

# HEARING ON THE JANUARY 6TH INVESTIGATION

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE TO  
INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH  
ATTACK ON THE  
UNITED STATES CAPITOL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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Attack on the United States Capitol



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THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL

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## HEARING ON THE JANUARY 6TH INVESTIGATION

Tuesday, June 28, 2022

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH  
ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL,  
*Washington, DC.*

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:01 p.m., in room 390, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Thompson, Cheney, Lofgren, Schiff, Aguilar, Murphy, Raskin, Luria, and Kinzinger.

Chairman THOMPSON. The Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol will be in order.

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the Committee in recess at any point.

Pursuant to House Deposition Authority Regulation 10, the Chair announces the Committee's approval to release the deposition material presented during this hearing.

Good afternoon. In our hearings over the previous weeks, the Select Committee has laid out the details of a multi-part pressure campaign driven by the former President aimed at overturning the results of the 2020 Presidential election and blocking the transfer of power. We have shown that this effort was based on a lie, a lie that the election was stolen, tainted by wide-spread fraud. Donald Trump's Big Lie.

In the weeks ahead, the Committee will hold additional hearings about how Donald Trump summoned a mob of his supporters to Washington, spurred them to march on the Capitol, and failed to take meaningful action to quell the violence as it was unfolding on January 6th.

However, in recent days, the Select Committee has obtained new information dealing with what was going on in the White House on January 6th and in the days prior, specific detailed information about what the former President and his top aides were doing and saying in those critical hours, first-hand details of what transpired in the Office of the White House Chief of Staff, just steps from the Oval Office, as the threats of violence became clear, and indeed violence ultimately descended on the Capitol in the attack on American democracy.

It is important that the American people hear that information immediately. That is why, in consultation with the Vice Chair, I have recalled the Committee for today's hearing.

As you have seen and heard in our earlier hearings, the Select Committee has developed a massive body of evidence, thanks to the many hundreds of witnesses who have voluntarily provided information relevant to our investigation. It hasn't always been easy to get that information because the same people who drove the former President's pressure campaign to overturn the election are now trying to cover up the truth about January 6th.

But, thanks to the courage of certain individuals, the truth won't be buried; the American people won't be left in the dark.

Our witness today, Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson, has embodied that courage.

I won't get into a lot of detail about what Ms. Hutchinson's testimony will show. I will allow her words to speak for themselves. I hope everyone at home will listen very closely.

First, I will recognize our distinguished Vice Chair, Ms. Cheney of Wyoming, for any opening statements she would care to offer.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In our first five hearings, the Committee has heard from a significant number of Republicans, including former Trump administration Justice Department officials, Trump campaign officials, several members of President Trump's White House staff, a prominent conservative judge, and several others.

Today's witness, Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson, is another Republican and another former member of President Trump's White House staff.

Certain of us in the House of Representatives recall that Ms. Hutchinson once worked for House Republican Whip Steve Scalise. But she is also a familiar face on Capitol Hill because she held a prominent role in the White House Legislative Affairs Office and later was the principal aide to President Trump's chief of staff, Mark Meadows.

Ms. Hutchinson has spent considerable time up here on Capitol Hill representing the Trump administration, and we welcome her back.

Up until now, our hearings have each been organized to address specific elements of President Trump's plan to overturn the 2020 election. Today, we are departing somewhat from that model because Ms. Hutchinson's testimony touches on several important and cross-cutting topics, topics that are relevant to each of our future hearings.

In her role working for the White House chief of staff, Ms. Hutchinson handled a vast number of sensitive issues. She worked in the West Wing, several steps down the hall from the Oval Office. Ms. Hutchinson spoke daily with Members of Congress, with high-ranking officials in the administration, with senior White House staff, including Mr. Meadows, with White House counsel lawyers, and with Mr. Tony Ornato, who served as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff. She also worked on a daily basis with members of the Secret Service who were posted in the White House. In short, Ms. Hutchinson was in a position to know a great deal about the happenings in the Trump White House.

Ms. Hutchinson has already sat for four videotaped interviews with Committee investigators, and we thank her very much for her cooperation and for her courage. We will cover certain but not all



relevant topics within Ms. Hutchinson's knowledge today. Again, our future hearings will supply greater detail, putting the testimony today in a broader and more complete context.

Today, you will hear Ms. Hutchinson relate certain first-hand observations of President Trump's conduct on January 6th. You will also hear new information regarding the actions and statements of Mr. Trump's senior advisors that day, including his chief of staff, Mark Meadows, and his White House counsel. We will begin to examine evidence bearing on what President Trump and members of the White House staff knew about the prospect for violence on January 6th, even before that violence began.

To best communicate the information the Committee has gathered, we will follow the practice of our recent hearings, playing videotaped testimony from Ms. Hutchinson and others and also posing questions to Ms. Hutchinson live.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much.

Our witness today is Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson, who served in the Trump administration in the White House Office of Legislative Affairs from 2019 to 2020 and as a special assistant to the President in the White House Chief of Staff's Office from March 2020 through January 2021.

I will now swear in our witness.

The witness will please stand and raise her right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. You may be seated.

Let the record reflect the witness answered in the affirmative.

I now recognize myself for questions.

Ms. Hutchinson, I would like to start with a few questions about your background. These are some photographs we have obtained highlighting your career.

These show you with Members of Congress, including Steve Scalise, as well as the White House with Leader Kevin McCarthy and Jim Jordan. Others show you with the President and Members of Congress aboard Air Force One.

Before you worked in the White House, you worked on Capitol Hill for Representative Steve Scalise, the Republican Whip, and Senator Ted Cruz. Then, in 2019, you moved to the White House and served there until the end of the Trump administration in 2020.

When you started at the White House, you served in the Office of Legislative Affairs. We understand that you were initially hired as a staff assistant but were soon promoted to a position of greater responsibility. Can you explain your role for the Committee?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. When I moved over to the White House Chief of Staff's Office with Mr. Meadows, when he became the fourth chief of staff, it is difficult to describe a typical day. I was a special assistant to the President and an advisor to the chief of staff. The days depended on what the President was doing that day, and that is kind-of how my portfolio was reflected.

I had a lot of outreach with Members of Congress, senior Cabinet officials. We would work—I would work on policy issues with relevant internal components and Members on the Hill, as well as se-

curity protocol at the White House complex for Mr. Meadows and the President.

Chairman THOMPSON. Then you received another promotion in March 2020. At that time, you became the principal aide to the new White House chief of staff, Mark Meadows. Is that right?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct, sir.

Chairman THOMPSON. What did a typical day look like for you in your work with Mr. Meadows?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. It varied with what was going on. We spent a lot of time on the Hill. I spent time on the Hill independently too, as I was his liaison for Capitol Hill. We did a lot of Presidential travel engagements, but mostly I was there to serve what the chief of staff needed, and a lot of times what the chief of staff needed was a reflection of what the President's schedule was detailed to do that day.

Chairman THOMPSON. So is it fair to say that you spoke regularly in your position both with Members of Congress and with senior members of the Trump administration?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct. That is a fair assessment, sir.

Chairman THOMPSON. Would you say that, in your work with Mr. Meadows, you were typically in contact with him and others in the White House throughout the day?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct, sir. Mr. Meadows and I were in contact almost pretty much throughout every day consistently.

Chairman THOMPSON. Although so much of grave importance happens in the West Wing of the White House, it is quite a small building.

Above me on the screen, you can see a map of the first floor of the West Wing of the White House. On the right, you can see the President's Oval Office; on the left, the chief of staff's office suite. Within the chief of staff's office suite, in the heart of the West Wing, was your desk, which was between the Vice President's office, Mr. Kushner's office, and the Oval Office.

Ms. Hutchinson, is this an accurate depiction of where you were located?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. It is accurate. It is a lot smaller than it looks.

Chairman THOMPSON. Absolutely.

Ms. Hutchinson, this is a photo that shows the short distance between your office and the President's Oval Office. It only takes 5 to 10 seconds or so to walk down the hall from your office to the Oval Office. Is that right?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct.

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.

Pursuant to section 5(c)(8) of House Resolution 503, the Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Wyoming, Ms. Cheney, for questions.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we will begin today with an exchange that first provided Ms. Hutchinson a tangible sense of the on-going planning for the events of January 6th.

On January 2nd, 4 days before the attack on our Capitol, President Trump's lead lawyer, Mr. Giuliani, was meeting with White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows and others.

Ms. Hutchinson, do you remember Mr. Giuliani meeting with Mr. Meadows on January 2, 2021?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I do. He met with Mr. Meadows in the evening of January 2, 2021.

Vice Chair CHENEY. We understand that you walked Mr. Giuliani out of the White House that night, and he talked to you about January 6th. What do you remember him saying?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. As Mr. Giuliani and I were walking to his vehicle that evening, he looked at me and said something to the effect of: "Cass, are you excited for the 6th? It is going to be a great day."

I remember looking at him, saying: "Rudy, would you explain what is happening on the 6th?"

He responded something to the effect of: "We are going to the Capitol. It is going to be great. The President's going to be there. He is going to look powerful. He is going to be with the Members. He is going to be with the Senators. Talk to the chief about it. Talk to the chief about it. He knows about it."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Did you go back then up to the West Wing and tell Mr. Meadows about your conversation with Mr. Giuliani?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I did. After Mr. Giuliani had left the campus that evening, I went back up to our office, and I found Mr. Meadows in his office on the couch. He was scrolling through his phone. I remember leaning against the doorway and saying: "I had an interesting conversation with Rudy, Mark. It sounds like we are going to go to the Capitol."

He didn't look up from his phone and said something to the effect of: "There is a lot going on, Cass, but I don't know; things might get real, real bad on January 6th."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, Mr. Meadows is engaged in litigation with the Committee to try to avoid testifying here. What was your reaction when he said to you "things might get real, real bad"?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. In the days before January 2nd, I was apprehensive about the 6th. I had heard general plans for a rally. I had heard tentative movements to potentially go to the Capitol.

But, when hearing Rudy's take on January 6th and then Mark's response, that was the first—that evening was the first moment that I remember feeling scared and nervous for what could happen on January 6th. I had a deeper concern for what was happening with the planning aspects of it.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you, Ms. Hutchinson.

Today, we are going to be focusing primarily on the events of January 5th and 6th at the White House.

But, to begin and to frame the discussion, I want to talk about a conversation that you had with Mr. John Ratcliffe, the Director of National Intelligence. You had this conversation in December 2020.

Mr. Ratcliffe was nominated by President Trump to oversee U.S. intelligence—or U.S. intelligence community. Before his appointment, Mr. Ratcliffe was a Republican Member of Congress.

As you will see on this clip, Director Ratcliffe's comments in December 2020 were prescient.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. My understanding was Mr.—Director Ratcliffe didn't want much to do with the post-election period. Director Ratcliffe felt that it wasn't some-

thing that the White House should be pursuing. He felt it was dangerous to the President's legacy. He had expressed to me that he was concerned that it could spiral out of control and potentially be dangerous, either for our democracy or the way that things were going for the 6th.

Mr. GEORGE. When you say, "It wasn't something the White House should be pursuing," what is the "it"?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Trying to fight the results of the election, finding missing ballots, pressuring—filing lawsuits in certain States where there didn't seem to be significant evidence and reaching out to State legislatures about that. So pretty much the way that the White House is handling the post-election period, he felt that there could be dangerous repercussions in terms of precedents set for elections, for our democracy, for the 6th. You know, he was hoping that we would concede.

Vice Chair CHENEY. So, Ms. Hutchinson, now we are going to turn to certain information that was available before January 4th and what the Trump administration and the President knew about the potential for violence before January 6th.

On the screen, you will see an email received by Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue on January 4th from the National Security Division of the Department of Justice.

Mr. Donoghue testified in our hearings last week. The email identifies apparent planning by those coming to Washington on January 6th to "occupy Federal buildings," and discussions of "invading the Capitol Building."

Here is what Mr. Donoghue said to us.

Acting Deputy Attorney General DONOGHUE. And we knew that if you have tens of thousands of very upset people showing up in Washington, DC, that there was potential for violence.

Vice Chair CHENEY. U.S. Secret Service was looking at similar information and watching the planned demonstrations. In fact, their Intelligence Division sent several emails to White House personnel like Deputy Chief of Staff Tony Ornato, and the head of the President's protective detail, Robert Engel, including certain materials listing events like those on the screen.

The White House continued to receive updates about planned demonstrations, including information regarding the Proud Boys organizing and planning to attend events on January 6th. Although Ms. Hutchinson has no detailed knowledge of any planning involving the Proud Boys or January 6th, she did note this:

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I recall hearing the word "Oath Keeper" and hearing the word "Proud Boys" closer to the planning of the January 6th rally when Mr. Giuliani would be around.

Vice Chair CHENEY. On January 3rd, the Capitol Police issued a special event assessment.

In that document, the Capitol Police noted that the Proud Boys and other groups plan to be in Washington, DC, on January 6th and indicated that, "Unlike previous post-election protests, the targets of the pro-Trump supporters are not necessarily the counter protesters as they were previously, but rather Congress itself is the target on the 6th."

Of course, we all know now that the Proud Boys showed up on January 6th, marched from the Washington Monument to the Capitol that day, and led the riotous mob to invade and occupy our Capitol.

Ms. Hutchinson, I want to play you a clip of one of our meetings when you described the call on January 4th that you received from

National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien on the same topic: Potential violence on January 6th.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I received a call from Robert O'Brien, the National Security Advisor. He had asked if he could speak with Mr. Meadows about potential violent—words of violence that he was hearing that were potentially going to happen on the Hill on January 6th. I had asked if he connected with Tony Ornato because Tony Ornato had a conversation with him—with Mark about that topic. Robert had said, "I will talk to Tony," and then, you know, I don't know if Robert ever connected with Mark about the issue.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, can you describe for us Mr. Ornato's responsibilities as deputy chief of staff?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. The deputy chief of staff's position at the White House for operations is arguably one of the most important positions that somebody can hold. They are in charge of all security protocol for the campus and all Presidential protectees, primarily, the President and the First Family, but anything that requires security for any individual that has Presidential protection. So, the chief of staff or the National Security Advisor, as well as the Vice President's team too, Tony would oversee all of that. He was the conduit for security protocol between White House staff and United States Secret Service.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you.

You also described a brief meeting between Mr. Ornato and Mr. Meadows on the potential for violence. The meeting was on January 4th. They were talking about the potential for violence on January 6th. Let's listen to a clip of that testimony.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I remember Mr. Ornato had talked to him about intelligence reports. I just remember Mr. Ornato coming in and saying that we had intel reports saying that there could potentially be violence on the—on the 6th.

Vice Chair CHENEY. You also told us about reports of violence and weapons that the Secret Service were receiving on the night of January 5th and throughout the day on January 6th. Is that correct?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct.

Vice Chair CHENEY. There are reports that police in Washington, DC, had arrested several people with firearms or ammunition following a separate pro-Trump rally in Freedom Plaza on the evening of January 5th. Are those some of the reports that you recall hearing about?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. They are.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Of course, the world now knows that the people who attacked the Capitol on January 6th had many different types of weapons.

When a President speaks, the Secret Service typically requires those attending to pass through metal detectors, known as magnetometers or mags for short. The Select Committee has learned that people who willingly entered the enclosed area for President Trump's speech were screened so they could attend the rally at the Ellipse. They had weapons and other items that were confiscated: Pepper spray, knives, brass knuckles, tasers, body armor, gas masks, batons, blunt weapons. Those were just from the people who chose to go through the security for the President's event on the Ellipse, not the several thousand members of the

crowd who refused to go through the mags and watched from the lawn near the Washington Monument.

The Select Committee has learned about reports from outside the magnetometers and has obtained police radio transmissions identifying individuals with firearms, including AR-15s, near the Ellipse on the morning of January 6th. Let's listen.

MPD RADIO TRANSMISSION. There's an individual who's entering, gonna be a white male, about 6 feet tall, thin build, brown cowboy boots. He's got blue jeans and a blue jean jacket, and underneath the blue jean jacket, complainants both saw stock of an AR-15. He's gonna be with a group of individuals—about five to eight—five to eight other individuals. Two of the individuals in that group at the base of the tree near the porta potties were wearing green fatigues—green olive dress-style fatigues, about 5'8", 5'9", skinny—skinny White males, brown cowboy boots. They had Glock-style pistols in their waistbands.

MPD RADIO TRANSMISSION. 8736 with a message. That subject's weapon on his right hip—that's a negative. He's in the tree.

MPD RADIO TRANSMISSION. Motor 1, make sure PPD knows they have an elevated threat in the trees south side of Constitution Avenue. Look for the "Don't Tread On Me" flag, American flag facemask, cowboy boots, weapon on the right—right side hip.

MPD RADIO TRANSMISSION. I've got three men walking down the street in fatigues carrying AR-15. Copy at 14th and Independence.

Vice Chair CHENEY. AR-15s at 14th and Independence. As you saw in those emails, the first report that we showed we now know was sent in the 8 o'clock hour on January 6th. This talked about people in the crowd wearing ballistic helmets and body armor, carrying radio equipment and military-grade backpacks.

The second report we showed you on the screen was sent by the Secret Service in the 11 a.m. hour, and it addressed reports of a man with a rifle near the Ellipse.

Ms. Hutchinson, in prior testimony, you described for us a meeting in the White House around 10 a.m. in the morning of January 6th, involving Chief of Staff Meadows and Tony Ornato. Were you in that meeting?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I was.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Let's listen to your testimony about that meeting, and then we will have some questions.

Mr. GEORGE. I think the last time we talked you mentioned that some of the weapons that people had at the rally included flag poles—oversized sticks or flag poles, bear spray. Is there anything else that you recall hearing about the people who had gathered [inaudible]?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I recall Tony and I having a conversation with Mark probably around 10 a.m., 10:15 a.m., where I remember Tony mentioning knives, guns in the form of pistols and rifles, bear spray, body armor, spears, and flag poles. Spears were one item. Flag poles were one item. But then Tony had relayed to me something to the effect of "and these"—"I think people are fastening spears on to the ends of flag poles."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, here's a clip of your testimony regarding Mr. Meadows's response to learning that the rally attendees were armed that day.

Vice Chair CHENEY. What was Mark's reaction—Mr. Meadows' reaction to this list of weapons that people had in the crowd?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. When Tony and I went in to talk to Mark that morning, Mark was sitting on his couch on his phone, which is something typical. I remember Tony just got right into it, like, "Sir, I just want to let you know," and informed him, like, "This is how many people we have outside the mags right now. These are the weapons that we are known to have." It's possible he listed more weapons off that I just don't recall and gave him a brief, but inconcise, explanation but also fairly—fairly thorough. And I remember distinctly Mark not looking up from his phone. All right.

I remember Tony finishing his explanation and it taking a few seconds for Mark to say something, to the point I almost said, "Mark, did you hear him?" And then Mark chimed in and was, like, "All right. Anything else?" still looking down at his phone. And Tony looked at me and I looked at Tony, and Tony said, "No, sir. Do you have any questions?" He was, like, "What are you hearing?" And I looked at Tony, and I was, like, "Sir, he just told you about what was happening down at the rally." And then he was, like, "Yeah, yeah, I know." And then he looked up and said, "Have you talked to the President?" And Tony said, "Yes, sir. He is aware, too." And then he said, "All right. Good."

Vice Chair CHENEY. He asked Tony if Tony had informed the President?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Yes.

Vice Chair CHENEY. And Tony said, yes, he had?

Vice Chair CHENEY. So, Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding that Mr. Ornato told the President about weapons at the rally on the morning of January 6th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is what Mr. Ornato relayed to me.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Here's how you characterized Mr. Meadows's general response when people raised concerns about what could happen on January 6th.

Mr. GEORGE. So, at the time in the days leading up to the 6th, there were lots of public reports about how things might go bad on the 6th, even the potential for violence. If I'm hearing you correctly, what stands out to you is that Mr. Meadows did not share those concerns or at least didn't act on those concerns?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Did not act on those concerns would be accurate.

Mr. GEORGE. But other people raised them to him? Like, in this exchange, you mention that Mr. Ornato pulled him aside.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That's correct.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, we are going to show now an exchange of texts between you and Deputy Chief of Staff Ornato.

These text messages were exchanged while you were at the Ellipse. In one text, you write: "But the crowd looks good from that vantage point. As long as we get the shot. He was F'ing furious."

The text messages also stress that President Trump kept mentioning the OTR, an off-the-record movement. We are going to come back and ask you about that in a minute.

But could you tell us, first of all, who it is in the text who was furious?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. The "he" in that text that I was referring to was the President.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Why was he furious, Ms. Hutchinson?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. He was furious because he wanted the arena that we had on the Ellipse to be maxed out at capacity for all attendees. The advance team had relayed to him that the mags were free flowing. Everybody who had wanted to come in had already come in, but he still was angry about the extra space and wanted more people to come in.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Did you go to the rally in the Presidential motorcade?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I was there, yes, in the motorcade.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Were you backstage with the President and other members of his staff and family?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I was.

Vice Chair CHENEY. You told us, Ms. Hutchinson, about particular comments that you heard while you were in the tent area.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. When we were in the off-stage announce area tent behind the stage, he was very concerned about the shot, meaning the photograph that we would

get because the rally space wasn't full. One of the reasons, which I've previously stated, was because he wanted it to be full and for people to not feel excluded because they had come far to watch him at the rally, and he felt the mags were at fault for not letting everybody in. But another leading reason, and likely the primary reason, is because he wanted it full, and he was angry that we weren't letting people through the mags with weapons—what the Secret Service deems as weapons and are—are weapons.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. But when we were in the off-stage announce tent, I was part of a conversation—I was in the vicinity of a conversation where I overheard the President say something to the effect of, "You know, I don't F'ing care that they have weapons. They're not here to hurt me. Take the F'ing mags away. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol from here. Let the people in. Take the F'ing mags away."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Just to be clear, Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding that the President wanted to take the mags away and said that the armed individuals were not there to hurt him?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That's a fair assessment.

Vice Chair CHENEY. The issue wasn't with the amount of space available in the official rally area only but, instead, that people did not want to have to go through the mags.

Let's listen to a portion of what you told us about that.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. In this particular instance, it wasn't the capacity of our space. It was the mags and the people that didn't want to come through, and that's what Tony had been trying to relay to him that morning: "You know, it's not the issues that we encounter on the campaign. We have enough space, sir. They don't want to come in right now. They have weapons they don't want confiscated by the Secret Service, and they're fine on the Mall. They can see you on the Mall, and they want to march straight to the Capitol from the Mall."

Vice Chair CHENEY. The President apparently wanted all attendees inside the official rally space and repeatedly said, "They are not here to hurt me."

Vice Chair CHENEY. And—and just to be clear, so he was told again in—in that conversation—or was he told again in that conversation that people couldn't come through the mags because they had weapons?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Correct.

Vice Chair CHENEY. And that people—and his response was to say, "They can march to the Capitol from—from the Ellipse?"

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Something to the effect of "take the F'ing mags away. They're not here to hurt me. Let them in. Let my people in. They can march to the Capitol after the rally is over. They can march from—they can march from the Ellipse. Take the F'ing mags away. Then they can march to the Capitol."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, what we saw when those clips were playing were photos provided by the National Archives showing the President in the offstage tent before his speech on the Ellipse. You were in some of those photos as well. I just want to confirm that that is when you heard the President say the people with weapons weren't there to hurt him and that he wanted the Secret Service to remove the magnetometers.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct. In the photos that you displayed, we were standing toward the front of the tent with the TVs really close to where he would walk out to go onto the stage. These conversations happened 2 to 3 minutes before he took the stage that morning.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Let's reflect on that for moment. President Trump was aware that a number of the individuals in the crowd had weapons and were wearing body armor. Here is what President Trump instructed the crowd to do.



President TRUMP. We're gonna walk down—and I'll be there with you. We're gonna walk down—we're gonna walk down—anyone you want but I think right here—we're gonna walk down to the Capitol.

Vice Chair CHENEY. The crowd, as we know, did proceed to the Capitol. It soon became apparent to the Secret Service, including the Secret Service teams in the crowd, along with White House staff that security at the Capitol would not be sufficient.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I'd had two or three phone conversations with Mr. Ornato when we were at the Ellipse, and then I had four men on Mr. Meadows' detail with me in between those individuals and then a few other bodies on the ground, just Secret Service doing advance. They were getting notifications through their radios, and Mr. Ornato in one phone conversation had called me and said, "Make sure the chief knows that they are getting close to the Capitol. They are having trouble stacking bodies."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, when you said they were having trouble stacking bodies, did you mean that law enforcement at the Capitol needed more people to defend the Capitol from the rioters?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. It was becoming clear to us and to the Secret Service that Capitol Police officers were getting overrun at the security barricades outside of the Capitol Building, and they were having short—they were short people to defend the building against the rioters.

Vice Chair CHENEY. You mentioned that Mr. Ornato was conveying this to you because he wanted you to tell Mr. Meadows. So did you tell Mr. Meadows that people were getting closer to the Capitol and that Capitol Police was having difficulty?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. After I had the conversation with Mr. Meadows, Mr.—after I had the conversation with Ornato, I went to have the discussion with Mr. Meadows. He was in a secure vehicle at the time making a call. So, when I had gone over to the car, I went to open the door to let him know; he had immediately shut it. I don't know who he was speaking with. It wasn't something that he regularly did, especially when I would go over to give him information. So I was a bit taken aback, but I didn't think much of it and thinking that I was—I would be able to have the conversation with him a few moments later.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Were you able to have that conversation a few moments later?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Probably about 20 to 25 minutes later. There was another period in between where he shut the door again. Then, when he finally got out of the vehicle, we had the conversation. But, at that point, there was a backlog of information that he should have been made aware of.

Vice Chair CHENEY. So you opened the door to the control car, and Mr. Meadows pulled it shut?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct.

Vice Chair CHENEY. He did that two times.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct.

Vice Chair CHENEY. When you finally were able to give Mr. Meadows the information about the violence at the Capitol, what was his reaction?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. He almost had a lack of reaction. I remember him saying "all right," something to the effect of: How much longer does the President have left in his speech?

Vice Chair CHENEY. Again, much of this information about the potential for violence was known or learned about the onset of the violence, early enough for President Trump to take steps to prevent it. He could, for example, have urged the crowd at the Ellipse not to march to the Capitol. He could have condemned the violence immediately once it began, or he could have taken multiple other steps.

But, as we will see today and in later hearings, President Trump had something else in mind.

One other question at this point, Ms. Hutchinson. Were you aware of concerns that White House Counsel Pat Cipollone or Eric Herschmann had about the language President Trump used in his Ellipse speech?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. There were many discussions the morning of the 6th about the rhetoric of the speech that day. In my conversations with Mr. Herschmann, he had relayed that we would be foolish to include language that had been included at the President's request, which had lines along to the effect of: Fight for Trump. We are going to march to the Capitol. I will be there with you. Fight for me. Fight for what we are doing. Fight for the movement.

Things about Vice President at the time too.

Both Mr. Herschmann and the White House Counsel's Office were urging the speechwriters to not include that language for legal concerns and also for the optics of what it could portray the President wanting to do that day.

Vice Chair CHENEY. We just heard the President say that he would be with his supporters as they marched to the Capitol. Even though he did not end up going, he certainly wanted to.

Some have questioned whether President Trump genuinely planned to come here to the Capitol on January 6th. In his book, Mark Meadows falsely wrote that, after President gave his speech on January 6th, he told Mr. Meadows that he was "speaking metaphorically about the walk to the Capitol."

As you will see, Donald Trump was not speaking metaphorically.

As we heard earlier, Rudy Giuliani told Ms. Hutchinson that Mr. Trump planned to travel to the Capitol on January 6th. I want to pause for just a moment to ask you, Ms. Hutchinson, to explain some of the terminology you will hear today. We have heard you use two different terms to describe plans for the President's movement to the Capitol or anywhere else. One of those is a "scheduled movement" and another one is "OTR." Could you describe for us what each of those mean?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. A scheduled Presidential movement is on his official schedule. It is notified to the press and to a wide range of staff that will be traveling with him. It is known to the public, known to the Secret Service, and they are able to coordinate the movement days in advance.

An off-the-record movement is confined to the knowledge of a very, very small group of advisors and staff. Typically, a very small group of staff would travel with him, mostly that are just included in the National Security package. You can pull an off-the-record movement together in less than an hour. It is a way to kind-of circumvent having to release it to the press, if that is the goal of it,

or to not have to have as many security parameters put in place ahead of time to make the moment happen.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you.

Let's turn back now to the President's plans to travel to the Capitol on January 6th. We know that White House Counsel Pat Cipollone was concerned about the legal implications of such a trip, and he agreed with the Secret Service that it shouldn't happen.

Ms. Hutchinson, did you have any conversations with Pat Cipollone about his concerns about the President going to the Capitol on January 6th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. On January 3rd, Mr. Cipollone had approached me, knowing that Mark had raised the prospect of going up to the Capitol on January 6th. Mr. Cipollone and I had a brief private conversation where he said to me: "We need to make sure that this doesn't happen. This would be legally a terrible idea for us. We have serious legal concerns if we go up to the Capitol that day."

He then urged me to continue relaying that to Mr. Meadows, because it is my understanding that Mr. Cipollone thought that Mr. Meadows was indeed pushing this along with the President.

Vice Chair CHENEY. We understand, Ms. Hutchinson, that you also spoke to Mr. Cipollone on the morning of the 6th, as you were about to go to the rally on the Ellipse. Mr. Cipollone said something to you like: "Make sure the movement to the Capitol does not happen."

Is that correct?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct. I saw Mr. Cipollone right before I walked out onto West Exec that morning, and Mr. Cipollone said something to the effect of: "Please make sure we don't go up to the Capitol, Cassidy. Keep in touch with me. We are going to get charged with every crime imaginable if we make that movement happen."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Do you remember which crimes Mr. Cipollone was concerned with?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. In the days leading up to the 6th, we had conversations about potentially obstructing justice or defrauding the electoral count.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Let's hear about some of those concerns that you mentioned earlier in one of your interviews with us.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Having a private conversation with Pat late in the afternoon of the 3rd or 4th, that Pat was concerned it would look like we were obstructing justice or obstructing the electoral college count—and I apologize for probably not being very—

Vice Chair CHENEY. That's fine.

Ms. HUTCHINSON [continuing]. Clear with my legal terms here—but that it would look like we were obstructing what was happening on Capitol Hill, and he was also worried that it would look like we were inciting a riot or encouraging a riot to erupt on the Capitol—at the Capitol.

Vice Chair CHENEY. In fact, in the days before January 6th and on January 6th itself, President Trump expressed to multiple White House aides that he wanted to go to the Capitol after his speech.

Here is what various White House aides have told the Committee about the President's desire to go to the Capitol.

Mr. GEORGE. Did the President tell you this, that he wanted to speak at the Capitol?

Mr. LUNA. Correct. Yes.

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Mr. TONOLLI. During the meeting in the dining room, did the idea of the President proceeding or walking to the Capitol on the 6th after his speech come up?

Mr. MAX MILLER. Walking to the Capitol? No.

Mr. TONOLLI. Driving to the Capitol?

Mr. MAX MILLER. It came up.

Mr. TONOLLI. OK. How did it come up and what was discussed?

Mr. MAX MILLER. He brought it up. He said, "I want to go down to the Capitol."

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Mr. GEORGE. What about him marching to the Capitol on the 6th?

Mr. LUNA. Yes.

Mr. GEORGE. Tell us about that.

Mr. LUNA. So it's kind-of a general thing. I mean, to get into the specifics of it, I—I was aware of a desire of the President to potentially march to the—or—or accompany the rally attendees to the Capitol.

Mr. GEORGE. When did you first hear about this idea of the President accompanying rally attendees to the Capitol on the 6th?

Mr. LUNA. This was at the 6th. This was during the—after he finished his remarks.

Vice Chair CHENEY. When the President said that he would be going to the Capitol during his speech on the Ellipse, the Secret Service scrambled to find a way for him to go. We know this from witnesses and the Secret Service, also from messages among staff on the President's National Security Council. The NSC staff were monitoring the situation in real time. You can see how the situation evolved in the following chat log that the Committee has obtained.

As you can see, NSC staff believed that MOGUL—the President—was "going to the Capitol," and "they are finding the best route now."

From these chats, we also know the staff learned of the attack on the Capitol in real time. When President Trump left the Ellipse stage at 1:10, the staff knew that rioters had invaded the inaugural stage and Capitol Police were calling for all available officers to respond.

When Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy heard the President say he was going to the Capitol, he called you, Ms. Hutchinson. Isn't that right?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct.

Vice Chair CHENEY. In this text message, you told Tony Ornato, "McCarthy just called me too," and "Do you guys think you are coming to my office?"

Tell us about the call that day with Leader McCarthy during the President's speech on the Ellipse.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I was still in the tent behind the stage. When you are behind the stage, you can't really hear what is going on in front of you. So, when Mr. McCarthy called me with this information, I answered the call, and he sounded rushed but also frustrated and angry at me. I was confused because I didn't know what the President had just said.

He then explained: "The President just said he is marching to the Capitol. You told me this whole week you aren't coming up here. Why would you lie to me?"

I said: "I am not lying. I wasn't lying to you, sir. I—we are not going to the Capitol."

He said: "Well, he just said it on stage, Cassidy. Figure it out. Don't come up here."

I said: "I will run the traps on this now. I will shoot you a text. I can assure you we are not coming up to the Capitol. We have already made that decision."

He pressed a little bit more, believing me, but I think frustrated that the President had said that. We ended the phone conversation after that.

I called Mr. Ornato to reconfirm that we weren't going to the Capitol, and—which is also in our text messages. I sent Mr. McCarthy another text telling him the affirmative, that we were not going up to the Capitol, and he didn't respond after that.

Vice Chair CHENEY. We understand, Ms. Hutchinson, that the plans for the President to come to the Capitol had included discussions at some point about what the President would do when he came up to the Capitol on January 6th.

Let's look at a clip of one of your interviews discussing that issue with the Committee.

Vice Chair CHENEY. When you were talking about a scheduled movement, did anyone say what the President wanted to do when he got here?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. No, not that I can specifically remember. I remember—I remember hearing a few different ideas discussed with—between Mark and Scott Perry, Mark and Rudy Giuliani. I don't know which conversations were elevated to the President. I don't know what he personally wanted to do when he went up to the Capitol that day. You know, I know that there were discussions about him having another speech outside of the Capitol before going in. I know that there was a conversation about him going into the House Chamber at one point.

Vice Chair CHENEY. As we have all just heard, in the days leading up to January 6th, on the day of the speech, both before and during and after the rally speech, President Trump was pushing his staff to arrange for him to come up here to the Capitol during the electoral vote count. Let's turn now to what happened in the President's vehicle when the Secret Service told him he would not be going to the Capitol after his speech.

First, here is the President's motorcade leaving the Ellipse after his speech on January 6th.

Ms. Hutchinson, when you returned to the White House in the motorcade after the President's speech, where did you go?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. When I returned to the White House, I walked upstairs toward the chief of staff's office, and I noticed Mr. Ornato lingering outside of the office. Once we had made eye contact, he quickly waved me to go into his office, which was just across the hall from mine.

When I went in, he shut the door, and I noticed Bobby Engel, who was the head of Mr. Trump's security detail, sitting in a chair looking somewhat discombobulated, a little lost.

I looked at Tony, and he had said: "Did you F'ing hear what happened in the Beast?"

I said: "No, Tony, I just got back. What happened?"

Tony proceeded to tell me that, when the President got in the Beast, he was under the impression from Mr. Meadows that the off-the-record movement to the Capitol was still possible and likely to happen but that Bobby had more information.

So, once the President had gotten into the vehicle with Bobby, he thought that they were going up to the Capitol, and when Bobby had relayed to him “we are not, we don’t have the assets to do it, it is not secure, we are going back to the West Wing,” the President had very strong, a very angry response to that.

Tony described him as being irate. The President said something to the effect of: “I am the F’ing President. Take me up to the Capitol now.”

To which Bobby responded: “Sir, we have to go back to the West Wing.”

The President reached up toward the front of the vehicle to grab at the steering wheel. Mr. Engel grabbed his arm and said: “Sir, you need to take your hand off the steering wheel. We are going back to the West Wing. We are not going to the Capitol.”

Mr. Trump then used his free hand to lunge toward Bobby Engel. When Mr. Ornato had recounted the story to me, he had motioned toward his clavicles.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Was Mr. Engel in the room as Mr. Ornato told you this story?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. He was.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Did Mr. Engel correct or disagree with any part of the story from Mr. Ornato?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Engel did not correct or disagree with any part of the story.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Did Mr. Engel or Mr. Ornato ever after that tell you that what Mr. Ornato had just said was untrue?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Neither Mr. Ornato nor Mr. Engel told me ever that it was untrue.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Despite this altercation, this physical altercation during the ride back to the White House, President Trump still demanded to go to the Capitol.

Here is what Kayleigh McEnany, the White House press secretary at the time, wrote in her personal notes and told the Committee about President Trump’s desire to go the Capitol after returning to the White House.

Mr. WOOD. When you wrote, “POTUS wanted to walk to the Capitol,” was that based solely on what the President said during his speech or anything that he or anybody else said afterwards?

Ms. MCENANY. So, to the best of my recollection, I believe when we got back to the White House he said he wanted to physically walk with the marchers, and according to my notes, he then said he’d be fine with just riding the Beast. But to the best of my recollection, he wanted to be a part of the march in some fashion.

Mr. WOOD. And just for the record, “the Beast” refers to the Presidential limousine?

Ms. MCENANY. Yes.

Vice Chair CHENEY. President Trump did not go to the Capitol that day. We understand that he blamed Mark Meadows for that.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. So, prior to leaving the rally site when he got off the stage and everybody was making the movement back to the motorcade, I’d overheard Mr. Meadows say to him then, as I had prior to Mr. Trump taking the stage that morning, that he was still working on getting an off-the-record movement to the Capitol. So, when Mr. Trump took the stage, he was under the impression by Mr. Meadows that it was still possible. So, when he got off the stage, I had relayed to Mr. Meadows that I had another conversation with Tony—the movement was still not possible. Mr. Meadows said, “OK.” And then as they proceeded to go to the motorcade and—Mr. Meadows had reiterated, “We’re gonna work on it, sir. Talk to Bobby. Bobby has more information.” Mark got into his vehicle. To my understanding,

Trump got into the Beast, and after we had all arrived back at the White House later in the day, it had been relayed to me via Mark that the President wasn't happy that Bobby didn't pull it off for him and that Mark didn't work hard enough to get the movement on the books.

Vice Chair CHENEY. The physical altercation that Ms. Hutchinson described in the Presidential vehicle was not the first time that the President had become angry about issues relating to the election.

On December 1, 2020, Attorney General Barr said in an interview that the Department of Justice had not found evidence of wide-spread election fraud sufficient to change the outcome of the election.

Ms. Hutchinson, how did the President react to hearing that news?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Around the time that I understand the AP article went live, I remember hearing noise coming from down the hallway. So I poked my head out of the office, and I saw the valet walking toward our office.

He had said: Get the chief down to the dining room. The President wants him.

So, Mark went down to the dining room, came back to the office a few minutes later. After Mark had returned, I left the office and went down to the dining room, and I noticed that the door was propped open, and the valet was inside the dining room changing a tablecloth off of the dining room table. He motioned for me to come in and then pointed toward the front of the room near the fireplace mantle and the TV, where I first noticed there was ketchup dripping down the wall and there was a shattered porcelain plate on the floor.

The valet had articulated that the President was extremely angry at the Attorney General's AP interview and had thrown his lunch against the wall, which was causing them to have to clean up. So, I grabbed a towel and started wiping the ketchup off the wall to help the valet out.

He said something to the effect of: "He is really ticked off about this. I would stay clear of him for right now. He is really, really ticked off about this right now."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, was this the only instance that you are aware where the President threw dishes?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. It is not.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Are there other instances in the dining room that you recall where he expressed his anger?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. There were several times throughout my tenure with the chief of staff that I was aware of him either throwing dishes or flipping the tablecloth to let all the contents of the table go onto the floor, and likely break or go everywhere.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, Attorney General Barr described to the Committee the President's angry reaction when he finally met with President Trump. Let's listen.

Attorney General BARR. And I said, "Look, I know that you're dissatisfied with me and I'm glad to offer my resignation." And he pounded the table very hard—everyone sort-of jumped—and he said "Accepted."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I reserve.

Chairman THOMPSON. The gentlewoman reserves.

The Chair requests those in the hearing room remain seated until the Capitol Police have escorted our witness from the room.

Pursuant to the order of the Committee of today, the Chair declares the Committee in recess for a period of approximately 10 minutes.

[Accordingly, at 2:01 p.m., the Committee recessed until 2:15 p.m., when it was called to order by the Chairman.]

Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Wyoming, Vice Chair Cheney.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before we turn to what Ms. Hutchinson saw and heard in the White House during the violent attack on the Capitol on January 6th, let's discuss certain communications White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows had on January 5th.

President Trump's associate, Roger Stone, attended rallies during the afternoon and the evening of January 5th in Washington, DC.

On January 5th and 6th, Mr. Stone was photographed with multiple members of the Oath Keepers who were allegedly serving as his security detail.

As we now know, multiple members of that organization have been charged with or pled guilty to crimes associated with January 6th. Mr. Stone has invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination before this Committee. General Michael Flynn has also taken the Fifth before this Committee.

Mr. Stone previously had been convicted of other Federal crimes unrelated to January 6th. General Flynn had pleaded guilty to a felony charge also predating and unrelated to January 6th. President Trump pardoned General Flynn just weeks after the Presidential election. In July 2020, he commuted the sentence Roger Stone was to serve.

The night before January 6th, President Trump instructed his chief of staff, Mark Meadows, to contact both Roger Stone and Michael Flynn regarding what would play out the next day.

Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding that President Trump asked Mark Meadows to speak with Roger Stone and General Flynn on January 5th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is correct. That is my understanding.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding that Mr. Meadows called Mr. Stone on the 5th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I am under the impression that Mr. Meadows did complete both a call to Mr. Stone and General Flynn the evening of the 5th.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Do you know what they talked about that evening, Ms. Hutchinson?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I am not sure.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Is it your understanding that Mr. Giuliani, Mr. Eastman, and others had set up what has been called a "war room" at the Willard Hotel on the night of the 5th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I was aware of that the night of the 5th.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Do you know if Mr. Meadows ever intended to go to the Willard Hotel on the night of the 5th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Meadows had a conversation with me where he wanted me to work with Secret Service on a movement from the White House to the Willard Hotel so we could attend the



meeting, or meetings, with Mr. Giuliani and his associates in the war room.

Vice Chair CHENEY. What was your view as to whether or not Mr. Meadows should go to the Willard that night?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I had made it clear to Mr. Meadows that I didn't believe it was a smart idea for him to go to the Willard Hotel that night. I wasn't sure everything that was going on at the Willard Hotel, although I knew enough about what Mr. Giuliani and his associates were pushing during this period. I didn't think that it was something appropriate for the White House chief of staff to attend or to consider involvement in. I made that clear to Mr. Meadows.

Throughout the afternoon, he mentioned a few more times going up to the Willard Hotel that evening, and then eventually dropped the subject the night of the 5th and said that he would dial in instead.

Vice Chair CHENEY. So General Flynn has appeared before this Committee. When he appeared before our Committee, he took the Fifth. Let's briefly view a clip of General Mike Flynn taking the Fifth Amendment.

Vice Chair CHENEY. General Flynn, do you believe the violence on January 6th was justified?

Mr. WARRINGTON. Can we have a minute?

Vice Chair CHENEY. Yes.

[1 minute, 36 seconds later.]

Mr. WARRINGTON. All right. I'm back. Congresswoman Cheney, could you repeat the question, please?

Vice Chair CHENEY. Yes. General Flynn, do you believe the violence on January 6th was justified?

Mr. WARRINGTON. Is that—can I get a clarification. Is that a moral question or a legal question?

Vice Chair CHENEY. I'm asking both.

General FLYNN. I said—I said the Fifth.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Do you believe the violence on January 6th was justified morally?

General FLYNN. Take the Fifth.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Do you believe the violence on January 6th was justified legally?

General FLYNN. Fifth.

Vice Chair CHENEY. General Flynn, do you believe in the peaceful transition of power in the United States of America?

General FLYNN. The Fifth.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Let's move on now to January 6th and the conduct of Donald Trump and Mark Meadows during the attack on the Capitol.

Ms. Hutchinson, I would like now for us to listen to a description, your description of what transpired in the West Wing during the attack. For context, in this clip you describe the time frame starting at about 2 p.m.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. So I remember Mark being alone in his office for quite some time. And, you know, I know we've spoken about Ben Williamson going in at one point, and I don't personally remember Ben going in. I don't doubt that he had gone in. But I remember him being alone in his office for most of the afternoon. Around 2 o'clock to 2:05—around 2 o'clock to 2:05, you know, we were watching the TV, and I could see that the rioters were getting closer and closer to the Capitol.

Mark still hadn't popped out of his office or said anything about it. So that's when I went into his office. I saw that he was sitting on his couch on his cell phone, same as the morning, where he was just kind-of scrolling and typing. I said, "Hey, are

you watching the TV, chief?" Because his TV was small and I—you can see it, but I didn't know if he was really paying attention.

I said, "You watching the TV, chief?" He was like, "Yeah." I said, "The rioters are getting really close. Have you talked to the President?" And he goes, "No, he wants to be alone right now"—still looking at his phone.

So I start to get frustrated because, you know, I sort-of felt like I was watching a—this is not a great comparison—but a bad car accident that was about to happen where you can't stop it but you want to be able to do something.

I just remember—I remember thinking, in that moment, Mark needs to snap out of this, and I don't know how to snap him out of this, but he—he needs to care. And I just remember I blurted out and I said, "Mark, do you know where Jim's at right now?" And he looked up at me at that point and said, "Jim?" And I said, "Mark, is—he was on the floor a little while ago giving a floor speech. Did you listen?" He said, "Yeah, it was real good. Did you like it?" And I said, "Yeah. Do you know where he's at right now?" He said, "No, I haven't heard from him." And I said, "You might want to check in with him, Mark." And I remember pointing at the TV, and I said, "The rioters are getting close. They might get in." And he looked at me and said something to the effect of, "All right. I'll—I'll give him a call."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Not long after the rioters broke into the Capitol, you described what happened with White House Counsel Pat Cipollone.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. No more than a minute, minute and a half later, I see Pat Cipollone barreling down the hallway toward our office, and he rushed right in, looked at me, said, "Is Mark in his office?" And I said, "Yes." He just looked at me and started shaking his head and went over, opened Mark's office door, stood there with the door propped open, and said something to—Mark is still sitting on his phone. I remember, like, glancing and he's still sitting on his phone.

And I remember Pat saying to him something to the effect of, "The rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and see the President now." And Mark looked up at him and said, "He doesn't want to do anything, Pat." And Pat said something to the effect of—and very clearly had said this to Mark—something to the effect of, "Mark, something needs to be done or people are going to die, and the blood is going to be on your F<sup>ing</sup> hands. This is getting out of control. I'm going down there."

And at that point, Mark stood up from his couch, both of his phones in his hand. He had his glasses on still. He walked out with Pat. He put both of his phones on my desk and said, "Let me know if Jim calls." And they walked out and went down to the dining room.

Vice Chair CHENEY. A few minutes later Representative Jordan called back.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. A couple minutes later, so likely around—between 2:15 and 2:25—I know the tweet went out at 2:24. I don't remember if I was there when the tweet went out or if it happened right afterwards, but Jim had called. I answered the phone, said, "One second." He knew it was—I guess he knew who it was and I introduced myself, but I—I don't remember if he called my cell phone or if he had called one of Mark's. But I answered the phone and said, "One sec. Mark's down the hall. I'm going to go hand the phone to him." And he said, "OK."

So I went down. I asked the valet if Mark was in the dining room. The valet said, "Yes." I opened the door to the dining room, briefly stepped in to get Mark's attention. I showed him the phone, like flipped the phone his way so he could see it said Jim Jordan. He had stepped to where I was standing there holding the door open, took the phone, talking to Jim with the door still propped open.

So I took a few steps back. So I probably was two feet from Mark. He was standing in the doorway going into the Oval Office dining room. They had a brief conversation. And in the crossfires—you know, I heard briefly, like, what they were talking about, but in the background, I had heard conversations in the Oval dining room with the—at that point talking about the "hang Mike Pence" chants.

Vice Chair CHENEY. That clip ended, Ms. Hutchinson, with you recalling that you heard the President, Mr. Meadows, and the White House counsel discussing the "Hang Mike Pence" chants, and then you described for us what happened next.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. It wasn't until Mark hung up the phone, handed it back to me, I went back to my desk. A couple of minutes later, him and Pat came back, possibly

Eric Herschmann, too. I'm pretty sure Eric Herschmann was there, but I'm—I'm confident it was Pat that was there. I remember Pat saying something to the effect of, "Mark, we need to do something more. They're literally calling for the Vice President to be F'ing hung."

And Mark had responded something to the effect of, "You heard him, Pat. He thinks Mike deserves it. He doesn't think they're doing anything wrong," to which Pat said something, "This is F'ing crazy. We need to be doing something more," briefly stepped into Mark's office.

And when Mark had said something—when Mark had said something to the effect of "he doesn't think they're doing anything wrong," knowing what I had heard briefly in the dining room, coupled with Pat discussing the "hang Mike Pence" chants in the lobby of our office and then Mark's response, I understood "they're" to be the rioters in the Capitol that were chanting for the Vice President to be hung.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Let me pause here on this point. The rioters chanted, "Hang Mike Pence."

The President of the United States, Donald Trump, said that "Mike deserves it," and that, "Those rioters were not doing anything wrong."

This is a sentiment that he has expressed at other times as well. In an interview with ABC News correspondent Jonathan Karl, President Trump was asked about the supporters chanting, "Hang Mike Pence," last year.

Instead of condemning them, the former President defended them.

Mr. KARL [continuing]. Saying "hang Mike Pence."

President TRUMP. Because it's—it's common sense, Jon. It's common sense that you're supposed to protect—how can you—if you know a vote is fraudulent, right, how can you pass on a fraudulent vote to Congress?

Vice Chair CHENEY. President Trump's view that the rioters were not doing anything wrong, and that "Mike deserved it," helps us to understand why the President did not ask the rioters to leave the Capitol for multiple hours. In fact, he put this tweet out at 2:24 p.m.

Ms. Hutchinson, do you recall seeing this tweet in which the President said the Vice President did not have the courage to do what needed to be done?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I do.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, what was your reaction when you saw this tweet?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. As a staffer that works to always represent the administration to the best of my ability and to showcase the good things that he had done for the country, I remember feeling frustrated, disappointed. Really—it felt personal. I was really sad. As an American, I was disgusted.

It was unpatriotic. It was un-American. We were watching the Capitol Building get defaced over a lie. It was something that was really hard in that moment to digest, knowing what I had been hearing down the hall and the conversations that were happening, seeing that tweet come up and knowing what was happening on the Hill. It is something that I—I still struggle to work through the emotions of that.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, we have also spoken to multiple other White House staff about their reaction to Donald Trump's 2:24 tweet, condemning Mike Pence for not having the courage to refuse to count electoral votes, an act that would have been illegal.

Matthew Pottinger, a former Marine intelligence officer who served in the White House for 4 years, including as Deputy National Security Advisor, was in the vicinity of the Oval Office at various points throughout the day. When he saw that tweet, he immediately decided to resign his position.

Let's watch him describe his reaction to the President's tweet.

Mr. POTTINGER. One of my staff brought me a printout of a tweet by the President, and the tweet said something to the effect that "Mike Pence," the Vice President, "didn't have the courage to do what" he—"what should have been done." I—I read that tweet and made a decision at that moment to resign. That's where I knew that I was leaving that day once I read that tweet.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ultimately, members of the White House staff, Sarah Matthews, Cabinet members Secretary Chao and Secretary DeVos resigned as well. Here is Secretary DeVos's resignation letter.

As can you see, in resigning on January 6th, Secretary DeVos said to the President, "There's no mistaking the impact your rhetoric had on the situation, and it is the inflection point for me."

Let's also look at Secretary Chao's resignation statement.

When Secretary Chao resigned, she spoke of the January 6th attack. She said, "As I am sure is the case with many of you, this has deeply troubled me in a way I simply cannot set aside."

Ms. Hutchinson, in our prior interviews, we have asked you about what the President's advisors were urging him to do during the attack. You have described roughly three different camps of thoughts inside the White House that day.

Can you tell us about those?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. There was a group of individuals that were strongly urging him to take immediate and swift action. I would classify the White House Counsel's Office, Mr. Herschmann, Ms. Ivanka Trump, in that category of really working to get him to take action and pleading with him to take action.

There was a more neutral group where advisors were trying to toe the line, knowing that Mr. Trump didn't necessarily want to take immediate action and condemn the riots, but knowing something needed to be done.

Then there was the last group which was deflect and blame. Let's blame Antifa. These aren't our people.

It is my understanding that Mr. Meadows was in the deflect-and-blame category. But he did end up taking a more neutral route, knowing that there were several advisors in the President's circle, urging him to take more action, which I think was reflected in the rhetoric released later that day in the videos.

Vice Chair CHENEY. You told us that the White House Counsel's Office was in the camp encouraging the President to tell the rioters to stop the attack and to leave the Capitol.

Let's listen.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. White House counsel's office wanted there to be a strong statement out to condemn the rioters. I'm confident in that.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Now let's look at just one example of what some senior advisors to the President were urging.

Ms. Hutchinson, could you look at the exhibit that we are showing on the screen now?

Have you seen this note before?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is a note that I wrote at the direction of the chief of staff on January 6th, likely around 3 o'clock.

Vice Chair CHENEY. It's written on a chief of staff note card. But that is your handwriting, Ms. Hutchinson?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is my handwriting.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Why did you write this note?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. The chief of staff was in a meeting with Eric Herschmann, potentially Mr. Philbin. They had rushed out of the office fairly quickly. Mark had handed me the note card with one of his pens, and sort-of dictating a statement for the President to potentially put out.

Vice Chair CHENEY. And—no. I am sorry. Go ahead.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. No, that is okay.

There were two phrases on there, one "illegal" and one "without proper authority". The "illegal" phrase was the one that Mr. Meadows had dictated to me. Mr. Herschmann had chimed in and said also put "without legal authority". There should have been a slash between the two phrases. It was an "or," if the President had opted to put one of those statements out. Evidently, he didn't. Later that afternoon, Mark came back from the Oval dining room and put the palm card on my desk with "illegally" crossed out but said we didn't need to take further action on that statement.

Vice Chair CHENEY. So to your knowledge this statement was never issued.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. It was—to my knowledge it was never issued.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, did you understand that Ivanka Trump wanted her father to send people home?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That is my understanding, yes.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Let's play a clip of you addressing that issue.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I remember her saying at various points, you know, she wants him—she wanted her dad to send them home. She wanted her dad to tell them to go home peacefully, and she wanted to include language that he necessarily wasn't on board with at the time.

Vice Chair CHENEY. You will hear more about this at our later hearings. But we have evidence of many others, imploring Donald Trump and Mark Meadows to take action. Here is some of that evidence, text messages sent to Mark Meadows during the attack.

This is a text message at 2:32 from Laura Ingraham.

"Hey, Mark, the President needs to tell people in the Capitol to go home."

The next message: "This is hurting all of us."

Then: "He is destroying his legacy and playing into every stereotype. We lose all credibility against the BLM-Antifa crowd if things go south."

The President's son, Don Jr., also urgently contacted Mark Meadows.

At 2:53, he wrote: "He's got to condemn this shit ASAP. The Capitol Police tweet is not enough."

As you will see, these are just two of the numerous examples of Trump supporters and allies urging the President to tell his supporters to leave the Capitol. It would not have been hard for the President to simply walk down to the briefing room a few feet down the hall from the Oval Office, as Nora O'Donnell noted during an

interview with House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy, where Leader McCarthy said he believed the attack was un-American.

Ms. O'DONNELL. I want to quickly bring in Kevin McCarthy, the House Minority Leader. Leader McCarthy, do you condemn this violence?

Mr. MCCARTHY. I completely condemn the violence in the Capitol. What we're currently watching unfold is un-American. I am—I'm disappointed. I'm sad. This is not what our country should look like. This is not who we are. This is not the First Amendment. This has to stop, and this has to stop now.

Ms. O'DONNELL. Leader McCarthy, the President of the United States has a briefing room steps from the Oval Office. It is—the cameras are hot 24/7, as you know. Why hasn't he walked down and said that now?

Mr. MCCARTHY. I—I conveyed to the President what I think is best to do, and I'm hopeful the President will do it.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Republican House Member Mike Gallagher also implored the President to call off the attack.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. President, you have got to stop this. You are the only person who can call this off. Call it off. The election is over. Call it off. This is bigger than you. It's bigger than any Member of Congress. It is about the United States of America, which is more important than any politician. Call it off. It's over.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Despite the fact that many people close to Donald Trump were urging him to send people home, he did not do so until later, much later. At 4:17 p.m., Donald Trump finally told the rioters to go home, and that he loved them. Here is a portion of the video President Trump recorded from the White House.

President TRUMP. We have to have peace, so go home. We love you. You're very special. You've seen what happens. You see the way others are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel, but go home and go home in peace.

Vice Chair CHENEY. But as we will show in even greater detail in future hearings, Donald Trump was reluctant to put this message out. He still could not bring himself to condemn the attack. Ms. Hutchinson has told us that, too.

Vice Chair CHENEY. The one that he put out at 4:17?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I'm sure you've discussed it and just to elaborate if I hadn't already at that point. I recall him being reluctant to film the video on the 6th. I was not involved in any of the logistics or the planning for that video. I just remember seeing the video go out and feeling a little shocked after it went out.

Vice Chair CHENEY. On the evening of January 6th and the day after, the President's family and his senior staff and others tried to encourage the President to condemn the violence and commit to the peaceful transition of power. At 3:31 p.m. on January 6th, Sean Hannity of Fox News texted Mark Meadows.

Mr. Hannity said, "Can he make a statement? I saw the tweet. Ask people to leave the Capitol."

Later that evening Mr. Hannity sent another text message to Mark Meadows. This time he shared a link to a tweet.

That tweet reported that President Trump's Cabinet Secretaries were considering invoking the 25th Amendment to remove President Trump from office.

As you can see on the screen, the 25th Amendment to the Constitution creates a process for the transition of power if a President is unfit or unable to serve. The 25th Amendment has never been used to remove a President. But the Committee has learned that after the attack on the U.S. Capitol, this was being discussed by members of President Trump's Cabinet as a way of stripping the full power of the Presidency from Donald Trump.

President Trump's supporters were worried. In addition to the tweet that he sent Mark Meadows after the attack, Sean Hannity apparently spoke with President Trump and warned him about what could happen.

We understand that this text message that Sean Hannity sent to Kayleigh McEnany on January 7th shows what Mr. Hannity said to the President. First, no more stolen election talk. Second, impeachment and 25th Amendment are real. Many people will quit.

Ms. Hutchinson, you told us that you were hearing about discussions related to the 25th Amendment. Here is part of what you said.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Pompeo reached out to have the conversation with Mr. Meadows in case he hadn't heard the discussions amongst Cabinet Secretaries. And from what I understand, it was more of a, "This is what I'm hearing. I want you to be aware of it, but I also think it's worth putting on your radar because you are the chief of staff. You're technically the boss of all the Cabinet Secretaries. And, you know, if the conversations progressed, you should be ready to take action on this. I'm concerned for you and your positioning with this. Reach out to me if you have any questions or, like, if I can be helpful with you at all."

Vice Chair CHENEY. Inside the White House, the President's advisors, including members of his family, wanted him to deliver a speech to the country. Deputy White House Counsel Pat Philbin prepared the first draft of what would be the President's remarks on National healing delivered by a pre-taped video on January 7th.

When he arrived at the White House on the 7th, Mr. Philbin believed that more needed to be said. So, he sat down and started writing. He shared the draft with Pat Cipollone who also believed the President needed to say more. Mr. Cipollone agreed with the content, as did Eric Herschmann, who reviewed the draft. The Committee has learned that the President did not agree with the substance as drafted and resisted giving a speech at all.

Ms. Hutchinson, do you recall discussions about the President's speech on January 7th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I do.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Let's listen, Ms. Hutchinson, to what you told us about that and about the process of crafting those remarks.

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I learned from a conversation with Mark and overhearing between him and White House Counsel and Eric Herschmann as well that Trump didn't necessarily think he needed to do anything more on the 7th than what he had already done on the 6th. When he was convinced to put out a video on the 7th, he—I understand that he had a lot of opinions about what the context of that announcement were to entail.

I had original drafts of the speech where, you know, there were—several lines didn't make it in there about prosecuting the rioters or calling them violent. He didn't want that in there. He wanted to put in there that he wanted to potentially pardon them. And this is just with the increased emphasis of his mindset at the time which was he didn't think that they did anything wrong.

He—the people who did something wrong that day or the person who did something wrong that day was Mike Pence by not standing with him.

Vice Chair CHENEY. But the President's advisors urged him to give his speech.

Mr. GEORGE. Who convinced him to do the video on the 7th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I'm not sure who convinced him or if it was a group of people that convinced him.

Mr. GEORGE. Who was in the group that you're aware of?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That I'm aware of: Mark, Ivanka, Jared Kushner, Eric Herschmann, Pat Cipollone, Pat Philbin. Those are the people that I'm aware of.

Mr. GEORGE. Do you know why that group of people thought it was necessary for him to release a statement?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I believe Kayleigh McEnany as well. From what I understood at the time and from what the reports were coming in, there was a large concern of the 25th Amendment potentially being invoked, and there were concerns about what would happen in the Senate if it was—if the 25th was invoked. So the primary reason that I had heard other than, you know, we did not do enough on the 6th, we need to get a stronger message out there and condemn this is—otherwise this will be your legacy.

The secondary reason to that was, you know, think about what might happen in the final 15 days of your Presidency if we don't do this. There's already talks about invoking the 25th Amendment. You need this as cover.

Vice Chair CHENEY. The President ultimately delivered the remarks. Unlike many of his other speeches, he did not ad lib much. He recited them without significant alteration, except one. Even then, on January 7, 2021, the day after the attack on the U.S. Capitol, the President still could not bring himself to say, "But this election is now over."

One other point about the speech, Ms. Hutchinson, did you hear that Mr. Trump at one point wanted to add language about pardoning those who took part in the January 6th riot?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I did hear that, and I understand that Mr. Meadows was encouraging that language as well.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you.

Here is what you told us previously about that.

Mr. GEORGE. You said he was instructed not to include it. Who was instructing him not to include language about the pardon in that January 7th speech?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. I understood from White House counsel's office coming to our office that morning that they didn't think that it was a good idea to include that in the speech.

Mr. GEORGE. That being Pat Cipollone?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. That's correct. And Eric Herschmann.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, did Rudy Giuliani ever suggest that he was interested in receiving a Presidential pardon related to January 6th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. He did.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Ms. Hutchinson, did White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows ever indicate that he was interested in receiving a Presidential pardon related to January 6th?

Ms. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Meadows did seek that pardon, yes, ma'am.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you, Ms. Hutchinson.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman THOMPSON. I want to thank our witness for joining us today.

The Members of the Select Committee may have additional questions for today's witness, and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.

Without objection, Members will be permitted 10 business days to submit statements for the record including opening remarks and additional questions for the witness.

Without objection, the Chair recognizes the Vice Chair for a closing statement.

Vice Chair CHENEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to begin by thanking Ms. Hutchinson for her testimony today. We are all in her debt. Our Nation is preserved by those who abide by their oaths to our Constitution. Our Nation is pre-



served by those who know the fundamental difference between right and wrong. I want all Americans to know that what Ms. Hutchinson has done today is not easy. The easy course is to hide from the spotlight, to refuse to come forward, to attempt to downplay or deny what happened.

That brings me to a different topic. While our Committee has seen many witnesses, including many Republicans, testify fully and forthrightly, this has not been true of every witness. We have received evidence of one particular practice that raises significant concern. Our Committee commonly asks witnesses connected to Mr. Trump's administration or campaign whether they have been contacted by any of their former colleagues or anyone else who attempted to influence or impact their testimony.

Without identifying any of the individuals involved, let me show you a couple of samples of answers we received to this question.

First, here is how one witness described phone calls from people interested in that witness's testimony: "What they said to me is, As long as I continue to be a team player, they know that I am on the right team. I am doing the right thing. I am protecting who I need to protect. You know, I will continue to stay in good graces in Trump World. And they have reminded me a couple of times that Trump does read transcripts and just keep that in mind as I proceed through my interviews with the committee."

Here is another sample in a different context. This is a call received by one of our witnesses: "A person let me know you have your deposition tomorrow. He wants me to let you know he is thinking about you. He knows you are loyal, and you are going to do the right thing when you go in for your deposition."

I think most Americans know that attempting to influence witnesses to testify untruthfully presents very serious concerns. We will be discussing these issues as a Committee carefully considering our next steps.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

I yield back.

Chairman THOMPSON. The gentlewoman yields back.

Ms. Hutchinson, thank you. Thank you for doing your patriotic duty and helping the American people get a complete understanding of January 6th and its causes. Thank you for your courage in testifying here today. You have the gratitude of this Committee and your country. I know it wasn't easy to sit here today and answer these questions.

But after hearing your testimony in all its candor and detail, I want to speak directly to the handful of witnesses who have been outliers in our investigation, the small number who have defied us outright, those whose memories have failed them again and again on the most important details, and to those who fear Donald Trump and his enablers.

Because of this courageous woman and others like her, your attempt to hide the truth from the American people will fail. To that group of witnesses, if you have heard this testimony today and suddenly you remember things you couldn't previously recall, or there are some details you would like to clarify, or you discovered some courage you had hidden away somewhere, our doors remain open.

The Select Committee will reconvene in the weeks ahead as we continue to lay out our findings to the American people.

The Chair requests those in the hearing room remain seated until the Capitol Police have escorted the witness and Members from the room.

Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

