[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-70]
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND
U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 17, 2022
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-987 WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Seventeenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
Chair C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
Jonathan Lord, Professional Staff Member
Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
Brooke Alred, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 3
WITNESSES
Baker, Sasha, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 5
McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central
Command........................................................ 8
Townsend, GEN Stephen J., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command.... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Baker, Sasha................................................. 51
McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr................................. 77
Townsend, GEN Stephen J...................................... 64
Documents Submitted for the Record:
AFRICOM Maps................................................. 109
CENTCOM Maps................................................. 115
GEN McKenzie response to Mrs. McClain........................ 117
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 121
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 121
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 135
Ms. Jacobs................................................... 135
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 125
Mr. Moore.................................................... 137
Mr. Scott.................................................... 128
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN
THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 17, 2022.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Call the meeting to order.
This morning the committee is gathered for the ``National
Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater
Middle East and Africa.''
A couple of programming notes before we get started.
It is a long, complicated day on the committee. We have
this hearing, and then, at 1 o'clock, we have the Under
Secretary for Policy, Mr. Kahl, giving us a briefing on
Ukraine, a classified briefing. And then, these fine folks will
be back at 2:30 for a classified version of this brief.
So, I have finally decided that I don't actually have to
read the statement explaining how our virtual hearing works. I
will simply say that this is a hybrid hearing. There will be
some people here in person; there will be some people appearing
virtually. And we will all be prepared for that.
Our witnesses this morning are Sasha Baker, who is the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of
Defense; General Stephen Townsend, who is the commander of the
U.S. Africa Command; and General Kenneth McKenzie, who is the
commander for U.S. Central Command.
And both General Townsend and General McKenzie are
scheduled to have this be their last appearance before our
committee. Events happen. One never knows when we might have to
bring you back before then. But, at any rate, you are retiring.
And both you gentleman have appeared before this committee
many times, served this country incredibly well in a variety of
capacities. But in the two theaters that you are currently
responsible for, you have had a lot to do during your tenure
there, and you have done it quite well. And we have appreciated
the relationship and we wish you the best. And thank you for
your service.
And these, as mentioned, are two incredibly important
commands. I think on this committee there is always a
challenge. We are trying to prioritize. We have spent a lot of
time the last few years talking about how China is the pacing
threat; we need to focus on China. Obviously, with Vladimir
Putin's brutal and violent decision to violate the fundamental
laws of the world and invade Ukraine in the way that he has, a
lot of attention has focused there.
But the bottom line is, while we do need to prioritize, we
also need to be aware of, you know, we live in a robust threat
environment. We have got to be paying attention to all of it
and trying to make sure that we are meeting all of those
challenges; first of all, because they are all important, and
second of all, because they all tend to be interconnected.
Certainly in the two theaters that we are talking about
today, both China and Russia are factors in the great power
competition that we find ourselves in. So, we want to make sure
that we are addressing those issues.
So, taking them one at a time, starting with the Africa
Command, China is incredibly active in that region, looking to
build partnerships, you know, the goal of ultimately building
bases wherever they can. It is incredibly important that we
keep an eye on that, maintain our relationships in Africa, and
try to deal with that challenge.
At the same time, the transnational terrorism threat is
still very real throughout the continent. Things have gotten
more complicated on the Horn, given the conflict in Ethiopia. I
have always felt that the partnerships that we built to deal
with the challenges in Somalia and the challenges that are
presented by AQ [al-Qaida] in the Arabian Peninsula between
Yemen and Somalia, the partnerships that we have built with
Kenya and Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, and others in the region
have really been a great model for how partnerships can help us
meet our national security threats, so that we don't do it all
alone.
We have a similar and growing challenge in West Africa, as
there are a variety of different transnational terrorist
elements there that we need to work with. And in the midst of
all that, Russia is aggressively, through the Wagner Group,
providing security in that region that is having a very
destabilizing effect. It is not a coincidence that the
increased presence of Wagner as a security force has matched up
with an increase in the number of coups throughout West Africa.
We have got a lot of challenges in Africa, and we look
forward to hearing from General Townsend about his take on
those challenges and answering our questions on that.
Central Command also has a lot of challenges. Certainly, we
have seen the drawdown in both Afghanistan and Iraq over the
course of the last 10 years that has changed that, but the
challenges are very real. And I know General McKenzie knows
that one of the central questions that this committee will have
is, what now in Afghanistan? There is still a threat there from
al-Qaida and from ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. What
is our plan for dealing with that threat, now that we have
pulled out of Afghanistan?
And in the Middle East, we still have the challenges from
ISIS, the instability in Syria, the instability in Yemen. I am
particularly interested to hear the latest on what Iran is up
to, and how we are working with partners in the region to
contain that threat.
And also, I would be curious to hear, as Russia gets
further and further bogged down in Ukraine, what does that mean
for their activity in Syria, where, as we know, they have been
very involved going forward?
The bottom line is--and my written statement gets into a
lot more detail--we could talk about both of these areas of
responsibility for a very long time. There is a lot to do.
There are a lot of challenges. They are a huge part of our
national security posture going forward, and I look forward to
hearing more details from all three of our witnesses on how
best we should meet those challenges going forward.
With that, Mr. Rogers is out ill this morning, and ably
filling in is Mr. Wittman, as the ranking member. And I will
yield to him for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I deeply appreciate our witnesses coming to testify before
us today. And thanks so much for your service.
General Townsend, as was discussed last week, the threats
in Africa are multifaceted and they continue to grow. But
spending on AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] comprises only about
three-tenths of 1 percent of the entire defense budget--not
related to the magnitude of what I believe is the building
threat. And it is these meager resources that are now spread
even thinner because of the challenges we face before us with
Russia and China. And that is not just worldwide; that is
specifically there on the African continent.
Russia has been entering into a disturbing number of arms
sales and basing agreements in African nations. China is using
the Belt and Road Initiative to extract African natural
resources and gain permanent footholds on the continent. The
Chinese have built an overseas military base in the
strategically important area of the Horn of Africa, and they
are actively scouting other locations, including the Atlantic
coast. Make no mistake about their intentions.
The growing presence of China and Russia in Africa is a
threat to our national security, and it is imperative that we
increase investments there, as well as other places around the
world.
I look forward to hearing from you, General Townsend, about
how we can maximize diplomatic and military efforts to counter
Russia and China's growing global ambitions in China.
In CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], General McKenzie, we are
also seeing increased Chinese presence. China is building ports
and other infrastructure throughout the region, and it has
entered into trade and telecom [telecommunication] agreements
with allies in the region.
But what I find most concerning is that President Xi
continues to cozy up to the Ayatollah. China signed valuable
trade deals with Iran, bought Iranian oil in defiance of
international sanctions, and joined Russia in conducting joint
drills with the Iranian navy. These actions provide a lifeline
to Iran at a very dangerous time.
The Ayatollah continues to fund and equip terrorists
targeting American troops. His cronies are prolonging a civil
war and a humanitarian crisis in Syria, and his regime is
aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. We absolutely cannot
allow this to happen. I do not believe that reentering the
JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] will stop them. I
look forward to hearing more about the administration's plan
for ending the Ayatollah's quest for a nuclear weapon and how
they intend to deal with the rest of the regime's destabilizing
actions.
Finally, to both you, General McKenzie and General
Townsend, you continue to face tremendous challenges snuffing
out hardened terrorists in both AORs [areas of responsibility],
and I am very concerned that we are backsliding on the progress
we have made in combating terrorism.
In Africa, the repositioning of U.S. and French forces
further from terrorist hotspots is making it much harder for us
to successfully conduct counterterrorism operations.
In CENTCOM, President Biden's decision to unilaterally and
unconditionally withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan has
undermined our national security. As anticipated by nearly
everyone except the President, the Taliban has overrun the
government, and Afghanistan is reverting back to being a
breeding ground for terrorists.
The President assures us that this so-called over-the-
horizon strategy will prevent that from happening, but this is
completely devoid of reality. In the 6 months since the
withdrawal, we have not been informed of a single successful
over-the-horizon strike. I guess it is possible that al-Qaida
and ISIS-K [Khorasan Province] have thrown down their arms and
decided to live in peaceful coexistence with the West, but I
fear what is more likely is that we no longer have a good
handle on where the terrorists are or what they are doing.
The truth is, without persistent ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance], reliable partners on the
ground, and nearby facilities to launch assets, we lack the
capability we need to conduct a successful strike. We know,
previously, human intelligence, signal intelligence, in theater
close to the adversary is critically important. And I look
forward to this afternoon's classified discussion on what
capabilities we have lost and how we can help restore them.
As to our posture shifts in the Indo-Pacific, we need to
ensure other combatant commanders we have the capabilities they
need to carry out their missions. We cannot allow for
blindspots, especially in your two AORs.
Before I wrap up, I would like to thank both of you for
your service, General Townsend and General McKenzie, incredible
service to our Nation.
General McKenzie, I wish you the best in your retirement.
Just make sure that you have your number available on speed
dial.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Wittman. And again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Baker, you are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF SASHA BAKER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Wittman,
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting
me to testify, and I ask that my written statement be entered
into the record.
For the past year, the Biden administration has placed a
priority on revitalizing and expanding the U.S. alliance and
partnership architecture. In bringing together our partners'
capabilities with our own, the Department is building an
integrated deterrence framework that we believe creates
advantages for ourselves and dilemmas for our adversaries.
In the Middle East and Africa, the Department builds
partnership through an approach that draws on all of our tools,
to include security cooperation, exercises, defense diplomacy,
and force posture.
The Department's priorities in the Middle East are to
defend against Iranian-backed threats, to counter violent
extremist organizations, and to deepen cooperation with our
partners. We are committed to deterring and defending against
threats posed by Iran and its proxies. The Department
continuously evaluates the appropriate mix of forces to defend
U.S. personnel and interests, if necessary.
In Iraq and Syria, the Department is committed to the
enduring defeat of ISIS, supporting a broad, whole-of-
government strategy designed to address the underlying
conditions that gave rise to ISIS.
In Yemen, our policy objectives are to end the conflict,
alleviate humanitarian suffering, and defeat the threat from
al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS-Yemen. Separately,
the Department supports the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and
Saudi Arabia in the defense of their territory and people from
cross-border Houthi attacks.
The Department is committed to deepening cooperation and
coordination between the United States, Israel, and partners in
the Middle East and Africa.
Recent normalization agreements have laid the groundwork
for Israel's entrance into the U.S. Central Command, which
will, in turn, we believe, enhance cooperation in the security
sphere.
In Afghanistan, our military service members served
honorably for two decades. Although we have withdrawn U.S.
forces, the Department continues to advance U.S. interests in
Afghanistan. This includes monitoring indicators and warnings
for counterterrorism threats against U.S. interests and the
U.S. homeland. It also includes supporting the Department of
State's efforts to facilitate the departure of American
citizens, lawful permanent residents, and our Afghan allies, as
well as efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. We
continue to support interagency partners in the care and
resettlement of Afghan evacuees in the United States.
In Central Asia, we are continuing to develop long-term
security cooperation programs that are focused on bolstering
regional capabilities to help counter a wide range of threats
in the region and to the U.S. homeland.
In our relationship with Pakistan, counterterrorism remains
a focus, as violent extremist organizations seek to target our
shared interests and destabilize the region. Pakistan has
participated robustly in counter-piracy efforts, for example,
meant to ensure a free and open maritime transit.
In Africa, the Department remains focused on countering
violent extremist organizations that pose a threat to the U.S.
homeland and interests, and addressing targeted strategic
competition concerns. To those ends, the Department is building
partnerships that support conflict resolution, improving
defense institutions, and attempting to strengthen democratic
norms.
DOD's [Department of Defense's] training and exercises
promote a respect for the law of armed conflict, for civilian
oversight of the military, and for human rights.
We employ a holistic approach, working with our partners
across the U.S. Government, to include State and USAID [United
States Agency for International Development], and we are
reviewing all of our deployments to ensure that they are
rightsized to balance our near-term challenges with our long-
term modernization and readiness requirements.
In the Horn of Africa, we remain committed to supporting
our AMISOM [African Union Mission to Somalia] partners, and in
the east and in the Sahel, we are focused on interagency and
multilateral efforts to stabilize the region and to improve our
counter-VEO [violent extremist organization] efforts.
In North Africa, we support a common security objectives on
the continent and in the southern Mediterranean.
And in the maritime domain, alongside the Department of
State, we are working with regional partners to secure the
Atlantic from maritime and transnational threats.
The Department's approach to the Middle East and Africa is
informed by threats to a free, stable, and open international
order, including those posed by Russia and the PRC [People's
Republic of China].
Russia seeks to reshape security structures, exploiting
governance vacuums and using private military companies and
resource extraction to undermine U.S. interests.
Beijing is establishing overseas infrastructure to project
and sustain military power while expanding its implements and
its access.
As the Department coordinates with partners to address our
shared threats and their security needs, it will also seek to
limit Russian and Chinese influence through sustained
engagement, demonstrating the superiority of the United States
as a partner of choice.
With the support of the Congress, the Department remains,
we believe, well-positioned to support our allies and partners,
to compete with Russia and the PRC, and to deter and defeat our
adversaries across the Middle East and North Africa.
In closing, I would just like to echo, on behalf of the
Department, our thanks to both General McKenzie and General
Townsend, for their long service to our Nation.
And with that, I will conclude and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Baker can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Before turning to General Townsend, one programming note
that I neglected to mention. We are going in reverse order of
questioning today. We try to give the freshmen, our junior
members, a chance to go first in some of our hearings. So, we
will be starting with the least senior and working our way up
today. Just to make sure everyone is aware of that.
General Townsend, you are recognized for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
AFRICA COMMAND
General Townsend. Chairman Smith, Congressman Wittman,
distinguished members of the committee, good morning. Thank you
for inviting me to appear today, even as the eyes of the world
are focused on Russia's lawless attack on the Ukraine, an
unjust war which impacts Africa as well.
For nearly 3 years, it has been the greatest privilege of
my career to represent the dedicated members of U.S. Africa
Command. Thank you for your steadfast support for them and for
our mission.
I am here this morning with my battle buddy and command
senior enlisted leader, Sergeant Major Richard Thresher, and
colleagues, Dr. Sasha Baker and General Frank McKenzie. For
General McKenzie and I, it is our final appearance before you.
Our joint testimony highlights continued and pressing
challenges and opportunities faced by our respective commands
and our Nation.
Together with our interagency teammates, USAFRICOM protects
and advances U.S. interests, prevents strategic distraction,
and preserves America's options--all in concert with our allies
and partners.
As AFRICOM's fifth commander, I have come to learn five
truths about Africa.
First, America cannot ignore Africa. Africa's challenges,
opportunities, and security interests are inseparable from our
own. Weak or poor governance, conflict, and climate change
stress the stability of many African nations, which in turn
will impact U.S. security and prosperity.
Second, our competitors clearly see Africa's rich
potential. China and Russia both seek to convert soft and hard
power investments into political influence, strategic access,
and military advantage. Both seek to bolster autocrats and
change international norms in their favor. For China, Africa is
their second continent. Across Africa, mercenaries from the
Kremlin's Wagner Group offer their services for profit--regime
protection, resource exploitation, and horrific violence
against Africans, just as we see in Ukraine today.
Third, deadly terrorism has metastasized to Africa. Al-
Qaida's Al-Shabaab in East Africa and ISIS and al-Qaida groups
in West Africa and elsewhere, are among the world's fastest
growing, wealthiest, and deadliest terrorist groups, and remain
grave and growing threats that aspire to kill Americans, both
there and in our homeland.
Fourth, a battle between democracy and authoritarianism is
raging across Africa. Despite a recent surge in democratic
backsliding, our values, our democracy, our willingness to work
with African partners create a huge demand for U.S. engagement
and U.S. partnership.
Fifth, in Africa, a few troops and a few bucks still go a
long way. Modest and predictable resourcing yields outsized
returns for U.S. and African security interests. As an economy
of force and posture of limited theater, AFRICOM employs just
.3 percent of DOD's operating budget and manpower. Modest
investments today can yield a continent of partners tomorrow.
We are most effective when we synchronize diplomacy,
development, and defense. So, we are grateful for your
continued leadership and backing to resource our interagency
partners at the State Department, USAID, and the intel
community. Thanks to the authorities and resources you provide,
and your continued interest and support in the capabilities
that AFRICOM requires to accomplish our mission.
In summary, USAFRICOM remains cheap insurance for America's
security.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Townsend can be found in
the Appendix on page 64.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General McKenzie.
STATEMENT OF GEN KENNETH F. McKENZIE, Jr., USMC, COMMANDER,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General McKenzie. Chairman Smith, Representative Wittman,
ladies and gentlemen of the committee, it is a pleasure to be
here today beside the Honorable Sasha Baker and General Steve
Townsend, and in the company of my senior enlisted leader,
Fleet Master Chief Jamie Herdel.
I want to thank you for allowing me this opportunity to
testify for the final time regarding U.S. Central Command's
posture in an area of responsibility that encompasses 21
nations, 600 million people, and lies at the strategic nexus of
the world's most important corridors of trade.
Much has transpired since I last delivered my annual
posture testimony; most notably, the conclusion of our military
campaign in Afghanistan and, of course, Russia's recent
invasion of Ukraine.
America's interests in the central region and the
challenges we confront there have proven remarkably resilient.
CENTCOM's mission to direct and enable military operations and
activities with allies and partners to increase regional
stability in support of enduring U.S. interests is essentially
unchanged from the day of the command's founding.
The primary threats to that security and stability are also
very familiar even today. CENTCOM was established nearly 40
years ago to counter the malign influence of a revolutionary
regime that had seized power in Tehran, and to compete with a
great power that had, in spite of international condemnation,
invaded the sovereign state of Afghanistan and imposed a puppet
regime.
Today, Iran is no less of a threat to American interests or
the stability of the region than it was in 1979. To the
contrary, the threat posed by Iran is graver than ever.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, moreover, has violently
demonstrated its willful disregard for international norms--
just as we have seen through Russia's actions in Syria and
elsewhere, in fact anywhere it sees an opportunity to diminish
confidence in America's leadership.
In a more measured fashion, China is also vying for
increased influence, at American expense, in a region it
depends upon for over 40 percent of its fossil fuels.
Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations, or VEOs, in the
CENTCOM area continue to pose a credible threat to the
homeland. In sum, the central region remains today a vital and
volatile arena for strategic competition and the decisive
theater in the campaign against VEOs.
The campaign to defeat the so-called Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria has entered a new phase. As of 1 January of this
year, Iraq has assumed sole responsibility for counter-ISIS
combat operations on its own soil.
In Syria, CENTCOM and its partners are degrading ISIS's
ability to regenerate by improving the security of facilities
for detained ISIS fighters, as well as for the displaced
persons camps where their families and others reside. More than
half of this population comes from other countries, and
addressing the threat of ISIS in northeast Syria, ultimately,
will require those countries to reclaim and repatriate whatever
citizens of theirs remain in these prisons and camps--ending
one of the world's worst humanitarian crises and depriving ISIS
of what currently is fertile soil for indoctrination and
spreading terror.
In Afghanistan, our campaign against al-Qaida and ISIS-
Khorasan has also entered a new phase. We are now conducting
this campaign from bases over the horizon. As I have said
before, this is difficult, but it is not impossible. I should
add today that we will be able to do so only so long as CENTCOM
has the requisite resources to find, fix, and finish threats to
the homeland before those threats develop the capability to
conduct external operations. I am talking specifically about
ISR assets and strike platforms. CENTCOM has the tools it needs
to perform this mission, but the margins are thin and the risk
will increase, should resources diminish.
In the Middle East, Iran continues to pose the greatest
threat to U.S. interests and the security of the region as a
whole. Through its proxies and clients, Iran has fomented
conflict in an arc, tracing from Yemen through the Arabian
Peninsula, across Iraq and Syria into Lebanon, and to the very
borders of Israel.
Saudi Arabia endures regular attacks from the Houthis, who
wield some of the most advanced unmanned aerial systems and
cruise missiles in the region--all courtesy of the Iranians.
Recently, the Houthis expanded these attacks to include urban
centers and bases with U.S. forces in the United Arab Emirates.
Tehran also enables its aligned militias in Iraq and Syria to
carry on a persistent, low-level campaign of indirect fire and
UAS [unmanned aerial systems] attacks against U.S. and
coalition forces, hoping to drive us from the region.
Iran's ballistic missile forces constitute an exigent
threat to the security of every state in the region. Among them
are our most important and enduring partners. They continue to
look to the United States for assurance that we, the historic
partner of choice in the region, will remain a reliable one.
China and Russia are also watching closely for any sign
that America's commitment to the collective security of the
region is wavering, and they are poised to capitalize on
whatever opportunities emerge.
In closing, let me thank you again for this opportunity to
testify.
I would also like to thank the soldiers, sailors, Marines,
airmen, coastguardsmen, and guardians who have served and
sacrificed in the CENTCOM AOR. It has been the greatest honor
of my life to serve as their commander.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General McKenzie can be found in
the Appendix on page 77.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Just two quick questions.
General Townsend, could you walk us through what you think
China is doing in Africa? When I met with you, you gave a
pretty good brief. And I know some of it we would have to do in
the classified session later. But what are they doing in
Africa, how does it threaten us, and what are we doing to
address it?
General Townsend. Thanks for the question, Chairman.
There should be some handouts at your places there that you
can refer to.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 109.]
The Chairman. Yes.
General Townsend. There is one on China there that depicts
what I will just kind of briefly talk to.
They compete with us in Africa. First of all, China has
made a decision, a deliberate decision, to compete with America
in Africa and win that competition. They compete primarily
through economic means and diplomatic means. And you can see
that there with their Belt and Road Initiative. They are
investing everywhere across the continent.
We don't actually have to meet that competition in every
location head-on. We have to pick and choose where we are going
to do that. And there are countries where it is important that
we do.
In the military sphere, you heard in the chairman's opening
remarks there that have their one overseas base in Djibouti.
The primary thing that concerns me with China's military
competition in Africa is that they are seeking, actively
seeking, a military base on the Atlantic coast of Africa. And
for a variety of reasons that I will go to in closed session,
that would be bad for America's security. And--as a first
priority, we need to prevent--deter a Chinese base on the
Atlantic coast of Africa.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And, General McKenzie, just a quick specific question on
Yemen. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues to be great.
The fight has gone back and forth there. I know our envoys
there have tried to get to a peace agreement, but unable to do
that. But, in terms of getting food, humanitarian assistance,
basic supplies, into Yemen, we continually hear about the
blockade of Yemen; that Saudi Arabia is like leading this
effort, blocking the ability of supplies to get in. Is there
more that we could do to free up the ability to get supplies,
the basic supplies of food, medical supplies, humanitarian aid
into Yemen? And what is really going on in terms of the effort
to blockade that by Saudi Arabia, or by anybody else?
General McKenzie. Chairman, you are correct, it is very
difficult to get humanitarian aid into Yemen. It is further
compounded by the fact that there are distribution problems
that the Houthis are associated with, once that aid gets in. I
would agree that there is more that we could do with our
friends in the region to allow more humanitarian aid to enter
Yemen, and I would support that action.
However, I think the larger problem is the distribution of
the aid, once it enters Yemen and actually gets out to the
people that need it. The U.N. [United Nations] Special
Representative is working that very hard, but that remains, I
think, the most significant problem, when it comes to
distribution of aid to the many hundreds of thousands of people
who experience food insecurity in Yemen.
The Chairman. But, before it gets in, the Saudis, in
particular, are searching ships, blocking ships from getting in
because they are afraid that arms are being shipped in.
General McKenzie. Sir, they are, and they have also allowed
aid ships to enter. It is not a perfect solution. It is not a
perfect solution, and I acknowledge that.
The Chairman. Well, that is something I would like to
continue to work with you on, because, as you know, the
humanitarian crisis there is extreme.
And with that, I will yield to Mr. Wittman for his
questions.
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I want to thank our witnesses.
I want to follow up on what the chairman talked about. It
is concerning to me, not just the dynamic that is happening
between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but the support that Iran is
providing to Yemen. That, to me, allows them to do the things
that they are doing that are very, very disruptive in that
area.
As we know, they have looted U.N. food convoys. They have
laid over a million mines in civilian areas. They have
recruited thousands of child soldiers and have taken over the
closed U.S. embassy. They are holding at least 11 former U.S.
embassy staffers hostage. And they have stepped up cross-border
attacks by drones and missiles against the UAE that have
actually targeted and killed civilians in the UAE.
As the chairman pointed out, they have completely rebuffed
efforts by the current administration to enter into any kind of
talks to resolve these particular issues.
General McKenzie, I want to go to you first and ask, what
are your thoughts about what we can do in interrupting the
relationship between Iran and the Houthis, which allow them,
unfortunately, to continue to keep this unsettled state in
Yemen? And that, in turn, antagonizes the Saudis, and this just
continues to escalate. Can you give us your perspective on
that?
General McKenzie. Sir, I can. And I would like to note at
the beginning that, while the supply of humanitarian aid to
Yemen has been imperfect and not consistent, throughout the
long history of this crisis, Iran has never imported a single
bag of rice or any other foodstuff into Yemen.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General McKenzie. In fact, the only material they have
brought into Yemen is stuff designed to kill people.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General McKenzie. So, we should just remember that when we
talk about the people here.
Sir, I believe there is an opportunity for a negotiated
settlement here. I believe that the parties, I believe that the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and I believe UAE are open to that
solution.
I believe that the Houthis have an opportunity, should they
choose to negotiate, but under prompting from their Iranian
masters, they have instead chosen to double down. They continue
their attacks into Saudi Arabia. As you noted, they have ramped
up attacks into UAE in a very disturbing new phase of
operations.
But I think there is an opportunity here, under the United
Nations, to get to a truce, and a truce would be the best of
possible worlds. We would be able to begin to open Hudaydah,
get foodstuffs into Hudaydah, and distribute it under the
auspices of someone other than the Houthis and their ability to
interfere with it.
Mr. Wittman. Can enough pressure be put on Iran and Saudi
Arabia to kind of force the Houthis to the table and say,
``Listen, you've got to resolve this''?
General McKenzie. I don't believe it is in Iran's interest
to end the war in Yemen. I think it is a fairly low-cost war
for them. As you noted, it embarrasses Saudi Arabia. It
embarrasses UAE. And I think they are actually not motivated to
do that right now.
I think it is certainly in the Houthis' best interest to
cut a deal. So, the ball is sort of in their court. They have
some opportunities. They need to seize those opportunities,
because, frankly, sir, I don't think those opportunities are
going to be there forever.
Mr. Wittman. Yes. Thanks.
Let me ask you briefly, too, about the growing threat from
ISIS-K in Afghanistan. As we had heard before, by a complete
withdrawal of forces there, we knew that the risks were going
to increase. Obviously, they have.
The concern is is that that risk is going to extend beyond
the borders of Afghanistan and they will have an opportunity or
a capability to pursue attacks outside of Afghanistan. That is
incredibly troubling.
Also, our ability to do significant CT [counterterrorism]
operations in Afghanistan, the issues of what we used to have
as far as human intelligence, signal intelligence, greatly
degraded now. The over-the-horizon capability is just not
something that is realistic in relation to the threat that we
face.
I wanted to get your best military judgment regarding the
adequacy of the current force structure in CENTCOM following
our departure from Afghanistan. What do we have in place? Is it
enough with this over-the-horizon capability to really keep a
handle and keep ISIS-K from growing to a point where it can
perpetrate attacks outside the border there? And what are the
risks with our current force structure? What are the risks that
are there before us today, and how do you think those risks
will continue to grow?
General McKenzie. Sir, in the closed session a little later
this afternoon, I am going to exhaustively drill down into our
force posture and all the disciplines of intelligence that we
are applying in Afghanistan, and give you very detailed and
specific granular answers to those questions. But I prefer to
do that in a closed session.
I will say that we are very concerned about the potential
for ISIS-K growth in Afghanistan. We assess that they do retain
a desire to attack us in our homeland here in the United
States. And absent effective pressure, that threat will only
grow and metastasize over time.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. That is what I want to get
to, is that you continue to see it growing, then, in the years
to come, unless something significant is done in the meantime?
General McKenzie. Sir, I will talk about that in great
detail a little bit later today.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield
back.
Mr. Courtney [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
In accordance with the chairman's extraordinary procedure
today, the chair recognizes Mr. Panetta from California.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate this opportunity. I just wish I would have had a
little more insight as to the order. But thank you very much.
That being said, gentlemen, Doctor, thank you very much for
being here. I appreciate your time. I appreciate your
testimony.
I am going to focus down to West Africa, and more
particular, in Mali especially. We know that the French came in
back in 2013, Operation Barkhane. They had U.S. support.
Unfortunately, now the French are leaving. Unfortunately, now
there is a void.
I don't have confidence in the 15,000 Blue Hats that are
there on the ground to fill that void. I am very skeptical of
the Malian government to actually contract with the Wagner
Group as well to do that.
I know that we provided support in Operation Barkhane, and
maybe this is a conversation we can have later this afternoon.
But my question to you is, one, why are the French leaving?
Two, who do you see filling that void? Three, why did they
contract with the Wagner Group, and if you could go into that a
little bit?
And then, my last question is, does China have a strategy?
You have this nice map here that shows their involvement in
Africa. Does China have a strategy to deal with the violent
extremism in Africa?
General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman.
So, first, the French aren't leaving. They are
repositioning in West Africa. They are leaving, as you pointed
out, Mali.
Mr. Panetta. They are going to Niger, correct?
General Townsend. Their plan is to go to Niger and Cote
d'Ivoire, and maybe a few other places. So, they are
repositioning their forces.
You asked the question, why are they leaving? So, in our
interactions with the French, they had come to the realization
that it was time to reset their campaign there and maybe gain
new efficiencies. And so, they had already made a decision,
which the French government had announced, that they were going
to reposition and reposture in West Africa.
Then, we had successive coups in Mali.
Mr. Panetta. Right.
General Townsend. And Mali, as you know, has invited in
Wagner. I think they have invited--and that gets to your second
question, why have they invited Wagner in? They have invited
Wagner in because they believe that Wagner will replace the
French and do a better job.
When I learned of this, I traveled to Mali and I met with
the president there, the junta president there. And I explained
that I thought it was a bad idea to invite Wagner in, because
we have seen them, I have seen them in Syria and I have seen
them in other places in Africa. And Wagner obeys no rules. They
won't follow the direction of the government. They won't
partner more effectively. I think they will only bring bad----
Mr. Panetta. Was he listening? Will he listen?
General Townsend. He told me that it wasn't Wagner; that
they were dealing with the French--the Russian Ministry of
Defense, except I think President Putin later said there are no
Russian military in Mali; there are private military companies
there, Wagner.
So, I think that only bad will come from that. I think
there may be some initial gains. We are seeing Wagner deploy
and build their base camps. They haven't really started
significant operations yet. I think they have already suffered
some casualties.
Mr. Panetta. Casualties from violent extremism?
General Townsend. Yes. I think that only bad is going to
come from their deployment there.
You asked about China. We don't see China having a counter-
violent extremist role. They are in Mali, though. They are
there as part of--they have a substantial force there as part
of MINUSMA [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali], the U.N. mission there. But we
don't see them doing--we see them doing a little bit of
counterterrorism training on the continent, but we do not see
them conducting any counter-VEO operations.
Mr. Panetta. And a lot of our role, then, will be from
Niger, is that correct, in regards to any sort of what we do?
General Townsend. We currently have forces in Niger, and I
am working with the Department of Defense on a strategy for
West Africa that will take into account the French reposturing;
that will take into account the malign actors like Wagner in
the region.
Mr. Panetta. And it sounds like you don't necessarily
believe this Malian official who you spoke to in regards to it
was an organized Russian group? You believe it is the Wagner
Group who is in there now?
General Townsend. It is the Wagner Group, supported by the
Ministry of Defense and the Kremlin. The Russian air force flew
them in.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Once again, thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Panetta. I was closely
watching the portraits of the past chairmen. There was no
disturbance of the universe. So, nice job.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just thought this was a
gift that you were giving an Irishman on St. Patrick's Day. So,
I appreciate that.
Thank you all for your service, and thanks for being here
today.
General McKenzie, I was a bit dumbfounded about a week and
a half ago. I read an article, a report, in The Wall Street
Journal that the UAE's Sheikh and the Crown Prince of Saudi
Arabia would not take a call from the President of the United
States. I found that alarming. I wanted to just hear your
thoughts on that.
General McKenzie. Relationships at that level would
probably be better with Ms. Baker or the Department of State
than me. I can tell you that, at my level, I have no trouble
talking to the chiefs of defense of each of those two
countries, and I talk to them frequently.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. Ms. Baker, if you would like to comment?
Thank you.
Ms. Baker. Congressman, thank you.
I can't speak to the specifics of the President's phone
calls. What I can tell you is from a defense perspective, as
General McKenzie said, we have long and enduring strategic
partnerships with both Saudi Arabia and UAE. Those have existed
for any number of years.
Mr. Fallon. I know. That is why I found it so----
Ms. Baker. We are fully committed to them.
Mr. Fallon [continuing]. Alarming and shocking that they
weren't taking--I thought they were allies of ours in the
region, and not to take the President of the United States
phone call, to me, it spoke volumes about the deteriorating
relationship.
Ms. Baker. Again, I can't speak to the President's phone
calls. I can tell you that, as General McKenzie said, we pick
up the phone and we talk with these folks every day, and we
have a very close and enduring partnership from a defense
perspective.
Mr. Fallon. General McKenzie, in Syria, I would love if you
could just touch on the influences that Turkey, Russia, and
Iran have. It seems to be an absolute mess, you know, from
everything we read, and then, the maps didn't help too much,
either. But I just wanted to get your thoughts on that.
General McKenzie. Sure. So, in Syria, Iran uses Syria
principally as a land bridge to move advanced conventional
weapons into Lebanon to be employed against Israel, as a
possibility. They are also interested in operating against our
forces that are there in Syria. As in Yemen, Iran, generally
speaking, has no positive objective in Syria. Rather, their
goals are almost wholly negative.
Mr. Fallon. Just disruption.
General McKenzie. It is disruption, but also they view it--
again, we shouldn't understate the importance of that corridor
that allows them to move weapons to a position against what
they consider their greatest foe and the nation they are sworn
to destroy, Israel.
Russia, obviously, has a client state in Syria. They came
in right after the beginning of the civil war. They have been
there for quite a while. It allows them to do several things by
being in there.
First of all, it is opportunistic. I don't see a long-term
strategy in the Russian action. They have got an air base in
western Syria. They have got a naval base in the eastern
Mediterranean, which they had during the Cold War, I might add.
So, it is not a new thing necessarily.
It also gives them the opportunity to attempt to posture on
the global stage and to throw sand in our gearbox. Again, it is
an act of opportunism that we see as typical of a lot of
Russian activity.
The Turks have genuine national security concerns----
Mr. Fallon. Is it the Kurds mainly? Are they concerned
about the Kurds more than anything else?
General McKenzie. Well, the Turks are, yes.
Mr. Fallon. Yes.
General McKenzie. We would argue that there are different
elements within the Kurds, and we disagree with Turkey on that,
on all the Kurds being devoted to attacking Turkey. But they do
have legitimate security concerns.
We also, as you know, partner heavily with the Syrian
Democratic Forces and other Syrian Kurdish elements to actually
conduct the fight against ISIS. So, there is a genuine dispute
there between us and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] partners over that. But, when all is said and
done, we do recognize they have legitimate security concerns.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, General.
General Townsend, I was noticing in the foreign aid we
crush the Chinese, $11 billion to about 2.5, but, in economic
trade, they almost quadruple ours in Africa. What I wanted to
ask you is, who is China the chummiest with? Whose
relationships are the best as far as the nation-states they
have and relationships they have in Africa? And what worries
you most about that theater?
General Townsend. Well, Congressman, thanks.
I don't think anybody has asked me who China is chummiest
with in Africa before. So, I don't think I have contemplated
that. They have pretty good relations with a lot of the
countries on the continent. Where the relations are strained is
in their earlier economic investments, where they have lured
African countries into what we call ``debt trap diplomacy.''
Mr. Fallon. Right.
General Townsend. And there are a number of those countries
where a large percentage of their foreign debt is held by
China, and China has extended leases on critical infrastructure
like ports and airports.
The thing I think I am most worried about is this military
base on the Atlantic coast. And where they have the most
traction for that today is in Equatorial Guinea.
Mr. Fallon. Yes.
General Townsend. They have laid markers down up and down
the coastline, but the place where they have actually made
progress toward this is Equatorial Guinea. And we have had a
recent interagency delegation travel there to discuss that with
the government there.
Mr. Fallon. Well, it concerns me because it is like almost
an end-around to the Monroe Doctrine in some ways to have a
Chinese base on the Atlantic----
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes Congresswoman Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
And, General McKenzie, I would like to start with a quote
that you made. You said, ``the proximate causes for the
establishment of CENTCOM nearly forty years ago'' was Iran, and
``Today, Iran is no less of a threat to American interests or
the stability of the region than it was in 1979. To the
contrary, the threat posed by Iran is graver than ever.''
So, I would like to ask you, from a perspective of CENTCOM,
how is the United States, and how is the United States and our
allies prepared to respond to this threat from Iran?
General McKenzie. So, the actual operational expression of
the Iranian threat is in the vast improvements in their
ballistic missile, their land attack cruise missile, and their
small unmanned aerial vehicle platforms, which over the last 5
to 7 years have dramatically increased, both in number and in
accuracy and ability to fly in relatively undetected ways. All
of that directly threatens the immediate partners.
Mrs. Luria. So, the 5 to 7 years, what year did we enter
into the JCPOA? It is about that timeframe?
General McKenzie. About that timeframe, but----
Mrs. Luria. So, I just wanted to shift, and maybe we can
have a more thorough conversation on the first part of the
question.
So, if the United States returns to the JCPOA, what impact
do you foresee that having on Iran's regional activities? What
impact on the flow of additional resources to the Houthis, to
Hezbollah, to Hamas, and their actions in the region against
the United States, Israel, and our allies?
General McKenzie. So, I will note, the principal foreign
policy objective we have vis-a-vis Iran is for them not to
possess a nuclear weapon. So, a JCPOA would presumably give
that assurance.
Mrs. Luria. Right. The current agreement has allowed them
to have additional resources to fund these proxy organizations.
General McKenzie. So, I believe that what they do with
their ballistic missiles, their proxies, and other things, are
not necessarily coupled directly to the JCPOA. But I will
acknowledge that there could be second-order effects of that. I
do not know what the terms of the pending JCPOA will be. I just
don't have that information.
Mrs. Luria. So, perhaps I will turn to Ms. Baker. And I
really don't think it is a disputed fact, by the fact that we
have eased pressure, we have lifted sanctions, Iran has more
resources. And those resources are flowing to these proxy
groups and terrorist organizations throughout the region.
So, if a nuclear deal is reached with Iran, I think that it
is likely that Tehran will use a significant part of those
associated sanctions reliefs to attack Israel and support these
terrorist proxies. Are we open to supplying Israel with
additional security assistance and other support, in light of
this potential situation?
Ms. Baker. Congresswoman, our commitment to Israel's
security is ironclad. We consult with them on a near daily
basis.
Mrs. Luria. Are they at the table in the negotiations for
the JCPOA right now?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, the Department, of course, does not
have the lead on those negotiations, but my understanding is
the Israelis are not at the table. We do consult with them
regularly, and we are in regular conversations about how we can
better bolster their security in the region.
Mrs. Luria. So, if we consult with them regularly, have
they expressed concerns over the pending reentry into the Iran
deal?
Ms. Baker. You know, I think this is a subject of active
conversation, and I don't know that there is a unified opinion
on that. That being said, we are committed to their security.
We are committed to giving them the equipment, the capabilities
that they need, the QME [qualitative military edge] that we
have committed to.
Mrs. Luria. So, I will shift back to General McKenzie. And
I wanted to ask, why hasn't there been a more forceful U.S.
response to Iran's aggression against our allies and our troops
in the region? For example, we just saw this strike this
weekend towards Erbil in the vicinity of the U.S. consulate.
And Iran directly took responsibility for that strike.
General McKenzie. Ma'am, I would like to talk about that in
the closed session, if I could, and I will be prepared to go
into great detail.
I will tell you that I think our response has been
measured, balanced. You know, after the strike on UAE by the
Houthis, we deployed a fifth-generation fighter squadron to Al
Dhafra Air Force Base. I sent a ballistic missile-capable
destroyer to UAE's waters. And we have done a variety of other
things to enhance their protection.
So, sometimes it doesn't require an immediate kinetic
response in order to show a measured response that assures our
partners and allies.
Mrs. Luria. So, has our current policy of not having a 1.0
continuous carrier presence in the Gulf, have you seen any
change in Iran's activities due to that? And do you think a
carrier in the Gulf is essential for a deterrent? And lastly,
balancing that versus the need for that asset within the 7th
Fleet AOR for PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]? Can you----
General McKenzie. So, as I think about deterring Iran, I
don't think in terms of individual platforms. I think in terms
of the holistic capabilities of the joint force--land-based
air, carrier-based air. And so, one is up; one is down. We have
other uses for those carriers; they can't be everywhere. But we
do innovative things. We bring bomber task forces in from the
United States. There are a variety of things I can display to
ensure the Iranians know that we have the capability to defend
ourselves and to punish them if they continue their malign
activities.
Mrs. Luria. Right. So, in your assessment, these shore-
based squadrons are providing, essentially, you, as the
combatant commander, the same equivalent capability as a
deterrent?
General McKenzie. Yes, and other capabilities as well
beyond that.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Mrs. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Perhaps I didn't hear that correctly. So, I will apologize
in advance. Did I hear you say that Israel doesn't have an
opinion or a position on the JCPOA?
Ms. Baker. No, ma'am. I believe that they have expressed
concerns.
Mrs. McClain. And they want us to go back in or not go back
in? What is their opinion?
Ms. Baker. Congresswoman, you know, I think it is a complex
situation. I am not sure that there is a unified point of view.
Mrs. McClain. That is interesting, because when I was in
Israel, it was clearly unified. So, I am just----
Ms. Baker. We have heard Israel's concerns about the JCPOA
loud and clear.
Mrs. McClain. Okay.
Ms. Baker. I want to acknowledge that.
Mrs. McClain. I just wanted to make sure I understood that
because I didn't catch that.
Ms. Baker. What we have committed to, in response, is the
ongoing conversation we have about ensuring Israel's QME, its
security. That was the case before the JCPOA. It is the case
during, when we were in the JCPOA, and it will continue in----
Mrs. McClain. But, to be clear, they do have a response;
they do have an opinion; they do have a position; and we are
clearly aware of what that position is?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, that is my understanding, yes.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you. Thank you. I just wanted to clear
that up.
Thank you all for being here.
General McKenzie, the DOD Inspector General, in a recent
report, stated that ``Iran-aligned militias continue to have
strong ties to some elements of Iraq's traditional security
forces''--especially pointing out Iraq's federal police, under
the Ministry of Interior. My question is this: Does the
Department, or any agency of the U.S. Government, continue to
provide assistance for Iraq's federal police and Ministry of
the Interior? Do we provide funds to them?
General McKenzie. Congresswoman, I will have to answer--
take that one for the record. I will come back with a precise
answer to that question.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 117.]
Mrs. McClain. Okay. Thank you.
My next question is, just this weekend, Iran directly
launched missiles in the vicinity of our consulate, right, in
Erbil, Kurdistan. I'm just--I'm trying to understand this and
come to grips with this, is how can we justify using taxpayer
dollars to go to a police force that supports that, or dollars
to support that?
General McKenzie. I will go into more detail in the closed
session. But I can tell you that they were not targeting us
with those strikes.
Mrs. McClain. I think I want to believe you. I think the
American people want to believe you. I am just not much for
coincidences. It is scary when you are on the outside looking
in. So, I look forward to the briefing to make us feel a little
bit better about that.
General McKenzie. Certainly.
Mrs. McClain. And then, my second question is, are you
familiar, obviously, with the Badr Corps?
General McKenzie. I am.
Mrs. McClain. Okay. My question is, do you believe that
that organization is best described as a terrorist
organization?
General McKenzie. It has--let me come back to you on that,
if you want a--let me put it better. I prefer to answer that in
a closed session, if I can.
Mrs. McClain. Okay.
General McKenzie. And I will be prepared to do that.
Mrs. McClain. With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Slotkin. Thanks.
Thanks for you all being here. And having served, I think
with all three of you in different capacities, I really
appreciate your service and all the work that you have done for
the country over many, many years.
I just want to continue the conversation on Iran. And,
General McKenzie, you know, I was reading through your
testimony, and there is a lot of discussion about Iran's
nefarious activities in the Middle East and their ballistic
missile program. Can you give us, as much as possible, just for
the American public to understand, the stakes of their nuclear
program; how close they are to turning fissile material into
nuclear, you know, weapons-grade material; and your assessment
of the threat, where it falls vis-a-vis the other threats
coming from Iran?
General McKenzie. Thank you. And it is good to see you
again, ma'am.
I would note, first of all, I think the Iranians are close.
I don't think that they have made a decision to go forward. I
think they actually, my assessment is, they want the sanctions
relief that has already been discussed here. And so, I think
the best solution would be to get an agreement where they are
not going to pursue a nuclear weapon. So, I will say that as
number one.
What really concerns me much more on a day-to-day basis are
their ballistic missiles, their cruise missiles, and their land
attack cruise missiles, which they have invested in heavily, at
great cost to their population, over the past several years.
Those capabilities directly threaten their neighbors today. And
we saw an example of that in the attack on Iraq over the
weekend--their ability to fire very accurate missiles into a
neighboring country, something they have done before, including
the attack on Al Asad Air Base in January of 2020. Those
capabilities concern me, and I believe they concern our
neighbors and friends in the region as well.
And that is, actually, one of the opportunities I will talk
a little bit more in the closed session about. We have an
opportunity to work on integrated air and missile defense. That
is the great opportunity in U.S. Central Command right now,
because that will address a cogent, imminent threat to all of
our neighbors in the region. And it is a tremendous
opportunity.
What that doesn't do is address the proxies, and their
proxy forces are very active. Principally, we look at Iraq and
in Syria, but they are obviously active in Yemen and in other
places both in and out of the region. And that is another
significant element that we work with our partners against.
Ms. Slotkin. Yes. I mean, certainly, as someone who used to
work on Iraq and work in Iraq, Iran's terrorist activities were
an everyday fact of life, frankly, if you were over there.
But I guess the question I have is, from the Chairman on
down, the best military advice on a deal that would focus just
on the nuclear parts of the Iranian threat. You know, we are
going to be asked in some form or fashion to weigh in on this.
There is, I think, a lot of briefing and a lot of work that is
still going to go on to bring people up to speed. But, as I
understand it, the deal, like the last deal, doesn't include
the ballistic missile program and the terrorism. What was the
best military advice from the Chairman on closing such a deal?
General McKenzie. I would defer to the Chairman on that
deal--on that military advice.
I would note, the last deal did not include those ancillary
elements that you talked about.
Ms. Slotkin. Right.
General McKenzie. And that is concerning.
Ms. Slotkin. But your best military advice at your level,
since this is your AOR, you support a deal that would just be
focused on the nuclear parts of the threat?
General McKenzie. I support Iran not having a nuclear
weapon. And I would support the most effective way to get
there. That will not solve all our problems.
Ms. Slotkin. Yes.
General McKenzie. But it would solve one problem. There are
other areas that we need to work in. And I know that we have
expressed interest in broadening the agreement. And my
understanding is Iran has resisted that. But I think we do need
to get to a broader agreement. But our number one priority is
for them not to have a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Slotkin. Appreciate that.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the witnesses being here this morning.
General McKenzie, has there been an impact to your AOR
since the Russian invasion of Ukraine? And if so, can you
describe the movement of the fighters, potentially from Syria
or elsewhere, from the AOR into Ukraine?
General McKenzie. So, we watch the Russians closely across
the region. They have not done much force balancing as a result
of the Ukraine operation. I can talk a little bit more about
that in the closed session. Not much, really none significant.
We have not seen a flow of fighters, and I can give you
some precise numbers in the closed session. We just haven't
seen much of that yet out of Syria. I know there is a lot of
discussion of that, but it is just not evident to us. And we
look at that pretty closely. And that could change, but that is
sort of what we see right now.
Mrs. Bice. I want to take a step back. We were discussing
in previous lines of questioning the Taliban and what has
happened in Afghanistan. During the NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act] markup, I offered an amendment which
required the DOD to report to Congress the security impacts of
the release of the prisoners from Bagram Air Base. Can you
share some of the security impacts that you have seen from
CENTCOM AOR as a result of the prisoners' releases?
General McKenzie. Sure. The release of the prisoners from
Bagram, Parwan, and Pul-e-Charkhi, which the Taliban overran on
or about the 13th to the 15th of August, first of all, injected
about a thousand ISIS fighters back into the battlespace of
Afghanistan. And that rejuvenated ISIS-K. And I believe the
Taliban are going to grow to reject that--or to regret the
decision to release those prisoners.
It also released thousands of Taliban fighters and others
who returned to the Taliban. But I think their action,
shortsighted, actually, has had a profoundly negative effect on
conditions inside Afghanistan. I believe, ultimately, unless we
are able to keep effective CT pressure on ISIS in particular,
they will have the opportunity to grow and seek to strike us
here in the homeland.
Mrs. Bice. And you mentioned that earlier.
Last question. It is widely known that large swaths of the
telecom infrastructure throughout the continent of Africa are
run on Chinese-produced hardware, including Huawei and ZTE
[Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment]. I have long been
concerned with the network security threats from compromised
Chinese-produced hardware. Can you talk about your level of
concern with these types of threats from AFRICOM AOR?
General Townsend. Yes. So, part of that extensive Chinese
investment on the African continent is telecommunications, as
you just mentioned. Huawei is endemic across the continent.
They are building smart cities/safe cities, which are going to
connect everything in those cities, and it will report back to
Beijing. Usually, it reports back to Beijing before it reports
to the host nation's capital. So, that is a fairly significant
threat that I don't think we truly understand the implications
of, and we won't until sometime in the future.
Mrs. Bice. Do you think our allies are aware of that?
General Townsend. Yes. I believe that they are. But, at the
same time, they are wanting to pull their countries into the
modern world. And so, China is offering very lucrative
technologies that they probably wouldn't be able to access
otherwise. And so, I think they are going into it mostly with
eyes open.
Mrs. Bice. Do you think there is any effective response
that the U.S. could have to this type of coercion, if you will?
General Townsend. I think probably--and I will defer to Ms.
Baker--but I think probably having an economical alternative--
right?--some competitive alternatives on the economic side in
the free market is probably the best alternative.
Mrs. Bice. I love the word ``free market,'' General. Are we
too far down the path, though, with the amount of equipment
that has been installed in Africa, to really impact in a
positive way the continent?
General Townsend. No, I don't believe that we are.
Mrs. Bice. Okay.
General Townsend. In the countries, in the safe cities that
are already being established, yes, but, elsewhere, I don't
believe that we are.
Mrs. Bice. Ms. Baker.
Ms. Baker. Congressman, if I could just add to that, I
think our strategy, as it relates to the telecommunications
infrastructure and the China challenge, is twofold. The first,
as General Townsend said, is we are trying to make sure that
partners and allies in the region, not only in AFRICOM, but
globally, have the information that we see about the threat
that this poses to their infrastructure and the potential
vulnerabilities that it will introduce into their systems. So,
that is part one; it is sort of an educational aspect.
We are also--and this is not a Department of Defense lead,
but as an administration--looking at technological solutions
that would allow some of these countries to get after that
telecommunications capability that they are so desperate to
get, but in a way that is safer.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlewoman's time has
expired.
Mrs. Murphy is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the areas that I have had some concerns about is
Iran's, both direct and through proxies, influence in Syria and
Lebanon. In fact, I was able to secure a provision in the
fiscal year 2020 Intelligence Authorization Act to ask the DNI
[Director of National Intelligence] to report to us a bit about
those efforts by Iran and how those efforts might impact U.S.
interests and our allies, including Israel.
I was wondering if you all could provide me with a bit of
an update on Iran's efforts to expand its influence in Syria
and Lebanon.
General McKenzie. Yes, ma'am, I will begin. I will begin
with Lebanon.
As I spoke a little bit earlier, Iran sees Lebanon as the
terminus of a land bridge to the Mediterranean that gives them
a perch from which they can launch attacks on Israel. So, their
interest in Lebanon is wholly transactional and is limited to
that.
They exercise influence in Lebanon through Lebanese
Hezbollah, LH, a shadow organization that we recognize has
penetrated many aspects of Lebanese society, but then again,
doesn't actually do much for the Lebanese. And our response to
that is, at my level, the mil-to-mil level, despite many other
things we are doing for the government of Lebanon writ large,
is we work very hard to sustain the Lebanese Armed Forces as
the single military representative of the properly constituted
government of Lebanon.
It is not a perfect relationship, but I believe in the long
term our best solution, and the strategy that we follow, is to
assist that armed force. I speak to the Chief of Defense of
Lebanon frequently, and I believe that they remain our best
opportunity to balance the other nefarious actors that are in
Lebanon.
If we turn to Syria, again, Iran's interest in Syria,
wholly transactional, wholly negative. It is the sort of middle
part of a land bridge that allows them to get into Israel. It
also serves as a staging place for potential attacks against
Israel and allows them, also, to stage for operations inside
Iraq, which is a long-term focus of Syrian foreign policy and
military strategy.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you.
And then, just shifting a little bit, The Wall Street
Journal reported yesterday that Saudi Arabia is considering
accepting the Chinese yuan as payment for oil exports, which
currently only accepts U.S. dollars. This is following up on
news that Saudi Arabia had invited the Chinese President to
visit the Kingdom on an official trip.
I think when I think about the prospect of a growing Saudi-
Chinese relationship, it is a little concerning, especially
given the historical partnership between the United States and
the Kingdom. What is your assessment of current Saudi-Chinese
relations and the impact that it could have on the United
States relationship, as well as our influence in the region?
General McKenzie. Ma'am, I can only talk really in my lane
at the mil-to-mil level. But I will note that I have a good
relationship with the Saudi Chief of Defense. We talk
frequently. It is my belief that we remain the preferred
partner of choice for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They want
our equipment, and they want more than our equipment, which is,
demonstrably, the best available--they want the training, the
education, and all the things that come with a partnership with
America.
As for outreach to the Chinese and what they might do with
oil sales there, probably not my lane to answer. I will defer
to Ms. Baker on that.
Ms. Baker. Yes, I mean, I agree completely with everything
that General McKenzie has said. The only thing I would add
perhaps, by way of context, it is clear to us, I think, that
strategic competition has come to the Middle East, and perhaps
has been there for quite some time. And so, we do see China and
Russia, but particularly China, looking for economic and other
inroads with some of our partners and allies.
As General McKenzie said, from a defense perspective, we
believe that those relationships are strong; that we remain the
partner of choice, and that there are things that we bring to
the table, and that we are offering to partners and allies in
the region, that, frankly, China and others can't match.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKenzie, thank you again for your service to this
great Nation, and Semper Fi.
I just have a pretty straightforward question for you on
Afghanistan. Just given how the withdrawal--not the 20 years,
not the mistakes that we made--but given how this withdrawal
was conducted, which I think most would say was a bit of a
debacle, any regrets?
General McKenzie. I think the end game for Afghanistan that
played out in the summer of 2021, those events didn't begin in
the spring of 2021 or the summer of 2021. You have got to look
all the way back for that.
Certainly, I regret that we no longer have the ability to
be as effective as we would like to be on the ground in
Afghanistan and the CT mission. We are doing that over the
horizon. As I have said, it is much harder to do that over the
horizon. And I will talk in great detail about that in the
closed session. So, I certainly regret that we no longer have
that opportunity.
Mr. Waltz. I have spoken with a number of the 13 Gold Star
families who are now without their loved ones because of an
ISIS fighter suicide bomber that was released from Bagram
Prison just weeks before. I just received notes from Afghan
women who served in the military alongside us that are being
hunted down right now with the database that we left behind,
with the payroll database. No regrets there? Nothing we could
have done differently in terms of how we exited?
General McKenzie. I think you go back to the basic
strategic decision that we were leaving, and everything else
flows from that basic strategic decision that we are going to
leave, and we are going to leave completely. And everything
flows from that.
Mr. Waltz. And was that the right decision, in your view?
General McKenzie. My opinion has been--and I have stated it
publicly--that we should have retained a small presence in
Afghanistan. I argued for 4,500 in the fall of 2020, and as we
went into the spring of 2021, it was my opinion--and remains my
opinion today--that about 2,500 would have given us adequate
forces on the ground to retain an advising capability.
Mr. Waltz. I appreciate that. And I appreciate your
reminding this committee of that, because I think we are going
to come to regret this decision. And I think it is going to be
felt in the homeland, and it is going to be felt by future
American soldiers that have to go fight their way back in to
deal with it.
Ms. Baker, along those lines, the FY22 [fiscal year 2022]
NDAA required an over-the-horizon strategy within 60 days of
passage. That was about a month ago. You are a month late.
Where is that strategy?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I don't know the exact progress of
that strategy. I would be happy to look into it and get you an
answer.
Mr. Waltz. You don't know the progress of an over-the-
horizon strategy required by law? The President of the United
States has cited the over-the-horizon strategy. Secretary
Austin, your boss, here, the last time he was here, said we can
do over the horizon; we can keep America safe.
I am in my district saying, ``The administration says we
can do this,'' even though, as a special operator, I know
better. What is the status?
General McKenzie, have you chopped on it and sent it up to
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]?
General McKenzie. That strategy is working right now. I
have, we have had the opportunity to work on that strategy. And
we actually have a practical strategy that is in effect right
now. Again, it is something I would be happy to talk about in
the closed session.
Ms. Baker. And, Congressman, if I could just clarify, we do
have a strategy for over the horizon. What I was referring to
is the specific report. I don't know what the status of that
report is, but I will get you an answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 121.]
Mr. Waltz. Okay.
Let's take a step back. We just had a successful strike
against the leader of ISIS, the successor, in Syria. And as I
have stated in this committee before, but I think it is worth
repeating, we had local allies that helped with that. Correct?
The Kurds. We have bases in the region in Jordan, Turkey,
Israel, northern Iraq, right?
General McKenzie. Sir, I would still characterize that
strike--and as you know, I am the officer who did it--I would
still characterize----
Mr. Waltz. Would you characterize that as over the horizon?
General McKenzie. That is over the horizon.
Mr. Waltz. Okay.
General McKenzie. I would characterize that as an over-the-
horizon strike----
Mr. Waltz. Let's look at the map again. Do we have any
bases in any neighboring country in Afghanistan?
General McKenzie. No. The difference is, as you note, the
distances are far greater going into Afghanistan. Conceptually,
it is the same thing. The distances are greater; the risks will
be higher. And you are well aware of that, sir. I know you----
Mr. Waltz. Right. Are we still reliant on Pakistan for
overflight of our ISR assets?
General McKenzie. There is no other way to get into
Afghanistan for me right now.
Mr. Waltz. Pakistan has historically supported the Taliban,
correct?
General McKenzie. They have also supported us. The air line
of communication is a direct reflect of Pakistan's support of
us.
Mr. Waltz. But it is a bit like asking the arsonist for
access for the fire department to put out the fire, should the
homeland be threatened again. We are reliant, just to be clear,
we are reliant on Pakistan for that overflight. Otherwise, we
have got to fight our way in.
General McKenzie. We are reliant on Pakistan, but, as you
know, we always reserve the right to defend ourselves anywhere
in the world.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Crow is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all of you for your service to the country
and for coming in.
And particularly, General Townsend and General McKenzie, in
your last appearance here before the committee, I applaud you
for your long and honorable service to the country.
General McKenzie, I understand very deeply that decisions
are made here in Washington, and strategic decisions are made,
and the military has to carry it out. And I want to thank you
for your service and candor before this committee and the
American people on Afghanistan and related issues.
And, General Townsend, as much as I want to start with you,
as a fellow Ranger, I am actually going to start and direct my
comments to Ms. Baker.
Ms. Baker, what is the timeline for the National Defense
Strategy? When can we expect to have that released by the
administration?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I can't provide you with a specific
date. I can tell you that it is in final coordination, and we
are hopeful to get it over to you all and out to the public
very soon.
Mr. Crow. Okay. And has that been held up because of the
recent events in Ukraine?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I think it is only appropriate for
us to take a look at what has happened in Ukraine and make sure
that we are reflecting that in the strategy. I will say that
the NDS [National Defense Strategy], as it has been developed
over the course of the last year, we believe is very resilient
to current events, and, in fact, continues to sort of--the
bones of it are going to remain unchanged.
Mr. Crow. I can certainly appreciate that, and appreciate
that you are taking into account some of the current events as
well that have changed the landscape a bit.
Focusing in on Africa, we have this notion, this proclivity
to kind of look at China as 10-feet tall sometimes. And
certainly, they are making big investments, and it would be a
mistake for us to underestimate them. But they are also making
a lot of mistakes, right? And the use of Chinese labor,
predatory economics, there is a lot of disenchantment that is
growing within Africa in some places. So, they certainly have
their weak points.
And we have our strengths. One of our strengths is the fact
that we have a larger value proposition. We can bring to the
table economic, humanitarian, you know, our moral authority, a
lot of things.
How would you classify, very briefly, what is the elevator
pitch for what is U.S.'s strategy in Africa? How would you
explain our strategic posture in Africa and our goals?
Ms. Baker. Congressman--and I would invite General Townsend
to add to this--I think we have three goals in Africa right
now. One is counter-VEO, and we do that by, with, and through
our partners.
The second is, to that same point, we are working to
strengthen those partnerships and strengthen----
Mr. Crow. Well, those are--I don't mean to interrupt--those
are things to do. Those are tasks, enablers. What is our
overarching goal? How do we want to be known in Africa? And how
would you classify our engagement?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I mean, I certainly think that our
goal in Africa is to be the continent's strategic partner of
choice.
Mr. Crow. Okay. So, with that in mind, from your perch at
DOD--and the U.S. Government often has silos, right? You know,
the State Department has their silo and their lane, DOD, USAID.
If our value proposition is to coordinate all of that and bring
that all to bear in a way that our force multiplies each of
those elements, how can we better do that and what are the
impediments to achieving that right now?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I think we are always working to
break down those silos, as you well know from your time in
uniform.
I will say I think--and General Townsend, again, can jump
in here--but it works better in the AFRICOM AOR. The
integration of our defense, diplomacy, and development efforts;
the fact that General Townsend has folks from USAID and State
sitting right beside him at his headquarters.
So, I think we have made a lot of progress in AFRICOM. And
frankly, there are things we can learn from AFRICOM and apply
to other COCOMs [combatant commands].
General Townsend. So, I think she has got our strategic
goal exactly right. We want to be the strategic partner of
choice. That translates into sustained U.S. access and
influence on the continent. And that will come in handy in a
million ways that we can't even foresee today.
Regarding the integration of, you know, the breaking down
of silos, we try really hard to do that every day in AFRICOM.
Dr. Baker has mentioned the fact that we have a 3D [three
dimensional] command, built that way, purpose-built that way
from the start.
One of my most senior leaders is a senior State Department
ambassador. I have got a senior development advisor from USAID.
We look at everything through that 3D lens every day to be the
strategic partner of choice, and maintain U.S. access and
influence.
Mr. Crow. Thank you. I appreciate everyone's hard work.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Just a programming note. As I mentioned, at 1 o'clock, we
will have a classified brief upstairs on Ukraine. So, we will
be concluding this at 12:45 to give the committee and everyone
time to sort of move up and get settled. So, we will wrap this
open hearing up at 12:45, and then, of course, we will be
seeing all of these folks again at 2:30 for the classified
portion of it.
Mr. Bergman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKenzie, General Townsend, thank you for your
decades of leadership. It takes leadership to do what we need
to do.
Ms. Baker, General McKenzie, let me lay out a scenario for
you. Under the 2015 JCPOA, Russia removed all excess low-
enriched uranium and nuclear materials from Iran. If a similar
requirement exists in a new deal, and if Iran subsequently
believes the agreement has been violated, or that it has not
received the promised sanctions relief, will Russia, could
Russia be in a position to return enriched uranium to Iran? In
essence, would that potentially put Vladimir Putin in the
position of being the de facto judge of compliance with the new
agreement?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, as you know, there is no agreement
yet. And there are----
Mr. Bergman. Again, it was a scenario.
Ms. Baker. Understood. We don't know whether Russia will
play that role in a future agreement. Certainly, in whatever
agreement is reached, if an agreement is reached, we would seek
to pressure-test it against any kind of interference of that
kind from the Russians. To this point, we have not seen any
indication, though, that they intend to act in that way.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. General McKenzie, in an UNCLASS
[unclassified] way, given the ongoing need to deploy U.S. air
defenses to Europe, how do you assess our, the United States,
ability to deploy and/or sustain similar systems in the Middle
East as a stopgap to help defend our Gulf allies, or at least
until they are much better able to defend themselves?
General McKenzie. Sir, over the last few years, we have
worked closely with our Gulf allies to expand their ability to
defend themselves. And, in fact, some of those countries have
very significant air defense inventories. Saudi Arabia has over
20 Patriot batteries. UAE has a number of Patriot batteries as
well. And as you know, UAE actually possesses THAAD [Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense], the high altitude system which was
tested successfully just last month.
So, the way that we actually accommodate the basic fact of
life that we don't enough U.S. Patriots to service all of our
needs globally, is through enhanced cooperation with our
allies. We are still there. We still have Patriots in the
theater. We still work with them. But what you do is you try to
think about the way nations can cooperate with each other, and
I will talk a little bit more about that in the closed session.
But there is a path forward.
And really, the countries in the region are the ones that
are directly threatened by the Iranian threat. They are
focused, I believe, in a way they have never been focused
before by the imminence of that threat, the fact--the quality
and number of the Iranian missiles and LACMs, land attack
cruise missiles, and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], is very
concerning to them. So, there is a real convergence of interest
on the part of our partners now.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. And basically, I think my next question
is going to be best answered in the closed, classified session
about the engagement with our partners. You kind of alluded to
that, and the preparation and the training and the cooperation
to confront and deter a nuclear Iran, should that possibility
become a potential reality.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back and save my
questions for the classified session.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And, General Townsend and General McKenzie, thank you for
your many years of service to our country. I say that with
great gratitude for the American people. We are lucky to have
had you in your posts.
And thank you, Secretary Baker, for your service now.
General McKenzie, I applaud the Department's commitment to
improve its policy in order to better protect civilians,
especially with Secretary Austin's new memorandum entitled
``Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response.'' As we have
seen several times just in this year alone, the U.S.,
tragically, can get it wrong sometimes. With this new
memorandum from the Secretary, including standing up a Civilian
Protection Center for Excellence, and issuing a forthcoming
Civilian Harm Mitigation Response Action Plan, how do you
believe this directive will impact the AOR's operations going
forward?
General McKenzie. Sir, thank you for the question.
I would like to begin by saying nobody wearing this uniform
ever wants to kill an innocent civilian. Nobody ever wants to
do that. There is nothing that is more completely antithetical
from the way we operate. We have made mistakes and we have
killed innocent civilians, and we acknowledge that. And we are
going to do everything we can to get better and narrow that gap
between our ideals and our actions.
I will tell you, with Secretary Austin, it is much more
than a memorandum. It is the energy he has brought to the
problem. I have several officers that are full-time committed
to a study that is going on right now that will form the basis
for future actions.
But, in the meantime, you know, we are not waiting on that
study. As a result of the RAND study and other studies that
have come out, we have undertaken a set of things in the short
term to improve our own processes within Central Command, as
General Townsend has within Africa Command.
So, we don't want to minimize this problem. We recognize
that it is, in fact, a significant and a critical problem that
cuts right to the very heart of what we want to do, as
representatives of the United States.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General Townsend, Africa nations are increasingly
influential in the United Nations and other international
forums. Currently, 3 of 15 United Nations Security Council
seats are held by African nations--with the Kenyan U.N.
ambassador giving an extremely powerful speech at the UNSC
meeting regarding Ukraine.
Unfortunately, there is a lot of public misunderstanding
about the AOR. You have been commander of AFRICOM for over 2\1/
2\ years. What are some of the misconceptions you hear from
both American officials and the American public about the AOR?
And how can we approach the AOR in a more productive and
effective manner?
General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman.
I think some of the main misconceptions are probably that,
first of all, Africa doesn't really matter to us; that we don't
have to worry about Africa. And maybe America has been able to
largely ignore Africa in the past, but that is not the future.
And that is why I said in my opening statement: America cannot
ignore Africa. So, that is probably the number one
misperception.
And then, I think they don't understand that we have a lot
of interest and a lot of partners there every day. We have a
great relationship with much of Africa. We are the partner of
choice for much of Africa, and just educating the American
public on that.
You mentioned the vote on Ukraine. And you are right, the
Kenyan ambassador did give a powerful speech and he voted to
condemn what the Russians were doing there.
But I am a little dismayed about much of the rest of the
continent. About half of the continent voted to condemn Russia.
The other half either abstained or did not vote, and that
concerns me. Only one country, though, did vote in support of
Russia, Eritrea. But the other--one-half of the continent
didn't really cast a vote, and that concerns me a bit. But many
of the countries that we are the strongest partners with did
join us, and the world, in condemning Russia.
So, I think the future for this country's security is in
Africa, and we have to lean into it.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General Townsend and Secretary Baker, around the world,
violent extremism has been a very difficult problem to address,
in particular in the AFRICOM AOR. From a report on recent
trends in militant Islamic group activity in Africa the past
few years, it appears there has been an alarming increase in
violent events by these groups, including Al-Shabaab and al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib area.
What is the biggest impediment to being able to better
address these threats? Do you think the U.S. needs to amend our
strategy in the AOR?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I will start, and then, of course,
turn to General Townsend.
I think the challenge that we face in the AFRICOM AOR--and
part of what is driving the growth in VEOs--is challenges of
underlying governance and underlying security. And so, a lot of
our effort in the AOR is dedicated towards institutional
capacity-building, building that security----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 121.]
The Chairman. I apologize, the gentleman's time has
expired. I should point that out upfront.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
The Chairman. Even if you are in the middle of answering
the question, we try to wrap up as close as possible, to
respect other members' time.
Mr. Banks is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKenzie, the original JCPOA was finalized in July
of 2015. Iran tested missiles in October 2015, before the deal
was even implemented in January of 2016. All of this directly
contradicted the Obama administration's objective to change
Iran's behavior for better through the deal. Then, after the
implementation of the JCPOA in January of 2016, Iran tested
missiles again in March of 2016.
General Lloyd Austin, the then-commander of CENTCOM, said
in a Senate hearing at the time that, despite the JCPOA, quote,
``There are a number of things that lead me to personally
believe that, you know, their behavior is not--they haven't
changed any course yet.'' End quote.
General McKenzie, 6 years later, do you agree with then-
General Austin's assessment of Iran's behavior following the
implementation of the JCPOA?
General McKenzie. With regard to ballistic missiles, cruise
missiles, land attack----
Mr. Banks. That it didn't change their behavior?
General McKenzie. Their behavior has not changed.
Mr. Banks. Do you think that the Islamic Republic of Iran
will ever give up its revisionist intentions in the region? And
if not, what does a successful counter-Iran policy look like?
General McKenzie. Well, I think you begin by Iran not
possessing nuclear weapons, and that needs to be an
overarching--that is our overarching goal. I think it is better
for everyone if Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon.
We should, then, try to find ways to bring their ballistic
missiles, the other elements of their national power that they
value very highly, under some form of control. And you are
right, they have proven extremely resistant to that up until
this time.
Mr. Banks. I appreciate that candidness.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies
reported, on August 10, 2021, that Iran possesses the largest
and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East and is a
major hub for weapons proliferation. If some form of the JCPOA
is restored, how do you expect Iran to behave regarding missile
proliferation amongst partner and proxy groups?
General McKenzie. Based on past behavior, I would expect
not much modification in that behavior.
Mr. Banks. And can you tell us, specifically, how CENTCOM
is prepared to deal with that?
General McKenzie. So, we work to prevent their successful
attacks by working with our partners for integrated air and
missile defense across the theater; by enhancing the
capabilities of all our partners' air defenses, in effect. And
that is the best way to do it.
I would also argue that Iran knows that, if they strike us,
we are prepared to respond very powerfully, if need be. So, we
attempt to achieve deterrence. And that has largely worked over
the past couple of years.
I note the attack last weekend, but let me emphasize again,
that attack was actually not directed at us.
Mr. Banks. Understood.
General, as one of his first foreign policy initiatives,
President Biden delisted the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen
as a foreign terrorist organization. But, instead of de-
escalating tension, the Houthis doubled their attacks on Saudi
Arabia in 2021 and occupied the U.S. embassy compound in Sana'a
and took the local staff hostage. In late 2021 and early 2022,
the Houthis also attacked UAE three times, killing three
people.
In the way the Houthis have conducted themselves, General,
do you think that the Houthis are terrorists?
General McKenzie. I would defer to Policy, Ms. Baker, for a
discussion about that, the delisting decision. But I can tell
you, from an operational military perspective, they continue to
wage war on their neighbors, both Saudi Arabia and UAE, and
they wage irresponsible, reckless war without regard for
casualties.
Mr. Banks. I understand as well that you would probably
defer as I ask: Why do you think the Iran-backed Houthis
increased hostility since the Biden administration delisted
them as a foreign terrorist organization?
General McKenzie. I am sorry, would you say that again,
please?
Mr. Banks. Well, why do you think that the Iran-backed
Houthis increased their hostility after the Biden
administration delisted them as a foreign terrorist
organization?
General McKenzie. I think they still--I think the Houthis
still believe there is a military means to achieve their end. I
don't believe they are right in that, but it doesn't matter
what I think; it is what they think.
Mr. Banks. How does CENTCOM plan to address the Houthis'
behavior moving forward?
General McKenzie. So, we have worked closely with both our
UAE partners. In the wake of this most recent attack, we sent
fifth-generation fighters to UAE. We moved a ballistic missile
defense-capable destroyer to the vicinity of UAE. We have
conducted refueling of UAE fighters that are flying combat air
patrol. And we have shared intelligence with the UAE on that.
So, we have done some very discrete, measurable things to help
our partners in UAE.
Mr. Banks. I have got 30 seconds left. Ms. Baker, why did
the Biden administration delist the Houthis as a foreign
terrorist organization?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, you know, I think no one in the
administration--certainly no one in the Department--takes
lightly the threat that the Houthis pose in the region. And as
General McKenzie said, we are attempting to get after that
problem, and we are providing any number of avenues of support,
both to the UAE and to the Saudis.
Mr. Banks. This is outrageous.
With that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General McKenzie and Townsend, we can't begin to thank you
enough for your extraordinary service, but know that we are
very grateful.
Let me start with, the report that was just released a few
days ago detailing the significant failures in training and
physical security at the U.S. Cooperative Security Location in
Kenya, where we lost a service member and two DOD contractors.
It was alarming to read that there was inadequate focus on
force protection, inadequate understanding of the threat,
inadequate security force preparation, and problems with
mission command.
What has that taught us in terms of looking at other
cooperative facilities in Africa as to our responsibility to
harden them in terms of security?
General Townsend. Thanks, ma'am.
Well, first, let me say we certainly regret the loss of the
lives of our three Americans there at Manda Bay. We studied
this situation in great detail over the last 2 years and have
applied the lessons learned across the African continent. All
the things you mentioned that are in that report were all true,
regretfully so.
I think they go back, they stem back to incorrect threat
assessments. So, when commanders and leaders look at threat
assessments, that is their first understanding, and that leads
them down--can lead them down the wrong path unless they----
Ms. Speier. So, are you saying now that all of our
facilities in Africa have been hardened and have greater
protection? Or do we have some areas where we need to do more?
And should you alert us to those?
General Townsend. All of our facilities have been improved
since the attack at Manda Bay. We applied those lessons across
all of them. However, we do have to continue that work. We have
got to improve our foxhole every day. That work continues, and
we do have requirements in that area.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
Ms. Baker, in the NDAA last year, an amendment that I
authored to request the status of African women--excuse me--
Afghan women and girls since the Taliban takeover was due March
1st. We haven't received it. When will we receive that?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I don't know the status of that
specific report, but I would be glad to look into it and make
sure we get it to you.
Ms. Speier. All right. Would you report back to the
committee, then, as to when we can expect that report?
Ms. Baker. Yes, absolutely.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Speier. All right.
Ms. Baker and General McKenzie, as far back as October, DOD
said it would be making payments to the families of those who
were killed on the August 29th drone attack. Can you tell us
the status of those payments?
General McKenzie. Ma'am, we are moving forward with those
payments in the interagency. I can talk a little bit more about
it in the closed session. CENTCOM stands ready to carry out
instructions on how to execute those payments, once a decision
is made.
Ms. Speier. Well, I thought we already made a decision to
make payments to those families.
General McKenzie. The modality of the payment and how it is
actually going to be executed.
Ms. Speier. So, are you saying that there hasn't been any
payments made to these families yet?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I just want to be a little careful
about what we discuss in the public session, because we don't
want to put these families at further risk, but we would be
happy to get you that information and talk about it in the
closed session this afternoon. There has been progress made----
Ms. Speier. I just want to make clear that, when we make a
commitment, we deliver on it. And we have a history----
Ms. Baker. We will deliver.
Ms. Speier [continuing]. Of not doing that. So, I have your
word that we are going to deliver to those families?
Ms. Baker. This has the attention of the highest of our
leadership, yes.
Ms. Speier. Can any of you tell us the extent of RT [Russia
Today] in Africa?
General Townsend. The extent of what, ma'am? I didn't catch
it.
Ms. Speier. Russia Today.
General Townsend. Right. So, I can't specifically talk
about that particular media outlet. I can say this: Russia has
extensive media engagement on the continent, and that is
greatly facilitated by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the oligarch, and his
media arm, in addition to--you know, he has the Wagner
mercenaries, but he has got a media arm that does that.
Ms. Speier. You know, I do think our committee has to take
very seriously the impact of RT around the world. I just came
back from Latin America, where not only is it pervasive and
ubiquitous, it is perceived to be objective. It is perceived to
be just a legitimate TV network. And----
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. She makes
an outstanding point, however, on the need to engage more in
the information warfare.
Ms. Speier. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I completely concur with my colleague regarding the risk
that RT poses, and it seems to appear more legitimate and
objective when Members of Congress go on RT. And so, I
associate myself with the gentlelady's comments, and perhaps
you could share them with the gentleman from California who
chairs the Intelligence Committee, who I have seen on RT
talking about legislation, giving them credibility.
Ms. Baker----
Ms. Speier. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Gaetz. I only have a few moments, but I would love to
chat with you about it further.
Ms. Baker, you said, in response to Congresswoman Bice's
questions, we have heard Israel's concerns about the JCPOA.
What are they?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I think Israel remains concerned,
as do we all, about Iran's malign activity in the region beyond
its nuclear program. And that is something that we discuss with
them regularly.
Mr. Gaetz. So, their concern is a better resourced Iran,
whether through sanctions relief or cash payments, would be
more capable in taking action against Israel? Does that
[inaudible] it?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, that is my understanding, yes.
Mr. Gaetz. And can we learn anything about whether or not
cash payments are on the table as part of a renewed JCPOA?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I am not able to discuss the
details of the agreement, only because there is no agreement
that has been reached at this point. I think there has been
progress made toward an agreement, but, of course, the issues
that are remaining are some of the most complex. So, you know,
I----
Mr. Gaetz. I understand that in a negotiation, you know,
nothing is settled until everything is settled.
Ms. Baker. Exactly.
Mr. Gaetz. But there are contours of an agreement, as we
get closer to it. And since the administration has been working
on an Iran deal, I was wondering whether or not we could take
off the table infusions of cash. Because when I asked General
McKenzie some years ago whether or not the cash payments that
the Obama administration permitted to Iran increased that very
malign activity that Israel is concerned about, that we are
concerned about, his answer was that there was more malign
activity following the last JCPOA.
Ms. Baker. Again, Congressman, I understand the concern. I
am just not able to discuss specifics of the agreement that is
being negotiated by the State Department, and----
Mr. Gaetz. So, you are not in position to be able to say
that cash payments are off the table?
Ms. Baker. I am not in a position to be able to discuss the
specifics of the agreement in any form.
Mr. Gaetz. General Townsend, is Vladimir Putin bringing
African mercenaries to the fight in Ukraine?
General Townsend. I have heard those reports. We haven't
seen that yet. We are watching for that very closely. However,
I do believe they are bringing Wagner fighters from Africa to
Ukraine.
Mr. Gaetz. And, General McKenzie, have you seen Vladimir
Putin successfully bring Syrian mercenaries to the fight in
Ukraine?
General McKenzie. Not yet. We watch that closely. I can't
say one or two people haven't gone, but we haven't seen any
systemic movement.
Mr. Gaetz. Great.
I will yield the remainder of my time to my Florida
colleague, Mr. Franklin.
Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Waltz.
General, in your testimony and throughout your statement--I
am sorry, General McKenzie--in your written testimony here
today and throughout the questioning, you made it clear that
you consider Iran to be the biggest threat to stability in the
CENTCOM AOR.
During my travels throughout the region, and most recently,
in Israel 2 weeks ago, the recurring theme is the malign
influence of Iran's proxies. You also spoke of those in your
testimony. Do you consider the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps] to be one of the drivers and facilitators of these
proxies?
General McKenzie. The IRGC and its elite element, the Quds
Force, absolutely at the very heart of these activities.
Mr. Franklin. Okay. It has been reported, and as recently
as yesterday in the press, that the Biden administration is
considering delisting the IRGC as a terror organization. I know
that decision involves a lot of factors that are beyond your
lane, but strictly on your military advice, do you think that
would be a good idea?
General McKenzie. I will defer on that one. I would not--I
think they certainly are very disruptive and dangerous in the
region. That remains my best military advice, and we should
treat them like that.
Mr. Franklin. And if they are emboldened or strengthened,
do you think that would make them a more formidable----
General McKenzie. I think anything you do to embolden or
strengthen them would have a negative effect across the region.
Mr. Franklin. Sure. Okay.
Echoing some of my other colleagues here with respect to
Israel, people we met with there were crystal clear that,
historically, whether it has been cash payments from the Obama
administration or any activities that lead to putting money in
the coffers of Iran, there is a direct correlation to the pace
of intensity of attacks when that money flows in there. Is it
your opinion that buying Iranian oil and lessening sanction on
Iran would lead to an increase in IRGC activity?
General McKenzie. I think any--I think the Iranian economy
as a whole is penetrated thoroughly by the IRGC. So, it is hard
to see where money flows inside the Iranian economy and how
much of it is used for legitimate reasons and how much of it is
used for illegitimate reasons.
Mr. Franklin. Roger that. Thank you, General.
And I appreciate my colleague yielding his time.
The Chairman. If I could just follow up on that point, so
we--I forget exactly when--but we left the JCPOA in 2017, 2018,
something like that. So, we went right back in, maximum
sanctions.
Would you say that Iranian malign activity since we left
the JCPOA has increased?
General McKenzie. I would, Chairman.
The Chairman. And that is the point, as you have said. The
point of the JCPOA is to stop them from getting a nuclear
weapon. It would appear that Iran's ability to do malign things
in the region doesn't seem to be tied to the JCPOA, because
they are still incredibly active, even though we have been out
of it for 3 years, 4 years now. So, just want to let members
chew on that one.
Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I just want to piggyback a little bit on the comment
that you just made about the JCPOA. When you look at the
evolution of Iran's malign activity, as you mentioned, we
really do have to look at the withdrawal from the JCPOA,
instead of looking at just a narrow window. It is just like
with our conversations on Afghanistan. We need to take a step
back and look at the broader historical movement.
But, anyhow, thank you for making that point, and I just
wanted to put an exclamation point on it.
Thank you so much, Chairman, for this hearing and for
making sure that we have the opportunity to speak to our
panelists.
And to our panelists, I just want to express my gratitude
to all of you for your service to our Nation, and for being
here today to share your wisdom. And I look forward to the
conversations in closed session as well.
I have the honor and privilege of representing El Paso,
Texas, which is home to Fort Bliss, America's second-largest
military installation and largest joint mobilization force
generation installation in the Army.
And obviously, the regions of the world that you all are
postured in have long been plagued by violence, instability,
and war. In some cases, that has been furthered by us. But as
we look to the future, and especially beyond our withdrawal
from Afghanistan, ahead of the challenges that we need to
confront, not just today, but going forward, challenges posed
by Iran, China, Russia, and the terrorist groups that they
empower in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM areas of operation, we have
got to be strategic with our engagement and our posture in this
ongoing battle, especially that battle between democracy and
authoritarianism.
General McKenzie, I was just in Israel, and I had the
opportunity to see for myself the warmer relations that exist
between Israel and Arab states. It really is a source of great
hope, and it is clear that the relationship has created some
stability in the region.
And I am pleased that CENTCOM, under your leadership, has
embraced this new reality. But we know that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict remains a source of tremendous friction,
and that threat is always just over the horizon. The fighting
last May is a prime example of how the conflict in that region
can very quickly escalate and become violence. Everyone there,
and here, we are all concerned that the cycles of violence will
only continue.
But, from an American national security perspective, do you
believe that such rounds of violence have adversely impacted
America's defense posture? And if so, is there a national
security impetus for the United States to take an active role
in improving the reality on the ground, in order to help create
the conditions needed to achieve a two-state solution? And if
so, how?
General McKenzie. Ma'am, the entry of Israel into the AOR
was a significant historical event. And so, what it has done
is, it is sort of the operational expression of what began with
the Abraham Accords and other normalization activities that go
forward. And so, the relationship that Israel is developing
with its Arab neighbors is going to be profoundly significant
in the years ahead.
Something that is an irritant to those good relationships
is, of course, the struggle with the Palestinians. And that is
an irritant to the Arabs, to many of them, and I think it is a
significant factor. Anything we could do to reduce that, to
reduce that as an irritant to those relationships, would
contribute to not only Israeli security, not only security
across the region, but ultimately our own security.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much.
And I have less than a minute left. But, generally
speaking, to what extent does U.S. security assistance and
coordination allow our regional partners to better coordinate
with each other, and remove some of the regional security
burdens that would otherwise fall more directly on American
shoulders?
General McKenzie. So, we have seen over the past year, year
and a half, the opportunity for nations to share U.S. resources
that one nation purchased, another nation had need of. There
are processes that we go through to allow that, what we call a
third-party transfer. And we have seen that work successfully.
The specifics I would rather put into the closed session, but I
am prepared to talk about that. But, yes, it is. It is
something we have found valuable.
I would simply tell you, we also struggle sometimes with
the United States bureaucracy, when we attempt to do these
moves. Sometimes we are our own most significant source of
friction when nations want to share things like that.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, General McKenzie.
I am out of time. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Panetta [presiding]. Thank you.
The chair recognizes Mr. Carl from Alabama.
Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it.
I apologize for popping in and out, but, as you well know,
it is one of those days.
Thank you to all of our speakers. I know it is time-
consuming for you to come here and take time away, but I
appreciate you coming here.
And oorah, General. I raised a Marine myself. So, I am very
proud of that.
General Townsend, you mentioned in your statement the
growing Chinese influence in AFRICOM and their possible plans
to establish a naval base on the western side of the continent,
allowing the Chinese to do this project. How can we expand our
naval capabilities to ensure that the Chinese do not have a
dominant posture in this area?
General Townsend. Congressman, I would defer to the
Department and the Navy on how we might expand our naval
capabilities there. The naval capabilities that I have today
are sufficient to do what AFRICOM must do. They are not
essential to precluding what China does on the Atlantic coast
of Africa. They will be essential if China is successful in
gaining a base there. In my view, we would have to invest more
naval presence there and activity to further protect America
from a Chinese naval base on the Atlantic coast.
Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir, and that is what I was after. I
appreciate that.
And I give my time back. That is the only question I have.
Thank you.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Carl.
The chair recognizes Mr. Scott from Georgia for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ma'am, gentlemen, I appreciate your service.
I slipped out for a few minutes to meet with a man named
David Beasley, who is the head of the World Food Program. And I
want to read to you one of his statements.
``We get 50 percent of our grains out of the Ukraine-Russia
area. It's going to have a dramatic impact on food cost,
shipping cost, oil, and fuel. This is a catastrophe on top of a
catastrophe.''
He pointed out that Sri Lanka right now--and I will just
read the headline from Bloomberg--``Shockwaves from War in
Ukraine Threaten to Swamp Sri Lanka.''
In 2021, more than half of the grain for the U.N. World
Food Program came from Ukraine. It is a tremendous exporter of
wheat, corn, sunflower oil. Russia and Ukraine combined account
for 30 percent of the global wheat exports. As this invasion
continues, it is more and more unlikely that Ukrainian farmers
will be able to plant their crops, or fertilize their crops, or
harvest their crops, or export any of this food supply into the
world. Developing countries in the Middle East and North Africa
will feel the impact of this.
And my question is, have you considered the instability and
unrest that will soon be taking place around the world in your
respective AORs? How can we help alleviate the suffering and
the instability that we believe will come from this? And what
funding resources do you need to take on this challenge?
General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman.
So, your point is exactly right about the food instability
especially impacting Africa. In fact, just in the last day or
so, the World Health Organization has declared a humanitarian
disaster in Ethiopia as being the greatest one on the planet.
So, food security, or insecurity is a critical part of that on
the African continent.
I would say, as I said in my opening remarks, I think--and
in my written statement--I think it is imperative that we
continue to fund USAID, because they invest in a robust way on
the African continent. It is probably one of the best
investments America makes there. And I think there is going to
be, because of the point you just made, there is going to be
more of that required.
General McKenzie. Sir, I would note two countries, in
particular, in my AOR will be threatened. One is Egypt; the
other is Jordan. Both depend significantly on imports from
Ukraine, and they will face a growing food insufficiency as we
go forward.
I think the long-term solution is you would like to find a
regional way to actually supplant exporting food into the
region, but that is a long-term solution. We are looking
aggressively now for short-term solutions that will bring wheat
and other foodstuffs in for the short term. And obviously, you
are going to have to find other sources, other global sources,
rather than Ukraine and Russia. And that is going to be hard to
do with a third of the market coming from those two areas. This
is a very pressing concern, and I appreciate your calling it
out.
Mr. Scott. Ms. Baker.
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I couldn't agree more with what
Generals McKenzie and Townsend have said. I would add to
General McKenzie's list perhaps Yemen as being a country that
will face an impact here.
You know, what we are seeing now are the second- and third-
order of consequences of Russia's unprovoked and illegal
invasion of Ukraine. As General Townsend said, USAID has the
lead on this issue. We are strongly in support of USAID's
efforts and we will continue to work with them in an
interagency fashion.
Mr. Scott. I think what is happening around the world right
now is because of the shortages and the anticipated shortages
is that people who were receiving some are now receiving none,
and a lot of people have had the assistance they were getting
through the World Food Program cut in half. I think as many as
13 million people in Yemen actually receive some type of
assistance through the World Food Program.
I just--I can't emphasize to this committee and to the
world enough the devastation of what Vladimir Putin has done
and the disruption around the world. And I think that the pain
and the suffering that that individual has caused is only now
beginning to be felt. And I think the world is going to be
hurting for several years because of what he has done. And I
just hope that we are paying attention to the potential civil
unrest and instability that comes from the lack of a global
food supply, because of what Vladimir Putin has done.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you so much.
And thank you to our witnesses. It is great to see you all
again.
And I first wanted to ask you, General Townsend: Recent
reporting brought to light U.S. support to the Rapid
Intervention Battalion in Cameroon under the 127e program. The
Rapid Intervention Battalion has been repeatedly implicated in
human rights abuses. So, why was U.S. support to the Rapid
Intervention Battalion not blocked on human rights grounds?
What steps is AFRICOM taking to ensure that any partner forces
supported under section 127e have not committed gross
violations of human rights? And wouldn't one way to prevent
this in the future be to subject 127e to the same kinds of
Leahy vetting standards we use for nearly every other security
assistance program?
General Townsend. So, there was an Amnesty International, I
think, report in 2017 that brought this to light. That caused
the Department and AFRICOM to look closely at our support, our
engagement with the Rapid Intervention Battalion in Cameroon.
In 2019, our relationship was ended with that element. In fact,
we have drawn down pretty much--in 2019 and by early 2020, we
ended all of our engagement with Cameroon.
We are starting to re-engage there on a very selected basis
with some few programs, but not with the Rapid Intervention
Battalion. And we do go through extensive vetting with all of
our programs, training programs, on the continent, to include
the 127e program.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Baker, nice to see you.
Recent years have seen U.S.-trained officers in Burkina
Faso, Mali, Guinea, Mauritania, and Gambia overthrow national
governments in military coups. Many of these countries had
issues with gross human rights violations in the past,
particularly Burkina Faso and Mali, and lacked robust security
sector governance and democratic progress that made this kind
of challenge, frankly, predictable.
On February 4th, I, along with Chairman Meeks, sent a
letter to President Biden, [Secretary of State] Blinken, and
Secretary Austin on our strategy in the Sahel and requested
that the administration evaluate its security sector assistance
and other efforts over the last 15 years to assess their
efficacy and areas for improvement. And I look forward to this
briefing and hope we can work together on this going forward.
But how have these developments impacted DOD's thinking on
which Sahelian and West African militaries we provide security
assistance to?
Ms. Baker. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for the
question.
I should note just upfront that we do have security
assistance restrictions as a result, as you said, of the recent
coups in both Burkina Faso, Mali, and also Guinea. So, for
starters, that is in place.
As you know, we work closely with the State Department to
ensure that we are vetting all security assistance partners, in
compliance with U.S. law, with local screening biometrics, as
it is required. There is always more that we can do in this
space. And so, we will look forward to getting you a briefing
on what we are working on.
Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you.
Frankly, I think some of these challenges with the folks we
trained was a bit predictable. So I want to make sure we are
going beyond just the immediate vetting, to make sure we are
contributing to the broader democratic governance of our
partner countries.
Ms. Baker. Absolutely. And I would just say, as General
Townsend has said, one of our focuses in the AFRICOM AOR in
particular is that institutional capacity-building that will
help us, we hope, to move beyond these kinds of incidents.
Ms. Jacobs. Great.
And, General McKenzie, the DOD has significantly
undercounted civilian casualties compared to numbers provided
by credible independent organizations, despite the fact that
these organizations undertake interviews, site visits, and
other measures that DOD does not generally have. Additionally,
recent New York Times reporting found that DOD prematurely
dismissed many civilian casualty reports at the assessment
phase without doing basic due diligence, like basic internet
searches or searching in Arabic instead of only in English.
And earlier this week, I, along with my colleagues, sent a
letter to DOD urging it to take steps on preventing and
mitigating civilian casualties moving forward. As CENTCOM
implements changes in procedures for tracking, assessing, and
investigating civilian harm, will CENTCOM revisit the many past
cases that appear to have been prematurely dismissed? And going
forward, what changes do you believe need to be made?
General McKenzie. I will begin by saying nobody wearing the
uniform of the United States is interested in killing an
innocent person. We work very hard to minimize that. But the
battlefield is a deadly and dangerous place, and we have made
mistakes. And, yes, we have killed innocent people. And we have
tried very hard to mitigate that.
As you know, the Secretary has undertaken a large,
comprehensive, exhaustive, and high-energy project to further
shape the efforts of the Department. And we are full
participants in that going forward.
I would tell you, in the interim, based on various reports
that have been issued, we have undertaken 10 discrete actions
within U.S. Central Command that will support the larger
effort, but we are not waiting on that to actually happen. And
I will be happy to send those 10 things over, so that you can
examine them.
But the Secretary is seized with this. His energy is
palpable, visible, and we are moving forward on it.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. We appreciate the Secretary's
efforts, and we will look forward to that briefing.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Franklin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I have a couple more questions that I didn't quite get
to before.
And again, back to General McKenzie. As Chairman Smith had
noted, Iranian terror activity has been significant, whether
there is a JCPOA in place or not. I understand that. Whether it
is Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen,
the Quds Forces in Iraq, the common denominator is the
neighborhood bully. And I hate to use that expression because
it is obviously a lot more significant than that, but they are
the bad guys. They are the bad actor in the neighborhood. They
are the ones that want to destabilize everything.
I hate to ask this--I wouldn't normally ask this question,
because I understand your place to provide advice and counsel
to the administration. But based on the way things unfolded in
Afghanistan, and knowing now the questions we were asking and
weren't getting answers to before, things are coming out that
there was a lot of advice provided by the Pentagon that was not
heeded by the administration.
And so, before we get this treaty that the administration
seems really bent on getting back into into place, I think it
is really essential that the details are discussed.
Has the White House engaged you for your regional security
expertise in the negotiation process of this Iran deal?
General McKenzie. Sir, the person I engage with is the
Secretary of Defense on policy.
Mr. Franklin. Okay.
General McKenzie. And I have a constant dialog with the
Secretary on all issues within the CENTCOM AOR.
Mr. Franklin. And I understand the Secretary has got a lot
on his plate. But where he is getting his primary source of the
boots-on-the-ground feedback is going to be from you?
General McKenzie. I think he gets it from me. I think he
gets it from Policy, you know, a variety of sources.
Mr. Franklin. Okay. So, my concern is what we are seeing on
the press out there, in the press, of what may be coming out--
delisting IRGC, buying Iranian oil. Those, from what you have
told us here, would not be in alignment with your advice on
what is best from a military perspective. And I don't expect
you to comment on that. But it is either that or they are not
asking for your advice at all. And I find either of those to be
very concerning, and we are going to watch very closely on how
this treaty develops.
But I thank you all. And I am assuming that this will be
the last time the two of you testify before us, but I want to
thank you, as a former military member, for your decades of
service. It is a lot of hard work and not very gratifying a lot
of times, but your Nation appreciates your work.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And I just want to clarify on the last answer, General
McKenzie said he is speaking to Secretary Austin, and that is
the chain of command here. The White House is not ignoring the
Department of Defense's opinion on this. They are speaking with
Secretary Austin, who is speaking to his people, and that is
where the information goes back.
And the larger point is it's we have civilian control of
the military for a reason. You know, the President is
ultimately the one who has to make the decisions. If we want to
just do whatever the military told, we wouldn't have civilian
control of the military. You take the advice, you process it,
and you make the best decision you can. And that is what they
are trying to do.
Ms. Baker. And, Mr. Chairman, if I could, I do just want to
clarify that both the Chairman and the Secretary have had
opportunities to provide that advice to the President and to
offer their recommendations.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that
clarification.
Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Baker, your testimony references the emerging concept
of integrated deterrence multiple times. You say the Department
``will continue to lean forward in strengthening multilateral
security cooperation in order to strengthen integrated
deterrence and to address threats, particularly those emanating
from Iran.''
Later on, you say, ``The integrated deterrence means
creating advantages for ourselves, our partners, and our allies
while creating dilemmas for our competitors.'' I would like to
talk a little bit about the dilemmas you envision under
integrated deterrence.
I know this is a CENTCOM hearing, but I wanted to ask
quickly about Russia. Your portfolio is, obviously, very vast.
Would it be a fair characterization of the administration's
policy that sanctions are designed to deny the Russian
government resources they would otherwise have available in
order to punish their behavior?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I would say that the sanctions that
the U.S. led, and that are not only U.S.-owned, but
multinational at this point, are designed to impose
consequences on Russia for its illegal invasion of Ukraine.
Mr. Gallagher. So, that's a yes, to punish their behavior.
And by punishing Russian behavior, we are creating dilemmas, as
you put it, or at least costs for the Russians, right, cost
imposition? Correct?
Ms. Baker. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Gallagher. So, under the same logic, if another actor--
say China--provided the Russian government with funding to help
them evade sanctions, that would, in a sense, create an
advantage for Russia--in the sense that it would mitigate some
of the costs we impose via sanctions, right?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, yes, and we are having a
conversation with China about our concerns in that regard.
Mr. Gallagher. I think this is a very important point, not
only because, as we evaluate whether China increases its
support to Russia, but, to be clear, if our adversaries have
access to more resources, that creates an advantage for them.
And if our adversaries have more resources and are more
capable, that creates dilemmas for ourselves and for our
allies.
And I bring this all up because I think it's a self-evident
point that is getting lost in the shuffle, that policies that
give our enemies more resources give them an advantage, and by
the administration's own admission, undermine its vision, such
as it exists, of integrated deterrence.
And I bring this up because, as my colleague, Mrs. Luria,
brought up before, we may be days before, according to some--
days away, according to some reports, from signing a deal with
Iran, which will, in any scenario, provide a massive windfall,
to the tune of billions of dollars, to the world's primary
state sponsor of terrorism. And everything else aside,
indications are that this deal will provide unprecedented
sanctions relief, well outside the scope of its nuclear
program, to the Iranian government, including from terrorism-
related sanctions.
And I don't think you have to be an opponent of the
original JCPOA to understand that this makes no sense. Just
take the administration's own words at face value. Their
strategy calls for creating advantages for our allies and
dilemmas for our adversaries, but this deal, by providing
massive resources to our primary adversary in the Middle East,
will create dilemmas for us and provide advantages to our
foremost enemy.
And just a quick question on that point. To your knowledge,
is the Central Bank of Iran still financing terrorism?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, that is a question I would have to
defer to Treasury and others.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. I have asked this question in other
committees. I have asked the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]
Director. It is a matter of public record, the Treasury
Department has put a--it doesn't take arcane or exquisite
intelligence to know the answer. But we will take it back.
I guess, since you responded to an earlier question from my
colleague, Mr. Crow, I believe, that the NDS is now being
delayed because of the crisis in Ukraine--is that correct?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, I wouldn't say it is being delayed
because of the crisis in Ukraine. It is in final coordination,
and we hope to have it to you soon.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. Are you rethinking any of the
assumptions underlying the NDS as a result of Ukraine? Or do
you see it as a validation of integrated deterrence?
Ms. Baker. Congressman, we believe that the strategy, in
fact, took into consideration some of the behavior that we have
now seen Russia exhibit, and that it is resilient to what we
are seeing from the Russians at this time.
Mr. Gallagher. So, do you believe integrated deterrence
succeeded in the case of Russia-Ukraine?
Ms. Baker. I think what you are seeing right now is
integrated deterrence in action, bringing together the
sanctions, the allies and the partners, all----
Mr. Gallagher. I have 7 seconds. But what you are
effectively saying is your entire theory of deterrence requires
on a country getting invaded and pillaged in order to galvanize
the West into action. And I just don't want to put our eggs in
that basket.
I am out of time.
The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate it.
I will point out we have sanctioned many nations long
before they invaded another country. Certainly, we had
sanctions, you know, against Russia. We have sanctions against
Iran now. And I think the central dilemma that this
administration is trying to wrestle with is, we also don't want
Iran to get a nuclear weapon. And that is kind of the tradeoff
on that that we are trying to go through.
And I have not seen any other reasonable plan, other than
negotiating with Iran, for how we stop them from getting a
nuclear weapon. Now the details of that negotiation, obviously,
matter. What are we giving up? What are we getting? But we
can't act like, for no apparent reason whatsoever, we are just
giving Iran sanctions relief, so they can engage in more
mischief. No, there is a very, very, very big reason why we are
engaged in these negotiations, and that is we don't want them
to have a nuclear weapon.
Now you can debate whether or not we are going to get there
on that, but I think that is worth at least throwing in there,
into that conversation and discussion.
We have no further requests for time.
I want to thank you all for your testimony. We will see you
in a couple of hours on the classified side.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 17, 2022
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 17, 2022
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 17, 2022
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Ms. Baker. Challenges in governance and underlying security
contribute to the growth of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and
this is an issue we face across the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)
area of responsibility (AOR). Thus, much of our effort in the AOR is
dedicated to institutional capacity building and enabling sustainable
security in close coordination with our allies and African partners.
Another focus of our efforts has been to support French CT operations
in the Sahel. While successful, we recognize that focusing only on the
military response has not been sufficient. In addition to the
significant resources DOD commits to counterterrorism efforts focused
on mitigating the immediate threat posed by VEOs in the region, we are
also coordinating with interagency partners, including the Department
of State, USAID, and the Department of the Treasury to implement the
NSC's Sahel Strategy and the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which focus on
development and prevention and mitigation of extremism and violent
conflict. The GFA is an important mechanism for addressing the
governance and security challenges needed to reverse the negative trend
in terrorist activity. [See page 31.]
General Townsend. Congressman, the biggest impediment to being able
to better address the threats posed by Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghrib, and I would add ISIS, is insufficient will on the part
of African governments to provide good governance and security to
confront the challenges. For the U.S., the highest impediment is a lack
of an approved whole of government strategy with appropriate resources
to achieve the objectives of said strategy.
Yes, I think the United States needs to amend our strategy in the
AOR, because the threat is increasing rapidly and so are the risks to
U.S. interests. [See page 31.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Ms. Baker. The Department submitted the Sec. 1069 report to
Congress on September 30, 2022. [See page 26.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 17, 2022
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the role the Army and other military
services have in training and assisting our allies and partners in the
region against a variety of threats to our nation's security and
regional stability? How do you plan to employ your assigned Security
Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) as well as your National Guard State
Partnership Program (SPP) units over the next 12 months?
Ms. Baker. The Army and other military services have an important
role in our security cooperation efforts and regular military-to-
military engagements with our allies and partners, including in the
Middle East and Africa. We are encouraged to see expanding roles for
DOD, including the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) and the
National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). Forging long-standing
relationships with SFABs and State National Guards builds ally and
partner military capabilities and interoperability. Enduring
relationships forged over many years both increases deterrence and
opens doors to the access and presence we need to compete in these
regions. With regard to the SPP, one of our strongest security
cooperation tools, we continue to grow the program throughout the
world. On April 1, DOD released findings from an independent strategic
evaluation covering SPP's outcomes from 2014-2019. The Department is
considering recommendations and lessons learned from this assessment,
monitoring, and evaluation effort, to include assessing the capacity
for new SPPs, how much growth the SPP can handle annually while
sustaining existing partnerships, and ways to leverage the SPP as a
unique and specialized security cooperation program.
Mr. Lamborn. One of the United States' most important relationships
in the Middle East is with Israel. As your command works to grow the
integrated air and missile defense system for the region and our
partners, how are Israeli capabilities being brought into the network?
How are theater capabilities being integrated into Israeli defense?
Ms. Baker. The Abraham Accords between Israel and many of its
neighbors in the Gulf and Morocco, in conjunction with Israel's long-
standing peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and Israel recently being
moved into the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility
expands opportunities to integrate air and missile defense capabilities
among our partners in the Middle East. There are a range of efforts
ongoing to enhance regionally integrated air and missile defense. For
instance, at the Negev Summit in March 2022, leaders from Israel,
Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and the United
States came together in Israel to discuss how to build on USCENTCOM's
work on integrated air and missile defense. These efforts build on the
annual JUNIPER-series missile defense exercise that U.S. European
Command conducted with Israel for more than 20 years, which USCENTCOM
is continuing. DOD efforts are not limited to Israel; in a related
effort in mid-March of this year, DOD co-chaired the U.S.-Gulf
Cooperation Council working group on integrated air and missile
defense, which developed a common vision for deterring the most
pressing threats in the region and reaffirmed a shared commitment to
regional security. Additionally, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and
the Israeli Missile Defense Organization have cooperated on research,
development, and production of advanced air and missile defense
capabilities for more than 30 years. The Department is now working to
leverage this past experience in bilateral force development and
multilateral operational lessons learned to facilitate an integrated
air and missile defense architecture for all our partners in the
region.
Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the role the Army and other military
services have in training and assisting our allies and partners in the
region against a variety of threats to our nation's security and
regional stability? How do you plan to employ your assigned Security
Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) as well as your National Guard State
Partnership Program (SPP) units over the next 12 months?
General Townsend. USAFRICOM's Components play a significant role in
training and assisting our Allies and Partners in the region against a
variety of threats to our nation's security and regional stability. All
Services leverage the Joint Exercise Program (JEP), security
cooperation and assistance, and engagements to maintain presence and
influence access. In addition, our efforts directly counter Russia and
China influence and seek to maintain the U.S. as the partner of choice.
I am a big fan of both the SFAB and SPP. Both are agile, low cost, high
payoff programs.
Over the next 12 months, our assigned SFAB will support operations,
activities and investments in 8 African Countries. These include tier
one countries of Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, Tunisia, Djibouti and Kenya.
Engagement in tier two countries include Chad and Niger.
Over the next 12 months, USAFRICOM SPP will continue to leverage
relationships and capabilities to build partnership capacity and
sustained engagements on the continent. Specifically, the Indiana NG
will conduct the Niger Logistics Company Building T&E case in Niger.
Mr. Lamborn. What roles do the Air and Army National Guard have in
your theater and how are they enabling your mission?
General Townsend. The Air and Army National Guard enable USAFRICOM,
across the full range of operations, activities, and initiatives (OAI)
by providing the operational depth of highly trained personnel and
capabilities where the inventory of available Active Component forces
cannot meet the operational demand. The bottom line is the National
Guard is critical to almost everything AFRICOM does.
Missions include providing Crisis Response Security Task Force in
East Africa, Intra-Theater Airlift (C-130s), Engineering, Signal and
Communication functions, Aviation support, Theater Fixed Wing (C-12s)
and Airfield Operations support and Army Security Force Assistance
Trainers.
Mr. Lamborn. Israel's acquisition of the KC-46 will be important
for its military capabilities, especially as military threats posed by
Iran and others will only increase. However, the anticipated delivery
for Israel's KC-46 appears to be years away. Have you looked a the
temporary deployment or stationing of one or two U.S. KC-46s in Israel
as a means to (1) support U.S. interests, training, and dynamic force
employment and (2) conduct a combined pilot, crew chief, and maintainer
training with Israeli counterparts on the KC-46? Do you believe such an
arrangement could reduce the time for Israel between receipt of the KC-
46s and those assets achieving full operational capability?
General McKenzie. (U) Currently there is no planned KC-46
deployment to Israel. We have not planned any KC-46 Title 10 subject
matter expert exchanges with Israel due to lack of KC-46 assets/
personnel in theater. Once those assets are programmed for arrival, we
will likely coordinate with Israel for potential subject matter
exchanges and/or potential deployments based on mission requirements
and resources.
Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the role the Army and other military
services have in training and assisting our allies and partners in the
region against a variety of threats to our nation's security and
regional stability? How do you plan to employ your assigned Security
Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) as well as your National Guard State
Partnership Program (SPP) units over the next 12 months?
General McKenzie. (U) The SFAB provides USCENTCOM with a persistent
network of Army Security Force Assistance (SFA) Teams conducting
theater security cooperation activities across the USCENTCOM area of
responsibility (AOR). The SFAB is now authorized to provide
capabilities in support of CJTF-OIR in Iraq where they assist in
training partner forces to counter and defeat D'aesh. The SFAB conducts
advising with partners through subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE),
conferences and seminars. When authorized, SFAB is conducting building
partner capacity (BPC) activities focused on counter unmanned aerial
systems (CUAS), counter improvised explosive device, border security,
military decision-making process (MDMP), and intelligence preparation
of the battlefield.
(U) The U.S. Army National Guard's (USARNG) State Partnership
Program (SPP) supports the USARCENT security cooperation effort in
three main ways: by providing subject matter expertise, by providing
additional capabilities to accomplish tasks, and by providing
continuity to complement what USARCENT accomplishes with rotational
forces. These activities include bilateral and multilateral engagements
resulting in the development of seminars, visits and subject matter
expert exchanges which serve to strengthen partner relationships.
(U) State partnerships are an essential component of enduring
partner relationships. One distinguishing characteristic of our
National Guard units is many Guardsmen remain in units longer than
their active-duty contemporaries. This lends an additional element of
continuity to SPPs; often partner nation (PN) units will maintain
enduring relationships with their State Guard counterparts. In our AOR
countries, that longevity enhances trust. That trust, in turn, allows
Guardsmen to play a prominent role as we develop and implement our
country security cooperation plans (CSCPs).
(U) USCENTCOM is currently developing plans for FY23 and will seek
to maximize the use of the SFABs to advance our individual country
objectives. Our SPP partners are fully integrated in our security
cooperation planning process and often generate an outsize return.
Mr. Lamborn. What roles do the Air and Army National Guard have in
your theater and how are they enabling your mission?
General McKenzie. (U) For Fiscal Year 2022, USCENTCOM received
allocation of Air and Army National Guard units and service members
from 35 different states, with the preponderance of them supporting the
missions of our Army and Air Force components. In Fiscal Year 2022
USCENTCOM will employ over 1,200 Air National Guardsmen and over 8,500
Army National Guardsmen. 17 of those troop-contributing states provide
units in support of the train, advise, assist, and enable mission in
Iraq. These nearly 10,000 citizen Soldiers and Airmen are an essential
component of the Joint Force and are critical to our success. When
USCENTCOM requests critical force elements to conduct operations within
our area of responsibility, it is done without regard to the component.
The services, in turn, source our operational requirements with units
and personnel from across all components.
Mr. Lamborn. Your area of responsibility has become increasingly
complicated by Iran's relationships with China and Russia. By
conducting foreign military sales with Iran, China and Russia are
making an already challenging security threat more advanced. Should we
be concerned about continued advancements of Iranian threats in the
area, including future hypersonic threats? To what degree is the
Integrated Air and Missile Defense system we are developing able to
deter and defend against these threats?
General McKenzie. (U) Yes, we should be very concerned about
advancements in Iran's capabilities, including the potential for Iran
to acquire future hypersonic technology, and the threat Iran presents
to U.S. and partner interests. Iran's expanding inventory of advanced
conventional weapons and their proliferation to its proxies and
partners, coupled with improved offensive air and air defense
capabilities, is a growing concern due to the quantity and quality of
these systems. Reports that Russia has turned to Iran for lethal
unmanned aerial vehicles for operations in Ukraine highlights one
example of closer military ties between Tehran and our strategic
competitors.
Mr. Lamborn. One of the United States' most important relationships
in the Middle East is with Israel. As your command works to grow the
integrated air and missile defense system for the region and our
partners, how are Israeli capabilities being brought into the network?
How are theater capabilities being integrated into Israeli defense?
General McKenzie. (U) Israel is currently interoperable with the
United States via network connections to the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) and USEUCOM, and connections from MDA and USEUCOM to USCENTCOM.
Integrating Israel's capabilities with USCENTCOM is a priority for us
and will be discussed in detail with the Israelis at Command and
Control Interoperability Boards (CCIB). USCENTCOM intends to collect
and approve Information Exchange Requirements (IERs), which will then
allow us to develop a plan for greater and more direct integration
between Israeli and USCENTCOM systems.
Mr. Lamborn. What is being done to support the integration of
Israel into existing USCENTCOM networks, like the regional missile
warning notifications supported by the U.S. Space Force?
General McKenzie. (U) We have an extensive variety of shared
engagements and working groups with Israel that include secure C2
interoperability and integration, air and missile defense, joint
exercises, defense cooperation, and intelligence sharing. These fora
provide us with a venue to explore and develop greater integration with
Israel. For example, we requested and received approval to integrate
Israel into the information sharing Middle East Security Forces (MESF)
construct. Second, USCENTCOM integrated the Shared Early Warning (SEW)
network into the USCENTCOM Command Center in June 2022. Third,
USCENTCOM J6 hosted USEUCOM and Israel for the Engineering Working
Group (EWG) from September 12-15, 2022 to discuss the transition of
secure IT services from USEUCOM to USCENTCOM. Moving forward, regional
integration of air defense is a tremendous opportunity to pursue for
this unified command plan transition. USCENTCOM and IDF aim to sign a
Data Sharing Memorandum of Understanding at the upcoming Command and
Control Interoperability Board (CCIB), the primary venue to discuss
secure C2 interoperability and the integration of Israel into existing
USCENTCOM networks.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Congress just approved and the President signed into law
an additional $1 billion for Israel's Iron Dome system. How quickly can
we get this funding spent and help Israel to be in a better position to
deal with future threats from Hamas, Hezbollah and other terror groups?
Ms. Baker. The Department of Defense strongly supports replenishing
and strengthening Israel's Iron Dome Defense System capabilities. The
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S))
is the organization within the Department responsible for executing the
Exchange of Letters with the Israeli Ministry of Defense required to
execute the support provided in the OMNIBUS. The letters outline the
terms of the transfer of funds to support Israel's Iron Dome Defense
System, which include a workshare for U.S. industry of not less than
25% of the appropriated $1 billion funding. These discussions have
concluded and the letters were signed on April 22. Subsequently, the
Department transferred the supplemental funding for Iron Dome Defense
System to the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
Mr. Scott. What can be done to help prioritization of countering
this growing drone threat from a policy standpoint?
Ms. Baker. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
Mr. Scott. What is the state of logistics and transportation
infrastructure on the African continent, including warehousing,
communications, customs and legal support?
General Townsend. It is important here to distinguish the general
state of logistics infrastructure available across the continent and
that which U.S. Forces rely on to conduct operations into and within
the continent.
As a posture-limited command operating in an expansive and austere
environment, USAFRICOM Forces rely heavily on airlift and contracted
sustainment support. Strategic and tactical airlift offer the fastest
means to move forces and equipment into accessible airfields. USAFRICOM
leverages sealift to move assets relying heavily on our Embassy Teams
and Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) to work
through legal and customs exoneration processes that are unique to each
sovereign partner.
Logistical delays occur frequently on the continent--challenges
from washed out roads limiting ground movement, to fuel scarcity
resulting from a global crises. These forms of contested logistics have
driven the command to work with our Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
partners on prepositioning options. For example, as a result of
shipping delays for food supplies (CLASS I), DLA's Prime Vendor in West
Africa expanded its warehouse capabilities (infrastructure,
communication, etc.) to expedite delivery timelines for orders from our
Service components.
For airlift, when U.S. capacity is stretched, AFRICOM worked
closely with European and Tunisian partners to take advantage of excess
airlift capacity to expand distribution options.
Mr. Scott. A Chinese company just took control of Uganda's main
international airport because of a failure to pay back loans. How
should the U.S. government respond to China's continent-wide Belt and
Road activities?
General Townsend. The U.S. should continue to focus on building
strong partnerships in Africa while encouraging diverse sources of
investment for African nations. China continues to use transactional
relationships to expand its Belt and Road activities in Africa, while
the U.S. builds relationships with partner nations that prioritize a
safe, secure, and prosperous Africa. Ultimately, the negative
financial, social, and environmental impacts of Chinese activities in
Africa will limit the ability of the Chinese government to expand its
influence on the continent. At the same time, USAFRICOM will continue
to support U.S. diplomacy and development activities to reinforce
African partner resiliency so that they can make informed and
independent decision for their future stability and prosperity.
Mr. Scott. Is there an emerging C-130 coalition on the continent
for airlift?
General Townsend. Not really, but there is interest among African
partners to set one up and USAFRICOM is working to establish one in the
future. There is a construct based in Papa, Hungary that works called
the Heavy Airlift Wing utilizing C-17s. I would like to see a similar
construct among willing and capable African partners.
What the command has today is an established framework developed in
conjunction with European partners, operating on the continent, to
collaborate on intra and inter-theater airlift sharing options. This is
done within an Africa Distribution Network Forum that has existed for a
few years. Additionally, our Air Force team has been working to certify
willing and capable partners, notably Tunisia with viable C-130 fleets
through an Air Transport Sharing Mechanism (ATSM). With more African
partner C-130s certified as airworthy, we can see building towards a C-
130 coalition that the AU and RECs can rely on for crises response.
A good example of African solutions to African challenges occurred
last year as Angolan air assets moved South African and Botswanan
forces and cargo in support of a Southern African Development Community
(SADC) mission in Mozambique.
Mr. Scott. Does Russia have anything to offer the people of Africa
besides more arms and mercenaries to prolong its wars?
General Townsend. Some 43 African countries purchase or employ
Russian arms, however Russia also sells key agricultural commodities to
several African countries and engages others in energy and economic
cooperation. Though some cooperation initiatives provide genuine
benefits to African participants, others enable malign activity such as
sanctions evasion.
Fourteen African countries import more than half their wheat from
Russia and Ukraine, with Somalia depending entirely on these countries
for its supply. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is severely
disrupting this supply chain and has the potential to worsen food
insecurity in African countries, particularly those less reliant on
local grains such as sorghum and teff.
Russia has memorandums of understanding with countries such as
Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to assist in their development of
peaceful nuclear energy programs. Russia's Rosatom state atomic energy
corporation leads efforts to help African states develop and build
nuclear power plants, research institutes, and provides relevant
training.
Finally, Moscow can provide expertise to African states on mineral
resource extraction, often through oligarch-owned businesses. This is
an attractive offer for states with limited options due to local
security conditions or external sanctions.
Mr. Scott. In a global struggle against Communist China and Russia,
why must AFRICOM do more without having more resources?
General Townsend. [The information is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. What is the role of private logistics contractors like
Agility and APL in AFRICOM? How do they help AFRICOM respond to crises?
Are there any plans to involve private logistics companies in wargames
and exercises in order for AFRICOM to better understand their
capabilities and for private companies to improve their knowledge of
AFRICOM's potential logistics requirements?
General Townsend. No plans for USAFRICOM to involve private
logistics in wargames and exercises. In general, USAFRICOM relies
heavily on a variety of logistics contractors; for example, Agility
International Inc. (``Agility'') has been awarded contracts for surface
distribution, warehousing and cargo forwarding across USAFRICOM's Area
of Responsibility. One of the key functions for logistics contractors
includes supporting crisis response by maintaining Cooperative Security
Locations (CSL) in a ``warm base'' status, enabling U.S. forces to flow
in and receive support on very short notice. Although we contract
support for exercises, there are no plans to involve contractors in
wargames or exercises as it would involve granting an unfair advantage
to compete for potential logistic requirements, which would risk
violation of the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act.
Mr. Scott. Do the military planners in AFRICOM have the established
databases regarding available logistics infrastructure with the private
sector prior to conducting missions?
General Townsend. Military planners at USAFRICOM are able to assess
existing logistics infrastructure required to support operations via
several means: Pre-Deployment Site Surveys (PDSS), U.S. Embassy Country
Team information, and USTRANSCOM airfield report databases. Where the
site is considered a Cooperative Security Location (CSL), a Logistics
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)-funded private contractor provides
site updates to our logistics planners.
Generally, there isn't a single database consolidating all this
data; however, USAFRICOM supports ongoing DOD efforts to consolidate
numerous logistics systems of record, to include operational contract
support databases, into a new and single data environment. This will
provide a significant advantage to our planners.
Mr. Scott. Does AFRICOM have any plans to work with private
logistics companies to identify locations where additional
infrastructure should be located?
General Townsend. USAFRICOM components may choose to leverage
existing USACE/NAVFAC contracts with Architectural and Engineering (AE)
firms when requirements emerge to conduct master planning in the form
of long range plans and studies at locations where additional
infrastructure should be located at existing posture locations. Master
planning provides a long-term strategy to guide future infrastructure
investment, and supports visualizing the connection between the
infrastructure, current and potential future missions, and the people
assigned to those locations. USAFRICOM doesn't work directly with
private logistics companies to identify locations where additional
infrastructure should be located, however USAFRICOM does consult with
contractors on how to best utilize current and future investments on
the current list of posture locations across the continent.
Mr. Scott. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen wrote in the March 2022 issue
of Proceedings an article entitled, ``The Time is Right for a Pivot to
Africa.'' Moreover, according to Ambassador Cohen, ``It will be crucial
to first sell the American public on a pivot to Africa.'' What
recommendations do you have to sell the American people on a pivot to
Africa?
General Townsend. I recommend Congress and USAFRICOM continue to
work together to inform the American people that a more stable and
prosperous Africa will enhance America's security. In addition to
public statements and congressional testimony, congress can provide
funding to support publically releasable studies. These studies are a
good method to provide reliable information to the U.S. public on
security concerns. Examples of area where studies would provide value
include: Chinese military expansion in Africa, illegal fishing in the
Gulf of Guinea, the malign effects of private military companies in
Africa and threats of African instability to American security and
prosperity.
This enormous continent sits on global crossroads and is ripe with
opportunity while simultaneously burdened with challenges. It holds
tremendous geo-strategic significance while being shaped by the
competing forces of prosperity and poverty, peace and conflict, plenty
and famine, good governance and corruption and democratic backsliding.
Africa possesses vast untapped energy deposits, including gone
third of the world's mineral reserve and rare earth metals. These
resources are key supplies that America and the world rely upon to
produce 21st century technologies. Open and transparent management of
Africa's resources could contribute to prosperity at local and global
levels, while predatory lending practices and elite manipulation could
undermine African prosperity while fueling broader global conflict. The
winners and losers of the 21st century global economy may well be
determined in Africa.
According to the Global Terrorism Index, seven of the ten countries
with the largest increase in terrorism in 2020 were in Sub Saharan
Africa. In East Africa, for example, al-Qaida's al-Shabaab remains the
greatest threat to U.S. persons and interests in the region as well as
the homeland, while undermining peace, security, and political progress
in Somalia.
The American people should also know that our strategic
competitors, China and Russia, have long recognized Africa's
importance. Both nations leverage opportunities to erode U.S. influence
with African nations. Both nations are gaining ground on the continent.
Both nations successfully convert soft and hard power investments into
new partnerships. Both nations exert political influence at U.S.
expense.
USAFRICOM believes it is imperative that America sustain a
predictable, though modest, investment in Africa to protect U.S.
interests and advance U.S. objectives in this dynamic and important
region of the world. A sustained and coordinate U.S. government
approach, bolstered by strategic vision and appropriate resourcing, can
serve to strengthen relationships with partners in Africa, deter malign
influence, and further our objective for increased security, stability
and prosperity on the continent.
Mr. Scott. What is the potential of security, sustainable
agriculture, trade, and better governance in AFRICOM?
General Townsend. The short answer is the potential is tremendous
but also unlikely if we do not resource a whole-of-government approach
to doing so. Africa has immense human, economic, and resource
potential. While some countries have made impressive strides in all of
these areas, others appear mired in cycles of conflict. USAFRICOM's
focus is on security, but security force assistance, and countering
VEOs, can only make a long-term impacts in conjunction with diplomacy
and development efforts that collectively improve the governing
institutions and the lives of people.
Security, political, and economic challenges require coordinated
investments across the U.S. government and with allies and partners.
These problems are interconnected, and so must be the solutions. The
demands of population displacement and forced migrations, for example,
reaffirm the need for a whole-of-government approach bolstered by the
right authorities and timely funding to tackle these challenges. For
its part, USAFRICOM works to promote partner defense capabilities,
anti-corruption campaigns, and military subordination to civilian
authorities in order to help create conditions for expanded stability
and development.
Mr. Scott. How can the United States better communicate to the
people of Africa that Communist Chinese and Russian projects in Africa
are a very bad deal for the people of Africa?
General Townsend. First, we need to communicate effectively across
diplomacy, development, and defense to ensure the United States
projects a unified message. USAFRICOM works across the U.S. government
to achieve this goal and explain to African partners our views on
Chinese and Russian projects.
Second, we need to demonstrate that the United States is the better
partner of choice by providing timely and effective support to partners
when and where they need it. USAFRICOM works with partners to
understand their needs and meet them where they are. Speed and
flexibility are two areas where we continually seek improvements to
ensure we get our partners what they need.
We seek to continue to work with congress and our interagency
partners to reinforce the negative aspects of Chinese and Russian
investments and provide dependable alternatives.
Mr. Scott. Will you please describe AFRICOM's role in countering
Russian influence operations?
General Townsend. Our role, within the larger whole of government
approach, is to secure the U.S. strategic interests by ensuring access
and influence while strengthening partner of choice status in a secure
and stable Africa.
Our approach to the Russian problem is three-pronged. Our
operations, activities and investments are focused on undermining
Russia's ability to sow distrust and cynicism, protecting democratic
norms, values, and institutions that hold power to maintain
accountability and promoting U.S. Ally, and Partner interests and
reputation.
We leverage the Joint Exercise Program (JEP), security cooperation
and assistance, Combined Military Information Support Operations
(MISO), and strategic engagements to maintain presence and access to
influence African partners and counter Russian operations.
Mr. Scott. What is AFRICOM's strategy for the use and management of
information for both offensive and defensive information operations?
General Townsend. USAFRICOM's information strategy is to preserve
U.S., ally, and partner decision-making advantage, while denying the
same to our adversaries. We have a special focus on shining a spotlight
on the bad behaviors of malign actors such as China, Russia (including
PMCs), Iran and VEOs.
Defensively, the Command strategy is to ensure the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of Command, interagency, and partner
information at all times. USAFRICOM does this by mitigating
vulnerabilities to U.S. and partner networks.
Offensively, USAFRICOM disrupts, manipulates, and interrupts
adversary information and decision making cycles to our advantage. We
accomplish this through the application of information related
capabilities (e.g. cyber, electronic warfare, military information
support operations, operations security, and deception).
Mr. Scott. What war colleges in the AFRICOM AOR are in need of
additional U.S. assistance to enhance their respective missions? What
nations still need to establish a war college for their armed forces?
Should African military personnel receive additional seats at U.S. War
Colleges? What more can U.S. War Colleges do to enhance any
partnerships with African War Colleges?
General Townsend. African war colleges are generally underfunded
across the board and would benefit from stronger professional military
education (PME) programs. Two countries have asked for our assistance
in this space, Senegal and Nigeria, which we are exploring programs of
support. We have not received any other requests this past year.
The countries still lacking an accredited senior war college
include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, CAR, Chad, Comoros,
Congo-Brazzaville; Congo-Kinshasa, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Although
some of these countries have some form of PME, they all present
opportunities to partner with U.S. institution for mutual benefit.
To address demand signals that exceed our domestic capacity,
additional resources would enable USAFRICOM to mirror the successful
efforts of USEUCOM's ``mini-war college''--a U.S. training center in
southern Germany that provides senior military education to European
partners and allies--that served as a critical enabler of Ukraine's
military modernization following the invasion of Crimea.
U.S. War Colleges can help improve ties with African militaries by
providing additional instructors to integrate with the staffs at
African war colleges. It is preferable that we plan these requests a
year out, but USAFRICOM often lacks sufficient personnel to fulfill
these requests. Further, at moment, the U.S. government does not
accredit African military institutions, although we have assessed
several partner institutions on their degree of equivalency to our own,
there is more that we could do to help African military institutions
gain accreditation.
Mr. Scott. How many manned and unmanned platforms would have to be
deployed to AFRICOM's AOR to be able to have 24/7 coverage of AFRICOM
for 365 days a year?
General Townsend. [The information is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Scott. What are you seeing today from Iran in your area of
operation?
General Townsend. Iran is pursuing an aggressive strategy in Africa
to expand its influence, elevate its international credibility, and
threaten Western and Israeli interests. Since the October 2020
expiration of the UN arms embargo on Iran, Tehran has increasingly
focused on expanding its diplomatic and defense outreach in Africa,
specifically in the east and west. So far in 2022, Iran has pledged to
provide several West African countries defense and technology
assistance. In 2021, Iran established a new embassy in the Republic of
the Congo, the Iranian navy circumnavigated Africa for the first time,
and Iranian armed UAS were delivered to the Ethiopian military during
the Tigray conflict. Many of Iran's outreach efforts are in the nascent
stages and likely are vulnerable to disruption through measures such as
U.S. and diplomatic and military engagement with African partners.
Additionally, the Iranian threat network (ITN), led by the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), has increased its
activity and remained intent on expanding its capabilities in Africa.
Since late 2020, there have been at least ten disrupted probable ITN
plots in Africa, including two plots against U.S. ambassadors in
Africa. Iran almost certainly continues to seek retaliation for the
death of former IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani, and it could
leverage the ITN to attack high-level U.S. government or military
officials in Africa, especially if Iran suspects them of complicity in
Soleimani's death. Finally, the IRGC-QF is increasingly leveraging East
African smuggling networks operating in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to
resupply the Huthis in Yemen with lethal aid.
Mr. Scott. How will CENTCOM focus on integrating Israel into
already-established multinational exercises hosted by Israel's Arab
partners like Egypt (Bright Star) and the UAE (Iron Union) to include
Israel, and vice versa, will you encourage Israeli to invite Arab
partners to join their exercises (e.g., Blue Flag)?
General McKenzie. (U) Incorporating Israel into the USCENTCOM area
of responsibility (AOR) operationalizes the Abraham Accords by adding a
military component to the broad normalization that is already underway
between Israel and many of its Arab neighbors. Israel brings advanced
maritime and air and missile defense capabilities to regional
partnerships. Their expertise and increasing acceptance among regional
partners enable a shared approach to address threats from regional
malign actors. In addition to our traditional JUNIPER-series exercises
with Israel, as the mil-to-mil relationships between Israel and our
other regional partners expand, we are working with partners to include
Israel in exercises they have never participated in before, such as
IRON UNION. Additionally, we are working with the Israelis to include
our mutual Arab partners in Israeli exercises such as BLUE FLAG. While
geopolitics influence the levels and visibility of such engagements,
USCENTCOM is working across all engagements to normalize Israel's mil-
to-mil relationships with partners with increasing success. We are
optimistic that Egypt may invite Israel to participate in BRIGHT STAR
23.
Mr. Scott. Opportunities now exist for CENTCOM to integrate Israel
into existing U.S.-led multinational task forces. Recent examples
include joint naval exercises between Israel, the United States, the
UAE, and Bahrain in the Red Sea in November, and the International
Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express 2022 which included participants from
Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia in February.
How will CENTCOM work to continue to expand such joint maritime
exercises? Do you think incorporating Israel into the Combined Maritime
Forces (CMF), a 34-nation partnership based at NAVCENT headquarters in
Bahrain that focuses on freedom of navigation, counterpiracy, counter
narcotics, and other illicit activity by non-state actors makes sense?
Of CMF's three separate task forces focused on maritime security, where
do you feel Israeli participation may be most feasible? (Operations
outside the Persian Gulf (Task Force 150), counterpiracy missions (Task
Force 151), or operations inside the Persian Gulf (Task Force 152) in
immediate proximity to Iran?
General McKenzie. (U) Incorporating Israel into the USCENTCOM Area
of Responsibility (AOR) operationalizes the Abraham Accords by adding a
military component to the broad normalization that is already underway
between Israel and many of its Arab neighbors. Incorporation of Israel
into the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) may also bring considerable
military capability and expertise to this critical regional
partnership. With 34 partner nations, the CMF, centered on adherence to
the rules-based international order, is the world's largest maritime
partnership. With shared interest in protecting maritime trade routes
in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Gulf, and the Red Sea, Israel can add
capabilities and capacity to the enduring CMF construct. Over time,
participation by Israel in all CMF task forces focused on maritime
security may be feasible.
Mr. Scott. Are you seeing an uptick in advanced drone threats in
the CENTCOM AOR? How concerned are you about attacks on our forces and
facilities by multiple drones and drone swarms?
General McKenzie. (U) Yes, I am deeply concerned about U.S. and
partner force protection, especially as Iran demonstrates increased use
of UAVs and a willingness to proliferate these systems. We have already
observed the adversary's use of multiple drones in a single attack and
swarms remain a possibility. I am further concerned Iran is expanding
its UAV inventory while improving tactics, techniques, and procedures--
and sharing equipment and knowledge with its proxies and partners.
(U) Protecting our forces and assets is my top commitment.
USCENTCOM has already seen complex attacks involving multiple drones
(varying in size) as well as mortars and missiles. We fully expect
swarming and other tactics will continue to evolve, along with other
technique and technology advancements.
Mr. Scott. You have expressed an urgent operational need for
counter UAS capabilities. Is DOD developing and fielding counter drone
systems fast enough to mitigate this growing threat so that we do not
have to shoot down cheap ``Costco'' drones, as you say, with F-16s and
Patriots?
General McKenzie. (U) DOD has made great progress in fielding C-UAS
systems, and we have effective layered defenses in place at many of our
locations, but there is more work to be done. Recently the Department
reprogrammed approximately $460 million to support the Counter-small
UAS (C-sUAS) requirements, and I support the increased funding to
address future C-UAS/CsUAS requirements.
Mr. Scott. The Office of the Under Secretary for Research and
Engineering and the Administration's Council on Science and Technology
have prioritized exploring directed energy and specifically high-power
microwave, technology and solutions. Is CENTCOM working on directed
energy and high-power microwave solutions for electronic warfare and
air and missile defense?
General McKenzie. (U) USCENTCOM fully supports development, testing
and fielding of directed energy (DE) capabilities for use in our area
of responsibility. Our role in the development of warfighting
capabilities is to validate Joint needs generated by our components. We
also participate in the development of future warfighting concepts,
which serve to drive innovation across the Department. We are not
funded to pursue solutions to our generated needs. To address our
needs, we must compete for funding from programs established within the
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the Services--the
research, development, testing, and engineering (RDT&E) ecosystem--
which pursue material solutions to service and Combatant Command needs.
In the past, USCENTCOM oversaw the first operational use of a DE
weapon, and we continue to work with the Services and developers to
bring follow-on systems into our AOR. Additionally, we employ a number
of electromagnetic techniques; high power microwaves being one of them,
against a variety of threats. As such, USCENTCOM sees great potential
in the use of DE due to its potential for faster response and a
magazine that is recharged through on-board, fuel-based power and
thermal management systems. We stand ready to work with the RDT&E
community to assist in the development, including operational testing
in our AOR of DE systems tailored to address our warfighting needs.
Mr. Scott. Would you support the immediate deployment of proven
counter-drone prototypes into the CENTCOM AOR to include kinetic and
non-kinetic systems like high-power-microwaves?
General McKenzie. (U) USCENTCOM already employs prototypes and
conducts operational assessments of counter-drone prototypes in
theater, to include laser, high-powered microwave, and electromagnetic
pulse systems. An ``all-of-the-above'' layered defense is the best way
forward and we gladly accept new systems for testing, particularly
systems that add capability to take down larger UAS that may or may not
transmit a frequency.
Mr. Scott. How might CENTCOM strengthen maritime domain awareness
in the CENTCOM AOR? How might the sharing of relevant information in a
timely and coherent manner be accomplished?
General McKenzie. (U) Our Naval component (NAVCENT) established a
Task Force (TF 59) to test and operate unmanned surface vessels (USVs)
and artificial intelligence systems in the AOR. TF 59's USVs enhance
maritime domain awareness by facilitating a persistent maritime
presence throughout the AOR and by leveraging advanced technologies
like artificial intelligence. TF 59 is actively working with partners
to develop a regional network of USVs that will be able to gather and
share maritime domain awareness information to deter smuggling and
other malign activities. Additionally, we conduct regular P-8 and
unmanned air surveillance missions to develop maritime domain
awareness, as do several of our partners. NAVCENT also leads a thirty-
four nation coalition called the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) located
at NAVCENT headquarters in Bahrain. CMF representatives at NAVCENT
daily share maritime domain awareness information and coordinate
operations throughout the AOR.
Mr. Scott. What steps are being, or can be, taken to maintain
robust bilateral missile defense cooperation with Israel, even as the
United States also works to develop more regional air defenses? Given
the ongoing need to deploy U.S. air defenses to Europe, how do you
assess the United States' ability to deploy or sustain similar systems
in the Middle East as a stopgap to help defend our Gulf allies--at
least until they are much better able to defend themselves?
General McKenzie. (U) There has been no degradation to the robust
bilateral missile defense relationship with Israel. In fact, USCENTCOM
is working to expand this relationship beyond ballistic missile defense
to air and missile defense (AMD) to add defenses to counter cruise
missile (CM) and unmanned aerial system (UAS) threats. The strong
bilateral relationship is in many ways the foundation of our regional
air defense efforts, which will benefit both Israel, our other
partners, and U.S. interests in the region.
(U) USCENTCOM has identified two key concerns deriving from the
reduction of U.S. air defense systems in the area of responsibility
(AOR). The first is a reduction in coverage for U.S. forces and
critical infrastructure, and the second is the perception that these
reductions create among our regional partners that the U.S. is
abandoning the region. To mitigate these concerns, USCENTCOM is working
with partners to improve employment and integration of partner systems.
(U) Only three Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations have the
capability and capacity to provide limited defense--acquired via FMS:
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. All three countries
field advanced air and missile defense (AMD) capabilities such as
Patriot and/or THAAD. Bahrain have agreed to purchase two Patriot
batteries, but they are several years from initial fielding.
Mr. Scott. What do you assess would be the impact of lifting the
Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of the IRGC? Would Iranian
malign influence increase or decrease as a result?
General McKenzie. (U) To date, the FTO designation has not impeded
Iran's pursuit of its strategic objectives. I assess lifting the FTO
designation will have no impact on Iranian malign influence. The IRGC-
QF and its proxies and partners will remain Tehran's primary tool to
dominate its neighbors and eliminate the U.S. military presence from
the region.
Mr. Scott. China has made significant strides in expanding its
influence in the Middle East. What is your assessment of China's
growing footprint, and do you consider China's influence on the region
as competition for the United States as we pursue our own defense and
security interests? What are you doing to win against China and ensure
that U.S. defense and security interests are maintained in the face of
Chinese malign activity?
General McKenzie. (U) China's growing presence in the region
directly competes with U.S. defense and security interests in the
Middle East. Beijing's holistic diplomatic, information, military, and
economic approach seeks to amplify and exploit a false ``abandonment''
narrative. This approach threatens to displace the U.S. over time as
the strategic partner of choice in the region. We must leverage tools
such as FMS to build partnered nation capacity and capability in order
to strengthen our relations and maintain our position as the partner of
choice. Our greatest tool to counter China is the relationships we
maintain with our allies and partners in the region. Sustaining these
relationships is a whole of government effort.
Mr. Scott. What is the status of Israel's integration into
CENTCOM's AOR? What steps are still outstanding? Will you commit to
accelerating Israel's move into CENTCOM?
General McKenzie. (U) Working with the Secretary, Joint Staff, and
USEUCOM, we have identified 46 distinct groups of activities that must
transfer to USCENTCOM or require modification of their function. To
date, we have successfully transferred or modified 25 of these 46
activities since we started the transfers in September 2021. Throughout
the process, we have successfully worked with USEUCOM to find
opportunities to responsibly accelerate the transfer and will continue
as this process moves forward.
Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard enhance their relationship
with the Israeli Navy?
General McKenzie. (U) Our Naval component (NAVCENT) routinely
operates and trains with the Israeli Navy. NAVCENT's U.S. Coast Guard
personnel and ships have conducted a number of engagements, including
subject matter expert exchanges, port visits, visit, board, search and
seizure (VBSS) exchanges, seamanship and navigation, search and rescue,
small boat operations, and engineering exchanges. Operations and
trainings will continue on a regular basis as NAVCENT works with the
Israeli Navy to enhance maritime domain awareness and maritime security
in the AOR.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. How should the U.S. work with allies and partners,
including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, to improve the
interdiction of Iranian weapons shipments going to Iran's proxies and
affiliates throughout the CENTCOM region?
General McKenzie. (U) We continue to focus on targeting malign
actor advanced conventional weapons (ACW) proliferation across the
Arabian Peninsula (AP) and territorial waters by, with, and through our
partners. Our component commands remain postured across the AP to
defend against and interdict ACW threats. U.S. forces should approach
the ACW problem from a joint and multi-lateral perspective, as
countering this threat requires a division of labor across joint-
combined operations and to identify vulnerabilities in the weapons
shipment network. We should focus on continuing to promote regional
stability and security operations, degrading ACW manufacturing,
leveraging multi-national resources, synchronizing personnel and assets
to align with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capabilities, and
sustaining existing information sharing with partners. USCENTCOM is
actively engaging partner nations across the AOR to increase their
understanding of the growing Iranian threat and gain their commitment
to addressing the shared regional security concerns posed by Iran. We
must continue to leverage our regional partnerships by sharing
releasable intelligence and information to develop a common
understanding of the threat. Additionally, we must remain engaged with
partners for timely exploitation of collected exploitable material.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
Ms. Jacobs. The government promised to evacuate survivors of the
August 29 drone strike. Have they been evacuated yet, and if not, why
not?
Ms. Baker. The Department, in coordination with other U.S.
Government departments, continues to take steps to respond to the
August 29, 2021 airstrike in Kabul, which resulted in the tragic death
of Mr. Zemari Ahmadi and nine other individuals. As part of this, we
are working closely with Nutrition & Education International (NEI), Mr.
Ahmadi's employer. This is a high priority matter for the Department
and with the full support of the Secretary and Policy staff have been
working directly with the President of NEI, Dr. Steven Kwon and
representatives of the affected families. To protect their safety, and
security, we are not able to provide more information regarding these
efforts in an unclassified format at this time. [QFR #24 for cross-
reference.]
Ms. Jacobs. Congress recently reauthorized three million dollars
annually for ex gratia payments for civilians who have experienced harm
from U.S. military operations. However, in 2020, the last year for
which this information is publicly available, the Department of Defense
disbursed zero dollars in ex gratia payments. Most civilian casualties
in recent years have occurred in the CENTCOM AOR. As it improves
civilian casualty tracking and reporting, does CENTCOM plan to return
to past cases of civilian harm to offer ex gratia payments? How does
CENTCOM plan to change or improve its ex gratia disbursement procedures
moving forward?
Ms. Baker. The Department made ex gratia payments of $5,000 in
calendar year 2021. A single payment was made in January and reported
to Congress in the first quarterly report for that year. The payment
was made by USFOR-A in accordance with DOD and USCENTCOM regulations
and procedures. As mention in the response to QFR 24 above, DOD in
coordination with other U.S. Government departments, continues to take
steps to respond to the August 29, 2021 airstrike in Kabul. With
respect to the general reduction in payments beginning in 2020 and
continuing to the present, two factors combined to reduce the number
and amount of payments. One was the requirement to develop new
regulations as required by section 1213 of the FY 2020 NDAA, followed
by the requisite country assessments in consultation with our State
Department colleagues. Additionally, due to the general change in the
nature and number of operations in the U.S. Central Command area of
responsibility beginning in 2020, the number of civilian casualties
resulting from U.S. operations decreased substantially. DOD commands
continue to assess and review open incidents of civilian casualties,
and can reopen cases that have been resolved if new information is made
available. Finally, the improvements to processes will be addressed for
DOD-wide application by the Secretary of Defense directed Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response Action Plan -Task Force (CHMRAP-TF) now
underway.
Ms. Jacobs. What measures does AFRICOM take to fulfill that
requirement and assess whether imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances in the context of 127e
operations?
General Townsend. [The information is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Ms. Jacobs. General Townsend, you have frequently noted the
logistical challenges with troops ``commuting to work'' and that there
are more ``effective and efficient ways'' in Somalia to carry out
AFRICOMs mission. But let's take a step back a bit. Can you first
describe how any operations in Somalia have measurable reduced
instances of terrorism and violent extremism in Somalia?
And how specifically would a permanent force presence better our
mission to address violent extremism in Somalia?
General Townsend. U.S. operations in Somalia have served as a key
catalyst and enabler of Somali National Army (SNA) territorial gains,
removed al-Shabaab leaders and attack planners, and limited the pace
and scope of the group's attacks. Since the U.S. repositioning in early
2021, al-Shabaab's advances--including expansion in Mogadishu, central
Somalia, and along the Kenya-Somalia border--have underscored the role
of sustained U.S. operations in constraining the group's operations.
Operationally, a permanent presence in Somalia will improve our
interaction with partner forces, increasing the pace and efficiency of
operations to contain al-Shabaab.
U.S. operations and training in Somalia have enabled the SNA to
clear and seize territory from al-Shabaab, including significant
terrain in the Lower Shabelle region during Operation Badbaado in 2019-
2020. U.S. collective self-defense airstrikes have also supported
partner forces during advances against al-Shabaab positions.
U.S. airstrikes have removed senior al-Shabaab members and attack
planners, driving the group's leadership to reduce its visibility and
delay operational goals. Airstrikes have also disrupted specific attack
plans, including against U.S. interests.
The impact of U.S. operations is also evidenced by attack trends
following the U.S. repositioning from Somalia in January 2021. The
group subsequently increased attacks in Mogadishu, more than doubling
the number of VBIED attacks in 2021 compared to 2020 and increasing its
pace of assassinations in the capital.
A persistent force presence will (1) reduce risk to our troops, (2)
increase rapport between USSOF and our partner forces, (3) increase the
flow of information and (4) facilitate efficient command and control.
Without the logistical burdens inherent to episodic engagements,
operational tempo and tactical efficiency will increase. A persistent
presence also better enables intelligence development required to
illuminate VEOs network activity.
Ms. Jacobs. I am pleased to hear that CENTCOM has implemented
preliminary changes to its method of tracking and reporting allegations
of civilian casualties. As recommended in the recently released RAND
report on DOD Civilian Casualty Policies and Procedures, will you
commit to consulting with civil society organizations specialized in
civilian harm as you continue making and implementing changes?
General McKenzie. (U) Yes, USCENTCOM will continue to engage and
consult with civil society organizations focused on mitigating civilian
harm during military operations. Likewise, USCENTCOM remains committed
to the significant work the Department has undertaken to develop the
new DOD Instruction on preventing and mitigating civilian harm. The
Department's work has been informed by our experiences and lessons
learned in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen as well as the studies
you reference, civil society organizations specializing in civilian
harm, and DODIG reports.
Ms. Jacobs. Congress recently reauthorized three million dollars
annually for ex gratia payments for civilians who have experienced harm
from U.S. military operations. However, in 2020, the last year for
which this information is publicly available, the Department of Defense
disbursed zero dollars in ex gratia payments. Most civilian casualties
in recent years have occurred in the CENTCOM AOR. As it improves
civilian casualty tracking and reporting, does CENTCOM plan to return
to past cases of civilian harm to offer ex gratia payments? How does
CENTCOM plan to change or improve its ex gratia disbursement procedures
moving forward?
General McKenzie. (U) The ability to offer ex gratia payments
provides an important tool for our commanders on the ground to ensure
the safety and security of our forces and address instances of civilian
harm where and when appropriate. Commanders retain the ability to
utilize ex gratia for past cases as appropriate subject to the
statutory requirements, as implemented by DOD. Ex gratia remains a very
important tool for our commanders and we remain committed to training
our leaders and teams on the benefits and purpose of this authority so
that it is considered and utilized within the authority permitted and
consistent with the spirit and intent of the authorization.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
Mr. Moore. Recognizing that the DOD shared the responsibility to
withdraw from Afghanistan with the State Department, I would like you
to answer to the best of your ability, what was the thought process
behind the decision to withdraw all U.S. military forces, end close air
support, and remove civilian contractors from Afghanistan, particularly
prior to the evacuation of U.S. citizens?
Ms. Baker. After a rigorous policy review, President Biden decided
to withdraw the remaining U.S. forces from Afghanistan and end a 20-
year war. It is my understanding that the decision was informed by
extensive consultations with his entire national security team, Members
of Congress, allies and partners, and other experts. The United States
continued to provide support to the Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces (ANDSF) with civilian contractors and U.S. military
close air support until just days before the evacuation began. The
unexpected speed of the Taliban's ground seizure resulted in our rapid
withdrawal and led to both high levels of desertion and the sudden
surrender of the ANDSF. It is my understanding that extending the U.S.
presence beyond the end of August would have greatly imperiled our
forces and our mission.
Mr. Moore. President Biden has stated that the U.S. will use over-
the-horizon capabilities to strike terrorist threats remaining in
Afghanistan, yet I lack understanding of how this is logistically
possible. A quick glance of the map shows there is no good way for the
U.S. to access Afghanistan from the air. Pakistan is not our friend,
Iran and China are not options, and nations bordering Afghanistan are
unwilling to cooperate. Even if the vast distances involved did not
impede how rapidly the U.S. could respond in Afghanistan, which they
do, what are some of the practical, political, and geographical
limitations regarding the over-the-horizon capabilities to defeat
emerging terrorist threats in Afghanistan, and what is the
administration doing to work around these challenges?
Ms. Baker. The Department remains committed to never again letting
Afghanistan to become a safe haven for terrorist organizations, and we
will use all of the Department's capabilities in furtherance of that
objective. DOD continues to invest in and deploy capabilities that can
effectively counter terrorism from Afghanistan. We have the edge over
terrorist groups in technological capacity, direct-action readiness and
expertise, and power projection capability. We continue to deepen our
relationships in the region, collaborate with allies and partners, and
ensure we bring the right mix of the Department's capabilities to bear.
For instance, we have been working with Pakistan to meet our
counterterrorism objectives in the region. We remain confident in our
ability to conduct this mission and the Department can provide
additional information in a classified format.
[all]