[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
                HEARING ON THE JANUARY 6TH INVESTIGATION

=======================================================================


                                HEARING

                               before the

                          SELECT COMMITTEE TO
                      INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH
                             ATTACK ON THE
                         UNITED STATES CAPITOL

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             JUNE 28, 2022

                               __________

                            Serial No. 117-7

                               __________

Printed for the use of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 
                6th Attack on the United States Capitol
                                     



[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

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              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
49-354 PDF          WASHINGTON : 2022 
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               

 SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE UNITED
 
                             STATES CAPITOL

               Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
                    Liz Cheney, Wyoming, Vice Chair
                        Zoe Lofgren, California
                       Adam B. Schiff, California
                        Pete Aguilar, California
                      Stephanie N. Murphy, Florida
                         Jamie Raskin, Maryland
                       Elaine G. Luria, Virginia
                        Adam Kinzinger, Illinois
                            COMMITTEE STAFF

                    David B. Buckley, Staff Director
      Kristin L. Amerling, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
               Hope Goins, Senior Counsel to the Chairman
           Joseph B. Maher, Senior Counsel to the Vice Chair
             Timothy J. Heaphy, Chief Investigative Counsel
                      Jamie Fleet, Senior Advisor
               Timothy R. Mulvey, Communications Director
           Candyce Phoenix, Senior Counsel and Senior Advisor
 John F. Wood, Senior Investigative Counsel and Of Counsel to the Vice 
                                 Chair

Katherine B. Abrams, Staff                Thomas E. Joscelyn, Senior
    Associate                              Professional Staff Member
Temidayo Aganga-Williams, Senior           Rebecca L. Knooihuizen, Financial 
    Investigative Counsel                       Investigator
Alejandra Apecechea, Investigative         Casey E. Lucier, Investigative 
    Counsel                                       Counsel
Lisa A. Bianco, Director of Member         Damon M. Marx, Professional Staff 
    Services and Security Manager                   Member
Jerome P. Bjelopera, Investigator          Evan B. Mauldin, Chief Clerk
Bryan Bonner, Investigative Counsel        Yonatan L. Moskowitz, Senior 
Richard R. Bruno, Senior                           Counsel
    Administrative Assistant               Hannah G. Muldavin, Deputy 
Marcus Childress, Investigative             Communications Director
    Counsel                                Jonathan D. Murray, Professional 
John Marcus Clark, Security                      Staff Member
    Director                               Jacob A. Nelson, Professional 
Jacqueline N. Colvett, Digital                     Staff Member
    Director                               Elizabeth Obrand, Staff Associate
Heather I. Connelly, Professional          Raymond O'Mara, Director of 
    Staff Member                              External Affairs
Meghan E. Conroy, Investigator             Elyes Ouechtati, Technology 
Heather L. Crowell, Printer                       Partner
    Proofreader                            Robin M. Peguero, Investigative 
William C. Danvers, Senior                          Counsel
    Researcher                             Sandeep A. Prasanna, Investigative 
Soumyalatha Dayananda, Senior                        Counsel
    Investigative Counsel                  Barry Pump, Parliamentarian
Stephen W. DeVine, Senior Counsel          Sean M. Quinn, Investigative 
Lawrence J. Eagleburger,                            Counsel
    Professional Staff Member              Brittany M. J. Record, Senior 
Kevin S. Elliker, Investigative                      Counsel
    Counsel                                Denver Riggleman, Senior Technical 
Margaret E. Emamzadeh, Staff                         Advisor
    Associate                             Joshua D. Roselman, Investigative 
Sadallah A. Farah, Professional                      Counsel
    Staff Member                          James N. Sasso, Senior 
Daniel A. George, Senior                  Investigative Counsel
    Investigative Counsel                 Grant H. Saunders, Professional 
Jacob H. Glick, Investigative                     Staff Member
    Counsel                               Samantha O. Stiles, Chief 
Aaron S. Greene, Clerk                    Administrative Officer
Marc S. Harris, Senior                    Sean P. Tonolli, Senior 
    Investigative Counsel                 Investigative Counsel
Alice K. Hayes, Clerk                     David A. Weinberg, Senior 
Quincy T. Henderson, Staff                Professional Staff Member
    Assistant                             Amanda S. Wick, Senior 
Jenna Hopkins, Professional Staff         Investigative Counsel
    Member                                Darrin L. Williams, Jr., Staff 
Camisha L. Johnson, Professional                Assistant
    Staff Member                          Zachary S. Wood, Clerk
                                         
     
                                         
                               CONTRACTORS & CONSULTANTS      
       
                             Rawaa Alobaidi
                             Melinda Arons
                              Steve Baker
                            Elizabeth Bisbee
                              David Canady
                             John Coughlin
                             Aaron Dietzen
                              Gina Ferrise
                           Angel Goldsborough
                             James Goldston
                              Polly Grube
                          L. Christine Healey
                             Danny Holladay
                              Percy Howard
                              Dean Jackson
                           Stephanie J. Jones
                              Hyatt Mamoun
                               Mary Marsh
                               Todd Mason
                              Ryan Mayers
                              Jeff McBride
                               Fred Muram
                             Alex Newhouse
                              John Norton
                             Orlando Pinder
                               Owen Pratt
                              Dan Pryzgoda
                              Brian Sasser
                            William Scherer
                              Driss Sekkat
                              Chris Stuart
                            Preston Sullivan
                              Brian Young

                           Innovative Driven
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Select Committee 
  to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States 
  Capitol........................................................     1
The Honorable Liz Cheney, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of Wyoming, and Vice Chair, Select Committee to 
  Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol     2

                                Witness

Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson, Former Special Assistant to the President 
  and Aide to the Chief of Staff.................................     3


                HEARING ON THE JANUARY 6TH INVESTIGATION

                              ----------                              


                         Tuesday, June 28, 2022

                     U.S. House of Representatives,
 Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on 
                                 the United States Capitol,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:01 p.m., in 
room 390, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson 
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Thompson, Cheney, Lofgren, Schiff, 
Aguilar, Murphy, Raskin, Luria, and Kinzinger.
    Chairman Thompson. The Select Committee to Investigate the 
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol will be in 
order.
    Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the 
Committee in recess at any point.
    Pursuant to House Deposition Authority Regulation 10, the 
Chair announces the Committee's approval to release the 
deposition material presented during this hearing.
    Good afternoon. In our hearings over the previous weeks, 
the Select Committee has laid out the details of a multi-part 
pressure campaign driven by the former President aimed at 
overturning the results of the 2020 Presidential election and 
blocking the transfer of power. We have shown that this effort 
was based on a lie, a lie that the election was stolen, tainted 
by wide-spread fraud. Donald Trump's Big Lie.
    In the weeks ahead, the Committee will hold additional 
hearings about how Donald Trump summoned a mob of his 
supporters to Washington, spurred them to march on the Capitol, 
and failed to take meaningful action to quell the violence as 
it was unfolding on January 6th.
    However, in recent days, the Select Committee has obtained 
new information dealing with what was going on in the White 
House on January 6th and in the days prior, specific detailed 
information about what the former President and his top aides 
were doing and saying in those critical hours, first-hand 
details of what transpired in the Office of the White House 
Chief of Staff, just steps from the Oval Office, as the threats 
of violence became clear, and indeed violence ultimately 
descended on the Capitol in the attack on American democracy.
    It is important that the American people hear that 
information immediately. That is why, in consultation with the 
Vice Chair, I have recalled the Committee for today's hearing.
    As you have seen and heard in our earlier hearings, the 
Select Committee has developed a massive body of evidence, 
thanks to the many hundreds of witnesses who have voluntarily 
provided information relevant to our investigation. It hasn't 
always been easy to get that information because the same 
people who drove the former President's pressure campaign to 
overturn the election are now trying to cover up the truth 
about January 6th.
    But, thanks to the courage of certain individuals, the 
truth won't be buried; the American people won't be left in the 
dark.
    Our witness today, Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson, has embodied 
that courage.
    I won't get into a lot of detail about what Ms. 
Hutchinson's testimony will show. I will allow her words to 
speak for themselves. I hope everyone at home will listen very 
closely.
    First, I will recognize our distinguished Vice Chair, Ms. 
Cheney of Wyoming, for any opening statements she would care to 
offer.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    In our first five hearings, the Committee has heard from a 
significant number of Republicans, including former Trump 
administration Justice Department officials, Trump campaign 
officials, several members of President Trump's White House 
staff, a prominent conservative judge, and several others.
    Today's witness, Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson, is another 
Republican and another former member of President Trump's White 
House staff.
    Certain of us in the House of Representatives recall that 
Ms. Hutchinson once worked for House Republican Whip Steve 
Scalise. But she is also a familiar face on Capitol Hill 
because she held a prominent role in the White House 
Legislative Affairs Office and later was the principal aide to 
President Trump's chief of staff, Mark Meadows.
    Ms. Hutchinson has spent considerable time up here on 
Capitol Hill representing the Trump administration, and we 
welcome her back.
    Up until now, our hearings have each been organized to 
address specific elements of President Trump's plan to overturn 
the 2020 election. Today, we are departing somewhat from that 
model because Ms. Hutchinson's testimony touches on several 
important and cross-cutting topics, topics that are relevant to 
each of our future hearings.
    In her role working for the White House chief of staff, Ms. 
Hutchinson handled a vast number of sensitive issues. She 
worked in the West Wing, several steps down the hall from the 
Oval Office. Ms. Hutchinson spoke daily with Members of 
Congress, with high-ranking officials in the administration, 
with senior White House staff, including Mr. Meadows, with 
White House counsel lawyers, and with Mr. Tony Ornato, who 
served as the White House Deputy Chief of Staff. She also 
worked on a daily basis with members of the Secret Service who 
were posted in the White House. In short, Ms. Hutchinson was in 
a position to know a great deal about the happenings in the 
Trump White House.
    Ms. Hutchinson has already sat for four videotaped 
interviews with Committee investigators, and we thank her very 
much for her cooperation and for her courage. We will cover 
certain but not all relevant topics within Ms. Hutchinson's 
knowledge today. Again, our future hearings will supply greater 
detail, putting the testimony today in a broader and more 
complete context.
    Today, you will hear Ms. Hutchinson relate certain first-
hand observations of President Trump's conduct on January 6th. 
You will also hear new information regarding the actions and 
statements of Mr. Trump's senior advisors that day, including 
his chief of staff, Mark Meadows, and his White House counsel. 
We will begin to examine evidence bearing on what President 
Trump and members of the White House staff knew about the 
prospect for violence on January 6th, even before that violence 
began.
    To best communicate the information the Committee has 
gathered, we will follow the practice of our recent hearings, 
playing videotaped testimony from Ms. Hutchinson and others and 
also posing questions to Ms. Hutchinson live.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you very much.
    Our witness today is Ms. Cassidy Hutchinson, who served in 
the Trump administration in the White House Office of 
Legislative Affairs from 2019 to 2020 and as a special 
assistant to the President in the White House Chief of Staff's 
Office from March 2020 through January 2021.
    I will now swear in our witness.
    The witness will please stand and raise her right hand.
    [Witness sworn.]
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you. You may be seated.
    Let the record reflect the witness answered in the 
affirmative.
    I now recognize myself for questions.
    Ms. Hutchinson, I would like to start with a few questions 
about your background. These are some photographs we have 
obtained highlighting your career.
    These show you with Members of Congress, including Steve 
Scalise, as well as the White House with Leader Kevin McCarthy 
and Jim Jordan. Others show you with the President and Members 
of Congress aboard Air Force One.
    Before you worked in the White House, you worked on Capitol 
Hill for Representative Steve Scalise, the Republican Whip, and 
Senator Ted Cruz. Then, in 2019, you moved to the White House 
and served there until the end of the Trump administration in 
2020.
    When you started at the White House, you served in the 
Office of Legislative Affairs. We understand that you were 
initially hired as a staff assistant but were soon promoted to 
a position of greater responsibility. Can you explain your role 
for the Committee?
    Ms. Hutchinson. When I moved over to the White House Chief 
of Staff's Office with Mr. Meadows, when he became the fourth 
chief of staff, it is difficult to describe a typical day. I 
was a special assistant to the President and an advisor to the 
chief of staff. The days depended on what the President was 
doing that day, and that is kind-of how my portfolio was 
reflected.
    I had a lot of outreach with Members of Congress, senior 
Cabinet officials. We would work--I would work on policy issues 
with relevant internal components and Members on the Hill, as 
well as security protocol at the White House complex for Mr. 
Meadows and the President.
    Chairman Thompson. Then you received another promotion in 
March 2020. At that time, you became the principal aide to the 
new White House chief of staff, Mark Meadows. Is that right?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct, sir.
    Chairman Thompson. What did a typical day look like for you 
in your work with Mr. Meadows?
    Ms. Hutchinson. It varied with what was going on. We spent 
a lot of time on the Hill. I spent time on the Hill 
independently too, as I was his liaison for Capitol Hill. We 
did a lot of Presidential travel engagements, but mostly I was 
there to serve what the chief of staff needed, and a lot of 
times what the chief of staff needed was a reflection of what 
the President's schedule was detailed to do that day.
    Chairman Thompson. So is it fair to say that you spoke 
regularly in your position both with Members of Congress and 
with senior members of the Trump administration?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct. That is a fair assessment, 
sir.
    Chairman Thompson. Would you say that, in your work with 
Mr. Meadows, you were typically in contact with him and others 
in the White House throughout the day?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct, sir. Mr. Meadows and I 
were in contact almost pretty much throughout every day 
consistently.
    Chairman Thompson. Although so much of grave importance 
happens in the West Wing of the White House, it is quite a 
small building.
    Above me on the screen, you can see a map of the first 
floor of the West Wing of the White House. On the right, you 
can see the President's Oval Office; on the left, the chief of 
staff's office suite. Within the chief of staff's office suite, 
in the heart of the West Wing, was your desk, which was between 
the Vice President's office, Mr. Kushner's office, and the Oval 
Office.
    Ms. Hutchinson, is this an accurate depiction of where you 
were located?
    Ms. Hutchinson. It is accurate. It is a lot smaller than it 
looks.
    Chairman Thompson. Absolutely.
    Ms. Hutchinson, this is a photo that shows the short 
distance between your office and the President's Oval Office. 
It only takes 5 to 10 seconds or so to walk down the hall from 
your office to the Oval Office. Is that right?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct.
    Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
    Pursuant to section 5(c)(8) of House Resolution 503, the 
Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Wyoming, Ms. Cheney, for 
questions.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Chairman, we will begin today with an exchange that 
first provided Ms. Hutchinson a tangible sense of the on-going 
planning for the events of January 6th.
    On January 2nd, 4 days before the attack on our Capitol, 
President Trump's lead lawyer, Mr. Giuliani, was meeting with 
White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows and others.
    Ms. Hutchinson, do you remember Mr. Giuliani meeting with 
Mr. Meadows on January 2, 2021?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I do. He met with Mr. Meadows in the 
evening of January 2, 2021.
    Vice Chair Cheney. We understand that you walked Mr. 
Giuliani out of the White House that night, and he talked to 
you about January 6th. What do you remember him saying?
    Ms. Hutchinson. As Mr. Giuliani and I were walking to his 
vehicle that evening, he looked at me and said something to the 
effect of: ``Cass, are you excited for the 6th? It is going to 
be a great day.''
    I remember looking at him, saying: ``Rudy, would you 
explain what is happening on the 6th?''
    He responded something to the effect of: ``We are going to 
the Capitol. It is going to be great. The President's going to 
be there. He is going to look powerful. He is going to be with 
the Members. He is going to be with the Senators. Talk to the 
chief about it. Talk to the chief about it. He knows about 
it.''
    Vice Chair Cheney. Did you go back then up to the West Wing 
and tell Mr. Meadows about your conversation with Mr. Giuliani?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I did. After Mr. Giuliani had left the 
campus that evening, I went back up to our office, and I found 
Mr. Meadows in his office on the couch. He was scrolling 
through his phone. I remember leaning against the doorway and 
saying: ``I had an interesting conversation with Rudy, Mark. It 
sounds like we are going to go to the Capitol.''
    He didn't look up from his phone and said something to the 
effect of: ``There is a lot going on, Cass, but I don't know; 
things might get real, real bad on January 6th.''
    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, Mr. Meadows is engaged 
in litigation with the Committee to try to avoid testifying 
here. What was your reaction when he said to you ``things might 
get real, real bad''?
    Ms. Hutchinson. In the days before January 2nd, I was 
apprehensive about the 6th. I had heard general plans for a 
rally. I had heard tentative movements to potentially go to the 
Capitol.
    But, when hearing Rudy's take on January 6th and then 
Mark's response, that was the first--that evening was the first 
moment that I remember feeling scared and nervous for what 
could happen on January 6th. I had a deeper concern for what 
was happening with the planning aspects of it.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you, Ms. Hutchinson.
    Today, we are going to be focusing primarily on the events 
of January 5th and 6th at the White House.
    But, to begin and to frame the discussion, I want to talk 
about a conversation that you had with Mr. John Ratcliffe, the 
Director of National Intelligence. You had this conversation in 
December 2020.
    Mr. Ratcliffe was nominated by President Trump to oversee 
U.S. intelligence--or U.S. intelligence community. Before his 
appointment, Mr. Ratcliffe was a Republican Member of Congress.
    As you will see on this clip, Director Ratcliffe's comments 
in December 2020 were prescient.

    Ms. Hutchinson. My understanding was Mr.--Director Ratcliffe didn't 
want much to do with the post-election period. Director Ratcliffe felt 
that it wasn't something that the White House should be pursuing. He 
felt it was dangerous to the President's legacy. He had expressed to me 
that he was concerned that it could spiral out of control and 
potentially be dangerous, either for our democracy or the way that 
things were going for the 6th.
    Mr. George. When you say, ``It wasn't something the White House 
should be pursuing,'' what is the ``it''?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Trying to fight the results of the election, 
finding missing ballots, pressuring--filing lawsuits in certain States 
where there didn't seem to be significant evidence and reaching out to 
State legislatures about that. So pretty much the way that the White 
House is handling the post-election period, he felt that there could be 
dangerous repercussions in terms of precedents set for elections, for 
our democracy, for the 6th. You know, he was hoping that we would 
concede.

    Vice Chair Cheney. So, Ms. Hutchinson, now we are going to 
turn to certain information that was available before January 
4th and what the Trump administration and the President knew 
about the potential for violence before January 6th.
    On the screen, you will see an email received by Acting 
Deputy Attorney General Donoghue on January 4th from the 
National Security Division of the Department of Justice.
    Mr. Donoghue testified in our hearings last week. The email 
identifies apparent planning by those coming to Washington on 
January 6th to ``occupy Federal buildings,'' and discussions of 
``invading the Capitol Building.''
    Here is what Mr. Donoghue said to us.

    Acting Deputy Attorney General Donoghue. And we knew that if you 
have tens of thousands of very upset people showing up in Washington, 
DC, that there was potential for violence.

    Vice Chair Cheney. U.S. Secret Service was looking at 
similar information and watching the planned demonstrations. In 
fact, their Intelligence Division sent several emails to White 
House personnel like Deputy Chief of Staff Tony Ornato, and the 
head of the President's protective detail, Robert Engel, 
including certain materials listing events like those on the 
screen.
    The White House continued to receive updates about planned 
demonstrations, including information regarding the Proud Boys 
organizing and planning to attend events on January 6th. 
Although Ms. Hutchinson has no detailed knowledge of any 
planning involving the Proud Boys or January 6th, she did note 
this:

    Ms. Hutchinson. I recall hearing the word ``Oath Keeper'' and 
hearing the word ``Proud Boys'' closer to the planning of the January 
6th rally when Mr. Giuliani would be around.

    Vice Chair Cheney. On January 3rd, the Capitol Police 
issued a special event assessment.
    In that document, the Capitol Police noted that the Proud 
Boys and other groups plan to be in Washington, DC, on January 
6th and indicated that, ``Unlike previous post-election 
protests, the targets of the pro-Trump supporters are not 
necessarily the counter protesters as they were previously, but 
rather Congress itself is the target on the 6th.''
    Of course, we all know now that the Proud Boys showed up on 
January 6th, marched from the Washington Monument to the 
Capitol that day, and led the riotous mob to invade and occupy 
our Capitol.
    Ms. Hutchinson, I want to play you a clip of one of our 
meetings when you described the call on January 4th that you 
received from National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien on the 
same topic: Potential violence on January 6th.

    Ms. Hutchinson. I received a call from Robert O'Brien, the National 
Security Advisor. He had asked if he could speak with Mr. Meadows about 
potential violent--words of violence that he was hearing that were 
potentially going to happen on the Hill on January 6th. I had asked if 
he connected with Tony Ornato because Tony Ornato had a conversation 
with him--with Mark about that topic. Robert had said, ``I will talk to 
Tony,'' and then, you know, I don't know if Robert ever connected with 
Mark about the issue.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, can you describe for us 
Mr. Ornato's responsibilities as deputy chief of staff?
    Ms. Hutchinson. The deputy chief of staff's position at the 
White House for operations is arguably one of the most 
important positions that somebody can hold. They are in charge 
of all security protocol for the campus and all Presidential 
protectees, primarily, the President and the First Family, but 
anything that requires security for any individual that has 
Presidential protection. So, the chief of staff or the National 
Security Advisor, as well as the Vice President's team too, 
Tony would oversee all of that. He was the conduit for security 
protocol between White House staff and United States Secret 
Service.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you.
    You also described a brief meeting between Mr. Ornato and 
Mr. Meadows on the potential for violence. The meeting was on 
January 4th. They were talking about the potential for violence 
on January 6th. Let's listen to a clip of that testimony.

    Ms. Hutchinson. I remember Mr. Ornato had talked to him about 
intelligence reports. I just remember Mr. Ornato coming in and saying 
that we had intel reports saying that there could potentially be 
violence on the--on the 6th.

    Vice Chair Cheney. You also told us about reports of 
violence and weapons that the Secret Service were receiving on 
the night of January 5th and throughout the day on January 6th. 
Is that correct?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct.
    Vice Chair Cheney. There are reports that police in 
Washington, DC, had arrested several people with firearms or 
ammunition following a separate pro-Trump rally in Freedom 
Plaza on the evening of January 5th. Are those some of the 
reports that you recall hearing about?
    Ms. Hutchinson. They are.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Of course, the world now knows that the 
people who attacked the Capitol on January 6th had many 
different types of weapons.
    When a President speaks, the Secret Service typically 
requires those attending to pass through metal detectors, known 
as magnetometers or mags for short. The Select Committee has 
learned that people who willingly entered the enclosed area for 
President Trump's speech were screened so they could attend the 
rally at the Ellipse. They had weapons and other items that 
were confiscated: Pepper spray, knives, brass knuckles, tasers, 
body armor, gas masks, batons, blunt weapons. Those were just 
from the people who chose to go through the security for the 
President's event on the Ellipse, not the several thousand 
members of the crowd who refused to go through the mags and 
watched from the lawn near the Washington Monument.
    The Select Committee has learned about reports from outside 
the magnetometers and has obtained police radio transmissions 
identifying individuals with firearms, including AR-15s, near 
the Ellipse on the morning of January 6th. Let's listen.

    MPD Radio Transmission. There's an individual who's entering, gonna 
be a white male, about 6 feet tall, thin build, brown cowboy boots. 
He's got blue jeans and a blue jean jacket, and underneath the blue 
jean jacket, complainants both saw stock of an AR-15. He's gonna be 
with a group of individuals--about five to eight--five to eight other 
individuals. Two of the individuals in that group at the base of the 
tree near the porta potties were wearing green fatigues--green olive 
dress-style fatigues, about 5'8'', 5'9'', skinny--skinny White males, 
brown cowboy boots. They had Glock-style pistols in their waistbands.
    MPD Radio Transmission. 8736 with a message. That subject's weapon 
on his right hip--that's a negative. He's in the tree.
    MPD Radio Transmission. Motor 1, make sure PPD knows they have an 
elevated threat in the trees south side of Constitution Avenue. Look 
for the ``Don't Tread On Me'' flag, American flag facemask, cowboy 
boots, weapon on the right--right side hip.
    MPD Radio Transmission. I've got three men walking down the street 
in fatigues carrying AR-15. Copy at 14th and Independence.

    Vice Chair Cheney. AR-15s at 14th and Independence. As you 
saw in those emails, the first report that we showed we now 
know was sent in the 8 o'clock hour on January 6th. This talked 
about people in the crowd wearing ballistic helmets and body 
armor, carrying radio equipment and military-grade backpacks.
    The second report we showed you on the screen was sent by 
the Secret Service in the 11 a.m. hour, and it addressed 
reports of a man with a rifle near the Ellipse.
    Ms. Hutchinson, in prior testimony, you described for us a 
meeting in the White House around 10 a.m. in the morning of 
January 6th, involving Chief of Staff Meadows and Tony Ornato. 
Were you in that meeting?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I was.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Let's listen to your testimony about 
that meeting, and then we will have some questions.

    Mr. George. I think the last time we talked you mentioned that some 
of the weapons that people had at the rally included flag poles--
oversized sticks or flag poles, bear spray. Is there anything else that 
you recall hearing about the people who had gathered [inaudible]?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I recall Tony and I having a conversation with Mark 
probably around 10 a.m., 10:15 a.m., where I remember Tony mentioning 
knives, guns in the form of pistols and rifles, bear spray, body armor, 
spears, and flag poles. Spears were one item. Flag poles were one item. 
But then Tony had relayed to me something to the effect of ``and 
these''--``I think people are fastening spears on to the ends of flag 
poles.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, here's a clip of your 
testimony regarding Mr. Meadows's response to learning that the 
rally attendees were armed that day.

    Vice Chair Cheney. What was Mark's reaction--Mr. Meadows' reaction 
to this list of weapons that people had in the crowd?
    Ms. Hutchinson. When Tony and I went in to talk to Mark that 
morning, Mark was sitting on his couch on his phone, which is something 
typical. I remember Tony just got right into it, like, ``Sir, I just 
want to let you know,'' and informed him, like, ``This is how many 
people we have outside the mags right now. These are the weapons that 
we are known to have.'' It's possible he listed more weapons off that I 
just don't recall and gave him a brief, but inconcise, explanation but 
also fairly--fairly thorough. And I remember distinctly Mark not 
looking up from his phone. All right. I remember Tony finishing his 
explanation and it taking a few seconds for Mark to say something, to 
the point I almost said, ``Mark, did you hear him?'' And then Mark 
chimed in and was, like, ``All right. Anything else?'' still looking 
down at his phone. And Tony looked at me and I looked at Tony, and Tony 
said, ``No, sir. Do you have any questions?'' He was, like, ``What are 
you hearing?'' And I looked at Tony, and I was, like, ``Sir, he just 
told you about what was happening down at the rally.'' And then he was, 
like, ``Yeah, yeah, I know.'' And then he looked up and said, ``Have 
you talked to the President?'' And Tony said, ``Yes, sir. He is aware, 
too.'' And then he said, ``All right. Good.''
    Vice Chair Cheney. He asked Tony if Tony had informed the 
President?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Yes.
    Vice Chair Cheney. And Tony said, yes, he had?

    Vice Chair Cheney. So, Ms. Hutchinson, is it your 
understanding that Mr. Ornato told the President about weapons 
at the rally on the morning of January 6th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is what Mr. Ornato relayed to me.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Here's how you characterized Mr. 
Meadows's general response when people raised concerns about 
what could happen on January 6th.

    Mr. George. So, at the time in the days leading up to the 6th, 
there were lots of public reports about how things might go bad on the 
6th, even the potential for violence. If I'm hearing you correctly, 
what stands out to you is that Mr. Meadows did not share those concerns 
or at least didn't act on those concerns?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Did not act on those concerns would be accurate.
    Mr. George. But other people raised them to him? Like, in this 
exchange, you mention that Mr. Ornato pulled him aside.
    Ms. Hutchinson. That's correct.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, we are going to show now 
an exchange of texts between you and Deputy Chief of Staff 
Ornato.
    These text messages were exchanged while you were at the 
Ellipse. In one text, you write: ``But the crowd looks good 
from that vantage point. As long as we get the shot. He was 
F'ing furious.''
    The text messages also stress that President Trump kept 
mentioning the OTR, an off-the-record movement. We are going to 
come back and ask you about that in a minute.
    But could you tell us, first of all, who it is in the text 
who was furious?
    Ms. Hutchinson. The ``he'' in that text that I was 
referring to was the President.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Why was he furious, Ms. Hutchinson?
    Ms. Hutchinson. He was furious because he wanted the arena 
that we had on the Ellipse to be maxed out at capacity for all 
attendees. The advance team had relayed to him that the mags 
were free flowing. Everybody who had wanted to come in had 
already come in, but he still was angry about the extra space 
and wanted more people to come in.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Did you go to the rally in the 
Presidential motorcade?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I was there, yes, in the motorcade.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Were you backstage with the President 
and other members of his staff and family?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I was.
    Vice Chair Cheney. You told us, Ms. Hutchinson, about 
particular comments that you heard while you were in the tent 
area.

    Ms. Hutchinson. When we were in the off-stage announce area tent 
behind the stage, he was very concerned about the shot, meaning the 
photograph that we would get because the rally space wasn't full. One 
of the reasons, which I've previously stated, was because he wanted it 
to be full and for people to not feel excluded because they had come 
far to watch him at the rally, and he felt the mags were at fault for 
not letting everybody in. But another leading reason, and likely the 
primary reason, is because he wanted it full, and he was angry that we 
weren't letting people through the mags with weapons--what the Secret 
Service deems as weapons and are--are weapons.
    Ms. Hutchinson. But when we were in the off-stage announce tent, I 
was part of a conversation--I was in the vicinity of a conversation 
where I overheard the President say something to the effect of, ``You 
know, I don't F'ing care that they have weapons. They're not here to 
hurt me. Take the F'ing mags away. Let my people in. They can march to 
the Capitol from here. Let the people in. Take the F'ing mags away.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. Just to be clear, Ms. Hutchinson, is it 
your understanding that the President wanted to take the mags 
away and said that the armed individuals were not there to hurt 
him?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That's a fair assessment.
    Vice Chair Cheney. The issue wasn't with the amount of 
space available in the official rally area only but, instead, 
that people did not want to have to go through the mags.
    Let's listen to a portion of what you told us about that.

    Ms. Hutchinson. In this particular instance, it wasn't the capacity 
of our space. It was the mags and the people that didn't want to come 
through, and that's what Tony had been trying to relay to him that 
morning: ``You know, it's not the issues that we encounter on the 
campaign. We have enough space, sir. They don't want to come in right 
now. They have weapons they don't want confiscated by the Secret 
Service, and they're fine on the Mall. They can see you on the Mall, 
and they want to march straight to the Capitol from the Mall.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. The President apparently wanted all 
attendees inside the official rally space and repeatedly said, 
``They are not here to hurt me.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. And--and just to be clear, so he was told again 
in--in that conversation--or was he told again in that conversation 
that people couldn't come through the mags because they had weapons?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Correct.
    Vice Chair Cheney. And that people--and his response was to say, 
``They can march to the Capitol from--from the Ellipse?''
    Ms. Hutchinson. Something to the effect of ``take the F'ing mags 
away. They're not here to hurt me. Let them in. Let my people in. They 
can march to the Capitol after the rally is over. They can march from--
they can march from the Ellipse. Take the F'ing mags away. Then they 
can march to the Capitol.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, what we saw when those 
clips were playing were photos provided by the National 
Archives showing the President in the offstage tent before his 
speech on the Ellipse. You were in some of those photos as 
well. I just want to confirm that that is when you heard the 
President say the people with weapons weren't there to hurt him 
and that he wanted the Secret Service to remove the 
magnetometers.
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct. In the photos that you 
displayed, we were standing toward the front of the tent with 
the TVs really close to where he would walk out to go onto the 
stage. These conversations happened 2 to 3 minutes before he 
took the stage that morning.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Let's reflect on that for moment. 
President Trump was aware that a number of the individuals in 
the crowd had weapons and were wearing body armor. Here is what 
President Trump instructed the crowd to do.

    President Trump. We're gonna walk down--and I'll be there with you. 
We're gonna walk down--we're gonna walk down--anyone you want but I 
think right here--we're gonna walk down to the Capitol.

    Vice Chair Cheney. The crowd, as we know, did proceed to 
the Capitol. It soon became apparent to the Secret Service, 
including the Secret Service teams in the crowd, along with 
White House staff that security at the Capitol would not be 
sufficient.

    Ms. Hutchinson. I'd had two or three phone conversations with Mr. 
Ornato when we were at the Ellipse, and then I had four men on Mr. 
Meadows' detail with me in between those individuals and then a few 
other bodies on the ground, just Secret Service doing advance. They 
were getting notifications through their radios, and Mr. Ornato in one 
phone conversation had called me and said, ``Make sure the chief knows 
that they are getting close to the Capitol. They are having trouble 
stacking bodies.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, when you said they were 
having trouble stacking bodies, did you mean that law 
enforcement at the Capitol needed more people to defend the 
Capitol from the rioters?
    Ms. Hutchinson. It was becoming clear to us and to the 
Secret Service that Capitol Police officers were getting 
overrun at the security barricades outside of the Capitol 
Building, and they were having short--they were short people to 
defend the building against the rioters.
    Vice Chair Cheney. You mentioned that Mr. Ornato was 
conveying this to you because he wanted you to tell Mr. 
Meadows. So did you tell Mr. Meadows that people were getting 
closer to the Capitol and that Capitol Police was having 
difficulty?
    Ms. Hutchinson. After I had the conversation with Mr. 
Meadows, Mr.--after I had the conversation with Ornato, I went 
to have the discussion with Mr. Meadows. He was in a secure 
vehicle at the time making a call. So, when I had gone over to 
the car, I went to open the door to let him know; he had 
immediately shut it. I don't know who he was speaking with. It 
wasn't something that he regularly did, especially when I would 
go over to give him information. So I was a bit taken aback, 
but I didn't think much of it and thinking that I was--I would 
be able to have the conversation with him a few moments later.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Were you able to have that conversation 
a few moments later?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Probably about 20 to 25 minutes later. 
There was another period in between where he shut the door 
again. Then, when he finally got out of the vehicle, we had the 
conversation. But, at that point, there was a backlog of 
information that he should have been made aware of.
    Vice Chair Cheney. So you opened the door to the control 
car, and Mr. Meadows pulled it shut?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct.
    Vice Chair Cheney. He did that two times.
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct.
    Vice Chair Cheney. When you finally were able to give Mr. 
Meadows the information about the violence at the Capitol, what 
was his reaction?
    Ms. Hutchinson. He almost had a lack of reaction. I 
remember him saying ``all right,'' something to the effect of: 
How much longer does the President have left in his speech?
    Vice Chair Cheney. Again, much of this information about 
the potential for violence was known or learned about the onset 
of the violence, early enough for President Trump to take steps 
to prevent it. He could, for example, have urged the crowd at 
the Ellipse not to march to the Capitol. He could have 
condemned the violence immediately once it began, or he could 
have taken multiple other steps.
    But, as we will see today and in later hearings, President 
Trump had something else in mind.
    One other question at this point, Ms. Hutchinson. Were you 
aware of concerns that White House Counsel Pat Cipollone or 
Eric Herschmann had about the language President Trump used in 
his Ellipse speech?
    Ms. Hutchinson. There were many discussions the morning of 
the 6th about the rhetoric of the speech that day. In my 
conversations with Mr. Herschmann, he had relayed that we would 
be foolish to include language that had been included at the 
President's request, which had lines along to the effect of: 
Fight for Trump. We are going to march to the Capitol. I will 
be there with you. Fight for me. Fight for what we are doing. 
Fight for the movement.
    Things about Vice President at the time too.
    Both Mr. Herschmann and the White House Counsel's Office 
were urging the speechwriters to not include that language for 
legal concerns and also for the optics of what it could portray 
the President wanting to do that day.
    Vice Chair Cheney. We just heard the President say that he 
would be with his supporters as they marched to the Capitol. 
Even though he did not end up going, he certainly wanted to.
    Some have questioned whether President Trump genuinely 
planned to come here to the Capitol on January 6th. In his 
book, Mark Meadows falsely wrote that, after President gave his 
speech on January 6th, he told Mr. Meadows that he was 
``speaking metaphorically about the walk to the Capitol.''
    As you will see, Donald Trump was not speaking 
metaphorically.
    As we heard earlier, Rudy Giuliani told Ms. Hutchinson that 
Mr. Trump planned to travel to the Capitol on January 6th. I 
want to pause for just a moment to ask you, Ms. Hutchinson, to 
explain some of the terminology you will hear today. We have 
heard you use two different terms to describe plans for the 
President's movement to the Capitol or anywhere else. One of 
those is a ``scheduled movement'' and another one is ``OTR.'' 
Could you describe for us what each of those mean?
    Ms. Hutchinson. A scheduled Presidential movement is on his 
official schedule. It is notified to the press and to a wide 
range of staff that will be traveling with him. It is known to 
the public, known to the Secret Service, and they are able to 
coordinate the movement days in advance.
    An off-the-record movement is confined to the knowledge of 
a very, very small group of advisors and staff. Typically, a 
very small group of staff would travel with him, mostly that 
are just included in the National Security package. You can 
pull an off-the-record movement together in less than an hour. 
It is a way to kind-of circumvent having to release it to the 
press, if that is the goal of it, or to not have to have as 
many security parameters put in place ahead of time to make the 
moment happen.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you.
    Let's turn back now to the President's plans to travel to 
the Capitol on January 6th. We know that White House Counsel 
Pat Cipollone was concerned about the legal implications of 
such a trip, and he agreed with the Secret Service that it 
shouldn't happen.
    Ms. Hutchinson, did you have any conversations with Pat 
Cipollone about his concerns about the President going to the 
Capitol on January 6th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. On January 3rd, Mr. Cipollone had 
approached me, knowing that Mark had raised the prospect of 
going up to the Capitol on January 6th. Mr. Cipollone and I had 
a brief private conversation where he said to me: ``We need to 
make sure that this doesn't happen. This would be legally a 
terrible idea for us. We have serious legal concerns if we go 
up to the Capitol that day.''
    He then urged me to continue relaying that to Mr. Meadows, 
because it is my understanding that Mr. Cipollone thought that 
Mr. Meadows was indeed pushing this along with the President.
    Vice Chair Cheney. We understand, Ms. Hutchinson, that you 
also spoke to Mr. Cipollone on the morning of the 6th, as you 
were about to go to the rally on the Ellipse. Mr. Cipollone 
said something to you like: ``Make sure the movement to the 
Capitol does not happen.''
    Is that correct?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct. I saw Mr. Cipollone right 
before I walked out onto West Exec that morning, and Mr. 
Cipollone said something to the effect of: ``Please make sure 
we don't go up to the Capitol, Cassidy. Keep in touch with me. 
We are going to get charged with every crime imaginable if we 
make that movement happen.''
    Vice Chair Cheney. Do you remember which crimes Mr. 
Cipollone was concerned with?
    Ms. Hutchinson. In the days leading up to the 6th, we had 
conversations about potentially obstructing justice or 
defrauding the electoral count.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Let's hear about some of those concerns 
that you mentioned earlier in one of your interviews with us.

    Ms. Hutchinson. Having a private conversation with Pat late in the 
afternoon of the 3rd or 4th, that Pat was concerned it would look like 
we were obstructing justice or obstructing the electoral college 
count--and I apologize for probably not being very----
    Vice Chair Cheney. That's fine.
    Ms. Hutchinson [continuing]. Clear with my legal terms here--but 
that it would look like we were obstructing what was happening on 
Capitol Hill, and he was also worried that it would look like we were 
inciting a riot or encouraging a riot to erupt on the Capitol--at the 
Capitol.

    Vice Chair Cheney. In fact, in the days before January 6th 
and on January 6th itself, President Trump expressed to 
multiple White House aides that he wanted to go to the Capitol 
after his speech.
    Here is what various White House aides have told the 
Committee about the President's desire to go to the Capitol.

    Mr. George. Did the President tell you this, that he wanted to 
speak at the Capitol?
    Mr. Luna. Correct. Yes.
                                 ______
                                 
    Mr. Tonolli. During the meeting in the dining room, did the idea of 
the President proceeding or walking to the Capitol on the 6th after his 
speech come up?
    Mr. Max Miller. Walking to the Capitol? No.
    Mr. Tonolli. Driving to the Capitol?
    Mr. Max Miller. It came up.
    Mr. Tonolli. OK. How did it come up and what was discussed?
    Mr. Max Miller. He brought it up. He said, ``I want to go down to 
the Capitol.''
                                 ______
                                 
    Mr. George. What about him marching to the Capitol on the 6th?
    Mr. Luna. Yes.
    Mr. George. Tell us about that.
    Mr. Luna. So it's kind-of a general thing. I mean, to get into the 
specifics of it, I--I was aware of a desire of the President to 
potentially march to the--or--or accompany the rally attendees to the 
Capitol.
    Mr. George. When did you first hear about this idea of the 
President accompanying rally attendees to the Capitol on the 6th?
    Mr. Luna. This was at the 6th. This was during the--after he 
finished his remarks.

    Vice Chair Cheney. When the President said that he would be 
going to the Capitol during his speech on the Ellipse, the 
Secret Service scrambled to find a way for him to go. We know 
this from witnesses and the Secret Service, also from messages 
among staff on the President's National Security Council. The 
NSC staff were monitoring the situation in real time. You can 
see how the situation evolved in the following chat log that 
the Committee has obtained.
    As you can see, NSC staff believed that MOGUL--the 
President--was ``going to the Capitol,'' and ``they are finding 
the best route now.''
    From these chats, we also know the staff learned of the 
attack on the Capitol in real time. When President Trump left 
the Ellipse stage at 1:10, the staff knew that rioters had 
invaded the inaugural stage and Capitol Police were calling for 
all available officers to respond.
    When Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy heard the President 
say he was going to the Capitol, he called you, Ms. Hutchinson. 
Isn't that right?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct.
    Vice Chair Cheney. In this text message, you told Tony 
Ornato, ``McCarthy just called me too,'' and ``Do you guys 
think you are coming to my office?''
    Tell us about the call that day with Leader McCarthy during 
the President's speech on the Ellipse.
    Ms. Hutchinson. I was still in the tent behind the stage. 
When you are behind the stage, you can't really hear what is 
going on in front of you. So, when Mr. McCarthy called me with 
this information, I answered the call, and he sounded rushed 
but also frustrated and angry at me. I was confused because I 
didn't know what the President had just said.
    He then explained: ``The President just said he is marching 
to the Capitol. You told me this whole week you aren't coming 
up here. Why would you lie to me?''
    I said: ``I am not lying. I wasn't lying to you, sir. I--we 
are not going to the Capitol.''
    He said: ``Well, he just said it on stage, Cassidy. Figure 
it out. Don't come up here.''
    I said: ``I will run the traps on this now. I will shoot 
you a text. I can assure you we are not coming up to the 
Capitol. We have already made that decision.''
    He pressed a little bit more, believing me, but I think 
frustrated that the President had said that. We ended the phone 
conversation after that.
    I called Mr. Ornato to reconfirm that we weren't going to 
the Capitol, and--which is also in our text messages. I sent 
Mr. McCarthy another text telling him the affirmative, that we 
were not going up to the Capitol, and he didn't respond after 
that.
    Vice Chair Cheney. We understand, Ms. Hutchinson, that the 
plans for the President to come to the Capitol had included 
discussions at some point about what the President would do 
when he came up to the Capitol on January 6th.
    Let's look at a clip of one of your interviews discussing 
that issue with the Committee.

    Vice Chair Cheney. When you were talking about a scheduled 
movement, did anyone say what the President wanted to do when he got 
here?
    Ms. Hutchinson. No, not that I can specifically remember. I 
remember--I remember hearing a few different ideas discussed with--
between Mark and Scott Perry, Mark and Rudy Giuliani. I don't know 
which conversations were elevated to the President. I don't know what 
he personally wanted to do when he went up to the Capitol that day. You 
know, I know that there were discussions about him having another 
speech outside of the Capitol before going in. I know that there was a 
conversation about him going into the House Chamber at one point.

    Vice Chair Cheney. As we have all just heard, in the days 
leading up to January 6th, on the day of the speech, both 
before and during and after the rally speech, President Trump 
was pushing his staff to arrange for him to come up here to the 
Capitol during the electoral vote count. Let's turn now to what 
happened in the President's vehicle when the Secret Service 
told him he would not be going to the Capitol after his speech.
    First, here is the President's motorcade leaving the 
Ellipse after his speech on January 6th.
    Ms. Hutchinson, when you returned to the White House in the 
motorcade after the President's speech, where did you go?
    Ms. Hutchinson. When I returned to the White House, I 
walked upstairs toward the chief of staff's office, and I 
noticed Mr. Ornato lingering outside of the office. Once we had 
made eye contact, he quickly waved me to go into his office, 
which was just across the hall from mine.
    When I went in, he shut the door, and I noticed Bobby 
Engel, who was the head of Mr. Trump's security detail, sitting 
in a chair looking somewhat discombobulated, a little lost.
    I looked at Tony, and he had said: ``Did you F'ing hear 
what happened in the Beast?''
    I said: ``No, Tony, I just got back. What happened?''
    Tony proceeded to tell me that, when the President got in 
the Beast, he was under the impression from Mr. Meadows that 
the off-the-record movement to the Capitol was still possible 
and likely to happen but that Bobby had more information.
    So, once the President had gotten into the vehicle with 
Bobby, he thought that they were going up to the Capitol, and 
when Bobby had relayed to him ``we are not, we don't have the 
assets to do it, it is not secure, we are going back to the 
West Wing,'' the President had very strong, a very angry 
response to that.
    Tony described him as being irate. The President said 
something to the effect of: ``I am the F'ing President. Take me 
up to the Capitol now.''
    To which Bobby responded: ``Sir, we have to go back to the 
West Wing.''
    The President reached up toward the front of the vehicle to 
grab at the steering wheel. Mr. Engel grabbed his arm and said: 
``Sir, you need to take your hand off the steering wheel. We 
are going back to the West Wing. We are not going to the 
Capitol.''
    Mr. Trump then used his free hand to lunge toward Bobby 
Engel. When Mr. Ornato had recounted the story to me, he had 
motioned toward his clavicles.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Was Mr. Engel in the room as Mr. Ornato 
told you this story?
    Ms. Hutchinson. He was.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Did Mr. Engel correct or disagree with 
any part of the story from Mr. Ornato?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Mr. Engel did not correct or disagree with 
any part of the story.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Did Mr. Engel or Mr. Ornato ever after 
that tell you that what Mr. Ornato had just said was untrue?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Neither Mr. Ornato nor Mr. Engel told me 
ever that it was untrue.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Despite this altercation, this physical 
altercation during the ride back to the White House, President 
Trump still demanded to go to the Capitol.
    Here is what Kayleigh McEnany, the White House press 
secretary at the time, wrote in her personal notes and told the 
Committee about President Trump's desire to go the Capitol 
after returning to the White House.

    Mr. Wood. When you wrote, ``POTUS wanted to walk to the Capitol,'' 
was that based solely on what the President said during his speech or 
anything that he or anybody else said afterwards?
    Ms. McEnany. So, to the best of my recollection, I believe when we 
got back to the White House he said he wanted to physically walk with 
the marchers, and according to my notes, he then said he'd be fine with 
just riding the Beast. But to the best of my recollection, he wanted to 
be a part of the march in some fashion.
    Mr. Wood. And just for the record, ``the Beast'' refers to the 
Presidential limousine?
    Ms. McEnany. Yes.

    Vice Chair Cheney. President Trump did not go to the 
Capitol that day. We understand that he blamed Mark Meadows for 
that.

    Ms. Hutchinson. So, prior to leaving the rally site when he got off 
the stage and everybody was making the movement back to the motorcade, 
I'd overheard Mr. Meadows say to him then, as I had prior to Mr. Trump 
taking the stage that morning, that he was still working on getting an 
off-the-record movement to the Capitol. So, when Mr. Trump took the 
stage, he was under the impression by Mr. Meadows that it was still 
possible. So, when he got off the stage, I had relayed to Mr. Meadows 
that I had another conversation with Tony--the movement was still not 
possible. Mr. Meadows said, ``OK.'' And then as they proceeded to go to 
the motorcade and--Mr. Meadows had reiterated, ``We're gonna work on 
it, sir. Talk to Bobby. Bobby has more information.'' Mark got into his 
vehicle. To my understanding, Trump got into the Beast, and after we 
had all arrived back at the White House later in the day, it had been 
relayed to me via Mark that the President wasn't happy that Bobby 
didn't pull it off for him and that Mark didn't work hard enough to get 
the movement on the books.

    Vice Chair Cheney. The physical altercation that Ms. 
Hutchinson described in the Presidential vehicle was not the 
first time that the President had become angry about issues 
relating to the election.
    On December 1, 2020, Attorney General Barr said in an 
interview that the Department of Justice had not found evidence 
of wide-spread election fraud sufficient to change the outcome 
of the election.
    Ms. Hutchinson, how did the President react to hearing that 
news?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Around the time that I understand the AP 
article went live, I remember hearing noise coming from down 
the hallway. So I poked my head out of the office, and I saw 
the valet walking toward our office.
    He had said: Get the chief down to the dining room. The 
President wants him.
    So, Mark went down to the dining room, came back to the 
office a few minutes later. After Mark had returned, I left the 
office and went down to the dining room, and I noticed that the 
door was propped open, and the valet was inside the dining room 
changing a tablecloth off of the dining room table. He motioned 
for me to come in and then pointed toward the front of the room 
near the fireplace mantle and the TV, where I first noticed 
there was ketchup dripping down the wall and there was a 
shattered porcelain plate on the floor.
    The valet had articulated that the President was extremely 
angry at the Attorney General's AP interview and had thrown his 
lunch against the wall, which was causing them to have to clean 
up. So, I grabbed a towel and started wiping the ketchup off 
the wall to help the valet out.
    He said something to the effect of: ``He is really ticked 
off about this. I would stay clear of him for right now. He is 
really, really ticked off about this right now.''
    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, was this the only 
instance that you are aware where the President threw dishes?
    Ms. Hutchinson. It is not.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Are there other instances in the dining 
room that you recall where he expressed his anger?
    Ms. Hutchinson. There were several times throughout my 
tenure with the chief of staff that I was aware of him either 
throwing dishes or flipping the tablecloth to let all the 
contents of the table go onto the floor, and likely break or go 
everywhere.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, Attorney General Barr 
described to the Committee the President's angry reaction when 
he finally met with President Trump. Let's listen.

    Attorney General Barr. And I said, ``Look, I know that you're 
dissatisfied with me and I'm glad to offer my resignation.'' And he 
pounded the table very hard--everyone sort-of jumped--and he said 
``Accepted.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. Mr. Chairman, I reserve.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlewoman reserves.
    The Chair requests those in the hearing room remain seated 
until the Capitol Police have escorted our witness from the 
room.
    Pursuant to the order of the Committee of today, the Chair 
declares the Committee in recess for a period of approximately 
10 minutes.
    [Accordingly, at 2:01 p.m., the Committee recessed until 
2:15 p.m., when it was called to order by the Chairman.]
    Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman 
from Wyoming, Vice Chair Cheney.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Before we turn to what Ms. Hutchinson saw and heard in the 
White House during the violent attack on the Capitol on January 
6th, let's discuss certain communications White House Chief of 
Staff Mark Meadows had on January 5th.
    President Trump's associate, Roger Stone, attended rallies 
during the afternoon and the evening of January 5th in 
Washington, DC.
    On January 5th and 6th, Mr. Stone was photographed with 
multiple members of the Oath Keepers who were allegedly serving 
as his security detail.
    As we now know, multiple members of that organization have 
been charged with or pled guilty to crimes associated with 
January 6th. Mr. Stone has invoked his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination before this Committee. 
General Michael Flynn has also taken the Fifth before this 
Committee.
    Mr. Stone previously had been convicted of other Federal 
crimes unrelated to January 6th. General Flynn had pleaded 
guilty to a felony charge also predating and unrelated to 
January 6th. President Trump pardoned General Flynn just weeks 
after the Presidential election. In July 2020, he commuted the 
sentence Roger Stone was to serve.
    The night before January 6th, President Trump instructed 
his chief of staff, Mark Meadows, to contact both Roger Stone 
and Michael Flynn regarding what would play out the next day.
    Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding that President 
Trump asked Mark Meadows to speak with Roger Stone and General 
Flynn on January 5th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is correct. That is my understanding.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, is it your understanding 
that Mr. Meadows called Mr. Stone on the 5th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I am under the impression that Mr. Meadows 
did complete both a call to Mr. Stone and General Flynn the 
evening of the 5th.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Do you know what they talked about that 
evening, Ms. Hutchinson?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I am not sure.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Is it your understanding that Mr. 
Giuliani, Mr. Eastman, and others had set up what has been 
called a ``war room'' at the Willard Hotel on the night of the 
5th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I was aware of that the night of the 5th.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Do you know if Mr. Meadows ever intended 
to go to the Willard Hotel on the night of the 5th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Mr. Meadows had a conversation with me 
where he wanted me to work with Secret Service on a movement 
from the White House to the Willard Hotel so we could attend 
the meeting, or meetings, with Mr. Giuliani and his associates 
in the war room.
    Vice Chair Cheney. What was your view as to whether or not 
Mr. Meadows should go to the Willard that night?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I had made it clear to Mr. Meadows that I 
didn't believe it was a smart idea for him to go to the Willard 
Hotel that night. I wasn't sure everything that was going on at 
the Willard Hotel, although I knew enough about what Mr. 
Giuliani and his associates were pushing during this period. I 
didn't think that it was something appropriate for the White 
House chief of staff to attend or to consider involvement in. I 
made that clear to Mr. Meadows.
    Throughout the afternoon, he mentioned a few more times 
going up to the Willard Hotel that evening, and then eventually 
dropped the subject the night of the 5th and said that he would 
dial in instead.
    Vice Chair Cheney. So General Flynn has appeared before 
this Committee. When he appeared before our Committee, he took 
the Fifth. Let's briefly view a clip of General Mike Flynn 
taking the Fifth Amendment.

    Vice Chair Cheney. General Flynn, do you believe the violence on 
January 6th was justified?
    Mr. Warrington. Can we have a minute?
    Vice Chair Cheney. Yes.
    [1 minute, 36 seconds later.]
    Mr. Warrington. All right. I'm back. Congresswoman Cheney, could 
you repeat the question, please?
    Vice Chair Cheney. Yes. General Flynn, do you believe the violence 
on January 6th was justified?
    Mr. Warrington. Is that--can I get a clarification. Is that a moral 
question or a legal question?
    Vice Chair Cheney. I'm asking both.
    General Flynn. I said--I said the Fifth.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Do you believe the violence on January 6th was 
justified morally?
    General Flynn. Take the Fifth.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Do you believe the violence on January 6th was 
justified legally?
    General Flynn. Fifth.
    Vice Chair Cheney. General Flynn, do you believe in the peaceful 
transition of power in the United States of America?
    General Flynn. The Fifth.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Let's move on now to January 6th and the 
conduct of Donald Trump and Mark Meadows during the attack on 
the Capitol.
    Ms. Hutchinson, I would like now for us to listen to a 
description, your description of what transpired in the West 
Wing during the attack. For context, in this clip you describe 
the time frame starting at about 2 p.m.

    Ms. Hutchinson. So I remember Mark being alone in his office for 
quite some time. And, you know, I know we've spoken about Ben 
Williamson going in at one point, and I don't personally remember Ben 
going in. I don't doubt that he had gone in. But I remember him being 
alone in his office for most of the afternoon. Around 2 o'clock to 
2:05--around 2 o'clock to 2:05, you know, we were watching the TV, and 
I could see that the rioters were getting closer and closer to the 
Capitol.
    Mark still hadn't popped out of his office or said anything about 
it. So that's when I went into his office. I saw that he was sitting on 
his couch on his cell phone, same as the morning, where he was just 
kind-of scrolling and typing. I said, ``Hey, are you watching the TV, 
chief?'' Because his TV was small and I--you can see it, but I didn't 
know if he was really paying attention.
    I said, ``You watching the TV, chief?'' He was like, ``Yeah.'' I 
said, ``The rioters are getting really close. Have you talked to the 
President?'' And he goes, ``No, he wants to be alone right now''--still 
looking at his phone.
    So I start to get frustrated because, you know, I sort-of felt like 
I was watching a--this is not a great comparison--but a bad car 
accident that was about to happen where you can't stop it but you want 
to be able to do something.
    I just remember--I remember thinking, in that moment, Mark needs to 
snap out of this, and I don't know how to snap him out of this, but 
he--he needs to care. And I just remember I blurted out and I said, 
``Mark, do you know where Jim's at right now?'' And he looked up at me 
at that point and said, ``Jim?'' And I said, ``Mark, is--he was on the 
floor a little while ago giving a floor speech. Did you listen?'' He 
said, ``Yeah, it was real good. Did you like it?'' And I said, ``Yeah. 
Do you know where he's at right now?'' He said, ``No, I haven't heard 
from him.'' And I said, ``You might want to check in with him, Mark.'' 
And I remember pointing at the TV, and I said, ``The rioters are 
getting close. They might get in.'' And he looked at me and said 
something to the effect of, ``All right. I'll--I'll give him a call.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. Not long after the rioters broke into 
the Capitol, you described what happened with White House 
Counsel Pat Cipollone.

    Ms. Hutchinson. No more than a minute, minute and a half later, I 
see Pat Cipollone barreling down the hallway toward our office, and he 
rushed right in, looked at me, said, ``Is Mark in his office?'' And I 
said, ``Yes.'' He just looked at me and started shaking his head and 
went over, opened Mark's office door, stood there with the door propped 
open, and said something to--Mark is still sitting on his phone. I 
remember, like, glancing and he's still sitting on his phone.
    And I remember Pat saying to him something to the effect of, ``The 
rioters have gotten to the Capitol, Mark. We need to go down and see 
the President now.'' And Mark looked up at him and said, ``He doesn't 
want to do anything, Pat.'' And Pat said something to the effect of--
and very clearly had said this to Mark--something to the effect of, 
``Mark, something needs to be done or people are going to die, and the 
blood is going to be on your F'ing hands. This is getting out of 
control. I'm going down there.''
    And at that point, Mark stood up from his couch, both of his phones 
in his hand. He had his glasses on still. He walked out with Pat. He 
put both of his phones on my desk and said, ``Let me know if Jim 
calls.'' And they walked out and went down to the dining room.

    Vice Chair Cheney. A few minutes later Representative 
Jordan called back.

    Ms. Hutchinson. A couple minutes later, so likely around--between 
2:15 and 2:25--I know the tweet went out at 2:24. I don't remember if I 
was there when the tweet went out or if it happened right afterwards, 
but Jim had called. I answered the phone, said, ``One second.'' He knew 
it was--I guess he knew who it was and I introduced myself, but I--I 
don't remember if he called my cell phone or if he had called one of 
Mark's. But I answered the phone and said, ``One sec. Mark's down the 
hall. I'm going to go hand the phone to him.'' And he said, ``OK.''
    So I went down. I asked the valet if Mark was in the dining room. 
The valet said, ``Yes.'' I opened the door to the dining room, briefly 
stepped in to get Mark's attention. I showed him the phone, like 
flipped the phone his way so he could see it said Jim Jordan. He had 
stepped to where I was standing there holding the door open, took the 
phone, talking to Jim with the door still propped open.
    So I took a few steps back. So I probably was two feet from Mark. 
He was standing in the doorway going into the Oval Office dining room. 
They had a brief conversation. And in the crossfires--you know, I heard 
briefly, like, what they were talking about, but in the background, I 
had heard conversations in the Oval dining room with the--at that point 
talking about the ``hang Mike Pence'' chants.

    Vice Chair Cheney. That clip ended, Ms. Hutchinson, with 
you recalling that you heard the President, Mr. Meadows, and 
the White House counsel discussing the ``Hang Mike Pence'' 
chants, and then you described for us what happened next.

    Ms. Hutchinson. It wasn't until Mark hung up the phone, handed it 
back to me, I went back to my desk. A couple of minutes later, him and 
Pat came back, possibly Eric Herschmann, too. I'm pretty sure Eric 
Herschmann was there, but I'm--I'm confident it was Pat that was there. 
I remember Pat saying something to the effect of, ``Mark, we need to do 
something more. They're literally calling for the Vice President to be 
F'ing hung.''
    And Mark had responded something to the effect of, ``You heard him, 
Pat. He thinks Mike deserves it. He doesn't think they're doing 
anything wrong,'' to which Pat said something, ``This is F'ing crazy. 
We need to be doing something more,'' briefly stepped into Mark's 
office.
    And when Mark had said something--when Mark had said something to 
the effect of ``he doesn't think they're doing anything wrong,'' 
knowing what I had heard briefly in the dining room, coupled with Pat 
discussing the ``hang Mike Pence'' chants in the lobby of our office 
and then Mark's response, I understood ``they're'' to be the rioters in 
the Capitol that were chanting for the Vice President to be hung.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Let me pause here on this point. The 
rioters chanted, ``Hang Mike Pence.''
    The President of the United States, Donald Trump, said that 
``Mike deserves it,'' and that, ``Those rioters were not doing 
anything wrong.''
    This is a sentiment that he has expressed at other times as 
well. In an interview with ABC News correspondent Jonathan 
Karl, President Trump was asked about the supporters chanting, 
``Hang Mike Pence,'' last year.
    Instead of condemning them, the former President defended 
them.

    Mr. Karl [continuing]. Saying ``hang Mike Pence.''
    President Trump. Because it's--it's common sense, Jon. It's common 
sense that you're supposed to protect--how can you--if you know a vote 
is fraudulent, right, how can you pass on a fraudulent vote to 
Congress?

    Vice Chair Cheney. President Trump's view that the rioters 
were not doing anything wrong, and that ``Mike deserved it,'' 
helps us to understand why the President did not ask the 
rioters to leave the Capitol for multiple hours. In fact, he 
put this tweet out at 
2:24 p.m.
    Ms. Hutchinson, do you recall seeing this tweet in which 
the President said the Vice President did not have the courage 
to do what needed to be done?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I do.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, what was your reaction 
when you saw this tweet?
    Ms. Hutchinson. As a staffer that works to always represent 
the administration to the best of my ability and to showcase 
the good things that he had done for the country, I remember 
feeling frustrated, disappointed. Really--it felt personal. I 
was really sad. As an American, I was disgusted.
    It was unpatriotic. It was un-American. We were watching 
the Capitol Building get defaced over a lie. It was something 
that was really hard in that moment to digest, knowing what I 
had been hearing down the hall and the conversations that were 
happening, seeing that tweet come up and knowing what was 
happening on the Hill. It is something that I--I still struggle 
to work through the emotions of that.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, we have also spoken to 
multiple other White House staff about their reaction to Donald 
Trump's 2:24 tweet, condemning Mike Pence for not having the 
courage to refuse to count electoral votes, an act that would 
have been illegal.
    Matthew Pottinger, a former Marine intelligence officer who 
served in the White House for 4 years, including as Deputy 
National Security Advisor, was in the vicinity of the Oval 
Office at various points throughout the day. When he saw that 
tweet, he immediately decided to resign his position.
    Let's watch him describe his reaction to the President's 
tweet.

    Mr. Pottinger. One of my staff brought me a printout of a tweet by 
the President, and the tweet said something to the effect that ``Mike 
Pence,'' the Vice President, ``didn't have the courage to do what'' 
he--``what should have been done.'' I--I read that tweet and made a 
decision at that moment to resign. That's where I knew that I was 
leaving that day once I read that tweet.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Ultimately, members of the White House 
staff, Sarah Matthews, Cabinet members Secretary Chao and 
Secretary DeVos resigned as well. Here is Secretary DeVos's 
resignation letter.
    As can you see, in resigning on January 6th, Secretary 
DeVos said to the President, ``There's no mistaking the impact 
your rhetoric had on the situation, and it is the inflection 
point for me.''
    Let's also look at Secretary Chao's resignation statement.
    When Secretary Chao resigned, she spoke of the January 6th 
attack. She said, ``As I am sure is the case with many of you, 
this has deeply troubled me in a way I simply cannot set 
aside.''
    Ms. Hutchinson, in our prior interviews, we have asked you 
about what the President's advisors were urging him to do 
during the attack. You have described roughly three different 
camps of thoughts inside the White House that day.
    Can you tell us about those?
    Ms. Hutchinson. There was a group of individuals that were 
strongly urging him to take immediate and swift action. I would 
classify the White House Counsel's Office, Mr. Herschmann, Ms. 
Ivanka Trump, in that category of really working to get him to 
take action and pleading with him to take action.
    There was a more neutral group where advisors were trying 
to toe the line, knowing that Mr. Trump didn't necessarily want 
to take immediate action and condemn the riots, but knowing 
something needed to be done.
    Then there was the last group which was deflect and blame. 
Let's blame Antifa. These aren't our people.
    It is my understanding that Mr. Meadows was in the deflect-
and-blame category. But he did end up taking a more neutral 
route, knowing that there were several advisors in the 
President's circle, urging him to take more action, which I 
think was reflected in the rhetoric released later that day in 
the videos.
    Vice Chair Cheney. You told us that the White House 
Counsel's Office was in the camp encouraging the President to 
tell the rioters to stop the attack and to leave the Capitol.
    Let's listen.

    Ms. Hutchinson. White House counsel's office wanted there to be a 
strong statement out to condemn the rioters. I'm confident in that.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Now let's look at just one example of 
what some senior advisors to the President were urging.
    Ms. Hutchinson, could you look at the exhibit that we are 
showing on the screen now?
    Have you seen this note before?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is a note that I wrote at the 
direction of the chief of staff on January 6th, likely around 3 
o'clock.
    Vice Chair Cheney. It's written on a chief of staff note 
card. But that is your handwriting, Ms. Hutchinson?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is my handwriting.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Why did you write this note?
    Ms. Hutchinson. The chief of staff was in a meeting with 
Eric Herschmann, potentially Mr. Philbin. They had rushed out 
of the office fairly quickly. Mark had handed me the note card 
with one of his pens, and sort-of dictating a statement for the 
President to potentially put out.
    Vice Chair Cheney. And--no. I am sorry. Go ahead.
    Ms. Hutchinson. No, that is okay.
    There were two phrases on there, one ``illegal'' and one 
``without proper authority''. The ``illegal'' phrase was the 
one that Mr. Meadows had dictated to me. Mr. Herschmann had 
chimed in and said also put ``without legal authority''. There 
should have been a slash between the two phrases. It was an 
``or,'' if the President had opted to put one of those 
statements out. Evidently, he didn't. Later that afternoon, 
Mark came back from the Oval dining room and put the palm card 
on my desk with ``illegally'' crossed out but said we didn't 
need to take further action on that statement.
    Vice Chair Cheney. So to your knowledge this statement was 
never issued.
    Ms. Hutchinson. It was--to my knowledge it was never 
issued.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, did you understand that 
Ivanka Trump wanted her father to send people home?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That is my understanding, yes.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Let's play a clip of you addressing that 
issue.

    Ms. Hutchinson. I remember her saying at various points, you know, 
she wants him--she wanted her dad to send them home. She wanted her dad 
to tell them to go home peacefully, and she wanted to include language 
that he necessarily wasn't on board with at the time.

    Vice Chair Cheney. You will hear more about this at our 
later hearings. But we have evidence of many others, imploring 
Donald Trump and Mark Meadows to take action. Here is some of 
that evidence, text messages sent to Mark Meadows during the 
attack.
    This is a text message at 2:32 from Laura Ingraham.
    ``Hey, Mark, the President needs to tell people in the 
Capitol to go home.''
    The next message: ``This is hurting all of us.''
    Then: ``He is destroying his legacy and playing into every 
stereotype. We lose all credibility against the BLM-Antifa 
crowd if things go south.''
    The President's son, Don Jr., also urgently contacted Mark 
Meadows.
    At 2:53, he wrote: ``He's got to condemn this shit ASAP. 
The Capitol Police tweet is not enough.''
    As you will see, these are just two of the numerous 
examples of Trump supporters and allies urging the President to 
tell his supporters to leave the Capitol. It would not have 
been hard for the President to simply walk down to the briefing 
room a few feet down the hall from the Oval Office, as Nora 
O'Donnell noted during an interview with House Republican 
Leader Kevin McCarthy, where Leader McCarthy said he believed 
the attack was un-American.

    Ms. O'Donnell. I want to quickly bring in Kevin McCarthy, the House 
Minority Leader. Leader McCarthy, do you condemn this violence?
    Mr. McCarthy. I completely condemn the violence in the Capitol. 
What we're currently watching unfold is un-American. I am--I'm 
disappointed. I'm sad. This is not what our country should look like. 
This is not who we are. This is not the First Amendment. This has to 
stop, and this has to stop now.
    Ms. O'Donnell. Leader McCarthy, the President of the United States 
has a briefing room steps from the Oval Office. It is--the cameras are 
hot 24/7, as you know. Why hasn't he walked down and said that now?
    Mr. McCarthy. I--I conveyed to the President what I think is best 
to do, and I'm hopeful the President will do it.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Republican House Member Mike Gallagher 
also implored the President to call off the attack.

    Mr. Gallagher. Mr. President, you have got to stop this. You are 
the only person who can call this off. Call it off. The election is 
over. Call it off. This is bigger than you. It's bigger than any Member 
of Congress. It is about the United States of America, which is more 
important than any politician. Call it off. It's over.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Despite the fact that many people close 
to Donald Trump were urging him to send people home, he did not 
do so until later, much later. At 4:17 p.m., Donald Trump 
finally told the rioters to go home, and that he loved them. 
Here is a portion of the video President Trump recorded from 
the White House.

    President Trump. We have to have peace, so go home. We love you. 
You're very special. You've seen what happens. You see the way others 
are treated that are so bad and so evil. I know how you feel, but go 
home and go home in peace.

    Vice Chair Cheney. But as we will show in even greater 
detail in future hearings, Donald Trump was reluctant to put 
this message out. He still could not bring himself to condemn 
the attack. Ms. Hutchinson has told us that, too.

    Vice Chair Cheney. The one that he put out at 4:17?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I'm sure you've discussed it and just to elaborate 
if I hadn't already at that point. I recall him being reluctant to film 
the video on the 6th. I was not involved in any of the logistics or the 
planning for that video. I just remember seeing the video go out and 
feeling a little shocked after it went out.

    Vice Chair Cheney. On the evening of January 6th and the 
day after, the President's family and his senior staff and 
others tried to encourage the President to condemn the violence 
and commit to the peaceful transition of power. At 3:31 p.m. on 
January 6th, Sean Hannity of Fox News texted Mark Meadows.
    Mr. Hannity said, ``Can he make a statement? I saw the 
tweet. Ask people to leave the Capitol.''
    Later that evening Mr. Hannity sent another text message to 
Mark Meadows. This time he shared a link to a tweet.
    That tweet reported that President Trump's Cabinet 
Secretaries were considering invoking the 25th Amendment to 
remove President Trump from office.
    As you can see on the screen, the 25th Amendment to the 
Constitution creates a process for the transition of power if a 
President is unfit or unable to serve. The 25th Amendment has 
never been used to remove a President. But the Committee has 
learned that after the attack on the U.S. Capitol, this was 
being discussed by members of President Trump's Cabinet as a 
way of stripping the full power of the Presidency from Donald 
Trump.
    President Trump's supporters were worried. In addition to 
the tweet that he sent Mark Meadows after the attack, Sean 
Hannity apparently spoke with President Trump and warned him 
about what could happen.
    We understand that this text message that Sean Hannity sent 
to Kayleigh McEnany on January 7th shows what Mr. Hannity said 
to the President. First, no more stolen election talk. Second, 
impeachment and 25th Amendment are real. Many people will quit.
    Ms. Hutchinson, you told us that you were hearing about 
discussions related to the 25th Amendment. Here is part of what 
you said.

    Ms. Hutchinson. Mr. Pompeo reached out to have the conversation 
with Mr. Meadows in case he hadn't heard the discussions amongst 
Cabinet Secretaries. And from what I understand, it was more of a, 
``This is what I'm hearing. I want you to be aware of it, but I also 
think it's worth putting on your radar because you are the chief of 
staff. You're technically the boss of all the Cabinet Secretaries. And, 
you know, if the conversations progressed, you should be ready to take 
action on this. I'm concerned for you and your positioning with this. 
Reach out to me if you have any questions or, like, if I can be helpful 
with you at all.''

    Vice Chair Cheney. Inside the White House, the President's 
advisors, including members of his family, wanted him to 
deliver a speech to the country. Deputy White House Counsel Pat 
Philbin prepared the first draft of what would be the 
President's remarks on National healing delivered by a pre-
taped video on January 7th.
    When he arrived at the White House on the 7th, Mr. Philbin 
believed that more needed to be said. So, he sat down and 
started writing. He shared the draft with Pat Cipollone who 
also believed the President needed to say more. Mr. Cipollone 
agreed with the content, as did Eric Herschmann, who reviewed 
the draft. The Committee has learned that the President did not 
agree with the substance as drafted and resisted giving a 
speech at all.
    Ms. Hutchinson, do you recall discussions about the 
President's speech on January 7th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I do.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Let's listen, Ms. Hutchinson, to what 
you told us about that and about the process of crafting those 
remarks.

    Ms. Hutchinson. I learned from a conversation with Mark and 
overhearing between him and White House Counsel and Eric Herschmann as 
well that Trump didn't necessarily think he needed to do anything more 
on the 7th than what he had already done on the 6th. When he was 
convinced to put out a video on the 7th, he--I understand that he had a 
lot of opinions about what the context of that announcement were to 
entail.
    I had original drafts of the speech where, you know, there were--
several lines didn't make it in there about prosecuting the rioters or 
calling them violent. He didn't want that in there. He wanted to put in 
there that he wanted to potentially pardon them. And this is just with 
the increased emphasis of his mindset at the time which was he didn't 
think that they did anything wrong.
    He--the people who did something wrong that day or the person who 
did something wrong that day was Mike Pence by not standing with him.

    Vice Chair Cheney. But the President's advisors urged him 
to give his speech.

    Mr. George. Who convinced him to do the video on the 7th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I'm not sure who convinced him or if it was a group 
of people that convinced him.
    Mr. George. Who was in the group that you're aware of?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That I'm aware of: Mark, Ivanka, Jared Kushner, 
Eric Herschmann, Pat Cipollone, Pat Philbin. Those are the people that 
I'm aware of.
    Mr. George. Do you know why that group of people thought it was 
necessary for him to release a statement?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I believe Kayleigh McEnany as well. From what I 
understood at the time and from what the reports were coming in, there 
was a large concern of the 25th Amendment potentially being invoked, 
and there were concerns about what would happen in the Senate if it 
was--if the 25th was invoked. So the primary reason that I had heard 
other than, you know, we did not do enough on the 6th, we need to get a 
stronger message out there and condemn this is--otherwise this will be 
your legacy.
    The secondary reason to that was, you know, think about what might 
happen in the final 15 days of your Presidency if we don't do this. 
There's already talks about invoking the 25th Amendment. You need this 
as cover.

    Vice Chair Cheney. The President ultimately delivered the 
remarks. Unlike many of his other speeches, he did not ad lib 
much. He recited them without significant alteration, except 
one. Even then, on January 7, 2021, the day after the attack on 
the U.S. Capitol, the President still could not bring himself 
to say, ``But this election is now over.''
    One other point about the speech, Ms. Hutchinson, did you 
hear that Mr. Trump at one point wanted to add language about 
pardoning those who took part in the January 6th riot?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I did hear that, and I understand that Mr. 
Meadows was encouraging that language as well.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you.
    Here is what you told us previously about that.

    Mr. George. You said he was instructed not to include it. Who was 
instructing him not to include language about the pardon in that 
January 7th speech?
    Ms. Hutchinson. I understood from White House counsel's office 
coming to our office that morning that they didn't think that it was a 
good idea to include that in the speech.
    Mr. George. That being Pat Cipollone?
    Ms. Hutchinson. That's correct. And Eric Herschmann.

    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, did Rudy Giuliani ever 
suggest that he was interested in receiving a Presidential 
pardon related to January 6th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. He did.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Ms. Hutchinson, did White House Chief of 
Staff Mark Meadows ever indicate that he was interested in 
receiving a Presidential pardon related to January 6th?
    Ms. Hutchinson. Mr. Meadows did seek that pardon, yes, 
ma'am.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you, Ms. Hutchinson.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. I want to thank our witness for joining 
us today.
    The Members of the Select Committee may have additional 
questions for today's witness, and we ask that you respond 
expeditiously in writing to those questions.
    Without objection, Members will be permitted 10 business 
days to submit statements for the record including opening 
remarks and additional questions for the witness.
    Without objection, the Chair recognizes the Vice Chair for 
a closing statement.
    Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to begin by thanking Ms. Hutchinson for her 
testimony today. We are all in her debt. Our Nation is 
preserved by those who abide by their oaths to our 
Constitution. Our Nation is preserved by those who know the 
fundamental difference between right and wrong. I want all 
Americans to know that what Ms. Hutchinson has done today is 
not easy. The easy course is to hide from the spotlight, to 
refuse to come forward, to attempt to downplay or deny what 
happened.
    That brings me to a different topic. While our Committee 
has seen many witnesses, including many Republicans, testify 
fully and forthrightly, this has not been true of every 
witness. We have received evidence of one particular practice 
that raises significant concern. Our Committee commonly asks 
witnesses connected to Mr. Trump's administration or campaign 
whether they have been contacted by any of their former 
colleagues or anyone else who attempted to influence or impact 
their testimony.
    Without identifying any of the individuals involved, let me 
show you a couple of samples of answers we received to this 
question.
    First, here is how one witness described phone calls from 
people interested in that witness's testimony: ``What they said 
to me is, As long as I continue to be a team player, they know 
that I am on the right team. I am doing the right thing. I am 
protecting who I need to protect. You know, I will continue to 
stay in good graces in Trump World. And they have reminded me a 
couple of times that Trump does read transcripts and just keep 
that in mind as I proceed through my interviews with the 
committee.''
    Here is another sample in a different context. This is a 
call received by one of our witnesses: ``A person let me know 
you have your deposition tomorrow. He wants me to let you know 
he is thinking about you. He knows you are loyal, and you are 
going do the right thing when you go in for your deposition.''
    I think most Americans know that attempting to influence 
witnesses to testify untruthfully presents very serious 
concerns. We will be discussing these issues as a Committee 
carefully considering our next steps.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Thompson. The gentlewoman yields back.
    Ms. Hutchinson, thank you. Thank you for doing your 
patriotic duty and helping the American people get a complete 
understanding of January 6th and its causes. Thank you for your 
courage in testifying here today. You have the gratitude of 
this Committee and your country. I know it wasn't easy to sit 
here today and answer these questions.
    But after hearing your testimony in all its candor and 
detail, I want to speak directly to the handful of witnesses 
who have been outliers in our investigation, the small number 
who have defied us outright, those whose memories have failed 
them again and again on the most important details, and to 
those who fear Donald Trump and his enablers.
    Because of this courageous woman and others like her, your 
attempt to hide the truth from the American people will fail. 
To that group of witnesses, if you have heard this testimony 
today and suddenly you remember things you couldn't previously 
recall, or there are some details you would like to clarify, or 
you discovered some courage you had hidden away somewhere, our 
doors remain open.
    The Select Committee will reconvene in the weeks ahead as 
we continue to lay out our findings to the American people.
    The Chair requests those in the hearing room remain seated 
until the Capitol Police have escorted the witness and Members 
from the room.
    Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]