[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THREE YEARS AFTER LION AIR 610: FAA IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE 2020 AIRCRAFT CERTIFI-
CATION, SAFETY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
=======================================================================
(117-29)
REMOTE HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AVIATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 21, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
49-705 WASHINGTON : 2023
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DON YOUNG, Alaska District of Columbia
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BOB GIBBS, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JOHN KATKO, New York HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
BRIAN BABIN, Texas Georgia
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina DINA TITUS, Nevada
MIKE BOST, Illinois SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas JARED HUFFMAN, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania MARK DeSAULNIER, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON, STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
Puerto Rico SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee GREG STANTON, Arizona
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
NANCY MACE, South Carolina CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
Subcommittee on Aviation
RICK LARSEN, Washington, Chair
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
DON YOUNG, Alaska ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
JOHN KATKO, New York NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin Georgia
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota JULIA BROWNLEY, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey MARK DeSAULNIER, California
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
NANCY MACE, South Carolina ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas GREG STANTON, Arizona
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
MICHELLE STEEL, California CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania, Vice
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio) Chair
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
District of Columbia
EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
JOHN GARAMENDI, California
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation,
opening statement.............................................. 4
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, opening statement.............................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, prepared statement............................. 79
WITNESSES
Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, oral statement................................. 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Andre Carson:
Letter of October 8, 2021, from Hon. Brian K. Fitzpatrick,
Member of Congress, et al., to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration............. 25
Letter of October 19, 2021, from Families of Ethiopian
Airlines Flight 302 Crash Victims, to Department of
Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration
Officials.................................................. 26
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew:
Letter of October 19, 2021, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew,
Member of Congress, to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration............. 64
Letter of October 21, 2021, from the American Federation of
Government Employees, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and National Federation
of Federal Employees, to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration............. 67
Fact Sheet Titled ``FAA Document Confirms It Wasn't The Pilots,''
by the Flight ET302 Families Foundation, Submitted for the
Record by Hon. Garret Graves................................... 72
Statement of Paul Hudson, President, FlyersRights.org, Submitted
for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio........................ 80
Boeing 2013 Meeting Minutes, Submitted for the Record by Hon.
Greg Stanton................................................... 83
APPENDIX
Questions to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration, from:
Hon. Sam Graves.............................................. 85
Hon. Garret Graves........................................... 85
Hon. Scott Perry............................................. 85
Hon. Pete Stauber............................................ 89
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
October 15, 2021
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Aviation
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Aviation
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on Three Years After Lion
Air 610: FAA Implementation of the 2020 Aircraft Certification,
Safety, and Accountability Act
_______________________________________________________________________
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Aviation will meet on Thursday, October
21, 2021, at 10:00 a.m. EDT in 2167 Rayburn House Office
Building to hold an oversight hearing titled, Three Years After
Lion Air 610: FAA Implementation of the 2020 Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. The hearing will
examine ongoing work within the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) to implement provisions of the bipartisan Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.\1\ For the
Majority, the Act was the culmination of an 18-month
investigation by Committee Majority staff \2\--the longest in
the Committee's history. For both the Majority and the
Minority, the Act addresses both the specific recommendations
of the various non-partisan, expert safety reviews as well as
the many factors that contributed to the tragic Boeing 737 MAX
accidents (discussed below). FAA Administrator Steve Dickson is
the only witness.
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\1\ Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. V (2020).
\2\ Staff of the U.S. House Cmte. on Transp. and Infra., The
Design, Development, and Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX: Final
Committee Report (Sept. 2020), at https://transportation.house.gov/imo/
media/doc/2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20
Public%20Release.pdf.
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BACKGROUND
Two air disasters in 2018 and 2019 involving a new
derivative of the Boeing 737, the Boeing 737 MAX, revealed
numerous shortcomings in the FAA's process for certifying the
safety of new airplane designs, including derivatives of 50-
year-old airframes such as the 737.\3\ In response to these two
crashes, which resulted in the deaths of 346 passengers and
crew, the FAA grounded the 737 MAX for a year and eight months,
the longest grounding of a U.S.-built airliner in history.
Numerous expert safety reviews and investigations discovered
some limitations and failures of the FAA's certification
process, acts and omissions by Boeing, and areas to be
addressed in pilot training.\4\ Therefore, Congress enacted the
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act in
December 2020 to improve these processes and prevent similar
deficiencies in the future.
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\3\ See Dep't of Transp. Office of Insp. Gen., Weaknesses in FAA's
Certification and Delegation Processes Hindered Its Oversight of the
737 MAX 8, Rpt. No. AV2021020 (Feb. 21, 2021) (hereinafter ``IG
Report'').
\4\ Boeing 737 MAX reviews and investigation reports include: Joint
Authorities Technical Review, ``Boeing's 737 MAX Flight Control System,
Observations, Findings and Recommendations Report'' (October 11, 2019);
National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendation Report,
``Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of
Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance'' (ASR-19-01;
September 19, 2019); U.S. Department of Transportation Special
Committee to review the Federal Aviation Administration's Aircraft
Certification Process Report (January 16, 2020); and Safety Oversight
and Certification Aviation Rulemaking Committee (SOC-ARC)
Recommendation Report to the Federal Aviation Administration (December
2018).
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I. THE CRASHES AND FAA RESPONSE
On October 29, 2021, more than 100 families in Indonesia
and around the world will mark the third anniversary of the
first 737 MAX crash: that of Lion Air flight 610. The airplane
operating flight 610, a two-month-old 737 MAX 8, crashed into
the Java Sea 11 minutes after takeoff from Jakarta bound for
Pangkal Pinang, Indonesia, killing all 189 passengers and
crew.\5\
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\5\ Rep. of Indonesia, Nat'l Transp. Safety Cmte., Preliminary
Aircraft Accident Investigation Report: PT Lion Mentari Airlines,
Boeing 737-8 (MAX); PK-LQP, Rpt. No. KNKT.18.10.35.04, available at
https://avherald.com/files/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Preliminary
%20Report.pdf.
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The second crash occurred slightly more than four months
later, on March 10, 2019, when Ethiopian Airlines flight 302
crashed six minutes after takeoff from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
on a morning flight to Nairobi, Kenya.\6\ All 157 passengers
and crew (including eight Americans) were killed on impact.
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\6\ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Transp.,
Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, Aircraft Accident Investigation
Preliminary Report: Ethiopian Airlines Group, B737-8 (MAX) Registered
ET-AVJ, Rpt. No. AI-01/19 (April 4, 2019), at http://www.ecaa.gov.et/
Home/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Preliminary-Report-B737-800MAX-ET-
AVJ.pdf (hereinafter ``ET302 preliminary report'').
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Within weeks of the Lion Air crash, based on a preliminary
readout from the flight data recorder recovered from the
wreckage, investigators had a sense of what might have been a
major contributing factor in the accident. A small vane called
an ``alpha vane,'' slightly smaller than a test tube, protrudes
from each side of the airplane's nose and measures the angle
between the airplane's flight path and the oncoming air, which
is known as the ``angle of attack.'' The alpha vane on the left
side of the Lion Air airplane's nose had somehow been
misaligned and registered an abnormally high nose-up pitch
attitude, triggering operation of a new system called the
maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), which
was designed to push the airplane's nose down in such
circumstances.\7\
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\7\ See, e.g., Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation
Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the
Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (Sept.
19, 2019), at 3-4, available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1901.pdf (hereinafter ``NTSB Safety
Recommendation Report'') (``During the preliminary design stage of the
737 MAX, Boeing testing and analysis revealed that the addition of the
LEAP-1B engine and associated nacelle changes produced an ANU [airplane
nose-up] pitching moment when the airplane was operating at high AOA
and mid Mach numbers. After studying various options for addressing
this issue, Boeing implemented aerodynamic changes as well as a
stability augmentation function, MCAS, as an extension of the existing
speed trim system to improve aircraft handling characteristics and
decrease pitch-up tendency at elevated AOA.'')
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On November 7, 2018, shortly after the Lion Air accident,
the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive to 737 MAX
operators. The directive did not mention MCAS by name; instead,
it advised air carriers that an erroneous angle-of-attack
reading could cause ``a potential for repeated nose-down trim
commands'' and ultimately ``could cause the flight crew to have
difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive
nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible
impact with terrain.'' \8\ The directive instructed that crews
who detect ``uncommanded horizontal stabilizer trim movement''
should follow a pre-existing memory item procedure for the
broader scenario of a ``runaway stabilizer.'' \9\ But the
Ethiopian Airlines accident demonstrated that further action
was necessary. The day after the accident, civil aviation
regulators worldwide began prohibiting the operation of Boeing
737 MAX airplanes in their jurisdictions. The FAA grounded the
airplane on March 13, 2019, three days after the crash, after a
link between the two accidents was established.\10\
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\8\ Fed. Aviation Admin., Emergency Airworthiness Directive No.
2018-23-51 (Nov. 7, 2018), at http://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/83ec7f95f3e5bfbd8625833e
0070a070/$FILE/2018-23-51_Emergency.pdf.
\9\ Id.
\10\ Fed. Aviation Admin., Emergency Order of Prohibition to
Operators of Boeing Company Model 737-8 and Boeing Company Model 737-9
Airplanes (March 13, 2019).
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The 737 MAX returned to service starting in December 2020,
when the FAA approved a substantial number of design changes to
ensure erroneous MCAS activation would not occur and that, if
it did, the crew would be able to maintain control of the
airplane.\11\ This recertification followed more than a year of
extensive aircraft design reviews by the FAA, NASA, the Air
Force, the Volpe Center, foreign aviation safety regulators,
and others.
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\11\ Airworthiness Directive, The Boeing Company Airplanes, 85 Fed.
Reg. 74560 (Nov. 4, 2020).
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II. THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
All aircraft and aviation products are subject to FAA
certification prior to their sale and use in the United States.
The FAA is responsible for regulating aviation safety, which
includes approving the design and manufacture of new aircraft
and aviation products before they enter the National Airspace
System.\12\
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\12\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 44702, 44704; GAO, Aviation
Manufacturing: Status of FAA's Efforts to Improve Certification and
Regulatory Consistency (July 31, 2014), GAO-14-829T, at 1.
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A. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION AUTHORIZATION
Since even before the establishment of FAA's predecessor
agency in 1958, the federal government has delegated some
safety certification responsibilities to technical experts in
the industry. As airplanes, engines, and their constituent
systems became increasingly complex, Congress authorized the
FAA to leverage the product-specific knowledge among
appropriately qualified employees of manufacturers to determine
a new product's compliance with the applicable provisions of
the Federal Aviation Regulations. A designee may receive
authority to examine, inspect, and test aircraft and persons
for the purpose of issuing certificates.\13\
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\13\ GAO-14-829T at 4.
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The organization designation authorization (ODA) program
allows the FAA to leverage limited resources to focus on the
areas of highest risk. The program was envisioned to allow
qualified individuals or organizations to certify, on behalf of
the FAA, that well-understood, non-critical, or low-risk
designs comply with applicable Federal requirements, thereby
freeing up some of FAA's resources to focus on and remain
directly involved in the review and approval of higher-risk
items, such as safety-critical or ``novel or unusual''
designs.\14\ Regardless of delegation decisions, the FAA bears
ultimate responsibility for ensuring new aircraft designs are
safe and comply with design requirements.
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\14\ See FAA, Airworthiness Certification, https://www.faa.gov/
aircraft/air_cert/airworthiness_certification/; U.S. House Cmte. On
Transp. and Infra., ``Status of the Boeing 737 MAX,'' Testimony of
Daniel Elwell, FAA Acting Administrator (May 15, 2019), at 28-29
(hereinafter ``Elwell Testimony'').
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B. CERTIFICATION OF THE 737 MAX
Since the original 737 aircraft was certified in 1967, the
FAA has approved numerous new models of the aircraft, all
through amendments to the original 737's type certificate. With
regard to the FAA certification of the 737 MAX, the process to
issue an amended type certificate, from initial application to
final certification, took five years, with the final amended
type certificate issued in March 2017, according to the
FAA.\15\ The process included 297 certification flight tests,
including tests of the MCAS functions. Although the system
should have been considered safety-critical, as the FAA
acknowledged before the Subcommittee in 2019, the FAA years
earlier had delegated certification of MCAS to Boeing as part
of a larger delegation of certification of the flight control
system pursuant to Boeing's ODA.\16\ In 2015, the FAA delegated
some key safety assessments of the flight control system, which
contained MCAS, back to Boeing based on the risk rating of
``major'' (under this rating, flight crews are the redundancy
for a system failure).\17\
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\15\ See Boeing Commercial Airplanes, ``Boeing 737 MAX 8 Earns FAA
Certification'' (March 9, 2017), at https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2017-
03-09-Boeing-737-MAX-8-Earns-FAA-Certification.
\16\ Dep't of Transp. Insp. Gen. staff briefing for Committee staff
on work to date investigating FAA's certification of the 737 MAX and
MCAS (October 7, 2019).
\17\ Id.
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In a review of the process for certifying the 737 MAX, the
Department of Transportation inspector general ultimately found
that
limitations in FAA's guidance and processes that impacted
certification and led to a significant misunderstanding of
[MCAS] . . . . First, FAA's certification guidance does not
adequately address integrating new technologies into existing
aircraft models. Second, FAA did not have a complete
understanding of Boeing's safety assessments performed on MCAS
until after the first accident. Communication gaps further
hindered the effectiveness of the certification process. In
addition, management and oversight weaknesses limit FAA's
ability to assess and mitigate risks with the Boeing ODA.\18\
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\18\ IG Report, supra note 3.
The latter risks included the risk that Boeing employees
would place undue pressure on their colleagues who work as ODA
unit members on the FAA's behalf.\19\ In fact, the inspector
general reported that, in a 2016 survey of ODA unit members, 40
percent of respondents said they had experienced undue pressure
from other Boeing employees.\20\
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\19\ Id. at 35-36.
\20\ Id. at 35.
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MCAS was a feature of the 737 MAX because Boeing determined
that the system was necessary to ensure that the 737 MAX would
exhibit the same control characteristics as the 737NG during
certain maneuvers in flight.\21\ MCAS may have also created new
training requirements for pilots, but Boeing's chief technical
pilot for the 737 MAX program asked the FAA to remove
references to MCAS from the flight crew operating manual on the
premise that the system would not operate under normal flight
conditions and later boasted that he had lied to
regulators.\22\ On October 14, 2021, a federal grand jury
returned an indictment against that Boeing employee for six
counts of fraud stemming from his communications with two U.S.
737 MAX customers about the 737 MAX flight control system.\23\
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\21\ See, e.g., NTSB Safety Recommendation Report, supra note 7, at
8.
\22\ David Gelles and Natalie Kitroeff, ``Boeing Pilot Complained
of `Egregious' Issue with 737 Max in 2016,'' New York Times (Oct. 18,
2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/
business/boeing-flight-simulator-text-message.html.
\23\ Indictment, U.S. v. Mark A. Forkner, No. 4-21CR-268-0 (N.D.
Texas Oct. 14, 2021).
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In addition, to preserve commonality between the 737 MAX
and its prior model, Boeing received 11 exceptions from FAA
design regulations promulgated after the 1967 type certificate
was issued. For example, Boeing obtained an exception from the
FAA that relieved Boeing of the requirement that the 737 MAX
must be equipped with a caution, alert, and advisory system
that ``[p]rovide[s] timely attention-getting cues through at
least two different senses by a combination of aural, visual,
or tactile indications'' and that ``[p]revent[s] the
presentation of an alert that is inappropriate or
unnecessary.'' \24\ Instead, the 737 MAX largely uses legacy
cautions, warnings, alerts, and advisories grandfathered from
the previous 737 generation.\25\ That design makes it more
likely for pilots to become task-saturated or fail to timely
diagnose safety-critical failures in time to recover the
aircraft during rare but extreme failure scenarios like those
that confronted the pilots of Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian
Airlines flight 302.\26\
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\24\ 14 C.F.R. Sec. 25.1322(c), (d); see Dominic Gates, ``Boeing
pushed FAA to relax 737 MAX certification requirements for crew
alerts,'' Seattle Times (Oct. 2, 2019), at https://
www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-pushed-faa-to-
arelax-737-max-
certification-requirements-for-crew-alerts/.
\25\ The Boeing 737 Technical Site, ``737-MAX Flightdeck,'' at
http://www.b737.org.uk/flightdeck737max.htm.
\26\ See, e.g., NTSB Safety Recommendation Report, supra note 7.
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III. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIONS
In the wake of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302,
the Committee launched an investigation at the direction of
Chair DeFazio and Chair Larsen into the certification of the
737 MAX and related issues.\27\ As part of the 18-month-long
investigation, the Committee held five public hearings; wrote
nearly two dozen oversight letters; obtained an estimated
600,000 pages of documents from Boeing, the FAA, and others;
received information and insight from former and current
employees; and interviewed dozens of current and former Boeing
and FAA employees.\28\ In September 2020, the Committee issued
a Majority staff report detailing its investigative
findings.\29\
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\27\ Chairs DeFazio, Larsen Respond to Grounding of Boeing
Aircraft, Press Release (Mar. 13, 2019), available at https://
transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-defazio-larsen-
respond-to-grounding-of-boeing-aircraft.
\28\ See The Design, Development & Certification of the Boeing 737
MAX, Majority Staff of the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure Final Committee Report Prepared for Chair DeFazio and
Chair Larsen (Sept. 2020), p. 6, available at https://
transportation.house.gov/imo/
media/doc/
2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf.
\29\ Id.
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In addition, there were many other investigations and
reviews, including the National Transportation Safety Board
safety recommendations report in 2019; a review by a U.S.-led
international panel, the Joint Authorities Technical Review; a
separate review by a panel of current and former U.S. aviation
leaders, convened as the Special Committee to Review FAA's
Aircraft Certification Process; a review of the technical
changes to the airplane by a team of aviation industry experts
from FAA, NASA, the Air Force, and the Volpe Center, convened
as the B737 MAX Technical Advisory Board; and reviews by the
U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General.
These investigations and reviews underscored the need for the
2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.
IV. NOTEWORTHY PROVISIONS OF THE SAFETY LEGISLATION
According to the numerous safety expert reviews and
investigations, unfortunately the FAA's certification process
failed to detect or properly account for the possibility that a
single alpha vane failure--which normally would not result in a
crash--could set in motion a series of events, including
erroneous MCAS activation, that would create a situation from
which the pilots could not recover. Accordingly, the bipartisan
safety law includes 35 provisions that collectively address the
shortcomings and limitations of the process and require
regulatory action on the FAA's part; imposes civil penalties
upon manufacturers for providing the FAA or airlines with
incomplete or misleading information on important systems;
requires FAA approval of new ODA unit members to prevent
conflicts of interest and to ensure their competence; requires
the FAA to address international pilot training standards, the
safety benefits of flight deck automation, and the concurrent
need for strong manual flying skills; and penalizes the
exertion of undue pressure on those unit members, among other
things.
The following are the most significant of such provisions.
A. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directs the FAA to require Jan. 26, 2021..... IN PROGRESS: FAA
aircraft and other aerospace expects issuance
industry manufacturers to adopt of proposed rule
safety management systems, in September
which allow them to identify, 2022.
manage, and eliminate safety
risks through a variety of
mechanisms and internal
processes, consistent with
international standards and
practices.
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B. EXPERT REVIEW OF BOEING'S SAFETY CULTURE
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convenes an independent expert Jan. 26, 2021..... IN PROGRESS: FAA
review panel to review The has taken
Boeing Company's exercise of internal steps to
its ODA privileges, the prepare, but the
company's safety culture, and panel won't be
capability to perform FAA- convened before
delegated functions. 2022. The charter
is expected in
fall 2021.
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C. MORE EXPERTS FOR CERTIFICATION ACTIVITIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authorizes $27 million N/A...............
in annual appropriations for
the FAA to recruit and retain
engineers, safety inspectors,
human factors specialists,
software and cybersecurity
experts, and other qualified
technical experts who perform
duties related to the
certification of aircraft,
engines, and other components.
Also directs the FAA to Jan. 26, 2021..... IN PROGRESS: FAA
conduct a review of its began the review
workforce responsible for in February 2021.
aircraft certification to The review is
determine whether the agency ongoing.
has the necessary expertise and
capability to certify new
technologies and materials.
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D. REQUIREMENT FOR DISCLOSURE OF SAFETY-CRITICAL INFORMATION TO THE FAA
AND AIRLINES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requires manufacturers to Effective at IN PROGRESS: FAA
disclose to the FAA, and to enactment. is preparing
airlines and pilots via three policy
airplane flight manuals and documents for FAA
flight crew operating manuals, employees and
all safety-critical information aerospace
related to an aircraft, manufacturers
including information regarding outlining the
systems that manipulate flight agency's
controls without direct pilot enforcement of
input and whose failure or this provision.
erroneous activation would Completion
present a risk with an outcome expected in 2022.
rated hazardous or
catastrophic. Imposes up to a
$1 million civil penalty for a
violation of the disclosure
requirements.
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E. LIMITATION ON DELEGATION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prohibits the FAA from Effective at IN PROGRESS: FAA
delegating to a manufacturer enactment. has taken a
the authority to certify on number of
behalf of the agency that a internal steps
critical system design feature, and will issue
including a ``novel or unusual the final FAA
design feature,'' complies with policy documents
the Federal Aviation in 2023.
Regulations until the FAA
Administrator has validated any
underlying assumptions related
to human factors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. REFORM OF THE ODA SYSTEM TO ADD ACCOUNTABILITY AND PREVENT UNDUE
PRESSURE ON ODA UNIT MEMBERS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requires the FAA Jan. 1, 2022...... IN PROGRESS: FAA
Administrator, beginning on expects to issue
January 1, 2022, to approve final policy
each new individual selected by documents for
an ODA holder engaged in the manufacturer and
design of an aircraft, aircraft FAA employees in
engine, propeller, or appliance February 2022.
before they become an
authorized representative (or
``ODA unit member'') to act on
the FAA's behalf in validating
compliance of aircraft systems
and designs with FAA
requirements. Requires new ODA
unit members to meet
qualifications issued by the
FAA Administrator, and that at
a minimum, such individuals
must possess the requisite
knowledge and technical skills
and be of good moral character.
Allows for conditional
designations of ODA unit
members and requires the FAA to
approve or reject those
designations within 30 days.
Reinforces the FAA
Administrator's authority to
rescind an approval for an
individual to serve as an ODA
unit member at any time, for
any reason.
Directs the FAA to
review each current Boeing ODA
unit member to ensure each
individual meets the agency's
minimum qualifications.
Imposes a civil penalty
for any supervisor of an ODA
holder that manufactures
transport category airplanes
who interferes with (e.g.,
harasses, berates, or
threatens) an ODA unit member's
performance of authorized
functions on behalf of the FAA
and requires all ODA unit
members to promptly report any
cases of interference
experienced or witnessed at a
company.
Directs the FAA to
perform periodic audits of each
manufacturing ODA unit and its
procedures at least once every
seven years.
Directs the FAA to
assign aviation safety advisors
to ODA unit members at certain
aircraft and engine
manufacturers to ensure unit
members are knowledgeable of
FAA policies and to monitor
their performance.
Prohibits the FAA and
ODA holders from prohibiting
ODA unit members from
communicating with FAA
personnel and vice-versa.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. VOLUNTARY SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directs the FAA, in Dec. 27, 2021..... COMPLETE
collaboration with labor
groups, to implement a
confidential voluntary safety
reporting program for FAA
engineers, safety inspectors,
systems safety specialists, and
others to report safety issues
to FAA management.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. CONSIDERATION OF HOW ONE FAILURE CAUSES OTHERS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directs the FAA to require an Dec. 27, 2022..... IN PROGRESS: FAA
applicant for an amended type is working to
certificate for a transport develop an
airplane, such as Boeing in the implementation
case of the 737 MAX, to perform plan and expects
a system safety assessment to issue a notice
(SSA) with respect to each of proposed
proposed design change the FAA rulemaking in
determines is significant, and 2022.
to review each SSA for
sufficiency and adequate
consideration of the airplane-
level effects of failures,
including pilot responses to
those failures.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. NEW GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING CHANGES TO EXISTING AIRPLANE
DESIGNS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directs the FAA to exercise Dec. 27, 2023..... IN PROGRESS: FAA
leadership in the creation of has engaged with
international policies and other civil
standards relating to the regulators and is
issuance of amended type leading a working
certificates for new airplane group on pilots'
design, and requires the FAA to reliance on
conduct a rulemaking to revise automation as
and improve the process for part of broader
issuing amended type engagement at the
certificates. International
Civil Aviation
Organization.
Policy and
regulatory
documents
expected in 2024.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
J. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adds aviation manufacturing Effective at COMPLETE: FAA is
employees to existing laws enactment. monitoring and
protecting airline employees addressing claims
from whistleblower retaliation of retaliation
for reporting safety issues or against
violations. whistleblowers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
K. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PILOT TRAINING
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mandate Deadline Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expands the FAA's role Jan. 26, 2021, to IN PROGRESS:
in reviewing and approving initiate an Expert panel's
pilot training requirements for expert safety final report with
commercial aircraft, by review of recommendations
initiating several reviews assumptions to improve pilot
examining human factors, regarding pilot training
increased aircraft automation, training. requirements
pilot skills, crew resource expected in 2022.
management, and FAA pilot
certification standards.
Authorizes $5 million
in annual appropriations for
expanded FAA programs to assist
foreign aviation authorities to
improve international aviation
safety.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
WITNESS
The Honorable Steve Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration
THREE YEARS AFTER LION AIR 610: FAA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2020 AIRCRAFT
CERTIFICATION, SAFETY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2021
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. Rick
Larsen (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present in person: Mr. Larsen, Ms. Davids of
Kansas, Mr. Kahele, Mr. Stanton, Mr. Graves of Louisiana, Mr.
Graves of Missouri, Mr. Perry, Mr. Mast, Mr. Stauber, Mr.
Burchett, Dr. Van Drew, and Ms. Mace,
Members present remotely: Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Carson, Ms.
Williams of Georgia, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Ms. Titus, Mr.
Payne, Mr. DeSaulnier, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Allred, Mr. Lamb, Ms.
Norton, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Balderson, Ms. Van Duyne, Mr.
Gimenez, and Mrs. Steel.
Mr. Larsen. Good morning. I call the meeting of the House
Subcommittee on Aviation to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing. Without
objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions. Without objection, so
ordered.
As a reminder, please keep your microphones muted unless
speaking. Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I
will request the Member by name to mute your microphone,
please. And as a reminder, to insert a document into the
record, please have your staff email it to
[email protected].
And just as a further reminder for Members in the hearing
room, if you are speaking, you do not need to wear a mask.
Otherwise, please wear a mask. I think that is actually a
committee rule, but we have had pretty good cooperation here
and look forward to further cooperation.
Good morning and welcome to today's Aviation Subcommittee
hearing titled, ``Three Years After Lion Air 610: FAA
Implementation of the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act.''
Nearly 3 years ago, on October 29, 2018, Lion Air flight
610 crashed into the Java Sea. Less than 6 months later, on
March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed near
Addis Ababa.
These two tragedies ended the lives of 346 people. Victims
included parents, children, teachers, friends, and
humanitarians who deserved to arrive safely at their
destination but never did.
For nearly 2 years, victims' families tirelessly lent their
support to necessary reforms to the Federal Aviation
Administration certification process to reduce the likelihood
that other families would experience such devastating loss.
I want to acknowledge and thank the victims' families for
your presence here today in the hearing room and for your
tireless advocacy. You and your loved ones remain at the
forefront of this committee's oversight of the implementation
of this important bill.
I also want to acknowledge the hard-working women and men
who go to work each day at the Boeing plants in Everett and
Renton who are proud of the product that they design, assemble,
and build. They were and are distraught that the same product
contributed to the deaths of so many and the grief of so many
others.
This hearing and this legislation are, though, not just
about one aircraft. They are about making air travel safer for
everybody, restoring confidence in the aviation industry, and
ensuring U.S. aviation remains the global standard in terms of
safety.
In an historic effort, the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee conducted a nearly 2-year
investigation into the design, development, and certification
of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The committee's thorough
investigation uncovered flawed management decisions and
inadequate organizational structures at Boeing and the FAA that
were necessary to confront.
And last December, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act was signed into law to restore the integrity
of the FAA's aircraft certification process and to make flight
safer.
This bipartisan legislation is built upon the lessons
learned from the committee's investigation and the
recommendations of the independent Technical Advisory Board,
Joint Authorities Technical Review, and other key entities.
Among its provisions, the new law improves aviation safety
culture by requiring aircraft and aerospace manufacturers to
adopt safety management systems; enhances transparency and
accountability by requiring the disclosure of certain safety-
critical information related to an aircraft to the FAA;
addresses undue pressure on employees acting on behalf of the
FAA, for example, extending airline whistleblower protections
to U.S. aviation manufacturing employees; and requires
sufficient evaluation of human factors in the certification
process to ensure flightcrews can do their job safely and
effectively.
As with any comprehensive legislation designed to reform a
complicated system like the certification of aircraft,
implementation should not be expected to occur overnight.
However, the legislation lays out specific timelines for
actions by the FAA to take place.
FAA has provided updates on some of these actions but has
not yet provided specific details on progress for many of the
requirements.
So, today's hearing is an opportunity for the subcommittee
to hear from the FAA on the status of these reforms, how the
agency plans to implement them, and to identify any potential
causes for delay.
Today's witness is Steve Dickson, the FAA Administrator. I
am pleased to welcome him today, and he has served in this role
since August of 2019.
Administrator Dickson, the past few years have been a
tumultuous time in the agency's history. And I appreciate you
and your team's commitment to the implementation of the
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act and your
personal involvement in the review of the 737 MAX.
So, while I am encouraged by the agency's progress, though,
clearly there is much more work to do. The U.S. is the leader
in global aviation, and the FAA's actions in the U.S. have
profound implications for passenger air travel around the
world. It is vital this subcommittee carry out its
responsibility to oversee the FAA's implementation of the
critical reforms enacted under the Aircraft Certification,
Safety, and Accountability Act.
I look forward to today's discussion on how best to support
the FAA's ongoing work to ensure the safety of the traveling
public.
With that, I will now turn to Ranking Member Representative
Graves of Louisiana for an opening statement.
[Mr. Larsen's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation
Good morning and welcome to today's Aviation Subcommittee hearing
titled ``Three Years After Lion Air 610: FAA Implementation of the 2020
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.''
Nearly three years ago, on October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610
crashed into the Java Sea.
Less than six months later, on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines
Flight 302 crashed near Addis Ababa.
These two tragedies ended the lives of 346 people.
Victims included parents, children, teachers, friends and
humanitarians who deserved to arrive safely at their destinations, but
never did.
For nearly two years, victims' families tirelessly lent their
support to necessary reforms to the Federal Aviation Administration's
(FAA) certification process to reduce the likelihood other families
would experience such devastating loss.
I want to acknowledge and thank the victims' families for your
presence and your tireless advocacy.
You and your loved ones remain at the forefront as this Committee
oversees implementation of aircraft certification reform.
I also want to acknowledge the hard-working women and men who go to
work each day at the Boeing plant in Everett and are proud of the
product they design, assemble and build.
They are distraught this same product contributed to the deaths of
so many and the grief of so many others.
This hearing and this legislation are not about just one aircraft.
They are about making air travel safer, restoring confidence in the
aviation industry and ensuring U.S. aviation remains the global gold
standard in terms of safety.
In an historic effort, the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee conducted a nearly two-year investigation into the design,
development and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The
Committee's thorough investigation uncovered flawed management
decisions and inadequate organizational structures at Boeing and FAA
that were necessary to confront.
Last December, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act was signed into law to restore the integrity of the
FAA's aircraft certification process and make flight safer.
This bipartisan legislation is built upon the lessons learned from
the Committee's investigation and the recommendations of the
independent Technical Advisory Board, Joint Authorities Technical
Review and other key entities.
Among its provisions, the new law will:
Improve aviation safety culture, by requiring aircraft
and aerospace manufacturers to adopt safety management systems;
Enhance transparency and accountability, by requiring the
disclosure of certain safety-critical information related to an
aircraft to the FAA;
Address undue pressure on employees acting on behalf of
the FAA, for example, extending airline whistleblower protections to
U.S. aviation manufacturing employees; and
Require sufficient evaluation of human factors in the
certification process to ensure flight crews can do their jobs safely
and efficiently.
As with any comprehensive legislation designed to reform a
complicated system like the certification of aircraft, implementation
should not be expected to occur overnight.
However, the legislation lays out specific timelines for actions by
FAA to take place.
FAA has provided updates on some of these actions but has not yet
specific details on progress for many of the requirements.
Today's hearing is an opportunity for this Subcommittee to hear
from the FAA on the status of these reforms, how the agency plans to
implement them, and identify any potential causes for delay.
I am pleased to welcome today's witness, FAA Administrator Steve
Dickson, who has served in this role since August of 2019.
Administrator Dickson, the past few years have been a tumultuous
time in the agency's history.
I appreciate your and your team's commitment to the implementation
of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act and your
personal involvement in the review of the 737 MAX.
While I am encouraged by the agency's progress, clearly there is
much more work to do.
The United States is the leader in global aviation, and the FAA's
actions in the U.S. have profound implications for passenger air travel
around the world.
It is vital this subcommittee carry out its responsibility to
oversee the FAA's implementation of the critical reforms enacted under
the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.
I look forward to today's discussion on how to best support the
FAA's ongoing work to ensure the safety of the traveling public.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank you for holding this hearing.
Secondly, and importantly, I want to join you in thanking
the families for their relentless efforts to ensure that we
never forget what happened in our pursuit of perfection.
Mr. Chairman, this hearing is an opportunity for us to talk
about what has happened since the awful crashes of the 737 MAX.
It is an opportunity for us to talk about progress that has
been made on the 2018 authorization bill and the progress that
has been made on the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act that we worked together on.
Mr. Chairman, this is all about assessing the accidents and
determining the lessons learned. This is about making reforms,
both administratively and in law. And this is about us holding
folks accountable.
And in that first one, as you well know, there have been
dozens of assessments, reports, and technical groups that have
been pulled together, including the National Transportation
Safety Board, to extract every lesson learned that could
possibly be extracted.
It is about ensuring that the FAA, using their
administrative authorities, that they step up and make changes
to their policies in an effort to ensure that we do not allow
anything like what happened with the MAX to occur again. It is
ensuring that those that perhaps did break the law, that they
are held accountable.
And I want to highlight that there was an indictment just
last week, showing that this was not entirely an administrative
failure, that there were folks who actually broke the law and
they are being held accountable.
And, Mr. Chairman, it is important for us to continue
working together to not establish, but to maintain the gold
standard that the FAA has in terms of global aviation safety
and maintain, not establish, but maintain the fact that
traveling by air is still the safest means of transportation.
Mr. Chairman, I noted earlier that we did the 2018
authorization bill, and that bill still has dozens of
provisions that are yet to be implemented. The Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act that we worked on
last year, that still has 35 provisions that must be
implemented.
Mr. Chairman, it is critical that we today learn from the
FAA what steps have been taken in the implementation of the
2018 act and the implementation of the act that we worked on in
December of last year.
It is important that we learn from the FAA, we hear from
the FAA how all of the steps that occurred with the MAX will
never occur again as a result of some of the reforms that have
been made both internally and made through the law changes that
we implemented in December of 2020.
I look forward to hearing from Administrator Dickson. I
think that we still have some significant work to do over the
coming months. And we must continue to strive for perfection.
So, Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.
[Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Aviation
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, first I want to thank you for holding this
hearing and secondly, and importantly, I want to join you in thanking
the families for their relentless efforts to ensure that we never
forget what happened in our pursuit of perfection. This hearing is an
opportunity for us to talk about what has happened since the awful
crashes of the 737 Max. It's an opportunity for us to talk about what
progress has been made on the 2018 authorization bill and the progress
that has been made on Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act (``Aircraft Certification Act'') that we worked
together on.
Mr. Chairman, this is all about assessing the accidents and
determining the lessons learned. This is about making reforms, both
administratively and in the law, and this is about us holding folks
accountable. In that first one, as you well know, there have been
dozens of assessments, reports, and technical groups that have been
pulled together including the National Transportation Safety Board to
extract every lesson learned that could possibly be extracted. It's
about ensuring that the FAA, using their administrative authorities,
that they step up and make changes to their policies and in an effort
to ensure that we do not allow anything like what happened with the Max
to ever occur again. It's ensuring that those that perhaps did break
the law that they are held accountable, and I want to highlight that
there was an indictment just last week showing that this was not an
entirely an administrative failure--that there were folks who actually
broke the law and they are being held accountable.
Mr. Chairman, it's important for us to continue working together to
not establish but to maintain the gold standard that the FAA has in
terms of global aviation safety and maintain, not establish, but to
maintain the fact that traveling by air is still the safest means of
transportation.
Mr. Chairman, I noted earlier that we did the 2018 authorization
bill and that bill still has dozens of provisions that are yet to be
implemented. The Aircraft Certification Safety and Credibility Act that
we worked on last year still has 35 provisions that must be
implemented.
Mr. Chairman, it is critical that we today learn from the FAA what
steps have been taken in the implementation of the 2018 act and the act
we worked on in December of last year. It is important that we learn
from the FAA, that we hear from the FAA how all of the steps that
occurred with the Max will never occur again as a result of some of the
reforms that have been made both internally and made through the law
changes that we implemented in December of 2020.
I look forward to hearing from Administrator Dickson.
I still think we have some significant work to do over the coming
months and we must continue to strive for perfection.
Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. I thank the Representative.
I will now turn to the chair of the full committee,
Representative DeFazio from Oregon, who is online, I believe,
on Zoom.
Mr. DeFazio. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am a little limited. I just had back surgery. So, I am
here at the office.
The most damning thing that came out of our extraordinary
investigation--and I thank all the staff who did unbelievable
work on the most indepth, most serious investigation ever done
by this committee, one of the two or three oldest in Congress--
was that FAA and Boeing were compliant.
Now, how can you be compliant when 346 innocent people died
in crashes because of a system which was developed by
engineers?
In 2013, they decided, well, no one outside Boeing should
know about the system. Ultimately, the system was wiped out of
the pilot's manual until after the first crash. And, beyond
that, the system had been significantly modified. And
essentially this was concealed from the public, from the
pilots, and from the FAA.
That can never, ever happen again. And we have seen to it
in the legislation we passed, which we want to see fully and
quickly implemented, that any novel, new things on the plane,
anything that can take control without pilot command, will be
fully disclosed and known and examined to be certain that it is
safe.
Now, yeah, there has been one indictment. One indictment.
This started at the top in Boeing. It started in the executive
suite. It is in the boardroom. ``We got to rush this plane out
the door to compete with Airbus or we are going to lose
sales.'' Big chart. Countdown clock. They put pressure all the
way down the line.
As Rick said, we have in the Seattle area the best
engineers and aircraft mechanics and workers in the world.
Unfortunately, Boeing, to save money, decided, ``Gee, let's go
down to the South where we don't have to have unions.'' And
they have been having some pretty extraordinary quality
problems down there.
There weren't quality problems, except for rushing the
line, in Renton, and we heard about those from one of the
production managers.
And the fact is that they also concealed that a Boeing test
pilot, fully conversant and knowledgeable of the system,
knowing it was going to trigger, could not recover the plane
within 12 seconds, meaning you are going to go in. That was
concealed.
And the fact that one person has been indicted, Boeing is
slapped with a fine that is insignificant in terms of their
revenues, I am concerned that we haven't seen a major change in
the culture there. And that is why we are mandating.
Can you imagine, a company the size of Boeing didn't have a
safety management system in place? That is pretty
extraordinary. I know little, tiny manufacturers that had such
systems in place that make things nowhere near as critical as
airplanes.
That is one of the things in our bill that must be
implemented as soon as possible. I see the timelines drag out
1, 2 years. I get pretty tired of this process, particularly
when lives are at stake, potentially at stake.
And I want to hear today what we are going to do to
expedite the most critical parts of the legislation we passed,
fully bipartisan, through the House, through the Senate. It is
a mandate from Congress that the culture at FAA is going to
change, the scrutiny is going to change, we are giving you
additional engineers and expertise to help keep up with these
companies. But it has to change.
And the fact that, as Rick also mentioned, we have things
that were supposed to be self-executing, pretty damn clear in
the law. The flight attendants' duty time, I am glad it burped
out of FAA.
It seems every time we hold a hearing--I think I am going
to start holding a lot more--out comes something we have been
waiting for. So, we finally got the flight attendants' duty
time. Only, let's see, it was November 4, 2018, self-executing
law.
Your attorneys over there need a little poke for them to
look at explicit things written by Congress that say this goes
into law, it is self-executing, you don't screw around with it
for 3 years. You don't send it to OMB. You just do it.
And it didn't happen. And now we are at, ``Oh, we got an
NPRM out, proposed rulemaking.'' And that will take another how
long?
Meanwhile flight attendants are incredibly stressed with
the conditions in the air now. We have gone through that. We
have held hearings on that, what is going on, on the planes.
They are overworked. They are tired. And we don't have that
rule in place yet.
A number of the airlines have already complied. Guess what?
It didn't hurt their service. It didn't cost them anything. It
just meant that some of the people who managed schedules had to
create new computer programs. It shouldn't take 3 years.
And secondary barriers, we now know after January 6 that
there are probably more domestic terrorists in this country
than there are foreign terrorists in this country. And yet I
see the flight attendants standing bravely there by the flight
deck door. When I flew last week, the pilot or copilot, I don't
know which he was, he came out and chatted for 20 minutes with
the flight attendant standing there like this, while she was
looking over her shoulder and talking to him.
You are telling me a couple of people can't rush that
flight deck when that door opens? And yet here we are, we are
languishing even further behind on secondary barriers.
I hope this isn't back to the good old days of tombstone
mentality at FAA: We will move on secondary barriers when some
domestic terrorists take over a plane and something really
horrible happens.
So, I just want to hear today from the Administrator how we
are going to start being less of a turgid bureaucracy and do
what you are supposed to do, serve the public, protect the
public.
When I started, when we got in this investigation and I
found out that regulated entities were now called customers--
customers? They are not your customers. They are not customers.
They are people who you oversee and regulate.
I changed that law after a tragic crash way back in the
1990s. I took out the promotional authority from the FAA more
than 20 years ago. It has crept back in. It has got to get
kicked out the door.
I am looking forward to the testimony. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
[Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Larsen, for calling today's hearing on the FAA's
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act, an important set of reforms that we enacted last
year in response to two air disasters that revealed serious lapses in
our aviation safety system.
Those two crashes of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes in 2018 and 2019,
which claimed the lives of 346 sons and daughters, fathers and mothers,
brothers and sisters, were not only senseless tragedies but also a
national embarrassment.
The crashes, that of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302, were
the culmination of a series of failures, negligent acts and omissions,
and allegedly criminal acts within The Boeing Company, as well as
dangerous inadequacies in the FAA's process for certifying new
airplanes. It is clear that Boeing needed thorough regulation and
strict oversight, but its regulator could not provide enough of either,
despite the efforts of numerous dedicated civil servants.
The litany of mistakes resulted in the certification of a passenger
airliner with a fatal flaw: a system called the maneuvering
characteristics augmentation system, or MCAS, that activated
erroneously and pushed the two accident airplanes into unrecoverable
dives. Not even a Boeing test pilot, in a simulator, could recover the
plane when MCAS erroneously activated--much less standard airline
pilots who were unaware the system even existed.
The committee's 18-month-long investigation, as well as other
evaluations by two panels of aviation safety experts in the United
States and our own National Transportation Safety Board; investigations
by national safety authorities in Ethiopia and Indonesia; and even
press reports established that:
MCAS, as a safety-critical system, didn't receive the
attention from FAA engineers and pilots that it should have received;
Boeing should not have received authority from the FAA to
conclude independently that erroneous MCAS activation would not result
in a crash, and the FAA should have assumed responsibility for
thoroughly evaluating MCAS;
At least one Boeing employee in a position of
responsibility on the 737 MAX program lied to airlines and the FAA
about MCAS and was indicted last week on six counts of fraud;
Both Boeing and the FAA failed to fully appreciate that
an erroneous reading from a small, fragile, needle-like instrument
protruding from the side of the forward fuselage, called an AOA sensor,
could cause MCAS to send the airplane into an unrecoverable dive; and
Many other incredible lapses with Boeing's safety culture
and the FAA's inability to detect and correct those problems before
they jeopardized public safety.
The bill we enacted last winter addresses these issues
comprehensively.
Based on an update and documents provided to committee staff, I am
encouraged that the FAA is making progress in implementing these
reforms, and I commend Administrator Dickson for his attention to the
urgent need for their swift implementation. I hope he will continue to
place particular emphasis on this work, because Boeing's next
aircraft--the 777X--is already in flight tests.
Moreover, Boeing is reportedly considering development of the 737
MAX's successor despite the fact that the 787 program has been beset by
manufacturing errors, a months-long cessation of deliveries, and FAA
fines against Boeing for Boeing employees harassing and placing undue
pressure on their colleagues who are in charge of ensuring compliance
with safety requirements. So, Administrator Dickson, I hope you will
continue implementing this legislation with urgency because its
necessity is clear.
That said, I must register my disapproval of the FAA's delay in
implementing two explicit mandates from the 2018 FAA reauthorization,
which have languished in the bureaucratic process despite a clear
safety imperative for both.
The first is the requirement that flight attendants receive at
least 10 hours of rest between duty periods. The bill's language left
no room for discretion: The FAA was to issue a final rule by November
4, 2018, in accordance with the parameters we laid out in that mandate.
Nearly three years later, we've yet to see a final rule.
The second is the requirement for the installation of secondary
flight deck barriers on all newly manufactured airliners. The deadline
passed two years ago, on October 5, 2019. Still, no order or final
rule.
Administrator Dickson, I acknowledge that these mandates were
enacted before your tenure began at the FAA. But the delay in complying
with the letter of the law is completely unacceptable. I want an update
from you on the status of these safety-critical regulations, and I want
your commitment to doing whatever is necessary within your authority to
meet the will of Congress in the shortest possible time.
I again thank Chair Larsen for calling this hearing, and I look
forward to hearing from Administrator Dickson. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee,
the Representative from Missouri, Mr. Graves, for as much time
as he may consume.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Chairman Larsen.
I want to thank Administrator Dickson for being here today
to testify or at least testify online.
And I want to commend you for a job well done under some
very difficult circumstances over the past several years. Both
industry and labor groups have praised your leadership on a
number of issues, everything from aviation safety to dealing
with disruptive passengers. And we have seen that praise. And,
again, I want to say thank you.
I am looking forward to hearing how the FAA is doing when
it comes to implementing the bipartisan certification reform
law that did pass last Congress. The development and drafting
of that law is a model of how we can work together and how
bipartisan cooperation can yield positive results for the
American people.
The law directs the FAA to implement the many nonpartisan
expert recommendations developed in the wake of the Boeing 737
MAX accidents. It also includes several provisions that I
championed relating to pilot training and improving manual
flying skills, which is a very important priority in improving
aviation safety.
Less than a year has passed since the law's enactment, but
the urgency of the changes required demands that Congress do
keep a close eye on the FAA's progress.
And this hearing is also a good opportunity to hear from
you on other FAA initiatives and policies, activities. There
are a number of concerning issues that are related to general
aviation safety that I am going to be looking for some answers
on.
Specifically, I would like for you to address the FAA's
recent changes to the longstanding flight training guidance
that has created a lot of confusion and a lot of concern out
there in the pilot community. These changes have a very
negative impact on safety, and they create an unnecessary
paperwork burden on both instructors and on the FAA, for that
matter.
So, I hope that you will take a little bit of time today to
address these pressing safety issues.
And while we are on the topic of pilots, I want to again
make very clear my very strong opposition to the sweeping,
indiscriminate vaccine mandate that this administration is
pushing on commercial airlines.
After Congress joined together in a bipartisan way to
provide $30 billion to help save aviation jobs during the
pandemic and keep these vital workers on the job, it is
insulting that these same workers are being told, if they don't
get a vaccine, then they are going to be fired.
We had no problem asking pilots and flight attendants and
other frontline aviation employees to continue working through
the pandemic when there was no vaccine, and indeed we have seen
studies, including one by the Department of Defense, that has
shown that the airplane environment presents a very low risk of
COVID transmission.
But, despite this, we are now seeing heavy-handed tactics
of this administration to coerce businesses into implementing
an indiscriminate vaccine mandate while there is already a
shortage of workers to fill these aviation jobs in the first
place.
In fact, prior to the pandemic, we were already staring
down a very serious aviation worker and pilot shortage. So,
with returning demand, I don't expect that this problem is just
magically going to go away.
We should not be treating pilots and other airline workers
any differently than we did in 2020. We want them to be safe.
But this mandate is not about safety. It is about politics,
plain and simple.
So, with that, I want to thank you, Administrator, for
being with us today. And I look forward to your testimony.
And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Larsen, and thank you to Administrator Dickson for
being here today.
I want to commend you for a job well done under difficult
circumstances over the past several years.
Both industry and labor groups have praised your leadership on a
number of issues, everything from aviation safety to dealing with
disruptive passengers. We've seen that praise and again I say thank
you.
I am looking forward to hearing how the FAA is doing when it comes
to implementing the bipartisan certification reform law that passed
last Congress.
The development and drafting of that law is a model of how we can
work together and how bipartisan cooperation can yield positive results
for the American people.
The law directs the FAA to implement the many non-partisan expert
recommendations developed in the wake of the Boeing 737 MAX accidents.
It also includes several provisions I championed relating to pilot
training and improving manual flying skills--an important priority in
improving aviation safety.
Less than a year has passed since the law's enactment, but the
urgency of the changes required demand that Congress keep a close eye
on the FAA's progress.
This hearing is also a good opportunity to hear from you on other
FAA initiatives and policies.
There are a number of concerning issues related to general aviation
safety that I am going to be looking for some answers on.
Specifically, I would like you to address the FAA's recent changes
to longstanding flight training guidance that has created a lot of
confusion and a lot of concern in the pilot community.
These changes could have a negative impact on safety and create an
unnecessary paperwork burden on both instructors and the FAA. So, I
hope you will take some time today to address these pressing safety
issues.
And while we're on the topic of pilots, I want to again make very
clear my strong opposition to the sweeping, indiscriminate vaccine
mandates that this Administration is pushing on commercial airlines.
After Congress joined together in a bipartisan way to provide $30
billion dollars to help save aviation jobs during the pandemic and keep
these vital workers on the job, it is insulting that these same workers
are being told that if they don't get the vaccine they are going to be
fired.
They had no problem asking pilots, flight attendants, and other
frontline aviation employees to continue working through the pandemic
when there was no vaccine.
Indeed, we have seen studies, including one by the Department of
Defense, have shown that the airplane environment presents a low risk
of COVID transmission.
But despite this we are now seeing the heavy-handed tactics of this
Administration to coerce businesses into implementing an indiscriminate
vaccine mandate while there's already a shortage of workers to fill
these aviation jobs in the first place.
In fact, prior to the pandemic we were staring down a very serious
aviation worker and pilot shortage.
So, with returning demand I do not expect that the problem has
magically gone away.
We should not be treating our pilots and other airline workers any
differently than we did in 2020. We want them to be safe. But this
mandate is not about their safety it's about politics. It's plain and
simple.
With that, I want to thank you for being here today, Administrator
Dickson, and I look forward to your testimony. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
So, now I want to turn to the FAA Administrator, Steve
Dickson.
I let the FAA know that you could have up to 10 minutes
since you are the only one testifying today. I understand you
won't take that, but I don't want you to feel constrained by
the 5-minute timeline. So, you can get your comments in for us
before we head to questions.
So, with that, I will recognize Administrator Dickson for
his opening testimony.
Administrator.
TESTIMONY OF HON. STEPHEN M. DICKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Chair Larsen.
And good morning, Chair DeFazio, Chair Larsen, Ranking
Member Graves and Ranking Member Garret Graves, and members of
the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the FAA's approach
to aviation safety oversight, as well as our efforts to
strengthen the aircraft certification process.
Safety is a journey, not a destination. And we are
constantly evolving as a regulator and as an air navigation
services provider to deliver the safest and most efficient
aerospace system in the world.
Now, one of the first things that I did as FAA
Administrator was make it clear that we are the regulator, and
I reset the relationship with Boeing. I said that we would
continue to exert a high level of scrutiny, and that continues
to this day.
I have made it clear that we are raising the bar on safety
externally and internally. We are asking ourselves the hard
questions, and we are asking them of those that we regulate. We
will not accept the status quo.
Now, we are committed to improving the robustness of the
certification process, including our oversight of the functions
that we delegate to aircraft designers and manufacturers. And
to that end, we embrace reform, and we are focused across the
agency on continuous improvement.
I will discuss a number of initiatives that we have
underway and the work that we have completed to address this
goal, as well as to implement the requirements of the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.
But first I want to take a moment to repeat my commitment
and my thanks to the families of the victims of the Ethiopian
Airlines and Lion Air accidents, and to this committee, that we
at the FAA are constantly working to ensure that the lessons
learned from these accidents are resulting in a higher margin
of safety for the aviation system around the world.
In the nearly 3 years since these tragedies, we have made
tangible and lasting safety improvements to the global aviation
system, in part from the input and direction that we have
received from the Congress and this committee. And as was noted
earlier, there is much more to be done.
The act has more than 100 unique requirements that we are
implementing to make aircraft certification and safety
oversight more holistic, systematic, transparent, and
effective. I can say with confidence that we are doing more for
certification oversight, and we are doing it more
systematically, since this time last year.
For one, we are delegating fewer responsibilities to
manufacturers, and we are demanding more transparency from
them. We continue to value their technical expertise as we
prioritize our oversight to focus on safety-critical areas.
The FAA is also revising guidance and criteria used for
determining significant changes so that proposed changes to an
aircraft are evaluated from a whole aircraft system
perspective, including the human interface elements.
We are promoting the use of safety management systems, or
SMS, where safety issues are actively looked for and identified
and then the root cause is addressed.
And as part of this rulemaking, we will also evaluate
potential SMS requirements for repair stations, certificate
holders that conduct common carriage operations under part 135,
and certain air tour operators under part 91.
Now, we are also making progress with industry
participation in voluntary SMS programs. Currently, four design
and manufacturing organizations have voluntarily adopted SMS
with six others in the pipeline. Boeing itself also established
a voluntary SMS program as part of the settlement agreement.
What we learned from all these programs will directly
benefit our rules and policies.
Now, the FAA has initiated a rulemaking to standardize
regulations and guidance for conducting system safety
assessments on transport category airplanes.
The FAA is taking a fresh look at the human factors
assumptions that we have been using for the design and
certification of transport category aircraft, including pilot
response times.
We are actively expanding our portfolio of data collection
and analytics tools so that we can more effectively share
safety data within the FAA and also among industry stakeholders
and international partners.
Data is key to the early identification of potential
hazards and safety problems. And per the act, we have a new
contract with the Transportation Research Board that will help
us discover emerging safety trends in aviation.
Since aviation is a global system, the FAA is also working
closely with the International Civil Aviation Organization and
other international stakeholders to influence and adjust the
maintenance and pilot training requirements for U.S. products
that operate under other civil aviation authorities.
Chair DeFazio, Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves and
Graves, and each member of the committee, as you can see, the
FAA is fully committed to a thorough and complete
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act. We approach all of this work with
tremendous humility, and we do not take safety for granted.
However, we are not just doing this work because you have
directed us to do it. We are doing it because it is the right
thing to do for aviation safety. This is what the public
expects, and it is the standard that we have set for ourselves.
We will accept nothing less.
Thank you again for your support and your direction. And
now I am happy to answer your questions.
[Mr. Dickson's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration
Good morning Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of
the subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approach to aviation safety
oversight and our activities to implement changes to strengthen the
aircraft certification process. Certifying aviation products is a
critical aspect of the FAA's safety mission. We are committed to
improving the certification process, including our oversight of
functions delegated to aircraft designers and manufacturers. We have
undertaken a number of initiatives to address this goal, as well as to
comprehensively implement the requirements of the bipartisan Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (``Act'').
Before we begin to discuss the specifics of certification reform
implementation, on behalf of the United States Department of
Transportation and everyone at the FAA, I would like to recognize, as
we have before, the families of the victims of the Lion Air and
Ethiopian Airlines accidents and extend our deepest sympathies and
condolences to them. It has been nearly 3 years since the Lion Air
accident, and we have made significant progress on addressing the
findings and recommendations that resulted from the numerous
investigations and independent reviews of both accidents involving the
Boeing 737 MAX. We will continue to prioritize our work to improve
aviation safety to make sure this never happens again.
As mentioned, our efforts to implement certification reform are
well underway. I want to thank Congress for enacting this landmark
aviation safety legislation and for this committee's continued
leadership on aviation safety matters. The Act has more than one
hundred unique requirements that we are implementing in a holistic,
systematic, transparent, and efficient manner to improve aircraft
certification and safety oversight. The FAA is working diligently to
implement the requirements while also ensuring that we are approaching
our efforts as systemically and effectively as possible. Specific
agency actions taken to implement the requirements of the Act are
discussed more fully below; however, I also wish to note that, in
general, our approach to aircraft certification and safety oversight
has changed. The FAA's relationship with manufacturers is evolving. We
are prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and working to focus that
oversight on safety critical areas. We are delegating fewer
responsibilities and demanding more transparency from them, and
evaluating key assumptions prior to delegating functions in certain
areas. While we continue to value their technical expertise, we are
also committed to enforcing the highest safety standards for the
manufacturers that we regulate. Our work to fully implement the Act is
still in the early stages, and we are carrying it out with the urgency
that it requires. The discussion below provides an overview of some of
our accomplishments to date.
Safety Management Systems. To ensure a holistic and
proactive assessment and mitigation of hazards, and to support further
improvement in safety performance, we continue to work with industry to
increase transparency, strengthen risk management practices, and
improve feedback channels between industry and the FAA. We believe that
enhancing and promoting the use of safety management systems (SMS)--
where safety issues are actively looked for and identified, and then
the root cause is addressed--is integral to achieving this objective,
and we have taken a number of steps toward increasing the use of SMS in
the design and manufacturing environment. As required by the Act, we
have initiated a rulemaking that contemplates requiring aircraft
manufacturers that hold both a type certificate and a production
certificate to adopt SMS, consistent with international standards and
practices.\1\ As part of this rulemaking, we will also evaluate
potential SMS requirements for repair stations, certificate holders
that conduct common carriage operations under part 135, and certain air
tour operators under part 91.\2\ We also created guidance for the
development of voluntary SMS programs and are working closely with
industry to encourage participation in voluntary SMS programs to
further enhance safety across the entire aviation system. Currently,
four design and manufacturing organizations have voluntarily adopted
SMS with six others in progress. Boeing also established an SMS under
the FAA's Voluntary SMS program as part of the settlement agreement.
The voluntary programs have enabled the FAA to gain valuable experience
on oversight of SMS for design and manufacturing organizations, and the
lessons learned will help inform FAA's SMS rulemaking and policy
development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ RIN 2120-AL60, Safety Management System (SMS) for Parts 21, 91,
135 and 145 issued. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AL60
\2\ The FAA is developing a final rule to require the use of SMS at
airports certificated under Part 139. RIN 2120-AJ38, Airport Safety
Management System. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AJ38
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System Safety and Human Factors. We are working on
several initiatives to ensure system safety assessments and human
factors assumptions are incorporated into the FAA's aviation safety
policy and oversight. We have initiated a rulemaking to standardize
regulations and guidance for conducting system safety assessments on
transport category airplanes.\3\ In addition, the expert safety review
panel that we established pursuant to the Act is meeting regularly to
review the assumptions relied upon in aircraft design and certification
of transport category aircraft--including assumptions regarding pilot
response times. We are also developing new guidance for industry on the
submission of safety critical information. There are several
interrelated provisions regarding human factors and human systems
integration. To address these, we have taken a number of steps to
strengthen the foundation of aviation human factors safety research and
to bolster the technical expertise within the Aviation Safety (AVS)
organization. This includes developing a human factors education and
training program, doubling the number of human factors staff within
AVS, and realigning the hiring of technical advisors with the necessary
technical expertise involved in critical safety decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ RIN 2120-AJ99, System Safety Assessments for transport category
airplanes issued. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AJ99
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Global Collaboration. To further international
harmonization and collaboration with respect to aircraft type
certification and continued operational safety, the FAA established the
Changed Product Rule International Authority Working Group and held the
first meeting in July 2021. This working group will develop
recommendations for international policy and guidance to ensure
proposed changes to an aircraft are evaluated from an integrated whole
aircraft system perspective. The FAA is working closely with the
International Civil Aviation Organization and other international
stakeholders to influence and adjust the maintenance and pilot training
requirements for U.S. products operating under the oversight of another
civil aviation authority. In addition, FAA representatives have
presented at and attended several webinars, work group meetings, and
seminars, including a presentation at the 2021 Zhuhai International
Flight Training and Safety seminar on topics of competency based pilot
training and automation dependency. The FAA plans to continue this
global engagement into the future, including seeking new opportunities
to collaborate with civil aviation authorities and other international
stakeholders to foster improvements in international safety standards
and practices for aircraft design and certification, pilot training,
and operational safety management. Additionally, to fulfill the
requirement to ensure that pilot operational evaluations for aircraft
type certifications utilize pilots from air carriers that are expected
to operate such aircraft, the FAA has already begun to incorporate air
carrier pilots into such evaluations.
Data. We are actively expanding our oversight
capabilities by advancing data collection and analytics tools to share
safety data within the FAA and between industry stakeholders and
international partners. These efforts include technological
enhancements to the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
system to integrate new data sources and methods for safety analysis,
which will improve data quality and accessibility to support risk-based
decision-making. In addition, the FAA's new contract with the
Transportation Research Board, established pursuant to the Act in June
2021, will aid the agency's effort to conduct annual analysis and
reporting on current and emerging safety trends in aviation. As the
aviation landscape continues to evolve, it will be increasingly
necessary to bolster the FAA's use of safety data and collaboration
with industry to identify potential hazards and safety problems and to
solve these problems before they give rise to an accident or incident.
Integration of Certification and Oversight. The Act
requires the FAA to convene an interdisciplinary integrated project
team upon the agency's receipt of every application for a new type
certificate for a transport category airplane. The FAA previously
commissioned the Integrated Program Management team comprised of
subject matter experts from Flight Standards and the Aircraft
Certification Service to assess current practices and policies and make
recommendations for improving FAA oversight through the integration of
design and operations. The best practices identified from this process
are being applied to ongoing certification projects, and we intend to
enhance the current procedures to incorporate additional requirements
contained in the Act. The FAA is also revising our current Technical
Advisory Board (TAB) process to use the TAB in all new and amended type
certification projects. We anticipate implementing this policy next
spring. The Act also directs FAA to establish an executive council to
oversee the FAA Compliance Program. This program provides a framework
for how the agency returns a regulated entity to compliance through
comprehensive safety data sharing between the FAA and regulated
entities. Pursuant to the Act's requirements, we established the FAA
Compliance Program Executive Council to monitor the operation and
effectiveness of the Compliance Program, and held the first meeting in
August 2021. We also updated the Compliance Program order to reflect
the implementation of the Executive Council and the Compliance Program
Steering Committee.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Aviation
Administration Compliance Program, Order 8000.373B, April 22, 2021, at
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8000.373B.pdf.
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Culture of Safety and Excellence. The FAA is committed to
fostering a just safety culture, while providing transparency to
improve safety, operational excellence, and efficiency. These efforts
include promoting voluntary safety reporting, increasing workforce
competencies, and attracting talented staff. In April 2021, we
implemented the Voluntary Safety Reporting Program (VSRP) to provide a
mechanism for employees to voluntarily report potential hazards and
safety concerns without fear of reprisal or other repercussions.\5\
Preliminary data on VSRP usage indicates that employees are comfortable
using the system and they are regularly using it to raise safety
concerns. An added bonus of VSRP is that it promotes collaboration
between employees and management for proactively addressing safety
concerns and developing corrective action recommendations. To assess
the effectiveness of these efforts and to meet the requirements of the
Act, we will conduct annual internal safety culture assessments that
include surveys of AVS employees in order to evaluate the safety
culture and the implementation of VSRP programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Safety Voluntary
Safety Reporting Program, Order 800.375, February 02, 2021, at http://
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/VS_8000.375.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accountability. A critical part of fostering a just
safety culture is ensuring that we hold our people to the highest
safety standards. In response to requirements in the Act, we have taken
a critical look at our own internal oversight processes and taken steps
to enhance accountability. This includes re-designating the Office of
Investigations to the new Office of Investigations and Professional
Responsibility and establishing investigative processes that are based
on best practices identified from similar offices at other federal
agencies and from the FAA's experience, expertise, and other sources.
Although our work is not yet done, we believe that incorporating these
best practices will improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and
transparency of the FAA's investigative process.
Delegation. The Act requires the FAA to institute
extensive and meaningful changes to the Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA) program and our oversight of that program. To
address these legislative requirements, we expect to implement
significant changes to our policies and procedures for delegating
certification authority to private entities. These changes include
policy requiring FAA approval of individual ODA unit members for
certain ODA types, and policy aimed at preventing interference with ODA
unit members in performance of their duties. We are also standing up an
expert panel to conduct a review of ODAs for transport category
airplanes and make recommendations to the FAA based on that review.
Additionally, as required under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, we
previously established the ODA Office to provide oversight and to
ensure consistency of the FAA's audit functions under the ODA program.
In April 2021, the FAA realigned the ODA Office to report directly to
the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety. This reporting
structure reflects the FAA's priority to oversee, standardize, and
ensure consistency in the ODA system, as well as to facilitate many of
the ODA reform requirements contained in the Act. To that end, the ODA
Office anticipates adding more employees in Fiscal Year 2022, and
hiring has already begun. The additional staff will allow the office to
perform more outreach, identify best practices, and implement measures
to maintain consistent oversight.
Certification and Continued Operational Safety Processes.
Ensuring the safety of aviation products through certification is an
important function of the FAA, and we are continuously taking steps to
enhance the type certification process. This includes revising guidance
and criteria used for determining significant changes to best ensure
that proposed changes to an aircraft are evaluated from a whole
aircraft-level perspective, including human interface elements. We have
also commissioned external reviews to evaluate our Transport Airplane
Risk Assessment Model and type certification process. To address the
Act's requirements to establish an appeal and issue resolution
processes for certification decisions, we are developing an
implementing order.
Innovation. Aviation is incredibly dynamic, and it is
imperative for the FAA to take steps to accelerate and expand the
deployment of new technologies in order to reduce barriers and actively
promote innovation that enhances the safety and efficiency of the
National Airspace System. We recently established and staffed the
Center for Emerging Concepts and Innovation to support certification of
new aircraft and technologies by providing pre-application engagement
with companies to identify a preliminary path to compliance. We are
also taking steps to foster enhanced coordination across the FAA on
emerging products and concepts.
Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, I want to assure you, and each
member of the Subcommittee, that the FAA is fully committed to thorough
and complete implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act. As we continue this process, we remain committed to
our transparent and accountable approach, which includes regular
briefings on our progress with staff of the committees of jurisdiction,
labor partners, industry stakeholders, and more. We will continue to
assess our entire certification and oversight framework in light of
past experience, industry growth, technological advancements, and
innovation as we carry out our responsibilities for public safety. We
approach all of this work with humility and do not take safety for
granted. We are confident that we are making substantial and meaningful
progress, and will continue to keep Congress apprised throughout this
work.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Administrator Dickson.
I will now turn to Member questions and first recognize
myself for 5 minutes.
Administrator, for some of the rulemaking, the FAA has been
taking a policy guidance document approach as opposed to a
rulemaking process.
As rulemaking and regulatory actions are more
institutionalized, is there consideration to making policy
guidance documents into rules and regulations?
Should this committee be concerned, in other words, about
the flexibility of policy guidance documents and whether they
are going to be around in the future versus taking a rulemaking
process that will institutionalize the direction?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Chair
Larsen.
The reason that we are using policy memos and other methods
here is that in some cases it allows us to make changes in a
more expedient manner and allows us to implement the provisions
of the certification reform bill in a timely fashion in
accordance with the timelines that are prescribed.
I will use section 107 as an example. There are several
requirements in that section about the appointment and
oversight of ODA unit members, which we know is extremely
important, and it requires FAA approval for their appointment
and also the appointment of FAA advisers for those unit
members.
In order to have these policies in place as required in
January of 2022, we issued a policy memo on unit member
appointment and a policy memo on FAA advisers. But the next
revision of the ODA order will then roll these policy memos
into that document, but that takes a longer amount of time to
run through the formal clearance process.
So, the use of the policy memos and other activities,
voluntary SMS is another example, is, as either rulemaking or
the development of orders occurs, that takes time. But we have
ways to accomplish the substance of what the Congress directed
and what we need to do, frankly, as a result of all the reviews
and investigations that have been accomplished over the last
couple of years.
Mr. Larsen. Can you quickly explain then how the FAA plans
to enforce those policy memos versus being able to enforce a
rule or regulation?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the policy memos pertain to our
internal processes. So, they have full force and effect within
the agency. Those are not full rulemaking.
So, we will enforce those. But we want to, as you said, we
want to make sure they are fully institutionalized and that
they are in place for years and decades to come. And that is
why we will incorporate them into our orders as we go forward.
Mr. Larsen. One of the discussions and issues we dealt with
during the bill creation was type certificates. I think
formerly it was called the new product rule. I think I made a
note to myself to call it a stale type certificate.
The 737 type cert was nearly 50 years old when the FAA
amended it to add the 737 MAX 8, but the bill requires you-all
to consider whether there is a point at which FAA needs to
declare their type cert is too old to amend for a new
derivative and to require the manufacturer to apply for a new
type certificate.
Have you begun that assessment yet? If you have, when will
you complete it? If you haven't, when will you begin?
Mr. Dickson. Well, the short answer, Chair Larsen, is yes.
As you know, we needed recommendations and congressional
direction to do several things. One of them was an independent
study and some recommendations on type certification reform,
and also issue new rules and guidance as necessary to execute
on amended type certificate.
This all falls under the broad umbrella of what we call the
Changed Product Rule, and that is harmonized with the other
states of design internationally.
So, there is not only an FAA work that needs to be done.
But as we do that, it has to be done in coordination with
international authorities to make sure that certifying and
validating authorities are having the same approach around the
world.
So, with respect to the study, we have already tasked MITRE
to complete the study. And in the meantime, we are conducting
internal review of the applicable rules and also working with
our international partners.
We have chartered, and actually the Changed Product Rule
International Authority Working Group began to meet this
summer, had their first meeting in July, and they are meeting
on a regular basis.
That team's work to date has focused on identifying gaps
and lessons learned to formulate specific recommendations for
improvement. They will give us their report and recommendations
by the middle of next year, and then we will have consistency
around the international community on that.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I now turn to Mr. Graves of Louisiana for 5 minutes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Dickson, I appreciate you giving us an update
on the implementation of the certification bill.
I want to make note. I said earlier that we have a number
of outstanding mandates that are required under the 2018
authorization act. The 2016 extension had some outstanding
issues that have not been addressed.
It is confusing to me to see how the FAA has chosen some, I
guess, discretionary projects to move forward on, like airport
SMS rulemaking or reorganization of the UAS Integration Office,
rather than prioritizing some of the mandates in the law from
2016, 2018, or the December 2020 act.
Can I get your commitment today that the FAA will no longer
view some of the mandates in law as suggestions and you will
prioritize the implementation of those over some of these
discretionary projects?
Mr. Dickson. Ranking Member Graves, I want to make it very
clear to you and the leadership of the committee and all the
members of the committee and the Congress that the FAA is
absolutely committed and I am personally committed to
accomplishing everything that the Congress has required us to
do.
Most of the issues where we seek extended timeframes have
to do with full notice and comment rulemaking, and there have
been a few examples already raised on that this morning.
In terms of the overall 5-year reauthorization, we have
currently accomplished as of this morning 191 out of 300 of
those mandates. So, we are running at about 63 percent about 3
years in.
About one-quarter of those remaining are the rulemakings,
which have extended timelines in many cases, depending on the
complexity of the issue.
But I absolutely respect the role of Congress, and we take
that direction extremely seriously. I push my team very hard on
this. In fact, when I arrived at the agency, some of the first
questions that I asked about was why some of these things are
taking so long.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Administrator, I have got a few
other questions. If I can just get a commitment from you that
the law is going to be prioritized over these discretionary
projects, that would be great.
Mr. Dickson. We will always prioritize the mandates that we
have from Congress, yes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Administrator.
Administrator, earlier this year, full committee Ranking
Member Sam Graves and I sent you a letter regarding some
concerning comments out of EASA. Specifically, Director General
Ky said that they were, quote, ``moving away from the
established practice of relying on the FAA for certification of
U.S. aircraft.''
As you know, and as indicated in our letter, this does
violate some of the bilateral agreements. In the response that
you sent us, you indicated that you would be monitoring some of
the EASA activities to determine if there were any violations
of that agreement.
I just wanted to ask quickly if you had seen anything out
of EASA that appears to violate BASA, the bilateral agreement
we have with the Europeans.
Mr. Dickson. The short answer is I have not seen any
violations of the bilateral agreement. It continues to be
foundational to the relationship that we have.
And that was reinforced this summer. We had a summit on
aviation safety with the European Commission, and both of us
recommitted to the importance of the Bilateral Aviation Safety
Agreement.
We also meet on a regular basis at the executive director
level with them, and we have a delegation over there meeting
with them to make sure that we work through the issues.
I think it is important also to emphasize that there are
somewhat different administrative and review processes between
the two authorities. And so that is why we will see sometimes
delays on one side or the other as we make decisions and
validate each other's processes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Administrator. I just
urge you please to remain vigilant there. I think this is an
important issue.
Changing gears a little bit, in the FAA's 2022 budget
proposal, there are several actions related to the
reorganization of the FAA's Office of Investigations into the
Office of Investigations and Professional Responsibility, or
OPR. The only action in the certification bill that FAA is
directed to do is to rename the office.
Can you assure the committee that the actions that you are
taking are consistent with the law that existed before the
certification bill became, which, again, it clearly defines the
authorities? Could you respond, please?
Mr. Dickson. Yes. We will act consistent with our
authorities, and we will work with the Congress very closely as
we move forward to implement this section.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
And I am out of time. So, I just want to quickly state for
the record that it was not Congress' intent to transfer primary
investigative authority for whistleblower retaliation to the
Office of Audit and Investigations, or AAE. Instead, as the law
clearly states, AAE may investigate allegations of
whistleblower retaliation only if another office, like OPR, the
inspector general, or the Office of Special Counsel, refers it
to them.
In the interest of time, I am going to yield back and
convert this into a question for the record. But I did want to
make that clear in the record of the hearing.
I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. So noted.
The Chair now recognizes the chair of the full committee,
Mr. DeFazio of Oregon.
Mr. DeFazio.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity.
Mr. Administrator, I am just curious: What happens if you
ignore your lawyers? Who is going to sue you?
We said flight attendants was going to be done by November
5, 2018. And here we are in a notice of proposed rulemaking
which finally has emerged from the bowels of the agency 3 years
later.
You ignored the specific mandate of Congress at the behest
of your lawyers. I can't reconcile that.
Mr. Dickson. Well, Chair DeFazio, I do not ignore the
mandate of Congress, as I said a moment ago. I take it
extremely seriously. And I want to tell you very candidly that
I share your frustration.
But we have a process that we have to follow. It has to be
legally defensible. And we have not been relieved of the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
And there are a lot of things that I would like to have
move forward. The flight attendant rest is more straightforward
than secondary barriers.
But I share your frustration. And I want you to know that I
am absolutely committed to continue to push my team and to move
forward as quickly as we possibly can to get these provisions
into our regulations.
Mr. DeFazio. Well, then maybe Congress needs to look at the
Administrative Procedure Act and put in exceptions for health
and safety that can be taken by Administrators of the various
agencies. So, thanks.
The 2019-2020 survey of the Aviation Safety Office. I was
happy to hear you say the word earlier ``regulator.'' I assume
we have dropped the customer stuff. But those were very
disturbing findings. It said that 49 percent disagreed with the
statement that the FAA makes data-driven decisions about
safety, regardless of external pressure.
Some quotes.
``They [industry] just keep going up the chain until they
get the answers they want,'' which we saw with the MAX. They
would go to management even having lost two appeals in the
Seattle office.
`` `Don't rock the boat' with Boeing.''
``It feels like we are showing up to a knife fight with
Nerf weapons. It is a challenge to be an equal match with
Boeing in the meetings/conversations.''
Has that all dramatically changed, hopefully?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, I want----
Mr. DeFazio. I know that predates you. But I am just
saying, do you, like, get out there, meet with your employees,
say, ``How is it going? Are you feeling pressure? How are you
dealing with Boeing?''
We have had subsequent problems with Boeing on the 87 and
further problems on the 37, et cetera. So, I just want to know
that that is really history.
Mr. Dickson. Chair DeFazio, I would say that cultural
issues always require attention. And my people, you talked
about the dedicated career professionals at the FAA, I could
not be more proud of them. And as recently as yesterday, I
communicated that I have their back when it comes to safety and
when it comes to making the safety decisions that they need to
make.
I am hearing through various means that the employees feel
supported and empowered in ways that they have not in a long
time. But I don't take that at face value. So, we have to have
institutional mechanisms.
One of them that we put in place is the Voluntary Safety
Reporting Program, because in my experience we have to have a
mechanism where we work with our labor partners, with our
employees, and also our leaders within the agency to make sure
that issues are able to surface within the organization, and
that people feel empowered, and that they are willing to bring
things forward.
So, this survey, as I said in my opening statement, we have
to ask ourselves the tough questions. And these were the tough
questions. We might not like all of the answers. But that gives
us the information that we need so that we can go in and put
the appropriate changes into place, and that is exactly what we
are doing.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Thank you. I am pleased to hear that, and
I am happy. It wasn't the line employees who were the problem.
I remember one instance, can't remember exactly what it
was, that 11 of them said no. Then it was appealed by Boeing,
and the panel said no. And then finally they found a manager
higher up the food chain in Seattle who said, oh, yeah, sure,
fine, go right ahead.
So, I just want to know. And I would also like to see
consequences for people who blew off the technical advice and
blew off their other employees who were trying to do the right
thing in the future if that ever happens again. Hopefully your
new reporting system will cull out anybody who is a problem in
that.
On the Changed Product Rule, you talked about the dateline.
But the final implementation, it says here, is 2024, because it
says development policy and training 2023 and aligned
implementation in 2024.
Does that mean that we can't do it before then?
Mr. Dickson. Well, there will certainly be--in terms of
fully institutionalizing it so that it is sustainable practice
around the world with all the aviation authorities, I think
that is a realistic timeframe. But that doesn't mean that we
won't have decision criteria and things that we are doing in
the meantime.
And as I said, we have got MITRE doing a study for us and
bringing us some recommendations. We are seeking out and having
discussions with other authorities around the world.
And we are also evaluating internally what the criteria
need to be, whether it is time limited or a number of versions
or whatever, to balance what Chair Larsen talked about with
when an original type certificate was issued, but also to make
sure that we can bring in beneficial product improvements that
are safety improvements into existing aircraft. We want to be
able to do both.
Mr. DeFazio. That is great. But, I mean, part of the
problem was the design constraints of that antique airframe.
And that is just a concern that we have to continue to monitor.
And then finally, just on behalf of the families--and I
regret I am not in the hearing room. But, like I said, I am a
little bit restricted at the moment. I know that they just
wrote to you questioning continuing ODA to Boeing, given their
ongoing problems in their other plants on the east coast. And I
don't know what has been going on up in Seattle lately.
I would hope that you will give all due consideration to
that and review the most recent problems with Boeing and see
how we are going to root those out.
Mr. Dickson. Yes. Thank you for pointing that out.
We have limited the delegated authority that Boeing has.
And as you know, we have restricted, withheld Boeing's ability
to issue airworthiness certificates for the MAX. We have also
limited delegated functions for critical design features on the
777-9 and the 737-10 certification projects.
And, again, I would just point to the fact that, when I
came onboard as FAA Administrator almost 2\1/2\ years ago now,
the first thing I did was reset the relationship with Boeing.
That happened within the first couple of months, once I saw
what was going on. And I have made it clear to them continually
that we will continue to exercise a high level of scrutiny.
As you have noted, as the Congress has noted, and I think
it has been our experience over decades, delegation, if it is
done the right way, if it is done appropriately, it is a very
powerful tool that enhances safety. It allows us to leverage
engineering expertise.
But clearly in this case it did not function properly, and
that is what we are focused on, is to put systems and processes
in place to make sure that no one individual or no one failure
can exploit the system.
Mr. DeFazio. OK. Well, thank you. I am liking what I am
hearing. Keep it up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I now recognize Mr. Graves of Missouri, the ranking member
of the full committee.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, thank you, Administrator Dickson.
I do want to focus on, go back to pilot training. And
obviously and in light of the MAX 8 accidents, one of the real
priorities for me--and I talked at length about this--was
addressing international pilot training standards and the
overreliance we are getting, we are moving towards, when it
comes to automation in the cockpit and moving away from manual
flying skills or just being able to fly the aircraft if a
problem manifests itself.
And I am just curious if the FAA is ensuring that its
engagement with the international community is actually going
to result in any positive changes. Are you seeing that? Is the
international community being receptive to that? And I think
you share those same concerns with me, and I would just like
you to address it real quick.
Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question, Ranking Member
Graves.
We have longstanding efforts through multiple forums to
improve international safety standards, through ICAO,
multilaterally and bilaterally, and I am always working with my
counterparts around the world on these issues. We want to make
sure that we drive specific [inaudible] improvements.
I think you are aware of the Pilot Licensing and Training
Panel. The FAA is actually leading the Automation Working Group
there. We have our chief scientists on human factors and also
one of our foremost pilot training experts who is leading that
work.
Also, some of the things that we have done within the U.S.,
and I will point to upset prevention and recovery training. We
are working to incorporate that into ICAO standards and also
promote it and work with civil aviation authorities around the
world to assist pilots in preventing an upset, but if one does
occur, making sure that they have the skills to be able to
recover from it.
And then finally we have an advisory circular on flightpath
management that has been several years in the making. It
includes guidance on manual flying skills, managing automation,
and active pilot monitoring. And that will be out for public
comment here within the next few weeks. And then we will work
to promulgate those principles internationally as well.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. I look forward to that. That is
perfect. That is exactly what I was looking for.
And I want to shift directions right now back to what I
mentioned earlier in my opening, too, when it comes to the new
rule interpretation, when it comes to flight training and
standard and limited and experimental category aircraft and the
confusion that is causing amongst the instructor community, the
pilot community. I mean, it is really creating a problem for
us.
And I just to want to ask if the FAA is addressing that. We
are looking at legislation within NDAA to address it. But it
would be a whole lot more help if the FAA would address it
internally.
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, thank you for the question.
I think, as you know, I addressed this head on up at
Oshkosh AirVenture this year. In fact, we refer to Letter of
Deviation Authority, or LODA, as a four-letter word because I
know that it has created some confusion and some frustration
out there.
So, to get through this we have created a process where,
far from being bureaucratic, we have actually created a very
quick turnaround process on these approvals. The time to
process the deviation request is less than a day.
This actually wasn't a change in legal interpretation. I
know that there are feelings to the contrary. But through the
course of a court case, what came to our attention is that our
guidance and the underlying regulation which is controlling
were inconsistent. And so, we had to update that guidance.
We are going to update the rules to address the
inconsistency permanently, but we want to have an interim
process in place that facilitates and allows the trainings that
you are talking about to continue uninterrupted.
So, we will continue to work with you, I promise, on this
issue. I want to make sure, though, that we are really talking
about something that is very narrowly focused. And again, we
want to make sure that this doesn't go into other areas where I
think we are actually in very good shape.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. OK. And one last question: When it
comes to the vaccine mandate, was the FAA able to convey to the
administration just how much of a problem this could create
when it comes to manpower shortages and pilot shortages? And
the simple question I ask is, did the administration even ask
the FAA for any guidance on this?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, obviously, the purpose, we want
people to get vaccinated as a country, and we want to get
COVID-19 behind us. That is the point. And the CDC is the
public health authority. That aspect is certainly not within
the FAA's purview.
But I will tell you that my focus is on aviation safety and
on making sure that the aviation system can operate, and that
those jobs are out there, not only during the pandemic, but
that we live to fight another day, if you will, and have the
most dynamic and diverse and thriving aviation system going
forward.
And so, that is what we are really focused on is making
sure that we minimize disruptions and making sure that we
maximize predictability by keeping the air traffic system
operating and making sure that the airlines and all operators
of the system can continue to operate in a seamless way.
Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. I now recognize Members for 5
minutes. The first additional Member to be recognized is
Representative Carson of Indiana. Representative Carson.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have two
letters that I would like to enter into the hearing record, one
from our congressional colleagues, and one from the families of
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302.
Mr. Larsen. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Letter of October 8, 2021, from Hon. Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Member of
Congress, et al., to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Andre Carson
October 8, 2021.
The Honorable Stephen Dickson,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, DC 20591.
Dear Administrator Dickson:
We write to you today to express our concern regarding the FAA's
ongoing delay in issuing a final rule requiring the installation of
secondary flight deck barriers on new commercial aircraft. The threat
of a flight deck breach is still very real and must be addressed. We
are working to get H.R. 911 passed into law which would mandate
secondary barriers on all existing aircraft. Unfortunately, we are yet
to see an implementation date for secondary barriers for new aircraft
due to never-ending delays.
The last FAA Reauthorization Act (Public Law 115-254) was signed
into law on October 5, 2018. After 3 years, countless delays, and
bureaucratic excuses there is still not a clear date when secondary
barriers will be required on new aircraft. While most other new
provisions have already been fully implemented, we are yet to see one
of the most important bipartisan safety components of the law go into
effect.
Secondary barriers are critical to the safety of commercial
aircraft. On September 23 the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure held a hearing on the surge of air rage incidents. Every
witness from across the aviation industry acknowledged the safety
implications of these incidents. The threat of a passenger or
passengers attempting to breach the flight deck is still very real. In
June of this year, there were 2 domestic incidents of passengers
attempting to breach the flight deck. If a pilot had needed to use the
lavatory just prior to those incidents the results could have been
catastrophic. Secondary barriers only cost a few thousand dollars per
aircraft; a small sum to prevent another 9/11 style attack. While we
understand that FAA has its rulemaking procedure, we feel that 3 years
ought to be more than enough time.
Could you provide a written update on the remaining steps and
provide us with a realistic timeframe for when a final rule could be
issued? We look forward to your timely response.
Sincerely,
Brian Fitzpatrick,
Member of Congress.
Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
Member of Congress.
Andre Carson,
Member of Congress.
Josh Gottheimer,
Member of Congress.
John Garamendi,
Member of Congress.
Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Member of Congress.
Christopher H. Smith,
Member of Congress.
Glenn ``GT'' Thompson,
Member of Congress.
Mariannette Miller-Meeks, M.D.
Member of Congress.
Jeff Van Drew,
Member of Congress.
Jared Huffman,
Member of Congress.
Don Bacon,
Member of Congress.
Charlie Crist,
Member of Congress.
Letter of October 19, 2021, from Families of Ethiopian Airlines Flight
302 Crash Victims, to Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation
Administration Officials, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Andre Carson
[Editor's note: This letter contains 16 pages of signatures. The
hearing transcript resumes on page 42.]
October 19, 2021.
The Honorable Pete Buttigieg,
Secretary,
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Ave SE, Washington, DC
20590.
Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator,
Bradley Mims, Deputy Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration,
800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591.
Re: ET302 victim's families request for ODA Termination
Dear Secretary Buttigieg, Administrator Dickson and Deputy
Administrator Mims:
The undersigned families of the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crash
request that the Federal Aviation Administration terminate Boeing's
Organization Designation Authority (ODA). It has become clear that
Boeing is not a company that can be trusted with the public safety
responsibilities conferred by the ODA. Just as the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA) suspended GE Aviation's Design Organisational
Approval in Czech last March due to problems, FAA should do the same
for Boeing unless and until trust, competence and freedom from
interference is solidly demonstrated.
Section 7-2(c) of the Order 8100.15B, Organization Designation
Authorization Procedures, states that an ODA can be terminated due to
misconduct, lack of care or judgment or failure to implement needed
corrective action.
Boeing cannot be trusted to perform authorized safety functions
because it has engaged in the following misconduct which requires FAA
action to terminate its ODA:
1. deceiving the FAA about the nature and the power of the
maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) added to the
Boeing 737 MAX 8 (MAX) by way of misleading statements, half-truths and
omissions as admitted in its January 21, 2021 deferred prosecution
agreement;
2. deceiving the FAA about whether simulator training was required
for pilots to fly the MAX;
3. creating an ODA culture that applies undue pressure to
engineering personnel so they are not able to exercise independent
judgment free from organizational conflicts of interest;
4. wrongly approving the original 737 MAX design when it failed to
comply with several 14 CFR Part 25 regulations and required
Airworthiness Directives (ADs) for the resulting unsafe conditions;
5. failing to notify FAA that not all MAX aircraft were equipped
with a functional AOA disagree alert;
6. failing to manage the ODA in a competent manner that would
detect and correct employee and/or management misrepresentations and
dishonesty that compromises safety while benefitting Boeing's profit
goals;
7. failing to conduct realistic system safety assessments on
critical systems;
8. failing to insulate the ODA from Boeing's profit motives;
9. crafting arbitrary and unscientific assumptions, such as pilot
response times, to avoid implementing safety measures;
10. failing to conduct proper system safety assessments after the
Lion Air crash to determine problems, check incorrect assumptions, and
fix the problems;
11. failing to recognize catastrophic failure due to novel design
in flight controls and implementing a failsafe mechanism per FAR
requirements;
12. falsely stating that the Boeing board safety committee was
fully briefed and engaged after the Lion Air crash when that body did
not meet and failed to discuss or take any action to correct the flaws
in the MAX;
13. failing to spend resources to quickly fix the MAX after the
Lion Air crash and instead raising dividend's by 20% and authorizing a
$20 billion stock repurchase program for shareholders;
14. doubling down on the safety of the MAX, rather than fixing the
MAX, by issuing post-Lion Air crash press releases stating:
``We are confident in the safety of the 737 MAX'' (11/
21/18);
``As our customers and their passengers continue to fly
the 737 MAX to hundreds of destinations around the world every day,
they have our assurance that the 737 MAX is as safe as any airplane
that has ever flown the skies.'' (11/27/18)
15. selling and delivering more defective MAX aircraft to more
airlines after the Lion Air crash without fixing the problems.
The FAA, the Department of Justice, the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and a Delaware judge have all
affirmatively found that Boeing lied and concealed problems relating to
the MAX. Other Boeing commercial problems have also raised concerns,
including the 787 (on board fires) and the 777 (quality and
certification issues).
In 2013, a report from NATCA recommended that the Boeing Safety
Office be structured along the lines of the more traditional Gulfstream
office in Atlanta. That recommendation was ignored. Part of the
justification was that there was not sufficient labor resources
available in the Seattle office, even though subsequently it was found
that the number of projects handled by the office was stable.
Another report in 2017 prophetically stated this problem clearly:
``The ODA organization makes certification decisions, not the AR.
This leads to a potential decision making process influenced by a
``Group Think'' mentality. There is no personal accountability or
monetary motivation for ARs to contradict Company management positions
that do not support expenditures to upgrade noncompliant designs or do
testing needed to demonstrate compliance. ARs are reluctant to take
contradictory positions or bring up issues within the ODA for fear of
retaliation. In several cases ARs have refused to answer compliance
related questions when in meetings with the FAA and ODA management.
This reflects their fear of retaliation if they express a view that
contradicts the company position.'' (Pre-Decisional Involvement (PDI)
report, addressing Aircraft Certification Transformation, February 6,
2017)
The ODA system in general, and Boeing's use of ODA in particular,
invites undue influence and interference rather than resists it.
For these reasons, FAA should terminate Boeing's ODA so that FAA
performs the safety functions under standard certification procedures.
Sincerely,
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Victim Signatory
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Vecere............................... Megan Hoover, I am a friend
of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Liza Grandia, friend of the
family
Danielle Moore............................ Owen Campbell, I am the
friend of Danielle Moore
Micah John Messent........................ Amber Tansky, Sister of
victim
Max Edkins................................ Emily Harris, I am the
friend of the victim
Matt Vercere.............................. Matthew Baiamonte, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Dominique Lacroix, Sister
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Michael Moscarello, I am a
cousin of the victim.
Micah Messent............................. Glenda Wray, Friend
Graziella de Luis Ponce................... Isabel de Luis, I am the
niece of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Ahmed Ali, I am a friend of
the victim
Matt Vecere, Samya Stumo.................. Michael Stumo, father
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Carol Shrout, Family friend
Angela Rehhorn............................ Glenn Tibbett, Family friend
Melvin Riffle............................. Nicholas Reissr, Family
friend
Melvin Riffle, Bennett Riffle............. Jim McCoy, Very close family
friend of the victims
Angela Rehhorn............................ Melissa Tibbett, Neighbour
of the victim
Jess Hyba................................. jeff curry, I am a friend of
the victim
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Molly Abraham, Aunt
Danielle Moore............................ Idit Papular, I am a family
friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Kimberly, Family friend of
the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Kristine Wahlers, I am a
friend of the victim's
family.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Carly Bollinger, Cousins
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Marilyn Koutnik, I am a
friend of the victims
Danielle Moore............................ Jodie Layne, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................ Julie Kramer, Friend of
victim's mother
Danielle Moore............................ William Hedges, Danielle
knew me as Grandpa
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Pascale Perez, Mother's
friend
Matthew Vecere............................ Grace Traa, Friend of the
victim
Micah Messant............................. Nelsen Spickard, Cousin
Bennett Riffle............................ Sydney Malain, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Chrys Hutchings, friend of
Samya's parents
Jackson Musoni............................ Huguette Debets, Father of
my children
Micah Messent............................. Amy Chow, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Lydia Littlefield, friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Kim Bazinet, Family friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Lou McNeil, Friend
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Susan Riffel, I am the
mother of these victims.
Bennett Riffel, Melvin Riffel............. Ike Riffel, Father
Danielle Moore............................ Laura Reid, I am the
Godmother of the amazing,
talented, lovely Danielle
Moore
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Anne Robertson, I am the
cousin of these victims.
Matt Vecere............................... Sander Banta, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Sharon Krogman, I am the
cousin of the victim.
Sam Pegram................................ Natalie Eacersall, Friend of
a relative.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Cassidy Howell, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................ Curt McCullough, Family
friend
Samya Stumo............................... Barbara Dean, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Chuk Odenigbo, Friend
Melvin Riffle, Bennett Riffle............. Susan Janes, I am a family
friend of the victims'
family
Samya Stumo............................... Raffik Lopes, I am the
cousin of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Lois Fuller, Friend of the
victim's family
Melvin and Bennett Riffel................. Tammy Fisher, Cousin
Angela Rehhorn............................ Annette Vincent, I am the
aunt of the victim.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Brittney Riffel, Spouse and
Sister-in-Law
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Robert Holmlund, Great Uncle
Matt Vecere............................... Jenna DiGenni, Friend
Oliver Vick............................... Ben Coakley, Friend
Melvin Riffel............................. Katherine Zahner, Friend
Paolo Dieci............................... Elena Dieci, I am the niece
of the victim.
Marie Philipp............................. Julia Rubio Gamero, Best
friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Max Thabiso Edkins........................ Julian Kubel, I am the
friend of the victim
Bennet Riffel............................. Sandra Niemann, Family
friend
Paolo Dieci............................... Estella Dieci, Niece
Marie Christin Philipp.................... Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Wolfgang Eigner........................... Bettina Eigner, I am the
mother of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Janet Hedges, Aunt
Marie Christin Philipp.................... Heike Baumann, I am the aunt
of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Grantt Lopes, Cousin
Melvin Riffel............................. Pao Tane, Friend
Bennett Riffel............................ Deborah Najera, Family
Friend
Melvin Riffel............................. Deborah Najera, Family
Friend
Josefin Augusta Ekermann.................. Madelen Maria Ekermann,
Mother
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Susan Lamarche, I am the
maternal aunt of the
victim.
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Melisse Bouziane, I am a
cousin of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Paulina Polanco, I am the
friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram................................ Melanie Cremona, Friend
Mel Riffel, Bennett Riffel................ May Saeteurn, Friend of
victim
Clemence Boutant.......................... Pernille Kjaer Porte, I am
the friend of the victim.
Hussein Swaleh M'tetu..................... Feisal Swaleh, Son of the
victim
Anne Feigl................................ Anna Caroline Feigl, Sister
in Law
Sam Pegram................................ William Pegram, Grandfather
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Diana Officer, I am the
friend of the victims
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Aude Breton, Friend
Derick Kivia Lwugi........................ Gladys Kivia, Wife
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Dominique caumes, Niece
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Lizzie Muyawa Dube, Very
very good friend. How I
miss her daily
Sautner Christoph......................... Johannes Pernkopf, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................ Phyllis Robertson, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Cheryl Engel, Very close
friend
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Vincent Edith, Friend
Jonathan Seex............................. Noah Seex Svalin, I am
Jonathan's nephew.
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Lars-Peter Feigl, Sister
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Therese Rouget, Aunt of the
victim
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Dominique Verdugo, I am a
friend of the victim's
family
Gatchi de Luis............................ Jihane Sfeir, Friend
Jonathan Seex............................. Par Schroeder, Brother in
law
Marcelino Rassul Tayob.................... Mario Rassul, Brother
Marcelino Rassul Tayob.................... Elisangela Rassul, Uncle
Danielle Moore............................ Kathy E. Martorino, Friend
of the family
Virginia Chimenti......................... Angela Maria Farioli, I am
the friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Carol Moore, Aunt
Wolgang Eigner, Christoph Sautner, Armin Kerstin Bashir, We grow up,
Schietz. studied and worked together
Jonathan Seex............................. Joanna Seex, I am the sister
of Jonathan.
Micah John Messent........................ Joy Camp, Aunt
Ollie Vick................................ Keri Powell, Friend
Marcelino Rassul Tayob.................... Emmanuel Rassul, Uncle
Micah John Messent........................ David Camp, Uncle
Jonathan Bjorn Seex....................... Britt-Marie Seex, I am the
mother of the victim.
Clemence Boutant.......................... Mathieu Chaumeil, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Helen Fodnaess, I am a
friend of the victim.
MARIA PILAR BUZZETTI...................... AILA MOHRHOFF, FAMILY FRIEND
Sam Pegram................................ Vslerie, Grandmother
Marcelino Rassul Tayob.................... Hugo Leal, I am the friend
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Nadine Raimondo, I am one of
the parents' friends
Micheal Ryan.............................. Tiarnan, brother
Abiodun Bashua............................ Mariam Bashua, Daughter
Abiodun Bashua............................ Hyro Bashua, Grandson
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Hans-Joachim Feigl, I am the
father of the victim
Marie Philipp............................. Julia Simonsberger, friend
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Sieglinde Rink-Feigl, I am
the mother of the victim
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Abel Orain, I am a cousin of
the victim
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Eric Deschoenmaeker, Former
employer
Clemence-Isaure Boutant, Willm, Sam Pegram Emma O'Leary, I am a
colleague and friend of the
victims
Clemence Boutant.......................... Lucie Viver, Friend
Graziella de Luis......................... Martinez Gregorio, I m a
friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Kristina Louise
Hetherington, I am a friend
and colleague of the
victim.
Clemence-Isaure, BOUTANT-WILLM............ Jean-Louis MICHEL, Friend
Gachi De Luis............................. Patricia Rooke Crossley, I
am a friend and colleague
of victim
Marie Philipp............................. Susanne Radtke, I am the
friend of the victim.
Gachi de Luis............................. Tom Afton, Friend
Alexandra Wachtmeister.................... Anna Wachtmeister, Cousins
Anne Katrin Feigl......................... Catherine Hubert, Friend
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Henri Virol, I am the friend
of the victim
Anne Katrin Feigl......................... Jack Davies, Friend
Graziella De Luis......................... Anita Guerra, I am a friend
of the victim
Gachi de Luis............................. Francoise Point, I am a
friend of the victim
Gachi de Luis............................. Gilda Calleja, Close friend
Maria Pilar Buzzetti...................... Dalma Reka BERES, Colleague
Mick Ryan................................. Fergus Gleeson, Friend
Josefine Ekermann......................... Susan Saado, Friend
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Marie-Claire Ribeiro, I am a
friend of Veronique
Geoffroy, Camille's aunt.
Josefin Ekermann.......................... Alejandro Conde Geli,
Exboyfriend
Matthew Vecere............................ Jason McClain, I am the
cousin of the victim.
Anne Katrine Fiegl........................ Marcello GOLETTI, friend and
colleague
Stef Lacroix, Karoline Aadland............ Lauren Webber, Roommates
Eric Prieur............................... Sandra Prieur, He was my
brother
Christoph Sautner......................... Marlies Wohlmuth, Friend
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Juliette Rouesse, friend
Max Thabiso Edkins........................ Anne Lyons, Friend
Clemence Boutant.......................... Isabelle Charre, Friend
Max Tabiso Edkins......................... Dennis Bailey, Uncle
Maxc Thabiso Edkins....................... Gillian Mary Bailey-Edkins,
Auntie
Josefin Ekermann.......................... Lia Hen, My best friend
Graciela De Luis Ponce.................... Rosita Castro Dominguez,
Friend
Graciela Luis............................. Alejandra Safa Barraza,
Friend
Kadija Cathy Hamani....................... Hamani, Colleague
Michael Ryan.............................. James Spinelli, Friend
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Jerome Bichot, Family friend
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Olivier Peyre, I am a friend
of a cousin of the victim.
Clemence Boutant-Willm.................... Pascale Vulliez, I am the
friend of the victim
Michael Ryan.............................. Giulia Serrelli, Friend
Sara Gebre Michael........................ Ababu Yetbarek, Husband
Samya Stumo............................... Cassio Lopes, I am the
cousin of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Penny Owen, Friend of Family
Samya Stumo............................... Bradley R Krogman, Cousin
Marie Philipp............................. Angelika Begerow, I am the
friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Stacey Troster, Family
Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Christina Donnelly, Friend
of the victim
Graziella De Luis......................... Stefanie Santa, Friend of
the victim
Sam Pegram................................ James Killen, Friend of the
victim
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Yvette Le Gall, I am the
mother in law of Xavier
Fricaudet's brother
Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm............. Violaine Willm, Sister
Gachi de Luis............................. Jorge Tagle, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Josh Webb, I am a friend of
the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Allyson Steele, Friends of a
friend
Gachi de Luis............................. Claire Farrimond, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Jilian O'Neill, Friend
Joanne Toole.............................. Michael Rodgers, I am a
cousin of the victim
Amma Tesfamariam.......................... Solomon Tezera, Husband
Sintayhu Shafi............................ Yewubnesh Asnake, cousin
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Guenievre Darbord, Friend
Graziella de Luis y Ponce................. Becky Padera, I am a friend
of the victim
Sintayhu Shafi............................ Yewubnesh Asnake, cousin
Samya Stumo............................... Lara Mittaud, Friend
Paolo Dieci............................... Elizabeth McCarthy, I am
Paolo's sister in law
Max Edkins................................ Teboho Edkins, I am the
Brother of the victim.
Oliver Vick............................... Tasha Slaise, Olly was a
dear friend and our son's
beloved godfather
Olly Vick................................. kirsty norton, I am the
friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Pierre Royer, Uncle
Mel Riffel, Bennett Riffel................ Megan Golden, Cousin
Danielle Moore............................ David Lawless, Partner
Micah Messent............................. Heather Wilson, I am Micah
Messent's aunt.
Stephanie Lacroix, Angela Rehhorn, Victoria Woodhouse, Friend
Danielle Moore, Micah Messant. and colleague
Danielle Moore............................ Gabrielle Mills, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Jill Frankel, Friend
Matthew Vecere............................ Tracey Young, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................ Bryce and Linda Vincent,
Aunt and Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Micheline Geoffroy, Friend
of the family
Danielle Moore............................ Elizabeth Nagel, I am the
friend of the victim
Daniel Moore.............................. Asma Azhar, Friend
Matt Vecere............................... Jeff and Nancy Vecere, Matt
was our nephew
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Ryan Bennett, I am the
cousin of the victims.
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Paige Kimble, friend in
solidarity with the Stumo/
Milleron family
Micah Messent............................. Diane Gershman, I am Micah's
aunt
Danielle Moore............................ Siobhan Takala, I am a
friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Ludwika Dec, Family friend
Denielle Moore............................ Marciana Alfaro, Niece
Virginia Chiementi........................ Mateo Mancheno, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Judith Saathoff, Samya is
the granddaughter of my
cousin
Graciella de Luis Ponce................... Maria Regina Ponce Laviada,
first cousin
Samya Stumo............................... Sarina Ricketts, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Brian Hubbard, I am a friend
of the victim's family.
Samya Stumo............................... Ari Cardillo, Childhood
friend of victim
Danielle Moore............................ Tim Cruickshank, Roommate
Joanna Toole.............................. Joan Spruce, I am the aunt
of the victim.
Angela Rehhorn............................ G. Smith, Friend of the
family
Samya Stumo............................... Osamah Khalil, Friend of the
Family
Danielle Moore............................ Alexandra Bonham, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Christina Santala, Friend of
the victim's mother
Micah Messent, Danielle Moore............. Lucy Wilkie, I am a friend
of the 2 victims
Micheal Ryan.............................. Cristin Ryan, Sister
Mel Riffel................................ Chante Hettinger, Friend
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Luigi Flora, Camille's
mother's partner
Micah Messent............................. Mike Gershman, First cousin
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Nicolas Merle, friend of the
victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Deborah Conner, She was my
husband's cousin
Ghislaine De Claremont.................... Melissa Mairesse, Daughter
of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Richard Sweetman, I am a
family friend.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Katie Niccum, Cousin
Sebastiano Tusa........................... Alessandra Iovine, I am the
friend of the victim's
niece
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Carolyn Souaid, I am a
cousin of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................ Karen Bourne, I am the
friend of the mother of the
victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Philippe Leroux, I am a
friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Lucie Miron-Leroux, I am a
friend of the victim.
Micah Messent............................. Laurie Spickard, Cousin
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Joe LoGiudice, Step son-in-
laws
Samya Stumo............................... Amy Alpert, Friend of the
family
Alexandra Wachtmeister.................... Carl Nordlander, I am an
uncle of the victim.
Derick Lwugi.............................. Angel Kivia, I am the
daughter of Derick Lwugi.
Matthew Vecere............................ Linda Ha, Partner
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Tom Leatherman, I am a
friend of the victim
Lexi Deighton............................. Lexi Deighton, A friend
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Solange Lamy, Friend
Olly Vick................................. Simon Tilbury, Close friend
Josefin Ekermann.......................... V Leigh, Friend
Oliver Vick, Jessica Hyba................. Rebecca Vick, I am sister to
one victim, friend and
`sister-in-law' to the
other
Micah Messent............................. Caroline Rutledge, Friend
Angela Rehorn............................. S Mark Vincent, Uncle
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Alexandria Kealey, I am
friend of victims mother.
Angela Rehhorn............................ Ryan Rehhorn, Brother of
Angela
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Marine Capron, I am the
sister in law of the
victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Lloyd Baroody, friend of
family
Danielle Moore............................ Courtney Schreiter, Friend
Camille GEOFFROY.......................... Catherine BERTHET, I am the
mother of the victim
Melvin Riffel............................. Larissa felch, Melvin riffel
was my brother in law
Jessica Hyba.............................. Gregory Kovacs, Brother
Jessica Hyba.............................. Allan Kovacs, step father
Melvin Riffel, Bennet Riffel.............. HEIDI PRICE, My sons best
friends
Jessica Hyba.............................. Karol Kovacs, Mother
Angela Rehhorn............................ Petra MacKay, Cousin
Samya Stumo............................... Nina Anderson, friend of
parents
Max Thabiso Edkins........................ Marianne Gysae-Edkins, I am
the mother
Andrea Carol Anderson..................... Andrea Anderson, I am the
grandmother of the partner
of Micah's brother.
Micah Messent............................. Natalie Gates, friend
Hoda Bandeh-Ahmadi........................ Hoda Bandeh-Ahmadi, Friend/
colleague of Samya Stumo.
Danielle Courtney Moore................... Betty Moore, I am the
paternal Grandmother of the
victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Karen Carreras-Hubbard,
Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Ann Perry, family friend
Max Edkins................................ Inga Coleman, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Joanne Belanger, Aunt
Alexandra Wachtmeister.................... Wilhelm Wachtmeister, Father
of Alexandra
Graziella De Luis......................... Sofia Diaz, I am the niece
of the victim.
Joanna Toole.............................. Natalie Fullick, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Lisa Markowitz, I am a
friend of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................ Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Danielle Moore............................ Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Gachi de Luis............................. Maya de Luis, She was my
aunt
Clemence-Isaure BOUTANT................... Vincent WILLM, I am the
brother of the victim
Stephanie Lacriox......................... Connie Labreche, Cousin of
the victims father
Baleker, Sintayehu Shafi.................. Konjit Baleker, I'm the
sister of the victim
Oliver Vick............................... James Vick, Father
Matt Vecere............................... Colleen Menz, Aunt
Olivert Vick.............................. Cheryl Vick, I am the mother
of the victim
Graciela de Luis.......................... Alejandro suarez larrinaga,
Nephew of victim
Oliver Vick............................... Cheryl Vick. (Previously
misspelt), I am the Mother
of the victim
Oliver Vick............................... Cheryl Vick, I am the Mother
of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Noor Jdid, I am the friend
of the victim
Graziela de Luiz.......................... Margaret de Vanssay, Close
friend
De Luis................................... Christian Klacko, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Lindsay Butt, I am a friend
of the victim
N/A....................................... Arlene Tolopko, I am the
triend of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Patricia Frank, Second
cousin
Mick Ryan, Pilar Buzzetti, Zhen Zhen Huang Rodolfo, Friend and work
colleague.
Oliver Vick............................... Charles bennett, Friend
Marie Philipp............................. Helmut Schmidt, I am the
friend of the victim.
Marie Philipp............................. Monika Schmidt, I am the
friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole.............................. Nicky McNaughton, Best
friend
Micah Messent............................. Erica Greenup, best friend
Micah Messent............................. Frank Messent, I'm his older
brother
Graziela de Luis.......................... Javier, Brother of victim
Graziella de Luis
Clemence boutant WILLM.................... eddy willm, my cousin
Samya Stumo............................... Leila Baroody, friend
Melvin Riffel............................. Christina Felch, Mother in
law to the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Emma Belanger, Cousin
Micheal Ryan.............................. Christine Ryan, I am the
mother of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Alain Lacroix, I am
Stephanie's father.
Micheal Ryan.............................. Siobhan Brassil, Sister
Danielle Moore............................ Chris Moore, Father
Melvin Riffel............................. Clara LoGiudice, Son in law
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Zach Niccum, I am a friend/
family of the victims.
Melvin Riffel............................. Kaylynn Campbell, Family
member of his widow
Samya Stumo............................... Cheryl Williams, My daughter
friend of victim
Angela Rehhorn............................ Tara Reid, Friend of the
victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Philip Palmquist, I am the
cousin of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Sylvie Lamarche Lacroix, I
am the mother of Stephanie
Lacroix
Danielle Moore............................ Lita Venezuela, Friend of
the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Alanna Clark, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Nathalie Robillard, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Carole Girard, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Line Robillard, Aunt to
victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... J Caron, Cousin
Micah Messent............................. Suzanne Camp, I am Micah
Messent's mother
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Faith Neale, Friend of
victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Michael Moscarello, I am the
maternal cousin of the
victim.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Buczkowski, I am a friend of
the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Stephane Belanger, I am the
uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Lucie Lambert, Friend of
family
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Christopher Lamarche, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Helene Lacroix, I am the
grand-mother of the victim
Micah Messent............................. Deborah Fitzsimmons, Auntie
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Brigitte Castonguay, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Doris Blouin Harrison,
Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Torleif Stumo, I am the
brother of Samya.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Cameron Caron, I am cousin
of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Jennifer Finniss, Friend
Micah John Messent........................ John Joseph Messent, Father
of victim
Danielle Moore............................ Clariss Moore, I am the
mother of Danielle Moore
Danielle Moore............................ Rodilla Abenir, I am the
grandmother of Danielle
Moore
Danielle Moore............................ Fanny Abenir, I am the aunt
of Danielle Moore
Samya Stumo............................... Matthew Kreta, Childhood
Friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Anne Vien, Friend
Chunming Wang............................. SiyueWang, I am the daughter
of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Micheline Gervais, Friend of
family
Steph Lacroix............................. Shannon lafrance, Friend
Micah Messent............................. Kidston Short, I am Micah's
girlfriend
Micah Messent............................. Nancy MacPherson, Sister-in-
law
Graziella De Luis......................... Attilia Fracchia, I was a
close friend of the victim
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Bernard Vinot, a dear friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Linda Falardeau, Friend's
daughter
Joanna Toole.............................. Mark Toole, Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Caleb, Friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram, Sarah Auffret................. Rhiannon Griffiths, I was a
housemate of the victims at
different times
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Charlotte Wood, Friend of
the victims
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Charlotte Wood, I am the
friend of the victims
Mel Riffel................................ Ashley Jorgenson, I am a
friend of Mel
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Michel Robillard, I am the
uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Mariane Piche, Friend of
victim's parents (Alain and
Sylvie Lacroix)
N/A....................................... Eric Pagoada, Friend of a
friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Joanne Quinn, I am a friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Kris Picard, I am a friend
of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Diane Caron, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Johanne Lamarche, cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Barb Hogan, Colleague and
friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Pierrette Lachance, I am a
friend of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................ Jesslene Jawanda, I am the
friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Gualberto Abenir Jr, Neice
Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm............. Elisabeth Willm, I am the
mother of Clemence-Isaure.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Jocelyne Dubien, My cousins
daughter
Danielle Moore............................ Julie McDonald, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Gabrielle Gauthier, Former
work friend
Samya Stumo............................... Rami akhrass, Friend of
family
Danielle Moore............................ Kelly Ambrose, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Kathy Martorino, Moore
Family friend
Danielle Moore............................ Albert ajemian, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Lori Kinch, Friend of
victim's family
Danielle Moore............................ Laura Ward, I am a cousin of
the victimDanielle Moore
Danielle Moore............................ Joanne Cerdan, Family friend
Danielle Moore............................ Cameron Ure, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Dagni Ziedins, Friend of the
victims family
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Line Fogal, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Colleen Duffey, Family
friend
Danielle Moore............................ Da Chen, I am the friend of
the victim
Tamirat Mulu.............................. Fasika Mulu, Brother
Danielle Moore............................ Richard Hedges, I am the
uncle of the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Jenny Sutton, Friend
Stephanie LaCroix......................... Sarah Forrest, I am the
friend of the victim.
Xavier FRICAUDET.......................... Roseline FRICAUDET, I an the
mother of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Suzanne Labelle, I am an
aunt to the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Rob Del Mundo, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ chuchi mangubat, niece
Samuel Pegram............................. Seamus Harland, Friend
Anne Katrin Feigl......................... Juan Carlos Llorens Rojas, I
am te friend of the victim
Micah Messent............................. Ross Camp, Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Helene chartier, Friend
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Valerie Serres, friend
Danielle Moore............................ Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Dawn Tanner............................... Hunter Tanner French, I am
the son of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................ Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Danielle Moore............................ Lyn Abenir, Niece
Matt Vecere............................... Caroline McClain, I am the
cousin of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Mark Uzer, Niece
Danielle Moore............................ John Uzer, Niece
Jonathan Seex............................. Nadege Dubois-Seex, I am the
wife of the victim
Jonathan Seex............................. Alexandre seex, I am the son
of the victim
Mick Ryan................................. Andy Jackson, Friend
Jonathan Seex............................. Antoine Seex, I am the son
of the victim
Danielle Moore, Micah Messant............. Leah Luciuk, Friend of
victims
Jonathan Seex............................. Adeline seex, I am the
daughter of the victim
Boutant wilm Clemence..................... Christine Falcand, A Friend
of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Jennifer Doucet, Cousin
Danielle Moore, Paul N's wife, two Victoria, I am the friend of
children and his mother-in-law. the victim's parents
Mick Ryan................................. Rohit Kumar Pokharel,
Colleague
Joanna Toole.............................. Adrian Toole, I am Father
Mick Ryan................................. Clodagh Finn, Friend of the
victim
Danielle Moore............................ Troy Sabaot, Goddaughter
Mick Ryan................................. S.M. Tanbir Uddin, I am the
colleague of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................ Natasha Perera, Friend
Paolo Dieci............................... Luca Dieci, Brother
Paolo Dieci............................... Maria Luisa Mattioli, Wife
Paolo Dieci............................... Nella Dieci, Sister
Marie Philipp............................. Sophia Baumann, Cousin
Micah Messent............................. Emma Spickard, I am the
cousin of the victim.
Danielle C Moore.......................... Betty Moore, Grandmother of
the victim
Mick Ryan................................. Michael Brassil, Brother-in-
law
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Nicole Dumouchel, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Alexandra Dufort, I am a
friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Geraldine leka, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Alexander Tripp, Godfather
to Samya
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Maya McDonald, I am a friend
of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................ Kim Lawrence, Friend of the
victim's family
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Marlina Riffel, I am the
Aunt of the victims
Mick Ryan................................. Stephen Cahill, Friend and
co-worker
Samya Stumo............................... Sharrie Brooks, Cousin
Ekta Adhikari............................. Samir Nepal, Colleague
Mick Ryan................................. Finbarr Geaney, I am the
friend of the victim.
Graziella de Luis......................... Jean Kwo, Sister-in-law
Matt Vecere............................... Joyce Courter, I am a friend
of the victim.
Micah Messent............................. John Camp, Uncle
Alexandra Wachtmeister.................... Agneta Westman, Alexandra's
aunt
Micah Messent............................. Jade Ballard, I am the
eldest sister of the
victim.
Mick Ryan................................. Roy Crabb, Friend and
kindred Spirit
Micah Messent............................. Darryl Gershman, I am the
uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Rebecca Young, I am a friend
of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Monique, I am her aunt
Micah Messent............................. Cathy Camp, I am the Aunt of
MIcah Messent
Micah Camp................................ Keshia Chutter, I am the
cousin of the victim
Mick Ryan................................. Jennifer McAuliffe, I am the
cousin of the victims wife
Micah Messent............................. James Fitzsimmons, I am the
uncle of the victim.
Mick Ryan................................. Stuart Zimble, I am a close
friend
Michael Ryan.............................. Declan O'Mahony, I am a
friend of the victim.
Mick Ryan................................. Eadin O'Mahony, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Rosemary Quinn, Family
friend
Samya Stumo............................... Caitlin Hotaling, I am the
friend of the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Stephanie Kennedy, I used to
go to school with the
victim.
Mick Ryan................................. Orla Clinton, Friend and
colleague
Mick Ryan................................. Helen O'Dowd, I am a Friend
of the family of victim
Mick Ryan
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Paul and Patricia Nimchek,
We are friends of the
victim and her family.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Christina Callingham, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Darla Bennison, Friend of
Mother and Father and
extended families of the
victim.
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Darla Bennison, Friend of
the Mother and Father and
extended families of the
Victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Marc caron, Uncle
Samya Stumo............................... Tom Connell, Family friend
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Melanie Martin, Friend
Steph Lamarche............................ Rachelle Helin, I am a
friend of victim's mother.
Mick Ryan................................. Ahmad bin Zakaria, He was my
honorable chief
Danielle Moore............................ David Moore, I am the
brother of the victim
Ekta Adhikari, Mick Ryan.................. Praneet Shrestha, Fiancee,
Colleague
Marie Christin Philipp.................... Ellen Philipp, I am the
mother of the victim
Marie Christin Philipp.................... Klaus Philipp, I am the
father of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Annabelle Cerdan, Niece and
good friend
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Elena Riffel, I am the Aunt
of the victims
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Katharina, Close friend
Graziella de Luis......................... Mariana Cristellys, Friend
Michael Ryan.............................. Conor O'Sullivan, I am a
friend of the victim
Oliver Vick............................... Ilaria Gandossi, Father of
my children
Danille Moore............................. Aurie Narvaez, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Kathryn Brimson, Cousin
Danielle Moore............................ Sydney Brimson, 2nd Cousin
Joanna Toole.............................. Dennis Spruce, Uncle
Marie Philipp............................. Christiane Ulrich, Family
friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Diane Holmlund, I am a
second cousin of Samya
Michael Ryan.............................. Mari Turashvili, Friend
Danielle Moore............................ Alexander Cake, Cousin
Micah Messent............................. Jacqueline Messent, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Julie Balasalle, Friend and
coworker
Mick Ryan................................. Catherine Clark, Friend and
colleague of the victim
Anne-Katrin Feigel........................ Nicole Blu, I am a friend of
the victim.
Daniella Moore............................ Wilson Lee, I am the friend
of the victim
Mick Ryan................................. lucie jouanneau, friend
Samya Stumo............................... Theresa Williams, family
friend
Peter deMarsh............................. Michele Ashby, I am a friend
of a victim's sister. And I
fly!
Alexandra Wachtmeister.................... Nane Annan, I am a friend of
the victim
Mick (Micheal) Ryan....................... Aodhnaid Connolly Lennon,
Sister in Law
Amma Tesfamariam Woldesenbet.............. Bruk Tesfamariam
Woldesenbet, Brother
Danielle Moore............................ Honor Hedges Royer, aunt
Danielle Moore............................ Lora Meseman, Mother-in-law
Isabella Beryl Achieng Jaboma............. Allan Jaboma, She was my
sister
Graziella De Luis......................... Maya AlChidiac, Dear friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Pilar Vera Palmes, I am the
Chair of the Air Crash
Families Federation
International (ACVFFI)
Mick Ryan................................. Morgan Connolly, I am the
father-in-law of Mick Ryan
Mick Ryan................................. Maire Connolly, I am the
mother-in-law of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Natalie, Dear family friend
Max Edkins................................ Til Kreuels, I am a friend
of the victim.
Mick Ryan................................. Naoise Connolly Ryan, Wife
of Victim
Danielle Moore............................ Kathy Martorino, Friend of
Moore family
Samya Stumo............................... Nico Tripcevich, Family
friend
Angela Rehhorn............................ Catherine Vincent, I am the
Aunt of the victim.
Angela Rehhorn............................ John Vincent, I am the Uncle
of the victim
Sintayehu Shafi Baleker................... Liul Baleker, I am the
brother of the victim
Michael Ryan.............................. Robert Jackson, Friend
Mick Ryan................................. Sile Geaney, Family friend
Matt Vecere............................... Patricia Vecere McClain,
Aunt of victim
Marie Christin Philipp.................... Laura Vendt, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Jurgen Vsych, I am a friend
of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................ Glenn Gundermann, I am a
friend of the victim's
family.
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Marjorie Aelion, I am the
friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Laila Mokhiber, Cousin
Danielle Moore............................ Olivia Allen, friend and
colleague of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Joy Wahba, Friend
Daniel Moore, Micah Messent............... Matthew Miller, I am a
friend of Daniel and Micah
Abiodun Bashua............................ Alem Tebeje, Brother-in-law
Melvin Riffel............................. Korryll Lave, I am a friend
of the victim.
Abiodun Bashua............................ Yetunde Bashua, He was my
father
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Samantha Demers, I am a
friend of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Luis Arnal Delgado, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Penny Owen, Family friend
Max Thabiso Edkins........................ Jennifer Anderson-Ochoa, I
am a friend of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Harriett Northcutt, A friend
Samya STUMO............................... Laudison Lopes, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Lucille Martin, Friend of
the family
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Gail Brinkmeier, friend of
victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Lucille Martin, Friend of
the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Emilie Brule, I am the
friend of the victim.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Mackenzie Claver, I am the
best friend to the victims
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. John Fisher, I am married to
a cousin of the victims.
Samya Stumo............................... Carrie Olson, Cousin
Matt Vercere.............................. Matthew Baiamonte, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Nadia Milleron, I am Samya's
mother
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Lauri-Ann Loreto Neal, I am
a friend of the victim's
mother.
Mel Riffel................................ ED Duggan III, Friend
Carol Diehl............................... Carol Diehl, I am a friend
of the family
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... linda sawaya, friend of
victim's family
Bennett Riffel, Melvin Riffel............. Terri Sherman, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Helen A Hellmers, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Pat Brooks, I am a friend of
the victim's maternal
Grandmother, Professor
Laura Nader
Samya Stumo............................... Judy Metro, I am a friend of
the family.
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... David Teisler, She was
daughter of my daughter's
GodMother and a great
friend
Samya Stumo............................... Suzanne Murray, Family
friend
Samya Stumo............................... Mirna Mercado, I am a friend
of Samya
Samya Stumo............................... Laura Flores, my niece
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Gabrielle Paese, I am the
friend of the victim
Alexandra Wachtmeister.................... Anne-Margrete Wachtmeister,
I am her mother
Micah Messant............................. Nelsen Spickard, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Michel Monette, Friend of
the victim
Riffel.................................... Tonia, Friend
Samya Stumo a d Bella..................... Hayley Freedman, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... E Shaker, Cousin
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Diane de Schoutheete, I am
an aunt of Camille Geoffroy
Danielle Moore............................ Honor Hedges Royer, Aunt
Angela Rehhorn............................ Jeremy Harbinson, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Renee Betar, Friend of the
victim
Samya stumo............................... Janet Domenitz, Friend
Micah Messent............................. Caroline Willis, I am a
family friend.
Samya Stumo............................... James Holmlund, Samya is my
grand niece
Samya Stumo............................... Anne Marie Papandrea, Family
friend
Danielle Moore............................ Lita Venezuela, Friend if
the victim
Angela Rehhorn............................ Mary Eleanor Vincent, I am
the Aunt and Godmother of
Angela
Angela Rehhorn............................ Kaitlin Thatcher, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................ August Pokotylo, I am the
Uncle and Godfather of the
victim
Angela Rehhorn............................ Rowena Fonseka, Friend
N/A....................................... Shira Drossos, N/A
Samya Stumo............................... Marilyn J Holmlund, Samya
was the granddaughter of my
cousin Mary Holmlund Stumo
Danielle Moore............................ Bryan Sison, I am the friend
of the mother of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Emily Crawford, I am a
friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Karen Lundeen, Family friend
Mick Ryan................................. Giacomo Re, Friend and
colleague at WFP
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Veronique Geoffroy, Aunt
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Cari borja, Close Friend of
grandmother
Marie Christin Pfilipp.................... Michael Baumann, I am the
uncle of the victim
Samya Milleron............................ Nola Frick, Relative
Samya Stumo............................... Karen Hoyt, Friend of the
victim
Marie Christin Philipp.................... Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Mette Linnet, Friend
Wolfgang Eigner........................... Carmen Sigl, Friend
Max Edkins................................ Friederike Gysae-Schnurre, I
am his aunt
Mariapilar Buzzetti....................... Davide Picistrelli, friend
Immaculate Odero.......................... Victor Mwau, Close froend
Jonathan Seex............................. Maria Petersen, Cousin
Wolfgang Eigner, Armin Schietz, Christoph Jennifer Stefanits, Friend
Sautner.
Stefanie LaCroix.......................... Lauren Webber, Malawi
roommate
Sam Pegram................................ William Pegram, Grandfather
Micheal Ryan.............................. MP O'Brien, brother-in-law
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Nicolas Tsioukis, I am the
friend of the victim
Oliver Vick............................... Jonathan Haines, Cousin
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Francois Fricaudetxa, Father
Pilar Buzzetti............................ Angelo, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Lucy MacGillis, Friend
Arnold.................................... Chria, Friend
Paolo Dieci............................... Silvia Guglielmi, I am the
niece of the victim.
Marie Christin Philipp.................... Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Mercy NDIVO, Jared Babu................... Beatrice Kimuyu, I am mother
and Mother in-law of the
two victims
Ollie Vick, Jessica Hyba.................. Tim Bond, Friend
Max Thabiso Edkins........................ Andrea andersen, I am the
cousin of the victim
Immaculate Achieng Odero.................. Eliakim, Sister
Xavier FRICAUDET.......................... Olivier FRICAUDET, I'm the
cousin of the victim
Sintayhu Shafi............................ Yewubnesh, cousin
Harina HAFITZ............................. Stephanie COSTERG, I am the
friend of the victim.
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Rene Hautier, ami
Josefin Ekermann.......................... Norah Elena Ekermann, Sister
Joanne Toole.............................. Tanya Hucklesby, Friends
with her sister Karen
Graziela de Luis.......................... Alejandro, Nephew
Marie Philipp............................. Hendrik Philipp, I am her
brother
Michael Ryan.............................. Dene Cairns, I am a friend
of the victim
Olly Vick, Jessica Hyba................... Harriet Tarnoy, Friends
Alexandra Wachtmeister.................... Fredrik Wachtmeister,
Brother
Jonathan Seex............................. Par, Brother in law
Graziella de Luis......................... Isabel de Luis, sister
Sam Pegram................................ Val Pegram, Grandmother
Sebastiano Tusa........................... Alberta Pongiglione, I am a
friend of the victim
Marie Philipp............................. Laura Petrak, Best friend
Oliver Vick............................... Rifet Arapovic, I am the
friend of the victim.
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Gabriele Haldenwang, I am a
friend of the family of the
victim
Pilar Buzzetti............................ Richard Culley, I am the
friend of the victim
Immaculate Odero.......................... Sally, Sister-in-law
Oliver Vick............................... James Vick, I am the father
of the victim
Oliver Vick............................... Cheryl Vick, I am the Mother
of the victim
Immaculate Odero.......................... Christabel Were, Friend
Sam Pegram................................ Scott Hetherington, I am the
friend of the victim.
Michael Ryan.............................. Darragh Mcdonagh, Friend
Jessica Hyba.............................. George Ghikas, Friend
Oliver Vick............................... George Ghikas, Friend
Anne Feigl................................ Anna Caroline Feigl, Sister
in law
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Katharina Peters, Close
friend
Immaculate Achieng Odero.................. Denis Adhoch, Husband
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Rossi Hadzhieva, I am a
friend of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Diane Sykes, Family friend
Max Thabiso Edkins........................ Donald Edkins, I am the
father of Max Thabiso
Edkins.
Danielle Moore............................ Bhobbie alfaro, Cousin
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Joan, I am a friend of the
victim
Samya Stumo............................... Carol Conner, Family Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Matthew Caemmerer, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................ Lorna Nickerson, Family
friend
Paolo Dieci............................... Estella Dieci, Niece
Marie Philipp............................. Julia Schmidt, Friend of
family
Jonathan Seex............................. Linda Poidnakk, Friend
Danielle Moore, Micah Messent............. Mo Phung, Close friends.
Jonathan Seex............................. Gunilla Larsson, Jonathan
was the son of a very good
friend and I had known him
since he was a baby. It
still hurts that this
beautiful person is no
longer because of greed and
negligence!
Danielle Moore............................ Jacqueline Miller, I am the
friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole.............................. Paul Heydon, Friend of a
Friend of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Linda Miller, Friend
Jonathan Seex............................. Nadja Chekhov, I'm the
friend of the victim's
motter
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Julie Lacourse, I am a
friend of the victim.
Melvin and Bennett Riffel................. Cheryl hess, Cousin
Jonathan Seex............................. Johan Hartzell, Wife's
cousin
Immaculate Achieng' odero................. Princess Piro, I am a very
close family & childhood
friend & neighbor
Samya Stumo............................... Arlene Tolopko, I am a
friend of the victim.
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Valerie serres, friend
Sebastiano Tusa........................... Sofia Ambrogio, I am the
niece of the victim
Danielle Moore............................ Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Clemence Boutant.......................... Ian HENSTOCK, Friend /
former colleagues
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Kristen Brookes, friend of
the family
Michael Ryan.............................. Helen Maree, I am a family
member of the victim
Angela Elizabeth Maria Rehhorn............ Roland Rehhorn, Father of
victim
Sebastiano Tusa........................... Carlo Tusa, He was my
cousin.
Matthew Vecere............................ Richard McMullin, I am a
friend of the victim.
Jean-Michel Suzanne Barranger............. Laetitia Tavernier, I am the
dauthger
Jean Michel Suzanne Barranger............. Marc Tavernier, I am son-in-
law
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Murray Howe, friend of
Family
Eric Prieur............................... Prieur claire, My brother
Danielle Moore............................ Kathleen Randall, Cousin
Samya Stumo............................... Deveney williams, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Amy Alpert, Family friend
Cedric Galia Asiavugwa.................... Alex Kubasu, I am the friend
of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Sheryl Lechner, family
friend
Bennett Riffel, Melvin Riffel............. Lorraine Micke-Hayden, I am
the cousin of the victims.
Oliver Vick............................... Kirsten Young, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Jennifer Brown, I am a
friend of the victim.
Johanna Toole............................. Elisa Canalini, I am a
colleague of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Steven Souaid, I am a cousin
of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Robbyn Swan, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Sandra K Holmlund, Great
Niece
Angela Rehhorn............................ Jacob Oberfrank, Partner
Clemence Boutant-Willm, Samuel Pendam..... Claire FABING, I am a
colleague of the victims
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Michelle BeaudrySeguin,
Close friend
Steph Lacroix............................. Jamie Lafrance, Friend/
former roommate
Xavier FRICAUDET.......................... NOUVION Marie, famille
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Thomas Leatherman, Friend
and Colleague
Melvin Riffel............................. Melissa Duralia, I am the
friend of a victim
Graziella de Luis y Ponce................. Maria Tauber, Friend
Marie Philipp............................. Angelika Begerow, I am the
friend of the victim
Jonathan Seex............................. Anne-Marie Petersen, Aunt
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Sophie Le Bret, Family's
friend
Michael Ryan.............................. John Maree, Concerned
engineer family friend
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Sam Eifling, I'm a friend of
the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Michelle Wolfensperger,
Cousin
MELVIN Riffel, BENNETT RIFFEL............. Rebecca Richardson, I am a
friend of Ike and Susan
Riffel
Matt Vecere............................... Stephen Dintino, Friend
Dawn Tanner............................... Brian Kobiero, Spouse
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Regina M. Buono, Friend
Immaculate Achieng Odero.................. Emmy, Sister
Allan Chacha.............................. Allan Chacha, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Joseph Kreta, Childhood
friends
Mick Ryan................................. Jack Connolly, Uncle Inlaw
Melvin and Bennett Riffel................. Carl J. Koutnik MD, friend
of family
Immaculate Achieng Odero.................. Judith Otsieno, Friend
Mick Ryan................................. Lee Wassem, Family member
Mick Ryan................................. Deirdre Connolly, I am the
wife of Jack Connolly--
Mick's uncle in law
Suzanne Barranger, Jean Michel Barranger.. Barranger Sebastien, I am
the son of the victim
Paolo Dieci............................... Harlan Downs-Tepper, I am
the friend of the victim.
Juliah Mwashi............................. Florah Mwashi, Sister
Juliah Mwashi............................. Ivy Nduta, Mother
Juliah Mwashi............................. Joy Ayuma, Mother
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Virginie Fricaudet, I am the
sister
Jonathan Seex............................. Karen McDougall, I am a
childhood friend of the
victin.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Susan Mears, Family Friend
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Jean-Luc Moreau, I am friend
of the victim
Clemence Willm............................ Celine Grimault, I am a
friend of the victim.
Mick Ryan................................. Alan Connolly, Relative
Stephanie Lacroix......................... David Finniss, I am the
friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole.............................. Bridget Harris, Close family
friend and best friend of
my niece Katy Harris
Samya Stumo............................... Laura Zabriskie, I am a
friend and parishioner of
Samya.
Matt Vecere............................... Tomra Vecere, Sister
Matt Vecere............................... Charles Sinesi, Brother in
law
Clemence-Isaure Willm Boutant............. Emma Boutant, I am the step-
daughter of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................ Colleen Duffey, Family
friend
Samya Stumo............................... Evelyn Kreta, I was her
friend and church school
teacher.
Matt Vecere............................... Rachel Condon, Niece
Samya Stumo............................... Sylvia Lewis, I am a family
friend.
Oliver Vick............................... Lucy Bowers-Wildblood,
Friend, chosen family.
Oliver Vick............................... Lucy Bowers-Wildblood,
Friend, chosen family.
Danielle Moore............................ Nick Cake, Cousin
Michael Ryan.............................. Hayley Dowsing-Connolly,
Family friend
Samya Stumo............................... Karen Hubbard, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Matilde Guillen, I am the
host mother in Peru of the
victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Gustavo Justo, I am the host
father in Peru of the
victim
Emmaculate odero.......................... Susan, Friend
Immaculate odero.......................... Ephie, Sister
Mick Ryan................................. Mai, Colleague and Friend
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Harm van Duin, Friend
Sam Pegram................................ Mark Pegram, Father
Ekta Adhikari, Maria Pilar Buzzetti, Noel Griffin, Colleague and
Virginia Chimenti, Harina Hafitz, Zhen- friend
Zhen Huang, Michael Ryan, Djordje Vdovic.
Alexandra Wachtmeister.................... Anna Wachtmeister, Cousin
Immaculate Achieng Odero.................. Hermaton Nalyanya, A friend
to the victim
Agnes Mary Wangari Gathumbi............... Ian Kabaara, I am a friend
of the children of the
victim
Sam Pegram................................ Melanie Cremona, Friend
KARIM SAAFI............................... Mohamed Najeh Saafi, BROTHER
KARIM SAAFI............................... DRISS SAAFI, Oncle
KARIM SAAFI............................... ELYESS SAAFI, Oncle
Saafi Karim............................... Ingrid de Viennay, Je suis
son ancienne belle soeur.
KARIM SAAFI............................... INESS SAAFI, Oncle
Max Edkins................................ Kathleen McCarthy, Friend
Angela.................................... Shantel Rehhorn, Sister
Angela Rehhorn............................ Joan Vincent, Mother
Samya Stumo............................... Deirdre Hatch, I am a friend
of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... David Hatch, I am a friend
of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Glen Levacque, Cousin
Immaculate odero.......................... Ephie odero, Sister
Riffle Brothers........................... Ericka Allio, Family friend
CLEMENCE-ISAURE BOUTANT................... Denis Boutant, I am the
husband of the victim
Joanna Toole.............................. Jerome Toole, I am the
cousin of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Jenelle Pierce, Cousins
daughter passed way in the
plane.
Emmaculate Achieng Odero.................. Clifford Odero, I am the
brother of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Georgia Usry, Close friend
of the family
Jonathan Seex............................. Johanna, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Susan Lockwood, I am a
friend of the victim
Oliver Vick............................... David Haines, I am the
victim's uncle.
Danielle Moore............................ Mark Uzer, Cousin
Danielle Moore............................ Mark Uzer, Cousin
Samya Stumo............................... Joni Cushing, Friend
Jessica Hyba.............................. Susan Olszynko, Close friend
Michael Ryan.............................. Lynn Dowsing-Connolly, He
was my cousin's husband
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Fr. John Kreta, Spiritual
father
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Erika Wainwright, I am the
friend of Samya Stumo
Graciela De Luis Ponce.................... Noemi Laviada, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Hollis Starks, friend of the
victim
Jonathan Seex............................. Torben Rune, Friend of
victim
ZHEN ZHEN HUANG........................... WEI XIONG, I am the husband
of the victim
Graziella De Luis......................... Anita Guerra, I am a friend
of the victim
Max Thabiso Edkins........................ Gillian Mary Edkins Bailey,
I am the auntie
Mick Ryan................................. Thalia Maree, Cousin of
Mick's wife Naoise
Maygenet Worku............................ Eyasu Teshome, Husband
Anne-Katrin Feigl......................... Michele Pasquale, I am the
friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram................................ Tom Pegram, Brother
Camille Geofrroy.......................... Amelie Jourdier, I am the
aunt
Mick Ryan................................. Seanna Connolly, Brother in
law
Michael Ryan.............................. ciamha hurst, i am a friend
Mick Ryan................................. Tina O'Flynn, I am a friend
of the victim
Micheal Ryan.............................. Silvia Rodriguez Barbado, A
friend of the victim
Graziella de Luis y Ponce................. Susan Draz, Friend
Michael Ryan.............................. Eoin Daffy, Friend
Marie Christin Philipp.................... Wiebke Hormeyer, I am a
friend
Ines Michaela Gans........................ Bernd Gans, My daughter
Virginia Chimenti, Pilar Buzzetti, Harina Vincenzo Maggiore,
Hafiz. Colleagues
Karoline Aadland.......................... Knut Ingvar Aadland, I am
the father of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... James Carter, Friend of
Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Katherine Preston Cory, I am
a friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Tierney Simpson Jutzi,
Friend of a Friend
Carlo Spini, Gabriella Viciani............ Andrea Spini, I am the son
of the victims
Samya Stumo............................... Joseph Homsi, Friend
Abiodun Bashua............................ mena tebeje, I am a wife of
the victim
Clemence Wilm............................. Marine Rudant, friend
Samya Stumo............................... Carol McFadden, Friend of
friend
Xavier Fricaudet.......................... Yvette Le Gall, Xavier is
the brother of my son in
law
Stehanie Lacroix.......................... Chantale and Real
Boissonneault, daughter of
our friends
Josefin Ekerman La Torre.................. Michael, Cousin
Samya Stumo............................... Alyssa O'Connor, Close
Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Andres Justo, I am the
friendo ir the victim
Stephanie Lacroix......................... Sara Lefebvre, Classmate
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Lucia Justo, I am the friend
of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... Maria Sofia Justo Guillen, I
am the friend of the victim
Samya Stumo............................... April Cain, She was the
close friend of a young
friend of mine
Micah Messent............................. Isabella Morgan, Friend
Samya Stumo............................... Stuart Robinson, Friend
Sam Pegram................................ Deborah Pegram, I am Sams
Mum
Xavier FRICAUDET.......................... Isabelle REBILLARD, I am a
friend of the victim's
family
Oliver Vick............................... Lucinda Pullinger, Long term
friend
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel............. Mary Ann Tangney, Nephews
Michael Ryan.............................. Padraig McCarron, I am the
friend of the victim
Harina Hafitz............................. Arnaud Sournia, Friend of
the family of the victim
Virginia Chiementi........................ Mateo Mancheno, Friend of
the victim
Micheal Ryan.............................. Brian McDonagh, I am the
friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo............................... Ben Webb, Close friend
Jonathan Seex............................. Bjorn olund, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Lucia Guillen, I am the
friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Sandra Sermini-curtiss,
Friend of family
Matt Vecere............................... Warren McClain, I am the
uncle of the victim
Mel Riffel, Bennet Riffel................. Thomas Tangney, Uncle
Sergey Vyalikov........................... Alex Fikhman, I am the uncle-
in-law of victim.
Marie Philipp............................. Derek Hagen, Friend
Camille Geoffroy.......................... Laura Couillet, Freind
Samya Rose Stumo.......................... Andrew Souaid, Cousin
GEORGE KABAU.............................. PAUL KABAU, BROTHER
Max Edkins................................ Leonita Louw, Friend
Eric PRIEUR............................... Fabrice CRABIE, brother in
law
Mick Ryan................................. Morgan F Connolly, Brother-
in-law
Michael Ryan.............................. Theresa Stack, Friend of the
fmily
Sergey Vialikov........................... Dmitrii Vialikov, Brother
Sergey Vialikov........................... Nadya Vialikova, SON
Anne Karanja, Caroline Nduta Karanja, Dr. Karanja, Mother, sister,
Ryan, Kellie and Rubby. nephew and niece
Mick Ryan................................. Ian Connolly, Cousin in law
Mick Ryan................................. Sam Woolhead, My partner is
a family friend
Karim SAAFI............................... Abdel-Jawad Jellad, Nephew
Jonathan Seex............................. Carola Schroder, I'm mother
in law to his sister
Joanna Toole.............................. John Paul Rodgers, Cousin
Jonathan Seex............................. Carola Schroder, I'm mother
in law with his sister
Samya Stumo............................... Clarice Faber, Friend
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Carson. So, Administrator Dickson, you recently
received a letter, sir, from me and my colleagues,
Representative Fitzpatrick and Representative Payne, about
FAA's failure to implement a requirement for secondary cockpit
barriers that were enacted in 2018.
As the author of the 2018 provision, sir, it is beyond
frustrating to see a known security risk ignored by the FAA. We
worked with a number of stakeholders to effectively reach a
compromise that was able to pass our committee with bipartisan
support, pass the House and the Senate.
And instead of requiring secondary cockpit barriers on all
aircraft, old and new, H.R. 911 would mandate, which I am proud
to be a lead sponsor of. You know, our 2018 provision comprised
by only requiring barriers on new airplanes. Yet today, there
seems to be no progress whatsoever on implementing the
requirements.
Mr. Administrator, please tell me why there hasn't been any
progress to install secondary barriers? In our letter, we asked
for some details in writing, and we have yet to receive that
information. And when can we expect to receive this
information?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman.
I will reiterate the same comments that I made to Chair DeFazio
to start, is that I want this to happen more quickly. And we
are absolutely committed to implementing the requirement for
secondary barriers on transport category aircraft.
We do have rulemaking, notice of public comment rulemaking
that we have to do. Also, even though there had been a study a
number of years ago conducted by RTCA, it did not define the
necessary technical requirements for manufacturers to install
these barriers.
So, last year, we conducted an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee to get us that technical detail. We have that now,
and we are using it to inform and incorporate into our
rulemaking process.
So, I am happy to follow up with you personally on where we
go from here. But, again, we are working very hard to get this
out for a draft rule for public comment, get it through the
Department and through the executive branch, so that we can put
it into law, and we are going to do that absolutely as quickly
as we can.
Mr. Carson. Administrator, so why has progress been so
slow? It is almost unprecedented.
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, when you do any kind of
rulemaking, you have to start with data and information. And
that is what we had to go back and do. Once the decision was
made that we had to go through notice and comment rulemaking,
we have got to have the justification for the rule that will
stand up through the entire Administrative Procedure Act
process, and that is the due diligence that we are having to go
through.
Mr. Carson. All right. Well, we will be on standby. Thank
you, sir.
Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Carson.
I recognize now Representative Mast of Florida for 5
minutes.
Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
Number one, I just have to address what has to be one of
the most ignorant opening statements I have heard ever in this
committee, our chairman essentially comparing Americans to
Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 terrorists, saying that he
expects Americans will be breaking through a cockpit door in
order to crash an airplane. Pure ignorance.
I wonder if he would use that same brush to paint over
those that destroyed Minneapolis or destroyed Portland or other
cities across America, torched businesses, torched places like
that. Absolutely ignorant. I would hope that he would apologize
to all Americans for his opening statement, which I found to be
just ignorant and disgusting.
I am going to use the remainder of my time to ask an open-
ended question to you, Mr. Administrator, and I am going to ask
for your creativity on this. I don't know if there is a place
that FAA can play a role in this or not, but maybe you can find
something for us since it seems that the Department of Homeland
Security is unwilling to do anything to ground the flights and
the spread of people entering America illegally across this
country.
And so, my question to you, as the Administrator, can you
think of anything creatively that could be done through the FAA
to ground these flights of illegal immigrants across the United
States of America?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman.
We work very closely with other Federal agencies on security
matters. Customs and Border Protection is probably the most
prominent example, but, certainly, Department of Defense and
others.
With respect to civil aircraft operation, any registered
aircraft--my responsibility is the aviation safety of the
national airspace and to make sure that fair access is granted
to that. There is not a mechanism within the agency to look at
the nature of those operations that you are referring to, but
certainly, if there were information that came available to us
about some sort of illegal charter or something like that, that
is something that we would follow up on and make sure that the
appropriate security authorities were brought in to
investigate.
Mr. Mast. I appreciate your response. Could you be a little
bit--just explain a bit more on what would constitute an
illegal charter, in your mind?
Mr. Dickson. Well, it would probably come to us from
someone who brought it to our attention. It could be an
employee. It could be one of our inspectors saw something amiss
with a license or a private aircraft being used for commercial
purposes. Those types of things would be things that would give
us some evidence that we would begin to look into.
Mr. Mast. Does FAA take issue or find any problems with the
issues going on with manifests as it relates to these flights?
Obviously, individuals that cannot be identified very clearly
makes it difficult, maybe impossible, to manifest those flights
correctly as they are spread across the country. Is there any
issue that FAA takes with that?
Mr. Dickson. We don't have any visibility into manifests,
as you are describing.
Mr. Mast. Very good. I appreciate your responses today, Mr.
Administrator. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Davids of
Kansas for 5 minutes.
Ms. Davids. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you for your time today, Administrator Dickson.
First, I will just say I continue to keep the families of the
folks who lost loved ones in the 737 MAX tragedies. And then I
am going to focus my questions on the FAA implementation of the
2020 aircraft certification bill that we are talking about here
today.
So, when Boeing discovered the angle-of-attack disagree
alert was inoperable on more than 80 percent of the 737 MAX
aircraft, Boeing decided three things: One, to wait nearly 3
years to fix the problem when it would have been less expensive
to do so; two, to not notify the FAA that the alert wasn't
working, it didn't notify its MAX customers or MAX pilots; and
then three, which I think is even worse, it just kept building
and selling more planes with the same defect.
Boeing didn't ultimately divulge the problem until after
the Lion Air crash. Boeing tried to defend its actions,
claiming the faulty alert wasn't a safety issue. However, FAA's
then-Acting Administrator Dan Elwell told our committee in 2019
that the alert was required to be installed and functional on
all MAX airplanes, because it was part of the plane's certified
type design.
So, Mr. Dickson, I think it is clear that I find Boeing's
handling of this matter pretty concerning. So, I want to ask
you about what the FAA has done to address this, and to
discourage Boeing or any other manufacturers from acting
similarly in the future.
I know you have noted the reset of the relationship the FAA
has with Boeing specifically, and you have noted things like
the limited delegated authority. But I am curious specifically,
what enforcement action, if any, has the FAA taken against
Boeing for its defiance of the FAA's type design requirement
and concealing the inoperability of the AOA disagree alert?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. And I think
it is important to understand, again, that one of the first
things I did when I got to the agency was to make clear the
arm's-length relationship, and the regulatory relationship and
oversight that we have with Boeing. So that is where I would
start. And not only Boeing, but all the entities that we
regulate, whether it is manufacturing, airlines, or otherwise.
One of the important principles here is that we don't want
any single points of failure. And what you are describing is a
single point of failure. And we need to have layers of
protection. We need to have more transparency. We need to have
better coordination and collaboration among FAA officers. There
were things inside the agency, and also, the relationship
between the agency and Boeing that we are addressing and that
we have addressed over the last couple of years.
As an example of that, in 2020, we accepted Boeing's
voluntary safety management system program. And, again, the
rulemaking on SMS for manufacturers is not complete, but this
program comports with the national standards on safety
management systems, and also, ICAO standards as well. And we do
regular performance reviews. And this mechanism brings forward
information and data from Boeing. So they are in a position
where, instead of concealing----
Ms. Davids. Administrator----
Mr. Dickson [continuing]. [Inaudible] information to the
FAA.
Ms. Davids [continuing]. I want to clarify my question. I
was asking what enforcement action has been taken versus
acceptance of the safety protocols. I think that that is a good
thing, but I am curious how we are going to make sure that
Boeing or other manufacturers don't engage in concealment of
things like inoperability in the future.
Mr. Dickson. Well, we took enforcement action against
Boeing, one of the largest civil penalties we have ever levied
against a company. And, so, that was part of it. But overall,
again, the type of thing that you are describing now cannot
happen, because we have taken those single vulnerabilities out
of the system, and we will continue to work to find them and
ferret them out.
Also, we have increased our oversight, and the involvement
of our engineering team out on the production floor. We
typically have had inspectors out there. We still do. We have
increased our engineering staff presence. And we are seeing
differences in behavior where we have seen Boeing actually stop
production when issues have come up. So, again, this is
something we need to stay on top of.
Ms. Davids. Thank you, Administrator.
And I yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Representative Van Duyne of Texas for
5 minutes.
Ms. Van Duyne. Thank you very much.
Good afternoon, Administrator Dickson. Thank you very much
for being with us today. My district, which is Texas 24, is
home to Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, American Airlines, and Envoy
Air. We are also closely surrounded by Southwest Airlines'
headquarters in Dallas Love Field.
DFW Airport is the leading economic driver, not only in my
region but in the entire State of Texas. Hundreds of thousands
of jobs are reliant on the airport, and it serves as a major
recruiting tool as we see and hear from hundreds of CEOs who
are moving or who have moved their companies to that area
because of the airport.
In the last few weeks, we have seen disruptions across the
country from delays to cancellations. And while the causes of
some of these delays remain unknown, the timing related to the
announcement of the vaccine mandate is also very concerning.
Just Tuesday, you may have seen that Southwest Airlines
reversed their mandate.
I am curious now that we are coming upon the huge holiday
season, how is the FAA preparing for further disruptions in the
system as we move closer to the busiest travel time of the
year?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. And, again,
on the subject of the vaccine mandate, the idea there is to get
us past COVID-19 as a country as quickly as possible so that
the system can operate efficiently and effectively and preserve
all of those jobs.
My focus, again, is on aviation safety. I am very familiar
with the operations of Dallas/Fort Worth and Love Field and
American Airlines and Southwest Airlines. I have been in
regular contact with their leadership, and also with their
labor unions, to make sure that we can operate safely and
efficiently going into the holiday season, and we will continue
to stay focused on that.
Part of what is going on here is the changes in consumer
preferences. And kind of the guardrail-to-guardrail capacity
issues that we saw in the system require some time for airlines
to get their fleets and their workforces aligned so that they
can be responsive to consumer demand.
And we are doing everything that we can to make sure that
the aviation system, the air traffic control system, stays open
for business so that Thanksgiving and Christmas travel, and
really travel every day can continue unfettered and
uninterrupted, because it is a huge part of our economy and it
is a service that we provide to the public.
Ms. Van Duyne. I mean, it is absolutely a huge service to
our economy, but American Airlines alone has 4,000 pilots who
haven't been vaccinated. I know that your purpose and focus is
on preserving jobs, but what they are facing is right before
the holiday season actually having to be forced to lose their
jobs.
Have you had or sought input from pilots or from air
traffic control about the vaccine mandate?
Mr. Dickson. I am in constant contact, in regular contact
with labor leaders around the industry, and also with our
unions within the FAA. So, I think----
Ms. Van Duyne. So, you have, you have sought input from
pilots and from air traffic controllers?
Mr. Dickson. Always have a dialogue with them on a whole
host of issues.
Ms. Van Duyne. So, you have sought input from pilots and
ATC regarding the vaccine mandates?
Mr. Dickson. Well, not specifically the vaccine mandate,
but certainly any operational or safety issues that we have all
been concerned about throughout the pandemic and even in daily
operations, to make sure that we don't have undesirable
distractions, either at individual companies, or within the FAA
itself.
Ms. Van Duyne. Because what I am hearing directly from many
of them is just the increased stress. They are going to have to
lose their jobs. And it is not just for travel, it's supply
chain issues. UPS and some others have talked about the impact
that that is going to have on supply chain and on our economy
and on commerce in the U.S.
So what steps is the FAA using to address the supply chain
issues that appear to be getting worse before they are getting
better?
Mr. Dickson. Well, throughout the pandemic, we have used
the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, and we have collaborated
again with all stakeholders to make sure that the aviation
system remains available, and, again, open for business so that
the supply chain is not interrupted.
The FAA was right in the middle of----
Ms. Van Duyne. Are you concerned that vaccine mandates are
going to harm the commercial side on the supply chain side, as
I have heard?
Mr. Dickson. I don't have specific concerns there. Those
are between those employees and their employer. What I am
concerned about is to make sure that regardless of whatever the
distraction is, whether it is a company going through a merger,
whether it is challenges that people are having in their
personal lives or otherwise, that we are able to focus on
flying the airplane, operating the airplane----
Mr. Larsen. Representative, your time has expired.
Mr. Dickson [continuing]. And being able to operate the
aviation system efficiently.
Ms. Van Duyne. Thank you, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Kahele of
Hawaii for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Administrator Dickson, for coming to speak
to the Aviation Subcommittee today on the implementation of the
2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. As
a commercial airline transport pilot, this issue is very
personal to me, and I am glad that the Aviation Subcommittee
has committed and continues to provide oversight to ensure that
these mistakes will not be repeated.
As part of the committee's investigation into the 737 MAX,
we learned about multiple troubling instances where Boeing's
Authorized Representatives, who are supposed to be acting on
behalf of the FAA, and ultimately the public, signed off on
plans that clearly prioritized Boeing's focus on production and
profits, and not safety.
For example, when Boeing discovered that the angle-of-
attack disagree alert wasn't functioning on more than 80
percent of 737 MAX airplanes after the MAX was already in
commercial service, Boeing decided to wait nearly 3 years to
fix the problem so that they could save money by doing the fix
as part of its planned rollout of the 737 MAX 10, and
Authorized Representatives ultimately agreed to Boeing's plan
to delay the fix.
Or when Boeing convened a meeting back in 2013 to assess
whether it could downplay the significance of MCAS to
regulators so that Boeing could avoid additional regulatory
scrutiny and additional pilot training requirements, an
Authorized Representative agreed with Boeing's plan to limit
use of the term ``MCAS'' externally outside of Boeing to both
regulators and customers and, instead, communicate this known
issue externally an addition to speed trim.
And I want to quote from the summary report where the
Boeing Authorized Representative concurred with Boeing's plan
regarding its description of MCAS, and in a summary of that
meeting, which was part of an internal Boeing email, and I
quote, ``This will allow us to maintain the MCAS nomenclature
while not driving additional work due to training impacts and
maintenance manual expansion.''
So, the first of my two questions, Administrator Dickson,
is: As the FAA implements the Aircraft Certification, Safety,
and Accountability Act, what is the FAA doing to ensure that
its Authorized Representatives prioritize the safety of the
flying public over the financial bottom line of the industry?
Mr. Dickson. Well, this is a great question, actually right
at the point that I talked about earlier. We are monitoring
actively ODA holder accountability to program requirements so
that these things cannot happen again.
And what you are referring to, undue pressure or under the
broader rubric of interference, is a special emphasis area and
is a particular focus of our investigations and our oversight,
not only of Boeing but of all manufacturers that have an ODA.
So, we have conducted interviews with Boeing employees.
There is correspondence that we can certainly make available to
you if you haven't seen it already, to make sure unit members
are conducting their duties and are not under pressure from the
company to be able to comport to timelines or to conceal
issues.
Also, under Boeing's safety management system, one of the
things that they have done is they are conducting a safety risk
management process, to systematically assess everything that is
happening in those interactions with the agency, to root out
and address and be able to identify and eliminate any
interference in that relationship.
We are also in the process--and this gets back to my
opening answers to Chair Larsen. We are institutionalizing this
guidance, in order that governs our ODA oversight, to make sure
that it has got as much strength as it possibly can have. And
we are issuing some clarifying policy this fall.
We are also, as you know, in the legislation, we are
approving individual unit members, and we are appointing unit
member advisers from the agency for every unit member of an
ODA, so there will actually be those direct connections within
the agency.
All of those things are designed to eliminate any kind of
barriers to communication between Boeing and FAA.
Mr. Kahele. A quick yes-or-no question: Can we have your
commitment that the FAA will ensure that companies can't misuse
Authorized Representatives again in the future to sign off on
design and development plans that downplay any potentially
deadly new systems to regulators?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, absolutely.
Mr. Kahele. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Representative Steel of California
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Steel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.
Ranking Member Graves. And thank you, Administrator Dickson,
for coming out today.
You mentioned that it is imperative for the FAA to
accelerate and expand the deployment of new technologies in
order to reduce barriers and actively promote innovation that
enhances safety and efficiency, and that is really important.
But we need accountability when it comes to the future of
aviation noise.
My district is home to John Wayne Airport, which is a
world-class airport, and it is also close to Long Beach
Airport. I cannot stress enough how important it is for you and
the FAA to meet with local communities to discuss the issues
with aviation noise.
We tried to set up some of the meetings, and I even had a
very hard time to put your employees and these community
leaders to discuss about the noise issue. We must meet with
them outside of the formal roundtable process and on a regular
basis.
My constituents feel ignored by your administration, and
the FAA ombudsman has not adequately engaged with the community
as of now. The FAA needs to work with manufacturers to
prioritize safe, clean, equitable solutions to the complex and
nuanced issue of the aviation noise, because for them, aviation
noise--actually, for us--noise and environmental issues are the
most important part when you have an airport in your district.
I believe the Federal Government has an important role to
play in cutting redtape and providing a regulatory environment
where new technology can be approved for use safely.
So, could you discuss how FAA R&D is helping to advance
technologies to address noise issues, and what are some of
these much-needed projects and technologies?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. I will
address the second part first and then get into the community
engagement aspect, because that is really, I think, the nearest
term focus of your concern.
We have conducted research for years on engine technology
and on noise research, and that will continue. As a matter of
fact, we just issued $100 million in grants to, I believe it
was eight aviation companies on engine technology for improved
environment and also noise reduction. This is through our CLEEN
program, the Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, and Noise
Program that we have had in place for a number of years.
So, this is the next iteration of that, and that will be a
focus of the research. Those companies have to match that grant
money, but we can certainly get that information to your office
after the hearing, so you have got full visibility into what
that noise research looks like.
In terms of community engagement, this is something that is
extremely important to me, and I understand that the agency has
not always engaged in an effective manner with local
communities. But I think we have come a long way.
And in some of our more recent metroplex projects, for
example, we have been, I think, much more effective in engaging
everyone in the community. And with the Congress' help, our
regional administrators and our regional ombudsman, we do use
the roundtable process, but that is the front door of the FAA
on noise issues. So, I will follow up with them, to make sure
that they are engaging your constituents directly.
I also meet regularly, my staff and I meet regularly with
the Quiet Skies Caucus, and I would encourage dialogue with
them as well. We had our last meeting about, I believe it was
about 2 months ago, and there has been a lot of beneficial
dialogue there on ways that we can engage more systematically
around the country, including the role of our regional
administrators and regional ombudsman.
Mrs. Steel. I really appreciate that answer, because
metroplex has been implemented, and there is a certain runway
path has been more affected than before, because it was like a
scheduled landing to scheduled flying out. Now it is like one
path. That is the reason most of these local communities----
Mr. Larsen. Your time is expired.
Mrs. Steel. I have more questions, but you know what, I
will do it in writing.
So, I yield back. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Williams of
Georgia for 5 minutes.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Chairman Larsen, for
convening this hearing. And I also want to thank the committee
members and staff for all of the work that was done last
Congress to enact the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act. And while I was not here, I know, you all,
that this legislation will save lives.
It will equip the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure
that our airways, airplanes, and, most importantly, our
traveling constituents are safe. That last part is important to
me, you all, because I am a frequent flyer at the Nation's
busiest airport. My district is home to Hartsfield-Jackson
Atlanta International Airport, the Nation's busiest airport.
And, Mr. Dickson, we will be back as the world's busiest pretty
soon. We got a little asterisk in 2020, but we will be back
really soon as the world's busiest airport. And I want all
people who work in or travel through our Nation's busiest
airport to be safe.
Mr. Dickson, in your testimony, you mentioned that one of
the areas you are working on to implement the act is creating a
culture of safety and excellence at the FAA, including by
attracting talented staff.
To what extent are you focusing on diversity, equity, and
inclusion as part of FAA's efforts to create a talented
workforce, and what impact would a broader range of
perspectives at the FAA have on ensuring potential safety
hazards are identified and reported?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. Actually, I
really appreciate the opportunity to speak on this point,
Congresswoman, because diversity, in so many ways, is important
to the effectiveness of any safety organization, because
ultimately our subject matter expertise is important. You have
to have technical competency, but it is an organization that is
made up of people, and people are our most valuable resource.
So, we want to make sure we have got the right skills in
the right place at the right time, but we also want to make
sure that we have diversity of thought and perspectives,
experience, and opinions, because the last thing we want in a
safety organization is groupthink. We don't want sameness. We
want technical competency, but we have got to have experience
across the spectrum.
So, we are evolving our staffing models. We are looking at
the skill sets that we need now for in the future. What the FAA
needed in the early 2000s and the 1990s, that is not going to
be adequate for what we have going forward.
We are getting much more into predictive analytics, big
data, drones. My son has a videography business. The barriers
to entry are actually lowering in many respects. So, there are
many more avenues into aviation. What we have to do, though, is
meet people where they are.
This is one of the things where the pandemic has actually
benefited us somewhat, because it has actually accelerated our
virtual engagement. I have done podcasts with young people who
are getting started in their aviation and aerospace careers. We
have been able to highlight a lot of the great work, because it
is an exciting career and we want those in the workforce, or
those who are contemplating aerospace careers to understand
what the tremendous opportunities are.
We have also internally, and more relevant to aircraft
certification that we are talking about, we have reinvigorated
our senior technical experts. We have engaged labor. We are
expanding our engagement in career fairs and outreach. We have
the Women in Aviation Advisory Board and the Youth in Aviation
Advisory Group as well. We work with Future Aviation
Professionals of America, OBAP, Women in Aviation. And we will
continue to do those things.
And finally, in our regions, we have a very aggressive and
robust, we call it our STEM AVSED Program and our Adopt-a-
School Program. And we appreciate the Congress' support on
resources for those programs as well.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Dickson. And I am
probably going to need the followup to this in writing, because
we are running out of time. But following the enactment of this
act, I understand that FAA has implemented a Voluntary Safety
Reporting Program that will make sure that employees can report
safety issues to management.
So, if you could follow up later and just tell us more
about this process and how it has worked since its
implementation, and how would you characterize its success in
flagging safety issues that need to be addressed. I would love
to have more information on that.
Mr. Dickson. Be happy to.
Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Williams.
The next three Members in order that we have just so people
can prepare are Representative Gimenez of Florida,
Representative Titus of Nevada, and Representative Mace of
South Carolina.
So, with that, I will recognize Representative Gimenez of
Florida for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Dickson, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, is it
safe for the traveling public to travel by commercial airline?
Mr. Dickson. As was said I think earlier, aviation is the
safest form of travel. Commercial aviation in the U.S. is the
safest form of travel in the world. And there are a number of
mitigations in place. They have been well-publicized: airflow
on airplanes, the protocols that the airlines have been using
to make sure that airplanes are appropriately sanitized, and
then, of course, the----
Mr. Gimenez. I take that as a yes. Thank you. I appreciate
that.
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. Is there right now a mandate for any
passengers that when they get on an airplane right now that
they have to be vaccinated or they will be excluded from
traveling on an airplane?
Mr. Dickson. There is not a mandate within the United
States that I am aware of, no.
Mr. Gimenez. Does it make any sense to you then that you
could have an airplane full of 300 people, say, that are
unvaccinated, and the only people that have to be vaccinated
are actually the people that are operating the airplane? Does
that make sense to you?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the CDC is the public health
authority, and these measures are being taken in concert with
each other. So, I think it is important that we have all the
mitigations in place so that the aviation system can operate.
And I am not in a position to comment specifically on the
public health benefits.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. Did the Biden administration contact you
prior to issuing the vaccine mandate?
Mr. Dickson. There has certainly been--you know, we were
all certainly prepared----
Mr. Gimenez. Sir, I asked you a specific question. Did the
Biden administration contact you, talk to you prior to issuing
the vaccine mandate for airlines?
Mr. Dickson. I am not going to talk about internal
executive branch consultations.
Mr. Gimenez. OK. I will take that as a no then. OK.
Administrator, let's go to the certification process with
the 737 and the MAX, and I understand that there are safety
issues, et cetera. I am hearing concerns, though, from some of
the airline or the aircraft manufacturing industry that the
enhanced procedures that you have put in place may be also
slowing down production.
Is it possible to have enhanced oversight, and also,
production not to be slow? Is that possible, or are they
mutually exclusive?
Mr. Dickson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. No,
they are not mutually exclusive. Our oversight, if it is
conducted in a systematic way, and we work very closely with
the manufacturer and with the production line, and they will
surface information through their safety system, that actually
allows them to be safer as a manufacturer, but it also allows
us to be more effective in conducting our safety oversight as a
regulator.
And that is the approach that we have taken all along is we
are not overseeing individual anecdotal situations. We are
actually overseeing the entire design and production system and
making sure that it has the layers of protection and the
processes are disciplined and effective in producing a safe
product.
Mr. Gimenez. I am hearing some concerns, though, by some on
the production side of our aircraft industry that they are
being slowed in production. Again, if it is a safety issue, I
have absolutely no problem with that, but I would urge you to
make sure that your processes are in place so that we can have
the safety that the flying public and the American people
deserve and demand, but also, that we keep pace with
production, because it could cost American jobs in the end if
we slow them down to the point where they can't get their
planes out. So, we need to have a combination of the two. I am
glad that you have said that they are not mutually exclusive.
And so, with that, I will I yield back the balance of my
time. And thank you, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative.
I now turn to Representative Titus of Nevada for 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Administrator.
Since we are talking about the role of the FAA in
protecting the public, I think that it is very important, even
if it takes a few extra minutes, to not slap something
together. So, thank you for doing that.
Under the Trump administration, there was an order ``one
in, two out.'' If you made a new regulation, you had to get rid
of two existing regulations. Well, Secretary Buttigieg has
issued a rule that has eliminated that. I said repeatedly in
this committee that that was not a good system, especially in
aviation. And we saw how it held up regulations for the drone
industry, and the UAS in the airspace.
So, I am wondering if you had any experience with this, if
FAA is using this? You have moved to the forget about the ``one
in, two out.'' Has it been advantageous for you to use this, go
back to the old system? Could you just kind of address that for
us?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. And, again, I
will just reiterate the point that whether it is in the 2018
reauthorization, or the Aircraft Certification Act or previous
reauthorizations, we take congressional mandates very
seriously, and we are always working diligently to execute
those in a timely fashion.
With respect to the two-for-one rulemaking policy, we
worked very closely with our colleagues at the Department of
Transportation to implement updates to that policy. And we are
laser-focused on executing the rulemakings that benefit the
aviation system, particularly in the area of safety, which is
always going to be our North Star.
As an example of that, we had great Department support very
early in the administration to push forward the last remaining
rulemaking from the Colgan accident back in 2009, which was the
pilot records database. That was a huge priority for me, and we
were able to get that across the finish line earlier this year.
You mentioned some of the drone rulemakings, remote
identification, operations over people. And then, of course,
just this morning, we announced the publication of the Flight
Attendant Duty and Rest NPRM.
So, I think that is a reflection of how we are pushing this
activity forward under the paradigm of Secretary Buttigieg's
leadership at the Department.
Ms. Titus. Great. I am glad to hear that. I didn't think it
ever worked, and I am glad it is not in place now.
My second question is that we have been hearing kind of a
series of, I don't know if it is rumor or if there is some
press about it, but that there are problems with the Boeing
Dreamliner. And yet the production of that is continuing, and
there are also plenty of those planes still flying around with
customers in them even as we speak.
Can you talk about the FAA's role and how it relates to
these objections to the Dreamliner? What is going on there?
Mr. Dickson. Yes. Well, this was--I believe you are
referring to some nonconforming titanium parts that were
identified recently. These were produced by a Boeing supplier.
They affect a number of 787 aircraft. And I think the positive
aspect of this is this is something that Boeing's safety system
highlighted and they brought it to us. And we continue to
monitor the issue, and we use our continued operational safety
monitoring processes to determine the appropriate corrective
action. So happy to follow up with you on more specifics, but
it is something that we are looking at very closely.
Ms. Titus. OK. So, you couldn't say if it affects or is
enough to affect the certification process?
Mr. Dickson. This is not--this is a supplier issue, and it
is something that was discovered during the in-service of the
aircraft. And so, we will go back and look at the suppliers,
because the manufacturers also have oversight of their entire
supply chain. So, we will be running that thread back to its
origin as well.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you. I am glad to know Boeing
brought it to you this time instead of covering it up like last
time with the MAX.
Mr. Dickson. Yes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
I now recognize Representative Mace of South Carolina for 5
minutes.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Administrator Dickson, first of all, I appreciate you
coming before our committee here today and speaking on your
focus on implementing aircraft certification reform,
legislation enacted in the last Congress. As one of many
Members who represent a district with aviation manufacturing,
to include Boeing, we appreciate all that we are doing to try
to work together.
I would like to shift the focus, my focus to another area
related to aircraft certification. The enforcement of bilateral
agreements on aircraft certification between the U.S. and
foreign aviation authorities I believe deserves some attention.
I have met with and spoken with different aviation
manufacturers so far this year in my first 10\1/2\ months in
office. And it is my understanding the FAA abides by its
obligations to accept, after a reasonable review, the
certification given to new aircraft produced in other
countries, like Canada, France, and Brazil.
But what I have learned over the last few months is that
the same cannot be said for the certification of new U.S.
aircraft by various foreign aviation authorities. And these
delays result in significant delays in U.S. companies getting
their products to market in other countries.
This not only impacts the U.S. balance of trade where
aviation products and services are leading U.S. export and
American jobs in a sector where the United States continues to
be a world leader in aviation. Just as significantly, it delays
the introduction of the latest generation of aircraft, which
represent a real increase in safety as well as a greater fuel
efficiency, reducing aviation's impact on the environment in
terms of greenhouse gases and noise.
Both Ranking Member Sam Graves and Ranking Member Garret
Graves have expressed concern about recent EASA statements in
this area, and Senator Wicker has asked the GAO to review this
topic.
So, I just have two very simple questions this morning: Do
you share the concerns of the industry about compliance with
bilateral agreements by various foreign aviation entities?
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question.
And, as I said earlier, the bilateral agreements are extremely
important to us, and that is why my counterpart over in Europe,
we conducted a summit to make that very clear this summer. But
there are always going to be debates with various authorities.
I will say that we are laser-focused on this. We want
consistent validation of U.S. products. There have been, at
times, questions that we have had about products that are
produced in other countries. So, there is always going to be
some give and take, but we want to make sure that the bilateral
agreements are recognized and abided by, because all of us want
consistency in the design and manufacturing process around the
world.
Ms. Mace. And secondly, how can we in the Congress work
with you and the FAA to address this issue? I mean, it impacts
American jobs. It impacts safety. It impacts the environment.
Mr. Dickson. I think, really, we need to keep you informed,
which I think we are doing, as to what these bilateral
agreements are producing. And then we need to make sure that we
continue to institutionalize them and have productive
engagements at the working level, and that U.S. product are
treated equitably among the other states of design around the
world, and that decisions are not made for anything other than
aviation safety purposes.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Administrator Dickson.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Before I recognize Representative
Payne, who will be next, and then Representative Stauber, and
Representative DeSaulnier, in that order.
So, Representative Payne, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely
hearing, and also the ranking member.
Let's see. Administrator Dickson, the 2020 Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act authorizes $27
billion in annual appropriations to recruit new engineers,
safety inspectors, software experts and others who perform
duties related to the certification of airplanes and component
parts.
With this funding should come some opportunities for
candidates that come from diverse and underserved backgrounds.
One of my top priorities is ensuring that everyone has a fair
shot at getting good-paying jobs.
So, can you assure this committee that the FAA will make
every effort to ensure that these new opportunities reach
minority and underserved populations?
Mr. Dickson. Congressman, thank you for the question. And I
hope that that was clear from my earlier comments, but we are
going to leave no stone unturned to make sure that we bring the
best and brightest and most diverse candidates to the agency.
We need to have an agency that looks like the country that
we serve. And to the extent that we have had a very successful,
really set a record with our minority-serving internships this
year. I believe we had 321 participants. They did a great job
for us. We want to bring a lot of those folks onboard at the
FAA.
So, again, we need to meet people where they are. We need
to make sure that we are engaging within those underserved
communities. Deputy Administrator Brad Mims and I are both
committed to this, and we are both using the networks and the
relationships that we have to be able to support the most
diverse and equitable hiring process, because we do have, as
you said, a tremendous opportunity to bring in the next
generation within the agency. And we are absolutely committed
to that.
Mr. Payne. Excellent. Yes, it is a great opportunity at
this point in time to try to attempt to change the culture that
has existed. One of the most striking things I recall from the
multiple hearings this committee held on the tragedies was the
complete lack of a safety culture at the FAA.
Based on the information provided to me, it appears that
the FAA has not fully implemented requirements under the
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. Full
implementation of these requirements is essential to creating a
safety culture at the FAA.
Have you discussed how to implement these requirements?
And, if so, what do you plan to do to create a safety culture?
If not, when do you plan to review them and begin actions to
create the culture to prevent future tragedies?
Mr. Dickson. Well, there are multiple dimensions to your
question. Let me address the culture issue first. I think the
single most important thing at this point is making sure that
we have engaged our employees, our workforce--it is an
extremely professional and capable workforce--and that we have
room for differences of opinion, and we have processes by which
employees can bring concerns forward.
So, the question came up earlier about the Voluntary Safety
Reporting Program. In my experience in the airline industry,
the ability for employees to bring up safety concerns in
realtime is extremely valuable. So, the VSRP is a very powerful
mechanism in doing that.
We have already received more than 320 reports from our
employees. We work very closely with our employees through our
labor partners to make sure that we are intaking these issues,
and then we are also communicating the results back to the
workforce.
I have been very transparent in my communications with the
workforce and been extremely supportive of their efforts. And
we need to make sure that that is happening throughout all
levels of the organization, and we will absolutely stay focused
on that.
With respect to the execution of the act itself, as I
mentioned to Chair Larsen, we have implemented quite a few of
the provisions through policy memos to make sure that we are--
and other mechanisms--to make sure that we are moving forward
as expeditiously as possible, and that we will incorporate
those into our permanent guidance in order to make sure that
they are----
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time is expired.
I would now turn to Representative Stauber of Minnesota,
who will be followed by Representative Stanton of Arizona.
Representative Stauber, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stauber. Thank You, Chair.
Thank you, Administrator Dickson, for being here today. I
do want to reiterate what my colleague, Congressman Carson
spoke about, the secondary barriers. I think it is important
that that is a priority for the FAA and the industry. It is
going to help us become even more safe, and I think that there
are a number of us on this committee that support that for
sure.
And I am going to follow up on what Congresswoman Van Duyne
had stated and have some similar questions. So, as you know and
have already heard from many of my colleagues, President
Biden's vaccine mandate could have some seriously troubling
consequences going into our holiday season.
Although we do not have all the details from the
administration yet on timing, I would like to inquire about a
few scenarios that families in my district and across the
country are concerned about. I understand that the TSA is not
under your jurisdiction, but I am sure you are aware that about
40 percent of TSA agents are unvaccinated.
What will happen to air travel over the holidays if 40
percent of the TSA workforce is fired, which is equivalent to
about 20,000 officers, on the November 22nd vaccine mandate
deadline for Federal workers?
Mr. Dickson. Again, my focus is on safe and open operation
of the aviation system, and I know my counterpart at the TSA
for his role has the same concern. So, we are going to do
everything that we can to make sure that commercial aviation
operates in an uninterrupted way throughout.
Mr. Stauber. Administrator Dickson, what is the contingency
plan you have in place if 20,000 officers are fired on November
22nd?
Mr. Dickson. We have contingency plans for our own
workforce. And I can't speak for what the TSA's contingency
plans are, but I know that they have plans to deal with
whatever challenges they might face in their daily operations.
Mr. Stauber. Then, Administrator, what would happen to air
travel if the air traffic controllers who are unvaccinated are
terminated on the November 22nd vaccine mandate deadline?
Mr. Dickson. Again, we have dealt with this. We have lived
this on a daily basis throughout the pandemic. And I am very
proud of what we have done at the FAA to keep the air traffic
control system open and operating. Our----
Mr. Stauber. Just because my time is limited, I appreciate
the answer, but do you have contingency plans for ATC
deficiencies?
Mr. Dickson. We always have contingency plans, whether they
are facilities outages or anything that would affect the
availability of our employees. So, the answer to that is yes.
Mr. Stauber. Several air carriers have self-reported that
they each have hundreds of employees who are unvaccinated. This
likely equates to thousands of aviation employees who will be
fired or forced to quit when the Biden vaccine mandate goes
into effect.
If the air carriers were to experience mass forced layoffs
due to Biden's mandates, what would happen to air travel, and
specifically, flight cancellation and delays, over the busy
holidays?
Mr. Dickson. I am not going to speculate about that,
Congressman.
I know that we all have an interest. And I think the
aviation industry's focus is on serving the public and making
sure that people can travel in an unfettered way and that they
can do so in a safe manner.
And I know that the airlines are focused on that. We are
using their safety management systems to monitor every aspect
of their operation, regardless of whether there are challenges
with maintenance programs or aircraft availability or anything
else. And we will continue to do that, because that is part of
our responsibility.
Mr. Stauber. Administrator Dickson, can you guarantee to
Americans who are planning their holiday travel that their
flight plans will not be interrupted or impacted by President
Biden's vaccine mandate?
Mr. Dickson. I can guarantee that the FAA will be focused
on aviation safety and on making sure that the air navigation
system is available and open for business as we have throughout
the COVID-19 pandemic.
Mr. Stauber. So, what I heard you answer is you don't know.
You can't guarantee that the flight delays won't affect the
American people during the busy holiday season because of the
mandates.
Mr. Dickson. That is not what I said. I said I will
guarantee that we will do everything humanly possible to make
sure that the aviation system is safe and available and open
for business.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Administrator.
And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Stauber.
Representative Stanton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding this important accountability hearing.
Administrator Dickson, thank you for your testimony here
today.
In January, the Department of Justice entered into a
deferred prosecution agreement with Boeing. The agreement
focused on the actions of two Boeing 737 MAX technical pilots,
and one of those pilots was charged with six counts of fraud
last week by the Department of Justice.
In its agreement with Boeing, the DOJ determined that an
independent compliance monitor was unnecessary for several
reasons, including because the DOJ concluded, quote, ``The
misconduct was neither pervasive across the organization, nor
undertaken by a large number of employees, nor facilitated by
senior management,'' unquote.
These conclusions run contrary to this committee's own
investigative findings. In the course of this committee's
investigative findings, Boeing's meeting minutes from very
early on in the MAX program were uncovered that did document a
deliberate effort to avoid using the term ``MCAS'' outside of
Boeing to avoid additional regulatory scrutiny and the impacts
on pilot training. The plan called for Boeing to describe MCAS
as merely an addition to speed trim.
Administrator Dickson, without asking you to make any
assessment of criminality, are you aware of anyone else at
Boeing, other than these two technical pilots, who tried to
downplay the significance of MCAS to regulators?
Mr. Dickson. I am not aware of any particular individuals,
but I will tell you that at the highest levels of Boeing, from
day one, I made it clear of my expectations of how we were
going to oversee their operations and that I expected for
systemic improvements to take place.
And that is exactly what we have done in executing upon the
legislation that has been passed in December of last year and
also in response to our own internal reviews, as well as
various investigations and recommendations from review bodies.
My position is that these types of single failures, or even
small groups, we have put systemic improvements in place to
prevent this kind of activity from resulting in an unsafe
outcome.
Mr. Stanton. Mr. Dickson, let me reclaim my time, because I
appreciate the answer, but it is not the answer to the question
that was asked.
I am not asking whether you believe that any actions by
others may have been criminal, but I am asking this question:
Do you believe that only two Boeing employees attempted to
downplay the significance of MCAS to regulators, or do you
believe there were more employees that tried to downplay the
significance of MCAS?
Mr. Dickson. I believe that MCAS should have been included
in the materials and that it was a safety-critical system.
Whether there was any intentionality on the part of others, I
can't speak to.
Mr. Stanton. So, you acknowledge that obviously that MCAS
was somewhat disclosed to you and the FAA. But the issue here
obviously really isn't whether FAA was aware of MCAS. It is how
MCAS was presented to the FAA.
As the Joint Authorities Technical Review said, quote,
``The FAA was not completely unaware of MCAS,'' end quote.
However, the manner in which MCAS was presented to FAA made it,
quote, ``difficult to recognize the impacts and implications of
this system,'' end quote.
The JATR also said that, quote, ``If the FAA technical
staff had been fully aware of the details of the MCAS function
. . . it likely would have identified the potential for the
stabilizer to overpower the elevator,'' end quote.
Obviously, this is going to be continuing to be
investigated and reviewed. So, Administrator Dickson, will the
FAA commit to cooperate fully with the Department of Justice
should they need anything additional from FAA to complete this
investigation?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Congressman. Absolutely. And one of the--
if I could just take one moment----
Mr. Stanton. Please.
Mr. Dickson [continuing]. Aspects that you are referring to
are the coordination between classification and flight
standards within the agency.
And we have taken very strong steps with our project teams
and also looking at a certification project not only to the
design but also through [inaudible] the service to make sure
that those communication and coordination gaps are effectively
closed. So, we will continue to do that.
Mr. Stanton. Thank you for your commitment to fully
cooperate with DOJ moving forward.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Stanton.
I now recognize Representative Fitzpatrick, who will be
followed by Representative Allred.
Representative Fitzpatrick from Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
Thank you, Mr. Dickson, for being here.
And, Mr. Dickson, the Lion Air flight 610 crash was
incredibly tragic, and this committee took action to prevent
any future crashes like Lion Air or Ethiopian Airlines.
As part of the legislation, the FAA is set to take action
regarding pilot training. The 1,500-hour rule for pilots has
led to the past 12 years being among the safest in aviation
history.
Administrator Dickson, can you confirm to this committee
that you will not in any way, shape, or form weaken or reduce
requirements for first officer qualifications, the so-called
1,500-hour rule?
Mr. Dickson. We do not have any plans, and I do not have
any plans to deviate from that. So, the answer is no.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. OK. And if you do, would you be informing
this committee in advance?
Mr. Dickson. Of course.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Second, safety is our top priority, sir.
Several people have brought up secondary barriers.
As Chairman DeFazio and Mr. Carson mentioned, as well as
Mr. Stauber and several others, in 2018, flight deck secondary
barriers were included in the FAA reauthorization.
That bill was signed into law 3 years ago this month, and
we still have not seen action from the FAA. And as Mr. Carson
noted, we, along with 11 other Members--a strong bipartisan
contingent, by the way--sent a letter to you on October 8
expressing our concern with the continued delays in
implementing this critical safety provision.
All of us, sir, that fly take note of this. This was one of
the recommendations from the 9/11 Commission.
Sir, can you give us a realistic timeline of when we can
expect to see a final rule on secondary barriers?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Congressman, thank you again for the
question. And I will just reiterate my frustration at how long
this process has taken in this particular case, and rulemaking
by design is a lengthy process.
I am not able to commit to a specific timeline. What I can
commit to is that we are going to get this rule out there as
quickly as we possibly can.
We are absolutely devoted to complying with congressional
direction here, and we have the Department's very strong
support and advocacy as well. And so, I am confident that we
will be able to move forward.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. Sir, what is it going to take? Because we
have heard these responses for years now. My colleagues and I
are concerned that we may not see a final rule before we start
working on the next FAA reauthorization in 2023.
You said earlier in this hearing that you are committed to
secondary barriers. What assurances can you give me, can you
give this committee--and this is a bipartisan push, sir. We are
demanding that this happen. We passed it. What assurances can
you give us that it will be expedited, made a priority, and not
delayed any further?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, I can just give you the
assurances that I am pushing my team extremely hard on this.
We have got the beneficial work done by the Aviation
Rulemaking Advisory Committee, which gave us some of the
technical data that we needed, and I expect for there to be
industry comment once we do put a notice of proposed rulemaking
out.
But we are going to do that with all deliberate speed and
certainly all diligence, and we will keep you and the committee
informed of our progress as we move forward.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. OK. Mr. Dickson, just please take back, if
nothing else, that this is a top priority of Democrats and
Republicans on this committee.
Mr. Dickson. I hear you.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. This is critical to aviation safety. This
was one of the 41 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission.
Still, 20 years later, it has not been implemented. It is very
frustrating to us.
So, if you could please send that message back that we are
insisting that this be a top priority.
Mr. Dickson. I understand, and I hear you.
Mr. Fitzpatrick. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative.
I now call on Representative Allred of Texas for 5 minutes.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Administrator, for being here and for
appearing before our committee.
One of my main concerns that I have discussed over the
course of our investigation and our hearings of the 737 MAX
crashes was Boeing's seemingly capture of the regulatory
process.
And in your testimony, you mentioned that the agency is
prioritizing the oversight of manufacturers now, which of
course is what this is all about. And we are hopeful that that
is including oversight of the Organization Designation
Authorization, or ODA, process.
And I understand that recently FAA sent a letter to Boeing
initiating a review and expressing concerns with the company's
culture and how that appears to prevent ODA members from
communicating with FAA, which is one of the main things that
Congress has asked FAA to address in the Aircraft
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.
And I just want to ask, first of all, has Boeing responded
to your agency's letter?
Mr. Dickson. I am not aware of a formal response to the
letter, but we are having dialogue with them daily on this and
other matters, and it is something that we are laser-focused
on.
We are also, as I said earlier, we are involved in their
safety risk management process that is designed to root out any
interference between unit members and their ability to be able
to communicate and work with the agency.
I am not aware that we have got specific correspondence
back, but I will get back to you on that.
Mr. Allred. Well, yeah, I think that a letter of that kind
from your agency should be responded to formally and
informally. And we certainly are interested in what that
response is.
And, I guess, addressing the concerns over Boeing's ODA
process, I am wondering whether you think something more
dramatic needs to be done in terms of addressing the culture
there, whether there needs to be some kind of pause in that
process or some kind of intervention of some kind, because it
sounds like you are having an ongoing discussion.
But that, to be honest with you, sir, sounds similar to
what was occurring before when these oversights were allowed
into the process and of course led to these horrible crashes.
Do you feel confident right now in Boeing's ODA process and
what we are doing, our work with them?
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question and the
opportunity to respond in some more detail.
Again, cultural issues require constant attention. And I
have seen several indications of the kind of improvements that
I am looking for.
But I don't know that you would ever be complacent or
satisfied. This is always going to be an area of focus, not
just--I mean, with any regulated entity, to make sure that
undesirable issues are not percolating into the relationship.
So, we monitor our ODA Office that we have stood up in the
last 1\1/2\ years, and actually we are in the process of--they
are going to be responsible for quality control across all 80
ODAs that we have with the industry.
But with Boeing in particular, for example, their number of
voluntary disclosures where they are bringing things forward
that they weren't before, those are providing us with
information and data that we didn't have visibility into
before, so that we can make sure that they are systematically
intaking those issues, doing it with transparency, and driving
down those risks.
They have done other things that they weren't doing before,
such as stopping the production line. They would never do those
kinds of things before.
And finally, my people understand--and we have added
engineering expertise and others--they understand that I have
their back and that they are supported at the highest levels of
the agency.
So, these kinds of things, again, they aren't things that
happen overnight. They will require constant attention.
And, additionally, I would also point out that we have
retained several items. We have taken some of those ODA
privileges away, which I talked about earlier, such as
airworthiness certificates and requiring the validation of
human factors assumptions for safety-critical designs, and that
will continue.
Mr. Allred. That is good. And you mentioned that your ODA
Office has the support from the top of your agency. I would say
they have the support of the Congress as well. We are here to
support them, I certainly am, in terms of making sure that we
are providing sufficient oversight to protect the public.
So, with that, thank you for your testimony and for your
work.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
In order, I have Burchett, Norton and Van Drew.
So, I will recognize Representative Burchett for 5 minutes.
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. Representative Burchett?
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. Let's come back. We will go to Representative
Van Drew for 5 minutes.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon, Administrator Dickson. Thank you for
appearing before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, and thank
you for your exemplary leadership over the past 2 years.
In August, the FAA submitted a reprogramming request to the
Congress that would radically reorganize the FAA's research,
development, testing, and evaluation functions.
The FAA has gone to great lengths to obscure the proposal.
The request was submitted after the House had already passed
its transportation funding bill. The FAA is using evasive
tactics to sneak through bad policy that affects 1,000 FAA
workers at a minimum and $1 billion worth of taxpayers' money.
Today, I will share with you and everyone the truth of what
the FAA is proposing.
Administrator, I sent you a comprehensive letter of many
shortcomings of this proposal. I highly recommend my colleagues
read this letter, which I request to submit to the record.
Mr. Larsen. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Letter of October 19, 2021, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew, Member of
Congress, to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew
October 19, 2021.
Steve Dickson,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W.,
Washington, DC 20591.
Dear Administrator Dickson,
I am troubled by the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA)
request to the Congress to reorganize the FAA William J. Hughes
Technical Center and the FAA's broader research, development, testing
and evaluation functions. I am concerned that the proposal will reduce
the efficiency of the Technical Center and the FAA, hamper federal
oversight of the aviation industry, and is beyond the authority that
the Congress has granted to the FAA. I urge you to withdraw the FAA's
reprogramming request and instead develop a forward-looking strategy
that preserves the efficacy and integrity of the FAA William H. Hughes
Technical Center and the Federal Aviation Administration.
For over 50 years the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center has
been the FAA's premier laboratory and facility for the research,
development, testing and evaluation of cutting-edge aviation
technology. It is home to the FAA's NextGen air traffic control
modernization program, the FAA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Advanced
Air Mobility programs, and many other critical programs bringing
American aviation into the 21st century. These programs all stand to be
adversely affected by the proposal submitted by the FAA to the Congress
in August.
The Technical Center operates under a centralized organizational
model, led by the Technical Center Director. This model is standard
best practice across similar federal institutions. The concentration of
the Technical Center's multifaceted capabilities is a force-multiplier
for each distinct component. These capabilities regularly collaborate
on projects in ways that are only possible because they share a campus
and are organizationally connected. This holistic, unified, and
independent approach to the research, development, testing and
evaluation of aviation technology is the reason that the FAA's seal of
approval is the international gold standard of aviation.
The proposed reorganization would inexorably disrupt this
operational structure. The FAA has submitted a reprogramming request
that in effect would ``split'' the Technical Center into three
organizationally separate business lines, each of which would report to
offices in Washington D.C. This division of capabilities is
antithetical to the holistic philosophy that underlies the Technical
Center's effectiveness. Erecting such internal barriers will decrease
efficiency as well as operationally weaken each distinct component of
the Technical Center, and the Technical Center as a whole.
A notable shortcoming of the FAA's reprogramming request is the
failure to understand and respond to the needs of the United States'
domestic Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) industry. This high-potential
technological and commercial frontier should be at the forefront of the
FAA's policy development. There are serious policy challenges facing
the UAS industry, particularly in the areas of certification and
airspace integration. Instead of advancing solutions, the proposal
before the Congress takes a tremendous step backward by offering a
policy model more appropriate for the UAS industry of ten years ago.
The FAA proposes to essentially demote the extant ``UAS Office''.
The UAS functions would be made subsidiary to an ``Office of
Innovation,'' and moved from a business line under an Associate
Administrator to a lower line under an Assistant Administrator. This
new position is organizationally distant from both the certification
functions under the AVS line, and the airspace integration functions
under the AJO line. During a congressional briefing, FAA officials
recognized the importance of organizational distance and described the
proposed placement of UAS functions as ``half-way to everything.'' The
burgeoning UAS industry deserves better than the half-measure this
proposal represents.
The most alarming element of the proposal is the apparent intention
to eventually privatize the research, development, testing and
evaluation capabilities of the FAA. In a memo provided to the Congress,
the FAA asserts that ``in many cases that testing, and evaluation can
also be provided by industry for approval by the FAA,'' that ``the
testing workforce may need to shift to experts under contract and
consultancy,'' and that ``this changes the nature of the research
workforce from hands-on researcher to project manager.'' This is an
extraordinary divergence from the FAA's current research, development,
testing and evaluation model.
The impact of the FAA's request is substantial, immediately
affecting hundreds of positions and over $1 billion of expenditures.
The question before the Congress deserves the fullest scrutiny
considering the magnitude of the changes being proposed.
The FAA has justified their proposal by citing Sections 545 and 711
of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, stating that the FAA is simply
abiding by congressional mandate. These sections respectively direct
the FAA to create the positions of Chief Technology Officer and
Assistant Secretary for Research and Development but there is nothing
which necessitates the organizational division of the Technical Center
nor the broader changes being proposed.
It seems neither in the letter nor the spirit of the law to move
from the FAA's existing model wherein federal labs' research,
development, test, and evaluation operations are responsible for
setting and refining the safety, testing, evaluation gold standards of
today, to a model where the FAA rubber-stamps evaluations conducted by
the industry. Federal oversight of the aviation industry is important
and necessary. If implemented, this reorganization could cast doubt on
the safety of products approved for use in the NAS.
Further, Sections 545 and 711 appear to have been cherry-picked to
rationalize the proposed reorganization. There are similar provisions
that have not been implemented. I would direct you to Section 524,
which states:
``The Secretary of Transportation shall define the roles and
responsibilities of the William J. Hughes FAA Technical Center
in a manner that is consistent with the defined roles and
responsibilities of the Civil Aeromedical Institute.''
As of the date of this letter, the Department of Transportation has
not yet posted these congressionally mandated official roles and
responsibilities. Determining these responsibilities seems an important
step in developing any strategy related to the Technical Center.
The question of reorganization that the FAA has presented to the
Congress is an important one, particularly as it affects the safety of
the millions of Americans that travel and work via air every year. It
is the responsibility of the Congress to conduct proper oversight of
federal agencies to ensure that they are acting in the best interests
of the American taxpayer and in accordance with the law. On these two
points the FAA's reorganization does not pass muster, as it has the
potential to reduce the efficiency of the FAA Technical Center and the
FAA, hamper federal oversight of the aviation industry, and is beyond
the authorities that Congress intended to grant in the 2018
Authorization law.
Considering the concerns enumerated above, I urge you to withdraw
the FAA's reprogramming request, and instead develop a forward-looking
strategy that preserves the efficacy and integrity of the FAA William
J. Hughes Technical Center and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Sincerely,
Jeff Van Drew,
Member of Congress.
Cc:
House Committee on Appropriations
Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro--Chair
Congresswoman Kay Granger--Ranking Member
Congressman David Price--Chair--Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing
and Urban Development
Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart--Ranking Member--Subcommittee on
Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Congressman Peter DeFazio--Chair
Congressman Sam Graves--Ranking Member
Congressman Rick Larsen--Chair--Subcommittee on Aviation
Congressman Garret Graves--Ranking Member--Subcommittee on Aviation
Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senator Patrick Leahy--Chair
Senator Richard Shelby--Vice Chair
Senator Brian Schatz--Chair--Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing
and Urban Development
Senator Susan Collins--Ranking Member--Subcommittee on Transportation,
Housing and Urban Development
Senate Committee on Commerce Science, and Transportation
Senator Maria Cantwell--Chair
Senator Roger Wicker--Ranking Member
Senator Kyrsten Sinema--Chair--Subcommittee on Aviation Safety,
Operations, and Innovation
Senator Ted Cruz--Ranking Member--Subcommittee on Aviation Safety,
Operations, and Innovation
Dr. Van Drew. In short, this proposal is terrible.
First of all, it is doubtful that the FAA even has the
authority to do this under the 2018 authorization.
This deal would kneecap the FAA William J. Hughes Technical
Center. The technical center produces gold standard results
through a centralized model. It is a centralized model that
would be fractured under the FAA's proposal. This would break
the technical center.
The proposal also sets the drone industry back at least a
decade. I can state with absolute confidence that the drone
industry opposes this.
Particularly damning is the apparent intention to privatize
portions of the FAA. And I will say that again: the apparent
intention to privatize portions of the FAA.
An FAA memo states that, quote, ``In many cases that
testing, and evaluation can also be provided by the industry
for approval by the FAA,'' end quote, and that, quote, ``The
testing workforce may need to shift to experts under contract
and consultancy,'' end quote.
This privatization strategy threatens the FAA's independent
oversight over the aviation industry. In my letter, I request
that the FAA's proposal be formally withdrawn.
Administrator, I make that request again today.
Several major labor unions have just released a joint
letter in opposition to the proposal. These unions include but
are not limited to the National Federation of Federal
Employees, the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, and the American Federation of Government
Employees.
Together, these unions represent over 1.4 million American
workers. Their letter also requests that the FAA withdraw this
proposal.
I request to submit this letter to the record as well, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Letter of October 21, 2021, from the American Federation of Government
Employees, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, and National Federation of Federal Employees to Hon. Stephen
M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, Submitted
for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew
October 21, 2021.
Hon. Steve Dickson,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW,
Washington, DC 20591.
Dear Administrator Dickson:
We, the undersigned federal labor unions representing Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) employees, demand that the FAA withdraw
language in the FY2022 budget reprogramming request that seeks to
separate and realign research, development, test and evaluation
functions of the William J. Hughes Technical Center, (``WJHTC''), and
immediately halt any further efforts to diminish the WJHTC.
The William J. Hughes Technical Center is a world-renown aviation
research, development, and test and evaluation facility responsible for
maintaining and modernizing the U.S. air transportation system. It
completes its mission through centralized, state-of-the-art
laboratories, test facilities, and support facilities that optimize
U.S. air traffic control, communications, navigation, airports,
aircraft safety, and security. The WJHTC is tasked, among its other
missions, with supporting the nation's Next Generation Air
Transportation System, called NextGen.
It is within the FAA's Congressional and statutory mandate to
advance the NextGen program that we believe your administration has
taken liberties from which to augment both spirit and intent of the
law, to further position federal assets, programs, and jobs for
weakening and outsourcing. FAA leadership has not been fully
transparent in its communications with Congress, labor unions, and
other stakeholders regarding your plans for and movements within WJHTC.
The budget funding for the System Planning and Resource Management
program at the WJHTC was slashed by approximately 68% for FY2022, which
indicates the FAA is already implementing a reorganization. A
reorganization is inconsistent with appropriation law, appropriation
acts, and the intent of Congress.
We adamantly disagree with the claim cited in an FAA response to a
request from U.S. Representative Jeff Van Drew (NJ-2) to halt the
dismantling of the Tech Center, that the FAA Reauthorization Act of
2018 and the sections cited within, Section 545 and 711, provides any
authority to realign any part of the FAA, much less ``splitting'' the
William J. Hughes Technical Center into three disparate parts. The
authority cited in the FAA response is not reflected in the law. The
law only requires FAA create two positions: Chief Technology Officer
and Assistant Secretary for Research and Development. The proposed
splitting or reorganization of the WJHTC is not required for FAA to
comply with the law.
Your April 8, 2020 letter to Representative Van Drew made clear
your goal to make the WJHTC ``an even more attractive partner for
public-private partnerships with industry''. The work performed by
union members at the WJHTC is inherently governmental and too important
to outsource. In their work to preserve the safety of the flying
public, our federal government researchers are accountable to the
traveling public and taxpayers, not profiting business leaders or their
shareholders. The reorganization is seemingly a means to foster
contracting out at the expense of our members' jobs and directly
conflicts with President Biden's Executive Order 14025: Worker
Organizing and Empowerment.
Without a more detailed response from FAA regarding its plans for
the WJHTC, it is difficult to determine how many of the 5,000 employees
at the Tech Center may be affected by a reorganization, splitting, or
dismantling. However, based on the information we do have, it is
reasonable to conclude that all employees--among them, more than 1153
union members from six unions--will endure relocation or termination
through a Reduction in Force. As the FAA positions federal assets for
outsourcing, five thousand engineers, research specialists, computer
scientists, analysts, mathematicians, and other support staff will lose
their jobs at the Tech Center location.
We request that you cease immediately any further action on closing
or splitting or reorganizing the WJHTC.
For any questions or additional information, please contact any of
the following union representatives for further assistance: Julie
Tippens (AFGE) [email redacted], Hasan Soloman (IAMAW) [email
redacted], Steve Lenkart (NFFE) [email redacted].
Signed,
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE).
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(IAMAW).
National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE).
CC: The White House
U.S. Senator Bob Menendez
U.S. Senator Cory Booker
U.S. Representative Jeff Van Drew
Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
House Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Dr. Van Drew. Administrator Dickson, I don't believe that
this proposal is coming from you. I do not believe it is coming
from you. Nor do I believe that it is even coming from this
administration. It is crystal clear to me that this proposal is
emerging from deep-seated DC-based career FAA officials.
Administrator Dickson, considering the tremendous
opposition to this proposal, will you withdraw the
reprogramming request and work with Congress, work with labor,
work with industry to develop a good-faith proposal that
actually works for the aviation sector and the American
taxpayer?
And, once again, thank you for being here.
Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congressman Van Drew.
And I am happy to meet with you and our union partners. I
meet with them regularly, within the last week, as a matter of
fact. And I welcome hearing your concerns.
My goal actually is to strengthen the tech center, to make
sure that we are undertaking activities there that will benefit
the aviation industry.
I also want to assure you that, as this proposal had moved
forward, it does not affect the function or location of any
employee's job, tech center or otherwise.
And this really is a management reporting realignment. It
is putting the tech center on a more equal footing with our
aeronautical center in Oklahoma City, which has been a
tremendous success.
And I believe this will actually act to strengthen the tech
center. But I certainly would be interested in hearing your
thoughts and those of our labor partners as we move forward.
Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
Dr. Van Drew. I look forward to that. I have great
concerns. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Lynch of
Massachusetts for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just jump in, in support of Mr. Van Drew. Not what I
intended to speak on. But I am concerned about regulatory
capture, as we saw with the 737 MAX and the influence of
Boeing. That was an instance where a contractor came in and I
think really bigfooted what should have been independent agency
review.
So, for those reasons, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Van
Drew, and I would like to be part of that conversation to
maintain that independence among FAA employees.
I have had an opportunity to visit the tech center. And I
appreciate the good work that you are doing, Administrator, and
as well the good people at the tech center.
I really want to talk about the Civil Aviation Registry
operated by the FAA. As you know, we have had some troubling
incidents with U.S.-registered aircraft.
And this goes back to 2014. We found out through a bank
that the FAA had given a tail number to an individual who was
funded by Hezbollah.
We had another situation where the FAA had given a tail
number to an individual whose aircraft was in Tehran during a
time when we had sanctions against them.
We had another situation where another U.S. aircraft,
commercial aircraft--I am sorry--civil aircraft was found on
the tarmac in Libya when we had a no-fly zone in effect against
Libyan rebels.
We had a situation where Wells Fargo Bank represented the
individuals affiliated with the Sinaloa Cartel, and they were
given registration of aircraft.
So, I have a bill that would address some of the
insecurities that have been found to be present in our current
registration program. It requires beneficial ownership to be
established in terms of who the actual people in control of
that aircraft would be.
So, I am hoping to get some support from the FAA to try to
tackle that problem. Maybe it is not my bill. But we have got
to figure out a way to do this.
I think if 9/11 taught us anything is that there is a
certain vulnerability there with respect to our aircraft. And
now that we have drones, as well, in the mix, I think this is a
clear and present danger to our national security.
So, I am wondering if you have any thoughts on that, about
tightening up our Civil Aviation Registry.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Congressman. And actually, we would
look forward to working with you on that.
The only caveat I would say is we are working very hard on
the new registry system, which is sorely needed, and there have
been some technical challenges there. So, I would want to make
sure that we don't set back that effort, because that is
something that needs to get across the finish line.
So, we would look forward very much to having that dialogue
with you.
And if I might, just for 30 seconds, a question that you
and Congressman Van Drew raised about the tech center.
I want to make it clear that no one is delegating any
safety responsibility in this proposal. Prior to any federally
procured system going into the national airspace, it is
validated and approved by FAA technical professionals. And that
will not change under this proposal.
So that is not part of what we will be talking about here.
Mr. Lynch. OK. I will take that at face value. I would like
to drill down on it a little bit more----
Mr. Dickson. Sure.
Mr. Lynch [continuing]. Just in terms of where the lines of
responsibility begin and end. I think that would be helpful to
just reassuring people that what you say is, in fact, accurate
and that we all understand where the lines have been drawn.
Administrator, thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I yield back. Thank
you.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Lynch.
I now recognize Representative Johnson of Georgia for 5
minutes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing.
As FAA implements the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act, I am concerned about how difficult it is
going to be to get Boeing to improve its safety culture. Our
737 MAX investigation raised serious questions about Boeing's
willingness to learn critical lessons and change the way it
does business to improve safety.
Mr. Dickson, when committee staff interviewed Boeing's
then-vice president of propulsion, an individual who was
responsible for the general management of the MAX development,
including engineering and manufacturing, he said that he
considered the development of the MAX a success, despite two
deadly crashes that killed 346 people and MAX planes being
grounded for more than 1 year.
When committee staff interviewed Boeing's chief project
engineer for the 737 MAX program, he admitted that at the time
he approved MCAS, he was not aware that MCAS operated from a
single angle-of-attack sensor, that MCAS could activate
repeatedly, or that it took one of Boeing's own test pilots
more than 10 seconds to respond to an MCAS activation in a
flight simulator, resulting in what the pilot described as
catastrophic consequences.
Again, this was the chief project engineer who approved
MCAS. Yet Boeing went on to appoint this same person to be the
chief project engineer of the new 777X.
Are you aware, Mr. Dickson, of these facts and statements
from Boeing personnel?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, Congressman, I am.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. What do you think of them and of
the movement of the MAX 737 chief project engineer to the same
position for the 777X?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, as I have said previously, our
oversight of Boeing has fundamentally changed. We have retained
certain safety-critical functions for these certification
projects. We have retained the airworthiness certificates on
the 737 MAX aircraft. We are instituting a Technical Advisory
Board for the 777X, which will give us an independent
validation of our work.
We have also increased our involvement on the certification
of designs related to continued operational safety issues, and
we are meeting daily with Boeing on the performance of its
global fleet.
And, again, a number of systems and process improvements
have been put in place. And we have also increased the
proportion of our engineering personnel in the Boeing
Certificate Management Office, which oversees production, and
added additional management to the Boeing safety oversight
organization as well.
But I will be the first to say that this requires continued
vigilance, and that work is not done. Boeing safety management
system, we conduct regular reviews, and we are looking at their
safety data on a regular basis. And they are producing and
doing what they need to do, but there is more to be done.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. All right. Thank you.
If Boeing considers the 737 MAX program a success and the
same individual responsible for approving MCAS is now in charge
of Boeing's new 777X, what is the FAA doing as part of its
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act to get Boeing to improve its safety culture
and ensure that the 777X doesn't suffer the same fate as the
737 MAX?
Mr. Dickson. Well, again, these are systematic improvements
so that an individual or a failure in an individual process
cannot result in a consequential safety impact.
And that redundancy is built into the safety management
system. It is built into the data and the reporting that Boeing
is now generating that the FAA has visibility into. It is part
of the reset of the relationship. And that will continue going
forward as Boeing's safety management system matures.
These cultural changes require constant vigilance. And my
experience in the airline industry is it takes some time for
all levels of the organization to be fully executing on these
estimate processes. And that is what we are focused on, is
making sure that the process matures accordingly to produce a
safe product.
Mr. Larsen. The Representative's time has expired.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen. The Chair calls on Congresswoman Norton, who
expressed an interest in questions.
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. Administrator, just give us a moment.
Mr. Dickson. OK.
Mr. Larsen. So Representative Norton is not present as it
turns out. So that concludes the questions from most--OK. Hold
on. She just got on, Administrator. This is part of the dance
of Zoom, if you just give us a moment.
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. So we will wait until she comes up on the
screen.
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. We are still here, just waiting.
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. Let's call on Congresswoman Norton again to see
if she is going to come up. If not, then----
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. While we are waiting, could I ask
for a U.C.?
Mr. Larsen. Sure. Representative Graves.
Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask
unanimous consent that a document that has been included by
some of the victims' families be included in the record of the
hearing titled ``FAA Document Confirms.''
Mr. Larsen. That is fine. Without objection, we will
include that in the hearing record.
[The information follows:]
Fact Sheet Titled ``FAA Document Confirms It Wasn't The Pilots,'' by
the Flight ET302 Families Foundation, Submitted for the Record by Hon.
Garret Graves
FAA Document Confirms It Wasn't the Pilots
FAA: Boeing was required to make six design changes to
correct unsafe conditions of the original 737 Max
design.
This FAA document confirms \1\ that Boeing was required to make six
design changes to correct the unsafe conditions that existed in the
original 737 Max design. The design fixes, as well as training
enhancements and one maintenance issue were needed to correct the
unsafe condition and return the 737 Max to service. Any suggestion that
pilot error was the cause of the crashes is false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Summary of the FAA's Review of the Boeing 737 Max'',
subtitled, ``Return to Service of the Boeing 737 Max Aircraft'', dated
November 18, 2020 (Page 76-78)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. FAA Conclusion
Following a thorough, transparent and inclusive process, the FAA
determined that Boeing's changes to the 737 MAX design, flightcrew
procedures and maintenance procedures effectively mitigate the
airplane-related safety issues that contributed to the Flight 610 and
Flight 302 accidents.
* * *
13.1 Safety Issue #1: Use of Single Angle of Attack (AOA) Sensor
In the original design, erroneous data from a single AOA sensor
activated MCAS and subsequently caused airplane nose-down trim of the
horizontal stabilizer. In the new design, Boeing eliminated MCAS
reliance on a single AOA sensor signal by using both AOA sensor inputs
and through flight-control law changes that include safeguards against
failed or erroneous AOA indications. The updated FCC software with
revised flight-control laws uses inputs from both AOA sensors to
activate MCAS. This is in contrast to the original MCAS design, which
relied on data from only one sensor at a time, and allowed repeated
MCAS activation as a result of input from a single AOA sensor. The
updated FCC software compares the inputs from the two sensors to detect
a failed AOA sensor. If the difference between the AOA sensor inputs is
above a calculated threshold, the FCC will disable the STS, including
its MCAS function, for the remainder of that flight and provide a
corresponding indication of such deactivation on the flight deck.
13.2 Safety Issue #2: MCAS Reset Generates Repetitive MCAS Commands
In the original design, when a continuous erroneous high AOA sensor
value existed, the MCAS control law used pilot release of the electric
trim switch to reset MCAS activation. Once reset, the MCAS system would
make another airplane nose-down stabilizer trim command after five
seconds. This scenario would repeat each time the MCAS made a command
and the pilot made an electric trim command of any duration and
released the trim switch. In the new design, Boeing included flight-
control law changes to ensure that MCAS will not command repeated
movements of the horizontal stabilizer. The revised flight-control laws
allow only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event. A
subsequent activation of MCAS is only possible after the airplane
returns to a low-AOA state, below the threshold that would cause MCAS
activation.
13.3 Safety Issue #3 MCAS Trim Authority
In the original design, all MCAS commands were incremental
commands, which moved the horizontal stabilizer a fixed amount
regardless of the current position of the stabilizer. Therefore,
multiple MCAS commands resulted in a significant horizontal stabilizer
mistrim condition, which the flightcrew could not counter using only
elevator control. In the new design, Boeing included flight-control law
changes that limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the
horizontal stabilizer, so that the final horizontal stabilizer position
(after the MCAS command) preserves the flightcrew's ability to control
the airplane pitch by using only the control column.
13.4 Safety Issue #4 Flightcrew Recognition and Response
FDR data from both accidents show that the flight crews were unable
to effectively manage the stabilizer movement and multiple flight-deck
effects that occurred as a result of the single AOA sensor failure. In
the new design, Boeing revised eight non-normal flight crew procedures
and proposed additional training. The revised flight crew procedures
and pilot training provide the pilot with additional information to
recognize erroneous stabilizer movement and the effects of AOA sensor
failures.
13.5 Safety Issue #5 AOA DISAGREE Message
In the originally delivered configuration, the AOA DISAGREE alert
message on the Primary Flight Display was not functional unless the
airline chose the AOA indicator option. This alert message is intended
to be standard on all 737 MAX airplanes. In the new design, Boeing
revised the AOA DISAGREE implementation to maintain the original design
intent to be standard on all 737 MAX aircraft. The FAA is requiring an
additional software update that alerts the flight crew to a
disagreement between the two AOA sensors due to a sensor failure or
calibration issues. The updated software implements an AOA DISAGREE
alert message on all 737 MAX airplanes. While the lack of an AOA
DISAGREE alert message is not an unsafe condition itself, the FAA is
mandating this software update because the flightcrew procedures now
rely on this alert message to guide flightcrew action.
13.6 Safety Issue #6 Other Possible Stabilizer Runaway Failures
The FAA and Boeing conducted a comprehensive review of the
integrated SSA of the MCAS function. This review identified an
extremely remote failure condition that required timely pilot
intervention to ensure continued safe flight and landing. In the new
design, Boeing has implemented a Cross-FCC Trim Monitor, which can
effectively detect and shut down erroneous stabilizer commands from the
FCCs. This makes continued safe flight and landing for this type of
failure not dependent on pilot reaction time.
Some say that the pilots could and should have used cutout switches.
However, cutout switches were used in the ET302 crash, but because the
auto throttle also malfunctioned as a result of the faulty AOA sensor
(leading to excessive speed), the cutout switches did not help the
situation.
Contact: Nadia Milleron, mother of ET302 victim Samya Rose Stumo
[phone and email redacted]
Mr. Larsen. Well, with indulgence, Administrator, I do have
some followup questions while we are waiting for Congresswoman
Norton. None of these will come probably as a surprise to you
in terms of the subject matter. But if you are prepared to
answer these.
The committee investigation found the FAA neither received
sufficient information from the manufacturer about the MCAS on
the 737 MAX--for the record, that is Maneuvering
Characteristics Augmentation System--nor did the FAA receive
information through appropriate channels.
So, what changes to the process has the FAA done to ensure
that manufacturers disclose all appropriate information to the
FAA during the certification process?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Chair Larsen, I spoke to this somewhat
in the dialogue about our interaction, our changes in the way
that we oversee Boeing. And the safety management system, once
it is in place, it put certain reporting requirements in place
based on the data that is in their design and production
systems.
So, we have worked very closely with them. And as I said,
we meet daily. We are going beyond our normal continued
operational safety process to monitor the performance of the
fleet around the world in near realtime.
We are also having dialogue with their customers to make
sure that the relationship with the airlines that are operating
their aircraft, to see what they are hearing.
So, we are getting at this through several different
mechanisms to make sure that that information is coming to us
in a timely fashion as these projects move forward.
Mr. Larsen. And on the safety management system rule, you
discussed the SMS and the voluntary SMS. But when will the FAA
publish a rule on SMS?
Mr. Dickson. We expect to have an NPRM----
Ms. Norton. How can I get the sound?
Mr. Larsen. Sorry. Congresswoman Norton, if you could mute
for now and I will call on you when my questions are done.
Thank you.
Administrator?
Mr. Dickson. Yes, I will follow up with you on more details
on what we expect the timeline to be. I believe, as I recall,
the final rule is slated for 2024, roughly. So, we would expect
to see an NPRM out probably sometime late next year. It may be
late 2023, but I have got to confirm that.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
And can you clarify the ODA system with regards to
appointing unit members that you are--the deadline is January 1
next year, 2022, a couple months. But I understand you expect
to issue final policy documents for manufacturers and FAA
employees in February 2022. Is that accurate?
Mr. Dickson. That is correct. We have already issued
specific direction for the appointment of unit members and
advisers within the last 10 days, I believe.
Mr. Larsen. All right.
And then my final question, before we go to Congresswoman
Norton. The bill requires FAA to take leadership in evaluating
pilot training and standards, as you know. FAA also must ensure
airplane manufacturers, engineers, and pilots fully assess
human factors.
Can you be specific about the progress made on implementing
those requirements with regards to incorporating human factors
into requirements?
Mr. Dickson. Sure. We are, first of all, we are requiring
air carrier pilots to, in terms of pilot training, to regularly
demonstrate manual flight operation skills. They do it in all
training programs, initial, upgrade, and recurrent.
In March of 2019, we required pilots to complete Upset
Prevention and Recovery Training. I mentioned this in response
to Congressman Sam Graves' question earlier.
We are also drafting, and it is near completion, a new
advisory circular on flightpath management. This will provide
guidance tied to air carrier training requirements on manual
flying skills, managing automation, energy management, and
situational awareness and pilot monitoring.
Also, consistent with congressional direction, we tasked
our Airman Certification System Working Group to complete an
airman certification standards call to action, and this brings
members together to review how current standards affect pilot
competency in manual flying skills.
And then, finally, I think to the last portion of your
question, any delegation of safety-critical systems that have a
human factors interface, we have retained the delegation of
those until the applicant demonstrates what the underlying
assumptions are and that we have reviewed and approved what
those are.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you.
And now I am going to turn to Congresswoman Norton for 5
minutes.
You are recognized.
[Pause.]
Mr. Larsen. Congresswoman Norton, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Norton. I am sorry. I was on mute.
My question, Administrator Dickson, is related to retention
and recruitment of FAA certification oversight staff.
Section 104(f)(1) of the Aircraft Certification, Safety,
and Accountability Act reads, and I am quoting here, sir, ``Not
later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this title,
the Administrator shall begin collaboration with the exclusive
bargaining representatives of engineers, safety inspectors,
systems safety specialists, and other qualified technical
experts certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States
Code, to improve recruitment of employees for, and to implement
retention incentives for employees holding, positions with
respect to the certification of aircraft, aircraft engines,
propellers, and appliances.'' That is pretty long, but that is
the quote.
The FAA has briefed Congress and FAA unions in recent
months and indicated that the FAA initiated collaboration
through individual meetings with NATCA, PASS, and AFSCME in
February 2021, and the FAA coordinated with the Office of Human
Resources Management to identify flexibilities and initiatives
that support recruitment and retention activities.
May I ask you, what specifically has the Federal Aviation
Administration done to collaborate with labor unions that
represent the engineers, safety inspectors, system safety
specialists, and other qualified technical experts to improve
the recruitment of employees for and to implement the retention
incentives for employees holding positions with respect to
certification of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and
appliances?
Mr. Dickson. Well, Congresswoman Norton, it is good to see
you again. Saw each other when we had that gate 35X out of DCA.
It is resting in peace now with the new concourse out there. So
that was a big day. So, again, nice to see you.
Yes, you are absolutely right, we are always collaborating
with our unions. It is the right thing to do. And it was
required by the legislation.
We have engaged with them to refine and extend our
recruitment and retention incentives for these critical skill
sets and identify also the training needs.
There is always a concern, rightfully so, when we bring in
folks maybe with varying backgrounds and experience levels into
areas that traditionally have had a lot of experience in the
aerospace industry, and maybe even a second career in some
case, so that we make sure that they are successful when they
come into the agency.
So that has been very important. The Deputy Administrator
and I collaborate. In fact, we met with our unions as a group
last week and do so on a regular basis. They are supporting us
through all of our outreach programs, our recruiting.
And we are looking at ways where we can use some of the
independent authorities that we have, because we, if done
correctly, we do have some more flexibility than other parts of
the Federal Government to do direct hires and targeted hiring
in some areas.
And I can tell you, I have been very personally involved as
well, not only with labor, but in these outreach efforts. And
we have actually used virtual means to expand our outreach and
meet people where they are during the pandemic.
So, we will continue to do that.
Ms. Norton. Yes, we have heard from at least one labor
union representing FAA workers that there has not been true
collaboration and very little proactive engagement from the
safety line of business on this initiative.
What is your response to this? And how will you improve FAA
engagement with labor unions?
Mr. Dickson. I am not aware of that, but I am very
interested in that perspective. And so, I would love to work
with your office to see where that might be coming from and
what we can do to address it.
Ms. Norton. I will be in touch with you about that labor
union, and I very much appreciate your cooperation.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
Ms. Norton. I yield back.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton.
And that is a reminder as well, her questions remind me,
Administrator, that as you implement SMS, as you prepare a rule
on SMS, I think it is important, as well, that the women and
men who are working in the facilities, building, designing, and
assembling these aircraft, are an active part of the safety
management system. And their input is going to be critical to
ensuring long-term safety improvements as well.
So, with that, I want to thank the Administrator for
joining us today. That concludes our hearing. I want to thank
our witness again for his testimony. The comments have been
informative and very helpful and have given us some things to
follow up on, as well as for you.
And I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's
hearing remain open until such time as our witness has provided
answers to any questions that may have been submitted to him in
writing.
I also ask unanimous consent the record remain open for 15
days for any additional comments and information submitted by
Members or the witness to be included in the record of today's
hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
And the Subcommittee on Aviation now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Texas
Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member Graves
for holding today's hearing as this committee continues its
investigation into the tragic Boeing airline crashes in Indonesia in
October 2018, and in Ethiopia, in March 2019. I also want to thank the
Honorable FAA Administrator, Mr. Stephen Dickson, for his testimony.
As we solemnly approach the 3rd anniversary of the 2018 Boeing
airline crash in Indonesia, wherein Lion Air Flight 610 crashed shortly
after taking off from Jakarta, killing all 189 passengers and crew
members on board, to this day it still seems somewhat mindboggling to
me why the FAA would have delegated the certification of something so
critical to airplane safety as the ``maneuvering characteristics
augmentation system'' or MCAS, to Boeing in the first place.
The aftermath of the airline crashes also resulted in terrible
administrative and logistical chaos, which affected all airlines across
the nation. Southwest Airlines, based in my congressional district in
Dallas, was perhaps the most adversely affected given that they are the
biggest operator and customer of 737 Max planes, and had grounded their
entire fleet for nearly two years.
Potential Questions for Witness Stephen Dickson, Administrator, FAA:
Mr. Dickson, in a Department of Transportation OIG report following
the Boeing airline crashes, the report ``revealed numerous shortcomings
in the FAA's process for certifying the safety of new airplane designs,
including derivatives of 50-year-old airframes.''
1) Does the FAA support and continue to practice the retrofitting
of airplanes? What is your current policy on this?
2) Mr. Dickson, since Southwest Airlines and American Airlines
both have a large presence in the Dallas metro area, and both operate
large 737 MAX fleets, is the FAA closely monitoring the reliability of
737 MAX airplanes to immediately detect any safety issues and ensure
they are corrected quickly? If so, have any such issues arisen?
Mr. Dickson, in your testimony you mention that ``the FAA is
prioritizing the oversight of manufacturers and is working to focus
that oversight on safety in critical areas, while, among other items,
demanding more transparency from them.''
3) In what ways has your relationship with the manufacturers
changed and what types of transparency are you demanding?
4) Mr. Dickson, in what ways specifically is the FAA striving to
strengthen risk management practices and improve communication between
air and manufacturing industries and the FAA?
Mr. Dickson, with respect to increased global collaboration, in
your testimony you say that the ``FAA is working closely with the
International Civil Aviation Organization and others to influence and
adjust the maintenance and pilot training requirements for U.S.
products operating under the oversight of another civil aviation
authority.''
5) Can you provide the committee with specific examples of these
adjustments?
Mr. Dickson, with respect to data collection, in your testimony you
say that ``the FAA's new contract with the Transportation Research
Board will aid the agency's effort to conduct analysis and reporting on
current and emerging safety trends in aviation.''
6) Are you able to provide the committee with one or two specific
examples of the types of safety data being collected and how it will
prove beneficial towards the goal of identifying potential hazards and
safety issues before they lead to a serious incident?
Mr. Dickson, you mention in your testimony that in April of this
year the FAA began a ``Voluntary Safety Reporting Program to provide a
mechanism for employees to voluntarily report potential hazards and
safety concerns without fear of reprisal.''
7) I am curious to know if, in your estimation, this practice has
been successful thus far and what kind of employee feedback have you
received?
Statement of Paul Hudson, President, FlyersRights.org, Submitted for
the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
November 2, 2021.
Background and Basis for Hearing
In this oversight hearing, FAA Administrator Steve Dickson appeared
remotely as the only witness to answer Committee Members' questions and
concerns about what the FAA has been doing since the Lion Air Crash.
A Boeing 737 MAX jetliner crashed killing all on board in October
2018. A second crash in March 2019 also killing all on board, for a
total of 346 lives lost, was due to the same cause: powerful software
coupled with faulty sensors meant to correct design flaws in the MAX.
The system known as MCAS, hidden by Boeing from pilots and largely from
the FAA until after the second crash, would take control from pilots to
prevent stalls when sensors told the software the aircraft was pitching
up in danger of a stall and it would mimic the handling of earlier
versions of the 737 during regular flight. After the second crash, the
MAX was grounded worldwide, notwithstanding repeated assurances by
Boeing that it was still safe. It was ungrounded and re-certified as
safe by the FAA until November 2020 based on largely secret changes and
testing.
This hearing was also meant to address the lack of rulemaking by
the FAA on approximately 100 Congressional mandates, often going back
many years.
Lack of Transparency in MAX and other FAA safety regulation
Both the FAA and Boeing since 2019 repeatedly specifically promised
transparency to the media and to Congress under oath throughout the 737
MAX ungrounding process.
However, in FlyersRights.org's Freedom of Information Act
litigation against the FAA, the FAA claimed that it cannot or will not
release many thousands of pages of documents pertaining to the changes
made to the MAX and to the testing performed on the MAX. The FAA makes
the implausible claim that all of the redacted material, usually entire
pages, are either proprietary information or non-proprietary
information that cannot be reasonably segregated from proprietary
information.
The FAA makes this claim based solely on Boeing's claims that this
material is proprietary business information and Boeing's alleged
belief that it submitted this information to the government with an
implied promise of confidentiality. Under the Supreme Court's Argus
Leader decision in 2019 concerning proprietary information and FOIA
Exemption 4, the government may withhold information from public
disclosure under FOIA if a private company merely had the subjective
belief that the information within the submission constitutes
proprietary information and that it received an express or implied
promise of confidentiality.
This interpretation of the FOIA statute allows a federal agency
that does not want to publicly release any information to withhold all
information on the most spurious of claims. The erosion of FOIA could
not be more obvious than it is in this case. Since the 737 MAX crashes,
the Boeing Company has paid $2.5 billion in fines and compensation to
airlines and victim family members for criminal fraud in obtaining
original FAA certification for the Boeing 737 MAX. However, Boeing's
assertion is treated as determinative even though, according to the
U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case:
The misleading statements, half-truths, and omissions
communicated by Boeing employees to the FAA impeded the
government's ability to ensure the safety of the flying public.
This case sends a clear message: The Department of Justice will
hold manufacturers like Boeing accountable for defrauding
regulators--especially in industries where the stakes are this
high.
So although Boeing has been punished for defrauding the FAA, Boeing
continues to enjoy the fruits of the fraud by having its claims of
proprietary information respected by the FAA. Can Boeing have a
reasonable expectation of privacy for fraudulent information or
information provided in furtherance of fraud?
FAA, for its part, has a documented history of being misled by
Boeing and for having too cozy of a relationship with its regulated
entity. Numerous instances of this are detailed in the Department of
Justice Deferred Prosecution Agreement and the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee's September 2020 report, ``The Design,
Development & Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX.'' Despite promising
transparency in the aftermath of its single biggest failure in its
history, one that exposes the potential for future safety deficiencies,
the FAA has decided to treat as gospel the assertions made by its
regulated entity, the criminal felon, Boeing.
This not only illustrated how the FOIA statute needs updating,
modernizing, or clarification, but that known safety risks continue to
exist at Boeing, FAA, and in aircraft certification. Between the DOT
Inspector General Report, the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee Report, numerous Congressional hearings, and public
disclosures in litigation, no one can say that they are not aware of
these problems.
The 10/21/2021 House Transportation and Infrastructure hearing
could have been an opportunity to probe specific actions that the FAA
has and has not taken. Instead, Administrator Dickson was able to give
vague assertions that the agency ``was working on'' any topic that a
Member of Congress brought up.
FAA failure to set seat standards or update emergency evacuation
procedures
Another important issue not remarked upon in the hearing is the
issue of emergency evacuation safety and seat size. The 2018 FAA
Reauthorization Act gave the FAA one year to establish minimum seat
standards needed for passenger safety. Two years have passed since this
deadline and the FAA has not publicly released any standards or
progress. The Act also required the FAA to evaluate and modernize its
emergency evacuation standards. Again, the FAA has not submitted its
report to Congress and has not publicly released the May 2020 report
submitted by the FAA Emergency Evacuation Standards Aviation Rulemaking
Committee to the FAA.
Needed reforms to enforce Congressional mandates on FAA
The FAA, as the Aviation Subcommittee is well aware, has a long
history of ignoring Congressional mandates and deadlines, especially
for rulemaking. And such mandates are most often enacted only after the
agency has ignored or rejected stakeholder pleas for action.
Flyersrights.org and its predecessor the Aviation Consumer Action
Project having represented passengers and the general public on safety
issues before the FAA for decades has seen this ingrained pattern
repeated constantly.
In the case of emergency evacuation delays goes back at least to
2005, in the case of setting reasonable seat and passenger space
standards to 2015 and in the case of enforcement of helicopter
crashworthiness standards for over 20 years.
The solution in our view involves using the Congress' power of the
purse in FAA appropriation bills to prohibit spending on non-
Congressional mandates until Congressional mandates are completed. This
could include prohibiting spending on processing waiver and exemption
requests for existing FAA rules. The FAA Office of Rulemaking expends
considerable resources on this activity granting 250 to 500 such
requests annually based on industry requests.
Such enforcement mechanism were common in past decades by the
Transportation Appropriation subcommittees, particularly under the
chairmanship of the late Senator Lautenberg but have fallen into
disuse.
References
1. Boeing Deferred Prosecution Agreement: https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-pay-over-25-
billion
2. Lead Boeing Prosecutor Joins Boeing Corporate Criminal Defense Firm
Kirkland & Ellis, Corporate Crime Reporter: https://
www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/lead-boeing-prosecutor-
joins-boeing-corporate-criminal-defense-firm-kirkland-ellis/
3. Flyers Rights Education Fund v. FAA, 19-3749, (D.D.C. 2021)
4. The Design, Development & Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX,
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Report, September
2020: https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX
%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf
5. FAA's Process for Updating Its Aircraft Evacuation Standards Lacks
Data Collection and Analysis on Current Evacuation Risks,
Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General,
September 16, 2020: https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/38012
6. Weaknesses in FAA's Certification and Delegation Processes Hindered
Its Oversight of the 737 MAX 8, Department of Transportation Office
of the Inspector General, February 23, 2021: https://
www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/38302
7. Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, No. 18-481 (2019)
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-481_5426.pdf
Paul Hudson
President, FlyersRights.org
Member, FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (1993-present)
Member, FAA Emergency Evacuation Advisory Rulemaking Committee (2019 to
present)
1030 15th St NW #292
Washington, DC 20005
[email and phone number redacted]
Boeing 2013 Meeting Minutes,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Greg Stanton
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Appendix
----------
Question from Hon. Sam Graves to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Question 1. As you are aware, the last FAA Reauthorization requires
that towers that pose an obvious risk to aircraft operations be clearly
marked and/or included in the FAA's database by April 5, 2020. I
understand that despite Congressional direction, the FAA has no plans
to carry out this mandate in the foreseeable future. Can I get your
commitment today that the FAA will implement this provision with
appropriate urgency?
Answer. We are working through this rulemaking though there have
been challenges over the years. I understand there was direction in
2016 that created a wide array of towers that were supposed to be
marked and then the 2018 bill narrowed that list down while
establishing the requirement for a database to include the location of
various kinds of towers. One of the central challenges we have faced
implementing this rule is obtaining the necessary safety data and cost-
benefit benefit information to support rulemaking under the
Administrative Procedures Act. While we work on that, we have
identified an existing FAA maintained obstruction database that will be
able to present the information required in the bill. Until a rule is
in place, it will be voluntary for structures under 200 feet to be
placed in the database but we will continue to work through these
issues.
Question from Hon. Garret Graves to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Question 1. Administrator Dickson, as I stated during the hearing,
it was not Congress' intent to transfer primary investigative authority
for whistleblower retaliation to the Office of Audit and Investigation
(AAE) under section 133 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act (Public Law 116-260). Instead, as section
106(t)(3)(A)(vi) clearly states, AAE may only ``investigate allegations
of whistleblower retaliation by employees of the Agency that have been
delegated to the Office by the Office of Investigations and
Professional Responsibility, the inspector general of the Department of
Transportation, or the Office of Special Counsel.'' While this clause
permits the delegation of whistleblower retaliation investigations to
AAE, it does not require such delegation. Does FAA agree with this
understanding of the law?
Answer. Yes. Section 106(t) of title 49, U.S. Code, as revised by
section 133 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability
Act (Public Law 116-260), states that the Office of Whistleblower
Protection and Aviation Safety Investigations shall, ``investigate
allegations of whistleblower retaliation by employees of the Agency
that have been delegated to the Office by the Office of Investigations
and Professional Responsibility, the inspector general of the
Department of Transportation, or the Office of Special Counsel.''
Further, as you noted, nothing in the text of section 106(t) requires
the delegation of whistleblower retaliation investigations to the
Office of Whistleblower Protection and Aviation Safety Investigations.
The FAA is continuing its work to implement all of the requirements
under section 133 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and
Accountability Act.
Questions from Hon. Scott Perry to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Following up on your October 20, 2021, response to the September
23, 2021, letter sent by myself and my colleagues:
Question 1. What is the name and title of the CBP official who
submitted the request for the TFR?
Answer. Pursuant to the agreement between CBP and the FAA, the CBP
submitted this request for a TFR via a generic CBP email address to a
FAA group inbox specifically for TFR requests.
Question 2. Your response makes it appear that FAA assumed the
validity of the CBP request, was the basis of the request ever verified
by FAA?
a. Is it FAA policy to assume the validity of the request?
Answer. As stated in the FAA previous letter, the FAA has TFR
agreements with the Department of Defense and various U.S. Federal
security and intelligence agencies, including, but not limited to, CBP.
These interagency security partners may request a TFR via the
established procedures and communication channels between FAA and
interagency security partners. As previously stated, the request was
received from a CBP email address.
The FAA follows the procedures and processes contained in the
applicable regulations and interagency security partner agreements when
issuing TFRs. The FAA works with its interagency security partners on
the assumption that incoming TFR requests have a valid legal basis, and
are made in good faith and in support of the interagency security
partner's mission and the interests of the U.S. more generally.
However, when appropriate, the FAA will follow-up with the
requesting agency and adjust the size and scope of the restriction, as
appropriate, based upon the hazard/risk identified by the requesting
agency. For example, based upon the language in the request, the FAA
may decide to verify that the hazard/risk necessitates restrictions on
access to the requested amount of airspace identified by the requesting
agency and/or should cover the full scope of kinds of aircraft
requested.
In this situation, the FAA evaluated the original request for a TFR
and reached out to CBP for additional information. The original request
for a TFR covered additional types of aircraft. CBP explained the basis
for its request specifically related to operators operating unmanned
aircraft in a reckless or malicious manner and interfering with the
operation of other aircraft. Based upon those hazards, the FAA narrowed
the restriction to just unmanned aircraft.
b. If so, what is the justification of that policy?
Answer. As discussed above, the FAA assumes that its partner
agencies are acting in good faith; however, the FAA may validate the
amount of airspace requested for the restriction and the kinds of
aircraft that are restricted.
Question 3. You stated, ``In the last five years, FAA has received
and processed more than 1,200 CBP requests for TFRs.'' How many of
those were granted?
Answer. The FAA has received and processed 1,200 TFR requests from
CBP in the last 5 years. All 1,200 TFR requests received during this
timeframe were granted.
Question 4. You stated, ``By limiting sUAS operations to known
remote pilots, CBP officers were able to more easily identify
unauthorized sUAS being operated in US airspace within the TFR from
either side of the border by remote pilots attempting to track law
enforcement and to communicate with groups of migrants attempting to
avoid detection and evade detention, i.e., using drones to direct
migrants to evade law enforcement.''
a. Do UAS operations conducted by criminal enterprises to avoid
law enforcement abide by TFRs?
Answer. TFRs provide a sorting mechanism whereby illegal operations
are easier to identify because they tend not to abide by TFRs.
b. How many violations have been noted? How many have been
prosecuted?
Answer. We are working on gathering this information, and will
follow-up with a response separately.
c. How many aircraft illegally present in US airspace on the US
border have been interdicted?
Answer. CBP and other national security and law enforcement
agencies are responsible for interdictions. The FAA does not track this
information.
Question 5. You stated, ``On Thursday, September 16, 2021, CBP
requested FAA to establish a TFR over the area of the law enforcement
activity for the safety and security of responding officers and to
further the efforts of CBP to maintain border security.'' It's pretty
apparent to everyone that there was no actual law enforcement activity
occurring--no one was stopping folks from coming into the country--and
that there was little to no effort to maintain border security in the
region. Given this, what were the alleged law enforcement activities
that required the TFR? Did CBP tell the FAA what activities were
occurring or were they assumed to be occurring without validation?
Answer. As stated above, the FAA follows the procedures and
processes contained in the applicable regulations and interagency
security partner agreements when issuing TFRs. The FAA works with its
interagency security partners on the assumption that incoming TFR
requests have a valid legal basis, and are made in good faith and in
support of the interagency security partner's mission and the interests
of the U.S. more generally.
Question 6. Your response indicates that FAA is working on
gathering and reviewing the requested documents related to my letter
and will follow up with these documents separately. If they are not
included in response to these questions for the record, what is the
timeline for sending these documents?
Answer. The FAA is working, in coordination with CBP, on gathering
and reviewing the responsive documents related to the Del Rio TFR.
Vaccine Mandate Questions:
Question 1. Congress has provided the passenger air carrier
industry with nearly $54 billion to keep pilots, flight attendants, and
other employees connected to their jobs and their healthcare. Why did
we spend these taxpayer dollars if the plan is to force the airlines to
fire these very employees over their vaccination status?
Answer. The FAA does not administer the funding referred to in this
question and does not enforce COVID-19 vaccination requirements for
industry. The FAA is responsible for promoting safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce. Throughout the pandemic, the FAA has remained
focused on aviation safety and making sure that the aviation system can
operate effectively, including addressing workforce issues. The FAA has
taken a number of actions to help the aviation industry adjust
operations in response to the pandemic.
Question 2. Why can't pilots self-medicate with certain over-the-
counter medications prior to flying, yet the FAA seems is encouraging
them to take a vaccine with no long term safety studies?
Answer. The COVID-19 public health emergency has driven
extraordinary global efforts to develop effective and safe vaccines.
The vaccine produced by Pfizer-BioNTech has received Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval. In addition, the vaccines produced by
Moderna and Johnson & Johnson-Janssen have been made available to the
American public under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) by the FDA.
After careful review of available data regarding safety profiles, the
FAA Office of Aerospace Medicine (AAM) adopted the following policy as
both safe and operationally responsive to this unique situation:
Holders of FAA-issued Airman Medical Certificates or Medical
Clearances may receive the Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, or Johnson &
Johnson COVID-19 vaccine; however, a 48-hour no fly/no safety related
duty interval must be observed after each dose.
Individuals holding an Airman Medical Certificate or Medical
Clearance should be reminded that they are prohibited from performing
flight crewmember duties or air traffic control duties if they do not
meet medical certification requirements, including those related to
adverse events from medications that render them unable to perform such
duties. AAM will monitor the patient response to each vaccine and may
adjust this policy as necessary to ensure aviation safety.
For additional information: https://www.faa.gov/
licenses_certificates/medical_certification/
Question 3. The FAA has appropriately high safety standards, safety
of flight is paramount to the industry. Why then, has the FAA not been
emphatic that more studies are needed on the effects of this vaccine
with respect to high altitude, environments of changing atmospheric
pressure, and long-term sitting (i.e., blood clots and deep vein
thrombosis)?
Answer. The Office of Aerospace Medicine carefully reviewed the
vaccine manufacturers' applications for approval/emergency use
authorization and continues to monitor the performance and side effect
profiles of the vaccines for potential impacts to aviation safety. This
office also established the 48-hour ``No Fly/No Safety-Related Duty''
interval following each dose based on medical information about the
vaccines and the potential side effects.
For additional information: https://www.faa.gov/coronavirus/
guidance_resources/vaccine_faq/
Question 4. Has the FAA had an open forum or sought the feedback of
pilots and air traffic controllers regarding their concerns for flight
safety with regard to this vaccine? If so, when will said forum occur
and where will the results be published?
Answer. As a general matter, public health agencies are the
appropriate entities to manage public outreach regarding COVID-19
vaccines. With respect to any safety of flight-related concerns, pilots
and air traffic controllers should consult with their aviation medical
examiner (AME), so that they can receive medical advice appropriate to
their individual circumstances.
Question 5. Is it true that it took a period of seven years for the
FAA to be satisfied that it was safe to raise the mandatory retirement
age of pilots from 60-65? And during that time the FAA also instituted
a policy that two pilots could not occupy the cockpit who were both
over the age of 60? Why hasn't a similar safety study been launched
between vaccinated and unvaccinated pilots?
Answer. The Fair Treatment of Experienced Pilots Act (P.L. 110-135)
was signed into law on December 13, 2007. This law set 65 years old as
the mandatory retirement age of pilots.
As it relates to vaccines, the Office of Aerospace Medicine
carefully reviewed the vaccine manufacturers' applications for
approval/emergency use authorization and continues to monitor the
performance and side effect profiles of the vaccines for potential
impacts to aviation safety.
Question 6. Is the FAA aware of the additional stress that will
fall onto the system should otherwise qualified pilots and air traffic
controllers be terminated due to their constitutionally protected right
to refuse a vaccine? What is the plan for mitigating this potential
increase in stress?
Answer. The FAA has not seen any impact in the system. Specific to
FAA employees, as of Nov. 23, the FAA had achieved a 99.8% compliance
rate--meaning employees who are vaccinated with at least one dose or
who have a pending or approved exception or extension request--and a
90.2% vaccination rate--employees who are vaccinated with at least one
dose--across our workforce. Implementation of the requirement will not
result in any disruptions to critical services that the American people
depend on.
In addition, the FAA has contingency plans that are utilized today
to support continued operations if a facility experiences staffing
constraints. These facility-specific contingency plans are coordinated
in advance with aviation stakeholders prior to implementation. As
demonstrated over the past 21 months, the FAA is prepared to continue
to provide safe and efficient air traffic services if individuals do
not meet the Federal employee or contractor vaccine mandates, as
applicable.
Question 7. Is the FAA aware of the current stress on the system
where pilots are being faced with two decisions: take a vaccine with
documented potential side effects that can be career ending, or don't
take the vaccine and lose that same career? This puts pilots in an
impossible, stressful situation. That induced stress degrades flight
safety today. Has the FAA considered the same impossible, stressful
situation for mechanics, air traffic controllers, TSA agents, and all
other aviation safety-related fields?
Answer. The FAA regularly monitors a variety of data sources in
order to identify adverse trends and/or stressors that may be
developing within the National Airspace System. Data systems monitored
include the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS)
System, Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP), line operations safety
audits (LOSA), Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) etc. When risk
are identified, the Certificate Management Office adds it to the Safety
Assurance System's Certificate Holders Assessment Tool (CHAT) for
monitoring and surveillance. The airlines, using their Safety
Management Systems (SMS), can incorporate the safety data captured by
the programs listed above into their individual SMSs for monitoring and
assessing. This approach allows both the FAA and airlines to tailor
their approach to identify and address specific stressors as they
arise.
The FAA is requesting labor organizations and airline leadership
communicate with their membership and employees to address their
concerns and remind everyone to focus on safety and not allow
distractions to compromise it.
We continue to monitor the system for any circumstance that could
undermine safety.
Question 8. How can the FAA be certain that there are not currently
fully vaccinated pilots and air traffic controllers who are suffering
from an adverse vaccine reaction and are concealing that reaction so
that they will not potentially lose their medical license? What systems
are in place that a pilot or air traffic controller can safely disclose
these reactions and keep their jobs?
Answer. To maintain the highest level of safety in the National
Airspace System, the FAA requires pilots with medical certificates or
air traffic controllers with medical clearances to observe a period of
48 hours following the administration of each dose of a COVID-19
vaccine before conducting safety-sensitive aviation duties, such as
flying or controlling air traffic.
The required waiting period applies to those holding an Airman
Medical Certificate issued under 14 CFR Part 67 or a Medical Clearance
issued under FAA Order 3930.3C.
In addition, pilots must adhere to the guidance in 14 CFR 61.53 and
not exercise the privileges of their airman certificates if they know
they are medically unfit. There are similar requirements in FAA Order
3930.3C for air traffic controllers.
Question 9. The ``IM SAFE'' acronym the FAA encourages aviators to
use promotes the idea that safety to fly is self-determined. Why are
pilots who have determined through an informed decision made in concert
with their medical doctors that a Covid vaccine is detrimental to their
ability to fly safely being forced to take the vaccine anyway?
Answer. With respect to any safety of flight-related concerns,
pilots should consult with their aviation medical examiner (AME), so
that they can receive medical advice appropriate to their individual
circumstances.
Question 10. Are you familiar with the Harvard University T.H. Chan
School of Public Health Study that was conducted and published last
year which indicated that airline crews and passengers are not at risk
for contracting COVID-19 on an airplane? When it was published in
October of 2020, the study noted that ``to date, the CDC has not
confirmed a single case of viral transmission on a U.S. plane''. The
study concluded that there is a 0.03% chance of contracting COVID-19 on
a plane. Given these findings, why is the FAA encouraging the aviation
community to take this vaccine--especially in light of the mounting
VAERS reporting evidence that there are serious adverse reactions and
those reactions can come upon a person suddenly?
Answer. The FAA is aware of this study. The FAA continues to follow
the guidance and direction of the public health agencies with respect
to the response to the COVID-19 public health emergency in the aviation
context.
To maintain the highest level of safety in the National Airspace
System, the FAA requires pilots with medical certificates or air
traffic controllers with medical clearances to observe a period of 48
hours following the administration of each dose of COVID-19 vaccine
before conducting safety-sensitive aviation duties, such as flying or
controlling air traffic.
The required waiting period applies to those holding an Airman
Medical Certificate issued under 14 CFR Part 67 or a Medical Clearance
issued under FAA Order 3930.3C.
In addition, pilots must adhere to the guidance in 14 CFR 61.53 and
not exercise the privileges of their airman certificates if they know
they are medically unfit. There are similar requirements in FAA Order
3930.3C for air traffic controllers.
Question 11. Does the FAA intend to require vaccines for passengers
on commercial aviation flights? Will you commit FAA to not imposing
these requirements?
Answer. The FAA remains steadfast in its focus on safety of flight
and continuing to provide safe and efficient air navigation services
during the COVID-19 public health emergency. The public health and
security agencies have been the primary agencies to issue mandatory
public health requirements with respect to the COVID-19 public health
emergency in the aviation context. For example, the wearing of face
masks during travel and vaccination and testing mandates for
international travel have been implemented via public health orders and
security program changes.
Questions from Hon. Pete Stauber to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson,
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration
Question 1. We all know and understand the importance of 5G
broadband deployment and connectivity, including for use in aviation.
At the same time, aviation safety is of utmost importance. Several
other aviation authorities, including Canada, France, Australia, and
the UAE, announced that they are looking at 5G deployment in and around
major airports and heliports and the need for mitigations to minimize
5G interference impact on aircraft radar altimeters. By way of
background for those who may not be familiar, a radar altimeter is
equipment on an aircraft that directly measures the precise distance to
the ground, particularly important for safety when operating close to
the ground.
a. How engaged has FAA been on this matter and have you issued any
formal positions or planned actions on this like other aviation
authorities? Have you communicated the significance of this issue and
any safety concerns with DOT and other agencies, like NTIA or FCC? Do
you expect to take further action? It seems to me that FAA may have
been somewhat stifled in your ability to ensure that potential impacts
on aviation safety are raised and appropriately considered and
addressed by other government agencies. Do you think we need to
reevaluate this process?
Answer. The FAA has been continuously engaged on this issue for
several years and we have both shared our concern and worked with
stakeholders concerning the potential safety risks for 5G deployment to
interfere with radar altimeters, which provide data to other avionics.
On November 2, the FAA issued a Safety Information Alert Bulletin
(SAIB), which notifies the aviation community of a potential risk to
the National Airspace System.\1\ This SAIB also asks manufacturers and
OEMs to provide information to the FAA that may help us to more
effectively scope that risk. Similarly, the FAA is continuing its work
to assess the risk in order to issue formal safety guidance. In
parallel, we continue to work closely with the Department, NTIA, FCC,
and industry on technical solutions that ensure both the safety of the
national airspace and enable 5G services--which the FAA has always
supported.
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\1\ FAA, Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin, Risk of
Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters, AIR-21-18, November 2,
2021, at https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgSAIB.nsf/dc7bd4f27e5f107486257221005f069d/
27ffcbb45e6157e9862587810044ad19/$FILE/AIR-21-18.pdf
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