    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

         U.S. COAST GUARD'S LEADERSHIP ON ARCTIC SAFETY, SECURITY, AND
                          ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

    =======================================================================

                                    (117-62)

                                 REMOTE HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                    COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                DECEMBER 7, 2022

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

         Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
         transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                                 transportation

                                     ______

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    50-409 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023

                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                         PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair

    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,			SAM GRAVES, Missouri
      District of Columbia			ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas
    EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas		BOB GIBBS, Ohio
    RICK LARSEN, Washington			DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida
    GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California		THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
    STEVE COHEN, Tennessee			SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey			RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California		JOHN KATKO, New York
    HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 	BRIAN BABIN, Texas
    Georgia					GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana
    ANDRE CARSON, Indiana			DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
    DINA TITUS, Nevada			MIKE BOST, Illinois
    SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York		RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
    JARED HUFFMAN, California		DOUG LaMALFA, California
    JULIA BROWNLEY, California		BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas
    FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida		BRIAN J. MAST, Florida
    DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey	MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California		BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
    MARK DeSAULNIER, California		JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,
    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts		  Puerto Rico
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California		TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland		PETE STAUBER, Minnesota
    TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey		TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
    GREG STANTON, Arizona			DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota
    COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas			JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey
    SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair	MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi
    JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois	TROY E. NEHLS, Texas
    CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire		NANCY MACE, South Carolina
    CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania		NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts		BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas
    JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts		CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
    CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia		MICHELLE STEEL, California
    KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii			Vacancy
    MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
    NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
    MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
    TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
    SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK,
    Florida
                                    ------                                7

            Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                      SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Chair

    RICK LARSEN, Washington              BOB GIBBS, Ohio
    JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts,     RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas
      Vice Chair                         MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York       JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey
    ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California        NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           Vacancy
    CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire          SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)
    PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
        Officio)

                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                     STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

    Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
      Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
      Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     5
    Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
      Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     7
    Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
      Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................     9

                                   WITNESSES
                                    Panel 1

    Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations,
      U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement...............................    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    12
    Hon. Michael Sfraga, Ph.D., Chair, U.S. Arctic Research
      Commission, oral statement.....................................    16
        Prepared statement...........................................    17
    Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S. Government
      Accountability Office, oral statement..........................    24
        Prepared statement...........................................    26

                                    Panel 2

    Rebecca Pincus, Ph.D., Director, Polar Institute, Wilson Center,
      oral statement.................................................    45
        Prepared statement...........................................    46
    Martha Grabowski, Ph.D., Professor, Le Moyne College and
      Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board,
      National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, oral
      statement......................................................    52
        Prepared statement...........................................    54

                                    APPENDIX

    Question from Hon. Bob Gibbs on behalf of Hon. Garret Graves to
      Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for
      Operations, U.S. Coast Guard...................................    65

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                December 1, 2022

        SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

        TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation
        FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation
        RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``U.S. Coast Guard's
    Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and Environmental
    Responsibility''
    _______________________________________________________________________

                                    PURPOSE

        The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    will hold a hearing on Wednesday, December 7, 2022, at 10:00
    a.m. EST in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom to
    examine the implementation of the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic
    Strategy. The Subcommittee will hear testimony from the U.S.
    Coast Guard (USCG), the U.S. Arctic Research Commission
    (USARC), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Polar
    Institute of the Wilson Center, and Le Moyne College.

                                   BACKGROUND

        The Arctic region has transformed on multiple fronts in the
    decade since the release of the USCG's 2013 Arctic Strategy.\1\
    Geophysically, the surface temperature of the Arctic is warming
    2-3 times faster than the world as a whole,\2\ altering snow
    cover, ice cover, and trends in extreme storm events.\3\
    Between 1971 and 2019, the by-month average extent of sea ice
    in the Arctic declined in all months of the year but especially
    September (43 percent decline from 1971 to 2019), with climate
    models predicting that the first ice-free September in the
    Arctic could occur as soon as 2040.\4\ This extended summer has
    created novel opportunities for maritime transit, broadening
    the stage for commercial activities such as shipping, passenger
    cruises, energy development, and mineral extraction (Fig.
    1).\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/
    5pw/Arctic%20Policy/USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-
    330, accessed November 8, 2022; USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/
    Portals/0/Images/arctic/Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
    2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
        \2\ Arctic Council, 2021. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/
    bitstream/handle/11374/2621/
    MMIS12_2021_REYKJAVIK_AMAP_Arctic-Climate-Change-Update-2021-Key-
    Trends-and-
    Impacts.-Summary-for-Policy-makers.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; IPCC,
    2021. https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/plan/introduction-and-
    background.html, accessed November 8, 2022.
        \3\ IPCC, 2021. https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/plan/
    introduction-and-background.html, accessed November 8, 2022.
        \4\ Arctic Council, 2021. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/
    bitstream/handle/11374/2621/
    MMIS12_2021_REYKJAVIK_AMAP_Arctic-Climate-Change-Update-2021-Key-
    Trends-and-
    Impacts.-Summary-for-Policy-makers.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, accessed
    November 14, 2022.
        \5\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and
    Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S.
    Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460,
    accessed November 27, 2022.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     LFigure 1. Increase in vessel traffic in USCG District 17 Arctic area
                           of interest, 2009-2019.\6\

           LSource: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data. GAO-20-460

    LNote: The USCG District 17 Arctic area of interest is defined as north
      of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east to Banks Island in the
       Canadian Arctic, and west into Russia to the New Siberian Islands.

        Geopolitically,\\ the Arctic has been a region of
    increasing focus for the eight Arctic nations (U.S., Canada,
    Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Russia),
    and self-proclaimed ``Near Arctic'' states including the
    People's Republic of China (Fig. 2).\7\ The USCG, the U.S.
    Department of Defense (DOD), and the U.S. White House each
    released updated strategic plans within the past three
    years.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Id.
        \7\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/
    -1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
        \8\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/
    -1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022; U.S.
    White House, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/
    10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf, accessed November 27,
    2022; USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
    Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Russia's renewed aggression toward Ukraine has heightened
    geopolitical tensions, and previous efforts to work
    cooperatively in the Arctic are suspended until further notice,
    heightening risk and creating new uncertainty in USCG
    operations.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ DOS, 2022. https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-
    council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/, accessed
    November 27, 2022.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     LFigure 2. Map of the Arctic region as defined by the Arctic Research
      and Policy Act of 1984 (ARPA),\10\ highlighting two transit routes
    (Northwest Passage, Northeast (``Northern'') Passage) of high interest
                              to the U.S.\11\ \12\

    I. USCG\\ STRATEGY\\ IN\\ THE ARCTIC
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        \10\ ARPA, 2006. https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/
    arpa_amended.pdf, accessed November 27, 2022.
        \11\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
    Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
    2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
        \12\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-
    1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The USCG's vision for operating in the Arctic region is,
    ``Ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime
    activity in the Arctic.'' \13\ Safety, security, and
    environmental stewardship capture the spectrum of the USCG's
    primary duties under section 102 of title 14, U.S. Code.\14\ In
    a place as vast and remote as the Arctic, the USCG accomplishes
    this diverse mission set via multi-agency partnerships and
    multi-purpose assets and infrastructure.\15\ In this way, USCG
    activity in the Arctic can be viewed as an example of how the
    USCG optimizes use of its limited resources for its priority
    missions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
    DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
    USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed
    November 8, 2022.
        \14\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, cited by USCG, 2022. https://
    www.history.uscg.mil/Home/Missions/, accessed November 28, 2022.
        \15\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
    DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
    USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed
    November 8, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As an illustration of scale, Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian
    Islands is currently the closest U.S. deep draft port to the
    Arctic; roughly 1,100 nautical miles from Point Barrow (the
    northernmost point in the U.S.).\16\ Construction for the Deep
    Draft Port Project, which was authorized at $333 million in the
    2020 Water Resources Development Act included in the
    Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, is expected to begin
    in Spring 2023 and will provide a new deep draft port option in
    Nome, Alaska, still approximately 500 nautical miles from
    Barrow.\17\ Likewise, the closest USCG Air Station to Barrow is
    in Kodiak, Alaska, located approximately 945 nautical miles to
    the south.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
    DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
    USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed
    November 8, 2022.
        \17\ Alaska Public Media, 2022. https://alaskapublic.org/2022/11/
    18/nomes-arctic-deep-draft-port-project-approaches-milestone/, accessed
    November 28, 2022.
        \18\ USCG, 2013. https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
    DCO%20Documents/5pw/Arctic%20Policy/
    USCG%20Arctic%20Strategy.pdf?ver=2017-10-05-123403-330, accessed
    November 8, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        USCG Arctic operations are primarily based out of the USCG
    District 17 Command Center in Juneau, Alaska, and Base Kodiak,
    which is the largest USCG command in the entire Pacific
    Area.\19\ District 17 encompasses 3.9 million square miles and
    over 47,300 miles of shoreline throughout Alaska and the
    Arctic, from north of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east
    to the Banks Island in the Canadian Arctic, and west to Russia
    to the New Siberian Islands.\20\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
    District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022.
        \20\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
    District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022; GAO, 2020. ``Maritime
    Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and Interagency Leadership Could
    Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S. Arctic'', available at https://
    www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460, accessed November 27, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A. SAFETY

        Safety encapsulates four of the ``non-homeland security''
    missions of the USCG: Marine Safety; Search and Rescue; Aids to
    Navigation; and Ice Operations.\21\ During an average month,
    USCG District 17 saves 22 lives and over $1.65 million in
    property (includes onshore); reports and investigates 25 marine
    casualties; services 93 buoys and fixed aids to navigation;
    performs 143 commercial fishing vessel safety exams; teaches
    375 kids about life jacket wear; and performs 95 marine
    inspections.\22\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Homeland Security Act of 2002, cited by USCG, 2022. https://
    www.history.uscg.mil/Home/Missions/, accessed November 28, 2022.
        \22\ USCG, 2022. https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
    District-17/, accessed November 28, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    B. SECURITY

        Security encapsulates all five domestic security missions
    of the USCG: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Drug
    Interdiction; Migrant Interdiction; Defense Readiness; and
    Other Law Enforcement.\23\ In the context of the Arctic region,
    Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security and Defense Readiness
    are key functions of the USCG as it works in coordination with
    the DOD to stabilize the region geopolitically while
    safeguarding U.S. interests.\24\ Particularly, the USCG's non-
    homeland security missions, e.g., Search and Rescue, give the
    USCG visible presence and allows it to interact in non-
    confrontational ways. As such, the USCG--an armed service--is
    uniquely qualified to initiate and enhance partnerships between
    the U.S. government and others, be it local Alaskan
    communities, private commercial enterprises, or foreign
    nations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ Section 468, Title 6, U.S.C. https://uscode.house.gov/
    view.xhtml?req=(title:6%20section:
    468%20edition:prelim)%20OR%20(granuleid:USC-prelim-title6-
    section468)&f=treesort&
    edition=prelim&num=0&jumpTo=true, accessed November 28, 2022.
        \24\ DOD, 2019. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-
    1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF, accessed November 27, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    C. ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP

        The Alaskan commercial fishing industry is estimated to
    have a $3 billion impact on the U.S., and fished species are
    expected to shift northward within and into the Arctic as sea
    water temperatures rise,\25\ creating potential new enforcement
    challenges for the USCG to the current international
    prohibition on commercial fishing in the central Arctic
    Ocean.\26\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \25\ Huntington et al., 2020. ``Evidence suggests potential
    transformation of the Pacific Arctic ecosystem is underway'', available
    at https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0695-2, accessed November
    28, 2022.
        \26\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
    Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
    2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The USCG also plays a vital leadership role in responding
    to oil spills and other environmental pollution incidents.\27\
    This role is expected to require more of the USCG's time and
    resources as maritime traffic increases with the melting of the
    Arctic sea ice.\28\ However, it is worth noting that techniques
    to physically remove oil from ice-heavy landscapes are still
    underdeveloped.\29\ Oil pollution, along with the region's
    changing ecology, make federally and internationally protected
    marine mammals and other endangered species more vulnerable to
    extinction,\30\ and put Alaskan communities that depend on
    local food resources at increased risk.\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and
    Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S.
    Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460,
    accessed November 27, 2022.
        \28\ USARC, 2012. ``Oil Spills in Arctic Waters'', available at
    https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/oil_spills_2012_hi.pdf, accessed
    November 30, 2022.
        \29\ NAS, 2022. ``Oil in the Sea IV'', available at https://
    nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/26410/oil-in-the-sea-iv-inputs-fates-
    and-effects, accessed November 28, 2022.
        \30\ Id.
        \31\ CRS, March 2022. ``Changes in the Arctic: Background and
    Issues for Congress'', available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/
    product/pdf/R/R41153, accessed November 28, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    D. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE USCG

        Complimentary to the USCG's statutory missions listed in
    section 468 of title 6, U.S. Code, are seven statutory duties
    listed under section 102 of title 14, U.S. Code. Together,
    these statutes codify the necessity of the multi-purpose
    approach of USCG. For example, two duties that are particularly
    relevant to the Arctic strategy are the directives to develop
    and operate icebreaking facilities pursuant to international
    agreements, and to engage in oceanographic research of the high
    seas and in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.\32\
    So, in addition to having the ability to perform nine of the 11
    statutory missions, polar icebreakers shall also engage in
    oceanographic research. The White House's National Strategy for
    the Arctic Region emphasizes a commitment ``to a whole-of-
    government, evidence-based approach'' \33\--a principle which
    further emphasizes the planned use of icebreakers as multi-
    mission platforms.\34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ Section 102, Title 14, U.S.C. https://uscode.house.gov/
    view.xhtml?hl=false&edition=
    prelim&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title14-
    section102&num=0&saved=%7CKHRpdGxlOjE0
    IHNlY3Rpb246MTAyIGVkaXRpb246cHJlbGltKSBPUiAoZ3JhbnVsZWlkOlVTQy1
    wcmVsaW0tdGl0bGUxNC1zZWN0aW9uMTAyKQ%3D%3D%7CdHJlZXNvcnQ%3D%7C%7C0
    %7Cfalse%7Cprelim, accessed November 28, 2022.
        \33\ U.S. White House, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
    uploads/2022/10/National-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf, accessed
    November 27, 2022.
        \34\ CRS, September 21, 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
    (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'',
    available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391,
    accessed November 28, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    E. PARTNERSHIPS, THE POLAR CODE, AND ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

        The USCG's most recent Arctic guidance, the USCG Arctic
    Strategic Outlook (2019), offers three immediate lines of
    effort: 1) Enhance capability to operate effectively in a
    dynamic Arctic; 2) Strengthen the rules-based order; and 3)
    Innovate and adapt to promote resiliency and prosperity. These
    efforts are to be guided by the underlying principles of
    partnership, unity of effort, and culture of continuous
    innovation.\35\ To carry out these efforts, partnerships exist
    between the USCG and other U.S. federal agencies (e.g.,
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Arctic
    Research Commission), Alaska state agencies, Alaska local and
    indigenous communities, non-governmental organizations,
    academic institutions, and foreign-based entities.\36\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
    Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
    2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
        \36\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        International cooperation in the Arctic has been
    facilitated largely through the Arctic Council (Council),
    established in 1996.\37\ The Council is made up of the eight
    Arctic nations, six Indigenous Peoples' organizations
    (Permanent Participants), and a variety of other governmental
    and nongovernmental partners (Observers).\38\ In 2009 the
    Council called upon the International Maritime Organization
    (IMO) to formulate and adopt the International Code for Ships
    Operating in Polar Waters, referred to as the ``Polar Code.''
    The Polar Code went into effect on January 1, 2017, and enacts
    mandatory requirements intended to improve vessel safety and
    prevent pollution from vessels transiting in the Arctic,
    including ship construction, navigation, crew training, and
    ship operation.\39\ The Polar Code applies to passenger and
    cargo ships of 500 gross tons or more engaged in international
    voyages.\40\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \37\ Arctic Council, 2022. ``About the Arctic Council'', available
    at https://www.arctic-council.org/about/, accessed November 30, 2022.
        \38\ Id.
        \39\ IMO, 2022. ``Shipping in polar waters'', available at https://
    www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Polar-default.aspx, accessed
    November 30, 2022.
        \40\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Council is a consensus-based, intergovernmental forum
    that works to promote environmental, social, and economic
    aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic. Russia was
    scheduled to chair the Council from 2021-2023, but since
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine in March 2022, the seven other
    Arctic state members (including the U.S.) jointly declared a
    suspension of their participation from Council activities.\41\
    The future of the Council remains unclear.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \41\ DOS, March 2, 2022. ``Joint Statement on Arctic Council
    Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine'', available at
    https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-
    following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/, accessed November 8, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    II. DOCUMENTED CHALLENGES TO USCG ARCTIC OPERATIONS

    A. INFRASTRUCTURE

        Numerous governmental and academic reports have identified
    infrastructure and operational challenges to maritime
    transportation in the U.S. Arctic. Liabilities include limited
    satellite coverage and architecture to support voice and data
    communications, hazardous weather and ice conditions, and the
    lack of channel marking buoys and other floating visual aids to
    navigation (for which installation is not always possible due
    to continuously moving ice sheets).\42\ In addition, to
    ensuring safe and efficient maritime transportation in the
    region, it is necessary to conduct surveys to improve nautical
    charts, improve communications capabilities, improve weather
    forecasting and modeling, and develop community and regional
    emergency response networks in preparation for vessel and
    aircraft accidents and environmental damage related to
    increased ship traffic and industrial development.\43\ In many
    cases, data exist or are actively being collected, but the lag
    between data collection, communication, and operational use by
    the USCG is severe.\44\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \42\ Arctic Council, 2009. ``Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment'';
    U.S. White House, 2013. ``National Strategy for the Arctic Region'';
    GAO, 2014. ``Maritime Infrastructure: Key Issues Related to Commercial
    Activity in the U.S. Arctic over the Next Decade''; Alaska Arctic
    Policy Commission, 2015. ``Final Report''; U.S. Committee on the Marine
    Transportation System, 2016. ``A Ten-Year Prioritization of
    Infrastructure Needs in the U.S. Arctic''; Council on Foreign
    Relations, 2017. ``Arctic Imperatives, Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on
    America's Fourth Coast''; Center for Strategic and International
    Studies, 2017. ``Maritime Futures, the Arctic and the Bering Strait
    Region''.
        \43\ Id.
        \44\ Simonee et al. 2021. ``Sila Qanuippa? (How's the Weather?):
    Integrating Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit and Environmental Forecasting
    Products to Support Travel Safety around Pond Inlet, Nunavut, in a
    Changing Climate'', available at https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-20-
    0174.1, accessed November 16, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to known infrastructure requirements, the USCG
    has explored the need for the creation of new vessel routing
    measures to reduce the risk of marine casualties and increase
    the efficiency and predictability of vessel traffic in the U.S.
    Arctic.\45\ The USCG is also conducting several Arctic-focused
    research projects in collaboration with academia at the Arctic
    Domain Awareness Center, including methodologies to minimize
    environmental damage from spilled oil in extreme cold, enhanced
    navigational capabilities in the Arctic, establishing exposure
    limits for Search and Rescue team members in extreme cold, and
    developing a classification system of ice conditions.\46\ Other
    efforts to improve Arctic capabilities include the
    International Arctic Ocean Buoy Program, which maintains an
    international network of drifting buoys in the Arctic Ocean to
    provide meteorological and oceanographic data for real-time
    operational and research through the U.S. Integrated Ocean
    Observing System.\47\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \45\ USCG, 2016. ``Port Access Route Study: In the Chukchi Sea,
    Bering Strait, and Bering Sea. Preliminary Findings'', Number USCG-
    2014-0941 and USCG-2010-0833; USCG, 2018. ``Port Access Route Study:
    Alaskan Arctic Coast'', available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
    pkg/FR-2018-12-21/pdf/2018-27604.pdf, accessed November 28, 2022.
        \46\ USCG, 2018. ``FY18 RDT&E Project Portfolio'' in Acquisition
    Directorate. Research, Development, Test & Evaluation; Examples: Next
    Generation Arctic Navigational Safety Information System (proj #6211),
    Arctic Operations Support (proj #6210), Robust Maritime Arctic
    Communications (proj #6213), Safety Parameters for ICE Operations (proj
    #5301), Response to Oil in Ice (proj #4701), Ice Condition Risk
    Assessment Tool (proj #6512), and Arctic Technology Evaluation 2018
    (proj #62101).
        \47\ IOOS, 2022. https://ioos.noaa.gov/regions/aoos/, accessed
    November 28, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    B. ASSETS

        While several U.S. agencies have a physical presence and
    substantial interests in the Arctic, the USCG's experience,
    material assets, and installations located throughout Alaska
    establish it as a key presence in the region. However, with no
    assets permanently stationed above the Arctic Circle, the USCG
    is restricted to a seasonal presence via mobile command and
    control platforms such as large cutters and ocean-going ice-
    strengthened buoy tenders, and establishing seasonal air and
    communications capabilities by leasing facilities.\48\ Compared
    to Russia's six Arctic bases and 14 newly built icebreakers,
    the USCG is forced to stretch assets and capabilities to secure
    a wide mission set with limited resources.\49\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \48\ GAO, 2020. ``Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and
    Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S.
    Arctic'', available at https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-460,
    accessed November 27, 2022.
        \49\ USCG, 2019. https://www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Images/arctic/
    Arctic_Strategy_Book_APR_
    2019.pdf, accessed November 8, 2022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently
    consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, which
    carries out its primary mission, the resupply of McMurdo
    Station, in the Antarctic, and one medium polar icebreaker,
    Healy, which carries out its primary mission, scientific
    research, in the Arctic (Fig. 3).\50\ A decade-long effort to
    expand USCG capabilities in the Arctic found footing in
    Congress with the establishment of the USCG Polar Security
    Cutter (PSC) program and a Joint Program Office with the U.S.
    Navy in 2016.\51\ Authorization for the acquisition or
    procurement of a market-available icebreaker is included in the
    Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022, as is
    authorization for a third Polar Security Cutter (PSC; heavy
    polar icebreaker) and evaluation of the USCG's acquisition of
    three Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs; medium polar icebreakers).
    The USCG PSC program received a total of $1.8 billion in
    procurement funding through FY 2021, including $300 million
    that was provided through the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding account
    (FY 2017-2018).\52\ With the funding the USCG PSC program
    received through FY 2021, PSCs 1 and 2 are fully funded.\53\
    Construction of the first PSC is anticipated to begin in Spring
    2023 for an on-time delivery in FY 2025,\54\ though a delay
    appears probable at this time.\55\ Delivery of a heavy polar
    icebreaker will mark the U.S.'s first new heavy icebreaker in
    nearly 50 years.\56\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \50\ CRS, September 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
    (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'',
    available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391,
    accessed November 28, 2022.
        \51\ Id.
        \52\ U.S. Naval Institute, January 7, 2022. https://news.usni.org/
    2022/01/07/report-to-congress-on-coast-guard-polar-security-cutter-16,
    accessed November 28, 2022.
        \53\ Id.
        \54\ USCG, July 29, 2022. ``Q3 FY2022 USCG Surface Acquisition
    Update--CG&MT'', briefing to CGMT.
        \55\ Katz, J., November 14, 2022. ``Why a small shipyard merger
    could signal bigger problems for the US military'', available at
    https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/why-a-small-shipyard-merger-could-
    signal-bigger-problems-for-the-us-military/, accessed on November 29,
    2022.
        \56\ CRS, September 2022. ``Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter
    (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress'',
    available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391,
    accessed November 28, 2022.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

       LFigure 3. Coast Guard Cutter Healy, a 420-foot medium endurance
    icebreaker/research vessel, is the only icebreaker currently dedicated
     to Arctic operations. No other U.S. military service branch operates
                                icebreakers.\57\

        The\\ mixed fleet (three PSCs, three ASCs) arrangement
    currently under consideration will help close four major gaps
    in USCG Arctic capabilities that were identified by the
    Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center--unreliable
    communications, lack of adequate maritime domain awareness,
    scarcity of available assets (especially ice-resistant air
    support and icebreakers) and supporting infrastructure, and
    institutional difficulty to identify, articulate, and close
    capability gaps.\58\ The report states that if these capability
    gaps are not closed by the 2030s, the USCG risks facing
    substantial vulnerabilities in several of its missions in the
    Arctic including search and rescue, marine safety, ice
    operations, marine environmental protection, and ports,
    waterways, and coastal safety.\59\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \57\ Photo credit: USCG, 2022. https://www.history.uscg.mil/Our-
    Collections/Photos/igphoto/2002136680/, accessed November 27, 2022;
    Lind, 2018. ``USCG Cutter Healy Deploys for the Arctic'', available at
    https://www.passagemaker.com/trawler-news/uscg-cutter-healy-deploys-
    for-the-arctic#::text=In%20mid-
    July%20the%20United%20States%20Coast%20Guard
    %20Cutter,vessel%20operated%20by%20the%20USCG%2C%20measuring%20420%20fee
    t, accessed November 28, 2022.
        \58\ Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, 2018.
    ``Identifying Potential Gaps in the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic
    Capabilities'', available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/
    research_reports/RR2310.html, accessed on November 29, 2022.
        \59\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    III. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

        The Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022, which
    is expected to be included the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2023, includes key support for the USCG to
    continue implementing its Arctic Strategic Outlook. Title I,
    Authorizations, would authorize $167.2 million for a third PSC,
    $150 million for the acquisition or procurement of an available
    icebreaker, and $20 million for icebreaking cutters for
    operation in the Northeast, Arctic, and Great Lakes (FY 2023).
    Additionally, Title I would authorize $1 million for the USCG
    to evaluate design requirements for the ASC (FY 2023-2024).
        Title II dedicates an entire Subtitle to provisions
    affecting USCG operations in the Arctic region. Building on
    Title I authorizations, Title II would establish a medium
    icebreaker (i.e., ASC) program office within the USCG so that
    the it can conduct a PSC/ASC fleet mix analysis, and establish
    the conditions under which an available icebreaker may be
    acquired. Title II would also extend the timeline of the
    Pribilof Island Transition Completion Act of 2016 (Public Law
    114-120) and require an update to Congress on the USCG's
    activities and infrastructure needs at St. Paul Island, Alaska.

                                  WITNESS LIST

    PANEL I

         LVice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant
    for Operations, United States Coast Guard
         LHon. Michael Sfraga, Chair, United States Arctic
    Research Commission
         LMr. Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical
    Infrastructure Team, Government Accountability Office

    PANEL II

         LDr. Rebecca Pincus, Director, Polar Institute,
    Wilson Center
         LDr. Martha Grabowski, Professor, Le Moyne College
    and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board,
    National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

         U.S. COAST GUARD'S LEADERSHIP ON ARCTIC SAFETY, SECURITY, AND
                          ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2022

                      House of Representatives,
                        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
                               Maritime Transportation,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in
    room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon.
    Salud O. Carbajal (Chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Members present in person: Mr. Carbajal, Mr. DeFazio, Mr.
    Larsen of Washington, Mr. Auchincloss, Mr. Gibbs, Mr. Graves of
    Missouri, Mr. Weber of Texas, and Mr. Garamendi.
        Members present remotely: None.
        Mr. Carbajal. This subcommittee will come to order.
        I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
    declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
    subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
    today's hearing and ask questions.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        As a reminder, please keep your microphones muted unless
    speaking. Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I
    will respectfully request that the Member please mute their
    microphone.
        And to insert a document into the record, please have your
    staff email it to DocumentsT&I@mail.house.gov.
        Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing entitled,
    ``U.S. Coast Guard's Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and
    Environmental Responsibility.''
        Before we get started, I would like to acknowledge that
    today's hearing will be both Chairman DeFazio's and Ranking
    Member Gibbs' last hearings as Members of Congress. Both have
    decided to retire. For 36 years, the House of Representatives
    has been a better place because of Chairman DeFazio's
    leadership and insight. This institution will miss him, and I
    will miss his friendship.
        Mr. DeFazio, thank you for your leadership, your
    mentorship, and your service to our country.
        Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Salud.
        Mr. Carbajal. And, Mr. Gibbs, I want to thank you for your
    partnership and expertise as we worked through this year's
    bipartisan Coast Guard reauthorization. I appreciated the
    bipartisan collaboration that we developed to do our
    subcommittee's work, and I appreciate the friendship we
    developed along the way. Thank you for your 10 years of service
    to our country as well.
        Today also marks 81 years since the attack on Pearl Harbor
    that led our Nation to declare war within a day. To all of our
    veterans and active military families, thank you for your
    sacrifice and service to our country.
        Global peace is always tenuous. Today, we will hear
    testimony from five witnesses who are experts on the Arctic, a
    region where security and geopolitics are both at play. Today,
    we have experts before us to focus on the national security
    issues that are on the top of our minds, while others will
    enlighten us on the Coast Guard's leadership on maritime safety
    and environmental stewardship.
        Nearly 10 years ago, the Coast Guard published its first
    strategic plan for the Arctic region. The Service updated this
    plan in 2019 to reflect its coordination with the White House,
    Department of Defense, and the Department of State, which
    showed a new level of interest in the status of the United
    States as an Arctic nation.
        With Russia's recent aggression towards Ukraine, the
    geopolitical significance of the Arctic is even more
    pronounced. Although the Coast Guard security missions are
    critical, the Service continuously executes numerous other
    critical missions.
        The Coast Guard is responsible for maritime safety--that
    is, search and rescue, and aiding mariners in safe navigation
    by breaking ice, marking channels, and communicating real-time
    weather hazards.
        The Coast Guard must also enforce environmental laws in the
    Arctic. This will become more and more important as melting sea
    ice means more shipping traffic, more oil pollution, and
    migrating commercial fish stocks.
        Coast Guard partnerships with Alaskans and indigenous
    peoples, with private corporations, the State of Alaska, other
    Federal agencies, and other countries have met a gold standard
    in the last 10 years. Coordination and cooperation are not
    optional at the North Pole.
        To help us appreciate the importance of all the Coast
    Guard's Arctic missions, Admiral Gautier will be joined on a
    panel by the Honorable Michael Sfraga, the presidentially
    appointed Chair of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, and Mr.
    Andrew Von Ah, Director of the Physical Infrastructure team at
    the Government Accountability Office.
        The USARC is working hard to draw attention to the critical
    gap between the collection of data in the Arctic--weather, sea
    state, coastal mapping--and the Coast Guard's ability to use
    this information in its everyday operations.
        Similarly, the GAO has completed a number of studies in
    recent years that measure the success of, and gaps in, the
    Coast Guard's Arctic operations.
        Today's second panel will feature an Arctic strategic
    defense expert, Dr. Rebecca Pincus, director of the Polar
    Institute; and Dr. Martha Grabowski, a professor at Le Moyne
    College and a past chair of the Marine Board in the National
    Academies of Sciences.
        The Coast Guard has proven to be a nimble and resourceful
    leader for the U.S. in the Arctic. It can only fully implement
    its strategic plan if we fully grasp the form and severity of
    the challenges Coasties face operating in such a harsh, remote
    part of the world.
        The Coast Guard plays a multidimensional leadership role in
    the Arctic. Fortunately, we have five witnesses before us with
    multidimensional expertise.
        Let's begin.
        [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in
    Congress from the State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Coast
                       Guard and Maritime Transportation
        Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing on ``U.S. Coast
    Guard's Leadership on Arctic Safety, Security, and Environmental
    Responsibility.''
        Before we start, I'd like to acknowledge that today's hearing will
    be Chairman DeFazio's last as a Member of Congress. For 36 years, the
    House of Representatives has been a better place because of his
    leadership and insight. This institution will miss him and I will miss
    his friendship. Mr. DeFazio, thank you for your leadership and service
    to our country.
        Today also marks 81 years since the Attack on Pearl Harbor that led
    our Nation to declare war within a day. To all of our veterans and
    active military families, thank you for your sacrifice and service.
        Global peace is always tenuous. Today, we will hear testimony from
    five witnesses who are experts on the Arctic, a region where security
    and geopolitics are both at play. Today, we have experts before us to
    focus on the national security issues that are on the top of our minds,
    while others will enlighten us on the Coast Guard's leadership on
    maritime safety and environmental stewardship.
        Nearly 10 years ago, the Coast Guard published its first Strategic
    Plan for the Arctic region. The Service updated this plan in 2019 to
    reflect its coordination with the White House, Department of Defense,
    and the Department of State, which showed a new level of interest in
    the status of the United States as an Arctic nation.
        With Russia's recent aggression toward Ukraine, the geopolitical
    significance of the Arctic is even more pronounced. Although the Coast
    Guard's security missions are critical, the service continuously
    executes numerous other critical missions.
        The Coast Guard is responsible for maritime safety--that is, Search
    and Rescue, and aiding mariners in safe navigation by breaking ice,
    marking channels, and communicating real-time weather hazards.
        The Coast Guard must also enforce environmental laws in the Arctic.
    This will become more and more important as melting sea ice means more
    shipping traffic, more oil pollution, and migrating commercial fish
    stocks.
        Coast Guard partnerships with Alaskans and indigenous peoples, with
    private corporations, the State of Alaska, other federal agencies, and
    other countries have met a gold standard in the last 10 years.
    Coordination and cooperation are not optional at the North Pole.
        To help us appreciate the importance of all of the Coast Guard's
    Arctic missions, Admiral Gautier will be joined on a panel by the
    Honorable Michael Sfraga, the presidentially appointed Chair of the
    U.S. Arctic Research Commission, and Mr. Andrew Von Ah, Director of the
    Physical Infrastructure Team at the Government Accountability Office.
        The USARC is working hard to draw attention to the critical gap
    between the collection of data in the Arctic--weather, sea state,
    coastal mapping--and the Coast Guard's ability to use this information
    in its everyday operations.
        Similarly, the GAO has completed a number of studies in recent
    years that measure the success of, and gaps in, the Coast Guard's
    Arctic operations.
        Today's second panel will feature an Arctic strategic defense
    expert, Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director of the Polar Institute, and Dr.
    Martha Grabowski, a professor at Le Moyne College and a Past Chair of
    the Marine Board in the National Academies of Sciences.
        The Coast Guard has proven to be a nimble and resourceful leader
    for the U.S. in the Arctic. It can only fully implement its Strategic
    Plan if we fully grasp the form and severity of the challenges Coasties
    face operating in such a harsh, remote part of the world.
        The Coast Guard plays a multi-dimensional leadership role in the
    Arctic. Fortunately, we have five witnesses before us with multi-
    dimensional expertise. Let's begin.

        Mr. Carbajal. First, I would like to recognize Chairman
    DeFazio.
        Mr. DeFazio. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the
    kind words, and thank you for holding this hearing.
        We ignore the changes that are rapidly coming to the Arctic
    North at our own peril. And I am pleased to see that we have a
    number of proactive plans in place, but more is certainly going
    to need to be done.
        Although some deny that climate change exists, we are
    seeing extraordinary extended periods of ice retreat navigable
    waters throughout the Arctic region. We are now going to see,
    obviously, more transit of freighters, even tour ships in that
    area, which is obviously going to put burdens on the United
    States Coast Guard for their duties both for security and for
    protection of life and property.
        I am pleased, after many years of struggle, that we have
    two Polar Security Cutters fully funded, and we are going to
    authorize another one in the Don Young Coast Guard
    Authorization Act.
        We are also going to authorize the temporary utilization of
    an existing commercial icebreaker under lease so that we can
    enhance our capabilities. We have the Healy, and then we have
    the one remaining--and I always get them mixed up, Polar Star
    and Polar Sea, but whichever one we have--which is it, Admiral?
        Admiral Gautier. Polar Star.
        Mr. DeFazio. Polar Star. Good. OK. That was the one I was
    on. It is just too close together; I can never remember--which
    is patched together every year after it does its major duty and
    run to McMurdo Sound.
        It is interesting that, I mean, I guess they are still
    harvesting circuit boards and things that we don't make anymore
    with transistors off of the old Polar Sea, or they have been
    stockpiled somewhere, but it is pretty pathetic. I mean, Russia
    has 40. China, not even an Arctic nation, has two, and they are
    building more.
        This is going to be an era and an area of international
    competition, and potential issues will arise. I mean, there are
    resources and claims being extended. The idiots in the Senate
    have been unable to approve the Law of the Sea Treaty, so, we
    don't have full standing to object to Russia continually
    extending claims further and further into the Arctic region.
    But nothing can be done about the idiots in the Senate.
        So, with the Don Young bill, which will be hopefully
    tonight or this afternoon as part of the Water Resources
    Development Act--which is now the Water Resources Development
    Act, National Defense Authorization, Coast Guard Authorization,
    and God only knows what else is in that piece of legislation.
        And then there are other issues: bases. You are pretty
    distant from the more northern--because we only went there on a
    seasonal basis. I understand that we are looking at an enhanced
    deep-draft harbor. Our Coast Guard air station is, again,
    pretty far away, so, we are going to have to be looking at
    shoreside and seaside facilities to give us more proximity and
    less travel time to get into that area.
        As the chairman noted, this is my last hearing after 36
    years. I started down there somewhere, right about there I
    think, many years ago. This has been the honor of my life, to
    serve on this committee. I had great mentors. Particularly Jim
    Oberstar was an extraordinary mentor to me. And I hope I have
    mentored some of the next generation.
        And I wish Sam Graves, who I fully expect to be the next
    chairman, well on this committee. Sam is balanced and wants to
    get things done, so, I am looking forward to see that this
    committee will still be productive.
        And to Bob, congratulations. I am calling this the ``Year
    of the Great Retirement.'' A lot of people are retiring, and we
    are joining that crowd, although I am not going away, though I
    am going to be officially retired from Congress.
        And I want to thank my absolutely incredible staff. I can't
    name them all, but they have done so much great work over the
    years. A Member of Congress and this committee are only as good
    as the fabulous staff we have, whether it is legislative,
    investigative, or just organizational. This is the biggest
    committee in Congress. It is a little bit unwieldy, but I think
    we do pretty damn well.
        [Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
          Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
                       Transportation and Infrastructure
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for scheduling this morning's hearing to
    highlight the important role the Coast Guard serves in the Arctic. Of
    its many mission sets and various responsibilities, no role is more
    rapidly evolving than the Coast Guard's mission in the Arctic.
        The Coast Guard does not have the privilege of ignoring the
    significant and consequential impacts that climate change is having on
    our environment. Its servicemembers operate in the harsh terrain of the
    Arctic and bear witness to the full effects of a warming planet in that
    region. The fact is we all see it and we all experience it; from
    extreme weather events to coastal erosion, climate change is not
    something we can continue to ignore. We have to provide resources to
    the Coast Guard so they can mitigate the effects of climate change in
    their operational planning.
        As polar ice steadily decreases, new trade routes will emerge,
    linking Asia, North America, and Europe. The retreat of sea ice and the
    opening of navigable sea routes will only serve to accelerate the
    demands placed on this once inaccessible and remote region. This,
    inherently, will drive increased demand for Coast Guard services in the
    Arctic. That translates to more search and rescue response, more
    regulation of commercial fishing activity, more pollution response,
    more scientific data collection, and more icebreaking to facilitate
    commercial ships traversing Arctic waters. Indeed, the Coast Guard will
    need to augment its presence in this region if we, as a nation, are
    serious about protecting U.S. life and sovereignty in the Arctic.
        The Coast Guard operates the nation's only heavy polar icebreaker,
    the Polar Star. In years prior, Congress rightly recognized the need to
    expand Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic and authorized $1.8
    billion toward that effort. With two Polar Security Cutters fully
    funded and a third authorized in the Don Young Coast Guard
    Authorization Act of 2022, we have a modest start.
        The Coast Guard is the nation's most prominent Arctic presence, but
    I fear we risk losing our dominance as an Arctic state if we don't take
    more aggressive action. If the construction timeline for the Polar
    Sentinel--the first of three new Polar Security Cutters to be built--
    holds, we'll have a grand total of three polar icebreakers by the end
    of 2025. By comparison, Russia has 40 active icebreakers in the Arctic
    alone. China, which is not even a polar nation, currently operates two
    icebreakers, with plans to build more. Clearly, we have some catching
    up to do.
        I look forward to Congress passing the Don Young Coast Guard
    Authorization Act, which includes an authorization of $150 million to
    acquire a commercial icebreaker to fill the gap until the arrival of
    Polar Sentinel.
        I'll note, however, that recapitalizing our icebreaker fleet is
    just one of many steps needed to fill the capability gap in the Arctic.
    We also need to address the communications gap experienced in this
    frontier. Communications are key to any mission, but in the Arctic
    communications are especially strained and data transmission is very
    limited. Further, every Coast Guard mission starts on land. While the
    Coast Guard has a presence in Alaska, Congress needs to ensure that the
    personnel stationed in remote locations are fully supported with robust
    housing, childcare, and medical facilities. Coast Guard cutters and
    aircraft do not operate themselves so we must do better to improve the
    lives of Coast Guard servicemembers.
        Finally, we cannot ignore the ongoing war in Ukraine and the impact
    it has had on diplomacy in the Arctic. The pause of the U.S.
    involvement in the Arctic Council and the associated loss of
    international cooperation in the Arctic is troubling, and the long-term
    consequences of such are unknown. The U.S. does not yet have a clear
    path forward in this new, non-cooperative geopolitical arena. We need
    to bolster our Arctic capabilities so we are prepared for any scenario,
    threat, or hazard that may emerge.
        Today's hearing is timely, and the array of witnesses before us
    boast impressive resumes and expertise in the Arctic domain. I look
    forward to their testimony.
        I'd also like to mention that today will be the last hearing of the
    Transportation and Infrastructure Committee for the year, and my last
    hearing before I retire at the end of the 117th Congress. Being Chair
    of the Committee over the past four years has been the highlight of my
    36-year career. I wish Sam Graves the best as he prepares to take over
    the gavel at the beginning of the 118th Congress. I hope and expect he
    will continue the bipartisanship and productivity that this committee
    is known for. Thank you.

        Mr. DeFazio. So, with that, I yield back the balance of my
    time.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Now I would like to recognize Ranking Member Graves.
        Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I thank the witnesses, too, for being here, and I
    appreciate you being here.
        I particularly want to add my thanks and respect to both
    Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Gibbs. This is their last
    committee hearing, and their hard work and expertise from both
    of you are going to be missed on the committee overall and this
    subcommittee.
        I very much appreciated serving with both of you, and you
    have both done a lot of good things for the country when it
    comes to jurisdictions under this committee. And I can only
    hope that Oregon and Ohio will be just as well represented as
    you move on. But thanks for your service.
        I do know this is an Arctic hearing, but I do want to thank
    Admiral Gautier for what you are doing. And I want to remind
    you of the importance of getting the Barbers Point aviation
    facilities completed. That is something that means a whole lot
    to me when it comes to the next generation of aircraft and
    making sure that those maintenance facilities are up to date.
    And I look forward to working with the Coast Guard to obviously
    complete whatever is needed there at the Barbers Point Station
    in particular.
        I know that Arctic shipping routes are only available,
    unfortunately, for about 3 months during the summer along the
    Northern Sea Route or the Northwest Passage. And I do know the
    changing conditions in the Arctic have made maritime
    transportation in the region much more feasible, but I do know
    there are significant challenges associated with increasing
    vessel traffic in the U.S. Arctic and the Arctic Ocean overall.
        And I do know that, sadly, the U.S. is woefully unprepared
    for the increased traffic that we are going to see. But I look
    forward to hearing from you all today and reading your
    testimony, and, again, I appreciate you being here. The Coast
    Guard means a lot to me, and I know it does to the country. And
    so, I want to make sure that you all have everything that you
    need.
        [Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
         from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
                       Transportation and Infrastructure
        I know this is an Arctic hearing, but I want to thank Vice Admiral
    Gautier for your work and remind you of the importance of getting the
    Barbers Point facilities fully ready for the next generation of Coast
    Guard aircraft. I look forward to working with the Coast Guard to
    complete the needed upgrades at that Air Station.
        Historically, Arctic shipping routes were only available for up to
    three months in the summer along the Northern Sea Route or the
    Northwest Passage. Changing conditions in the Arctic have made maritime
    transportation in the region more feasible. However, there are still
    significant challenges associated with increasing vessel traffic in the
    U.S. Arctic and the Arctic Ocean as a whole.
        Sadly, the U.S. is woefully unprepared for this increased vessel
    traffic. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on the
    potential for increased Arctic maritime transportation and how to
    manage that growth effectively.

        Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thanks. I yield back.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
        I now will recognize Ranking Member Gibbs.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to also thank
    you for your kind words, and then, Chairman DeFazio, for your
    kind words.
        And one of my fondest memories I have of Chairman DeFazio
    is, when I was looking for offices, like, 4, 5, or 6 years ago
    in the Rayburn Building, I stumbled across Chairman DeFazio's
    office, and he was gracious enough to show me his nice big
    balcony.
        Which, I don't know if they let you out there anymore on
    that. I heard----
        Mr. DeFazio. [Inaudible.]
        Mr. Gibbs. Yes. But you were so gracious to do that, other
    side of the aisle. I appreciated that. That is a fond memory I
    have. You probably don't even remember when that happened.
        And I want to thank Ranking Member Graves for his kind
    words. And I am sure that the T&I Committee will be in good
    hands starting January 3rd, but I will be watching from afar. I
    will let you know how you are doing, if you mess up too bad.
        But I have been on this committee since 12 years ago when I
    first came to Congress, and I was privileged enough to be
    chairman of the Water Resources and Environment Subcommittee
    for 6 years. And I enjoyed working with the Army Corps and now
    the Coast Guard. And such memorable experiences, and I learned
    a lot. And I didn't know a whole lot when I started those chair
    positions and ranking member, but it has been wonderful. So, I
    will treasure those memories. I really appreciate it.
        So, Chairman DeFazio, I wish you well. I don't know how
    many years you were here, but you have had an esteemed career,
    and I am sure you will do fine out on the west coast.
        Mr. DeFazio. Thirty-six.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thirty-six years. So, I wish you well.
        Today, the subcommittee will hear testimony on the need for
    increased United States infrastructure to facilitate safe and
    efficient maritime transportation in the Arctic.
        For the first time in recorded history, more portions of
    the Arctic each year are becoming navigable. Vessel transits
    through the area covered by the Polar Code on shipping
    increased 25 percent between 2013 and 2019 and are expected to
    continue.
        It is critical that we understand current traffic flows and
    the steps that need to be taken to ensure that both vessels and
    mariners and the environment are properly protected. One way to
    ensure better Arctic access is to increase the U.S. icebreaker
    presence in the U.S. Arctic.
        The Coast Guard has contracted to acquire a new class of
    Polar Security Cutter, the first heavy icebreakers built in the
    U.S. since 1977. Though this is a good first step towards more
    fully implementing an active U.S. presence in the Arctic, these
    cutters are officially 1 year, and unofficially 2 years, behind
    their original construction timeline.
        The vessels will fall at least 1 more year behind their
    stated timeline, which was never realistic. In addition, the
    first cutter will conduct an Antarctic breakout and will not be
    available for work in the Arctic. So, they are going to
    Antarctica first, I guess, and then back to the Arctic, so,
    there will be more delays for up there. In other words, we are
    nearly a decade away from increased U.S. icebreaker presence in
    the Arctic.
        I look forward to the Coast Guard providing us a realistic
    timeline for when we can expect to see additional icebreaking
    capacity in the Arctic and what interim capacity measures the
    Coast Guard plans until then. However, while icebreakers
    provide important capabilities, there are many other issues
    that must be addressed to ensure safe and efficient Arctic
    navigation.
        Additional infrastructure and operational challenges to
    maritime transportation in the Arctic include: limited
    satellite coverage and architecture to support voice and data
    communications; the lack of a deep-draft port accommodating
    ships that will draft up to 35 feet; unpredictability in flow
    patterns of icebergs in shipping lanes; the lack of channel-
    marking buoys and other floating visual aids which are not
    possible due to continuously moving ice sheets; and scant
    hydrographic surveying and other data needed for safe
    navigation and resource protection and management.
        The United States is not alone in our efforts to facilitate
    safe commerce in the Arctic. We are part of the Arctic Council
    along with other Arctic nations like Canada, Russia, and the
    Nordic countries. However, the Council's activities have been
    in abeyance since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Russia holds
    the Council's chairmanship in 2022 and 2023, and it is not
    clear what the Council's future is after that.
        Working together in a consensus-based intergovernmental
    forum allowed Arctic nations to promote environmental, social,
    and economic aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic.
    The Council was also critical to successfully implementing the
    International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters--the
    Polar Code. If the Council cannot be revived, we need to find
    other mechanisms to ensure international cooperation on these
    issues.
        This Arctic really is the last frontier, the portion of our
    Nation's waters about which we still have much to learn.
    However, unless we can get the U.S. Coast Guard and other
    agencies assets into the area--an expensive and time-consuming
    challenge--we will not be able to use these areas
    strategically.
        [Mr. Gibbs' prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Hon. Bob Gibbs, a Representative in Congress from
    the State of Ohio, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
                            Maritime Transportation
        Today the Subcommittee will hear testimony on the need for
    increased United States infrastructure to facilitate safe and efficient
    maritime transportation in the Arctic. For the first time in recorded
    history, more portions of the Arctic each year are becoming navigable.
    Vessel transits through the area covered by the Polar Code shipping
    increased 25 percent between 2013 and 2019 and are expected to
    continue.
        It is critical that we understand current traffic flows and the
    steps that need to be taken to ensure that both vessels and mariners,
    and the environment, are properly protected. One way to ensure better
    Arctic access is to increase the U.S. icebreaker presence in the U.S.
    Arctic.
        The Coast Guard has contracted to acquire a new class of Polar
    Security Cutter, the first heavy icebreakers built in the U.S. since
    1977. Though a good first step toward more fully implementing an active
    U.S. presence in the Arctic, the PSCs are officially one year, and
    unofficially two years, behind their original construction timeline.
        The vessels will fall at least one more year behind that stated
    timeline, which was never realistic. In addition, the first PSC will
    conduct the Antarctic break out, and will not be available for work in
    the Arctic. In other words, we are nearly a decade away from increased
    U.S. icebreaker presence in the Arctic.
        I look forward to the Coast Guard providing us a realistic timeline
    for when we can expect to see additional icebreaking capacity in the
    Arctic, and what interim capacity measures the Coast Guard plans until
    then. However, while icebreakers provide important capabilities, there
    are many other issues that must be addressed to ensure safe and
    efficient Arctic navigation.
        Additional infrastructure and operational challenges to maritime
    transportation in the U.S. Arctic include limited satellite coverage
    and architecture to support voice and data communications; the lack of
    a deep-draft port; unpredictability in flow patterns of icebergs in
    shipping lanes; the lack of channel marking buoys and other floating
    visual aids, which are not possible due to continuously moving ice
    sheets; and scant hydrographic surveying and other data needed for safe
    navigation and resource protection and management.
        The United States is not alone in our efforts to facilitate safe
    commerce in the Arctic. We are part of the Arctic Council, along with
    other Arctic nations like Canada, Russia, and the Nordic countries.
    However, the Council's activities have been in abeyance since Russia's
    invasion of the Ukraine. Russia holds the Council's chairmanship in
    2022 and 2023, and it is not clear what the Council's future is after
    that.
        Working together in a consensus based, intergovernmental forum
    allowed Arctic nations to promote environmental, social, and economic
    aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic. The Council was also
    critical to successfully implementing the International Code for Ships
    Operating in Polar Waters--the Polar Code. If the Council cannot be
    revived, we need to find other mechanisms to ensure international
    cooperation on these issues.
        This Arctic really is the last frontier--the portion of our
    nation's waters about which we still have much to learn. However,
    unless we can get U.S. Coast Guard and other agencies assets into the
    area--an expensive and time-consuming challenge--we will not be able to
    use these areas strategically.

        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman Carbajal, for your work here
    on the committee, and I wish you all the best in the future.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Representative Gibbs.
        I would like to now welcome our first witness panel: Vice
    Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations at
    the United States Coast Guard; the Honorable Michael Sfraga,
    Chair of the United States Arctic Research Commission; and Mr.
    Andrew Von Ah, Director of Physical Infrastructure at the
    Government Accountability Office.
        Thank you for being here today, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
    included in the record.
        Since your written testimony has been made part of the
    record, the subcommittee requests that you limit your oral
    testimony to 5 minutes.
        Vice Admiral Gautier, you may proceed.

     TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PETER W. GAUTIER, DEPUTY COMMANDANT
     FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD; HON. MICHAEL SFRAGA, Ph.D.,
      CHAIR, U.S. ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION; AND ANDREW VON AH,
          DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. GOVERNMENT
                         ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Admiral Gautier. Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking
    Member Gibbs, Chairman DeFazio, and distinguished members of
    the subcommittee.
        I am really pleased and thank you for inviting me here
    today to update you on the Coast Guard's efforts on our Arctic
    strategy to promote safety, security, and environmental
    protection for the Arctic.
        And I would like to take a minute to add the Coast Guard's
    sincere appreciation, Chairman, for the service of Chairman
    Peter DeFazio, for his distinguished service to the United
    States Coast Guard, as well as the ranking member,
    Representative Bob Gibbs.
        The Coast Guard owes a debt of gratitude to you both and to
    your distinguished and dedicated staffs. Under your leadership,
    the House passed two Coast Guard authorization acts, and we
    were also included on two hurricane supplementals, CARES Act
    funding, as well as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
    and many other things that have helped the Coast Guard.
        And before I left for here today, Admiral Fagan, our
    Commandant, asked to express her personal thanks to you both.
    The Coast Guard is better for your support of us.
        The Arctic is undergoing a dramatic transformation of its
    physical, operational, and geostrategic environment. We are
    witnessing firsthand how the impact of climate change is
    opening up new access to Arctic waters. This drives greater
    activity in the Arctic region and, with it, risk across the
    maritime sector. And the Coast Guard is deeply concerned about
    the rising strategic risk to our Nation as Russia and China
    compete with diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage and
    influence in the Arctic.
        While our missions in the high latitudes have evolved since
    we first started operating in Alaska and the Arctic in 1867,
    the Coast Guard's commitment to the region has not. We are
    operating forward to address the safety and security of our
    Arctic residents and mariners who make their living there,
    homeporting new cutters, investing in infrastructure and
    capabilities, prioritizing our operations, supporting research,
    and strengthening our international partnerships.
        Changing conditions in the Arctic are driving an increased
    demand for Coast Guard services; there is no question about
    that. And we have a sense of urgency to make sure we can
    deliver now and well into the future.
        Our actions are supported by the 2022 U.S. National
    Strategy for the Arctic Region and its four interconnected
    pillars. And this strategy is fundamentally supported by our
    2019 Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook.
        Despite the geographical remoteness and logistical
    challenges inherent to all Arctic operations, the Coast Guard
    is meeting service demand through our flexible and
    expeditionary approach.
        This year, in our Operation Arctic Shield, we increased
    seasonal presence in the U.S. Arctic to provide Coast Guard
    services across 65 remote communities. Together with Federal,
    State, Tribal, and local stakeholders, we responded to Typhoon
    Merbok to ensure numerous impacted communities could receive
    critical fuel and supplies ahead of the winter freeze. And, in
    October, the Coast Guard cutter Healy reached the North Pole
    for the second time to conduct important scientific research.
        Strategic competition across the Arctic is also driving
    demand for our leadership. Last year, Coast Guard cutters
    intercepted four Chinese military vessels operating together in
    the U.S. exclusive economic zone off the Aleutians. And, in
    September, we intercepted a combined Russian-Chinese task group
    of seven ships in a similar location. In both instances, the
    Coast Guard met presence with presence to ensure these ships
    operated in accordance with international law.
        The Coast Guard's strategic influence extends beyond the
    U.S. Arctic. We routinely conduct engagements with other Arctic
    nations and partners. And despite the absence of Russia in the
    Arctic Council and Arctic Coast Guard Forum, we continue to
    work with like-minded nations to advance shared interests in
    safety, environmental stewardship, and responsible governance.
        We appreciate deeply the continued support from Congress
    and this committee in particular to build the next generation
    of Coast Guard capability for the Arctic. A top acquisition
    priority is the Polar Security Cutter, and we are working hard
    to advance that effort.
        We have asked for funding in this year's budget to increase
    near-term presence in the Arctic through acquisition of a
    commercially available medium icebreaker. With Congress' help,
    we are moving forward on this.
        Never before has Coast Guard leadership been more important
    to the Arctic.
        Thank you again, Chairman, for this opportunity, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [Admiral Gautier's prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant
                        for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard
                                  Introduction
        Good morning, Chair Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
    distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. It is my pleasure to be here
    today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in advancing national interests
    in the Arctic. The United States is one of only eight Arctic coastal
    States with both sovereign rights and sovereign responsibilities to
    safeguard our respective and shared interests. As climate change and
    strategic competition increasingly affect the geography, stability, and
    security of the Arctic region, U.S. Coast Guard presence and leadership
    have never been more critical.
        Arctic activity is increasing and evolving at a rapid pace, from a
    surge in oil and gas exploration a decade ago to growth in types and
    locations of vessel transits, including a significant expansion of
    environmental tourism over the past five years. The dynamic and
    accelerated changes in the Arctic environment make Arctic waters more
    accessible, creating new opportunities and challenges, and increasing
    multinational strategic competition.
        The Arctic's dynamic evolution magnifies the importance of U.S.
    national security across the region and intensifies the demand for the
    Coast Guard's services and leadership. In a region where presence means
    not only influence, but also security, the U.S. Coast Guard has been a
    key leader and interagency partner in shaping the Arctic security
    environment for over 150 years. I understand the significant level of
    investments required to further champion our Nation's efforts in the
    Arctic, and I embrace the trust Congress and the American people have
    placed in the U.S. Coast Guard. The Service will continue to prioritize
    actions that safeguard U.S. interests while promoting safe, secure, and
    environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.
                  National Security Drivers Across the Arctic
        The 2022 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) sets
    the vision for the Arctic as peaceful, stable, prosperous, and
    cooperative. The four pillars to achieve that vision are security,
    which encompasses both homeland security and national defense, climate
    change and environmental protection, sustainable economic development,
    and international cooperation and governance. These pillars are
    interconnected in terms of domestic and international risks, effects,
    and mitigating actions. They require coordination with the State of
    Alaska and across a broad spectrum of Arctic stakeholders including
    Indigenous communities, partners and allies, domestic and international
    bodies, academics, scientists, and the private sector. Our 2019 Coast
    Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook and its three lines of effort--enhancing
    capability to operate effectively, strengthen the rules-based order,
    and innovate and adapt to promote resilience and prosperity--support
    the four NSAR pillars.
        Peace and prosperity depend on adherence to the rules-based
    international order, particularly in the maritime domain. As we see
    around the globe, state and non-state malign actors take advantage of
    any governance gaps to poach natural resources or attempt to intimidate
    others through incursions into sovereign waters. Meeting these
    challenges requires the United States to be present, collaborate with
    others, and model professional behavior at sea. With our unique
    combination of authorities as an armed service, a law enforcement
    agency, a regulatory agency, and a humanitarian service, the Coast
    Guard is an ideal tool for the Nation to govern the U.S. Arctic
    maritime environment responsibly. The Coast Guard has excelled and will
    continue to excel in all of these elements, to include setting an
    example of responsible governance and reinforcing the rule of law
    through operational presence and strategic leadership.
                       Pillar 1: Security and Capability
        The geopolitical environment in the Arctic continues to evolve as
    state and non-state actors seek to advance their interests in the
    region. Allies, partners, and competitors increasingly contend for
    diplomatic, economic, and strategic advantage and influence. Russia and
    China exemplify this competition. Both have declared the Arctic a
    strategic priority; both have made significant investments in new or
    refurbished capabilities; and both are attempting to exert direct or
    indirect influence across the region using all of their instruments of
    national power.
        As the only U.S. armed force with both military and law enforcement
    authorities, and as a member of the Intelligence Community, the Coast
    Guard seamlessly employs multi-mission assets and cross-trained
    personnel to advance U.S. Arctic priorities. The Coast Guard serves as
    a critical bridge between the power of the Department of Defense and
    the diplomacy of the State Department, cultivating strong international
    relationships and building coalitions among Arctic partners based on
    mutual interests and values. These relationships enhance safety,
    maritime governance, and prosperity across the region, which in turn
    strengthen both national security and regional stability.
        The Coast Guard is directly observing increased strategic
    competition in the U.S. Arctic. Through the operations of its
    Seventeenth District, which is responsible for Coast Guard activities
    for an over 3,853,500 square mile area including Alaska and the Arctic,
    the Coast Guard meets presence with presence both to counter
    competition and positively influence behavior. Over the past two years,
    the Coast Guard has intercepted a Chinese military Surface Action
    Group, as well as a combined Russian-Chinese Task Group, operating in
    the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. In both instances, the Coast Guard's
    visible forward presence ensured that both groups operated in
    accordance with international law. The Coast Guard will continue to
    exhibit model governance grounded in international law, rules, norms,
    and standards, including freedom of navigation, in the U.S. Arctic and
    empowering like-minded partners and allies to do the same in their
    Arctic waters.
             Pillar 2: Climate Change and Environmental Protection
        The effects of climate change span the Arctic's physical,
    operational, and strategic environments. These pronounced effects
    threaten the stability of Arctic communities and natural resources, the
    traditional lifestyles of Alaska Natives, and national sovereignty
    across the region. Addressing these impacts begins with an informed
    understanding of how, when, and where the physical environment is
    changing, which enables evidenced-based decision-making to reduce the
    operational and strategic consequences. Scientific research within the
    Arctic, in general, will require investments and a coordinated whole-
    of-government approach to inform policy decisions. The Coast Guard
    looks forward to supporting Arctic research endeavors through its
    robust partnerships with institutions like the National Science
    Foundation, U.S. Arctic Research Commission, Polar Institute, National
    Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Navy, and U.S.
    National Ice Center. The Coast Guard has long provided Arctic access by
    including interagency and international scientists aboard the USCGC
    Healy to conduct critical scientific research. This research, and the
    understanding it affords, has enabled the Coast Guard, along with our
    national and international partners, to protect the maritime
    environment, build community resilience, and shape the security
    environment.
        While long-term trends indicate a more consistently navigable
    Arctic, near-term conditions are less predictable and thus more
    dangerous. In September 2022, Typhoon Merbok hit more than 1,000 miles
    of Alaska's west coast with hurricane-force winds, wave heights over 50
    feet, and storm surges that were the highest recorded in almost 50
    years. Storms of Merbok's magnitude usually occur in October and
    November after the formation of shoreside (first-year) ice that offers
    protection for coastal communities. However, unusually warmer waters in
    the Bering Sea enabled this storm's formation much earlier in the
    season. Merbok also hit during the fall subsistence harvest, damaging
    or destroying hunting and fishing boats and camps along the coasts and
    forcing immediate repairs to homes, businesses, and camps at the
    expense of harvest activities necessary to ensure winter food security
    in these communities.
        In the face of Merbok's dangerous and challenging conditions, the
    Coast Guard provided critical value to the region by proactively
    advancing community resilience. As a visible, agile, and adaptive
    force, the Coast Guard helped to coordinate the Federal, Tribal, State,
    and local response. The Service conducted damage assessments in 32
    remote communities, focusing on bulk fuel facilities, and connecting
    waterways to ensure communities could receive their fuel shipments and
    other critical supplies ahead of the winter freeze-up. Natural
    disasters like Merbok are only expected to increase in frequency and
    severity as a result of climate change, and the Coast Guard will be
    increasingly called upon to respond.
                   Pillar 3: Sustainable Economic Development
        As Arctic accessibility increases, so does the potential for new
    economic opportunities. The Arctic currently supplies roughly 10
    percent of the world's oil and 25 percent of its natural gas, but it is
    estimated to hold 22 percent of the Earth's undiscovered oil and
    natural gas supply. It also contains significant deposits of minerals
    essential to technology supply chains; at present, Alaska has the
    world's largest zinc mine and the largest known graphite deposit in the
    United States. Today, Alaska's top export is its seafood, topping $6
    billion in labor income annually, $15 billion in economic output, and
    accounting for over 40% of the total U.S. seafood exports and a
    significant portion of global seafood supply.
        These valuable resources are driving increased maritime activity in
    the U.S. Arctic. Oil and gas exploration has surged, as has
    environmental tourism. During the 2022 operating season, at least eight
    transits of adventure tour ships were planned from Greenland to Nome.
    As another means of enabling sustainable development, the Coast Guard
    supports scientific research, such as NOAA studies on the distribution
    of impacts to the region's fish and marine mammal stocks as well as
    other aspects of wildlife ecology. These studies also help inform our
    domain awareness and operational risks across the region. For example,
    understanding where fish stocks are moving and how commercial,
    recreational, and subsistence harvesters are responding enables the
    Coast Guard to proactively manage the waterways as well as protect both
    the mariners and the environment.
        Since 2009, the Coast Guard has influenced Arctic governance and
    sustainable development through Operation Arctic Shield. This Operation
    demonstrates the Coast Guard's operational capability, asserts
    leadership and models responsible international governance in a region
    of key geostrategic importance. The annual Operation includes three
    task forces--National Security and Enforcement, Aviation, and Marine
    Safety. Through these task forces, the Coast Guard, along with its
    Federal, Tribal, state, and Arctic Nation partners, protects
    sovereignty, enhances domain awareness, and regulates commercial
    activity. This year's operational highlights included the Coast Guard's
    interception of a Russian vessel fishing illegally in U.S. waters. The
    Coast Guard notified our counterparts in the Russian Border Guard who,
    at our request, investigated the incident and fined the vessel. The
    Coast Guard also conducted spill response and mass rescue exercises
    with Arctic hub communities, industry partners, and various other
    Tribal, state, and local stakeholders. These exercises enable our
    ability to not only protect people and the environment but also enhance
    our ability to maintain the Arctic's waterways and marine
    transportation system, the primary transportation mechanism across the
    region. This operational presence and responsible model of governance
    positions the Coast Guard as a central U.S. leader in influencing,
    shaping, and protecting sustainable economic development, subsistence
    lifestyles, and cultural traditions in the Arctic across the
    international landscape.
               Pillar 4: International Cooperation and Governance
        The Coast Guard's unique authorities, experience, and leadership
    distinguish it from the other Armed Services and traditional military
    instruments of national power. Leveraging these skills and
    characteristics provides the ability to both model responsible
    governance and compete below the level of armed conflict across the
    Arctic landscape. A key tenant of the new NSAR and the 2019 Coast Guard
    Arctic Strategic Outlook is asserting international leadership to
    advance cooperation that upholds international law, rules, norms, and
    standards for the Arctic coastal states and other non-Arctic flag
    States whose ships sail in Arctic waters. Upholding this strategic
    initiative, the Coast Guard consistently asserts its leadership and
    provides guidance and direction through such preeminent multilateral
    forums as the Arctic Council and the International Maritime
    Organization (IMO).
        The Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) similarly acts as a bridge
    between diplomacy and operations. This forum continues to serve as an
    independent, but complementary, body to the Arctic Council, with an
    operational focus on safe and environmentally responsible Arctic
    maritime activity. Since 2017, the Coast Guard has conducted multiple
    exercises with partner Arctic nations through the ACGF. These exercises
    enhance interoperability and provide a platform for direct dialogue
    among the Arctic agencies fulfilling Coast Guard functions. In 2021,
    the Arctic Council and the ACGF issued a joint statement of cooperation
    to enhance collaboration on both search and rescue and oil spill
    preparedness and response. This cooperation includes joint exercises,
    such as the 2021 ARCTIC GUARDIAN exercise, conducted under Iceland's
    Chairmanship, which explored both large-scale search and rescue and oil
    spill response protocols to a cruise ship incident in Arctic waters.
        Despite Russia's illegal war against Ukraine, the Coast Guard
    continues to bolster international cooperation and leadership
    commitments with the other Arctic Nations. The Coast Guard continues to
    participate in bi-lateral and multi-lateral Arctic exercises and
    patrols throughout the Arctic region with like-minded partners. This
    cooperation highlights that all other Arctic nations are aligned in
    upholding international law, rules, norms, and standards for those
    operating in the region. Participation in these activities enables the
    Service to build experience operating across the region, expand
    response capacity with international partners, and strengthen these
    strategic relationships.
                            Building Arctic Capacity
        The ability for the United States to protect U.S. national
    sovereignty, safeguard our homeland, and lead in the Arctic hinges on
    physical presence and access. U.S. operational presence and influence
    in the Arctic are founded on Coast Guard polar icebreakers. These ships
    provide assured, year-round access to the Polar Regions not only for
    Coast Guard missions, but also in support of critical activities of
    other agencies and Tribal Nations that protect key economic,
    environmental, and national security interests in the high latitudes.
        Thanks to Congressional support for the Coast Guard's Polar
    Security Cutter (PSC) program, which includes our Fiscal Year (FY) 2023
    President's Budget request of $167.2 million for PSC program management
    and production activities, Coast Guard presence will continue well into
    the future. The PSC is a top acquisition priority for the Coast Guard
    and the Navy and is vital for the U.S. to continue to project
    sovereignty and protect national security interests in the Polar
    Regions. The PSC is the capability the Nation needs to ensure
    persistent presence and robust domain awareness in the Arctic and
    Antarctic regions. The integrated Coast Guard-Navy Program Office
    continues to work actively with the prime contractor to mitigate
    schedule risks and ensure effective and efficient use of U.S. taxpayer
    dollars to deliver this critical capability. With Congress's continued
    support, the Nation is closer than we have been in over 40 years to
    recapitalizing our icebreaking fleet. Continued investment is key to
    meeting our Nation's growing needs in the rapidly evolving and dynamic
    Polar Regions.
        The FY 2023 President's Budget also requests $150 million to
    support the acquisition of a commercially available polar icebreaker,
    including initial modifications, crewing, and integrated logistics
    support required to reach initial operating capability. The U.S. has
    vital national interests in the Polar Regions and the purchase of a
    commercially available polar icebreaker is a viable strategy to
    accelerate U.S. presence in the polar regions in the near-term and
    increase capacity in the long-term.
        In addition to recapitalization of our icebreakers, the Coast Guard
    also needs adequate Arctic-capable surface and aviation assets,
    properly trained and equipped personnel, enhanced communication and
    domain awareness capabilities, and logistics resources. As outlined in
    the Coast Guard's 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook, closing gaps in these
    areas requires a whole-of-government approach coupled with consistent
    investment to meet not only the challenges the Arctic presents, but
    also the opportunities.
                                   Conclusion
        The Coast Guard has served and shaped national security in the
    Arctic for over 150 years and continues to play a critical role in the
    whole-of-government approach to secure national interests in the Polar
    Regions. The Coast Guard, and the Nation, must remain committed and
    agile in the rapidly evolving geopolitical and operational Arctic.
        The continued support of the Administration and Congress for a
    modernized and capable polar fleet and increased Coast Guard Arctic
    capacity and capabilities will fortify the Nation's position in this
    age of Arctic prominence. Coast Guard leadership is essential in
    maintaining a coalition of like-minded partners to shape the Arctic
    domain as a region of strategic cooperation. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify before you today and for your actions to support
    the members of the Coast Guard. I look forward to answering your
    questions.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Vice Admiral Gautier.
        Dr. Sfraga, you may proceed.
        Mr. Sfraga. Thank you.
        Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, Chairman DeFazio,
    and members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    address you today.
        I am Mike Sfraga. I am the Chair of the United States
    Arctic Research Commission. It is an independent Federal agency
    that advises Congress and the White House on issues related to
    Arctic research and related policies. I also sit before you as
    a resident of America's Arctic, the State of Alaska.
        I begin my remarks today by noting the U.S. Coast Guard and
    its forerunner, the Revenue Cutter Service, have a long history
    of supporting scientific research, starting with the
    environmental observations of the noted naturalist John Muir
    soon after the 1867 purchase of Alaska from Russia.
        Our Nation requires the Coast Guard's enduring support of
    Federal research to protect and defend America's Arctic
    interests, to better understand the changing Arctic landscape
    and its implications, to inform prudent economic development,
    and to foster peaceful, stable, and a prosperous North.
        I note that while oceanographic research is not among the
    11 statutory missions of the Coast Guard, it is indeed their
    sixth statutory primary duty.
        The Coast Guard advances scientific understanding of the
    polar regions in two fundamental ways. First, the Coast Guard
    itself supports a broad range of relevant basic and applied
    research, development, testing, and evaluation. And, second,
    Coast Guard icebreakers provide scientists--supported by many
    Federal agencies--direct access to the Arctic. These vessels
    also have modern scientific tools and enhanced capabilities,
    much of which have been provided by other Federal agencies.
        The U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region emphasizes
    two guiding principles relevant to today's discussion: first,
    plan for long-term investments, which means icebreakers;
    second, commit to a whole-of-Government approach.
        Clearly, icebreakers that may cost $600 million apiece are
    significant national investments and assets, requiring
    interagency efforts for long lead time for planning,
    construction, and outfitting.
        I turn my attention now to one of our Nation's two
    icebreakers, the Healy. Over the past 20 years, most of the
    Healy's time at sea has been in support of research, but two
    challenges loom just over the horizon.
        First, in recent years, Healy has become less available to
    the scientific community because there has been an increase in
    missions and patrols directly related to priorities of the
    Department of Homeland Security. Clearly, these missions are
    critical to our Nation's security and must continue.
        This inherent push/pull on the Healy's time in the Arctic
    demonstrates the ever-growing demands the Coast Guard has on it
    and that one single agency has upon it. This rebalancing of
    Healy's missions profile provides few alternatives to U.S.
    researchers other than to rely on foreign icebreakers for
    support.
        Second, Healy is now 23 years old, with an original service
    life of 30 years. Healy will undergo a 5-year service
    extension, but decommissioning is not far off. What vessel will
    replace the Healy? Will it be another Coast Guard vessel,
    perhaps an Arctic Security Cutter, for which there is no yet
    program of record?
        While the Healy's decommissioning may seem far off, it is
    sooner than we think, particularly for those of us who think in
    icebreaker years. Planning for replacement takes time, given
    the complexities of identifying interagency requirements,
    seeking authorizations and appropriations, procurement,
    construction, outfitting, sea trials, and so on. So, my message
    today to you is: Let's start now.
        And, finally, I want to shift the focus and describe the
    soft-power diplomacy that results from international scientific
    research and its value.
        Coast Guard icebreakers have long served as platforms for
    international scientific collaboration. By addressing common
    problems and sharing data when appropriate, the U.S. builds
    constructive relationships with like-minded nations in and
    outside of the Arctic, which strengthens the international
    rules-based order, the transatlantic alliance, U.S. and Canada,
    U.S. and Nordic cooperation, and cooperation throughout North
    America. The U.S. also benefits through access to new ideas,
    technologies, databases, and research partnerships.
        So, in conclusion, I offer four suggestions:
        Government planning to ensure continued and enduring access
    to the Arctic Ocean needs to begin now, given the long lead
    time before delivery.
        Two, when the Government procures new icebreakers, it
    should consider the broad mission sets and requirements of all
    applicable Federal departments and agencies, and when feasible,
    incorporate them into vessel designs in order to advance the
    full range of our Nation's Arctic interests.
        Three, specifically, multibeam sonar systems should be
    standard hydrographic equipment installed on all U.S.
    icebreakers, because the charts that they create reveal the
    depth and shape of the sea floor and provide information
    critical to safe navigation, economic development, weather
    prediction, coastal hazard assessment, coastal change analysis,
    fisheries habitat, and resource development.
        And, finally, continue to support research enabled by the
    Coast Guard in order to reap the international benefits of
    soft-power diplomacy.
        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Gibbs, thank you for the
    opportunity to speak with you today, and I do look forward to
    your questions.
        Thank you.
        [Mr. Sfraga's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Michael Sfraga, Ph.D., Chair, U.S. Arctic
                              Research Commission
        Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished members
    of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on the United
    States Coast Guard's (USGC) leadership on Arctic safety, security, and
    environmental responsibility. I am Dr. Mike Sfraga and I am honored to
    appear before you today as the presidentially appointed Chair of the
    United States Arctic Research Commission (USARC) to discuss these
    urgent set of issues.
                       The US Arctic Research Commission
        The USARC is an independent federal agency established by the
    Arctic Research Policy Act of 1984 as amended.
        Our agency's mission is to advance Arctic research on behalf of and
    to the benefit of the U.S.
        There are eight commissioners, seven of whom are directly appointed
    by the President. The eighth is the Director of the National Science
    Foundation (NSF) who serves as a non-voting ex officio member.
        The current members of the Commission are:
          Dr. Mike Sfraga, Chair; filling an academic/research
    seat, the founding director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute,
    former director, Global Risk and Resilience Program, Wilson Center, and
    currently serving as chair and distinguished fellow, Polar Institute,
    Wilson Center.
          Dr. Nikoosh Carlo; filling an academic/research seat, the
    founder and chief strategist at CNC North Consulting.
          Elizabeth Qaulluq Cravalho; filling an industry seat, the
    vice president of lands for NANA Regional Corporation, an Alaska Native
    Corporation.
          David Kennedy; filling an academic/research seat, the
    current Global Fellow at the Wilson Center's Polar Institute, Board
    Member of the World Maritime University, and Chairman of the External
    Advisory Board of the School of Marine Science and Ocean Engineering at
    the University of New Hampshire.
          Dr. Mark Myers; filling an industry seat, the principal
    of Myenergies.
          Dr. Jacqueline Richter-Menge; filling an academic/
    research seat, a research affiliate with the University of Alaska
    Fairbanks, 34 years of experience with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
    Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory.
          Deborah Vo; filling the Indigenous seat, Program Officer
    with the Rasmuson Foundation.
          Dr. Sethuraman Panchanathan; Director, NSF.

        The Commission releases a biennial report to the White House and to
    Congress on Arctic research goals and objectives to advise the
    president, Congress, guide the Interagency Arctic Research Policy
    Committee (IARPC) five-year plan, and to inform overall U.S. Arctic
    research efforts. The Commission also assists IARPC in establishing a
    national Arctic research program plan every five years to implement
    Arctic research policy.
        In addition to the above tasks, the Commission's duties, assigned
    by law, include:
          Facilitating cooperation between the Federal Government
    and State and local governments with respect to Arctic research;
          Reviewing Federal research programs in the Arctic and
    recommending improvements in coordination among programs;
          Recommending methods to improve logistical planning and
    support for Arctic research;
          Recommending methods for improving efficient sharing and
    dissemination of data and information on the Arctic among interested
    public and private institutions;
          Offering other recommendations and advice to the IARPC as
    it may find appropriate;
          Cooperating with the Governor of the State of Alaska and
    with agencies and organizations of that State which the Governor may
    designate with respect to the formulation of Arctic research policy;
    and
          Recommending to the IARPC the means for developing
    international scientific cooperation in the Arctic.

        The USARC is a statutory member of the North Pacific Research Board
    and the North Slope Science Initiative. The USARC is also a member,
    participant, liaison, or observer on the IARPC, the Interagency
    Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, the National Ocean
    Council, the Extended Continental Shelf Task Force, the Study of
    Environmental Arctic Change (SEARCH), the Civil Applications Committee,
    the Scientific Ice Expeditions Interagency Committee (Navy submarines),
    the Arctic Icebreaker Coordinating Committee of the University National
    Oceanographic Laboratory System, the Alaska Ocean Observing System, the
    Department of State's Arctic Policy Group, the Arctic Research
    Consortium of the United States, the International Permafrost
    Association, and the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies.
      US Coast Guard's statutory Arctic responsibilities include research
        The USCG has several statutory responsibilities in the Arctic that
    are pertinent to USARC's mission, which is to advance Arctic research
    in support of national Arctic policy and strategy.
        I start with the Coast Guard's research-focused Arctic statutory
    duties.
        Of the seven primary duties assigned to the Coast Guard in 14 USC
    102 \1\, three are relevant to today's discussion.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ 14 U.S.C. 102, Title 14--Coast Guard, Subtitle I--
    Establishment, Powers, Duties, and Administration, Chapter 1--
    Establishment and Duties
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Section 102(4) directs the Coast Guard to develop,
    establish, maintain, and operate, with due regard to the requirements
    of national defense, aids to maritime navigation, icebreaking
    facilities, and rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on,
    under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of
    the United States;
          Section 102(5) directs the Coast Guard to, pursuant to
    international agreements, develop, establish, maintain, and operate
    icebreaking facilities on, under, and over waters other than the high
    seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
          Section 102(6) directs the Coast Guard to engage in
    oceanographic research of the high seas and in waters subject to the
    jurisdiction of the United States.

        In addition to these duties, the Coast Guard was assigned 11
    statutory missions \2\ by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. Law
    107-296, November 25, 2002). Section 888(a)(1)(F) of that Act includes
    ``ice operations'' among the non-homeland security missions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ 6 U.S.C. 468(a) Definitions, Title 6--Domestic Security;
    Chapter 1--Homeland Security Organization; Subchapter VIII--
    Coordination with Non-Federal Entities, Inspector General, United
    States Secret Service, Coast Guard, General Provisions; Part H--
    Miscellaneous Provisions
        The USCG's ``non-homeland security missions'' include:
          (A)  Marine safety.
          (B)  Search and rescue.
          (C)  Aids to navigation.
          (D)  Living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement).
          (E)  Marine environmental protection.
          (F)  Ice operations.
        The USCG's ``homeland security missions'' include:
          (A)  Ports, waterways and coastal security.
          (B)  Drug interdiction.
          (C)  Migrant interdiction.
          (D)  Defense readiness.
          (E)  Other law enforcement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In light of these responsibilities, I note, as a simple
    observation, and as a curiosity, that while ``oceanographic research''
    is the sixth statutorily defined ``primary duty'' of the Coast Guard,
    ``oceanographic research'' is not mentioned as a statutorily defined
    ``mission.''
        I also note, from a historical perspective, that the USCG and its
    forerunner, the Revenue Cutter Service, led by Captain Michael A.
    Healy, supported the conduct of natural science and the gathering of
    environmental observations since soon after the 1867 purchase of Alaska
    from Russia. This federal activity has long been part of the proud
    history of the Coast Guard.
        And more recently, such as on page 23 of its own 2013 ``Arctic
    Strategy,'' the Coast Guard astutely recognized that ``limited
    operational resources . . . underline the need for increasing
    collaboration in the region,'' and that ``[t]he Coast Guard must also
    collaborate with academia and non-governmental partners to incentivize
    Arctic research . . .''
       Research implications of federal policy on Coast Guard operations
        As mentioned above, federal policy has implications for the Coast
    Guard's operational support of Arctic scientific research.
        The foundation for national Arctic policy is the National Security
    Presidential Directive-66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-25
    (NSPD66/HSPD25, ``Arctic Region Policy,'' \3\ released in January 2009
    by President Bush and subsequently reaffirmed by President Obama. A
    directive of this policy is to ``[e]nhance scientific monitoring and
    research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ NSPD66/HSPD25, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Building upon that policy, the White House recently released an
    updated NSAR, and the White House Arctic Executive Steering Committee
    \4\ and National Security Council are currently developing an
    implementation plan for the NSAR that is scheduled for release in 2023.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Arctic Executive Steering Committee, https://
    www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/ostps-teams/climate-and-environment/arctic-
    executive-steering-committee-aesc/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To fulfill the nation's vision for the Arctic, and to address the
    strategic pillars of the NSAR, the United States must have the critical
    infrastructure provided by science-capable polar icebreakers.
        Broadly speaking, the role of icebreakers and the relevance of
    research can be connected to all four pillars, which are:
          Pillar 1--Security: Develop Capabilities for Expanded
    Arctic Activity
          Pillar 2--Climate Change and Environmental Protection:
    Build Resilience and Advance Adaptation, while Mitigating Emissions
          Pillar 3--Sustainable Economic Development: Improve
    Livelihoods and Expand Economic Opportunity
          Pillar 4--International Cooperation and Governance:
    Sustain Arctic Institutions and Uphold International Law

        Progress on many of the ``strategic objectives,'' beneath each
    pillar, requires icebreakers and scientific research.
        For example:
          Strategic Objective 1.1 Improve Our Understanding of the
    Arctic Operating Environment. This requires scientific research to
    improve Arctic observing, mapping and charting; weather, water, and sea
    ice forecasting; and subseasonal and seasonal predictions.
          Strategic Objective 2.3: Expand Research to Better
    Understand Climate Change and Inform Policy Decisions. Of all the
    strategic objectives in NSAR, this is most directly related and
    important to Arctic scientific research, and to the need for icebreaker
    access to the high Arctic.

        The NSAR also emphasizes two guiding principles relevant to today's
    discussion. They are:
          Plan for Long-Lead Time Investments, which mentions
    procuring additional icebreakers and investing in scientific research.
          Commit to a Whole-of-Government, Evidence-Based Approach,
    which emphasizes that responsibilities in the Arctic region extend
    beyond any single government agency, and that ``U.S. Federal
    departments and agencies will work together, through coordinating
    bodies like the Arctic Executive Steering Committee and the National
    Security Council, to provide the resources, support, and expertise
    required to implement this strategy.''

        Clearly, vessels that are anticipated to cost over $600M to build
    are significant national investments, requiring long lead-times for
    planning, construction, and outfitting. The USCG currently has
    intentions of constructing and operating up to six icebreakers.
        Separately, the National Science Foundation is currently developing
    the design for a Polar Class 3 icebreaker, a new Antarctic Research
    Vessel \5\, which, if fully funded, is expected to be delivered by mid-
    2031. Should this vessel come to fruition, NSF intends to operate it
    exclusively in the Southern Hemisphere as a science-dedicated vessel.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=305919&org=OPP
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Consistent with the NSAR guiding principles of (a) ``plan for long-
    lead time investments'', and (b) ``commit to a whole-of-government,
    evidence-based approach,'' White House leadership, coordination, and
    guidance of all departments and agencies requiring icebreaker
    capabilities will be instrumental in ensuring the continued judicious
    and fiscally responsible use of taxpayer funds.
             US Coast Guard's support for polar scientific research
        The US Coast Guard is a critically essential and successful partner
    in advancing scientific understanding of the polar regions for two
    reasons.
        First, the Coast Guard itself supports a broad range of Arctic-
    relevant basic and applied research, development, testing, and
    evaluation at the USCG Research and Development Center, the US National
    Ice Center, the International Ice Patrol, and through partnerships,
    such as with the Department of Homeland Security's Arctic Domain
    Awareness Center.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Arctic Domain Awareness Center, https://
    arcticdomainawarenesscenter.org
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second, USCG's icebreakers provide direct scientific access to the
    Arctic. Much of the time that Coast Guard icebreakers are at sea, they
    are supporting scientific research missions by providing physical
    access with ships that have scientific and technical capabilities, much
    of which is funded by other federal agencies.
        For example, according to the USCG's annual cruise reports, over 90
    percent of the time that USCG Cutter HEALY (WAGB-20) operated at sea
    over the past 20 plus years, including transit time, it did so in
    support of scientific research.
        The Coast Guard's icebreakers are the only vessels owned and
    operated by the United States government that enable US scientists and
    their international collaborators to access and investigate regions at
    both poles that are infested with multi-year ice. The icebreakers are,
    in short, essential research infrastructure.
        The access provided by icebreakers enables scientists, funded by a
    wide range of government agencies, to study, understand, and explain
    how the polar regions serve as ``Earth's refrigerators,'' and how these
    regions are warming and changing rapidly. For example, scientists now
    report that Arctic air temperatures are warming four times faster than
    the global average \7\, and Arctic waters are acidifying at three to
    four times of non-Arctic waters.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-022-00498-3#Sec6
        \8\ https://www.science.org/doi/epdf/10.1126/science.abo0383
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These changes, and their implications on weather, marine
    ecosystems, food supplies, transportation, tourism, and resource
    development are critically important to understand as the US advances
    its priorities noted in the NSAR and NSS. Knowledge and insights gained
    from basic and applied research: (a) informs responsible stewardship of
    the Arctic region, the ancestral home of Indigenous Peoples; and (b)
    advances our understanding of the opportunities to wisely develop
    America's Arctic renewable resources, such as fish, and timber, and
    non-renewable resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals.
        Most of this research has been sponsored (i.e., financially
    supported) by a wide range of federal partners and stakeholders, such
    as the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Office of Naval Research (ONR),
    the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of
    Interior entities, such as the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
    (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and
    the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the Department of State, among
    others.
        These agencies have reimbursed Coast Guard many millions of dollars
    for ``ship time'' on icebreakers for the scientists, engineers,
    researchers, and investigators that these federal partners support.
        Here are a few scientific highlights of Arctic research conducted
    aboard HEALY:
          Over many oceanographic expeditions, NOAA, USGS, and
    State Department supported the seafloor and sub-seafloor mapping of the
    US's Extended Continental Shelf (ECS) in the Arctic region, consistent
    with international law. This has been a critically important process in
    determining US sovereign rights on and beneath this seabed, beyond the
    US's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Based on the scientific results,
    the size of the US's entire ECS is about two times the size of
    California, and half of that area surrounds Alaska.
          HEALY recently returned from an extended and highly
    successful expedition, partially funded by the NSF, that reached the
    North Pole. Academic scientists collected data as part of an
    internationally coordinated, multi-ship sampling campaign during 2020-
    2022, named ``Synoptic Arctic Survey,'' to study pan-Arctic ocean
    circulation, biogeochemical cycles and marine ecosystems. Notably, this
    research cannot be conducted from remote sensing platforms, or from
    electronic moored or autonomous devices. Physical presence, provided by
    icebreakers, is required. This research can also be considered an early
    US contribution toward our treaty obligation to help establish a
    ``Joint Program of Scientific Research and Monitoring'' by June 2023 as
    per the international Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas
    Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean.
          NOAA has been the primary sponsor of multiple HEALY
    expeditions in support of US participation in an international
    initiative referred to as the ``Distributed Biological Observatory,''
    which consists of a series of eight sampling locations, spanning from
    the Bering Sea to the Beaufort Sea, offshore Alaska. These sites serve
    as a ``change detection array'' where scientists can observe variations
    in physical and oceanographic conditions, such as biodiversity,
    productivity and food webs, which impact Alaska's fisheries. According
    to a report from the Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute, Alaska
    produces more seafood than all other U.S. states combined and provides
    two-thirds of the nation's wild-caught fish and shellfish. Alaska
    seafood is sold in 100 countries and is the State's top export, in
    excess of $3 billion, annually. Food web changes also impact walruses,
    seals, and ducks, which, in turn, are harvested by US citizens living
    in small, vulnerable Indigenous communities in Alaska's coastal areas.
    As a result, icebreakers are essential to understand food web changes
    which are linked to food security issues.
          The Office of Naval Research has funded both basic and
    applied Arctic research conducted aboard HEALY that directly support US
    Navy operations, and concurrently addresses USCG missions associated
    with homeland and national security and domain awareness. Examples
    include the ``Stratified Ocean Dynamics of the Arctic Ocean'' (SODA)
    initiative, and an ``Innovative Naval Prototype program aimed at
    engineering a networked Arctic Mobile Observing System (AMOS). These
    research programs require access to the ice-covered central Arctic,
    some of which contain ``multi-year'' (thick and old) accessible only
    with ``medium'' and ``heavy'' icebreakers.
          One of the important steps in addressing the NSAR
    strategic objective of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions in the
    Arctic is to observe and understand the natural exchanges of carbon
    dioxide between the Arctic Ocean and overlying atmosphere that is
    associated with physical processes and the marine ecosystem. While gas
    exchange can be monitored remotely, and on broad scales, by satellites,
    detailed in situ measurements, aboard oceanographic vessels, fill a
    critical gap in observations and improve efforts to quantify ocean
    uptake of carbon dioxide, and hence our ability to model and predict
    future climate scenarios. To that end, NSF has funded research programs
    to equip HEALY and use the vessel as a ``ship of opportunity,'' on a
    not-to-interfere basis, to make such measurements and contribute them
    to global databases.\9\ Additional measurements, of other needed
    atmospheric and surface ocean observations (long and short wave
    radiation, air temperature, wind speed, humidity, sea surface
    temperature, etc.) could also be collected, and would also help inform
    domain awareness and the global forecast system.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ https://www.socat.info
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Current and future challenges and opportunities
    Increasing demand for HEALY
        The demand for HEALY to conduct missions prioritized by the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has increased significantly over
    the last few years, thereby reducing HEALY's availability for
    scientific research missions, which are also increasing.
        Greater demand for the vessel, and prioritization of DHS missions,
    has had an outsized impact on Arctic research because HEALY is the only
    asset in the US fleet capable of providing access to the high Arctic
    Ocean. The rebalancing of HEALY's mission profile toward security and
    international search and rescue efforts provide few options to US
    researchers other than to rely on foreign icebreakers for support,
    which will impact both the amount and the nature of science that US
    investigators can achieve. In addition, federal science agencies remain
    responsible for ongoing operational costs for the scientific and
    technical equipment and capabilities they have installed on HEALY, even
    when such capabilities are not being used.
    HEALY replacement
        Commissioned in 1999, USCGC HEALY is now 23 years old, and has a
    designed service life of 30 years, with an anticipated five-year
    Service Life Extension Project beginning in FY 2026. A replacement will
    be needed for the HEALY by about 2034, suggesting that construction of
    the new vessel will need to begin no later than 2031, which is the same
    year that NSF anticipates delivery of the Antarctic Research Vessel.
        In short planning for the HEALY replacement, to operate in the
    Arctic Ocean, must start in the next couple of years, if not now.
        This situation raises many questions, such as:
          How will the US government provide that icebreaker, which
    is essential to meet our obligations and needs in the North?
          Will the USCG provide one of its three ``medium''
    icebreakers, referred to as an ``Arctic Security Cutter''--consistent
    with the Coast Guard's ``High Latitude Mission Analysis Report
    recommending three ``medium'' and three ``heavy'' vessels, as part of
    USCG's ``Polar Security Cutter'' Program? \10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program:
    Background and Issues for Congress, https://s3.documentcloud.org/
    documents/22275439/coast-guard-polar-security-cutter-polar-icebreaker-
    program-background-and-issues-for-congress-aug-30-2022.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          If so, will that vessel be designed and constructed in a
    manner that reflects the requirements of multiple missions, including
    scientific research?
          How will the requirements for those various missions,
    from other agencies, be identified, coordinated with the USCG, and
    incorporated into the overall design requirements?
          What government entities will be provided with the
    responsibilities and necessary budgets to identify, procure, install,
    operate and maintain the scientific and technical capabilities and
    equipment of the vessel, such as with multibeam sonar systems?
          Will there be White House leadership and coordination,
    including of budgets (e.g., from Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
    National Security Council (NSC), and Office of Science and Technology
    Policy (OSTP)) to ensure a whole-of-government approach to this
    process?
    Other U.S. government vessels that operate in ice-infested waters
                R/V Sikuliaq
        The R/V Sikuliaq, owned by the NSF and operated by the College of
    Fisheries and Ocean Sciences at the University of Alaska Fairbanks,
    with support from the NSF, provides excellent scientific access to
    waters covered with thin ice, up to 2.5 feet thick. This vessel,
    commissioned in 2015, is outfitted with a wide range of modern science
    capabilities and has proven most successful in addressing key research
    questions. The Sikuliaq, however, is not an icebreaker, and is not
    capable of accessing large regions of the Arctic, where thicker ice is
    encountered.
                Antarctic research vessel
        Last year, the NSF announced \11\ funding for the design of an
    Antarctic Research Vessel (ARV) \12\, which would essentially serve as
    a replacement for the R/V Nathanial B. Palmer and possibly also the R/V
    Laurence M. Gould that NSF charters from Edison Chouest Offshore, Inc.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ https://future.usap.gov/new-antarctic-vessel-approved/
        \12\ https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=305919&org=OPP
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The ARV will be designed as a modern, world-class, ice-breaking
    research vessel outfitted with first-rate scientific equipment and
    enhanced capabilities. If the project is approved by NSF for
    construction and fully funded by Congress, the ARV is expected to be
    delivered to the NSF by mid-2031, only three years before HEALY is
    anticipated to be decommissioned.
        Notably, the NSF would operate the ARV exclusively in the Southern
    Hemisphere, in support of Antarctic research. To my knowledge, the NSF
    has no current plans for a similar icebreaking research vessel for the
    Arctic region, and I also don't know whether the NSF is in discussion
    with the US Coast Guard regarding the opportunities to outfit Coast
    Guard vessels, beyond HEALY (i.e., the ``commercially available polar
    icebreaker'' USCG has requested in its FY23 budget request, or any of
    the three heavy icebreakers considered in the Polar Security Cutter
    program), with scientific research tools and capabilities to advance
    scientific research objectives in the Arctic region. Regardless, my
    overarching recommendation is that, consistent with the NSAR's guiding
    principle of a ``whole-of-government'' approach, any icebreaker owned
    and operated by the US government should consider mission requirements
    of the broader interagency user community, not just one department or
    agency.
    Autonomous platforms
        While ship-based observing will remain a critical pillar of Arctic
    research, the use of autonomous platforms will continue to expand,
    providing access to remote regions and to spatial and temporal scales
    that have previously been impractical or impossible to sample.
    Research-capable icebreakers could support new networks of autonomous
    instruments--both to deploy and recover instruments and to service
    critical supporting infrastructure, such as acoustic beacons that will
    provide `underwater GPS' for accurately geolocating assets operating
    under sea ice.
                              Soft power diplomacy
        Finally, I would also like to highlight the soft power diplomacy
    advanced by Arctic scientific research that is often associated with
    international scientific parties aboard icebreakers both domestic and
    foreign.
        Over many decades, USCG icebreakers (HEALY, POLAR STAR and POLAR
    SEA) provided platforms for international science collaboration that
    allowed key interactions by scientists to move forward even when
    political differences of various countries strained relations in other
    areas. Ongoing climate change issues warrant continued and expanded
    international research programs and USCG icebreakers are essential
    assets for such activities.
        Let me provide some specifics. In the recently released ``State of
    Arctic Science,'' \13\ the International Arctic Science Committee
    refers to the Distributed Biological Observatory and the Synoptic
    Arctic Survey research programs, of which, as mentioned above, US
    leadership has been a central element. These programs require
    icebreaker access to the high North. The UN Decade for Ocean Science
    and Sustainable Development will have a focus on the Arctic Ocean.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ https://iasc.info/about/publications-documents/state-of-
    arctic-science
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        By addressing common problems and data sharing where appropriate,
    the US builds constructive relationships with, Canada, Iceland, the
    Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands), our Nordic
    partners, and scientists and research organizations in non-Arctic
    nations in Europe and Asia. The US benefits through access to new
    ideas, technologies, and data bases, research partnerships, and it
    encourages, supports, and reinforces the international rules-based
    order. Enabling joint international research, international search and
    rescue operations, ensuring interoperability with vessels and crews
    from other nations, and working closely with other Arctic and non-
    Arctic nations in areas such as the North Atlantic and Barents Sea,
    also serves to reinforce the transatlantic alliance at a time of
    geopolitical uncertainty; specifically, as this uncertainty ripples
    globally to include the Arctic.
        And looking even longer term, Russia's presence in the Arctic
    cannot be ignored. Because of Russia's war on Ukraine, relations with
    Russia are the worst they have been since the Cold War. We do not know
    when the war will end, or when relations with Russia will begin to
    rebalance. But at some point in the future, scientific research in the
    Arctic region could be one step forward in rebuilding a more
    comprehensive understanding of the region and perhaps serve as a
    foundational effort to rebuild relations between Russia and the
    West.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
    2154896X.2022.2137091
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Summary of recommendations
        On behalf of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, I recommend:
        1.  Federal agencies should continue to, where feasible, ensure
    that icebreakers procured by the United States, consider the broad
    mission sets of several agencies.
        2.  Multibeam sonar systems on icebreakers that reveal the depth
    and shape of the seafloor can provide information critical to safe
    navigation, economic development, weather prediction, coastal hazard
    assessment, coastal change analysis, habitat studies, and resource
    development, among many other activities. It is a requirement before
    declaring any potential marine protected areas, or the United States'
    extended continental shelf. As called out on page 4 of the US Arctic
    Research Commission's last ``Goals report,'' Arctic marine charts are
    suboptimal in that only 4.1 percent of the US maritime Arctic is
    charted to modern international standards.\15\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ https://www.arctic.gov/uploads/assets/usarc_goals_2019-
    2020_low.pdf

        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Gibbs, thank you again for the
    opportunity to testify before you and this Subcommittee on the United
    States Coast Guard's leadership in the Arctic. As I have stated, the US
    Coast Guard is a critically essential and successful partner in
    advancing scientific understanding of the polar regions and advancing
    our nation's interests in the region. It must continue to be so even
    with increasing and competing demands for icebreaker missions. I am
    confident the recommendations offered in this testimony will help
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    achieve that.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Sfraga.
        Next, Mr. Von Ah, you may proceed.
        Mr. Von Ah. Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    discuss our work on Federal efforts to address gaps in maritime
    infrastructure in the Arctic.
        Climate change has led to record-low levels of sea ice,
    making Arctic waters navigable for longer periods of time,
    leading to increased shipping activity. Data show more transits
    of the Bering Strait in 2021 than ever before.
        Increased shipping of natural resources extracted from the
    Arctic, growing demand for tourism and destination cargoes, and
    greater interest in trans-Arctic routes that can reduce travel
    times may continue to drive activity in the region.
        These potential economic opportunities also bring safety
    and environmental risks, particularly given that the U.S.
    Arctic does not have the typical elements of a Marine
    Transportation System, such as a deep-draft port, comprehensive
    charting of waterways, and robust communications
    infrastructure.
        These gaps in infrastructure exacerbate the inherent
    challenges of maritime activity in the Arctic--vast distances,
    dangerous weather, and unpredictable ice conditions--which pose
    risks to mariners as well as the fragile Arctic ecosystem.
        My statement today is based on reports we issued in 2020
    and 2016 which had findings and recommendations related to
    addressing these gaps.
        In our 2020 report, we found that Federal efforts in the
    Arctic lacked a current strategy with goals and measures, as
    well as interagency leadership. We therefore recommended that
    the Executive Office of the President develop and publish a
    strategy to address gaps in Arctic maritime infrastructure and
    designate an interagency mechanism responsible for leading
    Federal efforts, given that several Federal agencies have key
    roles and responsibilities in the Arctic.
        In response to the recommendations, the White House
    reactivated the Arctic Executive Steering Committee as the
    mechanism to advance U.S. interests and coordinate Federal
    actions in the Arctic. In doing so, it appointed an executive
    director and convened its first meeting in December 2021.
        Since then, the steering committee has met several times
    and has developed and approved eight interagency initiatives.
    One of the eight initiatives, to advance safe and secure Arctic
    shipping, is led by the Coast Guard.
        In addition, in October 2022, the White House issued a
    National Strategy for the Arctic Region, which identifies
    needed improvements to maritime capabilities in the Arctic,
    including enhanced communications, mapping, charting, and
    navigational capabilities, as well as the need for a deep-draft
    harbor in Nome, Alaska, and additional icebreaking
    capabilities.
        While the strategy establishes a vision for Arctic
    capabilities, it does not provide details on steps needed to
    achieve that vision or establish goals or measures for
    addressing gaps in Arctic maritime infrastructure, as we had
    recommended.
        For example, although the strategy calls for investments in
    telecommunications infrastructure and the development of ports,
    it does not specify how agencies should prioritize these
    investments, nor does it identify measures to assess progress.
        In November, the executive director told us that the
    process of developing an implementation plan for the strategy
    was underway. Encouragingly, he noted that for each major
    action of the strategy, the implementation plan should identify
    lead and supporting agencies, and the plan should also identify
    investment priorities and resources to implement the actions
    and a way to measure progress.
        By completing this plan and establishing goals and metrics,
    the Federal Government should have the tools to demonstrate the
    results of its efforts and decisionmakers could gauge progress
    in addressing these gaps.
        Our report in 2016 found that, although the Coast Guard was
    taking some actions to implement its Arctic strategy, it did
    not have a systematic way to assess how its actions will help
    mitigate Arctic capability gaps. We therefore recommended that
    the Coast Guard, as it develops an implementation plan for its
    strategy, also develop measures for assessing its progress.
        As of December 2022, the Coast Guard is continuing to
    update its implementation plan. The plan is expected to provide
    the foundation for assessing its efforts, although Coast Guard
    officials have not identified a timeline to complete the plan.
        Better understanding its progress and addressing capability
    gaps will be important given the Coast Guard's recent and
    planned investments in icebreaking capabilities. The Coast
    Guard plans to invest an estimated $13.3 billion to acquire,
    operate, and maintain three heavy polar icebreakers. And by
    tracking its progress in addressing its icebreaking and other
    capability gaps, the Coast Guard will be better positioned to
    understand how to support these assets and what level of
    infrastructure and support investments are ultimately needed.
        Moreover, the Coast Guard has an important opportunity to
    coordinate the completion of its plan with the recently
    released National Strategy. The Coast Guard's multimission role
    and its presence in the region gives it a central role to many
    Federal efforts. Taking such action will position the Coast
    Guard to understand how to allocate its resources and
    prioritize activities to help achieve the national goals in the
    Arctic region.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy
    to answer any questions you may have.
        Thank you.
        [Mr. Von Ah's prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure,
                     U.S. Government Accountability Office
        Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
    Subcommittee:
        I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on Arctic
    maritime infrastructure. As we have previously reported, climate change
    has led to widespread effects, including warming in the Arctic that has
    exceeded the warming in the rest of the world. Since 1900, the Arctic
    region has warmed by about 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit--double the rate of
    the global temperature increase--leading to a significant decline in
    sea ice cover over the last four decades.\1\ Record low levels of sea
    ice have made Arctic waters navigable for longer periods of time and
    have increased opportunities for shipping in the region. This change
    presents potential economic opportunities as well as safety and
    environmental risks, particularly given the lack of maritime
    infrastructure in the region. In particular, the U.S. Arctic does not
    have the typical elements of a marine transportation system, such as a
    deep-draft port,\2\ comprehensive waterways charting, and robust
    communications infrastructure. These gaps in infrastructure exacerbate
    the inherent challenges of maritime activity in the Arctic--vast
    distances, dangerous weather, and unpredictable ice conditions--that
    pose risks to mariners as well as to the fragile Arctic ecosystem.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth
    National Climate Assessment, Volume II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Global
    Change Research Program, 2018).
        \2\ The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers defined a deep-draft port as
    one that can accommodate large vessels such as big cargo ships with a
    water depth greater than 35 feet. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
    Alaska Deep-Draft Arctic Port System Study (March 2013). The closest
    deep-draft port is Dutch Harbor in the southern Bering Sea and is over
    800 miles from the Bering Strait.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Within the United States, there are a number of stakeholders
    involved in maritime infrastructure in the Arctic, and they include
    several federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic
    and Atmospheric Administration, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
    The Coast Guard is a multi-mission, maritime military service that is
    responsible for maritime safety and security, environmental protection,
    and national security, among other responsibilities. Given the growing
    expanse of navigable waters and human activities, the Coast Guard faces
    expanding responsibilities for implementing and enforcing maritime
    policy in the region.
        We have previously made five recommendations to strategically plan
    and assess progress in federal efforts to address gaps in Arctic
    maritime capabilities and infrastructure. As described in greater
    detail in this statement, we are pleased to report that the U.S.
    Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) and the Executive
    Office of the President have addressed two of the three recommendations
    in our April 2020 report.\3\ Specifically, the CMTS--a federal
    interagency coordinating committee focused on the maritime
    transportation system--has addressed our recommendation to assess the
    risks posed by gaps in U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure. In
    addition, the Executive Office of the President has addressed our
    recommendation to designate a group responsible for leading and
    coordinating federal Arctic maritime efforts. The Executive Office of
    the President has partially addressed our other April 2020
    recommendation to develop a strategy to address U.S. Arctic maritime
    infrastructure that identifies goals and objectives, performance
    measures to monitor agencies' progress. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard has
    not yet implemented our two June 2016 recommendations: (1) to develop
    measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic
    capability gaps and (2) to design and implement a process to
    systematically assess its progress.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ GAO, Maritime Infrastructure: A Strategic Approach and
    Interagency Leadership Could Improve Federal Efforts in the U.S.
    Arctic, GAO-20-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2020).
        \4\ GAO, Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy Is Underway, but Agency Could
    Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps,
    GAO-16-453 (Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2016). In addition, GAO has
    issued several other reports on federal priorities in the Arctic. See
    GAO, Arctic Capabilities: Coast Guard is Taking Steps to Address Key
    Challenges, but Additional Work Remains, GAO-20-374T (Washington, D.C.:
    Feb. 5, 2020); GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program
    Needs to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO, GAO-18-600
    (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018); and GAO, Arctic Planning: Navy
    Report to Congress Aligns with Current Assessments of Arctic Threat
    Levels and Capabilities Required to Execute DOD's Strategy, GAO-19-42
    (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2018).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        My statement today will address:
        1.  trends in maritime shipping in the U.S. Arctic since 2009,
        2.  the extent to which federal actions to address maritime
    infrastructure have been informed by risk, and
        3.  government-wide and Coast Guard strategies to address maritime
    infrastructure and assess outcomes.

        This statement is based primarily on our April 2020 report on U.S.
    Arctic maritime infrastructure gaps and June 2016 report on the Coast
    Guard's Arctic capabilities.\5\ For the reports cited in this
    statement, among other methodologies, we reviewed Arctic strategies,
    interviewed selected agencies involved with maritime infrastructure and
    capabilities, and compared efforts to leading practices. Since the
    issuance of these reports, we received and reviewed information from
    the White House and the Coast Guard on the actions taken in response to
    our recommendations. In addition to our prior work, for this statement
    we spoke to the Executive Director of the Arctic Executive Steering
    Committee (AESC) and collected updated Arctic shipping data from the
    Coast Guard. Based on our review of these data for anomalies, outliers,
    or missing information and our previous assessment of such data for our
    April 2020 report, we determined that these data were sufficiently
    reliable for our purposes of describing Arctic shipping trends since
    2009.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ The term ``Arctic'' refers to the entire region north of the
    Arctic Circle. We define the ``U.S. Arctic'' as bounded by a line at 60
    degrees north that crosses the Bering Sea. This definition was set by
    the International Maritime Organization, the United Nations agency
    responsible for the safety and security of shipping.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        More detailed information on our scope and methodology can be found
    in the reports cited in this statement. We conducted the work on which
    this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
    perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
    a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
    objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
    basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
     Maritime Shipping in the U.S. Arctic Has Increased from 2009 through
                   2021 despite Challenging Safety Conditions
        Coast Guard data indicate that both the number of vessels in the
    U.S. Arctic and the number of transits through the Bering Strait
    increased from 2009 through 2021. Specifically, the number of vessels
    in the U.S. Arctic more than doubled from 130 in 2009 to 347 in 2021
    (see fig. 1). Given that a single vessel can make multiple trips per
    shipping season, the Coast Guard also measures maritime activity by the
    number of transits that vessels make per year through the Bering
    Strait, a key convergence point for trans-Arctic routes to the Pacific
    Ocean. According to that data, the number of transits through the
    Bering Strait increased from 280 in 2009 to 545 in 2021. The Coast
    Guard attributed increased cargo traffic levels in 2016 to the
    construction of a liquefied natural gas facility on the Yamal peninsula
    and, in subsequent years, identified Russian shipments from the
    facility as a driver of Bering Strait vessel traffic.

    Figure 1: Number of Vessels in the Coast Guard Arctic Area of Interest,
                                   2009	2021

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. GAO-23-106411

       Note: The Coast Guard District 17 Arctic area of interest extends
     north of the Bering Strait to the North Pole, east to Banks Island in
      the Canadian Arctic, and west to the New Siberian Islands in Russia.

        Although warming over the past decades has made trans-Arctic
    maritime routes more accessible, Arctic sea ice extent remains
    seasonal, with most shipping occurring during a narrow window extending
    from summer to early fall. Arctic sea ice typically reaches its maximum
    extent in March and its minimum in September each year; as a result,
    the shipping season is typically from June through October. As shown in
    figure 2, the extent of sea ice in September 2019 had a much smaller
    coverage area than the median September extent from 1981 to 2010.
    Meanwhile, the contraction of sea ice over time has increased
    accessibility to the Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago
    and the Northern Sea Route along the northern border of Russia. These
    two trans-Arctic maritime routes enable shipments between non-Arctic
    destinations, such as between Asia and Europe.\6\ However, most traffic
    in the U.S. Arctic is destinational, meaning it transports goods to and
    from the U.S. Arctic. Such traffic includes shipping supplies to U.S.
    Arctic communities, as well as transporting natural resources extracted
    from the U.S. Arctic to the global marketplace.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Coast Guard officials note that because of more ice and much
    shallower draft restrictions, the Northwest Passage contains far less
    marine traffic than the Northern Sea Route.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Figure 2: Trans-Arctic Maritime Routes and Arctic Sea Ice Extents from
     March and September 2019 Compared with the September Median, 1981 to
                                      2010

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     Sources: GAO analysis of National Snow and Ice Data Center; Office of
                Naval Intelligence; Map Resources. GAO-23-106411

        Although diminished sea ice has prolonged the shipping season and
    opened up shipping routes, environmental changes have also resulted in
    less predictable conditions, with more volatile weather and sea ice. In
    April 2020 we reported that stakeholders told us variation in ice
    conditions from year to year makes planning Arctic voyages difficult to
    do with reasonable accuracy.\7\ The unpredictable and harsh weather and
    ice conditions--combined with the vast distances and lack of maritime
    infrastructure--pose safety risks that stretch the region's already
    limited search and rescue capabilities and slow incidence response,
    according to stakeholders.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ GAO-20-460.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Federal Agencies' Actions to Address Arctic Infrastructure Gaps Have
           Not Been Informed by a Government-wide Assessment of Risks
        We have previously identified gaps in maritime infrastructure that
    can exacerbate inherent challenges to shipping in the Arctic.\8\ For
    example, since all of the Coast Guard's permanent assets are based well
    below the Arctic Circle, the agency is constrained by the time for
    surface vessels and aircraft to travel the vast distances to support
    operations above the Arctic Circle.\9\ See table 1 for examples of
    maritime infrastructure gaps in the U.S. Arctic identified by the U.S.
    Committee on the Marine Transportation System (CMTS) and other federal
    agencies as we reported in April 2020.\10\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ GAO-20-460.
        \9\ GAO-16-453.
        \10\ CMTS is a federal interagency coordinating committee focused
    on the maritime transportation system.

     Table 1: Examples of Maritime Infrastructure Gaps in the U.S. Arctic as
                           GAO Reported in April 2020
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Status in the U.S.
         Infrastructure Category           Examples             Arctic
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Environmental information.......  Charting and        GAO reported in
                                       mapping.            April 2020 that
                                                           less than 5
                                                           percent of the
                                                           U.S. maritime
                                                           Arctic had been
                                                           comprehensively
                                                           surveyed to
                                                           modern standards
                                                           for nautical
                                                           chart updates,
                                                           according to the
                                                           National Oceanic
                                                           and Atmospheric
                                                           Administration
                                                           (NOAA).
                                     ---------------------------------------
                                      Weather and sea     NOAA's National
                                       ice forecasting.    Weather Service
                                                           and the U.S.
                                                           National Ice
                                                           Center--a
                                                           partnership among
                                                           NOAA, the U.S.
                                                           Navy, and the
                                                           Coast Guard--
                                                           produce sea ice
                                                           and weather
                                                           forecasts. NOAA
                                                           has previously
                                                           noted that
                                                           observations that
                                                           are needed for
                                                           timely forecasts,
                                                           such as for wind
                                                           and clouds, are
                                                           very limited in
                                                           the Arctic.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Response services...............  Search and rescue.  There is limited
                                                           infrastructure to
                                                           support aviation-
                                                           based search and
                                                           rescue
                                                           operations. The
                                                           nearest Coast
                                                           Guard air station
                                                           to Utqiagvik, on
                                                           Alaska's northern
                                                           coast, is about
                                                           945 miles away in
                                                           Kodiak.
                                     ---------------------------------------
                                      Oil spill response  NOAA, Coast Guard,
                                                           Interior, and the
                                                           State of Alaska
                                                           have roles in
                                                           this area. Their
                                                           ability to
                                                           respond to oil
                                                           spills is
                                                           affected by the
                                                           communications
                                                           limitations in
                                                           the region and
                                                           the vast
                                                           distances over
                                                           which responders
                                                           and their
                                                           equipment must
                                                           travel.
                                     ---------------------------------------
                                      Icebreakers.......  The Coast Guard's
                                                           medium polar
                                                           icebreaker Healy
                                                           was commissioned
                                                           in 2000 and is
                                                           the primary polar
                                                           icebreaker used
                                                           in the U.S.
                                                           Arctic. The only
                                                           Coast Guard heavy
                                                           polar icebreaker,
                                                           the Polar Star,
                                                           was commissioned
                                                           in 1976 and is
                                                           typically used in
                                                           Antarctica to
                                                           support McMurdo
                                                           station.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operating environment and         Communications....  Communications,
     Navigation.                                           which are
                                                           sufficient to
                                                           support voice and
                                                           data needs in the
                                                           Bering Sea but
                                                           limited at higher
                                                           latitudes, are
                                                           necessary for
                                                           vessels to
                                                           receive weather
                                                           and sea ice
                                                           information or
                                                           request emergency
                                                           services.
                                     ---------------------------------------
                                      Deep-draft port...  The closest deep-
                                                           draft port is
                                                           Dutch Harbor in
                                                           the southern
                                                           Bering Sea and is
                                                           over 800 miles
                                                           from the Bering
                                                           Strait.
                                     ---------------------------------------
                                      Harbors of refuge.  A harbor of refuge
                                                           is a port, inlet,
                                                           or other body of
                                                           water normally
                                                           sheltered from
                                                           heavy seas by
                                                           land in which a
                                                           vessel can safely
                                                           moor during
                                                           severe conditions
                                                           or when it needs
                                                           repairs. The U.S.
                                                           Arctic lacks such
                                                           a harbor
                                                           designated by the
                                                           International
                                                           Maritime
                                                           Organization
                                                           (IMO).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: GAO analysis of federal agency information. GAO-23-106411

        In 2020, we found that federal agencies had taken some actions to
    address gaps in U.S. Arctic infrastructure. For example, the Coast
    Guard reported that it had taken a flexible approach to addressing
    infrastructure gaps by establishing seasonal, forward operating bases
    in the U.S. Arctic as needed to provide search and rescue support in
    areas where major shipping activity is occurring. In addition, the
    National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reported in 2019 that
    it had acquired nearly 1,500 square nautical miles of Arctic
    hydrographic survey data over the past 3 years. This, however, is a
    small percentage of the over 200,000 square nautical miles significant
    to navigation in the U.S. Arctic.
        We also found in 2020 that the agencies' actions were not based on
    a government-wide assessment of the economic, environmental, and safety
    risks posed by maritime infrastructure gaps to inform investment
    decisions in the U.S. Arctic. Rather, agency officials said that they
    based Arctic infrastructure decisions on their agency-specific
    missions, strategies, and collaborative efforts. Agency officials said
    that securing the resources to address U.S. Arctic infrastructure is
    challenging because such projects must compete with other established
    agency mission areas. For example, officials told us that
    infrastructure investments may not compete well against other agency-
    established priorities in other parts of the country, in part, because
    the Arctic is an emerging region and because of the considerable costs
    of developing infrastructure in the harsh Arctic environment.
        We reported that without a government-wide assessment of the
    economic, environmental, and safety risks posed by maritime
    infrastructure gaps, agencies lack assurance that their investments are
    addressing the highest-priority risks.\11\ Risk management is a widely
    endorsed strategy for helping policymakers decide about allocating
    finite resources and taking actions in conditions of uncertainty.\12\ A
    government-wide risk assessment could better enable agencies to
    evaluate potential U.S. Arctic infrastructure expenditures and assess
    the extent to which these expenditures will mitigate identified risks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ GAO-20-460.
        \12\ GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
    Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
    Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005). See also
    GAO, Enterprise Risk Management: Selected Agencies' Experiences
    Illustrate Good Practices in Managing Risks, GAO-17-63 (Washington,
    D.C.: Dec. 1, 2016).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We noted that the U.S. Committee on the Marine Transportation
    System (CMTS) was well suited to conduct such an assessment based on
    the committee's statutory role to coordinate the establishment of
    domestic transportation policies in the Arctic and its past work in
    this area. Therefore, we recommended that the CMTS complete a
    government-wide assessment of the economic, environmental, and safety
    risks posed by gaps in maritime infrastructure in the U.S. Arctic to
    inform investment priorities and decisions. In 2022, we confirmed that
    CMTS had taken several actions that, taken together, addressed the
    intent of this recommendation.\13\ As a result, the federal agencies
    responsible for addressing gaps in U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure
    will have more useful information to better inform their investment
    decisions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ In March 2022, CMTS published its ``U.S. Arctic Marine
    Transportation System Infrastructure Risk Resource Compendium,'' which
    addresses a range of risks, including the economic, environmental, and
    safety issues affected by Arctic infrastructure gaps. While this
    compendium does not represent a government-wide assessment of all risks
    posed by the infrastructure gaps, it provides useful information to
    federal agencies responsible for addressing gaps in U.S. Arctic
    maritime infrastructure to better inform their investment decisions.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Government-wide and Coast Guard Strategies Lack a Means to Measure
                     Progress in Addressing Infrastructure
        In April 2020, we found that government-wide interagency efforts to
    address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure lacked an up-to-date
    strategy and consistent interagency leadership to guide agency
    actions.\14\ In particular, in our April 2020 report we recommended
    that the appropriate entities within the Executive Office of the
    President, including the Office of Science Technology and Policy
    (OSTP):
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ GAO-20-460.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        1.  Develop and publish a strategy for addressing U.S. Arctic
    maritime infrastructure that identifies goals and objectives,
    performance measures to monitor agencies' progress over time, and the
    appropriate responses to address risks.
        2.  Designate the interagency group responsible for leading and
    coordinating federal efforts to address maritime infrastructure in the
    U.S. Arctic that includes all relevant stakeholders.\15\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ OSTP is an office within the White House that leads
    interagency science and technology policy coordination efforts.

        As of December 2022, the Executive Office of the President has
    addressed our recommendation to designate a group responsible for
    leading and coordinating federal Arctic maritime efforts. It did so in
    September 2021 by announcing the White House would reactivate the
    Arctic Executive Steering Committee (AESC) as a mechanism to advance
    U.S. interests and coordinate federal actions in the Arctic, including
    maritime infrastructure.\16\ In doing so, the White House appointed an
    executive director who convened the first meeting in December 2021. As
    of December 2022, according to the Executive Director of the AESC, the
    group has met several times and has developed and approved eight
    interagency initiatives. One of the eight initiatives--to advance safe
    and environmentally secure Arctic shipping--is led by the Coast Guard.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ The AESC is chaired by the Director of the OSTP and it
    includes members from more than 20 other federal departments and
    entities.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, as of December 2022, the Executive Office of the
    President has partially addressed our April 2020 recommendation to
    develop a strategy to address U.S. Arctic maritime infrastructure. In
    October 2022, the White House issued a National Strategy for the Arctic
    Region, which updated the previous National Strategy for the Arctic
    Region, issued by the Obama Administration in May 2013.\17\ OSTP
    officials told GAO that they had participated in this work, which had
    been led by the National Security Council (NSC). The updated strategy
    covers the period from 2022 to 2032, and establishes four ``pillars''
    to address both domestic and international issues in the U.S. Arctic.
    They are: (1) security; (2) climate change and environmental
    protection; (3) sustainable economic development; and (4) international
    cooperation and governance. The strategy identifies needed maritime
    capability improvements in the U.S. Arctic, including for enhanced
    communications, mapping, charting, and navigational capabilities, as
    well as the need for a deep draft harbor in Nome, Alaska.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Our April 2020 report noted that agency officials and
    stakeholders regarded the 2013 strategy as outdated, given the changes
    in conditions in the region. In particular, agency officials said
    national security was a growing concern in the Arctic.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, the current strategy does not establish goals and measures
    specifically to addressing Arctic maritime infrastructure as GAO
    recommended in April 2020. For example, although the strategy
    identifies an objective to invest in infrastructure such as supporting
    the development of a deep draft harbor, the strategy does not specify
    how agencies should prioritize these investments or identify goals and
    measures to assess progress. In November 2022, the AESC Executive
    Director told GAO that the White House--including OSTP and NSC--is
    early in the process of developing an implementation plan for the
    strategy. The AESC Executive Director noted that for each major action
    in the strategy, the implementation plan should identify lead and
    supporting agencies as well as a way to measure progress and to
    identify investment priorities and resources necessary to implement
    these actions. By completing this plan and establishing goals and
    associated performance measures, the federal government would have the
    tools to demonstrate the results of its efforts, and decision makers
    could gauge the extent of progress in addressing maritime
    infrastructure gaps.
        In addition, in June 2016, we found that the Coast Guard identified
    various gaps in its U.S. Arctic capabilities but had not assessed its
    progress in addressing these gaps.\18\ For example, the Coast Guard
    polar icebreaking fleet comprises two operational polar icebreakers--
    the Polar Star and Healy--of which only the Healy is currently
    operating in the Arctic. However, we found that, although the Coast
    Guard was taking some actions related to maritime in the Arctic, the
    Coast Guard had not assessed how its actions helped to mitigate its
    Arctic capability gaps. We noted that such an assessment--which would
    include developing measures for gauging its progress, when feasible--is
    critical to the Coast Guard's understanding of its progress toward
    addressing these gaps.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ GAO-16-453.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard (1) develop
    measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic
    capability gaps and (2) design and implement a process to
    systematically assess its progress.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ GAO-16-453.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As of December 2022, however, the Coast Guard had not yet
    implemented these two recommendations. The Coast Guard is currently
    updating its implementation plan for the Arctic strategy it published
    in 2019. The plan is expected to provide the foundation for assessing
    efforts to address Arctic capability gaps. Coast Guard officials stated
    that they are also developing a strategic metrics framework for
    measuring progress in addressing the capability gaps. Coast Guard
    officials did not identify when they plan to complete the plan and
    framework, stating that these are longer-term efforts.
        Developing a means to measure progress in addressing capability
    gaps is especially important given recent and planned investments in
    Coast Guard capabilities. For example, the Coast Guard, in
    collaboration with the Navy, plans to invest an estimated $13.3 billion
    for the acquisition, operation, and maintenance of three heavy polar
    icebreakers--also known as the Polar Security Cutters--over their
    entire 30-year life cycle.\20\ The Coast Guard initiated procurement of
    the first Polar Security Cutter, awarding a $746 million contract for
    design and construction in April 2019. By assessing and measuring how
    its actions have helped to mitigate capability gaps, the Coast Guard
    will be better positioned to plan its Arctic operations more
    effectively, including prioritizing activities to target gaps and
    allocating resources.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ This estimate is the acquisition program baseline as of May
    2021. See GAO, DHS Annual Assessment: Most Acquisition Programs Are
    Meeting Goals Even with Some Management Issues and COVID-19 Delays,
    GAO-22-104684 (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2022).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
    to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Von Ah.
        We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
    be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing
    myself.
        Vice Admiral Gautier, I understand that the closest deep-
    draft port to the Arctic is in the Aleutian Islands, some 800
    miles from the Bering Strait and some 1,000 miles from the
    northern population center in Barrow.
        That means that, unless an icebreaker happens to be nearby,
    a Coast Guard cutter or aircraft would have to travel over
    1,000 miles to a potential maritime search and rescue case.
    That clearly won't work.
        Please give us a sense of the magnitude of the investments
    that would be necessary for the Coast Guard to establish a
    year-round Arctic base and also what the benefits may be to
    doing so versus the Coast Guard's current seasonal operating
    approach.
        Admiral Gautier. Mr. Chairman, so the Coast Guard's Alaska
    home port that launches our Arctic operations is Kodiak. And we
    deeply appreciate Congress' support to continue the build-out
    of Kodiak.
        I think the port you are referring to is Dutch Harbor, and
    we do operate forward pretty frequently from Dutch Harbor,
    Alaska.
        The Coast Guard currently hasn't identified a specific
    deep-water port that we require as a home port, but we are
    really encouraged by sort of a whole-of-Government or
    interagency thoughts in terms of building additional Arctic
    infrastructure like Nome that was mentioned in the new National
    Strategy for the Arctic Region. We will use those locations for
    our Coast Guard operations if those are built.
        The further you get north, sir, to answer your first
    element of your question, the more expensive things get.
        Mr. Carbajal. I kind of figured that.
        Dr. Sfraga, in your written testimony, you discuss how the
    Coast Guard's engagement with scientific research may be used
    to advance soft-power diplomacy.
        How do you gauge the importance of the Coast Guard's
    diplomacy and soft power in a region where Russia and China
    have taken such publicly aggressive actions?
        Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As the Admiral noted, presence does a lot of things,
    including influence and match our presence to others. The Coast
    Guard really is the tip of the spear for us in the north,
    whether we are talking about the Bering Sea or the Barents, on
    either side of the North American continent.
        So, to have the Coast Guard patrolling in those areas, my
    home off the coast of Alaska, or with allies in Europe off the
    coast of Iceland and Greenland, north of Norway in the Barents,
    it shows that the United States is engaged. Most of the time,
    we are engaged with our allies.
        This is a signal. It is not unlike a signal that NATO
    provides, where we have multiple partners. The United States
    enjoys partnerships and allies. Russia does not enjoy that.
    China does not enjoy that. We do.
        And so, to bring together our Coast Guard with others does
    a number of things: interoperability--tyranny of distance in
    the north is a thing to overcome, unlike others. So, together,
    we can incorporate our interoperability. Two, having the
    presence there. Three, understanding that domain better.
    Although our Coast Guard has a long history, that domain is
    changing as we speak.
        So, to have a presence there most of the year, all year
    around, just projects U.S. national interests and projects our
    sovereignty over that area.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Mr. Von Ah, to what extent has the Arctic maritime
    transiting season been lengthened due to melting sea ice? Can
    you expand on how this lengthened season increases risk for the
    United States in terms of maritime safety and environmental
    stewardship? For example, how has this affected the personnel
    needs and resource allocations of the Coast Guard?
        Mr. Von Ah. Thanks for that question, Chairman Carbajal.
        So, recent data that we looked at shows that it has
    increased from--it used to be more around 3 months. For several
    years, it was looking like it was 5 months that there was
    access to that region. And, most recently, that increased to 7
    months, based on the information we saw.
        So, obviously, that puts pressure on the Coast Guard and
    puts demand on services for Coast Guard, whether it is
    potentially for inspecting new vessels crossing the Bering
    Strait to see that they are outfitted correctly, incident
    response, or just for general security and safety in the
    region.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        I now would like to recognize Ranking Member Gibbs.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Chairman.
        Vice Admiral, in the National Defense Authorization Act,
    which I guess we are going to vote on today I think, there is a
    request for authorization for an icebreaker and then also an
    existing icebreaker. The measure will waive certain contracting
    requirements that apply to construction of these new vessels.
        Assuming these funds are provided for the requested
    acquisition, how long do you expect this acquisition to take?
    And what additional funds will be required to refit this vessel
    for Coast Guard use in the Arctic? And when do you expect such
    a vessel to be available for service?
        Admiral Gautier. First off, Ranking Member, we really enjoy
    the congressional support that we are getting on the commercial
    icebreaker acquisition and for the relief needed in order to
    field it more quickly.
        So, our plan for this--and it is a bit of a voyage of
    discovery. We just haven't purchased commercially. In the Coast
    Guard, we traditionally don't do that--is, once we can get the
    money to acquire it, is to do a phased-in approach so we can do
    some just very initial work on it to make it a basic Coast
    Guard cutter. So, some basic damage control, basic command and
    control, and a paint job and staffing to make it a Coast Guard
    cutter so we can field it in the Arctic as quickly as possible.
        We think that in a phased-in approach over 2 years we can
    make it, then continue to build it out into the type of Coast
    Guard cutter that we need it to be, with the full suite of
    requirements met, so that we can then homeport it in a location
    where it will be operable in the Arctic.
        Mr. Gibbs. OK. Thank you.
        Mr. Sfraga--did I say that right?
        Mr. Sfraga. ``Sfraga.''
        Mr. Gibbs. ``Sfraga.'' OK. Thank you.
        The issues the Coast Guard, with the icebreaker--the Coast
    Guard kind of pretends the Healy's replacement is an unrelated
    topic, but designing an Arctic Security Cutter, also a Great
    Lakes icebreaker. Do you believe that the Coast Guard cutter
    Healy, which is used for Arctic research, should be
    recapitalized by providing for a fourth Polar Security Cutter,
    assigning an Arctic Security Cutter to the mission, designing a
    purpose-built research icebreaker, or using an array of
    unmanned platforms and other investments to deal with that
    issue?
        Do you understand?
        Mr. Sfraga. Thank you, Ranking Member. If I understand the
    question correctly, it is Arctic Security Cutter versus
    unmanned----
        Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Some of that, yes.
        Mr. Sfraga. OK.
        Mr. Gibbs. And then I think, too, more Polar Security
    Cutters.
        Mr. Sfraga. And more Polar Security Cutters.
        Well, the hearing today is about the Arctic, and I know the
    Polar Security Cutters, the heavies, will likely go down to the
    Antarctic. It doesn't preclude them from going north, but, in
    terms of the research community, we really do need those assets
    north. So, we would advocate for an Arctic Security Cutter to
    be outfitted to support research to head north sometime sooner
    rather than later.
        As I said, the Healy is going to phase out in a very short
    period of time in the icebreaker life. So, we are concerned
    about what happens then. Not that you should take away from the
    portfolio of a Polar Security Cutter program, but the fact is,
    our Nation needs a reliable Arctic Security Cutter, something
    like the Healy. If we do not have the Healy, we will not have
    capacity----
        Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. OK. So, I guess what you are
    saying, you favor the Arctic Security Cutter instead of having
    a polar research vessel to operate in both Antarctica and the
    Arctic? You want the other vessel to be just operating in the
    Arctic?
        Mr. Sfraga. The research community would like to have a
    dedicated icebreaker in the north that we could rely on to
    conduct our research.
        Mr. Gibbs. OK.
        Vice Admiral, I want to bring this up. Our late esteemed
    chairman, Don Young, represented Alaska for almost 50 years and
    had an issue up at St. George. There was a facility that was
    housing a helicopter for search and rescue, I believe. And I
    think anything close to that was more than 400 miles. And the
    Coast Guard had a lease agreement, and the locals didn't
    maintain the roof, and things kind of fell apart.
        What's the status--it seems to me that the environment up
    there and the distances, that it is probably a pretty important
    thing to have that capability of that helicopter for rescue
    missions and so on. Is the Coast Guard planning on reentering a
    lease and making sure that the facility is kept up? What are
    your thoughts on what your plans are?
        Admiral Gautier. It is important for the Coast Guard to
    that have that location in Saint Paul Island with the hangar so
    we can pre-stage helicopters out of that location. Especially
    as we see fish stocks migrating further north and the fishing
    fleet that is following that, Saint Paul Island is just an
    important location where we can conduct our missions more
    readily with the fishing fleet.
        So, we understand that in the draft authorization bill
    there is some language that might provide us a degree of relief
    that will enable us to continue to use that, and we do commit
    to using that facility.
        Mr. Gibbs. Will you commit to, prior to January 31st of
    next year entering a lease, that you will brief the
    subcommittee staff on that issue, before you enter into a
    lease?
        Admiral Gautier. So, if I understand the question, with the
    relief provided under the auth bill, that we would continue the
    leasing of that hangar so we can operate helicopters out of----
        Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Yes, I think what the
    subcommittee staff is looking at is a briefing from your folks
    prior to signing the lease, I think, to understand what the
    plan is.
        Because I think the concern is, when you are entering a
    lease, that the incident that happened with the damaged hangar
    won't happen again, and we won't be left without having that
    capability in that area.
        Admiral Gautier. Right. Yes, we really look forward to a
    future where we can resolve the issues so that we can use a
    hangar that is appropriate----
        Mr. Gibbs [interrupting]. Yes, I understand that. I think
    the subcommittee staff wants to be kept up to speed----
        Admiral Gautier [interposing]. Absolutely.
        Mr. Gibbs [continuing]. And make sure that--they want input
    and to make sure the lease is what is going to work.
        Admiral Gautier. Certainly.
        Mr. Gibbs. I think that is--I yield back.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs.
        I now would like to recognize Chairman DeFazio.
        Mr. DeFazio. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        Vice Admiral, you weren't around then, but I objected to
    the icebreaker contract with Halter that had never, ever built
    anything like that before. And I said, this is a really dumb
    idea. I still don't know why it happened.
        And, luckily, they have now been taken over by a company
    that actually has built and can continue to build ships and has
    built a bunch of Coast Guard boats with never a single defect.
        So, I just caution, if we--I am hoping that the Coast Guard
    will finish its evaluation on the ASCs. I don't see how you are
    going to get by without them. The Healy is kind of getting old
    and could use some modern replacements, and I think there is
    going to be a lot of work coming.
        How far away do you think you are on finishing an
    evaluation of the need for the ASCs?
        Admiral Gautier. Well, certainly, your counsel is
    incredibly valuable, given your history on this topic.
        Our focus is on the Polar Security Cutters at the moment,
    as you said. We do intend on forming a program of record in the
    future where we can examine requirements for a follow-on Arctic
    Security Cutter, a medium icebreaker, to provide us the sort of
    fleet mix and flexibility that we think we need.
        That is out in the future while we continue to focus on our
    preeminent acquisition, the PSC, plus now, with the support of
    Congress, bringing on this commercial medium icebreaker into
    the fleet.
        Mr. DeFazio. Right. Well, I mean, the PSCs, they are going.
    I mean, all you needed was to oversee it, and now you have
    someone who can actually build ships. So, it is not going to
    take a lot of work, unlike that other company.
        But the commercial--I think you have already addressed the
    commercial acquisition and the potential for that. And I
    understand that is going to take some time. But I would hope
    then you immediately move on to ASCs. I have some sense of
    haste.
        I just really think, even when we finally get to three
    functional, modern, major icebreakers, I mean, you still have
    the Antarctic mission and other things. I think the flexibility
    that the smaller ones afford is going to be absolutely
    necessary. And I just hope that there will be a real focus on
    that.
        I am also wondering, are you looking at interesting or new
    technologies for the region, whether that would be some
    unmanned aviation surveillance or things like that to extend
    your look in that region?
        Admiral Gautier. Yes, we certainly are, Mr. Chairman. I
    think the use of UAS is going to expand the eyes and ears that
    will just help us perform our mission that much better.
        The other thing that we continue to actually make some
    progress on is communications in the high latitude, which has
    been a historical challenge given just the nature of operating
    up there. And we are making progress along those lines, too.
        Mr. DeFazio. So, in the Arctic region, satellite
    communication is--I mean, just because of where you are at,
    there is no real good satellite communication?
        Admiral Gautier. Actually, there has been progress that is
    being made both with the Department of Defense and commercial
    industry. Space Force just launched two satellites that can
    provide us some secure communications and improvements in the
    high latitudes. And there are a number of commercial concerns
    that continue to launch constellations that will cover the high
    latitudes. So, actually, we are quite encouraged along those
    lines.
        Mr. DeFazio. Great. Great. That is going to fill in some
    gaps.
        That is it, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my
    time. Thank you.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Next, I will recognize Representative Weber.
        Mr. Weber of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I, too, want to add my word of thanks to Peter DeFazio
    for chairing the committee. And he is not paying attention, so,
    I will have to kill time here, which is OK for a Congressman.
    We have a saying, ``Why use four words when eight will do?''
        And so, Mr. Chairman, I was just saying we are going to
    miss you. I went on a codel with you and Myrnie over to Europe,
    the T&I Committee. It was great fun, and it was very well
    organized and very well done. I think Kathy probably had a lot
    to do with that. But I wish the best for you.
        And, Bob Gibbs, we are going to miss you. I remember when I
    was a freshman and came up here the first time, I parked in
    your parking space, because I didn't know better. And you were
    very gracious. And I have never recovered from that, because I
    am getting paid back. Every time there is a new crew, they seem
    to park in my parking space.
        But, anyway, thank you all. Congratulations for a job well
    done.
        A couple of questions, if I may, I guess to you, Vice
    Admiral.
        We have a company called GulfLink that is working on a
    project in Missouri City. And at a previous hearing in April of
    this year, MARAD Acting Administrator Lessley stated on the
    record that the USCG environmental review and MARAD record of
    decision for Texas GulfLink--you may have to do a little
    checking on that, Texas GulfLink--would be completed at the
    early part of 2023.
        And, of course, their question, as you might have supposed,
    is: Are we on track with that? Do you have any knowledge of
    that?
        Admiral Gautier. I do have knowledge of that. And that is
    right; the Coast Guard is tightly coordinated with MARAD in
    their lead Federal agency role in the permitting of this
    project. We are providing MARAD with information so they can
    conduct the environmental analysis.
        On our side, the Coast Guard has responsibility for doing
    things like reviewing their operations plan and making sure
    they comply with the safety and security regulations. They
    needed to do a risk analysis and some other things.
        So, those efforts will continue on the Coast Guard side
    without delay, sir.
        Mr. Weber of Texas. All right. I appreciate that.
        And, secondly, on November 17th, Representative Babin and
    myself wrote the Coast Guard a letter with questions regarding
    VT Halter.
        Does the contract that the Coast Guard approved for VT
    Halter require that U.S. law is followed in all aspects?
        Admiral Gautier. It does.
        Mr. Weber of Texas. It does?
        Has the Coast Guard contacted VT Halter to instruct the
    company that they need to resolve the question of proper
    licensing for the use of patented technology?
        Admiral Gautier. I think, in general, in working with VT
    Halter, we reinforced the fact that they need to comply with
    law.
        I think on the particular instance that you might be
    referring to, my understanding is that there might be a
    complaint about a certain patent infringement. To date, the
    Coast Guard nor DoD or the Navy have received through channels
    a complaint on any patent infringements, but we understand that
    something might be out there. And if and when we receive
    something, we will act appropriately and take it seriously.
        Mr. Weber of Texas. So, you know that it is out there, and
    during the recent purchase of VT Halter by Bollinger
    Shipyards--and you all did a review of that purchase, right?
        Admiral Gautier. We haven't actually received a patent
    infringement complaint, sir.
        Mr. Weber of Texas. Nothing at all? Well, you are aware of
    that patent licensing issue. So, was that included in the Coast
    Guard review of the sale? The possibility, if nothing else.
        Admiral Gautier. Not to my knowledge specifically.
        Mr. Weber of Texas. OK. Do you know when we could
    anticipate an answer to these questions? Could you look into
    that? You said not to your knowledge.
        Admiral Gautier. Well, certainly, sir, we could. But I
    think it is important that any entity that might have a patent
    infringement complaint needs to make that complaint to the
    Federal Government through channels.
        Mr. Weber of Texas. OK, but you are aware of it; it just
    has not come through the right channels to you?
        Admiral Gautier. It has not been received by the Navy or
    the Coast Guard through our Integrated Program Office.
        Mr. Weber of Texas. OK. Well, I appreciate that and
    appreciate your response.
        I appreciate what you all do. My oldest and longest--well,
    my youngest and longest living uncle, Vernon Weber, was a
    Coastie. And he is 92 and living up in Woodville, Texas. And
    so, we appreciate you guys.
        And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Weber.
        I will now recognize Representative Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Admiral, first for you, this is somewhat related to Mr.
    DeFazio's questions, but I wonder if you could be more
    specific.
        In 2018, the Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center
    identified a number of interrelated capability gaps that could
    challenge the Coast Guard's ability to operate in the Arctic,
    including voice and data communications and sensor coverage.
        And I was curious what steps the Coast Guard has taken to
    address those gaps, and is there anything yet that needs to be
    done?
        Admiral Gautier. Sir, we have issued a contract for second-
    generation Coast Guard communications capabilities across the
    entire fleet of Coast Guard cutters, not just the ones that
    will be operating in the Arctic.
        And, as part of this, we continue to work closely with DoD,
    like in the Space Force example that I mentioned, where they
    are providing some additional coverage through their
    constellation in the polar regions for military-specific secure
    communications.
        In addition to that, working directly with other commercial
    providers and then other entities like DHS Science and
    Technology, we are exploring efforts for commercial satellite
    provision. In fact, the Polar Star, which is a couple of days
    out of Australia, headed down to Antarctica, is carrying a
    commercial satellite receiving capability on it for operation
    in Antarctica.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Is that going to be--is that
    experimental? Is that prototyping? Or is this a----
        Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. It is. We are essentially
    experimenting with a couple of different options, and this one
    is just an easy, commercially available one. It will enable the
    crewmembers to communicate back with their families and things
    like that.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. With regards to Space Force
    capability, without getting too far into this in this setting,
    is that strictly a military communications capability for
    national security uses only?
        Admiral Gautier. To my knowledge, it is.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. To your knowledge. OK, yes.
        So, in terms of commercial or safety, environmental
    purposes, your communication and sensors--you haven't developed
    those capabilities to address these other missions of the Coast
    Guard in the Arctic region?
        Admiral Gautier. Congressman, we are improving. We are not
    necessarily where we want to be or need to be. We still think
    that we have gaps, but the good news here is that, in
    particular, the commercial capability is being fielded pretty
    quickly to be able to close those gaps.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. And so, related to that, the
    commercial fishing industry supports a lot of jobs in my State,
    and in Alaska, obviously. A lot of folks, they live in the
    Pacific Northwest during the winter and fish up north in the
    summer for obvious reasons. The Coast Guard plays a pretty key
    role, though, in responding to spills and other environmental
    pollution incidents that have an impact on the quality of
    fishing.
        There are techniques to remove oil from ice-heavy
    landscapes, but those are still underdeveloped. Is the Coast
    Guard taking any action to put any work into developing those
    techniques?
        Admiral Gautier. We are. Through our research--the Coast
    Guard's research and development programs and the network we
    then have through other elements like DHS Science and
    Technology and other research institutions, the Coast Guard has
    been working on some solutions. In particular, for ice-covered
    waters in the Arctic, we recently tested an underwater remote
    vehicle that can detect oil sub-ice. And so, things like that
    we are proceeding at so we can close some of those gaps.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Mr. Von Ah, your testimony
    recommends that the Coast Guard develop measures for assessing
    how its actions have helped mitigate capability gaps and design
    and implement a process to address progress.
        Are there specific gaps that can be addressed more quickly
    if recommendations are implemented?
        Mr. Von Ah. Thank you for that question, Representative
    Larsen. I don't know if we have done the work to say whether or
    not there are certain gaps that could be addressed more
    quickly. Certainly, what we are looking for in our
    recommendations is the ability for these agencies to be able to
    prioritize their investments relative to the goals that we are
    trying to achieve in the Arctic, that are laid out in the
    Arctic maritime strategy and, in the Coast Guard's case, in
    their own agency Arctic strategy.
        So, we haven't seen an implementation plan yet from them in
    terms of how they are going to go about--what specific plans
    and what goals they have. We understand it is still being
    developed. And so, it is hard to say exactly which ones could
    go more quickly, but I think that is sort of what we are hoping
    to see in their plan.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. With that, thank you. I will
    yield back.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Larsen.
        I will now recognize Representative Auchincloss.
        Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
        I would like to focus on the Arctic Council and what
    Russia's war in Ukraine means for the alliance. The Arctic
    Council, as you all know, is a consensus-based
    intergovernmental forum made up of the eight Arctic nations,
    six indigenous peoples organizations, and a variety of other
    Government and nongovernmental partners. Russia was scheduled
    to chair the Council from 2021 to 2023, but was suspended from
    all participation due to its invasion of Ukraine.
        Vice Admiral, a question for you. Accepting as a premise
    that the Arctic Council is an important international convenor
    for the maritime community and serves U.S. security and
    economic interests, what is the Coast Guard planning to do to
    fill the void of leadership left by Russia at the Arctic
    Council?
        Admiral Gautier. The Arctic Council is indeed an important
    international forum to maintain the sorts of free and open and
    stable Arctic waters that we all hope to enjoy. So, when Russia
    invaded Ukraine, Arctic Council activities were suspended for a
    time, but then the remaining Council members got together,
    absent Russia, and put together a work plan with some projects
    to continue as they can, as we can, to move forward on some of
    those items.
        So, Norway becomes the chair of Arctic Council in April of
    next year, and there are discussions about what a work program
    moving forward might look like for the Arctic Council in the
    future.
        Mr. Auchincloss. The Coast Guard has no assets permanently
    stationed above the Arctic Circle, compared to Russia's 6
    Arctic bases and 14 newly built icebreakers. So, given these
    limitations, what can Congress do to support us asserting our
    leadership with this vacuum that is being created in the Arctic
    Council?
        Admiral Gautier. Well, in terms of not having a home port,
    so to speak, by the Arctic Council, continued support for the
    types of investments that we have requested in terms of basing
    of our Polar Security Cutters, in terms of other home ports.
    Things like you supporting in Kodiak are tremendously
    important.
        So, the State Department leads our delegation to the Arctic
    Council, and I think just general Government congressional
    support of what U.S. Government does in the Arctic Council is
    helpful.
        Likewise, we have a more preeminent role in the Arctic
    Coast Guard Forum, which is different but related to that. And
    our conversations with respect to oilspill response, search and
    rescue, and other things that we do in the Arctic Coast Guard
    Forum, we hope to move forward under Norway's chairmanship in
    the future, too.
        Mr. Auchincloss. Good. So, in addition to Russia being
    increasingly aggressive, they released a naval doctrine in
    August that emphasized the Arctic Ocean's importance to the
    country, and I already talked through their assets that they
    have.
        China is also increasing the assertive. In February 2022,
    Beijing and Moscow pledged in a joint statement to increase
    cooperation on sustainable development in the Arctic. In
    September, Chinese and Russian warships conducted a joint
    exercise in the Bering Sea. In September, the USCG cutter
    Kimball was on patrol when it identified a Chinese-guided
    missile cruiser about 75 nautical miles north of Alaska's Kiska
    Island.
        How are you redistributing your assets and patrols given
    increased activity and demonstrated interest by the CCP in
    operating in the Arctic?
        Admiral Gautier. So, our Coast Guard District 17 commander
    has created an operation called Frontier Shield. And what we
    have done is--so, with the decommissioning of our High
    Endurance Cutters, or 378s, we have operated more National
    Security Cutters in the region in addition to the Coast Guard
    cutter Healy. And we are on patrol in a way where we can get,
    through intelligence means and the Department of Defense, sort
    of an advanced warning of where we might be confronting or
    seeing these surface action groups so we can position ourselves
    the right way so we can meet their presence with our presence
    to make sure everyone is complying with international rules and
    norms.
        Mr. Auchincloss. We need to make it absolutely clear, and
    not just in the South China Sea, but also clearly in the Arctic
    as well, that the United States Navy and Coast Guard is going
    to ensure that international waters are a global commons that
    are to be navigated free of incursions by CCP. It needs to be
    absolutely unequivocal. To the extent that you need support
    from Congress in doing so, I hope that you will be forthcoming.
        Admiral Gautier. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Auchincloss.
        Next, I will recognize Representative Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    the privilege of joining your committee for this hearing.
        The Arctic should be on all of our minds. I know the Coast
    Guard has been trying to provide the necessary activities in
    the Coast Guard for a long time, and, unfortunately, has not
    been able to develop the necessary vessels, basically
    icebreakers of various kinds, to do the job. I want to focus on
    the icebreaker issue, which was discussed earlier. So, I am
    going do it again.
        What is the current status of the one heavy icebreaker that
    soon will be under construction? When do you expect it to be
    completed?
        Admiral Gautier. Sir, you are referring to the Polar Star,
    I believe. The status of the Polar Star, actually, a few days
    out of Australia on its way to----
        Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. No. No, no. I am sorry. Not
    that. That one is the only one you have, but the new one that
    you intend to----
        Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. Oh, on the Healy or the----
        Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. Well, let me put it more----
        Admiral Gautier [interrupting]. On the Polar Security
    Cutter, my apologies.
        Mr. Garamendi. You are authorized and you have money to
    build an icebreaker. What is the status of that project?
        Admiral Gautier. Forgive me, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. That is OK.
        Admiral Gautier. I understand the question.
        So, in terms of the Polar Security Cutter progress, in
    terms of construction, we do know that it is taking longer than
    we anticipated to complete, for the shipyard to complete, the
    detailed design phase of the Polar Security Cutter project.
    This is a crucial phase that needs to happen right, especially
    on the first-of-class icebreaker before we can move together
    with construction of the first PSC.
        So, having said that, it is unlikely, sir, that the lead
    PSC will be delivered during fiscal year 2025, which I think
    might have been the latest update from the Coast Guard on that.
    And that's what is in the contract. And, in fact, we assess
    that there is considerable schedule risk even for delivery in
    fiscal year 2026.
        Mr. Garamendi. So, we are looking beyond 2025?
        Admiral Gautier. We are.
        Mr. Garamendi. Any idea how far beyond? You say there is
    risk in the schedule.
        Admiral Gautier. Sir, we want to give you a precise
    estimate of what that looks like, and we won't----
        Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. You have not been precise in
    the past, so, just give me a range. Are we talking 2030?
        Admiral Gautier. We need to evaluate what this detailed
    design phase, how long it is going to take.
        Mr. Garamendi. When will you come to us with that
    evaluation?
        Admiral Gautier. We are at risk to be into fiscal year
    2027, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. So, what do you intend to do between now and
    then, that being, what, 6 years from now?
        Admiral Gautier. We are continuing to compress the schedule
    wherever we can on the acquisitions. We have asked, as you
    know, for funding in this fiscal year to purchase a
    commercially available medium icebreaker.
        Mr. Garamendi. And what is the status of that purchase? I
    assume that is the Chouest.
        Admiral Gautier. Pending the fiscal year 2023 budget
    passage, sir, we intend on doing a quick evaluation and moving
    forward on an acquisition for that, and then moving into a
    phased-in process so we can get that into the Arctic as quickly
    as we possibly can.
        Mr. Garamendi. And your proposed schedule to accomplish
    that is?
        Admiral Gautier. We think it will be a phased-in 2-year
    schedule before we can have it homeported, permanently
    homeported and operational. We hope that we will be able to
    actually operate that particular icebreaker sooner than 2 years
    from now.
        Mr. Garamendi. Do you have a specific work plan to
    accomplish that?
        Admiral Gautier. We have, honestly, a lot of details to be
    filled in on that. We need to take a deeper look at the
    icebreaker that----
        Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. You have not yet done a deep
    look at it?
        Admiral Gautier. Sorry?
        Mr. Garamendi. You have not yet done a deep look at that
    icebreaker?
        Admiral Gautier. We have done an initial evaluation of this
    particular icebreaker, but pending an acquisition, it will
    enable us to put together a much more----
        Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Please. Understand, this
    committee, for at least the decade that I have been involved in
    it, wants you to have icebreakers. Don't dance with us. Give us
    the specific information we need to make it happen. You are
    going to need law. You are going to need money. You are going
    to need acquisition authority. You have got to give us the
    precise information. Don't dance around. You are very good at
    dancing. You haven't given me a solid answer on anything yet.
    But you have got to be very, very precise.
        This ship has been before you for more than a year, and yet
    you have not done a detailed look at what it is going to take,
    or maybe you are not willing to give us the information we need
    so that we can help make it happen.
        Now, there are other icebreakers that are available from
    foreign countries, specifically Finland and Sweden, that have
    offered to lease--long-term lease--icebreakers to the United
    States. Have you looked at that possibility?
        Admiral Gautier. We have looked at that possibility
    previously. Obviously, we need to have some statutory relief to
    Buy American in order to do something like that.
        Mr. Garamendi. We understand that. We know the law. We
    write the law. We understand. We also understand we have got a
    very serious problem in the Arctic. We don't have the ability
    to patrol the Arctic unless the Healy is available, and it is
    going to go into a shipyard and won't be available until just
    towards the end of the Arctic summer season, correct? That's
    standard.
        I will just tell you I am very disappointed. I am very,
    very disappointed. We have been at this 10 years, and the Coast
    Guard is still dancing around. You have got to come to us with
    a solid plan. Here is what we need. We need it by this date.
    Here is how we can get it done. And yes, you are going to need
    authority to do that, but you are not going to get authority
    until we know what it is and how the plan works. So, please, I
    am 10 years into this. I am pretty damn tired of the dancing
    around. OK.
        Now, what is the followup for the heavy icebreaker that is
    perhaps going to be done sometime between 2027 and 2030? What
    is the plan for the next followup?
        Admiral Gautier. So, we intend on opening up a program for
    a follow-on icebreaker, the Arctic Security Cutter is what we
    are calling it, as you know, a medium icebreaker.
        Mr. Garamendi. And you intend to?
        Admiral Gautier. We intend on creating a program of record
    in order to do that. Our focus is really on the Polar
    Security----
        Mr. Garamendi [interrupting]. Sir, if I might, 30 seconds?
        So, have you communicated with this committee about what
    that plan is?
        Admiral Gautier. I don't think we have provided details yet
    because, quite frankly, we need to develop those details.
        Mr. Garamendi. I yield back.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
        If there are no further questions, I thank the witnesses
    from our first panel and will now call up panel 2. Thank you
    very much.
        Welcome. I would now like to welcome our next panel of
    witnesses: Dr. Rebecca Pincus, director of the Polar Institute
    at the Wilson Center; and Dr. Martha Grabowski, professor at Le
    Moyne College and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute--I hope I
    pronounced that right--and former chair of the Marine Board at
    the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
        Thank you for being here today, and I look forward to your
    testimony.
        Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
    included in the record. As with the previous panel, since your
    written testimony has been made part of the record, the
    subcommittee requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5
    minutes.
        Dr. Pincus, you may proceed.

    TESTIMONY OF REBECCA PINCUS, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, POLAR INSTITUTE,
    WILSON CENTER; AND MARTHA GRABOWSKI, Ph.D., PROFESSOR, LE MOYNE
       COLLEGE AND RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE; PAST CHAIR,
    MARINE BOARD, NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND
                                MEDICINE

        Ms. Pincus. Thank you.
        Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished
    members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you
    today as director of the Wilson Center's Polar Institute.
        In keeping with the global, policy-focused work of the
    Wilson Center, I offer the following comments on the U.S. Coast
    Guard's Arctic missions in the context of U.S. national
    interests and objectives in the Arctic and beyond.
        My argument is threefold. First, that in the global context
    of long-term strategic competition, the Coast Guard is an
    effective means for strengthening relationships with allies and
    partners and for competing with adversaries via the integrated
    deterrence framework established in the National Defense
    Strategy.
        Second, that the U.S. has clearly identified the Indo-
    Pacific as the priority theater and Europe as the secondary
    theater of strategic importance, and the Arctic must be
    understood in that strategic hierarchy.
        And third, for a number of practical reasons, the Coast
    Guard is a cost-effective means to pursue multiple national
    interests in the Arctic.
        The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic take place in the
    global context of geopolitical competition, with China as the
    pacing threat, while Russia is broadly viewed as an acute
    threat. The 2022 National Defense Strategy establishes the
    concept of integrated deterrents as the chief means of engaging
    in holistic competition with both China and Russia. The Coast
    Guard can play a unique role in integrated deterrence.
        In the Arctic and beyond, the Coast Guard is a welcome
    partner on a host of issues of shared concern. From search and
    rescue, to fisheries enforcement, to drug interdiction, the
    Coast Guard is a partner welcomed by countries around the
    world. The top maritime concerns of many partner nations are
    bread-and-butter U.S. Coast Guard missions: enforcing fisheries
    regulations, interdicting crime and terrorism at sea, and
    maritime safety and response. Coast Guard international
    partnerships enhance partner capacity, pave the way for U.S.
    access, and embody the vision of integrated deterrents
    enshrined in the NDS.
        In addition, clear identification I referenced above of the
    Indo-Pacific as the first priority and Russia and Europe as the
    second priority helps place the Arctic in context. In light of
    these priorities, the Department of Defense has identified
    stability in the Arctic as its desired objective, and is taking
    a requirements-driven approach to calibrating its posture in
    the Arctic.
        In pursuit of stability in the Arctic, the Coast Guard has
    an important role to play in the National Defense Strategy
    concept of campaigning. Defined in the NDS as the conduct and
    sequencing of logically linked military initiatives aimed at
    advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time,
    campaigning in the Arctic should not contribute to escalation.
    The Coast Guard is well-positioned to campaign without
    escalating, as white-hulled Coast Guard vessels are inherently
    less escalatory than Navy warships.
        Finally, given the extra costs associated with achieving
    and maintaining U.S. Government presence in the Arctic, it is
    imperative to achieve maximum results for the investment of
    taxpayer dollars. In the Arctic, the U.S. needs Swiss Army
    knife solutions: cheap, durable, and useful for accomplishing
    many different tasks. On a single patrol, a U.S. Coast Guard
    icebreaker might demonstrate sovereignty, respond to a search
    and rescue case, and support scientific research.
        The ability of Coast Guard assets to perform multiple
    missions in the Arctic simultaneously advances multiple
    national interests, in the spirit of the National Strategy for
    the Arctic Region's emphasis on whole-of-Government solutions.
        In conclusion, there are both strategic and practical
    reasons to fully resource the Coast Guard's Arctic missions.
    The Coast Guard is a highly useful tool for conducting
    integrated deterrence, campaigning, and engaging in strategic
    competition. For example, the Coast Guard could partner with
    Denmark and Greenland to build capacity and enhance Maritime
    Domain Awareness, strengthening our relations with these
    important allies.
        More importantly, the Coast Guard should develop a strategy
    for conducting and resourcing integrated deterrents and
    campaigning operations. The Arctic region provides an ideal
    test bed for developing and implementing integration concepts
    with global applicability.
        The Coast Guard is a useful means of meeting the complex
    threats to U.S. security interests and to ensuring a stable and
    open international system, but only if it can clearly identify
    a path forward and justify additional resources. The Coast
    Guard should be asked to proactively articulate a coherent,
    specific, and a rigorous strategic vision for its role in
    advancing U.S. strategic ends in the Arctic.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts, and
    I look forward to your questions.
        [Ms. Pincus' prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Rebecca Pincus, Ph.D., Director, Polar Institute,
                                 Wilson Center
                                  Introduction
        Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and distinguished members
    of the Committee, thank you for convening this hearing on the United
    States Coast Guard's (USCG) leadership on Arctic safety, security, and
    environmental responsibility. I am Dr. Rebecca Pincus and I am honored
    to appear before you today as the Director of the Wilson Center's Polar
    Institute to discuss these issues.
        Prior to directing the Polar Institute, I served on the faculty of
    the U.S. Naval War College, in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
    From 2020-2022, I was detailed from the Naval War College to the Office
    of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, first to the Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development office and
    later the newly established Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Arctic and Global Resilience. Before joining the Naval War College, I
    served on the faculty of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and led research
    for the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy.
                    Woodrow Wilson Center's Polar Institute
        The Polar Institute was established as a program within the Woodrow
    Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2017. Since then, it has
    become a premier forum for discussion and policy analysis of Arctic
    issues. The Polar Institute holistically studies the central policy
    issues facing these regions, with an emphasis on Arctic governance,
    climate change, economic development, scientific research, security,
    and Indigenous communities. Our nonpartisan analysis and findings are
    communicated to policymakers and other stakeholders.
        The Polar Institute is holding a series of public events on the
    recently-released 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR).
    Our first event, in October, provided an opportunity for speakers from
    the Arctic Executive Steering Commission, National Security Council,
    Department of Defense, and Department of State to unpack the NSAR and
    discuss their agencies' work. Our next event will be a deep-dive into
    the work of the Department of Homeland Security in the Arctic. In
    February 2023, we will hold an event focusing on science and research
    in the Arctic. Events are livestreamed, and recordings are available on
    our website.
        In addition, we have ongoing work streams on Nordic and European
    Union security perspectives on the Arctic, critical minerals and the
    green energy transition in the Arctic, and maritime security and
    stewardship.
        We do this work within the administrative context of the Woodrow
    Wilson Center, which was chartered by Congress in 1968 as the official
    memorial to President Woodrow Wilson. The Wilson Center is the nation's
    key non-partisan policy forum for tacking global issues through
    independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for
    the policy community.
        The Coast Guard as a Strategic Means to Accomplish National Ends
        In keeping with the global, policy-focused work of the Wilson
    Center, I offer the following comments on the U.S. Coast Guard's Arctic
    missions. By framing the USCG missions in the context of U.S. national
    interests and objectives in the Arctic and beyond, I will underscore
    the valuable contributions made by the Coast Guard and its value as a
    tool of national power.
        In brief, my core argument is threefold: first, that in the global
    context of long-term, strategic competition, the Coast Guard is an
    effective means for strengthening relationships with Allies and
    partners and for competing with adversaries via the integrated
    deterrence framework established in the National Defense Strategy
    (NDS); second, that the U.S. has clearly identified the Indo-Pacific as
    the priority theater, and Europe as the secondary theater of strategic
    importance, and therefore the Arctic must be understood in that
    strategic hierarchy; and third, for a number of practical reasons, the
    Coast Guard is a cost-effective means to pursue multiple national
    interests in the Arctic.
              1. Global context: long-term, strategic competition
        The Coast Guard's missions in the Arctic take place in the global
    context of geopolitical competition, with China as the pacing threat.
    For several years, there has been bipartisan consensus in the United
    States on the importance and scale of the challenge posed by China,
    while Russia is broadly and accurately viewed as an ``acute'' threat.
    The 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies share similar language on
    the threats posed by China and Russia:
          (2018) ``Long-term strategic competitions with China and
    Russia are the principal priorities for the Department . . .''
          (2022) ``The 2022 NDS advances a strategy focused on the
    PRC [People's Republic of China] . . . as our pacing challenge . . .
    also accounts for the acute threat posed by Russia . . .''

        The 2022 NDS establishes the concept of integrated deterrence as
    the chief means of engaging in holistic competition with both the PRC
    and Russia: in the words of Secretary of Defense Austin, ``to develop,
    combine, and coordinate our strengths to maximum effect . . . in close
    collaboration with our counterparts across the U.S. Government and with
    Allies and partners.'' \1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Department of Defense, ``2022 National Defense Strategy,'' pp.
    iv. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-
    NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard can play a unique role in integrated deterrence. It
    can serve as a fulcrum between the DoD and DHS, able to leverage the
    authorities and missions of both federal departments. It partners with
    State, local, and Tribal entities; with the private sector in the
    global maritime industry; and with its foreign counterparts. In this
    regard, the Coast Guard is a unique national tool for working across
    jurisdictions and functions.
        The Coast Guard is useful in forging strong relationships with
    Allies and partners, in the Arctic and around the world. As a law-
    enforcement agency, it is also key to upholding the rules-based order
    that all countries rely upon. It is an important component of strategic
    competition with Russia and China.
        In the Arctic and beyond, the Coast Guard is a welcome partner on a
    host of issues of shared concern. From search and rescue to fisheries
    enforcement to drug interdiction, the Coast Guard is a partner welcomed
    by countries around the world. The top maritime concerns of many
    partner nations are bread-and-butter USCG missions: enforcing fisheries
    regulations, interdicting crime and terrorism at sea, and maritime
    safety and response. The Coast Guard's Mobile Training Teams train over
    1000 international military students each year, in over 40 countries,
    in both bi- and multilateral formats.\2\ International training covers
    the range of Coast Guard missions, and is tailored to specific national
    or regional needs. Coast Guard international partnerships enhance
    partner capacity, pave the way for U.S. access, and embody the vision
    of integrated deterrence enshrined in the NDS.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ For more information, see the website of the U.S. Coast Guard
    Office of International Affairs and Foreign Policy, https://
    www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Director-of-International-Affairs-
    and-Foreign-Policy-CG-DCO-I/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Consider U.S. interests in forging closer ties with Greenland. As
    part of the Kingdom of Denmark, and host of the U.S. Air Base Thule,
    Greenland also holds important strategic mineral resources. In 2020,
    the U.S. reopened a consulate in Nuuk, Greenland, and work is ongoing
    to broaden and deepen the relationship between the U.S. and
    Greenland.\3\ The U.S. Coast Guard should be a more significant part of
    these efforts. According to the Greenlandic government, the fishing
    industry is responsible for more than 85% of exports and over 20% of
    employment. USCG is ideally poised to partner with Greenland and
    Denmark on maritime domain awareness, enforcement, and safety: issues
    of top concern to Greenland's leaders.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ U.S. Department of State, ``The United States and Greenland.''
    https://dk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/u-s-greenland/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the Arctic, the U.S. Coast Guard is also able to navigate
    sensitive relationships. The most obvious example is along the U.S.-
    Russia maritime boundary in the Bering Sea, where USCG has maintained a
    professional and functioning working relationship with the Russian
    Border Guard throughout the current crisis driven by Russia's further
    invasion of Ukraine. For example, even in 2022, we saw just one
    incident in which a Russian fishing vessels crossed the boundary line
    to fish illegally in U.S. waters; when the U.S. Coast Guard reported
    the vessel, the Russian Border Guard responded.
        Another, less obvious example is Canada: the U.S. and Canada do not
    agree on the international status of the Northwest Passage, and the
    maritime boundary in the Beaufort Sea is unresolved. Despite these
    differences, the U.S. Coast Guard has partnered with its Canadian
    counterparts to conduct two transits of the Northwest Passage recently,
    in 2017 and 2021. In 2021, the icebreaker Healy carried officers from
    the British Royal Navy and the Dutch Navy on its transit, and used its
    onboard multibeam sonar system to provide Canada with high-resolution
    hydrographic survey data in the approach to the hamlet of Resolute, in
    Nunavut, which will be used by the Canadian Coast Guard to identify a
    safe shipping lane. This transit and associated activities are evidence
    of the mission's contribution to strong relationships with allies and
    partners in the Arctic and beyond.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Melody Schreiber, ``US icebreaker departs on a voyage that will
    transit the Northwest Passage.'' Arctic Today, August 26, 2021. https:/
    /www.arctictoday.com/us-coast-guard-science-joint-mission-northwest-
    passage/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to building relationships with allies and partners, the
    U.S. Coast Guard contributes to integrated deterrence through
    fortifying the rules-based order and demonstrating U.S. sovereignty and
    resolve in the Arctic.
        In September 2022, the U.S. Coast Guard cutter Kimball encountered
    a flotilla of PLA Navy and Russian Navy vessels in the Bering Sea,
    inside the U.S. exclusive economic zone.\5\ The combined naval exercise
    in the Bering followed another encounter in 2021, when USCG encountered
    four PLAN warships, also in the U.S. EEZ.\6\ In 2020, a Russian Navy
    flotilla conducted operations in an active fishing area inside U.S.
    waters.\7\ Chinese icebreakers Xue Long and Xue Long II regularly
    conduct research in the Arctic.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ Maggie Nelson, ``Coast Guard spots Chinese and Russian military
    ships together in Bering Sea.'' Alaska Public Radio, September 27,
    2022. https://alaskapublic.org/2022/09/27/coast-guard-spots-chinese-
    and-russian-military-ships-together-in-bering-sea/.
        \6\ Dylan Simard, ``Coast Guard encountered Chinese warships in the
    Aleutians in August.'' Alaska Public Radio, September 14, 2021. https:/
    /alaskapublic.org/2021/09/14/coast-guard-encountered-chinese-warships-
    in-the-aleutians/.
        \7\ Nathaniel Herz, `` `Move out of the way': Bering Sea fishing
    boats report close encounter with Russian military.'' Alaska Public
    Radio, August 27, 2020. https://alaskapublic.org/2020/08/27/move-out-
    of-the-way-bering-sea-fishing-boats-report-close-encounter-with-
    russian-military/.
        \8\ Atle Staalesen, ``Chinese icebreaker sails to North Pole,
    explores remote Arctic ridge.'' Arctic Today, August 12, 2021. https://
    www.arctictoday.com/chinese-icebreaker-sails-to-north-pole-explores-
    remote-arctic-ridge/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Without U.S. Coast Guard patrols in these waters, the Russian and
    Chinese warships would have symbolic free rein. USCG presence to
    identify and monitor these activities ensures the safety of U.S.
    citizens and interests in the Arctic.
        In November 2022, the Federation Council of Russia approved a law
    restricting vessel traffic in the Northern Sea Route. According to the
    new law, foreign military vessels traveling in the NSR must request
    permission from the Russian government 90 days before the date of
    passage. Further, no more than one foreign warship or other state
    vessel may be in the NSR at a time. Foreign submarines must surface
    while in the NSR. The law allows for the suspension of passage of
    foreign state vessels.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ TASS, November 30, 2022. [Cyrillic text] https://tass.ru/
    ekonomika/16462331 (tass.ru).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The new Russian legislation is likely to increase calls for a
    freedom of navigation exercise by the U.S. While Russia designates the
    Northern Sea Route as internal waters, the U.S. holds that key parts of
    the passage are international straits, where restrictive measures are
    not permitted under the terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the
    Sea (UNCLOS).
        Given the maritime hazards present in the NSR, icebreaker support
    for a FONOP, particularly in the eastern stretches, is advisable. USCG
    vessels may be considered less inflammatory to the Russians.
           2. The Arctic is not the priority theater in U.S. strategy
        The clear identification of the Indo-Pacific as the first priority,
    and Russia/Europe as the second priority, helps place the Arctic in
    context. The Department of Defense has not yet achieved its desired
    posture and balance of forces in the Indo-Pacific. Military support to
    Ukraine and reassurance of NATO Allies have placed further demands on
    the DoD. In light of these urgent priorities, the DoD has identified
    stability in the Arctic as its desired objective and is taking a
    requirements-driven approach to calibrating DoD posture in the Arctic.
    DoD's priority in the Arctic is homeland defense and early warning.
        The 2022 National Security Strategy seeks to ``Maintain a peaceful
    Arctic'' and states: ``We will uphold U.S. security in the region by
    improving our maritime domain awareness, communications, disaster
    response capabilities, and icebreaking capacity . . . We will exercise
    U.S. Government presence in the region as required, while reducing risk
    and preventing unnecessary escalation.'' \10\ The 2022 National Defense
    Strategy notes that ``The United States seeks a stable Arctic region
    characterized by adherence to internationally-agreed upon rules and
    norms.'' \11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ The White House, ``National Security Strategy,'' October 2022.
    Pp. 44-45. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-
    Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
        \11\ 2022 NDS, pp. 16.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In pursuit of stability in the Arctic, the Coast Guard also has a
    role to play in the NDS concept of campaigning. Defined as ``the
    conduct and sequencing of logically-linked military initiatives aimed
    at advancing well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time,''
    \12\ campaigning in the Arctic should not contribute to escalation. The
    Coast Guard is well-positioned to campaign without escalating, as
    white-hulled Coast Guard vessels are inherently less-escalatory than
    Navy warships.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ 2022 NDS, pp. 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Stability in the Arctic, and a lower priority relative to the Indo-
    Pacific, does not mean the region is not important to the United
    States. The U.S. has significant territorial equity and sovereignty
    interests, including northern and western parts of Alaska, as well as
    the Aleutian Island chain and the Bering, Beaufort, and Chukchi Seas
    adjacent to Alaska, which are all included in the definition of Arctic
    provided in the 1984 Arctic Research and Policy Act.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, Section 112,
    ``Definition.'' Available from US Arctic Research Commission at https:/
    /www.arctic.gov/legislation/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The U.S. has economic interests in the Arctic maritime, including
    fisheries, energy, shipping, and tourism. The Alaskan fishing industry
    harvests two-thirds of the nation's seafood, according to an industry
    group, and generates over $15 billion in direct and secondary economic
    outputs.\14\ The cruise industry calls Alaska ``the premier cruise
    destination market in the United States.'' In 2019, Alaska received
    almost two-thirds of all cruise passenger visits at U.S. ports,
    producing $1.2 billion in income in Alaska and 23,000 jobs.\15\ Cruise
    traffic is rebounding from the pandemic and trends prior to 2020
    indicate strong growth across the industry.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Alaska Seafood, ``Updated Report Affirms Alaska's Seafood
    Industry is Essential Driver of State Economy.'' January 12, 2022.
    https://www.alaskaseafood.org/news/for-release-2022-
    economic-value-of-alaskas-seafood-industry-report/
    #::text=Nationally%2C%20the%20Alaska
    %20seafood%20industry,%248.6%20billion%20in%20multiplier%20effects.
        \15\ Business Research and Economic Advisors, ``The Contribution of
    the International Cruise Industry to the U.S. Economy in 2019.'' Cruise
    Lines International Association (CLIA). Pp 51-52. https://
    www.alaskatia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019-USA-Cruise-EIS.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        U.S. Arctic waters may also be affected by activities in adjacent
    Russian waters. While Russia's war in Ukraine has dampened shipping
    activity through the Northern Sea Route, Russia continues to ship LNG
    from its Arctic developments in Yamal. These LNG shipments are
    increasingly heading east, to Asia, transiting the Bering Strait and
    increasing environmental and maritime risks in the region. Less
    dramatic, but more frequent, are environmental impacts from garbage and
    pollutants that regularly wash into U.S. Arctic waters from Russia,
    including petroleum products and industrial debris. In 2020, large
    amounts of garbage washed ashore in the Bering Strait region, covering
    miles of shoreline and including hazardous waste (insecticide,
    lubricants, butane) and large amounts of plastic debris, as well as
    dead seabirds. Russian text and logos were identified on the marine
    debris, much of which was related to commercial fisheries.\16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ G. Sheffield, et al. ``2020 Foreign Marine Debris Event--
    Bering Strait.'' NOAA Arctic Report Card 2021. https://arctic.noaa.gov/
    Report-Card/Report-Card-2021/ArtMID/8022/ArticleID/952/2020-Foreign-
    Marine-Debris-Event%E2%80%94Bering-Strait.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Reductions in sea ice and warming conditions in the Arctic enable
    increased maritime activity. Changing weather conditions create
    uncertainty. The combination of increased maritime activity and less-
    predictable weather conditions generate maritime hazards. Fishing
    vessels, cruise ships, and other vessels are all subject to the
    maritime hazards present in Arctic waters. Climate change is
    anticipated to increase need for search and rescue in the region.\17\
    Whatever the cause or origin, when an accident occurs in the Arctic--
    particularly in the Bering Strait, the narrow body of water separating
    the U.S. and Russia--there may be consequences in U.S. waters.
    Proximity to Russia raises the stakes for humanitarian or environmental
    disaster response.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ Fourth National Climate Assessment, ``Chapter 26: Alaska.''
    https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/26/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        From a military perspective, Alaska and the U.S. Arctic are
    important to homeland defense, as forward locations for early warning
    detection and interdiction systems. New delivery systems from vectors
    in Eurasia make investments in U.S. and NORAD missile early warning and
    defeat systems critical, as outlined in the NDS. Alaska is also an
    important location for its proximity to the Indo-Pacific theater. As
    such, it hosts the largest concentration of fifth-generation fighter
    aircraft in the world. However, the NDS demands that the DoD focus
    ruthlessly: ``we must not over-exert, reallocate, or redesign our
    forces for regional crises that cross the threshold of risk to
    preparedness for our highest strategic priorities.'' \18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \18\ 2022 NDS, pp. 22.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          3. Practical benefits of Coast Guard missions in the Arctic
        There is an Arctic cost premium: whether building infrastructure,
    maintaining vehicles, or buying milk, it's more expensive, often
    significantly so. In rural Alaska, a gallon of gas may often cost $10-
    15, and a gallon of milk will be similarly expensive.\19\ Shipping in
    goods raises costs. U.S. Government operations are not immune to the
    additional costs inherent to remote, harsh environments like the
    Arctic.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ See, for example: Zachariah Hughes, ``Fuel in the Alaska
    village of Noatak was $16 a gallon. The costs are more than just
    money.'' Anchorage Daily News, May 18, 2022. https://www.adn.com/
    alaska-news/rural-alaska/2022/05/18/fuel-in-the-alaska-village-of-
    noatak-was-16-a-gallon-the-costs-are-more-than-just-money/; Ann
    Schmidt, ``Extreme grocery prices in rural Alaska shock TikTok: `$18
    for milk'.'' Fox Business, December 3, 2021. https://
    www.foxbusiness.com/lifestyle/rural-alaska-grocery-store-prices-viral.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Given the extra costs associated with achieving and maintaining
    U.S. Government presence in the Arctic, it is imperative to achieve
    maximum results for the investment of taxpayer dollars. In the Arctic,
    the U.S. needs Swiss Army knife solutions: cheap, durable, and useful
    for accomplishing many different tasks. On a single patrol, a Coast
    Guard icebreaker might demonstrate sovereignty, respond to a search and
    rescue case, and support scientific research. The ability of Coast
    Guard assets to perform multiple missions in the Arctic simultaneously
    advances multiple national interests, in the spirit of the National
    Strategy for the Arctic Region's emphasis on whole-of-government
    solutions.
        The Coast Guard's practical application in the Arctic contrasts
    with the U.S. Navy, which is confronting several significant strategic
    and operational challenges that defy quick solutions, and which make
    additional missions in the Arctic potentially costly, in both financial
    and strategic terms. Its shipbuilding and future fleet plans reflect
    the challenges of responding to the current and future threats posed by
    Chinese military advances, new technologies including unmanned systems,
    and budget issues. Its 30-year plan for shipbuilding has been
    characterized as requiring annual appropriations that the Congressional
    Budget Office describes as ``unprecedented since World War II.'' \20\
    It faces serious challenges in maintenance and repair at yards \21\,
    including at Navy submarine yards.\22\ In recent years, the Navy has
    experienced a string of accidents \23\ and scandals \24\ that further
    complicate its ability to reposition itself to meet future demands.
    Adding further demands, for operations in a region that is famously
    harsh, does nothing to help the Navy. Moreover, it does not reflect the
    broader national and defense strategies that enshrine cost-effective,
    whole-of-government, integrated solutions. The Coast Guard has a strong
    track record of achieving maximum effects with minimum resources,
    leading some experts to take a hard look at transferring Navy budgets
    for small combatant funding to USCG.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ Congressional Budget Office, ``An Analysis of the Navy's
    December 2020 Shipbuilding Plan.'' April 2021. https://www.cbo.gov/
    publication/57091.
        \21\ U.S. Government Accountability Office, ``Naval Shipyards:
    Ongoing Challenges Could Jeopardize Navy's Ability to Improve
    Shipyards.'' May 10, 2022. GAO-22-105993.
        \22\ Congressional Budget Office, ``The Capacity of the Navy's
    Shipyards to Maintain its Submarines.'' March 2021. https://
    www.cbo.gov/publication/57083.
        \23\ Robert Faturechi, et al. ``Years of Warnings, then Death and
    Disaster.'' ProPublica, February 7, 2019. https://
    features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/us-navy-crashes-japan-cause-
    mccain/.
        \24\ Blake Herzinger, ``Fat Leonard Cost the US Navy More than
    Money.'' October 24, 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/24/fat-
    leonard-us-navy-corruption-scandal/.
        \25\ See, for example, Craig Hooper and Bryan Clark, ``Fed Up,
    Congress Considers Giving Coast Guard the Navy's Small Ship Funding.''
    Forbes, May 23, 2022. https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2022/05/
    23/fed-up-congress-considers-giving-coast-guard-navys-small-ship-
    funding/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     So what can the Coast Guard do better?
        In conclusion, there are both strategic and practical reasons to
    fully resource the Coast Guard's Arctic missions. The Coast Guard is a
    highly useful tool for conducting integrated deterrence, campaigning,
    and engaging in strategic competition. It is an agency with a
    remarkably high degree of trust around the world. Through its capacity-
    building work with partner nations on fisheries enforcement, drug
    interdiction, and search and rescue, the Coast Guard helps the U.S. win
    partners and future allies. By building maritime law enforcement
    capacity around the world, the Coast Guard contributes to the U.S.
    effort to establish and uphold the global rules-based order that our
    prosperity and peace depend upon.
        In the Arctic, the Coast Guard could partner with Denmark and
    Greenland to build capacity and enhance maritime domain awareness,
    strengthening our relations with these important allies. While USCG
    already engages with the Danish Joint Arctic Command (JACO) in
    Greenland via the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, and has participated in
    international maritime exercises, expanding and deepening the
    relationship could yield benefits.
        More importantly, the Coast Guard should develop a strategy for
    conducting and resourcing integrated deterrence and campaigning
    operations. This is important in the Arctic and beyond. The Coast
    Guard's 2022 Strategy and 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook are valuable
    documents, but do not match the National Defense Strategy in terms of
    specificity, prioritization, and an overarching strategic framework to
    guide decision-making. The 2020 Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, which
    was jointly signed out by the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard,
    provides an example of an integrated approach to naval and maritime
    strategy. The Arctic region provides an ideal test bed for developing
    and implementing integration concepts across the Navy-Marines-Coast
    Guard, as well as with Allies and partners.
        The Coast Guard in the Arctic--and beyond--can play a unique role
    in integrated deterrence and campaigning as defined in the NDS. Through
    strengthening relationships with Allies and partners, and assisting in
    security cooperation, the Coast Guard can advance national objectives
    and minimize escalation. The Coast Guard is an important means of
    meeting the complex threats to U.S. security interests, and to ensuring
    a stable and open international system: only if it can clearly identify
    a path forward and justify additional resources. The Coast Guard should
    be asked to proactively articulate a coherent, specific, and rigorous
    strategic vision for its role in advancing U.S. strategic ends in the
    Arctic.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you
    today, and for your support for the Coast Guard family. I look forward
    to your questions.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Pincus.
        Dr. Grabowski, you may proceed.
        Ms. Grabowski. Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking
    Member Gibbs, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
    appreciate the opportunity to testify today in this hearing
    addressing Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic.
        I have had the privilege of being associated with the
    National Academies for 30 years, and I just completed my second
    tour as chair of the Marine Board and the Transportation
    Research Board. In 2014, I chaired the NASEM study sponsored by
    the Coast Guard and seven other organizations that focused on
    the Nation's ability to respond to a catastrophic oilspill in
    the Arctic. I am also a member of the current NASEM committee
    examining the adequacy of Coast Guard statutory authorities to
    respond to novel uses of the maritime environment. Our
    committee work is in process at present, and I am not going to
    comment on it today.
        My focus today, however, are on three areas important for
    Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic: Maritime Domain
    Awareness, support for Coast Guard operations and personnel,
    and Coast Guard's needs for a resilient physical,
    technological, and human infrastructure.
        Coast Guard needs to support U.S. missions in the Arctic
    depend on effective Maritime Domain Awareness, which for the
    Coast Guard requires improved visibility of and access to
    vessel traffic information, as well as current nautical charts.
    Important to this is the Coast Guard's increasing need to adopt
    current and future-facing information technology and systems,
    as was highlighted in several recent GAO reports.
        Several studies have addressed the Coast Guard's risks and
    challenges in the Arctic. Few efforts, however, have adopted
    systematic processes and advanced analytics with multiparty
    Arctic stakeholders to determine the impact and the risks of
    the accelerating changes that the Coast Guard is facing in the
    Arctic today and in the future.
        Operationally, changing Arctic traffic and environmental
    conditions will increase needs for Coast Guard emergency
    response, vessel safety, and environmental protection
    capabilities. Maritime resources and other rescue equipment and
    supplies for response are limited in the Bering Strait region,
    and as we have already heard, the Coast Guard is far from
    possible incident locations.
        Arctic missions are also going to require, as we have
    heard, new technology, certification, training, proficiency,
    and experiences, as the Coast Guard increasingly adopts and
    regulates the use of uncrewed and autonomous maritime systems.
        Underlying effective operational support are robust,
    secure, and available communications; data and infrastructure;
    real-time and longitudinal sea ice, charting, navigation, and
    shoreline effects data; efficient and enterprisewide data
    systems; and advanced analytics capabilities; all of which are
    going to be a challenge for the Coast Guard.
        Coast Guard needs to support their environmental protection
    mission and oilspill response activities are significant. Some
    of the NASEM 2014 recommendations that were in that report have
    been addressed, such as a call for traffic evaluation in the
    Bering Strait and oilspill and emergency response training
    programs for local entities so that the Coast Guard and the
    communities can develop trained response teams in the local
    communities. But others, such as the call for increased Coast
    Guard presence and performance capability in the Arctic,
    establishment of a comprehensive, collaborative long-term
    Arctic oilspill R&D program, and increased oilspill response
    infrastructure and marine facilities in the Arctic have not
    been.
        Finally, Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic depends on
    resilient physical, technological, and human infrastructure.
    Historically, investments in the Arctic have not grown with
    expanded Coast Guard responsibilities. As important will be the
    required investments in Coast Guard technology and human
    infrastructure that are important for a robust and resilient
    Coast Guard today and in the future.
        Coast Guard Arctic operations occur in a unique social and
    cultural setting that is reliant on partnerships with
    neighboring countries, Arctic nations, and the Arctic Council,
    as well as on partnerships with local organizations, the Arctic
    communities, and strong bonds within the Arctic communities and
    with Arctic stakeholders. The coproduction of knowledge,
    policies, regulations, and programs with local stakeholders,
    indigenous groups, and community leaders is critical for Coast
    Guard success in the Arctic.
        Ultimately, a robust and resilient maritime infrastructure
    requires significant, long-term, and interdisciplinary Arctic
    research with partners that can benefit the Coast Guard, as
    well as all of its Arctic partners.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
    before you on these important issues about Coast Guard
    leadership in the Arctic. The Coast Guard is a critical leader
    and a partner in the Arctic, with increasing demands and
    missions stretching their capability and capacity. Your support
    of the Coast Guard's critical mission needs is essential for an
    effective Coast Guard today and in the future.
        Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your
    questions.
        [Ms. Grabowski's prepared statement follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Martha Grabowski, Ph.D., Professor, Le Moyne
    College and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Past Chair, Marine Board,
           National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
        Good morning, Chairman Carbajal, Ranking Member Gibbs, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
    to testify today in this hearing addressing Coast Guard leadership on
    Arctic safety, security and environmental responsibility, and I thank
    you for your continued support of the United States Coast Guard.
        I am a professor of Information Systems at Le Moyne College in
    Syracuse, New York, and a senior research scientist in the Department
    of Industrial Engineering at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Troy,
    New York. I am a 1979 graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at
    Kings Point, in the 2nd class of women to graduate from a federal
    service academy. Upon graduation, I was licensed by the Coast Guard as
    a Third Mate, and ultimately as Second Mate, and I sailed on tankers,
    liquefied natural gas carriers, and ocean-going integrated tugs and
    barges carrying super phosphoric acid to Russia.
        I have been licensed by the Coast Guard, my research has been
    funded by the Coast Guard, and my research, exploring technology
    impacts in safety-critical systems and the marine transportation
    system, is important to the future of the marine transportation system.
        I'm currently investigating the impact of advanced visualization
    and artificial intelligence technology on maritime safety, decision-
    making, communications and agility in a series of simulator experiments
    using Google Glass with the Staten Island Ferry. My earliest research
    developed and tested an artificial intelligence ship navigation system
    aboard Trans Alaskan Pipeline Service (TAPS) Trade tankers sailing into
    and out of Valdez, Alaska. My current research takes me further north
    in Alaska, with funding from the National Science Foundation, as our
    research team develops resource allocation models, and addresses the
    challenges and needs for resilient maritime infrastructure in the
    Arctic, with benefits for Arctic communities.
        Most recently, several weeks ago, I was in Fairbanks, Alaska with
    my students, having met with Coast Guard Sector Anchorage and with
    researchers at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, on our research
    projects that use uncrewed aerial systems in Arctic search and rescue,
    and for Arctic maritime infrastructure data gathering and analysis. We
    flew out as Typhoon Merbok blew in, and the impacts of the Typhoon and
    the onslaught of the increasingly impactful series of major storms and
    maritime events besieging the Arctic and Western Alaska are both
    impressive and frightening to consider.
        I have had the privilege of being associated with the National
    Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (NASEM) for 30 years,
    and just completed my 2nd tour as Chair of the National Academies'
    Transportation Research Board/Marine Board. I have also chaired or co-
    chaired five NASEM studies and served on four other NASEM committees.
    In 2014, I chaired the NASEM study sponsored by the Coast Guard, the
    U.S. Arctic Research Commission, the American Petroleum Institute, the
    Department of Interior/Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
    and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Marine Mammal
    Commission, NOAA, and the Prince William Sound Oil Spill Recovery
    Institute. That study assessed the nation's ability to respond to a
    catastrophic oil spill in the Arctic. The nation's capability to
    respond in 2014 was not strong, and in 2022, it has not measurably
    improved.
        I am also a member of the current NASEM committee examining the
    adequacy of Coast Guard statutory authorities in light of novel uses of
    the maritime environment, including foreseeable developments such as
    aquaculture, autonomous systems, decarbonization of maritime vessels
    and systems, offshore energy, fishing, migration and commercial space
    operations. Our committee's work is in process at present, and I will
    not comment on its process, deliberations, conclusions or
    recommendations, except to note that Coast Guard Arctic activities and
    missions are some of the `foreseeable developments' noted in the
    committee's statement of task.
        My focus today will be on three areas important for Coast Guard
    leadership in the Arctic: maritime domain awareness, support for Coast
    Guard operations and personnel, and Coast Guard needs for resilient
    physical, technological and human infrastructure in the Arctic.
                                   Background
        The United States is an Arctic nation, and the United States Coast
    Guard serves as the nation's first maritime responder and the lead
    federal agency for homeland security, safety, and environmental
    stewardship in the Arctic. Coast Guard roles have expanded in the
    Arctic to include representing American interests as a leader in the
    international bodies governing navigation, search and rescue, vessel
    safety, fisheries enforcement, and pollution response across the entire
    Arctic.
        The types of challenges that the Coast Guard is called upon to
    address in the Arctic are wide-ranging and significant, stretching from
    traditional missions in vessel navigation; emergency and oil spill
    prevention, response and mitigation; search and rescue; vessel safety,
    inspection and compliance; shoreside facilities' safety and inspection;
    fisheries; migration; offshore energy; and managing a talented but
    stretched workforce in a tight employment market across an enormous
    Area of Responsibility (AOR); as well as growing non-traditional
    missions supporting national geopolitical and humanitarian needs in
    remote locations.
        Arctic maritime activities and transits are increasing due, in
    part, to changing climatic and environmental conditions, such as rising
    sea surface temperatures and declines in sea ice extent. As an example,
    Bering Strait transits totaled 262 in 2009, but doubled in 2021 to 555
    (Marine Exchange of Alaska, 2022). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker,
    cruise ship, and fishing vessel traffic in the Arctic region is
    increasing. As the region continues to open and strategic competition
    drives more actors to look to the Arctic for economic and geopolitical
    advantages, the demand for Coast Guard leadership and presence will
    continue to grow. Geopolitical developments and tensions among other
    nations operating in the region, which are often unpredictable, are
    constant considerations in U.S. Arctic priorities and operations.
        Future geopolitical, fisheries, law enforcement, security and
    national security interests will bring more and larger vessels of
    different types to Western Alaska, the Arctic, and through the Bering
    Strait. With the movement of sea ice through the Bering Strait,
    occurrences of storms and rough sea waves are also likely to increase,
    as are maritime navigation risks and the likelihood of vessel
    accidents. Increases in shipping traffic also bring heightened
    environmental risks.
        Pollution from shipping and human waste is increasing in the Bering
    Strait. Vessel navigation exposes the Arctic ecosystem to dangers from
    vessel strikes, noises, and contamination, as well as dangers after
    accidents, such as oil spills and other hazardous releases. Cleaning up
    oil spills in the Arctic presents distinct challenges, as conditions
    such as lack of daylight, remoteness, and ice-cover can complicate
    response strategies and impact their effectiveness. Furthermore,
    historic storms exacerbated by climate change are also damaging the
    Arctic's fragile existing maritime infrastructure, its vulnerable
    gravel shores, and its power and water facilities, which are often
    built close to unprotected shorelines.
        These effects, coupled with aging fuel tanks located near critical
    water supplies, melting permafrost, and an increasing number of
    tsunamigenic landslides near coastal communities and cruise vessel
    ports, are forcing Arctic communities to relocate, causing shipping and
    cruise vessel operators to review schedules and port visits, and are
    occasioning the Coast Guard to consider personnel and workforce
    assignments.
        As oil and gas, shipping, and tourism activities increase, the U.S.
    Coast Guard will need an enhanced presence and performance capacity in
    the Arctic, including area-specific training, icebreaking capability,
    improved availability of vessels for responding to oil spills or other
    emergency situations, and aircraft and helicopter support facilities
    for the open water season and eventually year-round. Arctic assignments
    for trained and experienced personnel and tribal liaisons could benefit
    by being of longer duration, to take full advantage of their skills.
        Operational and personnel support for the Coast Guard's Arctic Area
    of Responsibility is thus critical, given the size and scope of the
    Coast Guard's AOR in Alaska, which encompasses over 3.8 million
    (3,853,500) square miles, and over 47,300 miles of shoreline. Sustained
    funding and leadership commitment is required to increase the presence
    of the Coast Guard in the Arctic and to strengthen and expand the Coast
    Guard's ongoing and future Arctic missions.
                          1. Maritime Domain Awareness
        Coast Guard needs to support effective U.S. missions in the Arctic
    center depend on effective maritime domain awareness, which for the
    Coast Guard requires improved visibility and access to transit and
    destination vessel traffic information. The 2014 NASEM report
    highlighted Coast Guard needs to obtain broader satellite monitoring of
    Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals in the Arctic through
    government means or from private providers. The NAS Committee's
    recommendation that the Coast Guard expedite its evaluation of traffic
    through the Bering Strait to determine if vessel traffic monitoring
    systems, including determining if an internationally recognized traffic
    separation scheme was warranted, was followed by 2018 action by the
    International Maritime Organization (IMO)'s Maritime Safety Committee,
    which adopted new and amended ships' routing measures in the Bering Sea
    and Bering Strait, aimed at reducing the risks of incidents--the first
    measures adopted by the IMO for the Arctic region where the Polar Code
    applies.
        Intrinsic to effective maritime domain awareness is the Coast
    Guard's increasing need to adopt current and future-facing information
    technology and systems, as highlighted in several recent GAO reports
    (U.S. GAO, 2020; 2022). Limited Arctic communications, networks and
    connectivity, a perennial challenge, impact Coast Guard maritime domain
    awareness, operational effectiveness and the Coast Guard's ability to
    interact with its partners in the Arctic.
        Key to effective maritime domain awareness is the development of
    and requirement for data standards for nautical charting, water level,
    vessel transit and safety data, among others. Recent efforts, such as
    the multi-agency work led by the Department of Homeland Security and
    NOAA, the U.S. Committee on the Maritime Transportation System (CMTS)
    and the U.S. Department of Transportation/Maritime Administration in
    their Data Harmonization project--in which the Coast Guard was a
    participant--are an important step forward in this area.
        Current nautical charts for the increasing number of vessels
    transiting the Arctic, and to support Coast Guard missions in the
    Arctic, are a persistent challenge and NOAA prioritization and
    resources to accomplish accelerated bathymetric surveys and nautical
    charting are critical in this regard.
        Several studies have addressed Coast Guard risks and challenges in
    the Arctic. Few efforts, however, have adopted systematic processes and
    advanced analytics with multiparty Arctic stakeholders to determine the
    impact and risks of the accelerating technological, industry, climate,
    geopolitical and economic changes currently facing the Coast Guard or
    envisioned in the future Arctic. The Coast Guard could benefit from a
    comprehensive assessment of the risks it confronts in the Arctic,
    similar to the multi-party, shared decision processes and analyses
    followed in the Coast-Guard led and supported maritime risk assessments
    in Prince William Sound, Cook Inlet, and the Aleutian Islands, and
    similar to the processes that were followed in the State of
    Washington's two Vessel Traffic Risk Assessments, and the vessel
    traffic risk assessments currently underway, led by the Washington
    State Department of Ecology.
        A national risk framework that informs Arctic priorities is
    important as the Coast Guard and Department of Defense increasingly
    operate in the Arctic and update their Arctic strategies in light of
    evolving geopolitical forces. A structured approach consistently
    followed would guide strategic investments, promote transparency and
    accountability, and include assessment of existing and future Arctic
    policies and programs.
              2. Support for Coast Guard Operations and Personnel
        Changing Arctic traffic and environmental conditions will increase
    needs for Coast Guard emergency response, vessel safety and
    environmental protection capabilities. Maritime resources and other
    rescue equipment and supplies for response are limited in the Bering
    Strait region, with the U.S. Coast Guard far from possible incident
    locations. As Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) tankers, ore and gravel
    carriers, and government, research and cruise vessels make more
    transits, the Coast Guard will likely need to expand its capacity to
    monitor compliance with transit and environmental regulations in the
    Arctic region. Ensuring environmental response infrastructure is
    sufficient and foreign vessels transiting international straits are
    complying with regulations will be increasingly important over the next
    decade, as will promulgation of pollution control or mitigation
    measures, and measures imposed internationally by the Polar Code.
        Coast Guard Arctic missions require new technology, skills,
    certifications and experience. As the Coast Guard increasingly adopts
    and regulates the use of uncrewed and autonomous maritime systems--in
    the air, on the water's surface and under the sea--Coast Guard needs
    for operational policies, procedures, certification, training and
    performance measurement with these new technologies will be required.
    Autonomous systems and uncrewed aerial systems are being tested, used
    and evaluated by the Coast Guard, by industry and by academia to assist
    with Coast Guard missions in vessel inspection; search and rescue; oil
    spill response; maritime infrastructure protection; and fisheries
    management. Training, certification and re-certification policies and
    procedures are thus important needs for the Coast Guard in the Arctic,
    and increasing use of autonomous and uncrewed systems will require the
    Coast Guard to adapt their operations, training and certification
    policies and procedures.
        Key to effective operational support are robust, secure and
    available communications and connectivity, a perennial Arctic
    challenge. As important are the data, storage, retrieval, management,
    security and analytical issues associated with new types of structured
    (text, numbers, statistics) and unstructured (video, audio, simulation,
    pdfs, augmented and virtual reality) data being collected in the Arctic
    with autonomous and uncrewed systems.
        Accelerating changes in the Arctic region increase the Coast
    Guard's needs for data and data infrastructure. Real-time and
    longitudinal data on sea ice, charting and navigation data, and
    shoreline effects data are needed. New missions and operations, such as
    the use of autonomous and uncrewed systems for vessel and facility
    inspections; oil spill prevention and response; support for U.S.
    geopolitical activities; border protection; humanitarian response; and
    fisheries management, among others, will require secure data, server,
    cloud storage and networks, as well as efficient enterprise-wide data
    and information storage, retrieval and management, and advanced
    analytic techniques, all of which will be a challenge for the Coast
    Guard. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and resources to support this
    need, and/or arrangements with sister maritime and data agencies are
    lacking, resulting in gaps and lost opportunities to leverage new
    technology, data and visualization of Arctic baseline and trend data.
        Coast Guard needs to support their environmental protection mission
    and oil spill response activities, including drills, simulations, and
    use of new technology, are significant. The 2014 NASEM report
    Responding to Oil Spills in the Arctic Marine Environment, (https://
    nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/18625/responding-to-oil-spills-in-
    the-us-arctic-marine-environment) addressed challenges in the U.S.
    capability to respond to a catastrophic Arctic oil spill, including
    needs for oil spill response capabilities, research, logistics,
    infrastructure, training and international coordination.
        Some of the NASEM 2014 report recommendations have been addressed--
    such as a call for evaluation of traffic in the Bering Strait and oil
    spill and emergency response training programs for local entities so as
    to develop trained response teams in local villages--but others, such
    as (1) the call for increased Coast Guard presence and performance
    capability in the Arctic, (2) establishment of a comprehensive,
    collaborative, long-term Arctic oil spill research and development
    program, or (3) increased oil spill response infrastructure and marine
    facilities in the Arctic, have not.
        In addition, the technology, data and scientific infrastructure
    required for effective Arctic oil spill response noted in the NASEM
    2014 report still needs significant bolstering. This includes (1) an
    improved real-time oceanographic-ice-meteorological forecasting system
    and (2) high resolution satellite and airborne imagery coupled with up-
    to-date high resolution digital elevation models that are updated
    regularly to capture the dynamic, rapidly-changing U.S. Arctic
    coastline.
     3. Coast Guard Needs for Resilient Physical, Technological and Human
                                 Infrastructure
        Coast Guard leadership in the Arctic depends on resilient physical,
    technological and human infrastructure. The rapid and often
    unpredictable changes occurring in the Arctic are likely to increase
    pressure on Arctic infrastructure and Coast Guard resources over the
    next decade. Historically, investments in Arctic infrastructure have
    not grown with expanded Coast Guard responsibilities. Coast Guard
    Evergreen strategic planning exercises have identified challenges in
    and lack of investment in communications, situation and domain
    awareness capabilities, resource availability and allocation hurdles,
    and lack of political and institutional will (Tingstad, et al., 2018).
    The resources available through the Nome Deep Draft Port project will
    bring new attention to and opportunities to invest in resilient
    maritime physical infrastructure. As important will be the required
    associated investments in Coast Guard technology and human
    infrastructure that are essential elements in a robust and resilient
    Coast Guard in its Arctic operations.
        Developing and strengthening partnerships in the Arctic is a
    critical Coast Guard leadership role. Effective Coast Guard Arctic
    missions rely on communications, information sharing and partnerships
    with neighboring countries and provinces, as well as on international
    policy developments at the IMO, among Arctic nations, and at
    consultative and deliberative groups such as the Arctic Council.
        Coast Guard Arctic operations occur in a unique social and cultural
    setting that is reliant on local and traditional knowledge and on
    strong bonds within and with communities and across Arctic
    stakeholders. Co-production of knowledge, policies, regulations,
    programs, and activities from the inception of those activities, in the
    planning stages through completion and project monitoring, with local
    stakeholders, indigenous partners and community leaders, as well as
    knowledge sharing, are crucial for the Coast Guard's effectiveness. In
    addition, the Coast Guard's partnerships with industry, classification
    societies, international partners, and R&D institutions are also
    extremely important for Coast Guard Arctic operations, and in
    developing improved Arctic maritime domain awareness.
        Ultimately, a robust and resilient maritime infrastructure requires
    significant, long-term and interdisciplinary Arctic research. Research
    partnerships could clearly benefit the Coast Guard and its Arctic
    missions. Agencies such as the Arctic Research Commission, the polar
    and Arctic programs at the National Science Foundation (NSF), the
    National Institutes for Health (NIH), the Environmental Protection
    Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
    the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the
    Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), FEMA, NOAA and the U.S. Army
    Corps of Engineers, along with the State of Alaska, industry partners
    and coalitions, incorporated and unincorporated Arctic boroughs, Alaska
    Native Corporations, non-governmental organizations, academia,
    environmental groups, and community leaders are natural partners.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gibbs, and members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
    on the U.S. Coast Guard's leadership in the Arctic. The U.S. Coast
    Guard is a critical leader and partner in the Arctic, with increasing
    demands and missions stretching their capacity and capability. Your
    support of the Coast Guard's critical mission needs, including maritime
    domain awareness, operations and personnel, and for a resilient
    physical, technological and human maritime infrastructure in the
    Arctic, is essential for an effective U.S. Coast Guard today and in the
    future.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you
    today and for all that you do for the men and women of the United
    States Coast Guard. I look forward to your questions.
    References
    Marine Exchange of Alaska (2022), quoted in Banshchikova. I. 2022.
        Crossing the Line: How the Increase in Shipping Traffic Threatens
        the Bering Strait. World Wildlife Fund, 26 October. https://
        files.worldwildlife.org/wwfcmsprod/
        files/Publication/file/
        30k7kbwrud_Crossing_the_Line_brochure_proof3.pdf?_
        ga=2.190909484.746421881.1668270313-1793220812.1668270312,
        Retrieved 1 December 2022.

    National Academies of Science, Engineering & Medicine (NASEM). 2014.
        Responding to Oil Spills in the U.S. Arctic Marine Environment.
        Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. https://
        nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/18625/responding-to-oil-spills-
        in-the-us-arctic-marine-environment, retrieved 1 December 2022.

    National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017.
        Acquisition and Operation of Polar Icebreakers: Fulfilling the
        Nation's Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
        https://doi.org/10.17226/24834.

    Tingstad, A., Savitz, S., Van Abel, K., Woods, D., Anania, K., Ziegler,
        M. D., Davenport, A.C. & Costello, K. 2018. Identifying Potential
        Gaps in US Coast Guard Arctic Capabilities. RAND Corporation.
        https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2310.html, retrieved 1
        December 2022.

    U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2020. Coast Guard: Actions
        Needed to Ensure Investments in Key Data System Meet Mission and
        User Needs. Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, GAO
        Report 20-562, July. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-562,
        retrieved 1 December 2022.

    U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2022. Coast Guard: Actions
        Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation. Washington, D.C.:
        Government Accountability Office, GAO Report GAO-22-105092, July.
        Retrieved 7 October 2022. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-
        105092, retrieved 1 December 2022.

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Grabowski.
        We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
    be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing
    myself.
        Dr. Pincus, the United States will not be able to match
    Russia's fleet of 40 Arctic icebreakers, nor should we try to
    as a Nation with a shorter northern coastline and a more
    diverse fleet of subsurface and air transportation assets.
        What is a better metric by which to gauge the U.S. whole
    Arctic capacity than simply the number of icebreakers? And in
    addition to their investment in icebreaking assets, how would
    you rate the United States investments in the emerging Arctic
    to that of Russia and China?
        Ms. Pincus. You are starting with an easy question. Thank
    you.
        I appreciate your note that the U.S. will not and should
    not look for parity in terms of Russian icebreakers. The vast
    majority of Russian icebreakers are with a commercial purpose,
    and they are operated by Rosatomflot, which is a Russian state-
    owned corporation. They have commercial purpose. Although they
    could certainly be used in the event of a military contingency
    to provide logistic support to naval vessels, their purpose is
    commercial. And it is not a good comparison for what the U.S.
    Coast Guard icebreakers do in the Arctic.
        Nevertheless, the U.S. does need robust icebreaking
    capability. As a global power, we need to be able to project
    our power and presence around the world at the time and place
    of our choosing, including in both the Arctic and Antarctica.
    The fact that the two polar regions are very far apart means
    that to achieve both polar presences and to have sufficient
    redundancy to be able to respond in the event of any
    contingency affecting one of our icebreakers is the true
    metric. Do we have presence in both polar regions at the time
    and place of our choosing, year-round access, and do we have
    sufficient redundancy? And I believe those are the metrics the
    Coast Guard has used in developing its proposals for the Polar
    Security Cutter program.
        The follow-on Arctic Security Cutter program, I believe,
    will be more responsive to activity in the region. We are
    seeing ice diminish faster than scientific predictions had
    forecasted. So, measured ice reductions are happening faster
    than our models had projected. That changes requirements for
    icebreaker access. With shrinking sea ice, we may be able to
    get by with lower powered icebreakers or a mix of ice-hardened
    and icebreaking vessels. So, I think that Arctic Security
    Cutter program will be in response to ice reductions as well as
    projections in activity.
        Looking holistically at investments in the Arctic region, I
    think we need to toggle to the strategic ends that we are
    trying to achieve. When it comes to securing U.S. waters,
    securing U.S. citizens and people under our protection for
    maritime activity, that's an important metric. Can the Coast
    Guard observe, monitor, control, and respond to maritime
    activity, to growing maritime activity in the U.S. Arctic?
        We are seeing important growth in cruise tourism. The
    larger and larger vessels are coming into the region more
    frequently. That poses scale risks to our missions. We are also
    seeing changes in the seasonality and location of fishing. So,
    fishing fleets are another important source of maritime
    casualties. There's increased air traffic in the region. So,
    making sure that the Coast Guard can respond to human security
    is critically important.
        In addition, the Coast Guard needs to be able to exert
    domain awareness and assert sovereignty, as we saw with the
    Chinese and Russian naval vessels incurring into our EEZ. We
    need to be able to respond, to communicate that that activity,
    that foreign activity in our EEZ, does not have free reign.
    Nevertheless, I would emphasize that the Arctic is not the top
    U.S. strategic priority. Our priority is the Indo-Pacific and
    it is Europe. As a secondary theater, every investment is going
    to be toggled within that framework. Again, I believe that
    argues well for Coast Guard presence.
        But I would encourage Congress to look at U.S. capabilities
    in the Arctic in light of our global priorities, and scale them
    to respond to our multiple national objectives: human security,
    environmental security, securing economic assets, asserting
    sovereignty. And I believe that is the framework within which
    we could accurately make those measurements.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much for that very thorough
    answer.
        Dr. Grabowski, we know commercial traffic has been and will
    continue to increase in the Arctic as the icecaps melt. Would
    you please expound on the consequence of underfunding the Coast
    Guard for its environmental missions, such as fisheries
    enforcement and pollution response?
        Ms. Grabowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
    So, the consequences of underfunding the Coast Guard in its
    Arctic mission are seen at multiple levels. At a local level, a
    failure to fully fund the Coast Guard for its oilspill response
    and vessel response capabilities has an impact at the local
    level. Indigenous populations and Arctic villages across the
    Arctic depend on clean air and clean water and the animals and
    species that live in the air, on the land, under the water, and
    on the water. And so, there is a risk to the local population
    of underfunding Coast Guard missions.
        At a national level, it is important for the Coast Guard to
    be fully funded with respect to its environmental
    responsibility capabilities, because if it is not, tradeoffs
    occur. And the question then becomes, which of the 11 statutory
    Coast Guard missions is more important? And so, when tradeoffs
    occur because of underfunding, the missions of the Coast Guard
    are not met fully, and the Nation suffers.
        And then, finally, globally there is an impact if we don't
    fulfill our missions with respect to environmental
    responsibility, because the voice of the United States within
    international fora with respect to environmental response is
    the voice of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard is our voice of
    the Nation; at the International Maritime Organization; at the
    International Association of Lighthouse Authorities, where
    vessel safety and vessel navigation, standards, and regulations
    are established; and within the oilspill and the fisheries
    communities.
        So, at many different levels, underfunding the Coast Guard
    with respect to oilspill responsibilities has impacts locally,
    for the Nation, and then globally.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much.
        I will now recognize Representative Gibbs.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am going to kind of tie two questions together. I will
    start with Ms. Pincus. Your answer there, you covered a lot of
    it, but I guess I am really concerned about what the future
    holds with Russia and China. And you talked a lot about the
    commercial interests, and we don't have a lot of redundancy or
    resilience up there, and our infrastructure needs help.
        And from a national security standpoint, what do you think
    are actions this administration could undertake to counter some
    of these activities of Russia and China in the Arctic, and what
    is your biggest fear? You talked a lot about commercial, but
    also from the strategic interest.
        And then tying that in with the Arctic Council, and Dr.
    Grabowski can answer too. We see with Russia that the Council
    has kind of been suspended, I guess, because of the Ukrainian
    situation. What do you see moving forward with that and how
    that ties in with our relationship with Russia and China in the
    Arctic? Just kind of put your glasses on and see what you
    anticipate and what maybe we should be looking for in the
    future, legislativewise or our administration, to address these
    issues with especially Russia and China.
        Ms. Pincus. Thank you for the question. To lead off, when
    it comes to the Arctic Council, I think I have been reassured
    in speaking with Norwegian counterparts in the last few weeks,
    while there had been some concern about the transition from the
    Russian chairmanship to the Norwegian chairmanship, which is
    going to take place in May of this year, Norwegians seem less
    anxious than they were. They seem to feel fairly confident that
    that transition will happen and happen smoothly, which
    reassures me that we will soon be in an Arctic Council led by
    Norway where there will be more opportunities available to
    continue its important work.
        When it comes to Russia and China, I think that is the
    $64,000 question. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, of
    Crimea in 2014, the imposition of Western sanctions in 2015, we
    saw a very clear pivot by Russia east towards partnering with
    China, taking Chinese investment, using Chinese ships to ship
    through their Northern Sea Route. It was sort of an unintended
    second-order effect of that sanctions package.
        Following the imposition of sanctions this year, Russia's
    further invasion of Ukraine, China has been less--it has, to a
    large extent, complied with these sanctions, particularly its
    larger banks and state-owned corporations have been in
    compliance. No Chinese vessels have sailed through the Northern
    Sea Route in 2022. That is significant.
        Mr. Gibbs. Wait. Say that again. No Chinese vessel has
    what?
        Ms. Pincus. No Chinese vessels have sailed through Russia's
    Northern Sea Route in 2022.
        Mr. Gibbs. Oh, OK.
        Ms. Pincus. So, that's really interesting.
        Russia is trying to win back that Chinese investment and
    partnership in developing its Arctic. It needs outside capital
    and technical know-how to do so. It has also been seeing
    alternate partners. So, it has been seeking partnership with
    India and Vietnam and other non-Arctic states.
        The extent to which the Chinese-Russia relationship deepens
    or not in the next year or two is very significant. That's what
    I am watching. It is hard to tell where that relationship is
    going. We have seen some mixed messages.
        Obviously, there was the declaration of ``no limits''
    friendship in January of last year, which immediately preceded
    Russia's invasion. Since then, there have been some mixed
    messages. Should a more full-fledged relationship between them
    appear, should their joint military exercises deepen into
    something closer to a military relationship or alliance, we
    could have a significant challenge in the Arctic region and
    beyond, of course. But as of yet, I think we have some reason
    to hope that the natural frictions in that relationship
    continue to keep them at arm's length. Nothing unites like a
    common enemy, so, it is important for U.S. foreign policy that
    we watch that relationship very carefully.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Gibbs. Dr. Grabowski, do you want to comment on the
    Arctic Council?
        Ms. Grabowski. Thank you for the second half of the
    question.
        Clearly, our partnerships with the Arctic Council, with
    Arctic nations, and with all our partners across the Arctic are
    very important. And so, monitoring developments as
    relationships develop and wax and wane is clearly important.
        It is significant to note that, even though there have been
    disconnects at the Arctic Council, the operational working
    relationships where people on the ground with respect to
    oilspill response, for instance, have continued to develop.
        And so, District 17 and Sector Anchorage, the Coast Guard
    representatives in the Arctic, will tell you that those
    conversations still exist despite the discussions that are
    occurring at higher levels. That's reassuring from an
    environmental responsibility because, as we all know, oil
    doesn't respect international boundaries, and if there is an
    event, it is important that all hands show up.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Gibbs. Thank you for your answers. Thanks for being
    here.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Gibbs.
        I now recognize Representative Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Ms. Pincus, you were responding to a question from the
    chairman that analyzed the role of the Coast Guard in the
    Arctic, and as I was trying to follow along on your responses,
    you were suggesting there's a series of things that need to be
    done.
        The Coast Guard has its Arctic strategy. The Air Force, the
    Army, and the Navy have an Arctic strategy, which, perhaps you
    agree with me or not, are sophomoric, maybe freshman.
        I would appreciate your analysis of those strategies in
    detail and your recommendations on what would be a fulsome
    strategy for the United States in the Arctic, including the
    environmental issues, which have been discussed here, and also
    the international competition issues. So, if you can deliver
    that to this committee--I don't know--maybe Friday of this
    week, we really need to know.
        We really need to lay out an Arctic--we need to force those
    agencies to develop a good, strong, comprehensive Arctic
    strategy that, as you said, that coordinates. So, if you can do
    that in the remaining 1\1/2\ minutes or provide a paper on it,
    it would be very, very helpful. You heard the conversation I
    had with regard to icebreakers. So, help us.
        Ms. Pincus. Thank you. I appreciate your analysis, and I
    agree. I think the Service strategies can be improved. And I
    would point to the National Defense Strategy and the classified
    portions of the NDS as providing a realistic framework that
    prioritizes top-level priorities and deprioritizes and accepts
    risk for lower level priorities. And that's really important.
    And the classified version contains additional metrics by which
    those priorities and success or failure can be measured. And I
    think that is also very useful.
        And perhaps Arctic strategy, Service strategies, Coast
    Guard strategies should have more significant classified
    sections that would permit a more frank analysis, but that
    frank analysis is necessary because of the cost involved and
    because of the competing priorities that must be adjudicated.
        I think there is good reason why the Coast Guard is a
    value-added way to achieve national objectives in the Arctic
    given urgent DoD priorities. But I would agree with you, that
    is a strategy. And a robust, specific, measurable strategy that
    includes yardsticks and timelines is the first step before any
    other resourcing, because that's what justifies the resources
    and that is--a Service can be held accountable.
        And I would be happy to provide further analysis to your
    office, absolutely. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Garamendi. I would appreciate that, but I think the
    members of the committee would also, and certainly the
    chairman. So, please. Thank you.
        Ms. Pincus. Absolutely. Thank you.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Not seeing any more questions, that concludes our hearing
    for today.
        I would like to once again thank all the witnesses for
    their testimony today. The contributions to today's discussion
    have been very informative and helpful.
        I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
    remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
    answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
    writing.
        I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
    for 15 days for additional comments and information submitted
    by Members or witnesses to be included in the record of today's
    hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        The subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                   Appendix

                                  ----------

     Question from Hon. Bob Gibbs on behalf of Hon. Garret Graves to Vice
    Admiral Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast
                                     Guard

        Question 1. Vice Admiral Gautier, in April of this year, Acting
    MARAD Administrator Lessley committed to the timely processing of
    Deepwater Ports Act permits. In regards to the Texas GulfLink project,
    Administrator Lessley stated that MARAD was working with Coast Guard
    partners to develop a detailed timeline for the environmental review
    and estimated the completion of a Record of Decision by early 2023.
    What action is the Coast Guard taking to ensure the application stays
    on schedule and to maintain the commitment for a Record of Decision by
    early next year?
        Answer. The Coast Guard continues to work with the Maritime
    Administration (MARAD) to develop a legally sufficient Final
    Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), per the National Environmental
    Policy Act (NEPA). As required by NEPA, the Coast Guard and MARAD are
    actively reviewing and methodically responding to approximately 1,600
    public comments received during the public comment period on the
    Supplemental Draft EIS, which closed on November 30, 2022. The Coast
    Guard continues to diligently support MARAD's deepwater port licensing
    process during and after Final EIS development.

                                  [all]