[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 18, 2021
__________
Serial No. 117-133
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey PETER MEIJER, Michigan
ANDY KIM, New Jersey NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina YOUNG KIM, California
JIM COSTA, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas RON WRIGHT, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida, Chairman
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOE WILSON, South Carolina,
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island Ranking Member
TED LIEU, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey LEE ZELDIN, New York
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina BRIAN MAST, Florida
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
BRAD SHERMAN, California GREG STEUBE, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
Casey Kustin, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Notte, Dr. Hanna, Senior Research Associate, Vienna Center for
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.............................. 8
Wehrey, Dr. Frederic, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace............................................ 15
Welsh, Ms. Caitlin, Director, Global Food Security Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies................. 25
Rumley, Mr. Grant, Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 34
INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Information submitted for the record............................. 59
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 68
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 69
Hearing Attendance............................................... 70
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
Statement for the record from Representative Connolly............ 71
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 73
THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S INVASION OF UKRAINE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA
Wednesday, May 18, 2022
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East, North
Africa and Global Counterterrorism,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Theodore E.
Deutch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Deutch. The Subcommittee on the Middle East, North
Africa and Global Counterterrorism will come to order. Without
objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of the
subcommittee at any point and all members will have 5 days to
submit statements, extraneous material, and questions for the
record, subject to the length limitations in the rules.
As a reminder, members who are participating virtually,
please keep your video function on at all times, even when you
are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for
muting and unmuting themselves consistent with House Resolution
8 and the accompanying regulations. Staff will only mute
members and witnesses as appropriate when they are not under
recognition, to eliminate background noise.
And pursuant to notice, the subcommittee is meeting today
to hear testimony on Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the Middle
East and/or its invasion of Ukraine and the impact in the
Middle East and North Africa. I see that we have a quorum and I
will recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
I would like to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses, Dr.
Hanna Notte who is with us virtually; Dr. Frederic Wehrey--
Wehrey, sorry--also with us virtually; Ms. Caitlin Welsh; and
Mr. Grant Rumley. I thank you for joining us today for what I
know is a timely and important discussion. I also want to take
a moment and acknowledge a delegation from the Ukrainian
parliament that is here with us today. I want to thank you for
coming and I want you as both, please, as a fellow
parliamentarian and a proud American, I want you to know that
we stand with you and with your country at this difficult time.
Of course.
It has been 12 weeks since Russia's illegal and unjust
invasion of Ukraine. And in that time, we have seen over six
million Ukrainian refugees flee their homes. We have seen the
destruction, Russian destruction of hospitals, apartments,
Ukrainian culture sites, as well as horrific war crimes and
atrocities committed by Russian forces in Bucha and elsewhere.
From the start, the United States, our European allies, and
partners around the world coalesced in opposition to the
invasion and in support of the Ukrainian people. And while the
eyes of the world are on Ukraine, there is no question that
this war has dramatically shifted the international landscape
as we know it and has caused major ramifications in just about
every country and region around the world. The Middle East is
no exception.
Russia and Ukraine, together, provide roughly one-third of
the total global wheat exports and the majority of supply to
the MENA region. In 2019, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, the UAE,
Israel, Tunisia, and Oman, all imported nearly half of their
annual supply of wheat from the two countries. So the Russia
invasion not only interrupted the wheat harvest and exports in
Ukraine, but also impacted countries' ability and desire to
purchase wheat from Russia and impeded the global supply of
fertilizers. As a result, wheat prices have risen more than 60
percent this year, and when combined with the COVID pandemic
and mounting economic constraints, high dependence on Russian
and Ukrainian food exports exacerbate humanitarian crises in
parts of the region like Syria and Yemen.
Moreover, high food prices and shortages have the potential
to cause social unrest, severe instability, fiscal crises, and
waves of migration. I am eager to hear from our witnesses today
on the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on food
security in the region, and specifically what the U.S. and our
international partners can do to help alleviate the needs.
Russia has a significant conventional military and
mercenary presence in the Middle East and North Africa but the
war in Ukraine has caused Russia to shift resources and
attention away from the region. Russia has had a naval
installation in Tartus, Syria, since the early 1970's and has
been integral to Bashar al-Assad's, in enabling his regime to
cling to power. And while the success of Russian forces and the
necessity of Russian support in Syria heightened perceptions of
Russian influence, its failures in Ukraine have sobered the
region's understanding of Russian capabilities and reduced the
desire for Russian defense exports.
Russia has had a military presence in Libya since the 2019
civil war when it intervened on behalf of Khalifa Haftar
through the deployment of Russian military personnel and
mercenaries from Syria and the Kremlin-backed private military
force, the Wagner Group. While fighters remain in Libya today
on Moscow's behalf, a significant number of them have moved to
Ukraine in recent weeks to reinforce Russia's battered army,
and I hope to hear more from our witnesses today about Russia's
current force posture in the Middle East and North Africa,
their operational and strategic goals in the region, and how
these have shifted since the invasion of Ukraine in February.
On the diplomatic front, countries in the Middle East and
North Africa region are an important asset to the world's
response against the Russian invasion of Ukraine. With Russia
accounting for approximately 34 percent of the oil and 40
percent of the natural gas to Europe, countries in the region
have the opportunity to support new supply sources and to help
solidify European energy independence from Russia.
Russia has attempted to advance diplomatic relations with
countries in the Middle East like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and Libya. Over the past few years, in particular, Russia has
perceived an opportunity to court regional leaders who seek
leverage against the U.S. or to exploit concerns of U.S.
partners about the reliability of U.S. support. Russia's
behavior on many important regional issues, including Bab al-
Hawa border reauthorization in Syria coming up in July, is
threatening international stability and security further.
In addition, Russia has long aligned itself with Iran and
supported its malign behavior across the region and beyond.
Just as the United States and our partners have coalesced in
opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its violation of
Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, so too must we
unite against Iran in support of our regional partners
including Israel and the Gulf States whose territory and
citizens are constantly under threat from Iran and its proxies.
A vast majority of U.S. partners and allies in the region
stood together at the United Nations in voting to condemn
Russia's invasion of Ukraine; however, when it came suspending
Russia's right of membership at the Human Rights Council, a
significant number of countries in the region chose to abstain.
And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
Russia's shifting diplomatic influence in the Middle East, the
role that countries in the MENA region can or should play to
further isolate Russia, and the impact that these challenges
will have on U.S. foreign policy.
Again, I thank our witnesses for being here. I am grateful
for our friends from the Ukrainian parliament who are here, and
I will now yield to Ranking Member Wilson for his opening
remarks.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Ted Deutch. And Chairman
Deutch, I want you to know how grateful we are for your
leadership, what a difference you have made as you are
concluding your service in Congress. You have made such a
positive difference and particularly we can see the positive
difference that you have made recently with the additional
funding for the people of Ukraine to show our affection for the
people of Ukraine.
And how fitting to have a delegation of Ukrainian
parliament present because they should know that Americans are
united to send a message to the people of Ukraine that we
appreciate their resolve, their courage, and a message to Putin
that indeed he is sacrificing young Russians solely for the
benefit of his personal aggrandizement of oil and money and
power, and so what a time for all of us to come together.
And I appreciate this hearing in particular about Putin's
war in Ukraine and the consequence in the Middle East/North
Africa region. Certainly, we see an example of Putin's maniacal
destabilization goals exemplified through his involvement in
the Middle East and North Africa. The world is at a conflict
between democracy with rule of law opposed by authoritarians
with rule of gun. There is the sad sequence developing of Putin
invading Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia with the Chinese
Communist Party invading Taiwan as Iran seeks to vaporize
Israel and India is destabilized. We must all stand firm.
The world has witnessed Putin's murderous atrocities in
Syria as Putin props up the butcher Bashar al-Assad in his
continued war on his own people who desire a democratic and
free Syria. The images of bombed-out hospitals and schools in
Ukraine are a mirror image of what we have witnessed in Syria
at Aleppo. Without Putin, Assad could not have been able to
carry out atrocities on the scale that have been witnessed.
This unholy alliance is critical for Putin to maintain a
footprint in the region.
Utilizing Hmeimim and the naval base at Tartus, Russia's
only overseas naval facility outside of the former Soviet
borders, Putin stages exercises and protects power in the
Mediterranean. In Libya, Russia continues its support of
warlord Khalifa Haftar and further destabilizing a country
trying to rebuild.
I was grateful to lead the Libya Stabilization Act with
Chairman Ted Deutch to hold Russia accountable for its malign
actions in Libya. Putin's murderous Wagner Group is deployed
across war zones in the Middle East aligned with authoritarian
regimes wreaking havoc in committing human rights' violations.
It remains to be seen how Putin's war in Ukraine has affected
Wagner Group's deployments across the MENA region.
A critical sequence of Putin's war is the effect on the
global wheat supply. More than one-fourth of the world's wheat
comes from Russia and Ukraine, with Ukraine's harvest season
nearing. Incredibly, 80 percent of the wheat imported by Egypt
is from Ukraine. Putin's war has shut down ports, displaced
farmers, severely jeopardized the forecast for exportable
wheat; the effects of this are obvious to the entire region and
to the MENA as a top customer as Putin has revealed himself to
be the destabilizing actor, that he is creating opportunities
for the United States to step in as the more reliable
alternative with regards to security assistance.
The United States should continue to leverage sanctions
imposed on Russian arms sales and by encouraging MENA countries
to enact their sanctions to prevent their countries from
becoming a haven for dirty money that fuels Putin's war. Make
no mistake, Putin's goals are insidious. He seeks to establish
reliance and extort countries to do his bidding. A bizarre
beneficiary of the changing energy landscape will undoubtedly
be Iran. With the Administration's inclination to lift
sanctions on the regime in Tehran in an effort to return to the
disastrous JCPOA, we will see other countries follow China's
lead in importing Iranian oil to fuel the destruction of
Israel.
I thank our witnesses for their time and expertise and I
look forward to hearing from you. With that, I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. Thanks again to our
witnesses for being here today. Let me remind the witnesses to
please limit your testimony to 5 minutes and, without
objection, your written statements will be made a part of the
hearing record. I will now introduce our witnesses.
Dr. Hanna Notte is a senior research associate with the
Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation focusing on
arms control and security issues involving Russia, the Middle
East, their intersection, and implications for U.S. and
European policy. She completed her doctorate at Oxford
University in 2018 on the topic of U.S.-Russian cooperation in
the Middle East. She is fluent in Russian and Arabic. She is a
German national residing in Berlin and Vienna. Her
contributions have appeared in Foreign Policy, the Washington
Post, War on the Rocks and Carnegie, among others.
Dr. Frederic Wehrey is a senior fellow in the Middle East
Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace where
he focuses on geopolitics, security and governance in Libya,
North Africa, and the Gulf. He has testified before the U.S.
Senate and House on multiple occasions, served as a consultant
to the United Nations and other international organizations,
and prior to joining Carnegie, he served for 21 years in the
active and reserve components of the U.S. Air Force with tours
across the Middle East and Africa. He holds a doctorate from
the University of Oxford and a master's degree from Princeton
University.
Ms. Caitlin Welsh is the director of Global Food Security
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
where she provides insight and policy solutions to global and
U.S. food security challenges. She brings over a decade of U.S.
Government experience to this role, serving most recently on
the National Security Council and National Economic Council as
director of Global Economic Engagement where she coordinated
U.S. policy in the G7 and G20. Prior to the White House, Ms.
Welsh spent over 7 years in the Department of State's Office of
Global Food Security, including as acting director, offering
guidance to the Secretary of State on global food security.
And finally, Mr. Grant Rumley is a senior fellow at The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy's program on Great
Power Competition and the Middle East where he specializes in
military and security affairs in the Middle East. From 2018 to
2021, Grant served in both the Trump and Biden Administrations
as an advisor for Middle East policy in the Office of Secretary
of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, and prior to joining OSD, Mr. Rumley was Research
Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies where his
research focused on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
As we can see, we have an esteemed group of witnesses
today. I thank all of them for being here. I will now recognize
the witnesses for 5 minutes each and, without objection, your
prepared written statements will be made a part of the record.
Dr. Notte, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DR. HANNA NOTTE, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE, VIENNA
CENTER FOR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION
Dr. Notte. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, members
of the subcommittee, members of the Ukrainian parliament,
thanks very much for inviting me to participate in today's
hearing. My name is Hanna Notte. I am a senior research
associate at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-
Proliferation and I am here to speak solely on my own behalf.
As Russia settles into a protracted war of aggression
against Ukraine, the ripple effects are being felt across the
Middle East. High energy and food prices are just one example.
So what should we expect regarding Russia's role in the MENA
region going forward?
It has been my assessment which was reaffirmed in
conversations I had in Moscow just days before the invasion of
Ukraine that Russia's approach to the region has settled into a
stable modus operandi in recent years. First, Moscow's military
presence in Syria has given it a buffer zone on its southern
flank to counter perceived threats from within the region, but
also to deter NATO outside the European theater. And second,
Russia has turned to the region to diversify its economic
relations with a focus on arms sales, civilian nuclear exports,
and wheat supplies. And in building influence, Russia has
largely followed what I would call a low-cost, high-disruption
approach, also using hybrid tactics such as private military
companies and disinformation.
Now these Russian interests in the region will not
fundamentally change with the invasion of Ukraine. Today,
Russia's regional diplomacy remains highly active, aimed at
offsetting the impact of Western sanctions and demonstrating
that Moscow is not isolated internationally. However, I would
expect Russia's activities to be accompanied by a certain
military risk aversion, for instance, vis-a-vis U.S. forces in
Syria, while the bulk of its military remains consumed in
Ukraine. It wants to preserve existing gains in Syria.
Now let me turn to the question of Russian cooperation in
specific areas. Starting with arms control and non-
proliferation, though Moscow seemed intent on spoiling
negotiations to restore the JCPOA in early March, it
subsequently dropped demands for written guarantees that its
cooperation with Tehran would not be hindered by sanctions
imposed over Ukraine. But still, I think the geopolitical
situation might make Moscow less willing to help finalize a
nuclear deal. As in the past, Russia is also unlikely to
support any U.S. efforts to curb Iran's use of missiles and
proxies in the region because, essentially, Iran's regional
strategy pins down U.S. resources while elevating Russia as a
regional mediator which serves Russian interests well.
Just a few words on the implications of Russia's nuclear
saber-rattling over Ukraine for proliferation trends in the
region, I think those will require careful monitoring. Regional
countries took note of a nuclear weapons State using veiled
nuclear threats to deter the conventional defense of a
nonnuclear weapons State and they will reflect what this
precedent means for their own security.
Just a few words on Syria, Security Council Resolution 2585
on the provision of humanitarian aid to northwest Syria is up
for renewal in July. Now rationally speaking, the Kremlin
should cooperate to avoid a worsening of Syria's food crisis
especially if an endgame in Ukraine remains out of reach. But
considering the current level of tensions between Russia and
the West, I think the United States should be prepared for a
Russian Security Council veto, regardless.
Alongside continued Russian stalling on the Syrian
constitutional committee, Moscow has no serious interest in
seeing the committee advance. It will instead try to foster a
Gulf Arab counterweight to Iran and Syria through
normalization, especially for the contingency that Russia may
need to scale back its own presence in Syria due to Ukraine.
Now let me finally turn to some views on the Ukraine war
from within the MENA region. First, unfortunately, I think
there is a widespread perception that the Ukraine war is not
their war. That it is a great power, NATO-Russia war partially
fueled by NATO and U.S. actions vis-a-vis Russia. Second, there
are accusations of Western double standards. The military
support to Kyiv, the reception of Ukrainian refugees, these are
rightly or wrongly viewed as proof that the West cares
significantly more about conflicts in Europe's neighborhood
than those in the Middle East.
Third, regional elites worry about U.S. conventional
security guarantees. They fear that the threats posed by Russia
and China will accelerate a decline in U.S. power in the Middle
East and they also fear that the U.S. will have limited
bandwidth to confront Iran's missile and proxy activities. And
with those fears, they feel they cannot afford to put all their
eggs into the U.S. basket.
And then finally, each regional State has very distinct
business and security interests with Russia. As a result--and I
will end here--I think U.S. opportunities to get regional
States to turn against Russia are circumscribed. Loosening
these ties that States have been building with Russia will
require a heavy lift, a U.S. regional strategy that is both
comprehensive and specific. Comprehensive in addressing those
threat perceptions that have led regional countries to seek
diversified great power relations in the first place, and
specific in mitigating each country's distinct interest in
doing business with Russia.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Notte follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Notte.
Next, Dr. Wehrey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERIC WEHREY, SENIOR FELLOW, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Dr. Wehrey. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson, members
of the subcommittee, members of the Ukrainian parliament, thank
you for the opportunity to speak with you here today about how
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has impacted Russian arms sales
and other military activities in the Middle East and North
Africa.
I join you remotely from Tripoli, Libya, a city that bore
the brunt of a Russian military assault in the form of hundreds
of mercenaries from the Wagner Group who were backing a Libyan
warlord in a bid to topple the Libyan Government. While this
assault failed, it caused thousands of deaths and it left deep
political divisions in its wake. Moreover, thousands of Wagner
personnel and advanced Russian weaponry remain entrenched
across Libya.
In many respects, Russia's Libya campaign epitomizes its
renewed activism across the Middle East which has included
military intervention, arms sales, grain exports, diplomatic
mediation and a willingness to talk to all sides, energy and
infrastructure projects, and propaganda in media. This
engagement is largely opportunistic and ad hoc. It seizes on
instability and power vacuums. It exploits the insecurities of
U.S. partners in the region about the reliability of U.S.
support and their displeasure with the conditionality that the
U.S. sometimes attaches to its arms sales.
Russian arms deliveries, in contrast, are faster and free
from restrictions related to human rights, but Russia cannot
provide the security guarantees that many Arab States have
depended on from the United States. Now in the wake of its
invasion of Ukraine, Russia is trying to reap dividends from
its investment in the region, call in favors, and capitalize on
local ambivalence and hostility to the United States both from
States and from Arab publics.
America's Arab security partners have deferred on joining
the Western condemnation of Russian aggression and some have
refused efforts to isolate Russia economically. Meanwhile,
Russia is trying to divert Wagner forces and Syrian militia
fighters to Ukraine from both Syria and Libya. But both the
scale and military significance of this deployment should not
be overStated. The actual number of Syrians who have arrived in
Ukraine is unclear and Libyan contacts with firsthand knowledge
have told me that thousands of Wagner troops still remain very
much present in Libya.
On top of this, these mercenaries and the Syrian fighters
will find a vastly more capable foe in Ukraine than the ones
they previously fought and, more importantly, Russia's
disastrous war in Ukraine is tarnishing its reputation as an
arms supplier in the Middle East. Russian weapons have been
shown to be flawed in combat and often fatally so. Battlefield
expenditures and attrition have whittled away Russia's
inventory, especially precision munitions, and sanctions have
eroded its defense industrial base especially electronic
components.
As a result, Russia won't be able to fulfill its existing
commitments and potential buyers will be increasingly dissuaded
from turning to Russia. This shortfall could be modestly
exploited by China which possesses large quantities of Russian-
made arms and spare parts which it could use to keep existing
inventories in the region up and running. China could also
intensify its efforts to sell its own advanced weaponry like
drones.
Now in response to this new landscape, the U.S. should
avoid trying to coax its Arab partners back into the fold with
promises of more weapons and more formal security commitments.
Neither Russia nor China can really flip any State in this
region into its orbit, and for too long Arab regimes,
especially Arab autocrats, have cleverly courted assistance
from Moscow and Beijing to extract arms deals from Washington
and to obtain leniency on human rights.
Instead of taking this bait, the U.S. should amplify the
effects of Russia's diminished reputation as an arms provider
while also using financial sanctions and especially the more
effective and consistent application of the 2017 CAATSA
sanctions to constrain Russian arms flows. The U.S. should also
try to fill its partners' legitimate defense needs with
transfers of its own or through European partners or regional
producers like Turkey or Israel.
But the U.S. shouldn't let this charged moment of great
power rivalry distract it from focusing on the daunting
socioeconomic and political problems that the Middle East and
its societies face. These problems include authoritarian
governance and corruption; the fallout from the pandemic; and,
of course, food insecurity arising from the Ukraine war;
climate change; the looming end of the hydrocarbon era; and the
lack of opportunities, economic opportunities to name but a
few.
These problems present a far more pressing threat to both
long-term stability and to U.S. interests than any encroachment
by Moscow, or Beijing for that matter. They demand a fresh,
holistic approach from the U.S. rather than a return to the
overly securitized policies that have defined the American
presence in the Middle East for decades.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Frederic Wehrey follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Dr. Wehrey.
Ms. Welsh, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MS. CAITLIN WELSH, DIRECTOR, GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY
PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Welsh. Chairman Deutch, Ranking Member Wilson,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank for the
opportunity to testify today, and welcome to members of the
Ukrainian parliament. Following is a summary of my written
testimony which I have submitted to the committee.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine leaves few agricultural
markets untouched and threatens food security for millions in
and outside the Black Sea. The war has reduced supplies and
increased prices of foods exported from Ukraine and Russia,
namely wheat, maize, and sunflower oil; driven up demand for
substitute products; and reduced fertilizer exports from the
Black Sea. Today's high cost of energy puts further pressure on
food and fertilizer prices.
Most vulnerable to the impact of these price spikes are
countries for whom wheat is a major source of calories, that
rely on imports to meet their food security needs, and that
source a significant proportion of their imports from Ukraine
and Russia. This characterizes many countries in the Middle
East and North Africa. Levels of food insecurity caused by this
war and appropriate policy responses differ depending on
context. For example, Egypt is the world's largest importer of
wheat, sourcing over 70 percent of its wheat from the Black Sea
which presents problems for its budget. Egypt spends about $3
billion annually for wheat imports, and over $3.2 billion on
its bread subsidy program. Experts recommend that Egypt
diversify its sources of wheat imports, reduce per capita
consumption of bread, more efficiently target its food subsidy
program, and adapt its agricultural sector to water shortages
and climate related threats.
The Russia-Ukraine war is raising the cost of food at a
time of extreme food insecurity amid the civil war in Yemen
where over the half the population are food insecure, including
over 30,000 in famine-like conditions. Yemen relies on imports
to meet its food needs. The total value of food imports exceeds
the value of all exports from Yemen. Emergency aid is critical
to addressing levels of food insecurity there, and it is
particularly important to maintain the value of cash transfers
in the face of high inflation.
The Russia-Ukraine war is limiting access to wheat for
Lebanon, already in one of the worst economic crises in the
world. Lebanon has not recorded economic growth since 2017 and
food price inflation reached 400 percent in December 2021.
Lebanon procures approximately 75 percent of its wheat from
Russia and Ukraine, and experts recommend Lebanon shore up
wheat supplies for the near term and ensure equitable
distribution of bread through social safety net programs and
rebuild its grain silos to insulate itself and perhaps other
countries in the region from supply and price shocks.
And although Gulf countries import up to 90 percent of
their food, including from the Black Sea, they have thus far
weathered the agriculture market impacts of Russia's war on
Ukraine. A range of efforts have bolstered food security in the
GCC whose countries are also benefiting from high oil prices.
Still, analysts recommend GCC countries encourage domestic
agricultural production, invest in agricultural companies, and
build in and maintain food reserves to buffer the effects of
future crises.
Some policy prescriptions differ country to country based
on context while others are recommended broadly: Refrain from
imposing export bans; avoid hoarding and panic buying; continue
to exempt food and fertilizer from sanctions; and provide
humanitarian assistance through the U.N. World Food Programme.
The U.S. and global responses to the food security impacts
of Russia's war are still unfolding. Today and tomorrow,
Secretary Blinken will host two meetings on this exact topic at
the U.N. in New York. G7 Development, Health, and Finance
ministers are meeting in Germany this week and discussing
solutions to food insecurity caused by this war. And 2 days
ago, Secretary Yellen announced actions from international
financial institutions to address this crisis.
In the 2015 intelligence community assessment on global
food security, the IC warned that--and this is a quote: Large
exportable supplies of key components of food production come
from States where conflict and government actions could cause
supply chain disruptions that lead to price spikes. In years to
come, conflict, climate change, and other factors will continue
to affect food security particularly in the MENA region.
In their responses to today's global food crises,
policymakers would be wise to consider investing in mechanisms
that help food importing countries weather today's and future
supply and price shocks. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Welsh follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Ms. Welsh.
And Mr. Rumley, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. GRANT RUMLEY, SENIOR FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Deutch,
Ranking Member Wilson, members of the subcommittee, members of
the Ukrainian parliament, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on the issue of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and
its impact on the Middle East and North Africa. I am honored to
be included alongside such distinguished scholars.
Russia is one of the few countries in the world to maintain
a relatively positive diplomatic standing with nearly every
country in the Middle East. It does so through a combination of
an active military presence, high-level diplomatic engagement,
and a concerted effort to position itself as a viable source of
arms should countries seek non-U.S. materiel.
Russia's military presence in the region is well-
documented. By Russia MoD statements, Russia has deployed over
60,000 troops to Syria since intervening in 2015. From its two
bases in Syria, Hmeimim and Tartus, Russia is able to project
power into the eastern Mediterranean, influence the course of
the Syrian civil war, and intervene in countries like Libya.
Russia complements this military posture with an active and
often effective arms sales pitch across the region, often
seeking to exploit gaps left by the U.S. Turkey's acquisition
of the S-400 and Egypt's purchase of the Sukhoi 35 are well-
known, but others in the region continue to be interested in
Russian materiel.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, however, threatens Russia's
standing in the region. Already, reports indicate Russia has
begun withdrawing some troops and mercenaries from the region
to support its invasion of Ukraine. While we can expect these
reports to continue, if the war continues to go poorly for
Russia, I am skeptical of a full Russian withdrawal and instead
expect Russia to continue to consolidate its forces until it is
left with a skeleton presence at Hmeimim and Tartus, its most
strategic assets in the region.
On arms sales, the Russian defense industry, which has
struggled to produce key platforms following sanctions
initially placed after its 2014 invasion of Ukraine, will
likely have to prioritize replenishing the Russian military
over exporting. Further, customers of Russian arms may struggle
with the resources to maintain and sustain the materiel in
their inventory. Still, so long as Russia is able to make
platforms, there will likely always be potential customers of
Russian arms.
Given all this, I recommend the U.S. consider the following
steps: First, clarify the U.S. policy regarding the
implementation of CAATSA. I know the CAATSA debate in the U.S.
usually pits delaying a determination against issuing a waiver,
but delaying a determination only leaves partners more
confused. Issuing a waiver sends a clear message to countries
around the world as to what the U.S. sees as acceptable
regarding a future relationship with Russia.
Second, maintain the U.S. presence in northeast Syria. A
diminished Russian presence may create a vacuum for ISIS.
Additionally, a key Russian demand in negotiations over Syria's
future has been that all U.S. forces leave the country. As
Russia's presence wanes on the ground, ours may grant us more
leverage in negotiating over Syria's future.
Third, proactively shape partner requests in order to
explore enhanced production possibilities. Many of our partners
in the Middle East and North Africa seek not only U.S. arms but
help in planning for a post-petroleum future. They seek
technological sharing, co-production, and support for their own
defense industrial base. By shaping multiyear acquisition
strategies with partners individually, the U.S. can prioritize
partner needs while also potentially opening the possibility
for enhanced production capabilities.
Provide off-ramps to countries in the middle of major arms
transactions with Russia or who have recently purchased Russian
systems. Turkey and Egypt are two examples of traditional U.S.
partners with significant Russian arms in their inventories.
There may now be a window to begin to wean them off Russian
arms. Elsewhere in the world, the U.S. may also want to
consider expanding the availability of foreign military
financing to traditional Russian customers in order to lure
them away from Russia.
Prepare select platforms for simultaneous export in order
to better compete with great power competitors. As drones
increasingly populate the Middle East, a common complaint from
partners is the lack of an exportable, effective U.S. counter-
UAV platform especially when Russia and China market one. To
better compete with great power competitors, the U.S. must
compete in this space as well.
And finally, continue targeting Russian sanctions evasion
efforts to ensure lasting impact to the Russian defense
industry. In particular, this effort should focus on Chinese
companies and the potential for China to supply Russia with
dual-use components that may support its defense acquisitions.
I thank you again for your time and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rumley follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Rumley, and thanks to
all of the witnesses. I will now recognize members for 5
minutes each. Pursuant to House rules, all time yielded is for
the purpose of questioning our witnesses. Because of the hybrid
format at this hearing, I will recognize members by committee
seniority, alternating between Democrats and Republicans. If
you miss your turn, please let our staff know so that we can
come back to you. If you seek recognition, you must unmute your
microphone and address the chair verbally. I will defer my time
until the end, and with that recognize Mr. Cicilline for the
purpose of questioning the witnesses.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Chairman Deutch. And thank you to
you and to Ranking Member Wilson for holding today's hearing on
this very important issue. And I too want to welcome our
colleagues, the members of the Ukrainian parliament, and say
that the Congress of the United States and the American people
stand very firmly with the Ukrainian people in your fight for
democracy not only for your future but for the future of
democracy in the world, so it is an honor to have you with us.
And thank you to our witnesses for your very compelling
testimony.
I want to begin with you, Ms. Welsh. I was in the region
recently with the chairman and then with Senator Coons and met
with David Beasley of the World Food Programme and he provided
a similar, kind of very daunting and terrifying future in terms
of food insecurity and particularly with what was happening at
the Port of Odessa where food is just apparently going to rot
because the Russians won't let it be offloaded.
So I am wondering what--and then you also spoke about the
fertilizer shortage, so it is not only the immediate food
insecurity, but it is also the ability to plant for the next
season. What should we be doing in addition to, obviously,
providing additional resources to programs like the World Food
Programme? What else can Congress do to mitigate the impact
both in the short term and the long term of this really
devastating impact on food security in the region?
Ms. Welsh. Thank you for that question, for an excellent
question. I will note that the worst impacts, I think, are
still to come. The restrictions that we have seen in exports
are exports from the last season's harvest. The current season
is still in the ground ready for harvest in the coming months.
The USDA has put out its first estimate of the proportion of
that harvest that will not be able to be exported and they
estimate a reduction of over 11 million metric tons of wheat
from Ukraine that won't be able to make it out of Ukraine. So I
think that effects will continue at least in the medium term.
In addition to providing robust financing for WFP, which I
sense Congress is willing to do, I think it is, well, it is
incredibly important to continue to do that not only for those
who are immediately impacted in Ukraine and by this crisis, but
for those who are experiencing acute food insecurity absent
this crisis in the Horn of Africa, in the Sahel region, et
cetera.
Also note that the World Food Programme has estimated that
because of this war the cost of production for--the cost of
operation for WFP have risen up to $23 billion per month. So I
think it is incredibly important to continue robust financing
for WFP and in addition to that, you know, as I mentioned, we
are in the midst of formulation of U.S. and global responses.
In the long term, of course, it is very important to
continue to invest in resilient agriculture, especially in the
face of climate change. The way that I view this situation
though is that apart from emergency assistance on the one hand
and long-term assistance, which is agricultural development, on
the other hand we need a financing facility to help food-
importing countries, perhaps those that are not experiencing
the worst of this crisis, to afford the cost of imports.
And I am sensing that that is what Secretary Yellen was
announcing with financing from the IFIs on Monday, and that
that is also what we could expect to hear out of the G7 in
June.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
Dr. Notte, earlier this year, I joined Chairman Meeks and
Chairman Deutch, along with others, urging the Biden
Administration to continue its efforts to restore human rights
as a vital pillar in our bilateral relationships with Egypt.
And I am wondering if you could comment on how you see Russia's
invasion of Ukraine affecting U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relations
and, you know, what opportunities does the Administration have
to deepen these ties and how do we do so while also honoring
our commitment to human rights?
And also how does Egypt perceive Russia in terms of its
strategic partnership and has that changed since their brutal,
barbaric invasion of Ukraine?
Dr. Notte. Thank you very much for the question,
Congressman. I think the first thing you have to say is that
while Egyptian-Russian relations go way back by decades, the
Soviet Union had a stake in Egypt, and important relations one
really shouldn't overState the depth and the importance of the
Egyptian-Russian relationship.
There are some trade relations. There are the wheat
supplies, that is true. Russia intends to build a nuclear power
plant at El Dabaa in Egypt, so that is certainly sort of a
strategic area where the Russians want to position themselves.
And then there are the occasional arms sales to Egypt in an
Egyptian effort to diversify its arms procurement. But, you
know, the relationship hasn't really evolved much beyond that.
One should also say, I think, that Egypt has looked
favorably somewhat upon Russia's role in Libya as seeing Russia
and its partnership with General Haftar sort of as a, as a sort
of guarantee that the Egyptian-Libyan border remains somewhat
stable and the Egyptians have looked toward the Russians to
ensure that.
Now when it comes to sort of undermining Russian commercial
opportunities in Egypt, with the El Dabaa power plant, I think
countries in the region might well doubt that Rosatom, which is
the company that is building those power plants, can be an
attractive provider in the future. Rosatom hasn't been
sanctioned yet, but the companies that usually, the banks that
provide loans for those power plants like Sberbank, when it
comes to the Turkish power plant Akkuyu, have been sanctioned.
And also a nuclear power plant is a decades-long investment and
there might well be doubts about Russia's ability to service
and maintain strategic technologies, whether its arms or
whether its nuclear power plants, in the future.
So I would actually expect a certain hesitancy by countries
like Egypt to procure these strategic technologies from Russia
going forward. And I think the United States should make clear
those limitations of the Russians in their own bilateral
consultations with the Egyptians.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you so much. My time has expired. I
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deutch. And thank you, Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Wilson is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And indeed, as we have
our visiting parliamentarians from Ukraine, what an
extraordinary time in history, you should be aware. I
appreciate the leadership of Chairman Ted Deutch assisting in
the 40 billion-dollar aid package. That is the largest package
that truly has ever occurred so quickly because it is done
heartfelt.
And then I am really grateful that as our parliamentarians
if you have a chance to travel across the United States, you
are going to find out something and that is that on virtually
every street there is a flag of Ukraine in front of one, two or
three homes. And then I am really grateful that I was able to
provide a flag of Ukraine. When you visit the Statehouse in
South Carolina and you visit with the Governor Henry McMaster,
who is a strong friend of Ukraine, the first thing you are
going to see when you get to the office is the flag of Ukraine.
So you are thought of, your courage. From our perspective,
it is Don't Tread On Me/Live Free or Die, the American
Revolution. With that, a question for Mr. Rumley. What factors
do you think would assist in deterring U.S. partners from
purchasing Russian military equipment? What can we do to
prevent China from backfilling the defense procurement space
that may be vacated by Russia in the Middle East?
Mr. Rumley. Thank you for that question, Congressman. I
definitely think customers of Russian arms are going to have
several hurdles going forward not only with simply maintaining
and sustaining what they have already purchased, but in some of
the basic logistics, even the payment process. A Russian bank
complained last month that it wasn't able to process close to a
billion dollars in payments from India and Egypt over arms
sales. I think countries that purchase Russian arms will also
now have to consider the potential that they may incur
secondary sanctions in addition to running afoul of CAATSA.
I think from our standpoint, there are many ways that we
can amend our security cooperation approach. The Middle East, I
think, is a key theater for the future of great power
competition. Not only have we been competing with Russia in
terms of arms sales there, but China increasingly has sold
armed drones to the region. They have sold it to traditional
partners--Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE. And what
they are doing is oftentimes what we are not willing to do.
Our partners in the region seek coproduction, they seek
technology sharing; China and Russia are willing to work
together to build these advanced platforms. Russia and the UAE
inked an agreement several years ago to produce a fifth-
generation fighter. Nothing has come of that yet. China and
Saudi Arabia, however, signed an agreement a couple months ago
to jointly produce armed drones in Saudi Arabia.
And so I think the U.S. may want to think creatively in
terms of both what we sell, how we sell it, and what we are
doing to make this more of a relationship and something beyond
a strict transaction.
Mr. Wilson. Putin uses the base in Syria to challenge
NATO's southern flank, a direct threat to Turkey, to Greece, to
Bulgaria, to Albania, to Italy. Can you provide more
information on how Russia uses this base to challenge NATO? You
detailed how Russia's military presence in Syria supports
Russia's power protection. Is there anything the United States
can do to limit the Russian presence in Syria and therefore
their projection in the region?
Mr. Rumley. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. Their presence in
Syria has evolved from a modest airstrip in 2015 to a base at
Hmeimim that by open source reporting can serve as a logistics
hub, a medical hub. It has the runways to host Russia's most
advanced bombers. There were reports before Ukraine that Russia
was deploying Tu-22 bombers there and hypersonic missiles.
Their facility at Tartus, likewise, has--their ability to stage
naval assets there has expanded. They can now stage up to 11
ships there. So it has grown from a rather modest beginning to
something much more, I think, challenging from a U.S.
standpoint.
In terms of what we can do, I think we can continue to
support Ukraine and the defense of Ukraine and the longer that
Russia is bogged down in Ukraine, the harder it will be for
Russia's military to extend and maintain its presence in the
Middle East.
Mr. Wilson. I was disappointed to hear that Russia has a 5-
year agreement with Egypt to use its airbases and air space.
How utilized is this agreement by the Russian Federation in the
last 5 years and what factors will influence Egypt's decision
of whether to renew the agreement?
Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congressman. I think Dr. Wehrey
might be able to provide some details as well here. I think
from Egypt's standpoint, the basing agreement fits into both
their shared objectives with Russia in terms of intervening in
the Libya conflict. I think it also fits into their
diversifications since President Sisi came to power of seeking
to diversify both who they buy from, but also where they--who
they jointly cooperate with on a military front.
I think it is, I cannot say for certain whether they will
renew it. I know there is the option to automatically renew the
agreement. But again, the effects of Ukraine may make it
difficult for Russia to maintain much of a presence there.
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Input in the future, Egypt should
be such an important part of stability in the Middle East and a
strong ally of the United States so any way we can back them up
to not be reliant on anything that relates to Putin. I yield
back.
Mr. Deutch. I thank the ranking member and yield 5 minutes
to Mr. Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So obviously, for
a lot of countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the war
in Ukraine has brought significant economic challenges, food
and security, for example, countries like Egypt and Libya,
Yemen, Tunisia. But for other countries, particularly from some
of the oil-rich countries in the Persian Gulf, the war from
everything I can see has brought nothing but economic benefits
that they have taken advantage of.
Right now, there is a shortage of about 1.5 million barrels
a day of oil on the global markets, if you count the Russian
oil that has been lost due to sanctions and then throw in what
we have generated additionally from our strategic reserves. And
all of the experts I have spoken to tell me there are only two
countries in the world that have the capacity to make up that
shortfall in a short period of time and that is Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates. And yet they seem to have made a
deliberate choice for several months not to use that power to
stabilize these global energy markets and they have made a lot
of money at it.
The Saudi Arabia's Aramco, for example, the State-owned oil
company, in the first quarter of 2022 made a profit of $40
billion in comparison to $22 billion in the first quarter of
the previous year. That is 124 percent increase, an 18 billion-
dollar windfall from basically the increased oil prices from
the Ukraine war. By refusing to play their role, they have
enabled Russia to make a lot more money because the price of
oil is higher on their remaining oil exports and they have
seriously hurt the United States and our western European
allies. All of our constituents are feeling this right now.
They have made it extremely hard for us, harder than it
otherwise would have been to impose the types of sanctions on
Russian energy that are needed to bring this war to an end.
So I wanted to ask you, Mr. Wehrey, I mean, first of all,
can you think of any countries in the world that are doing more
to undermine our sanctions on Russia than Saudi Arabia and the
UAE? And two, why are they doing this? What are the concessions
that they are trying to extract from us as part of this
process?
Dr. Wehrey. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
think you raise a very important point about the nature of our
partnership with these two States. And the idea that because of
the Ukraine war we should redouble our efforts to solidify
those partnerships and especially in terms of security and
arms, I think we need to question what that partnership has
gotten us in the region to begin with.
We have sold these countries arms. They have used arms in
ways that have been destabilizing in the region that have
killed civilians. In many cases, these arms are bought purely
for prestige or used for domestic repression. Simply selling
arms to these countries often doesn't give the U.S. leverage.
So the entire range of security outcomes from our giving arms
to them, you know, really hasn't gotten us anything.
And now, of course, you raise the issue of oil. They are
not coming on board with us here. There is a whole list of, you
know, logic. They have relationships with China. They are
trying to extract more guarantees from us. I mean the United
Arab Emirates have demanded a formal security pact from the
United States. And so that goes to my earlier point in my
statement that these States have seized upon this moment, this
very charged moment of great power rivalry and they are trying
to manipulate it. They are trying to extract as much as they
can from us. And I do think we need to, frankly speaking, call
them on their bluff. You know, Russia and China are not going
to step in and defend these countries from Iranian missiles.
They are not going to play the role. I think the U.S. has to be
comfortable with a degree of security diversification in the
region, a degree of multipolarity.
Mr. Malinowski. I just have a few seconds left, but I mean
doesn't this raise the question of who is the superpower in
this relationship, right, are we leveraging them or are they
able to leverage us? I mean I recall President Trump actually
got the Saudis to pump less oil in 2020 by threatening to pull
our troops out of the kingdom. And it took basically a few days
to get that concession once he was willing to play that card.
I mean what, and it has taken us months this year, so far
unsuccessfully, to get a similar result by different means. So
what lesson do you draw from that?
Dr. Wehrey. Well, I think you are right, Congressman. We
have, still, enormous cards we can play in terms of the defense
that we are providing them in terms of the systems that we put
on their soil. There is a naval patrol that we just agreed to
with the Saudis, so I mean we are already doing so much. We do
have enormous cards and we are the superpower. We need to start
acting like it and we need to be confident in doing so, I
think. And we still have seniority in the relationship, to
answer your question.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Malinowski. Mr. Steube is
recognized.
Mr. Steube. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My questions are for
Mr. Rumley. Israel has publicly condemned Russia's invasion of
Ukraine through announcements and votes in international
settings. Israel also sought to provide political support and
humanitarian relief for the Ukrainians, including allowing over
15,000 Jewish and non-Jewish refugees to enter Israel, without
alienating Russia. In some instances, Israel officials served
as communicators between their Russian and Ukrainian
counterparts.
Since 2015, Russia's military presence and air defense
capabilities in Syria have given it influence over Israel's
ability to conduct air strikes there. Israel has depended on
access to Syrian air space to target Iranian personnel and
equipment especially those related to the transport of
munitions or precision weapons technology to Hezbollah and
Lebanon.
How has Russia repositioned its forces in the Middle East
since the start of the Ukrainian conflict?
Mr. Rumley. Thank you for the question, Congressman. We
have seen reports that Russia has repositioned its forces in
the region, mostly consolidated into airbases, pulling out from
sort of different parts of the country, I think, further in the
east. It is hard to verify these reports as they all are open
source, but I think your question is an important one because
it gets at Israel's equities in Syria and its relationship with
Russia.
And I think we cannot underscore enough just how much the
IL-20 shootdown in 2018 impacted both the Israeli military, but
also the Israeli security leadership today. Israel's priority
is freedom of action in Syria and maintaining freedom of action
in Syria in order to destabilize Iran's activities there,
Iran's ability to support its proxies in Lebanon and Hezbollah.
And so I think Israel has to navigate that fine balance
with Russia as Russia has deployed S-300's in support of Bashar
al-Assad and S-400's in support of its own premium assets, so
it is certainly a fine line and I think we have seen Israeli
policy from the start of Ukraine reflect that.
Mr. Steube. Currently, five countries operate in or
maintain military forces in Syria--Russia, Turkey, Iran,
Israel, and the United States. The Assad government backed by
Russia and Iran and aligned military forces controls about two-
thirds of Syria's territory including most of the major cities.
Russia's military influence also extends to North Africa. The
Syrian regime also helps funnel money back to Russian
oligarchs.
How have Russian partners like Iran and Assad responded to
redeployments in the region?
Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, I think what we
are very likely to see is where Russia repositions and
withdraws Iran and its proxies will look to fill that vacuum. I
think that is, going back to my remarks, what makes our
presence in northeastern Syria all the more important both to
ensure that any withdrawal doesn't create a vacuum that ISIS
and its elements can exploit, but also that we can be there to
monitor and potentially disrupt Iranian activities to fill that
vacuum.
And so I think given the strain placed on the Russian
forces, it is likely we are going to see a more active Iranian
activity in the region.
Mr. Steube. Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu had a close working relationship with Vladimir Putin
and the two leaders maintained a hotline which allowed the
Israel military to alert Russian forces of incoming strikes in
Syria. However, it is clear that even before Russia's war with
Ukraine, Putin and Israel's new Prime Minister Bennett do not
share the same relationship. Russia's assistance to Syrian
force in intercepting Israeli missiles in July 2021
demonstrates this. So how do the security dynamics in Syria
impact Israel's approach to Ukraine with respect to Russia?
Mr. Rumley. Yes. That is a great question. Thank you,
Congressman. I think it is clear that so long as Russia has its
air defense systems in Syria in support of Bashar al-Assad, it
will maintain some form of leverage over Israel's ability to
conduct operations in Syria and strike back at that Iranian
infrastructure.
I think that I cannot speak to the Bennett/Putin
relationship, but I do think it is a combination both of
navigating that dynamic in Syria but also him being relatively
new. The Putin/Netanyahu relationship had many years to develop
and so I think it was both probably not great timing for
Bennett to inherit this crisis, but I think we are going to
continue to see Israel navigate a fine line in its relationship
with Russia.
Mr. Steube. I have a couple of seconds left, real quick.
What are the risks to Israel's security by supporting Ukraine
against the Russian invasion?
Mr. Rumley. Yes, Congressman. There is always the risk that
is ever present on Israel's mind that Russia may turn on its
air defense systems and begin to attempt to deny Israel freedom
of action in Syria.
Mr. Steube. Thanks for your time here today. I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Steube. I will yield myself
time, first, for questioning. Let me start with Dr. Notte. I
wanted to followup, Dr. Notte, on your reference to Russia's
veiled nuclear threats and ask what that--what is it that you
believe, how is it that you believe that will impact the Middle
East in particular, and can you speak to those nuclear threats
and the possibility of nuclear, tactical nuclear strikes by
Russia and the impact on proliferation in the Middle East
region?
Dr. Notte. Thank you for the question, Chairman. I think at
this point, one can only speak anecdotally and somewhat
speculatively to the impact that this nuclear saber-rattling
over Ukraine has for the region. I can certainly share that
regional interlocutors have taken note of this threat and are
really asking, is this is a safe world to live in where some
countries have nuclear weapons and those that do not have them
can be coerced, can be blackmailed, and can be the victim of a
conventional aggression without someone coming to their aid.
And I think it is the combination of those threats and how
they are perceived in the region, plus the worry about a
growing Iranian nuclear threat, which many in the region
believe will not be mitigated even if we have a restoration of
the JCPOA. Many believe that Iran might end up with a threshold
nuclear capability anyway and then it is just one step away
from weaponization.
`So it is really the combination of those two factors and
they worry that the United States might have insufficient
bandwidth to give those, you know, assurances to those
countries to mitigate that threat that I think sort of gets
them thinking. I am not prepared to say today that on that
basis countries have concluded to, you know, pursue a nuclear
program or a nuclear option hedging, but I do believe that it
is something that capitals will consider.
Mr. Deutch. And you referenced the bandwidth issue of the
United States and questions about the perception of what that
bandwidth might be and whether it is great enough. I want to
followup with, specifically, with a question about Russia and
the comment that--actually, I think Dr. Wehrey and Mr. Rumley,
you both spoke to this--the failure of the Russian invasion to
roll through Ukraine.
The challenges that the Russian military has had, show the
limit of Russia's capability. And for countries in the MENA
region, that may have looked--well, they previously looked to
Russia as a potential security partner, one who is less
demanding, as I think a couple of you said, than the U.S. may
be.
How is their failure in Ukraine being perceived and how can
the United States capitalize on the failures of Russia and
Ukraine to show that the United States including our values
remain a dedicated ally to Middle Eastern countries? And Mr.
Rumley. We will certainly even go to Dr. Wehrey.
Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that is
absolutely right. I think for potential customers and current
customers of Russian arms in the Middle East, right now,
assuming you are able to maintain and sustain what you have
bought, you are assuming Russia's going to be able to build and
even export future materiel. And assuming you will be able to
pay for it, I think there will still be some appetite in the
region for Russian arms.
I think Middle East partners and partners globally will
distinguish between the way Russia has used its forces and the
standalone capabilities of some of these platforms. I think
also the prices for these may drop dramatically in the future
and so there are likely always going to be customers out there
looking for cheap arms that come with less perceived strings
attached to it.
I think the U.S. has several partners in the middle of
major Russian arms purchases that we can, like Turkey and the
S-400 that has requested the F-16 or Egypt and Sukhoi 35 that
has requested the F-15, I am not saying we have to sort of make
a deal right now for that, but I think it is clear that these
countries are going to have gaps, gaps in their capabilities
where they had planned on having Russian platforms to
complement. And we can work with our partners and work with our
own defense industry and see if there is ways in which we can
provide off-ramps for them to gradually disinvest these Russian
platforms.
Mr. Deutch. I thank you.
Dr. Wehrey, you had said earlier that Russia cannot really
offer security guarantees in that their weapons aren't good. Do
you want to speak to that?
Dr. Wehrey. Right. Thank you for the question. You know, it
is perceived, really, a sort of transactional, commercial
approach, you know, it hasn't--and I think States in the region
have responded. They haven't moved, you know, their
relationships with Russia to the sorts of relationships that
really define alliances and partnerships. They haven't opened
up access to bases a lot of times, you know, and so I think it
is a mutual understanding.
When countries in the region buy U.S. arms, they believe
they are buying much more than the capability, the hardware;
that they are purchasing an insurance policy, right. And I
think especially for, you know, States in the Gulf, there is a
fundamental sense of insecurity. These are States that face
Iran, but they are also autocrats. I mean they are insecure
because of their political systems. They face dissent from
within. We saw that with, you know, Egypt.
And so they are purchasing a whole stream of, you know,
U.S. assurances--they believe they are--and Russia is not going
to come in and replace that. It is not going to, you know, and
even the U.S. isn't. So again, I think, you know, in light of
its disastrous performance in Ukraine, and to be clear, there
have been other instances in Crimea where Russian hardware was
also shown to be defective, but I think this is of a
qualitatively different level. You know, the U.S. needs to let
this speak for itself.
And as my co-panelist mentioned, I do think there is an
opportunity to help wean partners off of Russian systems
through co-production, through alternative, you know,
suppliers. We need to provide that opening for them. But, you
know, we shouldn't get back into the arms race game, you know,
I think we need to keep our eye on the long-term problems in
the region which, as I mentioned, are enormous and relate to
governance and economy.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Dr. Wehrey.
I have a number of questions on food security issues for
Ms. Welsh, but I am going to yield to Mr. Perry next and we
will come back, Ms. Welsh, on the next go-around.
Mr. Perry, you are recognized.
Mr. Perry. I thank the chairman. Sorry to be late. Other
things going on. To the witnesses, good to see you. I think my
question is probably for Mr. Rumley, and instead of reading all
this I know you talked about off-ramps, or at least I suspect
you did even though I wasn't here, you know, we just passed $40
billion in a Ukraine assistance package and I think that we are
depleting our own supply of javelins and stingers. There are
not being produced as far as I know, or if they are in not much
capacity, so we are reducing our own stockpile at this very
moment.
In that context, what do you think is the scope of your
proposed expansion to the Foreign Military Financing program
and how would you square your off-ramps for these additional
countries with our shortages? So you are talking about adding
additional countries; meanwhile, we are depleting what we have
based on the one country that is obviously being attacked and
invaded right now militarily, but this puts the United States
in a perilous position. We have to protect ourselves, right. I
mean you put your oxygen mask on first on the airplane before
you put it on each other. There is a reason for that and it is
a similar situation here.
Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congressman. The issue of co-
production is one means, I think, to address a common complaint
which is buying from America takes too long; that it is too
complicated; that if we get in line to buy something from the
U.S. we are going to have to wait years to get it. A good
example is the F-16. There are over 20 countries in the world
that fly the F-16. We currently, Lockheed Martin builds it out
of one facility. That facility if you get in line today, you
are probably not getting the F-16 for 5 years from when you
sign on the dotted line for it. In the 1970's and the 1980's,
we co-produced the F-16 with three other European countries and
we were able to get them off the line faster. The initial order
at those facilities was for a thousand F-16s. The initial order
for the F-16 plant in South Carolina was for 90 F-16s for
Taiwan and Morocco.
And so from an industry standpoint, it is a question of
scale, and so they are not able to, I think, ramp up the
production because while the demand gets closer to a thousand
over time--it is at 128 last I checked--it is not there yet.
And so I think we can use Foreign Military Financing, longer
security cooperation planning, working with our partners on
sort of multiyear acquisition timetables to then also
communicate and send a message, send a signal to the defense
industry that these orders for upgrades, for new kits that are
going to come down the road, you can start to plan around that
and potentially address some of these production lags.
Mr. Perry. So just being the devil's advocate in the
conversation here and being the guy that kind of sees that
government creates something, there is a problem that
government probably created, and then has the solution for it
which usually is a bigger problem in the end, in my opinion,
but why are we at this point with foreign military sales or
financing? Like how did we get there that that is the solution?
Like when you say that your initial order was for a thousand,
and there is no doubt in my mind that we were able to complete
that, what has changed between then and now that puts us in a
position where we have to go to other countries for production
and potentially compromise national security and intellectual
property, et cetera, and quite honestly, just the work to be
done in America? What has changed that has put us in this
position?
Mr. Rumley. Absolutely, Congressman, I think the initial
order for the F-16 was because it was a new platform that was
coming off the line. Right now, the F-16 is used by a lot of
countries but it is not the most premier platform in our own
arsenal and so as we have developed more platforms. We have
poured more resources into developing the Joint Strike Fighter,
the F-35, for instance.
So I think co-production is one way to both speed up
delivery for platform----
Mr. Perry. Yes, but hold on a second. So I get it. It is
essentially what we would call--although I think it is a
fantastic machine and if I had my choice that would be one of
the things I would choose to fly. But it is essentially a
legacy aircraft from an American perspective. We should be able
to turn them out like--like all the tooling and the die, all
that stuff is done and all the questions, potentially, have
already been answered for years upon years.
Why aren't we just cranking these things out like, you
know, an assembly line factory?
Mr. Rumley. Yes. Absolutely, Congressman, I think and I
would have to defer to defense industry on this one. I think it
is simply the out-year demand signal that makes it hard for
industry to allocate all the resources toward----
Mr. Perry. I mean it is not a finite pie. We got, I mean in
some respects maybe you do not have manpower or something, but
that is the question. What has changed that we cannot produce
what we need to produce in a timely fashion? And it doesn't
seem like, really, I do not know if you just do not have the
answer or you are guessing or whatever and I am not saying you
should. But it doesn't seem to be that I am getting, I do not
hear anything that makes me think that we shouldn't be able to
do this. I yield.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Representative Perry.
Representative Manning, you are recognized.
Ms. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses for being here today. I want to go back to the issue
of food security that we have been talking about just a little
bit. Mr. Malinowski talked about the enormous benefit that some
of the Gulf countries are getting in terms of banner oil
profits.
So Ms. Welsh, or any of the others who want to weigh on
this, what is the capacity or the willingness, really, of the
wealthier Gulf countries to set up and help provide financing
and food to those who need it the most within the region?
Ms. Welsh, do you want to comment on that?
Ms. Welsh. Certainly. Thank you, Representative, for that
good question. You know, I do not know specifically. I can
speak to past efforts from my time at the State Department to
get Gulf countries to invest multilateral financing facilities
for agricultural development, for example. Those efforts were
not necessarily successful. So in my own experience, it hasn't
been easy to get Gulf countries to invest in food security and
agriculture for the rest of the region.
I do think that that is potentially an untapped source,
untapped resource when it comes to the impacts on food
security. Again, we are seeing high oil prices highly
correlated to the price of food, which again it is only
exacerbating the problem. So I think it is a good point that
you brought up.
Ms. Manning. Thank you. And what about the impact of
countries' export bans on the region such as India's recent ban
on wheat? What other sources are there, potential sources for
countries that previously relied on Russian or Ukrainian
imports to diversify their supply?
Ms. Welsh. Thank you for that question. At present, about
20 countries are putting in place export restrictions. They are
not outright bans, but restrictions on some products. India has
not outright banned its exports. It is still letting some of
its exports to continue to countries that it had agreements in
place prior, prior to last week, and it is also exempting
humanitarian assistance from its export restrictions.
Regardless, India's restrictions are coming at a very bad time,
of course.
Other options are production from other producing regions,
from United States, Argentina, Australia, but again prices are
global so for all importing countries the ultimate bill is
going to be higher.
Ms. Manning. Thank you.
Mr. Rumley, I want to turn to you. In your testimony, you
mentioned that Russia will face difficulty maintaining its
current posture in the Middle East. Which countries are poised
to fill in the gap and how can we prevent Iranian-backed forces
from benefiting from this situation that Russia has gotten
itself into, particularly in Syria?
Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think the answer
was in the question. I think especially in Syria, Iran and its
proxies are going to look to fill the gap there. I think we
have already seen sort of initial reports suggesting as much.
Hezbollah has also been active in Syria in the past. Again, I
would just say, I do think that while we see them
repositioning, I do not think we will see a total withdrawal
unless Ukraine goes dramatically worse for Russia.
In Libya, I would defer to Dr. Wehrey who is there right
now on that, but I would expect that there is no shortage of
foreign support flooding into that conflict.
Ms. Manning. What are the options for preventing the
Iranian-backed forces in Syria from increasing their bad
actions?
Mr. Rumley. Yes, Congresswoman. One of the issues, I think,
that we have is that we do not have a ton of great options for
it. Our force presence there is we do not have the authorities,
necessarily, to combat the Iranian presence. I think our
presence in northeast Syria and our presence at al-Tanf
garrison serves as a bit of a disruption to Iran's efforts to
establish what we called the GLOC, the ground line of
communication. But again, I am not certain how much we will be
able to necessarily thwart them.
I think our other partners in the region, most in
particular Israel, are currently working on this problem set
and working to roll back some of Iran's gains there, and so I
think perhaps the best way to answer that is to continue to
support Israel.
Ms. Manning. And what impact if any do you see by the
recent election in Lebanon?
Mr. Rumley. Thank you, Congresswoman. I think what we are
seeing out of Lebanon is unfortunately likely to be not what
the country needs in terms of delivering proper governance. I
think the election results were leaning toward the inconclusive
at this point in terms of who is going to actually come out on
top, and I am most of all concerned for the future of Lebanon
and its people.
Ms. Manning. Thank you. I believe my time is about to
expire. I yield back.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Ms. Manning.
Mr. Burchett, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always a
pleasure being with you. I have several questions. I will get
right to them. Do you all think that the countries in the
Middle East and North Africa regions will have some second
thoughts about buying Russian-made armaments after seeing them
in the field in Ukraine? It seems like they have been a little
less than successful.
Mr. Rumley. Yes, Congressman. I think the performance is
not up to perhaps the sales pitch. But while, as I said
earlier, while I do think their reputation has taken a hit, I
think customers will distinguish between the way Russia has
fought this conflict and the way its standalone platforms
operate.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, I agree with you. In the Second World
War, you know, they had the T-34 tanks and they took on the
much stronger German Tigers and other things and they whipped
them. A German tank commander said we would blow one up and
there would be 12 more behind them. But the interesting thing
about it was that they, during the Second World War, they would
have maybe a tank crew of four people, I believe, and they
would have three different languages in there and they had a
lot of difficulties there, but apparently now they have similar
languages but they just do not have the fighting men that they
did.
Do you think there is any, do you think that the Russians
are using Syrians to fight in the Ukraine? Has that been pretty
much documented or is that just internet rumors?
Mr. Rumley. I think, as I understand it, Russia's key gap
in the Ukraine right now is one of manpower, and so I would
expect them to continue to call up their mercenaries around the
region to support their efforts there.
Mr. Burchett. So is that a maybe?
Mr. Rumley. It is hard to say from an open source
standpoint.
Mr. Burchett. All right. That is an honest answer. How do
you think we will be able to prevent the Chinese from filling
the defense procurement space, so have it that may be vacated
by the Russians in the Middle East?
Mr. Rumley. I think, yes, Congressman. I think Dr. Wehrey
actually hit the nail on the head there when he said, when he
noted that China has a lot of legacy Russian platforms and will
likely be a leading candidate to transfer some of these
platforms to countries that had purchased Russian arms in the
past and may be seeking maintenance and sustainment for them.
I think China is already active in the Middle East, already
flooding the market with armed drones. It is already looking to
market other platforms as well. It sold their defense systems
to Serbia. It is looking to advance its arms sales. And so if
we aren't going to be the supplier, China is, in my view, going
to step in.
Mr. Burchett. OK. What is the situation of the food in the
region, the food imports, due to the Russian invasion of
Ukraine?
Ms. Welsh. Thank you for the question, Representative. As I
noted, many countries in the Middle East and North Africa rely
on imports from Russia and Ukraine. And at present, I will say
that it is an open question. As I noted earlier, USDA has
projected that 35 percent of the current crop, current wheat
crop from Ukraine, will not be harvested this year. So their
crop is, their exports are curtailed at the same time Russia's
exports are continuing.
Russia has been exempted. Russia's agricultural exports and
fertilizer has been exempted from sanctions for the United
States, EU, and other countries, so Russia continues to export.
In fact, USDA is estimating that Russia's exports are
increasing at this time, and I am also seeing open source
reporting of Russia stealing grain from Ukraine, relabeling it,
and exporting it at a premium to countries in the Middle East
and North Africa.
Mr. Burchett. Russians are going to do like Russians are
going to do. They are thieves, basically.
Are there any counter ISIS operations at risk due to
Russia's invasion of Ukraine? And if you could, if that is a
yes, could you explain that to me?
Mr. Rumley. That is a great question, Congressman. I do
not----
Mr. Burchett. You will get nowhere complimenting me up here
with these people. They will just mark you down a couple
notches, so it is better if you insult me like they do. Like
Ted does. Just kidding.
Mr. Rumley. No, it is an important question. It is one my
former colleagues in the Department of Defense will be looking
at. I think that the biggest risk perhaps to the D-ISIS mission
and our presence in Syria is any potential one-off conflicts or
clashes with both Iranian-aligned groups, but also Russian
mercenaries like we saw in 2018 in Deir ez-Zor. Ostensibly,
should Russian mercenaries be pulled back from areas of Syria
that may alleviate some of those concerns, so I am optimistic
we will be able to continue the D-ISIS mission.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back 6
seconds of my time.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Burchett. And I, for
the record, would never insult you.
I have just two final questions before we wrap up this, I
think, really important and productive hearing. One, Dr. Notte,
I just want to go back to you on this nuclear issue again.
There has been some conversation here, there has been
conversation, generally, about, a lot of conversation here
about our allies in the region and their belief in America's
staying power in the region. There is some suggestions that our
allies are trying to manipulate us.
I would just ask you since you spoke about nuclear
proliferation, from the perspective of our allies, in
particular the Emiratis who faced attacks on Dubai from
Iranian-backed groups, and on the Saudis who faced attacks on
their soil, and given the ongoing threats from Iran, from the
IRGC, is when you look at the region and you think about
nuclear proliferation it seems clear, but I want to make sure I
am not missing anything, that for those countries the best
decision is to stand with the United States against Iran's
malign influence in the region and against Iran's efforts to
develop nuclear weapons. And it seems also in the best interest
of the United States to make clear that it is our position that
Iran--that we won't tolerate Iran's malign activities and that
we will never allow Iran to have nuclear weapons. Do you agree
with that?
Dr. Notte. Thank you, Chairman. I absolutely agree with
this assessment. I do think that there is partially a problem
that the United States has at the level of perception. You
know, there is this widespread perception that the United
States is not taking the missile and proxy threat by Iran
seriously enough, is not doing enough, when of course, and some
other witnesses have said it, the United States is still doing
a lot in the region while certainly Russia and Iran, Russia and
China will not support regional countries in withstanding the
missile and proxy issue either. In fact, I would pose to you
that it is to Russia's advantage if Iran and proxy and missile
threats destabilize the region to a certain extent because
again it pins down U.S. resources that could otherwise be freed
up for elsewhere.
So I think that perception has to be mitigated. Make
clearer to partners that the United States is still very much
engaged. Witness Wehrey noted the new naval force that has been
put in place for the Red Sea. I believe the new CENTCOM chief
is currently visiting the region.
I think the United States could also do a little more to
perhaps leverage European allies in sort of carrying the burden
of responsibility for mitigating the Iranian proxy and missile
threat in the region. The Europeans have not been historically
very involved in that effort and Europe is the direct
neighborhood of the Middle East. We Europeans are fundamentally
reliant on stability in the region, so perhaps more could
happen there.
But yes, I fundamentally agree with your assessment that it
is the best choice of regional countries to partner with the
United States, perhaps also now building on operationalizing
the Abraham Accords, more defense and deterrence cooperation
between Gulf Arab States and Israel, where again CENTCOM is
also positioning itself in a leading role to support that
process.
Mr. Deutch. So I appreciate that, Dr. Notte.
Mr. Rumley, then I will turn to you. The best approach,
just trying to pull some of what Dr. Notte said together, is
for the United States to lead the effort to stand up to Iran.
That means rallying our allies including, I think Dr. Notte is
quite right, our allies in Europe and it also means standing
and working with our allies in the region. Israel as part of
CENTCOM now means there are greater opportunities from a
security standpoint to work together with Israel, our Gulf
allies in the region to confront this.
But the best way to do that is for just as America has
rallied support from our allies in opposition of Russia's
violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, we should be
doing the same thing with respect to Iran, correct?
Mr. Rumley. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think there is a
real desire in the Middle East right now for a type of security
architecture designed to combat Iran's, or counter at least,
Iran's malign activities in the region. You will recall the
previous Administration tried to sort of build the security
architecture. It did not work for a number of reasons. I think
it was A, a bit too ambitious. At the time, it tried to cover
so many disciplines and subdisciplines. It was also before the
Abraham Accords and the normalization.
But things have changed now. We have these normalization
agreements. We have these peace agreements. We have moved
Israel under the UCP into CENTCOM. So I think we have the
window and the opportunity to start building this and I would
recommend that we start with sort of a modest approach. Focus
on one capability like air defense and link our partners in the
region, bring in our European partners as well, and work with
our partners in the region on establishing sort of a network of
air defense systems to counter Iran's activities.
Mr. Deutch. Mr. Rumley, I agree with you as well.
Ms. Welsh, let me just wrap up with you. Mr. Rumley talked
about how things are different. I want to just finish by
talking about how things were before and what we need to do to
ensure that we do not go back there. High food prices were one
of the driving forces behind Arab Spring, and the question is
whether the food insecurity issues as wrought by the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and
the rising food prices that we have seen contribute to anti-
government sentiment, contribute to instability, and what
should we be doing to ensure that we are in the best position
to prevent instability and to work to continue to address
humanitarian needs and the need for greater democracy and human
rights in the region.
Mr. Wilson. Chairman? OK.
Mr. Deutch. I am sorry?
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Chairman, not to interrupt our witness, but
I appreciate you raising the issue of the Iranian nuclear
threat and I would like to submit for the record an article
that we just received, Iran is in Position for a Surprise
Nuclear Breakout, by Andrea Stricker of the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies. And I would like to move that this be
included in the record. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deutch. Without objection, Mr. Wilson.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Deutch. I would point out that--to you as ranking
member, before, since you surprised us, it took a while for
your image to appear so you were literally the voice of god in
this hearing room, which invites lots of thoughts on our part.
But it was good to hear you and we----
Mr. Wilson. Very unusual.
Mr. Deutch [continuing]. Appreciate you submitting that for
the record.
Ms. Welsh?
Ms. Welsh. Thank you, Chairman Deutch, for your question.
Certainly, high food prices put pressure on governments as you
mentioned during the Arab Spring. U.N. food price index reached
an all-time high, and the period of the highest prices directly
coincided with protests that led to regime change in Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt, and again protests across the Middle East and
North Africa.
High food prices are very rarely, if ever, the only cause
of protests that lead to regime change. They do cause
disruption, political and social disruption when there are
preexisting sentiments, preexisting displeasure with, you know,
with government or other factors. We can expect high food
prices to lead to disruptions in places where there are
governance challenges.
What we can do to quell those impacts are as I mentioned
all the efforts that are under discussion in the global fora
right now to blunt, to reduce the price of food for food
importing countries. So that is a short-term response. And
short-term responses, I would put both emergency humanitarian
assistance, which it is incredibly important to continue to
fund that robustly, and also financing for countries that are
not the most food insecure but still need funding to meet their
food security needs, which to me is a separate bucket and I
consider that a separate response in emergency assistance.
In the long term, I think it is very important to continue
to invest in agricultural systems particularly in the Middle
East and North Africa where water security is a very big
challenge, to continue to invest in agricultural production in
countries that are food importing, in the food producing
countries, in major exporting countries around the world. We
shouldn't though assume, we shouldn't confuse investing in
agriculture to be a short-term solution, because certainly at a
time of high fertilizer prices it might help in the long term
but certainly not in the short term.
Mr. Deutch. Great. I appreciate your insight. I think it is
clear from the hearing and the interest of the members the
Russian invasion of Ukraine has no doubt altered the course of
world events. That is particularly true in the Middle East and
North Africa, the effect as it relates to food security and
military presence and the diplomatic landscape. With support
from the United States and partners in the region, we will have
to meet these challenges and we have the opportunity to be a
key pillar of resistance to Russian influence and aggression
both in Ukraine and around the world in the region.
And I appreciate all that our witnesses contributed to this
conversation. I thank them for being here today. Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for you and we
ask our witnesses to please respond to those questions in
writing. I would ask my colleagues to--that any witness
questions for the hearing record be submitted to the
subcommittee clerk within five business days.
And with that, without objection, the hearing is adjourned.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]