[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CHANGING ELECTION SECURITY LANDSCAPE:
THREATS TO ELECTION OFFICIALS AND INFRA-
STRUCTURE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 20, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-67
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
49-692 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Eric Swalwell, California Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Dina Titus, Nevada Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Peter Meijer, Michigan
Val Butler Demings, Florida Kat Cammack, Florida
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California August Pfluger, Texas
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Mayra Flores, Texas
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York, Vice
Chairman
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Ritchie Torres, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Vice Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Ms. Maggie Toulouse Oliver, Secretary of State, State of New
Mexico:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. Neal Kelley, Chair, Committee for Safe and Secure Elections,
Former Registrar of Voters, Orange County, California:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Ms. Elizabeth Howard, Senior Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. Frank LaRose, Secretary of State, State of Ohio:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
For the Record
The Honorable Dan Bishop, a Representative in Congress From the
State of North Carolina:
Article, Carolina Journal...................................... 40
THE CHANGING ELECTION SECURITY LANDSCAPE: THREATS TO ELECTION OFFICIALS
AND INFRASTRUCTURE
----------
Wednesday, July 20, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Ritchie Torres
[Vice Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Torres, Jackson Lee, Langevin,
Payne, Clarke, Titus, Watson Coleman, Demings, Malinowski,
Katko, Higgins, Guest, Bishop, Van Drew, Miller-Meeks,
Harshbarger, Clyde, LaTurner, Meijer, Cammack, Pfluger,
Garbarino, and Flores.
Vice Chairman Torres. The Committee on Homeland Security
will be in order. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to
declare the committee in recess at any point.
Good morning. Free and fair elections are the bedrock of
our democracy. As we learned just over 18 months ago, democracy
is not something we can take for granted. We must defend it
fiercely and protect the institutions that uphold it. So, I
commend Chairman Thompson for allowing this important hearing
on the threats to our elections.
When I was first eligible to vote in 2006, election offices
across the country were in the process of replacing
infrastructure to defend against the greatest threat to
elections in recent history: The notorious ``hanging chad.''
Social media was new and largely a way for young college kids
to connect. Our adversaries had not figured out how to
weaponize our freedom of speech or our technological ingenuity
and use it against us.
The notion that an armed crowd would descend upon the
United States Capitol to disrupt the peaceful transfer of power
would have been beyond anyone's wildest imagination. Harassing
election officials to alter an election result was something
relegated to developing democracies or democracies in decline.
But the 2016 election ushered in a new era of threats to our
democracy.
The Russian government targeted election infrastructure and
exploited social media to spread conspiracy theories to tip the
scales in favor of one candidate and, more devastatingly, begin
to sow doubt among the public about the integrity of our
democratic institutions. Committee Democrats recognized the
urgent National security threat the Russian government had
created and established an Election Security Task Force with
Members of the House Administration Committee to better
understand the threats to elections and how to mitigate against
them. Unfortunately, we did not get bipartisan support to
implement the task force's recommendations and efforts to enact
them into law have languished in the Senate for two Congresses.
In the mean time, our adversaries redoubled their efforts
to sow division among us and some desperate politicians latched
onto the ``Big Lie'' and other conspiracy theories. As a
result, 3 days after I was sworn into my first term in
Congress, a violent mob stormed the Capitol, holding democracy
hostage.
Outside Washington, election officials have found
themselves victims of harassment and threats in a way that we
have never seen before. As a result, election offices across
the country are struggling to retain a trained staff,
exacerbating the existing challenges associated with
administering the 2022 mid-term elections.
When we were sworn in as Members of this chamber, we took
an oath to protect and defend the Constitution and the
democratic principles enshrined in it. It is incumbent upon all
of us to understand the evolving threats to our elections and
to defend against them.
I look forward to the testimony today and I thank our
witnesses for their participation. Before I recognize the
Ranking Member, on behalf of Chairman Thompson and the Members
of the committee, I would like to welcome Congresswoman Mayra
Flores of Texas to the panel. We look forward to working with
you on important matters before this committee.
[The statement of Vice Chairman Torres follows:]
Statement of Vice Chairman Ritchie Torres
July 20, 2022
Free and fair elections are the bedrock of our democracy. As we
learned just over 18 months ago, democracy is not something we can take
for granted. We must defend it fiercely and protect the institutions
that uphold it. So, I commend the Chairman for holding this important
hearing on the threats to our elections.
When I was first eligible to vote in 2006, election offices across
the country were in the process of replacing infrastructure to defend
against the greatest threat to elections in recent history: The
notorious ``hanging chad.'' Social media was new, and largely a way for
young college kids to connect. Our adversaries had not figured out how
to weaponize our freedom of speech or our technological ingenuity and
use it against us.
The notion that an armed crowd would descend upon the United States
Capitol to disrupt the peaceful transition of power would have been
beyond anyone's wildest imagination. And harassing election officials
to alter an election result was something relegated to developing
democracies or democracies in decline. But the 2016 election ushered in
a new era of threats to our democracy.
The Russian government targeted election infrastructure and
exploited social media to spread conspiracy theories to tip the scales
in favor of one candidate and, more devastatingly, begin to sow doubt
among the public about the integrity of our democratic institutions.
Committee Democrats recognized the urgent National security threat the
Russian government had created, and established an Election Security
Task Force with Members of the House Administration Committee to better
understand threats to elections and how to mitigate against them.
Unfortunately, we did not get bipartisan support to implement the Task
Force's recommendations, and efforts to enact them into law have
languished in the Senate for two Congresses.
In the mean time, our adversaries redoubled their efforts to sow
division among us, and some desperate politicians latched on to the
``Big Lie'' and other conspiracy theories. As a result, 3 days after I
was sworn into my first term in Congress, a violent mob stormed the
Capitol, forcing me and my staff to evacuate, and held democracy
hostage to a unfounded lie.
Outside Washington, election officials have found themselves
victims of harassment and threats in a way we have never seen before.
As a result, election offices across the country are struggling to
retain a trained staff, exacerbating the existing challenges associated
with administering the 2022 midterm elections.
When we were sworn in as Members of this chamber, we took an oath
to protect and defend the Constitution and the democratic principles
enshrined in it. It is incumbent upon all of us to understand evolving
threats to our elections and to defend against them.
Vice Chairman Torres. The Chair recognizes the Ranking
Member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Katko, for an opening statement.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Chairman, you stole my thunder because I was
going to welcome Mayra Flores as well to Congress in general,
but for this committee in particular given her proximity to the
Southwest Border. Her expertise in that regard will be
definitely a value-add to the committee.
So, I want to thank you for holding this hearing today, Mr.
Chairman, and I appreciate our witnesses being here to discuss
how we can work together to physically protect our State and
local election officials while also securing election
infrastructure from foreign interference and cyber threats.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or
CISA, is charged by Congress with being the Nation's lead
civilian cybersecurity agency and it plays a critical role in
this endeavor. I look forward to our witnesses' perspectives on
ways to improve the physical security of our elections as well
the tools and services provided by CISA to shore up our
election cyber defenses. They have come a long way for sure.
Our committee remains committed to securing our
democratically-run elections from all threats, including
physical threats to election workers. Following the 2020
Presidential election, the Department of Justice reported more
than 850 incidents of threats and harassment targeting election
workers. Issues such as these will not be tolerated and can and
should continue to be dealt with by local law enforcement.
In recent years, foreign adversaries, like Russia, Iran,
and China, have targeted U.S. elections, both through election
influence and election interference. Foreign actors seek to
undermine our elections both directly by tampering with our
election systems and indirectly by attempting to influence how
people think about an election. Let me be clear, the United
States will not allow any adversary to sow distrust or chaos in
our democratic process.
In addition to these foreign interference efforts, our
Nation is seeing a spike in cyber threats across all 16
critical infrastructure sectors, and the election
infrastructure sector is no exception. Simply being vigilant is
no longer enough. Today's cyber threat environment demands a
posture of unwavering resilience.
As we enter the 2022 elections we must keep a keen eye on
the midterms and ensure that voters can be confident that their
vote will be cast securely. Given the volume and sophistication
of the cyber threats we face, we must empower CISA with the
tools and resources it needs to support our State and local
election officials so that they can carry out their mission to
administer free and fair elections.
CISA's election security mission has greatly evolved since
election infrastructure was designated as a subsector of our
Nation's critical infrastructure in 2017. CISA has gone to
great lengths to build trusted relationships with State and
local election officials across the country and has provided
free and voluntary cybersecurity services, tools, and other
guidance in all 50 States.
A key part of securing election infrastructure that is
owned and operated by State and local governments, not the
Federal Government, is ensuring that CISA has the ability to
provide situational awareness about vulnerabilities across
digital footprints. I am pleased that we are joined today by
Secretary LaRose, who as Ohio Secretary of State serves the
State's chief elections officer. The secretary spent years
working to ensure Ohio's elections are secure and he was even
named Legislator of the Year in 2016 by the Ohio Association of
Election Officials for his work to improve the State's election
process. I look forward to hearing from the secretary and all
our witnesses today about the practical, meaningful steps
Congress can take to improve CISA's ability to support State
and local officials in protecting the cyber and physical
security of our elections.
Cybersecurity is indeed a team sport and now is the time to
double down. Protecting the homeland requires partnerships
throughout all levels of government and across industries and
party lines. Working together we can be prepared not only for
the threats of today, but also the emerging risks of tomorrow.
Before I close, briefly, I just want to give you one quick
story. Several years ago--2 years ago, we had an Election
Security Task Force meeting up in Central New York. We had the
election officials there from the counties in my district. One
woman told me that she received 1,762 directives from the
Election Security Task Force in 1 year. She shares her chief
information security officer with 20-something other agencies
in her county, and no one has digested that information. That
is one of the big concerns I have and that is one of the big
things we need to tackle going forward is how do we make
actionable the information we are getting from the experts?
That is something that I want to hear from you, Ms. Howard, and
the other witnesses today.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
[The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member John Katko
July 20, 2022
Thank you, Vice Chairman Torres, for holding this hearing today.
I appreciate our witnesses being here to discuss how we can work
together to physically protect our State and local election officials,
while also securing election infrastructure from foreign interference
and cyber threats.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
charged by Congress with being the Nation's lead civilian cybersecurity
agency, plays a critical role in this endeavor.
I look forward to our witnesses' perspectives on ways to improve
the physical security of our elections, as well as the tools and
services provided by CISA to shore up our election cyber defenses.
Our committee remains committed to securing our democratically-run
elections from all threats, including physical threats to election
workers.
Following the 2020 Presidential election, the Department of Justice
reported more than 850 incidents of threats and harassment targeting
election workers.
Issues such as these will not be tolerated and can and should
continue to be dealt with by local law enforcement.
In recent years, foreign adversaries like Russia, Iran, and China
have targeted U.S. elections both through election influence and
election interference.
Foreign actors seek to undermine our elections both directly, by
tampering with our election systems, and indirectly, by attempting to
influence how people think about an election.
Let me be clear, the United States will not allow any adversary to
sow distrust or chaos in our democratic process.
In addition to these foreign interference efforts, our Nation is
seeing a spike in cyber threats across all 16 critical infrastructure
sectors, and the election infrastructure sector is no exception.
Simply being vigilant is no longer enough.
Today's cyber threat environment demands a posture of unwavering
resilience.
As we enter 2022 elections, we must keep a keen eye on the midterms
and ensure that voters can be confident that their vote will be cast
securely.
Given the volume and sophistication of the cyber threats we face,
we must empower CISA with the tools and resources it needs to support
our State and local election officials so that they can carry out their
mission to administer free and fair elections.
CISA's election security mission has greatly evolved since election
infrastructure was designated as a subsector of our Nation's critical
infrastructure in 2017.
CISA has gone to great lengths to build trusted relationships with
State and local election officials across the country, and has provided
free and voluntary cybersecurity services, tools, and other guidance in
all 50 States.
A key part of securing election infrastructure that is owned and
operated by State and local governments--not the Federal Government--is
ensuring that CISA has the ability to provide situational awareness
about vulnerabilities across digital footprints.
I am pleased that we are joined today by Secretary LaRose, who as
Ohio's Secretary of State serves as the State's chief elections
officer.
The secretary has spent years working to ensure Ohio's elections
are secure, and he was even named Legislator of the Year in 2016 by the
Ohio Association of Election Officials for his work to improve the
State's election process.
I look forward to hearing from the secretary and all our witnesses
today about the practical, meaningful steps Congress can take to
improve CISA's ability to support our State and local officials in
protecting the cyber and physical security of our elections.
Cybersecurity is a team sport, and now is the time to double down.
Protecting the homeland requires partnerships throughout all levels
of government, and across industries and party lines.
Working together, we can be prepared not only for the threats of
today, but also the emerging risks of tomorrow. Thank you.
Vice Chairman Torres. Other Members of the committee are
reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
July 20, 2022
Chairman Thompson and Ranking Member Katko, thank you for convening
today's hearing titled ``The Changing Election Security Landscape:
Threats to Election Officials and Infrastructure.''
I thank today's witnesses:
The Honorable Maggie Toulouse Oliver, secretary of state,
State of New Mexico;
Mr. Neal Kelley, chair, Committee for Safe and Secure
Elections, and former registrar of voters, Orange County,
California;
Ms. Elizabeth Howard, senior counsel, Brennan Center for
Justice; and
The Honorable Frank LaRose, secretary of state, State of
Ohio (Minority witness).
The Constitution establishes that Congress can set the date of
Federal Elections, which they did in 1845 by making it Federal law that
Federal Elections will occur on the first Tuesday, after the first
Monday in November of even-numbered years.
Constitution, Article I, Section 4, states:
``The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations . . . ''
This election is the first since the ``Big Lie'' regarding the
outcome of the 2020 election led to series of events culminating in the
January 6, 2021, attack of the U.S. Capitol Building resulting in loss
of life.
The purpose of this hearing is to explore on-going challenges to
election security in advance of the midterm elections.
While concerns such as the cybersecurity of voting machines and
registration databases remain, the aftermath of the 2020 election
highlighted growing threats to the physical security of elections with
an increase in threats to election officials and a heightened risk of
officials acting improperly due to disinformation.
This hearing will provide an opportunity to hear from experts in
election administration and security on the current threat landscape
and what actions are necessary to protect elections.
Election officials carry out a vital role in the United States'
democratic system of government, and threats of violence and other
forms of intimidation against them represent a major security threat.
Addressing this challenge must be a priority for all levels of
government and law enforcement.
The root cause of physical threats against election officials is
the ``Big Lie'' and other disinformation about elections that motivate
people to try to intimidate election administrators.
All levels of government, political actors, and news and social
media companies must promote accurate information about elections to
reduce the number of violent threats.
While the 2020 election was the most secure in history, the events
during and after the election represent a new threat landscape that
risks even greater consequences in future elections if not addressed.
Protecting election officials and the physical security of election
infrastructure from all threats must be a vital part of any election
security strategy, in addition to on-going cybersecurity efforts.
Threats to election officials are a direct result of the work and
integrity of the Republican election offices in the States of Georgia,
Arizona, and elsewhere that would not participate in the ``Big Lie,''
by doing their jobs and telling the truth regarding the outcome of the
2020 election in their States.
The outcome of a public election has two certainties: There will be
a winner and there will be candidate or position that lost the
election.
Our system of elections requires that all parties that enter the
process be prepared to accept the outcome especially should they lose.
Throughout American history, we have had to face difficulties, but
our Nation has always held public elections.
From 1861-1865 the United States fought a Civil War, but it also
held two Federal Elections, one of which was the Presidential election.
In 1944, the United States was fighting for its survival and that
of people resisting the march of Fascism across Europe, and there was
Presidential election and America voted.
In 1968, riots occurred across the Nation as social upheaval
following the assassination of Martin Luther King, and Americans voted
for the office of the President.
In 2020, Americans need our help not just with accessing the most
fundamental tool of a democracy--casting a ballot, but they also need
our help with unemployment assistance, which ended at the end of July
along with eviction protection.
The efforts to ensure that every eligible person can register to
vote and cast a vote in a public election have spanned generations.
I have been persistent in my efforts to protect the rights of
disenfranchised communities in my district of inner-city Houston and
across the Nation.
Throughout my tenure in Congress, I have cosponsored dozens of
bills, amendments, and resolutions seeking to improve voters' rights at
all stages and levels of the election process.
This includes legislation aimed at:
1. Increasing voter outreach and turnout;
2. Ensuring both early and same-day registration;
3. Standardizing physical and language accessibility at polling
places;
4. Expanding early voting periods;
5. Decreasing voter wait times;
6. Guaranteeing absentee ballots, especially for displaced
citizens;
7. Modernizing voting technologies and strengthening our voter
record systems;
8. Establishing the Federal Election Day as a National holiday; and
9. Condemning and criminalizing deceptive practices, voter
intimidation, and other suppression tactics.
Along with many of my colleagues in the CBC, I was an original
cosponsor of H.R. 9, the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta
Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act, which
became public law on July 27, 2006.
I also authored H.R. 745 in the 110th Congress, which added the
legendary Barbara Jordan to the list of civil rights trailblazers whose
names honor the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act.
This bill strengthened the original Voting Rights Act by replacing
Federal voting examiners with Federal voting observers--a significant
distinction that made it easier to safeguard against racially-biased
voter suppression tactics.
In the 114th Congress, I introduced H.R. 75, the Coretta Scott King
Mid-Decade Redistricting Prohibition Act of 2015, which would prohibit
States whose Congressional districts have been redistricted after a
decennial census from redrawing their district lines until the next
census.
The voting rights struggles of the 20th Century are now joined by
voting rights threats posed by the 21st Century.
Russia, an adversary of the United States, engaged in repeated
attempts to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election, which prompted
an unprecedented all-of-government effort to alert local and State
election administrators to be aware of the threat.
Russia targeted our Presidential election according to the report,
``Background to Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent
U.S. Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution,''
provided by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's
National Intelligence Council.
Russia used every cyber espionage tool available to influence the
outcome of the Presidential election by using a multi-faceted campaign
that included theft of data; strategically-timed release of stolen
information; production of fake news; and manipulation of facts to
avoid blame.
In 2016, Russia was blamed for breaching 21 local and State
election systems, which they studied extensively.
Following the 2016 election, frustrated by the lack of action by
the Republican majority in addressing the intelligence community's
conclusion of Russian interference in the election, then-Ranking Member
Thompson, together with former Committee on House Administration
Ranking Member Robert Brady, launched the Congressional Task Force on
Election Security (Task Force) in July 2017.
The Task Force met with dozens of elections experts, State election
officials, and National security experts to assess vulnerabilities in
election infrastructure and how to address them.
In February 2018, the Task Force produced a report that included 10
recommendations and then introduced legislation to implement them. H.R.
5011, the Election Security Act, garnered the support of 126 Members--
all of them Democrats.
That language is Title III of H.R. 1, the For the People Act.
Additionally, building upon earlier proposals, in January, the House
passed H.R. 5746, the Freedom to Vote: John R. Lewis Act, which
included several election security provisions, including requiring
States to switch to voting systems with voter-verified paper ballots,
mandating States conduct post-election audits, and authorizing
additional election security grants to the States.
In February 2018, special counsel Robert Mueller released
indictments of 13 Russians, at least one of whom has direct ties to
Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The 37-page indictment details the actions taken to interfere with
the U.S. political system, including the 2016 US. Presidential
election.
Among the charges, which include charges for obstruction of
justice, are several especially notable details.
The indictment states that 13 defendants posed as U.S. persons and
created false U.S. personas and operated social media pages and groups
designed to attract U.S. audiences.
The Russians were not deterred by these indictments and again
interfered in the 2020 election.
In September 2019, acting director of national intelligence, Joseph
Maguire, told Congress that the greatest challenge that we do have is
to make sure that we maintain the integrity of our election system.
The Constitution leaves the administration of elections to the
States, but today States must face state-sponsored threats to election
integrity.
We must be steadfast in our resolve to have a strong shield to
defend civilian and critical infrastructure networks for all threats
foreign and domestic.
We must extend the Federal efforts to ensure election integrity to
the protection of election workers and that should include poll workers
from threats or harm.
In response to the growing number of threats to election officials,
the Biden administration has taken several actions to better support
State and local governments and to hold perpetrators accountable.
In July 2021, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the
creation of a task force to address threats of violence against
election workers.
The task force is led by Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco, along
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation; DOJ's Criminal, Civil Rights,
and National Security Divisions; and interagency partners such as the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
As part of this effort, DOJ has created a toll-free hotline for the
public to report election threats.
The task force has received over 1,000 reports of threats, it has
only achieved one criminal conviction, with two additional active
prosecutions.
According to legal experts, achieving convictions in many cases may
be difficult, but organizations representing election officials and
other advocacy groups have encouraged DOJ to take a more aggressive
approach.
The House passed legislation in December 2021 as part of H.R. 5314,
the Protecting Our Democracy Act, to codify the task force.
Records of complaints are challenged by election officials who are
unfamiliar with the task force, with 42 percent of local election
officials reporting not having heard of it, according to the Brennan
Center's survey.
Additionally, 89 percent of local officials say they would report
threats to local law enforcement, with only 22 percent stating they
would report threats to Federal authorities, limiting the Federal
Government's visibility.
These are challenges and opportunities to support and engage local
and State elections officials in advance of the November election to
inform them of resources and tools available to them.
I look forward to the testimony of today's witnesses.
Thank you.
Vice Chairman Torres. Members are also reminded that the
committee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by
the Chairman and Ranking Member in our February 3, 2021,
colloquy regarding remote procedures.
I now welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness,
the Honorable Maggie Toulouse Oliver has served as the
Secretary of State of New Mexico since 2016. From 2007 until
2016, Secretary Toulouse Oliver served as the county clerk of
Bernalillo County, where she oversaw elections in the State's
largest county. Secretary Toulouse Oliver is also the past
president of the National Association of the Secretaries of
States.
Our second witness, Mr. Neal Kelley, is the current
chairman for the Committee for Safe and Secure Elections. Mr.
Kelley recently retired from serving as the chief election
official, the Registrar of Voters, for Orange County,
California, a role he held for over 17 years. Mr. Kelley is
also a past member of the EAC Voting System Standards Board, a
past founding member of the DHS Election Security Task Force,
Government Coordinating Council, and a number of other
organizations aimed at making elections more assessable and
secure.
Our third witness, Ms. Elizabeth Howard, is a senior
counsel for elections and government at the Brennan Center for
Justice at NYU School of Law. Prior to joining the Brennan
Center, Ms. Howard served as deputy commissioner to the
Virginia Department of Elections. During her tenure she
coordinated many election administration modernization
projects, including the adoption of on-line paperless absentee
ballot applications for which the department received a 2017
Innovations in American Government Bright Ideas Award from the
Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at the
Harvard Kennedy School.
Our final witness, the Honorable Frank LaRose, has served
as the Secretary of State of Ohio since 2019. Prior, Secretary
LaRose served two terms in the Ohio State Senate and was named
the Legislator of the Year in 2016 by the Ohio Association of
Election Officials in recognition of his support and commitment
to improving Ohio's election process.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record. The Chair asks each witness to
summarize their statements for 5 minutes beginning with
Secretary Toulouse Oliver.
STATEMENT OF MAGGIE TOULOUSE OLIVER, SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE
OF NEW MEXICO
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Members of the committee. I am very pleased to be here today
with these distinguished colleagues. My name is Maggie Toulouse
Oliver and I serve as New Mexico's secretary of state, our
chief elections official.
Election administration in the United States is conducted
at the State, county, and local levels by civil servants who
come to work every day to do their duty keeping the engine of
our democracy running. This work is not glamorous, but it is
vital to how we elect our leaders and how we organize our way
of life.
Since 2020, however, lies and misinformation about how
elections are run and about the people who run them have
proliferated to an unprecedented degree. Among a significant
portion of the country the continuous drumbeat of these lies
has created an atmosphere of distrust in our elections and our
election officials. Many people now believe that our country's
highest office is occupied by an illegitimate President. Many
people now believe that our entire election infrastructure is
corrupted and has been weaponized to exclusively favor one
political party. Many people now believe that election
administration practices that serve to increase access and
security, like secure ballot boxes, air-gapped vote counting
systems, vote by mail, and the ministerial certification of
election results, to name only a few, are part of a vast
conspiracy meant to undermine our entire American way of life.
Of course, these things are not true. No one has ever
produced a shred of credible evidence to support these
conspiratorial claims. But the consequences of these lies have
real-world impacts, especially for election officials. For
people who believe their Government is corrupt and their
leaders are not legitimate, threats of physical violence and
acts of intimidation have, unfortunately, begun to seem like
acceptable responses.
In New Mexico, the conspiracies about our voting and
election systems have gripped a portion of the electorate here
and have caused people to take action. During the 2020 election
cycle, I was doxxed and had to leave my home for weeks under
State police protection. My office has since had to utilize
services for both me and members of my staff that prevent
doxxing by removing personal identifying information from the
internet. Since 2020, my office has certainly seen an uptick in
social media trolling, aggrieved emails and calls into our
office, and other communications that parrot the misinformation
circulating widely in the National discourse.
But more recently, especially since our June 2022 primary
election, my office has experienced pointed threats, serious
enough to be referred to law enforcement. As recently as June,
for example, there were 3 threatening phone calls against me
that were referred to our FBI field office for investigation.
These threats came on the heels of my office's effort to
directly combat election misinformation through a new website
and shortly after a Nationally-publicized situation in Otero
County, New Mexico, where the county commission, parroting much
of the election misinformation we are seeing across the
country, initially refused to certify the primary election
results. My office then had to seek a court order to compel
them to perform their duty under the law.
Growing distrust about out election system leads to either
apathy or indignation, both of which will have detrimental
effects on our entire system of government. For the election
officials and volunteer poll workers that our elections depend
on, I fear that threats coupled with the general vitriol on-
line and in the media directed at all aspects of our elections
will cause them so much stress and uncertainty that they will
simply not want to do work anymore. We have already seen this
happening in many parts of the country.
For voters, I feel that the flood of misinformation will
compel them to lose more and more trust in the system and they
will no longer participate in our democracy. I believe both
Federal and State law enforcement agencies are taking these
threats seriously and diligently and we must show the public
that threats against election officials will not be tolerated.
Thank you again. I hope my testimony is helpful and I am
happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Toulouse Oliver follows:]
Prepared Statement of Maggie Toulouse Oliver
July 20, 2022
Members of the committee, thank you for organizing this important
hearing today and for inviting me to testify. My name is Maggie
Toulouse Oliver and I serve as New Mexico's secretary of state, our
State's chief elections officer.
Election administration in the United States is conducted at the
State, county, and local levels by civil servants who come to work
every day to do their duty keeping the engine of our democracy running.
This work is not glamorous, but it is vital to how we elect our leaders
and how we organize our way of life.
Since 2020, however, lies and misinformation about how elections
are run and about the people who run them have proliferated to an
unprecedented degree. Among a significant portion of the country the
continuous drumbeat of these lies has created an atmosphere of distrust
in our elections and our election officials.
Many people now believe that our country's highest office is
occupied by an illegitimate President. Many people now believe that our
entire election infrastructure is corrupted and has been weaponized to
exclusively favor one political party. Many people now believe that
election administration practices that serve to increase access and
security--like secured ballot drop boxes, air-gapped vote counting
systems, absentee voting, and the ministerial certification of election
results, to name only a few--are part of a vast conspiracy meant to
undermine our entire American way of life.
Of course, these things are not true and no one has ever produced a
shred of evidence to support these conspiratorial claims. But the
consequences of these lies have real-world impacts, especially for
election officials.
For people who believe their Government is corrupt and their
leaders are not legitimate, threats of physical violence and acts of
intimidation have, unfortunately, begun to seem like acceptable
responses.
In New Mexico, the conspiracies about our voting and election
systems have gripped a certain portion of the electorate and have
caused people to act. During the 2020 election cycle, I was doxxed and
had to leave my home for weeks under State police protection. My office
has since had to utilize services for both me and members of my staff
that prevent doxxing by removing personal identifying information from
the internet.
Since 2020 my office has certainly seen an uptick in social media
trolling, aggrieved emails and calls into our office, and other
communications that parrot the misinformation circulating widely in the
National discourse.
But more recently, especially since our June 2022 Primary Election,
my office has experienced pointed threats serious enough to be referred
to law enforcement. As recently as June, for example, there were 3
threatening phone calls against me that were referred to our FBI field
office for investigation.
These threats came on the heels of my office's effort to directly
combat election misinformation through a new website, and shortly after
a nationally-publicized situation in Otero County, New Mexico where the
county commission--parroting much of the election misinformation we're
seeing across the country--initially refused to certify the Primary
Election results. My office then had to seek a court order to compel
them to perform their duty under the law.
Growing distrust about our election systems leads to either apathy
or indignation, both of which will have detrimental effects on our
entire system of government. For the election officials and volunteer
poll workers that our elections depend on, I fear that threats, coupled
with the general vitriol on-line and in the media directed at all
aspects of our elections, will cause them so much stress and
uncertainty that they will simply not want to do the work anymore. We
have already seen this happening in many parts of the country. For
voters, I fear that the flood of misinformation will compel them to
lose more and more trust in the system and they will no longer
participate in our democracy.
I believe both Federal and State law enforcement agencies are
taking these threats seriously and are diligently investigating them.
We must show the public that threats against election officials will
not be tolerated.
However, legal action is the last line of defense. We will not put
a stop to such threats until the rhetoric gets ratcheted down and
elected officials, the media, political parties, and others find better
ways to educate the public about the realities of how our elections are
conducted and secured.
I hope my testimony today is helpful for the committee and your
future work. I thank you again for giving me this opportunity to
testify on these crucial matters on behalf of New Mexico and our
State's election administrators.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have for me.
Vice Chairman Torres. Thank you for your testimony. The
Chair recognizes Mr. Kelley to summarize his statement for 5
minutes. Mr. Kelley.
STATEMENT OF NEAL KELLEY, CHAIR, COMMITTEE FOR SAFE AND SECURE
ELECTIONS, FORMER REGISTRAR OF VOTERS
Mr. Kelley. Yes, I am sorry. Good morning, Chairman Torres,
Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the Committee on Homeland
Security. Thank you for the invitation to speak today at this
important hearing.
``You rigged my election.'' ``We are going to try you and
hang you.'' ``We are coming for you.'' ``There will be blood on
the ballots and blood on you.''
These are just a small example of the type of threats and
harassment election officials around the country have
experienced, including myself, in recent elections. We also
know that many election officials, in addition to personal
threats, have also endured threats against their families. As a
result, upcoming elections are not very appealing to those that
run them. Many have left the profession. The impact is wide-
spread.
While the effects on individuals are devastating, the
potential blow to democracy should not be dismissed. Throughout
my written testimony I talk about the need to engage law
enforcement in the election planning process. However, I must
make clear that I am not advocating for the presence of armed
officers in polling places. This is a sensitive issue and one
that should be handled with the seriousness that it deserves.
I believe there are ways to address these growing threats
while remaining steadfast in our resolve to recognize that the
mere presence of law enforcement in the polls can be viewed as
intimidation.
There are steps that can help. As an example, while serving
as Orange County's chief election official, I established a
task force made up of DHS, the FBI, our State and local law
enforcement partners, and our district attorney. Combining my
experience as a former police officer, we worked
collaboratively long before an election to plan for specific
responses. This included local plainclothes investigators
prepositioned in the field, not in polling places, reviews of
all voting locations, personnel, and intelligence gathering.
When we were faced with agitated observers, threats, and
protests in 2020, the coordinated response was swift and
effective.
Amid these growing threats I believe that we should not
lose sight that elections are critical infrastructure, as
mentioned by Ranking Member Katko, which was established to
support and protect the mechanics of running elections. The
protection of our Nation's poll workers, voters, physical
locations, ballot counting centers, and voting systems, which
are a part of the backbone of our democracy, should be a
priority.
I would like to try and thread a needle here. I feel it is
important to highlight the very essential right to observe and
comment on elections, to be a part of the process, and to
engage with your local election administrator. I believe in the
fundamental rights that the First Amendment affords our
citizens as they exercise their rights to challenge the outcome
of an election.
Transparency goes hand-in-hand with a fully audited,
accurate, and fair election. These are not mutually exclusive.
Nevertheless, as an election official you know when that line
has been crossed, when acts of violence, threats to oneself or
family, threats to the infrastructure, interference,
harassment, or intimidation begins to emerge, then the entire
process is at risk.
Over the past several months, a group of election officials
and law enforcement personnel from across the country have been
meeting to address the protection of the public servants who
supervise our elections from intimidation, threats, and
violence. Recently organized is the Committee for Safe and
Secure Elections, of which I am currently the chair. I
mentioned at the outset it is a group of chief of police,
elected sheriffs, and former and current election officials
Nation-wide coming together to close the gap between law
enforcement and election administration.
Our committee is focused on creating tools and developing
solutions to combat this problem, such as resources, guides,
and training for law enforcement and election officials,
creating tools designed to build relationships among partner
agencies, and looking at potential policies that might help to
reduce the risk.
I don't want to leave this important topic without also
noting that we must continue to do work to reduce voters' lack
of confidence, which can exacerbate the very issues we are
discussing today. For instance, election officials should
continue to expand audits, partner with prosecutors on any
violations of election law, and improve the voter experience
which will continue to build trust and confidence among voters.
This, of course, will not change all hearts and minds, but
this is a journey without a finish line. Congress can greatly
assist States and counties with these growing threats by
raising awareness, increasing funding to enhance physical
security of election offices, the associated infrastructure,
and supporting collaboration among election officials and law
enforcement partners when needed and most appropriate.
Finally in closing, our institutes of democracy are under
attack and while many election officials are resilient, it is
stretching their capacity to operate while being threatened. I
don't mean to overstate this, but the important act of running
fair and accurate elections is what holds a fragile democracy
together. We just want someone to have our backs.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Neal Kelley
July 20, 2022
Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Vice Chairman Torres, Ranking
Member Katko, and Members of the Committee on Homeland Security. My
name is Neal Kelley, and I am the retired chief election official,
registrar of voters for Orange County, California. Before serving in
this role, I served as a deputy sheriff and later a police officer in
Southern California. I am now the current chair of the Committee for
Safe and Secure Elections, a 32-member committee made up of elected
Sheriffs, other members of law enforcement and current and former
election officials from around the country. Thank you for the
invitation to speak at this hearing to address:
The changing election security landscape, including threats
to election officials and infrastructure;
Barriers States and counties encounter in the pursuit of
enhancing election security;
The best practices used in Orange County, including
collaboration with local and Federal law enforcement,
development of tools designed to aid local law enforcement, and
field operations designed to ensure that no intimidation occurs
at the polls;
The value organizations, such as the Committee for Safe and
Secure Elections, can bring to combat this growing problem;
And how Congress can further assist States and counties with
reducing risk and enhancing overall election security.
``You rigged my election''; ``We are going to try you and hang
you''; ``We are coming for you''; ``There will be blood on the ballots
and blood on you''. These are just a small example of the type of
threats and harassment election officials around the country have
experienced in recent elections. We also know that many election
officials received thousands of threatening emails, text messages, had
their personal information doxxed on-line, faced protests in front of
their homes, and in addition to personal threats have endured threats
against their families. As a result, upcoming elections are not very
appealing to those that run them. In fact, this has mutated into a real
migraine for election officials. Many have left the profession. The
impact is wide-spread. While the effects on the individuals are
devastating the potential blow to democracy should not be dismissed.
Controversial political statements with inflammatory accusations
have the potential to incite continued harassment or violence from the
public. Throughout my testimony I talk about the need to engage law
enforcement in the election planning process. However, I must make
clear that I am not advocating for the presence of armed officers in
polling places. This is a sensitive issue and one that should be
handled with the seriousness that it deserves. I believe there are ways
to address these growing threats while remaining steadfast in our
resolve to recognize that the mere presence of law enforcement in the
polls can be viewed as intimidation. To be sure, there are valid
reasons that laws exist to protect voters against potential, or actual
intimidation.
With this in mind, we must prevent efforts to corrupt our electoral
process while continuing to administer elections for an electorate that
is increasing in size and complexity. The threats and challenges will
continue to grow, and the security of the American elections process
will only be achieved through collaboration, cooperation, and the
allocation of sufficient resources.
Amid these growing threats I believe that we should not lose sight
that elections are critical infrastructure, which was established to
support and protect the mechanics of running elections. The protection
of our Nation's poll workers, voters, physical locations, ballot-
counting centers, and voting systems, which are a part of the backbone
of our democracy, should be a priority.
Let me try and thread a needle here--I believe it's important to
distinguish against the very fundamental right to observe and comment
on elections, to be a part of the process, and to engage with your
local election administrator. Research has shown that members of our
communities often have higher levels of trust with their local
officials, and we should capitalize on that. I believe in the
fundamental rights that the First Amendment affords our citizens as
they exercise their rights to challenge the outcome of an election. I
believe transparency goes hand-in-hand with a fully-audited, accurate,
and fair election; these are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, as
an election official you know when that line is crossed. When acts of
violence, threats to oneself or family, threats to the infrastructure,
or interference begins to emerge, then the entire process is at risk.
There are many barriers that municipalities, counties, and States
face when working to combat these growing threats. Election officials
are very good with planning, preparing, and adjusting to changing
operational conditions. But that kind of preparation does not prepare
them for the increased risks associated with conducting elections in
today's divisive environment. I like to say that if you visit one
election office, you visit one election office. By this I mean that
they are all very different in size and scope based on the disparate
nature of how we conduct elections in this country. But the common
theme among all of them is a need for funding; I believe the playbook
of claiming an election outcome is inaccurate in all close contests
will only grow; and it's a real concern that something could trigger an
individual, or individuals to react with violence. Funding is an issue
for all election officials. While threats and intimidation were
exponentially larger in certain parts of the country, this is not just
an issue in battleground States or contested races. Funding can
continue to improve physical and overall security and help improve
preparedness for law enforcement to protect polling locations, poll
workers, and election officials.
Disinformation and misinformation will continue to expand and tools
and resources to help provide timely and accurate information is
essential. While one-time funding has been historically allocated,
election security is known to be an on-going challenge that will
require on-going efforts to better understand threats and
vulnerabilities and develop strategies and solutions to defend and
protect America's election infrastructure.
We should not conflate disagreements with laws, regulations, and
rules with the outrageous notion that all elections are ``rigged''. Is
there work to be done? Of course. Too often election officials are
bound by outdated laws that should be updated. Misunderstandings of
legal, or regulatory constraints can and does cause suspicion, rumors
and breeds irrational theories. These kinds of disparities only fuel a
public hungry for explanations as to why their favored candidate lost
an election.
I don't want this to appear that funding is the only solution. As
an example, while serving as Orange County's chief election official, I
established a task force made up of the Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI, our State and local law enforcement partners, and
our district attorney. We worked collaboratively long before an
election to plan for specific responses. This included local plain
clothes investigators pre-positioned in the field, not in polling
places, reviews of all voting locations and personnel, and intelligence
gathering.
Prior to this approach there were many times I would be called to a
polling location due to a sensitive matter and occasionally would meet
local law enforcement on scene. Often these were obvious staged events
by political operatives, which sometimes crossed the line into
potential intimidation. Police officers would ask me ``is this even a
crime? Isn't this a civil matter?''.
As a result, we created a pocket guide for law enforcement officers
that they could carry with them and would inform them of criminal
violations of election laws, not often used by responding officers.
Briefing and informing local law enforcement bridged an important gap
and made for a much stronger partnership. Understanding that threats
and interference is a real problem can drastically improve
collaboration and reduce, not eliminate, the risks.
In addition, we remained closely connected to the Election
Assistance Commission (EAC), our local law enforcement fusion center
and to Information Sharing and Analysis Centers such as Multi-State
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) and the Election
Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC).
Information sharing in both directions is tremendously helpful for
maintaining awareness of innovative solutions and security threats or
challenges. To increase staff awareness of election security, my staff
participated in regular tabletop exercises with government and private
partners.
In the weeks following the 2020 election my office was inundated
with agitated observers and on one occasion a protest with hundreds of
people. Because of our pre-election task force work, there was a rapid
response, detailed intelligence, and action items put into place.
I don't want to leave this topic without also noting that we must
continue to do work to reduce voters' lack of confidence, which can
exacerbate the very issues we are discussing today. For instance,
election officials should continue to expand audits, partner with
prosecutors on any violations of election law, and improve the voter
experience, which will continue to build trust and confidence among
voters. If the challenges currently facing our election systems are
ignored, we risk continued erosion of confidence in our elections and
in the integrity of our election processes. This of course will not
change all hearts and minds, but this is a journey without a finish
line.
Over the past several months, a group of election officials and law
enforcement personnel from across the country have been meeting to
address the protection of the public servants who supervise our
elections from intimidation, threats, and violence. Recently organized
as the Committee for Safe and Secure Elections, which I currently
chair, this is a group of chiefs of police, elected sheriffs, and
former and current election officials Nation-wide coming together to
close the gap between law enforcement and election administration.
But why is there a gap? During the 2016 election cycle discussion
around foreign interference in our elections spurred many election
offices to build relationships with Federal partners like the FBI, the
Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies to enhance
cooperation on cybersecurity issues. But what wasn't addressed in large
part was physical security, for election officials, staff, voters, and
polling places. During the 2020 election cycle it was clear that many
local law enforcement agencies and election officials were not
communicating in many parts of the country. But 2020 made us think,
what should a local official do if he or she receives threats? Whom do
you contact? How can the officials and the process be protected from
disruption? The committee was created to help address these issues and
reduce the risks.
Our committee is focused on a four-part process, some of it very
simple. The first part is developing resource materials for law
enforcement officials, such as the pocket guides that I spoke about
earlier. The committee members agree that this could be a model for
developing similar materials for local law enforcement agencies,
specifically about elections. Our hope is to make the spread of this
material much more efficient across the country. The second is
training. One of the challenges is establishing that the need to
increase physical election security is a real issue. An effective way
to achieve this is by creating and using law enforcement training
videos designed to build awareness on threats to election officials and
the infrastructure. Identifying steps that can be taken by law
enforcement and election offices prepares both for how to respond in
certain scenarios and how they can work together to identify examples
where a plainclothes response could help deescalate and would be most
appropriate. The third step is bridging the gaps. We want law
enforcement to proactively reach out to their local election officials
and vice versa long before election day. Together, they should
establish joint procedures for communication in advance of elections.
An election official shouldn't arrive at work on election day, find a
threatening situation, and not know what to do. If local law
enforcement and local election offices have met in advance and created
a plan, knowing how to respond will be much clearer. We hope to provide
guidelines that can help election officials through this process. You
might ask why this critical planning would not already be in place--in
many cases it is because it has never been a part of the playbook for
election officials. It's clear that you must get everyone who is
involved in the administration of elections to go through a step-by-
step process of engaging with law enforcement at the local level--
street officers, beat officers, detectives. Getting everyone on both
sides of this equation to know each other and know how to communicate
with each other will go a long way with improving response and
protection.
The final piece falls in the policy arena. While the committee has
not decided how we are going to approach this important element,
potential changes in policy or regulations might reduce the risk of
certain threats or provide clear direction to law enforcement and
election officials on reporting, tracking, and recognizing the warning
signs.
During my nearly two-decade tenure as the chief elections official
in Orange County, I have seen the election security landscape change
dramatically. While in the recent past the focus has been on developing
digital defense strategies, it has now sadly morphed into the real and
dangerous threats posed to the men and women who run elections.
State and local election officials need broad support to protect
America's election infrastructure, its people, and its processes. As I
previously noted, and as you are aware, States and counties differ not
only in geographic area and population size but also in terms of their
access to resources, funding, and information. Yet, the election
security challenges that local election officials face has no bearing
on the size of their jurisdiction, access to funding and resources, and
the ability to mitigate or respond to such threats.
There are hundreds, if not thousands, of election offices where
only a handful of dedicated staff are on hand to run their
jurisdiction's elections fairly and securely. The lack of personnel in
many of these small jurisdictions makes it difficult to add additional
responsibilities. Sending staff to trainings or bringing trainings to
small or rural voting jurisdictions can be particularly challenging
because it reduces the number of staff on hand at the elections'
office. The magnitude of what is involved in maintaining election
security can be overwhelming to any individual seeking to expand their
knowledge and remain abreast of the ever-changing field of election
security. We must not lose sight of smaller jurisdictions that could
benefit greatly from shared resources.
Congress has a unique ability to address issues affecting multiple
States. It is incredibly challenging to coordinate resources and
knowledge sharing amongst States and local jurisdictions. Congress can
greatly assist States and counties with these growing threats by
raising awareness, increasing funding to enhance physical security of
election offices and the associated infrastructure, and supporting
collaboration among election officials and law enforcement partners
when needed and most appropriate.
Our institutes of democracy are under attack and while many
election officials are resilient, it is stretching their capacity to
operate while being threatened. I don't want to overstate this, but the
important act of running fair and accurate elections is what holds a
fragile democracy together. We just want someone to have our backs.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Vice Chairman Torres. Thank you for your testimony. The
Chair recognizes Ms. Howard to summarize her statement for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH HOWARD, SENIOR COUNSEL, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE
Ms. Howard. Thank you, Chairman Torres, Ranking Member
Katko, and Members of this committee for the opportunity to
speak with you today about the ever-changing election security
landscape and one of the biggest concerns facing our elections
today: Threats against election officials.
As you know, in 2017, State and local election officials
were somewhat suddenly informed about the threats against our
election infrastructure by foreign enemies, such as Russia and
Iran, and about the types of attacks that they were now
responsible for protecting our election infrastructure against.
Despite being underfunded and under-resourced, our election
officials are rising to the challenge. Just 5 years later,
there has been a remarkable improvement in the resiliency of
our election infrastructure.
Today, election officials view cybersecurity as a critical
component of planning for safe and secure elections. New and
more secure voting equipment has been deployed across many
States and many counties. Election officials have developed and
practiced plans to respond to various cyber threats, such as
ransomware. Many officials have taken other important steps to
harden their systems against cyber attack.
This significant shift would not have happened without the
Federal financial support specifically designated for election
security that Congress has provided starting in 2018 and the
Federal partners, including the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency and the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission that have worked closely with our election officials
over the past 5 years.
Also critical to the significant improvements that we see
today are the election community leaders who have led by
example, including the three other witnesses on today's panel.
Ohio Secretary of State LaRose has long been a pioneer on the
election and cybersecurity front, working to quickly and
strategically secure Ohio's election infrastructure against
attack and establishing some of the first State-wide standards
in the country.
New Mexico Secretary of State Toulouse Oliver has also
served as an important election security leader. She was one of
the first to quickly distribute the initial tranche of Federal
election security funding to those most in need in her State:
County election officials.
Neal Kelley, who as a local election official was primarily
responsible for administering elections, published one of the
first practical election security resources for officials, the
2018 Election Security Playbook.
While we are now on the right track to secure our election
infrastructure against cyber attack, new and different threats,
many with domestic roots, have arisen, including threats of
physical harm to our election officials, their families, and
their staff.
``You will f'ing pay for your f'ing lying f'ing remarks. We
will take you out. F you, F your family, F your life, you F'er.
Watch your f'ing back.''
Threats like that left as a voicemail for a Republican
election official in Michigan, were received by election
officials across the country after the 2020 election and
continue today. Not surprisingly, these threats are leading to
additional serious concerns, such as an alarming number of
election officials leaving the profession, which are
contributing to the fragility of our democracy.
Just as they needed your help to protect our technology,
election officials now need your help to keep them, their
families, and their staff safe. In the Brennan Center's 2022
election officials survey, we found that more than three-
fourths of election officials believe that threats against them
had increased in recent years. More than half were concerned
about the safety of their colleagues and 1 in 6 election
officials had been threatened.
Effective mitigation strategies will require tackling not
only these threats, but also the barrage of false information
about our election administration and our election officials
that is fueling these threats.
Of course, Congress alone cannot eliminate these problems.
A proper response will require a whole-of-society approach, and
we all have a role to play. However, Congress can play a
primary role in tackling these issues and spurring on others to
do their part. For example, Congress should authorize grants
specifically for physical safety training and for security
enhancements to election officials' residences. Congress should
also work with a number of Federal departments and agencies to
ensure that they are effectively working to protect our
election officials, including the Departments of Homeland
Security and Justice, as I have detailed in my written
testimony.
Thank you again for your time today and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Howard follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elizabeth Howard
July 20, 2022
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the
committee: Thank you for the opportunity to speak about the critical
issue of threats against our election officials and our democracy.
While the 2020 election is long over, election officials from Alaska to
Florida continue to face the scary effects of the on-going barrage of
false allegations about their work and our election administration
system. These effects include credible death threats against our State
and local election officials, which are contributing to other serious
concerns, such as the growing number of election officials leaving
their positions, that increase the fragility of our democracy.
Effectively combatting these threats will require a whole-of-
society approach. While Congress alone cannot eliminate these problems,
they play a primary role in mitigating many of these threats and can
help to spur on Government agencies, the private sector, non-
Governmental organizations and individuals to do their part as well.
For over a decade, I have worked with election officials on
election administration issues. In my former position as deputy
commissioner of elections in Virginia, I led various election security
projects, including the decertification of all paperless voting
machines. In my current role, I work closely with State and local
election officials across the country on election administration
issues, including election security. Unfortunately, today the physical
safety of our election officials is an increasingly important component
of election security. I have also co-authored multiple reports on
election security and policies that will better enable our election
infrastructure, including our voting systems, to withstand attack and
keep our election officials safe.
The Brennan Center for Justice--a nonpartisan law and policy
institute that focuses on democracy and justice--appreciates the
opportunity to report on the threats facing our election officials and
our democracy and ways to protect against these threats.\1\ Election
officials also appreciate this committee's work to help protect our
democracy and increase awareness of these important issues.
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\1\ The Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of
Law is a nonpartisan public policy and law institute that works to
reform, revitalize, and defend our country's system of democracy and
justice. I am a senior counsel in the Brennan Center's Elections and
Government Program. My testimony does not purport to convey the views,
if any, of the New York University School of Law.
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I hope to convey five points in my testimony today: (1)
Disinformation is fueling threats against election workers across the
country; (2) Many election officials are leaving the profession, citing
threats and misinformation as key reasons; (3) The loss of election
administration expertise and experience is likely to spur further
disinformation; (4) Against these challenges, election officials are
not getting the Federal support they need. Congress has a critical role
to play in protecting our election officials, including oversight of
the Federal agencies and departments currently working on this issue;
and (5) A whole-of-society approach is needed to address the problems
of election disinformation.
i. disinformation is fueling threats against election workers across
the country.
Election officials and workers have faced--and continue to face--a
barrage of threats, intimidation, and harassment in the wake of the
2020 election. Over the past 2 years, officials have shared experiences
of receiving threatening phone calls and on-line messages,\2\ being
followed or intimidated at their office,\3\ and needing to flee their
home out of fear for their safety.\4\ And these officials--many with
years or decades of experience--have warned that the quantity and
severity of these attacks has increased dramatically compared to past
election cycles.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Brennan Center for Justice, ``Election Officials Are Under
Attack (Full-Length Version),'' June 16, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=WOCBIiVUBMc.
\3\ See Election Subversion: A Growing Threat to Election
Integrity, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on House Administration, 117th
Cong. (2021) (Statement of Adrian Fontes, former Recorder, Maricopa
County, AZ).
\4\ See Linda So, ``Special Report: Trump-Inspired Death Threats
are Terrorizing Election Workers,'' Reuters, June 11, 2021, https://
www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-georgia-threats-idINL2N2NP1RG.
\5\ Brennan Center for Justice, Election Officials Under Attack,
June 16, 2021, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/
election-officials-under-attack; Brennan Center for Justice, Local
Election Officials Survey (March 2022), March 10, 2022, https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/local-election-
officials-survey-march-2022 (77 percent of local election officials
feel that threats against election officials have increased, decreased,
or have stayed about the same as in recent years).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These are not rare or isolated incidents. In a Nation-wide survey
of local election officials that the Brennan Center commissioned
earlier this year, 1 in 6 election officials said that they have
experienced threats because of their job, and 77 percent said that they
feel these threats have increased in recent years.\6\ More than 1 in 4
election officials are concerned about being assaulted on the job, and
over half are concerned about the safety of their colleagues.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey
(March 2022), March 10, 2022, 6, 5, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/research-reports/local-election-officials-survey-march-2022.
\7\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey, 5.
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As we spoke with election officials about the reasons for this
alarming trend, many saw a direct link between the threats they were
facing and the increase in disinformation about the election process,
specifically the lie that the 2020 election was stolen or that wide-
spread fraud affected the outcome.\8\ In many cases, the perpetrators
have specifically cited these lies as justification for threats of
death, violence, or sexual assault against not only election workers,
but their family and children as well.\9\ A Nevada man, for example,
was arrested for threatening State election workers with messages that
included: ``I want to thank you for such a great job you all did on
stealing the election. I hope you all go to jail for treason. I hope
your children get molested. You are all going to (expletive) die.''\10\
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\8\ Brennan Center for Justice, Election Officials Under Attack,
10.
\9\ Linda So and Jason Szep, ``U.S. Election Workers Get Little
Help from Law Enforcement as Terror Threats Mount,'' Reuters, September
8, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-
election-threats-law-enforcement/.
\10\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Man Charged for Threatening
Nevada State Election Worker,'' press release, January 27, 2022,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/man-charged-threatening-nevada-state-
election-worker.
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Opportunistic political leaders pushed an outrageous lie that
election officials and workers directly permitted, at minimum, an
election to be stolen, and many of the people we depend on to protect
our democracy now face constant fear for their safety.
ii. many election workers are leaving their positions, citing threats
and disinformation as key reasons why.
The barrage of threats and disinformation, in combination with
political interference and sheer exhaustion, is pushing experienced
professionals out of election administration. Our survey earlier this
year showed that nearly a third of election officials knew one or more
election workers who have left their job at least in part because of
fear for their safety.\11\ In the long term, 60 percent of officials
are concerned that threats, harassment, and intimidation will make it
difficult to retain and recruit election workers.\12\
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\11\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey,
19.
\12\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey,
19.
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Many election officials themselves are leaving their positions.
Although election officials broadly find enjoyment in their jobs and
are proud of the service they perform for their community, nearly 20
percent of officials surveyed plan to leave their positions before the
2024 election.\13\ For these officials, the No. 1 reason cited for
leaving was political leaders' attacks on a system they know is fair
and honest.\14\
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\13\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey,
18.
\14\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey,
18.
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This concern isn't hypothetical. ``[F]ive of Arizona's 15 counties
have new elections directors this cycle.''\15\ Six of Georgia's most
populous counties, representing nearly a third of all active voters in
Georgia,\16\ have new election directors this cycle.\17\ The number of
election officials leaving their positions in Michigan, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin has been described as an ``exodus.''\18\
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\15\ Mary Jo Pitzl, `` `It's a very sad day': Across Arizona,
Election Officials Leave Office Following Harassment Over 2020,''
Arizona Republic, July 10, 2022, https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/
politics/elections/2022/07/10/arizona-elections-leaders-leaving-their-
posts-early-following-threats/7816106001/.
\16\ Georgia Secretary of State, ``Georgia Active Voters Report,''
last updated December 2021, https://sos.ga.gov/georgia-active-voters-
report.
\17\ Fulton County, Gwinnett County, DeKalb County, Chatham County,
Richmond County, and Macon-Bibb County. Ben Brasch, ``Fulton Names
Interim Elections Director as Chief Departs,'' Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, March 16, 2022, https://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta-news/
fulton-names-interim-elections-director-as-chief-departs/
V75A2AJQDNAERB2WBB3XD6GVFA/; Curt Yeomans, ``Gwinnett Elections Board
Hires Zach Manifold, from Ohio, to be County's New Election
Supervisor,'' Gwinnett Daily Post, June 28, 2021, https://
www.gwinnettdailypost.com/local/gwinnett-elections-board-hires-zach-
manifold-from-ohio-to-be-countys-new-election-supervisor/
article_80853c90-d853-11eb-adf2-2b0670f5be7b.html; Tyler Estep, ``New
DeKalb County Elections Director Appointed,'' Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, January 13, 2022, https://www.ajc.com/neighborhoods/
dekalb/new-dekalb-county-elections-director-appointed/
LZ5NHGY7SJDEDAWROWLLUFYUJE/; ``Billy Wooten Named Chatham County Board
of Elections' Supervisor of Elections,'' Savannah Business Journal,
December 15, 2021, https://www.savannahbusinessjournal.com/news/
elections/billy-wooten-named-chatham-county-board-of-elections-
supervisor-of-elections/article_3da73a8a-5da6-11ec-bfcd-
f3c451b45061.html; Miguel Legoas, ``Augusta Board of Elections
Promoting Assistant Director to Lead,'' Augusta Chronicle, August 10,
2021, https://www.augustachronicle.com/story/news/politics/2021/08/10/
augusta-board-elections-promoting-assistant-director-lead/5547944001/;
Liz Fabian, ``Macon-Bibb Elections Supervisor's Resignation Cites
Stress, Workload, New Election Laws,'' Macon Newsroom, January 10,
2022, https://macon-newsroom.com/12148/news/macon-bibb-elections-
supervisors-resignation-cites-stress-workload-new-election-laws/.
\18\ Anthony Izaguirre, ``Exodus of Election Officials Raises
Concerns of Partisanship,'' AP News, https://apnews.com/article/
election-officials-retire-trump-2020-threats-misinformation-
3b810d8b3b3adee2ca409689788b863f.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We don't have to guess why they've left. They've been very clear.
In early 2021, Roxanna Moritz, the chief local election official in
Scott County, IA, resigned from the position (to which she had just
been re-elected), stating, ``after a difficult year in 2020 with both
the Primary and the General Election, I have decided it is time for me
to retire. Not only did we face the constant barrage of lies and
innuendos in regards to the security and integrity of elections, but
name calling and physical threats.''\19\ Moritz added, ``It was not
just me, but my staff faced this abuse as well.''\20\ Rick Barron, the
former elections director in Fulton County Georgia shared that threats
led to his resignation in late 2021, stating, ``I've had to think about
my daughter. She gets nervous when I just take the dog outside, and she
wants the windows closed in my bedroom, the shades. So those are some
of the things that I had to consider.''\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Mark Ridolfi, ``Moritz Cites Reasons for Leaving: Threats,
Lies about Election Security, and Battles with Scott County
Supervisors,'' North Scott Press, March 10, 2021, https://
www.northscottpress.com/stories/moritz-cites-reasons-for-leaving-
threats-lies-about-election-security-and-battles-with-scott,80481.
\20\ Id.
\21\ Erin Burnett OutFront (CNN television broadcast November 4,
2021) (interview with Richard Barron), https://www.facebook.com/cnn/
videos/georgia-election-official-resigns-amid-death-threats/
3098687650407659/.
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These departures have continued in 2022. Former Yavapai County, AZ
Recorder Leslie Hoffman resigned earlier this month, noting that the
local sheriff patrols her house periodically because of threats that
she has received.\22\ ``It's getting to be a lot,'' she added.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Mary Papenfuss, ``Arizona Election Officials Are Being Hounded
Out of Office with Ugly Threats,'' Huffington Post, July 4, 2022,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/arizona-election-officials-feeling-jobs-
threats_n_62c2653ae4b014f50a33d5cc.
\23\ Id.
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iii. the loss of election administration expertise and experience is
likely to spur further disinformation.
As current officials and workers depart due to disinformation and
harassment, the underlying challenges are likely to worsen and in turn
create a greater threat for our election professionals and
infrastructure.
For one, the departing election professionals will leave in their
wake a dearth of knowledge on how best to secure elections and serve
voters. As they are replaced by fewer or less experienced workers, we
are likely to see more mistakes or less capacity to respond to those
mistakes. This is highly dangerous in an environment where conspiracy-
driven individuals are prepared to amplify any error that they feel
validates their beliefs, even when the error was unintentional or had
no impact on the accuracy or outcome of the election. When a single
Michigan county with fewer than 20,000 voters initially reported
incorrect results for the 2020 Presidential election, the mistake was
immediately seized on and eventually amplified into a broad conspiracy
that Dominion voting systems had rigged the election.\24\ Accurate
information, including that the mistake was quickly identified and
corrected, and that multiple subsequent audits and recounts confirmed
the accuracy of the election and voting equipment,\25\ was no match for
the spread of falsehoods by political campaigns and television
personalities.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Mark Bowden and Matthew Teague, ``How a County Clerk in
Michigan Found Herself at the Center of Trump's Attempt to Overturn the
Election,'' Time, December 15, 2021, https://time.com/6128812/the-
steal-antrim-county-michigan/.
\25\ Michigan Bureau of Elections, ``Post-Election Audit Report
Confirms Accuracy and Integrity of Michigan's Election,'' press
release, April 22, 2021, https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/press-
releases/2021/04/22/post-election-audit-report-confirms-accuracy-and-
integrity-of-michigans-election.
\26\ Mark Bowden and Matthew Teague, ``How a County Clerk in
Michigan Found Herself at the Center of Trump's Attempt to Overturn the
Election''; Alec Dent, ``Fact Check: Addressing Yet More Claims about
Dominion Voting Systems,'' The Dispatch, November 14, 2020, https://
factcheck.thedispatch.com/p/fact-check-addressing-yet-more-claims.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Worse, current election workers may be replaced by people who have
bought into election conspiracy theories themselves and who seek to
actively undermine the security and integrity of our election system.
The Brennan Center's survey found that more than half of local election
officials are concerned that some of their in-coming colleagues might
believe that wide-spread fraud occurred in 2020.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey,
14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are already getting a glimpse of what could happen if election
offices and polling places are filled with people who are sympathetic
to election conspiracies. Since the 2020 election, there have been at
least 17 reported incidents where supporters of the Big Lie have gained
or attempted to gain access to voting equipment to find evidence of
false election claims.\28\ These incidents were often in coordination
with, or at the behest of, some of the most prominent purveyors of
election disinformation.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Nathan Layne and Peter Eisler, ``Exclusive: Michigan Widens
Probe into Voting System Breaches by Trump Allies,'' Reuters, June 7,
2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-michigan-widens-probe-
into-voting-system-breaches-by-trump-allies-2022-06-06/.
\29\ Lawrence Norden, ``Illegal Attempts to Access Voting Machines
Didn't Stop with Jan. 6 Insurrection,'' Brennan Center for Justice,
June 28, 2022, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/
illegal-attempts-access-voting-machines-didnt-stop-jan-6-insurrection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While election officials have by-and-large resisted such pressure
from outside actors, the new class of workers may be more susceptible
to these lies or may seek election administration roles simply because
they want to abuse their position in pursuit of furthering conspiracy
theories. In Michigan for example, a local clerk who took office after
the 2020 election and who endorsed election conspiracies refused to
allow a vendor to perform routine maintenance on a voting machine,
falsely believing that the maintenance would erase old data that could
prove the machines were rigged.\30\
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\30\ Michigan Bureau of Elections, Letter from Jonathan Brater,
Director of Elections to Stephanie Scott, Adams Township Clerk dated
October 15, 2021, https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/MISOS/
2021/10/25/file_attachments/1976229/Letters%20to%20Adams%20Town-
ship%20Clerk.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The risk is not only that these individuals will use their
positions of influence to spread disinformation, but also that they may
place the actual security of our election infrastructure and processes
at risk. After one Colorado clerk permitted an activist to access the
county's voting equipment--a breach that led to election deniers
publicly sharing passwords for the voting system--the Secretary of
State was forced to decommission the equipment because the State could
not be confident in the integrity of the systems.\31\ Future insider
threat attacks could similarly put the security of voting machines,
voter registration databases, and other sensitive election systems at
risk, as well as the personal safety of election workers
themselves.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Justin Wingerter, ``Mesa County Must Replace Election
Equipment Due to Security Breach, Secretary of State Says,'' Denver
Post, August 12, 2021, https://www.denverpost.com/2021/08/12/election-
security-colorado-mesa-county-jena-griswold/.
\32\ U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency,
Election Infrastructure Insider Threat Mitigation Guide, https://
www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
election_insider_threat_mitigation_guide_508_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State and local election offices take many steps--and more can be
done--to prevent and detect attempts by workers, vendors, or outside
actors to undermine election systems. These measures include limiting
digital and physical access to critical systems, keeping detailed chain
of custody records, and operating in two-person or bipartisan teams to
collect and count ballots.\33\ But many election offices do not have
the funding needed to make further security upgrades to protect against
insider threats, such as camera surveillance or keycard access
systems.\34\ Moreover, even where election offices are sufficiently
prepared to detect insider threat attacks and recover from these
incidents, the response may not be quick enough to prevent damages to
public confidence in elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Id.
\34\ Lawrence Norden, Derek Tisler and Turquoise Baker, ``Estimated
Costs for Protecting Election Infrastructure Against Insider Threats,''
Brennan Center for Justice, March 7, 2022, https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/estimated-costs-
protecting-election-infrastructure-against-insider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. against these challenges, election officials are not getting the
federal support they need.
In the face of staffing shortages, threats to their safety, and
rampant disinformation, election officials are not getting the support
and resources they need. The Brennan Center's poll found that 80
percent of local election officials think the Federal Government is
either doing nothing to support them or are not doing enough.\35\ The
administration and Congress must do more to protect election workers
and help them defend elections against security threats and
disinformation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey,
22.
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A. Congress should provide more resources and protections for election
workers.
Congress can take steps now that will help protect election workers
from threats of violence and give comfort to these workers who fear for
the safety of themselves, their colleagues, and their families.
Specifically, Congress should:
Authorize grants that can be used for physical safety
precautions, including prevention and de-escalation training,
personal information protection, and security upgrades to
offices and homes;
Fund CISA to develop and conduct on-line safety training;
Prohibit individuals from revealing personal identifying
information of election workers and election vendors with the
intent to threaten or intimidate them; and,
Provide grant funding to allow States to set up or expand
current address confidentiality programs to cover election
workers.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Gowri Ramachandran, ``How Congress Can Help Protect Election
Workers,'' Brennan Center for Justice, March 25, 2022, https://
www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-congress-can-help-
protect-election-workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Congress should exercise its oversight authority to ensure that
Federal agencies are taking steps to help protect election
officials and our democracy.
``Congressional oversight is one of the most important
responsibilities of the U.S. Congress. Congressional oversight refers
to the review, monitoring, and supervision of Federal agencies,
programs, and policy implementation, and it provides the Legislative
branch with an opportunity to inspect, examine, review, and check the
Executive branch and its agencies.''\37\ The purposes of Congressional
oversight include, to: Improve the efficiency, effectiveness, and
economy of governmental operations; evaluate program performance;
assess an agency or official's ability to manage and carry out program
objectives; review and determine Federal financial priorities; ensure
that Executive policies reflect the public interest; and, acquire
information useful in future policy making.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Rules Majority
Office, ``The General Principles of Congressional Oversight, https://
rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/
Archives/
comm_gp_cong_oversight.htm#:?:text=congressional%20oversight%20refers-
%20to%20the,executive%20branch%20and%20its%20agencies.
\38\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the context of election security oversight, Congress can play an
important role in ensuring that Federal election security programs and
policies are prioritized, effective, and properly funded.
1. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of
Homeland Security should provide meaningful access
to existing Federal grants for election security
needs.
In January, DOJ clarified that JAG Byrne grant funds can be used by
State and local recipients to ``deter, detect, and protect against
threats of violence against election workers, administrators,
officials, and others associated with the electoral process.''\39\
Months later, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reinstated
``enhancing election security'' as a National priority area for its
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), encouraging States to spend a
portion of funds on election security needs.\40\ Each of these was an
important step to direct much-needed resources to State and local
election officials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ U.S. Department of Justice, Letter from Vanita Gupta,
Associate Attorney General to State Administering Agency Directors
dated January 26, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/opa/page/file/1465931/
download.
\40\ U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, ``Fiscal Year 2022
Homeland Security Grant Program Key Changes,'' May 13, 2022, https://
www.fema.gov/fact-sheet/fiscal-year-2022-homeland-security-grant-
program-key-changes.
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Yet as we get closer to the 2022 election, election officials are
having difficulty accessing these funds. Indeed, a DOJ spokesperson
told CNN that as of June 6, the division that oversees the Byrne JAG
program ``had not reported any use of the funds to protect against
threats of violence to election workers.''\41\ And election officials
in at least one State have already had their request for JAG Byrne
funds denied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Sean Lyngaas, ``Election Officials Worry about Their Safety
Ahead of Midterms,'' CNN, June 17, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/
17/politics/elections-midterms-2022-security-threats/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. DOJ should hire a senior advisor with strong
relationships in the elections community for the
Election Threats Task Force.
Without firm requirements for State and local recipients of JAG and
HSGP grants to spend a portion on election security, the State
administering agencies that plan how grant funds will be spent are too
likely to overlook election needs or to deprioritize those needs due to
political pressures. The State agencies--typically law enforcement or
public safety departments led by appointees of elected officials--have
long-standing priorities attached to these Federal funding streams,
while election officials operate as largely new stakeholders that must
convince these agencies to divert a portion of funds away from other
programs. And that is only where election officials are aware that they
can vie for a share of these grants to begin with.
With HSGP funds in particular, election officials are also facing
timing issues, as the ``enhancing election security'' National priority
area was announced just weeks before the grant opened and 2 months
before the deadline for grant application submissions.\42\ By this
time, many State administering agencies had likely already set
priorities based on previous years' requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, ``Fiscal Year 2022
Homeland Security Grant Program Key Changes''; U.S. Federal Emergency
Management Agency, ``The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Notice
of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) Fiscal Year 2022 Homeland Security Grant
Program,'' May 13, 2022, https://www.fema.gov/grants/preparedness/
homeland-security/fy-22-nofo#d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Going forward, Congress should ensure that election officials have
meaningful access to these critical resources by requiring--or urging
DOJ and DHS to require--that a portion of funds be spent on election
security needs and that State administering agencies consult with the
chief State election official before submitting a grant application.
Congress should consider similar requirements for future grant programs
that are likely to face the same problems in getting resources to
election security needs, including the newly-created State and Local
Cybersecurity Grant Program that the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act established to distribute $1 billion in new cybersecurity funding
over the next 4 years.\43\ Short of that, Congress should encourage DOJ
and FEMA to conduct more extensive outreach with State administering
agencies on the need to prioritize physical security for election
workers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58,
70612, 135 Stat. 429, 1272 (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In July 2021, DOJ launched a law enforcement task force to address
the rise in threats against election workers.\44\ But the Brennan
Center's survey found that 42 percent of local election officials have
never heard of the DOJ's task force, and another 48 percent said that
they have heard of it but did not know much about the effort.\45\ Just
9 percent said that they were very familiar with the DOJ's Election
Threats Task Force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ U.S. Department of Justice, ``Justice Department Launches Task
Force to Combat Threats Against Election Workers,'' July 29, 2021,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/justice-department-launches-task-
force-combat-threats-against-election-workers-0.
\45\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey,
23.
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Congress can also address this issue by funding more grants that go
directly to State and local election officials.
3. DOJ's Election Threats Task Force should expand to
include local law enforcement
These numbers suggest that the task force must expand outreach to
local election officials and raise awareness of its efforts.
Importantly, DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have recently
made significant and much-appreciated progress in their outreach
efforts. Federal agents and DOJ personnel have attended election
official meetings and conferences across the country and many election
officials have shared stories about personal outreach by in-State
Federal officials. However, with more than 8,000 local election
officials in the United States, there is more work to do. And there is
reason to believe strategic expansion of current outreach efforts would
reap results. After hearing an explanation of the task force, 57
percent of respondents said that they were somewhat or very confident
that the task force's investigation and prosecution of threats against
election officials would make them feel safer in their role as an
election official.\46\ Simply learning about the task force will
provide a boost in confidence, which is sorely needed in an environment
where more than half of local election officials who have been
threatened because of their jobs did not even report the threat to law
enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CISA faced similar challenges after former DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson designated election infrastructure as critical infrastructure
in 2017.\47\ This designation let CISA provide free cybersecurity
services and support to State and local election officials. However,
many officials were unfamiliar with CISA and leery of Federal
overreach. After what election officials described as a ``rocky
start,''\48\ CISA hired a former election official with bipartisan
long-term relationships in the community to serve as a senior advisor.
Today, CISA enjoys wide-spread support and awareness. Former CISA
director Christopher Krebs has said hiring the senior advisor was among
the most effective steps in CISA's work with State and local election
officials.\49\
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\47\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ``Statement by Secretary
Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical
Infrastructure Subsector,'' press release, January 6, 2017, https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/06/statement-secretary-johnson-designation-
election-infrastructure-critical.
\48\ U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Transcript from EAC
Election Readiness Summit, October 3, 2018, https://www.eac.gov/sites/
default/files/event_document/files/CART_1003-
18EAC_Election_Readiness_Summit.pdf.
\49\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOJ should bring on a similar senior advisor to the task force.
This person could leverage existing relationships to boost awareness of
the task force and its work, help manage election official
relationships, and provide information and expertise about election
administration. This senior advisor could also help the task force
navigate and map the elections community's existing relationships,
formal and informal, with other Federal agencies such as the EAC and
CISA.
When election officials report threats to law enforcement, the
Federal Government is rarely their first call. The Brennan Center's
survey found that 89 percent of local election officials who reported a
threat to law enforcement contacted local law enforcement, compared to
22 percent who contacted Federal law enforcement.\50\ (A small
percentage reported threats to both.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Brennan Center for Justice, Local Election Officials Survey,
7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this reason, DOJ should expand its Election Threats Task force
to formally include local law enforcement. This inclusion would allow
the task force to identify threat patterns that individual local law
enforcement agencies may not be able to see in isolation. It would
likely help local law enforcement (the main contact for most election
officials) better respond to such threats. It may enable DOJ to bring
criminal actions when there are no possible State actions. It would
ease DOJ's referral of cases when charges would be more easily made at
the State or local level. And it likely would boost awareness of the
task force since local election officials are far more likely to have
pre-existing relationships with local sheriff or police departments.
v. a whole-of-society response is needed to address the problems of
election disinformation.
As discussed above, election mis-, dis- and mal-information are
causing and contributing to many serious concerns our democracy
currently faces. Effectively addressing these problems, and their
effects, will require participation from political leaders, government
officials, media platforms, and individuals--a whole-of-society
commitment to protecting democracy. Internet and social media companies
especially can help thwart the effects of disinformation by boosting
content from trusted sources (election officials in particular),
limiting the spread of disinformation by delaying the publication of
posts from prominent disinformation spreaders, and sending corrective
information to users who have interacted with election
misinformation.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Brennan Center, Election Officials Under Attack, 10-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Political leaders--Republican and Democrat alike--are critical to
effectively combating election disinformation. They can help ``build
trust in our democracy by promoting accurate information about our
election system from trusted sources. Especially important is elevating
the voice of election officials, who have first-hand knowledge of the
many safeguards in place to ensure the accuracy, security, and
integrity of every election.''\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ See A Growing Threat: How Disinformation Damages American
Democracy, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on House Administration, 117th
Cong. (2022) (Statement of Edgardo Cortes, Election Security Advisor,
Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law), https://
docs.house.gov/meetings/HA/HA08/20220622/114910/HHRG-117-HA08-WState-
CortesE-20220622.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Members of the public often take their cues from political
leaders. They need to hear that the election system can be trusted and
see their representatives standing behind the workers who do the job of
securing the right to vote.''\53\ They too have an important role in
identifying and stopping the spread of false information. For example,
members of the public ``should try to determine the veracity of any
election information before sharing or acting on it.''\54\ And if they
see suspect information, they should check with a trusted source, such
as their State or local election official, for accurate information and
report disinformation to the same officials.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Id.
\54\ Tim Lau, ``Voters vs. Disinformation,'' Brennan Center for
Justice, September 2, 2020, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
analysis-opinion/voters-vs-disinformation.
\55\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Journalists and civil society organizations play key roles in this
work as well. One important function they have is to expose shoddy and
wasteful work, sometimes paid for with taxpayer funds, by individuals
and entities attempting to exploit the doubts held by some with
incomplete or inaccurate information about our election administration
system for the purpose of personal gain or profit. Many have already
joined these efforts, amplifying accurate election information and the
voices of election officials, obtaining and sharing relevant public
records, and working to prevent bad actors from causing further
harm.\56\ For example, on behalf of All Voting is Local Arizona,
Arizona Democracy Resource Center, Living United for Change Arizona,
and Mi Familia Vota, the Brennan Center sent a letter to Federal
officials requesting that Cyber Ninjas--the firm that led the Arizona
Senate's costly sham audit of the 2020 election--and its CEO Doug
Logan, be prohibited from contracting with the Federal Government.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Organizations that have done important work on this issue in
Arizona and Wisconsin include Advancing Arizona, All Voting is Local,
American Oversight, Arizona Democracy Resource Center, Arizona Faith
Network, Arizona Wins, Campaign Legal Center, Common Cause, Law
Forward, Lucha Arizona, Mi Familia Vota, Progress Arizona, Protect
Democracy, Rural AZ Action, Securing Democracy, States United, and
Wisconsin Voices. Journalists include Molly Beck (Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel), Jeremy Duda (Axios, Arizona Mirror), Jen Fifield (Votebeat,
Arizona Republic), Patrick Marley (Washington Post, Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel), Henry Redman (Wisconsin Examiner), Brahm Resnick (12 News/
KPNX TV (NBC)), Dillon Rosenblatt (AZ Mirror), and Yvonne Wingett
Sanchez (Washington Post).
\57\ John J. Martin and Elizabeth Howard, ``Cyber Ninjas and Its
CEO Should Be Banned from Government Contracts,'' Brennan Center for
Justice, July 18, 2022, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
analysis-opinion/cyber-ninjas-and-its-ceo-should-be-banned-government-
contracts; Elizabeth Howard and John L. Martin, ``Referral Letter for
Cyber Ninjas Debarment Consideration,'' Brennan Center for Justice,
July 18, 2022, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/
referral-letter-cyber-ninjas-debarment-consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local and State officials also have important contributions to
make. In June, a group of local and State election officials joined
with law enforcement leaders from across the country and others to
establish the Committee for Safe and Secure Elections.\58\ This
committee, supported by the Brennan Center, R Street Institute, Protect
Democracy and Elections Group, was formed to ``support policies and
practices that protect election workers and voters from violence,
threats, and intimidation.''\59\ Its work includes developing resources
for both the law enforcement and election communities, which increase
awareness of the threats that election officials and workers face and
how to respond to these threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Committee for Safe and Secure Elections, https://
safeelections.org/.
\59\ Committee for Safe and Secure Elections, ``About the
Committee,'' https://safeelections.org/about.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
vi. conclusion
Election officials from across the country continue to face death
threats and harassment for simply doing their jobs. False information
about our election administration is a significant contributor to these
threats that are leading to numerous other concerns, such as the high
numbers of election officials leaving the profession, which increase
the fragility of our democracy. Congress has a critical role to play in
helping better protect our election officials, including increasing
awareness of these threats, providing grant funds designated for
targeted assistance to our officials, and spurring on government
agencies, civil society, the private sector, and other actors to work
together to protect our democracy.
Vice Chairman Torres. Thank you for your testimony. The
Chair recognizes Secretary LaRose to summarize his statement
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF FRANK LA ROSE, SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF OHIO
Mr. LaRose. Well, good morning, everyone, and thank you so
much, Chairman Torres and Ranking Member Katko and really all
the members of the House Homeland Security Committee. Thanks
for the opportunity to submit my testimony today on the
security of our elections, of course something that we all care
deeply about.
First, let me set the scene for you. It is May 4, 2021. It
is Primary Election Day in Ohio and an individual has plugged
an unauthorized laptop into a government network at the Lake
County Administrative Building. He was engaging in some sort of
effort to capture election data. Presumably, his hope was that
he was going to discover or download some sort of election
information to prove that election results can be impacted by
an outside influence. I am happy to report that that person
failed and he failed miserably. Why? Quite simply because we
were prepared.
Now, when I served as an Army Green Berets in the Special
Forces, we learned to never let our guard down. Our lives were
a constant churn of study and preparation and execution. After
all, the bad guys only had to be right once. We had to be right
every single day.
When I was elected secretary of state, I took that same
mindset and adapted it to how we operate in Ohio. In fact, we
made it our standard.
So, how did we stop this perpetrator on Primary Election
Day in 2021? It actually started in 2019. When I issued as
secretary of state our first-ever security directive for all of
Ohio's 88 county boards of elections it was a checklist. I
called it our pre-flight checklist for the Presidential
election of 2020. It was a 34-point checklist of both physical
and cybersecurity requirements that were designed with one
purpose: To keep the bad guys out.
Now, I will be honest, when I first announced these
requirements at a meeting of all of our county boards of
elections there was a groan in the audience and even some
laughter in the back. I was asking a lot of them and many
thought that it wasn't possible. But our elections are too
important and we can't sit on our hands and hope that things
are going to be OK. We have to take action, and that is exactly
what our county boards of elections did.
From the largest, most populous, and sophisticated county
boards of elections in our State to the most rural county
boards of elections that had been really administering
elections the same way for generations, they all rolled up
their sleeves and in concert with the security professionals in
our office they got it done. That is why Ohio's bipartisan
teams of elections professionals in my opinion are truly the
best in the business.
So, when this individual plugged his laptop into a Lake
County administrative building, what did he access? Quite
simply, nothing. First of all, every single county board of
elections' computer system has long been siloed off from every
other county office. So, anyone thinking that they could use a
county computer system in one county office to somehow
infiltrate the county board of elections would find that they
would run into an impenetrable brick wall.
Second, even if they had somehow gotten into the Board of
Elections building and plugged into their network, they would
have immediately been blocked because that computer would have
been recognized as an unauthorized user on that network. Again,
game over.
These are just two out of dozens of improvements that we
made at our county boards of elections since 2019. Naturally,
when we talk about cybersecurity we are talking primarily about
those elements of election infrastructure which are, of course,
connected to the internet. We are talking about email,
websites, polling location look-up functions, on-line voter
registration, all conveniences that voters, of course, want to
have access to.
But it is important to emphasize that voting equipment is
never connected to the internet. There is an entire separate
parallel set of election infrastructure that is never connected
to the internet. Quite simply, anything that touches a ballot
can never be connected to the internet. That is scanners,
voting machines, tabulators, all of which are very strictly
air-gapped.
Since our first directive we have issued two more, again,
we can never get complacent or rest on our laurels, with the
most recent one just announced last month. We called it our
Security Directive 3.0. As the tactics of our enemies change
and evolve, we must do the same. That is why we can't rest and
we won't rest. A comprehensive, multifaceted security strategy
within our county boards of elections is necessary to provide
the redundancy required for a strong election system
infrastructure.
We also know that our elections are only as successful as
the people who run them. In 2020, we recruited a small army of
dedicated patriots, Republicans and Democrats, to serve as poll
workers. In the face of uncertainty amid the start of the
COVID-19 pandemic, we had a record 56,789 Ohioans who stepped
up, were trained, and ready to serve their communities. They
provided secure, accurate, and accessible elections, the ones
which Ohio voters have, of course, become accustomed.
In light of the pandemic, we knew that we had to get
creative about poll worker recruitment. That is exactly what we
did. We worked with a whole array of professionals and all
sorts of different demographics to recruit patriotic Ohioans
from across the State to help us administer an incredibly
challenging election. In doing so, we stood up also an army of
truth-tellers who could speak first-hand about the lengths to
which Ohio goes to ensure the integrity of our elections. You
simply can't put a price on that. Integrity matters. That is
what our elections are built on. Thomas Jefferson put it very
succinctly when he said that our government----
Vice Chairman Torres. Secretary LaRose, if you can
conclude.
Mr. LaRose. Yes, sir. Government derives its just powers
from the consent of the governed. The only way that we convey
that is through a free and fair election, and that is what we
are going to continue to deliver in Ohio.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. LaRose follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank LaRose
Chairman Thompson, Vice Chair Torres, Ranking Member Katko, and
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to submit testimony today on
the security of our elections system.
Let me set the scene for you.
May 4, 2021. It's primary election day in Ohio, and someone has
been granted access into a government office in the Lake County
administration building. That individual has plugged an unauthorized
laptop into a government network in an effort to capture election data.
Presumably, their hope is to discover and download some type of
election information to prove election results can be impacted by
outside influence.
That person failed, and failed miserably.
Why? Preparation.
When I served as a Green Beret in the U.S. Army Special Forces, we
never let our guard down. Our lives were a constant churn of study,
preparation, and execution. After all, the bad guys only had to be
right once--we had to be right every single time.
When I was elected secretary of state, I took that same mindset and
adapted it to how we operate in Ohio. We made it the standard.
So how did we stop this perpetrator on primary election day in
2021? It actually started back in 2019 when we issued our first
Security Directive for Ohio's 88 county boards of elections. It was a
34-point checklist of physical and cybersecurity requirements designed
with one purpose--keep out the bad guys.
I'll be honest--when I announced these requirements at a meeting of
our county board of election teams, there was an audible groan--with
even some laughter. We were asking a lot of them--it's true. But our
elections are too important. We can't sit back on our hands and hope
everything is going to be ok. We have to take action.
And that's what our county boards of elections did. From the
largest, most populous, and sophisticated county boards to the most
rural counties that had been administering elections their way for
generations, they rolled up their sleeves, and in concert with the
security professionals in my office, they got it done. Make no mistake,
this was a big lift.
But that's why Ohio's bipartisan teams of election professionals
are the best in the business.
So when this individual plugged in their laptop at the Lake County
Administrative Building, what did they find? Nothing.
First, every single county board of elections computer system had
long been siloed off from all other county offices. Right then and
there, anyone thinking they can use the county computer system to
infiltrate the board of elections would find they had hit a hard brick
wall.
Second, even if they had somehow plugged this computer into the
county board of elections system, it would be immediately blocked
because it would be recognized as an unauthorized computer. Again, game
over.
These are just two of dozens of improvements made at our county
boards of elections since 2019. Naturally, when we talk about
cybersecurity, we're talking primarily about those elements of election
infrastructure which are connected to the internet--email, websites,
polling location lookups, and on-line voter registration. What this
perpetrator may not have realized is that there is a completely
separate element of election infrastructure which is never connected to
the internet, not even capable of an internet connection, and which is
rigorously tested before every election and audited after every
election.
Anything that touches a ballot--scanners, voting machines, and
tabulators--are 100 percent air-gapped. Simply put, the Lake County
attempted breach never had a chance of succeeding because of the
forward-thinking cybersecurity protocols we developed in 2019, and the
county boards of elections that worked so hard to implement them.
Since our first directive, we've issued two more, with the most
recent announced just last month. As the tactics of our enemies change
and evolve, we must do the same. That's why we can't and won't rest on
our laurels. A comprehensive, multi-faceted security strategy within
our county boards of elections is necessary to provide the redundancy
required of a strong election system infrastructure.
We also know that our elections are only as successful as the
people who run them. In 2020, we recruited a small army of dedicated
patriots to serve as poll workers. In the face of uncertainty amid the
start of the COVID-19 pandemic, a record 56,789 Ohioans were trained
and ready to serve their communities and provide the secure, accurate,
and accessible election to which our voters have become accustomed.
In light of the pandemic, we knew we had to get creative about poll
worker recruitment. So that's exactly what we did. We worked with
lawyers, accountants, and realtors to provide continuing education
credit in exchange for serving on election day.
We went into barbershops and salons with our Styling for Democracy
recruitment project.
We reached out to veterans who heard a Second Call to Duty and
signed them up to defend the constitution once again, but this time as
poll workers.
We even went into the high schools to recruit high school seniors
to boost their civic education, and hopefully get some extra credit on
the side.
It worked. We set records and fully staffed every polling location.
But we did something more--we created a legion of Ambassadors--an army
of truth-tellers who can speak first-hand about the lengths Ohio goes
to ensure the integrity of our elections. You can't put a price on
that.
Integrity matters. It's what our elections are built upon. As
Thomas Jefferson put it, our Government derives its ``just powers from
the consent of the governed''. We can't maintain that consent if we
aren't always moving forward and finding ways to balance election
security and accessibility.
Whether it's the post-election audits we require after every
election, staffing our county boards of elections with a balanced team
of bipartisan election officials working collaboratively and
professionally, or new security upgrades that protect our systems from
those who would do it harm--we have a duty to maintain. It's an oath I
swore to protect, and it's a model I hope we can share with the Nation.
Vice Chairman Torres. No, thank you, Secretary LaRose. I
thank the witnesses for their testimony.
The Chair reminds each Member that he or she will have 5
minutes to question the witnesses. I will not recognize myself
for questions.
Ms. Howard, threats to election security vary widely in the
United States. There is the threat of a cyber attack on
election infrastructure, there is the threat of influence
operations that radicalize people with misinformation and
disinformation and malinformation, and then there is the threat
of violence and harassment and intimidation against election
officials themselves. Of all these threats, which one, in your
view, has the greatest likelihood of endangering election
security in the 2020 Congressional midterm elections? 2022, I
apologize.
Ms. Howard. Thank you for the question. Right now one of my
biggest concerns has to do with threats against election
officials, not just because of the threats against the election
officials, but because of the cascading effects that result
from these threats to election officials. So, what we are
seeing across the country are election officials who are
deciding to leave the profession.
So, for example, 5 out of Arizona's 15 counties now have
new election directors this cycle. Six of Georgia's most
populous counties have new election directors this cycle. This
creates the potential for more mis- and disinformation because
the people taking the retiring election official's place are
not going to have the same level of experience, they are not
going to know as much, and they are not going to be as prepared
as those who had several years of experience who were running
elections in their State and their county to combat, right,
this ever-growing threat of mis-, dis-, and malinformation.
Vice Chairman Torres. Ms. Howard, you noted that 1 in 6
election officials have been the target of threats. We have
heard from Secretary Oliver and Mr. Kelley that they themselves
have been the targets of threats. We know that former President
Trump's narrative of a stolen election inspired the Stop the
Steal movement which ultimately led to the insurrection on
January 6th.
My question is for Mr. Kelley and Secretary Oliver. You
know, to what extent, based on your own experience, are the
words and ideas of former President Donald Trump at fault for
creating what seems to be an unprecedented hostile environment
against election officials?
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. I
will say this, that although these types of discourse were
amplified in 2020, I have heard them before. If you go back to
2018 in Orange County, there was a number of similar threats
and issues that arose when we had Congressional districts flip
from red to blue. We received very similar public statements
from local elected officials. So, it is not just at the
National level. It can certainly happen at the local level. We
see that. I will say this, it is not just in battleground
States or contested contests. It is across the country.
So, while I think it certainly had an effect, I have seen
it before.
Vice Chairman Torres. Secretary Oliver.
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly
agree with my colleague, Mr. Kelley. But as you noted in my
introduction, I have been an election official at the local and
State level now for almost 16 years, so, of course, in every
single election we see rumors, we see mis- and disinformation.
Typically, once we as election officials are able to clarify
any questions about how the election is conducted and provide
the public or accusers with information, those rumors tend to
peter out.
Unfortunately, we are still on a daily basis in my State
and across the country living with the reverberating effects of
the ``Big Lie'' from 2020. The recent activities that happened
in my State where we almost failed to certify an entire
county's worth of votes in a primary election are a direct
result of that rhetoric. As we all know, when it comes to
leadership, you know, what you say from the very highest
echelons of government power in this country do have those
reverberating effects.
So, yes, Mr. Chairman, they are impactful and they continue
to be impactful on a daily basis in this work.
Vice Chairman Torres. Ms. Howard, there is a DOJ task force
aimed at confronting threats against election workers. It has
received well over a thousand reports of threats, but has only
secured one conviction, which raises the question why only one
conviction? Is the issue one of law, that the law is
insufficiently protective of election workers, or is it one of
enforcement? What is your assessment of what is going on there?
Ms. Howard. So, the DOJ task force has taken important
steps, but clearly, what they have done is not enough. We have
a couple of recommendations specifically for the DOJ task
force.
We think that they need to expand the task force to include
State and local law enforcement. As our Brennan Center survey
showed, almost 9 out of 10 election officials who had been
threatened reported those threats not to Federal officials, but
to their local law enforcement. DOJ needs to bring them to the
table to help combat this serious threat.
Vice Chairman Torres. Just before I conclude, do you think
Federal law is sufficiently protective of election workers?
Ms. Howard. I think there are improvements to be made.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentleman
from New York, the Ranking Member, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, again, want to
recognize Ms. Flores. We have recognized her before she got
here, but welcome to the committee and welcome to Congress.
Mr. LaRose, I spoke in my opening statement at the end
about my concern about the local election officials being able
to digest the vast amount of election security information that
they are given. I want to ask you just briefly can you tell me
what you think about what we can do to make that more
digestible for the locals? The information is no good and the
security directors are no good if the locals cannot digest it.
So, I wonder if you could comment on that for me a second.
Mr. LaRose. Well, thank you so much, Ranking Member Katko.
You know, it kind-of reminds me of my time in the military
where we had a saying that you-know-what rolls downhill because
somebody's bright idea at the top ultimately comes down to a
sergeant or a private that has to implement it and oftentimes
there is a lot that they have to deal with other than those
kind of directions that are coming from a headquarters
somewhere. We have tried to be knowledgeable about that when we
deal with our county boards of elections.
Now, of course, I issue directives. I have to do that in
order to coordinate the way our county boards of elections
operate. But it is important to remember that they are the
folks on the ground doing the implementing of all of these
things that you are telling them to do. Often that means that
they are focused on a variety of different things.
So we also need to recognize that our boards of elections,
at least in Ohio and I am sure this is the case around the
country, reflect the great diversity of our country. I have
boards of elections where it is two people that work in the
courthouse basement. They are purposeful and dutiful about
their work, but it is just them to run that county board of
elections. I have got county boards of elections that are 150
people with a, you know, very large and sophisticated staff.
So it is important for us to remember the men and women on
the ground, these bipartisan groups that are doing the work of
running elections. We can't throw too much at them. We have to
prioritize what really matters.
Mr. Katko. That I understand, but how do we fix it? I
understand the problem.
Mr. LaRose. Yes, and again, it is us being mindful. Right?
It means that myself as a State administrator, the other 49
that do this work need to be knowledgeable about what we are
telling them to do. But it also means that we need to be very
careful, you all need to be very careful about not sending down
directives or passing laws that would create Federal standards
that may be unattainable as well.
One of the other things is far too many times the funding
that comes is appreciated, but there are so many strings
attached that the work that it takes to comply with all of the
different standards attached to that funding make the dollars
much less useful because you spend so much time filling out the
forms to justify how you are spending the dollars.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. LaRose. Ms. Howard.
Ms. Howard. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. I would
say that the concerns that you are raising are at the opposite
end of the spectrum of the concerns. When I was an election
official, again, in 2017 and the beginning of 2018, when we
weren't receiving sufficient information----
Mr. Katko. It went from 0 to 60, right?
Ms. Howard. Exactly.
Mr. Katko. Now we have to figure out how to digest it.
Ms. Howard. Exactly.
Mr. Katko. Right.
Ms. Howard. So, I think that Federal officials and CISA
officials in particular have recognized that they are trying to
calibrate the amount and the quality of information that is
being provided to our local election officials. CISA
representatives at multiple meetings that I have attended with
election officials proactively ask for feedback about, again,
the quantity and quality of the content that they are
receiving.
I think CISA--this is a--you know, and on-going work is
required and CISA is, you know, working to do this. So, they
need to continue to listen to the election official community
about what is helpful and what is not.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much. Ms. Oliver, I understand
your testimony and I credit your testimony about what generated
some of the personal threats against election care workers, but
I also appreciate the candid testimony of Mr. Kelley that it
comes from a variety of different sources and not just one, and
I think we need to keep that in mind going forward. Election
security, I think, and a lot of the problems with election
security are generated, it seems like to me, from the internet
and the ability of coward to hide behind the internet and
foment discontent on-line and then make that discontent
actionable by nut-jobs locally. That is one of my concerns.
So if any of you want to address that, Mr. Kelley, maybe,
want to address how we can better try and find and anticipate
the threats before they happen. That is finding the proverbial
needle in a haystack, but what do you think, sir?
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, Ranking Member Katko. I think it is
a great question. I will tell you that work that I have done
with our local law enforcement fusion center in Orange County
went a long way with that because the intelligence gathering on
the ground is really important, and identifying individuals on
social media that might be spreading disinformation and
misinformation, but, not only that, may have represented
potential signs that they could be triggered into some sort of
violent act or something along the lines of threats. I think
that that intelligence gathering is critical to reducing the
risk up front.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentleman
from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me
okay?
Vice Chairman Torres. We can hear you.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing and I thank our witnesses for their
testimony today.
As we all know, there is no such thing as perfect
cybersecurity. I have said that many times myself, including in
our election systems. As such, we should expect that
vulnerabilities will continue to be discovered within our
election infrastructure moving forward. Yet, amidst a climate
of rampant disinformation and outrageous lies about election
security, I do fear that the responsible disclosure of and
communication about cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election
infrastructure is becoming more and more challenging.
So, not all vulnerabilities, of course, would be equal in
their severity or ease of exploitation. But their very
existence could be manipulated to undermine public confidence
in the integrity of election infrastructure and, by
consequence, the outcome of an election itself.
So, to all of our witnesses the questions are how are State
and local election officials thinking about communicating to
the public about cybersecurity vulnerabilities in election
systems in a way that preserves trust in those systems? Also,
how can elements of the Federal Government, such as CISA, lend
their support? Are there opportunities here for Congressional
actions that will help address this challenge as well?
Mr. LaRose. Well, Congressman, I will start, I suppose, if
I may. In Ohio, we were the first State in the country to
implement what is called a vulnerability disclosure policy.
Effectively, we were asking the good guys, the white hat
hackers, to find wherever we had a vulnerability and let us
know about it. That has resulted in dozens of fixes that we
have made. We found where our errors were and we fixed them.
One thing, though, that I have struggled with and have
wanted maybe some more help from the Federal Government on is
being able to share our successes. When things go wrong, the
public generally will know about it pretty quickly, but we
haven't always been able to share our successes, and the public
should know when we had a day where the good guys won and the
bad guys lost. Oftentimes that means as quickly as possible
declassifying what can be declassified without, of course,
jeopardizing sources or methods. But giving us the chance to
tell the stories of where we stopped the bad guys is something
I would like to be able to do more of.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Next.
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Yes, Mr. Chairman, Member Langevin, I
agree exactly with what my colleague from Ohio just said. I
will say that when I first came into the secretary of state's
office in late 2016, obviously we had just gone through an
election where many election officials across the country were
not aware of what the Federal Government was aware of. I think
there has been a tremendous amount of work done along--working
alongside CISA and DHS, the work that the Government
Coordinating Council has done, to try to figure out what is the
right balance.
Obviously, we want to be aware as soon as possible as chief
election officials of any potential vulnerabilities. We want to
address them immediately. We need that information yesterday,
not tomorrow.
I will say that I feel like the Federal Government has done
a much better job about quickly declassifying or relaying
appropriate directives to our offices. We are getting so much
better about sharing that information with each other. But it
is a delicate balance because we want to make sure once we have
identified a vulnerability, that we have a plan to fix it, to
fix it quickly, and that it is going to get the job done.
So a lot of the work we do is that very careful balance. We
do need to make the public aware, that is incredibly important,
but we also need to make sure we have those plans in place.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. As a former secretary of state
myself, I understand the particular challenges you all have, so
thank you for the work you are doing.
Let me shift before my time has expired. Ms. Howard, if I
could, in your testimony you noted that despite Federal efforts
to make grant funding for programs such as Byrne Justice
Assistance Grant program available for election security, none
of these funds have yet been used for such purposes and that
election officials in at least one State have already had their
request for Byrne JAG funding denied.
Could you and other witnesses, with your insights here,
speak to some of the difficulties that election officials are
experiencing in the application process for these grants? You
know, is there more the Department of Justice can do or other
departments administering the election security grants to do to
help to get this money out? If so, is there opportunity for
Congressional action here, too?
Ms. Howard. Thank you for the question. Yes, there are--now
available to election officials are Homeland Grant Security
Program funds. Just recently, the Department of Homeland
Security reinstated election security as a priority. However,
that prioritization was not accompanied with a minimum spend of
those grants on election security. What election officials are
seeing and are concerned about is the fact that their needs are
going to be deprioritized.
These funds are not new and many of the----
Vice Chairman Torres. Ms. Howard, I am going to have to
interrupt because we are 30 seconds over. I have to recognize
the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Guest, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Guest. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary
LaRose, our Constitution, as you are well aware, gives
individual States the rights to conduct their own elections.
This is a central pillar of our government that Federal
authorities I believe must not infringe upon. So my question,
very broad in nature, is what can Congress do to make sure that
we are providing a secure electoral system without direct
interference from the Federal Government in a process that I
believe that our Founding Fathers rightfully intended to be
controlled at a local and State level?
Mr. LaRose. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
should say I enjoyed working with your secretary of state
through our national association.
You are right. There are 50 different ways of running
elections throughout this country. That decentralized nature of
the way we run elections is not a bug, it is a feature in the
way that American elections are organized and it goes back to
our very founding. It must be protected.
As you are well aware, though, the Federal Government has
some resources that States just candidly do not have. That is
why I think that it is important to continue providing those
resources. CISA is just one great example of that. I found it
to be a very positive working relationship that we have with
them. Then, you know, to resist the temptation, of course, to
tinker, for the Federal Government to start intervening and
telling States how to run elections.
I do think it is good for States to develop best practices
and share those with other States. Candidly, I have worked to
share some of the things that we do in Ohio so that other
States can learn from them because we have been under the
National spotlight for many years in Ohio.
But for the Federal Government to start mandating the way
States run elections is a bridge too far in my opinion. I would
say, humbly, stick to helping us do our jobs better instead of
telling us how to do them.
Mr. Guest. Mr. Secretary, you do mention about Federal
mandates. Recently legislation introduced in the House actually
passed out of the House. Two of the things that were in that
legislation as it relates to voting, two things that I find
very troubling: No. 1, is that we do away with voter
identification when individuals go to the polling place,
looking to attempt to cast their vote; it would also require
same-day voter registration. I know that Ohio is a State that
does require advanced registration, as does my State of
Mississippi, and also requires voters to present an ID when
they are showing up and doing in-person voting.
So, can you talk just a little about the importance of
having individuals make sure that they are registered at some
period of time before the election? Then also, the importance
of voter ID in the integrity process as we are looking at
making sure that elections are both fair and that individuals
trust the outcome of those elections.
Mr. LaRose. Well, yes, thank you, Congressman. It is about
finding that balance. I reject this notion and some offer this
idea that somehow you have to choose from either convenient
elections or secure elections. I think that is a false choice.
In Ohio, we have elections that are both convenient and secure.
It is easy to vote and it is hard to cheat in the Buckeye
State. I know that is the case in many other States as well.
But these are policies that we have developed that work in our
State, that fit the make-up of our State, and it may not work
in other States and other geographies.
For example, as you mentioned, our State constitution
requires people to register to vote 30 days before the
election. I think it would be a very bad thing for the Federal
Government to ignore what our State constitution says and
mandate same-day voter registration, for example. Proving that
a voter is who they say they are is an important thing, and we
do that in Ohio through mandatory photo ID. If you don't have
it, you can produce alternative forms of identification because
we don't want to leave anyone out of the process, but we do
want to know who voters are when they turn up to vote and to
make sure that they are actually registered voters.
So these are just important common-sense safeguards. They
work for Ohio. They work for Mississippi. If you don't like it
in your State, then you work with your State legislature to
make those changes. That is the best place to make election law
is at the State legislative level and I think we should stick
with that.
Mr. Guest. Thank you very much. A last question. Ms.
Howard, I saw in your testimony, it looks like on page 7 of
your written testimony, you talked about the need for there to
be funding for security upgrades on the homes of election
workers. I am kind-of curious as to who that would include,
possible funding mechanisms, costs that would be associated.
Are you talking about election commissioners or are you talking
about poll workers? Who would be eligible for these home
security upgrades?
Ms. Howard. Thank you so much for the question. As you
heard earlier in Secretary Toulouse's opening remarks, she had
to leave her home. I am aware of other election officials who
had to leave their home. I am aware of election officials who
have had local law enforcement do assessments of the physical
security of their homes when they are under threat. Some of
these election officials simply cannot afford to make the
recommended security enhancements to their homes.
I think that certainly that this should, at minimum, cover
election officials, so the primary election officials at the
local level responsible for administering our elections.
Vice Chairman Torres. Thank you, Ms. Howard.
Mr. Guest. Thank you and I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. The gentleman's time has expired. I
will recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing, and to the Ranking Member, thank you very much.
Mr. Kelley, you mentioned in your testimony that after 2016
DHS enhanced its relationships with the State and local
election officials on cybersecurity, but there has not been as
much engagement in the physical security. Has that changed
since the 2020 election, and how can DHS better partner with
State and local governments on physical security concerns and
enhance information sharing?
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. I
will say that I believe it certainly has improved. I want to
give public props to DHS because I took advantage of their
services that they had to offer, and it is like a shopping cart
of services. That goes a long way to increasing the physical
security of our buildings and the physical security of our vote
centers.
I will say that I am seeing more of that being done across
the country by my colleagues than has been the case in 2016.
DHS continues to roll out additional products and services that
I think are very valuable for us. So thank you.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. This is for all the witnesses. In Ms.
Howard's testimony she explained that many elected officials
are leaving their positions because of their increase in
threats, potentially leaving elections to be run by
inexperienced workers. For all witnesses, can you elaborate on
the value of experienced election workers in providing an
official and secure election process and what type of problems
may occur if we are forced to rely on inexperienced work force?
How can we better retain election workers in today's
environment?
Anyone can start.
Mr. LaRose. Well, Congressman, I would be happy to start
with that. We recognize of course how important experience is.
In fact, what I did when I came into this office is created a
mentorship program where new election officials, staff, members
of the boards of elections can be partnered with someone from
their party from a similar size county board of elections, and
benefit from that experience. So that mentorship has really
been a great program in Ohio and a lot of people are benefiting
from it.
But you are right, we have challenges recruiting and
retaining election officials, those paid full-time staff. It is
not just, of course, that is a big deal, but it is beyond that.
It is also just the burn-out of the constant turn of the work
that they are having to deal with.
Mr. Kelley. Congressman, I would just add that I think that
as we continue to professionalize this industry we are going to
see additional retention as more election officials have
resources that they can rely upon and feel that people have
their backs. I think you are going to see more retention across
the country.
Ms. Howard. Sir, I would just also add----
Vice Chairman Torres. Could you hold on just 1 second, Ms.
Howard? Whoever, please mute if you are participating
virtually. We need you to mute. I am sorry, Ms. Howard.
Ms. Howard. Thank you, sir. I would also add that the
typical election official, the typical local election official
makes about $50,000 a year. The reality is that these jobs, as
Secretary LaRose hinted at, are unrelenting.
Our election officials, unlike many of us, don't have the
luxury of getting an extension regardless of whether a child is
having an important moment, a graduation, regardless of whether
a loved one or themselves is sick.
I will note that Neal Kelley, who is also here today, in
2020 was in the hospital with COVID and he continued working
because there is no extension. There are no excuses when you
are an election official.
So I think there are a lot of steps that we can take to
help support them, fully staff their offices, and pay them for
the work that they do.
Mr. Payne. I thank the witnesses for those answers and, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentleman
from North Carolina, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to start off
consistent with the spirit of this hearing and say I think all
elected officials and everybody in our country ought to condemn
threats and even the part of what Ms. Howard read, even profane
kind-of vehemence directed against election officials and
everybody else.
I mean we have seen in recent weeks the same sort of
invective and threats and even assassination attempt directed
against the U.S. Supreme Court Justices. Sometimes there seems
to be some selectivity in terms of the way officials respond
and, in fact, official responses.
So we had the controversy last year with the Department of
Justice issuing a memorandum about Nation-wide activity
concerning threats against school board officials that sort-of
turned out to be not so many threats, but even some harsh
rhetoric. Yet maybe we haven't seen that kind of reaction in
the case of election officials and perhaps we should.
We shouldn't see officials confronted and condemned and
hectored and so forth at restaurants. So I think that should be
said across the board.
Let me ask Ms. Howard quickly, do you agree with that?
Ms. Howard. Yes, I think that political violence is a
problem and that we should condemn threats against our election
officials.
Mr. Bishop. And other officials, wouldn't you agree?
Ms. Howard. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. Secretary Oliver, I noted a few weeks ago that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that ballot drop boxes are
illegal under that State law. You spoke about the reasons for
distrust, and you attributed them to, you used the term ``Big
Lie,'' and of course that has a lot of currency.
But isn't it--I mean there is no recourse for it, but isn't
it true by implication that ballots cast in Wisconsin by
absentee drop-box deposited ballots were illegal in the 2020
election?
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Congressman, thank you for the
question. You know, I cannot speak to the ins and outs of the
specific legality, the constitutional questions that came forth
in Wisconsin.
What I can tell you is that in States like mine where we
have secure 24-hour monitored systems that are permissible
under State law, we do not see the level of concern and,
frankly, the alleged fraud that, you know, has been leveled
such ballot collection systems.
I am sorry, Mr.--yes.
Mr. Bishop. It is sort-of independent, Secretary Oliver,
with whether it is legal or, excuse me, whether it is a good
policy or bad policy. I am not trying to attribute one or the
other. I am just trying to say there were a variety of things
that contributed to an atmosphere of distrust about the
election, one of which were allegations leveled that things
were done illegally in certain places. At least--and I will use
the Wisconsin case as an example. That turns out to have been
validated at least by a later holding by the Supreme Court,
doesn't it?
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. You know, Congressman, I think the
challenge is that if we continue to litigate election law after
an election has already been certified, after people have
already been installed in office, I think this is one of the
big challenges that we are dealing with. Now whether Wisconsin
can continue to use secured monitor containers or not, of
course, is at the discretion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and
the lawmakers there in that State.
It certainly doesn't affect, in retrospect, the outcome of
the election and the certification of that election.
Mr. Bishop. Well, I just think that the use of procedures
that are illegal, the executive officials improvising on the
election law, which was a big part of the controversy in 2020,
now you see. I mean, again, I agree. Once the election is done
there is no point in relitigating. I mean you can't, literally
can't.
But the determination that it was illegal I think has some
implications for people to make, so I am not sure you can then
level against people who make comments on that subject
responsibility for distrust in elections. It is a shared
responsibility at worse.
Let me ask quickly to Ms. Howard. In North Carolina we have
got a situation where the partisan board of elections, as I
say, we have a partisan majority. The Brennan Center, in fact,
advocated for that when that was litigated in North Carolina,
just voted 3-2 to kick the Green Party off the ballot. It is
a--Democrat-dominated board and they did it over an issue
concerning signatures, allegedly. But the same board recently
said they refused to verify signatures on ballot applications.
I wonder, doesn't that sort of inconsistency breed
distrust? Isn't a partisan board's majority, partisan split
rejection of a party from the ballot, doesn't that undermine
trust in elections and election officials?
Vice Chairman Torres. Ms. Howard, time has expired, but
please answer as concisely as you can.
Ms. Howard. Thank you for the question. I don't have the
details about that vote or objections. I will talk to my
colleagues that might be more familiar with it and get back to
you with information.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, ma'am. Mr. Chairman, I would like
unanimous consent to submit an article from the Carolina
Journal dated July 15, entitled ``Lawsuit Links Governor's
Office to Effort Blocking Green Party from Ballot.''
Vice Chairman Torres. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Lawsuit links Governor's office to effort blocking Green Party from
ballot
David Larson, Carolina Journal, July 15, 2022.
In the July 14 lawsuit filed by the N.C. Green Party against the
N.C. State Board of Elections (NCSBE), the NCGP pointed to identical
language used in public records requests by an Elias Law Group
attorney, Elizabeth Poston; and Amelia Brown, an alleged legal intern
for Gov. Roy Cooper, as potential evidence that the Governor's office
collaborated with Democratic political efforts to exclude the Green
Party from the 2022 midterm ballots.
The Elias Law Group is the powerful national Democratic firm that
spearheaded the effort to get the NCGP off the ballot in collaboration
with the N.C. Democratic Party and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee. But this is the first suggestion that these groups had
assistance from fellow Democrat Gov. Roy Cooper.
In the public records request, Brown is not listed as working for
Cooper. But her address is given, which is in Carrboro. The Amelia
Brown who lists herself on Linkedin as being a legal intern for Cooper
also lives in Carrboro.
``I should clarify that the complaint specifies that we don't know
for sure that the Amelia Brown that made the request is the same Amelia
Brown that is an intern in the Governor's office; but that's what we
believe and that's what we alleged,''C. Green Party attorney Oliver
Hall told Carolina Journal in a July 15 interview.
The Linkedin profile referenced in the suit, retrieved by CJ on
July 15, is shown in screenshots below. Brown's other recent roles were
with Democratic and progressive political campaigns.
On July 15, Carolina Journal called the number and emailed the
address listed for Brown in the public records request but did not
receive a response by publication. Carolina Journal also reached out to
the Elias Law Group for comment on this potential connection with the
Governor's office but did not receive a response by publication.
On July 15, CJ also reached out to Gov. Cooper's press office about
the Green Party's lawsuit and being linked to the Elias Law Group's
efforts, but there was also no response by publication.
At issue is whether Cooper's office worked with the Elias Law Group
and the DSCC to try to exclude a possible ``spoiler'' candidate on the
U.S. Senate ballot. The Green Party wants to add Matthew Hoh to the
list of Senate candidates, and some Democrats have expressed concern
this could draw left-wing voters away from their candidate, former
Supreme Court Chief Justice Cheri Beasley.
As evidence of this possible connection with the Governor's office,
the Green Party provided Carolina Journal the language from those
public records requests from Brown and from Elias Law Group attorney
Elizabeth Poston. A few examples of identical language CJ spotted in a
brief review of the requests from both Brown and Poston include:
``Pursuant to Chapter 132 of the General Statutes of North Carolina
(the North Carolina Public Records Act), I hereby request the following
information and data related to the Green Party's petition to become a
recognized political party''
``If any part of the record is deemed to be confidential, please
produce the portion that is not confidential.''
``If you intend to deny this request in whole or in part, please
advise me in writing of the particular statutory exemption upon which
you are relying or other basis for your denial.''
``Please inform me of any charges associated with these requests
and the method of payment requested.''
``Please produce all records you can provide as they become
available on a rolling basis, even if you conclude that you are unable
to comply with certain parts of the request.''
``If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to
email me''
In other places, the language of the alleged request from Cooper's
office and the two from the Elias Law Group is similar but not
identical. The information requested differs in all three, but they
follow the same format, starting and ending with the identical
language.
``You can draw your own conclusions about how these requests ended
up being virtually identical in substantial respects, but it speaks for
itself,'' Hall said. ``Both requests were for the same material--Green
Party petitions and related information and documents. And both
requests used verbatim language. They weren't completely identical;
they were made at different times a few weeks apart. That seems like
more than a coincidence.''
Asked if there could be any other explanation for the identical
language beyond collaboration between Cooper's office and the Elias Law
Group, Hall said, ``Not that I know of.''
``We don't know what happened,'' Hall said. ``But if it's the case
that the office of the Democratic Governor of North Carolina was
involved in any way in an effort to remove the Green Party from the
ballot, then that raises troubling questions about the role of elected
public officials and State resources being dedicated to an effort to
suppress voter choice in North Carolina. We are investigating it and we
don't know anything more at this point. But we're going to find out.''
The Green Party's U.S. Senate candidate Matthew Hoh spoke with
Carolina Journal's Mitch Kokai on July 14 about the new lawsuit. In the
interview, he mentioned the possible connection with Cooper, saying,
``The Elias Law Firm, working with--and we have this in our complaint--
we allege working with the Governor's office, an executive agency
that's supposed to be non-partisan, has worked to undermine our
petition effort by deliberately misleading, I really should say lying,
to people about who they are in an effort to get people to remove their
names from our petition so they can say the Green Party can't be on the
ballot.''
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentlewoman
from New York, Ms. Clark, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning to
everyone. Thanks to all of our witnesses for joining us today
to discuss changing the election security landscape.
Before I begin I would like to just offer my well wishes to
our Chairman and friend, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Thompson. We wish him a speedy recovery, a full and complete
recovery, and hope to see him soon.
I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for calling this
hearing to address threats against election officials and
infrastructures. This is an issue that I myself and other
Members of this committee have raised for a number of years.
The importance of addressing this now has only been underscored
by the excellent work done by the January 6th Select Committee.
Protecting the physical safety of the folks responsible for
carrying out our most sacred democratic processes, our local
election officials and election workers, is of paramount
importance. Recognizing this system provides a number of
voluntary physical security assessments and training that can
help local election officials enhance dangerous dips in
security.
Secretary Toulouse, excuse me, Secretary Toulouse Oliver
and Mr. Kelley, how effective are citizens' programs on
physical election security and what additional assistance from
CISA would be most beneficial to you and individuals in your
capacity? Then finally, how can CISA's role be expanded to
benefit and help States and local governments strengthen their
physical election security posture?
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you, Congresswoman. First and
foremost I just want to say that CISA and the DHS have been
absolutely incredible partners with election officials like me
around the country for the last several years, primarily, of
course, for several years on the cybersecurity front. But here
in my State and I know in many others, if not most other States
across the Nation, we also take advantage of the physical
security tools and resources that are provided to us.
I think, you know, the very first piece of that puzzle is
to conduct these assessments. We have been working together in
my State, and I know many others have, to conduct those
assessments because without assessing the situation, we don't
know exactly what we need in order to keep our poll workers
safe and our voters safe out in the field, and our election
officials as well.
So I think, you know, like everything we have been doing on
the cybersecurity front and the physical security front as we
go through elections and as we continue to see what we need and
what circumstances we are dealing with, CISA has been able to
develop and adapt and improve those resources that are
available to us.
I don't have a specific recommendation at this point other
than we should continue that work, CISA should continue that
work in partnership with our offices. As has already been
mentioned today, you know, funding is critical, you know,
elections are critical National infrastructure. A State like
mine, a little bit goes a very long way for us to be able to
secure our election environments.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. Mr. Kelley, anything you'd like to
add?
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, Congresswoman. I will keep it brief.
I agree definitely with what Secretary Oliver has said about
the services.
Just very quickly on the ground I have a 200,000-square-
foot campus that I was responsible for in Orange County. CISA,
DHS came in and did a very detailed assessment on that and
identified dozens of areas where we can improve physical
security. The one thing that I would add is that improving from
CISA the use of the same assessments for vote centers and those
that work in the vote centers would be very critical and
important.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, both. Ms. Howard, in your testimony
you talk for Congress to fund efforts to develop and conduct
on-line safety training. Can you elaborate on how you see this
program operating?
Ms. Howard. So election officials' personal information is
often available on-line. There are consultants who can provide
training and information about how to protect your personal
information, how to protect against doxing. There are services
where they can go out and proactively assist the election
official with pulling down and taking down that information and
scrubbing it.
There are a variety of steps that election officials can
take. Putting together a training that provides a checklist for
election officials just about common-sense practices that they
can implement on their own would be a step in the right
direction.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentlewoman
from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-Meeks.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Chair Torres. I thank all of
our witnesses and Ranking Member for conducting this hearing.
Iowa, over the past 4 years, has passed election integrity
laws, and each time we have passed a law we have seen record
numbers of people show up at the polls to vote or to vote
absentee after an absentee ballot request. So we are finding
that people's confidence in the election system does affect
their willingness to turn out to vote. So it is an
extraordinarily important topic.
Secretary LaRose, you recently confronted the challenge of
non-Government entities, the Voter Participation Center and the
Center for Voter Information, spreading election misinformation
in your State. The duo sent false, unsolicited mailings and
confused voters.
How are you combatting this threat to your State's
election?
Mr. LaRose. Yes. Thank you so much, Congresswoman. The
simple matter is that it has been done with information,
getting accurate information out to the people of Ohio.
But this concern first came to us from our county boards of
elections in a bipartisan way. They were getting concerned
phone calls from voters that said they were receiving multiple
of these forms that were addressed to people that had not lived
at that residence for many years or were deceased. So the real
problem with these organizations is that they were using bad
data.
Of course there is nothing wrong with getting voter
registration forms out or with getting absentee ballot request
forms out to make it easier for people to request their
absentee ballot, which, of course, we allow in Ohio for any
voter that wants to vote absentee.
The problem was these organizations just did shoddy work
and it really confused voters. We have encouraged organizations
like this, if they want to engage in some sort of a, you know,
absentee ballot request, drive, or whatever else, work with us
to make sure you have got good data and you are using the right
kind of forms and that kind of thing.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Yes, certainly we know that voter rolls
and voter lists are not clean to that point. It also appears
that Ohio, like Iowa, is facing a shortage of election workers.
One news article claimed that a county in your State has 551
workers but needs 846. Do you believe that this is a threat to
your State's election integrity? If so, what, if anything, can
Congress or the Federal Government do to help States facing
these challenges?
Mr. LaRose. Yes, thank you. To the last question, we work
really hard at maintaining accurate voter lists. These groups
were using lists from years ago and that was part of the real
problem.
Poll worker recruitment, it is like hygiene, it is like
brushing your teeth. We have got to do it every day, right? So
this is something we have really focused on. I am happy to
report that for this unusual August 2 primary that Ohio has to
hold for our State legislative races we are actually seeing
strong numbers of poll worker recruiting.
We have implemented all of these creative programs where we
have worked with barber shops and beauty salons and the lawyers
in the State to get continuing education credit; other
professionals, like realtors and librarians as well. So we have
really worked hard on poll worker recruitment.
The fact is you can't open 4,000 polling locations across
the State of Ohio unless you have got 40,000 poll workers to
staff them.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you for that. Also, after the 2016
election, and I think we have heard part of this already by
some of the other witnesses, State and local election officials
felt frustrated by the lack of coordination from the Federal
Government by not providing enough details regarding the
Russian activity and how to respond.
Learning from this, both CISA and the FBI changed their
policies regarding incident notification, and now notify chief
State election officials when the cyber incident occurs and the
locality in their State.
Some have previously expressed the need for required
reporting of election cyber incidents to CISA and the FBI. Can
you briefly discuss why this may be necessary?
Mr. LaRose. Yes. We need to know things so that we can act
quickly. That is the bottom line is when it comes to protecting
our elections, time is of the essence. Elections occur on this
routine schedule, and the next election is always just right
around the corner or we may even be in the midst of conducting
an election. So time is always of the essence.
I can tell you where CISA and FBI have vastly improved this
is making sure that their State election officials, the
secretaries of state in most cases, are immediately notified.
If it is a county board of elections that has a vulnerability
or problem, of course that county board of elections needs to
know. But we as their State partner also need to know
immediately. Thankfully, those processes have been improved,
but there is always room to continue to improve that.
Again, a notification on a Friday night or a Saturday
morning will result in action right then. We are not going to
wait until everybody comes back to work on Monday morning. That
is why these things are so timely and crucial.
Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Yes, we found the same thing in Iowa,
and utilizing the resources CISA is providing to us going into
a roundtable which includes our election officials in it as
well as education and businesses. Thank you so much for your
testimony.
Thank you, Chair Torres, I yield back my time.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentlewoman
from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to
the witnesses. I want to follow up on Representative Miller-
Meek's question.
First of all, let me just say to you, Mr. LaRose, I hope
you are sharing information that has been successful to you all
in Ohio with the rest of the secretaries of state around the
country. I hope that you are connected in a way that they
benefit from some of this information because it doesn't seem
that you are experiencing the same kind of issues that we seem
to be hearing about in other places.
So, Secretary of State Oliver, what do we need to do to be
able to recruit poll workers, new election officers? How do we
assure them that they are going to be safe and supported? What
is it the Federal Government needs to do to be able to help you
all do what you need to do to make sure we have enough and we
have the appropriate folks working either Election Day or even
in, you know, in the offices in general?
Then I would like to have Ms. Howard respond to that
question as well.
Ms. Howard. Thank you, Congresswoman. First and foremost,
Secretary LaRose is one of our most active partners at the
national level. He and I are both very active in our National
Association of Secretaries of State, which is recently started
to be homed by your secretary of state, Madam Congresswoman,
which we are very excited about. We do share best practices
with each other.
But to your question, I think we have already--we have seen
some signaling both from CISA, DHS, and our other Federal law
enforcement partners and the DOJ and FBI task force that
election officials at all levels for security is a National
priority.
That needs to continue to be a drumbeat and it needs to
continue to get louder using all of the platforms that the
Federal Government has available to it to make folks aware.
In terms of a recruitment, you know, I think when I grew
up, you know, serving as a poll official, working the polls,
either that was a typically considered a civic duty, a sense of
volunteerism and community was installed. I think we have kind-
of gotten away from that and I think the more we can do at all
levels of government to send the message that being a part of
the election process, particularly if you are somebody who has
questions or concerns about the integrity of our election
process, is a wonderful way not only to serve your community
and to be a good public citizen, but it is also a way to make
sure that our elections have integrity.
So I would love to see more public information by all the
various platforms we have available to us.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Ms. Howard, I particularly
want to know about the resources that are necessary to ensure
that the protections that need to exist locally that they are
available, that election workers and poll workers in
particular, recognize that there is this system that has got
their backs and to what extent our local enforcement and State
enforcement agencies are participating and recognizing the need
to be engaged robustly.
Particularly in this next election, and preparing for the
one after.
Ms. Howard. Thank you so much for the question. I would
highlight the Committee for Safe and Secure Elections, which is
chaired by Neal Kelley and supported by the Brennan Center and
other organizations that is working closely with State and
local law enforcement and State and local election officials to
address many of the concerns that you have highlighted.
I will also say that election officials have reported, some
of them have reported struggling to access some of the Federal
grant funds that are available for election security. So as we
talked about earlier, the Homeland Security Grant Program
Election Security was recently reinstated as a priority area.
However, unlike other priority areas, there is not a minimum
spend on election security. It is a similar issue with the JAG
Byrne Fund, which are available to help better protect election
officials.
There is no minimum spend on election security. What many
election officials have reported is they are struggling to
actually attain access for a variety of reasons, including the
timing of the grant cycle, the notification of when they are
identified as a priority area, and other issues that, you know,
we believe that requiring the minimum for election security
will alleviate many of those concerns and will help get the
Federal funding to the election officials that need it.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentlewoman
from Tennessee, Mrs. Harshbarger.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A thank you to
the witnesses for being here today. I do have a question for
Secretary LaRose.
I know that Ohio did a great job in 2020 with election
integrity, and not every State did as well as Ohio, OK? I live
in Tennessee and I think we did a pretty good job. But you
spoke about your Security Directive 3.0 to protect elections in
Ohio. Could you explain this measure and how States can
implement this in a successful manner to have secure elections?
Mr. LaRose. Yes, absolutely. Thank you so much,
Congresswoman. This built, of course, on our first Security
Directive and our second Security Directive, so this is just
the third iteration in these checklists that we are giving.
This one is a 31-point checklist that we are giving our county
boards of election. We are giving them a few months to get this
done in, bringing some funding to the table.
What we did is put really strict new standards in place for
vendors. Our election officials rely on a lot of vendors, and
if they are not secure, then that could harm the integrity of
our process as well.
Stronger physical security requirements, working with DHS
to do physical security audits. If you have got the best
cybersecurity in the world but your server closet is left
propped open or unlocked, then that is not going to help you
too much.
Better vulnerability disclosure and specifically requiring
vulnerability disclosure for our vendors so that they can
leverage the power of the private sector of the ethical hackers
out there to find where things are wrong.
Then, of course, also prohibiting election equipment
provided by foreign vendors that are on the restricted list
that the Federal Government maintains.
These are just some of the things that we are doing. You
can talk about several other items as well, like better
vulnerability scans that are being put in place. But those are
the highlights.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, tell me about that vulnerability
scan. I read that and I am like tell me how this works.
Mr. LaRose. Yes. So what we are doing now is requiring the
boards of elections to let the vulnerability scanners inside
the door. It is like a home inspection. If you are buying a new
home and the home inspector can only look at the outside of the
home, they are going to find a few things, the roof or whatever
else. But if you actually let them into the basement, if you
let them go up in the attic, that is when they are really going
to find if the house is in good shape or not. So this new
vulnerability scan that we are requiring the boards of election
to do brings the folks that doing those inside so they can get
inside of the systems and really take a deeper look at what is
going on in them.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Well, makes sense to me. I would
certainly want them to look in my basement or my attic if I had
an issue with my home.
Now you talk about cybersecurity efforts. Can you tell me a
little bit about what you are doing in Ohio? Because with that
security directive, looks like you are requiring local elected
officials or election officials to include cybersecurity terms
in their contracts.
Mr. LaRose. Absolutely. That is how we enforce it with
vendors, right? So when our boards of elections engage in a
contract with a vendor, in many cases these are boilerplate
contracts that have been used for many years. We are now
requiring them to include cybersecurity terms in that contract.
The simple fact is if you cannot abide by those terms, then you
cannot contract with the county board of elections in Ohio. You
have got to be able to live up to the terms of that contract.
So that is just another step that we are taking, again, to
make sure that these vendors that our boards of election are so
relying on can meet the cybersecurity standards that we have
set for our boards.
Mrs. Harshbarger. You know, you hear about things, and I
heard when I went to Nashville and talked to the legislators, I
think the early part of the year, there was a problem in one of
the counties with the Dominion machine, that every sixth vote
it kicked out. They caught that because more people showed up
to vote than there were votes.
So, you know, there has to be measures in place in any
State and every county to make sure that there is no question
about the integrity of any election.
You know, that 31-point checklist, that is something I
would like to take a look at honestly, make sure that we are
doing that in Tennessee, or anything that we could make do with
and implement.
I know that my county where I live in went to paper ballots
this year and you have to show your driver's license, paper
ballot, it all has to match up. You know, that ensures safe
elections, in my opinion.
OK. I thank you for that, and I will yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Vice Chairman Torres. Thank you. I will now recognize the
gentlewoman from Florida, Mrs. Demings.
Mrs. Demings. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. To all
of our witnesses, every one of you, thank you for your
testimony today, but also thank you for what you are willing to
do under what has grown to be unbelievable challenge and
circumstances. Thank you for protecting our democracy. I think
we all know, or we should know, that regardless of what State,
what your home State is, that every person deserves to be able
to cast their vote and have their vote counted.
I have heard, Mr. Kelley, I believe you said you are a
former law enforcement officer, and I have also heard, Mr.
LaRose, you are a former Army Green Beret. We thank you for
that service, but I certainly hope that is not the new criteria
these days for election workers.
Your testimony has been so valuable, but believe me it has
been quite painful.
Mr. Kelley, you talked about that the level of threat,
violent, crazy unbelievable threats have been amplified after
2020. As a 27-year law enforcement officer who certainly had an
opportunity to interact with a lot of election workers, I have
never heard the stories during my time that I have heard since
2020.
You said the threats have been amplified. I think that is
such a politically correct way of putting it. But I would like
to hear from you again in that particular area as well as
everywhere.
As a matter of fact, let me start. Ms. Oliver amplified in
2020 but you have seen it before, that is what Mr. Kelley said,
you have seen it before. Could you just talk about a little bit
what you have seen before 2020 compared to post-2020, please,
ma'am?
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you, Congresswoman. So in my
experience, again, in almost 16 years of conducting and
overseeing elections, first of all I think every elected
official at every level in this country knows what it is to
have someone harass you, make, you know, even general threats
against you. Sometimes individuals, particularly those with
mental health issues, get fixated on election officials and
from time to time, you know, there are concerns about our
personal safety. I don't know a single elected official that
hasn't gone through something like that.
However, in my personal experience the level of vitriol,
the specificity of threats, again, having my personal private
information doxxed and having to fear for my own personal
safety and the safety of my family at home during the holidays,
those are things that I have never personally experienced in my
role as an election official. So I would say it has been
amplified significantly since 2020, in my personal experience.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you so much. Mr. LaRose, thank you for
the job you are doing in Ohio. But could you answer that
question for me, please?
Mr. LaRose. Yes, Congresswoman. My experience is slightly
more limited. I have only been the secretary of state since
2019. But you are right, there have been a lot of folks that
have gotten too emotionally exercised about elections
administration.
I spoke to our election officials conference last year and
what I said to them is that of course elections are political,
every aspect of campaigning is. But elections administration
must not be politicized. I think that should be our focus.
The nuts and bolts of how we run elections and count the
votes and report the results, let us stop politicizing that,
keep the politics for the campaigns.
Mrs. Demings. Ms. Howard.
Ms. Howard. Thank you for the question. I served as an
election official from 2014 to 2018 and I don't ever recall
receiving a threat in that period just for doing my job.
However, as you heard from many election officials, that is
just not the reality today. Many election officials across the
country, in red States, in blue States, in red counties and
blue counties, purple counties, are now receiving credible
death threats.
Mrs. Demings. Thank you. Mr. Kelley, I will end with you.
You also talked about that you are not advocating for armed
officers. Yet people are receiving threats for their families,
their own personal safety just for protecting our election.
Could you talk a little bit about what you are advocating
in terms of working more closely with law enforcement to
protect the integrity of our elections?
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, Congresswoman, for the question. I
think it is a great one. I think that there is a couple things
that could be done.
First of all, law enforcement in many cases is unaware that
issues on Election Day or leading up to the election can be a
real threat or a real issue. Not in all cases, but in some.
I found that beat officers, officers on the ground, just
are not familiar with criminal codes for election violations or
that threat to election officials are occurring in large
numbers. So awareness is very critical.
Very quickly, when I was in Orange County I had police
officers respond to some scenes and they just thought it was a
civil matter. They were not aware that there were actually
criminal violations that occurred at a vote center. So making
them aware----
Vice Chairman Torres. Mr. Kelley, I am going to--the time
has expired. I will now recognize for 5 minutes the gentlewoman
from Texas, Mrs. Flores, and welcome to the committee.
Mrs. Flores. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking
Member, for holding this hearing today. Despite recent claims
to the contrary, our country has record-high voter turnout.
Given this, we must ensure those who are voting are legally
permitted to and able to easily continue to do so.
Our role in securing safe, fair, and free elections should
be prioritized, making it easy to vote and hard to cheat.
I want to thank all our poll watchers and all our election
officials for all the work that they do. We must condemn all
threats against our election officials. I know what it is like
to be there and I just cannot imagine what they are going
through, and I believe that we must provide them with the
resources and the funds so they can do their job more
effectively.
Despite remarks by the administration implying that
Hispanic Americans don't know how to use the internet and,
therefore, are incapable of exercising their right to vote, I
can speak first-hand about both willingness and the capacity of
my community and the Hispanic community around the country to
make their voices heard. Voter security, it is a National
security.
I am thankful to all the witnesses for taking the time to
speak with us here this morning. If I may ask Mr. Kelley, thank
you for being here this morning. Can you talk about the
physical safety of election workers and officials, specifically
in Orange County?
Mr. Kelley. Thank you very much for the question. Yes,
ma'am, I absolutely can. I think vote center employees, as we
call them in Orange County, or poll workers, the safety and
security of them is paramount in what we do in every election.
There are a number of things that we can do to increase the
protections. For instance, plainclothes officers in the field
ready to respond very quickly to incidents at polling places.
Training that can help our vote center supervisors deescalate
issues is very important.
But I can tell you that we were focused on security for
those vote center locations and our poll workers and keeping
them a priority because they are the back-up of how we operate.
It is very important that we protect them.
Mrs. Flores. Thank you. Secretary LaRose, thank you for
being here this morning. I know it has been talked about
already this morning but can you go further into details about
the organizations such as the Voter Participation Center
sending out false information? You know, highlighting what
steps is your office taking to stop this and other groups from
spreading misinformation?
Mr. LaRose. Yes, thank you so much, Congresswoman.
Appreciate the question.
As I was starting to say earlier, it is really about public
information, the voters deserve to know where their trusted
source for elections information is. That is why we are
constantly promoting, go to the official .gov website that your
secretary of state or your county board of elections operates.
In our case it is VoteOhio.gov. That is where we want people to
make sure that they are getting their trusted source of
accurate information.
But as it relates to false information in general, listen,
the best antidote to lies is truth, and lots of it. So we work
to make sure that Ohioans have access to that accurate
information. We partner with community organizations from the
diverse communities throughout Ohio to make sure that we get
accurate information out there. Social media is another one. So
these are all part of the efforts that really every secretary
of state engages in so that voters know how to vote and they
know that they can trust their vote in the Buckeye State at
least, and that is something that we are proud of.
Mrs. Flores. Thank you for your testimony. I yield my time
back.
Vice Chairman Torres. Thank you. I will now recognize the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Malinowski, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all of
our witnesses for the work that you do.
I want to start with you, Mr. LaRose, and say at the outset
I was very impressed by your testimony and by the work that you
are doing in Ohio to protect the physical integrity of our
elections, but also then to defend the integrity of our
elections against all of the misinformation that is out there.
That said, it seems we have still got a very, very big
problem in terms of public perception when something like 40
percent of Americans believe that the 2020 election was stolen,
about 60 to 70 percent of Republicans. I saw a poll that
suggested in Ohio 62 percent of Republican primary voters in
2022 believed that the 2020 election was stolen.
I trust you agree with me that is a very dangerous
phenomenon. I mean, if I were to believe that a Presidential
election were stolen I would be losing faith in my democracy
and the system of government in our country. Clearly, that is
the root cause of the threats of violence that many nonpartisan
election officials across the country are facing.
So I guess my question for you is what more needs to be
done? What should elected officials, responsible leaders in our
country, be doing to address that false belief out there and to
restore the confidence of all Americans that Federal elections
have integrity?
Mr. LaRose. Well, thank you, Congressman. You know, in some
ways I guess I find the silver lining to every cloud. The fact
is that folks are interested in this topic right now at a level
they wouldn't normally be and so I view this as an opportunity
to educate people about the safeguards that exist and to make
sure that that information is available in all parts of our
State.
I will give you a couple of examples. We have worked with
our county boards of elections and had them set up booths at
their county fair where people can come and vote on their
favorite deep-fried fair food or whatever. That is just the
hook to get people to come over because when they do they will
see a voting machine and they may be inclined to say, well,
hey, is this the one with the secret foreign algorithm in it?
Instead of laughing at that person, it is a chance to engage
with them and teach them that voting machines are never
connected to the internet. They are tested before each
election, audited after each election, et cetera.
We have worked with, again, with the diverse communities
from throughout the States to help empower those community
leaders to be sources of accurate information about election
integrity.
You know what, we have put out the challenge. If you
believe that there are big problems in our elections, sign up
to be a poll worker. Put your money where your mouth is. Spend
the long day of doing this work. What we found is that when
people do that, they come out of the experience saying, you
know what, elections are run honestly and reported accurately.
Those are just a few ideas, and those are things that we
are doing here in Ohio.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. Thank you so much, and, you
know, I am sure you also agree just simply all of us as public
officials just need to tell the truth about our elections.
Because when we don't, it encourages our constituents to lose
confidence.
Ms. Oliver, you know, we have heard a lot about what
happened in New Mexico, and I assume that a lot of the lies and
misinformation that led to those threats were spreading on the
internet on social media platforms. I often say that the Big
Lie is the virus, but Facebook is the wind.
It is not just that these things appear on the internet, it
is that the large on-line platforms do write these algorithms
that basically connect every single person with the propensity
to believe in conspiracy theories with conspiracy theories. If
you are on the right. it will push you further right; if you
are on the left, it will push you further left. These companies
design their networks in a way that encourages the spread of
information that makes us angry at each other, that increases
our divisions from one another.
So I see you nodding, so I assume something that you agree
with. We are--a number of us are working in Congress on
legislation that would hold the social media platforms more
accountable for the way in which they amplify and recommend
information to the American people to deal with these kinds of
threats. That is something that you think would be helpful?
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Absolutely, Congressman, thank you. I
think that is a worthy effort and I think, you know, just among
my secretary of state colleagues, you know, I think we all
share that concern, right? Both the misinformation from the
right and the misinformation from the left.
In fact, what we know for a fact when we all started
heavily engaging in the cybersecurity work about 5 years ago,
was that, you know, foreign entities, particularly Russia,
Iran, et cetera, were taking advantage of those divisions. And
so----
Vice Chairman Torres. I am going to have to interject. I
apologize. I want to recognize the gentleman from Texas for 5
minutes, Mr. Pfluger.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to all the
witnesses for your time today. Nothing is more important than a
secure election with integrity. We are and we should be setting
the standard, the gold standard around the world.
Secretary LaRose, you talked about how you stopped the
perpetrator in 2021 and how that work really began in 2019 with
good preparation. I think that is key.
So what actions are States or the Federal Government
currently not taking right now that prevent us and protect any
threats in the future, 2, 4, 5, 6 years from now?
Mr. LaRose. Thank you, Congressman. Of course the threats
are constantly emerging, the bad guys are always coming up with
creative new ways to do things and that is why we can't rest.
The one step that all States should take that we have taken
in Ohio is that your chief elections officer should have a
CISO, chief information security officer, somebody who focuses
solely on that work of cybersecurity. You should have a
vulnerability disclosure policy if you don't already. If there
is a hole in your fence, you need to know about it and the
vulnerability disclosure policy is a way to do just that.
Again, there are a lot of other things, like Albert sensors
that are available from our partners with DHS. If you don't
have those at your county boards of elections you should do
that. That allows for that remote monitoring.
So, again, if something goes wrong on a Saturday morning or
a Friday night in the middle of the weekend you can know about
it before everybody comes back to work on Monday and you can
mitigate the problem right then and there.
Those are just a few of the steps, but, again, it is about
constantly monitoring emerging threats. That is why our
partnership with CISA is so crucial.
Mr. Pfluger. Well, thank you for taking those steps and
ensuring that we do have faith in the system. Whether it is
real or perceived, we have to get to a point where we have
faith in our election system.
Ms. Oliver, it is disturbing to read, thank you for your 16
years of work, and it is really disturbing to hear your
testimony, to read about the doxxing, to hear about the
threats. That should never happen and we should all, as elected
officials, and as was eloquently mentioned, condemn that.
I am interested to hear not just how that made you feel,
but how does it make you feel to now see Supreme Court Justices
being doxxed and groups encouraging people to go to restaurants
and intimidate those individuals?
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you, Congressman. You know,
violence has no place in our democracy. Threats of violence and
harassment really undermine our democracy. Frankly, it doesn't
matter which party, what level of public official, I think we
are seeing this become more prevalent. So that is deeply
concerning because as it becomes more prevalent, more
individuals who may be inclined to engage in such behavior are
looking at these examples and saying, well, if these folks are
doing it, we should engage in that, too, it might push folks
over the edge to engage.
It has no place in democracy, period, no matter who we are
talking about.
Mr. Pfluger. You are right. It is very disturbing to see
those that will not condemn those actions, that won't hold
people accountable for trying to use force, the threat of
force, or any sort of intimidation, and disturbing to hear your
testimony. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kelley, I am interested in your thoughts on, you know,
just the verification and knowing who is who, running a good
election system and understanding, and how important it is to
verify who is voting. Do you believe that it should be a
requirement to verify those who are voting in your elections,
and would you like to see that centralized at the Federal
level?
Mr. Kelley. Thank you, Congressman, for the question. Of
course I was operating under California law, which did not
allow for identification to be presented in person. So as an
election official I can kind-of see the value in that in terms
of showing your ID just like when you fly on an aircraft. It
probably wouldn't be a bad idea to show at a polling place.
But that is above my pay grade and a policy discussion that
election officials should be making.
Mr. Pfluger. Well, Mr. Kelley, I think it is incumbent upon
all of us, I mean this is a good hearing for us to come
together as experts in the field, you guys as experts, us
asking the questions. But, you know, I find it hard to believe,
I mean those that are getting into the Capitol today most
likely have to provide an ID to get into the Capitol building
to verify who they are. Yet in States, you know, if we are not
able to verify I think your voice matters. I would say it is
actually, you know, not above your pay grade. You are the
expert in this and need to be, you know, advocating for those
policies.
So I find it hard to look at some of the Federal policies
and proposals that are coming forward to say that we maybe
don't need to have an ID, we don't need to show who we are, we
don't need to approve the system and give what my colleague on
the other side of the aisle just said, which is the perception
of a good system that has integrity and character.
I know I am past my time, so thank you to all the
witnesses. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentleman
from Michigan, Mr. Meijer, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our
witnesses who are here today.
You know, I think something that has come up in a lot of
the questions and testimony is that public trust and confidence
in our elections is essential. I think we also saw in the 2020
election that that hinges strongly on having quick and accurate
results. The longer it takes for results to be reported, the
more time that is spent on that count, it allows the room for
doubt, disinformation, and conspiracy theories to multiply,
that then further degrades public faith in our elections.
Secretary LaRose, there are several steps that States can
take to make sure those election results are reported quickly
and accurately, including the pre-processing of absentee
ballots, encouraging early in-person voting if someone is not
present to vote in person on Election Day.
Can you describe what steps Ohio has taken to make sure
that your election results can be reported as quickly and
accurately as possible? Are there other actions that you have
taken to improve the timeliness and accuracy of election
results?
Mr. LaRose. Yes, Congressman, thank you for the question. I
wrote a mission statement on my chief of staff's dry erase
board in the summer of 2020. I said when Ohioans go to bed on
election night they will know and they will believe the results
of the 2020 Presidential election. We accomplished both of
those missions.
It is about logistics and preparation. It is about making
sure that you have the procedures in place to quickly tabulate
but to never sacrifice accuracy for speed. That is the balance
that we have struck here in Ohio.
One of the reasons why we were able to report our results
on election night is that we process our absentee ballots ahead
of time. I know your State doesn't do that. Candidly, it is
something that you all should look at because we don't count
ballots until the polls are closed on election night but we do
process them ahead of time. We check the identification. Even
taking them out of their envelopes and flattening them out so
they are ready to go through the scanner. That is a process
that takes a while.
Those are the kind of things that we do in Ohio to make
sure that we can deliver those results on election night.
Also, again, that decentralized nature of how this is done.
It is done at 88 different county boards of elections and
making sure that they have the tools necessary to get that job
done has been one of our top priorities.
Mr. Meijer. I think the phrase in the Army for that would
be slow is steady, smooth is fast.
Mr. LaRose. Very good, yes, sir.
Mr. Meijer. Did you have any issues establishing and
implementing those processes? As you look to other States as
you travel around, you talk to the secretaries of state, you
know, are other States well-equipped or well-suited to adopt
similar best practices, or are there resource constraints along
these lines that may require Federal support?
Mr. LaRose. You know, the thing is if you have seen the way
one State runs elections, then you have seen the way one State
runs elections, right? They are all different.
So a lot of those would require changes at the State level.
But now is the time to do that, well in advance of the next
Presidential election. So if your State has laws that prevent
the boards of elections from being able to process absentee
ballots and get them ready to go and count them immediately as
soon as the polls close, then that is something that you should
look at.
As far as constraints on resources, some of this stuff
isn't expensive. I will give you an example. In 2020, we
directed our county boards of elections to consider spending
some of their HAVA money or CARES Act money on a simple
thousand-dollar machine that cuts open envelopes. Our rural
boards have been using the old slicer to cut it open. It is
just a process improvement like a thousand-dollar envelope
slicing machine can be a big improvement.
But, yes, Federal support is important and we have used it
well here in Ohio.
Mr. Meijer. One last thing. When we were going into the
2020 elections in Michigan and obviously with a large number of
absentee ballots. I am not tracking how other States were
dealing with this at the judicial level, but we temporarily had
a judicial opinion that ballots could be received after the
time polls closed so long as they were postmarked, you know, by
the date of the election.
Now we have seen similar processes like that in California,
in New York. I have colleagues here in the House who had to
wait several months in order to learn whether or not they won
or lost their primary in some elections or a general election
as well.
Can you speak to just what you have seen in terms--I guess
if you could just remark on that? I know I have 30 seconds
left, so just want your quick thoughts.
Mr. LaRose. Yes. Some of the worst things that happen in an
elections administration happen as a result of crisis
opportunism at a court. The things that go wrong in elections
generally aren't some sort of cloak-and-dagger secretive
operation, it happens in the plain light of day in a courtroom.
Those kind-of last-minute decisions are very problematic.
Election law should be made at the Statehouse, never at the
courthouse.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. The Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Van Drew.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
Thank you for the witnesses for testifying today before the
committee.
Ms. Howard, in your written testimony you assert that the
loss of election administration expertise and experience is
likely to spur further disinformation and use a Michigan
county's mistakes in the 2020 election as an example of why
having informed and knowledgeable election officials is so very
crucial and very critical.
I agree with you, that in order for your people to have
faith in elections and for elections to occur smoothly we need
to have election officials who are willing and able to
correctly do their jobs, it is important.
I also believe that people need to have confidence in their
technology and in their equipment that is used to count their
votes. You made one mention of Dominion and these Dominion
voting machines in your testimony, but did not elaborate on the
distrust in those machines. It is important to ensure that
election officials are using the very best technology available
and possible.
Just last month CISA published a report which highlighted
issues with Dominion's technology, with one concern being that
the authentication mechanism used is susceptible to forgery.
That is just unacceptable. We can't live with that. We need
election integrity.
In addition to having qualified election officials, do you
think it is important to have machines and software that are
secure and not susceptible to forgery? So that is my first
question.
My next question is in my district there were thousands
upon thousands of people who received multiple ballots in the
mail, ballots for people who used to live at that residence,
ballots for people who had passed away. The list goes on and
on.
I would like to know what you feel about that. New Jersey
carelessly sent out millions of live ballots to people who did
not request them, which rightfully caused great concern amongst
South Jersey voters. It is no surprise that voters worry and
wonder about the validity of voting.
Do you think that States are sending out millions of
unsolicited ballots which are often drawn from outdated voter
rolls? Do you think that in any way could possibly promote
election security?
So those are my two questions. I thank you for your time.
Ms. Howard. Thank you so much for your questions. So first,
I will say that no system is 100 percent secure.
In the election security sphere we are all endeavoring to
make our election systems more resilient. The three main prongs
of the election security stool, if you will, are to have paper
ballots, post-election audits where you actually go back and
review those paper ballots, and solid cybersecurity practices
across the board.
Mr. Van Drew. May I interrupt for a second? I am sorry to
do that. When you say ``paper ballots,'' do you mean paper
back-up or do you mean that actually you prefer a paper ballot
system, period?
Ms. Howard. Paper ballot system, period.
Mr. Van Drew. OK. You were going to explain why.
Ms. Howard. So voting on paper ballots ensures that in the
event that there are any questions about the accuracy of
elections, you can go back to the record the voter voted on and
check and confirm the accuracy of the outcome that has been
reported.
You saw post-election audits conducted across the country
after the 2020 election and again after the 2022 primaries, and
you will see more and more audits conducted after the 2022
midterms.
So to your second question, you know, mistakes happen in
elections, no election is perfect. However, election officials
have a number of safeguards built into all of the processes and
all of the cycles in our election system. So they have
safeguards built into the voter registration process, they have
safeguards built into the absentee ballot process, they have
safeguards implemented in voting in person on Election Day.
So even in the event of mistakes or errors these safeguards
are put into place to protect the integrity of our elections
and to ensure that eligible voters can cast a ballot.
Mr. Van Drew. Real quick, I know I only have a couple
seconds.
Vice Chairman Torres. We do not have any more time.
Mr. Van Drew. Thank you very much.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentlewoman
from Nevada, Ms. Titus, 5 minutes.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join all of
you in wishing Chairman Thompson a quick recovery. We miss him
and we hope he is doing okay.
You know, we heard all the testimony, and I agree with it,
that election security is a constantly-evolving threat to our
whole democratic process. The environment changes from one
cycle to the next.
In 2016, we were primarily concerned about Russian
interference, then in 2020, it was the former President's Big
Lie that kind-of was the biggest threat to elections. Then
during the 2022 we need to look at what is in the political
environment that can again threaten our elections? I believe it
is those domestic threats that are the most serious that we
need to worry about.
Last month I wrote a letter to Secretary Mayorkas, many of
the Members of this committee signed onto it, to raise concerns
about the increased threats and violence as a result of the
Supreme Court's decision to overturn the right to abortion.
I cited an analysis from a Southern Nevada Counterterrorism
Center that found that domestic violence extremists, motivated
by the heightened political environment, could threaten our
midterm elections. The report predicted that the threat would
increase against our election workers.
In fact, in 2019, the number of attacks in the United
States against abortion providers more than doubled. I am
afraid that our elections will bear the brunt of that in the
coming months and that our election poll workers could be the
targets as well.
I would ask Secretary Oliver if she has taken any steps to
protect elections in New Mexico against this heightened threat
environment post-Dobbs decision, and how this committee can
work with DHS to kind-of navigate this threatening environment
for our elections as we move toward November.
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you, Congresswoman. We certainly
are. Let me just say this, all of these potential threats that
you just cited on the cyber front, you know, resulting from
continued unhappiness with the outcome of the 2020 election,
you know, in 2020, of course we were dealing with somewhat
across the country leading into elections and so, you know,
response to the Dobbs Decision, you know, potentially could see
similar things.
So, yes, to answer your question we very much are reporting
very closely with not only our Federal law enforcement but our
State police and our local law enforcement partners. We meet
with them regularly. We set up virtual situation rooms and the
lead-up to and on Election Day to monitor not just the cyber
environment to ensure that it is secure, but the physical
environment of our polling places and anyplace where voting
activity or ballot processing activity is going on around the
State.
We continue to learn more and so we continue to develop
more tools and plans for how to deal with that more effectively
at each election.
Ms. Titus. Well, it sounds like New Mexico is doing a good
job. Some of the rest of us could learn from you establishing
these best practices.
Any one thing that you could recommend that we ought to go
home and talk about to our own State election departments?
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. One great thing that we are doing here
in New Mexico, and I know some other States are doing this as
well, is we have also formed a partnership with our New Mexico
State Air National Guard. Their Cyber Task Force comes and
works on-site with us during the election process as well. So
we have added additional eyes and ears and expertise to monitor
our cyber environment to ensure that that is safe. It has been
a wonderful partnership, I recommend it in every State.
Ms. Titus. We will certainly do that. Thank you so much. I
yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. The Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our panelists
for appearing before us today virtually and in person.
Mr. Chairman, election fraud is a reality throughout the
history of modern man across the world. Fraud and criminal
behavior is as old as mankind itself. It is as old as mankind's
tendency to succumb to failure of spirit. We all failed and
fallen since Adam, and our elections are no exception to that.
I read a quote from a political article regarding a
University of Pennsylvania research scholar immediately after
the Presidential election. He said, how could this be? He
researched exit poll numbers that he was familiar with and had
been reported on the night of the election. He says he went
down a rabbit hole with statistical analysis in search of
explanations for the votes that seemed to have magically
appeared. A week after the election he shared a draft of his
finding with his colleagues, scholars all, and the conclusion
was that, I quote, ``Fraud was an unavoidable hypothesis.''
His analysis wound up spreading widely, drawing thousands
of responses from around the country, people who believed, as
he did, that the election had been stolen. To quote from a
political article, ``It is about the 2004 election, Bush and
Kerry.'' This was a Democrat analyst.
Understand, ladies and gentlemen, my colleagues on both
sides of the aisle, election fraud and compromised elections is
not new, it is old as man itself. What is new now is the
digital age.
Nobody had an iPhone in the 2000 election of Bush and Al
Gore, highly controversial. In 2004, it's on Facebook. Now we
face a digital era where the theatre of engagement has changed
and nowhere more so than in our sovereign States'
responsibility to carry out solid elections every year that the
American people can depend upon.
So the real challenge right now is how will our sovereign
States present best models for dealing with the perception
amongst the American citizenry that our elections lack
integrity, that their votes won't count? This must be addressed
at the State level.
I for one do not support the Federalization of our
elections we're representative republic of sovereign States,
this is a States' role. Therefore, the best practices of those
States amongst the sovereign States that have provided solid,
secure elections, cycle after cycle, this must be shared and
encouraged amongst your State partners across the country.
I ask Secretary LaRose, if you are prepared for a question,
sir.
Mr. LaRose. Yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. As we saw in the 2020 election, due to the
COVID pandemic, as Americans were unconcerned, it was quite
convenient, the pandemic. Mail-in ballots, it certainly
presented challenges State by State about how we deal with
this. Millions and millions and millions of mail ballots,
mostly unrequested, some arguably outside the parameters of the
law of that sovereign State wherein they were delivered. It is
a Constitutional question got to be settled ultimately in
Article III, adjudicated, and we will learn from our challenges
of the 2020 election cycle.
But I ask you, Secretary LaRose, during the COVID pandemic
our country had to make a dramatic shift regarding how--or our
country was forced to make a dramatic shift, found themselves
making that choice on how to conduct elections. What were some
lessons learned, sir? How can that be shared with the rest of
the country as we move toward this election cycle, to encourage
Americans that elections are indeed secure and that actions
have been embraced within the sovereign States to make certain
that our elections are secure?
Vice Chairman Torres. The time has expired but you can
answer the question concisely, please.
Mr. LaRose. Yes, I will answer the question briefly. Resist
the temptation for crisis opportunism. The way that your State
has run elections has been put in place for a reason. Follow
your State laws, work with your State legislator to make
changes if you need to, don't allow the courts to make last-
minute changes in your elections, and mind the logistics. Pay
attention to the nuts and bolts of getting ballots to people
that should have them and getting them back, and not doing
things that are sort-of novel just because you are in a crisis.
Vice Chairman Torres. Thank you.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
Vice Chairman Torres. I will now recognize the gentlewoman
from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning to all of the witnesses.
Let me be very clear of the importance of this hearing. I
will concisely take the ultimate reason though over the years
we have looked at the questions of voter registration,
machines, cybersecurity, all important issues for this very
focused Committee on Homeland Security.
But the real issue is in the aftermath of the 2020
election, wrapped up in the Big Lie and the continuation of the
Big Lie is really the question of threats of the physical
security of elections with an increase in threats to election
officers and a heightened risk of officials acting improperly
due to disinformation. That is simply what we are facing in our
ability to really carry legitimate elections that are guided
by, as a previous witness said, by the laws of the State. They
are not guided by misinformation, disinformation, and violence,
that is what we are facing.
I was appalled at the threat of the elections officials in
Atlanta, in Georgia, in the last election. Still unchecked to
date. I am appalled at the State laws that have criminalized
anyone trying to be a good Samaritan with a glass of water.
So Ms. Toulouse Oliver, let me ask you as relates to
election officials' protection, funding often does not reach
its intended target. What is hindering those funds from
reaching the election official? Ms. Oliver.
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Congresswoman----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am sorry, the secretary----
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. That is okay. Just wanted to make sure
you meant me.
Congresswoman, I think there is like a couple of issues. I
think first and foremost one of the biggest challenges we have,
for example in my State, and I know many of my colleagues have
shared similar concerns, because the funding that we received
so far--which, by the way, we are incredibly grateful for and I
will never stop thanking you all for what you have allocated to
the State as a whole in our work. Because it has come
sporadically in lump sum payments and we don't necessarily know
when or if there will be more funding coming, we had to be
extremely diligent and thoughtful about making those funds last
as long as possible to sustain the programs that we have built
around election security and cybersecurity. So often that means
we are holding onto funds at the State level, you know, waiting
to see what we are going to continue to need in the future
because we cannot necessarily count on that additional fund.
Then, Madam Congresswoman, I know that some States, like my
colleague in Minnesota for example, when the Federal funding is
allocated, he then has to go through the approval of the State
legislature. That timing doesn't necessarily align for when
those funds are allocated and when the secretary then can get
ahold of it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I have got only a short period
of time so I see the logjam that we need to address.
Let me ask Ms. Howard again on the question of election
security, in the attack on election workers, I think your
testimony mentioned that election workers are simply leaving
their positions.
In my time as a public servant and going before the voters,
it was an honor to be engaged in the election process.
What are some of the things that we can do immediately to
help fill these positions as well as prevent more workers from
leaving?
I am now in the midst of a Judiciary Committee hearing,
trying to ban assault weapons. I do not know whether with this
rise in gun violence, whether someone will think it is
important for their position to come to a poll with a gun.
What should we do and how should the Federal Government be
involved? I, frankly, believe we should be doing a lot more
with persons on the ground. Ms. Howard? Thank you for your work
with the Brennan Center.
Ms. Howard. Thank you so much for the question.
There are several things that Congress can do. So first,
Congress can allocate funding specifically for training for
election officials about how to--for their physical safety, and
they can allocate funding so that election officials can
enhance the security at their personal residences. Congress can
also request that CISA provide specific training to election
officials to protect their personal security.
In addition, Congress can work with the multiple Federal
agencies and departments that are working to help protect our
election officials to make sure that their efforts are
effective.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just very quickly then with the 1 second I
have, let me just stick with Ms. Howard about the----
Vice Chairman Torres. I am sorry, your time has expired and
we do have to move on.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I will submit it in writing. Thank you so
very much. I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. We just want to be fair. I now
recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino. Is Mr.
Garbarino here?
Mr. Garbarino. Yes, on-line. Thank you, Chairman and
Ranking Member, for holding this hearing.
Secretary of State LaRose, I had a question for you. You
talked briefly about your partnership with CISA. In 2019, when
Russian-connected individuals attempted to hack your State's
system, is that where that relationship started with CISA or
did you have something going on before with them? How did they
help or how did the Federal Government assist you after the
attempted hack in 2019?
Mr. LaRose. Yes, I can tell you that I made it a priority
from my first couple of days in office to get to know my
counterparts in other States, and we worked closely with the
cybersecurity teams in other States as well as my partners at
CISA and then down to the county level. So it is about
laterally and up and down. So we have been working with them
ever since I came into office.
But that partnership paid off, as you mentioned, when our
State, like many other States, was the subject of what resulted
to--in a ransomware attempt.
Mr. Garbarino. Okay. So, you know, working with CISA, they
are the head, you know, here for cybersecurity and social
security agency, and now the election system has been declared
as critical infrastructure. So their job is to protect it from
cyber and physical threats.
What services does CISA provide now that are most
impactful? What are things that they could do better on, you
know, what is good, what is bad about your relationship with
them?
Mr. LaRose. Yes. So first of all, information flow has
gotten a lot better. At one point in time it was kind-of like
we had to pull information out of them. I can tell you that
that has gotten better over time. They have been purposeful
about that.
There is a whole variety of services that they offer, down
to a county level. I have actually required as part of our
security directives, that 1.0, 2.0 and 3.30 that I have put
out, and we have required our counties to engage in those
services.
One question is just one of resources. Sometimes there is a
backlog in actually receiving those services. I know CISA has
worked to address that, but if there was one helpful thing, it
would be working to increase the resources of CISA so that
those services can be delivered more quickly without the delay
that currently exists.
Mr. Garbarino. So they are doing a good job, we just need
to increase their funding so they can do it better.
Mr. LaRose. Then the team at CISA is incredibly purposeful,
that from the director on down. In fact she took the time to
come visit us in Ohio personally just 2 weeks ago and we
appreciate the partnership with them.
Mr. Garbarino. Yes, we have a very good relationship with
her, the director. We think she is doing a great job over
there. I appreciate that.
I am going to yield to my colleague, Mr. Pfluger, from
Texas. I know he had some more questions. So I yield back.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you for the time. Nothing is more
important than the integrity of our elections right now. There
is distrust in the American public, there is a distrust. I'll
remind my colleagues, in fact, the former gubernatorial
candidates in the State of Georgia still won't concede the
election for Governor there.
So, you know, the distrust here, and I will focus my
questions with Ms. Howard.
You mentioned safeguards a number of times, safeguards for
elections to make sure that they are secure, to make sure that
the trust--the public has the trust.
So on the subject of identifications, IDs, would you say
that the use of IDs to register, the use of IDs to actually
vote and prove who you are, and the use of IDs to then match up
when you are counting those votes, would be a safeguard that
would enhance that trust in the election integrity in all
States?
I want to hear your take on safeguards because you speak
with great authority on this.
Ms. Howard. Oh, I am so sorry, thank you. Thank you for the
question.
I think whether or not a photo ID is critical depends upon
the other safeguards that are in the system. You can't just
look at one piece without----
Mr. Pfluger. Sure. So in States like New York or New
Jersey, where ballots can be mailed without actually requesting
them, wouldn't that be a good safeguard to have, that the ID
then matches up the person who is voting, or his signature?
Ms. Howard. So in many States the absentee ballot process
requires that the voter sign the return envelope. Some States
require an additional witness signature on the there. So again,
it depends on all the other safeguards that are in the process.
Mr. Pfluger. So would you say, in your comment previously
you said all States have different takes on it. Are you for the
Federalization of our election system?
Ms. Howard. So I think there have been important Federal
laws that protect every citizen's right to vote. So, for
instance, in HAVA, which was passed after the 2000 election, it
included mandatory provisional ballots be offered to
individuals that have issues at the polls on Election Day as a
safeguard.
Mr. Pfluger. I think that the safeguards that we need can
be based around an ID that tells you who that person is,
especially in States that don't have the signature requirement
or that mail ballots to people who might not have asked for
them. The American public deserves that. We have to have a
system that has integrity and that we trust. Right now there is
a great distrust in our election system.
I thank the gentlemen from New York for yielding the time.
Vice Chairman Torres. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Clyde,
the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Clyde, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clyde. Thank you, Chairman Torres. The safety and well-
being of election administrators and a robust secure election
infrastructure is paramount to a functioning republic. In
recent years election security has become an even greater
concern because of the radical changes in ``flexibilities''
that were allowed and attributed to COVID-19. For example, the
Supreme Court in Pennsylvania ruled just weeks before the
Presidential election, that ballots should be accepted as late
as the Friday after Election Day, even ballots without a
postmark.
This was, of course, a direct encroachment on the authority
of the Pennsylvania State Legislature which enacted strong
election integrity regulations and voter ID. This certainly
caused much confusion for election administrators and for the
voters.
This issue hits right at home with my constituents as our
very own secretary of state unilaterally altered Georgia's
statutory requirements, requiring the authentication of
absentee ballot signatures with an unlawful consent decree.
Understandably, people are concerned with the
administration of the 2020 elections. Because partisan
officials bypassed the legislative process, effectively
changing the rules of the game as the game was being played.
According to the documentary ``2000 Mules,'' thousands of
ballots were illegally harvested by political operatives and
placed into drop boxes in at least 5 States, which is a direct
violation of State laws, which clearly say that you can only
return ballots for immediate family members.
To be sure, our local election administrators are not to
blame for the poor decisions of some State elected officials
that cast doubt on our election integrity.
I applaud the efforts of election administrators in spite
of rapidly-changing guidance to administer elections in
accordance with the Constitution and State laws. I agree that
their safety is paramount.
Nevertheless, these constantly-changing election laws from
left-leaning judges amid a Presidential election rightfully led
to voters having questions and frustrations about the integrity
of the elections. Strong election laws, like Georgia's SB202,
will do a lot to ensure confidence in elections across the
country. But hand recounts of paper ballots by local election
officials would go a long way to further the confidence of
concerned voters. In fact, I think that in my home State every
election should have an automatic 10 percent recount of random
counties to act as an audit of the results.
So, Ms. Howard, to your comment. I think that what you said
about the need for election audits is absolutely correct. While
I believe stronger election laws that restore confidence in our
election process will reduce the threats of violence toward
election officials, I believe that local law enforcement is the
first and best line of defense for these types of threats. We
make sure that those who commit unlawful acts of violence are
prosecuted at the State level.
It is no secret that my Democrat colleagues have exploited
these threats to justify a Federal takeover of elections. Make
no mistake, this hearing will be used as a platform by the
Democrat majority to push for total Federal control, like Mr.
Sarbanes' Preventing Election Subversion Act of 2021.
With that being said, I will direct my first question to
Mr. LaRose. Mr. LaRose, as you know, the Democrats' so-called
election subversion bill, H.R. 4064, would set forth burdensome
requirements for Federal elections. For example, it prevents
meaningful poll observer access by mandating an 8-foot minimum
distance in order to observe ballot counts across the country.
I am aware that there have been threats against election
administrators in the State of Ohio. Is local law enforcement
equipped to investigate and arrest the individuals who made
these kind of threats, sir?
Mr. LaRose. More than adequately equipped, Congressman. In
fact, we send a memo to all of our law enforcement partners
before each election, making sure that they know not only the
rights but the responsibilities that they have to safeguard not
only our poll workers but voters, really everybody involved in
the process. We have even gotten all of our election officials
to now be equipped with police radios through our State's MARKS
system in the case of an emergency so that we can communicate
directly with law enforcement.
Mr. Clyde. So local law enforcement is more than adequately
equipped to handle this.
Mr. LaRose. Yes.
Mr. Clyde. Next question. How would such a Federal
regulation imposing an 8-foot observer distance impact your
constituents' confidence that the poll observer could do their
work effectively?
Mr. LaRose. Well, observation is crucial, but, really, what
that is is micromanagement. For somebody in Washington to think
that they need to tell 88 county boards of elections in Ohio
and how many hundreds of other county boards of elections
across the country how far away observers should stand is the
height of Federal Government arrogance, in my opinion.
Mr. Clyde. Thank you. I believe local control is best when
it comes to things like this.
Ms. Howard, as you may be aware, poll workers had a large
polling center in Detroit, Michigan, block the windows with
cardboard pizza boxes to bar observer access to the 2020
election. Do you believe it is appropriate for windows to be
blocked so that the views of observers are obstructed?
Ms. Howard. Thank you for your question. I am not familiar
with the allegations about what happened in Detroit. But I will
say in general there are laws in Michigan and many other States
which allow for observers at very different points of the
election process. Those observers, authorized under law, should
not be obstructed.
Vice Chairman Torres. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Clyde. Thank you. I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. I now recognize the gentlewoman from
Florida, Mrs. Cammack.
Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Very timely topic as
we head into a very important election in this year's midterms.
I think it is something that we all have grave concerns about,
of course, election integrity is a driving issue. I think as a
fundamental right to go out and vote, we need to really ensure
that peoples' ballots are being counted as they intend them to
be counted when they are cast.
So I know folks across the country are really watching this
and Members have been coming and going.
So for our witnesses I am just going to ask a couple of
questions to make sure that I understand exactly where you all
stand on this. So I will start with Ms. Oliver.
Do you believe that a government-issued ID, complete with a
photo, should be required to vote? This question will go to all
witnesses, but I will start with Ms. Oliver.
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you, Congresswoman. We do not
require that here in New Mexico. It is one option. I think of
many--excuse me?
Mrs. Cammack. How can you verify the identity of an
individual without a photo ID that is government-issued?
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. They are required to provide other
identifiable information. Again, a photo ID is an option for
voters. They can also provide other forms of documentary ID or
give a verbal confirmation of personal/private information to
verify their identity.
Mrs. Cammack. That doesn't seem particularly secure so we
might want to work on that.
Mr. Kelley.
Mr. Kelley. I remind myself that I am retired so I can give
my personal opinion now. I do not believe it would be a bad
thing to provide an ID to increase voter confidence. I do not
know ultimately what problem it solves in some cases, but I do
not think it would be a bad idea.
Mrs. Cammack. OK. Ms. Howard.
Ms. Howard. I think that it is hard to look at one piece of
the election----
Mrs. Cammack. Just a yes or no, ma'am. Do you believe that
a government ID, complete with a photo, should be required to
vote?
Ms. Howard. No.
Mrs. Cammack. Mr. LaRose.
Mr. LaRose. Congresswoman, the simple answer is yes, and
most Americans believe that as well. We should make sure
everybody can get one easily and that we maintain accurate
voter rolls.
Mrs. Cammack. Absolutely. I think it is very curious that
of the four witnesses that we have here today, three have said
in some form or fashion that no photo ID should be required to
vote, that a verbal confirmation is all that is to suffice that
a person is who they say they are. I mean, I can go out and say
that I am Jennifer Aniston but that doesn't make me Jennifer
Aniston, as much as I would like it to be.
So we need to, I think, one, if we are taking about this
issue, start with the basic premise of verification. You need
to have a photo ID to cash a check. You need a photo ID to live
life. We require driver's licenses with photos to drive a car.
There are basic things that we have to do in life that require
photo IDs. I do not think this is discriminatory in any shape,
way, form, or fashion. I would love to see our local officials
work to really make sure that it is as accessible and easy to
get a government-issued ID complete with a photo so that we do
not have these questions down the road.
I am going to go to my second question for the witnesses.
Do you believe that third-party political organizations that
are funded by political parties should be prohibited from
signature verification? I will start with you, Mr. LaRose.
Mr. LaRose. Yes, in Ohio that work of signature
verification is done by sworn election officials from both
parties and observed by the public if they wish to observe
that. That is where signature verification should be done. That
is how we do it in Ohio.
Mrs. Cammack. Excellent. Thank you, Mr. LaRose. Ms. Howard.
Ms. Howard. Thank you for the question. You know I think
that Secretary LaRose brings up an important point. The
signature verification procedures that I am aware of are done
by election officials, many of whom are sworn in and sworn to
uphold the State----
Mrs. Cammack. But not Georgia. Mr. Kelley.
Mr. Kelley. I believe in the exact same thing Secretary
LaRose said.
Mrs. Cammack. Thank you. And Ms. Oliver.
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. I agree with Secretary LaRose. I will
just quickly add that in my State, and many, we do allow
political party observers at that.
Mrs. Cammack. I appreciate that. For Ms. Oliver and Mr.
LaRose, I am sure you are all aware of the ERIC system, the
system that allows States to talk to each other so if a person
who is registered to vote in Florida passes away in Ohio, the
two States can talk to each other to make sure that those voter
rolls are updated.
Do you believe that each State should employ the use of the
ERIC system? I will start with you, Ms. Oliver.
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Absolutely. We use it here and we
encourage it everywhere.
Mrs. Cammack. Thank you. Mr. LaRose.
Mr. LaRose. Great tool for fraud prevention and gives us a
way to catch people that try to vote in multiple States, even
though that is rare, we can catch them now using ERIC. Every
State should consider using it.
Mrs. Cammack. I appreciate it. My time has expired, so I
will submit the remainder of my questions for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. Of course. The Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. LaTurner.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. LaRose, thank
you so much for being with us today. It is good to see you. I
want to talk about a couple things with you.
First of all, the vulnerability disclosure policy, I am
interested in that. Could you talk about what that is and what
that looks like and how it is implemented? Congratulations on
being the first State, by the way.
Mr. LaRose. Yes. Well, thank you. It was written up by a
number of publications at the time because it was kind-of a
novel thing. I enjoyed being able to stand in front of groups
in 2020 and say I am the guy who runs Ohio's elections and I am
asking people to hack me. Now, of course, you get gasps and you
would have to then explain it to people.
What I am saying is the good guys and gals, the white
hacker, white hat or ethical hackers out there, sometimes they
call themselves security researchers now, which is a more warm
and fuzzy sounding thing.
But the fact is there are folks out there that love to do
this, to find vulnerabilities. They are motivated by patriotic
purposes to try to find where those vulnerabilities exist and
to tell us about them. So you can see our vulnerability
disclosure policy if you go to OhioSOS.gov or VoteOhio.gov and
go to right to the bottom of our website. It says Vulnerability
Disclosure Policy. If you click on that it says, hey, good-guy
hackers, if you find something, tell us.
Now you can't vandalize our site, you can't cause some sort
of a breach, but if you tell us, we will not only fix the
problem, but we will recognize you.
We had a great ethical hacker on our stage at our Election
Official Conference and we gave him a big award. That is the
kind of thing that other States should be doing as well.
Mr. LaTurner. I appreciate that. As you are aware, CISA
offers a vulnerability disclosure policy platform to help
Federal agencies. Is this, in your opinion, something that CISA
could engage in or should engage in with States and localities
as well? Would that be helpful?
Mr. LaRose. Congressman, anything we can do to encourage
and even incentivize this, is good. We work currently with a
private-sector provider that helps get the word out to the
hacker community that, hey, listen, Ohio wants to use your
expertise and we will recognize you for your efforts. But to do
that through CISA would be a great tool as well.
Mr. LaTurner. I read that in one of your counties they have
551 workers, but need 846 for the poll watchers. I am curious,
how do you plan to close that gap? This is a problem that
States across the country are having. What do you think the
potential implications are for election integrity and security?
Mr. LaRose. Yes. So we will close that gap, Congressman. It
is something that we have been focused on really from the very
beginning. You know we have done creative things like recruit
high school seniors through what we call the Youth at the Booth
Program. We have worked with my fellow veterans, asking them to
answer a second call to duty, right, to continue fulfilling
that oath that they took to preserve and protect the
Constitution. We have worked with businesses, encouraging them
to give their employees a day for democracy. Give them a free
day off, an uncharged day off to be poll workers.
So those are the kind-of things we are doing, but we are
also holding our boards of elections accountable. The reason
you know that number is because we publicly report it now. So
those county boards of elections that don't have enough poll
workers, they get the scrutiny and the pressure to make sure
they get there by Election Day.
Mr. LaTurner. It sounds like you are doing a lot of
exciting things there. How many other States are implementing
the vulnerability disclosure policy, do you have any idea?
Mr. LaRose. I believe it is in the single digits at this
point, but it is growing.
Mr. LaTurner. OK. What about the ideas that you talked
about, the Youth in the Booth and things like that? Are you
sharing these in your professional organization or anything so
other States have the opportunity to benefit from your
experience?
Mr. LaRose. Yes. For us it is the National Association of
Secretaries of States. My friend and colleague from New Mexico
is an active participant and former president of that
organization. We got together just a couple weeks ago in Baton
Rouge and we were exchanging ideas. This is exactly what we do.
So, yes, we love to steal each other's good ideas and
hopefully my colleagues around the country steal some good
ideas from Ohio.
Mr. LaTurner. I appreciate that. Mr. Kelley, during your
tenure in Orange County your department would produce an
Election Security Playbook in conjunction with State and local
officials, in addition to the FBI and DHS. Can you talk more
about this and the emphasis your office put on collaboration
and partnerships? Because I think it is really key, as I talked
about with Secretary LaRose, that we are all rowing in the same
direction, that we are collaborating, we are sharing
information so that we can tackle this problem.
Mr. Kelley. Yes, sir, thank you, Congressman. Collaboration
was a big part of what we did in Orange County. In fact, I
partnered at the table with DHS, FBI, local, State officials,
law enforcement. We came up with a playbook and a design for
responses on Election Day and leading up to Election Day. If
you don't have that type of collaboration leading up to those
important elements, you are going to have gaps, there is no
question about it.
One other quick thing I would say as part of that playbook
is doing things like list maintenance and increasing that list
maintenance effort before ballots go out so that you can
improve voter confidence, That is a big part of it.
Mr. LaTurner. I appreciate that. My time has expired. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Vice Chairman Torres. Thank you. We are at the end of our
hearing. But before I conclude I do want to ask each witness
what is the most important action that we in Congress can take
to fundamentally enhance election security? I will start with
Secretary Oliver.
Ms. Toulouse Oliver. Thank you again, Mr. Chair, and thank
you so much for having me here today. I think it has been a
very important discussion and I think that although the major
differing political views, I think there have been a lot of
consistent threads throughout this conversation and hopefully
that gives you all and the American public increased confidence
in our election process.
Mr. Chairman, continue to support us as election officials
in our States. I think many commenters today have noted the
importance of allowing States and indeed the Constitutional
requirement to allow States to conduct elections. We do so many
things in common to ensure the integrity of our elections. But
continue to support us in our efforts and particularly with, it
doesn't have to be a lot, but on-going funding so that we can
protect our critical election infrastructure which is a part of
our National security infrastructure.
Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.
Vice Chairman Torres. Mr. Kelley, what is the most
important thing we can do in Congress?
Mr. Kelley. Mr. Chairman, I echo Secretary Oliver's
comments and thank you very much for today's hearing.
Two quick things. I believe funding is very important,
improving physical security at election offices will go a long
way and that assistance is badly needed.
Then raising awareness on this issue. It is very important
that not only the American public become aware of this, but
also local law enforcement leaders and election officials
across the country.
Vice Chairman Torres. Ms. Howard.
Ms. Howard. Thank you so much for holding this hearing
today. I think the most important thing that Congress can do is
to provide additional funding for election officials and to
require the currently-available funding to have a minimum spend
for election security.
Vice Chairman Torres. Secretary LaRose.
Mr. LaRose. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. We each have
an important responsibility from the county-level election
officials to the State officials to you all at the Federal
level. So I think that the first thing is, allow us to do our
jobs and don't try to do our jobs for us by setting the
specific rules surrounding elections administration, but do
support us with the great resources that you offer right now
from CISA. Consider growing those resources.
One additional thing is that voter list maintenance is
probably one of the most important responsibilities we have;
maintaining that very dynamic list that is constantly changing
is hard. The Federal Government has resources that are not
always made available to the States as far as verifying
citizenship data, death records, those kind of things. So more
data flow as it relates to voter list maintenance would also be
very helpful.
Vice Chairman Torres. I thank the witnesses for their
excellent testimony and the Members for their questions. The
Members of the committee may have additional questions for the
witnesses and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing
to those questions.
The Chair reminds the Members that the committee record
will remain open for 10 business days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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