanently stationed above the Arctic Circle, the USCG 
is restricted to a seasonal presence via mobile command and 
control platforms such as large cutters and ocean-going ice-
strengthened buoy tenders, and establishing seasonal air and 
communications capabilities by leasing facilities.\48\ Compared 
to Russia's six Arctic bases and 14 newly built icebreakers, 
the USCG is forced to stretch assets and capabilities to secure 
a wide mission set with limited resources.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and 
Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S. 
Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460, 
accessed November 27, 2022.
    \49\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently 
consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, which 
carries out its primary mission, the resupply of McMurdo 
Station, in the Antarctic, and one medium polar icebreaker, 
Healy, which carries out its primary mission, scientific 
research, in the Arctic (Fig. 3).\50\ A decade-long effort to 
expand USCG capabilities in the Arctic found footing in 
Congress with the establishment of the USCG Polar Security 
Cutter (PSC) program and a Joint Program Office with the U.S. 
Navy in 2016.\51\ Authorization for the acquisition or 
procurement of a market-available icebreaker is included in the 
Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022, as is 
authorization for a third Polar Security Cutter (PSC; heavy 
polar icebreaker) and evaluation of the USCG's acquisition of 
three Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs; medium polar icebreakers). 
The USCG PSC program received a total of $1.8 billion in 
procurement funding through FY 2021, including $300 million 
that was provided through the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding account 
(FY 2017-2018).\52\ With the funding the USCG PSC program 
received through FY 2021, PSCs 1 and 2 are fully funded.\53\ 
Construction of the first PSC is anticipated to begin in Spring 
2023 for an on-time delivery in FY 2025,\54\ though a delay 
appears probable at this time.\55\ Delivery of a heavy polar 
icebreaker will mark the U.S.'s first new heavy icebreaker in 
nearly 50 years.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ CRS, September 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter 
(Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'', 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391, 
accessed November 28, 2022.
    \51\ Id.
    \52\ U.S. Naval Institute, January 7, 2022. https://news.usni.org/
2022/01/07/report-to-congress-on-coast-guard-polar-security-cutter-16, 
accessed November 28, 2022.
    \53\ Id.
    \54\ USCG, July 29, 2022. ``Q3 FY2022 USCG Surface Acquisition 
Update--CG&MT'', briefing to CGMT.
    \55\ Katz, J., November 14, 2022. ``Why a small shipyard merger 
could signal bigger problems for the US military'', available at 
https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/why-a-small-shipyard-merger-could-
signal-bigger-problems-for-the-us-military/, accessed on November 29, 
2022.
    \56\ CRS, September 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter 
(Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'', 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391, 
accessed November 28, 2022.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

   LFigure 3. Coast Guard Cutter Healy, a 420-foot medium endurance 
icebreaker/research vessel, is the only icebreaker currently dedicated 
 to Arctic operations. No other U.S. military service branch operates 
                            icebreakers.\57\

    The\\ mixed fleet (three PSCs, three ASCs) arrangement 
currently under consideration will help close four major gaps 
in USCG Arctic capabilities that were identified by the 
Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center--unreliable 
communications, lack of adequate maritime domain awareness, 
scarcity of available assets (especially ice-resistant air 
support and icebreakers) and supporting infrastructure, and 
institutional difficulty to identify, articulate, and close 
capability gaps.\58\ The report states that if these capability 
gaps are not closed by the 2030s, the USCG risks facing 
substantial vulnerabilities in several of its missions in the 
Arctic including search and rescue, marine safety, ice 
operations, marine environmental protection, and ports, 
waterways, and coastal safety.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ Photo credit: USCG, 2022. https://www.history.uscg.mil/Our-
Collections/Photos/igphoto/2002136680/, accessed November 27, 2022; 
Lind, 2018. ``USCG Cutter Healy Deploys for the Arctic'', available at 
https://www.passagemaker.com/trawler-news/uscg-cutter-healy-deploys-
for-the-arctic#::text=In%20mid-
July%20the%20United%20States%20Coast%20Guard
%20Cutter,vessel%20operated%20by%20the%20USCG%2C%20measuring%20420%20fee
t, accessed November 28, 2022.
    \58\ Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, 2018. 
``Identifying Potential Gaps in the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic 
Capabilities'', available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR2310.html, accessed on November 29, 2022.
    \59\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

    The Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022, which 
is expected to be included the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2023, includes key support for the USCG to 
continue implementing its Arctic Strategic Outlook. Title I, 
Authorizations, would authorize $167.2 million for a third PSC, 
$150 million for the acquisition or procurement of an available 
icebreaker, and $20 million for icebreaking cutters for 
operation in the Northeast, Arctic, and Great Lakes (FY 2023). 
Additionally, Title I would authorize $1 million for the USCG 
to evaluate design requirements for the ASC (FY 2023-2024).
    Title II dedicates an entire Subtitle to provisions 
affecting USCG operations in the Arctic region. Building on 
Title I authorizations, Title II would establish a medium 
icebreaker (i.e., ASC) program office within the USCG so that 
the it can conduct a PSC/ASC fleet mix analysis, and establish 
the conditions under which an available icebreaker may be 
acquired. Title II would also extend the timeline of the 
Pribilof Island Transition Completion Act of 2016 (Public Law 
114-120) and require an update to Congress on the USCG's 
activities and infrastructure needs at St. Paul Island, Alaska.

                              WITNESS LIST

PANEL I

     LVice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant 
for Operations, United States Coast Guard
     LHon. Michael Sfraga, Chair, United States Arctic 
Research Commission
     LMr. Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical 
Infrastructure Team, Government Accountability Office

PANEL II

     LDr. Rebecca Pincus, Director, Polar Institute, 
Wilson Center
     LDr. Martha Grabowski, Professor, Le Moyne College 
and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board, 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine


 
     U.S. COAST GUARD'S LEADERSHIP ON ARCTIC SAFETY, SECURITY, AND 
                      ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2022

                  House of Representatives,
                    Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
                           Maritime Transportation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. 
Salud O. Carbajal (Chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Members present in person: Mr. Carbajal, Mr. DeFazio, Mr. 
Larsen of Washington, Mr. Auchincloss, Mr. Gibbs, Mr. Graves of 
Missouri, Mr. Weber of Texas, and Mr. Garamendi.
    Members present remotely: None.
    Mr. Carbajal. This subcommittee will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As a reminder, please keep your microphones muted unless 
speaking. Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I 
will respectfully request that the Member please mute their 
microphone.
    And to insert a document into the record, please have your 
staff email it to [email protected].
    Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing entitled, 
``U.S. Coast Guard's Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and 
Environmental Responsibility.''
    Before we get started, I would like to acknowledge that 
today's hearing will be both Chairman DeFazio's and Ranking 
Member Gibbs' last hearings as Members of Congress. Both have 
decided to retire. For 36 years, the House of Representatives 
has been a better place because of Chairman DeFazio's 
leadership and insight. This institution will miss him, and I 
will miss his friendship.
    Mr. DeFazio, thank you for your leadership, your 
mentorship, and your service to our country.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Salud.
    Mr. Carbajal. And, Mr. Gibbs, I want to thank you for your 
partnership and expertise as we worked through this year's 
bipartisan Coast Guard reauthorization. I appreciated the 
bipartisan collaboration that we developed to do our 
subcommittee's work, and I appreciate the friendship we 
developed along the way. Thank you for your 10 years of service 
to our country as well.
    Today also marks 81 years since the attack on Pearl Harbor 
that led our Nation to declare war within a day. To all of our 
veterans and active military families, thank you for your 
sacrifice and service to our country.
    Global peace is always tenuous. Today, we will hear 
testimony from five witnesses who are experts on the Arctic, a 
region where security and geopolitics are both at play. Today, 
we have experts before us to focus on the national security 
issues that are on the top of our minds, while others will 
enlighten us on the Coast Guard's leadership on maritime safety 
and environmental stewardship.
    Nearly 10 years ago, the Coast Guard published its first 
strategic plan for the Arctic region. The Service updated this 
plan in 2019 to reflect its coordination with the White House, 
Department of Defense, and the Department of State, which 
showed a new level of interest in the status of the United 
States as an Arctic nation.
    With Russia's recent aggression towards Ukraine, the 
geopolitical significance of the Arctic is even more 
pronounced. Although the Coast Guard security missions are 
critical, the Service continuously executes numerous other 
critical missions.
    The Coast Guard is responsible for maritime safety--that 
is, search and rescue, and aiding mariners in safe navigation 
by breaking ice, marking channels, and communicating real-time 
weather hazards.
    The Coast Guard must also enforce environmental laws in the 
Arctic. This will become more and more important as melting sea 
ice means more shipping traffic, more oil pollution, and 
migrating commercial fish stocks.
    Coast Guard partnerships with Alaskans and indigenous 
peoples, with private corporations, the State of Alaska, other 
Federal agencies, and other countries have met a gold standard 
in the last 10 years. Coordination and cooperation are not 
optional at the North Pole.
    To help us appreciate the importance of all the Coast 
Guard's Arctic missions, Admiral Gautier will be joined on a 
panel by the Honorable Michael Sfraga, the presidentially 
appointed Chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, and Mr. 
Andrew Von Ah, Director of the Physical Infrastructure team at 
the Government Accountability Office.
    The USARC is working hard to draw attention to the critical 
gap between the collection of data in the Arctic--weather, sea 
state, coastal mapping--and the Coast Guard's ability to use 
this information in its everyday operations.
    Similarly, the GAO has completed a number of studies in 
recent years that measure the success of, and gaps in, the 
Coast Guard's Arctic operations.
    Today's second panel will feature an Arctic strategic 
defense expert, Dr. Rebecca Pincus, director of the Polar 
Institute; and Dr. Martha Grabowski, a professor at Le Moyne 
College and a past chair of the Marine Board in the National 
Academies of Sciences.
    The Coast Guard has proven to be a nimble and resourceful 
leader for the U.S. in the Arctic. It can only fully implement 
its strategic plan if we fully grasp the form and severity of 
the challenges Coasties face operating in such a harsh, remote 
part of the world.
    The Coast Guard plays a multidimensional leadership role in 
the Arctic. Fortunately, we have five witnesses before us with 
multidimensional expertise.
    Let's begin.
    [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in 
Congress from the State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast 
                   Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing on ``U.S. Coast 
Guard's Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and Environmental 
Responsibility.''
    Before we start, I'd like to acknowledge that today's hearing will 
be Chairman DeFazio's last as a Member of Congress. For 36 years, the 
House of Representatives has been a better place because of his 
leadership and insight. This institution will miss him and I will miss 
his friendship. Mr. DeFazio, thank you for your leadership and service 
to our country.
    Today also marks 81 years since the Attack on Pearl Harbor that led 
our Nation to declare war within a day. To all of our veterans and 
active military families, thank you for your sacrifice and service.
    Global peace is always tenuous. Today, we will hear testimony from 
five witnesses who are experts on the Arctic, a region where security 
and geopolitics are both at play. Today, we have experts before us to 
focus on the national security issues that are on the top of our minds, 
while others will enlighten us on the Coast Guard's leadership on 
maritime safety and environmental stewardship.
    Nearly 10 years ago, the Coast Guard published its first Strategic 
Plan for the Arctic region. The Service updated this plan in 2019 to 
reflect its coordination with the White House, Department of Defense, 
and the Department of State, which showed a new level of interest in 
the status of the United States as an Arctic nation.
    With Russia's recent aggression toward Ukraine, the geopolitical 
significance of the Arctic is even more pronounced. Although the Coast 
Guard's security missions are critical, the service continuously 
executes numerous other critical missions.
    The Coast Guard is responsible for maritime safety--that is, Search 
and Rescue, and aiding mariners in safe navigation by breaking ice, 
marking channels, and communicating real-time weather hazards.
    The Coast Guard must also enforce environmental laws in the Arctic. 
This will become more and more important as melting sea ice means more 
shipping traffic, more oil pollution, and migrating commercial fish 
stocks.
    Coast Guard partnerships with Alaskans and indigenous peoples, with 
private corporations, the State of Alaska, other federal agencies, and 
other countries have met a gold standard in the last 10 years. 
Coordination and cooperation are not optional at the North Pole.
    To help us appreciate the importance of all of the Coast Guard's 
Arctic missions, Admiral Gautier will be joined on a panel by the 
Honorable Michael Sfraga, the presidentially appointed Chair of the 
U.S. Arctic Research Commission, and Mr. Andrew Von Ah, Director of the 
Physical Infrastructure Team at the Government Accountability Office.
    The USARC is working hard to draw attention to the critical gap 
between the collection of data in the Arctic--weather, sea state, 
coastal mapping--and the Coast Guard's ability to use this information 
in its everyday operations.
    Similarly, the GAO has completed a number of studies in recent 
years that measure the success of, and gaps in, the Coast Guard's 
Arctic operations.
    Today's second panel will feature an Arctic strategic defense 
expert, Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director of the Polar Institute, and Dr. 
Martha Grabowski, a professor at Le Moyne College and a Past Chair of 
the Marine Board in the National Academies of Sciences.
    The Coast Guard has proven to be a nimble and resourceful leader 
for the U.S. in the Arctic. It can only fully implement its Strategic 
Plan if we fully grasp the form and severity of the challenges Coasties 
face operating in such a harsh, remote part of the world.
    The Coast Guard plays a multi-dimensional leadership role in the 
Arctic. Fortunately, we have five witnesses before us with multi-
dimensional expertise. Let's begin.

    Mr. Carbajal. First, I would like to recognize Chairman 
DeFazio.
    Mr. DeFazio. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the 
kind words, and thank you for holding this hearing.
    We ignore the changes that are rapidly coming to the Arctic 
North at our own peril. And I am pleased to see that we have a 
number of proactive plans in place, but more is certainly going 
to need to be done.
    Although some deny that climate change exists, we are 
seeing extraordinary extended periods of ice retreat navigable 
waters throughout the Arctic region. We are now going to see, 
obviously, more transit of freighters, even tour ships in that 
area, which is obviously going to put burdens on the United 
States Coast Guard for their duties both for security and for 
protection of life and property.
    I am pleased, after many years of struggle, that we have 
two Polar Security Cutters fully funded, and we are going to 
authorize another one in the Don Young Coast Guard 
Authorization Act.
    We are also going to authorize the temporary utilization of 
an existing commercial icebreaker under lease so that we can 
enhance our capabilities. We have the Healy, and then we have 
the one remaining--and I always get them mixed up, Polar Star 
and Polar Sea, but whichever one we have--which is it, Admiral?
    Admiral Gautier. Polar Star.
    Mr. DeFazio. Polar Star. Good. OK. That was the one I was 
on. It is just too close together; I can never remember--which 
is patched together every year after it does its major duty and 
run to McMurdo Sound.
    It is interesting that, I mean, I guess they are still 
harvesting circuit boards and things that we don't make anymore 
with transistors off of the old Polar Sea, or they have been 
stockpiled somewhere, but it is pretty pathetic. I mean, Russia 
has 40. China, not even an Arctic nation, has two, and they are 
building more.
    This is going to be an era and an area of international 
competition, and potential issues will arise. I mean, there are 
resources and claims being extended. The idiots in the Senate 
have been unable to approve the Law of the Sea Treaty, so, we 
don't have full standing to object to Russia continually 
extending claims further and further into the Arctic region. 
But nothing can be done about the idiots in the Senate.
    So, with the Don Young bill, which will be hopefully 
tonight or this afternoon as part of the Water Resources 
Development Act--which is now the Water Resources Development 
Act, National Defense Authorization, Coast Guard Authorization, 
and God only knows what else is in that piece of legislation.
    And then there are other issues: bases. You are pretty 
distant from the more northern--because we only went there on a 
seasonal basis. I understand that we are looking at an enhanced 
deep-draft harbor. Our Coast Guard air station is, again, 
pretty far away, so, we are going to have to be looking at 
shoreside and seaside facilities to give us more proximity and 
less travel time to get into that area.
    As the chairman noted, this is my last hearing after 36 
years. I started down there somewhere, right about there I 
think, many years ago. This has been the honor of my life, to 
serve on this committee. I had great mentors. Particularly Jim 
Oberstar was an extraordinary mentor to me. And I hope I have 
mentored some of the next generation.
    And I wish Sam Graves, who I fully expect to be the next 
chairman, well on this committee. Sam is balanced and wants to 
get things done, so, I am looking forward to see that this 
committee will still be productive.
    And to Bob, congratulations. I am calling this the ``Year 
of the Great Retirement.'' A lot of people are retiring, and we 
are joining that crowd, although I am not going away, though I 
am going to be officially retired from Congress.
    And I want to thank my absolutely incredible staff. I can't 
name them all, but they have done so much great work over the 
years. A Member of Congress and this committee are only as good 
as the fabulous staff we have, whether it is legislative, 
investigative, or just organizational. This is the biggest 
committee in Congress. It is a little bit unwieldy, but I think 
we do pretty damn well.
    [Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in 
      Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this morning's hearing to 
highlight the important role the Coast Guard serves in the Arctic. Of 
its many mission sets and various responsibilities, no role is more 
rapidly evolving than the Coast Guard's mission in the Arctic.
    The Coast Guard does not have the privilege of ignoring the 
significant and consequential impacts that climate change is having on 
our environment. Its servicemembers operate in the harsh terrain of the 
Arctic and bear witness to the full effects of a warming planet in that 
region. The fact is we all see it and we all experience it; from 
extreme weather events to coastal erosion, climate change is not 
something we can continue to ignore. We have to provide resources to 
the Coast Guard so they can mitigate the effects of climate change in 
their operational planning.
    As polar ice steadily decreases, new trade routes will emerge, 
linking Asia, North America, and Europe. The retreat of sea ice and the 
opening of navigable sea routes will only serve to accelerate the 
demands placed on this once inaccessible and remote region. This, 
inherently, will drive increased demand for Coast Guard services in the 
Arctic. That translates to more search and rescue response, more 
regulation of commercial fishing activity, more pollution response, 
more scientific data collection, and more icebreaking to facilitate 
commercial ships traversing Arctic waters. Indeed, the Coast Guard will 
need to augment its presence in this region if we, as a nation, are 
serious about protecting U.S. life and sovereignty in the Arctic.
    The Coast Guard operates the nation's only heavy polar icebreaker, 
the Polar Star. In years prior, Congress rightly recognized the need to 
expand Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic and authorized $1.8 
billion toward that effort. With two Polar Security Cutters fully 
funded and a third authorized in the Don Young Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2022, we have a modest start.
    The Coast Guard is the nation's most prominent Arctic presence, but 
I fear we risk losing our dominance as an Arctic state if we don't take 
more aggressive action. If the construction timeline for the Polar 
Sentinel--the first of three new Polar Security Cutters to be built--
holds, we'll have a grand total of three polar icebreakers by the end 
of 2025. By comparison, Russia has 40 active icebreakers in the Arctic 
alone. China, which is not even a polar nation, currently operates two 
icebreakers, with plans to build more. Clearly, we have some catching 
up to do.
    I look forward to Congress passing the Don Young Coast Guard 
Authorization Act, which includes an authorization of $150 million to 
acquire a commercial icebreaker to fill the gap until the arrival of 
Polar Sentinel.
    I'll note, however, that recapitalizing our icebreaker fleet is 
just one of many steps needed to fill the capability gap in the Arctic. 
We also need to address the communications gap experienced in this 
frontier. Communications are key to any mission, but in the Arctic 
communications are especially strained and data transmission is very 
limited. Further, every Coast Guard mission starts on land. While the 
Coast Guard has a presence in Alaska, Congress needs to ensure that the 
personnel stationed in remote locations are fully supported with robust 
housing, childcare, and medical facilities. Coast Guard cutters and 
aircraft do not operate themselves so we must do better to improve the 
lives of Coast Guard servicemembers.
    Finally, we cannot ignore the ongoing war in Ukraine and the impact 
it has had on diplomacy in the Arctic. The pause of the U.S. 
involvement in the Arctic Council and the associated loss of 
international cooperation in the Arctic is troubling, and the long-term 
consequences of such are unknown. The U.S. does not yet have a clear 
path forward in this new, non-cooperative geopolitical arena. We need 
to bolster our Arctic capabilities so we are prepared for any scenario, 
threat, or hazard that may emerge.
    Today's hearing is timely, and the array of witnesses before us 
boast impressive resumes and expertise in the Arctic domain. I look 
forward to their testimony.
    I'd also like to mention that today will be the last hearing of the 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee for the year, and my last 
hearing before I retire at the end of the 117th Congress. Being Chair 
of the Committee over the past four years has been the highlight of my 
36-year career. I wish Sam Graves the best as he prepares to take over 
the gavel at the beginning of the 118th Congress. I hope and expect he 
will continue the bipartisanship and productivity that this committee 
is known for. Thank you.

    Mr. DeFazio. So, with that, I yield back the balance of my 
time.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Now I would like to recognize Ranking Member Graves.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I thank the witnesses, too, for being here, and I 
appreciate you being here.
    I particularly want to add my thanks and respect to both 
Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Gibbs. This is their last 
committee hearing, and their hard work and expertise from both 
of you are going to be missed on the committee overall and this 
subcommittee.
    I very much appreciated serving with both of you, and you 
have both done a lot of good things for the country when it 
comes to jurisdictions under this committee. And I can only 
hope that Oregon and Ohio will be just as well represented as 
you move on. But thanks for your service.
    I do know this is an Arctic hearing, but I do want to thank 
Admiral Gautier for what you are doing. And I want to remind 
you of the importance of getting the Barbers Point aviation 
facilities completed. That is something that means a whole lot 
to me when it comes to the next generation of aircraft and 
making sure that those maintenance facilities are up to date. 
And I look forward to working with the Coast Guard to obviously 
complete whatever is needed there at the Barbers Point Station 
in particular.
    I know that Arctic shipping routes are only available, 
unfortunately, for about 3 months during the summer along the 
Northern Sea Route or the Northwest Passage. And I do know the 
changing conditions in the Arctic have made maritime 
transportation in the region much more feasible, but I do know 
there are significant challenges associated with increasing 
vessel traffic in the U.S. Arctic and the Arctic Ocean overall.
    And I do know that, sadly, the U.S. is woefully unprepared 
for the increased traffic that we are going to see. But I look 
forward to hearing from you all today and reading your 
testimony, and, again, I appreciate you being here. The Coast 
Guard means a lot to me, and I know it does to the country. And 
so, I want to make sure that you all have everything that you 
need.
    [Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress 
     from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    I know this is an Arctic hearing, but I want to thank Vice Admiral 
Gautier for your work and remind you of the importance of getting the 
Barbers Point facilities fully ready for the next generation of Coast 
Guard aircraft. I look forward to working with the Coast Guard to 
complete the needed upgrades at that Air Station.
    Historically, Arctic shipping routes were only available for up to 
three months in the summer along the Northern Sea Route or the 
Northwest Passage. Changing conditions in the Arctic have made maritime 
transportation in the region more feasible. However, there are still 
significant challenges associated with increasing vessel traffic in the 
U.S. Arctic and the Arctic Ocean as a whole.
    Sadly, the U.S. is woefully unprepared for this increased vessel 
traffic. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on the 
potential for increased Arctic maritime transportation and how to 
manage that growth effectively.

    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks. I yield back.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
    I now will recognize Ranking Member Gibbs.
    Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to also thank 
you for your kind words, and then, Chairman DeFazio, for your 
kind words.
    And one of my fondest memories I have of Chairman DeFazio 
is, when I was looking for offices, like, 4, 5, or 6 years ago 
in the Rayburn Building, I stumbled across Chairman DeFazio's 
office, and he was gracious enough to show me his nice big 
balcony.
    Which, I don't know if they let you out there anymore on 
that. I heard----
    Mr. DeFazio. [Inaudible.]
    Mr. Gibbs. Yes. But you were so gracious to do that, other 
side of the aisle. I appreciated that. That is a fond memory I 
have. You probably don't even remember when that happened.
    And I want to thank Ranking Member Graves for his kind 
words. And I am sure that the T&I Committee will be in good 
hands starting January 3rd, but I will be watching from afar. I 
will let you know how you are doing, if you mess up too bad.
    But I have been on this committee since 12 years ago when I 
first came to Congress, and I was privileged enough to be 
chairman of the Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee 
for 6 years. And I enjoyed working with the Army Corps and now 
the Coast Guard. And such memorable experiences, and I learned 
a lot. And I didn't know a whole lot when I started those chair 
positions and ranking member, but it has been wonderful. So, I 
will treasure those memories. I really appreciate it.
    So, Chairman DeFazio, I wish you well. I don't know how 
many years you were here, but you have had an esteemed career, 
and I am sure you will do fine out on the west coast.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thirty-six.
    Mr. Gibbs. Thirty-six years. So, I wish you well.
    Today, the subcommittee will hear testimony on the need for 
increased United States infrastructure to facilitate safe and 
efficient maritime transportation in the Arctic.
    For the first time in recorded history, more portions of 
the Arctic each year are becoming navigable. Vessel transits 
through the area covered by the Polar Code on shipping 
increased 25 percent between 2013 and 2019 and are expected to 
continue.
    It is critical that we understand current traffic flows and 
the steps that need to be taken to ensure that both vessels and 
mariners and the environment are properly protected. One way to 
ensure better Arctic access is to increase the U.S. icebreaker 
presence in the U.S. Arctic.
    The Coast Guard has contracted to acquire a new class of 
Polar Security Cutter, the first heavy icebreakers built in the 
U.S. since 1977. Though this is a good first step towards more 
fully implementing an active U.S. presence in the Arctic, these 
cutters are officially 1 year, and unofficially 2 years, behind 
their original construction timeline.
    The vessels will fall at least 1 more year behind their 
stated timeline, which was never realistic. In addition, the 
first cutter will conduct an Antarctic breakout and will not be 
available for work in the Arctic. So, they are going to 
Antarctica first, I guess, and then back to the Arctic, so, 
there will be more delays for up there. In other words, we are 
nearly a decade away from increased U.S. icebreaker presence in 
the Arctic.
    I look forward to the Coast Guard providing us a realistic 
timeline for when we can expect to see additional icebreaking 
capacity in the Arctic and what interim capacity measures the 
Coast Guard plans until then. However, while icebreakers 
provide important capabilities, there are many other issues 
that must be addressed to ensure safe and efficient Arctic 
navigation.
    Additional infrastructure and operational challenges to 
maritime transportation in the Arctic include: limited 
satellite coverage and architecture to support voice and data 
communications; the lack of a deep-draft port accommodating 
ships that will draft up to 35 feet; unpredictability in flow 
patterns of icebergs in shipping lanes; the lack of channel-
marking buoys and other floating visual aids which are not 
possible due to continuously moving ice sheets; and scant 
hydrographic surveying and other data needed for safe 
navigation and resource protection and management.
    The United States is not alone in our efforts to facilitate 
safe commerce in the Arctic. We are part of the Arctic Council 
along with other Arctic nations like Canada, Russia, and the 
Nordic countries. However, the Council's activities have been 
in abeyance since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia holds 
the Council's chairmanship in 2022 and 2023, and it is not 
clear what the Council's future is after that.
    Working together in a consensus-based intergovernmental 
forum allowed Arctic nations to promote environmental, social, 
and economic aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic. 
The Council was also critical to successfully implementing the 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters--the 
Polar Code. If the Council cannot be revived, we need to find 
other mechanisms to ensure international cooperation on these 
issues.
    This Arctic really is the last frontier, the portion of our 
Nation's waters about which we still have much to learn. 
However, unless we can get the U.S. Coast Guard and other 
agencies assets into the area--an expensive and time-consuming 
challenge--we will not be able to use these areas 
strategically.
    [Mr. Gibbs' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from 
the State of Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
                        Maritime Transportation
    Today the Subcommittee will hear testimony on the need for 
increased United States infrastructure to facilitate safe and efficient 
maritime transportation in the Arctic. For the first time in recorded 
history, more portions of the Arctic each year are becoming navigable. 
Vessel transits through the area covered by the Polar Code shipping 
increased 25 percent between 2013 and 2019 and are expected to 
continue.
    It is critical that we understand current traffic flows and the 
steps that need to be taken to ensure that both vessels and mariners, 
and the environment, are properly protected. One way to ensure better 
Arctic access is to increase the U.S. icebreaker presence in the U.S. 
Arctic.
    The Coast Guard has contracted to acquire a new class of Polar 
Security Cutter, the first heavy icebreakers built in the U.S. since 
1977. Though a good first step toward more fully implementing an active 
U.S. presence in the Arctic, the PSCs are officially one year, and 
unofficially two years, behind their original construction timeline.
    The vessels will fall at least one more year behind that stated 
timeline, which was never realistic. In addition, the first PSC will 
conduct the Antarctic break out, and will not be available for work in 
the Arctic. In other words, we are nearly a decade away from increased 
U.S. icebreaker presence in the Arctic.
    I look forward to the Coast Guard providing us a realistic timeline 
for when we can expect to see additional icebreaking capacity in the 
Arctic, and what interim capacity measures the Coast Guard plans until 
then. However, while icebreakers provide important capabilities, there 
are many other issues that must be addressed to ensure safe and 
efficient Arctic navigation.
    Additional infrastructure and operational challenges to maritime 
transportation in the U.S. Arctic include limited satellite coverage 
and architecture to support voice and data communications; the lack of 
a deep-draft port; unpredictability in flow patterns of icebergs in 
shipping lanes; the lack of channel marking buoys and other floating 
visual aids, which are not possible due to continuously moving ice 
sheets; and scant hydrographic surveying and other data needed for safe 
navigation and resource protection and management.
    The United States is not alone in our efforts to facilitate safe 
commerce in the Arctic. We are part of the Arctic Council, along with 
other Arctic nations like Canada, Russia, and the Nordic countries. 
However, the Council's activities have been in abeyance since Russia's 
invasion of the Ukraine. Russia holds the Council's chairmanship in 
2022 and 2023, and it is not clear what the Council's future is after 
that.
    Working together in a consensus based, intergovernmental forum 
allowed Arctic nations to promote environmental, social, and economic 
aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic. The Council was also 
critical to successfully implementing the International Code for Ships 
Operating in Polar Waters--the Polar Code. If the Council cannot be 
revived, we need to find other mechanisms to ensure international 
cooperation on these issues.
    This Arctic really is the last frontier--the portion of our 
nation's waters about which we still have much to learn. However, 
unless we can get U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies assets into the 
area--an expensive and time-consuming challenge--we will not be able to 
use these areas strategically.

    Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman Carbajal, for your work here 
on the committee, and I wish you all the best in the future.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Representative Gibbs.
    I would like to now welcome our first witness panel: Vice 
Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations at 
the United States Coast Guard; the Honorable Michael Sfraga, 
Chair of the United States Arctic Research Commission; and Mr. 
Andrew Von Ah, Director of Physical Infrastructure at the 
Government Accountability Office.
    Thank you for being here today, and I look forward to your 
testimony.
    Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be 
included in the record.
    Since your written testimony has been made part of the 
record, the subcommittee requests that you limit your oral 
testimony to 5 minutes.
    Vice Admiral Gautier, you may proceed.

 TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PETER W. GAUTIER, DEPUTY COMMANDANT 
 FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; HON. MICHAEL SFRAGA, Ph.D., 
  CHAIR, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION; AND ANDREW VON AH, 
      DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. GOVERNMENT 
                     ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Admiral Gautier. Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking 
Member Gibbs, Chairman DeFazio, and distinguished members of 
the subcommittee.
    I am really pleased and thank you for inviting me here 
today to update you on the Coast Guard's efforts on our Arctic 
strategy to promote safety, security, and environmental 
protection for the Arctic.
    And I would like to take a minute to add the Coast Guard's 
sincere appreciation, Chairman, for the service of Chairman 
Peter DeFazio, for his distinguished service to the United 
States Coast Guard, as well as the ranking member, 
Representative Bob Gibbs.
    The Coast Guard owes a debt of gratitude to you both and to 
your distinguished and dedicated staffs. Under your leadership, 
the House passed two Coast Guard authorization acts, and we 
were also included on two hurricane supplementals, CARES Act 
funding, as well as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 
and many other things that have helped the Coast Guard.
    And before I left for here today, Admiral Fagan, our 
Commandant, asked to express her personal thanks to you both. 
The Coast Guard is better for your support of us.
    The Arctic is undergoing a dramatic transformation of its 
physical, operational, and geostrategic environment. We are 
witnessing firsthand how the impact of climate change is 
opening up new access to Arctic waters. This drives greater 
activity in the Arctic region and, with it, risk across the 
maritime sector. And the Coast Guard is deeply concerned about 
the rising strategic risk to our Nation as Russia and China 
compete with diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage and 
influence in the Arctic.
    While our missions in the high latitudes have evolved since 
we first started operating in Alaska and the Arctic in 1867, 
the Coast Guard's commitment to the region has not. We are 
operating forward to address the safety and security of our 
Arctic residents and mariners who make their living there, 
homeporting new cutters, investing in infrastructure and 
capabilities, prioritizing our operations, supporting research, 
and strengthening our international partnerships.
    Changing conditions in the Arctic are driving an increased 
demand for Coast Guard services; there is no question about 
that. And we have a sense of urgency to make sure we can 
deliver now and well into the future.
    Our actions are supported by the 2022 U.S. National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region and its four interconnected 
pillars. And this strategy is fundamentally supported by our 
2019 Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook.
    Despite the geographical remoteness and logistical 
challenges inherent to all Arctic operations, the Coast Guard 
is meeting service demand through our flexible and 
expeditionary approach.
    This year, in our Operation Arctic Shield, we increased 
seasonal presence in the U.S. Arctic to provide Coast Guard 
services across 65 remote communities. Together with Federal, 
State, Tribal, and local stakeholders, we responded to Typhoon 
Merbok to ensure numerous impacted communities could receive 
critical fuel and supplies ahead of the winter freeze. And, in 
October, the Coast Guard cutter Healy reached the North Pole 
for the second time to conduct important scientific research.
    Strategic competition across the Arctic is also driving 
demand for our leadership. Last year, Coast Guard cutters 
intercepted four Chinese military vessels operating together in 
the U.S. exclusive economic zone off the Aleutians. And, in 
September, we intercepted a combined Russian-Chinese task group 
of seven ships in a similar location. In both instances, the 
Coast Guard met presence with presence to ensure these ships 
operated in accordance with international law.
    The Coast Guard's strategic influence extends beyond the 
U.S. Arctic. We routinely conduct engagements with other Arctic 
nations and partners. And despite the absence of Russia in the 
Arctic Council and Arctic Coast Guard Forum, we continue to 
work with like-minded nations to advance shared interests in 
safety, environmental stewardship, and responsible governance.
    We appreciate deeply the continued support from Congress 
and this committee in particular to build the next generation 
of Coast Guard capability for the Arctic. A top acquisition 
priority is the Polar Security Cutter, and we are working hard 
to advance that effort.
    We have asked for funding in this year's budget to increase 
near-term presence in the Arctic through acquisition of a 
commercially available medium icebreaker. With Congress' help, 
we are moving forward on this.
    Never before has Coast Guard leadership been more important 
to the Arctic.
    Thank you again, Chairman, for this opportunity, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [Admiral Gautier's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant 
                    for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
                              Introduction
    Good morning, Chair Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and 
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here 
today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in advancing national interests 
in the Arctic. The United States is one of only eight Arctic coastal 
States with both sovereign rights and sovereign responsibilities to 
safeguard our respective and shared interests. As climate change and 
strategic competition increasingly affect the geography, stability, and 
security of the Arctic region, U.S. Coast Guard presence and leadership 
have never been more critical.
    Arctic activity is increasing and evolving at a rapid pace, from a 
surge in oil and gas exploration a decade ago to growth in types and 
locations of vessel transits, including a significant expansion of 
environmental tourism over the past five years. The dynamic and 
accelerated changes in the Arctic environment make Arctic waters more 
accessible, creating new opportunities and challenges, and increasing 
multinational strategic competition.
    The Arctic's dynamic evolution magnifies the importance of U.S. 
national security across the region and intensifies the demand for the 
Coast Guard's services and leadership. In a region where presence means 
not only influence, but also security, the U.S. Coast Guard has been a 
key leader and interagency partner in shaping the Arctic security 
environment for over 150 years. I understand the significant level of 
investments required to further champion our Nation's efforts in the 
Arctic, and I embrace the trust Congress and the American people have 
placed in the U.S. Coast Guard. The Service will continue to prioritize 
actions that safeguard U.S. interests while promoting safe, secure, and 
environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.
              National Security Drivers Across the Arctic
    The 2022 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) sets 
the vision for the Arctic as peaceful, stable, prosperous, and 
cooperative. The four pillars to achieve that vision are security, 
which encompasses both homeland security and national defense, climate 
change and environmental protection, sustainable economic development, 
and international cooperation and governance. These pillars are 
interconnected in terms of domestic and international risks, effects, 
and mitigating actions. They require coordination with the State of 
Alaska and across a broad spectrum of Arctic stakeholders including 
Indigenous communities, partners and allies, domestic and international 
bodies, academics, scientists, and the private sector. Our 2019 Coast 
Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook and its three lines of effort--enhancing 
capability to operate effectively, strengthen the rules-based order, 
and innovate and adapt to promote resilience and prosperity--support 
the four NSAR pillars.
    Peace and prosperity depend on adherence to the rules-based 
international order, particularly in the maritime domain. As we see 
around the globe, state and non-state malign actors take advantage of 
any governance gaps to poach natural resources or attempt to intimidate 
others through incursions into sovereign waters. Meeting these 
challenges requires the United States to be present, collaborate with 
others, and model professional behavior at sea. With our unique 
combination of authorities as an armed service, a law enforcement 
agency, a regulatory agency, and a humanitarian service, the Coast 
Guard is an ideal tool for the Nation to govern the U.S. Arctic 
maritime environment responsibly. The Coast Guard has excelled and will 
continue to excel in all of these elements, to include setting an 
example of responsible governance and reinforcing the rule of law 
through operational presence and strategic leadership.
                   Pillar 1: Security and Capability
    The geopolitical environment in the Arctic continues to evolve as 
state and non-state actors seek to advance their interests in the 
region. Allies, partners, and competitors increasingly contend for 
diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage and influence. Russia and 
China exemplify this competition. Both have declared the Arctic a 
strategic priority; both have made significant investments in new or 
refurbished capabilities; and both are attempting to exert direct or 
indirect influence across the region using all of their instruments of 
national power.
    As the only U.S. armed force with both military and law enforcement 
authorities, and as a member of the Intelligence Community, the Coast 
Guard seamlessly employs multi-mission assets and cross-trained 
personnel to advance U.S. Arctic priorities. The Coast Guard serves as 
a critical bridge between the power of the Department of Defense and 
the diplomacy of the State Department, cultivating strong international 
relationships and building coalitions among Arctic partners based on 
mutual interests and values. These relationships enhance safety, 
maritime governance, and prosperity across the region, which in turn 
strengthen both national security and regional stability.
    The Coast Guard is directly observing increased strategic 
competition in the U.S. Arctic. Through the operations of its 
Seventeenth District, which is responsible for Coast Guard activities 
for an over 3,853,500 square mile area including Alaska and the Arctic, 
the Coast Guard meets presence with presence both to counter 
competition and positively influence behavior. Over the past two years, 
the Coast Guard has intercepted a Chinese military Surface Action 
Group, as well as a combined Russian-Chinese Task Group, operating in 
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. In both instances, the Coast Guard's 
visible forward presence ensured that both groups operated in 
accordance with international law. The Coast Guard will continue to 
exhibit model governance grounded in international law, rules, norms, 
and standards, including freedom of navigation, in the U.S. Arctic and 
empowering like-minded partners and allies to do the same in their 
Arctic waters.
         Pillar 2: Climate Change and Environmental Protection
    The effects of climate change span the Arctic's physical, 
operational, and strategic environments. These pronounced effects 
threaten the stability of Arctic communities and natural resources, the 
traditional lifestyles of Alaska Natives, and national sovereignty 
across the region. Addressing these impacts begins with an informed 
understanding of how, when, and where the physical environment is 
changing, which enables evidenced-based decision-making to reduce the 
operational and strategic consequences. Scientific research within the 
Arctic, in general, will require investments and a coordinated whole-
of-government approach to inform policy decisions. The Coast Guard 
looks forward to supporting Arctic research endeavors through its 
robust partnerships with institutions like the National Science 
Foundation, U.S. Arctic Research Commission, Polar Institute, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Navy, and U.S. 
National Ice Center. The Coast Guard has long provided Arctic access by 
including interagency and international scientists aboard the USCGC 
Healy to conduct critical scientific research. This research, and the 
understanding it affords, has enabled the Coast Guard, along with our 
national and international partners, to protect the maritime 
environment, build community resilience, and shape the security 
environment.
    While long-term trends indicate a more consistently navigable 
Arctic, near-term conditions are less predictable and thus more 
dangerous. In September 2022, Typhoon Merbok hit more than 1,000 miles 
of Alaska's west coast with hurricane-force winds, wave heights over 50 
feet, and storm surges that were the highest recorded in almost 50 
years. Storms of Merbok's magnitude usually occur in October and 
November after the formation of shoreside (first-year) ice that offers 
protection for coastal communities. However, unusually warmer waters in 
the Bering Sea enabled this storm's formation much earlier in the 
season. Merbok also hit during the fall subsistence harvest, damaging 
or destroying hunting and fishing boats and camps along the coasts and 
forcing immediate repairs to homes, businesses, and camps at the 
expense of harvest activities necessary to ensure winter food security 
in these communities.
    In the face of Merbok's dangerous and challenging conditions, the 
Coast Guard provided critical value to the region by proactively 
advancing community resilience. As a visible, agile, and adaptive 
force, the Coast Guard helped to coordinate the Federal, Tribal, State, 
and local response. The Service conducted damage assessments in 32 
remote communities, focusing on bulk fuel facilities, and connecting 
waterways to ensure communities could receive their fuel shipments and 
other critical supplies ahead of the winter freeze-up. Natural 
disasters like Merbok are only expected to increase in frequency and 
severity as a result of climate change, and the Coast Guard will be 
increasingly called upon to respond.
               Pillar 3: Sustainable Economic Development
    As Arctic accessibility increases, so does the potential for new 
economic opportunities. The Arctic currently supplies roughly 10 
percent of the world's oil and 25 percent of its natural gas, but it is 
estimated to hold 22 percent of the Earth's undiscovered oil and 
natural gas supply. It also contains significant deposits of minerals 
essential to technology supply chains; at present, Alaska has the 
world's largest zinc mine and the largest known graphite deposit in the 
United States. Today, Alaska's top export is its seafood, topping $6 
billion in labor income annually, $15 billion in economic output, and 
accounting for over 40% of the total U.S. seafood exports and a 
significant portion of global seafood supply.
    These valuable resources are driving increased maritime activity in 
the U.S. Arctic. Oil and gas exploration has surged, as has 
environmental tourism. During the 2022 operating season, at least eight 
transits of adventure tour ships were planned from Greenland to Nome. 
As another means of enabling sustainable development, the Coast Guard 
supports scientific research, such as NOAA studies on the distribution 
of impacts to the region's fish and marine mammal stocks as well as 
other aspects of wildlife ecology. These studies also help inform our 
domain awareness and operational risks across the region. For example, 
understanding where fish stocks are moving and how commercial, 
recreational, and subsistence harvesters are responding enables the 
Coast Guard to proactively manage the waterways as well as protect both 
the mariners and the environment.
    Since 2009, the Coast Guard has influenced Arctic governance and 
sustainable development through Operation Arctic Shield. This Operation 
demonstrates the Coast Guard's operational capability, asserts 
leadership and models responsible international governance in a region 
of key geostrategic importance. The annual Operation includes three 
task forces--National Security and Enforcement, Aviation, and Marine 
Safety. Through these task forces, the Coast Guard, along with its 
Federal, Tribal, state, and Arctic Nation partners, protects 
sovereignty, enhances domain awareness, and regulates commercial 
activity. This year's operational highlights included the Coast Guard's 
interception of a Russian vessel fishing illegally in U.S. waters. The 
Coast Guard notified our counterparts in the Russian Border Guard who, 
at our request, investigated the incident and fined the vessel. The 
Coast Guard also conducted spill response and mass rescue exercises 
with Arctic hub communities, industry partners, and various other 
Tribal, state, and local stakeholders. These exercises enable our 
ability to not only protect people and the environment but also enhance 
our ability to maintain the Arctic's waterways and marine 
transportation system, the primary transportation mechanism across the 
region. This operational presence and responsible model of governance 
positions the Coast Guard as a central U.S. leader in influencing, 
shaping, and protecting sustainable economic development, subsistence 
lifestyles, and cultural traditions in the Arctic across the 
international landscape.
           Pillar 4: International Cooperation and Governance
    The Coast Guard's unique authorities, experience, and leadership 
distinguish it from the other Armed Services and traditional military 
instruments of national power. Leveraging these skills and 
characteristics provides the ability to both model responsible 
governance and compete below the level of armed conflict across the 
Arctic landscape. A key tenant of the new NSAR and the 2019 Coast Guard 
Arctic Strategic Outlook is asserting international leadership to 
advance cooperation that upholds international law, rules, norms, and 
standards for the Arctic coastal states and other non-Arctic flag 
States whose ships sail in Arctic waters. Upholding this strategic 
initiative, the Coast Guard consistently asserts its leadership and 
provides guidance and direction through such preeminent multilateral 
forums as the Arctic Council and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO).
    The Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) similarly acts as a bridge 
between diplomacy and operations. This forum continues to serve as an 
independent, but complementary, body to the Arctic Council, with an 
operational focus on safe and environmentally responsible Arctic 
maritime activity. Since 2017, the Coast Guard has conducted multiple 
exercises with partner Arctic nations through the ACGF. These exercises 
enhance interoperability and provide a platform for direct dialogue 
among the Arctic agencies fulfilling Coast Guard functions. In 2021, 
the Arctic Council and the ACGF issued a joint statement of cooperation 
to enhance collaboration on both search and rescue and oil spill 
preparedness and response. This cooperation includes joint exercises, 
such as the 2021 ARCTIC GUARDIAN exercise, conducted under Iceland's 
Chairmanship, which explored both large-scale search and rescue and oil 
spill response protocols to a cruise ship incident in Arctic waters.
    Despite Russia's illegal war against Ukraine, the Coast Guard 
continues to bolster international cooperation and leadership 
commitments with the other Arctic Nations. The Coast Guard continues to 
participate in bi-lateral and multi-lateral Arctic exercises and 
patrols throughout the Arctic region with like-minded partners. This 
cooperation highlights that all other Arctic nations are aligned in 
upholding international law, rules, norms, and standards for those 
operating in the region. Participation in these activities enables the 
Service to build experience operating across the region, expand 
response capacity with international partners, and strengthen these 
strategic relationships.
                        Building Arctic Capacity
    The ability for the United States to protect U.S. national 
sovereignty, safeguard our homeland, and lead in the Arctic hinges on 
physical presence and access. U.S. operational presence and influence 
in the Arctic are founded on Coast Guard polar icebreakers. These ships 
provide assured, year-round access to the Polar Regions not only for 
Coast Guard missions, but also in support of critical activities of 
other agencies and Tribal Nations that protect key economic, 
environmental, and national security interests in the high latitudes.
    Thanks to Congressional support for the Coast Guard's Polar 
Security Cutter (PSC) program, which includes our Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 
President's Budget request of $167.2 million for PSC program management 
and production activities, Coast Guard presence will continue well into 
the future. The PSC is a top acquisition priority for the Coast Guard 
and the Navy and is vital for the U.S. to continue to project 
sovereignty and protect national security interests in the Polar 
Regions. The PSC is the capability the Nation needs to ensure 
persistent presence and robust domain awareness in the Arctic and 
Antarctic regions. The integrated Coast Guard-Navy Program Office 
continues to work actively with the prime contractor to mitigate 
schedule risks and ensure effective and efficient use of U.S. taxpayer 
dollars to deliver this critical capability. With Congress's continued 
support, the Nation is closer than we have been in over 40 years to 
recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet. Continued investment is key to 
meeting our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and dynamic 
Polar Regions.
    The FY 2023 President's Budget also requests $150 million to 
support the acquisition of a commercially available polar icebreaker, 
including initial modifications, crewing, and integrated logistics 
support required to reach initial operating capability. The U.S. has 
vital national interests in the Polar Regions and the purchase of a 
commercially available polar icebreaker is a viable strategy to 
accelerate U.S. presence in the polar regions in the near-term and 
increase capacity in the long-term.
    In addition to recapitalization of our icebreakers, the Coast Guard 
also needs adequate Arctic-capable surface and aviation assets, 
properly trained and equipped personnel, enhanced communication and 
domain awareness capabilities, and logistics resources. As outlined in 
the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook, closing gaps in these 
areas requires a whole-of-government approach coupled with consistent 
investment to meet not only the challenges the Arctic presents, but 
also the opportunities.
                               Conclusion
    The Coast Guard has served and shaped national security in the 
Arctic for over 150 years and continues to play a critical role in the 
whole-of-government approach to secure national interests in the Polar 
Regions. The Coast Guard, and the Nation, must remain committed and 
agile in the rapidly evolving geopolitical and operational Arctic.
    The continued support of the Administration and Congress for a 
modernized and capable polar fleet and increased Coast Guard Arctic 
capacity and capabilities will fortify the Nation's position in this 
age of Arctic prominence. Coast Guard leadership is essential in 
maintaining a coalition of like-minded partners to shape the Arctic 
domain as a region of strategic cooperation. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today and for your actions to support 
the members of the Coast Guard. I look forward to answering your 
questions.

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Vice Admiral Gautier.
    Dr. Sfraga, you may proceed.
    Mr. Sfraga. Thank you.
    Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, Chairman DeFazio, 
and members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
address you today.
    I am Mike Sfraga. I am the Chair of the United States 
Arctic Research Commission. It is an independent Federal agency 
that advises Congress and the White House on issues related to 
Arctic research and related policies. I also sit before you as 
a resident of America's Arctic, the State of Alaska.
    I begin my remarks today by noting the U.S. Coast Guard and 
its forerunner, the Revenue Cutter Service, have a long history 
of supporting scientific research, starting with the 
environmental observations of the noted naturalist John Muir 
soon after the 1867 purchase of Alaska from Russia.
    Our Nation requires the Coast Guard's enduring support of 
Federal research to protect and defend America's Arctic 
interests, to better understand the changing Arctic landscape 
and its implications, to inform prudent economic development, 
and to foster peaceful, stable, and a prosperous North.
    I note that while oceanographic research is not among the 
11 statutory missions of the Coast Guard, it is indeed their 
sixth statutory primary duty.
    The Coast Guard advances scientific understanding of the 
polar regions in two fundamental ways. First, the Coast Guard 
itself supports a broad range of relevant basic and applied 
research, development, testing, and evaluation. And, second, 
Coast Guard icebreakers provide scientists--supported by many 
Federal agencies--direct access to the Arctic. These vessels 
also have modern scientific tools and enhanced capabilities, 
much of which have been provided by other Federal agencies.
    The U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region emphasizes 
two guiding principles relevant to today's discussion: first, 
plan for long-term investments, which means icebreakers; 
second, commit to a whole-of-Government approach.
    Clearly, icebreakers that may cost $600 million apiece are 
significant national investments and assets, requiring 
interagency efforts for long lead time for planning, 
construction, and outfitting.
    I turn my attention now to one of our Nation's two 
icebreakers, the Healy. Over the past 20 years, most of the 
Healy's time at sea has been in support of research, but two 
challenges loom just over the horizon.
    First, in recent years, Healy has become less available to 
the scientific community because there has been an increase in 
missions and patrols directly related to priorities of the 
Department of Homeland Security. Clearly, these missions are 
critical to our Nation's security and must continue.
    This inherent push/pull on the Healy's time in the Arctic 
demonstrates the ever-growing demands the Coast Guard has on it 
and that one single agency has upon it. This rebalancing of 
Healy's missions profile provides few alternatives to U.S. 
researchers other than to rely on foreign icebreakers for 
support.
    Second, Healy is now 23 years old, with an original service 
life of 30 years. Healy will undergo a 5-year service 
extension, but decommissioning is not far off. What vessel will 
replace the Healy? Will it be another Coast Guard vessel, 
perhaps an Arctic Security Cutter, for which there is no yet 
program of record?
    While the Healy's decommissioning may seem far off, it is 
sooner than we think, particularly for those of us who think in 
icebreaker years. Planning for replacement takes time, given 
the complexities of identifying interagency requirements, 
seeking authorizations and appropriations, procurement, 
construction, outfitting, sea trials, and so on. So, my message 
today to you is: Let's start now.
    And, finally, I want to shift the focus and describe the 
soft-power diplomacy that results from international scientific 
research and its value.
    Coast Guard icebreakers have long served as platforms for 
international scientific collaboration. By addressing common 
problems and sharing data when appropriate, the U.S. builds 
constructive relationships with like-minded nations in and 
outside of the Arctic, which strengthens the international 
rules-based order, the transatlantic alliance, U.S. and Canada, 
U.S. and Nordic cooperation, and cooperation throughout North 
America. The U.S. also benefits through access to new ideas, 
technologies, databases, and research partnerships.
    So, in conclusion, I offer four suggestions:
    Government planning to ensure continued and enduring access 
to the Arctic Ocean needs to begin now, given the long lead 
time before delivery.
    Two, when the Government procures new icebreakers, it 
should consider the broad mission sets and requirements of all 
applicable Federal departments and agencies, and when feasible, 
incorporate them into vessel designs in order to advance the 
full range of our Nation's Arctic interests.
    Three, specifically, multibeam sonar systems should be 
standard hydrographic equipment installed on all U.S. 
icebreakers, because the charts that they create reveal the 
depth and shape of the sea floor and provide information 
critical to safe navigation, economic development, weather 
prediction, coastal hazard assessment, coastal change analysis, 
fisheries habitat, and resource development.
    And, finally, continue to support research enabled by the 
Coast Guard in order to reap the international benefits of 
soft-power diplomacy.
    Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Gibbs, thank you for the 
opportunity to speak with you today, and I do look forward to 
your questions.
    Thank you.
    [Mr. Sfraga's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael Sfraga, Ph.D., Chair, U.S. Arctic 
                          Research Commission
    Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished members 
of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on the United 
States Coast Guard's (USGC) leadership on Arctic safety, security, and 
environmental responsibility. I am Dr. Mike Sfraga and I am honored to 
appear before you today as the presidentially appointed Chair of the 
United States Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to discuss these 
urgent set of issues.
                   The US Arctic Research Commission
    The USARC is an independent federal agency established by the 
Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984 as amended.
    Our agency's mission is to advance Arctic research on behalf of and 
to the benefit of the U.S.
    There are eight commissioners, seven of whom are directly appointed 
by the President. The eighth is the Director of the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) who serves as a non-voting ex officio member.
    The current members of the Commission are:
      Dr. Mike Sfraga, Chair; filling an academic/research 
seat, the founding director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute, 
former director, Global Risk and Resilience Program, Wilson Center, and 
currently serving as chair and distinguished fellow, Polar Institute, 
Wilson Center.
      Dr. Nikoosh Carlo; filling an academic/research seat, the 
founder and chief strategist at CNC North Consulting.
      Elizabeth Qaulluq Cravalho; filling an industry seat, the 
vice president of lands for NANA Regional Corporation, an Alaska Native 
Corporation.
      David Kennedy; filling an academic/research seat, the 
current Global Fellow at the Wilson Center's Polar Institute, Board 
Member of the World Maritime University, and Chairman of the External 
Advisory Board of the School of Marine Science and Ocean Engineering at 
the University of New Hampshire.
      Dr. Mark Myers; filling an industry seat, the principal 
of Myenergies.
      Dr. Jacqueline Richter-Menge; filling an academic/
research seat, a research affiliate with the University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, 34 years of experience with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory.
      Deborah Vo; filling the Indigenous seat, Program Officer 
with the Rasmuson Foundation.
      Dr. Sethuraman Panchanathan; Director, NSF.

    The Commission releases a biennial report to the White House and to 
Congress on Arctic research goals and objectives to advise the 
president, Congress, guide the Interagency Arctic Research Policy 
Committee (IARPC) five-year plan, and to inform overall U.S. Arctic 
research efforts. The Commission also assists IARPC in establishing a 
national Arctic research program plan every five years to implement 
Arctic research policy.
    In addition to the above tasks, the Commission's duties, assigned 
by law, include:
      Facilitating cooperation between the Federal Government 
and State and local governments with respect to Arctic research;
      Reviewing Federal research programs in the Arctic and 
recommending improvements in coordination among programs;
      Recommending methods to improve logistical planning and 
support for Arctic research;
      Recommending methods for improving efficient sharing and 
dissemination of data and information on the Arctic among interested 
public and private institutions;
      Offering other recommendations and advice to the IARPC as 
it may find appropriate;
      Cooperating with the Governor of the State of Alaska and 
with agencies and organizations of that State which the Governor may 
designate with respect to the formulation of Arctic research policy; 
and
      Recommending to the IARPC the means for developing 
international scientific cooperation in the Arctic.

    The USARC is a statutory member of the North Pacific Research Board 
and the North Slope Science Initiative. The USARC is also a member, 
participant, liaison, or observer on the IARPC, the Interagency 
Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, the National Ocean 
Council, the Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, the Study of 
Environmental Arctic Change (SEARCH), the Civil Applications Committee, 
the Scientific Ice Expeditions Interagency Committee (Navy submarines), 
the Arctic Icebreaker Coordinating Committee of the University National 
Oceanographic Laboratory System, the Alaska Ocean Observing System, the 
Department of State's Arctic Policy Group, the Arctic Research 
Consortium of the United States, the International Permafrost 
Association, and the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.
  US Coast Guard's statutory Arctic responsibilities include research
    The USCG has several statutory responsibilities in the Arctic that 
are pertinent to USARC's mission, which is to advance Arctic research 
in support of national Arctic policy and strategy.
    I start with the Coast Guard's research-focused Arctic statutory 
duties.
    Of the seven primary duties assigned to the Coast Guard in 14 USC 
102 \1\, three are relevant to today's discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 14 U.S.C. 102, Title 14--Coast Guard, Subtitle I--
Establishment, Powers, Duties, and Administration, Chapter 1--
Establishment and Duties
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      Section 102(4) directs the Coast Guard to develop, 
establish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements 
of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking 
facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, 
under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States;
      Section 102(5) directs the Coast Guard to, pursuant to 
international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate 
icebreaking facilities on, under, and over waters other than the high 
seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
      Section 102(6) directs the Coast Guard to engage in 
oceanographic research of the high seas and in waters subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.

    In addition to these duties, the Coast Guard was assigned 11 
statutory missions \2\ by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. Law 
107-296, November 25, 2002). Section 888(a)(1)(F) of that Act includes 
``ice operations'' among the non-homeland security missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 6 U.S.C. 468(a) Definitions, Title 6--Domestic Security; 
Chapter 1--Homeland Security Organization; Subchapter VIII--
Coordination with Non-Federal Entities, Inspector General, United 
States Secret Service, Coast Guard, General Provisions; Part H--
Miscellaneous Provisions
    The USCG's ``non-homeland security missions'' include:
      (A)  Marine safety.
      (B)  Search and rescue.
      (C)  Aids to navigation.
      (D)  Living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement).
      (E)  Marine environmental protection.
      (F)  Ice operations.
    The USCG's ``homeland security missions'' include:
      (A)  Ports, waterways and coastal security.
      (B)  Drug interdiction.
      (C)  Migrant interdiction.
      (D)  Defense readiness.
      (E)  Other law enforcement.
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    In light of these responsibilities, I note, as a simple 
observation, and as a curiosity, that while ``oceanographic research'' 
is the sixth statutorily defined ``primary duty'' of the Coast Guard, 
``oceanographic research'' is not mentioned as a statutorily defined 
``mission.''
    I also note, from a historical perspective, that the USCG and its 
forerunner, the Revenue Cutter Service, led by Captain Michael A. 
Healy, supported the conduct of natural science and the gathering of 
environmental observations since soon after the 1867 purchase of Alaska 
from Russia. This federal activity has long been part of the proud 
history of the Coast Guard.
    And more recently, such as on page 23 of its own 2013 ``Arctic 
Strategy,'' the Coast Guard astutely recognized that ``limited 
operational resources . . . underline the need for increasing 
collaboration in the region,'' and that ``[t]he Coast Guard must also 
collaborate with academia and non-governmental partners to incentivize 
Arctic research . . .''
   Research implications of federal policy on Coast Guard operations
    As mentioned above, federal policy has implications for the Coast 
Guard's operational support of Arctic scientific research.
    The foundation for national Arctic policy is the National Security 
Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25 
(NSPD66/HSPD25, ``Arctic Region Policy,'' \3\ released in January 2009 
by President Bush and subsequently reaffirmed by President Obama. A 
directive of this policy is to ``[e]nhance scientific monitoring and 
research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.''
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    \3\ NSPD66/HSPD25, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm
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    Building upon that policy, the White House recently released an 
updated NSAR, and the White House Arctic Executive Steering Committee 
\4\ and National Security Council are currently developing an 
implementation plan for the NSAR that is scheduled for release in 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Arctic Executive Steering Committee, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ostps-teams/climate-and-environment/arctic-
executive-steering-committee-aesc/
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    To fulfill the nation's vision for the Arctic, and to address the 
strategic pillars of the NSAR, the United States must have the critical 
infrastructure provided by science-capable polar icebreakers.
    Broadly speaking, the role of icebreakers and the relevance of 
research can be connected to all four pillars, which are:
      Pillar 1--Security: Develop Capabilities for Expanded 
Arctic Activity
      Pillar 2--Climate Change and Environmental Protection: 
Build Resilience and Advance Adaptation, while Mitigating Emissions
      Pillar 3--Sustainable Economic Development: Improve 
Livelihoods and Expand Economic Opportunity
      Pillar 4--International Cooperation and Governance: 
Sustain Arctic Institutions and Uphold International Law

    Progress on many of the ``strategic objectives,'' beneath each 
pillar, requires icebreakers and scientific research.
    For example:
      Strategic Objective 1.1 Improve Our Understanding of the 
Arctic Operating Environment. This requires scientific research to 
improve Arctic observing, mapping and charting; weather, water, and sea 
ice forecasting; and subseasonal and seasonal predictions.
      Strategic Objective 2.3: Expand Research to Better 
Understand Climate Change and Inform Policy Decisions. Of all the 
strategic objectives in NSAR, this is most directly related and 
important to Arctic scientific research, and to the need for icebreaker 
access to the high Arctic.

    The NSAR also emphasizes two guiding principles relevant to today's 
discussion. They are:
      Plan for Long-Lead Time Investments, which mentions 
procuring additional icebreakers and investing in scientific research.
      Commit to a Whole-of-Government, Evidence-Based Approach, 
which emphasizes that responsibilities in the Arctic region extend 
beyond any single government agency, and that ``U.S. Federal 
departments and agencies will work together, through coordinating 
bodies like the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the National 
Security Council, to provide the resources, support, and expertise 
required to implement this strategy.''

    Clearly, vessels that are anticipated to cost over $600M to build 
are significant national investments, requiring long lead-times for 
planning, construction, and outfitting. The USCG currently has 
intentions of constructing and operating up to six icebreakers.
    Separately, the National Science Foundation is currently developing 
the design for a Polar Class 3 icebreaker, a new Antarctic Research 
Vessel \5\, which, if fully funded, is expected to be delivered by mid-
2031. Should this vessel come to fruition, NSF intends to operate it 
exclusively in the Southern Hemisphere as a science-dedicated vessel.
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    \5\ https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=305919&org=OPP
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    Consistent with the NSAR guiding principles of (a) ``plan for long-
lead time investments'', and (b) ``commit to a whole-of-government, 
evidence-based approach,'' White House leadership, coordination, and 
guidance of all departments and agencies requiring icebreaker 
capabilities will be instrumental in ensuring the continued judicious 
and fiscally responsible use of taxpayer funds.
         US Coast Guard's support for polar scientific research
    The US Coast Guard is a critically essential and successful partner 
in advancing scientific understanding of the polar regions for two 
reasons.
    First, the Coast Guard itself supports a broad range of Arctic-
relevant basic and applied research, development, testing, and 
evaluation at the USCG Research and Development Center, the US National 
Ice Center, the International Ice Patrol, and through partnerships, 
such as with the Department of Homeland Security's Arctic Domain 
Awareness Center.\6\
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    \6\ Arctic Domain Awareness Center, https://
arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, USCG's icebreakers provide direct scientific access to the 
Arctic. Much of the time that Coast Guard icebreakers are at sea, they 
are supporting scientific research missions by providing physical 
access with ships that have scientific and technical capabilities, much 
of which is funded by other federal agencies.
    For example, according to the USCG's annual cruise reports, over 90 
percent of the time that USCG Cutter HEALY (WAGB-20) operated at sea 
over the past 20 plus years, including transit time, it did so in 
support of scientific research.
    The Coast Guard's icebreakers are the only vessels owned and 
operated by the United States government that enable US scientists and 
their international collaborators to access and investigate regions at 
both poles that are infested with multi-year ice. The icebreakers are, 
in short, essential research infrastructure.
    The access provided by icebreakers enables scientists, funded by a 
wide range of government agencies, to study, understand, and explain 
how the polar regions serve as ``Earth's refrigerators,'' and how these 
regions are warming and changing rapidly. For example, scientists now 
report that Arctic air temperatures are warming four times faster than 
the global average \7\, and Arctic waters are acidifying at three to 
four times of non-Arctic waters.\8\
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    \7\ https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-022-00498-3#Sec6
    \8\ https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/science.abo0383
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These changes, and their implications on weather, marine 
ecosystems, food supplies, transportation, tourism, and resource 
development are critically important to understand as the US advances 
its priorities noted in the NSAR and NSS. Knowledge and insights gained 
from basic and applied research: (a) informs responsible stewardship of 
the Arctic region, the ancestral home of Indigenous Peoples; and (b) 
advances our understanding of the opportunities to wisely develop 
America's Arctic renewable resources, such as fish, and timber, and 
non-renewable resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals.
    Most of this research has been sponsored (i.e., financially 
supported) by a wide range of federal partners and stakeholders, such 
as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), 
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of 
Interior entities, such as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and 
the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the Department of State, among 
others.
    These agencies have reimbursed Coast Guard many millions of dollars 
for ``ship time'' on icebreakers for the scientists, engineers, 
researchers, and investigators that these federal partners support.
    Here are a few scientific highlights of Arctic research conducted 
aboard HEALY:
      Over many oceanographic expeditions, NOAA, USGS, and 
State Department supported the seafloor and sub-seafloor mapping of the 
US's Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) in the Arctic region, consistent 
with international law. This has been a critically important process in 
determining US sovereign rights on and beneath this seabed, beyond the 
US's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Based on the scientific results, 
the size of the US's entire ECS is about two times the size of 
California, and half of that area surrounds Alaska.
      HEALY recently returned from an extended and highly 
successful expedition, partially funded by the NSF, that reached the 
North Pole. Academic scientists collected data as part of an 
internationally coordinated, multi-ship sampling campaign during 2020-
2022, named ``Synoptic Arctic Survey,'' to study pan-Arctic ocean 
circulation, biogeochemical cycles and marine ecosystems. Notably, this 
research cannot be conducted from remote sensing platforms, or from 
electronic moored or autonomous devices. Physical presence, provided by 
icebreakers, is required. This research can also be considered an early 
US contribution toward our treaty obligation to help establish a 
``Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring'' by June 2023 as 
per the international Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas 
Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean.
      NOAA has been the primary sponsor of multiple HEALY 
expeditions in support of US participation in an international 
initiative referred to as the ``Distributed Biological Observatory,'' 
which consists of a series of eight sampling locations, spanning from 
the Bering Sea to the Beaufort Sea, offshore Alaska. These sites serve 
as a ``change detection array'' where scientists can observe variations 
in physical and oceanographic conditions, such as biodiversity, 
productivity and food webs, which impact Alaska's fisheries. According 
to a report from the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute, Alaska 
produces more seafood than all other U.S. states combined and provides 
two-thirds of the nation's wild-caught fish and shellfish. Alaska 
seafood is sold in 100 countries and is the State's top export, in 
excess of $3 billion, annually. Food web changes also impact walruses, 
seals, and ducks, which, in turn, are harvested by US citizens living 
in small, vulnerable Indigenous communities in Alaska's coastal areas. 
As a result, icebreakers are essential to understand food web changes 
which are linked to food security issues.
      The Office of Naval Research has funded both basic and 
applied Arctic research conducted aboard HEALY that directly support US 
Navy operations, and concurrently addresses USCG missions associated 
with homeland and national security and domain awareness. Examples 
include the ``Stratified Ocean Dynamics of the Arctic Ocean'' (SODA) 
initiative, and an ``Innovative Naval Prototype program aimed at 
engineering a networked Arctic Mobile Observing System (AMOS). These 
research programs require access to the ice-covered central Arctic, 
some of which contain ``multi-year'' (thick and old) accessible only 
with ``medium'' and ``heavy'' icebreakers.
      One of the important steps in addressing the NSAR 
strategic objective of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in the 
Arctic is to observe and understand the natural exchanges of carbon 
dioxide between the Arctic Ocean and overlying atmosphere that is 
associated with physical processes and the marine ecosystem. While gas 
exchange can be monitored remotely, and on broad scales, by satellites, 
detailed in situ measurements, aboard oceanographic vessels, fill a 
critical gap in observations and improve efforts to quantify ocean 
uptake of carbon dioxide, and hence our ability to model and predict 
future climate scenarios. To that end, NSF has funded research programs 
to equip HEALY and use the vessel as a ``ship of opportunity,'' on a 
not-to-interfere basis, to make such measurements and contribute them 
to global databases.\9\ Additional measurements, of other needed 
atmospheric and surface ocean observations (long and short wave 
radiation, air temperature, wind speed, humidity, sea surface 
temperature, etc.) could also be collected, and would also help inform 
domain awareness and the global forecast system.
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    \9\ https://www.socat.info
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            Current and future challenges and opportunities
Increasing demand for HEALY
    The demand for HEALY to conduct missions prioritized by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has increased significantly over 
the last few years, thereby reducing HEALY's availability for 
scientific research missions, which are also increasing.
    Greater demand for the vessel, and prioritization of DHS missions, 
has had an outsized impact on Arctic research because HEALY is the only 
asset in the US fleet capable of providing access to the high Arctic 
Ocean. The rebalancing of HEALY's mission profile toward security and 
international search and rescue efforts provide few options to US 
researchers other than to rely on foreign icebreakers for support, 
which will impact both the amount and the nature of science that US 
investigators can achieve. In addition, federal science agencies remain 
responsible for ongoing operational costs for the scientific and 
technical equipment and capabilities they have installed on HEALY, even 
when such capabilities are not being used.
HEALY replacement
    Commissioned in 1999, USCGC HEALY is now 23 years old, and has a 
designed service life of 30 years, with an anticipated five-year 
Service Life Extension Project beginning in FY 2026. A replacement will 
be needed for the HEALY by about 2034, suggesting that construction of 
the new vessel will need to begin no later than 2031, which is the same 
year that NSF anticipates delivery of the Antarctic Research Vessel.
    In short planning for the HEALY replacement, to operate in the 
Arctic Ocean, must start in the next couple of years, if not now.
    This situation raises many questions, such as:
      How will the US government provide that icebreaker, which 
is essential to meet our obligations and needs in the North?
      Will the USCG provide one of its three ``medium'' 
icebreakers, referred to as an ``Arctic Security Cutter''--consistent 
with the Coast Guard's ``High Latitude Mission Analysis Report 
recommending three ``medium'' and three ``heavy'' vessels, as part of 
USCG's ``Polar Security Cutter'' Program? \10\
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    \10\ Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: 
Background and Issues for Congress, https://s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/22275439/coast-guard-polar-security-cutter-polar-icebreaker-
program-background-and-issues-for-congress-aug-30-2022.pdf
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      If so, will that vessel be designed and constructed in a 
manner that reflects the requirements of multiple missions, including 
scientific research?
      How will the requirements for those various missions, 
from other agencies, be identified, coordinated with the USCG, and 
incorporated into the overall design requirements?
      What government entities will be provided with the 
responsibilities and necessary budgets to identify, procure, install, 
operate and maintain the scientific and technical capabilities and 
equipment of the vessel, such as with multibeam sonar systems?
      Will there be White House leadership and coordination, 
including of budgets (e.g., from Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
National Security Council (NSC), and Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP)) to ensure a whole-of-government approach to this 
process?
Other U.S. government vessels that operate in ice-infested waters
            R/V Sikuliaq
    The R/V Sikuliaq, owned by the NSF and operated by the College of 
Fisheries and Ocean Sciences at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, 
with support from the NSF, provides excellent scientific access to 
waters covered with thin ice, up to 2.5 feet thick. This vessel, 
commissioned in 2015, is outfitted with a wide range of modern science 
capabilities and has proven most successful in addressing key research 
questions. The Sikuliaq, however, is not an icebreaker, and is not 
capable of accessing large regions of the Arctic, where thicker ice is 
encountered.
            Antarctic research vessel
    Last year, the NSF announced \11\ funding for the design of an 
Antarctic Research Vessel (ARV) \12\, which would essentially serve as 
a replacement for the R/V Nathanial B. Palmer and possibly also the R/V 
Laurence M. Gould that NSF charters from Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc.
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    \11\ https://future.usap.gov/new-antarctic-vessel-approved/
    \12\ https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=305919&org=OPP
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    The ARV will be designed as a modern, world-class, ice-breaking 
research vessel outfitted with first-rate scientific equipment and 
enhanced capabilities. If the project is approved by NSF for 
construction and fully funded by Congress, the ARV is expected to be 
delivered to the NSF by mid-2031, only three years before HEALY is 
anticipated to be decommissioned.
    Notably, the NSF would operate the ARV exclusively in the Southern 
Hemisphere, in support of Antarctic research. To my knowledge, the NSF 
has no current plans for a similar icebreaking research vessel for the 
Arctic region, and I also don't know whether the NSF is in discussion 
with the US Coast Guard regarding the opportunities to outfit Coast 
Guard vessels, beyond HEALY (i.e., the ``commercially available polar 
icebreaker'' USCG has requested in its FY23 budget request, or any of 
the three heavy icebreakers considered in the Polar Security Cutter 
program), with scientific research tools and capabilities to advance 
scientific research objectives in the Arctic region. Regardless, my 
overarching recommendation is that, consistent with the NSAR's guiding 
principle of a ``whole-of-government'' approach, any icebreaker owned 
and operated by the US government should consider mission requirements 
of the broader interagency user community, not just one department or 
agency.
Autonomous platforms
    While ship-based observing will remain a critical pillar of Arctic 
research, the use of autonomous platforms will continue to expand, 
providing access to remote regions and to spatial and temporal scales 
that have previously been impractical or impossible to sample. 
Research-capable icebreakers could support new networks of autonomous 
instruments--both to deploy and recover instruments and to service 
critical supporting infrastructure, such as acoustic beacons that will 
provide `underwater GPS' for accurately geolocating assets operating 
under sea ice.
                          Soft power diplomacy
    Finally, I would also like to highlight the soft power diplomacy 
advanced by Arctic scientific research that is often associated with 
international scientific parties aboard icebreakers both domestic and 
foreign.
    Over many decades, USCG icebreakers (HEALY, POLAR STAR and POLAR 
SEA) provided platforms for international science collaboration that 
allowed key interactions by scientists to move forward even when 
political differences of various countries strained relations in other 
areas. Ongoing climate change issues warrant continued and expanded 
international research programs and USCG icebreakers are essential 
assets for such activities.
    Let me provide some specifics. In the recently released ``State of 
Arctic Science,'' \13\ the International Arctic Science Committee 
refers to the Distributed Biological Observatory and the Synoptic 
Arctic Survey research programs, of which, as mentioned above, US 
leadership has been a central element. These programs require 
icebreaker access to the high North. The UN Decade for Ocean Science 
and Sustainable Development will have a focus on the Arctic Ocean.
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    \13\ https://iasc.info/about/publications-documents/state-of-
arctic-science
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    By addressing common problems and data sharing where appropriate, 
the US builds constructive relationships with, Canada, Iceland, the 
Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands), our Nordic 
partners, and scientists and research organizations in non-Arctic 
nations in Europe and Asia. The US benefits through access to new 
ideas, technologies, and data bases, research partnerships, and it 
encourages, supports, and reinforces the international rules-based 
order. Enabling joint international research, international search and 
rescue operations, ensuring interoperability with vessels and crews 
from other nations, and working closely with other Arctic and non-
Arctic nations in areas such as the North Atlantic and Barents Sea, 
also serves to reinforce the transatlantic alliance at a time of 
geopolitical uncertainty; specifically, as this uncertainty ripples 
globally to include the Arctic.
    And looking even longer term, Russia's presence in the Arctic 
cannot be ignored. Because of Russia's war on Ukraine, relations with 
Russia are the worst they have been since the Cold War. We do not know 
when the war will end, or when relations with Russia will begin to 
rebalance. But at some point in the future, scientific research in the 
Arctic region could be one step forward in rebuilding a more 
comprehensive understanding of the region and perhaps serve as a 
foundational effort to rebuild relations between Russia and the 
West.\14\
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    \14\ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
2154896X.2022.2137091
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                       Summary of recommendations
    On behalf of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, I recommend:
    1.  Federal agencies should continue to, where feasible, ensure 
that icebreakers procured by the United States, consider the broad 
mission sets of several agencies.
    2.  Multibeam sonar systems on icebreakers that reveal the depth 
and shape of the seafloor can provide information critical to safe 
navigation, economic development, weather prediction, coastal hazard 
assessment, coastal change analysis, habitat studies, and resource 
development, among many other activities. It is a requirement before 
declaring any potential marine protected areas, or the United States' 
extended continental shelf. As called out on page 4 of the US Arctic 
Research Commission's last ``Goals report,'' Arctic marine charts are 
suboptimal in that only 4.1 percent of the US maritime Arctic is 
charted to modern international standards.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/usarc_goals_2019-
2020_low.pdf

    Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Gibbs, thank you again for the 
opportunity to testify before you and this Subcommittee on the United 
States Coast Guard's leadership in the Arctic. As I have stated, the US 
Coast Guard is a critically essential and successful partner in 
advancing scientific understanding of the polar regions and advancing 
our nation's interests in the region. It must continue to be so even 
with increasing and competing demands for icebreaker missions. I am 
confident the recommendations offered in this testimony will help 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
achieve that.

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Sfraga.
    Next, Mr. Von Ah, you may proceed.
    Mr. Von Ah. Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
discuss our work on Federal efforts to address gaps in maritime 
infrastructure in the Arctic.
    Climate change has led to record-low levels of sea ice, 
making Arctic waters navigable for longer periods of time, 
leading to increased shipping activity. Data show more transits 
of the Bering Strait in 2021 than ever before.
    Increased shipping of natural resources extracted from the 
Arctic, growing demand for tourism and destination cargoes, and 
greater interest in trans-Arctic routes that can reduce travel 
times may continue to drive activity in the region.
    These potential economic opportunities also bring safety 
and environmental risks, particularly given that the U.S. 
Arctic does not have the typical elements of a Marine 
Transportation System, such as a deep-draft port, comprehensive 
charting of waterways, and robust communications 
infrastructure.
    These gaps in infrastructure exacerbate the inherent 
challenges of maritime activity in the Arctic--vast distances, 
dangerous weather, and unpredictable ice conditions--which pose 
risks to mariners as well as the fragile Arctic ecosystem.
    My statement today is based on reports we issued in 2020 
and 2016 which had findings and recommendations related to 
addressing these gaps.
    In our 2020 report, we found that Federal efforts in the 
Arctic lacked a current strategy with goals and measures, as 
well as interagency leadership. We therefore recommended that 
the Executive Office of the President develop and publish a 
strategy to address gaps in Arctic maritime infrastructure and 
designate an interagency mechanism responsible for leading 
Federal efforts, given that several Federal agencies have key 
roles and responsibilities in the Arctic.
    In response to the recommendations, the White House 
reactivated the Arctic Executive Steering Committee as the 
mechanism to advance U.S. interests and coordinate Federal 
actions in the Arctic. In doing so, it appointed an executive 
director and convened its first meeting in December 2021.
    Since then, the steering committee has met several times 
and has developed and approved eight interagency initiatives. 
One of the eight initiatives, to advance safe and secure Arctic 
shipping, is led by the Coast Guard.
    In addition, in October 2022, the White House issued a 
National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which identifies 
needed improvements to maritime capabilities in the Arctic, 
including enhanced communications, mapping, charting, and 
navigational capabilities, as well as the need for a deep-draft 
harbor in Nome, Alaska, and additional icebreaking 
capabilities.
    While the strategy establishes a vision for Arctic 
capabilities, it does not provide details on steps needed to 
achieve that vision or establish goals or measures for 
addressing gaps in Arctic maritime infrastructure, as we had 
recommended.
    For example, although the strategy calls for investments in 
telecommunications infrastructure and the development of ports, 
it does not specify how agencies should prioritize these 
investments, nor does it identify measures to assess progress.
    In November, the executive director told us that the 
process of developing an implementation plan for the strategy 
was underway. Encouragingly, he noted that for each major 
action of the strategy, the implementation plan should identify 
lead and supporting agencies, and the plan should also identify 
investment priorities and resources to implement the actions 
and a way to measure progress.
    By completing this plan and establishing goals and metrics, 
the Federal Government should have the tools to demonstrate the 
results of its efforts and decisionmakers could gauge progress 
in addressing these gaps.
    Our report in 2016 found that, although the Coast Guard was 
taking some actions to implement its Arctic strategy, it did 
not have a systematic way to assess how its actions will help 
mitigate Arctic capability gaps. We therefore recommended that 
the Coast Guard, as it develops an implementation plan for its 
strategy, also develop measures for assessing its progress.
    As of December 2022, the Coast Guard is continuing to 
update its implementation plan. The plan is expected to provide 
the foundation for assessing its efforts, although Coast Guard 
officials have not identified a timeline to complete the plan.
    Better understanding its progress and addressing capability 
gaps will be important given the Coast Guard's recent and 
planned investments in icebreaking capabilities. The Coast 
Guard plans to invest an estimated $13.3 billion to acquire, 
operate, and maintain three heavy polar icebreakers. And by 
tracking its progress in addressing its icebreaking and other 
capability gaps, the Coast Guard will be better positioned to 
understand how to support these assets and what level of 
infrastructure and support investments are ultimately needed.
    Moreover, the Coast Guard has an important opportunity to 
coordinate the completion of its plan with the recently 
released National Strategy. The Coast Guard's multimission role 
and its presence in the region gives it a central role to many 
Federal efforts. Taking such action will position the Coast 
Guard to understand how to allocate its resources and 
prioritize activities to help achieve the national goals in the 
Arctic region.
    Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy 
to answer any questions you may have.
    Thank you.
    [Mr. Von Ah's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, 
                 U.S. Government Accountability Office
    Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on Arctic 
maritime infrastructure. As we have previously reported, climate change 
has led to widespread effects, including warming in the Arctic that has 
exceeded the warming in the rest of the world. Since 1900, the Arctic 
region has warmed by about 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit--double the rate of 
the global temperature increase--leading to a significant decline in 
sea ice cover over the last four decades.\1\ Record low levels of sea 
ice have made Arctic waters navigable for longer periods of time and 
have increased opportunities for shipping in the region. This change 
presents potential economic opportunities as well as safety and 
environmental risks, particularly given the lack of maritime 
infrastructure in the region. In particular, the U.S. Arctic does not 
have the typical elements of a marine transportation system, such as a 
deep-draft port,\2\ comprehensive waterways charting, and robust 
communications infrastructure. These gaps in infrastructure exacerbate 
the inherent challenges of maritime activity in the Arctic--vast 
distances, dangerous weather, and unpredictable ice conditions--that 
pose risks to mariners as well as to the fragile Arctic ecosystem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth 
National Climate Assessment, Volume II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Global 
Change Research Program, 2018).
    \2\ The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers defined a deep-draft port as 
one that can accommodate large vessels such as big cargo ships with a 
water depth greater than 35 feet. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic Port System Study (March 2013). The closest 
deep-draft port is Dutch Harbor in the southern Bering Sea and is over 
800 miles from the Bering Strait.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Within the United States, there are a number of stakeholders 
involved in maritime infrastructure in the Arctic, and they include 
several federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service that is 
responsible for maritime safety and security, environmental protection, 
and national security, among other responsibilities. Given the growing 
expanse of navigable waters and human activities, the Coast Guard faces 
expanding responsibilities for implementing and enforcing maritime 
policy in the region.
    We have previously made five recommendations to strategically plan 
and assess progress in federal efforts to address gaps in Arctic 
maritime capabilities and infrastructure. As described in greater 
detail in this statement, we are pleased to report that the U.S. 
Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) and the Executive 
Office of the President have addressed two of the three recommendations 
in our April 2020 report.\3\ Specifically, the CMTS--a federal 
interagency coordinating committee focused on the maritime 
transportation system--has addressed our recommendation to assess the 
risks posed by gaps in U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure. In 
addition, the Executive Office of the President has addressed our 
recommendation to designate a group responsible for leading and 
coordinating federal Arctic maritime efforts. The Executive Office of 
the President has partially addressed our other April 2020 
recommendation to develop a strategy to address U.S. Arctic maritime 
infrastructure that identifies goals and objectives, performance 
measures to monitor agencies' progress. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard has 
not yet implemented our two June 2016 recommendations: (1) to develop 
measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic 
capability gaps and (2) to design and implement a process to 
systematically assess its progress.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ GAO, Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and 
Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S. 
Arctic, GAO-20-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2020).
    \4\ GAO, Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could 
Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps, 
GAO-16-453 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2016). In addition, GAO has 
issued several other reports on federal priorities in the Arctic. See 
GAO, Arctic Capabilities: Coast Guard is Taking Steps to Address Key 
Challenges, but Additional Work Remains, GAO-20-374T (Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 5, 2020); GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program 
Needs to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO, GAO-18-600 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018); and GAO, Arctic Planning: Navy 
Report to Congress Aligns with Current Assessments of Arctic Threat 
Levels and Capabilities Required to Execute DOD's Strategy, GAO-19-42 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    My statement today will address:
    1.  trends in maritime shipping in the U.S. Arctic since 2009,
    2.  the extent to which federal actions to address maritime 
infrastructure have been informed by risk, and
    3.  government-wide and Coast Guard strategies to address maritime 
infrastructure and assess outcomes.

    This statement is based primarily on our April 2020 report on U.S. 
Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps and June 2016 report on the Coast 
Guard's Arctic capabilities.\5\ For the reports cited in this 
statement, among other methodologies, we reviewed Arctic strategies, 
interviewed selected agencies involved with maritime infrastructure and 
capabilities, and compared efforts to leading practices. Since the 
issuance of these reports, we received and reviewed information from 
the White House and the Coast Guard on the actions taken in response to 
our recommendations. In addition to our prior work, for this statement 
we spoke to the Executive Director of the Arctic Executive Steering 
Committee (AESC) and collected updated Arctic shipping data from the 
Coast Guard. Based on our review of these data for anomalies, outliers, 
or missing information and our previous assessment of such data for our 
April 2020 report, we determined that these data were sufficiently 
reliable for our purposes of describing Arctic shipping trends since 
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ The term ``Arctic'' refers to the entire region north of the 
Arctic Circle. We define the ``U.S. Arctic'' as bounded by a line at 60 
degrees north that crosses the Bering Sea. This definition was set by 
the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations agency 
responsible for the safety and security of shipping.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found 
in the reports cited in this statement. We conducted the work on which 
this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
 Maritime Shipping in the U.S. Arctic Has Increased from 2009 through 
               2021 despite Challenging Safety Conditions
    Coast Guard data indicate that both the number of vessels in the 
U.S. Arctic and the number of transits through the Bering Strait 
increased from 2009 through 2021. Specifically, the number of vessels 
in the U.S. Arctic more than doubled from 130 in 2009 to 347 in 2021 
(see fig. 1). Given that a single vessel can make multiple trips per 
shipping season, the Coast Guard also measures maritime activity by the 
number of transits that vessels make per year through the Bering 
Strait, a key convergence point for trans-Arctic routes to the Pacific 
Ocean. According to that data, the number of transits through the 
Bering Strait increased from 280 in 2009 to 545 in 2021. The Coast 
Guard attributed increased cargo traffic levels in 2016 to the 
construction of a liquefied natural gas facility on the Yamal peninsula 
and, in subsequent years, identified Russian shipments from the 
facility as a driver of Bering Strait vessel traffic.

Figure 1: Number of Vessels in the Coast Guard Arctic Area of Interest, 
                               2009	2021

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. GAO-23-106411

   Note: The Coast Guard District 17 Arctic area of interest extends 
 north of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east to Banks Island in 
  the Canadian Arctic, and west to the New Siberian Islands in Russia.

    Although warming over the past decades has made trans-Arctic 
maritime routes more accessible, Arctic sea ice extent remains 
seasonal, with most shipping occurring during a narrow window extending 
from summer to early fall. Arctic sea ice typically reaches its maximum 
extent in March and its minimum in September each year; as a result, 
the shipping season is typically from June through October. As shown in 
figure 2, the extent of sea ice in September 2019 had a much smaller 
coverage area than the median September extent from 1981 to 2010. 
Meanwhile, the contraction of sea ice over time has increased 
accessibility to the Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago 
and the Northern Sea Route along the northern border of Russia. These 
two trans-Arctic maritime routes enable shipments between non-Arctic 
destinations, such as between Asia and Europe.\6\ However, most traffic 
in the U.S. Arctic is destinational, meaning it transports goods to and 
from the U.S. Arctic. Such traffic includes shipping supplies to U.S. 
Arctic communities, as well as transporting natural resources extracted 
from the U.S. Arctic to the global marketplace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Coast Guard officials note that because of more ice and much 
shallower draft restrictions, the Northwest Passage contains far less 
marine traffic than the Northern Sea Route.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure 2: Trans-Arctic Maritime Routes and Arctic Sea Ice Extents from 
 March and September 2019 Compared with the September Median, 1981 to 
                                  2010

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

 Sources: GAO analysis of National Snow and Ice Data Center; Office of 
            Naval Intelligence; Map Resources. GAO-23-106411

    Although diminished sea ice has prolonged the shipping season and 
opened up shipping routes, environmental changes have also resulted in 
less predictable conditions, with more volatile weather and sea ice. In 
April 2020 we reported that stakeholders told us variation in ice 
conditions from year to year makes planning Arctic voyages difficult to 
do with reasonable accuracy.\7\ The unpredictable and harsh weather and 
ice conditions--combined with the vast distances and lack of maritime 
infrastructure--pose safety risks that stretch the region's already 
limited search and rescue capabilities and slow incidence response, 
according to stakeholders.
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    \7\ GAO-20-460.
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 Federal Agencies' Actions to Address Arctic Infrastructure Gaps Have 
       Not Been Informed by a Government-wide Assessment of Risks
    We have previously identified gaps in maritime infrastructure that 
can exacerbate inherent challenges to shipping in the Arctic.\8\ For 
example, since all of the Coast Guard's permanent assets are based well 
below the Arctic Circle, the agency is constrained by the time for 
surface vessels and aircraft to travel the vast distances to support 
operations above the Arctic Circle.\9\ See table 1 for examples of 
maritime infrastructure gaps in the U.S. Arctic identified by the U.S. 
Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) and other federal 
agencies as we reported in April 2020.\10\
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    \8\ GAO-20-460.
    \9\ GAO-16-453.
    \10\ CMTS is a federal interagency coordinating committee focused 
on the maritime transportation system.

 Table 1: Examples of Maritime Infrastructure Gaps in the U.S. Arctic as
                       GAO Reported in April 2020
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Status in the U.S.
     Infrastructure Category           Examples             Arctic
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Environmental information.......  Charting and        GAO reported in
                                   mapping.            April 2020 that
                                                       less than 5
                                                       percent of the
                                                       U.S. maritime
                                                       Arctic had been
                                                       comprehensively
                                                       surveyed to
                                                       modern standards
                                                       for nautical
                                                       chart updates,
                                                       according to the
                                                       National Oceanic
                                                       and Atmospheric
                                                       Administration
                                                       (NOAA).
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Weather and sea     NOAA's National
                                   ice forecasting.    Weather Service
                                                       and the U.S.
                                                       National Ice
                                                       Center--a
                                                       partnership among
                                                       NOAA, the U.S.
                                                       Navy, and the
                                                       Coast Guard--
                                                       produce sea ice
                                                       and weather
                                                       forecasts. NOAA
                                                       has previously
                                                       noted that
                                                       observations that
                                                       are needed for
                                                       timely forecasts,
                                                       such as for wind
                                                       and clouds, are
                                                       very limited in
                                                       the Arctic.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Response services...............  Search and rescue.  There is limited
                                                       infrastructure to
                                                       support aviation-
                                                       based search and
                                                       rescue
                                                       operations. The
                                                       nearest Coast
                                                       Guard air station
                                                       to Utqiagvik, on
                                                       Alaska's northern
                                                       coast, is about
                                                       945 miles away in
                                                       Kodiak.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Oil spill response  NOAA, Coast Guard,
                                                       Interior, and the
                                                       State of Alaska
                                                       have roles in
                                                       this area. Their
                                                       ability to
                                                       respond to oil
                                                       spills is
                                                       affected by the
                                                       communications
                                                       limitations in
                                                       the region and
                                                       the vast
                                                       distances over
                                                       which responders
                                                       and their
                                                       equipment must
                                                       travel.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Icebreakers.......  The Coast Guard's
                                                       medium polar
                                                       icebreaker Healy
                                                       was commissioned
                                                       in 2000 and is
                                                       the primary polar
                                                       icebreaker used
                                                       in the U.S.
                                                       Arctic. The only
                                                       Coast Guard heavy
                                                       polar icebreaker,
                                                       the Polar Star,
                                                       was commissioned
                                                       in 1976 and is
                                                       typically used in
                                                       Antarctica to
                                                       support McMurdo
                                                       station.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operating environment and         Communications....  Communications,
 Navigation.                                           which are
                                                       sufficient to
                                                       support voice and
                                                       data needs in the
                                                       Bering Sea but
                                                       limited at higher
                                                       latitudes, are
                                                       necessary for
                                                       vessels to
                                                       receive weather
                                                       and sea ice
                                                       information or
                                                       request emergency
                                                       services.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Deep-draft port...  The closest deep-
                                                       draft port is
                                                       Dutch Harbor in
                                                       the southern
                                                       Bering Sea and is
                                                       over 800 miles
                                                       from the Bering
                                                       Strait.
                                 ---------------------------------------
                                  Harbors of refuge.  A harbor of refuge
                                                       is a port, inlet,
                                                       or other body of
                                                       water normally
                                                       sheltered from
                                                       heavy seas by
                                                       land in which a
                                                       vessel can safely
                                                       moor during
                                                       severe conditions
                                                       or when it needs
                                                       repairs. The U.S.
                                                       Arctic lacks such
                                                       a harbor
                                                       designated by the
                                                       International
                                                       Maritime
                                                       Organization
                                                       (IMO).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of federal agency information. GAO-23-106411

    In 2020, we found that federal agencies had taken some actions to 
address gaps in U.S. Arctic infrastructure. For example, the Coast 
Guard reported that it had taken a flexible approach to addressing 
infrastructure gaps by establishing seasonal, forward operating bases 
in the U.S. Arctic as needed to provide search and rescue support in 
areas where major shipping activity is occurring. In addition, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported in 2019 that 
it had acquired nearly 1,500 square nautical miles of Arctic 
hydrographic survey data over the past 3 years. This, however, is a 
small percentage of the over 200,000 square nautical miles significant 
to navigation in the U.S. Arctic.
    We also found in 2020 that the agencies' actions were not based on 
a government-wide assessment of the economic, environmental, and safety 
risks posed by maritime infrastructure gaps to inform investment 
decisions in the U.S. Arctic. Rather, agency officials said that they 
based Arctic infrastructure decisions on their agency-specific 
missions, strategies, and collaborative efforts. Agency officials said 
that securing the resources to address U.S. Arctic infrastructure is 
challenging because such projects must compete with other established 
agency mission areas. For example, officials told us that 
infrastructure investments may not compete well against other agency-
established priorities in other parts of the country, in part, because 
the Arctic is an emerging region and because of the considerable costs 
of developing infrastructure in the harsh Arctic environment.
    We reported that without a government-wide assessment of the 
economic, environmental, and safety risks posed by maritime 
infrastructure gaps, agencies lack assurance that their investments are 
addressing the highest-priority risks.\11\ Risk management is a widely 
endorsed strategy for helping policymakers decide about allocating 
finite resources and taking actions in conditions of uncertainty.\12\ A 
government-wide risk assessment could better enable agencies to 
evaluate potential U.S. Arctic infrastructure expenditures and assess 
the extent to which these expenditures will mitigate identified risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ GAO-20-460.
    \12\ GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess 
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical 
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005). See also 
GAO, Enterprise Risk Management: Selected Agencies' Experiences 
Illustrate Good Practices in Managing Risks, GAO-17-63 (Washington, 
D.C.: Dec. 1, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We noted that the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation 
System (CMTS) was well suited to conduct such an assessment based on 
the committee's statutory role to coordinate the establishment of 
domestic transportation policies in the Arctic and its past work in 
this area. Therefore, we recommended that the CMTS complete a 
government-wide assessment of the economic, environmental, and safety 
risks posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic to 
inform investment priorities and decisions. In 2022, we confirmed that 
CMTS had taken several actions that, taken together, addressed the 
intent of this recommendation.\13\ As a result, the federal agencies 
responsible for addressing gaps in U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure 
will have more useful information to better inform their investment 
decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ In March 2022, CMTS published its ``U.S. Arctic Marine 
Transportation System Infrastructure Risk Resource Compendium,'' which 
addresses a range of risks, including the economic, environmental, and 
safety issues affected by Arctic infrastructure gaps. While this 
compendium does not represent a government-wide assessment of all risks 
posed by the infrastructure gaps, it provides useful information to 
federal agencies responsible for addressing gaps in U.S. Arctic 
maritime infrastructure to better inform their investment decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Government-wide and Coast Guard Strategies Lack a Means to Measure 
                 Progress in Addressing Infrastructure
    In April 2020, we found that government-wide interagency efforts to 
address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure lacked an up-to-date 
strategy and consistent interagency leadership to guide agency 
actions.\14\ In particular, in our April 2020 report we recommended 
that the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the 
President, including the Office of Science Technology and Policy 
(OSTP):
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ GAO-20-460.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1.  Develop and publish a strategy for addressing U.S. Arctic 
maritime infrastructure that identifies goals and objectives, 
performance measures to monitor agencies' progress over time, and the 
appropriate responses to address risks.
    2.  Designate the interagency group responsible for leading and 
coordinating federal efforts to address maritime infrastructure in the 
U.S. Arctic that includes all relevant stakeholders.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ OSTP is an office within the White House that leads 
interagency science and technology policy coordination efforts.

    As of December 2022, the Executive Office of the President has 
addressed our recommendation to designate a group responsible for 
leading and coordinating federal Arctic maritime efforts. It did so in 
September 2021 by announcing the White House would reactivate the 
Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) as a mechanism to advance 
U.S. interests and coordinate federal actions in the Arctic, including 
maritime infrastructure.\16\ In doing so, the White House appointed an 
executive director who convened the first meeting in December 2021. As 
of December 2022, according to the Executive Director of the AESC, the 
group has met several times and has developed and approved eight 
interagency initiatives. One of the eight initiatives--to advance safe 
and environmentally secure Arctic shipping--is led by the Coast Guard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ The AESC is chaired by the Director of the OSTP and it 
includes members from more than 20 other federal departments and 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, as of December 2022, the Executive Office of the 
President has partially addressed our April 2020 recommendation to 
develop a strategy to address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure. In 
October 2022, the White House issued a National Strategy for the Arctic 
Region, which updated the previous National Strategy for the Arctic 
Region, issued by the Obama Administration in May 2013.\17\ OSTP 
officials told GAO that they had participated in this work, which had 
been led by the National Security Council (NSC). The updated strategy 
covers the period from 2022 to 2032, and establishes four ``pillars'' 
to address both domestic and international issues in the U.S. Arctic. 
They are: (1) security; (2) climate change and environmental 
protection; (3) sustainable economic development; and (4) international 
cooperation and governance. The strategy identifies needed maritime 
capability improvements in the U.S. Arctic, including for enhanced 
communications, mapping, charting, and navigational capabilities, as 
well as the need for a deep draft harbor in Nome, Alaska.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Our April 2020 report noted that agency officials and 
stakeholders regarded the 2013 strategy as outdated, given the changes 
in conditions in the region. In particular, agency officials said 
national security was a growing concern in the Arctic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the current strategy does not establish goals and measures 
specifically to addressing Arctic maritime infrastructure as GAO 
recommended in April 2020. For example, although the strategy 
identifies an objective to invest in infrastructure such as supporting 
the development of a deep draft harbor, the strategy does not specify 
how agencies should prioritize these investments or identify goals and 
measures to assess progress. In November 2022, the AESC Executive 
Director told GAO that the White House--including OSTP and NSC--is 
early in the process of developing an implementation plan for the 
strategy. The AESC Executive Director noted that for each major action 
in the strategy, the implementation plan should identify lead and 
supporting agencies as well as a way to measure progress and to 
identify investment priorities and resources necessary to implement 
these actions. By completing this plan and establishing goals and 
associated performance measures, the federal government would have the 
tools to demonstrate the results of its efforts, and decision makers 
could gauge the extent of progress in addressing maritime 
infrastructure gaps.
    In addition, in June 2016, we found that the Coast Guard identified 
various gaps in its U.S. Arctic capabilities but had not assessed its 
progress in addressing these gaps.\18\ For example, the Coast Guard 
polar icebreaking fleet comprises two operational polar icebreakers--
the Polar Star and Healy--of which only the Healy is currently 
operating in the Arctic. However, we found that, although the Coast 
Guard was taking some actions related to maritime in the Arctic, the 
Coast Guard had not assessed how its actions helped to mitigate its 
Arctic capability gaps. We noted that such an assessment--which would 
include developing measures for gauging its progress, when feasible--is 
critical to the Coast Guard's understanding of its progress toward 
addressing these gaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ GAO-16-453.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard (1) develop 
measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic 
capability gaps and (2) design and implement a process to 
systematically assess its progress.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ GAO-16-453.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As of December 2022, however, the Coast Guard had not yet 
implemented these two recommendations. The Coast Guard is currently 
updating its implementation plan for the Arctic strategy it published 
in 2019. The plan is expected to provide the foundation for assessing 
efforts to address Arctic capability gaps. Coast Guard officials stated 
that they are also developing a strategic metrics framework for 
measuring progress in addressing the capability gaps. Coast Guard 
officials did not identify when they plan to complete the plan and 
framework, stating that these are longer-term efforts.
    Developing a means to measure progress in addressing capability 
gaps is especially important given recent and planned investments in 
Coast Guard capabilities. For example, the Coast Guard, in 
collaboration with the Navy, plans to invest an estimated $13.3 billion 
for the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of three heavy polar 
icebreakers--also known as the Polar Security Cutters--over their 
entire 30-year life cycle.\20\ The Coast Guard initiated procurement of 
the first Polar Security Cutter, awarding a $746 million contract for 
design and construction in April 2019. By assessing and measuring how 
its actions have helped to mitigate capability gaps, the Coast Guard 
will be better positioned to plan its Arctic operations more 
effectively, including prioritizing activities to target gaps and 
allocating resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ This estimate is the acquisition program baseline as of May 
2021. See GAO, DHS Annual Assessment: Most Acquisition Programs Are 
Meeting Goals Even with Some Management Issues and COVID-19 Delays, 
GAO-22-104684 (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2022).
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    Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Von Ah.
    We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will 
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing 
myself.
    Vice Admiral Gautier, I understand that the closest deep-
draft port to the Arctic is in the Aleutian Islands, some 800 
miles from the Bering Strait and some 1,000 miles from the 
northern population center in Barrow.
    That means that, unless an icebreaker happens to be nearby, 
a Coast Guard cutter or aircraft would have to travel over 
1,000 miles to a potential maritime search and rescue case. 
That clearly won't work.
    Please give us a sense of the magnitude of the investments 
that would be necessary for the Coast Guard to establish a 
year-round Arctic base and also what the benefits may be to 
doing so versus the Coast Guard's current seasonal operating 
approach.
    Admiral Gautier. Mr. Chairman, so the Coast Guard's Alaska 
home port that launches our Arctic operations is Kodiak. And we 
deeply appreciate Congress' support to continue the build-out 
of Kodiak.
    I think the port you are referring to is Dutch Harbor, and 
we do operate forward pretty frequently from Dutch Harbor, 
Alaska.
    The Coast Guard currently hasn't identified a specific 
deep-water port that we require as a home port, but we are 
really encouraged by sort of a whole-of-Government or 
interagency thoughts in terms of building additional Arctic 
infrastructure like Nome that was mentioned in the new National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region. We will use those locations for 
our Coast Guard operations if those are built.
    The further you get north, sir, to answer your first 
element of your question, the more expensive things get.
    Mr. Carbajal. I kind of figured that.
    Dr. Sfraga, in your written testimony, you discuss how the 
Coast Guard's engagement with scientific research may be used 
to advance soft-power diplomacy.
    How do you gauge the importance of the Coast Guard's 
diplomacy and soft power in a region where Russia and China 
have taken such publicly aggressive actions?
    Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As the Admiral noted, presence does a lot of things, 
including influence and match our presence to others. The Coast 
Guard really is the tip of the spear for us in the north, 
whether we are talking about the Bering Sea or the Barents, on 
either side of the North American continent.
    So, to have the Coast Guard patrolling in those areas, my 
home off the coast of Alaska, or with allies in Europe off the 
coast of Iceland and Greenland, north of Norway in the Barents, 
it shows that the United States is engaged. Most of the time, 
we are engaged with our allies.
    This is a signal. It is not unlike a signal that NATO 
provides, where we have multiple partners. The United States 
enjoys partnerships and allies. Russia does not enjoy that. 
China does not enjoy that. We do.
    And so, to bring together our Coast Guard with others does 
a number of things: interoperability--tyranny of distance in 
the north is a thing to overcome, unlike others. So, together, 
we can incorporate our interoperability. Two, having the 
presence there. Three, understanding that domain better. 
Although our Coast Guard has a long history, that domain is 
changing as we speak.
    So, to have a presence there most of the year, all year 
around, just projects U.S. national interests and projects our 
sovereignty over that area.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Mr. Von Ah, to what extent has the Arctic maritime 
transiting season been lengthened due to melting sea ice? Can 
you expand on how this lengthened season increases risk for the 
United States in terms of maritime safety and environmental 
stewardship? For example, how has this affected the personnel 
needs and resource allocations of the Coast Guard?
    Mr. Von Ah. Thanks for that question, Chairman Carbajal.
    So, recent data that we looked at shows that it has 
increased from--it used to be more around 3 months. For several 
years, it was looking like it was 5 months that there was 
access to that region. And, most recently, that increased to 7 
months, based on the information we saw.
    So, obviously, that puts pressure on the Coast Guard and 
puts demand on services for Coast Guard, whether it is 
potentially for inspecting new vessels crossing the Bering 
Strait to see that they are outfitted correctly, incident 
response, or just for general security and safety in the 
region.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    I now would like to recognize Ranking Member Gibbs.
    Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman.
    Vice Admiral, in the National Defense Authorization Act, 
which I guess we are going to vote on today I think, there is a 
request for authorization for an icebreaker and then also an 
existing icebreaker. The measure will waive certain contracting 
requirements that apply to construction of these new vessels.
    Assuming these funds are provided for the requested 
acquisition, how long do you expect this acquisition to take? 
And what additional funds will be required to refit this vessel 
for Coast Guard use in the Arctic? And when do you expect such 
a vessel to be available for service?
    Admiral Gautier. First off, Ranking Member, we really enjoy 
the congressional support that we are getting on the commercial 
icebreaker acquisition and for the relief needed in order to 
field it more quickly.
    So, our plan for this--and it is a bit of a voyage of 
discovery. We just haven't purchased commercially. In the Coast 
Guard, we traditionally don't do that--is, once we can get the 
money to acquire it, is to do a phased-in approach so we can do 
some just very initial work on it to make it a basic Coast 
Guard cutter. So, some basic damage control, basic command and 
control, and a paint job and staffing to make it a Coast Guard 
cutter so we can field it in the Arctic as quickly as possible.
    We think that in a phased-in approach over 2 years we can 
make it, then continue to build it out into the type of Coast 
Guard cutter that we need it to be, with the full suite of 
requirements met, so that we can then homeport it in a location 
where it will be operable in the Arctic.
    Mr. Gibbs. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. Sfraga--did I say that right?
    Mr. Sfraga. ``Sfraga.''
    Mr. Gibbs. ``Sfraga.'' OK. Thank you.
    The issues the Coast Guard, with the icebreaker--the Coast 
Guard kind of pretends the Healy's replacement is an unrelated 
topic, but designing an Arctic Security Cutter, also a Great 
Lakes icebreaker. Do you believe that the Coast Guard cutter 
Healy, which is used for Arctic research, should be 
recapitalized by providing for a fourth Polar Security Cutter, 
assigning an Arctic Security Cutter to the mission, designing a 
purpose-built research icebreaker, or using an array of 
unmanned platforms and other investments to deal with that 
issue?
    Do you understand?
    Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Ranking Member. If I understand the 
question correctly, it is Arctic Security Cutter versus 
unmanned----
    Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Some of that, yes.
    Mr. Sfraga. OK.
    Mr. Gibbs. And then I think, too, more Polar Security 
Cutters.
    Mr. Sfraga. And more Polar Security Cutters.
    Well, the hearing today is about the Arctic, and I know the 
Polar Security Cutters, the heavies, will likely go down to the 
Antarctic. It doesn't preclude them from going north, but, in 
terms of the research community, we really do need those assets 
north. So, we would advocate for an Arctic Security Cutter to 
be outfitted to support research to head north sometime sooner 
rather than later.
    As I said, the Healy is going to phase out in a very short 
period of time in the icebreaker life. So, we are concerned 
about what happens then. Not that you should take away from the 
portfolio of a Polar Security Cutter program, but the fact is, 
our Nation needs a reliable Arctic Security Cutter, something 
like the Healy. If we do not have the Healy, we will not have 
capacity----
    Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. OK. So, I guess what you are 
saying, you favor the Arctic Security Cutter instead of having 
a polar research vessel to operate in both Antarctica and the 
Arctic? You want the other vessel to be just operating in the 
Arctic?
    Mr. Sfraga. The research community would like to have a 
dedicated icebreaker in the north that we could rely on to 
conduct our research.
    Mr. Gibbs. OK.
    Vice Admiral, I want to bring this up. Our late esteemed 
chairman, Don Young, represented Alaska for almost 50 years and 
had an issue up at St. George. There was a facility that was 
housing a helicopter for search and rescue, I believe. And I 
think anything close to that was more than 400 miles. And the 
Coast Guard had a lease agreement, and the locals didn't 
maintain the roof, and things kind of fell apart.
    What's the status--it seems to me that the environment up 
there and the distances, that it is probably a pretty important 
thing to have that capability of that helicopter for rescue 
missions and so on. Is the Coast Guard planning on reentering a 
lease and making sure that the facility is kept up? What are 
your thoughts on what your plans are?
    Admiral Gautier. It is important for the Coast Guard to 
that have that location in Saint Paul Island with the hangar so 
we can pre-stage helicopters out of that location. Especially 
as we see fish stocks migrating further north and the fishing 
fleet that is following that, Saint Paul Island is just an 
important location where we can conduct our missions more 
readily with the fishing fleet.
    So, we understand that in the draft authorization bill 
there is some language that might provide us a degree of relief 
that will enable us to continue to use that, and we do commit 
to using that facility.
    Mr. Gibbs. Will you commit to, prior to January 31st of 
next year entering a lease, that you will brief the 
subcommittee staff on that issue, before you enter into a 
lease?
    Admiral Gautier. So, if I understand the question, with the 
relief provided under the auth bill, that we would continue the 
leasing of that hangar so we can operate helicopters out of----
    Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Yes, I think what the 
subcommittee staff is looking at is a briefing from your folks 
prior to signing the lease, I think, to understand what the 
plan is.
    Because I think the concern is, when you are entering a 
lease, that the incident that happened with the damaged hangar 
won't happen again, and we won't be left without having that 
capability in that area.
    Admiral Gautier. Right. Yes, we really look forward to a 
future where we can resolve the issues so that we can use a 
hangar that is appropriate----
    Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Yes, I understand that. I think 
the subcommittee staff wants to be kept up to speed----
    Admiral Gautier [interposing]. Absolutely.
    Mr. Gibbs [continuing]. And make sure that--they want input 
and to make sure the lease is what is going to work.
    Admiral Gautier. Certainly.
    Mr. Gibbs. I think that is--I yield back.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs.
    I now would like to recognize Chairman DeFazio.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Vice Admiral, you weren't around then, but I objected to 
the icebreaker contract with Halter that had never, ever built 
anything like that before. And I said, this is a really dumb 
idea. I still don't know why it happened.
    And, luckily, they have now been taken over by a company 
that actually has built and can continue to build ships and has 
built a bunch of Coast Guard boats with never a single defect.
    So, I just caution, if we--I am hoping that the Coast Guard 
will finish its evaluation on the ASCs. I don't see how you are 
going to get by without them. The Healy is kind of getting old 
and could use some modern replacements, and I think there is 
going to be a lot of work coming.
    How far away do you think you are on finishing an 
evaluation of the need for the ASCs?
    Admiral Gautier. Well, certainly, your counsel is 
incredibly valuable, given your history on this topic.
    Our focus is on the Polar Security Cutters at the moment, 
as you said. We do intend on forming a program of record in the 
future where we can examine requirements for a follow-on Arctic 
Security Cutter, a medium icebreaker, to provide us the sort of 
fleet mix and flexibility that we think we need.
    That is out in the future while we continue to focus on our 
preeminent acquisition, the PSC, plus now, with the support of 
Congress, bringing on this commercial medium icebreaker into 
the fleet.
    Mr. DeFazio. Right. Well, I mean, the PSCs, they are going. 
I mean, all you needed was to oversee it, and now you have 
someone who can actually build ships. So, it is not going to 
take a lot of work, unlike that other company.
    But the commercial--I think you have already addressed the 
commercial acquisition and the potential for that. And I 
understand that is going to take some time. But I would hope 
then you immediately move on to ASCs. I have some sense of 
haste.
    I just really think, even when we finally get to three 
functional, modern, major icebreakers, I mean, you still have 
the Antarctic mission and other things. I think the flexibility 
that the smaller ones afford is going to be absolutely 
necessary. And I just hope that there will be a real focus on 
that.
    I am also wondering, are you looking at interesting or new 
technologies for the region, whether that would be some 
unmanned aviation surveillance or things like that to extend 
your look in that region?
    Admiral Gautier. Yes, we certainly are, Mr. Chairman. I 
think the use of UAS is going to expand the eyes and ears that 
will just help us perform our mission that much better.
    The other thing that we continue to actually make some 
progress on is communications in the high latitude, which has 
been a historical challenge given just the nature of operating 
up there. And we are making progress along those lines, too.
    Mr. DeFazio. So, in the Arctic region, satellite 
communication is--I mean, just because of where you are at, 
there is no real good satellite communication?
    Admiral Gautier. Actually, there has been progress that is 
being made both with the Department of Defense and commercial 
industry. Space Force just launched two satellites that can 
provide us some secure communications and improvements in the 
high latitudes. And there are a number of commercial concerns 
that continue to launch constellations that will cover the high 
latitudes. So, actually, we are quite encouraged along those 
lines.
    Mr. DeFazio. Great. Great. That is going to fill in some 
gaps.
    That is it, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my 
time. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Next, I will recognize Representative Weber.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I, too, want to add my word of thanks to Peter DeFazio 
for chairing the committee. And he is not paying attention, so, 
I will have to kill time here, which is OK for a Congressman. 
We have a saying, ``Why use four words when eight will do?''
    And so, Mr. Chairman, I was just saying we are going to 
miss you. I went on a codel with you and Myrnie over to Europe, 
the T&I Committee. It was great fun, and it was very well 
organized and very well done. I think Kathy probably had a lot 
to do with that. But I wish the best for you.
    And, Bob Gibbs, we are going to miss you. I remember when I 
was a freshman and came up here the first time, I parked in 
your parking space, because I didn't know better. And you were 
very gracious. And I have never recovered from that, because I 
am getting paid back. Every time there is a new crew, they seem 
to park in my parking space.
    But, anyway, thank you all. Congratulations for a job well 
done.
    A couple of questions, if I may, I guess to you, Vice 
Admiral.
    We have a company called GulfLink that is working on a 
project in Missouri City. And at a previous hearing in April of 
this year, MARAD Acting Administrator Lessley stated on the 
record that the USCG environmental review and MARAD record of 
decision for Texas GulfLink--you may have to do a little 
checking on that, Texas GulfLink--would be completed at the 
early part of 2023.
    And, of course, their question, as you might have supposed, 
is: Are we on track with that? Do you have any knowledge of 
that?
    Admiral Gautier. I do have knowledge of that. And that is 
right; the Coast Guard is tightly coordinated with MARAD in 
their lead Federal agency role in the permitting of this 
project. We are providing MARAD with information so they can 
conduct the environmental analysis.
    On our side, the Coast Guard has responsibility for doing 
things like reviewing their operations plan and making sure 
they comply with the safety and security regulations. They 
needed to do a risk analysis and some other things.
    So, those efforts will continue on the Coast Guard side 
without delay, sir.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. All right. I appreciate that.
    And, secondly, on November 17th, Representative Babin and 
myself wrote the Coast Guard a letter with questions regarding 
VT Halter.
    Does the contract that the Coast Guard approved for VT 
Halter require that U.S. law is followed in all aspects?
    Admiral Gautier. It does.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. It does?
    Has the Coast Guard contacted VT Halter to instruct the 
company that they need to resolve the question of proper 
licensing for the use of patented technology?
    Admiral Gautier. I think, in general, in working with VT 
Halter, we reinforced the fact that they need to comply with 
law.
    I think on the particular instance that you might be 
referring to, my understanding is that there might be a 
complaint about a certain patent infringement. To date, the 
Coast Guard nor DoD or the Navy have received through channels 
a complaint on any patent infringements, but we understand that 
something might be out there. And if and when we receive 
something, we will act appropriately and take it seriously.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. So, you know that it is out there, and 
during the recent purchase of VT Halter by Bollinger 
Shipyards--and you all did a review of that purchase, right?
    Admiral Gautier. We haven't actually received a patent 
infringement complaint, sir.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. Nothing at all? Well, you are aware of 
that patent licensing issue. So, was that included in the Coast 
Guard review of the sale? The possibility, if nothing else.
    Admiral Gautier. Not to my knowledge specifically.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. OK. Do you know when we could 
anticipate an answer to these questions? Could you look into 
that? You said not to your knowledge.
    Admiral Gautier. Well, certainly, sir, we could. But I 
think it is important that any entity that might have a patent 
infringement complaint needs to make that complaint to the 
Federal Government through channels.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. OK, but you are aware of it; it just 
has not come through the right channels to you?
    Admiral Gautier. It has not been received by the Navy or 
the Coast Guard through our Integrated Program Office.
    Mr. Weber of Texas. OK. Well, I appreciate that and 
appreciate your response.
    I appreciate what you all do. My oldest and longest--well, 
my youngest and longest living uncle, Vernon Weber, was a 
Coastie. And he is 92 and living up in Woodville, Texas. And 
so, we appreciate you guys.
    And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Weber.
    I will now recognize Representative Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Admiral, first for you, this is somewhat related to Mr. 
DeFazio's questions, but I wonder if you could be more 
specific.
    In 2018, the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center 
identified a number of interrelated capability gaps that could 
challenge the Coast Guard's ability to operate in the Arctic, 
including voice and data communications and sensor coverage.
    And I was curious what steps the Coast Guard has taken to 
address those gaps, and is there anything yet that needs to be 
done?
    Admiral Gautier. Sir, we have issued a contract for second-
generation Coast Guard communications capabilities across the 
entire fleet of Coast Guard cutters, not just the ones that 
will be operating in the Arctic.
    And, as part of this, we continue to work closely with DoD, 
like in the Space Force example that I mentioned, where they 
are providing some additional coverage through their 
constellation in the polar regions for military-specific secure 
communications.
    In addition to that, working directly with other commercial 
providers and then other entities like DHS Science and 
Technology, we are exploring efforts for commercial satellite 
provision. In fact, the Polar Star, which is a couple of days 
out of Australia, headed down to Antarctica, is carrying a 
commercial satellite receiving capability on it for operation 
in Antarctica.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Is that going to be--is that 
experimental? Is that prototyping? Or is this a----
    Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. It is. We are essentially 
experimenting with a couple of different options, and this one 
is just an easy, commercially available one. It will enable the 
crewmembers to communicate back with their families and things 
like that.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. With regards to Space Force 
capability, without getting too far into this in this setting, 
is that strictly a military communications capability for 
national security uses only?
    Admiral Gautier. To my knowledge, it is.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. To your knowledge. OK, yes.
    So, in terms of commercial or safety, environmental 
purposes, your communication and sensors--you haven't developed 
those capabilities to address these other missions of the Coast 
Guard in the Arctic region?
    Admiral Gautier. Congressman, we are improving. We are not 
necessarily where we want to be or need to be. We still think 
that we have gaps, but the good news here is that, in 
particular, the commercial capability is being fielded pretty 
quickly to be able to close those gaps.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. And so, related to that, the 
commercial fishing industry supports a lot of jobs in my State, 
and in Alaska, obviously. A lot of folks, they live in the 
Pacific Northwest during the winter and fish up north in the 
summer for obvious reasons. The Coast Guard plays a pretty key 
role, though, in responding to spills and other environmental 
pollution incidents that have an impact on the quality of 
fishing.
    There are techniques to remove oil from ice-heavy 
landscapes, but those are still underdeveloped. Is the Coast 
Guard taking any action to put any work into developing those 
techniques?
    Admiral Gautier. We are. Through our research--the Coast 
Guard's research and development programs and the network we 
then have through other elements like DHS Science and 
Technology and other research institutions, the Coast Guard has 
been working on some solutions. In particular, for ice-covered 
waters in the Arctic, we recently tested an underwater remote 
vehicle that can detect oil sub-ice. And so, things like that 
we are proceeding at so we can close some of those gaps.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Mr. Von Ah, your testimony 
recommends that the Coast Guard develop measures for assessing 
how its actions have helped mitigate capability gaps and design 
and implement a process to address progress.
    Are there specific gaps that can be addressed more quickly 
if recommendations are implemented?
    Mr. Von Ah. Thank you for that question, Representative 
Larsen. I don't know if we have done the work to say whether or 
not there are certain gaps that could be addressed more 
quickly. Certainly, what we are looking for in our 
recommendations is the ability for these agencies to be able to 
prioritize their investments relative to the goals that we are 
trying to achieve in the Arctic, that are laid out in the 
Arctic maritime strategy and, in the Coast Guard's case, in 
their own agency Arctic strategy.
    So, we haven't seen an implementation plan yet from them in 
terms of how they are going to go about--what specific plans 
and what goals they have. We understand it is still being 
developed. And so, it is hard to say exactly which ones could 
go more quickly, but I think that is sort of what we are hoping 
to see in their plan.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. With that, thank you. I will 
yield back.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
    I will now recognize Representative Auchincloss.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
    I would like to focus on the Arctic Council and what 
Russia's war in Ukraine means for the alliance. The Arctic 
Council, as you all know, is a consensus-based 
intergovernmental forum made up of the eight Arctic nations, 
six indigenous peoples organizations, and a variety of other 
Government and nongovernmental partners. Russia was scheduled 
to chair the Council from 2021 to 2023, but was suspended from 
all participation due to its invasion of Ukraine.
    Vice Admiral, a question for you. Accepting as a premise 
that the Arctic Council is an important international convenor 
for the maritime community and serves U.S. security and 
economic interests, what is the Coast Guard planning to do to 
fill the void of leadership left by Russia at the Arctic 
Council?
    Admiral Gautier. The Arctic Council is indeed an important 
international forum to maintain the sorts of free and open and 
stable Arctic waters that we all hope to enjoy. So, when Russia 
invaded Ukraine, Arctic Council activities were suspended for a 
time, but then the remaining Council members got together, 
absent Russia, and put together a work plan with some projects 
to continue as they can, as we can, to move forward on some of 
those items.
    So, Norway becomes the chair of Arctic Council in April of 
next year, and there are discussions about what a work program 
moving forward might look like for the Arctic Council in the 
future.
    Mr. Auchincloss. The Coast Guard has no assets permanently 
stationed above the Arctic Circle, compared to Russia's 6 
Arctic bases and 14 newly built icebreakers. So, given these 
limitations, what can Congress do to support us asserting our 
leadership with this vacuum that is being created in the Arctic 
Council?
    Admiral Gautier. Well, in terms of not having a home port, 
so to speak, by the Arctic Council, continued support for the 
types of investments that we have requested in terms of basing 
of our Polar Security Cutters, in terms of other home ports. 
Things like you supporting in Kodiak are tremendously 
important.
    So, the State Department leads our delegation to the Arctic 
Council, and I think just general Government congressional 
support of what U.S. Government does in the Arctic Council is 
helpful.
    Likewise, we have a more preeminent role in the Arctic 
Coast Guard Forum, which is different but related to that. And 
our conversations with respect to oilspill response, search and 
rescue, and other things that we do in the Arctic Coast Guard 
Forum, we hope to move forward under Norway's chairmanship in 
the future, too.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Good. So, in addition to Russia being 
increasingly aggressive, they released a naval doctrine in 
August that emphasized the Arctic Ocean's importance to the 
country, and I already talked through their assets that they 
have.
    China is also increasing the assertive. In February 2022, 
Beijing and Moscow pledged in a joint statement to increase 
cooperation on sustainable development in the Arctic. In 
September, Chinese and Russian warships conducted a joint 
exercise in the Bering Sea. In September, the USCG cutter 
Kimball was on patrol when it identified a Chinese-guided 
missile cruiser about 75 nautical miles north of Alaska's Kiska 
Island.
    How are you redistributing your assets and patrols given 
increased activity and demonstrated interest by the CCP in 
operating in the Arctic?
    Admiral Gautier. So, our Coast Guard District 17 commander 
has created an operation called Frontier Shield. And what we 
have done is--so, with the decommissioning of our High 
Endurance Cutters, or 378s, we have operated more National 
Security Cutters in the region in addition to the Coast Guard 
cutter Healy. And we are on patrol in a way where we can get, 
through intelligence means and the Department of Defense, sort 
of an advanced warning of where we might be confronting or 
seeing these surface action groups so we can position ourselves 
the right way so we can meet their presence with our presence 
to make sure everyone is complying with international rules and 
norms.
    Mr. Auchincloss. We need to make it absolutely clear, and 
not just in the South China Sea, but also clearly in the Arctic 
as well, that the United States Navy and Coast Guard is going 
to ensure that international waters are a global commons that 
are to be navigated free of incursions by CCP. It needs to be 
absolutely unequivocal. To the extent that you need support 
from Congress in doing so, I hope that you will be forthcoming.
    Admiral Gautier. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Auchincloss.
    Next, I will recognize Representative Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
the privilege of joining your committee for this hearing.
    The Arctic should be on all of our minds. I know the Coast 
Guard has been trying to provide the necessary activities in 
the Coast Guard for a long time, and, unfortunately, has not 
been able to develop the necessary vessels, basically 
icebreakers of various kinds, to do the job. I want to focus on 
the icebreaker issue, which was discussed earlier. So, I am 
going do it again.
    What is the current status of the one heavy icebreaker that 
soon will be under construction? When do you expect it to be 
completed?
    Admiral Gautier. Sir, you are referring to the Polar Star, 
I believe. The status of the Polar Star, actually, a few days 
out of Australia on its way to----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. No. No, no. I am sorry. Not 
that. That one is the only one you have, but the new one that 
you intend to----
    Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. Oh, on the Healy or the----
    Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. Well, let me put it more----
    Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. On the Polar Security 
Cutter, my apologies.
    Mr. Garamendi. You are authorized and you have money to 
build an icebreaker. What is the status of that project?
    Admiral Gautier. Forgive me, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. That is OK.
    Admiral Gautier. I understand the question.
    So, in terms of the Polar Security Cutter progress, in 
terms of construction, we do know that it is taking longer than 
we anticipated to complete, for the shipyard to complete, the 
detailed design phase of the Polar Security Cutter project. 
This is a crucial phase that needs to happen right, especially 
on the first-of-class icebreaker before we can move together 
with construction of the first PSC.
    So, having said that, it is unlikely, sir, that the lead 
PSC will be delivered during fiscal year 2025, which I think 
might have been the latest update from the Coast Guard on that. 
And that's what is in the contract. And, in fact, we assess 
that there is considerable schedule risk even for delivery in 
fiscal year 2026.
    Mr. Garamendi. So, we are looking beyond 2025?
    Admiral Gautier. We are.
    Mr. Garamendi. Any idea how far beyond? You say there is 
risk in the schedule.
    Admiral Gautier. Sir, we want to give you a precise 
estimate of what that looks like, and we won't----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. You have not been precise in 
the past, so, just give me a range. Are we talking 2030?
    Admiral Gautier. We need to evaluate what this detailed 
design phase, how long it is going to take.
    Mr. Garamendi. When will you come to us with that 
evaluation?
    Admiral Gautier. We are at risk to be into fiscal year 
2027, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. So, what do you intend to do between now and 
then, that being, what, 6 years from now?
    Admiral Gautier. We are continuing to compress the schedule 
wherever we can on the acquisitions. We have asked, as you 
know, for funding in this fiscal year to purchase a 
commercially available medium icebreaker.
    Mr. Garamendi. And what is the status of that purchase? I 
assume that is the Chouest.
    Admiral Gautier. Pending the fiscal year 2023 budget 
passage, sir, we intend on doing a quick evaluation and moving 
forward on an acquisition for that, and then moving into a 
phased-in process so we can get that into the Arctic as quickly 
as we possibly can.
    Mr. Garamendi. And your proposed schedule to accomplish 
that is?
    Admiral Gautier. We think it will be a phased-in 2-year 
schedule before we can have it homeported, permanently 
homeported and operational. We hope that we will be able to 
actually operate that particular icebreaker sooner than 2 years 
from now.
    Mr. Garamendi. Do you have a specific work plan to 
accomplish that?
    Admiral Gautier. We have, honestly, a lot of details to be 
filled in on that. We need to take a deeper look at the 
icebreaker that----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. You have not yet done a deep 
look at it?
    Admiral Gautier. Sorry?
    Mr. Garamendi. You have not yet done a deep look at that 
icebreaker?
    Admiral Gautier. We have done an initial evaluation of this 
particular icebreaker, but pending an acquisition, it will 
enable us to put together a much more----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Please. Understand, this 
committee, for at least the decade that I have been involved in 
it, wants you to have icebreakers. Don't dance with us. Give us 
the specific information we need to make it happen. You are 
going to need law. You are going to need money. You are going 
to need acquisition authority. You have got to give us the 
precise information. Don't dance around. You are very good at 
dancing. You haven't given me a solid answer on anything yet. 
But you have got to be very, very precise.
    This ship has been before you for more than a year, and yet 
you have not done a detailed look at what it is going to take, 
or maybe you are not willing to give us the information we need 
so that we can help make it happen.
    Now, there are other icebreakers that are available from 
foreign countries, specifically Finland and Sweden, that have 
offered to lease--long-term lease--icebreakers to the United 
States. Have you looked at that possibility?
    Admiral Gautier. We have looked at that possibility 
previously. Obviously, we need to have some statutory relief to 
Buy American in order to do something like that.
    Mr. Garamendi. We understand that. We know the law. We 
write the law. We understand. We also understand we have got a 
very serious problem in the Arctic. We don't have the ability 
to patrol the Arctic unless the Healy is available, and it is 
going to go into a shipyard and won't be available until just 
towards the end of the Arctic summer season, correct? That's 
standard.
    I will just tell you I am very disappointed. I am very, 
very disappointed. We have been at this 10 years, and the Coast 
Guard is still dancing around. You have got to come to us with 
a solid plan. Here is what we need. We need it by this date. 
Here is how we can get it done. And yes, you are going to need 
authority to do that, but you are not going to get authority 
until we know what it is and how the plan works. So, please, I 
am 10 years into this. I am pretty damn tired of the dancing 
around. OK.
    Now, what is the followup for the heavy icebreaker that is 
perhaps going to be done sometime between 2027 and 2030? What 
is the plan for the next followup?
    Admiral Gautier. So, we intend on opening up a program for 
a follow-on icebreaker, the Arctic Security Cutter is what we 
are calling it, as you know, a medium icebreaker.
    Mr. Garamendi. And you intend to?
    Admiral Gautier. We intend on creating a program of record 
in order to do that. Our focus is really on the Polar 
Security----
    Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Sir, if I might, 30 seconds?
    So, have you communicated with this committee about what 
that plan is?
    Admiral Gautier. I don't think we have provided details yet 
because, quite frankly, we need to develop those details.
    Mr. Garamendi. I yield back.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
    If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses 
from our first panel and will now call up panel 2. Thank you 
very much.
    Welcome. I would now like to welcome our next panel of 
witnesses: Dr. Rebecca Pincus, director of the Polar Institute 
at the Wilson Center; and Dr. Martha Grabowski, professor at Le 
Moyne College and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute--I hope I 
pronounced that right--and former chair of the Marine Board at 
the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
    Thank you for being here today, and I look forward to your 
testimony.
    Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be 
included in the record. As with the previous panel, since your 
written testimony has been made part of the record, the 
subcommittee requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Pincus, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF REBECCA PINCUS, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, POLAR INSTITUTE, 
WILSON CENTER; AND MARTHA GRABOWSKI, Ph.D., PROFESSOR, LE MOYNE 
   COLLEGE AND RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE; PAST CHAIR, 
MARINE BOARD, NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND 
                            MEDICINE

    Ms. Pincus. Thank you.
    Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished 
members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 
today as director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute.
    In keeping with the global, policy-focused work of the 
Wilson Center, I offer the following comments on the U.S. Coast 
Guard's Arctic missions in the context of U.S. national 
interests and objectives in the Arctic and beyond.
    My argument is threefold. First, that in the global context 
of long-term strategic competition, the Coast Guard is an 
effective means for strengthening relationships with allies and 
partners and for competing with adversaries via the integrated 
deterrence framework established in the National Defense 
Strategy.
    Second, that the U.S. has clearly identified the Indo-
Pacific as the priority theater and Europe as the secondary 
theater of strategic importance, and the Arctic must be 
understood in that strategic hierarchy.
    And third, for a number of practical reasons, the Coast 
Guard is a cost-effective means to pursue multiple national 
interests in the Arctic.
    The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic take place in the 
global context of geopolitical competition, with China as the 
pacing threat, while Russia is broadly viewed as an acute 
threat. The 2022 National Defense Strategy establishes the 
concept of integrated deterrents as the chief means of engaging 
in holistic competition with both China and Russia. The Coast 
Guard can play a unique role in integrated deterrence.
    In the Arctic and beyond, the Coast Guard is a welcome 
partner on a host of issues of shared concern. From search and 
rescue, to fisheries enforcement, to drug interdiction, the 
Coast Guard is a partner welcomed by countries around the 
world. The top maritime concerns of many partner nations are 
bread-and-butter U.S. Coast Guard missions: enforcing fisheries 
regulations, interdicting crime and terrorism at sea, and 
maritime safety and response. Coast Guard international 
partnerships enhance partner capacity, pave the way for U.S. 
access, and embody the vision of integrated deterrents 
enshrined in the NDS.
    In addition, clear identification I referenced above of the 
Indo-Pacific as the first priority and Russia and Europe as the 
second priority helps place the Arctic in context. In light of 
these priorities, the Department of Defense has identified 
stability in the Arctic as its desired objective, and is taking 
a requirements-driven approach to calibrating its posture in 
the Arctic.
    In pursuit of stability in the Arctic, the Coast Guard has 
an important role to play in the National Defense Strategy 
concept of campaigning. Defined in the NDS as the conduct and 
sequencing of logically linked military initiatives aimed at 
advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time, 
campaigning in the Arctic should not contribute to escalation. 
The Coast Guard is well-positioned to campaign without 
escalating, as white-hulled Coast Guard vessels are inherently 
less escalatory than Navy warships.
    Finally, given the extra costs associated with achieving 
and maintaining U.S. Government presence in the Arctic, it is 
imperative to achieve maximum results for the investment of 
taxpayer dollars. In the Arctic, the U.S. needs Swiss Army 
knife solutions: cheap, durable, and useful for accomplishing 
many different tasks. On a single patrol, a U.S. Coast Guard 
icebreaker might demonstrate sovereignty, respond to a search 
and rescue case, and support scientific research.
    The ability of Coast Guard assets to perform multiple 
missions in the Arctic simultaneously advances multiple 
national interests, in the spirit of the National Strategy for 
the Arctic Region's emphasis on whole-of-Government solutions.
    In conclusion, there are both strategic and practical 
reasons to fully resource the Coast Guard's Arctic missions. 
The Coast Guard is a highly useful tool for conducting 
integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engaging in strategic 
competition. For example, the Coast Guard could partner with 
Denmark and Greenland to build capacity and enhance Maritime 
Domain Awareness, strengthening our relations with these 
important allies.
    More importantly, the Coast Guard should develop a strategy 
for conducting and resourcing integrated deterrents and 
campaigning operations. The Arctic region provides an ideal 
test bed for developing and implementing integration concepts 
with global applicability.
    The Coast Guard is a useful means of meeting the complex 
threats to U.S. security interests and to ensuring a stable and 
open international system, but only if it can clearly identify 
a path forward and justify additional resources. The Coast 
Guard should be asked to proactively articulate a coherent, 
specific, and a rigorous strategic vision for its role in 
advancing U.S. strategic ends in the Arctic.
    Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts, and 
I look forward to your questions.
    [Ms. Pincus' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Pincus, Ph.D., Director, Polar Institute, 
                             Wilson Center
                              Introduction
    Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished members 
of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on the United 
States Coast Guard's (USCG) leadership on Arctic safety, security, and 
environmental responsibility. I am Dr. Rebecca Pincus and I am honored 
to appear before you today as the Director of the Wilson Center's Polar 
Institute to discuss these issues.
    Prior to directing the Polar Institute, I served on the faculty of 
the U.S. Naval War College, in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. 
From 2020-2022, I was detailed from the Naval War College to the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, first to the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development office and 
later the newly established Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Arctic and Global Resilience. Before joining the Naval War College, I 
served on the faculty of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and led research 
for the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy.
                Woodrow Wilson Center's Polar Institute
    The Polar Institute was established as a program within the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2017. Since then, it has 
become a premier forum for discussion and policy analysis of Arctic 
issues. The Polar Institute holistically studies the central policy 
issues facing these regions, with an emphasis on Arctic governance, 
climate change, economic development, scientific research, security, 
and Indigenous communities. Our nonpartisan analysis and findings are 
communicated to policymakers and other stakeholders.
    The Polar Institute is holding a series of public events on the 
recently-released 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR). 
Our first event, in October, provided an opportunity for speakers from 
the Arctic Executive Steering Commission, National Security Council, 
Department of Defense, and Department of State to unpack the NSAR and 
discuss their agencies' work. Our next event will be a deep-dive into 
the work of the Department of Homeland Security in the Arctic. In 
February 2023, we will hold an event focusing on science and research 
in the Arctic. Events are livestreamed, and recordings are available on 
our website.
    In addition, we have ongoing work streams on Nordic and European 
Union security perspectives on the Arctic, critical minerals and the 
green energy transition in the Arctic, and maritime security and 
stewardship.
    We do this work within the administrative context of the Woodrow 
Wilson Center, which was chartered by Congress in 1968 as the official 
memorial to President Woodrow Wilson. The Wilson Center is the nation's 
key non-partisan policy forum for tacking global issues through 
independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for 
the policy community.
    The Coast Guard as a Strategic Means to Accomplish National Ends
    In keeping with the global, policy-focused work of the Wilson 
Center, I offer the following comments on the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic 
missions. By framing the USCG missions in the context of U.S. national 
interests and objectives in the Arctic and beyond, I will underscore 
the valuable contributions made by the Coast Guard and its value as a 
tool of national power.
    In brief, my core argument is threefold: first, that in the global 
context of long-term, strategic competition, the Coast Guard is an 
effective means for strengthening relationships with Allies and 
partners and for competing with adversaries via the integrated 
deterrence framework established in the National Defense Strategy 
(NDS); second, that the U.S. has clearly identified the Indo-Pacific as 
the priority theater, and Europe as the secondary theater of strategic 
importance, and therefore the Arctic must be understood in that 
strategic hierarchy; and third, for a number of practical reasons, the 
Coast Guard is a cost-effective means to pursue multiple national 
interests in the Arctic.
          1. Global context: long-term, strategic competition
    The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic take place in the global 
context of geopolitical competition, with China as the pacing threat. 
For several years, there has been bipartisan consensus in the United 
States on the importance and scale of the challenge posed by China, 
while Russia is broadly and accurately viewed as an ``acute'' threat. 
The 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies share similar language on 
the threats posed by China and Russia:
      (2018) ``Long-term strategic competitions with China and 
Russia are the principal priorities for the Department . . .''
      (2022) ``The 2022 NDS advances a strategy focused on the 
PRC [People's Republic of China] . . . as our pacing challenge . . . 
also accounts for the acute threat posed by Russia . . .''

    The 2022 NDS establishes the concept of integrated deterrence as 
the chief means of engaging in holistic competition with both the PRC 
and Russia: in the words of Secretary of Defense Austin, ``to develop, 
combine, and coordinate our strengths to maximum effect . . . in close 
collaboration with our counterparts across the U.S. Government and with 
Allies and partners.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Department of Defense, ``2022 National Defense Strategy,'' pp. 
iv. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-
NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF
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    The Coast Guard can play a unique role in integrated deterrence. It 
can serve as a fulcrum between the DoD and DHS, able to leverage the 
authorities and missions of both federal departments. It partners with 
State, local, and Tribal entities; with the private sector in the 
global maritime industry; and with its foreign counterparts. In this 
regard, the Coast Guard is a unique national tool for working across 
jurisdictions and functions.
    The Coast Guard is useful in forging strong relationships with 
Allies and partners, in the Arctic and around the world. As a law-
enforcement agency, it is also key to upholding the rules-based order 
that all countries rely upon. It is an important component of strategic 
competition with Russia and China.
    In the Arctic and beyond, the Coast Guard is a welcome partner on a 
host of issues of shared concern. From search and rescue to fisheries 
enforcement to drug interdiction, the Coast Guard is a partner welcomed 
by countries around the world. The top maritime concerns of many 
partner nations are bread-and-butter USCG missions: enforcing fisheries 
regulations, interdicting crime and terrorism at sea, and maritime 
safety and response. The Coast Guard's Mobile Training Teams train over 
1000 international military students each year, in over 40 countries, 
in both bi- and multilateral formats.\2\ International training covers 
the range of Coast Guard missions, and is tailored to specific national 
or regional needs. Coast Guard international partnerships enhance 
partner capacity, pave the way for U.S. access, and embody the vision 
of integrated deterrence enshrined in the NDS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ For more information, see the website of the U.S. Coast Guard 
Office of International Affairs and Foreign Policy, https://
www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Director-of-International-Affairs-
and-Foreign-Policy-CG-DCO-I/.
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    Consider U.S. interests in forging closer ties with Greenland. As 
part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and host of the U.S. Air Base Thule, 
Greenland also holds important strategic mineral resources. In 2020, 
the U.S. reopened a consulate in Nuuk, Greenland, and work is ongoing 
to broaden and deepen the relationship between the U.S. and 
Greenland.\3\ The U.S. Coast Guard should be a more significant part of 
these efforts. According to the Greenlandic government, the fishing 
industry is responsible for more than 85% of exports and over 20% of 
employment. USCG is ideally poised to partner with Greenland and 
Denmark on maritime domain awareness, enforcement, and safety: issues 
of top concern to Greenland's leaders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ U.S. Department of State, ``The United States and Greenland.'' 
https://dk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/u-s-greenland/.
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    In the Arctic, the U.S. Coast Guard is also able to navigate 
sensitive relationships. The most obvious example is along the U.S.-
Russia maritime boundary in the Bering Sea, where USCG has maintained a 
professional and functioning working relationship with the Russian 
Border Guard throughout the current crisis driven by Russia's further 
invasion of Ukraine. For example, even in 2022, we saw just one 
incident in which a Russian fishing vessels crossed the boundary line 
to fish illegally in U.S. waters; when the U.S. Coast Guard reported 
the vessel, the Russian Border Guard responded.
    Another, less obvious example is Canada: the U.S. and Canada do not 
agree on the international status of the Northwest Passage, and the 
maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea is unresolved. Despite these 
differences, the U.S. Coast Guard has partnered with its Canadian 
counterparts to conduct two transits of the Northwest Passage recently, 
in 2017 and 2021. In 2021, the icebreaker Healy carried officers from 
the British Royal Navy and the Dutch Navy on its transit, and used its 
onboard multibeam sonar system to provide Canada with high-resolution 
hydrographic survey data in the approach to the hamlet of Resolute, in 
Nunavut, which will be used by the Canadian Coast Guard to identify a 
safe shipping lane. This transit and associated activities are evidence 
of the mission's contribution to strong relationships with allies and 
partners in the Arctic and beyond.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Melody Schreiber, ``US icebreaker departs on a voyage that will 
transit the Northwest Passage.'' Arctic Today, August 26, 2021. https:/
/www.arctictoday.com/us-coast-guard-science-joint-mission-northwest-
passage/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to building relationships with allies and partners, the 
U.S. Coast Guard contributes to integrated deterrence through 
fortifying the rules-based order and demonstrating U.S. sovereignty and 
resolve in the Arctic.
    In September 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Kimball encountered 
a flotilla of PLA Navy and Russian Navy vessels in the Bering Sea, 
inside the U.S. exclusive economic zone.\5\ The combined naval exercise 
in the Bering followed another encounter in 2021, when USCG encountered 
four PLAN warships, also in the U.S. EEZ.\6\ In 2020, a Russian Navy 
flotilla conducted operations in an active fishing area inside U.S. 
waters.\7\ Chinese icebreakers Xue Long and Xue Long II regularly 
conduct research in the Arctic.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Maggie Nelson, ``Coast Guard spots Chinese and Russian military 
ships together in Bering Sea.'' Alaska Public Radio, September 27, 
2022. https://alaskapublic.org/2022/09/27/coast-guard-spots-chinese-
and-russian-military-ships-together-in-bering-sea/.
    \6\ Dylan Simard, ``Coast Guard encountered Chinese warships in the 
Aleutians in August.'' Alaska Public Radio, September 14, 2021. https:/
/alaskapublic.org/2021/09/14/coast-guard-encountered-chinese-warships-
in-the-aleutians/.
    \7\ Nathaniel Herz, `` `Move out of the way': Bering Sea fishing 
boats report close encounter with Russian military.'' Alaska Public 
Radio, August 27, 2020. https://alaskapublic.org/2020/08/27/move-out-
of-the-way-bering-sea-fishing-boats-report-close-encounter-with-
russian-military/.
    \8\ Atle Staalesen, ``Chinese icebreaker sails to North Pole, 
explores remote Arctic ridge.'' Arctic Today, August 12, 2021. https://
www.arctictoday.com/chinese-icebreaker-sails-to-north-pole-explores-
remote-arctic-ridge/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Without U.S. Coast Guard patrols in these waters, the Russian and 
Chinese warships would have symbolic free rein. USCG presence to 
identify and monitor these activities ensures the safety of U.S. 
citizens and interests in the Arctic.
    In November 2022, the Federation Council of Russia approved a law 
restricting vessel traffic in the Northern Sea Route. According to the 
new law, foreign military vessels traveling in the NSR must request 
permission from the Russian government 90 days before the date of 
passage. Further, no more than one foreign warship or other state 
vessel may be in the NSR at a time. Foreign submarines must surface 
while in the NSR. The law allows for the suspension of passage of 
foreign state vessels.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ TASS, November 30, 2022. [Cyrillic text] https://tass.ru/
ekonomika/16462331 (tass.ru).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The new Russian legislation is likely to increase calls for a 
freedom of navigation exercise by the U.S. While Russia designates the 
Northern Sea Route as internal waters, the U.S. holds that key parts of 
the passage are international straits, where restrictive measures are 
not permitted under the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS).
    Given the maritime hazards present in the NSR, icebreaker support 
for a FONOP, particularly in the eastern stretches, is advisable. USCG 
vessels may be considered less inflammatory to the Russians.
       2. The Arctic is not the priority theater in U.S. strategy
    The clear identification of the Indo-Pacific as the first priority, 
and Russia/Europe as the second priority, helps place the Arctic in 
context. The Department of Defense has not yet achieved its desired 
posture and balance of forces in the Indo-Pacific. Military support to 
Ukraine and reassurance of NATO Allies have placed further demands on 
the DoD. In light of these urgent priorities, the DoD has identified 
stability in the Arctic as its desired objective and is taking a 
requirements-driven approach to calibrating DoD posture in the Arctic. 
DoD's priority in the Arctic is homeland defense and early warning.
    The 2022 National Security Strategy seeks to ``Maintain a peaceful 
Arctic'' and states: ``We will uphold U.S. security in the region by 
improving our maritime domain awareness, communications, disaster 
response capabilities, and icebreaking capacity . . . We will exercise 
U.S. Government presence in the region as required, while reducing risk 
and preventing unnecessary escalation.'' \10\ The 2022 National Defense 
Strategy notes that ``The United States seeks a stable Arctic region 
characterized by adherence to internationally-agreed upon rules and 
norms.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The White House, ``National Security Strategy,'' October 2022. 
Pp. 44-45. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-
Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
    \11\ 2022 NDS, pp. 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In pursuit of stability in the Arctic, the Coast Guard also has a 
role to play in the NDS concept of campaigning. Defined as ``the 
conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives aimed 
at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time,'' 
\12\ campaigning in the Arctic should not contribute to escalation. The 
Coast Guard is well-positioned to campaign without escalating, as 
white-hulled Coast Guard vessels are inherently less-escalatory than 
Navy warships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ 2022 NDS, pp. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Stability in the Arctic, and a lower priority relative to the Indo-
Pacific, does not mean the region is not important to the United 
States. The U.S. has significant territorial equity and sovereignty 
interests, including northern and western parts of Alaska, as well as 
the Aleutian Island chain and the Bering, Beaufort, and Chukchi Seas 
adjacent to Alaska, which are all included in the definition of Arctic 
provided in the 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, Section 112, 
``Definition.'' Available from US Arctic Research Commission at https:/
/www.arctic.gov/legislation/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. has economic interests in the Arctic maritime, including 
fisheries, energy, shipping, and tourism. The Alaskan fishing industry 
harvests two-thirds of the nation's seafood, according to an industry 
group, and generates over $15 billion in direct and secondary economic 
outputs.\14\ The cruise industry calls Alaska ``the premier cruise 
destination market in the United States.'' In 2019, Alaska received 
almost two-thirds of all cruise passenger visits at U.S. ports, 
producing $1.2 billion in income in Alaska and 23,000 jobs.\15\ Cruise 
traffic is rebounding from the pandemic and trends prior to 2020 
indicate strong growth across the industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Alaska Seafood, ``Updated Report Affirms Alaska's Seafood 
Industry is Essential Driver of State Economy.'' January 12, 2022. 
https://www.alaskaseafood.org/news/for-release-2022-
economic-value-of-alaskas-seafood-industry-report/
#::text=Nationally%2C%20the%20Alaska
%20seafood%20industry,%248.6%20billion%20in%20multiplier%20effects.
    \15\ Business Research and Economic Advisors, ``The Contribution of 
the International Cruise Industry to the U.S. Economy in 2019.'' Cruise 
Lines International Association (CLIA). Pp 51-52. https://
www.alaskatia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019-USA-Cruise-EIS.pdf.
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    U.S. Arctic waters may also be affected by activities in adjacent 
Russian waters. While Russia's war in Ukraine has dampened shipping 
activity through the Northern Sea Route, Russia continues to ship LNG 
from its Arctic developments in Yamal. These LNG shipments are 
increasingly heading east, to Asia, transiting the Bering Strait and 
increasing environmental and maritime risks in the region. Less 
dramatic, but more frequent, are environmental impacts from garbage and 
pollutants that regularly wash into U.S. Arctic waters from Russia, 
including petroleum products and industrial debris. In 2020, large 
amounts of garbage washed ashore in the Bering Strait region, covering 
miles of shoreline and including hazardous waste (insecticide, 
lubricants, butane) and large amounts of plastic debris, as well as 
dead seabirds. Russian text and logos were identified on the marine 
debris, much of which was related to commercial fisheries.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ G. Sheffield, et al. ``2020 Foreign Marine Debris Event--
Bering Strait.'' NOAA Arctic Report Card 2021. https://arctic.noaa.gov/
Report-Card/Report-Card-2021/ArtMID/8022/ArticleID/952/2020-Foreign-
Marine-Debris-Event%E2%80%94Bering-Strait.
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    Reductions in sea ice and warming conditions in the Arctic enable 
increased maritime activity. Changing weather conditions create 
uncertainty. The combination of increased maritime activity and less-
predictable weather conditions generate maritime hazards. Fishing 
vessels, cruise ships, and other vessels are all subject to the 
maritime hazards present in Arctic waters. Climate change is 
anticipated to increase need for search and rescue in the region.\17\ 
Whatever the cause or origin, when an accident occurs in the Arctic--
particularly in the Bering Strait, the narrow body of water separating 
the U.S. and Russia--there may be consequences in U.S. waters. 
Proximity to Russia raises the stakes for humanitarian or environmental 
disaster response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Fourth National Climate Assessment, ``Chapter 26: Alaska.'' 
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/26/.
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    From a military perspective, Alaska and the U.S. Arctic are 
important to homeland defense, as forward locations for early warning 
detection and interdiction systems. New delivery systems from vectors 
in Eurasia make investments in U.S. and NORAD missile early warning and 
defeat systems critical, as outlined in the NDS. Alaska is also an 
important location for its proximity to the Indo-Pacific theater. As 
such, it hosts the largest concentration of fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft in the world. However, the NDS demands that the DoD focus 
ruthlessly: ``we must not over-exert, reallocate, or redesign our 
forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to 
preparedness for our highest strategic priorities.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ 2022 NDS, pp. 22.
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      3. Practical benefits of Coast Guard missions in the Arctic
    There is an Arctic cost premium: whether building infrastructure, 
maintaining vehicles, or buying milk, it's more expensive, often 
significantly so. In rural Alaska, a gallon of gas may often cost $10-
15, and a gallon of milk will be similarly expensive.\19\ Shipping in 
goods raises costs. U.S. Government operations are not immune to the 
additional costs inherent to remote, harsh environments like the 
Arctic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ See, for example: Zachariah Hughes, ``Fuel in the Alaska 
village of Noatak was $16 a gallon. The costs are more than just 
money.'' Anchorage Daily News, May 18, 2022. https://www.adn.com/
alaska-news/rural-alaska/2022/05/18/fuel-in-the-alaska-village-of-
noatak-was-16-a-gallon-the-costs-are-more-than-just-money/; Ann 
Schmidt, ``Extreme grocery prices in rural Alaska shock TikTok: `$18 
for milk'.'' Fox Business, December 3, 2021. https://
www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/rural-alaska-grocery-store-prices-viral.
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    Given the extra costs associated with achieving and maintaining 
U.S. Government presence in the Arctic, it is imperative to achieve 
maximum results for the investment of taxpayer dollars. In the Arctic, 
the U.S. needs Swiss Army knife solutions: cheap, durable, and useful 
for accomplishing many different tasks. On a single patrol, a Coast 
Guard icebreaker might demonstrate sovereignty, respond to a search and 
rescue case, and support scientific research. The ability of Coast 
Guard assets to perform multiple missions in the Arctic simultaneously 
advances multiple national interests, in the spirit of the National 
Strategy for the Arctic Region's emphasis on whole-of-government 
solutions.
    The Coast Guard's practical application in the Arctic contrasts 
with the U.S. Navy, which is confronting several significant strategic 
and operational challenges that defy quick solutions, and which make 
additional missions in the Arctic potentially costly, in both financial 
and strategic terms. Its shipbuilding and future fleet plans reflect 
the challenges of responding to the current and future threats posed by 
Chinese military advances, new technologies including unmanned systems, 
and budget issues. Its 30-year plan for shipbuilding has been 
characterized as requiring annual appropriations that the Congressional 
Budget Office describes as ``unprecedented since World War II.'' \20\ 
It faces serious challenges in maintenance and repair at yards \21\, 
including at Navy submarine yards.\22\ In recent years, the Navy has 
experienced a string of accidents \23\ and scandals \24\ that further 
complicate its ability to reposition itself to meet future demands. 
Adding further demands, for operations in a region that is famously 
harsh, does nothing to help the Navy. Moreover, it does not reflect the 
broader national and defense strategies that enshrine cost-effective, 
whole-of-government, integrated solutions. The Coast Guard has a strong 
track record of achieving maximum effects with minimum resources, 
leading some experts to take a hard look at transferring Navy budgets 
for small combatant funding to USCG.\25\
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    \20\ Congressional Budget Office, ``An Analysis of the Navy's 
December 2020 Shipbuilding Plan.'' April 2021. https://www.cbo.gov/
publication/57091.
    \21\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Naval Shipyards: 
Ongoing Challenges Could Jeopardize Navy's Ability to Improve 
Shipyards.'' May 10, 2022. GAO-22-105993.
    \22\ Congressional Budget Office, ``The Capacity of the Navy's 
Shipyards to Maintain its Submarines.'' March 2021. https://
www.cbo.gov/publication/57083.
    \23\ Robert Faturechi, et al. ``Years of Warnings, then Death and 
Disaster.'' ProPublica, February 7, 2019. https://
features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/us-navy-crashes-japan-cause-
mccain/.
    \24\ Blake Herzinger, ``Fat Leonard Cost the US Navy More than 
Money.'' October 24, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/24/fat-
leonard-us-navy-corruption-scandal/.
    \25\ See, for example, Craig Hooper and Bryan Clark, ``Fed Up, 
Congress Considers Giving Coast Guard the Navy's Small Ship Funding.'' 
Forbes, May 23, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/05/
23/fed-up-congress-considers-giving-coast-guard-navys-small-ship-
funding/.
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                 So what can the Coast Guard do better?
    In conclusion, there are both strategic and practical reasons to 
fully resource the Coast Guard's Arctic missions. The Coast Guard is a 
highly useful tool for conducting integrated deterrence, campaigning, 
and engaging in strategic competition. It is an agency with a 
remarkably high degree of trust around the world. Through its capacity-
building work with partner nations on fisheries enforcement, drug 
interdiction, and search and rescue, the Coast Guard helps the U.S. win 
partners and future allies. By building maritime law enforcement 
capacity around the world, the Coast Guard contributes to the U.S. 
effort to establish and uphold the global rules-based order that our 
prosperity and peace depend upon.
    In the Arctic, the Coast Guard could partner with Denmark and 
Greenland to build capacity and enhance maritime domain awareness, 
strengthening our relations with these important allies. While USCG 
already engages with the Danish Joint Arctic Command (JACO) in 
Greenland via the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and has participated in 
international maritime exercises, expanding and deepening the 
relationship could yield benefits.
    More importantly, the Coast Guard should develop a strategy for 
conducting and resourcing integrated deterrence and campaigning 
operations. This is important in the Arctic and beyond. The Coast 
Guard's 2022 Strategy and 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook are valuable 
documents, but do not match the National Defense Strategy in terms of 
specificity, prioritization, and an overarching strategic framework to 
guide decision-making. The 2020 Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, which 
was jointly signed out by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, 
provides an example of an integrated approach to naval and maritime 
strategy. The Arctic region provides an ideal test bed for developing 
and implementing integration concepts across the Navy-Marines-Coast 
Guard, as well as with Allies and partners.
    The Coast Guard in the Arctic--and beyond--can play a unique role 
in integrated deterrence and campaigning as defined in the NDS. Through 
strengthening relationships with Allies and partners, and assisting in 
security cooperation, the Coast Guard can advance national objectives 
and minimize escalation. The Coast Guard is an important means of 
meeting the complex threats to U.S. security interests, and to ensuring 
a stable and open international system: only if it can clearly identify 
a path forward and justify additional resources. The Coast Guard should 
be asked to proactively articulate a coherent, specific, and rigorous 
strategic vision for its role in advancing U.S. strategic ends in the 
Arctic.
    Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you 
today, and for your support for the Coast Guard family. I look forward 
to your questions.

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Pincus.
    Dr. Grabowski, you may proceed.
    Ms. Grabowski. Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking 
Member Gibbs, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 
appreciate the opportunity to testify today in this hearing 
addressing Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic.
    I have had the privilege of being associated with the 
National Academies for 30 years, and I just completed my second 
tour as chair of the Marine Board and the Transportation 
Research Board. In 2014, I chaired the NASEM study sponsored by 
the Coast Guard and seven other organizations that focused on 
the Nation's ability to respond to a catastrophic oilspill in 
the Arctic. I am also a member of the current NASEM committee 
examining the adequacy of Coast Guard statutory authorities to 
respond to novel uses of the maritime environment. Our 
committee work is in process at present, and I am not going to 
comment on it today.
    My focus today, however, are on three areas important for 
Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic: Maritime Domain 
Awareness, support for Coast Guard operations and personnel, 
and Coast Guard's needs for a resilient physical, 
technological, and human infrastructure.
    Coast Guard needs to support U.S. missions in the Arctic 
depend on effective Maritime Domain Awareness, which for the 
Coast Guard requires improved visibility of and access to 
vessel traffic information, as well as current nautical charts. 
Important to this is the Coast Guard's increasing need to adopt 
current and future-facing information technology and systems, 
as was highlighted in several recent GAO reports.
    Several studies have addressed the Coast Guard's risks and 
challenges in the Arctic. Few efforts, however, have adopted 
systematic processes and advanced analytics with multiparty 
Arctic stakeholders to determine the impact and the risks of 
the accelerating changes that the Coast Guard is facing in the 
Arctic today and in the future.
    Operationally, changing Arctic traffic and environmental 
conditions will increase needs for Coast Guard emergency 
response, vessel safety, and environmental protection 
capabilities. Maritime resources and other rescue equipment and 
supplies for response are limited in the Bering Strait region, 
and as we have already heard, the Coast Guard is far from 
possible incident locations.
    Arctic missions are also going to require, as we have 
heard, new technology, certification, training, proficiency, 
and experiences, as the Coast Guard increasingly adopts and 
regulates the use of uncrewed and autonomous maritime systems.
    Underlying effective operational support are robust, 
secure, and available communications; data and infrastructure; 
real-time and longitudinal sea ice, charting, navigation, and 
shoreline effects data; efficient and enterprisewide data 
systems; and advanced analytics capabilities; all of which are 
going to be a challenge for the Coast Guard.
    Coast Guard needs to support their environmental protection 
mission and oilspill response activities are significant. Some 
of the NASEM 2014 recommendations that were in that report have 
been addressed, such as a call for traffic evaluation in the 
Bering Strait and oilspill and emergency response training 
programs for local entities so that the Coast Guard and the 
communities can develop trained response teams in the local 
communities. But others, such as the call for increased Coast 
Guard presence and performance capability in the Arctic, 
establishment of a comprehensive, collaborative long-term 
Arctic oilspill R&D program, and increased oilspill response 
infrastructure and marine facilities in the Arctic have not 
been.
    Finally, Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic depends on 
resilient physical, technological, and human infrastructure. 
Historically, investments in the Arctic have not grown with 
expanded Coast Guard responsibilities. As important will be the 
required investments in Coast Guard technology and human 
infrastructure that are important for a robust and resilient 
Coast Guard today and in the future.
    Coast Guard Arctic operations occur in a unique social and 
cultural setting that is reliant on partnerships with 
neighboring countries, Arctic nations, and the Arctic Council, 
as well as on partnerships with local organizations, the Arctic 
communities, and strong bonds within the Arctic communities and 
with Arctic stakeholders. The coproduction of knowledge, 
policies, regulations, and programs with local stakeholders, 
indigenous groups, and community leaders is critical for Coast 
Guard success in the Arctic.
    Ultimately, a robust and resilient maritime infrastructure 
requires significant, long-term, and interdisciplinary Arctic 
research with partners that can benefit the Coast Guard, as 
well as all of its Arctic partners.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify 
before you on these important issues about Coast Guard 
leadership in the Arctic. The Coast Guard is a critical leader 
and a partner in the Arctic, with increasing demands and 
missions stretching their capability and capacity. Your support 
of the Coast Guard's critical mission needs is essential for an 
effective Coast Guard today and in the future.
    Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your 
questions.
    [Ms. Grabowski's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Martha Grabowski, Ph.D., Professor, Le Moyne 
College and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board, 
       National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
    Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity 
to testify today in this hearing addressing Coast Guard leadership on 
Arctic safety, security and environmental responsibility, and I thank 
you for your continued support of the United States Coast Guard.
    I am a professor of Information Systems at Le Moyne College in 
Syracuse, New York, and a senior research scientist in the Department 
of Industrial Engineering at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy, 
New York. I am a 1979 graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at 
Kings Point, in the 2nd class of women to graduate from a federal 
service academy. Upon graduation, I was licensed by the Coast Guard as 
a Third Mate, and ultimately as Second Mate, and I sailed on tankers, 
liquefied natural gas carriers, and ocean-going integrated tugs and 
barges carrying super phosphoric acid to Russia.
    I have been licensed by the Coast Guard, my research has been 
funded by the Coast Guard, and my research, exploring technology 
impacts in safety-critical systems and the marine transportation 
system, is important to the future of the marine transportation system.
    I'm currently investigating the impact of advanced visualization 
and artificial intelligence technology on maritime safety, decision-
making, communications and agility in a series of simulator experiments 
using Google Glass with the Staten Island Ferry. My earliest research 
developed and tested an artificial intelligence ship navigation system 
aboard Trans Alaskan Pipeline Service (TAPS) Trade tankers sailing into 
and out of Valdez, Alaska. My current research takes me further north 
in Alaska, with funding from the National Science Foundation, as our 
research team develops resource allocation models, and addresses the 
challenges and needs for resilient maritime infrastructure in the 
Arctic, with benefits for Arctic communities.
    Most recently, several weeks ago, I was in Fairbanks, Alaska with 
my students, having met with Coast Guard Sector Anchorage and with 
researchers at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, on our research 
projects that use uncrewed aerial systems in Arctic search and rescue, 
and for Arctic maritime infrastructure data gathering and analysis. We 
flew out as Typhoon Merbok blew in, and the impacts of the Typhoon and 
the onslaught of the increasingly impactful series of major storms and 
maritime events besieging the Arctic and Western Alaska are both 
impressive and frightening to consider.
    I have had the privilege of being associated with the National 
Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) for 30 years, 
and just completed my 2nd tour as Chair of the National Academies' 
Transportation Research Board/Marine Board. I have also chaired or co-
chaired five NASEM studies and served on four other NASEM committees. 
In 2014, I chaired the NASEM study sponsored by the Coast Guard, the 
U.S. Arctic Research Commission, the American Petroleum Institute, the 
Department of Interior/Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Marine Mammal 
Commission, NOAA, and the Prince William Sound Oil Spill Recovery 
Institute. That study assessed the nation's ability to respond to a 
catastrophic oil spill in the Arctic. The nation's capability to 
respond in 2014 was not strong, and in 2022, it has not measurably 
improved.
    I am also a member of the current NASEM committee examining the 
adequacy of Coast Guard statutory authorities in light of novel uses of 
the maritime environment, including foreseeable developments such as 
aquaculture, autonomous systems, decarbonization of maritime vessels 
and systems, offshore energy, fishing, migration and commercial space 
operations. Our committee's work is in process at present, and I will 
not comment on its process, deliberations, conclusions or 
recommendations, except to note that Coast Guard Arctic activities and 
missions are some of the `foreseeable developments' noted in the 
committee's statement of task.
    My focus today will be on three areas important for Coast Guard 
leadership in the Arctic: maritime domain awareness, support for Coast 
Guard operations and personnel, and Coast Guard needs for resilient 
physical, technological and human infrastructure in the Arctic.
                               Background
    The United States is an Arctic nation, and the United States Coast 
Guard serves as the nation's first maritime responder and the lead 
federal agency for homeland security, safety, and environmental 
stewardship in the Arctic. Coast Guard roles have expanded in the 
Arctic to include representing American interests as a leader in the 
international bodies governing navigation, search and rescue, vessel 
safety, fisheries enforcement, and pollution response across the entire 
Arctic.
    The types of challenges that the Coast Guard is called upon to 
address in the Arctic are wide-ranging and significant, stretching from 
traditional missions in vessel navigation; emergency and oil spill 
prevention, response and mitigation; search and rescue; vessel safety, 
inspection and compliance; shoreside facilities' safety and inspection; 
fisheries; migration; offshore energy; and managing a talented but 
stretched workforce in a tight employment market across an enormous 
Area of Responsibility (AOR); as well as growing non-traditional 
missions supporting national geopolitical and humanitarian needs in 
remote locations.
    Arctic maritime activities and transits are increasing due, in 
part, to changing climatic and environmental conditions, such as rising 
sea surface temperatures and declines in sea ice extent. As an example, 
Bering Strait transits totaled 262 in 2009, but doubled in 2021 to 555 
(Marine Exchange of Alaska, 2022). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker, 
cruise ship, and fishing vessel traffic in the Arctic region is 
increasing. As the region continues to open and strategic competition 
drives more actors to look to the Arctic for economic and geopolitical 
advantages, the demand for Coast Guard leadership and presence will 
continue to grow. Geopolitical developments and tensions among other 
nations operating in the region, which are often unpredictable, are 
constant considerations in U.S. Arctic priorities and operations.
    Future geopolitical, fisheries, law enforcement, security and 
national security interests will bring more and larger vessels of 
different types to Western Alaska, the Arctic, and through the Bering 
Strait. With the movement of sea ice through the Bering Strait, 
occurrences of storms and rough sea waves are also likely to increase, 
as are maritime navigation risks and the likelihood of vessel 
accidents. Increases in shipping traffic also bring heightened 
environmental risks.
    Pollution from shipping and human waste is increasing in the Bering 
Strait. Vessel navigation exposes the Arctic ecosystem to dangers from 
vessel strikes, noises, and contamination, as well as dangers after 
accidents, such as oil spills and other hazardous releases. Cleaning up 
oil spills in the Arctic presents distinct challenges, as conditions 
such as lack of daylight, remoteness, and ice-cover can complicate 
response strategies and impact their effectiveness. Furthermore, 
historic storms exacerbated by climate change are also damaging the 
Arctic's fragile existing maritime infrastructure, its vulnerable 
gravel shores, and its power and water facilities, which are often 
built close to unprotected shorelines.
    These effects, coupled with aging fuel tanks located near critical 
water supplies, melting permafrost, and an increasing number of 
tsunamigenic landslides near coastal communities and cruise vessel 
ports, are forcing Arctic communities to relocate, causing shipping and 
cruise vessel operators to review schedules and port visits, and are 
occasioning the Coast Guard to consider personnel and workforce 
assignments.
    As oil and gas, shipping, and tourism activities increase, the U.S. 
Coast Guard will need an enhanced presence and performance capacity in 
the Arctic, including area-specific training, icebreaking capability, 
improved availability of vessels for responding to oil spills or other 
emergency situations, and aircraft and helicopter support facilities 
for the open water season and eventually year-round. Arctic assignments 
for trained and experienced personnel and tribal liaisons could benefit 
by being of longer duration, to take full advantage of their skills.
    Operational and personnel support for the Coast Guard's Arctic Area 
of Responsibility is thus critical, given the size and scope of the 
Coast Guard's AOR in Alaska, which encompasses over 3.8 million 
(3,853,500) square miles, and over 47,300 miles of shoreline. Sustained 
funding and leadership commitment is required to increase the presence 
of the Coast Guard in the Arctic and to strengthen and expand the Coast 
Guard's ongoing and future Arctic missions.
                      1. Maritime Domain Awareness
    Coast Guard needs to support effective U.S. missions in the Arctic 
center depend on effective maritime domain awareness, which for the 
Coast Guard requires improved visibility and access to transit and 
destination vessel traffic information. The 2014 NASEM report 
highlighted Coast Guard needs to obtain broader satellite monitoring of 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals in the Arctic through 
government means or from private providers. The NAS Committee's 
recommendation that the Coast Guard expedite its evaluation of traffic 
through the Bering Strait to determine if vessel traffic monitoring 
systems, including determining if an internationally recognized traffic 
separation scheme was warranted, was followed by 2018 action by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO)'s Maritime Safety Committee, 
which adopted new and amended ships' routing measures in the Bering Sea 
and Bering Strait, aimed at reducing the risks of incidents--the first 
measures adopted by the IMO for the Arctic region where the Polar Code 
applies.
    Intrinsic to effective maritime domain awareness is the Coast 
Guard's increasing need to adopt current and future-facing information 
technology and systems, as highlighted in several recent GAO reports 
(U.S. GAO, 2020; 2022). Limited Arctic communications, networks and 
connectivity, a perennial challenge, impact Coast Guard maritime domain 
awareness, operational effectiveness and the Coast Guard's ability to 
interact with its partners in the Arctic.
    Key to effective maritime domain awareness is the development of 
and requirement for data standards for nautical charting, water level, 
vessel transit and safety data, among others. Recent efforts, such as 
the multi-agency work led by the Department of Homeland Security and 
NOAA, the U.S. Committee on the Maritime Transportation System (CMTS) 
and the U.S. Department of Transportation/Maritime Administration in 
their Data Harmonization project--in which the Coast Guard was a 
participant--are an important step forward in this area.
    Current nautical charts for the increasing number of vessels 
transiting the Arctic, and to support Coast Guard missions in the 
Arctic, are a persistent challenge and NOAA prioritization and 
resources to accomplish accelerated bathymetric surveys and nautical 
charting are critical in this regard.
    Several studies have addressed Coast Guard risks and challenges in 
the Arctic. Few efforts, however, have adopted systematic processes and 
advanced analytics with multiparty Arctic stakeholders to determine the 
impact and risks of the accelerating technological, industry, climate, 
geopolitical and economic changes currently facing the Coast Guard or 
envisioned in the future Arctic. The Coast Guard could benefit from a 
comprehensive assessment of the risks it confronts in the Arctic, 
similar to the multi-party, shared decision processes and analyses 
followed in the Coast-Guard led and supported maritime risk assessments 
in Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, and the Aleutian Islands, and 
similar to the processes that were followed in the State of 
Washington's two Vessel Traffic Risk Assessments, and the vessel 
traffic risk assessments currently underway, led by the Washington 
State Department of Ecology.
    A national risk framework that informs Arctic priorities is 
important as the Coast Guard and Department of Defense increasingly 
operate in the Arctic and update their Arctic strategies in light of 
evolving geopolitical forces. A structured approach consistently 
followed would guide strategic investments, promote transparency and 
accountability, and include assessment of existing and future Arctic 
policies and programs.
          2. Support for Coast Guard Operations and Personnel
    Changing Arctic traffic and environmental conditions will increase 
needs for Coast Guard emergency response, vessel safety and 
environmental protection capabilities. Maritime resources and other 
rescue equipment and supplies for response are limited in the Bering 
Strait region, with the U.S. Coast Guard far from possible incident 
locations. As Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) tankers, ore and gravel 
carriers, and government, research and cruise vessels make more 
transits, the Coast Guard will likely need to expand its capacity to 
monitor compliance with transit and environmental regulations in the 
Arctic region. Ensuring environmental response infrastructure is 
sufficient and foreign vessels transiting international straits are 
complying with regulations will be increasingly important over the next 
decade, as will promulgation of pollution control or mitigation 
measures, and measures imposed internationally by the Polar Code.
    Coast Guard Arctic missions require new technology, skills, 
certifications and experience. As the Coast Guard increasingly adopts 
and regulates the use of uncrewed and autonomous maritime systems--in 
the air, on the water's surface and under the sea--Coast Guard needs 
for operational policies, procedures, certification, training and 
performance measurement with these new technologies will be required. 
Autonomous systems and uncrewed aerial systems are being tested, used 
and evaluated by the Coast Guard, by industry and by academia to assist 
with Coast Guard missions in vessel inspection; search and rescue; oil 
spill response; maritime infrastructure protection; and fisheries 
management. Training, certification and re-certification policies and 
procedures are thus important needs for the Coast Guard in the Arctic, 
and increasing use of autonomous and uncrewed systems will require the 
Coast Guard to adapt their operations, training and certification 
policies and procedures.
    Key to effective operational support are robust, secure and 
available communications and connectivity, a perennial Arctic 
challenge. As important are the data, storage, retrieval, management, 
security and analytical issues associated with new types of structured 
(text, numbers, statistics) and unstructured (video, audio, simulation, 
pdfs, augmented and virtual reality) data being collected in the Arctic 
with autonomous and uncrewed systems.
    Accelerating changes in the Arctic region increase the Coast 
Guard's needs for data and data infrastructure. Real-time and 
longitudinal data on sea ice, charting and navigation data, and 
shoreline effects data are needed. New missions and operations, such as 
the use of autonomous and uncrewed systems for vessel and facility 
inspections; oil spill prevention and response; support for U.S. 
geopolitical activities; border protection; humanitarian response; and 
fisheries management, among others, will require secure data, server, 
cloud storage and networks, as well as efficient enterprise-wide data 
and information storage, retrieval and management, and advanced 
analytic techniques, all of which will be a challenge for the Coast 
Guard. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and resources to support this 
need, and/or arrangements with sister maritime and data agencies are 
lacking, resulting in gaps and lost opportunities to leverage new 
technology, data and visualization of Arctic baseline and trend data.
    Coast Guard needs to support their environmental protection mission 
and oil spill response activities, including drills, simulations, and 
use of new technology, are significant. The 2014 NASEM report 
Responding to Oil Spills in the Arctic Marine Environment, (https://
nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/18625/responding-to-oil-spills-in-
the-us-arctic-marine-environment) addressed challenges in the U.S. 
capability to respond to a catastrophic Arctic oil spill, including 
needs for oil spill response capabilities, research, logistics, 
infrastructure, training and international coordination.
    Some of the NASEM 2014 report recommendations have been addressed--
such as a call for evaluation of traffic in the Bering Strait and oil 
spill and emergency response training programs for local entities so as 
to develop trained response teams in local villages--but others, such 
as (1) the call for increased Coast Guard presence and performance 
capability in the Arctic, (2) establishment of a comprehensive, 
collaborative, long-term Arctic oil spill research and development 
program, or (3) increased oil spill response infrastructure and marine 
facilities in the Arctic, have not.
    In addition, the technology, data and scientific infrastructure 
required for effective Arctic oil spill response noted in the NASEM 
2014 report still needs significant bolstering. This includes (1) an 
improved real-time oceanographic-ice-meteorological forecasting system 
and (2) high resolution satellite and airborne imagery coupled with up-
to-date high resolution digital elevation models that are updated 
regularly to capture the dynamic, rapidly-changing U.S. Arctic 
coastline.
 3. Coast Guard Needs for Resilient Physical, Technological and Human 
                             Infrastructure
    Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic depends on resilient physical, 
technological and human infrastructure. The rapid and often 
unpredictable changes occurring in the Arctic are likely to increase 
pressure on Arctic infrastructure and Coast Guard resources over the 
next decade. Historically, investments in Arctic infrastructure have 
not grown with expanded Coast Guard responsibilities. Coast Guard 
Evergreen strategic planning exercises have identified challenges in 
and lack of investment in communications, situation and domain 
awareness capabilities, resource availability and allocation hurdles, 
and lack of political and institutional will (Tingstad, et al., 2018). 
The resources available through the Nome Deep Draft Port project will 
bring new attention to and opportunities to invest in resilient 
maritime physical infrastructure. As important will be the required 
associated investments in Coast Guard technology and human 
infrastructure that are essential elements in a robust and resilient 
Coast Guard in its Arctic operations.
    Developing and strengthening partnerships in the Arctic is a 
critical Coast Guard leadership role. Effective Coast Guard Arctic 
missions rely on communications, information sharing and partnerships 
with neighboring countries and provinces, as well as on international 
policy developments at the IMO, among Arctic nations, and at 
consultative and deliberative groups such as the Arctic Council.
    Coast Guard Arctic operations occur in a unique social and cultural 
setting that is reliant on local and traditional knowledge and on 
strong bonds within and with communities and across Arctic 
stakeholders. Co-production of knowledge, policies, regulations, 
programs, and activities from the inception of those activities, in the 
planning stages through completion and project monitoring, with local 
stakeholders, indigenous partners and community leaders, as well as 
knowledge sharing, are crucial for the Coast Guard's effectiveness. In 
addition, the Coast Guard's partnerships with industry, classification 
societies, international partners, and R&D institutions are also 
extremely important for Coast Guard Arctic operations, and in 
developing improved Arctic maritime domain awareness.
    Ultimately, a robust and resilient maritime infrastructure requires 
significant, long-term and interdisciplinary Arctic research. Research 
partnerships could clearly benefit the Coast Guard and its Arctic 
missions. Agencies such as the Arctic Research Commission, the polar 
and Arctic programs at the National Science Foundation (NSF), the 
National Institutes for Health (NIH), the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), FEMA, NOAA and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, along with the State of Alaska, industry partners 
and coalitions, incorporated and unincorporated Arctic boroughs, Alaska 
Native Corporations, non-governmental organizations, academia, 
environmental groups, and community leaders are natural partners.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you 
on the U.S. Coast Guard's leadership in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast 
Guard is a critical leader and partner in the Arctic, with increasing 
demands and missions stretching their capacity and capability. Your 
support of the Coast Guard's critical mission needs, including maritime 
domain awareness, operations and personnel, and for a resilient 
physical, technological and human maritime infrastructure in the 
Arctic, is essential for an effective U.S. Coast Guard today and in the 
future.
    Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you 
today and for all that you do for the men and women of the United 
States Coast Guard. I look forward to your questions.
References
Marine Exchange of Alaska (2022), quoted in Banshchikova. I. 2022. 
    Crossing the Line: How the Increase in Shipping Traffic Threatens 
    the Bering Strait. World Wildlife Fund, 26 October. https://
    files.worldwildlife.org/wwfcmsprod/
    files/Publication/file/
    30k7kbwrud_Crossing_the_Line_brochure_proof3.pdf?_
    ga=2.190909484.746421881.1668270313-1793220812.1668270312, 
    Retrieved 1 December 2022.

National Academies of Science, Engineering & Medicine (NASEM). 2014. 
    Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment. 
    Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. https://
    nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/18625/responding-to-oil-spills-
    in-the-us-arctic-marine-environment, retrieved 1 December 2022.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. 
    Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the 
    Nation's Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
    https://doi.org/10.17226/24834.

Tingstad, A., Savitz, S., Van Abel, K., Woods, D., Anania, K., Ziegler, 
    M. D., Davenport, A.C. & Costello, K. 2018. Identifying Potential 
    Gaps in US Coast Guard Arctic Capabilities. RAND Corporation. 
    https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2310.html, retrieved 1 
    December 2022.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2020. Coast Guard: Actions 
    Needed to Ensure Investments in Key Data System Meet Mission and 
    User Needs. Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, GAO 
    Report 20-562, July. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-562, 
    retrieved 1 December 2022.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2022. Coast Guard: Actions 
    Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation. Washington, D.C.: 
    Government Accountability Office, GAO Report GAO-22-105092, July. 
    Retrieved 7 October 2022. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-
    105092, retrieved 1 December 2022.

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Grabowski.
    We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will 
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing 
myself.
    Dr. Pincus, the United States will not be able to match 
Russia's fleet of 40 Arctic icebreakers, nor should we try to 
as a Nation with a shorter northern coastline and a more 
diverse fleet of subsurface and air transportation assets.
    What is a better metric by which to gauge the U.S. whole 
Arctic capacity than simply the number of icebreakers? And in 
addition to their investment in icebreaking assets, how would 
you rate the United States investments in the emerging Arctic 
to that of Russia and China?
    Ms. Pincus. You are starting with an easy question. Thank 
you.
    I appreciate your note that the U.S. will not and should 
not look for parity in terms of Russian icebreakers. The vast 
majority of Russian icebreakers are with a commercial purpose, 
and they are operated by Rosatomflot, which is a Russian state-
owned corporation. They have commercial purpose. Although they 
could certainly be used in the event of a military contingency 
to provide logistic support to naval vessels, their purpose is 
commercial. And it is not a good comparison for what the U.S. 
Coast Guard icebreakers do in the Arctic.
    Nevertheless, the U.S. does need robust icebreaking 
capability. As a global power, we need to be able to project 
our power and presence around the world at the time and place 
of our choosing, including in both the Arctic and Antarctica. 
The fact that the two polar regions are very far apart means 
that to achieve both polar presences and to have sufficient 
redundancy to be able to respond in the event of any 
contingency affecting one of our icebreakers is the true 
metric. Do we have presence in both polar regions at the time 
and place of our choosing, year-round access, and do we have 
sufficient redundancy? And I believe those are the metrics the 
Coast Guard has used in developing its proposals for the Polar 
Security Cutter program.
    The follow-on Arctic Security Cutter program, I believe, 
will be more responsive to activity in the region. We are 
seeing ice diminish faster than scientific predictions had 
forecasted. So, measured ice reductions are happening faster 
than our models had projected. That changes requirements for 
icebreaker access. With shrinking sea ice, we may be able to 
get by with lower powered icebreakers or a mix of ice-hardened 
and icebreaking vessels. So, I think that Arctic Security 
Cutter program will be in response to ice reductions as well as 
projections in activity.
    Looking holistically at investments in the Arctic region, I 
think we need to toggle to the strategic ends that we are 
trying to achieve. When it comes to securing U.S. waters, 
securing U.S. citizens and people under our protection for 
maritime activity, that's an important metric. Can the Coast 
Guard observe, monitor, control, and respond to maritime 
activity, to growing maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic?
    We are seeing important growth in cruise tourism. The 
larger and larger vessels are coming into the region more 
frequently. That poses scale risks to our missions. We are also 
seeing changes in the seasonality and location of fishing. So, 
fishing fleets are another important source of maritime 
casualties. There's increased air traffic in the region. So, 
making sure that the Coast Guard can respond to human security 
is critically important.
    In addition, the Coast Guard needs to be able to exert 
domain awareness and assert sovereignty, as we saw with the 
Chinese and Russian naval vessels incurring into our EEZ. We 
need to be able to respond, to communicate that that activity, 
that foreign activity in our EEZ, does not have free reign. 
Nevertheless, I would emphasize that the Arctic is not the top 
U.S. strategic priority. Our priority is the Indo-Pacific and 
it is Europe. As a secondary theater, every investment is going 
to be toggled within that framework. Again, I believe that 
argues well for Coast Guard presence.
    But I would encourage Congress to look at U.S. capabilities 
in the Arctic in light of our global priorities, and scale them 
to respond to our multiple national objectives: human security, 
environmental security, securing economic assets, asserting 
sovereignty. And I believe that is the framework within which 
we could accurately make those measurements.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much for that very thorough 
answer.
    Dr. Grabowski, we know commercial traffic has been and will 
continue to increase in the Arctic as the icecaps melt. Would 
you please expound on the consequence of underfunding the Coast 
Guard for its environmental missions, such as fisheries 
enforcement and pollution response?
    Ms. Grabowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question. 
So, the consequences of underfunding the Coast Guard in its 
Arctic mission are seen at multiple levels. At a local level, a 
failure to fully fund the Coast Guard for its oilspill response 
and vessel response capabilities has an impact at the local 
level. Indigenous populations and Arctic villages across the 
Arctic depend on clean air and clean water and the animals and 
species that live in the air, on the land, under the water, and 
on the water. And so, there is a risk to the local population 
of underfunding Coast Guard missions.
    At a national level, it is important for the Coast Guard to 
be fully funded with respect to its environmental 
responsibility capabilities, because if it is not, tradeoffs 
occur. And the question then becomes, which of the 11 statutory 
Coast Guard missions is more important? And so, when tradeoffs 
occur because of underfunding, the missions of the Coast Guard 
are not met fully, and the Nation suffers.
    And then, finally, globally there is an impact if we don't 
fulfill our missions with respect to environmental 
responsibility, because the voice of the United States within 
international fora with respect to environmental response is 
the voice of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is our voice of 
the Nation; at the International Maritime Organization; at the 
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities, where 
vessel safety and vessel navigation, standards, and regulations 
are established; and within the oilspill and the fisheries 
communities.
    So, at many different levels, underfunding the Coast Guard 
with respect to oilspill responsibilities has impacts locally, 
for the Nation, and then globally.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
    I will now recognize Representative Gibbs.
    Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am going to kind of tie two questions together. I will 
start with Ms. Pincus. Your answer there, you covered a lot of 
it, but I guess I am really concerned about what the future 
holds with Russia and China. And you talked a lot about the 
commercial interests, and we don't have a lot of redundancy or 
resilience up there, and our infrastructure needs help.
    And from a national security standpoint, what do you think 
are actions this administration could undertake to counter some 
of these activities of Russia and China in the Arctic, and what 
is your biggest fear? You talked a lot about commercial, but 
also from the strategic interest.
    And then tying that in with the Arctic Council, and Dr. 
Grabowski can answer too. We see with Russia that the Council 
has kind of been suspended, I guess, because of the Ukrainian 
situation. What do you see moving forward with that and how 
that ties in with our relationship with Russia and China in the 
Arctic? Just kind of put your glasses on and see what you 
anticipate and what maybe we should be looking for in the 
future, legislativewise or our administration, to address these 
issues with especially Russia and China.
    Ms. Pincus. Thank you for the question. To lead off, when 
it comes to the Arctic Council, I think I have been reassured 
in speaking with Norwegian counterparts in the last few weeks, 
while there had been some concern about the transition from the 
Russian chairmanship to the Norwegian chairmanship, which is 
going to take place in May of this year, Norwegians seem less 
anxious than they were. They seem to feel fairly confident that 
that transition will happen and happen smoothly, which 
reassures me that we will soon be in an Arctic Council led by 
Norway where there will be more opportunities available to 
continue its important work.
    When it comes to Russia and China, I think that is the 
$64,000 question. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, of 
Crimea in 2014, the imposition of Western sanctions in 2015, we 
saw a very clear pivot by Russia east towards partnering with 
China, taking Chinese investment, using Chinese ships to ship 
through their Northern Sea Route. It was sort of an unintended 
second-order effect of that sanctions package.
    Following the imposition of sanctions this year, Russia's 
further invasion of Ukraine, China has been less--it has, to a 
large extent, complied with these sanctions, particularly its 
larger banks and state-owned corporations have been in 
compliance. No Chinese vessels have sailed through the Northern 
Sea Route in 2022. That is significant.
    Mr. Gibbs. Wait. Say that again. No Chinese vessel has 
what?
    Ms. Pincus. No Chinese vessels have sailed through Russia's 
Northern Sea Route in 2022.
    Mr. Gibbs. Oh, OK.
    Ms. Pincus. So, that's really interesting.
    Russia is trying to win back that Chinese investment and 
partnership in developing its Arctic. It needs outside capital 
and technical know-how to do so. It has also been seeing 
alternate partners. So, it has been seeking partnership with 
India and Vietnam and other non-Arctic states.
    The extent to which the Chinese-Russia relationship deepens 
or not in the next year or two is very significant. That's what 
I am watching. It is hard to tell where that relationship is 
going. We have seen some mixed messages.
    Obviously, there was the declaration of ``no limits'' 
friendship in January of last year, which immediately preceded 
Russia's invasion. Since then, there have been some mixed 
messages. Should a more full-fledged relationship between them 
appear, should their joint military exercises deepen into 
something closer to a military relationship or alliance, we 
could have a significant challenge in the Arctic region and 
beyond, of course. But as of yet, I think we have some reason 
to hope that the natural frictions in that relationship 
continue to keep them at arm's length. Nothing unites like a 
common enemy, so, it is important for U.S. foreign policy that 
we watch that relationship very carefully.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Gibbs. Dr. Grabowski, do you want to comment on the 
Arctic Council?
    Ms. Grabowski. Thank you for the second half of the 
question.
    Clearly, our partnerships with the Arctic Council, with 
Arctic nations, and with all our partners across the Arctic are 
very important. And so, monitoring developments as 
relationships develop and wax and wane is clearly important.
    It is significant to note that, even though there have been 
disconnects at the Arctic Council, the operational working 
relationships where people on the ground with respect to 
oilspill response, for instance, have continued to develop.
    And so, District 17 and Sector Anchorage, the Coast Guard 
representatives in the Arctic, will tell you that those 
conversations still exist despite the discussions that are 
occurring at higher levels. That's reassuring from an 
environmental responsibility because, as we all know, oil 
doesn't respect international boundaries, and if there is an 
event, it is important that all hands show up.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Gibbs. Thank you for your answers. Thanks for being 
here.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs.
    I now recognize Representative Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Ms. Pincus, you were responding to a question from the 
chairman that analyzed the role of the Coast Guard in the 
Arctic, and as I was trying to follow along on your responses, 
you were suggesting there's a series of things that need to be 
done.
    The Coast Guard has its Arctic strategy. The Air Force, the 
Army, and the Navy have an Arctic strategy, which, perhaps you 
agree with me or not, are sophomoric, maybe freshman.
    I would appreciate your analysis of those strategies in 
detail and your recommendations on what would be a fulsome 
strategy for the United States in the Arctic, including the 
environmental issues, which have been discussed here, and also 
the international competition issues. So, if you can deliver 
that to this committee--I don't know--maybe Friday of this 
week, we really need to know.
    We really need to lay out an Arctic--we need to force those 
agencies to develop a good, strong, comprehensive Arctic 
strategy that, as you said, that coordinates. So, if you can do 
that in the remaining 1\1/2\ minutes or provide a paper on it, 
it would be very, very helpful. You heard the conversation I 
had with regard to icebreakers. So, help us.
    Ms. Pincus. Thank you. I appreciate your analysis, and I 
agree. I think the Service strategies can be improved. And I 
would point to the National Defense Strategy and the classified 
portions of the NDS as providing a realistic framework that 
prioritizes top-level priorities and deprioritizes and accepts 
risk for lower level priorities. And that's really important. 
And the classified version contains additional metrics by which 
those priorities and success or failure can be measured. And I 
think that is also very useful.
    And perhaps Arctic strategy, Service strategies, Coast 
Guard strategies should have more significant classified 
sections that would permit a more frank analysis, but that 
frank analysis is necessary because of the cost involved and 
because of the competing priorities that must be adjudicated.
    I think there is good reason why the Coast Guard is a 
value-added way to achieve national objectives in the Arctic 
given urgent DoD priorities. But I would agree with you, that 
is a strategy. And a robust, specific, measurable strategy that 
includes yardsticks and timelines is the first step before any 
other resourcing, because that's what justifies the resources 
and that is--a Service can be held accountable.
    And I would be happy to provide further analysis to your 
office, absolutely. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Garamendi. I would appreciate that, but I think the 
members of the committee would also, and certainly the 
chairman. So, please. Thank you.
    Ms. Pincus. Absolutely. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Not seeing any more questions, that concludes our hearing 
for today.
    I would like to once again thank all the witnesses for 
their testimony today. The contributions to today's discussion 
have been very informative and helpful.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided 
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in 
writing.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for additional comments and information submitted 
by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's 
hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                               Appendix

                              ----------                              


 Question from Hon. Bob Gibbs on behalf of Hon. Garret Graves to Vice 
Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast 
                                 Guard

    Question 1. Vice Admiral Gautier, in April of this year, Acting 
MARAD Administrator Lessley committed to the timely processing of 
Deepwater Ports Act permits. In regards to the Texas GulfLink project, 
Administrator Lessley stated that MARAD was working with Coast Guard 
partners to develop a detailed timeline for the environmental review 
and estimated the completion of a Record of Decision by early 2023. 
What action is the Coast Guard taking to ensure the application stays 
on schedule and to maintain the commitment for a Record of Decision by 
early next year?
    Answer. The Coast Guard continues to work with the Maritime 
Administration (MARAD) to develop a legally sufficient Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), per the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA). As required by NEPA, the Coast Guard and MARAD are 
actively reviewing and methodically responding to approximately 1,600 
public comments received during the public comment period on the 
Supplemental Draft EIS, which closed on November 30, 2022. The Coast 
Guard continues to diligently support MARAD's deepwater port licensing 
process during and after Final EIS development.

                                    
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