[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                THREE YEARS AFTER LION AIR 610: FAA IMPLE-
                 MENTATION OF THE 2020 AIRCRAFT CERTIFI-
                 CATION, SAFETY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

=======================================================================

                                (117-29)

                             REMOTE HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                                AVIATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 21, 2021

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]             


     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation                             
                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
49-705                       WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                             
 
             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DON YOUNG, Alaska                      District of Columbia
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      RICK LARSEN, Washington
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JOHN KATKO, New York                 HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
BRIAN BABIN, Texas                   Georgia
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina         DINA TITUS, Nevada
MIKE BOST, Illinois                  SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           JARED HUFFMAN, California
DOUG LaMALFA, California             JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas            FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   MARK DeSAULNIER, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON,            STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
  Puerto Rico                        SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota              TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              GREG STANTON, Arizona
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota          COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi           JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 ANTONIO DELGADO, New York
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York         CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California           CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
                                     KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
                                     MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
                                     NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
                                     MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
                                     TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana

                        Subcommittee on Aviation

  RICK LARSEN, Washington, Chair
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana             STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
DON YOUNG, Alaska                    ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
JOHN KATKO, New York                 NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida               HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            Georgia
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania   DINA TITUS, Nevada
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota              JULIA BROWNLEY, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee              DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey       MARK DeSAULNIER, California
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas                 STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas                GREG STANTON, Arizona
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
MICHELLE STEEL, California           CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania, Vice 
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio)    Chair
                                     ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
                                       District of Columbia
                                     EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
                                     JOHN GARAMENDI, California
                                     PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex 
                                     Officio)

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................   vii

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation, opening 
  statement......................................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Aviation, 
  opening statement..............................................     4
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     8
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     9
    Prepared statement...........................................    10
Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of Texas, prepared statement.............................    79

                               WITNESSES

Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation 
  Administration, oral statement.................................    11
    Prepared statement...........................................    13

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Submissions for the Record by Hon. Andre Carson:
    Letter of October 8, 2021, from Hon. Brian K. Fitzpatrick, 
      Member of Congress, et al., to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, 
      Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.............    25
    Letter of October 19, 2021, from Families of Ethiopian 
      Airlines Flight 302 Crash Victims, to Department of 
      Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration 
      Officials..................................................    26
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew:
    Letter of October 19, 2021, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew, 
      Member of Congress, to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, 
      Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.............    64
    Letter of October 21, 2021, from the American Federation of 
      Government Employees, International Association of 
      Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and National Federation 
      of Federal Employees, to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, 
      Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration.............    67
Fact Sheet Titled ``FAA Document Confirms It Wasn't The Pilots,'' 
  by the Flight ET302 Families Foundation, Submitted for the 
  Record by Hon. Garret Graves...................................    72
Statement of Paul Hudson, President, FlyersRights.org, Submitted 
  for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio........................    80
Boeing 2013 Meeting Minutes, Submitted for the Record by Hon. 
  Greg Stanton...................................................    83

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal 
  Aviation Administration, from:
    Hon. Sam Graves..............................................    85
    Hon. Garret Graves...........................................    85
    Hon. Scott Perry.............................................    85
    Hon. Pete Stauber............................................    89

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                            October 15, 2021

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Aviation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Aviation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on Three Years After Lion 
Air 610: FAA Implementation of the 2020 Aircraft Certification, 
Safety, and Accountability Act
_______________________________________________________________________


                                PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Aviation will meet on Thursday, October 
21, 2021, at 10:00 a.m. EDT in 2167 Rayburn House Office 
Building to hold an oversight hearing titled, Three Years After 
Lion Air 610: FAA Implementation of the 2020 Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. The hearing will 
examine ongoing work within the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) to implement provisions of the bipartisan Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.\1\ For the 
Majority, the Act was the culmination of an 18-month 
investigation by Committee Majority staff \2\--the longest in 
the Committee's history. For both the Majority and the 
Minority, the Act addresses both the specific recommendations 
of the various non-partisan, expert safety reviews as well as 
the many factors that contributed to the tragic Boeing 737 MAX 
accidents (discussed below). FAA Administrator Steve Dickson is 
the only witness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Pub. L. No. 116-260, div. V (2020).
    \2\ Staff of the U.S. House Cmte. on Transp. and Infra., The 
Design, Development, and Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX: Final 
Committee Report (Sept. 2020), at https://transportation.house.gov/imo/
media/doc/2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20
Public%20Release.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               BACKGROUND

    Two air disasters in 2018 and 2019 involving a new 
derivative of the Boeing 737, the Boeing 737 MAX, revealed 
numerous shortcomings in the FAA's process for certifying the 
safety of new airplane designs, including derivatives of 50-
year-old airframes such as the 737.\3\ In response to these two 
crashes, which resulted in the deaths of 346 passengers and 
crew, the FAA grounded the 737 MAX for a year and eight months, 
the longest grounding of a U.S.-built airliner in history. 
Numerous expert safety reviews and investigations discovered 
some limitations and failures of the FAA's certification 
process, acts and omissions by Boeing, and areas to be 
addressed in pilot training.\4\ Therefore, Congress enacted the 
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act in 
December 2020 to improve these processes and prevent similar 
deficiencies in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See Dep't of Transp. Office of Insp. Gen., Weaknesses in FAA's 
Certification and Delegation Processes Hindered Its Oversight of the 
737 MAX 8, Rpt. No. AV2021020 (Feb. 21, 2021) (hereinafter ``IG 
Report'').
    \4\ Boeing 737 MAX reviews and investigation reports include: Joint 
Authorities Technical Review, ``Boeing's 737 MAX Flight Control System, 
Observations, Findings and Recommendations Report'' (October 11, 2019); 
National Transportation Safety Board Safety Recommendation Report, 
``Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the Effects of 
Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance'' (ASR-19-01; 
September 19, 2019); U.S. Department of Transportation Special 
Committee to review the Federal Aviation Administration's Aircraft 
Certification Process Report (January 16, 2020); and Safety Oversight 
and Certification Aviation Rulemaking Committee (SOC-ARC) 
Recommendation Report to the Federal Aviation Administration (December 
2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. THE CRASHES AND FAA RESPONSE

    On October 29, 2021, more than 100 families in Indonesia 
and around the world will mark the third anniversary of the 
first 737 MAX crash: that of Lion Air flight 610. The airplane 
operating flight 610, a two-month-old 737 MAX 8, crashed into 
the Java Sea 11 minutes after takeoff from Jakarta bound for 
Pangkal Pinang, Indonesia, killing all 189 passengers and 
crew.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Rep. of Indonesia, Nat'l Transp. Safety Cmte., Preliminary 
Aircraft Accident Investigation Report: PT Lion Mentari Airlines, 
Boeing 737-8 (MAX); PK-LQP, Rpt. No. KNKT.18.10.35.04, available at 
https://avherald.com/files/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Preliminary
%20Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The second crash occurred slightly more than four months 
later, on March 10, 2019, when Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 
crashed six minutes after takeoff from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
on a morning flight to Nairobi, Kenya.\6\ All 157 passengers 
and crew (including eight Americans) were killed on impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Ministry of Transp., 
Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, Aircraft Accident Investigation 
Preliminary Report: Ethiopian Airlines Group, B737-8 (MAX) Registered 
ET-AVJ, Rpt. No. AI-01/19 (April 4, 2019), at http://www.ecaa.gov.et/
Home/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Preliminary-Report-B737-800MAX-ET-
AVJ.pdf (hereinafter ``ET302 preliminary report'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Within weeks of the Lion Air crash, based on a preliminary 
readout from the flight data recorder recovered from the 
wreckage, investigators had a sense of what might have been a 
major contributing factor in the accident. A small vane called 
an ``alpha vane,'' slightly smaller than a test tube, protrudes 
from each side of the airplane's nose and measures the angle 
between the airplane's flight path and the oncoming air, which 
is known as the ``angle of attack.'' The alpha vane on the left 
side of the Lion Air airplane's nose had somehow been 
misaligned and registered an abnormally high nose-up pitch 
attitude, triggering operation of a new system called the 
maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS), which 
was designed to push the airplane's nose down in such 
circumstances.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See, e.g., Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Safety Recommendation 
Report: Assumptions Used in the Safety Assessment Process and the 
Effects of Multiple Alerts and Indications on Pilot Performance (Sept. 
19, 2019), at 3-4, available at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1901.pdf (hereinafter ``NTSB Safety 
Recommendation Report'') (``During the preliminary design stage of the 
737 MAX, Boeing testing and analysis revealed that the addition of the 
LEAP-1B engine and associated nacelle changes produced an ANU [airplane 
nose-up] pitching moment when the airplane was operating at high AOA 
and mid Mach numbers. After studying various options for addressing 
this issue, Boeing implemented aerodynamic changes as well as a 
stability augmentation function, MCAS, as an extension of the existing 
speed trim system to improve aircraft handling characteristics and 
decrease pitch-up tendency at elevated AOA.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On November 7, 2018, shortly after the Lion Air accident, 
the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive to 737 MAX 
operators. The directive did not mention MCAS by name; instead, 
it advised air carriers that an erroneous angle-of-attack 
reading could cause ``a potential for repeated nose-down trim 
commands'' and ultimately ``could cause the flight crew to have 
difficulty controlling the airplane, and lead to excessive 
nose-down attitude, significant altitude loss, and possible 
impact with terrain.'' \8\ The directive instructed that crews 
who detect ``uncommanded horizontal stabilizer trim movement'' 
should follow a pre-existing memory item procedure for the 
broader scenario of a ``runaway stabilizer.'' \9\ But the 
Ethiopian Airlines accident demonstrated that further action 
was necessary. The day after the accident, civil aviation 
regulators worldwide began prohibiting the operation of Boeing 
737 MAX airplanes in their jurisdictions. The FAA grounded the 
airplane on March 13, 2019, three days after the crash, after a 
link between the two accidents was established.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Fed. Aviation Admin., Emergency Airworthiness Directive No. 
2018-23-51 (Nov. 7, 2018), at http://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgad.nsf/0/83ec7f95f3e5bfbd8625833e
0070a070/$FILE/2018-23-51_Emergency.pdf.
    \9\ Id.
    \10\ Fed. Aviation Admin., Emergency Order of Prohibition to 
Operators of Boeing Company Model 737-8 and Boeing Company Model 737-9 
Airplanes (March 13, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The 737 MAX returned to service starting in December 2020, 
when the FAA approved a substantial number of design changes to 
ensure erroneous MCAS activation would not occur and that, if 
it did, the crew would be able to maintain control of the 
airplane.\11\ This recertification followed more than a year of 
extensive aircraft design reviews by the FAA, NASA, the Air 
Force, the Volpe Center, foreign aviation safety regulators, 
and others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Airworthiness Directive, The Boeing Company Airplanes, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 74560 (Nov. 4, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

    All aircraft and aviation products are subject to FAA 
certification prior to their sale and use in the United States. 
The FAA is responsible for regulating aviation safety, which 
includes approving the design and manufacture of new aircraft 
and aviation products before they enter the National Airspace 
System.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  44702, 44704; GAO, Aviation 
Manufacturing: Status of FAA's Efforts to Improve Certification and 
Regulatory Consistency (July 31, 2014), GAO-14-829T, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION AUTHORIZATION

    Since even before the establishment of FAA's predecessor 
agency in 1958, the federal government has delegated some 
safety certification responsibilities to technical experts in 
the industry. As airplanes, engines, and their constituent 
systems became increasingly complex, Congress authorized the 
FAA to leverage the product-specific knowledge among 
appropriately qualified employees of manufacturers to determine 
a new product's compliance with the applicable provisions of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations. A designee may receive 
authority to examine, inspect, and test aircraft and persons 
for the purpose of issuing certificates.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ GAO-14-829T at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The organization designation authorization (ODA) program 
allows the FAA to leverage limited resources to focus on the 
areas of highest risk. The program was envisioned to allow 
qualified individuals or organizations to certify, on behalf of 
the FAA, that well-understood, non-critical, or low-risk 
designs comply with applicable Federal requirements, thereby 
freeing up some of FAA's resources to focus on and remain 
directly involved in the review and approval of higher-risk 
items, such as safety-critical or ``novel or unusual'' 
designs.\14\ Regardless of delegation decisions, the FAA bears 
ultimate responsibility for ensuring new aircraft designs are 
safe and comply with design requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See FAA, Airworthiness Certification, https://www.faa.gov/
aircraft/air_cert/airworthiness_certification/; U.S. House Cmte. On 
Transp. and Infra., ``Status of the Boeing 737 MAX,'' Testimony of 
Daniel Elwell, FAA Acting Administrator (May 15, 2019), at 28-29 
(hereinafter ``Elwell Testimony'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. CERTIFICATION OF THE 737 MAX

    Since the original 737 aircraft was certified in 1967, the 
FAA has approved numerous new models of the aircraft, all 
through amendments to the original 737's type certificate. With 
regard to the FAA certification of the 737 MAX, the process to 
issue an amended type certificate, from initial application to 
final certification, took five years, with the final amended 
type certificate issued in March 2017, according to the 
FAA.\15\ The process included 297 certification flight tests, 
including tests of the MCAS functions. Although the system 
should have been considered safety-critical, as the FAA 
acknowledged before the Subcommittee in 2019, the FAA years 
earlier had delegated certification of MCAS to Boeing as part 
of a larger delegation of certification of the flight control 
system pursuant to Boeing's ODA.\16\ In 2015, the FAA delegated 
some key safety assessments of the flight control system, which 
contained MCAS, back to Boeing based on the risk rating of 
``major'' (under this rating, flight crews are the redundancy 
for a system failure).\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ See Boeing Commercial Airplanes, ``Boeing 737 MAX 8 Earns FAA 
Certification'' (March 9, 2017), at https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2017-
03-09-Boeing-737-MAX-8-Earns-FAA-Certification.
    \16\ Dep't of Transp. Insp. Gen. staff briefing for Committee staff 
on work to date investigating FAA's certification of the 737 MAX and 
MCAS (October 7, 2019).
    \17\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In a review of the process for certifying the 737 MAX, the 
Department of Transportation inspector general ultimately found 
that

        limitations in FAA's guidance and processes that impacted 
        certification and led to a significant misunderstanding of 
        [MCAS] . . . . First, FAA's certification guidance does not 
        adequately address integrating new technologies into existing 
        aircraft models. Second, FAA did not have a complete 
        understanding of Boeing's safety assessments performed on MCAS 
        until after the first accident. Communication gaps further 
        hindered the effectiveness of the certification process. In 
        addition, management and oversight weaknesses limit FAA's 
        ability to assess and mitigate risks with the Boeing ODA.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ IG Report, supra note 3.

    The latter risks included the risk that Boeing employees 
would place undue pressure on their colleagues who work as ODA 
unit members on the FAA's behalf.\19\ In fact, the inspector 
general reported that, in a 2016 survey of ODA unit members, 40 
percent of respondents said they had experienced undue pressure 
from other Boeing employees.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Id. at 35-36.
    \20\ Id. at 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MCAS was a feature of the 737 MAX because Boeing determined 
that the system was necessary to ensure that the 737 MAX would 
exhibit the same control characteristics as the 737NG during 
certain maneuvers in flight.\21\ MCAS may have also created new 
training requirements for pilots, but Boeing's chief technical 
pilot for the 737 MAX program asked the FAA to remove 
references to MCAS from the flight crew operating manual on the 
premise that the system would not operate under normal flight 
conditions and later boasted that he had lied to 
regulators.\22\ On October 14, 2021, a federal grand jury 
returned an indictment against that Boeing employee for six 
counts of fraud stemming from his communications with two U.S. 
737 MAX customers about the 737 MAX flight control system.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ See, e.g., NTSB Safety Recommendation Report, supra note 7, at 
8.
    \22\ David Gelles and Natalie Kitroeff, ``Boeing Pilot Complained 
of `Egregious' Issue with 737 Max in 2016,'' New York Times (Oct. 18, 
2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/18/
business/boeing-flight-simulator-text-message.html.
    \23\ Indictment, U.S. v. Mark A. Forkner, No. 4-21CR-268-0 (N.D. 
Texas Oct. 14, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, to preserve commonality between the 737 MAX 
and its prior model, Boeing received 11 exceptions from FAA 
design regulations promulgated after the 1967 type certificate 
was issued. For example, Boeing obtained an exception from the 
FAA that relieved Boeing of the requirement that the 737 MAX 
must be equipped with a caution, alert, and advisory system 
that ``[p]rovide[s] timely attention-getting cues through at 
least two different senses by a combination of aural, visual, 
or tactile indications'' and that ``[p]revent[s] the 
presentation of an alert that is inappropriate or 
unnecessary.'' \24\ Instead, the 737 MAX largely uses legacy 
cautions, warnings, alerts, and advisories grandfathered from 
the previous 737 generation.\25\ That design makes it more 
likely for pilots to become task-saturated or fail to timely 
diagnose safety-critical failures in time to recover the 
aircraft during rare but extreme failure scenarios like those 
that confronted the pilots of Lion Air flight 610 and Ethiopian 
Airlines flight 302.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ 14 C.F.R. Sec.  25.1322(c), (d); see Dominic Gates, ``Boeing 
pushed FAA to relax 737 MAX certification requirements for crew 
alerts,'' Seattle Times (Oct. 2, 2019), at https://
www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-pushed-faa-to-
arelax-737-max-
certification-requirements-for-crew-alerts/.
    \25\ The Boeing 737 Technical Site, ``737-MAX Flightdeck,'' at 
http://www.b737.org.uk/flightdeck737max.htm.
    \26\ See, e.g., NTSB Safety Recommendation Report, supra note 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATIONS

    In the wake of the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, 
the Committee launched an investigation at the direction of 
Chair DeFazio and Chair Larsen into the certification of the 
737 MAX and related issues.\27\ As part of the 18-month-long 
investigation, the Committee held five public hearings; wrote 
nearly two dozen oversight letters; obtained an estimated 
600,000 pages of documents from Boeing, the FAA, and others; 
received information and insight from former and current 
employees; and interviewed dozens of current and former Boeing 
and FAA employees.\28\ In September 2020, the Committee issued 
a Majority staff report detailing its investigative 
findings.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Chairs DeFazio, Larsen Respond to Grounding of Boeing 
Aircraft, Press Release (Mar. 13, 2019), available at https://
transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-defazio-larsen-
respond-to-grounding-of-boeing-aircraft.
    \28\ See The Design, Development & Certification of the Boeing 737 
MAX, Majority Staff of the Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure Final Committee Report Prepared for Chair DeFazio and 
Chair Larsen (Sept. 2020), p. 6, available at https://
transportation.house.gov/imo/
media/doc/
2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf.
    \29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, there were many other investigations and 
reviews, including the National Transportation Safety Board 
safety recommendations report in 2019; a review by a U.S.-led 
international panel, the Joint Authorities Technical Review; a 
separate review by a panel of current and former U.S. aviation 
leaders, convened as the Special Committee to Review FAA's 
Aircraft Certification Process; a review of the technical 
changes to the airplane by a team of aviation industry experts 
from FAA, NASA, the Air Force, and the Volpe Center, convened 
as the B737 MAX Technical Advisory Board; and reviews by the 
U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General. 
These investigations and reviews underscored the need for the 
2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.

IV. NOTEWORTHY PROVISIONS OF THE SAFETY LEGISLATION

    According to the numerous safety expert reviews and 
investigations, unfortunately the FAA's certification process 
failed to detect or properly account for the possibility that a 
single alpha vane failure--which normally would not result in a 
crash--could set in motion a series of events, including 
erroneous MCAS activation, that would create a situation from 
which the pilots could not recover. Accordingly, the bipartisan 
safety law includes 35 provisions that collectively address the 
shortcomings and limitations of the process and require 
regulatory action on the FAA's part; imposes civil penalties 
upon manufacturers for providing the FAA or airlines with 
incomplete or misleading information on important systems; 
requires FAA approval of new ODA unit members to prevent 
conflicts of interest and to ensure their competence; requires 
the FAA to address international pilot training standards, the 
safety benefits of flight deck automation, and the concurrent 
need for strong manual flying skills; and penalizes the 
exertion of undue pressure on those unit members, among other 
things.
    The following are the most significant of such provisions.

A. SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directs the FAA to require        Jan. 26, 2021.....  IN PROGRESS: FAA
 aircraft and other aerospace                          expects issuance
 industry manufacturers to adopt                       of proposed rule
 safety management systems,                            in September
 which allow them to identify,                         2022.
 manage, and eliminate safety
 risks through a variety of
 mechanisms and internal
 processes, consistent with
 international standards and
 practices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. EXPERT REVIEW OF BOEING'S SAFETY CULTURE

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Convenes an independent expert    Jan. 26, 2021.....  IN PROGRESS: FAA
 review panel to review The                            has taken
 Boeing Company's exercise of                          internal steps to
 its ODA privileges, the                               prepare, but the
 company's safety culture, and                         panel won't be
 capability to perform FAA-                            convened before
 delegated functions.                                  2022. The charter
                                                       is expected in
                                                       fall 2021.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. MORE EXPERTS FOR CERTIFICATION ACTIVITIES

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Authorizes $27 million   N/A...............
 in annual appropriations for
 the FAA to recruit and retain
 engineers, safety inspectors,
 human factors specialists,
 software and cybersecurity
 experts, and other qualified
 technical experts who perform
 duties related to the
 certification of aircraft,
 engines, and other components.
 Also directs the FAA to  Jan. 26, 2021.....  IN PROGRESS: FAA
 conduct a review of its                               began the review
 workforce responsible for                             in February 2021.
 aircraft certification to                             The review is
 determine whether the agency                          ongoing.
 has the necessary expertise and
 capability to certify new
 technologies and materials.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. REQUIREMENT FOR DISCLOSURE OF SAFETY-CRITICAL INFORMATION TO THE FAA 
                    AND AIRLINES

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requires manufacturers to         Effective at        IN PROGRESS: FAA
 disclose to the FAA, and to       enactment.          is preparing
 airlines and pilots via                               three policy
 airplane flight manuals and                           documents for FAA
 flight crew operating manuals,                        employees and
 all safety-critical information                       aerospace
 related to an aircraft,                               manufacturers
 including information regarding                       outlining the
 systems that manipulate flight                        agency's
 controls without direct pilot                         enforcement of
 input and whose failure or                            this provision.
 erroneous activation would                            Completion
 present a risk with an outcome                        expected in 2022.
 rated hazardous or
 catastrophic. Imposes up to a
 $1 million civil penalty for a
 violation of the disclosure
 requirements.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. LIMITATION ON DELEGATION

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prohibits the FAA from            Effective at        IN PROGRESS: FAA
 delegating to a manufacturer      enactment.          has taken a
 the authority to certify on                           number of
 behalf of the agency that a                           internal steps
 critical system design feature,                       and will issue
 including a ``novel or unusual                        the final FAA
 design feature,'' complies with                       policy documents
 the Federal Aviation                                  in 2023.
 Regulations until the FAA
 Administrator has validated any
 underlying assumptions related
 to human factors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. REFORM OF THE ODA SYSTEM TO ADD ACCOUNTABILITY AND PREVENT UNDUE 
                    PRESSURE ON ODA UNIT MEMBERS

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Requires the FAA         Jan. 1, 2022......  IN PROGRESS: FAA
 Administrator, beginning on                           expects to issue
 January 1, 2022, to approve                           final policy
 each new individual selected by                       documents for
 an ODA holder engaged in the                          manufacturer and
 design of an aircraft, aircraft                       FAA employees in
 engine, propeller, or appliance                       February 2022.
 before they become an
 authorized representative (or
 ``ODA unit member'') to act on
 the FAA's behalf in validating
 compliance of aircraft systems
 and designs with FAA
 requirements. Requires new ODA
 unit members to meet
 qualifications issued by the
 FAA Administrator, and that at
 a minimum, such individuals
 must possess the requisite
 knowledge and technical skills
 and be of good moral character.
 Allows for conditional
 designations of ODA unit
 members and requires the FAA to
 approve or reject those
 designations within 30 days.
 Reinforces the FAA
 Administrator's authority to
 rescind an approval for an
 individual to serve as an ODA
 unit member at any time, for
 any reason.
 Directs the FAA to
 review each current Boeing ODA
 unit member to ensure each
 individual meets the agency's
 minimum qualifications.
 Imposes a civil penalty
 for any supervisor of an ODA
 holder that manufactures
 transport category airplanes
 who interferes with (e.g.,
 harasses, berates, or
 threatens) an ODA unit member's
 performance of authorized
 functions on behalf of the FAA
 and requires all ODA unit
 members to promptly report any
 cases of interference
 experienced or witnessed at a
 company.
 Directs the FAA to
 perform periodic audits of each
 manufacturing ODA unit and its
 procedures at least once every
 seven years.
 Directs the FAA to
 assign aviation safety advisors
 to ODA unit members at certain
 aircraft and engine
 manufacturers to ensure unit
 members are knowledgeable of
 FAA policies and to monitor
 their performance.
 Prohibits the FAA and
 ODA holders from prohibiting
 ODA unit members from
 communicating with FAA
 personnel and vice-versa.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

G. VOLUNTARY SAFETY REPORTING PROGRAM

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directs the FAA, in               Dec. 27, 2021.....  COMPLETE
 collaboration with labor
 groups, to implement a
 confidential voluntary safety
 reporting program for FAA
 engineers, safety inspectors,
 systems safety specialists, and
 others to report safety issues
 to FAA management.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. CONSIDERATION OF HOW ONE FAILURE CAUSES OTHERS

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directs the FAA to require an     Dec. 27, 2022.....  IN PROGRESS: FAA
 applicant for an amended type                         is working to
 certificate for a transport                           develop an
 airplane, such as Boeing in the                       implementation
 case of the 737 MAX, to perform                       plan and expects
 a system safety assessment                            to issue a notice
 (SSA) with respect to each                            of proposed
 proposed design change the FAA                        rulemaking in
 determines is significant, and                        2022.
 to review each SSA for
 sufficiency and adequate
 consideration of the airplane-
 level effects of failures,
 including pilot responses to
 those failures.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. NEW GLOBAL STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING CHANGES TO EXISTING AIRPLANE 
                    DESIGNS

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Directs the FAA to exercise       Dec. 27, 2023.....  IN PROGRESS: FAA
 leadership in the creation of                         has engaged with
 international policies and                            other civil
 standards relating to the                             regulators and is
 issuance of amended type                              leading a working
 certificates for new airplane                         group on pilots'
 design, and requires the FAA to                       reliance on
 conduct a rulemaking to revise                        automation as
 and improve the process for                           part of broader
 issuing amended type                                  engagement at the
 certificates.                                         International
                                                       Civil Aviation
                                                       Organization.
                                                       Policy and
                                                       regulatory
                                                       documents
                                                       expected in 2024.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Adds aviation manufacturing       Effective at        COMPLETE: FAA is
 employees to existing laws        enactment.          monitoring and
 protecting airline employees                          addressing claims
 from whistleblower retaliation                        of retaliation
 for reporting safety issues or                        against
 violations.                                           whistleblowers.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

K. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL PILOT TRAINING

------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Mandate                   Deadline             Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Expands the FAA's role   Jan. 26, 2021, to   IN PROGRESS:
 in reviewing and approving        initiate an         Expert panel's
 pilot training requirements for   expert safety       final report with
 commercial aircraft, by           review of           recommendations
 initiating several reviews        assumptions         to improve pilot
 examining human factors,          regarding pilot     training
 increased aircraft automation,    training.           requirements
 pilot skills, crew resource                           expected in 2022.
 management, and FAA pilot
 certification standards.
 Authorizes $5 million
 in annual appropriations for
 expanded FAA programs to assist
 foreign aviation authorities to
 improve international aviation
 safety.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                WITNESS

The Honorable Steve Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation 
Administration

 
THREE YEARS AFTER LION AIR 610: FAA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2020 AIRCRAFT 
             CERTIFICATION, SAFETY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2021

                  House of Representatives,
                          Subcommittee on Aviation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. Rick 
Larsen (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Members present in person: Mr. Larsen, Ms. Davids of 
Kansas, Mr. Kahele, Mr. Stanton, Mr. Graves of Louisiana, Mr. 
Graves of Missouri, Mr. Perry, Mr. Mast, Mr. Stauber, Mr. 
Burchett, Dr. Van Drew, and Ms. Mace,
    Members present remotely: Mr. DeFazio, Mr. Carson, Ms. 
Williams of Georgia, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Ms. Titus, Mr. 
Payne, Mr. DeSaulnier, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Allred, Mr. Lamb, Ms. 
Norton, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Balderson, Ms. Van Duyne, Mr. 
Gimenez, and Mrs. Steel.
    Mr. Larsen. Good morning. I call the meeting of the House 
Subcommittee on Aviation to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing. Without 
objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions. Without objection, so 
ordered.
    As a reminder, please keep your microphones muted unless 
speaking. Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I 
will request the Member by name to mute your microphone, 
please. And as a reminder, to insert a document into the 
record, please have your staff email it to 
[email protected].
    And just as a further reminder for Members in the hearing 
room, if you are speaking, you do not need to wear a mask. 
Otherwise, please wear a mask. I think that is actually a 
committee rule, but we have had pretty good cooperation here 
and look forward to further cooperation.
    Good morning and welcome to today's Aviation Subcommittee 
hearing titled, ``Three Years After Lion Air 610: FAA 
Implementation of the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act.''
    Nearly 3 years ago, on October 29, 2018, Lion Air flight 
610 crashed into the Java Sea. Less than 6 months later, on 
March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed near 
Addis Ababa.
    These two tragedies ended the lives of 346 people. Victims 
included parents, children, teachers, friends, and 
humanitarians who deserved to arrive safely at their 
destination but never did.
    For nearly 2 years, victims' families tirelessly lent their 
support to necessary reforms to the Federal Aviation 
Administration certification process to reduce the likelihood 
that other families would experience such devastating loss.
    I want to acknowledge and thank the victims' families for 
your presence here today in the hearing room and for your 
tireless advocacy. You and your loved ones remain at the 
forefront of this committee's oversight of the implementation 
of this important bill.
    I also want to acknowledge the hard-working women and men 
who go to work each day at the Boeing plants in Everett and 
Renton who are proud of the product that they design, assemble, 
and build. They were and are distraught that the same product 
contributed to the deaths of so many and the grief of so many 
others.
    This hearing and this legislation are, though, not just 
about one aircraft. They are about making air travel safer for 
everybody, restoring confidence in the aviation industry, and 
ensuring U.S. aviation remains the global standard in terms of 
safety.
    In an historic effort, the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee conducted a nearly 2-year 
investigation into the design, development, and certification 
of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The committee's thorough 
investigation uncovered flawed management decisions and 
inadequate organizational structures at Boeing and the FAA that 
were necessary to confront.
    And last December, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act was signed into law to restore the integrity 
of the FAA's aircraft certification process and to make flight 
safer.
    This bipartisan legislation is built upon the lessons 
learned from the committee's investigation and the 
recommendations of the independent Technical Advisory Board, 
Joint Authorities Technical Review, and other key entities.
    Among its provisions, the new law improves aviation safety 
culture by requiring aircraft and aerospace manufacturers to 
adopt safety management systems; enhances transparency and 
accountability by requiring the disclosure of certain safety-
critical information related to an aircraft to the FAA; 
addresses undue pressure on employees acting on behalf of the 
FAA, for example, extending airline whistleblower protections 
to U.S. aviation manufacturing employees; and requires 
sufficient evaluation of human factors in the certification 
process to ensure flightcrews can do their job safely and 
effectively.
    As with any comprehensive legislation designed to reform a 
complicated system like the certification of aircraft, 
implementation should not be expected to occur overnight. 
However, the legislation lays out specific timelines for 
actions by the FAA to take place.
    FAA has provided updates on some of these actions but has 
not yet provided specific details on progress for many of the 
requirements.
    So, today's hearing is an opportunity for the subcommittee 
to hear from the FAA on the status of these reforms, how the 
agency plans to implement them, and to identify any potential 
causes for delay.
    Today's witness is Steve Dickson, the FAA Administrator. I 
am pleased to welcome him today, and he has served in this role 
since August of 2019.
    Administrator Dickson, the past few years have been a 
tumultuous time in the agency's history. And I appreciate you 
and your team's commitment to the implementation of the 
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act and your 
personal involvement in the review of the 737 MAX.
    So, while I am encouraged by the agency's progress, though, 
clearly there is much more work to do. The U.S. is the leader 
in global aviation, and the FAA's actions in the U.S. have 
profound implications for passenger air travel around the 
world. It is vital this subcommittee carry out its 
responsibility to oversee the FAA's implementation of the 
critical reforms enacted under the Aircraft Certification, 
Safety, and Accountability Act.
    I look forward to today's discussion on how best to support 
the FAA's ongoing work to ensure the safety of the traveling 
public.
    With that, I will now turn to Ranking Member Representative 
Graves of Louisiana for an opening statement.
    [Mr. Larsen's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress 
   from the State of Washington, and Chair, Subcommittee on Aviation
    Good morning and welcome to today's Aviation Subcommittee hearing 
titled ``Three Years After Lion Air 610: FAA Implementation of the 2020 
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.''
    Nearly three years ago, on October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 
crashed into the Java Sea.
    Less than six months later, on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines 
Flight 302 crashed near Addis Ababa.
    These two tragedies ended the lives of 346 people.
    Victims included parents, children, teachers, friends and 
humanitarians who deserved to arrive safely at their destinations, but 
never did.
    For nearly two years, victims' families tirelessly lent their 
support to necessary reforms to the Federal Aviation Administration's 
(FAA) certification process to reduce the likelihood other families 
would experience such devastating loss.
    I want to acknowledge and thank the victims' families for your 
presence and your tireless advocacy.
    You and your loved ones remain at the forefront as this Committee 
oversees implementation of aircraft certification reform.
    I also want to acknowledge the hard-working women and men who go to 
work each day at the Boeing plant in Everett and are proud of the 
product they design, assemble and build.
    They are distraught this same product contributed to the deaths of 
so many and the grief of so many others.
    This hearing and this legislation are not about just one aircraft.
    They are about making air travel safer, restoring confidence in the 
aviation industry and ensuring U.S. aviation remains the global gold 
standard in terms of safety.
    In an historic effort, the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee conducted a nearly two-year investigation into the design, 
development and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The 
Committee's thorough investigation uncovered flawed management 
decisions and inadequate organizational structures at Boeing and FAA 
that were necessary to confront.
    Last December, the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act was signed into law to restore the integrity of the 
FAA's aircraft certification process and make flight safer.
    This bipartisan legislation is built upon the lessons learned from 
the Committee's investigation and the recommendations of the 
independent Technical Advisory Board, Joint Authorities Technical 
Review and other key entities.
    Among its provisions, the new law will:
      Improve aviation safety culture, by requiring aircraft 
and aerospace manufacturers to adopt safety management systems;
      Enhance transparency and accountability, by requiring the 
disclosure of certain safety-critical information related to an 
aircraft to the FAA;
      Address undue pressure on employees acting on behalf of 
the FAA, for example, extending airline whistleblower protections to 
U.S. aviation manufacturing employees; and
      Require sufficient evaluation of human factors in the 
certification process to ensure flight crews can do their jobs safely 
and efficiently.

    As with any comprehensive legislation designed to reform a 
complicated system like the certification of aircraft, implementation 
should not be expected to occur overnight.
    However, the legislation lays out specific timelines for actions by 
FAA to take place.
    FAA has provided updates on some of these actions but has not yet 
specific details on progress for many of the requirements.
    Today's hearing is an opportunity for this Subcommittee to hear 
from the FAA on the status of these reforms, how the agency plans to 
implement them, and identify any potential causes for delay.
    I am pleased to welcome today's witness, FAA Administrator Steve 
Dickson, who has served in this role since August of 2019.
    Administrator Dickson, the past few years have been a tumultuous 
time in the agency's history.
    I appreciate your and your team's commitment to the implementation 
of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act and your 
personal involvement in the review of the 737 MAX.
    While I am encouraged by the agency's progress, clearly there is 
much more work to do.
    The United States is the leader in global aviation, and the FAA's 
actions in the U.S. have profound implications for passenger air travel 
around the world.
    It is vital this subcommittee carry out its responsibility to 
oversee the FAA's implementation of the critical reforms enacted under 
the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.
    I look forward to today's discussion on how to best support the 
FAA's ongoing work to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, I want to thank you for holding this hearing.
    Secondly, and importantly, I want to join you in thanking 
the families for their relentless efforts to ensure that we 
never forget what happened in our pursuit of perfection.
    Mr. Chairman, this hearing is an opportunity for us to talk 
about what has happened since the awful crashes of the 737 MAX. 
It is an opportunity for us to talk about progress that has 
been made on the 2018 authorization bill and the progress that 
has been made on the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act that we worked together on.
    Mr. Chairman, this is all about assessing the accidents and 
determining the lessons learned. This is about making reforms, 
both administratively and in law. And this is about us holding 
folks accountable.
    And in that first one, as you well know, there have been 
dozens of assessments, reports, and technical groups that have 
been pulled together, including the National Transportation 
Safety Board, to extract every lesson learned that could 
possibly be extracted.
    It is about ensuring that the FAA, using their 
administrative authorities, that they step up and make changes 
to their policies in an effort to ensure that we do not allow 
anything like what happened with the MAX to occur again. It is 
ensuring that those that perhaps did break the law, that they 
are held accountable.
    And I want to highlight that there was an indictment just 
last week, showing that this was not entirely an administrative 
failure, that there were folks who actually broke the law and 
they are being held accountable.
    And, Mr. Chairman, it is important for us to continue 
working together to not establish, but to maintain the gold 
standard that the FAA has in terms of global aviation safety 
and maintain, not establish, but maintain the fact that 
traveling by air is still the safest means of transportation.
    Mr. Chairman, I noted earlier that we did the 2018 
authorization bill, and that bill still has dozens of 
provisions that are yet to be implemented. The Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act that we worked on 
last year, that still has 35 provisions that must be 
implemented.
    Mr. Chairman, it is critical that we today learn from the 
FAA what steps have been taken in the implementation of the 
2018 act and the implementation of the act that we worked on in 
December of last year.
    It is important that we learn from the FAA, we hear from 
the FAA how all of the steps that occurred with the MAX will 
never occur again as a result of some of the reforms that have 
been made both internally and made through the law changes that 
we implemented in December of 2020.
    I look forward to hearing from Administrator Dickson. I 
think that we still have some significant work to do over the 
coming months. And we must continue to strive for perfection.
    So, Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.
    [Mr. Graves of Louisiana's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress 
   from the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
                                Aviation
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, first I want to thank you for holding this 
hearing and secondly, and importantly, I want to join you in thanking 
the families for their relentless efforts to ensure that we never 
forget what happened in our pursuit of perfection. This hearing is an 
opportunity for us to talk about what has happened since the awful 
crashes of the 737 Max. It's an opportunity for us to talk about what 
progress has been made on the 2018 authorization bill and the progress 
that has been made on Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act (``Aircraft Certification Act'') that we worked 
together on.
    Mr. Chairman, this is all about assessing the accidents and 
determining the lessons learned. This is about making reforms, both 
administratively and in the law, and this is about us holding folks 
accountable. In that first one, as you well know, there have been 
dozens of assessments, reports, and technical groups that have been 
pulled together including the National Transportation Safety Board to 
extract every lesson learned that could possibly be extracted. It's 
about ensuring that the FAA, using their administrative authorities, 
that they step up and make changes to their policies and in an effort 
to ensure that we do not allow anything like what happened with the Max 
to ever occur again. It's ensuring that those that perhaps did break 
the law that they are held accountable, and I want to highlight that 
there was an indictment just last week showing that this was not an 
entirely an administrative failure--that there were folks who actually 
broke the law and they are being held accountable.
    Mr. Chairman, it's important for us to continue working together to 
not establish but to maintain the gold standard that the FAA has in 
terms of global aviation safety and maintain, not establish, but to 
maintain the fact that traveling by air is still the safest means of 
transportation.
    Mr. Chairman, I noted earlier that we did the 2018 authorization 
bill and that bill still has dozens of provisions that are yet to be 
implemented. The Aircraft Certification Safety and Credibility Act that 
we worked on last year still has 35 provisions that must be 
implemented.
    Mr. Chairman, it is critical that we today learn from the FAA what 
steps have been taken in the implementation of the 2018 act and the act 
we worked on in December of last year. It is important that we learn 
from the FAA, that we hear from the FAA how all of the steps that 
occurred with the Max will never occur again as a result of some of the 
reforms that have been made both internally and made through the law 
changes that we implemented in December of 2020.
    I look forward to hearing from Administrator Dickson.
    I still think we have some significant work to do over the coming 
months and we must continue to strive for perfection.
    Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.

    Mr. Larsen. I thank the Representative.
    I will now turn to the chair of the full committee, 
Representative DeFazio from Oregon, who is online, I believe, 
on Zoom.
    Mr. DeFazio. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am a little limited. I just had back surgery. So, I am 
here at the office.
    The most damning thing that came out of our extraordinary 
investigation--and I thank all the staff who did unbelievable 
work on the most indepth, most serious investigation ever done 
by this committee, one of the two or three oldest in Congress--
was that FAA and Boeing were compliant.
    Now, how can you be compliant when 346 innocent people died 
in crashes because of a system which was developed by 
engineers?
    In 2013, they decided, well, no one outside Boeing should 
know about the system. Ultimately, the system was wiped out of 
the pilot's manual until after the first crash. And, beyond 
that, the system had been significantly modified. And 
essentially this was concealed from the public, from the 
pilots, and from the FAA.
    That can never, ever happen again. And we have seen to it 
in the legislation we passed, which we want to see fully and 
quickly implemented, that any novel, new things on the plane, 
anything that can take control without pilot command, will be 
fully disclosed and known and examined to be certain that it is 
safe.
    Now, yeah, there has been one indictment. One indictment. 
This started at the top in Boeing. It started in the executive 
suite. It is in the boardroom. ``We got to rush this plane out 
the door to compete with Airbus or we are going to lose 
sales.'' Big chart. Countdown clock. They put pressure all the 
way down the line.
    As Rick said, we have in the Seattle area the best 
engineers and aircraft mechanics and workers in the world. 
Unfortunately, Boeing, to save money, decided, ``Gee, let's go 
down to the South where we don't have to have unions.'' And 
they have been having some pretty extraordinary quality 
problems down there.
    There weren't quality problems, except for rushing the 
line, in Renton, and we heard about those from one of the 
production managers.
    And the fact is that they also concealed that a Boeing test 
pilot, fully conversant and knowledgeable of the system, 
knowing it was going to trigger, could not recover the plane 
within 12 seconds, meaning you are going to go in. That was 
concealed.
    And the fact that one person has been indicted, Boeing is 
slapped with a fine that is insignificant in terms of their 
revenues, I am concerned that we haven't seen a major change in 
the culture there. And that is why we are mandating.
    Can you imagine, a company the size of Boeing didn't have a 
safety management system in place? That is pretty 
extraordinary. I know little, tiny manufacturers that had such 
systems in place that make things nowhere near as critical as 
airplanes.
    That is one of the things in our bill that must be 
implemented as soon as possible. I see the timelines drag out 
1, 2 years. I get pretty tired of this process, particularly 
when lives are at stake, potentially at stake.
    And I want to hear today what we are going to do to 
expedite the most critical parts of the legislation we passed, 
fully bipartisan, through the House, through the Senate. It is 
a mandate from Congress that the culture at FAA is going to 
change, the scrutiny is going to change, we are giving you 
additional engineers and expertise to help keep up with these 
companies. But it has to change.
    And the fact that, as Rick also mentioned, we have things 
that were supposed to be self-executing, pretty damn clear in 
the law. The flight attendants' duty time, I am glad it burped 
out of FAA.
    It seems every time we hold a hearing--I think I am going 
to start holding a lot more--out comes something we have been 
waiting for. So, we finally got the flight attendants' duty 
time. Only, let's see, it was November 4, 2018, self-executing 
law.
    Your attorneys over there need a little poke for them to 
look at explicit things written by Congress that say this goes 
into law, it is self-executing, you don't screw around with it 
for 3 years. You don't send it to OMB. You just do it.
    And it didn't happen. And now we are at, ``Oh, we got an 
NPRM out, proposed rulemaking.'' And that will take another how 
long?
    Meanwhile flight attendants are incredibly stressed with 
the conditions in the air now. We have gone through that. We 
have held hearings on that, what is going on, on the planes. 
They are overworked. They are tired. And we don't have that 
rule in place yet.
    A number of the airlines have already complied. Guess what? 
It didn't hurt their service. It didn't cost them anything. It 
just meant that some of the people who managed schedules had to 
create new computer programs. It shouldn't take 3 years.
    And secondary barriers, we now know after January 6 that 
there are probably more domestic terrorists in this country 
than there are foreign terrorists in this country. And yet I 
see the flight attendants standing bravely there by the flight 
deck door. When I flew last week, the pilot or copilot, I don't 
know which he was, he came out and chatted for 20 minutes with 
the flight attendant standing there like this, while she was 
looking over her shoulder and talking to him.
    You are telling me a couple of people can't rush that 
flight deck when that door opens? And yet here we are, we are 
languishing even further behind on secondary barriers.
    I hope this isn't back to the good old days of tombstone 
mentality at FAA: We will move on secondary barriers when some 
domestic terrorists take over a plane and something really 
horrible happens.
    So, I just want to hear today from the Administrator how we 
are going to start being less of a turgid bureaucracy and do 
what you are supposed to do, serve the public, protect the 
public.
    When I started, when we got in this investigation and I 
found out that regulated entities were now called customers--
customers? They are not your customers. They are not customers. 
They are people who you oversee and regulate.
    I changed that law after a tragic crash way back in the 
1990s. I took out the promotional authority from the FAA more 
than 20 years ago. It has crept back in. It has got to get 
kicked out the door.
    I am looking forward to the testimony. Thank you, Mr. 
Chair.
    [Mr. DeFazio's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in 
      Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Larsen, for calling today's hearing on the FAA's 
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act, an important set of reforms that we enacted last 
year in response to two air disasters that revealed serious lapses in 
our aviation safety system.
    Those two crashes of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes in 2018 and 2019, 
which claimed the lives of 346 sons and daughters, fathers and mothers, 
brothers and sisters, were not only senseless tragedies but also a 
national embarrassment.
    The crashes, that of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302, were 
the culmination of a series of failures, negligent acts and omissions, 
and allegedly criminal acts within The Boeing Company, as well as 
dangerous inadequacies in the FAA's process for certifying new 
airplanes. It is clear that Boeing needed thorough regulation and 
strict oversight, but its regulator could not provide enough of either, 
despite the efforts of numerous dedicated civil servants.
    The litany of mistakes resulted in the certification of a passenger 
airliner with a fatal flaw: a system called the maneuvering 
characteristics augmentation system, or MCAS, that activated 
erroneously and pushed the two accident airplanes into unrecoverable 
dives. Not even a Boeing test pilot, in a simulator, could recover the 
plane when MCAS erroneously activated--much less standard airline 
pilots who were unaware the system even existed.
    The committee's 18-month-long investigation, as well as other 
evaluations by two panels of aviation safety experts in the United 
States and our own National Transportation Safety Board; investigations 
by national safety authorities in Ethiopia and Indonesia; and even 
press reports established that:
      MCAS, as a safety-critical system, didn't receive the 
attention from FAA engineers and pilots that it should have received;
      Boeing should not have received authority from the FAA to 
conclude independently that erroneous MCAS activation would not result 
in a crash, and the FAA should have assumed responsibility for 
thoroughly evaluating MCAS;
      At least one Boeing employee in a position of 
responsibility on the 737 MAX program lied to airlines and the FAA 
about MCAS and was indicted last week on six counts of fraud;
      Both Boeing and the FAA failed to fully appreciate that 
an erroneous reading from a small, fragile, needle-like instrument 
protruding from the side of the forward fuselage, called an AOA sensor, 
could cause MCAS to send the airplane into an unrecoverable dive; and
      Many other incredible lapses with Boeing's safety culture 
and the FAA's inability to detect and correct those problems before 
they jeopardized public safety.

    The bill we enacted last winter addresses these issues 
comprehensively.
    Based on an update and documents provided to committee staff, I am 
encouraged that the FAA is making progress in implementing these 
reforms, and I commend Administrator Dickson for his attention to the 
urgent need for their swift implementation. I hope he will continue to 
place particular emphasis on this work, because Boeing's next 
aircraft--the 777X--is already in flight tests.
    Moreover, Boeing is reportedly considering development of the 737 
MAX's successor despite the fact that the 787 program has been beset by 
manufacturing errors, a months-long cessation of deliveries, and FAA 
fines against Boeing for Boeing employees harassing and placing undue 
pressure on their colleagues who are in charge of ensuring compliance 
with safety requirements. So, Administrator Dickson, I hope you will 
continue implementing this legislation with urgency because its 
necessity is clear.
    That said, I must register my disapproval of the FAA's delay in 
implementing two explicit mandates from the 2018 FAA reauthorization, 
which have languished in the bureaucratic process despite a clear 
safety imperative for both.
    The first is the requirement that flight attendants receive at 
least 10 hours of rest between duty periods. The bill's language left 
no room for discretion: The FAA was to issue a final rule by November 
4, 2018, in accordance with the parameters we laid out in that mandate. 
Nearly three years later, we've yet to see a final rule.
    The second is the requirement for the installation of secondary 
flight deck barriers on all newly manufactured airliners. The deadline 
passed two years ago, on October 5, 2019. Still, no order or final 
rule.
    Administrator Dickson, I acknowledge that these mandates were 
enacted before your tenure began at the FAA. But the delay in complying 
with the letter of the law is completely unacceptable. I want an update 
from you on the status of these safety-critical regulations, and I want 
your commitment to doing whatever is necessary within your authority to 
meet the will of Congress in the shortest possible time.
    I again thank Chair Larsen for calling this hearing, and I look 
forward to hearing from Administrator Dickson. I yield back.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, 
the Representative from Missouri, Mr. Graves, for as much time 
as he may consume.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Chairman Larsen.
    I want to thank Administrator Dickson for being here today 
to testify or at least testify online.
    And I want to commend you for a job well done under some 
very difficult circumstances over the past several years. Both 
industry and labor groups have praised your leadership on a 
number of issues, everything from aviation safety to dealing 
with disruptive passengers. And we have seen that praise. And, 
again, I want to say thank you.
    I am looking forward to hearing how the FAA is doing when 
it comes to implementing the bipartisan certification reform 
law that did pass last Congress. The development and drafting 
of that law is a model of how we can work together and how 
bipartisan cooperation can yield positive results for the 
American people.
    The law directs the FAA to implement the many nonpartisan 
expert recommendations developed in the wake of the Boeing 737 
MAX accidents. It also includes several provisions that I 
championed relating to pilot training and improving manual 
flying skills, which is a very important priority in improving 
aviation safety.
    Less than a year has passed since the law's enactment, but 
the urgency of the changes required demands that Congress do 
keep a close eye on the FAA's progress.
    And this hearing is also a good opportunity to hear from 
you on other FAA initiatives and policies, activities. There 
are a number of concerning issues that are related to general 
aviation safety that I am going to be looking for some answers 
on.
    Specifically, I would like for you to address the FAA's 
recent changes to the longstanding flight training guidance 
that has created a lot of confusion and a lot of concern out 
there in the pilot community. These changes have a very 
negative impact on safety, and they create an unnecessary 
paperwork burden on both instructors and on the FAA, for that 
matter.
    So, I hope that you will take a little bit of time today to 
address these pressing safety issues.
    And while we are on the topic of pilots, I want to again 
make very clear my very strong opposition to the sweeping, 
indiscriminate vaccine mandate that this administration is 
pushing on commercial airlines.
    After Congress joined together in a bipartisan way to 
provide $30 billion to help save aviation jobs during the 
pandemic and keep these vital workers on the job, it is 
insulting that these same workers are being told, if they don't 
get a vaccine, then they are going to be fired.
    We had no problem asking pilots and flight attendants and 
other frontline aviation employees to continue working through 
the pandemic when there was no vaccine, and indeed we have seen 
studies, including one by the Department of Defense, that has 
shown that the airplane environment presents a very low risk of 
COVID transmission.
    But, despite this, we are now seeing heavy-handed tactics 
of this administration to coerce businesses into implementing 
an indiscriminate vaccine mandate while there is already a 
shortage of workers to fill these aviation jobs in the first 
place.
    In fact, prior to the pandemic, we were already staring 
down a very serious aviation worker and pilot shortage. So, 
with returning demand, I don't expect that this problem is just 
magically going to go away.
    We should not be treating pilots and other airline workers 
any differently than we did in 2020. We want them to be safe. 
But this mandate is not about safety. It is about politics, 
plain and simple.
    So, with that, I want to thank you, Administrator, for 
being with us today. And I look forward to your testimony.
    And, with that, I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [Mr. Graves of Missouri's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress 
     from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Larsen, and thank you to Administrator Dickson for 
being here today.
    I want to commend you for a job well done under difficult 
circumstances over the past several years.
    Both industry and labor groups have praised your leadership on a 
number of issues, everything from aviation safety to dealing with 
disruptive passengers. We've seen that praise and again I say thank 
you.
    I am looking forward to hearing how the FAA is doing when it comes 
to implementing the bipartisan certification reform law that passed 
last Congress.
    The development and drafting of that law is a model of how we can 
work together and how bipartisan cooperation can yield positive results 
for the American people.
    The law directs the FAA to implement the many non-partisan expert 
recommendations developed in the wake of the Boeing 737 MAX accidents.
    It also includes several provisions I championed relating to pilot 
training and improving manual flying skills--an important priority in 
improving aviation safety.
    Less than a year has passed since the law's enactment, but the 
urgency of the changes required demand that Congress keep a close eye 
on the FAA's progress.
    This hearing is also a good opportunity to hear from you on other 
FAA initiatives and policies.
    There are a number of concerning issues related to general aviation 
safety that I am going to be looking for some answers on.
    Specifically, I would like you to address the FAA's recent changes 
to longstanding flight training guidance that has created a lot of 
confusion and a lot of concern in the pilot community.
    These changes could have a negative impact on safety and create an 
unnecessary paperwork burden on both instructors and the FAA. So, I 
hope you will take some time today to address these pressing safety 
issues.
    And while we're on the topic of pilots, I want to again make very 
clear my strong opposition to the sweeping, indiscriminate vaccine 
mandates that this Administration is pushing on commercial airlines.
    After Congress joined together in a bipartisan way to provide $30 
billion dollars to help save aviation jobs during the pandemic and keep 
these vital workers on the job, it is insulting that these same workers 
are being told that if they don't get the vaccine they are going to be 
fired.
    They had no problem asking pilots, flight attendants, and other 
frontline aviation employees to continue working through the pandemic 
when there was no vaccine.
    Indeed, we have seen studies, including one by the Department of 
Defense, have shown that the airplane environment presents a low risk 
of COVID transmission.
    But despite this we are now seeing the heavy-handed tactics of this 
Administration to coerce businesses into implementing an indiscriminate 
vaccine mandate while there's already a shortage of workers to fill 
these aviation jobs in the first place.
    In fact, prior to the pandemic we were staring down a very serious 
aviation worker and pilot shortage.
    So, with returning demand I do not expect that the problem has 
magically gone away.
    We should not be treating our pilots and other airline workers any 
differently than we did in 2020. We want them to be safe. But this 
mandate is not about their safety it's about politics. It's plain and 
simple.
    With that, I want to thank you for being here today, Administrator 
Dickson, and I look forward to your testimony. I yield back.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Graves.
    So, now I want to turn to the FAA Administrator, Steve 
Dickson.
    I let the FAA know that you could have up to 10 minutes 
since you are the only one testifying today. I understand you 
won't take that, but I don't want you to feel constrained by 
the 5-minute timeline. So, you can get your comments in for us 
before we head to questions.
    So, with that, I will recognize Administrator Dickson for 
his opening testimony.
    Administrator.

 TESTIMONY OF HON. STEPHEN M. DICKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL 
                    AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Chair Larsen.
    And good morning, Chair DeFazio, Chair Larsen, Ranking 
Member Graves and Ranking Member Garret Graves, and members of 
the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the FAA's approach 
to aviation safety oversight, as well as our efforts to 
strengthen the aircraft certification process.
    Safety is a journey, not a destination. And we are 
constantly evolving as a regulator and as an air navigation 
services provider to deliver the safest and most efficient 
aerospace system in the world.
    Now, one of the first things that I did as FAA 
Administrator was make it clear that we are the regulator, and 
I reset the relationship with Boeing. I said that we would 
continue to exert a high level of scrutiny, and that continues 
to this day.
    I have made it clear that we are raising the bar on safety 
externally and internally. We are asking ourselves the hard 
questions, and we are asking them of those that we regulate. We 
will not accept the status quo.
    Now, we are committed to improving the robustness of the 
certification process, including our oversight of the functions 
that we delegate to aircraft designers and manufacturers. And 
to that end, we embrace reform, and we are focused across the 
agency on continuous improvement.
    I will discuss a number of initiatives that we have 
underway and the work that we have completed to address this 
goal, as well as to implement the requirements of the Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.
    But first I want to take a moment to repeat my commitment 
and my thanks to the families of the victims of the Ethiopian 
Airlines and Lion Air accidents, and to this committee, that we 
at the FAA are constantly working to ensure that the lessons 
learned from these accidents are resulting in a higher margin 
of safety for the aviation system around the world.
    In the nearly 3 years since these tragedies, we have made 
tangible and lasting safety improvements to the global aviation 
system, in part from the input and direction that we have 
received from the Congress and this committee. And as was noted 
earlier, there is much more to be done.
    The act has more than 100 unique requirements that we are 
implementing to make aircraft certification and safety 
oversight more holistic, systematic, transparent, and 
effective. I can say with confidence that we are doing more for 
certification oversight, and we are doing it more 
systematically, since this time last year.
    For one, we are delegating fewer responsibilities to 
manufacturers, and we are demanding more transparency from 
them. We continue to value their technical expertise as we 
prioritize our oversight to focus on safety-critical areas.
    The FAA is also revising guidance and criteria used for 
determining significant changes so that proposed changes to an 
aircraft are evaluated from a whole aircraft system 
perspective, including the human interface elements.
    We are promoting the use of safety management systems, or 
SMS, where safety issues are actively looked for and identified 
and then the root cause is addressed.
    And as part of this rulemaking, we will also evaluate 
potential SMS requirements for repair stations, certificate 
holders that conduct common carriage operations under part 135, 
and certain air tour operators under part 91.
    Now, we are also making progress with industry 
participation in voluntary SMS programs. Currently, four design 
and manufacturing organizations have voluntarily adopted SMS 
with six others in the pipeline. Boeing itself also established 
a voluntary SMS program as part of the settlement agreement.
    What we learned from all these programs will directly 
benefit our rules and policies.
    Now, the FAA has initiated a rulemaking to standardize 
regulations and guidance for conducting system safety 
assessments on transport category airplanes.
    The FAA is taking a fresh look at the human factors 
assumptions that we have been using for the design and 
certification of transport category aircraft, including pilot 
response times.
    We are actively expanding our portfolio of data collection 
and analytics tools so that we can more effectively share 
safety data within the FAA and also among industry stakeholders 
and international partners.
    Data is key to the early identification of potential 
hazards and safety problems. And per the act, we have a new 
contract with the Transportation Research Board that will help 
us discover emerging safety trends in aviation.
    Since aviation is a global system, the FAA is also working 
closely with the International Civil Aviation Organization and 
other international stakeholders to influence and adjust the 
maintenance and pilot training requirements for U.S. products 
that operate under other civil aviation authorities.
    Chair DeFazio, Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves and 
Graves, and each member of the committee, as you can see, the 
FAA is fully committed to a thorough and complete 
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act. We approach all of this work with 
tremendous humility, and we do not take safety for granted.
    However, we are not just doing this work because you have 
directed us to do it. We are doing it because it is the right 
thing to do for aviation safety. This is what the public 
expects, and it is the standard that we have set for ourselves. 
We will accept nothing less.
    Thank you again for your support and your direction. And 
now I am happy to answer your questions.
    [Mr. Dickson's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal 
                        Aviation Administration
    Good morning Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, and Members of 
the subcommittee:
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss 
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approach to aviation safety 
oversight and our activities to implement changes to strengthen the 
aircraft certification process. Certifying aviation products is a 
critical aspect of the FAA's safety mission. We are committed to 
improving the certification process, including our oversight of 
functions delegated to aircraft designers and manufacturers. We have 
undertaken a number of initiatives to address this goal, as well as to 
comprehensively implement the requirements of the bipartisan Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act (``Act'').
    Before we begin to discuss the specifics of certification reform 
implementation, on behalf of the United States Department of 
Transportation and everyone at the FAA, I would like to recognize, as 
we have before, the families of the victims of the Lion Air and 
Ethiopian Airlines accidents and extend our deepest sympathies and 
condolences to them. It has been nearly 3 years since the Lion Air 
accident, and we have made significant progress on addressing the 
findings and recommendations that resulted from the numerous 
investigations and independent reviews of both accidents involving the 
Boeing 737 MAX. We will continue to prioritize our work to improve 
aviation safety to make sure this never happens again.
    As mentioned, our efforts to implement certification reform are 
well underway. I want to thank Congress for enacting this landmark 
aviation safety legislation and for this committee's continued 
leadership on aviation safety matters. The Act has more than one 
hundred unique requirements that we are implementing in a holistic, 
systematic, transparent, and efficient manner to improve aircraft 
certification and safety oversight. The FAA is working diligently to 
implement the requirements while also ensuring that we are approaching 
our efforts as systemically and effectively as possible. Specific 
agency actions taken to implement the requirements of the Act are 
discussed more fully below; however, I also wish to note that, in 
general, our approach to aircraft certification and safety oversight 
has changed. The FAA's relationship with manufacturers is evolving. We 
are prioritizing oversight of manufacturers and working to focus that 
oversight on safety critical areas. We are delegating fewer 
responsibilities and demanding more transparency from them, and 
evaluating key assumptions prior to delegating functions in certain 
areas. While we continue to value their technical expertise, we are 
also committed to enforcing the highest safety standards for the 
manufacturers that we regulate. Our work to fully implement the Act is 
still in the early stages, and we are carrying it out with the urgency 
that it requires. The discussion below provides an overview of some of 
our accomplishments to date.
      Safety Management Systems. To ensure a holistic and 
proactive assessment and mitigation of hazards, and to support further 
improvement in safety performance, we continue to work with industry to 
increase transparency, strengthen risk management practices, and 
improve feedback channels between industry and the FAA. We believe that 
enhancing and promoting the use of safety management systems (SMS)--
where safety issues are actively looked for and identified, and then 
the root cause is addressed--is integral to achieving this objective, 
and we have taken a number of steps toward increasing the use of SMS in 
the design and manufacturing environment. As required by the Act, we 
have initiated a rulemaking that contemplates requiring aircraft 
manufacturers that hold both a type certificate and a production 
certificate to adopt SMS, consistent with international standards and 
practices.\1\ As part of this rulemaking, we will also evaluate 
potential SMS requirements for repair stations, certificate holders 
that conduct common carriage operations under part 135, and certain air 
tour operators under part 91.\2\ We also created guidance for the 
development of voluntary SMS programs and are working closely with 
industry to encourage participation in voluntary SMS programs to 
further enhance safety across the entire aviation system. Currently, 
four design and manufacturing organizations have voluntarily adopted 
SMS with six others in progress. Boeing also established an SMS under 
the FAA's Voluntary SMS program as part of the settlement agreement. 
The voluntary programs have enabled the FAA to gain valuable experience 
on oversight of SMS for design and manufacturing organizations, and the 
lessons learned will help inform FAA's SMS rulemaking and policy 
development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ RIN 2120-AL60, Safety Management System (SMS) for Parts 21, 91, 
135 and 145 issued. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AL60
    \2\ The FAA is developing a final rule to require the use of SMS at 
airports certificated under Part 139. RIN 2120-AJ38, Airport Safety 
Management System. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AJ38
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      System Safety and Human Factors. We are working on 
several initiatives to ensure system safety assessments and human 
factors assumptions are incorporated into the FAA's aviation safety 
policy and oversight. We have initiated a rulemaking to standardize 
regulations and guidance for conducting system safety assessments on 
transport category airplanes.\3\ In addition, the expert safety review 
panel that we established pursuant to the Act is meeting regularly to 
review the assumptions relied upon in aircraft design and certification 
of transport category aircraft--including assumptions regarding pilot 
response times. We are also developing new guidance for industry on the 
submission of safety critical information. There are several 
interrelated provisions regarding human factors and human systems 
integration. To address these, we have taken a number of steps to 
strengthen the foundation of aviation human factors safety research and 
to bolster the technical expertise within the Aviation Safety (AVS) 
organization. This includes developing a human factors education and 
training program, doubling the number of human factors staff within 
AVS, and realigning the hiring of technical advisors with the necessary 
technical expertise involved in critical safety decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ RIN 2120-AJ99, System Safety Assessments for transport category 
airplanes issued. https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202104&RIN=2120-AJ99
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Global Collaboration. To further international 
harmonization and collaboration with respect to aircraft type 
certification and continued operational safety, the FAA established the 
Changed Product Rule International Authority Working Group and held the 
first meeting in July 2021. This working group will develop 
recommendations for international policy and guidance to ensure 
proposed changes to an aircraft are evaluated from an integrated whole 
aircraft system perspective. The FAA is working closely with the 
International Civil Aviation Organization and other international 
stakeholders to influence and adjust the maintenance and pilot training 
requirements for U.S. products operating under the oversight of another 
civil aviation authority. In addition, FAA representatives have 
presented at and attended several webinars, work group meetings, and 
seminars, including a presentation at the 2021 Zhuhai International 
Flight Training and Safety seminar on topics of competency based pilot 
training and automation dependency. The FAA plans to continue this 
global engagement into the future, including seeking new opportunities 
to collaborate with civil aviation authorities and other international 
stakeholders to foster improvements in international safety standards 
and practices for aircraft design and certification, pilot training, 
and operational safety management. Additionally, to fulfill the 
requirement to ensure that pilot operational evaluations for aircraft 
type certifications utilize pilots from air carriers that are expected 
to operate such aircraft, the FAA has already begun to incorporate air 
carrier pilots into such evaluations.
      Data. We are actively expanding our oversight 
capabilities by advancing data collection and analytics tools to share 
safety data within the FAA and between industry stakeholders and 
international partners. These efforts include technological 
enhancements to the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
system to integrate new data sources and methods for safety analysis, 
which will improve data quality and accessibility to support risk-based 
decision-making. In addition, the FAA's new contract with the 
Transportation Research Board, established pursuant to the Act in June 
2021, will aid the agency's effort to conduct annual analysis and 
reporting on current and emerging safety trends in aviation. As the 
aviation landscape continues to evolve, it will be increasingly 
necessary to bolster the FAA's use of safety data and collaboration 
with industry to identify potential hazards and safety problems and to 
solve these problems before they give rise to an accident or incident.
      Integration of Certification and Oversight. The Act 
requires the FAA to convene an interdisciplinary integrated project 
team upon the agency's receipt of every application for a new type 
certificate for a transport category airplane. The FAA previously 
commissioned the Integrated Program Management team comprised of 
subject matter experts from Flight Standards and the Aircraft 
Certification Service to assess current practices and policies and make 
recommendations for improving FAA oversight through the integration of 
design and operations. The best practices identified from this process 
are being applied to ongoing certification projects, and we intend to 
enhance the current procedures to incorporate additional requirements 
contained in the Act. The FAA is also revising our current Technical 
Advisory Board (TAB) process to use the TAB in all new and amended type 
certification projects. We anticipate implementing this policy next 
spring. The Act also directs FAA to establish an executive council to 
oversee the FAA Compliance Program. This program provides a framework 
for how the agency returns a regulated entity to compliance through 
comprehensive safety data sharing between the FAA and regulated 
entities. Pursuant to the Act's requirements, we established the FAA 
Compliance Program Executive Council to monitor the operation and 
effectiveness of the Compliance Program, and held the first meeting in 
August 2021. We also updated the Compliance Program order to reflect 
the implementation of the Executive Council and the Compliance Program 
Steering Committee.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Aviation 
Administration Compliance Program, Order 8000.373B, April 22, 2021, at 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_8000.373B.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Culture of Safety and Excellence. The FAA is committed to 
fostering a just safety culture, while providing transparency to 
improve safety, operational excellence, and efficiency. These efforts 
include promoting voluntary safety reporting, increasing workforce 
competencies, and attracting talented staff. In April 2021, we 
implemented the Voluntary Safety Reporting Program (VSRP) to provide a 
mechanism for employees to voluntarily report potential hazards and 
safety concerns without fear of reprisal or other repercussions.\5\ 
Preliminary data on VSRP usage indicates that employees are comfortable 
using the system and they are regularly using it to raise safety 
concerns. An added bonus of VSRP is that it promotes collaboration 
between employees and management for proactively addressing safety 
concerns and developing corrective action recommendations. To assess 
the effectiveness of these efforts and to meet the requirements of the 
Act, we will conduct annual internal safety culture assessments that 
include surveys of AVS employees in order to evaluate the safety 
culture and the implementation of VSRP programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Federal Aviation Administration, Aviation Safety Voluntary 
Safety Reporting Program, Order 800.375, February 02, 2021, at http://
www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/VS_8000.375.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Accountability. A critical part of fostering a just 
safety culture is ensuring that we hold our people to the highest 
safety standards. In response to requirements in the Act, we have taken 
a critical look at our own internal oversight processes and taken steps 
to enhance accountability. This includes re-designating the Office of 
Investigations to the new Office of Investigations and Professional 
Responsibility and establishing investigative processes that are based 
on best practices identified from similar offices at other federal 
agencies and from the FAA's experience, expertise, and other sources. 
Although our work is not yet done, we believe that incorporating these 
best practices will improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and 
transparency of the FAA's investigative process.
      Delegation. The Act requires the FAA to institute 
extensive and meaningful changes to the Organization Designation 
Authorization (ODA) program and our oversight of that program. To 
address these legislative requirements, we expect to implement 
significant changes to our policies and procedures for delegating 
certification authority to private entities. These changes include 
policy requiring FAA approval of individual ODA unit members for 
certain ODA types, and policy aimed at preventing interference with ODA 
unit members in performance of their duties. We are also standing up an 
expert panel to conduct a review of ODAs for transport category 
airplanes and make recommendations to the FAA based on that review. 
Additionally, as required under the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, we 
previously established the ODA Office to provide oversight and to 
ensure consistency of the FAA's audit functions under the ODA program. 
In April 2021, the FAA realigned the ODA Office to report directly to 
the Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety. This reporting 
structure reflects the FAA's priority to oversee, standardize, and 
ensure consistency in the ODA system, as well as to facilitate many of 
the ODA reform requirements contained in the Act. To that end, the ODA 
Office anticipates adding more employees in Fiscal Year 2022, and 
hiring has already begun. The additional staff will allow the office to 
perform more outreach, identify best practices, and implement measures 
to maintain consistent oversight.
      Certification and Continued Operational Safety Processes. 
Ensuring the safety of aviation products through certification is an 
important function of the FAA, and we are continuously taking steps to 
enhance the type certification process. This includes revising guidance 
and criteria used for determining significant changes to best ensure 
that proposed changes to an aircraft are evaluated from a whole 
aircraft-level perspective, including human interface elements. We have 
also commissioned external reviews to evaluate our Transport Airplane 
Risk Assessment Model and type certification process. To address the 
Act's requirements to establish an appeal and issue resolution 
processes for certification decisions, we are developing an 
implementing order.
      Innovation. Aviation is incredibly dynamic, and it is 
imperative for the FAA to take steps to accelerate and expand the 
deployment of new technologies in order to reduce barriers and actively 
promote innovation that enhances the safety and efficiency of the 
National Airspace System. We recently established and staffed the 
Center for Emerging Concepts and Innovation to support certification of 
new aircraft and technologies by providing pre-application engagement 
with companies to identify a preliminary path to compliance. We are 
also taking steps to foster enhanced coordination across the FAA on 
emerging products and concepts.

    Chair Larsen, Ranking Member Graves, I want to assure you, and each 
member of the Subcommittee, that the FAA is fully committed to thorough 
and complete implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act. As we continue this process, we remain committed to 
our transparent and accountable approach, which includes regular 
briefings on our progress with staff of the committees of jurisdiction, 
labor partners, industry stakeholders, and more. We will continue to 
assess our entire certification and oversight framework in light of 
past experience, industry growth, technological advancements, and 
innovation as we carry out our responsibilities for public safety. We 
approach all of this work with humility and do not take safety for 
granted. We are confident that we are making substantial and meaningful 
progress, and will continue to keep Congress apprised throughout this 
work.

    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Administrator Dickson.
    I will now turn to Member questions and first recognize 
myself for 5 minutes.
    Administrator, for some of the rulemaking, the FAA has been 
taking a policy guidance document approach as opposed to a 
rulemaking process.
    As rulemaking and regulatory actions are more 
institutionalized, is there consideration to making policy 
guidance documents into rules and regulations?
    Should this committee be concerned, in other words, about 
the flexibility of policy guidance documents and whether they 
are going to be around in the future versus taking a rulemaking 
process that will institutionalize the direction?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Chair 
Larsen.
    The reason that we are using policy memos and other methods 
here is that in some cases it allows us to make changes in a 
more expedient manner and allows us to implement the provisions 
of the certification reform bill in a timely fashion in 
accordance with the timelines that are prescribed.
    I will use section 107 as an example. There are several 
requirements in that section about the appointment and 
oversight of ODA unit members, which we know is extremely 
important, and it requires FAA approval for their appointment 
and also the appointment of FAA advisers for those unit 
members.
    In order to have these policies in place as required in 
January of 2022, we issued a policy memo on unit member 
appointment and a policy memo on FAA advisers. But the next 
revision of the ODA order will then roll these policy memos 
into that document, but that takes a longer amount of time to 
run through the formal clearance process.
    So, the use of the policy memos and other activities, 
voluntary SMS is another example, is, as either rulemaking or 
the development of orders occurs, that takes time. But we have 
ways to accomplish the substance of what the Congress directed 
and what we need to do, frankly, as a result of all the reviews 
and investigations that have been accomplished over the last 
couple of years.
    Mr. Larsen. Can you quickly explain then how the FAA plans 
to enforce those policy memos versus being able to enforce a 
rule or regulation?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the policy memos pertain to our 
internal processes. So, they have full force and effect within 
the agency. Those are not full rulemaking.
    So, we will enforce those. But we want to, as you said, we 
want to make sure they are fully institutionalized and that 
they are in place for years and decades to come. And that is 
why we will incorporate them into our orders as we go forward.
    Mr. Larsen. One of the discussions and issues we dealt with 
during the bill creation was type certificates. I think 
formerly it was called the new product rule. I think I made a 
note to myself to call it a stale type certificate.
    The 737 type cert was nearly 50 years old when the FAA 
amended it to add the 737 MAX 8, but the bill requires you-all 
to consider whether there is a point at which FAA needs to 
declare their type cert is too old to amend for a new 
derivative and to require the manufacturer to apply for a new 
type certificate.
    Have you begun that assessment yet? If you have, when will 
you complete it? If you haven't, when will you begin?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, the short answer, Chair Larsen, is yes.
    As you know, we needed recommendations and congressional 
direction to do several things. One of them was an independent 
study and some recommendations on type certification reform, 
and also issue new rules and guidance as necessary to execute 
on amended type certificate.
    This all falls under the broad umbrella of what we call the 
Changed Product Rule, and that is harmonized with the other 
states of design internationally.
    So, there is not only an FAA work that needs to be done. 
But as we do that, it has to be done in coordination with 
international authorities to make sure that certifying and 
validating authorities are having the same approach around the 
world.
    So, with respect to the study, we have already tasked MITRE 
to complete the study. And in the meantime, we are conducting 
internal review of the applicable rules and also working with 
our international partners.
    We have chartered, and actually the Changed Product Rule 
International Authority Working Group began to meet this 
summer, had their first meeting in July, and they are meeting 
on a regular basis.
    That team's work to date has focused on identifying gaps 
and lessons learned to formulate specific recommendations for 
improvement. They will give us their report and recommendations 
by the middle of next year, and then we will have consistency 
around the international community on that.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    I now turn to Mr. Graves of Louisiana for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Administrator Dickson, I appreciate you giving us an update 
on the implementation of the certification bill.
    I want to make note. I said earlier that we have a number 
of outstanding mandates that are required under the 2018 
authorization act. The 2016 extension had some outstanding 
issues that have not been addressed.
    It is confusing to me to see how the FAA has chosen some, I 
guess, discretionary projects to move forward on, like airport 
SMS rulemaking or reorganization of the UAS Integration Office, 
rather than prioritizing some of the mandates in the law from 
2016, 2018, or the December 2020 act.
    Can I get your commitment today that the FAA will no longer 
view some of the mandates in law as suggestions and you will 
prioritize the implementation of those over some of these 
discretionary projects?
    Mr. Dickson. Ranking Member Graves, I want to make it very 
clear to you and the leadership of the committee and all the 
members of the committee and the Congress that the FAA is 
absolutely committed and I am personally committed to 
accomplishing everything that the Congress has required us to 
do.
    Most of the issues where we seek extended timeframes have 
to do with full notice and comment rulemaking, and there have 
been a few examples already raised on that this morning.
    In terms of the overall 5-year reauthorization, we have 
currently accomplished as of this morning 191 out of 300 of 
those mandates. So, we are running at about 63 percent about 3 
years in.
    About one-quarter of those remaining are the rulemakings, 
which have extended timelines in many cases, depending on the 
complexity of the issue.
    But I absolutely respect the role of Congress, and we take 
that direction extremely seriously. I push my team very hard on 
this. In fact, when I arrived at the agency, some of the first 
questions that I asked about was why some of these things are 
taking so long.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Administrator, I have got a few 
other questions. If I can just get a commitment from you that 
the law is going to be prioritized over these discretionary 
projects, that would be great.
    Mr. Dickson. We will always prioritize the mandates that we 
have from Congress, yes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Administrator.
    Administrator, earlier this year, full committee Ranking 
Member Sam Graves and I sent you a letter regarding some 
concerning comments out of EASA. Specifically, Director General 
Ky said that they were, quote, ``moving away from the 
established practice of relying on the FAA for certification of 
U.S. aircraft.''
    As you know, and as indicated in our letter, this does 
violate some of the bilateral agreements. In the response that 
you sent us, you indicated that you would be monitoring some of 
the EASA activities to determine if there were any violations 
of that agreement.
    I just wanted to ask quickly if you had seen anything out 
of EASA that appears to violate BASA, the bilateral agreement 
we have with the Europeans.
    Mr. Dickson. The short answer is I have not seen any 
violations of the bilateral agreement. It continues to be 
foundational to the relationship that we have.
    And that was reinforced this summer. We had a summit on 
aviation safety with the European Commission, and both of us 
recommitted to the importance of the Bilateral Aviation Safety 
Agreement.
    We also meet on a regular basis at the executive director 
level with them, and we have a delegation over there meeting 
with them to make sure that we work through the issues.
    I think it is important also to emphasize that there are 
somewhat different administrative and review processes between 
the two authorities. And so that is why we will see sometimes 
delays on one side or the other as we make decisions and 
validate each other's processes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Administrator. I just 
urge you please to remain vigilant there. I think this is an 
important issue.
    Changing gears a little bit, in the FAA's 2022 budget 
proposal, there are several actions related to the 
reorganization of the FAA's Office of Investigations into the 
Office of Investigations and Professional Responsibility, or 
OPR. The only action in the certification bill that FAA is 
directed to do is to rename the office.
    Can you assure the committee that the actions that you are 
taking are consistent with the law that existed before the 
certification bill became, which, again, it clearly defines the 
authorities? Could you respond, please?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes. We will act consistent with our 
authorities, and we will work with the Congress very closely as 
we move forward to implement this section.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you.
    And I am out of time. So, I just want to quickly state for 
the record that it was not Congress' intent to transfer primary 
investigative authority for whistleblower retaliation to the 
Office of Audit and Investigations, or AAE. Instead, as the law 
clearly states, AAE may investigate allegations of 
whistleblower retaliation only if another office, like OPR, the 
inspector general, or the Office of Special Counsel, refers it 
to them.
    In the interest of time, I am going to yield back and 
convert this into a question for the record. But I did want to 
make that clear in the record of the hearing.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. So noted.
    The Chair now recognizes the chair of the full committee, 
Mr. DeFazio of Oregon.
    Mr. DeFazio.
    Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 
opportunity.
    Mr. Administrator, I am just curious: What happens if you 
ignore your lawyers? Who is going to sue you?
    We said flight attendants was going to be done by November 
5, 2018. And here we are in a notice of proposed rulemaking 
which finally has emerged from the bowels of the agency 3 years 
later.
    You ignored the specific mandate of Congress at the behest 
of your lawyers. I can't reconcile that.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Chair DeFazio, I do not ignore the 
mandate of Congress, as I said a moment ago. I take it 
extremely seriously. And I want to tell you very candidly that 
I share your frustration.
    But we have a process that we have to follow. It has to be 
legally defensible. And we have not been relieved of the 
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.
    And there are a lot of things that I would like to have 
move forward. The flight attendant rest is more straightforward 
than secondary barriers.
    But I share your frustration. And I want you to know that I 
am absolutely committed to continue to push my team and to move 
forward as quickly as we possibly can to get these provisions 
into our regulations.
    Mr. DeFazio. Well, then maybe Congress needs to look at the 
Administrative Procedure Act and put in exceptions for health 
and safety that can be taken by Administrators of the various 
agencies. So, thanks.
    The 2019-2020 survey of the Aviation Safety Office. I was 
happy to hear you say the word earlier ``regulator.'' I assume 
we have dropped the customer stuff. But those were very 
disturbing findings. It said that 49 percent disagreed with the 
statement that the FAA makes data-driven decisions about 
safety, regardless of external pressure.
    Some quotes.
    ``They [industry] just keep going up the chain until they 
get the answers they want,'' which we saw with the MAX. They 
would go to management even having lost two appeals in the 
Seattle office.
    `` `Don't rock the boat' with Boeing.''
    ``It feels like we are showing up to a knife fight with 
Nerf weapons. It is a challenge to be an equal match with 
Boeing in the meetings/conversations.''
    Has that all dramatically changed, hopefully?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, I want----
    Mr. DeFazio. I know that predates you. But I am just 
saying, do you, like, get out there, meet with your employees, 
say, ``How is it going? Are you feeling pressure? How are you 
dealing with Boeing?''
    We have had subsequent problems with Boeing on the 87 and 
further problems on the 37, et cetera. So, I just want to know 
that that is really history.
    Mr. Dickson. Chair DeFazio, I would say that cultural 
issues always require attention. And my people, you talked 
about the dedicated career professionals at the FAA, I could 
not be more proud of them. And as recently as yesterday, I 
communicated that I have their back when it comes to safety and 
when it comes to making the safety decisions that they need to 
make.
    I am hearing through various means that the employees feel 
supported and empowered in ways that they have not in a long 
time. But I don't take that at face value. So, we have to have 
institutional mechanisms.
    One of them that we put in place is the Voluntary Safety 
Reporting Program, because in my experience we have to have a 
mechanism where we work with our labor partners, with our 
employees, and also our leaders within the agency to make sure 
that issues are able to surface within the organization, and 
that people feel empowered, and that they are willing to bring 
things forward.
    So, this survey, as I said in my opening statement, we have 
to ask ourselves the tough questions. And these were the tough 
questions. We might not like all of the answers. But that gives 
us the information that we need so that we can go in and put 
the appropriate changes into place, and that is exactly what we 
are doing.
    Mr. DeFazio. OK. Thank you. I am pleased to hear that, and 
I am happy. It wasn't the line employees who were the problem.
    I remember one instance, can't remember exactly what it 
was, that 11 of them said no. Then it was appealed by Boeing, 
and the panel said no. And then finally they found a manager 
higher up the food chain in Seattle who said, oh, yeah, sure, 
fine, go right ahead.
    So, I just want to know. And I would also like to see 
consequences for people who blew off the technical advice and 
blew off their other employees who were trying to do the right 
thing in the future if that ever happens again. Hopefully your 
new reporting system will cull out anybody who is a problem in 
that.
    On the Changed Product Rule, you talked about the dateline. 
But the final implementation, it says here, is 2024, because it 
says development policy and training 2023 and aligned 
implementation in 2024.
    Does that mean that we can't do it before then?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, there will certainly be--in terms of 
fully institutionalizing it so that it is sustainable practice 
around the world with all the aviation authorities, I think 
that is a realistic timeframe. But that doesn't mean that we 
won't have decision criteria and things that we are doing in 
the meantime.
    And as I said, we have got MITRE doing a study for us and 
bringing us some recommendations. We are seeking out and having 
discussions with other authorities around the world.
    And we are also evaluating internally what the criteria 
need to be, whether it is time limited or a number of versions 
or whatever, to balance what Chair Larsen talked about with 
when an original type certificate was issued, but also to make 
sure that we can bring in beneficial product improvements that 
are safety improvements into existing aircraft. We want to be 
able to do both.
    Mr. DeFazio. That is great. But, I mean, part of the 
problem was the design constraints of that antique airframe. 
And that is just a concern that we have to continue to monitor.
    And then finally, just on behalf of the families--and I 
regret I am not in the hearing room. But, like I said, I am a 
little bit restricted at the moment. I know that they just 
wrote to you questioning continuing ODA to Boeing, given their 
ongoing problems in their other plants on the east coast. And I 
don't know what has been going on up in Seattle lately.
    I would hope that you will give all due consideration to 
that and review the most recent problems with Boeing and see 
how we are going to root those out.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes. Thank you for pointing that out.
    We have limited the delegated authority that Boeing has. 
And as you know, we have restricted, withheld Boeing's ability 
to issue airworthiness certificates for the MAX. We have also 
limited delegated functions for critical design features on the 
777-9 and the 737-10 certification projects.
    And, again, I would just point to the fact that, when I 
came onboard as FAA Administrator almost 2\1/2\ years ago now, 
the first thing I did was reset the relationship with Boeing. 
That happened within the first couple of months, once I saw 
what was going on. And I have made it clear to them continually 
that we will continue to exercise a high level of scrutiny.
    As you have noted, as the Congress has noted, and I think 
it has been our experience over decades, delegation, if it is 
done the right way, if it is done appropriately, it is a very 
powerful tool that enhances safety. It allows us to leverage 
engineering expertise.
    But clearly in this case it did not function properly, and 
that is what we are focused on, is to put systems and processes 
in place to make sure that no one individual or no one failure 
can exploit the system.
    Mr. DeFazio. OK. Well, thank you. I am liking what I am 
hearing. Keep it up.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I now recognize Mr. Graves of Missouri, the ranking member 
of the full committee.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, again, thank you, Administrator Dickson.
    I do want to focus on, go back to pilot training. And 
obviously and in light of the MAX 8 accidents, one of the real 
priorities for me--and I talked at length about this--was 
addressing international pilot training standards and the 
overreliance we are getting, we are moving towards, when it 
comes to automation in the cockpit and moving away from manual 
flying skills or just being able to fly the aircraft if a 
problem manifests itself.
    And I am just curious if the FAA is ensuring that its 
engagement with the international community is actually going 
to result in any positive changes. Are you seeing that? Is the 
international community being receptive to that? And I think 
you share those same concerns with me, and I would just like 
you to address it real quick.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, it is a great question, Ranking Member 
Graves.
    We have longstanding efforts through multiple forums to 
improve international safety standards, through ICAO, 
multilaterally and bilaterally, and I am always working with my 
counterparts around the world on these issues. We want to make 
sure that we drive specific [inaudible] improvements.
    I think you are aware of the Pilot Licensing and Training 
Panel. The FAA is actually leading the Automation Working Group 
there. We have our chief scientists on human factors and also 
one of our foremost pilot training experts who is leading that 
work.
    Also, some of the things that we have done within the U.S., 
and I will point to upset prevention and recovery training. We 
are working to incorporate that into ICAO standards and also 
promote it and work with civil aviation authorities around the 
world to assist pilots in preventing an upset, but if one does 
occur, making sure that they have the skills to be able to 
recover from it.
    And then finally we have an advisory circular on flightpath 
management that has been several years in the making. It 
includes guidance on manual flying skills, managing automation, 
and active pilot monitoring. And that will be out for public 
comment here within the next few weeks. And then we will work 
to promulgate those principles internationally as well.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. I look forward to that. That is 
perfect. That is exactly what I was looking for.
    And I want to shift directions right now back to what I 
mentioned earlier in my opening, too, when it comes to the new 
rule interpretation, when it comes to flight training and 
standard and limited and experimental category aircraft and the 
confusion that is causing amongst the instructor community, the 
pilot community. I mean, it is really creating a problem for 
us.
    And I just to want to ask if the FAA is addressing that. We 
are looking at legislation within NDAA to address it. But it 
would be a whole lot more help if the FAA would address it 
internally.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, thank you for the question.
    I think, as you know, I addressed this head on up at 
Oshkosh AirVenture this year. In fact, we refer to Letter of 
Deviation Authority, or LODA, as a four-letter word because I 
know that it has created some confusion and some frustration 
out there.
    So, to get through this we have created a process where, 
far from being bureaucratic, we have actually created a very 
quick turnaround process on these approvals. The time to 
process the deviation request is less than a day.
    This actually wasn't a change in legal interpretation. I 
know that there are feelings to the contrary. But through the 
course of a court case, what came to our attention is that our 
guidance and the underlying regulation which is controlling 
were inconsistent. And so, we had to update that guidance.
    We are going to update the rules to address the 
inconsistency permanently, but we want to have an interim 
process in place that facilitates and allows the trainings that 
you are talking about to continue uninterrupted.
    So, we will continue to work with you, I promise, on this 
issue. I want to make sure, though, that we are really talking 
about something that is very narrowly focused. And again, we 
want to make sure that this doesn't go into other areas where I 
think we are actually in very good shape.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. OK. And one last question: When it 
comes to the vaccine mandate, was the FAA able to convey to the 
administration just how much of a problem this could create 
when it comes to manpower shortages and pilot shortages? And 
the simple question I ask is, did the administration even ask 
the FAA for any guidance on this?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, obviously, the purpose, we want 
people to get vaccinated as a country, and we want to get 
COVID-19 behind us. That is the point. And the CDC is the 
public health authority. That aspect is certainly not within 
the FAA's purview.
    But I will tell you that my focus is on aviation safety and 
on making sure that the aviation system can operate, and that 
those jobs are out there, not only during the pandemic, but 
that we live to fight another day, if you will, and have the 
most dynamic and diverse and thriving aviation system going 
forward.
    And so, that is what we are really focused on is making 
sure that we minimize disruptions and making sure that we 
maximize predictability by keeping the air traffic system 
operating and making sure that the airlines and all operators 
of the system can continue to operate in a seamless way.
    Mr. Graves of Missouri. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. I now recognize Members for 5 
minutes. The first additional Member to be recognized is 
Representative Carson of Indiana. Representative Carson.
    Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have two 
letters that I would like to enter into the hearing record, one 
from our congressional colleagues, and one from the families of 
Ethiopian Airlines flight 302.
    Mr. Larsen. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
 Letter of October 8, 2021, from Hon. Brian K. Fitzpatrick, Member of 
 Congress, et al., to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal 
 Aviation Administration, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Andre Carson
                                                   October 8, 2021.
The Honorable Stephen Dickson,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, 
        Washington, DC 20591.

    Dear Administrator Dickson:
    We write to you today to express our concern regarding the FAA's 
ongoing delay in issuing a final rule requiring the installation of 
secondary flight deck barriers on new commercial aircraft. The threat 
of a flight deck breach is still very real and must be addressed. We 
are working to get H.R. 911 passed into law which would mandate 
secondary barriers on all existing aircraft. Unfortunately, we are yet 
to see an implementation date for secondary barriers for new aircraft 
due to never-ending delays.
    The last FAA Reauthorization Act (Public Law 115-254) was signed 
into law on October 5, 2018. After 3 years, countless delays, and 
bureaucratic excuses there is still not a clear date when secondary 
barriers will be required on new aircraft. While most other new 
provisions have already been fully implemented, we are yet to see one 
of the most important bipartisan safety components of the law go into 
effect.
    Secondary barriers are critical to the safety of commercial 
aircraft. On September 23 the House Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure held a hearing on the surge of air rage incidents. Every 
witness from across the aviation industry acknowledged the safety 
implications of these incidents. The threat of a passenger or 
passengers attempting to breach the flight deck is still very real. In 
June of this year, there were 2 domestic incidents of passengers 
attempting to breach the flight deck. If a pilot had needed to use the 
lavatory just prior to those incidents the results could have been 
catastrophic. Secondary barriers only cost a few thousand dollars per 
aircraft; a small sum to prevent another 9/11 style attack. While we 
understand that FAA has its rulemaking procedure, we feel that 3 years 
ought to be more than enough time.
    Could you provide a written update on the remaining steps and 
provide us with a realistic timeframe for when a final rule could be 
issued? We look forward to your timely response.
        Sincerely,
Brian Fitzpatrick,
  Member of Congress.
Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
  Member of Congress.
Andre Carson,
  Member of Congress.
Josh Gottheimer,
  Member of Congress.
John Garamendi,
  Member of Congress.
Eleanor Holmes Norton,
  Member of Congress.
Christopher H. Smith,
  Member of Congress.
Glenn ``GT'' Thompson,
  Member of Congress.
Mariannette Miller-Meeks, M.D.
  Member of Congress.
Jeff Van Drew,
  Member of Congress.
Jared Huffman,
  Member of Congress.
Don Bacon,
  Member of Congress.
Charlie Crist,
  Member of Congress.
  

                                 
Letter of October 19, 2021, from Families of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 
302 Crash Victims, to Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation 
Administration Officials, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Andre Carson
[Editor's note: This letter contains 16 pages of signatures. The 
hearing transcript resumes on page 42.]
                                                  October 19, 2021.
The Honorable Pete Buttigieg,
Secretary,
Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Ave SE, Washington, DC 
        20590.
Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator,
Bradley Mims, Deputy Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration,
800 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591.

Re: ET302 victim's families request for ODA Termination

    Dear Secretary Buttigieg, Administrator Dickson and Deputy 
Administrator Mims:
    The undersigned families of the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crash 
request that the Federal Aviation Administration terminate Boeing's 
Organization Designation Authority (ODA). It has become clear that 
Boeing is not a company that can be trusted with the public safety 
responsibilities conferred by the ODA. Just as the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) suspended GE Aviation's Design Organisational 
Approval in Czech last March due to problems, FAA should do the same 
for Boeing unless and until trust, competence and freedom from 
interference is solidly demonstrated.
    Section 7-2(c) of the Order 8100.15B, Organization Designation 
Authorization Procedures, states that an ODA can be terminated due to 
misconduct, lack of care or judgment or failure to implement needed 
corrective action.
    Boeing cannot be trusted to perform authorized safety functions 
because it has engaged in the following misconduct which requires FAA 
action to terminate its ODA:
    1.  deceiving the FAA about the nature and the power of the 
maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) added to the 
Boeing 737 MAX 8 (MAX) by way of misleading statements, half-truths and 
omissions as admitted in its January 21, 2021 deferred prosecution 
agreement;
    2.  deceiving the FAA about whether simulator training was required 
for pilots to fly the MAX;
    3.  creating an ODA culture that applies undue pressure to 
engineering personnel so they are not able to exercise independent 
judgment free from organizational conflicts of interest;
    4.  wrongly approving the original 737 MAX design when it failed to 
comply with several 14 CFR Part 25 regulations and required 
Airworthiness Directives (ADs) for the resulting unsafe conditions;
    5.  failing to notify FAA that not all MAX aircraft were equipped 
with a functional AOA disagree alert;
    6.  failing to manage the ODA in a competent manner that would 
detect and correct employee and/or management misrepresentations and 
dishonesty that compromises safety while benefitting Boeing's profit 
goals;
    7.  failing to conduct realistic system safety assessments on 
critical systems;
    8.  failing to insulate the ODA from Boeing's profit motives;
    9.  crafting arbitrary and unscientific assumptions, such as pilot 
response times, to avoid implementing safety measures;
    10.  failing to conduct proper system safety assessments after the 
Lion Air crash to determine problems, check incorrect assumptions, and 
fix the problems;
    11.  failing to recognize catastrophic failure due to novel design 
in flight controls and implementing a failsafe mechanism per FAR 
requirements;
    12.  falsely stating that the Boeing board safety committee was 
fully briefed and engaged after the Lion Air crash when that body did 
not meet and failed to discuss or take any action to correct the flaws 
in the MAX;
    13.  failing to spend resources to quickly fix the MAX after the 
Lion Air crash and instead raising dividend's by 20% and authorizing a 
$20 billion stock repurchase program for shareholders;
    14.  doubling down on the safety of the MAX, rather than fixing the 
MAX, by issuing post-Lion Air crash press releases stating:
        ``We are confident in the safety of the 737 MAX'' (11/
21/18);
        ``As our customers and their passengers continue to fly 
the 737 MAX to hundreds of destinations around the world every day, 
they have our assurance that the 737 MAX is as safe as any airplane 
that has ever flown the skies.'' (11/27/18)
    15.  selling and delivering more defective MAX aircraft to more 
airlines after the Lion Air crash without fixing the problems.

    The FAA, the Department of Justice, the House Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure and a Delaware judge have all 
affirmatively found that Boeing lied and concealed problems relating to 
the MAX. Other Boeing commercial problems have also raised concerns, 
including the 787 (on board fires) and the 777 (quality and 
certification issues).
    In 2013, a report from NATCA recommended that the Boeing Safety 
Office be structured along the lines of the more traditional Gulfstream 
office in Atlanta. That recommendation was ignored. Part of the 
justification was that there was not sufficient labor resources 
available in the Seattle office, even though subsequently it was found 
that the number of projects handled by the office was stable.
    Another report in 2017 prophetically stated this problem clearly:
    ``The ODA organization makes certification decisions, not the AR. 
This leads to a potential decision making process influenced by a 
``Group Think'' mentality. There is no personal accountability or 
monetary motivation for ARs to contradict Company management positions 
that do not support expenditures to upgrade noncompliant designs or do 
testing needed to demonstrate compliance. ARs are reluctant to take 
contradictory positions or bring up issues within the ODA for fear of 
retaliation. In several cases ARs have refused to answer compliance 
related questions when in meetings with the FAA and ODA management. 
This reflects their fear of retaliation if they express a view that 
contradicts the company position.'' (Pre-Decisional Involvement (PDI) 
report, addressing Aircraft Certification Transformation, February 6, 
2017)
    The ODA system in general, and Boeing's use of ODA in particular, 
invites undue influence and interference rather than resists it.
    For these reasons, FAA should terminate Boeing's ODA so that FAA 
performs the safety functions under standard certification procedures.
        Sincerely,

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Victim                              Signatory
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Vecere...............................  Megan Hoover, I am a friend
                                             of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Liza Grandia, friend of the
                                             family
Danielle Moore............................  Owen Campbell, I am the
                                             friend of Danielle Moore
Micah John Messent........................  Amber Tansky, Sister of
                                             victim
Max Edkins................................  Emily Harris, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Matt Vercere..............................  Matthew Baiamonte, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Dominique Lacroix, Sister
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Michael Moscarello, I am a
                                             cousin of the victim.
Micah Messent.............................  Glenda Wray, Friend
Graziella de Luis Ponce...................  Isabel de Luis, I am the
                                             niece of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Ahmed Ali, I am a friend of
                                             the victim
Matt Vecere, Samya Stumo..................  Michael Stumo, father
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Carol Shrout, Family friend
Angela Rehhorn............................  Glenn Tibbett, Family friend
Melvin Riffle.............................  Nicholas Reissr, Family
                                             friend
Melvin Riffle, Bennett Riffle.............  Jim McCoy, Very close family
                                             friend of the victims
Angela Rehhorn............................  Melissa Tibbett, Neighbour
                                             of the victim
Jess Hyba.................................  jeff curry, I am a friend of
                                             the victim
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Molly Abraham, Aunt
Danielle Moore............................  Idit Papular, I am a family
                                             friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Kimberly, Family friend of
                                             the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Kristine Wahlers, I am a
                                             friend of the victim's
                                             family.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Carly Bollinger, Cousins
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Marilyn Koutnik, I am a
                                             friend of the victims
Danielle Moore............................  Jodie Layne, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................  Julie Kramer, Friend of
                                             victim's mother
Danielle Moore............................  William Hedges, Danielle
                                             knew me as Grandpa
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Pascale Perez, Mother's
                                             friend
Matthew Vecere............................  Grace Traa, Friend of the
                                             victim
Micah Messant.............................  Nelsen Spickard, Cousin
Bennett Riffle............................  Sydney Malain, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Chrys Hutchings, friend of
                                             Samya's parents
Jackson Musoni............................  Huguette Debets, Father of
                                             my children
Micah Messent.............................  Amy Chow, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Lydia Littlefield, friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Kim Bazinet, Family friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Lou McNeil, Friend
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Susan Riffel, I am the
                                             mother of these victims.
Bennett Riffel, Melvin Riffel.............  Ike Riffel, Father
Danielle Moore............................  Laura Reid, I am the
                                             Godmother of the amazing,
                                             talented, lovely Danielle
                                             Moore
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Anne Robertson, I am the
                                             cousin of these victims.
Matt Vecere...............................  Sander Banta, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Sharon Krogman, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim.
Sam Pegram................................  Natalie Eacersall, Friend of
                                             a relative.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Cassidy Howell, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................  Curt McCullough, Family
                                             friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Barbara Dean, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Chuk Odenigbo, Friend
Melvin Riffle, Bennett Riffle.............  Susan Janes, I am a family
                                             friend of the victims'
                                             family
Samya Stumo...............................  Raffik Lopes, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Lois Fuller, Friend of the
                                             victim's family
Melvin and Bennett Riffel.................  Tammy Fisher, Cousin
Angela Rehhorn............................  Annette Vincent, I am the
                                             aunt of the victim.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Brittney Riffel, Spouse and
                                             Sister-in-Law
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Robert Holmlund, Great Uncle
Matt Vecere...............................  Jenna DiGenni, Friend
Oliver Vick...............................  Ben Coakley, Friend
Melvin Riffel.............................  Katherine Zahner, Friend
Paolo Dieci...............................  Elena Dieci, I am the niece
                                             of the victim.
Marie Philipp.............................  Julia Rubio Gamero, Best
                                             friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Max Thabiso Edkins........................  Julian Kubel, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Bennet Riffel.............................  Sandra Niemann, Family
                                             friend
Paolo Dieci...............................  Estella Dieci, Niece
Marie Christin Philipp....................  Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Wolfgang Eigner...........................  Bettina Eigner, I am the
                                             mother of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Janet Hedges, Aunt
Marie Christin Philipp....................  Heike Baumann, I am the aunt
                                             of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Grantt Lopes, Cousin
Melvin Riffel.............................  Pao Tane, Friend
Bennett Riffel............................  Deborah Najera, Family
                                             Friend
Melvin Riffel.............................  Deborah Najera, Family
                                             Friend
Josefin Augusta Ekermann..................  Madelen Maria Ekermann,
                                             Mother
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Susan Lamarche, I am the
                                             maternal aunt of the
                                             victim.
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Melisse Bouziane, I am a
                                             cousin of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Paulina Polanco, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram................................  Melanie Cremona, Friend
Mel Riffel, Bennett Riffel................  May Saeteurn, Friend of
                                             victim
Clemence Boutant..........................  Pernille Kjaer Porte, I am
                                             the friend of the victim.
Hussein Swaleh M'tetu.....................  Feisal Swaleh, Son of the
                                             victim
Anne Feigl................................  Anna Caroline Feigl, Sister
                                             in Law
Sam Pegram................................  William Pegram, Grandfather
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Diana Officer, I am the
                                             friend of the victims
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Aude Breton, Friend
Derick Kivia Lwugi........................  Gladys Kivia, Wife
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Dominique caumes, Niece
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Lizzie Muyawa Dube, Very
                                             very good friend. How I
                                             miss her daily
Sautner Christoph.........................  Johannes Pernkopf, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................  Phyllis Robertson, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Cheryl Engel, Very close
                                             friend
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Vincent Edith, Friend
Jonathan Seex.............................  Noah Seex Svalin, I am
                                             Jonathan's nephew.
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Lars-Peter Feigl, Sister
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Therese Rouget, Aunt of the
                                             victim
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Dominique Verdugo, I am a
                                             friend of the victim's
                                             family
Gatchi de Luis............................  Jihane Sfeir, Friend
Jonathan Seex.............................  Par Schroeder, Brother in
                                             law
Marcelino Rassul Tayob....................  Mario Rassul, Brother
Marcelino Rassul Tayob....................  Elisangela Rassul, Uncle
Danielle Moore............................  Kathy E. Martorino, Friend
                                             of the family
Virginia Chimenti.........................  Angela Maria Farioli, I am
                                             the friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Carol Moore, Aunt
Wolgang Eigner, Christoph Sautner, Armin    Kerstin Bashir, We grow up,
 Schietz.                                    studied and worked together
Jonathan Seex.............................  Joanna Seex, I am the sister
                                             of Jonathan.
Micah John Messent........................  Joy Camp, Aunt
Ollie Vick................................  Keri Powell, Friend
Marcelino Rassul Tayob....................  Emmanuel Rassul, Uncle
Micah John Messent........................  David Camp, Uncle
Jonathan Bjorn Seex.......................  Britt-Marie Seex, I am the
                                             mother of the victim.
Clemence Boutant..........................  Mathieu Chaumeil, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Helen Fodnaess, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
MARIA PILAR BUZZETTI......................  AILA MOHRHOFF, FAMILY FRIEND
Sam Pegram................................  Vslerie, Grandmother
Marcelino Rassul Tayob....................  Hugo Leal, I am the friend
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Nadine Raimondo, I am one of
                                             the parents' friends
Micheal Ryan..............................  Tiarnan, brother
Abiodun Bashua............................  Mariam Bashua, Daughter
Abiodun Bashua............................  Hyro Bashua, Grandson
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Hans-Joachim Feigl, I am the
                                             father of the victim
Marie Philipp.............................  Julia Simonsberger, friend
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Sieglinde Rink-Feigl, I am
                                             the mother of the victim
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Abel Orain, I am a cousin of
                                             the victim
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Eric Deschoenmaeker, Former
                                             employer
Clemence-Isaure Boutant, Willm, Sam Pegram  Emma O'Leary, I am a
                                             colleague and friend of the
                                             victims
Clemence Boutant..........................  Lucie Viver, Friend
Graziella de Luis.........................  Martinez Gregorio, I m a
                                             friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Kristina Louise
                                             Hetherington, I am a friend
                                             and colleague of the
                                             victim.
Clemence-Isaure, BOUTANT-WILLM............  Jean-Louis MICHEL, Friend
Gachi De Luis.............................  Patricia Rooke Crossley, I
                                             am a friend and colleague
                                             of victim
Marie Philipp.............................  Susanne Radtke, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Gachi de Luis.............................  Tom Afton, Friend
Alexandra Wachtmeister....................  Anna Wachtmeister, Cousins
Anne Katrin Feigl.........................  Catherine Hubert, Friend
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Henri Virol, I am the friend
                                             of the victim
Anne Katrin Feigl.........................  Jack Davies, Friend
Graziella De Luis.........................  Anita Guerra, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Gachi de Luis.............................  Francoise Point, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Gachi de Luis.............................  Gilda Calleja, Close friend
Maria Pilar Buzzetti......................  Dalma Reka BERES, Colleague
Mick Ryan.................................  Fergus Gleeson, Friend
Josefine Ekermann.........................  Susan Saado, Friend
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Marie-Claire Ribeiro, I am a
                                             friend of Veronique
                                             Geoffroy, Camille's aunt.
Josefin Ekermann..........................  Alejandro Conde Geli,
                                             Exboyfriend
Matthew Vecere............................  Jason McClain, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim.
Anne Katrine Fiegl........................  Marcello GOLETTI, friend and
                                             colleague
Stef Lacroix, Karoline Aadland............  Lauren Webber, Roommates
Eric Prieur...............................  Sandra Prieur, He was my
                                             brother
Christoph Sautner.........................  Marlies Wohlmuth, Friend
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Juliette Rouesse, friend
Max Thabiso Edkins........................  Anne Lyons, Friend
Clemence Boutant..........................  Isabelle Charre, Friend
Max Tabiso Edkins.........................  Dennis Bailey, Uncle
Maxc Thabiso Edkins.......................  Gillian Mary Bailey-Edkins,
                                             Auntie
Josefin Ekermann..........................  Lia Hen, My best friend
Graciela De Luis Ponce....................  Rosita Castro Dominguez,
                                             Friend
Graciela Luis.............................  Alejandra Safa Barraza,
                                             Friend
Kadija Cathy Hamani.......................  Hamani, Colleague
Michael Ryan..............................  James Spinelli, Friend
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Jerome Bichot, Family friend
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Olivier Peyre, I am a friend
                                             of a cousin of the victim.
Clemence Boutant-Willm....................  Pascale Vulliez, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Michael Ryan..............................  Giulia Serrelli, Friend
Sara Gebre Michael........................  Ababu Yetbarek, Husband
Samya Stumo...............................  Cassio Lopes, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Penny Owen, Friend of Family
Samya Stumo...............................  Bradley R Krogman, Cousin
Marie Philipp.............................  Angelika Begerow, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Stacey Troster, Family
                                             Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Christina Donnelly, Friend
                                             of the victim
Graziella De Luis.........................  Stefanie Santa, Friend of
                                             the victim
Sam Pegram................................  James Killen, Friend of the
                                             victim
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Yvette Le Gall, I am the
                                             mother in law of Xavier
                                             Fricaudet's brother
Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm.............  Violaine Willm, Sister
Gachi de Luis.............................  Jorge Tagle, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Josh Webb, I am a friend of
                                             the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Allyson Steele, Friends of a
                                             friend
Gachi de Luis.............................  Claire Farrimond, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Jilian O'Neill, Friend
Joanne Toole..............................  Michael Rodgers, I am a
                                             cousin of the victim
Amma Tesfamariam..........................  Solomon Tezera, Husband
Sintayhu Shafi............................  Yewubnesh Asnake, cousin
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Guenievre Darbord, Friend
Graziella de Luis y Ponce.................  Becky Padera, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Sintayhu Shafi............................  Yewubnesh Asnake, cousin
Samya Stumo...............................  Lara Mittaud, Friend
Paolo Dieci...............................  Elizabeth McCarthy, I am
                                             Paolo's sister in law
Max Edkins................................  Teboho Edkins, I am the
                                             Brother of the victim.
Oliver Vick...............................  Tasha Slaise, Olly was a
                                             dear friend and our son's
                                             beloved godfather
Olly Vick.................................  kirsty norton, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Pierre Royer, Uncle
Mel Riffel, Bennett Riffel................  Megan Golden, Cousin
Danielle Moore............................  David Lawless, Partner
Micah Messent.............................  Heather Wilson, I am Micah
                                             Messent's aunt.
Stephanie Lacroix, Angela Rehhorn,          Victoria Woodhouse, Friend
 Danielle Moore, Micah Messant.              and colleague
Danielle Moore............................  Gabrielle Mills, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Jill Frankel, Friend
Matthew Vecere............................  Tracey Young, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................  Bryce and Linda Vincent,
                                             Aunt and Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Micheline Geoffroy, Friend
                                             of the family
Danielle Moore............................  Elizabeth Nagel, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Daniel Moore..............................  Asma Azhar, Friend
Matt Vecere...............................  Jeff and Nancy Vecere, Matt
                                             was our nephew
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Ryan Bennett, I am the
                                             cousin of the victims.
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Paige Kimble, friend in
                                             solidarity with the Stumo/
                                             Milleron family
Micah Messent.............................  Diane Gershman, I am Micah's
                                             aunt
Danielle Moore............................  Siobhan Takala, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Ludwika Dec, Family friend
Denielle Moore............................  Marciana Alfaro, Niece
Virginia Chiementi........................  Mateo Mancheno, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Judith Saathoff, Samya is
                                             the granddaughter of my
                                             cousin
Graciella de Luis Ponce...................  Maria Regina Ponce Laviada,
                                             first cousin
Samya Stumo...............................  Sarina Ricketts, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Brian Hubbard, I am a friend
                                             of the victim's family.
Samya Stumo...............................  Ari Cardillo, Childhood
                                             friend of victim
Danielle Moore............................  Tim Cruickshank, Roommate
Joanna Toole..............................  Joan Spruce, I am the aunt
                                             of the victim.
Angela Rehhorn............................  G. Smith, Friend of the
                                             family
Samya Stumo...............................  Osamah Khalil, Friend of the
                                             Family
Danielle Moore............................  Alexandra Bonham, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Christina Santala, Friend of
                                             the victim's mother
Micah Messent, Danielle Moore.............  Lucy Wilkie, I am a friend
                                             of the 2 victims
Micheal Ryan..............................  Cristin Ryan, Sister
Mel Riffel................................  Chante Hettinger, Friend
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Luigi Flora, Camille's
                                             mother's partner
Micah Messent.............................  Mike Gershman, First cousin
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Nicolas Merle, friend of the
                                             victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Deborah Conner, She was my
                                             husband's cousin
Ghislaine De Claremont....................  Melissa Mairesse, Daughter
                                             of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Richard Sweetman, I am a
                                             family friend.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Katie Niccum, Cousin
Sebastiano Tusa...........................  Alessandra Iovine, I am the
                                             friend of the victim's
                                             niece
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Carolyn Souaid, I am a
                                             cousin of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................  Karen Bourne, I am the
                                             friend of the mother of the
                                             victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Philippe Leroux, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Lucie Miron-Leroux, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Micah Messent.............................  Laurie Spickard, Cousin
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Joe LoGiudice, Step son-in-
                                             laws
Samya Stumo...............................  Amy Alpert, Friend of the
                                             family
Alexandra Wachtmeister....................  Carl Nordlander, I am an
                                             uncle of the victim.
Derick Lwugi..............................  Angel Kivia, I am the
                                             daughter of Derick Lwugi.
Matthew Vecere............................  Linda Ha, Partner
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Tom Leatherman, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Lexi Deighton.............................  Lexi Deighton, A friend
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Solange Lamy, Friend
Olly Vick.................................  Simon Tilbury, Close friend
Josefin Ekermann..........................  V Leigh, Friend
Oliver Vick, Jessica Hyba.................  Rebecca Vick, I am sister to
                                             one victim, friend and
                                             `sister-in-law' to the
                                             other
Micah Messent.............................  Caroline Rutledge, Friend
Angela Rehorn.............................  S Mark Vincent, Uncle
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Alexandria Kealey, I am
                                             friend of victims mother.
Angela Rehhorn............................  Ryan Rehhorn, Brother of
                                             Angela
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Marine Capron, I am the
                                             sister in law of the
                                             victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Lloyd Baroody, friend of
                                             family
Danielle Moore............................  Courtney Schreiter, Friend
Camille GEOFFROY..........................  Catherine BERTHET, I am the
                                             mother of the victim
Melvin Riffel.............................  Larissa felch, Melvin riffel
                                             was my brother in law
Jessica Hyba..............................  Gregory Kovacs, Brother
Jessica Hyba..............................  Allan Kovacs, step father
Melvin Riffel, Bennet Riffel..............  HEIDI PRICE, My sons best
                                             friends
Jessica Hyba..............................  Karol Kovacs, Mother
Angela Rehhorn............................  Petra MacKay, Cousin
Samya Stumo...............................  Nina Anderson, friend of
                                             parents
Max Thabiso Edkins........................  Marianne Gysae-Edkins, I am
                                             the mother
Andrea Carol Anderson.....................  Andrea Anderson, I am the
                                             grandmother of the partner
                                             of Micah's brother.
Micah Messent.............................  Natalie Gates, friend
Hoda Bandeh-Ahmadi........................  Hoda Bandeh-Ahmadi, Friend/
                                             colleague of Samya Stumo.
Danielle Courtney Moore...................  Betty Moore, I am the
                                             paternal Grandmother of the
                                             victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Karen Carreras-Hubbard,
                                             Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Ann Perry, family friend
Max Edkins................................  Inga Coleman, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Joanne Belanger, Aunt
Alexandra Wachtmeister....................  Wilhelm Wachtmeister, Father
                                             of Alexandra
Graziella De Luis.........................  Sofia Diaz, I am the niece
                                             of the victim.
Joanna Toole..............................  Natalie Fullick, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Lisa Markowitz, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................  Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Danielle Moore............................  Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Gachi de Luis.............................  Maya de Luis, She was my
                                             aunt
Clemence-Isaure BOUTANT...................  Vincent WILLM, I am the
                                             brother of the victim
Stephanie Lacriox.........................  Connie Labreche, Cousin of
                                             the victims father
Baleker, Sintayehu Shafi..................  Konjit Baleker, I'm the
                                             sister of the victim
Oliver Vick...............................  James Vick, Father
Matt Vecere...............................  Colleen Menz, Aunt
Olivert Vick..............................  Cheryl Vick, I am the mother
                                             of the victim
Graciela de Luis..........................  Alejandro suarez larrinaga,
                                             Nephew of victim
Oliver Vick...............................  Cheryl Vick. (Previously
                                             misspelt), I am the Mother
                                             of the victim
Oliver Vick...............................  Cheryl Vick, I am the Mother
                                             of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Noor Jdid, I am the friend
                                             of the victim
Graziela de Luiz..........................  Margaret de Vanssay, Close
                                             friend
De Luis...................................  Christian Klacko, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Lindsay Butt, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
N/A.......................................  Arlene Tolopko, I am the
                                             triend of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Patricia Frank, Second
                                             cousin
Mick Ryan, Pilar Buzzetti, Zhen Zhen Huang  Rodolfo, Friend and work
                                             colleague.
Oliver Vick...............................  Charles bennett, Friend
Marie Philipp.............................  Helmut Schmidt, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Marie Philipp.............................  Monika Schmidt, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole..............................  Nicky McNaughton, Best
                                             friend
Micah Messent.............................  Erica Greenup, best friend
Micah Messent.............................  Frank Messent, I'm his older
                                             brother
Graziela de Luis..........................  Javier, Brother of victim
                                             Graziella de Luis
Clemence boutant WILLM....................  eddy willm, my cousin
Samya Stumo...............................  Leila Baroody, friend
Melvin Riffel.............................  Christina Felch, Mother in
                                             law to the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Emma Belanger, Cousin
Micheal Ryan..............................  Christine Ryan, I am the
                                             mother of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Alain Lacroix, I am
                                             Stephanie's father.
Micheal Ryan..............................  Siobhan Brassil, Sister
Danielle Moore............................  Chris Moore, Father
Melvin Riffel.............................  Clara LoGiudice, Son in law
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Zach Niccum, I am a friend/
                                             family of the victims.
Melvin Riffel.............................  Kaylynn Campbell, Family
                                             member of his widow
Samya Stumo...............................  Cheryl Williams, My daughter
                                             friend of victim
Angela Rehhorn............................  Tara Reid, Friend of the
                                             victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Philip Palmquist, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Sylvie Lamarche Lacroix, I
                                             am the mother of Stephanie
                                             Lacroix
Danielle Moore............................  Lita Venezuela, Friend of
                                             the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Alanna Clark, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Nathalie Robillard, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Carole Girard, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Line Robillard, Aunt to
                                             victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  J Caron, Cousin
Micah Messent.............................  Suzanne Camp, I am Micah
                                             Messent's mother
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Faith Neale, Friend of
                                             victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Michael Moscarello, I am the
                                             maternal cousin of the
                                             victim.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Buczkowski, I am a friend of
                                             the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Stephane Belanger, I am the
                                             uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Lucie Lambert, Friend of
                                             family
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Christopher Lamarche, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Helene Lacroix, I am the
                                             grand-mother of the victim
Micah Messent.............................  Deborah Fitzsimmons, Auntie
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Brigitte Castonguay, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Doris Blouin Harrison,
                                             Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Torleif Stumo, I am the
                                             brother of Samya.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Cameron Caron, I am cousin
                                             of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Jennifer Finniss, Friend
Micah John Messent........................  John Joseph Messent, Father
                                             of victim
Danielle Moore............................  Clariss Moore, I am the
                                             mother of Danielle Moore
Danielle Moore............................  Rodilla Abenir, I am the
                                             grandmother of Danielle
                                             Moore
Danielle Moore............................  Fanny Abenir, I am the aunt
                                             of Danielle Moore
Samya Stumo...............................  Matthew Kreta, Childhood
                                             Friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Anne Vien, Friend
Chunming Wang.............................  SiyueWang, I am the daughter
                                             of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Micheline Gervais, Friend of
                                             family
Steph Lacroix.............................  Shannon lafrance, Friend
Micah Messent.............................  Kidston Short, I am Micah's
                                             girlfriend
Micah Messent.............................  Nancy MacPherson, Sister-in-
                                             law
Graziella De Luis.........................  Attilia Fracchia, I was a
                                             close friend of the victim
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Bernard Vinot, a dear friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Linda Falardeau, Friend's
                                             daughter
Joanna Toole..............................  Mark Toole, Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Caleb, Friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram, Sarah Auffret.................  Rhiannon Griffiths, I was a
                                             housemate of the victims at
                                             different times
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Charlotte Wood, Friend of
                                             the victims
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Charlotte Wood, I am the
                                             friend of the victims
Mel Riffel................................  Ashley Jorgenson, I am a
                                             friend of Mel
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Michel Robillard, I am the
                                             uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Mariane Piche, Friend of
                                             victim's parents (Alain and
                                             Sylvie Lacroix)
N/A.......................................  Eric Pagoada, Friend of a
                                             friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Joanne Quinn, I am a friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Kris Picard, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Diane Caron, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Johanne Lamarche, cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Barb Hogan, Colleague and
                                             friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Pierrette Lachance, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................  Jesslene Jawanda, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Gualberto Abenir Jr, Neice
Clemence-Isaure Boutant-Willm.............  Elisabeth Willm, I am the
                                             mother of Clemence-Isaure.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Jocelyne Dubien, My cousins
                                             daughter
Danielle Moore............................  Julie McDonald, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Gabrielle Gauthier, Former
                                             work friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Rami akhrass, Friend of
                                             family
Danielle Moore............................  Kelly Ambrose, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Kathy Martorino, Moore
                                             Family friend
Danielle Moore............................  Albert ajemian, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Lori Kinch, Friend of
                                             victim's family
Danielle Moore............................  Laura Ward, I am a cousin of
                                             the victimDanielle Moore
Danielle Moore............................  Joanne Cerdan, Family friend
Danielle Moore............................  Cameron Ure, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Dagni Ziedins, Friend of the
                                             victims family
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Line Fogal, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Colleen Duffey, Family
                                             friend
Danielle Moore............................  Da Chen, I am the friend of
                                             the victim
Tamirat Mulu..............................  Fasika Mulu, Brother
Danielle Moore............................  Richard Hedges, I am the
                                             uncle of the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Jenny Sutton, Friend
Stephanie LaCroix.........................  Sarah Forrest, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Xavier FRICAUDET..........................  Roseline FRICAUDET, I an the
                                             mother of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Suzanne Labelle, I am an
                                             aunt to the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Rob Del Mundo, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  chuchi mangubat, niece
Samuel Pegram.............................  Seamus Harland, Friend
Anne Katrin Feigl.........................  Juan Carlos Llorens Rojas, I
                                             am te friend of the victim
Micah Messent.............................  Ross Camp, Uncle
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Helene chartier, Friend
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Valerie Serres, friend
Danielle Moore............................  Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Dawn Tanner...............................  Hunter Tanner French, I am
                                             the son of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................  Cynthia Abenir, Niece
Danielle Moore............................  Lyn Abenir, Niece
Matt Vecere...............................  Caroline McClain, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Mark Uzer, Niece
Danielle Moore............................  John Uzer, Niece
Jonathan Seex.............................  Nadege Dubois-Seex, I am the
                                             wife of the victim
Jonathan Seex.............................  Alexandre seex, I am the son
                                             of the victim
Mick Ryan.................................  Andy Jackson, Friend
Jonathan Seex.............................  Antoine Seex, I am the son
                                             of the victim
Danielle Moore, Micah Messant.............  Leah Luciuk, Friend of
                                             victims
Jonathan Seex.............................  Adeline seex, I am the
                                             daughter of the victim
Boutant wilm Clemence.....................  Christine Falcand, A Friend
                                             of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Jennifer Doucet, Cousin
Danielle Moore, Paul N's wife, two          Victoria, I am the friend of
 children and his mother-in-law.             the victim's parents
Mick Ryan.................................  Rohit Kumar Pokharel,
                                             Colleague
Joanna Toole..............................  Adrian Toole, I am Father
Mick Ryan.................................  Clodagh Finn, Friend of the
                                             victim
Danielle Moore............................  Troy Sabaot, Goddaughter
Mick Ryan.................................  S.M. Tanbir Uddin, I am the
                                             colleague of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................  Natasha Perera, Friend
Paolo Dieci...............................  Luca Dieci, Brother
Paolo Dieci...............................  Maria Luisa Mattioli, Wife
Paolo Dieci...............................  Nella Dieci, Sister
Marie Philipp.............................  Sophia Baumann, Cousin
Micah Messent.............................  Emma Spickard, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim.
Danielle C Moore..........................  Betty Moore, Grandmother of
                                             the victim
Mick Ryan.................................  Michael Brassil, Brother-in-
                                             law
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Nicole Dumouchel, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Alexandra Dufort, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Geraldine leka, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Alexander Tripp, Godfather
                                             to Samya
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Maya McDonald, I am a friend
                                             of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................  Kim Lawrence, Friend of the
                                             victim's family
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Marlina Riffel, I am the
                                             Aunt of the victims
Mick Ryan.................................  Stephen Cahill, Friend and
                                             co-worker
Samya Stumo...............................  Sharrie Brooks, Cousin
Ekta Adhikari.............................  Samir Nepal, Colleague
Mick Ryan.................................  Finbarr Geaney, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Graziella de Luis.........................  Jean Kwo, Sister-in-law
Matt Vecere...............................  Joyce Courter, I am a friend
                                             of the victim.
Micah Messent.............................  John Camp, Uncle
Alexandra Wachtmeister....................  Agneta Westman, Alexandra's
                                             aunt
Micah Messent.............................  Jade Ballard, I am the
                                             eldest sister of the
                                             victim.
Mick Ryan.................................  Roy Crabb, Friend and
                                             kindred Spirit
Micah Messent.............................  Darryl Gershman, I am the
                                             uncle of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Rebecca Young, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Monique, I am her aunt
Micah Messent.............................  Cathy Camp, I am the Aunt of
                                             MIcah Messent
Micah Camp................................  Keshia Chutter, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim
Mick Ryan.................................  Jennifer McAuliffe, I am the
                                             cousin of the victims wife
Micah Messent.............................  James Fitzsimmons, I am the
                                             uncle of the victim.
Mick Ryan.................................  Stuart Zimble, I am a close
                                             friend
Michael Ryan..............................  Declan O'Mahony, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Mick Ryan.................................  Eadin O'Mahony, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Rosemary Quinn, Family
                                             friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Caitlin Hotaling, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Stephanie Kennedy, I used to
                                             go to school with the
                                             victim.
Mick Ryan.................................  Orla Clinton, Friend and
                                             colleague
Mick Ryan.................................  Helen O'Dowd, I am a Friend
                                             of the family of victim
                                             Mick Ryan
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Paul and Patricia Nimchek,
                                             We are friends of the
                                             victim and her family.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Christina Callingham, Friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Darla Bennison, Friend of
                                             Mother and Father and
                                             extended families of the
                                             victim.
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Darla Bennison, Friend of
                                             the Mother and Father and
                                             extended families of the
                                             Victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Marc caron, Uncle
Samya Stumo...............................  Tom Connell, Family friend
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Melanie Martin, Friend
Steph Lamarche............................  Rachelle Helin, I am a
                                             friend of victim's mother.
Mick Ryan.................................  Ahmad bin Zakaria, He was my
                                             honorable chief
Danielle Moore............................  David Moore, I am the
                                             brother of the victim
Ekta Adhikari, Mick Ryan..................  Praneet Shrestha, Fiancee,
                                             Colleague
Marie Christin Philipp....................  Ellen Philipp, I am the
                                             mother of the victim
Marie Christin Philipp....................  Klaus Philipp, I am the
                                             father of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Annabelle Cerdan, Niece and
                                             good friend
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Elena Riffel, I am the Aunt
                                             of the victims
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Katharina, Close friend
Graziella de Luis.........................  Mariana Cristellys, Friend
Michael Ryan..............................  Conor O'Sullivan, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Oliver Vick...............................  Ilaria Gandossi, Father of
                                             my children
Danille Moore.............................  Aurie Narvaez, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Kathryn Brimson, Cousin
Danielle Moore............................  Sydney Brimson, 2nd Cousin
Joanna Toole..............................  Dennis Spruce, Uncle
Marie Philipp.............................  Christiane Ulrich, Family
                                             friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Diane Holmlund, I am a
                                             second cousin of Samya
Michael Ryan..............................  Mari Turashvili, Friend
Danielle Moore............................  Alexander Cake, Cousin
Micah Messent.............................  Jacqueline Messent, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Julie Balasalle, Friend and
                                             coworker
Mick Ryan.................................  Catherine Clark, Friend and
                                             colleague of the victim
Anne-Katrin Feigel........................  Nicole Blu, I am a friend of
                                             the victim.
Daniella Moore............................  Wilson Lee, I am the friend
                                             of the victim
Mick Ryan.................................  lucie jouanneau, friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Theresa Williams, family
                                             friend
Peter deMarsh.............................  Michele Ashby, I am a friend
                                             of a victim's sister. And I
                                             fly!
Alexandra Wachtmeister....................  Nane Annan, I am a friend of
                                             the victim
Mick (Micheal) Ryan.......................  Aodhnaid Connolly Lennon,
                                             Sister in Law
Amma Tesfamariam Woldesenbet..............  Bruk Tesfamariam
                                             Woldesenbet, Brother
Danielle Moore............................  Honor Hedges Royer, aunt
Danielle Moore............................  Lora Meseman, Mother-in-law
Isabella Beryl Achieng Jaboma.............  Allan Jaboma, She was my
                                             sister
Graziella De Luis.........................  Maya AlChidiac, Dear friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Pilar Vera Palmes, I am the
                                             Chair of the Air Crash
                                             Families Federation
                                             International (ACVFFI)
Mick Ryan.................................  Morgan Connolly, I am the
                                             father-in-law of Mick Ryan
Mick Ryan.................................  Maire Connolly, I am the
                                             mother-in-law of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Natalie, Dear family friend
Max Edkins................................  Til Kreuels, I am a friend
                                             of the victim.
Mick Ryan.................................  Naoise Connolly Ryan, Wife
                                             of Victim
Danielle Moore............................  Kathy Martorino, Friend of
                                             Moore family
Samya Stumo...............................  Nico Tripcevich, Family
                                             friend
Angela Rehhorn............................  Catherine Vincent, I am the
                                             Aunt of the victim.
Angela Rehhorn............................  John Vincent, I am the Uncle
                                             of the victim
Sintayehu Shafi Baleker...................  Liul Baleker, I am the
                                             brother of the victim
Michael Ryan..............................  Robert Jackson, Friend
Mick Ryan.................................  Sile Geaney, Family friend
Matt Vecere...............................  Patricia Vecere McClain,
                                             Aunt of victim
Marie Christin Philipp....................  Laura Vendt, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Jurgen Vsych, I am a friend
                                             of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................  Glenn Gundermann, I am a
                                             friend of the victim's
                                             family.
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Marjorie Aelion, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Laila Mokhiber, Cousin
Danielle Moore............................  Olivia Allen, friend and
                                             colleague of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Joy Wahba, Friend
Daniel Moore, Micah Messent...............  Matthew Miller, I am a
                                             friend of Daniel and Micah
Abiodun Bashua............................  Alem Tebeje, Brother-in-law
Melvin Riffel.............................  Korryll Lave, I am a friend
                                             of the victim.
Abiodun Bashua............................  Yetunde Bashua, He was my
                                             father
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Samantha Demers, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Luis Arnal Delgado, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Penny Owen, Family friend
Max Thabiso Edkins........................  Jennifer Anderson-Ochoa, I
                                             am a friend of the victim.
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Harriett Northcutt, A friend
Samya STUMO...............................  Laudison Lopes, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Lucille Martin, Friend of
                                             the family
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Gail Brinkmeier, friend of
                                             victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Lucille Martin, Friend of
                                             the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Emilie Brule, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Mackenzie Claver, I am the
                                             best friend to the victims
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  John Fisher, I am married to
                                             a cousin of the victims.
Samya Stumo...............................  Carrie Olson, Cousin
Matt Vercere..............................  Matthew Baiamonte, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Nadia Milleron, I am Samya's
                                             mother
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Lauri-Ann Loreto Neal, I am
                                             a friend of the victim's
                                             mother.
Mel Riffel................................  ED Duggan III, Friend
Carol Diehl...............................  Carol Diehl, I am a friend
                                             of the family
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  linda sawaya, friend of
                                             victim's family
Bennett Riffel, Melvin Riffel.............  Terri Sherman, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Helen A Hellmers, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Pat Brooks, I am a friend of
                                             the victim's maternal
                                             Grandmother, Professor
                                             Laura Nader
Samya Stumo...............................  Judy Metro, I am a friend of
                                             the family.
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  David Teisler, She was
                                             daughter of my daughter's
                                             GodMother and a great
                                             friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Suzanne Murray, Family
                                             friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Mirna Mercado, I am a friend
                                             of Samya
Samya Stumo...............................  Laura Flores, my niece
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Gabrielle Paese, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Alexandra Wachtmeister....................  Anne-Margrete Wachtmeister,
                                             I am her mother
Micah Messant.............................  Nelsen Spickard, Cousin
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Michel Monette, Friend of
                                             the victim
Riffel....................................  Tonia, Friend
Samya Stumo a d Bella.....................  Hayley Freedman, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  E Shaker, Cousin
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Diane de Schoutheete, I am
                                             an aunt of Camille Geoffroy
Danielle Moore............................  Honor Hedges Royer, Aunt
Angela Rehhorn............................  Jeremy Harbinson, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Renee Betar, Friend of the
                                             victim
Samya stumo...............................  Janet Domenitz, Friend
Micah Messent.............................  Caroline Willis, I am a
                                             family friend.
Samya Stumo...............................  James Holmlund, Samya is my
                                             grand niece
Samya Stumo...............................  Anne Marie Papandrea, Family
                                             friend
Danielle Moore............................  Lita Venezuela, Friend if
                                             the victim
Angela Rehhorn............................  Mary Eleanor Vincent, I am
                                             the Aunt and Godmother of
                                             Angela
Angela Rehhorn............................  Kaitlin Thatcher, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................  August Pokotylo, I am the
                                             Uncle and Godfather of the
                                             victim
Angela Rehhorn............................  Rowena Fonseka, Friend
N/A.......................................  Shira Drossos, N/A
Samya Stumo...............................  Marilyn J Holmlund, Samya
                                             was the granddaughter of my
                                             cousin Mary Holmlund Stumo
Danielle Moore............................  Bryan Sison, I am the friend
                                             of the mother of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Emily Crawford, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Karen Lundeen, Family friend
Mick Ryan.................................  Giacomo Re, Friend and
                                             colleague at WFP
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Veronique Geoffroy, Aunt
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Cari borja, Close Friend of
                                             grandmother
Marie Christin Pfilipp....................  Michael Baumann, I am the
                                             uncle of the victim
Samya Milleron............................  Nola Frick, Relative
Samya Stumo...............................  Karen Hoyt, Friend of the
                                             victim
Marie Christin Philipp....................  Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Mette Linnet, Friend
Wolfgang Eigner...........................  Carmen Sigl, Friend
Max Edkins................................  Friederike Gysae-Schnurre, I
                                             am his aunt
Mariapilar Buzzetti.......................  Davide Picistrelli, friend
Immaculate Odero..........................  Victor Mwau, Close froend
Jonathan Seex.............................  Maria Petersen, Cousin
Wolfgang Eigner, Armin Schietz, Christoph   Jennifer Stefanits, Friend
 Sautner.
Stefanie LaCroix..........................  Lauren Webber, Malawi
                                             roommate
Sam Pegram................................  William Pegram, Grandfather
Micheal Ryan..............................  MP O'Brien, brother-in-law
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Nicolas Tsioukis, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Oliver Vick...............................  Jonathan Haines, Cousin
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Francois Fricaudetxa, Father
Pilar Buzzetti............................  Angelo, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Lucy MacGillis, Friend
Arnold....................................  Chria, Friend
Paolo Dieci...............................  Silvia Guglielmi, I am the
                                             niece of the victim.
Marie Christin Philipp....................  Doris Fuchs, I am the aunt
Mercy NDIVO, Jared Babu...................  Beatrice Kimuyu, I am mother
                                             and Mother in-law of the
                                             two victims
Ollie Vick, Jessica Hyba..................  Tim Bond, Friend
Max Thabiso Edkins........................  Andrea andersen, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim
Immaculate Achieng Odero..................  Eliakim, Sister
Xavier FRICAUDET..........................  Olivier FRICAUDET, I'm the
                                             cousin of the victim
Sintayhu Shafi............................  Yewubnesh, cousin
Harina HAFITZ.............................  Stephanie COSTERG, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Rene Hautier, ami
Josefin Ekermann..........................  Norah Elena Ekermann, Sister
Joanne Toole..............................  Tanya Hucklesby, Friends
                                             with her sister Karen
Graziela de Luis..........................  Alejandro, Nephew
Marie Philipp.............................  Hendrik Philipp, I am her
                                             brother
Michael Ryan..............................  Dene Cairns, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Olly Vick, Jessica Hyba...................  Harriet Tarnoy, Friends
Alexandra Wachtmeister....................  Fredrik Wachtmeister,
                                             Brother
Jonathan Seex.............................  Par, Brother in law
Graziella de Luis.........................  Isabel de Luis, sister
Sam Pegram................................  Val Pegram, Grandmother
Sebastiano Tusa...........................  Alberta Pongiglione, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Marie Philipp.............................  Laura Petrak, Best friend
Oliver Vick...............................  Rifet Arapovic, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Gabriele Haldenwang, I am a
                                             friend of the family of the
                                             victim
Pilar Buzzetti............................  Richard Culley, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Immaculate Odero..........................  Sally, Sister-in-law
Oliver Vick...............................  James Vick, I am the father
                                             of the victim
Oliver Vick...............................  Cheryl Vick, I am the Mother
                                             of the victim
Immaculate Odero..........................  Christabel Were, Friend
Sam Pegram................................  Scott Hetherington, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Michael Ryan..............................  Darragh Mcdonagh, Friend
Jessica Hyba..............................  George Ghikas, Friend
Oliver Vick...............................  George Ghikas, Friend
Anne Feigl................................  Anna Caroline Feigl, Sister
                                             in law
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Katharina Peters, Close
                                             friend
Immaculate Achieng Odero..................  Denis Adhoch, Husband
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Rossi Hadzhieva, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Diane Sykes, Family friend
Max Thabiso Edkins........................  Donald Edkins, I am the
                                             father of Max Thabiso
                                             Edkins.
Danielle Moore............................  Bhobbie alfaro, Cousin
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Joan, I am a friend of the
                                             victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Carol Conner, Family Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Matthew Caemmerer, Friend
Angela Rehhorn............................  Lorna Nickerson, Family
                                             friend
Paolo Dieci...............................  Estella Dieci, Niece
Marie Philipp.............................  Julia Schmidt, Friend of
                                             family
Jonathan Seex.............................  Linda Poidnakk, Friend
Danielle Moore, Micah Messent.............  Mo Phung, Close friends.
Jonathan Seex.............................  Gunilla Larsson, Jonathan
                                             was the son of a very good
                                             friend and I had known him
                                             since he was a baby. It
                                             still hurts that this
                                             beautiful person is no
                                             longer because of greed and
                                             negligence!
Danielle Moore............................  Jacqueline Miller, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole..............................  Paul Heydon, Friend of a
                                             Friend of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Linda Miller, Friend
Jonathan Seex.............................  Nadja Chekhov, I'm the
                                             friend of the victim's
                                             motter
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Julie Lacourse, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Melvin and Bennett Riffel.................  Cheryl hess, Cousin
Jonathan Seex.............................  Johan Hartzell, Wife's
                                             cousin
Immaculate Achieng' odero.................  Princess Piro, I am a very
                                             close family & childhood
                                             friend & neighbor
Samya Stumo...............................  Arlene Tolopko, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Valerie serres, friend
Sebastiano Tusa...........................  Sofia Ambrogio, I am the
                                             niece of the victim
Danielle Moore............................  Gualberto Abenir Jr, Niece
Clemence Boutant..........................  Ian HENSTOCK, Friend /
                                             former colleagues
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Kristen Brookes, friend of
                                             the family
Michael Ryan..............................  Helen Maree, I am a family
                                             member of the victim
Angela Elizabeth Maria Rehhorn............  Roland Rehhorn, Father of
                                             victim
Sebastiano Tusa...........................  Carlo Tusa, He was my
                                             cousin.
Matthew Vecere............................  Richard McMullin, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Jean-Michel Suzanne Barranger.............  Laetitia Tavernier, I am the
                                             dauthger
Jean Michel Suzanne Barranger.............  Marc Tavernier, I am son-in-
                                             law
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Murray Howe, friend of
                                             Family
Eric Prieur...............................  Prieur claire, My brother
Danielle Moore............................  Kathleen Randall, Cousin
Samya Stumo...............................  Deveney williams, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Amy Alpert, Family friend
Cedric Galia Asiavugwa....................  Alex Kubasu, I am the friend
                                             of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Sheryl Lechner, family
                                             friend
Bennett Riffel, Melvin Riffel.............  Lorraine Micke-Hayden, I am
                                             the cousin of the victims.
Oliver Vick...............................  Kirsten Young, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Jennifer Brown, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Johanna Toole.............................  Elisa Canalini, I am a
                                             colleague of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Steven Souaid, I am a cousin
                                             of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Robbyn Swan, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Sandra K Holmlund, Great
                                             Niece
Angela Rehhorn............................  Jacob Oberfrank, Partner
Clemence Boutant-Willm, Samuel Pendam.....  Claire FABING, I am a
                                             colleague of the victims
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Michelle BeaudrySeguin,
                                             Close friend
Steph Lacroix.............................  Jamie Lafrance, Friend/
                                             former roommate
Xavier FRICAUDET..........................  NOUVION Marie, famille
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Thomas Leatherman, Friend
                                             and Colleague
Melvin Riffel.............................  Melissa Duralia, I am the
                                             friend of a victim
Graziella de Luis y Ponce.................  Maria Tauber, Friend
Marie Philipp.............................  Angelika Begerow, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Jonathan Seex.............................  Anne-Marie Petersen, Aunt
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Sophie Le Bret, Family's
                                             friend
Michael Ryan..............................  John Maree, Concerned
                                             engineer family friend
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Sam Eifling, I'm a friend of
                                             the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Michelle Wolfensperger,
                                             Cousin
MELVIN Riffel, BENNETT RIFFEL.............  Rebecca Richardson, I am a
                                             friend of Ike and Susan
                                             Riffel
Matt Vecere...............................  Stephen Dintino, Friend
Dawn Tanner...............................  Brian Kobiero, Spouse
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Regina M. Buono, Friend
Immaculate Achieng Odero..................  Emmy, Sister
Allan Chacha..............................  Allan Chacha, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Joseph Kreta, Childhood
                                             friends
Mick Ryan.................................  Jack Connolly, Uncle Inlaw
Melvin and Bennett Riffel.................  Carl J. Koutnik MD, friend
                                             of family
Immaculate Achieng Odero..................  Judith Otsieno, Friend
Mick Ryan.................................  Lee Wassem, Family member
Mick Ryan.................................  Deirdre Connolly, I am the
                                             wife of Jack Connolly--
                                             Mick's uncle in law
Suzanne Barranger, Jean Michel Barranger..  Barranger Sebastien, I am
                                             the son of the victim
Paolo Dieci...............................  Harlan Downs-Tepper, I am
                                             the friend of the victim.
Juliah Mwashi.............................  Florah Mwashi, Sister
Juliah Mwashi.............................  Ivy Nduta, Mother
Juliah Mwashi.............................  Joy Ayuma, Mother
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Virginie Fricaudet, I am the
                                             sister
Jonathan Seex.............................  Karen McDougall, I am a
                                             childhood friend of the
                                             victin.
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Susan Mears, Family Friend
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Jean-Luc Moreau, I am friend
                                             of the victim
Clemence Willm............................  Celine Grimault, I am a
                                             friend of the victim.
Mick Ryan.................................  Alan Connolly, Relative
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  David Finniss, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Joanna Toole..............................  Bridget Harris, Close family
                                             friend and best friend of
                                             my niece Katy Harris
Samya Stumo...............................  Laura Zabriskie, I am a
                                             friend and parishioner of
                                             Samya.
Matt Vecere...............................  Tomra Vecere, Sister
Matt Vecere...............................  Charles Sinesi, Brother in
                                             law
Clemence-Isaure Willm Boutant.............  Emma Boutant, I am the step-
                                             daughter of the victim.
Danielle Moore............................  Colleen Duffey, Family
                                             friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Evelyn Kreta, I was her
                                             friend and church school
                                             teacher.
Matt Vecere...............................  Rachel Condon, Niece
Samya Stumo...............................  Sylvia Lewis, I am a family
                                             friend.
Oliver Vick...............................  Lucy Bowers-Wildblood,
                                             Friend, chosen family.
Oliver Vick...............................  Lucy Bowers-Wildblood,
                                             Friend, chosen family.
Danielle Moore............................  Nick Cake, Cousin
Michael Ryan..............................  Hayley Dowsing-Connolly,
                                             Family friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Karen Hubbard, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Matilde Guillen, I am the
                                             host mother in Peru of the
                                             victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Gustavo Justo, I am the host
                                             father in Peru of the
                                             victim
Emmaculate odero..........................  Susan, Friend
Immaculate odero..........................  Ephie, Sister
Mick Ryan.................................  Mai, Colleague and Friend
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Harm van Duin, Friend
Sam Pegram................................  Mark Pegram, Father
Ekta Adhikari, Maria Pilar Buzzetti,        Noel Griffin, Colleague and
 Virginia Chimenti, Harina Hafitz, Zhen-     friend
 Zhen Huang, Michael Ryan, Djordje Vdovic.
Alexandra Wachtmeister....................  Anna Wachtmeister, Cousin
Immaculate Achieng Odero..................  Hermaton Nalyanya, A friend
                                             to the victim
Agnes Mary Wangari Gathumbi...............  Ian Kabaara, I am a friend
                                             of the children of the
                                             victim
Sam Pegram................................  Melanie Cremona, Friend
KARIM SAAFI...............................  Mohamed Najeh Saafi, BROTHER
KARIM SAAFI...............................  DRISS SAAFI, Oncle
KARIM SAAFI...............................  ELYESS SAAFI, Oncle
Saafi Karim...............................  Ingrid de Viennay, Je suis
                                             son ancienne belle soeur.
KARIM SAAFI...............................  INESS SAAFI, Oncle
Max Edkins................................  Kathleen McCarthy, Friend
Angela....................................  Shantel Rehhorn, Sister
Angela Rehhorn............................  Joan Vincent, Mother
Samya Stumo...............................  Deirdre Hatch, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  David Hatch, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Glen Levacque, Cousin
Immaculate odero..........................  Ephie odero, Sister
Riffle Brothers...........................  Ericka Allio, Family friend
CLEMENCE-ISAURE BOUTANT...................  Denis Boutant, I am the
                                             husband of the victim
Joanna Toole..............................  Jerome Toole, I am the
                                             cousin of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Jenelle Pierce, Cousins
                                             daughter passed way in the
                                             plane.
Emmaculate Achieng Odero..................  Clifford Odero, I am the
                                             brother of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Georgia Usry, Close friend
                                             of the family
Jonathan Seex.............................  Johanna, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Susan Lockwood, I am a
                                             friend of the victim
Oliver Vick...............................  David Haines, I am the
                                             victim's uncle.
Danielle Moore............................  Mark Uzer, Cousin
Danielle Moore............................  Mark Uzer, Cousin
Samya Stumo...............................  Joni Cushing, Friend
Jessica Hyba..............................  Susan Olszynko, Close friend
Michael Ryan..............................  Lynn Dowsing-Connolly, He
                                             was my cousin's husband
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Fr. John Kreta, Spiritual
                                             father
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Erika Wainwright, I am the
                                             friend of Samya Stumo
Graciela De Luis Ponce....................  Noemi Laviada, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Hollis Starks, friend of the
                                             victim
Jonathan Seex.............................  Torben Rune, Friend of
                                             victim
ZHEN ZHEN HUANG...........................  WEI XIONG, I am the husband
                                             of the victim
Graziella De Luis.........................  Anita Guerra, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Max Thabiso Edkins........................  Gillian Mary Edkins Bailey,
                                             I am the auntie
Mick Ryan.................................  Thalia Maree, Cousin of
                                             Mick's wife Naoise
Maygenet Worku............................  Eyasu Teshome, Husband
Anne-Katrin Feigl.........................  Michele Pasquale, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Sam Pegram................................  Tom Pegram, Brother
Camille Geofrroy..........................  Amelie Jourdier, I am the
                                             aunt
Mick Ryan.................................  Seanna Connolly, Brother in
                                             law
Michael Ryan..............................  ciamha hurst, i am a friend
Mick Ryan.................................  Tina O'Flynn, I am a friend
                                             of the victim
Micheal Ryan..............................  Silvia Rodriguez Barbado, A
                                             friend of the victim
Graziella de Luis y Ponce.................  Susan Draz, Friend
Michael Ryan..............................  Eoin Daffy, Friend
Marie Christin Philipp....................  Wiebke Hormeyer, I am a
                                             friend
Ines Michaela Gans........................  Bernd Gans, My daughter
Virginia Chimenti, Pilar Buzzetti, Harina   Vincenzo Maggiore,
 Hafiz.                                      Colleagues
Karoline Aadland..........................  Knut Ingvar Aadland, I am
                                             the father of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  James Carter, Friend of
                                             Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Katherine Preston Cory, I am
                                             a friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Tierney Simpson Jutzi,
                                             Friend of a Friend
Carlo Spini, Gabriella Viciani............  Andrea Spini, I am the son
                                             of the victims
Samya Stumo...............................  Joseph Homsi, Friend
Abiodun Bashua............................  mena tebeje, I am a wife of
                                             the victim
Clemence Wilm.............................  Marine Rudant, friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Carol McFadden, Friend of
                                             friend
Xavier Fricaudet..........................  Yvette Le Gall, Xavier is
                                             the brother of my son in
                                             law
Stehanie Lacroix..........................  Chantale and Real
                                             Boissonneault, daughter of
                                             our friends
Josefin Ekerman La Torre..................  Michael, Cousin
Samya Stumo...............................  Alyssa O'Connor, Close
                                             Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Andres Justo, I am the
                                             friendo ir the victim
Stephanie Lacroix.........................  Sara Lefebvre, Classmate
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Lucia Justo, I am the friend
                                             of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  Maria Sofia Justo Guillen, I
                                             am the friend of the victim
Samya Stumo...............................  April Cain, She was the
                                             close friend of a young
                                             friend of mine
Micah Messent.............................  Isabella Morgan, Friend
Samya Stumo...............................  Stuart Robinson, Friend
Sam Pegram................................  Deborah Pegram, I am Sams
                                             Mum
Xavier FRICAUDET..........................  Isabelle REBILLARD, I am a
                                             friend of the victim's
                                             family
Oliver Vick...............................  Lucinda Pullinger, Long term
                                             friend
Melvin Riffel, Bennett Riffel.............  Mary Ann Tangney, Nephews
Michael Ryan..............................  Padraig McCarron, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Harina Hafitz.............................  Arnaud Sournia, Friend of
                                             the family of the victim
Virginia Chiementi........................  Mateo Mancheno, Friend of
                                             the victim
Micheal Ryan..............................  Brian McDonagh, I am the
                                             friend of the victim.
Samya Stumo...............................  Ben Webb, Close friend
Jonathan Seex.............................  Bjorn olund, Friend
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Lucia Guillen, I am the
                                             friend of the victim
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Sandra Sermini-curtiss,
                                             Friend of family
Matt Vecere...............................  Warren McClain, I am the
                                             uncle of the victim
Mel Riffel, Bennet Riffel.................  Thomas Tangney, Uncle
Sergey Vyalikov...........................  Alex Fikhman, I am the uncle-
                                             in-law of victim.
Marie Philipp.............................  Derek Hagen, Friend
Camille Geoffroy..........................  Laura Couillet, Freind
Samya Rose Stumo..........................  Andrew Souaid, Cousin
GEORGE KABAU..............................  PAUL KABAU, BROTHER
Max Edkins................................  Leonita Louw, Friend
Eric PRIEUR...............................  Fabrice CRABIE, brother in
                                             law
Mick Ryan.................................  Morgan F Connolly, Brother-
                                             in-law
Michael Ryan..............................  Theresa Stack, Friend of the
                                             fmily
Sergey Vialikov...........................  Dmitrii Vialikov, Brother
Sergey Vialikov...........................  Nadya Vialikova, SON
Anne Karanja, Caroline Nduta Karanja,       Dr. Karanja, Mother, sister,
 Ryan, Kellie and Rubby.                     nephew and niece
Mick Ryan.................................  Ian Connolly, Cousin in law
Mick Ryan.................................  Sam Woolhead, My partner is
                                             a family friend
Karim SAAFI...............................  Abdel-Jawad Jellad, Nephew
Jonathan Seex.............................  Carola Schroder, I'm mother
                                             in law to his sister
Joanna Toole..............................  John Paul Rodgers, Cousin
Jonathan Seex.............................  Carola Schroder, I'm mother
                                             in law with his sister
Samya Stumo...............................  Clarice Faber, Friend
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Mr. Carson. So, Administrator Dickson, you recently 
received a letter, sir, from me and my colleagues, 
Representative Fitzpatrick and Representative Payne, about 
FAA's failure to implement a requirement for secondary cockpit 
barriers that were enacted in 2018.
    As the author of the 2018 provision, sir, it is beyond 
frustrating to see a known security risk ignored by the FAA. We 
worked with a number of stakeholders to effectively reach a 
compromise that was able to pass our committee with bipartisan 
support, pass the House and the Senate.
    And instead of requiring secondary cockpit barriers on all 
aircraft, old and new, H.R. 911 would mandate, which I am proud 
to be a lead sponsor of. You know, our 2018 provision comprised 
by only requiring barriers on new airplanes. Yet today, there 
seems to be no progress whatsoever on implementing the 
requirements.
    Mr. Administrator, please tell me why there hasn't been any 
progress to install secondary barriers? In our letter, we asked 
for some details in writing, and we have yet to receive that 
information. And when can we expect to receive this 
information?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman. 
I will reiterate the same comments that I made to Chair DeFazio 
to start, is that I want this to happen more quickly. And we 
are absolutely committed to implementing the requirement for 
secondary barriers on transport category aircraft.
    We do have rulemaking, notice of public comment rulemaking 
that we have to do. Also, even though there had been a study a 
number of years ago conducted by RTCA, it did not define the 
necessary technical requirements for manufacturers to install 
these barriers.
    So, last year, we conducted an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee to get us that technical detail. We have that now, 
and we are using it to inform and incorporate into our 
rulemaking process.
    So, I am happy to follow up with you personally on where we 
go from here. But, again, we are working very hard to get this 
out for a draft rule for public comment, get it through the 
Department and through the executive branch, so that we can put 
it into law, and we are going to do that absolutely as quickly 
as we can.
    Mr. Carson. Administrator, so why has progress been so 
slow? It is almost unprecedented.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, when you do any kind of 
rulemaking, you have to start with data and information. And 
that is what we had to go back and do. Once the decision was 
made that we had to go through notice and comment rulemaking, 
we have got to have the justification for the rule that will 
stand up through the entire Administrative Procedure Act 
process, and that is the due diligence that we are having to go 
through.
    Mr. Carson. All right. Well, we will be on standby. Thank 
you, sir.
    Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Carson.
    I recognize now Representative Mast of Florida for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman.
    Number one, I just have to address what has to be one of 
the most ignorant opening statements I have heard ever in this 
committee, our chairman essentially comparing Americans to 
Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 terrorists, saying that he 
expects Americans will be breaking through a cockpit door in 
order to crash an airplane. Pure ignorance.
    I wonder if he would use that same brush to paint over 
those that destroyed Minneapolis or destroyed Portland or other 
cities across America, torched businesses, torched places like 
that. Absolutely ignorant. I would hope that he would apologize 
to all Americans for his opening statement, which I found to be 
just ignorant and disgusting.
    I am going to use the remainder of my time to ask an open-
ended question to you, Mr. Administrator, and I am going to ask 
for your creativity on this. I don't know if there is a place 
that FAA can play a role in this or not, but maybe you can find 
something for us since it seems that the Department of Homeland 
Security is unwilling to do anything to ground the flights and 
the spread of people entering America illegally across this 
country.
    And so, my question to you, as the Administrator, can you 
think of anything creatively that could be done through the FAA 
to ground these flights of illegal immigrants across the United 
States of America?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman. 
We work very closely with other Federal agencies on security 
matters. Customs and Border Protection is probably the most 
prominent example, but, certainly, Department of Defense and 
others.
    With respect to civil aircraft operation, any registered 
aircraft--my responsibility is the aviation safety of the 
national airspace and to make sure that fair access is granted 
to that. There is not a mechanism within the agency to look at 
the nature of those operations that you are referring to, but 
certainly, if there were information that came available to us 
about some sort of illegal charter or something like that, that 
is something that we would follow up on and make sure that the 
appropriate security authorities were brought in to 
investigate.
    Mr. Mast. I appreciate your response. Could you be a little 
bit--just explain a bit more on what would constitute an 
illegal charter, in your mind?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, it would probably come to us from 
someone who brought it to our attention. It could be an 
employee. It could be one of our inspectors saw something amiss 
with a license or a private aircraft being used for commercial 
purposes. Those types of things would be things that would give 
us some evidence that we would begin to look into.
    Mr. Mast. Does FAA take issue or find any problems with the 
issues going on with manifests as it relates to these flights? 
Obviously, individuals that cannot be identified very clearly 
makes it difficult, maybe impossible, to manifest those flights 
correctly as they are spread across the country. Is there any 
issue that FAA takes with that?
    Mr. Dickson. We don't have any visibility into manifests, 
as you are describing.
    Mr. Mast. Very good. I appreciate your responses today, Mr. 
Administrator. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Davids of 
Kansas for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Davids. Thank you, Chairman.
    And thank you for your time today, Administrator Dickson. 
First, I will just say I continue to keep the families of the 
folks who lost loved ones in the 737 MAX tragedies. And then I 
am going to focus my questions on the FAA implementation of the 
2020 aircraft certification bill that we are talking about here 
today.
    So, when Boeing discovered the angle-of-attack disagree 
alert was inoperable on more than 80 percent of the 737 MAX 
aircraft, Boeing decided three things: One, to wait nearly 3 
years to fix the problem when it would have been less expensive 
to do so; two, to not notify the FAA that the alert wasn't 
working, it didn't notify its MAX customers or MAX pilots; and 
then three, which I think is even worse, it just kept building 
and selling more planes with the same defect.
    Boeing didn't ultimately divulge the problem until after 
the Lion Air crash. Boeing tried to defend its actions, 
claiming the faulty alert wasn't a safety issue. However, FAA's 
then-Acting Administrator Dan Elwell told our committee in 2019 
that the alert was required to be installed and functional on 
all MAX airplanes, because it was part of the plane's certified 
type design.
    So, Mr. Dickson, I think it is clear that I find Boeing's 
handling of this matter pretty concerning. So, I want to ask 
you about what the FAA has done to address this, and to 
discourage Boeing or any other manufacturers from acting 
similarly in the future.
    I know you have noted the reset of the relationship the FAA 
has with Boeing specifically, and you have noted things like 
the limited delegated authority. But I am curious specifically, 
what enforcement action, if any, has the FAA taken against 
Boeing for its defiance of the FAA's type design requirement 
and concealing the inoperability of the AOA disagree alert?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. And I think 
it is important to understand, again, that one of the first 
things I did when I got to the agency was to make clear the 
arm's-length relationship, and the regulatory relationship and 
oversight that we have with Boeing. So that is where I would 
start. And not only Boeing, but all the entities that we 
regulate, whether it is manufacturing, airlines, or otherwise.
    One of the important principles here is that we don't want 
any single points of failure. And what you are describing is a 
single point of failure. And we need to have layers of 
protection. We need to have more transparency. We need to have 
better coordination and collaboration among FAA officers. There 
were things inside the agency, and also, the relationship 
between the agency and Boeing that we are addressing and that 
we have addressed over the last couple of years.
    As an example of that, in 2020, we accepted Boeing's 
voluntary safety management system program. And, again, the 
rulemaking on SMS for manufacturers is not complete, but this 
program comports with the national standards on safety 
management systems, and also, ICAO standards as well. And we do 
regular performance reviews. And this mechanism brings forward 
information and data from Boeing. So they are in a position 
where, instead of concealing----
    Ms. Davids. Administrator----
    Mr. Dickson [continuing]. [Inaudible] information to the 
FAA.
    Ms. Davids [continuing]. I want to clarify my question. I 
was asking what enforcement action has been taken versus 
acceptance of the safety protocols. I think that that is a good 
thing, but I am curious how we are going to make sure that 
Boeing or other manufacturers don't engage in concealment of 
things like inoperability in the future.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, we took enforcement action against 
Boeing, one of the largest civil penalties we have ever levied 
against a company. And, so, that was part of it. But overall, 
again, the type of thing that you are describing now cannot 
happen, because we have taken those single vulnerabilities out 
of the system, and we will continue to work to find them and 
ferret them out.
    Also, we have increased our oversight, and the involvement 
of our engineering team out on the production floor. We 
typically have had inspectors out there. We still do. We have 
increased our engineering staff presence. And we are seeing 
differences in behavior where we have seen Boeing actually stop 
production when issues have come up. So, again, this is 
something we need to stay on top of.
    Ms. Davids. Thank you, Administrator.
    And I yield back, Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The Chair recognizes Representative Van Duyne of Texas for 
5 minutes.
    Ms. Van Duyne. Thank you very much.
    Good afternoon, Administrator Dickson. Thank you very much 
for being with us today. My district, which is Texas 24, is 
home to Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, American Airlines, and Envoy 
Air. We are also closely surrounded by Southwest Airlines' 
headquarters in Dallas Love Field.
    DFW Airport is the leading economic driver, not only in my 
region but in the entire State of Texas. Hundreds of thousands 
of jobs are reliant on the airport, and it serves as a major 
recruiting tool as we see and hear from hundreds of CEOs who 
are moving or who have moved their companies to that area 
because of the airport.
    In the last few weeks, we have seen disruptions across the 
country from delays to cancellations. And while the causes of 
some of these delays remain unknown, the timing related to the 
announcement of the vaccine mandate is also very concerning. 
Just Tuesday, you may have seen that Southwest Airlines 
reversed their mandate.
    I am curious now that we are coming upon the huge holiday 
season, how is the FAA preparing for further disruptions in the 
system as we move closer to the busiest travel time of the 
year?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. And, again, 
on the subject of the vaccine mandate, the idea there is to get 
us past COVID-19 as a country as quickly as possible so that 
the system can operate efficiently and effectively and preserve 
all of those jobs.
    My focus, again, is on aviation safety. I am very familiar 
with the operations of Dallas/Fort Worth and Love Field and 
American Airlines and Southwest Airlines. I have been in 
regular contact with their leadership, and also with their 
labor unions, to make sure that we can operate safely and 
efficiently going into the holiday season, and we will continue 
to stay focused on that.
    Part of what is going on here is the changes in consumer 
preferences. And kind of the guardrail-to-guardrail capacity 
issues that we saw in the system require some time for airlines 
to get their fleets and their workforces aligned so that they 
can be responsive to consumer demand.
    And we are doing everything that we can to make sure that 
the aviation system, the air traffic control system, stays open 
for business so that Thanksgiving and Christmas travel, and 
really travel every day can continue unfettered and 
uninterrupted, because it is a huge part of our economy and it 
is a service that we provide to the public.
    Ms. Van Duyne. I mean, it is absolutely a huge service to 
our economy, but American Airlines alone has 4,000 pilots who 
haven't been vaccinated. I know that your purpose and focus is 
on preserving jobs, but what they are facing is right before 
the holiday season actually having to be forced to lose their 
jobs.
    Have you had or sought input from pilots or from air 
traffic control about the vaccine mandate?
    Mr. Dickson. I am in constant contact, in regular contact 
with labor leaders around the industry, and also with our 
unions within the FAA. So, I think----
    Ms. Van Duyne. So, you have, you have sought input from 
pilots and from air traffic controllers?
    Mr. Dickson. Always have a dialogue with them on a whole 
host of issues.
    Ms. Van Duyne. So, you have sought input from pilots and 
ATC regarding the vaccine mandates?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, not specifically the vaccine mandate, 
but certainly any operational or safety issues that we have all 
been concerned about throughout the pandemic and even in daily 
operations, to make sure that we don't have undesirable 
distractions, either at individual companies, or within the FAA 
itself.
    Ms. Van Duyne. Because what I am hearing directly from many 
of them is just the increased stress. They are going to have to 
lose their jobs. And it is not just for travel, it's supply 
chain issues. UPS and some others have talked about the impact 
that that is going to have on supply chain and on our economy 
and on commerce in the U.S.
    So what steps is the FAA using to address the supply chain 
issues that appear to be getting worse before they are getting 
better?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, throughout the pandemic, we have used 
the Commercial Aviation Safety Team, and we have collaborated 
again with all stakeholders to make sure that the aviation 
system remains available, and, again, open for business so that 
the supply chain is not interrupted.
    The FAA was right in the middle of----
    Ms. Van Duyne. Are you concerned that vaccine mandates are 
going to harm the commercial side on the supply chain side, as 
I have heard?
    Mr. Dickson. I don't have specific concerns there. Those 
are between those employees and their employer. What I am 
concerned about is to make sure that regardless of whatever the 
distraction is, whether it is a company going through a merger, 
whether it is challenges that people are having in their 
personal lives or otherwise, that we are able to focus on 
flying the airplane, operating the airplane----
    Mr. Larsen. Representative, your time has expired.
    Mr. Dickson [continuing]. And being able to operate the 
aviation system efficiently.
    Ms. Van Duyne. Thank you, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Kahele of 
Hawaii for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Administrator Dickson, for coming to speak 
to the Aviation Subcommittee today on the implementation of the 
2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. As 
a commercial airline transport pilot, this issue is very 
personal to me, and I am glad that the Aviation Subcommittee 
has committed and continues to provide oversight to ensure that 
these mistakes will not be repeated.
    As part of the committee's investigation into the 737 MAX, 
we learned about multiple troubling instances where Boeing's 
Authorized Representatives, who are supposed to be acting on 
behalf of the FAA, and ultimately the public, signed off on 
plans that clearly prioritized Boeing's focus on production and 
profits, and not safety.
    For example, when Boeing discovered that the angle-of-
attack disagree alert wasn't functioning on more than 80 
percent of 737 MAX airplanes after the MAX was already in 
commercial service, Boeing decided to wait nearly 3 years to 
fix the problem so that they could save money by doing the fix 
as part of its planned rollout of the 737 MAX 10, and 
Authorized Representatives ultimately agreed to Boeing's plan 
to delay the fix.
    Or when Boeing convened a meeting back in 2013 to assess 
whether it could downplay the significance of MCAS to 
regulators so that Boeing could avoid additional regulatory 
scrutiny and additional pilot training requirements, an 
Authorized Representative agreed with Boeing's plan to limit 
use of the term ``MCAS'' externally outside of Boeing to both 
regulators and customers and, instead, communicate this known 
issue externally an addition to speed trim.
    And I want to quote from the summary report where the 
Boeing Authorized Representative concurred with Boeing's plan 
regarding its description of MCAS, and in a summary of that 
meeting, which was part of an internal Boeing email, and I 
quote, ``This will allow us to maintain the MCAS nomenclature 
while not driving additional work due to training impacts and 
maintenance manual expansion.''
    So, the first of my two questions, Administrator Dickson, 
is: As the FAA implements the Aircraft Certification, Safety, 
and Accountability Act, what is the FAA doing to ensure that 
its Authorized Representatives prioritize the safety of the 
flying public over the financial bottom line of the industry?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, this is a great question, actually right 
at the point that I talked about earlier. We are monitoring 
actively ODA holder accountability to program requirements so 
that these things cannot happen again.
    And what you are referring to, undue pressure or under the 
broader rubric of interference, is a special emphasis area and 
is a particular focus of our investigations and our oversight, 
not only of Boeing but of all manufacturers that have an ODA.
    So, we have conducted interviews with Boeing employees. 
There is correspondence that we can certainly make available to 
you if you haven't seen it already, to make sure unit members 
are conducting their duties and are not under pressure from the 
company to be able to comport to timelines or to conceal 
issues.
    Also, under Boeing's safety management system, one of the 
things that they have done is they are conducting a safety risk 
management process, to systematically assess everything that is 
happening in those interactions with the agency, to root out 
and address and be able to identify and eliminate any 
interference in that relationship.
    We are also in the process--and this gets back to my 
opening answers to Chair Larsen. We are institutionalizing this 
guidance, in order that governs our ODA oversight, to make sure 
that it has got as much strength as it possibly can have. And 
we are issuing some clarifying policy this fall.
    We are also, as you know, in the legislation, we are 
approving individual unit members, and we are appointing unit 
member advisers from the agency for every unit member of an 
ODA, so there will actually be those direct connections within 
the agency.
    All of those things are designed to eliminate any kind of 
barriers to communication between Boeing and FAA.
    Mr. Kahele. A quick yes-or-no question: Can we have your 
commitment that the FAA will ensure that companies can't misuse 
Authorized Representatives again in the future to sign off on 
design and development plans that downplay any potentially 
deadly new systems to regulators?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, absolutely.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The Chair now recognizes Representative Steel of California 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Steel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. 
Ranking Member Graves. And thank you, Administrator Dickson, 
for coming out today.
    You mentioned that it is imperative for the FAA to 
accelerate and expand the deployment of new technologies in 
order to reduce barriers and actively promote innovation that 
enhances safety and efficiency, and that is really important. 
But we need accountability when it comes to the future of 
aviation noise.
    My district is home to John Wayne Airport, which is a 
world-class airport, and it is also close to Long Beach 
Airport. I cannot stress enough how important it is for you and 
the FAA to meet with local communities to discuss the issues 
with aviation noise.
    We tried to set up some of the meetings, and I even had a 
very hard time to put your employees and these community 
leaders to discuss about the noise issue. We must meet with 
them outside of the formal roundtable process and on a regular 
basis.
    My constituents feel ignored by your administration, and 
the FAA ombudsman has not adequately engaged with the community 
as of now. The FAA needs to work with manufacturers to 
prioritize safe, clean, equitable solutions to the complex and 
nuanced issue of the aviation noise, because for them, aviation 
noise--actually, for us--noise and environmental issues are the 
most important part when you have an airport in your district.
    I believe the Federal Government has an important role to 
play in cutting redtape and providing a regulatory environment 
where new technology can be approved for use safely.
    So, could you discuss how FAA R&D is helping to advance 
technologies to address noise issues, and what are some of 
these much-needed projects and technologies?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. I will 
address the second part first and then get into the community 
engagement aspect, because that is really, I think, the nearest 
term focus of your concern.
    We have conducted research for years on engine technology 
and on noise research, and that will continue. As a matter of 
fact, we just issued $100 million in grants to, I believe it 
was eight aviation companies on engine technology for improved 
environment and also noise reduction. This is through our CLEEN 
program, the Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, and Noise 
Program that we have had in place for a number of years.
    So, this is the next iteration of that, and that will be a 
focus of the research. Those companies have to match that grant 
money, but we can certainly get that information to your office 
after the hearing, so you have got full visibility into what 
that noise research looks like.
    In terms of community engagement, this is something that is 
extremely important to me, and I understand that the agency has 
not always engaged in an effective manner with local 
communities. But I think we have come a long way.
    And in some of our more recent metroplex projects, for 
example, we have been, I think, much more effective in engaging 
everyone in the community. And with the Congress' help, our 
regional administrators and our regional ombudsman, we do use 
the roundtable process, but that is the front door of the FAA 
on noise issues. So, I will follow up with them, to make sure 
that they are engaging your constituents directly.
    I also meet regularly, my staff and I meet regularly with 
the Quiet Skies Caucus, and I would encourage dialogue with 
them as well. We had our last meeting about, I believe it was 
about 2 months ago, and there has been a lot of beneficial 
dialogue there on ways that we can engage more systematically 
around the country, including the role of our regional 
administrators and regional ombudsman.
    Mrs. Steel. I really appreciate that answer, because 
metroplex has been implemented, and there is a certain runway 
path has been more affected than before, because it was like a 
scheduled landing to scheduled flying out. Now it is like one 
path. That is the reason most of these local communities----
    Mr. Larsen. Your time is expired.
    Mrs. Steel. I have more questions, but you know what, I 
will do it in writing.
    So, I yield back. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Williams of 
Georgia for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Chairman Larsen, for 
convening this hearing. And I also want to thank the committee 
members and staff for all of the work that was done last 
Congress to enact the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act. And while I was not here, I know, you all, 
that this legislation will save lives.
    It will equip the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure 
that our airways, airplanes, and, most importantly, our 
traveling constituents are safe. That last part is important to 
me, you all, because I am a frequent flyer at the Nation's 
busiest airport. My district is home to Hartsfield-Jackson 
Atlanta International Airport, the Nation's busiest airport. 
And, Mr. Dickson, we will be back as the world's busiest pretty 
soon. We got a little asterisk in 2020, but we will be back 
really soon as the world's busiest airport. And I want all 
people who work in or travel through our Nation's busiest 
airport to be safe.
    Mr. Dickson, in your testimony, you mentioned that one of 
the areas you are working on to implement the act is creating a 
culture of safety and excellence at the FAA, including by 
attracting talented staff.
    To what extent are you focusing on diversity, equity, and 
inclusion as part of FAA's efforts to create a talented 
workforce, and what impact would a broader range of 
perspectives at the FAA have on ensuring potential safety 
hazards are identified and reported?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question. Actually, I 
really appreciate the opportunity to speak on this point, 
Congresswoman, because diversity, in so many ways, is important 
to the effectiveness of any safety organization, because 
ultimately our subject matter expertise is important. You have 
to have technical competency, but it is an organization that is 
made up of people, and people are our most valuable resource.
    So, we want to make sure we have got the right skills in 
the right place at the right time, but we also want to make 
sure that we have diversity of thought and perspectives, 
experience, and opinions, because the last thing we want in a 
safety organization is groupthink. We don't want sameness. We 
want technical competency, but we have got to have experience 
across the spectrum.
    So, we are evolving our staffing models. We are looking at 
the skill sets that we need now for in the future. What the FAA 
needed in the early 2000s and the 1990s, that is not going to 
be adequate for what we have going forward.
    We are getting much more into predictive analytics, big 
data, drones. My son has a videography business. The barriers 
to entry are actually lowering in many respects. So, there are 
many more avenues into aviation. What we have to do, though, is 
meet people where they are.
    This is one of the things where the pandemic has actually 
benefited us somewhat, because it has actually accelerated our 
virtual engagement. I have done podcasts with young people who 
are getting started in their aviation and aerospace careers. We 
have been able to highlight a lot of the great work, because it 
is an exciting career and we want those in the workforce, or 
those who are contemplating aerospace careers to understand 
what the tremendous opportunities are.
    We have also internally, and more relevant to aircraft 
certification that we are talking about, we have reinvigorated 
our senior technical experts. We have engaged labor. We are 
expanding our engagement in career fairs and outreach. We have 
the Women in Aviation Advisory Board and the Youth in Aviation 
Advisory Group as well. We work with Future Aviation 
Professionals of America, OBAP, Women in Aviation. And we will 
continue to do those things.
    And finally, in our regions, we have a very aggressive and 
robust, we call it our STEM AVSED Program and our Adopt-a-
School Program. And we appreciate the Congress' support on 
resources for those programs as well.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Dickson. And I am 
probably going to need the followup to this in writing, because 
we are running out of time. But following the enactment of this 
act, I understand that FAA has implemented a Voluntary Safety 
Reporting Program that will make sure that employees can report 
safety issues to management.
    So, if you could follow up later and just tell us more 
about this process and how it has worked since its 
implementation, and how would you characterize its success in 
flagging safety issues that need to be addressed. I would love 
to have more information on that.
    Mr. Dickson. Be happy to.
    Ms. Williams of Georgia. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Williams.
    The next three Members in order that we have just so people 
can prepare are Representative Gimenez of Florida, 
Representative Titus of Nevada, and Representative Mace of 
South Carolina.
    So, with that, I will recognize Representative Gimenez of 
Florida for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Mr. Dickson, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, is it 
safe for the traveling public to travel by commercial airline?
    Mr. Dickson. As was said I think earlier, aviation is the 
safest form of travel. Commercial aviation in the U.S. is the 
safest form of travel in the world. And there are a number of 
mitigations in place. They have been well-publicized: airflow 
on airplanes, the protocols that the airlines have been using 
to make sure that airplanes are appropriately sanitized, and 
then, of course, the----
    Mr. Gimenez. I take that as a yes. Thank you. I appreciate 
that.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK. Is there right now a mandate for any 
passengers that when they get on an airplane right now that 
they have to be vaccinated or they will be excluded from 
traveling on an airplane?
    Mr. Dickson. There is not a mandate within the United 
States that I am aware of, no.
    Mr. Gimenez. Does it make any sense to you then that you 
could have an airplane full of 300 people, say, that are 
unvaccinated, and the only people that have to be vaccinated 
are actually the people that are operating the airplane? Does 
that make sense to you?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, the CDC is the public health 
authority, and these measures are being taken in concert with 
each other. So, I think it is important that we have all the 
mitigations in place so that the aviation system can operate. 
And I am not in a position to comment specifically on the 
public health benefits.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK. Did the Biden administration contact you 
prior to issuing the vaccine mandate?
    Mr. Dickson. There has certainly been--you know, we were 
all certainly prepared----
    Mr. Gimenez. Sir, I asked you a specific question. Did the 
Biden administration contact you, talk to you prior to issuing 
the vaccine mandate for airlines?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not going to talk about internal 
executive branch consultations.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK. I will take that as a no then. OK.
    Administrator, let's go to the certification process with 
the 737 and the MAX, and I understand that there are safety 
issues, et cetera. I am hearing concerns, though, from some of 
the airline or the aircraft manufacturing industry that the 
enhanced procedures that you have put in place may be also 
slowing down production.
    Is it possible to have enhanced oversight, and also, 
production not to be slow? Is that possible, or are they 
mutually exclusive?
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you for the question, Congressman. No, 
they are not mutually exclusive. Our oversight, if it is 
conducted in a systematic way, and we work very closely with 
the manufacturer and with the production line, and they will 
surface information through their safety system, that actually 
allows them to be safer as a manufacturer, but it also allows 
us to be more effective in conducting our safety oversight as a 
regulator.
    And that is the approach that we have taken all along is we 
are not overseeing individual anecdotal situations. We are 
actually overseeing the entire design and production system and 
making sure that it has the layers of protection and the 
processes are disciplined and effective in producing a safe 
product.
    Mr. Gimenez. I am hearing some concerns, though, by some on 
the production side of our aircraft industry that they are 
being slowed in production. Again, if it is a safety issue, I 
have absolutely no problem with that, but I would urge you to 
make sure that your processes are in place so that we can have 
the safety that the flying public and the American people 
deserve and demand, but also, that we keep pace with 
production, because it could cost American jobs in the end if 
we slow them down to the point where they can't get their 
planes out. So, we need to have a combination of the two. I am 
glad that you have said that they are not mutually exclusive.
    And so, with that, I will I yield back the balance of my 
time. And thank you, sir.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative.
    I now turn to Representative Titus of Nevada for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Administrator.
    Since we are talking about the role of the FAA in 
protecting the public, I think that it is very important, even 
if it takes a few extra minutes, to not slap something 
together. So, thank you for doing that.
    Under the Trump administration, there was an order ``one 
in, two out.'' If you made a new regulation, you had to get rid 
of two existing regulations. Well, Secretary Buttigieg has 
issued a rule that has eliminated that. I said repeatedly in 
this committee that that was not a good system, especially in 
aviation. And we saw how it held up regulations for the drone 
industry, and the UAS in the airspace.
    So, I am wondering if you had any experience with this, if 
FAA is using this? You have moved to the forget about the ``one 
in, two out.'' Has it been advantageous for you to use this, go 
back to the old system? Could you just kind of address that for 
us?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congresswoman. And, again, I 
will just reiterate the point that whether it is in the 2018 
reauthorization, or the Aircraft Certification Act or previous 
reauthorizations, we take congressional mandates very 
seriously, and we are always working diligently to execute 
those in a timely fashion.
    With respect to the two-for-one rulemaking policy, we 
worked very closely with our colleagues at the Department of 
Transportation to implement updates to that policy. And we are 
laser-focused on executing the rulemakings that benefit the 
aviation system, particularly in the area of safety, which is 
always going to be our North Star.
    As an example of that, we had great Department support very 
early in the administration to push forward the last remaining 
rulemaking from the Colgan accident back in 2009, which was the 
pilot records database. That was a huge priority for me, and we 
were able to get that across the finish line earlier this year.
    You mentioned some of the drone rulemakings, remote 
identification, operations over people. And then, of course, 
just this morning, we announced the publication of the Flight 
Attendant Duty and Rest NPRM.
    So, I think that is a reflection of how we are pushing this 
activity forward under the paradigm of Secretary Buttigieg's 
leadership at the Department.
    Ms. Titus. Great. I am glad to hear that. I didn't think it 
ever worked, and I am glad it is not in place now.
    My second question is that we have been hearing kind of a 
series of, I don't know if it is rumor or if there is some 
press about it, but that there are problems with the Boeing 
Dreamliner. And yet the production of that is continuing, and 
there are also plenty of those planes still flying around with 
customers in them even as we speak.
    Can you talk about the FAA's role and how it relates to 
these objections to the Dreamliner? What is going on there?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes. Well, this was--I believe you are 
referring to some nonconforming titanium parts that were 
identified recently. These were produced by a Boeing supplier. 
They affect a number of 787 aircraft. And I think the positive 
aspect of this is this is something that Boeing's safety system 
highlighted and they brought it to us. And we continue to 
monitor the issue, and we use our continued operational safety 
monitoring processes to determine the appropriate corrective 
action. So happy to follow up with you on more specifics, but 
it is something that we are looking at very closely.
    Ms. Titus. OK. So, you couldn't say if it affects or is 
enough to affect the certification process?
    Mr. Dickson. This is not--this is a supplier issue, and it 
is something that was discovered during the in-service of the 
aircraft. And so, we will go back and look at the suppliers, 
because the manufacturers also have oversight of their entire 
supply chain. So, we will be running that thread back to its 
origin as well.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you. I am glad to know Boeing 
brought it to you this time instead of covering it up like last 
time with the MAX.
    Mr. Dickson. Yes.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    I now recognize Representative Mace of South Carolina for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Administrator Dickson, first of all, I appreciate you 
coming before our committee here today and speaking on your 
focus on implementing aircraft certification reform, 
legislation enacted in the last Congress. As one of many 
Members who represent a district with aviation manufacturing, 
to include Boeing, we appreciate all that we are doing to try 
to work together.
    I would like to shift the focus, my focus to another area 
related to aircraft certification. The enforcement of bilateral 
agreements on aircraft certification between the U.S. and 
foreign aviation authorities I believe deserves some attention.
    I have met with and spoken with different aviation 
manufacturers so far this year in my first 10\1/2\ months in 
office. And it is my understanding the FAA abides by its 
obligations to accept, after a reasonable review, the 
certification given to new aircraft produced in other 
countries, like Canada, France, and Brazil.
    But what I have learned over the last few months is that 
the same cannot be said for the certification of new U.S. 
aircraft by various foreign aviation authorities. And these 
delays result in significant delays in U.S. companies getting 
their products to market in other countries.
    This not only impacts the U.S. balance of trade where 
aviation products and services are leading U.S. export and 
American jobs in a sector where the United States continues to 
be a world leader in aviation. Just as significantly, it delays 
the introduction of the latest generation of aircraft, which 
represent a real increase in safety as well as a greater fuel 
efficiency, reducing aviation's impact on the environment in 
terms of greenhouse gases and noise.
    Both Ranking Member Sam Graves and Ranking Member Garret 
Graves have expressed concern about recent EASA statements in 
this area, and Senator Wicker has asked the GAO to review this 
topic.
    So, I just have two very simple questions this morning: Do 
you share the concerns of the industry about compliance with 
bilateral agreements by various foreign aviation entities?
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. 
And, as I said earlier, the bilateral agreements are extremely 
important to us, and that is why my counterpart over in Europe, 
we conducted a summit to make that very clear this summer. But 
there are always going to be debates with various authorities.
    I will say that we are laser-focused on this. We want 
consistent validation of U.S. products. There have been, at 
times, questions that we have had about products that are 
produced in other countries. So, there is always going to be 
some give and take, but we want to make sure that the bilateral 
agreements are recognized and abided by, because all of us want 
consistency in the design and manufacturing process around the 
world.
    Ms. Mace. And secondly, how can we in the Congress work 
with you and the FAA to address this issue? I mean, it impacts 
American jobs. It impacts safety. It impacts the environment.
    Mr. Dickson. I think, really, we need to keep you informed, 
which I think we are doing, as to what these bilateral 
agreements are producing. And then we need to make sure that we 
continue to institutionalize them and have productive 
engagements at the working level, and that U.S. product are 
treated equitably among the other states of design around the 
world, and that decisions are not made for anything other than 
aviation safety purposes.
    Ms. Mace. Thank you, Administrator Dickson.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Before I recognize Representative 
Payne, who will be next, and then Representative Stauber, and 
Representative DeSaulnier, in that order.
    So, Representative Payne, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely 
hearing, and also the ranking member.
    Let's see. Administrator Dickson, the 2020 Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act authorizes $27 
billion in annual appropriations to recruit new engineers, 
safety inspectors, software experts and others who perform 
duties related to the certification of airplanes and component 
parts.
    With this funding should come some opportunities for 
candidates that come from diverse and underserved backgrounds. 
One of my top priorities is ensuring that everyone has a fair 
shot at getting good-paying jobs.
    So, can you assure this committee that the FAA will make 
every effort to ensure that these new opportunities reach 
minority and underserved populations?
    Mr. Dickson. Congressman, thank you for the question. And I 
hope that that was clear from my earlier comments, but we are 
going to leave no stone unturned to make sure that we bring the 
best and brightest and most diverse candidates to the agency.
    We need to have an agency that looks like the country that 
we serve. And to the extent that we have had a very successful, 
really set a record with our minority-serving internships this 
year. I believe we had 321 participants. They did a great job 
for us. We want to bring a lot of those folks onboard at the 
FAA.
    So, again, we need to meet people where they are. We need 
to make sure that we are engaging within those underserved 
communities. Deputy Administrator Brad Mims and I are both 
committed to this, and we are both using the networks and the 
relationships that we have to be able to support the most 
diverse and equitable hiring process, because we do have, as 
you said, a tremendous opportunity to bring in the next 
generation within the agency. And we are absolutely committed 
to that.
    Mr. Payne. Excellent. Yes, it is a great opportunity at 
this point in time to try to attempt to change the culture that 
has existed. One of the most striking things I recall from the 
multiple hearings this committee held on the tragedies was the 
complete lack of a safety culture at the FAA.
    Based on the information provided to me, it appears that 
the FAA has not fully implemented requirements under the 
Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act. Full 
implementation of these requirements is essential to creating a 
safety culture at the FAA.
    Have you discussed how to implement these requirements? 
And, if so, what do you plan to do to create a safety culture? 
If not, when do you plan to review them and begin actions to 
create the culture to prevent future tragedies?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, there are multiple dimensions to your 
question. Let me address the culture issue first. I think the 
single most important thing at this point is making sure that 
we have engaged our employees, our workforce--it is an 
extremely professional and capable workforce--and that we have 
room for differences of opinion, and we have processes by which 
employees can bring concerns forward.
    So, the question came up earlier about the Voluntary Safety 
Reporting Program. In my experience in the airline industry, 
the ability for employees to bring up safety concerns in 
realtime is extremely valuable. So, the VSRP is a very powerful 
mechanism in doing that.
    We have already received more than 320 reports from our 
employees. We work very closely with our employees through our 
labor partners to make sure that we are intaking these issues, 
and then we are also communicating the results back to the 
workforce.
    I have been very transparent in my communications with the 
workforce and been extremely supportive of their efforts. And 
we need to make sure that that is happening throughout all 
levels of the organization, and we will absolutely stay focused 
on that.
    With respect to the execution of the act itself, as I 
mentioned to Chair Larsen, we have implemented quite a few of 
the provisions through policy memos to make sure that we are--
and other mechanisms--to make sure that we are moving forward 
as expeditiously as possible, and that we will incorporate 
those into our permanent guidance in order to make sure that 
they are----
    Mr. Payne. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time is expired.
    I would now turn to Representative Stauber of Minnesota, 
who will be followed by Representative Stanton of Arizona. 
Representative Stauber, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank You, Chair.
    Thank you, Administrator Dickson, for being here today. I 
do want to reiterate what my colleague, Congressman Carson 
spoke about, the secondary barriers. I think it is important 
that that is a priority for the FAA and the industry. It is 
going to help us become even more safe, and I think that there 
are a number of us on this committee that support that for 
sure.
    And I am going to follow up on what Congresswoman Van Duyne 
had stated and have some similar questions. So, as you know and 
have already heard from many of my colleagues, President 
Biden's vaccine mandate could have some seriously troubling 
consequences going into our holiday season.
    Although we do not have all the details from the 
administration yet on timing, I would like to inquire about a 
few scenarios that families in my district and across the 
country are concerned about. I understand that the TSA is not 
under your jurisdiction, but I am sure you are aware that about 
40 percent of TSA agents are unvaccinated.
    What will happen to air travel over the holidays if 40 
percent of the TSA workforce is fired, which is equivalent to 
about 20,000 officers, on the November 22nd vaccine mandate 
deadline for Federal workers?
    Mr. Dickson. Again, my focus is on safe and open operation 
of the aviation system, and I know my counterpart at the TSA 
for his role has the same concern. So, we are going to do 
everything that we can to make sure that commercial aviation 
operates in an uninterrupted way throughout.
    Mr. Stauber. Administrator Dickson, what is the contingency 
plan you have in place if 20,000 officers are fired on November 
22nd?
    Mr. Dickson. We have contingency plans for our own 
workforce. And I can't speak for what the TSA's contingency 
plans are, but I know that they have plans to deal with 
whatever challenges they might face in their daily operations.
    Mr. Stauber. Then, Administrator, what would happen to air 
travel if the air traffic controllers who are unvaccinated are 
terminated on the November 22nd vaccine mandate deadline?
    Mr. Dickson. Again, we have dealt with this. We have lived 
this on a daily basis throughout the pandemic. And I am very 
proud of what we have done at the FAA to keep the air traffic 
control system open and operating. Our----
    Mr. Stauber. Just because my time is limited, I appreciate 
the answer, but do you have contingency plans for ATC 
deficiencies?
    Mr. Dickson. We always have contingency plans, whether they 
are facilities outages or anything that would affect the 
availability of our employees. So, the answer to that is yes.
    Mr. Stauber. Several air carriers have self-reported that 
they each have hundreds of employees who are unvaccinated. This 
likely equates to thousands of aviation employees who will be 
fired or forced to quit when the Biden vaccine mandate goes 
into effect.
    If the air carriers were to experience mass forced layoffs 
due to Biden's mandates, what would happen to air travel, and 
specifically, flight cancellation and delays, over the busy 
holidays?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not going to speculate about that, 
Congressman.
    I know that we all have an interest. And I think the 
aviation industry's focus is on serving the public and making 
sure that people can travel in an unfettered way and that they 
can do so in a safe manner.
    And I know that the airlines are focused on that. We are 
using their safety management systems to monitor every aspect 
of their operation, regardless of whether there are challenges 
with maintenance programs or aircraft availability or anything 
else. And we will continue to do that, because that is part of 
our responsibility.
    Mr. Stauber. Administrator Dickson, can you guarantee to 
Americans who are planning their holiday travel that their 
flight plans will not be interrupted or impacted by President 
Biden's vaccine mandate?
    Mr. Dickson. I can guarantee that the FAA will be focused 
on aviation safety and on making sure that the air navigation 
system is available and open for business as we have throughout 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
    Mr. Stauber. So, what I heard you answer is you don't know. 
You can't guarantee that the flight delays won't affect the 
American people during the busy holiday season because of the 
mandates.
    Mr. Dickson. That is not what I said. I said I will 
guarantee that we will do everything humanly possible to make 
sure that the aviation system is safe and available and open 
for business.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you, Administrator.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Stauber.
    Representative Stanton, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
for holding this important accountability hearing.
    Administrator Dickson, thank you for your testimony here 
today.
    In January, the Department of Justice entered into a 
deferred prosecution agreement with Boeing. The agreement 
focused on the actions of two Boeing 737 MAX technical pilots, 
and one of those pilots was charged with six counts of fraud 
last week by the Department of Justice.
    In its agreement with Boeing, the DOJ determined that an 
independent compliance monitor was unnecessary for several 
reasons, including because the DOJ concluded, quote, ``The 
misconduct was neither pervasive across the organization, nor 
undertaken by a large number of employees, nor facilitated by 
senior management,'' unquote.
    These conclusions run contrary to this committee's own 
investigative findings. In the course of this committee's 
investigative findings, Boeing's meeting minutes from very 
early on in the MAX program were uncovered that did document a 
deliberate effort to avoid using the term ``MCAS'' outside of 
Boeing to avoid additional regulatory scrutiny and the impacts 
on pilot training. The plan called for Boeing to describe MCAS 
as merely an addition to speed trim.
    Administrator Dickson, without asking you to make any 
assessment of criminality, are you aware of anyone else at 
Boeing, other than these two technical pilots, who tried to 
downplay the significance of MCAS to regulators?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not aware of any particular individuals, 
but I will tell you that at the highest levels of Boeing, from 
day one, I made it clear of my expectations of how we were 
going to oversee their operations and that I expected for 
systemic improvements to take place.
    And that is exactly what we have done in executing upon the 
legislation that has been passed in December of last year and 
also in response to our own internal reviews, as well as 
various investigations and recommendations from review bodies.
    My position is that these types of single failures, or even 
small groups, we have put systemic improvements in place to 
prevent this kind of activity from resulting in an unsafe 
outcome.
    Mr. Stanton. Mr. Dickson, let me reclaim my time, because I 
appreciate the answer, but it is not the answer to the question 
that was asked.
    I am not asking whether you believe that any actions by 
others may have been criminal, but I am asking this question: 
Do you believe that only two Boeing employees attempted to 
downplay the significance of MCAS to regulators, or do you 
believe there were more employees that tried to downplay the 
significance of MCAS?
    Mr. Dickson. I believe that MCAS should have been included 
in the materials and that it was a safety-critical system. 
Whether there was any intentionality on the part of others, I 
can't speak to.
    Mr. Stanton. So, you acknowledge that obviously that MCAS 
was somewhat disclosed to you and the FAA. But the issue here 
obviously really isn't whether FAA was aware of MCAS. It is how 
MCAS was presented to the FAA.
    As the Joint Authorities Technical Review said, quote, 
``The FAA was not completely unaware of MCAS,'' end quote. 
However, the manner in which MCAS was presented to FAA made it, 
quote, ``difficult to recognize the impacts and implications of 
this system,'' end quote.
    The JATR also said that, quote, ``If the FAA technical 
staff had been fully aware of the details of the MCAS function 
. . . it likely would have identified the potential for the 
stabilizer to overpower the elevator,'' end quote.
    Obviously, this is going to be continuing to be 
investigated and reviewed. So, Administrator Dickson, will the 
FAA commit to cooperate fully with the Department of Justice 
should they need anything additional from FAA to complete this 
investigation?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Congressman. Absolutely. And one of the--
if I could just take one moment----
    Mr. Stanton. Please.
    Mr. Dickson [continuing]. Aspects that you are referring to 
are the coordination between classification and flight 
standards within the agency.
    And we have taken very strong steps with our project teams 
and also looking at a certification project not only to the 
design but also through [inaudible] the service to make sure 
that those communication and coordination gaps are effectively 
closed. So, we will continue to do that.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you for your commitment to fully 
cooperate with DOJ moving forward.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Stanton.
    I now recognize Representative Fitzpatrick, who will be 
followed by Representative Allred.
    Representative Fitzpatrick from Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.
    Thank you, Mr. Dickson, for being here.
    And, Mr. Dickson, the Lion Air flight 610 crash was 
incredibly tragic, and this committee took action to prevent 
any future crashes like Lion Air or Ethiopian Airlines.
    As part of the legislation, the FAA is set to take action 
regarding pilot training. The 1,500-hour rule for pilots has 
led to the past 12 years being among the safest in aviation 
history.
    Administrator Dickson, can you confirm to this committee 
that you will not in any way, shape, or form weaken or reduce 
requirements for first officer qualifications, the so-called 
1,500-hour rule?
    Mr. Dickson. We do not have any plans, and I do not have 
any plans to deviate from that. So, the answer is no.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. OK. And if you do, would you be informing 
this committee in advance?
    Mr. Dickson. Of course.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Second, safety is our top priority, sir. 
Several people have brought up secondary barriers.
    As Chairman DeFazio and Mr. Carson mentioned, as well as 
Mr. Stauber and several others, in 2018, flight deck secondary 
barriers were included in the FAA reauthorization.
    That bill was signed into law 3 years ago this month, and 
we still have not seen action from the FAA. And as Mr. Carson 
noted, we, along with 11 other Members--a strong bipartisan 
contingent, by the way--sent a letter to you on October 8 
expressing our concern with the continued delays in 
implementing this critical safety provision.
    All of us, sir, that fly take note of this. This was one of 
the recommendations from the 9/11 Commission.
    Sir, can you give us a realistic timeline of when we can 
expect to see a final rule on secondary barriers?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Congressman, thank you again for the 
question. And I will just reiterate my frustration at how long 
this process has taken in this particular case, and rulemaking 
by design is a lengthy process.
    I am not able to commit to a specific timeline. What I can 
commit to is that we are going to get this rule out there as 
quickly as we possibly can.
    We are absolutely devoted to complying with congressional 
direction here, and we have the Department's very strong 
support and advocacy as well. And so, I am confident that we 
will be able to move forward.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. Sir, what is it going to take? Because we 
have heard these responses for years now. My colleagues and I 
are concerned that we may not see a final rule before we start 
working on the next FAA reauthorization in 2023.
    You said earlier in this hearing that you are committed to 
secondary barriers. What assurances can you give me, can you 
give this committee--and this is a bipartisan push, sir. We are 
demanding that this happen. We passed it. What assurances can 
you give us that it will be expedited, made a priority, and not 
delayed any further?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, I can just give you the 
assurances that I am pushing my team extremely hard on this.
    We have got the beneficial work done by the Aviation 
Rulemaking Advisory Committee, which gave us some of the 
technical data that we needed, and I expect for there to be 
industry comment once we do put a notice of proposed rulemaking 
out.
    But we are going to do that with all deliberate speed and 
certainly all diligence, and we will keep you and the committee 
informed of our progress as we move forward.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. OK. Mr. Dickson, just please take back, if 
nothing else, that this is a top priority of Democrats and 
Republicans on this committee.
    Mr. Dickson. I hear you.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. This is critical to aviation safety. This 
was one of the 41 recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission. 
Still, 20 years later, it has not been implemented. It is very 
frustrating to us.
    So, if you could please send that message back that we are 
insisting that this be a top priority.
    Mr. Dickson. I understand, and I hear you.
    Mr. Fitzpatrick. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative.
    I now call on Representative Allred of Texas for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Mr. Administrator, for being here and for 
appearing before our committee.
    One of my main concerns that I have discussed over the 
course of our investigation and our hearings of the 737 MAX 
crashes was Boeing's seemingly capture of the regulatory 
process.
    And in your testimony, you mentioned that the agency is 
prioritizing the oversight of manufacturers now, which of 
course is what this is all about. And we are hopeful that that 
is including oversight of the Organization Designation 
Authorization, or ODA, process.
    And I understand that recently FAA sent a letter to Boeing 
initiating a review and expressing concerns with the company's 
culture and how that appears to prevent ODA members from 
communicating with FAA, which is one of the main things that 
Congress has asked FAA to address in the Aircraft 
Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act.
    And I just want to ask, first of all, has Boeing responded 
to your agency's letter?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not aware of a formal response to the 
letter, but we are having dialogue with them daily on this and 
other matters, and it is something that we are laser-focused 
on.
    We are also, as I said earlier, we are involved in their 
safety risk management process that is designed to root out any 
interference between unit members and their ability to be able 
to communicate and work with the agency.
    I am not aware that we have got specific correspondence 
back, but I will get back to you on that.
    Mr. Allred. Well, yeah, I think that a letter of that kind 
from your agency should be responded to formally and 
informally. And we certainly are interested in what that 
response is.
    And, I guess, addressing the concerns over Boeing's ODA 
process, I am wondering whether you think something more 
dramatic needs to be done in terms of addressing the culture 
there, whether there needs to be some kind of pause in that 
process or some kind of intervention of some kind, because it 
sounds like you are having an ongoing discussion.
    But that, to be honest with you, sir, sounds similar to 
what was occurring before when these oversights were allowed 
into the process and of course led to these horrible crashes.
    Do you feel confident right now in Boeing's ODA process and 
what we are doing, our work with them?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you for the question and the 
opportunity to respond in some more detail.
    Again, cultural issues require constant attention. And I 
have seen several indications of the kind of improvements that 
I am looking for.
    But I don't know that you would ever be complacent or 
satisfied. This is always going to be an area of focus, not 
just--I mean, with any regulated entity, to make sure that 
undesirable issues are not percolating into the relationship.
    So, we monitor our ODA Office that we have stood up in the 
last 1\1/2\ years, and actually we are in the process of--they 
are going to be responsible for quality control across all 80 
ODAs that we have with the industry.
    But with Boeing in particular, for example, their number of 
voluntary disclosures where they are bringing things forward 
that they weren't before, those are providing us with 
information and data that we didn't have visibility into 
before, so that we can make sure that they are systematically 
intaking those issues, doing it with transparency, and driving 
down those risks.
    They have done other things that they weren't doing before, 
such as stopping the production line. They would never do those 
kinds of things before.
    And finally, my people understand--and we have added 
engineering expertise and others--they understand that I have 
their back and that they are supported at the highest levels of 
the agency.
    So, these kinds of things, again, they aren't things that 
happen overnight. They will require constant attention.
    And, additionally, I would also point out that we have 
retained several items. We have taken some of those ODA 
privileges away, which I talked about earlier, such as 
airworthiness certificates and requiring the validation of 
human factors assumptions for safety-critical designs, and that 
will continue.
    Mr. Allred. That is good. And you mentioned that your ODA 
Office has the support from the top of your agency. I would say 
they have the support of the Congress as well. We are here to 
support them, I certainly am, in terms of making sure that we 
are providing sufficient oversight to protect the public.
    So, with that, thank you for your testimony and for your 
work.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    In order, I have Burchett, Norton and Van Drew.
    So, I will recognize Representative Burchett for 5 minutes.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. Representative Burchett?
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. Let's come back. We will go to Representative 
Van Drew for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Good afternoon, Administrator Dickson. Thank you for 
appearing before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, and thank 
you for your exemplary leadership over the past 2 years.
    In August, the FAA submitted a reprogramming request to the 
Congress that would radically reorganize the FAA's research, 
development, testing, and evaluation functions.
    The FAA has gone to great lengths to obscure the proposal. 
The request was submitted after the House had already passed 
its transportation funding bill. The FAA is using evasive 
tactics to sneak through bad policy that affects 1,000 FAA 
workers at a minimum and $1 billion worth of taxpayers' money.
    Today, I will share with you and everyone the truth of what 
the FAA is proposing.
    Administrator, I sent you a comprehensive letter of many 
shortcomings of this proposal. I highly recommend my colleagues 
read this letter, which I request to submit to the record.
    Mr. Larsen. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
  Letter of October 19, 2021, from Hon. Jefferson Van Drew, Member of 
 Congress, to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation 
  Administration, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew
                                                  October 19, 2021.
Steve Dickson,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., 
        Washington, DC 20591.
    Dear Administrator Dickson,
    I am troubled by the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) 
request to the Congress to reorganize the FAA William J. Hughes 
Technical Center and the FAA's broader research, development, testing 
and evaluation functions. I am concerned that the proposal will reduce 
the efficiency of the Technical Center and the FAA, hamper federal 
oversight of the aviation industry, and is beyond the authority that 
the Congress has granted to the FAA. I urge you to withdraw the FAA's 
reprogramming request and instead develop a forward-looking strategy 
that preserves the efficacy and integrity of the FAA William H. Hughes 
Technical Center and the Federal Aviation Administration.
    For over 50 years the FAA William J. Hughes Technical Center has 
been the FAA's premier laboratory and facility for the research, 
development, testing and evaluation of cutting-edge aviation 
technology. It is home to the FAA's NextGen air traffic control 
modernization program, the FAA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Advanced 
Air Mobility programs, and many other critical programs bringing 
American aviation into the 21st century. These programs all stand to be 
adversely affected by the proposal submitted by the FAA to the Congress 
in August.
    The Technical Center operates under a centralized organizational 
model, led by the Technical Center Director. This model is standard 
best practice across similar federal institutions. The concentration of 
the Technical Center's multifaceted capabilities is a force-multiplier 
for each distinct component. These capabilities regularly collaborate 
on projects in ways that are only possible because they share a campus 
and are organizationally connected. This holistic, unified, and 
independent approach to the research, development, testing and 
evaluation of aviation technology is the reason that the FAA's seal of 
approval is the international gold standard of aviation.
    The proposed reorganization would inexorably disrupt this 
operational structure. The FAA has submitted a reprogramming request 
that in effect would ``split'' the Technical Center into three 
organizationally separate business lines, each of which would report to 
offices in Washington D.C. This division of capabilities is 
antithetical to the holistic philosophy that underlies the Technical 
Center's effectiveness. Erecting such internal barriers will decrease 
efficiency as well as operationally weaken each distinct component of 
the Technical Center, and the Technical Center as a whole.
    A notable shortcoming of the FAA's reprogramming request is the 
failure to understand and respond to the needs of the United States' 
domestic Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) industry. This high-potential 
technological and commercial frontier should be at the forefront of the 
FAA's policy development. There are serious policy challenges facing 
the UAS industry, particularly in the areas of certification and 
airspace integration. Instead of advancing solutions, the proposal 
before the Congress takes a tremendous step backward by offering a 
policy model more appropriate for the UAS industry of ten years ago.
    The FAA proposes to essentially demote the extant ``UAS Office''. 
The UAS functions would be made subsidiary to an ``Office of 
Innovation,'' and moved from a business line under an Associate 
Administrator to a lower line under an Assistant Administrator. This 
new position is organizationally distant from both the certification 
functions under the AVS line, and the airspace integration functions 
under the AJO line. During a congressional briefing, FAA officials 
recognized the importance of organizational distance and described the 
proposed placement of UAS functions as ``half-way to everything.'' The 
burgeoning UAS industry deserves better than the half-measure this 
proposal represents.
    The most alarming element of the proposal is the apparent intention 
to eventually privatize the research, development, testing and 
evaluation capabilities of the FAA. In a memo provided to the Congress, 
the FAA asserts that ``in many cases that testing, and evaluation can 
also be provided by industry for approval by the FAA,'' that ``the 
testing workforce may need to shift to experts under contract and 
consultancy,'' and that ``this changes the nature of the research 
workforce from hands-on researcher to project manager.'' This is an 
extraordinary divergence from the FAA's current research, development, 
testing and evaluation model.
    The impact of the FAA's request is substantial, immediately 
affecting hundreds of positions and over $1 billion of expenditures. 
The question before the Congress deserves the fullest scrutiny 
considering the magnitude of the changes being proposed.
    The FAA has justified their proposal by citing Sections 545 and 711 
of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, stating that the FAA is simply 
abiding by congressional mandate. These sections respectively direct 
the FAA to create the positions of Chief Technology Officer and 
Assistant Secretary for Research and Development but there is nothing 
which necessitates the organizational division of the Technical Center 
nor the broader changes being proposed.
    It seems neither in the letter nor the spirit of the law to move 
from the FAA's existing model wherein federal labs' research, 
development, test, and evaluation operations are responsible for 
setting and refining the safety, testing, evaluation gold standards of 
today, to a model where the FAA rubber-stamps evaluations conducted by 
the industry. Federal oversight of the aviation industry is important 
and necessary. If implemented, this reorganization could cast doubt on 
the safety of products approved for use in the NAS.
    Further, Sections 545 and 711 appear to have been cherry-picked to 
rationalize the proposed reorganization. There are similar provisions 
that have not been implemented. I would direct you to Section 524, 
which states:

        ``The Secretary of Transportation shall define the roles and 
        responsibilities of the William J. Hughes FAA Technical Center 
        in a manner that is consistent with the defined roles and 
        responsibilities of the Civil Aeromedical Institute.''

    As of the date of this letter, the Department of Transportation has 
not yet posted these congressionally mandated official roles and 
responsibilities. Determining these responsibilities seems an important 
step in developing any strategy related to the Technical Center.
    The question of reorganization that the FAA has presented to the 
Congress is an important one, particularly as it affects the safety of 
the millions of Americans that travel and work via air every year. It 
is the responsibility of the Congress to conduct proper oversight of 
federal agencies to ensure that they are acting in the best interests 
of the American taxpayer and in accordance with the law. On these two 
points the FAA's reorganization does not pass muster, as it has the 
potential to reduce the efficiency of the FAA Technical Center and the 
FAA, hamper federal oversight of the aviation industry, and is beyond 
the authorities that Congress intended to grant in the 2018 
Authorization law.
    Considering the concerns enumerated above, I urge you to withdraw 
the FAA's reprogramming request, and instead develop a forward-looking 
strategy that preserves the efficacy and integrity of the FAA William 
J. Hughes Technical Center and the Federal Aviation Administration.
        Sincerely,
                                             Jeff Van Drew,
                                                Member of Congress.

Cc:
House Committee on Appropriations
Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro--Chair
Congresswoman Kay Granger--Ranking Member
Congressman David Price--Chair--Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing 
and Urban Development
Congressman Mario Diaz-Balart--Ranking Member--Subcommittee on 
Transportation, Housing, and Urban Development

House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Congressman Peter DeFazio--Chair
Congressman Sam Graves--Ranking Member
Congressman Rick Larsen--Chair--Subcommittee on Aviation
Congressman Garret Graves--Ranking Member--Subcommittee on Aviation

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senator Patrick Leahy--Chair
Senator Richard Shelby--Vice Chair
Senator Brian Schatz--Chair--Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing 
and Urban Development
Senator Susan Collins--Ranking Member--Subcommittee on Transportation, 
Housing and Urban Development

Senate Committee on Commerce Science, and Transportation
Senator Maria Cantwell--Chair
Senator Roger Wicker--Ranking Member
Senator Kyrsten Sinema--Chair--Subcommittee on Aviation Safety, 
Operations, and Innovation
Senator Ted Cruz--Ranking Member--Subcommittee on Aviation Safety, 
Operations, and Innovation

    Dr. Van Drew. In short, this proposal is terrible.
    First of all, it is doubtful that the FAA even has the 
authority to do this under the 2018 authorization.
    This deal would kneecap the FAA William J. Hughes Technical 
Center. The technical center produces gold standard results 
through a centralized model. It is a centralized model that 
would be fractured under the FAA's proposal. This would break 
the technical center.
    The proposal also sets the drone industry back at least a 
decade. I can state with absolute confidence that the drone 
industry opposes this.
    Particularly damning is the apparent intention to privatize 
portions of the FAA. And I will say that again: the apparent 
intention to privatize portions of the FAA.
    An FAA memo states that, quote, ``In many cases that 
testing, and evaluation can also be provided by the industry 
for approval by the FAA,'' end quote, and that, quote, ``The 
testing workforce may need to shift to experts under contract 
and consultancy,'' end quote.
    This privatization strategy threatens the FAA's independent 
oversight over the aviation industry. In my letter, I request 
that the FAA's proposal be formally withdrawn.
    Administrator, I make that request again today.
    Several major labor unions have just released a joint 
letter in opposition to the proposal. These unions include but 
are not limited to the National Federation of Federal 
Employees, the International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers, and the American Federation of Government 
Employees.
    Together, these unions represent over 1.4 million American 
workers. Their letter also requests that the FAA withdraw this 
proposal.
    I request to submit this letter to the record as well, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
Letter of October 21, 2021, from the American Federation of Government 
   Employees, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
 Workers, and National Federation of Federal Employees to Hon. Stephen 
 M. Dickson, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, Submitted 
               for the Record by Hon. Jefferson Van Drew
                                                  October 21, 2021.
Hon. Steve Dickson,
Administrator,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW, 
        Washington, DC 20591.
    Dear Administrator Dickson:
    We, the undersigned federal labor unions representing Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) employees, demand that the FAA withdraw 
language in the FY2022 budget reprogramming request that seeks to 
separate and realign research, development, test and evaluation 
functions of the William J. Hughes Technical Center, (``WJHTC''), and 
immediately halt any further efforts to diminish the WJHTC.
    The William J. Hughes Technical Center is a world-renown aviation 
research, development, and test and evaluation facility responsible for 
maintaining and modernizing the U.S. air transportation system. It 
completes its mission through centralized, state-of-the-art 
laboratories, test facilities, and support facilities that optimize 
U.S. air traffic control, communications, navigation, airports, 
aircraft safety, and security. The WJHTC is tasked, among its other 
missions, with supporting the nation's Next Generation Air 
Transportation System, called NextGen.
    It is within the FAA's Congressional and statutory mandate to 
advance the NextGen program that we believe your administration has 
taken liberties from which to augment both spirit and intent of the 
law, to further position federal assets, programs, and jobs for 
weakening and outsourcing. FAA leadership has not been fully 
transparent in its communications with Congress, labor unions, and 
other stakeholders regarding your plans for and movements within WJHTC. 
The budget funding for the System Planning and Resource Management 
program at the WJHTC was slashed by approximately 68% for FY2022, which 
indicates the FAA is already implementing a reorganization. A 
reorganization is inconsistent with appropriation law, appropriation 
acts, and the intent of Congress.
    We adamantly disagree with the claim cited in an FAA response to a 
request from U.S. Representative Jeff Van Drew (NJ-2) to halt the 
dismantling of the Tech Center, that the FAA Reauthorization Act of 
2018 and the sections cited within, Section 545 and 711, provides any 
authority to realign any part of the FAA, much less ``splitting'' the 
William J. Hughes Technical Center into three disparate parts. The 
authority cited in the FAA response is not reflected in the law. The 
law only requires FAA create two positions: Chief Technology Officer 
and Assistant Secretary for Research and Development. The proposed 
splitting or reorganization of the WJHTC is not required for FAA to 
comply with the law.
    Your April 8, 2020 letter to Representative Van Drew made clear 
your goal to make the WJHTC ``an even more attractive partner for 
public-private partnerships with industry''. The work performed by 
union members at the WJHTC is inherently governmental and too important 
to outsource. In their work to preserve the safety of the flying 
public, our federal government researchers are accountable to the 
traveling public and taxpayers, not profiting business leaders or their 
shareholders. The reorganization is seemingly a means to foster 
contracting out at the expense of our members' jobs and directly 
conflicts with President Biden's Executive Order 14025: Worker 
Organizing and Empowerment.
    Without a more detailed response from FAA regarding its plans for 
the WJHTC, it is difficult to determine how many of the 5,000 employees 
at the Tech Center may be affected by a reorganization, splitting, or 
dismantling. However, based on the information we do have, it is 
reasonable to conclude that all employees--among them, more than 1153 
union members from six unions--will endure relocation or termination 
through a Reduction in Force. As the FAA positions federal assets for 
outsourcing, five thousand engineers, research specialists, computer 
scientists, analysts, mathematicians, and other support staff will lose 
their jobs at the Tech Center location.
    We request that you cease immediately any further action on closing 
or splitting or reorganizing the WJHTC.
    For any questions or additional information, please contact any of 
the following union representatives for further assistance: Julie 
Tippens (AFGE) [email redacted], Hasan Soloman (IAMAW) [email 
redacted], Steve Lenkart (NFFE) [email redacted].
        Signed,
                American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE).
     International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 
                                                           (IAMAW).
                   National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE).

  CC: The White House
      U.S. Senator Bob Menendez
      U.S. Senator Cory Booker
      U.S. Representative Jeff Van Drew
      Senate Committee on Appropriations
      Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
      House Committee on Appropriations
      House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

    Dr. Van Drew. Administrator Dickson, I don't believe that 
this proposal is coming from you. I do not believe it is coming 
from you. Nor do I believe that it is even coming from this 
administration. It is crystal clear to me that this proposal is 
emerging from deep-seated DC-based career FAA officials.
    Administrator Dickson, considering the tremendous 
opposition to this proposal, will you withdraw the 
reprogramming request and work with Congress, work with labor, 
work with industry to develop a good-faith proposal that 
actually works for the aviation sector and the American 
taxpayer?
    And, once again, thank you for being here.
    Mr. Dickson. Well, thank you, Congressman Van Drew.
    And I am happy to meet with you and our union partners. I 
meet with them regularly, within the last week, as a matter of 
fact. And I welcome hearing your concerns.
    My goal actually is to strengthen the tech center, to make 
sure that we are undertaking activities there that will benefit 
the aviation industry.
    I also want to assure you that, as this proposal had moved 
forward, it does not affect the function or location of any 
employee's job, tech center or otherwise.
    And this really is a management reporting realignment. It 
is putting the tech center on a more equal footing with our 
aeronautical center in Oklahoma City, which has been a 
tremendous success.
    And I believe this will actually act to strengthen the tech 
center. But I certainly would be interested in hearing your 
thoughts and those of our labor partners as we move forward.
    Mr. Larsen. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Dr. Van Drew. I look forward to that. I have great 
concerns. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. The Chair recognizes Representative Lynch of 
Massachusetts for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me just jump in, in support of Mr. Van Drew. Not what I 
intended to speak on. But I am concerned about regulatory 
capture, as we saw with the 737 MAX and the influence of 
Boeing. That was an instance where a contractor came in and I 
think really bigfooted what should have been independent agency 
review.
    So, for those reasons, I am inclined to agree with Mr. Van 
Drew, and I would like to be part of that conversation to 
maintain that independence among FAA employees.
    I have had an opportunity to visit the tech center. And I 
appreciate the good work that you are doing, Administrator, and 
as well the good people at the tech center.
    I really want to talk about the Civil Aviation Registry 
operated by the FAA. As you know, we have had some troubling 
incidents with U.S.-registered aircraft.
    And this goes back to 2014. We found out through a bank 
that the FAA had given a tail number to an individual who was 
funded by Hezbollah.
    We had another situation where the FAA had given a tail 
number to an individual whose aircraft was in Tehran during a 
time when we had sanctions against them.
    We had another situation where another U.S. aircraft, 
commercial aircraft--I am sorry--civil aircraft was found on 
the tarmac in Libya when we had a no-fly zone in effect against 
Libyan rebels.
    We had a situation where Wells Fargo Bank represented the 
individuals affiliated with the Sinaloa Cartel, and they were 
given registration of aircraft.
    So, I have a bill that would address some of the 
insecurities that have been found to be present in our current 
registration program. It requires beneficial ownership to be 
established in terms of who the actual people in control of 
that aircraft would be.
    So, I am hoping to get some support from the FAA to try to 
tackle that problem. Maybe it is not my bill. But we have got 
to figure out a way to do this.
    I think if 9/11 taught us anything is that there is a 
certain vulnerability there with respect to our aircraft. And 
now that we have drones, as well, in the mix, I think this is a 
clear and present danger to our national security.
    So, I am wondering if you have any thoughts on that, about 
tightening up our Civil Aviation Registry.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you, Congressman. And actually, we would 
look forward to working with you on that.
    The only caveat I would say is we are working very hard on 
the new registry system, which is sorely needed, and there have 
been some technical challenges there. So, I would want to make 
sure that we don't set back that effort, because that is 
something that needs to get across the finish line.
    So, we would look forward very much to having that dialogue 
with you.
    And if I might, just for 30 seconds, a question that you 
and Congressman Van Drew raised about the tech center.
    I want to make it clear that no one is delegating any 
safety responsibility in this proposal. Prior to any federally 
procured system going into the national airspace, it is 
validated and approved by FAA technical professionals. And that 
will not change under this proposal.
    So that is not part of what we will be talking about here.
    Mr. Lynch. OK. I will take that at face value. I would like 
to drill down on it a little bit more----
    Mr. Dickson. Sure.
    Mr. Lynch [continuing]. Just in terms of where the lines of 
responsibility begin and end. I think that would be helpful to 
just reassuring people that what you say is, in fact, accurate 
and that we all understand where the lines have been drawn.
    Administrator, thank you for your testimony.
    Mr. Chairman, my time has expired, and I yield back. Thank 
you.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Representative Lynch.
    I now recognize Representative Johnson of Georgia for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
holding this hearing.
    As FAA implements the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act, I am concerned about how difficult it is 
going to be to get Boeing to improve its safety culture. Our 
737 MAX investigation raised serious questions about Boeing's 
willingness to learn critical lessons and change the way it 
does business to improve safety.
    Mr. Dickson, when committee staff interviewed Boeing's 
then-vice president of propulsion, an individual who was 
responsible for the general management of the MAX development, 
including engineering and manufacturing, he said that he 
considered the development of the MAX a success, despite two 
deadly crashes that killed 346 people and MAX planes being 
grounded for more than 1 year.
    When committee staff interviewed Boeing's chief project 
engineer for the 737 MAX program, he admitted that at the time 
he approved MCAS, he was not aware that MCAS operated from a 
single angle-of-attack sensor, that MCAS could activate 
repeatedly, or that it took one of Boeing's own test pilots 
more than 10 seconds to respond to an MCAS activation in a 
flight simulator, resulting in what the pilot described as 
catastrophic consequences.
    Again, this was the chief project engineer who approved 
MCAS. Yet Boeing went on to appoint this same person to be the 
chief project engineer of the new 777X.
    Are you aware, Mr. Dickson, of these facts and statements 
from Boeing personnel?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, Congressman, I am.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. What do you think of them and of 
the movement of the MAX 737 chief project engineer to the same 
position for the 777X?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, as I have said previously, our 
oversight of Boeing has fundamentally changed. We have retained 
certain safety-critical functions for these certification 
projects. We have retained the airworthiness certificates on 
the 737 MAX aircraft. We are instituting a Technical Advisory 
Board for the 777X, which will give us an independent 
validation of our work.
    We have also increased our involvement on the certification 
of designs related to continued operational safety issues, and 
we are meeting daily with Boeing on the performance of its 
global fleet.
    And, again, a number of systems and process improvements 
have been put in place. And we have also increased the 
proportion of our engineering personnel in the Boeing 
Certificate Management Office, which oversees production, and 
added additional management to the Boeing safety oversight 
organization as well.
    But I will be the first to say that this requires continued 
vigilance, and that work is not done. Boeing safety management 
system, we conduct regular reviews, and we are looking at their 
safety data on a regular basis. And they are producing and 
doing what they need to do, but there is more to be done.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. All right. Thank you.
    If Boeing considers the 737 MAX program a success and the 
same individual responsible for approving MCAS is now in charge 
of Boeing's new 777X, what is the FAA doing as part of its 
implementation of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act to get Boeing to improve its safety culture 
and ensure that the 777X doesn't suffer the same fate as the 
737 MAX?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, again, these are systematic improvements 
so that an individual or a failure in an individual process 
cannot result in a consequential safety impact.
    And that redundancy is built into the safety management 
system. It is built into the data and the reporting that Boeing 
is now generating that the FAA has visibility into. It is part 
of the reset of the relationship. And that will continue going 
forward as Boeing's safety management system matures.
    These cultural changes require constant vigilance. And my 
experience in the airline industry is it takes some time for 
all levels of the organization to be fully executing on these 
estimate processes. And that is what we are focused on, is 
making sure that the process matures accordingly to produce a 
safe product.
    Mr. Larsen. The Representative's time has expired.
    Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen. The Chair calls on Congresswoman Norton, who 
expressed an interest in questions.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. Administrator, just give us a moment.
    Mr. Dickson. OK.
    Mr. Larsen. So Representative Norton is not present as it 
turns out. So that concludes the questions from most--OK. Hold 
on. She just got on, Administrator. This is part of the dance 
of Zoom, if you just give us a moment.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. So we will wait until she comes up on the 
screen.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. We are still here, just waiting.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. Let's call on Congresswoman Norton again to see 
if she is going to come up. If not, then----
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman?
    Mr. Larsen. Yes.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. While we are waiting, could I ask 
for a U.C.?
    Mr. Larsen. Sure. Representative Graves.
    Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask 
unanimous consent that a document that has been included by 
some of the victims' families be included in the record of the 
hearing titled ``FAA Document Confirms.''
    Mr. Larsen. That is fine. Without objection, we will 
include that in the hearing record.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
 Fact Sheet Titled ``FAA Document Confirms It Wasn't The Pilots,'' by 
the Flight ET302 Families Foundation, Submitted for the Record by Hon. 
                             Garret Graves


               FAA Document Confirms It Wasn't the Pilots
            FAA: Boeing was required to make six design changes to 
                    correct unsafe conditions of the original 737 Max 
                    design.
    This FAA document confirms \1\ that Boeing was required to make six 
design changes to correct the unsafe conditions that existed in the 
original 737 Max design. The design fixes, as well as training 
enhancements and one maintenance issue were needed to correct the 
unsafe condition and return the 737 Max to service. Any suggestion that 
pilot error was the cause of the crashes is false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Summary of the FAA's Review of the Boeing 737 Max'', 
subtitled, ``Return to Service of the Boeing 737 Max Aircraft'', dated 
November 18, 2020 (Page 76-78)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. FAA Conclusion
    Following a thorough, transparent and inclusive process, the FAA 
determined that Boeing's changes to the 737 MAX design, flightcrew 
procedures and maintenance procedures effectively mitigate the 
airplane-related safety issues that contributed to the Flight 610 and 
Flight 302 accidents.

* * *
13.1 Safety Issue #1: Use of Single Angle of Attack (AOA) Sensor
    In the original design, erroneous data from a single AOA sensor 
activated MCAS and subsequently caused airplane nose-down trim of the 
horizontal stabilizer. In the new design, Boeing eliminated MCAS 
reliance on a single AOA sensor signal by using both AOA sensor inputs 
and through flight-control law changes that include safeguards against 
failed or erroneous AOA indications. The updated FCC software with 
revised flight-control laws uses inputs from both AOA sensors to 
activate MCAS. This is in contrast to the original MCAS design, which 
relied on data from only one sensor at a time, and allowed repeated 
MCAS activation as a result of input from a single AOA sensor. The 
updated FCC software compares the inputs from the two sensors to detect 
a failed AOA sensor. If the difference between the AOA sensor inputs is 
above a calculated threshold, the FCC will disable the STS, including 
its MCAS function, for the remainder of that flight and provide a 
corresponding indication of such deactivation on the flight deck.
13.2 Safety Issue #2: MCAS Reset Generates Repetitive MCAS Commands
    In the original design, when a continuous erroneous high AOA sensor 
value existed, the MCAS control law used pilot release of the electric 
trim switch to reset MCAS activation. Once reset, the MCAS system would 
make another airplane nose-down stabilizer trim command after five 
seconds. This scenario would repeat each time the MCAS made a command 
and the pilot made an electric trim command of any duration and 
released the trim switch. In the new design, Boeing included flight-
control law changes to ensure that MCAS will not command repeated 
movements of the horizontal stabilizer. The revised flight-control laws 
allow only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event. A 
subsequent activation of MCAS is only possible after the airplane 
returns to a low-AOA state, below the threshold that would cause MCAS 
activation.
13.3 Safety Issue #3 MCAS Trim Authority
    In the original design, all MCAS commands were incremental 
commands, which moved the horizontal stabilizer a fixed amount 
regardless of the current position of the stabilizer. Therefore, 
multiple MCAS commands resulted in a significant horizontal stabilizer 
mistrim condition, which the flightcrew could not counter using only 
elevator control. In the new design, Boeing included flight-control law 
changes that limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the 
horizontal stabilizer, so that the final horizontal stabilizer position 
(after the MCAS command) preserves the flightcrew's ability to control 
the airplane pitch by using only the control column.
13.4 Safety Issue #4 Flightcrew Recognition and Response
    FDR data from both accidents show that the flight crews were unable 
to effectively manage the stabilizer movement and multiple flight-deck 
effects that occurred as a result of the single AOA sensor failure. In 
the new design, Boeing revised eight non-normal flight crew procedures 
and proposed additional training. The revised flight crew procedures 
and pilot training provide the pilot with additional information to 
recognize erroneous stabilizer movement and the effects of AOA sensor 
failures.
13.5 Safety Issue #5 AOA DISAGREE Message
    In the originally delivered configuration, the AOA DISAGREE alert 
message on the Primary Flight Display was not functional unless the 
airline chose the AOA indicator option. This alert message is intended 
to be standard on all 737 MAX airplanes. In the new design, Boeing 
revised the AOA DISAGREE implementation to maintain the original design 
intent to be standard on all 737 MAX aircraft. The FAA is requiring an 
additional software update that alerts the flight crew to a 
disagreement between the two AOA sensors due to a sensor failure or 
calibration issues. The updated software implements an AOA DISAGREE 
alert message on all 737 MAX airplanes. While the lack of an AOA 
DISAGREE alert message is not an unsafe condition itself, the FAA is 
mandating this software update because the flightcrew procedures now 
rely on this alert message to guide flightcrew action.
13.6 Safety Issue #6 Other Possible Stabilizer Runaway Failures
    The FAA and Boeing conducted a comprehensive review of the 
integrated SSA of the MCAS function. This review identified an 
extremely remote failure condition that required timely pilot 
intervention to ensure continued safe flight and landing. In the new 
design, Boeing has implemented a Cross-FCC Trim Monitor, which can 
effectively detect and shut down erroneous stabilizer commands from the 
FCCs. This makes continued safe flight and landing for this type of 
failure not dependent on pilot reaction time.

Some say that the pilots could and should have used cutout switches. 
However, cutout switches were used in the ET302 crash, but because the 
auto throttle also malfunctioned as a result of the faulty AOA sensor 
(leading to excessive speed), the cutout switches did not help the 
situation.

Contact: Nadia Milleron, mother of ET302 victim Samya Rose Stumo
[phone and email redacted]

    Mr. Larsen. Well, with indulgence, Administrator, I do have 
some followup questions while we are waiting for Congresswoman 
Norton. None of these will come probably as a surprise to you 
in terms of the subject matter. But if you are prepared to 
answer these.
    The committee investigation found the FAA neither received 
sufficient information from the manufacturer about the MCAS on 
the 737 MAX--for the record, that is Maneuvering 
Characteristics Augmentation System--nor did the FAA receive 
information through appropriate channels.
    So, what changes to the process has the FAA done to ensure 
that manufacturers disclose all appropriate information to the 
FAA during the certification process?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Chair Larsen, I spoke to this somewhat 
in the dialogue about our interaction, our changes in the way 
that we oversee Boeing. And the safety management system, once 
it is in place, it put certain reporting requirements in place 
based on the data that is in their design and production 
systems.
    So, we have worked very closely with them. And as I said, 
we meet daily. We are going beyond our normal continued 
operational safety process to monitor the performance of the 
fleet around the world in near realtime.
    We are also having dialogue with their customers to make 
sure that the relationship with the airlines that are operating 
their aircraft, to see what they are hearing.
    So, we are getting at this through several different 
mechanisms to make sure that that information is coming to us 
in a timely fashion as these projects move forward.
    Mr. Larsen. And on the safety management system rule, you 
discussed the SMS and the voluntary SMS. But when will the FAA 
publish a rule on SMS?
    Mr. Dickson. We expect to have an NPRM----
    Ms. Norton. How can I get the sound?
    Mr. Larsen. Sorry. Congresswoman Norton, if you could mute 
for now and I will call on you when my questions are done. 
Thank you.
    Administrator?
    Mr. Dickson. Yes, I will follow up with you on more details 
on what we expect the timeline to be. I believe, as I recall, 
the final rule is slated for 2024, roughly. So, we would expect 
to see an NPRM out probably sometime late next year. It may be 
late 2023, but I have got to confirm that.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    And can you clarify the ODA system with regards to 
appointing unit members that you are--the deadline is January 1 
next year, 2022, a couple months. But I understand you expect 
to issue final policy documents for manufacturers and FAA 
employees in February 2022. Is that accurate?
    Mr. Dickson. That is correct. We have already issued 
specific direction for the appointment of unit members and 
advisers within the last 10 days, I believe.
    Mr. Larsen. All right.
    And then my final question, before we go to Congresswoman 
Norton. The bill requires FAA to take leadership in evaluating 
pilot training and standards, as you know. FAA also must ensure 
airplane manufacturers, engineers, and pilots fully assess 
human factors.
    Can you be specific about the progress made on implementing 
those requirements with regards to incorporating human factors 
into requirements?
    Mr. Dickson. Sure. We are, first of all, we are requiring 
air carrier pilots to, in terms of pilot training, to regularly 
demonstrate manual flight operation skills. They do it in all 
training programs, initial, upgrade, and recurrent.
    In March of 2019, we required pilots to complete Upset 
Prevention and Recovery Training. I mentioned this in response 
to Congressman Sam Graves' question earlier.
    We are also drafting, and it is near completion, a new 
advisory circular on flightpath management. This will provide 
guidance tied to air carrier training requirements on manual 
flying skills, managing automation, energy management, and 
situational awareness and pilot monitoring.
    Also, consistent with congressional direction, we tasked 
our Airman Certification System Working Group to complete an 
airman certification standards call to action, and this brings 
members together to review how current standards affect pilot 
competency in manual flying skills.
    And then, finally, I think to the last portion of your 
question, any delegation of safety-critical systems that have a 
human factors interface, we have retained the delegation of 
those until the applicant demonstrates what the underlying 
assumptions are and that we have reviewed and approved what 
those are.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you.
    And now I am going to turn to Congresswoman Norton for 5 
minutes.
    You are recognized.
    [Pause.]
    Mr. Larsen. Congresswoman Norton, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Norton. I am sorry. I was on mute.
    My question, Administrator Dickson, is related to retention 
and recruitment of FAA certification oversight staff.
    Section 104(f)(1) of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, 
and Accountability Act reads, and I am quoting here, sir, ``Not 
later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this title, 
the Administrator shall begin collaboration with the exclusive 
bargaining representatives of engineers, safety inspectors, 
systems safety specialists, and other qualified technical 
experts certified under section 7111 of title 5, United States 
Code, to improve recruitment of employees for, and to implement 
retention incentives for employees holding, positions with 
respect to the certification of aircraft, aircraft engines, 
propellers, and appliances.'' That is pretty long, but that is 
the quote.
    The FAA has briefed Congress and FAA unions in recent 
months and indicated that the FAA initiated collaboration 
through individual meetings with NATCA, PASS, and AFSCME in 
February 2021, and the FAA coordinated with the Office of Human 
Resources Management to identify flexibilities and initiatives 
that support recruitment and retention activities.
    May I ask you, what specifically has the Federal Aviation 
Administration done to collaborate with labor unions that 
represent the engineers, safety inspectors, system safety 
specialists, and other qualified technical experts to improve 
the recruitment of employees for and to implement the retention 
incentives for employees holding positions with respect to 
certification of aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and 
appliances?
    Mr. Dickson. Well, Congresswoman Norton, it is good to see 
you again. Saw each other when we had that gate 35X out of DCA. 
It is resting in peace now with the new concourse out there. So 
that was a big day. So, again, nice to see you.
    Yes, you are absolutely right, we are always collaborating 
with our unions. It is the right thing to do. And it was 
required by the legislation.
    We have engaged with them to refine and extend our 
recruitment and retention incentives for these critical skill 
sets and identify also the training needs.
    There is always a concern, rightfully so, when we bring in 
folks maybe with varying backgrounds and experience levels into 
areas that traditionally have had a lot of experience in the 
aerospace industry, and maybe even a second career in some 
case, so that we make sure that they are successful when they 
come into the agency.
    So that has been very important. The Deputy Administrator 
and I collaborate. In fact, we met with our unions as a group 
last week and do so on a regular basis. They are supporting us 
through all of our outreach programs, our recruiting.
    And we are looking at ways where we can use some of the 
independent authorities that we have, because we, if done 
correctly, we do have some more flexibility than other parts of 
the Federal Government to do direct hires and targeted hiring 
in some areas.
    And I can tell you, I have been very personally involved as 
well, not only with labor, but in these outreach efforts. And 
we have actually used virtual means to expand our outreach and 
meet people where they are during the pandemic.
    So, we will continue to do that.
    Ms. Norton. Yes, we have heard from at least one labor 
union representing FAA workers that there has not been true 
collaboration and very little proactive engagement from the 
safety line of business on this initiative.
    What is your response to this? And how will you improve FAA 
engagement with labor unions?
    Mr. Dickson. I am not aware of that, but I am very 
interested in that perspective. And so, I would love to work 
with your office to see where that might be coming from and 
what we can do to address it.
    Ms. Norton. I will be in touch with you about that labor 
union, and I very much appreciate your cooperation.
    Thank you very much.
    Mr. Dickson. Thank you.
    Ms. Norton. I yield back.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton.
    And that is a reminder as well, her questions remind me, 
Administrator, that as you implement SMS, as you prepare a rule 
on SMS, I think it is important, as well, that the women and 
men who are working in the facilities, building, designing, and 
assembling these aircraft, are an active part of the safety 
management system. And their input is going to be critical to 
ensuring long-term safety improvements as well.
    So, with that, I want to thank the Administrator for 
joining us today. That concludes our hearing. I want to thank 
our witness again for his testimony. The comments have been 
informative and very helpful and have given us some things to 
follow up on, as well as for you.
    And I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's 
hearing remain open until such time as our witness has provided 
answers to any questions that may have been submitted to him in 
writing.
    I also ask unanimous consent the record remain open for 15 
days for any additional comments and information submitted by 
Members or the witness to be included in the record of today's 
hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    And the Subcommittee on Aviation now stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              

 Prepared Statement of Hon. Eddie Bernice Johnson, a Representative in 
                    Congress from the State of Texas
    Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Larsen and Ranking Member Graves 
for holding today's hearing as this committee continues its 
investigation into the tragic Boeing airline crashes in Indonesia in 
October 2018, and in Ethiopia, in March 2019. I also want to thank the 
Honorable FAA Administrator, Mr. Stephen Dickson, for his testimony.
    As we solemnly approach the 3rd anniversary of the 2018 Boeing 
airline crash in Indonesia, wherein Lion Air Flight 610 crashed shortly 
after taking off from Jakarta, killing all 189 passengers and crew 
members on board, to this day it still seems somewhat mindboggling to 
me why the FAA would have delegated the certification of something so 
critical to airplane safety as the ``maneuvering characteristics 
augmentation system'' or MCAS, to Boeing in the first place.
    The aftermath of the airline crashes also resulted in terrible 
administrative and logistical chaos, which affected all airlines across 
the nation. Southwest Airlines, based in my congressional district in 
Dallas, was perhaps the most adversely affected given that they are the 
biggest operator and customer of 737 Max planes, and had grounded their 
entire fleet for nearly two years.
Potential Questions for Witness Stephen Dickson, Administrator, FAA:
    Mr. Dickson, in a Department of Transportation OIG report following 
the Boeing airline crashes, the report ``revealed numerous shortcomings 
in the FAA's process for certifying the safety of new airplane designs, 
including derivatives of 50-year-old airframes.''
    1)  Does the FAA support and continue to practice the retrofitting 
of airplanes? What is your current policy on this?
    2)  Mr. Dickson, since Southwest Airlines and American Airlines 
both have a large presence in the Dallas metro area, and both operate 
large 737 MAX fleets, is the FAA closely monitoring the reliability of 
737 MAX airplanes to immediately detect any safety issues and ensure 
they are corrected quickly? If so, have any such issues arisen?

    Mr. Dickson, in your testimony you mention that ``the FAA is 
prioritizing the oversight of manufacturers and is working to focus 
that oversight on safety in critical areas, while, among other items, 
demanding more transparency from them.''
    3)  In what ways has your relationship with the manufacturers 
changed and what types of transparency are you demanding?
    4)  Mr. Dickson, in what ways specifically is the FAA striving to 
strengthen risk management practices and improve communication between 
air and manufacturing industries and the FAA?

    Mr. Dickson, with respect to increased global collaboration, in 
your testimony you say that the ``FAA is working closely with the 
International Civil Aviation Organization and others to influence and 
adjust the maintenance and pilot training requirements for U.S. 
products operating under the oversight of another civil aviation 
authority.''
    5)  Can you provide the committee with specific examples of these 
adjustments?

    Mr. Dickson, with respect to data collection, in your testimony you 
say that ``the FAA's new contract with the Transportation Research 
Board will aid the agency's effort to conduct analysis and reporting on 
current and emerging safety trends in aviation.''
    6)  Are you able to provide the committee with one or two specific 
examples of the types of safety data being collected and how it will 
prove beneficial towards the goal of identifying potential hazards and 
safety issues before they lead to a serious incident?

    Mr. Dickson, you mention in your testimony that in April of this 
year the FAA began a ``Voluntary Safety Reporting Program to provide a 
mechanism for employees to voluntarily report potential hazards and 
safety concerns without fear of reprisal.''
    7)  I am curious to know if, in your estimation, this practice has 
been successful thus far and what kind of employee feedback have you 
received?

                                 
 Statement of Paul Hudson, President, FlyersRights.org, Submitted for 
                  the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
                                                  November 2, 2021.
                    Background and Basis for Hearing
    In this oversight hearing, FAA Administrator Steve Dickson appeared 
remotely as the only witness to answer Committee Members' questions and 
concerns about what the FAA has been doing since the Lion Air Crash.
    A Boeing 737 MAX jetliner crashed killing all on board in October 
2018. A second crash in March 2019 also killing all on board, for a 
total of 346 lives lost, was due to the same cause: powerful software 
coupled with faulty sensors meant to correct design flaws in the MAX. 
The system known as MCAS, hidden by Boeing from pilots and largely from 
the FAA until after the second crash, would take control from pilots to 
prevent stalls when sensors told the software the aircraft was pitching 
up in danger of a stall and it would mimic the handling of earlier 
versions of the 737 during regular flight. After the second crash, the 
MAX was grounded worldwide, notwithstanding repeated assurances by 
Boeing that it was still safe. It was ungrounded and re-certified as 
safe by the FAA until November 2020 based on largely secret changes and 
testing.
    This hearing was also meant to address the lack of rulemaking by 
the FAA on approximately 100 Congressional mandates, often going back 
many years.
      Lack of Transparency in MAX and other FAA safety regulation
    Both the FAA and Boeing since 2019 repeatedly specifically promised 
transparency to the media and to Congress under oath throughout the 737 
MAX ungrounding process.
    However, in FlyersRights.org's Freedom of Information Act 
litigation against the FAA, the FAA claimed that it cannot or will not 
release many thousands of pages of documents pertaining to the changes 
made to the MAX and to the testing performed on the MAX. The FAA makes 
the implausible claim that all of the redacted material, usually entire 
pages, are either proprietary information or non-proprietary 
information that cannot be reasonably segregated from proprietary 
information.
    The FAA makes this claim based solely on Boeing's claims that this 
material is proprietary business information and Boeing's alleged 
belief that it submitted this information to the government with an 
implied promise of confidentiality. Under the Supreme Court's Argus 
Leader decision in 2019 concerning proprietary information and FOIA 
Exemption 4, the government may withhold information from public 
disclosure under FOIA if a private company merely had the subjective 
belief that the information within the submission constitutes 
proprietary information and that it received an express or implied 
promise of confidentiality.
    This interpretation of the FOIA statute allows a federal agency 
that does not want to publicly release any information to withhold all 
information on the most spurious of claims. The erosion of FOIA could 
not be more obvious than it is in this case. Since the 737 MAX crashes, 
the Boeing Company has paid $2.5 billion in fines and compensation to 
airlines and victim family members for criminal fraud in obtaining 
original FAA certification for the Boeing 737 MAX. However, Boeing's 
assertion is treated as determinative even though, according to the 
U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case:

        The misleading statements, half-truths, and omissions 
        communicated by Boeing employees to the FAA impeded the 
        government's ability to ensure the safety of the flying public. 
        This case sends a clear message: The Department of Justice will 
        hold manufacturers like Boeing accountable for defrauding 
        regulators--especially in industries where the stakes are this 
        high.

    So although Boeing has been punished for defrauding the FAA, Boeing 
continues to enjoy the fruits of the fraud by having its claims of 
proprietary information respected by the FAA. Can Boeing have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for fraudulent information or 
information provided in furtherance of fraud?
    FAA, for its part, has a documented history of being misled by 
Boeing and for having too cozy of a relationship with its regulated 
entity. Numerous instances of this are detailed in the Department of 
Justice Deferred Prosecution Agreement and the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Committee's September 2020 report, ``The Design, 
Development & Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX.'' Despite promising 
transparency in the aftermath of its single biggest failure in its 
history, one that exposes the potential for future safety deficiencies, 
the FAA has decided to treat as gospel the assertions made by its 
regulated entity, the criminal felon, Boeing.
    This not only illustrated how the FOIA statute needs updating, 
modernizing, or clarification, but that known safety risks continue to 
exist at Boeing, FAA, and in aircraft certification. Between the DOT 
Inspector General Report, the House Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee Report, numerous Congressional hearings, and public 
disclosures in litigation, no one can say that they are not aware of 
these problems.
    The 10/21/2021 House Transportation and Infrastructure hearing 
could have been an opportunity to probe specific actions that the FAA 
has and has not taken. Instead, Administrator Dickson was able to give 
vague assertions that the agency ``was working on'' any topic that a 
Member of Congress brought up.
   FAA failure to set seat standards or update emergency evacuation 
                               procedures
    Another important issue not remarked upon in the hearing is the 
issue of emergency evacuation safety and seat size. The 2018 FAA 
Reauthorization Act gave the FAA one year to establish minimum seat 
standards needed for passenger safety. Two years have passed since this 
deadline and the FAA has not publicly released any standards or 
progress. The Act also required the FAA to evaluate and modernize its 
emergency evacuation standards. Again, the FAA has not submitted its 
report to Congress and has not publicly released the May 2020 report 
submitted by the FAA Emergency Evacuation Standards Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee to the FAA.
        Needed reforms to enforce Congressional mandates on FAA
    The FAA, as the Aviation Subcommittee is well aware, has a long 
history of ignoring Congressional mandates and deadlines, especially 
for rulemaking. And such mandates are most often enacted only after the 
agency has ignored or rejected stakeholder pleas for action. 
Flyersrights.org and its predecessor the Aviation Consumer Action 
Project having represented passengers and the general public on safety 
issues before the FAA for decades has seen this ingrained pattern 
repeated constantly.
    In the case of emergency evacuation delays goes back at least to 
2005, in the case of setting reasonable seat and passenger space 
standards to 2015 and in the case of enforcement of helicopter 
crashworthiness standards for over 20 years.
    The solution in our view involves using the Congress' power of the 
purse in FAA appropriation bills to prohibit spending on non-
Congressional mandates until Congressional mandates are completed. This 
could include prohibiting spending on processing waiver and exemption 
requests for existing FAA rules. The FAA Office of Rulemaking expends 
considerable resources on this activity granting 250 to 500 such 
requests annually based on industry requests.
    Such enforcement mechanism were common in past decades by the 
Transportation Appropriation subcommittees, particularly under the 
chairmanship of the late Senator Lautenberg but have fallen into 
disuse.
References
1.  Boeing Deferred Prosecution Agreement: https://www.justice.gov/opa/
    pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-pay-over-25-
    billion

2.  Lead Boeing Prosecutor Joins Boeing Corporate Criminal Defense Firm 
    Kirkland & Ellis, Corporate Crime Reporter: https://
    www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/lead-boeing-prosecutor-
    joins-boeing-corporate-criminal-defense-firm-kirkland-ellis/

3.  Flyers Rights Education Fund v. FAA, 19-3749, (D.D.C. 2021)

4.  The Design, Development & Certification of the Boeing 737 MAX, 
    House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Report, September 
    2020: https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
    2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX
    %20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf

5.  FAA's Process for Updating Its Aircraft Evacuation Standards Lacks 
    Data Collection and Analysis on Current Evacuation Risks, 
    Department of Transportation Office of the Inspector General, 
    September 16, 2020: https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/38012

6.  Weaknesses in FAA's Certification and Delegation Processes Hindered 
    Its Oversight of the 737 MAX 8, Department of Transportation Office 
    of the Inspector General, February 23, 2021: https://
    www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/38302

7.  Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, No. 18-481 (2019) 
    https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-481_5426.pdf

Paul Hudson
President, FlyersRights.org
Member, FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (1993-present)
Member, FAA Emergency Evacuation Advisory Rulemaking Committee (2019 to 
present)
1030 15th St NW #292
Washington, DC 20005
[email and phone number redacted]

                                 
                      Boeing 2013 Meeting Minutes,
             Submitted for the Record by Hon. Greg Stanton

[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


       Question from Hon. Sam Graves to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, 
             Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

    Question 1. As you are aware, the last FAA Reauthorization requires 
that towers that pose an obvious risk to aircraft operations be clearly 
marked and/or included in the FAA's database by April 5, 2020. I 
understand that despite Congressional direction, the FAA has no plans 
to carry out this mandate in the foreseeable future. Can I get your 
commitment today that the FAA will implement this provision with 
appropriate urgency?
    Answer. We are working through this rulemaking though there have 
been challenges over the years. I understand there was direction in 
2016 that created a wide array of towers that were supposed to be 
marked and then the 2018 bill narrowed that list down while 
establishing the requirement for a database to include the location of 
various kinds of towers. One of the central challenges we have faced 
implementing this rule is obtaining the necessary safety data and cost-
benefit benefit information to support rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedures Act. While we work on that, we have 
identified an existing FAA maintained obstruction database that will be 
able to present the information required in the bill. Until a rule is 
in place, it will be voluntary for structures under 200 feet to be 
placed in the database but we will continue to work through these 
issues.

     Question from Hon. Garret Graves to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, 
             Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

    Question 1. Administrator Dickson, as I stated during the hearing, 
it was not Congress' intent to transfer primary investigative authority 
for whistleblower retaliation to the Office of Audit and Investigation 
(AAE) under section 133 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act (Public Law 116-260). Instead, as section 
106(t)(3)(A)(vi) clearly states, AAE may only ``investigate allegations 
of whistleblower retaliation by employees of the Agency that have been 
delegated to the Office by the Office of Investigations and 
Professional Responsibility, the inspector general of the Department of 
Transportation, or the Office of Special Counsel.'' While this clause 
permits the delegation of whistleblower retaliation investigations to 
AAE, it does not require such delegation. Does FAA agree with this 
understanding of the law?
    Answer. Yes. Section 106(t) of title 49, U.S. Code, as revised by 
section 133 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability 
Act (Public Law 116-260), states that the Office of Whistleblower 
Protection and Aviation Safety Investigations shall, ``investigate 
allegations of whistleblower retaliation by employees of the Agency 
that have been delegated to the Office by the Office of Investigations 
and Professional Responsibility, the inspector general of the 
Department of Transportation, or the Office of Special Counsel.'' 
Further, as you noted, nothing in the text of section 106(t) requires 
the delegation of whistleblower retaliation investigations to the 
Office of Whistleblower Protection and Aviation Safety Investigations.
    The FAA is continuing its work to implement all of the requirements 
under section 133 of the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and 
Accountability Act.

      Questions from Hon. Scott Perry to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, 
             Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

    Following up on your October 20, 2021, response to the September 
23, 2021, letter sent by myself and my colleagues:
    Question 1. What is the name and title of the CBP official who 
submitted the request for the TFR?
    Answer. Pursuant to the agreement between CBP and the FAA, the CBP 
submitted this request for a TFR via a generic CBP email address to a 
FAA group inbox specifically for TFR requests.

    Question 2. Your response makes it appear that FAA assumed the 
validity of the CBP request, was the basis of the request ever verified 
by FAA?
    a.  Is it FAA policy to assume the validity of the request?
    Answer. As stated in the FAA previous letter, the FAA has TFR 
agreements with the Department of Defense and various U.S. Federal 
security and intelligence agencies, including, but not limited to, CBP. 
These interagency security partners may request a TFR via the 
established procedures and communication channels between FAA and 
interagency security partners. As previously stated, the request was 
received from a CBP email address.
    The FAA follows the procedures and processes contained in the 
applicable regulations and interagency security partner agreements when 
issuing TFRs. The FAA works with its interagency security partners on 
the assumption that incoming TFR requests have a valid legal basis, and 
are made in good faith and in support of the interagency security 
partner's mission and the interests of the U.S. more generally.
    However, when appropriate, the FAA will follow-up with the 
requesting agency and adjust the size and scope of the restriction, as 
appropriate, based upon the hazard/risk identified by the requesting 
agency. For example, based upon the language in the request, the FAA 
may decide to verify that the hazard/risk necessitates restrictions on 
access to the requested amount of airspace identified by the requesting 
agency and/or should cover the full scope of kinds of aircraft 
requested.
    In this situation, the FAA evaluated the original request for a TFR 
and reached out to CBP for additional information. The original request 
for a TFR covered additional types of aircraft. CBP explained the basis 
for its request specifically related to operators operating unmanned 
aircraft in a reckless or malicious manner and interfering with the 
operation of other aircraft. Based upon those hazards, the FAA narrowed 
the restriction to just unmanned aircraft.

    b.  If so, what is the justification of that policy?
    Answer. As discussed above, the FAA assumes that its partner 
agencies are acting in good faith; however, the FAA may validate the 
amount of airspace requested for the restriction and the kinds of 
aircraft that are restricted.

    Question 3. You stated, ``In the last five years, FAA has received 
and processed more than 1,200 CBP requests for TFRs.'' How many of 
those were granted?
    Answer. The FAA has received and processed 1,200 TFR requests from 
CBP in the last 5 years. All 1,200 TFR requests received during this 
timeframe were granted.

    Question 4. You stated, ``By limiting sUAS operations to known 
remote pilots, CBP officers were able to more easily identify 
unauthorized sUAS being operated in US airspace within the TFR from 
either side of the border by remote pilots attempting to track law 
enforcement and to communicate with groups of migrants attempting to 
avoid detection and evade detention, i.e., using drones to direct 
migrants to evade law enforcement.''
    a.  Do UAS operations conducted by criminal enterprises to avoid 
law enforcement abide by TFRs?
    Answer. TFRs provide a sorting mechanism whereby illegal operations 
are easier to identify because they tend not to abide by TFRs.

    b.  How many violations have been noted? How many have been 
prosecuted?
    Answer. We are working on gathering this information, and will 
follow-up with a response separately.

    c.  How many aircraft illegally present in US airspace on the US 
border have been interdicted?
    Answer. CBP and other national security and law enforcement 
agencies are responsible for interdictions. The FAA does not track this 
information.

    Question 5. You stated, ``On Thursday, September 16, 2021, CBP 
requested FAA to establish a TFR over the area of the law enforcement 
activity for the safety and security of responding officers and to 
further the efforts of CBP to maintain border security.'' It's pretty 
apparent to everyone that there was no actual law enforcement activity 
occurring--no one was stopping folks from coming into the country--and 
that there was little to no effort to maintain border security in the 
region. Given this, what were the alleged law enforcement activities 
that required the TFR? Did CBP tell the FAA what activities were 
occurring or were they assumed to be occurring without validation?
    Answer. As stated above, the FAA follows the procedures and 
processes contained in the applicable regulations and interagency 
security partner agreements when issuing TFRs. The FAA works with its 
interagency security partners on the assumption that incoming TFR 
requests have a valid legal basis, and are made in good faith and in 
support of the interagency security partner's mission and the interests 
of the U.S. more generally.

    Question 6. Your response indicates that FAA is working on 
gathering and reviewing the requested documents related to my letter 
and will follow up with these documents separately. If they are not 
included in response to these questions for the record, what is the 
timeline for sending these documents?
    Answer. The FAA is working, in coordination with CBP, on gathering 
and reviewing the responsive documents related to the Del Rio TFR.
Vaccine Mandate Questions:
    Question 1. Congress has provided the passenger air carrier 
industry with nearly $54 billion to keep pilots, flight attendants, and 
other employees connected to their jobs and their healthcare. Why did 
we spend these taxpayer dollars if the plan is to force the airlines to 
fire these very employees over their vaccination status?
    Answer. The FAA does not administer the funding referred to in this 
question and does not enforce COVID-19 vaccination requirements for 
industry. The FAA is responsible for promoting safe flight of civil 
aircraft in air commerce. Throughout the pandemic, the FAA has remained 
focused on aviation safety and making sure that the aviation system can 
operate effectively, including addressing workforce issues. The FAA has 
taken a number of actions to help the aviation industry adjust 
operations in response to the pandemic.

    Question 2. Why can't pilots self-medicate with certain over-the-
counter medications prior to flying, yet the FAA seems is encouraging 
them to take a vaccine with no long term safety studies?
    Answer. The COVID-19 public health emergency has driven 
extraordinary global efforts to develop effective and safe vaccines. 
The vaccine produced by Pfizer-BioNTech has received Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval. In addition, the vaccines produced by 
Moderna and Johnson & Johnson-Janssen have been made available to the 
American public under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) by the FDA. 
After careful review of available data regarding safety profiles, the 
FAA Office of Aerospace Medicine (AAM) adopted the following policy as 
both safe and operationally responsive to this unique situation:
    Holders of FAA-issued Airman Medical Certificates or Medical 
Clearances may receive the Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, or Johnson & 
Johnson COVID-19 vaccine; however, a 48-hour no fly/no safety related 
duty interval must be observed after each dose.
    Individuals holding an Airman Medical Certificate or Medical 
Clearance should be reminded that they are prohibited from performing 
flight crewmember duties or air traffic control duties if they do not 
meet medical certification requirements, including those related to 
adverse events from medications that render them unable to perform such 
duties. AAM will monitor the patient response to each vaccine and may 
adjust this policy as necessary to ensure aviation safety.
    For additional information: https://www.faa.gov/
licenses_certificates/medical_certification/

    Question 3. The FAA has appropriately high safety standards, safety 
of flight is paramount to the industry. Why then, has the FAA not been 
emphatic that more studies are needed on the effects of this vaccine 
with respect to high altitude, environments of changing atmospheric 
pressure, and long-term sitting (i.e., blood clots and deep vein 
thrombosis)?
    Answer. The Office of Aerospace Medicine carefully reviewed the 
vaccine manufacturers' applications for approval/emergency use 
authorization and continues to monitor the performance and side effect 
profiles of the vaccines for potential impacts to aviation safety. This 
office also established the 48-hour ``No Fly/No Safety-Related Duty'' 
interval following each dose based on medical information about the 
vaccines and the potential side effects.
    For additional information: https://www.faa.gov/coronavirus/
guidance_resources/vaccine_faq/

    Question 4. Has the FAA had an open forum or sought the feedback of 
pilots and air traffic controllers regarding their concerns for flight 
safety with regard to this vaccine? If so, when will said forum occur 
and where will the results be published?
    Answer. As a general matter, public health agencies are the 
appropriate entities to manage public outreach regarding COVID-19 
vaccines. With respect to any safety of flight-related concerns, pilots 
and air traffic controllers should consult with their aviation medical 
examiner (AME), so that they can receive medical advice appropriate to 
their individual circumstances.

    Question 5. Is it true that it took a period of seven years for the 
FAA to be satisfied that it was safe to raise the mandatory retirement 
age of pilots from 60-65? And during that time the FAA also instituted 
a policy that two pilots could not occupy the cockpit who were both 
over the age of 60? Why hasn't a similar safety study been launched 
between vaccinated and unvaccinated pilots?
    Answer. The Fair Treatment of Experienced Pilots Act (P.L. 110-135) 
was signed into law on December 13, 2007. This law set 65 years old as 
the mandatory retirement age of pilots.
    As it relates to vaccines, the Office of Aerospace Medicine 
carefully reviewed the vaccine manufacturers' applications for 
approval/emergency use authorization and continues to monitor the 
performance and side effect profiles of the vaccines for potential 
impacts to aviation safety.

    Question 6. Is the FAA aware of the additional stress that will 
fall onto the system should otherwise qualified pilots and air traffic 
controllers be terminated due to their constitutionally protected right 
to refuse a vaccine? What is the plan for mitigating this potential 
increase in stress?
    Answer. The FAA has not seen any impact in the system. Specific to 
FAA employees, as of Nov. 23, the FAA had achieved a 99.8% compliance 
rate--meaning employees who are vaccinated with at least one dose or 
who have a pending or approved exception or extension request--and a 
90.2% vaccination rate--employees who are vaccinated with at least one 
dose--across our workforce. Implementation of the requirement will not 
result in any disruptions to critical services that the American people 
depend on.
    In addition, the FAA has contingency plans that are utilized today 
to support continued operations if a facility experiences staffing 
constraints. These facility-specific contingency plans are coordinated 
in advance with aviation stakeholders prior to implementation. As 
demonstrated over the past 21 months, the FAA is prepared to continue 
to provide safe and efficient air traffic services if individuals do 
not meet the Federal employee or contractor vaccine mandates, as 
applicable.

    Question 7. Is the FAA aware of the current stress on the system 
where pilots are being faced with two decisions: take a vaccine with 
documented potential side effects that can be career ending, or don't 
take the vaccine and lose that same career? This puts pilots in an 
impossible, stressful situation. That induced stress degrades flight 
safety today. Has the FAA considered the same impossible, stressful 
situation for mechanics, air traffic controllers, TSA agents, and all 
other aviation safety-related fields?
    Answer. The FAA regularly monitors a variety of data sources in 
order to identify adverse trends and/or stressors that may be 
developing within the National Airspace System. Data systems monitored 
include the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
System, Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP), line operations safety 
audits (LOSA), Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) etc. When risk 
are identified, the Certificate Management Office adds it to the Safety 
Assurance System's Certificate Holders Assessment Tool (CHAT) for 
monitoring and surveillance. The airlines, using their Safety 
Management Systems (SMS), can incorporate the safety data captured by 
the programs listed above into their individual SMSs for monitoring and 
assessing. This approach allows both the FAA and airlines to tailor 
their approach to identify and address specific stressors as they 
arise.
    The FAA is requesting labor organizations and airline leadership 
communicate with their membership and employees to address their 
concerns and remind everyone to focus on safety and not allow 
distractions to compromise it.
    We continue to monitor the system for any circumstance that could 
undermine safety.

    Question 8. How can the FAA be certain that there are not currently 
fully vaccinated pilots and air traffic controllers who are suffering 
from an adverse vaccine reaction and are concealing that reaction so 
that they will not potentially lose their medical license? What systems 
are in place that a pilot or air traffic controller can safely disclose 
these reactions and keep their jobs?
    Answer. To maintain the highest level of safety in the National 
Airspace System, the FAA requires pilots with medical certificates or 
air traffic controllers with medical clearances to observe a period of 
48 hours following the administration of each dose of a COVID-19 
vaccine before conducting safety-sensitive aviation duties, such as 
flying or controlling air traffic.
    The required waiting period applies to those holding an Airman 
Medical Certificate issued under 14 CFR Part 67 or a Medical Clearance 
issued under FAA Order 3930.3C.
    In addition, pilots must adhere to the guidance in 14 CFR 61.53 and 
not exercise the privileges of their airman certificates if they know 
they are medically unfit. There are similar requirements in FAA Order 
3930.3C for air traffic controllers.

    Question 9. The ``IM SAFE'' acronym the FAA encourages aviators to 
use promotes the idea that safety to fly is self-determined. Why are 
pilots who have determined through an informed decision made in concert 
with their medical doctors that a Covid vaccine is detrimental to their 
ability to fly safely being forced to take the vaccine anyway?
    Answer. With respect to any safety of flight-related concerns, 
pilots should consult with their aviation medical examiner (AME), so 
that they can receive medical advice appropriate to their individual 
circumstances.

    Question 10. Are you familiar with the Harvard University T.H. Chan 
School of Public Health Study that was conducted and published last 
year which indicated that airline crews and passengers are not at risk 
for contracting COVID-19 on an airplane? When it was published in 
October of 2020, the study noted that ``to date, the CDC has not 
confirmed a single case of viral transmission on a U.S. plane''. The 
study concluded that there is a 0.03% chance of contracting COVID-19 on 
a plane. Given these findings, why is the FAA encouraging the aviation 
community to take this vaccine--especially in light of the mounting 
VAERS reporting evidence that there are serious adverse reactions and 
those reactions can come upon a person suddenly?
    Answer. The FAA is aware of this study. The FAA continues to follow 
the guidance and direction of the public health agencies with respect 
to the response to the COVID-19 public health emergency in the aviation 
context.
    To maintain the highest level of safety in the National Airspace 
System, the FAA requires pilots with medical certificates or air 
traffic controllers with medical clearances to observe a period of 48 
hours following the administration of each dose of COVID-19 vaccine 
before conducting safety-sensitive aviation duties, such as flying or 
controlling air traffic.
    The required waiting period applies to those holding an Airman 
Medical Certificate issued under 14 CFR Part 67 or a Medical Clearance 
issued under FAA Order 3930.3C.
    In addition, pilots must adhere to the guidance in 14 CFR 61.53 and 
not exercise the privileges of their airman certificates if they know 
they are medically unfit. There are similar requirements in FAA Order 
3930.3C for air traffic controllers.

    Question 11. Does the FAA intend to require vaccines for passengers 
on commercial aviation flights? Will you commit FAA to not imposing 
these requirements?
    Answer. The FAA remains steadfast in its focus on safety of flight 
and continuing to provide safe and efficient air navigation services 
during the COVID-19 public health emergency. The public health and 
security agencies have been the primary agencies to issue mandatory 
public health requirements with respect to the COVID-19 public health 
emergency in the aviation context. For example, the wearing of face 
masks during travel and vaccination and testing mandates for 
international travel have been implemented via public health orders and 
security program changes.

     Questions from Hon. Pete Stauber to Hon. Stephen M. Dickson, 
             Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

    Question 1. We all know and understand the importance of 5G 
broadband deployment and connectivity, including for use in aviation. 
At the same time, aviation safety is of utmost importance. Several 
other aviation authorities, including Canada, France, Australia, and 
the UAE, announced that they are looking at 5G deployment in and around 
major airports and heliports and the need for mitigations to minimize 
5G interference impact on aircraft radar altimeters. By way of 
background for those who may not be familiar, a radar altimeter is 
equipment on an aircraft that directly measures the precise distance to 
the ground, particularly important for safety when operating close to 
the ground.
    a.  How engaged has FAA been on this matter and have you issued any 
formal positions or planned actions on this like other aviation 
authorities? Have you communicated the significance of this issue and 
any safety concerns with DOT and other agencies, like NTIA or FCC? Do 
you expect to take further action? It seems to me that FAA may have 
been somewhat stifled in your ability to ensure that potential impacts 
on aviation safety are raised and appropriately considered and 
addressed by other government agencies. Do you think we need to 
reevaluate this process?
    Answer. The FAA has been continuously engaged on this issue for 
several years and we have both shared our concern and worked with 
stakeholders concerning the potential safety risks for 5G deployment to 
interfere with radar altimeters, which provide data to other avionics. 
On November 2, the FAA issued a Safety Information Alert Bulletin 
(SAIB), which notifies the aviation community of a potential risk to 
the National Airspace System.\1\ This SAIB also asks manufacturers and 
OEMs to provide information to the FAA that may help us to more 
effectively scope that risk. Similarly, the FAA is continuing its work 
to assess the risk in order to issue formal safety guidance. In 
parallel, we continue to work closely with the Department, NTIA, FCC, 
and industry on technical solutions that ensure both the safety of the 
national airspace and enable 5G services--which the FAA has always 
supported.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ FAA, Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin, Risk of 
Potential Adverse Effects on Radio Altimeters, AIR-21-18, November 2, 
2021, at https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgSAIB.nsf/dc7bd4f27e5f107486257221005f069d/
27ffcbb45e6157e9862587810044ad19/$FILE/AIR-21-18.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              
                              [all]