[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
        A HEARING TO REVIEW THE STATE OF THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                        COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               ----------                              

                            OCTOBER 7, 2021

                               ----------                              

                           Serial No. 117-18



                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




          Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture
                         agriculture.house.gov













        A HEARING TO REVIEW THE STATE OF THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                        COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            OCTOBER 7, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-18




                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]





          Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture
                         agriculture.house.gov




                                ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

49-397 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2022









                        COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE

                     DAVID SCOTT, Georgia, Chairman

JIM COSTA, California                GLENN THOMPSON, Pennsylvania, 
JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts     Ranking Minority Member
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
ALMA S. ADAMS, North Carolina, Vice  ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, 
Chair                                Arkansas
ABIGAIL DAVIS SPANBERGER, Virginia   SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JAHANA HAYES, Connecticut            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
ANTONIO DELGADO, New York            DOUG LaMALFA, California
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine               RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia
GREGORIO KILILI CAMACHO SABLAN,      DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
Northern Mariana Islands             TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire         DON BACON, Nebraska
CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois               DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota
SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York       JAMES R. BAIRD, Indiana
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands   JIM HAGEDORN, Minnesota
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona              CHRIS JACOBS, New York
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        TROY BALDERSON, Ohio
RO KHANNA, California                MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas
AL LAWSON, Jr., Florida              TRACEY MANN, Kansas
J. LUIS CORREA, California           RANDY FEENSTRA, Iowa
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota               MARY E. MILLER, Illinois
JOSH HARDER, California              BARRY MOORE, Alabama
CYNTHIA AXNE, Iowa                   KAT CAMMACK, Florida
KIM SCHRIER, Washington              MICHELLE FISCHBACH, Minnesota
JIMMY PANETTA, California            JULIA LETLOW, Louisiana
ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia

                                 ______

                      Anne Simmons, Staff Director

                 Parish Braden, Minority Staff Director

                                  (ii)







                             C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Costa, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from California, 
  prepared statement.............................................     6
Hagedorn, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from Minnesota, 
  submitted letter...............................................   330
Scott, Hon. David, a Representative in Congress from Georgia, 
  opening statement..............................................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Submitted report.............................................   203
Thompson, Hon. Glenn, a Representative in Congress from 
  Pennsylvania, opening statement................................     3

                               Witnesses

Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a Senator in Congress from Iowa............     6
    Prepared statement...........................................     7
Vilsack, Hon. Thomas ``Tom'' J., Secretary, U.S. Department of 
  Agriculture, Washington, D.C...................................     8
    Prepared statement...........................................     9
    Supplementary material.......................................   335
    Submitted questions..........................................   342
Wilkinson, Todd, Vice President, National Cattlemen's Beef 
  Association, De Smet, SD.......................................    53
    Prepared statement...........................................    54
    Submitted question...........................................   350
Leger, Francois, Owner, FPL Food, Augusta, GA; on behalf of North 
  American Meat Institute........................................    98
    Prepared statement...........................................   100
    Submitted question...........................................   351
Blubaugh, Scott, President, Oklahoma Farmers Union, Tonkawa, OK; 
  on behalf of National Farmers Union............................   102
    Prepared statement...........................................   103
    Submitted question...........................................   351
Hays, Scott, Vice President, National Pork Producers Council, 
  Monroe City, MO................................................   112
    Prepared statement...........................................   114
    Submitted question...........................................   352
Boner, Brad, Vice President, American Sheep Industry Association, 
  Glenrock, WY...................................................   175
    Prepared statement...........................................   176
    Submitted question...........................................   354

                           Submitted Material

United States Cattlemen's Association, submitted statement.......   336



 
        A HEARING TO REVIEW THE STATE OF THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY

                              ----------                              


                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2021

                          House of Representatives,
                                  Committee on Agriculture,
                                                   Washington, D.C.
    The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 12:01 p.m., in Room 
1300 of the Longworth House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon. 
David Scott of Georgia [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
    Members present: Representatives David Scott of Georgia, 
Adams, Spanberger, Hayes, Delgado, Rush, Pingree, Sablan, 
Kuster, Plaskett, O'Halleran, Khanna, Lawson, Craig, Harder, 
Axne, Schrier, Bishop, Thompson, Austin Scott of Georgia, 
Hartzler, LaMalfa, Allen, Rouzer, Johnson, Baird, Hagedorn, 
Jacobs, Balderson, Cloud, Mann, Feenstra, Miller, Moore, 
Cammack, Fischbach, and Letlow.
    Staff present: Daniel Feingold, Prescott Martin III, Lesly 
Weber McNitt, Kelcy Schanuman, Ashley Smith, Caleb Crosswhite, 
Patricia Straughn, Erin Wilson, and Dana Sandman.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID SCOTT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
                     CONGRESS FROM GEORGIA

    The Chairman. The Committee will come to order. Welcome, 
and thank you for joining us today on this extraordinary, and 
very important, and urgent hearing entitled, A Hearing to 
Review the State of the Livestock Industry. Now, after brief 
opening remarks, Members will receive testimony from our 
witnesses today, and then the hearing will be open to 
questions. Members will be recognized in order of seniority, 
alternating between Majority and Minority Members, and in order 
of arrival for those Members who have joined us after the 
hearing was called to order. And, of course, Members, when you 
are recognized, please remember to unmute your microphones, and 
then you will have 5 minutes to ask your questions, or make a 
comment. And, if you are not speaking, please, I ask you to 
remain muted in order to minimize any background noise. And in 
order to get to as many questions as possible, the timer will 
stay consistently visible on each of your screens. Now, ladies 
and gentlemen, let me take just a few minutes to give you my 
own opening statement.
    This is, as I said, a most important and urgent hearing, 
because today we will discuss the very important issues facing 
our livestock sector. Animal agriculture, ladies and gentlemen, 
is a very important, very significant part of the engine of our 
food system, and not only that, of our entire United States 
economy, and our very important international trade. As 
agricultural policymakers, it is our job to examine the 
conditions that enable this important and critical industry to 
succeed, and to address any barriers that would limit that 
success as well.
    Our livestock industry is facing significant challenges: 
heightened concerns about fairness and transparency in the 
marketplace as well. In fact, the previous Chairman and Ranking 
Member of our House Agriculture Committee requested a report on 
issues and trends in the cattle markets. Earlier this week 
Texas A&M University published this report entitled, The U.S. 
Beef Supply Chain: Issues and Challenges.* So, without 
objection, on behalf of Ranking Member Thompson and myself, I 
would like to submit this report for this hearing record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Editor's note: the report referred to is located on p. 203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ladies and gentlemen, we all agree now that our farmers, 
our ranchers, should have access to free and fair markets, and 
this is why the leaders of this Agriculture Committee, and the 
House of Representatives, have been working in a bipartisan way 
in our hopes of reaching an agreement on a long-term extension 
of Livestock Mandatory Reporting, which we refer to as LMR. 
That is also why we introduced H.R. 5290, to extend LMR's 
authorization for 1 year. Our legislation continues the United 
States Department of Agriculture's Mandatory Price Reporting 
Program, which provides vital price discovery and market 
information. And, of course, I expect we will hear more of that 
from our witnesses later on.
    I also look forward to hearing from our distinguished 
witnesses' views on critical issues like competitiveness, 
supply chain resilience, labor, animal health, and our U.S. 
Department of Agriculture's implementation of the COVID-19 
relief and rebuilding assistance, which was authorized by us in 
Congress. We have convened a distinguished group of witnesses, 
who will not only provide diverse perspectives on the issues 
confronting our farmers and ranchers, but they also will 
present views on how we can move forward. And my hope for 
today's hearing is that by us listening, listening to the 
voices of these very influential and knowledgeable voices from 
across the industry, we here in Congress will be able to find 
common ground on policies that will enhance the state of our 
precious livestock sector.
    And I am so pleased to have before us Senator Chuck 
Grassley from Iowa, a distinguished gentleman. And I am also 
delighted to welcome our distinguished Secretary Tom Vilsack 
back again to the Committee, and to hear from him an update on 
all the work that the United States Department of Agriculture 
is doing for our livestock industry. And, of course, we have 
our distinguished panel. And ladies and gentlemen, we are going 
to hear from these industry experts because they are highly 
recognized as the most knowledgeable voices in livestock. So I 
welcome you all to this extraordinary hearing, and we all look 
forward to it.
    Now, one final comment. I recognize that we do have 
diverse, and sometimes differing, views on what it will take to 
strengthen our livestock industry, and better position it for 
the future. And I want all of us to listen, listen with an open 
mind, and remember that while we may take different approaches, 
have different opinions, here's one thing for sure, that we all 
have a shared motivation to make our agriculture system of the 
United States better so that we can maintain our recognition as 
the greatest, best agriculture system in the world.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. David Scott follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Hon. David Scott, a Representative in Congress 
                              from Georgia
    Today, we will discuss the very important issues facing the 
livestock sector. Animal agriculture is an engine of our food system, 
the U.S. economy, and our international trade. As agricultural policy 
makers, it is our job to examine the conditions that enable this 
industry to succeed and to address any barriers to its success as well.
    Recently, the livestock industry has faced significant challenges 
and heightened concerns about fairness and transparency in the 
marketplace. In fact, the previous Chairman and Ranking Member of this 
Committee requested a report on issues and trends in cattle markets. 
Earlier this week, Texas A&M University published this report: ``The 
U.S. Beef Supply Chain: Issues and Challenges'' and it has proven very 
timely. Without objection, on behalf of Ranking Member Thompson and 
myself, I'd like to submit this report for the hearing record.
    I think we can all agree that our farmers and ranchers should have 
access to free and fair markets. That is why the leaders of this 
Committee have been working in a bipartisan way toward reaching an 
agreement on a long-term extension of Livestock Mandatory Reporting 
(LMR). That is also why I introduced H.R. 5290 to extend LMR's 
authorization for 1 year.
    This legislation continues USDA's Mandatory Price Reporting 
Program, which provides vital price discovery and market information. I 
expect that we will hear views on how this program is working from our 
witnesses.
    I also look forward to hearing our witnesses' views on critical 
issues such as competitiveness, supply chain resilience, labor, animal 
health, and the USDA's implementation of the COVID-19 relief and 
rebuilding assistance authorized by Congress.
    We have convened a distinguished group of witnesses who can not 
only provide diverse perspectives on the issues confronting our farmers 
and ranchers, but also present views on how we can move forward. My 
hope for today's hearing is that by listening to voices from across the 
industry, we will be able to find common ground on policies that will 
enhance the state of the livestock sector.
    I am pleased to have before us Senator Chuck Grassley from Iowa. I 
am also delighted to welcome Secretary Vilsack back to the Committee 
and to hear an update from him on all of the work the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture is doing for our livestock industry. Last but not least, 
our industry panel contains some of the most knowledgeable voices in 
livestock, and I welcome them as well.
    I recognize that among our witnesses, and even the Members of this 
Committee, we have diverse and sometimes differing views on what it 
will take to strengthen this industry and better position it for the 
future. I implore my friends and colleagues to listen with an open mind 
and remember that, while we may take different approaches, our shared 
motivation is the betterment of American agriculture.

    The Chairman. And with that, I would now like to welcome 
the distinguishing Ranking Member, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania, Mr. Thompson, for his opening remarks.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GLENN THOMPSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
                   CONGRESS FROM PENNSYLVANIA

    Mr. Thompson. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much, 
and good afternoon, everyone. On countless occasions I have 
mentioned the importance of this Committee getting back to 
holding hearings to explore issues facing production 
agriculture, and conducting oversight of the numerous programs 
administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, especially 
as we gear up for the next farm bill. So, in that regard, I am 
thankful, Chairman Scott, that we are giving the livestock 
industry the attention that it deserves today.
    Now, while it is always nice to hear from our Senate 
colleagues, and I am thankful to finally have an opportunity 
for an open discussion with Secretary Vilsack, this certainly 
isn't the setting I would have chosen. First off, I have a 
number of questions for the Department that extend far beyond 
the subject matter of today's hearing, and I am sure my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle do as well, questions 
that deserve answers, and that, in many cases, have gone 
ignored for far too long. Now, these grievances aside, I want 
to thank both Senator Grassley and Secretary Vilsack for your 
participation and testimony. I also want to express my 
gratitude to the industry panelists that have been gracious 
enough to participate today. I am even more eager to hear 
directly from you about what is and is not working, and what 
may need to be addressed to ensure that our livestock industry 
can thrive. Now, I sincerely hope your views are heard and 
carefully considered before this Administration or Congress 
takes any further action on regulations and legislation 
affecting the livestock industry, and ultimately your 
livelihoods.
    Now, moving to the substance of today's hearing, I have 
said it before, and I am going to say it again, food security 
is national security. The pandemic made that sensitive linkage 
abundantly clear, as the resilience of our production, 
processing, and distribution systems was put to the test. Now, 
while I am impressed with the resolve of both our producers and 
our processors in continuing to provide safe, nutritious 
products tailored to meet an ever-growing array of customer 
demands, there are still concerns and lingering frustrations 
across the countryside.
    Now, these issues are wide-ranging, from market 
concentration, price transparency, and processing capacity, to 
labor shortages, and lingering animal disease threats. And 
meanwhile, despite what we may hear from a few, there is a 
clear lack of consensus on legislative and regulatory proposals 
intended to address many of those issues. Now, it seems the 
forthcoming Packers and Stockyards, or GIPSA Rules, we continue 
to hear so much about have been plucked off the shelf by this 
Administration, dusted off, and rebranded as a silver bullet to 
every conceivable marketplace concern.
    Now, they were undoubtedly controversial the last time the 
Secretary tried to push them through, and if this 
Administration is serious about these proposals, rather than 
pitting one segment of the industry against another, they will 
need to strike a careful balance reflective of the needs and 
the concerns of all segments of industry, while avoiding severe 
unintended consequences, and that won't be an easy task. It 
will be equally important for Congress to avoid unintended 
consequences, and keep diverse industry needs in mind, as we 
consider proposals designed to increase price transparency. We 
will no doubt hear today from those who view government 
intervention as the only solution. Others will characterize 
such intervention as a costly solution in search of a problem 
guaranteed to disrupt the use of popular marketing tools. Above 
all, it is imperative producers and industry participants 
maintain access to the information already available through 
the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Program, and that broader 
policy disputes don't become the reason for a lapse in program 
authority.
    Now, that said, I am confident this Committee will continue 
its work to pursue pragmatic solutions that we all can agree 
upon. I would be remiss if I didn't commend Congressman Dusty 
Johnson, Ranking Member of our Livestock and Foreign 
Agriculture Subcommittee, for his continued leadership on that 
front.
    It is no secret that labor shortages continue to plague our 
economy, the agriculture and processing sectors in particular. 
And despite innovative efforts to contain the spread of COVID 
within packing plants, and industry efforts to attract 
employees with bonuses, wage increases, and other benefits, 
processing facilities across the country remain woefully 
understaffed.
    While directives related to masking requirements at 
processing plants and vaccine mandates for Federal and private-
sector employees are assuredly well-intended, I am increasingly 
concerned about the rigid and dogmatic approach to their 
enforcement, and the potential to exacerbate our labor shortage 
crisis. I hear these fears as I travel across the country from 
truck drivers, workers in warehouses, factory workers, FSIS 
inspectors, FSA county office staff, and county committees, 
crop insurance agents, and loss adjusters, and the list goes 
on.
    Now, thankfully, there are some areas where everyone seems 
to be in general agreement, including the support for improving 
access to processing, and increasing overall processing 
capacity. So far I have been pleased to see Congress and the 
Administration teaming up on this endeavor, from reducing 
overtime inspection costs for small- and very-small-processors, 
to providing resources to help existing plants become federally 
inspected to the much anticipated $500 million investment and 
expansion efforts across the nation.
    I am certainly behind the idea of giving new small- and 
medium-sized facilities the boost that they need to get 
started, allowing them to find their niche, and hopefully 
watching them grow to medium- and larger-sized players, making 
for a more resilient and competitive marketplace along the way. 
But this week's announcement of an additional $100 million for 
a related loan guarantee program served as a stark reminder of 
the lack of detail regarding these programs. Rather than 
continue to throw money at the problem, it is time for answers 
and implementation of the programs already promised.
    And finally, no discussion of livestock industry would be 
complete without acknowledging the foreign animal disease 
threats knocking at our doorsteps. The detection of African 
Swine Fever in Haiti and the Dominican Republic underscores the 
importance of our disease prevention and preparedness efforts. 
Unfortunately, politics got in the way of enhancing these 
efforts during the reconciliation process. That said, I am 
confident that industry and the Department will continue to do 
all they can to keep the disease at bay, and I am appreciative 
of the CCC money set aside to do so.
    So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to today's 
discussion, and the testimony of our distinguished panelists 
that we have today, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson. The chair 
would request that other Members submit your opening statements 
for the record so witnesses may begin their testimony, and to 
ensure that there is ample time for questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Costa follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from 
                               California
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing and 
thank you to the witnesses on all three panels for agreeing to 
participate. As our nation continues to recover from the impact of 
COVID-19, climate change will also play a critical role as we look 
towards sustainable solutions within the livestock industry. While I 
appreciate USDA's efforts to provide resources to the livestock 
industry, I would like to highlight the importance of not repeating 
past mistakes. I was one of the conferees of the 2008 Farm Bill, and it 
is critically important that it be implemented as Congress intended. 
Not that Congressional intent can have unintended consequences, but we 
certainly would want to prevent actions that can have unintended 
consequences within the industry. There were careful negotiations that 
took place that involved compromises by all parties. In subsequent farm 
bills, they have been reauthorized. I remember what was discussed and 
what was rejected. With that being said, I will be submitting questions 
for the record and look forward to having further discussions on all 
the topics being covered today. Thank you.

    The Chairman. Now we turn to our first panel, and we 
welcome to our first panel today the distinguished Senator 
Chuck Grassley, from the great State of Iowa. Senator Grassley, 
it is good to have you, and now you are recognized for 5 
minutes. Please begin your testimony when you are ready.

 STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, A SENATOR IN CONGRESS FROM 
                              IOWA

    Mr. Grassley. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, 
distinguished Members of the House Agriculture Committee, it is 
an honor to testify, to discuss the state of the livestock 
industry. And I want to thank you, Chairman Scott, because you 
gave me 1 hour in your office in June to discuss this 
particular issue, and you were very gracious.
    My name is Chuck Grassley, and I am farmer from Butler 
County, Iowa, however, my son Robin and grandson Pat do most of 
the work. While this hearing covers all livestock, I want to 
discuss the reforms needed in the cattle industry. Chairman 
Scott, I appreciate your interest in the cattle market reform. 
When we met earlier this summer to discuss my bill that I have 
with Senator Tester, Democratic, of Montana, you took a keen 
interest in ensuring that family farmers across the country not 
only survive, but can make an honest living.
    Secretary Vilsack, your next witness, knows that cattle 
producers are struggling. At USDA, Secretary Vilsack is taking 
steps to expand the meat processing industry with grants and 
loans to address bottlenecks in the food supply chain. 
Secretary Vilsack has also taken action to support the 
enforcement of the Packers and Stockyards Act. That is a badly 
needed move. In addition, President Biden issued an Executive 
Order where he called on the Secretary of Agriculture to ensure 
farmers have, ``measures to enhance price discovery, increase 
transparency, and improve the functioning of the cattle, and 
other livestock markets.'' While I appreciate the actions from 
White House and Secretary Vilsack, it is now time for Congress 
to act.
    As the nation's number one producer of meat, Iowans rely on 
market information provided by the Mandatory Price Reporting, 
and they need that information to run their businesses. The 
reauthorization of the mandatory price reporting is the vehicle 
available where we can add additional price transparency and 
price discovery measures, and that is what I am advocating. 
Over the past 18 months we have seen massive price 
discrepancies between fed cattle and box beef. This is pushing 
cattle producers and feeders to the brink of having to sell 
their operations.
    The four major meat packing companies control 80 to 85 
percent of cattle slaughter. These companies have the advantage 
of procuring cattle from thousands of producers. These 
companies can also act as a chokepoint for the entire industry. 
Given the critical nature of their operations, these packers 
dominate the marketplace, and limit opportunities for price 
negotiation. According to USDA, for every $1 Americans spend on 
food, only 14.3 goes to the farmers. Meanwhile, the retail 
price of beef for consumers has increased and remained high, 
and every consumer knows that. I want to make clear that I am 
not upset about paying more for beef. I am upset because 
farmers are not making a profit.
    And while some participants in the third panel will say 
otherwise, I want to make it clear there is no denying we need 
serious reform in the way our country markets cattle. I believe 
that my bill, commonly referred to as 50/14 (S. 949), would 
create the price transparency that is needed in the 
marketplace. My colleague, Senator Fischer of Nebraska, has a 
bill that would help as well. Ultimately, Senator Fischer and I 
are working on a compromise that can unite the industry because 
kicking the can down the road is not an option. I hear 
constantly from Iowa cattle--we need help, now.
    The beef industry employs hundreds of thousands of hard-
working men and women who work each day to help feed our 
country and the world. I am in front of you today to ask that 
you join with me, and other Senators on the Senate Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, in including real reforms in 
mandatory price reporting. Cattlemen across the country are 
counting on all of us. Thank you, Chairman Scott, and please 
take what we talked about last summer into consideration as you 
look at this change in this bill. I thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Grassley follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Hon. Chuck Grassley, a Senator in Congress from 
                                  Iowa
    Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and other distinguished 
Members of the House Agriculture Committee--it is an honor to testify 
today to discuss the state of the livestock industry.
    My name is Chuck Grassley. And I'm a farmer from Butler County, 
Iowa.
    While this hearing covers all livestock, I want to discuss the 
reform needed in the cattle industry.
    Chairman Scott, I appreciate your interest in cattle market reform. 
When we met earlier this summer to discuss my bill with Senator Tester, 
you took a keen interest in ensuring that family farms across the 
country not only survive, but can make an honest living.
    Secretary Vilsack, the next witness, knows that cattle producers 
are struggling.
    At USDA, Secretary Vilsack is taking steps to expand the meat 
processing industry with grants and loans to address bottlenecks in the 
food supply chain.
    He has also taken action to support the enforcement of the Packers 
and Stockyards Act.
    In addition, President Biden issued an Executive Order where he 
called on the Secretary of Agriculture to ensure farmers have, 
``Measures to enhance price discovery, increase transparency, and 
improve the functioning of the cattle and other livestock markets.''
    While I appreciate the actions from the White House and Secretary 
Vilsack, it is now time for Congress to do our part.
    As the nation's number one producer of meat, Iowans rely on market 
information provided by Mandatory Price Reporting to run their 
businesses.
    The reauthorization of Mandatory Price Reporting is the vehicle 
available where we can add additional price transparency and price 
discovery measures.
    Over the past 18 months we've seen massive price discrepancies 
between fed cattle and boxed beef.
    This is pushing cattle producers and feeders to the brink of having 
to selling their operations.
    The four major beef packing companies control over 80 percent of 
the cattle industry.
    These companies have the advantage of procuring cattle from 
thousands of producers, acting as a chokepoint for the entire industry.
    Given the critical nature of their operations, these packers 
dominate the marketplace and limit opportunity for pricing 
negotiations.
    According to USDA, for every $1 Americans spend on food, only 14.3 
goes to farmers.
    Meanwhile, the retail price of beef for consumers has increased and 
remains high.
    I want to make it clear that I'm not upset about paying more for my 
beef. I'm upset the farmer isn't getting paid.
    And while some participants in the third panel will say otherwise, 
there is no denying we need serious reform in the way our country 
markets cattle.
    I believe my bill, commonly referred to as 50/14, and would create 
the price transparency that is needed in the marketplace.
    My colleague, Senator Fischer has a bill that would help as well.
    Ultimately, Senator Fischer and I are working on a compromise that 
can unite the industry because kicking the can down the road is not an 
option.
    The beef industry employs hundreds of thousands of hardworking men 
and women who work each day to help feed our country and the world.
    I'm in front of you today to ask that you join with me and other 
Senators on the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee 
to include real reform in Mandatory Price Reporting.
    Cattlemen across the country are counting on us.

    The Chairman. Senator Grassley, we thank you for your 
excellent testimony before us today, and at this time, you are 
now excused.
    Mr. Grassley. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Now let us turn our 
attention to panel two. And I am so pleased to welcome back to 
the Agriculture Committee our second witness today, Secretary 
Tom Vilsack. Secretary Vilsack, welcome. You are now recognized 
for your 5 minutes. Please begin your testimony when you are 
ready.

 STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS ``TOM'' J. VILSACK, SECRETARY, U.S. 
          DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

    Secretary Vilsack. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, 
and Members of the Committee, thank you very much for the 
opportunity to be here today, and I certainly commend the 
Chairman, and Ranking Member, and the Committee for conducting 
this very important hearing.
    It is an extraordinary set of complex factors to be 
examined when we talk about the livestock industry in the 
United States. Supply, demand, capacity, competition, markets, 
and many, many factors making it an incredibly difficult 
industry, whether it is weather, feed costs, vertical 
integration, supply chain disruptions, packing and slaughter 
capacity, ownership, consolidation, competition, trade, port 
congestion, seasonality. Many, many other factors make it 
extraordinarily complex.
    Our inventories are down in beef, pork, and poultry for a 
variety of reasons, whether it is drought, or disease, or 
disruption of the supply chain. At the same time, we are seeing 
incredibly high demand domestically, and exports at a high 
level, in fact, setting a record for the level of ag exports 
this year. We know that there is a high concentration in this 
industry. We know that it creates capacity challenges, 
especially in beef, and there is a need for additional 
capacity. That is one of the reasons why we began the process 
of establishing a $500 million fund. We have solicited 
information and input from those who are interested in 
potentially utilizing this fund. We have received over 500 
comments, and we are now in the process of analyzing those 
comments in order to establish and structure the program. The 
expectation is that that structure will take place sometime 
before the end of the year, and that we will begin to make 
decisions and investments hopefully in the first quarter of 
2022.
    We need additional capacity. We also need to strengthen our 
existing local and regional small- and very-small-processing 
facilities, and that is the reason why we have used the 
resources provided by Congress to, as Representative Thompson 
indicated, to assist in reducing overtime costs. Over 1,879 
facilities have already received assistance and help from the 
USDA as a result of that program that you all put in place. We 
also have taken a look at the opportunity to modernize existing 
facilities with the resources established by Congress. We have 
over 245 applications that are in the process of being reviewed 
now for the roughly $55 million available for that purpose. We 
also recognize that, in addition to additional processing 
capacity, and supporting our existing facilities, we need to 
make sure that we address the issue of training and workforce. 
That obviously involves, as well, immigration reform. I am 
certainly pleased that the House of Representatives was able to 
pass the Farm Workforce Modernization Act of 2021 (H.R. 1603), 
and hope that the Senate is able to do so as well.
    The goal here is obviously to strike a better balance 
between supply and demand, between process and capacity 
competition, with greater transparency so that we can have a 
stable, dependent, and fair market. At the end of the day, our 
Department is anxious to have fair prices for producers, and a 
fair deal for consumers.
    Mr. Chairman, with that I would be happy to respond to 
questions from the Committee.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Vilsack follows:]

 Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas ``Tom'' J. Vilsack, Secretary, U.S. 
              Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
    Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of 
this Committee, for inviting me here today to discuss the many 
challenges facing our livestock producers and how the Department of 
Agriculture is working to address them.
    Today, our livestock producers are up against historically 
difficult odds. They are bearing the brunt of drought and the 
challenges of climate change, facing arising animal diseases, adapting 
to new cyber threats, and dealing with the market disruptions from a 
global pandemic. They are also facing these challenges within an 
industry structure that often denies them access to fair markets.
    Responding to these headwinds facing livestock producers require 
short-, medi-
um-, and long-term solutions. They also require creativity to tackle 
old problems, and quick action to address rising new ones. Underpinning 
all this is the desire to ensure producers can be profitable enough to 
stay on the farm.
    Last week, the Department announced a series of investments focused 
on providing immediate relief. We are committing up to $500 million in 
Commodity Credit Corporation funds to protect our livestock industry 
from African Swine Fever. We've heard from the Members of this 
Committee, we've heard from U.S. pork producers, and we've heard from 
economists about how devastating an African Swine Fever outbreak on our 
shores would be. One estimate from an Iowa State researcher put the 
total cost of an outbreak at $50 billion over 10 years.\1\ In this 
case, we think an ounce of prevention is likely worth a pound of cure, 
so we're being proactive and aggressive in our approach domestically to 
keep this threat from reaching our shores and coordinated and 
collaborative in our approach internationally. We know African Swine 
Fever is not the only disease threat facing producers. This investment 
allows us to take on this challenge head-on without diverting resources 
from other key animal disease threats.
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    Another immediate challenge facing livestock producers is 
unprecedented drought conditions brought on by climate change. The 
Drought Monitor shows that more than 40 percent of the continuous 
United States has experienced some level of drought since September 
2020 and more than 20 percent has experienced extreme or exceptional 
drought since April. In some areas of the U.S., conditions have been 
unyielding, unprecedented and costly. Producers have faced the 
possibility of having to liquidate herds after spending a lifetime 
building them because they cannot grow or afford the feed they need. 
They need help. We deeply appreciate Congress' recent $10 billion 
investment as part of the disaster supplemental bill (Public Law No[.] 
117-43) to provide relief to producers facing drought, wildfire, smoke, 
and heat. We announced last week an effort to complement that funding 
by committing an additional $500 million in Commodity Credit 
Corporation funds to support drought recovery and encourage adoption of 
water-smart management practices.
Building Back Better
    This short-term assistance must be complemented by longer-term 
efforts to ensure producers can stay on the land and make a living.
    This summer I visited a meat processing plant in Council Bluffs, 
Iowa. While there, I met with producers who told me that the price they 
are getting for their cattle isn't coming close to covering the costs 
of production. Producers need to be better positioned to capture more 
value within the supply chain.
    The COVID-19 pandemic led to massive disruption across the supply 
chain, and it exposed a food system that was rigid, consolidated, and 
fragile. This crisis left grocery store shelves empty at the same time 
farmers saw lower prices and some had nowhere to market their animals. 
It put a spotlight on the challenges producers face and the need to 
establish better balance in the marketplace of who benefits from food 
dollars spent.
    That's why USDA is working to build more resilient, better, and 
fairer markets for producers and consumers alike. As part of the Biden-
Harris Administration's push to build back a stronger, more resilient 
economy, USDA is using a wide range of tools to promote competition and 
create new market opportunities and support a robust workforce.
    In July, USDA announced our intent to invest $500 million to expand 
meat and poultry processing capacity as part of the Build Back Better 
initiative to build a better food system through loans, grants and 
technical assistance. To make sure we get this critical task right, the 
Department sought and is currently reviewing the more than 400 comments 
from stakeholders over the past few months. Our intent is to invest in 
processing capacity that supports safe, fairly compensated jobs in 
rural communities, while giving producers more market options and 
consumers a more reliable supply of food. I look forward to sharing 
details of next steps soon and welcome your input.
    Already, we have announced more than $150 million for existing 
small- and very-small-processing facilities to help them weather COVID, 
compete in the marketplace and have the support needed to reach more 
customers. This assistance comes in the form of $55 million for the 
Meat and Poultry Inspection Readiness Grant program and $100 million to 
reduce the cost of overtime inspection for existing small- and very-
small-Federal establishments. I thank this Committee for its bipartisan 
leadership in providing us with the funds and authorities for these 
efforts. During the early stages of the pandemic, many local processors 
wanted to keep their doors open on holidays and weekends to increase 
their processing capacity and address extensive backlogs in their 
regions. To do so, they paid overtime fees for food safety inspectors 
to come in after hours and ensure that products were still meeting 
safety standards. This program is reimbursing small- and very-small-
plants for these costs and enabling them to reinvest those funds in 
their businesses.
    This week, we announced the creation of a new Food Supply Chain 
Loan Guarantee Program through the Rural Business--Cooperative Service. 
The new loan guarantee program will support financing of the start-up 
or expansion of ``middle of the supply chain'' entities that are 
engaged in the processing, manufacturing, or distribution of food. The 
program will leverage $100 million in funds from the American Rescue 
Plan to make up hundreds of millions of dollars in loan guarantees 
available. This funding will make the supply chain more resilient to 
market shocks, give a greater share of the food dollar to those 
growing, processing and distributing our food, and ensure that 
consumers have a wide array of healthy and affordable choices in the 
grocery aisle.
Addressing Competition & Markets
    Investments in capacity are just one tool available to us to create 
better fairer markets. We must also leverage our existing authority to 
create rules and regulations that ensure all livestock producers are on 
a level playing field. As part of the President's Executive Order on 
Promoting Competition in the American Economy, the Department of 
Agriculture is engaging in a series of rulemakings and other steps to 
increase competition in agricultural processing industries that will 
lead to fairer markets for producers. These new rules and actions will 
increase ranchers' earnings by fighting abuses. For too long, livestock 
producers as well as farmers have not been able to claim their fair 
share of each dollar spent on food.
    First, USDA intends to propose a new rule that will provide greater 
clarity to strengthen enforcement of unfair and deceptive practices, 
undue preferences, and unjust prejudices. Second, USDA will propose a 
new poultry grower tournament system rule, with the current inactive 
proposal to be withdrawn. Third, USDA will re-propose a rule to clarify 
that parties do not need to demonstrate harm to competition in order to 
bring an action under section 202(a) and 202(b) of the Packers & 
Stockyards Act. It's past time USDA fully deploy the Packers and 
Stockyards Act and protect ranchers and farmers.
    Second, USDA will issue a new rule defining when meat can carry the 
label of ``Product of USA.'' American consumers shouldn't be confused 
about what they are spending their food dollars on. And third, we're 
also complementing these rules with enhanced market transparency tools 
under our Market News Service and the Livestock Mandatory Reporting 
Act.
Conclusion
    As the Biden-Harris Administration restarts the world's largest 
economy and makes great strides in the economic recovery, USDA is 
committed to a restart that is right for the American people--producers 
and consumers alike--by transforming the food system and strengthening 
rural communities. This is a pivotal moment of opportunity to put 
farmer profitability and the forefront of our efforts to build back a 
better food system that is secure, competitive, distributed, and 
resilient. Our livestock and poultry producers are a vital part of a 
vibrant future for rural America and we stand ready to help them tackle 
the challenges they face. I look forward to working with Congress on 
these important issues.
    Thank you for your time today, and I look forward to any answering 
any questions you may have.

    The Chairman. Sorry. Thank you, Secretary Vilsack, for your 
excellent testimony today. At this time, Members, we are going 
to open it up for questions for the Secretary. Members will be 
recognized for questions in order of your seniority, 
alternating between Majority and Minority Members. You will be 
recognized for 5 minutes each in order to allow us to get as 
many questions in as possible. Again I remind each of you to 
please keep your microphones muted until you are recognized so 
that we can minimize background noise.
    Now I recognize my own self here, Secretary, and again, 
welcome. I want to start off by saying thank you, and you and I 
have been working together on some very, very serious issues 
facing us, and I am delighted to be a partner with you as we 
deal with so many of the issues facing agriculture now. I have 
been especially encouraged by the recent announcement that you 
made out of the U.S. Department of Agriculture that is related 
to your bold and great efforts to combat African Swine Fever, 
and we refer to it now as ASF.
    As you also know, this is a priority to many Members on our 
House Agriculture Committee, and I was so pleased to hear that 
you had some news, and you were kind enough to call me and 
share the news before you made it, that the USDA has a 
promising vaccine candidate for the African Swine Flu. I have 
also been a firm believer, as I mentioned to you, that 
investment in Federal research is very critical to advancing 
the agriculture industry, and this important work that is going 
on with our Agricultural Research Service is evidence of that. 
And so my first question to you, Mr. Secretary, is what are the 
next steps that you have that involves advancing this vaccine, 
and also how long until we can expect it to be ready for use?
    Secretary Vilsack. Mr. Chairman, there are actually seven 
vaccines that are currently under investigation and examination 
at various ARS facilities in USDA. The specific vaccine that 
you are referring to has recently gone through sort of the 
first steps or stages of testing, and appears to be very 
effective against the Asian version of African Swine Fever. 
There is still quite a bit of work yet to be done before that 
particular vaccine is capable and able to be utilized in the 
market. There are additional steps and responsibilities that 
are undertaken. It is going to take some time, additional field 
tests. I also understand that there is also an effort, 
potentially, to involve Vietnam, that is currently dealing with 
African Swine Fever, in terms of doing some additional testing. 
So while I am as anxious as you are to get this to the market 
as quickly as possible, we have to do so in a way that ensures 
the safety of it. But it is moving forward, as are the other 
six possible candidates.
    The Chairman. Secretary, it has come to my attention that 
evidence that economies-of-scale have driven consolidation in 
meatpacking, and that larger facilities operate more 
efficiently. How do we strike a balance between benefits and 
costs of concentration?
    Secretary Vilsack. Mr. Chairman, I think the key here is to 
have a resilient and efficient system, which means that I think 
we need to continue to support our small- and very-small-
processing capacity, as I mentioned in my statement, but we 
also need to expand capacity. There is no question that we are 
short of capacity, which is one of the reasons why it is more 
difficult for farmers to get a fair price for what they are 
raising. That is the reason why we have put together this fund. 
As I indicated, we have 500 comments in terms of how it should 
be structured, in terms of grants, loans, guaranteed loans, 
forgivable loans. We are in the process of finalizing the 
structure. Hopefully by the end of this year we have the 
structure in place so that we can begin accepting applications.
    The Chairman. And then, Mr. Secretary, you mentioned 
barriers. Identify these barriers. What are the barriers to 
enhancing our meat processing capacity and supply chain 
resilience?
    Secretary Vilsack. I would say two principal barriers, Mr. 
Chairman. Capital is one of them, and then second I think there 
is still the need for us to invest in additional training and 
additional workforce.
    The Chairman. Very good. And now I will turn to the 
gentlemen from Pennsylvania, our Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson. 
You are now recognized for your 5 minutes.
    Mr. Thompson. Well, Mr. Chairman, once again, thank you for 
this hearing. It is much appreciated. Mr. Secretary, certainly 
I share your commitment to enhancing the resilience of our food 
supply, and part of that can be achieved through increasing 
processing capacity across the country. Unfortunately, on this 
topic, some of the Department's actions simply didn't match its 
rhetoric. The lack of an appeal in the New Swine Inspection 
System case is a notable example. And while I certainly would 
be curious to hear the explanation for why this Administration 
chose not to appeal a rule with the potential to reduce 
national swine packing capacity by 2.5 percent, it [inaudible] 
and I have my suspicions, [inaudible] today it is probably more 
constructive to focus on what is [inaudible] being done to 
address this problem. I have heard that progress is being made 
on a solution, but things have been held up by the White House. 
Mr. Secretary, can you clarify what is being done to remedy 
this situation for both the affected processing facilities and 
the producers, and when can we expect to see these solutions 
finalized, and even more importantly, implemented?
    Secretary Vilsack. Mr. Thompson, Representative Thompson, I 
am sorry, you cut out a little bit during the course of your 
question. I want to make sure I understand it. Are you asking 
about the effort to expand processing, or are you asking about 
line speed, or both? I think we can all agree we need to expand 
broadband.
    The Chairman. Yes, better----
    Secretary Vilsack. All right, Mr. Chairman, let me see if I 
can respond to the Ranking Member's question on both line speed 
and processing.
    The Chairman. Sure. Go right ahead.
    Secretary Vilsack. On the processing side, as I indicated, 
the resources for the assistance to modernize existing 
facilities so they could potentially qualify for Federal 
inspection and interstate transactions, we received 246 
applications for those resources, and we are in the process of 
reviewing those applications, and making the grants of up to 
$200,000, with a match requirement. On the $500 million, as I 
indicated, we had 500 comments. We are in the process of 
finalizing the structure of how that program's going to be 
adopted, and I expand and anticipate we will begin making 
investments at the beginning of next year, in the first 
quarter.
    On the line speed issue, the Department of Justice makes 
these decisions. Candidly, the previous Administration did not 
put into the record any information relating to worker safety. 
The court found that to be a fatal error in that line speed 
determination, and the reality is we are now working with both 
the industry and those who represent workers to try to figure 
out ways in which we can balance appropriately the need for 
worker safety, food safety, and farmer profits. We don't think 
the Department of Agriculture, or for that matter this 
Committee, wants to necessarily have to choose between those 
three priorities. We need to establish all of them. I believe 
we can get that done. I believe that there is a willingness on 
the part of those who represent workers, and on the part of the 
industry to find creative ways to allow adequate processing, 
but to do so without sacrificing worker safety or health. And 
that is what we are focused on, and that is what we intend to 
pursue.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Is the 
Ranking Member back on the platform? He has a minute left. If 
not, I will now recognize the gentlewoman from North Carolina, 
Ms. Adams, who is also Vice Chair of the House Agriculture 
Committee. Ms. Adams, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Adams. Thank you, Chairman Scott and Ranking Member 
Thompson for hosting the hearing. Secretary Vilsack, thank you 
for taking the time to be with us. While my district is 
substantially urban and suburban, I understand the urgency and 
the importance of this issue. In my State of North Carolina, we 
have heard a lot about contract poultry growers being faced 
with abusive, deceptive, discriminatory, and retaliatory 
treatment from giant poultry companies for years. Livestock and 
poultry markets have become highly consolidated, with very 
negative implications for farmers, consumers, and workers.
    And President Biden, through his July Executive Order on 
promoting competition in the American economy, has made this 
point, and has called on USDA and the anti-trust enforcement 
agencies to address the problem. In this regard, I would like 
to applaud the President, and the Administration, for their 
promises to move forward with updated and strengthened Packers 
and Stockyards Act regulations to address abusive, deceptive, 
retaliatory, or discriminatory practice used by meatpackers and 
poultry companies against farmers.
    As part of the vertically integrated contract poultry 
production model, these poultry growers take on huge debt 
burdens to build single-use chicken houses on their own farms, 
and depend on one-sided contracts with giant poultry companies 
to be able to continue making money and loan payments with 
their poultry houses. So, with a new set of Packers and 
Stockyards Act rulemakings coming up, we have the chance to 
remedy this situation, and to help to move us forward toward 
fair and competitive markets not only for poultry farmers, but 
for livestock farmers. Our farmers need fair playing fields and 
healthy competition to thrive, so, without decisive action from 
Congress and USDA to address this, we will see the same 
vertically integrated poultry model spread to all the livestock 
categories as well, to the detriment of independent farmers and 
rural communities. So it is time for us to stand up for 
farmers.
    And, Mr. Secretary, I want to applaud you and President 
Biden for the plans you have announced to strengthen Packers 
and Stockyards regulations to give livestock and poultry 
farmers more protections against this abusive behavior. So, 
when do you expect to publish the rules, and what can we, as 
this Committee, do to help you with this process?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, thank you very much for the 
question. I would say three things in response. Number one, we 
made sure that when we were looking at COVID relief, that we 
made some adjustments for these contract growers so that they 
got adequate assistance and help. On the Packers and 
Stockyards, we are focused initially on the poultry tournament 
system rule to make sure that that is a fair and equitable 
system. I anticipate and expect that we are going to see 
activity on this rule towards the end of this year, the first 
part of next year. That will be followed by the rule clarifying 
undue preferences and unfair practices. That will be followed 
by the rule that involves scope of practice.
    We also point out a frequently asked question document that 
sort of clarifies how we see rules that were established under 
the Trump Administration in terms of enforcement, and making 
sure that folks understand and appreciate that we are going to 
look at ways in which we can prevent discrimination, prevent 
retaliation, prevent unfair practices in this industry. The 
last thing I would say is we are also working at the 
instruction of the President to put together a library, if you 
will, of contract information and language so that folks can 
make a determination of whether or not their particular 
contract is different, is fair, is reasonable, is in line with 
what you would normally see in this industry.
    Ms. Adams. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. The 
Department of Justice has been investigating meat packers to 
ensure no anti-competitive or illicit behavior was at the root 
of the spread between the cow, fed cattle, and box beef prices. 
Do you have a sense of when we might see the results of this 
investigation, whether they will be released publicly to ensure 
the transparency and the accountability in the industry?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, we are cooperating with the 
Department of Justice, and we will continue to do so. I can't 
tell you today precisely what their timeline is, but I know 
that they are continuing to investigate. They are also, as you 
well know, engaged in price fixing litigation as well, one 
potential defendant having already acknowledged, others 
cooperating. So we will continue to look at ways in which we 
can cooperate and partner with the Department of Justice to 
ensure that our anti-trust laws are being enforced.
    Ms. Adams. Great. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Yes, thank you. And now I recognize the 
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Rouzer. You are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
    The Chairman. Yes. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Rouzer. Mr. Secretary, good to see you again, I am 
concerned that the Department has re-proposed the GIPSA rules 
from the last time when you were Secretary. Generally speaking, 
the rules that are being proposed will invite litigation. That 
doesn't help anybody, except for the trial lawyers themselves, 
and it is going to reduce contracting [inaudible] options for 
producers.
    The Chairman. Yes, we can hear you now.
    Mr. Rouzer. Before any new proposed rules are released, 
will you commit to having the Office of the Chief Economist 
conduct a full economic analysis of the cost and benefit of the 
rules, and release that report at the same time of the proposed 
rules?
    Secretary Vilsack. Congressman, we will follow the 
requirements under the administrative laws and rules that we 
are governed by in terms of the development of rules and 
regulations. To the extent that it requires an analysis, we 
will obviously do that. To the extent that it requires 
disclosure, we will do that. We will make sure that the rules 
that we have are based on an aggressive and thoughtful effort. 
I can commit to that.
    Mr. Rouzer. But you can't commit to releasing a report at 
the same time?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, we will release the information 
that is required under the administrative rules that provides 
background and information on why we think this is necessary. 
We are not playing hide the ball here. We obviously want folks 
to understand and appreciate what the issue is, and why we are 
in the process of establishing rules and regulations. Congress 
passed the Packers and Stockyards Act quite some time ago, 
understanding and appreciating that there is always a need for 
oversight, and we expect to do this in a way that is fair, 
reasonable, and equitable.
    Mr. Rouzer. Well, I think it is important that a full 
economic analysis of the cost and benefit of the rules is 
proposed at the same time the proposed rule is put forward, so 
that point is covered. Number two, USDA announced a program to 
give $700 million to farm and food workers impacted by COVID. I 
am just curious, will [inaudible] this money be distributed to 
non-union plants?
    Secretary Vilsack. The resources--I am sorry, 
Representative, I didn't quite hear all of your question. I 
think you are asking about the resources that are available for 
inspections and for modernization? Is that what you are asking 
about? Whether it is available to plants, regardless of 
unionized status?
    Mr. Rouzer. Well, you announced $700 million to farm and 
food workers impacted by COVID.
    Secretary Vilsack. It is--that--those resources are being 
provided--I am sorry.
    Mr. Rouzer. [inaudible].
    Secretary Vilsack. Those resources are being provided to 
organizations that have the ability and capacity to distribute 
those resources to folks who worked in plants and in grocery 
stores. I would imagine that some of those plants are 
unionized, and perhaps some are not. We will be working through 
organizations that represent--are in a position to distribute. 
That is one of the qualifications for participation in that 
resource.
    Mr. Rouzer. Okay. So how is it going to be determined that 
a worker would be eligible for that money?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, these are people that worked in--
farm workers. These are folks who worked in grocery stores. 
These are folks who worked in meat packing processing 
facilities. I think it is relatively simple to explain and to 
identify folks who work in those three areas. And it is 
designed primarily to offset any costs or any expense that they 
incurred during the initial stages of COVID.
    Mr. Rouzer. Will there be an audit for any potential fraud 
and abuse?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I think there is always the 
possibility of oversight. I don't know if there is going to be 
a specific audit, per se, but there wouldn't be anything 
preventing that from happening.
    Mr. Rouzer. Will there be a limit on the amount that goes 
towards administrative fees for various organizations?
    Secretary Vilsack. I think there is a limitation on the 
amount of money that can go for administrative fees. I think 
the primary goal here is to get the vast amount of these 
resources in the hands of folks who incurred expense because 
they had to buy masks, or they had to take time off to get 
vaccinated, whatever it might be.
    The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The 
gentlewoman from Virginia, Ms. Spanberger, who is also Chair of 
the Subcommittee on Conservation, Forestry, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Spanberger. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. 
Secretary, I want to thank you so much for being here today, 
and I really thank you for your leadership on promoting 
competition and supply chain security in the livestock and 
meatpacking industry. As you mentioned in your testimony, 
between cyberattacks, pandemic disruptions, and other stresses 
on the U.S. food supply chains, we have seen the issue of 
consolidation in our meatpacking industry as not just an 
economic threat to producers, but it is also a national 
security threat to the United States. As a former CIA officer, 
I am deeply concerned about the ability of foreign actors to 
disrupt our agricultural sector, particularly as we see this 
type of consolidation. That is why I was really proud to co-
lead the Butcher Block Act (H.R. 4140), alongside my colleague 
and fellow Committee Member, Dusty Johnson. The Butcher Block 
Act would establish a loan program at USDA for new and 
expanding meat processors, and I was very excited that just 
this week USDA announced a similar loan guarantee initiative 
that will help expand meat and poultry processing capacity 
using funds from the American Rescue Plan, so I thank you for 
that initiative.
    But for my question today, Mr. Secretary, I want to talk 
about climate change, and I want to thank you for your work in 
bringing growers and producers to the table to combat the 
climate crisis. And certainly I once had a farmer say we are 
the original conservationists. And certainly, as the original 
conservationists, farmers in rural communities really have to 
be an integral part of any solution to the climate crisis. And 
it was in that vein, and with that thought, that I was proud to 
introduce the Growing Climate Solutions Act, H.R. 2820, 
alongside Representative Don Bacon of Nebraska, also a 
Committee Member, and ultimately we were pleased to see that 
legislation pass the Senate with a vote of 92-8.
    So the legislation, as I know you are aware, would empower 
USDA to help farmers navigate voluntary private carbon markets 
with confidence. With USDA's help, farmers who choose to 
participate would be able to collect a new stream of revenue 
for their work. They'd be sequestering carbon and reducing 
emissions, and the bill is almost universally endorsed by 
national farm groups, while gaining support from prominent 
environmental groups and private-sector companies as well. So I 
was curious, Secretary Vilsack, from your view of this 
legislation, do you believe that this legislation would be 
helpful to growers and producers as you, in your role as 
Secretary, are working on the climate crisis? And would you 
care to comment on it?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I think it would be incredibly 
helpful, because it is clear that we need to provide more 
information and more technical assistance, in terms of what 
climate-smart practices consist of, and how to measure, and 
quantify, and verify those results. So the Act that you are 
encouraging your Members and your colleagues to vote on, and 
the one that passed the Senate overwhelmingly, would provide 
that kind of help and assistance, and I think it would 
complement nicely the Climate-Smart Partnership Initiative we 
announced last week in Colorado, where we are essentially 
looking at large scale demonstration and pilot projects to be 
able to aggregate information about what works and what doesn't 
so that we can, over time, create the standard for climate-
smart commodities.
    As was the case with your Act, significant support from the 
agricultural community, a lot of farm groups supporting the 
Growing Climate Solutions Act. Likewise, both the food, and ag, 
and environmental industries are very supportive of our efforts 
to try to focus on these pilots and demonstration projects, so 
I think it is a nice combination of providing the technical 
assistance and the resources to minimize risk to farmers, and 
to empower them with information and knowledge about how best 
to incorporate climate-smart practices in their farming 
operations.
    Ms. Spanberger. And certainly the trusted voice that is 
USDA is a valuable resource there. Well, thank you for those 
comments, it is music to my ears, and certainly we do hope to 
be able to move forward, and ensure that our farmers and 
producers can sequester carbon, while also ensuring an 
additional revenue stream, particularly given the challenges 
that so many producers are facing across the country. In the 
time that I have left, Secretary Vilsack, could you speak a 
little bit about the loan guarantee program that I mentioned in 
my comments, before I asked the first question? I am curious 
how you see this loan guarantee program specifically helping 
new entrants to the meat packing and processing industry.
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, we have two basic opportunities 
for folks who are getting into the business, the $500 million 
program that was announced several months ago. And the loan 
guarantee program is really looking at ways in which we can 
help folks in the middle of the supply chain. There may be a 
need for cold storage. There may be a need for mobile 
processing. There may be a need for farmers to work together 
cooperatively to brand and market a particular product. These 
resources would basically make it easier for banks, CDFIs, to 
lend the money to have an entity either get started, or to 
expand, or to improve their operation.
    Right now many bankers, many CDFIs, are not really fully 
comfortable knowing this area of the middle, and so the loan 
guarantee makes it a little bit easier for them to make the 
loans available across the board. But it is primarily designed 
at the middle of the supply chain. The $500 million is based on 
creating capital for new processing facilities.
    Ms. Spanberger. Fantastic. Well, thank you for your time.
    The Chairman. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The 
gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Austin Scott, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Secretary Vilsack, thank you for joining us today. My pork 
producers are telling me that the pork producers still have not 
been paid the CFAP payments. Is that correct?
    Secretary Vilsack. I think we have announced those 
payments, Representative, but I am more than happy to double 
check and get back to you with exactly how many dollars have 
actually been paid out to those producers.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Okay. I would be interested in 
knowing that on the pork, as well as any of the other CFAP 
payments.
    Secretary Vilsack. I can tell you that over $4 billion have 
been distributed to producers, commodity producers, livestock 
producers, but we can get you very specific information and 
dollar amounts.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Okay. I would very much 
appreciate that, thank you.* And I know that GIPSA's been 
brought up a lot. I would just like to point out that Chairman 
David Scott and I both co-authored a letter to Secretary Perdue 
outlining our concerns with what had been done in the past. 
There has historically been pretty broad bipartisan concerns 
there, and, again, would ask that you stay in close contact 
with the Committee on any of the rules and regulations with 
regard to GIPSA. There, again, has typically been broad 
bipartisan concern with that particular area of USDA and the 
rules and regulations.
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    * Editor's note: the information referred to is located on p. 335.
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    One question I have deals with the Food Safety Inspection 
Service and the masks. How many businesses have not been 
allowed to have inspections, or have had inspections withheld, 
as a result of non-compliance of that notice?
    Secretary Vilsack. I understand, Congressman, it is 
characterized as a handful, somewhere in the neighborhood of 
less than ten.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Okay. I will yield the 
remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman, and certainly, by the next 
panel, expect to be in my office and have further questions. 
But, Secretary Vilsack, before I go, I certainly would very 
much appreciate an update with specifics on the CFAP payments. 
My pork producers are telling me that they have not been paid, 
and, as you know, all of our livestock producers have had a 
very difficult year. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Scott. The gentlewoman from 
Maine, Ms. Pingree, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Pingree. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 
Secretary, for being with us today. I really appreciate your 
attention to all this, and I am glad the Chairman has decided 
to have this hearing. I am going to try to get in two 
questions, so I will see if I can be quick. I know organic 
agriculture isn't the primary focus of today's hearing, but it 
is just so important to my district. During your previous time 
as the Secretary, you finalized the Organic Livestock and 
Poultry Practices Rule, and I was disappointed to see that the 
Trump Administration withdrew that. In June you announced the 
USDA plans to begin rulemaking on these standards again. I just 
want to reiterate how essential it is to have meaningful, well-
defined standards for organic livestock and poultry. Could you 
give us a little update on the progress? And I know that there 
is a legal challenge going on, but I am wondering if you could 
start the rulemaking even with the litigation ongoing?
    Secretary Vilsack. We have actually started that process, 
Congresswoman. We anticipate and expect an opportunity to get 
what we are working on to our General Counsel for review in the 
very near future, and to OMB hopefully by the end of this year, 
and hopefully seeing some progress, in terms of publication, in 
2022. We understand and appreciate the need to get this done, 
that and the Origin of Livestock Rule are two things that we 
are prioritizing.
    Ms. Pingree. Great. Well, again, I don't have to remind you 
that having standards that really recognize the inputs that 
people have to use for what they need to do as organic 
producers is just so critical, and really is a challenge to the 
marketplace right now.
    We are certainly talking a lot about meat processing today, 
and I just want to focus a little on the small-scale meat 
processors. I appreciate the attention to increasing resilience 
and diversity in meat and poultry processing, and I know that 
you have given that renewed interest, including that $500 
million investment that has been announced, to support new 
competitive entrants into the sector, and certainly you have 
talked a little bit about it today. But I just want to focus 
more on the smaller-scale producers, including help for 
existing small-scale producers to expand and upgrade their 
infrastructure. What are the USDA's plans for supporting small 
processors within the $500 million investment? Will support for 
the existing Federal inspected small processors to upgrade 
their facilities be included in the program? That seems like 
somewhat of an oversight to me.
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, reason why we are focused on new 
processing capacity with the $500 million is because you all 
have identified additional resources available to small- and 
very-small-processing facilities that wish to modernize. That 
is the grant program that I alluded to earlier, roughly $55 
million. We received 240+ applications for those resources. 
These are $200,000 grants that will enable those small 
producers, if they wish, to upgrade their systems so that they 
can qualify for interstate transactions which would expand 
their market. And we want to see where that goes, and we want 
to see what the demand is.
    In addition, we ought to see, as well how the $100 million 
that has been provided to reduce overtime costs to help small- 
and very-small-producers, processing facilities, pay for 
Federal inspection, and for their inspectors. That has been a 
very popular effort. Almost 1,900 operations are taking 
advantage of that. So those two areas are areas that we are 
providing help and assistance. The $500 million, we will see 
essentially how the $55 million operates, and see if there is 
additional demand. If there is, we can make some adjustments, 
or we can take a look at additional resources in that 
processing grant program.
    Ms. Pingree. Great. And, I mean, I really appreciate how 
important that is, and how big of a roadblock this is for so 
many producers who are finding increased interest in the 
market. A lot of people want to buy locally raised meat, and 
they want to buy it from farms that are using sustainable 
methods, but there is such a backlog in the processing. I know 
I don't have to tell you that, but it is just a huge issue in 
our region.
    I am just going to clarify, because I think I heard you 
right, and I know one grant can't do everything, but under the 
meat and poultry inspection readiness grants, if you are 
already a federally inspected processor, but you won't expand 
your capacity, you currently aren't eligible, is that correct?
    Secretary Vilsack. I think that is correct, but I could be 
corrected on that, but I believe that is correct. The goal of 
this was to try to give people the ability to expand their 
capacity and expand their market opportunities.
    Ms. Pingree. Right. Okay. I will clarify that with you, and 
I appreciate your answers, and I am out of time, but thank you 
for being with us here today.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlelady from Missouri, Mrs. 
Hartzler, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Great. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and 
thank you, Secretary Vilsack. I wanted to actually build on the 
question that we just heard from my colleague, Representative 
Pingree, about the $500 million grants that are under review 
right now. I want to encourage you to include the smaller 
plants that stood up after COVID began. I hope that you will 
consider the definition of new plant as including new as in 
from the start of the pandemic, because I am aware of some 
facilities that, with the problem that we were seeing, stood up 
during that timeframe, and they went in debt to build these 
facilities, and I am concerned that they won't be able to 
qualify for some of these funds that are very, very important. 
I sure hope that you will consider that in the process.
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, as I indicated, we received over 
500 comments. I suspect those comments will be incorporated. We 
will obviously take your concerns into consideration. I expect 
and anticipate that the demand is going to be in excess of what 
we have resources for the very reason that you have just 
alluded to. There are facilities that were in the planning 
stage, there were facilities that are about ready to operate, 
and they may need operating resources, as opposed to capital, 
to build.
    So I think we are going to find a lot from this particular 
program, and the goal here is to learn, so that in turn, as you 
all look at farm bill programs, and things of that nature, 
there may be lessons that could be applied to additional 
programs that could be established on a more permanent basis in 
this space.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. And another area of concern that 
I am hearing from several of our USDA offices is this concern 
with the vaccine mandate that has been put down by the 
Administration. There is the thinking that many USDA offices 
will have to close because individuals just do not feel 
comfortable, for whatever reason, in taking a vaccine. And I 
was hoping that you would be open to allowing for some 
exemptions of these mandates if the individuals already had 
antibodies in their system, or if they did other precautions, 
rather than having these offices close, and our farmers not 
have access to the services. Are you open to setting up some 
sort of an exemption service to keep them open, and allow the 
workers to continue to come if the offices are going to close, 
or if it is going to significantly hamper the operations?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, there are provisions in the 
proposal for religious exemptions and for health exemptions, 
and so we will certainly respect those. And I would anticipate 
and expect that we will do what we need to do to keep offices 
open. At the end of the day, we don't want to necessarily 
reduce the service to people that need the service, so I don't 
anticipate that we are actually going to see a significant 
number of closed offices that would significantly reduce our 
capacity to serve farmers and ranchers in your state, and in 
other states.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Great. That is great news. I appreciate 
that. In the outdated Packers and Stockyard Act there is a 
prohibition that individuals who own sale barns cannot also 
have a packing facility, and this is detrimental to our goal to 
be able to increase the packing capacity. And so are you open 
to looking at removing this barrier to entry to allow people 
active in the livestock sector already to invest in local and 
regional processing?
    Secretary Vilsack. Congresswoman, this is the first time 
that question's been asked of me, and I am probably not in a 
position to say yes or no. I am more than happy to go back to 
the office and talk to our folks as they are putting this rule 
together. I want to make sure that I am not interfering with 
the capacity of the rulemaking process, but I certainly will be 
glad to ask the team that question.
    Mrs. Hartzler. Wonderful. And I appreciate the Chairman 
started off by asking a question about the vaccine for the 
African Swine Fever, and that is certainly very encouraging. 
You probably are aware, though, of some other wonderful 
technology at the University of Missouri they have developed a 
pig that is immune to or resistant to PRRS. And, of course, 
that is also one of the world's very costly animal diseases, 
but, because of the jurisdictional mayhem between the USDA and 
the FDA, this technology's not yet available to producers. It 
hasn't been approved. So can you please share your goals for 
ensuring that there is an appropriate regulatory structure for 
agriculture to use the tools that we have in addressing these 
environmental disease and food safety issues?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, that is a great question, and it 
is one that I would sort of align myself with you on. I think 
there are ways in which we have to work collaboratively with 
our friends at FDA to make sure that our regulatory system is 
able to respond quickly enough, and be able to keep aligned, or 
keep pace, with the pace of change, and I could give you 
several examples where I think we have work to do in that 
space. I have expressed that to our friends at FDA.
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. The 
gentleman from the Northern Mariana Islands, Mr. Sablan, you 
are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sablan. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for 
holding this truly important hearing. Secretary Vilsack, 
welcome, from right around the world, actually. I am 14 hours 
ahead of Eastern Daylight Time. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, 
the hearing, but I want the Secretary to commend the Deputy 
Under Secretary Stacy Dean for working with me to--we are 
getting close to coming to an agreement on an effort that I 
started when you were in your first term as Secretary of 
Agriculture a long time ago. And I think we are getting close 
to an agreement, and I would just like to recognize her effort, 
coming to terms with this effort that I started over a decade 
ago, Mr. Secretary. Just thought you would know about your--
about Secretary Dean, Stacy Dean's efforts. Mr. Chairman, I 
don't expect a response from the Secretary, so I yield back.
    Secretary Vilsack. Congressman, thank you. I appreciate 
that. I will make sure that the Deputy Under Secretary is aware 
of your thanks, and we will continue to work hard to try to get 
those nutrition programs working for all of your folks.
    Mr. Sablan. I appreciate that, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. The gentleman from 
Georgia, Mr. Allen, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Allen. Good.
    The Chairman. Yes, I can.
    Mr. Allen. Thank you very much, and I appreciate you having 
this hearing today. Good morning, Secretary Vilsack, or 
afternoon, I guess it is. Thank you for joining us today. 
Obviously the hearing today is an important one, and it is 
focused on an issue that I have heard from my constituents 
frequently since the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020. All matters 
related to food security are certainly national security. If we 
cannot assure our constituents that our food supply chains are 
secure at all times, then we aren't doing our job.
    During this pandemic we saw undisputable evidence that 
those supply chains are not secure. I believe that over-
consolidation in the meatpacking industry does hold a share of 
the blame for this situation we have found ourselves in, and 
obviously, we want to support the small packing operations, but 
I think we have a geography problem. These facilities are sort 
of centralized in locations, and we need more distribution 
throughout the country. However, what we should to address this 
issue is an infinitely more complicated question to answer.
    As you are aware, the Agricultural Marketing Service 
maintains a library of the various contracts and pricing 
arrangements in the swine industry. However, no such contract 
library exists for cattle producers. I have heard from several 
cattlemen about the need to provide more transparency in the 
market, particularly for formula transactions. Do you believe 
that establishing a contract library for cattle would provide 
more price transparency to the cattle producers in my district?
    Secretary Vilsack. Congressman, good question. The 
President's Executive Order has asked us to put together a 
report due in December on this very issue. I don't want to 
anticipate and expect what the report's ultimately going to 
conclude, but I think, to the extent that we can create more 
information for producers about what contracts ought to be, 
what contracts are, the more transparency, I think the stronger 
the market is, and that would be my hope, that we would be able 
to provide help and assistance with a library of sorts, if you 
will, across all: beef, poultry, and pork.
    Mr. Allen. Mr. Secretary, speaking to the Administration, 
there is concern about this Administration rushing ahead with 
too much, too soon on measures that will have unknown impacts 
on the highly complex livestock markets. In your mind, would it 
make more sense, for example, to wait to see how the 
investments being made in additional processing capacity affect 
the marketplace before piling on additional measures, like the 
announced Packers and Stockyards regulations?
    Secretary Vilsack. Congressman, I think that they are 
complimentary. I don't think that they necessarily need to be 
sequenced. And the reason they are complimentary is Packers and 
Stockyards really doesn't address the capacity competition 
issue, it addresses whether or not activities and relationships 
between producers and processors are fair, are reasonable, are 
equitable, are not being used discriminatorily, or in 
retaliation. So I think it is a slightly different problem it 
is trying to address, and trying to prevent, as opposed to the 
capacity consolidation issue, which requires us to have more 
processing capacity.
    Mr. Allen. Well, as the industry, we need to maybe 
communicate a little better, because there is concern out 
there. Your Department announced a Packers and Stockyards 
investigation to explore potential packer wrongdoing in the 
wake of the Tyson facility fire in Holcomb, Kansas, and the 
ongoing pandemic. Can you clarify whether that investigation is 
ongoing, and if not, what were the findings?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, if there is an investigation 
undertaken, I am assuming it also involves the Department of 
Justice, who would be sort of the lead in this effort. But I 
will get back to you, Congressman. I don't know the answer to 
that question.
    [The information referred to is located on p. 335.]
    Mr. Allen. All right. Well, great. Well, thank you, Mr. 
Secretary, and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Allen. And now the gentlewoman 
from New Hampshire, Ms. Kuster, recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Kuster. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I so 
appreciate you holding this hearing. I want to welcome back 
Secretary Vilsack. Just as you have returned to the USDA, I am 
excited to have returned to the Agriculture Committee again 
this year, and I am pleased to be working with you once more. I 
want to begin my questions by sticking with the livestock theme 
of this hearing, and ask about contract production, especially 
in light of a large number of dairies in the Northeast region 
recently losing their organic milk contracts.
    I would be curious to get your thoughts, Mr. Secretary, 
about production contracts, as I know these are also common in 
other parts of the livestock sector. I am troubled that in some 
cases production contracts can inhibit producers with unstable 
pricing structures and short contract lengths. Sometimes 
farmers don't have much leverage to stand up for fairer terms. 
I am wondering if you are also concerned about that, and 
whether this can disadvantage small farmers and producers, as 
well as certain geographic areas, and do you think there will 
be lessons we can learn from this situation in the Northeast 
that could help small producers remain viable?
    Secretary Vilsack. Congresswoman, I am very familiar with 
the situation in the Northeast. In fact, we had a very extended 
conversation with a task force that has been put together that 
is going to operate under the Vermont Dairy Innovation Center 
to try to begin the process of trying to formulate a plan to 
deal with this regional challenge. It is a complex circumstance 
in the Northeast, where there is a surplus of organic milk, and 
there are transportation challenges that one of the major 
processors has determined to sort of consolidate where they 
process the milk, and who they are going to do business with, 
which has caused the disruption. So we are now in the process 
of taking a look at ways in which we can provide help and 
assistance to those producers to find a home for their milk, 
whether it is through procurement, USDA, whether it is through 
additional processing capacity, or whether it is working with 
other Federal agencies to address the transportation challenges 
that the industry faces.
    I am more than happy to talk generally about the importance 
of having fair contracts. I think there is a role, in an 
efficient system, for contracting processes, but we want to 
make sure that they are fair. We want to make sure that when 
farmers enter into such contracts, they are aware of what is 
equitable, or what potentially might be inequitable in terms of 
the relationship, and that is one of the reasons why we are 
engaged in rulemaking, one of the reasons why we put more 
studies out recently on price discovery, one of the reasons why 
we will continue to look at ways in which we can create this 
contract library that I referred to earlier. So there are a 
series of steps that have to be taken, I think. There is no one 
single answer to this situation.
    Ms. Kuster. Great. Thank you. And thank you for working 
with the task force. I want to switch gears a bit and ask you 
about the Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership 
Initiative that you announced last week. While I understand the 
public comment period is still open, and there are details to 
be worked out, could you speak to your vision for how to ensure 
small family farms and forestry operations will be well 
represented in the pilot projects that are ultimately selected?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, there is, as part of the structure 
of the partnership, in essence a requirement that we do the 
sufficient outreach to community-building organizations to 
ensure that we receive applications that impact and affect 
directly small producers, disadvantaged producers, distressed 
producers, ways in which we can provide help and assistance 
across the board. This is not designed to provide help and 
assistance solely to large production facilities.
    The reality is, this operation is really designed to 
address the issues that folks have raised about the importance 
of getting more producers engaged in this in a thoughtful way, 
by allowing aggregation of very-small-producers into a larger 
group that will allow those small-producers to receive 
financial assistance to adopt climate-smart agricultural 
practices, and then work with universities and others to be 
able to quantify and obtain data that will allow us, 
ultimately, to create standards that will assist farmers, at 
whatever size benefitting from climate-smart commodity sales, 
and also potentially benefit from any ecosystem market that 
they may at--in the private-sector be able to qualify for.
    The goal here is to get information and data so that we do 
this right, and that we support the right set of policies and 
practices, so there will be a concerted effort to make sure 
that we help producers of all sizes in this effort.
    Ms. Kuster. Great. Thank you. My time is running short. I 
have one more question on the Northeast Federal Milk Marketing 
Order regarding milk producers, but I will submit that for the 
record. Thanks so much, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Now I recognize the 
gentleman from South Dakota, Mr. Johnson. You are now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I will 
start with a couple of thank you's. First off, you and I share 
a sense of the importance of small and regional processors, and 
so I want to thank you for the implementation of that overtime 
relief program that was championed by Congresswoman Angie Craig 
and I, so thank you to your team for that. Second, just 
building on I think a really good conversation that you and Ms. 
Adams had with regard to the value of a poultry contract 
library, and the conversation that you and Mr. Allen had about 
the potential value of a beef contract library, I just want to 
thank your team again. They have provided a tremendous amount 
of technical assistance in the last couple of months, as our 
team has been working to introduce, and I think it will be 
forthcoming, legislation that would establish a beef contract 
library like we have today in pork, and that you are working to 
develop in poultry, so thank you for that.
    My third comment is going to be a question, sir, about Ms. 
Pingree's and Mrs. Hartzler's interest in that $500 million 
going toward small-processors, and maybe extremely-small-
processors. I think that could well be a good investment, but I 
also know that this is a very difficult marketplace for small 
processors to exist in the long-term. A few years ago, margins 
were negative numbers, we saw a lot of those smaller facilities 
cease operation, or be bought out by much larger participants. 
Do you have any thoughts for us about how USDA and Congress 
could ensure that investments go toward processors that are 
likely to be able to withstand those kinds of storms, that will 
be abiding, and that will provide longer lived benefit to the 
marketplace?
    Secretary Vilsack. Congressman, that is a great question, 
and I have asked for assistance from folks who work in the 
private-sector to assist us as we formulate this effort to make 
sure that we are making wise decisions, and not putting people 
in a situation where they are bound to fail. That is not the 
point here. The point is we want folks to succeed. So, first of 
all, we are going to do an analysis and make sure that we are 
investing.
    Second, there may very well be a component of this, I don't 
want to prejudge this, but there may very well be a component 
of this that looks not just at entities that need capital to 
build, but those who might need assistance in the first early 
stages of operation to get their feet on the ground. So, 
structuring this in a way that potentially provides some level 
of assistance and help, utilizing potentially other programs at 
USDA to do that.
    Third, there is an opportunity here, it is not just in the 
packing area, it is also in the value-added section. If you 
take a look at where the money is in this industry, there is a 
lot of money being gained with value-added, and I think the 
opportunity here for small- and very-small-processing capacity 
is to add an additional wrinkle, an additional value-added 
component, to customize, if you will, the product that they are 
producing so that they get a higher value in the marketplace, 
that they create a niche for themselves in that marketplace. 
And I think we will be looking at ways in which we can provide 
assistance and help so that you not only have a processing 
capacity, but you have the ability to add value in the 
marketplace, and be able to get perhaps a higher price that 
might make it just a little bit easier for you in that niche 
market to be able to stay in business.
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. And as you work 
to examine the possibility of some of those early days 
operating capital, I think that could be argued, rightfully, to 
help with capacity building. Let's just make sure that we have 
a gameplan for bringing down that support, because support for 
fledgling market participants is one thing. If the handouts 
just continue into perpetuity, or for a long time, then 
obviously I think we have more market distortion there, and 
more problematic investments.
    Maybe just two other things quickly, sir, I would mention. 
It has been widely reported in the press that President Biden 
had indicated to Prime Minister Johnson over at the United 
Kingdom that we were going to open up our shores to additional 
British lamb without reciprocal access. I think that is 
concerning, and so I would just ask that--maybe I will submit 
that for the record, and if you could follow up with any 
insight you have into that, that'd be wonderful.
    Secretary Vilsack. This is an important issue. We are out 
there asking our----
    Mr. Johnson. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry, the Chairman's 
going to cut me off in 15 seconds, so let me just say this. I 
want to double down on the comments Chairman Thompson made with 
regard to the line speeds. You have talked, I think rightfully 
so, about the importance of building capacity. USDA has the 
power, through a process, to expand capacity, and I hope you 
will do so. Time is of the essence, sir. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The Chairman will yield time. I believe, Mr. 
Secretary, you wanted to respond about the Prime Minister----
    Secretary Vilsack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I travel 
overseas, Representative, I am always asking our European 
friends and others to follow the science, particularly as it 
relates to BSE. We had this conversation with our Chinese 
friends for a long time. We have to be consistent here. We have 
to follow the science. We have to follow OIE recommendations 
and requirements. We have been dealing with this issue, in 
terms of lamb, for a long period of time, and so it is pretty 
consistent with our approach internationally, for our exports, 
that we follow the science, and I think we have to talk the 
talk and walk the walk, and that is what you are going to see 
here.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence, 
and the record will be stronger served because you allowed 
that. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you for responding to Mr. Johnson's 
question.
    The gentlewoman from Iowa, Mrs. Axne, is recognized now for 
5 minutes.
    Mrs. Axne. Thank you, Chairman Scott, and thank you for 
holding a hearing on this incredibly important issue to our 
state, which is, of course, why we saw Senator Grassley here 
earlier, and I am so grateful to have my fellow Iowan here, 
Secretary Vilsack. I want to thank Secretary--sorry, Senator 
Grassley for testifying and raising the need for reform in the 
cattle industry. I have actually worked with the Senator, and 
led the introduction of his 50/14 bill (H.R. 7501) ** in the 
House last year, and agree that we absolutely need a compromise 
that unites the industry, but also works for Iowa's independent 
cattle producers.
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    ** Editor's note: the bill was introduced July 9, 2020 and is 
entitled, To amend the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 to foster 
efficient markets and increase competition and transparency among 
packers that purchase livestock from producers.
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    And thank you, Secretary Vilsack, for joining us to discuss 
this important issue as well. You, of course, know I was proud 
to be standing next to you in Council Bluffs this summer when 
you announced the USDA's effort to expand processing capacity, 
with $500 million provided by Congress in the American Rescue 
Plan. And we all know that those resources are so desperately 
needed because I constantly hear from Iowa producers about the 
significant consolidation in the industry, and the increasing 
price spread, as well as a lack of competition in the cash 
market.
    You and I both have heard from a local producer who had 
been selling his cattle at a loss while his packer was making a 
significant profit. We talked about that in Council Bluffs, 
and, unfortunately, that is not an isolated incident. In fact, 
at one point during the pandemic, cattle prices had declined by 
18 percent, while box beef prices went up by 80 percent. So 
what we are seeing, of course, is producers being paid less, 
consumers are paying more, but the packers control over 80 
percent of the market, and are making significant profits, and 
this is absolutely not right, and not good for our country, and 
certainly not good for Iowa's 3rd District, so we need more 
locally owned processing capacity to help with this issue.
    So, Secretary Vilsack, I know your Department is reviewing 
comments from the request for information for the new program 
to expand this capacity. However, I am a bit concerned that 
these new resources could ultimately benefit the large packers 
if they are allowed to purchase their competition and retain 
their market power. The folks that you and I met with in 
Council Bluff, Cattlemen's Heritage, raised this issue in a 
public comment to the USDA, and suggested that if an entity 
receives public funding for this program, that they can't sell 
to the Big Four within 25--if they sell to the Big Four within 
25 years, then they have to pay back 100 percent. So I am 
wondering if you share this concern, and if so, how can the 
USDA implement this program that assures that we can address 
this issue?
    Secretary Vilsack. Congresswoman, I don't want to 
presuppose what the process that we are currently going through 
in analyzing these comments will result in, but I would say 
that, as a former governor, I do understand and appreciate the 
notion of claw back. As you well know, with economic 
development programs, when an industry receives a grant, or a 
forgivable loan, or whatever it might be, based on certain 
representations concerning job growth, if they don't meet those 
representations, they don't meet those goals, they are required 
to pay all or a portion of what they receive from the state 
back. And I think we have to structure the program in a way 
that we can justify to taxpayers that their resources have been 
used in a thoughtful and appropriate way, and I would certainly 
hope that whatever structure we put together would be able to 
meet that standard, and continue to meet that standard.
    Mrs. Axne. Okay. Well, great, and obviously I know you are 
taking this to heart. You heard the words the cattleman said, 
and we certainly want to help those industries here in our 
state, so thank you for that.
    Now I want to turn to African Swine Fever, which, of 
course, is of great concern to producers in our State of Iowa, 
who lead in hog production. As you know, my colleagues and I 
recently wrote to you, requesting that you leverage every 
single available authority in the USDA to fight against this 
deadly animal disease, so thank you, first and foremost, for 
your recent announcement that you would do just that, and try 
and make significant investments--will make significant 
investments, I should say, in ASF from spreading to the U.S. 
But I noticed in the announcement it looks like most of the 
funding will be concentrating about containing ASF in the 
Caribbean, and then heightening the surveillance there. Can you 
clarify, then, how these funds will be allocated, and does the 
Department have remaining needs for resources here at home to 
prepare for an emergency if ASF were to hit our shores? And, 
finally, is our prevention infrastructure, like the National 
Veterinary Stockpile, adequately equipped to handle such an 
outbreak?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, it is important for us to minimize 
and to eliminate the risk at its source, which is why we are 
working with the Dominican Republic and the Haitians to address 
the issue as it exists in their countries today, and to provide 
them assistance and help, both technical assistance and 
financial assistance, to do the right job in minimizing, and 
ultimately eliminating, the risk in those two countries. We 
also ask for OIE to establish a protective zone around Puerto 
Rico and the Virgin Islands so that there will be no imports 
coming in from those two areas into the mainland of the U.S. 
OIE's never had an application for protective zone protection, 
so they are going to take a little time to look at our 
application, but we are moving forward on that.
    We are shoring up and beefing up our surveillance, our 
detection systems. I think we are in place with the systems 
that we have in place, and should, God forbid, this happen, 
that we would be able to identify it quickly, we would be able 
to eradicate it quickly, we would be able to contain the damage 
to protect a state or a region of the country. We will do 
everything we possibly can to make sure this doesn't get to our 
shores, and to be able to respond as quickly as possible, 
should it get to our shores.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Vilsack. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Go ahead.
    Secretary Vilsack. There is no vaccine yet, so it is not 
like we can stockpile vaccine, but we are obviously--as I said 
earlier, we are working on the development of a vaccine, and 
hope to get that as quickly as possible.
    Mrs. Axne. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The gentleman from 
Indiana, Mr. Baird, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 
Secretary for being here. It is very timely to have the 
discussion we are having relating to livestock. My question 
deals with a topic that really is fascinating to me, and it 
represents an opportunity for American agriculture, and that is 
animal biotech. We all know the broad and valuable benefits our 
industry can gain from this technology, but with past products, 
we have seen somewhat of a difficulty in getting those to 
market, and the regulatory process is incredibly onerous. So 
this morning Chair Plaskett and I sent over a letter to you, 
and the Acting FDA Commissioner Woodcock, with the support of 
Chairman Scott and Ranking Member Thompson, and more than \2/3\ 
of the entire Committee, and we were expressing our concerns 
for how the current cumbersome regulatory process sends a 
message, and tends to stifle innovation, and so we want to urge 
cooperation between the agencies to develop an efficient, and 
risk- and science-based regulatory system that can create a 
safe, predictable path to market for these innovative 
technologies. So my question to you, can you elaborate and 
update us on USDA's ANPR regarding what steps the Department's 
taking to lead in providing this regulatory framework?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I would agree with, yes, 
Congressman, I would agree with you this is a technology that 
is important and relevant. In terms of USDA's involvement, we 
are really focused on ensuring that products that are produced, 
animals that are produced, that we have sufficient and 
appropriate labeling, and so our focus is on that. With the 
advance notice of rulemaking, we are going to proceed 
expeditiously. We attempted, as a Department, to reach an 
agreement with the Health and Human Services and FDA. In the 
Trump Administration, there was a Memorandum of Understanding 
that was originally signed. I am not sure that the folks at HHS 
published that memorandum. There were some concerns about 
whether or not there was adequate authority at HHS to sign the 
memorandum, so we are in the process, obviously, of taking a 
look at that, and determining whether or not there are some 
additional steps that need to be taken to make sure we have 
bright lines between what we do and what FDA does. We will 
certainly work hard to make sure that we are not impeding the 
market, and impeding the importance of this technology.
    Mr. Baird. Well, that is encouraging, and I thank you very 
much for doing that, and your comment's are kind of a lead-in 
to my next question, which deals with the USDA, as they 
recently re-opened the comment period on labeling of meat and 
poultry products that are derived from cultured cells of swine 
and poultry. That memorandum, or agreement, that I think you 
were talking about, between FDA and FSIS, was back in 2019. So 
my question to you is how do you see this labeling process, and 
what's your perspective on labeling these cultured meat 
products?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I think the key here is to make 
sure that the consumers are not confused, the consumers have 
information that allows them to make appropriate choices in the 
marketplace. And so we are taking a look and making sure that, 
in a number of areas in labeling, that we are sort of on the 
side of consumers here, making sure that they have the 
information they need, and the information that is being 
provided to them is accurate, and doesn't misrepresent. Whether 
it is in this space, or whether it is in the ``Product of 
U.S.'' labeling space, we want to make sure consumers are well 
informed.
    Mr. Baird. Well, thank you very much for those comments, 
and, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlewoman from Washington, 
Ms. Schrier, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Schrier. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome 
back, Secretary Vilsack. It is good to have you here today. The 
first issue I want to discuss is access to slaughter and 
processing for small- and medium-sized producers, which is a 
top concern for ranchers in my district, and we have heard a 
lot of this theme of protecting the little guy today, so I want 
to tell you about Bright Ide Acres. It is a small farm in 
Orting, Washington that I visited back in May, and they said, 
basically, they are just one or two injuries or illnesses away 
from losing access to slaughter and processing services 
entirely.
    And most small producers in Washington State are served by 
slaughter and processor services operating under a custom of 
exempt licenses that are granted by the state. And yet 
Washington has a shortage of inspected processing plants, and 
many producers don't want to pay the costs of these processors, 
or to upgrade their own businesses to meet inspection 
requirements. So, as a result, many producers that want to 
access retail markets are unable to do so, and they end up, as 
you have heard, with the farmers losing money along the way.
    So, to address the market access issues for local producers 
in Washington, access to these services would probably make the 
biggest difference to them. So, Secretary Vilsack, how is the 
USDA working to facilitate livestock farmers' access to markets 
broadly, as directed in President Biden's July Executive Order 
on promoting competition?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, there are a couple of things we 
are doing, Congresswoman. First of all, we are instituting the 
resources that you all provided for modernization of existing 
facilities to expand market opportunities. We are providing 
those resources that would allow folks to upgrade their 
facilities, the grants of up to $200,000. As I said, roughly 
240 applications for those resources, so perhaps folks in your 
district might have considered applying for that. Second, we 
just recently announced this $100 million loan guarantee 
program, which we think is going to leverage hundreds of 
millions of dollars of loan guarantees. That also could be used 
potentially for mobile processing capacity, which might also 
provide another avenue, if you will, for your farmers to be 
able to have their meat processed.
    And finally, to the extent that they might be interested in 
coming together in a co-op situation to build themselves, and 
to be owners of a processing facility, they could potentially 
take advantage of the $500 million program that we are setting 
up. So I think there are a number of places along the way, with 
specific focus on processing. Then there are, of course, a 
series of other USDA programs, whether it is Value-Added 
Producer Grants, or whether it is business and industry loan 
guarantee programs that could potentially be used as well.
    Ms. Schrier. Thank you so much. That is a great answer. I 
love the idea of the small farms joining together, and we will 
pursue those grants, and I will share this information with 
them. I also just want to note that the Washington State 
livestock industry, and, in fact, all of our agriculture 
sector, is very reliant on foreign trade, Washington is number 
three in exports in the United States, and, thanks to our 
ports, has the fourth largest container shipping center in 
North America. And north central Washington's is not about 
livestock, but we have been known as the apple capital of the 
world, and beyond agriculture, from aerospace to digital trade, 
one in five jobs in Washington State is supported by trade.
    And so, I know this matters to other people on this 
Committee, because we all ship overseas, and that is why I am 
so concerned about shipping issues that I know you know about 
at our ports, and I was heartened by your recent announcement 
that the USDA will be dedicating funding to address this, which 
we got to speak about briefly on the phone the other day. So my 
question is this: profitability of U.S. livestock producers 
depends on access to these foreign markets, can you speak more 
specifically to how USDA is working to ensure access to foreign 
consumers, and maintaining relationships built over many years?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, there are two answers to that 
question. I think first and foremost we continue to promote 
U.S. agriculture through our various offices across the world. 
We are in 75 countries. We have agriculture experts in 75 
countries promoting U.S. ag, working with cooperators that we 
helped to fund through the market assistance programs at the 
Foreign Agricultural Service.
    Second, we are also obviously working on the port 
congestion issue. I have talked to John Porcari, who's been put 
in charge by the President to look into this issue of 
congestion to determine how best to break up the congestion so 
we can get more movement. We have established the fund that you 
made reference to, designed to look at ways in which we can 
address whatever issues it may be, whether it is pallets, 
whether it is workforce, whether it is empty containers, and 
trying to provide financial incentives to fill those containers 
with our stuff and send it overseas.
    The good news is, from an export perspective, that we are 
looking, and just set a record, a fiscal year record, exceeding 
by about $30 billion the previous record, in terms of exports, 
and we anticipate and expect Fiscal Year 2022 will be another 
record year. So we are moving product, we are going to continue 
to advocate. I mean, there is a whole series of other things I 
could say, but the time is up, the Chairman's giving me the eye 
up there. I am going to have to stop.
    Ms. Schrier. Thank you. And thank you for also working with 
the Federal Maritime Commission on those shippers. Thanks very 
much. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The gentleman from 
Minnesota, Mr. Hagedorn, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Hagedorn. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to 
be doing this from the car, but it is a district work period, 
and I am out working the district, so it is what it is. Mr. 
Secretary, thank you for being here, and answering our 
questions, and discussing the issues, and for whatever advocacy 
you and the Department can give our livestock industry.
    I would like to talk a little bit about the line speed 
issue that Ranking Member Thompson and Representative Johnson 
brought up. This past spring a Federal judge blocked USDA's New 
Swine Inspection System rule because of a technicality. And, 
the court ruled that USDA failed to address comments related to 
worker safety, which is kind of strange, because under the NSIS 
(New Swine Inspection System) Program, where they sped up the 
lines, actually workplace injuries were reduced 86 percent. 
That is a pretty good record, and something I think we would 
want to continue.
    Six facilities around the country have been operating under 
these higher line speeds for, like, 20 years, and one of them 
is in my district in Austin, Minnesota, Quality Pork 
Processing. Senator Grassley, myself, Representative Johnson, 
and over 70 other Members from both chambers sent you a letter 
a couple months back urging you to take action to prevent the 
line speeds from being slowed down. And I might add, I was very 
disappointed that we couldn't do this on a bipartisan basis. 
None of the Democrats in the House or the Senate joined 74 
Republicans in urging the USDA to look out for our pork 
producers in this area.
    I don't know if this is a real urgency for you and the 
Department, Mr. Secretary, because so far you haven't answered 
our letter. And, as a former Congressional Relations Officer, 
usually if you are going to testify before a committee, you try 
to clear up all the letters that hadn't been answered, but thus 
far, we never received anything. And, on top of that, in a 
closed door session with our Livestock and Foreign Agriculture 
Subcommittee, your staff said to us directly that the reason 
you didn't take action in this area is because essentially you 
were colluding and working with the unions. Now, that is very 
disappointing to me. Chairman Scott, I would like to make a 
motion that I would add this into the record, the NSIS letter, 
to which 74 Members of Congress wrote the Secretary, and we 
have yet to hear a response.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    [The letter referred to is located on p. 330.]
    Secretary Vilsack. Congressman, I am happy--
    Mr. Hagedorn. I just kind of want to finish up here, 
please, Mr. Secretary. Because of the Biden Administration's 
inaction, NSIS plants slowed down line speeds July 1, in some 
cases by 200 head per hour. That hurt our independent 
producers, that hurt consumers, that hurt these plants. It was 
a lose/lose/lose/lose situation. It hurt the workers, to be 
honest with you. The result is that we lost 2.5 percent of 
production, which is the equivalent, believe it or not, of one 
plant. Now, we don't have very many packing plants in this 
country for pork, and we need more capacity, and now we are 
down one plant because of this inaction. So, after that, for 
whatever reason, you announced you are going to put out $500 
million to try to help people. That seems to not make a lot of 
sense because you could've just handled the situation, and 
avoided the need to spend taxpayer dollars.
    Since July, though, you have told industry that there are 
some waiver criteria out there that you would like to look at 
it in order to get the line speeds back up and running for 
these six plants, and so I guess my question is, what's the 
status of that criteria, as far as these waivers? And, when you 
receive those waivers, will you and USDA commit to approving 
them so we can get back to regular order? And with that, I will 
await your response.
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, thank you very much, Congressman. 
I apologize for not responding to the letter. We will make sure 
that we get a response to you quickly, but you will get my 
response here today. First of all, we are under an injunction, 
so it is not a situation where we have the ability to tell a 
Federal judge that we are not going to comply with the 
injunction. And the reason we are under an injunction is 
because the Trump Administration did not put into the record 
any information that they had about worker safety. For some 
reason, they chose not to do that. That is more than a 
technicality, that is a fatal flaw, and that is the problem. 
That is the number one problem.
    The second thing is we did try to work, and continue to 
work with, actually, the facility in your district. They sat 
down with workers, and they said, let's be creative about this. 
Let's not have to choose between worker safety, food safety, 
and pork profits, let's figure out how we can do all three. And 
they came up with a proposal. We are in the process of trying 
to get that proposal essentially to a point where it could 
create the structure for a waiver for the other five facilities 
to be able to decide whether they wish to choose to follow 
that. If they wish to choose to follow it, then obviously we 
are in a situation where those folks can try, for the next 12 
months, this program, and we learn from this program. We figure 
out what the challenges, what the problems are.
    Mr. Hagedorn. To reclaim whatever time I have, first of 
all, the Solicitor General under Biden did nothing to appeal 
this case and move it along. Second of all, you guys could've 
written regulations that solve the problem, and----
    The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
    Mr. Hagedorn. We had worker safety for 20 years----
    The Chairman. Thank you for that explanation, Mr. 
Secretary. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Bishop, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so 
much for holding this hearing today. It is very timely. And 
thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here with us today. The 
tremendous job that you are doing at USDA to implement the 
COVID relief through the various programs that are being 
executed by USDA deserves accolades. The nutrition programs, 
the supply chain, the workforce safety concerns, for all of our 
producers that are impacted. So thank you for that, and thank 
you for your courtesies to me, in my capacity as Chair of the 
Agriculture Subcommittee of Appropriations, in providing the 
regular updates that you provide with respect to what USGS is 
doing. And most recently I was excited to hear of the success 
of the African Swine Fever vaccine development.
    That being said, I would like to deal with a little bit, 
Mr. Secretary, on the cooperative interstate agreements. I was 
encouraged to see that the Food Safety Inspection Service and 
South Dakota finalized Cooperative Interstate Shipment 
agreement in June. But under the program, selected state 
inspected establishments that comply with Federal inspection 
requirements are permitted to ship processed meats into 
interstate commerce. This is an underutilized tool that would 
diversify the beef and the other meat processing markets, but 
only 9 of the 27 states that have state meat and poultry 
inspection programs have cooperative interstate shipping 
agreements. Can you help me understand why there is so little 
participation in the program, and whether there is anything 
that we can do to make it easier for states like Georgia and 
others to participate?
    Secretary Vilsack. I think the simple answer, Mr. Chairman, 
is that, in order to be able to do interstate, or, for that 
matter, export activities, the facilities have to have not 
equal to, but they have to have the same inspection system that 
you have in federally inspected facilities, so it is a 
significant change in the way in which they would approach 
inspections. It is not a matter of equivalency, it is a matter 
of actually having exactly the same. So that is one of the 
reasons I think you all put the resources together to provide 
the money for folks, if they wish, to modernize their 
facilities to be able to get up to that standard, to be able to 
meet that standard, they now have the option and the ability to 
do that. A number of facilities have made applications, so we 
may see that increase, and that may create incentive for states 
to take a slightly different position. We may get to see more 
than nine of the 27 states qualify.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I understand, and I 
am going back to the Packers and Stockyards Act. I understand 
that the Department intends to issue the three new proposed 
rules to enforce the Packers and Stockyards Act, and that, in 
August, you introduced a new enforcement policy while the 
rulemakings are being finalized, and there was considerable 
pushback from segments of the livestock and poultry industries 
when you proposed the GIPSA rules in 2011. Tell us, how has the 
need for rulemaking on certain provisions of the Packers and 
Stockyards Act changed during the last 10 years, if at all?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I think we have learned a lot 
about some of the challenges that poultry producers in 
particular had under the tournament system, questions about 
whether or not they were being treated fairly, whether there 
was sort of an equivalent treatment from one grower to the 
next. We learned of situations where producers were advised, 
without much notice, of a decision to cut off the ability to 
continue to contract with particular processors. And so there 
was a series of significant events and activities that gave 
rise to the need for us to strengthen the rules against 
retaliation, to strengthen the rules against discrimination, to 
draw a bright line as to what is an undue and unfair practice, 
that there was clarity.
    Now, I think there is also the issue of whether or not the 
standard that courts have imposed on the rules that requires a 
finding that competition is not limited specifically to the 
individual producer, but to the entire industry, well, that is 
a very high standard, and a very difficult standard to meet, so 
a combination of all those factors led us to believe there was 
a need to take a look at, to provide greater clarity, greater 
direction and protection, if you will, so that there is a more 
level playing field in this space between the processors and 
the producer.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Mann, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mann. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Secretary, thank 
you for participating in this hearing this afternoon. I am 
still awaiting replies from your office regarding different 
written concerns. One, the delay in CFAP payments to deserving 
producers, and two, issues concerning USDA vaccine mandates, 
including FSA County Committee members need to be exempt from 
the Administration vaccine mandates. If these vaccine mandates 
go into effect, Mr. Secretary, it will decimate an already 
diminished FSA workforce, also dramatically disrupt the current 
county committee structure filled by producers across many of 
my 63 counties, and much of rural America, so I would 
appreciate a response back on those items, sir, when you can.
    My first question has to do with vaccine mandates. I have a 
lot of concerns about them. As you know, President Biden issued 
an Executive Order requiring all Federal employees to be fully 
vaccinated by November 22. Given, sir, that federally inspected 
establishments cannot operate without USDA inspection, what is 
the USDA's plan to ensure that federally inspected meat and 
poultry processing plants are adequately staffed if a 
significant percentage of the inspection workforce elects not 
to get vaccinated, and is subsequently discharged? In other 
words, on one hand, I think there is overwhelming consensus we 
need to increase capacity. On the other hand, we are about to 
put ourselves in a situation, because of forced vaccine 
mandates, where the government might dramatically decrease 
capacity. What are your thoughts on that, and what is the plan 
to remedy that?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, we are in the process of surveying 
our employees, Representative, to determine whether or not what 
you have suggested is a likely scenario. At this point, I am 
not convinced it is. I think that the significant percentage of 
workers at USDA understand and appreciate that our concern is 
for worker safety. Our concern is to make sure that people are 
protected, that we comply with CDC guidelines, and I don't 
anticipate at this point that we are going to see a major 
disruption in our capacity to do our job at USDA. We will make 
adjustments if it turns out that survey results over time begin 
to reflect a different approach than what I am seeing today. 
Obviously we will take steps to make sure that we do not 
disrupt inspections, and we do not disrupt the important work 
that is being done at these plants. I don't see it today.
    Mr. Mann. Okay. Yes. November 22 is going to be here pretty 
quickly, and I just have a lot of concerns with the position we 
are potentially ourselves in, further hampering and hindering 
the industry. The second question, sir, would you agree that 
part of a healthy free market competition is the ability to 
distinguish your product from your competitors? And if the USDA 
is successful in allowing individual harm as a basis for 
violation under Section 202 of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 
won't this inhibit cattle producers in Kansas and across the 
country from differentiating their products because the packer 
can't pay a higher price for a higher quality, better product 
due to fear of prosecution by the USDA, or a potential lawsuit 
from the producer who didn't get the same price for an inferior 
product?
    Secretary Vilsack. I don't believe so, Congressman. I think 
we can craft these rules in a way that provides a bright line 
for industry to understand and appreciate what is acceptable 
and what is not acceptable, what is fair to producers and what 
is unfair. I think the problem in the past has been the 
uncertainty of what is or what isn't, and that is what we are 
trying to rectify with the Packers and Stockyards revisions 
that we are considering.
    Mr. Mann. Well, my understanding is today we have had eight 
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have upheld the requirements 
so far, with no dissenting circuits, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
has denied review of this topic multiple times. Each time the 
courts have found the Plaintiffs must show harm to overall 
competition, rather than injury to an individual. Essentially, 
the courts have said the law is meant to ensure equal 
opportunity, not equal outcomes amongst producers. So, based on 
all the court decisions, and despite a clear Congressional 
intent, how do you plan to initiate the rulemaking and draw 
this line that you discussed?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I am going to rely on the folks in 
our Department that are essentially responsible for making sure 
that what we propose can pass muster in courts. That is the 
goal here. Obviously, we are not going to review these in 
isolation. We are going to review these in light of the way the 
law is, and the way the law needs to be followed.
    Mr. Mann. Okay. I see my time has expired. Thank you, sir. 
I appreciate you coming before us this afternoon.
    The Chairman. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. O'Halleran, 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking 
Member, for today's hearing, and thank you, Mr. Secretary, for 
being here today. I still look forward, at some time, to having 
you out to Arizona and seeing some of our agriculture industry, 
and our beautiful forests. And I also want to show you 
firsthand the devastation that unabated wildfire, and 
subsequent burn scars, during extreme monsoonal flooding that 
has occurred in communities. These disasters are not one-time 
events. They continue to impact communities for months, and 
even years, after their occurrence. One such example is the 
Museum Fire in Flagstaff. In July of 2019, the fire was 
originally sparked by forest studying work from a Federal 
contractor. Since that time, the burn scar has resulted in 
intense flooding from routine rains in some communities in 
Flagstaff, and, throughout my district, quite frankly. We need 
Federal assistance soon.
    Secretary, as you know, the entire State of Arizona, and 
much of the Southwest, is experiencing a severe drought. We 
know that short-term drought can negatively affect nutrition 
sources, milk production, and future yields. It can also reduce 
feed availability, leading to overgrazing. Heat stress is also 
proven to decrease milk production in dairy cattle, and result 
in lower quality of beef. How is the Department of Agriculture 
working with the Bureau of Reclamation on drought issues to 
ensure that livestock markets are not impacted? What additional 
resources are needed to better support ranchers during these 
period of extended drought? Thank you.
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I want to acknowledge the good 
work of the Congress in passing the continuing resolution that 
contained $10 billion of additional resource and help, $750 
million of which was designated for assistance to livestock 
producers, particularly in the western part of the U.S., who 
have suffered, and those, well, in other parts of the country 
that have suffered from natural disasters.
    We at the USDA have also identified some additional 
resources from the Commodity Credit Corporation that we would 
have available that can't be used for specific payments to 
farmers, as is the case with the continuing resolution 
resources, but can be used potentially to reduce the cost of 
transportation or the cost of feed that producers may have to 
incur as a result of not having access to sufficient forage for 
their animals. What we want to do is we want to keep farmers on 
the farm. We want to keep them in business. We don't want them 
to have to liquidate their herds, because they spent a lifetime 
building them up.
    Second, we have also looked at ways in which we could use 
the existing conservation programs to provide some help and 
assistance to producers. Arizona was one of four states that 
received additional EQIP resources under the EQIP Program that 
was drought related, so we are going to continue to look for 
ways in which we could provide direct assistance, ways in which 
we can help reduce costs, and ways in which we can enable 
farmers to embrace conservation practices to try to mitigate 
the consequences of this very severe drought.
    Mr. O'Halleran. Thank you, Secretary. My second question, 
some of it has been answered about processing, but I do have a 
part that I don't know if you answered or not. What is the USDA 
doing to investigate ways to make inspections more readily 
available through the use of technology, including utilizing 
video and sensors to make virtual inspection a feasible 
reality?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, one of the things that we did when 
I was Secretary before was to take a look at the science of 
food, food safety, and to make sure that we were inspecting in 
the right places. Obviously, it is incredibly important to the 
market that we maintain food safety, and so, to the extent that 
our old system of inspection was one that, essentially, was 
inspecting the wrong things, or was inspecting areas where 
there was little risk of contaminants or bacteria attaching to 
product, we have now basically changed that so we are really 
focused on the areas in a production facility where the risks 
are highest. We will continue to look at ways in which we can 
modernize our system, and modernize our rules. I think we are 
constantly looking for ways in which we can improve food 
safety.
    There are also additional steps we can take, particularly 
with reference to Salmonella, which I think we will be 
announcing in the very near future, to really try to reduce the 
risk of that, and reduce the risk of foodborne illnesses 
directly connected to Salmonella. It is still too high.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Now I 
recognize the gentleman from Iowa, Mr. Feenstra. You are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Feenstra. Thank you, Chairman Scott and Ranking Member 
Thompson, and thank you, Secretary Vilsack, for being here 
today. There are many challenges today impacting our livestock 
producers, from African Swine Fever, that we talked about, to 
cyberattacks on the agriculture sector, also our line speeds, 
so we have a lot of work to do. But today I want to focus my 
questions on cattle market reform.
    For months I have been calling on the Agriculture Committee 
to hold a hearing to examine anti-competitive behavior in the 
beef industry. I continue to hear from cattle producers 
struggling to break even, and I am glad for the opportunity to 
express these concerns before the Committee today. One of the 
key concerns from the cattle producers in my district is a lack 
of transparency and pricing. Since coming to Congress, I have 
advocated for efforts to ensure true price discovery, and allow 
cattle producers sufficient leverage in cash negotiations.
    Last month the White House published a statement on the 
actions the Administration is taking to improve competition in 
cattle markets. One of these items was that the Administration 
will, and I quote, ``work with Congress to make cattle markets 
more transparent and fair'', and that the Administration, as I 
quote, is ``encouraged to see bipartisan legislation by 
Senators Tester, Fischer, Grassley, Widen, and others to seek 
to improve price discovery in the cattle markets.''
    Secretary Vilsack, we heard from Senator Grassley today 
about the need to act on legislation now, it is so crucial. 
This is an area that has bipartisan support. Can I get a 
commitment from you to help on bipartisan legislation like what 
Secretary Grassley and Fischer have proposed, in line with the 
support of the White House that has been expressed?
    Secretary Vilsack. Congressman, I think there is no 
question that we need more information. There are just fewer 
and fewer negotiated sales, which obviously have an impact on 
alternative marketing arrangements, and there can be potential 
for manipulation. We are more than happy to provide help and 
assistance. Just one caution, that we look for the proper 
balance, as we try to provide greater transparency, we don't 
necessarily sacrifice the benefits of the existing system in 
terms of efficiency. It is not easy to do. This is not easy to 
do, but it is important to be aware of the need for greater 
transparency, and also maintaining the efficiency of the 
current system.
    Mr. Feenstra. Thank you, Secretary Vilsack. I could simply 
say that there is a significant monopoly going on with pork 
packers right now that we have to get down to the bottom of 
this, and we have to have transparency to make this all work. 
And, as you know from Iowa, there are a lot of independent 
producers that are getting forced out of their operations, and 
we simply cannot wait any longer.
    While Congress continues to do its part, I appreciate 
USDA's effort to address these issues. In July USDA announced 
$500 million to expand meat and poultry processing capacity. I 
understand the Department's currently reviewing comments from 
stakeholders. Earlier this week USDA announced another $100 
million to increase processing and strengthen the supply chain. 
Secretary Vilsack, do you know when we can expect to know the 
eligibility requirements and application window for this 
funding?
    Secretary Vilsack. It is my hope that, on the $500 million 
fund, that we have a framework in place before the end of the 
year, and that we start making decisions in the first quarter 
of 2022.
    Mr. Feenstra. Awesome. Thank you very much. Do you know 
when we will have more details about the series of Packers and 
Stockyard rulings announced as part of the President's 
Executive Order promoting competition in the American economy?
    Secretary Vilsack. The goal that I have set in my own mind 
is for us to get information to OMB potentially by the end of 
this year on Packers and Stockyards.
    Mr. Feenstra. Thank you. Again, there is so much urgency 
regarding this. Our independent producers are truly at stake. I 
appreciate you coming before the Committee today, Secretary, 
and I am glad to partner with you in restoring fairness in the 
cattle market. Thank you, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentlewoman from the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
Ms. Plaskett, who is also Chair of the Subcommittee on 
Biotechnology, Horticulture, and Research, is now recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Plaskett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you for convening all of us today for this important hearing 
during Committee work week. I also want to thank my colleagues 
for such tremendously informative and thoughtful questions, and 
to you, Mr. Secretary, for the time that you have been willing 
to spend with us, and really informing us on so much of the 
work that you were doing since taking the helm once again of 
the Department of Agriculture.
    As you were aware, during the previous Administration there 
were changes that were made in the Economic Research Service, 
as well as in NIFA. Those entities were moved from Washington, 
and sent out into the other parts of the United States. There 
was great concern that many of us had that the knowledge base, 
the scientists who had been with those agencies for a number of 
years, would not make that move as well, and we saw a reduction 
in personnel and FTEs in those agencies, which, of course, will 
impact how those agencies operate. Can you give us an update 
on, if any changes have been made, and plan on ensuring that 
those agencies are able to do the output of scientific research 
that is so critical for the agricultural industry?
    Secretary Vilsack. I am certainly aware of the concern that 
you raised, and one of the first things we did when I came back 
into office was to make sure that we used whatever resources we 
could use to accelerate hiring so that we could fill the 
vacancies that had occurred as a result of the shift to Kansas 
City. I believe I am correct when I say that NIFA has 
essentially fulfilled its goal of additional staff. I think 110 
comes to mind right now of folks that NIFA has recently hired 
to get back to a level where work is getting done. In fact, I 
think work is getting done even more quickly than it was under 
the previous Administration, and I think ERS has also made some 
additional hires. I am not sure if they are yet at the level 
they need to be, but I know that they have accelerated hiring 
as well. So I feel a little bit more comfortable about the 
circumstance and situation because of these new hires.
    Ms. Plaskett. Thank you. Thank you very much for that. I 
also recognize that the Biden-Harris Administration has made 
addressing climate change a major part of its agenda. Can you 
share how new technologies, like gene editing in livestock, 
help American farmers and ranchers improve their environmental 
footprint?
    Secretary Vilsack. I recently came back from Florence, 
Italy after visiting with my counterparts from the G20, and one 
of the messages that I conveyed on behalf of U.S. agriculture 
was the importance and necessity of us continuing to embrace 
innovation, and not to necessarily surrender the ability to 
continue to be productive, notwithstanding the challenges of 
climate. I was heartened by the response that I got from many 
of my colleagues, recognizing that productivity, and 
innovation, and climate response, and mitigation adaptation 
don't necessarily have to be in conflict.
    Gene editing has a tremendous capacity, and I will just 
give you an example. You can, and there is research now 
underway, in root systems, primarily of radishes and things of 
that nature, of cover crops, but could potentially be applied 
to commodity crops, where you expand significantly the capacity 
of the root system that can, in turn, store more carbon, which 
could potentially create an opportunity for American 
agriculture to do even more than it is capable of doing today, 
in terms of carbon storage and capture. You can potentially, 
with gene editing, change the photosynthesis formula, if you 
will, for plants and crops so that they essentially absorb more 
carbon, and convert it into nutrients, and convert it into the 
root system.
    So there is an unlimited potential here, which means we 
need to invest more in research, and I am glad to see that, in 
the budget that is been approved by the House Agriculture 
Committee, there are additional resources for this important 
research.
    Ms. Plaskett. Well, thank you very much for that, and once 
again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing, and 
I also want to thank my colleague, Mr. Baird, for addressing 
the letter that we were able to get out, working in a 
bipartisan manner, expressing our concerns, and the work that 
is needed in genetic improvements, and the hallmark that they 
have made in agriculture. And thank you for addressing that in 
your discussion with him. I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentlelady from Florida, Mrs. Cammack, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 
Member. You guys know that I come from a district with a strong 
livestock presence, particularly cow-calf operations, and their 
success over past decades has been driven not by government 
intervention or mandates, but by allowing markets to sort 
themselves out. We all know conditions change. We know, through 
natural market fluctuations, or even though unique 
unprecedented events, like COVID-19----
    The Chairman. Excuse me, Mrs. Cammack. Let me remind 
Members, please unmute, and mute if you are not speaking. Thank 
you.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Point being that the 
markets work, and they work best with as little government 
intervention as possible. Producers, like those I have met with 
cow-calf operations in Florida, share concerns that any attempt 
to intervene in their ability to make their own transaction 
choices will prove harmful to their long-term success.
    So, Secretary Vilsack, I appreciate you being here today. 
As you know, cow-calf operations, cattle producers, and 
packers, enter into various marketing agreements to ensure that 
a supply of cattle that meet certain specifications, breed, 
genetics, antibiotic and hormones use and others, are 
frequently tied to branded products or retailer requirements. 
These specifications allow producers, packers, and retailers to 
differentiate their products in the marketplace and meet 
consumer demand.
    Now, courts have long upheld the harm to competition 
standard in USDA Packers and Stockyard rules, however, recent 
proposals by the USDA, your Department, could see that standard 
eliminated. Now, if that were to happen, it would, one, open up 
a floodgate of litigation, two, potentially limit choice for 
consumers, and three, limit the opportunity for producers to 
obtain premiums for their cattle. Secretary Vilsack, is that 
the USDA's goal with the Packers and Stockyard rules?
    Secretary Vilsack. No, Congresswoman. The goal, obviously, 
is to make sure that there is a fair price for producers, and 
that the marketplace works with appropriate transparency, and 
that producers are not at a significant disadvantage in 
negotiating with processors.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Secretary Vilsack. Does the USDA 
believe that beef quality and product differentiation are 
important to consumers and producers?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I think there is no question that, 
to the extent that you have opportunities to value-add, that is 
an important consideration, as long as producers get fair 
price, or a fair return, for the value added that they are 
providing. That is the key here, is getting the fair return.
    Mrs. Cammack. Absolutely. Now, Mr. Secretary, I spoke with 
a number of cattle producers in my state this week about their 
top concerns, and one of their chief concerns they highlighted 
was pretty straightforward, the vacancies at our Farm Service 
Agency offices. Now, the FSA offices across the country 
continue to suffer from staff vacancies. I understand that this 
is a new Administration, but we both know how important these 
offices are to the success of our producers, so why are we into 
month 10 of this Administration, and these positions remain 
vacant, and do you have a timeline that you could share with us 
on completing these incredibly important appointments and 
filling the vacancies?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, let me reassure you we survey the 
level of work being done at FSA offices to see whether or not 
there has been a drop-off of work in terms of processing loan 
applications and so forth, and the good news is the great work 
that is being done at FSA offices, there has not been a drop-
off of work to farmers. We are dealing with, however, a 
department that had significant reductions, employment freezes 
in the previous Administration, that we are now in the process 
of working our way through, trying to deal with. We faced a 
department that literally had thousands of vacancies, and 
thousands of jobs that needed to be filled. Now, we are working 
as fast as we possibly can to get up to speed here, but in the 
meantime, our folks are doing a great job of making sure that 
they can provide the service that farmers need.
    Mrs. Cammack. Well, Mr. Secretary, I have information that 
is contrary to your statement about the level of efficiency 
within the FSA offices, and I know in a state like Florida, 
that is a top ten state in total agricultural output, we have 
agriculture as our number one economic driver, the fact that we 
do not have these positions filled is a huge issue for states 
like ours, and I would love to continue that conversation 
offline. But, in the interest of time, and the fact that I only 
have 34 seconds left, I do want to get to a final question. 
And, of course, if you could detail this into a report back to 
us in the coming weeks, I sure would appreciate it. Have you 
been communicating, Mr. Secretary, with the Department of 
Homeland Security, working with your counterparts in other 
agencies, to ensure that there is a cohesive, effective 
response to preventing African Swine Fever from entering the 
United States through our ports in Florida and elsewhere? This 
is a concern that we have seen here recently in the news, and 
we want to ensure that this is at top of mind.
    Secretary Vilsack. My first call was to Secretary Mayorkas 
on African Swine Fever----
    Mrs. Cammack. And would you be willing to detail the 
conversation, and the plan, in a report, in a follow up?
    The Chairman. The lady's time has expired. Mr. Secretary, 
you might respond to that in writing.
    Secretary Vilsack. Sure. I am happy to share with everyone 
the work that we are doing in building up surveillance and 
building up detection, increasing canine, increasing vigilance 
at the border, as well as working with our friends in the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti to minimize the risk.*** And, as I 
mentioned before, the protective zone that we have around 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands that we are requesting, so 
there is quite a bit of activity in this space.
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    *** Editor's note: the information referred to is located on p. 
336.
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    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlewoman from Connecticut, 
Mrs. Hayes, who is also the Chairwoman of our Subcommittee on 
Nutrition, Oversight, and Department Operations, is now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Hayes. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
for hosting this very important hearing. I represent the 5th 
District in Connecticut, and while livestock does not have a 
significant footprint in my district, I cannot pass up an 
opportunity to present the issues that are important to the 
people of my community to the Secretary.
    So, Secretary Vilsack, thank you so much for being here. 
Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, Connecticut farmers 
have suffered immensely. Early on, milk dumping was commonplace 
as supply chains were heavily disrupted. Later in the pandemic, 
Connecticut farmers sought Federal relief, but few were 
successful. Just four percent of Farmers to Families Food Box 
contracts went to the Northeast, and just eight percent of 
Connecticut farmers received CFAP payments. Last week, at Sub-
Edge Farm in Farmington in my district, floods devastated their 
operation, resulting in 20 acres of crop loss and Thanksgiving 
turkeys. Because government assistance has not been able to 
fully close their margins, Sub-Edge Farms has had to rely on 
funds from a GoFundMe account and local restaurant fundraisers 
to keep their staff on payroll.
    We have talked about this issue at length, Mr. Secretary, 
and I am happy to see that USDA has moved forward to address 
the concerns of small farmers. So, Secretary Vilsack, can you 
give further details on how the Pandemic Market Volatility 
Assistance Program will benefit small farmers that may have 
been neglected throughout the pandemic?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, it is designed to provide 
assistance and help, and we are not finished with this effort. 
We have additional announcements that we are going to make that 
are focused on using pandemic assistance resources to provide 
help and assistance to farmers that didn't get adequate 
protection under previous disbursements. We have taken a number 
of steps to try to help small- and mid-sized producers to 
receive assistance, and we are going to continue to look for 
ways in which we can provide help.
    We have had procurement, where there are new procurement 
opportunities. We recently announced $1 billion The Emergency 
Food Assistance Program: $300 million to $400 million of that 
is to be spent for small-, mid-sized distressed farmers, those 
who are underserved; $500 million is to be used in local and 
regional distribution centers to create new market 
opportunities. So there is procurement, there is additional 
financial assistance. We are continuing to work with a variety 
of mechanisms that we have yet to announce to provide help and 
assistance, so more is coming.
    Mrs. Hayes. Well, thank you so much for that detail. And I 
understand that this program was created with funds that the 
USDA has also used to create a dairy donation program, and 
supplemental dairy margin coverage programs. Have small- and 
medium-sized farms been able to access those programs easily, 
and how is the USDA implementing any new outreach strategies to 
compensate for previous program disparities?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, the dairy donation program is 
available for folks who essentially experienced difficulties 
during the early stages of the pandemic, and so they are able 
to apply for those resources. The other assistance programs are 
designed to sort of equalize sort of an oddity that occurred 
during the COVID situation where the U.S. Government was in the 
business of purchasing a lot of cheese, and that created a bit 
of a challenge for some of the milk producers, in terms of 
getting full and complete value for their milk. So we are in 
the process of trying to at least make up 80 percent of the 
losses that they may have incurred by virtue of that 
distortion, up to 5 million pounds of milk, which is really 
focused on small- and mid-sized dairy producers.
    There is additional help and assistance going to be 
forthcoming for dairy operators as well, as we take a look at 
the gross Margin Protection Program--the coverage program, 
rather, and making adjustments there. All told, it is about 
$1.3 billion of additional assistance for dairy operators.
    Mrs. Hayes. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary. I am very 
excited to hear all of those things, and I am always generally 
concerned about the lack of programmatic equity between large 
corporate farms and some of the smaller family farms that I 
represent, so I look forward to collaborating with you and the 
Department, and assisting in any way I can, or with the Members 
of Congress, to help make sure that all of our farmers can feel 
the impact of the work that is being done at the USDA. Thank 
you so much, Mr. Secretary, for your time. Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlelady from Minnesota, 
Mrs. Fischbach, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Fischbach. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Secretary Vilsack, for being here today. You talked a little 
bit about the drought with Representative O'Halleran, but in 
your written testimony you mentioned that producers face the 
possibility of having to liquidate herds to due to the lack of 
availability or affordability of feed and forage from this 
summer's drought. In my district, that was not just a 
possibility, it was reality.
    Nearly all of my state has had some kind of abnormally dry 
conditions, and over \3/4\ is in severe drought. Most notably, 
the northwest and north central portion of my district spent 
significant time in the highest level of drought conditions, 
which is where I heard from producers that, unfortunately, this 
possibility did become a reality. To this day, portions of that 
northern point are still in D3 extreme drought. The producers 
in my district saw this coming, and requested emergency 
authorization to hay and graze CRP acres prior to the nesting 
season. In July I led a delegation letter with Senator 
Klobuchar formally requesting action from you prior to the 
primary nesting season. Other Members and delegations, 
including Congressman Johnson, requested the same from you. To 
this day, we have yet to receive word from you or your staff on 
what drove that decision. Seeing as this is your first time 
appearing before the Committee since the drought started, I am 
now asking you on the record to explain this decision.
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, the law didn't allow me to take 
the action that you all requested.
    Mrs. Fischbach. Then, Secretary, what specifically in that 
2018 bill, because I think you are referring to the 2018 Farm 
Bill, what specifically there prevented you from doing that?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I can get you the chapter and 
verse, Congresswoman, I don't have it on the top of my head, 
but I will tell you that staff indicated to me that I didn't 
have the authority to do what you were asking me to do, that it 
would require a law change. I am more than happy to work with 
all of you to do the technical work to deal with this; but, our 
interpretation was that we weren't able to do what you were 
asking us to do. As soon as we were able to do it legally, we 
did it.
    Mrs. Fischbach. And, Secretary, we have entered a 
bipartisan, I believe with Representative Angie Craig from 
Minnesota, we put together a bill already to clarify that, if 
that is the reason that we are unable to do that. But in 
addition to that, I heard frustrations from producers that 
emergency haying in post-primary nesting season was disallowed 
upon the graduation of a county from a D2 to a D3 drought, and 
I can't figure out why a county's hay situation is suddenly in 
better shape enough to lift this emergency authorization as the 
drought conditions actually worsened. Can you explain for the 
producers in my district why that decision was made, and where 
in law that we need to make those changes?
    Secretary Vilsack. I am happy to look into that 
circumstance. That doesn't sound right to me either, 
Congresswoman. I am happy to look into that.
    Mrs. Fischbach. Well, I would certainly appreciate some 
kind of a written response to that, because that is a huge 
concern. We just could not figure out why exactly that was the 
case. But, this does all tie back to one of the biggest 
concerns from producers in my district, and I heard from 
producers over and over about the confusing, and at times 
conflicting, information from the USDA as to what resources 
were available to them, what practices they can do when, and it 
goes on and on.
    My staff and I pulled together a resource page to help 
adjudicate some of these concerns, but I am concerned that 
information, decisions, and authorities are not clearly and 
accurately filtering down from Washington to the states, and to 
those farmers. I look forward to working with you to address 
these concerns and better clarify the authorities you need so 
that we are not just throwing money at a problem, and not 
really addressing the concerns and issues that farmers are 
facing, but we are better preparing and responding to the 
situations like this in the future. And, Mr. Chairman, with 
that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. 
Lawson, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lawson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. 
Secretary, welcome to this Committee. And I would like to say 
welcome to the most important Committee in Congress, because 
without food and poultry we have nothing. But my question 
centers around: for generations Black farmers and producers 
have been faced with systemic racism, and it shouldn't be a 
part of the farming effort in order to get information down and 
resources down to farmers that benefits all Americans, but for 
some reason, it has always been a part. I used to talk to 
former Secretary Perdue about this particular issue.
    I would like to know, because of this pandemic, and I have 
heard other Members complain about this. Sometimes we forget 
that we have been in a pandemic, they want everything right 
now. But because of this pandemic, what kind of relief and 
distribution investments and supplies, Mr. Vilsack, USDA are 
making to ensure that these programs are successful and 
beneficial for new and small socially disadvantaged livestock 
and poultry producers and processors?
    And I want to say this too, when minority farmers, because 
I have a lot of different farmers in the district, small 
farmers, when minority farmers sometimes are granted different 
resources for what has happened to them in the past, then some 
of my White farmers, they want to go to court because they feel 
like now they are being discriminated against for something 
they didn't get. When you are trying to make up the difference, 
and put them more on a level playing field, it becomes very 
difficult, as a Member, as you walk between these groups. And 
so, as a result, my question is what at the Department level 
can make people feel that things are fair, that they have just 
as much resources as anybody else, and some of the things we 
didn't do in the past that we are going to do in the future?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, there are a number of responses to 
that question, Congressman. First of all, we are, actually in 
the next several days, making--and maybe it was today--making a 
series of announcements of grants to cooperative organizations 
designed to provide additional outreach to distressed 
historically underserved producers so that they get information 
concerning the various programs and activities, and how to 
apply and participate in those programs.
    Second, we are looking for ways in which we can provide 
procurement opportunities. I mentioned earlier the temporary 
assistance program, where we are basically taking a look at 
ways in which we can create resources for local and regional 
distribution for sales to historically underserved producers to 
give them market opportunity.
    As part of the American Rescue Plan, you all passed Section 
1006, which is designed to expand technical access to 
information designed to help with market access and land 
access. We just recently announced the Heirs Property Rule to 
try to provide help and assistance to producers to be able to 
qualify for some of our programs, because they had fractionated 
interests of land. We need to get that title to land cleared so 
that they can apply for resources. So there are a variety of 
activities underway. There is also an internal review within 
USDA to identify any particular barriers that exist, and remove 
those barriers. And then we also just recently announced the 
formation of the Equity Commission called for under the 
American Rescue Plan, and President Biden's Executive Order, 
that will provide an outside look at our activities to make 
recommendations on how we may be able to reduce any barriers 
that may exist.
    The Chairman. Does the gentleman yield back?
    Mr. Lawson. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I am losing my 
voice.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you very much. The gentleman from 
California now, Mr. LaMalfa, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Actually, we are cutting a little rice right 
here in northern California on our farm. It is our last day, 
trying to beat the rain, so it is timely for Secretary Vilsack 
to check out the----
    The Chairman. Mr. LaMalfa, you might want to speak a little 
closer to your microphone. We are having a little difficulty 
hearing you.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thanks for your indulgence there. Secretary, 
thanks for being at our hearing today, as I come from our 
combine in NorCal. So just a couple quick things. First of all, 
I appreciate your attention to these issues for us. Here in my 
northern California district, livestock grazing is an extremely 
important tool for vegetation management, and that is, as you 
know, very huge, since we have had over 1\1/2\ million acres of 
fire in our forested areas, where grazing can be a big help in 
those forests, and in the periphery around it. So we have seen, 
with the permitted and vacant allotments, that the forests have 
become overgrown, so we need a lot more effort on that.
    So, there were, as of June of 2019, 211 vacant U.S. Forest 
Service Region 5 grazing allotments. What can we do to get 
those back into circulation again, to get more cattle, sheep, 
and goats helping out? Because certainly we are under the gun 
with the amount of fire we have each year. And, as a side note, 
I hope we can get the Forest Service really cracking on the 
restoration that needs to be done, because we are going to have 
so much erosion that is going to get into our waterways as 
well. But what can we do to speed up the grazing allotments?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, thanks for the question. First of 
all is to make sure that the vacant areas that you are 
referring to, are they vacant for a reason or not? Are they 
just simply vacant? Sometimes there are vacant lots because 
they have been over-utilized, and it is rotational grazing. 
Sometimes there is a scientific reason why we can't allow 
grazing. We want to make sure we don't disrupt the science. But 
to the extent that we have vacant lots, sometimes we have them 
for these kinds of circumstances, so I am sure the Forest 
Service will be moving as quickly as possible, for those lots 
that are appropriate, to create access for those folks who have 
lost their grazing rights because of fire.
    I will tell you, Congressman, I couldn't agree with you 
more. We do need to do a lot more restoration, but at the end 
of the day, it is really about finances, and that is it is 
important for the infrastructure bill, that is why it is 
important for the reconciliation bill to get passed, because it 
is going to provide sufficient resources for us not to continue 
to do what we have been doing for far too long, which is simply 
putting fires out. It takes about $50,000 an acre to put a fire 
out. It takes about $1,400 an acre to adequately treat an acre, 
so it is cost-efficient for us to treat more acres, but 
continually have to rob Peter to pay Paul. So I am looking 
forward to----
    Mr. LaMalfa. Yes. Thank you. I just toured much of the area 
yesterday in my district. There are so many dead ghost trees. 
We are going to have hundreds of thousands of acres of dead 
trees, and whatever grazing can do to help in between that will 
be huge. Let me touch on, too, the situation with our ports, as 
I know you are painfully aware, with our ports here on the West 
Coast, there are many, many ships out there, and that means we 
are not also loading up our ag products to go back overseas 
from port, and there are so many almonds we grow here in 
California. Could you touch on a little bit, please, on how far 
USDA's been able to get with the Department of Transportation 
and Maritime on just helping break the backlog, and make sure 
that agriculture is served in putting something back on these 
empty containers that seem to be going across the seas?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I think I heard most of that 
question, Congressman. I will try to respond. We have been in 
contact with the Maritime Commission. As you know, it is an 
independent Federal regulatory agency, so there is limited 
capacity that we have to basically force them to do things, but 
we have strongly encouraged them to do what they can to break 
up the congestion, to deal with the issue of empty containers. 
We have also worked with John Porcari, who the President has 
appointed as a special envoy, and most recently we identified 
money within CCC to be able to be used as we determine what we 
can do, whether it is pallets, whether it is workers, whether 
it is incentives for empty containers to be filled with 
agricultural products, resources that can potentially be used 
to provide some help and assistance. That is our intent. About 
$500 million is available now to help. If you have some 
suggestions and ideas about that, we would welcome them.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Okay. We will send those in. I appreciate the 
time. I will leave you with a little more harvest scenery here, 
so take care, sir.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlelady now from Illinois, 
Mrs. Miller, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Miller. Thank you so much, Mr. Secretary. I am 
grateful for the opportunity today to address questions and 
concerns, of producers, and I want to say that I understand 
from personal experience. My husband and I have been running a 
multi-generational family farm and cow-calf operation, and our 
two adult sons are now struggling to carry on. So many of these 
concerns, I have a deep understanding of, and they definitely 
affect many of our neighbors and friends that are involved in 
this industry.
    So, Mr. Secretary, in your testimony you mentioned that the 
Department will be complementing the proposed Packers and 
Stockyards rules with enhanced market transparency tools under 
our Market News Service and Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act, 
would you please explain what sorts of tools you are referring 
to?
    Secretary Vilsack. We just issued two additional studies to 
provide additional resources and information that would 
provide, based on LMR data. We also had a webinar recently to 
give folks a better understanding of how to utilize LMR, so 
additional Market News reports and webinars to make sure that 
producers are fully aware. We will continue to look for ways in 
which we can, as I mentioned earlier, utilize libraries so 
people understand and appreciate, as well contract provisions 
that may be fair and reasonable to be included in their 
contracts.
    Mrs. Miller. Thank you, and I look forward to having access 
to you to bring ideas from the producers. I know you are aware 
many in the cattle industry and in Congress are eager to learn 
the results of the DOJ's investigation of beef packers 
announced in the summer of 2020. To date, the DOJ has not 
provided any updates regarding investigation status, or 
conclusive reports resulting from its review. Would you please 
describe how the USDA collaborates with or supports the DOJ 
during such an investigation, and do you have insight on when 
we can expect to see the conclusion of the investigation?
    Secretary Vilsack. I don't have insight in terms of when 
the DOJ will finish their work, but I will tell you that USDA 
is engaged and involved in providing the technical assistance, 
the data, the information that the DOJ requests. We are sort of 
the depository of a lot of information, a lot of data, about 
the market which the DOJ requests, and we provide it as they 
request it so that they can make a proper evaluation and 
determination.
    Mrs. Miller. Okay. And we look forward to getting more of 
that information. And finally, Mr. Secretary, when the 
President promised not to raise taxes on anyone making less 
than $400,000 a year, is it reasonable to presume that the 
promise included farm and ranch families? Can you guarantee 
that no rancher who makes less than $400,000 per year will face 
new taxes, or increased borrowing costs due to the President's 
support for drastically reducing the estate tax exemption?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, I don't think there is--the 
President hasn't made any recommendation to reduce the estate 
tax exemption. That is still $11 million, and I don't think 
there has been any change that is been proposed there. I think 
what you might be asking about is the stepped-up basis. That is 
a different issue, and I will tell you that our ERS has taken a 
look at this, and they have concluded not once but twice that 
roughly 98 percent of the family farms in this country are not 
going to be impacted and affected by this, and so I would stand 
on the ERS study. I would be happy to provide it to you if you 
have not had a chance to read it.
    Mrs. Miller. Are you saying that rolling that back is not 
going to affect the family farm or ranch?
    Secretary Vilsack. I am sorry, what?
    Mrs. Miller. Did you just say that rolling back the 
stepped-up basis is not going to affect them?
    Secretary Vilsack. Well, that is because there are two very 
important conditions here. One is if the farm continues to be 
owned and operated by the family, there is no impact. There is 
no tax due, there is no capital gains that is due at that point 
in time. Second, if, in fact, at some point in time in the 
future the family decides to sell the farm and get out of the 
farming business, there are exemptions, $1 million a person. 
When you combine the exemptions, and the fact that the vast 
majority of farms that are being transferred will continue to 
be owned and operated by the family, you are talking about 98 
percent of the farms.
    The people that are going to be impacted by this are people 
like me. I am an owner of a farm, my kids are never going to be 
farmers. The farm I own has appreciated over the last 30 years 
that I have owned it, and the reality is, if my kids sell it, 
then, frankly, I am okay with them having to pay tax, because I 
am not a farmer, they are not farmers. We are trying to protect 
the family farm, and I think the family farms are being 
protected.
    The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
    Mrs. Miller. Rolling back stepped-up basis is the end of 
the family farm.
    Secretary Vilsack. I don't agree, respectfully.
    The Chairman. The gentlelady from Louisiana, Ms. Letlow, is 
recognized now for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Letlow. Thank you, Chairman Scott. Secretary Vilsack, 
it is an honor to have you before the House Agriculture 
Committee today. As one of the newest Members of this 
Committee, and in Congress, this is my first hearing 
opportunity to discuss with you the essential role agriculture 
plays throughout Louisiana's 5th District, and the challenges 
our producers are facing throughout the state. As you know, 
just last month Louisiana, and the southeastern part of my 
district, was hit really hard by Hurricane Ida. While our 
agriculture community works to recovery from this devastating 
storm, many other producers across my state still await 
assistance in the aftermath of Hurricanes Laura and Delta of 
last year.
    Since taking office, it has remained a top priority of mine 
to secure vital disaster assistance for the hardworking 
farmers, ranchers, and forestland owners back home. That is why 
last week I voted in support of critical disaster relief that 
will help Louisianans rebuild their homes and livelihoods. The 
continuing resolution also included the much anticipated 
extension of the WHIP+ Program for 2020 and 2021 natural 
disasters. I urge you and your staff to provide our communities 
with some certainty in a time of hardship by getting these 
funds in the hands of our farmers as quickly as possible.
    On September 8, USDA announced its plans to help cover 
costs of transporting feed for livestock that rely on grazing 
by updating the Emergency Assistance for Livestock, Honeybees, 
and Farm-Raised Fish Program, specific to drought impacted 
producers. While not due to the drought, ranchers throughout 
Hurricane Ida's path have experienced similar issues on the 
opposite end of the spectrum. Livestock producers in coastal 
parishes that don't typically store much feed or hay were left 
with pasture land inundated with salt water surge. 
Additionally, ranchers that do store some hay haven't been able 
to cut much, if any, this year due to abnormally wet weather. 
My office inquired with the USDA about expanding this same 
assistance to individuals having to haul in feed as a result of 
the storm. In response, it is my understanding that the change 
gives the flexibility to consider this program for other events 
when USDA has determined a shortage of local or regional feed 
availability.
    Mr. Secretary, I wanted to take this opportunity today to 
express that the need for assistance is there, and Louisiana 
agriculture stakeholders are currently working to gather the 
appropriate data to quantify this need. As you work to develop 
this policy, are you committed to ensuring other events, such 
as Hurricane Ida, will be given full consideration to access 
this program?
    Secretary Vilsack. Yes.
    Ms. Letlow. Great. Okay. Thank you for that, and I look 
forward to working with you on this issue, as well as other 
standing disaster programs, and how we can make them work more 
efficiently in the next farm bill. Thank you so much for your 
time. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Letlow. And with that, Mr. 
Secretary, we have completed our questions for you. We want to 
thank you for your participation, and for the thoughtful and 
very informative presentation that you have given, and 
answering our questions. Thank you very much.
    Secretary Vilsack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. And now, Mr. Secretary, you are excused.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, and those who are 
watching us on C-SPAN, I have a very important announcement. In 
order for us to reset the room for our third panel of five very 
outstanding livestock industry representatives and witnesses, 
we are going to have to reset the room, pause, for 15 minutes, 
and then we will return at exactly 3:05. And so, without 
objection, the Committee now stands in recess for 15 minutes. 
We will be back with an exciting, informative panel of five 
industry witnesses at exactly 3:05.
    [Recess.]
    The Chairman. The Committee will now come to order, and we 
are now ready to move on to our third panel of distinguished 
witnesses today, and we all are very excited about hearing from 
each of you, because you represent really where the action is 
when it comes to our livestock animal agriculture. And we are 
so delighted that you are here, and taking the time to give us 
your wisdom, your knowledge, in terms of the great challenges 
that we are facing to make sure we address the right way all of 
the concerns that are resting with our very precious, and I 
mean that sincerely, our livestock animal part of our food 
supply is most important to us, and around the world, in terms 
of our trade negotiations.
    And so let us start with our distinguished fellow Member of 
Congress, the distinguished gentleman from South Dakota, 
Representative Dusty Johnson, to introduce our very first 
witness today. Representative Johnson, you are now recognized.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this 
opportunity. We all have people we know in our lives who are 
widely acknowledged to be wise, to be thoughtful, to be fair, 
and our speaker from South Dakota today is those things, and he 
has come by that wisdom, Mr. Chairman, honestly. I have to tell 
you, when you look at his resume, you can see that he's been 
out doing it, as you alluded to at the top of this hearing, 
sir. This gentleman, with his son, has been a cow-calf 
producer. He is the co-owner of a small feeding operation. He 
has served in leadership roles at the state level, and now at 
the national level as well. When this gentleman speaks, his 
friends and his neighbors listen, and I know, Mr. Chairman, I 
certainly do listen to him. So, without any further ado, it is 
an honor for me to recognize my friend, and fellow South 
Dakotan, Todd Wilkinson.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And now our next 
witness on this panel is Mr. Francois Leger, I hope I got that 
right, from the great State of Georgia, my own state. He is the 
owner of FPL Food, and he's here to testify on behalf of our 
North American Meat Institute.
    Our third witness on the panel is Mr. Scott Blubaugh, who 
is the President of the Oklahoma Farmers Union, and is here 
testifying on behalf of the National Farmers Union.
    Our fourth witness on this panel today is Mr. Scott Hays, 
who is the Vice President of the National Pork Producers 
Council.
    And our fifth, and final, witness on this panel is Mr. Brad 
Boner, who is the Vice President of the American Sheep 
Association.
    Such a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today, 
and we are so delighted to have you, and thank you for taking 
some of your valuable time to come before this Committee and 
give us this important knowledge that we need on this Committee 
so we can make the correct decisions that are impacting our 
livestock industry.
    Now, let me just give you a few directions. The timer will 
be visible to you on your screen, and you will have a countdown 
to zero, at which point your time has expired. Each of you will 
have 5 minutes. Now let me start with Mr. Wilkinson. Please 
begin when you are ready.

     STATEMENT OF TODD WILKINSON, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL 
           CATTLEMEN'S BEEF ASSOCIATION, DE SMET, SD

    Mr. Wilkinson. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and 
Members of the Committee, on behalf of America's cattle 
producers, thank you for inviting me to testify today. My name 
is Todd Wilkinson, and I am currently serving as the Vice 
President of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association. 
Together with my son, I own and operate a cow-calf and feeding 
operation in South Dakota. Additionally, I maintain a law 
practice focused largely on ag law. I am testifying today on 
behalf of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association, the U.S. 
cattle and beef industry's oldest and largest national trade 
association. Our role at NCBA is to facilitate a policy process 
that respects differing perspectives, consults informed 
expertise, allows for robust debate, and ultimately arrives at 
grassroots policy positions that are representative of the 
entire industry. It is from this perspective that I offer my 
remarks.
    Cattle production is inherently challenging. Even in a good 
year the differences between making a profit and a loss depend 
upon factors outside of the rancher's and farmer's control. Let 
me be clear, the past few years have been anything but good. As 
producers struggled to get by, the large meat packers rake in 
record breaking profits, profits that have not been equitably 
shared with cattle producers. The current marketing situation 
brought on by COVID, cybersecurity, plant fires, countless 
other factors, have even the most seasoned industry veterans 
asking for changes. Something has to give. Because the 
challenges facing our industry are so diverse, it is imperative 
that policymakers at all levels of the government remain 
focused on viable and tenable solutions with vast industry buy-
in. NCBA is working through these problems, and has 
consistently come back to four points.
    First, price discovery. Adequate negotiated trade volumes 
are critical to our market's function. Thanks to efforts of 
producers, negotiated trade volumes are up. Some meat packers, 
however, have yet to demonstrate a serious commitment to 
purchasing cattle on a negotiated basis. AMAs are very 
important to the fed cattle trade. NCBA supports their 
continued use, as they fit the unique business models of cattle 
producers. However, equally as important is the price discovery 
drive from direct buyer-seller negotiations.
    Second, market transparency. Since the enactment of the 
Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act, cattle producers have 
benefitted from consistent and timely reports. That is 
currently up for reauthorization, and as it is up for 
reauthorization, we ask you to make changes in LMR to increase 
transparency.
    Third, processing capacity. Much of the problem in this 
industry is processing capacity. Currently there is a serious 
shortage of hook space. The industry could economically 
accommodate another 5,700 hooks of daily processing capacity. 
Help is needed for new independent regional and small 
producers. Look, we understand supply and demand. The problem 
is demand is excellent. We are moving record amounts of beef. 
The issue is the ability to process it. Big supplies forced 
into a narrow funnel result in the packers exercising too much 
market control.
    Finally, market oversight. Markets can only function when 
all participants play by the same rules, which, while much of 
the spread between box beef and fed cattle prices can be 
explained on supply and demand, NCBA called on the Department 
of Justice to investigate the major packers in June of 2020. 
The purpose of this request was to ensure that no anti-
competitive behavior has taken place. To date, we have not 
learned the results of that investigation. Our question is how 
long does it take to do an investigation?
    The message I am here to deliver today is that complex 
problems rarely have simple solutions. Regardless of the origin 
of today's problem, it is clear there is no silver bullet. We 
strongly urge Congress to resist one-size-fits-all policy 
prescriptions, which may have disastrous unintended 
consequences. Careful consideration must be given to the risk/
reward of enacting market influencing laws for hundreds of 
thousands of American ranchers, and millions of beef consumers. 
Lawmakers should adopt a multi-pronged approach to bring relief 
to cattle producers, transparency to the markets, and 
resiliency to the supply chain.
    In closing, Mr. Chairman, it has been a difficult few years 
for the cattle producers, but this Committee's desire to aid 
our industry has not gone unnoticed. We appreciate your 
leadership, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I stand willing to 
handle any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Wilkinson follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Todd Wilkinson, Vice President, National 
               Cattlemen's Beef Association, De Smet, SD
Introduction
    Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the 
Committee, on behalf of America's cattle producers, thank you for 
inviting me to offer testimony on this important issue.
    My name is Todd Wilkinson, and I currently serve as Vice President 
of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association. I am a second generation 
rancher and live in De Smet, SD. I own and operate a cow-calf and 
cattle backgrounding operation with my son, who is the third generation 
of our family to work the ranch. Additionally, I run a small cattle 
feeding facility and maintain a law practice, where I assist other 
farmers and ranchers with estate planning and other agricultural law 
issues.
    The National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA), on whose behalf I 
testify today, is the U.S. cattle and beef industry's oldest and 
largest national trade association. In addition to our 25,000 direct 
members, NCBA represents forty-four state cattlemen's associations with 
collective memberships numbering some 175,000 cattle producers--each of 
whom has a voice in our grassroots policy-making process. It is 
important to note that well in excess of 90 percent of those members 
are family-owned business entities involved in the cow-calf, stocker/
backgrounder, and feeding sectors of the supply chain. In other words, 
like myself, true ranchers and farmers.
    In a grassroots membership base as diverse as ours, it necessarily 
follows that business models and opinions are equally diverse. Just as 
cattle production in the western United States is very different than 
in the Midwest or Southeast, so too are the methods by which our 
producers choose to market cattle between segments of the supply chain. 
Our role at NCBA is to facilitate a policy process that respects those 
differing perspectives, consults informed expertise, allows for robust 
discussion and debate, and ultimately arrives at policy positions that 
are representative of the entire industry.
Background
    The present situation unfolding within the U.S. cattle markets is 
highly complex and multifaceted. Some of the underlying dynamics at 
play have been present in our industry for some time. Other factors 
have emerged more recently. Independent of the origins of the issues 
themselves, the present conversations on how best to address them were 
recently elevated as a result of two major events.
    In August of 2019, a fire at Tyson Foods' Finney County beef plant 
in Holcomb, KS wreaked havoc upon the cattle markets. In the days 
following the fire, live cattle prices declined substantially while 
boxed beef values soared.\1\ At the peak of this market volatility, the 
spread between fed cattle and boxed beef prices reached $67.17/cwt--at 
the time, the widest gap since records began under Livestock Mandatory 
Reporting (LMR).\2\ While the supply shocks brought about by this 
``black swan'' event created severe challenges for cattle producers, 
those hardships were dwarfed by those brought on by the COVID-19 
pandemic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Boxed Beef & Fed Cattle Price Spread Investigation Report. 
USDA-AMS: 2020.
    \2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As meatpacking plants began to temporarily close, whether due to 
isolated outbreaks of the virus or to comply with local public health 
orders, cattle supplies began to build up across all segments of the 
supply chain. At the height of the pandemic, the industry realized a 
roughly 40 percent decline in beef processing capacity utilization.\3\ 
The resulting supply and demand dynamics showed similar results to the 
Holcomb fire: fed cattle prices fell by 18 percent and boxed beef 
prices skyrocketed 80 percent.\4\ While the industry has made great 
strides toward recovery, the effects of COVID-19 are still being felt 
by cattle producers today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Ibid.
    \4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The marketing environment for livestock these past several years 
has been immensely challenging for farmers and ranchers nationwide. 
Input costs have continued to rise and prices paid for cattle have not 
comparably risen from recent lows. As previously noted, some of these 
challenges were brought about because of the pandemic; others existed 
before and were merely accentuated by the immense volatility that 
COVID-19 brought to our markets. Earlier this year, USDA requested 
comments from the agricultural sector on ways to strengthen our supply 
chains.\5\ NCBA submitted exhaustive comments to this docket, and some 
of the issues discussed therein overlap with those the Committee is 
exploring today. Thus, those comments have been attached to this 
testimony for the Committee's consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ 86 Fed. Reg. 20652; Docket No. AMS-TM-21-0034.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because the challenges facing our industry are so diverse, it is 
imperative that policy makers at all levels of government remain 
focused on viable and tenable solutions with vast industry buy-in. Let 
me be clear, there is no such thing as a silver bullet. We strongly 
urge Congress to resist one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions.
Recent NCBA Engagement on Cattle Marketing Issues
    NCBA has maintained a standing Live Cattle Marketing Committee for 
many years, and often employs a working group of market participants, 
state affiliates, and outside experts to research specific issues and 
offer objective guidance that may be used in the development of NCBA 
policies. While a few outside observers have been critical of NCBA's 
approach and policies, we have remained committed to respecting the 
direction and intent passed by our tens of thousands of grassroots 
members through our policy process. We strongly recommend against 
discounting those voices around the country simply because they do not 
align with those of one particular lawmaker, region, or organization. 
As our organization has navigated the complexities of the myriad 
challenges at play, and the differing opinions on how best to address 
them, we have consistently come back to four main issues.
Price Discovery
    While long-term declines of negotiated trades of fed cattle had 
already begun an industry-wide discussion on the subject of price 
discovery, the Holcomb Fire and COVID-19 underscored the urgency of 
resolving this issue. In July 2020, NCBA's Live Cattle Marketing 
Committee met to discuss policy proposals as part of our organization's 
2020 Summer Business Meeting. Producer leaders from more than forty 
state cattlemen's associations worked for more than 6 hours to craft a 
policy that would help resolve concerns about live cattle marketing 
issues and lead the industry toward more robust price discovery. The 
NCBA Committee considered several proposals, each aimed at achieving 
greater volumes of negotiated cattle trade. After debate, the NCBA 
Committee recommended, and the NCBA Board of Directors approved, a 
policy that supports voluntary efforts to improve negotiated trade 
volumes with the potential for a legislative or regulatory solution in 
the future should robust regional trade numbers not be achieved.
    As mandated by this member-passed policy, NCBA leadership appointed 
a subgroup of the Live Cattle Marketing Working Group to develop a 
framework by which NCBA would monitor negotiated trades and establish 
benchmarks of weekly volumes. In October of 2020, the group announced 
this plan and issued a report titled, ``A Voluntary Approach to Achieve 
Robust Price Discovery in the Fed Cattle Market.''
    NCBA implemented this framework in January 2021. Since that time, 
cattle feeders within USDA's five major cattle feeding reporting 
regions (the ``5-Area'') \6\ have responded to the need for more 
negotiated trade in order to improve price discovery at the fed cattle 
level. In an impressively short period of time, many cattle producers, 
particularly in the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas regions, have 
adjusted longstanding business models to offer more cattle on a 
negotiated basis. In some cases, they have even traded cattle to 
achieve these weekly benchmarks despite short-term market indicators 
that prices would improve the following week. Our members' commitment 
to the success of this voluntary effort cannot be overstated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Alphabetically, USDA's five LMR reporting regions are: 
Colorado, Iowa-Minnesota, Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas-Oklahoma-New 
Mexico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We evaluate our framework on a quarterly basis, and have 
established a series of benchmarks (which we call ``triggers'') to 
inform the progress being made toward robust price discovery. 
Negotiated trade volumes were substantially higher across the country 
during the first quarter, though this progress still fell short of our 
established triggers. In the second quarter, however, cattle producers 
again rose to the occasion to trend even higher--on par with our 
triggers, and the preliminary results from the third quarter are also 
promising.\7\ This is certainly a marked improvement from trends 
observed even 1 year ago, and cattle producers deserve high praise for 
this work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Negotiated trade volumes by region are attached for 
convenience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All transactions require both a willing buyer and a willing seller. 
As evidenced by the negotiated trade volumes exhibited in the first and 
second quarters, cattle producers have been willing to sell their 
cattle on a negotiated basis, rather than utilizing alternative 
marketing arrangements (AMAs), such as formulas and forward contracts. 
Still, some meatpackers have yet to demonstrate a serious commitment to 
purchasing cattle on a negotiated basis. This jeopardizes our efforts 
to improve price discovery since the packer represents the buy-side of 
a cattle producer's ledger. NCBA recently completed an addition to our 
voluntary framework which will allow us to gauge whether or not the 
largest meatpackers are participating in negotiated trade at sufficient 
levels. Known as the ``packer participation silo,'' this addendum has 
been in place since the beginning of 2021's third quarter, and we 
expect to see its first results in mid-October.
    AMAs are very important in the fed cattle trade, and NCBA supports 
their continued use as they fit the unique business models of many 
cattle producers. They allow cattlemen and women to earn premiums for 
higher quality cattle and mitigate those risks associated with selling 
in the spot market. However, equally as important, is the price 
discovery derived from direct, buyer-seller negotiations. Just as NCBA 
and industry experts warn against a total rejection of AMAs, we also 
know that lack of participation in the negotiated market will similarly 
result in dire consequences for our industry. The benefits of AMAs 
cannot be allowed to come at the cost of robust price discovery. There 
must be a balance. That is why we continue to explore new means to 
encourage greater use of the cash market and negotiated grids through 
our voluntary framework.
    While more improvements are still needed to achieve consistency, 
including adequate meatpacker participation in the negotiated market, 
these results are encouraging. As new and innovative price discovery 
tools continue to emerge, we are confident our industry will continue 
to progress toward robust price discovery in the near-term future.
Market Transparency
    Since enactment of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act in 
1999,\8\ cattle producers have benefitted from the consistent and 
timely reporting of market information by USDA. Producers utilize this 
information to make informed marketing decisions that best suit their 
unique business needs. LMR requires Congressional reauthorization every 
5 years, and was set to expire at the end of Fiscal Year 2020. A 1 year 
extension of the program was included in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2021,\9\ and it was temporarily extended again 
via the most recent continuing resolution. The program is currently set 
to expire on December 3, 2021. NCBA strongly supports LMR and urges 
Congress to ensure that this critical tool does not expire.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ P.L. 106-78.
    \9\ P.L. 116-260.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Though LMR is essential to cattle producers, improvements could be 
made to the program to increase transparency within the cattle markets. 
Though many of these proposals can be adopted through the regulatory 
process, NCBA supports the establishment of a cattle contract library, 
reporting of formula base prices, and next-day carcass weight reporting 
among other things. We believe that this new information could further 
benefit producers as they market their cattle.
    USDA is required by law to protect the confidential business 
information of entities who report market information under LMR.\10\ To 
implement this mandate, USDA established the ``3/70/20'' 
confidentiality guidelines in 2001. Under this provision, price reports 
are published provided each report meets three conditions over the most 
recent 60 day period:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ 7 U.S.C.  1636(a).

  (1)  At least three reporting entities provide data at least 50 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            percent of the time;

  (2)  No single reporting entity provides more than 70 percent of the 
            data for a report; and

  (3)  No single reporting entity may be the sole reporting entity for 
            an individual report more than 20 percent of the time.

    While NCBA recognizes the Agency's statutory requirement to balance 
information with confidentiality, the 3/70/20 guidelines have often 
resulted in withheld reports throughout the major cattle feeding 
regions--most frequently in the Colorado region. NCBA supports efforts 
to revisit confidentiality rules to reduce instances of nonreporting, 
and will continue to work alongside allies on Capitol Hill and with 
USDA to ensure this critical information remains accessible to cattle 
producers.
    The reporting of formula transactions is another area where 
improvements to transparency could be made. Formulas are one of four 
transaction types reported by USDA under LMR, but it is the only type 
that is not clearly defined. Whereas negotiated grids, negotiated cash 
trades, and contracts are denoted by clear parameters and transaction 
structure, formulas are a catch-all for those trades which do not meet 
the definition of the other three. In an effort to bring more 
transparency to the formula bucket, we were pleased to see USDA 
announce they would begin publication of two new LMR reports on the 
subject. The National Daily Direct Formula Base Cattle report shares 
national base price information of formula agreements. The National 
Weekly Cattle Net Price Distribution reports the price and volume 
levels at which trade occurred across the weekly weighted average price 
for each purchase type--negotiated, negotiated grid, formula, and 
forward contract. The addition of these new publications will allow 
producers to better compare their marketing arrangement to others and 
allow them to make more informed business decisions on their 
operations. This was a tremendous step in the right direction, and NCBA 
encourages the enactment of similar transparency measures to shed more 
light on activity in the formula bucket.
    Cattle producers demand transparent markets in which to trade their 
livestock, and NCBA will work alongside all our Federal partners to 
improve transparency wherever possible. At the 2021 Cattle Industry 
Convention & NCBA Trade Show in Nashville in August, voting delegates 
from NCBA's various affiliates adopted a directive to establish a 
working group of cattle producers to explore issues related to market 
information, transparency, and reporting. The cattlemen and women who 
were appointed to this working group had their first meeting last week. 
Over the course of the next several months, they will explore issues 
relating to LMR confidentiality, market transparency, captive supply, 
Packers & Stockyards, economic research, and reporting thresholds. They 
will report their findings to NCBA's Live Cattle Marketing Committee in 
February 2022, and may recommend further policies to build upon our 
existing market transparency efforts.
Processing Capacity
    Adequate beef processing capacity is critical to maintaining 
profitability in the cattle industry and providing a steady supply of 
essential food products to American consumers. Currently, there is a 
serious shortage of processing capacity (commonly referred to as ``hook 
space'') throughout the beef production system. A recent study by 
RaboBank found that excess operational beef processing capacity--or 
hooks available in addition to those used to process existing fed 
cattle supplies--fell to zero in late 2016 and turned negative in early 
2017. The same study found that, under the current dynamics of supply 
and demand, the industry could economically accommodate an additional 
5,700 hooks of daily processing capacity. This equates to roughly 1.5 
million additional animals per year.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Aherin, Dustin. The Case for Capacity. RaboBank: 2020.
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    At present, the processing sector represents a bottleneck in the 
overall beef supply chain. The result has a negative effect on cattle 
producer leverage in fed cattle negotiations. When cattle supplies 
exceed the capacity to process them, the livestock become a less scarce 
resource and cattle prices decline. It is important to note that this 
is independent of demand for beef. Even when demand for U.S. beef is 
strong, a lack of processing capacity depresses prices for live cattle. 
The most pointed examples of this can be found in the Holcomb fire and 
COVID-19. In both cases, operational beef processing capacity 
utilization fell dramatically following temporary closures of high-
throughput beef plants. As a result, cattle prices declined, and boxed 
beef values drastically increased.
    To improve producer leverage in fed cattle negotiations, either 
cattle supplies must be reduced, or processing capacity must be 
expanded. Herd contractions and expansions occur naturally over the 
course of a somewhat predictable 10 year cycle. Currently, U.S. cattle 
inventories are cyclically high,\12\ but beef demand is also high both 
domestically and in our major export markets.\13\ Therefore, the 
clearest solution to meeting this demand while fostering profitability 
throughout the supply chain is not to shrink the cattle herd, but 
rather to expand beef processing capacity.
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    \12\ Cattle Report, USDA-NASS, January 2021.
    \13\ Factors that Drive Beef, Cattle Prices to Record Highs. 
RaboBank: 2021.
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    Meatpackers of all sizes face similar operational challenges, the 
most consistent and severe of which is labor recruitment and retention. 
The largest barrier to entry, however, is access to sufficient capital 
for construction. The industry average startup cost for a meat 
processing facility is roughly $100,000 per hook.\14\ This means that a 
modest 25 head per day plant would need to secure $2.5 million in 
financing just to build the infrastructure. As a further complication, 
traditional lending institutions are often unable to provide adequate 
financing due to the risk profile assessed to meatpacking business 
models. NCBA supported legislation such as the Butcher Block Act,\15\ 
introduced by bipartisan Members of this Committee, to provide Federal 
assistance to new processors, or those who wish to expand operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Newlin, Lacey. So You Want to Build a Slaughter Plant? High 
Plains Journal: 2020
    \15\ H.R. 4140 (117th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We were further pleased to see USDA acknowledge this need for more 
processing infrastructure and welcomed the Agency's announcement that 
over $500 million would be committed to support new market entrants in 
expanding beef packing capacity. While the addition of any new hook 
space is beneficial to remedy the current supply and demand imbalance, 
focusing on bringing more very small and small processors to market can 
provide producers additional options for processing and diversification 
for more resiliency within the sector overall. We submitted comments to 
USDA in response to their Request for Information,\16\ and have 
attached those comments to this testimony for the Committee's 
convenience.
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    \16\ 86 Fed. Reg. 37728; Docket No. AMS-TM-21-0058.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market Oversight
    Markets can only properly function when all participants play by 
the same rules. While much of the spread between boxed beef and fed 
cattle prices during the pandemic can be explained by the inherent 
characteristics of supply and demand, NCBA called upon the Department 
of Justice to investigate the major meatpackers in June 2020. The 
purpose of this request was to ensure that no anticompetitive behavior 
or illicit activity contributed to these disparate prices paid for 
similar commodities. To date, we have not learned the results of this 
investigation, nor have we received definitive confirmation that it is 
still ongoing. Over 100 lawmakers have signed onto letters requesting a 
status update from the Attorney General, and NCBA supported most of 
these efforts. It is imperative that cattle producers learn the 
Department's findings at the earliest possible opportunity. They 
deserve transparency and accountability.
NCBA Recommendations
    Throughout cattle marketing conversations over the past sixteen 
months, a small but vocal minority has suggested--and continues to 
suggest--that low cattle prices can be remedied or balanced simply 
through a government mandated marketing requirement. This is not 
accurate. Definitively, there is no simple solution sufficient to 
address the myriad challenges facing our industry. To suggest that any 
single legislative, regulatory, or industry-led action will solve all 
these problems is to grossly oversimplify and mislead. Rather, progress 
and marked improvement will require a multifaceted response from the 
industry, Congress, and Federal agencies.
    In Congress, lawmakers should focus their efforts on bringing more 
transparency to the cattle marketplace, supporting small- and mid-size 
beef packers, promoting expansion of processing capacity, ensuring a 
timely reauthorization of LMR, reviewing the confidentiality 
obligations required of USDA, and continuing oversight of the 
Department of Justice to ensure their ongoing investigation reaches a 
swift conclusion. We are continually reminded that a handful of 
lawmakers, are curious about legislation to require certain levels of 
negotiated trade, such as the Cattle Market Transparency Act \17\ and 
legislation known as ``50/14.'' \18\ Per our member-driven, grassroots 
policy, NCBA opposes government mandates in the cattle market at this 
time. Our industry-led effort to achieve price discovery must be 
allowed the opportunity to succeed or fail before our membership 
decides to seek a legislative or regulatory solution. Simply put, the 
midst of an ongoing market crisis is never a good time to make long-
term, market altering statutory changes. Careful consideration must be 
given to the risk and reward of enacting market-influencing laws for 
hundreds of thousands of American ranchers and millions of avid beef 
consumers.
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    \17\ S. 543 (117th Cong.).
    \18\ S. 949 (117th Cong.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As Congress evaluates several legislative proposals intended to 
help cattle producers during these uncertain times, we urge thorough 
vetting and attentive evaluation of economic assessments and feedback 
from the entire cattle industry. As we have for over fifty years, NCBA 
is happy to assist the Committee in this endeavor.
Conclusion
    I appreciate this opportunity to testify on behalf of NCBA's 
members--the men and women who put beef on the American dinner plate. 
It has been a difficult few years for cattle producers, and this 
Committee's desire to aid our industry during this time has not gone 
unnoticed. Your attention to these issues is greatly appreciated. As we 
continue to discuss creative solutions and potential paths forwards, we 
stand ready to assist in any way. Please do not hesitate to reach out 
to the NCBA Center for Public Policy at (202) 347-0228 with any 
questions.
                              Attachment 1
NCBA Supply Chain Comments (Docket No. AMS-TM-21-0034)
June 21, 2021

  Dr. Melissa R. Bailey,
  Agricultural Marketing Service,
  U.S. Department of Agriculture,
  Washington, D.C.

  FR Docket No. AMS-TM-21-0034 (86 Fed. Reg. 20652)

  Submitted via Regulations.gov
National Cattlemen's Beef Association Comments on Supply Chains for the 
        Production of Agricultural Commodities and Food Products
    The National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA) appreciates the 
opportunity to submit comments in response to the Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS) Notice on Supply Chains for the Production of 
Agricultural Commodities and Food Products published on April 21, 2021, 
and NCBA looks forward to partnering with the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) on initiatives to bolster cattle and beef supply 
chain resiliency under President Biden's ``America's Supply Chains'' 
Executive Order 14017.
    NCBA is the oldest and largest national trade association 
representing the interest of cattle producers, with both direct members 
and over 250,000 members represented through its 44 state affiliate 
associations. Producer-driven and directed, the following comments 
largely focus on an array of pre-harvest matters. Given the complexity 
and diversity of domestic cattle and beef production and the varied 
issues facing each segment of production, it is important to note that 
these comments should not be considered all-inclusive but are 
reflective of our membership's priorities and the current challenges 
facing U.S. cattle producers.
Cattle Production is the Most Important Segment of the U.S. 
        Agricultural Industry
    According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) 2017 
Census of Agriculture, the United States has more than 720,000 cattle 
ranches and farms which account for 35 percent of all U.S. agricultural 
operations. According to USDA-ERS, cattle production is the most 
important agricultural industry in the United States, accounting for 
$62 billion in cash receipts in 2020.\1\ In 2021, cattle production is 
forecasted to represent about 17 percent of the $391 billion in total 
cash receipts for agricultural commodities.\2\
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    \1\ USDA Economic Research Service, ``Annual Cash Receipts by 
Commodity,'' Accessed 06/15/2021.
    \2\ USDA Economic Research Service, ``Sector at a Glance,'' 
Accessed 06/15/2021.
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    U.S. cattle farms, ranches and feedlots in the United States raise 
about 93 million beef cattle. The vast majority are family-owned, 
multi-generational businesses with an average beef cow herd of 40 head. 
As a direct result of producer investments in scientific advancements 
in cattle genetics, nutrition, production practices, the U.S. is a 
global leader in cattle production efficiency. In fact, the U.S. 
produces 18 percent of the world's beef with six percent of the world's 
cattle.\3\ In addition, cattle producers own or care for roughly 35 
percent of the U.S. landmass. Because of this active management, they 
steward and improve over 800 million acres of wildlife habitat, unique 
landmarks, and delicate ecosystems.\4\
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    \3\ Source: UN FAOSTAT, 2018. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home.
    \4\ Andreini, E.M., ``How does upcycling relate to beef 
production?'', https://www.beefresearch.org/resources/beef-
sustainability/fact-sheets/upcycling, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to USDA's 2020 Report on Livestock Slaughter, ``[b]eef 
production totaled 27.2 billion pounds, up slightly from the previous 
year.'' \5\ The report also states that ``[c]ommercial cattle slaughter 
during 2020 totaled 32.8 million head, down two percent from 2019, with 
Federal inspection comprising 98.1 percent of the total. The average 
live weight was 1,373 pounds, up 29 pounds from a year ago. Steers 
comprised 49.3 percent of the total federally inspected cattle 
slaughter, heifers 29.4 percent, dairy cows 9.5 percent, other cows 
10.2 percent, and bulls 1.6 percent.'' \6\
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    \5\ USDA-National Agricultural Statistics Service, ``Livestock 
Slaughter, 2020 Summary,'' April 2021.
    \6\ Id.
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I. Overview of the Cattle and Beef Supply Chain
    The highly complex U.S. cattle and beef supply chain is best 
understood in two segments: pre-harvest and post-harvest.
U.S. Cattle and Beef Supply Chain
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Pre-Harvest (Cattle Supply Chain)
   Seedstock: While it is widely considered that the cow-calf 
        sector is beginning of the supply chain, the pre-cursor to the 
        cow-calf sector is the seedstock sector. The seedstock sector 
        consists of producers who specialize in raising prized breeding 
        stock (bulls, heifers) as well as genetics (semen and embryos) 
        and marketing their genetics to cow-calf producers. While many 
        calves are sired the old-fashioned way, there are segments of 
        the cattle industry who also use artificial insemination--a 
        practice that is more common in dairy cattle but has an 
        increasing presence in beef cattle.

   Cow-calf Operations: The cattle supply chain begins with 
        ranchers who maintain a breeding herd of mother cows that give 
        birth to calves once a year. When a calf is born, it weighs 
        about 60 to 100 pounds. Over the next few months, each calf 
        will live off its mother's milk and graze on grass pastures.

   Weaned Calves: Calves are weaned from their mother's milk at 
        about 6 to 10 months of age when they weigh between 450 and 700 
        pounds. These calves continue to graze on grass pastures. About 
        \1/3\ of the female calves will stay on the farm as heifers and 
        continue to grow until they become new mother cows the 
        following year. Heifers not retained for reproduction purposes 
        will continue to graze in pastures until they gain enough 
        weight to be transferred to a feedlot. Bulls are male calves 
        that are retained for breeding purposes. A vast majority of 
        males are not retained as breeding stock, and therefore become 
        steers. Depending on their size and weight, steers will either 
        be put on grass for a while to gain weight as stockers or will 
        be sent directly to feedlots.

   Stockers/Backgrounders: Cattle that are weaned but have not 
        reached an ideal weight for feedlots are referred to as 
        stockers or backgrounders. Stockers/backgrounders will continue 
        to grow and thrive by grazing on grass and pastures with 
        ranchers providing supplemental feed including vitamins and 
        minerals to meet all their nutritional needs. Once cattle reach 
        an ideal weight (750-850 lbs.), usually between 6 and 12 months 
        of age, they will be sold and shipped to a feedlot as feeder 
        cattle.

   Feed Lot: Most feeder cattle will spend between 4-6 months 
        at the feedlot, where they are cared for daily by 
        nutritionists, veterinarians and pen riders who ensure cattle 
        have constant access to water and a balanced diet that may 
        include grains (corn, wheat, soybean meal), roughage (hay and 
        grass) and local renewable byproducts (distillers grains and 
        beet pulp). Once cattle reach market weight (typically 1,200 to 
        1,400 pounds at 18 to 22 months of age), they are sent to a 
        packing plant (also called a processing facility).

   Livestock Markets: Feeder cattle and live cattle are sold at 
        livestock auction markets or through various marketing 
        arrangements. Seed stock (cows and bulls) that no longer 
        produce are sold to packers in livestock auction markets. 
        Cattle producers may work with an auction market to sell their 
        cattle to other cattle producers, to feedlots, or packers. 
        Historically, many livestock markets conducted in-person sales, 
        but many livestock markets have capitalized on technological 
        advancements and now host online auctions.

   Dairy Stock: Most males in dairy breeds are weaned as 
        steers, backgrounded, and sent to the feedlot before slaughter. 
        Most females are kept until they can no longer produce calves 
        or milk production declines, then they go to slaughter. Roughly 
        ten percent of cattle slaughtered in 2020 were dairy cows.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Id.

   International Livestock Trade, Cattle Imports & Exports: The 
        United States, Canada, and Mexico regularly trade livestock at 
        multiple stages of life. American producers purchase calves 
        from Mexico to background on grass until they are large enough 
        to go to feedlots. American feedlots purchase feeder cattle 
        from Canada and Mexico. American packers purchase live cattle, 
        direct-for-slaughter, from Canada. Less than two percent of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        cattle in the United States are foreign-born.

      Our robust domestic feeding and packing infrastructure leaves 
        little incentive to export feeder cattle and live cattle, 
        although there has been a recent increase in American feeder 
        cattle sales to Canadian feedlots, including Holstein calves 
        from Midwestern dairies. Overall, U.S. cattle exports are 
        mostly seedstock and genetics sold to producers in Canada, 
        Mexico, Brazil, China, and Argentina.
Critical Goods for Pre-Harvest Supply Chain
   Livestock/Livestock Genetics: Livestock serve as the 
        integral commodity for the entire cattle and beef supply chain. 
        Without cattle, there is no supply chain. The U.S. cattle 
        sector consists of roughly 93 million head of cattle raised in 
        all 50 states, with vast geographic and climatic diversity that 
        provides opportunities for producers to use different cattle 
        breeds to produce high-quality beef. While some producers use 
        purebred genetics, there are many crossbred or composite cattle 
        that are created to maximize strengths of different breeds. We 
        know the genetics of some breeds contribute to more tender 
        steak while other breeds of cattle are known for production 
        qualities such as calving ease, growth efficiency or increased 
        muscle mass. Each level of the pre-harvest supply chain depends 
        heavily on the safety, health, and quality of each animal. 
        Properly caring for cattle increases the likelihood that a 
        carcass will grade better upon slaughter and yield greater 
        economic return.

   Animal Health: A primary goal for cattle production at each 
        level within the supply chain, animal health is prioritized in 
        all cattle operations. While some aspects of animal care may 
        vary due to the complexity of the beef lifecycle and the 
        geographic variation across the country, the total commitment 
        to optimal animal care remains consistent among beef cattle 
        farmers and ranchers. Cattle producers work closely with their 
        veterinarians to properly apply scientific advancements and 
        innovations for animal health into their operations. Preventive 
        health care in the form of herd health programs, vaccination 
        protocols, disease control, nutritional management, and low 
        stress handling practices contribute to healthier cattle and 
        result in increased stewardship of resources. For over thirty 
        years, cattlemen and women have promoted and subscribed to Beef 
        Quality Assurance (BQA) program standards in such areas as 
        cattle care and handling, feedlot management, transportation, 
        and antimicrobial stewardship. The industry actively promotes 
        the national BQA program to provide greater guidance for 
        producers in these areas and to assure a high quality of 
        production nationwide for beef cattle. The BQA program is a 
        nationally coordinated, state-implemented program that provides 
        accepted scientific knowledge coupled with common-sense 
        husbandry techniques to raise cattle under optimum management 
        and environmental conditions.\8\ BQA exists as the gold 
        standard to ensure that cattle in the United States remain 
        healthy, are raised humanely, and beef is wholesome and safe 
        for consumers.
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    \8\ Beef Quality Assurance Program, BQA.org.

   Work Force--Cattle producers: Cattle production is a family-
        centered business with 91 percent of cattle operations being 
        family-owned \9\ and operated. With that said, the cattle 
        industry is very competitive, and success is never guaranteed. 
        Many U.S. cattle producers are highly skilled, highly educated 
        workers who are a combination of business manager, 
        entrepreneur, soil and water expert, veterinarian, tax 
        preparer, and attorney. Successful cattle production is not 
        something that can be taught in matter of weeks or months--it 
        requires years, sometimes generations of experience to be 
        economically and environmentally sustainable. Yet even the most 
        successful cattle operations are subject to economic downturns 
        and factors beyond their control. Many cattle producers are 
        also involved in their communities and churches, providing 
        another layer of value to rural communities. According to the 
        2017 Cattlemen's Stewardship Review, ``nearly 90 percent of 
        farmers and ranchers state that ensuring and maintaining a 
        healthy workforce is important to the future of the industry. 
        This includes a focus on safety, job creation/fair compensation 
        and management plans. According to the checkoff-funded 
        Sustainability Lifecycle Assessment, there was a 32 percent 
        reduction in occupational illnesses and accidents between 2005 
        and 2011. This achievement was the product of many segments of 
        the supply chain improving their protocols, including the 
        packing plant sector. Additionally, the implementation of BQA 
        animal handling programs also creates a safer environment for 
        both the employees and the cattle. 82 percent of farmers and 
        ranchers agree that fair compensation for labor is a high 
        priority for the future of the beef industry. Because many 
        small cattle farmers and ranchers employ only family members, 
        the inclusion of formalized employee training programs is more 
        prevalent in larger operations. The majority (73 percent) of 
        feedlots have nutritional management plans in place, and nearly 
        60 percent have environment plans as well. These practices all 
        contribute to a more equipped and engaged workforce.'' \10\
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    \9\ 2017 Cattlemen's Stewardship Review, p. 54.
    \10\ 2017 Cattlemen's Stewardship Review, p. 58.

   Work Force--Veterinarians: Veterinarians serve as integral 
        members of the cattle health team on beef cattle operations and 
        ensure the use of the best preventative health and husbandry 
        practices for cattle. Veterinary nutritionists formulate 
        rations for the nutritional management of both healthy animals 
        and those with one or more diseases. Cattle operations 
        throughout the supply chain may employ or retain consulting 
        veterinarians who advise on all aspects of cattle health and 
        nutrition. The American Veterinary Medical Association reported 
        a total membership of 92,000 veterinarians in 2018 with 8159 
        reporting as practicing on food animal species. The American 
        Association of Bovine Practitioners is composed of over 5000 
        veterinarians and veterinary students interested in bovine 
        medicine and surgery. The Academy of Veterinary Consultants, 
        composed of mostly veterinary nutritionists and consultants for 
        the cattle feeding sector, also serves as an organization for 
        veterinarians who exclusively practice bovine veterinary 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        medicine, with a current membership of 852 veterinarians.

      A shortage of veterinarians practicing food animal medicine 
        currently exists in rural veterinary practice areas across the 
        United States. The USDA, National Institute of Food and 
        Agriculture maintains a veterinary services shortages map in 
        the United States for a given fiscal year cycle.\11\ Economic 
        issues surrounding veterinary college debt and lower veterinary 
        salary ranges for rural large animal veterinary practitioners 
        play a major role in the veterinary shortage problems 
        experienced in rural settings. According to the American 
        Veterinary Medical Association, graduates of veterinary 
        colleges in 2020 incurred an average student debt of 
        $188,000.\12\ Veterinary student loan debt combined with lower 
        expected veterinary salaries in rural practice areas 
        contributes to the current shortage of veterinary care for some 
        regions of the country.
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    \11\ https://nifa.usda.gov/vmlrp-map.
    \12\ ``AVMA secures reintroduction of House legislation addressing 
student debt, veterinary shortages'', AVMA.org, 04/08/2021.

   Access to Capital: Cattle production is a capital-intensive 
        enterprise. As such, cattle producers depend upon access to 
        financing to increase efficiency, maintain solvency, and ensure 
        continuity in their businesses. One of the greatest impediments 
        to beginning farmers and ranchers and the continued success of 
        multi-generational operations alike is access to capital. While 
        capital needs vary by operation size and structure, in almost 
        all cases those needs are extraordinarily high. For cattle 
        production, land is the most expensive up-front cost. Unless a 
        producer inherits the land, they must compete with more 
        established cattle producers, farmers, and real estate 
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        developers who can offer more competitive bids.

      USDA offers a number of tools to bolster access to land and 
        capital, with targeted support for beginning farmers and 
        ranchers. It is important to note however, that other sources 
        of capital are also needed to purchase cattle, equipment, 
        animal health products, feed, and other goods and services--and 
        access to financing often supports agricultural producers in 
        the wake of severe weather events and market volatility. The 
        unfortunate reality is that the steady decline of rural 
        financial institutions and a growing disconnect between Wall 
        Street financiers and rural America has left fewer financial 
        lending options for cattle producers. USDA and other relevant 
        agencies can help bridge the gap and address deficiencies in 
        financing for rural businesses.

   Feed/Feed Additives: The diet of beef cattle contributes to 
        the efficient growth of the animal and the production of 
        wholesome, delicious, and nutritious beef. Cattle spend most of 
        their lives grazing on grass--and some continue to graze solely 
        on grass their entire lives to produce grass-finished beef. 
        Some ranchers choose to raise grass-finished beef because they 
        live in an area with lush grasses. But most beef cattle--
        approximately 95 percent--are finished in a feedlot on grains 
        like soybean meal, cotton seed hulls, barley, sugar beets, and 
        distillers grains.\13\ Cattle in feedlots typically reach 
        market weight around 3 to 6 months earlier than those raised on 
        grass alone. Cattle in feedlots are fed a carefully crafted 
        diet consisting of grains, roughage, and vitamins and minerals. 
        A variety of feed ingredients are used to help optimize cattle 
        nutrient intake and maintain their natural muscle-building 
        ability. While at the feedlots, cattle are fed rations that are 
        formulated by an animal nutritionist whose sole responsibility 
        is to ensure the animals are receiving all the nutrients 
        necessary for them to thrive. It is important to point out that 
        beef cattle, like other ruminants, have a digestive system that 
        includes a multi-compartment stomach that can digest fibrous 
        materials such as grass, corn stalks, cottonseeds, alfalfa and 
        grass hays, for example.
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    \13\ 2017 Cattlemen's Stewardship Review, pp.18-19.

   Transportation: Cattle rarely spend their entire lives on 
        one operation. In fact, many cattle produced on the East and 
        West Coasts will travel thousands of miles to their ultimate 
        destination. As cattle develop and advance to different stages 
        of production, they are moved by truck to each segment of the 
        supply chain. Livestock haulers are skilled drivers who are 
        critically important to the cattle supply chain because they 
        understand how to safely load, transport, and unload cattle at 
        each destination. Proper handling and transportation of cattle 
        can reduce sickness in calves, prevent bruises, and improve the 
        quality of the meat from these animals. The BQA Transportation 
        Program provides training specific for livestock haulers.\14\
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    \14\ BQA Transportation Program, https://www.bqa.org/programs/
transportation-program.
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Post-Harvest (Beef Supply Chain)
   Packer: After cattle are received and inspected at the 
        packing plant and are deemed safe for processing, they undergo 
        substantial transformation and become beef. United States 
        Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspectors are stationed in 
        all federally inspected packing plants and oversee the 
        implementation of safety, animal welfare and quality standards 
        from the time animals enter the plant until the final beef 
        products are shipped to processors, wholesale customers, food 
        service and retail outlets. If animals are sick or have an 
        injury, the USDA inspector will deem the animal unfit for human 
        consumption, and the animal will not enter the food supply. In 
        addition to beef cuts, packers utilize the entire carcass by 
        marketing hides, blood, tallow, and other parts for rendering. 
        The main product of a packing plant is boxed beef. This product 
        is sold to wholesale customers, processors and further 
        processors.

   Processor/Further Processor: A processor takes carcasses, 
        wholesale muscle cuts, and products like beef trimmings and 
        fabricates them to meet specific product demands from retail 
        markets and food service providers. Further processing responds 
        to demand from retail markets and food service providers that 
        have specific product demands such as curing, smoking, cooking, 
        salting, etc. A significant volume of beef imports, 
        approximately 72 percent, are lean beef trimmings that are 
        combined with fatty trimmings to make ground beef for 
        hamburgers.\15\
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    \15\ ``Exports and imports of beef both add value,'' Dr. Derrell 
Peel, Oklahoma State University, September 2019.

   Wholesale Customer: Wholesale customers are the middlemen 
        between packers and processors, and the food service and retail 
        sectors. Wholesale customers typically make bulk purchases and 
        have the logistical capacity to provide food service and retail 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        markets with timely and customized deliveries.

   Food Service Sector: Food Service applies to restaurants, 
        cafeterias, and other venues where food is consumed away from 
        home. About 60 percent of annual beef demand is consumed at 
        restaurants, schools, entertainment venues, and other non-
        retail locations. COVID-19 restrictions negatively impacted 
        traditional service at restaurants and forced many locations to 
        shift to carry-out and delivery options. The food service 
        sector suffered significantly due to COVID-19 restrictions, 
        resulting in an 11 percent loss in sales.\16\
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    \16\ ``Hindsight 2020: Retail and Foodservice Trends Through the 
Pandemic'', beefitswhatsfordinner.com, 03/26/2021.

   Retail Sector: Retail sales apply to food that is purchased 
        at grocery stores and is typically consumed at home. COVID-19 
        restrictions and supply chain disruptions caused a significant 
        increase in retail demand, with 83 percent of meals being 
        cooked or consumed at home. The shift in retail demand also 
        created a shift in buying patterns, with consumers stocking up 
        on items like ground beef and shifting to online purchases.\17\
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    \17\ Id.

   Consumer: The consumer is the ultimate destination for beef 
        carcass products, whether it is beef, hides, or the myriad of 
        products that are rendered from the carcass (pharmaceuticals, 
        cosmetics, etc.). Consumers can choose from over 30 different 
        lean cuts of beef. Beef is a nutrient-packed protein which 
        provides ten essential nutrients and, on average, half the 
        protein Daily Value in a single 3 ounce cooked serving. 
        According to USDA, a lean beef serving of about 170 calories (3 
        oz., cooked, with visible fat trimmed) contains less than 10 
        grams of total fat, 4.5 grams or less of saturated fat, and 
        less than 95 mg of cholesterol.\18\ Consumers can also learn 
        more about the nutritional qualities of beef, view recipes to 
        properly cook and enjoy beef, and learn more about how cattle 
        are sustainably raised at www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ ``Lean Beef Choices for Today's Consumer'', 
beefitswhatsfordinner.com, 09/23/2019.
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Critical Goods for Post-Harvest
   Work Force--Need for Skilled Labor in Packing Plants: The 
        beef supply chain cannot function properly without a steady 
        supply of skilled labor. Absent changes to COVID benefits for 
        individual workers, NCBA believes changes to the H-2A program 
        to include year-round labor is one viable solution to our labor 
        shortage. Additionally, the ability to obtain year-round labor 
        for employment at processing facilities, feedlots, and cow-calf 
        operations will continue to be a struggle for the cattle 
        industry without a multi-faceted approach to address a number 
        of weaknesses that exist from pasture to plate. This includes 
        allowing appropriate flexibilities to address near-term in-
        plant shortages, providing additional resources for workforce 
        training and development for highly skilled technical workers, 
        in-plant line operators, meat scientists and veterinarians 
        alike, and other potential regulatory changes to assist our 
        year-round cattle industry overall in closing the gaps in our 
        ongoing labor shortage.

   Work Force--FSIS Inspectors: Under the Federal Meat 
        Inspection Act of 1906 and related legislation, all meat, 
        poultry and egg products produced here in the United States, or 
        imported meat products, must be inspected by a Federal food 
        safety inspector and that service must be paid for by the 
        Federal Government. Without Federal food safety inspection, no 
        product can be sold or shipped interstate. FSIS inspectors are 
        vitally important to the supply chain, and we encourage the 
        government to continue designating them as essential staff who 
        will not be subject to government shutdowns and political 
        gamesmanship.
II. Impact of COVID-19 on the Cattle and Beef Industry, and the 
        Industry's Response
    As 2020 began, the cattle industry was cautiously optimistic about 
opportunities for profitability. Supply fundamentals were trending 
bullish, with plentiful grain, relatively low feed costs, record low 
unemployment and encouraging news relative to expanded foreign market 
access, and as a result, prospects looked promising for U.S. cattle 
producers. Unfortunately, in part due to the complex and highly 
fragmented nature of the beef supply chain, the COVID-19 pandemic 
created a unique set of challenges for each segment of our industry. 
Further, this extreme market volatility resulted in disproportionate 
economic harm for cattle ranchers and farmers, with initial estimates 
projecting roughly $13.6 billion in total economic damage.
    Throughout the pandemic, NCBA worked closely with stakeholders 
across of the cattle and beef supply chain to preserve continuity while 
at the same time prioritizing the health and safety of those who 
produce, process and deliver beef, as well as the safety of live 
animals and beef products alike (please see attachment for greater 
description). The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act of 2020, the Families First Coronavirus Response Act 2020, 
and other USDA existing authorities delivered much needed support to 
producers throughout the pandemic, and in particular, the Coronavirus 
Food Assistance Program (CFAP) provided vital financial assistance to 
buoy U.S. cattle producers. Moving forward, NCBA hopes to work closely 
with the Biden Administration to build and improve upon existing COVID-
19 response efforts, including but not limited to the following:

   Supply Chain: For cattle producers, the most calamitous 
        effect of the pandemic, by far, was the temporary closure of, 
        and slowdowns at, beef processing facilities. It is estimated 
        that at the height of slowdowns the industry realized a nearly 
        40 percent reduction in weekly processing capacity. The result 
        was catastrophic for cattle producers. While the industry has 
        made tremendous strides toward recovery, the effects of this 
        black swan event can still be seen in recent Cattle on Feed 
        Reports, the cattle futures market, and in cash bidding 
        throughout the fed cattle complex. Fortunately, unlike other 
        livestock species, no cattle were depopulated because of the 
        supply shocks brought on by COVID-19. If we are to avoid making 
        this the most humane option, every effort must be made to 
        safeguard beef production in the meatpacking sector and ensure 
        no further reduction in beef processing capacity occurs.

   Workforce: Worker safety continues to be of paramount 
        concern for cattle producers. The challenges packing plants and 
        producer suppliers faced in the early stages of the pandemic 
        were unprecedented. However, the supply chain remains intact 
        today due to the critical infrastructure designation which 
        ensured the availability of resources to implement critical 
        protocols and best practices like providing supplemental 
        protective equipment, implementing additional cleaning 
        procedures, and employing social distancing in the plants. NCBA 
        supported the Centers for Disease Control recommendation to 
        first administer COVID-19 vaccines to health care workers and 
        certain other high-risk individuals, and we greatly appreciate 
        the prioritization of COVID-19 vaccinations for meat industry 
        workers, including USDA inspectors and livestock suppliers.

   Transportation: On May 26, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
        Administration (FMCSA) announced an extension of the Hours-of-
        Service Emergency Declaration through August 31, 2021. NCBA 
        anticipates there will be a continued need for this declaration 
        through the duration of the pandemic. This critical step not 
        only keeps cattle haulers in business, but it is also the only 
        way to ensure grocery stores remained stocked by preserving 
        movement across the supply chain even when the flow of commerce 
        is disrupted by processing plant closures. USDA has often 
        served an important role, advocating for the agricultural 
        sectors unique transportation needs with Federal Motor Carrier 
        Safety Administration, and we respectfully encourage USDA to 
        maintain those efforts under the Biden Administration.
III. Ongoing Issues Facing the Industry and Recommended Solutions
(i.) Promote Economic Sustainability through Robust Price Discovery and 
        Increased Processing Capacity
   Price Discovery & Market Transparency: Profitability in the 
        cattle production segments of the beef supply chain is largely 
        influenced by producers' ability to discover prices at the fed 
        cattle level. Since the chief end-value of beef cattle is the 
        dressed carcass, prices paid for weaned calves, stockers, and 
        feeders are a derivative of the fed cattle price. While there 
        are myriad tools available to producers to discover price, the 
        most widely utilized are the weighted average prices paid 
        through negotiated transactions of fed cattle and reported 
        under Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR). USDA is prohibited 
        by law from disclosing the identifying information or 
        proprietary business information of reporting entities [7 
        U.S.C.  1636(a)]. To implement this mandate, USDA established 
        the ``3/70/20'' confidentiality guidelines in 2001. Under this 
        provision, price reports are published provided three 
        conditions are met for each report over the most recent 60 day 
        period:

    (1)  At least three reporting entities provide data at least 50 
            percent of the 
              time;

    (2)  No single reporting entity provides more than 70 percent of 
            the data for 
              a report; and

    (3)  No single reporting entity may be the sole reporting entity 
            for an indi-
              vidual report more than 20 percent of the time.

      While NCBA recognizes the Agency's requirement to balance the 
        need for information with safeguarding confidentiality, the 3/
        70/20 guidelines have resulted in instances of nonreporting 
        throughout the major cattle feeding regions. Recently, this 
        problem has been most apparent in the Colorado region. Cattle 
        producers rely upon the information reported under LMR to make 
        informed business decisions on their operations and are placed 
        at a competitive disadvantage when information is not published 
        due to confidentiality. NCBA encourages USDA to revisit the 3/
        70/20 guidelines and evaluate innovative ways to reduce 
        instances of nonreporting while adhering to statutory 
        obligations.
      NCBA appreciates and supports the wide array of LMR reports 
        published by the Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA-AMS). 
        Though LMR is a critical tool which provides essential 
        information to cattle producers, improvements could be made to 
        the implementation of the program to expand the information 
        which is reported. As the industry evolves over time, NCBA 
        encourages USDA-AMS to continuously solicit feedback from 
        market participants to identify new useful information which 
        could be published with regularity. For example, NCBA supports 
        the publication of next-day beef carcass weights, base prices 
        for formula transactions, and a cattle contract library similar 
        to the existing library for swine contracts.

   Processing Capacity & Negotiating Leverage: Adequate beef 
        processing capacity is critical to maintaining profitability in 
        the cattle industry and a steady supply of essential food 
        products to consumers. Currently, there is a shortage of 
        adequate processing capacity (commonly referred to as ``hook 
        space'') throughout the system. A recent study by Rabobank \19\ 
        found that excess operational beef processing capacity--or 
        hooks available in addition to those used to process existing 
        fed cattle supplies--fell to zero in late 2016 and turned 
        negative in early 2017. The same study found that, under the 
        current dynamics of supply and demand, the industry could 
        economically accommodate an additional 5,700 hooks of daily 
        processing capacity. This equates to roughly 1.5 million 
        additional animals per year.
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    \19\ Aherin, Dustin, RaboBank, October 2020 https://
research.rabobank.com/far/en/sectors/animal-protein/the-case-for-
capacity.html.

      At present, the processing sector represents a bottleneck in the 
        overall beef supply chain. The result has a negative effect on 
        cattle producer leverage in fed cattle negotiations. When 
        cattle supplies exceed the capacity to process them, the 
        livestock become a less scarce resource and cattle prices 
        decline. It is important to note that this is independent of 
        demand for the end-product, in this case beef. The most pointed 
        examples of this can be found in the 2019 fire at Tyson Foods' 
        Finney County beef processing facility in Holcomb, KS, and the 
        COVID-19 pandemic. In both cases, operational beef processing 
        capacity utilization dramatically fell following temporary 
        closures of high-throughput beef plants. As a result, cattle 
        prices declined, and boxed beef values drastically increased 
        according to a report issued by USDA-AMS in the summer of 
        2020.\20\
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    \20\ Boxed Beef & Fed Cattle Price Spread Investigation Report, 
USDA-AMS, July 2020 https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/
CattleandBeefPriceMarginReport.pdf.
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      To improve producer leverage in fed cattle negotiations, either 
        cattle supplies must be reduced, or processing capacity must be 
        expanded. Herd contractions and expansions occur naturally over 
        the course of a somewhat predictable 10 year cycle. Currently, 
        U.S. cattle inventories are cyclically high,\21\ but beef 
        demand is also high both domestically and in our major export 
        markets.\22\ The clearest solution to meeting this demand while 
        fostering profitability throughout the supply chain is to 
        expand beef processing capacity.
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    \21\ Cattle, USDA NASS, January 2021 https://
downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/h702q636h/
n009ww19g/9880wj45t/catl0121.pdf.
    \22\ Factors that drive beef, cattle prices to record highs, 
RaboBank, June 2021 https://www.meatpoultry.com/articles/25040-
rabobank-factors-that-drive-beef-cattle-prices-to-record-highs.
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      Meatpackers of all sizes face similar operational challenges, the 
        most consistent and severe of which is labor recruitment and 
        retention. The largest barrier to entry, however, is access to 
        sufficient capital for construction. The industry average 
        startup cost for a meat processing facility is roughly $100,000 
        per hook.\23\ This means that a modest 25 head per day plant 
        would need to secure $2.5 million in financing just to build 
        the infrastructure. As a further complication, traditional 
        lending institutions are often unable to provide adequate 
        financing due to the risk profile assessed to meatpacking 
        business models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Newlin, Lacey, So you want to build a slaughter plant?, High 
Plains Journal, June 2020, https://www.hpj.com/livestock/so-you-want-
to-build-a-slaughter-plant/article_a033a44e-acaf-11ea-a32d-
63beecbd5f05.html.
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      NCBA has partnered with lawmakers in Congress to introduce 
        legislation authorizing federally guaranteed, low-interest 
        loans to prospective meatpackers. As these proposals work 
        through the legislative process, we urge USDA to evaluate 
        existing programs and authorities where resources can 
        immediately be directed to support the expansion of beef 
        processing capacity. During such evaluations, we encourage 
        special attention to the Business and Industry Loan Guarantee 
        program under USDA's Rural Development mission area, and unused 
        funds appropriated to the Agency under the Coronavirus Aid, 
        Response, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.\24\
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    \24\ H.R. 748, 116th Congress, https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/
hr748/BILLS-116hr748enr.pdf.
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      Expanding domestic beef processing capacity is an important mid-
        to-long-term strategy to improve resiliency in our supply 
        chain. However, the existing infrastructure is today being 
        underutilized. Most major meatpackers are not operating plants 
        at 100 percent throughput capacity. Unfortunately, due to the 
        proprietary nature of firm-by-firm and plant-by-plant 
        efficiency data, the exact number of hooks which are not being 
        utilized is unknown. NCBA urges USDA to examine ways to support 
        the industry in reaching 100 percent processing capacity 
        utilization.
(ii) Promote Animal Health by Prioritizing Prevention and Preparedness
      Cattle producers recognize that a safe, secure, and healthy 
        cattle herd is the foundation of a resilient cattle and beef 
        supply chain. Without question, farmers and ranchers have long 
        prioritized the welfare of livestock, recognizing that good 
        animal health, care, production, and handling practices are 
        essential to efficient and profitable production. The U.S. 
        cattle and beef industry strongly supports investment in 
        agricultural research related to animal health and 
        productivity, coupled with producer education and extension 
        services, to properly apply scientific advancements and 
        innovations into our cattle operations to promote healthier 
        cattle and greater stewardship of resources. The combination of 
        scientific research and real-world application strengthens our 
        food production capabilities and increases the health and 
        safety of our food animals and the people who care for them. 
        NCBA encourages the Biden Administration to work closely with 
        cattle producers in addressing the following issues related to 
        animal health and the NCBA-recommended solutions.
(iii) Prioritize Animal Disease Prevention and Preparedness
      NCBA served as a staunch advocate for the animal health 
        provisions authorized under the 2018 Farm Bill, including 
        expansions to the National Animal Disease Preparedness and 
        Response Program (NADPRP) and the National Animal Health 
        Laboratory Network (NAHLN), as well as the establishment of the 
        National Animal Vaccine and Veterinary Countermeasures Bank 
        (NAVVCB). These programs are critically important for the 
        health and protection of our domestic cattle herd. NCBA hopes 
        to serve as a resource for the Biden Administration on 
        programmatic implementation and believes there is ample 
        opportunity for continued partnership relative to the future 
        development and expansion of these programs. Additionally, NCBA 
        seeks to remain an active participant in traceability 
        conversations with USDA. In keeping with the stated objective 
        in the Beef Industry Long Range plan (2021-2025) \25\ to make 
        traceability a reality for the U.S. beef cattle industry, NCBA 
        hopes to work with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
        Service to develop a platform for Radiofrequency identification 
        (RFID) technology to improve animal disease traceability for 
        the cattle industry while still prioritizing the need to 
        safeguard data confidentiality, protect producers from 
        liability concerns, operate at the speed of commerce, and 
        provide an economically feasible technology transition with 
        regard to tags and infrastructure requirements.
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    \25\ https://www.beeflongrangeplan.com/.
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(iv) Monitor Safety of Imported Feed Ingredients
      There are growing concerns among veterinary health professionals 
        that imported animal feed ingredients may serve as a vector for 
        the transmission of animal diseases such as African Swine Fever 
        (ASF) and Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD). NCBA is a member of the 
        Feed Risk Task Force, consisting of experts from USDA-APHIS and 
        the beef, pork, dairy, and animal feed sectors. The Feed Risk 
        Task Force meets regularly to share information and 
        recommendations to prevent the introduction of pathogens into 
        and within the United States via imported feed products. The 
        Feed Risk Task Force work led to the establishment of a 
        resolution at U.S. Animal Health Association (USAHA) in 2020 
        titled ``Feed Import Restrictions to Protect Against ASF 
        Importation in Feed''.\26\ In summary, USAHA asked the U.S. 
        government to restrict the importation of feed and/or feed 
        ingredients from countries that are positive for ASF, and to 
        create enforceable standards for affected countries to reduce 
        the risk of importing contaminated feed or feed ingredients. 
        While ASF does not directly impact cattle health, there is 
        great concern that there is similar risk for the transmission 
        of FMD in imported feed. NCBA encourages USDA and other 
        pertinent agencies to work with the Feed Risk Task Force to 
        identify risks associated with imported feed and feed 
        ingredients and take necessary steps to reduce associated 
        risks.
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    \26\ https://www.usaha.org/usaha-resolutions.
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(v) Improve Access to Biotechnology
      It is important for NCBA and the Biden Administration to continue 
        to modernize the regulatory framework for animal biotechnology. 
        NCBA supports the establishment of regulatory pathways for 
        animal biotechnology that facilitate innovation and provide 
        timely solutions for existing problems of morbidity and 
        mortality related to disease processes in cattle in the United 
        States. Gene-editing technology offers the opportunity to alter 
        the genome to eliminate some disease processes in animals and 
        thereby, improve productivity, reduce antimicrobial drug use, 
        and possibly even lower the risk for the development of 
        antimicrobial resistance over time. NCBA encourages the Biden 
        Administration to strongly consider moving all pre-market and 
        post-market regulatory authority for animal biotechnology 
        (other than for medical uses) from the Food and Drug 
        Administration to the United States Department of Agriculture 
        through a mutual order of understanding between the two 
        agencies. Greater access to biotechnology will empower cattle 
        producers to innovate and improve production methods while 
        addressing animal health and climate concerns.
(vi) Promote Antimicrobial Stewardship
      NCBA has demonstrated a long history of working to promote the 
        responsible use of antimicrobial drugs to prevent, control, and 
        treat diseases in cattle. NCBA has worked with FDA to advance 
        judicious antimicrobial use through our support of GFI #209 and 
        GFI #213, as well as first establishing ``A Beef Producers 
        Guide for Judicious Use of Antibiotics in Cattle'' to direct 
        responsible antimicrobial drug use in the cattle industry over 
        30 years ago. As FDA implements their 5 year strategy, 
        Supporting Antimicrobial Stewardship in Veterinary Settings, 
        NCBA hopes to continue to collaborate with the agency to 
        achieve best stewardship practices while also preserving uses 
        in animal agriculture for the antimicrobial tools necessary to 
        prevent, control, and treat diseases in the U.S. cattle herd. 
        We are especially interested in providing our feedback on a 
        proposed concept paper concerning the duration of use labeling 
        for medically important antimicrobial drugs used in animal feed 
        that currently lack a defined duration of use. As referenced in 
        NCBA's comments to the agency in response to a 2017 FDA Request 
        for Information (RFI) in the Federal Register, NCBA called for 
        scientific evidence to support all FDA decision-making on 
        defining durations of use for the specific disease conditions, 
        especially the vector-borne diseases, as well as consideration 
        for the effects of any proposed changes on animal health and 
        welfare. FDA supports veterinary oversight of antimicrobial 
        drugs and NCBA supports providing the necessary flexibility in 
        duration of use labeling for veterinarians to provide adequate 
        care for their animal patients.
(vii) Promote Cattle Producer Engagement to Address Antimicrobial 
        Resistance
      NCBA is actively working to prevent the development of 
        antimicrobial resistance thorough our involvement with 
        antimicrobial resistance research as a member of the Executive 
        Committee for the Foundation for Food and Agriculture Research, 
        International Consortium for Antimicrobial Stewardship in 
        Agriculture. In the past, NCBA's participation in the 
        Association of Public Land Grant Universities and American 
        Association of Veterinary Medical Colleges Task Force (2015) 
        led to the formation of the National Institute of Antimicrobial 
        Resistance Research and Education. Work on the organizational 
        committee for the Second International Symposium on 
        Alternatives to Antibiotics at the OIE (2016), and successful 
        engagement on the CDC Antimicrobial Resistance Challenge 
        project (2019) also demonstrate NCBA's commitment to seeking 
        solutions for antimicrobial resistance. Working collaboratively 
        to limit the development of antimicrobial resistance is a 
        priority for preserving antimicrobial drug effectiveness and 
        protecting human and animal health. In the past, the NARMS 
        program, a collaboration between FDA, CDC, USDA, state and 
        local health departments, and universities, has provided 
        quality antimicrobial resistance information for use in making 
        better informed decisions concerning antimicrobial drug use. 
        NCBA remains concerned that the new NARMS strategic plan (2021-
        2025) is highly aspirational for a historically resource-
        limited program and will require increased interagency 
        cooperation and resources to meet the newly expanded scope and 
        enhanced objectives. NCBA also recognizes the greater role of 
        bioinformatics for data analysis in NARMS and requests that the 
        agency establish a clear science-based pathway for data 
        attribution. We caution against the risk of sampling bias 
        within complex and dynamic environments. Finally, NCBA requests 
        a strong commitment by FDA for increased stakeholder outreach 
        and interagency coordination for the NARMS program. NCBA was 
        disappointed by the recent lack of agency collaboration with 
        industry stakeholders, who have been consistently supportive of 
        the NARMS program, when developing the updated NARMS strategic 
        plan.
(viii) Ranking of Antimicrobial Drugs According to Their Importance in 
        Human Medicine
      Historically, animal agriculture stakeholders have engaged more 
        closely with the Center for Veterinary Medicine at FDA than 
        with the other organizational units in the agency. At the same 
        time, NCBA hopes to engage with the Center for Drug Evaluation 
        and Research in the upcoming year to better inform CDER of the 
        possible implications for animal agriculture resulting from 
        future significant changes in the language of GFI #152 beyond 
        the proposed updated rankings for antimicrobials regarding 
        their importance to human medicine. While changes to the 
        language of GFI #152 were mentioned at the public meeting on 
        November 16, no definite revisions for the guidance were 
        proposed in the concept paper. Under a One Health approach, 
        revisions to GFI #152 to promote human health should also 
        protect animal health. Additionally, revisions should not be 
        structured to encourage the use of antimicrobial resistance as 
        a future non-tariff trade barrier.
(ix) The Importance of Technology in Addressing Animal Health and 
        Achieving Climate Goals
      Multiple ionophores have been marketed for use in food animals in 
        the United States since 1975. They were first identified as 
        coccidiosis control agents in poultry, then were discovered to 
        have significant performance advantages in cattle as well as 
        coccidiosis control, reduction of rumen acidosis and bloat in 
        beef feedlots, and pulmonary emphysema due to lush pasture 
        conditions. Ionophores comprise the majority of non-medically 
        important antibiotics sold for food animals in the United 
        States. Antibiotic resistance to the ionophores is only able to 
        be estimated based on epidemiological cutoffs, as no clinical 
        cutoffs related to in-vivo efficacy have been established. No 
        genetic resistance elements have been identified and genetic 
        transfer has only rarely been suggested in the literature. 
        Findings indicate that use of the ionophores in food animals 
        poses an almost nonexistent risk to animal or human health, 
        either through co-selection for medically important antibiotic 
        resistance or altering bacterial populations to increase the 
        shedding of potential foodborne pathogens. Maintaining access 
        to this technology is critical to the cattle industry's ability 
        to increase our sustainability footprint. Without these 
        products, USDA will not see the agriculture industry reach its 
        goals of reducing environmental impacts and increasing 
        productivity.
      NCBA also encourages USDA to collaborate with other Federal 
        agencies in prioritizing the approval of products that reduce 
        enteric methane production while maintaining or improving 
        animal performance. Products that reduce methane emissions at 
        the expense of animal performance are fatally flawed and will 
        likely never reach ``scalability.'' To provide value to both 
        producers and consumers, methane inhibitors should 
        simultaneously limit direct methane emissions while increasing 
        growth efficiency. USDA should consider these criteria when 
        evaluating products to maximize the impact of taxpayer dollars.
(x) Promote Safe and Efficient Transportation of Livestock
   Hours of Service Exemption for Livestock Haulers: Livestock 
        haulers play an integral role in the U.S. cattle and beef 
        supply chain by transporting cattle across the country. 
        Unfortunately, current Federal law imposes a significant burden 
        on livestock haulers as well as potential risks for animal 
        welfare in certain situations. The implementation of electronic 
        logging devices (ELDs) and existing Hours-of-Service (HOS) 
        rules pose unique challenges for livestock haulers. HOS rules 
        limit livestock haulers to 14 hours of on-duty time, a maximum 
        drive time of 11 hours, and then 10 consecutive hours of rest. 
        These time requirements are insufficient for most trips made by 
        livestock haulers and fail to accommodate the realities of 
        hauling live animals across the country. Unlike drivers hauling 
        consumer goods, livestock haulers cannot simply pull over and 
        rest for 10 consecutive hours when they run out of drive time, 
        because it is unhealthy for livestock to be left idle on a 
        trailer for long periods of time. Also, unloading livestock can 
        only occur in special facilities, and repeated loading and 
        unloading of livestock creates stress for the animal and may 
        compromise animal welfare. While NCBA appreciates the Federal 
        Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) extending the 
        emergency HOS exemptions for livestock haulers through August 
        31, 2021, there are long-term regulatory and statutory issues 
        that need to be addressed in order to protect and shore-up the 
        supply chain. First of all, the cattle industry needs a 
        continued exemption from the ELD mandate beyond the deadline of 
        September 30, 2021. Second, the cattle industry needs greater 
        flexibility to operate within the HOS requirements. The current 
        HOS exemption allows anyone hauling agricultural commodities to 
        be exempt from HOS rules as long as they are inside the 150 air 
        mile radius (172 road miles) of their initial starting point 
        for that day also known as the source. NCBA hopes to secure the 
        same exemption for the backend or destination of the 
        agricultural commodity haul to provide further flexibility 
        during the unloading period. It would be helpful to add this 
        backend 150 air mile exemption to the next surface 
        transportation reauthorization bill and we will continue to 
        work with Members of Congress to get this accomplished. This 
        will require a commitment from Congress to make the necessary 
        statutory changes in the surface transportation reauthorization 
        bill, and a commitment from FMCSA to work with livestock 
        producers to implement changes to HOS requirements.

   Truck Weights: Since 1982, the Federal gross vehicle weight 
        limit has remained at 80,000 pounds on five axles. The steady 
        increase in the speed of commerce due to growth in consumer 
        demand has resulted in more trucks on the road. While the 
        Federal weight limit is restricted to federally-funded roads 
        such as interstate highways, many states permit trucks that far 
        exceed 80,000 pounds to operate on lower classification roads, 
        driving through neighborhoods, by schools, and around other 
        densely populated areas. The cattle sector depends on livestock 
        haulers to ship cattle throughout the entire supply chain, and 
        the added transportation costs due to truck weight restrictions 
        creates a disparity in production costs for producers on the 
        East and West Coasts. NCBA supports the inclusion of a program 
        in the surface transportation reauthorization bill that would 
        permit a ten-state pilot program to allow operation of vehicles 
        weighing up to 91,000 pounds gross vehicle weight (GVW) with 
        six axles on Interstate System Highways. NCBA believes this 
        ten-state, 10 year pilot program will not only shift truck 
        traffic to the Interstate Highway System, reducing the need for 
        trucks to drive on smaller, more hazardous roads, but also take 
        more trucks off the road reducing overall greenhouse gas 
        emissions.

   Congestion at Ports: COVID-19 presented many supply chain 
        challenges, including delays and disruptions at our ports. 
        During the first months of COVID-19 shutdowns, the United 
        States imported large amounts of lean beef trimmings from our 
        trade partners in Australia and New Zealand--trimmings 
        necessary to produce ground beef. Worker availability and 
        shortages at inspection houses created supply chain disruptions 
        that were fortunately resolved in a matter of days, although 
        the ripple effect was felt throughout the supply chain for a 
        long time. Likewise, the lack of available workers to reload 
        ships with exports added to the backlog and exacerbated supply 
        chain disruptions. While many of the work force availability 
        issues have improved, U.S. exports are still facing logistical 
        challenges in our West Coast ports. There is strong demand for 
        U.S. beef and other proteins in Asian markets, but we are 
        hindered in fully capitalizing on that demand until the ongoing 
        backlog is resolved.
(xi) Strengthen the Work Force of the Entire Supply Chain
      The American cattle and beef industry operates at a more safe and 
        efficient level than most countries because of our highly 
        skilled labor force in both the pre-harvest and post-harvest 
        sectors of the supply chain. To maintain this competitive 
        advantage, it is important for the private sector and 
        government to continue working together to support industry-led 
        efforts in producer education and training, to address 
        disruptions in labor supply by expanding access to skilled 
        labor, and to reinforce food safety by ensuring access to food 
        safety inspectors.

   Promote Producer-Education and Quality Assurance Programs: 
        The cattle industry is actively engaged in promoting training 
        and education for cattle producers through coordinated efforts 
        such as the Beef Quality Assurance Program (BQA). BQA is a 
        nationally coordinated, state-implemented program that provides 
        accepted scientific knowledge coupled with common sense 
        husbandry techniques to raise cattle under optimum management 
        and environmental conditions.\27\ BQA standards are consistent 
        with principles found in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code 
        related to cattle,\28\ and BQA complies with the International 
        Organization for Standardization (ISO) Animal Welfare 
        Management/General Requirements and Guidance for Organizations 
        in the Food Supply Chain.\29\ The ISO specification was 
        developed in 2016 to provide a path for programs to show they 
        are aligned with the principles of the World Organisation of 
        Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code and ensures 
        the welfare of farm animals across the supply chain. BQA also 
        reinforces principles of the Codex Alimentarius \30\ by 
        instructing the creation and maintenance of Hazard Analysis 
        Critical Control Points (HACCP) plans for livestock 
        operations.\31\ In response to the Centers for Disease Control 
        (CDC) Challenge on Antimicrobial Resistance, NCBA worked to 
        increase participation in the Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) 
        program to ensure cattle producers are responsible and 
        judicious in their use of antimicrobial products through every 
        segment of the industry.\32\ Other countries, like Canada and 
        the United Kingdom, have developed similar producer programs 
        with similar goals, with BQA as an example to follow. As 
        greater attention is afforded to production standards and 
        improving supply chains, BQA should be viewed as an example of 
        higher standards achieved through producer education and 
        training. U.S. beef consumers at home and abroad will be 
        pleased to know that more than 85 percent of U.S. beef comes 
        from BQA-certified farmers and ranchers.\33\
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    \27\ https://www.bqa.org/.
    \28\ World Organisation for Animal Health, https://www.oie.int/
standard-setting/terrestrial-code/.
    \29\ USDA-Agricultural Marketing Service, https://www.ams.usda.gov/
services/auditing/awap.
    \30\ FAO, www.fao.org/3/w8088e/w8088e05.htm.
    \31\ Beef Quality Assurance Program Manual, https://www.bqa.org/
Media/BQA/Docs/nationalmanual.pdf.
    \32\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, ``The AMR 
Challenge'', https://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/intl-activities/amr-
challenge.html.
    \33\ http://www.beefitswhatsfordinner.com/raising-beef/beef-
quality-assurance.

   Need for Skilled Labor in Pre-Harvest and Post-Harvest 
        Sectors: The beef supply chain cannot function properly without 
        access to skilled labor. Absent changes to COVID benefits for 
        individual workers, NCBA believes changes to the H-2A program 
        to include year-round labor is one viable solution to our labor 
        shortage. Additionally, the ability to obtain year-round labor 
        for employment at processing facilities, feedlots, and cow-calf 
        operations will continue to be a struggle for the cattle 
        industry without a multi-faceted approach to address weaknesses 
        that exist from pasture to plate. This includes allowing 
        appropriate flexibilities to address near-term in-plant 
        shortages, providing additional resources for workforce 
        training and development for highly skilled technical workers, 
        in-plant line operators, meat scientists and veterinarians 
        alike, and other potential regulatory changes to assist our 
        year-round cattle industry overall in closing the gaps in our 
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        ongoing labor shortage.

   Support for FSIS Inspectors: Under the Federal Meat 
        Inspection Act of 1906 and related legislation, all meat, 
        poultry and egg products produced here in the United States or 
        imported must be inspected by a Federal food safety inspector 
        and that service must be paid for by the Federal Government. 
        Without Federal food safety inspection, no product can be sold 
        or shipped interstate. FSIS inspectors are vitally important to 
        the supply chain, and we encourage the government to continue 
        designating them as essential staff who will not be subject to 
        government shutdowns and political gamesmanship.
(xii) Encourage Climate Resiliency with Producer Engagement in 
        Conservation Efforts
      Cattle producers are America's original environmentalists, and as 
        such, we are instrumental in building a strong and sustainable 
        supply chain. We rely on healthy soil, clean air, and clean 
        water to raise healthy cattle and healthy families. We strive 
        to improve our environment at every stage of production by 
        being efficient, responsible, and respectful of our natural 
        resources.
      From the mountains of Montana to the swamplands of Florida, 
        livestock producers carefully manage stocking rates to create a 
        cultivated ecosystem that supports hundreds of thousands of 
        wildlife species, including endangered or otherwise imperiled 
        species that would not otherwise have suitable habitat. The 
        U.S. currently has 140 million acres enrolled in conservation 
        programs, resulting in cleaner water and air on a tract of land 
        approximately the size of New York and California combined.\34\ 
        Cattle grazing is the highest and best use of more than 800 
        million acres of permanent grassland, pasture, and rangeland, 
        which accounts for nearly \1/3\ of the continental U.S. 
        landmass. Much of the land cattle graze is not suitable for 
        growing other food products.\35\ Raising cattle on it more than 
        doubles the land area farmers and ranchers can use to raise 
        food for the world's growing population. This acreage not only 
        feeds cattle but also naturally sequesters carbon, a benefit 
        compounded by ruminant grazing. Grazing builds deep root 
        systems in prairie grasses, which improves soil health. Healthy 
        soils retain more water, sequester more carbon, and increase 
        the resiliency of our land. When properly managed, livestock 
        grazing can be used as a tool to lower wildfire risk by 
        controlling the amount, height, and distribution of grasses and 
        forage that fuel wildfires.\36\
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    \34\ Farmers for a Sustainable Future, https://www.fb.org/land/fsf.
    \35\ Andreini, E.M., ``How does upcycling relate to beef 
production?'', https://www.beefresearch.org/resources/beef-
sustainability/fact-sheets/upcycling, 2019.
    \36\ 2017 Cattlemen's Stewardship Review, p.45.
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      NCBA encourages USDA to consider the vital role of cattle 
        producers in building a strong and sustainable supply chain 
        through voluntary conservation programs, range health and fire 
        mitigation, collaborating to address air quality, providing 
        sound regulatory guidance for producer compliance, and using 
        science-based metrics to accurately measure climate factors.

   Increase Efficiency of USDA Conservation Programs: USDA has 
        a bevy of programs that allow for strong partnerships between 
        agency officials the public. NCBA supports investment in 
        voluntary conservation programs to improve public investment in 
        existing agency priorities, while also leveraging public and 
        private investment for improved natural resource outcomes. 
        Voluntary conservation practices supported by research and 
        implemented by producers with technical assistance are the key 
        to increasing efficiency and resilience. The use of cover crops 
        by farmers across the nation is perhaps the best example. While 
        cover crops have been a key tool in the agricultural producer's 
        toolbox since the mid-20th century, the producer community knew 
        little about which cover crops were best suited for their 
        climate and soil type. Often, the most suitable cover crop can 
        differ between regions, states, counties, or even fields on a 
        single farm. Years of dedicated research by USDA and land grant 
        universities continue to develop the cover crop knowledge base. 
        Now, farmers can utilize USDA and land-grant university 
        resources to determine the cover crops that best suit their 
        individual operations.

      NCBA urges USDA to bolster programs that keep land in production, 
        rather than promoting programs that allow land to lay fallow. 
        These ``working lands'' programs, including USDA's 
        Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and 
        Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) cost-share programs, 
        allow producers to manage their land efficiently while 
        simultaneously contributing to our nation's food supply. Land 
        in production, whether it be crop fields or pastures with 
        grazing cattle, provides a greater carbon sink than a fallow 
        landscape. Ruminant grazing increases land's ability to 
        sequester carbon, by deepening root structures and encouraging 
        photosynthesis. USDA-NRCS not only provides cost-share funding 
        through its EQIP and CSP programs, but also technical 
        assistance to farmers and ranchers who wish to implement 
        conservation practices. The benefit of Conservation Technical 
        Assistance (CTA) is its personalized approach: local NRCS 
        employees work with agricultural producers to implement a suite 
        of conservation practices best suited to fit the individual 
        needs of each operation. Many of the solutions supported by 
        NRCS' Conservation Technical Assistance are the product of 
        land-grant university research and extension. Voluntary 
        conservation practices, supported by research and implemented 
        by producers with technical assistance, are the key to 
        increasing efficiency and resilience.
      As USDA works to improve agriculture's environmental footprint, 
        we encourage the government to forgo use of subjective metrics, 
        such as potential climate impact, to determine eligibility to 
        conservation programs. Any standards for conservation program 
        access, including the conservation practice standards, should 
        be rooted in science. Animal feeding operations utilize 
        voluntary conservation programs to establish manure management 
        systems and eliminate waste discharges. By shutting the door to 
        producers who will most significantly benefit from conservation 
        programs, efforts to limit access based on potential climate 
        impact would directly reduce the programs' overall 
        environmental benefit. Greenhouse gas emissions cannot be 
        considered in a vacuum; the Agency must consider how best to 
        achieve holistic environmental improvements. Air quality, water 
        quality, soil quality, and wildlife habitat are all necessary 
        elements in establishing conservation programs that improve the 
        overall environmental footprint of the industry.

   Promote Greater Range Health and Fire Mitigation Efforts: 
        Livestock grazing provides a nimble tool to create fire breaks, 
        strategically reduce hazardous fuel loads, and apply targeted 
        forage management for a variety of resource management goals. 
        NCBA and our partners are eager to work with the Biden 
        Administration to find creative and effective ways to apply 
        livestock grazing as a tool to improve environment and 
        ecological goals, including the use of livestock for forage 
        management and wildfire fuel load reduction.

   Collaboration with Industry through the USDA Agricultural 
        Air Quality Task Force (AAQTF): This Federal advisory committee 
        has been an effective tool of collaboration between 
        agricultural stakeholders and the USDA on issues concerning 
        agricultural air quality. Prior iterations of the AAQTF 
        provided a forum to submit formal recommendations to the 
        Secretary of Agriculture, and NCBA recommends the Biden 
        Administration continue this effort in a way that promotes 
        inclusion of agricultural stakeholders.

   Provide Producers with Sound Regulatory Guidance--Navigable 
        Waters Protection Rule: In 2019, EPA, along with the U.S. Army 
        Corps of Engineers, finalized the Navigable Waters Protection 
        Rule--a replacement for the 2015 Clean Water Rule. America's 
        cattle producers need clean water to maintain successful 
        operations; their families, livestock, and communities depend 
        on it. However, the broad nature of the 2015 Clean Water Rule 
        created significant regulatory uncertainty for farmers and 
        ranchers across the nation. And while clean water is necessary, 
        clear rules are equally important to ensure that farmers can 
        pass their operations on to the next generation. The Navigable 
        Waters Protection Rule increases jurisdictional certainty for 
        farmers and ranchers while ensuring that our nation's most 
        vital surface waterbodies are protected.

      In its first round of implementation guidance (issued in December 
        2020), EPA addressed CWA 404 Jurisdictional Determination 
        elevation scenarios, ditches subject to the Normal Farming 
        Activities exemption, and program coordination with USDA and 
        USACE regarding Prior Converted Cropland determinations. NCBA 
        generally supports the continued use of these guidance 
        documents.

   Using Science-Based Metrics to Accurately Measure Climate 
        Factors--GWP*: As the government seeks to implement its climate 
        strategy, NCBA urges the adoption of the GWP* methodology. GWP* 
        accurately characterizes the warming potential of short-lived 
        GHGs, such as methane.

      According to leading scientists at the University of Oxford, 
        ``[t]he 100 year variant of the Global Warming Potential 
        (GWP100) has been formally adopted in international 
        climate policy (currently as established in the Kyoto Protocol, 
        and in the draft text of the Paris Agreement \37\) and 
        standardized Life Cycle Assessment (LCA)/carbon-footprinting 
        approaches \38\). Subsequently, GWP100 has become 
        the de facto standard for expressing emissions in the 
        scientific literature and general media, having essentially 
        become shorthand for the relative climate impacts of a given 
        product or activity. Despite its ubiquity, the relationship 
        between aggregate CO2 Equivalent (CO2-e) 
        emissions calculated using GWP100 and global warming 
        itself is ambiguous. Fundamentally, many of the shortcomings of 
        the GWP100 calculation as a universal climate metric 
        arise because it cannot sufficiently differentiate the impacts 
        of long- and short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs). In 
        previous reports, the International Panel on Climate Change 
        (IPCC) has acknowledged the shortcomings of current methods of 
        reporting methane impacts, including GWP100.'' \39\ GWP* was 
        first reported by the Climate Dynamics research team at the 
        University of Oxford in 2018, led by Myles Allen (commonly 
        referred to as ``the physicist behind net zero'') and has been 
        gaining acceptance in the scientific community as a GWP 
        calculation that more effectively measures the global warming 
        impact of methane.\40\
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    \37\ UNFCCC 2018 Presidency consultations on modalities, procedures 
and guidelines under the Paris Agreement with a focus on transparency 
Draft Report Version 1.
    \38\ ISO 14044 2006 Environmental Management--Life Cycle 
Assessment--Requirements and Guidelines.
    \39\ John Lynch, et al. 2020 Environ. Res. Lett. 15 044023
    \40\ Allen, M., et al., A solution to the misrepresentations of 
CO2-equivalent emissions of short-lived climate pollutants 
under ambitious mitigation, Climate and Atmospheric Science 1, 16 
(2018).
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      Moreover, the conventional GWP100 methodology does not 
        adequately capture the different behaviors of long-lived 
        climate pollutants (LLCPs) and SLCPs. The atmospheric lifetime 
        and radiative impacts of different GHGs differ dramatically. 
        Acknowledgement of this reality led to the widescale adoption 
        of the GWP100 methodology. GWP100 equates 
        emissions using a scaling factor--CO2-e. GHGs are 
        assigned a GHG equivalency, then that number is used to 
        determine the emissions' potential impact. Following 
        GWP100, a pound of methane equates to 25 pounds of 
        CO2. Thus, methane is calculated as 25 
        CO2e. However, this simplified scaling factor fails 
        to recognize the amount of time emissions remain in the 
        atmosphere--an equally important factor in determining 
        potential atmospheric impact. The GWP* methodology seeks to 
        remedy this oversight.\41\
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    \41\ Cain, M., Lynch, J., Allen, M.R., et al., Improved calculation 
of warming-equivalent emissions for short-lived climate pollutants, 
Climate Atmosphere Science 2, 29 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1038/
s41612-019-0086-4.
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      Anthropogenic warming estimations are largely determined by the 
        cumulative total emissions of LLCPs and the emission rates of 
        SLCPs. GWP* equates an increase in the emissions rate of an 
        SLCP with a single ``pulse'' emission of CO2, and 
        thus considers not only the initial intensity of GHGs, but also 
        the amount of time that they remain in the atmosphere. This 
        approach is a significant improvement on the conventional 
        GWP100 methodology. Further, the GWP* methodology 
        modifies the conventional GWP definition to consider 
        CO2 warming equivalents (CO2-we) rather 
        than CO2-e. Following GWP*, SLCPs can be 
        incorporated directly into carbon budgets consistent with long-
        term temperature goals, because every unit of CO2-we 
        emitted generates approximately the same amount of warming, 
        whether it is emitted as a SLCP or a LLCP. This is not the case 
        for conventionally derived CO2-e measurements. The 
        adoption of accurate emissions methodology is necessary to 
        ensure that national and international climate policies achieve 
        desired outcomes. NCBA urges the United States' adoption of 
        GWP*, and further asks the United States to promote GWP* 
        adoption internationally.
(xiii) Promote Economic Sustainability through Market-Based, Rules-
        Based, and Science-Based Trade Policies
   Impact of COVID-19 on Trade: At the beginning of 2020, U.S. 
        cattle producers were optimistic that export sales would 
        significantly increase due to expanded duty-free access in the 
        European Union, removal of Japan's massive 38.5 percent tariff, 
        and the removal of numerous non-tariff trade barriers as part 
        of the trade deal with China. The first quarter showed much 
        promise as sales were up eight percent (through March) \42\ 
        over the previous year, driven primarily by strong growth in 
        Japan and Korea despite the first signs of COVID-19 disrupting 
        key Asia markets. Unfortunately, as we moved into the second 
        quarter, we began to see our vulnerabilities exposed by the 
        pandemic, and the complex and highly fragmented nature of the 
        cattle and beef supply chain created a unique set of challenges 
        for each segment of our industry. Further, the extreme market 
        volatility resulted in disproportionate economic harm for 
        cattle producers, with initial estimates projecting roughly 
        $13.6 billion in total economic damage.
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    \42\ U.S. Meat Export Federation, ``Beef Plus Beef Variety Meats, 
March 2020,'' https://www.usmef.org/downloads/statistics/2020-03-beef-
plus.pdf.

      Our greatest export loss occurred in May and June, but export 
        sales increased significantly from July to October and brought 
        our annual sales close to 2019 totals. In 2020, our export 
        growth was primarily driven by sales in Japan and Korea--our 
        two greatest markets that accounted for half of our total 
        export sales. Expanded access to China coupled with the onset 
        of African Swine Fever in China, resulted in an increase of 260 
        percent in U.S. beef sales to China.\43\ We experienced modest 
        growth in Canada, but sales were down in most markets. One of 
        the hardest hit markets was Mexico, a perennial top 5 market 
        for U.S. beef, where U.S. beef sales declined by 23 
        percent.\44\
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    \43\ U.S. Meat Export Federation, ``Beef Plus Beef Variety Meats, 
December 2020,'' https://www.usmef.org/downloads/statistics/2020-12-
beef-plus.pdf.
    \44\ Id.
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      In the past few years leading up to 2020, the United States was a 
        net exporter of beef. That trend continued into the first 
        quarter of 2021 until COVID-19 hit. The increased demand for 
        ground beef and limited supply of domestic lean trimmings 
        created an increase in demand for lean beef imports. In 2021, 
        beef imports are down nearly 11 percent \45\ and exports have 
        started to recover in Asian markets. Fortunately, we were able 
        to make it through 2020 without being forced to euthanize 
        cattle, we avoided bans and closures in all major markets, and 
        we are in a much better position to recover faster and stronger 
        due to the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in 
        recent trade deals. In fact, 2021 is proving to be a positive 
        year for U.S. beef exports with a ten percent increase in 
        global sales, and an increase of 1318 percent in beef sales to 
        China.\46\
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    \45\ USDA Economic Research Service, ``Livestock, Dairy, Poultry 
Outlook,'' 04/15/2021.
    \46\ U.S. Meat Export Federation, ``Beef Plus Beef Variety Meats,'' 
April 2021, https://www.usmef.org/downloads/statistics/2021-04-beef-
plus.pdf.

   Importance of Interagency Coordination Between USDA and 
        other Agencies: NCBA greatly appreciates the team effort of 
        USDA, USTR, U.S. Department of State, and other agencies in 
        expanding market access for U.S. beef in key Asian markets 
        where we previously faced non-tariff trade barriers such as 
        age-based restrictions due to Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, 
        bans on growth promotants and production technologies, onerous 
        traceability requirements, and other arbitrary restrictions not 
        based on objective scientific standards. NCBA strongly 
        encourages the continuation of the close partnership of USDA 
        and other agencies to continue removing non-tariff trade 
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        barriers and promoting science-based standards.

   Avoid Marketing Policies That Trigger Retaliation: 
        Unfortunately, there are some people in the cattle and beef 
        industry who do not support the free-market principles that 
        have greatly benefitted our industry, and they are seeking the 
        return of divisive policies like mandatory country-of-origin 
        labeling (MCOOL), a law that Congress repealed in 2015. When 
        MCOOL was law, the compliance costs were an excessive 
        additional cost on every segment of the supply chain that led 
        to the closure of feedlots and packing plants across the 
        country. Studies show that MCOOL did not provide a net benefit 
        to customers or cattle producers.\47\ Most damaging of all, 
        MCOOL resulted in WTO-sanctioned tariffs of $1 billion from 
        Canada and Mexico. The tariffs were avoided because Congress 
        repealed MCOOL, but Canada and Mexico still retain the right to 
        retaliate if MCOOL is restored. It is also important to 
        remember that if Canada and Mexico retaliate against the United 
        States, there is currently no functioning WTO Appellate Body to 
        resolve the dispute.
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    \47\ Allen, Katie. ``K-State Research and Extension.'' Report Finds 
Mandatory COOL Causes Meat Industry, Consumer Losses. May 06, 2015.

      At the same time, NCBA is taking steps to address genuine 
        producer concerns with the current use of generic ``Product of 
        USA'' label. NCBA believes the best way to have true product 
        differentiation is to use origin labeling marketing claims that 
        are verified and voluntary. We will continue working with our 
        government and the entire value chain to ensure that accurate 
        and voluntary origin labels are in place to benefit cattle 
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        producers and consumers.

   Push Back Against European Policies That Undermine Science-
        Based Veterinary Practices: While the United States is fully 
        invested in harnessing the benefits and efficiencies of 
        science-based trade, the European Union considers science as a 
        secondary factor by embracing a philosophy called ``the 
        precautionary principle.'' The precautionary principle is 
        simply known by the following: ``better safe than sorry.'' 
        Under EU law, the precautionary principle provides for ``rapid 
        response'' to address ``possible danger to human, animal, or 
        plant health, or to protect the environment'' and can be used 
        to ``stop distribution or order withdrawal from the market of 
        products likely to be hazardous.'' The EU continues to invoke 
        the precautionary principle to justify its policies regarding 
        various regulatory issues and generally rejects arguments, on 
        the grounds of risk management, that the lack of clear evidence 
        of harm is not evidence of the absence of harm. A prime example 
        of the precautionary principle is the EU's ban on production 
        technologies such as hormones and beta agonists. These are 
        examples of two FDA-approved technologies that are commonly 
        used in U.S. cattle production and in many countries around the 
        world. And while the European Union does not have peer-reviewed 
        science and risk assessments to justify their bans of these 
        technologies, they hide behind the precautionary principle as a 
        protectionist measure to restrict beef imports from the United 
        States and other countries who use these safe and efficient 
        technologies.

      In June 2018, the EU adopted veterinary medicines legislation 
        that contains the ``concept of reciprocity'' for antimicrobial 
        drug use practices--commonly referred to as Article 118. Under 
        this new rule, the EU will no longer set antimicrobial 
        resistance policies on a risk-assessment but will use hazard-
        based analysis. Lowering the scientific threshold to restrict 
        the use of veterinary medicines could have negative impacts on 
        animal health and will most likely be used as the European 
        Union as another unjustified non-tariff trade barrier. Under 
        the terms of Article 118, all countries exporting animals or 
        animal products (meat, milk, eggs, fish) to the European Union 
        must follow antimicrobial use guidelines from the EU and not 
        administer any antimicrobials that are restricted from use in 
        food-producing animals in the EU Reciprocity is not legal under 
        the WTO and the United States must take all necessary steps to 
        prevent the EU from diluting the importance of science-based 
        trade standards. The veterinary medicines legislation will be 
        implemented in January 2022.
      The EU has not been transparent in this process and has not 
        provided direction on the scope of restricted antimicrobials or 
        the implementation of the restrictions. In short, we do not 
        know the names of potentially restricted antimicrobials, the 
        potential scope of restrictions on beef products, testing 
        methodology, or process of implementation. While the intent of 
        Article 118 may be good, the application could result in major 
        problems for animal health and consumer safety. From a trade 
        perspective, the application of these changes could give the 
        European Commission multiple avenues to erect non-science-based 
        restrictions on American agricultural goods.
      NCBA applauds the U.S. Government for publicly opposing Article 
        118 at a recent meeting of the WTO Committee on Sanitary and 
        Phytosanitary standards. The U.S. was not alone, with Paraguay, 
        Australia, Canada, Japan, Argentina, and Brazil also 
        registering formal complaints. If the EU does not address these 
        concerns and enacts the proposed legislative changes, it may 
        necessitate future WTO action.

   Beware of Emerging Non-Tariff Trade Barriers in Climate 
        Policy: In order to achieve the goal of climate neutrality by 
        2050, the EU Green Deal includes a proposal to establish a 
        carbon border adjustment mechanism (i.e., carbon border tax) to 
        reduce the risk of ``carbon leakage'' by assessing a tax on 
        imported goods based on carbon content and origin of the good. 
        ``A carbon price imposes costs, and if foreign suppliers do not 
        bear these costs, they will gain an advantage. Over time, 
        production will shift to jurisdictions that do not impose this 
        tax, and the country that imposed the measure in the first 
        place will have punished its industry while doing little to 
        limit (global) emissions. The solution to this problem, so far, 
        has been to exempt industry from having to pay these costs by 
        allocating emission rights to them for free. Now Europe wants 
        to impose a cost on imported goods to offset whatever advantage 
        they might have.'' By exporting EU regulations, the EU will use 
        its economic power to strong arm the developing world into 
        adopting its standards. This is an approach we have seen many 
        times in international forums on animal health.

      Likewise, in response to media coverage of fires in the Amazon, 
        the EU is considering new restrictions on imports of goods from 
        Brazil and other countries where deforestation may occur. The 
        concept requires companies to verify that their imported goods 
        are not sourced from lands that have been deforested or from 
        lands of displaced indigenous peoples. The theme of supply 
        chain accountability is one that is gaining broader support in 
        Europe, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States. Some 
        legislative proposals in Congress would extend the Lacey Act to 
        include imported goods from deforested lands.
      The truth is we do not have a deforestation problem in the United 
        States. While some may prefer to use measures like this to 
        restrict beef imports from other countries, it would set a 
        dangerous precedent that may be used against us in the future 
        by simply substituting deforestation with another subjective 
        term. In November 2020, NCBA submitted comments to USDA 
        offering guidance to USDA's narrative in addressing the EU's 
        proposed deforestation legislation. It is important that we 
        commit to using objective, science-based standards at all 
        times, and avoid following the European example of subjective 
        trade.
(xiv) Ensure Proper Regulatory Oversight of Alternative and Imitation 
        Products
      Cattle producers welcome competition and consumer choice, but the 
        regulations governing alternative protein products must protect 
        consumer health and well-being, prevent false and deceptive 
        marketing, and ensure a level playing field for real beef 
        products and meat analogues alike. NCBA supports the critical 
        role of USDA in the joint oversight of cell-cultured products 
        and look forward to providing further input as USDA works to 
        formally implement components of the dual regulatory framework, 
        including efforts to establish mandatory labeling requirements 
        that appropriately differentiate cell-cultured products from 
        their conventional counterparts.
      Cattle producers work hard to produce a safe, affordable and 
        nutritious protein product--the word beef not only represents 
        that product but is synonymous with a brand that has been 
        cultivated through decades of hard work and investments made by 
        farmers and ranchers across America. Unfortunately, a growing 
        number of plant-based imitation products have turned to 
        problematic marketing strategies in an effort to grow their 
        market share. The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) 
        and Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) have nearly identical 
        misbranding provisions. However, USDA's implementation of said 
        provisions has more effectively ensured product labels are 
        truthful and not misleading. NCBA believes the simplest 
        solution to rectify misleading plant-based labels is for FDA to 
        enforce the law as it stands and would encourage USDA to work 
        with Agency to that end. Absent meaningful enforcement action 
        against misbranded imitation products, NCBA supports 
        legislative and regulatory strategies that will allow 
        alternative protein products to appropriately differentiate 
        themselves in the market without trading on beef's good name.
(xv) Promote a Secure Supply Chain through Increased Cyber Security
      Recent cyber-attacks on companies such as Colonial Pipeline and 
        JBS have encouraged American companies to review security 
        systems for potential vulnerabilities and take necessary steps 
        to prevent and deter future attacks. In particular, the attack 
        on JBS gained attention from cattle producers who have 
        experienced multiple supply chain disruptions due to weather 
        and COVID-19, and the prospect of future cyber-attacks may 
        result in further supply chain disruptions and market 
        volatility.
      Without question, securing the health and safety of the 
        agriculture industry from terrorist groups and other negative 
        influences is a serious concern, and protecting our 
        agricultural industry is vitally important for a stable, self-
        sufficient food source for U.S. consumers. NCBA policy supports 
        new initiatives concerning acts of terrorism against livestock 
        to strengthen penalties for anyone involved in terrorist 
        activities affecting the agricultural industry. NCBA policy 
        also calls for increased coordination of local, state, and 
        Federal officials to effectively monitor and respond to threats 
        against the agriculture industry. It is important that any 
        measures designed to protect and strengthen the cattle and beef 
        supply chain from cyber-attack are created with stakeholder 
        input and coordination.
(xvi) Recognize Industry Efforts to Adhere to Animal Disease 
        Traceability Rules While Supporting Industry-led, Private-
        Sector Traceability Initiatives.
      One common theme that spans the entire pre-harvest sector is the 
        issue of animal disease traceability (ADT)--knowing where 
        diseased and at-risk animals are located, and where and when 
        they travel. ADT is key to the United States' ability to 
        effectively respond to an animal disease outbreak. NCBA has 
        long been supportive of traceability for animal health purposes 
        and believes that the goal of any identification program should 
        be to enable the cattle industry, state, and Federal animal 
        health officials to respond rapidly and effectively to animal 
        health emergencies. NCBA believes that ADT has the potential to 
        reduce the number of animals involved, to streamline response 
        times, to safeguard the food supply chain, and allow unaffected 
        producers to safely operate their businesses.
      Published in 2013, USDA's ADT rule established minimum national 
        official identification and documentation requirements for 
        traceability of livestock moving interstate. Under this rule, 
        and unless specifically exempted, livestock belonging to the 
        species covered by the regulations and moving interstate must 
        be officially identified and accompanied by an interstate 
        certificate of veterinary inspection or other documentation. In 
        September 2018, USDA published the APHIS Over-Arching Goals to 
        Enhance Traceability, which include electronic identification 
        tags for certain animals and increased data-sharing. NCBA's ADT 
        goals are aligned with USDA's long-term strategy on this issue.
      NCBA is working with cattle producers, USDA, and animal health 
        experts to build traceability systems that operate at the speed 
        of commerce, protect confidentiality, keep cattle 
        identification data secure, and protect cattle producers from 
        liability once the animals have left their control. NCBA 
        supports the efforts of U.S. CattleTrace, a private-sector 
        project that launched in August 2018. This nonprofit 
        corporation collects just four data points--animal ID, date, 
        time, and GPS location of the readers--and securely manages 
        this data for animal disease traceability. The program began in 
        Kansas and has expanded to Texas, Florida, and other beef-
        producing regions across the United States. Additionally, the 
        program includes participation from key supply chain businesses 
        and meatpackers. This is just one option for producers, and we 
        are hopeful that more traceability systems will emerge that 
        address similar goals and offer greater choices for producers. 
        Traceability systems should prioritize animal health to 
        function as an effective tool in strengthening our supply 
        chain.
Conclusion
    The U.S. cattle and beef supply industry has faced many unfortunate 
and unanticipated disruptions throughout our history, with COVID-19 as 
one of the most recent and significant examples. In response to each 
struggle we face, our industry's resilience and dogged determination 
prove that we can overcome obstacles and bounce back stronger than 
before--with the ability to pass on our knowledge, skills, and culture 
to future generations. NCBA appreciates USDA's significant undertaking 
of reviewing America's supply chains and listening to recommendations 
from stakeholders. The U.S. cattle and beef supply chain is strong, and 
we look forward to working with you to find practical, science-based, 
and proven solutions to build a stronger, more sustainable agricultural 
industry.
            Sincerely,

Ethan L. Lane,
Vice President, Government Affairs,
National Cattlemen's Beef Association.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



                NCBA Fed Cattle Negotiated Trade Tracker--2021 Q1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                        Week Ending:
    Region           75%            Category       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Threshold                           1/10/2021     1/17/2021     1/24/2021     1/31/2021     2/7/2021      2/14/2021     2/21/2021     2/28/2021     3/7/2021      3/14/2021     3/21/2021     3/28/2021     4/4/2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM          9,750            Neg. Cash          7,239         7,331         4,988         6,800         6,929         6,441         6,390         8,376         8,742         6,669         2,774         8,657         4,642
                                  Neg. Grid Base          2,046         4,893         3,356         2,827         5,159         3,690         4,003         5,104         6,299         6,060         3,553         4,649         3,997
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.               9,285        12,224         8,344         9,627        12,088        10,131        10,393        13,480        15,041        12,729         6,327        13,306        8,6390
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          KS         15,750            Neg. Cash         13,754        12,481        20,591        10,598        18,085         8,531         8,310        10,830        14,859        17,952        13,259        17,093        13,486
                                  Neg. Grid Base          3,430         2,343         3,410         2,105         3,504         6,198         1,382         4,086         4,383         2,903         3,978         5,442         5,556
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.              17,184        14,824        24,001        12,703        21,589        14,729         9,692        14,916        19,242        20,855        17,237        22,535       19,0420
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          NE         27,000            Neg. Cash         23,816        31,081        29,738        30,547        30,312        25,664        25,512        29,886        19,807        34,422        22,850        30,549        21,930
                                  Neg. Grid Base          3,947         5,153         5,371         8,014         6,071         8,456         4,679         4,352         4,403         2,887         3,216         4,760         5,232
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Subtotal Neg.            27,763        36,234        35,109        38,561        36,383        34,120        30,191        34,238        24,210        37,309        26,066        35,309        27,162
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CO *                           Neg. Cash          1,573         5,485         2,419         4,333            --            --            --            --         5,422         4,083         5,097         6,311           728
                                  Neg. Grid Base          1,654         5,498         2,297         4,566            --            --            --            --         3,155         2,777         1,982         2,071         1,263
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Subtotal Neg.             3,227        10,983         4,716         8,899            --            --            --            --         8,577         6,860         7,079         8,382         1,991
                                                   =====================================================================================================================================================================================
                                      8Total Neg.        30,990        47,217        39,825        47,460        36,383        34,120        30,191        34,238        32,787        44,169        33,145        43,691       29,1530
                                                   =====================================================================================================================================================================================
       IA-MN         12,000            Neg. Cash         19,414        27,355        18,887        24,220        26,081        21,443        20,342        18,668        19,844        18,875        26,397        21,961        26,291
                                  Neg. Grid Base          3,471         4,166         2,984         4,040         2,716         4,394         2,681         4,668         3,095         2,941         3,027         3,004         4,390
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.              22,885        31,521        21,871        28,260        28,797        25,837        23,023        23,336        22,939        21,816        29,424        24,965       30,6810
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM          9,750            Pass/Fail        8(465)0         2,474     8(1,406)0       8(123)0         2,338           381           643         3,730         5,291         2,979     8(3,423)0         3,556     8(1,111)0
          KS         15,750            Pass/Fail          1,434       8(926)0         8,251     8(3,047)0         5,839     8(1,021)0     8(6,058)0       8(834)0         3,492         5,105         1,487         6,785         3,292
       NE-CO         27,000            Pass/Fail          3,990        20,217        12,825        20,460         9,383         7,120         3,191         7,238         5,787        17,169         6,145        16,691         2,153
       IA-MN         12,000            Pass/Fail         10,885        19,521         9,871        16,260        16,797        13,837        11,023        11,336        10,939         9,816        17,424        12,965        18,681
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Sources:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Region:                                              USDA-AMS Report:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM                    LM_CT156 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2483.pdf)
          KS                    LM_CT157 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2484.pdf)
          NE                    LM_CT158 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2485.pdf)
          CO                    LM_CT134 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2670.pdf)
       IA-MN                    LM_CT137 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2672.pdf)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Zeroed cells denote unavailability of data due to confidentiality.


 
                                                                                            NCBA Fed Cattle Negotiated Trade Tracker--2021 Q2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                        Week Ending:
    Region           75%            Category       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Threshold                           4/11/2021     4/18/2021     4/25/2021     5/2/2021      5/9/2021      5/16/2021     5/23/2021     5/30/2021     6/6/2021      6/13/2021     6/20/2021     6/27/2021     7/4/2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM          9,750            Neg. Cash         13,387         8,900         3,668         9,055         6,850         7,953         7,071         9,183         5,776         7,470         7,440         1,324         5,355
                                  Neg. Grid Base          4,750         5,643         5,561         7,764         4,998         5,778         6,190         7,936         8,771         7,573         6,990         7,534         5,029
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.              18,137        14,543         9,229        16,819        11,848        13,731        13,261        17,119        14,547        15,043        14,430         8,858       10,3840
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          KS         15,750            Neg. Cash         21,343        14,758         6,345         8,374         7,881         8,814        16,536        13,843         9,326        13,602        22,727         2,921        13,291
                                  Neg. Grid Base          5,395         4,984         4,127         8,206         8,350        10,318         7,496        11,021        10,864         9,624         7,499         7,115        12,075
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.              26,738        19,742        10,472        16,580        16,231        19,132        24,032        24,864        20,190        23,226        30,226        10,036       25,3660
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          NE         27,000            Neg. Cash         31,150        25,593        21,314        22,886        32,744        23,087        25,735        28,551        17,189        35,353        20,781        18,700        25,960
                                  Neg. Grid Base          6,841         4,338         2,945         5,762         3,371         2,563        10,683        13,562        13,248        16,922        10,141         8,437         7,410
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Subtotal Neg.            37,991        29,931        24,259        28,648        36,115        25,650        36,418        42,113        30,437        52,275        30,922        27,137        33,370
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CO *                           Neg. Cash          4,322         2,850         1,708        25,261           995         1,135           857         1,299            --            --            --            --            --
                                  Neg. Grid Base          2,451         2,061           553         2,545           265           210         1,664         2,263            --            --            --            --            --
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Subtotal Neg.             6,773         4,911         2,261        27,806         1,260         1,345         2,521         3,562            --            --            --            --            --
                                                   =====================================================================================================================================================================================
                                      8Total Neg.        44,764        34,842        26,520        56,454        37,375        26,995        38,939        45,675        30,437        52,275        30,922        27,137       33,3700
                                                   =====================================================================================================================================================================================
       IA-MN         12,000            Neg. Cash         26,573        27,552        24,529        15,590        26,387        18,389        19,093        21,447        22,738        27,427        16,652        16,347        30,317
                                  Neg. Grid Base          3,053         3,903         2,308         2,998         3,269         4,516         4,413         7,047         4,484         5,195         4,975         3,414         6,035
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.              29,626        31,455        26,837        18,588        29,656        22,905        23,506        28,494        27,222        32,622        21,627        19,761       36,3520
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          75% Thresholds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM          9,750            Pass/Fail          8,387         4,793       8(521)0         7,069         2,098         3,981         3,511         7,369         4,797         5,293         4,680       8(892)0           634
          KS         15,750            Pass/Fail         10,988         3,992     8(5,278)0           830           481         3,382         8,282         9,114         4,440         7,476        14,476     8(5,714)0         9,616
       NE-CO         27,000            Pass/Fail         17,764         7,842       8(480)0        29,454        10,375         8(5)0        11,939        18,675         3,437        25,275         3,922           137         6,370
       IA-MN         12,000            Pass/Fail         17,626        19,455        14,837         6,588        17,656        10,905        11,506        16,494        15,222        20,622         9,627         7,761        24,352
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     100% Robust (FYI Only)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM         13,000           Over/Under          5,137         1,543     8(3,771)0         3,819     8(1,152)0           731           261         4,119         1,547         2,043         1,430      8(4,142)      (2,616)0
          KS         21,000           Over/Under          5,738      8(1,258)      (10,528)       (4,420)       (4,769)      (1,868)0         3,032         3,864       8(810)0         2,226         9,226    8(10,964)0         4,366
       NE-CO         36,000           Over/Under          8,764      8(1,158)      (9,480)0        20,454         1,375      (9,005)0         2,939         9,675     8(5,563)0        16,275      8(5,078)       (8,863)      (2,630)0
       IA-MN         11,000           Over/Under         18,626        20,455        15,837         7,588        18,656        11,905        12,506        17,494        16,222        21,622        10,627         8,761        25,352
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Sources:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Region:                                              USDA-AMS Report:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM                    LM_CT156 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2483.pdf)
          KS                    LM_CT157 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2484.pdf)
          NE                    LM_CT158 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2485.pdf)
          CO                    LM_CT134 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2670.pdf)
       IA-MN                    LM_CT137 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2672.pdf)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Zeroed cells denote unavailability of data due to confidentiality.


 
                                                                                            NCBA Fed Cattle Negotiated Trade Tracker--2021 Q3
                                                                                                          (Incomplete Dataset)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                        Week Ending:
    Region           75%            Category       -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Threshold                           7/11/2021     7/18/2021     7/25/2021     8/1/2021      8/8/2021      8/15/2021     8/22/2021     8/29/2021     9/5/2021      9/12/2021     9/19/2021     9/26/2021     10/3/2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM          9,750            Neg. Cash          7,480         5,930         6,182         6,561         6,713         5,582         5,757         3,874         3,125         5,838         3,810         4,145
                                  Neg. Grid Base          8,497         7,193         5,474         7,406         6,439         5,231         4,386         5,790         7,255         6,610         8,107         6,687
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.              15,977        13,123        11,656        13,967        13,152        10,813        10,143         9,664        10,380        12,448        11,917        10,832           --0
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          KS         15,750            Neg. Cash         18,921        10,162        12,882        12,406        11,089        15,200        10,514         7,806         6,472        10,087         8,396         9,058
                                  Neg. Grid Base         12,703        11,197        11,924        13,297        12,791        14,222        11,770        10,808        13,059        11,590        13,988        14,971
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.              31,624        21,359        24,806        25,703        23,880        29,422        22,284        18,614        19,531        21,677        22,384        24,029           --0
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          NE         27,000            Neg. Cash         18,717        25,916        23,752        21,649        33,886        22,013        35,257        17,024        17,034        22,184        19,287        27,002
                                  Neg. Grid Base         11,735         8,534         6,174         7,609         8,231         6,418         8,387         5,847         7,618         5,380         7,762         8,653
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Subtotal Neg.            30,452        34,450        29,926        29,258        42,117        28,431        43,644        22,871        24,652        27,564        27,049        35,655            --
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CO *                           Neg. Cash             --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --
                                  Neg. Grid Base             --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                Subtotal Neg.                --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --            --
                                                   =====================================================================================================================================================================================
                                      8Total Neg.        30,452        34,450        29,926        29,258        42,117        28,431        43,644        22,871        24,652        27,564        27,049        35,655           --0
                                                   =====================================================================================================================================================================================
       IA-MN         12,000            Neg. Cash         24,433        18,897        22,497        23,545        29,319        20,305        26,701        19,472        23,851        20,471        16,671        13,913
                                  Neg. Grid Base          8,084         6,766         6,412         5,880         8,460         6,900         6,432         3,754         4,154         3,771         5,026         4,281
                                                   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                8Total Neg.              32,517        25,663        28,909        29,425        37,779        27,205        33,133        23,226        28,005        24,242        21,697        18,194           --0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          75% Thresholds
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM          9,750            Pass/Fail          6,227         3,373         1,906         4,217         3,402         1,063           393        8(86)0           630         2,698         2,167         1,082     8(9,750)0
          KS         15,750            Pass/Fail         15,874         5,609         9,056         9,953         8,130        13,672         6,534         2,864         3,781         5,927         6,634         8,279    8(15,750)0
       NE-CO         27,000            Pass/Fail          3,452         7,450         2,926         2,258        15,117         1,431        16,644      8(4,129)      (2,348)0           564            49         8,655    8(27,000)0
       IA-MN         12,000            Pass/Fail         20,517        13,663        16,909        17,425        25,779        15,205        21,133        11,226        16,005        12,242         9,697         6,194    8(12,000)0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     100% Robust (FYI Only)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM         13,000           Over/Under          2,977           123      8(1,344)           967           152     8(2,187)0       (2,857)       (3,336)       (2,620)         (552)       (1,083)       (2,168)     (13,000)0
          KS         21,000           Over/Under         10,624           359         3,806         4,703         2,880         8,422         1,284      8(2,386)      (1,469)0           677         1,384         3,029    8(21,000)0
       NE-CO         36,000           Over/Under       8(5,548)       (1,550)       (6,074)      (6,742)0         6,117     8(7,569)0         7,644     8(13,129)      (11,348)       (8,436)       (8,951)         (345)     (36,000)0
       IA-MN         11,000           Over/Under         21,517        14,663        17,909        18,425        26,779        16,205        22,133        12,226        17,005        13,242        10,697         7,194    8(11,000)0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Sources:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Region:                                              USDA-AMS Report:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TX-OK-NM                    LM_CT156 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2483.pdf)
          KS                    LM_CT157 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2484.pdf)
          NE                    LM_CT158 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2485.pdf)
          CO                    LM_CT134 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2670.pdf)
       IA-MN                    LM_CT137 (https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2672.pdf)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Zeroed cells denote unavailability of data due to confidentiality.

                              Attachment 5
NCBA Meat and Poultry Investments RFI Comments (Docket No. AMS-TM-21-
        0058)
August 30, 2021

  Sarah J. Helming,
  U.S. Department of Agriculture
  Washington, D.C.

  FR Docket No. AMS-TM-21-0058 (86 Fed. Reg. 37728)

  Submitted via Regulations.gov
National Cattlemen's Beef Association Comments on Investments and 
        Opportunities for Meat and Poultry Processing Infrastructure
    Dear Ms. Helming:

    The National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA) appreciates the 
opportunity to submit comments in response to the Office of the 
Secretary's Request for Information (RFI) on Investments and 
Opportunities for Meat and Poultry Processing Infrastructure. NCBA is 
committed to partnering with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
and other Federal agencies on initiatives to bolster beef processing 
capacity under Executive Order 14036, ``Promoting Competition in the 
American Economy.''
    NCBA is the oldest and largest national trade association 
representing the interest of the U.S. cattle and beef industry, with 
over 250,000 members represented both through direct membership and 44 
state affiliate associations. Producer-driven and directed, the 
following comments largely focus on an array of pre-harvest matters. 
Given the complexity and diversity of domestic cattle and beef 
production and the varied issues facing each segment of production, it 
is important to note that these comments should not be considered all-
inclusive but are reflective of our membership's priorities and the 
current challenges facing U.S. cattle producers in the beef processing 
sector.
Background
    The U.S. cattle and beef supply chains are highly intricate and 
home to some of the most complex commodity markets on [E]arth (Figure 
1). While there are various ways to determine the individual 
transaction value for both cattle and beef, the baseline value 
fluctuates with supply and demand. For cattle producers, our primary 
demand is derived from meatpackers' needs to procure cattle for 
processing into beef. This is true whether a cattle producer is a cow-
calf operator, stocker, backgrounder, or feeder as all prices paid for 
beef cattle are a derivative of the expected fed cattle price.
    For several decades, the availability of beef packing capacity 
(commonly referred to as ``hook space'') exceeded the supply of fed 
cattle. However, a 2020 study by Rabobank found that this excess 
operational beef processing capacity fell to zero in late 2016 and 
turned negative early in 2017 where it remains today.\1\ Simply put, 
there is no longer sufficient hook space to process through cattle 
supplies. During the same time period, cattle herd inventories grew 
following price signals beginning in 2014.\2\ As a result, the packing 
sector presently represents a bottleneck in the overall beef supply 
chain, which has had a negative effect on cattle producer leverage in 
fed cattle negotiations. When cattle supplies exceed the capacity to 
process them, the livestock become an economically less scarce resource 
and cattle prices decline. It is important to note that this is 
independent of demand for the end-product, beef. The most pointed 
examples of this can be found in the 2019 fire at Tyson Foods' Finney 
County beef processing facility in Holcomb, KS, and the COVID-19 
pandemic. In both cases, operational beef processing capacity 
utilization dramatically fell following temporary closures of high-
throughput beef plants. As a result, cattle prices declined, and boxed 
beef values drastically increased according to a report issued by 
USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) in the summer of 2020.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Aherin, Dustin, Rabobank, September 2020 https://
research.rabobank.com/far/en/sectors/animal-protein/the-case-for-
capacity.html.
    \2\ See National Agricultural Statistics Service's semi-annual 
cattle inventory reports.
    \3\ Boxed Beef & Fed Cattle Price Spread Investigation Report, 
USDA-AMS, July 2020 https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/
CattleandBeefPriceMarginReport.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1
U.S. Cattle and Beef Supply Chain
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    To improve producer leverage in fed cattle negotiations, either 
cattle supplies must be reduced, or processing capacity must be 
expanded. Herd contractions and expansions occur naturally over the 
course of a somewhat predictable 10 year cycle. Currently, U.S. cattle 
inventories are cyclically high,\4\ but beef demand is also high both 
domestically and in our major export markets.\5\ Therefore, the 
clearest solution to meeting this demand while ensuring sufficient 
margin flow throughout the supply chain is to expand beef processing 
capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Cattle, USDA NASS, January 2021 https://
downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/h702q636h/
n009ww19g/9880wj45t/catl0121.pdf.
    \5\ Factors that drive beef, cattle prices to record highs, 
Rabobank, June 2021 https://www.meatpoultry.com/articles/25040-
rabobank-factors-that-drive-beefcattle-prices-to-record-highs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    NCBA greatly appreciates USDA's attention to this critical issue. 
Adequate beef processing capacity is critical to maintaining 
profitability in the cattle industry and a steady supply of essential 
food products to consumers.
    Before addressing some of the specific questions posed by the 
Agency, NCBA encourages USDA to consider the following recommendations. 
First, the $500 million allocated toward the meat and poultry 
processing sector must be strategically invested via multiple means to 
ensure maximum impact. While there are some challenges which plague 
meatpackers of all types, various constraints affect different 
processors based on several factors (i.e., regionality, plant size, 
etc.). Second, constructing or expanding capacity will not in and of 
itself create resiliency in our supply chains. It is equally as 
important for every new hook to be attached to comprehensive business 
models which include robust risk management strategies. New and 
expanded facilities must be able to withstand the financial ebbs and 
flows inherent to commodity-based enterprises. Third, careful and 
thorough analysis of all potential investment strategies must be 
conducted to ensure that standards of food safety, animal welfare, and 
product labeling are not jeopardized in the name of haste. While the 
need to expand beef processing is immediate, we cannot afford to 
threaten consumer confidence in our product. Fourth, USDA should 
consider research and development of automation technology. Even 
recently, significant integration of automation technology at meat 
plants has not been feasible because machines could not self-adjust for 
heterogeneity between carcasses. That is no longer the case, and recent 
breakthroughs in artificial intelligence could be incorporated into 
meat processing machinery to make these necessary adjustments.\6\ 
Maintaining a sufficient workforce is challenging for meatpackers of 
all sizes, and technology can greatly reduce the burden on human 
resources. Finally, USDA should reach out to sister agencies including 
the Department of Labor, Department of State, Department of 
Transportation, Small Business Administration, and others to identify 
ways in which their mission areas can support this important 
undertaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ See for example: https://scottautomation.com/assets/Sectors/
Meat-processing/Resources/Beef-Processing/Beef-Rib-Cutting-Scribing-
Brochure-EN.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Again, we appreciate this opportunity to provide the cattle 
industry perspective to USDA on this important topic. Many NCBA 
affiliate organizations, allied industry entities, and individual 
members have also submitted comments to this docket, and we encourage 
the Agency to carefully consider the perspectives of those groups as 
well. Our responses to some of the questions posed in the RFI are 
italicized below.
General Considerations
   What competition challenges and risks might new entrants 
        face from high levels of market concentration or other relevant 
        market conditions, and how can USDA and other Federal 
        Government agencies assist new entrants in mitigating those 
        risks? What resources exist at the state, Tribal, and local 
        level, as well as at academic research centers, to assist new 
        entrants in addressing competition challenges, and how can the 
        Federal Government support the effectiveness of those 
        resources?

      The chief barrier to entry for a prospective packer is access to 
        sufficient capital. The average cost of construction for a 
        packing plant runs approximately $100,000 per hook of daily 
        capacity,\7\ meaning that a modest 25 head per day facility 
        would require about $2.5 million in up-front capital just to 
        turn on the lights. In addition to the high startup cash 
        requirements, maintenance, regulatory compliance, competitive 
        wages, and other overhead costs require immense levels of 
        liquidity. The major meatpackers are well-established business 
        entities with several options available to them for financing. 
        Thus, new entrants in particular can struggle to access 
        adequate lines of credit to ensure both long- and short-term 
        financial viability. In addition to cash volume, the risk 
        profile for packing facilities is quite high, which can result 
        in unfavorable financing terms or inadequate credit offerings 
        from traditional lenders. USDA can assist in this endeavor by 
        distributing some of the funds available to qualified business 
        entities via federally guaranteed, low-interest loans and, in 
        some cases, grants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Newlin, Lacey, So you want to build a slaughter plant?, High 
Plains Journal, June 2020, https://www.hpj.com/livestock/so-you-want-
to-build-a-slaughterplant/article_a033a44e-acaf-11ea-a32d-
63beecbd5f05.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Economies-of-scale also play a substantial role in long-term 
        profitability for meatpackers. Meat processing businesses are 
        based upon a cost-plus margin model. The ability to keep costs 
        down is directly tied to investments made to increase 
        production and efficiency, reducing fixed costs to grow margin 
        where the price for the final meat product is heavily 
        commoditized. Well-established, high-throughput entities are 
        therefore at a tremendous market advantage over new entrants 
        who must still make efficiency-enhancing investments. USDA can 
        assist new entrants by partnering with land-grant universities 
        and cooperative extension to provide consulting services to 
        qualifying business entities.

   What type of investor, developer, or new entrant would be 
        best positioned to build a new facility, or expand an existing 
        facility, and who could fund it? What level of experience is 
        necessary for success?

      Prospective meatpackers must thoroughly research the market in 
        which they plan to operate. Factors such as sufficiency of 
        livestock supply, availability of workforce, transportation 
        costs, transaction types, and potential sales channels must be 
        considered. Those new entrants who will be most successful will 
        be based in regions currently underserved by meat processing 
        services and that have previously identified retail and/or 
        foodservice channels into which their product can be sold. USDA 
        can assist through the Office of the Chief Economist by 
        conducting market research to identify those areas where more 
        localized processing is most needed.
      Meatpacking, like any commodity-based enterprise is a cyclical 
        business. During periods of high beef demand and high cattle 
        supply, as is currently the case, beef packing can be highly 
        lucrative. On the other hand, when the reverse is true, 
        maintaining profitability can be challenging. Understanding 
        these cycles can be difficult for new entrants with minimal 
        experience in either the livestock or meat industries. USDA can 
        partner with land-grant universities and cooperative extension 
        to provide training to new entrants on how to maintain solvency 
        throughout these cycles. Further, USDA can enter into 
        partnerships with groups such as the CME Group and/or Commodity 
        Futures Trading Commission to educate prospective market 
        entrants on mitigating risk through a comprehensive hedging 
        strategy via futures and options markets.

   What business and operating structures (e.g., cooperatives, 
        farmer-owned facilities, sole proprietorship, limited liability 
        company, B corporation, etc.) can sustain these operations?

      There are a number of factors which may influence business 
        structure in the meat processing industry, and NCBA is not 
        aware of any data to support the assertion that a specific type 
        of enterprise or operating structure is an indicator of long-
        term success. That said, it's helpful to be aware of the 
        varying pro's and con's that exist relative to each operating 
        structure. For example, sole proprietorships and partnerships 
        are relatively easy to form but individual owners bear the 
        burden for all business debt and liability. Limited Liability 
        Corporations limit liability and are simpler to run than 
        corporations but receive less favorable treatment than 
        corporations. S corporations, C corporations, and cooperatives 
        arguably require the most effort to form or incorporate and run 
        but receive the benefit of various tax breaks (or in the case 
        of cooperatives, may even be eligible for certain grant 
        funding).

   How can workforce recruitment, training, and retention needs 
        be addressed to maintain or increase processing capacity?

      Across the country, the entire economy is experiencing a shortage 
        of skilled workers. Farms, ranches, and processing facilities 
        are no exception. Between the lockdowns and unemployment 
        incentives caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the labor situation 
        has continued to worsen. We continue to see labor shortages for 
        our livestock producers and processors. Many farmers and 
        ranchers would like to use the H-2A program administered by the 
        Department of Labor to fill critical labor gaps on farm and in 
        the processing sector.
      The biggest shortcoming of the H-2A program for cattle producers 
        is its structure in covering only seasonal temporary workers. 
        Raising livestock is a year-round job. To keep some workers on 
        farm for part of the year, some producers will use H-2A in its 
        current form, however as soon as that worker leaves that ranch, 
        the high-skilled and trained worker has moved on to another 
        seasonal job under a new visa.
      While ranches are constantly confronted with labor shortages, the 
        lack of a workable, year-round, no cap, H-2A program is also 
        worsening existing bottlenecks at meat processing plants. As 
        packing plants return to full operations, many jobs remain 
        vacant simply due to a lack of applicants. H-2A workers can 
        fill this need and help bring some stability back to the cattle 
        supply chain, but it needs to be a year-round program with no 
        cap. It must be accessible and workable for livestock producers 
        and processors alike.
      Another area that needs to be addressed in order to fill 
        specifically the jobs within the packing industry, is one that 
        we have not discussed in great detail in the past. The previous 
        Administration placed a cap on the number of individuals 
        entering the U.S. through the asylum and refugee visa system. 
        The packing plants rely heavily on these visa holders for the 
        processing plants. Fully recognizing that COVID-19 put a halt 
        to many of these individuals entering the U.S., once the 
        borders fully reopen, we need to take a hard look at these caps 
        and determine whether some of these restrictions can be lifted 
        to help with our continued labor shortages.

   What constitutes sufficient actual demand for small- and 
        very-small-processing facilities to keep a business operational 
        with appropriate cash flow? For context, USDA defines a 
        ``small'' establishment as those with ten or more employees but 
        fewer than 500 employees; a ``very small'' establishment is one 
        with fewer than ten employees or less than $2.5 million in 
        annual sales. Any establishment with 500 or more employees is 
        considered ``large''; there is no mid-scale size category.

      Demand for processing is highly regional, and includes not just 
        commodity fed cattle but cull cows and program cattle as well. 
        Therefore, demand can be difficult to ascertain--particularly 
        areas that are not included in traditional market reports 
        published via Livestock Mandatory Reporting. However, demand 
        can simplistically be determined by examining the opportunity 
        costs of adding hooks into a regional market. In those areas 
        where processors, regardless of size, are significantly 
        backlogged on harvest, livestock producers may be willing to 
        accept different transaction terms in order to eliminate the 
        variable costs associated with maintaining ownership of market-
        ready animals.
      One method for evaluating actual demand for larger processing 
        services can be determined by analyzing the regional 
        currentness of the cattle feeding sector. Currentness refers to 
        whether or not cattle are being marketed in a timely manner or 
        whether they are being retained on feed for longer than 
        necessary.\8\ Cattle feeders are considered to be current if 
        they are able to sell fed cattle around the same time they 
        achieve target weight. Currentness can be affected by factors 
        such as weather and cattle prices, but the availability of 
        operational processing capacity is a chief driver. USDA can 
        evaluate the actual regional demand for more processing in part 
        by analyzing Cattle on Feed reports published monthly by USDA's 
        National Agricultural Statistics Service. By comparing seasonal 
        on-feed levels in each region against historical datasets for 
        the same time period, trends can be identified which may 
        provide insights into what specific regions could sustain 
        additional processing capacity. For example, comparing the 
        late-summer on-feed levels in the Kansas region to previous 
        years shows a decrease in seasonal currentness over the past 
        years. This could indicate demand for more processing in this 
        region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Mark, Darrell R., Interpretation of the USDA Cattle on Feed 
Report, University of Nebraska Lincoln Extension, https://
extensionpublications.unl.edu/assets/pdf/ec850.pdf.

   How do processing needs and challenges vary by species and 
        by value-added product types (e.g., organic, local, grass-fed, 
        kosher, Halal)? Do these needs require special types of funding 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        (e.g., to encourage continued innovation)?

      While it is possible for very small and small meatpackers to 
        successfully compete with more well-established entities in the 
        production of ``commodity beef,'' they are better suited to 
        compete in niche markets (locally sourced, branded programs, 
        etc.). USDA can help support new entrants by working through 
        AMS to educate processors on existing process-verified programs 
        (PVPs) and, in some cases, establish new PVPs to suit the 
        marketing objectives of the new entrant. Oftentimes, the 
        funding needs for specialty products varies due to the unique 
        regulatory and verification standards associated with each.
Fair Treatment Of Farmers And Workers And Ownership Considerations
   What health and safety standards would encourage a safe and 
        healthy workplace?

      Food safety is of the utmost importance when operating a meat 
        processing facility of any size. Costs associated with 
        implementing effective food safety programs are sometimes 
        financially challenging for small- and very-small-facilities. 
        Many small processors lack the necessary resources and funding 
        to implement and maintain the expected level of food safety 
        measures. The 2016 National Beef Quality Audit found that food 
        safety was the most important quality factor when surveying all 
        segments of the beef supply chain.\9\ This points to the 
        importance that must be placed on food safety protocols when 
        operating a processing facility of any size. However, small 
        plants find it difficult to obtain the necessary tools and 
        training to develop sufficient food safety programs. In 
        considering how funds are appropriated to expand meat and 
        poultry processing capacity it is paramount that the 
        implementation of effective food safety programs be 
        incorporated. Specifically, USDA should consider allocating 
        funds for food safety, education and training for the 
        following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ 2016 National Beef Quality Audit Executive Summary (https://
www.bqa.org/Media/BQA/Docs/2016nbqa_es.pdf).

     Investment in sanitation equipment and installation of 
            the equipment. New technologies and modern equipment 
            increase the ability of processing facilities to adhere to 
            FSIS standards and make it less likely that a plant will be 
            subject to a product recall or identified as the source of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a foodborne illness outbreak.

     Training and education for the development of strong 
            Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) plans. 
            HACCP plans are highly technical documents that incorporate 
            scientific knowledge and practical actions that smaller 
            operators may not be able to develop themselves. Through a 
            mix of private consultation, cooperative extension, and 
            USDA technical assistance better, more effective, HACCP 
            plans could improve food safety programs that are tailored 
            to each facility.

     Workforce-related technical assistance that provides 
            additional resources for employee training, and development 
            for highly skilled technical workers and in-plant 
            operators. Small processors shouldn't have to sacrifice 
            production time and loss of income due to employees 
            participating in necessary food safety and equipment 
            training.

     Enhanced research for small and medium sized 
            processing facilities to match the scale and scope of 
            processing facilities. Science, data, and research are 
            primary tools USDA uses to protect public health. Modern 
            agriculture and food safety research has helped to build a 
            modern public health system that meets the evolving needs 
            of the food supply system. Large corporate processors have 
            researchers and meat scientists at their disposal. Small 
            processors are limited to data that pertains to their scale 
            of operation. The need for food safety research conducted 
            at small and medium sized facilities is essential to the 
            long-term viability of these businesses and the overall 
            supply chain.

      It is also vital that FSIS support inspection that has the 
        capacity and flexibility to react to the demands of meat 
        processing facilities of any size. Supply and demand can 
        rapidly change, particularly for small processors, and 
        inspectors need to be available and ready to accommodate such 
        shifts. Any funding provided by USDA-FSIS should ensure that 
        there are an adequate number of inspectors to allow facilities 
        to operate and react to local needs and supply chain demands.

   Should USDA have the ability to block the sale of processing 
        facilities built or invested in through Federal funds to large 
        or foreign-owned corporations? What other options should USDA 
        consider in order to prevent new, expanded, and successful 
        facilities from being acquired by the large corporations whose 
        consolidated operations can suffer from bottlenecks and create 
        significant supply chain vulnerabilities?

      If the ultimate goal of this effort is to eliminate or, at the 
        very least significantly reduce, supply chain vulnerabilities 
        for small- to mid-size processors then the immediate focus 
        should be on ensuring these entities are viable businesses--
        both now and in the future. NCBA does not have a position on 
        whether or not the Agency should be permitted to block the sale 
        of processing facilities, but reiterates the importance of 
        investing in sound business models that enhance competition and 
        opportunities for U.S. cattle producers. USDA should make every 
        effort to prevent further consolidation in this sector of the 
        beef supply chain.

   Should the process[o]r be required to purchase a minimum 
        volume through auctions or other public transactions?

      The negotiated trade of fed cattle is the primary driver of price 
        discovery in the cattle markets. The weighted averages of the 
        cattle prices negotiated helps producers understand the value 
        of their cattle at a specific point in time, and often is the 
        mechanism used to establish base prices in other transaction 
        types. However, under Livestock Mandatory Reporting, only the 
        information from those federally inspected packers which 
        process an average of 125,000 head of cattle per year (roughly 
        500 head per day) is included in those AMS reports. Therefore, 
        the vast majority of processing entities established through 
        USDA loans and/or grants will not contribute to price discovery 
        in this traditional sense.
      As previously noted, smaller meatpackers can be better suited to 
        producing niche meat products. Because the costs associated 
        with operating branded programs and PVPs are typically higher 
        than more traditional beef products--both to the livestock 
        producer and the processor--small packers need to be allowed 
        the flexibility to enter into agreements that make sense for 
        both the buy and sell side of the ledger. Requiring a certain 
        volume of specific transaction types would pose an unnecessary 
        regulatory burden on these critical businesses.

   If contracts are utilized, should practices like tournament 
        systems that have been found to be prone to anti-competitive 
        abuse be prohibited? Should contracts have at least a portion 
        of the payments to producers be based on wholesale meat prices?

      It is important that prices paid by packers to cattle producers 
        be fair and competitive with the market. In some cases, market 
        participants may prefer to base pricing models off of wholesale 
        meat prices. However, as previously stated, requiring a certain 
        volume of specific transaction types or contract structures 
        would pose an unnecessary burden on new entrants into the 
        meatpacking space.
Loans and Other Financing Considerations
   What financing tools facilitate access to capital for small 
        meat and poultry processing companies? In your response, please 
        consider the stage of corporate development (e.g., startup, 
        onsite expansion, restarting an idled facility, new location), 
        the potential use of funds (e.g., working capital, 
        construction, credit lines, equipment), and the type of 
        financing (e.g., grants, installment loans, balloon payment 
        loans, equity like investments). Please also consider the 
        prospective borrowers' type of business model (e.g., 
        cooperative, farmer joint-ownership, employee-ownership, mobile 
        meat- and poultry-processing operations).

      Guaranteed loans arguably represent the best opportunity to 
        finance capital-intensive projects in the meat processing 
        sector--from the construction of new facilities to significant 
        upgrades or expansions to existing facilities. Through USDA 
        Rural Development and the Small Business Administration (SBA), 
        NCBA is aware of several existing resources such as the 
        Business and Industry Loan Program and SBA 7(a) programs where 
        rural businesses can work with lenders to provide the capital 
        they need for their business. It is critically important that 
        efforts be made to strengthen meat supply chain resiliency in a 
        timely manner. Therefore, NCBA encourages USDA to consider 
        building upon existing programs to address needs in the 
        processing sector rather than establish a new program.

   What barriers, if any, exist that reduce access to capital 
        for very small and small meat and poultry processors? In your 
        response, consider collateral, capital, capacity, and other 
        factors.

      When working with a new customer, lenders will consider a host of 
        factors before providing capital, regardless of the business 
        venture, or even how that individual business is structured. 
        Some of the most important considerations include the ability 
        to repay and the risk of the venture. Beyond that, a lender 
        will consider whether the borrower has experience in that 
        particular business venture, if they have a sound business 
        plan, and whether they have a legitimate market in which to 
        sell their product. While the above factors need to be 
        considered, it is important to note that risk is most often the 
        greatest barrier to accessing capital.

   What are the most pressing needs of the meat and poultry 
        processing sector with regard to financing, and what action 
        should USDA take in the immediate term to improve access to 
        capital for small- and very-small-meat and poultry processors?

      As stated throughout these comments, construction or expansion of 
        beef processing capacity requires immense capital, and 
        oftentimes traditional lenders are not a suitable option for 
        processing entities. USDA is uniquely positioned to distribute 
        funds to entities at various stages of corporate development. 
        Whether by utilizing existing loan programs, such as the 
        Business and Industry Loan Guarantees program under USDA's 
        Rural Development mission area, or establishing new loan and 
        grant programs through other USDA bureaus, the Agency should 
        most immediately make financing available to qualified entities 
        demonstrating intent to expand processing capacity. Further, 
        many new beef processing plants and expansions have been 
        announced and are in various stages of construction. USDA 
        should consider tools to support those business entities who 
        have already engaged in capital raising efforts. In some cases, 
        grants or loan guarantees offered retroactively for costs 
        already incurred and paid may be appropriate to allow these 
        small businesses to direct more resources toward business 
        development undertakings such as scoping and efficiency 
        enhancement.

   What types of technical assistance or capacity building 
        support would be useful to lenders interested in starting or 
        expanding their meat and poultry processing lending?

      Existing processors and new business entities alike stand to 
        benefit from enhanced training and assistance, and increased 
        awareness of existing programs and resources is one important 
        component of that.
      USDA should also consider ways to support borrowers in the 
        context of lending barriers--whether that be through direct 
        efforts or grants to various entities for the purpose of 
        assisting with everything from a basic understanding of credit, 
        paperwork, and documentation needs to establishing a sound 
        business plan and securing a dedicated market for their 
        products.
      To remain competitive, meat processors must continuously upgrade 
        facilities for the purpose of upkeep, to implement new 
        technology, and maintain adherence to stringent food safety 
        standards. This support could come in the form of loan 
        guarantees or grants depending on project size and resource 
        requirements.
      Historically, initial losses are inevitable in startup plants. 
        And after the startup phase, packer margins are typically 
        narrower than pre-expansion. Due to the rapid pace of this 
        expansion, liquidity needs may be greater than in previous 
        cycles. Special funding considerations for these specific needs 
        may be warranted.

   How could Federal funds be best leveraged with state and 
        local resources (matching funds, in-kind support, government 
        assistance)?

      USDA should incentivize state, local, and Tribal governments to 
        partner with the Agency in bolstering the meat processing 
        sector, but should not require such participation for the 
        purposes of determining an applicant's eligibility. Further, 
        while many states have allocated Federal funds toward meat and 
        poultry processing--such as those received under the 
        Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (P.L. 116-
        136)--the previous receipt of aid should not necessarily 
        disqualify applicants from receiving additional funding. These 
        instances should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Grant Considerations
   Would a small plant expansion program structured similarly 
        to USDA's Meat and Poultry Inspection Readiness Grant (MPIRG), 
        but with a focus on expanding slaughter and processing capacity 
        for small federally inspected plants, be beneficial? If so, at 
        what award ($) level per grant and for what types of costs?

      While the new Meat and Poultry Inspection Readiness Grant program 
        is beneficial for existing facilities seeking to participate in 
        Federal inspection, a gap exists for facilities currently under 
        construction that are not yet operational. These entities 
        should not miss out on resources USDA will be providing through 
        this effort simply because they were too proactive in 
        addressing processing capacity needs in the beef sector.

   Are grant funds (or other funds) needed for marketing or 
        outreach activities, including recruiting new participants in 
        the industry?

      There are many individuals and businesses who have expressed 
        interest in entering the meat processing space. Thus, it is 
        unnecessary for funds to be dedicated toward recruitment of 
        potential operators. Funds will be better invested elsewhere.

   Would pilot grants that provide awards to small plants for 
        training and other support (e.g., cover wage gap during 
        apprenticeships) to develop their local workforce be effective 
        to address some of the labor challenges associated with 
        operating a current, expanded, or new facility?

      One of the difficulties with opening a new plant is attracting 
        workers and the retention of those workers. There will need to 
        be sufficient training to keep American workers employed at 
        these small to medium sized plants. We believe that an 
        apprenticeship type program has worked in other industries and 
        should work in the packing space as well. We recognize that 
        these plants need workers whether they are trained employees 
        from here within the U.S., or whether they come in through a 
        visa program already trained. This can be done through land-
        grant university programs as well as our extension agents and 
        programs across the U.S. The workforce training is a step in 
        the right direction towards solving our labor and retention 
        concerns.
Technical Assistance Considerations
   In what ways could technical assistance support best be 
        deployed to enhance competition and address challenges in the 
        marketplace, how is it best delivered, and by whom?

      As previously noted, those smaller plants which have the greatest 
        potential for long-term viability will be those servicing niche 
        markets. Due to economies of scale and efficiencies inherent to 
        larger production facilities, smaller processors may be better 
        suited focusing on opportunities in branded programs and 
        marketing into specific retail or foodservice distribution 
        channels. For this purpose, AMS should play an active role in 
        assisting borrowers and/or grantees in navigating existing 
        programs. If necessary, AMS should partner both with cattle 
        producers and smaller packers to develop new PVPs which give 
        borrowers and/or grantees a chance to better serve their 
        customers and maintain solvency.

   What workforce-related technical assistance is most needed, 
        how is it best delivered, and by whom (e.g., best industry 
        practices, training on equipment, new tools for safety)?

      While it is important to fill the positions at the plants and 
        throughout the supply chain, there needs to be funding for 
        workforce training programs at the plants. Some of those 
        positions such as Food Safety Inspectors and USDA graders 
        require more training than some of the positions on the 
        fabrication floor for example. However, those highly skilled 
        jobs on the fabrication floor are well paid positions and 
        require further workforce training. With continued focus on 
        workforce training, the goal would be to move more workers 
        towards jobs in the packing industry that they may not have 
        even been aware of, or training was a barrier to entry.
Partnerships and Combined Funding Considerations
   Should loans and grants be combined to support these 
        facilities? If so, what criteria should be used to determine 
        what portion of the funds are offered as loans versus grants?

      Loans and grants should be combined to support facilities. USDA 
        should determine on a case-by-case basis which method is the 
        most appropriate means of support. However, NCBA strongly 
        encourages the Agency to provide the same degree of technical 
        assistance to grantees as it does to borrowers. While loans 
        tend to incentivize a higher degree of partnership between 
        lender and borrower, grant recipients will require equal access 
        to resources in order to be successful.

   What conditions should be placed on grants or loans? If 
        those conditions are not met, should the grants require 
        repayment? If the conditions are met, should the loan be 
        forgivable?

      The construction or expansion of any additional hook space is 
        helpful to remedy the current supply and demand imbalances. 
        Therefore, conditions for loan or grant eligibility should not 
        be unnecessarily arduous or burdensome. Rather than conditions, 
        priority should be given to applicants who are more likely to 
        adopt those practices which maximize access to the market 
        (e.g., Federal inspection).

    Thank you for allowing NCBA to provide comments on behalf of our 
members--America's food producers. As mentioned, we look forward to 
continuing to partner with USDA on this critical undertaking. Please 
contact the NCBA Center for Public Policy at (202) 347-0228 for further 
information or assistance.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson. And now I 
recognize, for his 5 minutes, Mr. Leger. Please begin when you 
are ready.


         STATEMENT OF FRANCOIS LEGER, OWNER, FPL FOOD, 
         AUGUSTA, GA; ON BEHALF OF NORTH AMERICAN MEAT 
                           INSTITUTE

    Mr. Leger. Good afternoon, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member 
Thompson, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for holding 
this hearing. I am Francois Leger, the owner of FPL Food, a 
family-owned beef business based in Augusta, Georgia. FPL is a 
member of the North American Meat Institute, based in 
Washington, D.C. The Meat Institute represents more than 350 
packers and processors of beef, pork, lamb, veal, turkey, and 
processed meat products both large and small. Today I will 
discuss my business, and provide my perspective on challenges 
we face. I was raised on the farm in France. I pursued a degree 
in agriculture, and I have worked in the beef industry in 
France, Australia, South America, and the U.S. for more than 38 
years. In 2004 I purchased a processing facility and a grinding 
facility in Augusta, Georgia, and began FPL.
    FPL's business has two parts. First, we slaughter cows and 
bulls. We source cattle directly from producers, and through 
auction barns, purchased across the Southeast from more than a 
dozen states from east Texas to the Carolinas, from 
Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Virginia, to Florida, and, of 
course, Georgia. Our plant creates a critical market for many 
southeastern producers.
    Second, we have a fed cattle operation. As the business 
grew, FPL purchased pasture and farmland in central Georgia in 
2011, and built a cattle feeding operation that rivals anything 
in the Southeast. Today FPL's Chatel Farm has a herd totaling 
more than 8,000 head, including Angus and Akaushi, purebred 
stock animals, and feeder calf to support the FPL Food beef 
brand. Chatel Farm also buys feeder cattle from producers in 
the region through several arrangements. We work with producers 
committed to raise their calf according to the standard of our 
brand. We institute a buyback program for cattlemen who use our 
Chatel Angus genetic. For cow-calf producers who use our 
genetic in their herd, we will commit to buy their feeder cows. 
Our brand is built on the principle of quality, sustainability, 
traceability, and animal welfare, all intended to satisfy 
customer demand. Our structure and marketing options have a 
positive economic impact for the beef cattle industry in the 
Southeast.
    The cattle and beef industry is driven by supply and 
demand, and the cattle market is cyclical. Not long ago the 
cattle market was the reverse of today. In 2013, 2014, and 2015 
the herd was small, and producers were making record profit, 
while packers were losing money. In fact, I had to--our value 
at the plant for my company to survive. During the pandemic FPL 
worked with the Georgia Cattlemen's Association to help support 
the cattle industry in our region. We need cattle producers, 
and cattle producers need packers. And we need workers. 
Currently we see on average 20 percent of absentees in our 
plant. The labor shortage affects not only processing lines, 
but--warehouse where there is maintenance position, and other 
jobs are so critical to maintaining the supply chain, like 
truck drivers. For example, FPL is investing in tractor 
trailers just to help maintain our cattle supply.
    In addition to the investment we are making regarding labor 
and physical capital, we seek to advance our industry in the 
industry sustainability. USDA announced plans to propose new 
Packers and Stockyards Act rules to regulate the interactions 
between packers and producers. Bills have been introduced in 
Congress that would place certain purchasing requirements on 
packers. Government intervention like this could jeopardize 
packers' ability to provide products customers and consumers 
desire, which does not help cattle producers.
    Earlier this week Texas A&M University released an 
evaluation of today's cattle market, which included an 
important point about the importance of marketing agreement for 
providing better communication with producers and packers about 
beef marketing demands, such as--signals, costs, and 
scheduling, of--all which ultimately benefit consumers. My 
message today is the cattle and beef industry need to be 
customer oriented. This is the only way to achieve a fair 
result for all the----
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Leger follows:]

Prepared Statement of Francois Leger, Owner, FPL Food, Augusta, GA; on 
                Behalf of North American Meat Institute
    Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the 
Committee, thank you for holding this hearing and providing me the 
opportunity to testify today about livestock market issues. I am 
Francois Leger, the owner of FPL Food (FPL), a family-owned beef 
business based in Augusta, Georgia.
    FPL is a member of the North American Meat Institute (NAMI or the 
Meat Institute) based in Washington, D.C. The Meat Institute is the 
nation's oldest and largest trade association representing packers and 
processors of beef, pork, lamb, veal, turkey, and processed meat 
products. NAMI members include more than 350 meat packing and 
processing companies, large and small, and account for more than 95 
percent of United States output of meat and poultry products.
    The Meat Institute submitted detailed testimony for the record for 
the Livestock and Foreign Agriculture Subcommittee's hearing on the 
state of the beef supply chain on July 28. That testimony analyzes the 
meat supply chain, particularly regarding the repercussions of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
    Today, I will discuss my business and provide my perspective on 
challenges we face.
    I was raised on a farm in France and wanted to continue my family's 
proud farming legacy. I pursued a degree in agriculture and worked in 
the beef industry in France, Australia, South America, and the U.S. for 
more than 38 years. In 2004, I purchased a processing facility and a 
grinding facility in Augusta, Georgia, and began FPL.
    There are two parts to FPL's business. First, we slaughter cull 
cows and bulls. We source cattle directly from producers and through 
auction barn purchases across the Southeast from more than a dozen 
states, from east Texas to the Carolinas, from Mississippi, Alabama, 
Louisiana, Virginia to Florida, and of course Georgia. Our plant 
creates a critical market for many southeastern producers.
    Second, we have a fed cattle operation. As the business grew, FPL 
purchased pasture and farmland in central Georgia in 2011, and built a 
cattle-feeding operation that rivals anything in the Southeast. My goal 
was to prove that great quality fed cattle could be raised and finished 
for beef production in the Southeastern United States. To achieve that 
goal, I sourced some of the best Angus genetics, and raised corn and 
other forage crops as feed sources. Today, FPL's Chatel Farms has a 
herd totaling more than 8,000 head including Angus and Akaushi (Wagyu), 
pure-bred seed-stock animals, and feeder cattle to support the FPL Food 
beef brands.
    Chatel Farms also buys feeder cattle from producers in the region 
through a number of arrangements. Specifically, we work with producers 
who are committed to producing high quality, carcass-merit feeder 
cattle and who will raise their calves according to the standards of 
our brand. We've even instituted a buy-back program for Southeastern 
cattlemen who use our Chatel Ankony Angus genetics. For cow-calf 
producers who use our genetics in their herd, we will commit to buy 
their feeder calves. We also buy fed cattle on a cost-plus basis, 
providing more options to the producer.
    Our brand is built on the principles of quality, sustainability, 
traceability, and animal welfare, all intended to satisfy customer 
demand. Being in the Southeast, far away from most of the nation's 
largest feedlots, we built a vertically integrated business model to 
achieve the company's goals, and we work closely with local producers 
on the supply of cattle that will produce the quality of beef our 
customers demand. Our structure, and the marketing options for 
producers, have a positive economic impact for the beef cattle industry 
in the Southeast.
    To continue the vision of supplying high-quality southeastern U.S. 
beef, FPL purchased a further processing facility in 2012. This 
facility, in Thomasville, Georgia, enables FPL to produce case-ready 
retail beef cuts and portioned steaks and burgers for the retail and 
foodservice industry.
    We continue to grow our business through our brands and high-
quality boxed beef. With our fresh and frozen grinds program and case 
ready products from our further processing facility, FPL Food supplies 
a comprehensive portfolio of quality beef products that meet our 
customers' needs and supports cattle producers in the Southeastern 
region.
    Today, we have more than 1,600 team members at three facilities 
throughout Georgia--our farm, production plant, and further processing 
facility. These facilities supply multiple brands of beef products from 
cattle raised through a process that combines new innovations with 
traditional farming techniques.
    FPL Food continues to grow: we are in the process of a major 
expansion of our plant to add cooler and deboning space to increase 
capacity, and we are rebuilding our rendering facility to better supply 
tallow for renewable and biomass-based diesel manufacturers.
    The cattle and beef industry are driven by the supply and demand 
fundamentals of the free market, and the cattle industry is cyclical. 
Not that long ago the cattle market was the reverse of today--in 2013, 
2014 and 2015, the herd was small, and producers were making record 
profits while packers were losing money. In fact, I had to sell one 
plant for my company to survive.
    During the pandemic, with packing capacity operationally reduced 
and the cattle herd large, cattle prices dropped. FPL worked with the 
Georgia Cattlemen's Association to help support the cattle industry: we 
need cattle producers. And cattle producers need packers.
    As Dr. Dustin Aherin, Vice President, RaboResearch Animal Protein 
Analyst, recently testified before the Livestock Subcommittee \1\ at 
the July 28 hearing, ``Cattle are one of several inputs into beef 
production. Other major inputs include labor, physical capital, and 
technology.'' I can tell you from my experience in operating and 
growing FPL, he is correct.
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    \1\ https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AG/AG29/20210728/113973/HHRG-
117-AG29-Wstate-AherinD-20210728.pdf.
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    Production in meat packing and processing plants is tied to the 
number of employees working the line. Currently, we see on average 20 
percent daily absenteeism in our plant. I come to work every day and 
the first decision I face is which line to run and how to staff it. We 
have increased our starting salary to $15 an hour, which also means we 
must increase all salaries up the chain. Our average salary is now $20 
an hour for plant workers, and yet we still cannot run at full capacity 
because of absenteeism. Our costs in salary alone have increased by $7 
million a year.
    The meat industry has faced a labor shortage since before the 
pandemic, but it is acute today. The labor shortage affects not only 
processing lines, but also warehouse workers, maintenance positions 
necessary to keep production lines running, and other jobs also 
critical to maintaining the supply chain, such as truck drivers. For 
example, FPL is investing in tractor trailers just to help maintain our 
cattle supply. Moving cattle consistently and predictably is directly 
linked to slaughter capacity and, thus, producer sales. All these costs 
are in addition to higher costs for machinery parts and other materials 
FPL needs to maintain production levels.
    In addition to the investments we are making regarding labor and 
physical capital, we are constantly evaluating how we advance our 
contributions to healthy people, healthy animals and a healthy planet. 
FPL is a strong supporter of the industry's advancement goals. In July, 
NAMI and 11 other organizations representing farmers and companies who 
produce the vast majority of America's meat, poultry, and dairy 
products, and animal feed and ingredients, unveiled the Protein PACT 
for the People, Animals, and Climate of Tomorrow.\2\ The Protein PACT 
is the first joint initiative of its kind designed to verify progress 
toward global sustainable development goals across all animal protein 
sectors to ensure customers and consumers trust that meat aligns with 
their sustainability expectations.
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    \2\ https://www.meatinstitute.org/ht/display/ReleaseDetails/i/
192863/pid/287.
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    Through the Protein PACT, Meat Institute members have developed 
robust metrics for continuous improvement and publicly committed to 
sustain healthy animals, thriving workers and communities, safe food, 
balanced diets, and the environment and align with the United Nations' 
2030 Sustainable Development Goals.\3\
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    \3\ https://sdgs.un.org/goals.
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    We cannot achieve these goals in a restricted market that does not 
allow companies like mine to produce products that meet consumer 
expectations. USDA has announced plans to propose new Packers and 
Stockyards Act rules to regulate the interactions between packers and 
producers, and bills have been introduced in Congress that would place 
certain purchasing requirements on packers. Government intervention 
could jeopardize packers' ability to provide products customers and 
consumers desire. The industry needs to be customer oriented; we must 
provide the products customers want. Thirty years ago, I saw first-hand 
in France the result of direct government intervention into the meat 
industry, and it was a failure. I hope we avoid the same mistake here.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Leger, I appreciate that. And 
now, Mr. Blubaugh, you are now recognized. Please begin when 
you are ready.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT BLUBAUGH, PRESIDENT, OKLAHOMA FARMERS UNION, 
        TONKAWA, OK; ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL FARMERS UNION

    Mr. Blubaugh. Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and 
Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to 
testify on the topic that impacts the livestock industry, and 
myself directly. My name is Scott Blubaugh. I am a fifth-
generation farmer and rancher from north central Oklahoma. Our 
family operation, we grow wheat, milo, soybeans, and raise 
purebred and commercial Angus cattle. I also serve as the 
President of the Oklahoma Farmers Union, an organization 60,000 
members strong that represents farmers, ranchers, and rural 
citizens.
    Farmers Union was started in part to help restore and 
enhance competition in agriculture. Today a fair market remains 
a central issue for our organization and for our economy. Over 
the last 50 years our food system has come under control of 
fewer and fewer multinational corporations. Today the four 
largest companies in each of these major sectors of the meat 
industry control 85 percent of the beef packing, 70 percent of 
the pork processing, and 54 percent of broiler chicken 
processing. Unchecked consolidation and vertical integration 
have created a dramatic imbalance of power between producers 
and corporations, allowing corporations to manipulate the 
marketplace, push down the prices paid to farmers and ranchers, 
and ultimately drive us out of business.
    Last year I was honored to share my story with CNN's W. 
Kamau Bell at my ranch, where he filmed part of an agriculture 
episode, The United Shades of America. We talked about how the 
packers maximize their profits, overcharging consumers, and 
limiting farmers like myself to razor thin margins. Between 
1980 and 2020 the retailer's percentage of the beef food dollar 
has grown by 65 percent, and the packer's share has increased 
even more, by 70 percent. During this same time, the farmer and 
rancher's share has fell by more than 40 percent. I ask you, 
how fair is this?
    It doesn't have to be this way. Corporate consolidation of 
a food system, especially the livestock sector, is not 
inevitable. Regulators must consider the need for robust 
competition at all links of the livestock supply chain. One of 
the most important ways to achieve this is through stronger 
language and rules reinvigorating the Packers and Stockyards 
Act. Additionally, reliable information must be provided to 
farmers and ranchers through mandatory price reporting, and for 
consumers through accurate labeling. We appreciate the short-
term extension passed last week on the price reporting, but 
Congress must pass a long-term reauthorization, with reforms to 
improve price discovery.
    Furthermore, Federal and state governments should invest 
and support in more competition in both marketing and 
processing. USDA has started this process, and the State of 
Oklahoma has taken steps to increase resiliency in the 
livestock sector, ensuring greater value for our local and 
regional food systems. Through funding provided by the first 
CARES Act, Oklahoma launched a grant initiative to fund new 
small meat processors, and expand existing plants. The effort 
increased our total in-state processing by 350 head of cattle 
and hogs per week. The additional capacity created 170 new 
jobs, which are vital to the success of our rural communities.
    This is just one example in one state, but it is clear the 
need is to decentralize processing. It reduces the risk of the 
supply chain, and puts more funds in producers' pocket, and 
creates more jobs in rural America. Thank you for the 
opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Blubaugh follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Scott Blubaugh, President, Oklahoma Farmers 
        Union, Tonkawa, OK; on Behalf of National Farmers Union
    Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the House 
Agriculture Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 
My name is Scott Blubaugh. I'm a fifth-generation farmer and rancher 
from north-central Oklahoma. On our family operation, my father, my son 
and I grow milo and soybeans and raise purebred and commercial Angus 
cattle. I'm also the President of Oklahoma Farmers Union, a farm 
organization representing farmers, ranchers and rural citizens. We are 
60,000 members strong and represent a broad cross section of Oklahomans 
from across the state. In today's proceedings, I represent both 
Oklahoma Farmers Union and National Farmers Union (NFU).
    Last month, NFU launched the ``Fairness for Farmers'' campaign, an 
endeavor with clear goals: to promote competitive markets and address 
rampant corporate consolidation in the food and agriculture sectors and 
in rural economies. Promoting competition has been and continues to be 
a top priority for NFU because of the detrimental effects of 
consolidation on farmers, ranchers, and consumers. Today, most sectors 
in America's farm and food system are heavily consolidated and 
dominated by a small handful of multinational corporations, but even 
more so in the livestock industry. In fact, the four largest 
multinational meatpackers control 54 percent of U.S. poultry 
processing, 70 percent of U.S. pork processing, and 85 percent of beef 
packing. Waves of mergers, acquisitions, and insufficient antitrust 
enforcement followed a shift in public policy attitudes towards 
antitrust law in the 1970s. As a result, farmers and ranchers have been 
deprived choices, innovation, fair prices, and fair treatment.
    In late July 2021, NFU President Rob Larew testified at a Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing focused on competition in the beef 
industry. Discussion during the hearing showed there is growing 
bipartisan support for measures seeking to strengthen competition in 
the nation's heavily concentrated meatpacking industry. We are 
encouraged by these developments as well as the Biden Administration's 
recent Executive Order 14036 ``Promoting Competition in the American 
Economy'', which is an important commitment to restore fairness to our 
economy.
    There are several ways to ensure a more resilient food supply for 
consumers and a competitive marketplace for family farmers and 
ranchers. Across the economy, there must be more scrutiny of buyer 
power, and regulators must consider the need for robust competition at 
all links of the supply chain. In the meat and poultry sector, rules 
must be implemented that reinvigorate the Packers and Stockyards Act 
(PSA), clearly delineate prohibitions on packers under the PSA, and 
create needed protections for farmers under contract. Market 
participants must be provided with reliable information through 
mandatory price reporting and accurate labeling. Congress must pass a 
long-term reauthorization of Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR), while 
also instituting reforms to the program to increase transparency and 
true price discovery. Furthermore, Federal and state governments should 
invest in supporting more market competition in marketing and 
processing to build a more resilient livestock sector and to ensure 
greater value accrues to local and regional food systems.
The State of Competition in America's Farm and Food Supply Chain
    Today, a small handful of firms control the market for most farm 
inputs (such as seed, crop protection, fertilizer, and in equipment 
manufacturing), processing (including livestock slaughter and 
processing), food manufacturing, wholesale distribution, food service, 
and retail grocery. Family farmers and consumers sit on either end of 
this supply chain and are numerous and decentralized while a small set 
of large, consolidated firms in the middle of the supply chain wield 
immense market power. The incentives for firms to merge or acquire 
rivals are strong, which can increase their bargaining power relative 
to customers and suppliers. Consolidation, both horizontal and 
vertical, can help firms exclude smaller rivals from accessing markets, 
increase barriers to enter markets and compete, allows large rivals to 
collectively manipulate markets to their shared advantage. The four-
firm concentration ratio (CR4), a commonly used metric for measuring 
the market share of the top four firms in a sector, has risen 
precipitously among meat packers and poultry processors. Between 1977 
and 2018, the CR4 for beef packers slaughtering steers and heifers rose 
from 25 to 85 percent;\1\ for pork, the CR4 rose from 33 percent in 
1976 to 70 percent in 2018; \2\ for broiler chickens, the CR4 rose from 
34 percent in 1986 to 54 percent in 2018.3-4  While 
national-level industry consolidation may be lower for broilers, 
concentration is higher in localized markets.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Cai, X., K.W. Stiegert, and S.R. Koontz, ``Oligopsony Fed 
Cattle Pricing: Did Mandatory Price Reporting Increase Meatpacker 
Market Power?'' Proceedings of the NCCC-134 Conference on Applied 
Commodity Price Analysis, Forecasting and Market Risk Management. St. 
Louis, MO. https://legacy.farmdoc.illinois.edu/nccc134/conf_2011/pdf/
confp24-11.pdf.
    \2\ Clement E. Ward, ``Economics of Competition in the U.S. 
Livestock Industry,'' January 2010. https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/atr/legacy/2011/09/09/AGW-15639-a.pdf.
    \3\ Joel Greene, ``USDA's GIPSA Rule on Livestock & Poultry 
Marketing Practices.'' Congressional Research Service, 2016. https://
www.everycrsreport.com/files/20160107_R
41673_e1d67b445c928f46a6b23a04c38d116fdb819c93.pdf.
    \4\ USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), Packers and 
Stockyards Division, ``Annual Report 2019.'' https://www.ams.usda.gov/
sites/default/files/media/PSDAnnualReport2019.pdf.
    \5\ James M. MacDonald, ``Technology, Organization, and Financial 
Performance in U.S. Broiler Production'' (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture Economic Research Service, 2014), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/43869/48159_eib126.pdf?v=0.
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CR4 By Industry
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          * Data compiled by the National Farmers Union from multiple 
        sources.

    The rise in consolidation and decline in competition we see today 
in America's food supply chain has several explanations. In part, the 
issue has been the result of a shift in thinking regarding the 
interpretation of our existing antitrust laws.\6\ This, in turn, has 
led to anemic merger enforcement across the supply chain. As companies 
have gotten larger and competition has declined, anticompetitive 
conduct by dominant firms has received insufficient scrutiny.\7\ 
Additionally, with respect to livestock and poultry, the PSA has seen 
significant failures in enforcement.\8\ Despite direction from Congress 
in the 2008 Farm Bill to develop new rules to clarify the PSA, the more 
robust regulations that were promulgated--the ``Farmer Fair Practices'' 
rules--were either not finalized or shelved,\9\ and a subsequent rule 
that was finalized provides no meaningful protections for farmers.\10\
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    \6\ Tim Wu, The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age, 
2018.
    \7\ Diana L. Moss and Laura Alexander, ``When COVID-19 is the 
Symptom and Not the Disease: Consolidation, Competition, and Breakdowns 
in Food Supply Chains,'' American Antitrust Institute, May 7, 2020.
    \8\ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Testimony 
before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, United 
States Senate, ``Packers and Stockyards Programs: Continuing Problems 
with GIPSA Investigations of Competitive Practices,'' March 9, 2006. 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-532t.pdf.
    \9\ National Farmers Union, ``NFU Deeply Disappointed by USDA 
Decision to Terminate Farmer Fair Practices Rules,'' October 17, 2017. 
https://nfu.org/2017/10/17/nfu-deeply-disappointed-by-usda-decision-to-
terminate-farmer-fair-practices-rules-2/.
    \10\ National Farmers Union, ``Rule Fails to Protect Farmers from 
Discriminatory Practices, According to Farmers Union,'' December 10, 
2020. https://nfu.org/2020/12/10/rule-fails-to-protect-farmers-from-
discriminatory-practices-according-to-farmers-union/.
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    Last, the lack of competition in the livestock sector has a 
profound impact on consumers. Grocery prices are rising, and meat 
prices are rising higher than other retail food items. For the past 12 
months, overall food prices increased 3.7%, led by increases in 
beef.\11\ Despite the seemingly bounty of choices in food products and 
brands available to consumers at supermarkets, this is generally an 
illusion. For instance, Tyson's sells products under 38 separate retail 
brands.\12\
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    \11\ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index Summary 
of September 14, 2021. https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm.
    \12\ https://www.tysonfoods.com/our-brands.
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Examining Competition in the Livestock Sector
    While there are some important differences between the structure of 
the industries that produce cattle, hogs, and poultry, farmers and 
ranchers raising these livestock all face a shared challenge: slaughter 
and processing sectors that are more concentrated today than they were 
several decades ago. In addition to the consolidation among the major 
packers and processors, the number of cattle feeding operations in the 
top 13 cattle feeding states declined approximately 40 percent between 
the 1970s and the 1990s, despite a relatively stable number of fed 
cattle marketed during this period.\13\ There has also been a shift 
toward greater alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) and a thinning 
cash or spot market which gives packers greater control over the cattle 
supply. AMAs in the form of formula pricing averaged nearly 65 percent 
of total fed cattle procurement, compared to about 45 percent a decade 
earlier. By comparison, the negotiated grid and cash market for fed 
cattle declined to an average of about 24 percent nationally in 2019, 
compared to over 45 percent in 2009.\14\
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    \13\ United States General Accounting Office, ``Beef Industry: 
Packer Market Concentration and Cattle Prices,'' December 1990, GAO/
RCED-91-29. https://www.gao.gov/assets/rced-91-28.pdf.
    \14\ USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), Packers and 
Stockyards Division, ``Annual Report 2019.'' https://www.ams.usda.gov/
sites/default/files/media/PSDAnnualReport2019.pdf.
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    Heavy corporate consolidation in beef packing, and the shift toward 
fewer, very large plants, makes the industry more vulnerable to shocks. 
This puts producers at greater risk of experiencing lower prices and 
consumers are more likely to see high prices at retail. In the weeks 
and months following the fire that shut down the Tyson beef packing 
plant in Holcomb, Kansas, in August 2019, the spread between Choice 
boxed beef cutout values and fed cattle prices reached record 
levels.\15\ The plant at the time ranked as one of the eight largest 
plants in the United States in terms of daily harvest capacity; the 
fire eliminated approximately 30,000 head per week of capacity. While 
the company was ultimately able to shift some production to other 
plants, the event precipitated market reactions that lowered prices 
paid to ranchers, and increased prices for consumers, for several 
months.16-17   Additionally, in July 2020, following 
disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the price received for 
steers and heifers dropped below $100 per cwt., which had not happened 
at any other time since 2012.\18\
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    \15\ USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), ``Boxed beef and 
fed cattle price spread investigation report,'' July 22, 2020. https://
www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/Cattle
andBeefPriceMarginReport.pdf.
    \16\ ``The smoldering impact of Tyson's Holcomb fire,'' 
Meat+Poultry, October 14, 2019. https://www.meatpoultry.com/articles/
22036-the-smoldering-impact-of-tyson-holcomb-fire.
    \17\ Elliott Dennis, ``A historical perspective on the Holcomb 
fire: Differences and similarities to the COVID-19 situation and other 
significant market events,'' September 11, 2020. https://farm.unl.edu/
historical-perspective-holcomb-fire-differences-and-similarities-covid-
19-situation-and-other.
    \18\ USDA, NASS, ``Prices Received: Cattle Prices Received by 
Month, US,'' September 30, 2021. https://www.nass.usda.gov/
Charts_and_Maps/Agricultural_Prices/priceca.php.
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    While many variables influence the prices for farm products and the 
retail cost of food, the large price swings caused by recent 
disruptions are in large part a function of disrupted supply chains. 
The vulnerability of these supply chains to shocks is a feature of the 
extreme concentration in the middle of the supply chain between farmers 
and consumers. The rapid consolidation of packing and processing, 
driven by mergers and acquisitions by the Big Four, made the supply 
chain prone to breakdowns and bottlenecks. This, in turn, put more 
pressure on farmers and ranchers, who often operate on razor-thin 
margins. Significant price declines and volatile markets can threaten 
their livelihoods.
Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA) Reform
    The PSA is meant to assure fair competition, safeguard farmers and 
ranchers, and protect consumers, from unfair, deceptive, and unjustly 
discriminatory and monopolistic practices of the meat and poultry 
industries. Unfortunately, the PSA has been under-enforced.\19\ NFU is 
heartened that President Biden's executive order on competition both 
reaffirms the government's commitment to the principles that led to the 
passage of the PSA and specifically mentions the need for the Secretary 
of Agriculture to initiative rulemakings under the PSA ``to address the 
unfair treatment of farmers and improve conditions of competition in 
markets for their products.'' \20\ Furthermore, USDA has signaled that 
it will take action to strengthen the PSA.\21\
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    \19\ United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
Testimony before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 
United States Senate, ``Packers and Stockyards Programs: Continuing 
Problems with GIPSA Investigations of Competitive Practices,'' March 9, 
2006. https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-532t.pdf.
    \20\ Executive Order 14036 of July 9, 2021, ``Promoting Competition 
in the American Economy,'' Federal Register Vol. 86, No. 132, July 14, 
2021.
    \21\ ``USDA to Begin Work to Strengthen Enforcement of the Packers 
and Stockyards Act,'' USDA, June 11, 2021. https://www.usda.gov/media/
press-releases/2021/06/11/usda-begin-work-strengthen-enforcement-
packers-and-stockyards-act.
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    USDA should establish and clearly state through the rulemaking 
process that it is not necessary to show a competitive injury broadly 
to find an action of a packer, swine contractor, or live poultry dealer 
to be unlawful under the PSA. As USDA has repeatedly argued in court 
cases, the unambiguous language of section 202(a) and (b) of the PSA 
does not require any proof of an adverse effect on competition or of 
restraint of commerce or trade. The legislative history of the PSA 
shows that Congress intended to prohibit actions that give undue and 
unreasonable preferences without regard to whether they restrain trade, 
create a monopoly or control prices.
    Additionally, we were encouraged to see USDA released a recent FAQ 
Sheet on the steps they plan to take in revisiting the final rule with 
respect to ``undue or unreasonable preference or advantage,'' which 
failed to provide meaningful protections for producers, instead 
enshrining unfair, anti-competitive behavior already employed by the 
industry.\22\ Specifically, USDA should clarify that a ``reasonable 
business decision'' cannot justify an undue preference or advantage.
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    \22\ USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, ``Frequently Asked 
Questions on the Enforcement of Undue and Unreasonable Preferences 
Under the Packers and Stockyards Act.'' https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-
regulations/packers-and-stockyards-act/faq.
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    More generally, the update to the PSA should provide greater 
clarity about what practices in the meat and poultry industries 
constitute unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practices, and 
thus violate the PSA. Especially close attention should be paid to 
prohibiting unfair practices regarding grower ranking systems or 
``tournaments.'' PSA rulemaking should also institute anti-retaliation 
protections that help ensure farmers' right to association and so that 
farmers can speak up about unfair treatment without fear of 
retribution.
Price-Fixing in the Livestock and Poultry Industries
    Concentrated market structures also increase opportunities for 
market manipulation and coordinated behavior. There has been a spate of 
price fixing litigation brought against major livestock industry 
companies since 2016, with multiple indictments and guilty pleas. 
Allegations have touched all three major meat sectors--beef cattle, 
pork, and broiler chickens.
    Accusations of collusion began to shadow the broiler chicken 
industry in late 2016 with the filing of the Maplevale lawsuit.\23\ The 
suit alleged that large poultry companies coordinated prices between 
2008 and 2016, resulting in a 50 percent price increase for broiler 
chickens, despite a roughly 20 to 23 percent decrease in input costs 
over the same period.\24\ There have been several follow-on suits from 
other companies that purchase poultry making the same allegations.
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    \23\ Maplevale Farms, Inc. v. Defendants; case: 1:16-cv-08637, 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 
https://www.locklaw.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/090216-complaint-
maplevale-farms.pdf.
    \24\ Leah Douglas, ``Justice Dept. intervenes in major poultry 
price-fixing case,'' FERN, June 24, 2019.
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    The Department of Justice (DOJ) later intervened in the Maplevale 
case, and in June 2020 the first indictments of chicken-industry 
executives related to the case were announced.\25\ In October 2020, 
Pilgrim's Pride, which is majority owned by JBS, plead guilty to one 
count of conspiracy in restraint of competition, and agreed to pay a 
fine of $110.5 million.\26\ Additional settlements by chicken companies 
about price-fixing claims followed,\27\ and an indictment, of Claxton 
Poultry Farms, followed in May 2021.\28\ Multiple lawsuits were also 
brought against beef packers \29\ and the pork industry \30\ in August 
2019. In the case of pork, multiple settlements were subsequently 
announced, including $24.5 million from JBS in December 2020, another 
$20 million in March 2021, and $12.75 million in April 2021. It was 
announced in June 2021 that Smithfield Foods would pay $83 million to 
settle its case.\31\ Most recently, Tyson Foods agreed to pay $221.5 
million to settle several private lawsuits brought forward by poultry 
farmers.
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    \25\ Brent Kendall and Jacob Bunge, ``Chicken Industry Executives, 
Including Pilgrim's Pride CEO, Indicted on Price-Fixing Charges,'' Wall 
Street Journal, June 3, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/chicken-
industry-executives-including-pilgrim-s-pride-ceo-indicted-for-price-
fixing-11591202113.
    \26\ Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, Quarterly Report Pursuant to 
section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for the 
period ended September 27, 2020. https://ir.pilgrims.com/static-files/
4f802b29-38d5-4474-8581-6a12d0b545b1?source=email.
    \27\ Lillianna Byington, ``Pilgrim's Pride pleads guilty to price 
fixing with DOJ and agrees to pay $108M fine,'' FoodDive, January 11, 
2021, updated February 24, 2021. https://www.fooddive.com/news/
pilgrims-pride-to-pay-75m-price-fixing-settlement-to-chicken-buyers/
593154/.
    \28\ Department of Justice, ``Broiler chicken producer indicted for 
price fixing and big rigging,'' May 20, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/broiler-chicken-producer-indicted-price-fixing-and-bid-rigging.
    \29\ Leah Douglas, ``Multiple lawsuits allege price-fixing by big 
beef companies,'' FERN, October 28, 2019. https://thefern.org/
ag_insider/multiple-lawsuits-allege-price-fixing-by-big-beef-companies/
 
    \30\ Leah Douglas, ``More antitrust lawsuits hit the meat industry. 
This time, it's pork,'' FERN, November 7, 2019. https://thefern.org/
ag_insider/more-antitrust-lawsuits-hit-the-meat-industry-this-time-its-
pork/.
    \31\ Jessi Devenyns, ``Smithfield Foods will pay $83M to settle 
pork price-fixing claims,'' FoodDive, Nov. 6, 2020, updated June 30, 
2021. https://www.fooddive.com/news/jbs-settles-a-portion-of-pork-
price-fixing-lawsuit/588514/.
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    These instances of market manipulation are a symptom of 
concentrated markets. While the pursuit of these cases by Federal 
regulators is a welcome development, the need for these actions is a 
product of the existing lax antitrust laws and their under-enforcement. 
In addition to buttressing the PSA, ensuring more transparency in 
markets, and promoting competition and new market opportunities, 
Federal regulators must vigorously enforce existing antitrust laws. We 
support legislative efforts to address these issues as well, most 
notably the Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 
2021, authored by Sen. Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota, which would increase 
enforcement resources, strengthen prohibitions on mergers, and 
commission studies into past and future mergers.
Supply Chain Disruptions
    Livestock slaughter and processing is heavily consolidated. Today, 
there are approximately 835 federally inspected slaughter facilities 
and 1,938 other slaughter facilities in the United States.\32\ In 1968, 
there were nearly 10,000 total slaughtering establishments across the 
country.\33\ As the number of plants decreased, many remaining plants 
have become bigger; for example, just 50 plants slaughter and process 
98 percent of all cattle in the United States.\34\ While these larger 
plants may create certain efficiencies, they also create serious supply 
chain vulnerabilities.
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    \32\ ``Livestock Slaughter: 2019 Summary,'' USDA National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), April 2020, https://
downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-esmis/files/r207tp32d/
34850245n/5712mr72x/lsan0420.pdf.
    \33\ ``Livestock Slaughter: 1969,'' USDA Statistical Reporting 
Service, April 1970. https://downloads.usda.library.cornell.edu/usda-
esmis/files/r207tp32d/ht24wp48q/9k41zj37t/LiveSlauSu-04-00-1970.pdf.
    \34\ Michael Corkery and David Yaffe-Bellany, ``The Food Chain's 
Weakest Link: Slaughterhouses,'' The New York Times, April 18, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/business/coronavirus-meat-
slaughterhouses.html.
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    During the COVID-19 pandemic, extreme concentration in agricultural 
supply chains was most evident in the disruption in the meat and 
poultry industries, where the closures or slowdowns at several massive 
meatpacking plants resulted in lost markets for farmers, constrained 
supplies, and higher prices for consumers. As of September 2, 2021, 
nearly 60,000 meatpacking plant workers at 581 meatpacking plants 
tested positive for COVID-19.\35\ Many of these cases were part of 
outbreaks that led to temporary closures, greatly reducing processing 
capacity. At the peak of closures, beef and pork facilities were 
operating at 25 percent \36\ and 40 percent \37\ below average, 
respectively. This bottleneck stranded farmers with animals that were 
market-ready but had nowhere to go, leading to euthanized animals and 
depressed prices.
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    \35\ Leah Douglas, ``Mapping COVID-19 outbreaks in the food 
system,'' Food and Environment Reporting Network, April 22, 2020, 
accessed October 1, 2021, https://thefern.org/2020/04/mapping-covid-19-
in-meat-and-food-processing-plants/.
    \36\ Laura Reiley, ``Meat processing plants are closing due to 
COVID-19 outbreaks. Beef shortfalls may follow.'' The Washington Post, 
April 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/16/
meat-processing-plants-are-closing-due-covid-19-outbreaks-beef-
shortfalls-may-follow/.
    \37\ Laura Reiley, ``Tyson says nation's pork production is down 
50%, despite Trump's order to keep meat plants open,'' The Washington 
Post, May 4, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/04/
tyson-says-nations-pork-production-is-down-50-despite-trumps-order-
keep-meat-plants-open/.
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    As noted earlier in this testimony, a telling example of the 
potential consequences of supply chain vulnerabilities, even before the 
COVID-19 pandemic, was the at Tyson Foods' Holcomb, Kansas, beef 
processing plant for months. A more recent demonstration of supply 
chain vulnerabilities was the cyberattack in late May and early June of 
2021 that shuttered plants operated by the world's largest meat 
processor. JBS, which controls approximately \1/5\ of U.S. cattle 
slaughter, was hacked by a Russian-based ransomware group, forcing all 
nine of its beef plants in the U.S. offline.\38\ JBS's poultry and pork 
plants were disrupted as well.\39\ Once again, we could see the effects 
of this break in the supply chain reflected by the higher consumer 
prices and backlogs that ultimately impact ranchers.\40\
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    \38\ Rebecca Robbins, ``Meat processor JBS paid $11 million in 
ransom to hackers,'' New York Times, June 9, 2021. https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/business/jbs-cyberattack-ransom.html.
    \39\ Julie Creswell, Nicole Perlroth and Noam Scheiber, 
``Ransomware disrupts meat plants in latest attack on critical U.S. 
business,'' New York Times, June 1, 2021.
    \40\ Jacob Bunge, ``Meat buyers scramble after cyberattack hobbles 
JBS,'' Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2021. https://www.wsj.com/articles/
meatpacker-jbs-hit-by-cyberattack-affecting-north-american-australian-
operations-11622548864.
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Facilitating Competition and More Diverse Market Opportunities
    The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted how large, seemingly efficient 
systems of production can falter when there are shocks to those 
systems. Local and regional food systems also faced disruptions but 
were often better positioned to adapt rapidly to new conditions and 
protect against shocks, given their shorter supply chains and more 
direct connection to consumers.\41\ Thus, there is a need to strengthen 
infrastructure and grow linkages within local and regional food 
systems, which would promote greater competition in farm and food 
supply chains. In today's market, many livestock producers are forced 
to schedule access to slaughter facilities years in advance and have no 
choice but to transport their livestock hundreds of miles to the 
nearest facility. Farmers Union members and state divisions, including 
Oklahoma, have worked to achieve greater access to state and local 
funds for new marketing options.\42\
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    \41\ Dawn Thilmany, Elizabeth Canales, Sarah A. Low, and Kathryn 
Boys, ``Local Food Supply Chain Dynamics and Resilience during COVID-
19,'' Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, October 26, 2020. 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/aepp.13121.
    \42\ https://www.wisconsinfarmersunion.com/processing.
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    Thankfully, action is being taken on this front. Recently, USDA 
announced an investment of more than $150 million to help existing 
small- and very-small-processing facilities weather the challenges they 
have faced because of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as expand 
capacity.\43\ USDA also announced its intention to invest $500 million 
in American Rescue Plan funds to expand meat and poultry processing 
capacity. Additionally, we salute Congress for the passage of 
legislation that includes the concepts of the RAMP-UP Act, shepherded 
in part by Oklahoma Congressman Frank Lucas, that will help fund the 
construction of new small-scale processing plants and the retrofitting 
of existing plants already online to required Federal inspection 
standards.
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    \43\ Approximately $55 million is dedicated to the new Meat and 
Poultry Inspection Readiness Grant (MPIRG) program and includes the 
Planning for a Federal Grant of Inspection (PFGI) project for 
processing facilities currently in operation and working toward Federal 
inspection, as well as the Cooperative Interstate Shipment (CIS) 
Compliance project for processing facilities located in states with a 
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) CIS program. Another $100 
million is dedicated to helping small- and very-small-processing 
facilities deal with overtime inspection fees incurred due to increased 
slaughter and processing demand during the COVID-19 pandemic. More 
here: https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2021/06/21/usda-
invests-552-million-grants-increase-capacity-and-expand-access.
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    In Oklahoma, we have had a front-row view of how this type of 
targeted financial assistance can impact small processing plant 
capacity. With funds provided by the first Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt 
dedicated $10 million towards this very successful effort. The grant 
initiative received 196 applications that represented more than $100 
million in request needs.\44\ Ultimately, the $10 million was awarded 
to 40 separate projects--nine brand new facilities and the expansion of 
31 existing facilities.\45\ The overall result is an increase in total 
in-state processing capacity of 350 head of cattle and hogs per week, 
plus the addition of poultry and small food animal processing. The 
additional capacity created a total of 170 new jobs, most of which are 
in rural areas of Oklahoma.
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    \44\ Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry, ``195 
Meat Processing Grant Applicants Received for $10 Million.'' August 18, 
2020. https://ag.ok.gov/195-meat-processing-grant-applicants-received-
for-10-million/.
    \45\ Oklahoma Farm Report, ``CARES Act Money for Meat Processing 
Improvements Going to Forty Oklahoma Companies.'' September 2, 2020. 
http://www.oklahomafarmreport.com/wire/news/2020/09/
00088_ODAFFGrantMoneyMeatProcessing09022020_044803.php#.YVdn
2JrMKUl.
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    Dialing in on the impact this program has had on rural Oklahoma 
communities: Last year, an Oklahoma Farmers Union family opened a new 
small-scale processing plant in the tiny town of Council Hill, Okla. 
Watson Farms Meat Processing & Market, LLC, is a farmer-owned facility 
that created ten new jobs with a capacity of 128 head per month. The 
Watson family processes their own animals, along with the animals of 
their farmer neighbors, and the facility's retail counter only sells 
this locally-sourced beef and pork. The business has been so 
successful, the Watsons will soon open a secondary retail location.
    Between the CARES Act funds and some additional private sector 
investment, it is expected--by the end of the year--there will be 19 
new small and medium processing facilities online in our state.\46\
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    \46\ Oklahoma Farm Report, ``Ag Secretary Blayne Arthur Seees Two 
Big Hurdles for Oklahoma Beef Producers.'' July 28, 2021. http://
www.oklahomafarmreport.com/wire/news/2021/07/
01256_BlayneArthur07282021Top_145434.php#.YVdodJrMKUl.
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    It is evident the initiative was very successful--we just need more 
of it. Based on the number of grant requests and the success of 
completed projects, it is clear the interest and the need is there to 
decentralize processing, spread the risk, put more funds in producers' 
pockets and create these jobs in rural communities that help stabilize 
and enhance rural America.
    In addition to the CARES Act processing grants, additional state 
efforts to create and support small-scale processing include: funding 
positions for more state inspectors, training of skilled processing 
labor through CareerTech curriculum development and a mobile processing 
trailer, training of prison inmates, and enhancement of junior college 
processing facilities for educational training. All these efforts are 
in response to a workforce shortage in Oklahoma's meat processing 
industry.
    Included in these efforts, CareerTech and the Oklahoma Department 
of Agriculture, Food and Forestry (ODAFF) launched a statewide program 
to provide both online and hands-on training in meat processing. Hands-
on training is now offered at 11 high schools, three technology schools 
and five skills centers statewide.\47\
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    \47\ Oklahoma CareerTech, ``Meat Processing Workforce Education.'' 
Accessed October 1, 2021. https://www.okcareertech.org/educators/
resource-center/meat-processing-workforce-education.
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    Also adding to Oklahoma's processing capacity are our Tribal 
neighbors. The Quapaw Nation led efforts before the pandemic with the 
construction of a state-of-the-art processing plant.\48\ The Osage 
Nation has recently opened a new processing facility. Larger Tribes, 
including the Cherokee Nation, Choctaw Nation and Chickasaw Nation, are 
pursuing their own processing initiatives to first serve their own 
Tribal needs, then also assisting their neighbors in animal 
processing.\49\
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    \48\ Allison Herrera, ``The Quapaw Tribe hopes a cattle 
slaughterhouse will provide jobs in rural Oklahoma.'' The World, 
January 31, 2018. https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-01-31/quapaw-tribe-
hopes-cattle-slaughterhouse-will-provide-jobs-rural-oklahoma.
    \49\ Greg Henderson, ``Oklahoma Tribes Will Open Meat Plants.'' 
Drovers, October 16, 2020. https://www.drovers.com/news/oklahoma-
tribes-will-open-meat-plants.
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    Even with this increase in small-scale processing capacity, a great 
deal of frustration still exists with respect to lack of inspectors--
both state and Federal. When new plants are waiting to go online, it is 
often the last roadblock to completing the mission. On the surface, the 
lack of inspectors may seem separate from the competition issue, but 
it's directly tied. Small- and medium-sized plants are competing for 
the same inspectors as larger plants, but large plants seem to get 
priority. Putting jobs at the local level and building greater rural 
capacity can only be achieved if an adequate number of inspectors are 
trained and working.
    For beef producers hoping to find an alternative to selling their 
product to a major meatpacker, the lack of inspectors is just one more 
hurdle to success. There continues to be a tremendous backlog for 
processing. During the early stages of the pandemic, Oklahoma producers 
were waiting up to nearly 24 months for processing dates. That wait 
time has been reduced, but even with increased in-state processing 
capacity, it can still be from 6 months to 1 year to wait for a spot to 
have an animal processed.
    Continued investment in local processing opportunities for cattle 
stockmen will help rural communities and give consumers additional 
choices at competitive or even lower prices. USDA should continue its 
work to develop detailed guidance to help new or existing small meat 
and poultry slaughter and/or processing establishments comply with 
regulations, and to evaluate how current regulations or fees may create 
unnecessary barriers for those facilities that may seek Federal 
inspection. Investment of financial and technical resources to expand 
meat processing training programs is sorely needed, and USDA should 
prioritize this in future efforts. The department should also 
facilitate the development of mobile slaughter units that can fill gaps 
in slaughter where appropriate. When offering financial assistance to 
the development of new processing facilities, particular emphasis ought 
to be placed on producer- or worker-owned cooperative business 
structures. Finally, USDA should ensure it is setting up new or 
expanded plants for success, including by taking steps to prevent the 
use of predatory practices by dominant market participants.
Reliable, Accurate, and Robust Market Information
    Fair and competitive markets rely upon transparency and equitable 
access to reliable and accurate information. For farmers and ranchers 
to bargain effectively with packers and integrators, they need true 
price transparency in the marketplace. For consumers to make informed 
choices about the food they are buying, labels need to accurately 
represent the nature of the product. Shortcomings in price discovery 
and reporting must be addressed, as well as inaccurate origin labeling.
    Fed cattle procurement has continued to trend toward formula 
pricing and other AMAs, and away from the cash market. Congress passed 
the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act (LMRA) in 1999 in response to 
concerns about AMAs as well as rising concentration in the meat packing 
industry. LMRA resulted in mandatory price reporting of most 
transactions for livestock, and it has been renewed and amended 
multiple times.\50\ While LMR has been beneficial for price discovery 
in general, the continued erosion of the cash market for cattle is 
undermining its benefits. There is also relatively little price 
transparency in hogs and poultry, where cash markets have dwindled or 
been eliminated altogether.
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    \50\ Mathews, Brorsen, Hahn, Arnade, and Dohlman, ``Mandatory Price 
Reporting, Market Efficiency, and Price Discovery in Livestock 
Markets,'' USDA, Economic Research Service (ERS), LPDM-254-01, 
September 2015.
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Fed Cattle by Procurement Type: 2010-2019
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          * From: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), Packers 
        and Stockyards Division, ``Annual Report 2019.''

    USDA found that on a week-to-week basis higher levels of AMA 
procurement is associated with lower negotiated cash prices. 
Ultimately, AMA prices are also negatively impacted, because many 
packer pricing formulas and contract prices are based on cash markets 
prices. This trend toward thinner and thinner cash markets is eroding 
cash and AMA prices alike.\51\
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    \51\ USDA, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(GIPSA), ``Investigation of Beef Packers' Use of Alternative Marketing 
Arrangements,'' July 2014.
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    Packers prefer AMAs because they can reduce procurement and 
transaction costs and allow plants to operate closer to capacity more 
consistently. AMAs can also help sellers lock in prices, guarantee 
market access, and reduce transaction costs. However, the fact that 
AMAs are eroding price discovery and depressing cash market prices for 
fed cattle (and in turn, AMA prices), is cause for concern. The near 
elimination of a cash market for hogs, and the complete elimination of 
a cash market for poultry--and the negative implications for growers--
should also give cattle market participants pause.
    Problems with price discovery in cattle markets and the erosion of 
prices due to the ascension of AMAs should be addressed, in part, by 
establishing a minimum level of cash transactions in the marketplace. 
Since AMAs are known to erode cash prices, and since base prices for 
AMAs are themselves typically based on the cash market, a too thinly 
traded cash market is susceptible to manipulation and will result in 
producer prices that are lower than they otherwise would be with a more 
robust cash market.
    Furthermore, a cattle contract library should be established to 
help provide greater knowledge of the different contract provisions 
between packers and producer. This will help independent ranchers 
negotiate more favorable terms. Another concern in market openness is 
how a lack of consistency has reduced the effectiveness of LMR due to 
the withholding of information because of confidentiality concerns. 
These issues must be addressed for LMR to be an effective price 
discovery tool for producers.
Truth-in-Labeling
    Fair and competitive markets also require product labels that are 
truthful. A supply chain that contains false or misleading product 
labels puts domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage while 
preventing consumers from making fully informed decisions about the 
products they buy. Farmers and ranchers want to provide consumers with 
accurate information about the origins of the food they purchase and 
consume, and Federal labeling laws should support farmers in achieving 
that goal. Moreover, consumers consistently express a desire to know 
the origin of their food. A 2017 poll demonstrates that 89 percent of a 
representative sample of American adults favored requiring retailers to 
indicate on the package label the country-of-origin of fresh meat they 
sell.\52\ More recently, a survey of a representative sample of 
American adults showed that 87 percent of American think that beef and 
pork should have a label listing its country-of-origin, with fairly 
consistent support across age groups, party identification, and areas 
of residence (rural, suburban, and urban).\53\
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    \52\ Consumer Federation of America. ``Large Majority of American 
Strongly Support Requiring Origin Information on Fresh Meat.'' July 24, 
2017. https://consumerfed.org/press_release/large-majority-of-
americans-strongly-support-requiring-origin-information-on-fresh-meat/.
    \53\ Lake Research Partners. ``Results from a National Online 
Survey Around Rural and Agricultural Issues.'' Designed by Lake 
Research Partners, administered by CARAVAN in a national online omnibus 
survey. Conducted July 20-31, 2020, using a demographically 
representative sample of Americans 18 years of age or older.
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    Truthful and accurate voluntary labels are important to producers 
and helpful for consumers, but voluntary labeling is not a replacement 
or substitute for mandatory COOL. The misuse of voluntary product label 
claims, including ``Product of USA'' and ``Made in USA,'' are highly 
misleading to consumers and financially harmful to family farmers and 
ranchers.
    Currently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety 
and Inspection Service (FSIS) Food Standards and Labeling Policy Book 
presents standards that do not require a meat product to be born, 
raised, and slaughtered in the U.S. to be labeled ``Product of USA.'' 
\54\ The standard allows imported animals that are processed in the 
U.S. at USDA-inspected slaughter facilities to be labeled as ``Product 
of USA.'' Due to the significant number of cattle imported from Canada 
and Mexico, many beef products of foreign origin are being represented 
with some variation of a ``Made in USA'' claim.
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    \54\ USDA-FSIS, Office of Policy, Program and Employee Development. 
Food Standards and Labeling Policy Book. August 2005. https://
www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/7c48be3e-e516-4ccf-a2d5-b95a128f04ae/
Labeling-Policy-Book.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
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    We urge the Federal Trade Commission to finalize and enforce this 
rule; FSIS should then follow suit by amending its meat labeling 
standards to reflect FTC's recommendation that all or virtually all 
ingredients in a product must be made and sourced in the United States 
to carry a label that indicates it was `Made in the U.S.A.[']
    Furthermore, NFU has been a stalwart proponent of mandatory 
country-of-origin labeling (COOL) for meat. NFU policy states that 
mandatory COOL ``is a valuable marketing tool for producers, and it 
allows consumers to know where the meat products they consume are born, 
raised, slaughtered, and processed.'' \55\ We are particularly pleased 
to see renewed efforts to reinstate mandatory COOL, most notably 
represented by the American Beef Labeling Act, and look forward to 
working with this Committee to see to it that this important policy can 
be brought back into force.
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    \55\ National Farmers Union, Policy of the National Farmers Union, 
March 2021.
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Conclusion
    The farm and food supply chain--and the meat and poultry sector in 
particular--has become highly consolidated and uncompetitive, much to 
the detriment of family farmers, ranchers, rural communities, and 
consumers in Oklahoma and across the country. Strong action by this 
Committee, other lawmakers, and the Administration is needed to address 
these serious problems.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify at today's hearing. I 
appreciate the Committee's attention to this important issue and look 
forward to answering any of your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Hays, now you are 
recognized for 5 minutes. Please begin when you are ready.

    STATEMENT OF SCOTT HAYS, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL PORK 
               PRODUCERS COUNCIL, MONROE CITY, MO

    Mr. Hays. Good afternoon, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member 
Thompson, and Members of the Committee. My name is Scott Hays, 
a fifth-generation pork producer, and CEO of Two Mile Pork from 
Monroe City, Missouri. I serve as Vice President of the 
National Pork Producers Council, which represents the interests 
of America's 60,000 hog farmers. I am also active in the 
Missouri Pork Association. Before I get into any part of my 
testimony, I would like to thank Secretary Vilsack and the 
staff for committing $500 million to prevent and prepare for 
African Swine Fever, which was recently detected in the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti. I also want to thank the Members 
of this Committee who work to raise awareness of this important 
issue. These funds will help prevent this devastating disease 
from reaching the United States.
    American pork producers continue to work tirelessly to 
provide a safe and consistent source of protein for foreign and 
domestic consumers. One way we are able to do that is by having 
access to timely, accurate information on market transactions, 
which keeps us competitive in selling hogs. We get that 
information through the Livestock Mandatory Reporting. LMR 
requires meatpackers to provide USDA with data on hog prices, 
and with other information. The agency then publishes twice-
daily and weekly reports on hog prices, volumes, contracts, and 
product values. I frequently check the National Daily Hog and 
Pork Summary and the Daily Slaughter Reports, and use those to 
help negotiate any loads of hogs we sell on the cash market.
    Although LMR has been a resounding success, there are 
several changes pork producers would like to see, such as 
including prices with discounts, not just with carcasses, not 
just for cuts. And, as the last few weeks have proved 
necessary, ensuring USDA staff who produce LMR reports are 
deemed essential workers during a government shutdown. While we 
would like to see these changes to the reporting program, the 
most important thing is to maintain its authorization and 
funding. We are grateful for this Committee's efforts to extend 
LMR through the next 9 weeks, and look forward to working with 
you on a longer-term reauthorization.
    From the regulatory legal front, the pork industry was 
dealt a fairly big blow a Federal court struck down a provision 
for the New Swine Inspection System rule that let packers 
operate--faster processing line speeds. The court decision, 
which was made despite the fact that faster line speeds were 
tested for 20 years under a pilot program at five large plants, 
resulted in a 2\1/2\ percent loss of packing capacity 
nationwide, according to Iowa State economist Dermot Hayes. To 
put those losses in perspective, even if all the country's 
state inspected pork processing facilities were brought up to 
Federal standards, that would amount to less than one percent 
of the currently federally inspected pork packing capacity 
because packers push up prices to attract hogs to utilize that 
capacity. Conversely, we lose leverage when capacity decreases, 
so the line issue really needs to be fixed.
    Finally, although I already mentioned African Swine Fever, 
I would like to give you a small look at the potential 
devastation this disease could wreak on the agricultural 
industry, particularly pork producers, if there were an 
outbreak in the United States. Tens of thousands of hogs likely 
would die, and many would need to be euthanized, creating 
significant disposal challenges. U.S. pork exports, which 
account of 25 percent of our production, would stop 
immediately. That is a $7 billion hit to pork producers. Corn 
and soybean farmers, who produce our feed, likely would see a 
significant drop in demand, and subsequent loss in revenue. 
Many of the 550,000 mostly rural jobs supported by the pork 
industry would be negatively affected.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Thompson, for 
letting me testify on the needs of our nation's hog farmers--
take any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hays follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Scott Hays, Vice President, National Pork 
                   Producers Council, Monroe City, MO
Introduction
    Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the 
Committee, I want to express my deepest gratitude for the invitation to 
speak to you today on the state of, and on the needs of, our nation's 
farmers--specifically, our nation's hog farmers.
    My name is Scott Hays, and I am a fifth-generation pork producer 
and CEO of Two Mile Pork, a multi-generational farrow-to-finish farm in 
Monroe City, MO, with just shy of 40 hard-working employees. I also 
serve as Vice President of the National Pork Producers Council, the 
association representing our nation's 60,000 hog farmers. I am also 
active with the Missouri Pork Association, the Monroe City FFA chapter, 
and the Missouri Institute of Cooperatives.
    Pork production in the United States remains a robust part of 
American agriculture. In fact, the United States marketed 131 million 
hogs and exported $7 billion of pork products last year. This success 
has been in spite of years of exceptionally difficult circumstances for 
producers, which included trade retaliation from China and Mexico, 
animal disease outbreaks, and COVID-19 supply-chain disruptions. 
Through all of this, producers have worked tirelessly to provide 
stability for both rural economies and American consumers.
Comments on Announced Funding for ASF Prevention
    Before covering the primary topic of the hearing, I would like to 
first address the $3 billion in investments announced by Secretary 
Vilsack last week. Specifically, I would like to thank the Secretary 
and his staff on behalf of all American pork producers for directing 
$500 million toward efforts to stop African Swine Fever before it 
arrives in the United States. I would also like to thank the Members of 
this Committee who have raised awareness on this important issue. This 
funding represents a truly historic commitment by USDA to engage in 
prevention such as improved monitoring, detection, and depopulation 
efforts in the ASF-positive countries near our borders and at home if 
needed. ASF represents the single largest risk to American pork 
production, and we are extremely grateful for the Administration's 
proactive measures in this area. Pork producers also appreciate the 
simultaneous investments in relief from transportation disruptions and 
assistance for school nutrition.
Background on Hog Marketing
    Over the last several decades, there has been a massive shift in 
the way hogs are marketed to processors. Where once was a robust 
negotiated market or spot market, now lies an overwhelming use of 
different marketing agreements and production contracts. This shift did 
not occur without reason. Volatile market conditions and external 
shocks to the industry have incentivized producers to seek arrangements 
that can insulate them from market risk.
    The use of production contracts has expanded rapidly since the 
1980s. In this arrangement, a pork producer pays a contract grower to 
house and care for his or her animals. This provides significant 
benefits to contract growers since the credit of the livestock's owner 
can be leveraged to make capital improvements that can last beyond the 
duration of any individual contract all while being paid on a per-pig-
space basis that insulates the grower from market risk. To be clear, 
the pork industry does not utilize a tournament system and contract 
growers typically have several different livestock owners with whom 
they can choose to work.
    The use of marketing agreements has also expanded rapidly over the 
last several decades. While initially used by packers to have producers 
raise hogs with specific attributes, the hog price crash of 1998 drove 
farmers to utilize them as a means of guaranteeing shackle space at 
packing plants in volatile market conditions. The prices paid under 
these agreements are often based on a blend of many inputs, including 
spot market prices, the lean hog commodity index, or even pork cutout 
prices.
    Attached as an addendum to this statement, please find a paper 
prepared by Dr. Steve Meyer and Dr. Barry Goodwin that provides much 
more detail on the structure and operation of the U.S. pork industry.
Livestock Mandatory Reporting
    Livestock Mandatory Reporting plays a crucial role in the price 
discovery process for hog farmers. The ability for any producer to 
access accurate market data at regular intervals allows farmers to 
assess the relative strength of their existing contracts with 
processors and formulate competitive new agreements.
    Prior to 2001, livestock and meat price information were collected 
on a voluntary basis. Throughout the 1990s, the number of hogs sold on 
a negotiated basis declined and more and more animals were sold or 
contracted under marketing agreements that were not publicly reported. 
This made it difficult for farmers to assess ``fair'' market prices for 
livestock and eventually led to the adoption of Livestock Mandatory 
Reporting. In 1999, Congress passed the Livestock Mandatory Reporting 
Act (LMRA), and over time, amendments to the LMR rules have added 
important details and wholesale pork as part of the reporting.
    As a pork producer, I frequently check the National Daily Hog and 
Pork Summary and the Daily Slaughter reports and pull those numbers 
into a spreadsheet. Looking at trends in weights, prices, and volumes 
helps us negotiate any load of hogs we sell on the cash market. Most of 
our pigs are sold on marketing agreements, and having daily prices from 
the LMR reports allows us to look at packer formula offers and how they 
would have performed in good and tough times.
    LMR remains one of the most important tools in the arsenal of hog 
farmers today. So important, in fact, that I am going to be presenting 
alongside AMS later this month about the importance and use of the 
reports. That being said, there are a number of changes to LMR that 
would make the reports even more helpful to hog farmers, including:

  1.  Amend the definition of ``Reporting Day'' to ensure that USDA LMR 
            employees are deemed essential in the event of a government 
            shutdown. LMR data are the lifeblood of the hog and pork 
            markets. Without them, producers, packers, processors, 
            retailers, and foodservice operators are in the dark about 
            the value of hogs and pork products. There simply is no 
            context for commercial decisions affecting thousands of 
            businesses and millions of end-users. Without timely and 
            transparent publicly available dFexata, commerce can be 
            significantly impaired.

  2.  Amend the definition of Non-carcass Merit Premium to include 
            discounts. This would amend the current definition of 
            ``non-carcass merit premium'' to also include discounts. 
            Under current law only an increase (premium) from the base 
            price of swine is required. The amendment would also 
            require decreases (discounts). The change provides for the 
            possibility that any pricing mechanism that offers premiums 
            for certain non-carcass characteristics could also involve 
            discounts.

  3.  Amend the definition of ``Packer'' to require that new packing 
            plants begin reporting LMR data within 6 months of starting 
            operations. This would have the Secretary of Agriculture 
            require that a new processing plant that meets the 
            definition of packer begin reporting LMR data within 6 
            months of starting slaughter operations. Under current law, 
            there is no time requirement specified for determining the 
            packer status of a new processing plant or person or 
            requiring the new plant or person to begin reporting. In 
            the past, although USDA had the information needed to make 
            the determination, the process of including new plants in 
            the LMR system lagged.

  4.  Amend the definition of ``Swine or Pork Market Formula Purchase'' 
            to split swine market purchases from pork market purchases. 
            This would amend the current definition of ``swine or pork 
            market formula purchase'' into two distinct definitions of 
            swine market formula purchases (which is based on a market 
            for swine) and pork market formula purchases (which is 
            based on a market for pork or a pork product). This is 
            needed to provide clarity about how formula prices for hogs 
            are derived. When LMR was passed in 1999, swine and pork 
            market formulas were lumped together because (1) there were 
            very few hogs priced off the cutout value or other pork 
            value; (2) negotiated prices and the cutout value were 
            highly correlated; and (3) it simplified reporting in the 
            new program. Under current industry practices, neither 1 
            nor 2 still apply. The use of cutout value as the base 
            price for hog formulas has grown dramatically in recent 
            years, but the extent of that growth cannot be seen because 
            the number of animals priced off the cutout and the value 
            of those animals is masked by adding them in with swine 
            market formulas.

  5.  Expand the daily reporting of Barrows and Gilts of the Prior Day 
            Report. This would amend the information required from the 
            prior business day of a packer relating to slaughter data 
            for the total number of barrows and gilts slaughtered to 
            include two additional items of information. The first is 
            information concerning the average non-carcass merit 
            premiums or discounts, and the second is information 
            concerning the average net price without the average non-
            carcass merit premiums or discounts. At the time the Act 
            was passed in 1999, non-carcass merit premiums were 
            generally small and fit into very few categories, primarily 
            transportation, specified genetics, and volume. Today, 
            these premiums/discounts cover characteristics such as 
            gestation stall-free, antibiotic-free, ractopamine-free, 
            among others.

  6.  New mandatory reporting of Wholesale Pork Cuts. This would 
            require the mandatory reporting of carcasses. Under current 
            regulations, the definition of wholesale pork cuts does not 
            include carcasses.

    With that said, maintaining the program's authorization and funding 
are the most crucial aspects of Congress' work on LMR, and we 
appreciate the Committee Members' support for a year-long extension. I 
hope that in the near future these common-sense changes can be 
incorporated into the program.
Other Issues and Closing
    Livestock Mandatory Reporting is far from the only issue on the 
minds of pork producers right now.
    Earlier this year, a Federal court struck down a portion of the New 
Swine Inspection System (NSIS) rule that allowed participating packing 
plants to run at the higher speeds they've been safely operating at for 
over 20 years, causing a reduction in national packing capacity by an 
estimated 2.5%. Hog farmers are looking to policymakers to preserve 
that program and recover the capacity lost. By way of comparison, even 
if all 600+ state and municipal pork harvest facilities in the nation 
were brought up to Federal standards, it would amount to less than 1% 
of current federally inspected pork harvest capacity. (An analysis on 
state and municipal harvest capacity is appended to these comments.) 
Thus, the court decision on line speeds is significant because it 
shifts market leverage away from hog farmers. As hog farmers, we 
benefit from more harvest capacity as plants push up prices to attract 
hogs. Conversely, we lose market leverage when harvest capacity 
decreases. So, we are pleased that the Administration and Members of 
Congress from both sides of the aisle are looking for ways to expand 
pork harvest capacity. Obviously, rectifying the line speed issue is 
important. But, beyond that, NPPC has provided USDA with a menu of 
options in comments recently submitted, which are appended to this 
statement.
    Another priority issue for pork producers is African Swine Fever, 
which now is in the Western Hemisphere for the first time in decades, 
with detection of the swine-only disease in the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti. While producers are thrilled by the quick response the 
Administration has taken to prevent ASF's spread to the United States, 
it is imperative that Congress maintain open communication with USDA, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and others to ensure they are doing 
everything they can to prevent what could be a catastrophic event for 
our industry. An ASF outbreak in this country would have many 
devastating effects on U.S. agriculture, including the death of tens of 
thousands of hogs, significant disposal challenges associated with high 
volumes of hog mortality and euthanasia, the loss of U.S. pork exports 
(which account for over 25 percent of pork production and produce over 
$7 billion in value for pork producers), a significant reduction in 
demand for feed grains like corn and soybeans, and a negative impact on 
the 550,000 mostly rural jobs supported by the pork industry.
    Yet another challenge for the U.S. pork industry--indeed for much 
of agriculture--is workforce availability. A shortage of labor was a 
problem before COVID-19 and has been exacerbated by it, with some farms 
facing vacancy rates as high as 30% despite offering record-high wages 
and benefits. Reforming the existing H-2A visa, which allows temporary 
seasonal agricultural workers, to include year-round labor, without a 
cap on the number of visas available, is the only solution given rural 
America's declining population.
    The responsibilities before this Committee are and will continue to 
be of dramatic consequence to our industry and the rest of livestock 
production. I would be honored to answer any questions this Committee 
may have in pursuit of a successful future for American agriculture.
                              Attachment 1
August 30, 2021

  Sarah J. Helming,
  Agricultural Marketing Service,
  United States Department of Agriculture,
  Washington, D.C.

  RE: Comments of the National Pork Producers Council on Investments 
            and Opportunities for Meat and Poultry Processing 
            Infrastructure, Docket ID AMS-TM-21-0058

    Dear Ms. Helming:

    The National Pork Producers Council (NPPC), which represents the 
interests of America's more than 60,000 pork producers, submits the 
following comments on USDA's proposal to invest approximately $500 
million of American Rescue Plan funds to improve infrastructure, 
increase capacity, and promote diversification across the meat 
processing industry.
Introduction
    Pork production is a major contributor to the U.S. economy. 
America's pork producers in 2020 marketed 131 million hogs, providing 
more than $22 billion in farm-level income. Pork producers used roughly 
1.1 billion bushels of corn and the soybean meal from 455 million 
bushels of soybeans last year. Based on 2016 data, Iowa State 
University economists estimated the pork industry was responsible for 
nearly 514,000 jobs in the United States.
    U.S. hog operations tend to be heavily concentrated in the 
Midwest--Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska in 
particular--near the corn and soybeans that are the main ingredients of 
pig feed. There are also a number of hog farms in eastern North 
Carolina, many of which send pigs after they've been weaned to farms in 
the Midwest for ``finishing'' and processing.
    A major advantage the U.S. pork industry has in global markets and 
its competitive position relative to other U.S. meat proteins is the 
efficiency of the country's pork packing companies and plants. U.S. 
plants are, on average, larger than others around the globe and, 
according to industry sources, capable of converting hogs to value-
added pork products at some of the lowest costs in the world.
    The U.S. pork production system is characterized by robust 
competition, innovation, and efficiency, providing high-quality, 
affordable protein for consumers across the country and around the 
globe. Although five new, modern pork packing plants have come online 
over the past 5 years, industry capacity to harvest hogs sent to market 
remains inadequate. Adding capacity would benefit the entire pork 
industry--packers, producers and consumers. But that means much more 
than simply building new plants or expanding existing ones.
General Capacity Considerations
    There are many factors, not just capital availability USDA should 
consider that impact capacity. Even with unlimited money, plants will 
continue to struggle with line speed limits, labor shortages, and 
issues with Federal inspection. NPPC urges USDA to consider and, if 
within its power, address these issues in conjunction with plans to 
increase domestic capacity.
A. NSIS Line Speed Decision and Impact
          On July 1, 2021, a Federal court order went into effect, 
        eliminating a provision of USDA's New Swine Inspection System 
        (NSIS) that allowed pork packing plants to run faster 
        processing line speeds.\1\ (The Administration has until Aug. 
        31, 2021, to appeal the court ruling.)
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    \1\ https://www.porkbusiness.com/news/ag-policy/pork-industry-
seeks-waivers-plants-impacted-line-speed-ruling.
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          Although implemented in 2019, the NSIS was more than 20 years 
        in the making, with five pork plants operating faster line 
        speeds through the HACCP-Based Inspection Models Project 
        (HIMP)--a pilot program started in 1997 during the Clinton 
        Administration. A sixth plant joined the original five in 
        operating faster lines on implementation of the NSIS, which 
        also lets some plant inspection tasks, such as sorting hogs and 
        overseeing quality control, be performed by plant employees 
        rather than USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) 
        inspectors. This arrangement allows the inspectors to focus on 
        duties more directly related to food safety and animal welfare, 
        but final inspection accountability and authority remain with 
        USDA. At all six plants, the faster line speeds led to an 
        increase in capacity. HIMP--and later, NSIS--modernized an 
        inspection system that had remained unchanged for more than 50 
        years.
          According to Iowa State University economist Dr. Dermot 
        Hayes, slowing line speeds to the pre-1997 rate at the six 
        plants affected by the court ruling--facilities that process 
        \1/5\ of the approximately 130 million hogs marketed each 
        year--reduced nationwide processing capacity by three percent, 
        with impacted facilities able to reduce that to 2.5 percent by 
        adjusting operating hours. In turn, pork producers' market 
        power has diminished, leaving them with fewer options for 
        selling their hogs and disproportionately impacting smaller 
        producers located near affected plants.\2\
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    \2\ https://nppc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Impacts-of-NSIS-
Decision-on-Pork-Producers-Dr.-Hayes.pdf.
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          With more pigs and less capacity, the value of hogs likely 
        will fall over time, reducing margins throughout the pork 
        chain. Compounding that market response, the court's ruling 
        gives processors the ability to cancel contracts with 
        producers, forcing them to scramble to find processing plants 
        with capacity and likely requiring many to transport their hogs 
        long distances. According to Hayes, long-haul deliveries would 
        add $10 per hog to the cost of production for farmers already 
        faced with razor-thin margins.
          If the Administration decides not to appeal the court 
        decision, to avoid that potentially catastrophic outcome, NPPC 
        recommends USDA grant waivers from the court ruling to the six 
        plants that had been running faster line speeds.
          Without the ability to operate faster line speeds, packers 
        will likely take other steps to preserve existing capacity if 
        they have the available labor to do so, including mandatory 
        overtime, a measure that could be counterproductive if carried 
        out for a sustained period. Employees required to work longer 
        days or all day on Saturday are more likely to resign, which 
        would exacerbate an already tenuous labor situation. More 
        importantly, worker safety risks could be elevated with long 
        shifts.
B. Labor Shortages
          The pork industry--like other agricultural sectors--is facing 
        a severe labor shortage. Anecdotally, producers report that 
        shortages range from 10 to 20 percent for sectors with well-
        established visa pipelines for skilled-workers to about 30 
        percent for those, including packing plants, that require less-
        skilled labor. The lack of available workers throughout the 
        pork industry has been a long-standing issue and is one of the 
        reasons packing plants have had capacity issues.
          Part of the problem--albeit a good one in many respects--has 
        been the strengthening of the broader U.S. labor market, with 
        the U.S. unemployment rate falling from ten percent in 2009 to 
        3.5 percent in early 2020.
          Unemployment rates spiked in early 2020 but have shown a 
        steady decline this year as many returned to work. These 
        national unemployment trends still understate the tight labor 
        supply in most of the largest hog-producing states, where 
        unemployment is typically below the national level, even during 
        the March 2020-April 2021 period of COVID-19 shocks. During 
        that time, the nation's top eight hog-producing states averaged 
        an unemployment rate 1.3 percent lower than the national rate. 
        Even before the pandemic, five of those eight states 
        experienced a shrinking labor force, with losses from 2014 to 
        2019. Furthermore, in the largest hog-producing states, the 
        labor force participation rates are generally well above the 
        national average, indicating little or no slack in these local 
        labor markets.\3\
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    \3\ https://nppc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/August-2021-Labor-
Study.pdf.
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          The most troublesome trends facing the pork industry in the 
        longer term are the demographic realities in non-metropolitan 
        counties, where pork operations are overwhelmingly located. 
        Population growth has been slowing in U.S. non-metro counties 
        for decades, and large swaths of rural America have had 
        negative growth or loss. From 2010 to 2016, the overall non-
        metro population growth rate became negative for the first 
        time, and although growth has been slightly positive or neutral 
        from 2017 to 2019, non-metro populations in agricultural 
        regions continue to see losses.
          Additionally, the aging rural workforce is increasingly 
        unable or unwilling to do the strenuous labor that agricultural 
        work demands. (The average age of U.S. farmers is 57.5, up more 
        than a year from 2012, according to the 2017 Census of 
        Agriculture.) As more rural residents age beyond their 
        childbearing years, this negative trend in population and labor 
        force likely will accelerate.
          Those macroeconomic and demographic realities prompted the 
        pork industry, particularly the packing sector, to rely 
        increasingly on foreign-born workers. Indeed, many plants now 
        have immigrant workforces of as much as 50 percent. Overall, 
        according to the latest U.S. Census figures, more than 37 
        percent of meat-processing workers are foreign-born.
          But here, too, the industry faces significant challenges that 
        must be addressed in tandem with any capacity building. (It 
        would do no good to building new or expand existing pork 
        processing capacity if there are not enough workers to fill the 
        jobs necessary to run a plant. In fact, many of the nation's 
        pork packing plants already do not have enough available 
        workers to run weekday second shifts or Saturday shifts, 
        according to industry economists and analysts.)
          While over the last 30 years foreign-born workers offset some 
        of the decline in rural native-born population and labor force, 
        that trend likely had reversed even before the recent emergence 
        of political sentiment toward stricter immigration controls and 
        increased enforcement. Furthermore, an increasing proportion of 
        the large influx of immigrant workers who came to the United 
        States in the 1980s and 1990s are aging beyond their prime 
        working years.
          Also, improving economies and declining population growth in 
        countries that were sending immigrants to the United States are 
        changing the calculus of potential immigrants. There are more 
        and better jobs in many of those countries, and the baby booms 
        are over in those nations that fed the immigration waves of 
        recent decades.
          Unless action is taken to address the labor shortage in the 
        U.S. agriculture industry, there will be decades of 
        increasingly difficult labor market conditions for all rural 
        industries, including the pork industry.
          To address the labor shortage, NPPC recommends expanding the 
        existing H-2A visa program, which currently is limited to 
        temporary and seasonal foreign-born workers, to year-round 
        agricultural workers, without a cap on the annual number of 
        visas issued. Alternatively, the pork industry has backed 
        creation of a new visa category to allow year-round immigrant 
        agricultural laborers.
          The tight labor market is affecting every aspect of the pork 
        supply chain, including transportation of hogs. There has been 
        for several years a significant lack of commercial driver's 
        license truck drivers. According to a recent estimate, the 
        trucking industry needs an additional 60,800 drivers 
        immediately, and with anticipated driver retirements and 
        expected post-COVID increases in the production of goods, it 
        will need about 1.1 million new drivers over the next 
        decade.\4\
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    \4\ https://www.ttnews.com/articles/data-shows-there-are-more-
truckers-ever-experts-say-driver-shortage-still-issue.
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C. The Status, Utility, and Role of State-Inspected Packing Plants
          Following the COVID-19 disruptions of 2020, one proposed 
        solution for increasing resiliency in the U.S. pork supply 
        chain has been to invest in state-inspected packing plants. 
        There are an estimated 1,900 state-inspected slaughter and 
        processing facilities in the United States, and approximately 
        600 establishments are hog slaughter facilities. While small in 
        scale, state-inspected plants are great assets to rural 
        communities and often play an important role in local meat 
        supply chains. However, they contribute a small share of the 
        total pork supply and are not able to capture cost efficiency 
        benefits from economies of scale. Nearly all state-inspected 
        plants fall into the ``small'' or ``very small'' size 
        classification, and many have between just one and 20 
        employees.\5\ It is very common for state-inspected slaughter 
        and processing plants to also offer custom processing exempt 
        from inspection, where producers can get their animals 
        processed for private meat consumption, but the meat cannot be 
        sold commercially or served to the public.
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    \5\ FSIS defines ``small'' facilities as those with between 10 and 
499 employees and ``very small'' facilities as those with less than 10 
employees.
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          In 2020, non-federally inspected hog slaughter accounted for 
        less than 0.6 percent of total U.S. commercial hog slaughter. A 
        recent study at Iowa State University found that the proportion 
        of state-inspected hog slaughter is especially small in top 
        hog-producing states.\6\ Harvest totals in Iowa, for example, 
        were more than 40 million head in 2020, and just 5,200, or 0.01 
        percent of those hogs were slaughtered under state inspection. 
        In Minnesota, total commercial slaughter last year was more 
        than 12 million, and state-inspected slaughter totaled 8,500 
        head, or 0.1 percent of that. To put this in perspective, one 
        large plant with a capacity of 20,000 head per day can process 
        nearly four times in 1 day what all state-inspected facilities 
        in Iowa processed in 1 year.
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    \6\ https://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/pdf/
21pb34.pdf.
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          The fact that more than 600 hog slaughter facilities 
        contribute such a small portion of the total pork supply is a 
        strong testament to just how small these facilities really are. 
        In the same Iowa State University study, a survey of state-
        inspected hog slaughter facilities in Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, 
        Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, and 
        Wisconsin gathered information on average weekly capacity and 
        annual production levels. On average, weekly slaughter capacity 
        in 2020 was between 16 and 42 head for state-inspected plants 
        in those states, and average annual production was between 397 
        and 862 head.\7\ Several respondents indicated they only 
        process hogs 1 or 2 days each week, focusing on further 
        processing activities the remaining days.
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    \7\ These results are based on 49 survey responses, excluding the 
sole respondent from North Carolina, which reported a weekly capacity 
of over 200 head.
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          In response to COVID-19 supply chain issues and an increased 
        demand for local meat products, survey respondents indicated 
        their state-inspected facilities were able to increase weekly 
        slaughter capacity by 25 percent on average from 2019 to 2020. 
        For some plants, this may have been as simple as increasing 
        from 10 to 12 hogs per week, but many plants also received 
        grants through state CARES Act allocations and made lasting 
        improvements that permanently increased weekly capacity. In 
        total, state-inspected plants have been eligible for more than 
        $100 million in funding since the spring of 2020. While non-
        federally inspected processing totals increased by 11 percent 
        nationally from 2019 to 2020, this was still just 0.6 percent 
        of total hog processing.
          One of the biggest drawbacks of further investment in state-
        inspected plant capacity is the restriction on interstate 
        commerce. State-inspected plants are prohibited from selling or 
        distributing products outside of the state where the meat was 
        produced. Incentivizing the expansion of state-inspected plants 
        will do little to alleviate current supply chain issues, as 
        many state-inspected facilities are located in top pork-
        producing states. Therefore, without interstate shipment 
        eligibility, these plants would be unable to distribute pork 
        products to the rest of the country and would be supplementing 
        an already steady pork supply within their home states. State-
        inspected pork products are also not eligible for export.
          To help expand their marketing opportunities, USDA's Meat and 
        Poultry Inspection Readiness Grant (MPIRG) program has made 
        more than $50 million available to state-inspected plants for 
        obtaining Federal inspection status or participating in the 
        Cooperative Interstate Shipment (CIS) program. The CIS program 
        allows plants meeting FSIS standards to achieve interstate 
        shipment eligibility while remaining under state inspection. 
        Considering that the goal of USDA's capacity proposal is to 
        meaningfully expand capacity nationwide, it seems clear that 
        investing in plants that have the ability to sell outside of a 
        single state is preferable for the sake of efficiency.
          Based on 27 survey responses, the average estimated cost of 
        transitioning from state to Federal inspection standards is 
        about $52,000, with the highest estimates exceeding $200,000. 
        If these survey responses are representative of all state-
        inspected hog slaughter plants, the current funding support 
        level is likely sufficient for the number of facilities that 
        are interested in pursuing Federal inspection or CIS 
        certification. Additionally, many survey respondents indicated 
        they are not interested in transitioning away from their 
        state's inspection system.
          As mentioned previously, state-inspected plants are a 
        valuable piece of local food supply chains, but they are 
        limited in their ability to contribute to the greater industry 
        supply chain. Because state-inspected plants operate on such a 
        small scale and often do a significant share of custom exempt 
        meat processing, their business model makes them best suited to 
        continue serving their local communities rather than assuming--
        through expansion--the additional overhead costs associated 
        with larger facilities. Many survey respondents also noted they 
        are more concerned about sourcing enough reliable labor to 
        operate their plant efficiently at its current size than about 
        securing enough capital to expand the facility. The results of 
        the survey would suggest that any further USDA investment would 
        be best directed toward other methods of increasing capacity.
D. Shortage of FSIS Inspectors
          Federal inspection of meat processing plants is done by FSIS, 
        with inspectors on site at all times during processing. These 
        inspectors ensure that animals are fit for both processing and 
        human consumption and that products are correctly labeled and 
        packaged. While some requirements do differ between NSIS and 
        non-NSIS plants, the requirement that inspectors be physically 
        present is universal for federally inspected plants.
          As stated previously, some meat that is not federally 
        inspected may still be sold out-of-state if the state that 
        manages the inspection participates in the CIS program, which 
        requires that inspection standards be ``at least equal'' to 
        that of Federal inspection. State-inspected meat that does not 
        participate in such a program cannot be sold outside of that 
        state.
          Currently, FSIS faces a shortage of inspectors that threatens 
        to hamstring efforts to expand packing capacity. Federally 
        inspected plants cannot operate without continuous inspection 
        from an FSIS inspector and, should FSIS be unable to assign one 
        to a plant, new operating hours or even operation itself may be 
        blocked. This has been proved anecdotally by claims from NSIS 
        packers who, in light of the recent line speed court decision 
        (see NPPC's previous comments), faced significant challenges in 
        adding hours of operation because they could not find 
        inspectors to cover the additional hours. Over the last several 
        years, including pre-COVID-19 pandemic, meat processors have 
        increased wages to attract hard-to-find labor. FSIS must 
        similarly act to attract new inspectors to cover the processing 
        capacity USDA intends to create through this program.
Distribution of Funds
    The two fundamental questions of this RFI are: ``How will the money 
be spent?'' and ``Who will be spending it?'' NPPC understands that 
USDA's goal is not only to expand capacity but to do so in a manner 
that increases resiliency with regard to impact on competition and 
concentration. To do that, USDA will need to balance the desire to have 
a diversity of recipients of the proposed investment with the need to 
ensure that new capacity is significant enough to justify the expense.
A. What $500 Million Can Buy and Consideration of Efficiency
          While the relationship between investment and output appears 
        to be linear, the average output per worker tends to increase 
        for larger processing facilities. For instance, a very small 
        plant with ten or fewer employees may have a weekly output of 
        20 head (2 output/employee), a small plant with 200 employees 
        may have a weekly output of nearly 4,000 head (20 output/
        employee), and a large plant with 2,400 employees may have a 
        weekly output greater than 110,000 (46 output/employee). The 
        relationship between number of employees and output is 
        demonstrated in Figure 1 where output per worker is represented 
        by the green line and weekly slaughter capacity is depicted by 
        the blue columns.
          In Figure 1, output per worker is less than 20 for plants 
        with fewer than 200 employees but increases sharply for plants 
        with between 200 and 1,000 employees. Because of differences in 
        value-added processing activities, equipment, and line speeds, 
        output per worker varies between 36 and 57 for plants with more 
        than 1,000 employees.
Figure 1: Average Weekly Output per Employee
Worker Productivity and Weekly Slaughter Capacity
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Daily capacity estimates by Dr. Steve Meyer of 
        Partners for Production Agriculture,\8\ employment estimates 
        from company websites and local news reports, and small plant 
        data from previously mentioned ISU study.
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    \8\ https://cet.gcp.informamarkets.com/sites/cet.com/files/nhf-
porkpackerreport_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Note: Figure 1 represents 25 medium-to-large-sized plants and 
        40 plants with between 1 and 20 employees.

          As previously highlighted, labor availability likely poses a 
        larger barrier to increased capacity than available capital. 
        Indeed, in personal discussions with meatpackers, local 
        workforce availability is as important a consideration as the 
        availability of hogs when it comes to deciding where to build a 
        new facility. Because of this, NPPC suggests that USDA fund 
        large projects through either construction of new facilities or 
        expansion of existing plants, subject to the availability of 
        hogs and labor. Doing so will result in the largest increase in 
        total national capacity, which in turn will create the greatest 
        impact on prices for producers. In addition to benefits of 
        scale outlined above, it is important to note that fewer, 
        larger plants would rely on fewer FSIS inspectors. Given the 
        intense shortage of inspectors, which is unlikely to be 
        relieved given the recent NSIS line speed decision, USDA will 
        need to invest only in projects for which it will be able to 
        provide inspectors. It is important to note, however, that the 
        need to invest in large projects does not necessitate a need to 
        invest through existing large processing firms. Different 
        recipients, including producers or small packers, can undertake 
        these projects.
          Table 1 (below) adds the potential increased capacity at 
        different plant sizes and funding levels, assuming $125 million 
        in investment targeted at pork processing (based on the per-
        pound proportion of U.S. pork processing compared with other 
        meats domestically.) 9-10 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Base data sourced from Dr. Dermot Hayes of Iowa State 
University.
    \10\ https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=d/sp/i/47465/pid/
47465.

                     Table 1: Estimated Cost per Plant at Varying Subsidy and Output Levels
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capacity (Head/          Annual      Total Cost     10% Subsidy   # of Plants at    20% Subsidy   # of Plants at
 day)                    Output                                     10% Subsidy                     20% Subsidy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        2,500           650,000     $50,000,000      $5,000,000              25     $10,000,000            12.5
        4,000         1,040,000     $80,000,000      $8,000,000            15.6     $16,000,000             7.8
        5,000         1,300,000    $100,000,000     $10,000,000            12.5     $20,000,000             6.3
        8,000         2,080,000    $160,000,000     $16,000,000             7.8     $32,000,000             3.9
       10,000         2,600,000    $200,000,000     $20,000,000             6.3     $40,000,000             3.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capacity (Head/          Annual      Total Cost     30% Subsidy   # of Plants at    40% Subsidy   # of Plants at
 day)                    Output                                     30% Subsidy                     40% Subsidy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        2,500           650,000     $50,000,000     $15,000,000             8.3     $20,000,000             6.3
        4,000         1,040,000     $80,000,000     $24,000,000             5.2     $32,000,000             3.9
        5,000         1,300,000    $100,000,000     $30,000,000             4.2     $40,000,000             3.1
        8,000         2,080,000    $160,000,000     $48,000,000             2.6     $64,000,000               2
       10,000         2,600,000    $200,000,000     $60,000,000             2.1     $80,000,000             1.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Estimated number of plants assumes $125 million total subsidy allotted to pork processing.

          Ultimately, the level of assistance through a grant or low-
        interest loan for a project will be dependent on who will be 
        building the new or expanding the existing plant. Some 
        recipients, such as large packers or outside investors, will 
        likely have significantly more available capital than other 
        parties, which would allow USDA's investment to go further in 
        terms of new capacity. Other investors, such as small packers 
        or producers investing in a co-op plant, may require more 
        funding but come with resiliency and competitive benefits.
B. Different Potential Recipients
I. Producers
                  Producer-owned packing plants, while not making up a 
                majority of packing capacity, have steadily increased 
                their market share over the last couple decades. That 
                trend continues to be shown through the announcements 
                of new projects such as the upcoming $500 million pork 
                processing facility in Sioux Falls, SD, commissioned by 
                producer-owned Wholestone Foods.\11\ Wholestone, 
                Triumph, and other producer-owned plants have seen 
                phenomenal success over the last fifteen years, leading 
                to more producers considering engaging in packing 
                operations.
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    \11\ https://www.siouxfalls.business/pork-producer-owned-company-
plans-to-build-500m-sioux-falls-facility/.
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                  Producer investments in new packing capacity provide 
                several benefits. Firstly, for the producers who own 
                and supply these plants, prices received are generally 
                more stable, as return is based not on the fluctuating 
                value of the hog but rather of the meat sold to 
                retailers or distributors. Secondly, producer ownership 
                inherently addresses the question of adequacy of nearby 
                supply--particularly in closed plants where hogs are 
                supplied exclusively by the owners--since a facility's 
                required number of hogs is known to plant owners/
                suppliers and thus hogs are produced to meet the 
                plant's delivery requirements. Last, investment in 
                producer-owned facilities is likely to achieve USDA's 
                goals on the money's impact on concentration and 
                consolidation.
                  Investment in producer-owned facilities does come 
                with some drawbacks. Firstly, producers generally have 
                less available capital compared with other potential 
                groups, requiring that USDA either provide more cash or 
                allow for non-producers to take a minority stake in 
                exchange for supplemental startup costs (this is not an 
                uncommon practice.) Secondly and like other potential 
                recipients, new producer-owned plants will likely 
                require substantial technical assistance. Lastly, 
                finding enough producers at a significant enough 
                investment level in a concentrated area may prove to be 
                a logistical challenge if not properly broadcasted.
II. Small Packers
                  The shutdown and slowdown of large packing plants in 
                2020 highlighted the value of small meat processors in 
                local food supply chains. When there was nowhere else 
                for market-ready hogs to go, small processors made 
                efforts to increase processing capacity and meet 
                consumer demands for locally sourced meat. Even now, 
                more than a year after the shutdowns, small meat 
                processors are operating as close to capacity as they 
                can, only constrained by labor shortages and 
                administrative challenges. In some instances, wait 
                times at local locker plants exceed 18 months.
                  Investing in small meat packers, whether through 
                grants or low-interest loans, could help small plants 
                increase capacity through equipment purchases or 
                facility modifications, especially those that would 
                increase automation and alleviate current labor 
                capacity constraints. In many cases, small plants may 
                be able to increase volumes simply by improving 
                efficiency. Small plants would also benefit from USDA's 
                investment in training or technical assistance 
                programs.
                  Although small meat processors provide great value to 
                their communities and local economies, investing in 
                their expansion is certainly not the most efficient way 
                to increase overall capacity. There is no well-defined 
                ``minimum efficient scale'' for pork processing plants, 
                but many studies suggest that larger plants 
                significantly benefit from economies of scale. As 
                University of Alberta economist James Rude points out 
                in his study of supply chain resiliency, this is 
                largely due to the presence of substantial fixed costs 
                that must be spread over more units of output to be 
                efficient and optimize profitability.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ https://www.researchgate.net/profile/James-Rude/publication/
349949013_Resilience_
versus_Efficiency_The_feasibility_of_small_local_meatpacking_plants_in_C
anada/links/6048dd
3192851c1bd4ded671/Resilience-versus-Efficiency-The-feasibility-of-
small-local-meatpacking-plants-in-Canada.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  The scale-related drawbacks of investing in small 
                meat packers include lower productivity per worker, 
                higher overhead costs per unit, and inconsistent 
                capacity utilization. Small packers also lack many 
                processing capabilities such as the recovery of non-
                traditional parts, including intestines and hearts, 
                etc. Despite these challenges, increasing the share of 
                total processing at smaller plants would benefit rural 
                communities while contributing to USDA's goal of 
                increased competition and resiliency.
III. Large Packers
                  Over the past several decades, the vast majority of 
                meat processing in the United States has shifted to 
                fewer, larger packers. This is not by mistake. As 
                detailed earlier in the comments, larger processors 
                enjoy significant benefits of scale compared with their 
                smaller counterparts. Significant technological 
                investments--only available to firms with greater 
                access to capital--enable plants to increase their per 
                worker efficiency and decrease their per pound 
                production costs. As Dr. Glynn Tonsor alluded to in his 
                testimony to the Senate Agriculture Committee on June 
                23, the efficiency created by these plants has in many 
                ways led to the consistent growth of the livestock 
                industry.\13\
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    \13\ https://www.agriculture.senate.gov/hearings/examining-markets-
transparency-and-prices-from-cattle-producer-to-consumer.
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                  Considering large packers are generally more likely 
                to be at or near the 1,106 head per hour line speed 
                limit, investment in the existing infrastructure of 
                large pork processors is unlikely to result in any 
                increased capacity. Rather, investment in large packers 
                may be best served by the creation of new facilities 
                through grant or low-interest loan programs.
                  In that case, USDA may be able to maximize the 
                increase in capacity per dollar spent given that large 
                packers may need less granted or borrowed capital to 
                economically justify their own investment in new 
                infrastructure. Moreover, large packers are the most 
                experienced with the requirements of federally 
                inspected meat production and would require little to 
                no additional training or technical resources from 
                USDA. The ability of large packers to attract labor is 
                also better than that of other groups, since they are 
                more likely to enjoy both better per worker efficiency 
                and greater flexibility to increase the wages and 
                benefits paid to workers. These firms are also more 
                likely to have human resources departments with 
                expertise in both domestic recruitment and visa 
                requirements for foreign-born employees.
                  The drawbacks to investing in large packers mostly 
                relate to the impact on competition. Further 
                concentrating the proportion of processing capacity 
                among any major packer could result in an even further 
                erosion of producer market power. Moreover, as stated 
                earlier, it is crucial that USDA invest this money in a 
                manner maximizing the amount of new capacity. Doing so 
                will result in fewer, but higher output new facilities. 
                Investment through existing large packers in accordance 
                with those necessary principles will result in even 
                further consolidation. It is unclear whether increased 
                hog prices resulting from increased capacity would be 
                enough to negate any price pressure resulting from a 
                shift in the balance of economic power.
IV. Outside Investors
                  Investors completely outside of the business of 
                livestock production could be eligible to build new 
                capacity using USDA's assistance. Without knowing the 
                specific recipient, though, it's difficult to assess 
                the benefits and drawbacks of such a program. If the 
                investor is not involved in any part of the supply 
                chain, the program would help diversify the industry 
                and achieve the competition aims of USDA. However, 
                technical assistance needs would likely be greater than 
                any other recipient. NPPC believes that outside 
                investors, if included at all, should have their 
                ownership limited to a non-majority stake in a new 
                operation for the purposes of augmenting the starting 
                capital on hand.
Answers To Questions Listed in the Public Notice
    Below are NPPC's responses to some of the questions listed in the 
public notice.
A. How can workforce recruitment, training, and retention needs be 
        addressed to maintain or increase processing capacity?
          As stated earlier in our comments, labor availability is 
        perhaps an even larger barrier to increased packing capacity 
        than available capital. For instance, in the wake of the recent 
        ruling on NSIS line speeds, many packers have indicated they 
        were unable to even increase operating hours because of a lack 
        of available labor. This is not a new phenomenon, or one caused 
        by COVID-19. Meatpacking plants are often located in rural 
        regions with a high density of producers. Aging and out-
        migration have led to a smaller pool of prime working-age 
        individuals, creating an incredibly tight labor market in those 
        regions. From 2014 to 2019, the rural county labor force 
        declined in five of the eight top pork-producing states, where 
        much of the country's meat processing activity takes place.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ https://nppc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/August-2021-Labor-
Study.pdf.
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          Unfortunately, an increase in pay and/or benefits has not 
        offset these labor shortages. Data from the Bureau of Labor 
        Statistics shows that from 2016 to 2020, weekly wages increased 
        by 30.5 percent in the animal processing industry, while the 
        number of people employed in the industry increased by just 7.8 
        percent, or about 1.6 percent per year on average.\15\ This 
        indicates an inelastic supply of labor, where changes in wages 
        have little effect on the quantity of labor supplied. The 
        challenges that plague existing plants with regard to labor 
        availability are the same that will face new or expanded plants 
        resulting from USDA's capacity initiative--not one of available 
        capital for recruitment or training but one of labor access.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and 
Wages, NAICS 311611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Foreign-born workers are the only available pool of labor at 
        a scale equal to that of the shortage. One visa that may be 
        modified to allow for use by meatpackers is the H-2A visa. 
        Meatpacking is neither seasonal nor considered to be 
        agricultural labor for purposes of H-2A, but by opening the 
        program to non-seasonal labor and including meatpacking in the 
        definition of agricultural labor, plants may be able to access 
        significant labor through a program that already accounts for 
        domestic labor availability and wage impact.
B. What information is available to help guide USDA's understanding of 
        workforce needs of very small, small, and larger processors 
        (e.g., access to labor, training, safety considerations), 
        particularly as related to regional considerations and 
        solutions?
          While production styles vary greatly from small to large 
        plants, all meatpacking establishments require a steady, 
        reliable workforce to remain profitable. A 2018 National Hog 
        Farmer article authored by economist Dr. Steve Meyer reported 
        that labor constraints have often limited the ability of small 
        plants to fully utilize capacity, with many plants operating 
        around 80 percent of their potential even before any pandemic-
        related labor issues.\16\ While large plants have more ability 
        for automation, for several years many packers have reported 
        labor shortages restricting their ability to add value through 
        downstream tasks, such as boning or offal recovery, which in 
        turn lowers packer margins and, ultimately, the value of hogs. 
        Recently, as the nationwide labor shortage intensified, some of 
        the country's largest plants limited their operations by 20 to 
        30 percent of maximum capacity.\17\ As Dr. Meyer reported, 
        ``these shortfalls could, of course, disappear if workers can 
        be secured and attendance improved.''
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    \16\ https://www.nationalhogfarmer.com/marketing/us-slaughter-
capacity-settles-even-keel.
    \17\ https://cet.gcp.informamarkets.com/sites/cet.com/files/nhf-
porkpackerreport_0.pdf.
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          Workforce training needs also vary depending on the scale of 
        the plant. Smaller plants tend to require employees with a 
        higher average ``skill level'' than larger plants. This is 
        because small plants tend to lack automation and rely on 
        workers who have specialized training and meat-cutting 
        experience. Employees at smaller plants may also be asked to 
        perform a wider variety of tasks within the business, and the 
        relatively low productivity per worker in small plants makes it 
        hard for plant owners to pay high wages, especially during the 
        training period. Furthermore, the relative importance placed on 
        each individual employee puts smaller plants at a higher risk 
        of operating below full capacity. As Dr. Meyer noted, ``five 
        workers in a workforce of 800 are not nearly as important as 
        five workers might be in a workforce of 50.''
C. What regions show demonstrated processing needs, at what levels, and 
        for which species?
          The most urgent processing needs are demonstrated in regions 
        affected by the NSIS line speed ruling. An analysis by Dr. 
        Dermot Hayes of Iowa State University estimated that the ruling 
        would force six affected plants in Guymon, Okla.; Beardstown, 
        Ill.; Hatfield, Pa.; Coldwater, Mich.; Fremont, Neb.; and 
        Austin, Minn., to decrease their line speeds by up to 25 
        percent.\18\ While three of the affected plants are located 
        near the top pork-producing areas of southern Minnesota, Iowa, 
        and Illinois, the other three are in less hog farm-intensive 
        zones, where producers have fewer processing options if their 
        pigs can no longer be delivered to either the Hatfield, 
        Coldwater, or Guymon plants. Producers in these regions may now 
        be required to ship market hogs hundreds of miles if the nearby 
        plant cannot accept their pigs, which Dr. Hayes estimates could 
        increase transportation costs by up to $10 per head in some 
        cases.
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    \18\ https://nppc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Impacts-of-NSIS-
Decision-on-Pork-Producers-Dr.-Hayes.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          In addition to higher costs, longer transport times can 
        increase the risk for ``in-transit loss'' of hogs on board. 
        Ensuring that hog-producing regions have a proportionate level 
        of shackle space can help alleviate this concern. Using USDA's 
        regional federally inspected slaughter data and Dr. Steve 
        Meyer's estimates of packing plant capacity, it is possible to 
        estimate which regions' processing levels tend to exceed 
        capacity. Table 2 shows the regions with available data and the 
        number of weeks spent above 90 percent and 100 percent capacity 
        in 2019. Note that for all regions, capacity utilization is 
        highest from September to December. As shown in Table 2, the 
        regions in the first four rows most frequently reach their 
        weekly capacity level and would benefit most from increased 
        processing capacity.

Table 2: 2019 Estimated Regional Capacity Utilization (Measured in Head)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Average
                        Weekly        Weekly      # Weeks      # Weeks
       Region          Slaughter     Capacity    Above 90%    Above 100%
                         (FI)                     Capacity     Capacity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    IA, KS, MO, NE      1,077,380    1,157,895           37           10
              AR, LA, NM, 114,949      119,880           35           17
                 IL, IN, M711,686OH,   797,850           15            4
                 WI
DE, MD, PA, WV, VA        111,133      135,810           12            3
    AZ, CA, HI, NV         45,684       65,610            0            0
    AK, ID, OR, WA          6,661        9,747            0            0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: 2019 slaughter totals and capacity were used to represent a more
  ``typical'' capacity utilization cycle than 2020.
The region containing North Carolina could not be included due to lack
  of USDA data.

D. How can USDA support access to processing services for smaller-scale 
        producers? Are there opportunities for producers to engage in 
        cooperative or collaborative arrangements with each other or 
        other facilities to both ensure access and provide a sufficient 
        supply for a plant to operate? If so, what government 
        assistance would be needed to facilitate that type of 
        arrangement?
          Producer-owned processing facilities have been very 
        successful on a large scale, with examples including Triumph 
        Group, Prime Pork, Clemens Group, Prestage Foods, and 
        Wholestone Farms. It is likely that with adequate technical 
        assistance and capital, this model could be adopted by smaller-
        scale producers as well. The biggest potential challenge for 
        new small, producer-owned processing facilities is the 
        considerable fixed capital requirements and other startup costs 
        associated with building a facility. Because smaller producers 
        are likely to have less available capital than large producers, 
        this type of cooperative would require more contributors and 
        would come with more organizational and administrative 
        challenges. USDA could assist small producers with startup 
        costs through loans and grants while also working with state 
        agriculture departments to administer technical assistance and 
        help producers with the formation of cooperative meat 
        processing systems.
E. What metrics illuminate the extent of the competitive environment 
        for the products or services that producers and growers offer, 
        including at the local level? What factors up and down the 
        supply chain affect that competitive environment?
          A competitive environment is defined by various businesses 
        competing on several factors such as product development, 
        product quality, promotion, and price. Naturally, the extent of 
        competition on each of these factors is dependent on the number 
        of businesses in a given region, retail consumer demand, access 
        to capital, and capacity. Within the meat supply chain, the 
        metrics that illuminate the extent of the competitive 
        environment include the size and quantity of hog producers in 
        the region, their geographical proximity to a meat processing 
        facility, the size and quantity of meat packers in the area, 
        the national/regional supply of hogs, relationships with 
        retailers, and current capacity utilization. Because of the 
        economies of scale that exist throughout the meatpacking 
        industry, relative market share of large packers also affects 
        the competitive environment.
F. What seasonal throughput issues (e.g., under- and over-utilization 
        during parts of the year) or regional challenges need to be 
        considered for plant expansion or development?
          While hog production is a year-round business, production 
        levels are affected by a few seasonal factors. For example, 
        breeding efficiency and herd health may be more difficult to 
        manage during the winter months, and pigs born during this time 
        are ready for market in the summer. Conversely, pigs born in 
        the summer when the environment is more conducive to efficient 
        production are ready for market in the winter months. 
        Therefore, there are more pigs available for delivery to 
        packers in the winter than in the summer, and throughput levels 
        are not consistent every week of the year.
          As depicted in Figure 2, capacity utilization typically dips 
        lower in the summer months and is higher in the late fall and 
        winter. This national trend has been consistent for years and 
        is experienced on a smaller scale by all of the regions defined 
        in the comment related to regional capacity utilization.
Figure 2, Weekly Federally Inspected Hog Slaughter and Capacity 
        Utilization
Weekly Hog Slaughter, Federally Inspected 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) 
        and the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS).
G. Should the process[o]r be required to purchase a minimum volume 
        through auctions or other public transactions?
          While minimum spot market purchase requirements may seem like 
        an alluring way to level prices, this requirement could lead to 
        significant negative consequences for small producers. On the 
        side of the packing plant, meatpackers are likely to use their 
        allowable contracted hog quota on fewer, larger producers as a 
        means of lowering transaction costs, as well as ensuring a 
        steady supply of hogs. As a result, smaller producers will 
        largely be the ones selling on the spot market, creating a 
        risk-management disparity as fewer small operations will have 
        the relative safety of a contracted sale. Should hog prices 
        collapse, it is likely to be spot-dependent producers without a 
        guaranteed sale who will face the most significant damage. 
        Smaller farms, already least able to weather negative price 
        shocks, will bear a disproportionate amount of harm. In some 
        cases, this could lead to large producers purchasing struggling 
        smaller operations, driving industry consolidation.
          Additionally, should the new plants be producer-owned, this 
        requirement could negate many of the benefits of producer-owned 
        processing. Currently, producer-owned plants work well in a 
        ``closed'' system, meaning the plant owners comprise the 
        totality of its supply by controlling delivery requirements. In 
        this situation, the capacity of the plant is perfectly met 
        because its suppliers know exactly how many hogs to raise and 
        when. This maximizes efficiency and stabilizes profit for the 
        farmers. Should a minimum spot market requirement be mandated 
        for these plants, that will throw a portion of that output into 
        uncertainty, with some weeks falling short of 100 percent of 
        capacity.
H. If contract grower relationships are used that require a purpose-
        built production facility, should contract be required to cover 
        at least the length of the loan term?
          In this case, it is likely that the experience of the pork 
        industry differs dramatically from that of poultry and other 
        livestock industries. As the pork industry continues to expand, 
        the demand for grower services increases and payments for those 
        services increase alongside. Moreover, pork contract growers 
        generally enjoy a greater degree of choice and competition for 
        their services than do poultry growers, with several buyers for 
        pork services compared with one to two for poultry.
          As a result, pork contract growers can opt for a shorter 
        contract and almost always find a more lucrative arrangement 
        shortly after. While pork contract growers would be able to 
        guarantee they have a deal that pays off required capital 
        investments, they will miss out on the better available pig 
        space rates that likely accrue in the meantime. Because of 
        this, it would not be an issue to require that the option be 
        given to a contract grower for a loan-term-length contract. 
        However, a universal requirement may actually result in a 
        severe opportunity cost for pork contract growers.
I. What type of upstream analysis of customers/product demand is needed 
        to justify the level of lending or financial support?
          To maximize the efficiency of each dollar spent, it is 
        important for a plant to operate as close to capacity as 
        possible. With regard to evaluating upstream (producer side) 
        markets, new plants will likely need to evaluate whether there 
        is sufficient upstream hog supply in the region of a proposed 
        build site to justify USDA's financial engagement. As mentioned 
        in a previous comment, there are several regions that have 
        demonstrated an excess of market hogs relative to processing 
        capacity at several points throughout the year. However, these 
        estimates are based on the available region-level data and 
        estimated weekly capacity. For a more detailed analysis of 
        specific areas, it will be incumbent on USDA to compare its 
        confidential processing data with the known processing capacity 
        present in an area.
          To evaluate downstream (consumer/buyer) side markets, 
        applicants should demonstrate plans/strategies for likely 
        buyers of newly produced meat products. What this looks like, 
        however, will largely depend on the scale of the investment. 
        For larger plants, this may mean showing preliminary 
        commitments with retailers, foodservice firms, or export 
        distributors (for FSIS plants). For smaller firms, this may 
        simply mean sharing the current sales figures and future 
        marketing strategy for the product lines they intend to expand. 
        In either case, it is important that this, or any other 
        information on strategy, be kept confidential.
          It is also worth noting that the importance of demonstrated 
        demand may depend on whether USDA pursues a grant or loan 
        scheme. Should the money for increased capacity be distributed 
        under a loan program, it would be more important for recipients 
        to show solidified agreements rather than just proof of demand 
        or current sales figures. Any issues with sales--and as a 
        result, a new plant's ability to pay back a loan--could 
        threaten the life of USDA's program.
J. Would a small plant expansion program structured similarly to USDA's 
        Meat and Poultry Inspection Readiness Grant (MPIRG), but with a 
        focus on expanding slaughter and processing capacity for small 
        federally inspected plants, be beneficial? If so, at what award 
        ($) level per grant and for what types of costs?
          There are several components of USDA's MPIRG program that 
        should help guide the development of any new small plant 
        expansion program. Generally, the new program should provide 
        funding for eligible expansion activities and specify a 
        timeframe for project completions. Like the MPIRG program, the 
        funding would be most impactful if grant eligibility were 
        limited to existing plants rather than new construction 
        projects.
          Consistent with the MPIRG program, eligible activities should 
        be related to the modernization or expansion of existing 
        facilities (including expansion modifications to existing 
        buildings and/or construction of new buildings at existing 
        facilities) and the modernization of processing and 
        manufacturing equipment (including cutting equipment, mixers, 
        grinders, sausage stuffers, smokers, curing equipment, pipes, 
        motors, pumps, and valves).
          In terms of award levels, it is important to note that all 
        dollars invested in small, federally inspected plants will be 
        put toward expansion rather than achieving FSIS compliance. The 
        capital expenditures that come with increasing processing 
        capacity will exceed the average costs associated with 
        transitioning from state to Federal standards. Therefore, any 
        future grant program should ensure that maximum award levels 
        are sufficiently high enough to support meaningful expansion 
        efforts.
K. Would pilot grants that provide awards to small plants for training 
        and other support (e.g., cover wage gap during apprenticeships) 
        to develop their local workforce be effective to address some 
        of the labor challenges associated with operating a current, 
        expanded, or new facility?
          As mentioned previously, the primary workforce concern is 
        labor availability. While assistance for training would no 
        doubt alleviate some of the costs of onboarding workers at 
        smaller plants, it will not help address the most significant 
        challenge of labor access.
L. Should loans and grants be combined to support these facilities? If 
        so, what criteria should be used to determine what portion of 
        the funds are offered as loans versus grants?
          Loans and grants have different advantages relative to each 
        other. Ultimately, it is important to remember that $500 
        million is not a large amount of money when considering the 
        general costs of new processing facilities. By opting for a 
        loan program, USDA may be able to extend the utility of each 
        dollar beyond a single project. Moreover, regardless of whether 
        USDA issues the loans itself or works with existing ag lenders, 
        a mandate to take on more risky projects at lower rates may 
        still entice a wider group of potential investors/borrowers to 
        engage and build new processing capacity--though it will have 
        trouble doing so with current interest rates. By engaging with 
        a wider group, USDA avoids the economic hazard of picking a 
        smaller group of ``winners'' to receive grants at amounts 
        necessary to justify investment.
          For a loan program to succeed, it is imperative that the 
        rates and risk acceptability match the needs of the target 
        users. For instance, if USDA wants to expand capacity working 
        through producer-owned or small packers, loans will need to be 
        available not just at a below-market rate but to borrowers with 
        less up-front capital than might normally be expected. If not, 
        USDA simply mimics the role of traditional lenders, which would 
        encourage little in the way of new projects.
          Another issue to consider should USDA pursue a loan path is 
        working with existing lenders that deal with the target 
        audience, such as traditional banks for large packers, Farm 
        Credit System lenders for producers, and regional and local 
        banks for small packers. In this structure, USDA could simply 
        set rules for minimum/maximum investment per project, rate 
        caps, etc. while allowing financial institutions with existing 
        expertise in lending for these projects to administer the 
        support.
          A grant program would likely be able to only help jumpstart a 
        few, smaller projects. However, access to free cash would 
        broaden the types of entrants--specifically those with the 
        least access to capital. Moreover, there is some question as to 
        whether the current interest rate environment would allow for a 
        loan program to make any real impact on motivating new entrants 
        into the market. Loans are already available, and a grant would 
        go much further in enticing new investors to build processing 
        capacity.
          A grant program would also allow USDA to have firm knowledge 
        of how much it intends to spend, without the life of the 
        program being threatened by new ventures that do not survive. 
        It is often noted that packing plants can take years to become 
        profitable, and if they can operate with fewer costs (in this 
        case, a loan payment), it can increase a plant's chances of 
        long-term viability.
M. What conditions should be placed on grants or loans? If those 
        conditions are not met, should the grants require repayment? If 
        the conditions are met, should the loan be forgivable?
          To best support supply chain resiliency, it is important that 
        new or expanded plants be eligible for interstate shipment 
        either through Federal inspection programs or participation in 
        the CIS program. An Iowa State University study on state-
        inspected meat processors found that over 90 percent of U.S. 
        hog inventories exist in states with state meat inspection 
        programs.\19\ If significant investment is made in state-
        inspected rather than USDA-inspected plants, any additional 
        pork processed through these channels will be limited to 
        distribution within the state of origin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ https://www.card.iastate.edu/products/publications/pdf/
21pb34.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, state-inspected 
        plants have been eligible for nearly $100 million in funding 
        support from their respective states through the CARES Act. 
        USDA has also made more than $50 million in funding available 
        through the MPIRG program, where state-inspected plants can 
        receive up to $200,000 in grants to help them meet Federal 
        inspection standards. While these programs have targeted the 
        needs of state-inspected plants, USDA's next capacity 
        investment would be most efficiently targeted toward new or 
        existing federally inspected plants.
          NPPC strongly urges that any project that receives financial 
        assistance from USDA as part of its proposal to expand capacity 
        be federally inspected or participate in a cooperative 
        agreement with FSIS, ensuring that inspection standards meet or 
        exceed Federal standards.
Conclusion
    NPPC supports USDA's commitment to increasing meatpacking capacity 
in the United States. For producers, the economics are simple: more 
capacity means better prices for hogs. With that said, it is important 
to remember that barriers such as labor availability and the NSIS line 
speed decision are major--if not the primary--contributors to 
restrained capacity. Lasting and ongoing increases in capacity will 
only happen if issues such as those are addressed in tandem with new 
access to capital.
    USDA has many choices with regard to how it uses $500 million to 
spur capacity growth. While NPPC represents hog growers, not meat 
processors, our industries are inextricably linked. Larger, more 
sophisticated plants are capable of significant output relative to 
labor and other expenses, and we urge the Administration to use each 
dollar spent through this program as efficiently as possible.
    NPPC appreciates the opportunity to comment on USDA's efforts, 
which will enable the pork industry to continue leading the way as a 
vibrant American farm sector that is critical to the rural and overall 
U.S. economy.
    If you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact NPPC Manager 
for Competition, Labor, and Tax Policy Jack Detiveaux at 
[email protected].
            Sincerely,


           [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
            

Jen Sorenson,
President,
National Pork Producers Council.
                              Attachment 2
Structure and Importance of the U.S. Pork Industry
Dr. Steve R. Meyer, Partners for Production Agriculture

Dr. Barry Goodwin, North Carolina State University

          Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this document are held 
        solely by its authors and do not represent the views or 
        opinions of any other organization, regardless of affiliation.
Executive Summary
    Pork production is a major contributor to the U.S. economy. While 
there are only 66,000 pork producers, the 131 million animals they 
marketed in 2020 provided over $22 billion in cash receipts in 2020. In 
a report based on 2016 data, Iowa State University economists found 
that the industry was responsible for nearly 514,000 jobs in the United 
States. Pork producers used roughly 1.1 billion bushels of corn and the 
soybean meal from 455 million bushels of soybeans in 2020. Much of this 
impact is centered in major production states from the Dakotas and 
Nebraska eastward across the Corn Belt all the way to Pennsylvania. In 
addition, North Carolina is the third largest hog producing state and 
there is a major production and processing area in the Oklahoma and 
Texas panhandles and southwest Kansas.
    The number of U.S. hog operations has fallen sharply since the 
1950s but has stabilized since 2000. Small operations with less than 
100 pigs still account for the vast majority of farms, but 97.2 percent 
of all hogs are owned by operations with 1,000 head or more. Large 
farms own and produce most of the hogs in the United States, but most 
of these large farms are still owned by family enterprises. While 
``corporate'' production does exist, it does not account for nearly as 
high a percentage of total production as media reports purport.
    The United States is a global leader in pork production. Its 
modern, efficient packing plants with sterling food safety track 
records are a differentiator relative to other protein suppliers 
domestically and around the world. The U.S. pork industry has added 
many modern plants since the 1990s, including three brand new, state-
of-the-art facilities since 2017. The pork packing sector is indeed 
concentrated with the largest four firms holding about 64 percent of 
total capacity in 2020. But the sector's Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 
the metric used by the U.S. Department of Justice to gauge 
concentration and the potential for non-competitive behavior, was 
roughly 1,345 in 2020, well below the DOJ's critical level of 1,500 to 
demark a competitive industry.
    Pigs are produced in many manners, all of which have the goal of 
providing the best environment for the animals and their caretakers and 
producing safe, wholesome pork. These range from pasture production to 
climate-controlled barns. Some genetic lines are aimed at cost-
efficient production of lean pork products preferred by many consumers. 
Others are designed for superior meat quality favored by other more 
flavor-influenced consumers. There is no right or wrong way to raise a 
hog--just better or worse ways depending on climate, available feed 
ingredients and specific end uses and grower and customer preferences.
    USDA's Economic Research Service estimates that just over 60 
percent of all U.S. hogs were produced using some form of production 
contract in 2017. Under these contracts, growers agree to provide 
facilities, labor, utilities, and waste-nutrient management to 
contractors/integrators who own pigs. Contractors/integrators provide 
the animals, feed, management oversight, veterinary/medical supplies 
and services and transportation. Growers face no market risk and very 
little, if any, production risk. Contractors accept all of those risks. 
Contractors gain access to land, labor and modern facilities while 
growers get steady income that will pay them a wage and retire any debt 
incurred. Once the debt is repaid, contract facilities generate 
significant cash flows. Contract hog production has allowed many 
families to remain on their farms earning a good living while playing 
important roles in their rural communities.
    Hog production contracts differ dramatically from poultry 
production contracts. Hog growers are normally paid on a pig space per 
year basis with possible premiums for better feed conversion rates and 
lower death losses relative to an agreed-upon standard. Poultry 
producers are generally paid per bird placed, with premiums and 
discounts applied based on the grower's ranking among similar, usually 
nearby growers on performance metrics such as feed conversion and death 
loss. Hog contracts are long-term agreements spanning typically 5 to 10 
years. Poultry contracts are flock-by-flock agreements with placements 
of future flocks at the discretion of the contractor. Hog growers can 
market their services to a broad group of contractors because pigs and 
market hogs can be shipped long distances without significant stress or 
loss. Most poultry growers are captive to one (or maybe two or three) 
nearby contractors because chickens cannot be shipped long distances 
without suffering significant losses.
    The use of marketing agreements/contracts has grown dramatically 
since the early 1990s. They now govern the transfer of most pigs from 
producers to packers. Most marketing agreements/contracts cover 
deliveries for 3-7 years with prices based on negotiated/spot hog 
prices, CME Lean Hogs futures contracts, USDA's estimated pork cutout 
value or feed ingredient prices and pro forma cost of production 
formulas. These agreements provide certainty regarding packing plant 
access for producers and sufficient hog supplies for packers to operate 
plants at peak efficiencies. Some also reduce the variability of prices 
to be paid, thus mitigating risk. Most pork industry lenders prefer 
that their customers have marketing agreements in place to guarantee 
market access for their pigs. One negative impact of the growth of 
marketing agreements/contracts has been a long-term decline in the 
number of hogs for which prices are negotiated each day. This reduced 
level of ``price discovery'' interactions has cast significant doubt on 
whether those negotiated prices represent the true value of hogs. The 
``public good'' aspects of price information make increasing the number 
of hogs for which prices are negotiated particularly difficult. Ideas 
to require some minimum level of negotiated sales/purchases have 
significant negative repercussions as well.
    Hog and pork prices are determined by the interaction of supply and 
demand at various market/product levels. Consumer-level pork demand is 
the primary source of the demand for wholesale pork cuts. Export demand 
for U.S. pork accounts for roughly 25 percent of wholesale demand as 
well. Packers derive their demand for hogs from the demand for 
wholesale cuts. The farm-level supply of hogs is the basis of 
downstream supplies of wholesale cuts and retail and foodservice pork 
products. Industry participants use a number of information sources to 
gauge these interacting supplies and demands. Prices at all levels are 
discovered simultaneously by the interaction of buyers and sellers 
across the country and even around the world.
    In recent years, domestic consumption has accounted for about 75 
percent of U.S. pork output while exports have accounted for 25 
percent. Growing exports have claimed 63 percent of the increase in 
U.S. pork output since 1994. Domestic consumption grows at roughly the 
rate of U.S. population growth, meaning that domestic per capita 
consumption has been roughly steady since the early 1980s. The only 
significant deviation from this steady pattern was in 2011-2015 when 
higher feed prices driven by (a) government-subsidized and mandated use 
of corn-based ethanol and (b) the drought of 2012 as well as 
significant piglet losses cause by porcine epidemic diarrhea virus 
(PEDv) in 2014 pushed U.S. production sharply lower.
    The pork industry in the United States, Canada and Mexico are 
highly integrated due to the North American Free Trade Agreement of 
1994 and its successor, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement. These 
agreements eliminated tariffs among the three signatories, fostering 
growth in trade. Mexico and Canada are the number two and four U.S. 
pork export markets. U.S. producers purchased roughly 4.4 million 
weaner/feeder pigs from Canadian farms for finishing in the United 
States in 2020. U.S. packers bought an additional 800,000 Canadian pigs 
for processing in U.S. plants in the same year. The United States is 
Canada's largest pork export market. Shipments to Mexico have grown 16-
fold from 1993 to 2020, but the Mexican pork industry has grown by 60 
percent since 1995. Mexico is now a major exporter of pork as it sells 
high value cuts to Asian markets and purchases lower-value cuts from 
the United States.
Table of Contents
    Introduction
    Economic Importance
    Industry Structure
    Raising, Selling, and Buying Hogs
    Production Contracts
    Marketing Agreements
    Market Drivers and Dynamics for Pork and Hogs
    Price Discovery
    Important Markets for U.S. Pork
    Pork Exports
    North American Pork Market
    Pork vs. Beef vs. Chicken: A Comparison
Introduction
    The National Pork Producers Council in 1987 launched a pork 
promotion campaign with one of the world's most iconic slogans: Pork. 
The Other White Meat. The idea was to go head-to-head with chicken for 
the American consumers' food dollars. Beef was and is the No. 1 protein 
purchased in the United States, but the No. 2 spot was up for grabs.
    About the same time, the U.S. pork industry saw innovations in feed 
rations, animal care and housing and genetics; new ways of selling, 
buying and marketing hogs; and implementation of the first two major 
U.S. free trade agreements--with Canada, then Canada and Mexico--all of 
which prompted tremendous growth in pork production even as the number 
of hog operations declined.
    That growth today has made the U.S. pork industry the globe's No. 2 
producer (behind China) and the world's No. 1 exporter of pork.
    It is in that context that this paper examines the structure of the 
U.S. pork industry and its importance to agriculture, the U.S. economy 
and rural America--the places that feed 330 million Americans and 
millions more around the world.
Economic Importance
    The U.S. pork industry is a significant contributor to the economic 
activity of U.S. agriculture and the broader U.S. economy. More than 
60,000 pork producers marketed more that 131 million hogs in 2020 
despite significant disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic. 
Those animals provided farm-level cash receipts of over $22 billion.
    Iowa State University economists Daniel Otto, Lee Schulz and Mark 
Imerman estimated that in 2016 the U.S. pork industry was directly 
responsible for the creation of more than 37,000 full-time-equivalent 
jobs in pork production and generated roughly126,000 jobs in the rest 
of agriculture. In addition, the pork sector was responsible for 
124,750 jobs in packing and processing and 33,400 jobs in professional 
services such as financial services, insurance, and real estate. In 
total, the U.S. pork industry is responsible for nearly 514,000 mostly 
rural jobs in the United States.
    U.S pork producers in 2020 provided 28.3 billion pounds of safe, 
wholesome, and nutritious meat protein to consumers worldwide. By 
comparison, in 1960, at least ten times as many pork producers produced 
about 12 billion pounds of carcass-weight pork.
    Pork exports add significantly to the bottom line of each U.S. pork 
producer and have grown dramatically in recent years. They also 
supported an estimated 110,000 jobs in the U.S. pork sector and its 
allied industries in 2016, according to the ISU economists. (U.S. pork 
exports accounted for only about 20 percent of total U.S. production in 
2016, so the employment contribution was almost certainly larger in 
2020, when exports were a larger percentage of production.)
    Additionally, pork producers used roughly 1.1 billion bushels of 
corn and the soybean meal from 455 million bushels of soybeans in 2020. 
Pigs also consumed roughly 5 million tons of distillers dried grains 
with solubles (DDGS), a major byproduct of corn-based ethanol 
production.
    While the U.S. pork industry enhances the well-being of all U.S. 
citizens by providing safe, nutritious pork products, it contributes 
more specifically to the economics of a number of states, primarily in 
the Midwest. Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of hogs in the 
United States as of December 1, 2017. Major concentrations of hogs, hog 
farmers and the industries they support can be found in 13 states 
across a wide geographic region ranging from the Midwest to mid-
Atlantic and as far north as the Canadian border. One significant 
reason for this geographical distribution is that many of those states 
also are among the top producers of corn and soybeans--the main 
ingredients of hog feed. Colorado, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas and 
Utah also have large numbers of hogs and related enterprises. Smaller 
concentrations are found in Arizona, California, Mississippi, Montana 
and Tennessee. The pork packing sector mirrors these hog locations 
quite closely.
Figure 1

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Hogs and Pigs in the U.S., December 1, 2017 (Source: USDA, 
        2017 Census of Agriculture).
Industry Structure
    The structure (producer size, ownership, market share, etc.) of the 
U.S. pork industry has changed dramatically over time but has been 
relatively stable since the early 2000s. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
number of U.S. hog operations by size category from USDA's Census of 
Agriculture.
    The sharp decline in the number of hog operations from the late 
1950s through the 1970s was mirrored by reductions in the number of 
operations producing nearly all agricultural products. Major 
technological changes were a primary driver as were cultural and social 
changes that resulted in much smaller farm families and large 
migrations from farms to cities.
Figure 2
Number of Hog Operations by Marketings, 1959-2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Census of Agriculture, U.S. Bureau of the Census and 
        USDA, various editions.
Figure 3
Number of Hog Operations by Marketings, 1997-2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Census of Agriculture, U.S. Bureau of the Census and 
        USDA, various editions.
          Hog operations have somewhat stabilized near 60,000 in the 
        last two Census of Agriculture years.

    Technological changes continued in the pork industry from the 1970s 
through the 1990s as confinement production--housing animals indoors to 
protect them from weather, disease and predators--and advances in 
animal disease control and nutrition gave rise to substantial economies 
of scale in hog production. While farms that produced both feed (mainly 
corn) and hogs had a historical advantage over those that produced only 
hogs, Federal price support programs resulted in relatively low cash 
corn prices during this period, which allowed specialized pork 
enterprises to be competitive with their upstream-integrated 
competitors.
    These forces culminated in a major restructuring of the pork 
production sector in the mid-1990s. Economies of scale and the looming 
threat of environmental regulation drove a large expansion of the 
production sector that resulted in very low prices. The low prices of 
1994 and, even more so, the price debacle of 1998 (when live hog prices 
were less than $15 a carcass hundred weight (cwt.); today they're 
around $105) drove producers large and small from the industry but had 
a disproportionate impact on small producers because of the generally--
but not always--lower productivity of enterprises that were part of 
diversified farms relative to specialized hog enterprises.
    USDA in 1964 began breaking out ``large'' farms that had 1,000 head 
and more hogs. At that time, these large farms had 3.2 percent of the 
total U.S. inventory. That share grew to 22.7 percent in 1978, so USDA 
began providing more detail in the 1982 Census, and the new ``large'' 
category of farms with inventories of 5,000 head and more held 4.9 
percent of the national hog population. As can be seen in Figure 7, the 
share of farms with 1,000 head and more hogs has continued to grow over 
time, with the most dramatic growth being in those farms with 5,000 and 
more hogs. Farms with over 1,000 head now account for 97.2 percent of 
the national inventory. Those with 5,000 or more hold a 72.8 percent 
inventory share.
    A major advantage U.S. pork has in world markets and its 
competitive position relative to other U.S. proteins exists in the 
efficiency of U.S. pork packing companies and plants. U.S. plants are, 
on average, larger than others in the world and, according to industry 
sources, capable of converting hogs to value-added pork products at 
lower costs than plants located elsewhere in the world.
    The growth of U.S. pork plants is the result of adding many large, 
efficient plants since the early 1990s. That growth was accompanied by 
the closure of many older, generally smaller plants, some of which were 
in areas that no longer produce many hogs. (See Figure 4.)

                                Figure 4
                    Pork Packing Capacity by Company
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Company           Headquarters         2019       2020      Change
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1  Smithfield     Smithfield, VA           130,300  8130,3000
2  JBS            Greeley, CO               93,000     93,000
3  Tyson Foods    Dakota Dunes, SD          81,300     81,800        500
 (IBP)
4  Clemens Food   Hatfield, PA              23,700     23,700
 Group
5  Seaboard       Shawnee Mission, KS       20,500     22,500      2,000
 Farms
6  Triumph Foods  St. Joseph, MO            21,500     21,300      (200)
7  Triumph-       Sioux City, IA            20,400     20,400
 Seaboard
8  Hormel         Austin, MN                19,000     19,000
9  Indiana        Delphi, IN                17,300     16,700      (600)
 Packing Co.
10 Wholestone     Fremont, NE               10,675     11,500        825
 Foods
11 Prestage       Webster City, IA          10,000     10,000
 Foods
12 Agar Foods     Rantoul, IL                7,400      7,400
13 Premium Iowa   Hospers, IA                3,150      5,250      2,100
 Pork
14 Prime Pork     Windom, MN                 5,100      5,100
15 Sioux-Preme    Sioux Center, IA           4,600      4,600
 Packing
16 Johnsonville   Watertown, WI              3,500      3,425       (75)
 Sausage
17 Yosemite       Stockton, CA               3,200      3,200
 Meats
18 J.H Routh      Sandusky, OH               4,200      2,900    (1,300)
19 Pork King      Marengo, IL              82,2000      2,250         50
 Packing
20 Redwood Farms  Estherville, IA          82,4000      2,000      (400)
 (Dakota Pork)
21 Abbyland       Curtiss, WI                2,000      2,000
 Foods
22 Fisher Ham     Spring, TX                 1,700    81,7000
 and Meat
23 The Pork       Warsaw, NC                 1,500      1,500
 Company
   USA Pork       Hazellton, PA              1,500      1,500
 Products
25 Leidy's        Souderton, PA              1,350      1,350
26 Verschoor      Sioux City, IA             1,200      1,200
 Meats
27 Spectrum       Mount Morris, IL           1,150      1,150
 Meats
28 Tri-Eagle      Mentone, IN                1,100    81,1000
 Provision (Vin-
 Lee-Ron)
   Swaggerty      Kodak, TN                  88500      1,100        250
 Sausage Co
30 Bob Evans      Xenia, OH                  1,000      1,000
 Farms
31 Jim's Farm     Atwater, CA                 8850       8500
 Meats
32 Olson Meat     Orland, CA                   800        800
 Company
33 Peoria         Chicago, IL                  800      88000
 Packing
34 Calihan        Peoria, IL                   750        750
 Packing Company
35 Independent    Twin Falls, ID               730        730
 Meats
36 Martin's Pork  Falcon, NC               81,3000        650      (650)
 Products
37 F.B. Purnell   Simsonville, KY            85000        500
 Sausage
   Masami Meat    Klammath Falls, OR         85000        500
 Company
   Dekalb County  De Kalb, IL                  500        500
 Packing Company
40 Pioneer        Bowling Green, OH            450       450
 Packing Company
41 Williams       Union City, KY               400        400
 Sausage Co.
42 Carleton       Carleton, OR               83750        375
 Packing Company
43 Parks Family   Warsaw, NC                   350        350
 Meats
44 Morris Meat    Morris, IL                   300        300
 Packing
   Wampler's      Lenoir City, TN            83000        300
 Sausage
   Dean Sausage   Atalla, AL                   300      83000
47 Dealaman       Warren, NJ                   200      82000
 Eterprises,
 Inc.
48 Gunnoe         Goode, VA                     90         90
 Sausage
   Dayton Meat    Dayton, OR                   200         --      (200)
 Co.
Other plant not                              3,600      3,600
 [listed]
                                        --------------------------------
  Total Daily                              510,070    512,370      2,300
   Capacity
  Weekly                                 2,754,378  2,766,798    12,420
   Capacity @
   5.4 days per
   week
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Italic] numbers denote sow/boar plants or primarily sow/boar plants.
[8Shading0] indicate no response to 2020 survey.
Daily slaughter capacity of U.S. pork packing plants (Source: National
  Hog Farmer).

    This shift increased the concentration of ownership in U.S. pork 
packing. The four-firm concentration ratio (CR-4) of the U.S. industry 
grew from roughly 44 percent in 1995 to just over 70 percent in 2016. 
There is no critical value for CR-4, but 70 percent is normally 
considered high concentration.
    The Department of Justice (DOJ) uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
as its critical measure of concentration, especially in evaluating 
proposed mergers. The HHI is simply the sum of the squared value of all 
companies' market shares. A sector with four firms whose market shares 
are 30, 30, 20 and 20 would have a HHI of (30  30) + (30  30) + (20  
20) + (20  20) = 2,600.
    DOJ considers sectors with an HHI of 1,500 or below to be 
competitive. Any merger that leaves an industry's HHI below 1,500 will 
not likely be challenged. An HHI of 1,500 to 2,500 is considered 
moderately concentrated, and mergers in this range that change HHI by 
100 or more points will receive added scrutiny from DOJ. An industry 
with HHI greater than 2,500 is considered highly concentrated, and any 
merger that increases the HHI by 200 points or more will be presumed to 
enhance market power. DOJ does not specify actions it will take, but 
higher scrutiny is understood to mean the chance of challenging the 
merger increases.
    The pork packing sector generally has remained under the 
competitive market threshold of HHI 1,500. It did rise above that level 
in 2016 following the purchase of Cargill's pork operations by JBS. 
Based on daily slaughter capacity, the sector's HHI in 2016 was about 
1,538. DOJ uses actual market shares of hog slaughter, not capacity, to 
compute its official HHI figures.
    The opening of new packing plants in Sioux City, Iowa, and 
Coldwater, Mich., in 2017 and in Wright County, Iowa, and Luverne, 
Minn., in 2019 and 2020, respectively, reduced the sector's CR-4 and 
HHI significantly. These plants were built with hog producers' 
involvement and investments and represent vertical integration 
downstream through packing and processing by producers. Using packing 
capacity data, the 2020 CR-4 is 64, while the HHI is 1,345, indicating 
a structure more conducive to competition in the U.S. pork packing 
sector.
Raising, Selling, and Buying Hogs
    The markets for pork and hogs are national in that prices for hogs, 
whether sold by producers to packers live or in carcass form and pork 
cuts are determined primarily in the Corn Belt where the vast majority 
of hogs are raised, slaughtered and processed into pork. Prices in 
other production regions are based on these Midwestern prices, 
generally differing by the amount of transportation costs, just as 
economic theory predicts. Prices in regions with smaller hog numbers 
also may be affected by factors other than transportation costs since 
they are far more dependent on local demand conditions.
    Pigs are produced in a variety of ways in the United States. Some 
are still produced on diversified farms that involve multiple 
enterprises, while others are produced by specialized companies in 
specialized facilities. Some are produced outdoors in either pasture or 
woodlands, while others spend their entire lives indoors in climate-
controlled buildings. Some pigs are from genetic lines known for 
superior meat qualities that provide superior flavor, marbling or other 
characteristics determined in white tablecloth restaurants, while 
others are from lines designed to produce lean pork that meets the 
preferences of today's health-conscious consumer.
    Virtually all U.S. pigs are fed diets based on corn and soybean 
meal though some regions use other ingredients such as milo, barley and 
peas as well as byproducts from ethanol plants, bakeries, cereal makers 
and others. There is no right or wrong way to raise a hog--just better 
or worse ways depending on the local climate, available feedstuffs and 
specific end uses.
    The entities that produce hogs vary as much as the hogs themselves. 
These range from 4-H and Future Farmers of America (FFA) projects that 
involve only a few purchased feeder pigs each year to regionally 
diverse divisions of large production companies. There are sole 
proprietorships, partnerships, corporations of every type and limited 
liability companies. Most hog operations--even large ones--are owned 
and operated by individual families and usually involve several members 
of those families. Such family operations are typically full-time, 
commercial-scale hog producers.
    During the past 30 years, the industry has moved from hundreds of 
thousands of small operations that sold pigs by the pickup or trailer 
load through auction barns and buying stations to far fewer operations 
that sell pigs by the semi-trailer load directly to packers. That move 
led to new business practices in the pork industry. Contract 
production, open market operations and vertically owned enterprises are 
business choices that depend on factors such as transaction costs, 
risks and uncertainty in markets. No single solution is optimal for all 
circumstances. Today's demands for higher quality and verified 
production practices require improved information throughout the supply 
chain. Contracts provide the ability to create, control and communicate 
that information.
Production Contracts
    The 1980s saw the advent of contract production where the owner of 
pigs would contract with others to provide buildings, labor, utilities 
and waste management for a fee. Contract grower-finish facilities were 
the most common, but contract nurseries and breeding-gestation-
farrowing units also were used.
    The use of production contracts accomplishes several important 
goals for hog producers. First, they allow a hog producer to expand 
rapidly because the owner does not have to raise the capital to 
construct all the needed buildings. Contracts allows those facilities 
to be built with the contract grower's capital and credit and to be 
placed on the contract grower's balance sheet. The trade-off, of 
course, is that the contract grower can build equity in barns, feeders, 
hog sorters and other production facilities, with a useful life that in 
many cases goes well beyond the terms of the initial contract and 
indebtedness.
    Second, contracts allow swine production operations to be 
geographically dispersed, reducing the risk of loss that would exist if 
all animals were on one site and placing valuable waste nutrients 
(manure) near growing crops. Dispersion of facilities helps swine 
producers address potential risks such as disease and casualties from 
weather or fire. Having nutrients as fertilizer near their point of use 
reduces transportation costs and risks as well.
    Third, the growth of swine production contracts coincided with the 
development of separate-site swine production systems that segregated 
pigs of differing ages to control disease, increase pig health and 
enhance production efficiencies. Production contracts facilitated the 
widespread adoption of these systems by giving pig owners access to 
land in different areas. The benefits have been tremendous and have 
resulted in healthier animals, lower-cost production, higher output, 
more affordable pork products for U.S. and foreign consumers and ready 
access to organic fertilizers that many crop farmers use.
    Finally, production contracts allow thousands of rural residents to 
remain on family farms, making a full-time living in agriculture. 
Production contracts provide repayment assurance for bankers and, in 
turn, allow growers to finance, upgrade and modernize buildings. They 
provide steady sources of income without the grower having to face 
output or market risk. Once paid off (usually in 8 to 12 years), 
contract buildings provide substantial cash flow that can be used to 
replace or expand facilities. Many growers eventually become 
independent hog producers thanks to the opportunity provided by a 
production contract.
    Contract hog production payments were initially made on a per-head 
basis, with premiums paid for superior performance such as low death 
loss, low feed conversion rate and more pigs per sow per year. However, 
these types of payments do not perform well if weather conditions are 
bad or a disease challenge is encountered. In addition, early marketing 
or delayed pig deliveries meant growers were without pigs--and thus 
without payments--for periods of time, a situation that obviously 
reduced their incomes and ability to repay loans.
    Other payment systems were tried, but the industry finally adopted, 
in general, a system that pays growers a fixed amount per animal space 
per year with, in many but not all cases, premiums for performance that 
exceeds pre-specified levels. Hypothetically, the owner of a 1,000 head 
finishing barn may receive $36 per pig space per year (i.e., $36,000 
annually). In addition, the swine production contract grower may 
receive a premium if the feed conversion rate is less than, say, 2.9 
lbs. of feed per pound of gain or if death losses are, perhaps, less 
than 2.4 percent of delivered pigs. This payment system guarantees a 
minimum income level to growers, provides incentives to improve 
performance and, thus, profitability for pig owners and allows owners 
flexibility in the timing of placing and marketing pigs without 
imposing a consequence on the grower. The system has worked very well 
for swine contractors and swine production contract growers.
Marketing Agreements
    The other business practice that developed over the past 30 years 
is the use of marketing agreements to transfer ownership of pigs from 
producers to packers. Marketing agreements, like production contracts, 
have evolved over time to meet the needs of packers and producers.
    Early marketing agreements were offered by packers as a way of 
securing leaner hogs that would yield higher proportions of saleable 
cuts. In the 1980s and 1990s, the U.S. hog populations contained a 
large number of animals with too much fat and not enough lean muscle. 
As consumers began demanding lean pork products, packers identified 
producers who had lean, good cutting hogs and offered them a premium if 
they would make a long-term (as much as 5 to 7 years in some cases) 
commitment to sell to that packer. An additional benefit is assurance 
of throughput levels that maximize packing plant efficiencies. This 
allows producer-to-consumer price spreads to be as small as possible, 
keeping producer prices high and/or consumer prices low.
    Another incentive for using marketing contracts--guaranteed and 
timely access by producers to packing capacity--was driven primarily by 
the hog price crash of 1998. In that year, hog supplies increased 
sharply even while packing capacity declined primarily because of the 
bankruptcy of Thorn Apple Valley Packing in Detroit. Timely marketings 
were impossible during November and December of 1998, and prices fell 
to record lows. The inability to sell hogs on a timely basis drove many 
producers and their lenders to enter into marketing agreements to 
guarantee access to packing capacity, or ``shackle space'' at a packer. 
Few producers or lenders wanted to take the risk of lacking a market 
for their pigs, even over a very short period of time. Most shackle 
space contracts have prices tied by formulas directly to the spot or 
negotiated market and thus have no risk-mitigating characteristics--the 
price may be $1 or $2 higher than the spot price in return for a long-
term supply commitment, but the variance (i.e., the risk) of the 
formula price will be the same as the variance of the spot price. 
Producers who use these kinds of contracts to guarantee shackle space 
can (and many do) use futures, options and cash contracts with 
packers--the same tools used by producers selling on the spot/
negotiated market--to manage risk.
    Some marketing agreements, though, have price-stabilizing or risk-
mitigating components. Most of these do not attempt to raise or lower 
long-run prices as much as they try to reduce price variation, 
preventing steep downturns in revenues and helping manage cash flows. 
These contracts stabilize producers' financial performance and thus 
generally enhance their access to capital. In addition, they result in 
a more stable supply of hogs for packers.
    There have been attempts over the years to limit how producers sell 
and packers buy hogs, but such proposals would lead to more volatility 
in the market, less stability for producers and packers and, 
inevitably, to more vertical integration of the pork industry, with 
packers simply owning hogs from birth to slaughter.
Market Drivers and Dynamics for Pork and Hogs
    Prices of pork products and hogs depend, quite logically, on the 
supply of hogs and the demand for pork. Note that this statement 
involves two different but related products: pigs and pork.
    Pork demand is not simply per capita consumption. It is the 
quantities of pork that consumers are willing and able to buy at 
alternative prices. It is not a quantity but a set of price-quantity 
pairs. Prices and quantities are, logically, negatively related: 
Consumers will buy less pork at higher prices and more pork at lower 
prices.
    Since price and quantity are negatively related, one way to 
characterize the condition of pork demand is to observe the product of 
the two--total expenditures. Real per capita expenditures (RCPE) for 
pork is simply the product of the real (i.e., deflated) price of pork 
and per capita consumption in retail weight. The relative magnitude of 
price and quantity changes determine the change in RPCE. Monthly RPCE 
since 1991 appears in Figure 5. Note the large disruptions in consumer-
level pork demand in 2020 because of supply chain disruptions caused by 
COVID-19.
Figure 5
Real Per Capita Expenditures--Pork

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Kerns & Associates using data from USDA ERS, NASS and 
        FAS.

    The demand for pork is determined by consumer tastes and 
preferences, consumer incomes and prices of substitute goods (primarily 
beef, chicken and turkey). Changes in any of these variables will 
change the price-quantity pairs thus ``shifting'' demand.
    The demand for pork at the wholesale level and demand for hogs at 
the farm gate are ``derived'' from consumer demand by deducting costs 
and profits of intermediary firms from the prices consumers are willing 
to pay. This process results in sets of price-quantity pairs at the 
wholesale and hog levels that correspond to consumer-level price-
quantity pairs.
    Just as consumer-level pork demand is the ``source'' of demand for 
wholesale pork and hogs, the farm-level supply of hogs is the source 
for the wholesale and consumer-level supplies of pork. And just as 
demand is not a quantity but a set of price-quantity pairs, so is hog 
supply a set of price-quantity pairs that represent the number of hogs 
producers are willing and able to supply to the market at alternative 
prices.
    The supply of hogs is determined by the cost of inputs, production 
technology and expectations for profits. All of these are, importantly, 
somewhat a function of time, and they influence hog supply over 
relatively long periods.
    Producers cannot quickly change the number of hogs they produce. 
Decisions to change output levels can be made relatively quickly, but 
the actual reduction of hog numbers will take 10 to 12 months with the 
gestation period of a sow being roughly 4 months and pigs taking 5.5 to 
7 months to reach market weight. Expansion decisions take longer to 
execute than do reduction decisions as, in most cases, production 
facilities must be built. Expansion decisions have a 20 to 30-year 
impact on hog supplies since facilities placed into production will 
likely remain in production even if the original owner fails.
    To hog supply, the costs of harvesting, processing, transporting, 
and packaging pork and required profit margins are added to determine 
sets of price-quantity pairs that represent the amounts packers are 
willing and able to offer to wholesale pork buyers (further processors, 
retail stores, restaurants, etc.) at various wholesale prices. Costs of 
retailing and foodservice preparation and required profits of those 
establishments are then added to wholesale values to determine a set of 
price-quantity pairs that retailers/restaurants are willing and able to 
offer at alternative prices to consumers.
    The only remaining market factor is export demand. Over the last 
decade, the United States is the largest single pork exporting country 
in the world. The EU is the largest exporting entity. U.S. pork exports 
accounted for just over 27 percent of total carcass weight production 
in 2020. The value of U.S. pork and pork variety meat exports in 2020 
accounted for $56 per hog.
    Export customers in essence compete with domestic retail and 
foodservice businesses to buy wholesale pork. So, export demand impacts 
the hog-pork economy at the wholesale level. Portions of observed 
wholesale pork and farm-level hog demand are derived from export 
wholesale demand.
    This entire process provides supply and demand relationships at the 
farm, wholesale and consumer levels that simultaneously determine the 
quantities of hogs and pork produced and the prices at which those 
products trade at the farm, wholesale and consumer levels.
Price Discovery
    No single entity or group of entities ``sets'' the price for pork 
and hogs in the United States. Prices are determined by the supply and 
demand relationships described above on a daily basis and are 
``discovered'' by the interaction of buyers and sellers at all levels 
of the hog-pork economy. No entity knows the precise status of supplies 
or demands at the various market levels. Interaction and negotiation 
determine quantities traded and the prices of those trades from the 
various levels of uncertainty, therefore there can be different prices 
paid for hog or any wholesale cut on any given day.
    The quantity of hogs supplied to the market is the result of 
breeding decisions made almost a year before the pigs reach market 
weight. Therefore, the short-run supply of hogs tends to be inelastic, 
meaning that the quantity can change very little regardless of the 
price of hogs. In addition, consumer-level pork demand--and thus 
wholesale pork demand and hog demand--are by nature inelastic, meaning 
that any change in the quantity offered for sale will cause a larger 
price change in percentage terms in the opposite direction. So, when 
the supply curve increases (shifts to the right), prices fall by a 
greater percentage than quantity increases and producers' total 
revenues decline. When the supply curve decreases (shifts left) the 
opposite occurs.
    Clearly, the inelastic nature of hog demand allows producer revenue 
to increase when the quantity supplied is restricted. This is not 
unique to pig production, and the revenue-inelasticity relationship is 
a primary reason for antitrust laws. Without legal prohibitions, 
sellers can collude to restrict supplies and the resulting price 
increase will lead to higher revenues.
    Prices in the hog-pork complex are most clearly discovered at the 
wholesale level. It is here that the demands of domestic retailers and 
foodservice companies as well as export customers interact with the 
supply functions for wholesale pork cuts. This interaction produces 
individual cut prices that determine the cutout value of a pork 
carcass. Cutout value is the sum of the prices of the various wholesale 
cuts multiplied by the percentage of the carcass they represent.
    Hog prices are directly derived from the cutout value. As the 
cutout value rises, packers can (and usually do) pay more for hogs. As 
cutout falls, hog bids usually fall commensurately.
    The relative changes of cutout value and hog price depend largely 
on the bargaining position of producers and packers at any given point 
in time. When hog supplies are ample, packers can push hog values down 
relative to the cutout value. When hog supplies are tight, producers 
can command a higher proportion of the cutout value for their animals.
    The prices paid for hogs are derived in several fashions. Some are 
negotiated each day by hog sellers and packer buyers. Some are 
established by formulas that make various adjustments to negotiated 
prices, futures market prices or some other market price. Others are 
arrived at based on producers' cost of production.
    Pork plants that process 100,000 market hogs or more during a year 
are required by the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 to report 
a variety of information to USDA's Agriculture Marketing Service each 
day. Among these variables are the price, number, weight and carcass 
characteristics of pigs purchased and slaughtered. Companies that 
slaughter 100,000 sows/boars per year are required to report similar 
information on their purchases of cull sows and boars each day.
    Prices paid for barrows and gilts are the result of several pricing 
mechanisms. The ones included in mandatory price reporting reports are:

  1.  Negotiated Prices--The result of buyer-seller interaction that 
            results in agreement on a base price and a day of delivery. 
            This is the ``spot'' market for pigs, and the number of 
            pigs sold in this market has declined steadily. The number 
            and percentage of pigs traded on negotiated prices reached 
            all-time lows in 2020.

  2.  Swine or Pork Market Formula--Prices are based on a price from a 
            hog or pork market. Negotiated prices are frequently the 
            base market for formula-priced hogs, with actual prices 
            normally including an ``add-on'' from that base. Western 
            Corn Belt plus $2/cwt., for example. A growing portion of 
            this price category is based on a pork market, primarily 
            USDA's estimated pork cutout value. Cutout formulas usually 
            include a percentage (e.g., 90 percent of the cutout) or a 
            fixed adjustment (cutout value less $10). Some hogs are 
            priced using a combination of hog and pork markets.

  3.  Other Market Formula--Prices are based on Lean Hogs futures and 
            options.

  4.  Other Purchase Arrangement--Prices that do not fit neatly into 
            the other categories. This classification generally 
            includes hog prices that have some limitations (window 
            contracts, price floors, etc.), are based on a market other 
            than futures or hogs/pork (e.g., cost of production, corn/
            soybean meal prices, etc.) or involve non-carcass merit 
            premiums (e.g., pen gestation, the absence of antibiotics, 
            specific breed(s), free-range, etc.).

    The proportion of hogs priced by these alternative methods has 
changed over time. (See Figure 6). Some important points to note are:

  1.  The share of hogs for which prices are negotiated has been 
            falling for many years but has reached crucially low levels 
            recently. There is no ``right percentage'' for negotiated 
            animals, but the chances of a mismatch between the number 
            of ``open market'' (i.e., non-committed) hogs supplied by 
            producers and demanded by packers increases as the number 
            of these hogs falls. Two extra loads are less critical when 
            ten percent of hogs are negotiated than they would be when 
            one percent is negotiated.

  2.  Packer ownership of hogs continues to grow, but the primary 
            driver of growth since 2016 has been the opening of three 
            large, modern plants either entirely or partially owned by 
            producers. Because of this ownership, those producers' 
            animals moved from another pricing mechanism to ``packer-
            owned.'' These changes are also the driver in the changes 
            in Packer-Sold pig shares in 2017 and 2019. Packer-sold 
            pigs are pigs raised by packers that are, generally, not in 
            good geographic locations to be processed in the packers' 
            own plants. The 2020 spike was due to COVID-19 disruptions.

  3.  Changes in USDA Agricultural Marketing Service definitions caused 
            some major shifts among pricing categories in 2016. AMS 
            does not do this often, but it does have an impact on the 
            data when it does.
Figure 6
PCT of Hogs Purchased by Pricing Method, Weekly

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          USDA-AMS.

    Of primary concern to producers are the changes in price levels 
that have resulted from these long-term shifts in how hog prices are 
set. Figure 7 shows the weekly average prices of the four reporting 
categories for producer-sold hogs--i.e., hogs sold by independent 
producers to packers. Noteworthy features of Figure 7 are:

  1.  While Other Market Formula (Futures-tied) prices and Other 
            Purchase Arrangement (the catch-all category) prices move 
            generally with the market, they almost always will deviate 
            to some degree. The reason is that OMF prices are based on 
            futures prices at the time an agreement is made between the 
            producer and the packer but are reported only when those 
            animals are harvested. Therefore, the reported price might 
            differ substantially from the market price on the day of 
            sale or slaughter. OPA prices differ because some of the 
            price mechanisms are based on other markets (corn and 
            soybean meal, for instance), and some non-carcass premiums 
            (pen gestation, Berkshire genetics, for instance) can be 
            large.

  2.  Swine or Pork Market Formula and Negotiated Prices were very 
            close to each other until 2016 because: a) almost all Swine 
            or Pork Market Formula prices were based on negotiated 
            prices; and b) hog supplies were generally below packing 
            capacity.

  3.  Swine or Pork Market Formula and Negotiated Prices began to 
            diverge in 2016 and have been vastly different from mid-
            2019 until March 2021. There are two reasons for this 
            divergence.

      a.  Over roughly the past 5 years, more and more swine or pork 
            market 
                formulas have been based on pork prices, primarily 
            USDA's estimated 
                cutout value. That value is almost always more stable 
            than hog prices as 
                wholesale demand is more elastic than is hog demand. 
            This is one of the 
                attractive features to producers of tying hog prices to 
            the cutout value. 
                Pricing hogs off that cutout value and including those 
            prices in the Swine 
                or Pork Market Formula keeps the formula price higher 
            when market 
                prices fall. Such had been the case almost exclusively 
            before 2018.

      b.  Hog production has increased to the point where it once again 
            challenged 
                packing capacity in 2019, meaning the price of 
            negotiated pigs could be 
                pushed lower by packers since there were few 
            alternative outlets for 
                these ``extra'' pigs relative to supplies committed to 
            packers through con-
                tracts. This factor became especially large in 2020, 
            when packing plants 
                reduced throughput or even closed because of COVID-19 
            cases among 
                their workers. Plants that stayed open simply could not 
            process all the 
                hogs available, allowing the negotiated price to fall 
            dramatically. Pro-
                ducers had to move hogs regardless of the price that 
            was offered. The 
                price of cutout-based hogs did not fall nearly as far, 
            thus causing the 
                large differential in 2020. It should be noted that the 
            negotiated prices 
                in mid-2020--in the $20s and $30s per cwt.--were 
            actually higher than 
                they could have been based on market conditions. 
            Packers could have 
                dropped prices to practically zero and producers would 
            have had to accept 
                them to prevent being forced to destroy market-ready 
            animals. There 
                was, to anyone's knowledge, no ``collusion'' to keep 
            prices at or above 
                about $30/cwt carcass weight. Packers simply did not 
            lower their bids be-
                yond that point.
Figure 7
Net Market Hog Prices by Pricing Method, Weekly

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          USDA-AMS.

    The decline in the number of hogs for which prices are negotiated 
is the result of several diverse but powerful forces. It is not the 
result of any conspiracy among either producers or packers. Lenders 
prefer their clients to have long-term agreements for selling their 
pigs to guarantee ``shackle space'' or market access. Such contracts 
are frequently required to obtain financing. Producers who sell 
multiple truckloads of hogs per week or even per day prefer not to 
negotiate the price of every load since doing so takes time and, thus, 
money and is stressful. The process is easier and more fruitful when 
pigs are in relatively tight supply but becomes very difficult and 
potentially disastrous when supplies are ample.
    Neither producers nor packers are compensated for negotiating 
(i.e., discovering) prices in the spot market. In fact, producers are 
frequently penalized for negotiating since the price in the spot market 
is, more and more often, lower than prices paid for hogs priced by in 
other manners. Further, neither producers nor packers must pay to use 
these data as the base for other pricing mechanisms. And the use of the 
data by one party in no way diminishes its value in use by another 
party. These are all characteristics of a ``public good'' and give rise 
to a ``tragedy of the commons,'' where the public good is under-
produced and over-used in the presence of strictly market forces.
    Public goods (roads, July 4 fireworks displays, etc.) are usually 
provided by the government since leaving their production up to the 
private sector is bound to fail. But this particular public good can 
only be reported by the government. It cannot be produced by the 
government. Prices must be produced by the parties to the trade, and 
not every producer or every packer is necessarily good at negotiating 
prices. Thus, there is a serious question as to whether forcing 
negotiated transactions through public policy will result in efficient 
and accurate price discovery.
    And there will be other negative impacts. One of the reasons 
producers have longer-term pricing arrangements is that lenders desire 
more certainty about where market hogs will be sold and how they will 
be priced. Many loans for operations and facilities are contingent on a 
producer having a long-term marketing contract that guarantees access 
to packing capacity and specifies how prices will be determined. The 
risk reduction of such agreements is far from trivial so, without them, 
capital availability will become a problem for many pork producers.
Important Markets for U.S. Pork
    While, as noted earlier, pork export markets have grown in 
importance, the U.S. pork industry's ``bread and butter'' remains the 
domestic market, which takes roughly 75 percent of total annual 
production. Figure 8 shows the history of U.S. pork output, total 
consumption, exports and imports. Export growth has used 63 percent of 
the growth in output since 1994. Domestic consumption has used the 
remainder of that growth. Imports have been quite steady since the mid-
90s.
Figure 8
U.S. Pork Production, Consumption, Exports and Imports

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Livestock Marketing Information Center; Data from 
        USDA NASS and ERS.

    Domestic consumption has grown at roughly the rate of population 
growth, resulting in relatively steady U.S. per capita pork consumption 
(see Figure 9.) In fact, except for the 4 years from 2011 through 2014, 
U.S. per capita pork consumption has been between 47.8 and 52.7 pounds 
in every year since 1982. The low levels of 2011 through 2014 were 
caused, first, by higher production costs driven by the diversion of 
corn to ethanol production to fulfill Federal mandates, then by high 
corn and soybean prices because of the 2012 drought and finally, by the 
loss of six to eight million pigs in 2013 and 2014 due to the Porcine 
Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDv).
Figure 9
U.S. Pork Consumption, Per Capita

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Livestock Marketing Information Center; Data from 
        USDA NASS.

    Steady pork consumption, however, does not mean steady pork demand. 
The price consumers are willing and able to pay is an additional aspect 
of demand, and the combination of steady consumption and higher real 
(deflated) pork prices mean that pork demand has increased nicely since 
2009. Real per capita expenditures for pork, a proxy for the condition 
of pork demand, has increased by nearly 19 percent since its 2009 
nadir. The increase is the result of positive changes in consumers' 
preferences for pork (driven at least in part by pork's stellar record 
of food safety and improvements in the pork products offered to 
consumers), the relative prices of pork, beef and chicken and growth in 
consumer incomes.
Pork Exports
    The U.S. pork industry exported a record 7.225 billion pounds 
(carcass weight equivalent) of pork products in 2020. That quantity 
represented 25.5 percent of total U.S. output. In value terms, the U.S. 
exported $7.7 billion of pork and pork products, representing 38.5 
percent of the $20 billion of hogs sold last year.
    Over the past 10 years, the United States, on average, has been the 
top exporter of pork in the world; it is the globe's lowest-cost 
producer of pork. In any given year, the U.S. pork industry ships 
product to more than 100 countries.
    Since the U.S. pork industry first became a net exporter in 1995, 
pork has been a consistent contributor to the balance of trade of the 
United States. Top U.S. markets historically have been, in order, 
Japan, Mexico and Canada. South Korea joined that top echelon in 2011, 
and China, which had been an intermittent market for U.S. pork, was the 
top destination for U.S. pork in 2020. Forecasters expect Mexico to 
return to the top spot in 2021. (See Figure 10.)
Figure 10
U.S. Pork Exports by Destination, USDA-ERS Monthly

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Top export markets for U.S. pork, monthly (Source: Kerns & 
        Associates).
North American Pork Market
    Policies that foster the free flow of goods and expand export 
markets--mostly through trade agreements--are critical to the continued 
success of America's pork producers, U.S. agriculture and the overall 
American economy.
    Proof of that can be seen in the robust trade among the United 
States, Canada and Mexico under the 1994 North American Free Trade 
Agreement and now, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which 
updated the 25 year old NAFTA. In fact, Canada and Mexico are the top 
two destinations for U.S. goods and services, accounting for more than 
\1/3\ of total U.S. exports and supporting 14 million American jobs. 
Those jobs produce the nearly $1.4 billion of goods that are shipped to 
Canada and Mexico daily.
    While trade between the United States and Canada has been strong 
since before the countries signed their free trade agreement in early 
1988, trade between the United States and Mexico before NAFTA was 
somewhat anemic, totaling only $50 billion each way in 1993. Today, 
U.S. exports to Mexico are valued at $213 billion and support five 
million U.S. jobs. U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico have grown 
nearly 400 percent since NAFTA was implemented.
    Mexico and Canada were the No. 2 and No. 4 export markets, 
respectively, for the U.S. pork industry in 2020. From 1993, the year 
before NAFTA was implemented, to 2020, U.S. pork exports to Mexico 
increased 16-fold, from just 98 million pounds to almost 2.1 billion 
pounds, and exports to Canada went from 36.4 million pounds to nearly 
500 million pounds. Both NAFTA partners export some pork products to 
the United States.
    Indeed, the pork industries in all three countries have become 
integrated to a large degree. Canadian hog farmers in 2020, for 
example, sold about 4.4 million feeder pigs--ones 3-8 weeks old, 
weighing from 12 to 60 pounds--to U.S. pork producers mostly in the 
upper Midwest who raised them to slaughter weight. Canada also ships 
about 800,000 hogs a year directly for slaughter in U.S. packing 
plants.
    The United States is Canada's most important market for livestock 
and meat exports, and the two countries have developed a symbiotic 
relationship with regard to pork production: Canada has cooler summer 
temperatures that reduce seasonal infertility in its breeding animals, 
modern breeding, gestation and farrowing facilities and the sows to 
populate them and--because of the weak dollar--less expensive labor; 
and the United States provides large, efficient packing plants, cheap 
feed, finishing space and the millions of acres of row crop fields--
where corn and soybeans are grown (the feed)--on which to apply the 
highly-valued manure produced by hogs.
    The interdependence of the North American pork market is further 
illustrated by the growth of the Mexican pork industry since NAFTA went 
into effect and U.S. pork exports to Mexico began increasing. Estimates 
are that from 1995 to 2020 pork production in Mexico increased by 60 
percent. That rise was the result of the eradication of some diseases, 
improvements in disease prevention, growth in slaughter and processing 
plants as well as by a significant increase in consumer demand. It also 
prompted Mexico to start exporting pork. The resulting increase in 
demand for Mexican pork have led to even more imports of U.S. pork 
(it's more economical for Mexico to export high-value cuts to Japan, 
for example, and import lower-value cuts from the United States.)
    Further, Mexico's pork exports needed to come from packing 
facilities that met international standards, so starting in the early 
2000s, the country's government encouraged development of more 
federally inspected plants. A significant portion of those facilities, 
however, were underutilized. Mexico first filled the excess shackle 
space by importing live hogs from the United States. More recently it 
has been relying on increased production (more hogs) from its own 
producers, which has required importation of breeding stock--about 
30,000 gilts annually--from the United States.
    Nearly all of the pork market integration among the United States, 
Canada and Mexico took place under NAFTA, which set a zero-tariff rate 
for pork traded in North America.
Pork vs. Beef vs. Chicken: A Comparison
    In most developed economies, individuals consume meat as their 
primary source of dietary protein. In the United States and in most 
countries, three fundamental meat commodities form the cornerstone of 
individual diets: pork, beef, and chicken. Lesser roles in the typical 
American diet are claimed by fish, lamb, turkey, and other specialty 
meats. Although these different meats are sometimes assumed to be near-
perfect dietary substitutes, the individual meat commodities are highly 
differentiated. This is true across the different meat commodities but 
also within a single type of meat, where qualities and cuts are highly 
heterogeneous. In addition to the fact that individual meats have 
numerous quality attributes that affect consumption, the animal 
industries that are the sources of the meats are very different.
    Production and marketing practices for pork, beef and chicken 
differ substantially, as do the geographic patterns of production. 
Figures 11 through 13 illustrate the geographic distribution of pork, 
poultry and beef cattle producers as of the third quarter of 2020 and 
the distribution of hogs, broilers and beef cattle as determined by the 
2017 Agricultural Census.
    Beef cattle are produced in nearly every state, with counties in 
the Great Plains and Western United States having large numbers of beef 
cattle operations. In contrast, while hogs are distributed in the wide 
regions mentioned earlier, major concentrations exist in Eastern North 
Carolina and the Corn Belt. Poultry production also is geographically 
concentrated, with operations mostly in the Southern United States and 
the Delta region.
Figure 11
Number of Hog and Pig Production Establishments: 3rd Quarter of 2020 
        NAICS 1122
        
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Number of Beef Cattle Ranching, Farming, and Feedlot Establishments: 
        3rd Quarter of 2020 NAICS 1121
        
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Number of Broilers and Chicken Meat Production Establishments: 3rd 
        Quarter of 2020 NAICS 11232
        
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure 12
Hogs and Pigs--Inventory: 2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          2017 Census of Agriculture.
          17-M211. U.S. Department of Agriculture, National 
        Agricultural Statistics Service.
Cattle and Calves--Inventory: 2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          2017 Census of Agriculture.
          17-M208. U.S. Department of Agriculture, National 
        Agricultural Statistics Service.
Number of Broilers and Other Meat-Type Chickens Sold: 2017

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          2017 Census of Agriculture.
          17-M213. U.S. Department of Agriculture, National 
        Agricultural Statistics Service.

    Substantial differences also exist in the production and marketing 
of each of these three meat commodities. Contracts are an increasingly 
important aspect of agricultural production and marketing. In general 
terms, they are agreements reached before harvest or before the end of 
a production cycle for livestock and specify quality attributes and a 
compensation mechanism. Contracts generally are separated into 
marketing and production contracts.
    As described in the previous section on hog sales, marketing 
contracts specify the terms of exchange for a commodity between a buyer 
and seller. Marketing contracts differ significantly from production 
contracts in that they usually do not dictate the method or means of 
production. In contrast, production contracts often include specific 
grower responsibilities for inputs, the means and methods of 
production, and the desired product qualities. The use of production 
contracts has expanded considerably in recent years (see Figure 13.) 
Over 90 percent of poultry production now involves a production 
contract, and more than 60 percent of hogs are now grown and marketed 
under production contracts. The use of production contracts also is 
growing significantly for beef cattle, with over 30 percent of 
production now under contracts.
Figure 13
Value of Production under Contract (percent)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


          Source: USDA Economic Research Service.

    Significant differences exist in the way growers are compensated by 
contractors (or, in some areas, integrators). The poultry industry uses 
a tournament system, whereby compensation is determined by a grower's 
relative performance compared to a group of similarly situated growers. 
A grower who uses less feed per pound of meat produced, for example, 
will receive a bonus, while growers on the other end of the efficiency 
ranking are penalized. The integration of input and output markets by 
processors is also frequently an attribute of production contracts. The 
agents involved in the supply of inputs and the coordination of 
production and marketing are often termed ``integrators,'' reflecting 
the vertically integrated nature of their operations. Integrators 
usually pay contract fees to the growers and supply feed, veterinary 
services, technical assistance, and transportation services.
    In contrast to the tournament system, pork producers usually 
contract with integrators to supply the production facilities, labor, 
utilities, insurance, and manure management, while the integrators 
supply the breeding stock, feed, veterinary services, transportation 
and a prescribed system of production and management. Ownership of the 
hogs typically stays with the integrator, and growers usually receive 
compensation on a per-pig or per-pig-space basis. Performance bonuses 
may also be paid for low mortality, morbidity, and feed efficiency.
    Production contracts provide an important mechanism for the sharing 
of risk between producers and processors/integrators. The processor may 
assume most or all the price risk, both for inputs and outputs. The 
costs of production facilities, which are substantial, generally are 
amortized over the lifetime of the assets. Long-term loans are often an 
important feature of hog production. Tournament contracts, such as 
those commonly used for broilers, may introduce an element of risk in 
that growers may be rewarded or penalized for stochastic production 
factors (foreseeable but random production issues such as diseases). A 
major source of risk for those who have invested in production 
facilities involves the potential of losing the processor or 
integrator.
    Limited competition among processors is also often noted as a 
factor that may impact compensation for growers.
    Significant differences also exist on the consumer side of the 
market. The last several years have seen some significant changes in 
meat consumption patterns in the United States, with chicken 
consumption steadily rising and beef consumption falling. Pork 
consumption has remained relatively steady. (See Figure 14.) The 
influence of seasonality is apparent in the data, though seasonal 
fluctuations have become muted, especially for turkey.
Figure 14
Quarterly Meat Consumption (lbs/capita)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Consumption patterns for meat often reflect ethnic influences, and 
as the ethnic makeup of the United States has changed over time, so has 
consumption of different meat commodities (figure 15 illustrates 
differences in consumption patterns for beef, pork, and chicken across 
Hispanic, non-Hispanic whites, and Blacks in the United States.) Strong 
ethnic patterns emerge, with beef and pork consumption being highest 
among Hispanic consumers, while black consumers have the highest 
chicken expenditures.
Figure 15
Beef Expenditures
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Pork Expenditures
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Chicken Expenditures
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure 
        Survey.

    We used the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model of consumer 
demand to consider meat demand elasticities.\1\ The model was estimated 
using quarterly price and consumption data drawn from USDA sources.\2\ 
The results show that demand conditions vary significantly across 
different meats. (See the uncompensated price and expenditure 
elasticities in Table 1.) Elasticities are the primary metric used by 
economists to quantify consumer demand relationships. The elasticity 
coefficient indicates the percentage change in consumption triggered by 
a given percentage change in price or expenditures. Beef is price 
inelastic, while pork and chicken are price elastic, with chicken 
having a very elastic response to price changes. Expenditure 
elasticities also differ across the different commodities. The 
implication is that consumers respond to changes in meat prices and 
expenditures quite differently for the different meat products. Pork 
demand is considerably more elastic than beef demand, suggesting that 
pork consumers are more sensitive to price changes. Chicken price 
changes have a significant effect on chicken consumption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Parameter estimates are presented in an appendix.
    \2\ Data, programming code, and estimation results are available 
from the authors on request.

                                     Table 1. AIDS Meat Demand Elasticities
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                Price
     Quantity      ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Beef               Pork             Chicken            Turkey          Expenditures
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Beef             ^0.8722            ^0.3773             0.3011             0.0189            0.9294
          Pork             ^0.5830            ^1.2479             0.9728             0.1071            0.7511
       Chicken              0.3959             0.9046            ^2.3613            ^0.2778            1.3385
        Turkey             ^0.0147             0.4872            ^1.6752            ^0.2104            1.4132
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                              Attachment 3
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

The Role of State-inspected Slaughter in the U.S. Pork Supply Chain: 
        Survey and Analysis
June 2021

21-PB 34

Holly Cook,* Master's Student, Department of Economics, Iowa State 
University, [email protected]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Corresponding author.

          Published by the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
        Development, 578 Heady Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 
        50011-1070; Phone: (515) 294-1183; Fax: (515) 294-6336; Web 
        site: www.card.iastate.edu.
          Author(s). The views expressed in this 
        publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center 
        for Agricultural and Rural Development or Iowa State 
        University.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race,
 color, age, ethnicity, religion, national origin, pregnancy, sexual
 orientation, gender identity, genetic information, sex, marital status,
 disability, or status as a U.S. veteran. Inquiries regarding non-
 discrimination policies may be directed to Office of Equal Opportunity,
 3410 Beardshear Hall, 515 Morrill Road, Ames, Iowa, 50011, Tel. (515)
 294-7612, Hotline: (515) 294-1222, email [email protected].
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Executive Summary
    The COVID-19 pandemic and other capacity-restricting events have 
motivated state and Federal Governments to invest over $100 million in 
grants for state-inspected meat processing plants. This paper evaluates 
the role of state-inspected plants in U.S. pork production and analyzes 
survey data from state-inspected plants and officials. The results of 
the survey indicate that most state-inspected plants are ``small'' or 
``very small,'' which is reflected in their production levels. All non-
federally inspected slaughter, which includes both state-inspected and 
custom-exempt processing, accounted for just 0.6 percent of all U.S. 
hog slaughter in 2020 and less than 0.5 percent in top-hog-producing 
states. For the ten states that reported totals, state-inspected hog 
slaughter accounted for about 45 percent of all non-federally inspected 
slaughter and just 0.2 percent of total hog slaughter in 2020. Although 
these plants are small, they were able to increase production and 
provide additional local slaughter capacity during COVID-19 shutdowns. 
From 2019 to 2020, non-federally inspected slaughter totals increased 
by 11.2 percent after years of decline. Over this same period, 47 
state-inspected survey respondents indicated that their annual 
slaughter totals increased by 25.4 percent on average. Funding from the 
CARES Act and other pandemic relief sources likely supported this 
effort.
Table of Contents
Background
Demographic Analysis of State Inspected Slaughter Plants

    The Cooperative Interstate Shipment (CIS) Program

Survey Results and Analysis
Conclusion
References
Appendix A
Appendix B
Background
    In response to disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, state 
and Federal Governments have placed a renewed focus on improving the 
resiliency of the food supply chain. Pandemic-related events led to 
intense supply- and demand-side shocks that resulted in severe 
disruption to all levels of food production in 2020. Due to the unique 
structure of various food supply chains, these shocks impacted each 
industry in different ways. For the U.S. pork industry, the trouble 
began in March 2020 and continued throughout the spring and summer 
months. Stay-at-home orders dramatically impacted the demand for 
specific pork products,\1\ COVID-19 outbreaks caused packing plant 
closures, and a reduction in packing capacity caused bottlenecks at the 
farm level. In worst-case scenarios, pork producers had no choice but 
to euthanize market-ready hogs when no slaughter or processing space 
was available. This sequence of events led many industry experts to 
begin questioning how the resiliency of the U.S. pork supply chain may 
be improved to prevent future disruption (Hayes, et al. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Restaurant closings and a reduction in food service business 
caused the demand and price for pork bellies to fall, but at home 
consumption increased demand for other cuts, i.e., pork loins and 
boneless hams (Hayes, et al. 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One proposed solution to this problem has been to invest in state-
inspected slaughter and processing facilities to increase total packing 
plant capacity and improve accessibility to local processing options. 
State slaughter and processing facilities are typically smaller than 
federally inspected plants, and they are inspected by their respective 
state departments rather than by the USDA. The size, capacity, and 
location of these plants will be further discussed in subsequent 
sections.
    In addition to the pandemic-motivated desire for increased supply-
chain resiliency, support for smaller meat processors has been on the 
rise as concern about concentration in the meatpacking industry grows. 
The Economic Research Service (ERS) reported in 2010 that of the 611 
USDA-certified hog slaughter facilities in the country, 12 plants 
accounted for more than 50 percent of federally inspected hog 
slaughter. The COVID-19 related shutdowns served as a reminder that the 
pork supply chain is dependent on a relatively small number of very 
large-scale slaughter facilities. A U.S. District Court ruling in May 
2021 reinforced this issue by striking down a provision of the USDA's 
New Swine Inspection System (NSIS) that allowed for increased line 
speeds and a more modern pork inspection process. If upheld, this 
ruling will ultimately result in slowed production at six affected 
plants leading to a projected 2.5 percent reduction in overall hog 
slaughter capacity (Hayes 2021). Small hog producers surrounding the 
affected plants will likely face higher transportation costs and lower 
prices received from packers, resulting in a less competitive market 
and increased consolidation within the industry (Hayes 2021). The 
negative industry impacts associated with the NSIS ruling provide 
additional motivation for research into state-inspected slaughter 
facilities and their potential to help make up some of the lost 
capacity.
    The culmination of interest in improving supply chain resiliency 
and increasing pork slaughter capacity has led to numerous legislative 
efforts at the state and Federal level and has helped motivate recent 
USDA funding initiatives. This paper will contribute to the discussion 
by assessing state-inspected slaughter plants and their ability to 
supplement the U.S. pork supply chain. This includes a demographic 
analysis of state-inspected slaughter plants, an evaluation of the 
USDA's Cooperative Interstate Shipment program, and a summary of survey 
data collected from state inspection officials and state-inspected 
plants.
Demographic Analysis of State Inspected Slaughter Plants
    State slaughter and processing facilities are governed and 
inspected by their respective state inspection departments. Each state 
department works in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) to ensure that their food safety protocols are ``at least equal 
to'' those of federally inspected plants (NASDA 2021). The phrase ``at 
least equal to'' means that state-inspection protocols need not be 
identical to Federal procedures in terms of equipment, recordkeeping, 
information systems, etc., but that the state system must be ``at least 
equal'' in terms of upholding food safety and inspection integrity. In 
2006 the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture 
(NASDA) estimated there to be 1,900 state-inspected meat and poultry 
slaughter and processing facilities in the U.S. Currently, 27 states 
operate a state-inspection program, and an estimated 604 establishments 
engage in hog slaughter specifically. Nearly all state-inspected plants 
process multiple species. Figure 1 shows the number and location of 
state-inspected pork slaughter facilities by county. Figure 2 
illustrates the distribution of hog inventories for all counties with 
over 1,000 head in inventories during the 2017 Census of Agriculture.
Figure 1. State-inspected pork slaughter facilities by county.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Establishment directories published by state 
        departments.
Figure 2. Hog inventories by county. 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: 2017 Census of Agriculture, NASS.
          Note: Map includes only counties with inventories greater 
        than 1,000 head.

    Looking at Figures 1 and 2, it is evident that many top-hog-
producing states have a state inspection program. Nearly 90 percent \2\ 
of total U.S. hog slaughter occurs in the 27 states that operate their 
own inspection programs. However, state-inspected slaughter is not 
necessarily giving these states a significant boost in terms of pork 
production. Non-federally inspected (NFI) slaughter is a measure that 
includes state-inspected, custom-exempt,\3\ and on-farm slaughter. In 
the 27 states with a state inspection program, NFI slaughter accounts 
for an average of 22 percent of a state's total slaughter. However, 
among top pork-producing states like Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois, 
Oklahoma, Indiana, and Missouri, NFI slaughter accounts for less than 
0.5 percent of total slaughter on average.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Hog slaughter totals for North Carolina, South Dakota, Kansas, 
and Virginia were not reported in 2020. Total slaughter values for 
these states were approximated using available data and the last 
reported values.
    \3\ Custom exempt slaughter plants are not required to prove 
compliance with state or Federal inspection standards. Meat processed 
at custom-exempt facilities is for private use and cannot be sold 
commercially (Johnson, et al. 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Most state-inspected slaughter facilities would be classified as 
``small'' or ``very small'' by the USDA's Food Safety Inspection 
Service (FSIS). A ``small'' facility employs between 10 and 499 people, 
and ``very small'' facilities have less than ten employees. Figure 3 
shows the distribution of all meat slaughter facilities in the country 
in 2019. This information comes from the U.S. Census Bureau's County 
Business Patterns (CBP) and includes establishments whose primary 
business activity is animal slaughter, classified as NAICS 311611. This 
NAICS coded industry excludes poultry and may also exclude some 
businesses that provide slaughtering services but bring in more revenue 
from their value-added processing activities.
Figure 3. Size distribution of U.S. meat slaughter facilities.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: 2019 County Business Pattern Tables, U.S. Census 
        Bureau.

    The CBP data does not allow state-inspected plants to be 
disaggregated, but FSIS publishes a directory of federally inspected 
establishments and their size classification. Subtracting the Federal 
distribution from the total produces an approximate distribution of 
non-federally inspected slaughter facilities in the U.S. whose primary 
business is animal slaughter rather than processing. Note that the CBP 
data is from 2019 and the FSIS information was generated in May 2021, 
so the total distribution will not equal Federal plus non-Federal 
establishment counts. This is because several new state-inspected 
plants have opened between 2019 and 2021, and information on FSIS 
plants from 2019 was not available. Figure 4 shows that most non-
federally inspected facilities are small or very small.
Figure 4. Size distribution of non-federally inspected U.S. meat 
        slaughter facilities.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: 2019 County Business Pattern Tables, U.S. Census 
        Bureau.

    In terms of production, all of these plants also comprise a small 
percentage of total hog slaughter. Figure 5 shows that since 2010, non-
federally inspected slaughter has accounted for less than one percent 
of total U.S. hog slaughter. Although hog production and commercial 
slaughter totals have been growing, NFI slaughter has seen an overall 
decline in the last decade. From 2010 to 2020, NFI slaughter decreased 
17.4 percent while total U.S. commercial slaughter increased 19.3 
percent. Thus, the percent share of total slaughter comprised by NFI 
plants decreased from 0.86 percent in 2010 to 0.59 percent in 2020.
Figure 5. Non-federally inspected slaughter totals and percent share of 
        total slaughter.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: NASS.
Figure 6. Total vs. Non-Federally Inspected Monthly Slaughter Totals
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: NASS.

    Though the 10 year trend in NFI slaughter is negative, there was an 
increase in NFI slaughter in 2020 that can likely be attributed to 
large packing plant shutdowns brought on by COVID-19. The shutdown and 
slowdown of packing plant operations led to as much as a 45% decline in 
daily U.S. slaughter capacity in the spring of 2020 (Cowley 2020). This 
issue is illustrated in Figure 6, where 2020 NFI slaughter rises well 
above 2019 levels in April and May and remains above 2019 levels until 
the fourth quarter. At its highest point in August 2020, NFI monthly 
slaughter totaled 74,900 hogs which was just 0.67 percent of total 
slaughter.
    As previously mentioned, the measure of non-federally inspected 
slaughter includes state-inspected, custom exempt, and on-farm 
slaughter. State-inspected slaughter numbers are not published by the 
USDA, but many states were willing to share their state-level totals 
for this paper. The available data show that an even smaller proportion 
of total slaughter comes from state-inspected plants than from all NFI 
sources. Table 1 below shows total, NFI, and state-inspected slaughter 
totals in 2020. State-inspected slaughter accounts for 45.0 percent of 
all NFI slaughter and just 0.2 percent of total slaughter in states 
with available data. This indicates that a significant portion of NFI 
slaughter, especially in states like Iowa, must come from custom-exempt 
slaughter for private consumption.

              Table 1. Total, NFI, and State-Inspected Slaughter Totals in 2020 (measured in head)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           State-Inspected    State-Inspected    State-Inspected
       State         Total Slaughter     NFI Slaughter        Slaughter         as % of NFI       as % of Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            IA          40,346,700             36,107              5,199               14.4               0.01
            MN          12,013,700             34,924              8,538               24.4                0.1
            IN           8,641,200             47,648             31,406               65.9                0.4
         MO **           8,632,800             37,566              8,654               23.0                0.1
            WI             865,300             47,118             43,965               93.3                5.1
            SC              93,800             50,018             16,471               32.9               17.6
            WY               4,700                  *                827                  *               17.6
            AZ               1,700                  *              1,265                  *               74.4
            NC                   *                  *             42,249                  *                  *
            VA                   *                  *                196                  *                  *
                   ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Total...........      70,599,900            253,381            158,470               45.0                0.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Indicates state total not reported by NASS in 2020.
** Missouri's state-inspected slaughter total includes all red meat species and likely overstates the state-
  inspected share of total hog slaughter.

    In a survey \4\ conducted with state-inspected slaughter facilities 
in nine top hog-producing states, participants were asked about their 
estimated weekly slaughter capacity and annual hog slaughter totals. 
Note that survey respondents account for about 14 percent of a state's 
total slaughter plants on average. The results of 49 responses are 
displayed in Table 2 below as an average for each survey state.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Survey design and response distributions are detailed in 
Section 3 and Appendix A.

  Table 2. Average Weekly Hog Slaughter Capacity and Average Annual Hog
                            Slaughter Totals
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              Average Weekly          Average Annual
          State                  Capacity          Slaughter (2016-2020)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Illinois                        16                     568
          Indiana                        42                     583
             Iowa                        17                     585
        Minnesota                        29                     862
         Missouri                        17                     675
North Carolina **                      200+                  4,000+
             Ohio                        17                     397
         Oklahoma                         *                       *
        Wisconsin                        19                     523
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* No responses received from state-inspected plants in Oklahoma.
** The sole respondent from North Carolina disclosed weekly but not
  annual slaughter totals. Total was approximated based on total state
  slaughter, number of establishments, and weekly capacity reported by
  the plant.

    While many state-inspected plants run at a very small capacity and 
comprise a minor share of the total pork supply, their potential 
importance to the U.S. pork supply chain was put on display during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. During large plant shutdowns and panic-buying 
behaviors at grocery stores, state-inspected and custom-exempt meat 
processors played an important role in local food supply chains. Pork 
producers relied on local processors to provide a small amount of 
excess slaughter capacity, and pork consumers began sourcing more meat 
products from their local lockers, resulting in an inundation of 
business at these plants. In the previously mentioned survey of 
slaughter establishments in top-hog-producing states, respondents 
reportedly increased their hog slaughter totals by 25.4 percent on 
average from 2019 to 2020. For the ten states that are represented in 
Table 1, the total number of hogs slaughtered at state inspected plants 
increased 31.0 percent from 2019 to 2020.
    The surge of non-federally inspected slaughter in 2020 was made 
possible in part by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security 
(CARES) Act. The CARES Act allocated millions of dollars to states 
which were distributed as grants to small meat processors. In most 
cases, these grants were intended to help small meat processors expand 
their operations and support the increased demand for meat products and 
slaughter capacity (IDALS 2021). As the meatpacking industry continues 
to face capacity issues such as the NSIS ruling and cyber-attacks, 
industry experts and policymakers seem to be increasingly interested in 
supporting state-inspected and custom-exempt meat processors.
The Cooperative Interstate Shipment (CIS) Program
    There are currently many barriers preventing state-inspected plants 
from increasing production to supplement the U.S. pork supply. In 
addition to labor shortages and cost-related inefficiencies, state-
inspected plants are limited to doing business via intrastate commerce, 
meaning they are only permitted to sell and distribute their products 
within the state where the meat originates (NASDA 2021). Because of 
this, state-inspected plants were limited in their ability to supply 
meat products and add inspected slaughter capacity during times of 
crisis in the spring of 2020.
    One way for state-inspected facilities to increase their market 
access is to participate in a USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS) initiative called the Cooperative Interstate Shipment (CIS) 
program. This program was created by a provision in the 2008 Farm Bill 
and was launched in 2012. The CIS program allows state-inspected plants 
to participate in interstate and international commerce, enjoying 
virtually all the same marketing freedoms as federally inspected 
plants. States can become eligible for this program by working with the 
USDA to ensure that they are able to conduct inspections in accordance 
with FSIS standards. This includes using the same information system 
and lab equipment as FSIS. State-inspected facilities that are located 
in a CIS state and have fewer than 25 employees are eligible for the 
program (FSIS 2021). To become certified, a business submits an 
application to the state, receives a visit from state inspectors to 
flag any potential issues, and hosts a visit from Federal inspectors to 
check that all requirements are met. Once approved, CIS participants 
continue working with their state inspection department, but state 
inspectors receive Federal training to ensure that CIS facilities 
continue meeting all FSIS requirements.
    While this program has the potential to help state-inspected plants 
reach new markets, it may not be a universal solution. Depending on how 
closely a state's inspection protocols align with FSIS, the program's 
requirements may make CIS eligibility quite expensive for some state 
departments and unattainable for many state-inspected plants. Small and 
very-small plants with less than 25 employees may not be able to 
justify the capital expenditure required to convert their systems and 
equipment, and slightly larger plants with more business activity 
likely would not qualify for the program. Furthermore, many small 
plants also offer custom-exempt slaughter and may be best suited to 
serve their local communities rather than distribute inspected product. 
The CIS program has been active for nearly 10 years but has just 93 
participants within nine states, including the addition of South Dakota 
in June 2021. Of these 93 participants, an estimated 23 CIS-certified 
establishments are slaughter facilities (FSIS 2021).
Survey Results and Analysis
    To better understand the scale of state-inspected slaughter 
facilities and their interest in interstate shipment, a survey was sent 
via email to 242 hog slaughter establishments. The selected 
establishments are located in the top pork-producing states of Iowa, 
Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and 
Oklahoma. Because the Cooperative Interstate Shipment program is a 
point of interest for the study, the survey was also sent to pork 
slaughter plants in Wisconsin, the state with the second greatest 
number of CIS-certified facilities. There are approximately 380 
facilities believed to slaughter hogs within the nine selected survey 
states. Of this number, 242 businesses could be reached by email and 
thus received the survey. There were 60 responses to the survey 
resulting in a 25% response rate. Table 3 shows the distribution of 
responses, and more information can be found in Appendix A.

                               Table 3. Distribution of Survey Responses by State
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               IA        IN        MO        OH        WI        MN       IL       OK       NC
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Hog Slaughter Plants       41        47        35        96        69        23       45       14       11
            Surveys Sent         27        25        23        55        64        15       25        6        3
                                                                             -----------------------------------
           CIS Responses          1         1         0         1         3            Not CIS Eligible
                                                                             -----------------------------------
       Non-CIS Responses          5         8         6        12        10         5        7        0        1
                           -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Total Responses.........        6         9         6        13        13         5        7        0        1
                           -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Response Rate        22%       36%       26%       24%       20%       33%      28%       0%      33%
                           -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  % Of Total Rep-.........      15%       19%       17%       14%       19%       22%      16%       0%       9%
    resented..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Survey participants were first asked to classify their business to 
ensure that the response came from a slaughter facility. Some 
respondents indicated that their business performed processing 
activities only, but these responses were still included in the 
analysis related to interstate shipment and expansion. The survey asked 
plants to identify the percentage of their total hog slaughter that was 
state-inspected rather than custom-exempt, the number of employees, 
their CIS eligibility or interest, and the impact that interstate 
shipment eligibility might have on their intentions to expand the 
business. The responses to these questions are summarized in Table 4 as 
a percentage of all respondents for each question.

 Table 4. Results of Selected Survey Questions, Reported as a Percentage
                              of Responses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             Classification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
State-                                           State-        State-
 Inspected                                      Inspected     Inspected
 Slaughter and                                  Slaughter    Processing
 Further                                          Only          Only
 Processing      State-Inspected and Custom
                    Slaughter and Further
                         Processing
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       23.3%                70.0%                     1.7%          5.0%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Percentage of total hog slaughter that is state inspected
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     0-20%          20-40%         40-60%        60-80%        80-100%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       24.5%            7.5%           5.7%           3.8%         58.5%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Number of Employees
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     1-10           10-20          20-30          30-40          40+
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       49.2%           42.4%           3.4%           0.0%          5.1%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  For CIS States: Are you CIS eligible?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Yes, and CIS                                    No, not       Unsure/
   certified     Yes, but not participating     eligible     Unfamiliar
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       13.3%                60.0%                     6.7%         20.0%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For Non-CIS States: What is your level of interest in the CIS program?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Very                                          Not         Unsure
interested, we                                 interested
  would apply
    for CIS        Somewhat interested, we
                  would want to learn more
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       41.7%                33.3%                     8.3%         16.7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Likelihood of expanding business if granted interstate shipment
                               eligibility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Very likely      Somewhat       Somewhat        Very         Unsure
                    likely        unlikely      unlikely
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       24.5%           41.5%           9.4%          17.0%          7.5%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Not all questions were answered by all respondents.
See Appendix A for the full list of survey questions.

    The results in Table 4 indicate that 70 percent of respondents were 
state-inspected slaughter and processing facilities that also offer 
custom processing. For over 58 percent of respondents, state-inspected 
work makes up 80-100 percent of their business, but for 25 percent of 
plants, inspected work accounts for less than 20 percent. Furthermore, 
over 90 percent of plants represented in the survey have between 1 and 
20 employees. When asked about CIS eligibility, 60 percent of 
respondents from CIS states were aware of the program but not 
participating, 13 percent of plants were CIS certified, and 20 percent 
were unfamiliar with the program. In non-CIS states, more than 75 
percent of respondents were at least somewhat interested in the CIS 
program, with 42 percent saying that they would apply for the program 
if it was available. Although many noted concerns about labor, nearly 
70 percent of respondents said they would be at least somewhat likely 
to increase slaughter capacity if granted interstate shipment 
eligibility.
    Survey participants were asked which aspects of their current 
facility would be the most expensive or difficult to transition from 
state to Federal inspection standards. The most common response 
category was facility upgrades and repairs (33%), followed by 
additional recordkeeping (26%) and labeling requirements (19%). Figure 
7 shows the distribution of responses.
Figure 7. Responses to the question: ``What would be the most difficult 
        or expensive part of transitioning from state to Federal 
        standards?''
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
    When asked about the cost of making these changes, 19 percent of 
respondents estimated that the required investment would be under 
$5,000, while an equal percentage estimated costs to be between 
$100,000 and $199,999. Fifteen percent of respondents estimated that 
they would spend between $10,000 and $19,999 to transition from state 
to Federal standards. The average cost estimate across all states was 
nearly $52,000, and the distribution of responses is summarized in 
Figure 8.
Figure 8. Estimated cost of meeting USDA inspection criteria.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    The open-ended question of estimated cost yielded the lowest 
response rate with just 27 estimates from 60 completed surveys. 
However, it may be one of the most valuable pieces of information 
collected from participants. Although a small percentage of businesses 
are represented in each state, the relative ``ease'' at which a plant 
feels they could meet USDA standards appears to match up with current 
CIS participation within states. Table 5 shows the average cost 
estimate for each state as well as the current status of CIS 
participation in that state.

  Table 5. Estimated Cost of CIS Certification and CIS Participation by
                                  State
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Number of
      State            Estimates       Average Cost    CIS Participation
                       Reported          Estimate            Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            OH                  4            $4,625       32 Total, 7
                                                            Slaughter
            WI                  9           $40,625       23 Total, 5
                                                            Slaughter
            IN                  5           $42,020       18 Total, 4
                                                            Slaughter
            IA                  2           $50,125       10 Total, 2
                                                            Slaughter
            MO                  1          $100,000        2 Total, 0
                                                            Slaughter
             IL                 1           $11,000                Not
                                                           Participating
            MN                  5          $117,000                Not
                                                           Participating
                  ------------------------------------------------------
  Total/Average..              27           $52,199      85 Total, 18
                                                            Slaughter
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If we ignore the single response from Illinois, it seems that the 
lowest cost estimates are associated with the highest CIS participation 
rates. This is not a claim of causality, but it may serve as evidence 
that some states and state-inspected plants have an easier time 
obtaining CIS certification depending on how closely their state 
program aligns with USDA protocols. For example, the state of Iowa was 
already using the Public Health Information System (PHIS) that is used 
by FSIS, but a state that uses a different system may incur additional 
costs when applying for CIS eligibility. The Iowa Meat Inspection 
Bureau initially estimated the state's cost of meeting CIS requirements 
to be $200,000. This includes trainings for state inspectors, which 
were less expensive when conducted virtually, and some lab equipment 
purchases. The department shared that no CIS applicants in Iowa have 
had to make substantial changes beyond standard repairs, cleaning, and 
revising the language of their procedures. They also reported that all 
plants that have undergone a Federal visit have passed and received CIS 
certification. State inspection programs can get up to 50 percent of 
their inspection costs reimbursed by FSIS, and once certified, CIS 
states are eligible for up to 60 percent cost reimbursement (FSIS 
2021). However, this may not be enough to incentivize some states to 
adopt the program. Officials with the Minnesota Dairy and Meat 
Inspection Division stated that even with the 60 percent reimbursement 
rate, the added costs of starting and operating the program were not 
financially feasible.
    At the individual plant level, each business decides which 
inspection option they are best suited for based on their size, 
business model, expansion intentions, and the incentives to change. For 
some plants, interstate shipment is not a priority, but for others, 
reaching new markets may allow the business to expand. There are 
several factors that may influence a plant's decision to seek CIS 
eligibility or switch from state to Federal inspection. One of the most 
important factors, based on conversations with the Iowa Meat Inspection 
Bureau, is a plant's proximity to a border. Plants that are located 
near state lines may have more opportunities and lower costs associated 
with distributing their products outside of the state. Appendix B 
contains maps of each state in the survey and the number of state-
inspected pork slaughter establishments in each county, providing a 
visual representation of how close each state's inspected plants are to 
the border. Another important factor is a plant's relationships with 
potential buyers. A state-inspected slaughter facility in Minnesota 
shared that they have several out-of-state retailers interested in 
their products, so they have begun investigating the costs associated 
with switching to Federal inspection. More generally, each plant must 
weigh the costs of making upgrades and switching programs with the 
potential benefits and funding incentives offered to do so.
    Aside from CIS participation, the only other way for state-
inspected establishments to gain interstate shipment eligibility is to 
become federally inspected. For facilities outside of CIS eligible 
states or for those that do not meet the CIS criteria, Federal 
inspection may be a better option. Survey participants were asked what 
factors might motivate them to switch from state to Federal inspection 
and were given a multiple-choice list to choose from. The list included 
interstate shipment eligibility, expanding their business, potential 
opportunities for financial assistance, or nothing/no interest. The 
most selected factors were expanding the business (30%) and interstate 
shipment (29%). Note that respondents could select more than one 
factor. However, out of 52 individual respondents, 16 said that nothing 
would motivate them to become federally inspected. Figure 9 summarizes 
the responses.
Figure 9. Potentially motivating factors of becoming federally 
        inspected.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
    Starting in March 2020, allocations from the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act have funded grants for small 
to medium sized meat processors in Iowa ($4 million), Indiana ($4 
million), South Dakota ($5 million), Washington ($4.6 million), 
Kentucky ($2 million), Arkansas ($5 million), Missouri ($17 million), 
Oklahoma ($10 million), and other states in the U.S. The Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, passed in December 2020, added an additional $60 
million in grants for small meat processors to upgrade their 
facilities, and $200,000 in grants could be used to help small 
facilities meet USDA inspection standards and achieve interstate 
shipment eligibility (American Farm Bureau 2021, Bodine 2021, Eddington 
2020, IDALS 2021, Investopedia 2021, WSDA 2021).
    In Iowa specifically, funding was allocated through three different 
types of grants. The grant type most related to this study was the 
Business Improvement Grant, which awarded funding to 109 meat and 
poultry facilities to purchase or upgrade equipment. This grant 
stipulated that facility improvements must allow the business to 
``increase its processing capacity to accommodate the increased demands 
brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic.'' Custom-exempt plants could also 
put this funding towards becoming inspected, and state-inspected plants 
could use funding to offset the costs of CIS certification (IDALS 
2021). In Missouri, over $17 million in grants were awarded and the 
number of state-inspected meat and poultry processing plants have 
doubled (Harker 2021). Grants in South Dakota, awarded to promote the 
expansion of slaughter and processing operations, are expected to fund 
at least 16 new facilities and 83 existing facilities (Shaffer 2021). 
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, many other states have 
awarded grants to state-inspected and custom-exempt meat processors 
incentivizing them to expand their operations, seek interstate shipment 
eligibility, and support the U.S. meat supply chain. In June 2021, the 
USDA announced an additional $4 billion in pandemic aid that would be 
directed to a few targeted groups including meat processors (Abbott 
2021).
    Survey participants were asked how potential state or USDA funding 
initiatives could help them increase capacity and expand. This was an 
open-ended question, but similar responses were categorized and are 
displayed in Table 6. Thirty-two percent of responses were related to 
labor and training programs. Many respondents left comments about their 
struggles with finding quality applicants and the cost and time 
expenditures associated with training. Several respondents commented 
that labor shortages are the most limiting factor in terms of business 
growth. Nineteen percent of respondents listed both facility and 
equipment upgrades as potential uses of funding. Although, a few plants 
indicated that equipment and facility upgrades would be targeted 
towards increasing efficiency so that less labor would be required to 
accomplish the same level of production. Other responses were related 
to making CIS status more financially attainable and streamlining the 
entire inspection process, including having more state inspectors 
available.

   Table 6. How could USDA or state funding be directed to motivate an
                     increase in slaughter capacity?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Response                       Number of Responses
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Labor and training                                                    12
Equipment upgrades                                                     7
Facility/infrastructure upgrades                                       7
Assisting with the costs of applying for CIS                           4
Expanding the business                                                 2
Adding cooler/freezer space                                            2
Hiring more inspectors                                                 1
Assisting with debt load from startup                                  1
Streamlining the inspection process                                    1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conclusion
    The demographic analysis and survey results indicate that state-
inspected plants are small, and they operate on a very small scale. 
Non-federally inspected slaughter accounts for less than 0.6 percent of 
total U.S. slaughter, and state-inspected slaughter makes up an even 
smaller proportion. The survey results, though limited in scope, 
indicate that state-inspected plants in most top-hog-producing states 
have an average weekly slaughter capacity of between 16 and 42 hogs, 
and they average between 400 and 900 hogs annually. To understand how 
small-scale each of these plants truly is, recall that Iowa has an 
estimated 41 state-inspected hog slaughter facilities, and the 2020 
state-wide state-inspected slaughter total was 5,199 hogs. To put this 
in perspective, there is a large, USDA inspected packing plant within 
the state of Iowa that processes 19,500 hogs each day and accounts for 
nearly four percent of U.S. pork processing capacity (Eller 2020). This 
means that one large plant can do in 1 day roughly four times what all 
state-inspected plants in Iowa could do in 1 year. No amount of funding 
or surges in production would allow state-inspected plants to make up 
for even a slight disruption at this large plant.
    However, state-inspected plants have shown throughout the COVID-19 
pandemic and large plant shutdowns that, with funding support, they are 
able to increase capacity. Recall that from 2019 to 2020, state-
inspected survey respondents increased their annual slaughter totals by 
over 25 percent on average. Total non-federally inspected slaughter 
also increased by over 11 percent during this time, and of the ten 
states with available data, state-inspected slaughter numbers increased 
nearly 31 percent from 2019 to 2020. This points to the possibility 
that non-federally inspected slaughter establishments may be capable of 
capturing and sustaining a larger share of total slaughter. Because 
most state-inspected slaughter plants are located in the states and 
counties with the greatest hog inventories, investing in local 
processing options may help increase local slaughter capacity, decrease 
transportation costs, and improve market competition for small or 
specialized hog producers.
    To meet the goals of future funding initiatives most effectively, 
many state-inspected plants will likely need to seek interstate 
shipment eligibility. In its first 10 years, the Cooperative Interstate 
Shipment (CIS) program has seen relatively low levels of participation, 
especially among slaughter facilities. However, two of the program's 
nine participating states only just became CIS eligible since the 
beginning of 2020, and they will likely see higher rates of CIS 
certification in the next few years. The Iowa Meat Inspection Bureau 
indicated that they have several slaughter facilities currently in the 
application process. The survey responses identify areas that plant 
operators view as the most difficult or expensive to transition to 
Federal standards, and they estimate the cost of making these changes. 
This information could be used to allocate grants or low-interest loans 
specifically for CIS certification or the transition to Federal 
inspection.
    Due to limited resources and data availability, this study was 
somewhat limited in scope. For future work on this issue, I recommend 
conducting a formal evaluation of the CIS program once its recent state 
participants have been active for several years. For more comprehensive 
survey data, I would recommend incorporating phone calls and follow-up 
emails to reach a greater percentage of state-inspected establishments. 
The events that occurred in 2020 related to the COVID-19 pandemic were 
unprecedented, and 2021 may be too soon to be analyzing the outcome 
that it had on the meatpacking industry. As more data becomes 
available, I would recommend conducting an updated analysis and perhaps 
investigating the impact that Federal and state grants have had on 
small meat processors, including custom-exempt facilities.

 
 
 
                               References
    Abbot, C. ``USDA to implement up to $4 billion in pandemic aid
 through mid-August.'' Successful Farming, June 16, 2021.
    Bodine, S. ``$60 million to Help Expand Small Meat Processors
 Included in New Coronavirus Aid Bill.'' Farms.com, December 24, 2020.
    Cowley, C., ``[COVID]-19 Disruptions in the U.S. Meat Supply
 Chain.'' Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, July 2020.
    Eddington, S., Anderson, R. ``Farm Bureau lauds $5 million Meat
 Processing Grant.'' Arkansas Farm Bureau, August 21, 2020.
    Eller, D. ``Tyson reopening its Waterloo processing plant with
 increased safety measures for workers.'' Des Moines Register, May 6,
 2020.
    Harker, J. ``Nearly 150 Smaller Processing Plants Get CARES
 Funding.'' Brownfield Ag News for America, May 5, 2021.
    Hayes, D.J., Schulz, L.L., Hart, C.E., Jacobs, K.L., ``A descriptive
 analysis of the COVID-19 impacts on U.S. pork, turkey, and egg
 markets.'' Agribusiness 37 (2020): 122-141.
    Hayes, D.J. ``Economic Impact of the Recent District Court Ruling
 Regarding Line Speeds on the U.S. Pork Industry.'' Iowa State
 University. May 2021.
    Iowa Department of Agriculture. ``More than 200 small meat and
 poultry processors awarded CARES Act funds to grow their businesses.''
 The National Provisioner, November 19, 2020.
    Johnson, R., Marti, D., Gwin, L. Slaughter and Processing Options
 and Issues for Locally Sourced Meat. Washington D.C.: USDA Economic
 Research Service. Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Outlook No.24. June
 2012.
    Kentucky Agricultural Development Fund. ``Gov. Beshear announces $2
 million in CARES Act funds for meat processing expansion.'' The
 National Provisioner, November 25, 2020.
    National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA).
 Interstate Meat Sales Background. Washington, D.C., 2021.
    Shaffer, E. ``Small South Dakota meat processors to get $5 million
 boost.'' Meat + Poultry, June 7, 2021.
    USDA Economic Research Service (ERS). Analysis of Previous Farm
 Bills. Washington, D.C. 2014.
    USDA Economic Research Service (ERS). Solving Processing Issues a
 Key to Successful Local Meat Marketing. Washington, D.C. 2013.
    USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). Cooperative
 Interstate Shipping Program. Washington, D.C. 2021.
    USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). Meat, Poultry and
 Egg Product Inspection Directory. Washington, D.C. 2021.
    Washington State Department of Agriculture. ``Relief grants for
 small meat processors.'' Morning Ag Clips, October 26, 2020.
 

Appendix A

      Table 7. Survey Questions for CIS States (IN, IA, OH, MO, WI)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Question                          Answer Choices
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Please select the choice that      a. State-Inspected Slaughter and
 best describes your business.         Further Processing
                                      b. State-Inspected and Custom
                                       Slaughter and Further Processing
                                      c. State-Inspected Slaughter Only
                                      d. State-Inspected Processing Only
------------------------------------------------------------------------
. Does your facility process hogs?    a. Yes
                                      b. No
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. How many people does your          a. 1-10
 business employ?                     b. 10-20
                                      c. 20-30
                                      d. 30-40
                                      e. 40+
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only displayed for respondents who
 selected choice (b) for Question #1
 
4. What proportion of hog slaughter   a. 0-20%
 is state-inspected (rather than      b. 20-40%
 custom-exempt)?                      c. 40-60%
                                      d. 60-80%
                                      e. 80-100%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. What is your weekly hog slaughter  Answers reported using a sliding
 capacity?                             scale
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Is your business eligible to       a. Yes, and we are CIS certified
 participate in the Cooperative       b. Yes, but we are not
 Interstate Shipment (CIS) program?    participating
                                      c. No, we are not eligible
                                      d. Unsure/Unfamiliar with CIS
                                       program
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only displayed for respondents who
 chose any option other than (d) for
 Question #6
 
7. CIS program certification          a. Changing computer/information
 requires state-inspected plants to    systems
 meet Federal inspection criteria.    b. Labeling requirements
 Which of the following aspects of    c. Equipment upgrades
 your business would be (or were)     d. Facility upgrades/ repairs
 the most difficult or expensive to   e. Additional recordkeeping/
 transition from state to Federal      procedural requirements
 standards? (select all that apply)   f. Other (please list):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only displayed for respondents who
 chose any option other than (d) for
 Question #6
8. What would you estimate to be the  Answer entered in text box
 total expenses associated with
 gaining CIS certification or
 becoming federally inspected?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only displayed for respondents who
 chose option (d) for Question #6
 
9. CIS program certification          Answer entered in text box
 requires state inspected plants to
 meet Federal inspection criteria.
 What would you estimate to be the
 total expenses associated with
 gaining CIS certification or
 becoming federally inspected?
10. Which of the following would      a. Interstate shipment
 motivate you to become federally     b. Expanding the business
 inspected? (select all that apply)   c. Financial Assistance
                                      d. Nothing/ No Interest
                                      e. Other (please list):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. How likely would you be to        a. Very likely
 expand your business (i.e.,          b. Somewhat likely
 increase slaughter capacity) if      c. Somewhat unlikely
 state-inspected plants could engage  d. Very unlikely
 in interstate commerce?              e. Unsure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. How could funding from state or   Answer entered in text box
 USDA initiatives best be directed
 to motivate state-inspected plants
 to seek interstate shipment and
 increase capacity?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. If willing to share, what were    2016: reported using sliding scale
 your annual hog slaughter totals     2017: reported using sliding scale
 for the past 5 years? (slide bar     2018: reported using sliding scale
 for each year)                       2019: reported using sliding scale
                                      2020: reported using sliding scale
------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Additional Comments               Answer entered in text box
------------------------------------------------------------------------


      Table 8. Survey Questions for Non-CIS States (IL, MN, NC, OK)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Question                          Answer Choices
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Please select the choice that      a. State-Inspected Slaughter and
 best describes your business.         Further Processing
                                      b. State-Inspected AND Custom
                                       Slaughter and Further Processing
                                      c. State-Inspected Slaughter Only
                                      d. State-Inspected Processing Only
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Does your facility process hogs?   a. Yes
                                      b. No
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. How many people does your          a. 1-10
 business employ?                     b. 10-20
                                      c. 20-30
                                      d. 30-40
                                      c. 40+
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only displayed for respondents who
 selected choice (b) for Question #1
 
4. What proportion of hog slaughter   a. 0-20%
 is state-inspected (rather than      b. 20-40%
 custom-exempt)?                      c. 40-60%
                                      d. 60-80%
                                      e. 80-100%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. What is your weekly hog slaughter  Answers reported using a sliding
 capacity?                             scale
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Which of the following would       a. Interstate shipment
 motivate you to become federally     b. Expanding the business
 inspected? (select all that apply)   c. Financial Assistance
                                      d. Nothing/ No Interest
                                      e. Other (please list):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Which of the following aspects of  a. Changing computer/information
 your business would be (or were)      systems
 the most difficult or expensive to   b. Labeling requirements
 transition from state to Federal     c. Equipment upgrades
 standards? (select all that apply)   d. Facility upgrades/ repairs
                                      e. Additional recordkeeping/
                                       procedural requirements
                                      f. Other (please list):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. What would you estimate to be the  Answer entered in text box
 total expenses associated with
 becoming federally inspected?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. The Cooperative Interstate         a. Very interested--we would apply
 Shipment (CIS) program allows state-  for CIS certification
 inspected facilities with less than  b. Somewhat interested--we would
 25 employees and meeting Federal      want to learn more about it
 criteria to engage in interstate     c. Not interested
 commerce. Eight states currently     d. Unsure
 offer this program. If your state
 became CIS eligible, how interested
 would you be in participating?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. How likely would you be to        a. Very likely
 expand your business (i.e.,          b. Somewhat likely
 increase slaughter capacity) if      c. Somewhat unlikely
 state-inspected plants could engage  d. Very unlikely
 in interstate commerce?              e. Unsure
------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. How could funding from state or   Answer entered in text box
 USDA initiatives best be directed
 to motivate state-inspected plants
 to seek interstate shipment and
 increase capacity?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. If willing to share, what were    2016: reported using sliding scale
 your annual hog slaughter totals     2017: reported using sliding scale
 for the past 5 years? (slide bar     2018: reported using sliding scale
 for each year)                       2019: reported using sliding scale
                                      2020: reported using sliding scale
------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Additional Comments               Answer entered in text box
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Appendix B
Figures 10-18. Maps of state-inspected pork slaughter facilities by 
        county in surveyed states.
Figure 10. Iowa. 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 11. Illinois.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 12. Missouri. 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 13. Minnesota.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 14. Ohio. 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 15. Indiana.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 16. Wisconsin. 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 17. Oklahoma.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Figure 18. North Carolina.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    The Chairman. Thank you very much. And now, Mr. Boner, 
please begin when you are ready.

    STATEMENT OF BRAD BONER, VICE PRESIDENT, AMERICAN SHEEP 
               INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, GLENROCK, WY

    Mr. Boner. Thank you, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member, 
Thompson, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the 
opportunity to speak with you today. I am Brad Boner, a sheep 
producer from the east central Wyoming, and current Vice 
President of the American Sheep Industry Association. My family 
raises sheep, commercial cattle, and black Angus seed stock. We 
are also involved in raising crops which support our livestock 
enterprises. I am the fifth generation to reside in our county, 
and my son Ryan is hard at work proudly carrying on our legacy 
of ranching in Wyoming.
    I was a founding member of Mountain States Land 
Cooperative. Over 19 years we successfully marketed our 
members' lands. In 2016 we purchased the JBS Lamb Processing 
Plant in Greeley, Colorado. At that time we were concerned with 
JBS wanting to change it to a beef facility. Loss of that 
facility would reduce U.S. slaughter capacity by 20 percent, 
leaving our cooperative members and other producers with no 
place to harvest their lambs. A subsidiary of the cooperative, 
Mountain States Rosen, operated the Greeley plant until April 
of 2020, when supply chain issues due to COVID resulted in a 
loss of a significant number of our retail and food service 
customers. Ultimately, bankruptcy proved to be our only viable 
option. Our worst fears were realized, and currently the 
Greeley plant serves as a beef facility for JBS.
    The loss of 20 percent of harvest capacity was a tough blow 
to our industry when we had lambs on feed across the country in 
preparation for our Easter/Passover season, our busiest 
marketing season of the year. Lamb producers were in a bind, 
with very limited places to market their lamb. Prices for lambs 
plummeted, and it looked for a moment like our industry, or 
many in it, would not be able to withstand the year. On top of 
this, our industry was also reeling from the decimation of 
rural markets due to an ongoing trade dispute with China. Sheep 
producers have two sources of income, wool and meat, and both 
were gone.
    These events highlighted the concentration and resulting 
supply chain vulnerability of our markets, conditions we had 
tried to avoid. Fortunately, and thankfully, with the 
intervention of Congress and the Administration, wool and lamb 
were ultimately included in the Coronavirus Food Assistance 
Program, and, working closely with USDA, we were able to give 
direct payments to producers and feeders, and resolve issues 
with the wool LDP to bridge this terrible gap.
    Tools like mandatory price reporting, the wool LDP, and 
lamb Livestock Risk Protection are vital to lamb producers like 
myself. Unfortunately, price reporting has not adjusted to 
changes in the lamb industry. While we would like the program 
to adjust to benefit producers, our number one goal is to 
ensure program does not experience a lapse. Of significant 
concern is the current confidentiality guideline at USDA, which 
restricts the information available to sheep producers. In 2011 
there were 13 reports available under the mandatory price 
reporting for lamb. Today there are only five reports 
available. Of these five reports, the amount of information 
provided has been diminished over the years, with data on 
formerly traded lambs not being reported in over a year. This 
sporadic price reporting led to the USDA's withdrawal of the 
lamb Livestock Risk Protection.
    Within the last year we have seen the opening of a new 
packing plant in Brush, Colorado, and the reopening of an 
additional packing plant in San Angelo, Texas. I am very 
pleased to say both facilities are either entirely or majority 
owned by producers, which shows the optimism and resilience 
built into our industry over generations. The American Sheep 
Industry Association appreciates the current efforts by 
Congress and the Administration to build resilient supply 
chains.
    The sheep industry continues to experience gaps in 
significant processing capacity, particularly in the upper 
Midwest and eastern regions, where we have experienced growth 
in both lamb supply and consumer demand. Sheep producers in 
these regions frequently comment that they are only offered one 
date, usually a year in advance, to get their lambs processed 
with few, if any, alternatives available. Relatively modest 
investments, especially through grants or federally backed 
loans to increase processing in the areas of the nation where 
we have both supply and demand could have a huge impact on the 
future of this industry.
    Trade too remains a major concern for sheep producers, with 
over 60 percent of the lamb available in the U.S. coming in 
mainly from Australia and New Zealand. We are concerned with 
the recent talks between the White House and the United 
Kingdom, which have indicated our market will soon be open to 
additional imports. Science-based standards are important, but 
equal importance should be placed on reciprocal access to 
foreign markets. We continue to ask that export opportunities 
for American lamb be prioritized before further import markets 
are opened.
    Thank you for this opportunity to visit with you, and I 
look forward to answering any questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Boner follows:]

   Prepared Statement of Brad Boner, Vice President, American Sheep 
                   Industry Association, Glenrock, WY
Introduction
    Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I am 
Brad Boner, a sheep producer from Wyoming and the current Vice 
President of the American Sheep Industry Association (ASI). ASI is the 
national trade association for the United States sheep industry, 
representing the nation's 100,000 lamb and wool producers. America's 
sheep producers continue a strong tradition of supporting wildlife 
habitat, natural resources, and open space across the country--all 
enabled by careful resource management while grazing our flocks on 
private and Federal lands.
    The sheep industry is very broad and diverse, nationally accounting 
for an economic impact in excess of $2.7 billion to the United States 
economy. I appreciate the opportunity to present our industry's 
perspective across a number of priorities:
Mandatory Price Reporting
    Ensuring there is not a lapse in Livestock Mandatory Price 
Reporting (LMR) is critical to the United States sheep industry. 
Unfortunately for sheep producers, LMR has not adjusted to changes in 
the lamb industry. Of particular concern is the implementation of the 
current confidentiality guideline of the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) which restricts the information available to sheep 
producers. In 2011, there were 13 reports under mandatory price 
reporting for lamb. Today, there are only five reports available, all 
of which are national reports released on a weekly basis. Of these five 
reports, the amount of information provided in the slaughter lamb 
report has been diminished over the years with the data on formula 
traded lambs not being reported in over a year. These lapses in price 
reporting led the industry last month to support USDA's withdrawal of 
Livestock Risk Protection--Lamb (LRP-Lamb) since the sporadic 
availability of the product unpinned by the lack of reported prices 
rendered the program of limited use. LRP-Lamb was a Federal lamb price 
insurance product and the only risk protection product available to 
lamb producers and feeders to hedge their risk. Robust and transparent, 
third party, price reporting is paramount to producers' ability to 
secure necessary loans in order to finance operations, expansions and 
startups. Without robust and transparent price reporting, lenders will 
find it difficult, if not impossible, to assess the viability of loan 
requests presented to them. This may lead to loans being denied that 
otherwise would have been accepted if trustworthy price reporting were 
available. Increased consolidation in the packing industry across 
livestock will only continue to hinder producers' access to accurate 
price reports and issues of confidentiality will need to be resolved 
sooner rather than later to preserve the value of LMR for sheep 
producers and the other commodities that rely on these reports.
    The American Sheep Industry Association has proposed a number of 
potential changes to LMR that we believe would enhance the program's 
effectiveness for lamb producers while protecting the interests of 
everyone in the supply chain. The first recommendation is to change or 
replace the 3/70/20 Confidentiality Guideline. This guideline is not 
required by statute and current market prices have a relatively short-
term relevance. By the time prices are reported, they only reflect past 
transactions. Prices and market activity can be reported without 
sacrificing confidentiality and the current confidentiality guideline 
by USDA is stifling the information lamb producers need to make 
accurate marketing decisions. Additionally, ASI has recommended that 
USDA amend LMR, so it reflects the unique nature of the lamb industry, 
such as including a definition for Vertical Business Relationships that 
includes Custom-Processors and lowering the packer processing threshold 
again for reporting to 20,000 head to reflect current slaughter lamb 
numbers. ASI believes these changes would greatly enhance the program 
for all users.
Packer Capacity and Concentration
    The lamb processing sector is highly concentrated with two to three 
firms influencing the majority of market sales and imported lamb 
influencing the other 50% of lamb meat sales in the United States. This 
concentration was highlighted during the outset of the COVID-19 
pandemic, when the sudden loss of restaurant and food services sales 
forced the bankruptcy proceedings of our second largest lamb packing 
facility, Mountain States Rosen, owned by the Mountain States Lamb 
Cooperative. The loss of this lamb packer at the height of what is 
traditionally the lamb industry's busiest marketing season, the Easter/
Passover holiday, exposed serious deficiencies in the industry's supply 
chain, namely the lack of adequate packing and fabrication capacity in 
the event of a market disruption.
    The American Sheep Industry appreciates the current efforts by 
Congress and the Administration to look at Investments and 
Opportunities for Meat and Poultry Processing Infrastructure and 
building resilient supply chains. The sheep industry continues to 
experience gaps in sufficient processing capacity across the country, 
particularly in the upper Midwest and eastern regions of the nation 
where lamb producers have shown growth in flock size and demand for 
lamb has expanded for local and non-traditional consumer markets. Sheep 
producers in these regions frequently comment that they are only 
offered one date, usually a year in advance, to get their lambs 
processed. If they miss that date or find themselves short or long of 
their anticipated head count, they have few if any viable alternatives 
available. Relatively modest investments, especially through grants or 
federally backed loans, to increase processing in areas of the nation 
where we have both supply and consumer demand could have a huge impact 
on the future of this industry. This is not only an issue of packing 
capacity in these regions, but also the hurdle of interstate shipment 
due to the lack of federally inspected facilities. Additionally, as in 
all of agriculture, access to skilled labor remains a tremendous 
challenge for our packing infrastructure. ASI supports efforts to look 
at additional flexibilities that allow small and regional processing 
facilities to engage in interstate commerce, without negatively 
impacting our vital food safety system.
Trade
    The lamb market in the United States is heavily influenced by 
imported lamb, particularly from Australia and New Zealand, which make 
up over 50% of total lamb sales. The American Sheep Industry 
Association in response has asked successive Administrations to 
prioritize lamb export opportunities for United States producers before 
allowing additional imports. Our industry still cannot access 
potentially lucrative markets like China, the European Union and the 
United Kingdom; this despite an announcement last month that the United 
States would begin allowing imported lamb from the United Kingdom. The 
domestic industry's ability to withstand additional import pressure at 
this challenging time, and the United Kingdom's tremendous potential 
for significant lamb exports in the wake of their departure from the 
European Union are a looming concern for United States lamb producers. 
A cautious and deliberative approach is necessary to ensure that while 
trade may be free, it is fair.
    Wool trade too remains a challenge. While we have seen an increase 
in wool shipments to China, numbers are still significantly lower than 
they were prior to the tariff retaliation. Additionally, shipping 
challenges continue to mount. The same holds true for the export of 
pelts. Prior to the implementation of tariffs, 72 percent of U.S. raw 
wool exports and 80 percent of U.S. sheep skins were sent to China. 
Continuing to build strength in the international marketing of lamb and 
wool requires a commitment to the promotion and export of United States 
wool to export markets through strong USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
(FAS) Program funding. ASI is the cooperator with the FAS for American 
wool and sheepskins and finds success every year in securing customers 
through the Market Access Program, the Foreign Market Development 
Program, and the Quality Samples Program. In 2001, ASI relaunched an 
export program for wool and significantly improved the competitiveness 
for American wool.
Barriers to Expansion
    There is tremendous reason for optimism in the American Sheep 
Industry. Lamb demand domestically is on the rise, wool is being 
recognized as a natural regenerative fiber for performance wear, and 
the vast environmental benefits of targeted grazing are being 
recognized by our private and public land managers across the country. 
With that optimism, there are barriers to our industry reaching its 
full potential, including:
State Wage Regulations
    The sheep industry has relied on sheep herders to care for, 
protect, and tend to their flocks since time immemorial. For large- and 
mid-sized western range operators, these sheep herders are an integral 
and necessary part of their operation, especially those that graze 
public lands. This work necessarily requires living in a camp with the 
sheep seasonally and moving the flock nearly daily to achieve range 
management goals in the most rugged and isolated lands in the United 
States. However, state wage and overtime regulations, particularly in 
California and Colorado, threaten to devastate our industry, mandating 
wages for this work that are untenable. If a solution is not found to 
bring these wages into line, there will not be a commercial sheep 
industry in these states, which represent our second and third largest 
sheep inventories and the sites of our largest lamb processing 
facilities.
H2-A Temporary Agricultural Workers
    The American Sheep Industry has a decades long history of a 
reliable, consistent, and legal workforce. Sheep ranchers depend on the 
H-2A sheepherder program to help care for more than \1/3\ of the ewes 
and lambs in the United States. To meet those needs, the industry has 
participated in temporary visa programs (in various forms) since the 
1950s. As a result, sheep producers employ a legal labor force with an 
estimated eight American jobs created/supported by each foreign worker 
employed. A workable temporary foreign labor program is essential for 
the sheep industry including the special procedures for herding in 
future legislation involving immigration workers.
Access to Animal Drugs
    With approximately 5.2 million head of the sheep, animal drug 
industries often find that securing Federal Drug Administration (FDA) 
approval for new, innovative, and even older products is not cost 
effective for this market. The lack of access to these key technologies 
used by our competitors in other countries, places the United States 
sheep producers at a disadvantage, not to mention limiting their 
ability to protect and prevent disease to ensure the welfare of their 
animals. While imported lamb may be treated with a product that has a 
USDA/Food Safety Inspection Service accepted residue level, that same 
product often is not approved for use in the United States by the FDA.
Predation
    Coyotes, mountain lions, wolves, and bears kill tens of thousands 
of lambs each year. Livestock losses attributed to these predators cost 
producers more than $232 million annually. American sheep producers 
rely on USDA/Wildlife Services, state and county programs to 
effectively control and manage predation by state managed and federally 
protected predatory species. The Livestock protection program is 
majority funded by industry and local cooperators. Sheep producers have 
adopted many techniques to reduce predation, including the wide-spread 
use of livestock protection dogs, but access to lethal and non-lethal 
predator control methods must be maintained.
Conclusion
    The American Sheep Industry has faced challenges these past years, 
related and unrelated to the COVID pandemic. Like all industries, the 
pandemic highlighted flaws and created failures in our supply chains, 
but we have emerged as a stronger industry. We did lose our second 
largest packing facility, but also saw two new packing facilities come 
on-line, both either entirely or majority producer-owned, showing the 
optimism in our industry. I'll reiterate the growth in demand for lamb 
and fine wool, and the environmental benefits of sheep production for 
range health, control of invasive weeds and reduction of hazardous fuel 
loads. With minor policy adjustments, the American Sheep Industry is 
poised for exponential growth.
    Thank you for your support of the livestock industry and for 
allowing me to visit with you about our priorities.
            Sincerely,

Brad Boner, Vice President.
American Sheep Industry Association.

    The Chairman. Well, thank each of you. You have given our 
Committee and our Members just some very, very, much needed 
information, and I am sure our Members are just very anxious to 
get to question you, and get additional information. At this 
time our Members will be recognized for questions in order of 
seniority, alternating between Majority and Minority Members. 
Each will be recognized for 5 minutes in order to allow us to 
get as many questions in as possible. And, as always, I remind 
each Member to please keep your microphones muted until you are 
recognized in order--so that we can minimize any background 
noise. Now, if I may start, I want to recognize myself for 5 
minutes. I hope I can get all my questions in, because you 
raised so many.
    Let me start with you, Mr. Wilkinson. You mentioned in your 
testimony, and I wrote it down here. You mentioned one size 
does not fit all. Can you explain what you mean by that, in 
reference to our Livestock Mandatory Reporting?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Certainly, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. The 
issue before you and your Committee is will mandatory price 
reporting for purchasing be enough to fix this market? And our 
concern is that if we shoot one bullet to try and cure a 
problem that has gone on for far too long, that we are going to 
decimate part of the producers, and let me explain why. 
Because, we think we are going to hit the packers, and I am all 
for hitting the packers, I will tell you that, but I think the 
bullet's not going to go at the packer. The bullet's going to 
go at the feeder, and then trickle down to the cow-calf 
operator. Because if that packer says, I am not going to 
purchase your cattle today because I have a certain quota that 
I have to meet of a different criteria, suddenly we are going 
to make commodity cattle.
    And our producers are proud of their cattle, and they want 
to be able to market their cattle at a higher level, and it is 
up to us to be able to have alternate marketing plans for them 
to be able to do that. And I am just concerned that Congress is 
going to overshoot, and try and exercise a one-size-fits-all 
answer.
    The Chairman. And let me ask you, what actions or changes 
do you feel would've helped to mitigate the disruptions in the 
meat supply in 2020?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Well, first and foremost, we need more 
capacity. I mean, you can get to the bottom of everything on 
here, we have let this market get down to so few players that 
they are largely controlling what is happening. Now, certainly, 
nobody could predict a pandemic, but if we had more packing 
capacity, they wouldn't have this funnel that we have to pour 
everything through. And the efforts that are happening through 
USDA right now, and through Congress, on increasing more 
packing capacity is really what we need. But I will tell you 
this, from NCBA's standpoint, we don't want that money that you 
are giving out to go to the four large packers. They don't need 
any more money. We need that to go to the small producers, and 
the medium-sized regional plants, because they can make a 
difference for us.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Now, Mr. Blubaugh, I wrote down--
and you made a statement relative to manipulation of the 
marketplace. Now, give us some examples, who's doing that? What 
companies?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Sure. I would say that the Livestock 
Reporting Act of 1999 (Pub. L. 106-78, Title IX) is very, very 
important for transparency in the marketplace, but here's the 
problem. With the current law, and it needs to be updated for 
modern times, you have so much of the live cattle market is now 
sold on a contract basis, with the AMAs, or the marketing 
agreements that they have, and very little of it is sold on a 
cash basis anymore. When this law was first written, most of 
the cattle were sold on a cash basis. And because of the 
private information that is in these marketing agreements, 
these alternative marketing agreements, we don't have true 
price transparency USDA is not allowed to collect that data, 
because of the privacy laws, and they are proprietary 
information. We would urge that that rule be changed, that law 
be changed, that all of the livestock marketing arrangements 
must be reported the same as the cash basis.
    The Chairman. I see. And let me just ask you, I have a few 
seconds here, in your testimony, you made references to other 
ways to increase capacity, such as training, labor, education. 
Can you elaborate on those efforts, as well as how they tackle 
the workforce issues?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Sure. In Oklahoma, Governor Stitt allocated 
$10 million of the first round of CARES money to fund small 
processors to get opened up, and to re-work old existing plants 
to get them up to USDA standards. And so we did that. One of 
the problems that we are running into in getting these plants 
open is both labor, of course, skilled labor I am talking 
about, and then the second thing is USDA inspectors.
    The Chairman. Yes.
    Mr. Blubaugh. We are in very short supply of USDA 
inspectors, and that is slowing down some of these brand new 
plants that are mom and pop owned in these small communities 
from getting their doors open.
    The Chairman. Yes. Well, thank you very much. My own time 
has run over a bit here, and so you can see, this is a very 
important hearing, in terms of our Livestock Mandatory 
Reporting. And now the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Ranking 
Member Thompson, you are now recognized for your 5 minutes.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
apologize for the technical difficulties earlier. I am assuming 
you can hear me now, though.
    The Chairman. Yes. Yes, we can hear you pretty clear.
    Mr. Thompson. I saw the nod of the head, so I figured that 
was a yes. And thank you to all the witnesses on the panel. 
This is, as the Chairman said, an incredibly important topic, 
and a very timely topic, and I would say critical. So I want to 
start out with Mr. Leger. Your testimony cautions against the 
sort of government interventions you previously experienced in 
France. Can you elaborate on what you saw, and the lessons 
learned that should be kept in mind, as new legislation and 
regulations are considered?
    Mr. Leger. Yes. Thank you for asking the question: 40 years 
ago France, trying to support the producers, and trying to find 
ways to get support to producers, so they pushed toward feeding 
young bulls. And--so the slaughterhouses--and the way they fed 
the push was through co-op. And the slaughterhouses had to buy 
those young bulls, and the price of those young bulls, the 
price of the meat, was regulated, so the government was fixing 
the price. The problem was we had put in place protection at 
the level of the producers. We killed those bulls at a certain 
price, but there was no market. So all the product end up in 
freezers, and the government after had to sell the product to 
other countries at huge discount. And I just don't believe it 
is good policies. It is not good to take the taxpayer money 
and--to put it this way. So I am just cautioning against these 
kind of things.
    Mr. Thompson. Mr. Wilkinson, how does a shortage of beef 
processing capacity affect the cattle producers' negotiating 
leverage in fed cattle transactions?
    Mr. Wilkinson.--and we need to be able to better 
accommodate that by increasing capacity, and nothing is more 
important right now than increased processing capacity to 
America's farmers and ranchers.
    Mr. Thompson. Well, thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, can I 
inquire how much time I have left.
    The Chairman. You have time, but I want to make sure that 
everybody heard Mr. Wilkinson. I believe his microphone was off 
at one point. So, in all fairness, I think we are all on the 
same path now. If you could repeat that, and then, Ranking 
Member, you could proceed. I just want to make sure you heard 
what our witness said.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Mr. Chairman, you want me to answer that 
again?
    The Chairman. Yes. Would you? Can you hear him clearly, 
Ranking Member?
    Mr. Thompson. I can, Mr. Chairman, thank you. Go ahead, Mr. 
Wilkinson.
    The Chairman. Go right ahead.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Absolutely, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
Again, the point is right now we don't have enough hook space 
in the United States. We don't have enough processing capacity. 
And by increasing process capacity, we are going to take away 
that leverage from the packer, and we need to de-leverage the 
packers'--somewhat of a stranglehold they have on the market. 
If you think of a funnel, we are trying to take cattle and put 
them down into a funnel, and those packers control such a 
significant portion of the market, we are having a very 
difficult time dealing with that. The only way to cause that to 
change is to increase the size of the funnel, and increasing 
that funnel is going to come from greater hook space, greater 
packing capacity.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your insight. 
Mr. Boner, how important is USDA's Wildlife Services Program to 
the sheep industry, and what sorts of tools are the most 
important and effective in terms of predator control?
    Mr. Boner. Well, I thank you for the question. I appreciate 
it. Wildlife Services is paramount to the sheep industry. In 
particular, the Aerial Hunting Program, non-lethal and lethal 
methods, are critical to the survival of not only our animals, 
but our producers.
    Mr. Thompson. Very good. And I just want to ask all 
panelists, what advice do any of you have for USDA as it doles 
out upwards of $600 million in funding for processing capacity? 
What should the priorities be? What suggestions would you make?
    The Chairman. Who did you direct that to, Ranking Member?
    Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, you want me to repeat that?
    The Chairman. Yes. I think our witnesses are--did you 
direct it to any one of our----
    Mr. Thompson. No, none of the panelists in particular. 
Anyone that may have input.
    The Chairman. Any witness like to respond to the Ranking 
Member's question? Are we clear on that question? He was 
breaking up a bit.
    Mr. Wilkinson. I am not, Mr. Chairman. I couldn't hear it 
very well.
    The Chairman. Okay.
    Mr. Blubaugh. I couldn't either.
    The Chairman. Ranking Member you are breaking up a bit. We 
will take another shot with you. If you could repeat your 
question, because the witnesses didn't hear it.
    Mr. Thompson. Fine. Let's try that one more time.
    The Chairman. All right.
    Mr. Thompson. But, to any of the panelists, what advice 
might they have for USDA as it doles out upwards of $600 
million in funding to enhance the processing sector?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. Yes, Mr. Wilkinson?
    Mr. Wilkinson. I will take a swing that.
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Mr. Wilkinson. One of the first things that I would suggest 
is to not give it out to people that are making a lot of money. 
We don't need to give it to the four major packers. We need to 
give it to small producers, medium-sized facilities, so that 
they can make a difference in our markets.
    The Chairman. Anyone else?
    Mr. Blubaugh. I would absolutely agree with that call. That 
money needs to be directed to small- and medium-sized 
processing plants, and not--the Big Four packers should not 
receive any of that money.
    The Chairman. All right, anyone else. Yes, sir, Mr. Boner?
    Mr. Boner. I would just add real quickly that I would also 
add to that, in addition to handing that out to processors, I 
think it is important that those new processors have a sound 
marketing plan on how they are going to move product through 
their system as they move forward.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much. Good 
question, Ranking Member. Thank you for that.
    Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Okay. And now I recognize the gentlewoman 
from North Carolina, Ms. Adams, who is also Vice Chair of our 
House Agriculture Committee. You are recognized for 5 minutes, 
Ms. Adams.
    Ms. Adams. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our 
witnesses for your testimony today. The meat and poultry sector 
have become highly consolidated and uncompetitive. By 
transforming the food system, and transforming rural 
communities, we can ensure a more resilient food supply for 
consumers and a competitive marketplace for family farmers and 
ranchers, and our farmers are a vital part of our country, and 
we must ensure a fair and competitive marketplace.
    So, Mr. Blubaugh, in your statement you mentioned support 
for USDA's efforts to strengthen the Packers and Stockyards Act 
regulations to provide more protections for our national 
livestock and poultry farmers. So can you talk about why it is 
important for farmers in your area to strengthen these 
regulations to give farmers a fair shake?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Sure. That legislation was created well over 
100 years ago, and President Roosevelt used that legislation to 
bust up the packers 100 years ago or so, and we are kind of 
back to that consolidation again, once again to that level. So 
I think it is very important both for our contract growers to 
have protection under the Packers and Stockyards Act, as well 
as price discovery and transparency.
    Transparency is very important. We know that markets go up, 
and they go down. That is not what we are talking about here. 
We are talking about the lack of transparency, and the lack of 
competition in the marketplace for processing fed cattle, in 
this instance.
    Ms. Adams. Right. Thank you. Mr. Leger, in your testimony 
you mentioned that government intervention, such as reforming 
the Packers and Stockyards Act, and Congress introducing new 
bills to place purchasing requirements on packers, could 
jeopardize packers' ability to provide products customers and 
consumers desire, that the industry's advancement goals cannot 
be achieved through what you refer to as a restricted market. 
So are there any ways in which USDA could strengthen the 
Packers and Stockyards Act enforcement that the meatpacking 
industry would support? If so, why or why not?
    Mr. Leger. It is my understanding that there are talks 
about putting a library for cattle contracts. And, for a 
company like mine, I am feeding, as I said earlier, I have two 
types of business. I have a cow-bull business, and this one I 
buy everything on the open market, so it is negotiated. But, on 
the other hand, I have a feeding operation, and the reason why 
I have a feeding operation, it is because when I wanted to 
start my branded product no hormones, no antibiotics, I had no 
one who wanted to produce the cattle for me, so I had to start 
my own things. And today I am involved in genetic, so I have 
cow-calf. I produce some calves, but I buy or sell a lot of 
calves. One of the things that I am trying to do is sell bulls 
to collect the calves, and I have agreement with farmers, 
producers, who would raise those calves for me.
    My understanding is if today we open those contracts to 
everyone, I have the possibility to end up in a litigation 
because I--could be argued that I give more money to the 
producers who produce the calves that I want, compared to the 
one who I may simply say, I cannot buy from you, because that 
calf doesn't match the quality that I want.
    Ms. Adams. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Wilkinson, farmers and 
ranchers are reporting that one of the most beneficial Federal 
steps that can be taken is to permit interstate distribution 
and resale of customer slaughtered meat, so why do you think 
this has not been prioritized yet? Got just a few seconds.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Frankly, Madam Representative, I don't know 
why that hasn't been implemented yet. I don't think we want to 
impede that, and I would agree with your statement, and I think 
that is something that Congress can make major steps forward in 
pursuing that.
    Ms. Adams. Right. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am going to 
yield back.
    The Chairman. All right, thank you very much. And now I 
will recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Austin Scott, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, 
Mr. Hays, I have a quick question for you. Have the swine 
producers received their CFAP payments yet? Mine in Georgia are 
telling me they haven't, and I just wonder if you know the 
answer on that.
    Mr. Hays. So we received two rounds of CFAP payments, but 
my understanding was that they were for half of the payment, 
and there was another half that was supposed to come later, and 
that is the portion that we have not received, is the top half 
of that.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Okay. And do you know if that 
is limited to pork producers, or is that other producers as 
well?
    Mr. Hays. I do not know. I know contract producers were 
included in the last round----
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Okay. Fair enough.
    Thank you. And, Mr. Leger, the National American Meat 
Institute, you represent 350 companies who produce about 95 
percent of the meat products in America. What percentage of 
production from that 95 percent do you think the top ten 
percent of companies are responsible for?
    Mr. Leger. I am not sure I understand the question. Can you 
clarify more?
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Sure. So there are 350 
companies that the Meat Institute represents.
    Mr. Leger. Everywhere, overall.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. I'm sorry sir?
    Mr. Leger. Overall, across all proteins.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. That is right. But, if we took 
the top ten percent, if we took the top 35 largest from the 
Meat Institute, what would that percentage be, the 95 percent?
    Mr. Leger. I don't know the answer. The only answer that I 
know is about the beef, and if you take the biggest--and it was 
said earlier, the biggest company represent 85 percent.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Okay. The biggest four 
companies?
    Mr. Leger. Four or five.
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. At least four or five. I think 
it is four or five. Okay. So you have been successful in 
getting your products into Walmart, and that is one of the 
things that I don't think we have talked about enough in the 
food supply, is such that there are so few grocers out there 
now as well that are actually purchasing the products. They all 
want just in time delivery, and they all have their 
requirements. What suggestions do you have on how we get the 
super-size grocers of the world to carry more product from 
these smaller processing facilities?
    Mr. Leger. First, I am a strong proponent of transparency 
and cost-plus agreement, and that is the way I manage my 
business. And in regards to the small packing operations, if 
you start to open a multitude of small plants that deal with 
10, 30, 50 heads, you are going to have a big problem. It is 
going to be the problem of consistency. Product consistency, 
quality consistency. There is a reason why this industry is as 
concentrated as it is today. However, many questions have been 
asked about the concentration about this industry, and 
increasing the capacity of the industry. And, first of all, it 
is not simple to go and build a slaughterhouse, because you 
need, as a packer, I can testify today, if I wanted to build 
another slaughterhouse, I do not have the money to do it, first 
of all. Second thing, I am not sure I am going to have the 
supply, the cattle supply, to supply that new facility. I 
remember----
    Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Mr. Leger, I want to thank 
you. I am down to 20 seconds. I am very interested in the 
Committee pursuing co-op opportunities. I have spoken with the 
Georgia Cattlemen's Association, and opportunities for 
cattlemen to come together, and to own their own feedlots, and 
their own processing facilities, but then somehow we have to 
find a way to get the grocers to buy that product from us. And 
so I apologize for interrupting you, Mr. Leger, I am just out 
of time on the clock, and very interested in how we help our 
farmers' co-ops so that they can get a larger share of the 
price that the supermarket's getting. With that, Mr. Chairman, 
thank you for the indulgence to run 20 seconds over, and I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentlewoman from Maine, Ms. Pingree, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Pingree. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you again for this interesting day we have been having, and 
thank you to everyone on the panel. I have really appreciated 
hearing all your perspectives on the challenges that we are 
facing today. And, for the most part, really emphasizing the 
need for more packing capacity and less consolidation in the 
industry, and I really appreciate, Mr. Wilkinson, that you had 
a good perspective on that, because really increasingly there 
is more need for slaughterhouses than ever, particularly in our 
region, in New England, where we don't have the capacity that 
we used to, can't depend on just the big companies, so this is 
really an important hearing.
    Mr. Blubaugh, thank you for your testimony as well, and 
being part of the National Farmers Union. We all appreciate 
hearing from them. And I also am glad to hear you are from 
Oklahoma. My partner is from Gore, Oklahoma, and while I have 
never been in your region of the state, I know agriculture and 
beef production is really important there.
    I want to talk a little bit about Federal and food safety 
inspectors, getting them into some of the smaller facilities, 
especially since small plants are so often competing with the 
bigger facilities for the same inspectors. Do you have any 
recommendations that would help level the playing field for 
smaller facilities in this regard?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Yes. I think the Executive Order that 
President Biden put in place cutting the overtime requirements 
for these small plants, that helps, but we do have just an 
actual shortage of inspectors, and we are seeing that both at 
the state inspected facilities in Oklahoma, and at our USDA 
inspected facilities. So we have to address that problem, and 
get more Federal inspectors. Right now the big plants have 
priority, and so they are getting the inspectors. The small mom 
and pop startup plants, they are having very much trouble 
getting inspectors in there.
    Ms. Pingree. Yes, and I concur with you on that, we just 
don't have enough people. And while we know it is important for 
the big plants to keep running, I hear this frequently about 
the smaller facilities, just can't get them. Again, Mr. 
Blubaugh, we have heard a lot today about workforce challenges, 
and I think that is kind of universal across all industries 
right now, but certainly in this one. I have been working on a 
bipartisan bill called the Strengthening Local Processing Act 
of 2021 (H.R. 1258) that would create career training and 
apprenticeship programs in meat and poultry processing. It is 
not something that everybody thinks about going into as a 
career, but I think there is a lot we could do with that. In 
your testimony you mentioned some programs like this that have 
been operating in Oklahoma. Could you tell us more about those 
programs, and any models that they are using that we should 
know more about, or consider expanding?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Yes. I am very excited about our education 
starting up. We have a lack of skilled workers in the meat 
processing, and in management too of these plants. So we have 
our junior colleges in Oklahoma--one received part of the CARES 
money, was actually able to put a processing plant there at 
school, and so they are not only processing animals, but they 
are teaching students how to do the work. We see that also in 
our career techs throughout the state, and we even have some 
high schools now, in their FFA Programs, that are doing meat 
cutting, and learning those skills as well. So all of these 
things together are very useful.
    And we do have one Tribe, the Quapaw Nation in northeast 
Oklahoma, they have a state of the art processing plant that 
they have built that they do--they process all the needs of 
their own Tribal members, but they also process cattle from the 
neighbors down the road, and--with their excess capacity, but 
they are training their workers there. So they have this set up 
as a teaching opportunity to teach both skilled meat cutters 
and management.
    Ms. Pingree. Great. Thank you for that answer. That is 
great to hear about how you are handling it in Oklahoma, and we 
will certainly look into how that Tribe has been doing their 
work. Again, thank you, everyone, for your testimony, and with 
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. And now we will hear 
from the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Allen. You are now 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of 
our industry leaders today, and particularly thank you, my good 
friend Francois, for pitching in, because I want everybody to 
hear your story. It is one of the great success stories in my 
hometown, right there in Augusta, Georgia, and I am so proud of 
it. I have had the opportunity to tour your facility, and I was 
so proud. I want you to tell the panel, I called you when we 
were actually running out of food in grocery stores, and this 
was back in May of 2020, and I said, how are you producing? And 
you explained to me how you were doing it. Would you tell these 
folks how you did that? Because it was amazing. I mean, people 
around the country were shutting down their facilities, and you 
were saying, hey, send me more animals, I will process them, I 
will do my part during this difficult time in this country. 
Just quickly, can you tell these folks how you did it?
    Mr. Leger. So I--being from France, I was watching the news 
in Europe, and I understood quickly that, at that time, the 
pandemic would come directly to us, and my biggest worry was to 
lose our employees. So what we did, the way we did it--and 
thank you very much for the Cattlemen's Association of Georgia, 
because they have been very helpful. But what we did, we paid 
babysitters for our employees, we took mask policies 
immediately, and we never backed off of that mask policy. And 
we made sure that employees who had a fever, who had something, 
they were going to stay at home, paid them at home, made sure 
they would not contaminate someone, or potentially contaminate 
someone.
    And, in matter of fact, during the pandemic, I had the best 
absenteeism rate we ever had in the, believe it or not in the 
company. Compare it to today, today it is very poor compared to 
that time. And so that is how. But one thing, we never closed, 
not one day. We never closed.
    Mr. Allen. Right. Well, I want to thank you for that, 
because it is critical to our food supply in the Southeast. You 
all did a great job. And I will tell you, for all of our 
panelists here today, we have a war on small business in this 
country. I mean, the amount of regulations that are coming out 
of Washington, D.C. are going to kill the small business 
community. We also have about 25 million people who are stuck 
in welfare, work capable people, and we have probably got 
another ten million people sitting on the side. That is 35 
million in the workforce out there that are available that we 
need to get trained up and get to work, because we have the 
jobs for them.
    But somehow, for whatever reason, the government does not 
want to motivate those folks to do that, and I don't understand 
that for the life of me. In fact, the government is the biggest 
reason those folks are not working. And I think some of the 
things that we implemented during COVID have created this 
problem that my friend Francois has talked about, where he has 
this absenteeism now because of the enhanced unemployment, and 
other benefits, stimulus checks, you name it, that the 
government's putting out. So I don't know how you start a 
business now, and where you get the workers. I mean, we are 
talking about investing all this money and putting these people 
into business, and you need to go look and get Francois's 
advice, because what he's been able to accomplish, not many 
folks have been able to do.
    The other question I have is: you talked about working with 
the Cattlemen, and the relationship you have. How important is 
that?
    Mr. Leger. It is extremely important. I believe that a 
vertical integration, and have all the segment of the supply 
chain to work together, is the answer. You need to have the 
cow-calf producers, the feeder, everyone sit at the same table. 
And someone asked me a question earlier about that, and 
vertical integration--and the question was geared toward the 
big retailers. A lot of big retailers, and especially one we 
worked a lot with, is trying to achieve that, to put a vertical 
integration in place. And this is definitely the way to go, 
which is going to be very transparent, and open, put the 
problems on the table, fix them, and everyone gets the return 
that they deserve. But everyone needs to be open to do that 
including cattle producers.
    Mr. Allen. Yes. I am out of time. Francois, thank you for 
taking time today to testify. I appreciate your friendship, and 
if there is anything we could do to help you, you let us know.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Allen. Now the gentleman from 
Florida, Mr. Lawson, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lawson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to 
thank all of the esteemed panelists for testifying on this 
critical issue facing the livestock industry, and providing 
more perspectives on how to address industry and market 
challenge. During this hearing we have discussed a variety of 
events that have created a challenging market condition. While 
a local and regional food system faced some disruption, they 
was generally better positioned to adapt to the changes. My 
question would be to Mr. Blubaugh. You spoke a good deal about 
local and state partnerships in your hometown in Oklahoma that 
helped strengthen the infrastructure of the local supply 
chains. How can we duplicate these type of investments in other 
states who are potentially partnering with HBCUs and the MSIs?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Well, in Oklahoma we had $10 million 
allocated out of the CARES money to go to this project. We had 
196 applicants in our state apply for that grant money. There 
was enough money to go around, and there was 40 operations that 
were funded. Out of that, 19 new facilities either are online 
or will be online by the end of the year. And this was all 
administrated through the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, 
Food and Forestry, very successful program. A lot of times 
things we do in government does not work, but in this case, 
this program really works. Get the money out to the states, get 
the capital out there, to get these small plants going. But 
don't forget to get us some Federal inspectors as well.
    Mr. Lawson. Well, that is great. It is no secret that the 
agriculture industry has struggled to retain reliable, 
consistently well-trained workforce, especially during COVID-
19. Now, I know for a fact that a lot of the money that people 
received during the COVID time, that money is long gone, and so 
people are available. There is no more government assistance 
for most of this program, except to try to control the vaccine: 
the question for all witness, in your own opinion, what would 
be some changes Congress can make to address this shortage, 
especially in rural areas, which I represent some rural areas, 
and ensure that current and future workers have the mechanism 
for reporting abuse and retaliatory behavior within the 
industry? And that is for all the members of the panel.
    Mr. Blubaugh. Well, I would just say training and education 
would be the number one thing. We need to educate our young 
people in this skill. This is kind of a lost art. I remember, 
as a young man, going into the local grocery stores, and they 
all had a meat cutter there, and they would cut your steaks 
just the way you wanted them. And they processed them that way 
right there at the grocery store. But, those days are long 
gone, and there are very few of those left, and this is kind of 
a lost art.
    Mr. Wilkinson. If I could, Mr. Representative, I certainly 
agree. Training and education is critical, but I would also 
think we need to give people the incentive to go back to work, 
and continual payments to people to sit on the sidelines is 
counterproductive. Farmers and ranchers don't get the luxury of 
staying home and collecting a check. They have to work for it 
every day, and that is the America that I know, and that is 
what we need to get back to.
    Mr. Lawson. Anyone else?
    Mr. Hays. Yes, sir, I am in agreement with what's been 
said. Our rural communities, and that is where these small 
processors are at, and we have an aging population, we have a 
shrinking workforce, and it is a challenge to find folks. But, 
now these small plants, they are doing more and more business. 
My youngest son actually works for one, really enjoying it. But 
there is a need to educate and train folks to do that. But the 
main thing is we need more workers out here in the rural areas.
    Mr. Lawson. Okay. That is great. Anyone else want to 
respond?
    Mr. Leger. Yes. Yes. Labor is certainly a big issue in our 
industry, and we need to train, but also we need to attract 
more young people to come to work in our industry. And so one 
of the measures that I know a lot of packing houses have done, 
as an industry we have raised a lot the wage in order to try to 
compete with the money that people who sit on the side, the 
money that they receive. So that is one of the--that the 
packing industry has taken.
    The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired. Now I 
recognize the gentleman from South Dakota, Mr. Johnson, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have appreciated 
how much today's conversation has been focused on solutions. We 
are not just complaining about the problem, we are focusing on 
solutions. I very much appreciate that. To me, a big watershed 
moment was a few months ago, when the Livestock Marketing 
Association pulled together in Phoenix U.S. Cattlemen, R-CALF, 
NCBA, Farmers Union, Farm Bureau, and those groups, which 
represent a variety of different interests, and don't always 
agree on a whole lot, they walked away with an agreement that 
they could work together regarding three things in this arena. 
First off, additional transparency, including the formation of 
the beef contract library. Number two, more robust 
investigations. We have been talking a lot about investigations 
today, and I don't know of anybody that is particularly happy 
with those that have taken place so far, and then number three, 
investment in new capacity. And particularly, as Todd Wilkinson 
mentioned a bit ago, outside of the four large market 
participants on the processing side.
    So I have really taken those as the marching orders, and I 
want to work with those groups to do a better job in the 
livestock space. And I just want to call back to Senator 
Grassley, the testimony at the beginning of today. I think the 
Senator suggested that perhaps his 50/14 proposal was what was 
needed in the marketplace, and perhaps even that there was some 
consensus around that idea. I would say to my friends on this 
Committee, there is not consensus on that issue, and, in fact, 
50/14 or 30/14 did not come out of the Phoenix meeting.
    And when we look at the report that was put together by 
Texas A&M, a report that was done at the request of former 
Chairman Peterson and former Chairman Conaway, when you look at 
the key findings of that report, and on Page 12, Key Finding 
Number 8 says this, that mandatory minimums on negotiated 
transactions could, and I quote, ``impose huge costs that are 
passed down to cattle producers in the form of lower prices.'' 
And Page 104 of that report, again, prepared at the request of 
Mr. Peterson and Mr. Conaway, indicates that the reduced value 
to cattle producers in this country because of that kind of 
mandatory minimum could be $16 billion, and that that would hit 
producers.
    And so as we segue away from an idea that is not consensus-
based, and instead look at an idea that is consensus-based, the 
beef contract library, I want to first go to Mr. Wilkinson, and 
then to Mr. Blubaugh. Give us your thoughts, any additional 
things you haven't had an opportunity to say yet, about the 
validity and the importance of a beef contract library.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Thank you, Representative Johnson. You 
touched on a number of points, and certainly the contract 
library is critically important. They have already got it on 
the pork side, and we just need to be able to duplicate that. 
Me, as someone that is marketing cattle, I would like to know 
what else is being offered out there. It makes me more 
competitive, it gives me more of an advantage. Currently we 
don't have that, and until we get that, beef producers are 
going to be at a disadvantage, and that contract library is 
critically important, and I appreciate you bringing it up.
    Mr. Blubaugh. Yes.
    Mr. Johnson. Mr. Blubaugh?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Yes, I would absolutely agree. It is very 
important to have the contract library. Pork industry has had 
it a while. It is the same processors, for the most part, 
process the pork that process the beef, so there is really no 
legitimate reason not to have a contract library with all these 
contracts that are secret right now. And we need to have 
transparency in the marketplace, and especially because this 
alternative livestock marketing agreements are now the way most 
of the cattle are sold today, and it is not with a cash basis.
    Our organization, we support more cash trade, I don't have 
a magic number, whether that is 30 percent or 50 percent, but 
we support more cash trade to establish the market.
    Mr. Johnson. So with just the 20 seconds I have left, is 
there anything that would cause you to tell us we should not 
pursue a contract library on the beef side, based on your 
experience on pork?
    Mr. Hays. I don't see a problem with having a contract 
library. It has served the pork industry well. We had some of 
the same fears, but it is worked well. I don't think it is 
caused the issues that some of the folks may be concerned 
about.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, and Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. 
Balderson, is recognized now for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
the panel for being here. And my first question is going to be 
just kind of an add-on to the question Ranking Member Thompson 
started. Mr. Wilkinson, as you know, the USDA recently closed 
its public comment period for the $500 million in grants, 
loans, and technical assistance to address bottlenecks and 
supply chain issues. What advice would you have to the USDA to 
ensure they distribute this money effectively and expand 
processing capacity?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Thank you, Representative. First, I would 
again echo the need for this to get to the small-, the very-
small-, and the medium-sized processors. And in that situation, 
they don't need just grant money to build the facilities. 
Oftentimes it is operating capital, and the ability to 
guarantee a loan that is more critical for them. We don't want 
to set up a whole bunch of new processors just to fail to watch 
the big boys come in and buy them up, because that doesn't gain 
us anything. We need a framework around these loans and these 
grants so that they can have success going forward in the 
future.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you. A follow up, can you explain how 
a shortage of beef processing capacity affects cattle 
producers' negotiating leverage in fed cattle transactions?
    Mr. Wilkinson. I am sorry, Representative, was that 
directed to me? I couldn't hear.
    Mr. Balderson. Yes. I apologize, I stumbled there a little 
bit. Yes, Mr. Wilkinson, that was directed to you. I apologize.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Well, again, the shortage is the root of the 
problem here. We just have enough cattle, and, unfortunately, 
we are going through a herd reduction right now because of 
drought, which is what we don't want to do. We are faced with a 
situation where we are trying to take a big quantity and funnel 
it through a very small funnel, and we need that funnel, that 
increased capacity, in order to be able to put us on a level 
playing field. I want to be able to negotiate with somebody 
where I can say, you give me a bid, you give me a bid, and you 
give me a bid. I don't want them saying, this is the only bid 
you are going to get.
    I live in a part of the country that is fortunate that we 
do get multiple bids, but that is what we need to have go 
across the country. We need to have the capacity to be able to 
put these packers back on their heels.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you. My next question is for the 
entire panel, and I am down to 2 minutes and 25 seconds. It is 
a lengthy question, but anybody could jump in here. I have 
heard from a number of constituents, and those that work in the 
agricultural industry, about the devastating effects of port 
congestion and supply chain issues in the shipping industry, 
had a meeting on it yesterday, in fact. This is obviously a 
complex issue, and both the White House and Congress need to 
work together to fix it. First, can any of you provide details 
on how this disruption has hurt your members or businesses, and 
second, are you aware of any outreach efforts from the 
Department of Agriculture to provide information, direction, or 
advice to farmers or ranchers relating to port congestion and 
these shipping issues? And that is directed to the whole panel, 
anybody may jump in, and we are down to a minute and 30 
seconds, so thank you for as much response as possible.
    Mr. Boner. Real quickly, Congressman, I can jump in here. 
It has definitely impacted our producers' ability to export 
their wool overseas, and we have seen a very negative impact to 
our wool industry because of that. I have not personally seen 
anything from USDA to try, any literature or anything to help 
try to educate us on how to alleviate the problem, but it is a 
big impact right now.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Congressman, and if I may, certainly the 
lack of shipping capacity has impacted the beef industry, but 
it is also impacted the producer from the other side. The 
producers aren't able to get their components to be able to run 
their tractors, to do everything else that is necessary in the 
industry, and we are faced with a situation, I can't even buy 
fence posts right now because they are not available, and this 
port congestion seems like a problem that the government should 
be able to handle.
    Mr. Balderson. Agree.
    Mr. Blubaugh. I would just add I agree. We are having 
difficulties buying anything that is imported in here right 
now: spare parts, whether it is clothes you see in department 
stores, shelves are empty. This port problem is huge, and it is 
becoming a very big problem for us to operate out here in 
agriculture.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you all very much for your answers, 
and, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. And now I recognize the gentleman 
from Kansas, Mr. Mann, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mann. Thank you, Chairman Scott, and thank you to 
everyone for participating on this panel. It is essential, in 
my mind, that this Committee consistently hears directly from 
the producers who feed, fuel, and clothe our country and world. 
Agricultural productivity results in a freer America that does 
not have to depend on any other country for food. My district, 
Kansas 1, is the largest beef producing district in the 
country. We have cow-calf operations of all sizes, feedyards of 
all sizers, and packing plants. We can't lose sight, in my 
mind, of the economic impact of the livestock industry to rural 
America, and the fact that it is the largest demand driver of 
our crops as well. At least, that is the case in my district.
    I grew up on a family feedyard, and spent thousands of 
hours riding pens and doctoring cattle, and I am passionate 
about the cattle industry. I believe that we all should be 
proud of the progress the industry has made over the years to 
provide a high quality product that tastes great, and is in 
strong demand by consumers, both in the U.S. and around the 
world.
    I have a couple questions for Mr. Wilkinson. Toward the end 
of your testimony, you stated a few things that you think 
Congress should do. You indicated Congress should be focusing 
effort on bringing more transparency to the cattle marketplace, 
support small- and medium-sized packers, promote expansion of 
processing capacity, ensure timely authorization of LMR, review 
confidentiality agreements required of the USDA, and continued 
oversight of the DOJ to ensure the ongoing investigation 
reaches a swift conclusion. I have talked with hundreds of 
producers of all sizes throughout Kansas, and I agree with all 
of those recommendations. Would you mind expanding upon any 
further thoughts on a couple of them, focusing efforts on 
bringing more transparency to the cattle marketplace, and also 
reviewing confidentiality obligations that are required by the 
USDA?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Absolutely, Representative, and I am glad 
you brought that up. The confidentiality provisions that exist 
in LMR are problematic to the producers. We see situations 
where packers are not able to--we are not able to see what they 
are paying because we only have one packer in an area. 
Colorado's a classic example. It routinely doesn't get reported 
because of confidentiality issues. There has to be some changes 
made to LMR to allow for greater transparency in that 
information, and that is just critically important.
    And, part of the other issues are, I am going to speak from 
NCBA, because we have tackled this issue. We went head-on, and 
we went out and formed a working group that actually producers 
have caused greater negotiated trade to occur because of 
themselves, on a voluntary basis. And it is that producer-led 
solution that is going to get us out of this situation. No 
offense, but sometimes the government brings bigger problems 
than you can bring solutions.
    Mr. Mann. No offense taken, I completely agree. And that 
was really my second question for you, Mr. Wilkinson. I have 
talked to hundreds of cattle producers in Kansas' Big 1st, from 
the smallest cow-calf operations, to some of the country's 
largest feedyards, and everything in between. I will tell you, 
overwhelmingly I have heard that we need to: A, increase the 
price discovery in the cash market; B, we need to make sure the 
producers benefit when they provide a superior product; C, we 
need to not let the government interfere in the free market; 
and D, we need to acknowledge we have regional differences. Can 
you provide a little more explanation of the producer-driven 
effort to increase cash trade you alluded to just now. How's 
that going, and what progress have you seen so far?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Yes, I would be happy to, Mr. 
Representative. A working group was formed, and these are the 
grassroots. This is all across America where we had 
participation. These folks came together and tried to come up 
with some solutions, so they set trigger points, and if we 
didn't get sufficient trade happening voluntarily, then it was 
going to cause a trigger. We had a trigger in the first 
quarter. We didn't in the second quarter because we see 
negotiated trade go up.
    Most importantly, what has just happened in October, or the 
end of September, we now have all four of the major packers 
that were able to form a packer silo, and get their 
information, and find out how they are truly participating in 
negotiated trade. And, with that information, we are going to 
be able to develop a framework, where if these packers aren't 
going to participate, we are going to know it, and then we are 
going to have to take the next step. Right now the producers 
are leading the charge, and I have to give them hats off. They 
are doing a great job.
    Mr. Mann. Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson. I believe I am out of 
time. I appreciate everyone on the panel for being here today. 
Mr. Wilkinson, thanks for the further explanations. I yield 
back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Now I recognize the gentleman from 
Iowa, Mr. Feenstra, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Feenstra. Thank you, Chairman Scott, and thank you, 
Ranking Member Thompson. We have a problem. We have a problem. 
I probably represent the most independent producers of anywhere 
in the country, and my producers sometimes can't even get a 
bid. Can't even get a bid, unless you are vertically 
integrated, of course. So I talked to Secretary Vilsack this 
morning about the importance of price discovery measures within 
the cattle market. Mr. Blubaugh, can you share how increased 
price transparency and true price discovery measures included 
in long-term reauthorization of Livestock Mandatory Reporting 
may benefit the market participants?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Sure. It is just simply transparency. If we 
can get that contract library, we can get that data in there on 
all of the sales, and not just part of the sales, reported, 
that is going to help us a lot, be able to decide what really 
is the true value of our cattle, because it is so difficult 
right now.
    You see the price of box beef at record high prices, the 
price in the grocery stores are very high, but at the very same 
time, our ranchers--prices are going down, and continuing to go 
down. And every time we see a black swan event, which we have 
seen a cyberattack on some of the large processors that have 
shut them down, we have seen a fire up at Holcomb, Kansas that 
shut one of the large plants down, and then during the 
pandemic, with sick workers, that shut many plants down. And, 
one of these large plants that goes down, offline, for any 
reason whatsoever is nearly five percent of our beef capacity 
in processing, and so we are just way too consolidated, has led 
us into this problem.
    Mr. Feenstra. Yes, I would agree. I mean, it is hook space, 
shackle space, it is pricing, it is cash price. I am just 
trying to find my way of what we can do, as Congress. I do not 
agree that it is just simply hands off and let it play out. It 
is just not. I mean, the four packers, they have their way 
right now. They are making an incredible amount of profits, 
right? My in-laws, people I know, they are losing $120 a head. 
So my question to you also would be what do you think of 50/14 
proposal that Grassley and Fischer sort of are looking at?
    Mr. Blubaugh. Senator Grassley spoke a little bit this 
morning that he was in negotiations with Senator Fischer on 
coming up with a compromise bill to kind of mesh those two 
together. I think that is a great idea, I think it is the right 
direction that we need to go in, so I don't have the magic 
number of the best way. I know different regions of the country 
there is more cash trade in some areas and less in others. I 
will tell you in the Southern Plains, it is very low cash 
trade, below 20 percent in most weeks, so it is almost non-
existent in the Southern Plains.
    Mr. Feenstra. Yes. Right. I would agree with you, and that 
is the trouble. I think the producers in Iowa are just trying 
to make a living, and just trying to get some fairness in the 
market, and that just doesn't seem to happen.
    I want to pivot just a little bit to Mr. Hays on the swine 
industry. I have about a minute left. Can you just talk about 
African Swine Fever, and that we have a possible vaccine, the 
ASF vaccine, and what your thoughts are on how we can prevent 
this as we move forward, and is this an opportunity for us? Mr. 
Hays, if you could just extrapolate on that?
    Mr. Hays. Sure. Where we need to focus, Congressman, is 
keeping it out of the country, obviously, and that is why so 
much focus has been put on Dominican Republic and Haiti, 
because it is so close to us, and we would worry about it 
getting into the wild pig population.
    We are very supportive of the vaccine, we are excited about 
the vaccine, but that is more of a tool to clean up if we get 
African Swine Fever here. If we run out and vaccinate the U.S. 
herd without having a wild strain here, then all the problems 
that we are going to have with trade come as soon as we stick 
the first pig--considered positive at that point. So--grateful 
to have, but it is not the way to prevent it from coming----
    Mr. Feenstra. I agree 100 percent. It is just one of those 
things that we have--already had--and I represent the largest 
hog production in all of our nation in the 4th District, so 
thank you for those comments, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Feenstra. And now I recognize 
the gentlelady from Minnesota, Mrs. Fischbach, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Fischbach. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate 
it. And I would like to thank all the witnesses, and thank them 
for hanging in there with us. I know it has been a long day, 
and so I appreciate you hanging around to testify and to answer 
questions. And I would also like to associate myself with the 
opening comments of Mr. Mann, when he talked about how critical 
it is that we hear from producers, because, as we are going 
through legislation and policies, it is absolutely critical 
that we hear from the folks that are actually doing the work, 
that are actually having to implement the kinds of regulations 
and legislation we put into effect, so I particularly want to 
say thank you, because it is critical that we hear from 
producers.
    And just a couple of quick questions. Mr. Hays, your 
testimony included a variety of technical suggestions to the 
Livestock Mandatory Reporting requirements for the swine 
industry, and, big picture, can you explain what kind of 
benefits such changes would provide?
    Mr. Hays. So, yes, basically, Congresswoman, what we are 
asking is just to modernize it, would be the best way to say 
it. The pig market, the way we market pigs, continues to evolve 
and change, and we basically get to make changes in LMR once 
every 5 years, and we are just trying to get the market to 
catch up with where the industry's at, I guess would be a quick 
way of summarizing that.
    Mrs. Fischbach. Okay. Well, thank you very much, and do 
keep in touch on those, because it is critical, as we do go 
through the process of creating those new requirements, so 
thank you very much.
    And, Mr. Wilkinson, in your written testimony, you talk 
about long-term declines in negotiated trade of fed cattle. In 
your opinion, what has been the main driver of that decline, 
and is the NCBA concerned about the lower levels of negotiated 
trade?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Representative, I would tell you that NCBA 
is critically concerned about the reduction in negotiated 
trade. The good news was--or is that we have seen some 
increased trade this year in part because we have producers 
trying to come to a voluntary solution. But negotiated trade 
has to pick up. Why is it going down? I think that is largely 
because we have people using different marketing programs as to 
how to market their cattle.
    You know, 20 years ago there wasn't a lot of formula trade. 
Now we have grid-based trade. All of those are relatively new. 
That doesn't mean that they are wrong. As a producer, if I 
think my cattle are worth more, I want to get a better spiff, 
and I want to be able to negotiate that with the person that I 
am selling my cattle to. And, unfortunately, that doesn't mean 
I am going to take a bid from JBS, or take a bid from Tyson, or 
all of those. I want to be able to negotiate my cattle as a 
premium. So if I am selling certified Angus beef, I want to 
capture that premium. So, when I do that, I take it out of the 
direct cash negotiated trade, and that is part of the issue.
    I am not going to say it is a problem. It is the nature of 
where we are right now, but we still have to have price 
discovery, and we can't have everything based off of AMAs.
    Mrs. Fischbach. Thank you very much, I appreciate that. And 
then finally, Mr. Leger, how might government mandates on those 
required thresholds for cash purchases of cattle affect your 
business model?
    Mr. Leger. So I am in a different part of the United 
States, because I am in the Southeast. As you may know, we are 
not feeding very much cattle over there, but we are more a cow-
calf producer. In regard to my business, I am buying all my 
cows on the cash market--it is negotiated. So basically we are 
in auction barns, and we have three, four, five packers that 
bid for the same cow, and that is how I buy. And I have another 
type of buy that--where I put my grid every day out to certain 
buyers, and they deliver the cattle based on the price that I 
have put out. It is their choice. They have no obligation to 
come and deliver the cattle. If the price satisfies them, they 
come to me, and they are supplied.
    Mrs. Fischbach. Well, I thank you, and again, thank you to 
all of the witnesses. I really do appreciate you being here. 
And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my 13 seconds.
    The Chairman. Well, thank you for that. The gentleman from 
California, Mr. LaMalfa, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
it. For our panelists there, Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Boner, we 
asked Secretary Vilsack a little while ago about the vacant 
grazing allotments in the West that are an issue for our 
livestock folks, and so he was talking about how there might be 
certain issues with maybe endangered species, or others. It 
didn't sound like it was a bureaucratic issue. What is your 
experience with your memberships on what's going on with that? 
Whether it is a habitat issue, whether it is an endangered 
species, or some other issue with environment, or is it just 
coming down to bureaucracy and not getting the things out? Is 
there a concerted effort to just not get these allotments done 
for growers? What do you think about that? Tell me.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Mr. Representative, I am going to start by 
where you left off in your question, and, unfortunately, I 
think a lot of that is based on bureaucracy. Grazing is the 
best way for us to provide some forest protection, and 
unfortunately we are taking allotments away. And, cattle 
grazing is good for the habitat, and yet we seem to see a 
bureaucratic tendency to want to take that way, and leave that 
to grow up into wild grasses and game production areas, when, 
in fact, the opposite result ends up. And, unfortunately, your 
state has been victimized as part of that process. So grazing 
allotments need to be given out, and we need to get the cattle 
back on the ground, because that is the best forest protection 
we can do.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Yes.
    Mr. Boner. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I would 
echo what Mr. Wilkinson has just said. The experiences we see 
are most of the hurdles that are put out there are bureaucratic 
hurdles made by people with an agenda, for lack of a better 
term, and it is not good for forests, or forest management. We 
see that throughout the summers, as we watch our forests burn 
throughout the West. And so I would echo what Mr. Wilkinson 
said, that it is a bureaucratic problem.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Well, what do you gentlemen think, in part of 
my district and neighboring districts you also have a wild 
horse issue, you have sage grouse. I guess part of the things 
we need to dispel is that cattle grazing does not compete with 
wild horse territory. Do you guys find that the livestock 
industry is still being victimized by a perception on the wild 
horse issue? And then touch onto the sage grouse, and that 
habitat and such.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Yes, absolutely, Representative. And, I will 
start with sage grouse first, because it appears that we have 
made such progress by the producers voluntarily working on 
programs to enhance sage grouse, only to suddenly have the 
Federal Government decide that they want to declare more 
habitat critical, and kick the cattle back off the areas. It is 
just counterintuitive. I don't understand it, and neither do 
our producers.
    And the wild horse situation, we are not competing for the 
same area, and yet we are seeing bigger allotments of cattle 
moved off because supposedly we are supposed to be protecting a 
greater habitat area for wild horses, which is going unmanaged 
and unchecked.
    Mr. Boner. Yes, I would just add, in my home State of 
Wyoming, the wild horse issue is a tremendous issue, and we are 
seeing--it is so funny, on one hand the Federal agencies have 
these requirements for the amount of stubble height, and things 
that we leave in our allotments, yet on the wild horse areas, 
there is incredible amounts of overgrazing for long periods of 
time that are damaging the resource, yet nothing is done to 
control those populations. And so, again, the bureaucracy is 
not always the best manager of Federal lands.
    Mr. LaMalfa. No, it definitely isn't, as we suffer with 
hundreds of thousands of acres of forest fire on our Federal 
forest lands. It is just so frustrating, as I just went through 
the district yesterday. Our hills are going to turn into--
instead of tree-covered hills, they are going to be rolling 
hills in the mountains area. We all understand what you are up 
to, and how it could be helpful, so we just need to have you as 
partners here instead of the enemy, because there are folks 
that just flat don't like you in this industry, that you exist. 
And that is what a lot of it comes down to with the 
bureaucracy, anyway, thanks very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. LaMalfa. And now I recognize 
the gentlelady from Illinois, Mrs. Miller, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Miller. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this has 
been helpful and insightful. I do have to make the comment that 
40 percent of our ranchers are gone since 1980, and the rest of 
us are hanging on. And I say that coming from a family farm, 
and we run a cow-calf operation. I have visited neighbors, and 
it is very dire. I agree with my fellow Members on this. In 
addition, all of this impacts the rural economy. So, anyway, I 
do have a question, for Mr. Wilkinson. As a cow-calf producers 
and cattle feeder, do you believe that a cash market mandate 
would make you more money on your cattle? And if so, do you 
have an idea of what that threshold should be?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Actually, I believe, as a cow-calf operator, 
a cash market mandate is going to interfere with my business. 
It is going to be telling the feedlot owner whether or not they 
can sell their cattle because the packer suddenly has this new 
mandate that they have to comply with, and it gives another 
bullet in the packer's quiver, and they don't need any more 
bullets. We need to take away some of that, and our producers 
are very concerned that they are going to get taken--their free 
choice is going to get taken away. They want to be able to 
market their cattle the way they want to market their cattle. 
Don't tell us how we have to market our cattle. And you can say 
I am going to tell the packer, but the packer's going to tell 
us, because that is the nature of the market right now.
    Mrs. Miller. Thank you. And then I have another question 
relating to constituents that have reached out to me in light 
of expanding opportunities for small operation packers opening. 
Do you think it is viable to allow veterinarians to be licensed 
to do meat inspection in processing facilities? Do you think 
there is a place for this in the livestock industry?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Madam Representative, if the veterinarian is 
trained, and has the ability to do that, absolutely. We need 
more inspectors to be able to increase the smaller operations. 
We are looking for any solutions that we can put out there to 
increase the small producer production, because that is the 
producer that is going to get the food to that local community, 
that is going to drive the economy. It is not the big packers. 
We need to hit it on the ground level. I appreciate the 
question.
    Mrs. Miller. Yes. And I understand. My son's been having to 
schedule a year ahead of time for processing, so, like the 
other Members have said, this is a serious issue that we have. 
Thank you so much, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. And now we will hear 
from the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cloud. You are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Texas is a state, of 
course, where alternative market agreements are heavily relied 
on, and generally constituents argue for less regulation. As 
you can imagine, Texans generally do not support mandating a 
minimum amount of cash trade. In the last year, the Texas-
Oklahoma-New Mexico region has made strides in increasing the 
amount of negotiated cash transactions. Today 17 percent of the 
transactions in this area are negotiated by cash trade, not too 
far from the company average of 26 percent. At one time packers 
in this region only bought one percent of the cattle through 
cash contracts. Mr. Wilkinson, can you discuss some of the 
challenges associated with the government requiring certain 
levels of negotiated trade?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Yes, and, Representative, you hit the nail 
right on the head there. You know that increased cash trade 
came from producers voluntarily doing that. They went out and 
wanted to make the change. And, again, the issue is if you 
force something on the packer, we are afraid, as the feedlot 
owners, that that is then going to come down to us, and we are 
going to be limited on how we can market our cattle. So let us 
have a chance to solve this problem, because this year has 
demonstrated one thing loud and clear, we are making progress. 
And to all of a sudden force something down our throats, and 
mandate something that the government knows best, is clearly 
going to be problematic for America's cattle producers.
    Mr. Cloud. Can you discuss the benefits of alternative 
marketing agreements to producers?
    Mr. Wilkinson. I am sorry, Representative, I missed the 
question.
    Mr. Cloud. Can you discuss some of the benefits of 
alternative marketing agreements to producers?
    Mr. Wilkinson. Well, yes, absolutely. I will use myself as 
an example. I am producing an Angus animal, I have the ability 
to market that animal at a premium, and I am getting paid for 
that premium. And on a feedlot situation, if you put a certain 
type of cattle in there, and you have a marketing window to 
capture some additional dollars, that helps make a profit, and 
in this industry profit is so small, we need every avenue we 
can possibly take to increase our bottom line. And those 
alternative marketing arrangements are in part how some of us 
are surviving.
    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, I appreciate that. And I had wanted 
to be on earlier to talk with Secretary Vilsack. I am traveling 
the district, and wasn't able to get on, but one of the things 
I keep hearing over and over again from people across our 
district, they are really concerned with some of the tax 
proposals. You are a second-generation rancher. The 
Administration keeps saying [inaudible] proposed tax changes 
won't really affect you.
    Mr. Wilkinson. Representative, I am going to assume I know 
what that question was, because all I heard was taxes, and that 
gave me--my ears went right up. Secretary Vilsack's statement 
that the Administration's proposals on taxes is not going to 
have an impact on--other than two percent is pure bunk. You 
cannot take away stepped-up basis and increase the Federal 
estate tax--sure, give a million dollar exemption, because 
farmers and ranchers have their assets in land, cattle, and 
machinery. They don't have it in cash. We don't have cash like 
that in the bank.
    So when we have to pass it on to the next generation, and 
if my son is forced to pay tax to continue our operation, for 
me to get it from one point to the next point, that is 
ridiculous. And when he buys out his sisters in that operation, 
if he has to pay a capital gains tax on it, we are simply not 
going to be able to stay in operation.
    The other issue we talked about there is an exception to 
this, an exception to that. I have a client right now who's--he 
doesn't have a son, he has a step-son, and those exceptions 
don't work with the step-son, so his operation--and he's just 
passed away--is going to be directly impacted if we let these 
tax proposals come to fruition.
    Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson. I really appreciate 
your testimony. It is so vital that we do everything we can to 
protect the family farms. They really have been the life blood 
of our agriculture industry here in the United States. Thank 
you very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, we are 
not hearing everything, but we certainly thank you for that, 
and I certainly agree with you on the step-up----
    Mr. Cloud. Rural broadband. Rural broadband.
    The Chairman. Yes. Thank you very much. I appreciate that, 
and you made some--ladies and gentlemen, and just--you all who 
have given us your time, your energy, your influential 
testimonies, we are deeply appreciative, because we on this 
House Agriculture Committee are determined to bring and make 
sure that we are addressing these critical issues in our 
livestock animal agriculture area. And this has been a very 
informative hearing, and we thank you for it.
    And we thank all our witnesses. We had Senator Grassley 
here, Secretary Vilsack here, Mr. Wilkinson here, Mr. Leger, 
Mr. Blubaugh, Mr. Hays, and Mr. Boner. Thank you both--thank 
you all, all five of you, for coming today, and sharing your 
views, and answering our questions. And I want you to know that 
I am committed, as Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, 
to ensuring that Livestock Mandatory Reporting is extended. I 
referenced my bill, H.R. 5290, which would extend Livestock 
Mandatory Reporting for 1 year, a policy that has broad 
industry support. My bill has broad bipartisan support. As you 
heard, both Republican and Democratic Members here are on 
board, and committed as strongly as I am to making sure, 
because, number one, it maintains the transparency that you all 
have talked about, price discovery that you all have talked 
about.
    And this, as I said before, and I used the terminology, and 
I mean it, this is our precious industry. It is our food 
industry. It is about making sure it is secure. Where would we 
be without the livestock industry? And so we feel very 
concerned about that, and, as my colleagues and I lead this 
legislative effort to secure the future of Livestock Mandatory 
Reporting, and address the critical livestock policy issues 
that you all have raised and discussed with us today, I want to 
assure you that the valuable insights and recommendations that 
you all have made as our witnesses is considered in our report, 
and our legislative work. And we will keep you involved as we 
work our bill through the House of Representatives, into the 
Senate, and over to the White House for the President to sign 
this bill.
    And so I know the American people who shared your excellent 
testimony, thanks to C-SPAN, is greatly appreciative as well. 
Thank you so very much for sharing your views, answering 
questions, and really shining a light of direction as to where 
and what we need to do. Thank you.
    And so, with that, under the Rules of the Committee, the 
record of today's hearing will remain open for 10 calendar days 
to receive additional material and supplementary written 
responses from the witnesses to any questions posed by a 
Member. And so with that, ladies and gentlemen, this very 
important hearing of the Committee on Agriculture in the House 
of Representatives is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
    [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
Submitted Report by Hon. David Scott, a Representative in Congress from 
                                Georgia
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

The U.S. Beef Supply Chain: Issues and Challenges_Proceedings of a 
        Workshop on Cattle Markets
Kansas City, Missouri, June 3-4, 2021

Edited by Bart L. Fischer, Joe L. Outlaw, David P. Anderson, 
Agricultural and Food Policy Center, Texas A&M University

Supported by: Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. Department of 
Agriculture; The Agricultural and Food Policy Center, Texas A&M 
University

           2021 by the Agricultural and Food 
        Policy Center
          This book was published by the Agricultural and Food Policy 
        Center.
          Cover photograph by David P. Ernstes.
          Page layout by David P. Ernstes.
          No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or 
        by any means without the prior written permission of the 
        publisher:

                  The Agricultural and Food Policy Center
                  Texas A&M University
                  2124 TAMUS
                  College Station, TX 77843-2124
                  http://www.afpc.tamu.edu

          First edition: Published 2021 v3
Contents
Introduction
Key Findings
Contributers
Acknowledgments

    1. How We Got Here: A Historical Perspective on Cattle and Beef 
Markets

          Derrell S. Peel

    2. Price Determination and Price Discovery in the Fed Cattle 
Market: A Review of Economic Concepts and Empirical Work

          John D. Anderson, Andrew M. McKenzie, and James L. Mitchell

    3. How Market Institutions, Risks, and Agent Incentives Affect 
Price Discovery: Fed Cattle Market Implications

          Christopher T. Bastian, Chian Jones Ritten, and Amy M. Nagler

    4. Enhancing Supply Chain Coordination through Marketing 
Agreements: Incentives, Impacts, and Implications


          Ted C. Schroeder, Brian K. Coffey, and Glynn T. Tonsor

    5. Another Look at Alternative Marketing Arrangement Use by the 
Cattle and Beef Industry


          Stephen R. Koontz
    6. Market Reporting and Transparency

          Joshua G. Maples and Kenneth H. Burdine

    7. What Can the Cattle Industry Learn from Other Agricultural 
Markets That Have Limited Negotiated Trade?

          Scott Brown

    8. Implications of Fed Cattle Pricing Changes on the Cow-Calf 
Sector

          David P. Anderson, Charley C. Martinez, and Justin R. 
        Benavidez

    9. Examining Negotiated Cash Trade Targets

          Justin R. Benavidez and David P. Anderson

    10. Workshop Discussion Summary

          David P. Anderson
Introduction
Bart L. Fischer and Joe L. Outlaw \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Bart L. Fischer is a Research Assistant Professor with Texas 
A&M AgriLife Research. Joe L. Outlaw is a Regents Fellow, Professor & 
Extension Economist with Texas A&M AgriLife Extension Service. Both are 
Co-Directors of the Agricultural and Food Policy Center at Texas A&M 
University.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the evening of August 9, 2019, a fire swept through the nation's 
second-largest beef packing plant in Holcomb, Kansas, taking it offline 
for 4 months. A few months later, the COVID-19 pandemic struck, halting 
production at many of the nation's packing plants and significantly 
disrupting beef supply chains. While these were significantly different 
events, the economic impacts were much the same: processing disruptions 
(coupled with a rapid change in retail demand in the case of COVID-19 
as consumers shifted to eating at home and away from restaurants) sent 
wholesale and retail prices sharply higher. In contrast, disruptions in 
the processing sector resulted in less demand for fed cattle, which put 
downward pressure on fed and feeder cattle prices.
    While economists offer explanations rooted in fundamental supply 
and demand relationships, many others view these events as evidence 
that the system is broken, particularly as it relates to fed cattle 
pricing. These events have led to renewed concerns about packer 
concentration, lack of transparency in fed cattle pricing, and 
insufficient packing capacity. These same events have also resulted in 
a litany of legislative proposals as policymakers have sought to 
respond to the concerns of their constituents.
    While some of these issues are relatively new, many have been 
around for a very long time. For example, as long as ranchers have been 
raising cattle in the United States, there have been concerns about 
competition in the packing sector. In fact, as we write this, the 
Packers and Stockyards Act, which was designed ``to assure fair 
competition and fair trade practices, to safeguard farmers and ranchers 
. . . to protect consumers . . . and to protect members of the 
livestock, meat, and poultry industries from unfair, deceptive, 
unjustly discriminatory and monopolistic practices . . .'' turned 100 
years old. While competition is a near-constant concern of many in the 
industry, it is an issue that has been thoroughly studied. As such, it 
is addressed in this volume for context, but the primary work on 
concentration is being done by others who focus more on enforcement--
for example, the U.S. Department of Justice.
    Following passage of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, USDA's 
Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA-AMS) began collecting livestock 
pricing information from meat packers on a voluntary basis. Following 
concentration in the packing sector and an expansion of the use of 
alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) beyond the traditional 
negotiated (or cash) sales, Congress passed the Livestock Mandatory 
Reporting Act of 1999 (LMR) which went into effect in April 2001. With 
respect to cattle, the Act required price reporting for live cattle and 
boxed beef.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



    Growth in the use of AMAs has led to less use of negotiated cash 
pricing. Fewer cattle traded in a negotiated cash framework has led to 
worries about price discovery. As many (or most) AMAs are based on 
negotiated trades happening in the market, some argue that the lack of 
negotiated trades would result in a lack of adequate price discovery, 
affecting all cattle prices. The assumption of many is that more 
discovery (i.e., negotiated trades) would lead to higher producer 
prices. That assumption is not necessarily true.
    With LMR set to expire on September 30, 2020, many saw an 
opportunity to address a number of lingering concerns with fed cattle 
pricing. Instead, Congress chose to extend LMR authority through 
September 30, 2021, and the bipartisan leadership of the Committee on 
Agriculture in the U.S. House of Representatives asked USDA to 
commission a study to look into the issues surrounding fed cattle 
pricing (see pages vi-vii). Ultimately, USDA partnered with the 
Agricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC) at Texas A&M University, and 
this book is a culmination of that request.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The findings and conclusions in this book are those of the 
authors and should not be construed to represent any official USDA or 
U.S. Government determination or policy. This research was supported in 
part by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of the Chief 
Economist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While this book focused primarily on fed cattle pricing, Congress 
also asked us to weigh in on packing capacity issues as well. In many 
ways, packing capacity and fed cattle pricing are inextricably linked. 
As a result, capacity is addressed in a number of places throughout the 
book. With that said, on July 9, 2021, the Biden Administration 
announced that it was investing $500 million ``to expand meat and 
poultry processing capacity'' along with ``$150 million for existing 
small- and very-small-processing facilities to help them weather COVID, 
compete in the marketplace and get the support they need to reach more 
customers.'' \3\ As a result, some of the concern about packing 
capacity may dissipate as loans and grants are made available to bring 
additional capacity online.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2021/07/09/usda-
announces-500-million-expanded-meat-poultry-processing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In carrying out our work, we commissioned papers from noted experts 
around the country on a variety of topics, ranging from a history of 
how the industry arrived at this point to an initial evaluation of 
voluntary proposals introduced by industry to address some of these 
pressing challenges. AFPC hosted a workshop in Kansas City, MO, on June 
3-4, 2021, where the authors of the respective papers presented their 
findings. Four discussants--representing a diverse cross-section of the 
industry--were invited to offer a formal response. The workshop was 
open to the public, and participants offered a number of helpful 
comments.
    In Chapter 1, Derrell Peel provides a historical overview of how 
the cattle and beef markets have evolved over time. In Chapter 2, John 
Anderson, Andrew McKenzie, and James Mitchell distinguish between price 
discovery and price determination while addressing concerns about 
market thinness and undertaking an empirical evaluation of market 
efficiency. In Chapter 3, Christopher Bastian, Chian Jones Ritten, and 
Amy Nagler provide an overview of risks and agent incentives, and they 
tie those to fed cattle market implications. In Chapter 4, Ted 
Schroeder, Brian Coffey, and Glynn Tonsor closely examine the 
incentives and tradeoffs of marketing agreements and cash negotiated 
trade. In Chapter 5, Stephen Koontz revisits the RTI Livestock and Meat 
Marketing Study (LMMS) and uses those findings to provide an initial 
evaluation of various proposals to mandate minimum levels of negotiated 
(or cash) trade. In Chapter 6, Joshua Maples and Kenneth Burdine 
examine market reporting and transparency, with a particular focus on 
the role that contract libraries play in providing transparency. In 
Chapter 7, Scott Brown highlights lessons learned from other 
agricultural markets. In Chapter 8, David Anderson, Charley Martinez, 
and Justin Benavidez examine the implications of fed cattle pricing 
changes on the cow-calf sector. In Chapter 9, Justin Benavidez and 
David Anderson examine negotiated cash trade targets--specifically, the 
75% Plan developed by the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA). 
Finally, in Chapter 10, David Anderson provides a summary of the 
comments made by the discussants and participants at the workshop in 
Kansas City, MO. The box on pages x-xi provides a summary of the key 
findings from our work.
    While we offer these findings--which can largely be characterized 
as urging caution before changing a system that has resulted in cattle 
producers capturing significant value over the last 3 decades--we 
acknowledge the palpable frustration of many producers throughout the 
country. In many cases, their frustration seemingly stems from feeling 
like they aren't receiving the prices they think they should and the 
fact that economists often simply urge caution instead of offering 
finite answers. For example, as noted in the findings, economists are 
generally quite comfortable saying that price discovery is still quite 
robust, but we can't pinpoint the point at which that would cease to be 
the case. Unfortunately, we are limited to what we know, and that is 
what we've endeavored to outline in this book. Further, finite answers 
may not exist (and may never exist) because they are situation 
specific, and circumstances in the market are constantly changing.
    With that said, if Congress and/or USDA wish to make even more 
informed decisions, then additional research is in order. While 
Congress could certainly revisit confidentiality requirements in the 
context of reauthorizing LMR--for example, making more data publicly 
available for analysis--there are legitimate reasons for making sure 
confidential business data is protected. On the other hand, USDA has 
collected enormous volumes of data via LMR over the last 2 decades, 
much of which has never been independently analyzed. As such, in lieu 
of relaxing confidentiality requirements, Congress may wish to consider 
requiring USDA to contract for additional analysis but in a manner that 
protects business-sensitive information. There are a number of 
analytical tools that could be brought to bear, but so far, independent 
analysis is limited to a small subset of data that is made publicly 
available. As John Anderson, one of our chapter authors, recently 
quipped:

          Why do we keep studying the moon through binoculars when we 
        have the Hubble Space Telescope sitting right there?

    In the meantime, we would urge extreme caution in making changes to 
a system that has grown organically over time to reward high-quality 
beef production in a way that acknowledges regional differences 
throughout the country.
    Finally, a housekeeping note: this book is admittedly very 
technical and assumes a working knowledge of the industry. Where 
possible, we've tried to define terms, but we undoubtedly missed some. 
Further, many of these chapters are looking at varying angles on a 
common issue--principally, fed cattle pricing. Consequently, there is 
overlap between various chapters. Rather than forcing the reader to 
constantly refer to earlier chapters (for similar charts and 
definitions in particular), they are left in place throughout the book.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Key Findings from AFPC's Evaluation of Cattle Markets
 
                                 General
1. The beef cattle industry is one of the most--if not the most--
 complicated markets in agriculture, and stakeholders throughout the
 supply chain have a number of varied viewpoints.
2. Our capacity to answer questions is limited to the data that is
 collected, the timeframe over which it is collected, and the extent to
 which it is made publicly available.
 
                              Concentration
 
3. While not the central focus of the study, one can't discuss fed
 cattle pricing and capacity without acknowledging concerns over packer
 concentration. However, with respect to fed cattle pricing, research
 shows that alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) do not create
 market power, because they do not change underlying supply and demand
 fundamentals.
4. While not necessarily a popular position, most economic research
 confirms that the benefits to cattle producers due to economies of size
 in packing largely offset the costs associated with any market power
 exerted by packers. Research indicates that there is market power, but
 its effect has been small.
 
                           Fed Cattle Pricing
 
5. Innovation via AMAs originated with feeders who were attempting to
 capture value associated with improved quality. There has been
 tremendous variability in the adoption of AMAs, with the Texas-Oklahoma-
 New Mexico region by far being the largest users of AMAs.
6. Reliance on formula pricing significantly reduced transaction costs
 associated with negotiation and induced predictability in the supply
 chain.
7. Among the cattle market economists consulted, there was general
 agreement that price discovery in fed cattle markets is still robust
 despite the fact that less than 30% of the transactions are negotiated
 (or cash).
8. While some argue that imposing mandatory minimums on negotiated (or
 cash) transactions would improve price discovery in the fed cattle
 markets--accruing benefits to the cow/calf producer in the process--
 authors in this book argue it could have the opposite effect,
 potentially imposing huge costs that are passed down to cattle
 producers in the form of lower prices.
9. While the costs associated with imposing mandatory minimums could be
 huge, that is predicated on the statute being drafted in a way that is
 enforceable by USDA. The transaction types are so loosely defined that
 satisfying a mandate may simply be done by reporting a different
 transaction type--for example, even if the transaction was formula
 based, a buyer could make a phone call and subsequently report it as a
 ``negotiation.'' The rules of what constitutes a negotiation would have
 to be carefully defined for mandatory minimums to have the intended
 effect.
10. While the economists consulted argued that fed cattle price
 discovery was still robust, they also noted that additional
 transparency in general would be good because it could help build
 confidence in the market. They also noted that a contract library could
 be a good option (or at least wouldn't hurt).
 
                                Capacity
 
11. The experts consulted in this study repeatedly stressed the cyclical
 nature of the cattle business. While cattle supplies have outpaced
 available packing capacity, that will not always be the case. As a
 result, anyone who decides to build additional capacity must understand
 those market dynamics and be aware that packer margins can plummet with
 that cycle. The decline in packing capacity has occurred over several
 decades; it is not just a recent event.
12. As a result, expansion of small and regional packing capacity needs
 to be done in a way that is sustainable and economically viable. While
 the program is still being implemented, the funding recently made
 available by the Biden Administration may help meet that demand for
 additional capacity.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Contributers
    David P. Anderson is a Professor and Extension Economist with the 
Texas A&M AgriLife Extension Service. His work involves the analysis of 
livestock market economics and policy. David received his BS and MS 
from the University of Arizona and his Ph.D. from Texas A&M University.
    John D. Anderson is a Professor and Head of the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at the University of Arkansas. 
He also serves as Director of the Fryar Price Risk Management Center of 
Excellence. His work has involved describing and assessing the farm- 
and sector-level impacts of policy, regulatory, and market developments 
across a wide variety of agricultural commodities and markets. John 
received his Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from Oklahoma State 
University, his BS from the College of the Ozarks, and his MS from 
Arkansas State University.
    Christopher T. Bastian is a Professor in the Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Wyoming. His 
research has largely focused on market issues, production management, 
and natural resource concerns affecting agricultural producers, 
particularly related to livestock. Christopher received his Ph.D. in 
Agricultural and Resource Economics from Colorado State University and 
his BS and MS from the University of Wyoming.
    Justin R. Benavidez is an Assistant Professor and Extension 
Management Economist with the Texas A&M AgriLife Extension Service. 
Justin works in the areas of farm management, livestock, row crops, 
farm policy, marketing, and water's impact on agriculture. Justin 
received his BS, MS and Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from Texas A&M 
University.
    Scott Brown is an Associate Extension Professor in the Division of 
Applied Social Sciences and the Director of Strategic Partnerships for 
the College of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources at the 
University of Missouri. Scott received his Ph.D. in Agricultural 
Economics from the University of Missouri and his BS in Agricultural 
Business from Northwest Missouri State University.
    Kenneth H. Burdine is an Associate Extension Professor of Livestock 
Economics at the University of Kentucky. Kenny's extension program 
largely focuses on marketing, profitability, and price risk management. 
Kenny received his BS, MS, and Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from the 
University of Kentucky.
    Brian K. Coffey is an Associate Professor in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University. He teaches 
undergraduate courses in production economics and futures markets. His 
research is focused on the scholarship of teaching and learning, 
consumer demand analysis, and livestock economics. Brian received his 
Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from Kansas State University and his BS 
and MS in Agricultural Economics from the University of Kentucky.
    Stephen R. Koontz is a Professor in the Department of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics at Colorado State University. He has recently 
worked on a variety of market assessments regarding the thinning cash 
trade in fed cattle and beef. Stephen has a BS and MS in Agricultural 
Economics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and 
a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from the University of Illinois.
    Joshua G. Maples is an Assistant Professor and Livestock Extension 
Economist at Mississippi State University. His primary extension and 
research area is livestock market analysis. Josh received his Ph.D. in 
Agricultural Economics from Oklahoma State University and his BS and MS 
in Agricultural Economics from Mississippi State University.
    Charley C. Martinez is an Assistant Professor and Extension 
Economist in the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at 
the University of Tennessee. His work involves the fields of farm and 
financial management, and the analysis of livestock and meat market 
economics and policy. Charley received his BS in Agricultural Business-
Ranch Management from Texas A&M University-Kingsville and his Ph.D. in 
Agricultural Economics from Texas A&M University.
    Andrew M. McKenzie is a Professor and Associate Director of the 
Fryar Price Risk Management Center of Excellence in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at the University of Arkansas. 
His research interests include the role of transportation in grain 
marketing, price risk management strategies in poultry and grain 
markets, food safety issues, and the informational role played by 
financial and commodity markets in transmitting price signals. Andrew 
received his BA in Administrative Studies from the University of 
Dundee, his MS in Investment Analysis from Stirling University, and his 
Ph.D. in Economics from North Carolina State University.
    James L. Mitchell is an Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at the University of Arkansas 
and an Extension Livestock Economist with the University of Arkansas 
System Division of Agriculture. He leads integrated extension and 
research programs that address issues that span the livestock and meat 
supply chain. James has BS and MS degrees from Oklahoma State 
University and a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from Kansas State 
University.
    Amy M. Nagler is a Research Associate in the Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Wyoming. Her 
research includes using behavioral and experimental economics to 
explore interactions between price discovery and market institutions, 
marketing and pricing risks, tax and subsidy incidence, and bargaining 
behavior and gender. Amy received her MS in Agricultural Economics from 
the University of Wyoming and her BA from the University of Washington.
    Derrell S. Peel is the Charles Breedlove Professor of Agribusiness 
in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Oklahoma State 
University. He has served as the extension livestock marketing 
specialist since he came to Oklahoma State University in 1989. Derrell 
has BS and MS degrees from Montana State University and a Ph.D. from 
the University of Illinois.
    Chian Jones Ritten is an Associate Professor in the Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Wyoming. Her 
research has focused on negotiation behavior, particularly as it 
relates to market outcomes and issues of gender. Chian received her 
Ph.D. and MS degrees in Economics from Colorado State University and 
her BS from Northern Arizona University.
    Ted C. Schroeder is a Professor in the Department of Agricultural 
Economics at Kansas State University where he conducts research on 
livestock and meat marketing and teaches classes in risk management and 
agricultural marketing. Ted received his Ph.D. in Agricultural 
Economics from Iowa State University and his BS in Agricultural 
Economics from the University of Nebraska.
    Glynn T. Tonsor is an Assistant Professor in the Department of 
Agricultural Economics at Kansas State University. His current efforts 
are primarily devoted to a range of integrated research and extension 
activities with a particular focus on the cattle/beef and swine/pork 
industries. Glynn obtained his Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics from 
Kansas State University and his BS in Agricultural Business from 
Missouri State University.
Acknowledgments
Bart L. Fischer and Joe L. Outlaw
    This book is the product of a partnership between the Agricultural 
and Food Policy Center (AFPC) at Texas A&M University and the Office of 
the Chief Economist at the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA-OCE). The work originated from a request by the bipartisan 
leadership of the Committee on Agriculture in the U.S. House of 
Representatives during the 116th Congress.
    The project was partly funded via a cooperative agreement with 
USDA-OCE. Seth Meyer, Chief Economist, and Callie McAdams, Senior 
Economist, managed the project within USDA. We thank them both for 
their support and insightful comments throughout the project. We also 
thank the bipartisan staff on the House Agriculture Committee for their 
help and feedback throughout the project.
    The core of this project is a series of papers commissioned from 
experts across the country. The authors were exceptionally diligent in 
meeting very stringent deadlines and in presenting the results of their 
work at a workshop in Kansas City, MO, on June 3-4, 2021. They were 
joined by four discussants who offered a diversity of perspectives at 
the workshop, as did many others who simply came to attend. This topic 
attracts a lot of interest and a variety of opinions, and that was on 
full display at the workshop.
    Finally, this book would not be possible were it not for the 
exceptional team at AFPC that is frequently called on to analyze a wide 
array of policy issues related to agriculture. Brian Herbst coordinated 
the project within AFPC. David Ernstes served as technical editor for 
the book and formatted the final product. Sandra Norman managed 
conference registration and travel. Allison Wilton provided an initial 
review of each chapter. Finally, this was an all-hands-on deck project, 
with each member of our team playing a role in making sure the project 
was successfully completed on time.
Chapter 1
How We Got Here: A Historical Perspective on Cattle and Beef Markets
Derrell S. Peel
Introduction
          ``The beef cattle industry is caught up in difficult times.
          As economic pressures intensify, reactions tend to move away 
        from the objective and toward the emotional. Calls for 
        solutions are becoming more strident and many are taking the 
        form of proposed legislative remedies. Increased regulation of 
        how buyers and sellers do business, legislative or world court 
        actions to stop imports of live cattle, laws to mandate the 
        reporting of price information and terms of trade, country of 
        origin labeling, and a host of other `solutions' to low prices 
        and to producer-level losses are being proposed.
          There is a danger in all this, and the biggest danger is not 
        in the long history of, at best, mixed results in efforts by 
        the government to legislate solutions to economic problems. The 
        big danger is that all the attention on short-run and highly 
        visible issues will block recognition of the problems that are 
        long run and structural in nature and, in the process, prevent 
        efforts to move to programs and policies that have a legitimate 
        chance of helping.''

    The quote above is an apt assessment of the current situation in 
the U.S. cattle and beef industry. However, the passage is not new; it 
was written by Dr. Wayne Purcell in 1999 (Purcell, 1999). The issues 
facing the beef cattle industry today are not new; indeed, they have 
changed little in the past 30 years, and some have roots that extend 
back over a century. It is perhaps reassuring that the industry has, 
for the most part, avoided embarking on policies targeting issues 
``that are more nearly peripheral in nature and often deal with the 
symptoms of economic problems rather that the causes'' (Purcell, 1999). 
Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling (mCOOL) is a notable exception to 
that, but the United States did back away from the detrimental policy. 
However, like many other issues, mCOOL has not gone away. Indeed, the 
emotions, anger and frustration accompanying recent events such as the 
Holcomb packing plant fire in 2019, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic 
beginning in 2020, and the winter storm of February 2021 have fueled 
demands for an array of potential legislative actions that attempt to 
jump to a solution without addressing the complex structural and 
behavioral issues that brought the industry to the current situation. 
The risk is that these overly simplistic solutions will have long-term 
detrimental impacts on cattle producers, the industry, and consumers, 
and jeopardize the ability of the industry to compete in dynamic global 
protein markets for a successful future.

          The issues facing the beef cattle industry today are not new; 
        indeed, they have changed little in the past 30 years, and some 
        have roots that extend back over a century.
          The risk is that these overly simplistic solutions will have 
        long-term detrimental impacts on cattle producers, the 
        industry, and consumers, and jeopardize the ability of the 
        industry to compete in dynamic global protein markets for a 
        successful future.

    The more pressing need, as identified by Dr. Purcell, is to 
understand and address issues ``that would help the long run and 
structural issues that are prompting the price pressures'' (Purcell, 
1999). There is critical need to understand why the industry has 
evolved to have the structure that exists today and to function the way 
that it does. Individual firms and producers respond to the economic 
incentives that influence their actions. Collectively, these actions 
sometimes produce an industry structure and market outcomes that may 
not be desirable, in some respects, to the broader industry. If the 
industry desires to change or modify those outcomes, it is imperative 
that proposed solutions carefully evaluate new or changed incentives 
and the likelihood that desired outcomes are feasible or sustainable 
and, most critically, to understand potential unintended consequences 
and undesirable outcomes that may accompany proposed solutions.
    The objective of this chapter is to provide a brief history of the 
beef cattle industry and a historical perspective on structural changes 
and the evolution of industry characteristics and practices that 
determine the current structure and status of the industry. Profound 
changes in the beef cattle industry began in the 1960s and 1970s with 
the introduction of boxed beef technology fundamentally changing beef 
merchandising, the arrival of European continental genetics, and the 
development of commercial cattle feeding in the Plains. Arguably the 
most profound changes occurred in the 1980s and 1990s with dramatic 
increases in packer concentration, growth in cattle feeding, increased 
beef grading and dramatic changes in beef marketing, development of 
value-based cattle marketing, growth in international beef and cattle 
trade, and growing captive supply concerns. The 2000 to 2010 period saw 
recovery in beef demand from the late 1990s low, increasing use of 
alternative fed cattle marketing arrangements, dramatic growth in the 
ethanol industry leading to profound changes in crop agriculture and 
feed markets, and more development of branded and specialized beef 
markets. The period from 2010 to today has been characterized by 
several events--a historic drought in 2011 to 2013 resulting in 
unprecedented cattle prices in 2014 to 2015, reductions in packing 
capacity, the first significant cyclical expansion in cattle numbers in 
25 years, unprecedented growth and expansion in global beef trade, and 
most recently, a barrage of black swan events since 2019 dominated by 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Most Complex Set of Markets Anywhere
    It is reasonable to ask why the beef cattle industry should be 
plagued with so many contentious issues that have persisted for so 
long. Much of the reason is attributable to the fact that the U.S. 
cattle and beef industry may well be the most complex set of markets in 
existence. In its entirety, the cattle and beef industry represents an 
extraordinarily complicated set of cattle production and marketing 
activities which provide the source of a massive set of beef products 
marketed through a diverse set of final markets and all coordinated by 
a multitude of interrelated market transactions.
    No single graphic can represent the tremendous complexity of the 
beef cattle industry, but Figure 1.1 provides a representation of some 
of the many factors that comprise the cattle and beef industry. Figure 
1.1 shows that cattle originate in a
Figure 1.1. Beef Industry Structure.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          It is reasonable to ask why the beef cattle industry should 
        be plagued with so many contentious issues that have persisted 
        for so long. Much of the reason is attributable to the fact 
        that the U.S. cattle and beef industry may well be the most 
        complex set of markets in existence.

dispersed and diverse cow-calf production sector, which are assembled 
and aggregated through multiple production and marketing activities 
before being marketed from a relatively concentrated feedlot sector 
into a highly concentrated packing sector. Many beef products 
originating from beef packers are transformed into thousands of 
different beef products by further processors and food distributors 
before being marketed through a diverse set of supply chains that 
support retail grocery, food service and export markets. The list of 
factors that contribute to the vast complexity of the cattle and beef 
industry includes:

   Multiple distinct and separate production sectors (cow-calf, 
        stocker, and feedlot),

   Geographically dispersed primary production with many small 
        producers,

   Tendency for multi-year cycles of production/prices,

   Ruminant biology impacts, such as,

     Long production lags,

     Single offspring/interaction between breeding and 
            production, and

     Ability to use a wide variety of feed resources,

   Interaction between production and marketing due to

     Variable production systems,

   Seasonality of the many production and product markets,

   Assembly of animals regionally into larger marketing groups,

   Joint production/disassembly of carcasses into a vast array 
        of products,

   Product perishability,

   Multiple product marketing sectors,

   Many diverse final markets, and

   Dairy sector interaction with beef industry.

    The complicated industry described above and illustrated in Figure 
1.1 involve many different economic decision-makers and these factors 
all contribute to an intricate set of markets over time and space 
needed to provide a steady flow of perishable products. The difficulty 
for market participants at all levels to recognize and appreciate the 
enormous complexity of this massive set of markets and relationships is 
understandable.
A Brief Early History of the North American Cattle Industry
    Christopher Columbus brought cattle to the New World on his second 
voyage in 1493. In 1521, Hernan Cortes brought cattle to present day 
Mexico. The same year, Ponce de Leon brought cattle to present day 
Florida, though it likely was subsequent introductions that established 
cattle in the southeast United States. Cattle proliferated in central 
Mexico and moved north in the 16th century following the mining 
industry. By the early 17th century, cattle reached the Rio Grande and 
moved into present-day Texas, brought by the Spanish missions 
established in the region. Through the 17th and 18th centuries, Spanish 
cattle, escaped from or released by the missions and perhaps reflecting 
a touch of oxen breeding, became established and evolved into the 
iconic Texas Longhorn, running wild over a huge territory in present-
day Texas.
    The cattle industry that we recognize today really began in the 
post-Civil War period as returning soldiers established or reclaimed 
ranches abandoned before the war. Burgeoning beef demand in population 
centers in the eastern United States led to the roundup of millions of 
Longhorn cattle and resulted in the signature cattle drives in the late 
19th century. It was also during this period that one of the most 
salient characteristics of the cattle industry emerged . . . the cattle 
cycle. Figure 1.2 shows the inventory of cattle and calves since 1867 
and the pronounced tendency of the industry to experience multi-year 
cycles of inventory expansion and liquidation. The cyclical tendency 
has persisted regardless of whether the industry was trending higher or 
lower in overall inventory and is still a characteristic feature of the 
industry today.
Figure 1.2. All Cattle and Calves, 1867-2021.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.

    The era of open range and cattle drives was short lived as barbed 
wire fenced the range and westward expansion of railroads increased 
access to railheads. By the late 19th century, major stockyards 
developed next to packing companies in Chicago, Omaha, Kansas City, 
Fort Worth, and Oklahoma City. Cattle shipped to these terminal 
markets, mostly by rail, were traded by private treaty through 
stockyard commission companies. As the trucking industry developed, the 
influence of the railroads declined, and the role of the central 
stockyards declined. In the 1950s, packing companies began to relocate 
closer to cattle feeding and the large urban stockyards like Chicago, 
Kansas City, and Fort Worth declined and ultimately closed. Some of 
these terminal markets converted to auctions and continued as feeder 
cattle markets. The Oklahoma City stockyards, for example, changed to 
the auction format in 1961 and still conducts all sales through 
commission companies, a remnant of the terminal market structure. The 
St. Joseph stockyards recently announced that the auction would close 
in May 2021 after 134 years in business as stockyards and later an 
auction.
Inventory Trends and Cattle Cycles
    Figure 1.2 highlights the long-term trends in the cattle industry. 
Cattle numbers grew, with cyclical variation, in a steady trend upwards 
to a sharp peak of 132 million head in 1975. After the peak, cattle 
numbers declined, with continued cyclical variation, to under 110 
million head a decade later in 1985, then to less than 103 million head 
by 1995; By 2005, cattle numbered 95 million head. In the past 10 
years, all cattle and calves' inventory has averaged 92.1 million head, 
ranging from a recent low of 88.2 million head in 2014 to a recent 
cyclical peak of 94.8 million head in 2019. The January 1, 2021, 
inventory total was 93.6 million head. The inventory cycles apparent in 
Figure 1.2, when plotted from low to low as repeating patterns in 
Figure 1.3, give rise to the so-called ``Ten Year Cattle Cycle.'' In 
spite of this title, the figure shows that the last seven complete 
cycles have ranged from 9 years to 14 years, with only one cycle (2004 
to 2014) being exactly 10 years in length.
Figure 1.3. Total Cattle Inventory by Cycle, United States, January 1.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.

              Table 1.1. Beef Cow Inventory, Top 15 States and United States, 1950, 1975 and 2021.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        1950                     1975                                 2021
             ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rank                                                                                 Percent of   Percent of
                 State      1,000 Head     State    1,000 Head     State    1,000 Head      1950         1975
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        1            TX        3,302          TX       6,895          TX       4,685        141.9         67.9
        2            NE        1,051          MO       2,759          OK       2,189        285.4         80.7
        3            KS          928          OK       2,713          MO       2,035        342.6         73.8
        4            SD          810          NE       2,374          NE       1,900        180.8         80.0
        5            OK          767          SD       2,116          SD       1,799        222.1         85.0
        6            MT          754          KS       1,978          KS       1,477        159.2         74.7
        7            CA          622          IA       1,835          MT       1,419        188.2         83.9
        8            NM          619          MT       1,692          KY         983        525.7         68.8
        9            CO          615          FL       1,468          ND         975        293.7         78.5
       10            MO          594          MS       1,458          FL         929        166.8         63.3
       11            IA          588          KY       1,429          AR         925        451.2         73.5
       12            FL          557          TN       1,349          TN         900        491.8         66.7
       13            LA          475          AR       1,259          IA         890        151.4         48.5
       14            WY          431          ND       1,242          WY         702        162.9         87.1
       15            AZ          393          AL       1,238          AL         697        224.8         56.3
     U.S.            --       16,743          --      45,712          --      31,158        186.1         68.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The U.S. cow herd, consisting of beef and dairy cows, is the source 
of calf production and thus the ultimate supply of cattle for the beef 
industry. Figure 1.4 shows the inventories of beef and dairy cows since 
1945 and the changing roles of the two cattle sectors over time. Beef 
cows made up just 37 percent of the total cow numbers in 1945. Beef cow 
numbers grew rapidly and by the peak in 1975, beef cows represented a 
peak level of just over 80 percent of all cows. Beef cows have 
represented roughly 77 percent of the total cow inventory for the past 
40 years with a recent low of 75.9 percent in 2014. On January 1, 2021, 
beef cows represented 76.7 percent of all cows.
    Table 1.1 shows the fifteen largest beef cow states at various 
points in time and regional changes in cow-calf production over time. 
In 1950, the beef cattle industry was concentrated even more in the 
West than today. For example, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and 
Arizona were all in the top fifteen states in 1950, but fail to make 
the list currently. Table 1.1 shows that some states increased faster 
from 1950 to 1975, with some states having declined more from peak 1975 
levels. Several states increased proportionately more than others over 
time. Most dramatic are the increases in beef cows since 1950 in 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas, none of which made the list in 1950. 
North Dakota made the top fifteen by 1975 and increased to number nine 
currently. Several traditionally large beef cow states increased in 
rank from 1950 including Oklahoma and Missouri, while others remained 
highly ranked including Florida, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska and South 
Dakota. Iowa increased in rank from 1950 to 1975 then dropped 
significantly to 2021, at only 48.5 percent of the 1975 level.
Figure 1.4. United States Cow Inventory, 1945-2021.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.5. Cattle on Feed and All Cattle and Calves Inventory, 1,000 
        head, January 1.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.
Dairy Sector Impacts
    The dairy industry operates under economic forces that drive milk 
production. While these are quite separate from the beef industry, the 
animals used in dairy production ultimately become part of the beef 
supply. Slaughtered animals include male dairy calves, culled dairy 
replacement heifers, and culled dairy cows. The dairy sector is 
generally more stable and not, for example, subject to the cyclical 
variation typical of the beef cattle industry. However, normal dairy 
industry dynamics can sometimes serve to compound and exaggerate beef 
industry dynamics and at other times offset and mute beef industry 
dynamics. On occasion, the dairy industry has been the source of 
dramatic shocks to cattle markets, most notably the infamous (from a 
beef perspective) dairy herd buyout in 1986. On average, the dairy 
sector contributes 15 to 20 percent of total beef supplies.
Figure 1.6. Cattle on Feed Share, Selected States, 1,000 head, January 
        1.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.

    Dairy animals are discounted for their poorer productivity (gains, 
feed efficiency, etc.) as well as carcass yield and muscle 
conformation. Dairy steers are typically placed on feed at light 
weights and fed in feedlots for roughly a year. Because dairy genetics 
are very uniform, dairy steers finish very predictably and consistently 
produce high levels of Choice and Prime carcasses.
    The previously described dairy production practices are changing 
rapidly at the current time. The availability of sexed semen is 
allowing the dairy industry to focus artificial insemination on the 
highest quality cows for producing replacement heifers while breeding 
the remaining cows (sometimes using semen sexed for male animals) to 
beef breeds to produce beef-dairy crossbred calves that will perform 
and be valued more closely to beef calves. The sharp distinction 
between beef and dairy calves in beef production will become much more 
blurry in the coming years.
Cattle Feeding
    Cattle feeding developed rapidly in the post-World-War II period in 
the Corn Belt as farmer-feeders used cattle and hog feeding to market 
corn production. During this period, interest in carcass grading 
increased as consumer preferences for marbled beef developed. After 
limited beginnings in the 1950s, large commercial feedlots developed in 
the Plains in the 1960s and cattle feeding expanded rapidly. The 
feedlot inventory was just under ten million head in 1965, increased to 
12.5 million head in 1985, and was 14.7 million head in 2021 (Figure 
1.5). Figure 1.6 shows the shares of cattle on feed total by state and 
changes at these three points in time. The decrease in Midwest cattle 
feeding, including Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, is apparent in 
Figure 1.6. Just as obvious is the increase in cattle feeding in Texas, 
Kansas, Colorado, and additional growth in Nebraska. Cattle feeding in 
the Plains increased rapidly in the 1960s and early 70s with the 
development of irrigated crop agriculture that increased feedgrain 
supplies in the region and the use of steam flaked corn, which reduced 
the feed cost disadvantage of the plains compared to the Midwest. A 
smaller feed cost disadvantage combined with weather advantages to make 
the Plains region competitive with the Midwest. Figure 1.7 shows annual 
cattle on feed inventories for Texas and Nebraska (the two largest 
cattle feeding states since 1977). The figure shows the rapid rise of 
cattle on feed in Texas in the late 1960s, passing Nebraska in 1971. 
January 1 feedlot inventories in Texas exceeded Nebraska from 1971 to 
2015.
Figure 1.7. Cattle on Feed Inventory, 1,000 head, January 1.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.

    Figure 1.5 shows that feedlot production has generally increased 
since the 1980s. This is despite declining cattle numbers, also shown 
in Figure 1.5. Figure 1.8 confirms that cattle on feed inventories have 
increased as a percent of total cattle inventories over the past 40+ 
years. Figure 1.9 shows cattle on feed inventories as a percent of calf 
crop, as a percent of estimated feeder supply, and as a percent of 
total steer and heifer slaughter, all of which have trended up since 
the 1980s. Figure 1.10 shows that total feedlot capacity, as reported 
by USDA, has increased by roughly a million head in the past 20 years. 
Feedlots have been able to maintain inventories despite declining 
cattle numbers by reducing the turnover rate, i.e., by increasing days 
on feed (Figure 1.11). This results from feeding cattle to bigger 
weights and by feeding significant numbers of lightweight placements, 
which need additional days on feed. Figure 1.12 shows that feedlot 
placements have shifted in the past twenty years to include a larger 
percentage of heavy weight placements while maintaining the percentage 
of lightweight placements and reducing the proportions of traditional 
placements from 600 to 800 pounds. This has resulted in a more bimodal 
placement distribution in recent years.
Figure 1.8. Cattle on Feed Inventory as Percent of All Cattle and 
        Calves, January 1.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS data.
Figure 1.9. Cattle on Feed Inventory Increasing Relative to Industry, 
        January 1.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS data.
Figure 1.10. Feedlot Capacity, January 1, 1,000 head, 1999-2021.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.11. Days on Feed, 12 month moving average, Kansas Focus on 
        Feedlots.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Focus on Feedlots, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.12. Distribution of Feedlot Placements by Weight.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS data.
Heifer Feeding
    Beginning about 1980, heifer feeding received much more attention 
and improved rapidly and dramatically. Prior to that time, heifer 
feeding was treated as a residual--necessary, but not worthy of much 
management. Figure 1.13 shows that prior to about 1980, heifer carcass 
weights averaged about 15 percent less than steer carcass weights. In a 
matter of about a decade, heifer carcass weights increased relative to 
steers and have averaged 91 to 92 percent of steer carcass weights for 
the past 30 years. At the same time, the fed heifer price improved from 
a roughly four percent discount to fed steer prices to a par level with 
fed steer prices (Figure 1.14). Of course, there are productivity 
differences in heifer gains and feed efficiency that are still 
reflected in the typical discount of feeder heifer to feeder steer 
prices.
Figure 1.13. Heifer Carcass Weight as Percent of Steer Carcass Weight, 
        1960-2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS data.
Figure 1.14. Percent Difference in Fed Heifer and Fed Steer Live Price, 
        1970-2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS data.
Figure 1.15. Corn Price and Feedlot Steer Cost of Gain (COG), 1970-
        2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-NASS and Focus on Feedlots, compiled by LMIC.
Ethanol Impacts
    A fundamental change in cattle feeding occurred with the rapid 
expansion of the ethanol industry in 2006 to 2007. Corn used for food, 
seed and industrial purposes increased from an average of 2.4 billion 
bushels annually from 1997 to 2006 to an annual average of 6.2 billion 
bushels since 2007. National average corn prices averaged $2.27/bushel 
from 1970 to 2005 and have averaged $4.20/bushel in the period from 
2006 to 2019 (Figure 1.15). Increased corn prices are reflected in 
higher feedlot cost of gain. Figure 1.15 shows how feedlot cost of gain 
(COG) has increased similarly to the increase in corn prices. Ethanol 
production is heavily concentrated in the Corn Belt and the 
availability of distiller's grain feeds favors feed costs in the Corn 
Belt compared to the Plains. This was especially true in the initial 
years of the ethanol mandate. Economists predicted that the change in 
crop demand and use would have regional implications for cattle 
production with the competitive advantage shifting back to the Midwest 
(Peel, 2007). Figure 1.7 shows that the gap between Texas and Nebraska 
cattle on feed inventories began to narrow after 2006 and by 2015, the 
combination of cost disadvantages and limited cattle supplies allowed 
Nebraska on-feed inventories to equal or exceed Texas from 2015 to 
2019. In 2020 to 2021, increased cattle numbers and more time for 
market adjustments have allowed Texas to again regain the inventory 
advantage. However, a relative change in regional competitiveness 
remains.
    The dramatic change in crop production due to ethanol production 
had other implications for cattle markets as well. Ethanol demand 
boosted corn acreage significantly. From 1997 to 2006, average annual 
corn planted acreage was 79.1 million acres which increased to 91.1 
million acres from 2007 to 2016. Because of price relationships between 
corn and soybeans--and the fact that the two crops are often grown in 
fixed rotations--soybean acreage also increased after 2006. The 
increased crop acreage came from many places, but in the heart of the 
Corn Belt, more corn and soybeans meant less pasture. Total pastureland 
in Illinois, Indiana and Iowa decreased by 1.4 million acres, nearly 25 
percent, between the 2007 and 2017 Census of Agriculture (USDA-NASS, 
2009 and 2019). The number of beef cows in those three states also 
declined. The combined 5 year average inventory of beef cows in 
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa decreased by 11.8 percent, nearly 200,000 
head. This explains part of the decrease in Iowa's rank among major 
beef cattle states (Table 1.1).
Beef Production
    Following the peak cattle numbers in the mid-1970s, increased 
productivity in the beef industry helped maintain the level of beef 
production despite falling cattle numbers. Several factors contribute 
to this. In the short run, beef production and inventory adjustments 
are correlated. Thus, during liquidation phases of the cattle cycle, 
beef production increases as animals are removed from the breeding 
herd. In short, the industry must make beef production larger before it 
can get smaller. (Conversely, attempts to increase beef production 
require making a tight beef supply even tighter initially to save more 
females for breeding and invest in future production.) The inventory 
adjustments to beef production are temporary. Eventually, an ever-
decreasing cattle inventory must necessarily lead to decreasing beef 
production.
Figure 1.16. All Cattle and Calves Inventory and Annual Beef 
        Production, 1950-2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.17. Beef Production per Cow, 1950-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS data.

    Figure 1.16 shows the relative change in beef production relative 
to cattle numbers since 1950. Beef production increased as cattle 
numbers increased until 1975 and has increased more slowly since then. 
It could be said that beef production has continued to grow despite the 
decrease in cattle numbers since 1975. It could also be said that 
increasing productivity since 1975 is the reason for declining cattle 
numbers since 1975. Beef production per cow is a broad aggregate 
measure of industry productivity that includes the inventory 
adjustments discussed previously, but also numerous other increases in 
productivity including larger carcass weights (discussed below), other 
improvements in management, and production efficiency. Figure 1.17 
shows that beef production per cow has generally increased since 1950 
from less than 250 pounds per cow to over 660 pounds per cow currently.
Cattle Slaughter
    Cattle slaughter increased from 1960 as cattle numbers increased 
and reached a peak in 1976, 1 year after cattle inventories peaked and 
began a sharp liquidation (Figure 1.18 and Figure 1.2). Total 
commercial cattle slaughter in 2020 was 32.8 million head, down 23 
percent from the 1976 peak of 42.7 million head. Today, the vast 
majority of cattle slaughter is federally inspected resulting in the 
difference in commercial and federally inspected slaughter nearly 
disappearing in the past 3 decades (Figure 1.18). Total cattle 
inventories decreased 29 percent from the 1975 peak to current levels. 
Figure 1.19 shows the breakdown of cattle slaughter by steers, heifers, 
cows, and bulls and highlights that steer slaughter averages 50 percent 
of total cattle slaughter and is quite stable over time. Female 
slaughter (heifers plus cows) makes up about 48 percent of total 
slaughter and are three to five times more variable compared to steers. 
This highlights the fact that the dynamics of heifer retention and cow 
culling that are the core components of the cattle cycle also produce 
variation in heifer and cow slaughter. It is this interaction between 
breeding and production and the corresponding female dynamics that 
drive most of the variation in cattle slaughter and beef production 
over time. One broad measure of productivity in the cattle industry is 
the production of steers and heifers for slaughter. This can be thought 
of as the industry extraction rate and is shown in Figure 1.20. Steer 
plus heifer slaughter as a percent of the total cattle inventory 
increased from 15 percent in 1960 to a peak of 30 percent in 2000 and 
declined to 27 percent in 2020.
Figure 1.18. Cattle Slaughter, 1960-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.19. Cattle Slaughter, Federal Inspection, 1972-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.20. Steer and Heifer Slaughter as Percent of All Cattle and 
        Calves, 1960-2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS data.
Carcass Weights
    Carcass weights have increased on average since 1960. Steer carcass 
weights increased from 656 pounds in 1960 to 907 pounds in 2020, an 
average increase of 4.2 pounds per year (Figure 1.21). Heifer carcasses 
have increased from 546 pounds in 1960 to 834 pounds in 2020, 
increasing an average of 4.8 pounds per year (Figure 1.21). Increased 
attention to heifer feeding increased heifer carcass weight faster in 
the 1980s (Figure 1.13). Increased steer and heifer carcass weights are 
the result of genetics that have increased cattle size combined with 
feeding technology such as growth implants, ionophores, and beta 
agonists that push cattle weights. Feedlot production economics provide 
continued incentive for larger carcass weights, and it is not clear at 
what point a biological limit will be reached. However, there are moves 
at the cow-calf level to moderate cattle size to improve cow 
efficiency. Additionally, there are demand implications of larger and 
larger beef cuts (Maples, Lusk and Peel, 2017).
    Bulls and cows are bigger as well with bull carcass weights 
increasing from 698 pounds in 1962 to 879 pounds in 2020, an average 
increase of 3.1 pounds per year (Figure 1.22). Cow carcass weights have 
increased from 499 pounds in 1962 to 641 pounds in 2020, increasing an 
average of 2.5 pounds per year (Figure 1.22). The difference in average 
cow size between dairy and beef cows means that the average cow carcass 
weight reflects the proportion of dairy and beef cows slaughtered. 
Separate data on beef and dairy cow slaughter has been available since 
1986 and shows that beef cows have averaged 52 percent of total cow 
slaughter. Because of beef cow herd cyclical dynamics, the proportion 
of beef cows in the cow slaughter total has varied from 43 to 58 
percent. The higher rate of increase of fed steer and heifer carcass 
weights compared to cow and bull carcass weights likely reflects the 
impact of the aforementioned feeding technologies. As a result, the gap 
between steer and bull carcass weights has been narrowing in recent 
years and annual average steer carcass weights in 2019 and 2020 
exceeded the average bull carcass weight.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The fact that steer carcass weights exceeded bull carcass 
weights recently is a long-term structural trend that has been 
developing in the industry. In 1976, steer carcass weights exceeded 
bull carcass weights for a single year. This likely reflects industry 
adjustments to the spike peak in cattle numbers in 1975. The likelihood 
is that many young bulls were slaughtered as a result of the sharp 
decline in cow numbers in 1976 resulting in unusually low bull carcass 
weights for 1 year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1.21. Steer and Heifer Carcass Weights, Average Annual, 1960-
        2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.22. Cow and Bull Carcass Weight, Annual Average, 1960-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-NASS, compiled by LMIC.

    Bull carcass weights increased more rapidly compared to cows in the 
1980s. As a result, cow carcass weights declined relative to bull 
carcass weights from 1960 until the mid-1990s then increased (Figure 
1.23). This may reflect the adoption of continental genetics and an 
industry push to increase frame size that accelerated in 1970s. Bulls 
reflected this size increase initially, increasing relative to cows 
until the mid-1990s before cow size began to catch up. Cow carcasses 
dropped from about 71 percent of bull carcass weights in the 1960s to a 
low near 62 percent in 1996 before increasing to 73 percent by 2020.
Beef Fabrication
    The introduction of boxed beef fabrication technology in 1967 by 
Iowa Beef Processors (later IBP and later still Tyson) may well be the 
most significant factor impacting the beef industry in the past 
century. Boxed beef rapidly became the dominant wholesale beef 
technology in the 1970s and profoundly changed wholesale and retail 
beef markets because of the increased value and cost savings that 
accompany boxed beef. Prior to boxed beef, carcasses were shipped to 
retailers or further processors for final fabrication. Swinging 
carcasses are very inefficient to ship compared to boxes that stack and 
utilize refrigerated shipping capacity much more efficiently. Moreover, 
fabricating carcasses into primals and subprimals at the point of 
slaughter removes bone, fat and trim that is costly to ship. Prior to 
boxed beef, most grocery stores had in-store butchers that fabricated 
retail cuts on-site. Some larger grocery chains had centralized 
facilities to provide partial fabrication of carcasses prior to 
shipping to store butchers. Restaurants likewise either utilized in-
house butchers or relied on local further processors to source beef 
products. Boxed beef technology facilitated significant increases in 
total carcass value by allowing specific beef products to be directed 
efficiently to specific markets to meet product demand. Beef packers 
integrating boxed beef fabrication into the slaughter operations 
represented the first of many subsequent shifts of beef product 
development further upstream into increasingly centralized operations.
Figure 1.23. Cow Carcass Weight as Percent of Bull Carcass Weight, 
        1960-2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS data.

    Declining beef demand in the 1980s (discussed below) led to a 
series of product changes and innovations that continue today. Growing 
consumer preferences for ``lean'' beef led to early interest in grass-
fed beef in the 1980s and 1990s that was not, for the most part, very 
successful. However, this interest led to changes in wholesale beef 
product standards from traditional ``commodity'' trim of 1" of fat 
cover to ``close-trim'' produced by physically removing fat during 
fabrication. It turned out that consumers mostly wanted closely trimmed 
fed beef rather than grass-fed beef that generally (at that time) had 
little marbling. Trimming fat at the packer level was additionally 
efficient by further reducing shipping costs and facilitating markets 
for edible and inedible tallow rather than simply being waste trim for 
downstream customers. Over time, more and more fabrication has shifted 
to the packer level moving from primals to subprimals to a growing set 
of specific beef products including more boneless and peeled (denuded 
of fat) products and ultimately to case-ready products. Packers 
increasingly have additional fabrication facilities producing value-
added products including marinated and cooked products and, 
importantly, case-ready fresh beef for retail grocery. With a few 
notable exceptions, major grocery chains do not maintain butcher shops 
in stores and have little ability for in-store fabrication. Some small/
independent grocers continue to utilize in-store butcher shops but now 
can source exactly the set of wholesale beef products desired for the 
grocery case. Previously grocery stores had to find a way to 
merchandise all the products that resulted from in-store carcass 
fabrication. Packers fabricate to specific product specifications for 
various retail grocery customers, further processing and food service 
customers, and a variety of export markets. As a result, the major 
packers produce several thousand different products from a basic 
fabrication process that begins with several hundred carcass products 
and byproducts of slaughter and fabrication. Some packing facilities in 
certain locations have some or all packing capacity dedicated to value-
added programs that operate as sole-source for upstream suppliers and 
downstream markets.
Beef Further Processing and Distribution
    The food service sector consists of a wide range of restaurants, 
schools, and institutions such as hospitals and other service 
facilities and was previously referred to as HRI (hotels, restaurants, 
and institutions). The end users in this sector rely on further 
processing and food distribution companies to provide specific beef 
products. Further processors amplify the set of packer-sourced 
wholesale boxed beef products into an even larger array of fresh and 
frozen beef products including portion-control cuts and products that 
are tenderized, marinated, seasoned, breaded, and partially/fully 
cooked. This sector provides a variety of services for food service 
customers in addition to product processing, including product aging 
(wet or dry), cold storage (refrigerated, deep chill (suspended fresh) 
or frozen), and packaging for back-of-house restaurant convenience and 
efficiency.
    The COVID-19 pandemic revealed, somewhat to the shock and surprise 
of both consumers and producers, that the supply chains for retail 
grocery and food service are largely separate, very specialized, and 
quite complex. Not only are various beef cuts often used in different 
supply chains or used differently, but products like ground beef for 
retail grocery and for food service originate in very different supply 
chains (Peel, 2021). These specialized supply chains have developed 
over time to be efficient and reduce costs but are now revealed to be 
somewhat rigid and lack flexibility that could become more important in 
uncertain environments.
Figure 1.24. Percent of Beef Graded, Federally Inspected, 1976-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-NASS and USDA-AMS 
        data, compiled by LMIC.
Beef Grading
    USDA commodity beef grades were developed in the first half of the 
20th century and have been revised and adapted numerous times. The 
current set of carcass grades were established in 1941 and continue to 
be the basis for the majority of beef marketing. Grading is voluntary 
and the use of beef grades has changed considerably over time. In the 
era of carcass beef, many grocery stores did not rely heavily on 
grades. Much of the Choice and virtually all of the Prime beef was 
directed to the food service (HRI) trade. Instead of merchandising 
Select beef, retail groceries often purchased ungraded or ``no-roll'' 
beef. This changed dramatically in the 1980s as retail grocery switched 
to graded beef and actively marketed Select and Choice beef. Figure 
1.24 shows that in the 4 year period from 1989 to 1992, the percent of 
beef graded jumped from roughly 55 percent to about 82 percent. 
Recognizing that cull cow and bull carcasses are rarely graded, this 
means that nearly 100 percent of steer and heifer carcasses were then 
graded. Figure 1.25 shows the percent beef graded that is Choice. It 
appears that Choice grading declined sharply in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, but this reflects the change in grading percentage from 
Figure 1.24. In other words, 94 percent Choice of 56 percent of beef 
graded in 1988 is roughly the same as 56 percent Choice of, say, 95 
percent of steer and heifer beef graded in 1992. A similar explanation 
applies to Figure 1.26 that shows the change in Prime grading over 
time. The important story for both Choice and Prime has been the 
increase in high quality beef grading in recent years. Choice beef 
grading percentage increased from roughly 56 percent in 2006 to over 74 
percent currently. The increase in Prime grading has occurred more 
recently with percent of Prime beef less than four percent as recently 
as 2013 but increasing to nearly 11 percent in less than a decade. 
Figure 1.24 indicates a slight decrease in percent of beef graded in 
recent years. This may be the result of growth in branded beef 
marketing programs that do not rely on commodity grades. Historically, 
commodity grades were developed to provide quality information to 
consumers in situations where products were marketed in commodity form 
rather than differentiated products. However, most branded beef 
programs continue to use USDA grades as a component of the brand 
specifications.
Figure 1.25. Percent of Beef Graded Choice, Federally Inspected, 1976-
        2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS, compiled by LMIC.
Beef Demand
    Economists define demand for beef (or indeed any product) as the 
consumers' willingness to purchase a given quantity of the product at a 
given price. If we know the range of quantities purchased over a range 
of prices, holding other factors that affect demand constant, we can 
draw a demand curve for the product. Figure 1.27 shows per capita beef 
consumption since 1955. Beginning at about 61 pounds, per capita beef 
consumption increased to a 1976 peak of 95 pounds and has generally 
decreased, with periods of stable consumption to current levels of 55 
pounds/capita. Figure 1.27 is not a measure of beef demand but rather 
is better viewed as a measure of beef supply. Beef is a perishable 
product and will be consumed if produced and Figure 1.27 reveals the 
available per capita domestic supply of beef, adjusted for population 
changes and net trade flows. However, Figure 1.27 does show the central 
fact that beef consumption per person declined significantly starting 
in the late 1970s.
Figure 1.26. Percent of Beef Graded Prime, Federally Inspected, 1976-
        2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.27. Beef Consumption, Pounds per Capita, Retail Weight, 1955-
        2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Compiled and analysis by LMIC from USDA data.
Figure 1.28. Retail Beef Price, Dollars per Hundredweight Deflated 
        (2010 = 100), 1970-2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-ERS data, compiled by 
        LMIC.

    The other principal component of beef demand is price. Figure 1.28 
shows inflation-adjusted retail beef prices since 1970. Real retail 
beef prices decreased from a peak in 1980 to a low in 1997 before 
generally increasing to current levels. Economists combine this 
quantity and price data into models that also account for other demand 
factors to create demand indices that show relative changes in beef 
demand over time. Figure 1.29 is a plot of several beef demand indices 
from various researchers. These demand indices use different models, 
different base years and different price series (some are based on the 
Choice retail beef price and others on the broader All-Fresh retail 
beef price). Comparisons across indices are not valid, but each index 
over time and the relative pattern of changes across indices are 
revealing. The indices consistently show that beef demand decreased 
from 1980 to about 1998 then increased with another drop in 2010 to 
2011 followed by general increases in the last decade.
    While useful as a general indication of beef demand, there are 
numerous limitations to the aggregate demand analyses in Figure 1.29. 
The retail price series are imperfect measures of retail beef product 
prices. More importantly, retail grocery is only one consumer market 
channel and we do not have prices for beef in food service and export 
channels. Moreover, reducing beef consumption to a single aggregate 
measure glosses over the fact that beef is actually consumed as a broad 
set of specific products, each of which is a separate market and a 
separate demand, usually interrelated with many other beef product 
demands as well as other demand factors (Clark, 2019).
Figure 1.29. Beef Demand Indexes, Choice (KSU 1, KSU 2, Purcell) and 
        All Fresh (LMIC, KSU 2af), 1980-2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Purcell, KSU and LMIC.

    Choice and Select boxed beef prices are, in some ways, a better 
measure of the value of the entire set of beef products, but these also 
have many limitations. Boxed beef prices attempt to capture the 
wholesale value of beef products and convert them to a rough carcass 
equivalent. Boxed beef prices are calculated from of a set of roughly 
50 reported wholesale cut prices. The set of products included in boxed 
beef prices changes over time to reflect changing fabrication styles 
and product mixes. This makes the reported boxed beef price more 
closely reflect the value at a point in time, but more difficult to 
compare over time. Today's boxed beef prices reflect products with 
substantially higher levels of fabrication than earlier. For example, 
in recent years, wholesale prices are reported for the Top Blade (used 
to make Flat Iron steaks) and the Chuck Tender, both derived from the 
Chuck Clod subprimal. These products offer higher value potential, but 
they also represent additional fabrication and labor cost. Figure 1.30 
shows inflation-adjusted Choice boxed beef prices since 1980. The 
figure indicates that wholesale beef values have generally increased 
since the late 1990s. Exactly what this means (especially for things 
like packer profitability) is not easily understood. The set of beef 
products originating at the packing level has expanded considerably but 
so has the amount of further processing requiring additional 
fabrication (and cost).
Packing Capacity and Industry Concentration
    Suspicion and animosity between cattle producers and beef packers 
is nearly as old as the industry itself. Ward (2002) includes a quote 
from Senator John B. Kendrick, Wyoming in 1919: ``This squall between 
the packers and producers in this country ought to have blown over 
forty years ago, but we still have it on our hands . . .'' The ``Big 
Four'' meat packers at the turn of the 20th century were Armour, Swift, 
Cudahy, and Wilson. These companies and their descendants gave rise 80 
years later to a new ``Big Four,'' known today as Tyson, JBS, Cargill 
and National. The cost efficiencies associated with beef packing and 
fabrication (known as economies of size) are very strong economic 
drivers and, on the heels of the boxed beef revolution and continued 
fabrication and product innovations previously discussed, led to rapid 
concentration of beef packing in the 1980s (Figure 1.31). The four-firm 
concentration ratio is the percent of the market controlled by the four 
largest firms. The four-firm concentration ratio increased from less 
than 30 percent in the late 1970s to over 80 percent in just about a 
decade through a series of mergers and acquisitions by the largest 
firms (Ward, 2002). The four-firm concentration ratio has been 
relatively stable since the early 1990s, averaging 80.2 percent from 
1993 to 2008, then stepping up in 2009, and averaging 84.6 percent the 
past decade (Figure 1.31).
Figure 1.30. Choice Boxed Beef Price, Dollars per Hundredweight 
        Deflated (2010 = 100), 1980-2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculations by Peel from USDA-AMS data, compiled by 
        LMIC.

    Economies of size in beef packing is well documented and 
significant (e.g., McDonald, et al., 2000). The largest packing plants 
have considerable cost advantages over smaller (but still large) 
packing plants even half that size. However, increased concentration 
means that large firms have market power, thus raising the potential 
for anti-competitive behavior. Research shows that small but 
significant negative price impacts of market power are outweighed by 
several magnitudes in cost efficiencies that benefit producers and 
consumers (Peel, et al., 2020).
Figure 1.31. Four-Firm Concentration Ratio, Steer/Heifer Packing, 1972-
        2018.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Ward and USDA-GIPSA.

    Much of the beef packing infrastructure in the United States was 
built in the 1980s when cattle inventories were 15 to 20 percent larger 
than today. In the intervening time, the cattle industry has operated 
with excess packing capacity as cattle numbers declined (Figure 1.18). 
Slowly, packing capacity declined with several permanent plant closures 
including the ConAgra plant in Garden City, Kansas in 2000 (the plant 
burned and was not rebuilt); the Tyson plant in Emporia, Kansas in 
2008; and the Cargill plant in Plainview, Texas in 2013. The reduction 
in packing capacity--combined with the cyclical herd expansion from 
2014 to 2019--resulted, for the first time in more than 35 years, in a 
shortage of cattle packing capacity (Figure 1.32). Estimated steer plus 
heifer slaughter capacity has been less than slaughter since 2016, 
which means that the packing industry is meeting slaughter demands by 
increasing Saturday slaughter and stretching normal operating 
schedules. This fundamental change in fed cattle supply and demand 
balance is impacting fed cattle markets in ways not seen for many 
years.

          The reduction in packing capacity--combined with the cyclical 
        herd expansion from 2014 to 2019--resulted, for the first time 
        in more than 35 years, in a shortage of cattle packing 
        capacity.
Figure 1.32. Estimated Excess Steer and Heifer Packing Capacity, 2005-
        2020.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculated by Peel from USDA-NASS and Cattle-Fax 
        estimates.
Fed Cattle Pricing and Alternative Marketing Arrangements
    Until the 1990s most fed cattle were priced on averages, at the pen 
level and even entire showlists. Very little quality differentiation 
meant that high quality cattle were undervalued, and low-quality cattle 
usually received the average price. Packers had little incentive to 
differentiate cattle quality since they had to process all the cattle 
anyway. All that was important to packers was to get the average 
correct. The lack of quality signals meant that producers had little 
incentive to improve cattle. The problem was apparent; quality grading 
was low and beef demand was declining. This led to a major push in the 
industry for ``value-based marketing,'' which aimed to differentiate 
and value cattle according to quality differences. The result was the 
development of grid pricing in which a matrix of quality 
characteristics was applied to a base price to determine fed cattle 
premiums and discounts. Both buyers and sellers of fed cattle 
recognized the transaction costs of continually negotiating these grid 
sales. This quickly led to the use of formulas which incorporated the 
grid matrix and utilized a base price from an external source, most 
commonly a publicly reported cash price. In other cases, cattle were 
forward contracted. There were also concerns about packer-owned cattle, 
which diminished later as Cargill divested Caprock Cattle Feeders and 
JBS divested Five Rivers Cattle Feeding in the late-2010s.
    By the late 1990s, these various pricing and ownership arrangements 
led to concerns about ``captive supplies'' (later referred to as 
Alternative Marketing Arrangements or AMAs) and thinning cash 
markets.\2\ One outcome was Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) 
legislation requiring mandatory price reporting of fed cattle. The Act 
was implemented in 2001. Figure 1.33 plots LMR data showing the 
percentage of fed cattle pricing by various categories. The figure 
confirms that negotiated cash trades declined in the 2000s from roughly 
55 percent to a level ranging from 20 to 25 percent. Negotiated cash 
trades have remained at this level for the last decade. Concerns about 
thin markets and price discovery in fed cattle markets have persisted 
and grown sharper recently. Several current proposals would mandate a 
fixed percentage of negotiated cash trade for fed cattle. Many of the 
issues and concerns about thin markets and price discovery are 
summarized in Peel, et al., 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, AMAs commit cattle to 
packers in a formula relationship. While this has been referred to as 
``captive supplies,'' the inventory of fed cattle is not captive or 
under the control of the packer.

          Part of the complexity of the cattle industry is the 
        significant regional variation in production and marketing 
        practices and attendant diversity of cattle industry culture in 
        various parts of the country.
Figure 1.33. Fed Cattle Pricing, 2002-2021.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-AMS, compiled by LMIC.
Regional Fed Cattle Pricing Issues
    Part of the complexity of the cattle industry is the significant 
regional variation in production and marketing practices and attendant 
diversity of cattle industry culture in various parts of the country. 
The feedlot industry reflects this with characteristic differences in 
structure, business practices, and attitudes in different regions. The 
Midwest has a traditional history that evolved from farmer-feeders to 
smaller, independent feedlots. The southern and central plains include 
a higher proportion of large multi-feedlot operations and most of the 
largest cattle feeding firms are based in this region. These regional 
differences have led to marked differences in fed cattle pricing in 
different areas. Figure 1.34 shows the average negotiated cash 
percentage for the three largest cattle feeding areas of Kansas, 
Nebraska, and Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico. The cash trading percent is 
the lowest in the TX/OK/NM area and the highest in Nebraska. Regional 
variation in feedlot marketing practices is a significant contributor 
to the diverse concerns and variable perspectives about the nature of 
price discovery issues and proposed solutions that are currently 
evident in the cattle industry. Many concerns are couched in the 
context of price discovery (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) but 
really extend beyond price discovery per se into the long-standing 
suspicions related to concentration and market power.
Figure 1.34. Negotiated Cash Steers/Heifers as Percent of Sales by 
        Region, Weekly, 2009-2021.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.35. U.S. Beef Exports, 1,000 Tons, 1987-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-ERS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.36. U.S. Beef Imports, 1,000 Tons, 1987-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-ERS, compiled by LMIC.
International Trade of Beef and Cattle
    International trade of beef and cattle continues to grow in 
importance to the beef cattle industry. The United States is both a 
major exporter and importer of beef, and is currently projected to be 
the number two global beef exporter and the number two global beef 
importer (USDA-FAS 2021). Figure 1.35 shows U.S. beef exports to major 
destinations since 1987. Beef exports have grown significantly since 
the late 1980s with a major setback and long recovery after the first 
U.S. BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) case in late 2003. Recent 
growth in beef exports to China/Hong Kong represent potential to 
significantly expand beef exports beyond the current dominant markets 
of Japan and South Korea. U.S. beef imports from major sources are 
shown in Figure 1.36. The United States has long imported significant 
amounts of beef, primarily processing beef to support the food service 
ground beef market in the United States. An exception is beef imports 
from Mexico, which have grown sharply since 2013 and consists largely 
of cuts that are marketed to retail grocery.
    The increasingly integrated North American cattle and beef industry 
includes trade in live cattle between the United States, Mexico, and 
Canada. The United States imports a mix of feeder cattle, fed cattle 
and cull cows/bulls from Canada along with feeder cattle from Mexico 
(Figure 1.37). Cattle imports from Mexico have averaged 1.2 million 
head annually for the past decade. Imports of Canadian cattle have 
averaged about 800,000 head per year for the past decade. The United 
States does export some cattle to Mexico and Canada. These cattle 
exports are relatively small compared to cattle imports from Mexico. 
The number of cattle exported to Canada has increased since 2017 and 
the volume of cattle exported to Canada in 2020 was 40 percent of the 
volume of cattle imports from Canada. U.S. cattle trade with Mexico has 
a long and somewhat colorful history that includes trade during the 
Mexican Revolution (1910 to 1920) when the northern haciendas sold 
cattle to the United States to finance the Mexican Government, and 
Pancho Villa sold cattle stolen from the haciendas to the United States 
to finance the revolutionaries.
Figure 1.37. U.S. Imports of Mexican and Canadian Cattle, 1961-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-ERS, compiled by LMIC.
Figure 1.38. U.S. Beef Industry Net Export Values, Annual, 1994-2020.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-FAS, compiled and analysis by LMIC.

    The fact that the United States is both an exporter and importer of 
beef leads to many questions. The answer is a recognition that beef is 
not a single product but consists of many different products with 
varying demands and uses. The United States exports beef products that 
have higher value in foreign markets and imports products demanded in 
the United States that can be obtained more economically in foreign 
markets. As noted previously, beef imports are driven by the need for 
lean processing beef to support the enormous U.S. appetite for 
hamburgers. Though the volume of U.S. beef exports and imports is 
roughly equal, the value of products exported is typically higher than 
the value of beef products imported (Figure 1.38). Figure 1.38 also 
shows that the total trade picture involves not only beef but live 
cattle, hides, variety meats and tallow. The net value of trade for all 
these markets has been about $1.5 billion annually for the last decade.
    The value of international beef and cattle trade goes beyond the 
value reported in Figure 1.38. The disassembly of cattle into thousands 
of beef products inevitably leads to a mix of products that does not 
match consumer preferences in the United States, so some will have low 
demand. Some products, such as variety meats, would have little or no 
value without exports and would be redirected to the pet food industry 
or to rendering. Other products would be consumed in the United States 
in the absence of exports, but at the expense of higher value demand 
for more preferred products. In other words, exporting less desired 
products boosts domestic beef demand by allowing consumers to focus 
their beef spending to their highest value. Beef is a perishable 
product which will be consumed by someone, and if all products must be 
consumed in the domestic market, it will happen only with lower total 
value. The value and importance of international beef and cattle trade 
to the U.S. beef cattle industry continues to grow.
Country of Origin Labeling
    The 2002 Farm Bill included legislation to require country of 
origin labeling on beef and ground beef. While imported meats have been 
labeled since 1930, this law required meat from imported animals, along 
with ground beef, to carry detailed labels listing all origins for beef 
sold in retail grocery (Peel, 2009). The law did not apply to food 
service or highly processed products. The law specifically forbade USDA 
from implementing an animal identification system in order to verify 
the origin of domestically produced cattle. After several modifications 
and delays, mandatory country of origin labeling (mCOOL) was 
implemented in 2008. The United States lost a WTO case challenging the 
rule and ultimately removed the law in 2015 when faced with expensive 
tariffs from trading partners. Despite the lack of research that shows 
any demand increase or net value to the industry from mCOOL, along with 
numerous studies that verify the increased costs associated with mCOOL, 
the idea retains strong support among some cattle producers. It should 
be noted that there have never been any restrictions on the use of 
voluntary origin labels to the extent that such efforts provide value 
in beef product markets.
Where We Are Now
    In many ways, the cattle and beef industry has evolved 
significantly over time. A growing set of beef products are marketed 
through a vast array of retail grocery, food service, and export 
markets. An expanding set of specialized beef markets is capturing 
additional product value for branded programs based on grass-fed, 
natural (defined variably), non-hormone treated, or other attributes or 
consumer-desired production practices. The importance and value of 
international beef and cattle trade continues to grow and offers the 
greatest potential for sustained growth in the industry. Beef exports 
and imports help to optimize the mix of beef products in domestic 
markets and increase value directly and indirectly. Value-based 
marketing has provided incentives for cattle producers to increase beef 
quality over time as indicated by sharply higher Choice and Prime 
grading percentages and strong beef demand in recent years.
    On the other hand, little has changed. As indicated by the Purcell 
quote that began this chapter, the concerns, issues, and proposed 
solutions have changed little from cattle producers' perspectives. The 
adversarial relationship between producers and packers has not improved 
and is arguably worse than ever. Regional and sectoral differences 
among cattle producers are sharper and more bitter than ever. Producers 
have cycled through a veritable list of perceived villains over time 
including packer concentration/market power, price discovery, beef and 
cattle imports, and futures markets. Historically, periods of high 
cattle prices have significantly diminished producer concerns only to 
see them revived during typical industry dynamics. The turmoil of the 
past 2 years has revived all these concerns simultaneously and added a 
couple of new ones in the form of supply chains and cold storage. There 
are numerous, very real issues and concerns in cattle and beef markets 
now and going forward. These deserve serious attention and 
consideration, based on careful evaluation developed from past and 
needed future research. There are also many distractions. To conclude, 
it is worth repeating the words of Dr. Wayne Purcell:

          ``The big danger is that all the attention on short-run and 
        highly visible issues will block recognition of the problems 
        that are long run and structural in nature and, in the process, 
        prevent efforts to move to programs and policies that have a 
        legitimate chance of helping.''
Summary
    This chapter had two principal objectives: (1) to highlight the 
extraordinary complexity of the beef and cattle industry and (2) to 
provide a historical perspective to understand how the industry has 
evolved over time to have the characteristics, structure, and practices 
that make up the industry today. Both are critical in the face of many 
varied legislative solutions being proposed at the current time. 
Whether we are considering proposals such as mandated cash trading 
levels, mCOOL, or others, it is essential that producers, industry 
leaders, and policymakers understand the difficulty of successfully 
intervening in complex market systems without producing numerous and 
detrimental unintended consequences. Overly simplistic, one-size-fits-
all legislative solutions to complex problems are almost certain to 
impede and interrupt the complicated, dynamic market signals and 
adjustments that coordinate a vast array of cattle and beef markets. 
The cattle industry has historically strongly embraced market systems. 
Many current proposals represent a significant departure from that 
market-oriented tradition and producers and policymakers are advised to 
proceed with great caution and deliberation before invoking simplistic 
solutions with great potential for long-term harm to the industry and 
to consumers.

 
 
 
                               References
 
    Clark, L.E., 2019. Disaggregating Beef Demand: Data Limitations and
 Industry Perspectives. M.S. Thesis. Department of Agricultural
 Economics, Oklahoma State University.
    MacDonald J.M., M.E. Ollinger, K.E. Nelson, and C.R. Handy. 2000.
 Consolidation in U.S. Meatpacking. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
 Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Agricultural Economic Report
 No. 785.
    Maples, Joshua G., Jayson L. Lusk and Derrell S. Peel. ``Unintended
 Consequences of the Quest for Increased Efficiency in Beef Cattle: When
 Bigger isn't Better'' Food Policy. https://doi.org/10.1016/
 j.foodpol.2017.11.005, November 2017.
    Peel, Derrell S. ``An Overview of the Impacts of Corn Demand for
 Ethanol.'' Fact Sheet EFC-02, Livestock Marketing Information Center,
 February, 2007. https://www.lmic.info/publications/ethanol-co-products.
    Peel, Derrell S., ``Implementation of Country of Origin Labeling
 (COOL) in the Beef Industry.'' Choices, January, 2009.
    Peel, Derrell S., David Anderson, John Anderson, Chris Bastian,
 Scott Brown, Stephen Koontz and Josh Maples. ``Price Discovery Issues
 and Considerations'' Circular E-1053, Oklahoma Cooperative Extension
 Service, November 2020.
    Peel, Derrell S. ``Beef Supply Chains and the Impact of the COVID-19
 Pandemic'' Animal Frontiers. Volume 11 (January 2021), No. 1: 33-38.
    Purcell, Wayne D. ``Status, Conflicts, Issues, Opportunities and
 Needs in the U.S. Beef Industry.'' May, 1999. https://www.naiber.org/
 Publications/RILP/ncbawhite.pdf.
    USDA-FAS ``Livestock and Poultry: World Markets and Trade.'' USDA
 Foreign Agricultural Service, April 9, 2021. https://www.fas.usda.gov/
 data/livestock-and-poultry-world-markets-and-trade.
    USDA-NASS. ``2007 Census of Agriculture, United States Summary and
 State Data.'' Volume 1, Geographic Area Series, Part 51. February 2009.
 https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2007/Full_Report/
 Volume_1,_Chapter_1_US/usv1.pdf.
    USDA-NASS. ``2017 Census of Agriculture, United States Summary and
 State Data''. Volume 1, Geographic Area Series, Part 51. AC-17-A-51,
 April 2019. https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/
 index.php#full_report.
    Ward, C.E. ``A Review of Causes for and Consequences of Economic
 Concentration in the U.S. Meatpacking Industry.'' Current Agriculture,
 Food and Resource Issues, Issue 3, No. 28, 2002.
 

Chapter 2
Price Determination and Price Discovery in the Fed Cattle Market: A 
        Review of Economic Concepts and Empirical Work
John D. Anderson, Andrew M. McKenzie, and James L. Mitchell
Introduction
    Price discovery and price determination are closely related but 
distinct economic concepts related to the efficient and effective 
performance of markets. In discussions regarding the performance of 
prices in the fed cattle market, these two concepts are frequently not 
adequately distinguished. This leads to confusion regarding the 
perceived problems in the market, and consequently, potentially 
effective solutions. This chapter will describe both price discovery 
and price determination, focusing on the factors that influence the 
price discovery process in the fed cattle market. To assess the state 
of price discovery in regional fed cattle markets, an event study is 
performed using the reaction of regional cash fed cattle prices to 
unanticipated information in monthly Cattle on Feed reports. Results 
suggest that, while the information content of negotiated prices by 
region has changed in recent years, all regions continue to contribute 
to price discovery in the overall market. This result calls into 
question the need for proposed policy interventions to improve price 
discovery, as does the potential for such interventions to impede the 
ongoing market-driven evolution of pricing institutions in the sector. 
Few issues in the agricultural economy have attracted as much attention 
for as long a time as the behavior of prices in the fed cattle market. 
Questions about the accuracy and volatility of livestock prices--and 
particularly about the relationship of market structure to those 
issues--have been thoroughly investigated and hotly contested for well 
over a century now--with, it seems, little prospect for resolution even 
now.
    A brief example from history should suffice to illustrate the 
impressive continuity between past and present controversies in the 
livestock and meat sector. In summarizing the results of a major 
Congressionally-mandated investigation into meat-packer business 
practices by USDA and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the early 
twentieth century, Virtue (1920) notes that:

          One of the most general and persistent complaints of the 
        feeders is that prices of livestock so frequently have no 
        relation to cost of production, and, taken for short periods, 
        no relation to natural market conditions; that these 
        fluctuations introduce so great an element of risk as to make 
        feeding one of the most hazardous of industries, resulting in 
        disastrous losses to the feeders and in the end throwing a 
        great burden on consumers as well. Well-informed stock men are 
        convinced that these erratic price movements can be explained 
        only on the theory of ``manipulation'' by packers, whom they 
        regard as the beneficiaries of the changes. (p. 652)

    The issues that concerned Virtue's ``well-informed stock men'' 
related to whether or not livestock prices accurately reflected 
underlying supply and demand conditions, how quickly those prices 
adjusted to new information, and whether or not the concentration of 
market power at the processing level led to intentional, strategic 
manipulation of these processes. This would be a pretty fair summary of 
the concerns of today's cattle market participants as well. In slightly 
more technical jargon, these are issues that touch on the distinct but 
related concepts of price determination and price discovery.

          Price determination refers to how the forces of supply and 
        demand for a particular product or commodity interact to 
        produce an equilibrium price.
          In contrast to price determination, price discovery refers to 
        the means by which a particular buyer and seller arrive at a 
        price on a specific transaction.
Definition of Terms
    The terms ``price determination'' and ``price discovery'' are used 
virtually interchangeably in a great deal of non-technical 
communication about markets. However, among agricultural economists, 
these are terms of art with specific meaning, referring to different 
but related concepts relevant to any discussion of commodity pricing. 
In order to productively assess the impacts of changing institutional 
arrangements in the fed cattle market on price behavior, it is helpful 
to clearly distinguish between these concepts.
    Price determination refers to how the forces of supply and demand 
for a particular product or commodity interact to produce an 
equilibrium price. It is concerned not with the outcome of any 
particular transaction but rather with the general price level that 
prevails based on fundamental conditions in the broader-market. Price 
determination is well-represented graphically by the classic, 
``Marshallian scissors'' supply and demand graph, as depicted in Figure 
2.1.\1\ The interaction of market supply and market demand--reflecting 
the summation of individual participants on each side of the market--
results in an equilibrium price and quantity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The graphical representations of price discovery and price 
determination in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are common depictions of a market. 
In the context of specifically illustrating price determination and 
price discovery, though, these graphs borrow directly from Ward and 
Schroeder (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In contrast to price determination, price discovery refers to the 
means by which a particular buyer and seller arrive at a price on a 
specific transaction. In reality, market supply and demand are not 
directly observable. Buyers and sellers lack perfect information, so 
the equilibrium price and quantity are not as readily transparent as 
Figure 2.1 might imply. Thus bid (buyer) and ask (seller) prices will 
vary around the equilibrium price in the process of price discovery. 
This process is illustrated in Figure 2.2, in which the ``true'' supply 
and demand are bracketed by the upper and lower estimates of market 
participants. Bid and ask prices would be expected to fall between the 
high and low prices implied by the intersection of these supply and 
demand estimates, centering around the true equilibrium price.

          Improving price discovery cannot be expected to improve the 
        overall level of prices if prevailing supply and demand 
        fundamentals are consistent with low prices.
Figure 2.1. Price Determination in a Hypothetical Market.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Notes: Pe and Qe denote equilibrium 
        price and quantity, respectively.
Figure 2.2. Price Discovery in a Hypothetical Market.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Notes: Pe and Qe denote equilibrium 
        price and quantity, respectively.

    Price discovery is concerned directly with the mechanics by which 
individual transaction prices (and other terms of trade) are 
established rather than with broader, and generally more theoretical, 
issues of how supply and demand fundamentals affect the general price 
level (Tomek and Kaiser 2014). In effect, then, price determination 
represents a macro-level perspective on the equilibrium price while 
price discovery represents a micro-level perspective on the variability 
of prices around that equilibrium.
    With these distinctions in mind, it is worth noting clearly what 
improving price discovery can and cannot do. Most importantly, 
improving price discovery cannot be expected to improve the overall 
level of prices if prevailing supply and demand fundamentals are 
consistent with low prices. That is, if supply and demand conditions in 
the market are consistent with low prices (price determination), then 
the interactions of buyers and sellers in specific transactions should 
produce a low average price (price discovery). Realistically, what 
improving price discovery can accomplish is to make prices more 
efficient.
    Efficiency is another term that has a specific meaning among 
economists. A market is efficient if prices in that market reflect all 
available information (Fama, 1970). Janzen and Adjemian (2017) note 
that effective price discovery accomplishes the task of reflecting 
underlying information in a timely manner and does so via ``bona fide 
transactions or standing bids and offers whose prices are known to all 
market participants'' (p. 1192). This understanding of price discovery 
offers a useful perspective in that it allows potential price discovery 
issues to be separated from mere discontent over price determination at 
a low price point. For example, are market transactions truly bona 
fide? In a heavily concentrated market where power between buyers and 
sellers is dramatically asymmetrical, are transactions a reliable 
reflection of underlying fundamental conditions or are they distorted 
by the impact of that power asymmetry on the negotiation process? 
Further, as the volume of transactions declines, are there sufficient 
transactions or open bids to inform the broader market? In other words, 
how many negotiated transactions are needed to adequately reflect 
underlying fundamental information? These and similar issues complicate 
the conceptually simple relationship between price discovery and price 
determination.
Complicating Factors: Market Concentration
    The meatpacking sector is, and has long been, highly concentrated. 
The most recent annual report from USDA's Agricultural Marketing 
Service, Packers and Stockyards Division (2020) puts the four-firm 
concentration ratio for the steer and heifer processing sector at 85%, 
consistent with the level of concentration since the 1980s. 
Concentration ratios in regionally-defined markets are generally even 
higher (Ward, 1988). This high degree of market concentration has long 
fostered concern that prices are manipulated through non-competitive 
behavior (e.g., see the earlier citation from Virtue, 1920). A great 
deal of work over many years has sought evidence of such behavior in 
the fed cattle market, but such work has consistently found little 
support for significant negative price effects of concentration (Ward, 
1997; Ward, 1999; Crespi, Saitone, and Sexton, 2012).
    Even aside from the intentional exercise of market power, 
concentration could have more subtle effects on price discovery. 
Concentration in the meatpacking industry has largely been driven by 
the significant economies of size associated with meatpacking 
operations (Ward, 1988). Bailey and Brorsen (1987) note that economies 
of size could directly influence price discovery. Larger firms have 
more total information (public plus private) simply by virtue of the 
volume of transactions to which they are party. If this combination of 
information is more accurate than public information alone, price 
discovery may be affected. Price adjustments to new information in 
concentrated markets may also be affected if one or two major firms 
play a price leadership role (Goodwin and Holt, 1999).

          This high degree of market concentration has long fostered 
        concern that prices are manipulated through non-competitive 
        behavior. A great deal of work over many years has sought 
        evidence of such behavior in the fed cattle market, but such 
        work has consistently found little support for significant 
        negative price effects of concentration.
Complicating Factors: Thin Market Issues
    A market in which negotiated transactions over a given period of 
time are not sufficient to support efficient price discovery is a thin 
market (Anderson; et al., 2007). In a thin market, prices may become a 
less reliable guide to actual value as supported by market fundamentals 
and, in so doing, contribute to resource misallocation (Adjemian, 
Saitone, and Sexton 2016). In a practical sense, in such a market, we 
would expect to see increasing variability of prices around the 
equilibrium price; and evaluations of price discovery on thin markets 
often involve some means of quantifying this phenomenon (Tomek 1980).
    There is no doubt that pricing behavior in the fed cattle market 
has changed dramatically, particularly within the past decade, in ways 
that raise concerns about effective price discovery. While the total 
number of cattle traded each week remains quite large, negotiated 
transactions as a percentage of all transactions have fallen sharply. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2.3, which shows the percentage of total 
weekly fed cattle transactions accounted for by each transaction type 
reported by USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service from January 2009 
through March 2021. The change in the proportion of negotiated cash 
transactions is significant. For example, in 2010, 45 percent of all 
fed cattle transactions were negotiated (either negotiated cash or 
negotiated grid); 39 percent were formula-based transactions. In 2020, 
just 26 percent of fed cattle transactions were negotiated while 63 
percent were formula-based.
Figure 2.3. Weekly Live Cattle Transactions by Type: Percent of Total 
        Weekly Transactions.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, Livestock, 
        Poultry & Grain.
Figure 2.4. Weekly Live Cattle Transactions by Formula and Negotiated 
        Cash Sales: Texas/Oklahoma Reporting Region.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA Agricultural Marketing Service, Livestock, 
        Poultry & Grain.

    The decline in negotiated transactions is more pronounced at the 
regional level. For example, in the southern Plains feeding region, the 
volume of negotiated transactions has become quite small in recent 
years. This is confirmed by Figure 2.4, which shows negotiated cash and 
formula-based fed cattle transactions in Texas/Oklahoma from January 
2009 through March 2021. For the whole of 2020, negotiated cash 
transactions in this region amounted to just 12% of all fed cattle 
transactions.
    To a large extent, formula-based transactions rely on some previous 
negotiated price as a key component of the pricing formula (Coffey, 
Pendell, and Tonsor, 2019). Thus, more and more formula transactions 
are dependent on negotiated prices that reflect fewer and fewer 
underlying sales. As Adjemian, et al. (2016) point out, this has the 
potential to propagate any pricing inefficiencies more broadly, thus 
magnifying any pricing problems that already exist. This is not a new 
concern. Schroeder, et al. (1998) report results of a survey of both 
feeders and packers regarding fed cattle pricing practices. Those 
survey respondents note the potential for quality differences between 
negotiated and formula sales to result in pricing inaccuracies. 
Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting (LMR) was intended to alleviate at 
least some of these concerns. For example, LMR made it impossible for 
packers to manipulate the base price in formulas by only reporting some 
of their negotiated prices (Matthews, et al., 2015). However, as the 
negotiated side of the market has thinned further, concerns over 
pricing accuracy related to formula pricing have intensified.
    While many researchers have acknowledged the thinness of the 
negotiated fed cattle market and the potential for price discovery 
problems which that implies, considerable empirical work with data 
available through LMR has yet to document significant problems (Crespi, 
Saitone, and Sexton, 2012; Brorsen, Fain, and Maples, 2018). In a deep-
dive into livestock pricing practices initiated by Congressional action 
and making use of a unique data set on individual transactions compiled 
by USDA's Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, 
Muth, et al. (2007) found small negative price effects from the use of 
alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs, which include formula 
pricing). However, they also documented significant cost savings and 
quality improvements facilitated by AMAs--benefits that far outweighed 
the small negative price effects, such that eliminating AMAs would 
reduce both producer and consumer surplus in the sector. In a more 
recent study, Ward, Vestal, and Lee (2014) found that the relationship 
between negotiated and formula prices remained remarkably stable even 
as negotiated transaction volume declined. Thus, while negotiated 
transactions in the fed cattle market have clearly thinned, 
dramatically so in some regions, there is little objective evidence 
that this has adversely affected price discovery generally or that it 
has compromised the functioning of formula arrangements tied to 
negotiated prices.

          While negotiated transactions in the fed cattle market have 
        clearly thinned, dramatically so in some regions, there is 
        little objective evidence that this has adversely affected 
        price discovery generally or that it has compromised the 
        functioning of formula arrangements tied to negotiated prices.

    The inability of researchers to document thin-market-related 
pricing problems in the fed cattle sector is not too surprising for two 
primary reasons. First, defining the point at which a market becomes 
``too thin'' is notoriously difficult (Adammer, Bohl, and Gross, 2016). 
Previous work on thinning markets shows that relatively few 
transactions are required to maintain pricing efficiency as long as 
negotiated transactions are representative of the market as a whole 
(Tomek, 1980). Second, due to significant economies of size in packing 
plants, packers have a strong incentive to offer reasonably fair 
pricing terms in order to ensure optimal throughput for their plants 
over a long time horizon (Morrison, 2001; Anderson, Trapp, and Fleming, 
2003; MacDonald and Ollinger, 2005; Crespi, Saitone, and Sexton, 2012).
Fed Cattle Price Discovery: An Event Study Evaluation of Market 
        Efficiency
    A natural question to ask, in light of the increased use of formula 
pricing and associated concern over the effectiveness of price 
discovery in an increasingly thin negotiated market is which, if any, 
of the major LMR regional markets best reflect market supply and demand 
fundamentals in their negotiated prices? We seek to shed light on this 
issue using an event study approach to measure price responses to 
unanticipated information contained in monthly USDA Cattle on Feed 
(COF) Reports. The objective of this event study is to determine 
whether the efficiency of price discovery has been affected by changes 
in fed cattle pricing practices. Specific objectives are twofold: (1) 
to determine whether the process of price discovery has changed over 
time as pricing practices have evolved and (2) to identify any 
differences in the efficiency of price discovery across regions 
correlated with regional changes in fed cattle pricing practices.
    The issue of cattle market price discovery has drawn much attention 
in the literature, and a recent study by Coffey, Pendell and Tonsor 
(2019) found that the role played by the various LMR cash market 
regions has changed over the years. In particular, they highlighted the 
growing importance of Colorado as the share of negotiated transactions 
taking place in more traditional regions--e.g., Texas/Oklahoma/New 
Mexico--has decreased.
    A large amount of literature has shown that grain and livestock 
market futures prices respond to unanticipated information contained in 
USDA reports (Grunewald, McNulty, and Biere, 1993; Adjemian, 2012; 
Garcia, et al., 1997; Isengildina-Massa, et al., 2008a; Isengildina-
Massa, et al., 2008b; McKenzie, 2008; Sumner and Mueller, 1989; Karali, 
Isengildina-Massa, and Irwin, 2019). The unanticipated component of the 
report, which may be thought of as a market shock, is typically 
measured as the difference between analyst forecasts of the report and 
actual report numbers officially released by USDA. Thus, if it can be 
assumed that USDA reports contain valuable information, then 
significant price responses that are consistent with that information 
are indicative of price discovery. With this in mind, we examine the 
response of the five major LMR regional negotiated cash markets (i.e., 
Colorado, Iowa/Minnesota, Kansas, Nebraska, and Texas/Oklahoma/New 
Mexico) to the release of unanticipated information about on-feed 
inventory, placements, and marketings, contained in COF reports. By 
isolating specific supply and demand shocks, this approach allows us to 
examine the extent to which market prices respond in a rational manner 
consistent with effective price discovery. Larger than anticipated 
increases in on-feed inventory and placements--which reflect larger 
cattle supplies--should elicit price decreases. Conversely, larger than 
anticipated increases in cattle marketings--which reflect both 
increased demand and expectations for smaller remaining short-run 
supply--should result in price increases.
    Each component of the COF report provides the market with 
information that is used to make inferences about current and future 
beef production. On-feed inventory and marketing more closely relate to 
near term production, and shocks would be expected to have impacts on 
current cash market prices or nearby futures contract prices. On the 
other hand, surprises to cattle placements which have implications for 
future beef production and affect supplies in future months should 
influence deferred live cattle futures contract prices and cash prices 
several months after the COF report release date. However, the exact 
timing of price impacts with respect to surprises in placements is 
somewhat ambiguous depending upon cattle weights and is ultimately an 
empirical question. For example, nearby live cattle futures prices and 
current cash prices could be impacted through a feedback effect whereby 
the expectation of future price decreases could increase current 
supplies and depress current cash prices.
    Grunewald, McNulty and Biere (1993) found that surprises to both 
placements and marketings moved deferred live cattle futures prices, 
but only surprises to marketings affected nearby futures prices. 
Specifically, when placements are one percent higher than expected, 
this results in a 0.07 to 0.09 percent decrease in deferred futures 
prices; when marketings are one percent higher than expected, deferred 
futures prices increase by 0.15 to 0.18 percent. In contrast, Karali, 
Isengildina-Massa, and Irwin (2019) showed that surprises to both 
placements and marketings affected nearby live cattle futures prices 
prior to 2000, while only shocks to marketings impacted nearby futures 
prices after 2000. Their results are similar to Grunewald, McNulty and 
Biere. For example, when placements are one percent higher than 
expected, nearby futures prices prior to 2000 decrease by 0.04 percent, 
and when marketings are one percent higher than expected, nearby 
futures prices increase by about 0.1 percent over the 1977 to 2016 
period.
Data
    Monthly livestock market analyst forecasts reported in the Cattle 
Buyers Weekly newsletter and USDA announcements of monthly on-feed 
inventory, placements and marketings contained in COF reports were 
collected over the January 2004 to December 2020 period.\2\ Each month, 
between four to eight analysts make projections, which are reported in 
Cattle Buyers Weekly on the Monday prior to a Friday's COF release 
date. The average trade estimate is taken to be the median analyst 
forecast. USDA numbers and analyst forecasts are reported for the 
current month as a percentage of the comparable month a year ago. 
Market surprises, or the unanticipated component of the reports, were 
then measured as the percentage difference between the USDA numbers and 
the median analyst forecasts for on-feed inventory, placements, and 
marketings with respect to each monthly report over the sample period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Cattle Buyers Weekly, on occasion, did not publish a monthly 
preview due to a publishing break or business travel. Over the sample 
period, this occurred twelve times (September 18, 2017, January 18, 
2016, December 14, 2015, July 16, 2012, February 15, 2010, April 13, 
2009, September 15, 2008, October 16, 2006, January 16, 2006, September 
19, 2005, October 18, 2004, and February 16, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, weekly weighted average of live steer and heifer cash 
prices of the five major LMR regions (Colorado, Iowa/Minnesota, Kansas, 
Nebraska and Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico) were collected over the same 
January 2004 to December 2020 period. COF reports are typically 
released on Friday afternoons each month at 2:00 p.m. central time.\3\ 
To measure LMR region cash price responses to market surprises in on-
feed inventory, placements, and marketings, prices for the immediate 
week prior to a COF report release and for the immediate week following 
a COF report release were logged and the percentage change in price 
around each of the COF report months calculated.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ There were 4 missing observations for the Texas/Oklahoma/New 
Mexico series and 26 missing observations for the Colorado series 
because no prices were reported in those regions in certain weeks. The 
Colorado missing observations occurred between May 2018 and December 
2020.
    \4\ It should be noted that the immediate week prior to a COF 
release is actually the 5 days (Monday to Friday) of the COF release 
week. Given that, COF reports are released on Friday afternoons at 2 
p.m. central time, a small percentage of the week's LMR recorded prices 
may have occurred after the COF release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Methods
    A typical event study model can be written as an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression:

          (1) P+1 ^ P-1 + a + b 
        (COFijtUSDA ^ COFijtPrivate) + 
        et,

where in our study, P+1 ^ P-1 represents the 
logged percentage change in the negotiated cash fed cattle price from 
the week prior to the report release to the week following the report 
release. The term (COFijtUSDA ^ COFijtPrivate) 
represents the surprise or shock element of COF reports, where 
COFijtUSDA represents the USDA forecast of either on-feed 
inventory, placements, or marketings related information i, observed in 
month j and year t, and COFijtPrivate represents the median 
livestock market consensus forecast of either on-feed inventory, 
placements, or marketings related information i, observed in month j 
and year t (and is a mean zero normally distributed error with constant 
variance term).
    In the traditional event study approach, the estimated regression 
coefficient measures the average price response to a one percent change 
in the surprise element of USDA reports. Thus, it is assumed that LMR 
cash prices only react to the element of COF report information that 
was not anticipated by the analysts and the private-sector livestock 
industry. While we assume that rational LMR cash price reactions to COF 
surprises are indicative of price discovery, we acknowledge that these 
cash prices are also likely influenced by other market conditions and 
are likely noisy estimates of price discovery.
    We present several different event study results based on equation 
(1) regressions of cash price changes on COF market surprises. First, 
we analyze our model using data from the full sample period, January 
2004 to December 2020. Second, we analyze our model including only 
observations where placement surprises and marketings surprises would 
be expected to induce price reactions in the same direction. Our 
objective is to remove COF surprises associated with noisy price 
signals and only analyze the price impact of consistent, unambiguous 
bull or bear market surprises. Given that, a priori, we would expect 
price responses to be negatively correlated to placement surprises and 
positively correlated to marketings surprises, our goal is to remove 
monthly observations with either (a) larger than expected placements 
and larger than expected marketings, or (b) lower than expected 
placements and lower than expected marketings. Specifically, we only 
retain observations for months when positive placement surprises are 
simultaneously observed with negative marketings surprises (bear market 
shocks) and negative placement surprises are simultaneously observed 
with positive marketings surprises (bull market shocks). Third, and 
again to measure price discovery with respect to clear signals, we 
retain only observations with large placements (3% or larger in 
absolute terms) and/or marketings surprises (1% or larger in absolute 
terms) within our second (consistent bull or bear shock) data category.
Figure 2.5. Market Surprises or Analyst Forecast Errors (FE) of Cattle 
        on Feed, Placements, and Marketings: 1/16/04 to 12/18/20.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        

  Table 2.1. Correlations between Weekly Changes in Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices and Market Surprises to
                         Cattle on Feed, Placements and Marketings 1/16/04 to 12/18/20.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Feed       Placed      Marketed     Texas a     Kansas     Nebraska     Colorado     Iowa b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Feed             1     ** 0.81     ** ^0.31    ** ^0.14     * ^0.13       ^0.11         ^0.1     * ^0.12
     Placed                         1         ^0.1     * ^0.12     * ^0.13        ^0.1        ^0.11     * ^0.12
   Marketed                                      1         0.1        0.08        0.09       * 0.13        0.06
    Texas a                                                  1     ** 0.98     ** 0.93      ** 0.93     ** 0.90
     Kansas                                                              1     ** 0.94      ** 0.94     ** 0.91
   Nebraska                                                                          1      ** 0.96     ** 0.94
   Colorado                                                                                       1     ** 0.91
     Iowa b                                                                                                   1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two tailed test.
** indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two tailed test.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.

    In addition, and to make a fairer comparison between LMR markets, 
the second, third, and fourth applications of our analysis only include 
months where there are no missing observations across all five 
reporting regions. Finally, using our second (consistent bull or bear 
shock) data category, we split the sample between January 2004 to 
December 2013 and January 2014 to December 2020. Our objective in this 
case is to examine if the primary LMR cash market price discovery 
locations change over time. Our motivation stems from the fact that 
since 2014, the percentage volume of negotiated cash transactions 
occurring in the Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico region has decreased 
dramatically. Prior to 2014, this region accounted for 20% to 40% of 
negotiated transactions, with the number decreasing consistently over 
the period (Coffey, Pendell and Tonsor, 2019). However, in the post-
2014 period, this number had dropped to around 10% of negotiated 
transactions, which begs the question as to whether the price discovery 
role played by this market has also diminished over time.
Results
    The size of market surprises for on-feed inventory, placements, and 
marketings is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.5. Clearly, the 
magnitude of these surprises has remained constant over time, 
suggesting that the price discovery role played by COF reports has 
likely not diminished. Surprises to placements are typically much 
larger than either marketings or on-feed inventory surprises, with the 
latter by far the smallest. In addition, there does not appear to be 
any systematic bias in analyst forecasts with over-estimates equally as 
likely as under-estimates.

   Table 2.2. Response of Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices to Market
       Surprises in Placements and Marketings 1/16/04 to 12/18/20.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Parameters      Texas a     Kansas    Nebraska    Colorado    Iowa b
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Intercept       0.002       0.003      0.003       0.003      0.001
                  (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.002)
       Placed      ^0.074     *^0.076     ^0.063       ^0.06     ^0.069
                  (0.046)     (0.045)    (0.047)     (0.048)    (0.042)
     Marketed       0.154       0.122      0.142       0.217      0.073
                  (0.130)     (0.125)    (0.132)     (0.139)    (0.118)
    R-Squared       0.023       0.021      0.017       0.026      0.017
  LM(1)........     0.528       1.018      0.297       0.369      0.132
                  (0.467)     (0.313)    (0.586)     (0.544)    (0.716)
  B-P..........     0.446       0.198      0.312       0.188      0.751
                  (0.800)     (0.906)    (0.855)     (0.910)    (0.687)
  F Test.......     2.169       2.058      1.632       2.198      1.648
                  (0.117)     (0.131)    (0.198)     (0.114)    (0.195)
 Observations         188         192        192         166        192
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard errors of coefficients are presented in parentheses in top half
  of table.
LM(1) is Breusch-Godfrey (Lagrange Multiplier test for first order
  autocorrelation). The test statistic is specified as Chi-Squared with
  1 degree of freedom and p-values are presented in parentheses below
  the test statistic.
B-P is Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and p-values are
  presented in parentheses below the test statistic.
F-test for the hypothesis that all of the coefficients (excluding the
  constant) are zero with p-values in parentheses.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.


 Table 2.3. Correlations between Weekly Changes in Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices and Market Surprises with
           consistent Bull or Bear Market Surprises to Placements and Marketings 1/16/04 to 12/18/20.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Feed       Placed      Marketed     Texas a     Kansas     Nebraska     Colorado     Iowa b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Feed             1     ** 0.86     ** ^0.80    ** ^0.25    ** ^0.23     * ^0.19        ^0.15       ^0.14
     Placed                         1     ** ^0.67    ** ^0.29    ** ^0.30    ** ^0.24     ** ^0.23     * ^0.20
   Marketed                                      1     ** 0.27     ** 0.26     ** 0.24       * 0.20      * 0.21
    Texas a                                                  1     ** 0.97     ** 0.89      ** 0.89     ** 0.84
     Kansas                                                              1     ** 0.92      ** 0.93     ** 0.87
   Nebraska                                                                          1      ** 0.95     ** 0.94
   Colorado                                                                                       1     ** 0.88
     Iowa b                                                                                                   1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two tailed test.
** indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two tailed test.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.


 Table 2.4. Response of Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices to Consistent
Bull or Bear Market Surprises in Placements and Marketings 1/16/04 to 12/
                                 18/20.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Parameters      Texas a     Kansas    Nebraska    Colorado    Iowa b
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Intercept       0.001       0.001          0           0     ^0.001
                  (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.002)
       Placed      ^0.102      ^0.118     ^0.078        ^0.1     ^0.049
                  (0.074)     (0.078)    (0.080)     (0.084)    (0.076)
     Marketed       0.183       0.154      0.203       0.119      0.198
                  (0.195)     (0.205)    (0.211)     (0.221)    (0.199)
    R-Squared       0.096       0.094       0.07       0.057      0.051
  LM(1)........     0.562       0.617      0.365       0.171      0.293
                  (0.453)     (0.432)    (0.546)     (0.679)    (0.588)
  B-P..........     2.116        0.88      1.053       0.244      1.705
                  (0.347)     (0.644)    (0.591)     (0.885)    (0.426)
  F Test.......  ** 4.028    ** 3.955    * 2.847       2.303      2.058
                  (0.022)     (0.023)    (0.064)     (0.107)    (0.135)
 Observations          79          79         79          79         79
  Placed.......  *** ^0.148  *** ^0.15  ** ^0.130   ** ^0.130   * ^0.100
                  (0.055)           7    (0.060)     (0.062)    (0.056)
                              (0.058)
    R-Squared       0.085       0.087      0.058       0.054      0.039
  Marketed.....  ** 0.361    ** 0.361   ** 0.341     * 0.294    * 0.285
                  (0.146)     (0.153)    (0.156)     (0.165)    (0.148)
  R-Squared....     0.074       0.067      0.058        0.04      0.046
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard errors of coefficients are presented in parentheses in top half
  of table.
LM(1) is Breusch-Godfrey (Lagrange Multiplier test for first order
  autocorrelation). The test statistic is specified as Chi-Squared with
  1 degree of freedom and p-values are presented in parentheses below
  the test statistic.
B-P is Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and p-values are
  presented in parentheses below the test statistic.
F-test for the hypothesis that all of the coefficients (excluding the
  constant) are zero with p-values in parentheses.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.

    Correlations between market surprises and LMR cash price changes 
around the COF report releases for our whole January 2004 to December 
2020 sample period are presented in Table 2.1 and highlight several 
important implications of the data. First, on-feed inventory and 
placement surprises are highly positively correlated (0.81), such that 
including both as explanatory variables in a regression would likely 
lead to problems of multicollinearity. With this is mind, and given 
that preliminary specifications indicated that on-feed inventory 
surprises were insignificant and added no explanatory power beyond 
placement surprises, we present models and results with on-feed 
inventory surprises excluded. Second, as expected, on-feed inventory 
and placement surprises are negatively correlated to marketings. Larger 
than expected on-feed inventory and placement numbers, which correspond 
to higher supply, tend to occur when marketings, which are associated 
with lower supply and higher demand, are lower than expected. Third and 
consistent with economic theory, on-feed inventory and placement 
surprises--supply side shocks--are negatively correlated to LMR cash 
price changes, while marketings surprises--demand side shocks--are 
positively correlated to LMR cash price changes. Fourth, cash price 
changes across all five LMR market regions are highly positively 
correlated (r > 0.9), suggesting that these markets are well integrated 
and that price discovery signals are quickly transmitted.

 Table 2.5. Correlations between Weekly Changes in Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices and Market Surprises with
     only large Surprises in both Marketings and Placements with consistent Bull or Bear Market Surprises to
                                 Placements and Marketings 1/16/04 to 12/18/20.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Feed       Placed      Marketed     Texas a     Kansas     Nebraska     Colorado     Iowa b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Feed             1     ** 0.88     ** ^0.81    ** ^0.35    ** ^0.32     * ^0.25      * ^0.23       ^0.19
     Placed                         1     ** ^0.67    ** ^0.33    ** ^0.32     * ^0.23      * ^0.23       ^0.17
   Marketed                                      1     ** 0.33     ** 0.32      * 0.27       * 0.24      * 0.25
    Texas a                                                  1     ** 0.97     ** 0.87      ** 0.89     ** 0.82
     Kansas                                                              1     ** 0.91      ** 0.93     ** 0.86
   Nebraska                                                                          1      ** 0.96     ** 0.94
   Colorado                                                                                       1     ** 0.89
     Iowa b                                                                                                   1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two tailed test.
** indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two tailed test.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.

    Regression results based on equation (1), which measure immediate 
LMR cash price responses to COF surprises for the full sample period, 
are reported in Table 2.2. Results show that although all cash price 
responses are of the expected signs, only Kansas prices have a small 
but significant response to placement surprises. A 1% larger than 
expected increase in placements results in a 0.076% decrease in Kansas 
prices, which is roughly in line with previous research measuring 
cattle futures price reactions (Grunewald, McNulty, and Biere,1993; 
Karali, Isengildina-Massa, and Irwin, 2019). Also, R-squared values of 
around 2% show that COF surprises explain little of the price variation 
across LMR markets. If anything, COF reports, on average, provide very 
noisy price signals.
Consistent Bull and Bear Market Pricing Signals
    Turning to results for our models designed to measure clearer bull 
and bear market pricing signals, we can see much stronger correlations 
between LMR cash prices for all regions and COF surprises in Table 2.3. 
However, a natural and expected effect of organizing our data in this 
manner is to induce a high degree of correlation (r = ^0.67) between 
placements and marketings. As such, our regression models based on this 
data will suffer from muticollinearity between placements and 
marketings. It should be noted that the consequences of 
mulitcollinearity is to reduce the precision or accuracy of our 
coefficient estimates and increase their standard errors, reducing our 
ability to detect significant effects in our multiple regression 
models. However, importantly, the predictive and explanatory power of 
such models in terms of R-squared values is not diminished, and the 
joint contribution of our explanatory variables (placement and 
marketings surprises) can still be measured. Therefore, in the top half 
of Table 2.4 we present our consistent Bull or Bear market surprise 
models results for our multiple regression specifications (with both 
placement and marketings surprises included as explanatory variables), 
and for comparison purposes we present regression results for placement 
and marketing surprises modeled separately as explanatory variables.

 Table 2.6. Response of Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices to only large
Surprises in both Marketings and Placements with consistent Bull or Bear
   Market Surprises to Placements and Marketings 1/16/04 to 12/18/20.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Parameters      Texas a     Kansas    Nebraska    Colorado    Iowa b
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Intercept      ^0.001     ^ 0.002    ^ 0.003     ^ 0.002    ^ 0.004
                  (0.002)     (0.003)    (0.003)     (0.003)    (0.003)
       Placed     ^ 0.083     ^ 0.092    ^ 0.039     ^ 0.058    ^ 0.008
                  (0.075)     (0.080)    (0.083)     (0.085)    (0.079)
     Marketed       0.225       0.215      0.259       0.191      0.265
                  (0.196)     (0.207)    (0.215)     (0.221)    (0.205)
    R-Squared       0.129       0.123      0.079       0.066      0.061
  LM(1)........      0.26       0.084      0.273       0.381      0.452
                  (0.610)     (0.772)    (0.601)     (0.537)    (0.501)
  B-P..........      2.11       0.927      0.451       0.015      1.306
                  (0.348)     (0.629)    (0.798)     (0.993)    (0.521)
       F Test    ** 3.862    ** 3.659       2.22       1.828      1.681
                  (0.027)     (0.033)    (0.119)     (0.171)    (0.196)
 Observations          55          55         55          55         55
  Placed.......  ** ^ 0.141      ** ^   * ^ 0.106   * ^ 0.107   ^ 0.076
                  (0.056)       0.148    (0.061)     (0.063)    (0.059)
                              (0.059)
    R-Squared       0.107       0.105      0.053       0.052      0.031
  Marketed.....  ** 0.370    ** 0.376   ** 0.327     * 0.292    * 0.278
                  (0.145)     (0.154)    (0.158)     (0.163)    (0.150)
  R-Squared....     0.109       0.101      0.075       0.057      0.061
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard errors of coefficients are presented in parentheses in top half
  of table.
LM(1) is Breusch-Godfrey (Lagrange Multiplier test for first order
  autocorrelation). The test statistic is specified as Chi-Squared with
  1 degree of freedom and p-values are presented in parentheses below
  the test statistic.
B-P is Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and p-values are
  presented in parentheses below the test statistic.
F-test for the hypothesis that all of the coefficients (excluding the
  constant) are zero with p-values in parentheses.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.


 Table 2.7. Correlations between Weekly Changes in Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices and Market Surprises with
               consistent Bull or Bear Market Surprises to Placements and Marketings 2004 to 2013.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Feed       Placed      Marketed     Texas a     Kansas     Nebraska     Colorado     Iowa b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Feed             1     ** 0.88    ** ^ 0.81    * ^ 0.22      ^ 0.21      ^ 0.18       ^ 0.15      ^ 0.12
     Placed                         1    ** ^ 0.71    * ^ 0.25    * ^ 0.25    * ^ 0.21        ^ 0.2      ^ 0.16
   Marketed                                      1      * 0.29      * 0.27      * 0.24          0.2        0.21
    Texas a                                                  1     ** 0.97     ** 0.88      ** 0.90     ** 0.83
     Kansas                                                              1     ** 0.91      ** 0.93     ** 0.87
   Nebraska                                                                          1      ** 0.96     ** 0.94
   Colorado                                                                                       1     ** 0.89
     Iowa b                                                                                                   1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two tailed test.
** indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two tailed test.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.


 Table 2.8. Correlations between Weekly Changes in Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices and Market Surprises with
               consistent Bull or Bear Market Surprises to Placements and Marketings 2014 to 2020.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Feed       Placed      Marketed     Texas a     Kansas     Nebraska     Colorado     Iowa b
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Feed             1     ** 0.84    ** ^ 0.72    * ^ 0.43      ^ 0.38       ^ 0.4       ^ 0.31    * ^ 0.44
     Placed                         1    ** ^ 0.70    * ^ 0.43    * ^ 0.45    * ^ 0.43     * ^ 0.41    * ^ 0.46
   Marketed                                      1        0.33        0.37      * 0.46       * 0.41      * 0.44
    Texas a                                                  1     ** 0.98     ** 0.95      ** 0.89     ** 0.93
     Kansas                                                              1     ** 0.96      ** 0.95     ** 0.92
   Nebraska                                                                          1      ** 0.92     ** 0.95
   Colorado                                                                                       1     ** 0.86
     Iowa b                                                                                                   1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 10% level on a two tailed test.
** indicates the Pearson correlation coefficient is significant at the 5% level on a two tailed test.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.

    Although, as expected, coefficients are not significant for our 
multiple regressions, the R-squared values are much higher in 
comparison to our full sample results presented in Table 2.2. The 
Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico and Kansas markets appear to best incorporate 
the COF information with around 10% of the weekly price variation 
following the report release dates explained by surprises to placements 
and marketings. In contrast, only 5% of the weekly price variation is 
explained by the surprises in the Colorado and Iowa/Minnesota markets. 
These price impacts are confirmed by our separate regression results 
shown at the foot of Table 2.4. Clearly, by focusing on unambiguous 
bull and bear market signals in COF reports over the full sample 
period, our results show that the primary price discovery markets are 
Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico and Kansas. These results are perhaps not 
surprising given that the Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico and Kansas markets 
accounted for around 50 to 70% of the overall volume of negotiated 
transactions/marketings over the sample period (Coffey, Pendell and 
Tonsor, 2019).

 Table 2.9. Response of Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices to Consistent
Bull or Bear Market Surprises in Placements and Marketings 2004 to 2013.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Parameters      Texas a     Kansas    Nebraska    Colorado    Iowa b
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Intercept           0           0    ^ 0.001     ^ 0.001    ^ 0.002
                  (0.002)     (0.002)    (0.003)     (0.003)    (0.003)
       Placed     ^ 0.048     ^ 0.063     ^ 0.05     ^ 0.068    ^ 0.007
                  (0.093)     (0.097)    (0.104)     (0.107)    (0.101)
     Marketed       0.255       0.222      0.228       0.151      0.249
                  (0.207)     (0.216)    (0.232)     (0.239)    (0.225)
    R-Squared       0.086       0.078      0.061       0.045      0.045
  LM(1)........     0.177        0.16      1.508       0.475      0.487
                  (0.674)     (0.689)    (0.220)     (0.491)    (0.485)
  B-P..........     0.434       0.151      0.756       0.211      1.384
                  (0.805)     (0.927)    (0.685)     (0.900)    (0.501)
  F Test.......   * 2.713     * 2.451      1.889       1.368      1.358
                  (0.075)     (0.095)    (0.161)     (0.263)    (0.265)
 Observations                      61         61          61         61
  Placed.......  * ^ 0.129   * ^ 0.134  * ^ 0.123    ^ 0.116    ^ 0.087
                  (0.066)     (0.068)    (0.073)     (0.075)    (0.071)
    R-Squared       0.062       0.061      0.045       0.039      0.024
  Marketed.....  ** 0.331    ** 0.322    * 0.308       0.257       0.26
                  (0.145)     (0.151)    (0.162)     (0.167)    (0.157)
  R-Squared....     0.081       0.071      0.057       0.039      0.045
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard errors of coefficients are presented in parentheses in top half
  of table.
LM(1) is Breusch-Godfrey (Lagrange Multiplier test for first order
  autocorrelation). The test statistic is specified as Chi-Squared with
  1 degree of freedom and p-values are presented in parentheses below
  the test statistic.
B-P is Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and p-values are
  presented in parentheses below the test statistic.
F-test for the hypothesis that all of the coefficients (excluding the
  constant) are zero with p-values in parentheses.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.

Large Bull and Bear Market Pricing Signals
    We find similar results when we further breakdown the consistent 
bull and bear market data to focus only on large surprises to 
placements and marketings. The correlations between surprises and 
prices presented in Table 2.3 and the large bull and bear market 
pricing signal regression results shown in Table 2.6 again highlight 
the importance of Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico and Kansas markets for 
price discovery. Again, COF surprises account for twice as much of the 
weekly price variation in these markets compared with Colorado and 
Iowa/Minnesota markets.

Table 2.10. Response of Negotiated Live Cattle Cash Prices to Consistent
Bull or Bear Market Surprises in Placements and Marketings 2014 to 2020.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Parameters      Texas a     Kansas    Nebraska    Colorado    Iowa b
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Intercept       0.005       0.005      0.005       0.006      0.004
                  (0.005)     (0.006)    (0.005)     (0.006)    (0.004)
       Placed      ^ 0.21     ^ 0.208    ^ 0.104     ^ 0.137    ^ 0.126
                  (0.174)     (0.184)    (0.158)     (0.182)    (0.133)
     Marketed       0.199       0.451      1.042       0.887      0.669
                  (1.198)     (1.264)    (1.084)     (1.250)    (0.916)
    R-Squared       0.189       0.207       0.23       0.195      0.241
  LM(1)........     0.823       0.824      1.159       0.368      0.359
                  (0.364)     (0.364)    (0.282)     (0.544)    (0.549)
  B-P..........     0.478       0.229      0.123       0.617      0.797
                  (0.788)     (0.892)    (0.941)     (0.735)    (0.671)
                                                     (0.671)
  F Test.......     1.748       1.959      2.238        1.82      2.383
                  (0.208)     (0.175)    (0.141)     (0.196)    (0.126)
 Observations          18          18         18          18         18
  Placed.......  * ^ 0.230   * ^ 0.254  * ^ 0.211   * ^ 0.228       * ^
                  (0.120)     (0.127)    (0.112)     (0.127)      0.194
                                                                (0.093)
    R-Squared       0.188         0.2      0.183       0.168      0.214
  Marketed.....     1.216       1.457    * 1.547     * 1.553    * 1.279
                  (0.862)     (0.905)    (0.756)     (0.875)    (0.648)
  R-Squared....     0.081       0.071      0.057       0.039      0.045
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Standard errors of coefficients are presented in parentheses in top half
  of table.
LM(1) is Breusch-Godfrey (Lagrange Multiplier test for first order
  autocorrelation). The test statistic is specified as Chi-Squared with
  1 degree of freedom and p-values are presented in parentheses below
  the test statistic.
B-P is Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity and p-values are
  presented in parentheses below the test statistic.
F-test for the hypothesis that all of the coefficients (excluding the
  constant) are zero with p-values in parentheses.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
a Texas refers to the Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico market.
b Iowa refers to the Iowa-Minnesota market.

Consistent Bull and Bear Market Pricing Signals over the 2004 to 2013 
        versus the 2014 to 2020 Period
    Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show surprise and price correlations over the 
2004 to 2013 and 2014 to 2020 periods, respectively. The most 
noticeable difference is that the correlation between placement and 
marketings surprises and all LMR cash prices has doubled over the more 
recent 2014 to 2020 period. LMR cash markets are now more responsive 
than ever to unambiguous price signals contained in COF reports. Our 
regression model results presented in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 confirm this 
finding. Turning first to Table 2.9, our results highlight the 
important price discovery role played by Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico and 
Kansas markets over this earlier period. R-squared values and F-tests 
are much larger for these two markets compared with the others and, in 
particular, the Colorado and Iowa/Minnesota markets. In contrast, the 
2014 to 2020 regression results presented in Table 2.10 with respect to 
R-squared values show that prices responsiveness and discovery is now 
more equally shared across LMR markets. However, a word of caution is 
in order as the 2014 to 2020 results presented in Table 2.10 are only 
based on 18 observations and are subject to high levels of 
multicollinearity. This issue is reflected in the lack of precision of 
the coefficient estimates (high standard errors) and insignificant F-
tests.
Implications for the Fed Cattle Market
    Because the fed cattle market has become a highly concentrated 
market characterized by a relatively low volume of negotiated cash 
transactions, questions about the efficiency and accuracy of prices 
ought to be taken very seriously: such markets are undoubtedly 
susceptible to price discovery problems, including intentional 
manipulation. Evidence of such problems in the fed cattle market is 
sparse, however, despite intense investigation by numerous researchers 
using varied data and methodology over many years. Results presented 
here are broadly consistent with those previous findings. Analysis of 
fed cattle cash price response to unanticipated information in the 
monthly COF report suggest that all regions respond to such information 
in a manner consistent with active price discovery--that is, prices 
adjust quickly and consistent with the expectations of economic theory 
in response to unanticipated information.

          Much of the present concern over fed cattle price discovery 
        has focused on the Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico reporting region 
        because of the relative thinness of negotiated trade in that 
        region in recent years (see Figure 2.4). The analysis presented 
        here suggests that price discovery in this region has actually 
        been among the most active of any of the reporting regions over 
        the period of this study.

    Much of the present concern over fed cattle price discovery has 
focused on the Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico reporting region because of 
the relative thinness of negotiated trade in that region in recent 
years (see Figure 2.4). The analysis presented here suggests that price 
discovery in this region has actually been among the most active of any 
of the reporting regions over the period of this study. While 
negotiated prices in the region have become less responsive to 
unanticipated information since 2014, the (admittedly limited) data on 
response to information shocks since then does not suggest that the 
price discovery process in Texas/Oklahoma/New Mexico is notably 
different than in any other region, including regions (e.g., Nebraska, 
Iowa/Minnesota) with much higher proportions of negotiated 
transactions.
Summary and Conclusions
    A clear understanding of price discovery processes and mechanisms 
in the fed cattle market is important because a number of policy 
interventions have been proposed with the specified intent of improving 
price discovery. Without question, the fed cattle market has thinned 
rather dramatically over the past decade or so in terms of negotiated 
spot market transactions as a share of total transactions. While this 
situation raises legitimate concerns--particularly in light of formula 
transactions that rely on negotiated trades for price benchmarks--there 
is little evidence that the effectiveness of price discovery in the fed 
cattle market has been compromised, either by the thinning of 
negotiated trade or by market concentration in the meatpacking sector.
    The fact that the thin and highly-concentrated fed cattle market 
does not exhibit clear signs of non-competitive pricing behavior does 
not suggest that market participants should have no concerns about 
price discovery. The reliance of formula prices on negotiated prices is 
reason enough to pay particular attention to the manner in which prices 
are established in the market. Negotiated prices not only reveal 
information about supply and demand fundamentals in the fed cattle 
market; they also contribute substantially to formula prices that 
control \2/3\ or more of fed cattle trades. For both of these reasons, 
negotiated trades in the fed cattle market have some characteristics of 
a public good; therefore, market participants have a strong interest in 
ensuring that negotiated trades occur in sufficient quantity to fulfill 
this public good role (Koontz and Purcell, 1997). A number of 
complicated issues arise with respect to how this interest is best 
addressed. What volume of negotiated trades is necessary for efficient 
price discovery? Theory and empirical work, as reviewed in this volume, 
suggest that the figure may be quite small--smaller than market 
participants (at least on the selling side) are apparently comfortable 
with. If interventions to increase negotiated trade volume are 
undertaken, what form of intervention is appropriate? Market-based 
incentives or regulatory decree? In either case, it may well be that 
intervention disrupts the organic development of market institutions 
(both formal and informal) that are appropriate and effective for the 
circumstances of this particular market. After all, formula pricing has 
not been imposed on the fed cattle market by force: packers and feeders 
have mutually decided that it presents an effective and efficient way 
for them to transact routine business. It may well be that in seeking 
to preserve price discovery by familiar means, beneficial market 
innovations may be undermined, with unforeseen consequences for both 
individual market participants and for the sector as a whole.

 
 
 
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Chapter 3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note: Research referenced in this chapter using experimental 
economics methods by the authors was primarily supported by the Paul 
Lowham Research Fund. All opinions expressed here are those of the 
authors and not the funding source.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
How Market Institutions, Risks, and Agent Incentives Affect Price 
        Discovery: Fed Cattle Market Implications
Christopher T. Bastian, Chian Jones Ritten, and Amy M. Nagler
Introduction
    Concerns continue to grow regarding declining negotiated cash trade 
volumes and related impacts on fed cattle market price discovery. 
Various policy proposals to address these concerns center on the 
premise that mandating increased volumes of negotiated cash trade will 
fix the fed cattle market environment and price discovery will be 
improved (Brown, 2021; Nepveux, 2021). It is important to understand 
what price discovery is, and how various factors such as market 
institutions, risks faced by buyers and sellers, and related market 
agent incentives impact price discovery and resulting price levels 
(also called price determination). Such knowledge will improve our 
understanding of the potential success of policy proposals aimed at 
addressing price discovery concerns in fed cattle markets.
Price Discovery versus Price Determination
    As noted in Chapter 2, price discovery refers to the process by 
which a buyer and seller arrive at a price for a specific transaction. 
Negotiations that include all of the buyer's bid prices and the 
seller's asks or offer prices are part of the price discovery process. 
Price discovery directly relates to the mechanics by which individual 
transaction prices (and other terms of trade) occur rather than general 
market price levels.
    Price determination refers to the general price level that prevails 
after a number of individual transaction prices occur. Once the buyer 
and seller come to agreement on the terms of trade, including price, 
that individual transaction price becomes a potential piece of 
information signaling what those particular cattle were worth. 
Generally, an average of the individual fed cattle transactions prices 
during a specified time period, for a particular region, is reported by 
the United States Department of Agriculture Agricultural Marketing 
Service (USDA-AMS). Negotiated cash transactions are reported twice 
daily to AMS, and price information from these transactions appears in 
various reports. Transaction prices for other marketing methods are 
reported after the cattle are delivered to the packers, and this price 
information may be based on market conditions 1 to 2 weeks earlier 
(Schroeder, Tonsor, and Coffey, 2019). These publicly available prices 
represent price determination information for the fed cattle market for 
the reporting period.
Factors Affecting Price Discovery and Price Determination
    What factors affect price discovery? Anything that impacts buyers' 
bids, and/or sellers' offers during bargaining affects price discovery. 
Economic theory and research indicate a number of factors influence 
price discovery in fed cattle markets, including knowledge of supply 
and demand, trading institutions, risks traders face, risk preferences 
of traders, and expectations of value formed via multiple sources of 
old and current market information.

    Supply and Demand

    Individual buyers and sellers adjust to supply and demand factors 
at the time they negotiate price. For example, if feedlots have a 
higher number of cattle available, the supply of cattle has increased. 
This in turn means an individual buyer representing a packer could bid 
lower prices and still attract cattle. A seller (feedlot) would likely 
accept a lower price in this situation in order to sell cattle 
currently nearing slaughter weight. Alternatively, if demand for beef 
strengthened and resulting boxed beef prices were increased, buyers 
would need to increase bid prices to attract cattle into packing 
plants, and sellers would likely only accept a higher sale price during 
bargaining. Thus, price discovery adjusts to, and reflects, supply and 
demand conditions. As a result, the forces of supply and demand for a 
particular product or commodity generally drive price determination or 
price levels (Tomek and Kaiser, 2014).

    Trading Institutions

    Trading institutions are the mechanisms, including both formal and 
informal rules defining how agents interact, through which buyers and 
sellers discover transaction prices and other terms of trade (Nagler, 
et al., 2015; Tomek and Kaiser, 2014; Davidson and Weersink, 1998). The 
three most relevant trading institutions for cattle markets are Double 
Auction, English Auction, and Private Negotiation.
    The double auction is the trading institution used in live (fed) 
and feeder cattle futures transactions. Buyers start at low bid prices 
and sellers start at higher ask or offer prices. During haggling, 
buyers raise their bid prices and sellers lower their offer prices 
until a buyer's bid equals a seller's offer (Menkhaus, Phillips, and 
Bastian, 2003). During bargaining, multiple buyers and sellers may be 
haggling for the same futures contract or set of contracts. The double-
auction institution is information rich since all buyers and sellers 
can see each other's bids and offers during bargaining. This 
information allows agents to know what level successful bids and offers 
need to be. Discovery of transaction price occurs relatively quickly in 
this trading institution.
    The English auction is a trading institution commonly used in 
livestock cash market transactions. Its use has declined significantly 
for fed cattle, but it remains relatively prominent in feeder cattle 
markets. Sellers bring their cattle to the auction site, and a number 
of cattle are brought into a sale ring around which buyers and sellers 
are typically seated. Some information about the cattle is given prior 
to the sale, and then an auctioneer calls out a beginning bid level. 
Buyers signal to the auctioneer their willingness to pay higher prices, 
as the auctioneer indicates higher bid levels. This continues until no 
buyer is willing to pay a higher bid price (Menkhaus, Phillips, and 
Bastian, 2003). The buyer agreeing to the highest bid price purchases 
the cattle as long as the seller agrees to accept this price. Buyers 
are competing against each other to ``win'' the cattle with the highest 
bid price they are willing to pay. Sellers are passive and either 
accept or reject the winning bid for their cattle. Since buyers and 
sellers at the sale ring hear the bid prices, the English auction also 
is a relatively information-rich trading institution.
    Private negotiation is a less formal trading institution where one 
buyer and one seller negotiate privately. During negotiation, the buyer 
starts at a low bid level and increases that level while the seller 
starts at a high offer price and reduces that level (Menkhaus, Phillips 
and Bastian, 2003). Trade occurs when the buyer and seller agree on 
price and any other relevant terms of trade. As there are no other 
buyers or sellers involved, the only information available during 
bargaining is the bid and offer prices given by the buyer and seller 
pair. This institution is less information rich when compared to 
auctions as other buyers' bids (as in the case of the double and 
English auctions) and other sellers' offers (as in the case of double 
auction) are not available to the two traders while discovering price.
    Research conducted at the University of Wyoming used experimental 
economics methods to test whether differences in price discovery and 
price levels occur in these trading institutions (Menkhaus, Phillips, 
and Bastian, 2003). The laboratory setting allows researchers to 
control the market environment including supply and demand conditions, 
trading institution, and number of buyers and sellers transacting in 
the market (Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Roth, 2015). These experiments 
rely on induced-value theory and pay participants based on their 
trading behavior to create economic incentives similar to what is seen 
in cattle markets (Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Roth, 2015). These 
experiments are used because data for privately negotiated transactions 
in cattle markets are usually not available. Additionally, econometric 
analyses of transactions may suffer from dynamic supply and demand 
conditions that affect variability of price levels, making it difficult 
to determine the impact of the trading institution alone.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ These results come from laboratory market studies. Some have 
criticized that subject pools used in such experiments do not behave 
the same as agricultural producers. Nagler, et al. (2013) test behavior 
in laboratory market experiments across students and agricultural 
professionals. They find the same treatment effects across the two 
subject pools. Bastian (2019) examines bargaining behavior across 
market experiments using students and agricultural professionals and 
generally finds no difference across the bargaining strategy variables 
tested. Further, Frechette (2015) examines the broader experimental 
literature and concludes that results are generally consistent 
regardless of subjects used, lending further support to these 
experimental results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since the underlying supply and demand conditions are known and 
constant across the trading institutions in the laboratory market 
experiments, the research compared market outcomes to predicted 
competitive equilibrium price levels (Menkhaus, Phillips, and Bastian, 
2003). The resulting price levels were nearly 17% higher in English 
auction and 4% higher in double auction than the predicted equilibrium, 
but price determination for private negotiation was nearly 10% below 
the competitive equilibrium price (Figure 3.1).
    The underlying supply and demand conditions as well as number of 
buyers and sellers were exactly the same across each institution in 
these markets. Thus, no arguments of market structure or concentration 
giving buyers an advantage in private negotiation could be made in 
these experiments. Trading institution alone was the only difference 
across each set of experiments.
    Why did English auction result in a price that was higher and more 
favorable to sellers while private negotiation resulted in price being 
lower and more favorable to buyers? The English auction institution 
facilitates prices being driven up as buyers must compete against each 
other to purchase product while sellers are passive during bargaining. 
The double auction has lower price levels than the English auction, but 
very near the competitive equilibrium. The only difference is that 
sellers are also competing with other sellers for buyers' bids in the 
double auction. The simple addition of sellers competing amongst each 
other while simultaneously buyers are competing amongst each other 
leads to lower transactions prices that are closer to the predicted 
value than in the English auction. This result also is partially driven 
by individual bids and offers being known to all traders during price 
discovery.
Figure 3.1. Percent Difference in Price Level from Competitive 
        Equilibrium by Trading Institution.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
    Private negotiation, which is the dominant trading institution 
found in fed cattle markets, results in much lower price levels than 
auction markets. Given the low-price level in private negotiation, can 
we conclude the price discovery process is broken in private 
negotiation? No. First, it is important to understand that a major 
difference in this institution is the lack of buyers competing against 
buyers and/or sellers competing against sellers during bargaining. 
Additionally, an individual buyer and individual seller don't have the 
benefit of seeing other bids and offers during price discovery. Thus, 
individual bargaining behavior may impact price discovery and resulting 
price determination in private negotiation, which is likely mitigated 
by agent competition and bid/offer information in the auction 
institutions. One factor affecting bargaining behavior during price 
discovery in private negotiation relates to actual or perceived risks 
faced by participants in the market. Research indicates that advance 
production risk, matching risk, and negotiation failure risk greatly 
impact trader incentives and resulting behavior when transactions are 
privately negotiated (Menkhaus, et al., 2007; Sabasi, et al., 2013; 
Jones Ritten, et al., 2020).

    Risks and Agent Incentives

    Advance Production Risk

    Sellers in agricultural markets, including fed cattle markets, 
generally make decisions to produce inventory or product prior to sale 
(Nagler, et al., 2015; Menkhaus, et al., 2003). When sellers produce 
goods in advance of sale, this requires sellers to incur production 
costs prior to any promise of revenue. Thus, sellers are at risk of 
losing some or all of their production costs if prices fall below cost 
of production, or when sellers fail to reach an agreement with any 
buyer. This risk of losing some or all of the production cost is called 
advance production risk or inventory loss risk (Sabasi, et al., 2013; 
Menkhaus, et al., 2007).
    Research finds that advance production risk affects price discovery 
and price levels in privately negotiated markets (Menkhaus, et al., 
2003; Menkhaus, et al., 2007). Sellers facing this risk are more likely 
to make concessions during bargaining and accept lower trade prices 
rather than risk losing all of their production cost for a product. 
Moreover, buyers knowing sellers face this risk are less likely to 
offer high bid prices given sellers signal they are willing to accept 
lower prices (Menkhaus, et al., 2007). Research compares prices in 
private negotiation markets where sellers only produce what they agreed 
to sell (i.e., produce only what they have forward sold) to sellers 
producing inventory prior to negotiating price (Menkhaus, et al., 
2003). They found price levels were near equilibrium when inventory was 
sold prior to incurring production cost (2.75% above equilibrium) and 
nearly 10% below the competitive equilibrium when inventory was 
produced in advance (Figure 3.2).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ It should be noted that other research using the same supply 
and demand conditions find similar tendencies for private negotiation 
with advance production, but the magnitude of difference is somewhat 
smaller. Rahman, et al. (2019) find price levels are 6.55% below the 
competitive price with private negotiation and advance production.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Matching Risk

    This advance production risk is coupled with what is called 
matching risk (Menkhaus, et al., 2007). This is the risk of being 
matched with someone in the market that has already traded and feels 
less pressure to trade compared to their trading partner. It also 
encompasses trading with someone who is better at bargaining. For 
example, if you as a seller are paired with a buyer who has already 
purchased cattle and is less interested in your cattle, that buyer may 
bid less aggressively, making it harder to reach agreement on price. 
This can also occur if a buyer meets with a seller who has already sold 
what they planned to that period. This risk creates a potential cost 
for the trader to try and find someone else interested in trading. 
Research indicates that what happens with traders affected by this risk 
is they become more willing to make concessions when haggling over 
price to ensure a trade occurs rather than risk being matched with 
someone they are unable to trade with (Menkhaus, et al., 2007).
    Research investigating the impact of increased and decreased 
opportunities to match with a trade partner finds matching risk can 
have a significant impact on price discovery and price levels 
(Menkhaus, et al., 2007). The research compares the following matching 
scenarios: (1) All traders in the market are able to match three times 
with different trade partners (used previously by Menkhaus, et al., 
2003); (2) All traders in the market are able to match five times with 
trade partners; (3) Concentrating the market by cutting the number of 
buyers in half but doubling each of the buyers demand schedules and 
having five potential opportunities to match per trading period; and, 
(4) Concentrating the market by reducing the number of sellers by half 
but doubling supply schedules and having five matching opportunities 
per trading period. By doubling the demand (buyers) or supply (sellers) 
schedules, the underlying supply and demand remained constant and the 
predicted equilibrium was consistent across treatments (Menkhaus, et 
al., 2007). In this study, sellers also faced advance production risk.
Figure 3.2. Percent Difference in Price Level Given Advance Production 
        Risk.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
    Results show that increasing the number of matches from three to 
five with all trade partners, increased prices from about 9% under the 
competitive price to only 3% under the competitive price (Figure 3.3). 
By concentrating the number of buyers, doubling the demand of each 
buyer, and forcing the market to have five matches, matching risk had a 
large impact on price discovery and price level. With these big buyers, 
half the sellers were not matched with a buyer during each matching 
opportunity (there were two buyers as opposed to four sellers). The 
simple change of having fewer buyers relative to sellers increased 
matching risk. During this experiment even though there was a chance to 
be matched, half the sellers were randomly matched with buyers while 
half were not matched with a buyer during each matching opportunity. 
Unmatched sellers were forced to wait for an opportunity to sell, and 
once matched, these sellers faced the risk that the buyer had the 
supply needed. As a result, sellers were willing to make concessions in 
bargaining to reduce the chance they would be stuck with unsold 
inventory. Moreover, buyers experiencing less aggressive offer prices 
and bigger concessions from sellers, bid lower prices during 
bargaining. Average price levels were 22% below the competitive 
equilibrium in this scenario (Figure 3.3). When sellers were 
concentrated, buyers faced the same random chance of not being matched 
with a seller, as was the case in the concentrated buyer scenario. That 
is, half of the buyers were waiting to bargain with a seller during a 
matching opportunity while the other buyers bargained to purchase 
inventory. Thus, unmatched buyers faced the risk of less inventory 
being available for purchase once they had an opportunity to match with 
a seller. Sellers were able to increase their offer prices and buyers 
bid higher prices when matched with sellers to ensure product 
purchases. Price levels in this concentrated seller scenario were only 
one percent below, and not statistically different from, the 
competitive equilibrium price (Menkhaus, et al., 2007). We don't see 
the same magnitude of price difference between the concentrated 
scenarios because sellers still face and respond to advance production 
risk. Thus, the simple act of not being able to meet with a trade 
partner can make a significant difference in price discovery and 
resulting price levels.
Figure 3.3. Percent Difference in Price Level Given Matching Risk.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Negotiation Failure Risk

    Negotiation failure risk is the risk of not coming to agreement. 
Even though time and effort are spent bargaining, there is a risk that 
no price or terms of trade are agreed upon (Jones Ritten, et al., 
2020). If such a risk is realized, the persons involved must search for 
someone else to trade with. At that point, valuable time has been lost, 
increasing the chance that the next trading partner has either acquired 
or sold what they need to, i.e., matching risk increases. In the case 
of the fed cattle market, this realized risk could result in sellers 
holding onto cattle longer while incurring more costs until they find a 
willing buyer. For buyers, it could mean not having the amount of 
cattle desired for the slaughter plant at a given time.
    Focus group results in Wyoming found that producers generally felt 
they had to accept a buyer's terms rather than risk a failed 
negotiation (Bastian, et al., 2018). At the time of this writing, 
empirical research indicating the magnitude of impact from negotiation 
failure on commodity prices was unavailable, but it is expected that 
negotiation failure exacerbates the impact of both advance production 
and matching risks.
    Given the nature of these risks (advance production, matching, and 
negotiation failure) research suggests sellers are more likely to be at 
a bargaining disadvantage than buyers when private negotiation is the 
trading institution (Bastian, 2019; Menkhaus, et al., 2003; Menkhaus, 
et al., 2007). Moreover, recent empirical research related to producers 
and bargaining outcomes in other commodity markets supports these 
findings (Courtois and Subervie, 2015; Shokoohi, Chizari, and Asgari, 
2019). Price discovery within this institution, where these risks are 
present, generally results in price levels below the predicted 
equilibrium even with the same supply, demand, and number of firms.

    Risk Preferences

    Individual risk preferences affect bargaining behavior and 
resulting price discovery. Those agents who are more risk averse 
(buyers or sellers) tend to bargain for less advantageous transaction 
prices, leading to low individual earnings (Muthoo, 1999; Krishna, 
2010). Risk averse buyers involved in auctions or private negotiation 
tend to have higher bids to reduce the chance of not purchasing 
product, and risk averse sellers tend to give lower offers or asking 
prices to ensure a successful sale. Jones Ritten, et al. (2020) tested 
risk preferences across groups that first participate in a privately 
negotiated market experiment versus those that do not. The authors 
confirm previous findings that higher risk aversion resulted in lower 
earnings for market participants. Additionally, those who participated 
as a seller in a market experiment had significantly higher loss 
aversion compared to buyers, and those with higher loss aversion tended 
to bargain less aggressively and earned significantly less in the 
market.

    Market Information

    The above factors: trading institution, various risks, and risk 
preferences all interact with expectations of value when buyers and 
sellers enter into a transaction. One factor affecting expectation of 
value is product quality. Quality in fed cattle markets is generally 
measured in terms of yield and quality grades. Expectation of animal 
value generally increases as perceived quality increases. Increased 
quality, in turn, alters the levels at which bids and offers and 
resulting transaction prices occur (Jones, et al., 1992; Ward, et al., 
1996; Ward, 1992).
    Market information helps market agents form expectations about 
animal value prior to negotiating price. Research indicates that 
several sources of market price information affect price discovery and 
price determination for fed cattle. These market price sources include 
negotiated cash prices, boxed beef prices, and live cattle futures 
prices (Jones, et al., 1992; Matthews, et al., 2015; Ward, et al., 
1996; Ward, 1992; Ward, 1981).
    It is important to understand how these sources of market 
information affect price discovery. Reported prices are based on 
transactions that happened from 1 day to 1 or 2 weeks prior (for 
alternative marketing methods) when traders enter into negotiation, 
which give traders a general idea of price level. This information is 
tempered by any knowledge of other factors that could be affecting 
value of the animals available for sale. For example, let's say you 
expect the number of cattle to come out of feedyards this week is going 
to be down compared to last week. This signals that current supplies 
could be less than last week, so bids and offers should reflect that 
current information or expectation. Perhaps recent news indicates an 
increase in demand for beef in the near future, which signals to 
traders that current demand conditions are changing compared to last 
week. Thus, the price discovery process utilizes past price 
information, but traders also add any other current knowledge or 
expectations to their bids and offers.
    Market traders are continually updating their information and 
expectations as they enter into negotiations. Together with the factors 
discussed previously, market information plus any current supply and 
demand information affect price discovery. Different individuals with 
different risks and risk preferences are using that information, 
weighting its importance, forming expectations and making bids and 
offers to discover price. Thus, the price discovery process becomes 
dynamic and constantly incorporates new and updated information while 
being filtered through individual traders' perceptions of risk, 
quality, and animal value during bargaining.

    Trade Volume and Price Discovery

    How does trade volume impact the price discovery process? Let's 
start with the idea of a single transaction between a buyer and seller. 
Since the agents may face different risks and risk preferences, and 
weigh market information differently, bids and prices could result in a 
price that may be different than what current supply and demand 
conditions indicate. The difference between the transacted price versus 
what supply and demand conditions indicate could be large or small. As 
other transactions occur, the probability that prices are incorporating 
current supply and demand information more appropriately should 
increase. Thus, agricultural economists view more transactions as 
improving the accuracy of price determination and reported information 
about price levels. Tomek (1980, p. 435) states, ``If . . . the average 
of transaction price is an estimate of the true equilibrium price, the 
variance of the mean of transaction prices decreases as the number of 
transactions in-
creases . . .''. Thus, increased trade volume should improve the chance 
that an average reported price is accurate. Moreover, with more 
transactions, price determination generally adjusts more quickly given 
current supply and demand conditions, i.e., is more efficient (Fama, 
1970; Janzen and Adjemian, 2017).
    Given the above discussion, it is expected that volume affects the 
accuracy of past market price information used in the price discovery 
process. Research has found efficient price discovery and good market 
outcomes can occur with relatively low volumes of transactions or trade 
across various agricultural products and may change with differing 
supply and demand conditions (Peel, et al., 2020; Adjemian, et al., 
2016; Adjemian, Saitone, and Sexton, 2016; Tomek, 1980).
Fed Cattle Market Implications
    Factors motivating current concerns and the resulting calls for 
policy related to price discovery are understandable. Increased use of 
Alternative Marketing Agreements (AMAs), which rely primarily on 
previously reported negotiated cash prices, have reduced the volume of 
cattle being traded in cash or spot transactions (Peel, et al., 2020). 
Moreover, private negotiation is the primary trading in [situation] 
through which negotiated cash prices are discovered for fed cattle.\3\ 
Thus, sellers (feedlots) transacting fed cattle in cash markets face 
advance production, matching, and negotiation failure risks. It is 
likely that increased use of AMAs exacerbates these risks for those 
feedlots only selling cattle via negotiated cash trade, and puts them 
at a relative bargaining disadvantage (Sabasi, et al., 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ At the time of this writing the authors are not aware of any 
English auctions still being used to sell fed cattle. If any do exist, 
it is expected that the volume sold via auction is very small relative 
to the total volume being traded in fed cattle markets. This decline in 
English auction has likely occurred due to increased transactions costs 
and risks related to both quantity and quality variability for buyers 
relative to current market institutions being used.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A potential outcome of a policy mandating increased cash trade 
volume is that buyers will transact more cash-traded cattle, thereby 
reducing matching and negotiation failure risks for those feedlots 
(sellers) relying solely on cash trade.\4\ Hence, policy proposals 
aimed at reducing the use of AMAs and mandating increased cash trade 
volumes seemingly address a primary issue for sellers relying on 
negotiated cash trades. The current expectations of fed cattle sellers 
seem to be that mandating increased negotiated cash trade volumes will 
improve price discovery and potentially increase price levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ The realization of this outcome depends on the inability of 
buyers to adapt current AMA purchasing behavior to meet regulatory 
agent definitions of ``negotiated trade'' (Peel, et al., 2020). It 
seems feasible that buyers could potentially record a small amount of 
bid and offer communication related to last week's price, while using 
the structure of current AMA contracts with sellers, thereby meeting 
the regulatory definition but not fully meeting the intended policy 
objective. If this occurs, the likelihood of any change in current 
market outcomes is minimal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A primary question is whether policies mandating increased levels 
of negotiated cash trade volumes fully address risks and incentives for 
all agents trading in fed cattle markets, and thus making expectations 
of improved price discovery and price determination a realization. The 
reality is that feedlots will still face advance production risk, and 
while potentially reduced, they will still face some level of matching 
and negotiation failure risk even with a policy mandating increased 
negotiated cash trade volumes in place.
    Research at the University of Wyoming tested scenarios where 25%, 
50%, and 75% of the traders transacted produced inventory in an initial 
bargaining period, while those not allowed to trade in the first period 
(75%, 50%, 25%, of traders, respectively) waited for a second 
bargaining opportunity in which all market participants could trade 
(Sabasi, et al., 2013). The first bargaining period mimicked incentives 
faced by buyers and sellers in a market environment with the existence 
of AMAs. These AMAs scenarios were compared to a base scenario of no 
pre-committed trade (Sabasi, et al., 2013). Results indicate average 
prices were generally slightly higher in the AMAs bargaining period 
versus the second bargaining period mimicking the spot market, but they 
were generally not statistically different from each other. The 
researchers then compared agents not allowed to trade in the first 
period versus those that did. They found that generally sellers not 
allowed to trade in the first period negotiated for slightly lower 
prices compared to those that did, but seller price levels were not 
statistically different across the two groups. So, sellers not involved 
in the first bargaining period (AMAs) seemed to be somewhat 
disadvantaged, but the non-existence of AMAs in the base treatment did 
not result in significantly higher price levels for sellers. This 
result is very similar to empirical analyses that have examined the 
impact of AMAs on spot prices (Key, 2011; Muth, et al., 2008; 
Schroeder, et al., 1993; Vukina, Shin, and Zheng, 2009; Ward, Koontz, 
and Schroeder, 1998).
    Why weren't price levels higher in the non-AMAs scenario? First, it 
is important to remember that supply and demand conditions generally 
drive price levels, and the supply and demand levels were the same 
across all scenarios. Second, sellers still faced advance production 
risk and matching risks associated with bargaining ability of buyers 
during the first bargaining period. Generally, AMAs reduce the advance 
production risk for sellers and matching risk for both buyers and 
sellers engaged in those agreements. These reductions in risk create 
significant incentives for buyers and sellers to be involved with AMAs. 
A probable outcome of mandating increased negotiated cash trade is that 
some feedlots may have improved bargaining outcomes because of reduced 
matching risk, but those feedlots who have reduced sales opportunities 
via AMAs due to the policy will have worse outcomes. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that mandating increased volumes of negotiated trade will 
achieve desired expectations of increased price levels overall.
Summary and Conclusions
    Recent policy proposals to address price discovery concerns in fed 
cattle markets assume that mandating increased volumes of negotiated 
cash trade will improve the fed cattle market environment and price 
discovery (Brown, 2021; Nepveux, 2021). It is important to understand 
that a number of factors impact agent incentives when transacting fed 
cattle and resulting price discovery. Private negotiation is the 
dominant trading institution in fed cattle markets, and as a result, 
advance production, matching, and negotiation failure risks greatly 
impact bargaining outcomes. Policies focused on reducing AMAs and 
increasing negotiated cash trade volume do not fully address these 
risks and resulting incentives of agents involved in fed cattle 
markets. Some feedlots who sell fed cattle via negotiated cash trade 
may have reduced matching and negotiation failure risk as a result, but 
it is likely that economic surplus will be redistributed from agents 
(both buyers and sellers) utilizing AMAs to those benefitting from the 
policy.
    Trade volume impacts the potential accuracy of past price 
information used in price discovery. Research varies regarding 
necessary threshold levels of trade volume needed for improved price 
discovery, and as a result, the dynamic process of price discovery 
likely will be marginally impacted by policies aimed at increasing 
negotiated cash trades. Moreover, as price determination is generally 
driven by supply and demand conditions, expectations that policies 
aimed at increasing negotiated cash trade will significantly raise 
price levels are generally not supported by economic theory or numerous 
research findings.
    An additional issue is that such policies may have a negative 
impact on total economic surpluses generated by current fed cattle 
markets. AMAs reward quality, create improved production and processing 
efficiencies, reduce production costs per head through better plant 
utilization and spreading of fixed costs, and reduce search and 
transaction costs for cattle (Peel, et al., 2020; Koontz and Lawrence, 
2010; Anderson, Trapp, and Fleming, 2003; MacDonald, et al., 2000). 
Research also indicates average beef quality has increased given the 
use of AMAs thereby creating value for consumers (Muth, et al., 2007). 
These outcomes mean greater economic surplus has been created due to 
the use of AMAs. Thus, a potential outcome is that policies aimed at 
increasing negotiated cash trades and thereby reducing AMAs may have 
the unintended consequence of reducing overall economic surpluses 
currently achieved in the fed cattle and beef sector.

          A potential outcome is that policies aimed at increasing 
        negotiated cash trades and thereby reducing AMAs may have the 
        unintended consequence of reducing overall economic surpluses 
        currently achieved in the fed cattle and beef sector.

    Policies aimed at improving fed cattle markets and related economic 
surpluses must take into account the risks and incentives faced by all 
market agents. Peel, et al. (2020) propose that adding a transparent 
electronic trading platform for spot market transactions could improve 
price discovery in fed cattle markets with even a small amount of 
transactions. We extend that suggestion here as an alternative for 
consideration to policies focused on mandating increased negotiated 
cash trade. Research suggests that a double auction would likely be the 
best trading institution for such an endeavor (Menkhaus, et al., 2003). 
Price discovery will tend to be efficient in this institution provided 
a sufficient number of buyers and sellers participate. This trading 
institution also would mitigate some of the risks that seem to dominate 
bargaining outcomes in private negotiation. Any market alternative must 
reduce transaction costs for participants in order to be viable 
(Davidson and Weersink, 1998). Thus, development of several contracts 
with different specifications related to quality and yield grade that 
seem to be sought after in both negotiated cash and AMAs transactions, 
as well as specified premiums and penalties for spot delivery of cattle 
not meeting specifications, could be used to facilitate quicker trade. 
Resulting trade information would be reported and thereby add to price 
discovery. The question is whether enough incentives exist or whether 
other incentives would have to be provided to attract sufficient buyers 
and sellers. This alternative ultimately seems more beneficial than 
mandating increased volume of negotiated cash trades.

 
 
 
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 Koontz and J. Maples. 2020. ``Fed Cattle Price Discovery Issues and
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Chapter 4
Enhancing Supply Chain Coordination through Marketing Agreements: 
        Incentives, Impacts, and Implications
Ted C. Schroeder, Brian K. Coffey, and Glynn T. Tonsor
Prologue
    The U.S. cattle sector is an important segment of the overall farm 
economy representing about 18% of agricultural commodity receipts.\1\ 
The cattle and beef industry, in addition to being a massive economic 
sector, is immensely complex, diverse, and dynamic. The vast array of 
cattle and beef operations and associated business interests naturally 
creates a diversity of perceptions, opinions, and tradeoffs associated 
with alternative policies. As public university economists, our goal is 
to provide information, analysis, and opinions regarding how and why 
the industry has evolved so interested parties can better understand 
economic drivers of industry change. We provide this information using 
publicly available data, review of published work, and through 
countless industry participant discussions and interviews over the 
years to appreciate the intricate workings of the industry. We expect a 
variety of opinions will be present relative to issues addressed in 
this chapter. We hope our thoughts help guide and inform the dialogue.
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    \1\ https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/cattle-beef/
sector-at-a-glance/.
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Introduction
    Dramatic changes in the ways fed cattle are being purchased and 
valued through marketing agreements have occurred because of 
substantial economic incentives to improve vertical coordination and 
align value signals along the supply chain. Packers and feeders have 
forged marketing agreements because they address supply chain 
coordination challenges more effectively than negotiated cash fed 
cattle trade. Incentives to adopt marketing agreements are multi-
faceted, interconnected, and emanated in part to better meet customer 
demands. Having evolved over a few decades, marketing agreements have 
become integral in coordinating the beef supply chain. Structural 
changes in how fed cattle value is determined have resulted in thinly 
traded negotiated cash markets in some regions, raising concerns about 
reliability of reported trade and efficiency of cash market price 
discovery. Thinning negotiated cash cattle trade has resulted in 
reduced transparency of market information apprising industry 
participants of evolving supply and demand fundamentals. Tradeoffs 
between supply chain enhancements facilitated through marketing 
agreements and reduced market information due to thin negotiated cash 
trade need to be more clearly understood as strategies and policies are 
deliberated to address concerns.
    The purpose of this chapter is to identify and discuss major 
economic drivers of marketing agreements and associated outcomes. We 
also assess market information needs in light of shifts away from cash 
negotiated fed cattle trade toward marketing agreements. Specific 
objectives include:

  1.  Document changes over time in how fed cattle are marketed.

  2.  Identify and summarize the major incentives for cattle feeders 
            and beef packers to adopt marketing agreements and 
            associated tradeoffs relative to negotiated cash trade.

  3.  Outline current challenges regarding market transparency in 
            marketing agreements that need to be addressed.

  4.  Present potential methods Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) 
            might capture and illuminate improved market information 
            contained in marketing agreement price reporting.

  5.  Outline summary thoughts and recommendations.
Changing Marketing Methods
    Fed cattle marketing methods have undergone a major transformation 
over the past 15 years, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. In the early 
2000s, cash negotiated trade represented about 55% of typical weekly 
national fed cattle volume. Negotiated grid and forward contract trade 
represented roughly 10% each with the remaining 30% being formula 
trade. Around 2007, formula trade started to increase its relative 
share of fed cattle marketing so that by 2020 about 60 to 70% of fed 
cattle were formula purchases. During this same time cash negotiated 
trade dwindled to 20 to 25% with negotiated grid and forward contracts 
combined representing the remaining 15% of trade volume.
    Integral to understanding what these major trends imply about 
market performance and associated supply chain impacts are the 
definitions of what types of fed cattle transaction types are included 
in each category by the United States Department of Agriculture 
Agricultural Marketing Service (USDA-AMS, 2020):

  1.  Cash negotiated trade represents cattle purchased by the packer 
            where the price is negotiated with the seller and cattle 
            scheduled to be delivered to the plant within 30 days.

  2.  Forward contract trade is an agreement for the purchase of cattle 
            in advance of slaughter where the base price is established 
            referencing the CME Live Cattle Futures contract.

  3.  Negotiated grid purchases involve negotiating the base price 
            between the packer and cattle feeder at the time of the 
            agreement with delivery expected within 14 days. The final 
            net price is determined after slaughter and carcass grading 
            by adjusting the negotiated base price by grid premiums or 
            discounts based on carcass attributes.

  4.  Formula trade represents cattle committed for slaughter by any 
            means other than cash negotiated, forward contract, or 
            negotiated grid.

    These delineations are important because as we discuss marketing 
agreements in this chapter, we are essentially referring to formula 
trade (although in places we also include negotiated grids and we 
specifically note when we do so). However, formula trade, as reported 
by USDA, is a broad category and details vary considerably across 
associated transactions. Variation within formula trade compounds 
market transparency concerns as formula trade has increased in 
popularity. This issue is addressed specifically later in this chapter.
Figure 4.1. Shares of Weekly National Live Cattle Purchases by 
        Transaction Type, April 11, 2004-March 14, 2021.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS archived by LMIC. All live, dressed, steers, 
        heifers, other fed cattle, cows and bulls. Negotiated grid was 
        not tracked prior to April 2004.
Incentives and Tradeoffs of Marketing Agreements and Cash Negotiated 
        Trade
    In this section we summarize past research that has investigated 
incentives associated with adoption of marketing agreements and 
consequences of reduced cash negotiated trade. Much of the synthesis in 
this section originates from information gleaned from work by Anderson 
and Trapp (1999), Boykin, et al. (2017), RTI International (2007), 
Schroeder and Graff (2000), Schroeder, et al. (2002), Schroeder, et al. 
(1997), Tonsor, et al. (2010), Liu, et al. (2009), Peel, et al. (2020), 
and numerous discussions with industry participants over the years by 
the authors.
    Tradeoffs associated with wide-spread adoption of marketing 
agreements displacing cash negotiated fed cattle trade are both 
numerous and complex. Private incentives of cattle feeders and beef 
packers to adopt marketing agreements are well documented and 
straightforward. However, there are also broader supply chain forces 
which encourage marketing agreements. Furthermore, externalities 
associated with widespread decline in cash negotiated trade can create 
adverse consequences associated with the transition to marketing 
agreements.
    A stylized summary of cattle feeder and beef packer incentives and 
implications associated with various ways fed cattle are purchased is 
provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. We compare Live and Dressed Negotiated 
(i.e., cash negotiated trade); Forward Contract; Negotiated Grid; and 
Formula separated into two alternative valuation methods of Marketing 
Agreement Non-Grid and Marketing Agreement Grid. The color coding (red, 
yellow, and green shading in the tables refer to relative effectiveness 
of each marketing method in addressing each consideration) used in the 
tables is based on a synthesis of past research noted above, numerous 
informal discussions with industry participants, and our assessment. 
Specific selection of colors in some cells entails some subjectivity; 
the overall implications we report across marketing methods are stark 
and, we argue, robust.
Cattle Feeder Incentives and Tradeoffs
    For cattle feeders, the various fed cattle pricing and valuation 
methods offer highly varied incentives that differ across marketing 
methods (Table 4.1). To facilitate interpretation, we grouped the 
various individual impacts of each marketing method (individual rows in 
Table 4.1) into (1) Cattle Pricing and Value Signals; (2) Marketing 
Cost, Flexibility, & Risk Management; (3) Market Information; and (4) 
Supply Chain Coordination.

    Cattle Pricing and Value Signals

    As noted in Chapter 1, there exists a long history of concerns that 
fed cattle pricing mechanisms being used to market fed cattle using 
cash negotiated methods (often referred to as average pricing) were 
insufficient at sending value signals and providing incentives to 
cattle feeders to improve fed cattle quality. This is not a new 
concern. Conferences held some 30 years ago organized by the Research 
Institute on Livestock Pricing focused on concerns associated with 
inadequate value signals being sent through traditional fed cattle 
negotiated cash trade. These concerns, still present today, led to the 
design and adoption of value-based grid pricing of fed cattle. 
Variation in grid premiums and discounts across packers due to 
differentiated customer demands, coupled with varied cattle feeder 
comparative advantages, encouraged cattle feeders to target specific 
packer grids. Feeders consider their particular grids in feeder cattle 
procurement, feeding management, and marketing decisions. These actions 
naturally led many feedlots to form direct ties to a single packer with 
whom they entered into a marketing agreement.
Table 4.1. Relative Ability of Alternative Fed Cattle Marketing Methods 
        to Address Cattle Feeder Considerations.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        

          Marketing agreements assure feeders financial rewards for 
        incurring added costs associated with these practices. There is 
        no such guarantee when selling specific cattle in the 
        negotiated spot market. This is immensely important to 
        recognize as we consider the future implications of marketing 
        agreements in the fed cattle and beef supply chain.

    Grid pricing is the main way value signals associated with quality, 
yield, and various differentiated branded programs are sent to cattle 
feeders. As such, the most effective cattle marketing methods to ensure 
price differentials reflect quality is through use of grids. Negotiated 
grids and marketing agreements with grids are the most effective of the 
marketing methods used in the industry to directly link value with 
quality. Furthermore, grid information sent back to cattle feeders to 
enable them to better manage feeder cattle procurement, feeding 
protocols, and cattle harvest timing created even greater value for 
cattle feeders to enter into marketing agreements.
    As we present later, growing incentives to continue to develop 
marketing agreements have arrived or are on the horizon. For example, 
various certification systems and brands have developed. Such programs 
require feeders to invest in genetics, upstream alliances, and 
production practices to consistently meet specifications. Marketing 
agreements assure feeders financial rewards for incurring added costs 
associated with these practices. There is no such guarantee when 
selling specific cattle in the negotiated spot market. This is 
immensely important to recognize as we consider the future implications 
of marketing agreements in the fed cattle and beef supply chain.

    Marketing Cost, Flexibility, & Risk Management

    In the late 1980s, Cactus Feeders and IBP, Inc. entered into what 
was recognized as the first large-scale fed cattle marketing agreement 
between a cattle feeder and beef packer (Stalcup, 2004). Among major 
incentives noted at the time were reducing costs and eliminating 
distractions associated with weekly negotiating of fed cattle trade. 
Not long after, other cattle feeders entered into agreements, adding 
market access to a growing list of recognized incentives. Reduced costs 
and market access, which are present with or without a grid, remain 
among the most prominent reasons cattle feeders enter into marketing 
agreements. Most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic that reduced 
packing plant operational capacity, discussions with industry 
participants suggested some producers with marketing agreements had 
higher priority, more reliable, and more timely market access than 
cattle feeders who were attempting to negotiate spot trade each week. 
As packer operational capacity was challenged, contractual commitments 
for fed cattle to be delivered would be prioritized by packers over 
purchasing cattle in the spot market.
    Though marketing agreements reduce week-to-week marketing and price 
discovery costs and ensure market access, they also reduce flexibility 
for the cattle feeder and packer. Negotiated cash trade enables 
producers to readily reject cattle purchase offers and, if leverage 
swings in their favor, utilize that leverage to pursue more desirable 
terms of trade. When leverage is unfavorable for the cattle feeder, 
spot markets tend to have greater challenges in negotiating desirable 
outcomes. Cattle feeders who prefer greater independence, have 
comparative advantage for negotiating individual transactions, and 
value increased ability to accept or reject prevailing offers are more 
inclined to negotiate weekly trade on the spot market. Opportunities to 
take advantage of short-term leverage swings are largely non-existent 
in marketing agreements.

          Most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic that reduced 
        packing plant operational capacity, discussions with industry 
        participants suggested some producers with marketing agreements 
        had higher priority, more reliable, and more timely market 
        access than cattle feeders who were attempting to negotiate 
        spot trade each week.

    Market Information

    Perhaps the single most common concern about not negotiating spot 
market prices regularly is the associated impact on market information. 
This concern has circulated across industry participants as well as 
policy-making arenas for a long time (Peel, et al., 2020) and was a 
major reason Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) was launched some 20 
years ago (Parcell, et al., 2016). However, with the recent precipitous 
decline in negotiated cash market fed cattle trade together with large 
fed cattle suppliers challenging packer slaughter capacity, focused 
effort on finding ways to ``fix'' this problem has again elevated. We 
address the issue of market information and formula trade later. For 
now, we simply note cash negotiated trade is reported by USDA-AMS 
during the week the price is agreed upon. In contrast, formula trade 
price information is reported the week the cattle are delivered to the 
packer and often based on reported negotiated prices from 1 to 2 weeks 
earlier. As such, formula trade does not contribute much new 
information to price discovery. Furthermore, because of how broadly the 
formula price category is defined and reported by USDA (i.e., it 
encompasses all trade that is not categorized into one of the other 
reported methods), formula market information currently reported is not 
highly informative. Concerns are compounded by formula trade often 
relying on reported negotiated prices as a base price. As formula trade 
volume grows, a larger portion of cattle are partially priced by a 
negotiated price based on a thinner market (Schroeder, et al., 2018).

    Supply Chain Coordination

    The cattle producer--beef packer relationship has often been 
described as confrontational. Whether that is widely true or 
selectively present is debatable, but it is not ubiquitous. Having an 
adversarial relationship with your customers as a cattle feeder or your 
main suppliers as a packer is not conducive to coordinating the supply 
chain, quickly resolving conflicts that might arise, or working 
together to solve problems. The importance of establishing strong 
buyer-supplier relationships (SBSR) has been clearly established in the 
supply chain literature (Board, 2011; Kannan and Tan, 2006). Recent 
literature has focused even further on advantages of multiple vertical 
layers of supply chain relationships (e.g., think of cow-calf-
backgrounder-feeder-packer) (e.g., Kataike, et al., 2019). Established 
marketing agreements where both the supplier and buyer mutually benefit 
from the agreement creates strong business relationships that 
facilitate a collaborative relationship. This directly improves several 
dimensions of the supply chain, which is further discussed in the next 
section addressing impacts of cattle purchasing methods on packers/
customers.
    When a catastrophic event occurs, such as the Holcomb plant fire in 
August 2019, those with established relationships are able to more 
effectively work together to mitigate negative impacts. Due to the 
strong and lasting business relationship, both the feeder and the 
packer have an incentive to work together to adjust timing, scheduling, 
logistics, and other coordination issues to continue serving downstream 
customer needs.\2\
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    \2\ These sentiments were shared with us in personal confidential 
discussions with several industry participants.
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Packer/Customer Incentives and Tradeoffs
    Table 4.2 summarizes a similar color-coded matrix to that of Table 
4.1 but is focused on beef packer/customer considerations regarding fed 
cattle marketing agreements. Similar to the previous discussion 
relative to cattle producer considerations, we focus on relative 
rankings of the various fed cattle purchase methods for beef packers. 
Since the noted attributes also often influence beef customers who are 
further downstream in addition to packers, we refer somewhat more 
generally to fed cattle and beef customer impacts.

    Meeting Beef Customer Demands

    A host of factors influence beef packer ability to meet downstream 
customer demands. Many of these refer to specific product and service 
differentiation including Certifications, Product Branding, Quality 
Assurances, Process Assurances, and Traceability. Having a known supply 
of cattle and known suppliers enables better quality control and 
production process assurances. These motives are further emphasized 
later in this chapter, but they are not only immensely important to 
customers--their importance will continue to grow in the future as 
consumer demands and expectations evolve. These considerations are most 
effectively accomplished through marketing agreements with known 
sources of fed cattle in the production pipeline.
Table 4.2. Relative Ability of Alternative Fed Cattle Marketing Methods 
        to Facilitate Meeting Beef Customer Preferences.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
    Having assured sources of fed cattle through marketing agreements 
also makes animal traceability easier and product volumes assured so 
the packer is a reliable supplier to downstream customers with product-
specific demands. Predictable supply is essential for product branding, 
whether at retail or food service. Supply chain management incentives 
related to certification and branding are a major part of marketing 
agreements discussed regarding cattle feeders.

    Firm Operations

    Incentives for packers to enter into early marketing agreements in 
the late 1980s and 1990s were mostly associated with enhancing firm 
operations. In particular, marketing agreements reduce the cost of 
regularly searching for and bidding on cattle. The agreements provide 
consistent, predictable slaughter quantities in a business where 
operating plants at capacity provides substantial per-unit cost savings 
(Barkley and Schroeder, 1996). These incentives alone were enough to 
encourage packers to enter into marketing agreements even without the 
further supply chain enhancements noted above. Since the time of the 
early agreements, meeting customer demands has become a much more 
prominent incentive to establish marketing agreements (RTI 
International, 2007).
    One noteworthy tradeoff for packers that use marketing agreements 
is reduced flexibility. If a packer, for whatever reason, wishes to 
increase slaughter volume significantly relative to existing marketing 
agreements, their main option is to use the negotiated cash market for 
sourcing. If, on the other hand, they wish to reduce slaughter volume, 
adhering to existing agreements may not allow it. As such, packers give 
up flexibility in cattle procurement when they enter into marketing 
agreements. However, counter-balancing the reduced cattle purchasing 
flexibility, RTI International (2007) packer surveys revealed marketing 
agreements increased packer flexibility in meeting downstream customer 
demand.
    Enhanced vertical supply chain coordination among cattle producers, 
processors, and other participants is probably the most important 
benefit that has resulted from marketing agreements. Better buyer-
supplier communication improves value signals, reduces costs, improves 
scheduling, enhances ability to resolve problems, and enables 
downstream alliances. These outcomes are all beef supply chain benefits 
associated with marketing agreements that ultimately benefit beef 
consumers.
Figure 4.2. National Weekly Percentage of Steers and Heifers Grading 
        Choice and Prime, 1998-March 2021.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS as compiled by LMIC.
Evidence Summary of Cattle and Packer Marketing Agreement Incentives
    Quality Grade Impacts

    It is abundantly clear from the previous discussion that marketing 
agreements have incentivized higher-quality fed cattle production, 
especially through the use of grids. This begs the question: Has the 
increase in marketing agreements led to higher quality beef being 
produced?
    USDA Market News publishes weekly in the NW_LS196 estimated grading 
percent report a breakdown of steers and heifers offered for quality 
grading by grade category. Figure 4.2 illustrates the trend over time 
in percentage of steers and heifers grading Prime or Choice (the two 
highest grades) from 1998 to March 2021. During the late 1990s to about 
2007, roughly 55% of steers and heifers graded Choice or higher. The 
percentage of steers and heifers grading Prime or Choice trended upward 
since 2007 to greater than 80% in 2020 to 2021. Prime and Choice beef 
has increased substantially resulting in higher quality beef available 
for consumers at a more affordable price.
    Further demonstration of increasing beef quality over time is 
apparent in wholesale boxed beef sales. Figure 4.3 illustrates sales of 
Choice and higher-quality boxed beef (Choice + Branded + Prime) as well 
as just Branded boxed beef sales on a weekly basis starting in February 
2003 when USDA-AMS first started reporting. Branded sales data are 
reported separately. Choice and higher-grade sales went from 
representing about 35% in the early 2000s to about 55% since 2017. 
Branded beef increased from about 7% to about 20% over the same time 
frame. Marketing agreements rewarding higher quality grades through 
grid premiums have increased concurrent with beef quality over time, 
providing evidence grid pricing incentives have been effective.
Figure 4.3. Shares of Choice and Higher Grade and Branded Boxed Beef 
        Sales (Loads), Weekly February 28, 2003-March 12, 2021.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS.

    To provide an estimate of the value added to wholesale beef as a 
result of the higher quality grades being realized, we calculated the 
net gross dollars added by Prime, Branded, and Choice beef. To get this 
measure we multiplied premiums over Select for Prime, Choice, and 
Branded beef by their respective loads marketed. From that, we 
subtracted the discount of Ungraded beef relative to Select times 
Ungraded loads marketed. This step is necessary as the growing demand 
for high-quality beef likely increased penalties for lower-quality 
beef. This created a net gross dollars added (adjusted to 2019 dollars) 
over the 2004 to 2019 time period. The net gross value is illustrated 
in Figure 4.4. The net value changes across years as volumes, premiums, 
and discounts change. However, since 2015, consistent with when formula 
trade reached a plateau at about 60 to 70% of fed cattle trade (Figure 
4.1), the value added has increased from zero to greater than $700 
million in 2019. This means the volume-weighted premiums associated 
with higher quality beef net discounts for ungraded volume added some 
$700 million to wholesale beef value in 2019 alone (greater than $25/
head of fed cattle slaughtered).
Figure 4.4. Net Gross Real (2019=100) Dollars Added by Prime, Branded, 
        Choice, and Ungraded Boxed Beef Relative to Select, Annual 
        2004-2019.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Calculated using USDA-AMS and BLS data.

    Additional insight follows from combining beef grading shares and 
prices of boxed beef cutout composites by grade. Specifically, we can 
easily identify years of obvious demand growth from this information. 
Considering year-over-year changes, if the price premium for Prime over 
Select increased and the share of wholesale beef loads grading Prime 
grew while the share grading Select declined, then we know demand for 
Prime wholesale beef grew relative to Select. Applying this approach 
over the 16 years from 2005 to 2020 to Prime, Choice, and Branded 
wholesale beef relative to Select, we identify 6 years of obvious 
demand growth for Prime (2010, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2017, 2019); 3 for 
Choice (2011, 2016, 2017); and 5 for Branded (2010, 2011, 2016, 2017, 
2019). The multiple years since 2010 of clear demand growth for higher 
grading and branded wholesale beef is consistent with the monetary 
contribution noted in Figure 4.4. We see no years of clear demand 
growth for Ungraded beef. This a very conservative approach which 
identifies the minimum number of years with demand increases.

          Producers will not invest in expensive quality grade 
        enhancing production practices unless incentivized to do so.
          Recognizing many formula traded cattle are purchased using 
        grids that pay quality grade premium incentives makes it 
        logical to conclude there likely is at least some causality 
        between grid premiums and markedly improving beef quality.

    The previous charts are simply trends; one cannot definitively 
conclude whether there is causality. That is, one cannot say 
conclusively that marketing agreements caused beef quality to increase. 
However, causality can rarely be proven; instead, often the best we can 
do is identify common trends and interpret them in light of context-
specific knowledge. Marketing arrangements are inherently prevalent in 
branded product supply chains. The coordination of production, 
distribution, and marketing of branded items is challenging to 
accomplish in traditional spot markets (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
Producers will not invest in expensive quality grade enhancing 
production practices unless incentivized to do so. Grids connect the 
net fed cattle price directly to quality. No other pricing mechanism 
does this nearly as effectively. Recognizing many formula traded cattle 
are purchased using grids that pay quality grade premium incentives 
makes it logical to conclude there likely is at least some causality 
between grid premiums and markedly improving beef quality.

    Beef Trade Implications

    International trade in beef products has become a major factor 
driving industry prosperity. For example, in 2019, beef and variety 
meat product exports equated to $309.75 per head according to the U.S. 
Meat Export Federation.\3\ The top U.S. beef importers in 2019 are 
summarized in Table 4.3. The ten largest importers represented 90% of 
beef export volume with Japan and South Korea each representing more 
than 20%.
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    \3\ https://www.usmef.org/about-usmef/faq/.
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Table 4.3. U.S. Beef Imports by Country, 2019.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: USDA-ERS.

    Meat trade in general, and beef trade in particular, faces a number 
of trade restrictions (U.S. Trade Representative, 2021).\4\ For 
example, exports to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (three of the top 
ten importers) each require a USDA Quality System Assessment (QSA) 
verifying the products were derived from cattle less than 30 months of 
age (USDA, FSIS, 2020). Several countries require beef products be 
produced in a way that ensures the product is free of harmful residues. 
Restrictions also apply to where the animal was raised and/or 
slaughtered. China has zero tolerance for ractopamine in beef products 
as well as stringent maximum residue limits for zeranol, trenbolone 
acetate, and melengesterol acetate which are used to enhance feed 
efficiency and weight gain (USDA FSIS, 2020). Also important to 
recognize are countries that, because of their stringent import rules, 
greatly restrict import of U.S. beef. For example, EU member countries 
preclude meat imports from livestock treated with hormonal growth 
promotants (USDA FSIS, 2020).
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    \4\ https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2021/
2021NTE.pdf.
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    Synthesizing the varying requirements for U.S. beef by importing 
countries (with no assessment of the legitimacy and/or legality of 
those restrictions), it is apparent cattle production protocols are 
essential to gain export market access. Age and source verification 
requirements are present in some countries. Restrictions on residue 
levels on products used in cattle feeding are common. Precluding use of 
feed additives and/or hormonal growth promotants is prevalent. While 
verification of these production protocols can be accomplished in 
several ways, they all entail some form of assurance, third party 
verification, and potentially formal documentation from the producer to 
the packer in order to ensure the protocols are being adhered to. This 
provides another incentive for engaging in marketing agreements and 
contracts: to match up production protocols with packer-customer 
requirements. In general, adoption of many export requirement protocols 
by producers increases production costs. Establishing and maintaining 
export relationships is a costly venture. Beef packers will not take on 
the added costs without an agreement in place to consistently source 
cattle that meet the specifications of exporting countries. Likewise, 
cattle feeders will not take on costs of protocols to meet the 
standards absent associated premiums to offset added costs.
Marketing Agreements and Market Transparency
    One of the major concerns surrounding marketing agreements and 
formula fed cattle purchases are how they impact price reporting and 
market transparency. To understand the concern and ultimately determine 
ways to address it, the nature of the concern must first be delineated, 
as it is multidimensional.
    First, marketing agreement purchases do not contribute directly to 
the current week's cash market price discovery, though they contribute 
indirectly through anticipated volumes and impacts on market 
``currentness.'' This is because marketing agreements tend to be 
formula pricing with the base price in the formula established by 
reported negotiated prices from 1 to 2 weeks previous. As such, a 
voiced concern is that in thinly traded spot markets, there may be 
insufficient negotiated trade to establish reliable and representative 
cash market information. Furthermore, in some important cattle 
producing market regions (e.g., Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico), during 
certain weeks no negotiated cash price information is reported by USDA. 
The essence of this concern is that formula trade causes declining spot 
trade volume thus reducing market transparency. As long as formula 
prices are based on prior negotiated prices, they do not represent 
current prices. Switching to use of an alternative base price such as 
live cattle futures or some other concurrent price that matches the 
delivery date of formula purchased cattle could alleviate the time 
matching concern. However, it does not address the concern about the 
price not directly contributing to today's price discovery.
    A second dimension of the concern over formula trade, not unrelated 
to the thin market concern, is data confidentiality. USDA-AMS uses a 
set of confidentiality guidelines to determine whether particular 
market information is publicly reportable. If guidelines preclude 
reporting, the information may be either not reported or combined with 
other data and reported in more aggregated form to preserve 
confidentiality. The confidentiality guidelines USDA-AMS employs are at 
times binding and impact reporting, especially in market regions where 
there are only a few major packers and markets are thinly traded 
(Schroeder, et al., 2019). There are strategies to consider in reducing 
confidentiality constraints including:

  (1)  Modifying the confidentiality guidelines used by USDA-AMS to 
            lessen reporting constraints,

       Would need careful research to determine feasibility and 
            possible impacts.

  (2)  Aggregating information over time; for example, combining 
            multiple days/weeks of data in USDA-AMS reports,

       Not likely to reduce the problem appreciably because in 
            some cases it is en-
              demic with the regional market packer structure and 
            market thinness.

       Makes reported information dated and as such reduces 
            value in information 
              content.

  (3)  Aggregating information across purchase methods (e.g., combining 
            negotiated cash, negotiated grid, and formula trade into a 
            single category rather than separate categories),

       USDA aggregates now across these pricing methods as well 
            as adding in 
              forward contract trade in the weekly national 
            comprehensive report. This 
              is always reportable and provides a national fed cattle 
            composite net price/
              value.

       Removing the forward contract price data from the 
            reported composite 
              prices has been recommended in the past to make this 
            price reflect more 
              current prices, but to date that has not been done by 
            USDA (Schroeder and 
              Tonsor, 2017).

       Aggregated national price reports do not reveal price 
            variation present 
              across market regions at times (Schroeder, et al., 2018 
            and Schroeder, et 
              al., 2019).

  (4)  Aggregating across larger market regions when reporting USDA-AMS 
            data,

       Has been explored and could work but can reduce the 
            quality of the infor-
              mation in combined regions. For example, Texas-Oklahoma-
            New Mexico ne-
              gotiated trade could be combined with Kansas and be 
            reportable more 
              often, but since Kansas is already generally reportable, 
            this would slightly 
              dilute the Kansas report with prices from outside the 
            region and it would 
              not add information value to the existing Kansas report 
            (Schroeder, et al., 
              2019).
Figure 4.5. Snapshot of Part of USDA-AMS Daily Market Formula Cattle 
        Purchase Report.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS, https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/ams_2
        659.pdf.

  (5)  Reporting price summary information in a new way using 
            statistical modeling such as a hedonic model (discussed in 
            more detail later),

       Has been explored in preliminary work with USDA-AMS 
            transaction data 
              and may have promise, but needs more assessment 
            (Schroeder and Tonsor, 
              2017).

    Finally, a third concern relative to market transparency is related 
to the information that is and is not reported in formula trade market 
reports by USDA. Since formula trade is a ``catch-all'' category of 
transactions that are not negotiated cash, negotiated grid, or forward 
contract, there is considerable heterogeneity across transactions. For 
example, non-hormone-treated cattle (NHTC), grass-fed, organic, 
specific export-certified, grid cattle, and non-grid cattle purchased 
under marketing agreements are all included in formula trade market 
information reporting under LMR by USDA. As such, the reported price 
range in the formula trade category, representing by far the largest 
volume of cattle of the four categories, typically exceeds $30/cwt 
dressed weight (see example of partial recent daily market report in 
Figure 4.5). Such a large price range makes it difficult to interpret 
the information reported. The weighted-average price represents a broad 
array of types of cattle and transactions as the price range suggests. 
As such, there is no way to know why the range is so wide or what 
exactly the mixture of volumes of various types of cattle are that 
comprise the weighted average without having more data and completing 
careful analysis of the data.
    Resolving the issue of excessive heterogeneity in formula trade is 
an issue that USDA may be able to partly address through modifications 
to LMR and/or how it is implemented. LMR began in 2001, when fed cattle 
trade was still mostly negotiated cash and has had only modest changes 
since inception. Over the same time, formula trade has become the 
dominant purchase method. A few options exist for providing more 
transparency in formula trade cattle. One proposal suggests having USDA 
publish a data library of marketing agreements similar to what has been 
done for years in the swine market. We will let others opine on the 
value of publishing contracts, but we suspect the value for weekly 
price discovery and market transparency is relatively low. A more 
obvious way to increase transparency is to detail more what the large 
price range represents in formula trade reports. A few possible ideas 
come to mind each of which would need to be tested using LMR 
transactions data collected under LMR that is currently not published:

  (1)  Split formula trade market information into more refined 
            categories for (i) grid, (ii) non-grid, and (iii) specialty 
            (non-hormone treated, naturally raised, etc.) for price 
            reporting. Currently, this level of transaction detail is 
            not collected by USDA under LMR so it would require a 
            change in data collection protocols.\5\ Such further 
            refined reporting though could be subject to 
            confidentiality challenges which can only be determined by 
            collecting and analyzing the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Any considered adjustment in the level of transaction detail 
collected by USDA would warrant careful assessment and would apply to 
all forms of reportable transactions, not just formula trade.

  (2)  Combined with the above recommendation, we have also recommended 
            USDA report percentiles of prices in addition to simple 
            high and low prices in formula trade. For example, in 
            Figure 4.5 rather than reporting the high and low, USDA 
            could report the 15th and 85th percentile prices. These are 
            much tighter ranges than the absolute high and low and will 
            exclude extreme prices that are likely not relevant to many 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            producers (Schroeder and Tonsor, 2017).

  (3)  Develop some form of hedonic modeling to refine price/value 
            reporting. We have proposed this concept to USDA in past 
            exploratory analysis of LMR transaction sample data, though 
            only through preliminary testing (Schroeder and Tonsor, 
            2017).\6\ The idea with hedonic modeling of LMR transaction 
            data is that it might be capable of increasing pricing 
            transparency while also maintaining confidentiality of 
            actual reported prices if structured accordingly. This 
            approach necessarily entails economic and statistical 
            modeling of reported data to arrive at a reportable price 
            and not just publishing reported prices themselves. 
            However, what we are proposing is not as different as it 
            might first seem since weighted-average prices regularly 
            reported by USDA-AMS also require a statistical price 
            summary method and are not prices themselves. One of the 
            flexible advantages of using hedonic modeling to facilitate 
            market information reporting is subsets of trade can be 
            aggregated over time or space if necessary to ensure 
            confidentiality while not withholding all the information. 
            For example, if only a small number of NHTC traded this 
            week, they could be included in the hedonic model with the 
            previous week's NHTC transactions so an NHTC price 
            differential could still be reported.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Hedonic modeling is routinely used by other Federal agencies in 
price reporting (e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics).

  (4)  Combine currently reported separate categories with a goal 
            towards more frequent reporting with details of most 
            importance to the industry. Past research has considered 
            alternative aggregation across market regions regarding 
            negotiated trade (Schroeder, et al., 2019). Here possible 
            enhancements in formula reporting may include merging steer 
            and heifer categories (or live and dressed; or splitting % 
            Choice categories into two groups rather than four) with a 
            goal of enabling other--perhaps more desired--breakouts on 
            reports such as specialty (e.g., NHTC) vs. non-specialty 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            distinctions.

    Inherent in these possible suggestions, as is the case throughout 
this topic of discussion, are the trade-offs between what is reported 
and not reported that are directly influenced by private decisions 
regarding market channels used to transfer ownership of fed cattle.
Conclusion and Recommendations
    Fed cattle marketing agreements were launched some 30 years ago and 
focused on ensuring market access, enabling greater capacity 
utilization, and reducing transaction costs. Since then, marketing 
agreements have evolved to become instrumental in improving overall 
supply chain coordination. In addition to the original benefits, cattle 
producers now also utilize marketing agreements to secure higher prices 
associated with producing higher quality cattle, producing cattle to 
match downstream customer preferences, establishing stronger ties and 
relationships with cattle and beef customers, and building downstream 
alliances. Together, these provide important economic benefits to the 
cattle producer that collectively improve overall beef industry value 
and better serve end consumers. Any limits imposed on cattle feeders' 
ability to utilize marketing agreements would directly reduce the 
benefits such agreements have provided producers, packers, customers, 
and, ultimately, consumers.
    Development of marketing agreements have also reduced weekly 
visible price discovery information. The increased popularity of 
marketing agreements, combined with the ways marketing information is 
reported by USDA, makes the associated price information challenging to 
interpret. Some suggest this reduces market transparency. Indeed, 
difficult to discern marketing agreement price information is not 
entirely transparent. However, neither is cash negotiated trade where 
only limited details about the cattle (sex, market region, and visually 
estimated quality grade) are known. We have suggested several ways to 
improve information and transparency for marketing agreement 
transactions. The ideas we put forth include:

   Consideration of several possible ways to adjust USDA-AMS 
        market reporting confidentiality constraints.

   Modifying LMR information collection and reporting, 
        particularly for formula trade cattle, by USDA to better 
        illuminate reported price information.

   Utilization of new methods of cattle price reporting using 
        statistical models well suited for summarizing such diverse 
        transactions. However, this would require more research to 
        effectively design such statistical models and more detailed 
        data collection by USDA under LMR.

    As we noted in the prologue, in an industry as large and diverse as 
the U.S. cattle and beef sector, there are a wide range of situations 
and hence opinions on many topics. Our goal in this chapter was to 
guide and inform discussions to increase industry efficiency, 
effectiveness, and global competitiveness that elevates aggregate 
economic well-being. A myriad of economic incentives and market forces 
have led the fed cattle and beef sectors to the current situation. As 
such, any efforts to redirect or alter ongoing changes must appreciate 
the complexity, inter-relatedness, and tradeoffs associated with many 
of the issues. Further, along with any drawbacks of the current 
situation, it is important to not lose sight of the efficiency and 
consistency of the fed cattle sector in producing high-quality beef 
that meets demands of many types of consumers around the world. This 
chapter was composed with this goal and we hope it proves helpful 
accordingly.

 
 
 
                               References
 
    Anderson, J.D. and J.N. Trapp. (1999). ``Estimated Value of Non-
 Price Vertical Coordination in the Fed Cattle Market.'' Research
 Bulletin 2-99, Research Institute on Livestock Pricing.
    Barkley, A.P. and T.C. Schroeder. (1996). ``Long-Run Impacts of
 Captive Supplies.'' In Ward, et al., Role of Captive Supplies in Beef
 Packing USDA, GIPSA, GIPSA-RR 96-3, May.
    Board, S. (2011). ``Relational Contracts and the Value of Loyalty.''
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    Boykin, C.A., L.C. Eastwood, M.K. Harris, D.S. Hale, C.R. Kerth,
 D.B. Griffin, A.N. Arnold, J.D. Hasty, K.E. Belk, D.R. Woerner, R.J.
 Delmore, Jr., J.N. Martin, D.L. VanOverbeke, G.G. Mafi, M.M. Pfeiffer,
 T.E. Lawrence, T.J. McEvers, T.B. Schmidt, R.J. Maddock, D.D. Johnson,
 C.C. Carr, J.M. Scheffler, T.D. Pringle, A.M. Stelzleni, J. Gottlieb,
 J.W. Savell. (2017). ``National Beef Quality Audit--2016: In-Plant
 Survey of Carcass Characteristics Related to Quality, Quantity, and
 Value of Fed Steers and Heifers.'' Journal of Animal Science 95, 7,
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    Kannan, V.R., and K.C. Tan. 2006. ``Buyer-Supplier Relationships:
 The Impact of Supplier Selection and Buyer-Supplier Engagement on
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    Kataike, J., A. Molnar, H. De Stuer, and X. Gellynck. (2019).
 ``Examining the Relationship Between Chain Governance Structures and
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    Liu, Y., M.K. Muth, S.R. Koontz, and J.D. Lawrence. (2009).
 ``Evidence of the Role of Marketing Agreements and Valuation Methods in
 Improving Beef Quality.'' Agribusiness 25, 2: 147-163.
    Parcell, J., G. Tonsor, and T. Schroeder. (2016). Baseline Study of
 Livestock and Meat Marketing Trends and Implications for Livestock
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 Service, USDA. August. Available at: https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/
 default/files/media/Baseline-StudyLivestockMeatMarketingTrendsLMR.PDF.
    Peel, D.S., D. Anderson, J. Anderson, C. Bastian, S. Brown, S.R.
 Koontz, J. Maples. (2020). ``Fed Cattle Price Discovery Issues and
 Considerations.'' Unpublished report. September.
    RTI International. (2007). GIPSA Livestock and Meat Marketing Study.
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 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C.
    Schroeder, T.C., G.T. Tonsor, and B.K. Coffey. (2018). ``Commodity
 futures with thinly traded cash markets: The case of live cattle.''
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 www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405851318300564.
    Schroeder, T.C. and J.L. Graff. (2000). ``Value of Increased Pricing
 Accuracy in Fed Cattle.'' Review of Agricultural Economics 22, 1: 89-
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    Schroeder, T.C., L.L. Schulz, and G.T. Tonsor. (2019). Feasibility
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 Separate Delivery Window Categories. Research report prepared for the
 USDA, AMS, November 4.
    Schroeder, T.C., C.E. Ward, J. Lawrence, and D.M. Feuz. (2002). Fed
 Cattle Marketing Trends and Concerns: Cattle Feeder Survey Results.
 Kansas State University Agricultural Experiment Station and Cooperative
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    Schroeder, T.C. and G.T. Tonsor. (2017). Developing and Assessing a
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    Schroeder, T.C., C.E. Ward, J. Mintert, and D.S. Peel. (1997).
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Chapter 5
Another Look at Alternative Marketing Arrangement Use by the Cattle and 
        Beef Industry
Stephen R. Koontz
Introduction
    Marketing arrangements that are alternatives to the negotiated cash 
trade are important to the cattle and beef industry. These Alternative 
Marketing Arrangements (AMAs) improve efficiency in the system, improve 
coordination, often communicate information in addition to price, and 
are important for risk management purposes. These arrangements also 
impart a cost on the remaining cash market, but the cost evidence is a 
simpler conversation and has impacts that are more limited when 
compared to the benefits of AMAs.
    This chapter offers a research-based discussion of benefits and 
costs from the use of AMAs in the cattle and beef industry. AMAs are 
primarily and specifically formulas and forward contracts. The 
discussion offered here is mainly developed and synthesized from 
research conducted prior to 2007 through participation in the USDA 
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) RTI 
Livestock and Meat Marketing Study (LMMS). This research is over 
fifteen years old, but the economic fundamentals remain applicable, and 
the results are relevant. Price levels and quantities have changed, but 
the principles of supply--as determined by the cost of services at 
issue and demand beginning with the consumer and transferred to the 
farm- and ranch-level by provision of marketing services--have not. The 
discussion will offer a summary of the LMMS findings and attempt to 
consider how those findings might change with the subsequent changed 
market environments, underlying magnitudes, and considering inflation. 
The discussion will also place the results of the LMMS in the context 
of considerable other research on the market organization and 
performance of fed cattle and beef markets.
    Evidence from three of the four LMMS sections will be presented in 
turn. Dollar impacts and magnitudes are quoted from the LMMS research, 
with a base inflation year of 2004. Between 2004 and 2021, the Producer 
Price Index (PPI) showed an inflation rate of about 40%. While the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) measured inflation is higher, the PPI rate 
better measures impact within the raw material portion of the food 
system. Thus, extending this prior work to now involves impacts that 
are at least 30 to 40% larger, as long as there is not some 
compensating or exacerbating change in industry structure.

          The main purpose of this chapter is to offer a research 
        perspective on the ``30/14'' and ``50/14'' proposals that have 
        been circulated and supported by various organizations of 
        cattlemen and state producer associations.

    The main purpose of this chapter is to offer a research perspective 
on the ``30/14'' and ``50/14'' proposals that have been circulated and 
supported by various organizations of cattlemen and state producer 
associations. ``30/14'' refers to the requirement that each beef 
packing facility must procure 30% of fed cattle needs through the 
negotiated cash market for delivery within a 14 day period. ``50/14'' 
is similar with a 50% negotiated cash trade requirement. A number of 
similar proposals have been introduced--for example, S. 543 (117th 
Congress), the Cattle Market Transparency Act of 2021, which was 
introduced by Senator Deb Fischer (R-NE), would require USDA to, among 
other things, establish regional mandatory minimums for negotiated 
trade.
    Currently, just less than 70% of cattle marketings are through 
formula methods. Formula methods imply that the price for the 
transaction is discovered through some other transaction. Most 
commonly, a USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) reported regional 
price is used. Approximately 10% of fed cattle marketings are forward 
contracted. Forward contracts are transactions for cattle to be 
delivered 30 or more days in the future. This leaves about 20% that is 
transferred through the negotiated cash market, with a small portion 
(2%) using a negotiated grid pricing structure. Variations in these 
amounts differ greatly across the five USDA-AMS Livestock Mandatory 
Price Reporting regions. All of the policy proposals would involve 
substantial changes to how cattlemen and those in the cattle industry 
do business with packers. These proposals, if adopted, are mandates 
that require changing entire business models and practices.
    Mandates to negotiated cash trade are limitations on AMA use. LMMS 
was a research project which examined the benefits and costs to AMA 
use, mandated and funded by Congress. It was a project to address a 
similar policy mandate in 2002 within a proposed amendment to the farm 
bill: ``The Johnson Amendment.'' This amendment sought to prohibit or 
limit AMA use--the purpose of some of the legislative proposals 
currently under consideration. Thus, there is scientific research which 
addresses mandated-cash-trade questions.\1\ There are six total volumes 
of work from four teams comprised of 30 researchers totaling almost 3 
years of effort, an interim report, peer reviews, and comments of the 
effort are also available. The LMMS was not the first in-depth look at 
``captive supplies'', or AMAs prior to the LMMS effort. LMMS was, 
however, the most comprehensive benefit/cost analysis supported by 
multiple efforts, whereas the 1996 GIPSA Concentration Study looked 
more specifically at market power (Ward, Koontz, and Schroeder (1996), 
Azzam and Schroeter (1996), Kambhampaty, Driscoll, Purcell, and 
Peterson (1996), and Williams, et al. (1996)), as did the ``Panhandle 
Study'' (Schroeter and Azzam (1999)). An assessment of the policy 
proposals is offered in the context of having participated in both the 
LMMS and the Concentration Study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The original research project publications can be found online 
at https://www.gipsa.usda.gov/psp/publication/live_meat_market.aspx and 
the specific reports used in this chapter are Muth, et al. (2005) and 
Muth, et al. (2007).

          The short-term impact, for a policy most like that being 
        considered, is a $2.5 billion negative impact in the first year 
        and a cumulative negative impact of $16 billion over 10 years, 
        inflated to 2021 dollars. This cost is leveled mainly on cattle 
        producers. The 50/14 proposal would have these negative impacts 
        and the 30/14 would have similar negative impacts albeit 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        approximately halved.

    The bottom-line impact of any intervention into the cattle market 
is the fact that there are modest benefits and considerable costs due 
to lost efficiency and product quality from mandates. Similarly, but 
context reversed, this is because AMA use has considerable benefits and 
modest costs due to solid economic foundations. This was the conclusion 
across the fed cattle and beef, hog and pork, lamb and lamb meat, and 
downstream meat distribution industries in the LMMS. For the cattle and 
beef industry, the costs are ultimately incurred by cow-calf producers 
and beef consumers. The short-term impact for a policy most like that 
being considered is a $2.5 billion negative impact in the first year 
and a cumulative negative impact of $16 billion over 10 years, inflated 
to 2021 dollars. This cost is leveled mainly on cattle producers. The 
50/14 proposal would have these negative impacts and the 30/14 would 
have similar negative impacts albeit approximately halved.
    It is also important to recognize the regional distribution of 
impacts across the United States. Current policy proposals will have an 
impact on the upper Midwestern cattle feeding and packing industry, but 
there will be a substantial impact in the Southern Plains and on 
producers that supply calves into that system. The negotiated cash 
trade is only a small portion of the volume of animal marketings in the 
Southern Plains.
    Returning to details of the synthesis, the main cost to the cattle 
and beef industry of AMA use is the potential for beef packers to 
exercise market power. The main benefit to the cattle and beef industry 
of AMA use is that feeding and processing facilities can operate more 
efficiently, manage risks, and provide higher quality beef products to 
consumers. The market power versus efficiency question is of interest 
to producer groups, industry groups, and policy makers, and is often 
the bottom line in many discussions.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Examples of the research perspective on this question include: 
Azzam (1996), Azzam (1997), Azzam and Schroeter (1995), Lopez, Azzam, 
and Liron-Espana (2002 and 2003), Ward (2002), and Ji and Chung (2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A second cost of AMA use to the cattle and beef industry is the 
potential detrimental impact on the quality or effectiveness of price 
discovery. The LMMS did not address this issue, whereas some ongoing 
research work does. As discussed in Chapter 2, improving the quality of 
price discovery does not fundamentally change supply and demand, and 
will therefore not change the costs and benefits as measured in the 
LMMS. Substantial AMA use and limited use of the negotiated cash market 
can result in prices that are biased too high or too low or are 
inefficient, with more underlying volatility than need be. However, 
there is no empirical evidence supporting this concern.
    Four portions of the 2007 LMMS Final Report provide direct research 
results that can respond to the proposed policies. First, the LMMS 
measures the effect of market power stemming from AMA use on fed cattle 
transaction prices. Fed cattle prices change with a variety of market 
factors, quality factors associated with the cattle in the transaction, 
and the extent of AMA use by the packing industry at the time of the 
transaction. This ``cost'' associated with market power and AMAs was 
analyzed in the report.
    Second, individuals associated with businesses in the cattle 
feeding industry and in the beef packing industry were interviewed to 
assess the reasons for AMA use and to attempt to place a value on these 
alternatives to those businesses. AMA use was always part of a cost-
reducing, efficiency-increasing, and product quality-increasing 
exercise with all the businesses interviewed. AMA use allowed for 
reductions in personnel, increases in capacity utilization, and 
improvements to cattle and beef product quality. These changes were all 
communicated as important.
    Third, packer plant-level profit and loss (P&L) statements were 
analyzed in the LMMS. The focus was to determine the impacts of AMA use 
on the reported costs of slaughtering and processing fed cattle. The 
study examined supply chain management questions associated with AMA 
use. Specifically, did plants with higher levels of AMA use have lower 
cost of slaughter and processing? More efficient slaughter and 
processing results in higher prices to producers selling cattle and 
lower prices to consumers buying beef and is a benefit to the industry. 
This efficiency benefit was measured in the study.
    Fourth, these three results were combined in an economic model 
representing the cattle and beef markets so the net impact could be 
estimated. The net impacts were measured across the different segments 
of the industry--from the consumer to the producer--and over different 
time horizons, from the current year out to 10 years in the future. A 
summary of this overall assessment is offered at the end of the 
chapter.
    A further section will communicate the importance of economies of 
size to the beef packing industry. These economies are orders of 
magnitude larger than established measures of market power. Also, 
before the overall market impacts are presented, a market power 
discussion of AMA use will be offered. AMAs are often discussed with 
respect to impacting underlying market fundamentals. This is an 
improper assessment; an alternative assessment will be offered. This 
additional sixth section will offer a detailed example of AMA use 
across hypothetical markets for fed cattle. The example incorporates 
the structure of formulas and details the decision-making processes, 
while also illustrating how formula marketing volumes do not impact 
overall supply and demand nor does formula marketing empower downstream 
firms (packers) with a tool to exercise market power.
    Finally, the chapter will conclude by returning to the overall 
assessment and offer ideas for future research. The policy 
interventions being considered are substantial and would likely have 
far reaching impacts on the cattle and beef industries. The existing 
research remains clear but may also be dated. If there is an interest 
in updating this research--or making the research on a persistent issue 
more ongoing--there are some suggestions for helping to better 
understand what we do not know from existing scientific work.
Impact of AMAs on Cattle Prices
    This is the first section of this chapter to summarize findings 
from the LMMS.\3\ The LMMS project used packer data on fed cattle 
transaction prices between October 2003 and March 2005 to examine 
specifically if AMA volume impacted fed cattle prices. These databases 
were maintained by packers for accounting purposes for the payment for 
cattle and are reported in aggregate terms by the USDA-AMS under 
Mandatory Price Reporting. USDA GIPSA has the authority to compel 
packers to provide transactions and financial data for study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The findings are reported in Muth, et al. (2007), Muth, et al. 
(2008), and Liu, et al. (2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The transaction databases contain a wealth of detail about the 
cattle procured including animal breed, number of head, percent of 
animals in various USDA quality and yield grades, percent of out-weight 
carcasses (too light or too heavy), cattle destined for branded or 
certified programs, and the method of pricing and marketing. Pricing 
methods include liveweight, carcass weight, and carcass weight with 
grid premiums and discounts. Marketing methods include individual 
negotiated (cash market), forward contracted, packer-owned, formula, 
and auction barn or dealer purchased. This price database is not a 
sample, but rather the population of transactions as maintained by 
packers. As a result, impacts found here are not merely generalizations 
based on samples but are, in fact, the actual impacts on the market in 
the study period.
    Statistical analyses were used in which fed cattle transaction 
prices were explained by market conditions, animal quality, and AMA 
use. Market condition variables included the USDA reported boxed beef 
cutout value, the nearby CME live cattle futures prices, the prior 
week's AMS reported cash market price for the packer's region, and the 
volume of animals on the showlist. Animal or transaction quality is 
measured by the variables listed earlier. Another important variable in 
the analysis was showlist. Showlist size is not observed in the data 
directly nor reported by the USDA; it is the inventory of cattle for 
sale at any point in time. Cattle slaughtered on any 1 day must have 
been for sale--or on the showlist--for at least the prior 2-3 weeks. 
So, the showlist on a given day is the sum of cash market animals 
slaughtered over the next 14 days. Similarly, 21 days into the future 
were used, but the results were the same. AMAs were measured as a 
percent of plant weekly purchases or capacity, or the percentage of 
cattle slaughtered in each week that were AMA cattle. This variable 
provides a measure of market power.
    What are the results? First, economic fundamentals and animal 
quality are significant in explaining transaction prices. Higher boxed 
beef cutout values, futures prices, and prior week cash prices all 
result in higher transaction prices. Further, higher quality cattle 
earn premiums and lower quality cattle receive discounts relative to 
average quality animals. Larger numbers of animals in a transaction 
result in a premium. The model also shows that showlist size is 
important--outside of the showlist variable itself. When cattle prices 
are strong relative to market conditions then they tend to stay strong 
and when prices are weak then they tend to stay that way. All these 
results show that many things impact cattle prices and that there is 
considerable momentum in prices. The impact of AMA volume on price 
cannot be examined in isolation. The impact is residual, as these other 
economic factors are the most important determinates of price.
    The average fed cattle price in the sample period was $1.38 per 
pound of carcass weight. All prices, carcass, grid and liveweight, were 
converted to in-the-beef (or dressed weight). Once all the above things 
were accounted for, then the impact of AMAs can be measured. It was 
found that when AMA volumes are higher, relative to plant capacity, fed 
cattle prices are lower, but the impact is small. On average, a 1% 
increase in AMA cattle is associated with $0.04 per hundredweight 
decrease in transaction price. If all AMAs were eliminated (for all 
plants the average utilization was 17%), the associated price increase 
would be $0.68 per hundredweight of carcass. This would be $6.12 for a 
900 pound carcass. The impact was small but statistically significant. 
Further, it is important to recognize that this measure is from all the 
plants in the U.S. The result is a weighted average across all plants. 
The national average result is small, and this is because all the 
regional or plant specific impacts were small as well.
    This conclusion is also in agreement with a substantial majority of 
research on marker power in the cattle and beef industries. There are 
examples where market power is a large percentage of fed cattle 
price,\4\ but far more scientific work suggests the impact is small.\5\ 
Older research results from the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm 
(Bain 1968) tend to be larger than the more contemporary results from 
the New Empirical Industrial Organization paradigm (Bresnahan 1989). 
The results from the theoretical studies also suggest large impacts 
which are at odds with the empirical work.\6\ There are also a variety 
of works that examine market power over time or over different market 
conditions, or for changes in the market power exercising conduct,\7\ 
and research just on the impact of captive supplies.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ These works include Marion and Geithman (1995), Quail, Marion, 
Geithman, and Marquardt (1986), Hall, Schmitz, Cothern (1979), Azzam 
and Pagoulatos (1990), and Menkhaus, St. Clair, and Ahmaddaud (1981).
    \5\ See, for example, the works of: Azzam and Schroeter (1991), 
Koontz, Garcia, and Hudson (1993), Koontz and Garcia (1997), Elan 
(1992), Schroeter and Azzam (1990, 1999, 2003, and 2004), Ward (1981, 
1982, and 1992), and Muth and Wohlgenant (1999 and 1999).
    \6\ See Xia and Sexton (2004), Zheng and Sexton (2000), and Zheng 
and Brorsen (2010).
    \7\ See Schroeter (1988), Crespi and Sexton (2005), Crespi, Xia, 
and Jones (2010), Boyer and Brorsen (2013), Ji, Chung, and Lee (2017), 
Brorsen, Fain, and Maples (2018).
    \8\ See Schroeder, Jones, Mintert, and Barkley (1993), Ward, 
Koontz, and Schroeder (1998), Azzam (1998), and Love and Burton (1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Market power is a well-studied question, but there is no definitive 
study as there are a variety of approaches and assumptions needed to 
produce estimates. The main conclusion from a reading of this empirical 
research is that market power, while persistent, is not the primary 
determinate of fed cattle price. This is specifically the case when the 
market power assessment is viewed in the context of economies of size.
    However, extending these results to the current time period is the 
most questionable part of this process: taking results from the early 
2000s and interpreting in light of market conditions in the early 
2020s. AMA cattle are 60 to 70% of plant capacity and supplies are 
currently in excess of plant capacity if plants only operate 5 days per 
week. Market power measures may be higher in the 2016 to 2021 period 
than most of the research that has been done prior to 2015. This is a 
research question which will be answered by an analysis of the price 
history record. Regardless, it is doubtful market power measures are 
larger than economies of size, which will be discussed in several 
remaining sections.
Impact of AMAs on Cattle Feeding and Packing Operations
    This is the second section of this chapter to summarize findings 
from the LMMS. Part of the LMMS project involved interviewing cattle 
feedlots and packers in person and asking a series of questions 
regarding how restricting packer procurement would impact business. The 
questions asked included:

   What kind of immediate adjustments would your company have 
        to make if packer procurement relationships were restricted?

   What effects would restrictions on packer procurement 
        relationships have on how your company operates in the long 
        run?

   If this method affects costs, what would you estimate is the 
        percentage change in costs compared to using the negotiated 
        cash market?

   If this method affects quality, what would you estimate is 
        the percentage change in value compared to using the negotiated 
        cash market?

    The cattle feeder responses to the question of immediate 
adjustments were mixed. Some thought they would go out of business and 
that the adjustments would have a dramatic effect on the structure and 
stability of the industry. Others thought the adjustments would have no 
impact on their business or that effects would depend on how narrowly 
packer procurement relationships were defined. Still others had no 
opinion.
    One implication of restricting AMAs noted by several respondents 
was the impact on risk-bearing ability and capacity utilization. 
Outside investor capital reduced the equity that the cattle feeding 
business must provide to feed cattle, and known marketing arrangements 
allowed cattle feeders to secure both outside investment and better 
terms from lenders. Without AMAs, the cattle feeding business would 
feed fewer cattle and would have to borrow more against the cattle. The 
individual feeders would have underutilized capacity or would have to 
find new investors to replace the capital that investors who sought 
specific marketing methods once provided. There is investment capital 
that will feed cattle when the cattle were forward contracted or 
marketed under formula. This investment capital has much less interest 
in feeding cattle if animals must be marketed through negotiated cash 
trade.
    To attract capital that is not in cattle feeding would require a 
higher rate of return than cattle feeding currently offers. Otherwise, 
that capital would already have been invested in cattle feeding. Given 
that the supply and demand of beef is relatively fixed in the short 
run, fed cattle prices are not expected to change substantially. Thus, 
higher rates of return would have to come from downward pressure on 
feeder cattle price. Likewise, if feedlots have more debt and/or more 
risk, the higher cost of borrowing will result in lower bids for feeder 
cattle.
    Packers indicated that in the short run they simply would adjust to 
the new restriction and the extent of adjustment would depend on how 
the restrictions were defined and that over time, any costs implied by 
restrictions would be internalized and impact fed cattle bids. In the 
short run, feedlots and packers would adjust to restrictions on packer 
procurement relationships. Packers face the same beef demand and cattle 
supply, but they would buy more cattle through other methods. 
Individual feedlots that have AMA cattle would face increased risk and 
higher financing costs because they must own or find owners for the 
cattle. Packers expect they would have to reduce capacity utilization 
if procurement relationships were limited. In the short run, because 
cattle supplies are fixed, someone would own and feed the cattle, but 
there would be a higher rate of return or higher finance costs to 
replace the capital that is removed, thus leading to downward pressure 
on fed cattle and feeder cattle prices.
    Feedlots and packers identified two primary long-run effects of 
restricting packer procurement relationships of cattle. The first 
effect, consistent with short-run impacts, would be increased risk and 
reduced capacity utilization due to removing capital from the feeding 
sector. The second effect would be reduced product quality by moving 
back to a commodity market. Feedlots and packers expressed concern 
about the difficulty of meeting the needs for customized product in 
branded programs. New strategies would have to be developed to meet 
demand in this segment of the market. Otherwise, feedlots and packers 
would miss out on these higher-value consumer markets.
    Several respondents had the expectation that removing or 
restricting capital to the sector will lead to reduced capacity, 
particularly during downturns in the market. Greater quality concerns, 
more risk, and less capital will lead to a smaller beef industry. 
Feedlots thought their costs would increase if packer procurement 
relationships were restricted. Cost savings associated with AMA cattle 
come in the form of operational efficiency and lower average overhead 
cost through improved throughput.
    Operational efficiency from packer procurement relationships 
results in more consistent operations: the number of cattle in the 
feedlot is more consistent from month to month and labor is used more 
efficiently because of this predictability. For example, a labor 
efficiency of one person per 1,500 cattle may be achieved using packer 
procurement relationships rather than an industry average of one per 
1,000 cattle. Feedlots with AMA cattle have more consistent cattle and 
feeding programs and the consistency improves efficiency; a feedlot 
might need fewer feed trucks and could have larger feed batch runs, 
because a high percentage of the cattle would be on the same program 
(instead of having many different types of cattle and rations). Some 
feedlots reported close to a 20 percentage point increase in capacity 
utilization due to packer procurement relationships, which spreads 
overhead costs over more cattle.

          Some feedlots reported close to a 20 percentage point 
        increase in capacity utilization due to packer procurement 
        relationships, which spreads overhead costs over more cattle.
          Packers' concerns were related to beef quality and loss of 
        customers for higher quality products.

    Cost savings were estimated in the 17% to 22% range across those 
interviewed. With $0.30 per day yardage cost (not including feed) and 
150 days on feed, total feedlot cost per head is $45.00; thus, cost 
savings would be $7.65 to $9.90 per head. Labor cost savings estimates 
account for much of this gain and were reported to be in the $1.25 to 
$10.00 per head range. Quality premium loss estimates are over and 
above the efficiency gains and ranged from $15.00 to $17.00 per head.
    Packers estimated their change in costs from restricting packer 
procurement relationships would be less than those reported by 
feedlots. They noted some lost efficiencies and the need to add more 
cattle buyers to return to an all-cash procurement system (for example, 
an additional buyer costs $0.40 per head). Packers' concerns were 
related to beef quality and loss of customers for higher quality 
products.
    Feedlots and packers expressed concern about the impact on quality 
if packer procurement relationships were restricted. They expected to 
revert to a commodity market with few incentives for higher quality 
cattle. Feedlots reported this loss to be worth $1.00/cwt or higher. 
The interviews and economic model results (in the last section) agreed 
that the changes in quality and prices are expected to be small because 
of restricting AMAs. They also agree that everyone from consumers to 
cow-calf producers would be worse off because of the restrictions. That 
is, quality would be reduced, costs would increase for feedlots and 
packers, and cattle supplies would decline.
    The costs and benefits as discussed in this section are in 2004 
dollars. These can be reasonably inflated to 2021 dollars; however, the 
development of specific attribute beef products is far more prevalent 
today. For certain, the magnitudes of AMA benefits are not less. 
Further, many of the businesses interviewed are more entrenched in 
current business models that make substantial use of AMAs--these 
business models were more reasonably new during the LMMS project.
Impact of AMAs on Packer Plant-Level P&Ls
    This is the third section of this chapter to summarize findings 
from the LMMS. Monthly P&L statements from October 2003 to March 2005 
were examined for all the plants operated by the four largest packers. 
These plants accounted for 83% of USDA Federally Inspected Fed Steer 
and Heifer slaughter numbers. This was one of the unique portions of 
the LMMS as packer P&L data are almost never examined in published 
research.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ This work is reported in Muth, et al. (2007) and Koontz and 
Lawrence (2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The P&L data were used to examine four questions. First, what is 
the average total cost (ATC) of slaughter and processing? Statistical 
models were used to explain ATC as a function of volume and other 
things. The project was interested in the shape of the curve--how steep 
is it, is the bottom flat, and does it increase at higher volumes? 
Second, do plants with higher AMA volumes have lower costs all else 
constant? Third, do plants with higher AMA volumes have higher 
throughput than those with less? Fourth, do plants with higher AMA 
volumes have more predictable volumes?
    The results indicate that ATC was a function of volume, and 
modestly, other economic factors. Each plant is somewhat different in 
technology and engineering and therefore all have modestly different 
costs. Larger plants had lower ATC than smaller plants and the more 
cattle pushed through a plant, the lower the costs were per head. The 
ATC curve for a representative plant is presented in Figure 5.1. Packer 
slaughter and processing ATC decreased sharply over the entire range of 
processing volumes. Plants that operated at the low end of ATC are 5% 
to 7% more efficient than those that operated in the middle and 12 to 
15% more efficient that those on the high end. Large plants have 
significant cost advantages over small plants. This is likely the main 
reason for increasing concentration in the beef packing industry; big 
plants are less expensive to operate per head than are small plants. 
However, large plants require large volumes to realize these 
efficiencies. Consequently, securing supplies is crucial. Further, 
these economies are much greater than measures of market power.

          In combination, packing industry slaughter and processing 
        costs are 4.7% lower because of the use of AMAs.
Figure 5.1. Average Total Costs of Slaughter and Fabrication for a 
        Representative Beef Packing Plant from Firm-Level P&L Financial 
        Statements and Measured in $2004.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Muth, et al. (2007) and Koontz and Lawrence (2010.

    The project also found that plants with higher AMA volumes had 
lower costs, after accounting for other factors like volume. If AMA 
usage was eliminated, then costs would increase by 0.9%. The average 
cost of slaughter and processing for this period was $138.61 per head. 
Thus, the industry was saving $1.22 per head through direct use of 
AMAs. But the direct impact was not the only impact nor the most 
important. We also found that plants with higher AMA volumes had higher 
average monthly slaughter and processing volumes. In the absence of AMA 
usage, average monthly volume would be 8% lower and increase costs by 
2.6%. Finally, we found that plants with higher AMA volumes had more 
predictable average monthly volumes. Without AMAs, average monthly 
volumes would be 70% more variable and cause a 1.2% increase in cost. 
In combination, packing industry slaughter and processing costs are 
4.7% lower because of the use of AMAs. This was approximately a $6.50 
per head cost savings. During this period, the four largest packing 
firms had an average loss of $2.40 per head. AMAs were important to the 
packing industry, and to the cattle industry, from the standpoint of 
efficiency. The dollar impacts may have been small because of the short 
period for which P&L data were available. Over a longer period than 18 
months, cattle supplies and costs would be more variable, and more 
variation in cost might be associated with AMA use.
    These costs and values are in 2004 dollars and should inflate to 
2021 dollars with reasonable transparency. It is also likely impacts 
are greater now than in the early 2000s as AMA use is more common and 
more integrated into supply chains and plant management. Finally, the 
overall results and magnitudes reveal how out of balance the supplies 
of fed cattle were relative to packing capacity. Packing firms are 
under severe profit pressure and there are economic incentives to not 
invest in plant and packing infrastructure nor to maintain some plant 
operations.
The Importance of Economies of Size
    This section discusses work separate from the LMMS, continued after 
the LMMS was completed in the process of communicating and 
understanding the economic issues underlying growth and innovation in 
the beef packing industry. This work was reinforced by events 
experienced prior to the pandemic and during the closure of the economy 
during the COVID-19 outbreak.
    In today's dollars, a large efficient commercial slaughter and 
fabrication beef facility can run at a cost that is reasonably and 
approximately $180 to $200 per head, if the plant is of substantial 
size and runs multiple shifts per day over the entire week. These are 
also pre-COVID costs. Importantly, if the plant is operating at an 
efficient rate with high and steady throughput, then the plant can 
obtain its potential operating capacity. Commercial plants operate two 
shifts per day, for 6 days a week, and typically process at least 300 
head of fed cattle per hour. These plants will process 25,000 to 35,000 
head per week. Reducing the operating rate relative to potential 
capacity increases the cost per animal incurred during operations. Most 
of a packer's expenses are for the physical facility, equipment, plant 
management, portions of the meat sales force, and company management.
    Labor, energy, and materials costs are also important, but these 
variable costs are substantially less than fixed costs. The fixed costs 
do not vary in the short run, if a plant or a variety of plants owned 
by the firm do not operate at potential capacity. Reducing operations 
volumes by 20% then increases non-animal costs per animal by 7% to 10% 
relative to the lowest potential costs. Reducing operations volumes by 
40% then increases costs per animal by 15% to 20%, again relative to 
the lowest potential costs. Reducing the operating rate of packing 
plants increases the costs of operating and increases costs at an ever-
increasing rate. The most expensive-to-operate commercial plants when 
operated at reduced capacity incur costs of about $300 to $350 per 
head, compared to very small packing operations that serve the freezer 
beef market with best-case costs of $600 to $800 per animal pre-COVID.
    For a given facility, costs are lowest when running the plant at 
closest-to-potential capacity. Across the spectrum of possible plants, 
the larger plants have lower costs per unit processed. It is possible 
that plants can be so large as to have capacity larger than the 
regional supplies of animals and that transportation costs from 
bringing in animals from other regions may make the facility 
uneconomical. However, this does not appear to be common, nor is it 
discussed by packing industry members.
    It is difficult to estimate costs for the plants whose operations 
were so dramatically impacted during the spring of 2020. In all the 
meat packing plant operations data that have been reported, it is 
unprecedented for plant volumes to decline so steadily to such low 
levels. In any other situation, plants would simply cease operations. 
The managing firms would have temporarily closed the plants rather than 
operate at such low levels. However, the 2020 situation is unlike any 
other. Economics are not driving meat packing plant operations--rather, 
the pandemic is the driving factor.
    The following estimate is based on economic logic and not 
accounting data: if a plant is slaughtering and fabricating 312.5 
animals per hour, operating two shifts per day, and running 6 days per 
week, the total weekly volume is 30,000 head. Suppose operating costs 
are $180 per head at this volume and level of throughput. This is the 
top line in Table 5.1. The remainder of the table calculates the 
increased cost per head of reduced operations. Suppose the plant 
operates 5 days per week; then the cost per head jumps to more than 
$200 per head. One less day of operations results in a 20% increase in 
costs per head. If the plant operates 4 days per week, then the cost 
per head is $270 per head, a 50% increase in costs. Reducing plant 
operations by 1 or 2 days per week is not uncommon with reduced cattle 
supplies but are reasonable variations in plant operations. The 
variation in actual costs may be less as less energy, materials, and 
labor are required. Labor is often guaranteed a weekly number of hours, 
and plants are not simply turned off but have operations scheduled for 
multiple weeks.

   Table 5.1. Calculated Cost Per Head for a Hypothetical Large Plant
 Operating at Various Below-Capacity Volumes. (Throughput is 312.5 head
per hour, shifts are 8 hours, there are two shifts per day and operating
                        \1/2\ day is one shift.).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Days Per      Percent      Volume     Reduced    Cost Per      Cost
    Week       Capacity     Per Week    Volume       Head      Increase
------------------------------------------------------------------------
       6          100%       30,000         0%        $180          0%
     5.5        91.67%       27,500     ^8.33%        $196       9.09%
       5        83.33%       25,000    ^16.67%        $216         20%
     4.5           75%       22,500       ^25%        $240      33.33%
       4        66.67%       20,000    ^33.33%        $270         50%
     3.5        58.33%       17,500    ^41.67%        $309      71.43%
       3           50%       15,000       ^50%        $360        100%
     2.5        41.67%       12,500    ^58.33%        $432        140%
       2        33.33%       10,000    ^66.67%        $540        200%
     1.5           25%        7,500       ^75%        $720        300%
       1        16.67%        5,000    ^83.33%      $1,080        500%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure 5.2. Total Slaughter & Fabrication Cost Per Head for Efficient 
        Beef Plants Across Numbers of Operating Days (with Two Shifts 
        per Day) Per Week and Varying the Percent of Total Costs that 
        Are Fixed Versus Variable (100%-95%-85%-70%) and a Base Cost of 
        $180 Per Head.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: Author calculations.

    Figure 5.2 illustrates the total cost per head of slaughter and 
fabrication under alternative scenarios whereby the base cost is not 
entirely fixed costs. Scenarios are shown where variable costs are 5%, 
15%, and 30% of the base $180 per head cost. Costs per head do not 
increase as dramatically when more of the base cost is variable, as 
that portion of the cost decreases as fewer animals are processed and 
fewer shifts are run. By far the largest portion of base packing costs 
are fixed and reducing the volume of processing necessitates allocation 
of a higher portion of fixed costs to the individual animals processed.
    The prior discussion is a synthesis of interview information and 
economic logic. It is a simple example, but the conclusions are 
supported by all prior research on packer costs.\10\ Economies of size 
are a prevalent finding for the beef processing industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Including: Ward (1987, 1988, 1990, 1993), Ball and Chambers 
(1982), Logan and King (1965), Logan (1963), Matthews, Hahn, Nelson, 
Duewer, and Gustafson (1999), MacDonald, Ollinger, Nelson, and Handy 
(2000), Morrison-Paul (2001), and MacDonald (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Packer plant-level profit and loss (P&L) statements were analyzed 
in the LMMS. The focus was to determine the impacts of AMA use on the 
reported costs of slaughtering and processing fed cattle. The study 
examined supply chain management questions associated with AMA use. 
Specifically, did plants with higher levels of AMA use have lower cost 
of slaughter and processing? More efficient slaughter and processing 
results in higher prices to producers selling cattle and lower prices 
to consumers buying beef and is overall a benefit to the industry. This 
efficiency benefit was measured in the study. As a backdrop to the AMA-
related findings, there was also the more general interest in 
understanding packing costs as related to volumes. The P&L data 
research agreed with much prior research that there are substantial 
economies of size within individual plants and across plants of 
different sizes. The greater volumes individual plants processed lower 
the costs of processing, and across plants of different size, lower the 
costs of the large plant relative to modestly smaller plants.
A More Precise Example of ``Captive Supplies'' and the Cost of AMAs
    AMAs prior to the LMMS were referred to as ``captive supplies.'' 
This was a label heading chosen in a USDA GIPSA report where this 
activity was first reported. Captive supplies may be an inappropriate 
description in that the inventory of fed cattle are not captive or 
under the control of the packer. The animals are committed to the 
packer in a formula relationship. Feedlots control the marketing of 
formula animals because most formulas have a premium/discount structure 
for meat quality. Feedlots determine the week the animals will be 
slaughtered, and the packer determines the day of the week. There is 
additional communication in that packers are informed about the 
placement of animals in anticipation of being marketed on the formula 
and the performance of animals in the feeding process. There are 
informal arrangements as to the total volume and variability in the 
timing of marketings. Feeding performance as related to weather mainly 
also impacts this timing. Some of these issues have been discussed 
earlier in the chapter.

          AMAs [previously] were referred to as ``captive supplies.''
          Captive supplies may be an inappropriate description in that 
        the inventory of fed cattle are not captive or under the 
        control of the packer.

    Further, the prices for both negotiated cash and formula are 
quality adjusted equivalent. Both sides of formula arrangements do not 
negotiate the base price, but both sides want to trade fed cattle, and 
communicate that the interest is in having that happen at the market 
price. This has been communicated in interviews with cattle feeders and 
packing entities. The interest is in trading cattle, ``at the market.'' 
There are not separate markets for formula and cash cattle; the base 
price is similar if not equivalent. USDA-AMS regional reported prices 
are commonly used for the region where the formula arrangement is in 
place. Commonly, the TX-OK-NM price, Kansas price, or Nebraska price as 
reported for the prior week is used. This price is the base of many 
formulas, and grid premiums and discounts are negotiated but 
infrequently. The premiums and discounts may be determined by the 
product end market--USDA Quality Grade or Yield Grade. The base price 
has changed over time--early formula arrangements used a plant-average 
price. Packers were willing to trade cattle through the formula at the 
value at which the packer was securing all other fed cattle purchases 
for the plant to which the cattle were sold.
    Opponents of AMAs and some academics often use the following 
argument illustrating the negative impact AMAs have on the negotiated 
cash market: supplies of captive cattle allow the packer to not bid in 
the cash market and thereby reduce demand in the cash market and 
depress price in the cash market. This is the argument used with 
policymakers and in legal settings to mandate negotiated cash trade. It 
is one of the arguments in Picket v. Tyson Fresh Meats from 2004. 
However, it remains an incomplete argument as it ignores the supply 
side of the market. If the packer does not have to bid on the cattle, 
then it also is true that the cattle feeders do not have to offer the 
cattle for sale. AMAs do not change the market fundamentals--they do 
not change the total supply nor total demand. AMAs only change the 
channel in which animals are marketed.
    The markets for negotiated cash and formula animals are also not 
separate markets where packers can choose to buy more or less in the 
formula or cash market. Separating markets is a strategy for exercising 
market power. Formula cattle are not ``captive.'' The cattle feeding 
organization decides the week the cattle will be marketed, communicates 
that to the packer--and it is usually not a surprise as communication 
between the seller and buyer is ongoing--and the packer decides the day 
of the week cattle will be delivered. The marketing decision belongs to 
the cattle feeders, and almost all formula cattle are grid marketed and 
thus receive premiums and discounts. Marketing cattle early will result 
in more discounts and fewer premiums to the cattle owner on those 
animals.

Table 5.2. An Illustration of How Variation in AMA Volumes Do Not Impact
                       Cattle Market Fundamentals.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                               Scenario 3:   Scenario 4:
                   Scenario 1:   Scenario 2:   Excess Fed    Excess Fed
                     Low AMA      High AMA       Cattle        Cattle
                     Volume        Volume        Demand        Supply
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Feedlot         100,000       100,000        90,000       110,000
 Availability:
  Formula.......     40,000        80,000        80,000        90,000
  Cash..........     60,000        20,000        10,000        20,000
Packer Needs:       100,000       100,000       100,000       100,000
  Formula.......     40,000        80,000        80,000        90,000
  Cash..........     60,000        20,000        20,000        10,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 5.2 attempts to illustrate how to think about AMA cattle in a 
manner that accounts for both demand and supply impacts on the market. 
The top three rows, after the row headings, are the feedlot 
availability of animals from an illustrative region. Round numbers are 
used for simplicity. In the first column, the cattle feeding sector in 
this region has 100,000 head of fed cattle available in each week. 
Cattle feeders will market 40,000 head through formulas and 60,000 head 
through negotiated cash trade. The last three rows are the packing 
sector's needs for a given week in this example region. Also, in the 
first column, the packers need 100,000 head and will procure 40,000 
head through formula and 60,000 head through cash. This is because the 
methods are agreed upon and used by both the cattle feeding businesses 
and packing businesses. Whatever the packers' formula purchases are, 
they must match the formula sales from feedlots. Formulas cannot be 
used to depress demand as formula cattle are pulled from feedlot 
availability.
    The first column illustrates a low-AMA scenario, and the second 
column illustrates a high-AMA scenario. In the high-AMA scenario, 
packers procure 80,000 head per week through formula and the cattle 
feeders will market exactly that amount through formula. The remaining 
purchases are 20,000 head through cash trade. In these two scenarios, 
the market is in balance as the availability of cattle from feedlots is 
the same as the packer needs. This illustrates that AMAs do not change 
market fundamentals. High versus low AMA use does not create a 
disadvantage or advantage for either buyers or sellers.
    The issue emerges when supply and demand are out of balance. This 
is when cattle availability is high or low relative to packer needs. 
These two examples are illustrated in the third and fourth columns. In 
the third column, the packer has incentives to purchase 100,000 head 
that week but there are only 90,000 head available, with 80,000 head 
already accounted for via formula. Competitive pressure across packing 
firms would cause them to bid aggressively to secure a larger portion 
of 10,000 head that is available to satisfy a demand for 20,000 head. 
This is close to the actual fed cattle and beef market scenarios in 
many years prior to 2016. Formula use was high and the demand for the 
remaining cash cattle was aggressive. This period was characterized by 
excess capacity in the packing industry along with increasing returns 
to size. Packers bid aggressively for fed cattle and this impact 
spilled over into the valuation of formula cattle. High or low use of 
AMAs does not create this market scenario, and there is essentially one 
price across both formula and cash cattle.
    The same argument holds for the excess supply scenario. This is the 
fourth column of Table 5.2, and it is a reasonable facsimile of the fed 
cattle and beef market since late 2016 and early 2017. The packer has 
incentives to purchase 100,000 head that week but there are 110,000 
head available. There is little competitive pressure across packing 
firms and cattle can be secured with relative ease. Further, it is 
likely there would be additional formula cattle, which are valued no 
different than cash. In the end, more cattle are available than are 
needed and the cause of the issue is this supply/demand imbalance and 
not the use of formulas. In this market environment, there are more 
animals available than needed. Cattle prices must be lowered, and beef 
prices also increased to encourage the processing of the excess 
supplies. Again, negotiated cash trade feedlots may go weeks without a 
bid in this environment. The problem is not how the available supply is 
split across marketing methods.
    This section, in part, helps address the question of AMA use and 
market power, and reveals why the impact of AMA use on fed cattle 
prices are small. AMAs do impart a cost on fed cattle markets, but it 
is not market power related. The cost is related to the provision of 
information. The marketing of fed cattle through AMAs makes use of the 
price information discovered by those that negotiate in the cash 
market. Formulas are almost always based on a USDA-AMS price reported 
in one or more of the five major regional markets. Likewise, forward 
contracts make use of basis information--basis of cash relative to 
futures prices--where the underlying cash price is a USDA reported 
price. Finally, almost all cattle feeding operations benchmark 
transactions against some reported USDA-AMS reported price. Price 
discovery and the information provided through that process is a public 
good. The many marketing methods that do not use the cash market make 
use of information provided by that process. Price discovery is work, 
and users of AMAs avoid that work. Users of AMAs make use of cash price 
information, save the cost of negotiating and the cost associated with 
the risk of the negotiation failing, and contribute little. This is the 
tragedy of the commons and is a market failure. Public goods are 
underprovided in a market economy--this is the case with negotiated fed 
cattle cash price information--and it is made worse by AMAs.
    The issue is not that the market failure exists. Under provision of 
public goods is more or less a tautology. The examples of portions of 
our economy and society that benefit from the benevolence of others--
without payment--are substantial and numerous. The issue is: Are the 
remaining and resulting cash market transactions not accurate? Are the 
transactions that take place in the resulting thinned cash market 
biased or inefficient? Are the resulting transactions systematically 
incorrect? There is no research evidence of this. This is a result that 
cannot be found in the scientific literature. There are changes to 
marketing institutions that can improve market function--and limit 
market power--but are more sophisticated than volume mandates.
    The end conclusion from this section is that AMAs do not create 
market power as they do not change the supply and demand fundamentals, 
nor do they change control of the transaction process. AMAs do impact 
the provision of information, but there is no evidence that the 
resulting prices are somehow wrong. Market participants need to work to 
improve market function, but there remains balance between innovation, 
knowledge, and mandates. Changing one thing will not improve market 
prices for cattle producers, nor change the supply and demand picture, 
but it has the potential to disrupt efficient operations and make 
things worse for producers.
Market-Wide Impacts of AMAs
    This is the fourth and final section of this chapter to summarize 
findings from the LMMS. Market-wide impacts of AMAs were estimated 
using an economic model that can simulate the variety of market 
interactions in the cattle and beef industry. The demand side of the 
model starts with the consumer demand for beef and then demand is 
derived for the upstream products of boxed beef, fed cattle, and feeder 
cattle. The supply side of the model starts with feeder cattle supplied 
by producers and then downstream supplies are derived for fed animals, 
boxed beef, and retail product. United States imports of fed cattle and 
beef exports are also included in the model. All the models are 
dynamic, but most of the action occurs on the supply side. Price 
incentives at the retail level take time to filter down to the cow-calf 
producer and the producer's response is different for an incentive that 
lasts 1 year when compared to multiple years.
Figure 5.3. Simplified Beef and Cattle Market Channel Equilibrium.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: Muth, et al. (2007), Section 6, Figures 6-1 through 
        6-4.

    Figure 5.3 illustrates a simplified version of this model. There 
are no dynamics in the graphic and the industry segments are simplified 
to beef at retail and cattle at the producer level. Consumers pay the 
retail price and buy the equilibrium quantity. Consumer expenditure is 
the total revenue for the beef industry, calculated by price multiplied 
by quantity, and is represented by the size of the largest box with 
dashed black lines. Marketers provide services and these services have 
costs. The marketing margin is the top portion of the large box. 
Marketers receive consumer expenditures and pay producers the cattle 
price multiplied by the quantity. Revenue to cattle producers is the 
dark shaded bottom portion of the large box. In percentage terms, this 
is the producer's share of the consumer dollar.
    Increasing marketing costs requires the businesses that provide 
services between the producer and the consumer to capture a larger 
portion of consumer expenditures to maintain equivalent returns. 
Marketing costs will increase if AMAs are limited based on the 
interviews and the P&L analysis in the LMMS. Packers with AMA cattle 
have lower costs. If AMAs are limited, then marketers must pass on 
these cost increases--some to consumers who buy beef and the rest to 
producers that sell cattle. Beef prices will increase, and cattle 
prices will decrease. These changes are represented by the red lines in 
Figure 5.3. The derived supply of beef and the derived demand for 
cattle both will shift left. However, consumers do not take higher 
prices without reacting--they buy less beef. Consumer expenditures are 
the large box with dashed red lines. Likewise, cattle producers will 
supply less when prices are lower or there are fewer cattle producers. 
It is less profitable to produce cattle so fewer cattle are produced. 
The overall impact is that the marketing margin portion of consumer 
expenditures and industry revenue must increase, and the remaining 
payment to cattle producers is smaller, and is represented by the red 
shaded box.
    The magnitude of the changes depends on the relative size of all 
the supply and demand elasticities. Thus, all must be estimated, and 
these estimations are presented in the LMMS Final Report. The reported 
and used elasticities are very similar to much other research. Once the 
elasticities are measured, the market model can be used to measure the 
changes in all the different prices, the change in the quantity 
(including imports and exports), and the changes in revenues for the 
different industry segments. Further, there were two additional things 
that were considered and incorporated into the simulation.
    First, if there is market power and it is due to the use of AMAs, 
the cattle price may be too low initially. We know there is market 
power from the analysis of fed cattle transaction prices. It is not in 
Figure 5.3, but the market power will cause the cattle price to be too 
low and that piece of marketing margins can be given to the producer. 
(The idea is expressed by the text in the box.) Second, the original 
demand may change. Beef demand has seen improvement since 1998 and if 
some of this is due to improved quality and consistency facilitated by 
AMAs so that limiting them would adversely impact demand. This point is 
backed up in the LMMS in the interview results, survey results, 
analysis of gross margins in the P&L data, and market modeling done to 
estimate the elasticities. (Again, the idea is in the other text box.)

     Table 5.3. Percent Changes in Prices and Quantities Given a 25%
           Reduction of AMAs in the Cattle and Beef Industry.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Variable of Interest      Short Run (1 Year)      Long Run (10 Years)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retail Beef Price                  0.46%                   0.17%
Retail Beef Quantity              ^0.43%                  ^0.24%
Wholesale Beef Price               0.70%                   0.66%
Wholesale Beef Quantity           ^0.82%                  ^0.83%
Slaughter Cattle Price            ^1.43%                  ^0.81%
Slaughter Cattle                  ^0.25%                  ^0.38%
        Quantity
Feeder Cattle Price               ^0.10%                  ^0.08%
Feeder Cattle Quantity            ^0.94%                  ^0.34%
------------------------------------------------------------------------


   Table 5.4. Billions of Dollars of Changes in Producer and Consumer
  Surplus Given a 25% Reduction of AMAs in the Cattle and Beef Industry
                           Measured in $2004.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Percent Change
 Industry Segment    Short Run (1   Cumulative Long Run      in Total
   of Interest          Year)            (10 Years)          Surplus
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Consumer Surplus
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retail Beef            ^$0.371            ^$2.539             ^0.83%
    Consumer
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Producer Surplus
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retail Beef            ^$0.098            ^$1.504             ^0.36%
    Producer
Wholesale Beef         ^$0.143            ^$1.654             ^0.86%
    Producer
Slaughter Cattle       ^$0.558            ^$3.886             ^1.35%
    Producer
Feeder Cattle          ^$1.069            ^$5.141             ^2.67%
    Producer
                  ------------------------------------------------------
  Total of All         ^$1.867           ^$12.184             ^1.14%
   Producers.....
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    So, what is found when everything is combined, and all the market 
interactions are considered? Even if all market power is due to AMAs 
and if there is no link between AMAs and improved beef quality--both of 
which are unlikely--limiting the use of AMAs does economic harm to 
producers and consumers. The impacts are presented in Tables 5.3 and 
5.4. This is the best-case scenario for producers, as all other cases 
have larger negative impacts. The specific policy considered in the 
LMMS was a 25% reduction in the use of AMAs. For the cattle and beef 
industry, this means formula cattle. Changes in prices and quantities 
are presented in Table 5.3 for some of the different segments of the 
cattle and beef industry. Impacts on non-U.S. producers and consumers 
are not presented. Changes in the well-being of the beef industry and 
its different industry segments and in the well-being of the consumer 
are measured through the economic concepts of producer and consumer 
surpluses. One-year impacts and cumulative 10 year impacts are 
presented in Table 5.4.
    Changes in producer and consumer surpluses can be a difficult 
concept. These are not changes to revenues or expenditures. There is 
more to it than revenue (costs also change), but it is also important 
not to get tangled up in the subtleties of the question: Are consumer 
surplus and producer surplus the appropriate measure? The important 
thing is that the surplus changes are measures of changes in economic 
well-being. The measures are well-accepted and are bottom-line dollar 
impacts. If you want to know what the economic impact of a policy will 
be on producers, then you are asking about producer surplus. Likewise, 
the economic impact of a policy on consumers is consumer surplus.
    Let us outline producer surplus a little more first. In Figure 5.3, 
if marketing costs increase, then producers will receive lower prices 
and will produce fewer cattle. The portion of the gray box outside of 
the red box is the loss in revenue to producers--there is a vertical 
piece and a horizontal piece. The economic harm to the producer is not 
the entire change in revenue, however. The vertical portion of the gray 
box is a loss of revenue due to actions by producers (their response to 
lower market prices), so it is not counted. It can be viewed as 
producers responding rationally to economic incentives, and as the 
highest cost producers being pushed out of the business. The resources 
in the vertical portion move to other industries, lost to the beef 
industry, but not to the economy. So, the loss in producer surplus is 
the horizontal portion of the gray box. This can be viewed as lost 
profitability to the beef industry and lost wealth to the economy. This 
portion is due to the price decrease and is outside of the producer's 
control.
    Let us turn to the consumer next. In Figure 5.3, if marketing costs 
increase then consumers pay higher prices and purchase less beef. The 
price increase is larger than the quantity decrease because beef demand 
is inelastic, so consumer's expenditures on beef increase. However, the 
economic harm to the consumer is not the change in expenditure. Like 
the producer, the vertical portion of the change in expenditure is the 
consumer rationally responding to higher prices--they buy less beef. 
The vertical portion is shifted to consumption of other food products. 
However, the change the consumer can do nothing about is the change in 
price. This is the loss of surplus for the consumer.
    Let us look at the magnitude of the impacts on prices, quantities, 
and surpluses from limiting AMAs. Consumers of beef and producers of 
cattle are impacted the most. Consumers face higher beef prices and eat 
less beef. If a policy change drives up beef prices, consumers eat more 
chicken or pork. A policy that reduces AMA use will cost consumers 
close to $370 million in the short run and $2.5 billion in the long run 
in 2004 dollars. The impact is 0.8% of the size of total surplus the 
consumers get from beef.
    The downstream industry segments face changing prices and 
quantities, but most of the impact is due to fewer cattle. Retailers 
and wholesalers (packers are part of the wholesale segment) see higher 
prices but sell smaller quantities. The cost of limiting AMAs is about 
$200 million in the short run and $3 billion in the long run. These 
impacts are just over 1% of the total producer surplus for retail and 
wholesale industries and are, again, in 2004 dollars.
    Producers of slaughter cattle and feeder cattle (and cow-calf 
producers) are impacted the most. The simple fact is that the industry 
segment furthest upstream is the residual claimant on the consumer's 
dollar. Producers of cattle benefited the most from improving demand in 
the early-2000s and producers will be the most harmed from any policy 
that increases costs in the marketing system. Slaughter cattle and 
feeder cattle prices would decrease, and the numbers of animals 
produced are also less. The policy costs slaughter cattle producers 
$558 million in the short run and $3.9 billion in the long run. The 
policy costs feeder cattle producers $1 billion in the short run and $5 
billion in the long run. These impacts are 1.4% and 2.67% of the total 
producer surplus for the slaughter cattle and feeder cattle industries.
    The total cost to all producers and marketers in the cattle and 
beef industry was about $1.9 billion in the short run and $12 billion 
over 10 years, in 2004 dollars. This is 6% of the total producer 
surplus that all industry segments capture. These losses are 
significant percentages of the surplus that each industry captures, and 
the impact is mainly leveled on feeder cattle producers. The bottom 
line is that the market power was a lot smaller than the efficiency 
savings from the use of AMAs. Limiting AMAs loses producers a lot of 
efficiency downstream and gains producers little.
    These costs and values are in 2004 dollars and should inflate to 
2021 dollars with reasonable transparency. It is also likely impacts 
are greater now than in the early 2000s, as AMA use is more common and 
more integrated into supply chains and plant management. Baseline costs 
are higher now and mitigation of those costs through coordination is 
also likely higher. Further, demand improvements as communicated by 
premiums and improved beef product quality are greater now and losses 
to the sector if these improvements are lost due to lost coordination 
would be greater. Simple inflation of the impacts would likely 
underestimate true impacts but provide information about minimum 
impacts.
Regional Distribution of Impacts
    While the market-wide impacts are clear, it is important to also 
discuss potential differences in the impact across regions of the 
country as represented by the USDA-AMS price reporting regions. 
Regional differences were not considered with the LMMS. Thus, this 
section is not a synthesis of that report but is based on an 
understanding of current market conditions. Nevertheless, the regional 
distribution of impacts is clearly levered on specific regions and 
businesses.
    Nationally, AMA use is about 80% of fed cattle trade. The remaining 
20% of national fed cattle marketings are through negotiated cash 
trade. However, in the Southern Plains and specifically in the Texas-
Oklahoma-New Mexico region, just over 90% of cattle marketings are 
through formula methods, approximately 5% are forward contracted, and 
about 5% are marketed through negotiated cash trade. In the upper 
Midwest, 10% to 30% of cattle marketings are through formula methods, 
10% to 30% are forward contracted, and about 40% to 60% are marketed 
through negotiated cash trade. Based on the national marketing method 
amounts, negotiated cash trade volumes will have to increase from 20% 
of the total to 30% or 50% if either of the minimum cash participation 
mandates is legislated. In the furthest southern plains, the negotiated 
cash trade will have to increase from 5% of the total to 30% or to 50%. 
This is between a tripling and a five-fold increase in the average use 
of negotiated cash trade marketing methods for the southern cattle 
feeding and packing industry. The costs of all mandate proposals are 
overwhelmingly leveled on the southern United States and producers that 
supply that system.
    It is important to consider the lower bound usage of negotiated 
cash trade. Week to week variation is cash market use is substantial. 
Mandates are not focused on averages but require minimums, so all 
regions will be impacted. Clearly, the two regions that will be most 
impacted are Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Colorado. The two regions of 
Nebraska and Iowa are least impacted, with Kansas falling in the 
middle. It is also important to not dilute the impacts through 
averaging. A region that is historically 1 in 4 weeks below the mandate 
threshold is not necessarily impacted by 25% of any total. Disruptions 
in supply chains in a single week or month do have the potential to 
persist for weeks or months.
    Thus, it is reasonable that the ``50/14'' proposal is most like the 
25% AMA reduction considered in the LMMS. The ``30/14'' proposal would 
be approximately half the impact of the 25% AMA reduction but could 
potentially be larger. Further, there are packing companies with well-
known business models that emphasize product development, product 
uniqueness, and an integrated relationship with downstream businesses. 
These business models rely on coordination above what can be secured 
through procuring fed cattle in the negotiated cash market. This 
innovation is at risk without the additional coordination.
Summary and Conclusion
    Limiting the use of AMAs by the cattle feeding and beef packing 
industries will decrease efficiency, increase processing and marketing 
costs, and has the potential to reduce beef product quality. In today's 
dollars, the impact is at least $10 per head for the packer and at 
least $25 per head for the cattle feeding industry. The dollar amounts 
in this summary are converting the LMMS impacts to today's dollars and 
placing them in context based on continued communication with the 
cattle feeding and beef packing industries. In today's dollars, the 
total direct impact to the marketing system ranges reasonably from at 
least $35 per head to more reasonably $65 per head. The larger amount 
is based on recent communications. The costs at the industry level 
would potentially be over $2.5 billion per year in today's dollars, 
with the industry making economic adjustments and reducing in size, so 
that over a 10 year horizon the cumulative costs would be over $16 
billion. Much of the impact would be borne at the cow-calf producer 
level by farms and ranches. Further, the impact is distributed 
substantially on the industry that does business or supplies those in 
the Southern Plains of the United States.

          The costs at the industry level would potentially be over 
        $2.5 billion per year in today's dollars, with the industry 
        making economic adjustments and reducing in size, so that over 
        a 10 year horizon the cumulative costs would be over $16 
        billion. Much of the impact would be borne at the cow-calf 
        producer level by farms and ranches. Further, the impact is 
        distributed substantially on the industry that does business or 
        supplies those in the Southern Plains of the United States.

    A further look at AMAs and captive supplies does not change what we 
know about these marketing methods. The stack of benefits and strong 
economic justifications remain while the costs and concerns remain 
small. Policy directions are clear but not comfortable. Mandates create 
winners and losers but also will leave a marketing system worse off.
    So, what are the research needs to support policy actions? What are 
the needs to assure producers their interests are not being trampled? 
One of the main research needs is support for a long-term research 
program into the market organization and performance of cattle and beef 
markets. (There is also a supporting need for research into the market 
organization and performance of hog and pork markets and sheep and lamb 
markets. The cattle and beef markets are less problematic from a 
structural standpoint.) There is not long-term support for this type of 
research like there is for issues related to crop production, farming, 
crop usage, product development, and trade.
    There is a need for updating the 2007 RTI GIPSA LMMS. The economic 
fundamentals have not changed, but the price levels, total dollar 
magnitudes, and the percentage of animals moving through the marketing 
system via AMAs have. The beef packing industry is a substantially 
concentrated industry--although the levels of concentration have not 
changed markedly since the 1990s--and because of this, there is a need 
for long-term monitoring. Any industry restructuring or growth and 
change continues to emphasize economies of size rather than some other 
form of innovation. There is a reasonable need for continued research 
on the question of power versus these economies.
    Prior research has been coordinated and delivered to the USDA 
Packers and Stockyards Administration (P&S). This is the coordinating 
administrative branch. P&S also can compel provision of data from the 
packing industry for analysis, but the period of the P&S authority is 
limited to 18 months. There is a need for longer examination of price 
discovery. All livestock industries participate to some degree in 
mandatory price reporting to USDA-AMS and AMS has data from 2002 until 
the present. Price discovery questions eliciting the call for policy 
action can be examined in this data; additionally, questions about 
bidding, the number of market participants, and the impact on farm gate 
prices could be answered if this data were available. Future studies 
will need Congressional funding and authority to examine USDA-AMS LMR 
price data. Future funding also needs to be made more persistent.

          Mandates create winners and losers but also will leave a 
        marketing system worse off.

    Finally, there is a need for a more formal examination of the meat 
supply chain. Figure 5.3 is an accurate representation of the market 
channel from an equilibrium perspective. While the supply models are 
appropriate for driving market dynamics, there is a need to 
specifically study the supply chains. The market channel model does not 
well-integrate economies of size within the plant nor coordination of 
multiple plant firms with economies of size. The market channel model 
also does not well-account for product differentiation and the 
underlying changing product quality, branding, and credence 
characteristics that are emerging and becoming more prevalent. There is 
a need to understand, recognize, and measure coordination in the supply 
chain so that costs of policies that will disrupt the supply chain can 
be better understood.
    There are substantially less expensive methods for improving the 
quality of price discovery in fed cattle markets than by legislating 
mandates, but these mandates do offer an unprecedented experiment. The 
existing research is clear but are also conclusions drawn for a world 
that has not happened. Measurements from the real world must be made 
and extended to the policy proposed through economic concepts. That is 
the nature of and the common approach to this type of question. 
However, the mandate proposals, if enacted, will allow researchers to 
test if our economic thinking is correct. Actual cost and benefits of 
the policy can and will be measured.

 
 
 
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Chapter 6
Market Reporting and Transparency
Joshua G. Maples and Kenneth H. Burdine
Introduction
    The reliable reporting of trusted market data is critical for 
cattle market participants. Market price levels, especially as they 
relate to other markets, are the key driver of resource allocation and 
price discovery. This process can be hindered if available market 
information is limited or irregular. Without regular price reporting in 
which participants are confident, the dynamic process of cattle buyers 
and sellers discovering the market-clearing price would be subject to 
inefficiency. Market reporting alone is not price discovery; however, 
it certainly contributes to the price discovery process.
    Regular and reliable reporting of live cattle transactions provide 
a more transparent view of supply and demand conditions than would be 
possible without it. Publicly reporting market transactions increases 
the information available to all participants. Live cattle market 
reporting is generally a public good in that everyone can consume it 
and any one participant's use of it does not exclude others from using 
it. A primary motivation for government involvement in collecting and 
disseminating this information is that the private sector would be 
unlikely to provide these data at a socially optimal level.
    Market information available to everyone can improve market 
efficiency and help markets more quickly reach the market clearing 
price (C-FARE, 2013). Market participants generally look to public 
sources of data for information because they have confidence the data 
are reliable, complete, and free of any manipulation. Seminal research 
in this area has shown that when market participants possess incomplete 
information, price dispersion can occur (Stigler, 1961). Reductions in 
public cash market information has also been found to increase price 
variance and decrease production efficiency (Anderson, et al., 1998). 
So, if price data are perceived as credible and accurate, it can speed 
up market convergence, which is the process by which prices gravitate 
to a market level.
    Publicly reported market information can also reduce uncertainty. 
The C-FARE 2013 publication noted that many agricultural producers and 
processors are risk averse. For a risk averse participant, increased 
uncertainty tends to lead to lower output than the competitive level 
(Newberry and Stiglitz, 1981). Boyer and Brorsen (2013) showed that 
cattle sellers benefit from publicly available data because it reduces 
price uncertainty. This reduction in uncertainty led to reduced bid 
shading and more competitive bidding from buyers.
    There are many motivations for the collection and public 
dissemination of market data for agricultural markets, including live 
cattle markets. In this chapter, we discuss market reporting for live 
cattle. We begin with the background and evolution of the current 
market reporting system. This is followed by an overview of the data 
collected, how it is reported and limitations on reporting due to 
confidentiality. Next, we pay particular attention to the types of 
transactions that are reported, which has garnered much attention in 
recent public debates. We discuss how these transaction types are 
defined and how they could be used if incentives to choose one over 
another existed. Finally, we discuss the concept of a contract library 
and its potential to increase transparency for certain types of cattle 
transactions.
Background
    The desire and need for market reporting of cattle transactions 
likely go back as far as cattle trading in general. In the United 
States, these efforts gained structure in the 1940s with the 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946. This effort led to voluntary 
reporting of cattle market prices and was the general structure for 
price reporting for more than 50 years. The cattle and beef industry, 
and other livestock industries, continued to evolve over the decades 
during which voluntary reporting was the standard. Most of the concerns 
that exist today also existed then. Improvements to market reporting as 
a method for more transparent markets were often discussed and changes 
were made. These concerns were again highlighted in the late 1970s with 
hearings before Congressional subcommittees across multiple years.
    In a particular 1979 hearing before the Subcommittee on Livestock 
and Grains of the Committee on Agriculture in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, statements from USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS) administrators addressed mandatory price reporting. Among many 
other issues, this discussion included thin markets and formula trading 
(Committee on Agriculture, 1979). At this hearing over forty years ago, 
it was ``strongly emphasized'' that ``price reporting service 
improvements alone will not resolve problems resulting from a thin 
market.'' It was also discussed that mandatory price reporting was 
``premature'' at that point and could be avoided through increased 
voluntary reporting. There was much more that was discussed in this 
hearing that is still applicable to cattle markets today.
    In 1999, the calls for mandatory price reporting led to 
Congressional action. The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act (LMRA) was 
passed by Congress in 1999 and the system began in 2001. The act 
mandated USDA-AMS to implement a new mandatory system of price 
reporting. The LMRA modified the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 and 
is up for reauthorization about every 5 years, though there have been 
challenges with reauthorization. There is no ``fall-back'' legislation 
similar to those in farm bills. This recurring sunset provision allows 
frequent input by market participants but can lead to issues with 
longer term market reporting needs. Wachenheim and DeVuyst (2001) 
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory price reporting 
and the debate at the time.
    Koontz and Ward (2011) provide an excellent literature review and 
synthesis of market information research discussing the change from 
voluntary to mandatory reporting. In particular, they note that some of 
the calls for mandatory price reporting were to expose ``sweetheart'' 
deals and that there was no referenced research to support those 
positions. Perry, et al. (2005) also discussed the impact of the 
mandatory requirement on fed cattle markets and found that, ``prices 
received with formula purchasing arrangements, which were not 
comprehensively reported under the voluntary system, appear to closely 
match prices received with negotiated purchases.''
    Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) is the primary vehicle for 
cattle market price reporting in the United States. LMR requires 
packers to submit purchases and sales of livestock and livestock 
products to AMS. LMR originated from producers seeking greater 
transparency in livestock markets and this effort has broadly been 
accomplished. Pertinent to the current public discussion, in addition 
to the reporting of cash transactions, prices and volumes also began to 
be gathered under LMR for non-cash market transactions such as forward 
contracts and marketing agreements. These non-cash transactions were 
not captured under the voluntary price reporting system as they were 
considered by the AMS to be private treaties and outside of the purview 
of reporting the cash market (Koontz and Ward 2011). Through their 
inclusion, comparison of negotiated prices and non-negotiated prices 
was possible, which brought another level of increased transparency.
    Of course, the cattle industry has continued to evolve since 2001. 
Changes and enhancements have been proposed and continue to be 
implemented. Purcell, Schroeder, and Tonsor (2016) provide an excellent 
discussion of the structural changes in livestock production and 
packing and the implications for LMR.
    While we discuss some potential changes in this chapter, it is 
clear that LMR has significantly contributed to increased market 
transparency. Regardless of any issues with current LMR or needed 
adjustments, the data it provides is far preferred to not having any 
public price data at all.
LMR for Live Cattle
    The amount of LMR cattle data that is reported on a regular basis 
is substantial. In a presentation to stakeholder groups in 2016 to 
2017, AMS stated that LMR covered 92 percent of fed cattle 
transactions, 33 percent of cow and bull transactions, and covered 38 
live cattle plants (Pitcock, 2016). This amounted to 5,000 to 8,000 
records per day that fed between 29 and 53 reports on a daily basis. 
Four reporters carried out these tasks in 2016--two reporters covered 
negotiated cash and negotiated grid base, one reporter covered formula, 
forward, and negotiated net purchases, and one reporter covered cows 
and bulls.
    For LMR purposes, the term packer includes only a federally 
inspected cattle processing plant that slaughtered an average of 
125,000 head of cattle per year during the immediately preceding 5 
calendar years. Smaller packers are not subject to LMR reporting 
requirements.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Federal regulations covering LMR for fed cattle can be 
found in 7 CFR  59 or online at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/
CFR-2011-title7-vol3/pdf/CFR-2011-title7-vol3-part
59.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    LMR relies on submitted forms from packers to compile, and 
ultimately release, data to the public. Daily reporting requirements 
include the LPS-113 form which packers must submit twice per day at 
10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. central time (Figure 6.1). This form must 
contain all fed cattle transactions that occurred since the previous 
reporting period. A similar form, LPS-114, requires twice daily 
reporting of the volume of fed cattle committed and delivered (Figure 
6.1).
    While an example is not included in this book, there are also 
weekly requirements including LPS-115A and LPS-115B which require 
packers to report head count totals of Imported and Domestic Formula, 
Forward Contract, Negotiated Cash, and Negotiated Grid cattle 
slaughtered in the prior week and packer owned cattle (Figure 6.1). 
Another weekly report includes the premiums and discounts for various 
standards.
    Packers are expected to meet specific deadlines for each report and 
AMS reporters will review the submitted forms to ensure all expected 
plants have reported. All lots of fed cattle with ten head or fewer are 
automatically excluded. If a reporter sees an invalid record or notices 
a data outlier, they will contact the packer to learn more or correct 
the data prior to generating reports. Some transactions that appear to 
be outliers (e.g., price appears too high or too low) may be excluded 
from reports while the reporters check with the packer to confirm the 
price is correct.
    Two reports summarize excluded transactions each month. One is made 
for boxed beef cutout and boxed beef cuts (USDA, AMS, 2021a) and 
another is made for negotiated slaughter cattle purchases (USDA, AMS, 
2021b).
    Packers are also subject to two audits each year where they must 
provide documentation to the auditors (Koop, 2016). The audited 
information includes buy sheets, grading or settlement sheets, scale 
tickets, kill line-ups, sales invoices, and copies of checks, among 
other documentation. These audits help to ensure that packers are 
reporting correctly and are in compliance with requirements.

    Confidentiality Guidelines for LMR

    Confidentiality guidelines are in place to protect the identity of 
individuals and individual firms through the Livestock Mandatory Price 
Reporting Program. At the onset of the LMR program, AMS originally 
adopted a policy that three entities must report in a given area and 
that no entity could account for more than 60% of the market volume. 
However, this resulted in significant exclusions. Starting in 2001, a 
new confidentiality guideline was established, referred to as the 3/70/
20 guideline. It requires that the following conditions be met over the 
most recent 60 day period: (1) three reporting entities provide data at 
least 50% of the time, (2) no single entity provides more than 70% of 
the data for a report, (3) and no single entity is the sole reporting 
entity for an individual report more than 20% of the time. This change 
resulted in significant reductions in exclusions (Greene 2019).
Figure 6.1. USDA-AMS Mandatory Livestock Reporting Forms LP-113 and LP-
        114.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: https://mpr.ams.usda.gov/mpr/manuals/help/
        lsFormInfo.htm?
        selItem=lp-113&formName=LS113&product=livestock.

    While the 3/70/20 rule was a significant improvement over 3/60 in 
terms of the amount of data released, there are still times when 
confidentiality precludes release. For example, the weekly weighted 
average live cattle prices in Colorado have been rarely reported since 
2018 because there are often not three reporting entities. Unlike the 
exclusions based on price mentioned above, there is no report of 
transactions excluded for confidentiality because it would be fairly 
easy to ``back-out'' to which packer the excluded transactions belong.

          It is critical to recall that current LMR transaction types 
        were not designed to enforce volume requirements. In 
        particular, the definitions are useful to understand the market 
        but may have enough overlap to allow switching between formula 
        and negotiated without significantly changing how a transaction 
        occurred.

    The primary driver of confidentiality requirements is legality. The 
Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 specifically requires the 
USDA to publish mandatory data on livestock and meat price trends, 
contracting agreements, and supply and demand conditions ``in a manner 
that protects the identity of reporting entities and preserves the 
confidentiality of proprietary transactions.'' We acknowledge these 
legal reasons and the need to protect the identity of reporting firms.
    However, given the goal of this chapter is to discuss market 
reporting and transparency, we focus simply on the economic 
implications. Any changes to confidentiality requirements will require 
careful study of unintended consequences. This was true when the 
confidentiality rules changed from the original 3/60 rule to 3/70/20. 
Potential unintended economic consequences of this change have been 
debated in depth. While these concerns might also exist if 
confidentiality requirements are further relaxed, these concerns may 
not offset the potential benefit of more complete and transparent 
information available for price discovery and price determination.
    With respect to confidentiality, it is also important to understand 
that as additional details are required, the likelihood of 
confidentiality becoming an issue increases. This occurs because total 
market volume is spread across the various transaction types that are 
reported. The more specific the type of transaction that is required to 
be reported, the fewer transactions there will be to fall into that 
category. The fewer the transactions that fall into a given reporting 
category, the more likely something like the 3/70/20 rule will be 
breeched. In order to better understand this issue, a discussion of the 
various types of live cattle transactions is warranted.

    Live Cattle Transaction Types

    The data by transaction type was an important result of the change 
from voluntary to mandatory price reporting in 2001. Figures 6.2, 6.3, 
and 6.4 show the percentage of domestic cattle slaughtered by 
transaction type for total, live basis, and dressed basis, 
respectively. These transaction types were included in LMR to gain a 
better understanding of how cattle are traded. Currently, much 
discussion centers around using these transaction types to regulate 
volumes. Because the data were not collected, this was a discussion 
that was not possible in previous decades when producer pushes for 
change led to action.
Figure 6.2. Total domestic cattle slaughter percentage by transaction 
        type. 2002-2021.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS.
Figure 6.3. Live basis domestic cattle slaughter percentage by 
        transaction type. 2002-2021.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS.

    While the addition of these transaction types increased market 
transparency, it is critical to recall that current LMR transaction 
types were not designed to enforce volume requirements. In particular, 
the definitions are useful to understand the market but may have enough 
overlap to allow switching between formula and negotiated without 
significantly changing how a transaction occurred. The complete 
definitions for cattle are:

   Negotiated purchase is a cash or ``spot'' market purchase by 
        a packer of livestock from a producer under which the base 
        price for the livestock is determined by seller-buyer 
        interaction and agreement on a delivery day. Cattle are 
        delivered to the packer within 30 days of the agreement.

   Negotiated grid purchase is the negotiation of a base price, 
        from which premiums are added and discounts are subtracted, 
        determined by seller-buyer interaction and agreement on a 
        delivery day. Cattle are usually delivered to the packer not 
        more than 14 days after the date the livestock are committed to 
        the packer.

   Forward contract is an agreement for the purchase of 
        livestock, executed in advance of slaughter, under which the 
        base price is established by reference to publicly available 
        prices. For example, forward contracts may be priced on quoted 
        Chicago Mercantile Exchange prices or other comparable public 
        prices.
Figure 6.4. Dressed basis domestic cattle slaughter percentage by 
        transaction type. 2002-2021.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA-AMS.

   Formula marketing arrangement is the advance commitment of 
        livestock for slaughter by any means other than a negotiated or 
        negotiated grid purchase or a forward contract using a method 
        for calculating price in which the price is determined at a 
        future date.

    At the center of the difference between negotiated and formula 
trades is the seller-buyer interaction to determine price and agree on 
delivery day. The types of formulas used are not publicly available for 
fed cattle, though there are calls for a contract library which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
formulas use some adjustment of the previous week's negotiated price 
for their region as the base price. Strictly from a reporting 
standpoint, there is not an obvious incentive to classify one 
transaction type over another. A volume requirement for negotiated 
trade would create such an incentive for a packer to report more 
negotiated transactions.

          The introduction of an incentive or requirement to report 
        more negotiated transactions would lead to changes in the 
        number of cattle that fit the negotiated trade category. 
        However, it is less clear that it would fundamentally change 
        how those cattle exchange hands.

    The introduction of an incentive or requirement to report more 
negotiated transactions would lead to changes in the number of cattle 
that fit the negotiated trade category. However, it is less clear that 
it would fundamentally change how those cattle exchange hands.
    If an incentive for more negotiated trade existed, formula traders 
would need to either formally negotiate more cattle or modify their 
formula trading practices to fit within the negotiated transaction 
definition. Due to the significant cost advantages of formula trades, 
there would be a cost incentive to increase reported negotiated 
transactions while retaining at least some of the benefits of formula 
trades, whenever feasible. The key question is, can slight 
modifications of current formula trading practices allow these trades 
to be reported as negotiated trades without having to incur the cost of 
negotiation?
    This question is particularly relevant for well-established 
relationships between parties who use a formula. For example, if a 
long-standing formula agreement between a feedlot and a packer needs to 
be broken to meet negotiated requirements, could these two parties 
easily structure an ongoing negotiated trade arrangement? And could 
such an arrangement still avoid many of the costs associated with 
negotiation, especially the potential cost of a failed negotiation? And 
if such modifications to meet definitional requirements can be made, 
how much improvement to the price discovery process has actually 
occurred?
    Generally speaking, if packers are forced to more often classify 
transactions as negotiated instead of formula, rational participants 
would be expected to seek legal ways to meet the negotiated definition 
while minimizing the cost of doing so. Further, the packers and feeders 
with the best relationships will be best positioned to minimize the 
cost of swapping from formula to negotiated transactions. Additionally, 
it is unclear if these converted negotiated transactions would add 
significantly to the price discovery process.

          Generally speaking, if packers are forced to more often 
        classify transactions as negotiated instead of formula, 
        rational participants would be expected to seek legal ways to 
        meet the negotiated definition while minimizing the cost of 
        doing so.

    Many other questions remain about how participants would respond to 
a new incentive or requirement over negotiated trades. How would market 
reporting shift in the presence of regulation on volume by transaction 
type? Can AMS reporters and the twice annual auditing process easily 
determine which category a transaction should be in? Can the 
transaction types be better defined? Also in question: which cattle 
that are currently on a formula are likely to be shifted to negotiated? 
Information does not exist on the structure of current formulas.
The Potential Role of a Contract Library
    Another interesting aspect of the market transparency discussion 
involves details of non-negotiated trades. Non-negotiated trades 
include formula trades, forward contracts and packer owned cattle. 
While there have been legitimate reasons for movement away from 
negotiated trade and to alternative marketing agreements (AMAs), there 
are also significant concerns about the impact continued reductions in 
negotiated trades has on price discovery and the value of negotiated 
price information. Formula transactions now comprise the majority of 
fed cattle transactions and have become the source of much contention 
in the cattle sector.
    Much of the contention comes from the fact that a limited amount of 
information is truly known about the nature of these formula pricing 
agreements and that they are likely to be less reflective of current 
market conditions than negotiated trades. For the most part, cattle 
producers are unaware of the basic price formulas, premium and 
discounts, and other elements of these transactions that are key in 
arriving at the formula price. As price discovery discussions have 
taken center-stage, and transparency has become more important, the 
development of a contract library for cattle has been included in 
recent proposed legislation. A contract library would provide increased 
transparency as it would create a catalog of the types of contracts 
offered by packers to producers of fed cattle. This section will focus 
on outlining what would likely be included in a cattle contract 
library, as well as the potential benefits and limitations, if one were 
to be developed.
    The concept of a contract library is by no means new, as one was 
created for swine through the amended Packers and Stockyards Act. The 
existing Swine Contract Library (SCL) likely provides some perspective 
on what a beef cattle contract library might look like, and what 
information would be available, if one were created. Swine packers 
above a specific size are required to report written and verbal 
contracts to the USDA Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stockyards 
Administration (GIPSA). These provisions are then released by GIPSA 
through publicly available monthly Contract Summary Reports, although 
confidentiality is maintained. Producers do not know contract 
provisions being offered by individual firms, but they are able to see 
base price formulas, premiums and discounts, and other contract terms 
across a wide range of contracts (USDA-AMS, 2018).

          Assuming that a contract library for cattle looked similar to 
        what exists for swine . . . it is hard to argue that there 
        would not be some benefits to cattle producers from the 
        development of such a library and their ability to access it.

    Assuming that a contract library for cattle looked similar to what 
exists for swine, the library would provide a range of pricing 
agreements that are currently being used and would provide perspective 
on the variation in net price that is actually received from formula 
and contract transactions. It is hard to argue that there would not be 
some benefits to cattle producers from the development of such a 
library and their ability to access it.
    First, a cattle contract library would provide perspective on the 
markets that existing formula trades are based upon. It is likely that 
many formula prices are based on the cash prices for a given regional 
market, CME futures market, or based on a measure within a nearby plant 
of the buyer. Following are three examples (A, B, and C) of contracts 
pulled from the SCL (Figures 6.5-6.7). Contract A represents one of the 
simplest contract arrangements reported in the SCL for the market 
formula category in the western cornbelt for sows (Figure 6.5). Note 
that Contract A specifies the market report upon which the price is 
based, LM_HG231, for 300 to 450 lb sows on the day of delivery. The 
price for this contract is simply this price, plus a $2.50 contract 
premium. A similar formula contract can easily be imagined for live 
cattle such that the price is established as a certain amount above the 
previous week's price.
Figure 6.5. Contract A: Determination of Base Price 401.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         All Reports Referenced
 
LM_HG231, 300-450 pound sow, Day of Delivery
 
                               Other Terms
 
Final Price = Market Price + Contract Premium
Premium/Discount Type: Contract Premium, $2.50
------------------------------------------------------------------------

          Source: Swine Contract Library.

    Many existing swine contracts utilize a weighting of multiple 
prices to arrive at the contract price. For example, some base a 
percentage of the price on a specific hog market and a percentage of 
the price based on a pork carcass value with a specified cutout 
percentage. Contract B is an example of a contract that places 50% 
emphasis on two prices and includes a carcass merit adjustment (Figure 
6.6). It is possible that similar arrangements exist in cattle markets. 
A better understanding of what markets are used as the base for price 
formulas, and how often those market references show up in contracts, 
would provide valuable information to market participants.
Figure 6.6. Contract B: Determination of Base Price 1504.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         All Reports Referenced
 
LM_HG203, Negotiated Base Weighted Average, Average--3 days prior to
 delivery
LM_PK602, Pork Carcass Cutout, Average--3 days prior to delivery
 
                               Other Terms
 
Final Price = 50% (Weighted Average + Contract Premium) + 50% (Cutout
 Percentage * Cutout Value) + Carcass Merit Adjustment.
Premium/Discount Type: Sort; See Schedule: 78
Premium/Discount Type: Carcass Merit; See Schedule: 18
Premium/Discount Type: Contract Premium, $1.00
Premium/Discount Type: Cutout Percentage 91%
------------------------------------------------------------------------

          Source: Swine Contract Library.
Figure 6.7. Contract C: Determination of Base Price 2911.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         All Reports Referenced
 
LM_HG206, Weighted Average, Average--Previous Week
 
                               Other Terms
 
Floor Price: 0.28; Ceiling Price: 0.56
If Market Price (MP) > $50, then Base Price = MP ^ $0.50
Premium/Discount Type: Contract Premium, $7.25
Premium/Discount Type: Gender Mix, $6.25 > 60% barrows in load
------------------------------------------------------------------------

          Source: Swine Contract Library.

    Second, producers would also benefit from seeing the premiums and 
discounts used when employing those key markets. Lots of questions have 
surfaced over the last couple years about how representative the 
shrinking negotiated volume is of most cattle transactions. Seeing the 
adjustments used with base prices would shed some light on these types 
of questions as can be seen with the $2.50 and $1.00 contract premiums 
shown in Contracts A and B, respectively. A large number of contracts 
in the SCL specify contract premiums and knowing the range of these 
premium levels could be useful as producers attempt to understand the 
value of the cattle they produce and negotiate with buyers.
    Third, while base prices and premiums or discounts are likely to be 
the focus of most contract library discussions, there is additional 
value in other contract provisions that would be available. Beyond the 
variation in values that can potentially be learned from a contract 
library, seeing the individual elements within existing contracts would 
likely increase transparency about the various components being used. 
Pricing agreements can be complex and seeing all the elements of these 
contracts will provide more perspective on the nature of the 
agreements. Some of the reported swine contracts include price floors 
and ceilings, cost elements such as feed prices, transportation cost or 
delivery arrangements, etc. Contract C is a relatively simple contract 
based on a single market report from the previous week but adds the 
elements of both a price floor and ceiling in addition to a contract 
and gender percentage premium (Figure 6.7).

          Having access to this information would increase their level 
        of marketing knowledge and provide them with additional tools 
        as they develop their own pricing agreements.

    Another specific element that would likely be of considerable value 
to cattle producers would be the bonuses/premiums paid for certain 
programs such as naturally raised or produced without antibiotics. Some 
such references appear in the SCL and would presumably appear in a 
similar library for cattle. It is likely that a cattle contract library 
would reveal many contract elements that have not been considered by 
many producers. Having access to this information would increase their 
level of marketing knowledge and provide them with additional tools as 
they develop their own pricing agreements.
    While there are likely benefits of having a cattle contract 
library, there are certainly limitations to what one can be expected to 
provide. A contract library is a database of existing contracts for the 
purchase of livestock. Contracts listed would not be identified as 
being offered by a particular entity. Additionally, it would not 
provide perspective on the volume of cattle that are purchased under 
any individual contract. Just because a specific contract exists, does 
not mean that it is available to an individual producer. Some contracts 
may have been entered into under very different market conditions but 
remain in existence, or contracts may exist in the library but may be 
very rarely utilized.
    Still, by knowing the potential provisions that exist across 
contracts, producers may be in a better position to evaluate offers, 
negotiate terms, and compare pricing opportunities. Access to this 
information could provide a deeper understanding of formula and 
contract values. For example, understanding how much variation exists 
across formula values may well be more important to an individual 
producer than the average formula price in the market. Seeing what 
additional contract provisions accompany the more attractive pricing 
arrangements may explain some of this variation.
    The other interesting aspect of Swine Contract Library is the 
required reporting of contract purchases 6 and 12 months in the future, 
which is also referenced in recent proposed legislation with respect to 
the cattle industry. These data are made public by GIPSA on a monthly 
basis. While it does not include pricing information, it does provide 
an indication of contracted volume, which may shed some light on volume 
still needed for purchase. This has been another contentious issue in 
the beef sector and regular reporting of contracted volumes would 
increase market transparency.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ As a reference, the most recent such report can be found at 
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/SCLMRSummary.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Like most things with respect to price discovery, a contract 
library is one piece of a very complex puzzle. A contract library has 
the potential to provide some valuable information about contracts 
currently in use by market participants and could likely do so in a way 
that does not violate confidentiality guidelines, though there would 
likely be instances that run into confidentiality restrictions. This is 
a level of transparency that does not currently exist in the cattle 
sector. However, one must also understand the limitations of a contract 
library. It is not going to show what individual entities are paying 
for cattle, how they are arriving at those values, or how many cattle 
are truly being sold using those contracts. Further, compliance and 
reporting will create additional costs for market participants, which 
has the potential to be passed back in the form of lower cattle values.
Summary and Conclusion
    There are several points that should be emphasized with respect to 
market reporting and the importance of transparency in that process. 
The first point is simply how crucial market reporting is to the price 
discovery process and how important it is that this system remain in 
place. Reliable and transparent price reporting may not be a sufficient 
condition for desirable market qualities, but in most all cases, it is 
a necessary condition. Other chapters in this volume discuss that most 
of the present issues surrounding price discovery are not new and 
similar calls for action to improve price discovery have occurred with 
varying degrees of intensity over the past 50 years (and even further 
back). It was producer and producer group concerns, in the name of 
improving price discovery, that led to producer support for the 
mandatory price reporting system that is in place today. It is easy to 
take the market reporting system for granted, but to do so is to risk 
losing a key element for efficient markets. Required LMR 
reauthorization keeps this issue on the forefront about every 5 years. 
LMR provides much of the data to allow for discussions about price 
discovery to occur.
    Second, one must also understand what can realistically be expected 
from LMR. While a lot of the issues of concern today are not new, the 
current setting of increased concern of live cattle marketing issues is 
different from past decades because of the presence of LMR data. In 
particular, the LMR data on transaction type was not available under 
the voluntary framework prior to LMR. Many of the current proposals 
focus on these data and would rely on them for regulation. It is 
crucial to recognize that while these transaction types are 
informative, they were not designed to support a regulatory framework. 
LMR is a reporting tool and cannot be expected to deal with many of the 
issues that are often mentioned in pricing discussions such as market 
concentration, margins at different levels of the marketing chain, etc.
    Third, opportunities likely do exist to improve the information 
made available through market reporting. One potential step toward 
increased transparency could be the development of a contract library 
for cattle, similar to the Swine Contract Library. These trades can 
take on many different forms and a catalog of these contracts would 
increase transparency in the industry. Informing the public about 
markets that formula prices are based upon, how formulas are 
calculated, premiums and discounts, and other contract provisions would 
provide a deeper understanding of formula trades than prices alone. 
Clearly the cost of developing the library should be weighed against 
the benefits of its existence, but benefits in the form of increased 
transparency would exist.
    Fourth, confidentiality should be reviewed through the filter of 
the current market environment. Confidentiality requirements have been 
a concern for LMR since inception and these concerns will only increase 
as the cattle industry continues to evolve. It has been 20 years since 
guidelines were last revised and marketing conditions have drastically 
changed during that time. A basic question that could be asked is 
simply if all trades are worthy of being reported, even if the 
potential exists for those prices to be linked back to an individual 
entity? Clearly, confidentiality concerns are less of an issue in more 
competitive markets. Reporting more transactions could simply be 
considered a downside for buyers that are operating with fewer 
competitors.
    Overall, the relaxation of confidentiality requirements, combined 
with a better understanding of contracts, has the potential to benefit 
price discovery. In a setting where all proposed prescriptions to 
improve price discovery likely exhibit increased costs and/or 
unintended consequences, relaxing confidentiality, and improving 
descriptions of formula/contract trades might lead to the largest net 
benefit as compared to other proposals. This is likely especially true 
for cattle producers who would benefit from better price discovery 
without absorbing the larger costs associated with other proposed 
prescriptions.
    Finally, it is certain that technological advances will continue to 
impact all aspects of the cattle industry, including how cattle are 
marketed. Efforts exist to use online auctions for fed cattle which 
would allow buyers and sellers to observe the negotiation process and 
see posted prices. This may in fact illustrate the most important point 
of all. The cattle marketing system is continually evolving and LMR 
must find a way to evolve if it is going to continue to provide the 
reliable and transparent data that is necessary for efficient markets.

 
 
 
                               References
 
    Anderson, J., Ward, C., Koontz, S., Peel, D., & Trapp, J. 1998.
 ``Experimental Simulation of Public Information Impacts on Price
 Discovery and Marketing Efficiency in the Fed Cattle Market.'' Journal
 of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 23 (1), 262-278.
    Greene, J. 2019. ``Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act: Overview for
 Reauthorization in the 116th Congress.'' Congressional Research Service
 Report R45777. Available online https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
 pdf/R/R45777.
    Boyer, C.N. and B.W. Brorsen. 2013. ``Changes in Beef Packers'
 Market Power After the Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act: An
 Agent-based Auction.'' American Journal of Agricultural Economics 95:
 859-876.
    Committee on Agriculture. 1979. ``Price Movements in Cattle and Meat
 Markets, July-August 1979.'' Hearing before the Subcommittee on
 Livestock and Grains of the Committee on Agriculture of the U.S. House
 of Representatives. 96th Congress, First Session. October 30. Serial
 No: 96-HH. Available at https://books.google.com/books/about/
 Price_Movements_in_Cattle_and_Meat_Marke.html?id=gp6vt_iX6YsC.
    Koontz, S.R., and C.E. Ward. 2011. ``Livestock Mandatory Price
 Reporting: A Literature Review and Synthesis of Related Market
 Information Research.'' Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial
 Organization. Volume 9, Article 9.
    Koop, B. 2016. ``Livestock Mandatory Reporting Compliance Program.''
 Presentation at the 2016-2017 LMR Stakeholder Meetings. Available
 online: https://www.ams.usda.gov/reports/compliance-review-process.
    Newbery, D.M. and J.E. Stiglitz. 1981. The Theory of Commodity Price
 Stabilization: A Study of the Economics of Risk. Oxford, UK: Oxford
 University Press.
    Parcell, J., G.T. Tonsor, and T. Schroeder. 2016. ``Livestock
 Mandatory Price Reporting: A Literature Review and Synthesis of Related
 Market Information Research.'' Research commissioned by USDA
 Agricultural Marketing Service.
    Perry, J.J. MacDonald, K. Nelson, W. Hahn, C. Arnade, and G. Plato.
 2005. ``Did the Mandatory Requirement Aid the Market? Impact of the
 Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act.'' Electronic Outlook Report from the
 USDA Economic Research Service. LDP-M-135-01, September.
    Pitcock, J. 2016. ``Livestock Mandatory Reporting Cattle.''
 Presentation at the 2016-2017 LMR Stakeholder Meetings. Available
 online: https://www.ams.usda.gov/reports/cattle-reporting.
    Purcell, W., S.R. Koontz, T. Schroeder, C.E. Ward, J. Mintert, D.S.
 Peel, and D. Kenyon. 1997. ``Price Discovery in Concentrated Livestock
 Markets: Issues, Answers, Future Directions.'' Research Institute on
 Livestock Pricing, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
 Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA.
    Schroeder, T.C., L.L. Schulz, and G.T. Tonsor. 2019. ``Feasibility
 Assessment of Reporting Negotiated Slaughter Cattle Purchases in
 Separate Delivery Window Categories.'' Research report prepared for
 USDA-AMS. Available at https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/
 media/FinalReportNegotiated5AreaCattleStudy.pdf.
    The Council on Food, Agricultural & Resource Economics (C-FARE).
 (2013). Value of USDA Data Products. Washington, D.C. Originally
 published in 2013. Updated July 2016.
    United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
 Service (USDA, AMS). 2018. Swine Contract Library. https://
 www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/SCLFactsheet.pdf.
    United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
 Service (USDA, AMS). 2021a. Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR)
 Excluded Transaction Summary. National Weekly Boxed Beef Cutout and
 Boxed Beef Cuts. Available online: https://www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/
 lsmwaexxb459.pdf.
    United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
 Service (USDA, AMS). 2021b. Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR)
 Excluded Transaction Summary. National Weekly Direct Slaughter Cattle,
 Negotiated Purchases. Available online: https://www.ams.usda.gov/
 mnreports/lsmwaexct154.pdf.
    Wachenheim, C.J. and E.A. DeVuyst. ``Strategic Response to Mandatory
 Price Reporting Legislation in the U.S. Livestock and Meat Industries:
 Are Collusive Opportunities Enhanced?'' Agribusiness: An International
 Journal, 17 (2001): 177-195.
 

Chapter 7
What Can the Cattle Industry Learn from Other Agricultural Markets That 
        Have Limited Negotiated Trade?
Scott Brown
Introduction
    Many agricultural product markets have experienced thin markets and 
questions have arisen about whether these markets have adequate cash 
trade for reliable price discovery. Although this has been a more 
recent issue for cattle markets, the chicken and dairy industries have 
faced the issue of thin markets for decades while the pork industry 
dealt with declining levels of cash trade in the 1990s.
    The experiences of these other agricultural sectors can provide a 
useful point of reference for the cattle industry as it grapples with 
adequate price discovery in fed cattle markets and the reduction in 
negotiated trade. In some of these markets, there has been a high level 
of government support to help deal with pricing issues while in other 
markets there has been little government involvement.
    Clearly, each of these agricultural markets are unique. As such, 
there is no single solution to the issue of declining cash trade and 
how it is handled in a particular agricultural market. However, 
studying how these other markets have addressed thin market issues can 
provide some context for cattle markets.
    Thin markets have been defined as having a weak or no cash market 
and no related derivatives, little public market data, and little 
understanding by outsiders (Adjemian, 2016a). However, the definition 
of a thin market is often qualitative in nature (Anderson, 2007). The 
qualitative nature of the thin market definition makes it difficult to 
determine an exact threshold where a market becomes too thin. As 
discussed at length in Chapter 3, robust price discovery does not 
necessarily require a large number of cash transactions, though more 
trades reduce potential problems with price discovery.
Dairy Markets
    The U.S. market for cheese has often been described as a thin 
market. For many years, the National Cheese Exchange (NCE) located in 
Green Bay, WI, served as the primary cash market for cheese produced in 
the United States. The NCE was closed in 1997 amid expressed concerns 
of market manipulation and the spot cheese market was moved to the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) where it remains in operation today. 
In response to the thinness of spot cheese markets, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture's National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) began 
a voluntary survey of cheddar cheese prices in May 1997. In October 
1998, NASS expanded the survey to include butter, nonfat dry milk, and 
dry whey.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/
bn9996777?locale=en#release-items.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In late 2000, Public Law 106-532 was passed which created mandatory 
price reporting for dairy products. USDA's rulemaking process first 
concluded in June 2008 creating the Dairy Products Mandatory Reporting 
Program. By 2012, USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) also had 
a mandatory sales reporting system for dairy products with the first 
report (National Dairy Products Sales Report) being released in March 
2012.\2\ Dairy product prices remain important for dairy producers 
because Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) use these dairy product 
prices to determine minimum classified milk prices that processors must 
pay into the FMMO pools.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ https://usda.library.cornell.edu/concern/publications/
zs25x847n?locale=en.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Wisconsin Cheese Exchange was launched in 1918 to trade spot 
cheese (Hamm, 1995). It was officially renamed the National Cheese 
Exchange in 1974. The NCE was a weekly exchange that traded carloads of 
block and barrel cheeses each Friday. Although other exchanges existed 
to trade cheese, the NCE became the dominant exchange. Other spot 
prices did exist through the 1970s including the Wisconsin assembling 
points price which provided spot prices where the first handler could 
obtain alternative supplies (Lough, 1980). The NCE was described for 
decades as a thinly traded market. In the late 1970s, trades on the NCE 
represented less than one percent of all cheese produced (Mueller, 
1996). Despite the small quantity of cheese traded on the NCE, the 
market price reported at the NCE was still the dominant base price used 
in contracts of all types of cheese.
    As concerns about possible manipulation of the NCE grew, pressure 
for changes to the NCE intensified until it was ultimately closed. One 
issue raised was the behavior of NCE market participants. First, as 
reported by Mueller, the nine leading NCE traders accounted for 94 
percent of all purchases and 94 percent of all sales over the 1988 to 
1993 period (Mueller 1996). In addition, those dominant traders that 
benefited from lower prices sold 1,806 loads while those dominant 
traders that benefited from higher prices bought 1,947 loads. These 
results lead some to suggest these players were attempting to 
manipulate prices to their advantage. That is, selling loads could 
drive market prices lower and those participants that sold most of the 
loads would benefit from lower prices. The converse of those buying 
loads and benefiting from higher prices is also a possibility.
    Beyond the issues of market thinness and market dominance, other 
issues have been raised surrounding the NCE. Price volatility and how 
representative the NCE was of overall cheese pricing have been 
highlighted (Hamm, 1995). Dairy markets had exhibited little price 
volatility through most of the 1980s as government support programs 
provided a strong price floor and little opportunity for price 
volatility. As non-American cheeses grew in importance, it was 
questioned whether NCE trading of American cheese captured these new 
market developments. Amidst the growing concerns about the thinness of 
the NCE the spot cheese market moved to the CME in 1997 and the CME 
remains the spot cheese market today. Upon moving to the CME, the 
market began trading daily Monday through Friday.
    Even with the changes that came with the move of the spot cheese 
market to the CME, market thinness has remained a concern of many 
market participants. According to GAO research, over the 1997 to 2006 
period, the average number of daily transactions was 1.2 for cheese 
barrels and 2.5 for cheese blocks (GAO, 2007). The largest participants 
also represented a large percentage of trading. Over the 1999 to early 
2007 period, the two largest buyers of block cheese represented 74 
percent of trading and the four largest buyers of barrel cheese 
represented 56 percent of trading (GAO, 2007). The largest three 
sellers of block cheese represented 67 percent of block cheese trading 
and the top two sellers of barrel cheese represented 68 percent of 
trading (GAO, 2007). Trading on the CME remains small today. For the 
week ending May 21, 2021, each day saw ten or fewer transactions in 
either block or barrel cheese markets.
    Although the CME and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) provide oversight of all dairy product cash markets (cheese, 
butter, nonfat dry milk, and dry whey), there are still possible price 
manipulation issues that remain. A civil penalty was agreed to be paid 
by dairy participants for attempting to manipulate milk futures prices 
through CME cash cheese purchases in 2004 (Shields, 2009).
    The NASS survey for dairy prices that gave way to the AMS mandatory 
dairy product prices has provided another check on cash markets. The 
use of mandatory AMS dairy product prices in the formulas that 
calculate minimum Federal order class prices have relaxed at least some 
of the concerns of the thinness of the CME cash dairy product markets. 
A unique piece of the pricing puzzle for dairy producers is that FMMO 
minimum milk prices for the four classes of milk are determined by 
formulas that are driven in part by the mandatory dairy product prices 
reported by AMS. Built into the formulas are fixed production 
coefficients and make allowances that provide a fixed margin to a 
processor of milk products. This adds additional complication to the 
milk pricing process for dairy producers and can lead to further 
concerns about their milk checks.
    Dairy producers continue to worry that the days of cooperatives 
taking all the milk they want to produce are coming to an end and the 
assembly cost of milk for cooperatives continues to offer scale 
economies for the larger producers they service. It's important to draw 
a few observations about dairy markets and how they relate to the 
cattle market:

  1.  If dairy product market participants feel that cash markets are 
            being pushed or pulled to prices not in alignment with 
            underlying supply and demand conditions, it is easier for 
            dairy interests to take a market position on the opposite 
            side. In the negotiated market for fed cattle it is not as 
            simple to move from a buyer to a seller except for the use 
            of futures markets for live cattle.

  2.  Exceptionally thin markets for dairy products can operate 
            successfully, especially when mandatory prices help to 
            provide additional market information. However, adequate 
            price discovery is often difficult to measure.

  2.  The prevalence of dairy cooperatives may be providing a way for 
            dairy producers to better negotiate with upstream users of 
            milk even though at times producers have expressed concerns 
            about the function of dairy cooperatives.
Other Markets
    Hog markets have experienced a substantial decline in negotiated 
trade over the past 3 decades. In 1994, 62 percent of the hogs were 
sold on the negotiated market and by 2000 that percentage had fallen to 
26 percent (Grimes, 2003). Current negotiated trade stands at a little 
more than one percent according to AMS mandatory price reporting data. 
Swine or pork market formula and packer-owned hogs have been the two 
largest categories of monthly hog slaughter for the past several years. 
The combination of these two categories is responsible for roughly \2/
3\ of all hogs marketed. The small percentage of negotiated trade has 
been a concern in hog markets for several years. There have been more 
hog formulas based off of the wholesale pork cutout value recently, 
which has some advantages in terms of the base price being closer to 
the consumer so that demand signals reach producers more quickly and 
both producers and packers can more quickly respond to changing pork 
cutout values. Hog pricing became an issue in the 1990s as negotiated 
trade fell dramatically as processors and producers took advantage of 
economies of scale. Mandatory price reporting for hogs has helped many 
market participants, but adequate spot trade will continue to be an 
issue for the foreseeable future.
    As the hog market has evolved, enough time has passed to make 
permanent structural changes in how hogs are produced and priced. 
Relatively little negotiated trade remains, and there are even fewer 
auctions where finished hogs are bought and sold. The passage of time 
has solidified a new market and has lessened the call for policy-
mandated changes. The time element in market changes appears to have 
been given little attention in the literature.
    Chicken markets have reached a point where it is difficult to even 
find a cash market for chickens. The chicken industry has experienced 
vertical integration as market participants all along the marketing 
channel focus on transmitting consumer wants to all market participants 
to maximize overall demand for chicken.
    Market coordination and efficiency has moved the chicken industry 
to the point where individual complexes produce one type of bird for 
one type of outlet or even one customer. Recent completion of Costco's 
Lincoln Premium Poultry is a market innovation where Costco has built 
out the production capacity to supply chickens for their in-house 
rotisserie market. The birds are produced with contracted growers, as 
in other companies, but Costco has expanded into agricultural 
production. Complaints remain about tournament system pricing and the 
lack of ability to switch to different integrators, creating the risk 
for even more market power. But, to date, little has been done to 
change this system.
    A wide variety of vegetables and field crops, like malting barley, 
are examples of crops dominated by contracting. In many cases, the 
farmer grows the variety prescribed by the company and in the manner 
required. Often, there are few market prices reported or products 
traded. These are all considered to be thin markets, with the potential 
for problems associated with thinly traded markets. How might these 
other markets compare with fed cattle markets?
    It's well known that agricultural markets are becoming more 
concentrated; there are fewer buyers and sellers. Cash markets have 
dwindled, having been replaced by contracts or vertically integrated 
firms owning much of the production. Yet, these arrangements can 
produce economically efficient outcomes. Three conditions have been 
postulated as necessary for buyers to get a stable supply of farm 
products: (1) source enough product to efficiently operate facilities, 
(2) produce in a least cost or profit maximizing method, and (3) 
procure products efficiently (Adjemian, 2016b)
    For the market to work in the long run, buyers must pay a high 
enough price to keep farmers and ranchers producing. A market power 
argument that buyers force lower prices to producers means that, over 
time, resources in production will exit, resulting in buyers or 
processors losing their investment as well. Two conditions have been 
suggested that would allow competitive returns in agricultural 
production under alternative marketing arrangements: (1) the benefits 
of preserving resources in production agriculture are maintained and 
(2) buyers (processors) and sellers (farmers and ranchers) value the 
future enough (have a low enough discount rate to value the future). 
When these conditions are met, buyers and sellers can find grounds to 
create supplies to meet demands at a profitable price to the farmer.
    The agricultural markets mentioned above continue to produce 
agricultural commodities entering the processing and distribution 
systems. But, the transactions are not made in negotiated cash markets. 
The evolution of these markets was not pain free, meaning that many 
producers and processors exited as the market consolidated and 
concentrated. The fed cattle market might be thought of as being in 
this process now. Many other markets are years ahead in this process, 
leading to alternative marketing arrangements being the norm.
    Why might cattle be late to these changes that have occurred around 
much of agriculture? One reason is likely the nature, or structure, of 
production. Cattle and beef production begins extensively, out on 
ranges and pastures. All told, huge investments in land are necessary 
to consolidate production, and more profitable uses of capital are 
available. That dynamic makes cattle different from hogs or chickens. 
The fed cattle segment of the industry aggregates cattle into 
relatively small geographic areas, similar to other industries.
    Consolidation and concentration in feeding is happening now, 
leading to policy concerns that have already happened in other 
agricultural markets. At the same time, product differentiation into 
more varied market niches is happening. Beef is late to product 
differentiation as well. Niche markets such as grass-fed, organic, and 
other production system defined products are relatively new entrants. 
Branded beef products are even newer product niches compared to other 
agricultural products. Successful branded meat products have been slow 
to develop. Pork has long been branded in hams, sausage, and bacon by 
recipe differences. Fruit and vegetables are differentiated by variety. 
Milk and dairy products have long been successfully branded. Product 
differentiation and more niche markets lead to thinner markets and more 
alternative marketing arrangements.
Summary
    Many agricultural markets have seen cash markets for their products 
dwindle or completely vanish over the past several decades. This has 
led to many questions about adequate price discovery in many of these 
agricultural markets. The discussion around price discovery has been 
complicated as the capture of economies of scale has made all market 
segments of many agricultural commodities become more concentrated. 
Economies of scale reduce the costs of delivering farm products to 
consumers but often cause the volume of trade that occurs in cash 
markets to dwindle. Coordination of market participants at each step of 
the marketing channel has helped maximize efficiencies at the expense 
of cash trade.
    While many agricultural products moved in this direction long ago, 
the fed cattle market--and market participants--are now going through 
these growing pains. Yet, these markets mentioned above have found 
transaction mechanisms that ensure continued production and some kind 
of adequate market returns. Observing the changes that have occurred in 
other markets is helpful in thinking about alternative paths for the 
cattle market going forward.

 
 
 
                               References
 
    Adjemian, M.K., B.W. Brorsen, W. Hahn, T.L. Saitone, and R.J.
 Sexton. March 2016a. Thinning Markets in U.S. Agriculture, What Are the
 Implications for Producers and Processors, EIBM 148, U.S. Department of
 Agriculture, Economic Research Service. https://www.ers.usda.gov/
 webdocs/publications/44034/ 56926_eib148.pdf?v=8084.2 (accessed April
 2021).
    Adjemian, M.K., T.L. Saitone, and R.J. Sexton. 2016b. ``A Framework
 to Analyze the Performance of Thinly Traded Agricultural Commodity
 Markets.'' Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 98 (2): 581-596.
    Anderson, J., D. Hudson, A. Harri, and S. Turner. 2007. ``A New
 Taxonomy of Thin Markets.'' Selected paper presented at the SAEA Annual
 Meeting, Mobile, AL, February 4-7.
    Grimes, G., R. Plain, and S. Meyer. 2003. U.S. Hog Marketing
 Contract Study, January 2003. National Pork Board.
    Hamm, L.G. and R. March 1995. ``The National Cheese Exchange:
 Impacts on Dairy Industry Pricing.'' Dairy Markets and Policy--Issues
 and Options, No. M-7. Program on Dairy Markets and Policy, Cornell
 University.
    Lough, H.W. 1980. Cheese Pricing, AER-462, U.S. Department of
 Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    Mueller, W.F., B.W. Marion, M.H. Sial, F.E. Geithman. 1996. ``Cheese
 Pricing: A Study of the National Cheese Exchange.'' Food Systems
 Research Group Report. Department of Agricultural and Applied
 Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
    Shields, D.A. November 2009. ``Dairy Pricing Issues.'' Congressional
 Research Service Report, R40903. Congressional Research Service.
    U.S. Government Accountability Office, Spot Cheese Market-Market
 Oversight Has Increased, but Concerns Remain about Potential
 Manipulation, GAO-07-707, Washington, D.C., June 2007, p. 8, https://
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    U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. ``Dairy Farmers of
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Chapter 8
Implications of Fed Cattle Pricing Changes on the Cow-Calf Sector
David P. Anderson, Charley C. Martinez, and Justin R. Benavidez
Introduction
    Sometimes lost in the debate over negotiated sales versus 
alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) is that, primarily, it is a 
fed cattle pricing issue. The debate taps into long held views, 
sometimes correct, about market structure, changing markets, and 
perceptions of buyer's market power. Some of these views have been 
shaped from a time when the cattle market was very different from 
today, and some are formed by recent events.
    There is no doubt that fed cattle prices impact calf and feeder 
prices, wholesale prices, and retail prices throughout the supply 
chain. These price relationships are described in any basic price 
analysis class that one might (or might not) remember from college. 
Market signals are passed throughout the supply chain and reflect not 
only basic supply and demand, but incorporate information, quality, and 
production characteristics that are important at each production level. 
Market signals have changed dramatically over the last 40 years. Events 
such as the industry-led beef quality audit increased feeding, breed 
changes, and value-based marketing, and caused industry participants at 
all levels to work to improve production efficiencies and profits.
    This chapter examines the potential impact of changes to fed cattle 
pricing alternatives on cattle and calf prices through the transmission 
of imposed costs. The second part of the chapter explores several 
hypotheses about market premiums and price signals that have emerged in 
a changing cattle market.
Impacts on the Cow-Calf Sector
    This analysis begins with several premises: (1) the market has 
evolved over time to rely more on formula pricing, (2) moving to 
formula pricing has increased efficiency through the reduction of 
transaction costs in the industry, and (3) the reduction in transaction 
costs have affected farm, wholesale, and retail prices.
    Given the assumptions, what would happen if the market reverted to 
more negotiated pricing? Moving away from reliance on formula pricing 
and back to greater reliance on negotiated pricing, then, results in an 
increase in transaction costs between feeders and packers. The cost 
increase can be expected to change live cattle prices, calf and feeder 
prices, and wholesale and retail beef prices. There is a long 
literature of research on these types of topics spanning technical 
change, transaction costs, changes in demand, and various other changes 
in the marketplace. The basic marketing margin description and 
graphical analysis can be found in most price analysis textbooks but is 
referred to in this chapter from Tomek and Robinson (1981). In this 
basic framework, an increase in transaction costs results in a decrease 
in the derived demand for fed cattle and a reduction in supplies of 
beef. This means that the cost increase is passed from where it occurs 
through the marketing channel, both backwards and forwards in the 
supply chain. The end result is lower farm level prices (fed cattle) 
and higher retail beef prices.

          Koontz (2020) estimated that the value of formula pricing in 
        efficiency, or reduced costs, was $25 per head.
          The $25 per head cost increase applied to all cattle assumes 
        that all fed cattle are traded in a negotiated cash format.
          As expected, increasing transaction costs results in lower 
        live animal prices and higher wholesale and retail beef prices.
          If the live-to-cutout spread is a concern, the end result is 
        a widening price spread.

    This analysis uses an equilibrium displacement model (EDM) to 
quantify the effect of an increase in costs at the feeder-packer level 
on cattle and beef prices. This type of model has been widely used 
previously (Brester, Marsh, and Atwood, 2004; Gardner, 1975; Hanselka, 
et al., 2005; Schroeder and Tonsor, 2011; Wohlegenant, 1989). EDMs 
utilize previously estimated supply and demand elasticities to evaluate 
the impact of exogenous shocks. In this case, the exogenous shock in 
question is the imposition of increased transaction costs from reduced 
transaction efficiency due to reduced AMA use. This work follows an EDM 
developed by Johnson (2016). Supply and demand elasticities are taken 
from the literature for each production level. These estimates are used 
to estimate price and quantity changes through the marketing chain 
given a change in costs, supplies, or demands. Table 8.1 contains the 
elasticity estimates in the cattle and beef portion of the model.
    Koontz (2020) estimated that the value of formula pricing in 
efficiency, or reduced costs, was $25 per head. Several caveats are in 
order when using this estimate. As noted in Chapter 5, the first is 
that the estimate is 16 years old and would not reflect changes since 
that time. It is likely that the value of efficiency is much larger 
than that today. The $25 per head is applied across all fed cattle, not 
just those traded by formula. The year 2019 is used as the base year 
for analysis in the model to avoid 2020 given disruptions due to the 
pandemic (Martinez, et al., 2020). The $25 per head cost increase 
applied to all cattle assumes that all fed cattle are traded in a 
negotiated cash format.

 Table 8.1. Supply and Demand Elasticities Used in Estimating Impact of
                            Reducing AMA Use.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Name                              Elasticity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Own-price Elasticity of Demand for                  ^0.841
             Retail Beef
Own-price Elasticity of Supply for                   0.352
             Retail Beef
Own-price Elasticity of Demand for                  ^0.567
          Wholesale Beef
Own-price Elasticity of Supply for                   0.274
          Wholesale Beef
Own-price Elasticity of Demand for                  ^0.291
        Slaughter Cattle
Own-price Elasticity of Supply for                   0.254
        Slaughter Cattle
Own-price Elasticity of Demand for                  ^0.137
           Feeder Cattle
Own-price Elasticity of Supply for                   0.215
           Feeder Cattle
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Table 8.2. EDM Results of the Impact of a $25 per Head Cost of Returning
                      to a Negotiated Cash Market.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               2019 Base Price             Change
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calf Price $/cwt                    163.40                 ^$2.62
Feeder Price $/cwt                  144.67                 ^$2.32
Fed Cattle Price $/cwt              116.78                 ^$1.75
Cutout Value $/cwt                  219.51                   1.55
Retail Beef Price $/lb.               6.04                   0.03
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 8.2 contains the model estimates of the impact of a $25 per 
head increase in transaction costs. As expected, increasing transaction 
costs results in lower live animal prices and higher wholesale and 
retail beef prices. The impact on live prices ranges from ^$1.75 per 
cwt for fed cattle to ^$2.62 per cwt for calf prices. Beef prices at 
the wholesale (cutout) and retail levels increase. The impact on live 
prices are larger, in percentage terms, than meat prices. If the live-
to-cutout spread is a concern, the end result is a widening price 
spread. Work by Brester, et al. (2009) provides a good analysis on why 
farm share of the retail dollar is not necessarily a good base for 
policy-making.
Cow-Calf Market Emerging Premiums
    During uncertain times for beef demand in the 1980s, the industry 
began a series of studies including the National Consumer Retail Beef 
Study (Cross, 1986). Prior to the National Consumer Retail Beef Study, 
Rhodes, et al. (1978) summarized the state of producer alternatives in 
marketing cattle and beef and discussed the direction of value-based 
marketing, which is what the industry now knows as AMAs. While focused 
on retail demand, the National Consumer Retail Beef Study identified 
changes needed throughout the industry, from the cow-calf through 
feedlot sectors. Packer survey respondents indicated concerns about 
hide problems, injection site blemishes, implant related problems, and 
a lack of uniformity of cattle and carcasses as management problems. 
These were identified in phase III of the study as areas to improve 
cattle management (Savell, 1993).
    Two consensus points from the National Consumer Retail Beef Study 
were of particular interest to the live cattle side of the industry. 
The first was that fed cattle should be valued on an individual basis 
rather than an average live price. At that time, most cattle were sold 
on the average, meaning that an average price was negotiated and 
applied to all cattle in a pen regardless of each animal's quality. 
This means that the risk was left in the hands of the buyer (Ward, et 
al.). Second, the study results revealed a need to identify genetics of 
carcass merit, to make changes to the cowherd, and to select breeding 
stock for improved carcass merit. Since the late 1980s, it is hard to 
argue that the cow herd has not changed dramatically with more focus on 
carcass quality.
    A large body of research has been done on identifying the value 
contributions of various cattle characteristics. It has often been the 
case that price signals can be muted and different segments of the 
cattle industry value different traits (Outlaw, et al., 1997; Feuz, 
1999). The growth of value-based marketing and AMAs, as that value 
mechanism, has created a series of premiums and discounts reflecting 
quality. In the era of only negotiated prices, these premiums and 
discounts are likely to exist in limited forms due to on-average 
pricing.
    If formula pricing in fed cattle is a way to increase profits by 
reducing transaction costs, some studies indicate strategies to reduce 
transaction costs are at work in the cow-calf, stocker, and 
backgrounder segments, as well. The implication is that market signals 
to reduce costs, or increase profits, are at work in all segments of 
the industry and the result is an evolving market.
    A host of studies have examined factors affecting calf prices 
(Faminow and Gum, 1986; Marsh, 1985; Zapata, et al., 2020, Martinez, 
2020). The usual factors include weight, sex, breed type, color, 
castration, and horns. Looking at studies over time indicates that 
premiums between breeds have shifted. Early on, Angus (or black) calves 
sold at a discount to Herefords. That has changed over time to breeds 
selling at a discount to Angus (or black) calves. Past studies have 
shown higher prices accruing in video auctions compared to traditional 
auction markets. The increased prices were attributed to reducing 
transactions. Other studies have examined value added programs like 
VAC45, special sales of pre-conditioned calves, and marketing of 
commingled sales to capture volume premiums (Mathews, et al., 2007; 
Schulte, 2001; Lawrence and Yeboah, 2002; Ward, Ratcliff, and Lalman; 
King and Seeger, 2005; Vaaler, Schroeder, and Boland, 2005).
    The Beef Quality Assurance (BQA) certification program is a 
byproduct of the beef quality audits. The program targets a set of 
management practices to in crease quality. A survey of BQA certified 
cattle in Montana indicated that BQA members received $1.56 per cwt 
premium for steers and $1.09 per cwt premium for heifers (Brester, 
2009). These premiums were realized after accounting for normal trait 
differences like weight and sex.
    Mooney, et al. (2019) examined the effect of BQA certification on 
video prices in the Western United States. This work indicated a 
premium of $2.69 per cwt due to BQA certification. Interestingly, the 
analysis indicated that the premium had grown from $1.14 per cwt 
earlier in the study period. Participation in more value-added programs 
yielded even higher premiums.
    The work on valuing characteristics can be summarized into three 
areas: cattle characteristics, management activities, and premium 
certifications. Cattle characteristics in the form of breed choice can 
be shown to have changed over time to more highly-valued Angus (or 
black calves). Management activities can be thought of as including 
selling in larger lots, pre-conditioning calves, selling by video 
auction vs. traditional auction, or other preparation activities prior 
to sale. Larger lots and different selling venues are examples of 
ranchers selling calves in a way that reduces transaction costs, much 
like AMAs reduce transaction costs. Premium certifications, like BQA, 
are another method of adding value through information.
    Many of these value-adding traits are the direct result of 
producers looking to increase profit through the application of value-
based marketing from fed cattle to calves and feeders. The beef quality 
audits indicated a set of desirable producer management changes to 
boost beef quality. Many of these practices that deliver premiums can 
be traced directly to the beef quality audit and its influence in 
moving the industry to value-based marketing.
    It might be hard to conceive of market-based premiums and discounts 
going away if changes were made to AMAs. However, it is worth 
considering the impact of value-based marketing premiums and discounts 
that have occurred over the last few decades to avoid unintended 
consequences of potential legislative changes.
Conclusion
    The beef industry's move to AMAs represents part of the progression 
to value-based marketing and economic pressures to reduce transaction 
costs. Legislation or efforts to increase negotiated trade will 
increase industry costs. Those increased costs are estimated to result 
in lower calf prices and higher beef prices.
    Cattle pricing and market signals have evolved over the last 40 
years. Premiums that were not present prior to AMAs are now common. One 
of the challenges is maintaining the reward for quality if the method 
of pricing changes. Thinking through the effect of the pricing 
mechanism on market signals is an important consideration to prevent 
even more negative impacts of potential changes.

 
 
 
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Chapter 9
Examining Negotiated Cash Trade Targets
Justin R. Benavidez and David P. Anderson
Introduction
    On the evening of August 9, 2019, a fire caused severe damage to 
Tyson's beef processing plant in Holcomb, KS. The damage from the fire 
kept the plant and its base capacity of 6,000 head per day offline for 
the remainder of 2019. The decreased supply of beef to the open market 
led to a temporary spike in the price of boxed beef. At the same time, 
the decreased demand for fed (fattened, live) cattle resulted in a 
temporary decline in the price of fed cattle and feeder cattle.
    Similar dynamics overtook the cattle market 8 months later with the 
onset of COVID-19. As the pandemic took hold in packing plants, 
federally inspected weekly cattle slaughter fell from 684,000 head to 
438,000 head in just 5 weeks, a 36% decrease (Martinez, et al., 2020). 
Federally inspected weekly cattle slaughter was 180,000 head below the 
5 year average. Two weeks later, the boxed beef negotiated cutout value 
reached $459.04/cwt, while fed steers and feeder steers fell to some of 
the lowest levels in recent years. Three weeks before negotiated boxed 
beef prices peaked, the price of fed steers on the southern plains 
dipped to $99/cwt.
    Fundamentally, the recent market disruptions were the result of low 
demand for live cattle, some high demand for beef products, and tight 
supplies of beef, all resulting from limited live cattle processing 
capacity (Martinez, et al., 2020). These two events exacerbated 
concerns in the industry about price discovery, lower prices, market 
manipulation, capacity and utilization, and how fed cattle are bought 
and sold. The growth of alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) have 
fueled concern about the lack of price discovery and their effect on 
prices. Some industry participants consider the divergent prices to be 
signs of, at minimum, a broken market. The United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) conducted investigations into beef and cattle price 
spreads. Others called for more packing capacity. At the same time, 
vocal groups within the largest cattle and beef trade organization in 
the United States began calling for changes to market structures as a 
solution.
    The National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCBA) set about seeking 
solutions for the cattle and beef industry and in July 2020 announced 
support for a voluntary framework to ``increase frequent and 
transparent negotiated trade to regionally sufficient level'' to 
achieve robust price discovery (Bohn, et al., 2020). The idea is that 
increased negotiated trade volumes improve price discovery for fed 
cattle. Increased negotiated trade will result in a decrease in 
alternative marketing arrangements (AMAs) that, some argue, prevent 
adequate price discovery through creating markets that are too 
``thin.'' Others suggest that increased negotiated volumes will prevent 
price divergence like those resulting from the Tyson fire or the onset 
of COVID-19.
    NCBA's ``75% Plan'' is a voluntary framework that establishes 
`triggers' for each of the major cattle feeding regions (Bohn, et al., 
2020). The objective of this study is to evaluate the probability of 
tripping established triggers in different regions over time and, as a 
result, the probability of NCBA supporting legislative changes to 
cattle trading methods. The remainder of this chapter includes a brief 
review of cattle trading methods, a review of the data utilized for the 
75% Plan, an overview of the methods used and the simulation itself, 
and a discussion of results and conclusions.
Negotiated Trade
    As noted throughout this book, USDA recognizes and records several 
types of fed cattle sales methods. These sales methods are grouped into 
two types of fed cattle trade, negotiated and non-negotiated. 
Negotiated fed cattle sales categories include negotiated cash and 
negotiated grid. Negotiated trade is, ``[a] price . . . determined 
through buyer and seller interaction [where] the cattle are scheduled 
to be delivered to the plant within 30 days of the agreement'' 
(Agricultural Marketing Service, 2020). Non-negotiated fed cattle sales 
categories include formula sales, non-negotiated grid sales, and 
contract sales. There are pros and cons to each type of sale, and they 
vary depending on the party (buyer or seller). Some methods decrease 
transaction costs, others change the risk borne by each party, and 
still others provide quality incentives.
    Negotiated trade is valuable in that the spot market contributes to 
price discovery. Price discovery is the means through which an asset's 
price is set by matching buyers and sellers according to a price (Tomek 
and Kaiser, 2014). There is a bid and ask which leads to price 
discovery. Prices are set in other ways in non-negotiated trades. It 
might be plant average price, a USDA-AMS regional price, a futures 
price, or some other price (Agricultural Marketing Service, 2020). 
There is not a bid and ask to negotiate the price, and sellers do not 
know the price before the cattle are delivered. Research identified a 
clear and significant relationship between historical cash market 
volumes and the strength of price discovery in each USDA-AMS regional 
market.
    The share of cattle sold via AMAs rose quickly from the late 2000s 
to the present (Figure 9.1). Much of the growth of cattle sold via AMAs 
was at the expense of cattle sold via negotiated methods.
    The growth in AMAs was not equal across regions. Figure 9.1 
contains USDA reported AMA sales which appeared earliest in Texas-
Oklahoma-New Mexico. When USDA began reporting non-negotiated sales 
separately in 2008, sales of fed cattle via negotiated trade averaged 
44,509 head per week in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico. From 2015 to 2019 
(the last full 5 years before the 75% Plan), sales of fed cattle via 
negotiated trade averaged 7,666 head per week in the same region, or 
17% of 2008 weekly average negotiated volumes. Similar trends took hold 
shortly after in Kansas. In 2008, sales of fed cattle via negotiated 
trade averaged 38,323 head per week in Kansas. From 2015 to 2019, sales 
of fed cattle via negotiated trade averaged 17,274 head per week in the 
same region, or 45% of 2008 weekly average negotiated volumes.
Figure 9.1. USDA Weekly Reported Trade 2002-2021, by Region and Total 
        Cattle Sold via Alternative Marketing Arrangements and Cattle 
        Sold via Negotiated Sales.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA/AMS.

    Though AMAs are used in Nebraska-Colorado and Iowa-Minnesota, their 
share of total head sold is significantly smaller and did not begin 
until much later in the 2010s. In 2008, sales of fed cattle via 
negotiated trade averaged 70,653 head per week in Nebraska-Colorado and 
28,404 in Iowa-Minnesota. From 2015 to 2019, sales of fed cattle via 
negotiated trade in Nebraska-Colorado averaged 41,113 head per week, 
58% of 2008 weekly average negotiated volumes. From 2015 to 2019, sales 
of fed cattle via negotiated trade in Iowa-Minnesota averaged 24,115 
head per week, 85% of 2008 weekly average negotiated volumes. Some of 
the changes in negotiated volume are due to fluctuations in the size of 
the cattle market over time. However, in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and 
Kansas, most of the decline in negotiated fed cattle sales is directly 
inverse to the rise of AMAs.
The 75% Plan
    The 75% Plan was developed and approved by NCBA's Live Cattle 
Marketing Working Group in 2020. The 75% Plan is a voluntary approach 
designed to, ``increase frequent and transparent negotiated trade to 
regionally sufficient levels, to achieve robust price discovery 
determined by NCBA funded and directed research in all major cattle 
feeding regions'' (Bohn, et al., 2020). The plan is split into two 
silos: a packer silo and a feeder silo. At present, the rules of the 
packer silo are incomplete and therefore we will focus our attention 
primarily on the feeder silo.
    The plan utilizes a set of triggers specific to each AMS reporting 
region. These regions are Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico, Kansas, Nebraska-
Colorado, and Iowa-Minnesota (Figure 9.2). Nebraska and Colorado are 
reported separately by AMS but the 75% Plan combines them to account 
for nonreporting occurrences in Colorado.
    Under the voluntary 75% Plan, each region is expected to trade 75% 
of the negotiated volume, as defined by measurements developed by 
Koontz (2017), needed to meet robust price discovery in a given week. 
Each region must achieve these volumes 75% of the weeks in a quarter, 
i.e., 10 weeks or more. Koontz's work established an estimated volume 
of cattle needed to be sold on a negotiated basis in each region to 
achieve minimum and robust price discovery (although, as noted in 
Chapter 10, Koontz has called into question the way in which his 
results were being used to justify changes to current practices). Table 
9.1 lays out the volume of negotiated trade needed each week in each 
region to achieve robust price discovery. Table 9.1 also provides the 
NCBA's 75% of robust trade threshold.

 Table 9.1. Negotiated Volume to Achieve Robust Price Discovery and the
 Minimum Negotiated Volume Required by the 75% Plan (Koontz, 2017; Bohn,
                             et al., 2020).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    75% of Negotiated
                       Negotiated Volume Needed      Volume Needed to
        Region          to Achieve Robust Price    Achieve Robust Price
                         Discovery (Head/Week)    Discovery (Head/Week)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     TX-OK-NM                   13,000                     9,750
           KS                   21,000                    15,750
        NE-CO                   36,000                    27,000
        IA-MN                   16,000                    12,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These 4 weekly regional trade obligations are independent of one 
another. Increased negotiated volume in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico does 
not contribute to the obligations of Kansas regional trade. The failure 
of a given region to meet its obligations in a quarter constitutes a 
minor trigger. Note that there will eventually be eight potential 
triggers: four potential feeder triggers and four potential packer 
triggers. Three or more minor triggers (out of the eight) in the same 
quarter constitute a major trigger. Two major triggers in rolling set 
of four quarters will result in the NCBA Live Cattle Marketing Working 
Group recommending that, ``. . . NCBA pursue legislative or regulatory 
measures to compel adequate negotiated trade for robust price 
discovery'' (Bohn, et al., 2020).
Figure 9.2. National Cattlemen's Beef Association's 75% Plan Regions.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Source: National Cattlemen's Beef Association.

 Table 9.2. Sum of Weekly Fed Cattle Sold via Negotiated Methods by NCBA
                  75% Plan Region, First Quarter 2021.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Negotiated Trade Head/Week
                  ------------------------------------------------------
                      TX-OK-NM          KS         NE-CO        IA-MN
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 75% Robust             9,750         15,750       27,000       12,000
   Threshold
   1/4/2021            13,621       813,3600       31,637       21,314
  1/11/2021           89,2850         17,184       27,763       19,414
  1/18/2021            12,224       814,8240       36,234       27,355
  1/25/2021           88,3440         24,001       35,109       18,887
   2/1/2021            89,627        12,7030       38,561       24,220
   2/8/2021            12,088         21,589       36,383       26,081
  2/15/2021            10,131       814,7290       34,120       21,443
  2/22/2021            10,393        89,6920       30,191       20,342
   3/1/2021            13,480       814,9160       34,238       23,336
   3/8/2021            15,041         19,242     824,2100       22,939
  3/15/2021            12,729         20,855       37,309       21,816
  3/22/2021           86,3270         17,237     826,0660       29,424
  3/29/2021            13,306         22,535       35,299       24,965
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* [8Highlighted0] values indicates a week in which total head sold by
  negotiated methods fell below the threshold established by NCBA's 75%
  Plan.

    For an example of minor triggers, consider the first quarter of 
2021 in Table 9.2, which lists weekly combined sales of negotiated cash 
and negotiated grid sales of fed cattle by region. From January through 
March, Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico failed to meet the 75% of robust 
threshold 4 of 13 weeks. During the same period, Kansas failed to meet 
the 75% of robust threshold 6 of 13 weeks. Allowances were made for 
force majeure for 2 weeks in Kansas. With that adjustment, Kansas 
failed to meet the 75% of robust threshold 4 of 13 weeks. Nebraska-
Colorado met the 75% of robust threshold all but 2 of the 13 weeks. 
Iowa-Minnesota did not fail to meet the 75% of robust threshold at any 
time during the first quarter of 2021. Therefore, two minor triggers 
were tripped in the first quarter of 2021 (in TX-OK-NM and Kansas). A 
major trigger was not tripped because only two minor triggers were 
tripped in the quarter (recall that our stylized example does not 
include the packer silo).
Simulation of Minor and Major Triggers
    The remainder of the study is dedicated to evaluating the 
likelihood of possible outcomes under NCBA's 75% Plan. Using the 
Microsoft Excel plugin SIMETAR, a simulation model was developed to 
analyze the 75% plan using historic weekly USDA-AMS data to examine the 
probability of tripping minor and major triggers in the feeding silo 
and reveal the quarters and regions within a given year most at risk 
for tripping triggers. The data informing the simulation is weekly data 
collected and reported by USDA-AMS (Agricultural Marketing Service, 
2021). Data includes formula, grid, and contract purchases as well as 
negotiated purchases for each of the four regions defined by NCBA's 75% 
Plan (Bohn, et al., 2020).
    Anecdotal discussions with industry stakeholders indicated that the 
announcement of the 75% Plan may have induced changes in negotiated 
trade volumes in some regions as early as July 2020. Statistical 
testing confirmed that hypothesis, meaning that to accurately forecast 
future trade volumes the model must be adjusted for the change in 
behavior.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ A two-sample t-test of negotiated sales volumes from July 2020 
through March 2021 when compared to the same period a year prior, a 
previous 5 year average of the same period, and the previous 5 years in 
general rejected the hypothesis that the mean weekly negotiated trade 
of the compared periods were equal in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and 
Kansas. An F-test of the same periods rejected the hypothesis that the 
variances are equal for the same two regions. Stepwise regressions 
revealed that, before the announcement of the 75% Plan, a time trend 
and total fed cattle sales in a given week in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico 
explained 72.5% of the variation in negotiated sales in Texas-Oklahoma-
New Mexico from 2010 to 2019. A time trend and total fed cattle sales 
in a given week in Kansas explained 67.8% of the variation in 
negotiated sales in Kansas from 2010 to 2019. The same measures in 
Nebraska-Colorado and Iowa-Minnesota explained only 39.1% and 31.0% of 
the variation in negotiated sales in those regions, respectively. As 
previously discussed, Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas are the two 
regions with the lowest negotiated trade and therefore pose the highest 
risk of tripping a minor trigger. Therefore, the duration of the study 
utilizes methods best-tailored to predicting changes in Texas-Oklahoma-
New Mexico and Kansas. Upon including data from July 2020 to March 
2021, post 75% Plan announcement, the explanatory value of the 
previously discussed regression models are reduced. The coefficient of 
time trend becomes insignificant; however, the total fed cattle sales 
in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas remains significantly 
predictive of negotiated fed cattle sales, though with lower R-squared 
values.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If behavior has changed since (possibly as a result of) the 
announcement of the 75% Plan, then forecasting with historic negotiated 
volumes will underrepresent the potential negotiated sales. To base the 
forecasted negotiated volumes on data since then, while accounting for 
the low number of observations since July 2020 we developed an 
empirically distributed stochastic negotiated sales inflation factor 
(NSIF). The NSIF for each region is the difference between weekly 
negotiated sales since July 2020 and average weekly sales in the same 
week from 2015 to 2019.

 
                                 Negotiated Head Sold Since July 2020x
          NSIFi,x =           ------------------------------------------
                                    Negotiated Head Sold 2015-2019x
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

where i is one of the four NCBA 75% Plan fed cattle regions and x is a 
vector of weeks, x  (1,2,...,52) representing individual 
weeks in a calendar year. The average NSIF for Texas-Oklahoma-New 
Mexico is 1.7, Kansas is 1.24, Nebraska-Colorado is 0.83, and Iowa-
Minnesota is 0.99. Simply put, negotiated trade in a given week in 
Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico was 1.7 times greater on average from July 
2020 to March 2021 than it was from 2015 to 2019. Tests of the values 
of the NSIF adjusted values and actual values in the testing period 
fail to reject the validity of the NSIF as an accurate adjustment 
value.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ A two-sample t-test failed to reject the hypothesis that the 
actual means of January 2021 to March 2021 values and NSIF adjusted 
predicted means for the same period were equal for all regions (P-Value 
= 0.638 for Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico; P-Value = 0.597 for Kansas; and 
P-Value = 0.237 for Nebraska-Colorado; P-Value = 0.967 for Iowa-
Minnesota). An F-test revealed the same outcome for variances between 
the two samples in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico (P-Value = 0.064) and 
Kansas (P-Value = 0.532). The same test rejected the hypothesis of 
equal variance in Nebraska-Colorado (P-Value = 0.000) and Iowa-
Minnesota (P-Value = 0.008). Again, we chose to tailor our methods on 
forecasting outcomes for the at-risk regions and applied those methods 
equally to the regions with very low chances of tripping minor 
triggers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The NSIF yields several advantages. First, it accounts for the 
effort of different regions to adapt to the announcement of the 75% 
Plan. Second, it incorporates the seasonality of fed cattle sales by 
inflating or deflating values in accordance with historic average 
volumes in a given week. Accounting for seasonality provides more 
clarity in determining at-risk quarters. Finally, the NSIF can be 
varied artificially to easily test the system. For example, what would 
a 65% Plan or 85% Plan look like given the current NSIF? If a 65% or 
85% Plan were enacted, how much would negotiated trade need to change 
to avoid tripping newly inflated or deflated triggers? One disadvantage 
is the assumption that negotiated trade continues to trade at increased 
levels one, 2, and even 5 years out. However, with regular updates, a 
decreasing NSIF will reveal industry changes quickly.
    To forecast weekly negotiated sales for 2021, we multiply 
stochastic draws of NSIF by the 5 year average of negotiated sales in 
the corresponding week, x  (1,2,...,52). To forecast weekly 
negotiated sales for 2022 to 2025 we multiply stochastic draws of NSIF 
by the previous year's negotiated sales in the corresponding week, x 
 (1,2,...,52). Due to the previously discussed relationship 
between total fed cattle sales in a region and negotiated fed cattle 
sales in a region, we also accounted for the declining size of the U.S. 
cattle herd. The 2021 Cattle report described a decline in all cattle 
and calves from 93.8 million head on January 1, 2020 to 93.6 million 
head on January 1, 2021, a 0.2% decrease (Cowen, 2021). A review of 
cattle and calf inventory from 2000 to 2020 reveals that when the 
cattle herd is declining in size it declines 0.5% to 2.0% annually. To 
account for cattle herd declines, we draw stochastic, normally 
distributed values of herd decline from 0.5% to 1.0% and apply those 
values independently to each week from 2021 to 2024. In 2025 we apply a 
0.5% to 1.0% stochastic, normally distributed value of herd increase 
independently to each week to account for a potential change in the 
direction of the cattle cycle at that time. Accounting for the NSIF 
adjustments to negotiated trade, we forecast values of negotiated trade 
from 2021 to 2025. The model then records weeks in which negotiated 
volumes in a region did not meet the 75% Plan threshold for that 
region. The model then counts the number of weeks in a quarter for 
which volumes did not meet the 75% Plan threshold. Finally, the model 
reports the number of quarters in which a minor trigger is tripped, the 
number of quarters in which a major trigger is tripped, and whether two 
major triggers were tripped in a rolling set of four quarters leading 
to NCBA support of legislative action. We then simulate 500 potential 
outcomes for the entire system using the SIMETAR 
plugin for excel.
Results
    The relationship between negotiated volumes sold and total volumes 
sold is as expected. Figure 9.3 shows that the periods of the year in 
which total volumes sold are highest in the two most at-risk regions 
roughly correlate to the periods in which negotiated volumes sold are 
highest. Differing incentives throughout the year may induce different 
negotiated sales volumes as a percent of total sales, but when you 
consider Figure 9.3 in a quarterly breakdown, the relationship between 
the two is clear. The reason for this relationship is simple: more fed 
cattle sales increase the likelihood that some buyer and seller will 
have some cattle sold via negotiated methods. The relationship between 
negotiated volume sold and total volume sold in a given quarter becomes 
important over time as the 75% Plan evaluates trade on whole values 
rather than percentages; quarters with seasonally lower sales may be 
more at risk for tripping triggers than quarters with higher total 
sales.
    As the 75% Plan is evaluated on a quarterly basis and with the 
relationship between total trade and negotiated trade, it is important 
to know the quarters most at risk of failure in any given year. The 
Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) in Figure 9.4 contain the 
probability of different counts of cumulative weeks that meet 
negotiated trade levels necessary to avoid tripping a regional trigger 
during the first, second, third, and fourth quarters in Texas-Oklahoma-
New Mexico, and Kansas (the two at-risk regions) in a given year.
Figure 9.3. 2015-2019 Five-Year Average Index of Negotiated Volume Sold 
        and Total Volume Sold in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
          Source: USDA/AMS.
Figure 9.4. Cumulative Distribution Function of Weeks Meeting 
        Negotiated Trade Meeting Regional Requirements Under the 75% 
        Plan, Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
    The further to the left a CDF falls, the greater the likelihood 
that negotiated trade during that quarter in that region will not meet 
the weekly threshold necessary often enough to avoid tripping a minor 
trigger. For example, in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico there is 
approximately a 70% chance that, during a given first quarter, 
negotiated trade will exceed 9,750 head fewer than 10 weeks. However, 
there is only a 37.8% chance that during a given second quarter 
negotiated trade will exceed 9,750 head fewer than 10 weeks.
    The risk of failing to trade at 75% of negotiated volumes needed 
for robust price discovery for at least 10 weeks, per the NCBA 75% 
Plan, varies substantially by quarter. Figure 9.5 contains the 
probability of each quarter in each region tripping a minor trigger in 
a given year.
    Since the Nebraska-Colorado feeding sector is expected to trip its 
minor trigger rarely, and Iowa-Minnesota is not expected to trip its 
minor trigger at any point, it is important to focus on the two at-risk 
regions. The risk of a major trigger represented in Figure 9.6 only 
represents the feeding sector and so half of the potential triggers are 
not included in those outcomes. Therefore, until the packer silo's 
triggers are set, the risk of simultaneous minor triggers being tripped 
in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas is a better measure of the 
overall system risk. Figure 9.7 charts the same information as Figure 
9.6; however, Figure 9.7 only includes the probability of simultaneous 
minor triggers being tripped in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas.
    The risk of Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas simultaneously 
tripping minor triggers before 2025 is substantially higher than the 
risk of the feeder silo alone triggering NCBA support for legislative 
action. In fact, on average the risk of Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and 
Kansas simultaneously tripping minor triggers before 2025 is 44 times 
the risk of the feeder silo triggering NCBA support for legislative 
action. Overall, it is 14 times more likely that Texas-Oklahoma-New 
Mexico and Kansas will simultaneously trip minor triggers than the 
likelihood that the industry will fail the 75% Plan based on the feeder 
silo alone.
Figure 9.5. Probability of Failing 75% Volume > 3 Weeks in Quarter X, 
        by Region.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
Discussion
    Why does the discrepancy in total system probability of triggering 
vs. the probability of at-risk regions matter? With the packer silo 
still not formed (as of this writing), there is no way to accurately 
measure the probability of those additional four triggers being 
tripped. In the best-case scenario, the risk of each minor packer 
trigger being tripped will be zero, and the overall risk distribution 
of the industry failing the 75% Plan over time will look like Figure 
9.6. However, if we assume that there is any possibility of a packer 
silo trigger being tripped, the risk of the industry failing the 75% 
Plan over time looks like Figure 9.7. There is approximately a 48.8% 
chance of Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas simultaneously tripping 
their minor triggers in a given set of rolling quarters. That level of 
risk suggests that half the time that a single packer silo trigger is 
tripped, it will constitute a major trigger.
Figure 9.6. Probability of Only Feeder Silo Tripping a Major Trigger, 
        Rolling Quarters 2021-2025; Probability of 75% Plan Triggering 
        Legislative Action Before 2025.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        
    The number of fed cattle sold via negotiated methods has increased 
since the 75% Plan was introduced. The need to construct the NSIF alone 
suggests that the announcement of the 75% Plan induced a change in 
negotiated volumes. During the first quarter of 2021, both Texas-
Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas tripped their minor feeding silo 
triggers, but the number of fed cattle traded via negotiated methods 
grew over 2020. Every week in Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico, and 6 of 13 
weeks in Kansas, fed cattle traded via negotiated methods was above the 
minimum volume needed to achieve price discovery. In Texas-Oklahoma-New 
Mexico the number of fed cattle traded via negotiated methods was above 
the volume needed to achieve robust price discovery 4 of 13 weeks, 
robust price discovery being a higher threshold to cross. The same was 
true of Kansas 3 of 13 weeks.
    The final outcomes of the 75% Plan will depend largely on two 
things; the structure of the triggers in the packer silo and continued 
efforts of cattle feeders to trade fed cattle via negotiated methods. 
If the rules of the packer silo yield similar results to the feeder 
silo as it stands, it is very likely that the industry will fail the 
75% Plan. One region's packer silo minor trigger tripping regularly 
suggests an approximately 50% chance of the industry failing the 75% 
Plan.
    There are potential fixes from the cattle feeder side. The need for 
further research remains and questions still need to be answered. How 
much will negotiated trade from the feeder side continue to exceed 
negotiated trade in previous years? On average, how many more fed 
cattle must be traded weekly via negotiated methods to lower or 
eliminate the risk of one or two simultaneously tripped triggers in the 
at-risk regions? Will drought-induced liquidations force lower total 
fed cattle sales in the future once the cow herd is reduced, and if 
those lower total sales lead to lower negotiated sales, does long-term 
drought constitute force majeure? Are adjustments to the plan necessary 
to facilitate more realistic outcomes? Is a hard number of negotiated 
volume the best way to ensure increased prices? Most importantly, what 
is the ultimate impact of the 75% Plan on prices received at the fed 
cattle and feeder cattle levels?
Figure 9.7. Probability of Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas 
        Simultaneously Tripping Minor Triggers, Rolling Quarters 2021-
        2025; Probability of Texas-Oklahoma-New Mexico and Kansas 
        Simultaneously Tripping Minor Triggers Once before 2025.
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
        

 
 
 
                               References
 
    Agricultural Marketing Service. (2020) User's Guide to USDA LMR
 Cattle Price Reports. Washington D.C.
    Agricultural Marketing Service. (2021) MPR Data Mart. Washington
 D.C.
    Bohn, J., Buse, K., Horn, S., Kooima, B., Levi, J., Sander, T., and
 Stowater, T. (2020) A Voluntary Framework to Achieve Robust Price
 Discovery in the Fed Cattle Market, National Cattlemen's Beef
 Association--Center for Public Policy, policy.ncba.org/Media/Policy/
 Docs/ncba-regional-triggers-subgroup-report-overview-presentation_10-16-
 2020-53.pdf.
    Cowen, R. (2021) Cattle. Washington, D.C.
    Koontz, Stephen R. Colorado State University (2017) Price Discovery
 Research Project--What Volume of Cash Trade Is Needed for Price
 Discovery?
    Martinez, C.C., Maples, J.G., and Benavidez, J. (2020) Beef Cattle
 Markets and COVID-19. Appl. Econ. Perspect. Policy, 43: 304-314. https:/
 /doi.org/10.1002/aepp.13080.
    Richardson, J.W., Schumann, K.D., and Feldman, P.A. (2008)
 Probability Distributions Simulated in Simetar, ``Simetar: Simulation &
 Econometrics to Analyze Risk,'' Ch. 3: 8-28.
    Tomek, W.G. and Kaiser, H.M. (2014) Mechanisms for Discovering
 Price. ``Agricultural Product Prices,'' Ch. 11: 238-260.
 

Chapter 10
Workshop Discussion Summary
David P. Anderson

    The authors of the various chapters in this book presented their 
findings at a 2 day workshop in Kansas City, MO, from June 3-4, 2021. 
The workshop was open to the public, and time was reserved for Q&A 
following each presentation. In addition, at the end of each day, a 
formal discussion panel offered feedback on the presentations.
    The discussants were selected to represent a diverse cross-section 
of the industry.
    Following are their bios at the time of the workshop:

   Michael Nepveux serves as an Economist at the American Farm 
        Bureau Federation. His issue portfolio consists of livestock 
        and dairy markets, farm bill and Federal crop insurance, 
        renewable fuels, and hemp issues.

   Shelby Horn is currently part of the management team for 
        Abell Livestock, a commercial cow-calf/stocker operator with 
        ranches in Texas, Florida and New Mexico. Horn serves on the 
        Board of Directors of Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers 
        Association and is a member of the National Cattlemen's Beef 
        Association Marketing Committee.

   Don Close is the cattle market analyst for Rabobank, one of 
        the largest agricultural lenders in the world. He has had a 40 
        year career in agriculture and livestock markets, including at 
        a packer startup and as a market analyst at the Texas Cattle 
        Feeders Association. He speaks around the country on cattle 
        market issues to audiences of ranchers and other segments of 
        the industry. He is a well known and respected cattle market 
        analyst.

   Justin Tupper is the owner and operator of St. Onge 
        Livestock Auction Company. He is a leader in cattle 
        organizations, including serving as Vice President of U.S. 
        Cattlemen's Association, and a participant in recent leadership 
        meetings of all the national livestock organizations. He has 
        also testified before Congress on livestock market issues. He 
        brings an important perspective as a livestock auction company 
        owner to the fed cattle price discussion at the workshop. He 
        also brings an important regional perspective on fed cattle 
        pricing issues.

    Initial drafts of the papers (that eventually became chapters in 
this book) were provided to the discussants in advance so they had time 
to prepare for the workshop. They were invited to highlight where they 
agreed or disagreed with the presentations and to identify issues they 
thought were not sufficiently addressed. The discussion panels also 
spurred a number of audience questions and comments.
    While it is virtually impossible to fully capture 2 days of formal 
and information discussions in a succinct manner, this chapter attempts 
to highlight the major themes/comments that arose from the discussants 
and/or the audience. Further, it was made clear at the workshop that 
any comments would not be attributed to individual particpants so as to 
encourage robust discussion; as a result, the comments below are 
offered as-is with no attribution to individual participants.
Complexity
   In responding to Dr. Derrell Peel's point about the 
        complexity of the beef industry (as noted in Chapter 1), one 
        discussant observed that there are no easy solutions to solve 
        the problems of price discovery (and others) addressed in this 
        workshop. The complexity of the system suggests that it might 
        be likely that proposed solutions are either ineffective or are 
        counterproductive.

   One view expressed by a discussant was that, while complex, 
        efficiency in the marketplace is quite strong. The efficiency 
        of production practices and the speed with which information 
        moves through the marketplace is incredibly fast. Market 
        information and price signals move through the market faster 
        than legislation.
AMAs Have Value
   The general view was that AMAs have value to both buyers and 
        sellers. AMAs have led to the implementation of value-based 
        marketing that has increased cattle and beef quality throughout 
        the industry. Ranchers have drastically changed the genetic 
        makeup of their herds due to value-based marketing. There 
        appeared to be little interest in the audience in going away 
        from (or backtracking from) the improved beef quality that AMAs 
        have fostered, although some did question if the value provided 
        by AMAs is worth the perceived tradeoff in transparency.

   Some pointed out that premiums and discounts for quality are 
        not going away and, in fact, are going to become more valuable 
        over time, including for both feeder cattle and calves. In 
        fact, the entire beef supply chain has had to adapt to 
        accommodate the production of beef with specific attributes. To 
        that end, the days of buying on average (i.e., not 
        differentiating for quality) are numbered.
Packing Capacity
   One view of capacity constraints might suggest that one part 
        of the industry has low barriers to entry and a very liquid 
        market; the other side of the industry has high costs of entry 
        and limited liquidity. These conditions describe cattle 
        production and meat packing, respectively. Cattle producers, at 
        times, outproduce fixed plant capacity to process the cattle. 
        With those industry differences, there are times when the 
        supply of cattle is out of balance with the ability to 
        slaughter those cattle. The relative balance of the supply of 
        cattle and capacity creates leverage for either the buyer or 
        the seller.

   One estimate was that packing capacity needs to increase 
        4,000-5,000 head per day to alleviate the packing capacity 
        constraint. Recent press releases have indicated about 9,000 
        head per day in expansion is currently planned. While not all 
        of the proposed facilities may be built, when some of those 
        come on line--coupled with fewer cattle, cyclically--cattle 
        prices may take off like a rocket. In this case, packing 
        capacity exceeds the number of cattle produced, leading to a 
        change in the competitive position of feeders and packers.

   Another concern expressed was about reinvestment by current 
        major packers into new plants. The level of profits generated 
        over the last 2 years has not resulted in expansion and that 
        has led to frustration by many cattle producers.

   Others noted there are constraints to packing expansion, and 
        the labor constraint is an important one. One solution to the 
        lack of labor is additional investment in robotics. There might 
        be a role for government action in this area by funding 
        research on robotics. Those systems might be targeted to 
        smaller plants, whose success would expand capacity, increase 
        competition, and might increase price discovery.

   A question came from the audience about whether or not new 
        small plants would participate in the negotiated cash market 
        and if it matters how they buy cattle? The answer from one 
        discussant was that it shouldn't matter how they buy cattle, 
        but at least they would provide more competition in the 
        marketplace.
Risk Management
   One discussant noted that price discovery is important in 
        another way that was not addressed by the presenters. Accurate 
        spot prices, discovered prices, affect the futures market. If 
        cattle prices are not accurate, then there's no way to have a 
        viable risk management tool to hedge risk. Or, at least, 
        futures market prices would have to rely on some other 
        mechanism than inaccurate spot prices to be useful. A downsteam 
        impact of inaccurate price discovery would be spill-over 
        effects in the futures market and the loss of useful risk 
        management tools. Livestock risk management through crop 
        insurance policies like Livestock Risk Protection (LRP) also 
        relies on the futures market.
A Profitable Industry
   The discussion made it clear that certainly some of the 
        worries about price discovery exist because of difficult times 
        for cattle producers. Low prices and the lack of profits have 
        occurred at the same time as, seemingly, record profits for 
        packers. Some of the discussion centered around the need for a 
        profitable industry in all segments and not just one. The view 
        was expressed for the industry to be healthy long-term, there 
        need to be profits in every segment.
Market Transparency
   One discussant addressed the topic of confidentiality. The 
        prevailing view expressed was that if a trade happens, USDA 
        should report the price, arguing that eliminating 
        confidentiality constraints would greatly increase 
        transparency. They argued it would also reduce worries about 
        ``sweetheart'' deals where the playing field is not level. 
        Trades often happen very quickly, over the course of only an 
        hour. In that quick market action, does confidentiality really 
        matter?

   The contract library addressed in some legislation was 
        viewed positively by the discussants. The library would, at 
        least, add some information for producers to know what has been 
        offered. Examples from the hog market contract library were 
        discussed as an example of how a cattle contract library might 
        work. While the contract library was viewed positively, it was 
        noted that there are clear limitations on what a contract 
        library can be expected to solve in terms of price discovery 
        and/or transparency.
Market ``Rules of the Road''
   Several discussants expressed a series of ideas that might 
        be termed ``defining the rules of the road for the market.'' 
        The losses suffered by cattle producers compared to the 
        apparent profits by the packing sector over the last 2 years 
        suggests to some that there is a problem. One view is that 
        there needs to be a referee. Recent legislative options offer 
        some additional rules for the market. More effective Justice 
        Department actions would also provide some market oversight.
Price Discovery
   There was a general discussion about the fact that price 
        discovery is important throughout the industry, not just for 
        fed cattle. Prices at the fed cattle level certainly affect 
        calf prices and wholesale and retail beef prices. Every price 
        throughout the beef value chain is related to fed cattle 
        prices.

   One of the interesting issues in price discovery (or in the 
        market working) is the issue of having a second bidder in the 
        market. This idea was brought up in the second day's discussion 
        session. The view of one discussant was that he views this 
        bidder as the most important. A second bidder, in this view, is 
        someone who is actively bidding for cattle and they want to 
        buy. They force the bid winner to really work for the cattle. 
        So, the second bidder has to be honestly bidding to get the 
        cattle, it just so happens that they don't win. But, the 
        problem was viewed that there is often no second bidder in 
        cattle markets. This issue is also related to competitiveness 
        and market power.

   Discussion on both days included how thin is too thin for 
        adequate price discovery. During the discussion, one of the 
        authors noted that if all the research on price discovery was 
        summarized very briefly it would say that markets can be a lot 
        thinner than you think and still work very well. While the 
        academics in the room seemed reluctant to drive a stake in the 
        ground and say this is all you need, it is because there are 
        times in the market that you need a lot more trades to get 
        price discovery because there is some uncertainty in the 
        market. A good example might be in the height of the COVID-19 
        pandemic, or when a cow with bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
        (BSE) was discovered, or when some other economic turmoil hits 
        and there is a huge amount of uncertainty, then you need more 
        cattle traded. But, when there are not big events happening 
        that cause turmoil, then the number needed to trade is likely 
        very small. So, there is no right number that works for every 
        week. The number that need to trade is likely different 
        depending on events.

   Others noted that it is also not clear what low price 
        discovery means. It's not clear that we are close to losing it 
        either. Many people assume that if we had more discovery, we 
        would see higher producer prices. That is not at all clear and 
        the end result might be the opposite.

   One participant expressed the notion that giving up known 
        benefits for an unknown cost is a difficult policy step to 
        take.
Research
   Discussants identified a need for more research on these 
        topics to be able to make the most informed decision they can. 
        There is a lot of research about the value of AMAs and 
        estimated costs of not having AMAs. But, there are other 
        questions about what happens in the market if there is no 
        discovery or if trading becomes so thin there is no confidence 
        in the market.

   There was general discussion about a view of research--
        related to price discovery--that we can't destroy price 
        discovery in the pursuit of efficiency. In pursuit of 
        efficiency, we may lose price discovery to the detriment of 
        cattle producers. Research could build on what has been 
        presented in this conference to explore how far negotiated 
        trade can be pushed and still have adequate price discovery. 
        Research might also examine the tradeoffs between efficiency 
        and discovery.

   The view was expressed that a lot of price discovery 
        questions could be answered with more access to LMR data. There 
        is a lot of data that is not publicly released. Obtaining some 
        access to that data to answer a variety of price discovery 
        research questions would likely help in shedding light on the 
        market for buyers and sellers.

   While most research shows that very little market power is 
        exerted by packers, the view was expressed that this topic 
        needs to be monitored and periodically revisited due to the 
        concentrated nature of the industry.
AMS and NASS
   Discussion also revolved around the good work that USDA's 
        Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) does in disseminating 
        information. While they face many constraints, some self 
        inflicted, they do a tremendous amount of good work in 
        reporting prices to help producers know what is happening in 
        the marketplace. USDA's National Agricultural Statistics 
        Service (NASS) was also praised for the job they do in 
        developing market data. The lack of data in other countries was 
        viewed as a real constraint.

   Another comment focused on the difficulty in getting more 
        market data reported by AMS because it often requires industry 
        consensus. That is difficult to get sometimes given competing 
        interests.
Voluntary Solutions
   Participants discussed the fact that voluntary industry 
        efforts have increased negotiated trade. Those efforts have 
        resulted in more feeders offering more cattle in negotiated 
        trade. However, packers are not showing up to buy them. There 
        are packers who refuse to buy cattle in a negotiated format. 
        So, voluntary solutions have worked to some extent, but it does 
        take more buyers to be willing to participate.

   There is a view that there are some packers who are tone 
        deaf to the problems in the market. Those sharing that view 
        expressed frustration that the packers have been unwilling to 
        participate in voluntary solutions. The view is that they will 
        not work on voluntary measures unless they are required to.

    The discussion as a whole illustrated that in an audience of cattle 
industry stakeholders, the viewpoints on solutions to current concerns 
about cattle markets are highly diverse. There was general agreement 
that price discovery matters to the functioning of cattle markets, 
including fed cattle markets, but any needed policy changes remain an 
open question. With that said, there seemed to be general agreement on 
concerns about unintended consequences of otherwise well-intentioned 
policy changes.

          In 2020, at the request of the bipartisan leadership of the 
        Committee on Agriculture in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
        USDA was asked to commission a study to look into the issues 
        surrounding fed cattle pricing. Ultimately, USDA partnered with 
        the Agricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC) at Texas A&M 
        University, and this book is a culmination of that request.
          In carrying out our work, papers were commissioned from noted 
        experts around the country on a variety of topics, ranging from 
        a history of how the industry arrived at this point to an 
        initial evaluation of voluntary proposals introduced by 
        industry to address some of these pressing challenges. AFPC 
        hosted a workshop in Kansas City, MO, on June 3-4, 2021, where 
        the authors of the respective papers presented their findings. 
        Four discussants--representing a diverse cross-section of the 
        industry--were invited to offer a formal response. The workshop 
        was open to the public, and participants offered a number of 
        helpful comments.
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                                 ______
                                 
  Submitted Letter by Hon. Jim Hagedorn, a Representative in Congress 
                             from Minnesota
June 24, 2021

  Hon. Thomas ``Tom'' J. Vilsack,
  U.S. Department of Agriculture
  Washington, D.C.

    Dear Secretary Vilsack,

    We are writing to direct your attention to a recent U.S. district 
court decision which vacated a portion of the Department of Agriculture 
(``USDA'') New Swine Inspection System (``NSIS'') rule relating to line 
speeds at NSIS packing plants. By removing this provision six plants 
will be forced to reduce their output, and by extension, their purchase 
of hogs.
    While the economic impact to these packers will be significant, it 
is the nation's small- and medium-sized hog farmers who will suffer the 
greatest harm from upstream impacts. It is imperative that USDA act 
quickly, and pursue all available options, to prevent this reduction in 
packing capacity which is set to take place at the end of June.
    Although NSIS is relatively new, it is based upon a pilot program 
that operated successfully for decades. Its predecessor, the Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point (``HACCP'') Inspection Models 
Project (``HIMP'') program was developed during the Clinton 
Administration and ran continuously through 2019. As a result of HIMP's 
success, USDA began consideration of a permanent program during your 
first term as Secretary under the Obama Administration and finalized 
the program during the Trump Administration.
    The order to vacate the NSIS line speed provisions was due to the 
rulemaking process. The court determined the agency failed to satisfy 
the Administrative Procedure Act (``APA''), claiming it did not address 
certain comments raising worker safety concerns. Adherence to the APA 
is crucial to preserve sound and reasoned rulemaking by Federal 
agencies. However, there is compelling data about the safety of workers 
in NSIS. Specifically, FSIS data between 2002 and 2010 shows fewer 
worker injuries in NSIS program facilities over time and fewer injuries 
at NSIS plants when compared to their non-NSIS counterparts.
    If USDA fails to act, American hog farmers will face significant 
harm. Research from Dr. Dermot Hayes at Iowa State University indicates 
that the decision would reduce national packing capacity by 2.5% which 
will create a surplus of hogs on the market-dropping prices by $10.70/
cwt or roughly $23.22 per animal. The total economic loss of this 
decision on U.S. hog farmers is estimated at $80 million in 2021.
    As the hog production cycle spans nearly a year, hogs set to enter 
this reduced-capacity market are already being raised. Farmers have 
little ability to alter their supply in the next year. Many farmers 
supplying these NSIS plants will need to find alternative destinations 
for their hogs. The resulting surplus and reduced demand in a 
concentrated geographic region will shift economic power to pork 
processing companies. The culmination of economic losses from the 
producers selling their operation. By failing to act, USDA will drive 
consolidation in the pork industry.
    To avoid these consequences, the Department must defend the NSIS 
program through all available channels while the court-ordered 90 day 
stay is in place. Failure to do so will leave our nation's hog 
producers to bear the brunt of the consequences due to no fault of 
their own. Thank you for your consideration.
            Sincerely,
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Hon. Chuck Grassley,                 Hon. Jim Hagedorn,
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                                 ______
                                 
  Supplementary Material Submitted by Hon. Thomas ``Tom'' J. Vilsack, 
               Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Insert 1
          Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
        Secretary Vilsack, thank you for joining us today. My pork 
        producers are telling me that the pork producers still have not 
        been paid the CFAP payments. Is that correct?
          Secretary Vilsack. I think we have announced those payments, 
        Representative, but I am more than happy to double check and 
        get back to you with exactly how many dollars have actually 
        been paid out to those producers.
          Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Okay. I would be interested in 
        knowing that on the pork, as well as any of the other CFAP 
        payments.
          Secretary Vilsack. I can tell you that over $4 billion have 
        been distributed to producers, commodity producers, livestock 
        producers, but we can get you very specific information and 
        dollar amounts.
          Mr. Austin Scott of Georgia. Okay. I would very much 
        appreciate that, thank you.

    To date, of the 3,092 applications for SMHPP, 2,036 have been 
approved with total payments disbursed equaling $63.9M. Most SMHPP 
payments have been issued except for a few states working through 
appeals. You can also find additional information on our CFAP 
dashboard, which is here: https://www.farmers.gov/coronavirus/pandemic-
assistance/cfap2/data
Insert 2
          Mr. Allen. Well, as the industry, we need to maybe 
        communicate a little better, because there is concern out 
        there. Your Department announced a Packers and Stockyards 
        investigation to explore potential packer wrongdoing in the 
        wake of the Tyson facility fire in Holcomb, Kansas, and the 
        ongoing pandemic. Can you clarify whether that investigation is 
        ongoing, and if not, what were the findings?
          Secretary Vilsack. Well, if there is an investigation 
        undertaken, I am assuming it also involves the Department of 
        Justice, who would be sort of the lead in this effort. But I 
        will get back to you, Congressman. I don't know the answer to 
        that question.

    The previous Administration completed the investigation and 
corresponding report, which can be found here: https://www.usda.gov/
media/press-releases/2020/07/22/usda-provides-update-investigation-
following-2019-tyson-beef-plant.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Editor's note: the press release and report are retained in 
Committee file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Insert 3
          Mrs. Cammack. Well, Mr. Secretary, I have information that is 
        contrary to your statement about the level of efficiency within 
        the FSA offices, and I know in a state like Florida, that is a 
        top ten state in total agricultural output, we have agriculture 
        as our number one economic driver, the fact that we do not have 
        these positions filled is a huge issue for states like ours, 
        and I would love to continue that conversation offline. But, in 
        the interest of time, and the fact that I only have 34 seconds 
        left, I do want to get to a final question. And, of course, if 
        you could detail this into a report back to us in the coming 
        weeks, I sure would appreciate it. Have you been communicating, 
        Mr. Secretary, with the Department of Homeland Security, 
        working with your counterparts in other agencies, to ensure 
        that there is a cohesive, effective response to preventing 
        African Swine Fever from entering the United States through our 
        ports in Florida and elsewhere? This is a concern that we have 
        seen here recently in the news, and we want to ensure that this 
        is at top of mind.
          Secretary Vilsack. My first call was to Secretary Mayorkas on 
        African Swine Fever----
          Mrs. Cammack. And would you be willing to detail the 
        conversation, and the plan, in a report, in a follow up?
          The Chairman. The lady's time has expired. Mr. Secretary, you 
        might respond to that in writing.
          Secretary Vilsack. Sure. I am happy to share with everyone 
        the work that we are doing in building up surveillance and 
        building up detection, increasing canine, increasing vigilance 
        at the border, as well as working with our friends in the 
        Dominican Republic and Haiti to minimize the risk.

    USDA confirmed ASF in the Dominican Republic (DR) in July 2021 and 
in Haiti in September 2021. APHIS received $500 million in emergency 
funds from the CCC at the end of FY 2021, to assist with the response 
to these detections, establish a protection zone in Puerto Rico and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands, and steps to prevent the introduction of the 
disease in the United States. Those resources have helped USDA increase 
its testing capacity and capabilities and implement a surveillance 
plan. We are also working with States and industry to enhance 
preparedness, including preparing for a possible national swine 
movement standstill, improving depopulation and disposal methods, 
emphasizing biosecurity practices, and expanding diagnostic strategies.
                                 ______
                                 
      Submitted Statement by United States Cattlemen's Association
Introduction
    On behalf of the United States Cattlemen's Association (USCA), we 
thank you for the opportunity to provide this written testimony on 
behalf of the nation's cow-calf producers, backgrounders, feedlot 
operators, livestock haulers, and independent processors.
    USCA was founded on the principle that a grassroots effort by U.S. 
cow-calf producers, feedlot operators, backgrounders, and livestock 
haulers can work positively and effectively with Congress and the 
Administration to reform U.S. agriculture policy and ensure a fair, 
competitive marketplace. Our work is to ensure that the U.S. cattle 
industry that we leave for the next generation is one that can be both 
profitable and sustainable.
    Increasing consolidation and foreign ownership in the meatpacking 
sector has eroded the foundation of the U.S. cattle market. Congress 
holds the necessary power and tools to restore solid ground beneath the 
boots of U.S. cattle producers. We offer the following for 
consideration by this Committee.
Background
    In 1977, the number of cattle slaughtered by four firms accounted 
for only 25 percent of total slaughter capacity. Over the course of 2 
decades, that number increased to 71 percent.
    Today, four companies slaughter about 85% of U.S. fed cattle, 
according to the most recent data from the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). (Matilda Coleman, 2021).\1\ Two of those 
companies--JBS USA and National Beef--are owned and operated outside of 
the United States, in Brazil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Matilda Coleman, R. (2021, 06 17). How four big companies 
control the U.S. beef industry. Retrieved from UP News: https://
upnewsinfo.com/2021/06/17/how-four-big-companies-control-the-u-s-beef-
industry-by-reuters/.* **
    * Editor's note: references annotated with  are retained in 
Committee file.
    ** Editor's note: The referenced hyperlink is no longer available. 
The link to the official Reuters article is: https://www.reuters.com/
business/how-four-big-companies-control-us-beef-industry-2021-06-17/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The holding company behind JBS, J & F Investments, paid $3.2 
billion in fines in 2017 for its involvement in a government bribery 
scandal. That same year, news broke that JBS had paid Federal meat 
inspectors to ignore tainted meat product leaving their processing 
facilities--with some of that product intended for U.S. borders.
    It is a wholly unsustainable model for the U.S. beef production 
chain to rely on such a concentrated number of players, especially when 
half are foreign owned. Though the industry has been steadily building 
to this boiling point, three separate events in 2019, 2020, and 2021 
served to heighten awareness of the increased level of concentration in 
the meatpacking sector.
    On August 9, 2019, a fire broke out at one of the largest beef 
packing plants in the U.S. The Finney County Beef Plant in Holcomb, 
Kansas, owned by Tyson Foods, accounts for nearly six percent of the 
nation's slaughter capacity. In the days following the fire, U.S. 
cattle producers witnessed extreme volatility in the daily feeder and 
live cattle futures.
    A September 16, 2019, report released from Kansas State University 
listed projected values for finished steers in Kansas feedyards at 
negative $184.99.(Tonsor, 2019).\2\ During that same period, packer 
margins spiked significantly to nearly four times their annual average, 
or approximately $549. Within that same report, Kansas State University 
predicted that cattle feeders would not see a positive net return on 
finished steers or heifers until May 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Tonsor, D.G. (2019). Historical and Projected Kansas Feedlot 
Net Returns. Kansas State University. Retrieved from https://
agmanager.info/livestock-meat/cattle-finishing-historical-and-
projected-returns/cattle-feeding-returns-september-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, that positive net return never came. Instead, a 
global pandemic disrupted supply chains across the globe. The arrival 
of COVID-19 exposed inherent flaws in the U.S. meatpacking industry, 
resulting in a compromised food supply chain and exposing the 
vulnerability of our global meat processing workforce. In a report 
prepared by Brett Crosby of Custom Ag Solutions, Inc. (Crosby, 
2017),\3\ USCA estimated that the total impact of COVID-19 on the 
cattle industry would exceed $14.6 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Crosby, B. (2017, 04 17). Estimating COVID-19 Effects on the 
Cattle Markets. Retrieved from https://www.drovers.com/news/covid-19s-
impact-146-billion-usca-analysis-says.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Then, on May 30, 2021, JBS detected a ransomware attack that 
temporarily halted all production at its U.S. facilities, and certain 
facilities around the world.
    The combination of these so-called ``Black Swan'' events earned the 
attention of lawmakers, media, and the public. With the spotlight now 
on the cracks in the system, it is USCA's hope that we can finally make 
meaningful change to ensure a robust and secure domestic food system.
Ensuring a Fair and Competitive Market
    USCA supports clarifying definitions within the Packers and 
Stockyards Act of 1921 (P&S Act). The P&S Act was passed ``to regulate 
the sale of livestock by farmers to the more economically powerful 
livestock buyers.'' The Act passed following a long list of existing 
antitrust laws: the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914, and the Clayton Act of 1914. Congress 
recognized that while these existing laws addressed issues of anti-
competitive and collusive behaviors in U.S. markets, they did not 
address the subject of individual producers interacting with the highly 
concentrated meatpacking sector. Thus, the P&S Act directly addressed 
this issue with its most critical portion of the law, Section 202.
    The legislative history and purposes clearly demonstrate that 
sections 202(a) and (b) were to be distinct from the antitrust injuries 
illustrated in subsections (c), (d), and (e) based on the absence of 
anticompetitive language. The Congressional intent was clearly to 
provide remedies for individual producers in the instance that meat 
packers took unwarranted actions to provide less than fair market value 
to similarly situated producers. Consistent with the language and 
structure of the P&S Act, USCA wholly supports the USDA's longstanding 
position that the protections intended by sections 202(a) and (b) 
extend beyond the competitive injury required under the antitrust laws.
    USCA also believes that the ``harm to competition'' phrase must be 
addressed. The interpretation of this phrase has led to preferential 
contract agreements between meatpackers and select producers that has 
increased packer's control of supply and decimated price discovery, 
leading to a favorable position for the meatpacker. The 
``unreasonable'' requirement allows packers to continue paying premiums 
for higher quality and value-based pricing without the threat of 
litigation.
    USCA urges the USDA Packers and Stockyards Division to carry out 
its mission of promoting ``fair and competitive trading practices for 
the overall benefit of consumers and American agriculture.''
    Further, U.S. Senators Jon Tester (D-MT), Charles Grassley (R-IA), 
and Mike Rounds (R-SD) introduced legislation in June 2021 that would 
amend the Packers and Stockyards Act to establish the Office of the 
Special Investigator for Competition Matters.
    This bill directs coordination between the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade 
Commission, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. It grants 
subpoena power to aid in the investigation and prosecution of violators 
of the Packers & Stockyards Act and bolsters the legal power of the 
USDA by maintaining a staff of attorneys and other professionals with 
relevant expertise that can elevate cases of corruption.
    Regardless of whether anti-competitive practices are occurring, the 
four largest packers obviously have enough power and market share to 
manipulate cattle prices. This justifies additional oversight of the 
packing sector. For this reason, USCA strongly supports the successful 
passage of the Meat Packing Special Investigator Act (Senator Jon 
Tester, 2021) \4\ into law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Senator Jon Tester. (2021, 06 11). Tester, Grassley, Rounds 
Unveil Bill To Combat Anti-Competitive Practices in Meat Processing 
Industry that Threaten Nation's Food Supply. Retrieved from https://
www.tester.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=8380.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cattle Marketing in 2021
    Historically, packers have purchased most cattle through weekly 
negotiations with feedlots to agree upon the price of slaughter-ready 
animals' live weight (Live) or carcass weight (Dressed). Prices are 
stated either per pound ($/lb.) or per hundred pounds (hundred weight, 
or $/cwt). The industry generally refers to this pricing method as 
Negotiated Cash or Cash.
    In most regions, packers presently purchase a small minority of 
cattle through Cash pricing, and instead use Alternative Marketing 
Agreements (AMAs). AMAs generally use two components, market price and 
carcass quality, to arrive at a final price for cattle.
    The market price (Base Price) is usually a function of the Cash 
price in a particular area, and premiums or discounts are given based 
on carcass quality (the Grid). AMAs with the Base Price contractually 
established as a function of Cash or other markets (i.e., futures, 
boxed beef, etc.) are considered Formula cattle. AMAs with a Base Price 
negotiated weekly between the feedlot and packer are considered 
Negotiated Grid.
    Formula pricing is by far the most common AMA, and most formulas 
are based on a regional Cash price. Following is an example of a 
typical formula, including the timing of the information reported by 
MPR:

          Base Price: Kansas weighted average Cash price.
          Grid: Premiums for prime, choice, and high-yielding 
        carcasses. Discounts for select, standard, low-yielding 
        carcasses, and carcasses over 1,000 lbs. or under 700 lbs.

      a.  Day 1 (Monday): Feedlots commit slaughter-ready cattle to a 
            single proc-
                essor.

      b.  Day 6 (Saturday): Weekly Kansas Cash trade, reported daily 
            (MPR Re-
                ports LM_CT119, LM_CT120), averages $124/cwt for the 
            week.

      c.  Day 8 (Monday): MPR Weekly Cash trade is released (MPR Report 
            LM_
                CT161), setting Base Price at $124/cwt.

      d.  Day 9-18: Cattle are processed and graded. Grid Premium to 
            seller is $1/
                cwt.

      e.  Day 21: (Monday): MPR reports Formula Cattle Net Price of 
            $125 (MPR 
                Report LM_CT151)

    While AMAs offer advantages of reduced transaction costs and 
quality incentives, they also adversely affect price transparency, 
price discovery, and price competition.
Ensure Transparency and True Price Discovery
    The livestock industry is a historically up and down, ever-changing 
marketplace due to its dependence on consumer trends, domestic and 
international policies, and foreign market factors; however, today's 
marketplace lacks the transparency and true price discovery indicative 
of a healthy industry.
    Fewer and fewer cattle are sold on a negotiated cash basis, which 
reduces the ability for true price discovery in the cattle marketplace. 
Negotiated cash cattle make up less than 20 percent of the market yet 
set the price for the other 80 percent of cattle sold through formula 
contracts and or cattle futures market.
    The Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) program expires December 
31, 2021, following a 1 year extension that was granted in December 
2020 and another 3 month extension granted in September 2021. USCA 
would like to see changes made to this program to provide more accurate 
and transparent reports of daily prices and number of cattle purchased 
via the cash market.
    The Base Price and grid structure of formula agreements may vary 
significantly between feedlots, and the variation of these agreements 
is currently known only to the packers. This places cattle feeders at a 
disadvantage when negotiating formula agreements, because packers know 
what they have negotiated with other feedlots and the negotiating 
cattle feeder does not. For this reason, the USCA strongly supports 
creating a contract library and including it in LMR, as set forth in 
the Cattle Market Transparency Act of 2021. (Senator Deb Fischer, 
2021).\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Senator Deb Fischer. (2021, 03 2). Fischer, Wyden Introduce 
Cattle Market Transparency Act of 2021. Retrieved from https://
www.fischer.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/3/fischer-wyden-introduce-
cattle-market-transparency-act-of-2021.
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    Also, timely live cattle price information presently exists only 
for Negotiated Cash transactions. LMR currently requires packers to 
report Negotiated Cash transactions (Cash) twice daily, within at least 
16 hours of establishing a price. But LMR only reports prices for 
cattle purchased under Formulated (Formula), Negotiated Grid (Grid), 
and Forward Contract purchases only after they have been slaughtered.
    Formula, Grid, and Contract price reports are reported once weekly 
as an aggregated price of cattle slaughtered the prior week and daily 
prices are not reported. Because Formula and Grid prices include a 
carcass quality component, a substantial time lag exists for reporting 
these transactions.
    The time lag between base price establishment and slaughter for 
Formula and Grid Cattle is 7 to 21 days after the base price is 
established. The result is that prices for Formula, and Grid cattle, 
comprising roughly 60-80% of all cattle slaughtered, are reported an 
average of 2 weeks later than Cash prices.
    USCA's proposed solution is to require Base Price reporting twice 
daily. The Agriculture Marketing Service (AMS) publishes live cattle 
prices daily, weekly, and monthly through its LMR Datamart web portal. 
MPR reports include average, high, and low grid premiums and discounts 
weekly. Daily base price reports, combined with recent weeks' grid 
reports, offer a good estimate of the final value of formula cattle 
within the same timeframe of Cash reports.
    However, USCA also believes that overly burdensome Cash 
requirements may incentivize formula traders to bypass true 
negotiation. Packers and Feedlots who exclusively use Formulas for 
marketing and procurement may find the transaction cost of overly 
burdensome negotiation requirements large enough to circumvent the 
process completely.
    Feedlots may circumvent negotiation by simply offering cattle 
later, after the base price for their formula cattle has been 
established. A hypothetical example is described below:

  a.  Feedlot Formula uses the average Kansas Cash price as a base.

  b.  The feedlot's 3 week rolling average grid premium has been $1/
            cwt.

  c.  Feedlot waits until Kansas Cash price is reported, then offers 
            cattle to packer for $1 over reported Kansas price.

  d.  Packer accepts offer because the long-run average of procuring 
            cattle this way is nearly identical to procuring through a 
            formula.

    Transactions such as the one described in the previous example will 
be reported earlier than formula transactions, but they are not truly 
negotiated, as they rely on other market participants to negotiate the 
base price.
    As the number of negotiating market participants continues 
declining, market liquidity dwindles, and the possibility of price 
manipulation becomes a greater risk. The result is the appearance of 
price discovery without sufficient real price negotiation to keep 
markets truly competitive. USCA offers four proposed solutions.
    The first is to establish Negotiated Cash requirements high enough 
to facilitate price discovery, thereby reducing marketing costs and 
incentive for formula traders to circumvent the intent of the law.
    The second is to allow a base price proxy peg that is not easily 
manipulated to satisfy conditions for cash trade under certain 
conditions. USCA proposes allowing formula contracts with Base Prices 
that are either negotiated, or that are established using liquid, 
actively traded markets (e.g., live cattle futures) to satisfy 
negotiated cash requirements.
    A liquid, actively traded market reflects very little risk of price 
manipulation. Using such a market to establish base prices for formulas 
substantially decreases the risk that true price negotiation becomes so 
thinly traded as to be manipulated by any particular packer.
    Establishing base prices in this way still relies on others to 
negotiate, but the sheer volume of market participants ensures a 
competitive market.
    If the base price in the example described above were either 
negotiated weekly or based on an actively traded market like futures or 
boxed beef prices, and offered cattle for sale as described, it would 
be a true negotiated price.
    Allowing this type of trade to satisfy negotiated cash prices 
(assuming timely reporting) may encourage packers and feedlots to move 
toward a base price that is dependent on something other than Cash 
because the base price has less potential for manipulation.
    The third proposed solution is to limit the number of cattle any 
one plant can procure in advance, thereby limiting packer control of 
supply and the need for packers to be active bidders every week.
    This solution requires some analysis to determine the appropriate 
limit, but a packer who has 90% of their kill procured or otherwise 
committed in advance obviously has less incentive to be an active 
market participant than a packer who only has 30% of their cattle 
committed.
    This is the one proposed solution that appears certain to require 
changes to the Packers & Stockyards Act rather than using LMR 
reauthorization to implement.
    Finally, USCA believes packers should be required to offer cash 
bids or floor prices for cattle they would like feedlots to commit. 
Currently, most feedlots are required to commit cattle for sale without 
any cash offer or floor price. This forces feedlots to decide whether 
to commit cattle without any knowledge or guarantee of a base price or 
floor price.
Build Independent Processing Capacity
    The cost to build a new construction meat-processing facility is 
estimated at approximately $400 per square foot, inclusive of permits, 
site prep, utilities, property, building, refrigeration, and other 
costs. (Newlin, 2020).\6\ At that estimation, a small 20 head-per-week 
operation would need at least a 3,000 to 4,000 square feet of facility 
at an estimated cost of $1.2 million. Repurposing an existing building 
is slightly more economical, at a cost of approximately $150 per square 
foot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Newlin, L. (2020, 06 12). So you want to build a slaughter 
plant? Retrieved from High Plains Journal: https://www.hpj.com/
livestock/so-you-want-to-build-a-slaughter-plant/article_a033a44e-acaf-
11ea-a32d-63beecbd5f05.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Before breaking ground, however, there are pre-occupational capital 
expenses to be accounted for, including design of the facility, 
blueprints, consulting, utility prepayments, soil tests and environment 
impact. These expenses are estimated at 20% of the overall plant. For 
our small plant example listed above, we estimate $300,000 in pre-
occupational capital.
    Next, the facility will need to be filled with the necessary 
equipment for slaughter and processing, which includes rails, hand 
tools, cookers, smokers, and grinders. New equipment will run 
approximately $300,000 to $400,000.
    Just in our example, this small operation would require $1.8 
million just in start-up capital. To meet this need, they may turn to 
private or public financing depending on their individual situation. 
Examples of public financing opportunities include Tax Increment 
Financing; Tax Abatement; the Rural Economic Development loan and grant 
program; or the Small Business Administration's (SBA) Certified 
Development Corporation (``504'') Loan Program. (Niche Meat Processors 
Assistance Network, 2021.) \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Niche Meat Processors Assistance Network. (2021, 06 17). 
Finding Capital: Financing Options for Meat Processors. Retrieved from 
https://www.nichemeatprocessing.org/finding-capital:-financing-options-
for-meat-processors/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, more public funding opportunities are needed; in addition 
to streamlining and increasing the efficiency of current loan and grant 
programs. USCA recommends the following programmatic updates:

   Congress should direct funding authority to USDA to provide 
        capital infrastructure improvement grants to communities for 
        water sewage systems to support the development of independent 
        slaughter and processing facilities.

   Congress should provide tax income incentives to individuals 
        who invest in the construction of independent slaughter and 
        processing facilities.

   Congress should direct funding authority to USDA to provide 
        substantial grants, rather than cost-share programs, to 
        individuals for the purchasing of re-use buildings and to 
        upgrade the buildings to meet USDA Food Safety and Inspection 
        Service (FSIS) regulations for the development of independent 
        slaughter and processing facilities.

    USCA partners with independent local, state, and Federal meat 
processors to ensure that American beef is an option on every American 
plate. We value the independent processors' role in our supply chain 
and believe that our enhanced collaboration can bring policy changes 
that are both mutually beneficial and economically sustainable. USCA 
supports increased competition in this sector by increasing the 
opportunities for independent processors to succeed. Aside from capital 
investment, the following recommendations would greatly strengthen the 
bottom lines of independent processors:

   Plants classified by the USDA FSIS as small or very small 
        should be provided a USDA licensed grader by the USDA 
        Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) free of charge; or be 
        allowed to utilize electronic instrument grade augmentation 
        systems within their plant.

   Congress should immediately halt the payout of Federal 
        subsidies to any of the Big Four meat packing plants, 
        distributors, and retailers and instead prioritize subsidy 
        distribution to Very Small/Small independent meat packing 
        facilities.

   Congress should direct USDA to set aside a percentage of 
        their bids for meat purchase to Very Small/Small independent 
        meat packing facilities.

   USDA and DOJ need to have stronger, clearer, and enforceable 
        predatory pricing guidelines to protect these new properties 
        and investments.

    It is imperative that we invest in our independent processing 
capacity to address the increasing control of supply that the Big Four 
meatpackers hold over the rest of the industry. The ``efficiencies'' 
packers benefit from due to their massive size are not passed on 
throughout the supply chain. In a true, competitive, and functioning 
market, one would see these efficiencies pass all the way through the 
production chain. Instead, these for-profit multinational conglomerates 
have passed the cost savings of these efficiencies on to their 
shareholders. As a result, consumers pay higher prices at the grocery 
store, independent cattle producers and feeders continue to go broke, 
and meatpacker executives pat their backs and pad their pockets.
    Finally, an outdated regulation (9 CFR 201.67) that dates back to 
the terminal stockyards of the 1920s prevents livestock auction owners 
from owning or investing in a processing facility. In today's 
environment, where the cattle industry is focused on additional shackle 
space and wanting more packers to compete for livestock, this dated ban 
should be removed. Having another local or regional packer would bring 
more competition for cattle, and we should not be excluding people in 
the cattle industry that may want to invest in the packing segment.
Establish Truth in Labeling
    Currently, there exists a loophole which allows imported beef 
product, most often lean ground trim from South America, to be 
transported to our borders; undergo a ``significant transformation'', 
which can be as insignificant as trimming, rewrapping, or blending a 
small percentage of domestic product; and then claim the ``Product of 
the U.S.A.'' label on the final product.
    With the existence of this loophole, it is virtually impossible to 
provide assurance to consumers that the product they are purchasing is 
truly U.S. beef.
    Because of the large number of cattle from Canada and Mexico that 
enter the United States each year and are slaughtered in U.S. packing 
facilities, the possibility of beef products which are not born and 
raised as well as harvested in the United States carrying a label 
indicating ``Product of USA'' or some such other claim of U.S. origin 
is very real.
    It is our understanding that all products advertised or sold in the 
U.S., including food products like beef, must meet the Federal Trade 
Commission's (FTC) ``all or virtually all'' standard if ``made in USA'' 
or ``product of USA'' (or similar labeling) is to be applied. Without 
clear guidance from USDA FSIS, product either is already or will likely 
be mislabeled and cause confusion to consumers who are purchasing beef 
products and harm to American cattle producers.
    To eliminate the likelihood of confusion and to better inform 
consumers, USCA contends that labels indicating ``Made in USA,'' 
``Product of USA'' or similar content should be limited to beef from 
cattle born, raised, and harvested in the United States.
    In 2019, USCA submitted a petition for rulemaking to USDA FSIS 
(U.S. Cattlemen's Association, 2019) \8\ requesting this change. In its 
official response, FSIS acknowledged that the current regulatory 
framework ``may be causing confusion in the marketplace'' and decided 
to initiate rulemaking which is scheduled for release in 2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\* Editor's note: This reference was not included in the USCA's 
submitted statement. The reference is to 2019 Petition filed by USCA. 
The Petition and Response Letter are retained in Committee file and are 
available at: Petition for the Imposition of Beef Labeling 
Requirements: To Address ``Made in USA'' Or ``Product of USA'' Claims, 
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media_file/2020-07/19-05-
usca-102319.pdf and Response Letter https://www.fsis.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/media_file/2021-04/19-05-fsis-final-response-032620.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    USCA also supports two bills currently introduced that would seek 
to further define what constitutes a U.S. beef product. Those are the 
American Beef Labeling Act of 2021, or S. 2716, and the U.S.A. Beef 
Act, or S. 2623 and H.R. 4973.
Conclusion
    On Monday, May 10, 2021, member leaders of the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, National Cattlemen's Beef Association, National Farmers 
Union, R-CALF USA, and USCA met in Phoenix, Arizona.
    These groups convened at the request of the Livestock Marketing 
Association to discuss challenges involved in the marketing of finished 
cattle with the ultimate goal of bringing about a more financially 
sustainable situation for cattle feeders and cow-calf producers.
    This historic meeting of industry groups underscores the importance 
of advancing much needed market reform to ensure the viability of our 
nation's food supply. However, our work is not done. We need bold, 
immediate leadership from Congress to enact these changes.
    With the help of our lawmakers, we will overcome the industry's 
current challenges and continue to produce a healthy and abundant food 
supply; while simultaneously serving as stewards of the environment and 
ensuring a thriving rural and national economy. USCA looks forward to 
working with Members of the House Agriculture Committee to advance 
these goals.
                                 ______
                                 
                          Submitted Questions
Response from Hon. Thomas ``Tom'' J. Vilsack, Secretary, U.S. 
        Department of Agriculture
Question Submitted by Hon. Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from 
        California
    Question. Mr. Secretary, in August USDA announced that it would 
publish two new reports from Livestock Mandatory Reporting Data: The 
National Daily Direct Formula Base Cattle Report and the Weekly Cattle 
Net Price Distribution report. What kind of feedback has the Department 
received from industry since these reports became available?
    Answer. In August 2021, USDA launched two new USDA Market News 
reports (the National Daily Direct Formula Base Cattle and the National 
Weekly Cattle Net Price Distribution reports) based on Livestock 
Mandatory Reporting data to provide additional insight into formula 
cattle trades and help promote fair and competitive markets. These new 
reports have been well-received by a broad range of cattle market 
stakeholders including producers, producer organizations, beef 
processors and their respective trade organizations, private market 
analysts, and academics who work closely with the cattle industry. Many 
praised the increased transparency these reports bring to formula 
cattle purchasing as it provides producers with a better understanding 
of value differentials that allow them to market their cattle more 
competitively.
Question Submitted by Hon. Ann M. Kuster, a Representative in Congress 
        from New Hampshire
    Question. Mr. Secretary, I wanted to touch on the Pandemic Dairy 
Volatility Assistance Program, which is helping milk producers recover 
from the lopsided cheese prices and other disruptions last year. Do you 
have a sense of how these payments to producers will differ between 
Federal Milk Order regions? Some Federal Orders, including our 
Northeast Federal Order, were affected more than others.
    Answer. Because payments are based on what was paid for Class I 
fluid milk in each region during the period of July through December 
2020, payment rates in the Northeast do reflect the regions' higher 
Class I use relative to many other regions of the country. Once all 
producer payments are made, USDA will report total PMVAP monies paid to 
producers by region.
Questions Submitted by Hon. Glenn Thompson, a Representative in 
        Congress from Pennsylvania
    Question 1. Mr. Secretary, I have been pleased to see Congress and 
the Administration team up to focus on expanding access to processing 
and overall processing capacity--a goal seemingly everyone agrees on. 
However, I continue to hear concerns that the announced funding sources 
may only be used to support small- and very-small-establishments. Will 
there be a limitation on the size of plants eligible for the $500 
million in assistance announced on July 9, 2021, and if so, what will 
that limitation be and how will it be determined?
    Answer. There are a variety of programs \1\ planned or currently 
available to increase meat and poultry processing capacity and improve 
the meat and poultry supply chain. On February 24, 2022, USDA announced 
the new Meat and Poultry Processing Expansion program \2\ (MPPEP). 
Using $150 million in funding from the American Rescue Plan Act, the 
MPPEP program will provide gap financing grants of up to $25 million to 
eligible processors of any size. In addition, there is no minimum grant 
size and no restriction on the type of entity that can apply. 
Applications are welcomed from cooperatives, tribal entities, 
individuals, state entities, and others and funds can be used to both 
start new facilities and expand existing facilities. There are no 
restrictions on project size and there is no minimum request amount. 
There are, however, eligibility restrictions in place to ensure that 
major meat packers do not participate in the program. The MPPEP is one 
in a suite of programs that are being designed to address the range of 
needs and opportunities presented in the meat and poultry processing 
sector.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.usda.gov/meat.
    \2\ https://rd.usda.gov/mppep.

    Question 2. Mr. Secretary, I continue to hear from members of the 
livestock community about the need to reform the Federal Government's 
approach to the regulation of animals developed or enhanced through 
genetic engineering. I was pleased to see USDA's publication of an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) on this matter and hope 
that, under your leadership, USDA will continue to pursue an updated 
and more workable regulatory framework. Can you assure me that the 
Department will move forward with a proposed rule that would prevent 
amenable species modified or developed using genetic engineering and 
intended for agricultural purposes from being regulated subject to 
FDA's animal drug authority?
    Answer. Innovation is key to the success of American agriculture. 
Ensuring that U.S. producers have tools to keep them competitive here 
and abroad is an important priority for all of us and I understand the 
concerns some producers have raised about the current regulatory 
process for developing or enhancing animals using genetic engineering. 
We continue to work closely with our Federal partners to identify paths 
forward to improve these processes and we will continue to use the 
feedback we gathered through the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
process to guide these conversations and our next steps.

    Question 3. Mr. Secretary, as you know, President Biden's recent 
Executive Order requires all Federal employees to be fully vaccinated 
against the coronavirus by November 22. Given federally inspected 
establishments cannot operate without USDA inspection, what is USDA's 
plan to ensure federally inspected meat and poultry processing plants 
are adequately staffed if a significant percentage of the inspection 
workforce elects not to get vaccinated and is subsequently discharged?
    Answer. The vast majority of the USDA workforce has opted to get 
vaccinated for COVID-19 in order to protect themselves, their loved 
ones, and everyone with whom they interact at work and in their 
personal lives. 97% of the USDA workforce is in compliance with 
Executive Order 14043. Therefore, we did not anticipate any disruptions 
to USDA's ability to provide services to our stakeholders.
    On Friday, January 21, 2022, a District Court issued an Order 
enjoining the implementation and enforcement of Executive Order 14043. 
Consistent with that preliminary nationwide injunction, USDA has not 
taken action to implement or enforce the COVID-19 vaccination 
requirement pursuant to E.O. 14043 since the date of the injunction. 
All enforcement actions are currently paused, including the processing 
of suspensions or removals related to the vaccination requirement, as 
long as the nationwide preliminary injunction is in place.
    As long as the nationwide preliminary injunction is in place, the 
few meat and poultry inspectors who are still unvaccinated will 
continue to perform their jobs while following all safety protocols.

    Question 4. Mr. Secretary, I continue to hear concerns from small 
processors about their ability to comply with the recently imposed FSIS 
mask mandate. These small businesses are worried about the health of 
their employees in small-, partially open-air facilities, exposed to 
extreme high temperatures and moisture and debris that would 
contaminate the mask making it unwearable for practical purposes. I am 
worried that a very strict application of this policy without common 
sense exceptions will hinder the same small- and very-small-
establishments we have all been so jointly interested in seeing 
succeed.
    How has USDA been working to ensure a pragmatic implementation of 
this standard while avoiding unintended consequences?
    Answer. FSIS regulates approximately 6,600 establishments. FSIS has 
worked locally with each establishment to find solutions that meet the 
needs of both industry and our inspection staff and continues to do so.

    Question 4a. Prior to implementation, was any economic analysis 
conducted to estimate the potential impacts of this policy on 
producers, processors, and the economy generally? If so, what were the 
findings of that analysis?
    Answer. While FSIS considered the costs on industry, it did not 
conduct a full economic analysis because the Agency determined that 
immediate action was necessary to reduce or avoid health hazards.

    Question 4b. Can you cite the specific FSIS regulation that 
authorizes the withholding of inspection due to a facility's non-
compliance with the mask directive (FSIS Notice 34-21)?
    Answer. FSIS is authorized to protect the health and safety of our 
inspection force by the mandates of the Federal Meat Inspection Act 
(FMIA), the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), and the Egg 
Products Inspection Act (EPIA), the regulations issued under the FMIA, 
PPIA, EPIA, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH 
Act).

    Question 4c. At how many facilities have inspection services been 
withheld as a result of noncompliance with this notice?
    Answer. Out of the approximately 6,600 establishments only a few 
have not complied.

    Question 4d. How many facilities have voluntarily suspended 
inspection since the publication of this notice?
    Answer. FSIS does not collect information on what reason an 
establishment has for voluntarily suspended inspection. However, 
records show that over time the number of establishments under FSIS' 
regulation has grown.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2020                              6,531 active establishments
FY 2021                              6,630 active establishments
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Question 5. Mr. Secretary, what role does the Department of 
Agriculture play in preventing and responding to cyber attacks on 
critical agricultural infrastructure like the one recently experienced 
by JBS, and what proactive steps has the Department of Agriculture 
taken ensure other critical infrastructure is better protected against 
such hacking attempts?
    Answer. USDA works with food and agriculture companies with 
operations in the United States to take necessary steps to protect 
their IT and supply chain infrastructure so that it is more durable, 
distributed, and better able to withstand modern challenges, including 
cybersecurity threats and disruptions. In addition, USDA and the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), specifically the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), are the Food and Agriculture Critical 
Infrastructure Co-Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMA) and through 
this partnership:

  a.  Maintains and updates the Food and Agriculture Sector-Specific 
            Plan that also addresses cybersecurity risks.

  b.  Periodically conducts the Cybersecurity Assessment and Risk 
            Management Approach (CARMA) to examine cyber threats, 
            consequences, and vulnerabilities to improve identification 
            and management of cyber risks.

  c.  Provides leadership to the sector but has no regulatory authority 
            to mandate action within it.

  d.  Produces weekly emails and facilitates bi-annual joint membership 
            meetings that include cybersecurity topics.

    Question 6. It seems virtually everyone--industry, Congress, and 
the Administration--agree on the importance of access to protein 
processing and the need for an increase in overall processing capacity. 
That is why I remain baffled at the lack of an appeal of a court 
decision that has, and will continue, to directly reduce processing 
capacity for the pork industry.
    Did the Department recommend that the Solicitor General appeal the 
March 31, 2021, U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota's 
ruling regarding the elimination of line speed limits under USDA FSIS' 
New Swine Inspection System? If not, why not?
    Answer. USDA does not have the responsibility to decide whether to 
appeal a court's ruling. That decision rests with the Department of 
Justice, which litigated this case.

    Question 6a. Why has the Department decided not to use the 
rulemaking process to address the deficiencies in the original New 
Swine Inspection System rulemaking cited by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Minnesota in its March 31, 2021, decision?
    Answer. USDA has been collaborating with OSHA, the agency primarily 
responsible for worker safety, to develop a plan, consistent with the 
Court's decision, to obtain accurate data on the impact of increased 
line speed on worker safety in NSIS plants. We hope to announce 
something on this soon.

    Question 6b. Why has the Department not yet granted line speed 
waivers to the establishments effected by the court's decision--
especially those with a demonstrated history of worker safety while 
operating at higher line speeds?
    Answer. USDA has been collaborating with OSHA, the agency primarily 
responsible for worker safety, to develop a plan, consistent with the 
Court's decision, to obtain accurate data on the impact of increased 
line speed on worker safety in NSIS plants. We hope to announce 
something on this soon.

    Question 6c. When will the Department grant line speed waivers, or 
implement alternative regulatory solutions to allow effected plants to 
operate at the line speeds such establishments utilized prior to the 
March 31, 2021 court decision?
    Answer. USDA has been collaborating with OSHA, the agency primarily 
responsible for worker safety, to identify how best to implement the 
Court's decision so that we can obtain accurate data on the impact of 
increased line speed on worker safety in NSIS plants. We hope to 
announce something on this soon.
Questions Submitted by Hon. Vicky Hartzler, a Representative in 
        Congress from Missouri
    Question 1. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate the ongoing efforts to 
increase U.S. beef packing capacity. However, due to an outdated 
Packers and Stockyards Act regulation dating back to the terminal 
stockyards of the early 1900s, local livestock auction market or sale 
barn owners cannot own or invest in a packing facility. This seems to 
run counter to the current efforts to increase competition and supply 
chain resiliency, by limiting interested parties from opening or 
investing in new facilities. Are you open to removing this barrier to 
entry to allow people active in the livestock sector to invest in local 
and regional processing?
    Answer. Owing to the conflicting interests between those selling 
livestock and those buying livestock, the principle that packing 
companies and market agencies selling on commission must operate 
independently and with separate ownership dates back more than 100 
years, to the era that resulted in the passage of the P&S Act. While 
there is always a need to ensure our rules and regulations reflect the 
needs and circumstances of the times, I believe we need to carefully 
protect rules that guard against conflicts of interest.
    Enhancing competition and choice in meat processing is a top 
priority. My team and I welcome the chance to discuss ideas for how to 
maintain basic market fairness principles and also accomplish the goals 
of greater choice and competition in meat processing.

    Question 2. Mr. Secretary, for several months now USDA has held 
pork producers in the balance as they await a formerly promised ``top-
up'' payment of $17 per head. Members and staff have requested 
additional information several times and to my knowledge, not received 
a clear answer. Can you please provide a specific update as to the 
status of these payments and details as to when U.S. swine producers 
will receive formal notice regarding this payment?
    Answer. On December 13, 2021, USDA announced the Spot Market Hog 
Pandemic Program (SMHPP) to provide additional pandemic assistance for 
hog producers. As indicated previously, USDA initially evaluated past 
Coronavirus Food Assistance Program (CFAP) program assistance to target 
relief based on gaps or disparities in previous aid. Hog producers, 
especially those who sell through a spot market or a negotiated price, 
were burdened with a disproportionate share of losses due to pandemic 
disruptions. USDA examined the difference between negotiated prices for 
hogs and the five-year average, which demonstrated a significant price 
drop during April through September 2020. As a result, the proposed 
assistance under the prior administration to provide a flat rate swine 
payment based on CFAP 1 inventories will not be pursued.
    After the SMHPP was announced, stakeholders identified additional 
gaps where price declines occurred involving direct sales to sale 
barns, individuals, and brokers that also resulted in significant price 
declines. USDA [has] amended the Notice of Funds Availability to 
address those gaps and has extended sign up for the SMHPP through April 
19, 2022, so the gaps can be captured and producers can amend their 
applications to take those losses into consideration. With the 
additional gaps identified, USDA is waiting until sign up is complete 
to compensate all producers to ensure payments stay within the $50 
million funding limitation.
Questions Submitted Hon. David Rouzer, a Representative in Congress 
        from North Carolina
    Question 1. Mr. Secretary, the ink was barely dry on the previous 
Administration's new rule on Undue and Unreasonable preferences under 
the Packers and Stockyards Act when you announced plans to revitalize a 
trio of additional Packers and Stockyards regulations. It seems these 
rules will be similar or even identical to three rules promulgated 
during your previous tenure--rules that proved very controversial with 
stakeholders and Congress. Please share any updated economic analysis 
that led to your decision you to again move ahead with these rules.
    Answer. The pandemic drove home just how fragile our supply chains 
are, and how much concentration can harm both producers and consumers 
when prices collapse for producers and skyrocket for consumers. We are 
also seeing how concentrated industries are posing problems across the 
economy: indeed, the Biden-Harris Executive Order on Promoting 
Competition in the American Economy has 72 actions across all range of 
sectors. Ensuring our agricultural markets are open and competitive is 
an important part of making sure our entire economy is open, fair, and 
competitive-where with hard work, entrepreneurs can build successful 
businesses, deliver innovation and value to working families, and drive 
economic growth.

    Question 2. In a 2014 Packers and Stockyards report from the 
Western Regional Office, USDA found that Alternative Marketing 
Arrangements (AMAs) benefit cattle producers, including by locking in 
future prices to reduce risk, assuring timely market access, 
demonstrating creditworthiness to lenders, and reducing transaction 
costs. Likewise, USDA found that consumers benefit from AMAs due to 
improved overall beef quality and by providing a price signal to 
producers about the value of specific cattle qualities related to 
consumers' beef preferences. Overall, the report concluded the net 
effect of AMAs was a positive gain to the economy. Unfortunately, I 
continue to hear industry concern that despite these positive findings, 
your forthcoming Packers and Stockyards rules will most certainly 
impair the use of AMAs. Can you ensure that will not be the case? Will 
you ensure that these findings are included in the economic analysis 
underpinning the forthcoming rules?
    Answer. As I indicated, the pandemic drove home just how fragile 
our supply chains are, and how much concentration can harm both 
producers and consumers when prices collapse for producers and 
skyrocket for consumers. Ensuring our agricultural markets are open and 
competitive is an important part of making sure our entire economy is 
open, fair, and competitive.
    Our new rules are inspired by what was proposed in the past because 
many of those problems remain unaddressed. Yet the rules will also be 
different this time--to reflect the evolution of the markets and an 
evolution of thinking. I am committed to engaging with all stakeholders 
in our livestock and poultry markets, including those who value the 
benefits of AMAs, and taking all viewpoints into account. Our purpose 
is to increase choice, transparency, and fair play in the markets. To 
that end, I welcome the chance to engage on the substance of what we 
are doing when the proposals are ready.
    Please also know that consistent with administrative procedures we 
conduct a full economic analysis for each of the rules we are doing.

    Question 3. Last month, USDA announced a program to give $700 
million to farm and food workers impacted by COVID, including meat and 
poultry plants workers. As I understand it, the money would be given to 
unions and other nonprofit organizations who would then be responsible 
for distributing the funds to impacted workers.
    Answer. The Farm and Food Worker Relief (FFWR) Grant Program will 
issue competitive grants to State agencies, Tribal entities, and 
nonprofit organizations with experience in providing support or relief 
services to farmworkers or meatpacking workers. Entities receiving 
awards will then distribute relief payments to frontline farmworkers 
and meatpacking workers who incurred expenses preparing for, preventing 
exposure to, and responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. These entities 
are expected to have robust financial controls to prevent fraud, waste, 
and abuse.

    Question 3a. What efficiency considerations led USDA to select this 
implementation model rather than sending the money directly to the 
affected accompanies for dispersal or directly to the impacted workers?
    Answer. Stakeholder input led USDA to select the grants 
implementation model to award grants ranging from $5M to $50M to state 
agencies, Tribal entities, and nonprofit organizations serving 
farmworkers and meatpacking workers. This allows USDA to distribute 
funds to organizations, which will efficiently meet local and regional 
needs. In addition, section 751 of Division N of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2021 (Pub. L. No. 116-260), which is the 
authorization for FFWR, limits the USDA's authority to grants and 
loans. Issuing thousands of $600 grants would be overly burdensome for 
both individuals and the USDA to ensure alignment with both financial 
assistance and transparency laws and regulations.

    Question 3b. How will USDA audit and oversee this program to 
prevent fraud and abuse?
    Answer. Non-Federal entities (states, local governments, Tribes, 
and nonprofit organizations) with $750,000 or more in Federal 
expenditures within their fiscal year are required by the Single Audit 
Act Amendments of 1996 to have an annual audit of their Federal awards 
(e.g., grant and loan programs). Given the $5M minimum award, 
recipients of grants through this program will exceed this threshold 
and will be required to have an annual audit of their Federal award(s). 
AMS is also investing additional resources in fraud prevention and 
oversight mechanisms.

    Question 3c. What sort of limitations will be included to ensure 
the vast majority of funds make it into the hands of workers rather 
than being siphoned off for potentially exorbitant administrative 
costs?
    Answer. USDA will conduct a competitive review of the applications 
received and administrative review of the applications that are 
considered for funding. This review process will take into account the 
reasonableness of the administrative costs necessary to prevent waste, 
fraud, and abuse.

    Question 3d. I understand that some companies have already covered 
workers' costs or provided related benefits for the kind of worker 
expenses this program seeks to reimburse. Will that be taken into 
consideration when benefits are dispersed?
    Answer. Payments to individual workers are limited to a one-time 
payment of $600 per person to defray costs for reasonable and necessary 
personal, family, or living expenses such as, but not limited to: costs 
for personal protective equipment (PPE), expenses associated with 
quarantines and testing, and dependent care. Front-line workers 
applying for this disaster relief from the grant recipients must self-
certify that they incurred such expenses and have not received payment 
through another entity.
Question Submitted Hon. Michelle Fischbach, a Representative in 
        Congress from Minnesota
    Question. Secretary Vilsack, in your written testimony, you 
mentioned that producers have faced the possibility of having to 
liquidate herds due to the lack of availability or affordability of 
feed and forage from this summer's drought. In my district, this was 
not just a possibility, but a reality. Nearly all of my state has been 
in some kind of abnormally dry condition, and over \3/4\ in severe 
drought. Most notably, the northwest and north central portion of my 
district spent significant time in the highest level of drought 
conditions, which is where I heard from producers that unfortunately 
the possibility of herd culling became a reality. To this day, portions 
of that northern point are still in D3 extreme drought.
    The producers in my district saw this coming and requested 
emergency authorization to hay and graze CRP acres prior to the nesting 
season. In July, I responded to these calls by leading a delegation 
letter with Senator Klobuchar formally requesting action from you prior 
to the primary nesting season. Other Members and delegations including 
South Dakota, North Dakota and Montana made this same request to you. 
To this day, I have yet to receive any response from you or your staff 
on what drove that decision.
    You mentioned in your response to my question about what drove you 
to this decision that the law does not allow you to authorize emergency 
haying during the primary nesting season. However, statute specifically 
includes this authority:

          (1) In general.--The Secretary, in coordination with the 
        applicable state technical committee established under section 
        1261(a), shall permit certain activities or commercial uses of 
        established cover on land that is subject to a contract under 
        the conservation reserve program if--

                  (B) the Secretary, in coordination with the state 
                technical committee, includes contract modifications--

                          `(i) without any reduction in the rental rate 
                        for--
                          `(II) emergency grazing on all practices 
                        during the primary nesting season if payments 
                        are authorized for a county under the livestock 
                        forage disaster program under clause (ii) of 
                        section 1501(c)(3)(D) of the Agricultural Act 
                        of 2014 (7 U.S.C. 9081(c)(3)(D)), at 50 percent 
                        of the normal carrying capacity determined 
                        under clause (i) of that section, adjusted to 
                        the site-specific plan.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 16 U.S.C. 3833. (Retained in Committee file.)

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Please respond with the following:

  1.  Question. The specific statute and language you referred to that 
            does not allow emergency haying and grazing during primary 
            nesting season for drought-affected counties.

  1.  Answer. CRP statutory authority for emergency haying and grazing 
            on CRP land is located in 16 U.S.C. 3833. In all cases, 
            emergency haying may only take place outside of the primary 
            nesting season (PNS). Emergency grazing can take place 
            outside of PNS or during PNS, depending on the 
            circumstances, as described in the statute. What follows is 
            a summary of the key provisions of this authority.

        Emergency haying authority:
        16 U.S.C. 3833(b)(1)(B)(i)(I)(aa)--Emergency haying only 
            outside PNS, on all practices, when a county is designated 
            as being in a D2 or greater drought.
        16 U.S.C. 3833(b)(1)(B)(i)(III)--Emergency haying only outside 
            PNS, on only certain practices, if payments are authorized 
            for a county under the livestock forage disaster program. 
            (This version of emergency haying is allowed when payments 
            are authorized for a county under the livestock forage 
            disaster program pursuant to U.S.C. 9081(c)(3)(D). The 
            rules for this kind of emergency haying are different).
        Emergency grazing authority:
        16 U.S.C. 3833(b)(1)(B)(i)(I)(aa)--only outside PNS, on all 
            practices, when a county is designated as being in a D2 or 
            greater drought.
        16 U.S.C. 3833(b)(1)(B)(i)(II)--during PNS, on all practices, 
            if payments are authorized for a county under the livestock 
            forage disaster program. (This version of emergency grazing 
            is allowed when payments are authorized for a county under 
            the livestock forage disaster program pursuant to U.S.C. 
            9081(c)(3)(D). The rules for this kind of emergency grazing 
            are different).
        In sum: emergency haying and emergency grazing are allowed on 
            all practices when a county is designated as a D2 or 
            greater drought. But, once such a drought lasts for 8 
            consecutive weeks (in the case of D2), or the drought 
            becomes a D3 or greater, then the county becomes eligible 
            for payments under the livestock forage disaster program. 
            If and when such payments are actually authorized for the 
            county, then emergency haying and grazing are allowed, 
            albeit under different rules, as noted above.

  2.  Question. The reasoning behind the decision to not allow 
            emergency haying and grazing during primary nesting season 
            due to this language.

  2.  Answer. As noted in the above statutory citations, emergency 
            haying is never allowed during primary nesting season. 
            Emergency grazing during primary nesting season is only 
            allowed, in a specific county, if payments are authorized 
            for the county under the livestock forage disaster program.

  3.  Question. Recommendations to modify this language in order to 
            provide you with the adequate authority to allow these 
            practices should a similar drought arise in the future.

  3.  Answer. The authority to allow emergency haying and grazing 
            already exists in current CRP statutory authority. 
            Depending upon Congress' desired outcomes, the statutory 
            provisions described above can be combined and/or revised.

        If Congress wishes to do away with the more restrictive 
            conditions on emergency haying and grazing, it can remove 
            the trigger language regarding authorization of livestock 
            forage disaster program payments. Please note, however, 
            that authorization of livestock forage disaster program 
            payments also permits emergency grazing during PNS, albeit 
            under certain restrictions.
        Put another way, Congress can permit emergency haying and 
            grazing under only one set of conditions (D2 or greater 
            drought), with whatever restrictions Congress deems 
            appropriate.

    In addition, I heard frustrations from producers that emergency 
haying post-primary nesting season was disallowed upon the graduation 
of a county from D2 to D3 drought. In your response to my question 
during the hearing, you explained that this ``didn't sound right.'' 
Indeed, U.S. Code authorizes emergency haying and grazing outside of 
the primary nesting for counties ``D2 (severe drought) or 
greater . . . '' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 16 U.S.C. 3833.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With that in mind, please respond with the following:

  1.  Question. If you our one of your staff authorized this 
            revocation.

  2.  Question. The specific statute and language that drove this 
            decision.

  1-2.  Answer. 16 U.S.C. 3833(b)(1)(B)(i)(III)--Emergency haying on 
            certain practices, outside the primary nesting season. The 
            restriction to permit emergency haying to certain practices 
            is ratified in 7 CFR 141.63(f)(2) ``as determined by CCC''.

        FSA determined these ``certain practices'' to be CP1, CP2, 
            CP4B, CP4D, CP10, CP18B, CP18C, and CP38E but only if such 
            activity is specifically authorized in a CRP SAFE 
            agreement.
        FSA coordinated with the Environmental Activities Division to 
            identify the timeline and impact involved with completing 
            the NEPA process to identify additional practices for 
            emergency haying during the LFP period. Additional 
            practices may be authorized by Deputy Administrator of Farm 
            Programs if conditions warrant and are covered in both the 
            2014 Farm Bill SPEIS and 2018 Farm Bill Programmatic 
            Environmental Assessment (PEA) and Finding of No 
            Significant Impact (FONSI). FSA and the Environmental 
            Activities Division identified additional practices in the 
            2014 Farm Bill, Supplemental Programmatic Environmental 
            Impact Statement (SPEIS) and 2015 Record of Decision (ROD) 
            that could be approved on a case specific basis. These 
            practices include:

       CP8 Grass Waterways,

       CP21 Filter Strips,

       CP23 Wetland Restoration,

       CP23A Wetland Restoration, Non-floodplain,

       CP25 (grazing only) Rare and Declining Habitats,

       CP27 Farmable Wetlands,

       CP28 Farmable Wetland Buffers,

       CP37 Duck Nesting Habitat,

       CP39 Constructed Wetland, and

       CP41 Flooded Prairie Farmable Wetlands.

        Including the additional practices listed above would not 
            require additional NEPA compliance since they were covered 
            in the original 2014 SPEIS, 2015 ROD, and 2018 Farm Bill 
            CRP PEA and FONSI. However, to allow emergency haying on 
            CP25, or additional practices beyond the ones covered in 
            both the 2014 SPEIS and 2018 PEA, a new SPEIS could be 
            required which would take a minimum of one year to complete 
            and could result in possible litigation against the agency.
        FSA is currently evaluating its policies regarding restricting 
            the distance of non-emergency and emergency haying and 
            grazing from adjacent water bodies. Current policy 
            indicates haying and grazing activities are prohibited on 
            land within 20 of a perennial or season/intermittent 
            stream or permanent waterbody. Whereas the 2014 SPEIS and 
            2018 PEA prohibit non-emergency and emergency haying and 
            grazing activities from occurring within 120 of a 
            permanent waterbody and these areas must be fenced to 
            confine livestock, thus minimizing the potential for these 
            types of impacts.
        Livestock having access to surface waterbodies may pollute 
            water with nutrients mobilized by damage to streambanks and 
            vegetation from trampling, and the addition of manure.

  3.  Question. Recommendations to modify this language in order to 
            provide you with the adequate authority to allow these 
            practices should a similar drought arise in the future.

  3.  Answer. Please see the answer above.
Response from Todd Wilkinson, Vice President, National Cattlemen's Beef 
        Association
Question Submitted by Hon. Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from 
        California
    Question. If Livestock Mandatory Reporting is not reauthorized, 
what would the consequences be for livestock markets? Right now we have 
a short-term extension, does a long-term extension provide more 
stability for producers and markets? If so, do you have any specific 
request to be included in a 5 year reauthorization?
    Answer. Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) is the most accessible 
source of information and most critical market transparency tool 
currently available to cattle producers. Since the program's inception 
in 2001, cattlemen and -women have used the information reported by 
large meatpackers and published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) to obtain the timeliest price and volume information for a 
variety of cattle types, track seasonal and cyclical market trends, 
more precisely calculate basis for Live and Feeder cattle futures 
contracts, and establish base prices for alternative marketing 
arrangements.
    LMR authority has temporary lapsed twice in the program's 20 year 
history: once for 2 months in 2004 and once for approximately 1 year 
between 2005 and 2006. During the year-long lapse, USDA requested 
reporting entities continue to submit data to the Agricultural 
Marketing Service (USDA-AMS) on a voluntary basis. According to 
estimates, about 90% of meatpackers covered under the LMR statute 
continued data submission. Some information was better than none, but 
the omission of even small portions of packer data reduced confidence 
in the accuracy of information reported by USDA-AMS. Additionally, 
because the statutory authority had lapsed for over a year, USDA-AMS 
was required to reestablish regulatory authority and promulgated new 
implementing rules to continue administering LMR programming, further 
delaying the program from returning to its intended efficacy.
    The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-78) clearly 
intended large meatpackers be required by law to submit information in 
order to maintain consistency. During lapses in statutory authority, 
USDA-AMS and cattle producers alike must rely upon the good graces of 
reporting entities to continue submitting essential market information. 
While we would expect the vast majority of large meatpackers to 
continue data submission during potential lapses in the future, the 
possibility of less-than-full participation creates tremendous 
uncertainty in the marketplace. Such unpredictability is especially 
unhelpful during these times of great volatility within our supply 
chain. Should authority for the program lapse, producers would 
immediately lose access to reliable information necessary to conduct 
business in the livestock sector, and increased volatility in both the 
spot and futures markets should be expected to follow.
    NCBA favors long-term reauthorizations of the program, especially 
the standard 5 year durations. However, we have also been supportive of 
temporary measures to extend the program's authority, such the 
provision in the current Federal spending authority which has 
guaranteed LMR authority continues through February 18, 2022 (P.L. 117-
70). We were also supportive of Chairman David Scott's bill to extend 
the program's authority through September 30, 2022 (H.R. 5290), and 
were pleased to see this measure pass the House of Representatives on 
such a broad, bipartisan basis.
    The adverse cattle marketing environment of the last several years 
has prompted many in the industry to take a close look at the LMR 
statute and implementing regulations to see if changes could be made to 
strengthen the program. During our organization's convention in July 
2021, NCBA established a working group of cattle producers from across 
the country to evaluate market transparency tools, including several 
provisions of LMR. The working group will deliver its recommendations 
to our Live Cattle Marketing Committee in January 2022, and NCBA may 
adopt new policy advocating changes to LMR at that time. In the 
meantime, our priority is to keep the program viable and functioning 
with full statutory authority.
    Finally, we strongly oppose using LMR as a vehicle for legislative 
proposals which do not enjoy vast support within the industry. LMR has 
historically been reauthorized after exhaustive stakeholder engagement, 
and only those changes enjoying the broadest favor have been adopted 
into the final version of the bill. It is too critical a program to be 
jeopardized by frivolous riders and personal agendas. NCBA urges 
Congress continue the tradition of seeking stakeholder agreement as 
discussions occur on a full, 5 year reauthorization of LMR.
    Thank you.
Response from Francois Leger, Owner, FPL Food; on behalf of North 
        American Meat Institute
Question Submitted by Hon. Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from 
        California
    Question. If Livestock Mandatory Reporting is not reauthorized, 
what would the consequences be for livestock markets? Right now we have 
a short-term extension, does a long-term extension provide more 
stability for producers and markets? If so, do you have any specific 
request to be included in a 5 year reauthorization?
    Answer. Under Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) packers must 
report to USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service daily on the prices 
they pay to procure livestock, as well as slaughter data, net prices, 
actual weights, dressing percentages, and, for beef, the percent 
grading Choice, and more. Further, packers report all original sale 
beef transactions in both volume and price through the Daily Boxed Beef 
Report, twice daily.
    AMS publishes 24 daily and 20 weekly cattle reports each week--and 
just added two more reports in August, the Daily Direct Formula Base 
cattle report, and the National Weekly Cattle Net Price Distribution 
report. The data reported are derived from myriad transactions; 
changing reporting requirements runs the risk of changing the 
underlying transactions and potentially moving markets.
    When LMR authorization lapsed in the past, meat packers continued 
to voluntary report data to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Packer reporting, however, is not the same as USDA publishing the 
information it receives and if LMR lapses it raises concerns about 
USDA's ability to publish report--creating an information void. This 
risk highlights the importance of a long-term reauthorization of LMR to 
provide certainty for all industry participants.
    Another key consideration is that the Agricultural Marketing Act 
contains a strong confidentiality requirement that protects the 
reporting entities. Poorly conceived proposals to ``loosen'' 
confidentiality would risk exposing the strategic business decisions 
and market positions of reporting entities to the public, as well as 
those of the entities with which reporting entities do business.
    Finally, since LMR's inception any policy changes in 
reauthorization have always been achieved through the consensus 
agreement of all stakeholders.
Response from Scott Blubaugh, President, Oklahoma Farmers Union; on 
        behalf of National Farmers Union
Question Submitted by Hon. Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from 
        California
    Question. If Livestock Mandatory Reporting is not reauthorized, 
what would the consequences be for livestock markets? Right now we have 
a short-term extension, does a long-term extension provide more 
stability for producers and markets? If so, do you have any specific 
request to be included in a 5 year reauthorization?
    Answer. The continuation of Livestock Mandatory Reporting (LMR) is 
critical to maintaining price discovery in today's marketplace. If LMR 
were to lapse or be discontinued, there would be serious consequences 
for producers, and the marketplace would be generally harmed.
    With the current limited competition in the marketplace, farmers 
and ranchers are already at a disadvantage when compared to the large 
meat packers, even with LMR in effect. Removing LMR completely would 
further reduce access to information about the transactions that move 
livestock markets and would further undermine independent producers' 
ability to plan and negotiate.
    In previous instances when LMR lapsed during the mid-2000s, 
voluntary requests to meat packers were made by USDA. Most meat packers 
complied, but that is not to be expected or relied upon. Long-term 
extensions of LMR rectifies this uncertainty of compliance and leads to 
a more stable market for producers.
    With these considerations in mind, a simple reauthorization or 
extension of LMR without additional, meaningful reforms to market 
transparency and fairness would be a disservice to family farmers and 
ranchers. The points I raised in my testimony, along with the 
viewpoints from some of my fellow witnesses, should be considered and 
included in the next continuation or expansion of LMR. Of particular 
note, efforts should be made to encourage participation in the cash 
market by implementing a minimum cash trade percentage. A cattle 
contract library should be created for producers to consult when 
entering into agreements, and there should be greater transparency in 
alternative marketing arrangements. Additionally, tougher penalties 
should be implemented for those meat packers who fail to report or 
comply with LMR requirements, with fewer confidentiality loopholes.
Response from Scott Hays, Vice President, National Pork Producers 
        Council
Question Submitted by Hon. Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress from 
        California
    Question 1. If Livestock Mandatory Reporting is not reauthorized, 
what would the consequences be for livestock markets?
    Answer. If USDA is unable to continue any kind of publishing, the 
consequences would be immediate and severe. Producers would be left 
with few-to-no price discovery tools and would be effectively guessing 
in contract negotiations. Price volatility would increase dramatically 
as evidenced in the futures market, which would itself face decreased 
utility and increased premiums for farmers looking to hedge their 
production. Moreover, producers with existing marketing agreements 
often have portions of their contract based on LMR reportable data. A 
fair payout of an agreement could become a legal issue without the 
underlying data to reference. These potential issues are of particular 
importance now, as LMR is tied to USDA funding. Should a continuing 
resolution not be agreed to, a lapse in funding could result in no 
employees at USDA to report.
    Should USDA be able to continue publication of the reports on a 
non-mandatory basis, in the short term, impact would be less dire. Most 
meat process[o]rs have systems in place that automatically report price 
data to USDA without the need for manual reporting. In some cases, a 
packer might not find it worth it (in terms of either man-hour or 
actual cost) to disable such a system. However, over time, the utility 
of LMR will surely diminish. New packers will be unlikely or 
significantly late to provide USDA with meaningful price data. 
Additionally, some packers may choose to withdraw entirely given enough 
time after a lapse in authorization--opening the door for manipulation 
of the voluntary data or, at minimum, suspicion of manipulation. Should 
this occur, LMR will no longer fulfill its purpose of providing 
accurate market averages and will lose its utility. Producers will need 
to enter new marketing agreements without solid price discovery 
information and will likely pay for this with reduced profits.
    Additionally, there is some concern that USDA in either case may 
need to undergo entirely new rulemaking on LMR should it lapse. If this 
were to occur, that could itself create some unease when making new 
agreements due to an uncertainty of which data points may be available 
to base prices against.

    Question 1a. Right now we have a short-term extension, does a long-
term extension provide more stability for producers and markets?
    Answer. Absolutely. Marketing agreements entered into by producers 
are consistently lasting longer than the authorization of Livestock 
Mandatory Reporting. This is to say that producers are often facing 
situations where they do not know if they will have the same price 
discovery tools when negotiating their next agreement. This can force 
some producers that are worried about LMR's continued publication to 
negotiate their agreements earlier than they might otherwise--leading 
to agreements that may be less reflective of the market environment 
once executed.

    Question 1b. If so, do you have any specific request to be included 
in a 5 year reauthorization?
    Answer. Yes, NPPC has a number of recommended edits to the 
Livestock Mandatory Reporting program detailed below. With that said, 
it is important to note that, while these modernizing edits would be 
extremely helpful to pork producers, they cannot come at the expense of 
a lapse in LMR authorization.
  a.  Amend section 212(12) definition of ``Reporting Day''
          Purpose: This amendment amends the current definition of 
        ``reporting day'' to include any day on which a USDA employee 
        is on shutdown or emergency furlough as a result of a lapse in 
        appropriations.
          Need: LMR data are the lifeblood of the hog and pork markets. 
        Without them, producers, packers, processors, retailers and 
        foodservice operators are in the dark about the value of hogs 
        and pork products. There simply is no context for commercial 
        decisions affecting thousands of businesses and millions of 
        end-users. Without timely and transparent publicly available 
        data, commerce can be significantly impaired. Past 
        Administrations have suspended mandatory livestock reporting 
        when there was a lapse in appropriations. Although the current 
        Administration determined that mandatory livestock reporting 
        was an essential service, there is a concern that a future 
        Administration could reverse that determination. The amendment 
        is needed to ensure that timely and accurate information about 
        the number of hogs, the volume of product being traded, and the 
        prices of all items continues to be available even during a 
        government shutdown.
  b.  Amend section 231(10) definition of ``Noncarcass Merit Premium''
          Purpose: This amendment amends the current definition of 
        ``noncarcass merit premium'' to also include discounts. Under 
        current law only an increase (premium) in the base price of 
        swine is required. The amendment will require decreases 
        (discounts).
          Need: The change provides for the possibility that any 
        pricing mechanism that offers premiums for certain non-carcass 
        characteristics could also involve discounts.
  c.  Amend section 231(13) definition of ``Packer''
          Purpose: This amendment amends the current definition of 
        ``packer'' to require that the Secretary Agriculture require a 
        new processing plant which meets the definition of packer to 
        begin reporting LMR data within 6 months of beginning slaughter 
        operations
          Need: Under current law there is no time requirement 
        specified for determining the packer status of a new processing 
        plant or person or requiring the new plant or person to begin 
        reporting. In the past although USDA has the information needed 
        to make the determination, the process of including new plants 
        in the LMR system has lagged. The amendment is needed to ensure 
        that within 6 months of beginning operations information from a 
        new processing plant will be included in price reports. A 6 
        month deadline allows plants to know clearly when they must 
        start reporting and USDA-AMS to know clearly when they should 
        begin enforcing the requirements of the law. Providing a 
        statutory deadline allows AMS to implement the requirements of 
        MPR and avoid appearing arbitrary or punitive.
  d.  Amend section 231(22) definition of ``Swine or Pork Market 
        Formula Purchase''
          Purpose: This amendment amends the current definition of 
        ``swine or pork market formula purchase'' to separate into two 
        distinct definitions the swine market formula purchase (which 
        is based on a market for swine) from a pork market formula 
        purchase (which is based on a market for pork or a pork 
        product). Additional technical and conforming amendments are 
        made to other definitions and program operations to reflect 
        this change.
          Need: The amendment is needed to provide clarity about how 
        formula prices for hogs are derived. When LMR was passed in 
        1999, swine and pork market formulas were lumped together 
        because (1) there were very few hogs priced off the cutout 
        value or other pork valued, (2) negotiated prices and the 
        cutout value were highly correlated, and (3) it simplified 
        reporting in the new program. Under current industry practices, 
        neither (1) or (2) still apply. The use of cutout value as the 
        base price for hog formulas has grown dramatically in recent 
        years but the extent of that growth cannot be seen because the 
        number of animals priced off the cutout and the value of those 
        animals is masked by adding them in with swine market formulas. 
        In addition, the cutout value and negotiated hog prices are far 
        less correlated now meaning that a summation category 
        represents neither sub-group well. Having this information 
        reported and published separately will be useful to the entire 
        industry. While simplicity and efficiency in reporting is still 
        a desirable goal, the programming changes for reporting that 
        are required to implement this separation should not be 
        onerous.
  e.  Amend section 232(c)(1)(C) the Daily Reporting of Barrows and 
        Gilts of the Prior Day Report
          Purpose: This amendment amends the information required from 
        the prior business day of a packer relating to slaughter data 
        for the total number of barrows and gilts slaughtered to 
        include two additional items of information. The first is 
        information concerning the average noncarcass merit premiums or 
        discounts, and the second is information concerning the average 
        net price without the average noncarcass merit premiums or 
        discounts.
          Need: At the time that the Act was passed in 1999, noncarcass 
        merit premiums were generally small and fit into very few 
        categories, primarily transportation, specified genetics, and 
        volume. Today, these premiums/discounts cover characteristics 
        such as gestation stall free, antibiotic-free, ractopamine-
        free, among others. In addition, some of the premiums are 
        large. Knowing this information on daily basis instead of 
        weekly provides significantly more transparency to current hog 
        pricing. USDA-AMS has implemented the practice of placing any 
        lot of animals that has noncarcass merit premiums in the Other 
        Purchase Arrangement category regardless of how the base price 
        of the lot is determined. Including noncarcass merit premiums 
        and the price net of these premiums in the data required from 
        packers will allow USDA-AMS to correctly categorize every 
        purchase based on the method of price determination (i.e., 
        negotiated, swine market formula, pork market formula, 
        negotiated formula and other market formula), increasing the 
        accuracy of both hog purchase volumes and the prices net of 
        noncarcass merit premiums/discounts.
  f.  Amend section 232(e) the Weekly Noncarcass Merit Premium Report
          Purpose: This amendment amends the weekly noncarcass merit 
        premium report to also include noncarcass discounts.
          Need: This amendment is needed to conform the weekly non-
        carcass merit premium report with the new daily non-carcass 
        merit premium/discount information required.
  g.  Amend section 233 the Mandatory Reporting of Wholesale Pork Cuts
          Purpose: This amendment will require the mandatory reporting 
        of carcasses. Under current regulations, the definition of 
        wholesale pork cuts does not include carcasses.
          Need: The amendment is needed to improve the provision of 
        information to both producers and packers. The 2008 Farm Bill 
        directed USDA to conduct a study of the thin wholesale pork 
        reporting, which was a voluntary reporting activity at the 
        time. USDA concluded in the Wholesale Pork Reporting report 
        that there would be benefits from a mandatory reporting 
        program. When LMR was reauthorized in 2010, and a provision for 
        mandatory reporting of wholesale pork cuts was added, the 
        Secretary conducted a negotiated rulemaking to make the 
        required regulatory changes for mandatory wholesale pork 
        reporting. At that time there were few carcasses traded. 
        Consequently, USDA-AMS did not include pork carcasses in its 
        regulatory definition of Wholesale Pork Cuts. Now, however, 
        there is a significant volume of pork that moves, especially 
        into export markets, in the form of 3- and 6-piece carcasses. 
        The omission of ``pork carcasses'' from the wholesale pork 
        definition results in a deficiency in the report. The amendment 
        clarifies that ``pork carcasses'' are included in the reporting 
        of wholesale pork cuts.
  h.  Additional Report language on FOB Omaha
          When regulations for LMR were finalized in 2012, maintaining 
        FOB Omaha prices was important so market participants could 
        clearly see any differences that might exist between the FOB 
        Omaha prices and the FOB plant prices. Those difference are now 
        clear. In addition, few, if any, market participants use the 
        FOB Omaha series. FOB Omaha prices is produced by AMS by 
        adjusting FOB plant prices for transportation costs, thus 
        taking up scarce manpower. Dropping the system will have no 
        impact on the market and free AMS resources for more productive 
        work. Therefore, the Committee expects USDA to reform the 
        regulations accordingly and allow USDA-AMS to more efficiently 
        utilize their resources.
Response from Brad Boner, Vice President, American Sheep Industry 
        Association
Questions Submitted by Hon. Jim Costa, a Representative in Congress 
        from California
    Question. If Livestock Mandatory Reporting is not reauthorized, 
what would the consequences be for livestock markets? Right now we have 
a short-term extension, does a long-term extension provide more 
stability for producers and markets? If so, do you have any specific 
request to be included in a 5 year reauthorization?
    Answer. Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting is critical to the 
ability of sheep producers to make informed marketing decisions and the 
lapse of this reporting would significantly hamper price discovery in 
the sheep and lamb market, placing producers, lamb feeder, processors 
and industry stakeholders at a severe disadvantage in marketing lambs 
and lamb meat products. While we are appreciative of the current short-
term extension, a long-term full reauthorization benefits producers and 
market participants who in turn know they can count on continued, 
accurate and timely reporting of market information, encouraging 
competition and transparency in the marketplace while ensuring that 
cutting access to market information isn't used as a negotiating tool 
for individual priorities. For our industry, LMR is the sole source of 
market information on imported lamb which is critical as imports in 
2021 accounted for an estimated 68% of the total lamb and mutton supply 
in the U.S. The sheep industry supports the full reauthorization of LMR 
and asks Congress and USDA to work collaboratively to address the 
current confidentiality guidelines to provide sheep producers with 
more, not less, marketing information.

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