[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-70] 

                    NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND 
     U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 17, 2022


                                     





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                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                 
48-987                   WASHINGTON : 2023




                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                Jonathan Lord, Professional Staff Member
               Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
                          Brooke Alred, Clerk  
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                            C O N T E N T S

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              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3

                               WITNESSES

Baker, Sasha, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. 
  Department of Defense..........................................     5
McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central 
  Command........................................................     8
Townsend, GEN Stephen J., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command....     7

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Baker, Sasha.................................................    51
    McKenzie, Gen Kenneth F., Jr.................................    77
    Townsend, GEN Stephen J......................................    64

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    AFRICOM Maps.................................................   109
    CENTCOM Maps.................................................   115
    GEN McKenzie response to Mrs. McClain........................   117

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Carbajal.................................................   121
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   121

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Bacon....................................................   135
    Ms. Jacobs...................................................   135
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   125
    Mr. Moore....................................................   137
    Mr. Scott....................................................   128  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
                      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES 

                    AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN 

                   THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                          Washington, DC, Thursday, March 17, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. Call the meeting to order.
    This morning the committee is gathered for the ``National 
Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in the Greater 
Middle East and Africa.''
    A couple of programming notes before we get started.
    It is a long, complicated day on the committee. We have 
this hearing, and then, at 1 o'clock, we have the Under 
Secretary for Policy, Mr. Kahl, giving us a briefing on 
Ukraine, a classified briefing. And then, these fine folks will 
be back at 2:30 for a classified version of this brief.
    So, I have finally decided that I don't actually have to 
read the statement explaining how our virtual hearing works. I 
will simply say that this is a hybrid hearing. There will be 
some people here in person; there will be some people appearing 
virtually. And we will all be prepared for that.
    Our witnesses this morning are Sasha Baker, who is the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of 
Defense; General Stephen Townsend, who is the commander of the 
U.S. Africa Command; and General Kenneth McKenzie, who is the 
commander for U.S. Central Command.
    And both General Townsend and General McKenzie are 
scheduled to have this be their last appearance before our 
committee. Events happen. One never knows when we might have to 
bring you back before then. But, at any rate, you are retiring.
    And both you gentleman have appeared before this committee 
many times, served this country incredibly well in a variety of 
capacities. But in the two theaters that you are currently 
responsible for, you have had a lot to do during your tenure 
there, and you have done it quite well. And we have appreciated 
the relationship and we wish you the best. And thank you for 
your service.
    And these, as mentioned, are two incredibly important 
commands. I think on this committee there is always a 
challenge. We are trying to prioritize. We have spent a lot of 
time the last few years talking about how China is the pacing 
threat; we need to focus on China. Obviously, with Vladimir 
Putin's brutal and violent decision to violate the fundamental 
laws of the world and invade Ukraine in the way that he has, a 
lot of attention has focused there.
    But the bottom line is, while we do need to prioritize, we 
also need to be aware of, you know, we live in a robust threat 
environment. We have got to be paying attention to all of it 
and trying to make sure that we are meeting all of those 
challenges; first of all, because they are all important, and 
second of all, because they all tend to be interconnected.
    Certainly in the two theaters that we are talking about 
today, both China and Russia are factors in the great power 
competition that we find ourselves in. So, we want to make sure 
that we are addressing those issues.
    So, taking them one at a time, starting with the Africa 
Command, China is incredibly active in that region, looking to 
build partnerships, you know, the goal of ultimately building 
bases wherever they can. It is incredibly important that we 
keep an eye on that, maintain our relationships in Africa, and 
try to deal with that challenge.
    At the same time, the transnational terrorism threat is 
still very real throughout the continent. Things have gotten 
more complicated on the Horn, given the conflict in Ethiopia. I 
have always felt that the partnerships that we built to deal 
with the challenges in Somalia and the challenges that are 
presented by AQ [al-Qaida] in the Arabian Peninsula between 
Yemen and Somalia, the partnerships that we have built with 
Kenya and Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, and others in the region 
have really been a great model for how partnerships can help us 
meet our national security threats, so that we don't do it all 
alone.
    We have a similar and growing challenge in West Africa, as 
there are a variety of different transnational terrorist 
elements there that we need to work with. And in the midst of 
all that, Russia is aggressively, through the Wagner Group, 
providing security in that region that is having a very 
destabilizing effect. It is not a coincidence that the 
increased presence of Wagner as a security force has matched up 
with an increase in the number of coups throughout West Africa.
    We have got a lot of challenges in Africa, and we look 
forward to hearing from General Townsend about his take on 
those challenges and answering our questions on that.
    Central Command also has a lot of challenges. Certainly, we 
have seen the drawdown in both Afghanistan and Iraq over the 
course of the last 10 years that has changed that, but the 
challenges are very real. And I know General McKenzie knows 
that one of the central questions that this committee will have 
is, what now in Afghanistan? There is still a threat there from 
al-Qaida and from ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. What 
is our plan for dealing with that threat, now that we have 
pulled out of Afghanistan?
    And in the Middle East, we still have the challenges from 
ISIS, the instability in Syria, the instability in Yemen. I am 
particularly interested to hear the latest on what Iran is up 
to, and how we are working with partners in the region to 
contain that threat.
    And also, I would be curious to hear, as Russia gets 
further and further bogged down in Ukraine, what does that mean 
for their activity in Syria, where, as we know, they have been 
very involved going forward?
    The bottom line is--and my written statement gets into a 
lot more detail--we could talk about both of these areas of 
responsibility for a very long time. There is a lot to do. 
There are a lot of challenges. They are a huge part of our 
national security posture going forward, and I look forward to 
hearing more details from all three of our witnesses on how 
best we should meet those challenges going forward.
    With that, Mr. Rogers is out ill this morning, and ably 
filling in is Mr. Wittman, as the ranking member. And I will 
yield to him for his opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
             VIRGINIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I deeply appreciate our witnesses coming to testify before 
us today. And thanks so much for your service.
    General Townsend, as was discussed last week, the threats 
in Africa are multifaceted and they continue to grow. But 
spending on AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] comprises only about 
three-tenths of 1 percent of the entire defense budget--not 
related to the magnitude of what I believe is the building 
threat. And it is these meager resources that are now spread 
even thinner because of the challenges we face before us with 
Russia and China. And that is not just worldwide; that is 
specifically there on the African continent.
    Russia has been entering into a disturbing number of arms 
sales and basing agreements in African nations. China is using 
the Belt and Road Initiative to extract African natural 
resources and gain permanent footholds on the continent. The 
Chinese have built an overseas military base in the 
strategically important area of the Horn of Africa, and they 
are actively scouting other locations, including the Atlantic 
coast. Make no mistake about their intentions.
    The growing presence of China and Russia in Africa is a 
threat to our national security, and it is imperative that we 
increase investments there, as well as other places around the 
world.
    I look forward to hearing from you, General Townsend, about 
how we can maximize diplomatic and military efforts to counter 
Russia and China's growing global ambitions in China.
    In CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command], General McKenzie, we are 
also seeing increased Chinese presence. China is building ports 
and other infrastructure throughout the region, and it has 
entered into trade and telecom [telecommunication] agreements 
with allies in the region.
    But what I find most concerning is that President Xi 
continues to cozy up to the Ayatollah. China signed valuable 
trade deals with Iran, bought Iranian oil in defiance of 
international sanctions, and joined Russia in conducting joint 
drills with the Iranian navy. These actions provide a lifeline 
to Iran at a very dangerous time.
    The Ayatollah continues to fund and equip terrorists 
targeting American troops. His cronies are prolonging a civil 
war and a humanitarian crisis in Syria, and his regime is 
aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. We absolutely cannot 
allow this to happen. I do not believe that reentering the 
JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] will stop them. I 
look forward to hearing more about the administration's plan 
for ending the Ayatollah's quest for a nuclear weapon and how 
they intend to deal with the rest of the regime's destabilizing 
actions.
    Finally, to both you, General McKenzie and General 
Townsend, you continue to face tremendous challenges snuffing 
out hardened terrorists in both AORs [areas of responsibility], 
and I am very concerned that we are backsliding on the progress 
we have made in combating terrorism.
    In Africa, the repositioning of U.S. and French forces 
further from terrorist hotspots is making it much harder for us 
to successfully conduct counterterrorism operations.
    In CENTCOM, President Biden's decision to unilaterally and 
unconditionally withdraw all U.S. forces from Afghanistan has 
undermined our national security. As anticipated by nearly 
everyone except the President, the Taliban has overrun the 
government, and Afghanistan is reverting back to being a 
breeding ground for terrorists.
    The President assures us that this so-called over-the-
horizon strategy will prevent that from happening, but this is 
completely devoid of reality. In the 6 months since the 
withdrawal, we have not been informed of a single successful 
over-the-horizon strike. I guess it is possible that al-Qaida 
and ISIS-K [Khorasan Province] have thrown down their arms and 
decided to live in peaceful coexistence with the West, but I 
fear what is more likely is that we no longer have a good 
handle on where the terrorists are or what they are doing.
    The truth is, without persistent ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance], reliable partners on the 
ground, and nearby facilities to launch assets, we lack the 
capability we need to conduct a successful strike. We know, 
previously, human intelligence, signal intelligence, in theater 
close to the adversary is critically important. And I look 
forward to this afternoon's classified discussion on what 
capabilities we have lost and how we can help restore them.
    As to our posture shifts in the Indo-Pacific, we need to 
ensure other combatant commanders we have the capabilities they 
need to carry out their missions. We cannot allow for 
blindspots, especially in your two AORs.
    Before I wrap up, I would like to thank both of you for 
your service, General Townsend and General McKenzie, incredible 
service to our Nation.
    General McKenzie, I wish you the best in your retirement. 
Just make sure that you have your number available on speed 
dial.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Wittman. And again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Baker, you are recognized for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF SASHA BAKER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
               POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Congressman Wittman, 
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting 
me to testify, and I ask that my written statement be entered 
into the record.
    For the past year, the Biden administration has placed a 
priority on revitalizing and expanding the U.S. alliance and 
partnership architecture. In bringing together our partners' 
capabilities with our own, the Department is building an 
integrated deterrence framework that we believe creates 
advantages for ourselves and dilemmas for our adversaries.
    In the Middle East and Africa, the Department builds 
partnership through an approach that draws on all of our tools, 
to include security cooperation, exercises, defense diplomacy, 
and force posture.
    The Department's priorities in the Middle East are to 
defend against Iranian-backed threats, to counter violent 
extremist organizations, and to deepen cooperation with our 
partners. We are committed to deterring and defending against 
threats posed by Iran and its proxies. The Department 
continuously evaluates the appropriate mix of forces to defend 
U.S. personnel and interests, if necessary.
    In Iraq and Syria, the Department is committed to the 
enduring defeat of ISIS, supporting a broad, whole-of-
government strategy designed to address the underlying 
conditions that gave rise to ISIS.
    In Yemen, our policy objectives are to end the conflict, 
alleviate humanitarian suffering, and defeat the threat from 
al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS-Yemen. Separately, 
the Department supports the UAE [United Arab Emirates] and 
Saudi Arabia in the defense of their territory and people from 
cross-border Houthi attacks.
    The Department is committed to deepening cooperation and 
coordination between the United States, Israel, and partners in 
the Middle East and Africa.
    Recent normalization agreements have laid the groundwork 
for Israel's entrance into the U.S. Central Command, which 
will, in turn, we believe, enhance cooperation in the security 
sphere.
    In Afghanistan, our military service members served 
honorably for two decades. Although we have withdrawn U.S. 
forces, the Department continues to advance U.S. interests in 
Afghanistan. This includes monitoring indicators and warnings 
for counterterrorism threats against U.S. interests and the 
U.S. homeland. It also includes supporting the Department of 
State's efforts to facilitate the departure of American 
citizens, lawful permanent residents, and our Afghan allies, as 
well as efforts to alleviate the humanitarian crisis. We 
continue to support interagency partners in the care and 
resettlement of Afghan evacuees in the United States.
    In Central Asia, we are continuing to develop long-term 
security cooperation programs that are focused on bolstering 
regional capabilities to help counter a wide range of threats 
in the region and to the U.S. homeland.
    In our relationship with Pakistan, counterterrorism remains 
a focus, as violent extremist organizations seek to target our 
shared interests and destabilize the region. Pakistan has 
participated robustly in counter-piracy efforts, for example, 
meant to ensure a free and open maritime transit.
    In Africa, the Department remains focused on countering 
violent extremist organizations that pose a threat to the U.S. 
homeland and interests, and addressing targeted strategic 
competition concerns. To those ends, the Department is building 
partnerships that support conflict resolution, improving 
defense institutions, and attempting to strengthen democratic 
norms.
    DOD's [Department of Defense's] training and exercises 
promote a respect for the law of armed conflict, for civilian 
oversight of the military, and for human rights.
    We employ a holistic approach, working with our partners 
across the U.S. Government, to include State and USAID [United 
States Agency for International Development], and we are 
reviewing all of our deployments to ensure that they are 
rightsized to balance our near-term challenges with our long-
term modernization and readiness requirements.
    In the Horn of Africa, we remain committed to supporting 
our AMISOM [African Union Mission to Somalia] partners, and in 
the east and in the Sahel, we are focused on interagency and 
multilateral efforts to stabilize the region and to improve our 
counter-VEO [violent extremist organization] efforts.
    In North Africa, we support a common security objectives on 
the continent and in the southern Mediterranean.
    And in the maritime domain, alongside the Department of 
State, we are working with regional partners to secure the 
Atlantic from maritime and transnational threats.
    The Department's approach to the Middle East and Africa is 
informed by threats to a free, stable, and open international 
order, including those posed by Russia and the PRC [People's 
Republic of China].
    Russia seeks to reshape security structures, exploiting 
governance vacuums and using private military companies and 
resource extraction to undermine U.S. interests.
    Beijing is establishing overseas infrastructure to project 
and sustain military power while expanding its implements and 
its access.
    As the Department coordinates with partners to address our 
shared threats and their security needs, it will also seek to 
limit Russian and Chinese influence through sustained 
engagement, demonstrating the superiority of the United States 
as a partner of choice.
    With the support of the Congress, the Department remains, 
we believe, well-positioned to support our allies and partners, 
to compete with Russia and the PRC, and to deter and defeat our 
adversaries across the Middle East and North Africa.
    In closing, I would just like to echo, on behalf of the 
Department, our thanks to both General McKenzie and General 
Townsend, for their long service to our Nation.
    And with that, I will conclude and look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Baker can be found in the 
Appendix on page 51.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Before turning to General Townsend, one programming note 
that I neglected to mention. We are going in reverse order of 
questioning today. We try to give the freshmen, our junior 
members, a chance to go first in some of our hearings. So, we 
will be starting with the least senior and working our way up 
today. Just to make sure everyone is aware of that.
    General Townsend, you are recognized for your opening 
statement.

  STATEMENT OF GEN STEPHEN J. TOWNSEND, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. 
                         AFRICA COMMAND

    General Townsend. Chairman Smith, Congressman Wittman, 
distinguished members of the committee, good morning. Thank you 
for inviting me to appear today, even as the eyes of the world 
are focused on Russia's lawless attack on the Ukraine, an 
unjust war which impacts Africa as well.
    For nearly 3 years, it has been the greatest privilege of 
my career to represent the dedicated members of U.S. Africa 
Command. Thank you for your steadfast support for them and for 
our mission.
    I am here this morning with my battle buddy and command 
senior enlisted leader, Sergeant Major Richard Thresher, and 
colleagues, Dr. Sasha Baker and General Frank McKenzie. For 
General McKenzie and I, it is our final appearance before you. 
Our joint testimony highlights continued and pressing 
challenges and opportunities faced by our respective commands 
and our Nation.
    Together with our interagency teammates, USAFRICOM protects 
and advances U.S. interests, prevents strategic distraction, 
and preserves America's options--all in concert with our allies 
and partners.
    As AFRICOM's fifth commander, I have come to learn five 
truths about Africa.
    First, America cannot ignore Africa. Africa's challenges, 
opportunities, and security interests are inseparable from our 
own. Weak or poor governance, conflict, and climate change 
stress the stability of many African nations, which in turn 
will impact U.S. security and prosperity.
    Second, our competitors clearly see Africa's rich 
potential. China and Russia both seek to convert soft and hard 
power investments into political influence, strategic access, 
and military advantage. Both seek to bolster autocrats and 
change international norms in their favor. For China, Africa is 
their second continent. Across Africa, mercenaries from the 
Kremlin's Wagner Group offer their services for profit--regime 
protection, resource exploitation, and horrific violence 
against Africans, just as we see in Ukraine today.
    Third, deadly terrorism has metastasized to Africa. Al-
Qaida's Al-Shabaab in East Africa and ISIS and al-Qaida groups 
in West Africa and elsewhere, are among the world's fastest 
growing, wealthiest, and deadliest terrorist groups, and remain 
grave and growing threats that aspire to kill Americans, both 
there and in our homeland.
    Fourth, a battle between democracy and authoritarianism is 
raging across Africa. Despite a recent surge in democratic 
backsliding, our values, our democracy, our willingness to work 
with African partners create a huge demand for U.S. engagement 
and U.S. partnership.
    Fifth, in Africa, a few troops and a few bucks still go a 
long way. Modest and predictable resourcing yields outsized 
returns for U.S. and African security interests. As an economy 
of force and posture of limited theater, AFRICOM employs just 
.3 percent of DOD's operating budget and manpower. Modest 
investments today can yield a continent of partners tomorrow.
    We are most effective when we synchronize diplomacy, 
development, and defense. So, we are grateful for your 
continued leadership and backing to resource our interagency 
partners at the State Department, USAID, and the intel 
community. Thanks to the authorities and resources you provide, 
and your continued interest and support in the capabilities 
that AFRICOM requires to accomplish our mission.
    In summary, USAFRICOM remains cheap insurance for America's 
security.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Townsend can be found in 
the Appendix on page 64.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General McKenzie.

  STATEMENT OF GEN KENNETH F. McKENZIE, Jr., USMC, COMMANDER, 
                      U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

    General McKenzie. Chairman Smith, Representative Wittman, 
ladies and gentlemen of the committee, it is a pleasure to be 
here today beside the Honorable Sasha Baker and General Steve 
Townsend, and in the company of my senior enlisted leader, 
Fleet Master Chief Jamie Herdel.
    I want to thank you for allowing me this opportunity to 
testify for the final time regarding U.S. Central Command's 
posture in an area of responsibility that encompasses 21 
nations, 600 million people, and lies at the strategic nexus of 
the world's most important corridors of trade.
    Much has transpired since I last delivered my annual 
posture testimony; most notably, the conclusion of our military 
campaign in Afghanistan and, of course, Russia's recent 
invasion of Ukraine.
    America's interests in the central region and the 
challenges we confront there have proven remarkably resilient. 
CENTCOM's mission to direct and enable military operations and 
activities with allies and partners to increase regional 
stability in support of enduring U.S. interests is essentially 
unchanged from the day of the command's founding.
    The primary threats to that security and stability are also 
very familiar even today. CENTCOM was established nearly 40 
years ago to counter the malign influence of a revolutionary 
regime that had seized power in Tehran, and to compete with a 
great power that had, in spite of international condemnation, 
invaded the sovereign state of Afghanistan and imposed a puppet 
regime.
    Today, Iran is no less of a threat to American interests or 
the stability of the region than it was in 1979. To the 
contrary, the threat posed by Iran is graver than ever.
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine, moreover, has violently 
demonstrated its willful disregard for international norms--
just as we have seen through Russia's actions in Syria and 
elsewhere, in fact anywhere it sees an opportunity to diminish 
confidence in America's leadership.
    In a more measured fashion, China is also vying for 
increased influence, at American expense, in a region it 
depends upon for over 40 percent of its fossil fuels.
    Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations, or VEOs, in the 
CENTCOM area continue to pose a credible threat to the 
homeland. In sum, the central region remains today a vital and 
volatile arena for strategic competition and the decisive 
theater in the campaign against VEOs.
    The campaign to defeat the so-called Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria has entered a new phase. As of 1 January of this 
year, Iraq has assumed sole responsibility for counter-ISIS 
combat operations on its own soil.
    In Syria, CENTCOM and its partners are degrading ISIS's 
ability to regenerate by improving the security of facilities 
for detained ISIS fighters, as well as for the displaced 
persons camps where their families and others reside. More than 
half of this population comes from other countries, and 
addressing the threat of ISIS in northeast Syria, ultimately, 
will require those countries to reclaim and repatriate whatever 
citizens of theirs remain in these prisons and camps--ending 
one of the world's worst humanitarian crises and depriving ISIS 
of what currently is fertile soil for indoctrination and 
spreading terror.
    In Afghanistan, our campaign against al-Qaida and ISIS-
Khorasan has also entered a new phase. We are now conducting 
this campaign from bases over the horizon. As I have said 
before, this is difficult, but it is not impossible. I should 
add today that we will be able to do so only so long as CENTCOM 
has the requisite resources to find, fix, and finish threats to 
the homeland before those threats develop the capability to 
conduct external operations. I am talking specifically about 
ISR assets and strike platforms. CENTCOM has the tools it needs 
to perform this mission, but the margins are thin and the risk 
will increase, should resources diminish.
    In the Middle East, Iran continues to pose the greatest 
threat to U.S. interests and the security of the region as a 
whole. Through its proxies and clients, Iran has fomented 
conflict in an arc, tracing from Yemen through the Arabian 
Peninsula, across Iraq and Syria into Lebanon, and to the very 
borders of Israel.
    Saudi Arabia endures regular attacks from the Houthis, who 
wield some of the most advanced unmanned aerial systems and 
cruise missiles in the region--all courtesy of the Iranians. 
Recently, the Houthis expanded these attacks to include urban 
centers and bases with U.S. forces in the United Arab Emirates. 
Tehran also enables its aligned militias in Iraq and Syria to 
carry on a persistent, low-level campaign of indirect fire and 
UAS [unmanned aerial systems] attacks against U.S. and 
coalition forces, hoping to drive us from the region.
    Iran's ballistic missile forces constitute an exigent 
threat to the security of every state in the region. Among them 
are our most important and enduring partners. They continue to 
look to the United States for assurance that we, the historic 
partner of choice in the region, will remain a reliable one.
    China and Russia are also watching closely for any sign 
that America's commitment to the collective security of the 
region is wavering, and they are poised to capitalize on 
whatever opportunities emerge.
    In closing, let me thank you again for this opportunity to 
testify.
    I would also like to thank the soldiers, sailors, Marines, 
airmen, coastguardsmen, and guardians who have served and 
sacrificed in the CENTCOM AOR. It has been the greatest honor 
of my life to serve as their commander.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General McKenzie can be found in 
the Appendix on page 77.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Just two quick questions.
    General Townsend, could you walk us through what you think 
China is doing in Africa? When I met with you, you gave a 
pretty good brief. And I know some of it we would have to do in 
the classified session later. But what are they doing in 
Africa, how does it threaten us, and what are we doing to 
address it?
    General Townsend. Thanks for the question, Chairman.
    There should be some handouts at your places there that you 
can refer to.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
beginning on page 109.]
    The Chairman. Yes.
    General Townsend. There is one on China there that depicts 
what I will just kind of briefly talk to.
    They compete with us in Africa. First of all, China has 
made a decision, a deliberate decision, to compete with America 
in Africa and win that competition. They compete primarily 
through economic means and diplomatic means. And you can see 
that there with their Belt and Road Initiative. They are 
investing everywhere across the continent.
    We don't actually have to meet that competition in every 
location head-on. We have to pick and choose where we are going 
to do that. And there are countries where it is important that 
we do.
    In the military sphere, you heard in the chairman's opening 
remarks there that have their one overseas base in Djibouti. 
The primary thing that concerns me with China's military 
competition in Africa is that they are seeking, actively 
seeking, a military base on the Atlantic coast of Africa. And 
for a variety of reasons that I will go to in closed session, 
that would be bad for America's security. And--as a first 
priority, we need to prevent--deter a Chinese base on the 
Atlantic coast of Africa.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And, General McKenzie, just a quick specific question on 
Yemen. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen continues to be great. 
The fight has gone back and forth there. I know our envoys 
there have tried to get to a peace agreement, but unable to do 
that. But, in terms of getting food, humanitarian assistance, 
basic supplies, into Yemen, we continually hear about the 
blockade of Yemen; that Saudi Arabia is like leading this 
effort, blocking the ability of supplies to get in. Is there 
more that we could do to free up the ability to get supplies, 
the basic supplies of food, medical supplies, humanitarian aid 
into Yemen? And what is really going on in terms of the effort 
to blockade that by Saudi Arabia, or by anybody else?
    General McKenzie. Chairman, you are correct, it is very 
difficult to get humanitarian aid into Yemen. It is further 
compounded by the fact that there are distribution problems 
that the Houthis are associated with, once that aid gets in. I 
would agree that there is more that we could do with our 
friends in the region to allow more humanitarian aid to enter 
Yemen, and I would support that action.
    However, I think the larger problem is the distribution of 
the aid, once it enters Yemen and actually gets out to the 
people that need it. The U.N. [United Nations] Special 
Representative is working that very hard, but that remains, I 
think, the most significant problem, when it comes to 
distribution of aid to the many hundreds of thousands of people 
who experience food insecurity in Yemen.
    The Chairman. But, before it gets in, the Saudis, in 
particular, are searching ships, blocking ships from getting in 
because they are afraid that arms are being shipped in.
    General McKenzie. Sir, they are, and they have also allowed 
aid ships to enter. It is not a perfect solution. It is not a 
perfect solution, and I acknowledge that.
    The Chairman. Well, that is something I would like to 
continue to work with you on, because, as you know, the 
humanitarian crisis there is extreme.
    And with that, I will yield to Mr. Wittman for his 
questions.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, I want to thank our witnesses.
    I want to follow up on what the chairman talked about. It 
is concerning to me, not just the dynamic that is happening 
between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but the support that Iran is 
providing to Yemen. That, to me, allows them to do the things 
that they are doing that are very, very disruptive in that 
area.
    As we know, they have looted U.N. food convoys. They have 
laid over a million mines in civilian areas. They have 
recruited thousands of child soldiers and have taken over the 
closed U.S. embassy. They are holding at least 11 former U.S. 
embassy staffers hostage. And they have stepped up cross-border 
attacks by drones and missiles against the UAE that have 
actually targeted and killed civilians in the UAE.
    As the chairman pointed out, they have completely rebuffed 
efforts by the current administration to enter into any kind of 
talks to resolve these particular issues.
    General McKenzie, I want to go to you first and ask, what 
are your thoughts about what we can do in interrupting the 
relationship between Iran and the Houthis, which allow them, 
unfortunately, to continue to keep this unsettled state in 
Yemen? And that, in turn, antagonizes the Saudis, and this just 
continues to escalate. Can you give us your perspective on 
that?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I can. And I would like to note at 
the beginning that, while the supply of humanitarian aid to 
Yemen has been imperfect and not consistent, throughout the 
long history of this crisis, Iran has never imported a single 
bag of rice or any other foodstuff into Yemen.
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    General McKenzie. In fact, the only material they have 
brought into Yemen is stuff designed to kill people.
    Mr. Wittman. Yes.
    General McKenzie. So, we should just remember that when we 
talk about the people here.
    Sir, I believe there is an opportunity for a negotiated 
settlement here. I believe that the parties, I believe that the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and I believe UAE are open to that 
solution.
    I believe that the Houthis have an opportunity, should they 
choose to negotiate, but under prompting from their Iranian 
masters, they have instead chosen to double down. They continue 
their attacks into Saudi Arabia. As you noted, they have ramped 
up attacks into UAE in a very disturbing new phase of 
operations.
    But I think there is an opportunity here, under the United 
Nations, to get to a truce, and a truce would be the best of 
possible worlds. We would be able to begin to open Hudaydah, 
get foodstuffs into Hudaydah, and distribute it under the 
auspices of someone other than the Houthis and their ability to 
interfere with it.
    Mr. Wittman. Can enough pressure be put on Iran and Saudi 
Arabia to kind of force the Houthis to the table and say, 
``Listen, you've got to resolve this''?
    General McKenzie. I don't believe it is in Iran's interest 
to end the war in Yemen. I think it is a fairly low-cost war 
for them. As you noted, it embarrasses Saudi Arabia. It 
embarrasses UAE. And I think they are actually not motivated to 
do that right now.
    I think it is certainly in the Houthis' best interest to 
cut a deal. So, the ball is sort of in their court. They have 
some opportunities. They need to seize those opportunities, 
because, frankly, sir, I don't think those opportunities are 
going to be there forever.
    Mr. Wittman. Yes. Thanks.
    Let me ask you briefly, too, about the growing threat from 
ISIS-K in Afghanistan. As we had heard before, by a complete 
withdrawal of forces there, we knew that the risks were going 
to increase. Obviously, they have.
    The concern is is that that risk is going to extend beyond 
the borders of Afghanistan and they will have an opportunity or 
a capability to pursue attacks outside of Afghanistan. That is 
incredibly troubling.
    Also, our ability to do significant CT [counterterrorism] 
operations in Afghanistan, the issues of what we used to have 
as far as human intelligence, signal intelligence, greatly 
degraded now. The over-the-horizon capability is just not 
something that is realistic in relation to the threat that we 
face.
    I wanted to get your best military judgment regarding the 
adequacy of the current force structure in CENTCOM following 
our departure from Afghanistan. What do we have in place? Is it 
enough with this over-the-horizon capability to really keep a 
handle and keep ISIS-K from growing to a point where it can 
perpetrate attacks outside the border there? And what are the 
risks with our current force structure? What are the risks that 
are there before us today, and how do you think those risks 
will continue to grow?
    General McKenzie. Sir, in the closed session a little later 
this afternoon, I am going to exhaustively drill down into our 
force posture and all the disciplines of intelligence that we 
are applying in Afghanistan, and give you very detailed and 
specific granular answers to those questions. But I prefer to 
do that in a closed session.
    I will say that we are very concerned about the potential 
for ISIS-K growth in Afghanistan. We assess that they do retain 
a desire to attack us in our homeland here in the United 
States. And absent effective pressure, that threat will only 
grow and metastasize over time.
    Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. That is what I want to get 
to, is that you continue to see it growing, then, in the years 
to come, unless something significant is done in the meantime?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I will talk about that in great 
detail a little bit later today.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With that, I yield 
back.
    Mr. Courtney [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
    In accordance with the chairman's extraordinary procedure 
today, the chair recognizes Mr. Panetta from California.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 
appreciate this opportunity. I just wish I would have had a 
little more insight as to the order. But thank you very much.
    That being said, gentlemen, Doctor, thank you very much for 
being here. I appreciate your time. I appreciate your 
testimony.
    I am going to focus down to West Africa, and more 
particular, in Mali especially. We know that the French came in 
back in 2013, Operation Barkhane. They had U.S. support. 
Unfortunately, now the French are leaving. Unfortunately, now 
there is a void.
    I don't have confidence in the 15,000 Blue Hats that are 
there on the ground to fill that void. I am very skeptical of 
the Malian government to actually contract with the Wagner 
Group as well to do that.
    I know that we provided support in Operation Barkhane, and 
maybe this is a conversation we can have later this afternoon.
    But my question to you is, one, why are the French leaving? 
Two, who do you see filling that void? Three, why did they 
contract with the Wagner Group, and if you could go into that a 
little bit?
    And then, my last question is, does China have a strategy? 
You have this nice map here that shows their involvement in 
Africa. Does China have a strategy to deal with the violent 
extremism in Africa?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, first, the French aren't leaving. They are 
repositioning in West Africa. They are leaving, as you pointed 
out, Mali.
    Mr. Panetta. They are going to Niger, correct?
    General Townsend. Their plan is to go to Niger and Cote 
d'Ivoire, and maybe a few other places. So, they are 
repositioning their forces.
    You asked the question, why are they leaving? So, in our 
interactions with the French, they had come to the realization 
that it was time to reset their campaign there and maybe gain 
new efficiencies. And so, they had already made a decision, 
which the French government had announced, that they were going 
to reposition and reposture in West Africa.
    Then, we had successive coups in Mali.
    Mr. Panetta. Right.
    General Townsend. And Mali, as you know, has invited in 
Wagner. I think they have invited--and that gets to your second 
question, why have they invited Wagner in? They have invited 
Wagner in because they believe that Wagner will replace the 
French and do a better job.
    When I learned of this, I traveled to Mali and I met with 
the president there, the junta president there. And I explained 
that I thought it was a bad idea to invite Wagner in, because 
we have seen them, I have seen them in Syria and I have seen 
them in other places in Africa. And Wagner obeys no rules. They 
won't follow the direction of the government. They won't 
partner more effectively. I think they will only bring bad----
    Mr. Panetta. Was he listening? Will he listen?
    General Townsend. He told me that it wasn't Wagner; that 
they were dealing with the French--the Russian Ministry of 
Defense, except I think President Putin later said there are no 
Russian military in Mali; there are private military companies 
there, Wagner.
    So, I think that only bad will come from that. I think 
there may be some initial gains. We are seeing Wagner deploy 
and build their base camps. They haven't really started 
significant operations yet. I think they have already suffered 
some casualties.
    Mr. Panetta. Casualties from violent extremism?
    General Townsend. Yes. I think that only bad is going to 
come from their deployment there.
    You asked about China. We don't see China having a counter-
violent extremist role. They are in Mali, though. They are 
there as part of--they have a substantial force there as part 
of MINUSMA [United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali], the U.N. mission there. But we 
don't see them doing--we see them doing a little bit of 
counterterrorism training on the continent, but we do not see 
them conducting any counter-VEO operations.
    Mr. Panetta. And a lot of our role, then, will be from 
Niger, is that correct, in regards to any sort of what we do?
    General Townsend. We currently have forces in Niger, and I 
am working with the Department of Defense on a strategy for 
West Africa that will take into account the French reposturing; 
that will take into account the malign actors like Wagner in 
the region.
    Mr. Panetta. And it sounds like you don't necessarily 
believe this Malian official who you spoke to in regards to it 
was an organized Russian group? You believe it is the Wagner 
Group who is in there now?
    General Townsend. It is the Wagner Group, supported by the 
Ministry of Defense and the Kremlin. The Russian air force flew 
them in.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Once again, thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Panetta. I was closely 
watching the portraits of the past chairmen. There was no 
disturbance of the universe. So, nice job.
    The chair now recognizes Mr. Fallon.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just thought this was a 
gift that you were giving an Irishman on St. Patrick's Day. So, 
I appreciate that.
    Thank you all for your service, and thanks for being here 
today.
    General McKenzie, I was a bit dumbfounded about a week and 
a half ago. I read an article, a report, in The Wall Street 
Journal that the UAE's Sheikh and the Crown Prince of Saudi 
Arabia would not take a call from the President of the United 
States. I found that alarming. I wanted to just hear your 
thoughts on that.
    General McKenzie. Relationships at that level would 
probably be better with Ms. Baker or the Department of State 
than me. I can tell you that, at my level, I have no trouble 
talking to the chiefs of defense of each of those two 
countries, and I talk to them frequently.
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. Ms. Baker, if you would like to comment? 
Thank you.
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, thank you.
    I can't speak to the specifics of the President's phone 
calls. What I can tell you is from a defense perspective, as 
General McKenzie said, we have long and enduring strategic 
partnerships with both Saudi Arabia and UAE. Those have existed 
for any number of years.
    Mr. Fallon. I know. That is why I found it so----
    Ms. Baker. We are fully committed to them.
    Mr. Fallon [continuing]. Alarming and shocking that they 
weren't taking--I thought they were allies of ours in the 
region, and not to take the President of the United States 
phone call, to me, it spoke volumes about the deteriorating 
relationship.
    Ms. Baker. Again, I can't speak to the President's phone 
calls. I can tell you that, as General McKenzie said, we pick 
up the phone and we talk with these folks every day, and we 
have a very close and enduring partnership from a defense 
perspective.
    Mr. Fallon. General McKenzie, in Syria, I would love if you 
could just touch on the influences that Turkey, Russia, and 
Iran have. It seems to be an absolute mess, you know, from 
everything we read, and then, the maps didn't help too much, 
either. But I just wanted to get your thoughts on that.
    General McKenzie. Sure. So, in Syria, Iran uses Syria 
principally as a land bridge to move advanced conventional 
weapons into Lebanon to be employed against Israel, as a 
possibility. They are also interested in operating against our 
forces that are there in Syria. As in Yemen, Iran, generally 
speaking, has no positive objective in Syria. Rather, their 
goals are almost wholly negative.
    Mr. Fallon. Just disruption.
    General McKenzie. It is disruption, but also they view it--
again, we shouldn't understate the importance of that corridor 
that allows them to move weapons to a position against what 
they consider their greatest foe and the nation they are sworn 
to destroy, Israel.
    Russia, obviously, has a client state in Syria. They came 
in right after the beginning of the civil war. They have been 
there for quite a while. It allows them to do several things by 
being in there.
    First of all, it is opportunistic. I don't see a long-term 
strategy in the Russian action. They have got an air base in 
western Syria. They have got a naval base in the eastern 
Mediterranean, which they had during the Cold War, I might add. 
So, it is not a new thing necessarily.
    It also gives them the opportunity to attempt to posture on 
the global stage and to throw sand in our gearbox. Again, it is 
an act of opportunism that we see as typical of a lot of 
Russian activity.
    The Turks have genuine national security concerns----
    Mr. Fallon. Is it the Kurds mainly? Are they concerned 
about the Kurds more than anything else?
    General McKenzie. Well, the Turks are, yes.
    Mr. Fallon. Yes.
    General McKenzie. We would argue that there are different 
elements within the Kurds, and we disagree with Turkey on that, 
on all the Kurds being devoted to attacking Turkey. But they do 
have legitimate security concerns.
    We also, as you know, partner heavily with the Syrian 
Democratic Forces and other Syrian Kurdish elements to actually 
conduct the fight against ISIS. So, there is a genuine dispute 
there between us and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] partners over that. But, when all is said and 
done, we do recognize they have legitimate security concerns.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, General.
    General Townsend, I was noticing in the foreign aid we 
crush the Chinese, $11 billion to about 2.5, but, in economic 
trade, they almost quadruple ours in Africa. What I wanted to 
ask you is, who is China the chummiest with? Whose 
relationships are the best as far as the nation-states they 
have and relationships they have in Africa? And what worries 
you most about that theater?
    General Townsend. Well, Congressman, thanks.
    I don't think anybody has asked me who China is chummiest 
with in Africa before. So, I don't think I have contemplated 
that. They have pretty good relations with a lot of the 
countries on the continent. Where the relations are strained is 
in their earlier economic investments, where they have lured 
African countries into what we call ``debt trap diplomacy.''
    Mr. Fallon. Right.
    General Townsend. And there are a number of those countries 
where a large percentage of their foreign debt is held by 
China, and China has extended leases on critical infrastructure 
like ports and airports.
    The thing I think I am most worried about is this military 
base on the Atlantic coast. And where they have the most 
traction for that today is in Equatorial Guinea.
    Mr. Fallon. Yes.
    General Townsend. They have laid markers down up and down 
the coastline, but the place where they have actually made 
progress toward this is Equatorial Guinea. And we have had a 
recent interagency delegation travel there to discuss that with 
the government there.
    Mr. Fallon. Well, it concerns me because it is like almost 
an end-around to the Monroe Doctrine in some ways to have a 
Chinese base on the Atlantic----
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. The chair now recognizes Congresswoman Luria.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
    And, General McKenzie, I would like to start with a quote 
that you made. You said, ``the proximate causes for the 
establishment of CENTCOM nearly forty years ago'' was Iran, and 
``Today, Iran is no less of a threat to American interests or 
the stability of the region than it was in 1979. To the 
contrary, the threat posed by Iran is graver than ever.''
    So, I would like to ask you, from a perspective of CENTCOM, 
how is the United States, and how is the United States and our 
allies prepared to respond to this threat from Iran?
    General McKenzie. So, the actual operational expression of 
the Iranian threat is in the vast improvements in their 
ballistic missile, their land attack cruise missile, and their 
small unmanned aerial vehicle platforms, which over the last 5 
to 7 years have dramatically increased, both in number and in 
accuracy and ability to fly in relatively undetected ways. All 
of that directly threatens the immediate partners.
    Mrs. Luria. So, the 5 to 7 years, what year did we enter 
into the JCPOA? It is about that timeframe?
    General McKenzie. About that timeframe, but----
    Mrs. Luria. So, I just wanted to shift, and maybe we can 
have a more thorough conversation on the first part of the 
question.
    So, if the United States returns to the JCPOA, what impact 
do you foresee that having on Iran's regional activities? What 
impact on the flow of additional resources to the Houthis, to 
Hezbollah, to Hamas, and their actions in the region against 
the United States, Israel, and our allies?
    General McKenzie. So, I will note, the principal foreign 
policy objective we have vis-a-vis Iran is for them not to 
possess a nuclear weapon. So, a JCPOA would presumably give 
that assurance.
    Mrs. Luria. Right. The current agreement has allowed them 
to have additional resources to fund these proxy organizations.
    General McKenzie. So, I believe that what they do with 
their ballistic missiles, their proxies, and other things, are 
not necessarily coupled directly to the JCPOA. But I will 
acknowledge that there could be second-order effects of that. I 
do not know what the terms of the pending JCPOA will be. I just 
don't have that information.
    Mrs. Luria. So, perhaps I will turn to Ms. Baker. And I 
really don't think it is a disputed fact, by the fact that we 
have eased pressure, we have lifted sanctions, Iran has more 
resources. And those resources are flowing to these proxy 
groups and terrorist organizations throughout the region.
    So, if a nuclear deal is reached with Iran, I think that it 
is likely that Tehran will use a significant part of those 
associated sanctions reliefs to attack Israel and support these 
terrorist proxies. Are we open to supplying Israel with 
additional security assistance and other support, in light of 
this potential situation?
    Ms. Baker. Congresswoman, our commitment to Israel's 
security is ironclad. We consult with them on a near daily 
basis.
    Mrs. Luria. Are they at the table in the negotiations for 
the JCPOA right now?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, the Department, of course, does not 
have the lead on those negotiations, but my understanding is 
the Israelis are not at the table. We do consult with them 
regularly, and we are in regular conversations about how we can 
better bolster their security in the region.
    Mrs. Luria. So, if we consult with them regularly, have 
they expressed concerns over the pending reentry into the Iran 
deal?
    Ms. Baker. You know, I think this is a subject of active 
conversation, and I don't know that there is a unified opinion 
on that. That being said, we are committed to their security. 
We are committed to giving them the equipment, the capabilities 
that they need, the QME [qualitative military edge] that we 
have committed to.
    Mrs. Luria. So, I will shift back to General McKenzie. And 
I wanted to ask, why hasn't there been a more forceful U.S. 
response to Iran's aggression against our allies and our troops 
in the region? For example, we just saw this strike this 
weekend towards Erbil in the vicinity of the U.S. consulate. 
And Iran directly took responsibility for that strike.
    General McKenzie. Ma'am, I would like to talk about that in 
the closed session, if I could, and I will be prepared to go 
into great detail.
    I will tell you that I think our response has been 
measured, balanced. You know, after the strike on UAE by the 
Houthis, we deployed a fifth-generation fighter squadron to Al 
Dhafra Air Force Base. I sent a ballistic missile-capable 
destroyer to UAE's waters. And we have done a variety of other 
things to enhance their protection.
    So, sometimes it doesn't require an immediate kinetic 
response in order to show a measured response that assures our 
partners and allies.
    Mrs. Luria. So, has our current policy of not having a 1.0 
continuous carrier presence in the Gulf, have you seen any 
change in Iran's activities due to that? And do you think a 
carrier in the Gulf is essential for a deterrent? And lastly, 
balancing that versus the need for that asset within the 7th 
Fleet AOR for PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]? Can you----
    General McKenzie. So, as I think about deterring Iran, I 
don't think in terms of individual platforms. I think in terms 
of the holistic capabilities of the joint force--land-based 
air, carrier-based air. And so, one is up; one is down. We have 
other uses for those carriers; they can't be everywhere. But we 
do innovative things. We bring bomber task forces in from the 
United States. There are a variety of things I can display to 
ensure the Iranians know that we have the capability to defend 
ourselves and to punish them if they continue their malign 
activities.
    Mrs. Luria. Right. So, in your assessment, these shore-
based squadrons are providing, essentially, you, as the 
combatant commander, the same equivalent capability as a 
deterrent?
    General McKenzie. Yes, and other capabilities as well 
beyond that.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Mrs. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Perhaps I didn't hear that correctly. So, I will apologize 
in advance. Did I hear you say that Israel doesn't have an 
opinion or a position on the JCPOA?
    Ms. Baker. No, ma'am. I believe that they have expressed 
concerns.
    Mrs. McClain. And they want us to go back in or not go back 
in? What is their opinion?
    Ms. Baker. Congresswoman, you know, I think it is a complex 
situation. I am not sure that there is a unified point of view.
    Mrs. McClain. That is interesting, because when I was in 
Israel, it was clearly unified. So, I am just----
    Ms. Baker. We have heard Israel's concerns about the JCPOA 
loud and clear.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay.
    Ms. Baker. I want to acknowledge that.
    Mrs. McClain. I just wanted to make sure I understood that 
because I didn't catch that.
    Ms. Baker. What we have committed to, in response, is the 
ongoing conversation we have about ensuring Israel's QME, its 
security. That was the case before the JCPOA. It is the case 
during, when we were in the JCPOA, and it will continue in----
    Mrs. McClain. But, to be clear, they do have a response; 
they do have an opinion; they do have a position; and we are 
clearly aware of what that position is?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, that is my understanding, yes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you. Thank you. I just wanted to clear 
that up.
    Thank you all for being here.
    General McKenzie, the DOD Inspector General, in a recent 
report, stated that ``Iran-aligned militias continue to have 
strong ties to some elements of Iraq's traditional security 
forces''--especially pointing out Iraq's federal police, under 
the Ministry of Interior. My question is this: Does the 
Department, or any agency of the U.S. Government, continue to 
provide assistance for Iraq's federal police and Ministry of 
the Interior? Do we provide funds to them?
    General McKenzie. Congresswoman, I will have to answer--
take that one for the record. I will come back with a precise 
answer to that question.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 117.]
    Mrs. McClain. Okay. Thank you.
    My next question is, just this weekend, Iran directly 
launched missiles in the vicinity of our consulate, right, in 
Erbil, Kurdistan. I'm just--I'm trying to understand this and 
come to grips with this, is how can we justify using taxpayer 
dollars to go to a police force that supports that, or dollars 
to support that?
    General McKenzie. I will go into more detail in the closed 
session. But I can tell you that they were not targeting us 
with those strikes.
    Mrs. McClain. I think I want to believe you. I think the 
American people want to believe you. I am just not much for 
coincidences. It is scary when you are on the outside looking 
in. So, I look forward to the briefing to make us feel a little 
bit better about that.
    General McKenzie. Certainly.
    Mrs. McClain. And then, my second question is, are you 
familiar, obviously, with the Badr Corps?
    General McKenzie. I am.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay. My question is, do you believe that 
that organization is best described as a terrorist 
organization?
    General McKenzie. It has--let me come back to you on that, 
if you want a--let me put it better. I prefer to answer that in 
a closed session, if I can.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay.
    General McKenzie. And I will be prepared to do that.
    Mrs. McClain. With that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thanks.
    Thanks for you all being here. And having served, I think 
with all three of you in different capacities, I really 
appreciate your service and all the work that you have done for 
the country over many, many years.
    I just want to continue the conversation on Iran. And, 
General McKenzie, you know, I was reading through your 
testimony, and there is a lot of discussion about Iran's 
nefarious activities in the Middle East and their ballistic 
missile program. Can you give us, as much as possible, just for 
the American public to understand, the stakes of their nuclear 
program; how close they are to turning fissile material into 
nuclear, you know, weapons-grade material; and your assessment 
of the threat, where it falls vis-a-vis the other threats 
coming from Iran?
    General McKenzie. Thank you. And it is good to see you 
again, ma'am.
    I would note, first of all, I think the Iranians are close. 
I don't think that they have made a decision to go forward. I 
think they actually, my assessment is, they want the sanctions 
relief that has already been discussed here. And so, I think 
the best solution would be to get an agreement where they are 
not going to pursue a nuclear weapon. So, I will say that as 
number one.
    What really concerns me much more on a day-to-day basis are 
their ballistic missiles, their cruise missiles, and their land 
attack cruise missiles, which they have invested in heavily, at 
great cost to their population, over the past several years. 
Those capabilities directly threaten their neighbors today. And 
we saw an example of that in the attack on Iraq over the 
weekend--their ability to fire very accurate missiles into a 
neighboring country, something they have done before, including 
the attack on Al Asad Air Base in January of 2020. Those 
capabilities concern me, and I believe they concern our 
neighbors and friends in the region as well.
    And that is, actually, one of the opportunities I will talk 
a little bit more in the closed session about. We have an 
opportunity to work on integrated air and missile defense. That 
is the great opportunity in U.S. Central Command right now, 
because that will address a cogent, imminent threat to all of 
our neighbors in the region. And it is a tremendous 
opportunity.
    What that doesn't do is address the proxies, and their 
proxy forces are very active. Principally, we look at Iraq and 
in Syria, but they are obviously active in Yemen and in other 
places both in and out of the region. And that is another 
significant element that we work with our partners against.
    Ms. Slotkin. Yes. I mean, certainly, as someone who used to 
work on Iraq and work in Iraq, Iran's terrorist activities were 
an everyday fact of life, frankly, if you were over there.
    But I guess the question I have is, from the Chairman on 
down, the best military advice on a deal that would focus just 
on the nuclear parts of the Iranian threat. You know, we are 
going to be asked in some form or fashion to weigh in on this. 
There is, I think, a lot of briefing and a lot of work that is 
still going to go on to bring people up to speed. But, as I 
understand it, the deal, like the last deal, doesn't include 
the ballistic missile program and the terrorism. What was the 
best military advice from the Chairman on closing such a deal?
    General McKenzie. I would defer to the Chairman on that 
deal--on that military advice.
    I would note, the last deal did not include those ancillary 
elements that you talked about.
    Ms. Slotkin. Right.
    General McKenzie. And that is concerning.
    Ms. Slotkin. But your best military advice at your level, 
since this is your AOR, you support a deal that would just be 
focused on the nuclear parts of the threat?
    General McKenzie. I support Iran not having a nuclear 
weapon. And I would support the most effective way to get 
there. That will not solve all our problems.
    Ms. Slotkin. Yes.
    General McKenzie. But it would solve one problem. There are 
other areas that we need to work in. And I know that we have 
expressed interest in broadening the agreement. And my 
understanding is Iran has resisted that. But I think we do need 
to get to a broader agreement. But our number one priority is 
for them not to have a nuclear weapon.
    Ms. Slotkin. Appreciate that.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I appreciate the witnesses being here this morning.
    General McKenzie, has there been an impact to your AOR 
since the Russian invasion of Ukraine? And if so, can you 
describe the movement of the fighters, potentially from Syria 
or elsewhere, from the AOR into Ukraine?
    General McKenzie. So, we watch the Russians closely across 
the region. They have not done much force balancing as a result 
of the Ukraine operation. I can talk a little bit more about 
that in the closed session. Not much, really none significant.
    We have not seen a flow of fighters, and I can give you 
some precise numbers in the closed session. We just haven't 
seen much of that yet out of Syria. I know there is a lot of 
discussion of that, but it is just not evident to us. And we 
look at that pretty closely. And that could change, but that is 
sort of what we see right now.
    Mrs. Bice. I want to take a step back. We were discussing 
in previous lines of questioning the Taliban and what has 
happened in Afghanistan. During the NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] markup, I offered an amendment which 
required the DOD to report to Congress the security impacts of 
the release of the prisoners from Bagram Air Base. Can you 
share some of the security impacts that you have seen from 
CENTCOM AOR as a result of the prisoners' releases?
    General McKenzie. Sure. The release of the prisoners from 
Bagram, Parwan, and Pul-e-Charkhi, which the Taliban overran on 
or about the 13th to the 15th of August, first of all, injected 
about a thousand ISIS fighters back into the battlespace of 
Afghanistan. And that rejuvenated ISIS-K. And I believe the 
Taliban are going to grow to reject that--or to regret the 
decision to release those prisoners.
    It also released thousands of Taliban fighters and others 
who returned to the Taliban. But I think their action, 
shortsighted, actually, has had a profoundly negative effect on 
conditions inside Afghanistan. I believe, ultimately, unless we 
are able to keep effective CT pressure on ISIS in particular, 
they will have the opportunity to grow and seek to strike us 
here in the homeland.
    Mrs. Bice. And you mentioned that earlier.
    Last question. It is widely known that large swaths of the 
telecom infrastructure throughout the continent of Africa are 
run on Chinese-produced hardware, including Huawei and ZTE 
[Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment]. I have long been 
concerned with the network security threats from compromised 
Chinese-produced hardware. Can you talk about your level of 
concern with these types of threats from AFRICOM AOR?
    General Townsend. Yes. So, part of that extensive Chinese 
investment on the African continent is telecommunications, as 
you just mentioned. Huawei is endemic across the continent. 
They are building smart cities/safe cities, which are going to 
connect everything in those cities, and it will report back to 
Beijing. Usually, it reports back to Beijing before it reports 
to the host nation's capital. So, that is a fairly significant 
threat that I don't think we truly understand the implications 
of, and we won't until sometime in the future.
    Mrs. Bice. Do you think our allies are aware of that?
    General Townsend. Yes. I believe that they are. But, at the 
same time, they are wanting to pull their countries into the 
modern world. And so, China is offering very lucrative 
technologies that they probably wouldn't be able to access 
otherwise. And so, I think they are going into it mostly with 
eyes open.
    Mrs. Bice. Do you think there is any effective response 
that the U.S. could have to this type of coercion, if you will?
    General Townsend. I think probably--and I will defer to Ms. 
Baker--but I think probably having an economical alternative--
right?--some competitive alternatives on the economic side in 
the free market is probably the best alternative.
    Mrs. Bice. I love the word ``free market,'' General. Are we 
too far down the path, though, with the amount of equipment 
that has been installed in Africa, to really impact in a 
positive way the continent?
    General Townsend. No, I don't believe that we are.
    Mrs. Bice. Okay.
    General Townsend. In the countries, in the safe cities that 
are already being established, yes, but, elsewhere, I don't 
believe that we are.
    Mrs. Bice. Ms. Baker.
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, if I could just add to that, I 
think our strategy, as it relates to the telecommunications 
infrastructure and the China challenge, is twofold. The first, 
as General Townsend said, is we are trying to make sure that 
partners and allies in the region, not only in AFRICOM, but 
globally, have the information that we see about the threat 
that this poses to their infrastructure and the potential 
vulnerabilities that it will introduce into their systems. So, 
that is part one; it is sort of an educational aspect.
    We are also--and this is not a Department of Defense lead, 
but as an administration--looking at technological solutions 
that would allow some of these countries to get after that 
telecommunications capability that they are so desperate to 
get, but in a way that is safer.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentlewoman's time has 
expired.
    Mrs. Murphy is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    One of the areas that I have had some concerns about is 
Iran's, both direct and through proxies, influence in Syria and 
Lebanon. In fact, I was able to secure a provision in the 
fiscal year 2020 Intelligence Authorization Act to ask the DNI 
[Director of National Intelligence] to report to us a bit about 
those efforts by Iran and how those efforts might impact U.S. 
interests and our allies, including Israel.
    I was wondering if you all could provide me with a bit of 
an update on Iran's efforts to expand its influence in Syria 
and Lebanon.
    General McKenzie. Yes, ma'am, I will begin. I will begin 
with Lebanon.
    As I spoke a little bit earlier, Iran sees Lebanon as the 
terminus of a land bridge to the Mediterranean that gives them 
a perch from which they can launch attacks on Israel. So, their 
interest in Lebanon is wholly transactional and is limited to 
that.
    They exercise influence in Lebanon through Lebanese 
Hezbollah, LH, a shadow organization that we recognize has 
penetrated many aspects of Lebanese society, but then again, 
doesn't actually do much for the Lebanese. And our response to 
that is, at my level, the mil-to-mil level, despite many other 
things we are doing for the government of Lebanon writ large, 
is we work very hard to sustain the Lebanese Armed Forces as 
the single military representative of the properly constituted 
government of Lebanon.
    It is not a perfect relationship, but I believe in the long 
term our best solution, and the strategy that we follow, is to 
assist that armed force. I speak to the Chief of Defense of 
Lebanon frequently, and I believe that they remain our best 
opportunity to balance the other nefarious actors that are in 
Lebanon.
    If we turn to Syria, again, Iran's interest in Syria, 
wholly transactional, wholly negative. It is the sort of middle 
part of a land bridge that allows them to get into Israel. It 
also serves as a staging place for potential attacks against 
Israel and allows them, also, to stage for operations inside 
Iraq, which is a long-term focus of Syrian foreign policy and 
military strategy.
    Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you.
    And then, just shifting a little bit, The Wall Street 
Journal reported yesterday that Saudi Arabia is considering 
accepting the Chinese yuan as payment for oil exports, which 
currently only accepts U.S. dollars. This is following up on 
news that Saudi Arabia had invited the Chinese President to 
visit the Kingdom on an official trip.
    I think when I think about the prospect of a growing Saudi-
Chinese relationship, it is a little concerning, especially 
given the historical partnership between the United States and 
the Kingdom. What is your assessment of current Saudi-Chinese 
relations and the impact that it could have on the United 
States relationship, as well as our influence in the region?
    General McKenzie. Ma'am, I can only talk really in my lane 
at the mil-to-mil level. But I will note that I have a good 
relationship with the Saudi Chief of Defense. We talk 
frequently. It is my belief that we remain the preferred 
partner of choice for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They want 
our equipment, and they want more than our equipment, which is, 
demonstrably, the best available--they want the training, the 
education, and all the things that come with a partnership with 
America.
    As for outreach to the Chinese and what they might do with 
oil sales there, probably not my lane to answer. I will defer 
to Ms. Baker on that.
    Ms. Baker. Yes, I mean, I agree completely with everything 
that General McKenzie has said. The only thing I would add 
perhaps, by way of context, it is clear to us, I think, that 
strategic competition has come to the Middle East, and perhaps 
has been there for quite some time. And so, we do see China and 
Russia, but particularly China, looking for economic and other 
inroads with some of our partners and allies.
    As General McKenzie said, from a defense perspective, we 
believe that those relationships are strong; that we remain the 
partner of choice, and that there are things that we bring to 
the table, and that we are offering to partners and allies in 
the region, that, frankly, China and others can't match.
    Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General McKenzie, thank you again for your service to this 
great Nation, and Semper Fi.
    I just have a pretty straightforward question for you on 
Afghanistan. Just given how the withdrawal--not the 20 years, 
not the mistakes that we made--but given how this withdrawal 
was conducted, which I think most would say was a bit of a 
debacle, any regrets?
    General McKenzie. I think the end game for Afghanistan that 
played out in the summer of 2021, those events didn't begin in 
the spring of 2021 or the summer of 2021. You have got to look 
all the way back for that.
    Certainly, I regret that we no longer have the ability to 
be as effective as we would like to be on the ground in 
Afghanistan and the CT mission. We are doing that over the 
horizon. As I have said, it is much harder to do that over the 
horizon. And I will talk in great detail about that in the 
closed session. So, I certainly regret that we no longer have 
that opportunity.
    Mr. Waltz. I have spoken with a number of the 13 Gold Star 
families who are now without their loved ones because of an 
ISIS fighter suicide bomber that was released from Bagram 
Prison just weeks before. I just received notes from Afghan 
women who served in the military alongside us that are being 
hunted down right now with the database that we left behind, 
with the payroll database. No regrets there? Nothing we could 
have done differently in terms of how we exited?
    General McKenzie. I think you go back to the basic 
strategic decision that we were leaving, and everything else 
flows from that basic strategic decision that we are going to 
leave, and we are going to leave completely. And everything 
flows from that.
    Mr. Waltz. And was that the right decision, in your view?
    General McKenzie. My opinion has been--and I have stated it 
publicly--that we should have retained a small presence in 
Afghanistan. I argued for 4,500 in the fall of 2020, and as we 
went into the spring of 2021, it was my opinion--and remains my 
opinion today--that about 2,500 would have given us adequate 
forces on the ground to retain an advising capability.
    Mr. Waltz. I appreciate that. And I appreciate your 
reminding this committee of that, because I think we are going 
to come to regret this decision. And I think it is going to be 
felt in the homeland, and it is going to be felt by future 
American soldiers that have to go fight their way back in to 
deal with it.
    Ms. Baker, along those lines, the FY22 [fiscal year 2022] 
NDAA required an over-the-horizon strategy within 60 days of 
passage. That was about a month ago. You are a month late. 
Where is that strategy?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I don't know the exact progress of 
that strategy. I would be happy to look into it and get you an 
answer.
    Mr. Waltz. You don't know the progress of an over-the-
horizon strategy required by law? The President of the United 
States has cited the over-the-horizon strategy. Secretary 
Austin, your boss, here, the last time he was here, said we can 
do over the horizon; we can keep America safe.
    I am in my district saying, ``The administration says we 
can do this,'' even though, as a special operator, I know 
better. What is the status?
    General McKenzie, have you chopped on it and sent it up to 
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]?
    General McKenzie. That strategy is working right now. I 
have, we have had the opportunity to work on that strategy. And 
we actually have a practical strategy that is in effect right 
now. Again, it is something I would be happy to talk about in 
the closed session.
    Ms. Baker. And, Congressman, if I could just clarify, we do 
have a strategy for over the horizon. What I was referring to 
is the specific report. I don't know what the status of that 
report is, but I will get you an answer.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 121.]
    Mr. Waltz. Okay.
    Let's take a step back. We just had a successful strike 
against the leader of ISIS, the successor, in Syria. And as I 
have stated in this committee before, but I think it is worth 
repeating, we had local allies that helped with that. Correct? 
The Kurds. We have bases in the region in Jordan, Turkey, 
Israel, northern Iraq, right?
    General McKenzie. Sir, I would still characterize that 
strike--and as you know, I am the officer who did it--I would 
still characterize----
    Mr. Waltz. Would you characterize that as over the horizon?
    General McKenzie. That is over the horizon.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay.
    General McKenzie. I would characterize that as an over-the-
horizon strike----
    Mr. Waltz. Let's look at the map again. Do we have any 
bases in any neighboring country in Afghanistan?
    General McKenzie. No. The difference is, as you note, the 
distances are far greater going into Afghanistan. Conceptually, 
it is the same thing. The distances are greater; the risks will 
be higher. And you are well aware of that, sir. I know you----
    Mr. Waltz. Right. Are we still reliant on Pakistan for 
overflight of our ISR assets?
    General McKenzie. There is no other way to get into 
Afghanistan for me right now.
    Mr. Waltz. Pakistan has historically supported the Taliban, 
correct?
    General McKenzie. They have also supported us. The air line 
of communication is a direct reflect of Pakistan's support of 
us.
    Mr. Waltz. But it is a bit like asking the arsonist for 
access for the fire department to put out the fire, should the 
homeland be threatened again. We are reliant, just to be clear, 
we are reliant on Pakistan for that overflight. Otherwise, we 
have got to fight our way in.
    General McKenzie. We are reliant on Pakistan, but, as you 
know, we always reserve the right to defend ourselves anywhere 
in the world.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Crow is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to all of you for your service to the country 
and for coming in.
    And particularly, General Townsend and General McKenzie, in 
your last appearance here before the committee, I applaud you 
for your long and honorable service to the country.
    General McKenzie, I understand very deeply that decisions 
are made here in Washington, and strategic decisions are made, 
and the military has to carry it out. And I want to thank you 
for your service and candor before this committee and the 
American people on Afghanistan and related issues.
    And, General Townsend, as much as I want to start with you, 
as a fellow Ranger, I am actually going to start and direct my 
comments to Ms. Baker.
    Ms. Baker, what is the timeline for the National Defense 
Strategy? When can we expect to have that released by the 
administration?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I can't provide you with a specific 
date. I can tell you that it is in final coordination, and we 
are hopeful to get it over to you all and out to the public 
very soon.
    Mr. Crow. Okay. And has that been held up because of the 
recent events in Ukraine?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I think it is only appropriate for 
us to take a look at what has happened in Ukraine and make sure 
that we are reflecting that in the strategy. I will say that 
the NDS [National Defense Strategy], as it has been developed 
over the course of the last year, we believe is very resilient 
to current events, and, in fact, continues to sort of--the 
bones of it are going to remain unchanged.
    Mr. Crow. I can certainly appreciate that, and appreciate 
that you are taking into account some of the current events as 
well that have changed the landscape a bit.
    Focusing in on Africa, we have this notion, this proclivity 
to kind of look at China as 10-feet tall sometimes. And 
certainly, they are making big investments, and it would be a 
mistake for us to underestimate them. But they are also making 
a lot of mistakes, right? And the use of Chinese labor, 
predatory economics, there is a lot of disenchantment that is 
growing within Africa in some places. So, they certainly have 
their weak points.
    And we have our strengths. One of our strengths is the fact 
that we have a larger value proposition. We can bring to the 
table economic, humanitarian, you know, our moral authority, a 
lot of things.
    How would you classify, very briefly, what is the elevator 
pitch for what is U.S.'s strategy in Africa? How would you 
explain our strategic posture in Africa and our goals?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman--and I would invite General Townsend 
to add to this--I think we have three goals in Africa right 
now. One is counter-VEO, and we do that by, with, and through 
our partners.
    The second is, to that same point, we are working to 
strengthen those partnerships and strengthen----
    Mr. Crow. Well, those are--I don't mean to interrupt--those 
are things to do. Those are tasks, enablers. What is our 
overarching goal? How do we want to be known in Africa? And how 
would you classify our engagement?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I mean, I certainly think that our 
goal in Africa is to be the continent's strategic partner of 
choice.
    Mr. Crow. Okay. So, with that in mind, from your perch at 
DOD--and the U.S. Government often has silos, right? You know, 
the State Department has their silo and their lane, DOD, USAID. 
If our value proposition is to coordinate all of that and bring 
that all to bear in a way that our force multiplies each of 
those elements, how can we better do that and what are the 
impediments to achieving that right now?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I think we are always working to 
break down those silos, as you well know from your time in 
uniform.
    I will say I think--and General Townsend, again, can jump 
in here--but it works better in the AFRICOM AOR. The 
integration of our defense, diplomacy, and development efforts; 
the fact that General Townsend has folks from USAID and State 
sitting right beside him at his headquarters.
    So, I think we have made a lot of progress in AFRICOM. And 
frankly, there are things we can learn from AFRICOM and apply 
to other COCOMs [combatant commands].
    General Townsend. So, I think she has got our strategic 
goal exactly right. We want to be the strategic partner of 
choice. That translates into sustained U.S. access and 
influence on the continent. And that will come in handy in a 
million ways that we can't even foresee today.
    Regarding the integration of, you know, the breaking down 
of silos, we try really hard to do that every day in AFRICOM. 
Dr. Baker has mentioned the fact that we have a 3D [three 
dimensional] command, built that way, purpose-built that way 
from the start.
    One of my most senior leaders is a senior State Department 
ambassador. I have got a senior development advisor from USAID. 
We look at everything through that 3D lens every day to be the 
strategic partner of choice, and maintain U.S. access and 
influence.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you. I appreciate everyone's hard work.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Just a programming note. As I mentioned, at 1 o'clock, we 
will have a classified brief upstairs on Ukraine. So, we will 
be concluding this at 12:45 to give the committee and everyone 
time to sort of move up and get settled. So, we will wrap this 
open hearing up at 12:45, and then, of course, we will be 
seeing all of these folks again at 2:30 for the classified 
portion of it.
    Mr. Bergman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General McKenzie, General Townsend, thank you for your 
decades of leadership. It takes leadership to do what we need 
to do.
    Ms. Baker, General McKenzie, let me lay out a scenario for 
you. Under the 2015 JCPOA, Russia removed all excess low-
enriched uranium and nuclear materials from Iran. If a similar 
requirement exists in a new deal, and if Iran subsequently 
believes the agreement has been violated, or that it has not 
received the promised sanctions relief, will Russia, could 
Russia be in a position to return enriched uranium to Iran? In 
essence, would that potentially put Vladimir Putin in the 
position of being the de facto judge of compliance with the new 
agreement?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, as you know, there is no agreement 
yet. And there are----
    Mr. Bergman. Again, it was a scenario.
    Ms. Baker. Understood. We don't know whether Russia will 
play that role in a future agreement. Certainly, in whatever 
agreement is reached, if an agreement is reached, we would seek 
to pressure-test it against any kind of interference of that 
kind from the Russians. To this point, we have not seen any 
indication, though, that they intend to act in that way.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. General McKenzie, in an UNCLASS 
[unclassified] way, given the ongoing need to deploy U.S. air 
defenses to Europe, how do you assess our, the United States, 
ability to deploy and/or sustain similar systems in the Middle 
East as a stopgap to help defend our Gulf allies, or at least 
until they are much better able to defend themselves?
    General McKenzie. Sir, over the last few years, we have 
worked closely with our Gulf allies to expand their ability to 
defend themselves. And, in fact, some of those countries have 
very significant air defense inventories. Saudi Arabia has over 
20 Patriot batteries. UAE has a number of Patriot batteries as 
well. And as you know, UAE actually possesses THAAD [Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense], the high altitude system which was 
tested successfully just last month.
    So, the way that we actually accommodate the basic fact of 
life that we don't enough U.S. Patriots to service all of our 
needs globally, is through enhanced cooperation with our 
allies. We are still there. We still have Patriots in the 
theater. We still work with them. But what you do is you try to 
think about the way nations can cooperate with each other, and 
I will talk a little bit more about that in the closed session. 
But there is a path forward.
    And really, the countries in the region are the ones that 
are directly threatened by the Iranian threat. They are 
focused, I believe, in a way they have never been focused 
before by the imminence of that threat, the fact--the quality 
and number of the Iranian missiles and LACMs, land attack 
cruise missiles, and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], is very 
concerning to them. So, there is a real convergence of interest 
on the part of our partners now.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. And basically, I think my next question 
is going to be best answered in the closed, classified session 
about the engagement with our partners. You kind of alluded to 
that, and the preparation and the training and the cooperation 
to confront and deter a nuclear Iran, should that possibility 
become a potential reality.
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back and save my 
questions for the classified session.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And, General Townsend and General McKenzie, thank you for 
your many years of service to our country. I say that with 
great gratitude for the American people. We are lucky to have 
had you in your posts.
    And thank you, Secretary Baker, for your service now.
    General McKenzie, I applaud the Department's commitment to 
improve its policy in order to better protect civilians, 
especially with Secretary Austin's new memorandum entitled 
``Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response.'' As we have 
seen several times just in this year alone, the U.S., 
tragically, can get it wrong sometimes. With this new 
memorandum from the Secretary, including standing up a Civilian 
Protection Center for Excellence, and issuing a forthcoming 
Civilian Harm Mitigation Response Action Plan, how do you 
believe this directive will impact the AOR's operations going 
forward?
    General McKenzie. Sir, thank you for the question.
    I would like to begin by saying nobody wearing this uniform 
ever wants to kill an innocent civilian. Nobody ever wants to 
do that. There is nothing that is more completely antithetical 
from the way we operate. We have made mistakes and we have 
killed innocent civilians, and we acknowledge that. And we are 
going to do everything we can to get better and narrow that gap 
between our ideals and our actions.
    I will tell you, with Secretary Austin, it is much more 
than a memorandum. It is the energy he has brought to the 
problem. I have several officers that are full-time committed 
to a study that is going on right now that will form the basis 
for future actions.
    But, in the meantime, you know, we are not waiting on that 
study. As a result of the RAND study and other studies that 
have come out, we have undertaken a set of things in the short 
term to improve our own processes within Central Command, as 
General Townsend has within Africa Command.
    So, we don't want to minimize this problem. We recognize 
that it is, in fact, a significant and a critical problem that 
cuts right to the very heart of what we want to do, as 
representatives of the United States.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    General Townsend, Africa nations are increasingly 
influential in the United Nations and other international 
forums. Currently, 3 of 15 United Nations Security Council 
seats are held by African nations--with the Kenyan U.N. 
ambassador giving an extremely powerful speech at the UNSC 
meeting regarding Ukraine.
    Unfortunately, there is a lot of public misunderstanding 
about the AOR. You have been commander of AFRICOM for over 2\1/
2\ years. What are some of the misconceptions you hear from 
both American officials and the American public about the AOR? 
And how can we approach the AOR in a more productive and 
effective manner?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman.
    I think some of the main misconceptions are probably that, 
first of all, Africa doesn't really matter to us; that we don't 
have to worry about Africa. And maybe America has been able to 
largely ignore Africa in the past, but that is not the future. 
And that is why I said in my opening statement: America cannot 
ignore Africa. So, that is probably the number one 
misperception.
    And then, I think they don't understand that we have a lot 
of interest and a lot of partners there every day. We have a 
great relationship with much of Africa. We are the partner of 
choice for much of Africa, and just educating the American 
public on that.
    You mentioned the vote on Ukraine. And you are right, the 
Kenyan ambassador did give a powerful speech and he voted to 
condemn what the Russians were doing there.
    But I am a little dismayed about much of the rest of the 
continent. About half of the continent voted to condemn Russia. 
The other half either abstained or did not vote, and that 
concerns me. Only one country, though, did vote in support of 
Russia, Eritrea. But the other--one-half of the continent 
didn't really cast a vote, and that concerns me a bit. But many 
of the countries that we are the strongest partners with did 
join us, and the world, in condemning Russia.
    So, I think the future for this country's security is in 
Africa, and we have to lean into it.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    General Townsend and Secretary Baker, around the world, 
violent extremism has been a very difficult problem to address, 
in particular in the AFRICOM AOR. From a report on recent 
trends in militant Islamic group activity in Africa the past 
few years, it appears there has been an alarming increase in 
violent events by these groups, including Al-Shabaab and al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib area.
    What is the biggest impediment to being able to better 
address these threats? Do you think the U.S. needs to amend our 
strategy in the AOR?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I will start, and then, of course, 
turn to General Townsend.
    I think the challenge that we face in the AFRICOM AOR--and 
part of what is driving the growth in VEOs--is challenges of 
underlying governance and underlying security. And so, a lot of 
our effort in the AOR is dedicated towards institutional 
capacity-building, building that security----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 121.]
    The Chairman. I apologize, the gentleman's time has 
expired. I should point that out upfront.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Even if you are in the middle of answering 
the question, we try to wrap up as close as possible, to 
respect other members' time.
    Mr. Banks is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General McKenzie, the original JCPOA was finalized in July 
of 2015. Iran tested missiles in October 2015, before the deal 
was even implemented in January of 2016. All of this directly 
contradicted the Obama administration's objective to change 
Iran's behavior for better through the deal. Then, after the 
implementation of the JCPOA in January of 2016, Iran tested 
missiles again in March of 2016.
    General Lloyd Austin, the then-commander of CENTCOM, said 
in a Senate hearing at the time that, despite the JCPOA, quote, 
``There are a number of things that lead me to personally 
believe that, you know, their behavior is not--they haven't 
changed any course yet.'' End quote.
    General McKenzie, 6 years later, do you agree with then-
General Austin's assessment of Iran's behavior following the 
implementation of the JCPOA?
    General McKenzie. With regard to ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles, land attack----
    Mr. Banks. That it didn't change their behavior?
    General McKenzie. Their behavior has not changed.
    Mr. Banks. Do you think that the Islamic Republic of Iran 
will ever give up its revisionist intentions in the region? And 
if not, what does a successful counter-Iran policy look like?
    General McKenzie. Well, I think you begin by Iran not 
possessing nuclear weapons, and that needs to be an 
overarching--that is our overarching goal. I think it is better 
for everyone if Iran doesn't have a nuclear weapon.
    We should, then, try to find ways to bring their ballistic 
missiles, the other elements of their national power that they 
value very highly, under some form of control. And you are 
right, they have proven extremely resistant to that up until 
this time.
    Mr. Banks. I appreciate that candidness.
    The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
reported, on August 10, 2021, that Iran possesses the largest 
and most diverse missile arsenal in the Middle East and is a 
major hub for weapons proliferation. If some form of the JCPOA 
is restored, how do you expect Iran to behave regarding missile 
proliferation amongst partner and proxy groups?
    General McKenzie. Based on past behavior, I would expect 
not much modification in that behavior.
    Mr. Banks. And can you tell us, specifically, how CENTCOM 
is prepared to deal with that?
    General McKenzie. So, we work to prevent their successful 
attacks by working with our partners for integrated air and 
missile defense across the theater; by enhancing the 
capabilities of all our partners' air defenses, in effect. And 
that is the best way to do it.
    I would also argue that Iran knows that, if they strike us, 
we are prepared to respond very powerfully, if need be. So, we 
attempt to achieve deterrence. And that has largely worked over 
the past couple of years.
    I note the attack last weekend, but let me emphasize again, 
that attack was actually not directed at us.
    Mr. Banks. Understood.
    General, as one of his first foreign policy initiatives, 
President Biden delisted the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen 
as a foreign terrorist organization. But, instead of de-
escalating tension, the Houthis doubled their attacks on Saudi 
Arabia in 2021 and occupied the U.S. embassy compound in Sana'a 
and took the local staff hostage. In late 2021 and early 2022, 
the Houthis also attacked UAE three times, killing three 
people.
    In the way the Houthis have conducted themselves, General, 
do you think that the Houthis are terrorists?
    General McKenzie. I would defer to Policy, Ms. Baker, for a 
discussion about that, the delisting decision. But I can tell 
you, from an operational military perspective, they continue to 
wage war on their neighbors, both Saudi Arabia and UAE, and 
they wage irresponsible, reckless war without regard for 
casualties.
    Mr. Banks. I understand as well that you would probably 
defer as I ask: Why do you think the Iran-backed Houthis 
increased hostility since the Biden administration delisted 
them as a foreign terrorist organization?
    General McKenzie. I am sorry, would you say that again, 
please?
    Mr. Banks. Well, why do you think that the Iran-backed 
Houthis increased their hostility after the Biden 
administration delisted them as a foreign terrorist 
organization?
    General McKenzie. I think they still--I think the Houthis 
still believe there is a military means to achieve their end. I 
don't believe they are right in that, but it doesn't matter 
what I think; it is what they think.
    Mr. Banks. How does CENTCOM plan to address the Houthis' 
behavior moving forward?
    General McKenzie. So, we have worked closely with both our 
UAE partners. In the wake of this most recent attack, we sent 
fifth-generation fighters to UAE. We moved a ballistic missile 
defense-capable destroyer to the vicinity of UAE. We have 
conducted refueling of UAE fighters that are flying combat air 
patrol. And we have shared intelligence with the UAE on that. 
So, we have done some very discrete, measurable things to help 
our partners in UAE.
    Mr. Banks. I have got 30 seconds left. Ms. Baker, why did 
the Biden administration delist the Houthis as a foreign 
terrorist organization?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, you know, I think no one in the 
administration--certainly no one in the Department--takes 
lightly the threat that the Houthis pose in the region. And as 
General McKenzie said, we are attempting to get after that 
problem, and we are providing any number of avenues of support, 
both to the UAE and to the Saudis.
    Mr. Banks. This is outrageous.
    With that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Speier is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General McKenzie and Townsend, we can't begin to thank you 
enough for your extraordinary service, but know that we are 
very grateful.
    Let me start with, the report that was just released a few 
days ago detailing the significant failures in training and 
physical security at the U.S. Cooperative Security Location in 
Kenya, where we lost a service member and two DOD contractors. 
It was alarming to read that there was inadequate focus on 
force protection, inadequate understanding of the threat, 
inadequate security force preparation, and problems with 
mission command.
    What has that taught us in terms of looking at other 
cooperative facilities in Africa as to our responsibility to 
harden them in terms of security?
    General Townsend. Thanks, ma'am.
    Well, first, let me say we certainly regret the loss of the 
lives of our three Americans there at Manda Bay. We studied 
this situation in great detail over the last 2 years and have 
applied the lessons learned across the African continent. All 
the things you mentioned that are in that report were all true, 
regretfully so.
    I think they go back, they stem back to incorrect threat 
assessments. So, when commanders and leaders look at threat 
assessments, that is their first understanding, and that leads 
them down--can lead them down the wrong path unless they----
    Ms. Speier. So, are you saying now that all of our 
facilities in Africa have been hardened and have greater 
protection? Or do we have some areas where we need to do more? 
And should you alert us to those?
    General Townsend. All of our facilities have been improved 
since the attack at Manda Bay. We applied those lessons across 
all of them. However, we do have to continue that work. We have 
got to improve our foxhole every day. That work continues, and 
we do have requirements in that area.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you.
    Ms. Baker, in the NDAA last year, an amendment that I 
authored to request the status of African women--excuse me--
Afghan women and girls since the Taliban takeover was due March 
1st. We haven't received it. When will we receive that?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I don't know the status of that 
specific report, but I would be glad to look into it and make 
sure we get it to you.
    Ms. Speier. All right. Would you report back to the 
committee, then, as to when we can expect that report?
    Ms. Baker. Yes, absolutely.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Ms. Speier. All right.
    Ms. Baker and General McKenzie, as far back as October, DOD 
said it would be making payments to the families of those who 
were killed on the August 29th drone attack. Can you tell us 
the status of those payments?
    General McKenzie. Ma'am, we are moving forward with those 
payments in the interagency. I can talk a little bit more about 
it in the closed session. CENTCOM stands ready to carry out 
instructions on how to execute those payments, once a decision 
is made.
    Ms. Speier. Well, I thought we already made a decision to 
make payments to those families.
    General McKenzie. The modality of the payment and how it is 
actually going to be executed.
    Ms. Speier. So, are you saying that there hasn't been any 
payments made to these families yet?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I just want to be a little careful 
about what we discuss in the public session, because we don't 
want to put these families at further risk, but we would be 
happy to get you that information and talk about it in the 
closed session this afternoon. There has been progress made----
    Ms. Speier. I just want to make clear that, when we make a 
commitment, we deliver on it. And we have a history----
    Ms. Baker. We will deliver.
    Ms. Speier [continuing]. Of not doing that. So, I have your 
word that we are going to deliver to those families?
    Ms. Baker. This has the attention of the highest of our 
leadership, yes.
    Ms. Speier. Can any of you tell us the extent of RT [Russia 
Today] in Africa?
    General Townsend. The extent of what, ma'am? I didn't catch 
it.
    Ms. Speier. Russia Today.
    General Townsend. Right. So, I can't specifically talk 
about that particular media outlet. I can say this: Russia has 
extensive media engagement on the continent, and that is 
greatly facilitated by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the oligarch, and his 
media arm, in addition to--you know, he has the Wagner 
mercenaries, but he has got a media arm that does that.
    Ms. Speier. You know, I do think our committee has to take 
very seriously the impact of RT around the world. I just came 
back from Latin America, where not only is it pervasive and 
ubiquitous, it is perceived to be objective. It is perceived to 
be just a legitimate TV network. And----
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired. She makes 
an outstanding point, however, on the need to engage more in 
the information warfare.
    Ms. Speier. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I completely concur with my colleague regarding the risk 
that RT poses, and it seems to appear more legitimate and 
objective when Members of Congress go on RT. And so, I 
associate myself with the gentlelady's comments, and perhaps 
you could share them with the gentleman from California who 
chairs the Intelligence Committee, who I have seen on RT 
talking about legislation, giving them credibility.
    Ms. Baker----
    Ms. Speier. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Gaetz. I only have a few moments, but I would love to 
chat with you about it further.
    Ms. Baker, you said, in response to Congresswoman Bice's 
questions, we have heard Israel's concerns about the JCPOA. 
What are they?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I think Israel remains concerned, 
as do we all, about Iran's malign activity in the region beyond 
its nuclear program. And that is something that we discuss with 
them regularly.
    Mr. Gaetz. So, their concern is a better resourced Iran, 
whether through sanctions relief or cash payments, would be 
more capable in taking action against Israel? Does that 
[inaudible] it?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, that is my understanding, yes.
    Mr. Gaetz. And can we learn anything about whether or not 
cash payments are on the table as part of a renewed JCPOA?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I am not able to discuss the 
details of the agreement, only because there is no agreement 
that has been reached at this point. I think there has been 
progress made toward an agreement, but, of course, the issues 
that are remaining are some of the most complex. So, you know, 
I----
    Mr. Gaetz. I understand that in a negotiation, you know, 
nothing is settled until everything is settled.
    Ms. Baker. Exactly.
    Mr. Gaetz. But there are contours of an agreement, as we 
get closer to it. And since the administration has been working 
on an Iran deal, I was wondering whether or not we could take 
off the table infusions of cash. Because when I asked General 
McKenzie some years ago whether or not the cash payments that 
the Obama administration permitted to Iran increased that very 
malign activity that Israel is concerned about, that we are 
concerned about, his answer was that there was more malign 
activity following the last JCPOA.
    Ms. Baker. Again, Congressman, I understand the concern. I 
am just not able to discuss specifics of the agreement that is 
being negotiated by the State Department, and----
    Mr. Gaetz. So, you are not in position to be able to say 
that cash payments are off the table?
    Ms. Baker. I am not in a position to be able to discuss the 
specifics of the agreement in any form.
    Mr. Gaetz. General Townsend, is Vladimir Putin bringing 
African mercenaries to the fight in Ukraine?
    General Townsend. I have heard those reports. We haven't 
seen that yet. We are watching for that very closely. However, 
I do believe they are bringing Wagner fighters from Africa to 
Ukraine.
    Mr. Gaetz. And, General McKenzie, have you seen Vladimir 
Putin successfully bring Syrian mercenaries to the fight in 
Ukraine?
    General McKenzie. Not yet. We watch that closely. I can't 
say one or two people haven't gone, but we haven't seen any 
systemic movement.
    Mr. Gaetz. Great.
    I will yield the remainder of my time to my Florida 
colleague, Mr. Franklin.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Waltz.
    General, in your testimony and throughout your statement--I 
am sorry, General McKenzie--in your written testimony here 
today and throughout the questioning, you made it clear that 
you consider Iran to be the biggest threat to stability in the 
CENTCOM AOR.
    During my travels throughout the region, and most recently, 
in Israel 2 weeks ago, the recurring theme is the malign 
influence of Iran's proxies. You also spoke of those in your 
testimony. Do you consider the IRGC [Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps] to be one of the drivers and facilitators of these 
proxies?
    General McKenzie. The IRGC and its elite element, the Quds 
Force, absolutely at the very heart of these activities.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. It has been reported, and as recently 
as yesterday in the press, that the Biden administration is 
considering delisting the IRGC as a terror organization. I know 
that decision involves a lot of factors that are beyond your 
lane, but strictly on your military advice, do you think that 
would be a good idea?
    General McKenzie. I will defer on that one. I would not--I 
think they certainly are very disruptive and dangerous in the 
region. That remains my best military advice, and we should 
treat them like that.
    Mr. Franklin. And if they are emboldened or strengthened, 
do you think that would make them a more formidable----
    General McKenzie. I think anything you do to embolden or 
strengthen them would have a negative effect across the region.
    Mr. Franklin. Sure. Okay.
    Echoing some of my other colleagues here with respect to 
Israel, people we met with there were crystal clear that, 
historically, whether it has been cash payments from the Obama 
administration or any activities that lead to putting money in 
the coffers of Iran, there is a direct correlation to the pace 
of intensity of attacks when that money flows in there. Is it 
your opinion that buying Iranian oil and lessening sanction on 
Iran would lead to an increase in IRGC activity?
    General McKenzie. I think any--I think the Iranian economy 
as a whole is penetrated thoroughly by the IRGC. So, it is hard 
to see where money flows inside the Iranian economy and how 
much of it is used for legitimate reasons and how much of it is 
used for illegitimate reasons.
    Mr. Franklin. Roger that. Thank you, General.
    And I appreciate my colleague yielding his time.
    The Chairman. If I could just follow up on that point, so 
we--I forget exactly when--but we left the JCPOA in 2017, 2018, 
something like that. So, we went right back in, maximum 
sanctions.
    Would you say that Iranian malign activity since we left 
the JCPOA has increased?
    General McKenzie. I would, Chairman.
    The Chairman. And that is the point, as you have said. The 
point of the JCPOA is to stop them from getting a nuclear 
weapon. It would appear that Iran's ability to do malign things 
in the region doesn't seem to be tied to the JCPOA, because 
they are still incredibly active, even though we have been out 
of it for 3 years, 4 years now. So, just want to let members 
chew on that one.
    Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I just want to piggyback a little bit on the comment 
that you just made about the JCPOA. When you look at the 
evolution of Iran's malign activity, as you mentioned, we 
really do have to look at the withdrawal from the JCPOA, 
instead of looking at just a narrow window. It is just like 
with our conversations on Afghanistan. We need to take a step 
back and look at the broader historical movement.
    But, anyhow, thank you for making that point, and I just 
wanted to put an exclamation point on it.
    Thank you so much, Chairman, for this hearing and for 
making sure that we have the opportunity to speak to our 
panelists.
    And to our panelists, I just want to express my gratitude 
to all of you for your service to our Nation, and for being 
here today to share your wisdom. And I look forward to the 
conversations in closed session as well.
    I have the honor and privilege of representing El Paso, 
Texas, which is home to Fort Bliss, America's second-largest 
military installation and largest joint mobilization force 
generation installation in the Army.
    And obviously, the regions of the world that you all are 
postured in have long been plagued by violence, instability, 
and war. In some cases, that has been furthered by us. But as 
we look to the future, and especially beyond our withdrawal 
from Afghanistan, ahead of the challenges that we need to 
confront, not just today, but going forward, challenges posed 
by Iran, China, Russia, and the terrorist groups that they 
empower in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM areas of operation, we have 
got to be strategic with our engagement and our posture in this 
ongoing battle, especially that battle between democracy and 
authoritarianism.
    General McKenzie, I was just in Israel, and I had the 
opportunity to see for myself the warmer relations that exist 
between Israel and Arab states. It really is a source of great 
hope, and it is clear that the relationship has created some 
stability in the region.
    And I am pleased that CENTCOM, under your leadership, has 
embraced this new reality. But we know that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict remains a source of tremendous friction, 
and that threat is always just over the horizon. The fighting 
last May is a prime example of how the conflict in that region 
can very quickly escalate and become violence. Everyone there, 
and here, we are all concerned that the cycles of violence will 
only continue.
    But, from an American national security perspective, do you 
believe that such rounds of violence have adversely impacted 
America's defense posture? And if so, is there a national 
security impetus for the United States to take an active role 
in improving the reality on the ground, in order to help create 
the conditions needed to achieve a two-state solution? And if 
so, how?
    General McKenzie. Ma'am, the entry of Israel into the AOR 
was a significant historical event. And so, what it has done 
is, it is sort of the operational expression of what began with 
the Abraham Accords and other normalization activities that go 
forward. And so, the relationship that Israel is developing 
with its Arab neighbors is going to be profoundly significant 
in the years ahead.
    Something that is an irritant to those good relationships 
is, of course, the struggle with the Palestinians. And that is 
an irritant to the Arabs, to many of them, and I think it is a 
significant factor. Anything we could do to reduce that, to 
reduce that as an irritant to those relationships, would 
contribute to not only Israeli security, not only security 
across the region, but ultimately our own security.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much.
    And I have less than a minute left. But, generally 
speaking, to what extent does U.S. security assistance and 
coordination allow our regional partners to better coordinate 
with each other, and remove some of the regional security 
burdens that would otherwise fall more directly on American 
shoulders?
    General McKenzie. So, we have seen over the past year, year 
and a half, the opportunity for nations to share U.S. resources 
that one nation purchased, another nation had need of. There 
are processes that we go through to allow that, what we call a 
third-party transfer. And we have seen that work successfully. 
The specifics I would rather put into the closed session, but I 
am prepared to talk about that. But, yes, it is. It is 
something we have found valuable.
    I would simply tell you, we also struggle sometimes with 
the United States bureaucracy, when we attempt to do these 
moves. Sometimes we are our own most significant source of 
friction when nations want to share things like that.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, General McKenzie.
    I am out of time. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Panetta [presiding]. Thank you.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Carl from Alabama.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it.
    I apologize for popping in and out, but, as you well know, 
it is one of those days.
    Thank you to all of our speakers. I know it is time-
consuming for you to come here and take time away, but I 
appreciate you coming here.
    And oorah, General. I raised a Marine myself. So, I am very 
proud of that.
    General Townsend, you mentioned in your statement the 
growing Chinese influence in AFRICOM and their possible plans 
to establish a naval base on the western side of the continent, 
allowing the Chinese to do this project. How can we expand our 
naval capabilities to ensure that the Chinese do not have a 
dominant posture in this area?
    General Townsend. Congressman, I would defer to the 
Department and the Navy on how we might expand our naval 
capabilities there. The naval capabilities that I have today 
are sufficient to do what AFRICOM must do. They are not 
essential to precluding what China does on the Atlantic coast 
of Africa. They will be essential if China is successful in 
gaining a base there. In my view, we would have to invest more 
naval presence there and activity to further protect America 
from a Chinese naval base on the Atlantic coast.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir, and that is what I was after. I 
appreciate that.
    And I give my time back. That is the only question I have. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Carl.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Scott from Georgia for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ma'am, gentlemen, I appreciate your service.
    I slipped out for a few minutes to meet with a man named 
David Beasley, who is the head of the World Food Program. And I 
want to read to you one of his statements.
    ``We get 50 percent of our grains out of the Ukraine-Russia 
area. It's going to have a dramatic impact on food cost, 
shipping cost, oil, and fuel. This is a catastrophe on top of a 
catastrophe.''
    He pointed out that Sri Lanka right now--and I will just 
read the headline from Bloomberg--``Shockwaves from War in 
Ukraine Threaten to Swamp Sri Lanka.''
    In 2021, more than half of the grain for the U.N. World 
Food Program came from Ukraine. It is a tremendous exporter of 
wheat, corn, sunflower oil. Russia and Ukraine combined account 
for 30 percent of the global wheat exports. As this invasion 
continues, it is more and more unlikely that Ukrainian farmers 
will be able to plant their crops, or fertilize their crops, or 
harvest their crops, or export any of this food supply into the 
world. Developing countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
will feel the impact of this.
    And my question is, have you considered the instability and 
unrest that will soon be taking place around the world in your 
respective AORs? How can we help alleviate the suffering and 
the instability that we believe will come from this? And what 
funding resources do you need to take on this challenge?
    General Townsend. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, your point is exactly right about the food instability 
especially impacting Africa. In fact, just in the last day or 
so, the World Health Organization has declared a humanitarian 
disaster in Ethiopia as being the greatest one on the planet. 
So, food security, or insecurity is a critical part of that on 
the African continent.
    I would say, as I said in my opening remarks, I think--and 
in my written statement--I think it is imperative that we 
continue to fund USAID, because they invest in a robust way on 
the African continent. It is probably one of the best 
investments America makes there. And I think there is going to 
be, because of the point you just made, there is going to be 
more of that required.
    General McKenzie. Sir, I would note two countries, in 
particular, in my AOR will be threatened. One is Egypt; the 
other is Jordan. Both depend significantly on imports from 
Ukraine, and they will face a growing food insufficiency as we 
go forward.
    I think the long-term solution is you would like to find a 
regional way to actually supplant exporting food into the 
region, but that is a long-term solution. We are looking 
aggressively now for short-term solutions that will bring wheat 
and other foodstuffs in for the short term. And obviously, you 
are going to have to find other sources, other global sources, 
rather than Ukraine and Russia. And that is going to be hard to 
do with a third of the market coming from those two areas. This 
is a very pressing concern, and I appreciate your calling it 
out.
    Mr. Scott. Ms. Baker.
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I couldn't agree more with what 
Generals McKenzie and Townsend have said. I would add to 
General McKenzie's list perhaps Yemen as being a country that 
will face an impact here.
    You know, what we are seeing now are the second- and third-
order of consequences of Russia's unprovoked and illegal 
invasion of Ukraine. As General Townsend said, USAID has the 
lead on this issue. We are strongly in support of USAID's 
efforts and we will continue to work with them in an 
interagency fashion.
    Mr. Scott. I think what is happening around the world right 
now is because of the shortages and the anticipated shortages 
is that people who were receiving some are now receiving none, 
and a lot of people have had the assistance they were getting 
through the World Food Program cut in half. I think as many as 
13 million people in Yemen actually receive some type of 
assistance through the World Food Program.
    I just--I can't emphasize to this committee and to the 
world enough the devastation of what Vladimir Putin has done 
and the disruption around the world. And I think that the pain 
and the suffering that that individual has caused is only now 
beginning to be felt. And I think the world is going to be 
hurting for several years because of what he has done. And I 
just hope that we are paying attention to the potential civil 
unrest and instability that comes from the lack of a global 
food supply, because of what Vladimir Putin has done.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you so much.
    And thank you to our witnesses. It is great to see you all 
again.
    And I first wanted to ask you, General Townsend: Recent 
reporting brought to light U.S. support to the Rapid 
Intervention Battalion in Cameroon under the 127e program. The 
Rapid Intervention Battalion has been repeatedly implicated in 
human rights abuses. So, why was U.S. support to the Rapid 
Intervention Battalion not blocked on human rights grounds? 
What steps is AFRICOM taking to ensure that any partner forces 
supported under section 127e have not committed gross 
violations of human rights? And wouldn't one way to prevent 
this in the future be to subject 127e to the same kinds of 
Leahy vetting standards we use for nearly every other security 
assistance program?
    General Townsend. So, there was an Amnesty International, I 
think, report in 2017 that brought this to light. That caused 
the Department and AFRICOM to look closely at our support, our 
engagement with the Rapid Intervention Battalion in Cameroon. 
In 2019, our relationship was ended with that element. In fact, 
we have drawn down pretty much--in 2019 and by early 2020, we 
ended all of our engagement with Cameroon.
    We are starting to re-engage there on a very selected basis 
with some few programs, but not with the Rapid Intervention 
Battalion. And we do go through extensive vetting with all of 
our programs, training programs, on the continent, to include 
the 127e program.
    Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you.
    Ms. Baker, nice to see you.
    Recent years have seen U.S.-trained officers in Burkina 
Faso, Mali, Guinea, Mauritania, and Gambia overthrow national 
governments in military coups. Many of these countries had 
issues with gross human rights violations in the past, 
particularly Burkina Faso and Mali, and lacked robust security 
sector governance and democratic progress that made this kind 
of challenge, frankly, predictable.
    On February 4th, I, along with Chairman Meeks, sent a 
letter to President Biden, [Secretary of State] Blinken, and 
Secretary Austin on our strategy in the Sahel and requested 
that the administration evaluate its security sector assistance 
and other efforts over the last 15 years to assess their 
efficacy and areas for improvement. And I look forward to this 
briefing and hope we can work together on this going forward.
    But how have these developments impacted DOD's thinking on 
which Sahelian and West African militaries we provide security 
assistance to?
    Ms. Baker. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you for the 
question.
    I should note just upfront that we do have security 
assistance restrictions as a result, as you said, of the recent 
coups in both Burkina Faso, Mali, and also Guinea. So, for 
starters, that is in place.
    As you know, we work closely with the State Department to 
ensure that we are vetting all security assistance partners, in 
compliance with U.S. law, with local screening biometrics, as 
it is required. There is always more that we can do in this 
space. And so, we will look forward to getting you a briefing 
on what we are working on.
    Ms. Jacobs. Okay. Thank you.
    Frankly, I think some of these challenges with the folks we 
trained was a bit predictable. So I want to make sure we are 
going beyond just the immediate vetting, to make sure we are 
contributing to the broader democratic governance of our 
partner countries.
    Ms. Baker. Absolutely. And I would just say, as General 
Townsend has said, one of our focuses in the AFRICOM AOR in 
particular is that institutional capacity-building that will 
help us, we hope, to move beyond these kinds of incidents.
    Ms. Jacobs. Great.
    And, General McKenzie, the DOD has significantly 
undercounted civilian casualties compared to numbers provided 
by credible independent organizations, despite the fact that 
these organizations undertake interviews, site visits, and 
other measures that DOD does not generally have. Additionally, 
recent New York Times reporting found that DOD prematurely 
dismissed many civilian casualty reports at the assessment 
phase without doing basic due diligence, like basic internet 
searches or searching in Arabic instead of only in English.
    And earlier this week, I, along with my colleagues, sent a 
letter to DOD urging it to take steps on preventing and 
mitigating civilian casualties moving forward. As CENTCOM 
implements changes in procedures for tracking, assessing, and 
investigating civilian harm, will CENTCOM revisit the many past 
cases that appear to have been prematurely dismissed? And going 
forward, what changes do you believe need to be made?
    General McKenzie. I will begin by saying nobody wearing the 
uniform of the United States is interested in killing an 
innocent person. We work very hard to minimize that. But the 
battlefield is a deadly and dangerous place, and we have made 
mistakes. And, yes, we have killed innocent people. And we have 
tried very hard to mitigate that.
    As you know, the Secretary has undertaken a large, 
comprehensive, exhaustive, and high-energy project to further 
shape the efforts of the Department. And we are full 
participants in that going forward.
    I would tell you, in the interim, based on various reports 
that have been issued, we have undertaken 10 discrete actions 
within U.S. Central Command that will support the larger 
effort, but we are not waiting on that to actually happen. And 
I will be happy to send those 10 things over, so that you can 
examine them.
    But the Secretary is seized with this. His energy is 
palpable, visible, and we are moving forward on it.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. We appreciate the Secretary's 
efforts, and we will look forward to that briefing.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Mr. Franklin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I have a couple more questions that I didn't quite get 
to before.
    And again, back to General McKenzie. As Chairman Smith had 
noted, Iranian terror activity has been significant, whether 
there is a JCPOA in place or not. I understand that. Whether it 
is Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, 
the Quds Forces in Iraq, the common denominator is the 
neighborhood bully. And I hate to use that expression because 
it is obviously a lot more significant than that, but they are 
the bad guys. They are the bad actor in the neighborhood. They 
are the ones that want to destabilize everything.
    I hate to ask this--I wouldn't normally ask this question, 
because I understand your place to provide advice and counsel 
to the administration. But based on the way things unfolded in 
Afghanistan, and knowing now the questions we were asking and 
weren't getting answers to before, things are coming out that 
there was a lot of advice provided by the Pentagon that was not 
heeded by the administration.
    And so, before we get this treaty that the administration 
seems really bent on getting back into into place, I think it 
is really essential that the details are discussed.
    Has the White House engaged you for your regional security 
expertise in the negotiation process of this Iran deal?
    General McKenzie. Sir, the person I engage with is the 
Secretary of Defense on policy.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay.
    General McKenzie. And I have a constant dialog with the 
Secretary on all issues within the CENTCOM AOR.
    Mr. Franklin. And I understand the Secretary has got a lot 
on his plate. But where he is getting his primary source of the 
boots-on-the-ground feedback is going to be from you?
    General McKenzie. I think he gets it from me. I think he 
gets it from Policy, you know, a variety of sources.
    Mr. Franklin. Okay. So, my concern is what we are seeing on 
the press out there, in the press, of what may be coming out--
delisting IRGC, buying Iranian oil. Those, from what you have 
told us here, would not be in alignment with your advice on 
what is best from a military perspective. And I don't expect 
you to comment on that. But it is either that or they are not 
asking for your advice at all. And I find either of those to be 
very concerning, and we are going to watch very closely on how 
this treaty develops.
    But I thank you all. And I am assuming that this will be 
the last time the two of you testify before us, but I want to 
thank you, as a former military member, for your decades of 
service. It is a lot of hard work and not very gratifying a lot 
of times, but your Nation appreciates your work.
    And I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    And I just want to clarify on the last answer, General 
McKenzie said he is speaking to Secretary Austin, and that is 
the chain of command here. The White House is not ignoring the 
Department of Defense's opinion on this. They are speaking with 
Secretary Austin, who is speaking to his people, and that is 
where the information goes back.
    And the larger point is it's we have civilian control of 
the military for a reason. You know, the President is 
ultimately the one who has to make the decisions. If we want to 
just do whatever the military told, we wouldn't have civilian 
control of the military. You take the advice, you process it, 
and you make the best decision you can. And that is what they 
are trying to do.
    Ms. Baker. And, Mr. Chairman, if I could, I do just want to 
clarify that both the Chairman and the Secretary have had 
opportunities to provide that advice to the President and to 
offer their recommendations.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that 
clarification.
    Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Baker, your testimony references the emerging concept 
of integrated deterrence multiple times. You say the Department 
``will continue to lean forward in strengthening multilateral 
security cooperation in order to strengthen integrated 
deterrence and to address threats, particularly those emanating 
from Iran.''
    Later on, you say, ``The integrated deterrence means 
creating advantages for ourselves, our partners, and our allies 
while creating dilemmas for our competitors.'' I would like to 
talk a little bit about the dilemmas you envision under 
integrated deterrence.
    I know this is a CENTCOM hearing, but I wanted to ask 
quickly about Russia. Your portfolio is, obviously, very vast. 
Would it be a fair characterization of the administration's 
policy that sanctions are designed to deny the Russian 
government resources they would otherwise have available in 
order to punish their behavior?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I would say that the sanctions that 
the U.S. led, and that are not only U.S.-owned, but 
multinational at this point, are designed to impose 
consequences on Russia for its illegal invasion of Ukraine.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, that's a yes, to punish their behavior. 
And by punishing Russian behavior, we are creating dilemmas, as 
you put it, or at least costs for the Russians, right, cost 
imposition? Correct?
    Ms. Baker. Yes, Congressman.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, under the same logic, if another actor--
say China--provided the Russian government with funding to help 
them evade sanctions, that would, in a sense, create an 
advantage for Russia--in the sense that it would mitigate some 
of the costs we impose via sanctions, right?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, yes, and we are having a 
conversation with China about our concerns in that regard.
    Mr. Gallagher. I think this is a very important point, not 
only because, as we evaluate whether China increases its 
support to Russia, but, to be clear, if our adversaries have 
access to more resources, that creates an advantage for them. 
And if our adversaries have more resources and are more 
capable, that creates dilemmas for ourselves and for our 
allies.
    And I bring this all up because I think it's a self-evident 
point that is getting lost in the shuffle, that policies that 
give our enemies more resources give them an advantage, and by 
the administration's own admission, undermine its vision, such 
as it exists, of integrated deterrence.
    And I bring this up because, as my colleague, Mrs. Luria, 
brought up before, we may be days before, according to some--
days away, according to some reports, from signing a deal with 
Iran, which will, in any scenario, provide a massive windfall, 
to the tune of billions of dollars, to the world's primary 
state sponsor of terrorism. And everything else aside, 
indications are that this deal will provide unprecedented 
sanctions relief, well outside the scope of its nuclear 
program, to the Iranian government, including from terrorism-
related sanctions.
    And I don't think you have to be an opponent of the 
original JCPOA to understand that this makes no sense. Just 
take the administration's own words at face value. Their 
strategy calls for creating advantages for our allies and 
dilemmas for our adversaries, but this deal, by providing 
massive resources to our primary adversary in the Middle East, 
will create dilemmas for us and provide advantages to our 
foremost enemy.
    And just a quick question on that point. To your knowledge, 
is the Central Bank of Iran still financing terrorism?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, that is a question I would have to 
defer to Treasury and others.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. I have asked this question in other 
committees. I have asked the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] 
Director. It is a matter of public record, the Treasury 
Department has put a--it doesn't take arcane or exquisite 
intelligence to know the answer. But we will take it back.
    I guess, since you responded to an earlier question from my 
colleague, Mr. Crow, I believe, that the NDS is now being 
delayed because of the crisis in Ukraine--is that correct?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I wouldn't say it is being delayed 
because of the crisis in Ukraine. It is in final coordination, 
and we hope to have it to you soon.
    Mr. Gallagher. Okay. Are you rethinking any of the 
assumptions underlying the NDS as a result of Ukraine? Or do 
you see it as a validation of integrated deterrence?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, we believe that the strategy, in 
fact, took into consideration some of the behavior that we have 
now seen Russia exhibit, and that it is resilient to what we 
are seeing from the Russians at this time.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, do you believe integrated deterrence 
succeeded in the case of Russia-Ukraine?
    Ms. Baker. I think what you are seeing right now is 
integrated deterrence in action, bringing together the 
sanctions, the allies and the partners, all----
    Mr. Gallagher. I have 7 seconds. But what you are 
effectively saying is your entire theory of deterrence requires 
on a country getting invaded and pillaged in order to galvanize 
the West into action. And I just don't want to put our eggs in 
that basket.
    I am out of time.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate it.
    I will point out we have sanctioned many nations long 
before they invaded another country. Certainly, we had 
sanctions, you know, against Russia. We have sanctions against 
Iran now. And I think the central dilemma that this 
administration is trying to wrestle with is, we also don't want 
Iran to get a nuclear weapon. And that is kind of the tradeoff 
on that that we are trying to go through.
    And I have not seen any other reasonable plan, other than 
negotiating with Iran, for how we stop them from getting a 
nuclear weapon. Now the details of that negotiation, obviously, 
matter. What are we giving up? What are we getting? But we 
can't act like, for no apparent reason whatsoever, we are just 
giving Iran sanctions relief, so they can engage in more 
mischief. No, there is a very, very, very big reason why we are 
engaged in these negotiations, and that is we don't want them 
to have a nuclear weapon.
    Now you can debate whether or not we are going to get there 
on that, but I think that is worth at least throwing in there, 
into that conversation and discussion.
    We have no further requests for time.
    I want to thank you all for your testimony. We will see you 
in a couple of hours on the classified side.
    And with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]


      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 17, 2022

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 17, 2022

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 17, 2022

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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL

    Ms. Baker. Challenges in governance and underlying security 
contribute to the growth of violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and 
this is an issue we face across the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) 
area of responsibility (AOR). Thus, much of our effort in the AOR is 
dedicated to institutional capacity building and enabling sustainable 
security in close coordination with our allies and African partners. 
Another focus of our efforts has been to support French CT operations 
in the Sahel. While successful, we recognize that focusing only on the 
military response has not been sufficient. In addition to the 
significant resources DOD commits to counterterrorism efforts focused 
on mitigating the immediate threat posed by VEOs in the region, we are 
also coordinating with interagency partners, including the Department 
of State, USAID, and the Department of the Treasury to implement the 
NSC's Sahel Strategy and the Global Fragility Act (GFA), which focus on 
development and prevention and mitigation of extremism and violent 
conflict. The GFA is an important mechanism for addressing the 
governance and security challenges needed to reverse the negative trend 
in terrorist activity.   [See page 31.]
    General Townsend. Congressman, the biggest impediment to being able 
to better address the threats posed by Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghrib, and I would add ISIS, is insufficient will on the part 
of African governments to provide good governance and security to 
confront the challenges. For the U.S., the highest impediment is a lack 
of an approved whole of government strategy with appropriate resources 
to achieve the objectives of said strategy.
    Yes, I think the United States needs to amend our strategy in the 
AOR, because the threat is increasing rapidly and so are the risks to 
U.S. interests.   [See page 31.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Ms. Baker. The Department submitted the Sec. 1069 report to 
Congress on September 30, 2022.   [See page 26.]


      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 17, 2022

=======================================================================

      

                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

    Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the role the Army and other military 
services have in training and assisting our allies and partners in the 
region against a variety of threats to our nation's security and 
regional stability? How do you plan to employ your assigned Security 
Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) as well as your National Guard State 
Partnership Program (SPP) units over the next 12 months?
    Ms. Baker. The Army and other military services have an important 
role in our security cooperation efforts and regular military-to-
military engagements with our allies and partners, including in the 
Middle East and Africa. We are encouraged to see expanding roles for 
DOD, including the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB) and the 
National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). Forging long-standing 
relationships with SFABs and State National Guards builds ally and 
partner military capabilities and interoperability. Enduring 
relationships forged over many years both increases deterrence and 
opens doors to the access and presence we need to compete in these 
regions. With regard to the SPP, one of our strongest security 
cooperation tools, we continue to grow the program throughout the 
world. On April 1, DOD released findings from an independent strategic 
evaluation covering SPP's outcomes from 2014-2019. The Department is 
considering recommendations and lessons learned from this assessment, 
monitoring, and evaluation effort, to include assessing the capacity 
for new SPPs, how much growth the SPP can handle annually while 
sustaining existing partnerships, and ways to leverage the SPP as a 
unique and specialized security cooperation program.
    Mr. Lamborn. One of the United States' most important relationships 
in the Middle East is with Israel. As your command works to grow the 
integrated air and missile defense system for the region and our 
partners, how are Israeli capabilities being brought into the network? 
How are theater capabilities being integrated into Israeli defense?
    Ms. Baker. The Abraham Accords between Israel and many of its 
neighbors in the Gulf and Morocco, in conjunction with Israel's long-
standing peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan and Israel recently being 
moved into the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility 
expands opportunities to integrate air and missile defense capabilities 
among our partners in the Middle East. There are a range of efforts 
ongoing to enhance regionally integrated air and missile defense. For 
instance, at the Negev Summit in March 2022, leaders from Israel, 
Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and the United 
States came together in Israel to discuss how to build on USCENTCOM's 
work on integrated air and missile defense. These efforts build on the 
annual JUNIPER-series missile defense exercise that U.S. European 
Command conducted with Israel for more than 20 years, which USCENTCOM 
is continuing. DOD efforts are not limited to Israel; in a related 
effort in mid-March of this year, DOD co-chaired the U.S.-Gulf 
Cooperation Council working group on integrated air and missile 
defense, which developed a common vision for deterring the most 
pressing threats in the region and reaffirmed a shared commitment to 
regional security. Additionally, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency and 
the Israeli Missile Defense Organization have cooperated on research, 
development, and production of advanced air and missile defense 
capabilities for more than 30 years. The Department is now working to 
leverage this past experience in bilateral force development and 
multilateral operational lessons learned to facilitate an integrated 
air and missile defense architecture for all our partners in the 
region.
    Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the role the Army and other military 
services have in training and assisting our allies and partners in the 
region against a variety of threats to our nation's security and 
regional stability? How do you plan to employ your assigned Security 
Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) as well as your National Guard State 
Partnership Program (SPP) units over the next 12 months?
    General Townsend. USAFRICOM's Components play a significant role in 
training and assisting our Allies and Partners in the region against a 
variety of threats to our nation's security and regional stability. All 
Services leverage the Joint Exercise Program (JEP), security 
cooperation and assistance, and engagements to maintain presence and 
influence access. In addition, our efforts directly counter Russia and 
China influence and seek to maintain the U.S. as the partner of choice. 
I am a big fan of both the SFAB and SPP. Both are agile, low cost, high 
payoff programs.
    Over the next 12 months, our assigned SFAB will support operations, 
activities and investments in 8 African Countries. These include tier 
one countries of Morocco, Senegal, Ghana, Tunisia, Djibouti and Kenya. 
Engagement in tier two countries include Chad and Niger.
    Over the next 12 months, USAFRICOM SPP will continue to leverage 
relationships and capabilities to build partnership capacity and 
sustained engagements on the continent. Specifically, the Indiana NG 
will conduct the Niger Logistics Company Building T&E case in Niger.
    Mr. Lamborn. What roles do the Air and Army National Guard have in 
your theater and how are they enabling your mission?
    General Townsend. The Air and Army National Guard enable USAFRICOM, 
across the full range of operations, activities, and initiatives (OAI) 
by providing the operational depth of highly trained personnel and 
capabilities where the inventory of available Active Component forces 
cannot meet the operational demand. The bottom line is the National 
Guard is critical to almost everything AFRICOM does.
    Missions include providing Crisis Response Security Task Force in 
East Africa, Intra-Theater Airlift (C-130s), Engineering, Signal and 
Communication functions, Aviation support, Theater Fixed Wing (C-12s) 
and Airfield Operations support and Army Security Force Assistance 
Trainers.
    Mr. Lamborn. Israel's acquisition of the KC-46 will be important 
for its military capabilities, especially as military threats posed by 
Iran and others will only increase. However, the anticipated delivery 
for Israel's KC-46 appears to be years away. Have you looked a the 
temporary deployment or stationing of one or two U.S. KC-46s in Israel 
as a means to (1) support U.S. interests, training, and dynamic force 
employment and (2) conduct a combined pilot, crew chief, and maintainer 
training with Israeli counterparts on the KC-46? Do you believe such an 
arrangement could reduce the time for Israel between receipt of the KC-
46s and those assets achieving full operational capability?
    General McKenzie. (U) Currently there is no planned KC-46 
deployment to Israel. We have not planned any KC-46 Title 10 subject 
matter expert exchanges with Israel due to lack of KC-46 assets/
personnel in theater. Once those assets are programmed for arrival, we 
will likely coordinate with Israel for potential subject matter 
exchanges and/or potential deployments based on mission requirements 
and resources.
    Mr. Lamborn. Please describe the role the Army and other military 
services have in training and assisting our allies and partners in the 
region against a variety of threats to our nation's security and 
regional stability? How do you plan to employ your assigned Security 
Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) as well as your National Guard State 
Partnership Program (SPP) units over the next 12 months?
    General McKenzie. (U) The SFAB provides USCENTCOM with a persistent 
network of Army Security Force Assistance (SFA) Teams conducting 
theater security cooperation activities across the USCENTCOM area of 
responsibility (AOR). The SFAB is now authorized to provide 
capabilities in support of CJTF-OIR in Iraq where they assist in 
training partner forces to counter and defeat D'aesh. The SFAB conducts 
advising with partners through subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE), 
conferences and seminars. When authorized, SFAB is conducting building 
partner capacity (BPC) activities focused on counter unmanned aerial 
systems (CUAS), counter improvised explosive device, border security, 
military decision-making process (MDMP), and intelligence preparation 
of the battlefield.
    (U) The U.S. Army National Guard's (USARNG) State Partnership 
Program (SPP) supports the USARCENT security cooperation effort in 
three main ways: by providing subject matter expertise, by providing 
additional capabilities to accomplish tasks, and by providing 
continuity to complement what USARCENT accomplishes with rotational 
forces. These activities include bilateral and multilateral engagements 
resulting in the development of seminars, visits and subject matter 
expert exchanges which serve to strengthen partner relationships.
    (U) State partnerships are an essential component of enduring 
partner relationships. One distinguishing characteristic of our 
National Guard units is many Guardsmen remain in units longer than 
their active-duty contemporaries. This lends an additional element of 
continuity to SPPs; often partner nation (PN) units will maintain 
enduring relationships with their State Guard counterparts. In our AOR 
countries, that longevity enhances trust. That trust, in turn, allows 
Guardsmen to play a prominent role as we develop and implement our 
country security cooperation plans (CSCPs).
    (U) USCENTCOM is currently developing plans for FY23 and will seek 
to maximize the use of the SFABs to advance our individual country 
objectives. Our SPP partners are fully integrated in our security 
cooperation planning process and often generate an outsize return.
    Mr. Lamborn. What roles do the Air and Army National Guard have in 
your theater and how are they enabling your mission?
    General McKenzie. (U) For Fiscal Year 2022, USCENTCOM received 
allocation of Air and Army National Guard units and service members 
from 35 different states, with the preponderance of them supporting the 
missions of our Army and Air Force components. In Fiscal Year 2022 
USCENTCOM will employ over 1,200 Air National Guardsmen and over 8,500 
Army National Guardsmen. 17 of those troop-contributing states provide 
units in support of the train, advise, assist, and enable mission in 
Iraq. These nearly 10,000 citizen Soldiers and Airmen are an essential 
component of the Joint Force and are critical to our success. When 
USCENTCOM requests critical force elements to conduct operations within 
our area of responsibility, it is done without regard to the component. 
The services, in turn, source our operational requirements with units 
and personnel from across all components.
    Mr. Lamborn. Your area of responsibility has become increasingly 
complicated by Iran's relationships with China and Russia. By 
conducting foreign military sales with Iran, China and Russia are 
making an already challenging security threat more advanced. Should we 
be concerned about continued advancements of Iranian threats in the 
area, including future hypersonic threats? To what degree is the 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense system we are developing able to 
deter and defend against these threats?
    General McKenzie. (U) Yes, we should be very concerned about 
advancements in Iran's capabilities, including the potential for Iran 
to acquire future hypersonic technology, and the threat Iran presents 
to U.S. and partner interests. Iran's expanding inventory of advanced 
conventional weapons and their proliferation to its proxies and 
partners, coupled with improved offensive air and air defense 
capabilities, is a growing concern due to the quantity and quality of 
these systems. Reports that Russia has turned to Iran for lethal 
unmanned aerial vehicles for operations in Ukraine highlights one 
example of closer military ties between Tehran and our strategic 
competitors.
    Mr. Lamborn. One of the United States' most important relationships 
in the Middle East is with Israel. As your command works to grow the 
integrated air and missile defense system for the region and our 
partners, how are Israeli capabilities being brought into the network? 
How are theater capabilities being integrated into Israeli defense?
    General McKenzie. (U) Israel is currently interoperable with the 
United States via network connections to the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) and USEUCOM, and connections from MDA and USEUCOM to USCENTCOM. 
Integrating Israel's capabilities with USCENTCOM is a priority for us 
and will be discussed in detail with the Israelis at Command and 
Control Interoperability Boards (CCIB). USCENTCOM intends to collect 
and approve Information Exchange Requirements (IERs), which will then 
allow us to develop a plan for greater and more direct integration 
between Israeli and USCENTCOM systems.
    Mr. Lamborn. What is being done to support the integration of 
Israel into existing USCENTCOM networks, like the regional missile 
warning notifications supported by the U.S. Space Force?
    General McKenzie. (U) We have an extensive variety of shared 
engagements and working groups with Israel that include secure C2 
interoperability and integration, air and missile defense, joint 
exercises, defense cooperation, and intelligence sharing. These fora 
provide us with a venue to explore and develop greater integration with 
Israel. For example, we requested and received approval to integrate 
Israel into the information sharing Middle East Security Forces (MESF) 
construct. Second, USCENTCOM integrated the Shared Early Warning (SEW) 
network into the USCENTCOM Command Center in June 2022. Third, 
USCENTCOM J6 hosted USEUCOM and Israel for the Engineering Working 
Group (EWG) from September 12-15, 2022 to discuss the transition of 
secure IT services from USEUCOM to USCENTCOM. Moving forward, regional 
integration of air defense is a tremendous opportunity to pursue for 
this unified command plan transition. USCENTCOM and IDF aim to sign a 
Data Sharing Memorandum of Understanding at the upcoming Command and 
Control Interoperability Board (CCIB), the primary venue to discuss 
secure C2 interoperability and the integration of Israel into existing 
USCENTCOM networks.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. Congress just approved and the President signed into law 
an additional $1 billion for Israel's Iron Dome system. How quickly can 
we get this funding spent and help Israel to be in a better position to 
deal with future threats from Hamas, Hezbollah and other terror groups?
    Ms. Baker. The Department of Defense strongly supports replenishing 
and strengthening Israel's Iron Dome Defense System capabilities. The 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD (A&S)) 
is the organization within the Department responsible for executing the 
Exchange of Letters with the Israeli Ministry of Defense required to 
execute the support provided in the OMNIBUS. The letters outline the 
terms of the transfer of funds to support Israel's Iron Dome Defense 
System, which include a workshare for U.S. industry of not less than 
25% of the appropriated $1 billion funding. These discussions have 
concluded and the letters were signed on April 22. Subsequently, the 
Department transferred the supplemental funding for Iron Dome Defense 
System to the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
    Mr. Scott. What can be done to help prioritization of countering 
this growing drone threat from a policy standpoint?
    Ms. Baker. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Mr. Scott. What is the state of logistics and transportation 
infrastructure on the African continent, including warehousing, 
communications, customs and legal support?
    General Townsend. It is important here to distinguish the general 
state of logistics infrastructure available across the continent and 
that which U.S. Forces rely on to conduct operations into and within 
the continent.
    As a posture-limited command operating in an expansive and austere 
environment, USAFRICOM Forces rely heavily on airlift and contracted 
sustainment support. Strategic and tactical airlift offer the fastest 
means to move forces and equipment into accessible airfields. USAFRICOM 
leverages sealift to move assets relying heavily on our Embassy Teams 
and Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) to work 
through legal and customs exoneration processes that are unique to each 
sovereign partner.
    Logistical delays occur frequently on the continent--challenges 
from washed out roads limiting ground movement, to fuel scarcity 
resulting from a global crises. These forms of contested logistics have 
driven the command to work with our Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
partners on prepositioning options. For example, as a result of 
shipping delays for food supplies (CLASS I), DLA's Prime Vendor in West 
Africa expanded its warehouse capabilities (infrastructure, 
communication, etc.) to expedite delivery timelines for orders from our 
Service components.
    For airlift, when U.S. capacity is stretched, AFRICOM worked 
closely with European and Tunisian partners to take advantage of excess 
airlift capacity to expand distribution options.
    Mr. Scott. A Chinese company just took control of Uganda's main 
international airport because of a failure to pay back loans. How 
should the U.S. government respond to China's continent-wide Belt and 
Road activities?
    General Townsend. The U.S. should continue to focus on building 
strong partnerships in Africa while encouraging diverse sources of 
investment for African nations. China continues to use transactional 
relationships to expand its Belt and Road activities in Africa, while 
the U.S. builds relationships with partner nations that prioritize a 
safe, secure, and prosperous Africa. Ultimately, the negative 
financial, social, and environmental impacts of Chinese activities in 
Africa will limit the ability of the Chinese government to expand its 
influence on the continent. At the same time, USAFRICOM will continue 
to support U.S. diplomacy and development activities to reinforce 
African partner resiliency so that they can make informed and 
independent decision for their future stability and prosperity.
    Mr. Scott. Is there an emerging C-130 coalition on the continent 
for airlift?
    General Townsend. Not really, but there is interest among African 
partners to set one up and USAFRICOM is working to establish one in the 
future. There is a construct based in Papa, Hungary that works called 
the Heavy Airlift Wing utilizing C-17s. I would like to see a similar 
construct among willing and capable African partners.
    What the command has today is an established framework developed in 
conjunction with European partners, operating on the continent, to 
collaborate on intra and inter-theater airlift sharing options. This is 
done within an Africa Distribution Network Forum that has existed for a 
few years. Additionally, our Air Force team has been working to certify 
willing and capable partners, notably Tunisia with viable C-130 fleets 
through an Air Transport Sharing Mechanism (ATSM). With more African 
partner C-130s certified as airworthy, we can see building towards a C-
130 coalition that the AU and RECs can rely on for crises response.
    A good example of African solutions to African challenges occurred 
last year as Angolan air assets moved South African and Botswanan 
forces and cargo in support of a Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) mission in Mozambique.
    Mr. Scott. Does Russia have anything to offer the people of Africa 
besides more arms and mercenaries to prolong its wars?
    General Townsend. Some 43 African countries purchase or employ 
Russian arms, however Russia also sells key agricultural commodities to 
several African countries and engages others in energy and economic 
cooperation. Though some cooperation initiatives provide genuine 
benefits to African participants, others enable malign activity such as 
sanctions evasion.
    Fourteen African countries import more than half their wheat from 
Russia and Ukraine, with Somalia depending entirely on these countries 
for its supply. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is severely 
disrupting this supply chain and has the potential to worsen food 
insecurity in African countries, particularly those less reliant on 
local grains such as sorghum and teff.
    Russia has memorandums of understanding with countries such as 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to assist in their development of 
peaceful nuclear energy programs. Russia's Rosatom state atomic energy 
corporation leads efforts to help African states develop and build 
nuclear power plants, research institutes, and provides relevant 
training.
    Finally, Moscow can provide expertise to African states on mineral 
resource extraction, often through oligarch-owned businesses. This is 
an attractive offer for states with limited options due to local 
security conditions or external sanctions.
    Mr. Scott. In a global struggle against Communist China and Russia, 
why must AFRICOM do more without having more resources?
    General Townsend. [The information is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
    Mr. Scott. What is the role of private logistics contractors like 
Agility and APL in AFRICOM? How do they help AFRICOM respond to crises? 
Are there any plans to involve private logistics companies in wargames 
and exercises in order for AFRICOM to better understand their 
capabilities and for private companies to improve their knowledge of 
AFRICOM's potential logistics requirements?
    General Townsend. No plans for USAFRICOM to involve private 
logistics in wargames and exercises. In general, USAFRICOM relies 
heavily on a variety of logistics contractors; for example, Agility 
International Inc. (``Agility'') has been awarded contracts for surface 
distribution, warehousing and cargo forwarding across USAFRICOM's Area 
of Responsibility. One of the key functions for logistics contractors 
includes supporting crisis response by maintaining Cooperative Security 
Locations (CSL) in a ``warm base'' status, enabling U.S. forces to flow 
in and receive support on very short notice. Although we contract 
support for exercises, there are no plans to involve contractors in 
wargames or exercises as it would involve granting an unfair advantage 
to compete for potential logistic requirements, which would risk 
violation of the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act.
    Mr. Scott. Do the military planners in AFRICOM have the established 
databases regarding available logistics infrastructure with the private 
sector prior to conducting missions?
    General Townsend. Military planners at USAFRICOM are able to assess 
existing logistics infrastructure required to support operations via 
several means: Pre-Deployment Site Surveys (PDSS), U.S. Embassy Country 
Team information, and USTRANSCOM airfield report databases. Where the 
site is considered a Cooperative Security Location (CSL), a Logistics 
Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)-funded private contractor provides 
site updates to our logistics planners.
    Generally, there isn't a single database consolidating all this 
data; however, USAFRICOM supports ongoing DOD efforts to consolidate 
numerous logistics systems of record, to include operational contract 
support databases, into a new and single data environment. This will 
provide a significant advantage to our planners.
    Mr. Scott. Does AFRICOM have any plans to work with private 
logistics companies to identify locations where additional 
infrastructure should be located?
    General Townsend. USAFRICOM components may choose to leverage 
existing USACE/NAVFAC contracts with Architectural and Engineering (AE) 
firms when requirements emerge to conduct master planning in the form 
of long range plans and studies at locations where additional 
infrastructure should be located at existing posture locations. Master 
planning provides a long-term strategy to guide future infrastructure 
investment, and supports visualizing the connection between the 
infrastructure, current and potential future missions, and the people 
assigned to those locations. USAFRICOM doesn't work directly with 
private logistics companies to identify locations where additional 
infrastructure should be located, however USAFRICOM does consult with 
contractors on how to best utilize current and future investments on 
the current list of posture locations across the continent.
    Mr. Scott. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen wrote in the March 2022 issue 
of Proceedings an article entitled, ``The Time is Right for a Pivot to 
Africa.'' Moreover, according to Ambassador Cohen, ``It will be crucial 
to first sell the American public on a pivot to Africa.'' What 
recommendations do you have to sell the American people on a pivot to 
Africa?
    General Townsend. I recommend Congress and USAFRICOM continue to 
work together to inform the American people that a more stable and 
prosperous Africa will enhance America's security. In addition to 
public statements and congressional testimony, congress can provide 
funding to support publically releasable studies. These studies are a 
good method to provide reliable information to the U.S. public on 
security concerns. Examples of area where studies would provide value 
include: Chinese military expansion in Africa, illegal fishing in the 
Gulf of Guinea, the malign effects of private military companies in 
Africa and threats of African instability to American security and 
prosperity.
    This enormous continent sits on global crossroads and is ripe with 
opportunity while simultaneously burdened with challenges. It holds 
tremendous geo-strategic significance while being shaped by the 
competing forces of prosperity and poverty, peace and conflict, plenty 
and famine, good governance and corruption and democratic backsliding.
    Africa possesses vast untapped energy deposits, including gone 
third of the world's mineral reserve and rare earth metals. These 
resources are key supplies that America and the world rely upon to 
produce 21st century technologies. Open and transparent management of 
Africa's resources could contribute to prosperity at local and global 
levels, while predatory lending practices and elite manipulation could 
undermine African prosperity while fueling broader global conflict. The 
winners and losers of the 21st century global economy may well be 
determined in Africa.
    According to the Global Terrorism Index, seven of the ten countries 
with the largest increase in terrorism in 2020 were in Sub Saharan 
Africa. In East Africa, for example, al-Qaida's al-Shabaab remains the 
greatest threat to U.S. persons and interests in the region as well as 
the homeland, while undermining peace, security, and political progress 
in Somalia.
    The American people should also know that our strategic 
competitors, China and Russia, have long recognized Africa's 
importance. Both nations leverage opportunities to erode U.S. influence 
with African nations. Both nations are gaining ground on the continent. 
Both nations successfully convert soft and hard power investments into 
new partnerships. Both nations exert political influence at U.S. 
expense.
    USAFRICOM believes it is imperative that America sustain a 
predictable, though modest, investment in Africa to protect U.S. 
interests and advance U.S. objectives in this dynamic and important 
region of the world. A sustained and coordinate U.S. government 
approach, bolstered by strategic vision and appropriate resourcing, can 
serve to strengthen relationships with partners in Africa, deter malign 
influence, and further our objective for increased security, stability 
and prosperity on the continent.
    Mr. Scott. What is the potential of security, sustainable 
agriculture, trade, and better governance in AFRICOM?
    General Townsend. The short answer is the potential is tremendous 
but also unlikely if we do not resource a whole-of-government approach 
to doing so. Africa has immense human, economic, and resource 
potential. While some countries have made impressive strides in all of 
these areas, others appear mired in cycles of conflict. USAFRICOM's 
focus is on security, but security force assistance, and countering 
VEOs, can only make a long-term impacts in conjunction with diplomacy 
and development efforts that collectively improve the governing 
institutions and the lives of people.
    Security, political, and economic challenges require coordinated 
investments across the U.S. government and with allies and partners. 
These problems are interconnected, and so must be the solutions. The 
demands of population displacement and forced migrations, for example, 
reaffirm the need for a whole-of-government approach bolstered by the 
right authorities and timely funding to tackle these challenges. For 
its part, USAFRICOM works to promote partner defense capabilities, 
anti-corruption campaigns, and military subordination to civilian 
authorities in order to help create conditions for expanded stability 
and development.
    Mr. Scott. How can the United States better communicate to the 
people of Africa that Communist Chinese and Russian projects in Africa 
are a very bad deal for the people of Africa?
    General Townsend. First, we need to communicate effectively across 
diplomacy, development, and defense to ensure the United States 
projects a unified message. USAFRICOM works across the U.S. government 
to achieve this goal and explain to African partners our views on 
Chinese and Russian projects.
    Second, we need to demonstrate that the United States is the better 
partner of choice by providing timely and effective support to partners 
when and where they need it. USAFRICOM works with partners to 
understand their needs and meet them where they are. Speed and 
flexibility are two areas where we continually seek improvements to 
ensure we get our partners what they need.
    We seek to continue to work with congress and our interagency 
partners to reinforce the negative aspects of Chinese and Russian 
investments and provide dependable alternatives.
    Mr. Scott. Will you please describe AFRICOM's role in countering 
Russian influence operations?
    General Townsend. Our role, within the larger whole of government 
approach, is to secure the U.S. strategic interests by ensuring access 
and influence while strengthening partner of choice status in a secure 
and stable Africa.
    Our approach to the Russian problem is three-pronged. Our 
operations, activities and investments are focused on undermining 
Russia's ability to sow distrust and cynicism, protecting democratic 
norms, values, and institutions that hold power to maintain 
accountability and promoting U.S. Ally, and Partner interests and 
reputation.
    We leverage the Joint Exercise Program (JEP), security cooperation 
and assistance, Combined Military Information Support Operations 
(MISO), and strategic engagements to maintain presence and access to 
influence African partners and counter Russian operations.
    Mr. Scott. What is AFRICOM's strategy for the use and management of 
information for both offensive and defensive information operations?
    General Townsend. USAFRICOM's information strategy is to preserve 
U.S., ally, and partner decision-making advantage, while denying the 
same to our adversaries. We have a special focus on shining a spotlight 
on the bad behaviors of malign actors such as China, Russia (including 
PMCs), Iran and VEOs.
    Defensively, the Command strategy is to ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of Command, interagency, and partner 
information at all times. USAFRICOM does this by mitigating 
vulnerabilities to U.S. and partner networks.
    Offensively, USAFRICOM disrupts, manipulates, and interrupts 
adversary information and decision making cycles to our advantage. We 
accomplish this through the application of information related 
capabilities (e.g. cyber, electronic warfare, military information 
support operations, operations security, and deception).
    Mr. Scott. What war colleges in the AFRICOM AOR are in need of 
additional U.S. assistance to enhance their respective missions? What 
nations still need to establish a war college for their armed forces? 
Should African military personnel receive additional seats at U.S. War 
Colleges? What more can U.S. War Colleges do to enhance any 
partnerships with African War Colleges?
    General Townsend. African war colleges are generally underfunded 
across the board and would benefit from stronger professional military 
education (PME) programs. Two countries have asked for our assistance 
in this space, Senegal and Nigeria, which we are exploring programs of 
support. We have not received any other requests this past year.
    The countries still lacking an accredited senior war college 
include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, CAR, Chad, Comoros, 
Congo-Brazzaville; Congo-Kinshasa, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Although 
some of these countries have some form of PME, they all present 
opportunities to partner with U.S. institution for mutual benefit.
    To address demand signals that exceed our domestic capacity, 
additional resources would enable USAFRICOM to mirror the successful 
efforts of USEUCOM's ``mini-war college''--a U.S. training center in 
southern Germany that provides senior military education to European 
partners and allies--that served as a critical enabler of Ukraine's 
military modernization following the invasion of Crimea.
    U.S. War Colleges can help improve ties with African militaries by 
providing additional instructors to integrate with the staffs at 
African war colleges. It is preferable that we plan these requests a 
year out, but USAFRICOM often lacks sufficient personnel to fulfill 
these requests. Further, at moment, the U.S. government does not 
accredit African military institutions, although we have assessed 
several partner institutions on their degree of equivalency to our own, 
there is more that we could do to help African military institutions 
gain accreditation.
    Mr. Scott. How many manned and unmanned platforms would have to be 
deployed to AFRICOM's AOR to be able to have 24/7 coverage of AFRICOM 
for 365 days a year?
    General Townsend. [The information is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
    Mr. Scott. What are you seeing today from Iran in your area of 
operation?
    General Townsend. Iran is pursuing an aggressive strategy in Africa 
to expand its influence, elevate its international credibility, and 
threaten Western and Israeli interests. Since the October 2020 
expiration of the UN arms embargo on Iran, Tehran has increasingly 
focused on expanding its diplomatic and defense outreach in Africa, 
specifically in the east and west. So far in 2022, Iran has pledged to 
provide several West African countries defense and technology 
assistance. In 2021, Iran established a new embassy in the Republic of 
the Congo, the Iranian navy circumnavigated Africa for the first time, 
and Iranian armed UAS were delivered to the Ethiopian military during 
the Tigray conflict. Many of Iran's outreach efforts are in the nascent 
stages and likely are vulnerable to disruption through measures such as 
U.S. and diplomatic and military engagement with African partners.
    Additionally, the Iranian threat network (ITN), led by the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), has increased its 
activity and remained intent on expanding its capabilities in Africa. 
Since late 2020, there have been at least ten disrupted probable ITN 
plots in Africa, including two plots against U.S. ambassadors in 
Africa. Iran almost certainly continues to seek retaliation for the 
death of former IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani, and it could 
leverage the ITN to attack high-level U.S. government or military 
officials in Africa, especially if Iran suspects them of complicity in 
Soleimani's death. Finally, the IRGC-QF is increasingly leveraging East 
African smuggling networks operating in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden to 
resupply the Huthis in Yemen with lethal aid.
    Mr. Scott. How will CENTCOM focus on integrating Israel into 
already-established multinational exercises hosted by Israel's Arab 
partners like Egypt (Bright Star) and the UAE (Iron Union) to include 
Israel, and vice versa, will you encourage Israeli to invite Arab 
partners to join their exercises (e.g., Blue Flag)?
    General McKenzie. (U) Incorporating Israel into the USCENTCOM area 
of responsibility (AOR) operationalizes the Abraham Accords by adding a 
military component to the broad normalization that is already underway 
between Israel and many of its Arab neighbors. Israel brings advanced 
maritime and air and missile defense capabilities to regional 
partnerships. Their expertise and increasing acceptance among regional 
partners enable a shared approach to address threats from regional 
malign actors. In addition to our traditional JUNIPER-series exercises 
with Israel, as the mil-to-mil relationships between Israel and our 
other regional partners expand, we are working with partners to include 
Israel in exercises they have never participated in before, such as 
IRON UNION. Additionally, we are working with the Israelis to include 
our mutual Arab partners in Israeli exercises such as BLUE FLAG. While 
geopolitics influence the levels and visibility of such engagements, 
USCENTCOM is working across all engagements to normalize Israel's mil-
to-mil relationships with partners with increasing success. We are 
optimistic that Egypt may invite Israel to participate in BRIGHT STAR 
23.
    Mr. Scott. Opportunities now exist for CENTCOM to integrate Israel 
into existing U.S.-led multinational task forces. Recent examples 
include joint naval exercises between Israel, the United States, the 
UAE, and Bahrain in the Red Sea in November, and the International 
Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express 2022 which included participants from 
Israel, Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia in February. 
How will CENTCOM work to continue to expand such joint maritime 
exercises? Do you think incorporating Israel into the Combined Maritime 
Forces (CMF), a 34-nation partnership based at NAVCENT headquarters in 
Bahrain that focuses on freedom of navigation, counterpiracy, counter 
narcotics, and other illicit activity by non-state actors makes sense? 
Of CMF's three separate task forces focused on maritime security, where 
do you feel Israeli participation may be most feasible? (Operations 
outside the Persian Gulf (Task Force 150), counterpiracy missions (Task 
Force 151), or operations inside the Persian Gulf (Task Force 152) in 
immediate proximity to Iran?
    General McKenzie. (U) Incorporating Israel into the USCENTCOM Area 
of Responsibility (AOR) operationalizes the Abraham Accords by adding a 
military component to the broad normalization that is already underway 
between Israel and many of its Arab neighbors. Incorporation of Israel 
into the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) may also bring considerable 
military capability and expertise to this critical regional 
partnership. With 34 partner nations, the CMF, centered on adherence to 
the rules-based international order, is the world's largest maritime 
partnership. With shared interest in protecting maritime trade routes 
in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Gulf, and the Red Sea, Israel can add 
capabilities and capacity to the enduring CMF construct. Over time, 
participation by Israel in all CMF task forces focused on maritime 
security may be feasible.
    Mr. Scott. Are you seeing an uptick in advanced drone threats in 
the CENTCOM AOR? How concerned are you about attacks on our forces and 
facilities by multiple drones and drone swarms?
    General McKenzie. (U) Yes, I am deeply concerned about U.S. and 
partner force protection, especially as Iran demonstrates increased use 
of UAVs and a willingness to proliferate these systems. We have already 
observed the adversary's use of multiple drones in a single attack and 
swarms remain a possibility. I am further concerned Iran is expanding 
its UAV inventory while improving tactics, techniques, and procedures--
and sharing equipment and knowledge with its proxies and partners.
    (U) Protecting our forces and assets is my top commitment. 
USCENTCOM has already seen complex attacks involving multiple drones 
(varying in size) as well as mortars and missiles. We fully expect 
swarming and other tactics will continue to evolve, along with other 
technique and technology advancements.
    Mr. Scott. You have expressed an urgent operational need for 
counter UAS capabilities. Is DOD developing and fielding counter drone 
systems fast enough to mitigate this growing threat so that we do not 
have to shoot down cheap ``Costco'' drones, as you say, with F-16s and 
Patriots?
    General McKenzie. (U) DOD has made great progress in fielding C-UAS 
systems, and we have effective layered defenses in place at many of our 
locations, but there is more work to be done. Recently the Department 
reprogrammed approximately $460 million to support the Counter-small 
UAS (C-sUAS) requirements, and I support the increased funding to 
address future C-UAS/CsUAS requirements.
    Mr. Scott. The Office of the Under Secretary for Research and 
Engineering and the Administration's Council on Science and Technology 
have prioritized exploring directed energy and specifically high-power 
microwave, technology and solutions. Is CENTCOM working on directed 
energy and high-power microwave solutions for electronic warfare and 
air and missile defense?
    General McKenzie. (U) USCENTCOM fully supports development, testing 
and fielding of directed energy (DE) capabilities for use in our area 
of responsibility. Our role in the development of warfighting 
capabilities is to validate Joint needs generated by our components. We 
also participate in the development of future warfighting concepts, 
which serve to drive innovation across the Department. We are not 
funded to pursue solutions to our generated needs. To address our 
needs, we must compete for funding from programs established within the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the Services--the 
research, development, testing, and engineering (RDT&E) ecosystem--
which pursue material solutions to service and Combatant Command needs. 
In the past, USCENTCOM oversaw the first operational use of a DE 
weapon, and we continue to work with the Services and developers to 
bring follow-on systems into our AOR. Additionally, we employ a number 
of electromagnetic techniques; high power microwaves being one of them, 
against a variety of threats. As such, USCENTCOM sees great potential 
in the use of DE due to its potential for faster response and a 
magazine that is recharged through on-board, fuel-based power and 
thermal management systems. We stand ready to work with the RDT&E 
community to assist in the development, including operational testing 
in our AOR of DE systems tailored to address our warfighting needs.
    Mr. Scott. Would you support the immediate deployment of proven 
counter-drone prototypes into the CENTCOM AOR to include kinetic and 
non-kinetic systems like high-power-microwaves?
    General McKenzie. (U) USCENTCOM already employs prototypes and 
conducts operational assessments of counter-drone prototypes in 
theater, to include laser, high-powered microwave, and electromagnetic 
pulse systems. An ``all-of-the-above'' layered defense is the best way 
forward and we gladly accept new systems for testing, particularly 
systems that add capability to take down larger UAS that may or may not 
transmit a frequency.
    Mr. Scott. How might CENTCOM strengthen maritime domain awareness 
in the CENTCOM AOR? How might the sharing of relevant information in a 
timely and coherent manner be accomplished?
    General McKenzie. (U) Our Naval component (NAVCENT) established a 
Task Force (TF 59) to test and operate unmanned surface vessels (USVs) 
and artificial intelligence systems in the AOR. TF 59's USVs enhance 
maritime domain awareness by facilitating a persistent maritime 
presence throughout the AOR and by leveraging advanced technologies 
like artificial intelligence. TF 59 is actively working with partners 
to develop a regional network of USVs that will be able to gather and 
share maritime domain awareness information to deter smuggling and 
other malign activities. Additionally, we conduct regular P-8 and 
unmanned air surveillance missions to develop maritime domain 
awareness, as do several of our partners. NAVCENT also leads a thirty-
four nation coalition called the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) located 
at NAVCENT headquarters in Bahrain. CMF representatives at NAVCENT 
daily share maritime domain awareness information and coordinate 
operations throughout the AOR.
    Mr. Scott. What steps are being, or can be, taken to maintain 
robust bilateral missile defense cooperation with Israel, even as the 
United States also works to develop more regional air defenses? Given 
the ongoing need to deploy U.S. air defenses to Europe, how do you 
assess the United States' ability to deploy or sustain similar systems 
in the Middle East as a stopgap to help defend our Gulf allies--at 
least until they are much better able to defend themselves?
    General McKenzie. (U) There has been no degradation to the robust 
bilateral missile defense relationship with Israel. In fact, USCENTCOM 
is working to expand this relationship beyond ballistic missile defense 
to air and missile defense (AMD) to add defenses to counter cruise 
missile (CM) and unmanned aerial system (UAS) threats. The strong 
bilateral relationship is in many ways the foundation of our regional 
air defense efforts, which will benefit both Israel, our other 
partners, and U.S. interests in the region.
    (U) USCENTCOM has identified two key concerns deriving from the 
reduction of U.S. air defense systems in the area of responsibility 
(AOR). The first is a reduction in coverage for U.S. forces and 
critical infrastructure, and the second is the perception that these 
reductions create among our regional partners that the U.S. is 
abandoning the region. To mitigate these concerns, USCENTCOM is working 
with partners to improve employment and integration of partner systems.
    (U) Only three Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations have the 
capability and capacity to provide limited defense--acquired via FMS: 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. All three countries 
field advanced air and missile defense (AMD) capabilities such as 
Patriot and/or THAAD. Bahrain have agreed to purchase two Patriot 
batteries, but they are several years from initial fielding.
    Mr. Scott. What do you assess would be the impact of lifting the 
Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of the IRGC? Would Iranian 
malign influence increase or decrease as a result?
    General McKenzie. (U) To date, the FTO designation has not impeded 
Iran's pursuit of its strategic objectives. I assess lifting the FTO 
designation will have no impact on Iranian malign influence. The IRGC-
QF and its proxies and partners will remain Tehran's primary tool to 
dominate its neighbors and eliminate the U.S. military presence from 
the region.
    Mr. Scott. China has made significant strides in expanding its 
influence in the Middle East. What is your assessment of China's 
growing footprint, and do you consider China's influence on the region 
as competition for the United States as we pursue our own defense and 
security interests? What are you doing to win against China and ensure 
that U.S. defense and security interests are maintained in the face of 
Chinese malign activity?
    General McKenzie. (U) China's growing presence in the region 
directly competes with U.S. defense and security interests in the 
Middle East. Beijing's holistic diplomatic, information, military, and 
economic approach seeks to amplify and exploit a false ``abandonment'' 
narrative. This approach threatens to displace the U.S. over time as 
the strategic partner of choice in the region. We must leverage tools 
such as FMS to build partnered nation capacity and capability in order 
to strengthen our relations and maintain our position as the partner of 
choice. Our greatest tool to counter China is the relationships we 
maintain with our allies and partners in the region. Sustaining these 
relationships is a whole of government effort.
    Mr. Scott. What is the status of Israel's integration into 
CENTCOM's AOR? What steps are still outstanding? Will you commit to 
accelerating Israel's move into CENTCOM?
    General McKenzie. (U) Working with the Secretary, Joint Staff, and 
USEUCOM, we have identified 46 distinct groups of activities that must 
transfer to USCENTCOM or require modification of their function. To 
date, we have successfully transferred or modified 25 of these 46 
activities since we started the transfers in September 2021. Throughout 
the process, we have successfully worked with USEUCOM to find 
opportunities to responsibly accelerate the transfer and will continue 
as this process moves forward.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard enhance their relationship 
with the Israeli Navy?
    General McKenzie. (U) Our Naval component (NAVCENT) routinely 
operates and trains with the Israeli Navy. NAVCENT's U.S. Coast Guard 
personnel and ships have conducted a number of engagements, including 
subject matter expert exchanges, port visits, visit, board, search and 
seizure (VBSS) exchanges, seamanship and navigation, search and rescue, 
small boat operations, and engineering exchanges. Operations and 
trainings will continue on a regular basis as NAVCENT works with the 
Israeli Navy to enhance maritime domain awareness and maritime security 
in the AOR.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
    Mr. Bacon. How should the U.S. work with allies and partners, 
including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, to improve the 
interdiction of Iranian weapons shipments going to Iran's proxies and 
affiliates throughout the CENTCOM region?
    General McKenzie. (U) We continue to focus on targeting malign 
actor advanced conventional weapons (ACW) proliferation across the 
Arabian Peninsula (AP) and territorial waters by, with, and through our 
partners. Our component commands remain postured across the AP to 
defend against and interdict ACW threats. U.S. forces should approach 
the ACW problem from a joint and multi-lateral perspective, as 
countering this threat requires a division of labor across joint-
combined operations and to identify vulnerabilities in the weapons 
shipment network. We should focus on continuing to promote regional 
stability and security operations, degrading ACW manufacturing, 
leveraging multi-national resources, synchronizing personnel and assets 
to align with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) capabilities, and 
sustaining existing information sharing with partners. USCENTCOM is 
actively engaging partner nations across the AOR to increase their 
understanding of the growing Iranian threat and gain their commitment 
to addressing the shared regional security concerns posed by Iran. We 
must continue to leverage our regional partnerships by sharing 
releasable intelligence and information to develop a common 
understanding of the threat. Additionally, we must remain engaged with 
partners for timely exploitation of collected exploitable material.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
    Ms. Jacobs. The government promised to evacuate survivors of the 
August 29 drone strike. Have they been evacuated yet, and if not, why 
not?
    Ms. Baker. The Department, in coordination with other U.S. 
Government departments, continues to take steps to respond to the 
August 29, 2021 airstrike in Kabul, which resulted in the tragic death 
of Mr. Zemari Ahmadi and nine other individuals. As part of this, we 
are working closely with Nutrition & Education International (NEI), Mr. 
Ahmadi's employer. This is a high priority matter for the Department 
and with the full support of the Secretary and Policy staff have been 
working directly with the President of NEI, Dr. Steven Kwon and 
representatives of the affected families. To protect their safety, and 
security, we are not able to provide more information regarding these 
efforts in an unclassified format at this time. [QFR #24 for cross-
reference.]
    Ms. Jacobs. Congress recently reauthorized three million dollars 
annually for ex gratia payments for civilians who have experienced harm 
from U.S. military operations. However, in 2020, the last year for 
which this information is publicly available, the Department of Defense 
disbursed zero dollars in ex gratia payments. Most civilian casualties 
in recent years have occurred in the CENTCOM AOR. As it improves 
civilian casualty tracking and reporting, does CENTCOM plan to return 
to past cases of civilian harm to offer ex gratia payments? How does 
CENTCOM plan to change or improve its ex gratia disbursement procedures 
moving forward?
    Ms. Baker. The Department made ex gratia payments of $5,000 in 
calendar year 2021. A single payment was made in January and reported 
to Congress in the first quarterly report for that year. The payment 
was made by USFOR-A in accordance with DOD and USCENTCOM regulations 
and procedures. As mention in the response to QFR 24 above, DOD in 
coordination with other U.S. Government departments, continues to take 
steps to respond to the August 29, 2021 airstrike in Kabul. With 
respect to the general reduction in payments beginning in 2020 and 
continuing to the present, two factors combined to reduce the number 
and amount of payments. One was the requirement to develop new 
regulations as required by section 1213 of the FY 2020 NDAA, followed 
by the requisite country assessments in consultation with our State 
Department colleagues. Additionally, due to the general change in the 
nature and number of operations in the U.S. Central Command area of 
responsibility beginning in 2020, the number of civilian casualties 
resulting from U.S. operations decreased substantially. DOD commands 
continue to assess and review open incidents of civilian casualties, 
and can reopen cases that have been resolved if new information is made 
available. Finally, the improvements to processes will be addressed for 
DOD-wide application by the Secretary of Defense directed Civilian Harm 
Mitigation and Response Action Plan -Task Force (CHMRAP-TF) now 
underway.
    Ms. Jacobs. What measures does AFRICOM take to fulfill that 
requirement and assess whether imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances in the context of 127e 
operations?
    General Townsend. [The information is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
    Ms. Jacobs. General Townsend, you have frequently noted the 
logistical challenges with troops ``commuting to work'' and that there 
are more ``effective and efficient ways'' in Somalia to carry out 
AFRICOMs mission. But let's take a step back a bit. Can you first 
describe how any operations in Somalia have measurable reduced 
instances of terrorism and violent extremism in Somalia?
    And how specifically would a permanent force presence better our 
mission to address violent extremism in Somalia?
    General Townsend. U.S. operations in Somalia have served as a key 
catalyst and enabler of Somali National Army (SNA) territorial gains, 
removed al-Shabaab leaders and attack planners, and limited the pace 
and scope of the group's attacks. Since the U.S. repositioning in early 
2021, al-Shabaab's advances--including expansion in Mogadishu, central 
Somalia, and along the Kenya-Somalia border--have underscored the role 
of sustained U.S. operations in constraining the group's operations. 
Operationally, a permanent presence in Somalia will improve our 
interaction with partner forces, increasing the pace and efficiency of 
operations to contain al-Shabaab.
    U.S. operations and training in Somalia have enabled the SNA to 
clear and seize territory from al-Shabaab, including significant 
terrain in the Lower Shabelle region during Operation Badbaado in 2019-
2020. U.S. collective self-defense airstrikes have also supported 
partner forces during advances against al-Shabaab positions.
    U.S. airstrikes have removed senior al-Shabaab members and attack 
planners, driving the group's leadership to reduce its visibility and 
delay operational goals. Airstrikes have also disrupted specific attack 
plans, including against U.S. interests.
    The impact of U.S. operations is also evidenced by attack trends 
following the U.S. repositioning from Somalia in January 2021. The 
group subsequently increased attacks in Mogadishu, more than doubling 
the number of VBIED attacks in 2021 compared to 2020 and increasing its 
pace of assassinations in the capital.
    A persistent force presence will (1) reduce risk to our troops, (2) 
increase rapport between USSOF and our partner forces, (3) increase the 
flow of information and (4) facilitate efficient command and control. 
Without the logistical burdens inherent to episodic engagements, 
operational tempo and tactical efficiency will increase. A persistent 
presence also better enables intelligence development required to 
illuminate VEOs network activity.
    Ms. Jacobs. I am pleased to hear that CENTCOM has implemented 
preliminary changes to its method of tracking and reporting allegations 
of civilian casualties. As recommended in the recently released RAND 
report on DOD Civilian Casualty Policies and Procedures, will you 
commit to consulting with civil society organizations specialized in 
civilian harm as you continue making and implementing changes?
    General McKenzie. (U) Yes, USCENTCOM will continue to engage and 
consult with civil society organizations focused on mitigating civilian 
harm during military operations. Likewise, USCENTCOM remains committed 
to the significant work the Department has undertaken to develop the 
new DOD Instruction on preventing and mitigating civilian harm. The 
Department's work has been informed by our experiences and lessons 
learned in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen as well as the studies 
you reference, civil society organizations specializing in civilian 
harm, and DODIG reports.
    Ms. Jacobs. Congress recently reauthorized three million dollars 
annually for ex gratia payments for civilians who have experienced harm 
from U.S. military operations. However, in 2020, the last year for 
which this information is publicly available, the Department of Defense 
disbursed zero dollars in ex gratia payments. Most civilian casualties 
in recent years have occurred in the CENTCOM AOR. As it improves 
civilian casualty tracking and reporting, does CENTCOM plan to return 
to past cases of civilian harm to offer ex gratia payments? How does 
CENTCOM plan to change or improve its ex gratia disbursement procedures 
moving forward?
    General McKenzie. (U) The ability to offer ex gratia payments 
provides an important tool for our commanders on the ground to ensure 
the safety and security of our forces and address instances of civilian 
harm where and when appropriate. Commanders retain the ability to 
utilize ex gratia for past cases as appropriate subject to the 
statutory requirements, as implemented by DOD. Ex gratia remains a very 
important tool for our commanders and we remain committed to training 
our leaders and teams on the benefits and purpose of this authority so 
that it is considered and utilized within the authority permitted and 
consistent with the spirit and intent of the authorization.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. Recognizing that the DOD shared the responsibility to 
withdraw from Afghanistan with the State Department, I would like you 
to answer to the best of your ability, what was the thought process 
behind the decision to withdraw all U.S. military forces, end close air 
support, and remove civilian contractors from Afghanistan, particularly 
prior to the evacuation of U.S. citizens?
    Ms. Baker. After a rigorous policy review, President Biden decided 
to withdraw the remaining U.S. forces from Afghanistan and end a 20-
year war. It is my understanding that the decision was informed by 
extensive consultations with his entire national security team, Members 
of Congress, allies and partners, and other experts. The United States 
continued to provide support to the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces (ANDSF) with civilian contractors and U.S. military 
close air support until just days before the evacuation began. The 
unexpected speed of the Taliban's ground seizure resulted in our rapid 
withdrawal and led to both high levels of desertion and the sudden 
surrender of the ANDSF. It is my understanding that extending the U.S. 
presence beyond the end of August would have greatly imperiled our 
forces and our mission.
    Mr. Moore. President Biden has stated that the U.S. will use over-
the-horizon capabilities to strike terrorist threats remaining in 
Afghanistan, yet I lack understanding of how this is logistically 
possible. A quick glance of the map shows there is no good way for the 
U.S. to access Afghanistan from the air. Pakistan is not our friend, 
Iran and China are not options, and nations bordering Afghanistan are 
unwilling to cooperate. Even if the vast distances involved did not 
impede how rapidly the U.S. could respond in Afghanistan, which they 
do, what are some of the practical, political, and geographical 
limitations regarding the over-the-horizon capabilities to defeat 
emerging terrorist threats in Afghanistan, and what is the 
administration doing to work around these challenges?
    Ms. Baker. The Department remains committed to never again letting 
Afghanistan to become a safe haven for terrorist organizations, and we 
will use all of the Department's capabilities in furtherance of that 
objective. DOD continues to invest in and deploy capabilities that can 
effectively counter terrorism from Afghanistan. We have the edge over 
terrorist groups in technological capacity, direct-action readiness and 
expertise, and power projection capability. We continue to deepen our 
relationships in the region, collaborate with allies and partners, and 
ensure we bring the right mix of the Department's capabilities to bear. 
For instance, we have been working with Pakistan to meet our 
counterterrorism objectives in the region. We remain confident in our 
ability to conduct this mission and the Department can provide 
additional information in a classified format.

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