[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING ON THE JANUARY 6TH INVESTIGATION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH
ATTACK ON THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-6
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
49-353 WASHINGTON : 2022
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SELECT COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE UNITED
STATES CAPITOL
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Liz Cheney, Wyoming, Vice Chair
Zoe Lofgren, California
Adam B. Schiff, California
Pete Aguilar, California
Stephanie N. Murphy, Florida
Jamie Raskin, Maryland
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia
Adam Kinzinger, Illinois
COMMITTEE STAFF
David B. Buckley, Staff Director
Kristin L. Amerling, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Hope Goins, Senior Counsel to the Chairman
Joseph B. Maher, Senior Counsel to the Vice Chair
Timothy J. Heaphy, Chief Investigative Counsel
Jamie Fleet, Senior Advisor
Timothy R. Mulvey, Communications Director
Candyce Phoenix, Senior Counsel and Senior Advisor
John F. Wood, Senior Investigative Counsel and Of Counsel to the Vice
Chair
Katherine B. Abrams, Staff Thomas E. Joscelyn, Senior Professional
Associate Staff Member
Temidayo Aganga-Williams, Senior Rebecca L. Knooihuizen, Financial
Investigative Counsel Investigator
Alejandra Apecechea, Investigative Casey E. Lucier, Investigative Counsel
Counsel Damon M. Marx, Professional Staff Member
Lisa A. Bianco, Director of Member Evan B. Mauldin, Chief Clerk
Services and Security Manager Yonatan L. Moskowitz, Senior Counsel
Jerome P. Bjelopera, Investigator Hannah G. Muldavin, Deputy
Bryan Bonner, Investigative Counsel Communications Director
Richard R. Bruno, Senior Jonathan D. Murray, Professional Staff
Administrative Assistant Member
Marcus Childress, Investigative Jacob A. Nelson, Professional Staff Member
Counsel Elizabeth Obrand, Staff Associate
John Marcus Clark, Security Raymond O'Mara, Director of External
Director Affairs
Jacqueline N. Colvett, Digital Elyes Ouechtati, Technology Partner
Director Robin M. Peguero, Investigative Counsel
Heather I. Connelly, Professional Sandeep A. Prasanna, Investigative Counsel
Staff Member Barry Pump, Parliamentarian
Meghan E. Conroy, Investigator Sean M. Quinn, Investigative Counsel
Heather L. Crowell, Printer Brittany M. J. Record, Senior Counsel
Proofreader Denver Riggleman, Senior Technical Advisor
William C. Danvers, Senior Joshua D. Roselman, Investigative Counsel
Researcher James N. Sasso, Senior Investigative Counsel
Soumyalatha Dayananda, Senior Grant H. Saunders, Professional Staff
Investigative Counsel Member
Stephen W. DeVine, Senior Counsel Samantha O. Stiles, Chief Administrative
Lawrence J. Eagleburger, Officer
Professional Staff Member Sean P. Tonolli, Senior Investigative
Kevin S. Elliker, Investigative Counsel
Counsel David A. Weinberg, Senior Professional Staff
Margaret E. Emamzadeh, Staff Member
Associate Amanda S. Wick, Senior Investigative
Sadallah A. Farah, Professional Counsel
Staff Member Darrin L. Williams, Jr., Staff Assistant
Daniel A. George, Senior Zachary S. Wood, Clerk
Investigative Counsel
Jacob H. Glick, Investigative
Counsel
Aaron S. Greene, Clerk
Marc S. Harris, Senior
Investigative Counsel
Alice K. Hayes, Clerk
Quincy T. Henderson, Staff
Assistant
Jenna Hopkins, Professional Staff
Member
Camisha L. Johnson, Professional
Staff Member
CONTRACTORS & CONSULTANTS
Rawaa Alobaidi
Melinda Arons
Steve Baker
Elizabeth Bisbee
David Canady
John Coughlin
Aaron Dietzen
Gina Ferrise
Angel Goldsborough
James Goldston
Polly Grube
L. Christine Healey
Danny Holladay
Percy Howard
Dean Jackson
Stephanie J. Jones
Hyatt Mamoun
Mary Marsh
Todd Mason
Ryan Mayers
Jeff McBride
Fred Muram
Alex Newhouse
John Norton
Orlando Pinder
Owen Pratt
Dan Pryzgoda
Brian Sasser
William Scherer
Driss Sekkat
Chris Stuart
Preston Sullivan
Brian Young
Innovative Driven
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Select Committee
to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States
Capitol........................................................ 1
The Honorable Liz Cheney, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Wyoming, and Vice Chair, Select Committee to
Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol 2
The Honorable Adam Kinzinger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Illinois.......................................... 4
Witnesses
Mr. Jeffrey Rosen, Former Acting Attorney General................ 8
Mr. Richard Donoghue, Former Acting Deputy Attorney General...... 9
Mr. Steven A. Engel, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice...................... 9
Appendix
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey Rosen, Former Acting Attorney
General........................................................ 43
Prepared Statement of Steven A. Engel, Former Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice... 60
HEARING ON THE JANUARY 6TH INVESTIGATION
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Thursday, June 23, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on
the United States Capitol,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:02 p.m., in
room 390, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Bennie G. Thompson
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Cheney, Lofgren, Schiff,
Aguilar, Murphy, Raskin, Luria, and Kinzinger.
Chairman Thompson. The Select Committee to Investigate the
January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol will be in
order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
Committee in recess at any point.
Pursuant to House Deposition Authority Regulation 10, the
Chair announces the Committee's approval to release the
deposition material presented during today's hearing.
Good afternoon.
In our previous hearings, the Select Committee showed that
then-President Trump applied pressure at every level of
government, from local election workers up to his own Vice
President, hoping public servants would give in to that
pressure and help him steal an election he actually lost.
Today, we will tell the story of how the pressure campaign
also targeted the Federal agency charged with enforcement of
our laws: The Department of Justice.
We have already covered part of Mr. Trump's effort. We
heard Attorney General Bill Barr tell the Committee about the
baseless claims Mr. Trump wanted the Justice Department to
investigate and that Mr. Barr viewed those claims as nonsense.
Today, we will hear from Jeffrey Rosen, the person Mr.
Trump appointed to run the Justice Department after Attorney
General Barr resigned. We will hear from other senior Justice
Department officials also.
Together, these public servants resisted Mr. Trump's effort
to misuse the Justice Department as part of his plan to hold
onto power. We will show that Trump's demands that the
Department investigate baseless claims of election fraud
continued into January 2021.
But Donald Trump didn't just want the Justice Department to
investigate; he wanted the Justice Department to help
legitimize his lies, to baselessly call the election corrupt,
to appoint a special counsel to investigate alleged election
fraud, to send a letter to six State legislatures urging them
to consider altering the election results.
When these and other efforts failed, Donald Trump sought to
replace Mr. Rosen, the Acting Attorney General, with a lawyer
who he believed would inappropriately put the full weight of
the Justice Department behind the effort to overturn the
election.
Let's think about what that means.
Wherever you live in the United States, there is probably a
local government executive--a mayor or a county commissioner.
There is also an official responsible for enforcing the laws--a
district attorney or a local prosecutor.
Imagine if your mayor lost a reelection bid but, instead of
conceding the race, they picked up the phone, called the
district attorney and said, ``I want you to say this election
was stolen. I want you to tell the board of elections not to
certify the results.''
That is essentially what Donald Trump was trying to do with
the election for President of the United States. It was a
brazen attempt to use the Justice Department to advance the
President's personal political agenda.
Today, my colleague from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger, and our
witnesses will walk through the Select Committee's findings on
these matters.
But, first, I will recognize our distinguished Vice Chair,
Ms. Cheney of Wyoming, for any opening statement she would care
to offer.
Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
At this point, our Committee has just begun to show America
the evidence that we have gathered. There is much more to come,
both in our hearings and in our report. But I would like to
take just a moment to put everything we have seen in context.
We have already seen how President Trump falsely declared
victory on November 3, 2020; how he and his team launched a
fraudulent media campaign that persuaded tens of millions of
Americans that the election was stolen from him.
Donald Trump intentionally ran false ads on television and
social media featuring allegations that his advisors and his
Justice Department repeatedly told him were untrue.
We have also seen how Donald Trump launched a fraudulent
fundraising campaign that raised hundreds of millions of
dollars--again--based on those same false election fraud
allegations.
We have seen how President Trump and his allies corruptly
attempted to pressure Vice President Pence to refuse to count
lawful electoral votes and obstruct Congress's proceedings on
January 6th and how he provoked a violent mob to pursue the
Vice President and others in our Capitol.
We have seen how the President oversaw and personally
participated in an effort in multiple States to vilify,
threaten, and pressure election officials and to use false
allegations to pressure State legislators to change the outcome
of the election.
We have seen how President Trump worked with and directed
the Republican National Committee and others to organize an
effort to create fake electoral slates and, later, to transmit
those materially false documents to Federal officials--again--
as part of his planning for January 6th.
We have seen how President Trump persuaded tens of
thousands of his supporters to travel to Washington, DC, for
January 6th. We will see in far more detail how the President's
rally and march to the Capitol were organized and
choreographed.
As you can tell, these efforts were not some minor or ad
hoc enterprise concocted overnight. Each required planning and
coordination. Some required significant funding. All of them
were overseen by President Trump. Much more information will be
presented soon regarding the President's statements and actions
on January 6th.
Today, as Chairman Thompson indicated, we turn to yet
another element of the President's effort to overturn the 2020
election, this one involving the Department of Justice.
A key focus of our hearing today will be a draft letter
that our witnesses here today refused to sign. This letter was
written by Mr. Jeff Clark with another Department of Justice
lawyer, Ken Klukowski, and the letter was to be sent to the
leadership of the Georgia State legislature. Other versions of
the letter were intended for other States.
Neither Mr. Clark nor Mr. Klukowski had any evidence of
widespread election fraud, but they were quite aware of what
Mr. Trump wanted the Department to do. Jeff Clark met privately
with President Trump and others in the White House and agreed
to assist the President, without telling the senior leadership
of the Department who oversaw him.
As you will see, this letter claims that the U.S.
Department of Justice's investigations have ``identified
significant concerns that may have impacted the outcome of the
election in multiple States, including the State of Georgia.''
In fact, Donald Trump knew this was a lie. The Department
of Justice had already informed the President of the United
States repeatedly that its investigations had found no fraud
sufficient to overturn the results of the 2020 election.
The letter also said this: ``In light of these
developments, the Department recommends that the Georgia
General Assembly should convene in special session'' and
consider approving a new slate of electors.
It indicates that a separate, fake ``slate of electors
supporting Donald Trump'' has already been ``transmitted to
Washington, DC.''
For those of you who have been watching these hearings, the
language of this draft Justice Department letter will sound
very familiar. The text is similar to what we have seen from
John Eastman and Rudy Giuliani, both of whom were coordinating
with President Trump to overturn the 2020 election.
When one of our witnesses today, Mr. Donoghue, first saw
this draft letter, he wrote this: ``This would be a grave step
for the Department to take, and it could have tremendous
constitutional, political, and social ramifications for the
country.''
This Committee agrees. Had this letter been released on
official Department of Justice letterhead, it would have
falsely informed all Americans, including those who might be
inclined to come to Washington on January 6th, that President
Trump's election fraud allegations were likely very real.
Here is another observation about this letter. Look at the
signature line. It was written by Jeff Clark and Mr. Klukowski
not just for Clark's signature but also for our witnesses
today, Jeff Rosen and Richard Donoghue.
When it became clear that neither Mr. Rosen nor Mr.
Donoghue would sign this letter, President Trump's plan
necessarily changed. As you will hear today, Donald Trump
offered Mr. Clark the job of Acting Attorney General, replacing
Mr. Rosen, with the understanding that Clark would send this
letter to Georgia and other States and take other actions the
President requested.
One other point: Millions of Americans have seen the
testimony of Attorney General Barr before this Committee. At
one point in his deposition, the former Attorney General was
asked why he authorized the Department of Justice to
investigate fraud in the 2020 election at all; why not just
follow the regular course of action and let the investigations
occur much later in time, after January 6th?
Here is what he said.
Attorney General Barr. I felt the responsible thing to do was to
be--to be in a position to have a view as to whether or not there was
fraud. And, frankly, I think the fact that I put myself in the position
that I could say that we had looked at this and didn't think there was
fraud was really important to moving things forward. And I--I sort-of
shudder to think what the situation would have been if the--if the
position of the Department was, ``We're not even looking at this until
after Biden's in office.'' I'm not sure we would have had a transition
at all.
Vice Chair Cheney. I want to thank each of our witnesses
before us today for your role in addressing and rebutting the
false allegations of fraud at the root of January 6th. Thank
you for standing up for the Constitution and for the rule of
law.
Of course, not all public officials behaved in the
honorable way our witnesses did. At the close of today's
hearing, we will see video testimony by three members of Donald
Trump's White House staff. They will identify certain of the
Members of Congress who contacted the White House after January
6th to seek Presidential pardons for their conduct.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection, the Chair recognizes
the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to our witnesses for being here.
I would like to start with a personal story.
So, in May 2009, I returned from service in Iraq and I
announced my intention to run for Congress. A big reason I
decided to run for Congress was my motivation to ensure freedom
and democracy were defended overseas.
I remember making a commitment--out loud a few times and in
my heart repeatedly, even to today--that if we are going to ask
Americans to be willing to die in service to our country, we as
leaders must at least be willing to sacrifice our political
careers when integrity and our oath requires it. After all,
losing a job is nothing compared to losing your life.
Within the halls of power, in the face of a President, that
commitment can easily be forgotten. Presidential pressure can
be really hard to resist.
Today, we will focus on a few officials who stood firm
against President Trump's political pressure campaign. When the
President tried to misuse the Department and install a loyalist
at its helm, these brave officials refused and threatened to
resign. They were willing to sacrifice their careers for the
good of our country.
The Department of Justice is unique in the executive
branch. The President oversees the Department of Justice, yet
the President's personal or partisan interests must not shape
or dictate the Department's actions.
The President cannot and must not use the Department to
serve his own personal interest, and he must not use its people
to do his political bidding, especially when what he wants them
to do is to subvert democracy.
The President cannot pervert justice, nor the law, to
maintain his power. Justice must, both in fact and law, be
blind. That is critical to our whole system of self-governance.
During this hearing, you will hear time and time again
about the President's request to investigate claims of
widespread fraud. Our witnesses--Mr. Rosen, Mr. Donoghue, and
Mr. Engel--stood firm in the face of overbearing political
pressure because they understood that their oath was to the
Constitution and not to the personal or political interests of
the President.
The President and his allies became keenly aware that, with
legal challenges exhausted and electoral votes certified, their
only hope would be a last-ditch scheme to prevent Congress from
certifying the win, thus throwing the entire system into
constitutional chaos.
The President wanted the Department to sow doubt in the
legitimacy of the election to empower his followers and Members
of Congress to take action. If the Department could just lend
its credibility to the conspiracies, people would have the
justification they needed to spread the big lie.
So President Trump ultimately wanted the Department of
Justice to say the election was ``corrupt'' and ``leave the
rest to me and the Republican Congressmen.''
As you will hear today, the Department's top leadership
refused.
Not surprisingly, President Trump didn't take ``no'' for an
answer. He didn't accept it from Attorney General Barr, and he
wouldn't accept it from Mr. Rosen either. So he looked for
another Attorney General--his third in 2 weeks. He needed to
find someone who was willing to ignore the facts. That is not
the norm.
Let's look at what Attorneys General, Democrats and
Republicans alike, have said about upholding their oath to the
Constitution.
Attorney General Sessions. The Attorney General ultimately owes his
loyalty to the integrity of the American people and to the fidelity to
the Constitution and the legitimate laws of the country. That's what
he's ultimately required to do.
Attorney General Holder. I will be an independent Attorney General.
I will be the people's lawyer. If, however, there were an issue that I
thought were that significant that would compromise my ability to serve
as Attorney General in the way that I have described it as ``the
people's lawyer,'' I would not hesitate to resign.
Attorney General Mukasey. As you and I discussed, if the President
proposed to undertake a course of conduct that was in violation of the
Constitution, that would present me with a--a difficult, but not a
complex, problem. I would have two choices. I could either try to talk
him out of it or leave. Those are the choices.
Attorney General Lynch. The Attorney General's position as a
Cabinet member is perhaps unique from all of the Cabinet members. Yes,
a member of the President's Cabinet, but the Attorney General has a
unique responsibility to provide independent and objective advice to
the President or any agency when it is sought and sometimes, perhaps,
even when it is not sought.
Mr. Kinzinger. Everyone in that video, from Eric Holder to
Jeff Sessions, spoke as one about the independence of the
Department. It is a point of pride at Justice to apply the law
without the President's political self-interest tainting its
actions or dictating how it uses its authorities.
But President Trump did find one candidate at Justice who
seemed willing to do anything to help him stay in power. Let's
hear what President Trump's own lawyer, Eric Herschmann, had to
say about Jeff Clark's plan to overturn the election.
I would like to advise viewers, this video contains some
strong language.
Mr. Herschmann. And when he finished discussing what he planned on
doing, I said good, fucking--excuse me, sorry--F'ing A-hole,
congratulations. You just admitted your first step or act you take as
Attorney General would be committing a felony and violating rule 6(e).
You're clearly the right candidate for this job.
Mr. Kinzinger. So who is Jeff Clark? An environmental
lawyer, with no experience relevant to leading the entire
Department of Justice.
What was his only qualification? That he would do whatever
the President wanted him to do, including overthrowing a free
and a fair democratic election.
President Trump's campaign to bend the Justice Department
to his political will culminated in a showdown on January 3rd.
Today, we will take you inside that early evening Oval Office
meeting, where top Justice Department officials met with the
President. At stake: The leadership and integrity of the
Department of Justice.
Mr. Donoghue. The meeting took about another 2\1/2\ hours from the
time I entered. It was entirely focused on whether there should be a
DOJ leadership change. I was sitting directly in front of the
President. Jeff Rosen was to my right. Jeff Clark was to my left.
Acting Attorney General Rosen. He looked at me, and I underscored,
``Well, the one thing we know is you're not going to do anything. You
don't even agree that the concerns that are being presented are--are
valid. And here's someone who has--has a different view. So why
shouldn't I do that?'' You know, that's how the discussion then
proceeded.
Mr. Herschmann. Jeff Clark was proposing that--uh--Jeff Rosen be
replaced by Jeff Clark, and I thought the proposal was asinine.
Mr. Heaphy. What were Clark's purported bases for why it was in the
President's interest for him to step in? What would he do? What would--
how would things change according to Mr. Clark in the meeting?
Mr. Donoghue. He repeatedly said to the President that, if he was
put in the seat, he would conduct real investigations that would, in
his view, uncover widespread fraud. He would send out the letter that
he had drafted and that this was a last opportunity to sort-of set
things straight with this defective election and that he could do it
and he had the intelligence and the will and the desire to pursue these
matters in the way that the President thought most appropriate.
Mr. Herschmann. And he was making a pitch, and every time he'd get
clobbered over the head. He would, like, say, like, you know, he would
call to order, you know, the President--``your decision. You get the
chance to make this decision, and, you know, you've heard everybody,
and you can make your determination.'' And then we jump back in, and,
you know, they would clobber him.
Mr. Donoghue. I made the point that Jeff Clark is not even
competent to serve as the Attorney General. He's never been a criminal
attorney. He's never conducted a criminal investigation in his life.
He's never been in front of a grand jury, much less a trial jury. And
he kind of retorted by saying, ``Well, I've done a lot of very
complicated appeals in civil litigation, environmental litigation, and
things like that.'' And I said, ``That's right. You're an environmental
lawyer. How about you go back to your office and we'll call you when
there's an oil spill.'' And Pat Cipollone weighed in at one point. I
remember saying, ``You know, that letter that this guy wants to send,
that letter is a murder-suicide pact. It's going to damage everyone who
touches it, and we should have nothing to do with that letter. I don't
ever want to see that letter again.'' And so we went along those lines.
Mr. Herschmann. I thought Jeff's proposal--Clark's proposal was
nuts. I mean, this guy--at a certain point, ``Listen, the best I can
tell is the only thing you know about environmental and elections
challenges is they both start with E, and based on your answers
tonight, I'm not even certain you know that.''
Mr. Donoghue. The President said, ``Suppose I do this. Suppose I
replace him, Jeff Rosen, with him, Jeff Clark. What do you do?''
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, we know these men before us did the
right thing.
But think about what happens if these Justice officials
make a different decision. What happens if they bow to the
pressure? What would that do to us as a democracy? As a Nation?
Imagine a future where the President could screen
applicants to the Justice Department with one question: Are you
loyal to me or to the Constitution? It wouldn't take long to
find people willing to pledge their loyalty to the man.
We know many of President Trump's vocal supporters on
January 6th also wanted the Justice Department to do whatever
he asked as long as it meant he could stay in power. They made
sure Justice Department officials heard his message as they
protested loudly in front of the Department on their way to the
Capitol on January 6th.
Crowd. Do your job! Do your job! Do your job! Do your job! Do your
job!
Voice. Live in DC, we're marching to the Capitol. We are at the
Department of Justice right now telling these cowards to do their job!
Voice. We're going to take the Capitol.
Mr. Kinzinger. I want to take a moment now to speak
directly to my fellow Republicans.
Imagine the country's top prosecutor--with the power to
open investigations, subpoena, charge crimes, and seek
imprisonment--imagine that official pursuing the agenda of the
other party instead of that of the American people as a whole.
If you are a Democrat, imagine it the other way around.
Today, President Trump's total disregard for the
Constitution and his oath will be fully exposed.
Now let's get this hearing under way so we can do our part
to protect the freedoms that we often take for granted, so that
we can see how close we came to losing it all.
I now yield back to the Chairman.
Chairman Thompson. We are joined today by three
distinguished witnesses who each served in the Trump
administration in the months preceding January 6th.
Mr. Jeffrey Rosen served at the Department of Justice from
May 2019 until January 2021. With President Trump's nomination
and the confirmation of the U.S. Senate, he became the United
States Deputy Attorney General. In December 2020, he took the
mantle of Acting Attorney General.
Mr. Richard Donoghue has served in the Department of
Justice for over 14 years. Mr. Donoghue was a United States
attorney for the Eastern District of New York; then became Mr.
Rosen's Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General; and,
finally, Acting Deputy Attorney General. Mr. Donoghue also
served more than 20 years in the United States military,
including the 82nd Airborne and the Judge Advocate General's
Corps.
We are also joined by Mr. Steven Engel, the former
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel. He
was nominated by the former President and confirmed by the
Senate during the Trump administration. He served from November
2017 to January 2021 and has now returned to private practice.
I will now swear in our witnesses. The witnesses will
please stand and raise their right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Thompson. Thank you. You may be seated.
Let the record reflect the witnesses all answered in the
affirmative.
I now recognize myself for questions.
First of all, gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
All of you served at former President Trump's pleasure at
the Department of Justice in top leadership positions with
tremendous responsibilities.
Former Attorney General Bill Barr told the Select Committee
that, before he left the Department in December 2020, he told
President Trump, on at least three occasions, there was no
evidence of widespread election fraud that would have changed
the results of the Presidential election and refuted numerous
specific claims of election fraud the President was making.
Mr. Rosen, after Mr. Barr announced his resignation, did
Donald Trump continue to demand that the Department of Justice
investigate his claims of election fraud?
Mr. Rosen.\1\ Yes. He asserted that he thought the Justice
Department had not done enough.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rosen has been included in the
Appendix and may be found on page 43.
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Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
From the time you took over from Attorney General Barr
until January 3rd, how often did President Trump contact you or
the Department to push allegations of election fraud?
Mr. Rosen. So, between December 23rd and January 3rd, the
President either called me or met with me virtually every day,
with one or two exceptions, like Christmas Day.
Before that--because it had been announced that I would
become the Acting Attorney General before the date I actually
did--the President had asked that Rich Donoghue and I go over
and meet with him, I believe on December 15th, as well.
Chairman Thompson. So, after you had some of these meetings
and conversations with the President, what things did the
President raise with you?
Mr. Rosen. So the common element of all of this was the
President expressing his dissatisfaction that the Justice
Department, in his view, had not done enough to investigate
election fraud.
But, at different junctures, other topics came up at
different intervals. So, at one point, he had raised the
question of having a special counsel for election fraud. At a
number of points, he raised requests that I meet with his
campaign counsel, Mr. Giuliani.
At one point, he raised whether the Justice Department
would file a lawsuit in the Supreme Court. At a couple of
junctures, there were questions about making public statements
or about holding a press conference.
At one of the later junctures was this issue of sending a
letter to State legislatures in Georgia or other States.
So there were different things raised at different parts
of--or different intervals, with the common theme being his
dissatisfaction about what the Justice Department had done to
investigate election fraud.
I will say that the Justice Department declined all of
those requests that I was just referencing because we did not
think that they were appropriate, based on the facts and the
law as we understood them.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
So, Mr. Donoghue, on December 15th, the day after Attorney
General Barr announced his resignation, the President summoned
you and Mr. Rosen to the White House.
At this meeting with the President, what did he want to
discuss?
Mr. Donoghue. There were a number of topics of discussion
that day, Mr. Chairman.
Much of the conversation focused on a report that had been
recently released relating to Antrim County in Michigan. I
believe on December 13th an organization called the Allied
Security Group issued a report that alleged that the Dominion
voting machines in that county had a 68 percent error rate.
The report was widely covered in the media. We were aware
of it. We obtained a copy of it on the 14th of December, the
day prior. We circulated it to the U.S. attorneys in Michigan
for their awareness. We had a number of discussions internally.
But the conversation with the President on that day, the
15th, was largely focused on that, and he was essentially
saying, ``Have you seen this report?'' He was adamant that the
report must be accurate, that it proved that the election was
defective, that he, in fact, won the election, and the
Department should be using that report to basically tell the
American people that the results were not trustworthy.
He went on to other theories as well, but the bulk of that
conversation on December 15th focused on Antrim County,
Michigan, and the ASOG report.
Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Engel, we know that Attorney General Barr announced on
December 1, 2020, that the Department of Justice had found no
evidence of widespread fraud that could have changed the
outcome of the election.
So, from December 1, 2020, until today, as you sit here,
have you ever doubted that top-line conclusion?
Mr. Engel.\2\ No, I have never had any reason to doubt
Attorney General Barr's conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The prepared statement of Mr. Engel has been included in the
Appendix and may be found on page 60.
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Chairman Thompson. Thank you.
Pursuant to section 5(c)(8) of House Resolution 503, the
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Kinzinger, for questions.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the weeks leading to January 6th, the Department of
Justice was fielding almost daily requests from the President
to investigate claims of election fraud. Each claim was refuted
time and time again--an effort Attorney General Barr described
as ``Whack-A-Mole.''
When each of the President's efforts failed, he resorted to
installing a new Attorney General to say the election was
illegal and corrupt simply so he could stay in power.
President Trump started leaning on the Justice Department
the first chance he got, on November 29th, his first television
interview after the election.
Ms. Bartiromo. Where is the DOJ and the FBI in all of this, Mr.
President? You have laid out some serious charges here. Shouldn't this
be something that the FBI is investigating?
President Trump. Missing in action.
Ms. Bartiromo. Are they? Is the DOJ investigating?
President Trump. Missing in action. Can't tell you where they are.
Mr. Kinzinger. Republican Congressmen echoed the President
just 2 days later. They wrote a letter to Attorney General
Barr, laying into the Justice Department for a ``shocking lack
of action'' in investigating the claims of election fraud.
That same day, Attorney General Barr stated publicly that
President Trump's claims had no merit.
Ignoring the top law enforcement officer in the country,
Republican Congressmen amplified the ``stolen election''
message to the American public. Let's listen.
Mr. Gohmert. And so there's widespread evidence of fraud 'cause
people haven't done their jobs. Durham and Barr will deserve a big
notation in history when it's written of the rise and fall of the
United States if they don't clean up this mess, clean up the fraud, do
your jobs, and save this little experiment in self-government.
Mr. Biggs. Again, I join my colleagues in calling on Attorney
General Ball--Barr to immediately let us know what he's doing.
Mr. Gosar. We're already working on challenging the certified
electors. And then what about the courts? How pathetic are the courts?
[Crowd Boos]
Mr. Gaetz. January 6th, I'm joining with the fighters in the
Congress, and we are going to object to electors from States that
didn't run clean elections. [Applause] Democracy is left undefended if
we accept the results of a stolen election without fighting with every
bit of vigor we can muster.
Mr. Jordan. The ultimate date of significance is January 6. This is
how the process works. The ultimate arbiter here, the ultimate check
and balance, is the U.S. Congress. And when something is done in an
unconstitutional fashion, which happened in several of these States, we
have a duty to step forward and have this debate and have this vote on
the 6th of January.
Mr. Brooks. Today is the day American patriots start taking down
names and kicking ass.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Donoghue, on December 27th, you had a
90-minute conversation with the President where he raised false
claim after false claim with you and Mr. Rosen.
How did you respond to what you called a ``stream of
allegations''?
Mr. Donoghue. The December 27th conversation was, in my
mind, an escalation of the earlier conversations. As the former
Acting AG indicated, there were a lot of communications that
preceded that. As we got later in the month of December, the
President's entreaties became more urgent; he became more
adamant that we weren't doing our job, we needed to step up and
do our job.
He had this arsenal of allegations that he wanted to rely
on. So I felt in that conversation that it was incumbent upon
me to make it very clear to the President what our
investigations had revealed and that we had concluded, based on
actual investigations, actual witness interviews, actual
reviews of documents, that these allegations simply had no
merit.
I wanted to try to cut through the noise, because it was
clear to us that there were a lot of people whispering in his
ear, feeding him these conspiracy theories and allegations. I
felt that being very blunt in that conversation might help make
it clear to the President these allegations were simply not
true.
So, as he went through them--in what for me was a 90-minute
conversation or so and what for the former Acting AG was a 2-
hour conversation as the President went through them, I went
piece by piece to say, ``No, that's false, that is not true,''
and to correct him really in a serial fashion as he moved from
one theory to another.
Mr. Kinzinger. Can you give me an example of one or two of
those theories?
Mr. Donoghue. So one that was very clear at that point was
the Antrim County, the ASOG report that I mentioned earlier.
Allied Security Operations Group released this report that said
68 percent error rate.
There was, in fact, in Antrim County a hand recount. It had
nothing to do with the Department. The Department did not
request that. That was pursuant to litigation brought by other
parties. But there was a hand recount. So they were able to
compare the hand recount to what the machines had reported.
For the ballots that were actually counted by machine, more
than 15,000, there was 1 error, 1 ballot. I did a quick
calculation and came up with .0063 percent error rate, which is
well within tolerance.
So I made it very clear to the President, because he was so
fixated on the ASOG report in the December 15th conversation,
that, in fact, our investigation revealed that the error rate
was .0063 percent. ``So that, Mr. President, is an example of
what people are telling you that is not true and that you
cannot and should not be relying on.''
So that was one very explicit one, and I think you see that
reflected in my notes.
We went through a series of others. The truck driver who
claimed to have moved an entire tractor trailer of ballots from
New York to Pennsylvania, that was also incorrect. We did an
investigation with the FBI, interviewed witnesses at the front
end and the back end of that trailer's transit from New York to
Pennsylvania. We looked at loading manifests. We interviewed
witnesses, including, of course, the driver. We knew it wasn't
true. Whether the driver believed it or not was never clear to
me, but it was just not true. So that was another one that I
tried to educate the President on.
There were a series of others, mostly in swing States. Of
course, he wanted to talk a great deal about Georgia, the State
Farm Arena video, which he believed for various reasons was, as
he said it, ``fraud staring you right in the face.''
Mr. Kinzinger. Were any of the allegations he brought up
found credible? Did you find any of them credible?
Mr. Donoghue. No.
Mr. Kinzinger. So, during this conversation, did you take
handwritten notes directly quoting the President?
Mr. Donoghue. I did.
To make it clear, Attorney General Rosen called me on my
Government cell phone, said he had been on the phone with the
President for some time, the President had a lot of these
allegations. I was better versed in what the Department had
done, just because I had closer contact with the
investigations, and the AG asked me to get on the call. Of
course, I agreed.
I begin taking notes only because, at the outset, the
President made an allegation I had not heard. I had heard many
of these things; I knew many of them were investigated. But
when the President, at least when I came to the conversation,
when he began speaking, he brought up an allegation I was
completely unaware of. Of course, that concerned us. So I
simply reached out and grabbed a notepad off my wife's
nightstand and a pen, and I started jotting it down.
That had to do with an allegation that more than 200,000
votes were certified in the State of Pennsylvania that were not
actually cast. Sometimes the President would say it was 205;
sometimes he would say it was 250. But I had not heard this
before, and I wanted to get the allegation down clearly so that
we could look into it, if appropriate.
That is why I started taking those notes. Then, as the
conversation continued, I just continued to take the notes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let's take a look at the notes, if we could,
right now.
As we can see on the screen, you actually quote President
Trump asking, ``Where's DOJ?'', just like we heard him say in
his first television interview.
How did you respond to that?
Mr. Donoghue. So both the Acting AG and I tried to explain
to the President, on this occasion and on several other
occasions, that the Justice Department has a very important,
very specific, but very limited role in these elections. States
run their elections. We are not quality control for the States.
We are obviously interested in and have a mission that
relates to criminal conduct in relation to Federal elections.
We also have related civil rights responsibilities. So we do
have an important role, but the bottom line was, if a State ran
their election in such a way that it was defective, that is to
the State or Congress to correct. It is not for the Justice
Department to step in.
I certainly understood the President, as a layman, not
understanding why the Justice Department didn't have at least a
civil role to step in and bring suit on behalf of the American
people. We tried to explain that to him.
The American people do not constitute the client for the
United States Justice Department. The one and only client of
the United States Justice Department is the U.S. Government.
The U.S. Government does not have standing, as we were
repeatedly told by our internal teams--OLC, led by Steve Engel,
as well as the Office of the Solicitor General researched it
and gave us thorough, clear opinions that we simply did not
have standing. We tried to explain that to the President on
numerous occasions.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let's take a look at another one of your
notes. You also noted that Mr. Rosen said to Mr. Trump, ``DOJ
can't and won't snap its fingers and change the outcome of the
election.''
How did the President respond to that, sir?
Mr. Donoghue. He responded very quickly and said,
essentially, ``That's not what I'm asking you to do. What I'm
just asking you to do is just say it was corrupt, and leave the
rest to me and the Republican Congressmen.''
Mr. Kinzinger. So let's now put up the notes where you
quote the President, as you were speaking to that.
You said the President said, ``Just say the election was
corrupt, and leave the rest to me and the Republican
Congressmen.''
So, Mr. Donoghue, that is a direct quote from President
Trump, correct?
Mr. Donoghue. That is an exact quote from the President,
yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. The next note shows that the President kept
pressing.
Even though he had been told that there was no evidence of
fraud, did the President keep saying that the Department was
``obligated to tell people that this was an illegal, corrupt
election''?
Mr. Donoghue. That is also an exact quote from the
President, yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let me just be clear. Did the Department
find any evidence to conclude that there was anything illegal
or corrupt about the 2020 election?
Mr. Donoghue. There were isolated instances of fraud. None
of them came close to calling into question the outcome of the
election in any individual State.
Mr. Kinzinger. How would you describe the President's
demeanor during that call?
Mr. Donoghue. He was more agitated than he was on December
15th. The President, throughout all of these meetings and
telephone conversations, was adamant that he had won and that
we were not doing our job. But it did escalate over time until
ultimately the meeting on January 3rd, which was sort-of the
most extreme of the meetings and conversations.
Mr. Kinzinger. So I want to make sure we don't gloss this
over: ``Just say it was corrupt, and leave the rest to us.''
The President wanted the top Justice Department officials
to declare that the election was corrupt, even though, as he
knew, there was absolutely no evidence to support that
statement.
The President didn't care about actually investigating the
facts. He just wanted the Department of Justice to put its
stamp of approval on the lies.
Who was going to help him? Well, Jeff Clark.
Mr. Rosen, on Christmas Eve, your first official day as the
Acting Attorney General, President Trump called you. What did
he want to talk about?
Mr. Rosen. The same things he was talking about publicly.
He wanted to talk about that he thought the election had been
stolen or was corrupt and that there was widespread fraud. I
had told him that our reviews had not shown that to be the
case.
So we had an extended discussion, probably 15, maybe 20
minutes, something like that, with him urging that the
Department of Justice should be doing more with regard to
election fraud.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did he mention Jeff Clark's name?
Mr. Rosen. Yes. It was just in passing. He made what I
regarded as a peculiar reference. I don't remember the exact
quote, but it was something about, did I know Jeff Clark, or
did I know who he was, or something like that. I told him I
did, and then the conversation just moved on.
But when I hung up, I was quizzical as to, how does the
President even know Mr. Clark? I was not aware that they had
ever met or that the President had been involved with any of
the issues in the Civil Division.
Mr. Kinzinger. So it was a bit of a surprise when he
brought his name up?
Mr. Rosen. Yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. So Mr. Clark was the acting head of the
Civil Division and head of Environmental and Natural Resources
Division at the Department of Justice.
Do either of those divisions have any role whatsoever in
investigating election fraud, sir?
Mr. Rosen. No. And, to my awareness, Jeff Clark had had no
prior involvement of any kind with regard to the work that the
Department was doing that Attorney General Barr has talked
about to this Committee.
Mr. Kinzinger. So let's take a minute and explain why the
President mentioned Jeff Clark's name to Mr. Rosen here on
Christmas Eve.
On December 21st, some Republican Members of Congress met
with President Trump in the White House to talk about
overturning the 2020 election.
Let's hear Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene talk about
how this meeting got set up.
Mrs. Greene of Georgia. I was the only new Member at the meeting. I
called President Trump on Saturday and--and said, ``We've got to have a
meeting. There's many of us that feel like this election has been
stolen.''
Mr. Kinzinger. So, on the screen, you will see that
President Trump's chief of staff, Mark Meadows, tweeted about
that meeting right after it happened.
He said, ``Several Members of Congress just finished a
meeting in the Oval Office with President Donald Trump,
preparing to fight back against mounting evidence of voter
fraud. Stay tuned.''
On the same day he met with these Republican Members of
Congress, President Trump called into a conservative political
convention, and he used the opportunity to pressure the
Department of Justice to investigate his bogus claims.
President Trump. The problem is we need a party that's going to
fight, and we have some great Congressmen and--women that are doing it.
And we have others, some great fighters. But we won this in a
landslide. They know it, and we need backing from, like, the Justice
Department. And other people have to finally step up.
Mr. Kinzinger. The Select Committee obtained records from
the National Archives that show that Scott Perry was one of the
Congressmen who joined that meeting.
We learned from White House records--that you will now see
on the screen--that, the very next day, Representative Perry
returned to the White House. This time, he brought a Justice
Department official named Jeffrey Clark.
Representative Perry provided the following statement to
his local TV affiliate. He said, ``Throughout the past 4 years,
I've worked with Assistant Attorney General Clark on various
legislative matters. When President Trump asked if I would make
an introduction, I obliged.''
But why Jeff Clark? Let's hear Mr. Giuliani explain the
kind of person that he and the President wanted at the top of
Justice.
Mr. George. Do you remember ever recommending to anybody that Mr.
Clark, meaning Jeffrey Clark, at DOJ be given election-related
responsibilities?
Mr. Giuliani. You mean beyond the President?
Mr. George. Correct.
Mr. Giuliani. Well, beyond the President, I do recall saying to
people that somebody should be put in charge of the Justice Department
who isn't frightened of what's going to be done to their reputation
because the Justice Department was filled with people like that.
Mr. Kinzinger. Should put somebody that is not frightened
of what is going to be done to their reputation.
Mr. Donoghue, when you told the President that you wouldn't
pursue baseless claims of fraud, was it because you were
worried about your reputation?
Mr. Donoghue. No. Not at all.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Clark's name was also mentioned in White
House in late December and early January, as described by a top
aide to Mark Meadows, Cassidy Hutchinson.
Mr. George. Was it your understanding that Representative Perry was
pushing for a specific person to take over the Department?
Ms. Hutchinson. He wanted Mr. Clark--Mr. Jeff Clark to take over
the Department of Justice.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Rosen, after your call with President
Trump on December 24th, you spoke with Mr. Clark on December
26th about his contact with the President.
Can you tell us about that conversation?
Mr. Rosen. Yes.
Because I had been quizzical about why his name had come
up, I called him, and I tried to explore if he would share if
there was something I ought to know. After some back-and-forth,
he acknowledged that shortly before Christmas he had gone to a
meeting in the Oval Office with the President.
That, of course, surprised me. I asked him, how did that
happen? He was defensive. He said it had been unplanned, that
he had been talking to someone he referred to as ``General
Perry'' but I believe is Congressman Perry, and that,
unbeknownst to him, he was asked to go to a meeting, and he
didn't know it but it turned out it was at the Oval--he found
himself at the Oval Office. He was apologetic for that.
I said, well, you didn't tell me about it, it wasn't
authorized, and you didn't even tell me after the fact. You
know, this is not appropriate.
But he was contrite and said it had been inadvertent and it
would not happen again and that if anyone asked him to go to
such a meeting he would notify Rich Donoghue and me.
Mr. Kinzinger. Is there a policy that governs who can have
contact directly with the White House?
Mr. Rosen. Yes. So, across many administrations, for a long
period of time, there is a policy that, particularly with
regard to criminal investigations, restricts at both the White
House end and the Justice Department end those more sensitive
issues to the highest ranks.
So, for criminal matters, the policy for a long time has
been that only the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney
General, from the DOJ side, can have conversations about
criminal matters with the White House, or the Attorney General
and the Deputy Attorney General can authorize someone for a
specific item with their permission.
But the idea is to make sure that the top rung of the
Justice Department knows about it and is in the thing to
control it and make sure only appropriate things are done.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Engel, from your perspective, why is it
important to have a policy like Mr. Rosen just discussed?
Mr. Engel. Well, it is critical that the Department of
Justice conducts its criminal investigations free from either
the reality or any appearance of political interference.
So people can get in trouble if people at the White House
are speaking with people at the Department. That is why--the
purpose of these policies is to keep these communications as
infrequent and at the highest levels as possible, just to make
sure that people who are less careful about it, who don't
really understand these implications, such as Mr. Clark, don't
run afoul of those contact policies.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
So the Select Committee conducted an informal interview
with the White House Counsel, Pat Cipollone, and his deputy,
Pat Philbin, about their contact with Mr. Clark, though neither
has yet agreed to sit for transcribed and videotaped
interviews.
But Pat Cipollone told the Select Committee that he
intervened when he heard Mr. Clark was meeting with the
President about legal matters without his knowledge, which was
strictly against White House policy.
Mr. Cipollone and Mr. Philbin, like Mr. Rosen, told Mr.
Clark to stand down, and he didn't.
On the same day Acting Attorney General Rosen told Mr.
Clark to stop talking to the White House, Representative Perry
was urging Chief of Staff Mark Meadows to elevate Clark within
the Department of Justice.
You can now see on the screen behind me a series of texts
between Representative Perry and Mr. Meadows. They show that
Representative Perry requested that Mr. Clark be elevated
within the Department.
Representative Perry tells Mr. Meadows on December 26th
that, ``Mark, just checking in as time continues to count down.
Eleven days to January 6th and 25 days to inauguration. We've
got to get going.''
Representative Perry followed up and says, ``Mark, you
should call Jeff. I just got off the phone with him, and he
explained to me why the principal deputy won't work, especially
with the FBI. They will view it as not having the authority to
enforce what needs to be done.''
Mr. Meadows responds with, ``I got it. I think I
understand. Let me work on the deputy position.''
Representative Perry then texts, ``Roger. Just sent you
something on Signal. Just sent you an updated file. Did you
call Jeff Clark?''
Mr. Donoghue, Representative Perry called you the next day,
on December 27th. Who told him to call you?
Mr. Donoghue. My understanding is the President did. At the
outset of the call, Congressman Perry told me that he was
calling at the behest of the President.
Mr. Kinzinger. What did he want to talk about?
Mr. Donoghue. He wanted to talk about Pennsylvania in
particular. He gave me some background about, you know, why he
in particular doesn't trust the FBI and why the American people
don't necessarily trust the FBI.
Then he went into some allegations specific to
Pennsylvania, which included, amongst others, this allegation
that the secretary of state had certified more votes than were
actually cast.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did you direct the local U.S. attorney's
office to investigate that claim?
Mr. Donoghue. So Mr. Perry said that he had a great deal of
information, that investigations had been done, that there was
some sort of forensic-type report that would be helpful to me.
I didn't know Congressman Perry. I had never heard of him
before this conversation. But I said, ``Sir, if you've got
something that you think is relevant to what the Justice
Department's mission is, you should feel free to send it to
me.'' He did.
I was en route from New York to Washington. I got it. I
looked at it on my iPhone. Obviously, I couldn't read the whole
thing in transit like that, but I looked at it to get a feel
for what it was. Then I forwarded it to the United States
attorney for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did they get back to you? What did they
conclude?
Mr. Donoghue. Scott Brady looked at it. He was the Western
District of Pennsylvania U.S. attorney. Took him a couple days,
but he got back in relatively short order with a pretty clear
explanation for why there was no foundation for concern.
The secretary of state had not certified more votes than
were actually cast. The difference between the 5.25 that was
actually certified by the secretary of state and the 5 million
that was on a public-facing website was that the information on
the website was incomplete because 4 counties had not uploaded
their data.
Mr. Kinzinger. So no credibility to that claim?
Mr. Donoghue. There was zero to that, right.
Mr. Kinzinger. During that call, did Scott Perry mention
Mr. Clark? What did he say about him, if so?
Mr. Donoghue. He did; he mentioned Mr. Clark. He said
something to the effect of, ``I think Jeff Clark is great, and
I think he is the kind of guy who could get in there and do
something about this stuff.''
This was coming on the heels of the President having
mentioned Mr. Clark in the afternoon call earlier that day.
Mr. Kinzinger. I would like to yield to the gentlewoman
from Wyoming, Vice Chair Cheney.
Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Kinzinger. I
thank the gentleman for yielding.
As we discussed earlier, at the center of Mr. Clark's plan
to undo President Trump's election loss was a letter.
Mr. Donoghue, on December 28th, Mr. Clark emailed you and
Mr. Rosen a draft letter that he wanted you to sign and send to
Georgia State officials. You testified that this could have
``grave constitutional consequences.''
Mr. Donoghue, can you tell us what you meant by that?
Mr. Donoghue. Well, I had to read both the email and the
attached letter twice to make sure I really understood what he
was proposing because it was so extreme to me I had a hard time
getting my head around it initially.
But I read it, and I did understand it for what he
intended, and I had to sit down and sort-of compose what I
thought was an appropriate response.
I actually initially went next door to the Acting AG's
office, but he was not there. We were both on that email. I
knew we would both have probably a very similar reaction to it.
He was not in his office, so I returned to my office, and I
sat down to draft a response because I thought it was very
important to give a prompt response rejecting this out of hand.
In my response I explained a number of reasons this is not
the Department's role to suggest or dictate to State
legislatures how they should select their electors. But more
importantly, this was not based on fact. This was actually
contrary to the facts as developed by Department investigations
over the last several weeks and months.
So I responded to that. For the Department to insert itself
into the political process this way I think would have had
grave consequences for the country. It may very well have
spiraled us into a constitutional crisis. I wanted to make sure
that he understood the gravity of the situation because he
didn't seem to really appreciate it.
Vice Chair Cheney. What was Mr. Clark's reaction when you
sent this email to him?
Mr. Donoghue. He didn't respond directly to the email, but
we met shortly after that. After I sent the email, the Acting
AG returned. I went to his office. He had just read it. He had
a very similar reaction to me. He was exasperated. He told me
that he had told one of his administrative assistants to get
Jeff Clark up here, we want to him talk face to face about
this.
So the three of us then had a meeting probably around 1800
that night in the Deputy Attorney General's conference room.
Vice Chair Cheney. One of the things that you said to Mr.
Clark is, ``What you are doing is nothing less than the United
States Justice Department meddling in the outcome of a
Presidential election.''
I assume you conveyed that to him as well in your meeting
that evening?
Mr. Donoghue. Yes, in those very words. It was a very
contentious meeting. But, yes, that was said, amongst other
things.
Vice Chair Cheney. Despite this contentious meeting and
your strong reaction to the letter, did Mr. Clark continue to
push his concept in the coming days?
Mr. Donoghue. He did, yes. We had subsequent meetings and
conversations. The Acting AG probably had more contact with him
than I did.
But between the 28th and the 2nd, when we had another in-
person meeting, he clearly continued to move down this path. He
began calling witnesses and apparently conducting
investigations of his own.
He got a briefing from DNI about purported foreign
intelligence interference. We thought perhaps once it was
explained to him that there was no basis for that part of his
concern, that he would retreat.
But instead, he doubled down and said, ``Well, okay, so
there is no foreign interference. I still think there are
enough allegations out there that we should go ahead and send
this letter,'' which shocked me even more than the initial one
because you would think after a couple days of looking at this,
he, like we, would have come to the same conclusion that it was
completely unfounded.
Vice Chair Cheney. When you learned that he had been
calling witnesses and conducting investigations on his own, did
you confront him?
Mr. Donoghue. Yes.
Vice Chair Cheney. What was his reaction?
Mr. Donoghue. He got very defensive. You know, as I said,
there were a series of conversations through that week. I
certainly remember very specifically the conversation and the
meeting on January 2nd. That got even more confrontational.
But he was defensive. You know, similar to his earlier
reaction when I said this is nothing less than Justice
Department meddling in an election, his reaction was, ``I think
a lot of people have meddled in this election.''
So he kind-of clung to that, and then spewed out some of
these theories, some of which we had heard from the President,
but others which were floating around the internet and media,
and just kept insisting that the Department needed to act and
needed to send those letters.
Vice Chair Cheney. The Committee has also learned that Mr.
Clark was working with another attorney at the Department named
Ken Klukowski, who drafted this letter to Georgia with Mr.
Clark.
Mr. Klukowski had arrived at the Department on December
15th with just 36 days left until the inauguration. He was
specifically assigned to work under Jeff Clark.
Mr. Klukowski also worked with John Eastman, who we showed
you at our hearing last week was one of the primary architects
of President Trump's scheme to overturn the election.
The Georgia letter that we have been discussing
specifically talks about some of Dr. Eastman's theories,
including, ``The purpose of the special session the Department
recommends would be for the General Assembly to determine
whether the election failed to make a proper and valid choice
between the candidates, such that a General Assembly could take
whatever action is necessary to ensure that one of the slates
of electors cast on December 14th will be accepted by Congress
on January 6th.''
The Committee has also learned that the relationship
between Dr. Eastman and Mr. Klukowski persisted after Mr.
Klukowski joined the Justice Department.
Let's take a look at an email recommending that Mr.
Klukowski and Dr. Eastman brief Vice President Pence and his
staff. Other recipients of this email included the chief of
staff to Congressman Louie Gohmert.
The email says, ``As stated last week, I believe the Vice
President and his staff would benefit greatly from a briefing
by John and Ken. As I also mentioned, we want to make sure we
don't overexpose Ken given his new position.''
This email suggests that Mr. Klukowski was simultaneously
working with Jeffrey Clark to draft the proposed letter to
Georgia officials to overturn their certified election and
working with Dr. Eastman to help pressure the Vice President to
overturn the election.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today
and for answering our questions about this letter and other
issues.
We asked Mr. Clark some of the same questions that we have
asked you, and here is how he answered.
Mr. Wood. Did you discuss this draft letter to Georgia officials
with the President of the United States?
Mr. Clark. Fifth and executive privilege. Again, just restated for
the abundance of caution.
Mr. Wood. Okay. If you look again at the draft letter, in the first
paragraph, second sentence says, ``The Department will update you as we
are able on investigatory progress, but at this time, we have
identified significant concerns that may have impacted the outcome of
the election in multiple States, including the State of Georgia.''
Isn't that, in fact, contrary to what Attorney General Barr had said on
December 1, 2020?
Mr. Clark. Fifth.
Vice Chair Cheney. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Chairman, I reserve.
Chairman Thompson. Pursuant to the order of the Committee
of today, the Chair declares the Committee in recess for a
period of approximately 10 minutes.
[Accordingly, at 4:08 p.m., the Committee recessed until
4:20 p.m., when it was called to order by the Chairman.]
Chairman Thompson. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Illinois.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, around the time Mr. Clark was pushing for the
Department to send the Georgia letter, the President and his
supporters were pressuring the Justice Department to take other
actions to change the outcome of the 2020 election.
Mr. Engel, you were the head of the Office of Legal
Counsel. Can you first off explain your role? What is that?
Mr. Engel. Sure. One of the Attorney General's most
important responsibilities is to provide legal advice to the
President and to the executive branch.
As a practical matter, given the responsibilities of the
Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office
of Legal Counsel exercises that job on a day-to-day basis.
So, in addition, the head of OLC often functions as a
general counsel essentially to the Attorney General, and so is
often the chief legal adviser to the AG as well as the White
House and the executive branch more broadly.
Mr. Kinzinger. So given that role, can you kind-of describe
your relationship with the President?
Mr. Engel. Well, in connection with my role at OLC, over
the course of my tenure there there were a number of instances
in which folks at the White House would seek to bring me in to
provide legal advice to the President, sometimes discussing the
legal options that could be pursued among various policy--to
reach various policy objectives, sometimes to advise the
President that a course of action that they had been discussing
was not legally available.
Mr. Kinzinger. So I want to ask you about two things the
President asked you and the Department to do. The first is
reflected in this email that we are going to put on the screen.
The President sent a draft lawsuit to be filed by the
Department and the Supreme Court. He wanted you, Mr. Rosen, and
Mr. Cipollone specifically to review it. You and the Department
opposed filing it.
We see on the screen here the talking points that you
actually drafted on that. So you stated that, ``There is no
legal basis to bring this lawsuit. Anyone who thinks otherwise
simply doesn't know the law, much less the Supreme Court.''
Why was this the Department's position?
Mr. Engel. Well, I mean, I think the memo sort-of speaks to
this.
But essentially this was a draft lawsuit that apparently
was prepared by people outside the Department. It would be
styled as brought by the United States and by the Acting
Solicitor General as an original jurisdiction matter in the
Supreme Court.
It was a meritless lawsuit that was not something that the
Department could or would bring. You know, somebody obviously
prepared it, handed it to the President, and he forwarded it on
for our review.
But that memo explains why the Department of Justice, as
Mr. Donoghue said earlier, doesn't have any standing to bring
such a lawsuit. The lawsuit would have been untimely. The
States had chosen their electors. The electors had been
certified. They had cast their votes. They had been sent to
Washington, DC.
Neither Georgia nor any of the other States on December
28th, or whenever this was, was in a position to change those
votes. Essentially, the election had happened. The only thing
that hadn't happened was the formal counting of the votes.
So, obviously, the person who drafted this lawsuit didn't
really understand, in my view, you know, the law and/or how the
Supreme Court works or the Department of Justice.
So it was just not something we were going to do. The
Acting Attorney General asked me to prepare a memo with talking
points so that he could explain our reasons when he spoke with
the President about this.
Mr. Kinzinger. So would you say it was an unusual request?
Mr. Engel. Certainly. The request that the Department file
a lawsuit from--drafted by outside lawyers--was certainly an
unusual request.
Mr. Kinzinger. There was another issue you were asked to
look into. In mid-December, did the White House ask Attorney
General Barr to consider whether a special counsel could be
appointed to look into election fraud issues?
Mr. Engel. Yes. I mean, I think the President was probably
vocal at the time that he believed that a special counsel was
something that should be considered to look into election
fraud. There is a specific, you know, request where the
Attorney General sought my legal advice in the middle of
December.
Mr. Kinzinger. What was your conclusion? What conclusion
did you reach?
Mr. Engel. So this request was whether the Attorney General
could appoint as a special counsel a State attorney general to
conduct an investigation.
I mean, as a legal matter, under Federal law the Attorney
General actually has fairly wide discretion to delegate
prosecutorial authority, including to State prosecutors, which
happens to assist the Department, you know, and not uncommonly.
Obviously, a State attorney general exercising prosecutorial
authority on behalf of the Department of Justice would be
fairly uncommon.
When we looked at the issue, what we saw is actually that
the State law--the State was Louisiana--that the State law
precluded the Louisiana attorney general from accepting any
position, any official position on behalf of the U.S.
Government. So that answered the question, that it was not
legally available.
Mr. Kinzinger. So during your time at the Department, was
there ever any basis to appoint a special counsel to
investigate President Trump's election fraud claims?
Mr. Engel. Well, neither Attorney General Barr nor Acting
Attorney General Rosen did appoint a special counsel. You would
appoint a special counsel when the Department--when there is a
basis for the investigation and the Department essentially has
a conflict of interest.
It is important to get someone who is independent outside
of the Department to handle such an investigation. Neither
Attorney General Barr nor Acting Attorney General Rosen ever
believed that that was appropriate or necessary in this case.
Mr. Kinzinger. In fact, Attorney General Barr had already
told the President that there was no need for the special
counsel. He actually stated that publicly, and we will see that
here in a video from December 21st.
Attorney General Barr. To the extent that there's an investigation,
I think that it's being handled responsibly and professionally
currently within the--the Department, and to this point, I have not
seen a reason to appoint a Special Counsel, and I have no plan to do so
before I leave.
Mr. Kinzinger. So remember that December 21st was the same
day President Trump met with Republican Members at the White
House to strategize about how to overturn the election while
his Attorney General is out telling the public, again, that
there was no widespread evidence of election fraud. Yet, 2 days
later, we have President Trump tweeting, again publicly
pressuring the Department to appoint a special counsel.
He said, ``After seeing the massive voter fraud in the 2020
Presidential election, I disagree with anyone that thinks a
strong, fast, and fair special counsel is not needed
immediately. This was the most corrupt election in the history
of our country, and it must be closely examined.''
The Select Committee's investigation revealed that
President Trump went as far as to promise the job of special
counsel to now discredited former Trump campaign lawyer Sidney
Powell at a late-night meeting December 18th.
Ms. Powell. I know on--on Friday he had asked me to be Special
Counsel to address the election issues and to collect evidence, and he
was extremely frustrated with the lack of, I would call it, law
enforcement by any of the government agencies that are supposed to act
to protect the rule of law in our republic.
Mr. Kinzinger. So let's think here. What would a special
counsel do? With only days to go until election certification,
it wasn't to investigate anything. An investigation led by a
special counsel would just create an illusion of legitimacy and
provide fake cover for those who would want to object,
including those who stormed the Capitol on January 6th. All of
President Trump's plans for the Justice Department were being
rebuffed by Mr. Rosen, Mr. Donoghue, Mr. Engel, and others.
The President became desperate entering into the New Year
with January 6th fast approaching. President Trump rushed back
early from Mar-a-Lago on December 31st and called an emergency
meeting with the Department's leadership.
Here is Mr. Donoghue describing the last-minute meeting
held at the White House on New Year's Eve.
Mr. Donoghue. The President was a little more agitated than he had
been on the meeting--in the meeting on the 15th. He discussed a variety
of election matters. He did say, ``This sounds like the kind of thing
that would warrant appointment of a Special Counsel.'' There was a
point at which the President said something about, ``Why don't you guys
seize machines?''
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Rosen, the President asked you to seize
voting machines from State governments. What was your response
to that request?
Mr. Rosen. That we had seen nothing improper with regard to
the voting machines. I told him that the real experts at that
had been at DHS, and they had briefed us that they had looked
at it and that there was nothing wrong with the voting
machines. So that was not something that was appropriate to do.
Mr. Kinzinger. There would be no factual basis to seize
machines?
Mr. Rosen. I don't think there was legal authority either.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Donoghue, can you explain what the
President did after he was told that the Justice Department
would not seize voting machines?
Mr. Donoghue. The President was very agitated by the Acting
Attorney General's response. To the extent that machines and
the technology was being discussed, the Acting Attorney General
said that the DHS, Department of Homeland Security, has
expertise in machines and certifying them and making sure that
the States were operating them properly.
Since DHS had been mentioned, the President yelled out to
his secretary, ``Get Ken Cuccinelli on the phone.'' She did in
very short order.
Mr. Cuccinelli was on the phone. He was No. 2 at DHS at the
time. I was on the speaker phone. The President essentially
said, ``Ken, I am sitting here with the Acting Attorney
General. He just told me it is your job to seize machines, and
you are not doing your job.'' Mr. Cuccinelli responded.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Rosen, did you ever tell the President
that the Department of Homeland Security could seize voting
machines?
Mr. Rosen. No, certainly not.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Donoghue, during this meeting, did the
President tell you that he would remove you and Mr. Rosen
because you weren't declaring there was election fraud?
Mr. Donoghue. Toward the end of the meeting the President,
again, was getting very agitated, and he said, ``People tell me
I should just get rid of both of you, I should just remove you
and make a change in the leadership, put Jeff Clark in, maybe
something will finally get done.''
I responded as I think I had earlier in the December 27th
call: ``Mr. President, you should have the leadership that you
want. But understand the United States Justice Department
functions on facts, evidence, and law, and those are not going
to change. So you can have whatever leadership you want, but
the Department's position is not going to change.''
Mr. Kinzinger. The President's White House Counsel, Pat
Cipollone, was also present. Do you remember what his position
was?
Mr. Donoghue. Pat was very supportive. Pat Cipollone
throughout these conversations was extremely supportive of the
Justice Department. He was consistent. I think he had an
impossible job at that point, but he did it well. He always
sided with the Justice Department in these discussions.
Mr. Kinzinger. So let's pause for a second. It is New
Year's Eve. President Trump is talking about seizing voting
machines and making the same demands that had already been shot
down by former Attorney General Barr on at least three
occasions and by Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue on multiple other
occasions. Claim after claim knocked down, but the President
didn't care.
The next day, Chief of Staff Mark Meadows sent a flurry of
emails to you, Mr. Rosen, asking that the Department look into
a new set of allegations. We are going to put those emails here
on the screen.
Here we see three requests made on January 1st. One email
is a request from Mr. Meadows to you, Mr. Rosen, to send Jeff
Clark to Fulton County.
What did you do with this request?
Mr. Rosen. Well, really nothing. Certainly didn't send Mr.
Clark to Fulton County. But that email was the first
corroboration I had seen of--Mr. Clark had told me at that
point that the President was considering making the change by
Monday, January 4th.
So Mr. Meadows' email was something of a corroboration that
there were discussions going on that I had been--not been
informed about by Mr. Clark or anybody else.
Mr. Kinzinger. Interesting.
The second request that you have is to have the Department
of Justice lawyers investigate allegations of fraud related to
New Mexico.
Mr. Rosen, did you have concern about these emails?
Mr. Rosen. Yes. Really two concerns about that one. One was
that it was coming from a campaign or political party, and it
was really not our role to function as, you know, an arm of any
campaign for any party or any campaign. That wasn't our role.
That is part of why I had been unwilling to meet with Mr.
Giuliani or any of the campaign people before.
The other part was it was another one of these ones where
lots of work had already been done and I thought it was a
rehash of things that had been debunked previously.
Mr. Kinzinger. So the final email here included a
completely baseless conspiracy theory that an Italian defense
contractor uploaded software to a satellite that switched votes
from Trump to Biden.
The Select Committee investigation found that this wild,
baseless conspiracy theory made it from the recesses of the
internet to the highest echelons of our Government. On December
31st, Mr. Meadows received this internet conspiracy theory from
Representative Perry.
On the screen now is the text that Representative Perry
sent to Mr. Meadows, copying a YouTube link with the message,
``Why can't we just work with the Italian government?''
The next day, the President's chief of staff sent the
YouTube link to Mr. Rosen, who forwarded it to Mr. Donoghue.
Mr. Donoghue, did you watch this video?
Mr. Donoghue. I did, Congressman.
Mr. Kinzinger. How long was the video?
Mr. Donoghue. Approximately 20 minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let's just take a look at an excerpt of that
video, if we may.
Mr. Johnson. What's being said out of Rome, out of Italy is that
this was done in the U.S. Embassy, that there was a certain State
Department guy whose name I don't know yet. I guess this is probably
going to come out in Italy at some point. And he was the mastermind--
not the mastermind, but the--but anyway, the guy running the operation
of changing the votes. And that he was doing this in conjunction with
some support from MI6, the CIA, and this Leonardo group.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Donoghue, what was your reaction when
you watched that entire 20-minute video?
Mr. Donoghue. I emailed the Acting Attorney General and I
said, ``pure insanity,'' which was my impression of the video,
which was patently absurd.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Rosen, you were asked by Mr. Meadows to
meet with Mr. Johnson, who is the person in that video. What
was your reaction to that request?
Mr. Rosen. So, ordinarily, I would get an email like this
and there was no phone call. It would just come over the
transom.
But this one, he called me, Mr. Meadows, and asked me to
meet with Mr. Johnson. I told him this whole thing about Italy
had been debunked and that should be the end of that, and I
certainly wasn't going to meet with this person.
He initially seemed to accept that. He said, ``You know,
well, why won't you meet with him?''
I said, ``Because if he has real evidence, which this video
doesn't show, he can walk into an FBI field office anywhere in
the United States. There are 55 of them.''
He said, ``Okay.''
But then he called me back a few minutes later and
complained and said, ``I didn't tell you, but this fellow,
Johnson, is working with Rudy Giuliani, and Mr. Giuliani is
really offended that you think they have to go to an FBI field
office. That is insulting. So couldn't you just have the FBI or
you meet with these guys?''
By then, I was somewhat agitated, and told him that there
was no way on Earth that I was going to do that. I wasn't going
to meet with Mr. Johnson. I certainly wasn't going to meet with
Mr. Giuliani. I had made that clear repeatedly. So that is the
end of that, you know, don't raise this with me again.
So because Mr. Donoghue and I had been exchanging our views
about this--I think it was, yes, 7:13 on a Friday night of New
Year's Day--had run out of patience. I sent the email that you
are talking about where I made pretty clear that I had no
interest in doing anything further with this.
Mr. Kinzinger. Just to button this up, Mr. Donoghue. Did
you receive a follow-up call from a Department of Defense
official about this conspiracy?
Mr. Donoghue. I did. I believe it was that same day.
Mr. Kinzinger. Can you give details on that at all?
Mr. Donoghue. I received a telephone call from Kash Patel,
who I know was a DOD official at that time, worked for, I
believe, Acting Secretary of Defense Miller, and he didn't know
much about it. He basically said, ``Do you know anything about
this Italy thing and what this is all about?''
I informed him that the chief of staff had raised the issue
with us in his office on December 29th, that we had looked into
it a little bit. We had run the name that was provided to us by
the chief of staff.
I learned that that individual was in custody in Italy. He
had been arrested for a cyber offense of some sort in Italy.
The allegation was that he had been exfiltrating data from his
company. He was either an employee or a contractor of that
company, and he was in custody. That the whole thing was very,
very murky at best, and the video was absurd. But that we, the
Department, were not going to have anything do with it and DOD
should make up its own mind as to what they are going to do.
But I made it clear to him that I didn't think it was anything
worth pursuing.
Mr. Kinzinger. So you called the video absurd, and despite
the absurdity of that conspiracy theory we learned that Mr.
Meadows discussed it frequently in the White House.
Mr. Meadows didn't let the matter go. The request went from
the Department of Justice to the Secretary of Defense,
Christopher Miller. As you will hear, Secretary Miller actually
reached out to a high-ranking official based in Italy to follow
up on this claim.
Acting Secretary of Defense Miller. The ask for him was, ``Can you
call out the Defense Attache Rome and find out what the heck's going on
because I'm getting all these weird, crazy reports and probably the guy
on the ground knows more than anything?''
Mr. Kinzinger. The Select Committee confirmed that a call
was actually placed by Secretary Miller to the attache in Italy
to investigate the claim that Italian satellites were switching
votes from Trump to Biden.
This is one of the best examples of the lengths to which
President Trump would go to stay in power--scouring the
internet to support his conspiracy theories shown here, as he
told Mr. Donoghue in that December 27th call, ``You guys may
not be following the internet the way I do.''
President Trump's efforts to this point had failed.
Stonewalled by Mr. Rosen and Mr. Donoghue, President Trump had
only one option: He needed to make Clark Acting Attorney
General.
Mr. Rosen, during a January 2nd meeting with Mr. Clark, did
you confront him again about his contact with the President? If
so, can you describe that?
Mr. Rosen. So at this point Mr. Clark had told us that the
President had asked him to consider whether he would be willing
to replace me, supposedly on a time table by Monday the 4th.
So I had told Mr. Clark I thought he was making a colossal
error in judgment, but I also hoped to persuade him to be more
rational and to understood what we had understood, that there
is not a factual basis for the fraud assertions that are being
made.
So at this meeting, Mr. Donoghue and I met with Mr. Clark,
and I guess my hopes were disappointed in that Mr. Clark
continued to express a view that he thought there was fraud,
even though he had not been a participant in the Department's
review of that, and that he was dissatisfied that we knew what
we were doing.
But he had acknowledged that he had had further--I don't
know if it was a meeting or phone calls or what--but further
discussion with the President despite having a week earlier
said that he, (A), wouldn't do that, and if did, if he got an
invitation to do that, he would let Rich Donoghue or me know.
So we had--it was a contentious meeting where we were
chastising him that he was insubordinate, he was out of line,
he had not honored his own representations of what he would do.
He raised, again, that he thought that letter should go out and
we were not receptive to that.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did he tell you in that that the President
had offered him the job of Acting Attorney General?
Mr. Rosen. That was a day later. On the 2nd, he said that
the President had asked him to let him know if he would be
willing to take it.
Subsequently, he told me that--on Sunday, the 3rd--he told
me that the time line had moved up and that the President had
offered him the job and that he was accepting it.
Mr. Kinzinger. Let me ask you about that.
What was your reaction to that?
Mr. Rosen. Well, on the one hand, I wasn't going to accept
being fired by my subordinate, so I wanted to talk to the
President directly.
With regard to--the reason for that is I wanted to try to
convince the President not to go down the wrong path that Mr.
Clark seemed to be advocating.
It wasn't about me. There are only 17 days left in the
administration at that point. I would have been perfectly
content to have either of the gentleman on my left or right
replace me if anybody wanted to do that.
But I did not want for Department of Justice to be put in a
posture where it would be doing things that were not consistent
with the truth, were not consistent with its own appropriate
role, or were not consistent with the Constitution.
So I did four things as soon as Mr. Clark left my office on
that Sunday, the 3rd.
No. 1, I called Mark Meadows and said I need to see the
President right away. He was agreeable and set up a meeting for
6:15 that Sunday, so about 2 hours away.
No. 2, I called Pat Cipollone, the White House Counsel,
told him what was going on, and he said he would go into the
White House to make sure he was at the meeting, and he would be
supporting the Justice Department's position as he had been
doing consistently.
No. 3, I called Steve Engel, who was--I was at the
Department. It was a Sunday, but there had been some reasons I
needed to be there. Mr. Engel I called at home and asked him if
he would come in and go to the meeting, which he did and proved
to be quite helpful.
Then, No. 4, I asked Rich Donoghue and Pat Hovakimian, who
had previously been my chief of staff, to get the Department's
senior leadership on a call and let them know what was going
on, which they did.
Then Eric Herschmann called me to tell me that he was going
to go to the meeting and that he would be supporting the
Department of Justice position as well.
So I knew that the meeting was on course and that I would
have a number of people supportive of the Department of
Justice's approach and not supportive of Mr. Clark's approach.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did Mr. Clark ask you to continue to stay at
the Department?
Mr. Rosen. At that Sunday meeting when he told me that he
would be replacing me, he said he had asked to see me alone,
because usually he had met with me and Mr. Donoghue, because he
thought it would be appropriate in light of what was happening
to at least offer me that I could stay on as his deputy.
I thought that was preposterous, told him that was
nonsensical, and that there is no universe where I was going to
do that, to stay on and support someone else doing things that
were not consistent with what I thought should be done.
So I didn't accept that offer, if I can put it that way.
Mr. Kinzinger. During that meeting, did Mr. Clark ask you
to sign the Georgia letter?
Mr. Rosen. That was on the Saturday meeting, January 2nd,
that Mr. Donoghue and I had with him. He again raised with both
of us that he wanted us both to sign that letter actually.
Mr. Kinzinger. So in that meeting, did Mr. Clark say he
would turn down the President's offer if you reversed your
position and signed the letter?
Mr. Rosen. Yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did Mr. Clark--so you still refused to sign
and send that letter, I take it?
Mr. Rosen. That is right. I think Mr. Donoghue and I were
both very consistent that there was no way we were going to
sign that letter. It didn't matter what Mr. Clark's proposition
was in terms of his own activities, we were not going to sign
that letter as long as we were in charge of the Justice
Department.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you for that, by the way.
Mr. Donoghue, were you expecting to have to attend a
meeting at the White House on Sunday, January 3rd?
Mr. Donoghue. No. As the Acting AG indicated, we had a
meeting that afternoon that related to preparations for January
6th.
So I was at the Department, but I had no expectation of
leaving the Department. It was a Sunday afternoon, and I was
there in civilian clothes, as we both were, and expected to
have that meeting, do some other work.
But I had no expectation of going to the White House that
day.
Mr. Kinzinger. So let's ask, so prior to that Oval Office
meeting, did you set up a conference call with senior
leadership at the Department? If so, tell us about that call.
Mr. Donoghue. Yes. So, obviously, it was a bit of a
scramble that afternoon to prepare for the Oval Office meeting.
We had discussed on several occasions, the Acting Attorney
General and I, whether we should expand the circle of people
who knew what was going on.
It was very important that Steve Engel know, and that is
why I reached out to Steve on December 28th, because if Mr.
Rosen were removed from the seat and the President did not
immediately appoint someone else to serve as Attorney General,
just by function of the Department's change of succession Mr.
Engel would be in the seat. We wanted to make sure he knew what
was going on should that occur.
So the three of us knew. We also brought Pat Hovakimian in.
So the four of us knew. But no one else, aside from Jeff Clark,
of course, knew what was going on until late that Sunday
afternoon. We chose to keep a close hold because we didn't want
to create concern or panic in the Justice Department
leadership.
But at this point, I asked the Acting AG, ``What else can I
do to help prepare for this meeting at the Oval Office?''
He said, ``You and Pat should get the AAGs on the phone and
it is time to let them know what is going on. Let's find out
what they may do if there is a change in leadership, because
that will help inform the conversation at the Oval Office.''
Pat Hovakimian subsequently set up that meeting. We got
most, not all, but most of the AAGs on the phone. We very
quickly explained to them what the situation was.
I told them, ``I don't need an answer from you right now. I
don't need an answer on this phone call. But if you have an
answer, I need it in the next few minutes. So call me, email,
text me, whatever it is, if you know what you would do if Jeff
Clark is put in charge of the Department.''
Immediately Eric Dreiband, who was the AAG of the Civil
Rights Division, said, ``I don't need to think about it. There
is no way I am staying.''
Then the other AAGs began to chime in in turn and all
essentially said they would leave. They would resign en masse
if the President made that change in the Department leadership.
Mr. Kinzinger. Incredible.
I would like to look at the Assistant Attorney Generals on
the screen, if we can pull that up, have their pictures.
Did every Assistant Attorney General that you spoke to, as
you said, agree to resign?
Mr. Donoghue. Makan Delrahim was not on the call only
because we had some difficulty reaching him.
But, yes, the other people on the screen were on the call
and all without hesitation said that they would resign.
Mr. Kinzinger. So as part of the Select Committee's
investigation we found that while Mr. Rosen, Mr. Donoghue, and
Mr. Engel were preparing for their meeting at the White House,
Jeff Clark and the President were in constant communication,
beginning at
7 a.m.
White House call logs obtained by the Committee show that
by 4:19 p.m. on January 3rd, the White House had already begun
referring to Mr. Clark as the Acting Attorney General. As far
as the White House was concerned, Mr. Clark was already at the
top of the Justice Department.
Two hours later, DOJ leadership arrived at the White House.
The Select Committee interviewed every person who was inside
the room during this Sunday evening Oval Office meeting.
Mr. Cipollone told the Committee that he was ``unmistakably
angry'' during the meeting and that he, along with Eric
Herschmann and Mr. Donoghue ``forcefully challenged'' Mr. Clark
to produce evidence of his election fraud theories.
Mr. Rosen, can you describe how that meeting started?
Mr. Rosen. Yes.
So after some preliminaries--so we--Mr. Meadows had ushered
us all in, and then he left. So Mr. Cipollone did some
introductions.
So after some preliminaries, the President turned to me,
and he said, ``Well, one thing we know is you, Rosen, you
aren't going to do anything. You don't even agree with the
claims of election fraud. This other guy at least might do
something.''
Then I said, ``Well, Mr. President, you are right that I am
not going to allow the Justice Department to do anything to try
to overturn the election. That is true. But the reason for that
is because that is what is consistent with the facts and the
law and that is what is required under the Constitution. So
that is the right answer and a good thing for the country.
Therefore, I submit it is the right thing for you, Mr.
President.''
That kicked off another 2 hours of discussion in which
everyone in the room was in one way or another making different
points, but supportive of my approach for the Justice
Department and critical of Mr. Clark.
Mr. Kinzinger. So at some point, Mr. Donoghue comes in the
room. Can you explain what led to him coming in the room?
Mr. Rosen. Oh, I forgot about that.
So initially, in part I think because he was underdressed,
and we had not arranged--we had not yet told the President that
he was going to come in--the White House had a list of who
would be there that did include Mr. Engel, and the White House
Counsel, and the Deputy White House Counsel, Mr. Herschmann.
We went in, and then we told the President, maybe 10
minutes into the meeting or something, I forget how far in, Mr.
Donoghue was outside. He said, ``Well, bring him in.'' Then Mr.
Donoghue came in and joined the meeting.
Mr. Kinzinger. So, Mr. Donoghue, you enter that room. Can
you set the scene for us and describe the tone you walked into?
Mr. Donoghue. Yes. But if I could just back up one moment,
Congressman, because you put the pictures up on the screen of
the AAGs.
I just want to make clear, one of the AAGs who was not on
the screen was John Demers. John was the National Security
Division AAG.
John was on the call. But I prefaced the call by saying,
``John, we need you to stay in place. National security is too
important. We need to minimize the disruption. Whether you
resign is entirely up to you. Obviously, we will respect your
decision either way. But I am asking you, please stay in
place.''
He did. So I don't want to leave the impression that he was
not willing to resign, because I think he was.
Mr. Kinzinger. Great. Thank you for that.
Mr. Donoghue. So with regard to entering the Oval Office, I
was sitting in the hallway. An administrative assistant passed
by.
She asked me, ``Are you supposed to be in this meeting with
the President?''
I said, ``No. I am simply here in case questions come up
that other people don't have the answer to.''
She walked away and then came back probably 30 seconds
later and said, ``The President wants you in the meeting.''
I proceeded into the Oval Office. I took probably two or
three steps in and I stopped, because I was, as the AG said,
not exactly properly attired. I was wearing jeans and muddy
boots and an Army T-shirt, and I never would arrive in the Oval
Office this way.
I said, ``Mr. President, I apologize. I am sorry. I didn't
know I was going to be here.''
He said, ``No, no, no. Just come in, come in, come in.''
So I went in. I attempted to take a seat on one of the
couches that are behind the chairs arrayed in front of the
President's desk. He said, ``Oh, no, no, no. You are going to
be up here.''
Everyone kind-of laughed. They moved the chairs a little
bit. Someone from the White House Counsel's Office picked up a
spare chair and put it directly in front of the President and I
took that seat.
Mr. Kinzinger. Was there discussion about Mr. Clark? Can
you kind-of enlighten some of what that discussion was?
Mr. Donoghue. Yes. So the conversation at this point had
moved beyond the specific allegations, whether it was State
Farm Arena or Antrim County or Pennsylvania or whatever. We had
discussed those repeatedly, and that was backdrop to the
conversation.
But the conversation at this point was really about whether
the President should remove Jeff Rosen and replace him with
Jeff Clark. Everyone in the room, I think, understood that that
meant that letter would go out.
So that was the focus. It was about a 2\1/2\-hour meeting
after I entered. So there were discussions about the pros and
cons of doing that.
Early on, the President said, ``What do I have to lose?''
It was actually a good opening, because I said, ``Mr.
President, you have a great deal to lose.''
I began to explain to him what he had to lose and what the
country had to lose and what the Department had to lose, and
this was not in anyone's best interest.
That conversation went on for some time. Everyone
essentially chimed in with their own thoughts, all of which
were consistent about how damaging this would be to the
country, to the Department, to the administration, to him
personally.
At some point the conversation turned to whether Jeff Clark
was even qualified, competent to run the Justice Department,
which in my mind he clearly was not.
It was a heated conversation. I thought it was useful to
point out to the President that Jeff Clark simply didn't have
the skills, the ability, and the experience to run the
Department.
So I said, ``Mr. President, you are talking about putting a
man in that seat who has never tried a criminal case, who has
never conducted a criminal investigation. He is telling you
that he is going to take charge of the Department, 115,000
employees, including the entire FBI, and turn the place on a
dime and conduct nationwide criminal investigations that will
produce results in a matter of days. It is impossible. It is
absurd. It is not going to happen. It is going to fail.''
``He has never been in front of a trial jury, a grand jury.
He has never even been to Chris Wray's office.''
I said at one point, ``If you walk into Chris Wray's
office, No. 1, would you know how to get there? No. 2, if you
got there, would he even know who you are? Do you really think
that the FBI is going to suddenly start following your
orders?''
``It is not going to happen. He is not competent.''
That is the point at which Mr. Clark tried to defend
himself by saying, ``Well, I have been involved in very
significant civil and environmental litigation. I have argued
many appeals in appellate courts and things of that nature.''
Then I pointed out that, yes, he was an environmental
lawyer, and I didn't think that was appropriate background to
be running the United States Justice Department.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did anybody in there support Mr. Clark?
Mr. Donoghue. No one.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Rosen, it was you he was going to
replace. So what was your view about the President's plan to
appoint Mr. Clark?
Mr. Rosen. Well, as I alluded to earlier, the issue really
wasn't about me. It was--it would have been fine, as I said, to
have had Rich Donoghue replace me. I would have said, ``Great,
I get 17 days vacation,'' or something.
But the issue was the use of the Justice Department. It is
just so important that the Justice Department adhere to the
facts and the law.
That is what it is there to do, and that is what our
constitutional role was. So if the Justice Department gets out
of the role that it is supposed to play, that is really bad for
our country, and I don't know of a simpler way to say that.
When you damage our fundamental institutions, it is not easy to
repair them.
So I thought this was a really important issue--to try to
make sure that the Justice Department was able to stay on the
right course.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Donoghue, did you eventually tell the
President that mass resignations would occur if he installed
Mr. Clark and what the consequences would be?
Mr. Donoghue. Yes. So this was in line with the President
saying, ``What do I have to lose?'' Along those lines, he said,
``So suppose I do this, suppose I replace him, Jeff Rosen, with
him, Jeff Clark. What would you do?''
I said, ``Mr. President, I would resign immediately. I am
not working 1 minute for this guy,'' who I had just declared
was completely incompetent.
So the President immediately turned to Mr. Engel, and he
said, ``Steve you wouldn't resign, would you?''
He said, ``Absolutely I would, Mr. President. You leave me
no choice.''
Then I said, ``And we are not the only ones. No one cares
if we resign. If Steve and I go, that is fine. It doesn't
matter. But I am telling you what is going to happen. You are
going to lose your entire Department leadership. Every single
AAG will walk out on you. Your entire Department leadership
will walk out within hours. I don't know what happens after
that. I don't know what the United States attorneys are going
to do.''
We have U.S. attorneys in districts across the country, and
my guess would be that many of them would have resigned, and
that would then have led to resignations across the Department
in Washington.
I said, ``Mr. President, within 24, 48, 72 hours, you could
have hundreds and hundreds of resignations of the leadership of
your entire Justice Department because of your actions. What is
that going to say about you?''
Mr. Kinzinger. Wow.
Mr. Engel, what was--can you describe what your reaction
was to that?
Mr. Engel. Yes. No, I think when the President--my
recollection is that when the President turned to me and said,
``Steve, you wouldn't leave, would you?'' I said, ``Mr.
President, I have been with you through four Attorneys General,
including two Acting Attorneys General, but I couldn't be part
of this.''
Then the other thing that I said was that, you know,
``Look, all anyone is going to sort-of think about when they
see this--no one is going to read this letter. All anyone is
going to think is that you went through two Attorneys General
in 2 weeks until you found the environmental guy to sign this
thing.''
``So the story is not going to be that the Department of
Justice has found massive corruption that would have changed
the results of the election. It is going to be the disaster of
Jeff Clark.''
I think at that point Pat Cipollone said, ``Yes, this is a
murder-suicide pact, this letter.''
Mr. Donoghue. I would note too, Congressman, that it was in
this part of the conversation where Steve pointed out that Jeff
Clark would be left leading a graveyard. That comment clearly
had an impact on the President. The leadership will be gone.
Jeff Clark will be left leading a graveyard.
Mr. Engel. Again, the premise that--which Mr. Donoghue had
said--but that Mr. Clark could come in and take over the
Department of Justice and do something different was just an
absurd premise. All he was doing, Mr. Clark, by putting himself
forward, was blowing himself up. If the President were to have
gone that course, you know, it would have been a grievous error
for the President as well.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Cipollone, the White House Counsel, told
the Committee that Mr. Engel's response had a noticeable impact
on the President, that this was a turning point in the
conversation.
Mr. Donoghue, toward the end of this meeting, did the
President ask you what was going to happen to Mr. Clark?
Mr. Donoghue. He did. When we finally got to, I would say,
the last 15 minutes of the meeting, the President's decision
was apparent. He announced it. Jeff Clark tried to scrape his
way back and asked the President to reconsider. The President
doubled down and said, ``No, I have made my decision. That is
it. We are not going to do it.''
Then he turned to me and said, ``So what happens to him
now?'' meaning Mr. Clark, and he understood that Mr. Clark
reported to me.
I didn't initially understand the question. I said, ``Mr.
President?''
He said, ``Are you going to fire him?''
I said, ``I don't have the authority to fire him. He is a
Senate-confirmed Assistant Attorney General.''
He said, ``Well who has the authority to fire him?''
I said, ``Only you do, sir.''
He said, ``Well, I am not going to fire him.''
I said, ``All right. Well, then, we should all go back to
work.''
Mr. Kinzinger. Did you get a call from the President later
that night?
Mr. Donoghue. I did, I don't know, probably 90 minutes
later or something like that.
Mr. Kinzinger. What was that about?
Mr. Donoghue. The President at this point--we left the
White House, reconvened at the Department. I left the
Department. I was back in my apartment. My cell phone rang, it
was the President, and he had information about a truck
supposedly full of shredded ballots in Georgia that was in the
custody of an ICE agent whose name he had.
I told him that ICE was part of Department of Homeland
Security. I hadn't heard about this. If Department of Homeland
Security needed our assistance, we, of course, would provide
it. But it was really up to DHS to make a call if their agent
was involved.
He said, ``Fine, I understand. Can you just make sure that
Ken,'' meaning Ken Cuccinelli, ``knows about this?''
I said fine, I would pass that along to him. I eventually
contacted Ken Cuccinelli later that evening, and I said, ``This
is what the President told me. If you guys have anything you
think should be brought to our attention, let me know.''
He said, ``Thank you.'' That was it.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Cipollone left the meeting convinced the
President would not appoint Mr. Clark, but he didn't think the
President had actually accepted the truth about the election.
Sure enough, all the same debunked theories appeared in his
speech at the Ellipse 3 days later.
President Trump. In the State of Arizona, over 36,000 ballots were
illegally cast by non-citizens, 11,600 more ballots than votes were
counted, more than there were actual voters. You see that? In
Wisconsin, corrupt Democrat-run cities deployed more than 500 illegal,
unmanned, unsecured drop boxes, which collected a minimum of 91,000
unlawful votes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Donoghue, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Engel, and
others stopped President Trump's efforts at least temporarily.
Yet the message President Trump and his Republican allies
pushed throughout December made its way to his supporters
anyway. They kept up the pressure campaign on the way to
storming the Capitol on January 6th.
Mr. Rosen, were you at the Department of Justice on January
6th?
Mr. Rosen. Yes, I was there all day.
Mr. Kinzinger. Once the Capitol was under attack, I
understand that you communicated with fellow Cabinet members
and Capitol Hill leadership. Can you tell us who you spoke to?
Mr. Rosen. Yes. I was basically on the phone virtually
nonstop all day, some calls with our own DOJ folks, some with
Cabinet counterparts at DHS and Defense and Interior, some with
senior White House officials and with a number of congressional
leaders.
I received calls from Speaker Pelosi, from Leader McCarthy,
from Leader Schumer. I believe Leader McConnell's chief of
staff called; a number of other Members of Congress as well.
You know, the basic thrust of the calls with the Members of
Congress was, ``There is a dire situation here, and can you
help?'' I reported to them that we were on a very urgent basis
sending help from the Department.
We wound up sending over 500 agents and officers from FBI,
ATF, and the U.S. Marshals to assist with restoring order at
the Capitol.
So had a number of calls. As I say, it was more or less
nonstop all afternoon.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did you speak to the Vice President that
day?
Mr. Rosen. Yes. Twice. The----
Mr. Kinzinger. No. Please, go ahead.
Mr. Rosen. Well, I was going to say the first call was a
one-on-one discussion, somewhat akin to the congressional
leadership calls, updating him on what we were doing to assist.
The second call was a conference call around 7 o'clock with
the Vice President, congressional leaders, senior White House
staff, some other Cabinet officials, to address that order
appeared to be close to being restored or restored, but
security is still being determined, and the question being what
time could the Congress reassemble. The answer was 8 o'clock.
Thankfully Congress did reassemble and complete its
constitutional duty.
There was one highlight of that second call with the Vice
President, which is Mr. Donoghue had gone to the Rotunda of the
Capitol to be able to give a first-hand account and was able to
tell the folks on the call, including the Vice President, that
we thought 8 o'clock would work.
Mr. Kinzinger. Did you speak to the President on January
6th?
Mr. Rosen. No. I spoke to a number of senior White House
officials, but not the President.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Donoghue, on January 6th, we know from
Mr. Rosen that you helped in the effort to reconvene the joint
session. Is that correct?
Mr. Donoghue. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kinzinger. We see here in a video that we are going to
play now you arriving with your security detail to help secure
the Capitol.
Mr. Donoghue, 30 minutes after you arrived to the Capitol,
did you lead a briefing for the Vice President?
Mr. Donoghue. I am not sure exactly what the time frame
was, but I did participate in the call and participate in
briefing the Vice President as well as the congressional
leadership that night, yes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Where did you conduct that call at?
Mr. Donoghue. I was in an office. I am not entirely sure
where it was. My detail found it, because the acoustics in the
rotunda were such that it wasn't really conducive to having a
call. So they found an office. We went to that office. I
believe I participated in two phone calls, one at 1800 and one
at 1900, that night from that office.
Mr. Kinzinger. What time did you actually end up leaving
the Capitol?
Mr. Donoghue. I waited until the Senate was back in
session, which I believe they were gaveled in a few minutes
after 8 p.m. Once they were back in session and we were
confident that the entire facility was secured and cleared,
that there were no individuals hiding in closets or under
desks, that there were no IEDs or other suspicious devices left
behind, I left minutes later. I was probably gone by 8:30.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Donoghue, did you ever hear from
President Trump that day?
Mr. Donoghue. No. Like the AAG, the Acting AG, I spoke to
Pat Cipollone and Mark Meadows and the Vice President and the
congressional leadership, but I never spoke to the President
that day.
Mr. Kinzinger. So today's hearing showcased the efforts of
the Americans before us to stand up for democracy. Mr. Rosen
and Mr. Donoghue stayed steadfastly committed to the oath they
take as officials in the Department of Justice. On January 6th
itself, they assisted during the attack while our Commander-in-
Chief stayed silent. Their bravery is a high moment in the
sordid story of what led to January 6th.
My colleagues and I up here also take an oath. Some of them
failed to uphold theirs and, instead, chose to spread the big
lie.
Days after the tragic events of January 6th, some of these
same Republican Members requested pardons in the waning days of
the Trump administration.
Five days after the attack on the Capitol, Representative
Mo Brooks sent the email on the screen now. As you see, he
emailed the White House, ``pursuant to a request from Matt
Gaetz,'' requesting a pardon for Representative Gaetz, himself,
and unnamed others.
Witnesses told the Select Committee that the President
considered offering pardons to a wide range of individuals
connected to the President. Let's listen to some of that
testimony.
Mr. Wood. And was Representative Gaetz requesting a pardon?
Mr. Herschmann. I believe so. The--the general tone was we may get
prosecuted because we were defensive of, you know, the President's
positions on these things. The pardon that he was discussing--
requesting was as broad as you can describe, from beginning--I remember
he's--from the beginning of time up until today for any and all things.
Then he mentioned Nixon, and I said, ``Nixon's pardon was never nearly
that broad.''
Vice Chair Cheney. And are you aware of any Members of Congress
seeking pardons?
Ms. Hutchinson. I guess Mr. Gaetz and Mr. Brooks, I know, have both
advocated for there'd be a blanket pardon for Members involved in that
meeting and a--a handful of other Members that weren't at the December
21st meeting as the preemptive pardons. Mr. Gaetz was personally
pushing for a pardon, and he was doing so since early December. I'm not
sure why Mr. Gaetz reached out to me to ask if he could have a meeting
with Mr. Meadows about receiving a Presidential pardon.
Vice Chair Cheney. Did they all contact you?
Ms. Hutchinson. Not all of them, but several of them did.
Vice Chair Cheney. So you mentioned Mr. Gaetz, Mr. Brooks.
Ms. Hutchinson. Mr. Biggs did. Mr. Jordan talked about
congressional pardons, but he never asked me for one. It was more for
an update on whether the White House was going to pardon Members of
Congress. Mr. Gohmert asked for one as well. Mr. Perry asked for a
pardon, too, I'm sorry.
Vice Chair Cheney. Mr. Perry? Did he talk to you directly?
Ms. Hutchinson. Yes, he did.
Vice Chair Cheney. Did Marjorie Taylor Greene contact you?
Ms. Hutchinson. No, she didn't contact me about it. I heard that
she had asked White House Counsel's Office for a pardon from Mr.
Philbin, but I didn't frequently communicate with Ms. Greene.
Mr. Wood. Are you aware of any conversations or communications
regarding the possibility of giving Congressman Matt Gaetz a pardon?
Mr. McEntee. I know he had asked for it, but I don't know if he
ever received one or what happened with it.
Mr. Wood. How do you know that Congressman Gaetz asked for a
pardon?
Mr. McEntee. He told me.
Mr. Wood. Tell us about that.
Mr. McEntee. He told me he'd asked Meadows for a pardon.
Mr. Wood. Were you involved in or did you witness any conversations
about the possibility of a blanket pardon for everyone involved in
January 6th?
Mr. McEntee. I had heard that mentioned, yeah.
Mr. Wood. Do you know whether the President had any conversations
about potentially pardoning any family members?
Mr. McEntee. I know he had hinted at a blanket pardon for the
January 6th thing for anybody, but I think he had for all the staff and
everyone involved, not with January 6th, but just before he left
office, I know he had talked about that.
Mr. Kinzinger. The only reason I know to ask for a pardon
is because you think you have committed a crime.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. I want to thank our witnesses for
joining us today.
The Members of the Select Committee may have additional
questions for today's witnesses, and we ask that you respond
expeditiously in writing to these questions.
Without objection, Members will be permitted 10 business
days to submit statements for the record, including opening
remarks and additional questions for the witnesses.
Without objection, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Illinois for a closing statement.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Justice Department lawyers are not the President's
personal lawyers. We count on them to be on the side of the law
and to defend the best interests of the United States, not the
best interests of any political campaign. That is how it has
been since the Department was founded soon after the Civil War.
Justice Department lawyers are supposed to play it 100 percent
straight.
President Trump tried to erase his loss at the ballot box
by parachuting an unqualified man into the top job at Justice.
It was a power play to win at all costs, with no regard for the
will of the American people. It was about ignoring millions of
votes. Ignore them, throw them out, label them fraudulent,
corrupt, illegal, whatever. Facts were clearly just an
inconvenience.
From the Oval Office, President Trump urged others to bring
his big lie to life. He begged, ``Just say the election was
corrupt, and leave the rest to me and the Republican
Congressmen.'' He didn't care what the Department's
investigations proved. What good were facts when they would
only confirm his loss?
It is no surprise that all the far-out, fully fabricated,
whack-job conspiracy theories collapsed under even the
slightest scrutiny. That insanity went from the internet to the
highest levels of Government in no time.
The bottom line? The most senior leadership of the Justice
Department, from Attorney General Bill Barr to Jeff Rosen, his
successor, and his deputy, Rich Donoghue--everyone except Jeff
Clark--was telling President Trump the very same thing: The
conspiracy theories were false. The allegation of a stolen
election was a lie. The data left no room for doubt, nothing to
question. The Constitution left no room for President Trump to
change the outcome of the election.
But we are here today because the facts were irrelevant to
President Trump. It was about protecting his very real power
and very fragile ego, even if it required recklessly
undermining our entire electoral system by wildly casting
baseless doubt upon it.
In short, he was willing to sacrifice our Republic to
prolong his Presidency. I can imagine no more dishonorable act
by a President.
We owe a great debt of gratitude to these men you have
heard from here today. Real leaders who stood for Justice when
it was in grave peril, who put their country first when the
leader of the free world demanded otherwise. They threatened to
resign rather than corrupt our democracy. Thanks largely to
each of them, President Trump's coup failed.
Contrast that to Jeff Clark, who would do exactly what the
President wanted: Say there was massive fraud, forget the
facts, and leave the rest to President Trump's congressional
friends.
Mr. Clark refused to cooperate with this Committee. He pled
the Fifth over 125 times. Why risk self-incrimination?
President Trump's congressional friends--some of them are
angling for pardons? They knew that every bit of what they did
was a lie and it was wrong.
That is all the more reason to respect those who came here
to testify today. We thank them for their unflinching service
in the face of incredible pressure.
As it is said, ``The only thing necessary for evil to
succeed is good men to do nothing.'' Thankfully, there were
good people in the Department of Justice.
You heard from other good people, too, on Tuesday. They,
too, defended us.
But I am still worried that not enough has changed to
prevent this from happening again.
The oath that we take has to mean something. It has to cut
to the core of who we are and be the driving force of our
service to this Nation.
We on this Committee, we may be able to shine light on the
darkness, but that is not enough. It is now up to every
American, now and in the future, to stand for truth, to reject
the lies, wherever we confront them--in our towns, in our
capitals, in our friendships, in our families, and at the
ballot box, and within our own minds and hearts.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Without objection, the Chair recognizes
the gentlewoman from Wyoming, Ms. Cheney, for a closing
statement.
Vice Chair Cheney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I again want to thank the witnesses for being here today.
After today, I suspect that there will be some who label
you agents of the deep state or something else conspiratorial
or nonsensical meant to justify ignoring what you have said
today, ignoring the facts.
That may be the short-term cost of acting honorably and
telling the truth, but your actions should have an important
long-term impact. They will help keep us on the course set by
the Framers of our Constitution.
Let me paraphrase the words of John Adams and others:
Whether ours shall continue to be a Government of laws and not
of men is ultimately for the American people to decide.
Let me also today make a broader statement to millions of
Americans who put their trust in Donald Trump.
In these hearings so far, you have heard from more than a
dozen Republicans who have told you what actually happened in
the weeks before January 6th. You will hear from more in the
hearings to come. Several of them served Donald Trump in his
administration; others, in his campaign. Others have been
conservative Republicans for their entire careers.
It can be difficult to accept that President Trump abused
your trust, that he deceived you. Many will invent excuses to
ignore that fact. But that is a fact. I wish it weren't true,
but it is.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Thompson. Again, I thank our witnesses and thank
my colleagues for this hearing.
As we conclude our fifth hearing in this series, I want to
remind the American people of a few things the Committee has
shown.
Donald Trump lost the 2020 election. Top Republican
officials who supported Trump knew that he lost and told him he
lost. Trump knew he lost.
Those who say the election was affected by widespread voter
fraud are lying. They were lying in 2020, they were lying in
2021, and, indeed, they are lying today.
Donald Trump went to court. That is the right of any
candidate seeking to challenge the outcome of an election.
Donald Trump lost in court dozens and dozens of times.
He lost in part because there was no evidence that voter
fraud had any impact on the results of the election. To borrow
a phrase from our witness earlier this week, Mr. Bowers, all he
had was theories and no evidence.
As I have said, if you are running for office in the United
States, that is the end of the line. You accept the court's
judgment. You concede the race. You respect the rule of law and
the will of the voters.
But for Donald Trump, that wasn't the end of the line. Not
even close.
The voters refused to keep him in office. The courts
refused to keep him in office. But he continued to lie. He went
in search of anyone who would go along with his scheme.
As we have shown today, he pressured the Justice Department
to act as an arm of his reelection campaign. He hoped law
enforcement officials would give the appearance of legitimacy
to his lies so he and his allies had some veneer of credibility
when they told the country that the election was stolen.
Earlier this week, we showed how Donald Trump brought the
weight of the Presidency down on local and State officials who
were trying to do their jobs--and ultimately did. They
investigated his claims and found them to be false. Then they
endured Trump's pressure campaign, at great risk to themselves
and their loved ones.
Of course, there was the scheme to get the former Vice
President, Mike Pence, to violate the law and the Constitution
by rejecting the electoral college votes on January 6th and
blocking the peaceful transfer of power.
I mention the former Vice President last because, as we
showed, when he refused to bow to the pressure in those
critical moments on January 6th, there was a back-up plan for
stopping the transfer of power: The mob and their vile threats.
Up to this point, we have shown the inner workings of what
was essentially a political coup--an attempt to use the powers
of the Government, from the local level all the way up, to
overturn the results of the election.
Find me the votes. Send fake electors. Just say the
election was corrupt.
Along the way, we saw threats of violence; we saw what some
people were willing to do. In service of the Nation? Of the
Constitution? No. In service of Donald Trump.
When the Select Committee continues this series of
hearings, we are going to show how Donald Trump tapped into the
threat of violence; how he summoned the mob to Washington; and
how, after corruption and political pressure failed to keep
Donald Trump in office, violence became the last option.
Our investigation is ongoing. Those hearings have spurred
an influx of new information that the Committee and our
investigators are working to assess. We are committed to
presenting the American people with the most complete
information possible. That will be our aim when we reconvene in
the coming weeks.
The Chair requests those in the hearing room remain seated
until the Capitol Police have escorted Members from the room.
Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey A. Rosen, Former Acting Attorney General
June 15, 2022
Chairman Thompson and Vice Chair Cheney, thank you for inviting me
to appear here today with my former colleagues Richard Donoghue and
Steven Engel. Serving alongside them and the many other dedicated
employees of the Justice Department was an extraordinary honor. They
were and are an exceptional team of public servants who always put the
best interests of our Country first. In the interest of time, I have
submitted a copy of my prior opening statements to the House Oversight
Committee and Senate Judiciary Committee, and would ask that both be
entered into the public record.
With respect to my tenure at the Department of Justice, my priority
was to ensure the Department would always proceed on the basis of the
facts and the legal merits, to enforce the Constitution and preserve
the rule of law. We did that with unfailing fidelity under sometimes
very challenging circumstances.
During my tenure as Acting Attorney General, the Justice Department
maintained the position that the Department had been presented with no
evidence of widespread voter fraud at a scale sufficient to change the
outcome of the 2020 election. We thus held firm to the position that
the Department would not participate in any campaign's or political
party's legal challenges to the certification of the Electoral College
votes. We also insisted that there must be an orderly and peaceful
transfer of power under the Constitution. In particular, during my
tenure, we appointed no special prosecutors; sent no letters to States
or State legislators disputing the election outcome; and made no public
statements saying the election was corrupt and should be overturned. We
initiated no Supreme Court actions, nor filed or joined any other
lawsuits, calling into question the legitimacy of our election and
institutions. To the contrary, the only time the Department filed a
brief in court, it was to say that a Congress Member's lawsuit to
overturn the election should be dismissed, as it was.
Some argued to the former President and public that the election
was corrupt and stolen. That view was wrong then and it is wrong today,
and I hope our presence here today helps reaffirm that fact.
Thank you and I am happy to answer your questions.
______
Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight
and Reform
May 12, 2021
Testimony of Jeffrey A. Rosen, Former Acting United States Attorney
General and Deputy Attorney General
Chairwoman Maloney, Ranking Member Comer, and Members of the
Committee, good morning and thank you for the opportunity to join this
hearing today. Because this is my first appearance before this
Committee since June 2005, please allow me to introduce myself again. I
am Jeff Rosen, and from December 24, 2020 to January 20, 2021, I had
the honor and privilege of serving as the Acting Attorney General of
the United States. Since graduating from law school in 1982, I have
lived and worked in our nation's capital region, including more than 9
years of public service at three different Federal agencies. My first
position was as General Counsel of the Department of Transportation
under Secretary Norman Mineta, followed by service as General Counsel
and Senior Advisor at the Office of Management & Budget under then-
Director, now-Senator Rob Portman. After several years back in private
practice, I was Deputy Secretary of Transportation under Secretary
Elaine Chao, and after that I became Deputy Attorney General at the
Department of Justice (``DOJ'') under William Barr. After Attorney
General Barr's departure in December 2020, I became the Acting Attorney
General, leading the Department until the end of the Trump
Administration. My testimony today relates to my time as Acting
Attorney General, and I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the
actions taken by DOJ on January 6, 2021, to help restore order at the
Capitol and enable the completion of Congress' certification of the
2020 Electoral College vote.
introduction
The events of January 6 were a national travesty and an intolerable
attack on our representative democracy. To those who risked their
safety to protect everyone at the Capitol: I honor your bravery. To the
families of the Capitol Police officers who were injured that day or
died in the wake of the attack: I extend my deepest sympathy. And to
all of you and your staff who lived through that day: I share the
justified anger at what the violent mob of attackers put you through.
Although the storming of the Capitol was a tragic episode in our
nation's history, I take some comfort in the resilience of our
institutions in the face of such an attack, as demonstrated by
Congress's ability to reconvene and fulfill its constitutional duties
just hours after the breach. I am also proud of the efforts of DOJ,
which urgently deployed more than 500 agents and officers from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI''); the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (``ATF''); and the US Marshals Service (``USMS'')
to assist in restoring order at the Capitol. These outstanding men and
women moved with urgency to assist the Capitol Police and others in the
midst of an unprecedented security breach, and helped to clear and
secure the hallowed epicenter of representative government.
I am also proud of the swift action taken thereafter by DOJ
personnel in the FBI and the DC US Attorney's Office to investigate and
work to hold accountable those responsible for the disgraceful attack
on the Capitol. As I said publicly on January 7, 2021: ``Yesterday, our
Nation watched in disbelief as a mob breached the Capitol Building and
required Federal and local law enforcement to help restore order. The
Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that those responsible
for this attack on our Government and the rule of law face the full
consequences of their actions under the law. Our criminal prosecutors
have been working throughout the night with special agents and
investigators from the U.S. Capitol Police, FBI, ATF, Metropolitan
Police Department and the public to gather the evidence, identify
perpetrators, and charge Federal crimes where warranted. Some
participants in yesterday's violence will be charged today, and we will
continue to methodically assess evidence, charge crimes and make
arrests in the coming days and weeks to ensure that those responsible
are held accountable under the law.'' (attached as Ex. A).
I appreciate the importance of today's oversight hearing, and I
welcome the opportunity to share with you what I know about the January
6 events in light of my prior roles at the DOJ. The Justice Department
plays a special role in our government, and must be guided by our
Constitution and the rule of law. I can tell you that is what guided
me. My focus was consistently on following the rule of law and enabling
the orderly transition of power in the manner contemplated in our
Constitution and laws. Upon learning of the events at the Capitol on
January 6, my priorities were threefold: securing the Capitol following
the breach, supporting the Congress as it sought to fulfill its duty to
certify the Electoral College vote, and beginning the critical work of
holding accountable those who committed wrongful acts at the Capitol.
I want to note as a threshold matter that there are some
unavoidable limitations on the testimony I can provide today. For one,
my access to information is limited because I am no longer with DOJ.
Further, while the events of that day will be with me forever, my
memory is unlikely to be perfect, as some aspects are seared in memory
and others have become a blur. Moreover, I have only been authorized by
DOJ to testify on certain topics, as I am bound to maintain certain
information in confidence and must avoid making any statements that
could interfere with the numerous ongoing investigations and
prosecutions of individuals involved in the events of January 6. I
appreciate your patience and understanding as to those, as I do my best
to answer your questions.
i. doj actions prior to january 6
On December 24, 2020, with the departure of William Barr, I became
Acting Attorney General. During my tenure, DOJ maintained the position
publicly announced previously that the Department had been presented
with no evidence of widespread voter fraud at a scale sufficient to
change the outcome of the 2020 election, that it would not participate
in any campaign's or political party's legal challenges to the
certification of the Electoral College votes, and that there would be
an orderly and peaceful transfer of power under the Constitution.
During my tenure, no special prosecutors were appointed, whether for
election fraud or otherwise; no public statements were made questioning
the election; no letters were sent to State officials seeking to
overturn the election results; no DOJ court actions or filings were
submitted seeking to overturn election results, and the only time DOJ
did file a brief it was to seek a dismissal of Representative Gohmert's
lawsuit aiming to decertify the electoral count--and that lawsuit was
dismissed, as DOJ had urged.
In the days and weeks leading up to Congress's January 6 vote to
certify the results of the Electoral College, DOJ, FBI, and other law
enforcement agencies learned that there would likely be rallies and
protests in Washington D.C. on that day, including near the Ellipse and
the US Capitol, among other possible locations. By itself, that was not
unusual: the National Capital Region periodically and with some
regularity hosts protests, rallies, and other demonstrations that can
pose safety or security threats. The District of Columbia Metropolitan
Police Department (``MPD''), Park Police, and Capitol Police are all
experienced at dealing with such events. For example, they had dealt
with protest disturbances related to the election results as recently
as November and December 2020, and the Capitol Police (which are a part
of the legislative branch) handled days of protests pledging to ``flood
the Capitol'' during the nomination hearing of now-Justice Kavanaugh in
October 2018.
As you know, the police departments are not a part of DOJ, and DOJ
does not have authority to control their activities. But as an
investigative and prosecutorial agency, DOJ--primarily through the
FBI--would normally focus on gathering intelligence about potential
threats of violence and sharing information with police and Federal
partner agencies about those threats, while the Department of Homeland
Security (``DHS'') Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the police
were likewise gathering available intelligence as well.
From a leadership standpoint, my role was to ensure that the DOJ
organization was appropriately fulfilling its functions. I fulfilled
that obligation. Formal information coordination activities among DOJ,
various police departments--including the Capitol Police and MPD--and
various Federal agencies accelerated during the week of December 28.
MPD initiated a Joint Operations Command Center. The FBI's Washington
Field Office (``WFO'') set up a regular command post to share
information among the FBI, ATF, DHS, and each of the various police
organizations in the District (including the Capitol Police who are
part of the legislative branch and report to Congress). And the
District of Columbia US Attorney's Office arranged a number of
conference calls to coordinate among local and Federal law enforcement.
On January 5, the FBI took the added step of setting up a national
coordination center at its Strategic Information and Operations Center
(``SIOC''). Located at FBI headquarters, the SIOC was geared toward
facilitating better coordination and sharing of information, among the
Federal agencies, including DHS, the Department of the Interior
(``DOI''), and the Department of Defense (``DOD''). Each of these
Federal agencies supplied personnel to staff the SIOC 24/7 beginning on
January 5 and 6, and continuing for a period thereafter. It was my
understanding that the SIOC also coordinated closely with the WFO post,
and thus the partners located there as well.
I am aware that FBI Director Wray and Assistant Director Sanborn
have testified publicly about the FBI's work regarding the events of
January 6, and the work the FBI did, along with others, to gather
intelligence about the planned events and the risk of violence. Based
on the updates I received, I was confident that very substantial
efforts were undertaken by DOJ personnel in advance of January 6 to
understand and prepare for the potential threats, and share that
information with law enforcement partners. During the week of December
28, I received reports that MPD and others estimated that between
10,000 and 30,000 people would be coming for the rallies or protests on
January 6--a sizable, but not unprecedented number. Crowd size remained
a continuing topic of conversation during the ensuing week, but, based
on what was reported to me, projections did not materially change.
As is generally the case with large protests or demonstrations in
the National Capital Region, it was expected that experienced police
departments like the Capitol Police, the Park Police, and MPD would
bear responsibility for crowd control and security in their respective
jurisdictions.\1\ The Department of Defense, which includes the Army
National Guard, provided 340 personnel to assist MPD and placed others
on standby. On January 4, MPD arrested the leader of the Proud Boys
militia group for prior violent acts, and prosecutors obtained a
judicial order barring him from the city on January 6. District of
Columbia Mayor Muriel Bowser wrote to Acting Defense Secretary Miller
and me that MPD ``is prepared for this week's First Amendment
Activities,'' and that other than the logistical support of unarmed
members of the DC National Guard, DC ``has not requested personnel from
any other Federal law enforcement agencies.'' (attached as Ex. B.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In these types of situations, DOJ performs intelligence-
gathering, information-sharing, and after-the-fact investigation and
prosecution where warranted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, although not specifically requested by MPD, Capitol
Police, or any other agencies, my office directed various DOJ entities
to take cautionary steps to alert or pre-position tactical teams if
needed for support on January 6. For example, the FBI's Hostage Rescue
team and Render Safe teams were activated; an additional FBI SWAT team
from Baltimore was repositioned to Washington, DC.; ATF Special
Response Teams were pre-positioned in Virginia for activation if
needed; and USMS Special Operations Group personnel were also pre-
positioned in Virginia for deployment if needed.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Additionally, as it was conceivable that some protesters might
be unhappy with DOJ's not having filed court actions regarding the
election outcome, DOJ arranged for tactical support from Bureau of
Prisons personnel to supplement existing security at its own RFK
Building.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I believe that DOJ reasonably prepared for contingencies ahead of
January 6, understanding that there was considerable uncertainty as to
how many people would arrive, who those people would be, and precisely
what purposes they would pursue. Unlike the police, DOJ had no
frontline role with respect to crowd control. The FBI, ATF, DEA, and
U.S. Attorneys' offices, as investigative and prosecuting agencies, are
generally not equipped for crowd control. But DOJ took appropriate
precautions to have tactical support available if contingencies led to
them being called upon.
ii. doj's actions on january 6
The demonstrations and protests expected for January 6 had been a
significant focus of attention for DOJ and FBI leadership in the week
prior, and they continued to be so on the day of the events. On the
morning of January 6, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General
Richard Donoghue \3\ and I met with FBI leadership for the latest
updates and preparation. I continued to talk to Principal Associate
Deputy Attorney General Donoghue and FBI Deputy Director David Bowdich
throughout the day and their proactive engagement and decisionmaking
were simply invaluable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ During this time, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General
Donoghue was performing the functions of the Deputy Attorney General,
due to my taking the position of Acting Attorney General.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the early afternoon, as President Trump was speaking to an
audience at the Ellipse, I contacted the Acting US Attorney for the
District of Columbia, Michael Sherwin, in part to inquire if the crowd
size there was consistent with or larger than the forecasts. He was
personally in the vicinity of the event and reported that the size of
the crowd was on the lower side of the forecast and conceivably might
have been below the lower end of the range. He also indicated that the
crowd at the Ellipse did not appear to be violent or unruly.
Reports after that conversation were more negative. ATF was
notified of potential explosive devices having been placed at the
Republican and Democratic National Committee offices. ATF promptly sent
a team of experts to deal with the explosive devices, in coordination
with the Capitol Police and MPD. Subsequently, I observed on television
the events as the crowd moved from the Ellipse, up Constitution Avenue,
and then to the US Capitol. During that time, I recall receiving
updates from Acting US Attorney Sherwin and others.
Sometime around 2 o'clock p.m., I was horrified and dismayed as I
saw on television the crowd breaching the Capitol. I soon learned that
ATF and FBI, among others, had just received requests for assistance
from the Capitol Police and were beginning to respond. My office asked
ATF, FBI, and the USMS to provide as much help as possible as quickly
as possible, including deploying the pre-positioned resources. I also
recall receiving phone calls from White House staff requesting that DOJ
provide as much help as we could; I reported to them that we were doing
so. I also received calls from multiple Members of Congress and staff,
including members of leadership in both the House and Senate. I
informed them that DOJ was sending help as quickly as possible. As I
monitored the continuing events, I spoke multiple times with DOJ
personnel who were onsite and coordinated with my counterparts across
the Federal government.
My understanding is that ATF had some personnel arrive to the
Capitol very quickly, with sizable numbers following by 2:40 p.m. FBI
personnel, including from the Hostage Rescue and SWAT teams, and
personnel from the USMS Special Operations Group also deployed urgently
to the Capitol. In total, more than 500 DOJ personnel surged to the
Capitol to help clear the building and secure it so that the Congress
could resume its business. It is my understanding that DHS likewise
sent personnel from the Federal Protective Service and from Immigration
and Customs Enforcement and that MPD and other local police departments
also sent officers to assist the Capitol Police that afternoon.
My original plan had been to go to the FBI SIOC for the afternoon,
which was at the FBI headquarters just across the street from my
office, but the urgency of the phone discussions and the need to
coordinate with my DOJ staff in responding to the attack on the Capitol
complex prevented my doing so. Instead, Principal Associate Deputy
Attorney General Donoghue went to the SIOC and provided me with ongoing
updates. As the attack continued, he and FBI Deputy Director Bowdich
personally went to the Capitol building, to the Rotunda, and continued
to provide me with situation reports from inside the building as
efforts to restore order remained underway. I shared information with
others and sometimes facilitated others talking directly with Principal
Associate Deputy Attorney General Donoghue and Deputy Director Bowdich.
I also took steps to let the public know where DOJ stood with respect
to the attacks: I directed my staff to begin drafting a statement
condemning the attacks. After internal review at DOJ, this statement
was released later that same afternoon (attached as Ex. B).
It is my understanding that by approximately 5 o'clock to 5:30
p.m., the efforts at the Capitol to clear out the attackers had largely
succeeded in doing so with the help of the more than 500 DOJ agents and
officers who had deployed, but work remained, as those DOJ personnel
were then working with the Capitol Police and others to check for
explosives and to otherwise secure the offices and chambers in the
Capitol building, so that Congress could return that same day and
complete the electoral count.
At 7 o'clock p.m., I, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General
Donoghue, and others from DOJ participated in a conference call that
included congressional leaders and representatives from DHS and DOD, as
well as others. Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General Donoghue
provided a situation report, and congressional leaders wanted to know
if it would be feasible for the Congress to return and complete its
business that evening. Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General
Donoghue told them he expected Congress could return by 8 o'clock p.m.,
which is what happened, with Vice President Pence reconvening the
Senate at 8:06 p.m.
Accordingly, Congress returned and completed its constitutional
role in certifying the votes of the Electoral College that evening.
With the achievement of the twin objectives of restoring order at the
Capitol and enabling Congress to fulfill its electoral count obligation
under the Constitution, I was and remain extremely appreciative for the
work done that afternoon and into the night by the women and men of the
FBI, ATF, and USMS, as well as others at the DC US Attorney's Office
and elsewhere in DOJ. They, and all the others from DHS, DOD, DOI, and
the various police departments who went to that Capitol that afternoon
to help restore order, accomplished a vital feat for our country, and
we owe them our deepest gratitude.
iii. doj's actions after january 6
DOJ also immediately began work to ensure that those responsible
for the attack on the Capitol would face the full consequences of their
actions under the law. Acting US Attorney Sherwin and his team, along
with the FBI and police counterparts, began charging participants in
the violence as early as January 7. Within the first week after the
attack, more than 70 individuals had been criminally charged, and DOJ
had opened more than 170 investigations and gathered over 100,000
digital tips.
DOJ also sent the clear message that further violence would not be
tolerated in the lead up to President-Elect Biden's inauguration. In a
January 13 video message, I expressed DOJ's support for the exercise of
constitutional rights but also strongly warned that ``I want to send a
clear message to anyone contemplating violence, threats of violence, or
other criminal conduct: We will have no tolerance whatsoever for any
attempts to disrupt the peaceful transfer of power on January 20th that
our Constitution calls for . . . [t]he Department of Justice will seek
to hold any violators accountable to the fullest extent of the law.''
The work of investigating and prosecuting those who attacked the
Capitol on January 6 continues to this day and is now in the capable
hands of my former DOJ colleagues and the new DOJ leadership team. To
avoid interfering in these ongoing matters, I must leave it to others
to answer any questions regarding them as they deem appropriate.
iv. conclusion
January 6 was a dark and harrowing day for America. And though I
remain saddened by the events of that day, I am nonetheless grateful
that physical harm to Members of Congress was avoided and that, because
of the prompt work that was done to clear and secure the Capitol,
Congress was able to complete its work that same evening. I am also
proud of the role DOJ played in helping to restore order and all we
were able to accomplish alongside our partners from various police
forces, Federal departments and law enforcement agencies, and the
National Guard.
What the attackers did that day was terrible in its violence, the
loss of life, and injuries suffered. But it was also terrible because
it constituted an assault on a building that is a fundamental symbol of
our democracy, on the institution of Congress itself, and on an
electoral process required by our Constitution. As a society, we need
to restore greater respect and appreciation for our Constitution, our
representative democracy, and the rule of law. As I have said before,
violence and senseless criminal conduct are not the right way to
resolve differences or promote change in our country. And they will not
carry the day.
In closing, I would like to publicly thank my former DOJ colleagues
and everyone who played a role in bringing order to chaos on January 6.
I will leave it to others to assess why the security at the Capitol was
not sufficient to protect the building that afternoon in the first
instance, but the assistance that was provided after the breach
occurred is something that deserves appreciation. I will also leave it
to appropriate authorities to assess responsibility for what happened
and determine any precipitating causes.
Finally, if any valuable lesson could come out of the disturbing
events from the Capitol riots, perhaps it might be that Americans of
all backgrounds and political affiliations could agree that we cannot
have anything like that happen again. Our Constitution, our traditions,
and our ideals as a nation must be respected and revered. I know that
all of you share that wish as well.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Steven A. Engel, Former Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice
June 15, 2022
Good morning, Chairman Thompson, Vice Chairwoman Cheney, and
Members of the committee. I appear this morning at the Committee's
request, and I thank you for the opportunity to make an opening
statement.
Although the topics to be discussed involve Presidential
communications and the deliberative processes within the executive
branch, the U.S. Department of Justice has authorized me to provide
testimony on the particular subjects identified by the Committee, and
former President Trump previously authorized Department officials to
discuss these matters with the committees of Congress. I will therefore
seek to answer the Committee's questions to the best of my ability.
I was privileged to serve as the Assistant Attorney General of the
Office of Legal Counsel from November 2017 through January 2021. In
that role, I served as the chief counsel to the Attorney General and
the principal legal adviser to the executive branch. During that
period, we sought to ensure that our legal advice would assist the
President and his cabinet secretaries in discharging their
responsibilities within the boundaries of the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and in the interest of the people of the United
States. Our commitment to that work remained the same both before and
after the election of November 2020.
Following the November 2020 election, in an effort to promote
confidence in the election results, Attorney General Barr authorized
the Department to review and, where appropriate, to investigate reports
of fraud and irregularities as they came in. The Department's senior
officials ultimately concluded that there was no evidence of widespread
voter fraud on a scale sufficient to change the outcome of the
election, and Attorney General Barr reported that publicly in early
December.
Although I was not personally responsible for these investigations,
I did not doubt the judgment of the Attorney General and the
Department's senior leadership. As a Presidential candidate, President
Trump and his campaign had every right to pursue litigation in
contesting the election results in the various Federal and State
courts. But absent credible evidence of a violation of Federal law, the
Department did not have any role to play in these election contests.
This view was widely shared among the Department's senior
leadership, including by Acting Attorney General Rosen. Yet we
discovered in late December that one of the Assistant Attorneys
General, Jeff Clark, took a different view. Mr. Clark believed that the
Department should publicly assert that the election results had been
marred by fraud and should urge several of the States to replace their
previously certified electors. Mr. Clark's views came to the attention
of President Trump, who considered whether Mr. Clark should replace the
Acting Attorney General at the helm of the Department of Justice.
The Department's senior leadership, as well as the White House
Counsel, believed that Mr. Clark's plan lacked any factual or legal
basis. On January 3, we met with the President and with Mr. Clark to
explain why the Clark plan should not be pursued. We also made clear
that the Department's leadership could not remain if the President
chose to pursue that course. Following that discussion, President Trump
agreed with us, and he retained Acting Attorney General Rosen through
the end of his Administration.
It was a great honor to serve at the Department of Justice, and I
was privileged during my time to work with many lawyers of integrity
and honor, including those sitting beside me today. The Department's
leadership clearly understood our responsibility to ensure the neutral
enforcement of the law, to protect our Constitution, and to assist in
the peaceful transfer of power.
Thank you for the opportunity to make this statement, and I will
seek to answer the Committee's questions today to the best of my
ability.
[all]