[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-77]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                         FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

                                   ON

                FISCAL YEAR 2023 DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 5, 2022


 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]   
 
 
 
 
 
                            ______                       


               U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 50-335                 WASHINGTON : 2023 
  
 

                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Brian Garrett, Staff Director
              Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
               Geoff Gosselin, Professional Staff Member
                          Brooke Alred, Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Austin, Hon. Lloyd J., III, Secretary of Defense.................     5
Milley, GEN Mark A., USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff..     8

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Austin, Hon. Lloyd J., III...................................    95
    Milley, GEN Mark A...........................................   107

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Documents Submitted by Representative Gaetz..................   121
    Letter to Representative Slotkin.............................   164

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Bacon....................................................   168
    Mr. Banks....................................................   168
    Mr. Bergman..................................................   169
    Mr. Carbajal.................................................   168
    Mr. Courtney.................................................   167
    Ms. Escobar..................................................   169
    Mr. Fallon...................................................   170
    Dr. Green....................................................   170
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   170
    Mr. Johnson..................................................   170
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   167
    Mr. Moulton..................................................   167
    Ms. Sherrill.................................................   169
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   169

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Brown....................................................   184
    Mr. Courtney.................................................   174
    Mr. Franklin.................................................   190
    Mr. Gallagher................................................   186
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   196
    Mr. Keating..................................................   187
    Mr. Kelly....................................................   185
    Mr. Kim......................................................   187
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   173
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   191
    Mr. Morelle..................................................   189
    Mrs. Murphy..................................................   194
    Mr. Scott....................................................   178
    Mr. Smith....................................................   173
    Ms. Speier...................................................   174
    Ms. Stefanik.................................................   183
    Ms. Strickland...............................................   192
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   188
                FISCAL YEAR 2023 DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 5, 2022.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. Good morning. We will call the meeting to 
order.
    It is a full committee hearing for the fiscal year 2023 
defense budget request.
    The committee is honored this morning to have the Secretary 
of Defense, Lloyd Austin, with us, as well as the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, and the Comptroller at 
the Pentagon, Mike McCord, the guy whose job it is to keep 
track of the money. So, important to have all three of you 
here.
    Obviously, this is an incredibly important time for the 
national defense of this country and for peace and stability in 
the globe. We all watch on a daily basis what is happening in 
Ukraine, the horror and devastation from the violent attack 
that Vladimir Putin and Russia have brought down upon Ukraine, 
and we see the world that we do not want, unquestionably. And 
this committee and the Department of Defense have a huge role 
in trying to figure out how we create the better world that we 
do want.
    And as a starting point, our ability and our allies' 
ability to get aid and weapons to Ukraine has been crucial in 
the early days of this fight. Russia has struggled far greater 
than just about anybody expected. There are a lot of reasons 
for that. Certainly, the biggest is the will and the courage of 
the Ukrainian people, but it has also been crucial that our 
alliance, the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
alliance and others, have come together to offer that support 
to Ukraine.
    And one of the biggest questions that we are going to have 
in this committee for you three gentlemen is, how can we do 
more? How can we make sure we are getting absolutely everything 
we can to Ukraine to help them defend their country and defend 
themselves? And we will be very focused on that effort and 
stand ready to do anything we can to help make that happen.
    And then, the larger question as we look at this is, we 
have to make sure that Russia does not succeed because of the 
implications it has, certainly, for Ukraine, but for the larger 
world as well. We do not want Russia or other aggressive 
countries in the world to think that, by force, they can simply 
expand their territory and attack their neighbors. We need to 
build a robust deterrence across the globe to make sure that 
this kind of thing does not happen again. We have been working 
on that for a long time, obviously, on our national security 
policy, but it comes into incredibly sharp focus now, as we see 
the war in Ukraine.
    Deterrence is many things. Certainly, it is incredibly 
important that we build those alliances. Where would we be if 
we were trying to do this on our own or if we were deeply 
divided in the West? We would be in a terrible place. So, 
making sure that we continue to build those alliances across 
Europe and across the world is enormously important.
    We also need to understand that Russia and China are the 
principal threats here. As we now have the National Security 
Strategy, we have the 2023 budget, we see that President Biden 
and his team recognize that, and prioritize those threats is 
what we need to deter going forward.
    We face a very stark choice in the world. The President has 
outlined this clearly. We can push for greater freedom, greater 
economic and political freedom, or we can face the autocracy 
that Russia and China are trying to bring down upon us. And it 
is crucial that we build a defense budget that reflects that, 
and I believe that the budget that has been submitted gets us 
headed in the right direction.
    Now, there will be a lot of discussion about the topline. 
We had a fairly robust increase in the budget last year, as it 
was enacted, and we have a robust increase in the budget this 
year. We will have that debate about what that topline number 
should be, and that is fine. But what I hope we also really 
focus on is, where do we spend the money. Spending that money 
efficiently and effectively in a rapidly changing environment, 
to me, is the most important thing that this committee and the 
Pentagon could do.
    And it starts with recognizing the changing nature of 
warfare. I have come to sum it up as information and 
survivability, which I guess have always been central to 
warfare; it is just that they are changing so much now.
    And you can look and learn from how the Russians are 
struggling in Ukraine. They can't communicate with each other. 
Their large tank columns are victims to relatively cheap, 
inexpensive missiles. We need to figure out how do we build the 
force that can survive in today's world. We have to make sure 
that we can protect our information and distribute it. We have 
to make sure that our systems are not just single points of 
failure; you know, large, exquisite systems that can be shut 
down either by a cyberattack or a missile. We need to 
fundamentally rethink how we approach the military.
    And our biggest focus on this committee has been that 
innovation. And sadly, you know, the Pentagon is not the most 
innovative institution in the world. It is slow to adopt new 
technology. It is certainly slow to adopt software. A number of 
reforms and changes have been made in recent years to try to 
address that issue, but it is crucially important that we 
figure out how to develop new technologies first; and even more 
crucially, to figure out how to use them. AI [artificial 
intelligence], missile technology, drones--these are all 
critically important. How do you employ those? How do we put 
the right people in place to make sure that we are making the 
best use of the technology and innovation that we are doing?
    And I would recommend to all of you an article in Foreign 
Affairs magazine that former Secretary Spencer sent me that's 
entitled, ``The Pentagon's Office Culture Is Stuck in 1968.'' 
That may be a slight overstatement, but when you read the 
analysis of how you structure a company today to adopt to the 
innovative economy that we face, the technology changes that we 
face, versus how you would build a company in the more 
assembly-line industrial age of the 1960s, you can see a stark 
contrast. We really want to see that change, that we have a 
more innovative Pentagon that can take advantage of the changes 
that are happening out there and make sure that we get there 
first.
    Because, without question, when you look at the world, you 
have the U.S. and the West and our involvement, and then, you 
have China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational 
terrorist groups. Our job is simple. We want to deter those 
adversaries, all of them. We get into a ranking issue 
occasionally, and certainly, China is the biggest economy, the 
biggest, you know, alternative out there. Russia, clearly, is 
committing violent acts, as we speak. But they all matter.
    We need to build an alliance that promotes economic and 
political freedom, and we need to do it with a very, very 
strong military and a robust involvement in the world in 
diplomacy, in development, and in alliances. We have to build 
that.
    The Pentagon is a huge part of that. This morning's 
discussion is the kickoff point for our committee to looking at 
how the FY23 [fiscal year 2023] budget affects that fight. I 
look forward to the testimony and questions and answers.
    And with that, I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. 
Rogers, for his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to thank the witnesses for their attendance and 
their service to our country.
    The threats that we face now are more formidable than at 
any point in the 20 years I have had the privilege of serving 
on this committee. Unprecedented Chinese military modernization 
has enabled them to leapfrog us in key capabilities. The 
Chinese Communist Party now controls the largest army and navy 
in the world. It has more troops, more ships, and more 
hypersonic missiles than the United States. With each passing 
day, it is more and more clear that they diametrically oppose 
our interests.
    And to make matters worse, President Xi has entered into a 
no-limits partnership with Putin, providing him with strategic 
cover and international legitimacy. But Putin's catastrophic 
invasion of Ukraine has proven to the rest of the world that he 
is nothing more than an unhinged crackpot. The problem is this 
crackpot has his finger on the world's largest nuclear arsenal 
and illegal stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, which 
he hasn't hesitated to use against his perceived enemies.
    Emulating Putin's desire to undermine democracy are the 
despotic leaders of North Korea and Iran. Both continue to 
aggressively pursue nuclear weapons and conduct destabilizing 
activities in their region.
    Finally, the President's decision to unilaterally and 
unconditionally withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan has 
offered terrorists the opportunity to regain their footing. And 
our capability to keep an eye on them and strike them before 
they strike us has diminished.
    These are just a few of the growing threats confronting our 
Nation. How we respond to them is the biggest test we will face 
as Americans. Many of us here, regardless of party, believe we 
should respond with increased investment in the men and women 
of our Armed Forces and the modernization of our conventional 
and strategic deterrent.
    Unfortunately, the President doesn't see things the same 
way. For the second year in a row, the President has sent us a 
budget that fails to keep pace with China and Russia. And yet 
again it fails to keep pace with inflation. Despite predictions 
from leading economists the record high inflation will endure, 
the White House directed the Pentagon to assume a rate of only 
2.2 percent for FY23, regardless of this inflation.
    We are now at 8 percent inflation. To get an average of 2.2 
percent next year would require months of unprecedented low 
inflation. Everyone here knows that's not going to happen. That 
means every dollar of increase in this budget will be eaten by 
inflation. Very little, if anything, will be left over to 
modernize or grow capability.
    The President may claim this budget bolsters our national 
security, but that's far from the truth. The budget cuts the 
number of soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines well below 
authorized levels. It slashes the number of ships and aircraft 
in our arsenal. In fact, at no point over the next 5 years does 
the size of the Navy grow. Instead of moving toward a 500-ship 
Navy needed to counter China, it shrinks to 280 ships. The 
budget cuts procurement for the Army and Marine Corps, delaying 
critical modernization efforts. It slashes funding for next-
generation aircraft, new nuclear deterrent capability, and 
modernized ground combat vehicles.
    Finally, according to the President's Comptroller, the 
budget was completed before Putin's invasion of Ukraine. No 
funds have been added to the account for the increased cost of 
reinforcing NATO allies or to continue to provide lethal aid to 
Ukraine in the next fiscal year.
    This is extremely shortsighted. The problem, again this 
year, is not that the President refuses to spend money; it is 
that he refuses to spend it on defense. Yet again, the budget 
proposes massive increases in funding for the EPA 
[Environmental Protection Agency] and the Department of 
Education and HHS [Health and Human Services]. In all, non-
defense discretionary spending grows by an astonishing 12 
percent--three times more than defense. Using GDP [gross 
domestic product] as a metric, defense spending will total 3.1 
percent of GDP; non-defense spending will total 18 percent of 
GDP--nearly six times more than defense.
    I know these numbers are inconvenient to many people in the 
White House. Some on the far left want to slash defense 
spending by 10 percent. To his credit, the President hasn't 
gone there. But what he is proposing is far from what is needed 
to maintain a credible deterrent.
    Under the old National Defense Strategy, we needed an 
annual increase of 3 to 5 percent over inflation to stay ahead 
of China. The new National Defense Strategy departs little from 
the last one. I suspect the new commission we are appointing to 
review the National Defense Strategy will again recommend at 
least that level of funding.
    If this budget was truly driven by risk, 5 percent above 
inflation is the level of growth we would see. Unfortunately, 
that is not the case. This budget fails to account for the 
record inflation the Department is currently facing and 
severely underestimates its impact over the next year. It robs 
our warfighters of vital capabilities they need to carry out 
their missions. But, most regrettably, it gives China more time 
to enhance their military advantage and undermine our 
deterrence.
    I urge my colleagues to reject this budget and work in a 
bipartisan manner to address the urgent needs of our national 
defense.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Austin.

  STATEMENT OF HON. LLOYD J. AUSTIN III, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Secretary Austin. Good morning. Chairman Smith, Ranking 
Member Rogers, distinguished members of the committee, thank 
you for the chance to testify today in support of the 
President's budget request for fiscal year 2023.
    It is great to be here with General Milley, who has been an 
outstanding partner, and I am also glad to be joined today by 
our Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer, Mike McCord.
    Mr. Chairman, we are still focused on three key priorities 
at the Department of Defense: defending our Nation, taking care 
of our people, and succeeding through teamwork. And the budget 
request that we have submitted to you helps us meet each of 
those priorities. Our budget seeks more than $56 billion for 
airpower platforms and systems and more than $40 billion to 
maintain our dominance at sea, including buying nine more 
battle force ships, and almost $13 billion to support and 
modernize our combat-credible forces on land. Our budget 
request also funds the modernization of all three legs of the 
nuclear triad, to ensure that we maintain a safe, secure, and 
effective strategic deterrent.
    Of course, none of these capabilities matter much without 
our people and their families. So, we are seeking your support 
for a 4.6 percent pay raise for our military and civilian 
personnel and special pay and benefits. We also plan to invest 
in outstanding and affordable childcare in the construction of 
on-base Child Development Centers, and in ensuring that all our 
families can put good and healthy food on the table.
    We are also deeply focused on the terrible problem of 
suicide in the U.S. military. And I will keep on saying it: 
mental health is health, period. So, we are increasing access 
to mental health care, expanding telehealth capabilities, and 
fighting the tired, old stigmas against seeking help. With your 
support, I have just ordered the establishment of an 
independent review committee to help us grapple with suicide--
to better understand it, prevent it, and treat the unseen 
wounds that lead to it.
    At the same time, we are working hard to implement the 
recommendations of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual 
Assault, because we know that we have a long way to go to rid 
ourselves of this scourge. Our budget seeks nearly $480 million 
for that enterprise. And sexual assault, as we know, is not 
just a crime; it is an affront to our values and to everything 
that we are supposed to represent to each other and to this 
country. This is a leadership issue, and you have my personal 
commitment to keep leading.
    Now, while I am on the topic of leadership, let me briefly 
address our military's role in the world, because as I have 
said, we succeed through teamwork. And as I have witnessed 
myself in the last several weeks, countries around the world 
continue to look to the United States to provide that sort of 
leadership.
    With help from Congress, we have been able to rush security 
assistance to Ukraine to help the Ukrainian people defend their 
lives and their country and their freedom.
    And last October, I visited Kyiv to meet both my Ukrainian 
counterpart and President Zelenskyy, and we discussed our 
deepening defense partnership and our unwavering support for 
Ukraine's sovereignty in the face of Russian aggression.
    And even before Russia's unprovoked and illegal invasion, 
we provided Ukraine with a billion dollars' worth of weapons 
and gear through Presidential drawdown authority. And now we 
are delivering on another billion dollars pledged by President 
Biden. And our budget includes $650 million more for security 
assistance in Europe, including $300 million for the Ukraine 
Security Assistance Initiative. We are also helping to 
coordinate the delivery of material provided by other nations, 
which continues to flow in every single day. And let me thank 
all of you for your strong leadership toward our shared goal of 
helping Ukraine defend itself.
    And since the invasion, I have spoken and met frequently 
with Minister Reznikov, including just yesterday. And I have 
assured him that we will continue this effort, that we will get 
him and his troops the tools and the weapons that they need 
most and are using most effectively against Russian forces.
    We have also reinforced our NATO allies. We've sped 
additional combat power to the alliance's eastern flank, 
raising our posture in Europe to more than 100,000 troops. And 
these reinforcements include dozens of aircraft, an aircraft 
carrier strike group, and two brigade combat teams.
    And as President Biden made clear, we will defend every 
inch of NATO territory, if required. And we are making good on 
that promise.
    Mr. Chairman, you have heard me say many times we need 
resources matched to strategy, and strategy matched to policy, 
and policy matched to the will of the American people. This 
budget gives us the resources that we need to deliver on that 
promise as well. It reflects our recently submitted National 
Defense Strategy which highlights the pacing challenge of 
China. That is why we are investing some $6 billion in this 
budget in the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, and it is why we 
are realigning our posture in the Indo-Pacific toward a more 
distributed footprint.
    We are going to enhance our forward posture, 
infrastructure, presence, and readiness in the Indo-Pacific, 
including the missile defense of Guam. And it is why we are 
making broad investments in such key areas as undersea 
dominance, fighter aircraft modernization, and advanced 
weaponry, including hypersonic strike. And many of these 
investments will pay dividends in countering the acute threat 
of Russia as well, which our strategy underscores.
    At the same time, we must be prepared for threats that 
don't observe borders--from pandemics to climate change. And we 
must tackle the persistent threats posed by North Korea, Iran, 
and global terrorist groups.
    Now, the National Defense Strategy advances our goals in 
three main ways: forging integrated deterrence, campaigning, 
and building enduring advantages.
    Integrated deterrence means combining our strengths across 
all warfighting domains to maximum effect to ward off potential 
conflict.
    Campaigning means our day-to-day efforts to gain and 
sustain military advantage, counter acute forms of coercion by 
our competitors, and complicate their preparations for 
aggression.
    And to build enduring advantages, we need to accelerate 
force development, acquiring the technology that our 
warfighters need.
    So, our budget seeks more than $130 billion for research, 
development, testing, and evaluation. And that is the largest 
R&D [research and development] request that this Department has 
ever made. It is nearly a 10 percent increase over last year, 
which was the Department's previous high-water mark. And this 
includes $2 billion for artificial intelligence, $250 million 
for 5G [fifth-generation mobile network], nearly $28 billion 
for space capabilities, and another $11 billion to protect our 
networks and develop a cyber mission force.
    This budget maintains our edge, but it does not take that 
edge for granted. And quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, in the 21st 
century, you either innovate or you get left behind. And 
through the President's budget, and with the help of this 
committee, we will continue to innovate. And with your help, we 
will continue to defend this Nation, take care of our people, 
and support our allies and partners. And with your help, I know 
that we will continue to lead.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Austin can be found in 
the Appendix on page 95.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Chairman Milley.

  STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. MILLEY, USA, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT 
                        CHIEFS OF STAFF

    General Milley. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, I am privileged to 
represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and guardians 
of the United States joint force.
    Our troops are the best led, best equipped, best trained, 
most lethal, and most capable military force in the world. 
Alongside our allies and partners, at any given time, 
approximately 400,000 American troops are currently standing 
watch in 155 countries, and conducting operations every day to 
keep Americans safe.
    Currently, we are supporting our European allies and 
guarding NATO's eastern flank in the face of the unnecessary 
war of aggression by Russia against the people of Ukraine and 
the assault on the democratic institutions and the rules-based 
international order that have prevented great power war for the 
last 78 years, since the end of World War II.
    We are now facing two global powers, China and Russia, each 
with significant military capabilities, both who intend to 
fundamentally change the rules-based current global order. We 
are entering a world that is becoming more unstable, and the 
potential for significant international conflict between great 
powers is increasing, not decreasing.
    The United States military comprises one of the four key 
components of national power: diplomatic, economic, 
informational, and military. To protect the homeland and 
sustain a stable and open international system, in coordination 
with the other elements of power, we constantly develop a wide 
range of military options for the President, as Commander in 
Chief, and for this Congress to consider. As the U.S. military, 
we are prepared to deter and, if necessary, fight and win 
anyone who seeks to attack the United States or our allies, or 
our significant core vital national security interests.
    The joint force appreciates the work that our elected 
Representatives do to ensure that we have the resources needed 
to train, equip, and manage the force in order to be ready. We 
thank the Congress for increasing last fiscal year's level of 
military funding, and we look forward to your support for this 
year's budget.
    The joint force will deliver modernization and readiness 
for our Armed Forces and secure the people of the United States 
at the fiscal year 2023 budget request of $773 billion. This 
budget will enable the appropriate decisions for modernization 
and transformation of the joint force in order to set and meet 
the conditions of the operating environment that we will face 
in 2030 and beyond, the so-called changing character of war 
that we have discussed many times in the past.
    We will work diligently to ensure the resources that the 
American people entrust to us are spent prudently and in the 
best interest of the Nation. In alignment with the forthcoming 
National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy, 
this budget delivers a ready, agile, and capable joint force 
that will defend the Nation while taking care of our people and 
working with our partners and allies.
    We are witness to the greatest threat to peace and security 
of Europe, and perhaps the world, in my 42 years of service in 
uniform. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is threatening to 
undermine not only European peace and stability, but global 
peace and stability that my parents and a generation of 
Americans fought so hard to defend. The islands of the Pacific 
and the beaches of Normandy bore witness to the incredible 
tragedy that befalls humanity when nations seek power through 
military aggression across sovereign borders.
    Despite the horrific assault on the institutions of 
freedom, it is heartening to see the world rally and say never 
again to the specter of war in Europe. Your military stands 
ready to do whatever is directed in order to maintain peace and 
stability on the European continent, a peace that ensures 
global stability and international order, where all nations can 
prosper in peace.
    We are also prepared and need to sustain our capabilities 
anywhere else on the globe as well, with our priority effort 
being in the Asia-Pacific region, measured against our pacing 
challenge of a rising People's Republic of China.
    And in defense of our Nation, we must also maintain 
competitive overmatch in all the domains of war--cyber, space, 
land, sea, and air.
    To conclude, the United States is at a very critical and 
historic geostrategic inflection point. We need to pursue a 
clear-eyed strategy of maintaining the peace through the 
unambiguous capability of strength relative to China or Russia. 
This requires we simultaneously maintain readiness and 
modernize the force for the future. If we do not do that, then 
we will be risking the security of future generations. And I 
believe this budget is a major step in the right direction.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Milley can be found in 
the Appendix on page 107.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    For the questions and answers, as all of you know, but I 
want to reiterate, we have 5 minutes, and when we are done, we 
are done. So, even if the witnesses are in the middle of 
answering a question, I will cut them off and move on to other 
members.
    The Secretary and the Chairman have generously said they 
will be here to get through all members' questions. So, we will 
get through them.
    One other thing. It is perfectly okay to--it is your 5 
minutes--if you want to make a speech for 5 minutes, that is 
cool, or if you want to ask questions. I am going to try to 
make sure no one badgers the witnesses. If you ask a question, 
you will have to at least give them the tiniest, little bit of 
a chance to answer. Cutting off a filibuster is fine, but make 
sure they have a chance to speak. I don't want this to turn 
into a badgering session.
    With that, focusing on Ukraine, it is important to 
remember, we passed a supplemental budget just a couple of 
weeks ago. So, in addition to the number that we have, we have, 
roughly, $14 billion to specifically address Ukraine. So, it is 
wrong to say that the President or this Congress has ignored 
the situation in Ukraine; $14 billion is a significant 
investment.
    My question is, what is most important in that $14 billion? 
What are you using it for? How is that helping the fight in 
Ukraine? Mr. Secretary.
    Secretary Austin. Thank you, Chairman, and thanks for the 
support that you continue to provide to our efforts to provide 
security force assistance to Ukraine.
    I speak with my counterpart, Minister Reznikov, frequently. 
And as I said earlier, I just spoke with him yesterday. Because 
we do want to make sure that we are meeting their needs and we 
are providing them the things that are most useful to their 
fight. And the things that we have provided them, as you have 
seen, have been very, very instrumental in their efforts to 
block the advance of an overwhelming Russian force.
    So, what has been very helpful has been the anti-armor and 
anti-aircraft capability that we have provided them; also, the 
UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] capability that has been pushed 
in, as well as, you know, we have, over the years, provided 
them the ability to communicate through tactical radios, secure 
tactical radios, that we pushed in over a number of years.
    And they have been able to maintain command and control 
over their forces throughout. That has enabled them to do 
things that have provided them an advantage in certain cases.
    So, we will continue to focus on those types of things that 
have been most useful to them, as well as emerging needs that 
the Minister of Defense identifies.
    The Chairman. Thanks. Thank you.
    And for both of you, what lessons have we learned as we 
have watched the last month-plus now of the fight in Ukraine? 
Because you have got Russia, a global power, going up against a 
much, much smaller, less armed, less resourced foe and 
struggling mightily in doing that.
    As we look at what we need to build, and how we need to 
think about deterrence, we want to be ready for the fight, if 
it comes, but the main goal of what we are trying to do here is 
to build a force that will deter our adversaries. Iran, China, 
Russia, you know, being at the top of that list, North Korea.
    What have we learned about what we would need? As you see, 
I mean, obviously, one of the lessons is the tank isn't what it 
used to be. How is that informing for both of you what you 
think is most important to fund to make sure that we have that 
deterrence for the battlefield that we face today with the 
technology that is available?
    Secretary Austin. Well, we have learned that, armed with 
the right capabilities, a determined force can do tremendous 
work in terms of defending itself. And the Ukrainians 
demonstrate that each and every day. We have seen them, again, 
blunt the advance of a far superior force, with respect to the 
Russians in terms of numbers and capability, by using the right 
types of techniques and the right weapon systems. The Javelin, 
the Stingers have proven to be very, very effective in this 
fight.
    We have also learned that, just because you have the 
capability, it doesn't mean that you are going to overwhelm 
another force easily. The Russians have significant mechanized 
capability, but as you look at the techniques and tactics, 
procedures, that they used, they were not very effective. And 
so, you question the training, the leadership at the non-
commissioned level, non-commissioned officer [NCO] level, and 
their ability to provide basic logistics to a force that size. 
Those are the things that have given them significant problems 
over the last several weeks, in addition to their inability to 
link airpower to the ground effort.
    But there are a number of lessons that have been learned. I 
think, because the Russians have not been effective in using 
their armor, it does not mean that armor is ineffective on a 
battlefield going forward. It means that they were ineffective 
because of the things that they failed to do in this fight.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Chairman Milley.
    General Milley. Just a couple of comments briefly.
    One is the importance of intelligence. We have had 
extraordinary intelligence all throughout, and the 
intelligence-sharing that we have enabled Ukraine to see. So, I 
wouldn't suggest that it is at the level of the Ultra Secret 
sort of thing from World War II, but the ability of us to 
transmit information that is useful to Ukraine has been 
enormously helpful, I believe, to them. And I talk to my 
Ukrainian counterpart several times a week. So, he has 
reiterated that multiple times.
    Secondly is the importance of leadership. That is at the 
national level. I think that has been pretty clear with 
Zelenskyy, but also at the tactical level. Ukraine has been 
trained by the United States since 2014, and they have given me 
feedback personally saying that that training has been quite 
effective in terms of the concept of mission command, 
distributed junior-level leadership, and development of an NCO 
corps, junior officers that have initiative. That is not 
present in the Russian army; that is present right now in the 
Ukrainian army, and you see the effects of mission command, 
decentralized operation. And that is working out 
extraordinarily well on the battlefield.
    The third piece, I would say, is focusing on that which 
gives you the best effect on a battlefield, which in this case 
has been anti-tank weapons and air defense weapons that deny 
the Russians the ability to maintain air supremacy or even 
achieve air superiority.
    And the last thing, you mentioned character of war. One of 
the things we know is that, by mid-century, roughly speaking, 
90 percent of the 8 or 9 billion people that are going to 
inhabit the Earth, they are going to be living in highly dense 
urban areas. So, the character of war is going to shift--the 
character of war being how you fight; with what weapons you 
fight; the organizations, tactics, et cetera. That is going to 
shift. We have seen precursors of that in the battles of Mosul 
and Raqqa. We are seeing, again, Kyiv, Kharkiv, and all these 
urban battles.
    So, what you are seeing is forces that are optimized to 
fight in rural, wooded, rolling-hill-type terrain are going to 
have very, very difficult times in urban terrain. And that 
proved true, and that is one of the reasons why the Russians 
have withdrawn from Kyiv, because they couldn't mass the combat 
power to seize Kyiv.
    So, urban battle is going to dominate land combat in the 
future, and that will then also drive our use of helicopters, 
our use of radios, our use of tanks, armored vehicles, light 
infantry, dismounted light infantry, and so on and so forth.
    So, there is a lot of lessons to be learned, and I have got 
a whole laundry list we have been working with the Ukrainians 
on, but that is just the tip of the iceberg.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Milley, last week, we had General Wolters, EUCOM 
[U.S. European Command] commander, testify before us. And he 
stated that it was his best military judgment that we should 
reallocate some of our European troops for permanent basing in 
Poland, Romania, and in the Baltics. In your best military 
judgment, is that a good deterrent for us to pursue?
    General Milley. I think actual presence is always a good 
deterrent relative to a given threat, as a general rule of 
thumb. With respect to what General Wolters said, I have a 
slight modification, my view, anyway. My advice would be to 
create permanent bases, but don't permanently station. So, you 
get the effect of permanence by rotational forces cycling 
through permanent bases. And what you don't have to do is incur 
the cost of family moves, PXes [post exchanges], schools, 
housing, and that sort of thing. So, you cycle through 
expeditionary forces through forward-deployed permanent bases.
    And I believe that a lot of our European allies, especially 
those such as in the Baltics, or Poland, or Romania, or 
elsewhere, they are very, very willing to establish permanent 
bases. They will build them; they will pay for them, et cetera, 
and for us to cycle through on a rotational basis. So, you get 
the effect of permanent presence of forces, but the actual 
individual soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, are not permanently 
stationed there for 2 or 3 years.
    Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
    Secretary Austin, we had Celeste Wallander in here and 
asked her about this basing issue and if a decision is close to 
being made. She said they are working on it. Can you tell me 
something with more clarity about when we can expect a decision 
on this basing issue?
    Secretary Austin. Well, as you would expect, Ranking Member 
Rogers, NATO is going through a process right now to really 
kind of assess how we expect the security architecture in a 
region is going to change for the foreseeable future, or has 
changed for the foreseeable future.
    With that in mind, then, we will look to work with NATO. If 
NATO deems that it is appropriate to change its footprint, 
then, certainly, we will be a part of that. Our goal is to make 
sure that we continue to reassure our allies and partners, 
especially those that are on the eastern flank and especially 
our allies that are in the Baltic area, the Baltic region.
    So, this is a work in progress, as Secretary Wallander 
said, and I suspect that we'll--I expect that we will discuss 
this as we go into the June summit with NATO.
    Mr. Rogers. All right. Well, I can't think of a better 
signal that we could send to our allies and to Putin that we 
are committed to NATO than this basing issue.
    I am concerned that, with the budget, it only had one 
Patriot battery in it. In my view, we need at least three. I 
know we have a manning issue with that.
    But, General Milley, in your opinion, could we use--do we 
need more than one Patriot battery, in addition to what we 
currently have in inventory?
    General Milley. Thanks, Congressman.
    The Patriot is one of those systems that is in huge demand 
worldwide. We have got 15 battalions, I think it is, in the 
Army, and one of those is really an experimental type or 
training unit. So, call it 14 for deployment. We have got 
several spread out in the Middle East, Asia, and in Europe.
    And they are on a very, very high OPTEMPO [operations 
tempo], one of the highest in the force. So, additional Patriot 
is always a good thing. Now, having said that, Patriot is 
extraordinarily expensive. It takes a long time to train on it. 
So, one method could be to produce Patriot, sell them to allies 
and partners. That would be a technique that could work. We 
have done that in the Middle East.
    Another one is to produce Patriot and loan them to allies 
and partners and train the soldiers from the other countries. 
Because our soldiers in that particular MOS [military 
occupational specialty], we would have to expand the numbers 
significantly of those troops that man Patriot. But there is a 
couple of different ways to go about it, but I think Patriot is 
one of those systems that is definitely worth investing in.
    Mr. Rogers. Great. Well, that is what I would like to see 
us do. I would like for us to, instead of buying one 
additional, I would like for us to buy three, and then, use at 
least two of those along the eastern European flank on a loan 
basis and let them man them. But, for our needs alone, we need 
at least one more outside of Eastern Europe. And so, I hope the 
budget that we come up with does reflect that.
    The last question I would have--and I know it is hard to 
answer it, but this will be for Secretary Austin--we have just 
given in this current year, fiscal year, a 6 percent increase. 
I know you just got the omnibus bill in the last couple of 
weeks to fund it. But do you have any idea how you are going to 
keep up with inflation, given that we just plussed you up by 6 
percent, but we are living in an 8 percent inflation world?
    Secretary Austin. I would say that this is a very robust 
budget that we have asked for. And I think, Ranking Member 
Rogers, that we can address our needs with what is in this 
budget. And clearly, when we snapped the chalk line, when we 
built the budget, inflation was at a different point, but I 
think this budget gives us the capability to go after the types 
of things that we believe that we need to support our strategy 
and give us the warfighting capabilities that we need.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
    Secretary Austin. On the Patriot battery issue, I 
absolutely agree with you; you know, we do need more. If you 
take a look at what we are doing across the FYDP [Future Years 
Defense Program], we are going to invest in additional Patriot 
batteries going forward. We expect to have three batteries by 
the end of 2026.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today, 
and thank you for your service to our country.
    I applaud everything that we are doing to put weapons in 
the hands of the Ukrainian people. Thank you for making that 
happen under President Biden's leadership.
    Obviously, they have shown incredible resilience and 
effectiveness with the weapons that we have given them to push 
back against the Russians, the Javelins and the Stingers, in 
particular.
    But because we all want to do more, Mr. Secretary, you and 
I had a conversation at the Pentagon not long ago about more 
lethal weapon systems, and you did respond, saying that it 
doesn't do us any good to give the weapons that the Ukrainians 
are not trained to use, which I agree with that.
    But, now that we have the luxury of time, are we 
identifying those more lethal weapon systems that would help 
them to be more effective at fighting against the Russians, 
with a minimal amount of training that we could give some of 
the Ukrainians, and get those more sophisticated weapon systems 
into their hands?
    Secretary Austin. Yes, we are doing that. And I think if 
you look at the inventory of the latest round of assistance 
that we have provided them, there are UAVs like the Switchblade 
UAV that we discussed earlier. That is, you know, a higher 
level of technology, but provides them additional capability to 
go after armor formations and that sort of thing.
    And we continue to work with our allies to see what they 
may have in their inventory to be able to kind of up the game 
there in terms of additional capability. So, again, we continue 
to interact with them on a daily basis and endeavor to meet 
their needs, as the situation evolves.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    Let me turn to cyber for a minute. Secretary, in last 
year's testimony, I asked you a question that I would like to 
revisit. The Department of Defense recognizes five warfighter 
domains--air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. In the case of 
four of these, the senior civilian responsible for this domain 
is a service secretary. However, in the cyber domain, the 
senior-most civilian official is four rungs below in that 
hierarchy. Obviously, this seems like an imbalance. Can you 
explain to us why this does or does not make sense?
    Secretary Austin. Well, thank you, sir.
    While cyber is a warfighting domain, there is not a cyber 
force like there is with special operations forces, with Army 
forces, Space Forces. So, there is not a secretary, a service 
secretary, designated. The head of the Cyber Command and 
obviously, reports to me, and he also is supervised by my Under 
Secretary for Policy. And so, we have a number of checks and 
balances that provide civilian oversight. But because there is 
not a separate service, there is not a service secretary 
designated.
    Mr. Langevin. Well, I remain concerned about this 
structure, and I think that is something we are going to have 
to continue to look at, especially since cyber, the U.S. Cyber 
Command, cyber mission force, which could be--and is highly 
effective. I still think that we need to elevate the civilian 
oversight on this and involvement.
    Let me turn to something else. The so-called ``valley of 
death'' often makes it impossible for technology to transition 
from non-traditional organizations to programs of record to 
support the warfighter. What is the Department doing to solve 
this problem and how does this budget request reflect that 
effort?
    Secretary Austin. We have established an initiative. It is 
a reserve--it is called RDER [Rapid Defense Experimentation 
Reserve]--that encourages joint experimentation and encourages 
entrepreneurs to come in and bring their capabilities forward. 
And hopefully, using initiatives like that, we can help bridge 
this valley of death that you mention here.
    This is very important to us. We want to make sure that we 
are getting the best that is available out there in terms of 
technology and capability. And so, we will continue to focus on 
that particular issue. But I think it is really important to 
make sure that the small entrepreneurs have a chance to get 
their products in the inventory.
    Mr. Langevin. Couldn't agree more. We have incredible 
entrepreneurs out there that can help make the warfighter even 
more effective. We want to make sure they have that opportunity 
to do so.
    I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your service and your leadership.
    We were all very concerned, as the war broke out in 
Ukraine, as to the concern about weapons getting into Ukraine. 
We had advocated for the administration to give lethal 
assistance to Ukraine before the conflict occurred. After the 
conflict occurred, we were very concerned about how quickly 
things would get in. Both of you had given us assurances that 
you were doing so, and doing so quickly. I think we have seen 
the evidence of that on the battlefield. So, I want to thank 
you for your efforts. I think the whole world is seeing the 
effectiveness of U.S. lethal aid that is being provided to 
Ukraine.
    And that brings me to my area of question. The ranking 
member had raised the issue of the budget and the topline, and 
that is certainly important. Two other components under your 
responsibility are also cost, cost structures; how do we manage 
the overall cost. If we give you more money but we don't manage 
it effectively, we don't really buy more. Another issue is the 
rate of production, how quickly things get where they are 
going.
    And I think one of the lessons from Ukraine to our allies 
is going to be the need for them to stockpile weapons. We have 
a number of weapons that have been used by the U.S. and our 
allies that are going to have to be backfilled, and then, our 
whole inventory concept is going to have to change, as we look 
to the fact that we now have an aggressive Russia.
    Mr. Secretary, how do you view this issue of what we need 
to be doing specifically in the areas of missiles and 
ammunition, so that we can get the defense industrial base to 
ramp up production and also lower overall our costs?
    Secretary Austin. Well, thanks sir. This is, obviously, a 
very important issue for us, and my staff is working hard to 
ensure that we have engaged industry; we have highlighted what 
our requirements are. And we are working with them to speed up 
the process, to replenish those stocks that you mentioned. And 
I am optimistic that we will be able to truncate the forecasted 
timelines that we got early on. But this is very, very 
important to us. We not only have to replenish our stockages; 
we have to also make sure that those allies who volunteer to 
provide capability to the effort, if it is U.S. capability, we 
are able to replenish those stocks as well.
    So, we are working this very hard. Industry has been 
responsive. And if we need additional help or authorities from 
Congress, we won't hesitate to ask.
    Mr. Turner. Actually, I appreciate you mentioning it, 
because the timelines that we are hearing from you are 
certainly very concerning, and I hope that you are able to move 
those.
    To some extent, I think the defense industrial base looks 
at some of these weapon production systems as annuities, rather 
than actual contributions to national security. Because when we 
need to turn that dial, they need to be able to respond.
    That takes me to the next topic. You recently called in the 
defense industrial community that were involved in the 
hypersonics development to have a discussion as to how we can 
speed that up. We are behind our adversaries. Could you tell us 
how that is turning out?
    Secretary Austin. Yes, when we say we are behind our 
adversaries, I think we have to be careful. Now hypersonics is 
a capability, sir, but it is not the only capability.
    Mr. Turner. Seriously, we have a short period of time. I 
really want to hear how you are meeting it, the effort to get 
them----
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. I really want to answer----
    Mr. Turner. They need to speed it up. I mean, you can tell 
me that there are other systems, but we are talking 
hypersonics.
    Secretary Austin. Right, and there are other systems, and 
we look for a balance of capabilities that match our 
warfighting concepts here.
    And so, yes, I have engaged industry and asked them to make 
sure that they are leaning into this issue of hypersonic 
development. Most importantly, I have asked them to make sure 
that they are working with us on how we are going to defend 
ourselves with respect to hypersonics.
    And my staff, my R&E [research and engineering] staff is 
working with them to ensure that they have good visibility of 
what we think our----
    Mr. Turner. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.
    General, I have a question for you. The sea-launched cruise 
missile, SLCM, was zeroed out. You have previously stated the 
importance of the low-yield nuclear weapon and that you 
supported it. I am assuming you have not changed your position.
    General Milley. I have not, that is correct.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    Thanks for coming today.
    Just maybe turning to some other issues in the defense 
budget, perhaps for the Secretary, generally, on the research 
and development and the science and technology across the 
enterprise, how would you characterize that, the budget 
proposal?
    Secretary Austin. It is the largest amount that we have 
ever asked for in our budget. It is $130 billion. So, that is a 
substantial amount.
    Mr. Larsen. How would you characterize how it is allocated, 
not by service, but by the timing of the investment to get a 
result, if you will, to meet the speed of relevance and 
catching up with peer competitors in certain areas?
    Secretary Austin. Well, I think, of course, as you know, as 
you recall, in the 2022 budget, we invested heavily in RDT&E 
[research, development, test, and evaluation] as well. And so, 
there are a number of capabilities that we are going after that 
I think some of them will take time to come to reality. But 
investing in things like AI and those kinds of things, and 
space-based capabilities, again, in some cases long-term 
investments, but investments that we need to make now.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes. I know you probably came here to talk 
about today's headlines, and such. So, I appreciate your 
answering those questions.
    There is one particular program of interest of mine that 
NATO and the NATO alliance developed. The shorthand is DIANA, 
but it is the Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North 
Atlantic. And I don't think that we have committed yet to 
participating in the alliance's efforts for investment into 
developing and sharing, what they call, EDT, emerging 
disruptive technologies. Can you give me an update on that?
    Secretary Austin. I would just point to some of the things 
that we are doing. Like you will recall, AUKUS [trilateral 
security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States]--that we announced here this last year--not only 
includes the development of a submarine capability, it also 
includes working with our partners in other areas, like 
hypersonics, like long-range strike, and those kinds of things, 
and AI. And that is coming along really, really well. So, I 
agree with you; those types of investments are really 
important.
    Mr. Larsen. Sure.
    General Milley, the Secretary mentioned artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, and so on. To what extent are 
we starting to incorporate just a knowledge base and 
professional military education on how to use AI, what to 
expect from artificial intelligence--not to create a bunch of 
coders, but to ensure that the folks going into PME 
[professional military education] sort of understand these 
concepts and how they can be used, as well as the ethics around 
them?
    General Milley. Artificial intelligence in my view is, for 
lack of a better term, I would say it is the mother of all 
technologies here when it comes to military operations. Because 
what that will enable you to do is to go through the OODA 
loop--the observe, orient, direct, and act loop--the decision-
making process at rates of speed far greater than your 
opponent. So, that side that masters artificial intelligence 
and applies it to military operations is going to have, perhaps 
not decisive, but it is going to be a very, very significant 
advantage over your opponent.
    We are teaching those techniques and giving, essentially, 
introductory-level information about artificial intelligence in 
our professional military education at the war colleges, not so 
much at the lower schools, but the war colleges for sure.
    And there is a significant amount of investment, and off 
the top of my head--I don't have it in front of me--but I think 
it is $15 or $20 billion, something like that, in artificial 
intelligence in this budget. So, that is a real critical area 
of investment.
    Now, years ago, the Department of Defense was the 
innovative leader in technology many, many decades ago. Now, it 
is the commercial industry. So, we have got to leverage 
commercial efforts in artificial intelligence for military 
application, and that will be an enormous advantage in future 
combat.
    Mr. Larsen. Great. Do you anticipate injecting this type of 
education into the service academies in the near future?
    General Milley. Actually, the service academies right now 
are on the cutting edge of that. They are younger. They are 
digital natives. They do an awful lot of technical or 
technological courses at the service academies. So, they are 
actually at the cutting edge of the artificial intelligence 
programs that the Department of Defense is doing.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes, appreciate that. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    And you are either muted or we can't hear you. Well, we 
can't hear you. It could be insurmountable or it could be 
because you are muted.
    Mr. Lamborn. Can you hear me now, Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. We got you, Doug. Go ahead.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you so much.
    I have a concern I want to express, and then, I have 
several questions.
    Many of President Biden's national security failures 
feature an unwillingness to listen to military and subject 
matter experts. The atrocious withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
its tragic consequences was the first alarm bell. At that time, 
military advisors testified to Congress that, in their opinion, 
the United States should have kept a troop presence in 
Afghanistan past the withdrawal date, but this was not listened 
to.
    The second alarm bell went off on February 24th, when 
Russia invaded Ukraine. Here, the failure was the inability to 
deter Vladimir Putin and a misunderstanding of what it meant to 
deter.
    Throughout President Biden's response, the only constants 
have been reaction and assistance provided later than needed. 
And I am concerned about what might be a third alarm bell, the 
flaws in the Nuclear Posture Review [NPR], a possible decision 
to reenter the Iran nuclear deal, or others.
    So, with those concerns in mind, Chairman Milley, I have 
some questions for you. Last week--and Representative Turner 
started on this line of questions--we heard from General 
Wolters that his recommendation was to proceed with the nuclear 
sea-launched cruise missile, or SLCM-N, and its associated 
warhead. General Hyten was a big proponent of ensuring full 
funding for the SLCM-N.
    Just yesterday, the committee received a letter from 
Admiral Richard where he stated that, quote, ``The current 
situation in Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory convinces 
me a deterrence and assurance gap exists.'' Unquote. He goes on 
to state that, to address this gap, he needs a low-yield weapon 
with a non-ballistic trajectory--in other words, a sea-launched 
cruise missile.
    However, it seems that the Biden administration has chosen 
to cancel SLCM-N in its Nuclear Posture Review. What was your 
best military advice, General Milley, on the SLCM-N during the 
NPR process, and did it mirror that of Admiral Richard, General 
Wolters, and General Hyten?
    General Milley. Thanks.
    And as I have stated many, many times before, my best 
military advice to this President, or any President, is a 
matter between me and that President.
    I will say to you, though, as Members of Congress who have 
oversight responsibilities, my position on SLCM-N has not 
changed, as I mentioned to Representative Turner. My general 
view is that this President, or any President, deserves to have 
multiple options to deal with national security situations. And 
my advice is listened to, and I have an opportunity to express 
my voice on a continuous basis many, many times.
    Mr. Lamborn. General Milley, was any of this put in writing 
that we would be able to get a copy of?
    General Milley. My best military advice is almost always 
put in writing. Whether or not the committee requests that, 
there are rules, obviously, on how we do that. So, it is all 
classified, but I will defer to the chairman, Chairman Smith, 
on that. We give up stuff to the committee all the time or 
individual members, upon request. But there are procedures to 
do that, and it is in writing.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 167.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    Now, for both of you, I see that there is full funding in 
the budget for the ground-based strategic deterrent, W87-1 
warhead, and the two-site solution for producing plutonium 
pits. That is excellent and I applaud that.
    Now, I am curious as to why the Department of Defense 
cancelled a Minutemen III flight test last week. These are 
regularly scheduled tests that are scheduled months in advance.
    Secretary Austin, how could this have been perceived as 
escalatory when it is a routine test that is scheduled months 
in advance? And did the White House exercise and provide input 
over this cancellation?
    Secretary Austin. To answer your question on the second 
part of your question first, no, we did not get a directive to 
cancel that from the White House.
    It is my assessment, based upon the current state of play 
with respect to escalation management, that it was the best 
thing to do in terms of postponing, and then, eventually, 
cancelling that test. We will certainly be able to continue to 
make progress in the program. And so, that is not an issue.
    And by the way, thanks for your concern on our investment 
in our nuclear triad. I would just point that there--we have 
invested $34.4 billion into modernization of the triad in this 
budget, and I think that is very substantial.
    The Chairman. And I apologize, the gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to the witnesses.
    Actually, I am going to continue down this path, Secretary 
and General. Actually, on June 4th, we are going to have the 
keel-laying for the USS Columbia, which is the first boat in 
the recapitalization of the ballistic missile program. The 
budget that came over--and again, I chair Seapower, so we look 
at it pretty closely--it is $6 billion for Columbia. Again, 
that is the biggest number since this journey started back in 
2008. So, the commitment by the administration and your 
Department in terms of, really, the most critical leg of the 
triad, which is the sea-based leg--I mean, that is 70 percent 
of our strategic deterrence--is carried on those platforms. And 
the schedule is knife-edge. There is no really margin for delay 
in terms of moving that forward, and this budget certainly 
reflects that.
    I would also note, on page 7, General, of your testimony, 
you noted the fact that the budget invests in the industrial 
base to support fleet modernization and on-time delivery of the 
Columbia-class submarine. And there is $538 million for 
supplier development, submarine supplier development, as well 
as $227 for submarine workforce development, which just means 
that the Navy now is in the position of trying to boost 
welders, electricians, shipwrights, pipefitters.
    I mean, when we look at, really, the challenge that is 
being faced for Columbia--and frankly, shipbuilding across, it 
really is a workforce issue. And I have been around for a 
while. Those numbers, in terms of DOD [Department of Defense] 
investment into workforce, we have never seen anything that 
robust. And I was just wondering maybe if you wanted to enlarge 
on your comment in the testimony, General, in terms of that 
initiative.
    General Milley. I just would underline that our submarine 
force in the joint force, as we look to the future--the 
changing character of war and, then, operating environment in 
the 2030s, 2040s, and beyond--the submarine force is the most 
lethal, the most capable, and the most survivable part of the 
joint force that is out there. So, continued investment in the 
sub force is fundamental to the Nation's security.
    Mr. Courtney. And reaching beyond, really, just the Navy's 
sort of box, in terms of reaching out into the industrial base 
in a way that this budget does, again, the President, back in 
December, designated the submarine workforce as essential in a 
Defense Production Act Executive order--it was at the end of 
December--which, again, I don't think I have ever seen that in 
any other sort of production platform that we have.
    One point, just to go back to the question of the low-yield 
missiles, I would note that the Nuclear Posture Review does 
provide that low-yield missiles will be deployed on ballistic 
submarines. Again, the question of SLCM is really whether they 
are going to be extended to attack submarines. And I would just 
tell you, representing a district with a lot of submariners, 
that issue of changing, really, the mission of attack 
submarines is something that is greatly in dispute. And I think 
the administration made the right choice in terms of keeping 
the attack subs focused on their main mission, which is to have 
an agile, mobile--the queen on the chessboard, as Admiral 
Roughead used to call them. And I think putting tactical 
weapons on there really changes it in a really clunky way in 
terms of moving forward.
    I would note, also, that the budget that came over in terms 
of shipbuilding is about $28 billion. That is the first time in 
6 years where we have had a President's budget that has come 
over higher than the prior year's enacted level. And that may 
sound like sort of a green eyeshade sort of comment, but the 
fact is we are not beginning underground or below zero with 
this budget this year in terms of the committee. This is the 
first time we have actually seen investment in ship 
construction that is higher than the prior year. And again, I 
think that shows that you are committed to really making sure 
that we have the fleet of the future that is there.
    It is not perfect. I think General Berger has made a really 
good argument for the LPD [landing platform dock] program to 
get looked at, and I know that is on his unfunded requirements 
list. And again, I think that is something we are certainly 
going to take a very strong look at.
    And lastly, the sealift component which is mentioned in 
your testimony, it is only two boats. We have got to do better 
than that. And you know, again, from the Army, that sealift is 
not just a Navy program; it is really for the whole service. In 
the 16 seconds left, maybe you could sort of respond to that 
question.
    Secretary Austin. Certainly, it is important, and we 
acknowledge that. And you will see, as you look at the budget, 
the investments that we have made begin to reflect that.
    The Chairman. And again, I apologize, Mr. Courtney set you 
up horribly on that one.
    [Laughter.]
    So, we will have to get that for the record. The 
gentleman's time has expired.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 167.]
    Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, gentlemen, thanks for joining us today. Thanks so much 
for your service to our Nation.
    Secretary Austin, last March, INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command] Commander Phil Davidson said that he saw that China is 
making every preparation for a confrontation over Taiwan by 
2027. Current INDOPACOM Commander, Admiral Aquilino, said the 
same thing. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo agreed.
    In fact, General Milley has previously stated this: ``We're 
going to have to have a much larger fleet than we have today if 
we're serious about great power competition and deterring great 
power war, and if we're serious about dominant capability over 
something like China, or some other power that has significant 
capability.''
    Secretary Austin, do you agree that we should be preparing 
for a showdown with Taiwan in this decade?
    Secretary Austin. I agree that we should have the right 
capabilities to be able to not only be relevant in deterring 
future adversaries, but also dominant on a future battlefield. 
And we are investing in those capabilities in this budget.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
    General Milley, the Navy today has 297 ships, and this 
budget request will reduce our fleet to 280 by 2027. If you 
look at where we are in relation to the Chinese, our budget and 
number of ships have shrunk continually over the past two 
decades. We have gone from 318 ships down to 297 today. During 
the same period of time, China has gone from 210 ships to 360 
ships. DOD's budget will further shrink that to 280. DOD's own 
China Power Report projects that China will have 460 ships by 
2030. In this latest budget request, the Navy proposes to 
retire 24 ships and build 8 ships. I'm not a mathematician, but 
it seems like to me you can't do addition by subtraction. This 
seems to be grossly irresponsible and completely--completely 
denies the reality of what we are facing.
    General Milley, in your professional military judgment, 
does our shipbuilding plan accurately reflect the investments 
that we need to make in naval capacity and capabilities that we 
need to deter the Chinese in the years and decades to come?
    General Milley. Well, let me make a couple of comments, 
Congressman. Thank you for that.
    First, I think it is important to focus on capability.
    Mr. Wittman. Uh-huh.
    General Milley. So, capacity matters. Numbers matter. Mass 
matters. And I am onboard with all that. But capability 
matters, and the ships that we are retiring, the 20-some-odd, 
the two dozen ships that are coming out of the inventory in 
this particular budget, the Navy has assessed those--very high 
maintenance cost, high to sustain, and the cost is exceeding 
the benefit of those ships staying on Active Duty sort of 
thing. And the nine ships that we are procuring, the capability 
of those ships is the most modern in the fleet. So, you know, 
the capability-versus-capacity argument is there.
    I am always in favor of greater numbers. I think that is 
great. But I would bias towards capability rather than just 
sheer numbers.
    It is a fair argument about the number of ships the Chinese 
have, and it even gets worse if you think about our global 
commitment versus, say, the U.S. fleet that is in the Western 
Pacific or in the Pacific. The numbers are even--the ratios are 
even worse.
    But, again, it is capability versus capacity, and I would 
caution folks to go down into the detail about what our ships 
can do, and what the training of our sailors can do; what our 
tactics are; what our technologies are on our ships. I think 
there is a fundamental and significant advantage to us relative 
to China on that capability.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, General Milley, I don't deny that our 
ships are great and our sailors are great. But you do have to 
look at this in terms of magnitude. Quantity has a quality all 
of its own.
    General Milley. No dispute----
    Mr. Wittman [continuing]. And if we are going down to 280 
and they are at 460----
    General Milley. Right.
    Mr. Wittman [continuing]. Our great ships can only be in 
one place at one time. They can only engage so many targets. I 
have a hard time figuring out how the trajectory of China going 
in this direction, and the trajectory of the United States 
going in the opposite direction--it is almost impossible to 
make an argument to say that we are going to build enough 
capability in 9 ships to displace the Chinese, and that 9 ships 
are going to be able to replace the capacity and capability in 
24 ships. Like I said, I am not a mathematician, but it just 
seems like to me you can't do addition by subtraction.
    General Milley. Yes, I am not going to get in a big 
argument on the budget, because I am on the side of mass 
matters; quantity has a quality all on its own, et cetera. But 
you can't buy everything, and you can't be everything to 
everyone at all times, right? So, it has to be balanced in the 
budget.
    And I think this particular budget is divesting--and the 
Navy has done, I think, some really quality analysis there--
they are divesting of ships that are of marginal utility in a 
future combat environment against China and investing in the 
nine ships that do have great quality.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I will say, also, on this issue, shipbuilding capacity 
matters. I mean, basically, do we have the industrial base to 
support that, even if we put them in the budget? My 
understanding is we don't. So, that's a different challenge as 
well in terms of workforce.
    Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, thank you.
    Let me start with a thank you for the good work you have 
been doing with regard to Ukraine, pushing the necessary 
equipment into Ukraine. It is an extraordinary piece of work, 
and you are to be congratulated and thanked for that work.
    Also, in the work, Secretary Austin and General Milley, in 
rebuilding our relationships with NATO. They were virtually 
destroyed in the previous 4 years of the previous 
administration. Very rapidly rebuilt, and I think that may very 
well be, Secretary Austin, part of your integrated deterrence 
strategy. Is that correct, our allies?
    Secretary Austin. It is part of, a significant part of our 
strategy. Integrated deterrence means using all of the 
capability and capacity that is resident in all of the 
warfighting domains--air, land, space, cyber, sea--and 
networking those capabilities in new and different ways that 
really give us tremendous power and, also, make sure that we 
remain a dominant combat-capable force. And a big part of that 
is using the capability and capacity of our allies as well. And 
you are seeing us do that in NATO, as we speak, and you will 
see us continue to do that in the Indo-Pacific.
    But I think we have done that in the past, certainly, but 
we want to increase our efforts going forward. And I think I 
would point to AUKUS again as one of the types of things that 
we are doing to leverage the capability of our allies.
    Mr. Garamendi. Building on that, and on what Mr. Courtney 
was raising with regard to sealift, it is clear that we are in 
a position now to not be able to support our efforts in the 
Western Pacific, should it be necessary. And there doesn't 
appear to be, based upon the previous discussion, money to 
build the ships to provide the sealift capacity.
    A quick comment, if you would, on a strategy that would 
utilize the current Jones Act fleet in its fullness, making it 
militarily useful; subsidizing/adding to the strength of the 
ships, when necessary; repurposing them, and making them 
available, much as we currently do with the CRAF [Civil Reserve 
Air Fleet] program, the airline industry. If you would care to 
comment on that kind of a strategy that would be using all of 
the assets of the United States, including our maritime assets?
    Secretary Austin. Absolutely, and that is what we would 
hope to do in the case of need. You have seen us do that, as 
you pointed out, with aircraft. That is a thing that gives us 
the ability to punch above our weight class, and our country 
has always responded to our request in times of need, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, we will be working on that, a National 
Maritime Security Program, in the coming months ahead of us.
    A final point has to do with maintaining and repairing all 
of the things that we have. We don't do that so well. Our 
government-owned shipyards are antiquated. I am looking for the 
investment in that; also, in the depots; mentioned earlier, the 
issues of the arsenals. If you would care to comment on that, 
General Milley or Secretary Austin?
    Secretary Austin. Thanks, sir. That is a great question.
    And I think you will see in this budget a $1.7 billion 
investment in our public shipyards. And that begins to get 
after some of the things that you have mentioned. This is 
really important to make sure that we have the capability to 
not only build the kinds of ships that we need going forward, 
but also sustain them as well, as you pointed out.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, we are not there yet. That level of 
investment in the government yards and the public yards would 
probably not be sufficient to maintain the ships that we need 
to keep them at sea. We can build more and more ships, but if 
we cannot keep them at sea because they cannot be maintained in 
an orderly and quick way, it doesn't do much for us.
    Secretary Austin. I absolutely agree with you, sir. And 
that is why I said this is a good start, a good couple of steps 
forward, but we need more investment going forward.
    Mr. Garamendi. For the committee here, we may want to 
consider this, how we are going to invest in maintaining our 
ships at sea----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
    I want to speak briefly about INDOPACOM. It has over half 
the world's population. Ukraine puts 50 million metric tons of 
corn and wheat into the export markets. Russia is also 
responsible for a tremendous amount of wheat going into the 
global food supply. Russia has recently prohibited the export 
of sunflower seed. It seems that Russia is now using food, 
literally, as a weapon of war.
    I just want to make sure that, at the DOD, we are paying 
attention to the potential for a significant reduction in the 
global food supply, and what that means for the INDOPACOM 
region, where Ukraine is the largest supplier of the U.N. 
[United Nation] World Food Programme. Are those assessments 
being done by DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] or any other 
type of analyzing agency with regard to the potential unrest 
and instability in the INDOPACOM region?
    Secretary Austin. Those assessments continue to be done, 
sir, and this has been a focus, and is a focus, of our 
government, and across the interagency, you know, a number of 
agencies are looking at this. But we certainly share your 
concern.
    Mr. Scott. That part of the world, and really the global 
economy, the Black Sea region is something that the United 
States nor NATO have seemed to have a strategy for. And I do 
hope that, as we push forward, we will develop a strategy for 
the Black Sea region. The importance of that with regard to the 
world food supply I don't think can be overestimated.
    There is another country in that region that I am extremely 
concerned about. That is the country of Georgia. They have a 
partnership with the Georgia National Guard, one of the many 
State partnerships that we have. What are we doing with regard 
to those partnerships to make sure that, over the long term, 
those partnerships are strengthened, and using their ability to 
help fund putting the weapon systems in the region where we 
need them? In other words, as we talk about going to fight, we 
fight by, with, and through partners. And I want to make sure 
that we are using those partnerships to get the weapons in the 
region in such a manner that the U.S. does not pay all of the 
cost.
    Secretary Austin. We continue to do great work in countries 
like Georgia. And I was there a couple of months ago. I did get 
a chance to go out and visit with our troops that are actually 
doing some of that training that you mentioned. This is 
invaluable. It provides us great capabilities. And so, we will 
continue to invest in this.
    In terms of specific needs of countries, we will work those 
on a case-by-case, individual base. But the value of our troops 
engaging with countries in the region cannot be overstated. 
They are doing a tremendous job.
    Mr. Scott. One of my concerns, Mr. Secretary, is when we 
divest equipment in the United States, I think the A-10 is 
probably the best example. This is a weapon system that the DOD 
has requested that we divest from over the last several years, 
and at least as long as I can remember being a Member of 
Congress. Yet, when we look at the European theater right now, 
it is clearly a weapon system that, if people who share our 
interests and our values had them, they would be doing even 
better in the war against Russia.
    The DOD's position on divestment in the past has basically 
been that you just get rid of the weapon system. Has DOD 
changed their thought process on that, so that, when we divest 
from a weapon system, are we going to now allow people who 
share our interests and our values the opportunity to purchase 
and maintain that system?
    Secretary Austin. We have, over time, provided capabilities 
that we no longer use to other countries. And in every case, in 
terms of a high-end capability, I think you have to start with 
a threat, and if they use this piece of equipment or this 
system or capability in that environment, it's--will it be 
relevant?
    And so, as we look at the air defense systems that we can 
expect Georgia to encounter, we look at the training that is 
required, we look at the maintenance capabilities, and those 
sorts of things, all of that goes into an assessment to see 
whether or not it makes sense to actually do that. But, 
certainly, you make a great point.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Thank you to both Secretary Austin and General Milley for 
extraordinary work.
    First, Secretary Austin, last year you made a commitment 
that you would deal with the issue of sexual assault. You 
actually delivered on that commitment. Thank you very much for 
the military justice reform we have seen.
    But, as you I believe agree, sexual harassment needs to be 
taken out of the chain of command as well, because sexual 
harassment begets sexual assault. And it appeared to be taken 
out on the Senate side because they were getting signals from 
the Department. I hope this year that we can count on you to 
make that case to our Senate colleagues about the importance of 
taking sexual harassment out of the chain as well.
    Secretary Austin. Well, as you said, I think this entire 
issue is one that is very important to us, and we will continue 
to do the right things in terms of making sure that we provide 
the right environments for our troops to operate in. And we 
will continue to work to achieve the objectives that we have 
outlined in terms of reform of our UCMJ [Uniform Code of 
Military Justice]. And I really appreciate your support in the 
past year to----
    Ms. Speier. Thank you. Let me move on.
    I am troubled by the 41 percent increase in deaths by 
suicide by our service members in the past 5 years. I know you 
are as well. There are many factors, including OPTEMPO, toxic 
climates, and financial insecurity.
    But, having talked to the widows, talked to the parents, of 
those soldiers and airmen, in particular, who have taken their 
lives, the biggest problem is the lack of behavioral health 
expertise in the system. We are woefully underserved in that 
regard.
    And I am going with Senator Sullivan to Alaska this month. 
I know we are going to hear that that is part of the problem. 
You can't wait 2 months when you are exhibiting suicidal 
ideation.
    Now your Department, your Defense Health Agency has said it 
is going to take them until 2024 to come up with the number 
that is necessary to provide these services to our service 
members. Imagine if Kaiser or Providence told their board that 
it was going take them 2 years to determine what the number of 
providers that was necessary to serve their patients. They 
would be fired.
    What are you going to be able to do to light a fire under 
the Military Health System leadership to get a plan in place 
and the numbers identified?
    Secretary Austin. Well, as you heard me say in my opening 
statement, this is something that is very important to me, and 
the Department remains focused on it. As you know, with your 
help, we have stood up an independent review commission to look 
at how we are doing across the Department, and to look at the 
resources that we need and how we can speed up resources to 
make them available to our troops and our families.
    In the meantime, we are going to use every resource that is 
available to us. We are going to increase our use of tele-
health care. And again, I think this is very important, and we 
are going to stay focused on it.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you.
    General Milley, the Government Accountability Office [GAO] 
has repeatedly shown that the surface Navy is critically 
undermanned, and some 6,000 sailors undermanned. Yet, the 
budget request, the Navy is decreasing their end strength and 
requesting more ships. The GAO reports that sailors are working 
80 to 100 hours per week and sleeping less than 6 hours at 
night, and they are struggling with mental health. We saw it on 
the Fitzgerald. We have seen it in the ship that was destroyed, 
the $4 billion ship, in San Diego. What are we going to do to 
get the Navy to take this seriously?
    General Milley. Congresswoman, first, I think the Navy does 
take it seriously. The solution doesn't--it is not a simple 
solution. It has to do with OPTEMPO. The Navy is--I don't 
know--they are just under 1:2 OPTEMPO for their ships, the 
fleet at sea. So, they are running hard, and we ask an awful 
lot of our Navy, as we do the Army and the Air Force, et 
cetera. But the Navy is particularly stressed because we extend 
ships and they are out there for extended periods of time, et 
cetera.
    And as you note, the numbers are lower. Their manning 
levels are lower per ship than optimally manned. So, that is a 
problem. They are taking it seriously, but it is not something 
that the chain of command or the Navy leadership is not taking 
seriously.
    With respect to the behavioral health piece, I couldn't 
agree with you more. I think behavioral health specialists are 
critical to part of the problem or to solve the problem. But I 
would also emphasize the chain of command. There is a 
behavioral specialist in every squad, in every team, in every 
small group, and the squad leader----
    The Chairman. And the gentlewoman's time has expired.
    General Milley. Thank you.
    The Chairman. So, we will have to hold the answer there.
    And, Mr. Brooks is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    This last year, we have seen an Afghanistan withdrawal 
debacle; Russia invade the Ukraine; China threatening a nuclear 
attack on Japan, if Japan helps defend Taiwan against the 
Communist Chinese attack. And that brings me to my question for 
General Milley and Secretary Austin. In your professional 
opinion, over the past year, is the world a more dangerous 
place, a less dangerous place, or about the same?
    General Milley.
    General Milley. Thanks, Congressman.
    As I said in my opening statement, it is my observation, my 
analysis that the world is becoming more unstable, not less 
unstable. More unstable.
    Mr. Brooks. Secretary Austin.
    Secretary Austin. Yes, we are trending towards greater 
instability.
    Mr. Brooks. The Consumer Price Index [CPI] is increasing at 
a 7.9 percent rate, according to the official Federal 
Government statistics. Of course, that is an estimate. My 
personal belief is it is probably worse than that. Certainly, 
talking anecdotally to the people in my district, they believe 
that it is worse than that.
    What is the inflation rate for our national defense cost--
manpower, bullets, fuel, everything that comprises national 
defense. What is the inflation rate for those items?
    General Milley.
    General Milley. Well, first, I would defer to Mike McCord 
down here as an expert.
    But this budget assumes an inflation rate of 2.2 percent, 
which is, obviously, incorrect because it is almost 8 percent. 
And it might go up; it might go down, but most forecasts 
indicate it is going to go up, and it could level out at 9 or 
10 percent. Who knows? But it is, clearly, higher than what the 
assumption was in this budget.
    Mr. Brooks. When you say it assumes a 2.2 percent, are you 
talking about a 2.2 percent Consumer Price Index inflation 
rate, which is what we commonly look at, or are you talking 
about a 2.2 percent increase for national defense costs?
    General Milley. It's a CPI--the budget assumes 2.2 percent 
inflation rate, CPI inflation rate.
    Mr. Brooks. Well, when the official rate is 7.9 percent, 
why are we are assuming 2.2 percent?
    General Milley. Because the budget was produced quite a 
while ago. Those calculations were made prior to the current 
inflation rate, that is correct.
    And I would ask Mike McCord to make a comment on those 
specifics----
    Mr. Brooks. But you would agree, would you not, then, that 
the assumption, at least according to the official Federal 
Government inflation rate, is over 5 percent wrong?
    Mr. McCord. Congressman, we in the Department of Defense 
don't use, have never used, the CPI as what is relevant for 
what we do----
    Mr. Brooks. All right. Mr. McCord, let me ask you the 
question then: what is the inflation rate for the things that 
the military has to purchase in order to provide adequate 
national security?
    Mr. McCord. What we saw last year was 4 percent, and that 
is what we have built into the--that is what we built into our 
pricing going forward, was to get that 2 percent up to 4 
percent.
    Mr. Brooks. So, what is your degree of confidence that the 
4 percent rate is going to hold true?
    Mr. McCord. That is an unknown, Congressman, obviously. The 
fiscal year calculation that you are citing, and that General 
Milley was discussing, of course, starts 6 months from now and 
ends 18 months from now. So, a lot can happen up or down to 
affect that.
    Mr. Brooks. Well, let me add some comment, and then, some 
data. If we don't know what the inflation rate is for national 
defense-procured products, then we can't really know whether 
the President's budget strengthens or weakens America's 
national security in an environment that both General Milley 
and Secretary Austin believe is becoming more dangerous, not 
the same or less dangerous.
    And I have just looked up a couple of items that I hope 
that you all would take into account, as you determine what, 
ultimately, will be the budget that the President would support 
for national security. Over the past 2 years, from January 2020 
to January of 2022, crude oil has gone up 137 percent. Now that 
is a big-ticket item in national defense. Wholesale gas, 
another big ticket item in national defense, has gone up 39 
percent. Wholesale diesel has gone up 37 percent. There are 
probably other fuels, like jet fuels, or what have you, that 
have gone up significantly. So, I would hope that you all would 
take all these things into account and increase our defense 
spending in order to at least hold our own in real purchasing 
power.
    And then, I will add this final note: if I recall 
correctly, you are looking at about a 4.6 percent pay raise for 
our military personnel. Is that what I heard?
    General Milley. Yes.
    Mr. Brooks. Well, if 4.6 percent is it, given that the 
Consumer Price Index has gone up 7.9 percent, do the math. That 
comes out to a 3.3 percent pay cut for our military personnel.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Norcross is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman.
    And I just want to follow up on some of the previous 
conversations. When we start having the conversation of what we 
have available to us in our stockpiles, there is probably not a 
day that goes by since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict started 
that we are not talking about sending Javelins and Stingers. 
But I want to back up a little bit.
    We have a strategic stockpile that has been formulated 
based on risk over the years. General Milley, your assessment 
with respect to the weapons that we continue to supply Ukraine, 
the level of lethality that we can sustain, are we anywhere 
close right now to depleting what we need as an assessment of 
risk for our own protection, or potentially?
    General Milley. No, what we have supplied is a wide variety 
of small arms munitions, machine guns, grenades, grenade 
launchers, et cetera, and the two weapon systems that are most 
in the news is the Javelin and the Stinger. The Stinger doesn't 
get produced. There is no more production line on the Stinger. 
And with respect to Javelin, no, we are not at our--we are 
still meeting our mission requirements for Javelin. So, we are 
not breaking any of those red lines.
    Mr. Norcross. So, when we look at our single point of 
failures or critical rare earth materials that go into the 
explosives, the accelerants, our committee had a hearing 
earlier last week that talked about the Army's ongoing efforts 
to modernize the ammunition production facilities, which it 
would be kind to call them at World War II. And certainly, over 
the next 5 years, the half a billion dollars that has been 
looked at is something that we understand is minimum, given 
that critical supply chain.
    One of the other issues in that supply chain is the human 
efforts. And, Secretary Austin, this is where I would like to 
get your feedback. You know, buy in America has always been a 
motto that most of us adhere to. It has shown us over the 
course of the pandemic how important that is, for a variety of 
reasons.
    You heard about the naval shipbuilding areas, but across 
the board we--and Ms. Slotkin led a task force about this 
critical supply chain and bringing up the workforce. As you 
know, the soldiers do not get born and trained overnight. It 
takes time, as does our industry for a workforce.
    What are we doing to try to onshore some of those critical 
supply chain issues and build up what is made here in America 
versus across the globe?
    Secretary Austin. Yes, thanks for the question.
    And it has been a point of emphasis for us over the last 
year. As you know, the President is really working hard to 
onshore some of the key capabilities that have caused us some 
concern with respect to our supply chain here--microelectronics 
and those kinds of things. So, we are working with industry to 
help try to see what we can do, everything we can to do to help 
onshore those capabilities and make sure that we have the 
ability to create critical things, like microchips and that 
sort of stuff, here in the States. We are far too dependent on 
foreign supplies here.
    Mr. Norcross. And we should be sure to point out that our 
allies and partners are not the problem. It is those in second 
and third chain that create the problem. And again, just as you 
know, we have to build this industrial base. And the way we can 
do it is to signal the industry how critically important it is 
that we give them the assurances that it is just not a one 
year.
    And with that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
    General Milley, in your opening statement you began with 
the fact that we have the greatest military force on the planet 
and that we are prepared to defend ourselves and our allies and 
deter against aggression. That didn't work in Ukraine.
    What lessons have we learned in being perhaps more 
concerned about provocation of Vladimir Putin rather than 
deterring him, and how can we apply that when looking forward 
to the Chinese threat to Taiwan?
    General Milley. Well, I think that, with respect to the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine, it has been a longstanding 
objective of Putin. And candidly, short of the commitment of 
U.S. military forces into Ukraine proper, I am not sure he was 
deterrable. This has been a long-term objective of his that 
goes back years.
    So, I think the idea of deterring Putin from invading 
Ukraine, deterring him by the United States, would have 
required the commitment of U.S. military forces. And I think 
that would have risked armed conflict with Russia, which I 
certainly would not have advised.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And the President's strategy, at 
least publicly, and his administration, was to impose economic 
sanctions to deter Russia. So, did you advise him that that was 
probably not going to work and this invasion was inevitable?
    General Milley. It is not my lane to comment on sanctions 
per se, but sanctions have a very poor track record of 
deterring aggression, but they are a means of imposing 
significant cost. The objective of the sanctions is to impose 
significant cost if he invaded. Those significant costs, the 
sanctions in combination with the export controls, are breaking 
the back of the Russian economy, as we speak.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Secretary Austin, several members have 
brought up hypersonic weapons, and you mentioned we have other 
options. But, of the three countries currently fielding 
hypersonic glide weapons--Russia, China, and the United 
States--who is leading in that capability?
    Secretary Austin. I don't know what the inventories of the 
Chinese [audio malfunction].
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. You must not be attending the same 
briefings we are, because, clearly, China seems to be out 
front. We don't have a current capability that can defend 
against hypersonic threats, is that correct?
    Secretary Austin. [Audio malfunction.]
    Dr. DesJarlais. And that gap, that is the gap that the 
Glide Phase Interceptor is supposed to fill, correct?
    Secretary Austin. [Audio malfunction.]
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I heard some very concerning reports 
over the past week that the White House and the Department may 
be slowing the development of the Glide Phase Interceptor. Can 
you confirm?
    Secretary Austin. [Audio malfunction.] Yes, we remain on 
track with our program. And as you can see from the budget, we 
are investing a significant amount of money for the defense 
of--for missile defense.
    Dr. DesJarlais. We brought up undersea capabilities, and 
Russia currently has a nuclear-capable submarine-launched 
cruise missile, correct?
    Secretary Austin. Russia has? I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.
    Dr. DesJarlais. They have a nuclear-capable submarine-
launched cruise missile, correct?
    Secretary Austin. That is correct.
    Dr. DesJarlais. All right. President Biden has suggested 
that we cut our own capability for nuclear-capable sea-launched 
cruise missiles, and that is correct as well, right?
    Secretary Austin. As you can see----
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. What we are investing in----
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yes.
    Secretary Austi [continuing]. It is $34 billion in our 
nuclear triad here.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. General Milley, you commented that 
your best military advice is that we should keep this 
capability. Admiral Richard, General Wolters, I think VanHerck 
has mentioned that.
    Secretary Austin, do you agree with your colleagues that 
this is a capability that we should focus on, to help limit the 
asymmetry we have when it comes to the delivery of low-yield 
nuclear capability?
    Secretary Austin. Is this the SLCM-N that you are referring 
to?
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yes.
    Secretary Austin. Yes, you know, the marginal capability 
that this provides is far outweighed by the cost. And so, we 
have the ability----
    Dr. DesJarlais. You disagree with your colleagues?
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. To provide options to the 
President ----
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay.
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. With a number of means.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Well, the one thing that we hope is that, 
regardless of which party is in power in the White House, that 
our military advisors, like yourselves, look at this through an 
objective lens. I know we have had concern about the Department 
losing focus on our lethal capability and focusing on more of a 
woke military. I hope that is not the case. And it seems like a 
lot of us are in agreement on capabilities, but maybe President 
Biden is not listening----
    Secretary Austin. Well, let me just assure you that, 
Congressman, this is the most lethal force on the planet, and 
it will remain that way. And we will continue to invest in the 
things that we need to remain dominant on the battlefield.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Gallego.
    Mr. Gallego. Secretary Austin, can you explain the kinds of 
integrated deterrence in a little more detail? And are there 
any examples where we would have seen it succeed thus far, 
especially if there are any NATO examples?
    Secretary Austin. I think you heard me say a bit earlier 
that integrated deterrence really means using all the 
capability and capacity in all of the warfighting domains--air, 
land, sea, cyber, and space--and linking and networking those 
capabilities together in new ways to create synergies. And you 
are seeing us do that in a number of areas.
    It also involves leveraging the capability and the capacity 
of our allies. And again, I mentioned earlier that we have done 
that in the past, but we need to do that a lot better, not only 
in air, land, and sea, but also in space and cyber. Many of our 
allies have significant capability there as well.
    Mr. Gallego. Secretary Austin, just to follow up on that, 
one of the things I was very happy that you had in your written 
remarks was the steps we have taken with the allies to bolster 
NATO's eastern flank. In fact, one of my projects in Congress 
thus far is securing authorization for the Baltic Security 
Initiative, which provides targeted defense systems to Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, including an air defense, ammunition, 
and C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]. Across these 
capabilities or others, are there particular areas where you 
would like to deepen defense and military-to-military 
cooperation within the United States and the Baltic countries? 
And which capabilities do you think are most important for the 
Baltic States to prioritize?
    Secretary Austin. Well, some of them have some pretty 
significant capabilities in cyber, and I think they can add to 
our already robust inventory here. But I think things like 
cyber. In air and missile defense, we would like to see them to 
begin to develop more capabilities there and work together with 
their neighbors to link those capabilities together.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    And then, Secretary Austin, again, you referenced gray zone 
multiple times in your written testimony, noting our 
competitors' malign activities in it. One of my greatest 
concerns is Russia's ability to exploit the gray zone and to 
conduct targeted disinformation operations, spreading Putin's 
propaganda and blatant lies. Over the long term, I am also 
concerned about the lessons that China is drawing from Russia 
in the space itself. Could you share your perspective on how 
our forces can be more effective operating in this gray zone of 
conflict? What short- and long-term steps should we be taking 
to counter this malign influence from Russia right now, and 
from China, too, as it becomes more adept at spreading 
disinformation operating in the gray zone?
    Secretary Austin. Well, we have been very active before the 
onset of hostilities here with the Ukrainians in helping them 
with their cyber capabilities, and helping them develop methods 
to begin to counter some of the activity in the gray zone. And 
this is a learning process. We continue to learn. Thus far, I 
think we have been very effective in helping them, and they 
have been able to push back on a number of unhelpful narratives 
and stay ahead of the power curve, actually.
    So, there will be a number of lessons learned coming out of 
this, but I think we have grown in our awareness in terms of 
what it takes to be able to begin to be effective in countering 
unhelpful narratives in the information space.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    And then, lastly, in whatever remaining time, I would like 
to talk to you about the Civilian Harm Mitigation Response 
Action Plan. As you well know, civilian harm caused by U.S. 
military operations risks legitimacy overseas, including what 
we have already seen with the reaction to Russia.
    So, I was proud to do a letter with a bunch of Members. My 
understanding is that the review is still ongoing under the 90-
day window that you directed. Would you share any insights you 
have learned so far from this process?
    Secretary Austin. Well, I am not prepared to share insights 
at this point. The only insight I have is that the folks that 
we have assembled to work on this are very detailed and very 
committed to doing this the right way. And these are people 
from a number of communities, to include the active 
warfighters.
    And so, we still have work to do. The review is about 30 
days out in terms of the brief-out of the review. So, once that 
is done, I will be happy to share any insights and lessons 
learned from this, and also, prescribe our way ahead.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. I yield back my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Kelly is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    One of the things that I am really concerned about, 
Secretary Austin and General Milley, is that, across the DOD, I 
continually hear people talk about divesting of things for 
future things, future capabilities for current. And, General 
Milley, I have heard you say this. I learned this from you. We 
have to be able to fight today with the things--fight tonight 
with the things that we have right now.
    And so, I see that. We are talking about the Marine Corps 
says they need 31 amphib [amphibious] ships. Yet, we are saying 
we are only going to give you 24. We are only building 9 ships, 
and we are divesting of 24 in capabilities. It is a sliding 
scale of risk. KC-46s are not coming online, not providing all 
the capabilities we need in a timely enough manner. But, yet, 
we are talking about divesting of the KC-135s. So, we continue 
to divest of things. The same thing with the SLCM. If we have 
another capability that provides that same thing in the same 
region, then we need to do that.
    So, listen, I know everybody's heart is in the right place, 
but I just think we have to be very careful. Now we have a war 
with Russia and Ukraine, and relooking these things to see, do 
we have the capability, should the world ask, that we fight two 
wars on two fronts, whether that is ships and current 
capabilities or refueling aircraft?
    The other thing I am extremely concerned about, Secretary 
Austin--and I think this is something you can fix--is our 
merchant marine fleet, our ability to move ships, troops, 
equipment, fuel, all kind of logistics, we keep pushing that. 
That is not just a Navy function. It is the Army that has to 
have those goods. It is the Marine Corps. And so, we really 
have to look at this and we have to invest in our merchant 
marine fleet to be able to get us what we need when we do.
    What are you doing to get our merchant marine fleet set at 
a DOD level? Because I can tell you, the services are always 
going to say the other one needs to pay for it.
    Secretary Austin. We have not invested any monies in this 
budget towards the merchant marine fleet, but you make some 
good points.
    Mr. Kelly. But we need to--you would agree that that 
logistic chain, I mean, the reason the Russians are getting 
their tail kicked in Ukraine right now is a logistical failure. 
And if we don't plan to do logistics, I promise you it will not 
happen.
    I want to go back with KC-135s. Are you willing, General 
Milley, Secretary Austin, to relook the divesture of KC-135s 
until we have adequate capability to refuel to both INDOPACOM 
and, also, Europe? Are you willing to relook that and not 
divest until we have capabilities replaced?
    General Milley. I would be happy to relook anything in the 
budget that you want me to relook. And I will take a look at 
that and get with Air Force, and make sure that I clearly 
understand the divesture logic and the production rates of KC-
46.
    Mr. Kelly. And then, I just really hope you will relook the 
ship plan. I mean the Marines say they need 31 amphibs. Yet, 
DOD says we are only going to give you 24. And I disagree with 
the chairman a little bit on this. We do have the capability to 
produce those ships, but it is about keeping the workforce 
engaged and making sure that we have a timeline, and we don't 
change that every year, so that they can plan out to having the 
right industrial base at the right time.
    So, I hope we will get--I haven't seen a ship plan in 2 
years from the Navy, and that is one of the requirements that 
they are supposed to do. We need that in order to do our job.
    Secretary Austin. Thanks sir. And that is forthcoming. And 
also, they have done an amphib review, and that is forthcoming 
as well. And once that is done, I think we will have greater 
insights into what the Secretary of the Navy really believes 
the requirements are.
    I would just point to the fact--and I know you know this--
that we are investing $2.6 billion in amphibs in this budget. 
Amphibs are important; there is no question about it. We are 
going to make sure that----
    Mr. Kelly. Mr. Secretary, I hate to interrupt, but I have 
got 1 minute and I have got one more question I really want to 
talk about.
    I really just hope--you guys are the advisor to not just 
the President, but to the Nation, in making sure that we have 
the right risk of fighting today versus future capabilities 
that we have to have to win future wars. And I just hope that 
we will relook some of those things.
    The final point I want to talk about, there is a little bit 
of movement right now--and I just ask that both of you-all 
weigh in on this--to make Gold Star families, to include a Gold 
Star to make them someone who dies in service. If I die of a 
heart attack while I am doing Guard drill, my family is not a 
Gold Star family. I shouldn't get a Purple Heart for having an 
ATV [all-terrain vehicle] wreck downrange. That is not to 
denigrate anyone from not doing that. We love all our service 
members, however they die, but I really hope you will look hard 
in making sure our Gold Star families are Gold Star families 
who are lost in combat.
    General Milley. And I am doing that, personally doing that. 
And today is Gold Star Spouses Day, Gold Star Family Day, by 
the way. And there is nothing probably more important and 
sacred than to make sure that we honor those fallen in combat 
in the defense of this Nation. So, I am looking at it.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Oh, I apologize. Hold on. We will start in a 
second.
    The witnesses need a 15-minute break, which we are going to 
take at 11:30.
    So, we will go to Mr. Carbajal, and the next Republican, 
and then, we will take a 15-minute break after those two 
questioners.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you to both of you for your exceptional 
leadership throughout Russia's unprovoked war on Ukraine.
    I want to take a moment to highlight the California 
National Guard's unique and exceptional support to the Ukraine 
military through the National Guard's State Partnership 
Program. California has been partnered with Ukraine since 1993 
and since 2000. California and Ukraine soldiers have 
participated in over 330 military events, including training 
exercises at Camp Roberts, located in my district, in San Luis 
Obispo County.
    General Milley, how has California's State Partnership 
Program with Ukraine helped to improve the capabilities of 
Ukrainian forces to fight against the Russian invasion?
    General Milley. I mentioned it, I think, upfront, about the 
training effort that has been going on since 2014, the 
California guardsmen intimately involved in that. So, what is 
the result of that? So, over 8 years, the Ukrainian military 
has reformed itself, developed a non-commissioned officer 
corps, and adopted the U.S. doctrinal concept of mission 
command, decentralized decision-making at the lowest level that 
is effective at making the decision. And that is a direct 
result of the efforts of the California Guard and what they 
have done with Ukraine.
    More recently--and I'll just use this one vignette as an 
example of the value of the program--the connective tissue, the 
human connection between the Ukrainian military and the 
California Guard has proven extraordinary--to the point where 
the TAG [the adjutant general] of California still maintains 
almost daily contact with his counterparts, even though they 
are half a world away. That has been an invaluable source of 
communication, intelligence development, and transmission of 
information back and forth. So, it is things like that that are 
intangibles in war, but they prove extraordinarily valuable in 
the actual conduct of war.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    The men and women serving in uniform are the backbone of 
our national security. I appreciate the Department's increased 
investment in personnel needs. One issue both of your 
statements touched upon that I have been working on to address 
is available and affordable childcare for our military 
families. While construction of childcare Child Development 
Centers is critical, one deficiency that I hear when visiting 
installations is the lack of qualified childcare providers to 
meet the demand.
    Secretary Austin, how is the Department seeking to address 
the shortage of qualified childcare providers? Do you need 
additional authorities in order to hire the needed childcare 
staff?
    Secretary Austin. Thanks, sir.
    If we need additional authorities, we won't hesitate to ask 
for them. This is something that I have my P&R [Under Secretary 
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness] directorate taking a 
hard look at and working with the services in canvassing 
installations. This has been identified as an issue to us as 
well, and we are trying to identify incentives that will help 
attract the right people and help us train and equip the right 
people to provide quality childcare.
    Mr. Carbajal. Another workforce question, Secretary Austin. 
Your testimony touches on the Department's needs to improve its 
ability to attract and retain an innovation-minded workforce. 
For high-skilled positions such as those that require 
specialized skills and credentials to meet digital and 
cybersecurity needs, how can the Department better compete 
against private industry?
    Secretary Austin. In the skill sets that you mentioned, 
sir, this is tough because, obviously, you know, we can't 
compete with the compensation packages that some of the big 
tech offers. But, certainly, that won't stop us from going 
after people with the right skill sets.
    And this is a point of emphasis for us. We will continue to 
stay focused on it, to include bringing on people who are 
currently employed by those companies to serve in our Guard and 
Reserve forces as well.
    Mr. Carbajal. This committee has been very focused on the 
ongoing audit of the Department of Defense. Taxpayers deserve 
to know that, while the topline funding level for our national 
security has increased, the Department is effectively executing 
its funding.
    Secretary Austin, what material weaknesses has the audit 
identified that have been the hardest to address Department-
wide, and how are you working to address those?
    Secretary Austin. Well, you have seen me, I think, most 
recently put another letter out to the force emphasizing the 
importance of making sure that we have a clean audit going 
forward. And this is very important to me. This is something 
that Secretary McCord and I have worked on and will continue to 
work on. But I am not satisfied that we are there, but----
    The Chairman. I apologize, the gentleman's time has 
expired.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 168.]
    Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen. We have limited time. So, I am going 
to ask a yes-or-no question probably, unless otherwise 
indicated.
    Secretary Austin, last week, General Wolters told this 
committee that, in the months leading up to February 24th, he 
considered himself part of an interagency effort designed to 
deter and dissuade Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine. Did 
you share General Wolters' goal, yes or no?
    Secretary Austin. Well, I hope General Wolters shared my 
goals, since I am the Secretary of Defense. And my objectives 
were, number 1, defend this Nation; number 2, make sure that we 
did everything possible to unify and defend NATO, if required; 
number 3, flow security force assistance to Ukraine; and then 
number 4, manage escalation.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, the goal was not to deter Putin from 
invading Ukraine?
    Secretary Austin. I have just laid out what my goals were, 
and certainly----
    Mr. Gallagher. Which did not include deterring Putin from 
invading Ukraine, unless I missed it?
    Secretary Austin. Well, it was an objective of the 
government to deter Putin, but, as General Milley described, 
that is very difficult to do, unless you put forces on the 
ground, and that is a decision that we made early in the effort 
here, that we are not going to put forces in Ukraine to fight 
Russia.
    Mr. Gallagher. It was an objective of the government. You 
have just reminded us that you are an important person in that 
government apparatus as Secretary of Defense. Was it the goal 
of your policy, or the government's policy, for which you work, 
the President of the United States, to deter Putin from 
invading Ukraine?
    Secretary Austin. It was a goal to deter him from invading 
Ukraine, and if he did invade, it was a goal, and still is a 
goal, to impose significant costs on Putin. And you are seeing 
that play out in ways that Putin never imagined. And you are 
seeing the Ukrainians resist Putin in incredible ways because 
we provided them some capability to do that, but also because 
they have the grit and the determination to fight to defend 
their country.
    Mr. Gallagher. I totally agree with the great determination 
they have shown, which is remarkable.
    So, the goal was to deter Putin. We did not achieve that 
goal. Putin invaded, anyway, on February 24th.
    Do you share the assessment General Milley gave a little 
bit ago that perhaps Putin was simply undeterrable, and 
therefore, our campaign of deterrence was bound to fail?
    Secretary Austin. I do not believe that our campaign has 
failed. This is still in progress, and----
    Mr. Gallagher. Got it with respect to----
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. And there is a price to be 
paid by Putin for what he has done.
    Mr. Gallagher. Got it, but we failed to deter Putin from 
invading Ukraine. I am interested in whether you think there is 
anything we could have done, looking back--hindsight is 20/20--
in the months leading up to February 24th, to successfully 
deter him from invading Ukraine? And perhaps there isn't; I 
don't know. I am just curious to get your opinion on it.
    Secretary Austin. As General Milley pointed out, if we put 
forces into Ukraine to fight Putin, this would be a different 
story, but we made a decision that we weren't going to do that. 
And we made a decision for the right reason, and I support 
those decisions.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, I think that is, actually, a very 
important point, that perhaps if we had put hard power, 
American hard power, in the path of Putin, that would have been 
the only thing that could have deterred him.
    I guess what I am interested in, does that same analysis 
hold true with respect to Taiwan? Would putting American forces 
on Taiwan increase or decrease the likelihood that Xi Jinping 
would attempt an invasion?
    Secretary Austin. Hypothetical. I think that it is, you 
know, not advisable to make direct comparisons between Ukraine 
and Taiwan. These are two completely different scenarios, two 
different theaters. And so, you know----
    Mr. Gallagher. Do you think, then, that what has happened 
in Ukraine is not connected--has not impacted Xi's calculus 
with respect to Taiwan?
    Secretary Austin. No, I would have to--I am certain that, 
you know, I don't want to speculate with what is in Mr. Xi's 
head, but, certainly, I think, as the world looks at this, they 
have been impressed by the commitment, the resolve, of many 
countries in the world to resist that kind of behavior.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, would it be too far to characterize your 
view as the commitment and resolve on display by the Ukrainians 
and our NATO allies has made an invasion of Taiwan less likely 
than it was prior, than it was on February 23rd?
    Secretary Austin. Is the commitment of the people of 
Taiwan?
    Mr. Gallagher. No, no. The commitment that you just 
referenced with respect to NATO and Ukraine had any impact on 
Xi's calculus in Taiwan and made an invasion more or less 
likely?
    Secretary Austin. Well, again, I don't want to speculate on 
whether or not an invasion is likely or less likely. But, 
again, I would say that we just need to be careful about making 
direct comparisons between what is going on in Ukraine and what 
could happen in Taiwan.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    We are going to take a 15-minute break. We are going to be 
back at--well, I guess that would make it 11:47.
    Mr. Khanna is next. So, at 11:47, we will go to Mr. Khanna, 
and we will proceed from there.
    We will be right back.
    [Recess.]
    The Chairman. We will reconvene and get back to members' 
questions.
    Mr. Khanna is up and is recognized for 5 minutes, and he is 
appearing virtually. So, he will be on the screen.
    Mr. Khanna, do we have you?
    Mr. Khanna. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to use my 5 minutes for three different parts--one 
to follow up on the chairman's comments about the office 
culture article, on Mr. Gallagher and China, and hopefully, on 
Yemen.
    I read the Foreign Affairs article, and they said the 
Pentagon should look more like Apple computers, and I was, of 
course, struck by that, given that I represent Apple computers 
and Apple Park.
    One of the reasons that I think the article made that point 
is that, with technological change so fast and so rapid, we 
need to be adaptive. In Silicon Valley, you have startups that 
beat incumbents with huge, larger bank balances because they 
are innovative.
    And I guess my question for you, Secretary Austin and 
Chairman Milley, is, do you agree that critical to leading 
against China in the 21st century is having technological 
superiority? And have you spent time with Tim Cook and Sundar 
Pichai, and others, in Silicon Valley? And are you open to 
doing that?
    Secretary Austin. I have spent time with the CEO [chief 
executive officer] of Google. And while there are parts of us 
that really seriously need to be more streamlined and more 
adaptive, which I really embrace that, I would say that the 
Department of Defense turning into Google is probably not 
something that I would envision.
    But I clearly----
    Mr. Khanna. Well, I am not suggesting that, Secretary 
Austin, but I am suggesting that we take the best innovative 
parts of the culture. I think that is what the article 
suggests.
    Secretary Austin. Absolutely. I absolutely agree with that.
    General Milley. I would second that. Our need for 
innovation is critical. I think that we are an inheritor of an 
Industrial Age system that goes way back, not only the 
building, but the process, our programming systems, et cetera, 
all date back to the 1950s and 1960s, that sort of thing. So, 
it does need to be updated. And I think getting some of the 
best practices out of not only Silicon Valley, but other 
commercial best practices, is definitely worthwhile.
    I have personally spent some time out there, and that 
helped, when I was Chief of Staff of the Army, that helped in 
the concept of Army Futures Command and a few other initiatives 
we did. So, I do think that is a very valuable use of time, to 
just go out and take a look at best practices in the commercial 
world and apply them to the defense industry, or the Defense 
Department.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you. Thank you, General. And if I can be 
of any help, let me know. And I also think tech companies have 
an obligation to be doing more to assist our military. So, it 
is reciprocal.
    On Representative Gallagher's point, I share, of course, 
his concerns with China's potential invasion of Taiwan. I guess 
my question is, wouldn't the situation with Russia actually be 
a significant deterrent to China? I mean, the crushing 
sanctions on Putin, you have got to think, if you are Xi 
Jinping, that the world would be unified and China's economy 
would be devastated, if they thought of any aggressive action. 
So, wouldn't you say that Xi Jinping would be having second 
thoughts, given that he has seen President Biden rally the 
world and the economic impact that such a move would entail?
    Secretary Austin. I certainly would, and I would certainly 
think that he also values the economic opportunities that are 
present there in Western Europe.
    Mr. Khanna. Let me ask two questions, and then you can 
answer both, hopefully, with the time.
    For one, on Taiwan, is there anything we can do to expedite 
our arms sales there? My understanding is that they have been 
stopped because of supply chain issues.
    And then, the second, on Yemen, Secretary Austin, one of 
the reasons I was strongly in support of your nomination to be 
the Secretary--and you have done an outstanding job--is you 
were an early critic of the war in Yemen. You were right. I am 
encouraged by the recent ceasefire. Could you comment on what 
the United States will do if the Saudis violate the ceasefire, 
and whether we would be willing, then, to not provide spare 
parts to the Saudis if they violate it?
    Secretary Austin. We certainly hope that they don't violate 
it, and we don't have any reason to believe that they will. And 
again, every situation we will have to treat on its merits 
there. But I think it is really a good first step, and we need 
to continue to encourage our allies and partners to stay 
focused on the right things here.
    Mr. Khanna. And on the timeline of arms sales, is there 
anything we can do to expedite that, or why have they been 
slowed down?
    Secretary Austin. Well, thanks.
    This is a point of focus for me and making sure that we are 
doing everything that we have said we are going to do in terms 
of providing the ability for Taiwan to defend itself.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Secretary Austin, why should American taxpayers 
fund lectures at the National Defense University that promote 
socialism as a strategy to combat China?
    Secretary Austin. The National Defense University is an 
academic institution, and I don't know of any such lecture, 
but----
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, that is surprising because it was widely 
reported. The National Defense University had Thomas Piketty 
come, and this was the title of his lecture: ``Responding to 
China: the Case for Global Justice and Democratic Socialism.'' 
So, now that you know that they did this, would you agree that 
embracing socialism is not an effective strategy to combat 
China?
    Secretary Austin. Well, I certainly don't agree with 
embracing socialism. I think----
    Mr. Gaetz. So, that means----
    The Chairman. I am sorry, we are not going to do this. We 
are not going to let the guy say four words and still talk, and 
then, cut him off. We are just not.
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, I control the time, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Yes, but you also have to be fair to the 
witnesses.
    Mr. Gaetz. No, but I got the answer I wanted. I have a 
follow-up.
    My follow-up question is, if we don't embrace it, then, I 
guess, why did the National Defense University put out a 
statement--again, this is funded by U.S. taxpayers--saying, in 
this talk, Mr. Piketty will argue that ``The right answer lies 
in ending Western arrogance and promoting a new emancipatory 
and egalitarian horizon on a global scale, a new form of 
democratic and participatory, ecological, and post-colonial 
socialism''? So, why would we invite people we don't agree with 
to evangelize views and values that we don't share at the 
National Defense University, when we should be learning 
strategy about how to combat our enemies and make assessments 
that are accurate?
    Secretary Austin. And we do learn a lot about strategy and 
about the military, and about joint force development. And so, 
that is our focus in these institutions. I don't know what the 
context of this particular, or content of this particular 
speech was, but----
    Mr. Gaetz. But, Mr. Secretary, I have shared with you the 
context. The context wasn't better understand socialism, so we 
can defeat it. The context wasn't learn about it, so that we 
can offer countermeasures. The concept was that it is time for 
socialism. And the reason I know that is the context is because 
the lecture was pulled from a book written by Thomas Piketty 
entitled, ``Time for Socialism.'' And I just can't help but 
like notice you guys have been----
    Secretary Austin. And so, your question was whether or not 
we----
    Mr. Gaetz. I control the time.
    Secretary Austin. Your question was whether or not we----
    Mr. Gaetz. You guys have been blowing a lot of calls lately 
on matters of strategy, Mr. Secretary. You guys told us that 
Russia couldn't lose. You told us that the Taliban couldn't 
immediately win.
    And so, I guess I am wondering, what in the $773 billion 
that you are requesting today is going to help you make 
assessments that are accurate in the face of so many blown 
calls?
    Secretary Austin. You have seen what is in our budget. You 
have seen how the budget matches the strategy. And so, I will 
let that speak for itself.
    Mr. Gaetz. Well. I mean, I have also seen that we are 
behind----
    Secretary Austin. It makes an investment in combat----
    Mr. Gaetz. Mr. Secretary, we are behind in hypersonics. We 
failed to deter Russia. Last year, China----
    Secretary Austin. What do you mean we are behind in 
hypersonics? How do you, how do you----
    Mr. Gaetz. Okay. Who is ahead in hypersonics?
    Secretary Austin. How do you, how do you make that 
assessment?
    Mr. Gaetz. I don't know. I make that assessment because----
    Secretary Austin. Is it one-for-one----
    Mr. Gaetz [continuing]. China is fielding hypersonic 
weapons systems at this moment, and we are still developing 
them. I make that assessment because Russia----
    Secretary Austin. Are you talking about development of 
capabilities or development of----
    Mr. Gaetz. By the way, your own people brief us that we are 
behind and that China is winning. Are you aware of the 
briefings we get on hypersonics?
    Secretary Austin. I am certainly aware of briefings that we 
provide to Congress.
    Mr. Gaetz. But it is not just the hypersonics. It is all 
over the world. It is in Taiwan, where China last year flew 
more sorties than ever before. It is North Korea on pace to 
shatter prior records in the number of missiles that they are 
testing. And so, while everyone else in the world seems to be 
developing capabilities and being more strategic, we got time 
to embrace critical race theory at West Point; to embrace 
socialism at the National Defense University; to do mandatory 
pronoun training. Do you accept----
    Secretary Austin. You know, again, this is the most 
capable, the most combat-credible force in the world. It has 
been and it will be so going forward.
    Mr. Gaetz. Not if we continue down this path.
    Secretary Austin. And this budget helps us to do that.
    Mr. Gaetz. Not if we embrace socialism.
    Secretary Austin. And the fact that you are embarrassed by 
your country, by----
    Mr. Gaetz. Oh, no, no, no. I'm embarrassed by your 
leadership.
    Secretary Austin. I am sorry, but----
    Mr. Gaetz. I am not embarrassed for my country.
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. It is what you are saying.
    Mr. Gaetz. I wish we were not losing to China.
    Secretary Austin. It is what you are saying.
    Mr. Gaetz. I wish we were--you know what? You know, that is 
so, that is so disgraceful, that you would sit here and 
conflate your failures with the failures of the uniformed 
service members.
    You guys said that Russia would overrun Ukraine in 36 days. 
You said that the Taliban would be kept at bay for months. You 
totally blew those calls. And maybe we would be better at them 
if the National Defense University actually worked a little 
more on strategy and a little less on wokeism.
    Secretary Austin. Has it occurred to you that Russia has 
not overrun Ukraine because of what we have done and our allies 
have done?
    Mr. Gaetz. But that was baked into----
    Secretary Austin. Have you ever even thought about this?
    Mr. Gaetz. That was baked into your flawed assessment.
    And so, I saw that the Obama administration tried to 
destroy our military----
    Secretary Austin. The fact that we----
    Mr. Gaetz [continuing]. Tried to destroy our military by 
starving it of resources, and it seems the Biden administration 
is trying to destroy our military by force-feeding it wokeism.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes.
    I am sorry, Mr. Kim is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kim. Yes, thank you to the two of you. And I just want 
to say, on behalf of this committee, you know, we have a 
tradition of respecting the people that come before this 
committee in a bipartisan way. Make sure that, yes, we may have 
some disagreements about our policy, but all of us here are 
committed to our national security, committed to our service 
members, and certainly, committed to recognizing that your 
leadership is the leadership across the entirety of our 
military, not just in terms of--and certainly, not in terms of 
any political discourse or political party. So, I just wanted 
to thank you, all three of you, for coming before us today.
    Secretary Austin, I did want to ask you, you know, I was, 
as well as many others, horrified by the images that we saw 
coming out of Ukraine over this weekend, you know, what we saw 
in Bucha.
    Our military has had extraordinary abilities to see where 
the Russian forces have been in Ukraine and where they are 
going. So, I want to just ask you, do we know what Russian 
units were in Bucha that may have committed these atrocities?
    Secretary Austin. That is a thing that we continue to 
research, and there will be significant effort going into 
matching, you know, elements that were present with the time 
that these events probably occurred. But we don't know for 
certain, but we will continue to research it.
    Mr. Kim. Well, there is another element, too. You know, we 
see these units being redeployed. So, certainly, we want to 
make sure that we are dealing with the accountability of this. 
But also I have real fear about where these units may now be 
redeploying, whether or not they will conduct similar types of 
atrocities against Ukrainians in other parts of Ukraine. So, I 
would just ask for your attention on that as well.
    Secretary Austin. Absolutely.
    Mr. Kim. With these horrific attacks, we see there was 
redeployment of Russian forces as well, their apparent decision 
to pull away from Kyiv. Secretary Blinken this weekend said, 
you know, we may very well be entering a new phase in this war. 
I think that is something that I agree with. In my sense, it 
really does feel like where we are at now is different than 
where things were 5 to 6 weeks ago. But I wanted your thoughts 
on that. Does that sound right? Does this feel like a new phase 
in the war?
    Secretary Austin. I think that is right. I think, as the 
Russians thought that they could very quickly move into 
Ukraine, capture the capital city, and install their leader of 
choice, and they weren't able to do that.
    Mr. Kim. Yes.
    Secretary Austin. And so now, we see them reposturing and 
refocusing their main effort in the south and east. And so, as 
they enter this phase, it will probably be a lot more 
deliberate. They will be able to mass fires a lot more. And so, 
the violence will probably go up a notch there in terms of the 
types of things we have been seeing.
    Mr. Kim. So, on the Russian side, they are recalibrating, 
redeploying. Looking through your testimony to this body, you 
talked a lot about the need for us to be changing and adapting 
the ways that we operate; adapt and fortify our defense; have 
resilience and adaptability in terms of our defense. So, with 
this new phase of the war, with these shifting goals that we 
have seen from Russia, does that give us space to reassess what 
the Ukrainians need, as you talk about how we may see even 
greater levels of violence and firepower from the Russians. 
Does this give us that space to reassess what they need?
    Secretary Austin. Yes, I don't know if I would describe it 
as space. I would say that we are, I mean, we consider the 
Ukrainians to be in a knife fight, and they are----
    Mr. Kim. Yes.
    Secretary Austin. They are working hard every day. We are 
giving them what they need to continue to be successful, but we 
need to also look ahead, and we are doing that.
    Mr. Kim. Well, they are in a knife fight, but they are in a 
fight with all sorts of different weapons being directed 
towards them. I guess my more direct question to you is, if 
this is a new phase of the war, do you feel like there is space 
for you and the administration to reconsider, for instance, the 
fighter jets and the transfer, facilitating the transfer of 
fighter jets to the Ukrainians? Is that something, now that we 
are in a new phase, that you would reconsider?
    Secretary Austin. If you are talking about the transfer of 
MiGs----
    Mr. Kim. Right.
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. I mean, countries have the 
ability to do that now. And contrary to popular belief, the 
United States is not standing in the way of that happening.
    Mr. Kim. I agree with you on that front, but, certainly, 
the countries that we are talking about, they have expressed 
challenges in terms of how they transfer. They are asking for 
us to facilitate that. Is this the time for us to reconsider 
that?
    Secretary Austin. Well, this is a time for us to continue 
to focus on those things that will be effective in this fight, 
and even amping up the capabilities that we provide them in 
terms of those things that are most effective.
    Mr. Kim. I would like to work with you, as we enter this 
new phase, to figure out what exactly we can do for the 
Ukrainians.
    Thank you for all your help.
    Secretary Austin. Yes.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
    I have four questions. So, I am going to try to get through 
them rather quickly.
    My first question is on the budget. The proposed budget has 
military spending under inflation which is going to necessitate 
cuts to F-35 production, for example. So, my first question is 
with the overall divest-to-invest and I will ask this to 
General Milley. I guess the follow-up question is to Secretary 
Austin. But we are going to reduce our aircraft inventory by 
250 and add 75 aircraft. So, basically, for every three we are 
putting out, we are putting one in. And ships, we are reducing 
our ships by 24, and bringing in 9 ships. So, a little better 
than one-out-of-three replacement. Are we taking too much risk, 
General Milley?
    General Milley. I don't think we are taking too much risk 
relative to Russia and China, which is the focus of the NDS 
[National Defense Strategy], the focus of the budget. I 
recognize the numbers go down in both shipbuilding and in 
aircraft. But, again, I want to focus folks' attention on the 
capability that is being bought versus just raw numbers.
    A lot of the aircraft that are coming out that are, for 
example, A-10s, A-10s have very little utility relative to a 
high-end warfight against China. For example, they may be 
useful as an FMS [foreign military sale] article to give to 
other countries, but, for our purposes relative to China, no.
    So, the other systems that are divesting are recouping the 
monies in order to invest in capabilities that will be much 
more useful in the future operating environment.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
    I just worry about the amount that we are divesting, but I 
realize some of it is going to have to happen.
    Secretary Austin, when I talked to the Baltic countries--I 
am the Baltics co-chair for the Security Caucus--they said the 
most important thing to them was a permanent U.S. presence, 
maybe an air defense. They are not too dogmatic of what type of 
unit. But would you commit to at least considering a permanent 
presence in the Baltics?
    Secretary Austin. I think you know that I just recently met 
with the three Ministers of Defense from the Baltic region and 
heard their concerns, and we will stay focused on their 
concerns. I heard the same thing from them, that they really 
value a U.S. footprint.
    I will tell you, I will commit to you that we will continue 
to work with NATO to assess what the requirements will be going 
forward, and we will be a part of that solution. And where 
appropriate, we will commit forces.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
    A question concerning Ukraine. When I have worked with some 
of your leadership, as well as some of the Ukrainian 
parliamentarian members who came out to visit, we provided some 
very good capabilities to them. But there is one area that I 
keep hearing that they are lacking, and that is the ability to 
hit tanks and convoys behind the line of the fight. They have 
the materials at the line and they have good air defenses, but 
to hit tanks 10-20 miles back. And there are multiple weapons 
that could do that. Are we committed to helping fill that 
niche, Mr. Secretary?
    Secretary Austin. We are, and there are a number of ways 
you can do that. Long-range fires--we are working hard, I am 
personally working to ensure that we can get them as much as we 
possibly can. The use of UAVs have been very effective as well. 
So, we will continue that work.
    Mr. Bacon. What I hear is they have some, but not enough in 
that particular area of the spectrum of warfare. So, thank you.
    My final question is with Taiwan. Obviously, the day of an 
invasion, it is too late for deterrence. I think a strong, 
capable deterrence for Taiwan starts, well, hopefully, 10 years 
ago, but, clearly, now after Ukraine. It seems to me they need 
an anti-shipping missiles at a large quantity; also, long-range 
air defense capabilities. What are we doing to make sure the 
deterrence is effective in Taiwan?
    Thank you.
    Secretary Austin. Yes, well, we continue to work to do what 
we have advertised, and that is, to help Taiwan provide for its 
defense, help it defend itself. And there are a number of 
things that we are looking at across the board.
    Mr. Bacon. When I have traveled out there, sometimes they 
are asking for weapons that look like our military. But it 
seems to me, for them, they really do need the anti-amphibious 
capabilities and long-range air defense. Those two capabilities 
seem to be key to deterring China. And so, I hope we are 
working hard that way.
    But, General Milley, do you have anything you would like to 
add?
    General Milley. Yes, I think those two systems are 
important. The other thing I think that is an important lesson 
to draw from Ukraine is a nation in arms. So, if your opponent 
tries to invade you, and every military-age man and woman is 
armed, and they have a little bit of training, that could be a 
very effective use, and if it's a decentralized operation, 
where there is local initiative with junior officers, et 
cetera.
    Taiwan is a very complex piece of terrain, lots of 
mountains, high-density urban areas in Taipei. There is a lot 
that the Taiwanese can do in terms of----
    The Chairman. I apologize, the gentleman's time has 
expired. We will move on to the next person.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 168.]
    Mr. Keating is back with us and is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I thank both the Secretary and the General for their 
service.
    Some of the greatest experts, I think, on Russia that I 
have talked with over the last several months, in particular, 
were people that have had long-term experience with Russia. 
They include high-ranking foreign officials as well. And they 
pointed out to me that that February 17th response by the 
Russian Federation to what they term the bilateral treaty and 
security guarantees that they had wanted was critical to come 
back to.
    In that response, they required a U.S. withdrawal of all 
military personnel, and as well as a ban on armaments and 
related agreements. They cited, in particular, as red lines, 
the CEE countries, Central and Eastern Europe, and the SEE 
countries, Southeastern Europe, including 12 NATO nations. I 
think it underscores the fact that this is much larger than a 
Russian-Ukraine conflict.
    So, when I look at this commitment, what I would like to 
ask, perhaps General Milley, is what is the timeframe you 
forsee, given that kind of understanding of the way Russia 
thinks and acts? Could it be something as long as a decade, or 
even longer, that we are involved in this type of conflict?
    General Milley. That is hard to tell, and it is a bit early 
still, even though we are a month-plus into the war. There is 
much of the ground war left in Ukraine. But I do think this is 
a very protracted conflict, and I think it is at least measured 
in years; I don't know about decades, but at least years for 
sure. This is a very extended conflict that Russia has 
initiated, and I think that NATO, the United States, Ukraine, 
and all the allies and partners that are supporting Ukraine, 
are going to be involved in this for quite some time.
    Mr. Keating. Yes, Secretary Austin, could you reflect on 
this as well? You know, the fact that the breadth of what their 
requests and their demands are, how is that reflected in our 
policy? Because, indeed, this is far more expansive than just 
Russia and Ukraine.
    Secretary Austin. Yes, the ``asks'' were, and, I agree with 
you, they were very extensive. Having said that, you know, and 
much of that we couldn't possibly do, but having said that, we 
are going to always look--and we are negotiating with 
countries--we are going to always look for things where we can 
find common agreement and work from that, build from that.
    So, you are correct that that initial tranche of demands, 
for lack of a better term, was something that was not 
acceptable to Ukraine, most importantly, and to NATO, and to 
us.
    Mr. Keating. Also, I mean, what could we do in terms of 
policy for our partners right now? Two examples are Georgia and 
Finland that aren't NATO countries. What can we do to help 
support their concerns with the Russian aggression that is 
taking place?
    Secretary Austin. Well, we can do a lot. We can do more of 
what we are doing in terms of you heard us talk earlier about 
our engagement in helping them build their forces, and as they 
look to acquire different types of equipment to defend 
themselves, we can do that as well. And I know there are 
countries who aspire to be part of NATO, and NATO should 
continue to engage them.
    Mr. Keating. Given the fact there is 1 minute left, I would 
just like to ask you to amplify, if you could, some of your 
comments you made in the opening about undersea warfare and 
research, and making sure we have the proper investments in 
that regard. What do you see as the specific threats and how 
can we address them--in about 46 seconds?
    Secretary Austin. Well, I think the threats continue to 
evolve. China does have substantial capability undersea, but 
Russia does as well. And so, we want to make sure that, as we 
look across the landscape, we are able to meet any emerging 
threat.
    Mr. Keating. Great. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Banks is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Secretary Austin, The New York Times this 
morning reported the daily average for COVID-19 [coronavirus 
disease 2019] cases in the United States is at 27,573, much 
less than the .0001 percent of the total U.S. population. With 
COVID cases at all-time lows, why are we still enforcing the 
COVID vaccine mandate on our military personnel?
    Secretary Austin. We have seen variants of this virus, you 
know, wane and then grow again. And so, this is a medical 
readiness requirement, and it will remain so.
    Mr. Banks. General Milley, during a moment of increased 
action from Russia to China, is it worth it? Is it worth 
sacrificing our end strength for vaccine mandates? Would you 
rather have a few extra battalions of unvaccinated soldiers or 
not have them at all because of this?
    General Milley. Thanks, Congressman.
    I don't think it is an ``either/or''. I think we are an 
organization that requires--you are a veteran yourself--we get 
a lot of vaccinations. Anthrax is very, very low out there, and 
we still get anthrax vaccinations. So, I think getting 
vaccinated is part of the readiness issue of the health of the 
force. The numbers are very low, by the way, of those that are 
refusing to be vaccinated, and they are even lower, I mean, it 
is tiny, the numbers that are actually being asked to process 
out. So, I think it is manageable, and I think that I would 
prefer that everybody just go ahead and get vaccinated.
    Mr. Banks. According to a CNN article on January 18th, the 
Army National Guard missed its goal by over 8,000----
    General Milley. Yes.
    Mr. Banks [continuing]. Adding over 34,658 recruits for 
FY21.
    General Milley. Right.
    Mr. Banks. The 2023 defense budget request just released by 
the administration reduces the size of the Army by 12,000 
soldiers. Is the Army cutting their numbers because they know 
they can't recruit enough people to meet their quotas?
    General Milley. I have talked to General McConville about 
it a couple of different times. I think two major factors. One 
is the population at large, those that are eligible to enter 
the military, those numbers are actually pretty low. That is 
one point. It is the accessions challenge that is out there in 
recruiting on an annual basis. The second piece is that they 
want to reduce manpower in order to save the money and recoup 
that into modernization efforts. Those are the two fundamental 
reasons that the Army is doing what they are doing.
    Mr. Banks. General, it is a coincidence that the Army is 
moving forward with now involuntarily separating our soldiers 
and then offering a new $50,000 signing bonus to recruits who 
want to join the Army? How much additional cost are we going to 
incur because of the increased recruiting bonuses to combat 
projected losses from unvaccinated military personnel?
    General Milley. I would have to get back to you on a cost 
analysis in terms of the actual dollars relative to the bonus 
you mentioned, the $50,000 bonus.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 168.]
    General Milley. But, again, I go back to--I checked with 
General McConville just yesterday. The numbers that are 
actually being compelled to depart the military is very, very 
small in the Army, and I think it is likewise in the other 
services as well. There is a recruiting challenge, though, for 
the Army. The other services are meeting their recruiting 
goals; they are on a glide path for this fiscal year, but the 
Army is challenged, both Guard and Active.
    Mr. Banks. General Milley, on March 18th, the U.S. Army 
discharged three soldiers, the first time it has booted troops 
for failing to comply with the COVID-19 vaccine mandate. It is 
projected that 2,692 soldiers, the size of a couple of Army 
battalions, have not taken the vaccine and will likely be 
separated from the Army. Once again, how is this loss of 
personnel going to hurt the overall end strength of the Army?
    General Milley. I think if 2,000 are kicked out, I think 
that wouldn't hurt, but I think there is an issue of education 
here and persuasion, and making sure that these soldiers are 
making informed decisions.
    Mr. Banks. As of March 3rd, Army commanders have relieved a 
total of 6 regular Army leaders, including 2 battalion 
commanders, and issued 3,183 general officer written reprimands 
to regular Army soldiers for not taking the vaccination. How 
has this loss of leadership and focus on administrative burdens 
improved Army warfighting readiness and enhanced combat power?
    General Milley. Well, again, Congressman, I think that the 
idea of the health of the force, the readiness of the force in 
getting a vaccination, is a contributing factor to that. I 
think it is fundamental to the overall readiness of the force. 
So, I regret that commanders are getting relieved for things 
like that. I didn't know the numbers that you mentioned. I will 
go back to the Army and get the actual data. But we are an 
institution that has a sole set of requirements in terms of the 
health of the force and shots, and et cetera, and there is a 
policy and our job is to enforce the policy.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Crow is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to all of you for coming in and for your 
service to the country.
    Real quick, under the prior administration, they made a 
decision to move Space Command from Colorado to Alabama, and 
there are significant allegations of improper process. The GAO 
and DOD IG [Inspector General] are conducting reviews of that 
process, and if either of those reviews find that the process 
was not credible, will the Department commit to revisiting that 
process and starting it over, and doing it in a fair and 
transparent way?
    Secretary Austin. If there have been things that were 
improperly or illegally done, then, certainly, we will revisit 
that.
    Mr. Crow. Next, on the Ukraine front, a bunch of my 
colleagues already talked about Ukraine and the evolution of 
support. But can you just, very briefly, Mr. Secretary, talk 
about how should our support evolve, as this goes from a short-
term fight, us providing things that are needed and can be used 
now on the battlefield, to transitioning to a longer term 
fight, like the National Security Advisor indicated yesterday? 
How does that change the nature of our support?
    Secretary Austin. Yes, I believe that what Mr. Sullivan was 
describing was this fight that is going to take place in the 
south and east of the country, and it will take, as he 
described it, probably weeks for that to play out versus days. 
And so, we continue to look at what we think we don't think we 
know the Ukrainians will need, because we are talking to them 
on a daily basis. And it will be a lot of the same things that 
we provided already, but we look for things that also can 
provide them an advantage in this fight. And you have seen us 
begin to deploy some of those things.
    Mr. Crow. Well, we appreciate your work very much. We know 
this has been a Herculean effort by the men and women of the 
military, and the administration and the Department, and I 
thank you for that effort because it is saving lives.
    You know, this committee does have a long tradition of 
bipartisanship. There are people that have served, many people 
have served in uniform, but there are a very small handful of 
folks that don't understand service; that don't understand 
sacrifice; that attack and malign you and your service, 
somebody who has dedicated your entire life to service; who 
sometimes will compare our military to other militaries; call 
us woke; make up these contrived bogeymans of socialism or pull 
out lectures at universities.
    But I have known you for some time now and I have seen the 
pride that you take in our service men and women, and the pride 
that you take in this work, and how you have put your entire 
life focused on this.
    So could you just take, with the 2 minutes remaining, could 
you just paint a picture for this committee and for the 
American people about what makes you most proud of the men and 
women of our military, and what life is like on a daily basis 
for the men and women that you lead?
    Secretary Austin. Well, thanks.
    As you have heard me say a number of times, you know, my 
focus 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, is on defending this 
country. And I am proud to be able to serve alongside the men 
and women who occupy our ranks. They are committed to this. And 
I have been with them, most recently, in Poland, in Baltic 
States, and other eastern flank countries. I have been with 
them in the Indo-Pacific. They are all focused on the task at 
hand--training, being ready to perform their missions, and all 
of those missions contribute to the defense of this country and 
protecting our interests.
    And I have just got to tell you, I am incredibly proud of 
them. Day in and day out, they volunteer to do incredible 
things on behalf of this country. And we owe them a debt of 
gratitude that we can probably never repay. We owe their 
families a debt of gratitude as well.
    But they are smart, they are fit, they are focused, and 
they spend 99 percent of their time focused on defending this 
country and developing additional capabilities that they will 
need to be successful on a battlefield. So, any notion that 
they are woke or that our military is woke, you know, I take 
issue with that because it is just not true. It is a false 
narrative, and they deserve better than that.
    Mr. Crow. I couldn't agree more, they do deserve better 
than that. And they are getting better than that in your 
leadership and, frankly, the leadership and the focus of most 
people on this committee who take this work seriously, who are 
engaged in very difficult policy discussions, and know the 
threats that we face.
    I appreciate your leadership and Chairman Milley's 
leadership. Mr. McCord, you are more appreciated than this 
hearing probably indicates, but we appreciate your work as 
well.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Bergman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    One of my colleagues asked, General Milley, that you would 
commit to ensuring that the Gold Star family criteria remain 
the same, and I believe I heard you say yes.
    General Milley. I am very committed to that.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Secretary Austin, I would like to hear 
it from you.
    Secretary Austin. Yes.
    Mr. Bergman. Very good. That is probably one of the most 
solemn duties that we have, is to appropriately honor not only 
the men and women who die in service of our country in combat, 
but also their families as well.
    Let's talk a little bit about recruiting. General Milley, 
you opened up your statement--and I think accurately so--by 
saying we have the best led, best trained, best equipped, et 
cetera, et cetera, military in the world. Do we have the best 
recruited military, in your estimation?
    General Milley. The best recruited?
    Mr. Bergman. Yes.
    General Milley. I think all militaries are a reflection of 
the societies they come from. And we have a particularly 
challenging recruiting environment. As the former Chief of 
Staff of the Army, that was true then, and it is true now, and 
it has been true for quite a long time, in terms of the 
military has very high standards to get in. And unfortunately, 
the amount of eligible military-age men and women has gone down 
in terms of the standards over time. So, I think we are in a 
very challenging recruiting environment, but I do think those 
that do get in are the finest and the best. And I do think that 
we recruit the best of our society.
    Mr. Bergman. So, we have got, roughly, 70 percent who are 
ineligible for various reasons. So, we have already knocked 
that down to 30 percent. Has the Department of Defense spent 
any, I guess, research dollars to determine what is going to be 
the propensity of that remaining 30 percent to serve, to get 
involved at whatever level? I mean, is there any data that you 
guys are accumulating to enable us to better----
    General Milley. There is. There is a lot of data. There is 
a lot of money; there is a lot of research that goes into that 
very question, propensity to serve. We can get you that. I 
don't have it at my fingertips. We can get you the actual data 
that each of the services do----
    Mr. Bergman. Yes, well, this committee, you know, is 
bipartisan, and I don't think there is a one of us that is 
sitting here that don't want to see the men and women who are 
eligible to serve----
    General Milley. Sure.
    Mr. Bergman [continuing]. Get the right message, so that 
they will get over that hump, if you will, of why or why not.
    And you mentioned that this year the Army and the Guard is 
not going to meet their recruiting numbers. Now is that Air 
Guard or Army Guard, or both Guards?
    General Milley. Army Guard.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay.
    General Milley. Air Force, Marines, and Navy are meeting 
their goals right now. Army is not, both Active Army and Guard.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. So, if we are just talking about the 
Army and the Army Guard not meeting their end strength, is 
there any plan? Have you asked any of the other services who 
are meeting theirs maybe up it? If they are meeting their 
goals, do they have room for more? Are we looking at increased 
capabilities? I am not sure what is going on with the Army and 
the Army Guard, but do we have people waiting in line to sign 
up for the Air Force or the Navy or the Marine Corps?
    General Milley. The Navy is actually--I think it is the 
Navy--is actually at 102 percent on glide path. So, they are 
actually over their objectives. Air Force and Marines are 
meeting their objectives. And Army is about, I want to say it 
is about 10 or 15 points below the objective right now.
    Now the year is not over. The year is young. We are 4 
months into the year. Typically, this data will change very 
significantly upon high school graduation, come, you know, 
June-July timeframe. And that is the big months at which there 
is a big, huge data correction.
    What the Army is projecting over time is they will come in 
at a few percentage points below objective for the year, as 
opposed----
    Mr. Bergman. Are we sacrificing any quality to make those 
numbers?
    General Milley. No. No, not at all, Congressman.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay.
    General Milley. What they are doing is ensuring that they 
are enforcing the quality of the force coming in.
    Mr. Bergman. And just for the sake of discussion here, we 
know we have a significant number of men and women who are no 
longer in service because of their refusal to take the COVID 
vaccine. If, for whatever reason, any or all of them decided 
they wanted to reaffiliate with the service, would they be 
given an option?
    General Milley. I would have to get with each of the 
service chiefs in terms of the policies inside the service, but 
if someone wants to get the shot and come on back in, I don't--
--
    Mr. Bergman. Well, we have got millions and millions and 
millions of dollars of training----
    General Milley. Sure.
    Mr. Bergman [continuing]. In those people that we forced 
out, and we are short----
    General Milley. If you want to comply with the rules and 
regulations, I think----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 169.]
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thanks for being here. I know we are about to 
start hour three of this hearing, and I want to associate 
myself with the comments, the respectful comments, on both 
sides of the aisle for those who made it and apologize for 
those who aren't respectful, as you come up here for these 
hearings.
    I think that there's a lot of the issues that are affecting 
the average American, particularly around prices and budgets 
and supply chains are now we are seeing really affect the U.S. 
military. So, my questions are going to focus mostly on that.
    And, Mr. McCord, I am going to give you a chance to get in 
the game here.
    First and foremost, actually, I will start with Secretary 
Austin on supply chains, right? I represent a district that has 
two GM [General Motors] factories. One has been off and on 
dormant for the past year because we can't get a 14-cent 
microchip.
    Myself and Congressman Gallagher led a task force on DOD 
and sort of highlighting the issues on supply chains that the 
Department had. You know, you picked up the rug on some of our 
supply chains in the Defense Department. There was a lot of 
creepy-crawlies under there, a lot of dependencies on places 
like China, that even for our U.S. military we still had.
    Can you tell us--we had some prescriptions in the last NDAA 
[National Defense Authorization Act]--but help give us some 
comfort that, like our private sector companies, DOD is 
actually kind of getting in the game and looking at this as a 
vulnerability.
    Secretary Austin. We are in the game. As you know, it has 
been and is an area of emphasis for the President and for the 
government writ large. So, DOD is doing its part. This is 
especially important to us, as we look at components of our 
critical weapon systems that use microchips, that use critical 
materials, strategic materials. We want to make sure that we 
are not vulnerable to----
    Ms. Slotkin. Right, right. Because I think the thing that, 
while a GM plant can shut down, the U.S. military doesn't have 
that privilege of being able to shut down and just taking an 
economic hit. It is the protection of the country.
    Mr. McCord, on the budget, we have had a lot of discussion 
here about whether the proposed President's budget keeps up 
with the rate of inflation. And you said that you crafted the 
budget with a 4 percent inflation rate. We know that that has 
largely gone up. I know that, frankly, on a bipartisan basis, 
people are interested in at least making sure that the 
Department is keeping pace with inflation. Would you be willing 
to consider coming back to us and keying the budget to the rate 
of inflation? Very short, yes or no.
    Mr. McCord. Congresswoman, yes, I think we are going to 
need to work with the committees, I believe, going forward to 
look at what is actually happening on the ground. And we had, 
as the Secretary said, we had to snap the chalk line at some 
point. To finish the budget, you have to make some assumptions, 
and then, move on.
    Ms. Slotkin. Sure.
    Mr. McCord. And we normally revisit our own situation 
internally, which generates reprogrammings that we send to you. 
We will do that as soon as possible this year as well.
    Ms. Slotkin. And I think there is nowhere that is more 
clear where inflation is really kind of a punch in the gut, at 
least in a district like mine where people drive 40 miles one 
way to work, it is the price of gas. And as I see it, the 
Department of Defense is one of the biggest consumers maybe in 
the world of gasoline. And I think you noted it was about $12 
billion we spend a year on gas. What, if anything, has the 
Department of Defense done, advocating with the White House, to 
do more to try and affect the price of gas?
    Mr. McCord. Congressman, as you say, we consume a lot of 
gas, but we are small compared to the market. We cannot drive 
the market by ourselves, as 1 percent of the market. We are 
about 15 percent of the jet fuel market. So, we are a 
significant player there. But we are, ultimately, at the mercy 
of the markets, the way most other entities are.
    And our budget was done before Putin's invasion of Ukraine 
spiked oil prices. Of course, that spike may come down slowly; 
it may come down quickly. That is one of the main variables out 
there. But we are going to have to adjust for that going 
forward.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. I would just say, as one of the biggest 
consumers, at least in the United States, of gas, that your 
voice in the conversation on doing more to try and lower the 
prices of gas would be helpful.
    Lastly, Mr. McCord, we passed, on a bipartisan basis, an 
amendment in the last year's NDAA that helps to try and examine 
the amount of pork--and I mean congressional pork--that is in 
the Department of Defense budget: the things that you all have 
tried to kill; the legacy weapon systems you don't want 
anymore; the facilities you have tried to shut down. That 
amendment required a report. What is your assessment--I mean, I 
know the report isn't done yet--of what percentage of the 
Department budget are things that the U.S. Congress has 
required you to provide?
    Mr. McCord. Well, Congressman, again, the report is not 
done, but I think in most years it averages in the 3 to 5 
percent range. So, it is not overwhelming, but it is 
significant----
    The Chairman. And the rest of this we will have to take for 
the record.
    The gentlelady's time has expired.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 164.]
    Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Austin, a year ago, the rise of extremism, 
particularly white supremacy within the military, within our 
ranks, was a top priority for you. In fact, it was your first 
memo. Yet, the Department released a study this year, a year 
later, showing that 100 members of the military have 
participated in some type of extremism. That is 100 out of 2.5 
million. By my math, that shows that 99.996 percent of our 
military members have not participated in any form of 
extremism. So, with that data now being data-driven, is that 
still a top priority for you? Or can we move on?
    Secretary Austin. You made a couple of points here. And let 
me say that my top priority is defending this country. It has 
been and it will always be.
    On the issue of the percentages of people that are 
participating in extremist activities, you have heard me say 
that 99.9 percent of our people are doing the right thing every 
day, and I am proud of them for what they do. But a small 
percentage of people can have an outsized impact on our----
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Forgive me. I have a 
few questions.
    I think we have to be very careful. We are also seeing and 
polling a record drop in public confidence in the United States 
military. So, I think we have to be very careful about 
narratives--we even had a hearing here in this committee on the 
rising tide of white supremacy within our military--and keep 
those narratives data-driven. So, I appreciate 99.996 percent. 
One is too many, absolutely, and we always have to be vigilant. 
But we have to be careful about our narratives.
    I need to move on. Chairman Milley, we are absolutely 
providing more sophisticated equipment now to the Ukrainians--
counter-battery radar, my understanding, Puma UAVs in the 
latest package, finally. I would argue that this is belated. 
They should have had it last year. But we do have it in train.
    My concern is that the NATO Commander, General Wolters, 
testified that, as a policy matter, we are not conducting any 
training on this new equipment. So, my question is, why not?
    General Milley. We are not conducting training in Ukraine.
    Mr. Waltz. We are not conducting training in Poland, 
outside of Ukraine, that is what he testified. There is 
literally a handoff----
    General Milley. Yes, let me dig into that and----
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Maybe a quick verbal.
    General Milley. We may need to----
    Mr. Waltz. And so, my question is, you know that the 
training on this----
    General Milley. Sure.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Is critical.
    Secretary Austin. I think he said we were not conducting 
training in Poland. But, as you rightly point out, some of this 
gear does require training.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. Then, that drives my question then. Are we 
training the Ukrainians outside of Ukraine in any location?
    Secretary Austin. To use some of the gear, certainly, they 
have to have training, and we're doing that.
    Mr. Waltz. Great. That is fantastic. And thank you for 
clarifying that.
    General Milley. Some of them are being trained right here 
in the United States in our school system.
    Mr. Waltz. So, the Ukrainians are sending military, their 
soldiers off----
    General Milley. Well, we have Ukrainian----
    Mr. Waltz. And we are training, not IMET [International 
Military Education and Training] or those type of----
    General Milley. Yes, IMET is what I was talking about.
    Mr. Waltz. On the counter-battery, on the latest variants, 
on the things that we are providing, we are training them how 
to use it? That is reassuring.
    Secretary Austin. And you can take advantage of the 
Ukrainians that are already here----
    Mr. Waltz. Yes.
    Secretary Austin [continuing]. To leverage them as well.
    Mr. Waltz. Fantastic.
    On the Switchblade 600 variant, your Assistant Secretary 
for ISA [International Security Affairs] testified last week 
that there is a memo on your desk, Mr. Secretary, to give it 
the correct procurement authorities that we need, or the 
designation to get that thing moving. Are we cleared up there? 
Can we move that?
    Secretary Austin. The Switchblade 600 and 300 will move as 
quickly as they possibly can.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. General Wolters also testified that the 
Ukrainians would have been more effective if they had had 
Stingers pre-invasion, if they had had them on day one, trained 
up, ready to go. General Milley, do you disagree?
    General Milley. I think their air defense system, the 
larger air defense of SAMs [surface-to-air missiles], the S-
300s, Stingers for the MANPADs [man-portable air-defense 
system], and all the other varieties that the European 
countries have, the more that they had prior to the invasion, 
the better off they would have been. But I would caveat this: 
Russia has not, even today, established air superiority, and 
that is because of the effective use of MANPADs and their S-
300s.
    Mr. Waltz. Absolutely, but you wouldn't disagree that----
    General Milley. More would have been better.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. More would have been better.
    And I do think there is a lot of parallels, Mr. Secretary, 
to our approach to Taiwan. I respectfully disagree with you 
there. There are a lot of parallels, and there are a lot of 
things we should be learning--the effectiveness of sanctions as 
a deterrent and giving them the weapon systems they need pre-
invasion, not having a tough response, a robust response post-
invasion.
    Final question, General Milley, is the IRGC [Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps] a terrorist organization, and should 
it remain so? Your best military advice?
    The Chairman. You will have to take that one for the record 
because the gentleman is out of time.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 169.]
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
    General Milley. Yes.
    The Chairman. Ms. Houlahan is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you, Secretary Austin, General Milley, and Mr. 
McCord, for appearing before us today.
    I very much appreciate the challenging times that you and 
the Department are in right now, as we are facing and watching 
the horrific events of the war in Ukraine unfold.
    I also know that the Department's budget request this year 
is focused largely on modernization and transformation of the 
force. And in your written testimonies, you have mentioned how 
the Department has to modernize and divest from legacy 
platforms that may no longer meet the needs of the force right 
now here in this country.
    President Zelenskyy has repeatedly called on the United 
States to transfer aircraft and other weapon systems to 
Ukraine. And so, here, we potentially have supply with a known 
demand. Is there anything that is preventing the Department of 
Defense from transferring legacy weapon systems--and I will 
just give an example as the A-10--and other excess defense 
articles to Ukraine? Or are there any things that are 
preventing us for the training, preventing the training for 
those? Is there any additional authority that you need to be 
able to expedite or approve transferring of weapon systems to 
Ukraine? Secretary Austin.
    Secretary Austin. At this point, there are no additional 
authorities that we need. And certainly, if we need additional 
authorities, we won't hesitate to come ask you for them.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
    And with my next question, as we do identify weapons and 
systems that we can or are interested in divesting in, is there 
a process by which we can conduct due diligence to identify 
possible items for transfer to Ukraine or, to Mr. Waltz's 
point, to be more thoughtful about the future of other possible 
conflicts?
    Secretary Austin. It will be based upon their request and 
our assessment of what we have available. Also, the threat in 
the environment plays a big part of this. The ability to 
maintain the capability that we give them is also very, very 
important, and the ability to train on that equipment is also 
key.
    Ms. Houlahan. And so, using the A-10 as just an example, 
and knowing that we originally anticipated that this war would 
be a matter of days and hours, rather than now months and 
possibly years, using that A-10 as an example, is there a 
possibility of--what has the Department planned for the 21 A-
10s that are in the plan right now to divest from Fort Wayne, 
and what is the condition of those aircraft?
    Secretary Austin. Yes, again, it is not just exporting the 
A-10s.
    Ms. Houlahan. Sure.
    Secretary Austin. It is also whether or not that aircraft 
can survive in that environment, which is a key issue. And 
then, number two, whether or not they can sustain the aircraft, 
once we provide it to them. It is completely different, as you 
know, from any platform that they have or are currently using. 
And so, this is a big step, and then, training the pilots is 
not a matter of days; this is a matter of months to----
    Ms. Houlahan. Yes. Yes, sir. And I, actually, have done 
some investigation, and I think that we are on the same page, 
that our understanding is on the order of magnitude of a couple 
of months. And I know the anticipation was that this would not 
last that long, but it is clear that it might still. And again, 
the A-10 is just an example of something that we might be 
looking into.
    And with the remainder of my time, we are now in the fifth 
week with no apparent end. And we need to make sure that we are 
coming to terms with the fact that this could be longer than we 
anticipated.
    I am interested in the planned reduction of end strength 
across the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Navy, as we know, 
is already short of personnel and sea duty billets. The Air 
Force is suffering from a critical shortage of pilots. How is 
the Department forecasting and planning for this prolonged war 
in Ukraine? Maybe, General Milley, we could ask you that 
particular question.
    General Milley. Well, first, we are not directly engaged in 
combat operations in Ukraine. We are conducting deterrence and 
assurance operations in the periphery countries, the Article 5, 
NATO Article 5 countries.
    Having said that, in terms of the end strengths and the 
modest reductions in end strengths of each of the services, 
what the services have opted to do is reduce end strength a 
little bit in order to recoup savings, in order to modernize 
the force--aiming towards the 2030 timeframe, 2030-plus. And 
that is where you see these modest reductions in end strength. 
I mean, what they are trying to do is focus on China, and 
Russia secondarily, as the two principal threats in order to 
modernize and upgrade their force.
    Ms. Houlahan. Yes, and I think where my interest is, is 
that my understanding is that we haven't accounted for what 
might be a continued and increased presence in Europe in our 
force reduction planning.
    General Milley. Yes, the force posture, the long-term force 
posture in Europe is yet to be decided. It is under debate 
right now. It is under review. NATO plays a big part in that, 
and General Wolters will be making his recommendations to the 
Secretary on that.
    But, clearly, because of the war in Ukraine, there is at 
least a possibility, if not a probability, of an increased 
force presence over a lengthy period of time. That doesn't have 
to be stationing. That can be rotational. It can be a lot of 
different ways.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, gentlemen.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Johnson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, we need to understand the recruiting and 
retention challenges that the Department of Defense faces this 
year, and I am not sure if all the answers provided thus far 
have clarified it yet. So, I have a couple of questions on 
that.
    The Army has decided to cut Active Duty strength by 12,000 
soldiers in fiscal year 2023. Under Secretary Gabe Camarillo 
said last week, he said, quote, ``Like every other employer in 
the economy, we're facing some challenging conditions in terms 
of our ability to recruit and attract talent. Given the 
particular conditions of a very tight labor market, our ability 
to meet all of our projected recruiting goals were a little bit 
challenged.'' Unquote.
    Do you agree with Secretary Camarillo's assessment that it 
is the tight labor market that is the primary driver of 
recruitment challenges, at least for the Army?
    Secretary Austin. Thanks, Congressman.
    I think, actually, there are a number of things that go 
into this equation. The fact that unemployment is below 4 
percent is a key issue. But also if you take a look at the 
impact of COVID over the last couple of years, as you know, our 
recruiters recruit a lot of kids out of high school, and those 
high schools have been in session on an infrequent basis in 
terms of actual physical presence there. So, it has made things 
more complicated. The chairman mentioned a smaller population 
to recruit from.
    So, as we combine all of those things, then, you know, 
there are headwinds. And it will be--there will be headwinds 
for all of the services going forward.
    Mr. Johnson. I think that is true, but I want to 
acknowledge here that the objective facts, if we review the 
objective facts, I think the largest headwind is inescapably 
the reaction that DOD took to COVID. Let me provide some stats.
    Two years ago, right before the pandemic struck, we had the 
greatest economy in the history of the world. There were 
recruitment challenges; there have been for many years, but we 
didn't have the budget request proposing to cut 12,000 soldiers 
from the Army, like this year's budget asks. So, what has 
changed over the last 24 months? It is the Department's COVID 
vaccine mandate, and there is just no way around it. I mean, 
some have alluded to it already today. But requiring young men 
and women to take the vaccine has disqualified a huge portion 
of the population from military service.
    And here is some proof: nationwide, more than 40 percent of 
males age 18 to 24 have chosen not to become fully vaccinated, 
and as a result, they are now ineligible to join the military, 
right? Off the bat, that is 40 percent of the target 
demographic that is immediately ineligible to serve. I mean, 
this is just a fact.
    In the Southeast portion of the country, where I am from, 
that number is even greater. According to the CDC [Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention], 52 percent of 18- to 24-year-
old men in that region have chosen not to receive the vaccine. 
So, why does that specific geographic region matter so much? 
What makes the Southeast important is that, according to Under 
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, southern 
States produced nearly 47 percent of military enlistments in 
2019. That is Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, Virginia, 
Missouri, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas--fertile ground for DOD 
recruiters. But these States send their sons and daughters to 
serve the Nation at drastically higher rates than other States 
do. They contain only 38 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds in 
America, but they account for nearly half of all the 
enlistments.
    So, I understand what is being said about the tight labor 
market and the inability to meet fitness standards, and all the 
rest, but it is pretty plain, if we look at this, that DOD is 
having a recruiting and a retention crisis because it has 
disqualified over half of the male population from serving in 
the military in its best recruiting grounds, and nearly 40 
percent of men and women age 18 to 24 nationwide.
    And then, we are adding fuel to the crisis because there is 
this charade about the religious exemption process for service 
members, and I believe it is blatantly unconstitutional.
    Let me ask you quickly in the time that remains: In light 
of the obvious impact on recruitment and retention, does the 
Department have any plans to repeal or modify the current COVID 
vaccine requirement?
    Secretary Austin. I do not.
    Mr. Johnson. Let me ask you if you can tell us how many 
religious exemptions to the COVID vaccine have been granted 
across all services. And, I will note that, in February, 15 
exemptions were granted out of 16,000 applications.
    Secretary Austin. Okay. I am going to take that question 
and other COVID questions for the record. As you know, this is 
an issue in litigation. And so, I will take your questions for 
the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 170.]
    Mr. Johnson. Well, in the 40 seconds that I have remaining, 
I will just state the obvious, what a lot of people back home 
are asking me, and asking all of us, and that is: If it is so 
obvious that a vaccine mandate is causing this deficit in the 
number of troops, then why don't we just change it? I mean, 
COVID seems to be behind us----
    Secretary Austin. I certainly disagree with the premise, 
with your premise----
    Mr. Johnson. Well, I know you do, but, I mean, obviously, 
it is having a direct effect on our numbers of recruitment and 
retention, and readiness, which is of great concern to all of 
us. And I know you are not going to change your mind here 
today, but I am registering the concern of my district and many 
millions of Americans that we represent who share this opinion. 
And I hope that you will take it under advisement.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
    General Milley, Secretary Austin, thank you for your 
commitment to our Armed Forces and your service to our country.
    Gentlemen, both of you briefly touched on long-range 
precision and hypersonic fires in your testimony and the 
important role such a capability would play not only in 
integrated deterrence but also in enabling success in multi-
domain operations.
    As we work swiftly to modernize the joint force, more 
specifically, our long-range fires platforms, what ground-based 
platforms can commanders depend on to provide that capability 
and how, if at all, has the range displayed by Russian 
artillery in their war of aggression in Ukraine changed that 
thinking?
    How is the Department planning to increase our range 
without increasing our vulnerability to ground-based missile 
defense systems?
    General Milley. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    We have got a number of long-range systems in the inventory 
today. But what the Army, in particular, but also the Marine 
Corps are working on are experimental long-range fire systems. 
Those are rocket, some are hypersonic, and some are tube 
artillery, and these go very, very long range. I won't get 
into--we can have the team come over and give you a classified 
briefing on some of the experimental things that are going on.
    But we recognize that long-range and long-range precision 
fires--I'd even put that caveat on it--are critical to the 
future operational environment. That's proven true over and 
over and over again, and the ability--we're a maneuver-based 
military and for maneuver you have to have fires plus the 
movement--the mobility of the force--combined gives you 
maneuver at the lower levels or the tactical level.
    So we want to make sure that we have dominance in fires. We 
are--that's one of the critical areas of development in each of 
the services, but particularly the ground services.
    Ms. Sherrill. And, General Milley, would you consider the 
strategic long-range cannon an asset that would enable 
combatant commanders to succeed in multi-domain operations?
    General Milley. Yes. In fact that--yes, it's the basis of 
what the Army is calling multi-domain task force and what the 
Marines are calling the littoral regiments are those--is that 
cannon system.
    So that is--let's use the scenario of the South China Seas. 
With those capabilities based off shore-based long-range 
precision munitions, they should be able to do a significant 
amount of damage to any surface fleet, perhaps Chinese surface 
fleet.
    So the point is, is that that system--that particular 
system you mentioned is one of those in experimental 
development and it will be a key to a future warfight.
    Ms. Sherrill. And as the Army modernizes its indirect fire 
capabilities, will the SLRC [strategic long-range cannon] 
contribute to the integrated deterrence model? And can you 
speak on the importance that further developing a capability 
like that will have towards establishing a modern force? You 
spoke a little bit about, for example, in China how important 
that is.
    General Milley. Yeah. So I think this will be a lengthy 
conversation. But we have to start with the operating 
environment we're going to operate in and the changing 
character of war that Chairman Smith mentioned up front.
    Once we fully analyze that and understand that, what we 
derive is a set of attributes that come for each of the 
services in particular and the joint force combined.
    Ms. Sherrill. Speaking of that, would that be appropriate 
for the Marine Corps as well and their----
    General Milley. Absolutely. Yeah. So--and what the Marines 
are doing is upgrading their--and I'm aware of the debate 
that's ongoing with the Marines. But what they're trying to do 
is tailor the Marines to optimize their capability as part of 
the joint force in a future operating environment under a 
changed character of war. And there's a lot of nuance to that, 
which would be much beyond the time available here.
    But the key is the development of the doctrine, the 
organization, the personnel, the training, all of those things 
in combination to set us up for operations in the 2030s.
    That's what this budget is all about, actually.
    Ms. Sherrill. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.
    And with the Army's extended range cannon artillery system 
that was designed to close the capabilities gap between the 
U.S. and our adversaries, is there a plan to field a towed 
extended range version of the Mike-777?
    General Milley. The M-777--well, there is already a 155 
extended range towed version. So I think the short answer is 
yes, but that is not the system we're talking about. We're 
talking about the long-range precision fires that the Army's 
developing. That's not fielded yet at scale.
    There's some experimental units that are using it right 
now. They did some recent tests at White Sands, which have 
proven quite successful. But that's not yet in the field.
    Ms. Sherrill. And then as we work to build the capabilities 
within our hypersonics suite, is there not a need for a land-
based long-range surface-to-surface artillery asset that is 
more cost effective than the common hypersonic glide body and 
is readily available to combatant commanders seeking to strike 
critical targets such as headquarters, maintenance----
    The Chairman. I apologize, but the gentlelady's time has 
expired.
    Ms. Sherrill. I'll submit that question for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 169.]
    General Milley. The short answer is yes, the Army is 
developing that.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Green is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the ranking 
member. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and 
I want to, again, echo my amazing opportunity to bump into H-
MINUS [505th Parachute Infantry Regiment]--they're in Poland--
and see your previous unit that you commanded and a unit that I 
commanded.
    I'll tell you, they're doing fantastic work and so is Kevin 
Sharp, the brigade from 101st. They're just doing outstanding 
stuff.
    Brief comment. You know, 4 percent raise for troops in an 8 
percent inflation environment isn't a raise. I wish we could 
rethink that. And, certainly, I'm sure there'll be amendments 
that address it.
    Also on the topline number 4 percent in an 8 percent 
inflation is really a cut. Just want to make that comment.
    Mr. McCord, a quick comment for you. I saw a statement that 
you had made the budget was written prior to the Ukrainian 
invasion and could not be adjusted to include that.
    I want to tell you that--and I'm talking specifically about 
making adjustments due to what's going on in Ukraine--there's 
not a company in America where the board of directors would 
allow the CEO to say that. The speed of business is the speed 
of now, and the Pentagon has got to move at speed of business, 
the speed of now.
    And so, you know, in the few weeks that this thing has been 
going on, I would think that the adjustments could be made.
    Secretary Austin, a quick question for you. Who is advising 
the President that it's a good idea to allow the war criminals 
in Russia to build a nuclear reactor for Iran?
    In the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action], the 
current negotiations would allow Russia to build a nuclear 
reactor to the tune of $10 billion. These are the guys that, 
you know, have done these horrible things in Ukraine and we're 
here letting them--at least right now considering letting them 
build a nuclear reactor there.
    Secretary Austin. Well, I mean, there are a number of 
people that are leading that process. Of course, you know, our 
national security adviser plus, as you know, the State 
Department is leading the----
    Dr. Green. Let me ask you, I mean, is there somebody at DOD 
saying that's a good idea? Do you think it's a good idea?
    Secretary Austin. No, that's--no, we--I have not provided 
any counsel to the President on building----
    Dr. Green. I would ask you to do that. I think it's a 
really bad idea.
    I want to talk legacy systems, General Milley, with you if 
it's okay. We have had discussions before about phasing out 
legacy systems, bringing in new systems with the capability to 
overcome those and amplify on them. I'm a little concerned 
about JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System].
    You know, we Army guys, we love that program. It helps us, 
and there's, I guess, talk in this budget of the Air Force 
wanting to get rid of JSTARS. I'd love to hear your thoughts 
on--and maybe we have to go into a classified setting--is there 
going to be a capability gap if that thing goes away?
    General Milley. Well, first--like you, JSTARS is a great 
system. But this budget and the National Defense Strategy is 
optimizing for the pacing threat, the most significant 
strategic challenge to the United States--China--and then the 
acute challenge or the acute threat, which is Russia.
    JSTARS is not a survivable aircraft in that type of 
environment against that high-end threat. So that's point one.
    Point two, in terms of the capability that JSTARS does 
bring, which is the ability to battle track movements, et 
cetera, on the ground----
    Dr. Green. I take----
    General Milley. I'm sorry?
    Dr. Green. Targeting, too.
    General Milley. Targeting. That's right. And that 
capability will exist in a different form and from a different 
platform. But for that, I'd have to take it to a different 
session.
    Dr. Green. So there's no capability lost with that, with 
JSTARS going away?
    General Milley. I don't--no, no significant capability lost 
relative to China and Russia. If you wanted to use JSTARS in a 
lower intensity environment, then there would be because the 
JSTARS would be going away.
    But we're optimizing for China, then Russia.
    Dr. Green. I may then ask for that classified discussion so 
we can kind of go into that.
    One quick thought about this legacy falloff and the 
implementation of the new systems that are 5, 6 years out. I 
know Congressman Wittman has talked about this challenge. I'm 
aware that there's this strategic deterrence fund that hasn't 
been used for years. I'd love to get some details on that if 
you all have it because we could protect the guys across the 
aisle who don't necessarily want to see massive increases in 
the budget.
    We could fund some of the R&D for these new projects 
through that and it would be similar to the way we did the OCO 
[Overseas Contingency Operations fund] and sort of put money 
over there to--I would ask that that be considered, and even 
speaking to some of my Democrat colleagues they think that'd be 
a great idea about future systems so that we can maintain the 
capabilities in that gap period.
    Keep legacy systems around long enough, afford them in the 
current budget, and pay for the new systems in a different 
strategic fund. And if you could look into that and get back 
with my office that would be great. Thank you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 170.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this important 
hearing, and thank you, Secretary Austin and General Milley, 
for your service and for your time before us today.
    I have the honor and privilege of serving--representing El 
Paso, Texas, home to Fort Bliss, America's second largest 
military installation and the largest joint mobilization force 
generation installation in the Army, home to the 1st Armored 
Division and Joint Modernization Command.
    I'm so pleased to see $15 million in the budget for a new 
fire station at Fort Bliss and will work to ensure that that 
funding is included in this year's NDAA.
    Fort Bliss, its people, and infrastructure are critical to 
our military's readiness. From my first day as the 
Congresswoman for this great military installation, I've 
advocated for the investments needed for our assets and 
missions. I'm going to do it again here today.
    There are two infrastructure priorities that we need to 
fund critical to our readiness. The first is a modest 
investment in a railhead. The current rail infrastructure and 
design is a limiting factor in efficient movement of military 
equipment in support of deployments.
    Punting on providing funding for the railhead further 
degrades Fort Bliss' ability to mobilize and demobilize troops 
that come from every corner of the country because of the 
installation's mission as a joint mobilization force generation 
installation.
    Fort Hood has a similar number of assets and missions but a 
larger railhead. Bliss is doing the best they can but a larger 
railhead will allow them to better meet the DOD shift to meet 
the challenges of today and tomorrow, namely China.
    The second is the need for new barracks. I've been in the 
barracks at Fort Bliss and can tell you they are in poor shape 
and inadequately cooled. In a desert environment like El Paso 
where we have had more record-breaking triple digit 
temperatures each year as a result of the climate crisis, the 
barracks can become so hot I can easily see someone passing out 
as a result.
    I know there's some 3D [three-dimensional] printing 
innovation going on. But I want to emphasize that degraded 
living spaces and substandard facilities at our installations 
lowers morale, increases health and safety risks, and 
negatively impacts retention, which in turn affects our 
readiness.
    I provide these two examples in order to make sure that 
Fort Bliss remains top of mind to you and also to point out 
that our readiness is directly tied to the infrastructure we 
have here at home at key installations like Fort Bliss.
    Secretary Austin and General Milley, could you talk about 
where you see Fort Bliss fitting into the Department's plans 
for addressing the pacing challenge with China and modernizing 
our military?
    Secretary Austin. Well, as you've said, Fort Bliss has--
houses some of our most capable forces there with our armored 
forces and also some air defense capability. So it is an 
important installation to us and I share your concerns with 
making sure that we have the right facilities for our troops 
and make sure that our troops are taken care of. That's very, 
very important to me. We'll make sure that we go back and work 
with the Army to see where things stand in priority and get a 
better understanding of when and how these things are funded.
    General Milley. And I would just echo what the Secretary 
said. Fort Bliss is a strategic platform for the deployment of 
some really significant combat power in the armored division 
that's there. And as mentioned through many previous member 
comments about the importance of air defense systems, Patriot 
and so on, that's all done at Fort Bliss.
    And, of course, you know as well as I do that Fort Bliss is 
adjacent to White Sands Missile Range. A lot of testing for 
modernization is done there. So we want to make sure that the 
railheads are good so they can deploy the force.
    We want to make sure the barracks is squared away to ensure 
that the force itself is being taken care of so we can achieve 
those strategic objectives. I'll get with the Chief of Staff of 
the Army.
    I wasn't--you know, I'm former Chief of Staff of the Army. 
I wasn't tracking the barracks at Bliss have deteriorated that 
bad. But let me get back to you on an answer for that.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 169.]
    Ms. Escobar. Appreciate it. In my remaining 30 seconds, I 
just want to emphasize, as we have heard, some of my colleagues 
talk about legacy systems. It's really on Congress. It's 
important to us that we heed the advice that you've given us in 
classified and unclassified settings about the need to invest 
in the right way.
    My time is up. I yield back. Thank you both. And by the 
way, invite you both--would be honored to host you at Fort 
Bliss.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Carl is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 
for willingness to come in here and speak to us. I've got three 
quick points and one question. So you know when you get to me 
you're at the end of the line. So that's the good news.
    You know, on this defense budget, I, personally, am tired 
of a defense budget process that does not supply our troops or 
meet our global defensive needs. For example, reducing our 
naval fleet in order to stretch insufficient personnel across 
fewer ships indicates how backwards our defense spending 
approach has become.
    Second point, our withdrawal of Afghanistan indicates a 
completely avoidable failure of leadership and has made the 
world and our homeland less safe rather than more safe.
    And the third point, our refueling capability is essential, 
especially given the challenges presented by the Indo-Pacific. 
Last year in the same setting we had this conversation.
    I asked you both, General Milley--I asked you both where we 
are, essentially, on the circumstances with the KC-46. We were 
briefed last week that the KC-46 is capable of refueling 86 
percent of our aircraft. Would anyone in this room buy a car 
with the idea of it working 86 percent of the time and not 100 
percent of the time?
    So my frustration is really with this KC-46 and my 
question, General Milley and General Austin, I ask both of you 
why are we not moving forward with the next-generation tanker, 
the LMXT, which I understand is serving us quite well in 
Europe?
    General Milley. Yeah, thanks for that.
    Well, first, on your comment about refueling in general, 
that is a strategic capability that we have got to sustain, 
improve because the legs of aircraft, especially over the 
Pacific, are too short on a single tank of gas to be involved 
in a Chinese warfight, given that the Chinese do have anti-
access capabilities. Point one.
    Point two is the survivability of those aircraft is every 
bit as important as their ability to refuel an aircraft. So 
those are particularly vulnerable aircraft. So those two things 
have to be worked on.
    In this particular budget, if memory serves me right I 
think there is 15 KC-46es as part of this. We are phasing out 
some KC-135s. And I agree with you on the LMX piece. I think 
that is the next generation.
    We need to get going with that because that is more 
survivable and it handles a greater ability to refuel the 
fleet. So I'm not in disagreement with any of that. But 
refueling is a critical strategic capability that we have, and 
if you take it back to our--the American way of war, what makes 
us so much different than many other countries is our ability 
to project combat power very rapidly at great distances from 
continental United States and refueling, along with a maritime 
fleet, along with many other capabilities, are what enable us 
to do that.
    So that's a key area of investment that we need to continue 
to do.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir.
    Secretary Austin. I agree with what the chairman said. 
Refueling capability is a significant part of our strategic 
advantage and we have to make sure that we maintain the 
capability to fuel or refuel all of our aircraft.
    And so for a period of time, we'll need to make sure we 
have a kind of a blend of capabilities so until we get some of 
the problems fixed on the 46.
    But investing in the next generation, I think, is the right 
thing to do. So I agree with what you've raised there.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield my time.
    Ms. Escobar [presiding]. Mr. Golden is recognized.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    Secretary Austin and General Milley, thank you for being 
here today, and thank you for your lifetime of service to the 
country's defense.
    You know, sitting here for now 3 hours similar to the way 
that you two have it occurs to me that these hearings, 
obviously, are very important. It's why we do them, that the 
oversight is critical. The debate, I think, can be a real 
source of strength in the policymaking process when done 
correctly and done, I think in a general act of good faith.
    We have also seen some examples where, perhaps, it's not 
helpful in regards to the message it can send to the world, to 
our friends and our foes, and, most importantly, to the 
American people.
    In regards to that, I want to talk about something we 
really haven't talked about today and that's a recent opinion 
piece in The Wall Street Journal you may have seen, written by 
a former Member of Congress as well as a former secretary of a 
cabinet of a different Presidential administration past.
    And what's concerning about it, I think, is the message 
that it sends to the American people and to others who are 
paying attention and this has to do with the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps' current force redesign.
    I wanted to ask a couple of questions about this, and I'm 
going to start with General Milley. It says here that there are 
people out there who are feeling that it is unclear, 
particularly for people with experience in military planning, 
what formal review and coordination was required of the 
Commandant, before--his words, the author of this opinion 
piece--before the Commandant unilaterally announced a policy 
that would alter the Marine Corps.
    It goes on to say that the law doesn't give the Commandant 
carte blanche to make significant changes in force structure 
but, rather, title 10 provides that the Commandant performs his 
duties subject to the authority, direction, and control of the 
Secretary of the Navy, who also, by the way, is subject to the 
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.
    And that, finally, the President retains ultimate authority 
as Commander in Chief. The next paragraph here says that 
there's a problem in a restructuring of this scale having moved 
through without full consideration and debate in front of the 
proper offices within the Pentagon, such as the Defense 
Resource Board or others, and that a formal approval by the 
SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] should have been conducted before 
it was sent to the White House for further review and then sent 
to Congress for oversight hearings.
    Lastly, I would point out that the opinion piece asserts 
that this announcement was made during COVID making it 
difficult for congressional oversight to take place, and I 
think, perhaps, for you, General Milley, most concerning, it 
asserts that due to the chaos that existed in the Pentagon 
during the 2020 campaign year and post-election turbulence 
that, perhaps, this proposal has just floated through improper 
channels.
    And so I wanted to ask you, you've been around in this 
position since October of 2019. Do you have any concern along 
the way, having had this reforce--this restructure announced in 
March of 2020 that the proper process has not been followed?
    General Milley. No. And I read the piece by Senator Webb, 
and I have enormous respect for Senator Webb, by the way----
    Mr. Golden. As do I.
    General Milley [continuing]. As a Navy Cross winner, Marine 
veteran, a tremendous Navy Secretary, et cetera.
    I read the piece, and Dave Berger--the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, General Berger--he pretty rigorously thought this 
through with the Marine Corps Staff and the Navy Staff, and he 
did brief it up through various elements within the Department 
of Defense.
    I can't say about the White House piece. I assume he does 
hearings as well. I'm assuming that the oversight committees 
have heard it many times about the restructure of the Marine, 
you know, 2030 plan.
    But let's take a look just for a second. What is--what are 
they actually doing materially? What are they physically doing? 
You know, reducing by 3 infantry battalions, that certainly--
there's only 31 infantry battalions in the Marine Corps. So 
it's not a large force to begin with.
    Mr. Golden. We're almost out of time. Let me just say I 
think it's important. You were aware----
    General Milley. Yeah. We were----
    Mr. Golden [continuing]. That the Marine--you were aware 
that they'd been in front of Congress for oversight.
    General Milley. We were aware, and I'm also aware the 
alumni community of the Marine Corps is quite upset about it.
    Mr. Golden. The Secretary of the Navy under multiple 
administrations is aware of this----
    General Milley. Yeah.
    Mr. Golden [continuing]. And approved it. Obviously, it was 
greenlighted to come----
    General Milley. I believe the answer is yes to all that.
    Mr. Golden. And you're committed to ensuring that that 
proper process is followed, going forward?
    General Milley. Of course.
    Mr. Golden. Because my understanding of the Marines, as 
they're implementing this, they're also flexible and they're 
learning lessons and making adjustments, correct? So----
    General Milley. Totally. I have no problem with the process 
that was followed, and that may not have come clear to the 
Senator or others out in the alumni community.
    But inside the Pentagon, it's my belief anyway, because I 
saw it and so did many members of Department of Defense and I 
know the committees of oversight saw it.
    So I think that part of the process----
    Ms. Escobar. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Golden. It's an important point. Thank you.
    General Milley. Thank you.
    Ms. Escobar. Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent that all 
committee members have three legislative days to revise and 
extend their remarks and to include extraneous materials into 
the record.
    [Documents submitted by Mr. Gaetz can be found in the 
Appendix beginning on page 121.]
    Ms. Escobar. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Moore. Mr. Moore is recognized.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter strengthens national 
security, enhances global partnerships, and powers economic 
growth across our nation. I agree with Air Force chiefs--Chief 
of Staff Brown that the F-35 is, indeed, the cornerstone of Air 
Force modernization. It remains the most lethal, survivable, 
and connected fighter in the world, giving pilots an advantage 
against any adversary and then, most importantly, enabling them 
to execute their mission to come home safely.
    At Hill Air Force Base in Utah, our 388th Fighter Wing is 
the Air Force's first Active Duty combat capable F-35A 
Lightning unit. Right now, F-35s from the base's 34th Squadron 
have been deployed to Germany in response to Russia's 
aggression in Ukraine.
    However, I'm concerned that these fifth-generation aircraft 
have not consistently been accompanied with equally modern and 
advanced weaponry. The weaponry to accompany fifth-generation 
aircraft must include cyber and electronic warfare 
capabilities, superior radars and sensors, unmanned 
capabilities, and the ability to defeat rapidly relocatable 
targets in an anti-access environment.
    From my understanding JASSM [Joint Air-to-surface Standoff 
Missile] and LRASM [Long Range Anti-ship Missile] and the 
Stand-in Attack Weapon can help the F-35 reach its full 
potential as a fifth-generation fighter.
    Secretary Austin--and thank you all for being here and for 
your service--can you provide an update on the implementation 
of advanced weaponry for the F-35 with battle management 
capabilities needed to address an increasingly adversarial 
threats?
    Secretary Austin. Yeah. So we're working hard to make sure 
that, you know, we do in fact achieve the upgrades, going 
forward, that you mentioned and we are able to integrate the 
capabilities from cyber and information that you mentioned.
    That's a work in progress. We will continue to invest in 
precision-guided munitions because that's really, really 
important to us, and you've seen us invest in the upgrade of 
those precision-guided munitions to make sure that they're 
survivable.
    Mr. Moore. And I like to look at it and, you know, as I dig 
into this with my team and some of my stakeholders back home, 
I'd like to--you make a comparison. With an $80 million plane 
that we are putting 50-year-old weapons technology into, 
important piece, especially as we talk about the budget today, 
do you think there has been enough attention given to the 
weaponry available to the F-35?
    Secretary Austin. One of my priorities is to ensure that we 
continue to invest in the upgrade of our PGMs [precision-guided 
munitions] and that we have sufficient quantities of PGMs on 
hand. So we're going to continue to invest in this.
    Mr. Moore. Thank you. My last question is related to the 
number--the number of F-35s. The DOD is insistent it still 
plans to seek a total of 1,763 F-35s. However, at a rate of 33 
per year, that would take half a century. How is a decreased F-
35 buy--F-35 buy justified to meet the needs of peer 
competition in, you know, the very apparent and obvious 
adversarial AORs [areas of responsibility] that are increasing 
across our globe?
    Just comment on are we doing enough on this F-35 buy and by 
decreasing it are we ready--are we ready for the next fights?
    Secretary Austin. So peer competition is exactly what we 
have in mind and we want to make sure that we have the right 
mix of capabilities in the inventory as we go forward. And as 
you look across the FYDP you'll see that we invest in F-35s in 
a significant way. But--and the F-35 and the F-22 have specific 
roles in the fight and they are very, very capable aircraft. 
But other aircraft are also relevant and so we want to make 
sure we have the right mix.
    Mr. Moore. I've been impressed with--you know, one of the--
one of the highlights of this role--I'm in my first term in 
Congress and one of the highlights is getting--interacting 
individually with the pilots back on our Air Force base.
    I think a lot of us have that chance to go and hear their 
perspective, and they have such incredible ideas and such 
closeness to these weapon systems, and I know there's a real 
strong desire for their voice to be heard and the airmen as 
they work on these every day, and just will constantly 
encourage.
    There's no question here. I just want to constantly 
encourage our leadership and our committee to be thinking about 
what that direct base level input is and how important that is 
because they have amazing ideas and I just wanted to take this 
opportunity amidst the turmoil going on in the world to thank 
them for their service and really appreciate from every base 
but, particularly, where we have, you know, assets deployed 
from Ogden, Utah, right now and Layton.
    Thank you. Yield back.
    Ms. Escobar. Mrs. Luria is recognized.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you. General Milley, I noticed earlier in 
a comment to Mr. Bacon you said that, I don't think we're 
taking too much risk with regards to China and Russia.
    So one of the things that--when we look at the budget, we 
look at what's in it, what's not in it, the things that are 
unfunded requirements list, there's risk associated with each 
of those choices that were made based off of the topline and 
what you've included in the budget coming over to us.
    And I know that in title 10 it requires a Chairman's Risk 
Assessment, which would normally be submitted annually by 
February 15th. Have you submitted the risk assessment this 
year?
    General Milley. I have not. Typically, in sequence it goes 
National Security Strategy, then National Defense Strategy and 
then National Military Strategy, then the budget, then the 
Chairman's Risk Assessment.
    So--but anyway, I have it. It's in draft and it'd be 
submitted shortly. So talk risk for just a second. So the way 
we do that--the way I do it and the way we, as a Department 
have done it, or the Joint Staff has done it--is take a look at 
the probability and the consequence of a specific event and 
then measure it against the risk to force, risk to mission. 
Evaluate against time and the cost to troops, how much you 
are--what are you going to lose in terms of the bodies. So----
    Mrs. Luria. Well, can I jump in really quickly? So when was 
the last time the risk assessment was done?
    General Milley. It was 2 years ago.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Right. So August of 2020, asking also, 
perhaps, why it wasn't done last year.
    But I've reviewed the previous risk assessments and they 
don't really follow the format that you're stating and also 
they don't really follow the format as required in title 10 and 
include all of the elements in them that are necessary, which I 
think was written that way because that allows us to make 
decisions, perhaps, adding additional resources to the defense 
budget.
    General Milley. Sure.
    Mrs. Luria. So, go ahead, please. I'm sorry.
    General Milley. Okay. I'll do better on rewriting it in 
accordance with the formats. But my point being is the 
substance of any risk assessment that we do is relative to 
that.
    So the probability--we're evaluating risk in this--for this 
budget and this NDS relative to China and Russia, and specific 
to China, when I said my comment to Mr. Bacon earlier about 
the--I don't think it's too much risk, I think that we have 
mitigated risk relative to China and I think that the 
probability of armed conflict with China, the consequence would 
be high but the probability is not high in the near term in 
terms of this particular budget.
    Now, as you get in the outyears--as you get in the 
outyears, I think that----
    Mrs. Luria. What do you define by outyears?
    General Milley. Outyears is beyond five years. So beyond 
the FYDP.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. But that does not concur with what we 
have heard from Admiral Davidson and----
    General Milley. What Admiral Davidson said and Admiral 
Aquilino said was they said that the probability--or the 
capability of China to attack Taiwan is going to be 2027, 
capability, not probability.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay.
    General Milley. And that is exactly what President Xi 
charged his military to do.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, I would say that myself and many others 
on this committee interpreted Admiral Aquilino and Davidson's 
statements differently, but as we're limited in time----
    General Milley. Sure. They were interpreted differently. 
But what they said was the capability to attack Taiwan was 
going to be developed by 2027. That's not the same as a 
decision to attack Taiwan.
    Mrs. Luria. I think that they said that there was a high 
probability within the next 6 years--now 5 years, and I've 
heard that conversation directly with Admiral Aquilino.
    General Milley. So I think he said increased--increase of--
--
    Mrs. Luria. Just so that we can get through the question 
about risk.
    General Milley. Okay.
    Mrs. Luria. So, you know, the purpose is to say how the 
current and future risk changes with regards to the budget 
that's submitted, and so with the budget priorities, the 
tradeoffs, the physical constraints. And so there's some things 
in here.
    I mean, we're decomming [decomissioning] 24 ships. We're 
only building eight. You say nine. We're delaying the LAWs 
[light amphibious warships] for the Marine Corps to come to the 
fight in the Pacific. We're not maximizing our shipbuilding 
capacity.
    We could build 15 DDGs [guided-missile destroyers]. We're 
only building 10. We're stopping the LPD production line. We're 
pushing out the LHA [landing helicopter assault], the unfunded 
requirements list. Risk--like, what are the things that can 
prevent an invasion of Taiwan?
    You know, it's the bottom of the unfunded requirements list 
for offensive mining. Is the Air Force investing in long-range 
anti-surface missiles, LRASM? You know, these things that, in 
my mind, are priorities to accomplish our goals are some of 
them not even funded or not funded sufficiently.
    So you've made decisions there to fund this but put this on 
the unfunded requirements listed so there's a risk. So that is 
what I feel is not being communicated to the committee, and 
you're here requesting $773 billion and I feel like you haven't 
provided, you know, the most basic information necessary to 
understand what this budget will or will not do for the 
defense.
    General Milley. Well, just 30 seconds left. So as quickly 
as I can, I don't think that decommissioning ships that are 30 
years old that have no relevance to a fight against China, or 
limited relevance----
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Don't have time in 30 seconds to cover 
this topic. But I do think that I'm looking forward to reading 
about that in the risk assessment when it's submitted soon.
    So thank you, Chairman.
    General Milley. I don't think it's excessive risk.
    Ms. Escobar. Mrs. Bice is recognized.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you. I want to say thank you to Secretary 
Austin and General Milley for spending an extraordinary amount 
of time with us today.
    Secretary Austin, I understand that the Air Force plans to 
begin phasing out a number of the E-3 Sentry aircraft in 2023. 
As you know, this is an important platform for command and 
control, target detection, and battle management.
    I am concerned that if we phase out this aircraft without 
the replacement of the E-7 online, then we will lose critically 
needed combat capability. I'm also concerned that bases like 
Tinker Air Force Base would experience a decline in associated 
institutional knowledge, readiness, and workforce proficiency 
if we can't transition this workforce to the E-7 concurrently.
    Secretary, can you tell me how the Department plans to fill 
the capability gap of the E-3 aircraft if they are retired 
without a replacement at hand?
    Secretary Austin. We'll need to manage the transition to 
make sure that we have adequate capability on hand as we bring 
on new capabilities.
    Mrs. Bice. But at the current time, we're talking about 
taking out E-3s before those E-7s are even being built.
    Secretary Austin. Yeah. So and there are other platforms 
and ways to give us the situational awareness that we need and 
we'll leverage those platforms. But we'll continue to manage, 
you know, the transition to ensure that we have what we need to 
be relevant in the fight, going forward.
    Mrs. Bice. Are you suggesting that there is some other 
platform that's being considered to replace the capability of 
the E-3?
    Secretary Austin. There are a number of platforms that 
we'll use to create the situational awareness or provide 
situational awareness that you've alluded to.
    Mrs. Bice. But an aircraft may not be it?
    Secretary Austin. A number of capabilities.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you.
    Like many of my colleagues, I feel that the defense budget, 
in some cases, inadequately addresses the threats that we're 
facing today. I very much appreciate the pay increases for our 
service members in the budget. But as has been mentioned many 
times over, the pay increase does not actually cover the 
current cost of inflation. That's essentially a pay cut for our 
service members and their families.
    With the recent technological breakthroughs made by China 
and the growing military budgets of our foreign adversaries, do 
you think the President's budget, which fails to keep pace with 
inflation, is appropriate and adequate to counter these rising 
threats?
    Secretary Austin. This is a significant budget and it 
provides us the capability--the ability to go after the 
capabilities we need to support our warfighting concepts and 
our strategy overall. A significant budget.
    Mrs. Bice. I want to piggyback off of what Representative 
Luria mentioned with the risk assessment and, General Milley, 
if you'd like to comment on this piece of this.
    The conversation has really focused on military readiness 
and/or military equipment. How much emphasis are we putting on 
cyber and space? I think that's a piece that, in some cases, is 
maybe being put on the back burner.
    I remember in the opening testimony, I think, there's $2 
billion that's being invested. But how much are we really 
focused on ensuring that we have the proper capabilities from a 
cyber and space perspective?
    General Milley. This budget is putting in $27 billion, I 
think it is, into space that's space-specific and then there's 
probably additional monies throughout the Air Force and Space 
Command and Space Force beyond that $27, and then I think it's 
$11 or $12 billion into cyber. So I think that's pretty 
significant investments in both of those domains.
    Mrs. Bice. Any comments, Secretary Austin?
    Secretary Austin. The chairman's got it exactly right--
$27.6 billion in space and over $11 billion for cyber.
    Mrs. Bice. Do you think that $2 billion for AI is adequate?
    Secretary Austin. I do. I do.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you. I yield back.
    Ms. Escobar. Mr. Panetta is recognized.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Gentlemen, good morning. Thank you for your service and, of 
course, thank you for being here.
    Obviously, I think the invasion of Ukraine has pretty 
much--I believe it's revitalized democracies and as the 
administration and President said, it's strengthened our NATO's 
resolve and we have seen that, basically, in the fact that 
you're seeing other NATO countries beefing up their force--
their forces, and that includes what we're doing in regards to 
the defense budget that you submitted, the $813 billion, very, 
very large on its face.
    However, when you look at it compared to this year's 
budget, it's just 2 percent more.
    Also, you take into account inflation and the 2.5 percent 
of our budget, which is sort of an optimistic number. Some are 
actually saying that it's going to be a real terms cut in 
regards to defense spending and that Congress is going to have 
to do what it did this year and add probably close to $30 
billion.
    Moreover, the budget does not take into account what's 
spent on nukes, what's spent on resettling of Afghans, and our 
help with Ukraine at this point. Additionally, the release of 
this budget is before the release of the National Security 
Strategy.
    So, just quickly, combined with the inflation rate, one, do 
you think this is a cut--this is going to be a cut in defense 
spending? And two, because it doesn't take into account the 
National Security Strategy, will we need to review this budget 
at a later time?
    Secretary Austin. Thanks, Congressman.
    We actually built this budget based upon our National 
Defense Strategy, and a National Defense Strategy, as you know, 
has been released, and again, we would make significant effort 
to ensure that this budget gave us the capabilities that we 
needed to execute that strategy.
    So to answer your question, yes, and I do think--again, 
this is a substantial budget and it gives us the ability to go 
after those capabilities.
    Mr. Panetta. Understood. In regards--and thank you for 
that, Mr. Secretary--in regards to NATO, looking at the DIANA 
project, which I'm sure you're very aware of, which, you know, 
I believe will reinforce the transatlantic cooperation in 
important areas like hypersonic weapons and, of course, space 
technology--Secretary Austin, do you believe that the DIANA 
project offers the type of framework that we need to improve 
and refine NATO's capabilities to design, build, and validate 
our missile defense programs?
    Secretary Austin. I do. It's one of a number of things that 
will, you know, provide NATO the ability to be forward looking 
and, of course, you know, we'll go in and NATO will go in and 
review its requirements and concepts, going forward.
    So, but in terms of us, the United States of America, we 
routinely work with allies and partners to--and as we develop 
additional capabilities, and I pointed to AUKUS earlier on. 
That not only is focused on development of the submarine, but 
also working with our partner in developing technologies in AI 
and hypersonics and other things.
    Mr. Panetta. Right. And in regards--obviously, you've heard 
a number of questions in this hearing and in other hearings or 
at least I have heard many of my colleagues talk about the 
deterrence. Do you believe that DIANA will help our NATO allies 
as we continue to face, obviously, the challenges but fortify a 
collective deterrent?
    Secretary Austin. What will help us most, going forward, is 
our ability to remain united and committed to defending--excuse 
me, NATO territory. Again, there are a number of things that go 
into this equation.
    Sharing of information, for example, is one of those things 
which enabled us to create transparency and bolster confidence 
and led to what we're seeing--excuse me, in NATO right now and 
that's, largely, a part--that's, largely, a measure of what the 
President--his decision early on to do things to help us be 
able to share insights and information with our partners, and 
that transparency has really been helpful to us.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, 
gentlemen.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Mrs. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all 
for being here. I really appreciate it.
    I want to follow up on Ms. Luria's question when--as it 
pertains to risk. When do you think we'll have the risk 
assessment piece done?
    General Milley. Yeah, that's my responsibility to get that 
done and get it submitted to the Secretary and the President. 
Probably--my guess is in the next couple of weeks.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay. If you go through the risk----
    General Milley. And that gets submitted to you as well. 
It's not just to the Secretary and the President.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you. If, in that risk assessment, we 
find some glaring risks that maybe we didn't foresee, at that 
time, I'm assuming we will make some changes to the budget.
    General Milley. That's part of the idea is for--to submit 
it to the Secretary and the President and to the Congress--that 
if there are errors or glaring errors----
    Mrs. McClain. But not errors but significant risks, because 
it's----
    General Milley. Yeah. Yeah.
    Mrs. McClain. I'm trying to wrap my head around----
    General Milley. Significant risk has to be covered by the 
mitigating factors of the budget.
    Mrs. McClain. I'm trying to wrap my head around how we put 
together a budget but we don't really have a good risk 
assessment. Am I not understanding that correctly?
    General Milley. No, we do--well, I participate in the 
budget and my staff does as well. So there is a iterative 
process of risk assessment throughout the----
    Mrs. McClain. So we have a general idea. Okay. Thank you, 
sir.
    Then I need some clarification from both of you on the 
President's budget request for combat vehicles. Can you explain 
the Army's rationale for the precipitous drop in vehicle 
procurement, specifically, the Abrams tank, and what risks are 
we incurring with that drop in procurement of the Abrams tanks?
    General Milley. Well, first, we have got about 4,000 or 
5,000 tanks in the inventory. So, again, it's relative to the 
National Defense Strategy and we are optimizing the military 
for a fight that will occur sometime--if it occurs at all--
hopefully, it never does--in the 2030s and tanks may or may 
not--probably not--play a very significant role in a war 
against China in the 2030s.
    What will play a really significant role will be space and 
cyber, but also air defense systems, long-range precision 
fires, naval capabilities and air capabilities, and sub force.
    Mrs. McClain. So we just don't see a ground war, so to 
speak?
    General Milley. With China? The ground will have a--the 
ground forces--Marine and Army--will play an important role. 
But the dominant role will be played by the air and maritime 
forces.
    Mrs. McClain. With that then, the Air Force is the oldest, 
smallest, and least ready in its entire history. The Air Force 
leadership has repeatedly explained that they need to procure 
at least 72 fighter aircraft.
    However, in 2023 DOD budget cuts the Air Force new tactical 
combat aircraft, only to buy 57. So with the future being in 
air and space where we really need, why are we not fulfilling 
the 72? Why are we only procuring 57 if that's the future?
    General Milley. I thought it was--well, I----
    Mrs. McClain. Maybe I----
    General Milley. A minor point. I thought it was to 61.
    Mrs. McClain. Well, let's even say it's 61. It's still less 
than what has been requested, right?
    General Milley. Yeah. The Air Force opted to want to buy 
and purchase and return that money for--to build a Block 4 F-
35, which is the most advanced of the versions, right.
    So the ones that are being chosen not to buy, those are 
Block 3s. So we want to get the most advanced versions of these 
aircraft. The F-35 is going to be the quarterback of the joint 
force in a fight in the Western Pacific.
    That aircraft is critical and we want the most modern 
capabilities and that's what--that's what we're purchasing.
    Mrs. McClain. So we're just--we're taking the same money. 
We're just deferring it to a different air----
    General Milley. That's the idea behind what C.Q. Brown and 
the Secretary of the Air Force had decided to do.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay. And just an overall question in my last 
minute is it appears, with inflation being, you know, 8 percent 
and our budget being less than inflation, you know, we have all 
talked about we're not keeping up with inflation.
    One of the risks that I'm assuming that we're assessing is 
the risks on how we look to our adversaries and our allies in 
terms of our budget weakness, and I say that is if I look at 
China, for example, which is one of our major adversaries, 
right, they are spending--maybe even overspending, some could 
argue. We are cutting back. What message do you think that 
sends to our allies and adversaries, sir?
    General Milley. Yeah. So I don't think we are----
    Mrs. McClain. Either one. Either one.
    General Milley. I don't think we're cutting back. I think 
this is a substantial budget. Seven hundred--three-quarters of 
a trillion dollars is a lot of money. The Chinese are spending 
about $500 billion, $560 billion or so on their announced 
budget. If you factor in things like the----
    The Chairman. And I apologize. The lady's time has expired.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. Mr. Horsford is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you to our witnesses.
    Secretary Austin, it's my understanding that the Air Force 
intends to submit a legislative proposal this year requesting 
expanded usage of the Nevada Test and Training Range located in 
my district.
    This new proposal would come amid the ongoing effort by the 
Navy to reach an accessible compromise with local stakeholders 
regarding modernization of the Fallon Range Training Complex.
    I am deeply concerned, and I want to bring to your 
attention, that the Nevada delegation has still not been 
consulted on the Nevada Test and Training Range proposal or 
have been given details regarding the Air Force's plan.
    So my question is when will the Air Force share their 
proposal with the Nevada delegation and our constituents, and 
can you commit to ensuring that the Department works 
collaboratively with our delegation as well as our local, 
State, and tribal leaders to develop an accessible proposal for 
joint use in the Nevada Test and Training Range?
    Secretary Austin. On the first part of the question in 
terms of when they intend to share, I'll take that for the 
record and get back to you on what the--what their plan is.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 170.]
    Secretary Austin. And yes, we--you know, you have my 
commitment to make sure that we're transparent in what we're 
doing.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, sir. I look forward to working 
with you.
    I'd like to shift now to the small community of remotely 
piloted aircraft [RPA] crews shouldering the burden of over-
the-horizon operations in the Middle East and around the world. 
As the Air Force works to identify ways to improve quality of 
life for RPA crews, I want to ensure that the Department is 
leveraging all available tools already at its disposal.
    Secretary Austin, has the Department considered expanding 
the combat zone tax exclusion to RPA crews flying in support of 
named combat operations? Given their direct participation in 
these operations, would you support this expansion?
    Secretary Austin. In terms of expanding the combat zone, 
that's a thing that's, you know, is relevant to the area that 
we're actually fighting in and that's physical space on the 
ground.
    As to whether or not we provide credit to the troops that 
are engaged in activities there, that's a different issue. I 
know it's one that the Air Force has taken up before.
    I certainly support rewarding and awarding those airmen, 
soldiers, sailors that have participated in meaningful ways 
appropriately.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
    General Milley, given the unique burdens and stressors 
faced by RPA crews, would you commit to exploring the expansion 
of this program, the Special Operations Command's Preservation 
of the Force and Family program to include RPA crews flying in 
support of combat operations?
    General Milley. I'll absolutely take a look at that, along 
with the Secretary. Absolutely.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you. Changing subjects, in recent 
months, we have seen a concerning rise in attacks on LGBT 
[lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender] rights in statehouses 
across the country. These include efforts to deny life-saving 
medical care to our most vulnerable youth and a range of other 
potentially deadly policies.
    Secretary Austin, what steps is the Department taking to 
shield Active Duty service members and their dependents from 
these hateful attacks and are State laws denying or restricting 
gender-affirming care considered during the PCS [permanent 
change of station] process for service members with impacted 
dependents?
    Secretary Austin. Yeah. So there are some--there is some 
litigation ongoing with respect to a couple of States here and 
this particular issue. And so I won't comment on that.
    What I will say is that--and you've heard me say this and 
demonstrate this before--that all of our troops are important 
to us. They're at the top of my priority in terms of their 
health and well-being, and we want to provide opportunity for 
everybody who's qualified to serve in our military. And 
everything that we have done, you know, up to this point 
reflects that.
    We'll continue to do everything within our power to take 
care of our population.
    Mr. Horsford. So just related to that, in my final moments, 
it's my understanding that in 2021 DOD issued only about 4,000 
prescription for PrEP [pre-exposure prophylaxis], despite the 
fact that HIV [human immunodeficiency virus] infection rate 
among Active Duty service members has nearly doubled.
    So what steps has the DOD taken to improve access to PrEP 
to our service members?
    Secretary Austin. Yeah. I can't answer that question. But I 
will take it for the record. I'll get back to you on what we're 
doing or not doing in DOD.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 170.]
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being 
here today.
    As a 31-year Army veteran myself, as a grateful father of 
four service members who've served in Iraq, Egypt, and 
Afghanistan, I want you to succeed, and that's why I'm 
concerned, as Sean Hannity has pointed out, that correctly 
identified that we're in day 234 since the murder of 13 
American service members in Afghanistan as we left American 
personnel--Americans behind.
    I hope that you both can, by immediately providing help to 
Ukraine now, the most advanced military equipment for a victory 
for the people of Ukraine. We need to show our resolve and show 
our success for the very brave people of Ukraine who are just 
remarkably pushing back against Putin.
    With that in mind, General Austin, the front page of The 
Washington Post provided on February 28th--it speaks for 
itself--that Putin is threatening--he's a war criminal, I 
believe--the families of America and our allies with nuclear 
weapons.
    Modernization of our strategic nuclear stockpile should be 
a top priority, moving forward. We cannot expect to deter Putin 
when the nuclear capabilities are lagging behind theirs.
    Putin's recent invasion of Ukraine, which included threats 
of first strike nuclear attack toward America and our allies, 
elevated nuclear modernization on the Department's priority 
list. Can you explain the importance of modernization for 
deterrence?
    Secretary Austin. Thanks, sir. It's absolutely critical. 
You've heard me say before the triad has served us well over 
the years, and my goal is to make sure that it continues to do 
so. And that's why we have invested over $34 billion in this 
budget towards the modernization of our triad.
    Mr. Wilson. And, indeed, what you're saying peace through 
strength works.
    And also, General, in May 2018, NNSA [National Nuclear 
Security Administration] announced that it would pursue a new 
approach for the plutonium pit production split between the 
facilities at Los Alamos and the Savannah River Site.
    The war criminal Putin has the ability to produce plutonium 
pits, yet the United States currently lacks this ability. Does 
the Department of Defense continue to support the two-site 
solution for the plutonium pit production? How can we 
reasonably expect that this vital program will be adequately 
supported when the Department's budget request does not even 
exceed the rate of inflation?
    Secretary Austin. I can assure you that we're going to--
we're going to make sure that we have the capability that we 
require to make sure that our triad remains functional and 
safe, and so this is a thing that we'll continue to invest in.
    But we'll maintain the capability to do what needs to be 
done.
    Mr. Wilson. And the two-site solution to--with the 
capabilities of Los Alamos and Savannah River, that's critical 
that it be two sites?
    Secretary Austin. Well, what's critical is that we maintain 
the capability that we need and, again, as we look at things, 
going forward, you know, we'll make the right decisions. But my 
commitment to you is that we will make sure that we have the 
right capability--adequate capability to be successful.
    Mr. Wilson. And the American people need to know. Many of 
the pits that we have are 60 years old and so this is something 
that's just got to be done and the two-site solution would 
really work to the benefit of American people.
    And the final question, General, gruesomely, our treasured 
ally, India, the world's largest democracy, is choosing to 
align itself with the Kremlin by choosing Russian weapon 
systems over American and allied options.
    What weapons platforms could we offer through the foreign 
military sales program that would incentivize Indian leaders to 
reject Putin and align with its natural allies of democracy?
    Secretary Austin. Well, as you know, we have the finest 
weapon systems in the world and the most advanced weapon 
systems in the world, and so we have a range of capabilities 
that we can provide or offer.
    We continue to work with them to ensure that they 
understand that, you know, it's not in their--we believe that 
it's not in their best interest to continue to invest in 
Russian equipment and our requirement, going forward, is that, 
you know, they downscale the types of equipment that they're 
investing in and look to invest more in the types of things 
that will make us continue to be compatible.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, I look forward to continuing to work with 
the great people of India and what a great ally they can be if 
we eliminate some of the restrictions on sales.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, 
Secretary Austin and General Milley, for coming to the 
committee to talk about the FY23 budget request. You know, I 
know there's been a lot of conversation about the budget and 
whether it's what we need.
    In my initial assessment, I believe this budget is more 
than adequate and I look forward to working with you on what an 
adequate budget looks like, moving forward.
    So, you know, we have talked a lot about what--how much 
money we're spending and, you know, I want to talk a little bit 
about what we're spending money on. I think it's clear that so 
many of our doctrines and our policies and our weapon systems 
were designed for threats and challenges that happened in the 
past, but not necessarily the ones that we're facing now and 
into the future.
    And so, you know, I actually think the current war in 
Ukraine has shown the utility of low-cost weapons over large, 
expensive legacy systems.
    And so, Secretary Austin, what do you think the main 
lessons are for the U.S. in how successful Ukraine has been in 
fighting back a Russian force? And how do you think that should 
impact the way DOD does business? I know Chairman Smith touched 
on this in his opening, but I really want to drill down on, if 
in light of Ukraine, you think the Department should focus more 
on low-cost weapons and less on new expensive and often overly 
complex platforms that are often not even survivable in high-
end environments.
    Secretary Austin. Many of the weapons that have been 
effective, you know, are not necessarily low cost. But we have 
been able to provide them in sufficient quantities to make a 
significant difference. A lot of credit goes to the Ukrainian 
people for, you know, their will to fight, their determination, 
their willingness to sacrifice.
    But given all that, you know, they had, when the time came, 
you know, the elements, the right kinds of equipment to be able 
to make a difference on that battlefield and we have been 
pouring it in on a daily basis and increasing the--not only the 
quantity but the quality of capability that we have been 
providing.
    So there are some lessons to be learned in terms of 
commitment, leadership, tactics, techniques and procedures, 
logistics, integration of different types of platforms. You 
know, a number of lessons across the board.
    But a key lesson is that, you know, if you pay attention to 
the right things and do the right things, armed with the right 
equipment, you know, a smaller force can be very, very 
effective and that's what we're seeing today.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And I do think they're low 
cost relative to some of the high-end alternatives that we're 
talking about here today and I think it shows some of the real 
limits of the high-end systems that, for instance, Russia had.
    So moving on to the next topic, Secretary Austin, I and 
many other Members of Congress are looking forward to reviewing 
the report on civilian casualties and I'm very appreciative 
that you've called for a thorough review and have taken this 
very seriously.
    So just two quick requests related to that review. First, a 
few of my colleagues sent you a letter specifically focused on 
questions related to the strike first reported by The New York 
Times which took place in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019.
    Can you commit to us today that we can expect a prompt 
response to that letter, given the seriousness of the questions 
raised by public reporting?
    Secretary Austin. Yes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you very much. And secondly, General 
McKenzie a few weeks ago mentioned a list of 10 concrete steps 
CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] has taken to reduce civilian 
casualties. General McKenzie personally promised me at the 
hearing that he'd be transmitting that report to my team 
shortly but we have not received it.
    So can you please assist in urging CENTCOM to promptly 
provide that list to the committee?
    Secretary Austin. I certainly would like to see it as well, 
but I certainly will do that.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you.
    And finally, based on information from NGOs [non-
governmental organizations] and the media, such as The New York 
Times civilian casualty files, is DOD planning to revisit cases 
that were likely prematurely dismissed as a result of faulty 
initial assessments?
    Secretary Austin. At this point, we don't have an intent to 
relitigate cases or that--from before. Over.
    Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Well, I think that it's important that 
you do so since we know in so many of these instances that we 
have seen some really horrific cases that the initial 
assessment was declined, and so we were never able to get more 
information on that.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Fallon is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, General 
Milley, Secretary Austin, and Mr. McCord.
    You know, inflation is at 8 percent and the President's 
proposed budget, $813 billion, is a 4 percent increase year 
over year, which means in real dollars and purchasing power, of 
course, its reduction may be as much as $30 billion.
    And in a world ruled, you know, where the Taliban is ruling 
in Afghanistan after a humiliating withdrawal, we are witness 
to the largest land invasion we have seen in Europe since World 
War II, and the saber rattling of the Communist Chinese over 
the--particularly over the last year, where they increased 
their defense spending by 7 percent and are also using evermore 
increasing and aggressive rhetoric when it comes to, as they 
see it, their renegade province of Taiwan, and given these and 
a host of other threats that we're facing in this real world, 
to embark on a path to reduce the number of operational ships 
in our Navy by 24 vessels over the next 5 years, to reduce our 
Active Duty Army to the smallest size since World War II and 
overall to reduce our Active Duty force by about a point--
percentage and a half, I just don't think that's the right path 
and it's concerning to me.
    Secretary Austin, at the beginning of November last year, 
Ranking Members Rogers and Turner led a letter that myself and 
a total of 15 members of this committee signed--it's this 
letter right here--we signed on urging the President and your 
administration to do two things.
    Considering the massing that we saw of troops in open 
source reporting of the sizable Russian presence on the 
Ukrainian border and their equipment, and I think any level-
headed fairminded observer would have seen that if invasion 
wasn't imminent it was highly likely.
    We asked for two things: one, to send a significant amount 
of legal aid to the Ukraine immediately, and two, to deploy a 
military presence in the Black Sea.
    So, Secretary Austin, what was the total dollar amount of 
new lethal aid that was sent? Because I know we sent--the 
administration sent--I think it was $60 million in September of 
last year. What was the total of new lethal aid that was sent 
to the Ukraine in November of last year?
    Secretary Austin. I'll just tell you that over--you know, 
prior to the invasion, the total amount over time that we have 
provided to Ukraine was a billion dollars.
    Mr. Fallon. And what----
    Secretary Austin. Since the invasion we have also provided 
another billion dollars.
    Mr. Fallon. You don't know in November what that number 
was?
    Secretary Austin. I don't know how it breaks out in 
November versus any other--any other month, but----
    Mr. Fallon. Because my concern is that that letter wasn't 
heeded and we dragged our feet inexplicably for no reason.
    Secretary, what is the total number of ships we currently 
have in the Black Sea.
    Secretary Austin. Current U.S. ships in the Black Sea? 
Nothing.
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. Because we, historically, have kept a 
presence in the Black Sea. Is that correct? Fair to say?
    Secretary Austin. We have--I mean, a presence has ebbed and 
flowed over time, but there has not been a permanent presence 
in the Black Sea.
    Mr. Fallon. But in 2021, is it true that we had 12 ships in 
the Black Sea for a total and aggregate of 182 days?
    Secretary Austin. We were rotating in and out on various 
exercises working with partner nations. Yes.
    Mr. Fallon. So my concern is simply that we see this mass 
buildup, you know, of the Russians, and we had a presence in 
the Black Sea and now we have no presence at all, and it's 
almost as if we're cutting tail and running rather than trying 
to deter a very evil man and the actions that he's taken. And, 
you know, our worst nightmares from last November have, you 
know, come to pass.
    Please.
    Secretary Austin. [Inaudible.]
    The Chairman. I don't think your microphone--I don't think 
your microphone is on, Mr. Secretary. I know it's hard to----
    Secretary Austin. Yeah, if I could just----
    Mr. Fallon. Well, that's what the critics would say. I'm 
not saying, you know, because we, I think--in a large measure, 
we're allowing Putin to deter us and not deter him.
    Secretary Austin. So what you've seen, you know, in--you 
know, the day after he invaded, you know, we had forces flowing 
to the Baltic States, to the eastern flank, you know, within 24 
hours to reassure and deter. We had aircraft, flying police 
and--policing missions in Romania and Poland right away within 
24 hours.
    And so, Putin, his best estimate was that it was going to 
take months for NATO to react, to respond, to move forces to 
the eastern flank. But we were there within, you know, 24 
hours.
    So that's far from cutting tail and running, not to mention 
the incredible capability that we have been providing for the 
Ukrainians who have taken that assistance that we have provided 
along with our allies and partners and used it to good effect.
    Mr. Fallon. And, Secretary, just with the little time I 
have remaining, so we have no presence right now in the Black 
Sea. That's the bottom line, though.
    I went on a CODEL [congressional delegation] just recently 
and one of the--I found it interesting that the Romanian prime 
minister said that, when I asked him should we keep our bases 
in Eastern Europe permanent, he said he didn't think we had any 
choice.
    I wanted you to comment on that, if you could.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 170.]
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    So we have got one more questioner. I have some questions I 
want to get in before we get done here and then we're done. Mr. 
Moulton is going to be the last questioner. So we will be done 
short--shortly after 2:00. So if anybody's lurking around out 
there, we're done after Mr. Moulton.
    I want to follow up on the sub-launched cruise missile 
because we're probably going to have an argument over this, and 
I understand that, you know, the general position is more is 
better.
    But I know Mr. Courtney made some, I think, pretty well 
thought-out comments about the impact of turning our attack 
submarines into nuclear-launch submarines, and how that would 
undermine other missions, would complicate the ability to get 
in there for them to do what they're designed to do.
    It also, potentially, has an impact on the AUKUS deal 
because the Australians are pretty clear on the fact they don't 
want to be launching nuclear weapons off of a submarine.
    So, and we are building the Long Range Standoff weapon. 
Granted, that's up in the air, not underground--under the sea. 
But it has a very similar capability.
    So other than just, well, what the hell, we may as well 
have more, how do we overcome those concerns about the impact 
it would have and what the attack subs' missions already are in 
the wisdom of building this missile?
    And, General Milley, you sort of had staked your position 
that you want the missiles? So how do those arguments not 
undermine that?
    General Milley. There's 50-some-odd attack subs in the 
system. So what we're talking about is building or developing a 
piece of munition--ammo. Granted, it's nuclear. But so the 
weapon itself wouldn't be necessarily on each of those subs. So 
some of those subs, a small percentage, may have a mission 
change. The others would not.
    So I think it's a fair comment from Congressman Courtney 
about it, but I don't buy that in terms of the overall. I think 
that presenting the President, this President or future 
President, with options.
    But it's also a moot point. I'm here to defend the 
President's budget. The President's already made a decision. So 
this is not in--it's not----
    The Chairman. Let me make assure you, General it's not 
actually a moot point.
    General Milley. Well, I mean----
    The Chairman. We're still going to fight about it up here.
    General Milley. Okay. So----
    The Chairman. That's why I'm trying to make sure we have 
the argument. Yeah.
    General Milley. But, look, I support the NPR, which is part 
of the NDS, and we have a lot of nuclear capability. So no foe 
of the United States should underestimate our capability 
because of a SLCM-N--decision to produce or not produce a SLCM-
N.
    Our nuclear capability is much, much bigger than that. It 
is, as you know, a triad, and the amount of throw, weight we 
have, the amount of yield we have, in all kinds of different 
weapons systems--nuclear weapons systems--is enormous. And so 
no adversary of the United States should underestimate our 
capability.
    Will is a different matter. Whether we use it or not is a 
different matter. Those are political decisions. But our 
capability--our nuclear capability--is significant, it's 
assured, it's capable, and in this budget and in future budgets 
or past budgets we are continuing to recapitalize that system.
    So I wouldn't get overly hung up on the SLCM-N, because our 
nuclear capability writ large, the triad, is very capable to 
defend the United States.
    The Chairman. That's good. I will point out, as you can 
tell there are members of this committee who will get overly 
hung up on it. So we're trying to work through that and make 
sure we have the arguments clear and in front of us, and I--you 
know, I'm not a submarine person by any stretch of the 
imagination.
    But from what I understand, if you're talking about 
handling nuclear weapons on a submarine, that is an entirely 
different thing in terms of how you have to train the crew, 
prepare the crew----
    General Milley. That's right.
    The Chairman [continuing]. And even if the nuclear weapons 
aren't on that particular--the submarine at that particular----
    General Milley. They'd have to be certified.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Moment----
    General Milley. Yeah. My only point is that I'd like for 
all Presidents to have as many options as possible. That's all.
    The Chairman. Fair enough.
    Mr. Moulton is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentleman, thank you very much for your continued service 
to the country and your stamina.
    You have the weight on your shoulders of protecting freedom 
around the globe while avoiding a nuclear war every single day 
and that's not a weight that many would be able to bear.
    I was quite critical of the administration's handling of 
the withdrawal from Afghanistan. But I have to tell you, I 
think that the last 2 months of Putin's war in Ukraine, you've 
handled brilliantly and so I want to sincerely thank you for 
your leadership that's been so critical to our priorities and 
to the success of the Ukrainian people. So thank you.
    The only consistent criticism that I've heard in a 
bipartisan way on the effort in Ukraine is just simply the 
speed at which things are moving. You've done all the right 
things.
    Some people have said it could move more quickly and I 
think that reflects just a broader concern I have with this 
budget, that we're transforming the force, we're modernizing, 
you're investing a lot in research and development. My question 
is, are we moving quickly enough.
    So I just have a couple of questions on that.
    Mr. Secretary, you've testified about the various 
innovation efforts in the--and the DOD's investment in 
technology. But Defense Innovation University, DIU, which has 
leveraged $25 billion in private R&D, introduced 100 new 
suppliers to DOD from 37 States, has been cut in its budget for 
FY22. Why is that and is that a wise move for the future? I 
think they've been incredibly successful.
    Secretary Austin. Well, we--as we look across the 
landscape, we want to make sure that, you know, we're putting 
our dollars where we're going to get a good return and DIU has 
done amazing work for us over time and we want to make sure 
that we're also using other means to encourage initiative and 
bring new capabilities on board and get the input of 
entrepreneurs and small companies and that sort of business.
    But DIU is important to us. It will remain important to us. 
It's not a signal that we're phasing DIU out, if that's what--
--
    Mr. Moulton. No, Mr. Secretary, it's hard for me, 
especially as the co-chair of the Future of Defense Task Force 
from a couple of years ago, to imagine you not increasing the 
budget for DIU, given their returns.
    So I'd really like to--I'd like to have a more detailed 
answer for the record, please, on that, and if there's an 
opportunity for us to increase the budget that's something we'd 
like to do.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 167.]
    Mr. Moulton. In China, gentlemen, we have seen heavy 
divestment from the traditional land army. It was a good thing 
for us that China wasted a lot of time and effort on their 
million-man army because it was not very effective.
    They've been pretty dramatic in taking money out of that, 
downsizing their force, and putting it into other capabilities. 
As you think about the overall structure of DOD and the balance 
among the services, are you adapting that balance to meet the 
threats from China and Russia? Or does each service within your 
budget, essentially, still get the same amount of money?
    Secretary Austin. I can assure you that each service does 
not, and that's always an issue of great debate. But we're 
really going after the capabilities that we need that are 
relevant to this fight that we could have in the future.
    And so you've seen significant investment in naval forces 
and also air forces, and if you look across the FYDP that trend 
continues. But it's not a--excuse me, it's not a cookie cutter 
approach by any stretch of the imagination.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Secretary, on the same theme, can you 
just--I know that the chairman asked this question at the 
beginning of the hearing, but can you give me two specific 
lessons that we have learned from Ukraine and explain how those 
lessons are reflected in changes in this budget?
    So, you know, are you changing the amount of money that 
we're investing in artillery or armor or in drones or something 
like that, given the lessons we have seen on the ground in the 
last several weeks?
    Secretary Austin. The lesson--and, again, it's still early, 
and this is a month into the fight and there will be lessons 
that we take away from this. But in terms of how it impacts our 
structure and our warfighting capabilities we don't--there are 
no changes that we would desire to make at this point and, 
again, we'll see how this plays out over time.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, may I ask you the same question? 
Do you think that we should be making changes in our budget 
based on what we're seeing in Ukraine? I might add the conflict 
in Azerbaijan gave us a lot of lessons along the same lines.
    General Milley. I'd say two things.
    Not necessarily changes to the budget. But one is the 
fundamental significance of air defense systems in order to 
deny an opponent the ability to achieve air superiority or 
supremacy, that's been done by the Ukrainians and it's been 
done with a huge amount of help from the United States with 
Stingers, et cetera, but also because of our intelligence 
feeds.
    So the second big lesson here is intelligence. We have--and 
I'm not going to go in open hearing about the intelligence we 
have collected or how we did it and all that.
    But this war has, arguably, been the most successful 
intelligence operation in military history and it's really 
tremendous and someday that story will be told.
    I guess the third thing is the--is to reinforce the United 
States doctrinal methodology of mission command, power down, 
decentralize decision making to the lowest level possible.
    The Ukrainians have been trained on that over the last 6 
years, actually longer than that--8 years.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    General Milley. Sorry.
    The Chairman. Good answer, and this is a good place to 
close, I think, because, I mean, the President's budget is the 
President's budget. But it's a starting point, not an ending 
point.
    So a lot of the things that we have talked about here, and 
as we try to react to the lessons learned from the Ukraine 
conflict, you know, we have a number of months here to work our 
will legislatively in cooperation with the Department of 
Defense and the President to get to the right answer on this.
    But I think what Mr. Moulton and a number of other people 
are talking about is really important--modernizing the force. 
We have talked about it for a long time. How do we, you know, 
be--put ourselves in a position to take advantage of innovation 
more quickly and recognize how the battlefield has changed 
within the Pentagon budget.
    As you know, it's a big process, sort of like painting the 
Golden Gate Bridge. It's constant. You know, the budgets get 
introduced, requirements get locked in, you know, and the 
Pentagon has built a system around the 5-year plan.
    You know, one of our frustrations on DIU is DIU does great 
research on ideas and if they find something that works, then 
they got to wait 2 years before they can buy it, in many 
instances.
    I know there is some fungible money to do that. But the 
length and the process involved undermines our ability to 
rapidly react in terms of procurement, acquisition, in terms 
of, you know, how we're going to prioritize things.
    We are working to try to help you speed that up and that 
will be a lot of what we do in the next process. Of course, the 
single most important thing is that we can get this done by 
October 1st. That would help you as well.
    Gentlemen, do you have anything to say for the good of the 
order? I will allow you closing comments if you have them.
    Secretary Austin. My only closing comment, Chairman, is I 
want to thank the committee and all of your colleagues, writ 
large, for the tremendous support that you've given us, the 
speed at which you've moved to support our efforts, especially 
here in--with Ukraine here in the recent past and we'll 
continue this work.
    This is not--this is something that the chairman and I talk 
about every day and so this is not something that's been passed 
off to a staff officer at a lower level.
    This has our continued focus and we remain in contact with 
our--with our counterparts in Ukraine there. They have done--
they have performed magnificently and I think they'll continue 
that work.
    I would also point to the fact that what you're seeing with 
NATO right now is no accident. The President and all the 
Cabinet members have really leaned into making sure that we are 
transparent with NATO.
    We do everything we can to keep NATO unified, and I think--
well, I don't think, I know that our colleagues in Europe 
really appreciate our leadership and what we have done to help 
them.
    Thank you, sir.
    The Chairman. Thank you. We very much--I'm sorry, Chairman 
Milley. Go ahead.
    General Milley. And, you know, ditto. I would like to thank 
the committee for your continued support as well and I want to 
reemphasize what I said in the opening statement. We are at, 
literally, in my view, a pivot point in the geostrategic 
history of Europe, for sure, and perhaps the globe with this 
invasion of Ukraine and we have got to do everything we can 
that's possible, without going to war with Russia, to ensure 
that the Ukrainian people remain free and sovereign.
    That's really critically important to global security. And 
the third and last point is, I'm enormously proud of what this 
joint force is all about. Every single day these guys come to 
work.
    They work hard to defend their country and they're doing a 
selfless service for the defense of this Nation and support of 
the Constitution and nothing could make me prouder than what 
our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and guardians do every 
single day, day in and day out.
    The Chairman. I will emphasize those--the last few points 
the Secretary and Chairman Milley made, you know, one, that the 
hard work that has gone in from Secretary Austin and the entire 
Biden administration to pull this coalition together, to have 
the response, and then second, what you're seeing in Ukraine, 
we have been working to train the Ukrainians for a very long 
time. It shows. So we should be very proud of that.
    I do also want to thank the committee, I think, with one 
notable exception. This was a very, very good discussion of the 
issues and what we're looking for, and as far as that notable 
exception goes, I looked it up.
    Sadly, I don't have the power to simply take a member's 
time away. So if they're going, they're going.
    But other than that, I think this committee did a really 
good job of analyzing the issues. As I said, this is the start 
of the process. We have a lot of work to do between now and 
when we produce a final product and look forward to working 
with all you to get that done to the best of our ability.
    And with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 1:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



      
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                             April 5, 2022

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 5, 2022

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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

    General Milley. Strengthening deterrence of limited nuclear 
employment by Russia and China requires the United States to convince 
them that restraint is their best option. While our strategic nuclear 
triad, dual-capable aircraft, and conventional capabilities provide a 
strong contribution to our integrated deterrence approach, my position 
on SLCM-N has not changed. I believe SLCM-N would help counter any 
mistaken perception of an exploitable ``gap'' in U.S. regional 
deterrence capabilities and signal potential adversaries that their 
concepts of coercive, limited nuclear escalation offer no exploitable 
advantage.  [See page 19.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
    Secretary Austin. DOD recognizes the critical importance of 
strategic sealift to deter and, if needed, contest adversary aggression 
in the event of a contingency. The FY23 budget request includes $249.9M 
to acquire two used vessels and modernize and outfit five used vessels 
procured previously. The addition of the two vessels in FY23 brings the 
total number of vessels to nine. FY23 also continues targeted 
investment in maintenance and repair to address age-related material 
condition, equipment obsolescence, and service life extensions 
necessary to meet combatant commander readiness requirements. DOD is 
committed to recapitalizing the surge sealift fleet by procuring used 
vessels and converting them in U.S. shipyards, but we need your 
Committee's support to remove the statutory cap on the number of used, 
foreign-built vessels the Department can procure. We appreciate your 
leadership on sealift and look forward to working with you to enact 
this critical legislative change.  [See page 21.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Secretary Austin. The investment in the Defense Innovation Unit 
(DIU) over the past 6.5 years has paid dividends for the Department and 
the nation. Since 2015, DIU has:
      Awarded contracts to 279 unique companies. Of these, 100 
are non-traditional companies that are first-time DOD vendors and over 
200 of the 279 companies are small businesses.
      Transitioned 43 capabilities to the warfighter, including 
commercial satellite imagery, small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), 
artificial intelligence (AI) for predictive maintenance, and leading-
edge cyber tools. Eight of these capabilities have transitioned in the 
last six months alone.
      Lowered the barriers to entry to work with DOD, such that 
DIU fielded 1,116 company submissions to solve DOD problems last year 
(a 40 percent increase over the prior year).
      Shown how successful projects can be scaled across the 
DOD--making working with the DOD a better business choice for many of 
these non-traditional companies.
    Although it is true that DIU took a 20 percent funding cut (-$24M) 
between the Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 and FY 2022 enacted levels, the FY 
2023 President's Budget Request (PBR) will grow DIU's total funding 11 
percent (+$10M) from the FY 2022 enacted levels.
    By accelerating the adoption of leading commercial technology 
throughout the military and growing the national security innovation 
base, DIU plays an important role in the Department's efforts to 
maintain our enduring technological advantage over our adversaries. The 
Department is committed to improving the way it engages with the 
broader innovation ecosystem, and will ensure that DIU can build on its 
successful track record of scaling the impact of their tested 
commercial solutions across the Joint Force in the FY 2024 budget.  
[See page 86.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
    Secretary Austin. Following our fourth consecutive financial 
statement audit, I am pleased to see progress in areas such as civilian 
pay, military pay, and the Military Retirement Fund. However, we must 
redouble our efforts to learn from the audit and implement corrections 
into our business processes, while instituting strong internal controls 
that demonstrate stewardship of taxpayer dollars. The following 
material weaknesses are among the most challenging, and addressing them 
is critical to overall progression toward attaining clean audit 
opinions.
      Fund Balance with Treasury (FBWT). As a Department-wide 
material weakness and a multi-year audit priority, the Department 
continues to prioritize remediation efforts. FBWT remains a complex and 
broad-ranging topic, and numerous Department-wide initiatives remain in 
progress, to include standardizing FBWT reconciliations using various 
financial reporting systems and applications to balance the 
Department's data with Treasury records.
      Access Controls. Access controls have been a long-
standing challenge for the Department. Auditors issued more than 600 
notices of findings and recommendations pertaining to access controls 
during the course of FY 2021 financial statement audits. On January 31, 
2022, a memorandum was issued instructing Components to prioritize the 
remediation of privileged and end-user access controls by implementing 
Identity Credential and Access Management (ICAM). Achieving the ICAM 
goals will require long-term effort.
      Universe of Transactions (UoT) and Financial Reporting 
Internal Controls. As another audit priority area, the Deputy Secretary 
of Defense has recently mandated the use of the Department's Advancing 
Analytics System (Advana) to the greatest extent possible. This will 
support the attainment of a reliable and reconcilable UoT, one of the 
material weaknesses within the broader Financial Reporting Internal 
Controls material weakness category. DOD Components and their Service 
Providers are working together to compile and validate a complete list 
of relevant feeder and accounting systems that contribute to the 
Department's financial statements.
      Legacy Systems. As emphasized in the Department's 
Financial Management Strategy and Transformation Plan for fiscal years 
(FY) 2022-2026, there is a real need to aggressively retire legacy 
systems. Decreasing legacy financial and business systems will 
accelerate achievement of key department priorities, including audit 
progress, cybersecurity, and modernization. Retiring legacy systems 
swiftly allows the Department to avoid unnecessary maintenance costs 
and other serious risks, while reinvesting in modern capabilities that 
will better serve our workforce for decades to come.  [See page 37.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
    Secretary Austin. While ASCMs are paramount to our efforts to 
support Taiwan's self-defense, long range air defenses are not. We 
stand by our compliance to the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six 
Assurances to provide arms and services of a defensive nature to 
support Taiwan's self-defense. The key capabilities that Taiwan needs 
are ASCM, IAMD, and sea mines. Additionally, I fully support Taiwan's 
development of a concept of defense and taking the lessons learned from 
Ukraine.  [See page 47.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
    General Milley. To qualify for a $50K Critical Skills bonus, a 
recruit must meet the following requirements: 1. Non-Prior Service 
(NPS) 2. Test Score Category (TSC) 1-3A 3. 6-yr Enlistment 4. MOS = 11X 
(Infantry), 18X (Special Forces), 19K (Armor Crewman), 35M (Human 
Intelligence Collector), 35P (Cryptologic Linguist), or 37F (PSYOPS)
    As of 12 December, the Army has separated 1,861 service members for 
refusal to obey the mandatory COVID vaccination order. 1,797 of the 
individuals separated were enlisted service members and their 
separation equates to 0.5% of the Army's Active Component enlisted 
force. As of 12 December, the Army has separated 79 service members 
from the MOSs of interest. 30 x 13Js (Fire Control Specialist), 36 x 
18X (Special Forces), 4 x 35Ps (Cryptologic Linguist), and 9 x 14Ps 
(Air and Missile Defense Crewmember). The distribution by MOS and grade 
is:  [See page 49.]
    See attached table.
     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
    Of the 4 MOSs of interest, only 35P (0.19%) is below the 
benchmark of 0.5%, with the other three MOSs above.
    See attached table.
     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                                 .
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
    General Milley. Should service members who were separated for 
failure to obey the lawful order to receive a Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID 19) vaccination, subsequently decide that they wish to rejoin 
the military, they would need to meet all accessions criteria. This 
includes medical readiness expectations such as compliance with 
vaccination requirements. The applicable Military Department would then 
determine if the needs of the Service warranted reentry.  [See page 
53.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
    General Milley. The Department is fielding a mix of precision 
strike, long-range weapons that enable the Joint Force to deter threats 
and hold adversary forces at risk from operationally relevant ranges. 
The PB23 President's Budget includes development of high-end hypersonic 
weapons that, because of their speed, have the unique ability to strike 
deep and time sensitive targets. The PB23 budget also procures large 
quantites of subsonic cruise missiles and artillery systems in order 
achieve a cost-effective mix of weapons that can strike a diverse set 
of targets from air, land, and sea-based platforms.  [See page 62.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    General Milley. It is my view that the IRGC remains a terrorist 
organization because they directly support various designated terrorist 
organizations throughout the Middle East and beyond. The portion of the 
IRGC that is most deeply involved in support of terrorist organizations 
and conducts terrorist activities is the IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF). It 
is important to understand the IRGC-QF, as a subdivision element to 
IRGC is deeply involved in illicit/illegal terrorist activity, directly 
against the US, Allies and partners both regionally and globally.  [See 
page 57.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. ESCOBAR
    General Milley. Service members are engaged in the front lines of 
protecting our national security and they deserve the best possible 
living and working conditions. Sustaining safe, quality unaccompanied 
housing for junior personnel is crucial to recruitment, retention, 
readiness, and morale. The Department of the Army prioritizes 
investments in Fort Bliss barracks to ensure that the force is being 
taken care of so we can effectively deploy significant combat power 
from this strategic location, while also ensuring a high quality of 
life. Over the next five fiscal years, the Army has planned 35 projects 
totaling over 157 million dollars in repairs and improvements to the 
barracks at Fort Bliss.  [See page 65.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
    Secretary Austin. Vaccination against COVID-19 is a readiness 
issue, and we require a ready and healthy force to continue to defend 
the nation. That is why I directed that all members of our force be 
vaccinated against COVID-19. I also directed the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments to comply with uniform standards when granting 
medical, administrative, and religious exemptions. As of April 20, 
2022, the Military Services reported 82 approved exemptions from the 
mandatory COVID-19 vaccine as religious accommodations. The Army 
approved 2, the Navy 27, the Marine Corps 7, and the Air Force/Space 
Force approved 46.  [See page 60.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. GREEN
    General Milley. The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund (NSBDF), 
created in the FY2015 NDAA, provides enhanced acquisition authorities 
for the Navy when acquiring the COLUMBIA class submarine. The NSBDF 
enables the Department to obtain Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) for 
critical long-lead components required for the COLUMBIA program that 
generates savings for the government and provides stability for the 
industrial base. The Department is appreciative of the acquisition 
authorities provided by the NSBDF and intends to continue leveraging 
those authorities to deliver critical warfighting capability to the 
Fleet.  [See page 64.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FALLON
    Secretary Austin. Russia's unjust and illegal further invasion of 
Ukraine has clearly changed the security landscape in Europe, so we are 
in a process with our NATO Allies of determining our U.S. military 
footprint in Europe. That is an ongoing process and requires 
consultation with NATO. Through the access, basing, and overflight 
agreements the United States has in place with Allies and partners in 
Europe, DOD has been able to provide flexible, capable, and responsive 
presence that enhances interoperability and builds on the United 
States' longstanding commitment to NATO's security. The value of these 
in-place relationships and access was demonstrated in the most recent 
crisis in Ukraine when DOD swiftly and robustly repositioned and 
deployed combat power to locations across NATO's eastern flank, 
including southeastern Europe, in concert with our NATO Allies.  [See 
page 84.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Secretary Austin. The legislative proposal to support 5th 
generation training on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) is 
currently pending clearance at the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). The Department of the Air Force commits to sharing and 
collaborating on the proposal with all stakeholders and looks forward 
to being able to conduct non-intrusive, low-disturbance military 
activities on NTTR South Range.  [See page 77.]
    Secretary Austin. Taking care of our people remains my top 
priority, and that includes ensuring they have access to the necessary 
medical care they need. The Department continues to implement 
interventions, testing, education, and training on the prevention of 
transmission of HIV infection. We will continue to disseminate 
knowledge of HIV prevention, such as providing education regarding 
alternative HIV prevention practices and health education programs to 
prevent the transmission of HIV. Defense Health Agency Procedural 
Instruction 6025.29, ``Provision of Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) 
Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) for Persons at High Risk of Acquiring 
HIV Infection,'' describes the elements and resources required to 
implement an HIV PreP program in our military medical treatment 
facilities. Further, the Department provides a link for the HIV PrEP 
Toolkit for health care providers, which includes information and 
resources needed to provide PrEP. The Department continues clinical 
management of HIV to optimize care for HIV-infected Service members, to 
prevent secondary transmission, and to reduce variability in the 
provision of clinical care for HIV in the Military Health System.  [See 
page 79.]

?

      
=======================================================================


              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 5, 2022

=======================================================================

      

                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

    Mr. Smith. Secretary Austin, you testified that the marginal 
improvement the SLCM-N would provide if it were fielded in the 2030s 
would be outweighed by the cost of pursuing the capability. What costs 
led you to decide that the SLCM-N is not worth pursuing? Were there any 
other considerations that led to the decision to not pursue SLCM-N?
    Secretary Austin. The Nuclear Posture Review considered whether to 
invest in several different nuclear capabilities, including SLCM-N. The 
Nuclear Posture Review recommended, and I support, the decision to 
discontinue the SLCM-N program because the Department has other 
capabilities coming online sooner and which meet the Department's 
requirements. I am confident the Department has sufficient options to 
offer the President, as needed. For further information about SLCM-N, 
please see the classified Nuclear Posture Review and the Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) and corresponding documents that were recently 
provided to Congress.
    Mr. Smith. General Milley, you testified that despite your support 
for creating more nuclear options for the President, and thus the SLCM-
N, you support the 2022 NPR because the United States has a lot of 
nuclear capability. Is it your assessment that, without the SLCM-N, the 
capabilities that the United States has today and is pursuing are 
sufficient to meet current and future nuclear deterrence needs? What 
steps, conventional and/or nuclear, is the United States taking to 
strengthen deterrence of limited nuclear employment by Russia and 
China?
    General Milley. Strengthening deterrence of limited nuclear 
employment by Russia and China requires the United States to convince 
them that restraint is their best option. While our strategic nuclear 
triad, dual-capable aircraft, and conventional capabilities provide a 
strong contribution to our integrated deterrence approach, my position 
on SLCM-N has not changed. I believe SLCM-N would help counter any 
mistaken perception of an exploitable ``gap'' in U.S. regional 
deterrence capabilities and signal potential adversaries that their 
concepts of coercive, limited nuclear escalation offer no exploitable 
advantage.
    Mr. Smith. General Milley, as you're aware, the DOE/NNSA production 
complex is under severe strain that will make it difficult to deliver 
just-in-time warhead modernization programs across the nuclear triad. 
Asking NNSA to adapt the W80-4 warhead for a SLCM-N would add to NNSA's 
workload, potentially creating schedule risk for other programs. If 
there is some risk of a trade-off, would you advise prioritizing 
current warhead modernization efforts for the triad over the SLCM-N? Or 
is the benefit of the SLCM-N worth the risk?
    General Milley. The Nuclear Weapons Council has planned for the 
design, development, and production of a SLCM-N nuclear warhead since 
the supplemental capability was recommended in the 2018 Nuclear Posture 
Review. DOE/NNSA has developed options to leverage existing 
modernization efforts to minimize risk to the other modernization 
programs across the triad. Although President Biden's FY23 budget does 
not include funding for SLCM-N, I assess the benefits of the SLCM-N 
capability would outweigh the residual risk to the DOE/NNSA production 
complex.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. I have sent and cosigned multiple letters to you 
regarding the Department of Defense's compliance with Section 720 of 
the FY2022 NDAA. I am deeply concerned that service members are being 
arbitrarily discharged, even those with critical and sometimes 
irreplaceable national security roles, because they have not been 
granted a waiver to the vaccine mandate. Can you provide a response to 
my previous queries, or an estimated timeline for your response?
    Secretary Austin. Vaccination against COVID-19 is a readiness 
issue; we require a ready and healthy force to continue to defend the 
nation. That is why I directed that all members of our force be 
vaccinated against COVID-19. I also directed the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments to comply with uniform standards when granting 
medical, administrative, and religious exemptions. Consistent with my 
direction, the Military Departments used existing policies and 
procedures to manage mandatory vaccination of Service members to the 
extent practicable. On April 4, 2022, the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Personnel and Readiness signed a memorandum to the Military 
Departments, consistent with the requirements of section 720 of the 
FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act, reiterating that uniform 
standards are applied to Service members' requests for a medical or 
administrative exemption, including on religious grounds, from 
receiving an otherwise mandated COVID-19 vaccine. Additionally, the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness established a 
working group that will oversee the continued implementation of the 
uniform standards and suggest refinements to those standards as 
appropriate. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress on 
this critical readiness issue.
    Mr. Lamborn. What steps has the Department of Defense taken to 
integrate natural immunity into its vaccine requirements?
    Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense follows the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance with regard to COVID-19 
vaccination requirements. Per the CDC, a COVID-19 vaccination is a 
safer and more dependable way to build immunity to COVID-19 than 
immunity from transmission.
    Mr. Lamborn. Do you envision the need to service hardened and 
deeply buried targets going away anytime soon? Is your best military 
advice the same as Admiral Richard's that we should keep the B83 
gravity bomb to maintain the capability to go after these targets until 
a new replacement system is developed?
    General Milley. While maintaining an effective capability to 
service hardened and deeply buried targets will remain an enduring 
priority for the foreseeable future, I support the 2022 Nuclear Posture 
Review decision to retire the B83-1 immediately while we continue to 
develop a long-term and sustainable national strategy to hold hardened 
and deeply buried targets at risk.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
    Mr. Courtney. In an unclassified format, can you provide an update 
on the estimated cost of a SLCM-N acquisition program, an estimate of 
the increased operational and security costs that would be imposed on 
the fleet by a SLCM-N, an assessment of whether possession of a SLCM-N 
by Navy submarines would affect access to overseas ports and 
facilities, and a description of the validated military requirement?
    Secretary Austin. The Nuclear Posture Review considered whether to 
invest in several different nuclear capabilities, including SLCM-N. The 
Nuclear Posture Review recommended, and I support, the decision to 
discontinue the SLCM-N program because the Department has other 
capabilities coming online sooner and which meet the Department's 
requirements. I am confident the Department has sufficient options to 
offer the President, as needed. For further information about SLCM-N, 
please see the classified Nuclear Posture Review and the Analysis of 
Alternatives (AoA) and corresponding documents that were recently 
provided to Congress.
    Mr. Courtney. You noted the benefits of a SLCM-N in providing an 
additional nuclear option if it is fielded. However, there are also 
potential downsides. Has the Joint Staff evaluated trade-offs that 
would be associated with maintaining nuclear certification for 
Virginia-class submarines, allocating missile tubes on deployed 
submarines to nuclear-armed missiles, and assigning deployed Virginia-
class submarines to nuclear missions? Given the high demand for 
Virginia-class submarines in both USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM, do you have 
concern about the deployment of SLCM-N restricting conventional 
deterrence and warfighting options?
    General Milley. Deploying nuclear cruise missiles on Virginia-class 
attack submarines would reduce the number of conventional missiles each 
boat can carry. Having the option to deploy nuclear cruise missiles 
would enhance deterrence of our potential adversaries and assure our 
Allies. Their deployment would counter any mistaken perception of an 
exploitable ``gap'' in U.S. regional deterrence capabilities and signal 
potential adversaries that their concepts of coercive, limited nuclear 
escalation offer no exploitable advantage. Additionally, there are 
scenarios where the options made available by deploying SLCM-N on 
Virginia-class attack submarines outweighs the marginal tradeoff in 
conventional firepower.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
    Ms. Speier. Secretary Austin, I appreciate your support for the 
Independent Review Committee's recommendations and military justice 
reform, including the Department's $479 million request to fund these 
reforms. It is clear to me that one of the common contributors to both 
sexual assault and suicide is toxic command climate. I am encouraged by 
the Army's implementation of the command assessment program, which 
surveys peers and subordinates to detect abusive and ineffective 
leaders before they are selected for command. I understand the Marine 
Corps intends to implement this program, and the Navy SEALs have 
already implemented command assessments. But I am frustrated that the 
rest of the Navy and the Air Force are resisting. What will you do to 
get the Navy and Air Force to adopt this critical change to weed out 
toxic commanders?
    Secretary Austin. Rooting out sexual assault from the military 
remains a top priority of mine. I am also focused on the issues of 
suicide and mental health and recently established the Suicide 
Prevention and Response Independent Review Commission, as required by 
the FY22 NDAA. These are leadership issues, and I am committed to 
continuing to lead on them. I also expect the same commitment from my 
Service leadership. The recently released On-Site Installation 
Evaluation (OSIE) Report demonstrates how climate survey data can be 
used to assess risk and protective factors in military units throughout 
the world, including factors associated with toxic leadership. We 
intend to continue OSIE visits on a biennial basis. The Department will 
continue to leverage these tools to assist the Military Departments in 
meeting our high standards for leaders.
    Ms. Speier. One recommendation of the Independent Review Committee 
is for each service to create military justice or litigation tracks. 
These tracks retain talent and help train future Judge Advocates. I 
have heard significant resistance from the Services, especially the Air 
Force, in really creating these tracks and cultivating that experience. 
Given the Air Force's conviction rate being the lowest among all the 
services (Air Force: 55%; Army: 85%; Navy:79%; Marine: 86%), what are 
you doing to hold The Judge Advocate Generals to account when complying 
with this recommendation?
    Secretary Austin. I strongly support the recommendation from the 
Independent Review Commission regarding the establishment of career 
litigation billets for prosecutors, defense counsel, special victim 
counsel, and military judges in the Services' JAG corps, as well as a 
career track for military criminal justice. Shortly after the IRC's 
report, I directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to 
submit plans to establish career litigation billets for judge advocates 
involved in the litigation of special victim cases and the Secretaries 
of the Military Departments have done so. With the extensive reform of 
the military justice system enacted by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022--including the creation of an 
Office of Special Trial Counsel within each DOD Military Service--some 
revision of those previous plans may be necessary. Nevertheless, I 
assure you that I will remain focused on the timely implementation of 
this IRC recommendation across the Military Departments.
    Ms. Speier. Secretary Austin and General Milley, your testimonies 
spoke to the importance of childcare for readiness and retention. 
General Milley, you called military childcare ``the gold standard.'' 
Yet, 19,000 children are currently on waitlists for care, and by the 
military's own estimates, at least 60 childcare facilities are in poor 
or failing condition. This year's budget includes funding for just two 
child development center construction projects, with no additional 
facilities listed on the unfunded list. It goes without saying that 
childcare should not be an unfunded priority. Our military children 
deserve the very best, and their families can't be focused on the 
mission if they can't get childcare at all or are worried about poor 
facilities. What is the Department doing to reduce waitlists and fix 
our failing facilities?
    Secretary Austin. Taking care of our people is my top priority and 
ensuring our military families have high quality health care is a 
significant component of that. We are focused on modernizing our 
existing childcare facilities and expanding our childcare capacity 
through the construction of additional facilities. We recognize in 
particular the importance of providing childcare support in high-
density markets.
    The FY 2023 budget request directly reflects the Department's 
efforts to improve quality of life facilities for members and their 
families. The budget requests over $90 million in military construction 
for four child development centers and provides for many repair and 
modernization projects through our Operation and Maintenance Facilities 
Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization accounts, which are planned 
to exceed $50 million for existing child development centers. This 
budget request funds every child development center construction 
project that was identified as executable during the FY 2023 program/
budget review and prioritizes childcare in the Operation and 
Maintenance appropriations by addressing childcare needs.
    In addition to facility modernization and new construction, the 
Department is working on a variety of initiatives to expand access to 
affordable childcare. The traditional community-based fee assistance 
program is being expanded and public-private partnerships are being 
explored to increase childcare availability in areas where there is 
low-capacity and high-demand. In addition, we are focused on improving 
installation childcare capacity through ongoing staff recruitment, 
retention, and efficient childcare space utilization.
    Ms. Speier. Secretary Austin, I held a Military Personnel 
subcommittee hearing on sexual assault in the National Guard, and the 
lack of oversight and accountability is shocking. It is time to shine a 
light on these toxic units and support the servicemembers who suffer in 
these environments. What authorities do you need to act in support of 
victims in the National Guard?
    Secretary Austin. This is an issue that I and the Department take 
very seriously and I am comfortable with the authorities I have at this 
time. The majority of reported sexual assault cases in the National 
Guard occur when the parties are in a non-federal status. The authority 
to investigate and prosecute crimes, including sexual assault, 
committed by National Guard members in a non-federal status rests with 
State and local law enforcement entities. When an unrestricted report 
of sexual assault is made by a member of the National Guard, commanders 
refer the report to local law enforcement entities for criminal 
investigation, at which point local law enforcement officials decide 
whether or not to investigate or to prosecute.
    If local law enforcement does not investigate, or does not 
investigate in a timely manner, the National Guard Bureau's Office of 
Complex Investigations (OCI) may administratively investigate 
unrestricted reports of sexual assault with a National Guard nexus. 
Reflecting the importance of this issue, the Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau has made OCI a direct report, appointed a Major General to 
head OCI, and significantly increased the number of OCI Investigators. 
National Guard commanders can use the results of OCI investigations to 
take appropriate action. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau is also 
establishing a Prevention Workforce program that will increase Sexual 
Assault Response Coordinators and Victim Advocates by 30% at the 
Brigade and Wing level over the next two fiscal years. Additionally, 
his team will initiate Sexual Assault compliance and accountability 
inspections in all U.S. States, Territories, and the District of 
Columbia beginning with the high risk units we have identified through 
surveys and other pertinent data. All of these efforts will focus on 
providing additional support to victims of sexual assault and ensure 
compliance with DOD policies and instructions.
    Ms. Speier. The Defense Health Agency released a report (dated 
January 12, 2022) as required by House Report 116-442, page 150, 
Accompanying HR 6395, NDAA FY2021, stating that they are short over 
1,000 behavioral health providers. The report stated several items that 
are in need of attention to reduce that shortfall. Please address each 
of the following and state what authorities or funding you need to 
accomplish them:
      Increase in AD end strength to allow for more providers
      Implementing Pay incentives for AD behavioral health 
providers.
      Increasing scholarships and manpower authorizations for 
behavioral health training that includes military or civilian service 
commitment
      Incredibly long hiring timelines for civilian behavioral 
health providers
      Limits in pay structure that does not allow civilian 
incentive pay (specifically the report stated that the VA had 
authorities the DOD lacked regarding compensation for behavioral health 
providers)
      Increasing telehealth (please address this specifically 
as it relates to the new TRICARE contract being negotiated)--Will the 
new contract allow cross-network telehealth appointments?
    Secretary Austin. As I have said previously, mental health is 
health, period. We must increase the avenues by which our troops can 
receive behavioral health support, and we need to increase our capacity 
to provide that support. Our FY23 budget request includes $193 million 
for suicide prevention and $1.4 billion in broader mental health 
efforts. That $1.4 billion includes investments in primary care 
behavioral health, tele-behavioral health, the National Intrepid Center 
of Excellence and Intrepid Spirit Centers, substance abuse programs, 
and mental health research aimed at accelerating the innovation and 
delivery of preventive interventions and treatments for Traumatic Brain 
Injury, Post-Traumatic Stress, and other mental health conditions.
    Specific to your questions about the DHA report:
      Increase in AD end strength to allow for more providers 
Desired outcomes associated with increasing Active Duty end strength 
must be accompanied by in-depth analysis to: 1) place additional 
behavioral health (BH) providers at the needed locations, 2) weigh the 
ability to leverage contract and civil service providers, 3) assesses 
potential offsets to budgetary resources, and 4) determine the impact 
to uniformed personnel levels within other medical specialties or on 
the Services' non-medical end strength
      Implementing Pay incentives for AD behavioral health 
providers. DOD currently utilizes incentive pay authorities for 
officers in health professions under 10 USC 335. Similar to personnel 
requirements, implementing new pay incentives would require analysis to 
determine if that is the best course of action and may result in 
resource trade-offs within the Department. As resources are limited 
under DOD's top-line there may be resource implications on other 
medical specialties (e.g., anesthesiology, emergency medicine, surgical 
specialties), or to the broader overall force.
      Increasing scholarships and manpower authorizations for 
behavioral health training that includes military or civilian service 
commitment Increasing scholarships and manpower authorization for BH 
training that includes service or employment obligation is a longer-
term solution that may aid in sustaining the force. This course of 
action would not resolve current constraints, as it will likely take 
several years to achieve results that place additional BH providers 
across the MHS.
      Incredibly long hiring timelines for civilian behavioral 
health providers Revised hiring approaches would help stream-line the 
current hiring timelines. DOD is continually assessing ways to improve 
hiring timelines using existing authorities under 10 USC section 1599c 
and 5 USC section 9905 to recruit and appoint civilian BH providers in 
order to enable the DOD to be more competitive within local labor 
markets.
      Limits in pay structure that does not allow civilian 
incentive pay (specifically the report stated that the VA had 
authorities the DOD lacked regarding compensation for behavioral health 
providers)
      The DOD currently leverages the Special Salary Rate 
authority, allowing the DOD to increase rates of basic pay to amounts 
competitive within the local labor market. Further assessment would be 
needed to determine if a civilian incentive pay would allow DOD to be 
more competitive with VA and the private sector. We will also review 
our use of the Physicians' Comparability Allowance (PCA), which is used 
to recruit and retain civil service physicians.
      Limits in pay structure that does not allow civilian 
incentive pay (specifically the report stated that the VA had 
authorities the DOD lacked regarding compensation for behavioral health 
providers)
      The DOD currently leverages the Special Salary Rate 
authority, allowing the DOD to increase rates of basic pay to amounts 
competitive within the local labor market. Further assessment would be 
needed to determine if a civilian incentive pay would allow DOD to be 
more competitive with VA and the private sector. We also need to will 
also review our use of the Physicians' Comparability Allowance (PCA), 
which is used to recruit and retain civil service physicians.
      Increasing telehealth (please address this specifically 
as it relates to the new TRICARE contract being negotiated)--Will the 
new contract allow cross-network telehealth appointments? The T-5 
contract will provide telehealth appointments for primary care, 
specialty care, and BH services for military medical treatment facility 
(MTF)-enrolled and non-MTF enrolled beneficiaries for both routine and 
urgent services. For urgent services, telehealth will be available 365 
days per year and 24 hours per day. In addition, the contractor is 
required to develop and maintain a telehealth crisis action protocol to 
address rapid transition of care from telehealth to in-person. 
Telehealth providers will be required to connect to the Defense Health 
Agency through a compatible Health Information Exchange process in 
order to securely share information in accordance with applicable 
privacy rules.
    Ms. Speier. Secretary Austin, the Defense Suicide Prevention Office 
(DSPO) testified in a previous hearing that it was pursuing a safe 
storage training program. Would you consider subsidizing the cost of 
safe storage devices (such as firearm locks and safes) to 
servicemembers who request them?
    Secretary Austin. I am aware that research has shown that safe 
storage can help prevent suicides, and I absolutely support efforts to 
encourage safe storage of firearms. The Department is working with the 
Military Departments to pursue a safe storage training program and 
continues to explore options to enhance safe storage of lethal means, 
including weapons. The Department is also taking a proactive approach 
to safe storage education through its ``Firearm Retailer Toolkit.'' The 
toolkit enables firearm retailers to discuss safe storage options with 
their customers at the point of sale to help increase safe storage from 
the outset of firearm ownership.
    Ms. Speier. Secretary Austin and General Milley, your testimonies 
spoke to the importance of childcare for readiness and retention. 
General Milley, you called military childcare ``the gold standard.'' 
Yet, 19,000 children are currently on waitlists for care, and by the 
military's own estimates, at least 60 childcare facilities are in poor 
or failing condition. This year's budget includes funding for just two 
child development center construction projects, with no additional 
facilities listed on the unfunded list. It goes without saying that 
childcare should not be an unfunded priority. Our military children 
deserve the very best, and their families can't be focused on the 
mission if they can't get childcare at all or are worried about poor 
facilities. What is the Department doing to reduce waitlists and fix 
our failing facilities?
    General Milley. I defer to the SECDEF to provide a response on 
their ongoing efforts, however, I will say that childcare is a 
workforce enabler that directly impacts the readiness, efficiency, and 
retention of the Total Force. I fully support the Department's efforts 
to address the childcare challenges.
    Ms. Speier. Chairman Milley, last year at this hearing you agreed 
that operational tempo has been too high, and you committed to 
implementing reforms to Global Force Management to reduce OPTEMPO. What 
is the status of these reforms? Has OPTEMPO been reduced by your 
reforms, and by how much and in what instances?
    General Milley. In 2021 I directed an Operational Planning Team 
(OPT) to refine DOD Global Force Management (GFM) processes. The GFM 
Refinement OPT found the GFM processes were sound and agile, but 
recommended 14 improvements.
    Below is a list of the refinements and their status:
    1. J-8 Present DRT for SecDef signature prior to each GFMB 1--(Feb 
of each FY)
    2. J-8 Incrementally adjust ``Forces For'' timeline left--(Goal: 
approved by Dec 22)
    3. J-5 Develop Global Competition Framework--(Complete)
    4. Joint Staff/Joint Force collaborate in drafting Globally 
Integrated Risk Assessment--(Complete)
    5. J-5 Incorporate ``Risk to Modernization'' in next JRAM 
revision--(Complete)
    6. J-3 Track & annotate deviations from GFMAP Base Order in SDOB--
(Complete)
    7. J-3 Enforce Validation criteria--(Complete)
    8. Joint Staff enforce Joint Risk Analysis Manual procedures--
(Complete)
    9. J-3 Require 4-Star approval for High Risk/Non-concurs in FY23 
GFM PLANORD--(Complete)
    10. Joint Staff add 4-Star endorsement of High Risk in GFMIG & 
CJCSM 3130.06 (Goal: signature Summer 2022)
    11. J-3 Present GFMAP Base Order FY23 for SecDef signature NLT 
February--(Complete)
    12. Joint Staff provide annual GFM training to Joint Force via 
SVTC/travel--(Complete)
    13. J-7 include GFM in OPMEP/JPME (Goal: FY24)
    14. Accelerate Leader Dashboard development/Data convergence (AI 
enabled) (Goal: FY24)
    While the GFM Refinement OPT efforts were not specifically designed 
to reduce OPTEMPO, I expect that the Secretary of Defense's FY23 
Allocation Plan decisions, informed by Directed Readiness Tables 
status, the improved risk assessments directed by the Chairman's Joint 
Risk Assessment Methodology manual, and the prioritization scheme from 
the Global Competition Framework, will yield improved OPTEMPO across 
the Military Departments.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. Why can it take so long to get third party approval for 
NATO members to transfer weapons to other NATO members in a crisis? How 
can we improve the effectiveness, flexibility, and speed of our Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) process?
    Secretary Austin. Given the complexities of arms transfer decisions 
and the multiple U.S. interests involved in each arms transfer, 
decisions on third party transfer (TPT) requests are made on a case-by-
case basis. In addition to the typical processing of requests, 
statutory requirements in section 3 of the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) and section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) govern TPTs 
and require 30-day Congressional notifications of TPTs of Major Defense 
Equipment valued at $25M or more for NATO countries.
    With regard to approval of TPTs of defense articles to Ukraine, at 
the start of the on-going Ukraine crisis, the Department of State 
approved TPTs to implement the President's policy to provide weapons as 
quickly as possible. This expedited TPT process was energized by DoS 
and, through substantial effort, was responsible for providing Stinger 
and Javelin missiles to the Ukrainians in a matter of days, some within 
24 hours, after a request was made.
    Separate from TPTs, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) 
is looking at several ways to improve the effectiveness, flexibility, 
and speed of our FMS process.
    Mr. Scott. How many, if any, civilian personnel and defense 
contractors are being hired to calculate the carbon foot print of the 
Department of Defense?
    Secretary Austin. None. The Department's carbon footprint for scope 
one and two emissions is calculated by DOE's Federal Energy Management 
Program based on utility and fuel consumption information that we 
provide. The Department is beginning the much more complex process of 
calculating our scope three emissions (supply chain) with the intent 
that over time this will become a routine data element associated with 
procurement actions.
    Mr. Scott. The Ukrainian Air Force had MIG-29s in their inventory 
prior to the start of the Russo-Ukraine War on February 24, 2022. How 
can replacing aircraft lost in combat with the same kind of aircraft be 
considered an escalation?
    Secretary Austin. The United States remains committed to bolstering 
Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russia's unprovoked and 
unjustifiable war.
    With respect to aircraft, the United States does not operate MiG-
29s. For those Allies who do operate these aircraft, it is their 
sovereign decision to determine what kind of security assistance they 
will send to Ukraine. I am heartened by the continued flow of security 
assistance to our Ukrainian partners from our global allies and 
partners.
    The United States has committed more than $4.5 billion in security 
assistance to Ukraine since January 2021. This has been critical to 
ensuring Ukraine can defend itself against Russia's aggression, and we 
continue to adapt the systems and equipment we send to Ukraine based on 
our constant contact with the Ukrainian government. This security 
assistance is making a difference by helping Ukraine gain advantage on 
the battlefield today and build enduring strength for tomorrow.
    Mr. Scott. Should the need arise, is activating the Civil Reserve 
Air Fleet considered an escalation? Will the CRAF be ready, if 
activated, in response to the war in Ukraine?
    Secretary Austin. The United States, with thanks to Congress, has 
had a robust response to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine, 
encompassing more than $4.5 billion in security assistance since 
January 2021, and several force posture adjustments in Europe. Thus 
far, activating the Civil Reserve Air Fleet has not been necessary. The 
Department of Defense continues to evaluate and assess Russia's ongoing 
invasion, and continues to adapt our policy and deterrent approach to 
Russia in light of its aggressive, unprovoked war.
    Mr. Scott. Both the Air Force and Navy operate aerial aggressor 
squadrons with 3rd and 4th generation aircraft. What are the advantages 
of using 3rd and 4th generation aggressor aircraft instead of 5th 
generation aircraft? Are there any plans to assign 5th generation 
aircraft to the aggressor squadrons?
    Secretary Austin. Air Combat Command is planning the stand-up of an 
F-35 aggressor squadron, the exact timing and composition of which will 
depend on funding and the availability of early production F-35s. Our 
combat crews need to train against 5th generation weapon systems that 
replicate current adversary capability, however we do not currently 
have sufficient 5th generation assets to use as aggressors. The use of 
legacy aircraft as aggressors is currently the best option available as 
we consider future options.
    Mr. Scott. When the need arises, are you prepared to recommend to 
the President that the Defense Production Act be invoked in order to 
speed up the production of vital weapons and ammunition?
    Secretary Austin. When appropriate, I have and will execute DPA 
Title I authority to prioritize parts and components needed to produce 
vital weapons and ammunition to replenish U.S. stocks and support DOD 
readiness. In addition, the Additional Ukraine Supplemental 
Appropriations Act includes $600 million for the DPA Fund for use of 
Title III authorities. Of this total, a portion will be utilized to 
mitigate defense industrial base constraints to enable faster missile 
production to resupply U.S. stocks transferred to Ukraine. The 
remainder will be utilized to expand domestic capacity and invest in 
domestic production of strategic and critical materials essential to 
the national defense. Investment will focus on supply chains for 
advanced batteries, including lithium, nickel, cobalt, and graphite; 
and potentially other materials where Russia is a major global 
producer, including titanium.
    Mr. Scott. In your meetings and discussions with your foreign 
counterparts, what feedback do you receive on the National Guard's 
State Partnership Program?
    Secretary Austin. My counterparts involved in the State Partnership 
Program (SPP) routinely point to their State Partners as their most 
trusted friends; evidenced by the many co-deployments of partner 
countries and National Guard units together around the world. For 
nearly three decades, the SPP has been an invaluable tool for improving 
relationships with the more than 90 partner nations in the program. We 
continue to grow by two partnerships a year and the demand from 
potential partner nations to join SPP is remarkable. That demand is a 
direct result of SPP's most valuable contribution to international 
security--trust. Many of our partner countries are asking for increased 
contact and deeper ties, especially in the wake of the crisis and 
events in Ukraine. The most important resource we must continue to 
provide is predictability. Predictable, stable funding, and your full 
support of the FY 2023 President's Budget request, which includes 
Bilateral Affairs Officer positions in SPP countries, ensures close and 
enduring relationships with our partners. When crisis strikes, we 
cannot surge trust.
    Mr. Scott. Why can it take so long to get third party approval for 
NATO members to transfer weapons to other NATO members in a crisis? How 
can we improve the effectiveness, flexibility, and speed of our Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) process?
    General Milley. The Department of State supervises and directs the 
U.S. Government's Third Party Transfers and Foreign Military Sales. DOD 
is the implementing agency through the Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency. I defer to Department of State on how to improve the FMS 
process and third party transfer among NATO members.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the strategic relationship between the United States and 
Romania?
    General Milley. Romania is a model for defense modernization, an 
important host for U.S. forces, and a reliable contributor to 
international missions. In support of the NATO command structure, 
Romania also hosts multinational corps, division, and brigade 
headquarters. Mikhail Kogalniceanu (``MK'') Airbase is an important 
logistics node and a platform for U.S. and Allied operations in the 
region. Romania has invested billions in missile defense and long-range 
precision strike systems, setting a strong example for the region on 
defense modernization. Since the start of Russia's further invasion of 
Ukraine in February, Romania has accepted more than 700,000 refugees. 
Romania normally hosts the bulk of a deployed, rotational army combined 
arms battalion.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the partnership between the United States and Poland?
    General Milley. Poland's economic weight, its infrastructure, its 
commitment to ready, capable forces, and its location make it a 
critical Ally. Poland and the United States are consistently aligned 
vis-a-vis NATO and Europe, and Poland is a leader of regional 
cooperation. It also takes defense modernization seriously, with 
defense spending far exceeding its Wales Pledge targets. Recent 
procurements that substantially contribute to deterrence and defense 
include F-35s, Patriot air and missile defense systems, HIMARS rocket 
artillery, and M1 tanks. Poland normally hosts Army deployed, 
rotational corps and division headquarters as well as much of an 
armored brigade combat team. It also hosts a U.S.-led NATO enhanced 
Forward Presence Battlegroup. The costs of Russia's latest invasion of 
Ukraine are not abstract to Polish citizens. The Polish border with 
Ukraine was the primary transit point for millions of refugees fleeing 
the war (more than 2.5 million of these refugees currently reside in 
Poland). In the weeks prior to the February 2022 invasion, Poland 
provided man-portable air defense systems and other material, and 
Poland's critical role since then cannot be overstated.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the partnership between the United States and Lithuania?
    General Milley. Lithuania is a small but important NATO ally 
sharing borders with Belarus and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. 
Lithuania routinely demonstrates its value to the Alliance with 
consistently high defense spending and outsized contributions to 
international operations. Lithuania is an excellent host to U.S. and 
Allied forces, including a U.S. Army deployed, rotational combined 
armed battalion, and German-led NATO Enhanced Forward Presence 
battlegroup, and a NATO Baltic Air Policing contingent. Together with 
other Baltic state, Lithuania works closely with the United States on 
integrated air and maritime domain awareness as part of the Baltic 
Security Initiative. Lithuania was the first country to provide lethal 
aid to Ukraine in 2014. In the immediate lead-up to the February 2022 
invasion, Lithuania sent Ukraine Stinger missiles and other military 
assistance.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the partnership between the United States and Latvia?
    General Milley. Given that it borders Russia and Belarus, Latvia 
has watched Russian aggression in Ukraine with great concern. Though 
small, Latvia's prioritization of military modernization and NATO 
interoperability makes them a valuable Ally and important partner with 
regard to U.S. assurance and deterrence efforts. Latvia consistently 
meets NATO spending targets of 2% of GDP on defense and 20% of defense 
spending on modernization. Latvia often hosts U.S. forces for exercises 
and training. In the lead-up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Latvia 
donated Stinger man-portable air defense systems to Ukraine. Together 
with the other Baltic states, Latvia works closely with the United 
States on integrated air and maritime domain awareness as part of the 
Baltic Security Initiative.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the partnership between the United States and Estonia?
    General Milley. With a 183-mile border with Russia, Estonia is an 
important NATO Ally committed to fielding ready, lethal, and 
interoperable forces. Estonia is also one of the highest per-capita 
contributors to international cooperative security missions and 
assistance to Ukraine. Viewing cyber warfare as an effective way to 
fight (and defend itself against) more capable adversaries, Estonia has 
developed a niche specialization in cyber defense and hosts the NATO 
Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. Estonia also hosts a UK-led 
enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group. Estonia provides excellent 
support to U.S. forces deployed to the country for exercises and 
training. Together with other Baltic states, Estonia works closely with 
the United States on integrated air and maritime domain awareness as 
part of the Baltic Security Initiative.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the partnership between the United States and Slovakia?
    General Milley. In February 2022, Slovakia concluded a Defense 
Cooperation Agreement with the United States that opened the doors for 
deeper collaboration. The following month, Slovakia hosted 2,100 U.S. 
personnel for Exercise SABER STRIKE, the largest number of U.S. forces 
on Slovak soil in history. Slovakia recognizes both Russia and China as 
strategic threats, and Slovakia supports U.S. assurance and deterrence 
efforts on NATO's eastern flank. In response to Russia's further 
invasion of Ukraine in February, Slovakia provides S-300 air defense 
systems to Ukraine, addressing a critical requirement for the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces. Slovakia now hosts a NATO battle group along with German 
and U.S. Patriot batteries, and it contributes to the NATO battle group 
in Latvia. Committed to defense modernization, Slovakia has concluded 
purchases of UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters and F-16 multirole fighters in 
recent years.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the partnership between the United States and the Czech 
Republic?
    General Milley. The Czech Republic is a valuable Ally at the heart 
of Central Europe. A reliable contributor to international cooperative 
security efforts, the Czechs were active in Afghanistan and remain 
engaged inside and outside Europe. The Czechs also participate in NATO 
battlegroups in Latvia and Lithuania and regularly host deployed U.S. 
Air Force aircraft for exercises, training, and deterrence activities. 
The Czechs have purchased Bell UH-1Y and AH-1Z helicopters to replace 
their legacy Soviet fleet, reducing their dependence on Russian spare 
parts. Since the further invasions of Ukraine in 2022, the Czech 
Republic sent critical material assistance to Ukraine and are one of 
the main contributors to such aid as a percentage of GDP.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the partnership between the United States and Georgia?
    General Milley. The U.S. has excellent military relations with 
Georgia. The U.S. is assisting Georgia to improve its readiness and 
build sustainable forces capable of territorial defense and poised to 
support NATO expeditionary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Georgia 
is a NATO partner nation (not a NATO member, but a NATO aspirant). 
Georgia has been an enthusiastic recipient of multilateral and 
bilateral military and economic assistance. The U.S. also supports the 
Georgia-NATO Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) and assists 
with logistics. Georgia was the fourth largest troop contributor to the 
NATO mission in Afghanistan. In the latest Russian attack on Ukraine, 
the Georgian people support Ukraine, but the Georgia government 
prioritizes avoiding an open confrontation with Russia. The combination 
of a highly strategic location--proximate to Iran, deep water ports on 
the Black Sea, etc.--and a staunchly pro-West/pro-U.S. vein of popular 
sentiment allow Georgia to punch far above its weight.
    Mr. Scott. Should the United States send more officers to study at 
international war colleges? Should U.S. War colleges host more 
international students? If the answer is yes to either question, what 
additional resources are needed?
    General Milley. No, the United States sends an appropriate amount 
of its officers to international war colleges. While recognizing 
sending U.S. military officers to Allied and Partner war colleges is a 
critical component of further developing our mil-to-mil relationships, 
the Services face challenges in filling requests due to movement, 
language, training requirements, and funding constraints. The United 
States benefits from a diverse cohort of international students. Recent 
global events highlight the importance of cultivating relationships 
with international students attending U.S. War Colleges, but adding 
additional students can adversely impact curriculum quality due to 
classification limitations. In the current strategic environment war 
colleges need to emphasize a classified understanding of our pacing 
threat and instruction in the operational level of war. We strive to 
balance our classified curriculum focus with the strategic benefits of 
relationships developed with international students.
    Mr. Scott. How can the United States Coast Guard enhance the value 
they provide to the joint force?
    General Milley. The United States Coast Guard is a unique force 
multiplier for the Joint Force. They are both a military service and a 
law enforcement organization. Diplomacy is the Coast Guard's weapon--
they operate with over 60 countries all over the world. The Coast Guard 
has a proven history of building partnerships and sustaining trust with 
Allies which allows them access to contested regions. The Coast Guard 
advances U.S. national security interests by working with partner 
nations in the Indo-Pacific, shapes international norms within the 
Arctic Council, and supports combatant commanders through theater 
security cooperation missions in Africa and the Middle East. The Coast 
Guard models internationally-recognized maritime behavior and norms, 
which helps prevent escalation and conflict. Members of the United 
States Coast Guard are fully integrated across the Joint Force--serving 
on the Joint Staff, at combatant commands, and conducting operations 
alongside other services within the Department of Defense. Among the 
Coast Guard's statutory missions is ``defense readiness''--which 
requires the Coast Guard to maintain the training and capability to 
integrate with DOD forces. As such, the Coast Guard is built into the 
Joint Forces' operational plans and factored into the Global Force 
Management Allocation Plan.
    Mr. Scott. Music has the ability to cross cultures and that 
cultural diplomacy is what military bands bring to the fight. Are 
military bands being utilized to their full potential to enhance ties 
between nations? What additional resources are needed by military bands 
to build relationships with countries that might have some challenges?
    General Milley. I do not have oversight of the policy regarding use 
of military bands. I would have to defer this question to the services 
to provide any specific resourcing shortfalls they may have 
experienced.
    Mr. Scott. What lessons from foreign war colleges should be 
implemented to enhance the caliber of instruction and quality of the 
graduates from U.S. War Colleges?
    General Milley. Collaboration with our allies and partners helps 
enhance U.S. War College curriculums by providing unique perspectives 
to further strengthen the quality of instruction. We do not formally 
collect information on specific lessons that might improve the caliber 
of instruction or nominate curriculum changes resulting from feedback 
of foreign war college graduates.
    Mr. Scott. Both the Air Force and Navy operate aerial aggressor 
squadrons with 3rd and 4th generation aircraft. What are the advantages 
of using 3rd and 4th generation aggressor aircraft instead of 5th 
generation aircraft? Are their any plans to assign 5th generation 
aircraft to the aggressor squadrons?
    General Milley. The Department's goal is to ensure appropriate 
resources are applied to critical missions, which may include utilizing 
capabilities that exist in 3rd and 4th generation systems. Modernizing 
our Joint Force requires a balance of existing and modernized systems 
as we transition to integrate new technologies required to defeat 
future competitors. PB23 effectively balances current capability and 
capacity with investments in modernized systems for the future fight. 
The U.S. Air Force is transitioning the 65th Aggressor Squadron with 
5th-generation fighters (F-35As) to support major exercises and 
training events. This will enable the Joint Force to approximate our 
pacing challenge, enabling our aircrew to receive the best possible 
training prepares us for the high-end fight.
    Mr. Scott. Do you feel that for many senior military leaders, the 
crush of their daily routines leaves them struggling to find time for 
deliberate thought and strategic decision-making? How do we make this 
shift towards strategic thinking instead of micromanaging details?
    General Milley. Dedicating time for deliberate thought and 
strategic decision-making is a universal challenge for senior military 
leaders. Senior leaders develop their own battle rhythm to receive 
relevant information to develop situational awareness required to 
ensure informed decision making. A critical component of the battle 
rhythm is to assure ``protected'' time for senior leader's deliberate 
thought and strategic decision-making. At appropriate levels along the 
education continuum, staffs are similarly educated and trained to 
manage other important but ancillary details to support senior leader 
decision-making. A strategic thinking organization involves the senior 
leader and the staff at all levels. Applying thoughtful mission 
guidance from the leader, and empowered staff will naturally innovate 
to ensure organizational success. Empowerment at lower echelons results 
in more time at the higher levels to observe, reflect and enhance the 
overall strategic picture of the organization.
    Mr. Scott. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once remarked, 
``The only thing worse than having allies is not having them.'' Can you 
talk about the partnership between the United States and Bulgaria?
    General Milley. Bulgaria is an important NATO Ally and Black Sea 
security partner. Since joining NATO in 2004, Bulgaria has deployed 
many thousands of personnel in support of NATO missions. Bulgaria 
provides excellent support to rotational U.S. army forces and episodic 
Air Force elements deployed to the country. Although Bulgaria has deep 
historical and cultural ties to Russia, Bulgaria is committed to U.S. 
and NATO assurance and deterrence measures initiated following Russia's 
further invasion of Ukraine. Bulgaria now hosts a NATO battle group.
    Mr. Scott. In your meetings and discussions with your foreign 
counterparts, what feedback do you receive on the National Guard's 
State Partnership Program?
    General Milley. The National Guard's State Partnership program 
continues to be a low cost, high reward security cooperation program 
that enhances, influences and promotes access to global partners. The 
California National Guard's (CANG) partnership with Ukraine continues 
to be an excellent example of the long term positive benefits of the 
program. The established twenty-nine-year partnership has been integral 
to Ukraine's war efforts, and it has increased interest in the program 
throughout the U.S. European Command theater.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
    Ms. Stefanik. As the Department takes steps to invest in quantum 
computing, what is DOD doing to ensure quantum applications are being 
developed to address specific defense needs? Can you preview for the 
public how the National Security and National Defense strategies will 
prioritize technology like AI and quantum computing?
    Secretary Austin. For more than 30 years, DOD research efforts have 
defined the scope and breadth of the quantum information science field. 
From atomic clocks to quantum sensing to quantum computing, the DOD 
researchers and program managers at the Army, Navy, Air Force, and 
Defense Agencies have devoted themselves to spearheading basic and 
applied research in this field. As the DOD continues to invest in the 
development of quantum information science, the breadth of potential 
military applications that may be efficiently satisfied using quantum 
computers is a topic of active research across the DOD, including in 
the Air Force, Army, and Navy, as well as the Defense Agencies such as 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
    DOD research is generating insights into the kinds of applications 
that a quantum computer is likely to provide that would benefit the 
DOD, while also raising questions about how exactly the DOD could 
practically capture quantum computing's full potential. The DOD will 
continue to liaise with industry and academia to augment its 
understanding of potential military applications for quantum computing 
and seek a path to realizing the full potential of this emerging field 
continually over the long-term.
    The DOD's continued prioritization of critical technology areas 
such as artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing takes 
different forms depending on the maturity of the technology and 
research budget available. The DOD drives hard to rapidly advance 
technology readiness in areas where military advantage is well-
understood, while conducting fundamental research to formulate new 
ideas and improve the quantitative understanding of military impact 
where uncertainty exists.
    Ms. Stefanik. How does the Department intend to improve homeland 
defenses against hypersonic cruise missiles that may not take a 
traditional route of attack to the U.S.?
    Secretary Austin. Defending the U.S. homeland from all types of 
attacks, including from hypersonic cruise missiles, is our highest 
priority. The Department is investing in advancements in to improve our 
sensor identification, characterization, tracking, and attribution 
capabilities that will improve our situational awareness and decision-
making. We are also examining active (e.g., kinetic and non-kinetic 
intercept capabilities) and passive (e.g., dispersal, hardening) 
defense measures to protect critical assets. Additional information can 
be provided at a higher classification level.
    Ms. Stefanik. With much of the surrounding airspace closed to U.S. 
overflights, and growing instability in Pakistan, how is the Department 
adapting to conduct counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan? How can 
we monitor growing terror threats from ISIS-K or Al Qaida from space 
alone? What is the Department doing to improve ISR access over 
Afghanistan?
    Secretary Austin. The Department is committed to ensuring that 
Afghanistan is not a safe haven for terrorist organizations and will 
use its full capabilities in furtherance of that objective. DOD 
continues to invest in and deploy capabilities that can effectively 
counter terrorism threats from Afghanistan. We continue to deepen our 
relationships in the region, collaborate with allies and partners, and 
ensure we bring the right mix of capabilities to bear.
    We are monitoring threats from ISIS-K and al-Qa'ida by leveraging 
capabilities from across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence 
Community, which provide an integrated, whole-of-government 
intelligence picture. Most critically, through employment of airborne 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, over-the-
horizon allows us the ability to degrade terrorist groups that pose a 
direct threat to the United States and our allies in places in which we 
lack physical access. We are working diligently to maintain and grow 
our collection posture in the region.
    More detail is available at a higher classification.
    Ms. Stefanik. As a previous Commander of 10th Mountain Soldiers, 
what role do you see for the 10th Mountain Division as an elite arctic-
capable fighting Division in great power competition? Would you support 
a permanent rotation of arctic-capable units like the 10th Mountain in 
the European Defense Initiative? How would you utilize the 10th 
Mountain Division to carry out the Department's Joint Arctic Strategy?
    General Milley. The Arctic is a potential area of expanded 
competition and the Joint Force must be able to project power wherever 
necessary to maintain a credible deterrent. One key to that strategy is 
maintaining forces, like the 10th Mountain Division, who are 
specifically trained to fight in extreme cold and austere conditions. 
If a situation necessitates a DOD response, we must maintain the 
capability to rapidly deploy sufficient military power in the Arctic to 
meet DOD's three primary objectives as outlined in the 2019 DOD Arctic 
Strategy--defend the homeland, maintain favorable regional balances of 
power, and ensure common domains remain free and open. These objectives 
support U.S. government strategic goals for the Arctic as outlined in 
the National Defense Strategy and National Strategy for the Arctic 
Region. The Joint Force remains postured to support individual 
Combatant Commander requirements, while balancing global risk.
    Ms. Stefanik. As the Department takes steps to invest in quantum 
computing, what is DOD doing to ensure quantum applications are being 
developed to address specific defense needs? Can you preview for the 
public how the National Security and National Defense strategies will 
prioritize technology like AI and quantum computing?
    General Milley. The PB23 budget makes the largest-ever investment 
in RDT&E, at $130B, in order to modernize the Joint Force and keep up 
with the revolution in technology. This includes investment in 14 
critical enabling technologies that will be instrumental to the future 
of warfare, like Biotechnology, Quantum Science, and Trusted Artificial 
Intelligence. The DOD will leverage this funding to work closely with 
academia and the private sector to harness innovation and rapidly field 
military capabilities in a way that can build enduring advantages over 
the long term.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN
    Mr. Brown. The budget you released last week reduces the quantity 
of F-35s you are procuring. I understand that this decision is related 
to the timeline to get to the block 4 capabilities. When will you have 
joint propulsion requirements defined for the F-35 fleet? And, is there 
a plan to move forward with modernization of the F135 and development 
of the Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion? If so, what is it?
    Secretary Austin. The F-35 Joint Program Office is working to 
incorporate the Air Force's requirements for propulsion modification/
upgrade to the F-35 along with those from the other Services to 
formulate a joint requirement for the F-35.
    Modernization of the F-35 is under consideration as a means for 
addressing Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps priorities (early 
requirements) for the F-35 integrated propulsion and power and thermal 
management system. Results from on-going analyses and testing of the 
Adaptive Engine Transition Program full scale, flight weight prototype 
engines will inform the Services' future acquisition decisions.
    With regards to the Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion program, 
competitive design activities are underway and on track for a scheduled 
Preliminary Design Reviews in the summer of 2022.
    Mr. Brown. With an ever-tightening budget and scarce resources, how 
effective are DOD's in-house financial readiness efforts compared to 
services that consumer counseling entities and not-for-profit credit 
unions offer?
    Secretary Austin. As required by 10 U.S.C. Sec. 992, the DOD has a 
highly effective and comprehensive financial literacy and preparedness 
program that includes training on financial topics targeted across the 
military lifecycle and counseling services that address the individual 
needs of Service members and families. The Department has not seen 
evidence that consumer counseling entities and credit unions have the 
demonstrated capacity to meet all of the financial literacy and 
counseling program requirements across DOD's enterprise, to include 
active, Guard, and reserve members and families.
    However, the DOD does not restrict Service members from accessing 
services offered by on-base financial institutions or consumer 
counseling services. The Department also has ongoing relationships with 
various non-profit entities that augment financial readiness military 
training with online and in-person resources.
    The Department's program works across the various Federal agencies 
and departments, making use of the full talent and resources of the 
U.S. government to develop consistent, high-quality financial literacy 
programming, based on standardized learning objectives, that 
incorporate researched-based best practices for delivering financial 
education. Additionally, the Department regularly reviews and assesses 
the effectiveness of its programs to improve the quality of resources 
provided and strengthen the financial well-being of the force.
    The Department takes great care to ensure that any information 
presented is factual and unbiased. Individuals providing financial 
counseling under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 992 are required to be free from any 
conflicts of interest. DOD has established clear requirements for any 
non-federal entities that seek access to DOD installations in order to 
protect Service members from unfair or predatory commercial providers 
that have historically targeted them and their families. The Department 
must and will dedicate resources to care for our people--our most 
valuable resource.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
    Mr. Kelly. The COCOM demand for high-accuracy ISR, multi-domain 
operational capability to address near-peer mission requirements 
continues to grow, far exceeding the organic capability currently 
available by the services. What is the Department, as a joint 
requirement, and each of the services doing to take advantage of 
commercially-owned and commercially-operated aircraft to address the 
ISR mission requirements of the COCOMs for high-accuracy surveillance?
    Secretary Austin. The Department has used commercially-owned and 
commercially-operated (COCO) aircraft when Department Program of Record 
aircraft were not able to meet a validated COCOM requirement. These 
aircraft provide short-term capability fills and are employed in 
permissive operating environments from locations where the Department 
already has a physical presence. If there is a validated COCOM 
requirement for high-accuracy intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, multi-domain operational capability to address a near-
peer mission requirement, and the Department cannot meet the 
requirement with available assets, the Department may leverage COCO 
aircraft if they are suited to meet the validated requirement.
    Mr. Kelly. The COCOM demand for high-accuracy ISR, multi-domain 
operational capability to address near-peer mission requirements 
continues to grow, far exceeding the organic capability currently 
available by the services. What is the Department, as a joint 
requirement, and each of the services doing to take advantage of 
commercially-owned and commercially-operated aircraft to address the 
ISR mission requirements of the COCOMs for high-accuracy surveillance?
    General Milley. The PB23 submission includes a $2.8B request for 
ISR, an increase of $719M from the FY22 enacted budget. The Department, 
Combatant Commands, and Services are contracting commercially-available 
ISR capabilities. One example is demonstrated with the National 
Reconnaissance Office recently awarding five contracts to leverage 
commercial radar satellites that can provide high accuracy 
surveillance.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
    Mr. Gallagher. Secretary Austin, the fact sheet for the new 
National Defense Strategy describes China as our ``pacing challenge,'' 
while noting the ``acute threats'' posed by Russia. That reads to me 
like the Department is saying Russia is an immediate threat, while 
China is a longer-term problem that may not be immediately manifest as 
a threat. Is that what you intended to convey?
    Secretary Austin. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is our most 
consequential strategic competitor and, thus, the pacing challenge for 
the Department. The Department needs to be focused on deterring PRC 
aggression in the near, mid, and long term. The PRC is both a challenge 
for the Department today, and in the future. Our emphasis on integrated 
deterrence, enabled by combat-credible forces and backstopped by a 
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, is central to the 
Department's approach.
    As illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked further invasion of 
Ukraine, Russia poses an acute threat today. We will continue to 
collaborate with our NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust 
deterrence in the face of Russian aggression.
    Mr. Gallagher. One thing that troubles me in this budget request is 
our shrinking naval battle force, which would drop from 298 ships today 
all the way down to 280 in FY 2027, right in the middle of what many 
consider to be the period of greatest danger. Secretary Austin, how 
does the Department plan to make up for that reduced aggregate naval 
capacity? What specific technologies or expanded partnerships will be 
available in the next five years to make up for it?
    Secretary Austin. The Department is focused on developing the right 
mix of capabilities to remain dominant on the battlefield today, and in 
the future. That includes building a balanced fleet with high readiness 
to ensure the Navy can project combat-ready naval forces to campaign, 
deter, and, as necessary, win conflicts and wars. Sea control and sea 
denial in the underwater domain remain core advantages. To accelerate 
America's advantage at sea, we are prioritizing readiness to keep 
combat-credible forces forward. Our enduring forward posture guarantees 
our ability to respond to crisis and blunt gray-zone incrementalism. 
The Navy's global maneuverability supports diplomacy, reassures our 
allies, and generates favorable influence in key regions. Unmanned 
platforms will play a vital role in our future fleet. Successfully 
integrating unmanned platforms--under, on, and above the sea--gives our 
commanders better options to fight and win in contested spaces.
    In defense of our nation, we must also compete in all of the 
domains of war: space, cyber, land, sea, and air. Our budget request 
would invest nearly $28 billion in space capabilities and another $11 
billion to protect DOD networks and develop a St mission force. We are 
also requesting $24 billion in missile defense and defeat, $7 billion 
in long-range fires, and $4 billion in hypersonics.
    We also must continue to work with the shipbuilding industry to 
ensure that they have the shipyard capacity to produce and maintain our 
fleet.
    Mr. Gallagher. Chairman Milley, looking at the war in Ukraine, 
which types of US capabilities are you most concerned about being 
vulnerable on future battlefields? Do you have concerns about attack 
helicopters or armored vehicles, as well as their required logistical 
vehicle support, that don't have active protection systems?
    General Milley. I have concerns with artillery, both missile and 
tube systems, in terms of the Army's ability to absorb readiness 
impacts in fielded units. Further, I am also concerned with the threats 
faced by attack helicopters and armored vehicles that do not have 
active protection systems. The protection systems we have are good but 
we are continuously exploring ways to mitigate existing protection 
gaps, improve future technology insertions and minimize impacts to 
current capabilities.
    Mr. Gallagher. Chairman Milley, looking at the performance of the 
Ukrainian military, in your professional judgement, has the Ukrainian 
Security Assistance Initiative played a role in enhancing Ukraine's 
ability to withstand aggression? If Congress created a similar funding 
mechanism, say the Taiwanese Security Assistance Initiative, do you 
expect that it would likewise enhance Taiwan's ability to defend 
itself? In the event that the United States chose to intervene in a 
conflict over Taiwan, how would a more lethal and capable Taiwanese 
military impact US forces in that fight?
    General Milley. USAI has enhanced Ukraine's ability to stand 
against Russia. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the DOD's 
obligation is to provide arms and services of a defensive nature 
commensurate to the PLA threat. Any legislation and appropriation of 
funding that expedites the transfer of critical materiel and non-
materiel capabilities to the Taiwan Armed Forces will enhance Taiwan's 
ability to deter a more aggressive PRC from attempting to alter the 
status quo. If deterrence fails, a more lethal and capable Taiwan will 
reduce risk to U.S. forces in a conflict with the PRC. However, we are 
challenged in our efforts to expedite transfers to Taiwan because of 
defense industry production timelines, contracting delays, counter 
intelligence and releasability concerns.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
    Mr. Keating. I understand that the Department will no longer need 
to support DHS with CONUS facility and installation support for 
Operation Allies Welcome, is that correct? Will the Department still 
provide some sort of support to DHS for Operation Allies Welcome going 
forward? If so, what will that entail? What overseas support will the 
Department continue to provide at ``lily pad'' locations; what is their 
mission(s) and where are they located?
    Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense (DOD) was proud to 
provide support to Operation ALLIES WECOME (OAW) through the use of 
eight DOD installations within the United States at which DOD provided 
temporary housing, necessary medical care, and other support for Afghan 
evacuees. Since March 8, 2022, DOD has contracted with the National 
Conference Center (NCC), a privately owned commercial facility in 
Leesburg, Virginia, to temporarily house evacuees entering the United 
States as parolees in support of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the Department of State (DOS) resettlement operations. This 
new temporary shelter provides rooms in a non-congregate civilian 
setting and services to ensure the health and safety of the evacuee 
population as they are processed for resettlement.
    Contracting for the use of the NCC enabled DOD to end the use of 
military installations for temporary housing support, thereby returning 
these installations to normal operations. Similar to the support DOD 
provided at domestic military installations as humanitarian assistance, 
DOD has contracted to provide to DHS and DOS in this second phase of 
OAW: 1) NCC facility and facility-associated wrap-around services 
(culturally appropriate food, toiletries, etc.); 2) necessary medical 
services; and 3) linguist services. DOD is providing these services at 
the NCC pursuant to section 2561 of title 10, U.S. Code, using Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster, and with Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds appropriated 
specifically for DOD support of OAW.
    Overseas, DOD continues to support OAW at two locations: Camp As 
Sayliyah in Qatar and Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo. At both installations, 
DOD provides site management, shelter and food, sanitation, and 
necessary outpatient medical care pursuant to section 2561 using OHDACA 
funds appropriated specifically for DOD support of OAW.
    DOD is engaging with DHS and DOS to assess overseas and domestic 
needs for this mission into fiscal year 2023.
                                 ______
                                 
                     QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM
    Mr. Kim. Last year, you testified that efforts to expand healthcare 
to members of the National Guard and Reserve is an issue of the 
``utmost importance''. Chairman Milley also said that it is necessary 
to ensure the National Guard and Reserve forces receive equal pay and 
access to healthcare for the work that they do. What we're discussing 
today is a $773 billion defense budget request, and we have no problem 
spending billions of that on hardware, but I don't see that same level 
of urgency given to issues facing our military personnel, in particular 
healthcare for our Guard and Reserve, when an estimated 130,000 of them 
are without healthcare coverage. Is ensuring access to healthcare for 
our National Guard and Reserve still a priority for DOD? (If yes) Why 
is it that I don't see that prioritization or effort laid out in this 
year's defense budget? When can we expect the Department to seriously 
take up health care reform for our Guardsmen and Reservists?
    Secretary Austin. The health, welfare, and safety of our force is 
of utmost importance to me, and I welcome any initiatives that enable 
us to provide better health care to all members of our force. The 
readiness of our force is closely linked with the health of each and 
every Service member.
    TRICARE eligibility for all of DOD's 9.6 million beneficiaries is 
defined in statute. Our Selected Reserve and National Guard Service 
members have access to the low-cost, premium-based plan called TRICARE 
Reserve Select (TRS) when not activated under orders which qualify them 
for full TRICARE Prime benefits.
    Under current law, Service members who are also employed in their 
non-military duty capacity as a Federal civilian employee or dual-
status technician and are eligible for the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program (FEHBP) are not eligible to enroll in TRICARE at all. 
While this restriction is set to expire in 2030, removing it earlier 
will allow all of our Service members to have equal access to this low-
cost health care option.
    In addition to TRS, statutory authority provides full premium-free 
TRICARE coverage during specific windows around a period of qualifying 
active duty, which is normally activation on Federal orders for periods 
greater than 30 days. For Service members and their eligible family 
members, coverage can begin up to 180 days prior to activation once 
orders are received, and six months of transitional coverage following 
deactivation under the Transitional Assistance Management Program.
    Mr. Kim. I represent Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, which was 
host to one of the largest populations of Afghan refugees from 
Operation Allies Welcome. Most recently, as the DOD Budget Request Memo 
points out, in February 2022 JBMDL was the last OAW ``safe haven'' to 
close. Now, the base is working on repairs to barracks, restrooms, and 
other facilities. However, they have still not been given word from DOD 
on whether the funds they use for these improvements will need to be 
paid by the base and therefore detract from their own missions, or if 
the DOD will step in to provide funds from the Overseas Humanitarian, 
Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account or another source of funding. 
Can you provide some clarity on DOD's plans to reimburse bases for the 
costs associated with repairs after the OAW mission?
    Secretary Austin. The Department recognizes the critical need to 
repair facilities like Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst that supported 
OAW temporary shelter locations so that they can again be used for 
their originally intended purpose. The Department of Defense is 
actively working with the Department of State to execute the agreed-
upon way forward that will allow the use of OHDACA funding under 
section 2561 of title 10, U.S. Code, to restore the permitted locations 
to their prior condition.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. If ships with capability are important, and those ships 
with limited capability are the rationale for early retirements, how 
does this impact building the human capital of experienced and trained 
sailors and officers? It takes 3-5 years to build a competent 
warfighting sailor and decades to build a chief and commanding officer, 
but without the appropriate quantity of ships to train and build those 
sailors and officers are we not accelerating our Navy's demise?
    Secretary Austin. We have the most capable and dominant Navy in 
history, and they will remain that way. The Navy's proposed budget 
submission and 30-year ship building plan maximize maritime capability 
and capacity, getting us the right mix of capability for our missions 
today and for the future. When making difficult force structure and 
resource allocation decisions, the Navy considers individual platform 
capabilities and their contribution to the warfighting mission along 
with total ownership costs that include manpower, maintenance, and 
operations. As part of the programming and planning process, the Navy 
factors current and future readiness across seven readiness pillars 
(Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Networks, and 
Infrastructure). This process, integrated with the long range maritime 
strategy and supported by data driven community health metrics for our 
enlisted ratings and officer designators, ensures that the Navy's human 
capital plan, to include each individual community such as Surface 
Warfare, remains sustainable and executable over the long haul.
    Mr. Waltz. If ships with capability are important, and those ships 
with limited capability are the rationale for early retirements, how 
does this impact building the human capital of experienced and trained 
sailors and officers? It takes 3-5 years to build a competent 
warfighting sailor and decades to build a chief and commanding officer, 
but without the appropriate quantity of ships to train and build those 
sailors and officers are we not accelerating our Navy's demise?
    General Milley. The Navy's proposed budget submission and 30-year 
ship building plan maximizes maritime capability and capacity within 
given resource constraints. The Navy considers individual platform 
capabilities and their contribution to the warfighting mission along 
with total ownership costs that include manpower, maintenance and 
operations when making difficult force structure and resource 
allocation decisions. As part of the programming and planning process, 
the Navy factors current and future readiness across seven readiness 
pillars (Personnel, Equipment, Supply, Training, Ordnance, Networks, 
and Infrastructure). This process, integrated with the long range 
maritime strategy and supported by data driven community health metrics 
for our enlisted ratings and officer designators, ensures that the 
Navy's human capital plan, to include each individual communities such 
as Surface Warfare, remains sustainable and executable over the long 
haul.
    As a more tactical example, this is born out in the fact that when 
a ship is decommissioned, the experience of the crew is retained within 
the Navy by distributing the officers and sailors to other ships and 
commands throughout the force. Any reduction in the Navy's end strength 
due to the decommissioning is accounted for in adjustments to the 
recruiting mission in future years.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you for you and your team's time today. We look 
forward to future engagements. Question: regarding the budget, two 
weeks ago Congress approved $13.6 billion in emergency spending to aid 
Ukraine's fight against the Russian Federation and to bolster NATO--
this is above and beyond what was already spent. The FY23 budget 
requests $6.9 billion for the European Deterrence Initiative, NATO, and 
other efforts to counter the Russian Federation's autocratic agenda. 
Although an increase over FY22, it is still only about half of what was 
approved two weeks ago for a response to a single crisis. Are you 
comfortable with the requested amount? If, yes, can you elaborate on 
why you are comfortable with the requested amount? Thank you.
    Secretary Austin. In addition to asking for congressional support 
for our FY23 budget request, I am grateful to the House for passing the 
Ukraine supplemental request on May 10, 2022. This will help ensure we 
can continue to provide Ukraine the lethal aid necessary to push back 
against Russia's unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine. Robust 
investments, both through the President's FY23 Budget and through 
emergency spending, allow the predictability and flexibility to 
strengthen and support Ukraine's self-defense. The sustained year-on-
year investments of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) have 
enabled the Department to boost its ongoing deterrent posture since 
2014 through increased presence, exercises and training; enhanced 
prepositioning; improved infrastructure; and partner capacity-building 
in Europe, including the long-standing Ukraine Security Assistance 
Initiative. The investments enabled by EDI helped prepare U.S. forces 
to respond to the current situation in Europe.
    Mr. Morelle. Understanding NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) 
programs are programs of the Department of Energy, the potential for 
FY23 reduction in programmatic appropriations for ICF is concerning and 
may have implications for the U.S.' nuclear triad. A key part of the 
NNSA is the ICF program, which is a critical component of the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program that maintains a safe, secure, and effective 
nuclear deterrent. For nearly 2 decades, we have not seen major 
infrastructure investment in any of the three complementary ICF 
facilities, meanwhile China and Russia are building modern facilities 
intended to rival or exceed U.S. capabilities. Considering the 
importance of the ICF program, are you concerned with the significant 
drop in the PBR from $580 in FY22 to $544 in FY23? Thank you for your 
time.
    Secretary Austin. Through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), the 
Department of Defense (DOD) had the opportunity to review the 
President's FY 2023 Budget and the Future Years Nuclear Security 
Program for DOE/NNSA weapons activities. During this review, the NWC 
assessed that the budget represents a strong commitment to implementing 
many DOD priorities and that it meets stockpile and stockpile 
stewardship requirements for Science and Technology programs, including 
the ICF program.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you for you and your team's time today. We look 
forward to future engagements. Question: The interconnectedness of our 
strategic competitors, their aggressive pursuit of anti-access/area 
denial weapon systems and strategy, and their demonstrated ability of 
global strike is deeply concerning. These threats present our nation 
with an increased risk of engaging in a large-scale, all-domain, multi-
theater conflict, whereby interoperability across our combatant 
commands, Allies, and coalition partners become essential parts of our 
national security. How does joint all-domain command control facilitate 
interoperability across our combatant commands, Allies, and coalition 
partners? And as joint all-domain command and control moves from 
concept to policy and doctrine, how are our allies and partners being 
included into the employment concepts of joint all-domain command and 
Control. Thank you.
    General Milley. Joint Force integration with allies and 
multinational partners acts as a combat power force multiplier. JADC2 
emphasizes building allies' and partners' capability and capacity to 
enable operational interoperability, better integrated C2 and shared 
planning, and improved capability to counter subversion, coercion, and 
aggression by adversaries. The JADC2 Implementation Plan is divided 
into five lines of effort (LOE), where 'Mission Partner Information 
Sharing' is LOE 5. The LOE 5 end state is a Joint Force and its mission 
partners seamlessly and continually sharing trusted, interoperable, and 
protected data at all levels of security and releasability while 
supporting the range of multi-domain military operations across our 
allies and partners.
    Key to the success of JADC2 are seven core enabling capabilities, 
one of which is the Mission Partner Environment (MPE) capability 
framework. The technological center of gravity for Enterprise MPE is 
SABRE, the Secret & Below Releasable Environment--a hybrid-cloud 
information sharing capability employing data-centric security 
mechanisms. SABRE provides basic IT core collaboration services to 
include email, file share, chat, VOIP, and VTC. JADC2 will utilize 
SABRE to share information at the appropriate level of classification 
and releasability with Mission Partners to meet the daily mission 
partner information sharing and data exchange needs of the Combatant 
Commands at the Strategic-to-Operational level. SABRE will also 
integrate with existing Combatant Command capabilities, including the 
CENTCOM Partner Environment (CPE).
    Mr. Morelle. Understanding NNSA's Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) 
programs are programs of the Department of Energy, the potential for 
FY23 reduction in programmatic appropriations for ICF is concerning and 
may have implications for the U.S.' nuclear triad. A key part of the 
NNSA is the ICF program, which is a critical component of the Stockpile 
Stewardship Program that maintains a safe, secure, and effective 
nuclear deterrent. For nearly 2 decades, we have not seen major 
infrastructure investment in any of the three complementary ICF 
facilities, meanwhile China and Russia are building modern facilities 
intended to rival or exceed U.S. capabilities. Considering the 
importance of the ICF program, are you concerned with the significant 
drop in the PBR from $580 in FY22 to $544 in FY23? Thank you for your 
time.
    General Milley. The Department supports NNSA's continued investment 
in science and technology programs, which increased overall by 3.6% 
from FY22. I defer to DOE on specific levels of funding for the ICF 
Program and associated facilities.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKLIN
    Mr. Franklin. Secretary Austin, the PB contains 61 F-35s for the 
services instead of the planned 95. Considering the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine and the threats to our own forces and our partners in the 
Pacific, how can we justify failing to meet our planned increases on 
5th generation stealth air power for the 3rd year in a row?
    Secretary Austin. The F-35 is the most capable fighter attack 
aircraft in our inventory and has been tested in combat. F-35s are 
flying critical air policing missions in NATO today and the F-35 will 
remain a critical capability in our arsenal. That is why you see a 
significant commitment to F-35 over the FYDP. With that said, the 
Department is focused on getting the right mix of capabilities to match 
our warfighting concepts. F-35s with Technical Refresh-3 (TR-3) 
hardware and Block 4 modernization will ensure F-35 relevance and 
dominance in high-end engagements with a near-peer military. As a 
result the Department is focused on ensuring that we can acquire a 
suite of F-35s with Block 4 capabilities while we continue to field a 
mix of 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft that enable the Joint 
Force to establish air superiority whenever and wherever the nation 
needs it.
    Mr. Franklin. Secretary Austin, we went from 95 F-35s acquired in 
FY21 to 85 in FY22, and now down to 61 in FY23. Do you think that our 
failure to acquire the planned 95 F-35 fighters yet again this year 
will impact the United States' national security and to what degree 
does our failure to acquire these planes at the planned level signal 
our lack of commitment to U.S. air power?
    Secretary Austin. The F-35 is the most capable fighter attack 
aircraft in our inventory and has been tested in combat. F-35s are 
flying critical air policing missions in NATO today and the F-35 will 
remain a critical capability in our arsenal. That is why you see a 
significant commitment to F-35 over the FYDP. With that said, the 
Department is focused on getting the right mix of capabilities to match 
our warfighting concepts. F-35s with Technical Refresh-3 (TR-3) 
hardware and Block 4 modernization will ensure F-35 relevance and 
dominance in high-end engagements with a near-peer military. As a 
result the Department is focused on ensuring that we can acquire a 
suite of F-35s with Block 4 capabilities while we continue to field a 
mix of 4th and 5th generation fighter aircraft that enable the Joint 
Force to establish air superiority whenever and wherever the nation 
needs it.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. The security situation in Ukraine is a grim reminder 
that we cannot take the readiness of our forces for granted. This 
committee believes it is essential for the military services to better 
link the materiel readiness levels required for our major weapon 
systems to the National Defense Strategy.
    In the FY21 NDAA, Congress required the Department of Defense to 
report on material readiness metrics and objectives for major weapons 
systems annually, beginning with the FY23 President's Budget request.
    This is critical information for congressional oversight; yet it 
has not been included in the budget request materials released to date. 
Will we see these readiness metrics and objectives included in 
forthcoming FY23 budget request materials?
    Also, please tell us more about the work being led by the Director 
of Cost Assessment and Performance Evaluation to develop more accurate 
readiness modeling of the force.
    Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense is implementing a 
strategic readiness approach, focusing on the ability to build, 
maintain, and balance warfighting capabilities and competitive 
advantages to ensure that it can achieve strategic objectives across 
threat and time horizons. Viewing readiness through a strategic lens is 
designed to account for the myriad inputs that contribute to our forces 
being prepared to achieve our strategic objectives. The Office of the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Readiness is developing 
the Readiness Decision Impact Model, an analytic framework that 
integrates models across the Department to improve decision advantage 
by providing greater visibility on the readiness tradeoffs resulting 
from decisions.
    The FY21 NDAA-directed report on materiel readiness metrics for 
major weapons systems is expected to be completed within the next 60 
days.
    Currently there is no CAPE-led effort to develop more accurate 
readiness modeling of the force.
    Mrs. McClain. PFAS has been detected in the groundwater at 
approximately 400 military installations. DOD frequently uses the 
groundwater at bases to provide drinking water for servicemembers, 
essentially acting like a water utility. Since 2016, DOD has taken 
steps to provide drinking water that meets the LHA for PFOA and PFOS 
when DOD is the purveyor of drinking water. I am curious about the 
number of service members who were served contaminated water before 
2016.
      How many DOD installations acted or still act as the 
purveyor of drinking water to service members?
      For those installations that acted or still act as the 
purveyor of drinking water, for how many is the groundwater the source 
of drinking water? Which installations?
      Where the groundwater was the source of drinking at DOD 
installations, did DOD filter PFAS from the groundwater before 2016? 
Which installations?
      For each year between 1970 and 2015, how many service 
members and dependents were located at DOD installation where DOD was 
the purveyor of drinking water and the groundwater was the source of 
the drinking water?
      What steps has DOD taken to notify service members and 
their families that they were drinking or may have been drinking water 
contaminated with PFAS?
      During recent testimony before the Senate Armed Service 
Committee, DOD testified that DOD would release a health study on the 
impacts of PFAS on service member by the end of 2021. When will DOD 
release this study?
    Secretary Austin. First, let me say that the health and safety of 
our people and the communities of which we are a part is my top 
priority. PFAS contamination is both a Department issue and a broader 
issue in the United States, which is why I have spoken to EPA 
Administrator Reagan on several occasions about us getting after this 
challenge together. We have requested $227 million in the FY23 defense 
budget to address PFAS, and we are focused on greater transparency and 
communication with affected communities. We also continue to invest in 
firefighting alternatives without PFAS.
    With respect to your specific questions: a.) The attached list of 
165 installations identifies locations where DOD is or has acted as the 
purveyor of drinking water, where groundwater is used as a source of 
the drinking water. b.) DOD began taking action to address drinking 
water impacted by DOD activities, including applying filtration, 
following the Environmental Protection Agency's issuance of the 
lifetime drinking water Health Advisories (HA) in May of 2016 for two 
PFAS. DOD acted quickly to test and take steps to bring the levels of 
PFOS and PFOA in drinking water below the HA and/or provide alternative 
water. c.) DOD would need additional time to research the number of 
service members and dependents located at a particular installation in 
a given year over this requested 45-year time span. Because only a 
small number of U.S. installations where DOD supplies the drinking 
water tested above the PFAS health advisory levels, DOD could more 
quickly gather that information. d.) In June 2016, DOD directed that 
all drinking water systems operated by DOD worldwide be sampled and 
analyzed for PFOS and PFOA. If drinking water was identified as having 
PFOA and/or PFOS above the EPA HA level, DOD immediately notified the 
affected individuals and took action to bring levels below the HA and/
or provided alternate water. e.) The referenced study was finalized 
April 18, 2022 and is attached.
    Mrs. McClain. The security situation in Ukraine is a grim reminder 
that we cannot take the readiness of our forces for granted. This 
committee believes it is essential for the military services to better 
link the materiel readiness levels required for our major weapon 
systems to the National Defense Strategy.
    In the FY21 NDAA, Congress required the Department of Defense to 
report on material readiness metrics and objectives for major weapons 
systems annually, beginning with the FY23 President's Budget request.
    This is critical information for congressional oversight; yet it 
has not been included in the budget request materials released to date. 
Will we see these readiness metrics and objectives included in 
forthcoming FY23 budget request materials?
    Also, please tell us more about the work being led by the Director 
of Cost Assessment and Performance Evaluation to develop more accurate 
readiness modeling of the force.
    General Milley. I support transparent information exchange with 
Congress to ensure we are effectively resourcing our Joint Force to 
compete in a high-end conflict. I defer to the Military Departments and 
OSD (A&S) for reporting metrics on Materiel Readiness as part of the 
President's Budget submission and defer to OSD(CAPE) on the progress of 
their model development.
                                 ______
                                 
                 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND
    Ms. Strickland. Given the importance of Joint Base Lewis McChord as 
the Department continues to shift to the Indo-Pacific what can be done 
to build housing for servicemembers on base?
    As you evaluate the placement of missions how do you also shift 
resources so that there is enough infrastructure in place including 
housing and family support to ensure that those who are assigned to the 
mission can thrive?
    Secretary Austin. The Department of Defense is committed to 
ensuring service members and their families have access to affordable, 
quality housing within a reasonable commute of their assigned duty 
station. In all cases, DOD policy is to look first to community-based 
housing options. The Military Departments utilize the Housing 
Requirements and Market Analysis process to determine if there is a 
long-term need for additional housing in a specific military housing 
area. In cases where that analysis indicates a need for additional 
housing that is likely to persist over the long-term, the Military 
Department can pursue a variety of measures to secure additional 
housing to meet that requirement, such as working with the local 
community to promote the development of off-base community housing; 
leasing off-base housing units to make available to military members as 
government housing; or expanding on-base housing through privatization 
or military construction.
    At Joint Base Lewis McChord, the Army has worked to ensure that the 
private sector Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) company 
that owns and operates the on-base family housing accelerates 
renovations and repairs necessary to make housing units ready for 
occupancy, and the Army continues to work with the MHPI company to 
expand the on-base privatized housing to meet the current housing 
requirement.
    Basing decisions are governed by each Military Department's 
individual basing policies, which include consideration of a potential 
location's infrastructure and a community's capacity to support the 
mission when selecting where to bed-down new or relocating missions. 
Once a decision is made with respect to where to bed-down or relocate, 
the Military Department provides the local communities and their 
elected officials an estimate of the number of service members and 
dependents that will relocate or be added to the installation.
    The DOD is committed to working in partnership with local 
communities to provide demographic information on mission bed-downs and 
other information to facilitate community partnerships as necessary to 
ensure that our service members and their families have quality 
affordable housing when they arrive at a new duty station. This 
includes addressing local government and other stakeholder concerns to 
increase their confidence that the estimated housing requirement is 
realistic and that the demand for these additional housing units will 
be realized.
    Ms. Strickland. As of March 9th, there are 679 children (birth-5) 
who need childcare, and there are 214 direct care vacancies within the 
CYS, and of those, 195 have been open for more than 60 days at Joint 
Base Lewis McChord. For bases, like Joint Base Lewis McChord, that have 
significant issues with recruiting and retaining childcare providers, 
is the Department looking at incentives to provide hiring bonuses, 
retention bonuses, or increased pay to become even more competitive?
    Does the Department need additional authorities from Congress to 
provide incentives to recruit and retain childcare providers?
    Secretary Austin. Taking care of our Service members and their 
families is my top priority. That includes providing high quality, 
affordable childcare. childcare is in short supply and high demand 
nationally, which has driven up costs around the country, requiring the 
Department provide competitive pay and benefits to childcare providers. 
To be competitive within the local labor markets, the Department 
provides a comprehensive benefits package for childcare workers and 
wage flexibility within pay bands. A $15 federally mandated minimum 
wage was recently established, increasing pay for entry level providers 
and increasing wages for many staff.
    The Civilian Personnel Management System includes the authority to 
implement recruiting bonuses, relocation bonuses, and retention 
incentives. I encourage the maximum use of personnel flexibilities for 
recruitment and retention to include provisional hiring, noncompetitive 
transfer of employees between installations, and reinstatement of 
former child and youth employees to their same grade or pay-band level. 
These flexibilities are intended to alleviate the administrative burden 
and minimize the time associated with hiring employees new to Federal 
service. I am comfortable with the authorities that I have.
    I appreciate Congress' support to DOD's hiring needs by providing 
streamlined direct hiring authorities for critical positions, to 
include childcare service providers.
    Ms. Strickland. As the Department works to implement the Basic 
Needs Allowance can you tell me how the implementation is going?
    Can you tell me when you think servicemembers will be able to 
access these benefits?
    Secretary Austin. The health and wellbeing of our service members 
and their families is very important to me, and our budget request asks 
for your support in this area. I am grateful to Congress for the Basic 
Needs Allowance (BNA) legislation, which will assist the Department in 
helping service members who are the most financially challenged--those 
whose household incomes fall below 130 percent of Federal poverty 
guidelines. BNA will bring the income of these qualifying service 
members and their families up to that threshold. The Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is working 
aggressively with key stakeholders across OSD (e.g., Comptroller, 
Office of General Counsel, Financial Readiness representatives), and 
with the all the military services (including the Coast Guard), to 
draft and publish detailed implementing policy guidance, as well as to 
make needed pay systems modifications, to ensure the first BNA payments 
can go out in January 2023, as Congress intended. Additionally, our 
budget includes a 4.6 percent pay raise, raises to Basic Allowance for 
Housing, and helps reduce the cost of childcare, which is a major cost 
driver for families.
    Ms. Strickland. How are you working to ensure that as many 
servicemembers as possible have access to the Basic Needs Allowance?
    Secretary Austin. The health and wellbeing of all our family 
members and our troops is very important to me, and our budget requests 
asks for your support in this area. We are working aggressively to 
implement Basic Needs Allowance (BNA) in time for the first payments to 
go out in January 2023, as Congress intended. The Department is 
currently in the process of developing detailed policy guidance and 
making pay systems modifications, necessary to successfully implement 
BNA. As part of this process, consistent with congressional intent, we 
are considering the options under the law that will allow the 
Department to offer BNA to those Service members and families that 
qualify. The Department intends to aggressively publicize the BNA 
through the military chains of command, as well as take advantage of 
multiple additional communications channels, and to notify members 
individually, so that all potentially eligible members are aware of the 
opportunity to apply for BNA. The Department believes any eligible 
member should apply for this benefit and intends to work hard to reduce 
or eliminate any potential, perceived stigma associated with applying. 
Additionally, our budget includes a 4.6 percent pay raise, raises to 
Basic Allowance for Housing, and helps reduce the cost of childcare, 
which is a major cost driver for families.
    Ms. Strickland. During the Military Personnel subcommittee hearing 
on talent management, I asked the witnesses how they are working to 
recruit and retain a diverse force? The silence was deafening. Can you 
tell me how you believe the Services and the Department should improve 
the recruitment and retention of a diverse force?
    Secretary Austin. The future of the All-Volunteer Force and the 
evolving character of warfare require a Joint Force comprised of 
diverse backgrounds, perspectives, and skill sets to effectively 
support a wide range of complex warfighting missions. Today's mission-
effective force is a testament to progress in areas of military equal 
opportunity and related recruiting and personnel policy tactics. 
However, more needs to be done to address continuing challenges. To 
that end, the Department is focused on recruiting, accessing, 
developing, and retaining a pipeline of leaders who are as 
demographically diverse as the Nation they serve.
    The Department continuously reviews retention policies, identifies 
shortfalls and successes, and works with the Congress to enhance 
retention efforts where possible. The Services use a mix of tailored 
retention bonuses and non-monetary incentives as tools to incentivize 
retention. The Department also works to ensure that it creates 
opportunities for both professional and educational growth while 
mitigating and removing any unnecessary barriers to the development and 
promotion of talented and qualified military personnel. The Department 
is committed to providing an environment where all individuals are 
empowered, encouraged, and incentivized to grow in their career.
    Ms. Strickland. During the Military Personnel subcommittee hearing 
on talent management, I asked the witnesses how they are working to 
recruit and retain a diverse force? The silence was deafening. Can you 
tell me how you believe the Services and the Department should improve 
the recruitment and retention of a diverse force?
    General Milley. Overall, the composition of racial and ethnic 
minorities has increased over the past 10 years across the officer 
corps and enlisted force. Racial/ethnic minority representation among 
all military accessions has increased by 21.3% since 2013 (38.1% in 
2013 to 46.2% in 2021). The Department continues to explore ways to 
ensure our Force is representative both today and in the future, but 
defer to the military services the specifics on how they are recruiting 
and retaining a talented and diverse force.
    Ms. Strickland. The Independent Review Commission (IRC) has a 
working group dedicated to studying and making recommendations on 
Military Culture. Do you believe military culture needs to change to 
reflect a more diverse force? Do you believe that current military 
culture is a barrier to service for women and minorities? If change is 
warranted, how do you plan to change it?
    General Milley. The IRC Report made clear that improvements to 
climate and culture need to be made. All 18 recommendations from the 
climate and culture LOE have been accepted into the Secretary's IRC 
Implementation Plan.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY
    Mrs. Murphy. Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley: as the main 
national security challenge facing the United States shifts away from 
combatting terrorism and towards addressing great power challenges from 
Russia and China, the missions assigned to--along with the way we 
select and train--our 75,000-strong special operations force will need 
to evolve as well. I know this rebalancing effort is a priority for 
General Clark, the SOCOM commander, and his leadership team. I'd like 
to get your perspective on the issue. What unique capabilities does 
SOCOM bring to great power competition? Do you think SOCOM needs new 
authorities, or greater flexibility with existing authorities, to 
ensure success?
    Secretary Austin. U.S. special operations forces (SOF) bring a 
range of capabilities and can perform a range of missions that enhance 
the Joint Force's approach to integrated deterrence and contribute 
directly to active campaigning. These include foreign internal defense, 
special reconnaissance, civil-military affairs, information operations, 
and both kinetic and non-kinetic direct action missions. Through these 
activities SOF increase the Joint Force's understanding of the 
operating environment, can illuminate potential threats, bolster the 
resilience of our allies and partners, secures access and placement to 
shape conditions, and identify opportunities to create dilemmas and 
impose costs on our adversaries' subversive and coercive actions. SOF 
deploy in a small footprint and possess specialized skills, including 
language and cultural expertise that uniquely enable them to operate in 
politically sensitive and denied environments. In crisis scenarios, the 
small footprint and partner-centric focus allow SOF to react swiftly, 
integrate with allies and partners on the ground, and set conditions 
prior to conflict to help the Joint Force prevail during combat.
    Current authorities are sufficient to allow SOF to keep pace with 
competitors and help allies and partners combat gray zone activities. 
As SOF moves to become more active in campaigning in the gray zone, 
irregular warfare activities and preparation of the environment in all 
domains, alongside both traditional and non-traditional partners, will 
become increasingly critical to success. Section 1202 of the NDAA for 
FY 2018 supports activities to enable SOF to leverage placement and 
access with allies and partners to counter competitors' malign 
influence below the threshold of armed conflict.
    Mrs. Murphy. Secretary Austin, as a Member representing Florida, 
I'm very focused on Latin America and the Caribbean and the threats 
emanating from this region, which I call ``our shared neighborhood.'' 
The threats include malign activities on the part of China and Russia, 
along with transnational criminal organizations that traffic in drugs, 
weapons, and people. In the most recent NDAA, I secured a provision 
requiring a DOD assessment of China's growing presence and influence in 
the region. This year, I am working to include a companion report on 
Russia's efforts in the region, especially its partnerships with left-
wing authoritarian governments. I've been impressed by Southern 
Command's use of train-and-equip, capacity-building authority to 
counter these threats from nations and organizations of concern. I know 
the Department is requesting over a billion dollars in fiscal year 2023 
for the International Security Cooperation Program. Are you confident 
that enough of this money is going to be used in Southern Command's 
area of responsibility?
    Secretary Austin. The People's Republic of China continues to reach 
out diplomatically and economically to our partners in the Western 
Hemisphere, and has made some inroads in defense cooperation. Russia 
provides diplomatic, intelligence, financial, and military support to 
authoritarian regimes opposed to the United States in the region. 
Strong bilateral and multilateral defense partnerships (enabled by 
engagements and presence), intelligence and information exchanges, and 
educational programs and exercises are necessary tools to reduce the 
influence of malign actors in the hemisphere. The Department of 
Defense's fiscal year 2023 Resource Allocation Plan for the 
International Security Cooperation Program includes over $95M for 
security cooperation programs and activities in U.S. Southern Command's 
area of responsibility. These programs align with the Department's 
National Defense Strategy and are used for engagement with partner 
nations to build capacity and to counter the influence of the People's 
Republic of China and Russia in the region.
    Mrs. Murphy. Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley: as the main 
national security challenge facing the United States shifts away from 
combatting terrorism and towards addressing great power challenges from 
Russia and China, the missions assigned to--along with the way we 
select and train--our 75,000-strong special operations force will need 
to evolve as well. I know this rebalancing effort is a priority for 
General Clark, the SOCOM commander, and his leadership team. I'd like 
to get your perspective on the issue. What unique capabilities does 
SOCOM bring to great power competition? Do you think SOCOM needs new 
authorities, or greater flexibility with existing authorities, to 
ensure success?
    General Milley. U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) provide a 
number of unique capabilities to support global Integrated Deterrence 
against Russian and Chinese malign activity. USSOF's cultural 
understanding, global placement, and access provides our national 
command authority with heightened awareness and options to deter, 
disrupt, and counter our adversaries. USSOCOM has invested heavily in 
improving capability within the information domain through the Joint 
Military Information Support Operations Warfare Center and aims to gain 
the information advantage and counter adversary misinformation in 
support of the larger interagency, allies, and partners. These efforts 
and capabilities allow USSOF to further dissuade state competitors' 
ability to influence international order.
    U.S. Army Special Operations Command maintains and continues to 
modernize exquisite capabilities in Rotary Wing; cyber and space 
domains; manned and unmanned launch recovery systems in the littorals 
and open seas for maritime systems to support Irregular Warfare and 
Combatant Command campaign efforts and operations across multi-domain 
environments.
    USSOCOM continues to assess what authorities may be required for 
Integrated Deterrence and will work with the Joint Staff and the 
Department of Defense to communicate these needs to Congress.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. When does the Air Force intend to share the details 
of their legislative proposal for expanded use of the Nevada Test and 
Training Range with the Nevada delegation?
    Secretary Austin. The legislative proposal to support 5th 
generation training on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) is 
currently pending clearance at the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). The Department of the Air Force commits to sharing and 
collaborating on the proposal with all stakeholders and looks forward 
to being able to conduct non-intrusive, low-disturbance military 
activities on NTTR South Range.
    Mr. Horsford. Has the Department considered expanding the Combat 
Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE) to remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) crews 
flying in support of named combat operations? Given their direct 
participation in these operations, would you support this expansion?
    Has the Air Force considered expanding the CZTE to RPA crews before 
and if so can you share the results of any relevant studies or 
deliberations?
    Does the Department of Defense have the authorities to expand 
eligibility for the CZTE to RPA crews located at domestic bases, or 
would it require additional authorities from Congress or the President?
    Secretary Austin. The Department recognizes and appreciates the 
hard work and important role that remotely piloted aircraft crews 
contribute. However, the Department opposes extending the combat zone 
tax exclusion to members performing duty within the United States. To 
do so would conflict with the definition of service in the combat zone 
because remotely piloted aircraft crews are not in reciprocal, imminent 
danger, such as those serving in a combat zone.
    Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizing the combat 
zone tax exclusion requires that a member be physically present in the 
combat zone, a geographic location where the Armed Forces are engaged 
in combat, as designated by the President of the United States. The 
regulations for section 112 address the possibility of service outside 
of the combat zone as qualifying for the combat zone tax exclusion if 
the member is in direct support of operations in the combat zone and is 
receiving hostile fire or imminent danger pay. Remotely piloted 
aircraft crews operating in the United States are not in physical 
danger and thus do not satisfy the requirements to qualify for hostile 
fire or imminent danger.
    The Air Force has not conducted studies about or considered 
providing combat zone tax exclusion benefits to remotely piloted 
aircraft crews, as these crews, serving in the United States, would not 
qualify for hostile fire or imminent danger pay.
    The expansion of combat zone tax exclusion benefits to remotely 
piloted aircraft crews, which DOD opposes, would require additional 
legislative authority.
    Mr. Horsford. What steps is the Department taking to shield active-
duty service members and their dependents from attacks on LBGT rights 
at the state level? Are state laws denying or restricting gender-
affirming care considered during the PCS process for service members 
with impacted dependents?
    Under current regulations, could an active-duty service member with 
a dependent diagnosed with gender dysphoria be required to PCS to a 
state where the dependent may lose access to required medical care?
    Is the Department actively reviewing or revising relevant 
regulations governing the care of transgender service members or their 
dependents in light of efforts by state legislatures to restrict their 
access to medical care?
    Secretary Austin. Ensuring the readiness and resilience of Service 
members and their families is a top priority for the Department of 
Defense, and Service member and family readiness is critical to mission 
readiness. The Department is aware of enacted and prospective 
legislation in multiple states relating to gender affirming care. The 
Department is reviewing applicable laws to determine the impact on the 
military community in potentially affected states. The DOD continues to 
provide medically necessary gender affirming care for adolescent DOD 
beneficiaries diagnosed with gender dysphoria.
    Mr. Horsford. In recent years, DOD's HIV infection rate among 
active-duty service members has been nearly double that of the U.S. 
adult population. In 2019, the last year that CDC data was available 
for the general U.S. adult population, the annual HIV infection rate of 
.029% among active-duty service members dramatically exceeds that of 
the general U.S. adult population, which has a .014% infection rate. 
DOD's infection rate has remained relatively steady through 2021. Since 
2018, of the 1,512 active-duty service members diagnosed with HIV, 692 
have been Black and 203 have been Hispanic. This dramatic 
overrepresentation of minority groups is deeply concerning.
    Despite this, in 2021 DOD issued only 4,108 prescriptions for PrEP, 
a drug that can effectively prevent HIV infection. This does not come 
close to meeting the needs of the 12,000 active-duty service members 
DHA itself estimates are eligible. I believe the eligible population 
may be much larger; given that DHA's estimate is based on certain 
assumptions from the general U.S. population that do not translate 
directly to the active-duty service member population.
    I am concerned that there are unique access challenges and stigma 
around HIV prevention in the military, and that the Department is not 
taking necessary steps to overcome them.
    What steps has DOD taken to improve access to PrEP, especially 
among minority populations, and would you commit to supporting an 
expanded tele-health initiative to overcome access issues for service 
members?
    Secretary Austin. Taking care of our people remains my top 
priority, and that includes ensuring they have access to the necessary 
medical care they need. The Defense Health Agency (DHA) ensures that 
the military medical treatment facilities leverage HIV PrEP care 
capabilities and expertise across the Military Health System to include 
case consultation, provision of medical care, and telemedicine. DHA-
Procedural Instruction 6025.29, ``Provision of Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV) Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) for Persons at High Risk of 
Acquiring HIV Infection,'' describes the elements and resources 
required to implement an HIV PrEP program. The Department continues 
clinical management of HIV to optimize care for HIV-infected Service 
members, to prevent secondary transmission, and to reduce variability 
in the provision of clinical care for HIV in the Military Health 
System.
    Mr. Horsford. When does the Air Force intend to share the details 
of their legislative proposal for expanded use of the Nevada Test and 
Training Range with the Nevada delegation?
    General Milley. The legislative proposal to support 5th generation 
training on the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) was deferred by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on 1 June. The Department of 
the Air Force is working to have a similar legislative proposal 
included in the FY24 NDAA cycle. Additionally, the Department of the 
Air Force is working with the Department of the Interior to establish a 
Memorandum of understanding that adequately balances current and future 
aviation training needs and the purposes for which the Desert National 
Wildlife Refuge was created.
    Mr. Horsford. Has the Department considered expanding the Combat 
Zone Tax Exclusion (CZTE) to remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) crews 
flying in support of named combat operations? Given their direct 
participation in these operations, would you support this expansion?
    Has the Air Force considered expanding the CZTE to RPA crews before 
and if so can you share the results of any relevant studies or 
deliberations?
    Does the Department of Defense have the authorities to expand 
eligibility for the CZTE to RPA crews located at domestic bases, or 
would it require additional authorities from Congress or the President?
    General Milley. I recommend that the Department opposes extending 
the combat zone tax exclusion to members performing duty within the 
United States. Section 112 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizing 
combat zone tax exclusion clearly requires that a member be physically 
present in the combat zone, geographic location designated by the 
President where the Armed Forces are engaged in combat. I defer to the 
Air Force to respond on their consideration to expanding CZTE to RPA 
crews. I defer to the Secretary of Defense and to the Air Force on 
whether further authorities are needed regarding expansion of CZTE to 
RPA crews.
    Mr. Horsford. What steps is the Department taking to shield active-
duty service members and their dependents from attacks on LBGT rights 
at the state level? Are state laws denying or restricting gender-
affirming care considered during the PCS process for service members 
with impacted dependents?
    Under current regulations, could an active-duty service member with 
a dependent diagnosed with gender dysphoria be required to PCS to a 
state where the dependent may lose access to required medical care?
    Is the Department actively reviewing or revising relevant 
regulations governing the care of transgender service members or their 
dependents in light of efforts by state legislatures to restrict their 
access to medical care?
    General Milley. I defer to the Military Services to respond on any 
state ordinances that potentially effect their assignment policies. I 
defer to the Military Services to respond on their assignment policies. 
The Military Departments have waiver authority to approve reassignments 
before the passage of a stipulated time period to accommodate a broad 
array of personal hardships, should such a waiver be warranted. As with 
all Department Issuances, these policies will be periodically reviewed 
and updated using the established review procedures.
    Mr. Horsford. In recent years, DOD's HIV infection rate among 
active-duty service members has been nearly double that of the U.S. 
adult population. In 2019, the last year that CDC data was available 
for the general U.S. adult population, the annual HIV infection rate of 
.029% among active-duty service members dramatically exceeds that of 
the general U.S. adult population, which has a .014% infection rate. 
DOD's infection rate has remained relatively steady through 2021. Since 
2018, of the 1,512 active-duty service members diagnosed with HIV, 692 
have been Black and 203 have been Hispanic. This dramatic 
overrepresentation of minority groups is deeply concerning.
    Despite this, in 2021 DOD issued only 4,108 prescriptions for PrEP, 
a drug that can effectively prevent HIV infection. This does not come 
close to meeting the needs of the 12,000 active-duty service members 
DHA itself estimates are eligible. I believe the eligible population 
may be much larger; given that DHA's estimate is based on certain 
assumptions from the general U.S. population that do not translate 
directly to the active-duty service member population.
    I am concerned that there are unique access challenges and stigma 
around HIV prevention in the military, and that the Department is not 
taking necessary steps to overcome them.
    What steps has DOD taken to improve access to PrEP, especially 
among minority populations, and would you commit to supporting an 
expanded tele-health initiative to overcome access issues for service 
members?
    General Milley. I would defer to DOD P&R to answer this question 
and inform on the work they are doing to improve access to PrEP.