[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
                      FINDING THE RIGHT FREQUENCY:
                   5G DEPLOYMENT AND AVIATION SAFETY

=======================================================================

                                (117-40)

                             REMOTE HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                AVIATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                            FEBRUARY 3, 2022

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
             
             
             
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     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
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                             transportation
                             
                             
                             
                           ______
 
              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 49-706 PDF            WASHINGTON : 2023
                              
                             
                             
                             
             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DON YOUNG, Alaska                      District of Columbia
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      RICK LARSEN, Washington
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JOHN KATKO, New York                 HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   Georgia
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         DINA TITUS, Nevada
MIKE BOST, Illinois                  SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           JARED HUFFMAN, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California             JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas            FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   MARK DeSAULNIER, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,            STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
  Puerto Rico                        SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota              TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              GREG STANTON, Arizona
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota          COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi           JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York         CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California           CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
                                     KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
                                     MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
                                     NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
                                     MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
                                     TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana

                        Subcommittee on Aviation

  RICK LARSEN, Washington, Chair
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
DON YOUNG, Alaska                    ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
JOHN KATKO, New York                 NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            Georgia
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   DINA TITUS, Nevada
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota              JULIA BROWNLEY, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       MARK DeSAULNIER, California
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas                GREG STANTON, Arizona
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
MICHELLE STEEL, California           CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania, Vice 
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)    Chair
                                     ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
                                       District of Columbia
                                     EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
                                     JOHN GARAMENDI, California
                                     PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex 
                                     Officio)



                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................   vii

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening 
  statement......................................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, 
  opening statement..............................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     8
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    10

                               WITNESSES
                                Panel 1

Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation 
  Administration, oral statement.................................    11
    Prepared statement...........................................    13

                                Panel 2

Nicholas E. Calio, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
  Airlines for America, oral statement...........................    46
    Prepared statement...........................................    48
Hon. Eric Fanning, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
  Aerospace Industries Association, oral statement...............    53
    Prepared statement...........................................    55
Cathryn Stephens, A.A.E., Airport Director, Eugene Airport, on 
  behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives, oral 
  statement......................................................    59
    Prepared statement...........................................    61
Captain Joseph G. DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Association, 
  International, oral statement..................................    64
    Prepared statement...........................................    66
Faye Malarkey Black, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
  Regional Airline Association, oral statement...................    70
    Prepared statement...........................................    72
James Viola, President and Chief Executive Officer, Helicopter 
  Association International, oral statement......................    80
    Prepared statement...........................................    82
Hon. Meredith Attwell Baker, President and Chief Executive 
  Officer, CTIA, oral statement..................................    85
    Prepared statement...........................................    86
Dennis A. Roberson, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
  Roberson and Associates, LLC, oral statement...................    93
    Prepared statement...........................................    94

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Submissions for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio:
    Letter of February 7, 2022, and 5G Timeline from Captain 
      Joseph G. DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Association, 
      International..............................................   121
    Letter of February 2, 2022, from Present and Former Members 
      of the Federal Aviation Management Advisory Council........   126
    Statement of Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
      National Business Aviation Association.....................   127
    ``Analysis of 5G Deployment: Executive Summary,'' by 
      Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO..........   129
    ``Analysis of 5G Deployment: White Paper,'' February 2022, by 
      Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO..........   130
    Statement of Terry L. McVenes, President and Chief Executive 
      Officer, RTCA, Inc.........................................   136

                                APPENDIX

Questions from Hon. Sam Graves of Missouri to Hon. Stephen M. 
  Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration........   139
Questions from Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton to Hon. Eric Fanning, 
  President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries 
  Association....................................................   141
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Hon. Meredith Attwell 
  Baker, President and Chief Executive Officer, CTIA.............   142

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                            February 1, 2022

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Aviation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Aviation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Finding the Right 
Frequency: 5G Deployment and Aviation Safety''
_______________________________________________________________________


                                PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Aviation will meet on Thursday, 
February 3, 2022, at 11 a.m. EST in 2167 Rayburn House Office 
Building and virtually via Zoom for a hearing titled, ``Finding 
the Right Frequency: 5G Deployment and Aviation Safety.'' The 
hearing will examine how the C-band spectrum was reallocated 
for 5G wireless services, the aviation industry's safety 
concerns with the recent 5G deployment, and the effects of the 
recent deployment on the U.S. aviation industry and national 
airspace system (NAS). The Subcommittee will hear testimony 
from two panels. The first panel will feature the government 
witness from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The 
second panel will include witnesses from: Aerospace Industries 
Association (AIA), Airlines for America (A4A), Air Line Pilots 
Association (ALPA), American Association of Airport Executives 
(AAAE), CTIA, Helicopter Association International (HAI), 
Regional Airline Association (RAA), and a telecommunications 
consultant.

                               BACKGROUND

I. FCC AUCTION OF C-BAND FOR 5G

    On November 18, 2019, Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) Chair Ajit Pai informed Congress of the FCC's intention 
to hold a public auction of mid-band wireless spectrum from 
3.7-3.98 GHz, also known as the C-band, to fuel the deployment 
of 5G.\1\ At the time, many aviation stakeholders expressed 
concerns about potentially harmful radio frequency interference 
with certain aviation safety equipment, including radio 
altimeters,\2\ which operate in the adjacent 4.2-4.4 GHz band 
(aviation band).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Marguerite Reardon, ``FCC to auction C-band spectrum for 5G'', 
CNET (November 18, 2019), available at https://www.cnet.com/tech/
mobile/fcc-to-auction-c-band-spectrum-for-5g/.
    \2\ Radio altimeters are also known as radar altimeters or RADALT.
    \3\ Letter of Edward Yorkgitus, Aviation Spectrum Resources to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, GN 
Docket No. 12-122 (filed Oct. 25, 2019) available at: https://
ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10620182163379/
19062019%20Aviation%20Associations%20Joint
%20Ex%20Parte%20Filing%20Dkt%20No%2018-122.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In response to the FCC's announcement, the FAA sent a 
letter on September 30, 2019, to the Interdepartment Radio 
Advisory Committee (IRAC), which is responsible for advising 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) on spectrum decisions within the federal government, 
expressing reservations about the auction of the spectrum 
adjacent to the aviation band. In this letter, the FAA also 
notified the IRAC of testing that was being conducted by the 
Aerospace Vehicle Systems Institute on the resilience of a 
variety of altimeters against 5G interference.\4\ Additionally, 
on December 1, 2020, the General Counsel (and future Acting 
Secretary) of the Department of Transportation (DOT), Steven 
Bradbury, and FAA Administrator Steve Dickson sent a letter to 
the NTIA urging the agency to delay the FCC's upcoming auction 
due to concerns over the impact it could have on aviation 
safety.\5\ However, the NTIA did not enter the letter into the 
FCC docket for consideration.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Letter of Michael Richmond, FAA Interdepartment Radio Advisory 
Committee Representative to Peter Tenhula, Chairman, Interdepartment 
Radio Advisory Committee (filed Sept. 30, 2019).
    \5\ Secretary Steven Bradbury and Administrator Steve Dickson, 
Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz Band, FAA & DOT (December 
1, 2020), available at: https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-
10/DOT_Letter_to_NTIA_FCC3.7_GHz_Band_Auction.pdf.
    \6\ Fed Aviation Admin., FAA Statements on 5G (Jan. 2, 2022), 
available at: https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/faa-statements-5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following the FAA and DOT letters, the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure Chair Peter DeFazio sent a 
letter to FCC Chair Pai urging the FCC to postpone its 
scheduled C-band auction due to other federal agencies' 
concerns surrounding the potential harmful 5G interference with 
radio altimeters.\7\ Nonetheless, on December 8, 2020, the FCC 
began its public auction of the C-band, which yielded 21 
winning bids and $81 billion in revenue.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, Chair 
DeFazio Calls on FCC to Postpone Tomorrow's Scheduled Auction of a 
Portion of 3.7-4.2 GHz Radio Frequency Spectrum, Citing New Research 
That Amplifies the Safety Concerns of the Aviation Community (December 
07, 2020), available at: https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-
releases/chair-defazio-calls-on-fcc-to-postpone-tomorrows-scheduled-
auction-of-a-portion-of-37-42-ghz-radio-frequency-spectrum-citing-new-
research-that-amplifies-the-safety-concerns-of-the-aviation-community.
    \8\ See FCC Public Notice, Auction of Flexible-Use Service Licenses 
in the 3.7-3.98 GHz Band for Next-Generation Wireless Services, AU 
Docket No. 20-25 (Aug. 7, 2020), available at https://docs.fcc.gov/
public/attachments/FCC-20-110A1.pdf; FCC Announces Winning Bidders in 
C-band Auction, FCC (February 24, 2021), available at: https://
www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-announces-winning-bidders-c-band-auction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. RADIO ALTIMETERS

    Radio altimeters are fundamental flight instruments found 
on most commercial aircraft and many general aviation aircraft 
that enhance safety and flight operations by providing 
measurements of an aircraft's clearance height above the ground 
terrain and any obstacles.\9\ On approach during flight within 
2,500 feet of the ground terrain, the radio altimeter serves as 
a pilot's primary altitude-measuring instrument and is used for 
all-weather approaches and landing procedures; radio 
altimeter(s) enable a pilot to verify descent progress and 
distance to the ground on an approach, detecting unsafe 
situations.\10\ Use of a radio altimeter is critical in 
enabling safe arrivals, particularly during inclement weather, 
low cloud layers, or other instances of low visibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ RTCA Inc., Assessment of C-Band Mobile Telecommunications 
Interference Impact on Low Range Radar Altimeter Operations (October 7, 
2020), available at: https://www.rtca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/
SC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-20-PMC-2073_
accepted_changes.pdf.
    \10\ Jim Sparks, Radio Altitude: The Instrument of Choice, 
AviationPros (July 2003), available at: https://www.aviationpros.com/
home/article/10387134/radio-altitude-the-instrument-of-choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to the FAA, the ``receiver on the radio altimeter 
is typically highly accurate, however it may deliver erroneous 
results in the presence of out-of-band radiofrequency emissions 
from other frequency bands.'' \11\ Such interference from 
adjacent bands, or out-of-band radio frequency emissions, could 
pose a hazard to aircraft in flight by causing faulty or 
erroneous radio altimeter readings.\12\ Erroneous altimeter 
readings are a cause for concern at all phases of flight, 
particularly in automated flight deck systems that rely on 
accurate altimeter readings for a variety of systems and 
functions. For example, in 2009 a Turkish Airlines aircraft 
landing at Amsterdam-Schiphol Airport experienced a faulty 
radio altimeter reading that was fed into the automated flight 
deck system while on approach, contributing to the aircraft's 
fatal crash and resulting in nine deaths.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Fed. Aviation Admin., Safety Alert for Operators, Subject: 
Risk of Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in 
the Presence of 5G C-Band Interference (Dec. 23, 2021), available at: 
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/
airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2021/SAFO21007.pdf.
    \12\ Fed Aviation Admin., 5G and Aviation Safety (Jan. 2, 2022), 
available at: https://www.faa.gov/5g.
    \13\ Frances Fiorino, Boeing Warns of Possible 737 Altimeter Fault, 
Aviation Week (March 2009), available at: https://web.archive.org/web/
20120322020140/http://www.aviationweek.com/
aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=comm&id=news/
ALT030509.xml&headline=
Boeing%20Warns%20of%20Possible%20737%20Altimeter%20Fault.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Radio altimeters also provide height-above-terrain 
information, which can serve as a critical component for other 
systems on an aircraft, such as the Terrain Awareness and 
Warning System (TAWS).\14\ Terrain warning is required in the 
U.S. for all air carrier operations due to numerous fatal 
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) accidents,\15\ and has 
been the subject of several National Transportation Safety 
Board recommendations.\16\ Fortunately, there has not been a 
single passenger fatality due to a CFIT accident on an U.S. 
Part 121 aircraft equipped with TAWS since the system deployed 
in the late 1990s.\17\Prior to this time, CFIT accidents were 
the leading cause of fatalities in commercial aviation.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Hop Potter, Implementation of Terrain Awareness and Warning 
System (TAWS)--Final Report to CAST, Skybrary (May 2006), available at: 
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/
SE001:_Terrain_Awareness_Warning_System_(TAWS)_-_Final_Report and 
subsequent analysis of aircraft accident databases since 2006.
    \15\ 14 CFR 121.354 (2022).
    \16\ Hop Potter, supra note 14.
    \17\ Id.
    \18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the fall of 2020, the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA), a non-profit organization, completed a six-
month study of radio frequency interference from 5G network 
emissions with radio altimeter performance.\19\ The RTCA study 
stated that, without appropriate mitigations and guardrails, 
deployment of 5G wireless services in the C-band could cause 
``catastrophic failures leading to multiple fatalities.'' \20\ 
The RTCA study also concluded that the aviation industry cannot 
mitigate such a risk alone and suggested the FCC, FAA, and 
aviation and telecommunications (telecom) industries work 
together to ensure radio altimeters are safeguarded in the 
interest of public safety.\21\ While the FCC offered the 
aviation sector a 220 MHz guardrail (3.98-4.2 GHz) between 
bands to help prevent harmful interference, many aviation 
stakeholders maintained that this mitigation measure alone was 
not enough.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ RTCA, Assessment of C-band Mobile Telecommunications 
Interference Impact on Low Range Radar Altimeter Operations, (October 
7, 2020), available at: https://www.rtca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/
10/SC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-20-PMC-2073_
accepted_changes.pdf.
    \20\ Id. at 88.
    \21\ RTCA, supra note 19.
    \22\ Bevin Fletcher, Aviation Wireless Industries Clash Over C-band 
Interference, Fierce Wireless, (August 2021), available at: https://
www.fiercewireless.com/regulatory/aviation-wireless-industries-clash-
over-c-band-interference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since May 2021, the Department of Defense has been leading 
an interagency effort to test the potential effects of certain 
5G technologies on radio altimeters, primarily on military 
aircraft, focusing on improving the performance of equipment to 
protect against harmful interference.\23\ There have also been 
calls for developing performance standards for radio altimeters 
to ensure all altimeters are designed to filter out 
interference and are better performing given that no standards 
for radio altimeters currently exist. Although the RTCA is 
working on revising the minimum operational standards for 
altimeters, aviation stakeholders anticipate that the process 
of setting those standards and receiving approval from the FAA 
will take several years, after which more time will then need 
to be allotted for manufacturers to begin producing and 
installing these new altimeters.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Valerie Insinna and Aaron Mehta, As 5G auction continues, 
Pentagon turns to safety planning, Defense News (January 21, 2021), 
available at: https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/01/21/as-5g-auction-
continues-pentagon-turns-to-safety-risk-mitigation-plans/.
    \24\ Bani Sapra, Bringing 5G to the skies is more complicated than 
it seems, Wired (May 5, 2021), available at: https://wired.me/science/
bringing-5g-to-the-skies-is-more-complicated-than-it-seems/.
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III. 5G DEPLOYMENT AND THE FAA'S RESPONSE

A. SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN AND INITIAL 5G DEPLOYMENT 
                    DELAY

    The current situation over 5G deployment escalated in 
November 2021 when the FAA issued a special airworthiness 
information bulletin alerting manufacturers, operators, and 
pilots that action may be needed to address potential 
interference with radio altimeters caused by 5G deployment.\25\ 
Verizon and AT&T, which were expected to roll out 5G services 
in the C-band on December 5, 2021, subsequently announced they 
would delay their 5G rollout for 30 days, in order to provide 
additional time to address the aviation industry's 
concerns.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Special Airworthiness Bulletin on potential adverse effects on 
radio altimeters, Federal Aviation Administration (November 2, 2021), 
available at: https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgSAIB.nsf/dc7bd4f27e5f107486257221005f069d/27ffcbb45
e6157e9862587810044ad19/%24FILE/AIR-21-18.pdf.
    \26\ Cat Zakrzewski, AT&T and Verizon will delay rollout over 
airplane interference concerns, Washington Post (November 4, 2021), 
available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/11/04/att-
verizon-5g-delay/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. FAA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES (ADS) ON RADIO ALTIMETERS

    In early December 2021, the FAA issued a set of ADs, which 
included a directive that required revising flight manuals to 
prohibit certain operations requiring radio altimeter data when 
in the presence of 5G C-band signals, such as landing in low 
visibility conditions.\27\ This AD would apply to areas and 
airports later identified through Notice to Air Missions 
(NOTAMs).\28\ The AD was expected to prevent the dispatch of 
flights to certain airports and locations during times of low 
visibility--such as fog, rain, and snow--and result in 
significantly more flight diversions and cancellations.\29\ A4A 
estimated at the time that if the AD had been in effect in 
2019, approximately 345,000 passenger flights, 32 million 
passengers, and 5,400 cargo flights would have been impacted in 
the form of delayed flights, diversions, or cancellations.\30\ 
HAI also estimated that a large portion of their fleet could 
have been grounded without significant relief from the FAA.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ FAA, supra note 12.
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ FAA, supra note 6.
    \30\ David Shepardson, U.S. airlines warn 5G wireless could wreak 
havoc with flights, Reuters (December 15, 20221), available at: https:/
/www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-airlines-warn-5g-
wireless-could-cause-havoc-with-flights-2021-12-15/.
    \31\ HAI, Statement on FAA ADs Related to 5G Wireless Interference, 
(December 8, 2021), available at: https://rotormedia.com/hai-statement-
on-faa-airworthiness-directives-related-to-5g-wireless-interference/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. DECEMBER 2021 INFORMATION SHARING AGREEMENT

    One of the primary reasons the FAA issued a wide-reaching 
AD to mitigate potential harmful interference from 5G signals 
is because the FCC did not possess, and the telecom industry 
had not provided, data which contained the requisite critical 
information the FAA needed to provide an in-depth technical 
analysis.\32\ This prevented the FAA from conducting the 
critical risk assessments needed to put the proper mitigations 
in place prior to the originally scheduled deployment. Finally, 
in December 2021, the FAA confirmed that the telecom industry 
had begun transmitting the technical data (such as 5G base 
station locations) for the FAA to accurately assess the risk to 
aircraft radio altimeters.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Briefing provided to Committee staff by FAA on January 3, 
2021.
    \33\ Information provided to Committee staff by the FAA on Dec. 20, 
2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 22, 2021, Verizon and AT&T announced, through 
the wireless industry trade association, CTIA, an agreement 
between CTIA, AIA, and A4A, to begin sharing otherwise 
confidential technical data amongst their member companies.\34\ 
This information sharing agreement was critical for providing 
engineers and experts from the airlines and aviation 
manufacturers with previously unavailable data that allowed 
them to more accurately assess the potential risk of 5G signals 
to aircraft radio altimeters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ CTIA, Joint Statement from CTIA, AIA and A4A on 5G and 
Aviation Safety, (December 22, 2021), available at: https://
www.ctia.org/news/joint-statement-from-ctia-aia-and-a4a-on-5g-and-
aviation-safety#::text=December%2022%2C%202021-
,Joint%20Statement%20from%20CTIA
%2C%20AIA%20and,on%205G%20and%20Aviation%20Safety%20.&text=%E2%80%9COur%
20
belief%20is%20that%20by,5G%20while%20preserving%20aviation%20safety.%E2%
80%9D.
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D. JANUARY 3, 2022, AGREEMENT

    On January 3, 2022, Verizon and AT&T announced another two-
week delay of 5G deployment, from January 5, 2022, to January 
19, 2022, after DOT Secretary Buttigieg and FAA Administrator 
Dickson called on both telecom companies to delay deployment 
for two weeks in a December 31, 2021, letter.\35\ As part of 
that deal, Verizon and AT&T agreed to continue sharing the 
geographical locations of 5G ground stations and supply a more 
in-depth understanding of how the more powerful 5G signals of 
those stations would function within the C-band.\36\ 
Additionally, the FAA, in consultation with aviation 
stakeholders, agreed to identify 50 priority airports which 
would be subjected to temporary 5G ``exclusion zones,'' areas 
where 5G deployment would be prohibited within at least 1.25 
miles beyond the ends of the runway and about a half mile to 
either side.\37\ These priority airports were identified by the 
FAA and selected based on their traffic volume, number of low-
visibility days, and role as a diversion location for other 
airports that may experience disruption.\38\ This agreement was 
originally intended to only be in place for six months and gave 
the telecom industry the right to reject any of the originally 
agreed upon mitigations already in place. However, the terms of 
this agreement were later superseded by another agreement on 
January 18, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Associated Press, AT&T, Verizon delay new 5G service after 
Buttigieg request, (January 3, 2022), available at: https://
www.boston.com/news/technology/2022/01/03/att-verizon-delay-new-5g-
service-after-buttigieg-request/.
    \36\ Id.
    \37\ FAA, supra note 12.
    \38\ FAA, supra note 6.
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E. JANUARY 18, 2022, AGREEMENT

    On January 18, 2022, a day before the scheduled nationwide 
deployment of 5G, Verizon and AT&T announced they would delay 
deployment around certain airport runways.\39\ This move was in 
response to an A4A letter expressing concern over the recently 
issued FAA NOTAMs that placed flight restrictions affecting a 
significant number of airports, not just the 50 priority 
airports previously covered under the January 3, 2022, 
agreement.\40\ The new agreement,\41\ which the DOT and FAA 
also helped broker, called for expanded exclusion zones that 
prohibit 5G deployment within at least two \42\ miles of 
runways at all 87 airports affected by FAA NOTAMs.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ David Shepardson, AT&T, Verizon pause 5G rollout near U.S. 
airports to avoid flight disruptions, Reuters, (January 19, 2022), 
available at: https://www.reuters.com/
business/aerospace-defense/biden-administration-talks-head-off-5g-
aviation-standoff-2022-01-18/.
    \40\ See David Shepardson, Major U.S. airlines warn 5G could ground 
some planes, wreak havoc, Reuters, (January 18, 2022), available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/technology/
exclusive-major-us-airline-ceos-urge-action-avoid-catastrophic-5g-
flight-2022-01-17/.
    \41\ While the FAA has briefed the Committee on the general outline 
of the January 18, 2022, agreement, some of the specific details of the 
agreement remain undisclosed.
    \42\ The actual area for which deployment is prohibited is 
approximately 3 miles, but this extra mile is to ensure that an 
aircraft's radio altimeter will be performing accurately within 2 miles 
of an affected airport's runway. The FAA also continues to refine these 
areas, based on evolving risk, and it may change over time.
    \43\ While there have been several different types of 5G-related 
NOTAMs recently issued by the FAA, this is specifically in reference to 
the Instrument Approach Procedure (IAP) NOTAMs that restrict specific 
low visibility approach operations at certain airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The expanded exclusion zones around specific airports were 
designed to allay the FAA's concerns with 5G interference 
enough to permit the agency to issue more alternative methods 
of compliance (AMOCs), which in turn would allow more aircraft 
to operate at those airports even in low visibility 
conditions.\44\ According to the FAA, unlike the previous 
mitigation agreements that were agreed to, the terms of this 
agreement are not expected to expire until the FAA determines 
it is safe to deploy 5G within that two-mile radius.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ FAA, supra note 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

    Since the January 18, 2022, targeted delay, the FAA has 
issued a number of AMOCs which allow a large percentage of the 
commercial air carrier fleet to continue operations at all of 
the 87 airports that received Instrument Approach Procedure 
NOTAMs.\45\ In the case of 5G, an AMOC is essentially an 
exemption to the AD, allowing (a) a specific aircraft, with (b) 
a specific radio altimeter, to land at (c) specified airports, 
even in low visibility conditions, regardless of whether the 
airport has a 5G NOTAM or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ FAA, supra note 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The aircraft models that have received an AMOC and are 
approved as of January 31, 2022, represent at least 90 percent 
of the U.S. commercial fleet (compared to just 45 percent 
before the January 18, 2022, agreement) and include Boeing 717, 
737, 747, 757, 767, 777, 787, MD-10/-11 models; Airbus A300, 
A310, A319, A220, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350 and A380 models; 
Embraer 120, 170, and 190 regional jets; CL-600/CRJ regional 
jets; DHC-8 turboprops and ATR turboprops.\46\ However, those 
AMOCs are limited to the above aircraft models that possess one 
of 20 approved radio altimeters.\47\ While helicopter operators 
have not yet received an AMOC and are still restricted by 
certain airspace related NOTAMs, the FAA did grant a two-year 
waiver to the AD to allow most medical emergency flights to 
continue under certain conditions.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ FAA, supra note 12.
    \47\ Id.
    \48\ Helicopter Ass'n Int'l Partial Grant of Exemption, Regulatory 
Docket No. FAA-2021-1028, Exemption No. 18973 (Jan. 13, 2022), 
available at: https://rotormedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/
Approved-HAI-5G-Partial-grant.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When the FAA originally announced the first round of AMOC 
approvals prior to the January 18, 2022, agreement, low 
visibility operations were only permitted at 48 of the 87 
affected airports. This agreement has enabled the FAA to expand 
the list of airports to all 87 airports.\49\ It is worth noting 
that even with these AMOCs, sporadic disruptions are still 
expected throughout the NAS. For instance, there are still a 
significant number of commercial aircraft, particularly 
regional commercial aircraft, that have either yet to receive 
an AMOC or received a limited AMOC that still prohibits or 
severely restricts the aircraft from operating in low 
visibility conditions at certain airports.\50\ Additionally, as 
the FAA continues to receive and review additional information 
pertaining to the deployment of new 5G base stations, the 
agency will need to issue new NOTAMs for airports and areas 
that subsequently face higher risk of 5G interference for 
aircraft. As the potential risks of 5G interference to aircraft 
are determined, AMOCs--which expire at the end of each month--
will need to be reviewed and reissued.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ FAA, supra note 6
    \50\ FAA, supra note 12.
    \51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, continued collaboration between the FAA, FCC, and 
aviation and telecom stakeholders, and compliance with the 
known terms of the January 18, 2022, agreement is necessary to 
ultimately maintain aircraft safety and reduce further 
disruptions to the NAS.

V. INTERNATIONAL 5G DEPLOYMENT

    While 5G deployment has started to occur in as many as 40 
other countries, there are several significant differences that 
make comparisons between those countries and the United States 
difficult. For instance, most of these countries either (1) use 
drastically lower 5G power levels than the United States, (2) 
have implemented other mitigation strategies prior to 
deployment to prevent interference, namely 5G antennas' angle 
requirements or expansive exclusion zones near airport runways, 
or (3) operate their allocated frequencies for 5G farther away 
from the radio frequency band used by radio altimeters, thereby 
reducing the risk of interference. Additionally, they all have 
much less commercial aviation activity than the United States. 
Below are some examples of 5G deployment outside of the United 
States and the mitigations those regions have implemented:
     LEurope: The 3.4-3.8 GHz band is utilized for 5G 
in Europe. However, there is a separation of an additional 100 
MHz more than what will be provided in the U.S., reducing the 
risk of potential interference.\52\ The power levels permitted 
in most of Europe are 23 percent less than those that would be 
permitted in the U.S.\53\ The European countries specified 
below have additional mitigations in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ A4A, 5G Interference: Frequently Asked Questions, available 
at: https://www.airlines.org/5g-frequently-asked-questions/.
    \53\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LFrance: French regulators have imposed 5G 
exclusion zones (primarily around the Nice and Charles de 
Gaulle Airports) to protect public safety.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Ex Parte Letter from aviation stakeholders to Marlene Dortch, 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commissions, Docket No. 18-122 (filed 
Nov. 18, 2021), available at: https://www.airlines.org/wp-content/
uploads/2022/01/Aviation-Industry-Reply-to-CTIA-11-19-2021-2022-01-03-
15_57_10.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LCzech Republic: Prague Airport has imposed 5G 
exclusion zones to protect public safety.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LUnited Kingdom (UK): Power levels are 
significantly lower in both the frequency ranges 3.4-3.8 GHz, 
and 3.805-4.195 GHz by 62 percent and 99 percent, 
respectively.\56\ The UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has 
stated that 5G mobile base stations operating below 3.8 GHz 
pose a viable interference threat to radio altimeters.\57\ The 
UK CAA also stated that lower power levels in the 3.8-4.195 GHz 
range may be an issue for helicopters, especially those used 
for emergency services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Id.
    \57\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LAustralia: Compared to Europe and the United 
States, Australia operates farther away from the radio 
frequency band used by the radio altimeter. Additionally, the 
power levels permitted in Australia are 76 percent lower than 
allowed in the United States.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LJapan: Japan has deployed 5G up to 4.1 GHz and 
the power levels permitted for 5G are at least 90 percent below 
those permitted in the United States.\59\ The macro cell power 
levels are 96 percent below or only four percent of that 
permitted in the U.S., while the small cell power levels are 
less than one percent of what is permitted in the United 
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LCanada: Canadian regulators recently announced 
they would restrict certain 5G services around airports, 
placing ``exclusion zones'' around 26 airports where outdoor 5G 
base stations would not be permitted to operate--but indoor 5G 
operations would be allowed.\60\ Canada also established 
``protection zones'' where 5G operations would be allowed, with 
restricted power. Canada will now require, until it decides 
otherwise, that the 5G antennas tilt down, rather than 
horizontally or upward, so as not to interfere with radio 
altimeters.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Diana Furchgott-Roth, Canada Limits 5G to Protect Air Travel, 
Forbes, (November 21, 2021), available at: https://www.forbes.com/
sites/dianafurchtgott-roth/2021/11/21/canada-limits-5g-to-protect-air-
travel/?sh=593ae2737247.
    \61\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LSouth Korea: 5G is limited to 3.42-3.7 GHz and 
the maximum permitted 5G power is 95 percent less than the U.S. 
levels.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ A4A, supra note 52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               WITNESSES

                                Panel 1

     LThe Honorable Steve Dickson, Administrator, 
Federal Aviation Administration

                                Panel 2

     LNicholas E. Calio, President and CEO, Airlines 
for America
     LThe Honorable Eric Fanning, President and CEO, 
Aerospace Industries Association
     LCathryn Stephens, A.A.E., Airport Director, 
Eugene Airport, on behalf of American Association of Airport 
Executives
     LCaptain Joe DePete, President, Air Line Pilots 
Association
     LFaye Malarkey Black, President and CEO, Regional 
Airline Association
     LJames A. Viola, President and CEO, Helicopter 
Association International
     LThe Honorable Meredith Attwell Baker, President 
and CEO, CTIA
     LDennis Roberson, President and CEO, Roberson and 
Associates


     FINDING THE RIGHT FREQUENCY: 5G DEPLOYMENT AND AVIATION SAFETY

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2022

                  House of Representatives,
                          Subcommittee on Aviation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:01 a.m., in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. Rick 
Larsen (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Members present in person: Mr. Larsen of Washington, Mr. 
DeFazio, Mr. Graves of Louisiana, Mr. Graves of Missouri, Mr. 
Young, Mr. Perry, Mr. Katko, Mr. Burchett, and Mr. Garcia of 
Illinois.
    Members present remotely: Mr. Carson, Ms. Davids of Kansas, 
Mr. Kahele, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Ms. Titus, Ms. Brownley, 
Mr. Payne, Mr. DeSaulnier, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Stanton, Mr. Allred, 
Mr. Lamb, Ms. Norton, Ms. Johnson of Texas, Mr. Massie, Mr. 
Mast, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Balderson, Mr. Stauber, Dr. Van 
Drew, Mr. Nehls, Ms. Van Duyne, Mr. Gimenez, and Mrs. Steel.
    Mr. Larsen. I call the meeting of the House Subcommittee on 
Aviation to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    And as a reminder, please keep your microphone muted unless 
speaking. If I hear any inadvertent background noise, I will 
request that the Member mute their microphone. And I will not 
say please, despite the instructions.
    To insert a document into the record, please have your 
staff email it to [email protected].
    I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Good morning, and welcome to today's Aviation Subcommittee 
hearing titled, ``Finding the Right Frequency: 5G Deployment 
and Aviation Safety.''
    On January 24th, 25th, and 26th, Alaska Airlines cancelled 
over 50 flights at Paine Field in Everett, my hometown. Was it 
the thicker than unusual 24-hour fog? No, planes fly in worse. 
Was it the Embraer 175 radio altimeter? Also no; the airplane 
flies with that radio altimeter all the time. Was it the runway 
orientation? Was it pointing the wrong way? Well, that is a 
silly assumption to make. Was it the presence of a radio tower 
with a soon-to-be activated 5G transmitter? No, not just that.
    Unfortunately, the problem was all of those things coming 
together in a perfect storm of technology. This true story 
about 5G and aviation safety shows that the problem we are 
addressing today has more layers than a Dagwood sandwich.
    So, what do we do when we are faced with a complex problem 
like this? We break it into parts, and we focus on basic 
principles. And our basic principle in this subcommittee is 
aviation safety.
    So, how to ensure that 5G and aviation safety can coexist, 
in the words of several of our witnesses? What I hope emerges 
from this hearing is that the subcommittee has a firm grasp of 
what the telecommunication and aviation industry, the FAA, the 
FCC, the NTIA, and others can do to anticipate future 5G 
rollout conflicts, avoid them, what impact future FCC auctions 
may have on aviation operations, and establish a process, 
formal or informal, to proactively address these conflicts.
    In preparation for today's hearing, here is what I 
concluded.
    The aviation industry has expressed concerns about 5G 
interference as far back as 2015 at the World Radio Conference. 
I also found out there is actually something called the World 
Radio Conference.
    I also found out the NTIA, the Federal agency responsible 
for coordinating spectrum policy, failed to communicate the FAA 
concerns through the formalized FCC process.
    I found that telecom engineers and aerospace engineers have 
the name ``engineer'' in common, but beyond that, they speak 
actually different engineering languages when they speak to 
each other and when they speak to each other at all. But I 
understand that is changing as well, and that is a positive 
outcome.
    I found that the industries, aviation and telecom, have 
misaligned cultures on this issue, with telecom being about 
clearer, faster communications as its selling point, and 
aviation has aviation safety as its selling point. It is what 
gives the public confidence in flying.
    I also found out that this is not a Federal Government only 
problem. It is also an industry problem.
    So, what can we do to help aviation safety and 5G coexist?
    Well, I think there is an imperative here. There will be a 
continued rollout of the C-band from the 3.7 to 3.8 megahertz 
on the spectrum and eventually the 3.8 to 3.98, which will 
bring us that much closer to the 4.2 megahertz band where the 
aviation band starts.
    There is a potential for future auctions as well. And then 
there is 6G coming down, and it means different things to 
different people. And we don't know what it means for aviation 
safety. So, we need to begin to understand that.
    I think we need to establish informal and formal 
communication between the FAA and the FCC moving forward as 
well. So that, hopefully, we don't have to have another hearing 
like this.
    I would like to think that, perhaps, that in foreign policy 
what they call a track 2 dialogue can be convened, which is an 
informal, nongovernmental discussion, in this case, on 5G, on 
radio altimeters, on next steps that can be then used to inform 
the more formal mechanisms. Sort of sort these things out 
informally and then inform the formal mechanisms.
    I certainly look forward to other ideas that we are going 
to hear from our witnesses today. And as we move forward, maybe 
we can get this Dagwood sandwich down to bite-sized chunks 
moving forward.
    With that, I yield the balance of my time, and I will 
recognize Representative Graves from Louisiana for an opening 
statement.
    [Mr. Larsen's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress 
   from the State of Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation
    Good morning and welcome to today's Aviation Subcommittee hearing 
titled ``Finding the Right Frequency: 5G Deployment and Aviation 
Safety.''
    On January 24th, 25th and 26th, Alaska Airlines cancelled over 50 
flights at Paine Field in Everett, Washington, my hometown.
    Was it the thicker than usual 24-hour fog? No, planes fly in worse.
    Was it the Embraer 175 radio altimeter? Also no.
    Or the runway orientation? Was it pointing the wrong way? That's a 
silly assumption to make.
    Was it just the presence of a radio tower with a soon-to-be 
activated 5G transmitter? No, not just that.
    Unfortunately, the problem was all of those things coming together 
in a perfect storm of technology.
    This true story about 5G and aviation safety shows that the problem 
we are addressing today has more layers than a Dagwood sandwich.
    What do we do when we are faced with a complex problem like this?
    We break it into its parts and focus on basic principles. Our basic 
principle on this subcommittee is aviation safety.
    So how do we ensure that 5G and aviation safety can coexist, in the 
words of several of our witnesses.
    What I hope emerges from this hearing is that the Subcommittee has 
a firm grasp of what the telecommunication and aviation industries, the 
FAA, the FCC, the NTIA and others can do to anticipate future 5G 
rollout conflicts, avoid them, and what impact future FCC auctions may 
have on aviation operations, and establish a process, formal or 
informal, to proactively address these conflicts.
    In preparation for today's hearing, here is what I have concluded:
      The aviation industry has expressed concerns about 5G 
interference as far back as 2015 at the World Radio Conference.
      The NTIA, the federal agency responsible for coordinating 
spectrum policy, failed to communicate the FAA concerns through the 
formalized FCC process.
      Telecom engineers and aerospace engineers have the name 
``engineers'' in common, but beyond that, they speak different 
engineering languages when they speak to each other and when they speak 
to each other at all. But I understand that is changing as well, and 
that is a positive outcome.
      The industries, aviation and telecom, have misaligned 
cultures on this issue, with telecom being about clearer, faster 
communications as its selling point, and aviation has aviation safety 
as its selling point. It's what gives the public confidence in flying.
      This is not a federal government only problem. It is also 
an industry problem.

    So what can we do to help aviation safety and 5G coexist?
      It is imperative that there will be a continued rollout 
of the C-band from 3.7 to 3.8 MHz on the spectrum and eventually 3.8 to 
3.98, which will bring it closer to the 4.2 mHz band where the aviation 
band starts. There's a potential for future auctions as well. And then 
there's 6G coming down, and it means different things to different 
people, and we don't know what it means for aviation safety. So we need 
to begin to understand that.
      I think we need to establish an informal or formalized 
communication between the FAA and the FCC moving forward as well, so 
hopefully we don't have to have another hearing like this.
      I would like to think that perhaps in foreign policy what 
they call a Track II dialogue can be convened, which is an informal, 
non-governmental discussion, in this case on 5G, on radio altimeters, 
on next steps that can be used to inform the more formal mechanisms--
sort of sort these things out informally and the inform the formal 
mechanisms.

    I certainly look forward to other ideas that we are going to hear 
from our witnesses today.
    As we move forward, maybe we can get this Dagwood sandwich down to 
bite-sized chunks.

    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 
appreciate you having this hearing.
    Mr. Chairman, the United States has the safest aviation 
industry in the world. It is the safest way to travel. We have 
the gold standard in regard to safety and innovation. We also--
I believe I can speak for everyone on this panel--Republicans, 
Democrats, everyone--supports the deployment of 5G C-band and 
trying to help to bridge the digital divide.
    I don't think that there is anyone here that would stand in 
front of aviation safety and block efforts to advance, and I 
don't think that there is anyone here that would block efforts 
to improve technology, communication, and, again, to help to 
bridge the digital divide.
    Yet, if we look at what has happened and we found ourselves 
in this absolutely ridiculous, inexcusable situation, after 
knowing for years that there were challenges here, that there 
were issues here, and finding ourselves in a situation where at 
the very last minute there were claims, cries, demands, what 
have you, to delay deployment in something that was entirely 
preventable, something as the chair noted, issues had been 
raised not months before, but years and years before, and we 
found ourselves in this situation.
    There is something called Parkinson's law. Parkinson's law 
is that you are going to use every bit of time available to you 
to finish a task. In this case, we didn't even do that. We saw 
two very capable agencies, or three, if you include NTIA, just 
simply sit here and play chicken with one another or whatever 
ridiculousness happened and now we ended up threatening 
aviation safety. We had flights cancelled.
    And let me tell you something, Tim Clark, the CEO of 
Emirates, the airline, said, quote: ``This is one of the most 
delinquent, utterly irresponsible issues'' he has seen in his 
aviation career. This is the CEO of a company, of an airline. 
There is no excuse for us to be in this situation. This is what 
you would expect from some other country without the governance 
structure, without the strong civil support structure that we 
have in the United States. It is embarrassing and I will say it 
again, ridiculous, and it is inexcusable.
    The traveling public expects that airlines are going to be 
safe. We already have enough uncertainty related to schedules 
and weather and other things that we don't need to create our 
own problems further disrupting or creating uncertainty in 
airline travel.
    This committee takes aviation safety incredibly seriously 
as you have seen from what we have primarily focused on over 
the last 3 years. So, how do you balance this issue of aviation 
safety and deployment of 5G C-band to make sure that you can 
continue to have altimeters that work, you can continue to have 
aviation safety, and you can continue to deploy this new 
technology and improved communication?
    The first step is leadership. It is leadership, and it is 
fundamental changes in the two primary agencies, the FAA and 
the FCC, in terms of how they approach things in this case. 
Most of the time, I think the agencies sit there and they wait 
for people to come to them.
    And in this case, we saw agencies, both sitting there 
waiting, in many cases, and it simply didn't work. It caused 
the problem that we are facing today.
    I think we can partially blame the clash of cultures at the 
two agencies with very different missions. The communications 
regulator, the FCC, is searching for evidence that there are 
problems with altimeters and 5G interference. And the FAA, the 
aviation safety regulator, is searching for proof that there 
are none. Totally different approaches.
    And make no mistake that what is going on right now, we are 
still in the middle of this mess. We have temporary extensions, 
mitigation features, and Band-Aids. We are still in the middle 
of a big mess.
    And although the temperature has been turned down for now, 
there is an awful lot of work to be done by all parties as we 
move forward. To Administrator Dickson, I do want to thank you 
and your team for working through the holidays diligently and 
over the past month to keep our aviation system safe and 
operating while the significant rollout of 5G C-band across the 
country has occurred. And I know we have asked a lot of your 
team and I know they are going to be asking for a whole lot 
more over the next few months.
    We need them analyzing the data they are receiving from 
radio altimeter manufacturers, wireless communication 
companies, and aircraft manufacturers, and reporting what they 
have learned about potential interference. We need a lot of 
work in terms of the alternatives, I guess, approved in order 
to allow aviation safety to continue.
    We need them working with RTCA to expedite the development 
and publication of new radio altimeter standards and 
manufacturers to move forward. I look forward to hearing from 
the witnesses today. I want to say, again, I am glad everyone 
is working well together now. It shouldn't have taken this 
long, and I think that the White House and others should have 
stepped in well before we reached a level of chaos.
    Mr. Chairman, thanks, again, for having the hearing, and I 
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
    [Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress 
   from the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
                                Aviation
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you having this hearing
    The United States has the safest aviation industry in the world. We 
have the gold standard in safety and innovation, something this 
committee has focused on significantly over the last three years.
    I also believe I can speak for everyone on this panel, whether 
Republican or Democrat, that we all support the deployment of 5G C-band 
and efforts to help to bridge the digital divide and improve wireless 
connectivity throughout our country.
    Unfortunately, a lack of leadership resulted in those two goals not 
being able to coexist, and we find ourselves in an absolutely 
ridiculous, inexcusable situation. After knowing for years that there 
would be hurdles in deploying a new band of spectrum, nothing was done 
to cooperate and mitigate those risks. At the very last minute before 
deployment of this new technology, we heard cries and demands for 
delay. This was entirely preventable.
    We saw three very capable agencies--FCC, FAA, and NTIA--play 
chicken with one another. And that game of chicken ended up threatening 
aviation safety.
    There is no excuse for us to be in this situation. This is what you 
would expect from a country that doesn't have the governance structure 
that we have in the United States. It's embarrassing and I will say it 
again--ridiculous and inexcusable.
    The traveling public expects that airlines are going to be safe.
    We already have enough uncertainty related to schedules and weather 
as the industry is recovering from the pandemic, and we don't need to 
create additional problems that further disrupt airline travel.
    So, how do you balance aviation safety and the deployment of 5G C-
band, ensuring that our altimeters are operational to support aviation 
safety and, at the same time, continue to deploy new technology to 
improve communication?
    It starts with leadership and requires fundamental changes in the 
two primary agencies'--the FAA's and the FCC's--approach and 
anticipation of conflicts within their mission areas. Neither agency 
should sit back and wait to be acted upon by the other, and each agency 
should consider how its internal culture influences that operational 
procedure.
    The communications regulator, the FCC, searches for evidence that 
there is interference between 5G and aviation safety technologies. And 
the FAA, the aviation safety regulator, searches for proof that there 
isn't any. Totally different approaches.
    While both agencies are actively engaged in a constructive dialogue 
today, these challenges are not yet overcome. We are still in the 
middle of this mess with temporary extensions, mitigation features, and 
band-aids. And although the temperature has been turned down for now, 
there is an awful lot of work to be done by all parties as we move 
forward for this band of spectrum, and for future technological 
advances which will undoubtedly pose similar risks.
    Administrator Dickson, I want to thank you and your team for 
working diligently through the holidays and over the past month to keep 
our aviation system safe and operating while the significant rollout of 
5G C-band across the country has occurred.
    And I know we've asked a lot of your team, and I know we are going 
to be asking for a whole lot more over the next few months. We need 
them to analyze the data they're receiving from radio altimeter 
manufacturers, wireless communication companies, and aircraft 
manufacturers, and report what they've learned about potential 
interference and deploy mitigation strategies which preserve aviation 
safety while ensuring deployment of this next generation of 
technologies. We need a lot of work in terms of the alternatives 
approved in order to allow aviation safety to continue.
    We need them to work with RTCA to expedite the development and 
publication of new radio altimeter standards and manufacturers to move 
forward. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today, but I want 
to say again that I am glad everyone is working well together now. But 
it shouldn't have taken this long. That the White House didn't step in 
well before we reached this level of chaos is inexcusable.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and I look 
forward to hearing from our witnesses.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
    The Chair now recognizes the chair of the full committee. 
Mr. DeFazio of Oregon is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Well, you both have 
well outlined the extraordinary lack of communication and 
coordination between the FCC and the FAA and, of course, the 
NTIA is supposed to arbitrate these sorts of things and 
intervene--National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration--but they just received their first permanent 
head since the beginning of the Trump Presidency.
    There were five interim heads during his Presidency and, 
hopefully, the new head will be able to put them in their 
rightful place of coordinating as we move forward, because we 
are not done with this yet. We have temporary measures in 
place, but there are going to be more towers put out there. The 
companies consider their towers, their heights, their strength, 
their location to be proprietary data. It can't be proprietary 
data.
    You can't just plop one down next to a critical approach 
into an airport, but that is what was going on.
    And the industry refused to share that data, even though 
there was a very specific request made by the FAA on November 
2nd. And, finally, on December 22nd, they began to release data 
on where their secret towers were, what their powers were, 
where the antennas were pointed, and that is when we began to 
realize this was going to be a big problem.
    And, in fact, for the first 2 days, they said, oh, you 
can't give this data to anybody. You can't share it. This is 
secret. So, till we finally--the lawyers worked it out, and the 
FAA could work with the manufacturers and the airlines, and the 
airports have not really been particularly well-informed 
throughout this whole process. And there is just phenomenal 
room for improvement.
    There needs to be a formalized process. Memorandums of 
understanding between affected agencies, you know, dealing with 
the FCC. This isn't the first instance. The FCC decided to sell 
off half of the vehicle-to-vehicle safety band. We are moving 
to automated vehicles and we are trying to develop things, 
crash avoidance, vehicle communication, and they said, no, it 
is much more important that people can stream high D while 
walking down the street on their cellphone. So, they sold off 
half of that spectrum.
    They are being litigated and hopefully they will lose, and 
we will preserve that for the future of automobile safety. They 
also disregarded the concerns of the Department of Defense on 
letting Ligado turn on its satellites with the potential 
degradation of critical GPS.
    It is a pattern of ignoring consequences beyond the 
consequences to the profitability of the telecom industry. That 
is their only focus. Telecom wants this, they need this, they 
got to have it. That has got to change, and hopefully the NTIA 
can negotiate this, or maybe it has to be mandated by Congress.
    You are going to have memorandums of understanding. You are 
actually going to meaningfully cooperate and coordinate with 
these other agencies. You are going to take your, sort of, 
regulated--we don't really regulate telecoms any more, that is 
why we have the crappiest cellphone service in the world. Your 
regulated entities are going to communicate things to us, to 
the affected parties, that will affect their industries. I 
mean, that only makes sense. That only makes sense.
    It is so disappointing, and we still have denial. We are 
going to hear from a witness today that says, oh, we have much 
greater safeguards than France now. Oops, not true. Oh, they 
are operating at a much higher power in France. No, two and a 
half times higher here. The antenna angles are mandated to be 
tilted down in France and they have exclusion zones and the 
list goes on around the country, around the world. And they 
said, oh, because it is safe elsewhere, where everybody else 
has taken measures to protect aviation, but we didn't until the 
last minute. And it is a temporary agreement and something has 
to be worked out long term in the next 6 months. As they deploy 
more of these towers, they want to put them right in the 
flightpath because we want to get to that neighborhood over 
there. That is going to be a high-profit center for us, so, we 
want to have an antenna right there.
    There have to be some restrictions and agreements, because 
we cannot have conflicting industries. Having a dropped call is 
way less serious than having a dropped airplane out of the sky.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in 
      Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Larsen, for calling this important hearing today 
focused on the recent deployment of 5G technologies and its impact on 
the aviation industry and National Airspace System. I would like to 
thank FAA Administrator Dickson as well as the many aviation and 
telecom stakeholders for appearing before us today. I would also like 
to note that while FCC Chairwoman Rosenworcel had a conflict and could 
not join us today, the committee very much looks forward to hearing 
from her in the future on this issue.
    If the events of the last two months have taught us anything, it's 
that the current interagency process for auctioning off spectrum is 
completely broken. My colleagues and I watched in complete dismay as 
the deployment of 5G originally proceeded without any of the safety 
mitigations the FAA, aviation industry, and I have long called for. 
This resulted in a disorienting display of 5G fits and starts over the 
last several months, inevitably due to the FCC auctioning off 5G 
spectrum without any concrete plan in place to safely deploy these 
technologies without interfering with aviation.
    But it did not have to be this way!
    Despite what recent coverage of 5G deployment might suggest, the 
concerns expressed by the FAA and aviation industry are nothing new.
    In fact, numerous aviation stakeholders, including many we will 
hear from today, expressed concerns to the Trump-appointed, former FCC 
Chairman Ajit Pai, prior to and after the FCC voted to open up the C-
band for wireless use all the way back in 2018. But they were ignored.
    In September 2019, the FAA sent a letter to the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, or NTIA, expressing 
concerns that critical aviation systems could be impacted by harmful 
interference from C-band emissions and requesting the FCC delay further 
action until more studies could be done. However, they were ignored.
    In November 2019, I sent a letter to former FCC Chairman Pai 
expressing my concern about the FCC's continuing disregard for aviation 
safety and urging the agency to delay moving forward unless they 
include strong mitigations to prevent harmful interference with 
aircraft. I was ignored.
    In December 2020, the FAA and DOT sent a letter to the NTIA stating 
the ``FCC's [current] path in this proceeding is insufficient to 
address our concerns'' and urging them to delay the FCC's upcoming 
auction. However, the NTIA failed to enter the letter into the FCC's 
docket for consideration, and again, they were ignored.
    And this isn't exclusive to aviation or the FAA. In 2019, the FCC 
proposed to give away more than half the bandwidth previously reserved 
for transportation safety and connected vehicles, despite my objections 
and those of many other transportation stakeholders.
    The FCC's history of subordinating transportation safety to 
corporate broadband interests has predictably resulted in the current 
mess we find ourselves in and must change if we hope to avoid a similar 
result in the future.
    Now the telecom industry has argued that the safety mitigations the 
FAA and aviation industry are advocating for, and which the telecom 
industry has begrudgingly accepted only recently, are unnecessary 
because 5G deployment is occurring in as many as 40 other countries, 
with no confirmed reports of harmful interference with aircraft.
    However, what they fail to mention is that most of these countries 
use either drastically lower 5G power levels than the U.S., operate 5G 
further away from the frequency used by aircraft radio altimeters, or 
have required significant safety mitigations, such as airport exclusion 
zones or 5G antennae placement requirements, to limit the potential for 
harmful interference to aircraft.
    Additionally, no other country even comes close to having the level 
and complexity of civil aviation activity that exists in the U.S.
    As I've stated before, to make this comparison without recognizing 
the critical differences that exist between the U.S. and every other 
country that has deployed 5G technology is disingenuous, misleading, 
and displays a glaring disregard for the potential safety measures 
needed to protect the flying public.
    Now I want to be clear. I do not oppose the deployment of 5G.
    On the contrary, I know faster wireless speeds will help provide 
many great benefits for Americans, and have tremendous potential 
applications in the tech, healthcare, and national security fields.
    But let's not suggest the risks of delaying 5G deployment were ever 
equal to the risks deployment could pose to aviation safety.
    A dropped call or the inability to access a slightly faster 
internet connection is not nearly the same as the risk of a potential 
aviation accident. In fact, it's not even close.
    Radio altimeters serve as a pilot's primary altitude measurement 
during flight and are critical to enabling safe arrivals, particularly 
during inclement weather or other instances of low visibility. The risk 
of flying an aircraft with a compromised radio altimeter can be 
disastrous.
    For instance, in 2009 a Turkish Airlines flight experienced faulty 
radio altimeter readings while on approach, contributing to its fatal 
crash landing that resulted in nine deaths.
    The consequences of getting this right are enormous. We cannot 
afford to dismiss the aviation industry's concerns regarding the 
importance of accurate radio altimeter readings.
    We must do everything we can to prevent or limit the potential for 
5G signals to interfere with these devices.
    There are some who believe that the risk of 5G potentially 
interfering with aircraft radio altimeters is a ``low risk'' event that 
should be ignored. But this committee has learned that the consequences 
of ignoring even ``low-risk'' events in aviation can be catastrophic.
    The two crashes of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes in 2018 and 2019 may 
have been considered ``low-risk'' by some, but ultimately led to the 
tragic loss of 346 lives.
    Furthermore, in the wake of the 737 MAX crashes, this committee and 
the American public, rightfully, questioned the FAA's lax oversight of 
the 737 MAX certification process and its commitment to safety.
    But now there are critics--mostly those who tend to have no 
background in aerospace engineering or aviation safety--condemning the 
FAA for doing the very thing this committee and the American public 
have been calling on for decades: to do everything in its power to 
protect the American public from any and all risks to aviation safety.
    We must not now, or ever, condemn the FAA for prioritizing safety.
    Despite my continued concerns for how this process has played out, 
I am strongly supportive of the recent agreement reached between 
Verizon, AT&T, and the Biden administration to ensure we have 5G 
exclusion zones near all airports affected by the recent 5G deployment.
    This agreement and continued collaboration between the telecom 
industry, aviation stakeholders, and the FAA will help ensure we can 
maintain aviation safety while also limiting the disruption to the 
aviation industry and American travelers.
    Important questions remain: What are the precise details of the 
recent deal announced? How long are the current safety mitigations 
expected to last? What is the FAA doing to ensure it is communicating 
with all aviation stakeholders in a swift and transparent manner, 
particularly with regard to new AMOCs or NOTAMs the agency plans to 
issue? And what are the FAA, telecom industry, and aviation 
stakeholders doing to ensure we are fully prepared for future broadband 
deployments?
    I look forward to receiving answers to these important questions 
today. I yield back.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Chair.
    The Chair recognizes Representative Graves of Missouri for 
an opening statement.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member Graves, for having this hearing. And I also want to 
thank our witnesses on both panels for being here. It is no 
secret that our Nation continues to grapple with one crisis 
after the next. Thankfully, though, we are here today to talk 
about one crisis that was narrowly averted, at least for the 
time being.
    And I want to commend the aviation and telecom industries 
for their collaborative efforts to ensure that aviation safety 
and 5G deployment can safely coexist.
    It goes without saying that alarmist headlines, especially 
those about complex avionics and spectrum issues, lead to 
unhelpful finger pointing and distract from serious and 
technical efforts that produce some lasting solutions.
    Regrettably, many of these headlines were byproducts of a 
botched Government coordination process, even though the issues 
have been raised publicly now for years. The American people 
would have been better served had the Government acted much 
sooner than it did in bringing together the experts at FAA and 
the FCC, and related industries, to address the issues at hand.
    Here we are now, and I know that Members on both sides of 
the aisle are eager to hear what is going to happen in the 
short term, the medium term, and the long term to fully and 
permanently resolve any issues with potential 5G interference 
with radio altimeters.
    As always, aviation safety is the number one priority of 
this subcommittee and the FAA. And that safety can only be 
ensured when we are not lurching from one deadline to the 
other. Safety also requires certainty, and that is sorely 
lacking right now from both air carriers and wireless carriers.
    This topic is an issue of immense economic significance to 
both the telecommunications and aviation industries. It is 
crucial that all parties, under the most recent agreement, use 
this time to work together to devise and implement a permanent 
solution that facilitates 5G rollout and ensures aviation 
safety that works for all of the users of the system, whether 
they are major air carriers, regional airlines, helicopters, or 
general aviation operators. That is the balance that we have to 
strike, and again, Mr. Chairman, I am not going to pile on 
anymore. I think we have made our point, all of us.
    So, I look forward to hearing the witnesses and what they 
have to say and how we are going to move forward.
    Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman.
    [Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress 
     from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Larsen and Ranking Member Graves, and thank you to 
our witnesses on both panels for being here today.
    It's no secret that our Nation continues to grapple with one crisis 
after the next. Thankfully, though, we're here today to talk about one 
crisis that was narrowly averted, for the time being. I want to commend 
the aviation and telecom industries for their collaborative efforts to 
ensure that aviation safety and 5G deployment can safely co-exist.
    It goes without saying that alarmist headlines, especially those 
about complex avionics and spectrum issues, lead to unhelpful finger 
pointing and distract from serious and technical efforts that produce 
lasting solutions.
    Regrettably, many of these headlines were by-products of a botched 
government coordination process, even though the issues have been 
raised publicly for years now. The American people would have been 
better served had the government acted much sooner than it did in 
bringing together the experts at FAA and FCC, and the related 
industries, to address these issues.
    But we're here now, and I know that members on both sides of the 
aisle are eager to hear what has to happen in the short-, medium-, and 
long-term to fully and permanently resolve any issues with potential 5G 
interference with radio altimeters.
    As always, aviation safety is the number one priority of this 
subcommittee and the FAA. That safety can only be ensured when we're 
not lurching from one deadline to another. Safety also requires 
certainty, something that is sorely lacking right now for both air 
carriers and wireless carriers.
    This topic is an issue of immense economic significance to both the 
telecommunications and aviation industries. It's crucial that all 
parties, under the most recent agreement, use this time to work 
together to devise and implement a permanent solution that facilitates 
5G rollout and ensures aviation safety that works for all users of the 
system, whether they're major air carriers, regional airlines, 
helicopters, or other general aviation operators. That is the balance 
that we have to strike, and I look forward to hearing from our 
witnesses today to see how we do it.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Graves.
    So, before we turn to our witnesses, there was a floor 
schedule put out earlier. So, for the Members, there is no plan 
for votes on the floor till about 4:15. There is a 1:30 p.m. 
bipartisan classified briefing, and the House floor will go 
into recess at 1:30 p.m.
    It doesn't impact us, but just for your planning purposes, 
there won't be any need for us to break as a subcommittee, but 
at 1:30, the classified briefing is on the Russia/Ukraine 
issue, but the floor does not plan to vote till about 4:15 just 
for planning purposes. It should give us freedom to get through 
this, but folks may want to go to the briefing as well.
    We will now turn to our witnesses. We will be hearing two 
panels today with each panel followed by questions from 
Members.
    I will now like to welcome our first panel, which consists 
of one person, the Honorable Steve Dickson, Administrator of 
the Federal Aviation Administration. Administrator, thank you 
for joining us today, and we look forward to your testimony.
    And without objection, your full statement will be included 
in the record. Since it is part of the record, the subcommittee 
requests that you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
    Mr. Dickson, you may proceed.

 TESTIMONY OF HON. STEPHEN M. DICKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 
                    AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Chair Larsen. And good morning, 
Chair Larsen, Chair DeFazio, Ranking Members Graves and Graves, 
and the members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity today to discuss the FAA's 
efforts to keep aviation safe in the presence of 5G C-band 
wireless technology. We have continually maintained that 
through mutual cooperation, 5G and aviation can safely coexist.
    We have the safest aviation system in the world, and we 
don't take that for granted, something that is hard earned 
every day.
    We have achieved this because we take actions to mitigate 
known and potential risks to safety. And that is why the FAA 
has been involved in a sustained effort since well before the 
2020 spectrum auction to highlight and now mitigate potential 
5G interference with critical flight systems.
    I want to thank this committee for its help and support of 
aviation safety during this period. Our job would be 
significantly more difficult without the continued support of 
this committee.
    We also appreciate the wireless companies voluntarily 
providing us with the data that we need to maintain safety 
while minimizing flight disruptions during this rollout. Now, 
we are always concerned about radio frequency interference when 
it comes to aviation infrastructure, but in 2018, a new 
potential threat emerged. The MOBILE NOW Act directed the FCC 
to evaluate the feasibility of auctioning spectrum that is 
adjacent to the band where radio altimeters operate.
    The FAA and the aviation industry urged caution. Boeing and 
the Air Line Pilots Association on filings to the FCC back in 
2018 called for more analysis of this issue.
    The FAA collaborated with or supported research efforts 
that revealed that 5G operations could significantly degrade or 
completely interrupt radio altimeter operation during critical 
phases of flight.
    And in December of 2020, the Acting Deputy DOT Secretary 
and I sent a letter to the NTIA outlining our concerns about 
aviation safety backed up by the recent studies.
    We asked that the auction be delayed so that we could 
conduct safety risk assessment and identify mitigations. 
Ultimately, the auction occurred and two of the wireless 
companies that acquired the C-band spectrum scheduled the 
initial deployment in early December of 2021.
    We engaged with our interagency partners throughout the 
year in an effort to access the information that was necessary 
to inform aviation safety mitigations.
    Ultimately, as the deployment approached in late 2021, 
Secretary Buttigieg and I requested two pauses from the 
wireless companies until mid-January of 2022. During the delay, 
we established a direct relationship with the wireless 
companies to receive the necessary information, transmitter 
locations, power levels, and signal shape characteristics to 
begin making an aviation safety assessment.
    The wireless companies also agreed to keep towers turned 
off around airports that have low-visibility approaches. The 
safety model that we developed, along with the new data that we 
had access to from the telecommunications companies, allowed 
the FAA to determine which combination of altimeters and 
aircraft could be cleared to land in low-visibility conditions 
for specific runways at airports with 5G towers nearby.
    On January 19th, the wireless companies activated 5G C-band 
service in many of the 46 markets. Our analysis of the wireless 
company data has allowed us to target anticipated problem areas 
more precisely, reducing the impact of both industries. And 
while we have avoided significant disruption to commercial 
aviation, we recognize that some communities and operations 
have been affected because we have not been able to fully 
mitigate interference risk for certain radio altimeters.
    Now we know from long experience that early and open data 
exchange between everyone, stakeholders and regulators, has 
proven to be critical to identify and mitigate safety risks.
    Aviation remains the safest form of transportation because 
of our commitment to being data-driven in our processes, and we 
will lean on it as we set new standards for altimeter 
performance in the new environment that is created by the 5G C-
band deployment.
    Spectrum is a limited resource, but the demand is 
essentially infinite, and we know that it will increase in 
coming years. The FAA's primary concern is and always will be 
the safety of the aviation system, but we firmly believe that 
by working together, 5G and aviation, can and will, safely 
coexist.
    Moving forward, we are also ready to work across industry 
and with our Federal partners on a more thoughtful, inclusive, 
and collaborative approach to future spectrum policy and 
initiatives.
    Thank you very much for the chance to provide this update, 
and I look forward to answering your questions.
    [Mr. Dickson's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal 
                        Aviation Administration
    Chair Larsen, Chair DeFazio, Ranking Members Graves and Graves, and 
members of the subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to be here 
today to discuss fifth-generation wireless network technology--or 5G--
and aviation. To start, I would like to thank each of you for your 
continued unwavering support for aviation safety. Although the 
Department of Transportation (Department) and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) have made great progress in advancing our safety 
objectives related to 5G, we understand that our job would be 
significantly more difficult without the continued support of this 
committee and we greatly appreciate it. Similarly, the progress we have 
made on 5G would not have been achievable without the active leadership 
and sustained commitment of Secretary Buttigieg. The Secretary's 
engagement on this issue has significantly raised awareness of the 
safety concerns associated with 5G and his collaboration with the FAA 
and the wireless telecommunications companies (wireless companies) has 
helped enable much of the progress we have achieved in support of the 
safety and efficiency of the national airspace. We also appreciate the 
ongoing positive collaboration with the wireless companies and the 
participation of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Their 
willingness to work with us and provide us with needed data has allowed 
us to effectively carry out our mission and chart a path forward that 
maintains safety while minimizing flight disruptions.
    The FAA's first priority is the safety of the national airspace. 
That has guided the agency's actions so aviation and 5G can safely 
coexist. Cooperation with the FCC, the wireless companies, the aviation 
industry, and others has been critical to minimize disruptions to 
aviation while more than 90 percent of the wireless companies' 5G 
deployment has been able to go forward as planned.
                               Background
    Before I provide you with further details, I would like to lay the 
foundation of the 5G issue and offer some background on how we got to 
this point. At the outset, it is important to keep in mind that the FAA 
is responsible for the safe and efficient use of the national airspace. 
The FAA does not regulate electromagnetic spectrum or the 
telecommunications industry. Although the FAA manages assigned spectrum 
related to certain airspace management ground systems, for example, 5G 
has been a novel issue for the aviation industry. Also, all of the work 
that we have done in coordination with stakeholders outside of 
aviation, including the wireless companies, has been achieved through 
voluntary cooperation.
    I wanted to provide some highlights of the history of this issue. 
In 2018, the MOBILE NOW Act directed the FCC to evaluate the 
feasibility of commercial wireless deployments in the 3.7-4.2 gigahertz 
(GHz) band (C-band).\1\ That same year, in filings with the FCC, Boeing 
communicated its concern that aeronautical safety services that operate 
adjacent to the C-band should be adequately protected.\2\ Also in 2018, 
the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) urged in a filing to the FCC that 
appropriate steps be taken to ensure that interference on avionics by 
mobile wireless systems be fully analyzed and mitigated.\3\ The ALPA 
filing also referenced a study presented to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization expressing similar concerns as far back as 
2014.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See section 605(b) of Title VI of Division P of the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/PLAW-115publ141/pdf/PLAW-115publ141.pdf
    \2\ https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/121184623679/Boeing%20C-
band%20NPRM%20Reply%20
Comments%2012%2011%202018%20final.pdf
    \3\ https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10531182083849/
ALPA%20Comments%2017-183%2018-122.pdf
    \4\ https://www.icao.int/safety/acp/ACPWGF/ACP-WG-F-30/ACP-WGF30-
WP14%20Radio%20
Altimeter%20Adjacent%20Bands%20Compatibility%20Study%20with%20IMT-
FINAL%20
Rev1.docx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additionally, since 2018 the FAA has either partnered with or 
supported specific research conducted by the Aerospace Vehicle Systems 
Institute (AVSI), a cooperative research entity, and RTCA, a non-profit 
aerospace consensus standards development organization, concerning the 
potential effects of C-band interference on aircraft avionics. In 2019, 
the FAA sent a letter to the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) requesting that it consider the 
implications of the AVSI research and that it work to ensure that 
aircraft altimeters that operate in spectrum adjacent to the C-band do 
not receive harmful interference.
    In March 2020, the FCC released a report and order making 280 
megahertz (MHz) of the C-band available for 5G services.\5\ Their plan 
was to begin auctioning C-band spectrum on December 8, 2020.\6\ Shortly 
before that auction, the then-Acting Deputy Secretary of Transportation 
and I sent a letter to the NTIA expressing our concerns with the 
potential impact on aviation safety.\7\ We noted in the letter that 
recent testing had revealed the potential for harmful interference with 
radio (also known as radar) altimeters installed aboard aircraft and we 
requested a deferral of the auction to allow the FAA to conduct a 
safety risk assessment and identify mitigations. In our letter we 
referenced, for example, a 2019 study by AVSI that summarized 
preliminary data suggesting altimeter performance degradation from out-
of-band interference.\8\ An October 2020 report by RTCA was also 
referenced in the letter.\9\ The RTCA report concluded that 5G 
operations in the C-band may create harmful interference to some radio 
altimeters that would significantly degrade or completely interrupt 
their operation during critical phases of flight. As concerning as 
these and other findings have been to us, we also noted in our letter 
that we recognized the importance of making spectrum available for 
commercial purposes and ensuring American leadership in this space. We 
have continually maintained that, through mutual cooperation, 5G and 
aviation can safely coexist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-expands-flexible-use-c-band-
5g-0
    \6\ https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-begins-major-5g-spectrum-
auction
    \7\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-10/
DOT_Letter_to_NTIA_FCC3.7_GHz_
Band_Auction.pdf
    \8\ https://avsi.aero/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/AVSI-RA-Interim-
OOB-Interference-Report-211206.pdf
    \9\ https://www.rtca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/SC-239-5G-
Interference-Assessment-
Report_274-20-PMC-2073_accepted_changes.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Radio altimeters operate in the 4.2-4.4 GHz range. Even with a 
frequency separation of 220 MHz, from 5G operations, there may still 
exist potential harmful interference under certain circumstances. As a 
pilot, I know from experience that a radio altimeter is one of the most 
crucial pieces of safety equipment aboard an aircraft. Radio altimeters 
are used in low visibility landings and are the only sensors aboard 
civil aircraft that provide a pilot with a direct measurement of the 
distance between the aircraft and the ground or other obstacles. Many 
other critical safety systems rely directly upon input from radio 
altimeters including terrain awareness warning, wind shear 
surveillance, traffic collision avoidance, tail strike prevention, 
automated landing, and other related cockpit display and alert warning 
systems. Harmful interference affecting any of these systems has the 
potential to be catastrophic. There is no scenario under which harmful 
interference is acceptable from a safety standpoint, absent sufficient 
mitigations to address that interference.
                        Operational Mitigations
    Before and since the 2020 spectrum auction, the FAA has been 
involved in a sustained effort to assess and mitigate the risks 
associated with potential degraded radio altimeter performance. Prior 
to the initially scheduled 5G roll out for December 5, 2021, the 
Department and the FAA successfully worked with the telecommunications 
carriers to agree to a 30-day pause of the deployment to allow added 
time for safety mitigation actions. The FAA moved quickly to take 
advantage of the delay to protect the safety of the flying public:
      In November, and again in December of 2021, the FAA 
issued Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins to inform 
manufacturers, operators, and pilots of the planned deployment of 
5G.\10\ The bulletins contain detailed guidance for aircraft and 
altimeter manufacturers as well as aircraft operators and pilots and 
sought information from each group to further assist the FAA in 
assessing the reliability and accuracy of altimeters and the potential 
risks of 5G deployment on aviation safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgSAIB.nsf/dc7bd4f27e5f1074862
57221005f069d/27ffcbb45e6157e9862587810044ad19/$FILE/AIR-21-18.pdf
    https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/
dc7bd4f27e5f1074862
57221005f069d/379cfb187d16db10862587b4005b26fc/$FILE/AIR-21-18R1.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      On December 7, 2021, the FAA issued an Airworthiness 
Directive (AD) for all transport and commuter category airplanes 
equipped with a radio altimeter.\11\ The AD was based on our 
determination that radio altimeters cannot be relied upon to perform 
their intended function if they experience harmful interference from 5G 
C-band wireless broadband operations. The AD requires revising the 
flight manual to incorporate limitations prohibiting certain operations 
requiring radio altimeter data when in the presence of 5G C-band 
harmful interference in areas identified by Notices to Air Missions 
(NOTAMs). A similar AD was issued on the same day for helicopters.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-12/
FRC_Document_AD-2021-01169-T-D.pdf
    \12\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-12/
FRC_Document_AD-2021-01170-R-D.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      On December 23, 2021, the FAA issued a Safety Alert for 
Operators (SAFO). The SAFO provides information and guidance to 
operators regarding the risk of potential adverse effects on radio 
altimeters when operating in the presence of 5G C-band wireless 
broadband signals, and the role of NOTAMs in identifying the geographic 
areas where certain operations requiring a radio altimeter are 
prohibited in the presence of 5G signals.

    Simultaneous with each of these safety actions, the FAA and the 
Department continued to engage with wireless company officials, who 
agreed to an additional voluntary two-week pause in 5G deployment to 
provide the FAA with a path forward that would allow for sufficient 
safety mitigations and minimize disruptions in air travel. On December 
31, 2021, Secretary Buttigieg and I proposed an interim solution to the 
wireless companies.\13\ We suggested that with an additional two-week 
pause in deployment, the FAA and the aviation industry would identify 
key airports where a buffer zone with minimized 5G transmissions would 
permit aviation operations to continue safely while the FAA continued 
assessments of the interference potential around those airports. Our 
goal was, and continues to be, to identify mitigations for key airports 
to enable as many commercial aircraft as possible to operate safely in 
all conditions. This will allow for 5G C-band to deploy around these 
airports on a rolling basis, such that all C-band planned locations can 
be activated barring unforeseen technical challenges or new safety 
concerns.
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    \13\ https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-12/12.31.2021%20-
%20DOT%20and%20FAA
%20Letter%20to%20ATT%20and%20Verizon%20.pdf
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    We also conveyed that the FAA will safely expedite the review and 
determinations regarding proposals for Alternate Methods of Compliance 
(AMOC) for operators with high-performing radio altimeters to operate 
at those airports. The FAA may approve AMOCs for altimeter/aircraft 
configurations that have been proven to meet equivalent levels of 
safety in this novel environment. An FAA-approved AMOC allows an 
aircraft with a particular model of altimeter to conduct operations 
that require a radio altimeter in a geographic area where such 
operations would otherwise be prohibited because of 5G. As part of the 
agreement, the wireless companies agreed to provide the FAA with data 
relevant to existing and planned locations as well as operating 
characteristics of 5G base stations. The data provided has allowed the 
FAA to precisely determine which aircraft are cleared for specific 
runways at airports in the 5G area based on altimeter equipage and 
antenna location. This information is captured in the approved AMOCs 
and its accuracy is the foundation of the coexistence of aviation 
safety and 5G deployment in the short term. To date the FAA has issued 
over 20 AMOCs for commercial and business jets, covering approximately 
90 percent of the U.S. commercial fleet.
    Since January 19, 2022, wireless companies have activated more 5G 
C-band towers in 46 markets nationwide. Prior to and since the 5G 
deployment, the FAA has worked around the clock to enable 
implementation of mitigations, where needed, to address risks. 
Approximately 80 airports with low-visibility approaches in 5G 
deployment areas were identified, and the wireless companies agreed to 
turn off approximately 500 towers in the vicinity of those airports. 
These mitigations have enabled airlines and other flight operators to 
access most runways at airports in places where 5G is deployed, even in 
low visibility conditions. Although some flights have been affected by 
safety mitigations required in 5G deployment areas, significant 
disruptions to the air transportation system have been avoided. 
Further, our analysis of the data received has allowed us to focus our 
efforts and work much more efficiently.
                             Moving Forward
    The FAA is continuing to work with avionics manufacturers to 
evaluate altimeters and review manufacturer testing data to measure the 
accuracy, reliability, and robustness of each model. This includes data 
for altimeters used in regional and business aircraft. Also, the FAA is 
allowing helicopter air ambulance operators to continue using safety-
enhancing night vision goggles in areas where the aircraft's radio 
altimeter could be unreliable due to 5G C-band interference as 
identified by NOTAMs. Similar to commercial aircraft, helicopters may 
perform day and night operations that do not require the use of a radio 
altimeter. Further, despite the breadth and diversity of the general 
aviation fleet, the FAA is working as quickly as it can to enable these 
aircraft to operate safely and efficiently.
    As referenced earlier, NOTAMs let pilots and others know where 5G 
is present and operations are restricted. Although the wireless 
companies' actions creating buffer zones reduce the strength of 5G 
signals around airports, they do not fully eliminate it. The 
restrictions in a NOTAM do not apply if an aircraft has an altimeter 
that is approved by an AMOC for that location. Some aircraft, however, 
still do not have an approved AMOC for their altimeter. Additionally, 
even aircraft with an AMOC-approved altimeter may not be allowed to 
operate at all runways in the 5G area. Consequently, the restrictions 
outlined in the NOTAMs remain in place while the FAA continues to 
determine the accuracy and reliability of other altimeters that have 
not been approved by an AMOC.
    We are confident we will work through this issue safely with 
minimal disruptions, but we acknowledge that some altimeters--
especially older models used by certain segments of the aviation 
industry--may not receive approval as being safe in the presence of 5G 
emissions and interference, and may need to be replaced. The 
strengthening partnership across the aviation and telecommunications 
industries and the federal government has enabled substantial progress. 
In coming weeks, FAA will move quickly to use testing data and other 
insights to further refine our models and safely enable additional 5G 
deployment.
    Spectrum is a limited resource, and demand for it will likely 
increase in coming years, including new applications across the 
transportation sector. As we move forward, we will work with the 
industry and our federal partners to strengthen processes to safely 
unlock the rapid innovation that we seek as a nation. Early and open 
communications with stakeholders from all involved industries, and a 
robust interagency process, are key to identifying and solving 
potential issues long before they have a real-world impact.
    Thank you for the chance to provide this update and we look forward 
to continued engagement with the committee and subcommittee on this 
important issue.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Administrator Dickson.
    We are going to start with the chair of the full committee, 
Mr. DeFazio of Oregon. Mr. DeFazio, you are recognized.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator Dickson, thanks for being with us today.
    As we have said, we understand what happened and we want to 
be certain it doesn't happen again, but we are in sort of a 
temporary hold here, and it is not totally clear to me, and I 
think others, what happens at the end of the 6-month voluntary 
period.
    I have heard some say, no, it is not limited to 6 months 
and others saying, yes, it is limited to 6 months. So, could 
you, for instance, where they have turned off towers in 
proximity to airports with CAT III approaches and low-
visibility issues, the lower power, how is this going to be 
solved long term, and how long do the temporary measures stay 
in place, and what are we going to do permanently?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thanks for the question, Chair DeFazio. 
And all parties are working together very effectively at this 
point, and we have agreed to take the immediate steps necessary 
to avoid disruption to the aviation system and to stay at the 
table and work in good faith to determine the next steps. But 
so far, the telecom companies, as I mentioned, have agreed to 
refrain from activating their 5G towers that are unacceptably 
close to runways, according to the FAA safety model, which we 
continue to refine.
    They are also providing us with more data in a timely 
fashion to provide certainty and more predictability to the 
aviation system and also to help refine our safety analysis. 
And they are working with us as I speak, actually, on a flight 
test program that will contribute meaningfully to establishing 
the new standards for radio altimeters and also to refine what 
we are doing right now.
    So, I am encouraged by the progress. We are certainly in a 
much better place today than we were 2 to 3 weeks ago, and we 
certainly don't want to be repeating these deadlines that we 
have had to overcome. We are finally getting the specific 
detailed information that we need to make accurate safety 
assessments and that is what we are focused on.
    And the wireless companies, again, I think they have 
learned a lot about aviation safety. And we have certainly 
learned about their business. We are asking them for data that 
they have never had to provide to the Government before. So, 
that has been very beneficial to both sides, and we will 
continue that dialogue as we go forward.
    Mr. DeFazio. Right. I think we had two sets of engineers 
with different languages, and I am glad they are now 
communicating and understanding some of the concerns. We are 
going to hear from an industry representative, an organization 
that says, safe everywhere else in the world, and we are taking 
stronger measures than any other country in the world, things 
that haven't been done elsewhere. But I have seen pretty 
specific data that that isn't true.
    Can you address that? I mean, other countries have taken 
measures for exclusion zones, antenna strength, antenna 
direction, and other things. Is that correct? Many other 
countries.
    Mr. Dickson. That is correct. But there really is no 
comparison with either the aviation system or what is going on 
in the United States with 5G deployment. Our environment is not 
the same in either case. The power levels in other countries 
are different, the location on the spectrum is different, and, 
again, we have the most complex and dynamic airspace in the 
world.
    Also, I think, it is important to remember that we are 
regulating the manufacturers here as well, and so, to some 
degree, many countries around the world, their aviation safety 
regulators have a reduced scope of responsibility compared to 
the FAA.
    So, we have got to make sure that if a hazard is identified 
that we prove that whatever that hazard is has been completely 
mitigated from a safety perspective and that the system remains 
safe.
    And to that end, laboratory testing did show that there was 
a hazard from 5G C-band interference, and so, we have to prove, 
again, to ourselves that there is no hazard, and we are working 
diligently to do just that.
    Mr. DeFazio. OK. Thank you. I am about to run out of time, 
but I assume that we are going to be looking at perhaps a new 
generation of altimeters or some sort of filtration or 
something, but I mean, I am very concerned about the ongoing 
deployment and the ongoing protections that will be put in 
place. So, I am pleased the industry is cooperating at this 
point and, hopefully, we can work this out together.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The Chair recognizes Representative Graves of Louisiana for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Administrator Dickson, thank you very much for your testimony 
today.
    Look, I heard your answer to the chair about the U.S. 
system being more complex. I get it, but I also think that we 
have greater capabilities, and I am going to say it again, this 
is inexcusable. It is inexcusable to disrupt air operations, 
and I think it is inexcusable to delay or prevent the 
deployment of technology.
    Can you just help us to understand, with the incredible, 
pardon the pun, runway we had in this instance knowing for 
years that--maybe that wasn't as good as a Dagwood sandwich, 
but----
    Mr. Larsen. Not even close.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Not even close, but just help me 
understand, how did we get ourselves in this situation?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, really, two parts--I will try to answer 
both parts of your question, Ranking Member Graves. As was 
noted in some of the opening remarks, the aviation sector 
concerns date back to 2015, and I will provide a detailed 
chronology. I will go through all of those details here, but 
over a period of years, the FAA participated in testing, we 
connected with foreign authorities, including ICAO, and 
communicated our concerns clearly to the FCC via NTIA.
    We also have, back to Chair DeFazio's point, RTCA Special 
Committee 239 formed in early 2020 to develop permanent radio 
altimeter standards and began that work later in the year, and 
that work continues to this day.
    When the FCC released the R&O on C-band in March of 2020, 
we asked for the analysis that supported the conclusion that 
the limits that were being put in place were sufficient to 
protect aeronautical services, radio altimeters, in particular, 
but it wasn't until the summer of 2021 that we received that 
analysis, and it actually resulted in transmission limits and 
characteristics that indicated that the R&O values are not 
sufficient to protect radio altimeters.
    And as I said a few minutes ago, we tried for over a year, 
and we were asking for this data. As it turns out, the FCC 
didn't even have the data that we needed. And we discovered 
that when we started to work directly with the 
telecommunications companies. They had never had to provide 
this kind of information to the Government before. They had 
never had to think about how the signal would impact an 
airplane moving in three dimensions through space.
    And so, it is certainly my hope, and I think all of us 
recognize that the process did not serve anyone well, in this 
particular case, and so, it is in everyone's interest to 
examine the Federal spectrum process to ensure it's coordinated 
across executive branch agencies to ensure that we service and 
resolve issues----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. And Administrator, I am concerned 
about even during this interim time, do you believe the FAA has 
the bandwidth, has the capability to process the alternatives, 
the AMOCs between now and July?
    Mr. Dickson. It is a huge focus for us and all of the 
submissions that we have had--I am not aware that we have any 
pending submissions right now. In fact, we are meeting with the 
manufacturers on a daily basis, really, to refine their 
analysis as they discover more about the capabilities of the 
systems that are currently installed on aircraft.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. OK. And going back to your comment 
earlier about the timeline and information, that would be 
helpful if you could provide us with that. I would like to 
better understand the timeline and how we ran into this 
problem.
    Now, look, it is no secret, we are going to have 6G, 7G, in 
addition to the immediate issue we have of between now and July 
of trying to resolve this. Can you, one, help us understand if 
you believe the FAA has the resources, the capabilities it 
needs to continue this process through July and beyond as we 
have new technology roll out and innovation rolls out and new 
capabilities within communications?
    Can you give us some comfort or help identify resources you 
think that the FAA may need to ensure that this doesn't happen 
again?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we are using not only internal agency 
resources, but also industry resources as well. And I think 
that now that we are past the initial deployment, we have asked 
the telecommunications companies for longer line of sight on 
their deployments. And you know what? This is one of the 
differences between the aviation industry and the 
telecommunications industry. They are not used to the precision 
that we need to have when we are rolling out new technologies.
    If you think about air traffic control, when we make 
improvements to technology within our air traffic control 
facilities around the country, we have a very disciplined 
technology waterfall, training, change management, both inside 
and outside the agency as new capabilities such as data 
communications are rolled out.
    That happens over a period of years, and because we are 
literally--we are not changing the tires on the cars that are 
going down the road, we are changing the oil on the engine as 
the airplanes fly. And 50,000 flights a day operating three 
dimensions. The telecommunications companies' customers are on 
the ground, and so, they have never had to think about how 
those signals impact airplanes moving in three dimensions. That 
is what we are working on now.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. Appreciate it. Yield 
back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Graves. I recognize myself for 5 
minutes. Thank you, Administrator.
    Some questions. In testimony, we are going to hear later 
from Mr. Roberson, I hope I have the name pronounced correctly. 
He talks about, that ``the unfortunate truth is that there is a 
real problem, but it is what can be described as an `edge case' 
problem, that is, a problem that only occurs in unusual 
circumstances and for a very limited number of aircraft.''
    Does the term ``edge case'' exist in aviation testing, and 
if there is an edge case, is it allowed to exist in an aviation 
scenario?
    Mr. Dickson. No. We have to, as I said earlier, we have our 
commercial aviation system essentially engineered so that there 
is less than a one in a billion chance of a catastrophic 
failure. And so, any time there is any change in that system 
that creates additional risk, we have to prove to ourselves 
that it is safe.
    So, it is not enough to be comfortable or to have low-risk 
activities. I think that in Chair DeFazio's written statement, 
he talked about the 737 MAX. I mean, that is a good example of 
something that some people might have thought was low risk or 
fairly remote possibility. We can't accept that. The traveling 
public doesn't accept it, and we certainly don't accept it at 
the FAA.
    We have worked for decades to make sure that aviation 
safety risk is driven down to the levels that it is today.
    Mr. Larsen. I will even say that on the 737 MAX case, 
people thought what happened was an implausible scenario. 
Clearly, it was not, and we can't tolerate that at all.
    I want to ask a little bit more about Mr. Graves' comments 
and actually Chair DeFazio's comments with regards to the 
AMOCs. Now, for those listeners at home, an AMOC is an 
alternative method of compliance, A-M-O-C. It is basically an 
exemption to what otherwise you couldn't do. It allows you to 
do the thing that you want to do, in this case, fly an 
airplane, land an airplane on a runway in the presence of a 5G 
signal.
    And so, the FAA has been issuing these AMOCs, these 
essentially exemptions to the rule, but there are so many AMOCs 
that you have issued from the FAA with regards to this, that 
the exception is becoming the rule, but I don't think that is a 
very good way to run a National Airspace System. We have to get 
back to a point where the exception is an exception to the rule 
as opposed to the rule being the exception.
    So, Administrator, what are you all doing to be sure that 
these AMOCs at some point go away and we get back to a National 
Airspace System that can be run safely and efficiently without 
all these AMOCs?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question, and I would 
divide the answer into two parts. The first one is, what are we 
going to do to provide more predictability and certainty to all 
of our stakeholders around the system?
    And we have been working on the problem. There has been a 
sense of urgency around that, but we are getting up on a 
cadence of we have asked the telecommunications companies for 
longer line of sight on their deployments, so that we are not 
within a week of the next tranche of towers having to put this 
relief out on very short notice.
    And I am confident that in the coming weeks that we will 
get on a more regular cadence and hopefully reduced impact as 
we go forward.
    We are also working to refine our safety model, which will 
help us as we recognize areas where risk may be acceptable. We 
are not yet looking at: can we refine power levels. And so, 
there are several levers here that we are looking at in terms 
of mitigations that can provide some relief.
    The ultimate solution, though, and I think you will hear 
something about this on the second panel later, is the setting 
of new performance standards and airworthiness standards. That 
work is underway at RTCA Special Committee 239, as I speak. And 
I think, unfortunately, a lot of the people around industry who 
would be working on that effort, which is really the long-term 
solution, are involved in getting us through this period right 
now.
    But what we think is going to happen is, once those new 
standards are set, then there will be new performance standards 
and new designs. Potentially, STCs for filtering devices and 
other things. There are some promising discussions that we are 
having with some of the manufacturers about being able to 
improve the performance of existing equipment that is out 
there, and we will continue to focus on that as an interim 
solution as well while we work toward the long term.
    Mr. Larsen. There is going to be a lot of technical detail 
that we--as I have talked to you in the past, we don't need to 
understand everything about this as Members of Congress, but we 
do need to understand enough of this so that we can inform the 
policy. And as you all move through this, we need to be sure 
that we move through this with you.
    You have also outlined the fact that just within the C-
band, there is still more to happen, just as a result of the C-
band auction, including the 3.8 to 3.98 rollout. There are 
auctions in the future certainly, and the technology of 
communication is changing, and the discussion about 6G as an 
example of that, and we don't know right today what that means 
for the work of the FAA as well.
    Is that a fair assessment?
    Mr. Dickson. I think that is definitely fair. And there are 
other executive branch agencies, DoD, in particular, that have 
some equities in this area with future auctions that are being 
contemplated. So, we need to address the process issue now as a 
country, I would be in 100 percent agreement with that.
    Mr. Larsen. Well, I will just turn it over--looking for 
ideas about how we can either see that it is formalized or at 
least an informal consultation process going forward better 
than what we have had.
    With that, I do have next Representative Balderson from 
Ohio as next up for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Balderson. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    Good morning, everyone, and Administrator Dickson, thank 
you for taking the time to come before this committee.
    My first question is, the deployment of 5G is critical to 
America's competitiveness and it is crucial that we get these 
networks online as quickly as possible while minimizing any 
disruptions to aviation services ensuring safe air travel.
    My question for you is, how did the FAA make the 
determination that 5G would ensure harmful interference, and 
did the FAA perform any testing to validate the concerns in the 
RTCA study?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. As I 
mentioned, we had indicated our concerns with the C-band 
spectrum back in 2015 at the radio conference that Chair Larsen 
referred to in his remarks. We also participated in various 
testing, the AVSI testing, as well as the RTCA testing as well. 
We communicated our concerns to the FCC as all of this was 
happening through NTIA, and we worked in good faith through the 
interagency process.
    When I asked for the delay of the auction, along with the 
Department of Transportation, we asked that our concerns be 
forwarded on to the FCC, and unfortunately, that didn't happen.
    But we have been consistent in raising our concerns, and I 
know that there is a way to work together through this. As was 
said earlier, the two industries look at risk very differently 
and processes very differently, and we don't regulate the 
telecommunications industry. So, there was no way for us to 
access their data until we had the agreements in place with 
them in late December.
    And now in that relatively short span of time, we have been 
able to make a lot of progress. In the future, we need to have 
processes in place that allow that to take place before the 
actual rollout, and I think we will be in much better shape.
    Mr. Balderson. All right. Thank you very much. My followup: 
What specific measures or mitigations is the FAA looking for 
from wireless industry to make it possible to deploy 5G 
networks in the C-band around airports within the terms of 
their FCC licenses as soon as possible?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, as I said, we have already refined our 
safety model, which creates essentially a safety zone and a 
performance buffer for radio altimeters around airports, and we 
continue to refine that. The flight testing that we are doing 
with them right now, we are doing that in conjunction--we have 
designed those flight test scenarios using FAA flight test 
aircraft. We have designed those flights in conjunction with 
the telecommunications industry engineers.
    As a matter fact, their engineers are actually onboard FAA 
aircraft. We are reporting all the parameters of what the 
signal looks like as it impacts the airplane in various 
performance scenarios. And so, as we get that data, that will 
help us to sharpen our analysis. It will also inform the 
performance requirements for modifications to radio altimeters 
or the new performance standards for retrofit equipment if that 
becomes necessary.
    Mr. Balderson. OK. Thank you very much for both those 
answers.
    And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Balderson, for yielding back 1 
minute and 10 seconds. Appreciate it.
    I now recognize the gentleman from Hawaii, Representative 
Kahele. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chair. And thank you so much for 
putting on this really important committee. And hello to Chair 
Larsen and Ranking Member Graves and Administrator Dickson for 
convening this critical hearing so that we can ensure that our 
subcommittee is able to conduct proper oversight into the 
deployment of 5G.
    As a commercial airline pilot with Hawaiian Airlines, I 
understand firsthand the importance that radio altimeters play 
to ensure pilots are able to fly in all weather conditions. The 
aviation industry has spent years warning that 5G signals could 
cause radio frequency interference with altimeters, and I am 
disheartened that it has come to this point.
    There was clearly a breakdown in the interagency 
communications process. I think Chair DeFazio highlighted the 
failure of the Trump administration to put the right people in 
the right positions to ensure that this didn't happen. It did. 
And as a result, it has disrupted millions of passengers in our 
communities, especially our airlines.
    I have a question for Administrator Dickson. The first 
question I have is--and I can only speak for the airline that I 
work for. Hawaiian Airlines' AMOCs expire on 28 February 2022. 
That is in 25 days. I don't know what the other expiration 
dates are for all the other U.S. airlines and the locations 
that they fly to, when their AMOCs expire. I can only speak to 
Hawaii's flagship airline, which expire on 28 February 2022.
    The amount of workload that pilots have to deal with, that 
the airlines, the dispatchers have to deal with, they are 
already stressed in dealing with COVID, and now they have to 
deal with potential disruptions in their instrument approaches 
for CAT II and CAT III runways.
    And so, my question is, what is the plan between now and 
the next 25 days? Are we going to extend those AMOCs again? Are 
we going to get right up to the 23rd, 24th of February and 
potentially have another disruptive day throughout our Nation's 
airspace system? What are we doing to plan between now and the 
next 25 days for not just this airline's current AMOCs, but the 
other U.S. domestic fleets' AMOCs that potentially have 
expiration dates in the near future?
    Mr. Dickson. Congressman, thank you very much for the 
question, because as you point out very correctly, 
predictability and consistency is extremely important in our 
business. I am an operator myself, I am a pilot myself, and I 
know exactly what you are talking about. The last thing that 
you want is uncertainty on the flight deck or at the dispatch 
desk.
    The reason that the AMOCs expire is based on the next 
tranche that we expect from the telecommunications companies 
and their ability to be able to provide us with precise 
latitude/longitude, elevation, signal shape, all the things 
that I talked about earlier so that we can apply that. We have 
a tool that we have developed in the last few weeks that allows 
us to take their data--and this is getting to be more and more 
of a routine occurrence--we take their data, we put it into the 
tool, and determine where the pressure points are and whether 
their next deployment will comport with our safety model around 
airports to ensure safe performance for radio altimeters.
    That process has been because the initial deployment 
happened on the 19th of January, and then there was another 
tranche the 1st of February, there has been pretty rapid 
succession of AMOCs. We expect for that cadence to be longer as 
we go forward. We have asked for as much forward visibility as 
we possibly can. And this gets in to the difference that I 
talked about a minute ago between the two industries about how 
new technologies are rolled out.
    This time of year, the telcos are experiencing delays with 
work crews and things like that. We are learning a lot about 
their business, and I promise you, we are going to smooth this 
process out and make it more predictable because that is in 
everyone's best interest. And they have committed to work with 
us on that.
    Mr. Kahele. Thanks, Administrator. I will use my last 20 
seconds just for a yes-or-no answer. Can you ensure our 
operators on the flight deck and the passengers in the back to 
these critical airports that require CAT II or CAT III 
approaches that these airports are safe to fly into and execute 
a successful instrument approach with the current AMOCs that 
exist today?
    Mr. Dickson. Absolutely. Safety is something that we will 
not compromise. And if we have authorized low-visibility 
operations, you can count on the level of safety for the 
performance of those systems that we have always counted on and 
the public counts on.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you, sir. And mahalo, Chair.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Representative 
Burchett from Tennessee for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure 
following my ukulele-playing colleague from Hawaii. Hope to 
visit him soon. Maybe we could organize a codel over there, 
preferably beach side. That would be good.
    Mr. Larsen. Sorry. We didn't start the clock. Could you 
take 10 seconds off Mr. Burchett's clock, please?
    Mr. Burchett. I am sure that will make YouTube.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is for FAA Administrator 
Dickson.
    Sir, the aviation industries' concerns about harmful 5G C-
band interference aren't new, and I realize this was touched on 
earlier, but I want to get a little more specific. And as you 
pointed out in your testimony, you raised some of these 
concerns yourself in a letter to the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration back in 2020, 
I believe.
    So, why did the FAA wait until it is almost too late, 
dagummit, until the month before the originally scheduled 
rollout to start taking some safety mitigation actions?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. If you are 
talking about the last few weeks, again, we did not have the 
data that we needed because we don't regulate the 
telecommunications companies. We did not have the data that we 
needed until we were able to work with them directly.
    And as we discovered, when we began that dialogue, the data 
that we were asking for from them, they actually had never 
provided to the Government before. So, that really was where we 
started from in late December and early January, and has 
brought us to where we are now.
    Mr. Burchett. So, the information that you got, they never 
delivered, was that the reasoning why it got to you so late or 
is that just after the fact?
    Mr. Dickson. That is certainly once we got to the point--we 
had asked for the delays because we didn't want disruptions to 
the aviation system. We knew that there was a risk to radio 
altimeters, but we didn't have the ability to put specific 
mitigations in place and tailor them by fleet type and by 
airport until we had the specific deployment data from the 
telecommunications companies; otherwise, we are in a position 
where we have to assume that 5G C-band is blanketing the entire 
country, and so, you are in this least common denominator 
situation.
    That is where we were in November, and we are certainly in 
a much better place now than we were then. But we have got a 
lot of work in front of us, as I have been saying.
    Mr. Burchett. Where are we now in relation to preparedness 
as in relation to November as you stated?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we have the mainline fleet types, the 
larger aircraft. We still have some lower performing regional 
jets and other parts of the aviation community that are 
impacted. I am concerned about that. Helicopters are another 
area that we are going to have to pay close attention to.
    So, we are working on alternative means of compliance for 
those types of operations, for first responders and air 
ambulance-type operations as well. So, a lot of the 
conversations have been about the air carriers, but the entire 
aviation community, you know, we need to make sure that their 
concerns are addressed as well.
    Fortunately, for those other types of operations, there is 
not the kind of reliance on radio altimeters that you see in 
commercial aviation, but it is an important safety tool that we 
want them to have.
    Mr. Burchett. Do y'all have some date, arbitrary or 
otherwise, of compliance?
    Mr. Dickson. We will have to--the performance standards for 
C-band resistant radio altimeters are in development now. That 
work has been going on for some months now, and it will be some 
period of time. These standard-setting processes take time.
    I think the encouraging news to me is that this flight test 
activity that we are undertaking that is helping us get through 
the period that we are currently in, will also be very 
beneficial in setting those new standards. Because we will have 
real-world data that we can use to go back to the avionics 
manufacturers and help inform those new designs, but there will 
probably be some airplanes that we will have to retrofit new 
equipment.
    At a minimum, I think, we will see significant retrofit of 
filtering devices to make sure that the existing avionics are 
C-band resistant.
    Mr. Burchett. Thank you. I can hear my father saying as we 
are going down the beach in Myrtle--going down the road in our 
old station wagon in the 1970s when we were fussing in the back 
seat, my brother and sister and I, generally it was all their 
fault, not mine. I was generally in the role of the 
peacekeeper, but I could hear my dad saying, don't make me come 
back there.
    So, I would hope at some point y'all would fix this up and 
don't make us come back here.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Burchett.
    The Chair recognizes Representative Johnson of Georgia for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
holding this very important hearing.
    Aviation in the United States is the safest in the world, 
and I am sure my colleagues would agree that our intention is 
to make sure that it remains that way. So, the issue that we 
are facing right now is that the 5G services launched on 
January 19 used frequencies in a radio spectrum known as the C-
band, which can interfere with the safety equipment in 
aircraft, specifically, radio altimeters.
    Although the FAA raised concerns that the 5G networks may 
interfere with some aircraft, the Federal Communications 
Commission authorized the rollout of these networks. 
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport is one of the 
busiest and most efficient airports in the world. And while 
Hartsfield itself is not directly impacted by the 5G rollout, 
many of the airports that fly to and from Hartsfield-Jackson 
are.
    The inability of the FAA, FCC, and the aviation and telecom 
industries to reach consensus on aviation safety regarding 5G 
is very concerning. Numerous stakeholders have been discussing 
and weighing the challenges to the rollout of 5G technology 
since at least 2015. That includes the FAA, the FCC, National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, the aviation 
industry, and telecom companies. And despite 7 years of 
deliberation, Government agencies were unable to reach a 
consensus on whether 5G interference was safe for the aviation 
industry in time for the 5G rollout last month.
    Mr. Dickson, what has prevented the FAA from coordinating 
more effectively with the FCC to address industry interference 
concerns?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congressman, and greetings to 
you in Georgia. I am very familiar from my heritage at Delta 
Airlines with the operations of Hartsfield-Jackson and 
understand and appreciate your concerns.
    We recognize that the existing process for spectrum 
allocation did not serve anyone well. And it is in everyone's 
best interest, including aviation and the FAA, to examine the 
coordination process across the executive branch. Because we 
are going to be at this--you know, there is no free spectrum 
anymore. So, we are going to be at this, not only with 5G C-
band, but with other spectrum auctions in the future. So, we 
need to make sure that we surface and then resolve, that is the 
key, I think that you are talking about, is have a resolution 
process for these issues.
    My job is to make sure that the safety of the traveling 
public and the safety of the aviation system is not 
compromised. That is a very high bar. And so, I am not going to 
back off from that. And I would expect the FAA to do that.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Well, thank you. I appreciate your 
diligence, and good to see you today. Is it your opinion, sir, 
that the 5G sale and rollout timeline as executed by the FCC 
under the previous administration overlooked safety concerns?
    Mr. Dickson. Again, I would just say that the process 
didn't serve anyone well. I am not pointing fingers at anyone 
or another agency. We have to work together. And we have to 
recognize, as we said a few minutes ago, that these are two 
very different industries. But the airspace infrastructure has 
to be maintained. But it has to be able to coexist with 5G. We 
certainly all want that in our communities as we go forward.
    So, we have got to make sure that we are working hand in 
glove with each other to enable these new technologies to roll 
out, but to do it in a safe and predictable manner.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Well, let me ask you this then, Mr. 
Dickson, what steps can be taken now to ensure that as 5G 
technology is rolled out, the lack of interagency communication 
does not create additional problems down the road?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I think Ranking Member Graves talked 
about leadership. It is going to take leadership. Secretary 
Buttigieg has been providing a lot of that leadership. We also 
have an interagency group, including the Department of 
Transportation and the FAA, the Department of Commerce, the 
FCC, the Department of Defense meeting now on spectrum issues 
and the coordination process. And I expect that to certainly 
leverage the lessons that we have learned throughout this 
journey that we are all on.
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Representative 
Gimenez of Florida for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thanks, Chairman. A couple of questions 
concerning the safety aspect of this. Would you say that the 
telephones that are used by the passengers inside the 
airplane--I know we for years have been told we have to go on 
airplane mode--are the dangers now heightened because of this 
5G, as more and more passengers have 5G phones? And if they 
fail to heed the instructions of the flightcrew, does that pose 
a danger to the airplane, to the aircraft? Could it pose a 
danger to the aircraft?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, you are highlighting an issue that is 
actually part of the testing that we are doing. Because what we 
have to do is--the towers are generally smart towers. So, if 
you look at 5G, as more demand is placed on the tower, the 
power will increase. And so, if you have demand on the 
telecommunications system that is coming from the airplane, 
could that focus power on the aircraft as it is flying in low-
visibility conditions? These are the kinds of things that you 
can only determine through the kind of flight testing that we 
are doing now, and with the telecommunications and aviation 
industry sharing information with each other. So, I think it is 
an open question, but it is certainly one of the things that we 
are looking at.
    Mr. Gimenez. Have you put some kind of instructions to 
flightcrews now to make sure that this happens? Because I know 
that on the flights--I fly all the time between Miami and my 
hometown and here, I know that people keep their phones on; 
they don't put it on airplane mode. Have you instructed the 
airlines to be more vigilant and to make sure that these phones 
are actually on airplane mode in light of the fact that we 
don't know what these things will do?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question. And we have 
communicated that to the air carriers through the safety 
awareness bulletins that we have put out. We will continue to 
that, and we are continuing to have dialogue on how we make 
sure that that is not happening on aircraft. But it is a 
difficult issue. It is not like you have got flight attendants 
or pilots who are looking over everyone's shoulder on the 
airplane. So, it is a risk that we have to be very cognizant 
of.
    Mr. Gimenez. And one thing you can do is actually tell 
people why it is important to put on it airplane mode. People 
just say, put it on airplane mode. We don't know why we have to 
put it on airplane mode. Well, now maybe it is a good reason to 
say, hey, you need to put it on airplane mode because we don't 
know what these things do to the altimeter. That would probably 
make me put it on airplane mode. So, if you could do that and 
inform the passengers, maybe more of them will comply. Because 
right now, I bet you most people don't have the faintest idea 
of why we go on airplane mode.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we'll look at that.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK. One other thing, when exactly did you know 
that this was an issue--not when you wrote the letter--but when 
did you know that this could have been an issue?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I think the aviation community knew back 
in 2015. That is where the concerns were initially focused. But 
we started to--at the working level, my spectrum engineers and 
all that really were communicating directly with their 
counterparts at the FCC and elsewhere, back as early as 2019 
and probably even 2018.
    Mr. Gimenez. And nothing was done about it?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, we kept raising the concerns. And 
then after the--tried to get the auction delayed until we could 
work through the appropriate safety mitigations. And then we 
asked for the underlying data. And, again, it just shows the 
difference between how telecommunications looks at spectrum 
versus how it interacts with critical safety systems on 
aircraft.
    Mr. Gimenez. Well, I guess we got caught up in the race to 
5G. We wanted to be the first at the 5G, this Nation did. I 
guess that is why we wanted to sell spectrum. But it seems to 
me that in the 6 years in between, we could have figured out 
these solutions way before we had the implementation. But that 
is Monday morning quarterback. Thank you very much, and I will 
yield my time back. Thank you.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes 
Representative Allred of Texas for 5 minutes.
    [No response.]
    Mr. Larsen. Just a moment.
    All right. We will go to Representative Lamb of 
Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
    [No response.]
    Mr. Larsen. Going once, going twice.
    Representative Johnson of Texas, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    [No response.]
    Mr. Larsen. Representative Johnson from Texas, I see you on 
the screen, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    [No response.]
    Mr. Larsen. Just a moment. Administrator?
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. We will come back.
    Representative Lynch.
    [No response.]
    Mr. Larsen. We have got a list of names here. I am assuming 
they are----
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. Representative Payne of New Jersey. 
Representative Payne, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Hold on 
a second. Hold on a second.
    Representative Johnson, are you ready?
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. I am sorry, did you call me?
    Mr. Larsen. I did call you, Representative Johnson, yes.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. Yes, I am ready.
    Mr. Larsen. We are going to go to Representative Johnson 
from Texas for 5 minutes. You are recognized.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much. Let me thank you 
and the witnesses. I would like to ask, Administrator Dickson, 
why did the data exchange between Verizon, AT&T, and the FAA, 
and the rest of the aviation community only begin at the end of 
December 2021, knowing that this was on the horizon?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Representative Johnson. The 
real issue is that we don't regulate the telecommunications 
companies, so, we don't have a direct relationship with them. 
And so, we had to basically put in place nondisclosure 
agreements. In the aviation community, we regulate the 
manufacturers and the operators. And part of the safety that we 
enjoy in the U.S. with aviation is that they are required to 
share their data with us, even though it is proprietary. So, 
this was a new process for them.
    And once we put that protocol in place, the data started to 
flow, but it was some time--it was a few days before it was 
really usable, because it was in different formats, and it 
wasn't really--there wasn't an understanding of the kind of 
data that we needed, because they had never had to produce it 
for the Government before, again, because we are talking about 
how the signal impacts aircraft that are flying through the 
air.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. OK. I am wondering, do you believe 
that FAA and the Department of Transportation should have a 
more formal role in assessing the risk of spectrum or to the 
transportation safety?
    Mr. Dickson. Again, this process didn't serve anyone well, 
including, certainly, the aviation sector. And it also didn't 
serve the telecommunications industry well. So, I do believe 
that it is, again, in everyone's interest to examine this 
process, the Federal spectrum process. How it is coordinated 
across agencies, the FAA among the agencies, but not the only 
player, and make sure that we surface and then have a process 
to resolve concerns and issues upfront. That will put us in a 
much better place.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. How close are you on getting the 
altimeter certification for private jets? Are you near? Or is 
it on the horizon?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, the permanent solution is going to be 
some months away, if not a year or two. Because, again, we have 
to set new airworthiness standards. There is an industry group 
that is working on that. We will take that information in, it 
will also be harmonized with Europe and other authorities 
around the world. Because so many aviation authorities around 
the world are very interested in what we are doing to regulate 
our aviation manufacturers in the U.S.
    So, once those new standards are set, then the aviation 
manufacturers will come to us with their designs and then we 
will certify them for use on commercial aircraft going forward.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much. And thank you, 
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Johnson. The Chair 
now recognizes Representative Mast of Florida for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
    Sir, I want to talk a little bit about 5G, FAA, National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration, and a 
connection, a relationship between all of them and how they are 
working together in order to make sure that we have safe 
transportation. We can look at this on a number of different 
fronts. Did the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, which oversees public radio waves, did they 
offer to test civilian aircraft equipment last year?
    Mr. Dickson. Not that I am aware of.
    Mr. Mast. There was a Wall Street Journal article that said 
that that took place. So, the reporting on that is wrong?
    Mr. Dickson. There is no NTIA testing that I am aware of, 
of the kind that we would need to do to demonstrate the 
[inaudible] performance of radio altimeters or critical systems 
on aircraft.
    Mr. Mast. My understanding is that there was not any 
testing, but my understanding is also that there was an offer 
by the NTIA to do testing, and that the FAA did not allow the 
NTIA to move forward. Is that the case of what happened?
    Mr. Dickson. I will have to look into that specific. I am 
not aware of exactly what you are referring to. Again, it would 
depend on how the testing is set up and whether it has a 
sufficient level of rigor for aviation safety certification.
    Mr. Mast. So, you are saying there would be a barrier for 
the FAA to say we are just not going to allow this testing to 
take place?
    Mr. Dickson. If it is FAA testing, and there would be other 
participation, I think that that would be something that we 
would be very interested in.
    Mr. Mast. All right. Yeah, we will make sure that we get 
you the article, so that we can get a response from you on what 
exactly took place with that situation. I appreciate the 
testimony today. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield my time 
back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Mast. All right. Now 
we have Representative Allred from Texas.
    Mr. Allred. Yeah, I am here, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Allred. OK. Sorry about that, Mr. Chairman. You know, 
technical difficulties. And I want to thank Administrator 
Dickson for being here with us. Nice to see you again, sir. As 
a Member representing Dallas, a region that has one of the 
busiest airports--and really, airspaces--in the country, this 
has been a very important discussion.
    And I just have one question for you, sir. It is about 
whether if the aviation industry is able to design and 
manufacture new radio altimeters, how long would it take for 
FAA--as an estimate--to certify those?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the new standards for C-band 
resistant radio altimeters are yet to be set. And so, we will 
participate in that activity. It is a special committee that 
has been set up under the auspices of RTCA Special Committee 
239. And our technical experts are participating in that 
activity as are stakeholders from around the aviation 
community.
    Once those standards are set, we will be using them to 
develop new certification standards that will determine which 
radio altimeters perform well and which ones need to be 
upgraded. And that is what the manufacturers will bring back to 
us, those new designs.
    We are seeing some promising activity among the 
manufacturers for devices that may be added to the existing 
fleet out there. But those would be in the--not in terms of new 
certifications, but they would certainly improve the 
performance of what is out there in the fleet and provide 
additional operational flexibility to those airlines or other 
operators that may have low-performing equipment right now.
    Mr. Allred. Where are y'all in reviewing those additional 
items?
    Mr. Dickson. We are talking with manufacturers on a regular 
basis. I know that we had actually one of the radio altimeter 
manufacturers in, I believe, yesterday, talking about product 
improvements that they were planning to make. So, those 
discussions are ongoing on a pretty frequent basis.
    Mr. Allred. That wouldn't need an entirely review process. 
Is that right, or no?
    Mr. Dickson. Not if it is an improvement to an existing 
design or a filter, for example. Remember that radio altimeters 
actually--the same radio altimeter on different airplanes can 
perform differently----
    Mr. Allred. Right.
    Mr. Dickson [continuing]. Depending on how it is installed 
in the aircraft, how long the wiring is, and things like that. 
So, we have to look at the actual radio altimeter and the 
airplane combination together.
    Mr. Allred. OK. Well, obviously, whatever we do, we want to 
do it as safely as possible. But given places like Dallas where 
you have these big airports, and we want to also move forward 
with this technology, I hope that we can find something 
together. If there is anything we can do as a committee to 
support you in that, I hope you will let us know.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
    Mr. Allred. Yeah.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Allred. The 
Chair recognizes Representative Massie of Kentucky for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Massie. Thank you, Chairman Larsen. The FCC has an 
obligation to ensure over time that the radio spectrum is used 
for its highest and best use. In fact, it was Obama in 2010 who 
said, free up some space for these telecommunications devices. 
And I was shocked when I dug into this to find out how much of 
the spectrum the aviation industry uses.
    And I am wondering, by 1982 standards, it might have been 
the highest and best use of that spectrum. But now that we have 
got better radio frequency modulators and an ability to use 
this space--by the way, no more frequency is getting 
manufactured. We have got all that God has given us. It is like 
land on the planet. So, we have to be really careful with this 
space, and use it the best way.
    What I was shocked to find out is that the radio altimeter, 
which is basically a 1980s version of Mark Twain putting a rope 
in the water and measuring how far down things are, uses 200 
megahertz of spectrum. And it has got a 200-megahertz guard 
band if you are not concerned about the low-power satellite 
spectrum, and you are actually concerned about the 5G spectrum.
    It is like you are sitting in an airplane seat, and there 
is an empty seat next to you, and you are complaining about the 
seat on the other side of the aisle, is kind of the analogy 
here. Which in 1982, I understand, which is the last time these 
standards came out, it all worked out.
    But here is how valuable this spectrum is. It was auctioned 
off--280 megahertz of it was auctioned off 1 year ago and 
brought $81 billion. So, to use the radio altimeters--we are 
using 200 megahertz, which is about $300 million of megahertz. 
That is its commercial value. We are using about $60 billion of 
spectrum to figure out how far from the ground the airplane is 
when it gets within a couple thousand feet of the ground. It 
makes me wonder if we are kind of being sloppy with the 
spectrum usage in other aviation fields.
    I know that, FAA Administrator, I think you were involved 
in helping to develop the ATC digital communication between the 
plane and the tower. Do you have some familiarity with that?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    Mr. Massie. And it is my understanding that all of the VHF 
NAV for aviation fits in 10 megahertz, from 108 to 118 slot. 
And then we have got the audio communications that fit in 20 
megahertz above that. And y'all were able to use just 1 
megahertz to get all of the digital communications between the 
ATC and the planes.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, sir. Do you want me to respond?
    Mr. Massie. Well, if I am wrong, just correct me, but let 
me go on a little bit forward. If we were going to design radio 
altimeters now, how much spectrum do you think we would need? 
Would we need the whole 200 megahertz, which is $60 billion 
worth of spectrum? Could we do it with 10 megahertz, which 
would be $3 billion? Could we do it with 1 megahertz?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not a spectrum expert myself, but if you 
are asking me whether we can use spectrum more efficiently, I 
think the answer is yes. But we have to have a strategy for 
being able to do that. And remember, when commercial aircraft 
are certified and put into service, they will operate safely. 
And we engineer them to carry the public for a period of 30 to 
40 years.
    And so, if we are going to put that kind of retrofit 
mandate and standards development into avionics, that needs to 
be part of our national strategy. And maybe that is something 
that can come out of this spectrum process.
    But my point here is, we need to have the data of what we 
are designing around so we can set the standards for the 
avionics manufacturers and the airframe manufacturers to be 
able to produce those new units. And will they use spectrum 
more efficiently? I would say that they will.
    Mr. Massie. That was the whole point of my questioning, and 
you completely understand it. So, I want to make sure that we 
don't just solve this problem, but we solve the problem going 
forward. Because we are not inventing anymore spectrum. We 
can't create it. And we want to make sure that the aviation 
industry is a good steward. And I understand the changes 
happened faster with telecommunications than they could have 
possibly been certified in aircraft. But I appreciate you being 
willing to get in front of it and look for ways to sort of be a 
better steward----
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Massie [continuing]. Of the spectrum. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Payne of 
New Jersey for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I thought I was going to keep getting bumped back. It is 
like the bunny hop. Two steps forward; one, two, three back.
    Mr. Larsen. I apologize for the confusion.
    Mr. Payne. No problem. No problem. I am team player, and I 
am with you, sir.
    Mr. Administrator, 5G deployment has the potential to 
provide high-quality cellular service to millions of Americans. 
However, we must ensure that the deployment is, obviously, in a 
safe manner, and that it does not impact aviation operations, 
which you have articulated today, so we are on the same page 
there.
    Having multiple airports located in or near densely 
populated areas, such as my congressional district in Newark, 
adds another layer of complexity to keeping Americans safe when 
they travel on airplanes. How is the FAA taking this into 
account regarding the future actions on 5G deployment?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I would say, again, we are working in 
good faith. And the telecommunications companies are working 
with us as well, Verizon and AT&T currently. And that is 
creating opportunities for us to deploy additional 5G C-band, 
but make sure that aviation safety is protected, not only in 
terms of the technical performance of the aircraft and the 
radio altimeters, but also in terms of greater predictability 
for the flying public and for everyone that is using the 
National Airspace System. That is always going to be our top 
priority, ensuring the safety of our national airspace and the 
ability of Americans to be able to travel domestically and 
abroad safely.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you for that. Now, on to the future. There 
are areas in which the Federal Government could have done 
better, quite a few, in anticipating issues with 5G deployment 
and taking proactive steps to avoid problems so close to the 
rollout of services, which has been a common theme today.
    I don't know when, but eventually, there will be a 
successor to 5G. It is my sincere hope that history does not 
repeat itself with these problems. What lessons has the FAA 
learned so far with the problems encountered with 5G 
deployment, and how will it inform future actions with next-gen 
networks?
    Mr. Dickson. It is a great question, and I think that--you 
know, I have talked about the Federal spectrum process, and 
that there are interagency discussions right now on spectrum 
issues. But I think, more broadly, different industries that 
are intersecting each other--for example, a lot of our aviation 
infrastructure these days that used to be on the ground is 
actually on the aircraft. And we don't use radar, for example, 
as a primary means of surveillance anymore. Radar is still very 
important. But we have data link, the ADS-B system on the 
aircraft transmitting very precise positions to our 
controllers. GPS, certainly, are on commercial aircraft. And we 
are talking here about radio altimeters.
    So, as we go on, it is not just C-band, it is also other 
spectrum activities. We just need to make sure that we are very 
coordinated as a Federal Government, but also that industries 
are able to share data and information with each other. And 
that, certainly, the proprietary nature of their corporate 
information is protected, but that they are able to have 
dialogue and interchange so that we don't have one set of 
engineers saying one thing and another set of engineers saying 
something else.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you for that. And I feel that in the 
future we need to maybe look at the agency that has 
jurisdiction over a certain area. You can go to and request 
help in getting information that you need if it is lagging. So, 
I think that would be a really, really useful thing to have.
    Part of your problem was that you didn't have any 
jurisdiction over them. So, whatever is the entity that does, 
you should be able to go and request that they work with you on 
these matters. So, that is something that maybe I will take a 
look at. But thank you for your time. And, Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Payne. Next up will 
be Representative Katko. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 
After which will be Representative Carson. Katko and then 
Carson.
    Representative Katko, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ranking 
Member Graves, for having this hearing today. This discussion 
is essential to providing clarity to millions of Americans who 
are understandably confused about the rollout of 5G and its 
impact on aviation.
    You will be hearing from a panel of industry stakeholders 
later today, but I want to focus on the Federal response to the 
5G and, more specifically, the lack of coordination between FCC 
and the FAA leading up to this deployment.
    In my district in central New York, this issue gained very 
significant attention during the week of January 17 when we 
found out that Syracuse Hancock International Airport had 
temporarily lost clearance from the FAA for certain low-
visibility landings.
    Now, I want to tell you something that is earth shattering, 
it is often a lot of clouds in Syracuse, especially this time 
of year. Today, for example, we are getting 1\1/2\ feet of 
snow. So, it is not uncommon to have this issue. And we didn't 
know about any of this until January 17 when they were 
informed.
    Now although some of these have been resolved right now, 
questions still remain, and it is understandable than this 
initial disruption raises significant concerns for the airport 
and for passengers. In our region, Hancock International 
Airport plays a very key role in facilitating travel and acting 
as an access point for a very large area for commerce. The same 
is true for hundreds of other airports across the country and 
for the communities they serve.
    Even temporarily jeopardizing the availability of services 
at these locations can cause major disruptions and diminish 
public trust in air travel, at a time when industry is already 
struggling mightily to recover from the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic. And given that the Federal agencies involved had 
years to prepare for this rollout, it just seems like this is 
an absolutely unacceptable way to handle it.
    I agree with Chairman DeFazio's comments earlier that no 
one wants to see planes falling out of the sky, obviously, and 
we've got to make sure we are safe. Well, how the hell did we 
get to the point where there is so much brinkmanship going on 
with this when we had 5 years in the making? It wasn't until 
December of 2021 that the FAA and FCC even entered into an 
information-sharing agreement.
    So, I have got to ask you, Mr. Dickson, how did it come to 
this where the airports were just basically at the last minute 
getting these directives coming out? I mean, this was bubbling 
up for quite a long time.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congressman. I am very 
familiar with having spent a few years in my youth in upstate 
New York, a beautiful part of the country. I am very familiar 
with the weather up there having flown into Syracuse many 
times.
    So, as a former pilot myself and with an operational 
background, I understand that our stakeholders and the 
airport's community feel frustrated. I don't blame anyone for 
being frustrated by the use of----
    Mr. Katko. So, yes, I understand that, there is 
frustration, but how did it come to this, and how are we going 
to make sure this doesn't happen again? Because we are talking 
about an awful lot of commerce here, we are talking about--you 
know, there are obviously safety issues. But it kind of makes 
me worried about safety issues when you get directives at the 
last second, which tends to indicate that you really didn't 
have a plan, number one, or you didn't understand the gravity 
of the situation ahead of time. So, how did it come to it--
briefly--and how are we going to fix it to make sure it doesn't 
happen again?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, until we have the direct dialogue with 
the telecommunications companies and their commitment to modify 
their initial deployment, we weren't in a position to authorize 
the kinds of poor weather operations. So, we had had to 
communicate several weeks prior that this was an issue. When we 
provided the relief, we are actually providing that relief to 
the manufacturers, not to the airlines or the airports.
    And so, part of what we are working through now, and I 
think we are in a much better place, is if we get earlier 
deployment data from the telecommunications companies, that 
will allow us to have better line of sight on issues. And----
    Mr. Katko. I understand that, but, sir, it goes back again, 
5 years. You knew this possibility was coming for 5 years. And, 
again, I am at the last second. So, how can we help you if you 
need help from us? Is there something we need to do, or is 
there something you need to do to make sure you don't get 
caught like this again in the future? Because, quite frankly, 
it gives people the feeling that the bureaucratic malaise in 
Washington is alive and well. There are two agencies that 
weren't talking to each other until the last minute, number 
one.
    And then, number two, you not knowing what is going on 
until right at the end, and then you have to issue these things 
which cause disruptions in the system, when you have been 
working on this issue for 5 years.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, so, talking about not the actual initial 
rollout, but again, the broader issue of spectrum policy and 
strategy as a country, absolutely, that needs to be addressed. 
And so, again, we are involved in the interagency conversation 
with the Department of Transportation, Department of Defense, 
Department of Commerce, and others to make sure that----
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired. Please finish 
up. Thank you. Representative Carson, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman. Administrator Dickson, 
while I respect the need for an independent FCC, that does not 
mean that the FCC does what it pleases without real 
collaboration with other agencies and robust oversight. I think 
it is a shame, sir, that the FCC declined our invitation to 
testify today, quite frankly. NTIA is supposed to act as an 
intermediary between these agencies and the FCC. One can only 
look at where we are today and really conclude that the process 
has failed. Do you agree with me on the process being broken, 
sir? What are your thoughts?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, as I said before, the process did not 
serve anyone well. It did not serve the aviation community 
well, and, certainly, the FAA. And it also did not serve the 
telecommunications industry well. We certainly need to do 
better as a country.
    Mr. Carson. Yes, sir. Do you see the process which led us 
to this hearing today being workable without Congress stepping 
in to clarify the intent of the process? How do we keep this 
kind of problem from happening again?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I think that we need to stay focused on 
it. I believe that this is something where we can have--Chair 
Larsen talked about informal dialogue. If we can put mechanisms 
in place so that affected agencies are not interested parties 
in these proceedings, but actually their equities are 
recognized in the process, and that there is a mechanism for 
early data sharing. Because that is really what it comes down 
to is the data that we need to be able to make the decisions 
within--in this case, to preserve and protect aviation safety. 
That is what really needs to happen throughout this spectrum 
process. And I believe that the conversations that we are 
having within the executive branch certainly have that goal in 
mind.
    Mr. Carson. Thank you, sir. I yield back, Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Brownley of 
California for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. 
Administrator, for being here. In answering some of the other 
Members' questions, you talked about leadership being necessary 
so that this doesn't happen again, to bring agencies together 
and working together. You mentioned that Secretary Buttigieg 
has been demonstrating some of that leadership currently.
    So, I just--I guess I don't want to beat a dead horse 
here--so, what was the White House doing to help you and assist 
you during this timeframe?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, I am grateful for the support from the 
National Economic Council, its engagement in this matter to 
facilitate the dialogue that we needed to have between two very 
different industries.
    Again, as I have stated several times, the FAA had 
communicated our safety concerns over a period of several 
years. And, ultimately, the decision was made to proceed with 
the spectrum auction consistent with the FCC's determination, 
and then we had to act upon that reality. I wish there would 
have been a way to avoid that. I think that with this 
subcommittee's support, and certainly what we are doing now as 
part of this interagency process, we will see an improved 
process in the future.
    And, again, I think that this is an area that we just need 
to stay focused on to make sure that we can have a better 
outcome. Because this is not the last spectrum issue that we 
are going to be facing as a country. As someone said earlier, 
there is only a finite amount, and we have got to figure out 
how to enable future spectrum for beneficial public use.
    Ms. Brownley. Thank you for that, Mr. Administrator. So, I 
have two general aviation airports in my district. I have a 
naval base, and I have the 146th Airlift Wing of the California 
National Guard. So, my question is how is all of this impacting 
general aviation, and how are we working with DoD in terms of 
military National Guard?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we are working very closely with DoD as 
we do on a whole host of issues because, obviously, they share 
the civil airspace for their training and other activities that 
the FAA is responsible for. And, certainly, we have commercial 
flights occasionally flying into military bases, so we have got 
to pay attention to the issues there as well.
    In terms of general aviation, we have raised awareness in 
that community. The vast, vast, vast majority of those 
operators are not certified to do what we call Category II and 
Category III low-visibility approaches at less than a half mile 
visibility. So, they are not seeing the same kinds of impacts 
as the commercial air carriers. But there are other systems on 
the airplane that we have raised their awareness of, but they 
aren't in critical phases of flight.
    So, we are soliciting, we are working with our General 
Aviation Joint Steering Committee to make sure that we are 
getting information both from individual operators and the 
associations that represent them, so that we can all add that 
into the mix as we develop new standards for this equipment on 
airplanes going forward.
    Ms. Brownley. So, would you characterize general aviation 
airports as being out of the woods in terms of any danger?
    Mr. Dickson. I would say the biggest impacts are on a 
couple hundred airports that we have that have low-visibility 
approaches. In a 5G environment, where you don't have that kind 
of capability, it is very expensive. You are usually not going 
to see a general aviation airport with that kind of capability. 
It is a very expensive infrastructure to put in place because 
you have got a certified flightcrew, certified airplane, and a 
certified runway with approach lights, and a lot of very 
expensive infrastructure. That is usually not going to be what 
you've got at a GA airport. So, the impacts are not as great, 
but that community is something that we are paying very close 
attention to to make sure that they can continue to operate the 
way that they have previously.
    Ms. Brownley. Well, I hope that will continue to be the 
case. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Congresswoman 
Holmes Norton for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can everybody hear me?
    Mr. Larsen. We can hear you just fine.
    Ms. Norton. My question is to Administrator Dickson. 5G 
operates on the C-band, but that is a mid-band wireless 
spectrum from 3.7 to 3.98 GHz. But that is adjacent to a 4.2 to 
4.4 GHz band used by certain aviation safety equipment, 
including radio altimeters.
    In 2021, there was a safety alert to operators where the 
FAA warned, and here I am quoting, ``the receiver on the radio 
altimeter is typically accurate, however it may deliver 
erroneous results in the presence of out-of-band radio 
frequency emissions from other frequency bands.''
    So, my question, Administrator Dickson, is if the 
deployment of 5G wireless services in the C-band poses 
potential, unsafe interference with aviation safety equipment, 
are there alternative frequencies that telecommunications 
companies can use for their 5G rollout, and what is the nearest 
frequency in which 5G can operate that would not pose a risk of 
their interference to radio altimeters?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congresswoman Norton. It is 
good see you this morning. In answer to your question, there 
are other 5G frequency bands. But the C-band is particularly 
attractive. It has certain characteristics that make it, in 
terms of coverage and power levels, that make it very 
beneficial for 5G. And I think everyone--we certainly recognize 
that.
    In terms of the safety information that we have put out, we 
had a responsibility to notify the aviation community of the 
potential for interference based on the studies that had been 
done, and then the work that we are doing now in terms of 
testing, and also the avionics manufacturer is doing in terms 
of testing, is continuing to demonstrate the performance of the 
radio altimeters. And we will continue to work as we move 
forward.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you. This next question is for Mr. Viola. 
Mr. Viola, I am interested in this because----
    Mr. Larsen. Congresswoman?
    Ms. Norton. Yes?
    Mr. Larsen. He is on the second panel, if you want to put 
it in the record.
    Ms. Norton. Oh, he is on the second panel.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah.
    Ms. Norton. OK. Sorry.
    Mr. Larsen. That is fine.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you. Finally, let me ask if it is 
impossible or impracticable for 5G to operate on a different 
frequency, how costly would it be to upgrade the radio 
altimeters on regional jets and helicopters that are most 
susceptible to interference? How much time would be needed to 
approve of this new equipment?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, what we are doing is we are 
addressing the rollout that we have in front of us, making sure 
that we take appropriate steps to ensure that aviation safety 
is maintained. But in parallel, the new standards for radio 
altimeters are in the process of being developed. And once they 
are developed, it could be that some existing radio altimeters 
that are out there have satisfactory performance with the new 
standard. We don't know exactly where that cut point is yet.
    But then for those that do need to be replaced that don't 
meet the new standard, the manufacturers will produce new 
designs that the FAA will certify, and then those can be 
installed on those fleet types. I don't have the specific 
numbers on what that potential expense is, but I would imagine 
there is probably somebody on the second panel that can speak 
to that point.
    Ms. Norton. How much time it would take to approve the new 
equipment?
    Mr. Dickson. You know what, again, once the standards are 
set, which is probably, in my estimation, it is going to be 
probably about this time next year, is an optimistic scenario, 
but then I know that there is work going on at the 
manufacturers right now in anticipation of new standards being 
set, and we will have to see what that looks like once we get 
those newer standards in place.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Congresswoman Holmes Norton. Next up 
is Representative Stauber of Minnesota.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much, Chair Larsen. I thank you 
all for being here today. As we look at 5G deployment and in 
general other advancements in technology, we obviously need to 
ensure that we were using fact-based analysis. This will best 
facilitate an economic environment that allows the economy to 
grow and technology to advance while also ensuring customer 
safety.
    When it comes to 5G, we have all heard both sides of this 
argument, and to be fair, it is a little difficult to decipher 
at times. I agree that passenger safety must be the most 
paramount priority and any interference with navigational or 
operational instruments demands a solution. I also understand 
that advances in technology like 5G can be important tools for 
the future. And it is important that the Government foster 
innovation, not stifle it.
    Mr. Dickson, in your opinion, what is the perfect solution 
to this issue? Is it more buffer zones? Is it reorienting the 
towers? Is it an instrument fix to the altimeters? What do you 
think can be negotiated that is fair to both parties, and how 
soon do you think that can be achieved?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question. And, again, we 
have got the short-term solution. I think the key to all of 
this is early and very transparent data exchange. And that 
process only began in earnest between the aviation sector and 
the telecommunications companies back in late December. And we 
made tremendous progress in a very short period of time. I wish 
there had been a mechanism for that kind of exchange to happen 
earlier, and I think that we would be in a different place, but 
we can't rewrite that history.
    So, moving forward, I think we want to enable technology 
and innovation as you state, but we have got to make sure that 
there is a mechanism for affected stakeholders' interest to be 
accounted for. And that does happen on occasion, but it did not 
happen in this particular case, and we need to make sure that 
it does.
    Mr. Stauber. And how soon do you think it can be achieved? 
Can you give the committee a timeline? What is your thought?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the mitigations we have in place 
in terms of the 5G deployment patterns and the presence around 
airports, what our safety model looks like, the flight testing 
that we are doing right now, all of that is going to continue 
to refine what the problem set is. It is going to continue, I 
believe, to shrink the problem over the next few months.
    But the ultimate solution is using the data that we have 
now and the performance characteristics of the existing radio 
altimeters out there in the fleet to develop these new 
airworthiness standards. And that is probably not going to 
happen within the next year or so. An optimistic scenario is 
probably early 2023, and then the manufacturers will have the 
information that they need to be able to manufacture new units 
for those lower performing parts of the fleet that are 
operating currently.
    But in the meantime, working together and the mitigations 
that we have in place will be very beneficial in making sure 
that we can continue air commerce and have it done in a safe 
way for the public, but also enable additional 5G C-band to 
form, to happen simultaneously.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Dickson. I am sorry, you are on mute.
    Mr. Larsen. Representative Stauber, you are on mute.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Mr. Chair. So, what is your 
agency's very near-term plan to ensure this is resolved and 
working together? Do you have a working plan to get together so 
we are not doing this at the last minute, or rushing the 
information or rushing the process?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, that is a great question. And Secretary 
Buttigieg in our meeting with the telecommunications companies 
on a regular basis to ensure that we are staying, that we are 
continuing to focus on, on moving forward together. And our 
technical teams are meeting daily, if not multiple times a day. 
As I had mentioned earlier, we have set up flight test 
scenarios at some airports around the country, and we will 
continue do that. And that will give us the fidelity that we 
need in terms of what does this signal look like when it is 
actually arriving at the airport. That is research that had 
never been done before. And that will be very beneficial in 
both the near-term mitigations that we need to continue to pay, 
but also in developing a long-term solution.
    Mr. Stauber. Well, thank you very much. Mr. Chair, how much 
time do I have left?
    Mr. Larsen. Sorry you are out of time, Mr. Stauber.
    Mr. Stauber. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. I turn it back to 
you.
    Mr. Larsen. Right. I have two words for you, Mr. Stauber, 
stay warm.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen. It is minus 6 in Duluth, Minnesota, right now, 
folks. I would like to recognize Representative Titus of Nevada 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 
Administrator, for being here. I would like to go back to the 
question that Ms. Brownley posed, and just to put a point on 
it, general aviation is so important to the Las Vegas economy. 
We fly a lot of tourists in commercially, but those corporate 
jets and those executive jets that fly into Henderson and North 
Las Vegas bring people to Raiders games, to prize fights, to 
conventions, so, I am glad that you are working on that to be 
sure that they are accommodated with this new technology as 
well.
    Mr. Dickson. Absolutely, no, it is very important. And, 
again, the initial focus was on international commercial wide-
body aircraft. We didn't want Americans to be stranded overseas 
and not be able to get back up and get back home. And we have 
continued to work through all of the approvals.
    And as the manufacturers bring us for their proposals for 
how their systems will perform, we will process them as quickly 
as we possibly can. I am really proud of how quickly the agency 
has been able to respond at a time that has been very important 
to our country.
    Ms. Titus. Well, I appreciate that because so often we are 
reacting as opposed to being ahead of the game, and then we get 
behind Europe, we get behind Australia, and we try to catch up. 
And that is especially true of the FAA before you were there. I 
am not putting this on you, but they were so hidebound, we 
couldn't get them to do anything to keep up with the 
technology.
    And with this new 5G that we are trying to deal with, I 
would ask you too about the advanced air mobility. This new 
technology is coming. I was pleased to introduce a bill with 
the chairman and the ranking member. I wonder, are we trying to 
get ahead of the game with that, or is that also going to be 
reactive? And the same question I might ask about drones, we 
have all heard a lot about drones, and the development of the 
drones in the airspace and all. Are we thinking about any plans 
to deal with that?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, and I will--taking drones first, we have 
made a lot of progress, but we have got a ways to go. An 
example of the rigor of the approval process that we go through 
is when we did the rulemaking on remote identification.
    We engaged all of our Federal partners in that and had to 
actually change our approach a little bit based on the work 
that we had done with them. But, ultimately, we want to get 
drones. We just completed an aviation rulemaking committee on 
beyond visual line of sight operations rather than doing it at 
scale, rather than with individual exemptions. And I am excited 
to see that proceed on into the future.
    That rulemaking is definitely on our very short to-do list. 
With advanced air mobility, we are working with several 
manufacturers. I have actually spent some time with several of 
them. I was at an industry roundtable about 3 months ago 
talking about the near-term opportunities. I think the good 
news there is that our existing regulatory structure that we 
have around a lot of helicopter operations and other types of 
air mobility-type operations will serve us well in the early 
going.
    We have the first machines that we expect to be certified 
probably around 2024. So, in the aviation business that is 
right in front of us. So, we are looking forward to seeing that 
technology roll out. Think it will be very beneficial to 
society and great for our communities as well.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you. It is a difficult job you have 
balancing this 5G, so we can be competitive, especially now we 
are talking about competitiveness with China. We need to do 
that and yet the FAA's main priority has always been safety, 
which we want to be sure that the American public feels like 
they can travel by air safely.
    Mr. Dickson. Absolutely. We need to do both.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much.
    I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Representative Titus yields back.
    And I recognize Representative Van Drew of New Jersey for 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, Ranking 
Member, for holding this hearing on this critical issue.
    This committee has no higher responsibility than ensuring 
the safety of the flying public. The issue of 5G interference 
with aircraft radio altimeters is very serious. It is 
unfortunate that we are in this situation and it was certainly 
preventable. We can and must act to address the immediate 
problem and to ensure that it never happens again.
    Administrator Dickson, you and the FAA are working 
diligently, you are working hard to move this issue forward. It 
is clearly the FAA's top priority right now to ensure that the 
5G rollout occurs in the safest and least disruptive way 
possible.
    I commend your focus, and I know that you will keep it up. 
I am concerned that this will not be the last time that the FAA 
runs into spectrum management issues. Spectrum conflicts are 
only going to become more common as the airspace fills with new 
entrants. With the growth of the UAS industry, the United 
States airspace could have millions of drones flying around the 
country with hundreds of different operators. These companies 
will need spectrum to manage these drones without question.
    Much of the FAA's spectrum capability comes from the 
Spectrum Engineering Office. So, Mr. Administrator, I have 
several questions to ask. What role has the FAA Spectrum 
Engineering Office played in the process of detecting and 
solving the 5G interference issue before us? And now and into 
the future, do we need more resources? These are changing times 
and changing technologies, we need the resources to deal with 
this.
    How will the expansion of the UAS industry complicate the 
spectrum environment?
    Thank you.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Congressman Van Drew. And I know 
that you have particular focus on this. We have talked about 
the capabilities of the tech center and our very highly capable 
team there. As I said, this process did not serve anyone well, 
and we needed to do better, and we will.
    In terms of resources, I think that if we can improve the 
process, we are well resourced for what we have in front of us. 
My spectrum engineers, the last 3 months I have been talking 
with them on almost a daily basis. They are a very capable 
group, but this is not an issue that is going away.
    And as a matter of fact, in order to be able to continue to 
enable the kind of innovations that you are talking about, it 
is something that we are focused on in our workforce plan. We 
really need to make sure that we are bringing the kinds of 
21st-century expertise and experience into the agency that we 
will need to move these forward.
    So, I look forward to continuing to work with you on those 
very important issues.
    Dr. Van Drew. Good. I appreciate it. I look forward to it 
as well. Nothing could be more important right now.
    And I yield back, Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Van Drew.
    The Chair recognizes Representative Stanton for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Stanton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Can you see 
me OK?
    Mr. Larsen. Yes. It is fine and hear you fine.
    Mr. Stanton. All right. Our Nation needs 5G and the 
capabilities it brings. At the same time, safety of our 
national airspace must be a key priority for passengers, 
pilots, and crew. Administrator Dickson, you are tasked with 
the hard job of making both of these things happen right now.
    When did the FAA begin the process to review and improve 
existing radio altimeters in 5G deployment areas and were there 
barriers that prevented FAA from doing those assessments 
earlier?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the formal process for providing 
the approvals was dependent upon having the deployment data 
from the telecommunications industry, because--remember, we are 
not certifying new equipment right now. We are addressing what 
we call an unsafe condition that has been identified in radio 
altimeter avionics.
    So, when you do that, we issue an airworthiness directive 
that essentially, in this case, does not allow the use of that 
technology on the airplane. So, to continue to enable poor 
weather, low-visibility-type operations, again, operations in 
most cases of less than a half mile visibility where the pilot 
is doing what we call Category II or a Category III auto 
landing approach, the radio altimeter is very critical in that 
phase of flight.
    And until we had the specific deployment data, for example, 
latitude/longitude, elevation, is the tower on a hill, what is 
the height of the tower, signal strength, all of that 
deployment information, that is the information that we needed 
to be able to put our protection zones in place.
    And then once we did that, the aviation manufacturers came 
to us with the level of performance that they are testing 
indicated their radio altimeters would perform satisfactorily. 
Some of them range from a few hundred feet. Some of them are 
well over several miles where they are potentially vulnerable 
at this point to C-band interference.
    And so, we continue to work that, and we will continue to 
work with the manufacturers to ensure that only those 
operations that can be conducted safely will be allowed to 
continue.
    Mr. Stanton. Are there other technical concerns with 
interference other than just with radio altimeters?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, there are other--some airplanes have--
the root cause of all of this is the performance of the radio 
altimeter, but what has happened with certain aircraft types is 
that the radio altimeter has been architected into other 
automatic systems on the aircraft.
    For example, thrust reversers or spoilers, they are the 
panels that come up on the wing after landing to help slow the 
airplane down, those types of things in older aircraft types, 
you may have had a sensor on the wheel that detected when the 
airplane was on the ground. Now with some newer aircraft 
designs, the radio altimeter is used as a backup or perhaps 
even primary to those sensors, and that safety enhancement, 
actually, becomes compromised as well.
    I think the good news here is that the same relief that we 
are providing for low-visibility approaches is also protecting 
those systems on the aircraft as well.
    Mr. Stanton. What measures does the FAA have in place to 
ensure that the data provided by the telecom industry regarding 
5G deployment areas, such as tower locations and activations, 
power levels, et cetera, what measures do you have in place to 
ensure that it is accurate, reliable, and shared with you in a 
timely matter moving forward?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, I am having regular conversations 
with their leadership. We are having technical exchanges on a 
daily basis. We have developed a level of familiarity and a 
level of collaboration, and frankly, a building level of trust.
    It is always trust but verify, and that is part of what 
flight testing is telling us is, we think that the technical 
specifications and what they have committed to us is actually 
the way that things will perform in the real world. The flight 
testing is helping us to validate things like signal shape and 
power.
    And again, frankly, the kind of information exchange that 
we are having with them is information that they were never 
required to provide before. In fact, they had never even really 
thought about the impact of a C-band signal on a moving 
aircraft. It was just not something that was within their 
calculus.
    And so, now we are, just in the last few weeks, we are 
certainly working with each other much more effectively than we 
were before.
    Mr. Stanton. Trust but verify.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thanks, Representative, very much.
    So, as I understand it, for this panel, that is all the 
Members who have questions. And we have other Members waiting, 
but that is for the second panel. Going once? Going twice? 
Great.
    Administrator Dickson, thank you for joining us and thank 
you for giving us a little over 2 hours of your time to ask 
some questions.
    I think the second panel will also give us some very 
interesting perspective for us to explore based on some of the 
things you said. And we will be in touch with you with further 
questions, as well as some followup on how we can help out, but 
thank you very much for joining us today.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you for your support and for your 
leadership.
    Mr. Larsen. For the members on the panel, we are going to 
take a 10-minute recess. Some of us haven't had the chance to 
get up and walk around like others. So, we are going to take a 
10-minute recess and we will back for the second panel.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Larsen. I call the subcommittee back into session.
    I now call up panel 2. I will ask the witnesses on panel 2 
to please turn your cameras on and keep them on for the 
duration of the panel. I want to welcome the witnesses on our 
second panel.
    I will just go through the introduction of each one.
    Nick Calio, the president and CEO of Airlines for America.
    The Honorable Eric Fanning, president and CEO of the 
Aerospace Industries Association.
    Cathryn Stephens, airport director, Eugene Airport, on 
behalf of the American Association of Airport Executives.
    Captain Joe DePete, president of the Air Line Pilots 
Association.
    Faye Malarkey Black, president and CEO of the Regional 
Airline Association.
    James Viola, president and CEO of the Helicopter 
Association International.
    The Honorable Meredith Attwell Baker, president and CEO of 
CTIA.
    And Dennis Roberson, president and chief executive officer 
of Roberson and Associates and also a proud graduate of the 
Washington State University.
    Thank you for joining us today, and I look forward to your 
testimony.
    Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be 
included in the record. And since your written testimony has 
been made part of the record, the subcommittee requests that 
you limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
    With that, we will start with Mr. Calio. You are recognized 
for 5 minutes. You may proceed.

 TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS E. CALIO, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
OFFICER, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA; HON. ERIC FANNING, PRESIDENT AND 
  CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION; 
CATHRYN STEPHENS, A.A.E., AIRPORT DIRECTOR, EUGENE AIRPORT, ON 
   BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES; 
     CAPTAIN JOSEPH G. DePETE, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS 
ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL; FAYE MALARKEY BLACK, PRESIDENT AND 
 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION; JAMES 
   VIOLA, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HELICOPTER 
    ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL; HON. MEREDITH ATTWELL BAKER, 
  PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CTIA; AND DENNIS A. 
 ROBERSON, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ROBERSON AND 
                        ASSOCIATES, LLC

    Mr. Calio. Thank you, Chairman DeFazio and Larsen and 
Ranking Member Graves and Graves.
    A4A appreciates the opportunity to testify. Given the 
unprecedented impacts of the pandemic, it is quite notable that 
an unrelated problem would rise to be the most disruptive issue 
facing our industry, yet here we are. Commercial aviation is 
the safest mode of transportation in the world due in part to 
technology like radio altimeters. They are essential tools that 
provide input to many other critical safety systems on an 
airplane.
    Since the spring of 2018, A4A and others in the aviation 
industry, have been raising concerns about radio altimeters in 
the new 5G environment. I point you to the timeline of cautions 
we raised, which is attached to our written testimony. As time 
ran out ahead of the scheduled, and then rescheduled deployment 
dates, A4A sounded the alarm.
    I and all of our member CEOs signed a letter warning of 
significant disruption to air passengers, shippers, the supply 
chain, and delivery of needed medical supplies. The 
restrictions that were being imposed on the industry would have 
impacted approximately 345,000 passenger flights, 32 million 
passengers, and 5,400 cargo flights each year in the form of 
delayed flights, diversions, or cancellations.
    The past few months have been nothing short of a harrowing 
sequence of looming deadlines and impending Government action. 
The process that led up to this operational nightmare or 
potential operational nightmare should be held up as a 
cautionary tale of lack of communication and coordination gone 
awry.
    It is not a partisan problem or issue; it is a Government 
coordination problem that needs to be rationalized going 
forward. As a result of the FCC's decision not to address 
aviation safety concerns, the FAA rightly did.
    The situation could and should have been directly addressed 
prior to the spectrum auction, but we are encouraged by recent 
progress. Today, we are in a far better place thanks to the 
work of many, including the White House, the NEC, DOT, FAA, 
aviation stakeholders, and the telecommunications companies.
    Both the telecom and aviation industries have been thrust 
into this avoidable calamity by a Government process that 
failed to provide an adequate amount of interagency 
communication and recognition of decisional consequences down 
the line. We sincerely appreciate the telecoms' coordination 
efforts.
    We are also grateful to those in Congress who have lent 
their voices to drive solutions. Chairman DeFazio, in 
particular, we would like to thank for giving attention to this 
issue going back at least 3 years. For A4A, we are acutely 
focused on driving our Government partners to quickly find a 
permanent set of solutions that will allow 5Gs to expand while 
also protecting aviation from disruption.
    Specifically, we are asking for a long-term, transparent 
process that brings everyone to the table to work in a 
collaborative manner. Unfortunately, the current process has 
provided a complicated web based on aircraft-by-aircraft, 
runway-by-runway, radio altimeter-by-radio altimeter 
determinations made on a flight-by-flight basis.
    The situation isn't static either, but rather there are a 
constant ebb and flow of new 5G towers and airline and airport 
operating changes. The complexity that has been added to the 
aviation operations, along with the impacts on human factors 
involved, which I am sure Captain DePete will talk about, 
desperately calls for a stable approach that only the 
Government can provide.
    Just this past weekend, there was another round of 
reevaluations referred to as the AMOC process as mentioned by 
Administrator Dickson. It is paramount that the FAA continues 
to implement a permanent and more accurate risk evaluation 
tool, as well as improving its notifications and limitations 
process. There is no reason the types of mitigations that have 
been implemented internationally at the onset of the process, 
not after, through intergovernmental communication, could not 
have been effectively dealt with here in the United States.
    We are now trying to manage through the existing crisis, 
but it will likely take years, not weeks, to fully address. In 
the near term, we need a razor-sharp focus on the FAA honing a 
permanent evaluation tool.
    In the long term, we need a critical review of the 
intergovernmental communication during spectrum reallocation 
processes, and we need a long-term transparent process, as I 
said, that includes all stakeholders. Make no mistake about it, 
the aviation industry fully supports new technologies in 
deployment of 5G, however, it must be done in a manner that 
allows aviation and 5G to coexist safely.
    There likely will be a 6G and 7G and many other spectrum 
utilization issues in the future. They should be seamlessly 
integrated in the broader economy without causing seismic 
disruptions to critical industry segments.
    We have no doubt the United States can find a way to lead 
both aviation safety and 5G access, but it needs to be done 
right.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [Mr. Calio's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Nicholas E. Calio, President and Chief Executive 
                     Officer, Airlines for America
    Airlines for America (A4A) appreciates the opportunity to testify 
today regarding the ongoing implementation and deployment of 5G C-band 
transmission and its impact on the aviation industry, supply chain and 
broader economy. Given the unprecedented impacts of the COVID-19 
pandemic and the unpredictability caused by the ever-changing global 
disruption it has caused, it is notable that a non-pandemic issue would 
rise to be the most disruptive issue facing our industry.
    While the last three months have been nothing short of a harrowing 
sequence of looming deadlines and impending government action, I am 
encouraged by the progress that has resulted from the collaborative 
actions taken by the stakeholders represented on the panels today. 
There is still much work to be done, and we are unfortunately only at 
the beginning of what is expected to be a long odyssey, but we are in a 
much better place today than where we were just a few short weeks ago.
    Progress would not have been possible without the work of the White 
House, the National Economic Council (NEC), the Department of 
Transportation (DOT), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), aviation stakeholders and the 
telecommunications industry. In no small part, many in Congress have 
also lent their voice to raise concern and provide the leadership 
necessary to drive solutions. I would like to specifically thank 
Chairman DeFazio for his long-standing attention to this issue. He 
recognized the gravity of the situation well over two years ago, 
highlighting concerns to the FCC prior to the spectrum auction. Mr. 
Chairman, we are grateful for your actions on this matter.
    From a commercial aviation perspective, we are acutely focused on 
finding a set of solutions that allows 5G to expand to the C-band while 
also protecting aviation from any operational restrictions. It is 
imperative the data sharing, testing and honing of safety assurance 
tools continues at a rapid pace. The breadth and complexity of the 
operating changes to the aviation environment caused by these events, 
along with the impacts on human factors, desperately call for a 
methodical, predictable and routine set of solutions to stabilize our 
operating framework. This should be the mutual goal for all 
stakeholders.
                               Background
    In 2017, the FCC signaled its intention to auction C-band spectrum 
that would reallocate a portion of the 3.7-4.2 GHz frequency band, 
making the frequency spectrum from 3.7-3.98 GHz available for flexible 
use, including 5G in the C-band applications.
    Before the FCC's auction, the FAA determined that C-band mobile 
telecommunications signals could interfere with low range radio 
altimeter operations. The interference concerns were material because 
radio altimeters are the only device on every aircraft that can 
directly measure the distance between the aircraft and the ground. Data 
from those radio altimeters also feeds into several other safety-
critical flight control and warning systems that are needed in all 
phases of flight.
    Subsequently, the FAA and DOT jointly wrote to the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) expressing 
interference concerns. Despite being aware of the concerns, the FCC 
auctioned the spectrum to new licensees in December 2020 in a manner 
that did not address the core aviation interference concerns.
    Per the FCC order, starting on December 5, 2021, the telecom 
licensees were allowed and scheduled to activate their 5G in the C-
band. The telecom licensees have subsequently voluntarily modified 
their deployments to work with the FAA and aviation stakeholders to 
address interference issues around U.S. airports. Those efforts are 
ongoing.
                            Aviation Safety
    Safety is the top priority of U.S. airlines. Through decades of 
work and collaboration, air travel is the safest mode of transportation 
both domestically and globally. For airlines, our first commitment is 
to the safety of our passengers, our crewmembers and the public. 
Commercial aviation has achieved historical levels of safety due, in 
part, to technology investments made to enhance landing safely and 
which rely on the radio altimeter, such as Enhanced Ground Proximity 
Warning Systems, auto throttle, Head-Up Display, stability 
augmentation, tail strike warning, windshear warning, braking scale and 
pointer.
    Consistent with our culture of safety, through a series of meetings 
and filings with the FAA, the broader aviation industry has long 
conveyed its safety concerns with the FCC's actions and the potential 
consequences. These concerns include radio altimeters providing 
erroneous information to a variety of critical onboard aircraft systems 
when the aircraft is in the vicinity of 5G C-band broadcasting towers, 
especially for flights operating in Instrument Meteorological 
Conditions (IMC). The aviation industry has also consistently attempted 
to engage the FCC to discuss aviation safety risk mitigations and allow 
for the safe and efficient deployment to 5G technology. A timeline of 
these engagements is attached below.
    As a result of the FCC's decision to not address aviation safety 
concerns, the FAA has taken their own actions to address the aviation 
safety risks of 5G in the C-band. The FAA determined that ``radio 
altimeters cannot be relied upon to perform their intended function if 
they experience interference from wireless broadband operations in the 
[5G C-Band].'' The FAA issued an Airworthiness Directive (AD) requiring 
revisions to airplane flight manuals (AFM) to incorporate limitations 
prohibiting certain radio altimeter-dependent operations when the 
operation is in the presence of 5G C-band interference from known or 
suspected 5G C-band deployments near airports, which the FAA identifies 
through Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs). Accordingly, operational 
prohibitions are the new operating baseline at airports with nearby 5G 
C-band deployments under low visibility conditions, resulting in 
extreme operational impacts. However, pursuant to its Alternative 
Methods of Compliance (AMOC) process, the FAA has permitted (on a time-
limited basis) certain aircraft that are equipped with radio altimeters 
capable of functioning without adverse interference to operate without 
restrictions at airports with known 5G C-band deployments.
    However, we continue to be concerned with the operational 
uncertainty of a monthly AMOC process that requires a revaluation of 
the approved airports each time the telecom companies provide new 5G C-
band tower locations, which could result in the loss of access to a 
previously covered airport. In the near term, we believe the FAA should 
continue its collaboration with stakeholders to find and implement 
permanent, efficient and more accurate risk evaluation tools and 
mitigations, including fixes to 5G in the C-band deployment as well as 
FAA's notification and limitations process.
                    Initial Aviation Impact Analysis
    Shortly after the FAA issued its AD, A4A surveyed our members to 
assess the potential impact of the FAA actions and found:

        The expected costs to the flying public, shippers and airlines 
        would be significant as the AD would materially disrupt airline 
        operations. For example, if the AD were applied in arrears to 
        A4A members' 2019 operations, approximately 345,000 passenger 
        flights, 32 million passengers and 5,400 cargo flights would 
        have been impacted in the form of delayed flights, diversions 
        or cancellations. A4A estimates that U.S. passenger airlines 
        would incur an incremental $1.7 billion in operating costs 
        annually. Separately, A4A cargo operators estimate that the 
        directive would have cost them $400 million annually resulting 
        from the disruption to their time-sensitive operations.

    Further, the FAA AD would exact a heavy toll on passenger and 
shippers in the form of lost wages and productivity as well as higher 
operating costs. According to the FAA, the value of air travelers' time 
is worth $47.10 per hour. In 2019, the actual duration of the average 
flight arrival delay was 64 minutes. Based on this, A4A estimates the 
annual impact cost to passengers to be approximately $1.59 billion. At 
the time, we stressed that these estimates were also conservative as 
they did not address the ripple effect of delays throughout the system 
that result when flights are cancelled, diverted or delayed.
    Additionally, the estimates only measured the direct impacts to 
airlines and their customers. The analysis did not account for the 
impact to lost business for hospitality providers (i.e., missed 
meetings, hotel stays, restaurants, lost wages from indirect service 
providers, etc.). The ripple effect would be felt well beyond the 
airline sector and significantly impact the broader economy.
                    Revised Aviation Impact Analysis
    As more information was disseminated throughout January, it became 
clear the harm to aviation that would result from deployment of 5G in 
the C-band near airports would be substantially worse than originally 
anticipated for two key reasons.
    First, most of the 50 airports that were identified by the FAA for 
relief would still be subject to flight restrictions. Unless major hubs 
are cleared for aircraft to fly, the vast majority of the traveling and 
shipping public would essentially be grounded. This means that on any 
given day, more than 1,100 flights (both passenger and cargo) and 
100,000 travelers would be subjected to cancellations, diversions or 
delays.
    Second, flight restrictions would not be limited to poor weather 
operations. As outlined above, because radio altimeters provide 
critical information to other safety, flight control, alerting and 
navigation systems in modern airplanes, multiple modern safety systems 
on aircraft would be deemed unusable causing a much larger problem than 
what was known in early January. Airplane manufacturers also informed 
operators that there are huge swaths of the operating fleet that would 
need to be indefinitely grounded. In addition to the chaos caused 
domestically, this lack of usable widebody aircraft could potentially 
strand tens of thousands of Americans overseas.
    As of late January, the FAA has codified the manufacturer's 
concerns on four fleets of large aircraft, severely limiting or 
curtailing their operations at NOTAM-affected airports regardless of 
weather conditions, and more directives are expected.
    The impact of these additional variables, along with the ripple 
effects they would create across passenger and cargo operations, our 
workforce and the broader economy would simply be incalculable and 
untenable. Airline customers rely on airlines to transport time-
sensitive perishable products such as pharmaceuticals, vaccines, 
organs, critical supply chain parts and many other high-value items. 
Every one of the passenger and cargo carriers would also be struggling 
to get people, shipments, planes, and crews where they need to be. We 
were on the precipice of the nation's commerce grinding to a halt. 
Thankfully, the ongoing coordination and progress has allowed us to 
avoid these massive economic and operational disruptions for the most 
part.
                    Clearing the `Air' & `Airwaves'
    Some in the media and other observers have tried to portray this 
situation as a conflict between the airline industry and the 
telecommunications industry. That is simply not the case. In fact, 
airlines fully support 5G--but it needs to be deployed in a manner that 
allows 5G and aviation to coexist safely. We are grateful to our 
telecommunications colleagues and are hopeful they continue to play a 
critical role in sharing information with the FAA and FCC to help 
mitigate any interference issues. We cannot avoid significant 
disruption to the aviation system without their continued collaboration 
and transparency.
    The truth of the matter is that both of our industries have been 
thrust into this avoidable economic calamity by a government process 
that failed to provide an adequate amount of interagency communication, 
understanding and recognition of decisional consequences. The 
circumstances and challenges we face currently could and should have 
been directly addressed prior to the spectrum auction.
    International Examples: It's Not What You Do, It's How You Do It
    Much has been said and inferred regarding 5G deployment 
internationally. The FAA has noted that international examples versus 
U.S. 5G deployment are apples-to-oranges comparisons. As opposed to the 
process cited above, other countries reportedly heeded aviation 
concerns and addressed them through various mitigations prior to 5G C-
band technology deployment.
    On its dedicated 5G website, the FAA cites France as an example for 
comparison to the U.S. The FAA chart (attached) indicates the resulting 
deployment of 5G C-band in the U.S. is significantly distinguishable 
from deployment of 5G C-band in France because the FCC licensed the use 
of the spectrum at exponentially higher power levels. The allocated 
frequencies are also generally farther away from the radio frequency 
band used by radio altimeters. We understand that many other countries 
have also effectively utilized a combination of exclusion zones around 
airports, lower power levels and directional changes to antennas to 
mitigate interference.
    There is no reason to believe these types of mitigations could not 
have been contemplated and implemented at the on-set of the regulatory 
process through proper inter-governmental communication channels.
                            Lessons Learned
    The Committee and Congress should be aware that it will likely take 
years, not days or weeks, to fully and permanently mitigate the 
interference issues caused by deployment of 5G in the C-band. The 
interference issues have created a complex web of aircraft-by-aircraft, 
runway-by-runway, radio altimeter-by-radio altimeter determinations on 
a flight-by-flight basis. They have created a complicated matrix of 
variables and uncertainty in the operational deployment of aircraft 
assets and as we have seen, will still cause cancellations, delays and 
diversions even under the best of scenarios. In some cases, we are 
simply hoping for good weather so flights can be cleared to land at 
their intended destinations.
    The U.S. aviation industry should not be in this position and the 
process that led to this operational nightmare should be held up as 
cautionary tale of government communication and coordination gone awry. 
It is not a partisan problem; it is a government process problem that 
desperately needs to be addressed. One can assume there will be a 6G, 
7G and many other spectrum utilization issues in the future; those 
efforts should be seamlessly integrated into the broader economy 
without causing seismic disruptions to critical industry segments. 
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers for the current dynamic, but 
there a framework can be put in place to make sure this never happens 
again to our industry, or any other for that matter.
                               Conclusion
    We appreciate all the actions taken by various stakeholders to 
avert catastrophic disruption to the traveling and shipping public, the 
global supply chain and the U.S. economy. The day-to-day 
unpredictability remains a significant challenge for airlines, but the 
work over the course of the last few weeks is an important step toward 
achieving a permanent solution that will allow the U.S. to continue 
leading the world in aviation safety while also expanding our nation's 
5G network.

                                                       attachment 1
_______________________________________________________________________
          MYTH: Aviation Raised 5G Concerns at the Last Minute
    FACT: Aviation Started Raising Concerns as Far Back as May 2018
_______________________________________________________________________
                                TIMELINE
_______________________________________________________________________
                                  2018
March 2018--The Mobile Now Act is enacted, authorizing the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) through notice and comment on the 
feasibility of allowing commercial wireless services, licensed or 
unlicensed, to use or share use of the frequencies between 3700 
megahertz and 4200 megahertz.

April 2018--FCC issues public notice encouraging the public to comment 
on potential for more intensive use of the 3.7-4.2 GHz Band to submit 
those filings in this docket.

May 2018--A4A files comments in response to FCC public notice raising 
radio altimeter and satellite communication (SATCOM) interference 
concerns.

July 2018--FCC issues Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on 
Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz spectrum band.

October 2018--AVIATION SPECTRUM RESOURCES, INC. (ASRI) files comments 
to FCC reiterating aviation industry concerns on the potential impact 
to radio altimeter and SATCOM.
                                  2019
October 2019--AEROSPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS INSTITUTE (AVSI) files 
``Behavior of Radio Altimeters Subject to Out-Of-Band Interference'' 
report in FCC rulemaking docket, raising the potential for interference 
issues affecting the 4.2-4.4 GHz band start for commercial aircraft.

November 22, 2019--HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE (T&I) 
COMMITTEE Chair DeFazio sends letter to FCC warning of potential 
interference to radio altimeters from 5G deployment in the C-Band.
                                  2020
February 21, 2020--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends ex parte letter 
and presentation to FCC raising safety concerns.

February 28, 2020--FCC issues Order to move forward with auctioning 
``C-band'' spectrum.

May 2020--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION files petitions for 
reconsideration of the FCC Order.

October 7, 2020--RADIO TECHNICAL COMMISSION FOR AERONAUTICS (RTCA) 
completes a six-month assessment of interference from 5G network 
emissions with radio altimeter performance, revealing a ``major risk 
that 5G telecommunications systems in the 3.7-3.9 GHz band will cause 
harmful interference to [radio] altimeters on all types of civil 
aircraft.''

December 2020--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION submits letter of support 
for petition for reconsideration.

December 1, 2020--DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOT) AND FEDERAL 
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) submit joint letter voicing interference 
concerns to the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA)and request NTIA to submit their letter to the FCC 
public docket. NTIA did not submit the letter to the FCC docket.

December 7, 2020--HOUSE T&I COMMITTEE Chair DeFazio sends letter to FCC 
asking the agency to delay its C-Band auction.

December 8, 2020--FCC begins auction of the 3.7-3.98 GHz frequency 
band.
                                  2021
February 2021--FCC completes $81 billion auction of the 3.7-3.98 GHz 
frequency band and subsequently issues licenses to AT&T and Verizon to 
begin deployment on December 5, 2021.

May 2021--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends letter to FCC supporting 
aviation petition for reconsideration and responding to Cellular 
Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) FCC filing.

July 2021--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends letter to DOT raising 
imminent safety risk facing aviation industry.

August 2021--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends presentation to FCC 
raising safety concerns and asking for a taskforce to resolve concerns.

November 2, 2021--FAA issues Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin 
alerting manufacturers, operators and pilots that action might be 
required to address potential interference with aircraft radio 
altimeter caused by the rollout of 5G wireless broadband on December 5, 
2021.

November 3, 2021--FAA AND FCC announce that AT&T and Verizon have 
agreed to delay the 5G C-band deployment from December 5, 2021 to 
January 5, 2022.

November 5, 2021--AVIATION INDUSTRY COALITION sends letter to National 
Economic Council (NEC) urging it to ``work with the FCC and FAA to 
convene a joint industry working group and continue to delay the 
deployment of 5G technologies in this band until the safety and 
efficiency of the [National Air Space] is ensured.''

November 19, 2021--HOUSE T&I COMMITTEE Chair DeFazio and Aviation 
Subcommittee Chair Larsen send letter to FCC urging the agency not to 
go through with any 5G C-band deployments until the FAA conducts a risk 
assessment that proves no further ``mitigations are necessary or that 
all necessary mitigations are in place,'' and requesting FCC to provide 
FAA with any technical data related to aviation and 5G broadband 
service.

November 24, 2021--AT&T AND VERIZON issue a proposal committing to 
adopt ``additional precautionary measures'' for 6 months to mitigate 
the potential impact of 5G on radio altimeters.

December 3, 2021--AIA AND OTHER AVIATION STAKEHOLDERS circulate a 
counterproposal to the telecom industry's November 24 mitigation 
proposal.

December 7, 2021--FAA issues two Airworthiness Directives (ADs) 
identifying safety concerns and outlining potential flight 
restrictions. The ADs state that ``radio altimeters cannot be relied 
upon to perform their intended function if they experience interference 
from wireless broadband operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz frequency band 
(5G C-Band).''

December 22, 2021--A4A, AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASSOCIATION (AIA) AND CTIA 
announce agreement to work together in coordination with the FAA and 
FCC to ``identify a path forward.''

December 23, 2021--FAA issues second Special Airworthiness Information 
Bulletin and a Safety Alert for Operators regarding the ``Risk of 
Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in the 
Presence of 5G C-Band Interference.''

December 30, 2021--A4A files emergency petition with the FCC to stay 
initiation of the deployment of 5G around certain airports until a 
solution can be identified.
                                  2022
January 4, 2022--WHITE HOUSE announces agreement with AT&T and Verizon 
to delay the 5G C-band deployment by two weeks from January 5 to 
January 19, 2022 and to reduce the 5G signal power and not activate 
transmitters in close proximity to up to 50 priority airports for six 
months through July 5, 2022.

January 17, 2022--A4A sends a letter--signed by the CEOs of the leading 
cargo and passenger airlines--to National Economic Council Director 
Brian Deese, Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg, FAA Administrator 
Steve Dickson and FCC Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel urging immediate 
action to address major disruptions to the traveling and shipping 
public as a result of the deployment of new 5G service near airports 
scheduled to begin on January 19.

January 18, 2022--WHITE HOUSE announces agreement with AT&T and Verizon 
to deploy 5G on January 19, 2022 except around key airports and to 
continue working with the federal government on safe 5G deployment at 
those locations.

                                                       attachment 2

                          FAA Comparison Chart
                          
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                           Source: FAA.gov/5G

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, Mr. Calio.
    I will now turn to Mr. Fanning. Mr. Fanning, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fanning. Thank you. Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, 
Ranking Member Sam Graves, Ranking Member Garret Graves, and 
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear 
today and for your leadership on this important matter.
    In partnership with the FAA and other Government partners, 
U.S. aviation manufacturers and our airline customers set the 
gold standard of safety worldwide. Maintaining this 
unprecedented level of safety is our priority mission. For this 
reason, we have been expressing serious concerns about possible 
interference with a key aviation safety device known as a radio 
altimeter upon deployment of the new 5G service in the C-band.
    Spectrum is the lifeblood of our industry, and we support 
5G rollout. It will be important to our industry, it will be 
important to the more than 2 million people who work in our 
industry, and it will usher in new advances for our society, 
but it must be done in a way that assures the U.S. gold 
standard of safety defined as the chance of 1 catastrophic 
incident in 1 billion flight-hours.
    We know we can do this because as an industry we do it 
every day, introduce complex technologies into society safely. 
AIA members manufacture first-in-class fixed-wing and rotary 
aircraft of all sizes, each with extensive safety features. One 
of the most critical is the radio altimeter, which is the 
workhorse of the overall integrated safety system.
    While it is a simple device, it has the most consequential 
of purposes, helping to save lives. Altimeters help pilots 
determine an aircraft's altitude. These highly reliable devices 
are essential to a number of aircraft functions, including 
precision approach, landing, ground proximity, and collision 
avoidance. All commercial and most general aviation aircraft, 
as well as helicopters, use an altimeter.
    Altimeters are unique to each aircraft type and model. They 
are designed, manufactured, tested, and certified against the 
most rigorous safety requirements as a single component and 
then again as part of the aircraft's integrated safety system.
    Altimeters are especially important for pilots dealing with 
low-visibility conditions and in other situations like wind 
sheer, which causes rapid decrease in airspeed due to wind 
flows near the ground. It can be particularly hazardous during 
takeoff and landing. In such an environment, fluctuation in 
atmospheric pressure can result in airspeed indicators and 
barometric altimeters providing misleading indications to the 
flightcrew, but the radio altimeter can be trusted, and it is 
this device they must rely on to execute a successful escape 
maneuver.
    Beginning in 2018, aviation stakeholders began calling for 
collaboration to address potential interference because of the 
altimeter's essential safety function. While progress is now 
occurring, this is not the same as declaring the problem 
solved. The mitigation measures underway are temporary and 
focus on our largest cities. We need to ensure that all 
airports, including airports in small and mid-sized 
communities, can maintain their operations' safety as rollouts 
continue.
    The U.S. aviation system is incredibly complex. It is not 
nearly as simple as adopting another country's safety playbook 
for 5G development for reasons including orientation of the 
base tower and differing maximum power levels. Our efforts must 
be specific to U.S. needs and safety requirements.
    Based on where we are today, the development of new 
standards will take considerable time. Because of this, a 
proposal to retrofit out-of-band filters or other solutions 
cannot be accomplished overnight.
    Manufacturing and certifying new radar altimeter designs on 
a forward-fit basis is the ultimate goal, but that will take 
even longer. It will take extensive testing, certification, and 
time. The U.S. has set the gold standard as the safest aviation 
system in the world, and we have incredibly high requirements 
to keep it that way. Policy is an essential element to 
maintaining this level of safety, but currently there is no 
formal requirement for 5G interference tolerance, an incomplete 
understanding of spurious emissions, and no agreed-upon worst-
case interference scenario.
    One of the lessons learned in this case is that the effects 
of spectrum relocation or sharing are not simple. The auction 
process seeks to address and indemnify in-band users that are 
being relocated, but the effects of interference on nearby 
users and the requisite mitigation, as in this case, is not 
adequately addressed by all regulations.
    There will be future generations of technologies and 
spectrum auctions. We need to modernize the regulatory 
framework before this happens again. The ultimate goal is to 
maximize 5G while minimizing disruptions. There will be a gap 
between the end of the 6-month compromise and when the ultimate 
solution is identified and implemented.
    That means a process must be established to provide ongoing 
information sharing and dialogue between Government and all 
private-sector stakeholders, and a process that also helps us 
avoid finding ourselves in this position again as we 
contemplate future additions to spectrum.
    Thank you to the committee for listening to our 
perspectives, and I look forward to your questions.
    [Mr. Fanning's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eric Fanning, President and Chief Executive 
               Officer, Aerospace Industries Association
                              Introduction
    Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Sam Graves, 
Ranking Member Garret Graves, and members of the committee, thank you 
for inviting me to appear before the Aviation Subcommittee today. My 
name is Eric Fanning, and I serve as the President and CEO of the 
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA). For over 100 years, AIA has 
advocated for America's aerospace and defense (A&D) companies and the 
more than two million men and women who are the backbone of our 
industry.
    AIA applauds this committee for its ongoing leadership in ensuring 
5G in the C-Band will safely coexist with users of the National 
Airspace System. Chairman DeFazio and Chairman Larsen, we are 
particularly thankful for your ongoing work to highlight aviation 
safety concerns about potential 5G interference to multiple federal 
agencies and the White House as far back as November 2019. Over the 
past two-plus years, your staff continuously took time to meet with AIA 
and other members of the coalition to best understand how we can safely 
deploy 5G. For these things, we are grateful.
           Our Industry's Role in Protecting Aviation Safety
    Today, AIA represents over 300 aerospace and defense (A&D) 
companies ranging from family-run businesses to larger corporations 
exporting products around the globe. Our membership includes aircraft 
and engine manufacturers, companies that design and build radio 
altimeters and other aircraft systems that are integrated with them, as 
well as a vital supply chain network of companies that provide 
equipment, parts, maintenance, repair, and other services. Our members 
would tell you that our companies are in the safety business. And over 
the latest 25 years, in partnership with the Federal Aviation 
Administration, we set the highest safety standards across the globe. 
We are proud to be considered part of this ``gold standard'' safety 
system.
    AIA members manufacture fixed-wing and rotary aircraft of all 
sizes. These aircraft are first-in-class--superior in design and 
performance. The safety features are extensive, starting in the 
cockpit, deployed throughout the cabin, found in the engines, and even 
on the wings. One of the most critical safety features in an aircraft 
is a radio altimeter, which is the workhorse of the overall integrated 
safety system. While it is a simple device, it has the most 
sophisticated of purposes--helping to save lives.
    Altimeters help pilots determine a jet's altitude and its distance 
from other objects. These devices are essential to a number of aircraft 
functions, including precision approach, landing, ground proximity, and 
collision avoidance. It is the only sensor that provides this crucial 
information. All commercial and most general aviation aircraft, as well 
as many helicopters, use an altimeter. The devices are unique to each 
aircraft type and model. They are each designed, manufactured, tested, 
and certified against the most rigorous safety requirements and 
standards as a single component. They also go through the same 
stringent process once integrated into a specific aircraft where they 
are tested and certified as part of a coordinated aviation safety 
system.
    Altimeters are especially important for pilots when dealing with 
low-visibility conditions and in other situations such as encountering 
windshear. Because of the rigorous safety standards of the aviation 
industry and their reliability, radar altimeters are the backbone of an 
aircraft's overall safety system.
    To provide a real-world example of one of many critical instances 
where radar altimeters are used, consider when an aircraft encounters 
windshear. Windshear is a weather phenomenon that causes aircraft to 
experience a rapid decrease in airspeed due to wind flows near the 
ground. This can be particularly hazardous during takeoff and landing. 
When encountering a windshear, the pilot flying the aircraft may need 
to execute a manual escape maneuver, which adjusts pitch to a nose-up 
altitude and increases engine thrust to full power. It is worth noting 
that escape maneuvers often happen at low altitudes. The co-pilot or 
cockpit audible alerts then continuously call out radar altitude to 
help with decision making as they work to avoid ground contact. Loss 
of, or erroneous, radar altitude readings during the escape maneuver 
due to interference would greatly reduce the chances of a successful 
and safe outcome.
    Because of the unique and necessary role altimeters play in 
aviation, concern arose quickly about possible interference upon 
deployment of new 5G service in the C-Band from a broad group of 
stakeholders, ranging from the airlines, commercial pilots, the 
helicopter and regional airline associations, the manufacturers, and 
others.
                    Aviation Industry Support of 5G
    While safety is the cornerstone of our business, the aerospace and 
defense (A&D) industry is also an ecosystem rooted in technology and 
innovation. That means our sector needs advanced telecommunication 
services to include 5G and beyond and supports their rollout. Spectrum 
is the lifeblood of our industry, and we need safe, reliable, and 
continuous access to various bands, not just for today's technologies, 
but also for technologies that will be integrated into our airspace in 
the future.
    Perhaps more than any other industry, the A&D industry knows what 
it is like to introduce complex technologies into society and is 
committed to doing it safely. That is why we are confident that 5G in 
the C-Band and aviation can safely coexist. Over the past several 
years, our industry's concerns regarding the pending use of 5G in the 
C-Band have been focused on continued adherence to the highest level of 
aviation safety. Safety isn't as easy as flipping a switch, so the 
manufacturers' design and technical expertise must be brought into 
play. Again, I want to reiterate that you can't just provide a band-aid 
solution to assure gold-standard safety, which is defined as the chance 
of one catastrophic incident in one billion flight hours. We will 
continue to offer industry expertise to our government partners and 
airline or general aviation customers to help mitigate any possible 
interference.
                          How Did We Get Here?
    While we would all like to focus our efforts on continuing to make 
progress toward a safe and comprehensive resolution, examining how we 
arrived at this hearing is important for policymakers, the public, and 
the organizations involved in this issue.
    In 2018, the FCC released the first Public Notice expressing its 
intent to auction spectrum in the 3.7-4.2 GHz band (or C-Band). 
Consequently, AIA submitted comments to the FCC highlighting the 
potential inference to aeronautical communications and safety services, 
including radio altimeters, operating in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band. Over the 
last four years, AIA and our colleagues across the aviation industry 
have worked diligently to provide the FCC, FAA, National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Department of 
Defense (DoD), the White House, and Members of Congress with as much 
data as possible on the potential for interference.
    Additionally, with the FCC's encouragement, the Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) studied this issue. While the 
telecommunications industry was invited to participate in the analysis, 
it chose not to do so. In October 2020, RTCA concluded that 5G systems 
operating in the C-Band would likely cause interference with 
altimeters. Shortly thereafter, in December 2020, the Acting Deputy 
Secretary of Transportation and the FAA Administrator wrote to the NTIA 
expressing safety concerns over the planned auction and asking that it 
be deferred.\1\ According to the Wall Street Journal,\2\ this letter 
did not receive broad attention because it was not made public in the 
NTIA regulatory docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Letter to National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration re: ``Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz 
Band'', December 1, 2020, signed by Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Deputy 
Secretary and General Counsel, U. S. Department of Transportation and 
Steve Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.
    \2\ ``Agencies Feud Over Aviation Safety, 5G Rollout'', Wall Street 
Journal, November 15, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the key arguments against the aviation industry's concern is 
that 5G technology has been deployed in other countries around the 
world without causing harm to public and aviation safety. However, 
conditions are different in the United States due to three important 
factors: power levels, proximity to airports, and orientation of base 
towers.
    The U.S. aviation system is incredibly complex. It's not nearly as 
simple as adopting another country's safety playbook for many reasons, 
such as orientation of the base tower and differing maximum power 
levels. The deployment examples from other countries come with specific 
government-mandated restrictions, lower power levels, and different 
technical features that must be considered in making any comparison 
between the U.S. and overseas 5G deployment. Here are some specific 
examples which make the American deployment of 5G in the 3.7-4.2 GHz 
range different:
      Japan: While Japan has deployed 5G up to 4.1 GHz, the 
power levels permitted for 5G are at least 90% below those permitted in 
the United States. If 5G providers in the United States operated 5G 
with this mitigation, then the issue with aviation users would be 
reduced.
      Europe: The 3.4-3.8 GHz band is utilized for 5G. However, 
the amount of separation from adjacent bands is 100 MHz farther than 
authorized in the United States, meaning that interference is less 
likely to occur, and the maximum power level permitted in most of 
Europe is well below the level permitted in the United States.
      France: Regulators in France imposed mitigations on the 
use of 5G--exclusion zones--to protect public safety. This type of 
mitigation is consistent with recommendations made to the FCC by the 
aviation industry.
      Australia: Compared to Europe, Australia operates even 
farther away from the radio frequency band used by the radio altimeter. 
In addition, the power levels permitted in Australia are 76% lower than 
that allowed in the United States.

    The A & D industry believes in the incredible potential of 5G for 
our country and our companies, and we are committed to find ways to 
ensure that 5G in the C-Band and aviation can safely coexist. For this 
reason, in 2018 we called for a collaborative environment for the 
aviation industry and the telecommunications industry to share 
information. Our goal was to provide both the FAA and FCC with 
necessary data to address potential interference and, in turn, come to 
a long-term mutually agreeable solution that addressed the needs and 
concerns of all parties. Unfortunately, that collaboration did not 
begin until December 2021, the same month FCC licenses allowed 5G 
services to begin.
    In July 2021, the FAA met with AIA and the aviation industry and we 
expressed a need for information from the telecommunications industry 
including details such as 5G tower locations, antenna angles, and power 
levels. AIA subsequently joined a letter of 20 aviation associations 
and aerospace companies to the Department of Transportation and 
Department of Commerce requesting support from the Administration to 
facilitate interagency coordination and information sharing between the 
aviation and telecommunications industries.\3\ In November 2021, the 
National Economic Council (NEC) began discussions with both respective 
industries and the deployment of 5G in the C-Band was delayed by one 
month to January 5, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Aviation industry stakeholder letter to Transportation 
Secretary Pete Buttigieg and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, July 14, 
2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Between December 2021 and the beginning of this year, aviation 
engineers and technical experts worked tirelessly to collaborate and 
examine the consequences of interference. We are grateful Verizon and 
AT&T agreed to another delay on January 3, 2022, until January 19, 
2022, as we began to receive the FAA's Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs) 
and manufacturers could empirically analyze the impact to specific 
aircraft and their radio altimeter models and ultimately propose 
Alternative Means of Compliance (AMOCs).
    Thanks to strong communication and cooperation among the government 
and the aviation and telecommunication industry, significant progress 
has been made over the past few weeks. The intervention of this 
Committee, along with that of the NEC, the DOT, and the FAA has been a 
catalyst for bringing the different stakeholders together. Since the 
January 3rd agreement was signed, AT&T and Verizon have been working 
with aviation manufacturers daily--sharing data and developing 
additional mitigations to allow most commercial flights to take off and 
land safely. Fortunately, the telecommunications companies agreed to 
delay full deployment on January 18, 2022. While the process is 
belatedly making significant positive progress, there is more work to 
be done for 5G to deploy safely.
    While the FAA is currently working with the manufacturers, 
airlines, and the telecommunications companies, and progress is being 
made, it is important to note this is not the same as declaring the 
problem solved. What matters most is the percentage of overall U. S. 
aviation operations that are affected because they do not have an 
appropriate temporary approval from the FAA as reflected in an 
Alternative Means of Compliance (AMOC). Delays are still occurring, and 
AMOCs have not yet been approved for most regional airline operations, 
general aviation aircraft, or most helicopter operations.
    As this subcommittee knows well, our aviation system is a complex 
network of airports in small and mid-sized communities as well as big 
cities. FAA's 2021 National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems lists 
3,300 active airports in the United States. Many of these airports in 
small communities depend heavily on aviation because of remoteness or 
other factors. We need to ensure that all airports can maintain their 
operations, not just the large ones, as the 5G rollout continues. 
Furthermore, we will need to ensure the same agreements are in place as 
additional licensees deploy their systems. It is clear there is much 
more to be done over the coming months.
    While we wish intergovernmental coordination had been stronger and 
given more credence to the views of aviation experts and regulators, 
our industry needs 5G services and is committed to seeing their 
rollout, while preserving the highest levels of aviation safety at the 
same time. The aviation industry has the most knowledgeable and 
accomplished engineers, pilots, systems operators, and avionics experts 
in the world. Moving forward, it is our hope that their expertise on 
the complex science of machines in flight is given deference and 
greater weight as the NTIA and FCC continue their difficult job of 
deciding how to effectively utilize limited radiofrequency spectrum.
    We are glad to be making progress and working together, but by no 
means are we on a glide path. With many outstanding questions still on 
the table, there are disruptions in our future, even with further 
compromise and collaboration.
                      What Can This Committee Do?
    The United States has set the gold standard as the safest aviation 
system in the world, and we have incredibly high requirements to keep 
it that way. But currently, there is no formal requirement for 5G 
interference tolerance, an incomplete understanding of spurious 
emissions, and no agreed-upon worst case interference scenario. Based 
on where we are today, the development of new standards, including the 
implementation of minimum performance standards via Technical Service 
Orders (TSOs), will take considerable time. Because of this, a proposal 
to retrofit out-of-band filters or other solutions cannot be 
accomplished overnight. Manufacturing and certifying new radar 
altimeter designs on a forward-fit basis is the ultimate goal, but that 
will take even longer. In fact, it will take testing and take time.
    One of the lessons learned in this case is that the effects of 
spectrum relocation or sharing are not simple or clear-cut. The auction 
process seeks to address and indemnify in-band users that are being 
relocated to make room for new purchasers, whether 5G or other 
licensees. However, the effects of interference on nearby users and the 
requisite mitigation--as in this case--is not adequately addressed by 
the regulations governing spectrum allocation and auction. Aviation is 
left with the task of financing these fixes, over both the short- and 
long-term, and it is not clear whether auction proceeds are available 
for this purpose. We believe that needs to be considered.
    Finally, we hope Congress will consider changes to the spectrum 
auction process to consider the views of the government's aviation 
safety experts more appropriately in the DOT and the FAA. Just three 
months ago, Congress provided the DoD and the Congressional Armed 
Services Committees with additional authorities in future spectrum 
actions affecting the 3.1 to 3.45 GHz band in H.R. 3684, the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. This provision was designed to 
ensure this potential auction does not cause DoD the same kind of 
problems we are now experiencing in aviation, and ensures the 
appropriate Congressional committees are involved early in the process. 
Our aviation system is too important to our economy, and too vital to 
our small, rural communities, to face mass groundings again in the 
future. We urge this Committee and the Congress to explore similar 
authorities for the DOT, to ensure that the coordination with this 
committee, and the role of our government's aviation authorities, are 
strengthened in future spectrum decisions.
    We are not out of the woods yet and some disruptions are likely. 
The process will take a while because the stakes are so high. We are 
hopeful we can anticipate and address challenges or concerns earlier in 
the future. We know that the telecommunications industry carriers will 
continue to innovate, as will aviation. Spectrum is the lifeblood of 
our industry, and we need safe, reliable, and continuous access to 
various bands, not just for today's technologies, but also for 
technologies that will be integrated into our airspace in the future.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, Mr. Fanning.
    For the introduction of Ms. Stephens, I turn to the chair 
of the full committee, Chair DeFazio.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes. Thank you for 
the opportunity to introduce the next witness, Cathryn 
Stephens. She is the airport director in Eugene, Oregon, and 
she will offer both the perspective of an airport that does 
have a lot of low-visibility issues in the wintertime.
    In fact, many, many years ago, I had to kind of strong-arm 
the FAA to get a CAT II system because they said we didn't have 
enough flights, but we had more diversions and cancellations 
than almost any other airport that I could find, so they 
relented, and we got it. But if we couldn't use it, we would be 
back to those days of people ending up in Portland and driving 
down on a bus. So, that is not acceptable.
    She is a recognized leader in the city of Eugene, largest 
city in my district. She was named airport manager of the year 
by the Oregon Airport Management Association. She is a director 
for the AAAE and chairs the association's Diversity, Equity, 
and Inclusion Committee. She has done a lot for inclusion and 
innovation broadly across the airport community, not just for 
my airport. And she was helpful also to the committee as we 
work through coronavirus relief and the IIJA, Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act, and highlighting as she will, perhaps 
today a bit, the 5G issues in transitioning our airport, and I 
appreciate her taking the time to be here today.
    Thanks, Cathryn.
    Ms. Stephens. Thank you so much for that introduction, 
Chairman DeFazio.
    Mr. Larsen. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Stephens. Thank you. Chair DeFazio, Ranking Member 
Graves, Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the invitation and for your 
continued leadership on issues of importance to airports and 
the aviation industry.
    I am testifying today on behalf of the American Association 
of Airport Executives where I am a member of the board of 
directors. I currently serve as airport director at the Eugene 
Airport, and I would like to briefly express my personal 
appreciation to Chair DeFazio, my hometown Congressman, who has 
done so much for our community and for airports and the 
aviation industry during his distinguished career.
    Thank you, Chair DeFazio.
    Getting it right with the continued rollout of 5G and 
subsequent enhanced telecommunication services is imperative 
for airports in every segment of the highly interdependent 
aviation system. As the deployment continues, it must be done 
in a way that does not jeopardize aviation safety or 
significantly limit operations during low-visibility 
conditions.
    Delays, diversions, flight cancellations, and the grounding 
of aircrafts during low-visibility events, all of which remain 
possible as the 5G C-band rollout continues, aren't just an 
inconvenience, they ripple across the country and the globe 
quickly with significant negative impacts.
    Airports are on the front line of dealing with the fallout 
when disruptions occur, yet we haven't had much involvement in 
the 5G C-band deployment to this point or insight as to what 
the path will be moving forward, and that must change moving 
forward.
    At the Eugene Airport, for example, there are currently 
low-visibility flight limitations related to the 5G C-band 
deployment, even though Eugene is not one of the initial 46 
markets in which these services are being offered.
    We were surprised and concerned to learn of these 
limitations which posed significant challenges at EUG and 
flight disruptions for our passengers. To give you a sense of 
the magnitude of the issue, if the FAA's flight restrictions 
had been in place in 2021, there would have been about 90 low-
visibility days impacting up to 40 percent of our flights per 
day.
    More broadly, it is positive that the immediate systemwide 
crisis we all feared with the initial deployment on January 
19th has been averted. We commend AT&T and Verizon for their 
voluntary actions to establish deployment buffer zones at 
affected airports, and we appreciate the FAA's diligence to 
clear more than 90 percent of the U.S. commercial fleet to 
operate into affected airports in certain low-visibility 
situations as part of the AMOC process.
    Unfortunately, these fixes are both limited and temporary. 
We understand that the buffer zones where 5G C-band signals 
have been limited since January 19th around more than 80 
affected airports are shifting short term and remain in effect 
only because of the good graces of the telecommunications 
companies.
    We further understand that the FAA's AMOCs for aircraft 
will be subject to constant review, refinement, and alteration 
potentially. Additionally, there are still some regional 
aircraft that are not yet approved to fly during low-visibility 
conditions, including at the Eugene Airport.
    While only a small percentage of the fleet, these aircraft 
provide critical air service to many small communities. The 
recent cancellations at Paine Field, which appear to be 
resolved at least for now using the newly approved AMOCs, 
illustrate the painful impact that can be felt at smaller 
airports when key aircraft are prohibited from operating. Over 
the past few weeks, airports have seen cancellations, 
diversions, and other impacts resulting from the inability of 
aircraft to operate at affected airports in low-visibility 
conditions.
    Problems at spoke airports aren't just a local problem, 
they cascade and create disruptions, hassles, and problems 
throughout the system. So, how do we move forward? First, we 
need a permanent solution that provides long-term certainties 
at airlines, airports, passengers, and all segments of the 
industry. Not knowing long term what aircraft can fly where, 
under what conditions, is a serious problem for an industry 
that requires certainty for scheduling and planning.
    We also need better communication from our Federal partners 
and additional data and information sharing, transparency, and 
aviation industry involvement. The lack of insight into the 
location of 5G towers that could impact operations at 
individual airports is incredibly frustrating. With better 
information and more active involvement, airports and our 
aviation industry partners could be proactive in preparing 
rather than reactive as we have been forced to be in recent 
weeks.
    In closing, I would summarize by saying that the temporary 
reprieve of recent weeks has been positive, but airports have 
significant concerns about what lies ahead. We need a permanent 
solution that acknowledges the benefits of 5G services while 
also addressing the critical need for our Nation's aviation 
system to function 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and in low-
visibility conditions. AAAE stands ready to work with our 
Government and industry partners to address these critical 
needs.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [Ms. Stephens' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Cathryn Stephens, A.A.E., Airport Director, 
   Eugene Airport, on behalf of the American Association of Airport 
                               Executives
    Chair DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Chair Larsen, Ranking Member 
Graves, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 
to appear before you today to highlight airport industry concerns and 
the perspective of an individual airport operator on the effects of 5G 
C-Band deployment on the nation's aviation system.
    My name is Cathryn Stephens, and I am the Airport Director for the 
Eugene Airport (EUG) in Eugene, Oregon. I am testifying today on behalf 
of the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE), where I serve 
on the Board of Directors. AAAE is the world's largest professional 
organization representing individuals who manage and operate more than 
850 public-use commercial and general aviation airports across the 
country.
    As you have clearly recognized in putting together today's hearing, 
getting it ``right'' when it comes to the continued rollout of 5G and 
other critical telecommunication services in the months and years ahead 
is imperative for the continued safe and efficient operation of the 
nation's highly interdependent aviation system. The fact that you have 
gathered witnesses representing airports, mainline carriers, regional 
carriers, manufacturers, helicopter operators, and pilots speaks to the 
importance of this issue across the aviation industry.
    As has been widely reported, progress has been made in recent weeks 
to mitigate the immediate impacts of the 5G C-Band rollout on the 
aviation system and to prevent potential interference with aircraft 
operations that could have resulted in a significant safety hazard. The 
voluntary action taken by Verizon and AT&T on January 18 in advance of 
the January 19 rollout and the subsequent work by the Federal Aviation 
Administration to clear a large percentage of the U.S. commercial 
aircraft fleet to conduct low-visibility operations into affected 
airports are notable.
    Still, questions and concerns remain about what the days, weeks, 
months, and years ahead will mean as the situation evolves and as the 
deployment of 5G continues in communities across the country. Already, 
some airports--including Paine Field in Washington State--have seen 
significant flight cancellations during low-visibility events because 
of limitations placed on specific aircraft that routinely operate at 
their facilities. Other airports are seeing flight delays and 
diversions due to similar aircraft limitations as bad weather impacts 
operations at nearby airports. The list of affected airports could grow 
as more low-visibility events occur.
    Disruptions, diversions, flight cancellations, and the grounding of 
aircraft during low-visibility events--all of which hang over our 
industry and our passengers as a real possibility as the 5G C-Band 
rollout continues--aren't just an inconvenience, they ripple across the 
country and the globe quickly with significant, negative impacts on 
passengers, airports, communities, businesses, our supply chain, and 
the economy.
    While we are grateful for the measures that have been put in place 
to partially address immediate concerns--and commend AT&T and Verizon 
for their voluntary actions to date--we need to be clear: the temporary 
and partial fixes that have been in place to this point simply aren't 
acceptable in the long-term. We need a permanent solution that 
acknowledges the importance of 5G services to consumers, businesses, 
the economy, and national security and the significant investments by 
telecommunications providers while also addressing the critical need 
for our nation's aviation system to function 24 hours a day, 365 days a 
year, in low-visibility conditions.
    We also need better communication from our federal partners and 
additional data and information sharing, transparency, and aviation 
industry involvement to understand exactly where we are with 5G 
deployment and where we are headed.
    It's incredibly frustrating to me and my airport colleagues, for 
example, to not have insight into the location of 5G towers that could 
impact operations at our facilities and to lack information and 
certainty on what aircraft will be able to serve our airports under 
what circumstances in the future as 5G deployment continues. 
Uncertainty is a major problem in the aviation industry. Unfortunately, 
we find ourselves awash in uncertainty at the present time.
    Airports and our aviation industry partners need more insight and 
involvement on the path ahead so that we can be proactive in preparing 
rather than reactive as we have been forced to be in recent weeks. All 
airports--including those not immediately impacted by the initial 
January 19 rollout--must prepare for and deal with potential delays, 
diversions, cancellations, and other impacts, but we lack the 
information, insight, and involvement to do so effectively. That must 
change moving forward.
     The Eugene Perspective: Uncertainty, Questions, and Potential 
                          Operational Impacts
    The challenges, frustrations, questions, uncertainty, and potential 
operational impacts for affected airports are readily apparent at 
Eugene. Despite being outside of the 46 Partial Economic Areas (PEAs) 
where 5G C-Band was deployed on January 19, EUG and a handful of other 
airports outside of the initial PEAs have been subject to Instrument 
Approach Procedure (IAP) Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMs), which 
significantly limit aircraft operations during low-visibility 
conditions--conditions that can be routine in our area. These NOTAMs 
were issued by the FAA to identify the airport IAPs affected by 5G C-
Band interference and prohibited for use by the U.S. commercial fleet 
through an FAA airworthiness directive.
    At EUG and the 87 other airports with similar IAP NOTAMS related to 
5G deployment, no operations can occur in low-visibility conditions 
unless the FAA has granted the aircraft manufacturer an Alternative 
Means of Compliance (AMOC), which allows specific aircraft to fly into 
specific airports under specific conditions. Unfortunately, we have no 
insight into the conditions specified or the ability to review them as 
they are provided only to the manufacturer that holds the AMOC. The FAA 
does not make those approvals publicly available.
    While it is positive that the FAA has reviewed and approved AMOCs 
on an expedited basis to cover at least 90 percent of the U.S. 
commercial aircraft fleet, we are not yet at the point where all 
aircraft previously serving my airport and others can continue to 
operate in low-visibility conditions. The continued inability for 
certain aircraft to operate during low-visibility conditions poses a 
particular problem for airports that may only receive service or that 
receive the vast majority of service from those aircraft.
    Unfortunately, we do not know whether or when all aircraft that 
previously served my airport can continue to operate in low-visibility 
conditions now or in the future. The FAA has already acknowledged that 
some altimeters will have to be retrofitted or replaced based on 
existing data. As altimeters that are unable to function properly in a 
5G C-Band environment are identified, those aircraft will presumably be 
taken out of service until the altimeters can be upgraded, which will 
cause further impact on my airport and others.
    As I understand it, the recent cancellations at Paine Field offer 
an example of how unique and limited some of the recent fixes are. When 
fog rolled in and visibility became limited, one of the main aircraft 
serving the airport was effectively banned from operating, forcing the 
carrier to cancel all flights in and out of the airport. For smaller 
airports, including mine, where regional flights on smaller jets are 
common, we can't afford to simply shut down when the weather turns bad. 
As I mentioned previously, given the interdependent nature of the 
aviation system, problems at ``spoke'' airports aren't just a local 
problem, they cascade and create disruptions, hassles, and problems 
throughout the system.
    The potential for significant disruptions is apparent at my 
airport. If the FAA's flight restrictions had been in place in 2021, 
conservatively there would have been about 90 low-visibility days 
impacting up to 40 percent of our flights per day. We would have 
projected similar disruptions this year without the issuance of the 
AMOCs. But with those AMOCs under monthly review and anticipating 
additional disruptions as the next rounds of 5G C-Band rollout, we know 
there will be additional disruptions if no action is taken to 
immediately and safely return additional regional aircraft to service.
    EUG operates under low visibility conditions frequently during the 
winter months. For airport operations we utilize a ground control 
protocol, called the surface movement guidance control system or SMCGS, 
about 50 percent of winter days, usually lasting an average of about 
three hours.
    During low-visibility conditions, our airline partners utilize the 
CAT II/CAT III Instrument Landing System (ILS CAT II/III) on the field 
to land with visibility down to as low as 300 feet.
    Before the ILS CAT II/III system was installed 17 years ago, fog 
impacted air service reliability at EUG, and frequent delays and 
cancellations literally drove our local passengers two hours away to 
Portland International Airport. With the current ILS, our local 
passengers were finally able to stay off the freeway and fly local with 
confidence.
    Unrestricted utilization of the ILS CAT II/III approach by the U.S. 
commercial fleet is critical for safe and functional commercial air 
service at EUG, as well as the rest of the airport system where our 
flights connect.
              What's Next?--Questions and Recommendations
    The recent positive developments related to the initial 5G C-Band 
deployment have been welcome news to protect the safety of the National 
Airspace System and avoid major disruptions to our air transportation 
system. However, they may be a temporary reprieve and only made 
possible by the good graces of AT&T and Verizon. Lingering questions 
must be answered, and action must be taken to ensure that the remaining 
underlying issues are addressed and fixed permanently. Our questions at 
this point, include:
      Does the FAA anticipate that all aircraft that were 
previously allowed to operate in low-visibility conditions at affected 
airports will eventually be able to operate again?
      If so, what is the timeline for gaining AMOCs for these 
aircraft?
      If not, what percentage of the fleet could be rendered 
inoperable under low-visibility conditions at affected airports? Will 
those aircraft need to have their altimeters upgraded and what kind of 
impact will that have on our aviation system?
      Why did the FAA issue NOTAMs and restrict some operations 
from occurring at some airports outside of the 46 PEAs? Were the 
telecommunications companies authorized to have their 5G C-Band network 
deployed in areas outside of the 46 PEAs?
      How long are AT&T and Verizon willing to keep the buffer 
zones--areas around runways where the companies agreed not to activate 
5G towers--that helped limit the impacts of 5G C-Band deployment at 
affected airports?
      How many 5G towers exist within these buffer zones and 
how are these towers affecting operations at our airports?
      By what criteria is the FAA evaluating and approving 
AMOCs for specific aircraft to operate at specific airports under 
certain conditions? For example, how did the FAA determine that a 
buffer zone was necessary to ensure that low-visibility operations 
could continue at affected airports?
      How can airports--and other stakeholders that are unable 
to review AMOCs--easily determine what aircraft have been approved by 
the FAA to service what runways at what airports and under what 
conditions?
      If or when the telecommunication companies decide to 
remove or narrow the buffer zones, potentially on July 5, what airports 
would be impacted and how would the FAA proceed to mitigate those 
impacts?
      What efforts is FAA engaged in to determine if low-
visibility operations could occur at affected airports within a smaller 
buffer zone? What is the FAA doing to mitigate the operational impact 
at those airports?
      How will the FAA ensure that similar operational impacts 
do not occur when the 5G C-Band network is deployed in the rest of the 
country in December 2023?

    Answers to these and other questions raised by the industry along 
with additional transparency and data and information sharing are 
critical for airport operators and the aviation industry. Again, we 
need to be proactive in preparing for what comes next rather than 
reactive. In a recent letter to the FAA and FCC leadership, AAAE made 
the following, specific recommendations for a long-term solution:
      Creating narrowly tailored and sufficiently sized 
``buffer zones'' around runways at all affected airports where the 5G 
C-Band will be deployed to ensure continued operations in low-
visibility situations.
      Providing substantially more transparency into the scope 
of operational impacts that are expected to occur at individual 
airports to enable them to better prepare for and manage disruptions. 
We believe this can best be accomplished through the implementation of 
permanent data sharing mechanisms between the telecommunications 
companies, FAA, airports, and the aviation industry. To that end, we 
believe the establishment of a high-level working group to include 
airports merits serious consideration.
      Canceling, or providing substantial justification for, 
the IAP NOTAMs that were issued for airports that are located outside 
of the 46 markets where Verizon and AT&T have been authorized to deploy 
the 5G C-Band base stations.

    In closing, I do not want to downplay the significant actions that 
have been undertaken in recent days by AT&T and Verizon or the FAA. 
What looked to be a potential crisis for 88 airports across the 
country, including EUG, beginning on January 19 has been averted 
largely, and we are learning every day of additional aircraft cleared 
to fly into affected airports.
    Unfortunately, pockets of pain persist, and it is clear that the 
reprieve may be temporary and dependent on the willingness of the 
telecoms to operate in a limited fashion in some areas. As the 
situation evolves, continued vigilance is required from Congress, the 
FAA and DOT, the White House, telecommunication companies, and the 
entire aviation industry. AAAE stands ready to work with the government 
and our industry partners to address these critical needs.
    I am grateful for the opportunity to provide the views of the 
airport community on how we can minimize operational impacts moving 
forward and appreciate your attention to this issue. Thank you for your 
consideration and the opportunity to testify.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, Ms. Stephens.
    The Chair now recognizes Captain DePete for 5 minutes.
    Mr. DePete. Thank you, Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member 
Graves, Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member Graves, and the 
subcommittee members. I am Captain Joe DePete, president of the 
Air Line Pilots Association, International, which represents 
more than 62,000 U.S. and Canadian pilots.
    For airline pilots, safety is nonnegotiable. It is not 
about politics or profit. For this reason, it was an affront to 
us when the Federal Communications Commission, the FCC, 
licensed part of the C-band spectrum to the telecom sector 
without heeding or even acknowledging our concerns about 
aviation safety.
    This situation shows that the FCC's stovepiped approach 
threatens safety and is also forcing pilots to conduct 
extensive work-arounds for the foreseeable future. This is no 
way to run a railroad, and it is certainly no way to operate 
the world's safest air transportation system.
    So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. We 
would also thank Chairman DeFazio and committee members for 
voicing concern for aviation safety in the new 5G rollout.
    Your leadership, along with that of Transportation 
Secretary Buttigieg and FAA Administrator Dickson, forced 
telecom companies to delay implementation until risks are 
addressed.
    As early as 2018, ALPA took issue with the 5G deployment 
plans. We urge the FCC and telecom companies to share the data 
to identify potential risk. We contacted the FCC Chair and 
Commissioners, but they ignored our concerns and instead ceded 
to those with an $80 billion interest in a quick launch.
    Radar altimeters use radio waves to calculate how high the 
aircraft is above the terrain. Pilots and onboard safety 
systems use this data to navigate flights, especially during 
approach and landing in poor conditions.
    We have already seen the effects of the new 5G service at 
locations like Paine Field in Everett, Washington, and ALPA is 
sharing with the FAA all reports of interference. Deploying the 
new service in the United States held challenges. FCC 
authorized 5G signals here transmit using antennas aimed at the 
horizon and at higher power levels and closer to airports than 
anywhere else on the planet. For example, France approved 5G 
with antennas aimed below the horizon at one-third the 
transmission power and with runway safety areas two and a half 
times larger than those in the United States.
    For pilots, new 5G service injects more complexity and more 
risk into already complex flight operations. We must now 
analyze how 5G regulatory directives affect departure, arrival, 
and alternative airports. The increased pilot workload 
reinforces the importance of having at least two qualified, 
trained, and rested pilots on every flight deck.
    The U.S. air transportation system is the world's safest. 
If another industry seeks to introduce risk into the system, 
the burden should be on that industry to prove its actions 
won't degrade aviation safety. The launch of the new 5G service 
caused an avoidable crisis. The process must be reformed so 
that the United States can continue to be a world stage 
competitor in 5G and set the global standard in aviation 
safety.
    So, what can we do? We need action to fund and charge the 
FAA with staying informed and included in national spectrum 
strategies. We need to require the FCC to share publicly the 
new service transmitting data when issuing new or revising an 
existing license. We need to require the FCC to collaborate 
with and defer to U.S. Government agencies charged with safety 
oversight. We need to grant the FAA authority to reject new or 
expanded FCC spectrum applications that affect aviation until 
safety can be ensured. And finally, we need to require the FAA 
to share information on approved alternative methods of 
compliance.
    Airline pilots, as the arbiters of safety, are trained for 
life to decide when every flight is safe. However, the U.S. 
Government must do more to safeguard air transportation as 5G 
service expands, and ALPA pilots are more than ready to assist.
    Thank you very much.
    [Mr. DePete's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Captain Joseph G. DePete, President, Air Line 
                   Pilots Association, International
    Chairman DeFazio and Ranking Member Graves, my name is Captain Joe 
DePete, and I am the president of the Air Line Pilots Association, 
Int'l (ALPA). I am proud to say that I represent 62,000 pilots flying 
for 38 airlines in the United States and Canada. The airline pilots 
flying the line today are literally on the front lines of aviation 
safety, working in very challenging circumstances that have been 
created by the deployment of 5G mobile wireless in the C-Band of radio 
spectrum.
    For ALPA pilots, safety is nonnegotiable. It's not about politics 
or profit. On every flight, our customers--including members of this 
committee--entrust us with their lives and livelihoods. For that 
reason, it was an affront to airline pilots when the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) sold and licensed a section of the C-
Band spectrum to wireless companies without heeding--or even 
acknowledging--our concerns about potential interference with the radar 
altimeters we use to safely navigate our aircraft. Their stove-piped 
policymaking process and single-minded focus on doing the bidding of 
the telecom industry not only put the public at risk, but it has also 
forced pilots to perform extensive workarounds to ensure the safety of 
flight--workarounds that we expect will be needed for the foreseeable 
future.
    This is no way to run a railroad, and it's certainly no way to 
operate the world's safest air transportation system.
    We have been tracking the potential interference that mobile 
wireless transmissions in the C-Band could have on aircraft radar 
altimeters for years. Our first written submission to the FCC docket 
was on May 29, 2018, less than 30 days after the FCC opened the docket 
for comments. At that time, ALPA expressed concerns about the proposal 
and encouraged the FCC to work with the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and aviation industry representatives to mitigate the potential 
interference concerns. Radar altimeters are the only sensor onboard a 
civil aircraft which provides a direct measurement of the clearance 
height of the aircraft over the terrain or other obstacles. In addition 
to pilots' use of radar altimeters during a flight, many other aircraft 
systems utilize the data they generate, to properly function.
    The situation we find ourselves in has taken the complexity of an 
already intricate operation to a new level. The current system of 
preflight planning and dispatch of an airline flight--which already 
includes fuel planning; review, minimum equipment list, and status of 
all aircraft systems; review of weather at departure point; monitoring 
weather and systems en route; and monitoring weather at the destination 
airport while planning for contingencies along the way--now includes 
additional risk. Flight crews are now expected to know the type of 
radar altimeter the aircraft is equipped with, applicable airworthiness 
directives, whether that airframe/altimeter combination has been issued 
an alternate method of compliance (AMOC) for the intended destination 
airport and runway, and whether the alternate airport is still legal. 
This added complexity reinforces what everyone in this room knows: The 
most important safety feature on every airline flight is two highly 
experienced, well trained, and rested pilots on the flight deck.
    Anyone who believes that this process can be automated, flight deck 
crew reduced, or required experience levels shortened seriously needs 
to go on the line and attempt this operation for themselves.
    Two full weeks of 5G interference with radar altimeters have gone 
by. Incidents of radar altimeter anomalies have occurred. Pilots 
operating in today's 5G-induced chaos have had significant burdens 
added to each and every workday. Meanwhile, flights have been canceled 
and delayed, costing families money while introducing unwelcome delays 
in the supply chain for businesses large and small. Here are some of 
the new steps and considerations that each pilot faces when they go 
fly.
                        Notices to Air Missions
    Pilots must review Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs) published by 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to understand how each flight 
they make is affected by 5G interference with their radar altimeters. 
Frequently, the print-out for all the NOTAMs on a domestic flight 
between two large cities can be many pages, discussing items such as 
unlit obstructions, changes to procedures, taxiway closures, and other 
important flight data. Some of this data is static and does not change.
    The 1,851 5G-related NOTAMs that were published by the FAA are 
unique in that the NOTAMs change with the ongoing 5G deployment. This 
requires pilots to find and then carefully review them each time, even 
if they have seen them before. There may be differences for this flight 
than what they flew to the same airport, even if it was yesterday.
Airworthiness Limitations on the Aircraft--Airworthiness Directives and 
                                 AMOCs
    Pilots are now required to know and follow the details regarding 
5G's effects on aircraft airworthiness. Every aircraft has a new 
limitation due to 5G. An airworthiness directive (AD) published by the 
FAA in December 2021 limits aircraft approach and landing operations 
during periods of low clouds and visibility when NOTAMs are published 
for 5G interference. However, the FAA has subsequently approved 
alternate methods of compliance that provide relief from the 5G AD for 
certain aircraft types and radar altimeter combinations. Pilots now 
need to evaluate the aircraft to determine which of two 5G 
airworthiness scenarios applies each time they are dispatched an 
aircraft to fly.
    If the aircraft is operated with reduced capabilities as described 
in an AD and activated by the 5G interference NOTAMs, pilots must plan 
accordingly. The AD mandates changes to the minimum weather conditions 
acceptable for landing. The AD requires the evaluation of weather 
conditions at the departure, destination, and alternate airports and 
makes sure that they can safely conduct the flight with the reduced 
capabilities as stipulated in the AD. The AD requires pilots to 
continuously monitor weather conditions while en route to the 
destination and alternate airport weather more closely, so that if the 
need to divert arises, they can select a diversion airport that has 
weather conditions suitable for the aircraft capabilities.
    If the aircraft is operated with fewer or no restrictions because 
the aircraft has an approved AMOC for 5G, pilots must study the AMOC 
that applies to their aircraft carefully. They will need to verify that 
the AMOC can be applied at the airports and anticipated runways for 
their flight. In some cases, the AMOC applies to the departure but not 
the destination (or vice versa). Other possible situations are where 
the AMOC can be used at an alternate airport where a 5G NOTAM is 
published, but otherwise the flight can be conducted normally because 
neither departure or arrival is a 5G impacted airport.
    The complexity of the situation gets worse because the FAA has 
issued some AMOCs that approve low-weather operations only to specific 
runways at certain airports. Therefore, when low-visibility conditions 
exist, the pilot will need to plan ahead and be sure to only utilize 
the runways allowed by the AMOC. When needing to access the ``approved 
runway for the AMOC,'' the flight crew will need to coordinate with air 
traffic control, which adds to both pilot and controller workload.
    The AMOC is valid for 30 days, so the list of airports and runways 
that an aircraft is allowed to apply the AMOC to will change 
frequently. It is possible that an aircraft with an approved AMOC 
today, may no longer be approved the next time a pilot is assigned to 
that aircraft. In addition, if a pilot is rated to fly multiple types 
with one Type Rating, such as multiple models of the Boeing 737 or the 
common type among the Airbus 319/320/321 and/or if the airline has 
multiple makes or models of radar altimeters installed, they will also 
need to stay on top of the AMOC approvals for the specific aircraft 
they will be flying.
    Finally, as the FAA has stated, some aircraft may never be able to 
receive an AMOC due to the installed performance of the radar altimeter 
on the aircraft.
           Additional Limitations Not Covered by ADs or AMOC
    Some aircraft manufacturers have added additional guidance and 
revised certain flight deck procedures that need to be followed at 
airports where there is a 5G NOTAM. This is above and beyond the AD 
from the FAA. This means that, even on a sunny, cloudless day, the 
aircraft manufacturers have modified aircraft flight manuals for 
operating in the United States 5G environment. The pilot must now 
review these additional or revised procedures prior to flight and 
implement them when operating to or from the 5G airport.
          Selecting Alternate Airports and Preflight Planning
    Even more than usual, the pilot must also work very closely with 
airline dispatchers to ensure that alternate airports are still viable 
given the forecast weather and aircraft's 5G limitations. If the 
likelihood for poor weather is high, then the pilot and dispatcher will 
need to decide which alternate airport is less likely to be impacted by 
weather based on forecast conditions hours into the future. For some 
flights, there are multiple alternate airports. Once the flight plan, 
with alternate airport selection is finalized, pilots will then need to 
evaluate the fuel required for the flight, with the necessary reserves. 
In some cases, pilots may need to add more fuel to account for weather 
forecasts or other unanticipated delays created by the 5G situation, 
thereby making the flight more expensive to operate and increasing our 
carbon footprint.
       Monitoring and Addressing Radar Altimeter Issues In-Flight
    The 5G deployment has also added to a pilot's in-flight workload. 
There is now the potential for weather to wreak havoc with the flight. 
For example, low clouds or low visibilities at the destination airport 
will more frequently force decisions to divert to the alternate 
airport. If the low clouds and low visibilities ``go up and down'' over 
the course of several hours, then pilots may need to enter a holding 
pattern in hopes that the weather will improve to acceptable conditions 
for landing. Or, as discussed above, they will need to coordinate with 
air traffic control for a specific runway that is approved as part of 
their AMOC. All of these scenarios add workload and complexities that 
flight crews now need to work through.
    Pilots must also be prepared for in-flight 5G interference to 
result in a radar altimeter failure on the flight deck. When that 
happens, there may be additional failure alerts or changes in aircraft 
system behavior as critical safety systems are affected by unreliable 
radar altimeter altitude information. For example, the Traffic Alert 
and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) changes its alerting behavior 
based on radar altitude.
    Pilots will need to plan for the fact that certain systems may be 
unavailable in the arrival, approach, and landing phase of the flight. 
Although pilots pay close attention to the aircraft's operation, 
degraded safety systems such as terrain avoidance, certain collision 
warning features, and the automatic deployment of spoilers and reverse 
thrust are unwelcome changes in the aircraft's capabilities. The loss 
of these systems eliminates safety features, thereby adding risk.
    If this all seems complicated--that's because it is. And to think 
that airline pilots may do this multiple times per day while changing 
aircraft resulting in new AMOCs and NOTAMs to consider is daunting and 
adds risk. It is not an understatement to say that every airline pilot 
flying in America's airspace system today has the additional burden of 
reading, understanding, and making contingency plans based on a full 
understanding of all the above for each and every flight.
    What I've described above is a summary of what pilots face today. 
While some airlines have provided pilots with information and tools to 
help navigate the 5G situation, other airlines have provided only a 
minimal amount of guidance. It appears that the FAA might need to spend 
a bit more time ensuring that all operators are stepping up to 
consistently provide accurate data to flight crews. We are monitoring 
this situation very closely and listening to our pilots who are 
navigating this difficult situation.
                      Action Needed Going Forward
    ALPA appreciates the productive technical discussions between the 
aviation industry and the wireless industry that began in early 
January. The discussions allowed the FAA to rapidly approve the AMOCs 
described earlier, which in turn has to date largely prevented a 
breakdown in reliable airline services for passengers and shippers.
    This current situation was avoidable. If FCC and the wireless 
industry had been willing to talk to the FAA and aviation industry 
experts in 2019, prior to the FCC report and order, or even prior to 
the auction in 2020, we are certain that a better technical solution to 
this issue could have been worked out without the rancor expressed in 
public, and that the mobile wireless industry could have bid on the 
spectrum with a more complete understanding of the future operating 
environment and without the threat to aviation safety. We have seen 
other countries address 5G in the C-Band much more successfully.
    One of my fellow witnesses testifying at this hearing today is the 
president of CTIA, the mobile wireless trade association. They have 
been fond of saying that 5G works in 40 other countries, why not here? 
Well, I can tell you that if the FCC had adopted the 5G C-Band rules 
that are currently used in Japan, for example, we wouldn't even need to 
be here today.
    The maximum power level permitted in Japan is two percent of the 
maximum power authorized in the FCC Order for the U.S.\1\ And even with 
this significantly lower power, Japan still restricts the siting of 5G 
transmitters away from aircraft flight paths. CTIA simply can't have it 
both ways.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Japan Macro-cell limits are 63 watts (48 dBm/Mhz), while US 
rural power limits are 3280 watts (65 dBm/MHz). See ICAO Frequency 
Spectrum Management Panel paper FSMP-WG11-WP30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We can further contrast what happened in the U.S., with what 
happened in Canada and in France. In both countries, when the issue of 
radar altimeter interference was raised by the aviation safety 
regulator, they collaborated with each countries' spectrum regulator to 
put in place restrictions around airports before the 5G signal 
broadcasts began.
    In Canada authorities placed zones around each of the 26 most 
critical airports that prohibit deployment of 5G transmitters, and 
further place power limits in a protection zone that covers up to 1000' 
above ground. Canada has also put in place a national antenna down tilt 
requirement to further reduce the power of the 5G signals that are seen 
by aircraft, including for helicopter operations like medevac, which 
routinely must operate at low altitudes and away from predefined 
heliports and landing zones.
    Action by Congress is needed. A detailed analysis of the risk 
mitigation strategy for 5G in the C-Band should have been completed by 
the FAA, the FCC, the aviation industry, and the wireless industry much 
earlier in the process. With millions of air travelers' lives on the 
line, a federal agency with no foundational knowledge of our aviation 
system should not be the final arbiter of spectrum decisions.
    There are more hurdles for aviation as the 5G rollout in the C-Band 
continues. The expansion of the 5G network and the expiration of 
certain temporary mitigations requires immediate action. Failure to 
reach a data-driven solution that does not needlessly introduce 
additional risk to the national air space and costs to the aviation 
industry will result in the same chaotic and inefficient situation we 
find ourselves in today.
    The FAA's use of an AD and NOTAMs to ensure airline safety was the 
right step to take, and we fully support that action. The U.S. airline 
industry's safety record did not reach the current levels of 
performance without significant expertise and dedication by frontline 
employees including pilots, air traffic controllers, aviation 
maintenance technicians, flight attendants, and air traffic system 
maintenance personnel. ALPA and aviation labor in partnership with the 
FAA and the airlines have assembled risk-predictive, data-driven safety 
analysis systems and methodologies that have resulted in documented 
safety levels far above any other mode of transportation. Going 
forward, we welcome and should demand ongoing and detailed information-
sharing with other stakeholders in government and the private sector.
    Action is needed, and a process needs to be established to ensure 
that in the future, the FCC shares information and data that allows 
airlines to fully engage our risk analysis and safety data reviews 
before spectrum decisions are finalized. The FCC should be required to 
be forthcoming with as many details as possible on the transmitting 
specifications that they are proposing when issuing a new or revised 
spectrum approval, and they should work collaboratively when other 
regulators are involved in approving safety-related matters. In our 
view, the norm should be for FCC to defer to the federal safety 
regulators of the FAA or other agencies charged with safety oversight. 
I urge you and others on the committee to insist going forward that we 
require the use of a collaborative process as other countries 
successfully utilized.
    Legislation is also needed to allow FAA to share critical 
information needed for safety analysis and risk mitigations that affect 
aircraft operators. This is information approved as part of any 
applications or petitions and should be publicly shared with key 
aviation stakeholders. In the current situation, the FAA should be 
allowed to share certain information about the approved alternative 
methods of compliance to ensure that a consistent understanding of 
rapid-changing circumstances is happening in real-time. This could be 
accomplished, for example, by having the applicant include a draft 
statement for public release upon approval of an application or 
petition, which requires inclusion of equipment make and model, and 
other critical information such as airports where an approval will be 
effective.
    The FAA should also be funded and charged to stay better informed 
and included as a key stakeholder in any national spectrum strategies, 
including mobile wireless (5G or future) radio spectrum strategies. The 
FAA should be empowered to interact directly with FCC when required and 
not be limited in coordination by relying on another federal agency 
that does not understand aviation's carefully designed and very robust 
safety risk mitigation strategy.
    Lastly, the FAA should be granted the authority to reject new or 
expanded FCC spectrum applications that affect aviation until safety 
can be ensured.
    Mr. Chairman, we thank you and the committee for holding this 
timely and important hearing. The ongoing challenges that airline 
pilots are facing due to 5G interference with radar altimeters does not 
appear to be just a short-term issue, and there does not appear to be 
an end game defined, which means that your continuous monitoring of 
this situation is very much required and appreciated.
    On behalf of the more than 62,000 ALPA pilots working every day to 
safely arrive at their destination with passengers and cargo, I thank 
you for the opportunity to share our perspectives with you today.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much, Captain DePete, for your 
testimony.
    And I now want to call on Faye Malarkey Black, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Chair DeFazio, Ranking 
Member Graves and Graves and committee members. I appreciate 
the opportunity to speak today. RAA represents regional 
airlines that operate 44 percent of the Nation's flights and 
connect every corner of the country. Fully two-thirds of U.S. 
airports are served only by regional airlines.
    RAA was among those, including this committee, called for 
safeguarding safety and operational integrity of the aviation 
system before 5G rollout, yet FAA issued thousands of NOTAMs 
prohibiting airport operations in low visibility where new 5G 
signals interfere with aircraft radio altimeters. Alternative 
methods of compliance, or AMOCs, are granted only if 
manufacturers can show their equipment withstands the new 
interference.
    This patchwork of broad restrictions and case-by-case 
approvals has been disastrous. Airlines are uncertain when and 
what clearances they might get for which aircraft, if any. The 
impact on regional airlines has been particularly pronounced. 
Not one regional aircraft AMOC had been issued when 5G went 
live. Even now, because negotiated safeguards against 5G 
interference are insufficient for the typical regional 
altimeter, the FAA has issued far fewer of those compared with 
larger equipment. And more than half the fleet remains 
restricted at dozen of airports.
    These restricted aircraft provide more than 130,000 monthly 
flights and provide the only source of air service to 27 
airports. Passengers almost immediately experienced disruption. 
One carrier had 63 5G cancels the first week displacing 1,800 
passengers, some of those at Paine Field. Yesterday morning, an 
airline's entire inbound operation to Houston was delayed, nine 
flights were cancelled when 5G barred low-visibility 
approaches. By mid-day, 1,400 passengers were displaced.
    Earlier, an RAA member endured eight 5G cancels, not due to 
severe weather, just wet runways. Operational limitations have 
also caused denied boardings. One carrier was limited to using 
just 23 of its 50 seats as runway conditions changed. Even 
small reductions can make a 50-seat flight unprofitable and 
threaten the viability of the route.
    I urge this committee not to view these disruptions as mere 
pockets of pain. The list of excluded airports is now at 70 and 
growing each time a new tower turns on. Consider that all three 
New York metropolitan airports are excluded now, and more than 
one-quarter of the flights operate there are on aircraft now 
prohibited weather.
    The downstream consequences are vast. Regional airlines 
support the Nation's hub and spoke system. If 5G degrades their 
reliable schedules, then the integrity of the entire network is 
compromised. For smaller airports, fewer flights mean fewer 
options to recover displaced passengers and crew.
    For communities served by aircraft now banned in weather, 
that specter of completely avoidable economic calamity is still 
very much at hand. FAA's NOTAMs and AMOCs were designed to 
protect aviation safety from the 5G hazard. Still, we must be 
careful that we do not trade one set of risks for another.
    The entire industry must react, understand, and mitigate 
new risk each time a set of NOTAMs and AMOCs is offered. The 
introduction of more than 1,500 simultaneous NOTAMs is 
unprecedented. Each one complicates and increases the workload 
for dispatch, pilots, and ATC. For each approach, crews must 
determine if their aircraft is approved to utilize the approach 
being used for that airport, that runway, find and review the 
appropriate NOTAMs, and review the AMOC listing to determine 
what approach minimums apply before beginning the approach.
    ATC also faces significant new airspace saturation with 
scores more flights holding, circling, and diverting even as 
mild weather rolls in. We enjoy an exceptionally high level of 
aviation safety in the United States, due in part to many 
layers of safety procedures and tools.
    The radio altimeter is one such tool that enhances 
situational awareness. And 5G interference takes it away. In 
discussing risk, RAA doesn't wish to alarm passengers. Our 
members have taken every step to mitigate these risks and will 
not compromise safety. Flights will be grounded. Unfortunately, 
they have been. We must find a better and more sustainable path 
forward.
    Today's patchwork of NOTAMs and unattainable regional AMOCs 
creates two tiers of reliability in our system. One for cities 
and another for everywhere else. I want to make this abundantly 
clear: Radio altimeters on regional aircraft aren't faulty or 
defective. These altimeters are operating as they should based 
on current regulatory and certification standards set by the 
FAA. Regional airlines have invested millions in these tools to 
allow safe, reliable air service in weather. Now we can't use 
them because the FAA auctioned C-band spectrum without fully 
considering the consequences.
    We can't lose our sense of urgency. FAA must continue to 
refine data to determine if an aircraft can safely operate at 
airports. If they can't, better mitigations are needed. A 
roadmap may be found abroad where lower 5G power, down-tilted 
antennas, and wider exclusion zones protect more aircraft.
    FAA must also improve its NOTAMs and AMOCs process to 
ensure cohesiveness, timeliness, and predictability. I spent my 
career advocating for small community service [inaudible] 
activity. For travelers that means air service. We support 5G 
too, but aviation safety and [inaudible] must be [inaudible].
    I thank the committee for inviting me today. Thank you.
    [Ms Black's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Faye Malarkey Black, President and Chief 
            Executive Officer, Regional Airline Association
       Overview of Regional Airline Industry and Radio Altimeters
    My name is Faye Malarkey Black. I am the President and CEO of the 
Regional Airline Association (RAA). Regional airlines play a critical 
role in the U.S. air transportation system, particularly for smaller 
communities. The safety of our passengers, crewmembers, and the public 
is and will remain our top priority. This safety cannot be compromised. 
RAA appreciates the opportunity to testify before the Committee today 
and share our experiences with 5G deployment and the impact that it has 
had on the operation of our aircraft and on small community air 
service.
    RAA represents 17 regional airlines, which operate 44% of the U.S. 
scheduled passenger departures and directly employ over 65,000 
individuals. Regional airlines specialize in operating smaller aircraft 
that are rightsized for markets with fewer passengers traveling at 
once. Regional airlines carried about 73 million passengers in 2020--
reflecting COVID-19 impacts--and carried a more typical 165 million 
passengers in 2019. Regional airlines provide more than half of the air 
service in 30 states and more than 75% of the air service in 15 states. 
Most importantly, regional airlines offer the only source of scheduled, 
commercial air service at 66% of U.S. airports. In fact, major airlines 
directly operate at about 34% of US commercially served airports, while 
regional airlines operate at 94%. Because major airlines cannot serve 
smaller airports with larger, mainline aircraft, most partner with 
regional airlines to reach these customers. The goal of this 
arrangement is to bring air service connectivity and a seamless, 
reliable travel experience to passengers in every corner of the 
country. While regional airlines contribute significantly to civil 
aviation's overall $1.8 trillion economic footprint, air service at 
small communities (defined as small and non-hub airports) drove $152 
billion in direct economic activity in 2019, supporting over one 
million jobs and $43 billion in local taxes and wages.
    As this Committee knows, Radio Altimeters are critical sensors on 
board aircraft. This advanced technology enables and enhances numerous 
different safety and navigation functions throughout all phases of 
flight. On all types of aircraft, situational awareness of the flight 
crew is paramount to ensuring safe flight operations, especially flying 
in busy airspace, close to the ground, or in low visibility scenarios 
such as Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC). The radar altimeter 
plays a critical role in providing situational awareness in these 
operating conditions. Not only do radar altimeters provide a displayed 
indication of height above terrain to the flight crew, but they also 
form the basis of auditory altitude callouts during terminal landing 
procedures. Additionally, on commercial aircraft, the radar altimeter 
provides input to critical aircraft safety systems including, but not 
limited to, Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS), 
Terrain Awareness Warning Systems (TAWS) Airborne Collision Avoidance 
Systems (ACAS), windshear detection systems, flight control systems and 
autolanding functions, including auto throttle and ground lift dump and 
thrust reversers. This usage by a wide variety of systems onboard the 
aircraft leads to the possibility of specific operational impacts that 
go beyond a general loss of situational awareness or risk of controlled 
flight into terrain.
           Background--Radio Altimeter 5G Signal Interference
    This Committee has been relentless in engaging with the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and stakeholders in both aviation and telecommunications industry 
throughout the leadup to the deployment of 2.7-3.98 gigahertz (GHz) 
frequency band (``5G C-Band'') services on January 19, 2022. We are 
grateful for this engagement, which has certainly helped to drive 
progress on this complex issue. We also appreciate the engagement of 
the FAA, along with the Agency's willingness to hear RAA's remaining 
concerns. RAA was among stakeholders who consistently warned that 
deployment of 5G technologies must proceed only after resolving clear 
and well-reasoned concerns that 5G transmissions would pose a threat to 
the safety and operational integrity of our aviation system, by 
interfering with radio altimeters.
    Unfortunately, the FCC did not ensure sufficient mitigations to the 
root problems associated with 5G C-band interference and the FAA has 
concluded that interference with radio altimeters by wireless broadband 
operations presents an aviation safety hazard near airports. 
Consequently, the Agency issued an Airworthiness Directive days before 
the first anticipated rollout, warning that low-visibility operations 
would be restricted near 5G transmitters to mitigate the safety hazard. 
The Agency later issued an unprecedented 1,537 Notice to Air Missions 
(NOTAMs) specific to aerodromes, airspace, and instrument approach 
procedures. The FAA drew these NOTAMs according to its worst-case 
expectation of signal interference vulnerability and, accordingly, 
established a new baseline of vastly restricted operations when 
visibility drops below the established minimums.
    The operational impact of these NOTAMs is extensive. At dozens of 
U.S. airports impacted by the first-tier rollout of 5G services, NOTAMs 
restrict operators from performing a vast array of approaches in low-
visibility conditions. The primary impact of the NOTAMs serves to limit 
the use of the radio altimeters when flying instrument approaches in 
poor weather conditions. However, this is not the only operational 
impact as radio altimeters feed a wide range of additional, critical 
aircraft systems. Analysis by the aircraft manufacturers of the 
restrictions on the use of certain onboard systems has revealed 
additional landing and takeoff limitations that impact operations. The 
FAA acknowledges safety may also be upheld through Alternate Methods of 
Compliance (AMOCs), which the Agency approves when the AMOC provides an 
acceptable level of safety. Recognizing that some installed radio 
altimeters might be less impacted by 5G interference, the FAA directed 
aircraft original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to submit data showing 
their radio altimeters are capable of functioning without interference 
by encroaching 5G signals to gain AMOC approval.
    This process of allowing a patchwork of approvals, on a case-by-
case basis, to clear some aircraft at some airports, has been 
tremendously challenging for the entire industry. Airlines face 
uncertainty over when and what clearances they might get for which 
aircraft at which airports, if any. The process and outcomes have been 
particularly troubling for regional airlines, which were initially 
excluded from consultation on mitigation agreements with the 
telecommunications industry that would make achieving AMOCs more 
feasible. Perhaps as a result, the narrow runway safety zones and 
buffer zone mitigations were not designed to protect the typical 
regional aircraft altimeter. Tellingly, an earlier agreement between 
the FAA and FCC focused exclusively on fifty so-called priority 
airports and ignored most regional airports altogether. When 5G was 
turned on January 19, most mainline aircraft had received at least 
partial AMOCs for their safe operation, but no regional OEM AMOCs had 
been issued at all.
    This meant, when 5G went live, regional airlines remained 
restricted from operating during periods of low visibility at every 
airport with NOTAMs in place, even as headlines proclaimed the crisis 
was averted. Throughout the week, FAA continued to triage AMOC 
approvals according to its view of systemic impact, prioritizing 
regional airlines and aircraft last among commercial airlines. While 
the reasoning behind this prioritization may well have been aimed at 
relieving greater systemic pressure, we urge all stakeholders to 
consider that mitigating disruption at the aggregate-level does nothing 
for the tens of millions of passengers left vulnerable. Whether they 
are traveling for premium health care, to see a loved one, or just 
trying to get home to their families, passengers experience disruption 
as individuals and today's ever-changing NOTAMs and AMOCs expose 
regional airline passengers to more disruption. To this day, the FAA 
has been able to issue dramatically fewer AMOCs for regional aircraft 
compared with larger equipment and over half the regional fleet remains 
prohibited from operating in reduced visibility at dozens of key 
airports (See Appendix A). In many cases, the specific fleet types 
excluded from low visibility operations at hub airports operate more 
than a third of the airport's total departures. Regional airlines 
provide substantial support for the nation's intricate hub and spoke 
system; if 5G is allowed to degrade their reliable schedules then the 
integrity of the entire national air service network will be 
compromised. Put another way, the specter of ``completely avoidable 
economic calamity'' and vast disruption our major airline partners 
warned against last month remains very much in play for smaller 
communities who rely on aircraft that remain excluded from key airports 
in weather.
    Two regional jets, the E135/145 (E145) and the E170/175/190 (E175), 
face particularly pronounced restrictions. The E145, a 50-seat aircraft 
scheduled for 31,383 departures (4.3% U.S. departures) in January, 
comprises 14% of the regional jet fleet and has no AMOC approved or 
pending for any operation that requires radio altimeters. The FAA has 
issued NOTAMs at 66 such airports used by regional airlines with low 
visibility approaches at the time of this writing, including 57 of the 
189 U.S. airports the E145 serves today (Appendix B). Operating in 46 
states, the E145 provides the only source of air service to 26 
airports. (Appendix C). The E175 comprises 40% of the regional airline 
fleet, has a dual class configuration that can seat up to 76 passengers 
and was scheduled for 108,646 January departures (14.9% U.S. 
departures). Although this aircraft was granted an AMOC, that AMOC 
initially excluded 57 of the 69 NOTAM'd airports it serves. Overall, 
the E175 is used to provide air service to 167 U.S. airports, is used 
to provide the only source of air service to one airport (Paine Field) 
and supports more than 30% of the departures at 37 airports (Appendix 
C).
    On Sunday, January 30, the FAA used a revised safety analysis model 
to issue new NOTAMs and AMOCs associated with current upcoming 5G 
deployments. Adjustments to the FAA's model brought 21 more airports 
into the E175 AMOC but left 33 airports excluded and newly excluded two 
more (JFK, ALB) for a current total of 35 excluded airports. The E145 
remains excluded from all airports with NOTAMs. As more 5G towers are 
turned on and transmission signals are turned up and even as more high-
speed internet users impact the signal, we expect even more airports to 
become excluded. This will almost certainly disadvantage more 
communities and passengers.
    Despite relatively fair weather \1\ in the first week of 5G 
deployment, regional airlines almost immediately experienced delays and 
cancelations due to weather that would not have restricted operations 
before the signal interference. Several notable examples occurred in 
the Pacific Northwest, including one RAA member with a total of 63 5G 
related cancelations or delays between the January 19 rollout and 
January 31st. As several members of this Committee can attest, 
lingering fog is a typical weather pattern in the area. When visibility 
drops below certain levels \2\, no flights may operate. In other cases, 
the use of radio altimeters guides precision approaches to allow safe 
landings in certain categories of reduced visibility. Paine Field (PAE) 
in Everett, Washington, is served exclusively by the E175. Because of 
the proximity of the 5G tower to the runway, the E175's AMOC at the 
time did not cover approaches into the main runway. Because this is the 
runway authorized for low visibility approaches, all flights in and out 
of the airport were cancelled on Monday, January 24th, shutting down 
air service to the airport specifically and directly because of the 5G 
runway restrictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The extent of 5G cancelations associated with the 1/28-29/22 
weather event in the Northeastern U.S. is not yet known.
    \2\ The FAA denotes qualified U.S. airports and runways for 
Category I (CAT I), Category II (CAT II) and Category III (CAT III) 
Instrument Landing System (ILS) operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I urge this Committee not to view the disruptions in Pacific 
Northwest as merely pockets of pain and proof of a successful 5G roll 
out that has minimized disruptions; rather, they should be viewed as 
indicative of what awaits other parts of the country in the event of 
bad weather. The reality is that regional airlines operate in both 
large and small airports throughout the country; making considerable 
connections through the hubs to serve the spokes. Here are just a few a 
few examples of larger airports where the regional aircraft without an 
AMOC at the airport have a significant market presence:
      LGA has no AMOC for the E175. Of 20,293 scheduled flights 
in January, 7,395 were E175 aircraft equating to 36% (more than 1 of 3 
flights).
      EWR has no AMOC for the E175. Of 15,764 scheduled flights 
in January, 2,853 were E175 aircraft equating to 18% (nearly 1 of 5 
flights).
      JFK has no AMOC for the E175 or E145. Of 23,203 scheduled 
flights in January, 5,701 were E175 aircraft (no E145 ops) equating to 
25% (1 in 4 flights).
      PHL has no AMOC for the E175 or the E145. Of 8,973 
scheduled flights in January, 2,517 were E175 or E145 aircraft equating 
to 28% (more than 1 in 4 flights).
      RDU has no AMOC for the E175. Of 5,456 scheduled flights 
in January, 1,911 were E175 aircraft equating to 35% (more than 1 in 3 
flights).
      IND has no AMOC for the E175 or the E145. Of 4,102 
scheduled flights in January, 1,531 were E175 or E145 aircraft equating 
to 37%. (More than 1 in 3 flights)
      PDX has no AMOC for the E175. Of 5,039 scheduled flights 
in January, 822 were E175 aircraft equating to 16%.
      STL has no AMOC for the E175 or E145. Of 6,246 scheduled 
flights in January, 668 were E175 or E145 equating to 11%.
      MSP has no AMOC for the E175 or E145. Of 11,575 scheduled 
flights in January, 1,171 were E175 or E145 aircraft equating to 10%.

    For smaller markets, where there are fewer total departures and a 
high percentage of departures on aircraft without an AMOC, the impacts 
carry a different type of systemic impact. With fewer flights overall, 
airports served by regional airlines have fewer options to recover 
passenger and crew disruptions when diversions, cancelations and delays 
occur. Here is a sampling of airports in this category, where one or 
both aircraft lack an AMOC for an airport have significant regional 
departures: CLE (32% regional) CVG (31%) JAX, (36%) RIC (35%) OKC (34%) 
ROC (42%), LIT (51%), GSO (43%), MDT (39%), HSV (40%), SBP (49%), STS 
(70%), ORH (81%).
    Even at airports where service is permitted under certain AMOCs, 
many regional aircraft face other restrictions, such as limitations on 
runways. This is particularly troubling because regional airlines 
experience greater diversity in size, geography, weather, and runway 
characteristics at airports they serve, relative to other operators. 
One RAA member endured eight 5G interference cancelations in a single 
morning the week 5G went live--not due to a snowstorm or intense 
thunderstorms--but rather, wet runways at the arrival airport. In other 
cases, airlines are taking weight penalties to mitigate against 5G 
impact on systems. Another RAA member, already restricted outright from 
operating at multiple airports during weather, incurred weight 
penalties at airports it could serve. This required a real-time 
reduction in payload that forced the denied boarding of eight 
passengers across two flights. In addition to burdening those displaced 
passengers, even small reductions to the seating capacity of a 50 seat 
passenger aircraft quickly make for an unprofitable flight. Long term, 
such impacts threaten the viability of small community routes.
    Leaving dozens of airports and millions of passengers vulnerable to 
sweeping disruptions is unsustainable and unacceptable. Today's 
patchwork of NOTAMs and airport specific AMOCs that exclude regional 
aircraft is creating a two-tiered national aviation system where 
communities that rely on regional airline service are disadvantaged and 
subject to more disruption, while those served exclusively by larger 
aircraft are less vulnerable. It must be made abundantly clear that 
radio-altimeters on regional aircraft aren't faulty or defective; they 
are operating as they should, based on current regulatory and 
certification standards established by the FAA. Unfortunately, these 
standards became irrelevant when the FCC auctioned C-Band spectrum near 
the radio altimeter operating frequency without full consideration of 
the consequences.
                            Aviation Safety
    Most importantly, FAA's extensive use of NOTAMs creates a massive 
differential in workload and procedures that itself introduces risk 
into the aviation system. Fundamentally, NOTAMs are Irregular 
Operations (IROPs). While the NOTAMs and their associated AMOCs are 
offered to protect aviation safety from the 5G hazard, we must be 
extremely careful that we do not trade one set of risks or another. 
Pilots in the airline industry are trained to a set of practices and 
procedures, which have changed abruptly. The introduction of more than 
1,500 NOTAMs simultaneously is unprecedented. The entire industry must 
react, understand, and mitigate new risk each time a new set of NOTAMs 
and AMOCs is offered. Each NOTAM and AMOC complicates and increases the 
workload for aircraft dispatch professionals and pilots. Pilots 
performing short haul flights often fly to multiple destinations in a 
single day. Every approach requires the crew to determine if their 
aircraft is approved to utilize the approach being used currently for 
that airport and runway, then find and review the appropriate NOTAMs 
and review the AMOC listing to determine what approach minimums apply 
to the safely begin an approach. This workload shift will not be 
limited to airline crews. In cases where flights are dispatched before 
weather moves in, Air Traffic Control (ATC) will be required to handle 
significant airspace saturation associated with diversions and 
holdings. This in turn could spur ground stops and other systemic 
delays to allow ATC to safely handle the traffic flow.
    One very important factor behind the extremely high level of safety 
the U.S. aviation system enjoys today lies with the many layers of 
procedures and safety tools it employs. The introduction of these 
NOTAMs removes one such tool, by limiting use of the radio altimeter to 
enhance situation awareness. In discussing these risks, RAA does not 
wish to alarm U.S. airline passengers. Our members have taken every 
step to mitigate these risks and will not compromise safety. Flights 
will be grounded, and unfortunately, they have been. We must find a 
better and more sustainable path forward.
                 Comprehensive and Permanent Solutions
    Regional airlines have invested millions of dollars in advanced 
safety technologies like radio altimeters that allow safe and reliable 
air service for the traveling public during periods of poor weather. 
Without their use, flights will continue to be canceled, delayed and as 
necessary, diverted. This imposes a terrible burden on regional 
passengers. We should not be willing to accept two levels of 
reliability in this country and the FAA and FCC must not allow 5G 
interference to undermine and waste these investments by failing to 
ensure adequate protections for all aircraft. The FAA, the White House, 
FCC, telecommunication companies and aviation stakeholders must further 
commit to resolving underlying factors causing 5G C-Band interference 
near airports and mitigate those to protect safe operations at all 
airports--today and moving forward.
    The FAA should continue to review its analysis and modeling of 5G 
interference and refine this based on updates from telecom companies 
related to tower location, signal strength, and positioning, to 
determine if aircraft can safely operate at currently excluded 
airports. If the FAA find that these aircraft cannot safely operate 
under the current mitigations, the Agency and the White House should 
engage directly with the telecommunication companies to pursue other 
mitigations to restore that safe operation. Potential tactics may 
include efforts that have worked well abroad, such as additional 
lowering of 5G C-band power levels, requiring a downward tilt on 
airport-proximate 5G antennas, and creating exclusion zones near 
airports that protect all aircraft from transmission interference if 
necessary. Based on the limitations associated with some current 
regional aircraft AMOCs, these exclusion zones may need to be larger at 
certain airports.
    Continued and improved communications, including greater 
consultation of regional operators and stakeholders, will be central to 
the successful, safe deployment of 5G services. It is important that 
the FAA continue to work with the FCC and telecommunications 
stakeholders to ensure future communications are less hindered by Non-
Disclosure Agreement-driven opacity and other factors, so that direct 
and clear data-sharing can expand between stakeholders. RAA also asks 
that the FAA improve upon its process of issuing NOTAMs and AMOCs to 
ensure better cohesiveness, timeliness, and predictability.
                               Conclusion
    As an organization that supports air service to communities large 
and small, RAA believes in the power of connection. We are committed to 
working with all stakeholders, including this Committee, to ensure 
aviation safety is upheld and that an appropriate balance is struck 
between two important modes of connection: successful deployment of 5G 
services while preserving the integrity of the country's air 
transportation network. I thank the Committee for this opportunity to 
testify today and look forward to taking your questions at the 
conclusion of the panel.

              Appendix A--Airports with NOTAMs Excluded from AMOCs-- Select Regional Airline Fleet
    Black \\ denotes airport excluded in first round but cleared 1/31. Gray \\ denotes newly
                                                excluded on 1/27.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             NO AMOC   NO AMOC
          Airport List                    Name         CAT II/III Approach    E175      E175    NO AMOC  NO AMOC
                                                                            01.27.22  01.31.22    E145     Q400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFW.............................  Fort Worth Alliance  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALB.............................  Albany               Yes................  ........  7   X     .......  .......
                                   International.                                           0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUS.............................  Austin Bergstrom...  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BDL.............................  Bradley Windsor      Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
                                   Locks.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BFI.............................  Boeing Field.......  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BFL.............................  Bakersfield........  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BHM.............................  Birmingham.........  Yes................        X         X        X        X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BLI.............................  Bellingham.........  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BNA.............................  Nashville..........  Yes................  ........  ........       X        X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOS.............................  Boston Logan.......  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUR.............................  Burbank............  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BWI.............................  Baltimore..........  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAE.............................  Columbia...........  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHS.............................  Charleston SC......  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLE.............................  Cleveland..........  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CLT.............................  Charlotte..........  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CVG.............................  Cincinnati.........  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DAL.............................  Dallas.............  Yes................  ........  7   X     .......  .......
                                                                                            0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DAY.............................  Dayton.............  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DFW.............................  Dallas Fort Worth..  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DTW.............................  Detroit............  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EWR.............................  Newark.............  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FWA.............................  Fort Wayne.........  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GSO.............................  Greensboro.........  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GSP.............................  Greenville           Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
                                   Spartanburg.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIO.............................  Hillsboro OR.......  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HOU.............................  Houston Hobby......  Yes................        X     1___0        X        X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HPN.............................  White Plains.......  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HSV.............................  Huntsville.........  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IAH.............................  Houston George Bush  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IND.............................  Indianapolis.......  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISP.............................  Islip..............  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JAX.............................  Jacksonville.......  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JFK.............................  New York JFK.......  Yes................  ........  7   X          X   .......
                                                                                            0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LAX.............................  Los Angeles........  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LGA.............................  La Guardia.........  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LIT.............................  Little Rock........  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MCI.............................  Kansas City........  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MCO.............................  Orlando............  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MDT.............................  Harrisburg.........  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MEM.............................  Memphis............  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MHT.............................  Manchester NH......  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MKE.............................  Milwaukee..........  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MOD.............................  Modesto............  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MRY.............................  Monterey...........  Yes................  ........  ........  .......       X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MSN.............................  Madison WI.........  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MSP.............................  Minneapolis, St.     Yes................        X         X        X   .......
                                   Paul.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MSY.............................  New Orleans........  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OAK.............................  Oakland............  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OKC.............................  Oklahoma City......  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORH.............................  Worcester MA.......  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ORD.............................  Chicago O'Hare.....  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PAE.............................  Everett............  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PDX.............................  Portland OR........  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHL.............................  Philadelphia.......  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHX.............................  Phoenix............  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PIT.............................  Pittsburgh.........  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PVD.............................  Providence.........  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RDU.............................  Raleigh Durham.....  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RIC.............................  Richmond...........  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ROC.............................  Rochester NY.......  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RST.............................  Rochester MN.......  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SBP.............................  South Bend.........  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEA.............................  Seattle Tacoma.....  Yes................  ........    1___0   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SJC.............................  San Jose...........  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SLC.............................  Salt Lake City.....  Yes................        X     1___0        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SNA.............................  Orange County......  Yes................        X         X   .......  .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STL.............................  St Louis...........  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STS.............................  Sonoma County......  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SWF.............................  Stewart NY.........  Yes................        X     1___0        X        X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SYR.............................  Syracuse...........  Yes................  ........  ........       X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TPA.............................  Tampa..............  Yes................        X         X        X   .......
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\\ Editor's note: Colors were changed from green and orange in the original testimony to black and gray,
  respectively, in order to display the denotations in a black and white format.


                            Appendix B--26 Airports Served Exclusively by the ERJ145
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                           % ERJ
                                                                               ERJ 135/  Total    Other    135/
                   Jan-22                                                        145    Flights  Flights   140/
                                                                               Flights                      145
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABI.........................................  Abilene, TX....................      213      213        0  100.0%
ALO.........................................  Waterloo, IA...................       58       58        0  100.0%
ART.........................................  Watertown, NY..................       45       45        0  100.0%
BKW.........................................  Beckley, WV....................      107      107        0  100.0%
BPT.........................................  Jack Brooks, TX................       76       76        0  100.0%
CCR.........................................  Buchanan Field, CA.............       33       33        0  100.0%
CEC.........................................  Del Norte County, CA...........       30       30        0  100.0%
CLL.........................................  Easterwood, TX.................      193      193        0  100.0%
CMI.........................................  Willard, Il....................      151      151        0  100.0%
CVN.........................................  Clovis, NM.....................       54       54        0  100.0%
DBQ.........................................  Dubuque, IA....................       46       46        0  100.0%
DIK.........................................  Dickinson, ND..................       53       53        0  100.0%
DRT.........................................  Del Rio, TX....................       59       59        0  100.0%
FLO.........................................  Florence, SC...................       80       80        0  100.0%
GCK.........................................  Garden City, KS................       61       61        0  100.0%
GGG.........................................  East Texas Regional, TX........      126      126        0  100.0%
GLH.........................................  Greenville, MS.................       52       52        0  100.0%
LAW.........................................  Lawton, OK.....................       94       94        0  100.0%
MCN.........................................  Macon, GA......................       54       54        0  100.0%
PGA.........................................  Page, AZ.......................       40       40        0  100.0%
PGV.........................................  Greenville, NC.................       93       93        0  100.0%
PKB.........................................  Mid-Ohio, WV...................       53       53        0  100.0%
SBY.........................................  Salisbury, MD..................      119      119        0  100.0%
SPS.........................................  Wichita Falls, TX..............      213      213        0  100.0%
TXK.........................................  Texarkana Regional, AR.........       95       95        0  100.0%
TYR.........................................  Tyler-Pounds, TX...............      211      211        0  100.0%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                           Appendix C--37 Airports with 30% or More Departures by E175
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                               ERJ 170/                    % ERJ
                   Jan-22                                                        195     Total    Other    170/
                                                                               Flights  Flights  Flights    195
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PAE.........................................  Paine Field, WA................      259      260        1   99.6%
ORH.........................................  Worcester Regional, MA.........      121      149       28   81.2%
SUN.........................................  Friedman Memorial, ID..........      203      260       57   78.1%
STS.........................................  Sonoma, CA.....................      302      432      130   69.9%
ACV.........................................  Humbolt County, CA.............      153      220       67   69.5%
HHH.........................................  Hilton Head, SC................       64       95       31   67.4%
XNA.........................................  Northwest Arkansas, AR.........      730    1,312      582   55.6%
RDM.........................................  Redmond, OR....................      375      687      312   54.6%
BOI.........................................  Boise, ID......................    1,149    2,247    1,098   51.1%
SBP.........................................  San Luis Obispo, CA............      218      443      225   49.2%
CMH.........................................  Columbus, OH...................    1,866    3,873    2,007   48.2%
CHS.........................................  Charleston, SC.................    1,037    2,360    1,323   43.9%
PIT.........................................  Pittsburgh, PA.................    1,864    4,461    2,597   41.8%
MSO.........................................  Missoula, MT...................      150      372      222   40.3%
ILM.........................................  Wilmington, NC.................      228      585      357   39.0%
EYW.........................................  Key West, FL...................      497    1,276      779   38.9%
PSC.........................................  Pasco, WA......................      208      539      331   38.6%
GRK.........................................  Killeen-Fort Hood, TX..........      113      296      183   38.2%
LIT.........................................  Little Rock, AR................      488    1,280      792   38.1%
ORF.........................................  Norfolk, VA....................      763    2,073    1,310   36.8%
LGA.........................................  New York, LaGuardia............    7,395   20,293   12,898   36.4%
FCA.........................................  Kalispell, MT..................      102      280      178   36.4%
JAX.........................................  Jacksonville, FL...............    1,031    2,856    1,825   36.1%
IND.........................................  Indianapolis, IN...............    1,478    4,102    2,624   36.0%
RDU.........................................  Raleigh-Durham, NC.............    1,911    5,456    3,545   35.0%
HLN.........................................  Helena, MT.....................       52      154      102   33.8%
SAV.........................................  Savannah, GA...................      525    1,555    1,030   33.8%
DCA.........................................  RR Washington National, DC.....    4,743   14,101    9,358   33.6%
SDF.........................................  Louisville, KY.................      731    2,185    1,454   33.5%
EUG.........................................  Eugene, OR.....................      301      919      618   32.8%
SGF.........................................  Springfield, MO................      261      797      536   32.7%
OKC.........................................  Oklahoma City, OK..............      680    2,111    1,431   32.2%
MTJ.........................................  Montrose, CO...................      137      428      291   32.0%
BOS.........................................  Boston, MA.....................    6,082   19,476   13,394   31.2%
PSP.........................................  Palm Springs, CA...............      507    1,629    1,122   31.1%
BUF.........................................  Buffalo, NY....................      628    2,032    1,404   30.9%
MFR.........................................  Medford, OR....................      222      721      499   30.8%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
    The Chair recognizes Mr. James Viola, president and CEO of 
Helicopter Association International. You are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Viola. Thank you. Chairman DeFazio, Chairman Larsen, 
Ranking Member Sam Graves, Ranking Member Garret Graves, and 
members of the subcommittee, thank you for your leadership and 
for holding this hearing. I appreciate the opportunity to 
provide testimony today. I have been involved in aviation for 
more than 35 years and began my aviation career in the U.S. 
Army with the majority of my flying done as a special 
operations helicopter pilot. I later joined the FAA where I 
most recently served as the director of general aviation safety 
assurance. I now serve as the president and CEO of Helicopter 
Association International.
    Throughout my career, I have been dedicated to safety and 
the continued development and refinement of safe aviation 
operations. The unique capabilities of vertical flight means we 
can accomplish missions that no other aircraft can. And our 
industry is also expanding, bringing on to the flight deck 
exciting technologies such as advanced air mobility and eVTOL 
aircraft.
    Our operations are conducted at lower altitudes and at 
lower speeds. Many flights are conducted from start to finish 
without the use of airports. Every day, vertical flight serves 
the public good. Our members do everything from air medical, 
law enforcement, firefighting, heavy construction to urban air 
mobility, and even more. Helicopter air ambulance operators 
transport roughly 1,000 injured or critically ill patients 
every day.
    The FAA, in carrying out its mission to maintain aviation 
safety, put into place restrictions on helicopter flight 
operations through NOTAMs and airworthiness directives, or ADs, 
in order to mitigate the risk of 5G interference with aircraft 
radio altimeters. For helicopters, the AD prohibits certain 
operations requiring radio altimeters.
    The restriction in the AD, which prohibits takeoff and 
landings, has significant far-reaching consequences for the 
rotorcraft industry. We may be unable to conduct certain 
missions and provide public services, especially when you 
consider that limitation applies to nearly 2,000 NOTAM 
designated locations.
    To combat the impacts of 5G interference, the FAA 
implemented an alternative method of compliance, or AMOC. To 
date, the focus has been on part 121 air carriers and the FAA 
has done tremendous work there, but this is a Band-Aid approach 
to a permanent problem that is constantly changing. The 
rotorcraft AMOC procedures have not been formally released by 
the FAA. The process is still being fine-tuned.
    We believe it is critical that the FAA continue the same 
level of urgency and commitment as they have had for commercial 
aviation to mitigate operational impacts on helicopter 
operations and the essential services they provide to save 
lives, protect communities, and support jobs. It must be 
recognized that rotorcraft's operational environment is vastly 
different than the airlines.
    Helicopter operations which take place at much lower 
altitudes than airline flights could very well conduct their 
entire flight within the zones of this interference. Rotorcraft 
utilize airports, as well as unapproved locations such as 
streets, parking lots, or fields. The other avenue to combat 
the operational impact of 5G interference is the exemption 
process.
    The FAA partially approved a HAI petition for exemption 
allowing helicopter air ambulance operators to continue flying 
with restrictions. This relief will also allow them to use 
night vision goggles in the helicopter air ambulance 
operations. Ninety-seven percent of the 1,250 helicopters used 
in helicopter air ambulance now have an HAI exemption.
    I want to be very clear: HAI and our members are not 
against 5G. However, due to our mission profiles and 
operational parameters, 5G interference is a particular concern 
to the vertical flight sector. We want to ensure that 5G is 
deployed in such a way that it can safely coexist with aviation 
operations. The development of new radio altimeters with 
filters that can withstand 5G interference will take time, and 
the cost for operators to purchase and install these new 
altimeters is of particular concern to the industry.
    In the short term, HAI is focused on working with the FAA 
on AMOC process and additional exemptions with mitigations to 
allow operators to provide services to their communities. In 
the long term, we urge Congress to enact reforms to provide 
better transparency and coordination on the spectrum issues. 
The Department of Commerce and its Federal Advisory Committee 
have studied the issues of equitable access to spectrum and 
identified several recommendations.
    The reason we are here today is clear: Misaligned spectrum 
policy has disadvantaged aerospace and aviation users. It is 
imperative we find a solution to address the currently failed 
system so that we are not in the same situation again.
    I thank the committee again for the opportunity to provide 
the perspective of the vertical flight industry, and I look 
forward to continuing our work together in these important 
issues. My full comments are offered for the record. I welcome 
any questions.
    [Mr. Viola's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of James Viola, President and Chief Executive 
             Officer, Helicopter Association International
    Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, I want to thank you for holding this hearing on the 
urgent issue of 5G interference with safety-critical aviation 
equipment. Thank you for your leadership in defending aviation safety. 
I also want to express my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to 
provide testimony today.
    I have been involved in aviation for more than 35 years and have 
flown more than 70 types of aircraft, both helicopter and fixed-wing, 
military and civilian. I began my aviation career in the US Army, with 
the majority of my flying done as a special operations helicopter 
pilot. I later joined the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), where 
I most recently served as director of General Aviation Safety 
Assurance.
    I now serve as president and CEO of Helicopter Association 
International (HAI). As the professional trade association for the 
international helicopter industry, HAI represents more than 1,100 
companies and over 16,000 industry professionals in more than 65 
countries. Each year, HAI members safely operate more than 3,700 
helicopters and remotely piloted aircraft approximately 2.9 million 
hours. HAI is dedicated to the promotion of the helicopter as a safe, 
effective method of commerce and to the advancement of the 
international helicopter community.
    Throughout my career, I have been dedicated to safety and the 
continued development and refinement of safe aviation operations.
                        Serving the Public Good
    The unique capabilities of vertical flight--the ability to land and 
take off from practically anywhere, the maneuverability, and the 
ability to hover or fly at very low speeds--means we can accomplish 
missions that no other aircraft can. Another way we differ from fixed-
wing aircraft is that our operations are conducted at lower altitudes 
and at slower speeds.
    Every day, vertical flight serves the public good. Our members do 
everything from air medical, law enforcement, firefighting, heavy 
construction, utility patrol and maintenance, urban air mobility, and 
more. And our industry is expanding, bringing onto the flight deck 
exciting technology such as advanced air mobility and electric vertical 
takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft.
    All over the country, from densely populated cities to oil rigs 200 
miles offshore, helicopters are used to save lives, serve and protect 
American citizens, and support critical industries in demanding 
environments--and many of those missions are conducted from start to 
finish without the use of airports.
    As just one example of how vertical flight serves the public good, 
consider air medicine. Helicopter air ambulance (HAA) operators 
transport roughly 1,000 injured or critically ill patients every day. 
Up to 50,000 of the more than 300,000 people transported by HAA 
operators during 2021 were transported from off-airport or unimproved 
areas--meaning the 5G mitigations proposed to maintain an equivalent 
level of safety at airports will have no effect on those operations. 
The loss of a single life because of misguided 5G-related policies 
would be reprehensible.
                         5G Flight Restrictions
    In carrying out its mission to maintain safety in the US National 
Airspace System, the FAA has put into place restrictions on helicopter 
flight operations to mitigate the risk of 5G interference with aircraft 
radio altimeters. The FAA has communicated these restrictions via two 
channels: a series of Notices to Air Missions (NOTAMs) and 
Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-23-13.
    The FAA uses NOTAMs to define the geographic locations where 5G 
interference occurs. As of Jan. 27, 2022, the agency has issued 5G-
related NOTAMs for 1,904 locations around the country.
    AD 2021-23-13 states that when operating in US airspace, the 
following operations requiring radio altimeters are prohibited in areas 
defined by the presence of 5G C band wireless broadband interference as 
identified by NOTAM:
      Performing approaches that require radio altimeter 
minimums for rotorcraft offshore operations. Barometric minimums must 
be used for these operations instead.
      Engaging hover autopilot modes that require radio 
altimeter data.
      Engaging search and rescue (SAR) autopilot modes that 
require radio altimeter data.
      Performing takeoffs and landings in accordance with any 
procedure (Category A, Category B, or by Performance Class in the 
Rotorcraft Flight Manual or Operations Specification) that requires the 
use of radio altimeter data.

    For each mission, an operator must review their Rotorcraft Flight 
Manual and Operations Specification to determine if the use of radio 
altimeter data is required by provisions of Title 14 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations. If a radio altimeter is required and if the 
mission's flight path would overlap a geographic location identified by 
a 5G-related NOTAM, then the restrictions listed in the AD apply to 
that flight.
    The first and third bullets impact specific segments of our 
industry. However, the fourth bullet, which prohibits takeoffs and 
landings in areas identified by 5G-related NOTAMs, has significant, 
far-reaching consequences for the rotorcraft industry's ability to 
conduct missions and provide public services, especially when you 
consider that prohibition applies to nearly 2,000 US locations.
    The issue is not limited to radio altimeter performance alone. 
According to the FAA Safety Alert for Operators 21007 of Dec. 23, 2021, 
``a wide range of other automated safety systems rely on radio 
altimeter data.'' The agency goes on to note that 5G interference and 
the ensuing anomalous radio altimeter inputs could cause flight 
controls, including autopilots, to operate in an unexpected way, which 
pilots may not detect in time ``to maintain continued safe flight and 
landing.''
                   Alternative Methods of Compliance
    To reduce these impacts of 5G interference, the FAA has implemented 
an Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) process. This process 
evaluates the installed radio altimeter aboard an aircraft and its 
ability to withstand spectrum interference.
    To date, the focus has been on Part 121 carriers, and the FAA has 
done an outstanding job of streamlining the process to issue as many 
approvals as they have. We support these efforts for the airlines. The 
AMOC process is vital to ensure a healthy, viable US aviation industry. 
Currently the rotorcraft AMOC procedures have not been formally 
released by the FAA; the process is still being worked on and fine-
tuned. We believe it is critical that FAA continue the same level of 
urgency and commitment, as they have had for commercial aviation, to 
mitigate operational impacts upon helicopter operations and the rest of 
general aviation, and the essential services they provide to save 
lives, protect communities, and support jobs.
    The effects of 5G deployment are not limited to the nation's 
busiest airports, and mitigations by wireless carriers should not be 
limited to those locations either. As we start evaluating AMOCs for 
rotorcraft, we must recognize that the airlines' operational 
environment is vastly different than the one for rotorcraft. An 
airliner is only in the zone where it could potentially be impacted by 
5G interference for a short duration, generally during the critical 
period of takeoffs and landings. The vast majority of its flight is 
conducted at high altitudes, out of the range of 5G interference.
    Conversely, helicopter operations, which generally take place at 
much lower altitudes than airline flights, could very well conduct 
their entire flight within the zones of interference. In addition, 
while airplanes must take off and land from airports, rotorcraft can 
utilize a much wider variety of sites, including heliports and 
unimproved locations such as streets, parking lots, or fields. The 
voluntary measures proposed by the wireless carriers would provide 
modest 5G limitations at the surface of public-use heliports, of which 
there are only 55 in the country. That number is dwarfed by the 
estimated 6,533 to 8,533 HAA landing sites in the United States, with 
more than 4,000 being private-use heliports co-located at hospitals.
    HAI has partnered with the FAA to maximize the efficiency the AMOC 
process. Knowing that the FAA would be under immense pressure to 
approve a large amount of AMOCs, HAI took steps to ensure that critical 
helicopter operations could be prioritized. In cooperation with the 
FAA, HAI developed a 5G AMOC Portal, where operators can report how 
their operations are being impacted by 5G interference. These reports 
are shared with the FAA, providing the agency with additional 
intelligence on 5G impacts.
                               Exemptions
    The other avenue to reduce the operational impact of 5G 
interference is the exemption process. HAI is pleased that the FAA 
partially approved a petition for exemption that HAI had submitted in 
anticipation of 5G C band deployment, seeking relief from regulations 
that require a normally functioning radio altimeter for certain 
operations.
    This exemption allows Part 119 certificate holders authorized to 
conduct HAA operations under Part 135, subpart L, to continue Part 135 
helicopter operations while employing radar altimeters that may not 
function normally due to 5G interference. The relief will also allow 
the use of night-vision goggles (NVGs) in HAA operations.
    These exemptions are contingent on certain conditions and 
limitations. All pilots conducting operations under the exemption are 
required to receive and maintain a record of proper training. 
Additional conditions for NVG operations include the installation of a 
movable searchlight and a requirement for pilots or crew members to 
establish radio contact with ground personnel at a landing site so they 
can receive and confirm a description of the landing site.
    To date, 40 HAA operators have submitted Letters of Intent to use 
the HAI Exemption. This accounts for 1,206 helicopters in operation, or 
97% of the approximately 1,250 helicopters used in HAA operations.
    This exemption provides a significant path for moving forward, not 
only for HAA operators but for the countless communities and hospital 
networks that would otherwise have been deprived of the critical life-
saving support that can only be offered by helicopter operations. This 
exemption will allow HAA operators to continue to do what they do 
best--save lives.
                            The Path Forward
    I want to be very clear: HAI and our members are not against 5G. 
However, due to our mission profiles and operational parameters, 5G 
interference is of particular concern to the vertical flight sector. We 
want to ensure that 5G is deployed in such a way that it can safely 
coexist with US aviation operations.
    Under the exemption and with the proper mitigations in place, HAA 
missions can move forward. However, other rotorcraft industry sectors 
do not have similar exemptions that enable them to continue operations. 
Critical public-service missions, including firefighting, utility work, 
and law enforcement, and economically important ones, such as 
transportation and flight training, are severely constrained if 
operating in areas for which a 5G-related NOTAM has been issued. 
Additionally, emerging technologies such as advanced air mobility 
operations that are projected to begin operations in dense urban 
areas--the exact areas of 5G deployment--could face severe 
restrictions.
    The development of new radar altimeters with filters that can 
withstand 5G interference is critical to the vertical flight industry's 
ability to continue flying and serving the public good. However, 
developing and certifying new radar altimeters will take time. 
Additionally, the cost for operators to purchase and install these new 
altimeters is of significant concern to the industry. My members ask 
why they should be financially responsible for installing new equipment 
to mitigate the safety risk imposed by another corporation's decision 
to deploy 5G wireless systems.
    In the short term, HAI is focused on working with the FAA and the 
AMOC process to determine which radio altimeters and aircraft models 
can withstand 5G interference. Additionally, HAI will continue to 
explore for FAA approval exemptions and accompanying operational 
mitigations that will help operators to continue to provide aviation 
services to their communities.
    In the long term, we urge Congress to enact the necessary reforms 
to provide better transparency, efficiency, and coordination on 
spectrum issues by the FCC and other government agencies. Various 
parties, including the Department of Commerce and its Federal Advisory 
Committee, have studied the issue of equitable access to spectrum in 
the U.S. and identified several recommendations. It seems clear that 
misaligned domestic spectrum policy, to the disadvantage of aerospace 
and aviation users, is what brings us here today. We do need to find a 
solution to address how a currently failed system can be fixed so that 
we are not in the same situation again. The deployment of 5G will not 
be the last spectrum issue to resolve. Let's begin to work now to 
ensure that the problems we faced with the 5G rollout will not occur in 
the future.
    Ensuring the safety of those who fly--whether pilots, crews, or 
passengers--is always HAI's top priority. As such, we will continue to 
advocate for reasonable limitations on 5G deployment so that safety-
critical equipment on helicopters is not compromised by harmful 
interference. HAI will also continue to work with regulators to develop 
solutions that maintain safety and preserve the helicopter community's 
ability to operate in a 5G environment.
    I thank the Committee again for the opportunity to provide the 
perspective of the vertical flight industry and look forward to 
continuing our work together on these important issues. I welcome any 
questions.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much for your testimony. And we 
will now turn to Ms. Baker from the CTIA. You are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
including the wireless industry in today's hearing. I am glad 
to be here together with the aviation leaders, and the keyword 
for me is ``together.'' I am very happy to report that millions 
of Americans today are benefiting from next generation 5G 
service. Those same Americans are flying across the country and 
across the world safely. We got here thanks to a great deal of 
hard work in the past few years, particularly in the past few 
weeks.
    We have shown that engineer to engineer there is a path 
forward together. As of today, 90 percent of commercial planes 
have been cleared demonstrating the successful coexistence of 
5G and flights. We are committed to working to clear the 
remaining planes and being a good partner with aviation. I very 
much share the view expressed by American Airlines CEO Doug 
Parker that we are in the right spot.
    Technical experts are encouraged and information sharing 
has been key. An agreement between CTIA, A4A, and AIA helped 
drive this breakthrough. I also share the confidence of Scott 
Kirby, the CEO of United, who said that we will get to a final 
resolution. Like him, I just wished it had happened earlier.
    Rewind a few weeks and the press tried to pit the future of 
wireless versus aviation. That was always a false choice. We 
can and must have safe flights and robust 5G.
    Nearly 40 countries around the world have shown us it can 
happen, and it is happening now in communities across our 
country. We have been preparing to bring C-band spectrum into 
service for years. A regulatory rulemaking, global study, this 
has been a bipartisan priority to drive our national wireless 
leadership and close the digital divide.
    That extended process only reinforces how proud I am of 
AT&T, Verizon, and the U.S. wireless industry for being so 
responsive to aviation concerns.
    After spending billions on spectrum license and billions 
more deploying networks, they hit pause. They took repeated 
steps to ensure that we are in the position we are today. They 
delayed, in the public interest, fully confident of our ability 
to coexist effectively. They first postponed their launch 
voluntarily for 30 days to give aviation more time to evaluate 
altimeter performance. They then took steps to reduce their 
power in the air to protect airports and heliports, all in 
response to aviation concerns.
    Then they agreed to 2 additional weeks of delay. In doing 
so, they adopted even more temporary protections around 
airports. Still then, the carriers, the day before launch, 
agreed not to turn on cell towers in the immediate area around 
specific airports. The FCC called these the most comprehensive 
efforts in the world to safeguard aviation technologies. And 
they are.
    This is the type of U.S. corporate leadership we need. 
These temporary steps are on top of the FCC's balanced rules 
that were the culmination of years of expert review, capturing 
the feedback of both aviation and wireless interests.
    This hearing is rightfully focused on protecting aviation 
safety. We share that objective wholeheartedly and now have 
real-world evidence of it in the United States.
    I wish to close by sharing how excited I am for our 5G 
future. Accenture just last week released a report noting that 
broadly deployed 5G will help us achieve up to 20 percent of 
the administration's climate goals.
    5G will also create new home broadband competition and help 
close the digital divide in each of your districts. 5G is well 
worth the wait. That is why getting the full power 5G as 
envisioned by the FCC is so important, and it is why getting 
access to the next phase of C-band is so critical.
    The enhanced collaboration between our industries will make 
that a reality. The last few weeks have given us a clear 
roadmap to do so. This is about our global competitiveness and 
creating new opportunities in towns, small and large. We will 
do all of that while ensuring safe flights. That is really 
great news, and we should celebrate that.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [Ms. Baker's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Meredith Attwell Baker, President and Chief 
                        Executive Officer, CTIA
    Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, Subcommittee Chairman 
Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of the Subcommittee, on 
behalf of CTIA and the U.S. wireless industry, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today.
    Congress and this Committee have been laser focused on critical 
investments to our nation's infrastructure. The Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) recognized the key role that 5G plays in 
closing the digital divide and supported low-income households so they 
can stay connected. These historic investments in both our physical and 
digital infrastructure are integral to our connected future across 
America.
    Your leadership is also critical in supporting the safest air 
traffic system in the world. We can--and must--have both safe flights 
and robust and reliable C-Band 5G. I appreciate you holding this 
hearing.
   There is Broad Support and Commitment to Advancing C-Band 5G and 
                            Aviation Safety
    Last month, President Biden emphasized the U.S. Government's 
``commit[ment] to rapid 5G deployment'' while ensuring that aviation 
will ``safely co-exist.'' \1\ The wireless industry fully endorses the 
President's statement and is committed to working collaboratively with 
altimeter vendors, aircraft manufacturers, the airlines, helicopters, 
airports, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), the White House, and Congress--in sum, 
all stakeholders--to enable full-scale C-Band 5G deployments while 
maintaining air traffic safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Statement by President Joe Biden on 5G Deployment Agreement, 
The White House Briefing Room (Jan. 4, 2022) (``President Biden Jan. 4 
Statement'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The hard work over the last several weeks demonstrates that the 
United States can achieve the dual imperatives of air traffic safety 
and C-Band 5G. On January 19, 2022, AT&T and Verizon successfully 
launched 5G services in the initial tranche of C-Band 5G spectrum, the 
3.7-3.8 GHz band, and Americans have continued to travel safely across 
the nation.
    I am proud of how AT&T and Verizon responded in the face of 
concerns about C-Band 5G and the claims of potential interference to 
radio altimeters. Despite all available real-world evidence--including 
existing C-Band 5G networks operating abroad using the same frequencies 
with the same permitted power levels and with no reported incidents of 
interference to air traffic safety--AT&T and Verizon acted to allay 
public concern and to give the FAA and the aviation industry additional 
time to evaluate altimeter performance with 5G. Specifically, since the 
FAA issued its statement on 5G/altimeter co-existence on November 2, 
2021, AT&T and Verizon delayed their launches twice and committed to 
three different sets of voluntary temporary measures.
    I also want to thank the FAA for its actions in recent weeks to 
turn to an altimeter-by-altimeter review and keep Americans flying 
safely and with minimal disruption. As of January 28, 2022, the FAA has 
cleared 20 altimeter models and 90% of the U.S. commercial fleet for 
low visibility landings in the vicinity of C-Band 5G networks.\2\ This 
clearance rate demonstrates co-existence is attainable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ FAA, 5G and Aviation Safety, https://www.faa.gov/5g (last 
updated Jan. 28, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With continued collaboration and enhanced transparency, and relying 
on sound science and good engineering, I firmly believe we will achieve 
an outcome that permits robust C-Band 5G and continued air traffic 
safety across the American skies. To that end, I am encouraged by 
recent statements from airline leaders. As United's CEO Scott Kirby 
said, ``[w]hile I wish it happened earlier, the good news is we now 
have everyone engaged.'' \3\ And American Airlines CEO Doug Parker 
noted that technical experts working on 5G and air traffic safety 
``seem encouraged that we'll be able to address this in a way that 
allows for full deployment of 5G, including near airports.'' \4\ The 
wireless industry is committed to working with our aviation 
counterparts, the FCC, the FAA, and all of government to do the work 
necessary to achieve both robust C-Band 5G and safe skies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Chris Isidore, Major airlines say the 5G doomsday scenario is 
over, CNN Business (Jan. 21, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/20/
business/airlines-outlook-5g-truce/index.html.
    \4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           The Promise of 5G and the Importance of C-Band 5G
    5G wireless broadband networks are transforming the way we live and 
work, with speeds up to 100 times faster than 4G networks, connectivity 
responsiveness that is five times quicker, and network capacity that 
can handle 100 times the number of devices. In the transportation 
sector alone, 5G is beginning to help foster driverless cars, increase 
the efficiency of public transportation, and improve roadway safety and 
save lives. 5G will help update and build the industries of the future, 
including healthcare, smart manufacturing, logistics, and agriculture. 
The Boston Consulting Group projects that 5G networks will add $1.5 
trillion to America's economy and create 4.5 million new jobs over the 
next decade.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Enrique Duarte Melo et al., 5G Promises Massive Job and GDP 
Growth in the US, Boston Consulting Group (Feb. 2021), https://
www.ctia.org/news/report-5g-promises-massive-job-and-gdp-growth-in-the-
u-s. Conversely, delayed access to 5G spectrum has real impacts: every 
six-month delay in 5G deployment costs our nation's economy $25 billion 
in economic benefits over the next decade, risks America's 
competitiveness, and jeopardizes our ability to ensure global 5G 
leadership. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Further, a recently released Accenture study quantifies the 
importance of 5G wireless services to addressing climate change.\6\ 
Accenture concluded that in the U.S., use cases on 5G networks are 
expected to enable a 20 percent contribution toward carbon emission 
reduction targets, helping the country meet its climate change goals. 
Accenture finds that 5G use cases will have the same effect as taking 
nearly 72 million cars off the road for a year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Monica Kuroki et al., 5G Connectivity: A Key Enabling 
Technology to Meet America's Climate Change Goals, Accenture (Jan. 
2022), https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/5g-enabled-technologies-
could-solve-for-one-fifth-of-us-climate-change-target-by-2025-new-
study-finds.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rapid deployment of the C-Band is key to the U.S.'s global 
leadership in this developing 5G ecosystem, with economic and national 
security implications. Our global competitors understand that wireless 
leadership means billions of dollars in economic growth and millions of 
jobs in the industries of tomorrow, such as Smart Cities and the 
Internet of Things. Unfortunately, other countries possess significant 
advantages in the availability of spectrum for wireless innovation--for 
example, China is freeing up hundreds of megahertz of mid-band spectrum 
for 5G.
    Maintaining our global leadership in wireless and meeting the ever-
growing demand for next-generation wireless requires access to 
spectrum, and the FCC on a bipartisan basis has made strides to open up 
new frequency bands that will power 5G. Mid-band spectrum is the 
``sweet spot'' of spectrum innovation and is a key factor for 5G, as it 
provides high speeds over a broad coverage area, making sure no one 
gets left out of the New Economy. As a presidential candidate, 
Secretary Buttigieg committed to ``[s]peed up next generation wireless 
expansion . . . support[ing] clearing more government and other 
spectrum (like the C-band).'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Investing in an American Asset: Unleashing the Potential of 
Rural America, Pete for America, Aug. 6, 2019, https://
peteforamerica.com/policies/unleash-rural-opportunity/ [https://
archive.ph/MiFF7].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But America is playing catch-up, as the U.S. has a limited amount 
of mid-band spectrum available to power 5G networks. Across the globe, 
the C-Band is the mid-band workhorse for 5G. Nearly 40 countries are 
already using this spectrum with no threat to air safety. In the U.S., 
policymakers and industry stakeholders alike have been working to open 
up the C-Band for 5G for years, including international review dating 
back as early as 2003 and more recently as part of a 2017 FCC inquiry 
and the 2018 bipartisan MOBILE NOW law.\8\ In February 2020, the agency 
adopted a comprehensive order enabling 5G in the C-Band with carefully 
crafted technical rules to allow C-Band 5G to safely operate with 
altimeters. The FCC reviewed the concerns expressed by the aviation 
industry and concluded that ``the technical rules on power and emission 
limits we set for the [C-Band 5G] Service and the spectral separation 
of 220 megahertz should offer all due protection to [altimeter] 
services in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Expanding Flexible Use in Mid-Band Spectrum Between 3.7 and 24 
GHz, Notice of Inquiry, 32 FCC Rcd 6373 (2017); MOBILE NOW Act, Pub. L. 
No. 115-141, Division P, Title VI, Sec.  601 et seq. (2018).
    \9\ Expanding Flexible Use of the 3.7 to 4.2 GHz Band, Report and 
Order and Order of Proposed Modification, 35 FCC Rcd 2343, 2485  395 
(2020) (``C-Band Order'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In February 2021, the FCC completed an auction of 280 megahertz of 
C-Band spectrum that generated more than $81 billion for the U.S. 
Treasury--the largest spectrum auction in history. AT&T and Verizon won 
licenses in many of the most populated geographic areas in the 3.7-3.8 
GHz band and, under the FCC's rules, paid incumbent users billions of 
dollars more to clear the spectrum by December 5, 2021. The remaining 
licenses, covering the full band from 3.7-3.98 GHz, are scheduled to 
become available for 5G by December 2023.
    Following the auction, AT&T and Verizon sprang into action, 
investing billions of dollars to deploy C-Band 5G network 
infrastructure across the country, while thousands of employees worked 
to prepare the network, and thousands more were trained to engage with 
customers about C-Band 5G--all in the lead up to the scheduled launch, 
last December 5, 2021.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Letter from John Stankey, Chief Executive Officer, AT&T, Inc. 
& Hans Vestberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Verizon 
Communications, Inc., to Pete Buttigieg, Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Transportation & Steve Dickson, Administrator, FAA, at 2 (Jan. 2, 2022) 
(``AT&T Verizon Jan. 2 Letter''), https://www.politico.com/f/-
?id=0000017e-1c36-dee4-a5ff-fe3e997f0000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wireless Providers' Voluntary Delays and Steps to Pare Back the C-Band 
5G Launch Have Allowed Aviation Stakeholders to Verify 5G Can Co-Exist 
                              Effectively
    I am proud of AT&T and Verizon for their responsiveness to FAA and 
aviation concerns. The wireless providers have delayed launch twice, 
for a total of six weeks, and committed to voluntary measures 
restricting full-power C-Band 5G for six months in addition to the 
protections in the FCC's rules. The wireless industry remains confident 
that 5G poses no risk to air traffic safety but has taken these steps 
to allow the FAA time to evaluate altimeter performance with C-Band 5G.
    On November 2, 2021, just over a month before AT&T and Verizon were 
set to launch the first C-Band 5G networks in the U.S., the FAA issued 
a pronouncement on C-Band 5G, a Special Airworthiness Information 
Bulletin (SAIB) identifying a potential risk of C-Band 5G resulting in 
adverse effects to altimeters.\11\ The FAA sought information on 
altimeter design and deployment on aircraft, as well as testing 
results. The SAIB followed press reports a few days earlier suggesting 
there could be flight cancellations, delays or diversions if the FCC 
did not suspend C-Band operations.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ FAA, Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin; Risk of 
Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters, AIR-21-18 (Nov. 2, 2021) 
(``SAIB AIR-21-18''), https://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library-/rgSAIB.nsf/
dc7bd4f27e5f107486257221005f069d/27ffcbb45e
6157e9862587810044ad19/$FILE/AIR-21-18.pdf.
    \12\ Andrew Tangle & Ryan Tracy, FAA Plans Warnings to Pilots, 
Airlines Over New 5G Rollout, Wall St. J. (Oct. 29, 2021), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/faa-plans-warnings-to-pilots-airlines-over-new-5g-
rollout-11635524648.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the FCC had conducted a rigorous analysis and found no 
harmful interference to altimeters, and the FAA's SAIB recognized that 
other nations' C-Band wireless networks have not resulted in any 
documented reports of interference, the FAA acted in large part based 
on a single, flawed industry study. In response, on November 4, AT&T 
and Verizon announced the first of what would become two delays in the 
launch of C-Band 5G. Specifically, the two wireless providers 
voluntarily postponed their C-Band launches for one month, from 
December 5 until January 5, 2022, as a show of good faith to help 
provide aviation stakeholders additional time.\13\ The FCC and the FAA 
issued a joint statement, noting that ``[a]viation safety and 
technology leadership are national priorities, and with today's 
announcement these companies have demonstrated their commitment to 
both.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Cat Zakrzewski, AT&T and Verizon will delay 5G rollout over 
airplane interference concerns, Wash. Post (Nov. 4, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/11/04/att-verizon-5g-delay/.
    \14\ Linda Hardesty, AT&T, Verizon postpone C-Band rollouts until 
air safety review, FierceWireless (Nov. 4, 2021), https://
www.fiercewireless.com/operators/at-t-verizon-
postpone-c-band-rollouts-until-air-safety-review#::text=-
The%20FAA%20and%20the%20Federal,
impact%20on%20aviation%20safety%20technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This first delay was followed by discussions with the government 
officials in which AT&T and Verizon provided vast and unprecedented 
access to their 5G network deployment designs, radiofrequency planning, 
and equipment performance.\15\ On November 24, AT&T and Verizon 
announced they would supplement the FCC's restrictions with a set of 
voluntary precautionary measures that would last for six months, or 
until July 5, 2022, unless credible evidence exists that real-world 
interference would occur if the measures were relaxed.\16\ The 
temporary measures took two forms: the wireless providers agreed to (1) 
lower the power of C-Band transmissions across America including 
nationwide limits on power projected to the sky (where altimeters are 
in use), and (2) effectively curtail C-Band operations in broadly 
defined areas near public airports and helipads. AT&T and Verizon 
certified these commitments, making them enforceable by the FCC.\17\ 
The FCC recognized these new temporary measures as among ``the most 
comprehensive efforts in the world to safeguard aviation 
technologies.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Letter from Joan Marsh, Executive Vice President of Federal 
Regulatory Relations, AT&T Services, Inc. & Kathleen M. Grillo, Senior 
Vice President--Public Policy & Government Affairs, Verizon, to Jessica 
Rosenworcel, Chairwoman, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 5 (filed Nov. 
24, 2021).
    \16\ Id. at 6.
    \17\ Letter from Joan Marsh, Executive Vice President of Federal 
Regulatory Relations, AT&T Services, Inc. & William H. Johnson, Senior 
Vice President--Federal Regulatory & Legal Affairs, Verizon, to Marlene 
H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 1 (filed Dec. 31, 
2021) (``AT&T Verizon Dec. 31 Letter'').
    \18\ See Matt Daneman, AT&T, Verizon Limit C-Band Deployments Near 
Airports, Helipads Through July 6, at 2, Commc'ns Daily (Nov. 26, 2021) 
(quoting FCC spokesperson).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 7, 2021, the FAA issued two Airworthiness Directives, 
stating that ``radio altimeters cannot be relied upon to perform their 
intended function if they experience interference from wireless 
broadband operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz frequency band.'' \19\ The 
wireless industry's temporary measures were not addressed at all in the 
directives. The Airworthiness Directives previewed restrictions that 
would be imposed on pilots with the release of Notices to Air Missions 
(NOTAMs) at a later date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Airworthiness Directives; Transport and Commuter Category 
Airplanes, 86 Fed. Reg. 69984 (Dec. 9, 2021); Airworthiness Directives; 
Various Helicopters, 86 Fed. Reg. 69992 (Dec. 9, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On January 2, 2022, following more discussions with the White 
House, the Department of Commerce, the FCC, the Department of 
Transportation, and the FAA, AT&T and Verizon announced a further set 
of additional voluntary precautionary measures for the same six month 
period, until July 5, 2022, again in the spirit of cooperation and good 
faith. The wireless providers adopted C-Band exclusion zones around 
runways at certain airports that mirror those that are already in use 
in France, one of the very few C-Band 5G nations with any airport 
mitigations, with slight adaptation to reflect the modest technical 
differences in how C-Band is being deployed in the two countries.\20\ 
And on January 3, 2022, AT&T and Verizon agreed to a second delay for 
the C-Band 5G launch, from January 5 to January 19. President Biden 
praised the agreement and noted, ``we're grateful to all parties for 
their cooperation and good faith.'' \21\ Secretary Buttigieg and 
Administrator Dickson thanked AT&T and Verizon for these voluntary 
steps that ``will give us additional time and space to reduce the 
impacts to commercial flights.'' \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ AT&T Verizon Jan. 2 Letter.
    \21\ President Biden Jan. 4 Statement.
    \22\ Letter from Pete Buttigieg, Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Transportation & Steve Dickson, Administrator, FAA, to John Stankey, 
Chief Executive Officer, AT&T, Inc. & Hans Vestberg, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, Verizon Communications, Inc., at 1 (Jan. 3, 2022), 
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-01/
USDOT%20Letter%20to%20ATT%20Verizon_
20220103.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    U.S. providers have agreed to airport exclusions zones like France, 
large geographic protections for air traffic around airports, and a 
nationwide limit on power levels above the horizon for six months. No 
other country has such protections in place.
    Beginning in early January 2022, the FAA issued nearly two thousand 
NOTAMs, restricting certain operations requiring altimeter data in the 
vicinity of airports and heliports.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ FAA, FNS NOTAM Search, https://notams.aim.faa.gov/notamSearch/
nsapp.html#/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On January 18, a day prior to the C-Band 5G launch, AT&T and 
Verizon announced further voluntary temporary measures around 
airports.\24\ Secretary Buttigieg noted, ``[w]e recognize the economic 
importance of expanding 5G, and we appreciate the wireless companies 
working with us to protect the flying public and the country's supply 
chain.'' \25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ See Ian Duncan & Lori Aratani, Wireless carriers to limit 5G 
near airports after airlines warn of major disruptions, Wash. Post 
(Jan. 28, 2022) https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2022/01/
18/airlines-disruptions-5g-verizon-att/; Letter from Airlines for 
America, to Brian Deese, National Economic Council Director, Pete 
Buttigieg, Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, Steve Dickson, 
Administrator, FAA & Jessica Rosenworcel, Chairwoman, FCC, at 1 (Jan. 
17, 2022), https://www.airlines.org/news/a4a-urges-immediate-action-to-
address-5g-interference/.
    \25\ FAA, 5G and Aviation Safety, January 18, 2022 Statement from 
U.S. Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg (Jan. 18, 2022), https://
www.faa.gov/5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Secretary Buttigieg and Administrator Dickson also referred to the 
temporary measures as a better way forward, ``while permanent fixes are 
rapidly put into place.'' \26\ These voluntary delays and roll-backs of 
full-scale C-Band deployments have created economic burdens and 
disrupted network deployments, but AT&T and Verizon committed to these 
temporary measures in the public interest to give the FAA and aviation 
industry additional time to evaluate altimeter performance with C-Band 
5G. And these steps put us in the position we are in today: the FAA has 
now cleared 20 altimeter models and approved 90% of the U.S. commercial 
fleet for landing in low-visibility approaches in areas with C-Band 
5G.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Letter from Pete Buttigieg, Secretary, U.S. Department of 
Transportation & Steve Dickson, Administrator, FAA to John Stankey, 
Chief Executive Officer, AT&T, Inc. & Hans Vestberg, Chairman and Chief 
Executive Officer, Verizon Communications, Inc., at 1 (Dec. 31, 2021), 
https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2021-12/12.31.2021%20%20-
DOT%20and%20FAA
%20Letter%20to%20ATT%20and%20Verizon%20.pdf.
    \27\ FAA, 5G and Aviation Safety, https://www.faa.gov/5g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 With Sound Science and Good Engineering, the FCC Set Strong Rules to 
                           Protect Altimeters
    In the lead up to the 2020 C-Band Order, the FCC examined concerns 
raised about C-Band 5G/altimeter co-existence, taking into account 
comments by aviation interests, the nature of radio altimeters deployed 
on aircraft, and new C-Band 5G deployments. The FCC found--based on the 
record before it, global study of C-Band wireless dating back nearly 
two decades, and interagency dialogue--that ``the technical rules on 
power and emission limits we set for the [C-Band 5G] Service and the 
spectral separation of 220 megahertz should offer all due protection to 
[altimeter] services in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band.'' \28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ C-Band Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 2485  395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These restrictions are rigorous and significant. The FCC adopted a 
substantial protective barrier, or guard band, that separates 5G C-band 
signals from aviation signals--a minimum of 220 megahertz from 3.98 
GHz, the uppermost portion of C-Band 5G, to the 4.2-4.4 GHz altimeter 
band and, for the 3.7-3.8 GHz spectrum that AT&T and Verizon just 
launched, a separation of 400 megahertz. By way of reference, the 
entire FM radio band spans 20 megahertz. The 220 megahertz separation 
is more than twice the size of the separation requested by some 
aviation stakeholders in the FCC record.\29\ And it is more than twice 
the size of the guard band in Japan, where 5G networks operate up to 
4.1 GHz and down to 4.5 GHz, just 100 megahertz from the 4.2-4.4 GHz 
altimeter band, with no reports of interference to air traffic safety. 
The FCC rightly concluded that its large guard band and its carefully 
crafted technical rules on power and emission limits would fully 
``protect aeronautical services in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band.'' \30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Id. at 2484  391 (citing Comments of The Boeing Company 
(Boeing Reply), GN Docket No. 18-122, at 5-6 (filed Dec. 11, 2018)).
    \30\ Id. at 2485  395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The FCC's technical rules mandate that wireless emissions beyond 
the C-Band 5G frequency border are sixty million times lower than the 
maximum power allowed for in-band C-Band 5G operations. And leading 
equipment vendors have confirmed that out-of-band C-Band 5G 
transmissions at the 4.2 GHz band, the edge of the radio altimeter 
band, are one and one-half billion times lower than the maximum power 
per megahertz allowed for C-Band operations.\31\ The C-Band rules and 
systems are designed to be very good neighbors, greatly limiting the 
amount of signals that reach spectrum users in adjacent bands, let 
alone altimeter users operating hundreds of megahertz away.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ See AT&T Verizon Dec. 31 Letter at 3 (citing Letter from Mark 
Racek, Sr. Director Spectrum Policy, Ericsson, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 1-2 (filed Sept. 13, 2021); 
Letter from Jeffrey A. Marks, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, 
Nokia, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 1 
(filed Sept. 21, 2021)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To rebut the FCC's findings, aviation interests primarily rely on a 
single industry study,\32\ but that study applied flawed methodology 
and implausible scenarios to claim interference. That study's flaws are 
now well documented.\33\ And most notably, the study's assertions are 
contradicted by real-world deployments of C-Band 5G in nations around 
the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ See RTCA, Inc., Assessment of C-Band Mobile Telecommunications 
Interference Impact on Low Range Radar Altimeter Options, RTCA Paper 
No. 274-20/PMC-2073, at 21 Table 6-4, 67 Figure 10-16, and 87 (Oct. 7, 
2020), https://www.rtca.org/wp-content/uploads/-2020/
10/SC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-20-PMC-
2073_accepted_changes.pdf.
    \33\ See, e.g., Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President, 
Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN 
Docket No. 18-122, at 3 (filed Nov. 3, 2021) (``CTIA Nov. 3 Letter''); 
Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, 
CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed 
Oct. 27, 2020); Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President, 
Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN 
Docket No. 18-122 (filed Sept. 3, 2021); see also, e.g., Letter from 
Doug Hyslop, Vice President, Technology and Spectrum Planning, CTIA to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed Aug. 26, 
2020); Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President, Regulatory 
Affairs, CTIA to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-
122 (filed Oct. 30, 2020); Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice 
President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, 
FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed Nov. 17, 2020); Letter from Scott K. 
Bergmann, Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA to Marlene H. 
Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed Dec. 7, 2020); 
Letter from Kara Graves, Assistant Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, 
CTIA to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122 (filed 
Mar. 4, 2021). See Comments of CTIA, Docket Nos. FAA-2021-0953 & FAA-
2021-0954 (filed Jan. 24, 2022) (``CTIA FAA Comments'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Real-World Evidence from Nearly 40 Nations Confirms C-Band 5G and Air 
                             Traffic Safety
    As stakeholders examine the possibility of interference to 
altimeters, it is important to account for the real-world experience of 
wireless broadband networks operating in C-Band spectrum in 38 
countries in Europe and Asia with no reported impact on radio 
altimeters in the same 4.2-4.4 GHz band. The vast majority of these 
countries have no altimeter-specific restrictions on C-Band 
deployments. Many of these nations have C-Band 5G operations in the 
same band as AT&T and Verizon's Phase 1 spectrum (3.7 to 3.8 GHz) and 
with power limits that are the same or allow higher power than what the 
FCC adopted, including Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Romania, and Spain and, overlapping part of the band, Greece 
and New Zealand.\34\ The flawed aviation study would predict rampant 
interference to altimeters in these countries, but there has been none. 
While some nations authorize C-Band 5G at lower power levels than the 
U.S., those lower power levels would still cause widespread 
interference, according to the industry study that aviation interests 
rely on. That study invented a ``safe'' level of C-Band 5G dramatically 
lower than any C-Band 5G rules permit in any country; as but one 
example, the United Kingdom exceeds the aviation-purported ``safe'' 
level by 40,000x--with no reported incidents of interference to air 
traffic safety.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ See CTIA FAA Comments at 9-10. See also CTIA Nov. 3 Letter 
(noting that at least two hundred thousand 5G base stations are already 
operating today with technical rules and proximity to radio altimeter 
operations that the aviation industry's modeling assumptions would 
suggest should be seeing harmful interference, yet no known reports of 
interference exist); Letter from Jennifer L. Oberhausen, Assistant Vice 
President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, 
FCC, GN Docket No. 18-122, at 1 (filed Dec. 31, 2021).
    \35\ See CTIA FAA Comments at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Every day U.S.-registered aircraft, carrying thousands of U.S. 
citizens, land in these nations without incident. The FAA's SAIB 
recognized that no interference has been documented to date due to 
wireless broadband operations internationally.\36\ And the European 
Union Aviation Safety Agency, the EU's authority for aviation safety, 
reported in 2021 that ``[f]or the time being, EASA does not identify 
any conditions that compromise safety and reports no occurrences of 
interference from 5G base stations to aeronautical radio altimeters.'' 
\37\ These real-world deployments, subject to regulation equivalent to 
or similar to the FCC C-Band Order's spectral separation and technical 
limits, show that the U.S. framework for C-Band 5G ``protect[s] 
aeronautical services in the 4.2-4.4 GHz band.'' \38\ If interference 
were occurring, engineers would have seen it long before now across the 
globe.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ See SAIB AIR-21-18 at 1.
    \37\ European Commission Directorate-General for Communications 
Networks, Content and Technology, Commission Activities related to 
radio spectrum policy at 5 (June 16, 2021), https://rspg-spectrum.eu/
wp-content/uploads/-2021/06/RSPG21-018final_commission_activities.pdf.
    \38\ C-Band Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 2485  395.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Next Steps: Charting a Course for Resolution
    The steps AT&T and Verizon have taken in the last few months have 
put the U.S. in the position we are in today: C-Band 5G deployments in 
the 3.7-3.8 GHz band, to the benefit of U.S. consumers and industry, 
with continued safe and secure air travel. The temporary measures have 
given time for the FAA to clear altimeter models and approve aircraft 
models without widespread, significant disruption to air travel. As 
noted above, these temporary measures halt in July, and by then we will 
be less than 18 months from the December 2023 deadline for incumbent 
relocation that will pave the way for launch of all 3.7-3.98 GHz C-Band 
5G operations.
    The wireless industry is committed to working as a good partner to 
resolve aviation concerns, and to do so promptly. These discussions 
must be guided by sound science and good engineering, and informed by 
real-world experience. Our track record shows we are committed to C-
Band 5G and air traffic safety. We urge government agencies to engage 
collaboratively with industry, to be transparent in their analysis and 
their actions, and to identify the information they are relying on in 
their decisionmaking. With this framework, I am confident that we will 
continue to have the safest air traffic in the world and robust, full-
scale C-Band 5G. I am hopeful that the positive collaboration in the 
past few weeks provides a clear path to resolution in timely fashion--
well in advance of any deadlines--for the full-scale, nationwide launch 
of C-Band 5G across the 3.7-3.98 GHz band.
    Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward 
to your questions.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much for the testimony.
    I now turn to Dennis Roberson, president and CEO of 
Roberson and Associates, and I hope a proud Washington State 
University graduate. Dr. Roberson, you are recognized.
    Mr. Roberson. Absolutely. Thank you. Good afternoon, 
Chairman DeFazio and Larsen, Ranking Members Graves and Graves, 
and members of the Aviation Subcommittee. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify on this important topic. I am, as you 
have heard, Dennis Roberson, president and CEO of Roberson and 
Associates, the technology consulting firm serving both 
Government and commercial customers.
    My testimony represents my personal views and is not 
provided on behalf of any other organization. As you know, on 
January 19th, high-speed 5G cellular service was launched by 
both AT&T and Verizon based on their spectrum auction wins last 
year. The aviation community fought this rollout over the last 
several months initially focusing on safety of life issues and 
more recently massive disruptions in the airline flight 
schedules.
    This has been headline news with claims and counterclaims 
between AT&T and Verizon and the aviation industry. The 
cellular providers point to the nearly 40 nations who have 
successfully deployed 5G in the so-called C-band. While the 
aviation community countered and today included that many of 
these countries have significant restrictions on the spectrum 
use that did not exist in the United States.
    All this has made for a very confusing and contentious 
situation marked by lack of information and the inability of 
the FCC and FAA to resolve the conflict in a timely manner. 
That is the top level state of play, but is there really a 
problem? And going forward, what should be done to resolve the 
current concerns?
    First, the unfortunate truth is that there is a problem 
with the design of some of the aviation industries' older radar 
altimeters. Now to get a little technical, the altimeters are 
supposed to operate in their assigned spectrum bands between 
4.2 and 4.4 gigahertz.
    When these devices were originally designed, they had very 
low-power satellite neighbors. Since the altimeters operate on 
a radar principle looking for a signal reflected from the 
ground, their receivers couldn't detect the satellite signals. 
This led the altimeter designers to largely ignore their 
assigned spectrum boundaries and as a result, these receivers 
are sensitive to transmissions from far outside their assigned 
band.
    For decades, this was not an issue, but with new neighbors 
moving in, these old altimeters now have a potential 
interference problem. Adding a little more technical 
information to the mix, the AT&T and Verizon 5G service 
operates from 3.7 to 3.8 gigahertz or 400 megahertz away from 
the altimeter band.
    To put this into perspective, the whole FM radio band is 
only 20 megahertz wide. Because of the vast separation between 
the 5G cellular spectrum and the altimeter spectrum allocation, 
the FCC determined that there shouldn't be an issue. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case for old, technically wide-
open altimeters.
    Though the altimeters were once stand-alone instruments, 
today, as you have heard, they are highly integrated into the 
aircraft's avionics. If, for instance, the altimeters say the 
airplane is still in the air when it is actually landed, the 
operation of the reverse thrusters and spoilers that rapidly 
reduce the airplane's speed on the ground will be blocked. I am 
told that on an icy runway, this failure could increase the 
landing distance by as much as four times, which for short 
runway airports, for example, Washington's Reagan National 
Airport, could be an enormous problem.
    So, where do we go from here? First, my understanding and 
the good news is that most modern altimeters do not have a 5G 
interference problem. The FAA is currently determining both the 
robustness of various altimeter models and which altimeters are 
installed on which aircrafts, certifying those aircrafts that 
have altimeters that properly filter out 5G transmission.
    Using this process, the FAA has cleared 20 altimeter models 
and certified 90 percent of the commercial fleet. Those 
aircraft that don't have appropriate altimeters should be 
required to replace their altimeters or suffer a significant 
reduction in the weather conditions in which they are allowed 
to fly. Given this straightforward, but critical set of steps, 
aircraft can be safely flown and landed in the presence of 5G 
technology. And importantly, AT&T and Verizon can fully deploy 
their high-performance 5G networks.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the 
committee this afternoon, and I, too, look forward to your 
questions.
    [Mr. Roberson's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Dennis A. Roberson, President and Chief Executive 
                 Officer, Roberson and Associates, LLC
    Good morning Chairman Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of 
the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's Aviation 
Subcommittee. By way of background, I am Dennis Roberson and I serve as 
the President and CEO of Roberson and Associates, LLC, a technology and 
management consulting firm serving government and commercial customers. 
In addition, I am a Research Professor at Illinois Institute of 
Technology and serve in advisory or board roles for several start-up 
companies in the technology space. Prior to my current roles I served 
as Executive Vice President and Chief Technology Officer of Motorola 
and over the years have held executive positions at AT&T, Digital 
Equipment Corporation (now part of HP), IBM and NCR. I also served as 
the Chairman of the FCC's Technological Advisory Council for the past 
eight years and serve on the Department of Commerce Spectrum Management 
Advisory Committee. My technical focus and personal passion through 
these roles has been to optimize the use of our nation's increasingly 
valuable spectrum resources through both technology enhancements and 
enhanced spectrum management policies and practices.
    January 19th was the day that High Speed 5G Cellular service was 
launched by both AT&T and Verizon based on their very expensive 
Spectrum Auction wins at the FCC last year. The Aviation world 
including the FAA, commercial airline and private aircraft communities, 
airport authorities, and others have fought this roll-out for the last 
several months initially focusing on safety of life issues and more 
recently talking about massive disruptions in airline flight schedules. 
This has all been headline news with claims and counterclaims between 
the two major cellular providers operating in the contested spectrum 
band and the aviation industry. For their part, the cellular providers 
point to nearly 40 nations who have successfully deployed 5G in the so-
called C-Band spectrum while the aviation community counters with the 
fact that these countries have significant restrictions on the use of 
the band which until recently did not exist in the U.S. All this has 
made for a very confusing and contentious situation created by the lack 
of information and the failures of the FCC and FAA to resolve their 
differences in a timely fashion while the cellular carriers have 
delayed their roll-out and altered their plans on an almost weekly 
basis. 19 January was the day when all the hoopla finally came to a 
head when AT&T and Verizon began to deploy their high speed 5G service 
minus any deployments within a few miles of a major U.S. airport.
    That is the top-level state of play but is there really a problem 
and going forward what should be done now to eliminate the current 
concerns? First, the unfortunate truth is that there is a real problem, 
but it is what can be described as an ``edge case'' problem, that is, a 
problem that only occurs in unusual circumstances and for a very 
limited number of aircraft. So, what is the problem? Fundamentally, the 
problem is a design issue with the aviation industry's radar 
altimeters. These are the devices that sense how high the aircraft is 
above the ground and especially in bad weather when ground visibility 
is limited and runway conditions are suboptimal, this is a crucial 
component of an aircraft's ability to safely land. Now to get a little 
technical. The altimeters are supposed to operate in their assigned 
spectrum band between 4.2 and 4.4 GHz. Unfortunately, when these 
devices were originally designed, they had very low power neighbors, 
i.e., satellites beaming their information to the earth from very 
distant orbits. Since the altimeters operate on a radar principle 
looking for a signal reflected from the ground their receivers couldn't 
detect the very low power neighboring satellite signals. This led the 
early designers of the altimeters to decide they really could ignore 
their assigned spectrum boundaries and as result they allow transmitted 
energy far outside their band into the receiver. For decades this was 
not an issue given their quiet neighborhood, but with new neighbors now 
moving in (AT&T and Verizon), the spectral space that they were 
allowing into the receiver is now a potential problem.
    Adding a little more technical information to the mix, AT&T and 
Verizon have now commenced operation in the spectrum range from 3.7 GHz 
to 3.8 GHz, i.e., 400 MHz away from the altimeter band. To put this in 
perspective, the whole FM radio band (all stations) is only 20 MHz 
wide, so the spectral separation between the new 5G cellular band and 
the altimeter band is very, very large. The FCC for its part when 
granting the use of the band (which will ultimately be expanded to 
cover 3.7 to 3.98 GHz) determined that there shouldn't be an issue 
because of the vast separation between the 5G cellular use of the new 
spectrum and the altimeter spectrum allocation. Unfortunately, this is 
not the case for old, technically ``wide open'' altimeters. These radar 
altimeters may send out a signal and be unable to discern the reflected 
signal because of energy from the far away 5G towers entering the 
receiver, causing the radar altimeter to either fail to function or 
possibly provide a false reading.
    To make matters worse, though the altimeters were once only a 
standalone instrument that had an altitude indicator on the pilot's 
panel, today the altimeter is highly integrated into the avionics for 
modern aircraft. If for instance the altimeter says the aircraft is 
still in the air when it has actually landed, it will cause the reverse 
thrusters and spoilers that normally create a rapid reduction in the 
airplane's speed on the ground to not operate. I am told that in icy 
runway conditions the lack of reverse thrusters and spoilers could 
increase the landing distance by as much as four times which for short 
runway airports (e.g., Washington's Reagan National Airport or even 
worse Chicago's Midway Airport) with the potential for poor landing and 
runway conditions could be an enormous problem.
    So how do we get out of this mess? First, most of the time the 
situation is not nearly as bad as the dire challenges the worst-case 
scenarios would suggest. Modern altimeters are well designed and do not 
have the problem of looking far outside their assigned band. The 
addition of a very low-cost component, historically a small piece of 
ceramic, called a filter at the antenna input to the altimeter receiver 
eliminates the issue of looking outside the altimeters assigned band. 
Of course, retrofitting and certifying a new radar altimeter in an 
aircraft is a non-trivial expense in both time and dollars. Happily, 
most modern altimeters have filters and will not experience any 5G 
interference problem. The FAA is currently determining both the 
robustness of various altimeter models, having currently cleared some 
20 altimeter models, and which altimeters are installed on various 
aircraft, certifying those aircraft that have altimeters that properly 
filter out 5G transmissions. Those aircraft that don't have appropriate 
altimeters should be required to replace their altimeter or suffer a 
significant reduction in the weather conditions in which they are 
allowed to fly. Using this process, the FAA has reported that 
approximately 90% of commercial aircraft have been certified for safe 
operation in the presence of 5G transmissions.
    Given this straightforward, but critical set of steps, the aviation 
world can be returned to a safe environment in the presence of 5G 
technology and AT&T and Verizon can fully deploy their new C-Band 
systems including deployments around airports. As an important aside, 
while all of this turmoil has been proceeding, it should be noted that 
T-Mobile's deployment of high speed 5G is currently unimpeded by these 
concerns since it operates in spectrum that is even further away from 
the altimeter band at 2.5 GHz.
    Hopefully this Testimony will help clarify the technical aspects of 
this high-profile issue and the way forward. I look forward to hearing 
the questions or comments that this testimony inspires.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much for your testimony. I 
appreciate the technical descriptions in language we can 
understand here on the committee. I appreciate that.
    And with that, I will turn to the chair of the full 
committee, Chair DeFazio, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will go back to a 
question I put to the Administrator, which is, what happens at 
the end of 6 months?
    Right now, yes, we have cleared 90 percent of the planes, 
but that is with exclusion zones and lower power in proximity 
to the airports. In the testimony of CTIA, they say that they 
will last for 6 months or until July 5th unless credible 
evidence exists that real-world interference would occur.
    Well, the British aviation CAA found that, in fact, there 
is a viable interference threat to radio altimeters. France was 
cited by CTIA as well. We are doing exactly like France. Well, 
not exactly. They also have to deflect their antennas down and 
they have exclusion zones. Czech Republic has exclusion zones. 
They aren't doing those things for fun; they are doing those 
things because they think there is a real and credible threat 
to aviation.
    So, then other places--well, the Canadians also are now 
adopting exclusion zones around 26 airports where base towers 
might be deployed. And then other nations, Japan, 5 percent of 
the power here--no. 90 percent below here. Australia, 76 below 
here.
    We have the strongest signals and as initially deployed, no 
protections for aviation or airports. And we are saying, well, 
there are just a few old obsolete altimeters. Well, there is a 
NOTAM out on the 787, I think that is the most modern airplane 
in America's fleet, that their thrust reversers might not work 
in presence of 5G.
    And I don't think they went out and bought an old altimeter 
for the 787. So, this is real. So, the question I would have to 
the CTIA--I mean, I think that the companies have come around, 
but I know you are running an organization, the associations 
are generally run by the lowest common denominator member, and 
I think both Verizon and AT&T have recognized the real problems 
and we are trying to work through it, but I don't think that 
that is reflected in your testimony.
    So, What do you think is going to happen after 6 months, 
Ms. Baker?
    Ms. Baker. Well, thank you for your question, Mr. Chairman. 
I would say that we are working cooperatively, as Administrator 
Dickson said, and that we have made a great deal of progress, 
and the cooperation continues. And so, it is my firm belief 
that the aviation industry is going to get comfortable with the 
idea that these guard bands that Dennis Roberson just mentioned 
are so significant that there will not be interference in the 
altimeter proceedings.
    We feel confident that France is the outlier, and that most 
countries have not required any air support-specific 
protections. And the reason we keep mentioning France is 
because that is what AT&T and Verizon adopted in this temporary 
protections to give the FAA time to address the altimeters. And 
as we can see, the FAA is rolling off of these altimeter 
restrictions as quickly as they can.
    Mr. DeFazio. But--excuse me. But France is permanent. I am 
not aware that it goes away in 6 months. Czechoslovakia 
exclusion zones are permanent; they don't go away in 6 months. 
Canada, the exclusion zones are permanent; they don't go away 
in 6 months. And we are talking about, in 6 months, we are not 
going to have exclusion zones anymore, and we are going to be 
just so much more comfortable than France, Czechoslovakia, 
Great Britain, and Canada, that we are like, yeah, it is OK. 
Because then as soon as I land, my God, I am going to be able 
to stream 5G while I am still sitting on the airplane. Wow. 
That is great. I would rather know that I am going to land 
safely than being able to do that.
    Ms. Baker. Mr. Chairman, with due respect, I think the 
chart that you are working on doesn't fairly capture the most 
recent conditions. 5G is deployed in France in the same band, 
and the authorized power in France is higher than the FCC 
rules. France is only one of three nations with airport-
specific specifications today. And we applied that protection 
temporarily to help the FAA process.
    Given our nationwide limits skyward and the airport 
protections, the U.S. provides more protection today than 
France does for aircrafts. Again, France is an outlier, and 
there are at least----
    Mr. DeFazio. And Canada----
    Ms. Baker [continuing]. To have----
    Mr. DeFazio. And Canada and Czechoslovakia and many other 
nations that operate at a fraction of the power here in the 
United States who haven't seen fit to have to have exclusion 
zones because they are not worried about extraordinarily large 
high signals, strong signals interfering.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
    Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Graves of 
Louisiana.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Under the current 5G rollout plan, telecom providers are 
going to be, I guess, using the space in the vicinity of 
airports in a 3.7 to 3.8 band. They are going to temporarily 
delay the 3.8 to 4.0 as a cushion in the interim period.
    Mr. Roberson, I am curious, could you talk about whether 
you believe that current 3.7 to 3.8 is going to cause 
interference with radio altimeters? Do you think that the 
cushion of 3.8 to 4.0 is sufficient at this time?
    Mr. Roberson. Yes. As I testified, it is a very large 
cushion. It is really an unprecedented amount of spectrum that 
separates the 3.7 to 3.8 to the 4.2 to 4.4.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. And so, at this point, you don't 
anticipate that there will be conflicts with radio altimeters 
with that type of cushion in place?
    Mr. Roberson. There should not be. It is possible to create 
it. And as I testified, in early days, because there was no 
strong signal anywhere in the vicinity, radar altimeters were 
designed without any filtering at all. So, they saw anything in 
a very, very large area. But with filters--and we should 
identify that filters are little pieces of ceramic, 
historically, that cost nickels and dimes. I have actually 
personally made them in Motorola, as their executive vice 
president/chief technology officer. So, it is a very small 
thing.
    But I do understand why, in the earlier timeframes, since 
there was no interference outside the band, that the designers 
chose to eliminate those because there was no reason for them. 
But now there is, and now these altimeters do have a problem. 
But those are old altimeters. My understanding is that new 
altimeters do have the filtering, which is appropriate, and 
therefore, don't have a problem.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Which is why when I spoke earlier 
that I think that engagement with RTCA to make sure that 
appropriate technological sort of protocols in manufacturing 
moves in a direction to ensure consistency there.
    Ms. Baker, thank you for being here today. I appreciate 
your testimony. As we noted in opening statements, I think you 
heard a lot of frustration across the panel with just how we 
found ourselves in this situation. Certainly, 5G is not the 
latest--or, excuse me, going to be the end all/be all in regard 
to technology. We are certainly going to be moving, in fact, 
already are moving in the direction of 6G and 7G.
    Can you share a little bit about your lessons learned in 
this process and how we prevent, moving forward, these types of 
conflicts from happening again?
    Ms. Baker. Well, thank you so much for your question. And I 
think we share your frustration, because we followed the FCC 
rules. The FCC came out with their rules in March of 2020. And, 
how this didn't get resolved before--certainly before the 
auction in December of 2020, I don't understand. I have worked 
at NTIA. I know the Government's IRAC process, that is the 
interagency coordinating process, should have driven a 
resolution. I have seen that process work on really hairy 
spectrum issues from broadcasters to DoD to FBI surveillance.
    I wasn't there, so I can't speak to why it didn't work 
here. But we need to get the agency input early, and let the 
spectrum engineers do their job. Because this is a technical 
engineer issue, and we have the best engineers, certainly the 
best spectrum engineers in the world.
    I think now that we have a permanent head of NTIA in Alan 
Davidson and Jessica Rosenworcel as Chairman of the FCC, they 
have an opportunity now to take a fresh look at what is working 
and what is not, and we certainly hope that they will.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. I appreciate it.
    I want to make note there was an article in Politico today, 
I think, indicating that my friends over here had a meeting 
with the FCC. And I do just want to urge--I am very 
disappointed FCC is not here today. I heard there was a 
scheduling conflict, which I think, as important as this issue 
is, that this should have been the priority as opposed to other 
things. But I do want to make sure that we all acknowledge this 
is a bipartisan issue; we should be working together on it.
    And in addition to frustration with the FCC not being here, 
I want to remind my friends next to me and down the aisle there 
that we would be happy to join them in future meetings with the 
FCC.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fanning, in my opening testimony, I talked about the 
process moving forward, in part, the technical process moving 
forward. We have a rollout that will continue in the 3.7 to 
3.8. Then we have a rollout from 3.8 to 3.98. And then there is 
the future of 5G, and then there is 6G, and there are options 
in the future as well. And I said, well, I thought maybe we 
could create an informal technical process. And maybe it is not 
the RTCA process, but something that is more informal that can 
begin to inform some of these technical issues before they get 
formalized and then passed up to the process.
    Have you all at AIA thought about this type of new process 
or a different process so that we are helping to get ahead of 
these issues in the future?
    Mr. Fanning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have. The 
groundwork for that is starting, even as we speak really, in 
the last month, the great work that is being done between the 
aviation industry and the telecom industry. There is a lot of 
sharing of data, a lot of coming together, a lot of 
understanding of each other's sides, as you and Ranking Member 
Graves talked about in your opening comments. And we need to 
build on that, not just to answer Chairman DeFazio's question 
about what happens at the 6-month point, what happens between 
that point and when we solve and implement the issue that we 
are faced with now, but that we continue going forward, so we 
don't find ourselves in the place we are now, and we can avoid 
what Dr. Roberson talked about, which is making sure that 
everybody who is in spectrum is cognizant of how spectrum is 
being used elsewhere and all new entrants are as well.
    So, I think part of what we would suggest for a new process 
going forward is that we expand the definition of 
``stakeholder'' to be more exclusive. Other Government agencies 
like the Department of Defense, industries that aren't just in 
the band that is being discussed but are adjacent to it, 
because we have been building out spectrum and utilizing 
spectrum, increasing how we utilize spectrum over decades. And 
so, it has become more complex in many ways.
    What we saw here was, we are regulating spectrum in the 
21st century using a 20th-century model. But I do think that 
there are indicators that we are already doing this informally, 
because a lot of important work is being shared.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Thank you. I will explore that later 
after the hearing with you all. I need to move on to Captain 
DePete.
    And, Captain DePete, in your testimony, you discussed added 
workload about 5G deployment that has been created for pilots 
and a level of uncertainty. Can you expand a little bit on what 
added workload, how that has been put on pilots as a result of 
the 5G rollout?
    Mr. DePete. Certainly. And thank you for the question, Mr. 
Chairman. And also, Nick, I know you referred to this in terms 
of the human factors that are involved with this. We operate 
the safest air transportation system in the world here, and 
that has been through collaboration. And I do find it somewhat 
ironic, if I might just begin by saying that we have--and this 
is not to be funny, but in the ``Cool Hand Luke'' movie--the 
failure to communicate. These are communication companies that 
we have been asking a long time to collaborate with that have 
rejected those offers.
    So, having said that, our pilots are really becoming quite 
saturated by the number of NOTAMs that are outdated. A lot of 
work goes into preparation for a flight. And I know 
Representative Stauber has spoken on many occasions about the 
conditions of the NOTAM system. And I know the work in this 
committee has been extraordinary to try to push that along to 
improve that process.
    But you can imagine, in a busy cockpit, in a situation 
where an airline may need to divert into an alternative 
airport, the amount of work involved in that, especially since 
the AMOCs could be changed regularly, right? They are specific 
to runways, they are specific to airports. Now our crews also 
have to know what particular equipment they have on their 
airplanes, what the configuration is. And as Administrator 
Dickson had pointed out earlier, that is very dependent on a 
lot of different things, including how those systems are 
connected to the other safety systems on the airplane.
    So, yeah, I am not as sanguine about this at the moment as 
I have heard some others. In fact, I am concerned very much. 
And I think Chairman DeFazio, I think, articulated it very 
well. What is going to happen in 6 months, right? We are going 
to have to continue to work this.
    Thankfully, we have on every airplane a minimum of two 
well-trained, well-qualified, adequately rested pilots; the 
most highly trained pilots in the world. But this is on their 
shoulders. They have to sign for the airplane every day. I am 
not sure the telecommunications CEOs have to sign and say, this 
should not be a problem. That doesn't work in aviation. And all 
the people on this committee know that, right? You have all 
worked together. That is why we have achieved the greatest, I 
mean, I think in the history of humankind, the safest form of 
transportation. And when you consider the conveyance, it is 
remarkable.
    So, I know I ran out of time, but I think that answers your 
question.
    Mr. Larsen. That does answer my question, and----
    Mr. DePete. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. I will be able to maybe return to a 
second round.
    Mr. DePete. Sure.
    Mr. Larsen. With that, I will recognize Representative 
Balderson of Ohio for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry about that. I 
hit the button with my notebook.
    Thank you all for being here, the witnesses being here for 
our second panel today.
    My first question is for Ms. Baker. CTIA has been deeply 
involved in spectrum allocations for broadband services, 
including many instances where spectrum was relocated from 
Federal use or where specialized sharing and coexistence issues 
have to be worked out between commercial users and Federal 
institutions.
    Can you discuss the FCC's role, as the expert agency in 
radio interference matters, how Federal agencies typically 
resolve such matters with commercial users through the NTIA, 
and whether the FAA followed these processes in this case?
    Ms. Baker. Well, thank you very much for the question. And 
I can't speak to the specific whether the FAA followed this or 
not, because I would not have been in the room. I will say, 
typically, there is a Government agency called the IRAC at 
NTIA. They are congressionally mandated to advocate for Federal 
Government users.
    As I think maybe you mentioned earlier, spectrum is at a 
premium, and the using of spectrum efficiently is allowing us 
to continue to lead the world in many, many of, you know, 
automated transportation, wireless, broadcasting, you name it.
    So, I do think the FCC and the NTIA coordinate on the 
Federal and the commercial spectrum, and they have been able to 
work out multiple really complex deals, such as moving 
broadcasters, such as relocating DoD radars. I think I 
mentioned AWS-3, which was a DOJ and FBI surveillance.
    So, when they say that we haven't shared data, we are 
competitively sensitive in where we roll out and what the 
individual launching of cell sites are. So, this is not 
something that the FCC considers. They consider back to the 
guard bands. They consider whether the spectrum that they are 
allocating, which typically a guard band is 5 megahertz, here 
it is going to be 200, whether that causes interference.
    So, there is a very complex process, and Congress has 
weighed in multiple times on how to relocate and what gets paid 
for, frankly. That is the Government's job.
    Mr. Balderson. OK. Thank you very much for that answer.
    My next question is for Mr. Roberson. Thank you, Mr. 
Roberson, for being here. You were on the FCC's Technical 
Advisory Board for the C-band order. Can you provide some 
insight on how the FCC came to the conclusion that the 
mitigation measures adopted in the order would be enough to 
protect aviation safety?
    Mr. Roberson. Yes. Unfortunately, a little correction. The 
Technological Advisory Council specifically is precluded from 
weighing in on any issue that is before the FCC. So, the 
Technological Advisory Council serves as the headlights, 
looking out into the future.
    Now, having said that, the Technological Advisory Council, 
along with many Government agencies, identified that mid-band 
spectrum was crucial for 5G competitiveness, and, therefore, it 
is something truly important for the United States for 
competitiveness with the rest of the world to have capabilities 
in that spectral area. And, in fact, Congress dictated that 
that area of spectrum should be considered.
    As to the specific details of what were done, that is 
beyond my purview of the details. But I will note that how FCC 
works on these kinds of issues is to secure information from 
all available sources, and then based on what has been input 
into the docket, for their engineers to carefully review that 
material and then render a decision. So, that is how the 
process is supposed to work.
    Mr. Balderson. OK. My followup--and thank you for 
clarifying that. My followup--and we are short on time, because 
I always like to give the chairman back extra time--can you 
expand on Ms. Baker's insight regarding the FCC's role as the 
expert agency on radio interference matters?
    Mr. Roberson. Not really. I thought she provided an 
excellent answer. There is a process through the NTIA as the 
agency that provides the information to the FCC's docket, 
representing all groups, FAA, DoD, all the rest. And that 
process, no involvement, but as has been reported, there was 
apparently a breakdown in that link of getting information from 
the FAA into the FCC docket.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Chairman, sorry. I almost tried.
    Mr. Larsen. You were so, so close, Representative 
Balderson.
    I will say it is pretty clear there was a big breakdown in 
NTIA delivering that information to the FCC.
    All right. Next up is Representative Kahele of Hawaii.
    Mr. Kahele. Aloha, Mr. Chairman. And thank you so much for 
the second half of this hearing.
    My question is for Captain DePete. Captain DePete, you know 
as well as I do that safety is nonnegotiable. Pilots will fly 
when it is safe to fly. And we must not and cannot put profits 
above the safety of our pilots, our flightcrews in the back, 
and our passengers. This process between the selling of the C-
band to wireless companies through the FAA airworthiness 
directive has forced pilots, especially our regional pilots and 
general aviation pilots, to perform extensive maneuvers to 
ensure the safety of the flight due to the potential for radar 
altimeter interference.
    Captain DePete, you stated in your testimony that the FCC 
proceeded with the spectrum action without acknowledging ALPA's 
concerns. When did and how did ALPA first raise these concerns? 
And as the arbiters of safety, how can we ensure in the future 
that pilots' concerns, like ALPA's, are taken more seriously?
    Mr. DePete. Representative Kahele, thanks a lot for that 
question. Very important one obviously.
    So, it just so happens I have a document here that is six 
pages of single-spaced. For us it began, actually, prior to 
2018. But in 2018, we made an official request to the FCC 
expressing our concern about this. And then I would gladly 
provide this into the record for the committee to just see what 
ALPA had done since that time.
    And we have pretty much tried to go everywhere we could go 
to--including FAA and other--with DOT, everybody, to bring this 
to everyone's attention. And it was ignored. It was ignored by 
the FCC, and it was also ignored by the telecom industry. And I 
think they need to understand too, Representative Kahele, how 
we created this safe system that is not a forensic model 
anymore. It is a risk-predictive model where it is 1 billion to 
the chance of something going wrong, and that is why it is such 
an amazingly safe system. And our pilots planned and took a 
role in it. Our pilots are the essential workers, right? They 
are frontline workers who took us through COVID. And now we are 
looking at these kinds of human factors concerns which really 
were unnecessary. It is an introduction of risk that was 
completely unnecessary.
    So, we are doing all we can. We are not going to let work 
let up. I mean, thankfully, Administrator Dickson has been 
highly accessible. I speak to him probably every other day. He 
has been holding briefings regularly to inform us all, so that 
has been good.
    And then on our aircraft itself, it is always a challenge 
too, as you know, to be able to discern how you are having an 
interruption, right? We don't have a 5G light on the cab. Now, 
if it is an inoperative radio altimeter, obviously we could 
spot that quickly. However, if it is false or erroneous 
information, that is where the problem comes.
    But what I can say is this: By representing 62,000 pilots 
who are doing an incredible job handling this situation, we are 
the last arbiters of safety, and the airplane never leaves the 
gate unless it is safe to do so. If they don't continue to 
share the information, the airplanes won't fly. They will make 
a decision. No airplane will ever leave the gate unless the 
pilots understand it to be safe because they are the ones that 
sign for the aircraft. I hope I answered some of those 
questions.
    Mr. Kahele. Yeah, you bet. And just I will use the 
remaining 1\1/2\ minutes for a followup.
    Mr. DePete. Sure.
    Mr. Kahele. I know ALPA probably has and is having to 
track--this is a lot of information--a spreadsheet with 
aircraft----
    Mr. DePete. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Kahele [continuing]. Height, equipment, AMOCs, 
expiration dates. I talked earlier to Administrator Dickson 
about how the State's flagship carrier Hawaiian Airlines has 
AMOCs for all their airfields that they travel to, but they are 
going to expire in 25 days, and why this AMOC exemption is 
really important. Because if we don't have this, then pilots 
are forced into this bracket where, if the weather was zero-
zero at a destination, and they can't get into that airfield, 
they are going to have to divert to their destination 
ultimately. And if they can't get in, everyone else can't get 
in either. So, now you have 36 planes lined up at a destination 
alternate, you have fuel issues, you are number 27 in line. Can 
you speak to that from our pilots in the flight deck that have 
to deal with that?
    Mr. DePete. Absolutely. As an instructor pilot myself too, 
I have seen the workload rise in a cockpit pretty dramatically 
at times, right, when we are handling a situation. But in a 
divert situation in particular, right, you know as well as I do 
how busy it can get. But imagine now to have to consider all 
these other possibilities, knowing the configuration of the 
aircraft, ensuring that you have the data so the dispatch of 
our company's--the company's dispatch offices are going to be 
really, really tasked in ensuring that they are feeding us 
really good information. If we make the--if it is not accurate, 
up-to-date information, obviously it could lead us down a 
rabbit hole we don't ever want to go in.
    So, it is challenging, and it is really falling on the 
shoulders of our pilots. But, thankfully, we are the most well-
trained pilots in the world.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you, Captain DePete. And mahalo.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Representative 
Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Captain DePete, good to see you, sir. Two very brief 
questions, revisiting the altimeter issue. Radio altimeters are 
one of the most important instrument a pilot has. Any 
interference, obviously, is unacceptable. Two questions. Could 
you tell us what warning signs or ways to tell if a radio 
altimeter is experiencing interference while in flight? And 
second, regarding your opening statement about the anomalies, 
could you explain these instances and describe how common 
altimeter irregularities are in general?
    Mr. DePete. Representative Fitzpatrick, great to see you 
again. Thank you for those two questions.
    As I indicated it from Representative Kahele, it is very 
difficult to tell, right? If it is an inoperative radio 
altimeter, we have that occasionally happen, although they are 
hugely reliable, we have been doing fine landing in airports 
all over the world, right, without this problem. 5G introduced 
a new risk. But if it is inoperative, we can probably put that 
together pretty accurately. However, if it is erroneous 
information, that is where the key is, in that you don't know 
it is erroneous. You are going to rely on a lot of [inaudible] 
with these integrated systems on more modern airplanes.
    We are talking about connections to terrain awareness, 
EGPWS, throttles, our throttles, right? An uncommanded 
reduction in our throttles to idle while we are on close final 
in a wide-bodied airplane can create a rapid sink rate. So, our 
pilots are going to really Johnny-on-the-spot on this and 
really be ready to react and, thankfully, they are well-trained 
and they can do that. But it is unfortunate we put them in that 
situation.
    So, did that answer that part of that question? What was 
the second part, again, I am sorry?
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Just explaining, regarding your opening 
statement----
    Mr. DePete. Yeah.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick [continuing]. Some of the instances and 
describe how common altimeter irregularities are in general.
    Mr. DePete. Yeah. No, they are very reliable systems, and 
we have more than one, so, it has been really good. And it 
depends, like, in terms of the particular configuration on the 
airplane and the way they are wired into the systems as to how 
those anomalies would be shown to the flightcrews. So, that is 
where the complexities really begin. And throw on top of that 
the issues that we talked about before with the number of 
NOTAMs that have been put into the system now makes for a very 
challenging environment.
    So, along with flying the airplane, we are having to manage 
this 5G situation, which from a human-factor standpoint, not 
the best.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Captain. Good to see you.
    Mr. DePete. Thank you. You too.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. I yield the balance of my time to 
Representative Graves of Louisiana.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Fitzpatrick, I 
appreciate that.
    I want to ask, following up, Ms. Baker, a quick yes or no 
question. Do the telecoms have any type of shield from 
liability? Are you held harmless if there is an interference 
issue that leads to an accident?
    Ms. Baker. I don't know. I would say we take our--we take 
our mission so seriously. We also have 911 delivery. And I 
would have to defer to lawyers as to any sort of safe harbor, 
but I would say no harmful interference is, in fact, what we do 
for a living and take it very seriously.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
    Mr. Calio, the AMOC process, the alternatives that we 
discussed earlier, do you have concerns about the ability for 
the airlines to safely and, I guess, efficiently operate under 
this process?
    Mr. Calio. Yes, we do. Right now, it is, like I said during 
my oral testimony, it is a constant ebb and flow. And Joe just 
referenced the pilots. It is ever-changing.
    And I would like to clarify one thing. Ninety percent of 
aircraft have been cleared, but they haven't been cleared to 
land everywhere. That has a particular impact on the regional 
carriers, which I think needs to be looked at. But this 
constant churn of AMOCs once every month is something we can't 
continue to live by because we can't do a 30-day rolling 
operational planning process.
    So, we are working together very carefully right now. Our 
engineers are talking to the engineers from the telecom camp, 
from the FAA and the manufacturer. So, that is producing good 
results for right now. We need to come up with a better process 
long term, because this can't be kept in place where every 30 
days it changes where you can fly, when you can fly, how you 
can fly, which runway you can fly into.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Yeah, I agree. Thank you very 
much.
    Ms. Baker, coming back to you, look, the telecom industry, 
the FCC deals with deconfliction across technology all the over 
the place. This one dealing with aviation shouldn't be the 
first time we tread into this category. Is there a process that 
other administrations have used to help with deconfliction that 
result in a better outcome?
    Ms. Baker. This was option No. 107, and I have never seen 
anything like this before. So, I would say this is an anomaly. 
And, hopefully, we have got all the processes in place now to 
make sure that we are working with the aviation industry as 
cooperatively as possible. But, yes, the FCC takes comments, 
and they have spectrum experts that handle these issues all the 
time.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The Chair recognizes Representative Johnson of Texas for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to ask Ms. Black----
    Mr. Larsen. Representative Johnson, do you have a radio or 
something on in your office? Otherwise, if everyone can please 
mute.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. Hold on. I am sorry. That is a 
meeting with me in the White House.
    Mr. Larsen. Well, you will need to mute whatever meeting is 
taking place in order to ask questions.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. I am getting rid of it. Thank you. I 
am sorry. I am multitasking.
    But, Ms. Black, both DFW and Love Field Airport have 
numerous regional flights from Dallas to smaller cities 
throughout the southwest region in the State of Texas. And I am 
concerned about 5G technology's possible effect on small groups 
and smaller airports. Would you be able to elaborate on that 
concern?
    Ms. Black. Yes. And thank you very much for that question, 
Congresswoman. And that is exactly the point. You are right to 
be concerned about that. I want to say again, these are 
aircraft that were perfectly fine and certificated 
appropriately, but they now need AMOCs to operate in an 
environment that has been compromised by the 5G signal.
    About 14 percent of the regional fleet have no AMOC at all 
and no AMOC pact pending. Another 40 percent of the fleet, as 
Nick said just before, has a very limited AMOC, excludes dozens 
of airports. So, altogether, one or both of these fleet types 
are still restricted for 70 airports in weather.
    So, if you are in a hub, you might get restricted right 
there, but if you are traveling through that hub, then you 
don't get to your spokes. And in some cases, you might not have 
an AMOC at the hub or the spokes. These are aircraft--they are 
the only source of air service to smaller communities. With 
half of them sat down in weather at key airports, that is a big 
problem for smaller communities.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much.
    Now, Mr. Calio, I understand that 5G technology has been 
successfully implemented throughout Europe and in many Asian 
nations. What do you think is the difference here in the United 
States that makes us believe that we have got to do so much to 
mitigate this issue for how long?
    Mr. Calio. Thank you, Congresswoman. In our view, which is 
not Ms. Baker's view, there is a difference between what has 
been implemented overseas as to what is being implemented here. 
I think it points out, in fact, the divergence of facts, if you 
listen to the testimony, suggest again we need a better, more 
transparent, long-term process. These all should have been 
worked out ahead of time. We should not be arguing about this 
right now.
    And this is not really an argument between us and the 
telecom. We take a very different view. We rely on the FAA as 
our safety regulator. They have engineers. They believe that 
there was a possibility of interference.
    So, I would say, you have got different testimony on what 
happens overseas and what happens here. What we need to be 
looking for long term is an answer to not only why it happened, 
but more importantly, how we do not let it happen again and how 
we will resolve things going forward.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much.
    Now, perhaps both of you can comment on this. The altimeter 
plays an important role in airline flight. What would be the 
cost to replace the old altimeters on an average per plane?
    Mr. Calio. I will be happy to start. I do not know the 
answer to that at this point. What I do know, and Mr. Fanning 
can probably jump in here if you would like, but it is a very 
long-term process. Even to modify a current altimeter has to go 
through a certification process.
    Again, the difference in culture between the FAA and the 
FCC, for example, is always--our imperative is safety. You 
cannot compromise safety under any circumstance. So, we are 
talking--that is why I said earlier in my oral testimony, this 
is a matter of years, not days and not weeks. Is it something 
that is being looked at? Yes. As the Administrator pointed out, 
yes, it is, but it is just getting underway, and it is going to 
take time.
    Ms. Johnson of Texas. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Black, did you have--or anyone else like to comment on 
that?
    Ms. Black. I would just add that this issue is going to be 
with us for years and years. So, we have already talked about 
rolling out 6G, 7G. So, will we need to go out and buy new 
altimeters every time we roll out at 6G or 7G?
    Now, I don't have the exact cost either. I don't think they 
are nickels or dimes. But I do know that airlines spend 
millions of dollars investing in new safety tools, and so did 
airports, as Chairman DeFazio said earlier in the first panel, 
spent billions to become all-weather airports. So, we just want 
to make sure that all of these airports can use that 
technology.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Baker. If I may, I would just like to----
    Mr. Larsen. I am sorry. No. I am sorry. The gentlewoman's 
time has expired.
    And we will now go to Mr. Van Drew, Representative Van Drew 
from New Jersey for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman.
    I want to thank everybody for being here today and their 
wonderful testimony. This is important stuff. Your 
organizations actually represent essentially the entire 
aviation and telecommunications industries, and it is a massive 
part of the United States economy.
    Earlier today, I asked the FAA Administrator, Mr. Dickson, 
about how new entrants to the airspace, like drones, will 
complicate spectrum management into the future. I do not 
believe the FAA is currently equipped for the future of 
aviation spectrum management.
    The current 5G crisis was foreseeable. Individuals within 
the FAA Spectrum Engineering Office have been sounding the 
alarm for nearly a year. The spectrum office did not have the 
authority to make this issue a priority until it was too late.
    I believe that we must empower the Spectrum Engineering 
Office within the FAA. It must be provided greater procedural 
authority and voice so that our country is able to handle the 
spectrum challenges into the future.
    So, I direct my question to Eric Fanning, president and CEO 
of Aerospace Industries Association, and Meredith Attwell 
Baker, president and CEO of CTIA. Do you think the current 
situation shows us that the FAA is not properly equipped to 
meet the spectrum challenge of the future, such as drone 
integration? Further, do you believe that the FAA Spectrum 
Engineering Office must be empowered with authority to better 
manage spectrum resources, get spectrum to market faster, 
ensure capability and compatibility, and prevent conflicts like 
the ones we are experiencing right now?
    And if any other witnesses concur with this sentiment, feel 
free to make that known. Thank you. I will wait for your 
answer.
    Mr. Fanning. Congressman, thank you. I will start and say 
that I think it is an issue of empowering for the FAA. And what 
I was saying earlier that all stakeholders, we need to think of 
this more broadly as we move forward as we use spectrum, its 
limited bandwidth, as we use it for more complex technology, 
stronger signals, we need to have all the stakeholders that are 
in spectrum empowered to be a part of the conversation. Some 
formalized new process that brings all of us together rather 
than just thinking of spectrum in stovepiped bands, to think 
about it in its entirety. Because, clearly, that is part of 
what the issue was here.
    This was an FCC-controlled process, and the FAA raised 
concerns but wasn't empowered to do anything about it other 
than raise it. They have great engineers. They cooperate with 
industry which has world-class engineers. And so, I think we 
have to look across all the stakeholders in spectrum, certainly 
the FAA when it comes to aviation safety, and make sure that 
they are a part of the process in anything that we do as we 
expand what we use spectrum for going forward.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you.
    Ms. Baker. So, thank you so much for the question. And I 
would say the FAA is the safety regulator, and FCC and NTIA are 
the spectrum regulators. I fully support FAA having more 
engineering resources. I think many of the agencies that use 
spectrum could use more engineering resources, whether it is 
the Department of Energy, who regulates nuclear, or the 
Department of the Interior, who use spectrum to measure the 
height of rivers. I think everybody could use more spectrum 
knowledge now that we are using spectrum for so many different 
things.
    I think that we need to take another look at the consultive 
process, because this is an NTIA issue that they should be able 
to raise the FAA's issues with the FCC and advocate for the 
FCC. We can't have everyone have their own special regulator of 
spectrum. We need to speak with one voice.
    And so, I fully support the concept. I just want to be 
clear that the FCC and NTIA are the spectrum regulators who 
need to be fully informed, and agencies like the FCC--the FAA, 
excuse me, really do need to be part of this process and----
    Dr. Van Drew. Absolutely. I agree with you. And I think you 
hit it on the head. And we need the leadership. So, as all 
those voices come together, you also need the leadership so we 
are on the same page and we have the regulation that we need. I 
think we would do so much better. You can't have people in 
different spots doing different things not knowing, which is 
kind of what happened here, what the other fellow was doing. 
So, I think you really made a good point, and I agree with you 
on that.
    And I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The Chair recognizes Representative Payne of New Jersey for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let's see. I understand that aerospace companies are 
responding to 5G deployment concerns by utilizing filters on 
existing equipment as stopgap measures to compensate for signal 
interference. This would not have been necessary if there was 
proper communication across the Federal Government regarding 
the potential issues with 5G signals and technical concerns 
reached the appropriate parties. Inevitably, there will be a 
new technology to replace 5G.
    Mr. Fanning, how would proper communication of technical 
concerns make future rollouts of new technologies less chaotic?
    Mr. Fanning. Well, first and foremost, which I think all of 
the panelists agree with, is that the process starts earlier. 
So, there is something that we need to amend or modify to the 
process to make sure these concerns are surfaced earlier.
    As was stated at the beginning of this hearing by the chair 
and the ranking member, there are different cultures, different 
goals, different agendas on these industries. And as a country, 
we need them both to succeed. And so, making sure that dialogue 
starts earlier and perhaps never stops, because we know there 
are going to be future auctions, future technologies introduced 
into spectrum, to make sure that all of the relevant players, 
the stakeholders, and those who are affected by it are at the 
table and can voice their concerns and have them acted upon 
earlier. Because we certainly have been--the airlines, the 
pilots, the manufacturers--have been talking about this for a 
very long time.
    So, we need to make sure that there is not just dialogue 
but that there is a process in place to act on those concerns 
from an earlier point. Because we do have amazing engineers in 
all of our companies, but to reach the certification standards, 
the safety standards that aviation is held to for justifiable 
and important reasons, takes a lot of time. It is a very high 
bar to prove something won't happen, as Congressman Graves 
said, than to try and prove that it will happen.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
    I am glad we are having this hearing, and all are coming to 
the same conclusions, and everybody is hearing the same 
information from each other across the whole gamut.
    Ms. Baker, I am grateful that telecommunications companies 
and the Biden administration were able to reach a deal to delay 
5G deployment near airports, including Newark Liberty 
International Airport. However, these exclusion zones will 
expire, and 5G service will be fully deployed. How will 
telecommunications companies work with the Biden administration 
to ensure that full deployment of 5G will not cause any 
additional safety concerns?
    Ms. Baker. Well, thank you so much for your question. The 
process now, everyone is at the table. We are working with the 
FAA to give them the information they need. They asked for it 
in November, we got it to them in December. We are every day 
making progress. I feel confident we will continue to make this 
progress.
    So, in July, when the temporary restrictions, if they don't 
go way before--because I am hopeful that the FAA will 
understand that they are--and find and feel comfortable 100 
percent that there is not interference here, that there are 
plenty of countries around the world, such as Denmark to Spain 
to Ireland, who are using the same spectrum with the same power 
levels, and there is no interference.
    So, I am hopeful the FAA will be comfortable enough so when 
we reach--they roll off these temporary restrictions, and then 
when we roll out in phase 2, which is December of 2023, we will 
already have the process in place to make everyone comfortable 
that there is no interference here.
    Mr. Payne. OK. Well, thank you.
    And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    I now recognize Representative Nehls for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member 
Graves. And thank you for having this hearing. I am truly glad 
that Administrator Dickson testified, but I am truly 
disappointed the FCC refused to be here today.
    Both industries represented here today and their customers, 
the American people, have been failed by how the Government 
handled the spectrum auction and the concerns with altimeters. 
Just yesterday, on the Highways and Transit Subcommittee 
autonomous vehicle hearing, we heard about the FCC was looking 
into C-band for AVs in the nineties. That was 30 years ago, and 
we still don't have AVs on the road. It is mind-boggling that 
they had the foresight for that but auctioned off C-band for 5G 
without fully examining how it would impact the companies 
involved.
    I definitely would have liked an explanation from the FCC 
so we could prevent this from happening again. And I am truly 
disappointed the Chairwoman refused to testify here.
    I do thank our industry witnesses for being here. And my 
first question is for good Captain DePete. When operating an 
aircraft, how do pilots know if there is an interference 
problem with a radar altimeter in their aircraft?
    Mr. DePete. All right. Thank you for that question, 
Representative Nehls. And in regards to your FCC complaint, you 
are getting the same silent treatment, the committee is getting 
the same silent treatment that we have gotten over the years. 
So, I certainly can commiserate with you on that.
    In terms of trying to see and understand what is going on 
in an airplane, in the old airplane styles where we had 
federated systems, meaning that all the instruments were not 
digital and they were all spread out, we can kind of do checks 
and balances, see if one conformed with the other and make a 
decision on that and begin to go down a decision tree. In these 
new modern airplanes where the systems are integrated, which 
takes a great deal of understanding to understand how they are 
integrated because they are all different, it is a little 
difficult to discern sometimes what is actually happening in 
the airplane when there is a malfunction.
    If it is just a malfunction, if it is broke, if the system 
just stopped working, there are warnings that will be alerted 
to the crew. However, if it is false information, that is the 
tricky one, right? And how it affects other systems. We might 
see that first manifested in itself with some unusual throttle 
activity. We might see it--unfortunately, you would think 
terrain avoidance would be pretty important. Imagine if we 
didn't get the warnings that we were approaching terrain that 
we should, right? Or we got them when we shouldn't, and that 
creates another problem as well.
    So, that is a really outstanding question. I think that is 
the one I get the most of, and it is challenging.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Captain.
    And I have a couple of questions for Ms. Baker. Given that 
5G is already being delivered to the U.S. public using other 
spectrum bands, what is the importance of rapidly launching C-
band spectrum for 5G?
    Ms. Baker. Thank you so much. I am glad you asked that 
question. It is a really important one. 5G is--C-band is the 
background of 5G across the country. It is because it has 
unique characteristics, it goes very far, it carries a lot of 
data. And for this, it really will bring us--it is going to 
change. I think it is the most transformative technology that 
we have seen in decades. And it is going to happen to our 
economy, our education, our health, even our transportation.
    I mentioned Accenture put out a report last week that said 
if we deploy 5G, we will be 20 percent on our way to achieving 
the administration's climate goals. So, it is really important 
not to delay for full power. If we do, we are just going to 
harm America and your constituents.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you.
    And my last question, a little lengthy here, but the 
volunteer precautionary measures agreed to by AT&T and Verizon 
will last for roughly 6 months from launch. Yet both have 
emphasized they anticipate efforts to reduce or eliminate those 
precautionary measures even before that 6-month period ends. 
Why is allowing full utilization of the C-band spectrum for 5G, 
i.e., used without the precautionary measures under the FCC's 
originally adopted technical rules, so time-critical? Do you 
understand that?
    Ms. Baker. I did. And thank you for that question, too. I 
think it is important to take a look at the temporary 
restrictions. Let's take the 2 miles, 2 miles within an 
airport. If you are in Rayburn--which I can't tell if you are--
if you are in Rayburn and you go to National Airport, that is 
approximately 2 miles. If you are in Boston Logan and you go to 
Boston Common, that is 2 miles. So, that exclusion area is 
going to put large swaths of metropolitan areas and, frankly, a 
lot of underserved areas not being able to have 5G and just 
going to enhance the digital divide and leave people behind in 
a way that we just don't want to do.
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you both.
    Mr. Larsen. I will turn to--yeah, thank you--Representative 
Brownley of California for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Brownley, no?
    OK. Representative--OK. Congresswoman Holmes Norton for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Now, my first question is for Mr. Viola, president of the 
Helicopter Association. I represent the Nation's Capital and, 
as you know, the President and Congress are located here. In 
your testimony, you noted increased risks of 5G interference to 
helicopters, given that helicopter operations generally take 
place at much lower altitudes than airline flights and could 
conduct their entire flight within zones of 5G interference.
    The development of new radio altimeters with filters that 
can withstand 5G interference is, therefore, critical to 
helicopter and rotorcraft safety. But the cost for operators to 
purchase and install these new altimeters is of significant 
concern. Could you estimate the cost to helicopter operators to 
upgrade to newer, more resilient radio altimeters, and how do 
helicopter operators plan to cover this cost?
    Mr. Viola. So, thank you very much, Congresswoman Holmes 
Norton. I appreciate that question.
    Helicopters are just so much different from what we have 
been hearing today, as far as when the radar altimeter actually 
kicks in. You heard a lot about the 121 in airlines where most 
of their flight will be without that radar altimeter because it 
actually turns off once you get so high above the terrain.
    The helicopters use a radar altimeter a lot of times for--
where it is actually known about is because of reduced 
visibility. So, when we have good visibility, the radar 
altimeter is a safety aspect that gives us additional, not only 
our eyes telling us how far we are off the ground, because 
normally--especially if you are talking about coming in to get 
the President or yourself or someone flying around the DC area, 
you are actually deconflicting with the airliners that are over 
the top of you, you are coming up the river. So, over the 
water, that is where the pilot will glance over to make sure 
that he has maintaining the proper altitude above the ground.
    So, the importance of that and being able to not be 
affected by 5G in the filtering, you asked about the cost, I 
don't actually have the cost for those. And, of course, a lot 
of those aircraft are going to be on the military side, too. 
And I haven't been read into how much work they have been doing 
with the military aircraft to try to upgrade their radar 
altimeters. A lot of this----
    Ms. Norton. Could the cost impact the timeline for 
upgrading rotorcraft fleets?
    Mr. Viola. Well, what our problem right now with the 
rotorcraft fleet is that the AD, the airworthiness directive, 
and the NOTAMs--we are still having conversations with the FAA 
to determine what that actually means for the vertical flight 
community. Because the AD, the airworthiness directive, 
actually says that the radar altimeter is unairworthy. And then 
the NOTAM there supposedly says those are the areas where it 
may be unairworthy.
    And so, we have no AMOCs yet for the rotorcraft or the 
vertical flight community. And we are working very closely with 
the FAA to get there. And so, we are actually held back by 
regulations. And a lot of times you will hear me talk about 
regulations shouldn't apply to just helicopters, it should be a 
mission set. And so, right now, the FAA has told us 
helicopters--and that is why we specifically went in and we 
have made sure we got an exemption for the air ambulance 
missions because we want to make sure they can deploy.
    So, what they did for the air ambulance mission is the FAA 
says, OK, you can fly without the radar altimeter, even though 
it is required by rule, if you do additional training for all 
your pilots and you have a movable search light. So, it is 
things like that that they are trying to come up with, that 
equivalent level of safety. And that is why, until we get 
AMOCs, we really can't even get a cost estimate.
    Ms. Norton. Mr. Fanning, I would like to ask you about the 
logistics of upgrading radio altimeters for the U.S. air flight 
fleet. What steps are involved in that process? How long would 
it take to upgrade the altimeters for the entire fleet, and how 
much would that cost? And who currently bears the burden of 
that cost? Mr. Fanning.
    Mr. Fanning. Thanks for that question. There is a lot in 
there. The first thing we need to know is the operating 
environment that we will find ourselves in. So, what will be 
the standards based on that operating environment. So, what is 
the worst-case scenario for interference when 5G is fully 
rolled out. Then, as Administrator Dickson said earlier, we 
have to set the standards to that, and that could take easily 
into 2023 for the manufacturers to start designing, building 
for the certification process. So, there is testing 
certification. Once the FAA certifies something, then the 
manufacturers can build it at scale.
    Rolling it out to the whole fleet is another timeline 
altogether, because, also as Administrator Dickson said, these 
airplanes are designed to fly people for 35, 40 years. And so, 
it can take a long time to rotate a next generation of 
technology unless you are doing it inside of the lifespan of 
the aircraft.
    So, we are talking about a lengthy process to get next-
generation new radio altimeters into the entire fleet. And that 
creates a lot of variables with the cost for what that could 
be. We just don't have an answer for that right now. And who 
pays for it is another question also. Historically, when a part 
of spectrum is auctioned off, there are proceeds set aside to 
mitigate the impact of those people inside that bandwidth, but 
it hasn't taken into account adjacent bandwidth. So, it is a--
--
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. You have to wrap up your answer. It 
is a great question, but we need to move on the timeframe of 
the committee. But we would appreciate a followup written 
answer to that.
    The Chair recognizes Representative Perry of Pennsylvania 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Roberson, in your testimony you state, quote, ``All 
this made for a very confusing and contentious situation 
created by the lack of information and the failures of the FCC 
and FAA to resolve their differences in a timely fashion while 
the cellular carriers have delayed their rollout and altered 
their plans on an almost weekly basis,'' unquote.
    I think we can all agree that this is confusing and 
contentious. The situation should have been and could have been 
avoided had the administration had the foresight to bring folks 
together and figure this out prior to the deadline. 
Unfortunately, Secretary Buttigieg was asleep at the wheel with 
yet another crisis under his watch. And as you pointed out, 
quote, ``there is a real problem, but it is what can best can 
be described as an `edge case' problem, that is, a problem that 
only occurs in unusual circumstances and for a very limited 
number of aircraft,'' unquote.
    So, if I can ask you this: What do you think prevented the 
FAA, the FCC, and both industries from coming together and 
addressing these edge cases before it became a crisis.
    Mr. Roberson. I think a big part of it has been discussed 
already, and that is the way in which the process works. The 
FCC makes their decisions. They are the authorized body to make 
decisions on spectrum. And they make those decisions 
exclusively on the basis of the information that is provided to 
them in their docket.
    In this case, the information that the FAA had and the 
concerns weren't communicated through the NTIA to the FCC. So, 
they didn't have that information to act upon. So, that is a 
process miss that exists.
    In terms of other inputs--and there were a variety of those 
who communicated that they did provide information to the 
docket. The FCC is always looking for technical information 
that they can act upon. And so, while there were considerable 
worries that were expressed about radar altimeters and 
operation in general, those weren't quantified in a way that 
the FCC could act upon that. So, this is a process that needs 
to be improved.
    If I might, there is a fundamental one, too, that I 
suggested but didn't fully address, and that is that FCC itself 
doesn't regulate receivers. It regulates transmitters. So, as I 
described, for the altimeter designers, they felt free to 
design an altimeter that looked well outside their authorized 
band. And there is no prohibition, legal prohibition for them 
to not do that. The view historically was the market forces 
with----
    Mr. Perry. And the FCC didn't--the FCC didn't realize that 
or consider that or didn't know that?
    Mr. Roberson. This has been an item that has been under 
discussion for more than 40 years about receiver standards and 
the need for some form of regulation or guideline around 
receivers, but it is more complex probably than time would 
permit right now.
    Mr. Perry. All right. If I can ask you another question 
here. You also pointed out that the aviation world, including 
the FAA commercial airline and private aircraft communities, 
airport authorities and others, have fought this rollout for 
the last several months, initially focusing on safety of life 
issues and, more recently, talking about massive disruption in 
airline flight schedules.
    And that is what you said. Much of this, I believe, is 
primarily based on a study by RTCA filed with the FCC in 
November of 2020.
    The question is: Have you reviewed the study? And, if so, 
do you find that the RTCA study provides credible evidence that 
5G will cause problems with radio altimeters, and can you 
explain the basis for your response? And also, have there been 
instances of 5G interference with radio altimeters to date 
anywhere in the world where 5G has been implemented?
    Mr. Roberson. Yeah. Two-part questions. First part, I have 
reviewed and my team--40 people in the company--we have 
reviewed the RTCA study and do find that there are some 
significant flaws in the study where very worst, worst-case 
assumptions were made. And this is one of the things that was 
discussed earlier. It would be very helpful if RTCA and 
telecommunications engineers could have gotten together in a 
more timely way to review those studies and to hash out the 
inconsistencies in the ways that the study was conducted.
    On the question of recorded incidents where there have been 
difficulties with radar altimeters, this is probably a question 
better asked of Meredith, but, to my knowledge, there is no 
instance in the world that there has been a problem with radar 
altimeters at this point.
    Mr. Perry. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you very much.
    I now turn to Representative Garcia of Illinois for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Chairman Larsen and 
Chairman DeFazio, for holding this hearing on aviation safety 
and the impact of 5G. Thanks to all the witnesses.
    As many of our witnesses have alluded to today, there is 
currently a 2-mile restriction on deploying 5G around most 
major public airports in this country, including Midway Airport 
in Chicago.
    Let me be clear. I support the FAA's interim orders to 
preserve aviation safety, including the 2-mile restriction on 
5G deployment, but there are certain tradeoffs to these orders. 
Midway Airport is unusual because there are a lot of residents 
that live right around the airport. The airport is about 1 
square mile and is surrounded by working-class neighborhoods 
directly across the street, as this map shows.
    Many of you might have experienced this fact flying into 
Midway where planes go pretty close over homes. It is always an 
exciting landing experience. This poster behind me shows the 2-
mile radius that constituents of mine live around. They are 
primarily Latino and Black, and lack access to quality 
broadband.
    In fact, my own district office, which is 3 miles away, 
just outside the circle, has very poor broadband. For these 
residents and my district office, cellphone service is the 
primary way of accessing the internet. So, the potential lack 
of 5G in the long term, combined with the fact that telecom 
carriers are planning to shut down their 3G networks at the end 
of the year, is potentially devastating for these communities 
and residents around Midway Airport.
    We cannot permanently prevent these residents from using 
5G. We must expeditiously find a way to fully deploy 5G while 
keeping the same level of aviation safety that we all achieve 
under the FAA's interim orders.
    For Ms. Baker and Mr. Fanning, a question. I am deeply 
concerned about how long 5G access may be restricted in the 
neighborhoods adjacent to airports, especially when these are 
almost always working-class Latino and Black neighborhoods who 
already face significant barriers to broadband access. In your 
opinion, what is the long-term solution that will allow 
residents around airports to fully have 5G while maintaining 
the necessary level of aviation safety? And roughly, how long 
will it take us to get there?
    Ms. Baker. So, thank you so much for your question. I think 
that is a really, really important one. I am going to first 
answer the previous question, but there has been no reported 
interference from 5G in the areas in the almost 40 countries 
that rolled out 5G. But to your point, we have agreed 
voluntarily and temporarily to exclusion zones around these 
airports.
    And I think you raise such an interesting and important 
thing that we cannot exacerbate this digital divide. And so, 
what we are doing is working as cooperatively as we possibly 
can with the aviation industry and with the FAA to clear these 
zones as quickly as possible. And we have agreed to do this 
until July 5. And at that point--we hope we will be done sooner 
than that.
    We have made tremendous progress and we really have been 
cooperating well, and I am proud of our industry and I am proud 
of your industry. And it took too long to get here, but I am 
glad we are there.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Well, thank you for that.
    And as you noted in your testimony, telecom companies have 
in the past paid other spectrum users to vacate parts of the 
spectrum or upgrade their equipment so that telecom companies 
can fully use that spectrum.
    Would telecom companies be willing to pay some of the cost 
for airlines to upgrade their planes' altimeters that are at 
risk of interference so that we do not have these restrictions 
in place?
    Ms. Baker. So, I actually think it is premature to go 
there, because this hearing seems to presuppose that there is 
interference, where we don't believe that there is. So, I think 
we need to let the engineers do their job. And as far as who 
pays, yes, there have been all sorts of instances where, 
through a spectrum relocation fund or through a designation 
from Congress, there has been use--Congress can use the 
proceeds of this, you know, of an $80 billion auction as they 
wish.
    And so, that part is really up to the Government, but I 
don't accept the premise that there is actually interference at 
this point.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And before I run out of time, if 
your members aren't considering a plan, are they considering 
any cellphone plan pricing compensation for residents who are 
paying for 5G but cannot access 5G networks?
    Ms. Baker. Well, we are doing what we can to close the 
digital divide, and we are encouraged that in the 
infrastructure bill, Congress actually has helped us do that. 
So, I think there will be longer support to low-income families 
to help pay for their cellphone and broadband service, 
particularly as it becomes the competitive choice of many, 
especially low-income folks.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Looking forward to that 
conversation. Thank you.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Garcia.
    We are going to do a second round. I recognize the chair of 
the full committee for 5 minutes.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I did hear a couple of very disturbing assertions. Mr. 
Roberson said, oh, well, RTCA was based on the worst, worst 
case. Tell that to the 346 families of the people who died on 
the MAX. That was supposed to be a worst case, worst, worst 
case. Very improbable. We don't run aviation that way in this 
Nation.
    And then I heard also--I think it was Ms. Baker--that while 
the FCC auctioned it with Ajit Pai blowing off all concerns and 
not putting in any restrictions, but they followed the rules. 
Well, that was the other thing, the conclusion of our 
investigation, that both the FAA and Boeing said, well, we 
followed the rules, just 346 people died.
    We changed the damn rules. And, that is a question that 
needs to be raised about this, about this issue, and the lack 
of cooperation and coordination. I mean, there is a lot of talk 
about the NTIA run by the fifth political hack in a role under 
the Trump administration didn't forward the concerns of the 
FAA, but they had been directly communicated to Ajit Pai by 
everybody--by the pilots, by the airlines, by this committee, 
by the RTCA and others. And Ajit Pai just blew it all off 
because they were in a hurry to get it out there, and I am sure 
they were under a lot of pressure from the telecoms to get it 
out there. And we don't want to have any mitigations. We want 
to be able to have the most powerful towers in the world.
    We have got to get some facts straight. My staff checked 
again with the FAA on the strength of the signals in France, 
and they say it is 15 to 85 watts, and Ms. Baker says it is 
more powerful in France, but they had France at 631 watts. So, 
I guess I don't understand watts. I always thought higher 
wattage, more powerful. I don't know. Plus, they deflect the 
antennas down. And that is permanent.
    So, to say, oh, we might not need any measures, it is like, 
we don't think there is interference. There is another. Oh, we 
don't think there is interference? Think?
    We have to absolutely--100 percent to the minus nine 
power--know. That is the risk in aviation. One in one billion. 
And I don't think we know that yet, because you have got the 
Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom saying that they 
pose a viable interference threat to radio altimeters. Canada 
has just adopted exclusion zones around 26 airports. These are 
not insignificant countries, and they are much more similar to 
ours than Slovenia or whatever ones you are quoting out there 
that fly four airplanes a day.
    So, I am just not happy with the way that--like I said, I 
think the telecoms are getting it now, at least Verizon and 
AT&T. I don't think CTIA is getting it. And, I want to make 
sure that others get it. I mean, the RTCA report, worst, worst 
case--well, that is what we plan for is the worst, worst case.
    To Ms. Stephens, and this is a concern about the FAA. I 
don't think the FAA has been particularly transparent with 
airports. Can you comment on that?
    I mean, for instance, I was told by the Administrator on 
Thursday, Eugene wouldn't be impacted, and on Thursday, 
Portland was on their list, and then on Friday it wasn't, but 
no one seems to understand how that all worked.
    Ms. Stephens. Thank you, Chair DeFazio, for that question, 
and, yes, it is very true. The information has not been free 
flowing and transparent, and that has been a real challenge for 
airports to be able to plan and understand why we are being 
impacted in the way we are being impacted.
    Eugene wasn't even supposed to be in the first rollout, and 
then we got the surprise NOTAM on the day of the 5G rollout and 
needed to try to understand very quickly why we were on the 
list and how we were going to be impacted. We never truly 
understood, we still don't know why we are on that list and 
have the NOTAM in place, and now the majority of our carriers 
have needed to be operating under AMOCs during low-visibility 
operations and, in fact, we still have one aircraft type that 
is not cleared with an AMOC to be able to operate at Eugene.
    That impacts our passengers. Aside from the headaches that 
it causes for people trying to run airports, it really does 
impact our passengers. I was flying back to Eugene on Tuesday 
with a layover in Salt Lake City waiting at the gate for the 
Eugene flight, and I heard two passengers talking about how 2 
weeks prior they had taken the same flight back into Eugene and 
then they were diverted to Portland because of fog in Eugene 
and they were not able to land. That just goes to what we have 
been battling all these years, Congressman, is making sure that 
people can use their local air service.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Just a few followups.
    I want to underscore a point that the chair made about the 
language being used. Ms. Baker's comments or testimony said--
you state the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics, RTCA, 
study applied flawed methodology and implausible scenarios.
    The actions of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation 
System, or MCAS, flaw that overrode pilot auctions in the 
flight deck of 737 MAXes was an implausible scenario, and yet 
it did happen. We are in the implausible, implausible scenario 
business, and so, that is why there is such a thin safety 
margin in aviation.
    That is why, frankly, we take personally because we take 
responsibility for aviation safety on this subcommittee. We 
talk about implausible scenarios because there really aren't 
implausible scenarios when it comes to aviation safety.
    So, I just want to underscore that point about that, using 
that term, because it really sort of tells me that you all 
don't really get what we are trying to do. I think that has 
changed. Granted, I think that has changed, but also it seems 
to underscores a fundamental foundational problem that got us 
here in the first place.
    I mentioned in the beginning about just very different 
cultures, different cultures between the industries, different 
cultures between the agencies involved. So, I hope we have made 
that point strongly.
    Mr. Viola, on helicopters, given the fact that there are 
currently no AMOCs for helicopters, just how are--I presume 
helicopters are flying, but what does your future look like 
right now?
    Mr. Viola. Well, thank you very much for the question, 
Chairman Larsen. Well, that is kind of the problem we have. We 
have got some regulatory compliance issues, and because of the 
ADs and the NOTAMs, there are a lot of aircraft that aren't 
flying right now. And so, we are really working for 
clarification as to what are the requirements.
    If the aircraft is required or if it was a newer aircraft 
that has a radio altimeter on it, well, then that is when the 
AD kicks in on certain types of--you actually need to rewrite 
what the procedures are that describe when the radar 
requirement was needed. And then if the aircraft didn't have a 
radar altimeter and didn't need it, then those aircraft can 
still fly.
    So, we are still, last night and even this morning before 
our testimony here, working to see what exactly--if everybody 
in the FAA can agree to what the AD means for helicopters and 
what the NOTAM actually means for helicopters. Does it mean a 
possible interference or does it mean that you can't fly in 
that area at all?
    Mr. Larsen. Your testimony said there are 55 public use 
heliports in the country--is that right--on page 6 of your 
testimony?
    Mr. Viola. Yes.
    Mr. Larsen. Fifty-five heliports. But that number is 
dwarfed by anywhere from 6,533 to 8,533 helicopter or ambulance 
landing sites in the United States. Is that right?
    Mr. Viola. Yes, sir. That is correct.
    Mr. Larsen. You have any indication that any of these 
numbers were taken into any consideration by the NTIA or the 
FCC as they looked at these issues?
    Mr. Viola. No. We have----
    Mr. Larsen. None at all?
    Mr. Viola. We have no indication that they tried to avoid 
any of our known heliports. And I think it is kind of the same 
thing as it is for the airports, where normally, when a risk is 
introduced to aviation or there are methods or systems that 
prevent that risk from being introduced, I think in this case 
here, the risk is introduced and now we are dealing with it.
    Mr. Larsen. It is backwards.
    Mr. Fanning, if you talk to your members, is there one 
single radio altimeter fix or is it multiple fixes for 
altimeters based on the altimeter?
    Mr. Fanning. We don't know yet. The real testing only 
started once we got the data, the information from the 
telecoms, and the FAA is in daily conversation with the 
manufacturers about what they are learning, which also feeds 
into the AMOCs. It has been stated, but it is worth repeating, 
that an AMOC is not a permanent thing, and it doesn't give 
blanket coverage. Each AMOC is different, and they are adjusted 
or reviewed every 30 days.
    So, there is no one fix yet because we still don't have a 
full definition of the problem, but there is some optimism that 
the more modern altimeters are going to test well. But we just 
don't know what falls into those three buckets of an existing 
altimeter that is going to be fine with 5G, those that have to 
be retrofitted with a filter, and those that just won't work in 
the environment.
    But we are gathering the data in real time and, again, 
daily conversations with the FAA and also with the telecoms to 
get that data so we can test against it.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. All right.
    I want to thank the panelists, the second panel, for your 
testimony and your informative answers to help us understand 
these issues a lot better than we did even for us 3 years ago, 
2 years ago, 1 year ago, 6 months ago, 2 months ago, and even 
last week. But we have been, as a committee, subcommittee, 
trying to get up to speed on these issues as well. But having 
said that, I see that there is a lot more work to do, so we are 
going to stay very engaged on this as well.
    With that, that concludes our hearing.
    I want to thank the witnesses again. I ask unanimous 
consent that the record of today's hearing remain open until 
such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any 
questions that may be submitted to them in writing, and I would 
expect you all to get a few questions.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments and information 
submitted by Members or the witnesses to be included in the 
record of today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    With that, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              

  Letter of February 7, 2022, and 5G Timeline from Captain Joseph G. 
    DePete, President, Air Line Pilots Association, International, 
           Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
                                                  February 7, 2022.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Chair,
Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and 
        Infrastructure, 2163 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, 
        DC 20515.
The Honorable Garret Graves,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and 
        Infrastructure, 2402 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, 
        DC 20515.
    Dear Chair Larsen and Ranking Member Graves:
    Thank you for holding the very productive and informative hearing 
on Thursday, February 3, 2022, on ``Finding the Right Frequency: 5G 
Deployment and Aviation Safety''. We have created the safest aviation 
system in the world thanks to your leadership, commitment to safety, 
and steadfast support for a collaborative safety risk-management 
environment between frontline employees, the regulator and airline 
operators. ALPA stands ready to build on that record of safety and 
support you as we ensure that no third party will ever again be able to 
introduce risk into the national airspace system without labor, 
airlines and the regulator having a full say in the matter.
    As I mentioned during the hearing, enclosed is a timeline of 
aviation's interactions with the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), highlighting where the Air Line Pilots Association, 
International (ALPA) joined our fellow industry organizations in 
advocating for a collaborative approach for safe 5G deployment in the 
C-Band. Unfortunately, the FCC not only failed to heed our concerns, 
but they willfully neglected to carry out their regulatory 
responsibilities and ask licensees for critical data needed to plan for 
launching 5G while maintaining aviation safety. This failure on the 
part of the FCC has resulted in uncertainty, complexity, and increased 
workload for every flight. For airline pilots, safety is nonnegotiable. 
It's not about politics or profit. For this reason, it was an affront 
to us when the FCC licensed part of the C-Band spectrum to the telecom 
sector without acknowledging our concerns about aviation safety.
    Below is additional information for the record regarding the 
validity of the RTCA report, the cost to retrofit radar altimeters, 
concerns about telecommunications providers refusal to share necessary 
information, and the need to evaluate 5G risks to all aviation 
operations.
    There has been significant criticism of ``the RTCA report.'' RTCA, 
Inc. (formerly known as the Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics), is a 500-member not-for-profit standards development 
organization that serves as the primary forum in the United States for 
the development of avionics standards. The members of RTCA include 
unions, all airline aircraft manufacturers, avionics providers, 
airlines, airports, companies that serve as the air traffic control 
infrastructure industrial base, and more. The engineers and experts who 
attend RTCA represent the best technical minds of industry and U.S. and 
foreign governments. By working in a consensus-based environment, RTCA 
and its member participants have a long history of developing standards 
for aviation equipment that provide the necessary performance to ensure 
safety in operations.
    In conjunction with its European-based, sister organization, 
EUROCAE, the standards they have developed have been adopted by safety 
regulators; including the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Transport Canada, and the 
Agencia Nacional de Aviacao Civil of Brazil; for most of the electronic 
navigation equipment on board commercial airplanes. The International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has also recognized and adopted RTCA 
standards as a method of compliance as well.
    To be absolutely clear, the staff of RTCA do not write the 
standards, their members do. The members of RTCA develop consensus-
based standards and all participant concerns are reconciled before a 
document is published. In cases where they cannot be reconciled, the 
dissenting opinions, known as ``non-concur comments'' are included in 
the document. This process was followed by RTCA during its review of 
radar altimeters and the C-Band 5G environment.
    After the FCC Report and Order for Flexible Use of C-Band was 
issued, the RTCA President made several efforts to reach out to the 
wireless industry, including CTIA, to invite them be part of the 
process in developing the report which was eventually filed to the FCC 
docket in October 2020. While CTIA members attended, and provided an 
inadequate level of meaningful data, the information was used 
nonetheless to evaluate the 5G signal impact on radar altimeters. The 
intent was to work collaboratively with the wireless industry to ensure 
safe deployment of 5G C-Band with minimum disruption to aviation at 
least 18 months prior to the activation of C-Band service. 
Unfortunately, RTCA's data-driven report was rebuffed by the same CTIA 
members who were unwilling to provide data to support their dissenting 
views; their non-concur and rationale are fully documented in the RTCA 
report.
    The hearing provided damning insight into how broken the federal 
radio spectrum and licensing process is in relation to aviation safety 
and the need for immediate reform. Notably, I am troubled by the FAA 
Administrator's disclosure that productive conversations between the 
agency and the telecommunications providers did not begin until early 
January. It was further noted that the FCC had never asked the wireless 
industry for the data needed to conduct the safety risk mitigation 
assessment. Given that the agency legally tasked with oversight of the 
telecommunications industry completely failed to provide critical 
information relevant to the safety of the U.S. airspace system and 
voluntary dialogue by private sector companies did not begin until the 
precise time their actions posed catastrophic harm to public safety, it 
is clear there is a systemic failure of governance over the wireless 
industry's use of spectrum, disclosure of information, and licensing. 
This necessitates a redesign of the government's authority over these 
providers, including granting affected agencies, like the FAA, 
authority to reject or modify new or expanded spectrum applications as 
well as the ability to directly interact with the FCC.
    The hearing also raised questions regarding the importance of 
modifying and developing radar altimeter equipment and standards to 
potentially solve spectrum problems. To that end, it is important to 
make note of the costs involved. While it is difficult to provide 
specific information, we are generally aware that avionics upgrades can 
be more expensive than many would ever imagine. Because multiple radar 
altimeters are installed aboard large air transport aircraft, the cost 
of the modified or new equipment, including the cost of labor to 
install the equipment, and the cost of aircraft time out of service, 
the overall cost could easily be $100,000-$150,000 per aircraft, 
depending on the aircraft type. Of course, there are still a lot of 
hurdles to jump through before we know for sure, just exactly how 
difficult and involved that this equipment upgrade will be, so the 
estimated costs are also subject to change.
    In developing the new radar altimeter standards, a key piece of 
information needed before standards can be written is the external 
interference environment that radar altimeters must be able to tolerate 
globally, for the next several decades. To meet this demand, the 
aviation industry needs the active cooperation and input of the 
wireless industry to define the environment. We are pleased to hear 
that the FAA intends to share their flight test data with RTCA, for the 
development of future radar altimeter standards.
    Once new altimeter standards are available, the timeline for 
design, testing, certification, manufacturing, and installation is 
likely to take four or more years, even with priority placed on these 
upgrades. There may also be additional unforeseen costs to accelerate 
the process and upgrade all airliners, including those operated by 
international airlines operating in U.S. airspace. This truly is a 
global problem.
    During the hearing, I noted my concern with CTIA's continued 
sensitivity toward protecting proprietary information between 
competitors AT&T and Verizon. I wish to emphasize that in aviation, we 
do not compete on matters of safety. ``One Level of Safety'' has been 
the foundational principle for ALPA. The aviation industry, which 
features intense competition between carriers, manufactures and other 
parties, is nonetheless able to share information necessary for 
addressing matters of safety. The wireless industry can and must be 
held to the same standard. It appears that Verizon and AT&T are 
beginning to understand the need to share data for the advancement of 
safety, even if their trade association, CTIA, does not.
    Finally, as we look forward to new entrants to the aviation 
system--Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems and drones, Advanced Air 
Mobility, Hypersonic aircraft, and Commercial Space operations--we need 
to make sure that these entities are also not impacted by 5G 
interference. A thorough review and risk mitigation of the systems used 
by these stakeholders is also needed before allowing 5G in the C-Band 
to continue expansion.
    The U.S. air transportation system is the world's safest. As I said 
during the hearing, I feel very strongly that if or when another 
industry seeks to introduce risk into the system, the burden should be 
on that industry to prove its actions won't degrade aviation safety. 
The launch of the new 5G service caused an avoidable crisis. The 
process must be reformed so that the United States can continue to be a 
world-stage competitor in 5G and set the global standard in aviation 
safety.
    In closing, we again thank you for holding such a productive 
hearing. Speaking for the 62,000 pilots flying for 38 airlines that 
ALPA represents, we strongly encourage the committee's continued 
attention on the C-Band matter, and also in taking steps to ensure that 
this unnecessary breakdown in intragovernmental processes never happens 
again.
        Sincerely,
                                        Captain Joe DePete,
                            President, Air Line Pilots Association.

Attachment: ``5G Timeline Doc 02072022''

cc:  The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, Chair
     House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

     The Honorable Sam Graves, Ranking Member
     House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

                           Attachment: ``5G Timeline Doc 02072022''

    Below is a list of activities surrounding the issue of 5G and Radar 
Altimeters (radalts). ALPA actions and participation is noted where 
appropriate.

Docket 17-340 opened on 12/1/2017--Spectrum Policy Recommendations
                                  2018
  1/31/18--Aviation Spectrum Resources, Inc. (ASRI)--comments 
on need to protect aviation spectrum:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1013180946363/
ASRI%20Comments%20TAC%20Spectrum%20Policy-FINAL.pdf

  2/15/18--Boeing comments on need to protect aviation 
spectrum:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10216647614758/
Boeing%20TAC%20Recommendations%20Reply
%20Comments%202%2015%202018%20final.pdf

  FCC Docket 18-122 opened on 4/18/2018--Flexible Use of 3.7-
4.2 GHz

  5/29/18--ALPA Initial Comments:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10531182083849/ALPA%20Comments%2017-
183%2018-122.pdf

  5/31/18--ASRI initial filing:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10531846006939/
ASRI%20ex%20parte%20Gen%20Dkt%20No%2018-122.pdf

  6/19/18--Aviation Industry (ALPA, AOPA, A4A, AFC, AIA, GAMA, 
HAI, IATA, NATA, NBAA)--summary of discussions with Commission on need 
to protect radalts:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10620182163379/
19062019%20Aviation%20Associations%20Joint%20
Ex%20Parte%20Filing%20Dkt%20No%2018-122.pdf

  10/29/18--ASRI again comments on need to protect radar 
altimeters, recommending FCC work with FAA.
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1030875426359/ASRI%20-%2020181029-_C-
Band_NPRM_
Filing-FINAL_Rev1a.pdf

  12/17/18--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) met with FCC 
technical staff on need to protect radalts
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/12172825300371/
12.17.18%20Aviation%20Industry%20Ex-Parte
%20FINAL.pdf
                                  2019
  10/25/19--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) met with FCC 
technical staff again on need to protect radalts
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1025793221250/
Aviation%20and%20Aerospace%20FCC%20
Engineering%20Meeting%20Ex%20Parte%20Notice%20(FINAL%2010-25-19).pdf

  11/12/19-2/19/20--aviation met 6 additional times with FCC 
staff on protecting radalts
                                  2020
  2/21/20--Aviation Industry (including ALPA)--warning of 
interference on RadAlts if Draft Report and Order goes forward:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10222078579238/202002121-3.7-
4.2%20GHz%20Aerospace
%20Aviation%20Associations%20Letter%20to%20FCC%20GN%2018-122-FINAL.pdf

  Industry (including ALPA) meetings with Commissioners' Staffs 
2/21/20

  3/3/2020--FCC Report and Order--https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/
filing/0303046335999

Additional FCC Docket 18-122 Items:
  5/26/20--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) Petition for 
Reconsideration--asking for FCC to convene aviation/telcom industry 
work group:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10527379225572/C-
BAND%20Petition%20for%20Recon.pdf

        Sec.  Note that this Petition did NOT oppose the Order, but 
        asked for FCC leadership in identifying mitigations

  7/9/20--Aviation Industry Reply Comments to Petition:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10710274414682/
Aviation%20Petitioners%20Reply%20to
%20Oppositions.pdf

  12/7/20--Aviation Industry files proposals for mitigations to 
protect radalts:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/12072836329004/20201207-
Aviation%20and%20Aerospace
%20Suggested%20C-Band%205G%20Mitigations%20GN%2018-122-
Filed%20Version.pdf

  12/7/20--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) filed letters 
asks FCC to delay spectrum auction:
    https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filing/1207131706609
                                  2021
  5/12/21--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) describes how 
CTIA analysis of aviation concerns is incorrect
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/105130442707885/
Organizations%20Supporting%20Aviation
%20Safety%20Ex%20Parte%2012%20May%202021.pdf

  8/10/21--Aviation Industry (including ALPA) describes 
technical details of radalt and need to protect
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1081157361951/
Aviation%20and%20Aerospace%20Ex%20parte%20
Notice%20Aug%206%202021%20w%20OET%20WTB%20IB.pdf

  8/27/21--Meetings including ALPA, with FCC commissioner 
Carr's staff:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10827030728422/
Rad%20Alt%20Aug%2026%20Watson%20Meeting
%20Ex%20Parte%20Letter%20FILED.pdf

  October 2021--ALPA begins to lead industry coalition coms 
efforts including common talking points used by all coalition members

  11/2/21--Aviation Industry including ALPA filing asking for 
details of 5G deployment in order to develop aviation-side mitigations
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1103321105177/
Aviation%20Community%20FCC%20Filing%20for
%20Needed%205G%20Parameters.pdf

  11/4/21--Verizon and AT&T voluntarily agree to delay their 
turn on from
12/5/21 to 1/5/21.

  11/4/21--Aviation industry including ALPA began a series of 
meetings with the White House National Economic Council (NEC). The NEC 
begins leading interagency meetings between the FCC and FAA.

  11/19/21--Aviation Industry including ALPA reply to CTIA, 
describing how international deployments differ from US
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1119034580247/
Aviation%20Industry%20Reply%20to%20CTIA
%2011-19-2021.pdf

  11/24/21--AT&T and Verizon offer a six month reduction in 
power around airports. The aviation coalition determines that this 
action is insufficient to protect even one model of transponder as 
compared to the RTCA report.
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/11241848723664/2021-11-
24%20ATT%20Verizon%20Letter%20
FINAL.pdf

  12/06/21--Aviation files a counter-proposal to the Verizon/
AT&T letter, which provides protection to aviation radar altimeters:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1206159800868/
Aviation's%20Safety%20Proposal%2012.6.pdf

  12/07/21--FAA issues the Airworthiness Directives which 
prohibit certain operations in TBD areas where 5G interference is 
expected. The FAA will issue NOTAMs to activate the ADs.

  12/07/21--ALPA issues safety alert to all members about FAA 
AD on all transport and commuter category aircraft with radar 
altimeters

  12/09/21--Boeing holds multi-model operator telcons with 
customers worldwide, with ALPA also included, to describe that Boeing 
aircraft will be subject to the ADs, and that in their opinion further 
restrictions may be necessary.

  12/10/21--ALPA joins in a meeting with airline tech pilots on 
the impact of the 5G restrictions.

  12/14/21--ALPA coordinates with coalition members on 
background materials for reporters and transmits on behalf of industry

  12/14/21--ALPA has a telcon with NATCA to discuss ATC side of 
handling radar altimeter AD/NOTAMs. ATC does not know what to expect. 
We supported any action by NATCA to slow traffic as needed to manage 
the unknown impacts starting on 1/5/22.

  12/16/21-12/17/21--Aviation including ALPA visit with staff 
for each of the 4 FCC Commissioners. Aviation made the case that there 
will be severe economic impacts to airline passenger and cargo 
operations, with significant schedule impacts and passenger 
disruptions. Helicopter safety operations will be grounded. The FAA 
restrictions will not be easy or fast to overcome with Alternate 
Methods of Compliance (AMOCs), and that FCC needs to act to prevent and 
industry economic disaster on 1/5/22.

  12/20/21--ALPA letter to Senator Cantwell and Senator Wicker 
debunking myth that 5G is being deployed successfully in other 
countries without mitigation.

  12/23/21--FAA issues an updated SAIB:
    https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/
dc7bd4f27e5f1074
86257221005f069d/379cfb187d16db10862587b4005b26fc/$FILE/AIR-21-18R1.pdf

  12/23/21--FAA issues SAFO 21007 with example NOTAMs:
    https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/
airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/
all_safos/media/2021/SAFO21007.pdf

  12/31/21--DOT asked Verizon and AT&T to delay their roll out 
5G in order to work on mitigations that will protect more of aviation 
around several major airports. Verizon and AT&T rejected any further 
delay on 1/2/22, with an offer to implement limitations as in France. 
Aviation tech team has determined that the offer is only partial 
limitations that France has imposed, and does not protect aviation 
sufficiently.
                                  2022
  1/2/2022--ALPA filed a comment in support of the A4A Petition 
for Emergency Stay on the FCC Docket:
    https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/10102521821451/
ALPA%20Comments%20In%20Support%20of%20
A4A%20Petition%2001.02.2022%20Final2.pdf

  1/2/2022--ALPA sent a letter to FCC Chair Rosenworcel, asking 
for FCC to work collaboratively with aviation, to share data that shows 
that aviation's safety case is met.
    https://www.alpa.org/-/media/ALPA/Files/pdfs/news-events/letters/
2022/0103-5g-fcc-rosenworcel.pdf?la=en

  1/4/2022--Additional voluntary action by Verizon and AT&T 
delay until
1/19/2022 for start of 5G service.

  1/18/2022--ALPA issues safety alert to pilots prior to 5G 
signal broadcasts beginning.

  2/3/2022--ALPA testifies before the Aviation Subcommittee of 
the U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee reinforcing 
how the recent deployment of AT&T and Verizon's 5G services to impact 
aviation safety.

                                 
  Letter of February 2, 2022, from Present and Former Members of the 
Federal Aviation Management Advisory Council, Submitted for the Record 
                        by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
                                                  February 2, 2022.
The Honorable Peter DeFazio,
Chairman,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 
        20515.
The Honorable Sam Graves,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Garret Graves,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 
        20515.
    Dear Chairmen and Ranking Members:
    The undersigned are present and former members of the Federal 
Aviation Management Advisory Council (MAC). This letter represents our 
personal viewpoints alone, however, and is not sent in any official 
capacity on behalf of the Management Advisory Council or any other 
organization. We are writing to express our personal views on recent 
developments involving the FCC and the FAA's concern about possible 
harmful interference from 5G towers using C-band spectrum in the 
vicinity of airports. We would ask that this letter be included in the 
record of the February 3 hearing before the Subcommittee on Aviation.
    Like everyone, we were dismayed that the much-anticipated rollout 
of new 5G networks by AT&T and Verizon had to be postponed and modified 
as the result of aviation concerns that had not been addressed 
beforehand to the FAA's satisfaction. Like all Americans, we look 
forward to benefiting from the promise of 5G technology. We also 
believe, however, that the root cause of the disruption has not been 
sufficiently understood in the commentary we have seen to date. That 
root cause is a system for spectrum regulation that is no longer wholly 
fit for purpose--not, at least, where FCC decisions potentially 
compromise the statutory responsibilities of other federal agencies 
like the FAA.
    It is not our purpose to opine on whether the FCC's analysis of the 
potential for interference is better than that of the FAA or vice 
versa. First, that question is complicated by recent reports of the 
FAA's inability to obtain timely data it needed to assess accurately 
whether such interference would reduce the reliability of critical 
aircraft safety equipment--notably radar altimeters. (Earlier research 
filed with the FCC clearly said it would.) Second, it is essentially 
beside the point. What is not in dispute is that the FAA, responsible 
for an aviation system whose safety record is second to none, remained 
uncertain about the validity of the FCC's analysis and thus was 
required to take the actions that it did.
    More importantly, once the FCC was made aware of the FAA's 
concerns--concerns expressed over a period of years by both the FAA and 
the aviation industry--it should have affirmatively undertaken to 
resolve those concerns to the mutual satisfaction of everyone 
concerned. Rather than seek that mutually satisfactory solution, 
however, the FCC reverted to the familiar confines of the formal 
administrative process. It reviewed submissions to the record, formed 
its conclusions, and based its decision on those conclusions. That 
process--while wholly in keeping with the conventional regulatory 
jurisprudence--simply does not appropriately acknowledge that Congress 
vested final responsibility for aviation safety decisions in the FAA 
alone.
    The confusion, delay, and frustration that followed the decision 
were wholly foreseeable and could have been avoided entirely had the 
FCC adopted a more collaborative approach early in the process--
ideally, before launching a formal proceeding. The FAA cannot be 
treated as just another ``interested party'' that can be expected to 
accept quietly an outcome it deems insufficiently tested in the real 
world. Indeed, walking away from the issue despite its continuing 
uncertainty would represent a clear violation of the FAA's statutory 
obligation to ensure the safety of flight.
    Simply put, the FAA should not be required to bear the burden of 
proof before the FCC on a matter of aviation safety; if anything, it 
should be just the reverse. The bottom line is clear: the FCC should 
never be permitted to make a decision on the use of spectrum that the 
FAA believes might compromise aviation safety; it must ensure that the 
FAA's concerns are resolved to its satisfaction before making any 
decision, and certainly before auctioning spectrum, lest bidders be 
inadequately informed of possible limits on the use of the spectrum 
they are bidding on.
    A legislative amendment might easily be crafted to establish a more 
appropriately balanced process--one that recognizes that Executive 
Branch agencies like the FAA are not mere ``interested parties'' but 
rather instruments of government policy in their own right. They have a 
legal obligation to take whatever action they deem required by the 
public interest and, as we have seen, will do so.
    We believe, however, that a more readily available solution should 
be encouraged. The problem might be resolved easily by a memorandum of 
understanding between the FCC and the Executive Branch in which the FCC 
commits that it will make no decision that another agency believes will 
adversely affect critical systems for which that other agency is 
responsible before achieving a mutually acceptable agreement with that 
agency regarding the mitigations to be undertaken. The FCC would 
formally adopt that commitment as a standing policy; it would be within 
the scope of its statutory discretion to do so.
    If such an understanding cannot be achieved quickly among the 
affected agencies, we would advocate seeking a legislative solution. 
Without one or the other, we can look forward to many more conflicts of 
this kind as the electromagnetic spectrum becomes increasingly crowded, 
injecting an unacceptable level of uncertainty and instability into FCC 
decisions that are essential to America's future growth and prosperity.
        Respectfully,
Stephen A. Alterman,
  President, Cargo Airline Association.
Linda Hall Daschle,
  former FAA Deputy Administrator.
Derek Kan,
  former OMB Deputy Director, and former DOT Under Secretary of 
Transportation for Policy.
Will Ris,
  former SVP, Government Affairs, American Airlines.
Brian Wynne,
  CEO, Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International.
Peter J. Bunce,
  President and CEO, General Aviation Manufacturers Association.
Christopher A. Hart,
  former Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board.
Donna McLean,
  former DOT Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs, and Chief 
Financial Officer.
Jeffrey N. Shane,
  former DOT Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy.

                                 
Statement of Ed Bolen, President and Chief Executive Officer, National 
 Business Aviation Association, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter 
                               A. DeFazio
    On behalf of the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA), 
thank you for holding this hearing to discuss critical aviation safety 
concerns related to 5G telecommunications networks operating from 3.7-
3.98 gigahertz (GHz), a commonly referred to as the C-band. NBAA 
represents more than 11,000 member companies and professionals that 
rely on general aviation aircraft for business purposes. Like 
commercial airlines, general aviation operators also rely on radio 
altimeters for various safety-critical functions, including low-
visibility operations and other onboard safety systems. Beginning in 
2015, NBAA and a broad coalition of aviation stakeholders raised 
detailed safety concerns about the potential for 5G interference with 
radio altimeters. We appreciate the Subcommittee's continued attention 
to this important matter.
    NBAA members operate at thousands of airports across the nation, 
many of which are not served by commercial airlines. For example, 
general aviation aircraft deliver organs for transplant, perform air 
medical flights, assist in the aftermath of natural disasters and 
deliver critical supplies related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United 
States general aviation industry, including business aviation, supports 
1.2 million jobs and $247 billion in economic output.
    Radio altimeters are crucial for many general aviation missions, 
especially for low-visibility landings and helicopter operations. Also, 
radio altimeter data on the precise distance of the aircraft from the 
ground is integrated into other safety-critical flight control and 
warning systems needed for all phases of flight. This integrated nature 
of aircraft avionics systems means that simply replacing the radio 
altimeter is not an option or is prohibitively expensive. Potential 
radio altimeter replacement costs are of specific concern to general 
aviation aircraft operators since 85% are small and mid-sized 
businesses.
    With the significant benefits that 5G technology will provide for 
connectivity across the nation, NBAA believes these networks must 
safely co-exist with aviation. Achieving these benefits and preserving 
aviation safety requires enhanced interagency collaboration between the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), and other government stakeholders. In 2019, the 
aviation industry formally expressed concerns to the FCC about the 
implementation of 5G networks and conducted a study using the best 
available information at that time, which identified issues with radio 
altimeter interference. During this time, the aviation industry has 
been open to working with the FCC, FAA, and other agencies to advance 
the discussion on these issues.
    Unfortunately, since the December 2020 auction of the 5G-C 
spectrum, the required levels of coordination did not occur. This lack 
of coordination meant that as the rollout of 5G networks approached 
this year, we were in a reactive position because the necessary 
proactive coordination had not occurred. We applaud the FAA's dedicated 
work to quickly issue Airworthiness Directives, Notices to Air Missions 
(NOTAMs), and other guidance on the impact of 5G networks. Still, the 
reactive nature of these efforts created significant challenges and 
uncertainty for general aviation operators.
    Following the activation of 5G networks, the FAA is to be commended 
for its work to approve Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) that 
allow most commercial air carrier aircraft to operate safely at 
airports where there is potential for 5G interference. However, the FAA 
has only issued limited mitigations for business aircraft and 
helicopters to date. Without approved AMOCs or other relief, these 
aircraft continue to be prohibited from conducting low-visibility 
approaches and are subject to other flight restrictions in all 5G 
deployment areas, which will expand across the country. We respectfully 
request that the FAA dedicate the necessary resources to approve 
Letters of Acceptance for data submittals by altimeter manufacturers 
and supporting AMOCs, where appropriate, for general aviation aircraft 
and helicopters.
    With the current AMOC process, the FAA must re-issue each approval 
every 30 days, which requires significant agency resources. As new 5G 
towers come online, the FAA must review the data to determine if 
existing AMOCs still maintain an adequate level of safety or if 
modifications are necessary. This process of reviewing data and 
analyzing AMOCs for the commercial air carrier fleet means that FAA 
resources are often not available for general aviation aircraft 
operators and manufacturers. If the telecom providers could share data 
on tower locations and deployment plans with the FAA as soon as it 
becomes available, the agency could manage the AMOC process more 
proactively and dedicate additional resources to general aviation 
operators.
    As the 5G rollout continues across the country, the FAA will face a 
growing workload to review and re-issue AMOCs each month. By working 
collaboratively with the FCC, telecom providers, and other 
stakeholders, the FAA could have better visibility into future 5G 
impacts. For example, data sharing between the FAA and telecom 
providers in as close to real-time as possible would allow the FAA to 
perform a more forward-looking analysis and could mitigate the need to 
re-issue AMOCs every 30 days. The general aviation community looks 
forward to working with the FAA on an improved process so we can 
continue accessing airports across the nation and performing our 
critical missions.
    The dynamic and on-demand nature of business aviation operations 
also means that receiving NOTAMs on 5G restrictions with relatively 
little notice presents significant challenges. Unlike commercial 
airlines, most business aviation flights do not operate on a fixed 
route between the same airports. NBAA members can access more than 
5,000 public-use airports in the U.S., requiring additional detailed 
flight planning before each trip. The requirement to operate to such a 
diverse group of airports is another reason that enhanced data sharing 
and more lead time on subsequent phases of the 5G rollout will be 
essential to the general aviation community.
    Finally, we will continue to see rapid advancements in aviation and 
telecommunications technology that will present additional wireless 
spectrum challenges in the coming years. For example, advanced air 
mobility (AAM) aircraft are currently undergoing FAA certification 
review and will have unique spectrum requirements for safe operation. 
Long-term plans from AAM operators include autonomous vehicle 
operation, which will have different spectrum needs and safety 
considerations from piloted aircraft. Groups including RTCA, Inc. are 
already reviewing these complex issues, which will require more of our 
focus in the coming years. We encourage robust interagency coordination 
on future spectrum use and potential challenges involving all relevant 
government agencies, including the FCC and industry stakeholders.
    This hearing is an important opportunity to review the next steps 
on the 5G rollout and identify key lessons learned. We applaud the 
commitment of this Subcommittee and the FAA for their continued efforts 
to ensure the highest level of aviation safety. NBAA looks forward to 
working with the Aviation Subcommittee, FAA, and other agencies as we 
continue developing strategies to co-exist safely with next-generation 
wireless networks.

                                 
   ``Analysis of 5G Deployment: Executive Summary,'' by Professional 
Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO, Submitted for the Record by Hon. 
                            Peter A. DeFazio
              Analysis of 5G Deployment: Executive Summary
    The Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO (PASS), the 
union representing more than 11,000 Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) and Department of Defense (DoD) employees, is providing an 
analysis of the deployment of 5G and the potential for radio frequency 
interference with National Airspace System (NAS) systems and equipment. 
PASS utilized extensive review of various aviation and 
telecommunication industry white papers as well as conducting a 
literary review of research papers within the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) library.
    Radio frequency interference (RFI) is a well-known phenomenon in 
the electromagnetic spectrum.\1\ It is, as defined by the FAA Spectrum 
Engineering & Policy department, any emission, radiation, or induction 
that obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts, a radio communications 
service operating in accordance with established regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ NASA. ``The Electromagnetic Spectrum,'' modified March 2013. 
https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/emspectrum1.html.
    U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radio Frequency Interference 
Best Practices Guidebook, February 2020.
    Arecibo Observatory. ``Sources of Radio Frequency Interference.'' 
https://www.naic.edu/sondy/rfi.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The introduction of 5G radios into the aviation band of frequencies 
adds to an already complex environment of the electromagnetic spectrum. 
Many of the traditional unintentional RFI scenarios become an area of 
concern due to the proximity of frequency allocation as well as the 
physical location of the 5G radio emitters near aviation facilities. 
Over the years, as more users have been introduced into a spectrum 
allocation block, the users--especially in non-safety of life 
applications--have interfered with one another and the spectrum has 
become very noisy and degraded due to the amount of emissions in close 
frequency to one another.
    The 5G emissions are known to interfere with RADAR altimeters.\2\ 
These altimeters are used by many systems on the aircraft and any 
interference creates significant safety risk in low visibility landing 
situations. RADAR altimeter is integrated into the avionics suite of 
many aircraft, adding necessary sensor information and data points to 
complete a logic sequence in the autopilot and other integrated systems 
computing performance calculations. Any level of interference results 
in a layer of safety being compromised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``Safety Alert for Operators: 
Risk of Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in 
the Presences of 5G C-Band Interference,'' December 23, 2021.
    Federal Aviation Administration, AD 2021-23-12 and AD 2021-23-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The process for RFI resolution and mitigation can be a 
collaborative effort and should include all stakeholders to reach the 
best solutions. It is paramount that all aspects are considered to keep 
the aviation industry safe. PASS suggests the following additional 
solutions to safe progress:
      All manufacturers of 5G radios should send their radio to 
the FAA Technical Center for evaluation by the Spectrum Engineering 
division for testing for possible RFI scenarios.
      Different placement of antennas relative to airfields, 
including beam management.
      No radiation zones in the direction of airports and 
facilities that support aviation safety.
      Radiate the 5G radios at lower output power levels.
      Install antennas tilted downward to reduce potential 
interference to flights.
      Height restrictions on 5G radio towers to reduce line of 
site to aviation equipment.
      Fault detection and reporting on 5G radios to assist in 
faster RFI resolution.
      Apply spurious emission standards utilized in Europe to 
5G radios in the United States.

    PASS represents specialists at the FAA who are on the front lines 
when it comes to locating and documenting interference issues as well 
as inspectors who are responsible for investigating reports of aviation 
incidents. The crucial work these employees perform has the potential 
to be impacted by the deployment of 5G and PASS appreciates the 
opportunity to allow our concerns to be presented. The union strongly 
believes that addition of 5G without carefully mitigating risk to 
aviation will complicate the RFI resolution process by adding new 
interference potentials. It is crucial that both the Federal 
Communications Communication (FCC) and FAA dedicate resources 
specializing in 5G interference as future 5G rollouts are planned.

                                 
     ``Analysis of 5G Deployment: White Paper,'' February 2022, by 
 Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO, Submitted for the 
                    Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
                 Analysis of 5G Deployment: White Paper
    The following is an analysis conducted by the Professional Aviation 
Safety Specialists on 5G deployment and the potential for radio 
frequency interference with National Airspace System equipment.
                              Introduction
    There is the potential for newly deployed 5G radio access 
technology to cause radio frequency interference (RFI) in the nation's 
air traffic control system. This paper looks at the known interference 
potential with the RADAR/Radio altimeter in aircraft, as well as other 
potential interference issues that may arise with various ground- and 
space-based navigation systems within the National Airspace System 
(NAS).
    Since 1977, the Professional Aviation Safety Specialists, AFL-CIO 
(PASS), has represented more than 11,000 employees of the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense (DoD) who 
install, maintain, support and certify air traffic control and national 
defense equipment, inspect and oversee the commercial and general 
aviation industries, develop flight procedures, and perform quality 
analyses of complex aviation systems used in air traffic control and 
national defense in the United States and abroad.
    Nearly 700 million air travelers fly throughout the U.S. each year 
and PASS-represented employees are there to ensure the safety of the 
aviation system. Any mistakes or missteps could be catastrophic for the 
American flying public. As the demand for air travel continues to 
increase, so does the need to maintain the highest level of safety, 
integrity and reliability of the NAS. From inspectors who ensure 
industry compliance with FAA safety standards to systems specialists 
who protect the safety and efficiency of critical aviation systems, 
PASS-represented employees are focused on safety, every step of the 
way.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Professional Aviation Safety Specialists. ``About PASS.'' 
https://passnational.org/index.php/about-pass/about-pass
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              Methodology
    Utilizing extensive review of various aviation and 
telecommunication industry white papers as well as conducting a 
literary review of research papers within the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) library, PASS has reviewed and 
developed the following analysis of the 5G radio, focusing on 5G and 
its potential to cause harmful interference with both NAS and user 
equipment. Spectrum analysis techniques as defined in the FAA's radio 
frequency interference course developed and taught at the William J. 
Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, N.J., were utilized in 
analysis of all potential interference hazards identified in this 
paper.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical 
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For the purposes of this research, the union analyzed the potential 
for harmful interference caused by frequency allocation, power 
radiation levels, spurious and erratic transmissions, as well as other 
unintentional harmful interference caused by the improper operation or 
failure of the 5G radio. The goal and the methods used were to take a 
safety perspective viewpoint in order to analyze all potential hazards, 
along with how to identify them, while simultaneously developing a 
means to mitigate the hazards for all stakeholders involved.
    Careful consideration and time were dedicated to reviewing the 
design and use of the technology being deployed by the 
telecommunications industry for use in the 5G radio. PASS ensured that 
all aspects of beam management, radio location, frequency allocation, 
tower heights and power levels were considered in the analysis of 5G in 
regard to aviation equipment and potential interference, utilizing 
similar criteria as seen in the South Korean research on 5G conducted 
by the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute.\3\ Any 
mathematical formulas, equations or techniques are from referenced 
material and online resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Ho-kyung Son and Young-jun Chong, Interference Analysis for 
Compatibility Between 5G System and Aeronautical Radio Altimeter, 
published as part of 2020 International Conference on Information and 
Communication Technology Convergence (ICTC), October 21-23, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Literary Review
Radio Frequency Interference: An Overview
    Radio frequency interference (RFI) is a well-known phenomenon in 
the electromagnetic spectrum.\4\ Research into what types of RFI exist, 
such as intermodulation and how to mitigate the effects on 
communication equipment, date back 100 years or more and is well 
documented research.\5\ Modern day RFI is still an issue that many 
manufacturers try to address during the engineering and design phase of 
any electronic device. Even with multiple aspects of RFI taken into 
consideration during design, unforeseen issues often arise or there are 
issues that simply cannot be avoided. Regarding the aviation industry, 
there are multiple types of interference reported each day within the 
NAS which affect the operation of NAS components. As more users enter 
or become adjacent to the frequencies that are utilized for safety of 
life applications, it is extremely important that all aspects of RFI be 
considered and mitigated before they are introduced into the NAS and 
become unknown risks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ NASA. ``The Electromagnetic Spectrum,'' modified March 2013. 
https://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/science/toolbox/emspectrum1.html.
    U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radio Frequency Interference 
Best Practices Guidebook, February 2020.
    Arecibo Observatory. ``Sources of Radio Frequency Interference.'' 
https://www.naic.edu/sondy/rfi.html.
    \5\ K. Chang, Intermodulation Noise and Products Due to Frequency-
Dependent Nonlinearities in CATV Systems, published as part of IEEE 
Transactions on Communications (Volume 23, Issue 1), January 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Harmful interference as defined by the FAA Spectrum Engineering & 
Policy department is any emission, radiation, or induction that 
obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts, a radio communications service 
operating in accordance with established regulations. Some types of 
intentional interference are: Phantom controller, electronic attack 
(military), GPS jammers and any illegal operation by an unauthorized 
user. Some types of unintentional interference are brute force, spurs, 
intermodulation, as well as faulty, degraded and/or aging electronic 
equipment (see ``Interference Concerns'' below). Most RFI experienced 
by the FAA is unintentional in nature and takes cooperation between 
multiple stakeholders to resolve.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical 
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation Band of Frequencies
    The introduction of 5G radios adjacent to. Many of the traditional 
unintentional RFI scenarios become an area of concern due to the 
proximity of frequency allocation, as well as the physical location or 
proximity of the 5G radio emitters. By design, 5G is intended to 
operate within the frequency range and power thresholds set forth by 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and should not infringe on 
the use of any other adjacent frequencies.\7\ It is important to note 
that the telecommunications industry's 5G radios encompass a large 
variety of equipment and manufactures. These multiple types of 5G 
radios fall under 3rd Generation Partnership Project's (3GPP) \8\ n77 
technical standards, which cover spectrum allocation from 3.3GHz to 
4.2GHz. The aviation band has utilized the spectrum from 4.2GHz to 
4.4GHz for RADAR altimeters for over 40 years. The introduction of the 
5G radios places a non-safety of life user near a frequency band which 
is utilized in safety of life applications.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ CFR Title 47.
    \8\ 3GPP. https://www.3gpp.org/.
    \9\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``Safety Alert for Operators: 
Risk of Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in 
the Presences of 5G C-Band Interference,'' December 23, 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The reason for concern regarding this added allocation is 
warranted. Over the years, as more users are introduced into a spectrum 
allocation block, the users--especially in non-safety of life 
applications--begin to interfere with one another and the spectrum 
becomes noisy and degraded due to the number of emissions in close 
frequency to one another. Radio frequency interference has been 
increasingly observed in data recorded by several airborne and 
spaceborne radar sensing systems.\10\ It is important that before new 
users enter the spectrum, an assessment of the risks to aviation are 
performed to assure that safety of life applications can be maintained. 
Listed below in the table are the authorities for documenting RFI and 
reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The National Academies Press, ``Summary of the Radio-Frequency 
Interference Workshop,'' November 8, 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Table 1. Authority Contact Information for RF Interference Reporting 
                                  \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radio Frequency 
Interference Best Practices Guidebook, February 2020.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Authority Contact                       Information
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FCC 24/7 Operations Center................  https://fccprod.service-
                                             now.com/psix-esix/
                                             Phone: (202) 418-
                                             1122
                                             Email:
                                             [email protected] Non-Aviation
GPS Outages: USCG.........................  https://www.navcen.uscg.gov/
                                             ?pageName=gpsUserInput
Aviation GPS Outages: FAA.................  https://www.faa.gov/
                                             air_traffic/nas/gps_reports/
 
Military GPS Outages worldwide: GPSOC.....  https://gps.afspc.af.mil/
                                            (may not open for non-
                                             military users)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One major reason that PASS is concerned with RFI related to 5G 
radios is due to experience with new devices over the past 10 to 15 
years. With the introduction of 4G LTE and WiFi devices, there was an 
increase of RFI with systems such as the Terminal doppler weather RADAR 
and other NAS equipment. Radio frequency interference issues with 
broadband transmission media have been an important capacity and 
coverage issue for 4G, LTE, WiFi and other deployments. Interference 
modes unrecognized previously have risen to importance in the new 
wireless environment. Some of the issues encountered with 4G (e.g., 
from FM to LTE, CATV to LTE, and LTE to CATV) raise valid concern with 
5G deployment.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Chris Horne, LBA Blog, ``4G LTE Radio Interference Forum 
Debuts,'' November 11, 2013. https://www.lbagroup.com/blog/4g-lte-
radio-interference/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RADAR Altimeters
    PASS represents bargaining unit employees at the FAA who are on the 
front lines when it comes to documenting and finding interference 
issues. Other unions in the aviation industry have spoken loudly about 
their concern of interference issues on 5G deployment, and PASS would 
like to echo those concerns, as well as describe some of the added 
complexity around the issue.
    PASS-represented airways transportation systems specialists (ATSS), 
FAA job series 2101 employees, are located at airports across the 
nation and have a very complex job. An ATSS is often asked to document 
any complaints of interference and track and locate the source. This 
task is not an easy one as the source of interference is often not 
known and can be very difficult to find if it is not a continuous 
interference. When a pilot or controller reports RFI, the ATSS is 
notified to investigate what may be the cause. Often this may include 
interfacing with multiple entities and agencies to identify the source, 
creating a long process that takes a great amount of time.
    The first step is information gathering, trying to find out how 
often the interference happens and if it was reported by multiple 
users. In the case of 5G, the issue becomes a safety concern because of 
several factors: including but not necessarily limited to the location 
of the emitters, the power of the emitters, the frequency allocation of 
the emitters, and degraded or broken emitters and their interference 
potential (known and unknown). According to the FAA, the current known 
interference caused by the 5G emitters is with RADAR altimeters.\13\ 
These altimeters are used by many systems on the aircraft and any 
interference creates a significant safety risk in low visibility 
landing situations and various other situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``Safety Alert for Operators: 
Risk of Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters when Operating in 
the Presences of 5G C-Band Interference,'' December 23, 2021.
    Federal Aviation Administration, AD 2021-23-12 and AD 2021-23-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because of its long history of integrity and accuracy the RADAR 
altimeter is integrated as a core sensor feed into the avionics suite 
of many aircraft, adding necessary information and data points to 
complete a logic sequence in many modern and automated aircraft 
systems. For instance, upon landing, the RADAR altimeter is used to 
assist in verifying that an aircraft has reached the ground and to 
initiate a sequence involving other systems (ground spoilers, thrust 
reversers, autobraking systems, etc.) that slow the aircraft in a 
timely and predictable manner. Airlines calculate performance data 
based on the full functionality of these systems and the FAA authorizes 
flight crews to plan for and utilize certain runway lengths based on 
the availability of those systems. If the weather is a concern and the 
aircraft or its crew is not able to utilize the full complement of 
systems, the required length of runway increases greatly. In December 
2021, the FAA issued two Airworthiness Directives (ADs) that were 
prompted by a determination that radio altimeters cannot be relied upon 
to perform their intended function if they experience interference from 
wireless broadband operations in certain frequencies. During takeoffs 
and landings, as a result of this interference, certain airplane 
systems may not properly function. With the current 5G deployment, as 
with all ADs issued, PASS-represented employees in Aviation Safety are 
tasked with ensuring the ADs are complied with by the aviation 
community.
    Of specific concern is that the RADAR altimeter is used by airlines 
and by many smaller operators such as Helicopter Air Ambulance (HAA) 
operators performing emergency medical transportation. When conducting 
HAA operations, many takeoffs and landings are off airport. HAA flight 
crews are picking up trauma patients by the side of the road on 
improvised landing sites that have not had a full analysis of the 
possible 5G interference afforded to similar operations at airports and 
heliports. Some of these landing sites can be in very close proximity 
to cellular towers. It is in the best interest of all stakeholders that 
a failure situation is considered and planned for properly. At a 
minimum, the capability to alert the telecommunications service 
provider of an out of tolerance frequency, or power output, should be 
considered on all deployed devices.
Interference Concerns
    The introduction of the 5G radios (NR) emitter towers in proximity 
of landing environments or communication and navigational equipment 
means that there is a new source of potential RFI that did not 
previously exist.
    The largest area of concern for interference with 5G radios (NR) 
exists with the radio altimeters located in the aircraft. The system 
provides data to both the pilot display and automated systems on 
airframes, such as ground proximity warning, terrain awareness and 
warning (TAWS), flight control and deployment of altitude dependent 
systems. The radio altimeter is a critical safety function in landing/
take-off, low level maneuvering, and avoiding changes in terrain that 
may not be visible at night or during bad weather. The technical 
requirements are that the FMWC altimeter sweeps at 200MHz, with a 
transmit power ranging from 0.1 to 100 watts. The protection criteria 
as per the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) standard is that 
desensitization occurs at I/N = -6dB.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), ``Radio 
Altimeter Spectrum,'' February 6, 2018. https://www.icao.int/NACC/
Documents/Meetings/2018/RPG/RPGITUWRC2019-P08.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In a study by the Aerospace Vehicle Systems Institute (``AVSI'') 
project team on the ``Effect of Out-of-Band Interference Signals on 
Radio Altimeters,'' it was stated that while the altimeters considered 
in the testing are representative of the majority of systems fielded by 
commercial and private aviation, it is not a comprehensive set of data 
for all altimeters operating under all conditions.\15\ The same holds 
true for the 5G radios. There are different service providers and 
carriers deploying different radios that are manufactured by multiple 
vendors, thus the potential for interference is greatly expanded and 
dependent upon what type of 5G radio is interfering with what type of 
altimeter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Notice of Ex Parte Meeting, GN Docket No. 18-122, Aerospace 
Vehicle Systems Institute (``AVSI''), ``Effect of Out-of-Band 
Interference Signals on Radio Altimeters,'' February 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Brute Force
    Excessive output power and the location of the 5G radios (NR) 
emitters have the potential to cause brute force. If 5G radios are near 
the aircraft's radio altimeter, communication or navigation receivers, 
there is potential for RFI. Every receiver has a point at which a 
signal outside its Radio Frequency band pass will break through and 
overload. The receiver becomes desensitized, causing the receiver to be 
driven into nonlinear operation.\16\ The undesired signal gets detected 
in a highly garbled manner or the receiver becomes so desensitized that 
signal detection is impossible.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ J. Gavan and M. B. Shulman, Effects of Desensitization on 
Mobile Radio System Performance Part I: Qualitative Analysis, published 
as part of IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology, November 1984.
    Tian Tian, Hongshun Zhang and Yanzhi Hu, ``Study on UWB 
compatibility with airborne receivers of Tactical Air Navigation 
System,'' 2008 World Automation Congress.
    \17\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical 
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The location and power output of the 5G emitters near airports 
raises concern for potential brute force scenarios with Navigational 
Aids (NAVAIDS) such as Instrument Landing Systems (ILS), Distance 
Measuring Equipment (DME) and other ground-based navigation systems. 
Unless the source is extremely strong, the signal may not be detectable 
on the ground making it necessary to get a flight inspection aircraft 
in the area to identify the source.
    An additional aspect of concern for brute force is the beam 
management utilized by 5G radios (NR). The beam management technology 
allows the 5G radio to focus concentration on the user equipment (UE) 
from the base station tower (gNB) toward the users. This creates a 
scenario where the beam management system can aim and direct the power 
toward an aircraft on final approach, causing the possibility for brute 
force to be increased if the UE on the aircraft is not in airplane 
mode.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Giordani, M., M. Polese, A. Roy, D. Castor, and M. Zorzi. ``A 
tutorial on beam management for 3GPP NR at mmWave frequencies,'' IEEE 
Comm. Surveys & Tutorials, Q1 2019.
    IEEE Spectrum, Engineering Resources. https://
engineeringresources.spectrum.ieee.org/
?pt=dir&page=engineeringresources.
    MathWorks, Hybrid Beamforming for Massive MIMO Phased Array 
Systems. https://www.mathworks.com/content/dam/mathworks/white-paper/
gated/93096v00_Beamforming_
Whitepaper.pdf.
    MathWorks, Visual Antenna Coverage Map and Communication Links. 
https://www.mathworks.com/help/comm/ug/visualize-antenna-coverage-map-
and-communication-links.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Spurious Emissions
    Any electronic device has the potential to generate spurious 
emissions. When an electronic device radiates on an unintended 
frequency, such as transmitting the same frequency as another device, 
that is a spurious emission. In many cases, radios and electronics 
generate spurious emission when operating normally. The 5G radios have 
the potential to generate spurious emissions.\19\ These spurious 
emissions on a frequency, or frequencies, outside the assigned 
bandwidth are often generated from faulty transmitters or radio 
frequency amplifiers. Any signal above -104 dBm at a receiver's input 
has the potential to cause RFI.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical 
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
    IEEE Spectrum, Engineering Resources. https://
engineeringresources.spectrum.ieee.org/
?pt=dir&page=engineeringresources.
    \20\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical 
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
    U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Radio Frequency Interference 
Best Practices Guidebook, February 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The testing and data on what types of spurious emissions a 5G radio 
is capable of emitting while in normal operation or failed states has 
not been gathered. The problem when deploying new equipment into the 
aviation band of the spectrum is knowing exactly how that device 
operates and whether or not it has sufficient filtering on the output 
of the transmitters amplifier section to prevent spurious emissions.
            Erratic Emissions
    The location of the 5G radio near airports or in close proximity to 
communications and navigations equipment off an airport also raises the 
potential for erratic emissions. Erratic emissions, which is a specific 
type of spurious emissions, radiate off the assigned frequency to the 
radio and sweep across the frequency spectrum. These signals are highly 
dependent on several factors such as power level, temperature and 
humidity. Often these are very hard to source due to the intermittent 
nature of the RFI on specific frequencies caused by the sweeping 
nature, even though the source is constant.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Federal Aviation Administration, William J. Hughes Technical 
Center, ``RFI Resolution Course.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The testing and data on what types of erratic emissions a 5G radio 
is capable of emitting while in normal operation or failed states has 
not been gathered. As with spurious emissions, the aviation industry 
does not know if the 5G radio will generate erratic emissions. The 
major difference with erratic emissions compared to spurious emissions 
is the erratic emissions have the potential to take out or interfere 
with multiple types of equipment simultaneously as it sweeps across an 
often very broad range of spectrum.
RFI Resolution and Mitigation
    The process for RFI resolution and mitigation can be a 
collaborative effort and should include all stakeholders to preempt any 
interference, and then address it if it still occurs. It is paramount 
that all aspects are considered to keep the aviation industry safe.
    FAA, aviation industry and telecommunications communication systems 
and compatibility assessments with currently fielded radio altimeters 
are not ``one size fits all,'' so the RTCA SC-239 Assessment \22\ is a 
good starting place, but we must continue this work to ensure the two 
industries can exist in the safest way possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Radio Technical Committee for Aeronautics, SubCommittee-239, 
Low Range Altimeter, ``Assessment of C-Band Mobile Telecommunications 
Interference Impact on Low Range Radar Altimeter Operations'' (RTCA 
Paper No. 274-20/PMC-2073) October 7, 2020. https://www.rtca.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/SC-239-5G-Interference-Assessment-Report_274-
20-PMC-2073_
accepted_changes.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Additional solutions to safe progress may include:
      All manufacturers of 5G radios should send their radio to 
the FAA Technical Center for evaluation by the Spectrum Engineering 
division for testing for possible RFI scenarios.
      Different placement of antennas relative to airfields, 
including beam management.
      No radiation zones in the direction of airports and 
facilities that support aviation safety.
      Radiate the 5G radios at lower output power levels.
      Install antennas tilted downward to reduce potential 
interference with flights (see graphic below).
      Height restrictions on 5G radio towers to reduce line of 
site to aviation equipment.
      Fault detection and reporting on 5G radios to assist in 
faster RFI resolution.
      Apply stringent spurious emission standards within 
aviation safety bands to 5G radios in the United States.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               Conclusion
    PASS recognizes the efforts of airline unions and other aviation 
organizations for raising concerns about 5G deployment and protecting 
the safety of the flying public. We also would like to thank the FAA 
and the telecommunications industry for working together to implement 
and deploy 5G in the safest way possible. The delay and identification 
of 50 airports with wireless transmitters in close proximity to runways 
is a good start, but we must also protect small airports, helicopters 
and general aviation.
    The aviation safety concerns raised regarding interference to radio 
altimeters from wireless operations pose a hazard to the flying public. 
The current stop-gap solution is a preliminary response to mitigate the 
threat of 5G to aviation safety. However, it does not establish a 
sufficiently comprehensive and predictable framework for permanently 
addressing imminent and potential hazards to aviation caused by 5G 
radio interference.
    PASS believes that there is a need to reinvest in the personnel 
within the FCC and FAA who are dedicated to preventing interference 
issues before they arise and resolving them when they occur. Over the 
past 10 years, the FCC has closed multiple field offices. The state of 
Florida has only one FCC office to investigate and deal with all 
reported RFI issues in the entire state. In addition, the FAA does not 
have adequate staffing in the job series 2101 or 0856 field for those 
who specialize and resolve RFI issues.
    The addition of 5G will complicate the RFI resolution process by 
adding new interference potentials. It is crucial that federal agencies 
and telecommunications companies dedicate resources toward the 
prevention of 5G interference as future 5G rollouts are planned.

                                 
 Statement of Terry L. McVenes, President and Chief Executive Officer, 
     RTCA, Inc., Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
    Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    My name is Terry McVenes, and I am the current President and Chief 
Executive Officer of RTCA, Inc. RTCA was founded as the Radio Technical 
Committee for Aeronautics in 1935, and is a private, not-for-profit 
corporation that works with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 
regulators in other countries, and industry experts to develop 
technical performance standards. These standards serve as a basis for 
government certification of equipment used by tens of thousands of 
aircraft flying daily throughout the world's airspace. With over five 
hundred members, RTCA represents organizations, entities, and 
governments from across the globe including aircraft and avionics 
manufacturers, service providers, research and development 
organizations, academia, and uncrewed aviation systems.
    On October 8, 2020, RTCA, Inc. submitted an ex parte filing in the 
Federal Communications Commission docket to provide the Commission with 
the benefit of our completed report entitled ``Assessment of C-Band 
Mobile Telecommunications Interference on Low Range Radar Altimeter 
Operations'' (``RTCA MSG Report''). This report was the culmination of 
a six-month multi-stakeholder group (``MSG'') effort--the 5G Task 
Force--that commenced in April 2020 when the RTCA Special Committee 239 
(``SC-239'') issued an invitation to the public to participate. The 
Commission had encouraged such multi-stakeholder efforts to examine 
spectrum coexistence issues with radar altimeters as noted in the 
Commission's Report and Order in the matter of Expanding Flexible Use 
of the 3.7-4.2 GHz Band (``Order''). The RTCA MSG Report was informed 
by detailed information made available by the commercial wireless and 
aviation industries regarding their respective systems and was 
therefore able to examine issues of compatibility more thoroughly 
between existing radar altimeters and prospective flexible use 
licensees than were the earlier preliminary analyses submitted to the 
Commission. As explained in the RTCA MSG Report, the analysis found 
serious threats of harmful interference to today's installed radar 
altimeters from anticipated flexible use licensed deployments, 
including from spurious emissions into the radar altimeter band.
    At the time published, the RTCA MSG Report represented the most 
comprehensive analysis and assessment of the potential for interference 
to radar altimeters caused by 5G signals. It was based on the most up-
to-date information exchanged between the commercial mobile industry 
and the aviation industry. This included experts in the design and 
manufacturing of radar altimeters. As stated in the Report, our 
analysis and its conclusions should not be considered as a definitive 
one-time assessment but should serve as the basis for ongoing work and 
analysis to continue to ensure that radar altimeters will function as 
intended to enable continued safe aviation operations.
    Although we stand ready to continue our assessment of the 
relationship between 5G service and the proper functioning of radar 
altimeters as further information becomes available, it is important to 
note that the Report's findings and analysis remain uncontradicted by 
any authoritative response based on valid scientific and engineering 
methodology. Critics of the RTCA MSG Report have stated it should be 
dismissed because of improper assumptions and the parameters analyzed. 
Others have stated that the issue of potential 5G interference was 
looked at two years ago and no problems were uncovered. However, those 
calls for dismissal have never been backed up by hard science or 
engineering analysis. To our knowledge, no authoritative studies have 
been conducted that contradict the findings of the Report, and other 
independent testing has confirmed the RTCA findings. Furthermore, RTCA 
has not been approached to conduct further analysis or study based on 
new assumptions or parameters. Therefore, RTCA continues to stand 
behind the RTCA MSG Report from both a scientific and engineering 
perspective as well as its unbiased conclusions.
    RTCA applauds the recent efforts of technical collaboration between 
the telecommunications industry and the FAA that has led to allowing 
more operations into airports while enabling the safe implementation of 
5G service across the United States. Further dialogue between the 
aviation and mobile wireless telecommunications industries will be 
crucial in continuing to develop mitigations that will allow for both 
aviation and 5G implementation to be conducted in a safe and efficient 
manner. That dialogue must continue to take place with a proactive and 
transparent methodology, including further details of 5G 
implementations that may be used in deterministic analysis of the 
potential boundary conditions for failure or interference with low 
range radar altimeters.
    While the current short-term collaborative mitigation activity is 
to be commended, RTCA is continuing our longer-term effort via SC-239. 
This special committee was established by RTCA in December 2019 to 
update the current minimum operational performance standards for radar 
altimeters. Our focus is protecting future radar altimeters from 
existing and planned in-band and out-of-band interferences.
    It is important to note that future development and implementation 
of innovative technologies from both aviation and non-aviation 
interests are undoubtedly going to require new allocations of spectrum 
frequencies. It is also likely that those future allocations have the 
potential to conflict with those frequencies that have traditionally 
been allocated for aviation use. To address these future concerns, RTCA 
recently stood up a new special committee, SC-242, to take a broader 
look at potential frequency spectrum conflicts, analyze all of the 
current avionics standards in place, and then identify those areas that 
need to be addressed so that aviation interests can be out in front of 
any potential frequency conflicts early on in future technology 
development. We encourage Congress to support and promote appropriate 
government and industry parties to proactively participate in efforts 
such as ours so that the challenges we have witnessed in recent months 
can be minimized or avoided.
    The importance for the United States to maintain its international 
leadership in the implementation of modern technologies such as 5G 
cannot be overstated. Not only are billions of dollars at stake, but 
there are significant infrastructure and national security interests at 
stake as well. It is imperative that the appropriate government 
agencies collaborate early with each other, coupled and along with both 
aviation and non-aviation industries. Working together towards 
solutions early in the developmental process and based on an open and 
transparent exchange and analysis of factual engineering data by all 
parties will allow the United States to maintain leadership in the 
deployment of new technologies such as 5G as well as protecting the 
safety of the traveling public.
    With our unprecedented history of accomplishments since 1935, RTCA 
stands by to serve as a facilitator for such future dialogue. By 
providing the necessary leadership for participatory decision-making 
and consensus building, we aim to serve not only the aviation industry, 
but also serve as a catalyst for the advancement of technology and 
innovation on behalf of the American people.
    Thank you for the opportunity to provide this written testimony.



                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


Questions from Hon. Sam Graves of Missouri to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, 
             Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

    Question 1. On January 12, 2022, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) announced that it was developing a proposal 
under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to issue a proposed endangerment finding 
for lead emissions from piston-engine aircraft. 170,000 piston aircraft 
in the United States typically require leaded aviation gasoline to 
operate. Restricting the availability or use of aviation gasoline, 
which may occur if the EPA issues an endangerment finding, would be 
devastating to general aviation and the entire aviation industry if no 
low-cost, widely obtainable unleaded replacement fuel is available.
    The FAA's Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative (PAFI) is intended to 
identify unleaded aviation gasoline alternatives that can be used 
across the piston aircraft fleet.
    Answer. There are approximately 190,000 piston aircraft in the 
United States that typically require leaded aviation gasoline (avgas) 
to operate. Tetra-Etyly Lead (TEL) has been added to avgas since 1921 
to prevent engine damage and knocking at higher power settings. Today, 
avgas remains the only transportation fuel in the United States to 
contain lead.

    Can you please provide the Committee with a detailed status update 
on PAFI, including:
    1.a.  PAFI's mission;
    Answer. PAFI was formed to test and evaluate high-octane candidate 
gasolines, required by piston-engine aircraft, to replace 100 low lead 
(100LL) and to ultimately enable the transition of the entire U.S. 
aircraft fleet to unleaded gas.

    1.b.  a timeline of PAFI's milestones (denoting milestones 
accomplished and those still outstanding);
    Answer. There are currently two candidate fuels being evaluated 
under PAFI as part of the initial program phase. This initial phase 
will determine if either or both of the candidate fuels are viable 
replacement fuels for 100LL.
    If a fuel is successful in the initial phase, more extensive 
testing will be performed, including detonation testing with more 
engines and greater number of test conditions, longer durability test 
cycles, a comprehensive materials compatibility testing, and finally, 
flight testing using the candidate fuel on a variety of aircraft types.
    The anticipated timeline for completion of the initial phase is by 
the end of 2022. Completion of the final testing phase is dependent on 
the ability of the candidate fuels to meet the testing requirements.

    1.c.  an estimate on when fleetwide certification or availability 
of an unleaded aviation gasoline is expected;
    Answer. In parallel with the planned fuel testing, the FAA is 
developing a Fleet Authorization Process, as outlined under section 565 
of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. The Act allows the use of an 
unleaded aviation gasoline as a replacement for a leaded gasoline if 
the Administrator ``adopts a process (other than the traditional means 
of certification) to allow eligible aircraft and engines to operate 
using qualified replacement unleaded gasoline in a manner that ensures 
safety.''
    The FAA will address fleet authorization of unleaded aviation fuels 
for different octane levels. The FAA anticipates fleet authorization 
for lower octane fuels will be available next year.
    PAFI will continue to evaluate, test, and qualify high-octane 
aviation unleaded fuels with the objective to ultimately transition the 
fleet to unleaded aviation fuel.

    1.d.  action items and costs associated with ensuring the 
widespread availability of unleaded aviation gasoline, including the 
installation of new airport fueling systems;
    Answer. The information requested will be part of the government-
industry collaborative Eliminate Aviation Gasoline Lead Emissions 
(EAGLE) initiative, which launched earlier this month, to include 
efforts to determine the fuel infrastructure, airport infrastructure 
and associated commercial viability of unleaded aviation gasoline.

    1.e.  a copy of the most recent version of the PAFI Steering Group 
Charter; and
    Answer. See attached [below]:
         Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative Steering Group (PSG)
                              May 29, 2013
                                Charter
    In support of their ongoing commitment to facilitating the 
development and deployment of a high octane fuel that will have the 
least impact on the existing general aviation fleet and distribution 
system, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), American 
Petroleum Industry (API), Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA), 
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), National Air 
Transportation Association (NATA), National Business Aircraft 
Association (NBAA) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have 
joined to form the Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative Steering Group.
    Purpose of the Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative Steering Group 
(PSG): To facilitate, coordinate, expedite, promote and oversee the 
Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative (PAFI) based on the recommendations of 
the Unleaded Avgas Transition Aviation Rulemaking Committee Final 
Report.
    The role of the PSG includes providing supporting data and 
coordinating the activities of member organizations in support of the 
PAFI program. The PSG will establish a technical advisory committee 
comprising representatives from key stakeholder organizations to 
support the development of PAFI project activities and identify and 
engage subject matter experts as necessary to accomplish specific 
tasks. The Technical Advisory committee will help identify the 
resources needed to support unique PAFI tasks, such as the generation 
of job aids, and with support of the Industry Co-Lead solicit and 
coordinate the in-kind support needed from industry to support the 
development and approval of unleaded aviation gasolines.
    The PSG is organized as an industry-FAA coalition comprising 
industry associations and the FAA to coordinate the resources and 
support necessary for the program. The PSG will form working groups 
composed of necessary FAA and industry subject matter experts to 
develop procedures, plans, and other necessary information to conduct 
the fuel testing. The PSG will engage with industry stakeholders who 
allocate manpower and other resources to support these working groups 
and the test program.
    Duration: The PSG is established with an initial five-year charter 
in support and recognition of the Preparatory and Project phases of the 
PAFI. The PSG will undergo an annual review of its charter, membership, 
and purpose to address the potential changing needs and tasks as the 
industry moves closer to the Deployment stage of new fuels.
    Schedule: Members of the PSG will meet at a minimum of twice each 
year to receive a formal report on the status of the PAFI. The PSG will 
also conduct regular conference calls to support the activities of the 
PAFI leads and the Technical Advisory Committee.
    Overview of PAFI: The FAA's Unleaded Avgas Transition Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee (UAT ARC) recommended the establishment of a 
collaborative industry-government initiative referred to as the Piston 
Aviation Fuels Initiative. The objectives of this initiative are to 
identify candidate unleaded aviation gasolines, provide for the 
generation of qualification and certification data on those fuels, and 
facilitate fleet-wide certification of the selected candidate fuel(s) 
with the least impact on the existing piston-engine aircraft fleet. The 
PAFI program is designed to support the identification of the most 
viable fuels consistent with the FAA 2025 Flight Plan goal of 
identifying a viable unleaded aviation gasoline by 2018. Additional 
work will be necessary to develop a transition plan that supports the 
production and distribution of a fuel and transition of the existing 
aircraft fleet, including support for the certification of any hardware 
modifications that might be necessitated by a new fuel. The complexity, 
cost and timeline for successful transition is unknown at this time and 
will be partially dependent on the properties and capabilities of the 
fuel(s) that successfully emerge from the PAFI program.
    Identification of candidate unleaded aviation gasolines for the 
PAFI program shall be based on ``Fuel Development Roadmap--AVGAS 
Readiness Levels'' developed by the UAT ARC that identifies the key 
milestones in the aviation gasoline development process and the 
information needed to support assessment of the viability of candidate 
fuels in terms of impact upon the existing fleet, production and 
distribution infrastructure, environment and toxicology, and economic 
considerations. The elements of PAFI will be a PSG, FAA Test Program, 
FAA review board, and a centralized FAA certification office.
    PAFI includes an FAA test program which is composed of a subset of 
Test & Evaluation tasks from the UAT ARC final report based on the 
expected level of funding. The FAA test program will test candidate 
fuels at the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center to generate data 
that can then be used by the candidate fuel developer/sponsor to 
support both ASTM production specification development and FAA fleet-
wide certification, eliminating redundant testing activities. It 
includes procurement of necessary equipment and services to conduct 
tests in two phases: Phase 1 fuel properties testing of up to ten 
candidate fuels, and Phase 2 engine and aircraft testing of up to two 
candidate fuels.
    PAFI will also include the establishment of an Industry Co-Lead and 
an FAA Co-Lead. The Industry Co-Lead, reporting to the PSG, will act as 
the industry program manager, monitoring, directing and coordinating 
overall industry-related PAFI activities, and interface with industry, 
government and candidate fuel developers. The FAA Co-Lead (manager of 
the Fuels Program Office, AIR-20) will act as the FAA program manager 
and will monitor direct and coordinate overall government-related PAFI 
activities.
                          PAFI Steering Group
                                Members
                              May 29, 2013
Craig Fuller,
President & CEO
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

Bob Greco,
Group Director, Downstream and Industry Operations
American Petroleum Association

Jack Pelton,
Chairman of the Board
Experimental Aircraft Association

Peter A. White,
Fuels Program Office (AIR-20), Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
Pete Bunce,
President & CEO
General Aviation Manufacturers Association

Tom Hendricks,
President & CEO
National Air Transportation Association

Ed Bolen,
President & CEO
National Business Aviation Association
  
  

    1.f.  any other information relating to the certification of 
unleaded aviation gasoline, whether part of PAFI or not.
    Answer. To-date, a small percentage of the piston engine fleet is 
permitted to operate on unleaded fuels through FAA-approved 
Supplemental Type Certificates (STCs).
    These unleaded fuels include:
      UL 91 (91 Octane, ASTM Spec D7547);
      UL 94 (94 Octane, ASTM Spec D7547);
      Automotive gasoline (ASTM Spec D4814);
      82 UL (ASTM Spec D6227-04);
      GAMI Gl00UL (100 Octane).

    On February 23, 2022, the FAA announced a new initiative that 
outlines how our country can safely eliminate the use of leaded 
aviation fuel by the end of 2030 without adversely affecting the 
existing piston-engine fleet. The initiative, EAGLE, builds upon a 
continuing collaboration with Industry through PAFI.
    The effort to remove leaded aviation fuels will be based on four 
pillars of action that involve the FAA, the EPA, fuel suppliers and 
distributors, airports, engine and aircraft manufacturers, research 
institutions, associations, environmental experts, communities and 
other key stakeholders. The four pillars are:
      Develop Unleaded Fuels Infrastructure and Assess 
Commercial Viability;
      Support Research & Development and Technology 
Innovations;
      Continue to Evaluate and Authorize Safe Unleaded Fuels; 
and
      Establish Necessary Policies.

    Questions from Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton to Hon. Eric Fanning, 
President and Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace Industries Association

    Question 1. I would like to ask about the logistics of upgrading 
radio altimeters for the U.S. air fleet. What steps are involved in 
this process? How long would it take to upgrade the altimeters for the 
entire fleet? How much would that cost and who currently bears the 
burden for that cost?
    Answer. Our members are hard at work on this process. We believe 
there is a near term solution which includes retrofitting with a filter 
for those models that can accommodate them. As part of that work we are 
collaborating with the FAA to define how much potential interference a 
radio altimeter can tolerate and still be relied upon.
    We do know that some radio altimeter models will not be able to be 
retrofitted, and those will require a new design. Over the long term we 
would expect that all models will need to be replaced. This requires 
the publication of a new standard.
    The first step for a standard was taken in 2019 when RTCA formed a 
group to begin this process. However, a new standard will require a 
total re-write because the current criteria require a substantial 
update to enable them to work with U.S. and international operational 
systems.
    Originally the group expected to complete the standard this year, 
but the current crisis has impacted this work because the same staff 
are now prioritizing the analysis of data and designing near-term 
fixes. The expectation now is that a new standard could be ready in the 
third or fourth quarter of 2023.
    It is critical that the standard be written with the future in 
mind. This will require that the telecommunications industry provide 
data and plans for future operating environments, as well as the 
current ones. The development lifecycle for an altimeter can be 
measured in decades, so it is important for aviation to understand what 
6G and 7G look like twenty years from now.
    Regarding timelines, the retrofitting for aircraft where a near-
term solution is possible could take up to a year. The standard 
development, design of new radio altimeters, certification and 
replacement should be measured in years. It is difficult at this 
juncture to ascertain the costs of such a multi-year program, until the 
final operational environment is defined and the standard completed.

  Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Hon. Meredith Attwell Baker, 
              President and Chief Executive Officer, CTIA

    Question 1. It is my understanding that many of the wireless 
providers will be shutting down their 3G networks in order to make room 
for expanding 5G networks. This will not only impact connectivity for 
rural users who won't have immediate access to 5G, but there are 
numerous impacts on home security, in-vehicle technology and transit. 
It is my understanding that unless there is a delay in the shuttering 
of 3G systems, more than 60 transit agencies will lose their real-time 
transit information platforms because those systems run off of a 3G 
network and supply chain issues have impeded their ability to upgrade. 
Absent real-time information about the location of trains and buses, 
many transit riders will consider other modes of travel, creating 
serious safety, congestion, and climate impacts for areas across the 
country.
    As a matter of public safety and equity, will wireless providers be 
delaying their planned shut down of 3G service in order to give more 
time for transit agencies and others to adjust to the change?
    Answer. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. As you are aware, 
the national wireless carriers have each announced plans to transition 
the spectrum being used for 3G services to 5G services. Since those 
announcements, the industry has undertaken extensive efforts to educate 
its customers using 3G devices, including public transportation 
companies and transit agencies, about 3G sunset plans and how to 
continue service uninterrupted. Those outreach efforts included general 
3G sunset notices and reminders via direct mail, email, text messages, 
business team engagement, industry outreach, website tools, 
whitepapers, articles, and webcasts, all for the purpose of minimizing 
customer disruption. The industry has also offered IoT customers 
services to obtain replacement devices and tailored solutions to 
streamline device procurement, activation, and configuration. In the 
months leading up to the 3G sunset, the industry has engaged with 
public transportation agencies and telematics companies to assist in 
device migration efforts. The wireless industry has offered assistance 
to migrate devices more quickly and has even offered temporary roaming 
solutions. As an industry, we commit to remain focused on assisting 
those few remaining 3G customers to work through any device migration 
efforts.