[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING FREIGHT RAIL SAFETY
=======================================================================
(117-52)
REMOTE HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-964 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon, Chair
SAM GRAVES, Missouri ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas District of Columbia
BOB GIBBS, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida RICK LARSEN, Washington
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOHN KATKO, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California
BRIAN BABIN, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana Georgia
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
MIKE BOST, Illinois DINA TITUS, Nevada
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
DOUG LaMALFA, California JARED HUFFMAN, California
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas JULIA BROWNLEY, California
BRIAN J. MAST, Florida FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
JENNIFFER GONZALEZ-COLON, MARK DeSAULNIER, California
Puerto Rico STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota GREG STANTON, Arizona
JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey COLIN Z. ALLRED, Texas
MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi SHARICE DAVIDS, Kansas, Vice Chair
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
NANCY MACE, South Carolina CHRIS PAPPAS, New Hampshire
NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York CONOR LAMB, Pennsylvania
BETH VAN DUYNE, Texas SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
MICHELLE STEEL, California CAROLYN BOURDEAUX, Georgia
Vacancy KAIALI`I KAHELE, Hawaii
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
NIKEMA WILLIAMS, Georgia
MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
Vacancy
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., New Jersey,
Chair
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois MARIE NEWMAN, Illinois
MIKE BOST, Illinois STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
DOUG LaMALFA, California ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
BRUCE WESTERMAN, Arkansas FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida
BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania JESUS G. ``CHUY'' GARCIA, Illinois
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington,
PETE STAUBER, Minnesota Vice Chair
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
DUSTY JOHNSON, South Dakota HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
TROY E. NEHLS, Texas Georgia
MICHELLE STEEL, California DINA TITUS, Nevada
SAM GRAVES, Missouri (Ex Officio) JARED HUFFMAN, California
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JAKE AUCHINCLOSS, Massachusetts
TROY A. CARTER, Louisiana
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ vii
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, and Chair, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, opening statement.......... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Arkansas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, opening
statement...................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, prepared statement............................. 105
Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, prepared statement............................. 106
WITNESSES
Panel 1
Hon. Amit Bose, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration,
oral statement................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Hon. Thomas B. Chapman, Member, National Transportation Safety
Board, oral statement.......................................... 16
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Panel 2
Roy L. Morrison III, Director of Safety, Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employes Division, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, oral statement................................... 55
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Don Grissom, Assistant General President, Brotherhood of Railway
Carmen Division, TCU/IAM, oral statement....................... 61
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Grady C. Cothen, Jr., Retired, Transportation Policy Consultant,
oral statement................................................. 67
Prepared statement........................................... 68
Nathan C. Bachman, Vice President of Sales and Business
Development, Loram Technologies, Inc., oral statement.......... 73
Prepared statement........................................... 74
Cynthia M. Sanborn, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating
Officer, Norfolk Southern Corporation, and Chair, Safety and
Operations Management Committee, Association of American
Railroads, oral statement...................................... 77
Prepared statement........................................... 78
Jeremy Ferguson, President, Sheet Metal, Air, Rail,
Transportation-Transportation Division, oral statement......... 85
Prepared statement........................................... 87
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Letter of June 10, 2022, to Hon. Amit Bose, Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration, from Hon. Eric A. ``Rick''
Crawford, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Eric
A. ``Rick'' Crawford........................................... 4
Statement from the Association of State Railroad Safety Managers,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr........... 52
Submissions for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio:
Statement of Chuck Baker, President, American Short Line and
Regional Railroad Association.............................. 106
Emails from Two Railroad Employees........................... 110
Letter of June 28, 2022, to Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., Chair,
and Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials, from Rachel Maleh, Executive Director, Operation
Lifesaver, Inc............................................. 113
APPENDIX
Questions to Hon. Amit Bose, Administrator, Federal Railroad
Administration, from:
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio........................................ 115
Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton................................... 117
Hon. Seth Moulton............................................ 117
Hon. Dina Titus.............................................. 119
Hon. Brian K. Fitzpatrick.................................... 119
Questions to Hon. Thomas B. Chapman, Member, National
Transportation Safety Board, from:
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio........................................ 120
Hon. Seth Moulton............................................ 121
Hon. Dina Titus.............................................. 121
Questions to Roy L. Morrison III, Director of Safety, Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way Employes Division, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, from:
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr..................................... 122
Hon. Dina Titus.............................................. 122
Questions to Grady C. Cothen, Jr., Retired, Transportation Policy
Consultant, from:
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio........................................ 126
Hon. Seth Moulton............................................ 129
Questions to Cynthia M. Sanborn, Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer, Norfolk Southern Corporation, and
Chair, Safety and Operations Management Committee, Association
of American Railroads, from:
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio........................................ 130
Hon. Grace F. Napolitano..................................... 132
Hon. Seth Moulton............................................ 133
Questions from Hon. Dina Titus to Jeremy Ferguson, President,
Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, Transportation-Transportation Division. 135
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June 9, 2022
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: Members, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
and Hazardous Materials
FROM: Staff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
Hazardous Materials
RE: Subcommittee Hearing on ``Examining Freight Rail
Safety''
PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials will meet on Tuesday, June 14, 2022, at 10:00 a.m. ET
in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom to hold a
hearing titled ``Examining Freight Rail Safety.'' The purpose
of this hearing is to hear from government and stakeholder
witnesses about the state of freight rail safety and issues
pertinent to keeping rail operations, rail workers, and
communities safe. The Subcommittee will receive testimony from
the Federal Railroad Administration; the National
Transportation Safety Board; the Brotherhood of Maintenance of
Way Employes Division; Brotherhood of Railway Carmen Division;
retired transportation policy consultant; Loram Technologies,
Inc.; Norfolk Southern Corporation and Association of American
Railroads; and Sheet Metal, Air, Rail Transportation-
Transportation Division.
BACKGROUND
I. FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is responsible
for administering the federal rail safety program.\1\ FRA has
the authority to issue regulations and orders pertaining to
rail safety and to issue civil and criminal penalties to
enforce those regulations and orders.\2\
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\1\ Subtitle V of Title 49, United States Code.
\2\ Id.
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FRA executes its railroad safety responsibilities through
various skilled staff. FRA headquarters staff include technical
experts who manage the mission critical programs, provide
technical oversight and management of field personnel, and
support development of safety standards and regulations.\3\ The
agency relies on its field presence to monitor compliance with
federally mandated standards, which includes approximately 350
railroad safety inspectors covering six safety disciplines and
more than 100 specialists, engineers, analysts, and managers
who work in the field.\4\ FRA further relies on 202 state
safety inspectors employed by 33 states by agreement to perform
compliance inspections and additional investigative and
surveillance activities.\5\
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\3\ Federal Railroad Administration, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget
Estimates, Page 46.
\4\ The six disciplines include: operating practices; motive power
and equipment; signal and train control; track; hazardous materials;
and grade crossing safety. FY 2023 Budget Estimates, Page 42: https://
www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-04/
FRA_Budget_Estimates_
FY23.pdf
\5\ Communication from Federal Railroad Administration to
Subcommittee Staff, and https://railroads.dot.gov/divisions/
partnerships-programs/state-rail-safety-participation.
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In addition to FRA's field-based specialists and
inspectors, FRA's Office of Railroad Safety includes nine
Safety Management Teams (SMT) located across the country.\6\
Created in June 2020 during a reorganization of the office, the
SMTs are responsible for oversight and engagement with a single
railroad or a class of railroads to monitor risks at a
railroad-specific system-wide level rather than by region.\7\
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\6\ Safety Management Teams, https://railroads.dot.gov/divisions/
regional-offices/safety-management-teams
\7\ Id.
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II. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an
independent federal agency charged with investigating
significant accidents in railroad and other transportation
modes.\8\ Staff working in the Railroad Division of the Office
of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations
investigate accidents and incidents involving passenger and
freight railroads, commuter rail transit systems, and other
fixed guideway systems.\9\ The division also assesses selected
railroad safety issues, often based on a set of accident
investigations.\10\ Special studies may focus on analyses of
regulations, railroad safety programs or procedures, or audit
reviews of management and operations practices.\11\ The NTSB
also coordinates the resources of the federal government and
other organizations to assist victims and their family members
impacted by transportation disasters.\12\
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\8\ 49 USC 1131.
\9\ National Transportation Safety Board Fiscal Year 2023 Budget
Request, Page 66.
\10\ Id.
\11\ Id.
\12\ 49 USC 1139.
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The NTSB's 2021-2022 Most Wanted List of Transportation
Safety Improvements (``Most Wanted List'') includes a call to
improve the safety of rail workers.\13\ The Most Wanted List
highlights recurring safety issues impacting roadway workers in
accident investigations such as concerns for continued use of
train approach warning, the need for proper training and job
briefings, access to necessary protective equipment, and work
schedules and limitations based on science to prevent fatigued
workers from working overtime.\14\ The Most Wanted List also
calls for protection of operating crews and mechanical workers
through the use of buffer cars.\15\
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\13\ Improve Rail Worker Safety, 2021-2022 Most Wanted List,
National Transportation Safety Board https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/
Pages/mwl-21-22/mwl-rph-02.aspx
\14\ Id.
\15\ Id.
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III. SAFETY DATA
Railroads must regularly report to FRA on safety events
occurring in their systems that meet certain thresholds
specified in FRA regulations.\16\ FRA uses the information
concerning hazards and risks to carry out its regulatory
responsibilities, and for determining comparative trends of
railroad safety and to develop hazard elimination and risk
reduction programs that focus on preventing railroad injuries
and accidents.\17\ Accuracy of such reported information is
critical.\18\ FRA publishes on its website railroad reports and
safety data. Below is publicly reported data on Class I
railroads for the decade of 2013 to 2022.\19\
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\16\ 49 CFR Part 225.
\17\ 49 CFR 225.1
\18\ 49 CFR 225.33 regulates Internal Control Plans.
\19\ Data includes only Class I railroads, excluding Amtrak. Ten
Year Accident/Incident Overview 1.12, January-December 2022, retrieved
June 3, 2022, Available at https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/
OfficeofSafety/publicsite/Query/TenYearAccidentIncidentOverview.aspx.
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TRAIN ACCIDENTS (NOT AT GRADE CROSSINGS):
The number and rate of train accidents have fluctuated for
the last decade. The number of accidents include a low of 1,229
accidents (2021) and a high of 1,592 accidents (2018). The rate
of accidents per million train miles include a low of 2.415
accidents per million train miles (2013), and a high of 3.019
accidents per million train miles (2019).\20\ This compares to
the previous decade (2003-2012) annual train accidents which
measured at a low of 1,390 (2012) and a high of 2,778 (2004),
and rate of train accidents per million train miles at a low of
2.402 (2012) and a high of 4.372 (2004).\21\
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\20\ Accidents per million train miles is an FRA standard
measurement.
\21\ Data includes only Class I railroads, excluding Amtrak. Ten
Year Accident/Incident Overview 1.12, January-December 2012, retrieved
April 29, 2022. Available at https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov/
OfficeofSafety/publicsite/Query/TenYearAccidentIncidentOverview.aspx.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TRAIN ACCIDENTS (NOT AT GRADE CROSSINGS) BY CAUSE:
Railroads assign causes to reportable accidents. Human
factor and track remain the leading causes of train accidents,
followed by miscellaneous. This is consistent with the previous
decade.\22\
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\22\ Id.
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HIGHWAY-RAIL GRADE CROSSING INCIDENTS:
The number of highway-rail grade crossing incidents ranged
from 1,386 (2020) to 1,709 (2014); the rate of such incidents
per million train miles includes a low of 2.627 (2014) and high
of 3.633 (2021).
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EMPLOYEE ON-DUTY CASES (INJURY, ILLNESS, AND FATALTIES):
The number of employee on-duty deaths ranged from 6 (2016,
2019, 2020) to 9 (2013, 2017, 2018, 2021).
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ACCIDENTS IN YARDS:
In yards, switching is the process of putting cars in a
specific order. The total number of yard switching miles has
decreased over the decade, but the number of accidents on yard
track has fluctuated and the rate of yard accidents per yard
switching miles has increased.\23\
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\23\ Yard accidents per yard switching miles is an FRA standard
measurement.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
IV. SAFETY ISSUES
FATIGUE:
Research has shown that various conditions can affect
fatigue such as sleep loss, workload, stress, monotony,
workplace ergonomics, age, health, medications, noise, and
circadian disruption.\24\ Rapid changes in the circadian
pattern of sleep and wakefulness disrupt many physiological
functions, and such disruptions may impair human performance
and cause a general feeling of debility until realignment is
achieved.\25\ Symptoms of fatigue include, but are not limited
to, falling asleep, increased reaction time, loss of
attentional capacity, and decline of short-term and working
memory function which may impair performance, increase error,
and increase accident risk.\26\
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\24\ Citations for research related to fatigue can be found in
Federal Railroad Administration, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Fatigue
Risk Management Programs for Certain Passenger and Freight Railroads,
Docket No. FRA-2015-0122, December 22, 2020. See page 83486 of that
document for a description of fatigue symptoms.
\25\ Id at 83486.
\26\ Id.
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FRA research has established that the probability of rail
accidents increases as fatigue increases.\27\ Between 2000 and
2020, the NTSB conducted 11 major investigations of accidents
involving railroads subject to FRA jurisdiction in which
fatigue was identified as the probable or a contributing cause
of the accident.\28\
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\27\ Id. at 83491.
\28\ National Transportation Safety Board, Correspondence to the
Federal Railroad Administration dated February 17, 2021, on Safety
Recommendation R-12-016, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/_layouts/
ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-12-016.
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Congress and the FRA require railroads to manage their
employees' fatigue associated with railroad operations through
hours of service (HOS) limitations and rest requirements.\29\
HOS limitations are generally based on the assumption that
fatigue simply increases as time passes.\30\ This does not
account for factors such as sleep loss, amount of sleep,
circadian rhythms, sleep quality, and the effects of the type
of task being performed on the resulting level of fatigue.\31\
Additionally, not all railroad workers are covered by HOS
protections; ordinarily HOS do not apply to maintenance-of-way
employees, carmen, or yardmasters.\32\
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\29\ 49 USC Chapter 211; 49 CFR Part 228; Federal Railroad
Administration, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Fatigue Risk Management
Programs for Certain Passenger and Freight Railroads, Docket No. FRA-
2015-0122, December 22, 2020, Page 83486.
\30\ Id. at Page 83486.
\31\ Id.
\32\ Id. and Federal Railroad Administration, Yardmasters and Yard
Safety in the U.S. Railroad Industry: An Exploratory Study, January
2007, Page 9 https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/
422/ord0701.pdf
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As part of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008,
Congress required that by 2012 FRA require the Class I
railroads, railroad carriers providing intercity or commuter
rail passenger transportation, and railroad carriers that have
inadequate safety performance, develop fatigue management plans
(as part of safety risk reduction programs) to reduce the
fatigue experienced by safety-related railroad employees and to
reduce the likelihood of accidents, incidents, injuries, and
fatalities caused by fatigue.\33\ In December 2020, FRA issued
a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to implement the 2008
mandate.\34\
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\33\ Section 103 of Division A, Rail Safety Improvement Act of
2008, P.L. 110-432.
\34\ Federal Railroad Administration, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Fatigue Risk Management Programs for Certain Passenger and
Freight Railroads, Docket No. FRA-2015-0122, December 22, 2020.
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WORKFORCE:
The average total number of workers employed by the Class I
railroads at the end of 2021 was nearly one-third less than the
total employed in 2015, according to data reported by the
railroads and published by the Surface Transportation
Board.\35\ These cuts were implemented as part of precision
scheduled railroading and continued through the COVID-19
pandemic.\36\ Railroad workers and unions representing them
contend that the workforce cuts are causing worker fatigue from
increased working hours, increased workload, and management
pressure to rush safety work, all of which are leading to
deteriorated workplace conditions and reduced safety
culture.\37\ Examples include employees working 16-hour shifts
consecutively, fewer workers covering larger territories, and
less time permitted to inspect a rail car from three minutes to
one minute.\38\ They claim that this has contributed to workers
leaving the industry and refusing recalls from furlough.\39\
Railroads have in place plans to hire certain railroad workers
and are reporting regularly on those plans and their progress
to the Surface Transportation Board.\40\
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\35\ Employment data reported by the Class Is, published by the
Surface Transportation Board. https://www.stb.gov/reports-data/
economic-data/employment-data/
\36\ See for example page 5 of Norfolk Southern 2019 Annual Report
to Investors http://www.nscorp.com/content/dam/nscorp/get-to-know-ns/
investor-relations/annual-reports/annual-report-2019.pdf and page 55 of
Union Pacific 2020 Annual Report to Investors https://www.up.com/cs/
groups/public/@uprr/@investor/documents/investordocuments/
pdf_up_10k_02072020.pdf.
\37\ Comments of BMWE, BRS, SMART Mechanical Division, NCFO 32BJ/
SEIU, TWU, Submitted by Rich Edelman to the Surface Transportation
Board in Docket EP 770, Urgent Issues in Freight Rail Service, April
22, 2022, throughout including pages 84, 86, 90, 103, 105, 108, 109,
122, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131, 136, 142, 148, 149, 155, and 157-159.
\38\ Id.
\39\ Id. throughout including pages 60-63, 73-75, 90, 122, 136, and
143.
\40\ The Surface Transportation Board began requiring this
reporting following its April 26 and 27, 2022 public hearing with the
issuance of Decision, Surface Transportation Board, Urgent Issues in
Freight Rail Service--Railroad Reporting, May 6, 2022, Docket No. EP770
(Sub-No. 1).
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CREW SIZE:
Federal regulations do not require a minimum crew size.
While some railroad operations use single-person crews, Class I
railroads operate with two crewmembers: a locomotive engineer
and a conductor.\41\ In two-person crew operations, engineers
and conductors work together to safely operate a train.\42\ FRA
regulations do not prohibit railroads from choosing to operate
a train with only one crewmember.\43\
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\41\ U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad
Administration, Train Crew Staffing Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
Regulatory Impact Analysis, February 18, 2016, FRA-2014-0033, Page 22.
\42\ Subtitle V of Title 49, United States Code. Train Crew
Staffing Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Railroad
Administration, March 15, 2016, FRA-2014-0033, throughout including at
Page 13925.
\43\ Id. at page 13943.
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In March 2016, FRA issued an NPRM that proposed a standard
requiring a minimum of two crewmembers and minimum requirements
for the roles and responsibilities of the second
crewmember.\44\ The NPRM proposed two options for permitting
existing single-crew operations to continue and allowing
operations to begin single-crew operations, as well as
exceptions for certain passenger and freight operations.\45\
The agency held a public hearing on the NPRM in July 2016.\46\
On May 29, 2019, the FRA published in the Federal Register a
notice to withdraw the 2016 NPRM.\47\ In the May 2019 document,
FRA wrote that the withdrawal of the NPRM preempts states from
enacting laws relating to crew size.\48\
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\44\ Train Crew Staffing Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal
Railroad Administration, March 15, 2016, FRA-2014-0033.
\45\ Id.
\46\ Federal Railroad Administration, Proposed rule; notice of
public hearing and reopening of comment period, FRA-2014-0033 Notice
No. 3, June 15, 2016.
\47\ Train Crew Staffing Notice, Federal Railroad Administration,
May 29, 2019, FRA-2014-0033-1606.
\48\ Id.
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CREW CERTIFICATION AND TRAINING:
FRA regulations require that railroads have approved
locomotive engineer and conductor certification programs to
reduce the rate and number of accidents and incidents and to
improve railroad safety.\49\ The standards include minimum
eligibility, training, testing, certification, and monitoring
standards to help ensure that only those who meet minimum
safety standards serve as engineers and conductors.\50\
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\49\ 49 CFR Parts 240 and 242.
\50\ Id.
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From March to August 2021, two certified conductors were
fatally injured while performing their duties relating to train
operations.\51\ There were also incidents that resulted in
amputation and crushing injuries.\52\ In November 2021, FRA
identified the concern that the industry was reducing the
duration of conductor certification training for new-hire
employees and noted that there had recently been two certified
conductors with less than a year of service who suffered
amputations after being struck by moving railroad
equipment.\53\ FRA began conducting comprehensive reviews and
audits of all conductor certification programs to confirm
compliance with Part 242.\54\
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\51\ November 12, 2021 letter from Deputy Administrator Bose to the
Association of American Railroads, American Short Line and Regional
Railroad Association, and American Public Transportation Association.
\52\ Id.
\53\ Id.
\54\ Id.
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Section 22410 of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
(IIJA, P.L. 117-58) directs FRA to audit the locomotive
engineer and conductor qualification, certification, and
training programs, in consultation with the railroads and their
workers, for compliance with Parts 240 and 242.
SAFE TRAIN MAKEUP:
Proper train makeup is critical for ensuring a train is
able to effectively negotiate track and prevent derailment,
according to FRA.\55\ Train makeup refers to the placement of
individual railcars that make up a train.\56\ Freight trains
carry a variety of freight using different types of railcars
that vary in capacity, length, weight, and other
characteristics, and they operate through various weather
conditions and diverse terrain as flat plains and undulating or
mountainous territories.\57\ Improperly assembled trains are
more susceptible to derailment, in part because of vertical,
longitudinal, and lateral forces throughout the train--also
known as ``in-train'' forces--that can affect the stability of
a train on its tracks, depending on a variety of factors,
including the train's specifications, speed, and terrain, among
others.\58\ For example, excessive ``in-train'' forces can
cause a long, heavy train to pull apart or climb off the track
upon a change of grade (e.g., going up or down hills) or when
the train enters a curve.\59\
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\55\ Government Accountability Office, Rail Safety are Getting
Longer, and Additional Information is Needed to Assess their Impact,
May 2019, GAO-19-443, Page 6.
\56\ Id.
\57\ Id.
\58\ Id. at 7.
\59\ Id.
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A conventional air-braking system is controlled by an air
pressure signal from the leading locomotive, which sends a
signal through the train to engage brakes.\60\ Because each
railcar receives this signal sequentially, it takes multiple
seconds for railcars at the end of the train to receive the air
pressure signal and begin braking.\61\ Application of air
brakes generates in-train forces, as railcars at the front of
the train that have applied brakes will be pushed by railcars
further back that have not yet received the air signal.\62\
Other technologies, including two-way end-of-train (EOT)
devices and radio-controlled locomotives (distributed power
``DP'' units), are sometimes used by railroads in conjunction
with conventional brakes to provide improved braking
performance or other benefits, such as adding extra power to
help pull or push long and/or heavy trains.\63\ EOT devices
measure brake pressure and transmit this information via radio
signal to the front of the train.\64\ An EOT device can also
engage air brakes at the rear end of a train in an emergency to
decrease the time required to apply the brakes on all cars.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Id.
\61\ Id.
\62\ Id.
\63\ Id.
\64\ Id. at 8.
\65\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If radio communication between the controlling locomotive
and EOT device is interrupted, an EOT device will not be able
to initiate emergency braking when requested, according to
FRA.\66\ Regulations allow communication between the EOT device
and the controlling locomotive to be lost for up to 16 minutes
and 30 seconds before the crew is notified.\67\ If an engineer
encounters a situation necessitating an emergency brake
application during a loss of communication, the engineer may
have to request an emergency brake application multiple times
before the system responds.\68\ FRA raised concern with the
safety risks associated with loss of communication between
controlling locomotives and EOT and sought public comment in a
January 2020 NPRM.\69\ It published a final rule in December
2020 without mitigating communication loss; the final rule
required that operating employees be trained on the limitations
and use of the emergency application signal and the loss of
communication indicator.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Federal Railroad Administration, Final Rule, Miscellaneous
Amendments to Brake System Safety Standards and Codification of
Waivers, Docket No. FRA-2018-0093, December 11, 2020, page 80551.
\67\ Id. and 49 CFR 232.407
\68\ Id. at 80551.
\69\ Federal Railroad Administration, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, Miscellaneous Amendments to Brake System Safety Standards
and Codification of Waivers, Docket No. FRA-2018-0093, January 15,
2020, page 2506.
\70\ Federal Railroad Administration, Final Rule, Miscellaneous
Amendments to Brake System Safety Standards and Codification of
Waivers, Docket No. FRA-2018-0093, December 11, 2020, Page 80571.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2020, NTSB reported on an October 2018 accident in
Granite Canyon, WY, in which a Union Pacific (UP) freight train
collided with a stationary UP freight train after cresting a
hill and descending a grade for 13 miles, killing the
locomotive engineer and conductor of the striking train.\71\
NTSB determined that the probable cause was the failure of the
air brake system due to restricted air flow in the train's
brake pipe and the failure of the EOT to respond to an
emergency brake command.\72\ Contributing to the accident was
failure to maintain the railcars in accordance with federal
regulations, and the existence of regulatory and industry
standards that permit loss of communication with EOTs for
extended periods of time without warning the operating
crew.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ National Transportation Safety Board, Accident Report, NTSB/
RAR-20/05 PB2020-101016, Collision of Union Pacific Railroad Train
MGRCY04 with a Stationary Train, Granite Canyon, Wyoming, October 4,
2018, adopted December 29, 2020, Page 3.
\72\ Id. at 10.
\73\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also in 2020, NTSB reported on a CSX derailment in August
2017 in Hyndman, PA, in which three derailed tank cars
containing hazardous materials breached, resulting in a fire,
three destroyed homes, and the evacuation of 1,000
residents.\74\ This 10,612-foot long, 18,252 ton-train had no
distributed power and the train encountered leaks in the
braking system that were repaired enroute.\75\ No injuries or
fatalities occurred, with NTSB determining the probable cause
of the accident was the inappropriate use of hand brakes on
empty rail cars to control train speed and the placement of
blocks of empty rail cars at the front of the train leading to
longitudinal and lateral forces and tread buildup, both of
which were permissible under CSX operating practices.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ National Transportation Safety Board, Accident Report, NTSB/
RAR-2020/04 PB2020-101012, CSX Train Derailment with Hazardous
Materials Release, Hyndman, Pennsylvania, August 2, 2017, adopted
November 23, 2020, Page 3.
\75\ Id. at 15, 16.
\76\ Id. at 10, 50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRACK INSPECTION AND AUTONOMOUS TRACK INSPECTION TECHNOLOGY:
FRA regulates track safety under the minimum requirements
of 49 CFR Part 213. The regulations specify four categories of
track components requiring inspection, including track
geometry, roadbed, track structure, and track appliances and
track-related devices.\77\ The regulations require that a
designated qualified person perform visual inspections, at
frequencies determined by class of track, to monitor conditions
for compliance.\78\ When a track inspector identifies a
deviation from the minimum track safety standards, the
inspector must verify the defect and take appropriate action to
correct a verified defect, including immediate remediation in
certain circumstances.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ 49 CFR Subparts C, B, D, and E, respectively.
\78\ 49 CFR 213.7.
\79\ 49 CFR Part 213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automated Track Inspection (ATI) systems measure and
identify railroad track geometry defects.\80\ Since 1974, FRA
has operated an Automated Track Inspection Program (ATIP) to
supplement required visual track inspections to help railroads
identify noncompliant track geometry conditions requiring
repairs.\81\ ATI technologies can be equipped on locomotives or
other rolling stock and travel over the track to be inspected
via a train's movement over that track segment, including
trains operating in revenue service.\82\ Under FRA's ATIP, the
agency operates a fleet composed of a hi-rail vehicle and seven
track geometry cars, two of which are pulled by freight trains
in general revenue service.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ Ian Jefferies, Association of American Railroads, Letter to
Federal Railroad Administration Administrator Amit Bose, January 11,
2022, Page 1.
\81\ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation, FRA Uses Automated Track Inspections to Aid Oversight
but Could Improve Related Program Utilization Goals and Track
Inspection Reporting, April 27, 2022, https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-
item/38939, Page 8.
\82\ Ian Jefferies, Association of American Railroads, Letter to
Federal Railroad Administration Administrator Amit Bose, January 11,
2022, Page 3.
\83\ Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation, FRA Uses Automated Track Inspections to Aid Oversight
but Could Improve Related Program Utilization Goals and Track
Inspection Reporting, April 27, 2022, https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-
item/38939, Page 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 213 allows track owners to operate ATI systems; such
technologies are not prohibited by current regulations.\84\
Beginning in 2018, six of the seven Class I railroads have
operated with FRA's approval under 49 CFR 211.51 ATI testing
programs that include temporary suspension from the visual
inspection frequency intervals required by 49 CFR 213.233.\85\
The test programs permitted the carriers to reduce the
frequency at which track inspectors conduct visual inspections
while the carriers operated ATI systems on track in designated
territories.\86\ At the end of 2021, the total average of Class
I maintenance of way and structures employees--which includes
those who inspect, repair, maintain, and construct track--has
decreased by approximately 23 percent compared to 2014.\87\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ 49 CFR Part 213.
\85\ FRA-2018-0091; FRA-2019-0099; FRA-2020-0031; FRA-2019-0099;
FRA-2021-0044; FRA-2020-0013; FRA-2020-0014; FRA-2020-0056.
\86\ Id.
\87\ Data reported by Class I railroad carriers to the Surface
Transportation Board, https://www.stb.gov/reports-data/economic-data/
employment-data/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA approved extensions of test programs, four of which are
set to expire in November 2022.\88\ FRA approved a request for
a limited waiver under 213.233 from one carrier, denied its
request to expand the terms of that waiver, and denied a second
carrier's waiver request.\89\ In the former case, an
association representing state rail safety managers and the
labor union representing workers who inspect and repair track
filed comments voicing concerns and objection to the waiver,
respectively. In the second waiver, the same labor union
commented in opposition to the waiver.\90\ In the denial
letters, FRA stated that ``given the ongoing RSAC [Railroad
Safety Advisory Committee] task related to ATI, expanding the
existing relief at this time is not justified.'' \91\ ``FRA
notes that in carrying out this task, the RSAC will need to
consider data not only from the [carriers' ATI Test Programs],
but data from the relevant ATI Test Programs that are still
underway at multiple railroads. FRA finds that short-circuiting
this evaluation process on individual railroads is not in the
public interest and consistent with railroad safety at this
time.'' \92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ FRA-2020-0031; FRA-2020-0013; FRA-2020-0014; FRA-2020-0056.
\89\ FRA-2020-0064, FRA-2021-0044.
\90\ Docket No. FRA-2020-0064-0011, available at Docket No. FRA-
20201-0044, available at https://www.regulations.gov/document/FRA-2021-
0044-0003.
\91\ Federal Railroad Administration Letter to BNSF dated March 21,
2022, FRA-2020-0064, Page 2.
\92\ Federal Railroad Administration Letter to Norfolk Southern
dated March 21, 2022, FRA-2021-0044, Page 2-3; Federal Railroad
Administration Letter to BNSF dated March 21, 2022, FRA-2020-0064, Page
2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WITNESS LIST
PANEL I:
The Honorable Amit Bose, Administrator, Federal
Railroad Administration
The Honorable Thomas B. Chapman, Member, National
Transportation Safety Board
PANEL II:
Mr. Roy L. Morrison, Director of Safety,
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Mr. Don Grissom, Assistant General President,
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen Division, TCU/IAM
Mr. Grady C. Cothen, Jr., Retired, Transportation
Policy Consultant
Mr. Nathan Bachman, Vice President of Sales &
Business Development, Loram Technologies, Inc.
Ms. Cindy Sanborn, Executive Vice President &
Chief Operating Officer, Norfolk Southern Corporation, and
Chair, Safety & Operations Management Committee, Association of
American Railroads
Mr. Jeremy Ferguson, President, Sheet Metal, Air,
Rail, Transportation-Transportation Division
EXAMINING FREIGHT RAIL SAFETY
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2022
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building and via Zoom, Hon.
Donald M. Payne, Jr. (Chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
Members present in person: Mr. Payne, Mr. Malinowski, Mr.
Huffman, Mr. Auchincloss, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Perry, Mr. Rodney
Davis of Illinois, Mr. Bost, Mr. LaMalfa, Mr. Westerman, Mr.
Stauber, Mr. Burchett, and Mr. Nehls.
Members present remotely: Mr. Moulton, Mr. Garcia of
Illinois, Ms. Strickland, Mrs. Napolitano, Mr. Johnson of
Georgia, Ms. Titus, Mr. Carter of Louisiana, Mr. Weber of
Texas, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Balderson, Mr. Johnson of South
Dakota, and Mrs. Steel.
Mr. Payne. The subcommittee will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
today's hearing and ask questions.
Without objection, so ordered.
As a reminder, please keep your microphone muted unless
speaking. Should I hear any inadvertent background noise, I
will request that the Member please mute their microphone.
To insert a document into the record, please have your
staff email it to [email protected].
Good morning. I would like to thank our witnesses for
joining us today to share their testimony and expertise. I
would also like to thank the ranking member, Mr. Crawford, for
his commitment to making freight rail the safest way to ship
goods. The safety of the rail industry remains one of the most
important issues facing this subcommittee, and it is why we
included several safety provisions in the INVEST Act.
Today we will hear from two panels with unique insight into
safe operations of the freight rail system. First, we will hear
from Amit Bose, the Administrator of the Federal Railroad
Administration, whose primary role is ensuring the safety of
our Nation's railroads. He will be joined by Tom Chapman, a
member of the National Transportation Safety Board, which
investigates significant railroad accidents and recommends ways
of preventing future ones. These two agencies play distinct
roles in ensuring the safety of freight rail and protecting the
workers and surrounding communities from rail accidents.
Our second panel will be an opportunity to hear from
representatives of the workers and railroads who confront these
safety issues every day. The NTSB's 2021-2022 Most Wanted List
of Transportation Safety Improvements includes a call to
improve safety for rail workers. Their recommendations speak to
recurring safety issues impacting rail workers. These include
better track protection, proper training and job briefings, and
access to protective equipment.
Most importantly, it calls for work schedules and
limitations to prevent workers from working overtime while
fatigued. Railway worker fatigue is one of the most persistent
and pressing issues facing our national transportation system.
It is a condition we have known about for years but have not
solved. Just last week, the FRA took a major step to address
this with their final Fatigue Risk Management rule, and I look
forward to hearing more about that from our witnesses today.
The freight rail industry has lost nearly one-third of its
workforce in the past 8 years. The workers who remain report
that they are being worked harder with longer and more
unpredictable hours. They say these conditions are worsening
fatigue and making an industry that's inherently demanding even
tougher to work for. Cutting labor costs may have made Wall
Street happy, but it has left our national rail system more
rigid and less able to respond to the ongoing supply chain
shocks.
The increased pressures on rail workers have made it harder
for railroads to retain workers or recall them from furlough.
It takes several months to fully train freight rail crew. These
trainings cannot be rushed as we seek to fill vacancies created
when the railroads laid off workers, both before and during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Not having enough rail workers isn't just a
problem with the lack of conductors and engineers; it is across
the freight rail industry. This includes the carmen who inspect
and repair railcars and maintenance-of-way workers who build,
inspect, maintain, and repair track, bridges, and rights-of-
way.
We are pleased that these workers are represented here
today, and we look forward to hearing their testimony. It is
through the diligent work of every actor in the rail space--
railway workers, railroads, and regulators--that freight rail
has made significant strides to move goods safely across this
Nation.
There has been, however, a plateauing of safety
improvements in recent years, and the Class I railroads'
adoption of PSR has added new complications. This is why this
committee is concerned: We are concerned that the recent
attempts to reduce short-term costs have had a negative impact
on safety practices and the historically proud railroad safety
culture. And today's hearing is intended to consider some of
these current issues.
I would again like to thank all the witnesses for joining
us today, and I now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Crawford,
for his opening statement.
[Mr. Payne's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in
Congress from the State of New Jersey, and Chair, Subcommittee on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Good morning.
I'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us today to share their
testimony and expertise.
I'd also like to thank Ranking Member Crawford for his commitment
to making freight rail the safest way to ship goods.
The safety of the rail industry remains one of the most important
issues facing this subcommittee and it is why we included several
safety provisions in the INVEST Act.
Today we will hear from two panels with unique insight into the
safe operations of the freight rail system.
First, we will hear from Amit Bose, the Administrator of the
Federal Railroad Administration, whose primary role is ensuring the
safety of our nation's railroads.
He'll be joined by Tom Chapman, a Member of the National
Transportation Safety Board, which investigates significant railroad
accidents and recommends ways on preventing future ones.
These two agencies play distinct key roles in ensuring the safety
of freight rail and protecting the workers and the surrounding
communities from rail accidents.
Our second panel will be an opportunity to hear from
representatives of the workers and railroads, who confront these safety
issues every day.
The NTSB's 2021-2022 Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements includes the call to improve safety for rail workers.
Their recommendations speak to recurring safety issues impacting
rail workers.
These include better track protection, proper training and job
briefings, and access to protective equipment.
Most importantly, it calls for work schedules and limitations that
prevent workers from working overtime while fatigued.
Railway worker fatigue is one of the most persistent and pressing
issues facing our national transportation system.
It's a condition we've known about for years but haven't solved.
Just last week the FRA took a major step to address this with their
final Fatigue Risk Management Rule, and I look forward to hearing more
about that from our witnesses today.
The freight rail industry has lost nearly a third of its workforce
in the past 8 years.
The workers who remain report they are being worked harder, with
longer and more unpredictable hours.
They say these conditions are worsening fatigue and making an
industry that's inherently demanding even tougher to work for.
Cutting labor costs may have made Wall Street happy, but it's left
our national rail system more rigid and less able to respond to the
ongoing supply chain shocks.
The increased pressures on railway workers have made it harder for
the railroads to retain workers or recall them from furlough.
It takes several months to fully train freight rail crew.
These trainings cannot be rushed as we seek to fill vacancies
created when the railroads laid off workers--both before and during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Not having enough rail workers isn't just a problem with the lack
of conductors and engineers, it is across the freight rail industry.
This includes the carmen who inspect and repair railcars and
maintenance of way workers who build, inspect, maintain, and repair
track, bridges, and rights of way.
We are pleased that these workers are represented here today, and
we look forward to their testimony.
It is through the diligent work of every actor in the rail space--
railway workers, railroads, and regulators--that freight rail has made
significant strides to move goods safely across the nation.
There has been, however, a plateauing of safety improvements in
recent years, and the Class I railroads' adoption of PSR has added new
complications.
This is why this committee is concerned--we are concerned that
recent attempts to reduce short-term costs have had a negative impact
on safety practices and the historically proud railroad safety culture.
And today's hearing is intended to consider some of those current
issues.
I would again like to thank all our witnesses for joining us today,
and I now yield to the Ranking Member for his opening statement.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding this hearing today.
And I thank our witnesses for participating as well.
This hearing continues this subcommittee's focus on
important aspects of railroad industry safety. Today, we are
specifically focusing on safety issues in the freight rail
industry.
America's freight rail ranks as one of the safest means of
transporting goods in the world. According to the Association
of American Railroads, train accidents were down 33 percent
between the years 2000 and 2020, and accidents involving
hazardous materials were down 60 percent.
These gains in safety build towards the ultimate target of
zero accidents. Monitoring and protecting our 140,000-mile
freight rail network is no easy job. Improving highway-rail
grade crossing protections, reducing human error, and
supporting innovative new drone and automated safety
technologies can all contribute toward reaching the zero
accident goal.
Specifically, we must continue to encourage the development
of automated track inspection safety technology, which has been
shown to decrease accidents, identify new safety issues, and
free up safety inspectors to focus on other important duties.
I recently sent a letter to the Federal Railroad
Administration raising concerns about its denials of waivers to
continue testing automated track inspection technology. I ask
for unanimous consent to enter this letter into the record.
Mr. Payne. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Letter of June 10, 2022, to Hon. Amit Bose, Administrator, Federal
Railroad Administration, from Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515,
June 10, 2022.
The Honorable Amit Bose,
Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE,
Washington, DC 20590.
Dear Administrator Bose:
I write to express deep concerns about recent safety policy changes
by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) which likely limit the use
of automated track inspection (ATI) technology. FRA's recent decisions
to deny and limit the use and development of ATI technology lack a
basis in furthering safety and track inspection improvements and seem
politically motivated to appease labor interests.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Letter from Karl Alexy, Assoc. Adm'r. For R.R. Safety &
Chief Safety Officer, FRA to John Cech, Vice President (VP), BNSF Ry.
(Mar. 21, 2022) (on file with Committee) [hereinafter John Cech
Letter]; Letter from Karl Alexy, Assoc. Adm'r for R.R. Safety & Chief
Safety Officer, FRA to Thomas E. Zoeller, Gen. Counsel, NS (Mar. 21,
2022) (on file with Committee) [hereinafter Thomas Zoeller Letter].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For over thirty years, FRA supported the continued growth of
automated track inspection technology through FRA's own Automated Track
Inspection Program (ATIP).\2\ ATIP encourages the use of new
technologies to aid in track safety inspections that identify safety
issues that visual inspections may miss. Specifically, ATIP ``helps
America's railroads improve railroad quality and safety under statutes
mandated by Congress.'' \3\ Information collected by ATIP is used by
the government and the rail industry to improve railroad safety. As FRA
states:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ History of ATIP, United States Dep't of Transp. (USDOT),
available at https://railroads.dot.gov/track/automated-track-
inspection-program-atip/history-atip. [hereinafter History of ATIP].
\3\ ATIP Overview, USDOT, available at https://railroads.dot.gov/
track/automated-track-inspection-program-atip/atip-overview.
The track data collected by ATIP is used by FRA, railroad
inspectors and railroads to assist and assure track safety is
being maintained by setting priorities for their respective
compliance activities. Also, the data is used by FRA to assess
track safety trends within the industry. Immediately following
ATIP track surveys, the railroads use the data to help locate
and correct exceptions found. Often railroads use the ATIP data
as a quality assurance check on their track inspection and
maintenance programs.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ History of ATIP, supra note 2.
Only two years ago, FRA extolled the virtues of research and
development of artificial intelligence (AI) such as ATI for improving
railroad safety. As an FRA official noted, ``[w]ith the use of AI and
other technologies, there is great potential for railroads to further
reduce the occurrence of high-consequence accidents and derailments
altogether. To realize such a future for rail transportation, RD&T is
focused on dedicated research initiatives aimed at Improving,
Implementing and Inspiring[.]'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Jay P. Baillargeon, FRA RD&T: Using AI to Improve Safety,
Railway Age, Aug. 24, 2020, https://www.railwayage.com/analytics/fra-
rdt-using-ai-to-improve-safety/?RAchannel=home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recognizing the ability of this technology to enhance safety, Class
I freight railroads obtained FRA approvals to test the combination of
ATI technology and manual track inspections by gradually reducing
manual visual inspections required under a 1971 rulemaking.\6\ Despite
this progress, FRA's recent decisions to stop or limit ATI test
programs implemented by BNSF Railway and Norfolk Southern (NS) freight
railroads raise troubling questions about FRA's continued commitment to
promoting safety and security technology and the influence of labor
groups seeking to protect special interests.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Chris Woodward, Why Is Biden Admin. Blocking Increased Rail
Safety Program?, Inside Sources, May 4, 2022, https://
insidesources.com/why-is-biden-admin-blocking-increased-rail-safety-
program/.
\7\ See John Cech Letter, supra note 1; Thomas Zoeller Letter,
supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding BNSF, in 2018 FRA approved an ATI test program
specifically ``designed to test the use of unmanned autonomous track
geometry measurement systems (ATGMS) for track inspection as a viable
means to supplement and decrease the frequency of manual visual
inspections.'' \8\ On July 28, 2020, BNSF petitioned FRA seeking a
regulatory waiver that would allow it to continue its ATI testing.\9\
FRA published two notices in the Federal Register seeking comments on
BNSF's waiver petition, and received comments from two groups: the
Association of State Railroad Safety Managers and the Brotherhood of
Maintenance of Way Employees Division/IBT (BMWED). Both opposed
granting a waiver to BNSF.\10\ Nonetheless, on January 19, 2021, FRA
generally rejected the claims made by the labor unions and granted
BNSF's petition for waiver, in part, allowing BNSF to continue its ATI
waiver for five years.\11\ In approving BNSF's petition, FRA itself
noted that ATI inspections detect geometry defects ``more precisely and
accurately than visual inspections'' and found that granting the waiver
was in the public interest and consistent with railroad safety.\12\ As
recently as November 2021, FRA noted the ``successful results of the
[BNSF] test program'' to Congress and explained that BNSF's waiver was
granted due to cited improvements under the ``BNSF track geometry
measurement test program based on the established defect metric, FRA
monitoring procedures, and consistency of number of defects located by
visual track inspection.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Docket No. FRA-2020-0064-0011, available at https://
www.regulations.gov/docket/FRA-2020-0064/document.
\9\ Id.
\10\ Id.
\11\ Id.
\12\ Id.
\13\ FRA, Report to Congress: Automatic Track Geometry Measurement
System Technology Test Programs at 5 n.12, 9 (2021), available at
https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/report-/congress-automatic-track-
geometry-measurement-system-technology-test-programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, on June 15, 2021, BNSF again petitioned FRA based upon the
safety successes occurring under the January 19, 2021, waiver and
sought an expansion to two new ATI territories.\14\ BNSF supplemented
this petition with two letters highlighting the improved safety
benefits and success of BNSF's current ATI program as support.\15\ FRA
published notice of BNSF's petition in the Federal Register, which
elicited only one comment, from BMWED. As before, BMWED generally
opposed granting the expansion envisioned by the waiver on the grounds
that it ``does not feel'' \16\ the ATI technology provided an adequate
level of safety. On March 22, 2022, FRA found that expansion of the
waiver ``is not justified,'' \17\ and dismissed BNSF's petition.
Notably, FRA did not dispute ATI's safety benefits, but merely asserted
that an expansion of this test program was allegedly unnecessary since
FRA had already collected sufficient data from BNSF to evaluate
ATI.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ John Cech Letter, supra note 1.
\15\ Id.
\16\ Id.; see also Letter from Freddie N. Simpson, President, BMWED
to USDOT (Aug. 23, 2021) (on file with Committee).
\17\ Id.
\18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like BNSF, Norfolk Southern (NS) filed a petition with FRA on March
22, 2021, seeking a waiver of manual track inspection regulations to
permit the pairing of ATI technology with the frequency of manual
inspections that successfully demonstrated significant gains in track
quality and safety during NS's test program.\19\ At the time the waiver
petition was filed, NS was completing the final phase of its ATI test
program.\20\ NS noted increased benefits of combining ATI and manual
inspections, and reported: ``Almost all geometry defects found during
the Test Program were discovered by the [ATI] equipment rather than by
human inspectors.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Letter from Ed Boyle, VP NS to Hon. Amit Bose, Deputy Adm'r,
FRA (Jan. 6, 2022) (on file with Committee).
\20\ Id.
\21\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After waiting over nine months from initial filing of its waiver
petition, NS pleaded for FRA action. In a January 6, 2022, letter
seeking approval, NS explained ``[e]very day that passes without
approval of Norfolk Southern's Petition is another day that safety
benefit is not realized anywhere on Norfolk Southern's system . . .''
\22\ Similar to BNSF's ATI waiver petitions, BMWED submitted comments
opposing the petition, despite admitting the safety benefits of NS's
ATI technology.\23\ In defiance of FRA regulations requiring the FRA
Safety Board to decide waiver petitions within nine months, FRA denied
NS's petition a full year later, citing excuses similar to those used
in denial of BNSF's petition.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Id.
\23\ Id.
\24\ Thomas Zoeller Letter, supra note 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA's decisions to discourage the continued use and expansion of
proven ATI safety technology deny the demonstrated safety benefits for
freight rail operations and lack a reasonable justification linked to
improving industry safety and security. As one rail observer noted, the
BNSF decision ``makes no sense . . . whatsoever'' \25\ and signals that
``FRA seems to have made an about-face with its technology
initiatives.'' \26\ Furthermore, given the only opposition to the
continued ATI programs came from BMWED, denial of the waivers seem less
driven by legitimate safety concerns with ATI and instead, ``may be
politically motivated'' to satisfy the special interests of labor
unions.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ William C. Vantuono, BNSF, FRA Automated Track Inspection
Dispute in Federal Court, Railway Age, Apr. 21, 2022, https://
www.railwayage.com/regulatory/bnsf-fra-automated-track-inspection-
dispute-in-federal-court/?RAchannel=home.
\26\ Id.
\27\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of the above information and concerns, please provide the
following information by June 23, 2022:
1. Please provide a written explanation that details FRA's current
process to decide railroad waiver requests, including what role the
Safety Board plays in the decision-making process. Please also include
any standard operating procedures, memos, or internal process documents
which relate to this decision process.
a. Please outline the Administrator's role, if any, in granting
or denying a waiver petition in the first instance under 49 C.F.R.
Sec. 211.41.
b. Please outline the Administrator's role, if any, regarding
considering petitions for reconsideration of the grant or denial of a
waiver, per 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec. 211.41(f) & 211.57-.59.
c. Please outline and explained what factors are considered when
the Administrator is weighing whether to overrule a recommendation of
the safety board?
d. Please explain in detail changes made to the process to
decide railroad waiver requests since 2021 and the justification for
such changes.
e. Please explain what steps have been taken to formally notify
stakeholders of these changes. If notice has not been provided, please
explain the justification.
2. Please provide a written explanation as to whether the FRA
Safety Board believes it is fulfilling the requirements of 49 C.F.R.
Sec. 211.41 when it is considering waivers, including the nine-month
timeline under that regulation.
a. Does FRA have adequate resources and staff to timely evaluate
and decide railroad waiver requests?
b. If not, what is impacting the agency's overall ability to
timely issue waiver decisions since 2021, and what additional resources
might be needed to ensure decisions are made in the regulatorily
required time periods.
3. Does FRA believe any deficiencies existed in the transparency
of the waiver process prior to 2021?
a. If so, what specific steps has FRA taken improve the
transparency in the process?
b. Please provide any standard operating procedures, memos, or
internal documents related to the waiver process prior to 2021.
4. Please outline and provide written justifications for each step
the FRA taken since 2021 to ensure the efficient handling of waiver
requests.
a. Specifically, please explain the steps that FRA has taken
with stakeholders to ensure the efficient handling of waiver requests,
including which stakeholders FRA is working with.
5. What steps are the FRA taking to encourage and support
implementation of new technologies to improve safety for freight
railroads? Please provide specific examples of what areas the FRA is
examining as well as specific technologies that are under examination.
a. Does the FRA support freight railroads investing their own
funds in voluntary safety advancements?
b. How does FRA incentivize and encourage voluntary industry
efforts to advance safety and modernize severely outdated FRA
regulations to realize better safety? Please explain in detail the
steps you have taken, including any supporting documents.
c. What is FRA doing from a regulatory perspective to encourage
railroads to continue to invest in and develop these technologies,
understanding the substantial cost to do so?
d. If a new approach to rail safety driven by an innovative
technology solution is shown through data to improve overall railroad
safety, are there other non-safety considerations that would cause the
FRA to delay or reject such an approach?
6. FRA has acknowledged to Congress the safety benefits of ATI
programs. Why did FRA recently deny two railroad ATI waiver requests,
one a year after it was submitted? Given that four test programs are
still underway and collecting data, what led to FRA's recent waiver
denial letters being issued?
a. Given the safety benefits involved, why would FRA let
existing ATI test program approvals expire without renewing them in
November 2022? Why wouldn't test programs and waivers continue to be
granted and renewed until a final rule adopting this safety-improving
issue can be completed?
b. While NS's waiver petition was pending, FRA denied NS's
request to extend its test program in October 2021 on the ground that
an extension ``would not likely result in new, significant data.'' Yet
when FRA denied NS's waiver in March of 2022, it pointed to a lack of
``conclusive data'' demonstrating that the risks of reducing manual
inspections were effectively mitigated. As FRA's denial of the waiver
was based on a lack of ``conclusive data,'' please explain the process
FRA engages in for expressing concerns or changes during extension of
test programs.
i. Please specifically provide the Committee the information
that was provided by NS and the FRA regarding this extension in October
2021.
ii. Specifically, please provide a written explanation of
whether it complied with this FRA's extension process, and whether FRA
provided NS with any options to cure the lack of conclusive data or
further information on conditions that would have been necessary.
c. Why is FRA not moving to rulemaking now to address these
safety-improving programs, given the present RSAC process could take
years and may never result in reasonable consensus with involved rail
labor organizations?
7. The USDOT's fiscal year (FY) 2022 budget requests $16.5 million
for the FRA ATI Program (ATIP). The request specifically notes
``defective track is one of the most frequent causes of derailments.
Identifying track defects and other precursor conditions is the primary
focus of FRA's ATIP.'' \28\ The budget request goes on to explain that
the requested funding would be used for FRA's own ten ATIP vehicles,
but also ``to continue to validate the railroads' autonomous track
inspection programs.'' \29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ FRA, FRA Budget Estimates 2022 at 32 (2022), available at
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2021-05/FRA-FY-2022-
Budget-Estimates-FINAL.PDF.
\29\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. If the FRA receives the requested funding for ATIP, will it
commit to continue to use part of the funding to continue to validate
the railroads' autonomous track inspection programs?
b. If yes, do you believe the FRA would then need to approve
and/or continue the pending railroad ATI waivers requests and test
programs? Please explain in detail.
c. If no, please explain in detail the justifications for FRA's
reversal. Please include a detailed list of other FY 2022 budget
request that the FRA no longer plans to pursue and the justification.
8. Another promising safety innovation, which is particularly
important during the COVID pandemic, is 3-D virtual training. These
programs could also be helpful in ensuring employee re-training and
availability of training in the wake of supply chain challenges. After
14 months, the FRA recently denied railroad waiver requests even though
they have previously approved similar requests. Please explain FRA's
reasoning for the reversal.
9. In addition to safety improvements, new technologies also have
the potential to provide environmental benefits. However, FRA has
changed its decades-long precedent of expeditiously reviewing and
approving energy management system advancements under 49 CFR Part 229,
Subpart E--Locomotive Electronics, and instead, without explanation, is
now conducting them under 49 CFR Part 236, Subpart H--Standards for
Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems. Please explain why
FRA made change.
a. Prior to this change, were stakeholders consulted? If yes,
please explain which stakeholders and the method for consultation.
b. Please explain what steps have been taken to notify
stakeholders of these changes. If notice has not been provided, please
explain the justification.
c. Provide specific examples of freight railroad technologies
being explored by the FRA that provide environmental benefits.
If you have questions, please contact Republican Staff on the
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials.
Sincerely,
Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, finally, there are multiple Federal grant programs
that can help communities and railroads upgrade and improve
their tracks, highway-rail grade crossings, and general network
infrastructure in ways that can have dramatic impacts on
safety. We must ensure that this grant funding is open and
accessible to all qualified applicants in need and that the
money is distributed in a fair and transparent manner,
including to both rural and urban areas.
I commend the chair for holding this hearing today, and I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
And, Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield the balance of my
time.
[Mr. Crawford's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Arkansas, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
Thank you, Chair Payne, for holding this hearing, and thank you to
our witnesses for participating. This hearing continues this
Subcommittee's focus on important aspects of railroad industry safety.
Today we are specifically focusing on safety issues in the freight
railroad industry.
America's freight railroads rank as one of the safest means of
transporting goods in the world. According to the Association of
American Railroads, train accidents were down 33 percent between 2000
and 2020, and accidents involving hazardous materials were down 60
percent.
These gains in safety build towards the ultimate target of zero
accidents. Monitoring and protecting our 140,000-mile freight rail
network is no easy job. Improving highway-rail grade crossing
protections, reducing human error, and supporting innovative new drone
and automated safety technologies can all contribute towards reaching
the zero-accident goal.
Specifically, we must continue to encourage the development of
automated track inspection safety technology, which has been shown to
decrease accidents, identify new safety issues, and free up safety
inspectors to focus on other important duties.
I recently sent a letter to the Federal Railroad Administration
raising concerns about its denials of waivers to continue testing
Automated Track Inspection technology. I ask for unanimous consent to
enter this letter into the record.
Finally, there are multiple federal grant programs that can help
communities and railroads upgrade and improve their tracks, highway-
rail grade crossings, and general network infrastructure in ways that
can have dramatic impacts on safety. We must ensure that this grant
funding is open and accessible to all qualified applicants in need, and
that the money is distributed in a fair and transparent manner,
including to both rural and urban areas.
I commend the Chair for holding this hearing today and look forward
to hearing from our witnesses.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
OK. I guess we can move forward. I would like to now
welcome our witnesses for the first panel: the Honorable Amit
Bose, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, and then
the Honorable Thomas B. Chapman, member of the National
Transportation Safety Board.
Thank you for joining us today, and I look forward to your
testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record. Since your written testimony has been
made a part of the record, the subcommittee requests that you
limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
Administrator Bose, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF HON. AMIT BOSE, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL RAILROAD
ADMINISTRATION; AND HON. THOMAS B. CHAPMAN, MEMBER, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Bose. Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Crawford, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. Returning to this committee where I was a
staffer who worked on TEA-21 and WRDA and stood along the wall,
as many of the staffers will do today, is an honor.
Safety, including the safety of railroad employees,
railroad passengers, and communities through which railroads
operate, is FRA's top priority. FRA carries out its mission in
many ways, including through our broad regulatory enforcement
and oversight program of inspections and audits. FRA also
conducts accident and incident investigations, scientific
research, and data collection and analysis, and provides
extensive technical assistance.
FRA also reviewed the safety integration plans of the
largest rail company transactions before the Surface
Transportation Board in several decades. The Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law provides an unprecedented investment in
America's rail transportation system. It includes dedicated and
sustained funding that enables FRA to continue its core safety
mission while broadening its rail development and investment
portfolio. Among them are substantial funds to deter and
mitigate two longstanding rail safety issues: highway-rail
grade crossing collisions and trespassing.
Through other grant programs, FRA will support training and
education for our industry's workforce to help ensure
appropriate job protections for those working on federally
funded rail projects. With these expected historic investments
in our Nation's rail system, supporting the industry's
workforce in safely and efficiently operating and maintaining
the current system while preparing for the future is now more
critical than ever.
FRA's approach to safety is data-driven, risk-based, and
collaborative. The full implementation of Positive Train
Control technology was significant. FRA continues monitoring
PTC, including software updates, training, and integration into
operations. With the issuance of the Fatigue Risk Reduction
Program and System Safety Program rules, railroads have been
required to systemically identify, prioritize, and mitigate
risks, and to actively promote continuous safety improvement
and strengthen their safety culture by actively engaging the
workforce.
FRA continues to work on other significant regulatory
initiatives mandated by Congress and to address known hazards
more broadly. For example, in February, FRA expanded the scope
of the agency's alcohol and drug control regulations, and we
expect to issue soon a final rule dedicated to locomotive
recording devices. Yesterday, FRA published a final rule
requiring certain railroads to develop and implement Fatigue
Risk Management Programs as a part of their larger Risk
Reduction and System Safety Programs.
Aside from these initiatives, FRA is seeking to engage all
stakeholders in consensus-based safety improvements and
rulemaking through the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee,
which we rechartered in late 2021. It will meet again on June
27.
In April of this year, FRA held its first-ever Track and
Railroad Workplace Safety Symposium, during which over 600
technical experts shared best practices. Similarly, in the
spirit of partnership and collaboration, FRA is seeking to
expand the Confidential Close Call Reporting System, C3RS,
which enables railroad employees to report close calls and
unsafe events and conditions without fear of reprisal or
discipline.
As we look forward, FRA already had several initiatives
underway included in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. In late
2019, FRA established an online portal to receive, store, and
retrieve public reports on blocked highway-rail grade
crossings. And, just today, we issued a request for information
to solicit public input on how to make that tool even more
useful.
Other efforts are well underway to implement the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law sections related to high-speed rail
operations and pre-revenue service safety validation plans.
With respect to infrastructure investments, FRA just announced
the CRISI grants, totaling nearly $369 million for 46 projects
across 32 States, and we exceeded the bipartisan law's 25-
percent rural set aside.
In conclusion, FRA is committed to continuing to lead,
promote, and strengthen efforts among all stakeholders to
achieve meaningful and continuous improvements in rail
transportation safety. I look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
[Mr. Bose's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Amit Bose, Administrator, Federal Railroad
Administration
Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Crawford, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today to discuss rail
safety. The mission of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is to
enable the safe, reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods
for a strong America, now and in the future. Safety--including the
safety of railroad employees, rail passengers, and the communities
through which railroads operate--is FRA's top priority. FRA carries out
its mission in many ways, including through our broad regulatory
enforcement and oversight program, accident and incident
investigations, providing extensive technical assistance, scientific
research, and data collection and analysis. We also engage and partner
with both public and private stakeholders to identify and address
critical safety issues that affect railroad operations, railroad
employees, freight rail customers, the traveling public, and local
communities.
Additionally, FRA administers a variety of discretionary grant
programs. These programs have traditionally focused on funding to
improve the condition and performance of rail infrastructure. However,
with the passage of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), these
programs now include dedicated federal funds to support the
implementation of innovative solutions to deter and mitigate two
longstanding and vexing rail safety issues--highway-rail grade crossing
collisions and trespassing. The BIL also enables FRA to support the
industry's workforce by making funds available for training and
education, and for ensuring appropriate job protections for employees
impacted by federally funded rail projects.
The BIL provides dedicated and sustained resources that enable FRA
to continue to focus on its safety mission while broadening its efforts
on its rail development and investment portfolio to offer safer and
more convenient travel options for future generations. FRA recognizes
that the BIL is an unprecedented investment in our country's intermodal
transportation system, including freight and passenger rail which are
integral to the national transportation system. It presents a unique
opportunity for FRA and other stakeholders to make wise investments in
critical infrastructure, technology, and human capital that will make
it safer, more reliable, resilient, sustainable, and equitable. FRA is
committed to using the BIL's resources to bolster and expand its
existing safety programs, and where appropriate, to work with industry,
labor, and others to develop and implement new and innovative solutions
to address rail safety challenges.
Despite improvements in overall rail safety statistics elsewhere
and the implementation of advanced technologies such as PTC, the number
of grade crossing and trespassing incidents occurring over the last
decade has increased--grade crossing collisions by 1% and trespassing
casualties by 35%. Together these events account for more than 95% of
all rail-related fatalities over the past decade. In addition, human-
factor accidents remain a concern. FRA recognizes the opportunities the
BIL presents to better enable the agency, and other stakeholders, to
address these occurrences. Today, I would like to highlight our most
significant regulatory and safety initiatives, including implementation
of several key safety provisions of the BIL, and our strategy for
ensuring BIL funding is appropriately directed to the most pressing
rail safety issues. With this unprecedented investment in our Nation's
rail system, it is now more critical than ever to ensure that we enable
the industry's workforce to safely and efficiently operate and maintain
the current system while preparing for the future. Accordingly, I will
also highlight a few of FRA's key workforce development efforts.
FRA's Priority Regulatory and Safety Initiatives
FRA's approach to safety is data-driven, risk-based, proactive, and
collaborative. The full implementation of Positive Train Control (PTC)
technology on all 57,536 required freight and passenger railroad route
miles, has made railroad transportation safer. FRA will continue
monitoring PTC, including software updates, training and integration
into operations. With the issuance of its Risk Reduction Program (RRP)
and System Safety Program (SSP) rules, railroads have been required to
implement a comprehensive, system-oriented approach to improving
safety. Although implementation of these rules is just beginning, they
bring the tried-and-true principles of safety management systems to the
rail industry. The rules require railroads to systematically identify,
prioritize, and mitigate risks in their operating environment and to
actively promote continuous safety improvement and strengthen safety
culture.
Currently, all Class I railroads and passenger rail operations
required to submit RRP and SSP plans have done so, and FRA is working
with them and labor organizations to provide technical assistance to
ensure the railroads successfully conducted appropriate consultation
with directly affected employees during development of the plans. The
consultation process of FRA's RRP and SSP rules, as well as the fatigue
rule discussed below, requires engagement between railroads and
directly affected employees at all stages of plan development and
program implementation. To this end, and based on lessons learned from
initial implementation of the RRP and SSP rules, in the upcoming weeks,
FRA will provide written guidance on its expectations for the ongoing
consultation requirements under each of these rules.
Even as industry works to identify and prioritize risk on
individual railroad systems, FRA continues to work on regulatory
initiatives mandated by Congress and to address known hazards on a
broader basis. For example, in February of this year, FRA published a
final rule implementing Congress's mandate to expand the scope of the
agency's alcohol and drug control regulations to cover railroad
mechanical employees. Soon, FRA expects to issue a final rule
responsive to a Congressional mandate related to locomotive recording
devices.
On June 13, 2022, FRA published a final rule addressing railroad
employee fatigue. This rule responds to the same Congressional mandate
as FRA's RRP and SSP rules and requires railroads to develop and
implement Fatigue Risk Management Programs (FRMPs) as part of their
larger risk reduction programs. FRMPs are railroad-specific,
comprehensive safety programs involving the systematic identification
and evaluation of fatigue-related safety hazards among railroad
employees. Once the hazards are identified and evaluated, a railroad
must take action to reduce, if not eliminate, the associated risks.
Although the rule identifies the minimum categories of risk that a
railroad must consider including in its FRMP (i.e., general health and
medical conditions that may affect employees' fatigue levels,
scheduling issues, and job-specific characteristics), the rule is
results-oriented. Railroads' FRMPs must be designed and implemented to
effectively reduce the fatigue experienced by employees and to reduce
the probability of fatigue-related accidents and incidents.
As noted above, consistent with the requirements of FRA's RRP and
SSP rules, the fatigue rule requires railroads to consult with directly
affected employees during all stages of development and implementation
of the required FRMP. Recognizing that fatigue is a complex issue, the
rule is only one facet of FRA's ongoing efforts to address the issue.
For example, FRA recently conducted a survey of locomotive engineers
and conductors to gain an in-depth understanding of the factors that
contribute to fatigue and the resulting impacts on safety. Survey
questions addressed potential contributing factors to fatigue, such as
work schedules, commute times, and work/life balance. FRA will use the
survey results to identify fatigue-related research needs and the
survey's descriptive data will help FRA facilitate mutually beneficial
solutions between railroad workers and management. Thus, even after
issuance of this rule, FRA will continue to gather and analyze data to
better understand the root causes of railroad employee fatigue and its
effects on safety.
As required by the BIL, FRA will continue to work with both rail
and labor stakeholders to identify parties willing to participate in a
pilot project under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 21109 to evaluate the fatigue
implications of certain railroad employee scheduling practices. FRA
will also continue to conduct fatigue analyses as part of its
investigations of major rail accidents suspected of being human-factor
caused. FRA will continue our review and analysis of railroads'
attendance and other scheduling policies to ensure they do not conflict
with the federal hours of service laws or otherwise adversely affect
safety. Based on these ongoing efforts, FRA will take further actions
it determines necessary and within its statutory authority to address
issues associated with railroad employee fatigue.
FRA is developing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) addressing
train crew staffing safety requirements. The rule would address
potential safety risks for train operations with fewer than two crew
members. This proposed rule demonstrates FRA's belief that safety and
innovation go hand-in-hand. Historically, technological advances have
enabled a gradual reduction in the number of train crew members. Today,
with certain exceptions, most trains are operated with two-person
crews. As technology continues to advance and automation is on the
horizon, FRA intends this rule to serve as a tool to proactively
address the potential safety impact of train operations with fewer than
two crew members. The draft NPRM is currently under review with the
Office of Management and Budget. Once issued, FRA looks forward to
receiving and considering feedback from all stakeholders.
In terms of innovation, the Department has shared its innovations
principles:
Serve our policy priorities;
Help America win the 21st century;
Support workers;
Allow for experimentation and learn from failure;
Provide opportunities to collaborate; and
Be flexible and adapt as technology changes.
Those principles are a roadmap for innovation. FRA looks forward to
assessing proposals and efforts that reflect these principles.
Aside from these regulatory initiatives, with the rechartering of
the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) in late 2021, FRA is
refocusing its efforts to engage all stakeholders in the collaborative
and consensus-based rulemaking process. The RSAC was first established
more than a quarter century ago and provides a forum for the free and
candid exchange of technical expertise and views. FRA believes open
discussions and exchanges of data and ideas by all stakeholders,
including railroad employees, industry, and government technical
experts, are key to continued improvements in rail safety.
Not all safety advances are achieved through the regulatory
process. FRA believes collaboration among all stakeholders is critical.
For this reason, in April of this year, FRA held its first ever Track
and Railroad Workplace Safety Symposium. Over 600 technical experts in
track safety and roadway workplace safety participated in the
gathering, which provided a forum to discuss and share information and
best practices related to track inspection, maintenance, and roadway
worker protection.
Similarly, in the spirit of partnership and collaboration, FRA's
Confidential Close Call Reporting System (C3RS) program enables
railroad employees to report close calls and unsafe events and
conditions without fear of reprisal or discipline. Root cause analysis
is conducted on individual close calls, and collectively, safety
hazards are identified. It is a voluntary program with 21 railroads
(including passenger, commuter, and Class II and III freight railroads)
representing nearly 27,000 safety-related railroad employees currently
participating. Statistics show that over 75% of the close calls
reported are events that would never have become known without the
program. In 2021, the program launched the online Data Base Query Tool
(DBQT). The DBQT is the Nation's largest repository of voluntarily-
submitted railroad safety reports, each originating within FRA's C3RS
program. All stakeholders can use the publicly-available reports to
help improve safety through human factors research, education, training
and similar efforts. Recognizing the value in the data generated from
this program, FRA is currently working to expand the program to include
Class I freight railroads and through a pilot program with the Short
Line Safety Institute, FRA is working to encourage the participation of
additional Class III railroads.
FRA also continues to improve its accident and incident
investigation processes. These processes are designed to identify
primary and contributing causes so future accidents can be prevented
and also to identify local and industry-wide hazards, so that those
hazards can be proactively mitigated. Given these goals, collecting
accurate accident and incident data is critical and FRA has renewed its
focus on ensuring the accident and incident cause codes reported by
railroads accurately reflect the facts of each accident or incident
under investigation.
FRA's Implementation of Key BIL Safety Mandates
Along with the BIL's unprecedented federal investment in the
Nation's rail network, the law requires FRA to take specific actions to
improve railroad safety. In addition to the fatigue pilot studies I
noted earlier, key safety provisions of the BIL require FRA to take the
following actions:
Establish a blocked crossing portal;
Conduct a comprehensive rail safety review of Amtrak;
Partner with the National Academies of Science (NAS) to
conduct a study of the operation and safety of trains longer than 7,500
feet;
Institute a system of audits of the training,
qualification, and certification programs of railroad locomotive
engineers and conductors; and
Issue rules to enable high-speed rail service; and
require pre-revenue service safety validation plans for certain
railroads providing intercity or commuter rail passenger
transportation.
Although FRA already had initiatives underway consistent with
several of the BIL mandates prior to passage of the law, the BIL has
served to renew and streamline FRA's focus on these efforts. For
example, the BIL mandates that as a pilot program, FRA establish a
blocked crossing portal to receive, store, and retrieve information
regarding blocked highway-rail grade crossings. FRA's blocked crossing
portal has been in place since late 2019 and FRA is currently working
to update and improve it to comply with the BIL. In addition, on June
14, 2022, FRA issued a request for information so FRA can hear from
communities how to design the tool in the most useful manner possible.
FRA's efforts to implement several of the BIL's rulemaking mandates
are well underway. For example, FRA's current regulatory agenda
includes rules responsive to the BIL's mandates related to high-speed
rail operations, pre-revenue service safety validation plans for
certain rail passenger operations, and rules proposing to incorporate
into FRA's regulations several longstanding waivers from FRA's
regulatory requirements.
In addition to the BIL, FRA has other safety efforts well underway
in its day-to-day work. These are efforts that result in maintaining
and improving rail safety. In 2021, FRA initiated a program of
conducting periodic comprehensive system-wide safety audits of Class 1
railroads. To date, FRA has completed an audit of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company and is currently in the process of auditing Norfolk
Southern Railway Company. Within the next few months, FRA is planning
to initiate the BIL-mandated comprehensive rail safety review of Amtrak
as part of this existing program. Similarly, prior to passage of the
BIL, FRA had an ongoing research program dedicated to the safety and
operation of long trains. In response to BIL's mandate that FRA partner
with the NAS on this issue, FRA has begun the process of sharing its
ongoing work with the NAS to better inform the more extensive study the
BIL mandates.
In early 2021, out of concern about some railroads' changes to
their longstanding approaches to training under their FRA-approved
operating crew certification programs and consistent with
recommendations of the Department's Office of Inspector General, FRA
began conducting more detailed reviews of railroads' operating crew
training programs. Subsequently, in November 2021, I directed FRA's
Office of Railroad Safety to begin a process of comprehensively
reviewing and auditing all railroads' conductor certification programs
in response to accidents involving the severe on-duty injuries of
railroad conductors, including three accidents in which railroad
conductors were fatally injured.\1\ Thus far, that review has found
that some railroads' written programs do not conform with the
regulation. FRA technical experts are working with the railroads to
ensure that their programs conform with FRA regulations. The BIL
mandate to audit these programs reinforces FRA's efforts in this area
and FRA will begin the auditing process with the railroads' conforming
written programs in place.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The accidents involving fatal injuries occurred on both Class I
and short line railroads as follows: BNSF Railway Company (March 3 and
April 7, 2021); and WATCO Switching (October 29, 2021). Additionally,
on December 2, 2021, a conductor for the R.J. Corman Railroad Company
was fatally injured while on-duty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Strategies to Improve Grade Crossing Safety and Prevent Trespassing on
Railroad Property
FRA is working to identify innovative and non-traditional ways to
enhance grade crossing safety and prevent illegal trespassing on
railroad property. The agency continues to take a comprehensive
approach to both issues, and although the Department recognized grade
crossing safety in its 2021 Roadway Safety Strategy, neither the
Department nor FRA alone can solve these issues. Collaboration with
Departmental modal partners is key, as is collaboration and the
empowerment of all stakeholders, including states, local communities,
law enforcement, and others. For this reason, FRA continues to
implement its National Strategy to Prevent Trespassing on Railroad
Property and has launched the National High Risk Crossing Initiative.
These efforts include conducting focused inspections, educational
outreach, and partnering with local communities in places with the
highest number of trespassing incidents and high-risk grade crossings.
FRA will continue this collaboration with other DOT operating
administrations, local community leaders, law enforcement, railroads,
and the public to identify and share best practices and local
mitigation strategies. As part of these efforts, FRA is working to make
all stakeholders aware of the funding opportunities presented by the
BIL--including the new Railroad Crossing Elimination Program (RCEP) and
the availability of Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety
Improvements (CRISI) funds not only for capital improvement projects,
but projects addressing trespass prevention as well. Trespass
enforcement activities were initially demonstrated and evaluated
through FRA-funded research with DOT's Volpe Center, and those results
led directly to the creation of the successful dedicated funding
program within CRISI.
FRA has conducted three outreach sessions on the RCEP, stressing
the program's ability to fund all types of grade crossing improvements,
including grade separations, closures, and other actions to eliminate
problematic crossings and providing potential applicants guidance on
the application process. FRA expects to publish a Notice of Funding
Opportunity (NOFO) for this program this summer.
FRA just announced the first round of CRISI awards since passage of
the BIL. Notably, FRA awarded CRISI funds to 46 projects from 32 states
and the District of Columbia, with approximately 49% of the funding
going towards projects in rural areas, exceeding the BIL's 25% percent
set aside for such areas. FRA expects to release the FY22 CRISI NOFO--
the first round of CRISI funding provided by the BIL--in late summer or
early fall.\2\
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\2\ A full list of FRA BIL funding and program milestones, as well
as a tentative calendar for future actions, is available at: https://
railroads.dot.gov/BIL
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The level of CRISI funding provided by the BIL will also allow FRA
to invest in traditional, hard infrastructure safety projects,
including track and bridge replacements, but also more new, innovative,
and collaborative projects, such as the Rail Pulse project selected in
FY20 CRISI funding cycle. The FRA will be working with PennDOT and the
Rail Pulse Coalition members to develop a railcar onboard GPS sensor
system to provide real-time information. If successful, this technology
would not only result in more efficient and transparent freight rail
shipping, but also provide safety enhancements and information such as
sensors monitoring hand brake position and impact over certain speeds.
Focus on Enhancing Workforce Capacity and Development
FRA believes that with the unprecedented investment into our
Nation's rail infrastructure the BIL provides and to support continued
innovation and technological advancements, it is critical to ensure the
industry's workforce is properly educated and trained. For this reason,
FRA has renewed its focus on rail industry workforce development. For
example, FRA recently published draft guidance for its grantees to
ensure industry employees jobs are adequately protected from potential
adverse impacts of federally funded rail projects. In addition, FRA's
2023 budget request outlines an FRA initiative to establish a Railroad
Workforce Development program with dedicated funding within CRISI.
Although workforce development and training projects have been eligible
for CRISI funds since the passage of the FAST Act, FRA historically
received very few applications. With that said, FRA was excited to
recently announce two FY21 workforce development awards under CRISI.
The first, for a railroad engineering program at Morgan State
University, a historically black college and university (HBCU) in
Baltimore, MD, in collaboration with the University of Delaware. The
second award is for an Amtrak pilot program for a three-year Mechanical
Craft Workforce Development Apprenticeship Training Program, to take
place in Los Angeles, CA; Chicago, IL; Beech Grove, IN; New York, NY;
Wilmington, DE; and Washington DC. FRA believes that formalizing and
dedicating funding to the program will spur additional interest in
workforce development and training.
Additionally, FRA's 2023 budget request seeks funds to establish a
National Railroad Institute. Learning from its modal partners, the
Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Transit Administration,
which both maintain training institutes, and with support of our
colleagues at DOT's Volpe Center, the National Railroad Institute will
develop and conduct training and education programs for both public-
and private-sector railroad and allied industry employees. FRA
envisions the Institute playing a crucial role in ensuring railroad
workers develop and maintain the skillsets and tools necessary to
succeed in the industry's rapidly evolving technological landscape.
In conclusion, FRA is committed to continuing to lead, promote, and
strengthen efforts among all stakeholders to achieve meaningful and
continuous improvements in rail transportation safety. FRA recognizes
its responsibilities to the public, railroad employees, and the rail
industry in general, to ensure the unprecedented investments the BIL is
providing are used to make our Nation's freight and passenger rail
systems safer, more reliable, more resilient, more sustainable, and
more equitable than ever before. FRA is committed to meeting these
responsibilities.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
And now we recognize Mr. Chapman.
You may proceed, sir.
Mr. Chapman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Crawford, and members of the subcommittee. We appreciate this
opportunity to share insights regarding issues relating to
freight railroad safety.
I have a strong personal interest in rail safety. In the
early 1950s, my grandfather was struck and killed in a railroad
grade crossing crash. He was a volunteer firefighter on a duty
call with a colleague when the collision occurred. Because of
my family history, I have made rail safety, and grade crossing
safety specifically, a priority during my time on the Board.
Improving rail worker safety is on our Most Wanted List of
Transportation Safety Improvements. Improving rail worker
safety means making sure that roadway workers have the
training, equipment, rest, and layers of protection they need
while working on or around tracks. It means making sure that
crews operating trains carrying hazardous materials have time
to escape in case of an accident.
It also means reducing the risks of derailments and
collisions as trains are getting longer and heavier. Although
rail worker fatalities have declined overall in recent years,
we continue to see recurring safety issues in our accident
investigations that are 100 percent preventable.
Of particular concern is the continued reliance on train
approach warning for roadway workers. Under FRA regulations,
train approach warning is a method of establishing on-track
safety for workers using a lookout whose sole duty is to watch
for approaching trains and equipment. It is susceptible to
human error, such as underestimating the time needed for
workers to clear tracks.
We have long been concerned with the use of train approach
warning as the sole form of worker protection primarily because
it lacks redundancy. Trains travel at deceivingly high speeds,
and without proper warning, workers may not have enough time to
react.
Based on our investigations, we have made recommendations
to the FRA to ensure that lookouts have the tools necessary to
warn work crews of approaching trains. Likewise, we have
recommended that the FRA define when the risks associated with
using train approach warning are unacceptable and revise its
regulations to prohibit it in those cases. Although dialogue is
ongoing, FRA has yet to implement these recommendations.
In 2018, in Bowie, Maryland, a young man, just 21 years
old, lost his life in a preventable accident. He was standing
in a work zone on an active track in the path of Amtrak train
86, which was traveling at nearly 100 miles per hour. In this
case, Amtrak's reliance on train approach warning resulted in
failure to take advantage of the protections that could have
been provided by PTC.
In controlled track territory, the risk of roadway workers
being struck by a train can be reduced by using working limits
or speed restrictions, which would enable the PTC protections.
We recommended that Amtrak and all Class I railroads eliminate
the use of train approach warning in controlled track territory
during planned maintenance and inspection activities.
Mr. Chairman, fatigue decreases a person's alertness and
ability to work safely. Currently, FRA hours-of-service
regulations are limited to employees directly involved with the
movement of a train. However, FRA regulations do not cover
roadway workers who are just as critical to ensure safe
operations. FRA has indicated it does not have the legal
authority to extend these regulations. NTSB disagrees, and we
encourage Congress to consider clarifying the agency's
authority.
We have also investigated accidents involving high-hazard
flammable trains, breached tank cars and fires, placing crews
at unnecessary risk by not reasonably separating them from
combustibles. In 2017, we recommended that the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration evaluate the risks
posed to traincrews to determine the adequate separation
distance between hazardous materials and occupied cars to
ensure crews are protected during normal operations and
accident conditions. FRA should revise its regulations to
reflect those findings. In the interim, we recommend that PHMSA
require that all trains have a minimum of five buffer cars
between any crew-occupied equipment and cars carrying hazardous
materials.
The sequencing of cars and a train and controlling train
movement continue to be areas of interest in our
investigations, not only regarding the safe placement of
hazardous materials but also for reducing the risks of
derailments and collisions through effectively managing in-
train forces.
Mr. Payne. Please wrap up.
Mr. Chapman. Mr. Chairman, rail remains one of the safest
means of transportation, yet there will always be room for
improvement. The safety issues we continue to see in our
investigations are tragic because they are preventable. Thank
you again for the opportunity to testify.
[Mr. Chapman's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas B. Chapman, Member, National
Transportation Safety Board
Good morning, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Crawford, and members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) to testify, discuss our freight railroad accident
investigations and the lessons we have learned from those
investigations, and reiterate how critical it is for our federal,
industry, and labor partners, and for the Congress, to heed those
lessons learned and take action to help avoid future accidents.
Although this hearing is focused on freight rail safety, we are also
more than happy to provide the subcommittee with information regarding
passenger rail investigations and recommendations as well.
As you know, the NTSB is an independent federal agency charged by
Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident in the United
States and significant events in other modes of transportation--
highway, rail, marine, pipeline, and commercial space. We determine the
probable cause of the events we investigate and issue safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future occurrences. In addition, we
conduct special transportation safety research and special
investigations, and coordinate the resources of the federal government
and other organizations to assist victims and their family members who
have been impacted by major transportation disasters. We also serve as
the appellate authority for enforcement actions involving aviation and
mariner certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) and the United States Coast Guard, and adjudicate appeals of
civil penalty actions taken by the FAA.
The NTSB does not have authority to promulgate operating standards,
nor do we certificate organizations, individuals, or equipment.
Instead, we advance safety through our recommendations, which are
issued to any entity that can improve safety. Our goal is to identify
issues and advocate for safety improvements that, if implemented, would
prevent tragedies and injuries and save lives.
Rail Safety and Reauthorization
Our current authorization expires at the end of this fiscal year.
As you know, we have sent Congress a reauthorization proposal that
requests resources and hiring flexibility to increase the number of
investigators in our Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous
Materials Investigations (RPH), as well as in our other modes.\1\ These
resources will allow us to hire professionals with the needed skills,
purchase the equipment necessary for those skilled professionals to do
their jobs, and invest in staff training and development. Our workforce
is our greatest asset and is essential to our mission.
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\1\ National Transportation Safety Board Draft Reauthorization Act
of 2022. Washington, DC: NTSB.
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The NTSB is required to investigate any railroad accident in which
there is a fatality or substantial property damage, or that involves a
passenger train.\2\ We must currently meet this mandate with only 15
railroad investigators, two of whom are eligible for retirement. Those
15 investigators are currently working on 22 investigations, and we
open about 11 new investigations each year. This office is
understaffed. In fact, as part of our reauthorization proposal, we
identified a need for 21 additional staff over the next 5 years. Our
reauthorization request only fills a portion of this need.
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\2\ 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) 1131(a)(1)(C).
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Even if provided with the requested resources and workforce
flexibilities, we would be challenged to meet the broad mandate in
Title 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) 1131, given the tragic number of
fatalities that result from crashes at highway-rail grade crossings or
involving trespassers on railroad property each year. In 2021, 238
people were killed in crashes at grade crossings, and 625 people were
killed in trespassing-related accidents. This represents the
overwhelming majority of rail fatalities in the United States, and we
are grateful that Congress included several provisions in the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 (IIJA) \3\ to address
grade crossing and trespasser safety.
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\3\ Public Law 117-58.
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Our reauthorization proposal would amend the current mandate so
that crashes at grade crossings or accidents involving rail trespassers
no longer fall under our investigative mandate. Instead, we would
maintain the flexibility to investigate those grade-crossing crashes or
trespasser accidents that may provide a significant safety benefit to
the public, similar to how we approach highway crashes. In fact, the
Board traditionally treats such grade-crossing crashes as highway
investigations that include railroad investigators. This change to our
mandate would allow us to focus our resources on investigating those
accidents and crashes where we can provide the most effective findings
and recommendations to improve safety.
For those railroad accidents that we do not investigate, it is
important to note that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), as
the regulator, may still conduct an accident or incident investigation.
We have expressed concern in the past that FRA investigations do not
use the party process, as we do, to encourage participation from
relevant organizations, including employee unions. We have found that
union representation brings operations-specific knowledge to the
accident investigation team and helps facilitate employee cooperation.
As a result, in 2014, we recommended that the FRA include union
participation in its accident investigations, seeking congressional
authority to allow such participation, if necessary.\4\ We appreciate
that the IIJA includes a provision to address this issue by requiring
the Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop a standard process
for its rail accident and incident investigations, including consulting
with relevant entities, including employees.\5\
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\4\ Safety Recommendation R-14-37.
\5\ Pub. L. 117-58, section 22417.
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Let me be clear: this does not mean that improving safety on and
around tracks and at highway-rail grade crossings is not a priority for
the NTSB. As you may know, just last month, we launched a team to
investigate a fatal crash involving a Metra passenger train that
collided with a truck on the tracks in Clarendon Hills, Illinois. You
probably do not know, however, that I have an especially strong
interest in this rail safety issue. In the early 1950s, my grandfather,
a volunteer firefighter, was struck and killed in a railroad grade-
crossing crash. He and a colleague were on a call when the collision
occurred. The tragedy had a devastating impact on my mother and her
family. My mother was a high school student at the time, and the loss
of her father changed the course of her life. Consequently, I have made
grade-crossing safety a personal priority during my time on the Board.
Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements: Improve Rail
Worker Safety
Improving Rail Worker Safety is one of the issues highlighted in
our 2021-2022 Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety
Improvements.\6\ Improving rail worker safety means making sure that
roadway workers have the training, equipment, rest, and layers of
protection they need while working on or around tracks. It means making
sure that crews operating trains carrying hazardous materials have time
to escape in case of an accident. It also means reducing the risks of
derailments and collisions as trains become longer and heavier.
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\6\ National Transportation Safety Board. 2021-2022 Most Wanted
List of Transportation Safety Improvements. Washington, DC: NTSB.
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In recent years, we have investigated several railroad and transit
accidents where workers have been struck and injured or killed while
conducting routine maintenance or switching operations. Other workers
are vulnerable when cars carrying hazardous materials are too close to
those carrying train crew. We have also investigated accidents where
crew have been killed riding on the sides of trains, in violation of
rules. Since railroad worker safety regulations were implemented by the
FRA in 1997, there have been 466 railroad employee fatalities and
134,850 injuries.\7\ Although rail worker fatalities have declined
overall in recent years, we continue to see recurring safety issues in
our accident investigations that are 100 percent preventable,
highlighting the need for better worker protections.
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\7\ Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Fatalities and Injuries of
On-Duty Railroad Employees. Washington, DC: DOT. Accessed June 1, 2022.
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Roadway Workers and Train Approach Warning
The FRA's railroad workplace safety regulations include
requirements to protect workers when they are on the tracks and specify
railroads' oversight responsibilities.\8\ There are several ways to
provide on-track safety to roadway workers when their duties require
them to foul a track. For example, roadway workers can request
protection from the train dispatcher, who will set the signals to
prevent trains from entering the work area. Further, if positive train
control (PTC) is in effect, the trains will be stopped before entering
the designated work areas even if the locomotive engineer fails to do
so. The regulations also include the train approach warning (TAW)
method for roadway workers who foul a live track for incidental
inspections and minor repairs. TAW is a method of establishing on-track
safety for roadway workers using a watchperson or lookout whose sole
duty is to look out for approaching trains and on-track equipment and
provide ample warning time to allow workers to clear to a predetermined
place of safety at least 15 seconds before the arrival of a train or
other equipment.
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\8\ Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 214. Railroad Workplace
Safety.
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Many of the accidents we have investigated have involved TAW, which
is susceptible to human errors like miscalculating site distance and
underestimating the time needed for workers to clear tracks. We have
long been concerned with the risks of using TAW as the sole form of
worker protection, especially because it lacks safety redundancy.
Trains travel at deceptively high speeds and, without proper warning,
workers may not have enough time to react. Additional recurrent issues
we see in our investigations are the need to address training,
scheduling practices, and briefings. Specifically, lookouts should
receive proper training on how to warn work crews of approaching trains
and should have the required equipment to perform these duties.
Railroads must also develop work schedules and limitations based on
science to prevent fatigued workers from being eligible to work
overtime. Industry needs to ensure that job briefings are done
correctly and that procedures are in place to audit those briefings.
On January 17, 2017, a BNSF Railway train struck and killed two
roadway workers, including the watchperson, in Edgemont, South
Dakota.\9\ The roadway work group had been cleaning snow and ice from
the track switch on the main track to prepare for a train that was to
have its air brake system tested. The crew of the striking train
sounded the train horn and bell and applied emergency braking; however,
there was no response from the roadway work group. We found that the
probable cause of this accident was the improper use of TAW by the BNSF
Railway roadway work group to provide on-track safety.
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\9\ NTSB. BNSF Railway Roadway Worker Fatalities, Edgemont, South
Dakota, January 17, 2017. Washington, DC: NTSB. RAR 18/01.
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As a result of that investigation, we made recommendations to the
FRA to ensure that lookouts have the tools necessary to warn work crews
of approaching trains.\10\ In this case, BNSF Railroad did not provide
the appropriate equipment to its lookouts, despite being federally
mandated to do so. The FRA, for its part, was inconsistently enforcing
the regulation. In December 2018, the FRA responded to these
recommendations, saying that it disagreed with them and would not take
any action. The recommendations remain classified ``Open--Unacceptable
Response,'' and we continue to urge the FRA to reconsider its position
and take action to protect vulnerable roadway workers.
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\10\ Safety Recommendations R-18-16, -17, -18, and -19.
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Not even 6 months after the Edgemont accident, a Long Island Rail
Road (LIRR) train struck and killed a roadway worker foreperson who
stepped onto active tracks into the path of a train in Queens Village,
New York.\11\ A five-person crew, including the foreperson and
watchperson, were inspecting and making minor repairs to one of four
main tracks at an interlocking, using TAW for worker protection. The
watchperson had to look for trains moving at nearly 80 miles per hour
from both directions on multiple tracks, then warn workers and clear
the track within 15 seconds. In this accident, TAW was particularly
dangerous for the crew due to several factors, such as there being
multiple tracks at the interlocking, trains operating at high speeds in
both directions, and the crew having limited areas to which they could
clear trains, combined with the additional train traffic due to the
Belmont Stakes horse race occurring that day. All these factors created
unacceptable risks for the work crew.
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\11\ NTSB. Long Island Rail Road Roadway Worker Fatality, Queens
Village, New York, June 10, 2017. Washington, DC: NTSB, RAR 20/01.
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We determined that the probable cause of this accident was the
LIRR's decision to use TAW to protect the roadway workers on active
tracks. We found that TAW regulations do not ensure protection for
roadway workers to inspect and work on tracks where trains are allowed
to continue to operate, and we recommended that the FRA define when the
risks associated with using TAW are unacceptable and revise its
regulations to prohibit TAW from being used in those cases.\12\ In
April 2021, the FRA responded that it disagreed with the recommendation
and indicated that it would take no action to revise the regulations.
The recommendation is currently classified ``Open--Unacceptable
Response.''
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\12\ Safety Recommendation R-20-6.
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We reiterated this recommendation in September 2021 as a result of
our investigation of an April 24, 2018, accident in Bowie, Maryland,
where TAW was used for on-track safety.\13\ In that accident, an Amtrak
train struck and killed an Amtrak rail gang watchperson near the Bowie
State Train Station on Amtrak's Northeast Corridor. At the time of the
accident, main track 2 was out of service under a continuous track
outage for maintenance, and the adjacent tracks immediately to the east
and west of main track 2 were in service. Three lookouts were
protecting the roadway workers and watching for trains moving on
adjacent tracks. One watchperson was positioned near the boarding
platform, another was positioned in a nearby curve, and the third was
positioned toward the end of the curve, near a work gang of welders.
The third watchperson was struck by the train.
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\13\ NTSB. Amtrak Roadway Worker Fatality, Bowie, Maryland, April
24, 2018. Washington, DC: NTSB, RAR 21/02.
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In the Bowie accident, Amtrak's use of TAW circumvented the
protections that could have been provided by PTC. One of the specific
requirements of PTC is to protect workers and equipment on the track.
TAW does not use working limits or speed restrictions and, therefore,
gets around the protections that would be provided by PTC in controlled
track territory.\14\ For a PTC system to protect roadway workers, a
roadway worker-in-charge of on-track safety for a work group must
establish working limits with the train dispatcher. When working limits
are established, the PTC system prevents incursions into that segment
of track. Alternatively, temporary speed restrictions can also provide
protection. When a temporary speed restriction is placed on the track
by the dispatcher, PTC enforces that speed restriction.
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\14\ Controlled track means track upon which the railroad's
operating rules require that all movements of trains must be authorized
by a train dispatcher or a control operator.
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In controlled track territory, the risk of roadway workers being
struck by a train can be reduced by using working limits or speed
restrictions, which would enable PTC protections. We concluded in the
Bowie investigation that, had Amtrak established working limits or
speed restrictions on the adjacent tracks that enabled the protections
available under PTC rather than relying on the use of TAW, the accident
may have been prevented. Besides reiterating our recommendation to the
FRA to revise its regulations, we recommended that Amtrak and all Class
I railroads eliminate the use of TAW protection in controlled track
territory during planned maintenance and inspection activities.\15\
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\15\ Safety Recommendation R-21-5.
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The Bowie accident and others also highlight gaps in PTC
implementation, including risks of incursions by trains into work
zones. Requiring PTC only on certain tracks and allowing exceptions to
the rules creates unnecessary risk. We are currently conducting a
focused safety research report to specifically examine these issues.
Coverage of Roadway Workers Under Hours-of-Service Law
Fatigue decreases a person's alertness and ability to work safely.
The lookout and foreperson in the Queens Village accident were likely
fatigued because they had worked consecutive overtime shifts. The
lookout had worked and commuted for 38 of the 50 hours before the
accident, and the foreperson had been on duty for the same length of
time. This schedule did not allow either of them the opportunity for
restorative sleep in the two nights before the accident.
An agreement between the LIRR and its roadway worker labor union,
SMART Transportation Division, Local 29, allowed LIRR track workers to
take overtime shifts based on their skill and seniority, but without
considering other important factors, such as fatigue. This agreement
exposed employees and the public to unnecessary risk. In the Queens
Village investigation, we found that, had the LIRR used biomathematical
models of fatigue avoidance to develop work schedules and approval
processes for roadway workers, the foreperson's and lookout's likely
fatigue would have been avoided, and their overtime work requests for
the day of the accident would have been denied.
Currently, the FRA has hours-of-service regulations that cover
service positions and certain employees involved with the movement of a
train, including operators, dispatchers, and signal employees. The
regulations do not, however, classify roadway workers as personnel in
covered service positions and do not, therefore, limit their on-duty
time. Consequently, there are limited or no safety controls from the
FRA or railroads beyond union agreements and local work practices that
limit roadway workers' maximum work hours and ensure adequate
opportunities for needed sleep. Because roadway workers' duties often
affect the movement of a train and could possibly create unnecessary
safety risks for employees and the traveling public, we have
recommended that the FRA promulgate scientifically based hours-of-
service requirements for roadway workers.\16\
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\16\ Safety Recommendation R-20-7.
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The NTSB believes the FRA has the legal authority, under 49 U.S.C.
chapter 211, to apply hours-of-service requirements to roadway workers,
as it does with all its service positions. However, in April 2021, the
FRA told us that it disagrees. Although we maintain that FRA already
has the required legal authority, we believe that Congress should
consider clarifying the agency's authority in this regard.
Train Crews and High-Hazard Flammable Trains
The NTSB has also investigated accidents involving high-hazard
flammable trains (HHFTs) that resulted in breached tank cars and
hazardous material fires, increasing the risk of death and injury to
crewmembers.\17\ In several accidents, we have seen that there was not
enough separation between cars carrying hazardous materials and those
on which crewmembers were serving. We have also seen issues with
placing older tank cars in trains with other cars carrying flammable
liquids. In HHFT accidents, freight train crews may survive collisions
and derailments only to be injured or killed by hazardous materials
released subsequently. A crew involved in a locomotive collision may
experience injuries that would limit their ability to rapidly exit the
locomotive, thereby increasing their risk of injury from hazardous
material release or fire. We have made recommendations to industry, the
FRA, and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA) to address these risks.
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\17\ A high-hazard flammable train is defined in Title 49 CFR 171.8
as a single train transporting 70 or more loaded tank cars containing
Class 3 flammable liquid.
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Rail tank cars are built to certain DOT or industry
specifications.\18\ The Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST)
Act phased out legacy DOT-111 specification tank cars for transporting
certain flammable liquids, such as crude oil, and the cars continue
phasing out service for certain other commodities, such as ethanol. By
May 1, 2023, nonjacketed and jacketed DOT-111 tank cars must be phased
out; nonjacketed CPC-1232 tank cars must be phased out by July 1, 2023;
and jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars must be removed or retrofitted by May
1, 2025. Each of those tank cars must be either removed from flammable
liquids service or retrofitted with prescribed protective features,
such as a head shield, jacket, and thermal protection.
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\18\ Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Tank Car Specifications
and Terms. Washington, DC: DOT. Accessed June 1, 2022.
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In December 2020, we released a safety recommendation report based
on findings from investigations into two HHFT derailments.\19\ The
first occurred on April 24, 2019, in Fort Worth, Texas, when a Union
Pacific Railroad unit train carrying denatured ethanol derailed 25 of
the 96 loaded tank cars.\20\ Three tank cars, including one severely
damaged legacy DOT-111 tank car, were breached and released 65,270
gallons of denatured ethanol, which ignited and formed pool fires. Some
of the released ethanol entered a tributary of the Trinity River. The
local police evacuated nearby homes, and, fortunately, no individuals
were injured; however, three horses in a barn were killed, and three
were injured.
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\19\ NTSB. Placement of DOT-111 Tank Cars in High Hazard Flammable
Trains and the Use of Buffer Cars for the Protection of Train Crews.
Washington, DC: NTSB, RSR 20/01.
\20\ Union Pacific Railroad Derailment with Hazardous Materials
Release and Subsequent Fire, Fort Worth, Texas, April 24, 2019.
Washington, DC: NTSB, RAB 21/03.
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The second accident occurred on February 13, 2020, when a CSX
Transportation unit train also carrying 96 loaded tank cars of
denatured ethanol derailed three locomotives, one buffer car, and four
tank cars on a mountainside near Draffin, Kentucky.\21\ Two of the
derailed DOT-111 tank cars were breached and released 38,400 gallons of
denatured ethanol, which, along with diesel fuel from the locomotives,
ignited, engulfing the locomotives and the second and third tank cars.
The train crew escaped from the burning lead locomotive by jumping into
the river, where they were rescued by emergency responders.
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\21\ NTSB. Derailment of CSX Transportation Train K42911, Draffin,
Kentucky, February 13, 2020. Washington, DC: NTSB.
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As noted in our report, generally, cars positioned at the rear of a
train have a lower probability of being derailed and, therefore, a
lower probability of being breached by mechanical damage. In both the
Fort Worth and Draffin accidents, the breached DOT-111 tank cars were
positioned in the front third of the train, putting them at greater
risk of derailing in an accident, even though the trains' more robust,
puncture-resistant DOT-117J specification tank cars could have been
positioned in the front third of each train to decrease the risk of
flammable hazardous material releases. In addition, the DOT-111
baseline legacy tank cars could have been placed in the lowest-risk
positions for exposure to derailment or collision--and far away from
occupied locomotives. In response to recommendations we made, the
Renewable Fuels Association updated its Best Practices for Rail
Transport of Ethanol guidance with the suggested best practice of
placing DOT-111 and DOT-117 tank cars in a train consist.\22\ As long
as DOT-111 tank cars remain in service, we continue to urge shippers
and carriers to reduce risks by adopting placement strategies that
account for tank car type.
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\22\ Safety Recommendation R-20-27.
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Although PHMSA requires buffer cars between train crews and
hazardous materials, the agency has also issued a regulatory
interpretation that provides for a much shorter distance between them.
In 2017, we recommended that PHMSA evaluate the risks posed to train
crews by hazardous materials transported by rail, determine the
adequate separation distance between hazardous materials cars and
occupied cars to ensure train crews are protected during both normal
operations and accident conditions, and collaborate with the FRA to
revise the regulations to reflect those findings.\23\ That
recommendation is currently classified ``Open--Acceptable Response,''
as PHMSA has initiated a research project in coordination with the John
A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to address the issue.
We understand that the Volpe Center is in the process of finalizing a
report. In the meantime, we recommended that PHMSA withdraw its
regulatory interpretation and require that all trains have a minimum of
five buffer cars between any crew-occupied equipment and cars carrying
hazardous materials, regardless of train length and consist.\24\ PHMSA
has responded that it does not plan to take this interim action, and
the recommendation is classified ``Open--Unacceptable Response.''
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\23\ Safety Recommendation R-17-1.
\24\ Safety recommendation R-17-2.
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Train Handling and Operational Practices
The 2017 recommendations we made to PHMSA came as a result of our
investigation of a 2013 derailment and subsequent collision in
Casselton, North Dakota, in which a BNSF train carrying grain derailed
13 cars onto an adjacent track, where they were then struck by another
BNSF train. The striking train derailed two head-end locomotives, a
buffer car, and 20 cars loaded with crude oil.\25\ Following the
collision, the crew of the oil train narrowly escaped the area before
the locomotives were destroyed by the eruption of a postaccident fire
and energetic fireballs.
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\25\ NTSB. BNSF Railway Train Derailment and Subsequent Train
Collision, Release of Hazardous Materials, and Fire, Casselton, North
Dakota, December 30, 2013. Washington, DC: NTSB, RAB 17/01.
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The operational practices of sequencing rail cars in a train and
controlling train movement continue to be areas of interest in our
investigations, not only regarding the safe placement of hazardous
materials, but also for reducing the risks of derailments and
collisions through effectively managing in-train forces. We have
investigated accidents where operational practices \26\ and training
and oversight of operating crew \27\ did not sufficiently provide for
safe operation.
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\26\ NTSB. CSX Train Derailment with Hazardous Materials Release,
Hyndman, Pennsylvania, August 2, 2017. Washington, DC: NTSB, RAR 20/04.
\27\ NTSB. BNSF Railroad Collision, Kingman, Arizona, June 5, 2018.
Washington, DC: NTSB, RAR 21/01.
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We have also investigated accidents in freight rail where use of
available technology would mitigate risks. For example, another issue
that our investigators looked into as part of the Casselton
investigation was the performance of various train braking types,
particularly electronically controlled pneumatic (ECP) brakes. ECP
brakes are the most advanced train braking systems available for the
freight rail industry today. Unlike conventional or distributed power
systems, ECP brake systems simultaneously send an electronic braking
command to all equipped railcars in the train. In general, our research
has found that ECP brakes out-perform other braking systems in stopping
distance and energy dissipation during derailments, but we have not
made any recommendations in this area. In May 2015, PHMSA issued a
final rule to require HHFTs to operate with ECP braking capability
requirements; however, in September 2018, PHMSA, in coordination with
the FRA, rescinded the rule and eliminated the requirement for ECP
brakes.
Our investigation of the October 4, 2018, fatal collision between
two Union Pacific trains in Granite Canyon, Wyoming, found that the
accident could have been prevented had the train been equipped with an
ECP braking system.\28\ This collision occurred when the air brakes on
an eastbound UP freight train failed while the train descended a hill.
The striking train, consisting of 3 locomotives and 105 railcars,
collided with the rear of a standing UP freight train at about 55 mph,
causing the lead locomotives of the striking train and railcars of both
trains to derail. The locomotive engineer and conductor of the striking
train were killed.
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\28\ NTSB. Collision of Union Pacific Railroad MGRCY04 with a
Stationary Train, Granite Canyon, Wyoming, October 4, 2018. Washington,
DC: NTSB, RAR 20/05.
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We found that the length of the train, curvature of the track, and
obstructions due to physical terrain contributed to a loss of
communication between the head-of-train device (HTD) and the end-of-
train device (ETD) on the striking train. Normally when emergency
brakes are applied, in addition to venting the air brake pipe on the
lead locomotive, the HTD in the lead locomotive transmits a radio
message to the ETD at the rear of the train to initiate an emergency
brake application and vent the air brake pipe to atmosphere at the rear
of the train at the same time. In this accident, the locomotive
engineer of the striking train applied the emergency brake as the train
descended; however, the train's speed continued to increase. After the
emergency brake application, the crew received a ``front-to-rear no
communication'' message indicating the emergency brake request was not
received at the ETD. With an ECP brake system, the emergency brake
commands would have been received through the entire train, thereby
applying the brakes on each railcar.
Current FRA regulations allow 16 minutes and 30 seconds to elapse
before the engineer is alerted that communication with the ETD has been
lost. We recommended the FRA require more frequent communication checks
between the HTD and ETD, and that emergency brake signals continue to
transmit until to address this vulnerability.\29\
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\29\ Safety Recommendations R-20-28 and -29.
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I want to thank you for your efforts to address these issues in the
IIJA, specifically the provision requiring the DOT to seek to enter
into an agreement with the National Academies of Science to study the
impact that train length has on safety, including loss of communication
between the ETD and locomotive cab and braking performance.\30\ In
addition, the provision \31\ requiring the FRA to collect more data on
its Rail Equipment Accident/Incident Report regarding the number and
length of cars as well as the size of the crew on involved trains (the
latter of which addresses a recommendation that we made following the
2015 derailment of Amtrak 188 in Philadelphia) \32\ will help us
understand if further safety improvements are needed following
accidents.
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\30\ Pub. L. 117-58, Section 22422.
\31\ Pub. L. 117-58, Section 22421.
\32\ Safety Recommendation R-16-33.
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Conclusion
Although rail remains one of the safest means of transportation,
our investigations have found that railroad safety can be improved with
operators, labor unions, government oversight agencies, and local
communities sharing responsibility. The safety issues we continue to
see in our investigations are tragic because they are preventable.
We urge the FRA and PHMSA, as the regulators, to act now on our
recommendations to establish adequate roadway worker and operations
crew protections. If they do not address these deficiencies, we will
continue to see more accidents and incidents resulting in preventable
worker deaths and injuries. However, industry does not need to wait for
those agencies to act to protect workers. Eliminating the use of TAW
where the risks are too high, not allowing workers to be on the job
without adequate opportunity for rest, and reducing the potential for
train crews to be exposed to the hazards of highly flammable materials
will help prevent these accidents and save lives.
We recognize the progress that has been made; yet there will always
be room for improvement. The NTSB stands ready to work with the
Committee to continue improving rail safety. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start with myself.
Administrator Bose, in 1974, FRA began its automated track
inspection program. Just a few years ago, the Class I railroads
began operating automated track inspection, or ATI, test
programs. Four of those ATI test programs continue today. Are
the technologies operated under those ATI test programs
prohibited by the current FRA regulations?
Mr. Bose. Mr. Chairman, no.
Mr. Payne. OK. Yesterday, FRA finalized a rule on Fatigue
Risk Management Programs that we required in 2008. Can you
please share with the committee how you plan to ensure
railroads' plans seriously tackle fatigue, a known but
persistent safety threat?
Mr. Bose. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. Fatigue
is definitely an issue that FRA focuses on. As you know, safety
is FRA's priority. And, when it comes to fatigue, it is also
about hours of service and rest, and we know that the cognitive
abilities of railroad workers are very, very important.
So, when it comes to fatigue, we want to make sure that we
are looking at the whole picture, and we think the Fatigue Risk
Management rule will help us address those. Another important
component of that is the consultation with workers that we
expect to happen in a robust, comprehensive way.
Mr. Payne. OK. So, you definitely see the issue around
fatigue continuing to plague the safety of the overall system?
Mr. Bose. Yes, sir.
Mr. Payne. OK. All right. Thank you.
I now recognize Mr. Crawford for 5 minutes.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to direct this question to Administrator Bose.
Automated track inspection safety technology has been developed
for years with the unwavering support of the FRA. ATI has been
shown to help reduce freight rail accidents and identify safety
risks that manual inspections may not spot. ATI is also meant
to complement--not to replace--manual inspections and can free
up inspectors to focus on other important safety duties.
Given the clear proven benefits of ATI for freight rail
safety, why has the FRA suddenly decided to deny petitions to
continue testing ATI technology?
Mr. Bose. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I am
limited in some of my responses because the issue is in
litigation, as you know, and there is also petition for
reconsideration. But I am going to make some factual statements
because I want to answer your question to the extent that I
can.
First, prior to my arrival at FRA, those test programs that
you talked about didn't seek public comments. It wasn't a
transparent process. We have cleared that up. We are going
forward. We made sure that it is a transparent process so that
we can get comments in that.
Second, railroads can use ATI without FRA test programs,
without waivers. Like you said, ATI can catch things that
visual inspections can't. Visual inspections can catch things
that ATI can't, such as roadbed vegetation, tie condition,
track deponent defects. And those are really, really important
parts of track inspections that I just wanted to highlight.
We continue the four test programs. We are going to get
data from those, Congressman, and we are going to use that data
to see how to go forward. The Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee is also looking at this. We want to do this in a
collaborative way, and they are looking at the issue directly,
and hopefully we can reach a consensus on a path forward.
Mr. Crawford. As I indicated in my question, ATI is meant
to complement, not replace manual inspection, so, I think the
two can work together in a complementary fashion. But let me
move on.
During the Obama administration, FRA released a proposed
rule to require a Class I freight rail to operate with two
people in the cab of a locomotive. FRA noted it could not,
quote, ``provide reliable or conclusive statistical data to
suggest whether one-person crew operations are generally safer
or less safe than multiple-person crew operations,'' end quote.
The Trump administration then withdrew that rulemaking,
recognizing a lack of safety data to justify its
implementation. Given plans to now revive the two-man crew
rule, is there any new data to support a safety justification
for this rule?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, as we have put out publicly, the
draft proposed rule is in review right now, and it is going to
address the things that you brought up. We know that, in the
past, data has been a concern. We have heard about it in my
1\1/2\ years at the FRA. We want to make sure that the proposed
rule that we have gets a robust set of comments so that we know
what stakeholders are saying about the rule and the public is
saying about the rule. We definitely want to address the risks
associated with less than a two-person crew.
Mr. Crawford. Well, let me just say that I have some
concerns about this. It is possibly that the administration may
just be filling another campaign promise to labor unions. I
mean, we are suffering from the worst inflation we have seen in
40-plus years, and now we are talking about increasing labor
costs, the brunt of which are borne downstream by the consumer.
So, I want to make sure that whatever rulemaking we are
engaging in is actually based on real safety concerns and not
just fulfilling promises to unions on the part of the
administration. The reality is that it was withdrawn under the
previous administration for that very reason, because there was
no empirical evidence that suggested that there was greater
safety with multiple-person crews. And so, I just want to make
sure that, going forward, that that is the primary
consideration is safety and not promises to particular
stakeholders that were made during a campaign.
And, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
And, with all due respect to my colleague, Class I's
primarily run two-man crews now, so, there would be no major
increase in labor costs.
Next we will hear from the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Malinowski.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to see you, Administrator Bose. Congratulations
on your confirmation and thank you in particular for all your
work on the Gateway project, both before you took this job and
today. You and I toured the existing Hudson Tunnel with
Secretary Buttigieg last summer, and I know you have been a
champion of this project, which thankfully now is funded under
the bipartisan infrastructure bill, and I look forward to
working with you to get it over the finish line ahead of
schedule and under budget. That is the challenge before us
today.
I want to get right back to the topic that the ranking
member raised. June of 2019, your predecessor was sitting in
that chair, and I asked him what I thought were some pretty
straightforward questions about the length of trains and crew
sizes. So, I asked him, should we have 3-mile-long freight
trains? Should we have 5-mile-long freight trains? Should we
have 10-mile-long freight trains?
I asked him: Let's say you have a 3-mile-long train
operated by one crewmember and the train breaks down, how long
would it take for that single crewmember to walk from the front
of the train all the way to the back of the train to try to
figure out what was going on as first responders try to get
around the train, and, in some cases, entire communities are
simply divide in half? And Administrator Batory said: Well, it
might take 2 hours, 3 hours.
Then he added: It depends on if he is a good walker or not.
I don't know if that qualifies as data, but actually it
kind of does make sense. I mean, isn't it just common sense
that there are safety concerns related to a very long train
with one human being on the train? Trains break down. No matter
how good the technology is, at the end of the day, you are
going to need a person or people to be able to figure out what
went wrong and to fix it and ideally to prevent the thing from
going wrong in the first place. Would you agree?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, absolutely. And I will tell you
something, when I came to FRA, that was sort of amazing to me
was that FRA was not measuring train length in accidents and
investigations. We have changed that because it is always about
the data we hear, so, we are now taking stock of the size of
trains. And, like you also said, training is an important part
of that. Communication between the different parts of the train
is an important component of that. So, train length brings a
whole host of issues that are now things that we have to
address in a holistic way.
Mr. Malinowski. OK. Thank you so much.
Switching gears, or maybe switching tracks, I want to
quickly reaffirm my support for a few grant applications from
New Jersey Transit that are currently under review at FRA. The
first, Mega Program grant to enhance 69 commuter rail and bus
stations across New Jersey and New York; second, a State of
Good Repair grant for the Tonnelle Avenue right-of-way bridge,
which is part of the Hudson Tunnel project; third, a State of
Good Repair grant for improvements to Newark Penn Station, as
well as for planning and preconstruction activities for the
Hunter Flyover. I hope for full and fair consideration at FRA.
I look forward to hearing back from you soon on those.
And I want to particularly ask you about the Hunter
Flyover. I am sure you are familiar with that project from your
previous work. It is critical to one of the main commuter
railways in my district, the Raritan Valley Line. I wonder if
you might offer some thoughts about the importance of that
project.
Mr. Bose. Congressman, anytime we can make improvements on
rail, and particularly known spots like that one, we absolutely
want to. And we know that the grant programs that the
bipartisan law enabled and the projects, the opportunities that
it presents are going to lead to increased safety outcomes and
also better capacity and also more opportunities to increase
ridership. So, projects of that nature are the things that,
again, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, just a year ago, it
wasn't even possible, and now there is an endless amount of
possibilities.
Mr. Malinowski. Thank you so much.
I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
We will now hear from the gentleman from Illinois, my
friend, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
love that suit today, too. I have got to get me one of those.
First off, my first question is going to be for
Administrator Bose. In December of 2019, your predecessor,
Administrator Batory, launched the blocked rail crossing
incident reporter for public and law enforcement to report
blocked highway-rail grade crossings. And the goal of the
program was to address blocked crossings through identifying
chronic problems and working to address the underlying issues.
While blocked crossings occur in every corner of America,
in my district, we are having issues in the communities of
Bement and Decatur that I urge you to work with all parties to
address. My staff has consistently referred constituents to the
FRA's incident reporter, and so far, 235 reports have been
filed in Bement and 197 reports have been filed in Decatur
since the tools launched.
In these municipalities, trains block crossings for hours
and sometimes days at a time. The communities are literately
divided. Emergency response times are slowed, access to schools
cut off, and frustrated citizens consistently have their lives
disrupted. What is the FRA doing with the data collected, and
what steps are being taken to further address blocked
crossings?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, thank you for that question. And I
wish your communities didn't experience those blocked
crossings.
At FRA, what we do with that data is we look at it very
closely, to the extent that we can reach out to the railroad
companies directly and share that data with them, let them know
that we are hearing a lot of complaints from that specific
area, and talk to them about operational changes that they can
make, improvements that they can make.
Also, now, again, with the grant programs that we have, if
we need to grade separate, we talk about those opportunities as
well. But the contact with the community and our constant back
and forth with the community and the railroads is very, very
important. So, we want to facilitate those conversations, and
we want to make sure that we can reach a conclusion, a positive
outcome collaboratively.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Are these numbers high
compared to other communities?
Mr. Bose. They are high.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. OK. On another issue in my
district, we have consistently had the worst on-time service
for the Saluki Express and the Illini Express Amtrak routes in
central, eastern, and southern Illinois. Can you give me any
update on what is being done to address those issues on those
lines? Has the FRA heard anything from the rail lines or from
Amtrak?
Mr. Bose. Yes, Congressman. I am glad you asked about that.
We now have quarterly metrics and standards reports that we get
reports on on-time performance, and we are now at a point where
we have had consistent quarterly reports where we can look at
next steps. And I know Amtrak is looking at next steps to
address those issues in a comprehensive manner.
As you stated, these lines are well known to have had years
and years of continuous delays, and now we think we have the
tools in our toolbox necessary to move forward in a positive
direction to address those. And, again, our funding programs,
if there are issues with specific places that need sidings,
that need improved grade crossings, we have the ability to fund
those projects, so, let's address them together and move
forward so that there are no delays.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. I appreciate that. Are the
tools you are talking about tools to address the short shunt
issue on those particular lines?
Mr. Bose. Yeah, the short shunt issues are things that we
are looking at actively right now with Amtrak, with Canadian
National in particular. And we have been looking very, very
closely at them, and we think that there has been some very
positive movement.
Mr. Rodney Davis of Illinois. Well, I appreciate your
optimism, but forgive me for being somewhat of a pessimist
because I have had this same conversation for years now, and I
get a lot of positive talk that we are all working together,
but I don't see the improvement to fix the short shunt issue on
those particular lines.
And I said it the last time your predecessor was here and
the Amtrak CEO was here and anyone related to this particular
problem, we have got to see results, and, frankly, until we see
results, we are going to continue to push and put more pressure
to help our constituents.
And I appreciate your time today. Thank you for your
responses.
I will yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Payne. We will now hear from the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It is an
honor to be here.
Gentlemen, a big topic of conversation these days in the
freight rail world is Precision Scheduled Railroading. And it
seems to me that PSR affects a variety of constituents. It
affects customers, our shippers, the employers of businesses
that rely on rail transportation. It affects citizens who
benefit from shipping more goods by rail, like literally
everyone whoever gets on a highway or a road and encounters a
truck.
It affects railroad employees and most specifically their
safety. Speaking of safety, the American public, of course, is
affected by railroad safety. It affects railroad infrastructure
writ large, how much money railroads are pouring into improving
their infrastructure or whether it stays the same. PSR affects
Wall Street shareholders, and I would even add that it affects
Hunter Harrison's legacy.
But it seems to me that, on that long list, customers,
American citizens, railroad employees, railroad infrastructure,
Hunter Harrison, and Wall Street, the only beneficiary from PSR
has been Wall Street. I don't even think Hunter Harrison's
legacy will come out looking good in the long run here.
So, I would like to ask a few questions about this. We have
seen in recent days hiring plans at railroads right now focused
on running more trains trying to address the capacity problem,
but maintenance positions are completely stagnant. Since
railways drastically started reducing headcount in 2016 due to
PSR and an obsession with raw operating ratios, collision rates
have been stagnant despite purported technological advances in
safety, and we don't see more maintenance-of-way employees
coming back to work.
Administrator Bose, Mr. Chapman, either of you can answer
this, is there a connection here, and what are we going to do
to get the railroads better maintained?
Mr. Chapman. Let me say first, from a safety standpoint, we
are certainly aware of the concerns, the PSR concerns. We have
not investigated any accidents that were specifically related
to PSR, but the issues that folks have expressed concerned
about--fatigue, external issues, training, oversight, makeup of
trains--those are issues that we would look at in any accident
investigation.
So, it is on our radar to the extent that the concerns that
people are expressing might be a factor in a particular
accident. We have had no accident investigations that were
specifically related to PSR.
Mr. Bose. Congressman----
Mr. Moulton [interrupting]. Mr. Chapman, have derailments
been on the rise?
Mr. Chapman. I am sorry?
Mr. Moulton. Have derailments been on the rise?
Mr. Chapman. Let me check on that number. We will get you a
number here in just a minute. I don't believe that they are on
the rise.
Mr. Moulton. What about train breaks, trains breaking
apart, have they been on the rise?
Mr. Chapman. I am not aware that we have seen a pattern in
that regard.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I think we better check into that,
because I have heard from several railroad officials that that
is exactly the case, and it is striking to me that you would
not know.
Administrator Bose?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, as you know, safety is FRA's
priority, and PSR is a term that encompasses many different
aspects of safety and operations. I can assure you that FRA is
looking at the operational and process changes that seem to
have resulted from the railroad's implementation of what is
called PSR.
We know that the operation of fewer, longer trains without
the technology and training to support such operations could
affect safety, along with the removal of mechanical forces that
allows traincrews to perform mechanical inspections. And we
know that technology replacing the workforce with technology
that is not as effective may not lead to good outcomes, and we
are even looking at things like ineffective job briefings.
So, we have to look at all of this in a holistic way,
including hours of service, fatigue, and training. So, I want
to assure you that we are on the job here looking at things to
make sure that safety is paramount.
Mr. Moulton. Well, Administrator Bose, it is not just
safety; it is about service. It is about the safety of our
highways because a lot of customers are shifting traffic to
trucks because they can't get the service that they need from
the common carrier railways.
And, Mr. Chapman, I think that Mr. Bose's statement there
was a sort of long, technical way of saying that we better look
into train breaks and derailments because I think we will find
that they are absolutely on the rise and they are related to
longer trains.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
We will now her hear from the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Bost, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Bose, you have emphasized the importance of
the role that innovation would play in reaching FRA's safety
goals. Now, I am sure that as technology evolves and our Nation
innovates, it is important to use the most up-to-date
information and data to make decisions. Will you make a
commitment today to using the most up-to-date data when making
decisions about the use of new technology, and will you commit
to sharing with this committee the data to make those decisions
once the FRA has decided it?
Mr. Bose. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bost. And, in April, the Biden administration announced
a trucking action plan in an attempt to help the industry.
During the same month, the Secretary called for railroads to
improve their current self-service levels, which are similarly
being impacted by the Nation's challenge to recruit and retrain
qualified employees.
However, FRA has not acted with the same urgency to help
railroads address these workforce challenges. Why have you not
taken steps for rail to address those concerns, and what if any
specific steps has the Biden administration or DOT taken to
address workforce shortages in the rail industry?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, first, I just want to lead off with
the railroads and their workforce have been instrumental in
helping us get through the pandemic and the jobs that they have
done throughout this time.
We know that there have been backups on the supply chain. I
point you to the April 27 Surface Transportation Board hearing
where there was an earful said about the supply chain issues
that the railroads are facing. The Surface Transportation Board
is looking at it very closely. Just yesterday, they issued an
order because the railroads didn't provide sufficient data and
didn't answer the questions that the Surface Transportation
Board asked in terms of reporting. So, we need to continue to
get accurate information to see what is going on in the first
place.
When you mentioned worker shortages, that is a perennial
issue that has developed in recent years because of cutbacks
that the railroad companies have made themselves. Now, I am not
in the business of them operating and hiring workers or
removing workers, but the railroads themselves have said that
there is a worker shortage.
We want to make sure that the workers that they retain and
bring on board have a safe workplace, have a good workplace so
that they can retain those workers, and those workers can
continue and make railroading their career, their life's
ambition, and also a safe workplace. We want to make sure of
that.
In terms of supply chain, just quickly, Congressman, I know
my time is short, the President established a Supply Chain
Disruption Task Force. The Secretary is a part of that. The
Port Envoy, General Lyons, was just appointed a couple of weeks
ago. He works closely with the FRA to address any challenges
that we see on the supply chain having to do with rail. And we
also work cooperatively with the railroad companies themselves
to facilitate anything that they need from us to help them move
the supply chain and leave those disruptions behind.
Mr. Bost. Yeah, the only thing I disagree with you on is
the fact that you would say the railroads--that they cut their
workforce. I have been talking with them; they are having
trouble recruiting and getting engineers and workers back after
COVID like other industry.
Now, the concern I have is the same thing that I have in
the trucking industry, which is the industry I came from. When
we are trying desperately to recruit new employees, safety is
vitally important. And, with safety, we implemented it both in
trucking and rail and other heavy equipment that certain safety
tests are given that would check your blood alcohol level and/
or any drug level.
And I believe that we are having several States right now
that have legalized marijuana, and with alcohol, it only takes
about 8 hours to process out to a safe level. With marijuana,
we end up with a test that we have, all of a sudden we have
these new employees popping positive and/or not being able to
pass a drug test at all. And, with that, we are losing valuable
employees that we should have.
And I think it is a concern that we should look into on the
national level, though we don't want to violate the 10th
Amendment. Still, many of these States are putting us in
situations where we are having trouble recruiting for these
type of jobs. I appreciate your input on this.
And, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
We will now have Mr. Garcia from Illinois for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Chairman, for holding
this hearing on freight rail safety.
And thank you to our witnesses on both panels for appearing
today.
My first question is for Mr. Bose of the FRA. In your
testimony, you note some of the recent actions that the FRA has
taken to address fatigue among railroad employees and advance
traincrew staffing safety requirements. I applaud these actions
and your leadership, but more action, of course, is needed to
address the harm to workers from Precision Scheduled
Railroading, including the increased safety risk workers are
facing as a result of PSR.
Many of the labor representatives testifying on the second
panel have highlighted other issues that need to be addressed.
These issues include the lack of time for carmen to inspect
cars, railroad scheduling and attendance practices like Hi-Viz
that lead to more fatigue among workers, and a lack of
protections for railroad workers performing track work.
What is the FRA doing to address these issues, and how is
the FRA in general working with labor unions and railroads to
address railroad employees' concerns about the effects of PSR?
Mr. Bose. Thank you for that question, Congressman. This is
definitely an issue we hear a lot about, especially due to the
attendance policies that some of the railroads have instituted
over recent times. When it comes to fatigue, FRA has instituted
a couple of things that I want to share. When it comes to any
accident investigation that involves human factors as a
possible cause of the accident, we collect information about
fatigue. We also put out a survey at the beginning of this year
where we got upwards of 10,000 comments from specifically
conductors and engineers about their experiences with fatigue
and hours of service. So, we are analyzing that data right now.
In addition, I have also reminded the railroads when it
comes to their attendance policies that rest away from home is
not the same as rest at home, and you can't in perpetuity be
away from home and be properly rested.
In addition to that, Congressman, one more aspect of what
FRA does, we are also continuously looking into research and
conducting research about fatigue and its impact on workers.
So, we are addressing it in many ways, but I get your broader
point that it is a very important topic that we need to address
on a continuing basis here and now.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you for that. I want to
squeeze two more questions in, so, your brevity would be much
appreciated.
Blocked railroad crossings are a big issue in my district
as well. You mentioned in your testimony that you are planning
to do outreach to local communities to get their input as you
update FRA's blocked rail crossing portal. Can you expand on
this outreach, what it looks like, and how my local communities
can give you input if they would like to? And are you planning
to do any visits to locations with a lot of blocked crossings
like Chicago to meet with local communities and residents?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, a couple of things there. We just
put out a request for information on ways to make our portal
even better for blocked crossings. So, I urge your communities
to provide input through that process.
The second thing is the Railroad Crossing Elimination
Program in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law that you
supported, we are going to go out with a notice of funding
opportunity and also in that do webinars for communities so
that they can apply for funding. So, those are two ways of
doing it.
FRA has had offices based in communities throughout the
country, in Illinois is an example. So, we have field personnel
spread throughout the country, and they are always available to
talk to your communities. And I will follow up with your office
directly to make sure that they contact and speak to your
communities and get that input directly.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you. Thank you. I want to
squeeze my last question in.
Mr. Cothen's testimony makes a compelling case that the FRA
must take a more active role in overseeing the railroad's
management of physical forces on a train as it moves. Railroads
are blaming human error and other miscellaneous causes when
they report train derailments to the FRA, but oftentimes it is
incorrect decision of the railroad to make up equipment of a
train that leads to its derailment. The improper coding gives
an incorrect picture of the causes of train derailments.
So, what action is FRA taking to hold railroads
accountable, and what is the FRA doing to better identify the
causes and ensure that codes appropriately reflect the
circumstances or derailments?
Mr. Payne. Quickly.
Mr. Bose. Congressman, we are going to improve our coding.
Just so you know, we are aware of Mr. Cothen's paper. He
definitely shared it with FRA, and I think it is an important
contribution to the dialogue. As you know, the National Academy
of Sciences is doing a study on long trains. FRA has also a
study that has been ongoing that focuses on the break aspects
of long trains.
So, we are going to continue to make sure that research
goes forward in a comprehensive way and that we seek comment
from the workers that operate these trains so that we know that
the research addresses their real-life experiences.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Payne. Next, we will hear from the gentleman from
California, Mr. LaMalfa.
Mr. LaMalfa. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I know the conversation will continue on the issue with
railroad track time and the labor issues with that. When I have
talked with folks on either end of the industry, whether on the
train side or the receiving end of those products, it is a
giant problem, so, I appreciate you being here today and
addressing that.
One of the issues that we are looking at is that--well,
first, let me back up a little bit. Not long ago, the Biden
administration announced a trucking action plan to help the
industry increase the number of truckdrivers we have on the
road, which is even more critical with some of the train issues
we have. So, it is especially for the long-haul routes, but we
have not seen, that I know of, an action yet taken by the
administration to replace or improve the employment barriers
for the railroad side of it. So, as we are talking about maybe
an improvement in the trucking area, we need to have that
dramatically increased and improved in railroad employment.
So, the Secretary of Transportation has called for
railroads to improve their service levels. Railroads have
stated on multiple occasions they are having difficulty
recruiting and retaining, et cetera.
So, with the issues we are having with the supply chain,
and whether it is imports or domestic production, we have a lot
of ability in this country to make up for imports. And we
shouldn't be so dependent on imports anyway, in my view, for
food production and fertilizer, as we know, because, obviously,
for food production, you need fertilizer to get the yields we
are accustomed to, so we can make up for it with the capacity
we have in this country.
As you know, urea is going to be a bigger problem since
major exporters, Russia and China and Qatar, they are cutting
it off. And so, what is important about urea? Not only does it
have the nitrogen source for fertilizer and growing food, but
what is known as diesel exhaust fluid to keep the newer engines
from post-2010 running cleaner. It is an additive that
basically is fed into the exhaust system downstream of the
engine that, if you don't have it on trucks, tractors, other
equipment that are programmed for it, it won't run. Not only
would it not run well, the computer system basically shuts it
down. You can't operate the vehicle, the tractor, whatever,
without the diesel exhaust fluid, the blue fluid, as you know.
So, there is becoming a big supply chain problem on that.
And what can the administration do to be helping with the
production of that as well as the transportation? Because my
understanding is the railroad folks are, without the labor to
move the product, are starting to cut back some of the
truckstop people that would be vending it. They just don't have
the capacity to move it. This is going to be a giant crisis
here--yet another one--really soon if trucks and other
equipment that is needed does not have this DEF, the DEF
product to keep those newer cleaner engines operating.
Now, we can do other things. We can pull old trucks out of
inventory that don't require that or maybe go back to older
tractors or try to get a waiver on bypassing the system. That
is not going to be popular with EPA or anybody. So, what should
we do about this? DEF is going to be a big problem, and if the
rails can't move it, what are we going to do about that?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, that is something that I am happy to
look into more and address it.
In terms of working with the industry, we are happy to do
that and continue doing that to find ways to move the goods and
the commodities that we need.
I just want to mention and address what you talked about
workforce and increasing the railroad workforce in the CRISI
grants that I mentioned in my opening statement. There was a
grant that we gave for workforce development efforts. It was
for Amtrak mechanical employees specifically. But, again, the
funding that we have available now is going to unlock some
possibilities, and workforce improvement--we are increasing
workforce opportunities. We are going to look for----
Mr. LaMalfa [interrupting]. Well, Amtrak doesn't move the
ball on what I am talking about here, and I need you to grasp
the urgency of what I am talking about here. Because if we
don't have this fluid, this DEF getting to where it needs to
be, the trucks don't run, right. And ``if you have got it, a
truck brought it'' is one of the common phrases, is that goods,
food, whatever is not going to get moved from production to the
shelf or even pre-production, from the fields to the mill,
whatever it is.
Mr. Payne. Five seconds.
Mr. LaMalfa. This is a critical situation. So, we need not
be just looking into it. We need urgency from the
administration to look at an immediate way to make this happen.
Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
We will next hear from the gentlelady from California, Mrs.
Napolitano, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Administrator, it is good to see you again. I know you
are familiar with my community of San Gabriel Valley of
California, which has 160 trains daily [inaudible] in
communities next to businesses and along school property. There
are many grade crossings that cause major safety congestion and
pollution concerns in my district. How is the infrastructure
law improving grade crossing safety and installing grade
separations?
And, secondly, I have significant concerns over the train
length and the impact it has on safety in local communities. I
have waited over 20 minutes for a train, over 100-200 railcars
passing my community. What is the FRA doing to address the
increased length of trains?
Mr. Bose. Congresswoman, thanks for those questions. First
off, when you are talking about grade crossings and improving
or eliminating those, I have had the opportunity to visit both
the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. We also pulled
together a series of communities and local governments in that
area to talk to them about the opportunities in the Bipartisan
Infrastructure Law and really pointing them to programs like
CREATE where they can come together. And I know you are
familiar with the Alameda Corridor and all the improvements
there----
Mrs. Napolitano [interrupting]. It runs right through my
district.
Mr. Bose. Yes, ma'am. And so, that is the kind of effort
that we want to make sure the communities are aware of.
When you talk about long trains, it is definitely something
that the FRA is looking into. As I mentioned earlier, that just
collecting the data on that is something that FRA has started
to do to make sure that we know what is going on in the system
overall. We talked about in-train forces and the effects that
long trains have on that. We also need to make sure the workers
operating those trains are trained in the proper way possible.
And also, there can be communication breakdowns that happen on
long trains.
So, the points that you made are very good ones, and we are
happy to follow up with your office more directly.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, I would like to follow up with you
and make sure that maybe, if you have a chance to visit my
district, you can see what impacts it has on the people and on
the business in the area.
But I certainly am very pleased that you are there to take
care of some of the issues that we talked about. And maybe we
can--one more question that was just brought to mind is
Operation Lifesaver. I know it is a volunteer group out of the
railroad. But how can we help make it a committee or a group
that really focuses on safety, that is not volunteer, that is
set up by you and the railroads? Because it is essential when
you have grade crossings that are near schools and there are
kids involved.
Mr. Bose. Congresswoman, Operation Lifesaver is very much a
part of FRA's efforts. Just last week, they attended a
conference about level boarding and grade crossing issues. So,
they are a very big partner to FRA. We fund them based on the
money that Congress provides on a recurring basis year after
year, and we definitely look for any opportunities to continue
to partner with them. They just had their 50th anniversary, and
we are happy to celebrate it with them. But we are looking for
ways to enhance their views on that.
And I will pass it over to Mr. Chapman.
Mr. Chapman. And, Congresswoman, I will add that we at NTSB
have a very good relationship with Operation Lifesaver. I work
with them myself personally because of my own personal interest
in grade crossing safety. They do outstanding work and,
obviously, want to see additional support for them in any way
possible.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, I would like to be sure that we have
our schools available to tap into those sources, because it is
quite a problem with Alameda Corridor-East that doesn't have
all the grade crossings that are necessary to prevent any
accidents or anything happening in the area.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentlelady yields back.
We will now hear from Mr. Balderson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both
for being here today.
My first question is for Administrator Bose. About a month
ago, FRA announced the establishment of the Corridor
Identification and Development Program. According to the FRA,
the program will facilitate the development of intercity
passenger rail corridors. However, the FRA will not require
that any proposals demonstrate the commitment of host freight
railroads.
Does FRA believe freight railroad consolidation and
participation is necessary in this program?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, on shared corridors, especially
those owned by host railroads, projects will not go forward
without the host railroads' cooperation and participation.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you. Can you expand a little bit more
on the role of the freight railroads in this program, please?
Mr. Bose. In the Corridor Identification and Development
Program? Well, I will start from the beginning. Right after the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law passed, we did several webinars.
We reached out to the Class I railroads directly to ask them
for comments as a part of the program so that the program would
be informed by their views and would be stronger based on their
views. So, we sought their input in the first place.
Then when we developed the program, we knew that going
forward, again, that host railroads were absolutely necessary
in participating. And we emphasize that in the technical
assistance that we provide to any community, any State, any
locality that is looking at doing the corridor program.
Mr. Balderson. OK. Thank you very much.
My next question, Administrator, is: In the FRA's guidance
for the Corridor Identification and Development Program, the
FRA is requiring applicants state whether they intend to select
Amtrak as its operator or not. Can you explain why FRA is
requiring this determination so early in the process?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, I am not--can you repeat that? I
didn't catch that.
Mr. Balderson. Yes, sir. I sure can. I apologize.
In the FRA's guidance for the Corridor Identification and
Development Program, the FRA is requiring applicants state
whether they intend to select Amtrak as its operator or not.
Can you explain why the FRA is requiring this determination so
early in the process?
Mr. Bose. Thanks for the question, Congressman. We are just
seeking that for informational purposes. It in a way helps
determine how far along the corridor development is. Whether it
is Amtrak or a private operator or a non-Amtrak operator, it is
just a question asking if that box has been checked off.
Mr. Balderson. OK. I am going to follow up. To be clear,
would the FRA encourage and protect competitive bidding for
other rail operators in this program?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, absolutely. And let me be clear on
that. We have a private operator in Florida. We have a private
operator developing a railroad in California, Nevada, in Texas.
And we encourage other private operators throughout the country
to look at passenger rail opportunities in the United States.
Mr. Balderson. Thank you very much. I appreciate your
answers.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
We will now hear from Mr. Johnson from Georgia for 5
minutes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. And I want to thank the witnesses for
your time and your testimony.
And I apologize for the bad lighting. I am in a bad
situation, trying to do the best I can.
But the U.S. has the largest rail network in the world, and
keeping such an extensive system running safely is a heavy
lift. Many issues continue to plague railroads today, and they
are due, in part, to cost cuts and barebones operational plans
implemented across freight railroads. And these cost-cutting
measures are celebrated and encouraged by Wall Street.
Meanwhile, Americans face job losses, poor rail service, and
potentially deadly situations for railroad employees. Safety
and quality of service should always be the priority, not
profit.
In 2021, Class I railroads had more than 1,200 train
accidents and 9 employees died. In 1 month alone, two
conductors with less than a year of service were struck by
moving equipment and suffered serious injuries. Despite that,
conductor certification training has been shortened by the
railroads when onboarding new conductors.
Mr. Bose, does the FRA have concerns about the quality of
certification trainings, given that the reduced certification
period risks worker safety?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, that is something that FRA looks at
every day, and we know the concerns that have been expressed.
And we have actually caught some situations where the training
and certification process needs to be improved, and we have
shared that with the railroads directly so that the system can
be safe.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Are there any other plans that FRA
has to address that concern?
Mr. Bose. Yes, sir. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law
actually asks FRA to look at the certification program, and we
have that underway. And, again, we are looking at those
training programs railroad by railroad. And anytime we identify
gaps or deficiencies or areas where improvements are needed, we
make sure that the railroad makes those right away. We want to
make sure that when railroad workers operate on the trains or
provide service, that they are well trained and well versed.
These are special skills that are required to be railroaders.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
Mr. Chapman, in your testimony, you detail a number of
accidents, including some with fatalities, that occurred
despite use of the train approach warning, or TAW method, used
by crewmembers.
Mr. Chapman, can you briefly describe the TAW method for us
and some circumstances where it would and would not be
appropriate?
Mr. Chapman. Congressman, it is actually a very simple
system. It relies upon a watchman or a lookout to spot oncoming
trains and then to warn the crew, the working crew, of the
oncoming train. And the requirement is to allow the crew to
clear within 15 seconds before the oncoming train.
The problem is that it is highly susceptible to human
error, frankly, distraction, failure to properly anticipate the
oncoming train. Trains move very quickly. And so, we have seen
some accidents that were quite tragic.
The one that I highlighted in my statement was the Amtrak
accident in Bowie, Maryland, where a young man was killed,
struck by an oncoming Amtrak train moving at 100 miles an hour.
He was standing on an active track. Had no other place really
where solid footing was available to him.
What we believe is that, in controlled track areas, we are
not seeing the railroads take sufficient advantage of the
capabilities of the PTC system, which allows speed limitations
and other work limits to be put in place to ensure that we
don't have to rely on such a relatively rudimentary system as
train approach warning.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you.
My time has expired, and I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
We will now hear from Mr. Johnson of South Dakota.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
I would like to have a conversation with Mr. Bose,
particularly related to crew size. I know a few years ago FRA
had noted that it lacked empirical evidence to suggest that
one-person crews were either more safe or less safe than two-
person crews.
Sir, does the FRA have any new data or different findings?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, we will be happy to share that with
you when the notice of proposed rulemaking comes out in the
near future.
In terms of data, we know in the last NPRM, the notice of
proposed rulemaking, in 2016, cited Casselton, North Dakota, as
a place where an incident happened, where the crew worked
together. And having a less than two-person crew in that
situation could have been an even more negative outcome there.
You mention data. FRA also, subsequently to that withdrawal
notice, has had research, and we have conducted even more
research about crew size. So, we are happy to have that a part
of the record when the notice of proposed rulemaking goes out.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Yes. And I do think--I mean,
the North Dakota example is illuminating. Of course, it is just
one example. It is an anecdote. We can learn from those things,
but I do think we want to make decisions. We want to promulgate
rules based on good data. Are you not in the position to be
able to release that data to the public prior to a rulemaking?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, it has to be a part of the
rulemaking because, right now, we are in a deliberative process
putting that together. But we are happy to walk through the
NPRM, when that comes out, with you, with your staff, with the
committee. I know there will be a lot of interest.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Well, and to be clear, sir, I
am not asking that you would share with me what you intend to
introduce as a proposed rule. I understand that that would be
protected by the deliberative process. But, certainly, safety
data is something that you could release in advance of an NPRM,
isn't it?
Mr. Bose. It depends on what type of safety data you are
talking about, Congressman. We definitely have readily
available data on an ongoing basis that we put up on our
website. But we are happy to--I will follow up with your office
and go over some specific data that we can share.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Yes. I think that would be
instructive. Of course, whatever we do, we want to be evidence-
based and data-driven.
Do you have a timeline in mind for next steps with regard
to the NPRM?
Mr. Bose. The NPRM is under review right now, and it is
hard to pinpoint an exact time on that.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. So, we don't know whether that
would be weeks or months or longer?
Mr. Bose. It is going to depend, Congressman, on the review
process. I wish I could be more specific. I am sorry I can't
be.
Mr. Chapman. Congressman, if I could add something from the
NTSB perspective.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Yes.
Mr. Chapman. We think the very basic step that is being
taken now in modifying the incident/accident report form, FRA's
incident/accident report form, will help ensure just better
gathering of data with respect to crew size and train length.
We think that that very basic step will help generate
considerably more useful data than what we currently have.
Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Sure. Well, and I would just
note, Mr. Bose, I understand timelines can be flexible. And I
am not--I mean, I am not trying to pin you down. But I was a
regulator in a former life. I certainly as an agency had a role
in promulgating rules, and I always felt like one of the ways
that I could help to increase trust and transparency and
confidence is giving people some sense of when things might
happen.
And just even internally, of course, with my team, when I
was a former regulator, I would say, hey, gang, we want our
review to be done on X date. We will build in a couple of extra
weeks of wiggle time, because we know other things come up.
But the idea that you just don't have any idea when the
world would get a sense of what you are planning to propose, I
don't know that that is confidence inspiring. And I know you
work in an incredibly difficult political and technical
environment. But I just--I would just note that I think giving
rough timelines can help to buy up and build confidence in the
work of the FRA. And I hope you keep that in mind as we move in
the future.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
We will now hear from Mr. Auchincloss for 5 minutes.
[No response.]
Mr. Payne. OK. Next, we will move to Mr. Carter from
Louisiana for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
My question is for Administrator Bose. Thank you for being
here. I represent the Second Congressional District in
Louisiana, which is home to a lot of quaint towns. One
particularly quaint town is the city of Gretna that has a train
that runs through that community. There has been talk of
expanding that train, and I will tell you that the devastation
of trains that go through small communities is real. It impacts
commerce, it impacts quality of life, and generally has been
proven to be a real problem.
Can you share with me your views on how we can work to
preserve the security and sanctity of our small towns to
prevent these expansions of railways that run through small
cities?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, for FRA, safety is absolutely our
priority, so, we want to make sure any trains that operate in
those communities are doing so in a safe manner.
In terms of the expansion, I don't have the details that
you do exactly where and to what level. I can tell you that
when it comes to the railroads increasing their business and
increasing their footprint in a community, there are
opportunities through funding, through mitigation activities
that we always encourage, not to mention community input and
community collaboration as a part of the process.
For the Federal Railroad Administration, we want to make
sure our field inspectors are there for the community to answer
any questions that your constituents may have.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. And we have been in communication,
and I thank you for that. And I know that working with the
Governor's office and Secretary Wilson with the Department of
Transportation and Development in Louisiana, there has been
discussion ongoing.
I just want to flag that for you and ask that maybe we can
have a further discussion offline on the specifics of the issue
in the city of Gretna in Louisiana. But more generally across
the board, this is an issue that plagues many communities. And
while we understand the importance of commerce, we want to make
sure it is done in a way that, as you mentioned, is safe,
secure, and does not disassemble, if you will, the economy and
community that is so important to all of us.
Pivoting from that, the workforce shortages, how has that
increased your ability to maintain the security of rails that
run through communities?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, in terms of the staff reductions and
the workforce that you just mentioned, we in FRA absolutely
believe that the rail system in general is safe in its
operations. There is always room for improvement. We can always
do better. And we want to make sure that when the workforce
increases, that the training, the certification processes are
done the right way, and that we want to make sure that the
infrastructure and the equipment and every other part of the
railroad is as safe as possible for workers.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. And has that been the case, have
you seen increase, decrease, standstill as a result?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, I will just tell you, when I came on
last year, I had seen, the first half of the year especially,
there were fatalities of workers. And I followed those closely.
Every day there are reports I get about injuries and the
quality of the workplace. We want to make sure that there is a
safe environment for workers.
So, after that, I sent a letter. I contacted the railroads
directly, making sure that training and awareness of the
workers is paramount in their minds. So, we continue to do that
on a daily basis, Congressman. Whether it is through
inspections, through audits, through other means. FRA does that
as a part of our daily work every day.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. And while I applaud you for the
safety of workers--that is critically important, and I stand
wholeheartedly in support of that--tell me about the security
of neighborhoods and people and pedestrians.
Mr. Bose. Yes. Absolutely, Congressman. Another aspect of
what this administration is focused on is equity. Right? And we
want to make sure that when it comes to grade crossing safety,
trespasser safety, the impact that a railroad has on a
community is a safe one. We have recently done a grade crossing
summit to highlight safety improvements that we can make. So,
we will continue to do that. Anytime you need us to engage with
your communities directly, I am happy to do that. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Carter of Louisiana. I will definitely take you up on
that.
My time has expired. I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
We will next have Mrs. Steel from California for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Steel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you
very much, Ranking Member.
And, Administrator Bose, earlier this year organized crime
groups wreaked havoc on cargo trains in Los Angeles County,
stealing packages, equipment, and other important products from
railroad cars. This instance shed light on data collected from
Union Pacific since December 2020, detailing the 160-percent
increase in thefts along railroad tracks in Los Angeles County.
Many of the products stolen included medical equipment,
electronics, and food products, some of which may currently be
out of stock due to supply chain shortages.
It is also important to note that many of these purchases
are delivered, not just in California, but throughout the
United States, affecting interstate and international commerce.
The safety of our freight rail system includes the safety
of our rail workforce and the security of rail freight. How are
you working with the Department of Justice to hold the
perpetrators accountable, and how are you ensuring that this
instance does not spur up again this holiday season?
Mr. Bose. Congresswoman, thank you for that question. I
think you are referring specifically to what happened on Union
Pacific in the L.A. area over the course of the last year.
We have talked about workforce shortages. That is not only
in terms of the operations of the trains, but it is also in
their law enforcement. Those rights-of-way are privately owned.
These are privately owned railcars. They have their own police
force that is to look out for vandals, for other security
issues.
We made it clear to Union Pacific, as well as other
railroads, that security and securement of their equipment is
very, very important. In the L.A. area, we worked with local
law enforcement, as well as the Governor's office and
Department of Homeland Security, FBI, to make sure that those
instances are not repeated and we can improve on those. If they
reoccur, we are ready to tackle those with our other agencies
and law enforcement. They are very much a part of that.
I am hopeful that Union Pacific is giving the attention the
issue deserves so that those incidents that happened over the
course of the last year aren't repeated.
Mrs. Steel. So, since Federal and State and local law
enforcement are working together, have these crimes gone down
or stayed the same or increased?
Mr. Bose. Congresswoman, I have not seen an increase in
those activities. If you have information to the contrary,
please, please feel free to share it.
Another aspect of this that was really, really important is
just securing the actual intermodal units that the trains were
carrying and make sure they are properly locked. So, I am glad
those precautions have been taken going forward.
Mrs. Steel. Thank you very much, Administrator Bose.
Mr. Chairman, I have another question, but I don't think I
have enough time to get answers. So, what I am going to do is I
am going to submit in writing regarding that Federal funding
and grants have been provided to California high-speed rail,
which has already failed. So, I am going to put this in
writing.
And I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bose. That will be fine. Thank you, Congresswoman.
Mr. Payne. We thank the gentlelady for her consideration.
And we will next have Ms. Titus from Nevada.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to ask Mr. Bose about the rule that was
released yesterday by the FRA on Fatigue Risk Management
Programs. In the final rule, there was a reference to the FRA
revising its accident and incident investigation procedures to
analyze information on the involved railroad's attendance
policies.
I wonder if you could expand more on this and the reasons
you all changed your procedure. And if in the future FRA shows
that there are attendance policies that contribute to rail
incidents or accidents, would the FRA consider readdressing the
issue?
Mr. Bose. Congresswoman, thanks for that question. The
fatigue rule, as you mentioned, in addition to that, we are
also, when it comes to accident investigations, asking
questions about hours of service, about fatigue. We also did a
survey where we got over 10,000 responses from conductors and
engineers, and we are analyzing that as well.
In terms of rest, that is a very, very important issue, and
attendance policies are a part of that. It is something that
FRA has been reviewing and did review across the board at the
railroad companies.
We were not able to find a regulatory tool that we have
available to address those directly. But, again, we are very
focused to make sure that workers are meeting the hours-of-
service requirements that are in law. We are making sure that
FRA is analyzing data information related to hours of service
and fatigue.
I contacted the railroad companies to make sure that they
knew that the quality of rest and the quality in the attendance
policies is very important, that resting away from home is not
the same as resting at home. And I made that clear to them.
In terms of the fatigue rule, Congresswoman, the
consultation with workers is so important and such an important
aspect of that. We had the Fatigue Risk Reduction Program and
the System Safety Program come out in the last administration.
There was a hole in both those regulations that dealt with
consultation with workers. We knew that that could be improved
on, and through the fatigue rule, we started addressing that.
We need to do even more to ensure that that consultation is
done, because that will lead to a better fatigue plan and
better safety outcome.
Ms. Titus. You said you don't have the regulatory tools to
do something. Are there measures that we could take here in
this committee to give you those regulatory tools? Would you go
back over that and see if there is anything we need to do or we
need to bring forward?
Mr. Bose. Congresswoman, what I was referring to
specifically was the attendance policies and hours, and those
are things that are often worked out through agreements between
workers and the railroad companies. That is what I was
referring to.
What FRA does is we look at hours of service, we look at
fatigue, and we make sure that we have the information that we
need. And if there is anything we need to address, we do that
directly.
Ms. Titus. Well, it seems that in recent years railroads
have been acting more like Wall Street, cutting workers, longer
trains, less concern about people who actually roll the trains.
And I just want to be sure that they are protected and they
have as much rest as they need, because if they don't, not only
does that put them at risk, but it puts whatever they are
hauling at risk, and it puts everybody in the neighborhood that
they go through at risk.
Mr. Bose. Congresswoman, absolutely. We know what has been
going on in the industry. I can tell you that FRA is doing
focused inspections, is doing audits. Those were things that in
the recent past FRA had not put a lot of effort into. I
reinvigorated those efforts. And we want to make sure that the
railroads know that we are looking at these issues very, very
closely in line with what has gone on in the recent past. We
don't want to be late to this. That is why we are actively
looking at these things right now and addressing them.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you, Mr. Bose. I am glad to hear
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentlelady yields back.
We will now hear from Mr. Perry from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen,
for being here.
Administrator Bose, I want to read from your testimony:
``The mission of the Federal Railroad Administration is to
enable the safe,''--and I am just going to underline that--
``reliable, and efficient movement of people and goods for a
strong America, now and in the future.''
That is a quote.
And then another one: ``Safety--including the safety of
railroad employees, rail passengers, and the communities
through which railroads operate--is FRA's top priority.''
Sound about right to you? I mean, sounds like something you
would say and sounds like the mission that you are on, I would
think.
Mr. Bose. Yes, sir.
Mr. Perry. OK. So, I know that when you talked to Mr.
Crawford, you didn't want to answer questions regarding a
lawsuit with BNSF. But I am going to ask you questions about
Norfolk Southern, so, hopefully you can answer some questions
regarding automated track inspections.
Are automated track inspections and manual inspections
mutually exclusive? If you do one, you can't do the other?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, the answer to that is no.
Mr. Perry. Of course not, right? So, you can do both.
According to the testimony from Norfolk Southern, which
conclusively showed that expanding the waiver would improve
safety, would improve safety, and that also said that when the
request was denied, it described the program as successful. But
it seems like the key finding was ignored that the systemwide
implementation of ATGMS would improve rail and worker safety.
Have you provided any rationale why the waiver was denied?
Mr. Bose. We did, in the letter denying it.
Mr. Perry. Can you impart that to us now?
Mr. Bose. I am sorry?
Mr. Perry. I mean, can you just generalize and tell us why
it was denied?
Mr. Bose. Well, the letter said that the Railroad Safety
Advisory Committee is looking at automated track inspections in
general, and that is the way that the FRA is addressing
automated track inspections.
Mr. Perry. So, you don't think they have been successful?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, I am not going to get into--that
is--there is a petition for reconsideration. I want to be
respectful----
Mr. Perry [interrupting]. I am just asking you. I know
there is a petition, but we are trying to figure out if this
technology works and if it is not mutually exclusive. So,
Norfolk Southern, BNSF, any other railroad could implement the
automated track inspection and also do manual inspections, but
they are not allowed to do automated track inspection right now
because it has been denied. Right? The waiver has been denied.
So, I would like to know why that is, if you don't think,
if the FRA doesn't think that they have been successful or that
they enhance or increase safety, because that is what it seems
like.
Mr. Bose. Congressman, I think this is a really important
point. Norfolk Southern could use automated track inspections
right now. In fact, I think they are using it right now----
Mr. Perry [interrupting]. But they can't expand it.
Mr. Bose [continuing]. Without a waiver.
Mr. Perry. But they can't expand it, right?
Mr. Bose. They can expand it to other territories
throughout their network.
Mr. Perry. So, they haven't been denied a waiver?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, in order to use automated track
inspections, they do not need a waiver in the first place.
Mr. Perry. Well, it seems like--and I said I wasn't going
to ask, but I am going ask. It seems like on the same day that
they were denied, BNSF was denied to expand its preexisting
waiver to new territories. Is that not correct?
Mr. Bose. Both were denied by the Railroad Safety Board at
the FRA, yes, sir.
Mr. Perry. I thought you just said they weren't denied,
they could expand wherever they wanted to.
Mr. Bose. Automated track inspections do not require a
waiver to be in use. They are in use across railroads right
now.
Mr. Perry. So, why deny or not deny?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, factually, they were seeking those
waivers to eliminate or reduce visual inspections.
Mr. Perry. And how do you know that?
Mr. Bose. How do I know that?
Mr. Perry. Yes.
Mr. Bose. Because the docket that they submitted, the
request that they submitted is something that is available to
read.
Mr. Perry. OK. And it says that they did it because of
that.
Mr. Bose. Among other reasons, yes.
Mr. Perry. OK. So, they were going to reduce them. But were
they going to stop them, visual inspections, reduce or stop?
Mr. Bose. I don't recall exactly what they said, but----
Mr. Perry [interrupting]. And it is not mutually exclusive.
So, they can do automated track inspection and visual
inspections, right?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, I am not going to get into it
because, again, there is a petition for reconsideration. There
is litigation going on. I have tried to answer your questions.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
And I think it was clear everyone in the room supports ATI
and no waiver is required to operate ATI.
The next person up is the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Auchincloss, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
Before I begin, Administrator Bose, would you like to take
a minute of my time to expound on your answers to my colleague?
Mr. Payne. We are getting some feedback here.
[Pause.]
Mr. Payne. The gentleman can proceed.
[No response.]
Mr. Payne. While we are trying to figure out what is going
on with Mr. Auchincloss, we will hear from Mr. Burchett.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
I am the 435th most powerful Member of Congress, so, if
these questions have been asked before, I apologize. Obviously,
my party has not accepted my position in leadership as I have.
So, I appreciate you all.
We all know that businesses are struggling to find workers.
And I am wondering why would the agency consider forcing small
businesses to hire folks that they really don't need?
And I guess that is to Administrator Bose.
Mr. Bose. Congressman, I am not sure exactly what you are
referring to in terms of forcing railroads to hire workers. I
am not sure if you are talking about the shortages that we have
heard from the railroads directly in terms of the supply chain
and the increases that they need or if you are referring to the
crew size.
Mr. Burchett. I am referring to the rule that President
Biden's administration has moved forward to hire personnel or
operators with more people on a train than a lot of folks feel
is necessary.
Mr. Bose. Yes, sir. So, when it comes to that, I will just
note this: There was a notice of proposed rulemaking back in
2016, having to do with crew size. At that time, some railroad
companies had one-person crews, and there was not going to be a
change to that, if the railroads could provide the rationale
for continuing that. And also, in terms of the crew size, right
now, there is a minimum of two people on crews across the board
at the railroad companies.
So, there was, in the last notice of proposed rulemaking,
if it was below two, there was an opportunity to continue that,
as well as, if there is two, to maintain it. And there was also
a safety case that went along with those.
Mr. Burchett. OK. I am also worried, to carry that on, if
the railroads can't meet some of these requirements, do you
think it is possible that fewer trains would run and that would
result in a worsening service and increased supply chain
bottlenecks?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, when it comes to operating the
trains and providing the service, I leave that to the railroads
to do on their own. They are very successful businesses and
have been for a long time in this country, and I think they can
figure that out pretty well.
But I just want to highlight, again, the Surface
Transportation Board's April 27th hearing where we did hear
from customers and communities that experienced a lack of
service. If there is anything the FRA can do, the
administration can do to increase the workforce for them, the
railroads to increase their workers or retain workers, we are
happy to work with them.
Mr. Burchett. OK. I just read that some of those mandates
might carry over in more disruptions.
Two weeks ago, 24 short lines were awarded CRISI grants.
And I am wondering, how else is the Federal Railroad
Administration using the CRISI grants to invest in short line
upgrades in some of those safety improvements?
Mr. Bose. Yes, sir. So, when it comes to short lines, FRA
has a pretty robust program, but CRISI is the primary way that
we fund the short lines. We also have a Short Line Safety
Institute where we make sure that there is training and aspects
of safety that we are communicating with the short lines
directly. FRA also engages with the short lines throughout the
year so that we can talk to them about safety and provide
resources that they need.
I had an opportunity to go to California in Oakdale,
California, and visit a short line company called Sierra
Northern. And they were replacing ties, believe it or not, that
were over 100 years old, with the CRISI money that we gave
them. So, we are always looking for more opportunities. We
know----
Mr. Burchett [interrupting]. I hope it wasn't those
concrete ones. I see those behind some property I used to have.
I see those. They make nice borders for gardens now. They
didn't last too well as the good old wooden ones, I am afraid.
Mr. Bose. Yes, sir. They are wood. They are wood.
Mr. Burchett. Yes, sir. All righty. I am about to run out
of time. But I am curious about the administration's support of
funding CRISI at a higher level than its fiscal year 2023
budget. Fiscal year 2023, the Biden administration requested
$1.5 billion for the grants, and it was less than $1.6 billion
appropriated by Congress in fiscal year 2022.
And I am out of time, if you can just give me a quick one
on that.
Mr. Bose. Yes. We are always open to more funding for
CRISI. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law has funding for CRISI
for 5 continuous years, and that is a big deal to know that
there is going to be a robust program.
Mr. Burchett. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back
none of my time.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
Now we will have Mr. Stauber from Minnesota for 5 minutes.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
My question will be a followup to Representative
Burchett's. In my home district in northeast Minnesota, we have
Class I railroads and short lines crisscrossing the entire
State. They carry the iron ore that makes 80-plus percent of
America's steel. They carry coal and other commodities and more
from the west coast and the Plains, through the Port of Duluth.
They employ hundreds of people and provide for families,
supporting union jobs. Rail safety is ever present both in
those communities that have rail lines running through them and
the families who have parents and loved ones working on these
lines.
One such program that is important to rail safety is the
Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements grant
program, which you just talked about. Short line railroads are
directly eligible for CRISI funds, and they have been
successful in harnessing these resources since the program was
created in 2015.
And 2 weeks ago, the FRA made its latest awards, announcing
24 short lines would benefit from this program, putting
investments to work to make their railroads safer by upgrading
outdated track, bridges, and tunnels. These investments also
make the network more efficient.
Can you discuss your continued commitment toward using the
CRISI program to invest in key safety goals, like allowing
short line freight rail to upgrade and make important repairs?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, short lines play such an important
role in the railroad network that we have, and we want to do
everything possible to make sure that they are robust and have
the funding to make the improvements that they need. As you
mentioned, the CRISI program is such a great tool to do that.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much.
And can you discuss how CRISI more generally helps
railroads improve the efficiency of the supply chain?
Mr. Bose. Yes, absolutely. So, let me point out a couple of
examples. A lot of bridges don't carry 287 pounds of capacity.
So, the program can be used to make those improvements. They
are used to make improvements to track so that the tracks can
accommodate higher speed trains. And also, in terms of other
infrastructure improvements, to improve grade crossings or
eliminate grade crossings, that is another way that the CRISI
program is used by short line railroads.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much.
And I will just end with this. I would just encourage you
and the agency to continue working with railroads that are
doing improvements across our great land, to make sure that the
local community and the elected leaders in those areas where
the improvements are going to be made are part of the
conversation. And I think that is critically important.
We know that the railroads help build our country, and we
are upgrading the infrastructure. But I just want to make it
clear to you, my recommendation is to make sure that our
communities, many of them are smaller communities, that when
there are upgrades, et cetera, that the administration supports
working with the community, the community leaders and such, and
have an actual input on the design and be involved in the
conversation. I think that would be a great help as the
railroad continues to invest.
Mr. Bose. Absolutely, Congressman.
Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my 1 minute and 5 seconds.
Mr. Payne. I appreciate the gentleman's consideration.
And now we will have Mr. Auchincloss from Massachusetts who
has joined us.
Mr. Auchincloss. Chairman, apologies for the audio issues.
Thanks for your patience.
Before I begin, Administrator Bose, if you would like, I
want to grant you a minute just to further expound on your
answers to my colleague, Mr. Perry. I know you didn't have a
whole lot of time to explain. But if it would be helpful to
you, I want to give you that time now.
Mr. Bose. Thanks, Congressman. I was just trying to express
that automated track inspection efforts don't require any sort
of approval, any affirmative waivers for them to continue and
be utilized on a regular basis. Railroads can use them, are
using them right now without waivers.
Mr. Auchincloss. Got it. And now, Administrator, I want to
talk to you about CRISI. Short line freight rail is critical to
countless communities and economic sectors, helping industrial
manufacturing and agricultural customers move their goods to
market. The short line freight rail industry estimates that
more than $12 billion in investments are needed to ensure that
the industry can modernize and meet the needs of our economy.
The recently passed infrastructure law dramatically
increases the level of resources available through the
Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements grant
program, the CRISI program.
Massachusetts, the State I represent, has received nearly
$35 million in CRISI awards in recent years and another $1.75
million 2 weeks ago, putting the investments of the
infrastructure bill to work to make their railroads safer by
upgrading outdated tracks, bridges, and tunnels. And these
investments are also making the network more efficient.
Can you discuss your commitment towards using the CRISI
program to invest in key safety goals like allowing short line
freight rail to upgrade and make important repairs?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, you have that commitment.
Mr. Auchincloss. How can short line rail also support local
infrastructure improvements, many of which will use older rails
to transport construction materials?
Mr. Bose. We can definitely look for projects where we can
make those improvements. And we know, especially when it comes
to short lines, often they don't have the resources to do the
long-term improvements that are necessary. And we want to make
sure the program is utilized for that purpose.
Mr. Auchincloss. And can you also discuss how CRISI helps
short line railroads improve the efficiency of the supply
chain?
Mr. Bose. Yes, absolutely. I was mentioning, often in some
cases, short line railroad bridges aren't able to carry 287
pounds of equipment. So, that is one area. Also, often they
need track upgrades or replace ties, and the CRISI program
enables, just as examples, to make those improvements. So,
short lines definitely utilize that program.
And I also know that the short lines, relatively small
grants make a huge difference to those short lines, because
they encompass smaller geographic areas. So, we actually have a
bigger impact even with the short lines. The funding goes a lot
further.
Mr. Auchincloss. Got it.
Mr. Chapman, final question for you, a basic but open-ended
one. What is the single most important thing we can do to
improve the safety of freight rail?
Mr. Chapman. Well, the emphasis that I expressed in my
opening statement with respect to train approach warning, I
think if we took greater advantage of the limitations available
through PTC, made less use of train approach warning, I think
that would have the greatest impact, from our perspective,
certainly with respect to safety of roadway workers.
Mr. Auchincloss. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
Now, we will have Mr. Westerman from Arkansas for 5
minutes.
Mr. Westerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses.
My first question I want to ask Administrator Bose. And I
hear that the administration is moving forward with a new rule
that could require railroads to hire more personnel or to
operate with more people on a train. It would be the first time
in nearly the 200-year history of railroading in this country
that there has been a Federal rule on the number of people
needed to operate a train. And if it goes forward, I am worried
about the effects on small businesses and specifically short
line railroads.
I have the great opportunity to represent more short line
railroads in my district than any other congressional district.
And instead of putting capital where it may be better used,
like making improvements to track and structures that are
critical for the safe and efficient movement of goods and
freight, I am concerned that they will be asked to spend more
money on unnecessary workforce expansion.
Doesn't it make better sense to let small business
railroads invest in their infrastructure, which allows for a
safer, more efficient rail network, instead of being forced to
put more people on the payroll?
Mr. Bose. Congressman, thank you for that question. As you
know, and I have stated before, we are working on the notice of
proposed rulemaking for the crew size.
What I also said earlier, and I will highlight a part of
it, is that, in 2016, there was a notice of proposed
rulemaking, and there were some short line railroads identified
within that that had less than two-person crews: one-person
crews. And there was a path for them to continue utilizing one-
person crews if they could make the safety case for doing that.
So, that was in the last notice of proposed rulemaking.
Any rule that we put forward has to have a small business
consideration built into it. So, there will be absolutely an
opportunity for comments for us to receive to hear from the
short lines and other stakeholders directly when we go forward
with that.
Also, as you know, there is also a cost-benefit analysis
that will have to be a part of that notice of proposed
rulemaking.
Mr. Westerman. Thank you. In fiscal year 2022, Congress
provided CRISI with $1.625 billion in a mix of discretionary
and mandatory spending. But in the fiscal year 2023 budget
request, the administration proposed $1.5 billion.
Is there a reason that the administration is proposing to
cut CRISI funding? I mean, I am all for cutting costs where
necessary, but I am hoping you can tell me why they chose that
program to cut and what would be cut.
Mr. Bose. Congressman, there are a lot of considerations
that go into the budget proposal that we put forward. The
request reflects those tradeoffs. But we know, and I will
restate this, the CRISI program has a lot of benefits. It has
given a lot of benefits to short line railroads, and I look
forward to working with Congress to make sure that that program
continues in a robust way.
Mr. Westerman. Yes. With all the need for investment in our
infrastructure and especially on short line freight rail, it
seems like it would be wise to fully unleash that potential.
Mr. Bose. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. I understand. And it is also
important that we got the money out for fiscal year 2021 that
you all provided, and we did that just a few weeks ago. So, it
is absolutely--I hear your point on the importance of the
program.
Mr. Westerman. All right. Thank you, Administrator.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
I would like to thank the witnesses for their time today
and their testimony. We find it very valuable, and we will
continue these discussions into the future. Thank you.
We will now retire this panel and ask the second panel to
come up.
[Pause.]
Mr. Payne. OK. Good afternoon. Next we will hear from panel
2.
Before I proceed, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the
record a statement from the Association of State Railroad
Safety Managers.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement from the Association of State Railroad Safety Managers,
Submitted for the Record by Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr.
To: U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
The Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM) would like to
thank the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure for
the opportunity to provide a written statement regarding current
railroad industry practices that are having a negative impact on
safety. The ASRSM is a Federal Railroad Administration supported state-
based organization comprised of rail safety professionals from thirty-
one member states. The purpose of this organization is to support,
encourage, develop, and enhance railroad safety, especially through the
Federal/State Railroad Safety Programs as established and defined by
the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970. A principal motivation for
forming this Association was to attain greater uniformity among states
in the conduct of rail regulatory activities and to enable states to
speak with a collective voice on important rail safety topics.
There are several railroad practices that are of particular concern
to the Association. These concerns have been manifested primarily in
the operations of various Class I railroads, although it is not
uncommon to find them at the Class II, and Class III levels as well.
The issue of blocked grade crossings, the operation of very long
trains, the recent issue of railroads insisting that roadway owners/
municipalities bear the cost of on-going maintenance of crossing
devices, and the exuberant costs for preliminary engineering agreements
are four key issues we believe are critical and need to be addressed.
These concerns are further outlined below.
Blocked crossings
There are over 228,000 public and private highway-railroad grade
crossing across America. Blocked highway-railroad crossings by standing
and slow-moving trains are a chronic problem in almost every state. In
recent years, railroad companies have significantly expanded the use of
longer trains (sometimes exceeding three miles long) The cumulative
impacts of blocked highway-railroad crossings are very serious and
include:
Significant delays in providing firefighting and
lifesaving emergency medical care to those in need in areas with
blocked access.
Delays in police response to criminal activities with
blocked access.
Delays to school buses and parents transporting children
to and from school.
Attempts by drivers to ``beat'' the trains at crossings
they know are routinely blocked--endangering the vehicle occupants and
train crews.
Trespassing by pedestrians (including schoolchildren)
over and under stopped trains, risking serious injury or worse.
Prolonged traffic delays, impeding commerce and causing
re-routed traffic to impact local neighborhoods.
Preventing citizens from accessing their own homes,
schools, and workplaces, sometimes for hours at a time.
Many states and municipalities have implemented laws and rules that
prescribe the period a train can block a crossing for reasons other
than mechanical issues or emergencies. Unfortunately, courts have
consistently upheld the railroad's arguments that state laws are
federally preempted, rendering these local solutions moot. The new FRA
blocked crossing portal has not shown much effectiveness at this point,
other than to further illuminate these persisting issues suffered by so
many communities.
Concerns about very long trains
Today, trains are being built that can reach lengths more than
15,000 feet. The recent practice of operating very long trains has
magnified the blocked grade crossing issue especially when a long train
is stopped within a small town or village cutting off access at
multiple crossings.
Some of the trains being assembled are so long, that they do not
fit within the existing sidings, or inside rail yards. This has
resulted in railroads often using their main line to couple railcars
together causing additional problems with blocked roadway access.
Additionally, the operation of these very long trains presents
challenges to train crews especially when navigating curves and grades.
The distribution of loaded and empty cars, as well as the placement of
distributed power throughout a train present significant challenges in
train make-up, which if done improperly, can lead to derailments and
damage to equipment.
Finally, longer freight trains can negatively impact the timeliness
of passenger trains. In locations where freight and passenger trains
operate on the same tracks, faster passenger trains are often forced to
wait for a freight train to clear because the longer freight train is
unable to fit in to an existing siding. As a result, passenger trains
often suffer long delays while waiting for freight trains to clear.
Recent actions by railroads to demand that local applicants pay annual
maintenance costs for crossing signal units at highway-railroad grade
crossings.
Railroads are statutorily required to inspect and maintain all
signal and railroad crossing devices along their lines. Recently there
have been attempts by some railroads to pass through on-going
maintenance costs to local municipalities when new or upgraded devices
are installed. There have been recent attempts by some railroads to
assess annual maintenance fees to the local applicant, payable to the
railroad in perpetuity, and in some cases, under threat of unilateral
closure. The projects impacted by these actions include crossings which
are:
Upgraded with new signal equipment
Upgraded from a passive crossing to an active one
Opened where one did not previously exist
Altered in such a way that the railroad considers the
crossing project a new crossing
As a result, many projects which would be done to enhance grade
crossing safety, are stalling, or being canceled. In certain
circumstances, project scopes are being revised to eliminate the
upgrading, replacement, or installation of gates and lights so as not
to trigger the maintenance fee requirement. In so doing, aging crossing
equipment will continue to degrade and ultimately malfunction while
sourcing repair and replacement parts becomes more difficult. This
barrier to equipment enhancement compromises the safety of the
traveling public, to include pedestrians, bicyclists, etc. The actions
by some railroads to assign maintenance costs to local applicants has
reversed decades-long cost apportionment practices, as codified in many
state statutes, which placed the maintenance responsibility on the
railroad.
As many crossing projects are tied to Federal Highway
Administration funding via 23 USC Sec. 130, states are beginning to
have difficulty obligating these appropriated funds in a timely manner.
The risk of funds lapsing in any given fiscal year has become a real
impediment to their use. The strict guidelines governing the scoping
and use of Sec. 130 funds make it impossible to expand their
application to other safety priorities, further adding to the challenge
of fund obligation.
The costs for a preliminary engineering (PE) agreement have increased
dramatically.
A PE agreement is necessary for railroad employees and/or
consultants to travel to and survey the location of a potential
crossing project. The railroad representatives participate in
diagnostic meetings to plan for the proposed improvement project. The
PE expense assessed by the railroad is charged to the entity requesting
the project which is often a public entity (state, municipality,
county, etc.). The charges being assessed to municipalities for
preliminary assessments have skyrocketed over the last decade and
appear to be well over the market value for the service being provided.
For example, municipalities that have typically paid $10,000 for a PE
assessment are now being assessed $30,000 to $50,000. Smaller
communities with limited resources pursuing crossing upgrades and
improvements, struggle to obtain the funds necessary to execute a PE
agreement. This often results in delays and sometimes cancellation of
important grade crossing improvement projects.
Conclusion
As members of the ASRSM, we are confronted with these issues daily.
Our organization is comprised of railroad professionals located across
the country from all political persuasions. We bring these issues
forward to the committee because the rules in place for railroading are
created by the Federal Government and most typically state rules and
regulations are preempted. We ask that Congress formulate reasonable
solutions to these critical safety issues, and work with the
Administration to set rules that will effectively address these
problems.
Respectfully,
The Association of State Rail Safety Managers.
Mr. Payne. I would like now to welcome our second panel of
witnesses: Mr. Roy L. Morrison, director of safety, Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way Employes Division, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters; Don Grissom, assistant general
president of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen Division, TCU/
IAM; Mr. Grady Cothen, retired, transportation policy
consultant; Mr. Nathan Bachman, vice president of sales and
business development, Loram Technologies, Incorporated; Ms.
Cindy Sanborn, executive vice president and chief operating
officer, Norfolk Southern Corporation and chair of the
Association of American Railroad's Safety and Operations
Management Committee; and Mr. Jeremy Ferguson, president, Sheet
Metal, Air, Rail, Transportation-Transportation Division.
Thank you, all, for joining us today, and I look forward to
your testimony.
Without objection, our witnesses' full statements will be
included in the record. Since your written testimony has been
made part of the record, the subcommittee requests that you
limit your oral testimony to 5 minutes.
Mr. Morrison, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF ROY L. MORRISON III, DIRECTOR OF SAFETY,
BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE OF WAY EMPLOYES DIVISION,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS; DON GRISSOM, ASSISTANT
GENERAL PRESIDENT, BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY CARMEN DIVISION, TCU/
IAM; GRADY C. COTHEN, Jr., RETIRED, TRANSPORTATION POLICY
CONSULTANT; NATHAN C. BACHMAN, VICE PRESIDENT OF SALES AND
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, LORAM TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; CYNTHIA M.
SANBORN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION, AND CHAIR, SAFETY AND OPERATIONS
MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS; AND
JEREMY FERGUSON, PRESIDENT, SHEET METAL, AIR, RAIL,
TRANSPORTATION-TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
Mr. Morrison. Thank you, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member
Crawford, and members of the subcommittee. I am Roy Morrison,
director of safety for the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employes Division of the Teamsters. BMWED represents more than
30,000 railroad workers who do inspection, construction,
maintenance, and repair of tracks, roadbeds, bridges,
structures, and facilities on railroads. BMWED members have
raised these issues as the most pressing.
Precision Scheduled Railroading has produced historical
record profits and historically low staffing levels in the
railroad industry. Before COVID, employment on Class I's was
cut by over 30,000, and during COVID, employment has been cut
by thousands more. Now, even as traffic has returned, staffing
levels have not. Maintenance-of-way employees are working over
80 to 100 hours a week doing track maintenance in multiple
territories for months on end.
While railroads refuse to fill open positions and continue
furloughs, prior to PSR workforce cuts, BMWED commissioned an
occupational safety and health research study by highly
credentialed medical and academic researchers with expertise on
workplace safety and health. The full study is available on
BMWED's website. But the key finding of our study is that our
members face significantly higher levels of disease and injury
compared to workers in other industries. Severe understaffing
is only making these issues worse.
Additional maintenance-of-way forces and more stable work
schedules would provide some relief. With my written testimony,
I have shared letters from our members about current conditions
where they are pressed to cut corners, defer maintenance, skip
steps, not to work the standards they were trained to and met
prior to PSR. We ask the committee to continue to stay on top
of the issue and take further actions to mitigate damages
caused by PSR.
Starting in 2018, all the Class I railroads began test
programs referred to as automated track inspection, but it is
not new. ATI is just autonomous track geometry measurement
systems, which have been in use since the 1970s and were never
designed for FRA-mandated track inspections. But waivers
submitted to FRA showed the railroads want to cut human track
inspections by up to 80 percent even though there are defects
that machines cannot detect.
What ATI can do is identify track geometry defects, which
make up about 26 percent of the total defects FRA requires to
be inspected for. Taking human track inspectors off the tracks
leave 75 percent of track defects unmonitored. Railroads can
add all the technology they want without safety waivers. The
track geometry systems are already used on Amtrak at the
frequencies the freight railroads have tested. Amtrak doesn't
need safety waivers to do this. No railroad does.
It is vital to the safety of rail employees and the public
that manual in-person inspection frequencies remain at the
current levels mandated by Federal regulation. Recently, the
AAR has complained the FRA is not rubberstamping requests to
reduce human inspections. The AAR is wrong. FRA should
scrutinize these waiver requests and Congress should make it
clear that the FRA has your support.
I wanted to note, BMWED greatly appreciates Administrator
Bose. My testimony is not meant to be critical of him or the
work he is doing at FRA. We are just highlighting several
issues that have gone unresolved across multiple
administrations. BMWED thanks the NTSB for including roadway
worker safety on its agency's 2021-2022 Most Wanted List.
We also ask Congress to elevate 49 CFR 214.329 from
regulation to statute. The regulation requires provisions of
warning equipment such as whistles, air horns, white disks, red
flags, lanterns, or fuses to provide warning of oncoming
trains, but the Class I's just make roadway workers yell over
the noise, and FRA has ignored our request for stricter
enforcement.
The punitive damage standard for retaliation against
whistleblowers is the exact same as the standard to disqualify
railroad managers, but our efforts to get FRA to follow through
have been ignored for years. Failing to penalize managers
encourages retaliatory conduct. We just ask existing
regulations be enforced against bad actors.
Excepted track regulations permit railroads to designate
track as exempt from compliance with minimum safety
requirements. It was meant to provide short-term regulatory
relief 40 years ago, but railroads use it to cut costs and
avoid maintenance.
A 2020 NTSB report said of a worker fatality in Arlington,
Texas, quote, ``contributing to the accident was the
designation of the accident track as excepted track under
current FRA track safety standards, which allowed inadequate
track conditions to exist on track used regularly'' end quote.
Congress should sunset ``excepted track.''
I would like to thank you for your opportunity to raise
these concerns. Thank you.
[Mr. Morrison's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roy L. Morrison III, Director of Safety,
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters
Thank you, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Crawford and members of
the Subcommittee. I am Roy L Morrison III--Director of Safety for the
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (BMWED-IBT). My union represents
more than 30,000 railroad workers who perform inspection, construction,
maintenance, repair, and dismantling of tracks, roadbeds, bridges,
structures, and facilities on railroads throughout the United States,
including the major Class I freight railroads as well as many of the
largest commuter lines in the country. BMWED's membership is comprised
of highly skilled workers who are proud to perform their trade that is
vital to the American rail network and its reliability to the US supply
chain.
As Director of Safety, I am responsible for leading the union's
Safety Department, monitoring and addressing health and safety issues
for BMWED across the country, and serving as the union's primary
staffer engaging with Congress and agencies on legislative and
regulatory issues affecting the health and safety of our members. Prior
to my current role, I was an Internal Organizer on BMWED's
Communication Action Team (CAT) where I interacted with our members
from virtually every railroad across America to stay current on the
issues they experienced on the job. I started my career as a
Maintenance of Way (MOW) employee for 19 years at the Union Pacific
Railroad doing construction, maintenance and repair to the tracks,
structures, and bridges throughout the 14 states in the UP northern
system.
Thank you for giving the BMWED the opportunity to share with you
the safety concerns we see through the eyes of our Members in the rail
industry and the detrimental impact these issues may have on the
American people. Specifically, BMWED is concerned that: (1) current
railroad staffing levels are dangerously low; (2) automated track
inspection technology is an unacceptable substitute for human track
inspections; (3) railroads are providing insufficient protection for
roadway workers from oncoming trains when they are working on or near
active rail lines; (4) railroad managers must be disqualified following
safety sensitive violations; and (5) the ``excepted track'' loophole
that allows railroads to run over substandard tracks must be closed.
(1) Railroads Are Dangerously Understaffed
In 2015, many of the Class I railroads began implementing the
Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR) business model that has turned
the industry upside down. The focus of PSR is to reduce a railroad's
operating ratio, which is the proportion of operating expenses to
operating income. While PSR's across-the-board and ruthless cost-
cutting has produced historically low operating ratios and historical
record profits for the railroads, it also has produced historically low
staffing levels in the industry.
Between 2016 and 2020, before COVID, railroad employment on the
four largest Class I railroads was reduced by over 30,000. In 2016
Class I employment was at 153,000, by 2020 it was at 120,000. The
reductions in forces have continued and by December of 2021, Class I
employment was at 114,499. Even as traffic has returned, the staffing
levels have not. By the end of 2021, carloadings were only 2.6% below
carloadings at the end of 2019; revenue had returned to the levels at
the end of 2019. By December of 2021, a workforce 81% of the size of
the 2019 workforce was responsible for moving 97.4% of 2019
carloadings.
Along with these staffing cuts, railroads have curtailed
inspection, maintenance and repair work on their infrastructure and
equipment, and required a reduced workforce to handle the
responsibilities once handled by a significantly larger workforce. The
railroads have made it difficult to impossible for their employees to
properly perform their tasks that are essential to adequate rail
service. There's simply not enough time to perform the tasks and our
members are spread thin covering impossibly expanded work territories.
MOW employees are working over 100 hours a week to perform track
maintenance on multiple territories for months on end. Roadway workers,
in charge of the safety of the men and women working on track, are
working weeks without a day off while railroads refuse to fill
positions left open due to retirements, and have continued to furlough
MOW workers.
Prior to the massive workforce cuts caused as a direct result of
PSR the BMWED embarked on an Occupational Safety and Health research
project. A Summary Report was authored by a team of highly credentialed
medical and academic researchers with expertise in workplace safety and
health, performing studies both nationally and internationally. The
full research project includes three separate areas of study: (1)
epidemiology, (2) ergonomic and physical hazards, and (3) social and
economic impacts.
This study found significant elevated levels of disease and injury
compared to workers in other industries, accompanied by substantial
negative economic and social impacts.\1\ The increased mental and
physical toll from severe understanding placed on MOW workers only
exacerbate these issues. And many of these issues could be mitigated by
the railroads hiring additional MOW forces and providing more stable
work schedules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The full summary report is available at https://www.bmwe.org/
cms/file/08232018_145843_HSsurveyResults.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cuts to personnel mean the loss of industrial and institutional
knowledge, both of which are critical to the performance of railroading
work and ultimately, the performance of the American railroad system.
Railroading is a highly skilled trade and it takes years to master.
Railroad employers working crews so short staffed makes on the job
training all but impossible. One of the profound impacts we have seen
regarding training of new MOW forces is when seasoned employees retire,
they take a knowledge trust with them without any opportunity to train
the new work force.
In recent years we have seen an unprecedented number of MOW
employees retire early or quit mid-career. Until recently it was almost
unheard of for Maintenance of Way Employees to quit after acquiring a
number of years of seniority because the jobs were always considered
good jobs with good pay and good benefits. But the jobs have been
degraded by the railroads with respect to working conditions and by
pressure to work faster with less coworkers and resources often over
larger service territories, cut corners and ignore or defer repairs. In
a statement submitted to the Surface Transportation Board (STB) for its
multi-day hearing on Urgent Issues in Freight Rail Service (Ex Parte
No. 770), BMWED submitted copies of letters and statements from MOW
employees describing how the jobs have been degraded and working
conditions have deteriorated since the implementation of PSR. I am
including copies of these letters as Exhibit A accompanying my
testimony so that the Committee can hear directly from our members
about how they can't continue to perform the work in good conscience
under current conditions where they are pressured to cut corners/defer
maintenance/skip steps/not work to the standards they were trained to
and met through their careers until more recent years with the adoption
of PSR.
Chairman Payne, BMWED thanks you and Chairman DeFazio for
requesting that the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) examine
the impacts that the implementation of PSR by Class I railroads is
having on workers and safety.\2\ We also thank you for holding hearings
in March \3\ and May \4\ of this year where rail labor and the Chairman
of the STB have been able to testify about PSR. Staffing levels must be
restored and the policies designed to ruthlessly cut corners that are
driving good people from the industry must be ended. We ask that the
Committee continue to stay on top of this issue and take further action
to mitigate the damage caused by this cost-cutting value extraction
business model called ``PSR''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-
defazio-and-payne-jr-request-gao-study-on-the-impacts-of-precision-
scheduled-railroading-on-workers-safety-and-shippers.
\3\ https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-
defazio-payne-jr-statements-from-hearing-to-discuss-the-surface-
transportation-board-reauthorizations-role-in-improving-rail-service-
in-the-us.
\4\ https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairs-
defazio-payne-jr-statements-from-hearing-on-the-surface-transportation-
boards-role-in-resolving-freight-rail-conflicts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Automated Track Inspection Is Not a Substitute for Manual-Visual
Inspection Done by Trained Track Inspectors
Starting in 2018 all of the Class I railroads embarked on various
test programs they refer to as Automated Track Inspection systems
(ATI). In testimony before this Committee last year, the President and
CEO of the Association of American Railroads (AAR) complained that the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is not automatically approving
waivers of track inspection safety rules that set the required
frequency of human track inspections. That's wrong. The FRA is
absolutely right to scrutinize these waiver requests. And Congress
should make it clear that FRA has your support.
Although ATI sounds new and ``cutting edge'' the fact is that all
the tests approved by FRA exclusively rely on Autonomous Track Geometry
Measurement Systems (ATGMS). That just means the railroads are using
track geometry systems which have been in use on the railroads since
the 1970's. These track geometry systems were never designed to
complete FRA mandated track inspections. What those track geometry
systems can do is identify track geometry defects--which make up about
26% of the total defects that FRA requires to be inspected. A full list
of the defects is available at 49 CFR Sec. 213 sub part B-E.
Railroads are trying to replace human visual track inspectors who
have the ability to identify 100% of these defects (as well as a number
of non-regulatory defects) with a technology that only has the ability
to identify approximately 26% of them. Taking human track inspectors
off the tracks leaves almost 75% of track defects unmonitored and puts
us all at risk. Additionally, human track inspectors are required to
make ``immediate remediation'' of the defects they find on--which help
keep the trains moving with less disruption. The machines cannot do
that.
Rail labor supports the expanded use of these track geometry
systems to assist experienced human track inspection professionals, but
the waivers submitted to FRA indicate that the railroads want to cut
human track inspections by up to 80% below current levels while sorting
out whether the new technology actually works for defects it does
check, and even though there are defects the machines cannot detect.
Claims that the FRA or rail labor is preventing greater deployment of
these machines is simply false.
Railroads can add all the new technology they want without FRA
safety waivers. They could run the systems every day if they chose to.
On Amtrak's class 6-8 tracks, track geometry systems are already used
at the same frequencies the railroads want without FRA safety waivers.
But Amtrak is adhering to the existing required schedule for human
track inspections. Taking human track inspectors off the track and
replacing them with track geometry systems that are not even designed
to evaluate all the defects assessed by inspectors puts lives at risk.
It is vital to the safety of rail employees and the public that
manual in-person inspection frequencies remain at their current
mandated levels by the federal government. And Congress must not let
the railroads get away with trying to bully FRA into rubber stamping
safety waivers to get around the established safety minimum human
visual inspections frequencies.
(3) Roadway Worker Protections
BMWED would like to commend the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) for including recommendations to improve protections for
roadway worker safety on the agency's 2021-2022 ``Most Wanted List'' of
recommendations to save lives.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ https://www.ntsb.gov/Advocacy/mwl/Pages/mwl-21-22/mwl-rph-
02.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An additional measure to protect BMWED's roadway worker members
would be to simply enforce existing FRA regulations for safety
equipment to provide warnings of oncoming trains. Because FRA has had
years to enforce this minimum standard for roadway worker safety and
failed to do so, Congress should elevate this requirement from
regulation to statute.
Railroad watchmen/lookouts for roadway workers protect their co-
workers from oncoming trains when they are working on or near active
rail lines. Current regulations (49 CFR Sec. 214.329) require provision
of warning equipment to watchmen/lookouts such as whistles, air horns,
white disks, red flags, lanterns, or fuses. The equipment required by
this regulation is clearly defined and is essential to roadway worker
protection for employees working on or near active rail lines, but
railroads frequently fail to provide it. In fact, BMWED investigated
practices currently in place on all the Class 1 Railroad properties and
discovered that only Amtrak is currently in compliance with the
equipment regulations for FRA train approach warnings provided by
watchmen/ lookouts.
Still, FRA has not enforced the requirement. Instead, the freight
railroads encourage use of ``verbal'' warnings (i.e., yelling), rather
than use of the equipment mandated by the regulation. This is despite
the continuing occurrence of roadway worker fatalities where unequipped
watchman/lookouts were a primary or contributing factor (La Mirada, CA
5/7/08, Sunshine, AZ 1/23/2009, Minneapolis, MN 5/25/15, Edgemont, SD
1/17/17, and Estill, SC 11/30/18). Just getting the proper warning
equipment is a simple solution that will save lives.
Again, given FRA's failure to enforce this minimum standard for
roadway worker safety, BMWED asks Congress to elevate this requirement
from regulation to statute.
(4) Railroad Managers Must Be Disqualified Following Safety Sensitive
Violations
For years, BMWED has been raising the issue that FRA must take
action to disqualify railroad managers who have been found by a federal
court or administrative body to have willfully and intentionally
retaliated against a railroad employee whistleblower for reporting
safety issues. BMWED's efforts to get FRA to enforce existing
regulations have been ignored.
In 2012, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
issued a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to address non-enforcement of
FRA's regulations contained in 49 CFR Part II, Sec. 209.303 and Sec.
225.33.\6\ In 2016, BMWED submitted a FOIA request to FRA with a list
of ten whistleblower protection (49 USC Sec. 20109) cases in which
OSHA, Administrative Law Judges, DOL's Administrative Review Board,
and/or federal courts held that railroads, whose managers willfully and
intentionally retaliated against their workers, were punished by
imposition of punitive damages.\7\ The list from FRA identified each
offending railroad manager and summarized the details of the offensive
acts and intentionality of those acts. Even though the Sec. 20109
findings in all ten cases fully satisfied the FRA's presumption of
guilt sustaining manager disqualification under 49 CFR Sec. 209.329(a),
FRA never initiated and completed any proceedings to establish
potential violation of the provisions of Sec. 209.303 and/or Internal
Control Plan (ICP) requirements in any of these ten cases (or any
others).\8\ The FRA continued its policy of not enforcing these
regulations after the information from the FOIA request was revealed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Memorandum of Agreement Between the Federal Railroad
Administration U.S. Department of Transportation and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration U.S. Department of Labor on July 16,
2012.
\7\ The FRSA's Sec. 20109 punitive damage standard is virtually
identical to FRA's standard for disqualification of railroad managers
for violation of safety-sensitive regulations. Reference to Sec. 20109
punitive damage findings provide a compass course of clarity for FRA
enforcement of Sec. 209.303.
\8\ As in earlier years, the FRA's Annual Enforcement Reports for
FY 2019 and 2020 reveal no rail managers were disqualified or subjected
to a hearing. FRA's public databases do not appear to provide
information concerning violations of ICPs for retaliatory management
behavior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BMWED has raised these issues with FRA multiple times--including in
2018 and 2021. Failing to properly penalize these managers encourages
retaliatory conduct. It leads to a culture of impunity that makes the
railroads less safe. All that is required to address this is for FRA to
simply enforce existing regulations to disqualify these railroad
managers who have been found to have willfully and intentionally
retaliated against a railroad employee whistleblower for reporting
safety issues.
(5) The ``Excepted Track'' Loophole That Allows Railroads To Run Over
Substandard Tracks Must Be Closed
Excepted track regulation permits railroads to designate track as
effectively exempt from compliance with minimum safety requirements for
roadbed, track geometry and track structure. This was meant to be a
short-term solution to help railroads that were suffering 40 years ago.
There is no excuse for its continued existence.
The ``excepted track'' regulatory loophole was added to FRA
regulations in 1982 to provide regulatory relief following a series of
railroad industry bankruptcies in the 1970s. When adopted, FRA believed
that the designated tracks would be located in yards or otherwise on
comparatively level terrain in areas where the likelihood was remote
that a derailment would endanger a train crew or the general public.
Further, it was anticipated that the Excepted Track rules would be
applied for limited periods of operation over track maintained at less
than the established minimum safety standards, scheduled for
abandonment or later improvement. But railroads have applied the
Excepted Track regulation far more extensively.
In 1997, some minor changes were added to 49 CFR Sec. 213.4. Some
of the additions were an attempt to close loopholes in the regulations,
but the entire concept of excepted track is an unacceptable safety
loophole. Even after the 1997 changes, current rules are used by rail
carriers to designate track as excepted in order to avoid track
maintenance and encourage tolerance of dangerous track conditions, even
on trackage producing revenue adequate to support track maintenance.
As a recent example of the severity of the issue, in a September
2020 Railroad Accident Brief issued by the NTSB following a 2017
derailment in Arlington, Texas that resulted in a railroad worker
fatality, the NTSB wrote ``[b]ecause of the excepted track designation,
conditions were present at the POD [point of derailment] that otherwise
would not be permitted if the track was designated as Class 1 or
higher'' and ``[c]ontributing to the accident was the designation of
the accident track as excepted track under the current FRA Track Safety
Standards, which allowed inadequate track conditions to exist on track
used regularly.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
RAB2002.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no excuse for why a short-term solution from 40 years ago
that was designed to help railroads that were dealing with a series of
bankruptcies should continue to exist. The ``excepted track'' loophole
should be sunset. Carriers should only be allowed to designate sections
of track as ``Excepted'' for a limited period of time (no more than 5
years). After expiration of such time, track should be brought into
compliance with FRA Class I track standards.
Again, on behalf of the more than 30,000 members of BMWED, thank
you for the opportunity to raise these concerns about health and safety
issues in the railroad industry today.
Exhibit A
[Exhibit A is retained in committee files and is available online
at: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW14/20220614/114882/HHRG-117-
PW14-Wstate-MorrisonR-20220614-SD001.pdf ]
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Next we will have Mr. Grissom for 5 minutes.
Mr. Grissom. Chairman Payne, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking
Member Crawford, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on the important issue of
freight rail safety. My name is Don Grissom, and I am a 41-year
railroader currently serving as the assistant general president
of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, a division of the
Transportation Communications Union, or TCU/IAM.
Our members inspect, maintain, and repair railcars on our
Nation's railways. I am here today to speak about the
difficulty of the carman craft and how recent changes to the
railroad business model has increased pressure from management
and have created a disaster waiting to happen.
First, let me emphasize that these carmen jobs are skilled
positions. Upon hiring, a carman apprentice spends 732 working
days, six different 122-day phases to become a journeyman.
During this time, a carman becomes highly skilled at inspecting
and repairing railcars.
And, while freight cars may appear simple, the mechanics of
a freight car is quite complex. It includes airbrake systems,
brake assemblies, wheels, draft gears, yokes, couplers,
handholds, and other safety appliances, all of which is
required to be in working order per Federal regulation for a
train to operate safely.
Like other crafts, carmen have been cut to the bone in the
PSR era. We have lost anywhere from 15 to 30 percent of our
craft, depending on the railroad. And, since PSR, it amounts to
doing less with less or moving fewer carloads with fewer
employees. And the effect on the carmen is one of the
consistent and sustainable pressure on employees, pressure not
to inspect or repair railcars, pressure to turn a blind eye to
AAR and FRA defects, pressure to work so much forced overtime
that your body becomes dangerously fatigued. This is the life
of a carman in the PSR era. It is the only career I am aware of
where they train you to do a job and they fire you when you do
it.
Please remember, one defective railcar can derail an entire
train. Since each car has up to 90 inspection points per car
per side, or 180 in total, carmen were allowed around 3 minutes
per car on inspection. That is until the PSR era. Today, in
most locations, on all the Class I's, carmen only allowed 1
minute for inspection, and I provided evidence in my written
statement. As a result, cars often go uninspected. Even if they
are found defective, if the car will still roll down the track,
management tells them to send it out regardless of whether the
brake system or other critical components are in working order.
All of this is due to the pressure that applies to the
local management and workers to do whatever it takes to get the
train out. In August of 2021, the FRA performed a safety audit
on the UP. Unfortunately, we heard reports that local
management was given a heads-up so they could sweep all the
defects under the rug, and the FRA still found defective cars.
We also encourage the FRA to pay special attention to yards
where carmen have been fully removed from the property. A list
of those yards is included in my written statement.
Finally, some attention has been paid to railroad workers
on fatigue issues in the industry, but not enough. As noted
today, carmen are being forced to work overtime consistently.
Many reports of forced overtime include 16-hour shifts, 5 to 6
days in a row. Many of our members sleep in their cars between
the shift so they can get an extra hour or 2 hours of rest
instead of wasting time commuting home and back. This is not a
healthy environment.
A wise colleague of mine said to me: The railroads are
burning the candle at both ends. They are burning their
customers on one and burning out their employees on the other.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.
[Mr. Grissom's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Don Grissom, Assistant General President,
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen Division, TCU/IAM
Chairman Payne, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Crawford, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on the important issue of Freight Rail Safety.
My name is Don Grissom, and I currently serve as Assistant General
President of the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, a division of the
Transportation Communications Union, or TCU/IAM.
The Carmen Division represents employees on the railroads that
inspect, maintain, and repair rail cars, all across the country, at
every Class 1 railroad, Amtrak, commuter railroads, and some short
lines.
I have 41 years of railroad experience, having begun my career in
1981 on the C&O Railroad in Grand Rapids, MI, and later at CSX out of
Richmond, VA. I have attended NTSB classes in Northern Virginia, and
have participated in derailment and rail fatality accident
investigations. Since 2011, I have served by appointment of the
Secretary of Transportation to the Rail Safety Advisory Committee, or
RSAC.
I'm here today to speak about the difficulties of the Carman craft
and how recent changes to the railroad business model and increased
pressures from management have created a ticking time bomb on our
nation's rails.
Rail cars are both simple and complex. Their simplicity and
uniformity in design allows cars to be interchanged universally between
railroads, aiding in the free flow of freight commerce across America.
That said, the mechanics of freight cars are complex, and include
airbrake systems, brake assemblies, wheels, draft gears, yokes,
couplers, handholds and other safety appliances, as well as many other
components that are all required to be in working order--per federal
regulations--for a train to operate safely.
Upon hiring, a Carman Apprentice spends 732 working days (6
different 122-day phases) to become a Journeyman. During this time, a
Carman becomes highly skilled at inspecting and repairing rail cars.
Importantly, Carmen acquire many skillsets on the job that can be
utilized outside the industry, such as metal-working, welding, and
fabrication.
PSR Era
Like other crafts, Carmen have been cut to the bone in the PSR era.
Depending on the carrier, we've lost anywhere from 15-30% of our craft.
This alone wouldn't necessarily impact safety if rail car loads had
been cut by the similar ratios, but that isn't the case. Rail traffic
has largely stayed the same or declined only slightly. And, as many in
the rail industry say--at least those outside of Class 1 C-Suites--PSR
amounts to doing ``less with less''--or moving fewer car loads with
drastically fewer employees.
The net effect on Carmen is one of constant and sustained pressure
on employees. Pressure not to inspect or repair rail cars. Pressure to
turn a blind eye to AAR and FRA defects. Pressure to work so much
forced overtime that your body becomes dangerously fatigued.
All of this pressure is dictated by corporate leadership and
executed by regional or local management. Even when local managers know
what they're doing to their employees is wrong or unsafe (since they
came off the crafts themselves), they're forced to make our members'
lives miserable under penalty of their own termination.
That is the life of a Carman in the PSR era. It's the only career
I'm aware of where they train you to do a job, then fire you for doing
it.
1 Minute Per Car
As mentioned above, a freight rail car--while seemingly simple--is
a complex piece of equipment. And since one defective car can derail an
entire train, it's important to make sure every FRA-required component
has been inspected to be in working order. Each rail car has up to 90
inspection points, per car, per side (up to 180 in total). That's why,
for most of my career, Carmen were permitted around 3 minutes per car
on predeparture inspections.
That is, until the PSR era.
Today, in most locations, on all the Class 1s, Carmen are only
allowed 1 minute for predeparture inspections. Carmen used to get
underneath cars to perform physical touch inspections of components,
but now they only get a brief visual inspection. And it's not just our
craft either. Machinists--those that inspect and maintain locomotives--
have been given similar time reductions as well, not to mention the
operating crews' strict time constraints, as other unions can attest.
A 12-year Carman on Union Pacific recently detailed the issue to
me: ``On a 150 car train, we're only allowed 2.5 hours maximum to
perform inspections. However, when the FRA is on the property, that
rule changes to 4 hours and they give us four Carmen to do it. But as
soon as the FRA leaves, it's back to business as usual.''
Why do this? Simple: profits.
At the yard this Union Pacific Carman hails from they had 74 Carmen
on duty in 2018. Now, they have 24. Fewer people not only costs the
railroads less, but the implied and direct pressure on the remaining
Carmen--and all rank-and-file railroaders--is that if you don't do the
job as instructed, you're gone.
I have attached written proof of the one-minute per car policy
mandated by the railroads today, including:
A memo to Car Foremen at Union Pacific's Proviso Yard in
Chicago, IL.
A time claim at CSX where they first admitted their
policy in writing.
Safety metrics from Norfolk Southern showing ``Man
Minutes Per Car'' (MMPC), allowing 1.1 minutes per car on inbound
trains, and 1.7 minutes per car on outbound trains.
Pressure NOT to Shop Cars
As a result, cars often go uninspected. And even if they are
inspected, if the car will still roll down the track, they send it out,
regardless of whether brake systems or other critical components are
defective.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Screenshot from pre-PSR CSX Carman Training Video, which specifically
emphasizes that all rail cars must have operational brakes. Source:
``CSX Train Air Brake Test'', SafeRailroading Youtube Channel, April
30, 2013. https://youtu.be/3lSOh-ES-o8
All of this is due to the pressures applied to local management and
workers to do whatever it takes to get the train out the door. Terminal
dwell is a key metric by which C-Suite executives are scrutinizing
managers, so any increase in dwell time places their jobs at risk,
which forces them to work our members to the bone.
At one CSX shop, the railroad utilizes a ``traffic light'' system
to alert Carmen (and others) as to how much work the repair shop has
backing up. Green means ``go ahead and send Bad Orders to the shop,''
Yellow means ``We're getting full in the shop,'' and Red means ``Do NOT
send any more Bad Orders to the Shop.''
CSX ``traffic light'' system used to pressure Carmen NOT to find bad
order (aka defective) rail cars
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
After the FRA issued concerns about the traffic light system, CSX
simply moved the system to a virtual database. The pressures to local
managers and shop craft employees remains.
While CSX maintains that it's simply a visual tracking system for
repair work, in practice the system is used to pressure and intimidate
employees NOT to do their job, which is to inspect and ``cut out''
defective rail cars. For obvious reasons, this system is inherently
problematic as it runs counter to safety.
Unfortunately, this system also exists virtually at every yard, and
metrics are specifically focused on the amounts of Bad Orders as well
as dwell times.
UP Safety Audit--August, 2021
From August 1st through August 14th, 2021, the FRA audited a few
Union Pacific rail yards. According to the report, the FRA only saw a
defect ratio of 3.3% of rail cars. Let me tell you why that's
inaccurate or incomplete.
First, our members report that the FRA Safety Management Team (SMT)
6, which covers UP and KCS, communicated to Union Pacific ahead of time
what yards they would be inspecting, allowing the company to prepare
and get equipment up to code while also escorting inspectors around
pre-selected sections of the yard--and they still found defects.
Furthermore, our members reported that the FRA often wouldn't go to the
main yards, but rather only the side or satellite yards, and they
rarely--if ever--bothered to talk to our Carmen on duty. One would
think if the FRA field inspectors are interested in mechanical safety,
they would spend time talking to the folks on the ground that inspect
for safety compliance.
Second, to our knowledge, the FRA did not audit any of the yards
where Carmen have been fully removed from service and replaced with
``Utility workers,'' a somewhat flex position that is not a qualified
mechanical inspector, nor can they perform repairs. There are several
yards that currently have either no Carmen or only a single Carman
assigned to inspect. These yards include:
Kansas City, KS, 18th Street Yard--Removed 20 Carmen.
Having Utility positions perform inspections. Carmen only sent to make
repairs flagged by Utility or FRA.
Herrington, KS--Removed 13 Carmen. Having Utility
positions perform inspections. A ``Travelling Carman'' is dispatched
from Wichita, KS if a repair is flagged.
Wichita, KS--Removed 12 Carmen. Switchmen now performing
inspections. Two ``Travelling Carmen'' make repairs if any are found.
St. Louis, MO--Removed 8 Carmen. Traincrews are
performing all inspections in this yard.
Dallas, TX, Miller Yard--Removed 14 Carmen. Traincrews
and Utility are doing all inspections.
Arlington, TX--Removed 3 Carmen. Traincrews and Utility
are doing all inspections.
Texarkana, TX--Removed 5 Carmen. Traincrews and Utility
are doing all inspections.
Spring, TX, Lloyd/Spring Yard--Removed 4 Carmen.
Traincrews and Utility are doing all inspections.
Beaumont, TX--Removed 12 Carmen. Replaced with 4 Utility
men to do all inspections.
Angleton, TX, Angleton Yard--Removed 6 Carmen. Replaced
with 4 Utility men to do all inspections.
Lake Charles, LA--Removed 2 Carmen. Replaced with 2
Utility men to do all inspections.
Shreveport, LA--Removed 12 Carmen. Replaced with unknown
number of Utility men to do all inspections.
La Porte, TX, Strang Yard--Removed 5 Carmen. Replaced
with unknown number of Utility men to do all inspections.
El Paso, TX, Alfalfa Yard--Removed 17 Carmen (sent only 2
to Santa Teresa yard). Replaced with unknown number of Utility men to
do all inspections.
Pueblo, CO--Removed 2 Carmen. Train crews are now
performing all inspections.
Cheyenne, WY--Removed 8 Carmen. Only 3 left on the
property.
We have asked the FRA Safety Management Team--6 (SMT) to inspect
these yards in particular, and to do so without tipping off Union
Pacific management. It is THESE yards where inspections, both inbound
and outbound, are either not being performed at all or are not being
done in full compliance with FRA regulations.
Fatigue Issues
Finally, some attention has been paid to railroad workers on
fatigue issues in the industry, but not enough. And rarely are studies
aimed at Carmen or other shop crafts. As noted, in the PSR era, Carmen
are being forced into overtime constantly. Many report forced overtime
to include 16 hour shifts, 5-6 days in a row. Many of our members sleep
in their cars between shifts so they can get an extra hour or two of
rest, instead of wasting time commuting home and back.
This is NOT a healthy working environment.
Workplace fatigue is generally considered a workplace hazard, as
countless studies have shown, from both public (i.e. OSHA) and private
studies. The risk for a railroad employee is further compounded by the
nature of the work our members perform. Trains are incredibly heavy,
unstoppable objects, and everything in a rail yard ``hurts.''
Therefore, over the years regulations have placed emphasis on practices
and policies to reduce those risks as much as possible. That's why we
have blue flag protections, as well as strict training to perform job
tasks in a safe, effective manner.
Unfortunately, a lot of those practices and policies get thrown out
the window in the PSR era. And not necessarily by intention. Management
isn't telling our members to perform tasks in unsafe manners. They're
too smart to do that. But they don't have to, because it's all implied.
The pressures on managers to reduce dwell times places further
pressures on our members to cut corners not just on inspections, but on
their own safety. I routinely hear from my Local Chairmen that they
don't believe the pace that our members are being asked to work is
safe, both for the trains and the members themselves.
These kinds of issues are hard to quantify. But in the interest of
preventing the loss of another Carman's life or limb, I strongly urge
the FRA and Congress to study and adopt policies that cover the whole
health of shop and yard craft employees.
The issues raised today are all derived from the pressure placed on
railroads to adopt these so-called ``Precision Scheduled Railroading''
practices. These pressures to cut headcounts and reduce dwell times run
contrary to how our members were trained to ensure that trains on our
nation's railroads are safe. It is truly a sad time in the rail
industry.
When I began my career in 1981, we were at the beginning of the
Staggers Act era, when railroads were having a tough time turning a
profit, and our rolling stock and infrastructure was in deep disrepair.
For the following 35 years, we--the working men and women of the rail
industry--have turned things around to make the railroads profitable
enterprises.
Approximately 6 years ago, PSR began spreading throughout the
industry like a virus, once the leeches on Wall Street realized there
was a profit to be made by extracting wealth out of the industry.
Today, we have 45,000 (29%) fewer employees in the rail industry--and
the cuts to the Carman craft are a significant portion. But in order to
keep up with service demands, the much fewer Carmen throughout the
industry are asked to do much much more.
As my colleague Matt Hollis stated before the Surface
Transportation Board a few weeks ago: the relative quality of job is
now gone. What were once considered highly-desired and competitive
careers have been transformed into what you're seeing today: a labor
shortage where the job is so unappealing that our members are either
refusing recall or outright resigning their positions. This is NOT
normal, nor is it sustainable.
A wise colleague of mine said to me: ``the railroads are burning
the candle at both ends--burning their customers one, and burning out
their employees on the other.''
I believe that to be true.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
Attachments
[The attachments referenced in Mr. Grissom's prepared statement are
retained in committee files and are available online at:
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW14/20220614/114882/HHRG-117-PW14-
Wstate-GrissomD-20220614-SD001.pdf ]
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Next we have Mr. Cothen.
Mr. Cothen. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss railroad safety. I am
here as an individual having retired from FRA in 2010 after a
total of 36 years in the agency, two decades of which were as a
senior executive working on railroad safety policy issues and
including a stint as Associate Administrator for Safety. I
concluded my term as Deputy Associate Administrator for Safety
Standards.
My prepared statement provides some detail, but let me make
three points very directly focusing for today on the management
of in-train forces. You heard Administrator Bose refer to that
and Mr. Chapman refer to that.
First, the immense progress that the railroads had made in
safety over the past few decades has stalled out. Further
progress has been arrested by the railroad's commitment to one
form or another of so-called Precision Scheduled Railroading.
One of the features of PSRs implemented has been the use of
very heavy and long trains often marshaled without adherence to
train makeup principles based on research and experience.
Technology has sometimes been underutilized; at other times,
technology has been applied beyond its demonstrated capacity.
The result has been a succession of embarrassing and
dangerous accidents that need not have occurred. These are
often characterized as human factor accidents with the
implication that an employee has just made mistakes. But for
the most part, they are organizational accidents driven by
management decisions. Other accidents involving management of
in-train forces are being reported as equipment related, but
many equipment failures have resulted from excessive draft and
buff forces in poorly assembled trains.
Second, the problem will not solve itself. Investors are
demanding huge payouts in the form of stock buybacks and
dividends. PSR is designed to deliver cash to the bottom line.
The Congress and FRA need to place countervailing pressure on
the railroads through tough but flexible safety regulations.
Very likely, FRA cannot do it alone, given the propensity of
industry to seek shelter or just endless delay in the
excruciating regulatory process and the increasingly business-
friendly Federal courts. Congress needs to provide direction.
Third, it is important for us to raise our eyes above the
current morass and consider the future of rail technology.
Today's braking technology was conceived in the 1870s, and it
still has inherent limitations. We need electronically
controlled pneumatic brakes. ECP brakes were developed by the
AAR and suppliers in the 1990s. They were authorized for use in
selected revenue service under waivers that I signed, and then
they were authorized and incentivized by regulations that we
issued in 2007.
At that point, the momentum died. When FRA and PHMSA tried
to apply ECP brakes to high-hazard unit trains, the railroads
fought it, even though most of the costs would have been paid
by shippers and most of the benefits would have flowed to the
railroads. We need a legislative mandate for FRA to move
forward with the phased implementation of ECP brakes. The
railroads will not protect their own future so long as the goal
is short-term profitability.
This is the fact: When lavish returns on investment will
not be realized within the tenure of current railroad
managements, investment will be deferred. Positive Train
Control took a legislative mandate and 35 years to get done. In
the case of ECP brakes, progress has already been deferred for
over two decades.
Mr. Chairman, to provide a better explanation of this
complex topic, I have provided the committee, in addition to my
prepared statement, my white paper on management of in-train
forces, which is now in its third revision. It could also be
found at the Railway Age website. I look forward to any
questions the subcommittee may have. Thank you.
[Mr. Cothen's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Grady C. Cothen, Jr., Retired, Transportation
Policy Consultant
Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Crawford, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking
Member Graves, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you to discuss an important safety issue:
management of in-train forces. I am here as an individual, not in a
representative capacity. I have maintained a strong interest in
transportation safety after a career of 36 years at the Federal
Railroad Administration and additional work, following retirement from
Federal service, for a passenger railroad and a major transit
authority. Since 2016, I have been fully retired, although I remain a
member of the District of Columbia Bar and several professional
associations.
When we speak of managing in-train forces, we mean at least two
things. The first is proper control of the train as a whole, ensuring
that it will not exceed the permitted speed, that it can stop when and
where it needs to stop, and that it will not roll away uncontrolled.
The second is control of tensile (draft) and compressive (buff) forces
within the train as it gains momentum, is slowed by braking effort, and
gathers up or distributes ``slack'' among the locomotives and cars. If
draft and buff forces are not properly controlled, excessive lateral
over vertical forces can be translated to the wheel/rail interface,
resulting in wheel lift or rail rollover. Significant damage can also
be done to car components, often resulting in a train separation and an
emergency brake application leading to a derailment.
The challenge of managing in-train forces has been with us
throughout the history of railroads. From the advent of ``automatic''
train air brakes in the 1870's, to joint government and industry
research on track/train dynamics in the 1970's, to the adoption of
mandatory two-way end-of-train telemetry as a replacement for the
caboose in the 1990s, and to the more widespread use of distributed
power locomotives, this is a field that has benefitted from enhanced
knowledge and improved technology.
Still, when FRA reported to this Committee in 2005\1\, railroads
continued to report train accidents related to train make-up and train
handling. That pattern continues to the present date. There is good
reason why the pattern should be disrupted. FRA research has developed
and validated a computer model (``TEDS'' \2\) which, like its industry
counterpart (``TOES'' \3\) is capable of evaluating management of in-
train forces for purposes of accident investigation and accident
prevention. Thus, it would seem to be time for FRA to take a more
active role in overseeing this area of railroad safety, quite apart
from the other developments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Safe Placement of Train Cars: Report to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure (FRA June 2005).
\2\ Train Energy and Dynamics Simulator
\3\ Train Operations and Energy Simulator
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What are the other developments? Driven by investor demands, major
railroads have plunged head-long into one or more versions of so-called
``Precision Scheduled Railroading'' or PSR. This is an operating
philosophy that has produced neither precision nor scheduled
operations. It has succeeded handsomely in driving cash to the bottom
line, facilitating massive distributions through stock buy-backs and
dividends.
We all want our freight railroads to be profitable--none more than
my generation of FRA personnel. As colleagues under successive
Administrations, we helped the industry through the Northeast rail
reorganizations, the bankruptcy of Midwest carriers, economic
deregulation through the Staggers Rail Act, and the return of Conrail
to the private sector, among many misalignments in the track structure
along the way.
Profitability is a critical element of success, particularly for an
industry that is both capital and labor intensive and needs to generate
its capital from operations. But corporate responsibility requires
consideration of employees, customers, and affected communities, as
well as investors.
The first obligation of the railroad is to operate safely, and as a
former safety enforcement attorney and regulator I'm delighted that we
have seen immense progress over the last several decades. However, this
testimony addresses an area in which major railroads have regressed and
need to do a better job.
What is the problem? Perhaps, the simplest way of explaining this
is first to call out the types of accidents under discussion. In broad
summary, they are events involving one or more of the following:
Trains that are poorly marshalled because of the improper
placement of blocks of loaded cars, empty cars, long and short cars, or
cars presenting special problems (mostly cars with end of train
cushioning devices).
Trains that lack adequate means of control because of the
locomotives assigned and their placement in the train.
Trains for which the train air brake line is too long
(between assigned locomotives) to function as intended.
Trains marshalled with the expectation that locomotives
distributed within the train will remain in communication with the
controlling locomotive in the front but without sufficient means of
relaying electronic commands. (This can happen because communications
are blocked by terrain and other local conditions or simply because the
train is too long.)
Trains required by management to be controlled by energy
saving on-board systems, when the systems are not adequate to the job
given train make-up or route conditions.
These types of problems arise much more frequently under PSR
operations because this type of operating plan calls for--
Power assigned to each train to be minimally adequate
Pre-blocking to destination of rail cars regardless of
the impact on train make-up of large blocks picked up along the route
of travel
Aggregation of car types that formerly would be in trains
of uniform profile (intermodal trains, unit trains) into very long and
heavy manifest trains, and
Minimum staffing in yards and terminals, and reduced
numbers of crews handling local switching. This results in the
requirement for road crews to handle over-the-road challenges and also
perform local switching involving drafts of cars much longer and
heavier than previously would have been the case.
So, how are they doing with this traditional mix of potential
problems and brand-new problematic practices? The cleanest way to look
at this is to examine Class 1 railroad train accident performance.
Since the late 1970s, Class 1 railroads have gotten better and better,
decade after decade, until the current period. For now, however, they
have hit a plateau:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 1_Class 1 railroads, rate for all derailments (yard, siding,
main line, etc.)
Figure 1 focuses on derailments, for all causes and on all types of
tracks. There is a point of potential contention here because we use
the rate ``per million train miles.'' This rate has traditionally been
used as the appropriate measure of safety by the industry and FRA. It
is fair to say that with fewer trains the rate might rise. But it is
not as easy to say what another normalizing statistic should be. As the
graph shows, Class 1 railroads are hardly knocking it out of the park
when it comes to freight car miles or ton-miles of transportation
service. The markets railroads serve are growing much faster than
railroad car loadings or intermodal units transported (but that is for
another testimony). To be fair, the decline of coal as a fuel has also
cut drastically into ton miles.
If we stick with Class 1 railroads and consider only the raw
counts, and only for main line derailments, Figure 2 shows what the
picture looks like:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 2_Derailments, main line only (Class 1)
Figure 2 illustrates the lack of progress in derailment prevention
during the PSR era, which began among the major railroads in the United
States in mid-decade. But how can this be? Aren't we making big
progress in automated track inspections, more frequent internal rail
flaw testing, better wayside detectors and much improved use of the
data from these systems? In general, we would say ``yes.'' Figure 3
provides some insight:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Figure 3_Derailments by cause (Class 1 main line)
FRA accident reporting breaks up the various ``cause codes'' into
``buckets,'' and historically track/structure causes were most
numerous. Note the steady decline in derailments related to track and
structures. However, these declines have been offset by a steady rise
in so-called ``human factor'' accidents and the persistence of
equipment-caused accidents. The latter is surprising, given the
widespread deployment of wheel temperature and bearing detectors, flat
wheel detectors, and other technology (and the advent of ``big data''
used to trend individual cars in service to permit early intervention).
How, then, does this relate to management of in-train forces? Based
on Federal accident investigations and my own review of the data,
derailments caused by poor management of in-train forces are being
reported primarily under ``human factor'' codes. This categorization
fits the reporting system, which was established with heavy industry
input and is managed by FRA.
However, it is important to know the ``human factors'' include
organizational failures (e.g., train make-up, pushing technology
farther than it is ready to go) as well as individual mistakes.
Further, even events reported as individual mistakes may grow out of
organizational failures (e.g., dispatching a train that has little
chance of making it safely over the railroad). My own assessment, after
review of multiple years of raw train accident records, is that
organizational factors (management decisions related to PSR) are behind
this lackluster performance.
From the review, it is also evident that mechanical (equipment)
codes get applied to derailments caused by improper management of in-
train forces, sometimes questionably (e.g., when a coupler fails
without prior crack) and sometimes because the equipment code is the
only one available (e.g., when communication fails among locomotives in
the very long train).
Miscellaneous codes appear in the relevant data, as well, including
my personal favorite, ``M599--Other miscellaneous causes.'' That code
was applied to a derailment that was determined both by FRA and by the
railroad's own modeling to have been caused by train make-up. But the
cause code was never updated. (This is only one of many errors evident
in the filed accident reports.)
What can we do about it right now? Preventing each and every
accident involving management of in-train forces is not a goal within
our grasp given present technology and knowledge. However, the industry
can do much better today from the point of view of safety, and provide
much better service to its customers by using common sense. The
industry should--
Utilize the knowledge and experience that has been
reduced to train make-up rules on every railroad. Follow your own
rules, and update them promptly.
Don't rely on technology that is not ready (e.g., using
automated operations in territory where expertise and air brakes are
required) or that is not properly deployed (e.g., without supplementary
communications to close gaps).
Don't ask employees to do the impossible. If you have to
put multiple locomotives both in the middle of the train and in the
rear, and the train has to traverse undulating terrain with air brakes
used to avoid run-in or arrest movement down a grade, think twice.
Would you want to try to manage that train?
Very clearly, major railroads are not prepared to do this on their
own, so the Congress and FRA need to impose some discipline through an
appropriately flexible regulatory structure.
How can we mold a better future? For the longer term, railroads
express ambitions to automate their operations more fully. They are not
even close to being able to do that. However, with or without
automation, they would be much better positioned for the future with
electronically controlled pneumatic brakes (ECP brakes).
The industry declares its love for technology, but two-way end-of-
train devices took Congressional action. Positive Train Control came to
fruition 35 years after its conception only because of a statutory
mandate. Both technologies were implemented under rules I helped to
write.
Our usual attitude as believers in market forces is that management
will do what makes sense, and it doesn't need government to tell them.
Very often, happily, that is the case. However, when it comes to major
transitions that will cost a good amount of capital up front but will
not fully pay off during the tenure of the senior management then in
charge, the matter will often be deferred. If the investment itself is
not the major issue, often the fear of failure in implementation is.
ECP brakes has now been deferred since the 1990's, despite FRA's
efforts to support and incentivize implementation. The result has been
that run-away accidents have not ended and management of in-train
forces has been made increasingly difficult. It's time for ECP brakes.
Why should we care? The price for not moving forward on management
of in-train forces will be more derailments, more releases of hazardous
materials, more communities impacted, more disruptions to shippers'
supply chains, and more employees confronted with dangerous working
conditions on trains, on the ground, and during wreck clearance. Very
fortunately, most derailments are not catastrophic events; but the more
we treat them casually the more likely it is that we will have a
catastrophe. And the failure to treat railroad braking systems as
safety-critical will lead to further run-away accidents that will claim
lives as well as property.
Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons little has been done about
management of in-train forces, apart from the traditional focus on
power brake safety, is that the subject is dense and complicated. The
problem is one of interfacing systems, rapid technological change, the
variety of operating environments and operating plans, and the need for
human-centered engineering. The whole field is further complicated by
the realities of railroad interline service and joint operations,
meaning no single railroad can address it all alone.
I have provided the Committee with my White Paper on Management of
In-Train Forces (v3.0, June 2022), which explores the related issues
and attempts to frame appropriate questions and proposals, in some
depth. It even discusses the potential of ECP brakes to prevent or
mitigate some highway-rail grade crossing accidents and similar
obstruction events. I would appreciate its being made a part of the
record.
My hope is that Congress will charge FRA with developing flexible
regulations governing the management of in-train forces and direct FRA
to proceed with regulatory action requiring the phased implementation
of ECP brakes. If I can be helpful to members or staff going forward, I
would be happy to do so pro bono publico.
Thank you for the opportunity to address this important issue. I
would welcome the opportunity to respond to any questions.
Attachment
[The 110-page white paper entitled, ``Management of In-Train
Forces: Challenges and Directions'' by Grady C. Cothen, Jr. is retained
in committee files and is available online at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/PW/PW14/20220614/114882/HHRG-117-PW14-Wstate-CothenG-20220614-
SD001.pdf ]
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Now we will have Mr. Bachman for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bachman. Good morning, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member
Crawford, and members of this esteemed subcommittee. My name is
Nate Bachman, and I am the vice president of sales and business
development at Loram Technologies, Inc., LTI. Based out of
Georgetown, Texas, we are a division of Loram Maintenance of
Way.
In addition, I serve on the Executive Committee as the
secretary/treasurer of Railway Engineering-Maintenance
Suppliers Association, REMSA, a national trade association that
represents companies that manufacture rail maintenance-of-way
equipment and provide related services. I am honored to join
this distinguished panel today and to provide our perspective
on the important topic of freight rail safety.
I will first begin by commending Congress for the passing
of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The IIJA
provides visionary and unprecedented levels of funding for key
rail safety programs.
While Loram Technologies is just one business within REMSA,
the rail supply segment of the industry has a significant
economic fingerprint. Railway suppliers directly employ more
than 125,000 people in manufacturing, repair, maintenance, and
leasing, among others.
In addition to my role on the REMSA board, LTI is also a
proud and active member of the National Railroad Construction
and Maintenance Association, or NRC, and the Association of
American Railroads. Both at LTI specifically and in the entire
rail supply and contracting industry, safety is our number one
priority. We work as a company and industry to continually
improve safety performance.
In our experience, the most successful work environment is
one where technology, such as automated track inspection, can
complement the work on the ground to both augment and improve
safety for workers and railroads. That is precisely what this
technology does today.
To be clear, the intent of this technology is not to
replace workers. Before LTI and other companies developed these
solutions, track inspections were both labor and time
intensive. This technology can detect tiny defects invisible to
the human eye while enabling railroads to inspect up to eight
times as much track in a given day.
By targeting visual inspections through the use of data-
driven technology, we can reduce redundant manual inspections,
which both enhances greater roadway worker safety and allows
for an approach whereby track workers' inspection time can be
dedicated to, and prioritized around, the most pressing track
defects.
Loram Technologies utilizes proprietary state-of-the-art
imaging technology which scans the track to reveal the exact
condition of every railroad tie and the associated components
along the way. It pinpoints any potential problems and marks
their exact location so that the railroad can target and repair
them in an efficient manner. This technology finds flaws manual
detection methods may miss, and it does so while traveling at
speeds up to 25 miles per hour.
According to the FRA, track-related issues caused one-
quarter to one-third of all train accidents from 2001 to 2020.
The use of automated track inspection technologies paired with
visual inspections has helped to drive down this number
considerably.
We encourage Congress and the FRA to work collaboratively
to promote rail technologies that enhance safety in the
industry. We believe that the waivers that the Class I
railroads have requested for continuing their ATI pilot
programs puts safety first and should be continued.
More data from continued pilots benefits rail workers, rail
suppliers, railroads, the FRA, and the general public. This
combination of data-driven findings from ATI technology and the
visual inspections made by workers on the ground should be a
powerful force in moving the rail industry forward.
Thank you for the opportunity to share our perspective, and
I am happy to answer any questions.
[Mr. Bachman's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nathan C. Bachman, Vice President of Sales and
Business Development, Loram Technologies, Inc.
Introduction
Good morning, Chairman Payne, Ranking Member Crawford, and Members
of this esteemed subcommittee. My name is Nate Bachman and I am the
Vice President of Sales and Business Development at Loram Technologies,
Inc. (LTI). In addition, I serve on the Executive Committee as the
Secretary/Treasurer of the Railway Engineering-Maintenance Suppliers
Association (REMSA) a national trade association that represents
companies that manufacture rail maintenance-of-way equipment and
provide related services. I am honored to join this distinguished panel
today and to provide our perspective on the important topic of freight
rail safety.
Loram Technologies
Let me first begin by commending Congress for passing the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA). The IIJA provides
visionary and unprecedented levels of funding for key rail safety
programs. The Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements
(CRISI) grant program, in particular, is a vital source of funding for
the industry to address key safety improvement projects.
Now for some background on Loram Technologies, Inc. Based out of
Georgetown, Texas, LTI creates innovative solutions to help the
railroad industry. From our GateSync and Solaris ballast delivery
systems to the Aurora track inspection system; our products stand out
among the rest as technologically advanced, safer, more efficient and
more productive than traditional methods of getting things done. We
work with customers across the globe to deliver custom solutions
designed around their specific needs.
LTI is part of the Loram Corporation (Loram) based out of Hamel,
Minnesota. Loram employs more than 1,400 people with the majority of
those being heavy equipment operators and maintainers working on
railway lines across North America. The company has manufacturing
facilities and corporate offices in Minnesota, Illinois and Texas. It
has always been the company's objective to deliver safe, advanced, and
efficient solutions to the railroad industry.
REMSA and the Rail Supply Industry
While Loram Technologies is just one business within REMSA, the
rail supply segment of the industry has a significant economic
footprint. Beyond their critical support for a railroad system
comprising more than 1.6 million railcars, 38,000 locomotives, and
140,000 miles of track, the railway supply industry is also essential
to the national economy: generating value, stimulating jobs, and paying
taxes. The economic contribution of the railway supply industry in 2017
amounted to more than $74.2 billion in gross domestic product (GDP) and
they paid $16.9 billion in taxes to local, state and federal
governments. Railway suppliers directly employ more than 125,000 people
in manufacturing, repair, maintenance, and leasing, among others.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Tracking the Power of Rail Supply: The Economic Impact of
Railway Suppliers in the U.S. September 2018. https://www.remsa.org//
Files/Rail_Supplier_EIS_2018.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As I mentioned in my opening, I serve as an officer for REMSA.
REMSA represents nearly 250 companies in the maintenance-of-way segment
of the rail supply industry. Most REMSA member companies are small
businesses with manufacturing facilities and offices located all across
the United States.
REMSA was created in 1965 by the merger of the Association of Track
and Structure Suppliers and the National Railway Appliances
Association, two long-standing organizations in the railroad
maintenance-of-way industry. The association represents companies and
individuals who manufacture or sell maintenance-of-way equipment,
products, and services, or are engineers, contractors and consultants
working in construction and/or maintenance of railroad transportation
facilities. REMSA members constitute a large part of the maintenance-
of-way industry. The association sponsors Railway Interchange, the
largest exhibit of maintenance-of-way equipment, products and services
in the United States. REMSA members exhibit rail and track products,
track maintenance equipment and services, safety devices and software
that enables the railroad industry to work smarter.
In addition to my role on the REMSA Board, LTI is also a proud and
active member of the National Railroad Construction and Maintenance
Association (NRC) and the Association of American Railroads (AAR).
Finally, of note, REMSA and NRC collaborate on a grassroots program
that brings Members of Congress out to our member company facilities so
we can help educate Congress on the work that our members do and the
impact they have on the community, rail safety, and the local economy.
Background on Railway Automated Track Inspection (ATI) Technology
We appreciate the opportunity to provide our insights on freight
rail safety, and in particular, how the rise of technology has helped
to contribute to increased safety in the freight rail industry. As one
of several companies providing innovative rail inspection technologies
that complement the hard-working men and women on the ground, LTI is
well positioned to provide a brief overview of this technology.
Let me be clear, the intent of this technology is not to replace
workers. In our experience the most successful work environment is one
where technology, such as Automated Track Inspection (ATI), can
complement the work on the ground to both augment and improve safety
for workers and the railroads. That is precisely what this technology
does today. Both Congress and the FRA should strive to enact policies
that foster this critical relationship.
Both at LTI and in the entire rail supply and contracting industry,
safety is our number one priority. We work as a company and industry to
continually improve safety performance. LTI is an active member of the
NRC Safety Committee and through this work we have participated in
numerous FRA Rail Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) working groups
related to track safety standards and rail integrity regulations.
Though FRA data trends indicate that over the past 20 years the
freight rail industry is getting safer, we must always endeavor to work
together towards producing an even safer industry. Core to this
objective is taking the railway methods of the past and utilizing the
technologies of today to usher in the next century of railroading.
Until as an industry we are able to do this more effectively, progress
in the rail industry will be hindered.
Before LTI and other companies developed this technology, track
inspections were both labor and time intensive. This new technology can
detect tiny defects invisible to the human eye, while enabling
railroads to inspect up to eight times as much track each day. By
targeting visual inspections by using data-driven technology, we can
reduce redundant manual inspections which both enhances greater roadway
worker safety and allows for an approach whereby track workers'
inspection time can be dedicated to and prioritized around the most
pressing track defects.
As a provider of these systems, we have seen firsthand how this
technology can uncover track flaws and ballast deficiencies. In
addition to track flaws, LTI also uses proprietary state-of-the-art
imaging technology, which scans the tracks to reveal the exact
condition of every tie and the associated components along the way. It
pinpoints any potential problems and marks their exact location so that
the railroad can target and repair them in an efficient manner. This
technology finds flaws manual detection methods may miss, and it does
so while traveling at speeds averaging 25 mph.
LTI collects approximately 40,000 track miles of data annually.
With these collections, customers are able to evaluate tie and ballast
conditions. This data is used for both urgent track repairs as well as
maintenance planning in successive years. By utilizing technologically
advanced vision systems, we have been able to collect and catalog data
on hundreds of thousands of miles of track. This information has been
effectively utilized to help railroads focus their people and dollars
to most pressing maintenance needs.
According to the FRA, track-related issues caused one-quarter to
one-third of all train accidents from 2001 to 2020. The use of
automated track inspection technologies, in addition to visual
inspections, has helped drive down the number of track-caused
derailments.\2\ Additionally, per a letter that 23 U.S. Senators sent
to then FRA Deputy Administrator Amit Bose on October 29, 2021, the
``results of the ATI programs have overwhelmingly proven the safety
benefits of the concept. In some cases, the ATI tests have resulted in
an over 90 percent reduction in unprotected main track defects per 100
miles tested.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Report to Congress: Automatic Track Geometry Measurement System
Technology Test Programs. Federal Railroad Administration. November 23,
2021. https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/2021-11/
FRA%20Report%20to%20Congress-Track%20Inspection%20Test
%20Program%2011.23.21.pdf
\3\ Senate letter to FRA Deputy Administrator Amit Bose. October
29, 2021. https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-from-Senators-
to-Amit-Bose.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pair this with our own observations on the ground and the data from
the Class I railroads' ATI pilot programs, this technology clearly
detects track geometry defects with increased accuracy.
Recommendations
It is clear that through both our own experience as a leading
supplier of automated inspection technology and the data acquired
through the Class I railroad test programs that the ATI waivers have
yielded positive safety results. Moreover, as we have seen, the
development of automated inspection technologies is crucial to
enhancing safety by reducing the number of track-related and caused
derailments.
To that end, we encourage Congress and the FRA to work
collaboratively to promote rail technologies that enhance safety in the
industry. We believe that the waivers that the Class I railroads have
requested for continuing their ATI pilot programs put safety first and
should be continued. More data from continued pilots benefits rail
workers, rail suppliers, railroads, the FRA and the general public.
This combination of data-driven findings from ATI technology and
the visual inspections made by workers on the ground should be a
powerful force in moving the rail industry forward. Congress and the
FRA should carefully consider how to further promote the acceptance of
this technology in the near future, and should also embrace any new
future technology that will enhance safety in the rail industry.
Closing
Thank you for the opportunity to share our perspective on freight
rail safety. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, sir.
Next we will hear from Ms. Sanborn.
Ms. Sanborn. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today.
Norfolk Southern and the approximately 630 other freight
railroads operating in the United States form an integrated
system that provides the world's safest, most productive, and
lowest cost freight rail service. The U.S. freight railroad
industry is an irreplaceable national asset that enhances our
Nation's standard of living and its competitiveness in the
tough global economy.
The U.S. rail system owes its success to a lot of different
factors, but in my opinion, a key ingredient is our dedicated
workforce. Railroading is a tough, demanding job. The men and
women of Norfolk Southern put their boots on every day and work
hard to safely and efficiently serve our customers. It is no
exaggeration to say that the railroad couldn't operate without
them, and I am grateful that they have chosen to pursue a
career in this important industry.
In railroading, the relentless pursuit of safe operations
is not optional; it is a business imperative. We have an
obligation to operate safely for the benefit of our employees,
our customers, and the communities where we operate. And, while
we have not yet reached our ultimate goal of zero accidents and
injuries, we are making significant progress. The overall train
accident rate, the employee injury rate, and grade crossing
collision rate have all fallen substantially since the year
2000.
Railroads today have lower employee injury rates than most
other major industries, including trucking, airlines,
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and construction, even
lower than grocery stores. These results are driven by the
industry's sustained investment in its infrastructure, the
development of safety technologies, and the modernization of
operating and maintenance practices.
But the most important factor in achieving continuous
safety improvement is the creation of a company culture that
promotes safety through behavioral changes. Railroads work very
hard to train their employees and instill in them a high level
of safety awareness in everything they do. We are among the
Nation's most frequent recruiters of veterans, whose discipline
and training are a good fit within a high-performing safety
culture.
The Federal Government can also have significant impact on
the freight transportation sector's ability to achieve positive
safety outcomes. It is essential that, when the Government
enacts laws or regulation, it keeps in mind the impact on
safety of the Nation's entire transportation system. Taking an
evidence-based, holistic view of the whole transportation
ecosystem is vitally important to creating national safe
transportation policy that works for all stakeholders and
delivers continuous improvements in safety.
Regulation of crew size is a subject where I think the
Federal Government would benefit from taking this approach.
Legislation regulations have been considered that would mandate
that all Class I freight trains must operate with two employees
in the locomotive cab, yet there is no evidence that trains
with one-person crews have accidents at a higher rate than
trains with two-person crews.
While it wouldn't enhance safety, there is one thing a
crew-size regulation would accomplish: It would make
railroading less competitive against other modes of
transportation who do not face similar operational
restrictions. Imposing a minimum crew-size mandate on railroads
would undermine the policy goals of promoting safer, more
environmentally sustainable freight transportation.
The Federal Government also has an important role to play
in encouraging or at least not discouraging the development of
safety-enhancing technology. One recent technological
innovation with demonstrated safety benefits is automated track
inspection technology.
In cooperation with FRA, we developed a test to find the
optimum mix of automated and manual track inspections. On every
single metric tested, the automated system increased track
safety and quality, even as the frequency of manual inspections
was reduced. This system was able to detect defects that were
imperceptible under visual inspection, while human inspectors
were able to concentrate on making track repairs and finding
defects in switches, crossing diamonds, and other areas that
the automated system could not evaluate.
Despite these impressive results, the FRA recently denied
our request for a waiver that would have allowed the same
combination of automated and manual inspections everywhere on
the Norfolk Southern system.
At NS, our goal is to provide a customer experience that is
safe, efficient, and as cost-effective as possible, but this
can't happen without technology. We are concerned that FRA is
not doing everything it can to support the development of
technologies, such as automated track inspection systems, that
have actually been shown to work. We respectfully urge
policymakers at all levels to be proactive, collaborative
partners with railroads to meet our ultimate goal of zero
accidents and injuries.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
will be glad to take your questions.
[Ms. Sanborn's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cynthia M. Sanborn, Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer, Norfolk Southern Corporation, and Chair,
Safety and Operations Management Committee, Association of American
Railroads
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I am Cindy Sanborn,
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Norfolk
Southern Corporation, the parent company of Norfolk Southern Railway
Company. My career in the rail industry has spanned over 30 years and
has included service for three Class I railroads. I was certified as a
locomotive engineer for 26 years. While I am testifying today on behalf
of Norfolk Southern (NS), most of what I have to say is applicable to
other U.S. freight railroads as well.
Norfolk Southern's beginnings date back to the earliest days of
railroading nearly 200 years ago. Today, NS operates approximately
19,300 route miles in 22 states and the District of Columbia. We serve
more than 400 general warehouses and distribution centers; more than
200 lumber and paper facilities; some 120 steel-related facilities; 116
active coal loading facilities; 78 power plants; and more than 60 auto-
related facilities. We have more than 50 intermodal terminals and serve
every major port on the East Coast between New York City and
Jacksonville, as well as several Great Lakes ports and numerous river
ports. Through connections with our transportation partners, we deliver
products to consumers in every state and throughout the world.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Together, NS and the approximately 630 other freight railroads
operating in the United States form an integrated, nearly 140,000-mile
system that provides the world's safest, most productive, and lowest-
cost freight rail service. The U.S. freight railroad industry is the
envy of the world. It is an irreplaceable national asset that enhances
our nation's standard of living and its competitiveness in the tough
global economy.
The U.S. rail system owes it success to a lot of different factors,
but in my opinion the key ingredient is our dedicated workforce.
Railroading is a tough, demanding job, and not everyone is cut out for
it. The men and women of Norfolk Southern put their boots on every day
and work hard to provide a safe, efficient, and reliable service
product for our customers. It's no exaggeration to say the railroad
couldn't operate without them, and I am grateful that they have chosen
to pursue a career in this important industry.
Throughout my testimony, I will discuss a series of broad
principles that should govern the relationship between railroads and
rail safety regulators. Following that, I will briefly examine several
specific topics related to safety that are particularly germane today.
Safe and Working Hard Every Day to Get Even Safer
For Norfolk Southern--and I'm sure I can speak for all railroads
here too--pursuing safe operations is not optional; it's a business
imperative. We have an obligation to operate safely for the benefit of
our employees, our customers, and the communities where we operate.
While we have not yet reached our ultimate goal of zero accidents
and injuries, we are encouraged by the progress we have made. Data from
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) indicates that, for the rail
industry as a whole, the overall train accident rate in 2021 decreased
32 percent from 2000; the employee injury rate fell 48 percent; and the
grade crossing collision rate was down 23 percent. Railroads today have
lower employee injury rates than most other major industries, including
trucking, airlines, agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and
construction--even lower than grocery stores. Safety extends to
hazardous materials too; well over 99.99% of rail hazmat shipments
reach their destination without a release caused by a train accident.
These are tremendous safety success stories, driven by the industry's
sustained investment in its infrastructure, the development and
advancement of safety technologies, and the modernization of operating
and maintenance practices.
Railroad Accident Rates:
2000-2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total accidents -32%
Collisions -50%
Derailments -35%
Other -13%
Employee injuries -48%
Grade crossings -23%
Hazmat incidents \\ -60%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through 2020
Source: FRA, AAR
But the most important factor in achieving continuous safety
improvement is the creation of a company culture that promotes safety
through continuous education and reinforcement of safe behaviors. This
is why railroads work very hard to train their employees and instill in
them a high level of safety awareness in everything they do. Railroads
work diligently to identify new technologies, operational enhancements,
training, and other ways to further improve their safety record.
We recognize that the federal government can also have a
significant impact on the freight transportation sector's ability to
achieve positive safety outcomes. Therefore, it is essential that, when
Congress enacts laws or federal agencies promulgate regulations, they
not be driven by parochial concerns or persuaded by the use of
anecdotes that provide an incomplete, and often inaccurate, picture of
the rail safety environment. And it is equally important that when
federal officials regulate the rail industry that they not lose sight
of the impact laws and regulations focused on railroads have on the
safety of the nation's entire transportation system. Laws and
regulations, however well intended, that place operational burdens on
railroads can distort competition within the freight transportation
sector and divert freight from the much safer rail system to other far
more dangerous modes of transportation. We urge all federal officials--
not just safety regulators--to take these impacts into account when
they craft rail regulatory policy. Taking an evidence-based, holistic
view of the nation's entire transportation ecosystem is vitally
important to creating a national transportation policy that works for
all stakeholders and delivers continuous improvements in safety.
Technology and Process Streamlining
New technologies are changing transportation. For example,
widespread efforts are underway today--including extensive research
subsidized by taxpayers--to develop autonomous motor vehicles,
including autonomous trucks that would compete directly with railroads.
Autonomous vehicle technologies and other technologies impacting
transportation vary in their stages of development, but these are
challenges railroads must be ready to confront and compete with once
commercially viable.
As such, railroads will continue to work diligently to identify and
implement new technologies to make their operations more efficient
while also achieving safety outcomes that are at least as good as what
we are achieving today. However, the efforts of NS and other railroads
to harness the power of technology and drive innovation will not be as
effective as they could be if legislative and regulatory processes and
requirements fail to keep pace or are not well grounded in evidence-
based, scientific understanding.
Regulatory reform can, and should, be a key part of any federal
effort to improve rail safety. Railroads respectfully suggest that the
FRA and other agencies with regulatory authority over railroads should
become more forward-looking in how they propose and promulgate new
rules and in their approach to new safety technologies. More
specifically, these agencies should:
Carefully identify and describe beforehand the specific
concern that a particular new rule is meant to address and ensure that
the new rule actually would address the concern efficiently and
effectively. Meaningful dialogue with railroads and other interested
parties is essential in this effort.
Use current data and sound science to establish the need
for a new rule and to validate that the benefits of a new rule exceed
its costs. Assess the impact of any rule on the competitiveness of the
freight railroad industry and any likely freight diversions to less
safe modes of transportation.
When proposing rules, also propose metrics by which the
rules' effectiveness in achieving their stated objectives can be
judged. Regularly review final rules to determine if they are still
meeting those objectives.
Issue emergency orders only after finding a high risk of
imminent harm. Emergency orders should be narrowly tailored and expire
automatically after the unusual risk has passed or has been adequately
addressed.
Regulation of technologies should occur at the federal
level to avoid a patchwork of state and local rules that would create
confusion, inhibit the deployment of new innovations, and undercut the
efficient functioning of the national rail network.
Adopt performance-based, rather than prescriptive,
regulations. Take care not to ``lock in'' existing technologies and
processes so that new innovations and new technologies that could
improve safety and efficiency are not stifled. Performance-based
standards would give industry discretion to innovate, while still being
subject to effective agency oversight and continuing to ensure the
safety of rail employees, customers, and the public-at-large.
This last point, regarding technologies, is especially pertinent.
Railroads have long applied technological solutions to improve safety,
enhance performance, and create efficiencies--e.g., inspection cars
that use sophisticated electronic and optical instruments to inspect
track alignment, gauge, and curvature; ground-penetrating radar and
terrain conductivity sensors to identify problems below the ground
(such as excessive water penetration and deteriorated ballast) that
hinder track stability; and highly advanced vehicles that detect
internal flaws in rails; and drones to inspect the underside of
bridges.
Railroads will continue to develop and implement new technologies
to improve infrastructure safety and performance, but achieving maximum
safety benefits will require regulatory flexibility that does not
hinder innovation, allows railroads to find what works best, and
encourages railroads to keep investing in those technologies.
Track Inspection
Today, new railroad technologies must often be utilized in addition
to existing regulatory compliance practices and procedures--some of
which have been in place for decades and have long since been made
obsolete. This means, unfortunately, that the benefits of technological
advances are often marginalized for purposes of regulatory compliance.
Track inspections are a case in point. Since the advent of
railroading, track defects have been a cause of train accidents,
especially derailments. Historically, track inspections have been
conducted visually by track inspectors using hand-held measuring tools.
These manual inspections are conducted either on foot, or, more often
today, in railroad ``hi-rail'' vehicles.\1\ Based on a rule published
in 1971--more than 50 years ago--the FRA prescribes how often track
must be inspected in this manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A hi-rail vehicle is a specially designed vehicle that can
operate on roadways and rail tracks and is outfitted with track
inspection technologies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recent years, though, automated track inspection (ATI) has
dramatically changed the nature of track inspection. ATI systems use
technology (e.g., lasers and cameras) to measure and identify railroad
track defects. ATI systems are mounted on freight cars or locomotives
\2\ that inspect track during their day-to-day operations. These
systems collect and analyze track information while trains are
operating at normal speed and pulling freight across the network.
Additionally, a measurement showing how track structure is actually
performing under the load of a train is more valuable from a safety
perspective than a static measurement taken during a visual inspection
from a hi-rail vehicle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ NS is pleased to be the first North American freight railroad
to develop and deploy an ATI system mounted on a locomotive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With ATI, inspection data are sent wirelessly in real time to an
inspection office where track engineers verify the data and arrange for
needed repairs. If necessary, maintenance personnel are dispatched to
visually inspect track identified as potentially having a defect. ATI
systems allow track inspections at frequencies and levels of detail
that are not possible under standard visual inspection techniques. Put
another way, ATI detects track defects with far more accuracy,
consistency, and frequency than do manual visual inspections. ATI also
results in the collection of huge amounts of track inspection data,
allowing railroads to better understand and evaluate the safety of
their infrastructure and to develop improved preventative maintenance.
In other words, capital resources are better directed to ensure track
repairs are most accurately planned. The enormous advantages of ATI
explain why railroads have voluntarily invested significant resources
to develop and implement these systems. The FRA itself has also
expended millions of dollars annually to develop and use this
technology to improve track safety.
ATI inspections reduce (but do not eliminate) the need for visual
inspections. In fact, they help to make visual inspections more
effective by directing track inspectors to focus on areas that need
greater attention. ATI also lower employee risk exposure, as there is a
decreased need for inspectors to physically occupy track solely to
fulfill obsolete manual inspection requirements. Moreover, greater use
of ATI would increase rail network capacity and supply chain benefits
because existing track inspection procedures require railroads to
devote scarce capacity to visual inspections--capacity that could
otherwise be devoted to moving freight. Better track safety that
results in fewer track-caused accidents would also reduce supply chain
impacts that occur due to accidents and the subsequent time-consuming,
resource-intensive accident clean-up and repair efforts that flow from
them.
In recent years, the FRA gave several railroads, including NS,
permission to test ATI systems on portions of their networks in
conjunction with a reduced level of traditional visual inspections. The
results of these test programs were impressive. NS's experience is
illustrative. We call our ATI system an ``automated track geometry
measurement system,'' or ATGMS. We conducted our test program in our
Blue Ridge Division, where the wide variety of climatological,
topological, and operational features render it representative of our
rail system as a whole.
On every single metric tested, ATGMS increased track safety and
quality, even as the frequency of manual inspections was reduced. ATGMS
was able to detect defects that were imperceptible under visual
inspection, while human inspectors were able to concentrate on making
track repairs and finding defects in switches, crossing diamonds, and
other areas that ATGMS could not evaluate.
Because our data clearly demonstrated that ATGMS was safer than
legacy methods, in March 2021, we petitioned the FRA for a permanent
waiver that would allow us to reduce manual inspection for all lines on
which we had implemented ATGMS. However, in March of this year, FRA
denied that request. With all due respect to the FRA, its denial in our
case was contrary to the evidence. The FRA did not explain how granting
our waiver request could possibly endanger rail safety or the public
interest. It did not explain how granting a waiver could ``short-
circuit'' the existing Railroad Safety Advisory Committee's (RSAC)
consideration of ATI technology.\3\ Indeed, even as the FRA described
the test program as ``successful,'' it ignored the key finding--that
systemwide implementation of ATGMS would improve rail and worker
safety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ RSACs are formally chartered Federal Advisory Committees and
typically include representatives from all the FRA's major stakeholder
groups, including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers, and other
interested parties. Their purpose is to provide a forum for
collaborative rulemaking and program development. RSACs exist for many
different topics, including ATI systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the same day that it denied our request for a waiver, the FRA
denied a similar request from BNSF Railway. In BNSF's case, the FRA
denied BNSF the ability to expand a pre-existing waiver to new
territories even though the data BNSF had already developed under that
waiver conclusively showed that doing so would improve safety on those
new territories. The FRA has previously announced that it will allow
existing ATI test programs performed by other railroads to expire in
November 2022, when their initial terms are up, despite their positive
safety improvements. The FRA's actions are difficult to understand. The
combination of enhanced track inspections with reduced visual
inspections provides a far, far better system in terms of detecting
track defects than the 50-year-old visual inspection regime. The FRA
had encouraged the development and deployment of this technology for
years until abruptly changing their approach. The FRA should go back to
encouraging, not discouraging, technological advancements like these
that advance safety.
The ATI example shows how a broader use of the FRA's waiver
authority could be used to modify FRA regulatory directives in light of
changed circumstances, without sacrificing appropriate regulatory
oversight. Unfortunately, the timeline for granting even simple FRA
waiver requests is typically measured in months or years, and waivers
often come with conditions that largely negate their value. Congress
should direct the FRA to make permanent those long-standing waivers
whose value has been proven through successful test programs.
In addition, because short-term waivers from existing regulations
do not give the rail industry sufficient confidence to invest in new
technologies, regulatory barriers should be overcome in ways that are
more enduring than waivers. For example, the FRA could issue waivers of
indefinite duration and provide procedures for the expedited conversion
of time-limited waivers to permanent waivers or final rules if
equivalent or improved safety has been demonstrated.
Brake Systems
Railroads are deeply disappointed in the FRA's recent treatment of
ATI technology, but are more pleased with recent actions regarding rail
braking systems that will move safety forward.
FRA's final rule implementing miscellaneous amendments to its brake
system safety standards was published in December 2020 and allows for
railroads to modernize and make their operations more efficient while
reducing safety risks to employees and the public. More specifically,
the December 2020 rule modified FRA regulations governing train air
brake inspections in part by codifying longstanding industry waivers,
many of which were adopted during the Obama Administration, that
allowed railroads to lengthen the number of miles a rail car could
travel before the car's brake systems had to be tested. Safety data
gathered under the waivers demonstrated conclusively that more advanced
testing methods for automated single car air brake tests result in a
significant decline in freight car brake failures compared to the older
test method. The final rule also extends the time period between
certain air brake inspections. These regulatory updates were
appropriate due to the proliferation of technological improvements to
air brake systems.
Meanwhile, in January 2021, the FRA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) which proposes to allow railroads to replace
antiquated paper records of rail car brake inspections with modernized
electronic Air Brake Slip (eABS) recordkeeping systems. The eABS
systems allow railroads to accurately and efficiently track inspections
and mileage electronically on a freight car-by-freight car basis. The
old regulations require trains to stop more often than necessary for
inspections and limit trains' ability to drop off and pick up other
railcars due to recordkeeping limitations that necessitate treatment of
all the cars in a train as a single unit to be managed by a paper
record.
An eABS system provides robust, constantly updated car-specific
data. Coupled with railroads' use of modern preventative and predictive
maintenance strategies, wayside detectors and machine vision
stations,\4\ modernized mechanical equipment components, and improved
employee training programs, eABS systems permit far safer and more
efficient train operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Machine vision is, in essence, an MRI for a rail car. As a
train passes through a machine vision imaging area, lasers and cameras
quickly provide a three-dimensional model of each piece of train
equipment, identifying actual and potential defects. The model and
images can be viewed remotely from anywhere, allowing these ``in
advance'' inspections to be conducted rain or shine, day or night, from
the comfort of a desk chair. They allow railroads' mechanical teams to
know what repairs are needed before a train arrives in a rail yard.
This improves safety, speeds the repair process, reduces the time
trains have to spend in rail yards, reduces costly system delays, and
improves reliability and customer service.
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Fatigue Risk Management
On December 22, 2020, the FRA published an NPRM that, if
implemented, would require railroads to develop and implement Fatigue
Risk Management Programs. The NPRM would require railroad fatigue plans
to: (1) identify safety hazards associated with fatigue; (2) assess the
risks associated with identified hazards; (3) prioritize risks for
mitigation; (4) implement mitigation strategies for those risks; (5)
track the effectiveness of mitigation strategies; and (6) revise
fatigue plans after review of the effectiveness of such strategies.
Fatigue plans would set specific fatigue-related safety goals and
describe strategies for reaching those goals.
NS and other railroads want properly rested crews; it is not in a
railroad's best interest to have employees who are too tired to perform
their duties properly and safely. That's why railroads have long worked
with their employees and others to find innovative, scientifically-
based solutions to fatigue-related problems. Because factors that can
result in fatigue are multiple, complex, and frequently intertwined,
there is no single solution to fatigue. Railroads are concerned that as
the NPRM process plays out, the FRA will attempt to expand the scope of
this NPRM to encompass crew scheduling issues that are properly within
the purview of collective bargaining between railroads and rail labor.
Many rail employees work set schedules. However, some rail
employees, such as some train crews, work flexible schedules that vary
based on a variety of factors, including business levels, the time of
the year, and the day of the week. Weather conditions, track
maintenance, accidents, an unexpected employee illness, and dozens of
other factors can affect an employee's work schedule, thus impacting
the time other crews will be needed. Moreover, in many cases,
collective bargaining agreements allow rail employees, especially those
with the most seniority, to largely determine for themselves when and
how many hours they work (subject to limitations on the maximum number
of hours a rail employee can work). These employees' actions, in turn,
affect how many hours, and when, less senior employees work. This
greatly complicates railroads' ability to schedule crew assignments.
Scheduling is a complicated issue with circumstances unique to each
railroad. The FRA should refrain from interjecting itself into this
matter and instead allow railroads to continue to address the issue as
part of the collective bargaining process.
Crew Size
As members of this Committee are aware, legislation and regulations
have been proposed that would mandate that all Class I freight trains
must operate with a certified locomotive engineer and a certified
conductor in the locomotive cab.
Existing FRA regulations do not mandate minimum crew staffing
requirements. Some non-Class I railroads have long operated with just
one person in the locomotive cab, and thousands of Amtrak and commuter
passenger trains, carrying hundreds of thousands of passengers, operate
every day with just one person in the locomotive cab. For Class I
railroads, industry practice to date has been to have two-person crews
for over-the-road mainline operations. On NS and other Class I
railroads, the subject of crew size has typically been addressed as
part of the collective bargaining process with rail labor, and
railroads believe such matters should continue to be addressed in that
venue.
The major reason offered by proponents of a two-person crew mandate
is that it would enhance rail safety. Yet no one--not the FRA, not
sponsors of the legislation in Congress, not rail labor--can point to
hard data that support this contention. There is no evidence that
trains with one-person crews have accidents at a higher rate than
trains with two-person crews. The FRA itself, after its own review,
stated in 2009 that it found no ``factual evidence to support the
prohibition against one-person operations.'' \5\ The FRA again reviewed
the data on this issue in 2019 and determined that ``issuing any
regulation requiring a minimum number of train crewmembers would not be
justified because such a regulation is unnecessary for a railroad
operation to be conducted safely at this time.'' \6\
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\5\ FRA, Denial of BLET Petition on RCO and Other Single-Person
Operations, Nov. 10, 2009
\6\ FRA's May 28, 2019 Withdrawal of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in Dkt. FRA-2014-0033.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While crew size mandates have never been supported by safety data,
they make even less sense today with the implementation of positive
train control technology (PTC), which has been installed and is
operational on tens of thousands of miles of rail line throughout the
country. PTC is a system of technologies designed to automatically stop
a train before certain accidents caused by human error occur. PTC
advances rail safety through the use of advanced technology, while at
the same time further eliminating the need for ``a second set of eyes''
in locomotive cabs in certain circumstances. Neither NS nor other Class
I railroads seek the ability to impose one-person crews unilaterally.
Rather, we seek the flexibility to continue to work with rail labor
under the existing collective bargaining framework to identify when the
presence of PTC, or other technologies, allow a reduction in the number
of crewmembers in a locomotive cab without jeopardizing rail safety.
Virtual Training
The pandemic has been an unspeakable tragedy on many levels, but
one silver lining of it has been the development of reliable new video
communications systems that allow individuals to attend meetings
remotely. Virtual meeting technology has positive safety implications
in that it allows, in this case, railroaders to more easily access
training and other safety-related subjects than would be the case if
everything had to be done in-person in a classroom. Railroads have
developed virtual training modules for their employees--often with the
exact same course materials and a live instructor present, just on a
video screen rather than in a room together--but they are running into
resistance from the FRA and rail labor on expanding their use. Virtual
training can be an effective, efficient way to reach more employees
more quickly, and railroads urge policymakers to facilitate its use,
especially at a time when worker shortages are impacting rail service.
Conclusion
At NS, our goal is to provide a customer experience that is as
safe, efficient, and cost effective as possible. I know other railroads
share these goals. We are always willing to work cooperatively with
you, other policymakers, our employees, our customers, and all other
interested parties to advance our shared interests.
That can't happen without technology. Technology is the key to
unlocking further reductions in rail-related accidents and fatalities
of all kinds. While the rail industry is encouraged by the FRA's
recently published research which confirmed longstanding railroad data
that wayside detection systems are effective in the early
identification of equipment that needs maintenance and improving
operational safety, railroads remain concerned that the FRA is not
doing everything it can to support the deployment of other safety
technologies, such as ATI, that have actually been shown to work. We
respectfully urge policymakers at all levels--on this Committee, at the
FRA, and elsewhere--to be proactive, collaborative partners with
railroads to meet our shared safety goals.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Now we will hear from Mr. Ferguson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ferguson. Good afternoon, Chairman Payne, Ranking
Member Crawford, and members of the committee. Thank you for
allowing me the opportunity to testify.
I took office in October of 2019. In my first 15 months as
president, there were 12 rail transportation worker fatalities.
In fact, at one point, within that period, the railroad
suffered a fatality and at least one amputation every month for
9 months straight. Today, very little has changed for the
better.
Undoubtedly, the railroads will have a message of an
industry on the mend, but please rest assured that nothing can
be further from the truth. For the last 10 years, the railroads
have averaged eight fatalities per year. Last year, there were
nine. And while there may be brief lulls of those types of
events, the data reveals a steady, consistent, and frightening
trend.
Currently, the rail carriers are hell bent on risking
further injury to their employees, as well as the American
public and supply chain infrastructure, by reducing or
eliminating altogether the two crewmembers that control train
movement in the cab of a locomotive. They will tell you that it
is a matter of collective bargaining and that there is no data
to support otherwise. I say to you, please do not be swayed.
Safety is not nor should it ever be negotiable. I assure
you, accidents are occurring on short lines in yard jobs that
operate with less than a two-person crew, but the rates and/or
trends cannot be identified because the information is not
captured. Similarly, all Class I's over-the-road railroad
operations are performed with no less than a two-person crew
today, so, there is no other data to compare. In other words,
the railroads have no idea what will happen if they reduce crew
size, but it is a gamble they are willing to take for the sake
of satisfying their insatiable appetite of improving their
company's bottom line.
What we do know from the data that we do have is that
things are getting worse. A quick look at years 2020 through
2021 reveal an increase in total accidents and incidents from
8,792 to 9,192 and an increase in total employee injuries from
2,961 to 3,054. Make no mistake, it is railroad greed that I
believe has caused this committee to call us here today.
As you are aware, PSR was born from the pressure put forth
by investors and shareholders on Wall Street. Since its advent,
dramatic haphazard cuts have decimated railroad resources.
Approximately 33 percent of the Class I workforce was laid off
more than a year before the first case of COVID had ever been
identified. Locomotives were put in storage, and integral
crafts with special skills that were relied upon to perform
safety-critical inspections were eliminated from terminals
across the country.
Looking to the future, the trajectory for rail safety is
alarming, especially if PSR continues with its status quo.
Employees fortunate enough to have not been affected by the
cuts are now voluntarily walking away from what was once the
premier blue-collar job in the Nation. As a result, the
institutional knowledge that carriers are letting walk out the
door will threaten rail safety for another generation to come.
Exacerbating this issue is the railroad's panic-driven
effort to stop the PR nightmare they are currently facing for
their majority contribution to the supply chain crisis.
Included in this panic is the slashing of training programs for
new hires so that the railroads can portray an improving number
of workers, when in reality all they are actually doing is
providing the trainees with a deficient training program and a
foundation built for failure. This is evidenced by multiple
amputations and crushing injuries recently occurring to newly
promoted conductors.
Notably, FRA accident report measurements do not reflect
amputations. They are reported the same as most any other
injury. This needs to change. Also, a specialized study of the
dangers in switching operations is warranted by the NTSB. The
NTSB has never performed one of those specialized studies on
switching operations, and now is the time, as most fatalities
and amputations have occurred in the performance of switching
operations.
Compounding troubles in the rail industry is the fact that
train lengths are growing and so are the number of major
derailments, each one another step closer to the inevitability
of the big one. Also increasing are the number of blocked
crossings, the outcry from public commuters, and the stories of
first responders not being able to get to their destinations
while the victims, dependent upon their timely response,
perished on the other side of the train.
Long trains are also making very difficult work for the
crews. Radio communications are insufficient for the lengths of
the trains. Conductors and engineers regularly lose the ability
to communicate, often stranding them from a cry for help or a
much needed train movement instruction to ensure the safest
course. Long trains also expose our members to the elements for
periods of time that would be unacceptable by OSHA and other
industries but somehow are permissible in rail.
Mr. Payne. Please wrap up.
Mr. Ferguson. In closing, I would like to say this: I am on
record as having said that the railroad industry is going to
end up like Boeing. It is not just the accidents that I am
referring to; it is the lack of oversight and concern for the
railroad's constant capitulation to outside pressures that are
creating the biggest dangers. I am not sounding the alarm here;
I am screaming into the bullhorn for help. If left unchecked,
it is my members who will end up maimed or killed, and it is
America whose supply chain will end up collapsed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Ferguson's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeremy Ferguson, President, Sheet Metal, Air,
Rail, Transportation-Transportation Division
My name is Jeremy Ferguson, and I am the President of SMART
Transportation Division, which is the largest railroad union in the
United States--representing almost 40,000 freight railroad employees.
Our members work in the operating crafts of certified conductor,
certified locomotive engineer, yardmaster, yard foreman, switchman,
utility employee, trainman, and many others. It is with absolute pride
and honor that I present these remarks on their behalf.
Throughout history, freight railroading has been an inherently
dangerous industry. In fact, since its beginning, countless men and
women have lost their lives, suffered amputations and/or endured other
life-altering injuries--not much has changed today. Sure, the overall
numbers may be less, but so are the number of employees. The rates of
fatalities are little unchanged, the amputations are still occurring,
and workers are still becoming disabled with frightening regularity.
A cry for rail safety has never been more needed or more
appropriate.
In the field amongst the rail workers, a common safety mantra is
heard when referring to injuries and fatalities: one is too many. Last
year it was nine (9). Nine rail workers perished while performing the
daily tasks required of them by their Class I railroad employer, with
dozens suffering life-altering injuries. Despite all of the technology
and modern-day advancements--the functionality of rail equipment is
still crude, the hours are still relentless, and the work environment
is still unsafe. Granted, some progress was made over the years, but
much, if not most, has been undone with the adoption of a business
model called Precision Scheduled Railroading (PSR) which has left the
state of railroad safety today is in shambles.
This deterioration began during the prior administration that
allowed railroads excessive freedom to forego safety requirements to
achieve their PSR driven goals and to satisfy the pressures from their
Wall Street investors. Prior to PSR, railroads were enjoying the fruits
of the safest, most productive era in railroading history which was
borne and brought by the two-person crew.
PSR has led to the railroads significantly reducing service and
reducing employment. This in turn has lessened the number of required
inspections, as well as the quality of inspections mandated by
regulations. To that point, there have been so many carmen inspectors
removed that operating crews are now being forced to perform
inspections that they are not qualified to conduct, nor are they
equipped with the necessary tools to perform the tests.
According to AAR equipment manuals and FRA regulations, there are
sixty-six (66) safety points on a railroad car. Many railroads now only
allow 1\1/2\ minutes to inspect each car. Of course, this results in
more trains being inadequately inspected and defective cars being
transported. Longer, heavier, trains in operation today call for more,
not less, attention to inspections and safe equipment.
Since 2015, there has been a 30% reduction of employees. With such
a reduction in employment, there should have been a corresponding
reduction in employee injuries. But that has not been the case.
Congress has not comprehensively addressed railroad safety since
2008. We acknowledge that Congress, in the Infrastructure Investment
and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 117-58, addressed several issues critical to
railroad employees. However, many safety problems continue to exist,
and amendments are long overdue. The railroad workers have various
proposals which are attached for your consideration that would
significantly improve safety.\1\
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\1\ See Attachment A
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Safety Statistics
Railroad safety has grown worse since 2020. (See chart below).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Source: Table 1.12, https://safetydata.fra.dot.gov
2020 2021
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accidents/Incidents............................. 8,792 9,192
Total Fatalities................................ 746 902
Fatalities at crossings......................... 196 237
Collisions at crossings......................... 1,906 2,131
Employee on duty injuries....................... 2,961 3,054
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Derailments were reduced slightly from 1,116 to 1,073, but that is
still unacceptable.
A few specifics are illuminating. For example, on Norfolk Southern,
during a 7-month period in 2021, five conductors suffered amputations
and crushing injuries. Two of these amputations happened to newly
marked up new hires who went through the reduced training by NS. One
new hire rode a runaway car with no brakes for seven miles. This is a
blatant disregard of safety and the wellbeing of their own employees.
This is due, in part, because the NS has reduced its training program
for operating crews from 18 weeks to 6 weeks. This not only jeopardizes
the safety of a recently promoted conductor, but it also jeopardizes
his or her fellow co-workers, and every community and industry they
encounter.
There are a number of hidden safety issues that the railroads do
not report to the public or FRA. For example, my office has received
thousands of complaints regarding technological failures, including
positive train control failures. Our organization has received reports
of 187 PTC failures alone this year. That flies in the face of the
railroad argument that PTC is the answer to the elimination of human
factor incidents and justification to further reduce crew size. There
are likely more that were not reported for fear of retaliation. Also,
FRA sponsors a voluntary confidential program allowing railroad
carriers and their employees to report close calls. The problem is that
no Class 1 railroad is participating. The participants in the program
evaluate an issue and make recommendations for corrective action.
Employees are not retaliated against for being involved in a close
call, if he/she reports the incident. Nearly all transportation
incidents are preceded by a chain of events, one of which might have
prevented the accident if it had gone another way. When railroads
analyze individual close-call events as a group, safety risks can be
identified, and solutions developed. Close call reports can also
provide important safety information to the FRA so that it can more
effectively share important safety information with other carriers and
develop safety and enforcement tools to address any widespread safety
problems.) The airlines have a similar program called Aviation Safety
Action Program (ASAP) which has contributed to the airlines' stellar
safety record.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See Attachment B
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Another factor in the poor safety record is the fact that the
railroads have not put its profits into improving safety. As pointed
out by Mr. Martin Oberman, Chairman of the Surface Transportation
Board, U.S. railroads have reduced service to customers, raised freight
rates, while deriving $191 billion in dividends and stock buybacks
since 2010. The railroads paid out $77 billion in dividends during that
period. Recently, NS issued a $10 billion buyback of its stock. While
the above benefits the railroads stock price, it certainly did not
improve safety.
Precision Scheduled Railroading
Precision Scheduled Railroading is a service model the Class I
railroads have adopted, or are adopting, in an effort to streamline
operations. They tout it as providing shippers with consistent and
reliable service. PSR is the brainchild of Wall Street urging railroads
to increase their stock price. Implementing PSR has helped the
railroads lower their operating ratio which, in turn, assists investors
determine the financial health of a company. The adverse effect of PSR
greatly outweighs the increased profits of the railroads. The
significant reduction is the number of employees has greatly impacted
safe operations, increased fatigue associated with the same demanding
work with fewer employees, less training, less inspection of cars,
deferred maintenance, improper train make up, and potential safety
hazards being glossed over.
One serious safety issue arising now is that yardmasters are
required to supervise and monitor yard movements and radio
communications of several yards at once, and in some cases across an
entire state. As a result, emergency radio communications are being
missed, and improper instructions are becoming more common.
The railroads know that they can operate with little oversight by
FRA. The current administration is trying to improve this problem, but
as a study by the GAO pointed out, the FRA ``. . . estimates that its
inspectors have the ability to annually inspect less than 1 percent of
the railroad activities covered in regulation.'' RAIL SAFETY Improved
Human Capital Planning Could Address Emerging Safety Oversight
Challenge, Report to Congressional Requesters, December 2013, GAO-14-
85.
I testified at the ``Hearing on Urgent Issues in Freight Rail
Service'' before the Surface Transportation Board on April 26, 2022,
and pointed out the many safety problems that have occurred as the
result of PSR. My testimony is attached.\4\
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\4\ See Attachment C
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Needed Safety Improvements
Attached to my testimony are the much-needed safety improvements.
Some of these include crew size, fatigue and hours of service, close
call reporting, train length, blocked crossings, damages against
employees, proper train make-up, electronic controlled brakes, speed
signs, safe handholds on tank cars, union representatives allowed on
railroad property to inspect for safety, whistleblower, and Mexican
trains. I will discuss some of these.
Crew Size
On March 15, 2016 (81 Fed. Reg. 13918), FRA issued a Notice of
proposed Rulemaking covering all crew size issues. On June 15, 2016 (81
Fed. Reg. 39014), FRA noticed an oral hearing on the NPRM. The 0MB did
not clear the regulation before the end of the Obama administration.
Three years after the NPRM, the prior administration withdrew the
proposed regulation. 84 Fed. Reg. 24737. In the withdrawal, the FRA
also ruled that states were preempted from issuing such a rule. This
was done without any prior notice to the public. On Feb. 23, 2021, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the FRA decision
to preempt the states was improper, and it vacated the regulation
withdrawal. Transportation Division of the International Association of
Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, and Transportation Workers; Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen v. Federal Railroad Administration,
988 F. 3d 1170.
It should be noted that President Biden has publicly stated that he
supports two-person crews on freight trains. We understand that the FRA
is considering promulgating a crew size regulation. However, mandatory
legislation is necessary in order to prevent a future Administration's
attempt to repeal such regulation.
Fatigue and Hours of Service Amendments
Fatigue continues to be the greatest safety issue in the rail
industry. In 2008, Congress enacted some hours of service improvements.
See, Pub. L. 110-432, Sec. 108. However, many railroads still abuse the
law and changes are necessary to create a safe operating environment.
Fatigue can be significantly eliminated by requiring some hours of
service changes. All freight service assignments without defined start
times should have at least 10 hours prior notice calling time.
All yardmaster assignments should be covered service under the
freight employee's hours of service provisions. This craft typically
works 16 hours/day. Yardmasters are safety sensitive employees, and, in
the interests of safety, should not be forced to work excessive hours.
All deadheads in excess of three hours should be counted as a job
start. Numerous times, after working 12 hours, crews have been required
to wait for, and/or be in, deadhead service, for more than 8 hours.
This creates a serious fatigue issue. Also, as noted in the STB
hearing, it is common for crews to layover between 20 and 30 hours at
their away-from-home terminal. Many crews have been forced to remain at
the away from home terminals for multiple days, and the railroads
treated the stays as mandatory rest days. This is another issue of
abuse by railroads. No amount of time off duty at the away from home
terminal should reset the calendar clock of job starts, and the
employee should not be required to take mandatory rest days at the away
from home terminal.
Employees who work road service pools and extra boards are
requiredto be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week for a call
for duty with only one and a half to two hours' notice. Obviously, many
times, the employee must go to work fatigued, creating a major safety
issue. A response from a UP manager to an employee's complaint stated
``Please plan to be called anytime. Thanks.'' (Ex. 8 to BLET testimony
at STB hearing). It should not be forgotten that many trains transport
hazardous materials, including chlorine gas, anhydrous ammonia,
propane, etc. One full tank car can weigh 131 tons. Obviously, only
alert employees should operate such trains.
Current practice by many railroads is not informing an employee how
long an interim rest period will be. The result is that the employees
are unable to obtain reasonable rest. Interim release periods should
require railroads to notify the crew before going off-duty. If the crew
is not notified, the 10 hours uninterrupted rest should apply.
Another major problem is lack of nutritious food for employees at
their away from home terminal. Having hot nutritious food available for
railroad employees has been a serious problem for a number of years
because of FRA failing to enforce the current statutory requirement.
For example, the FRA has allowed the railroads to provide canned,
prepackaged, and frozen fast foods to be in compliance with the
requirement for ``suitable food''. See, April 29, 1991, FRA
interpretations of Hours of Service law. A railroad should be required
to provide hot nutritious food 24 hours a day at the sleeping quarters
for a particular crew at the away from home designated terminal, and at
a release location which is available for rest for a particular crew.
If such food is not provided on a railroad's premises, a restaurant
which provides such food should not be located more than 5 minutes
normal walking distance from the employee's sleeping quarters or other
rest facility. Fast food establishments should not satisfy the
requirements of this subsection.
Last, but not least, is the practice by some of the major carriers,
such as BNSF and CN, to impose draconian attendance policies. Attached
is the BNSF Policy and Q&A.\5\ As you can observe, it severely limits
the ability of employees to being able to mark off duty for such things
as medical issues and family emergencies. For example BNSF's most
recent absenteeism policy known as ``Hi-Viz,'' which was unilaterally
imposed upon its employees on February 1, 2022. The policy only allows
for a worker to have one day off a month and penalizes them for sick
time or for needing to take care of their family when a medical
emergency arises. It also assesses discipline, or, at the very least,
disincentivizes our members from utilizing family medical leave and
receiving necessary rest. The employees are not even allowed to take
time off for FRA required hearing and vision certification
requirements. As a result of the PSR, employees are forced to decide
between rest or spending time with their family. Members must go to
work fatigued because railroads afford them no other option--work or be
fired.
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\5\ See Attachment D & D-1
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Long Trains and Blocked Crossings
One of the features of PSR is that many trains now exceed miles in
length and transport hazardous materials. As shown at the STB hearing,
on CSXT during the 1st Quarter of 2022, a train departing South
Schenectady, NY totaled 24,138 feet. A number of the railroad's trains
exceeded 20,000 feet. This is typical throughout Class 1 railroads and
creates many safety problems, mechanical and logistical, such as the
inability to maintain adequate brake pipe pressure, which is needed so
a train can safely slow and stop. As trains lengthen, incidences of
them breaking apart are far more frequent, and a crewmember cannot
observe and monitor an entire two-mile-long train by looking out of the
window. Long trains create more air brake problems (especially in cold
weather), sticking brakes, flat wheels, more slack action, and couplers
and drawbar limits being exceeded, less track time for maintenance,
etc. Also, when a conductor is required to walk a long train, many
times on uneven terrain and during all weather conditions, the portable
radios often times lose contact with the engineer in the lead
locomotive. A train's two-way telemetry device and distributive
locomotives lose contact with the lead locomotive. One such incident
caused a runaway train on the Union Pacific in October 2018 killing two
crewmembers. The track was PTC active at the time. We have daily
reports of loss of communications and it's a wonder that we have not
had more catastrophic events as a result.
When a train is too long, and there is a loss of communication with
the rear of the train, the locomotive engineer cannot activate the
brakes at the rear of the train. Most importantly, when a long train
becomes disabled where it blocks a crossing, it is far more difficult
to uncouple the train to open crossings. On April 25, 2017, the
National Legislative Director of SMART-TD wrote to the Administrator of
the FRA, expressing specific safety concerns about railroads operating
excessively long trains. He sought an emergency order to limit the
length of trains. FRA responded on March 7, 2018, that the railroads
are operating the longer trains ``in an attempt to enhance service
delivery and operational efficiencies.'' The response by FRA did not
acknowledge the safety problems inherent in such operations. On May 21,
2021, Grady Cothen, a former Associate Administrator for Safety at FRA,
gave a presentation at the Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting
on the serious safety problems inherent in operations of long trains.
His document is entitled ``Management of In-Train Forces: Challenges
and Directions''. FRA has not taken any affirmative action as a result
of the presentation. Congress must step in and mandate that the length
of trains be limited.
An obvious problem with long trains is that in many instances
railroad crossings are blocked for long periods of time. This is a
major safety concern for emergency vehicles. Congress should prevent
railroads from blocking crossings after a certain length of time. Some
courts have ruled that states do not have authority to regulate this
issue. See, CSX Transportation, Inc. v. City of Plymouth, 283 F. 3d 812
(6th Cir. 2002). Crossings blocked by extra-long trains present more
than a simple inconvenience to drivers. They present legitimate dangers
to the lives of the public by potentially obstructing emergency vehicle
traffic, which then may have to go miles out of their way, especially
in rural areas, to respond to a fire, accident or medical crisis.
Relating to train length, the FRA has acknowledged that blocked
crossings is one of the largest complaints received from congressional
members. This can easily be corrected by requiring that the train crew
promptly make a separation of the train after a short time period. In
addition, having a Conductor on the train is necessary to be able to do
this in a timely manner.
Another reason for the blocked crossings is that railroad sidings,
nor yards, were ever constructed to accommodate these huge trains. As a
result, trains must remain on the main tracks for long periods, many
times blocking crossings.
We acknowledge that Congress, in the Infrastructure Investment and
Jobs Act, requires the FRA to establish s blocked crossing portal to
collect information regarding the cause of blocked crossing. (Sec.
22404). Everyone in the industry already knows the cause--it is long
trains. Congress needs to substantively address this problem now.
Improper train make-up
For many years, improper distribution of loaded and empty freight
cars (i.e., when a railroad attaches empty cars in the front of a
consist and loaded cars on the rear) has caused countless derailments.
In-train forces from the rear cause unsafe train handling and result in
derailments when a train slows. These forces break equipment, cause
rails to turn over or cause cars to climb the rails. Heavier freight
cars and longer trains create more of these forces.
Over the years, too many derailments could have been prevented by
proper train make-up. The CSX derailment in Hyndman, PA, on August 2,
2017, is a good example. There, 33 cars derailed, including 3 hazardous
materials cars which erupted, resulting in a fire. There were 128
loaded cars and 50 empty cars in the train. The NTSB issued a report of
the accident, stating that one of the probable causes was ``the
placement of blocks of empty rail cars at the front of the train
consist.'' (NTSB Acc. Rep. NTSB/RAR-20/04, pgs. vii and 29). The Board
pointed out that 90 % of the train's total tonnage was behind the lead
42 cars, resulting in excessive longitudinal and lateral forces exerted
on the empty cars.
In 1994, Congress required the Secretary to study existing
practices regarding the placement of cars on trains, with particular
attention to the placement of cars that carry hazardous materials, and
the FRA concluded that no new regulations were needed. We believe that
conclusion is outdated, particularly with the current use of longer
trains. The quality of train make-up has deteriorated with the advent
of longer trains. The Association of American Railroads has a Train
Make-Up Manual, which provides guidelines on train make-up. These are
not enforceable and are violated constantly. Congress should address
this issue by requiring FRA to promulgate regulations mandating proper
train make-up.
Damages lawsuits by railroads against employees
The Federal Employers' Liability Act was enacted in 1908, which
allows injured rail workers to file claims when railroads are
negligent. Not until recent years did the railroads began filing
lawsuits against employees for damages to railroad equipment. Some
courts have ruled that a railroad could seek damages against an
employee arising out of an accident. See Norfolk Southern Rwy. Co. v.
Tobergete and Hall, Civil Action No. 5:18-207-KKC (E.D. KY). In this
case, the railroad is sought $3,770,420.65. In another decision, Ammons
v. Wisconsin Central, LTD, 124 N.E. 3d 1(S. Ct. Ill. 2019), cert.
denied, Oct. 5, 2020, the appellate court upheld a lower court decision
that a railroad could seek property damages against an employee arising
out of an accident in Joliet, Illinois. In this Illinois case, the
railroad contends that it sustained property damages in excess of one
million dollars as a result of the collision. The case has been
remanded back to the Illinois circuit court for discovery and
preparation for trial.
There are only a handful of other cases relating to the same issue.
See Nordgren v. Burlington Northern RR, 101 F. 3d 1246 (8th Cir. 1996);
Schendel v. Duluth, Missabe, et. al., RR, 2014 WL 5365131 (MN. Dist.
Ct.) (RR seeking $2 million); Mancini v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 75724 (N.D. N.Y. 2010); Norfolk Southern Rwy. v. Paul
Murphy, et. al., 3-03-cv-665 (N.D. Ind. 2003); Kansas City Southern RR.
v. Morgan, No. 94-5016-cv-sw-8(W.D. MO. 1994); See also Michael Beethe,
Railroads Suing Injured Employees: Should the Federal Employers'
Liability Act Allow Railroads To Recover From Injured Railroad Workers
For Property Damages?, University of Missouri-Kansas City L. Rev. 232
(Winter 1996).
If allowed to continue, the vast majority of railroad accidents
will create a serious financial burden on railroad employees and their
families and which will result in numerous bankruptcies. It is common
knowledge that potential property damages in a train accident can be
enormous, resulting in millions of dollars. When compared to the amount
of reportable property damages in railroad accidents, the only valid
conclusion is that a railroad will not be able to recover damages from
its employees. Because there is no realistic opportunity for a railroad
to recover such property damages, a railroad's only intent for seeking
such recovery is to thwart an injury claim by the employee.
Recent Supreme Court Decision
On April 28, 2022, the Supreme Court, in a 4-4 decision, upheld a
decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, which held
that a locomotive was not ``in use'' under the Locomotive Inspection
Act (``LIA''). 49 U.S.C. Sec. 20701. There was no written opinion by
the Supreme Court. Justice Barrett took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case because she authored the opinion in the court of
appeals. The case is entitled LeDure v. Union Pacific RR. The 7th
Circuit decision is located at 962 F. 3d 907 (7th Cir. 2020). The
effect of the ruling is that, going forward, there will be numerous
expensive litigation nationwide attempting to determine if the Supreme
Court's decision prohibits application of the LIA.
In the LeDure case, the conductor, who brought the FELA case, was
preparing a group of locomotives for departure, and he slipped and fell
while walking along the locomotive walkway. The lower court held that
because the locomotive was stationary, was on a side track, and was
part of a train still needing to be assembled, it was not in use at the
time of the fall. The court of appeals upheld the lower court's
reasoning and decision.
Evidence demonstrates that a greater number of employees are
injured on locomotives not moving, than on moving locomotives. It
should not matter if a locomotive is moving or not. Any employee
injured while working on a locomotive should be protected to the same
extend as if he/she is injured while the locomotive is moving.
Statistics compiled by FRA from railroads' reporting show that between
CY 2015-2021, there were 1,660 injuries to employees in a locomotive
standing in the cab or walkways, and during the same period there were
388 injuries while a locomotive was moving. See, https://
safetydata.fra.dot.gov/OfficeofSafety/publicsite/Query/castally1.aspx.
(Table 2.04) Operating crews do more than transport freight across the
country. Much work is required prior to any movement. Many crews are
assigned to build trains in hundreds of rail yards throughout the
country. They board an alight locomotives and rail cars constantly in
the yards and are exposed daily to the hazards which the FRA has
addressed in the safety regulations.
Congress can put an end to the great expense litigating this issue
by eliminating the ``in use'' requirement under the LIA.
Time requirements imposed upon FRA
Based upon a 2021 court of appeals decision, mandatory time limits
Congress has placed upon FRA has limited validity. In SMART-TD and BLET
v. FRA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
citing a Supreme Court decision, ruled that ``If a statute does not
specify the consequence for noncompliance with a statutory timing
provision, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose
their own coercive sanction.'' 10 F. 4th 869, 874 (Aug. 20, 2021).
Congress, among other requirements, mandated that FRA promulgate a
risk reduction program, including a fatigue management requirement. 49
U.S.C. Sec. 20156. Congress requires that FRA must finalize a
regulation within 12 months of the notice of proposed rulemaking. 49
U.S.C. 20103(b). In the above case, the final rule was promulgated nine
years after the advance notice of proposed rulemaking was issued and
five years after the notice of proposed rulemaking was issued. That
clearly violated the congressional mandate, but the court,
nevertheless, upheld the regulation. The FRA still has not promulgated
a final Fatigue Management regulation.
Congress needs to insert a consequence for noncompliance with 49
U.S.C. 20103(b).
There are a number of other needed safety amendments, which are
attached to our testimony. We urge you to address each of these issues.
We thank you for your consideration.
Attachments
[The attachments referenced in Mr. Ferguson's prepared statement
are retained in committee files and are available online at:
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/PW/PW14/20220614/114882/HHRG-117-PW14-
Wstate-FergusonJ-20220614-SD001.pdf ]
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much.
We will now move on to Member questions. Each Member will
be recognized for 5 minutes, and I will start by recognizing
myself.
Mr. Morrison, have your members identified defects that
were missed by automated track inspection technology inspecting
the same track, and can you share an example?
Mr. Morrison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question.
Yes, my members have identified multiple defects that were
missed by the track geometry measurement technology. Several
examples exist, and I could get your office a list later. But I
have examples of broken rails, stripped joints where the joints
rip completely out, and it is the discontinuance in the rail
just like a broken [inaudible], tie defects, crossings where
the train was coming in contact with the crossing. We provided
several examples in our lawsuit with BNSF in 2018, and I can
provide you as many more as you want.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Mr. Grissom, what are the effects of allowing carmen only
one-third of the usual time to inspect railcars?
Mr. Grissom. Employees are pressured to rush the
inspection, and they are not doing a proper inspection on the
cars or repairs. When you inspect it, you might have to change
a brake shoe or go underneath, check the side bearing clearance
or clearance on the center plate, and this isn't being allowed
because with the pressure from management to get the cars out,
to get the train out to keep everything on schedule, there is
not enough time or employees allowed to properly inspect the
freight trains.
Mr. Payne. Mr. Ferguson, what are the safety reasons that
two-person crews are the industry standard on Class I freight
trains?
Mr. Ferguson. Well, thank you for the question, sir. The
safety reasons are endless. Two sets of eyes in the cab of the
locomotive is paramount for the safety of our communities that
we operate under. It keeps the trains moving, which helps our
supply chain. And, of course, it keeps fellow employees safe at
all given times.
Mr. Payne. Thank you.
With that, I will yield back and recognize the ranking
member.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to direct this question to Mr. Bachman. How has
automated track inspection technology improved freight rail
safety, and how can it be used to help not only in basic safety
inspections, but also in potentially identifying security
threats to our freight rail network?
Mr. Bachman. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
Where automated track inspection has benefited the industry,
specifically in our case, over the last decade-plus, we have
been able to collect copious amounts of data over nearly
500,000 miles worth of track. And it is the collection of this
data and really understanding what the conditions are on the
ground that have allowed us to provide metrics to our
customers, the railroads, where they can go out and identify
specific areas that need the greatest amount of attention and
allocate their resources to address those areas that have the
most pressing needs.
In terms of the overall safety of the railroads, we are of
the mind that by going out and collecting track and identifying
tie condition, really across the country, we have been able to
get a better understanding of overall tie condition, how ties
exist in different environments, and that has really allowed
the railroads the opportunity to plan better, to plan smarter,
and produce an overall greater quality product.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you. I appreciate the response.
And, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman yields back.
And now we will have Mr. Moulton from Massachusetts for 5
minutes.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, after reading all of your testimonies from four of
you, Mr. Morrison, Mr. Grissom, Mr. Ferguson, and Mr. Cothen,
gentlemen, all of you directly called out PSR, Precision
Scheduled Railroading, for its deleterious effects on service
and drastic cuts to vital personnel. I mean, there is not a
single piece of testimony that notes any benefit to PSR
whatsoever, which for all intents and purposes, appears to
strictly benefit the Wall Street shareholders whose pockets are
being padded by this change.
So, for all of you, how have we assembled a panel of
industry experts here today and not a single one of you stands
by arguably the biggest labor and financial decision
implemented in freight rail in the past quarter century? How
did we end up here? How did we end up here, and how do we get
out of this mess and return to a functional system that
prioritizes service capacity and safety and actually grows
volume, actually has customers saying, I want to switch from
truck to rail, because not only is it better for the rest of
America to get these trucks off the highway, but the railways
are actually offering better service? How do we get there?
Ms. Sanborn. Congressman Moulton, thank you for the
question. I will start. This is Cindy Sanborn from Norfolk
Southern, and I represent AAR as well.
I have to tell you that, in my mind, PSR is a catchphrase
for things people don't like about what is going on in the
railroad. I have to tell you that, at Norfolk Southern, we
implemented the basic principles of PSR in 2019, and those
basic principles are about turning assets, turning railcars,
and not switching them as many places if we don't need to to
benefit our customers.
And, as we implemented it in 2019, we actually saw our
service being extremely strong, some of the best we have had in
many, many years. And what we found was, if we weren't
switching cars as many places, and we had the technology of
distributed power and more technology on our locomotives than
we have had in years, upgrades to the capability of the track
[inaudible] of locomotives that allowed us to build longer
trains, and those two things together allowed us to not need as
many people to operate, whether it was traincrews or, in fact,
we shed about 400 locomotives at Norfolk Southern, so, we
didn't need as many people to work on locomotives.
And then we hit a pandemic. And going into the pandemic we
saw complete industries--think about the automobile industry
that went completely to no production whatsoever. We served
that both on the outbound side of finished automobiles and the
inbound side on metals and plastics going into making those
automobiles. And so, then we furloughed as a result of that
change in demand.
And as we have come out of the pandemic, as we all know,
the labor market has changed substantially in terms of the
amount of people looking for work versus the number of jobs
that are needed. And as I mentioned, our employees got us
through the pandemic, and they have worked tirelessly and very,
very diligently. And we are hiring very aggressively to help
solve these service issues because we want to grow our
business.
Mr. Moulton. Ms. Sanborn, look, employees have a tough job.
I have worked on a railroad track before. It is technical work.
It is often backbreaking work. They need to know the details of
that job, and yet, the STB issued an order criticizing Norfolk
Southern for a disturbing lack of detail about your plans to
improve service, including how many people NS will hire and how
you will do it.
I mean, these are obviously challenges, I get it. You are
facing challenges. But your employees are doing great work.
They are putting it in every day. How come you can't even come
up with a detailed plan for how you are going to fix this
problem?
Ms. Sanborn. Our discussions, our information we provided
to the STB was around our hiring plans, and if you look at our
geography, we have 95 hiring locations. If we gave a total
number of how many people we wanted to hire, if we didn't have
them in the right physical locations, in other words, you could
hit that target number but still not have the right people
spread across the different locations, we still wouldn't see
service improve.
So, trying to answer the question is extremely difficult,
but rest assured, we have substantial plans and are recruiting
very, very diligently. Some locations we are hiring where we
have very little difficulty sourcing employees, and some places
the job market is extremely, extremely tight, and we are having
trouble----
Mr. Moulton [interrupting]. What are you doing--what are
you doing to address derailments and the fact that these long
trains break in two much more frequently than shorter trains
and the fact that you don't even have sidings to hold these
long trains; the yards can't handle them? So, cars will wait
for days just waiting for a long train because you don't have
the locomotives, you don't have the personnel to operate these
trains. And then you finally get that train over the road, it
breaks in half, and when you finally get it back together and
get it to a yard, the yard can't even receive it.
Ms. Sanborn. Well, thanks for your----
Mr. Moulton [interrupting]. I mean, tell me that is not a
mess.
Ms. Sanborn. Thanks for your question. In the limited time
here and in the sake of brevity, I will tell you that, if we
had to run more trains, we would need even more people than we
need today. And running longer trains is allowing us to more
efficiently move what we can move and safely. I do not think
the evidence supports that longer trains drive derailments.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I would like to look into that further.
Mr. Chairman, I hope we can examine that last question further
because I think the exact opposite, that we are seeing more
derailments, more train breaks because they are so long. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Sanborn. I will be glad to communicate specifically
with you about that if you have specific questions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. And I concur----
Mr. Moulton [interrupting]. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Payne. I concur with the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Next we will hear from Mr. Garcia of Illinois.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question for Mr. Grissom. How seriously do you think that
railroads take fatigue as a safety issue, and how do you think
the FRA's new fatigue rule would change things?
Mr. Grissom. Well, the first part of your question there,
the railroads are not--I don't believe have taken fatigue at
all seriously. Let me give you an example. On CSX, we have a
form called PI-82, where the employees can report an unsafe
condition. Our members were turning in these PI-82s when they
are forced to work 16 hours or even beyond 16 hours. They were
telling their managers they were fatigued. They can't even stay
awake. They can't perform their job safely.
And the managers refused to accept these PI-82s, unsafe
condition forms. They clearly stated that these are not a
safety concern. This is not part of their safety program. And
this is what they are continuously telling our members. This
just happened on Monday right when the fatigue report came out,
and I can tell you, CSX, for one carrier is not taking it
seriously. The only thing that gets their attention is if it
affects their profit. If you hit them in their pocketbook, that
is what they take seriously. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you. Thank you, sir.
A question for Mr. Ferguson. You mentioned in your
testimony that radio communication failures are regularly
occurring because of the growing lengths of trains. Can you
expand on that and also address the real-life issues that this
creates for a conductor and an engineer. And also, what would
happen if this would occur while the train was blocking a
crossing and a crew was unable to communicate?
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, Mr. Congressman. Thank you. That is an
excellent question. And it happens every day out here across
all the Class I railroads that are dealing with extremely long
trains. For instance, I just got a report a few minutes ago,
there is a train operating across the State of Missouri that is
just over 21,000 feet long. So, that is three of our typical
trains, let's just say three times 7,000, right.
So, when you are trying to put that train together or you
have a crossing that you have to cut, and that means separate
the railroad cars that are blocking the highway-grade crossing,
the conductor has to communicate with the head-end where the
engineer is to move the cars and the train back and forth to
get everything situated.
And the radios that we are carrying as train men as
conductors can't stretch over 2 miles in most instances, and
some even less depending on what the weather and the other
atmospheric conditions are, so that creates a very unsafe
condition. And, if you get the equipment moving and then you
need to stop it suddenly, you can't get that message relayed to
the head-end.
If you are in a yard operation, management will tell our
crews to have somebody relay it, have a yardmaster relay it.
Everybody is too busy. There is too much radio chatter going
on. There are too many other things that are interfering with
the safe operation of that specific move, and it can become
very catastrophic very quickly, especially if the train is 3 to
4 miles long. That is insanity. So, it jeopardizes not only our
safety but the communities that we have to operate through and
when we are stopped and we have to separate equipment across
grade crossings.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. OK. Thank you.
And just a rapid-fire question to Mr. Grissom, Mr.
Ferguson, and Mr. Morrison, each of you mentioned the important
outstanding safety issues that need to be addressed by the FRA.
What is something that the FRA can do to address a concern you
raised in your testimony? And real brief, please.
Mr. Morrison. Thank you, Congressman. I would like to
start, if it is possible. As we said, I would say the biggest
thing that FRA could do is start enforcing the regulations on
manager disqualification for knowingly violating whistleblower
protections. We have been asking the FRA to look at those
regulations and implement them in an industry that is known for
its retaliatory behavior and making it hard on workers.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you. Anyone else? Because my
time is almost up.
Mr. Grissom. Yes, I would like to add just to have the FRA
show up more, enforce the regulations, and don't tip off
management before they come on the property so they get a true
picture of what is the day-to-day operation.
Mr. Garcia of Illinois. OK. Thank you, sir. And I think my
time is up, so, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Now we will have the gentlelady from California, Mrs.
Napolitano, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I agree with the
comments from my colleagues on the length of the trains because
that is one issue that I have had long in my area.
But, Ms. Sanborn, I have been long concerned about grade
crossing safety and blocked crossings. The statement from the
Association of State Railroad Safety Managers describes the
harmful safety impact of blocked crossings. But they also say
some railroads are requiring local municipalities to pay
maintenance fees for various grade crossing improvement
projects resulting in delay, canceling, or scaling back a
project intended to enhance grade crossing safety.
These maintenance fees have long been paid for by the
railroads, but now, shortly after Congress made available
billions in grants to support grade crossing improvement
projects, railroads are trying to pass the buck. We should be
working together to improve the grade crossing safety, not
creating more obstacles. And why are the railroads now having
governments pay for these maintenance fees, and can your
company and AAR look into this and please reverse the trend?
Ms. Sanborn. I am sorry, I could not quite understand what
you were saying. If somebody else did, I am happy to hear them.
Help me understand better what you just asked me. I just
couldn't hear you.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, it has to do with the rail crossings
and the grade crossing improvements. Prior to this, the
railroads took care of the maintenance fees, and now they are
asking the communities to pay for it but shortly after Congress
made available billions in grants to support them. And why are
the railroads now having governments pay for these maintenance
fees, and can your company and AAR look into it and please
reverse the trend?
Ms. Sanborn. Yes. So, as far as road crossing maintenance
fees, we pay for the operation of the crossing once it is
installed. And, if there is some specific questions that you
have, Congresswoman Napolitano, I will be happy to look
further. I am not that conversant on the issue that you are
bringing up specifically, but we will get back to you with an
answer.
Mrs. Napolitano. Well, this certainly is a problem. And I
agree with my colleagues' comments that the railroads are
making profits for Wall Street, and the communities are
suffering. And we need to be sure that we back the employees
because they--and as far as the whistleblowers are concerned,
maybe we should make more availability to them to tell us what
is going wrong so we can take action.
And I know that the railroads have autonomy over much of
what happens on the land, but it is important that we provide
more safety for the employees. I know, in my area, there are
many employees of the railroad, and sometimes they come to me
with some of the issues that they feel are important for their
safety, but we don't have enough input to be able to take
action on it.
Ms. Sanborn. To your point, I would agree that and involve
myself in listening to employees. In fact, in the last 30 days,
I have been in Roanoke, Virginia; Cincinnati, Ohio; Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; and I will be in the yard in Atlanta here on
Thursday and listening to our employees and what they have to
say around safety and concerns that they have.
I think that there is general frustration that they would
like to see the railroad operate better. They feel better when
the railroad operates better. And we absolutely want to do
that, both from a safety perspective and serving our customers
as well.
I would also say that part of the solution is hiring, and
we are very aggressively hiring and need our existing employees
that are working the jobs today to help train new employees.
And this is across all crafts. This is not just T&E.
And to your point around crossings and paying for things, I
would like to make this point: we compete across many, many
areas. We compete in service. There are alternatives to using
our service. We compete in terms of cost to be able to be the
most efficient, effective as we can so we can charge a
reasonable price for our service. And we compete from a
standpoint of capital markets and having access to those
capital markets by having shareholders buy our stock.
So, all three areas are very important areas for us to be
effective and efficient and serve our customers with the
overall umbrella constantly being safety. And we want to grow
our business. We feel that we are very climate friendly. We
know we are very climate friendly. We offer our customers an
opportunity to reduce their carbon footprint, and only can we
do that if we are able to provide a very, very good service.
And it takes our employees to do that; if it weren't for them,
we would not have a business. So, I think we are aligned in
many, many areas. I think frustrations might exist as well, but
thank you for your questions.
Mrs. Napolitano. I would like to be able to connect with
you later, because there are many other points that I would
like to bring forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentlelady yields back.
We will now have the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for
having this hearing, and I thank the second panel of witnesses
for your testimony today.
Workforce cuts by Class I railroads have decimated their
workforces by one-third of their size since 2015, and what is
especially shocking is that this cutting of the labor force
predates the pandemic. To date, rail companies have failed to
rehire previously furloughed workers, leading to labor
shortages on many rail lines.
Mr. Grissom and Mr. Morrison, do you think harsh and unduly
challenging working conditions play a role in workers deciding
not to return to the workforce, such as forced overtime,
heavier workloads, and management pressure to circumvent
safety?
Mr. Grissom. Yes. Thank you for the question. And you are
correct; we saw this problem before the pandemic, and one of
the issues is the railroads. They will furlough somebody. They
will be furloughed for a year or two, call them back. They may
work another year or two and then get laid off again. And
people are just sick and tired of being a part-time employee,
and they are just in a dilemma during the part of the furlough.
And so, you are right about the conditions and the
intimidation and not being respected as an employee at work.
This is what we are hearing from our members. And we are seeing
employees with 20, 25 years into the rail retirement system,
and we have got a unique rail retirement system where you can
have 30 years at age 60 and fully retire, and we are seeing
people with 20, 25 years of service walking off the job and----
Mr. Johnson of Georgia [interrupting]. And they are not
coming back because of the work conditions that are in
existence at this time. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Grissom. Yes. It is just they don't feel safe at work.
They just don't feel like they are taking safety seriously.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Grissom. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. All right. And, Mr. Morrison, what
do you think about it?
Mr. Morrison. Yes, thank you for the question, Congressman.
This is a great topic. Yes, the conditions our members are
being forced to work in right now are just catastrophic. And a
lot of them--yes, the work is hard and, yes, it is taxing on
our members and it is taking physical tolls, but also our
members are very professional in what they do.
And we have members also walking away from the industry
because of what they see this automated track inspection is
doing. They don't feel safe as a track inspector, and they
don't feel that the railroads are making that--giving them the
tools that they need to keep that railroad track safe. So----
Mr. Johnson of Georgia [interrupting]. Well, let me ask you
this question: What types of changes to working conditions
would be needed to encourage workers to remain on the job or
return to the job?
Mr. Morrison. So, for the maintenance-of-way employees,
yes, hiring and getting more people out there is absolutely
critical. Now, the railroads don't value their employees like
they say they do. We are in negotiations right now, and they
are not really keeping the industry as good of a job as it used
to be, and it is a highly hostile workforce. It is the only
industry I know of where our members actually purchase
insurance for when they get fired to help get them through the
process of going through the investigation and try to get back,
which might take up to 2 years.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Yes. Let me ask this question, Ms.
Sanborn. In recent years, trains have been growing consistently
longer with lengths now reaching more than 3 miles. What
factors, Ms. Sanborn, are evaluated when determining how long a
train should be, and would you agree that the decisionmaking
process is primarily driven by cost factors rather than safety?
Ms. Sanborn. I will tell you that our decisions around
train size and how we plan for that are created on needs of
service for our customers and how can we move that freight most
efficiently. And train size does play a factor in it, and
anytime we operate a train of a different type or longer train
on a geography that we haven't before, we do simulations to
ensure that it can be done safely.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Well, you are trying to get as much
money as you can out of each shipment, and so that is why train
lengths have gotten longer. Isn't that correct?
Ms. Sanborn. It is like I mentioned before, just real
briefly, we compete in service. We compete in cost to make an
effective service to be able to charge a decent price. So,
there are a number of reasons that we get the benefits of
longer trains and can then handle more business because we
compete more effectively in that way.
Mr. Johnson of Georgia. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Payne. The gentleman's time has expired.
We will next hear from the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Auchincloss, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
As we begin to inject billions into our Nation's
infrastructure, including, of course, rail, no project will be
able to get off the ground without a workforce. Railroading is
a 24/7 operation, frequently requiring odd working hours and
unpredictable schedules.
The average total number of workers employed by the Class I
railroads at the end of 2021 was nearly one-third less than the
total employed in 2015, according to data reported by the
railroads and published by the Surface Transportation Board.
For both Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Grissom, you have testified
that workers are leaving the industry because of worsening
conditions on the job. As workers leave the railroads and
aren't being replaced by new hires, what effect is that having
on the workload for the people still there?
And, Mr. Ferguson, you can begin.
Mr. Ferguson. Yes, Mr. Congressman. Thank you.
What it is doing to the existing workforce is basically
unbearable. They put forth these draconian attendance policies.
They want more out of the workforce they have today, and it is
making their family life, their work life, every part of it
unbearable because they are so short-handed.
If you are home, if you are fortunate enough to get time
with your family, the phone is constantly ringing once you
become rested under the hours of service. They don't have
enough people to adequately staff the other trains that you are
technically not responsible for, so, they are going to
constantly ring your phone. That may be in the middle of the
night while you are trying to get sleep for when you are going
to work on your regular scheduled job.
Mr. Auchincloss. And then jumping in there, for Mr.
Grissom, to that point, are workers being expected to take on
more shifts and potentially work while fatigued or in unsafe
conditions?
Mr. Grissom. Yes, they're required to stay over. So, we
normally--like you said, we are 24/7, three shifts, first,
second, third shift. So, if you are working second shift from 3
o'clock to 11 o'clock, you are thinking you are going to get
off at 11 o'clock tonight. But if there is not enough people
for third shift, you are going to be forced. It is a
requirement. You are going to stay over and perform another
shift. So, you are going to be there 16 hours.
And when you get there, you don't know if you are going to
work 8 hours or 16 hours or 24 hours or when you are going to
get home. And you don't know how to pack a lunch, because you
can't leave the property to go through the McDonald's drive-
through. You are stuck on that property with no food. That is
another issue we have.
Mr. Auchincloss. Understood.
And switching gears to Mr. Cothen. Your testimony describes
a regression in the management of in-train forces, identifying
five types of recurring incidents that demonstrate the problem:
improperly sequencing cars within a train, lack of appropriate
locomotive power, brake lines that are too long to function
properly, failure to account for possible loss of communication
throughout a train, and relying on onboard systems
inappropriately.
If in-train forces is as old as railroading, why are these
problems happening?
Mr. Cothen. Well, I try not to go to head-to-head with the
railroad operating officer because they are pretty tough and
very knowledgeable. But the fact of the matter is that, number
one, traditionally this was a matter handled by the railroads
themselves and pretty well. There were still lapses and the
railroad would report the train makeup was the cause of the
accident and, indeed, we are still getting reports of train
makeup as cause of the accident. Sometimes it is improper use
of dynamic brakes, but the underlying cause is the train was
not manageable by the crew, given its composition.
The more you take a block of cars and add another block of
cars sequentially at different locations, you aggregate the
cars into the most efficient train, the less likely it is that
that train is going to be made up correctly in terms of the
management of in-train forces, and that is what is going on.
Mr. Auchincloss. Mr. Cothen, I am going to interject there.
Thank you for the response.
I do want to give Ms. Sanborn the final minute just to
respond to the comments thus far.
Ms. Sanborn. Yes. Thank you very much for that.
Let me talk about in-train forces. A lot of technology has
come along that has been very beneficial to us to handle longer
trains very efficiently and safely. Distributed power is an
example of that. Energy management systems that are basically
cruise control systems that help operate the train with an eye
towards managing in-train forces, as well as speed and fuel
efficiency.
And I would tell you that we have operating rules that give
us a--have a very clear understanding of trailing tonnage and
specifics around how the train is made up, whether there is
end-of-car cushioning devices----
Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. But these accidents are
still happening.
Ms. Sanborn [continuing]. Where they are on the train.
Pardon?
Mr. Auchincloss. These are still happening.
Ms. Sanborn. What is happening?
Mr. Auchincloss. The accidents are still happening at an
increasing rate, and so, it calls into question the new
technologies and their efficacy to the problems at hand.
Ms. Sanborn. I think the technology is enhancing our
operation to make it more safe. And I think the technology will
continue to do that, both from a standpoint of train build and
train marshaling. And we are continuing to improve in the
visibility of that for not just the next station but the entire
route of the train.
Mr. Auchincloss. Yielding back, Chairman.
Mr. Payne. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
That concludes our hearing for today. I would like to thank
each of the witnesses for your testimony today.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
writing.
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments and information
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record
of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Oregon, and Chair, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
I thank the chair for calling this hearing. With so much change
happening in this industry, this hearing provides an opportunity to
examine the current state of freight rail safety and discuss the
challenges of the day.
At the outset, I think it's important to recognize that this
industry has seen significant safety gains over the last several
decades. In the late 1980s, for the Class I freight railroads, 20,000-
30,000 total accidents/incidents every year were common, so too were
more than 2,000 non-grade crossing train accidents, 800-900 total
fatalities, and dozens of on-duty employees fatalities. By comparison,
for the current 10 years of 2013-2022, total accidents/incidents have
ranged from 5,000-6,000 per year, non-grade crossing train accidents
have ranged from 1,200-1,600, total fatalities include 400-600 deaths,
and on-duty employee fatalities ranged from 6-9 lost lives.
Now, the changes that led to these safety gains did not come easily
or happen overnight, and some gains were the result of congressional
mandate or regulation that were put in place over the industry's
objections.
Those statistics show clear improvements over the decades. With
that record in mind, I am worried that our progress has leveled off.
Accidents continue and lives are lost every year. And workers are still
suffering fatalities and grisly injuries: just last year, in the span
of a few days, one Class I had two new conductors with less than a year
of service suffer amputations after being struck by on track equipment.
Railroading is inherently demanding and dangerous; it's a 24/7
operation that requires working on or near large, heavy, moving
equipment. Trains that can measure miles-long and weigh tens of
thousands of tons are traveling through communities.
For those reasons, the conversation about improving safety will
never end. We need to be nimble and mitigate issues we know are unsafe.
This is especially true in the era of so-called precision scheduled
railroading (PSR). After years of my railing against PSR and the ills
it's brought to this industry, the debate about whether the Class I's
have cut their workforce too much has finally been to put rest. For two
days in April, labor, rail shippers, even Wall Street analysts and the
railroads themselves, openly discussed the need to hire more workers.
Last month, the Surface Transportation Board told this committee it
agrees. Well, it's about time.
Today we'll hear from union witnesses whose members feel they are
near the breaking point. They say that because there are so few
workers, they're working longer hours--sometimes consecutive days of
16-hour shifts--covering larger territories and feeling pressures to
rush their work. We know about these conditions because individual
workers are writing in and telling us--saying these pressures are
causing untenable fatigue and safety concerns, contributing to poor
morale, and prompting some to leave the industry--a stark change from
what has traditionally been a sought-after career. This should be
troubling to everyone participating in this hearing.
In addition to the worker perspective, I'm interested in hearing
from the expert witness who's leveraged his decades of rail safety
experience to call attention to a litany of accidents that he believes
demonstrates a regression of the industry's management of in-train
forces, resulting in repeated risks and preventable accidents.
Another safety expert is here today representing the freight rail
industry which of course has a central role in today's conversation. I
look forward to hearing their perspective, what they're doing to
advance safety, and their commitment to improving the current
conditions.
I also want to note that we've been hearing concerns from
stakeholders not represented here today. For example, the Association
of State Railroad Safety Managers submitted a statement to this
committee raising concerns with several new railroad practices,
including a move by some railroads to shift maintenance costs
associated with crossing improvement projects, long borne by railroads,
to local municipalities, resulting in the stalling, canceling, or
scaling back of projects that are intended to enhance crossing safety.
The letter raises others concerns such as the impacts of very long
trains and the significant challenges in properly managing in-train
forces in order to avoid derailments and damaged equipment.
Lastly, I'm pleased that our federal railroad safety regulator is
here. Under this Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration
has sharpened its focus on safety, launching system-wide audits of the
Class I's, audits of crewmember certification programs, inspection
blitzes, a doubling down on accident reporting reviews, and rechartered
a consensus-building, Rail Safety Advisory Committee. I encourage FRA
to continue exercising its important oversight and regulatory
authorities to improve safety, and I urge Administrator Bose to listen
to the other witnesses testifying here today. If we are employing
practices known to create risks and cause accidents--put an end to
them. If there are corners being cut for the sake of efficiency and at
the expense of safety--put an end to it. The natural role of any safety
regulator is to thwart risks and hold all players accountable. That is
always your role, and it is especially important while Wall Street has
its grip on the industry.
I thank all the witnesses for participating today and look forward
to the discussion.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Graves, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Payne, and thank you to our witnesses for being
here.
Today, we are reviewing the current state of freight rail safety
and proposed security enhancements that ensure the freight railroad
industry remains one of the safest modes of transporting goods in the
world.
One of the best means of assisting our freight rail industry in
advancing safety innovation and improvements is through the federal
grant programs offered by the Federal Railroad Administration and other
agencies.
These programs offer important opportunities to eligible entities
to invest in maintenance and safety improvements, including grade-
crossing upgrades and closures, track replacements, and chances to test
and use new safety technology.
There are now historic levels of funding available in these grant
programs. We must ensure that this money is distributed transparently
and fairly with as few impediments as possible to applying and
receiving support.
Safety improvements not only protect the railroad industry and the
communities it serves, but it also assists in more efficiently moving
goods through our essential supply chain.
I look forward to hearing more from our witnesses.
Thank you, Chair Payne. I yield back.
Statement of Chuck Baker, President, American Short Line and Regional
Railroad Association, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
Introduction
As president of the American Short Line and Regional Railroad
Association (ASLRRA), the trade association representing the nation's
600 small business Class II and Class III railroads, I submit this
testimony for inclusion in the record of the subcommittee's hearing.
ASLRRA appreciates the subcommittee holding this hearing on safety
throughout the national rail network. Safety is the top priority of
ASLRRA's members. Short line freight railroads operate 24/7/365 in an
ever-changing and complex, increasingly demanding environment, working
in all weather and overcoming all manner of challenges and conditions
to serve our customers. Through it all, our members are constantly
focused on ensuring that their employees get home safely at the end of
each shift, and that the communities they serve are enhanced and made
stronger by the service we provide.
We are eager to share our insight, perspective and suggestions with
this panel.
The country's short line freight rail industry, a vital part of North
America's supply chain, is safe and getting safer.
ASLRRA's members are Class II and Class III railroads, all of which
are classified as small businesses.\1\ Our members are critical links
in the nation's freight supply chain, and all are vital engines of
economic activity. Together, our members are tied to 478,000 jobs
nationwide, $26.1 billion in labor income and $56.2 billion in economic
value-add. Our members provide a service that approximately 10,000
businesses nationwide rely upon to get goods and products to and from
market.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ According to the Surface Transportation Board, a Class II
railroad has annual revenues between $40,400,000 and $900,000,000; a
Class III railroad has revenues below $40,400,000.
\2\ The Section 45G Tax Credit and the Economic Contribution of the
Short Line Railroad Industry, prepared by PWC for ASLRRA (2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Short line railroads are especially integral in providing first-
and last-mile service, functioning frequently as the first and/or often
final link between suppliers and customers who require critical goods
and freight. Our members provide this connection in many key industries
critical to our country's economic health, including the manufacturing,
agricultural, energy, and chemical sectors.
As the first- and last-mile providers for one in five railcars
moving across the country on any given day, short lines interface
constantly with the public--shippers, community leaders, motorists, and
pedestrians--in the mostly small town and rural communities in which we
operate.
Short line owners, executives, and operating personnel are active
members of their local communities--you see them in the grocery store,
at the PTA meeting, on the ballfields, and in your places of worship.
Because short lines are small business owners, and they live and work
in the communities they serve, safety is more than a good business
decision, it is a steadfast personal obligation.
Recent data from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
indicates that this past decade has been the safest ever for freight
railroading, and that freight railroading is among the safest
industries in the nation.
But our work is not done, and we must never get complacent. We
pledge to remain ever-vigilant in driving forward with our safety-first
mindset.
ASLRRA provides key resources to assist railroads in enhancing safety
practices.
ASLRRA has more than one hundred years of history of providing
support to small business railroads. Today, our members regularly
indicate that the resources provided by the association are critical to
their success in all areas of operations--especially safety.
1) T3Training and education. We keep safety at the forefront for
our members by providing training and education and partnering with the
FRA and other subject matter experts for safety-driven content.
Education is provided in-person at regional and national events, and
via webinars with nearly 200 recorded sessions on a wide variety of
topics.
20)Investments in safety. We advocate in Washington, DC for
legislation that makes sense for short lines railroads and the public
that we serve. We seek laws that drive public money efficiently toward
projects and initiatives that make our operations ever-safer, deliver
public good by ensuring access to the U.S. economy for rural and small
town America's businesses, and provide family-supporting jobs. This
includes grant opportunities and tax credits that ensure that our
infrastructure is modern, efficient, and safe.
3)Smart oversight. We work on behalf of our members with rulemaking
bodies such as the FRA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Surface
Transportation Board (STB), and the Small Business Administration's
(SBA) Office of Advocacy to ensure that regulations drive improvements
in safety AND can be reasonably implemented by small businesses. We
bring ideas to these agencies to consider in upgrading and modernizing
rulemakings that are outdated due to new technologies available, or
operational changes. Examples of these efforts include the use of
electronic air brake slip systems (eABS), drones for certain types of
inspections, and more. Finally, we provide expert advice in rulemakings
to ensure there are no unintended consequences for small business
railroads.
4)Safety expertise. We provide industry expertise in safety
compliance, including auditing a railroad from a safety perspective, or
helping to solve operational challenges. Recently, our staff and member
railroads developed a template training program for 49 CFR Part 243 to
ensure that all members could complete the intensive required safety
training.
5) T3Honoring safety professionalism. We honor excellence in safety
on member railroads with our Jake Safety Award program. Hundreds of
short line railroads are recognized each year for winning ``Jakes with
Distinction'', signifying zero reportable injuries annually. Our Safety
Person and Safety Professional of the Year awards recognize exceptional
careers in safety and are the industry's most esteemed honors.
6) T3Elevating safety practices. As an eligible applicant for
certain federal grant funding programs, ASLRRA seeks to provide
additional resources to short line railroads to elevate safety
practices and to implement technology that will lead to safer
performance. For example, in partnership with the Iowa Northern
Railroad, ASLRRA was awarded a Fiscal Year 2020 grant through the
Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements (CRISI)
program, which will build online and in-person training specifically
designed for short line railroads in the areas of operations and
safety. Another grant in process through a recent FRA Broad Agency
Announcement (BAA) will fund the measuring of environmental impact of
practices and technologies that some of our members are currently
implementing, while ensuring that safety is not compromised. ASLRRA
also received a grant from the FRA to assist our member railroads with
the complexities of implementing PTC.
Short lines invest heavily in infrastructure, increasing safety for
employees and shippers.
Short line railroading is one of the most capital-intensive
industries in the country. Short lines invest on average 25% to 33% of
their annual revenues into maintaining and rehabilitating their
infrastructure. Additionally, short lines are often the custodians of
expensive bridges and tunnels that were originally built by much larger
railroads generations earlier and are now reaching the end of their
useful lives. Federal funding opportunities like the CRISI grant
program provide short lines with an opportunity to meet these
challenges.
Through the short line railroad 45G tax credit and government
infrastructure investment grant programs such as CRISI and other
important USDOT grant efforts (like Rebuilding American Infrastructure
with Sustainability and Equity (RAISE), Infrastructure for Rebuilding
America (INFRA), and the recently created Railroad Crossing Elimination
grant program, among others) short lines have been able to upgrade
thousands of miles of track to 286K-lb capabilities and rebuild and
repair worn-out and outdated bridges, tunnels and rail to improve
efficiency and ensure safer operations.
ASLRRA was pleased to see 24 of 46 Fiscal Year 2021 CRISI grant
projects awarded to short line railroads in early June 2022. These
projects will make freight rail transportation safer and more
affordable than ever in the areas they serve--while providing the most
environmentally friendly surface transportation mode available.
Upgraded infrastructure will lead to better on-time performance for
customers and the ability to handle more freight by rail, taking trucks
off the road--decreasing environmental impact and safety concerns for
the motoring public--all while delivering better safety performance.
The FY21 CRISI grants will provide approximately $150 million in
federal funds for short line infrastructure, which is a very welcome
infusion, and combined with approximately $1 billion in annual private
short line investment, will make a meaningful difference in short line
safety and service.
Still, there is much, much more work to be done to catch up with
our estimated $12 billion in state of good repair needs. Our members
look forward to competing vigorously for future rounds of CRISI funds
and putting them to use making the rail network safer for all who rely
on it. As the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) is
implemented and its critical resources are made available, we encourage
Congress to robustly fund the CRISI program at the full $1b annual
authorized discretionary appropriations level and the administration to
prioritize funding for the many freight rail projects that enhance
safety, while bringing other benefits, like reducing supply chain
bottlenecks, advancing environmental solutions and taking highway-
clogging trucks off of highways. These projects are often the biggest
``bang for the buck'' available in surface transportation.
Short Line Safety Institute (SLSI) drives safety culture improvements
for short line railroads.
Founded in 2015 to enhance the safety culture on small railroads,
the SLSI is supported by annual appropriations from Congress, via the
FRA. Safety culture has been identified as a top priority for the short
line and regional railroad industry. Class II and III railroads
sometimes lack the resources to conduct comprehensive internal safety
culture assessments and evaluations. SLSI was formed to fill this need
for smaller, often under-resourced railroads.
The goal of the SLSI and its programs is for the short line and
regional railroad industry to perform at an increasingly high level of
safety because of a focus not only on compliance, but on safety
culture, defined as ``the shared values, actions, and behaviors that
demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing goals and demands.''
The SLSI provides several programs, including its flagship Safety
Culture Assessment (SCA), recognized as the most robust safety culture
assessment in the railroad industry, at no cost to railroads. Many of
ASLRRA's members have taken advantage of the staff's 600 years of
collective safety experience and made measurable improvements to safety
culture as a result. An analysis conducted by the Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center in April 2022, Implementing SLSI-Provided
Opportunities Supports Safety Culture Growth, reports that railroads
who have completed a second ``Time 2'' SCA performed by the SLSI
experienced measurable overall improvement in safety culture, and in
each of the ten core elements of a strong safety culture evaluated
during an SCA.
The SLSI provides Safety Culture Assessments, Leadership Training,
and HazMat Training--all delivered in a variety of formats from in-
person to videos, to downloadable Posters and Safety Tips for use
during a safety briefing.
Short lines partner with industry experts to continuously improve
safety.
ASLRRA works closely with a variety of regulatory bodies, and other
industry associations, in the pursuit of strengthening safety
practices.
One of the strongest partners for ASLRRA members is Operation
Lifesaver, Inc. (OLI). OLI is a non-profit organization and nationally-
recognized leader in rail safety education. Since 1972, OLI has been
committed to preventing collisions, injuries and fatalities on and
around railroad tracks and highway-rail grade crossings, with the
support of public education programs in states across the U.S.
The largest areas of risk in train-related deaths and injuries are
from trespassing and suicide. Many of these incidents happen at grade
crossings. These incidents are tragic for all involved from the train
crew to the families impacted and the communities where these incidents
occur.
ASLRRA's members provide staff hours to volunteer across the
country to educate the public on rail safety. Many short line
professionals likewise serve at the state levels of Operations
Lifesaver, on boards and as trained presenters.
Our members have helped to support the 82% decline in train/motor
vehicle collisions from a 1972 high of roughly 12,000 annual incidents
to approximately 2,200 incidents in 2019 through their work with OLI.
Short line railroads urge Congress and the administration to advance
safety rules and regulations with known safety benefits and to foster--
not hinder--technology and operational practices that improve rail
safety.
With safety at the forefront of its members' daily operations,
ASLRRA is concerned that the regulatory structure governing the
industry fails, in some regard, to meet modern standards and allow for
the use of sophisticated technology to more efficiently accomplish
tasks that in the past have been done in a now antiquated fashion.
ASLRRA shares the strong concerns articulated by representatives of AAR
and the country's Class I railroads submitted for this hearing
concerning Automated Track Inspection (ATI) activities. We encourage
FRA to develop a posture on ATI and use of waivers that advances smart
technology--and does not impede its adoption. ASLRRA believes FRA
should encourage and incentivize efforts to use technology to make rail
safer--not stand in the way of safety efforts with requirements that
railroads adhere to now outdated practices. Similarly, ASLRRA
encourages FRA to move forward with smarter, more advanced and more
modern electronic eABS that replaces outdated methods--and that could
eliminate inefficient extra train movements.
Short lines urge FRA to continue its regulatory framework governing
excepted track. ``Excepted track'' is a designation of track on which
speed is limited to 10 mph and in which certain types of movements are
prohibited or restricted. For decades, short line railroads have used
excepted track to serve customers, adhering to FRA rules governing
excepted track that ensure safety for workers and the public. For
example, these rules require the following: the track must be inspected
at the same frequency as Class 1 track; speed on said track is limited
to 10 mph or under; there are limits to the number of hazardous
materials cars that can be carried; passenger operations are
prohibited; and the owner of the track may not designate the track as
excepted if the track is close to certain adjacent tracks, near a
bridge, public street or highway.
The ability to use excepted track has kept rail service safe and
viable for customers and increased public safety by keeping freight off
the highway. Proposals that would undermine this framework would harm
small business short line freight railroads, disrupt the supply chain,
and inject new safety uncertainties in the movement of goods and
freight.
ASLRRA also urges the FRA to publish an NPRM on 49 CFR Part 243
training, which codifies the use of training templates developed
specifically for small business short line railroads. The templates are
critical to ensuring implementable and thorough training procedures on
short line railroads, elevating safety.
Finally, ASLRA is concerned about a rulemaking underway on railroad
crew size. The FRA has announced that it will issue a rulemaking
requiring a minimum number of crew members on a train in most cases.
From what we know, this draft rule has no known, proven, or
quantifiable safety benefit. Rather, based on our research and due
diligence, it will increase the cost of our members' efforts to provide
service to shippers and customers, as many short lines today operate
safely with one crew member in the cab, commensurate with the
railroads' needs and requirements, or will eventually do so. Any
mandate to hire and train more personnel than necessary in rail
operations would force small business short line freight railroads to
make counterproductive economic decisions between necessary safety
upgrades and unnecessary forced hiring. Any mandate stands in stark
contrast to the prevailing policy in other modes of transportation that
are fostering an increase in unmanned operations--especially in
trucking and automobiles. We strongly discourage any rulemaking that
will not deliver a documented safety benefit and has the unintended
consequence of making transportation more costly to shippers.
Conclusion
The short line freight industry is safe, and getting safer. We
appreciate the subcommittee's attention to our statement. We welcome
future opportunities to provide examples of programs the short line
industry is supporting to increase safety, and to collaborate on future
initiatives.
Emails from Two Railroad Employees, Submitted for the Record by
Hon. Peter A. DeFazio
From----
Sent: Tuesday, June 7, 2022 4:01 PM
Subject: Examining Freight Rail Safety hearing
June 7, 2022.
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Attention: Examining Freight Rail Safety
Dear Congressional members,
My name is ---- and I have been employed by BNSF Railway since 2006,
about 16 years, as a Locomotive Engineer and Conductor. I am writing to
you concerning a grave situation that is occurring right now in this
company, and among all carriers in some form in the past few years. The
general safety of running trains 24/7 and 365 days a year falls upon
these Trainmen workers and other workers in Maintenance, Train
inspection forces (Carmen), and signalmen.
In the past few decades, Rail companies have decided that they
needed to cut workers to make massive profits for their stock holders.
It has resulted in massive employee cutbacks to the point now that the
railroads can not even run trains, especially in the past few months.
What did BNSF do when they suddenly realized that they did not have
enough crews? They did not go out and hire people. instead they doubled
down on new attendance policies to make the workers work weeks at a
time without an ability to lay off without being punished by the
Carriers. BNSF is especially egregious, with a new attendance policy
called ``HI-Viz''. UP has also done a similar, though slightly less
horrible attendance policy.
Imagine being on call 24/7. But never being able to lay off because
the carrier has limited numbers of lay off slots available to the
workers, yet if we try to lay off sick on weekends, holidays or other
``special days'' that local management can decide (like a county fair),
it makes it so that only a tiny percentage of workers can ever lay off
on a given day . . . for ANY reason. In my terminal, with less than 140
workers on a conductor board, only 11 can lay off. Right now, they
usually do allow people to lay off sick, but recently in Texas, the
company has been denying those layoffs.
Laying off sick is often the only means to get any rest when we are
working non-stop, and are tired and fatigued. We may work 12-14 hours
from home to our away from home terminal. Spend 12-24 hours in that
hotel room, then 12-14 hours back home. Often, we only get the minimum
RISA required rest of 10 hours. We used to get an average of 30-40
hours off, but since over 60 have quit our terminal, we are now working
the most anyone has ever seen in decades.
RISA does require workers to take 48 hours every 6 ``starts'', or
72 hours every ``7 starts''. But what the companies do, is wait for a
worker to be ``available'' for 24 hours and 1 minute, and that
``restarts'' the ``starts''. So what happens is that we do not actually
get time off, as we are always having to ``be ready to work'' every
day. Many never get RISA time off, though in the past few weeks, we
have been so short on workers that dozens now are hitting RISA
mandatory time off as we are working every 10 hours.
I know that this is all confusing. But the Railroads have made it
confusing. Various ways of laying off, depends on the ``points'' that
the carrier takes off for a certain day of the week. It is easy for
someone to get in trouble with these attendance policies, and dozens
are being fired weekly now for that alone. That is on top of the 500
that quit last week because they were sick and tired of being sick and
tired. About 2000 since Feb 1st 2022, when this policy started (out of
about 17500)
Many are quitting mid-career, from 12-24 years, giving up pensions
because they are so fatigued and never able to have family time at
home. Never able to go to their doctor appointments. Even paying a
necessary bill can become a headache, as we are often trying to sleep
during the middle of the day.
What is causing all this? It is partly with the carriers insisting
in Contract negotiations that they do not want to pay us Cost of living
increases, and are demanding 1 man crews, virtually eliminating the
Conductors. How do you tell a new hire that their job is probably gone
in 7 years? I will tell you, as an engineer, that this is madness. I do
not want to be on a train, by myself for 12 hours, with no other human
contact. Worse, is if we do have a breakdown, or an accident with the
public, the conductor can not be the ``first eyes'' on the scene for
emergency response. As what happened in a derailment a few years ago, a
Hazardous materials tank train derailed and caught fire. That conductor
was able to cut away the cars that were not on fire, and saved lives.
New hires are refusing to stay because they can find better pay, and
better hours at other industries. Most people do not even interview
anymore, and if they do get a 10 person class, usually only 1 or 2
finish new conductor training. The rest quit because of the pay and
attendance policies.
But that conductor's job is increasingly becoming more and more
dangerous. A radio ``packset'' that the conductor uses to communicate
to the engineer, was never designed for 2, 3, 4 mile ranges. Yet the
conductors are having to walk, often in bad weather, high heat, or feet
of snow, 3 miles to the rear end of a train to fix issues, with limited
communication. 13,000-15,000ft trains are way too long for that.
The other issue is the fact that many of these trains are in fact
too long to fit in sidings. This prevents shorter trains from getting
over the road, causing rail crews to ``die on hours of service'', often
having to be taxied an additional 1-3 hours to their terminals, above
and beyond their 12 hours of service.
As for Mechanical and signal forces, they too have been cut to the
bones. There is not enough to inspect trains to the extent they used
to. Not enough workers to service the tracks and rail systems. I think
that this is causing more derailments that we have seen in past few
years. Carmen used to inspect 150 different things on a rail car. In
recent years, that has gone down to less than 60. Go back to the 4 hour
``off air'' requirement of inspections, instead of the new 24 hours
``off air''.
I sincerely hope that Congress can address the following:
1) Need 2 Man Crews, for safety and for mental health of workers
and the public.
2) Need legislation that requires Carriers to negotiate on
attendance policies.
3) Need restrictions on train length to not more than 8000ft
4) Need legislation that gives workers the OPTION to get more time
off.
5) Need more oversight on requiring carriers to have more
manpower. That includes requiring reasonable contract negotiations for
reasonable pay comparable to other industries to attract new hires
6) Need more FRA inspectors, and less exemptions to required
inspections.
7) Need changes to Rail labor act, to give the unions more ability
to strike. Otherwise the Carriers have no desire to listen, nor
negotiate with them, resulting in the mess we have today.
Thank you for your time.
.
__________
From: Brent Roberts
Date: June 8, 2022 at 7:59:28 AM EDT
Subject: House Comm on Transportation & Infrastructure: Examining
Freight Rail Safety
I'm writing in support of any and all legislation or discussion
that may come before your Committee regarding efforts to maintain Two
Person Crews on railroad freight trains as it might relate to health,
welfare and public safety of our Citizens.
Prior to the railroad I served one 3 year tour in the US Army as
Military Policeman. After my tour was complete I obtained an Associate
Degree and eventually a Bachelor's Degree in Criminal Justice. I was
ultimately successful in having a 22 year career as a State Police
Agent. I mention this semi-biography to highlight the safety conscious
career fields in which I've been involved.
I was hired by the BNSF Railway in Feb of 2006 as a Conductor/
Switchman. In Jan of 2008 I achieved enough seniority in my terminal to
be promoted to the Locomotive Engineer Training program and
subsequently graduated from the program to become a Certified
Locomotive Engineer in June 2008. A few years later I was elected to
the Safety Committee of my Local Union and was also elected as my
Local's Legislative Representative dealing with mostly safety related
issues.
Several years after being promoted to a Locomotive Engineer I was
operating a southbound train through the City of Norman, OK. This City
has quiet zone grade crossings at every one of the grade crossings
located within its city limits. This means that as a Locomotive
Engineer I am not allowed to blow the train locomotive's very loud horn
as the train approaches and then traverses the grade crossing. All I'm
allowed to do is have the locomotive's bell ringing. The bell isn't
very loud compared to the locomotive's horn.
The City of Norman's Central Business District is near the Amtrak
Railway passenger depot and is located adjacent to the grade crossing
for Main Street. While the grade crossing utilized by vehicles is
equipped with the usual crossing arms, flashing lights and bells, the
part of the crossing utilized by pedestrians has no protective devices.
This allows pedestrians to cross the train tracks potentially without
any warning of an approaching train other than the locomotive's ringing
bell.
On the day of this incident I was operating my train approaching
the Main Street grade crossing. As a Locomotive Engineer behind the
controls of the locomotive I have 3 computer screens that require my
constant observation pertaining to the operation of the train, the
Positive Track Control (PTC) screen, the Trip Optimizer (TO) screen and
the normal screen showing the data fields related to the actual train.
At times keeping up with all three of these computer screens can
approach information overload. This is especially true when factoring
in insuring that the various safety devices are being operated
appropriately when approaching grade crossings, high traffic
pedestrian/entertainment areas or listening to radio traffic related to
other trains or from the Train Dispatcher.
As my train was approaching the Main Street grade crossing my
attention was focused on the various computer screens. I would scan
back and forth from the screens then the grade crossings trying to keep
track of all the data fields and events outside the train. I wasn't
seeing anything unusual outside so I'm looking at one of the computer
screens requiring me to take my eyes off of events outside the train.
All of a sudden I hear my Conductor exclaiming ``Don't do it''. I
look up to see a gentleman walking towards the Main Street grade
crossing on the pedestrian part of the crossing. He's wearing ear buds
and carrying a cell phone ostensibly listening to music while out
exercising. It's immediately apparent that he's completely oblivious to
the fact that he's about to be killed by walking in front of and being
run over by a train traveling at 55 mph.
I immediately reach down and start blowing the locomotive's horn in
an attempt to provide warning to the pedestrian. I can see him react to
the horn while still striding towards the grade crossing but he first
looks towards the south, then swivels his head to the north when he
sees the train. He is still striding towards the tracks as his momentum
hasn't slowed enough for him to stop . . . yet.
I can see him leaning back and trying to stop his momentum as the
train screams by him at 55 mph and I lose sight of him. He is literally
bending backwards at the waist trying to keep from walking in front of
and being hit by the train.
So little time has elapsed, `maybe' two seconds probably less,
since my Conductor alerted me to the pedestrian's proximity to the
train tracks that I haven't even had a chance to activate the train's
emergency braking capabilities. Not that the emergency brakes would
have slowed the train enough to prevent something by slowing the train.
This was such a bang/bang episode that there was only time to blow the
train's horn in an attempt to save the life of the pedestrian.
Ultimately my Conductor was able to look in his side view mirror
and see that the pedestrian was able to stop his momentum and other
than probably being scared out of his mind as far as I know was
uninjured. My Conductor did observe that the pedestrian's body was only
mere inches from the side of the train, he estimated it as 4 inches, as
it roared by at 55 mph having come that close to probably being killed
had he actually been struck by the train.
I'm relating this real life event not to complain about the lack of
safety devices on the crossing or even information overload but to
point out that this gentleman is ONLY alive today because there were
TWO persons inside the cab of the locomotive. Had I been the sole
occupant of the locomotive on this day the pedestrian would no doubt
have walked out in front of the train and been killed by the blunt
trauma impact of the locomotive striking him and he'd have had no idea,
literally, what had hit him.
I'm certain that there are countless similar situations across the
United States where having two persons in the cab of the locomotive
have saved lives and that this is just one more to add to the list.
However, what if there are other locomotive engineers with similar
stories that are worried about reprisals from their employer and never
submitted their stories.
The Facebook post from where I obtained your email address
mentioned that you would give confidential treatment to any email sent
to you. I'm unconcerned about my email identity remaining confidential.
My goal is to highlight awareness of issues similar to this in the
hopes that someone else's life isn't lost due to there being only one
person in the cab of the locomotive.
Respectfully,
Brent Roberts.
Letter of June 28, 2022, to Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., Chair, and Hon.
Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads,
Pipelines and Hazardous Materials, from Rachel Maleh, Executive
Director, Operation Lifesaver, Inc., Submitted for the Record by Hon.
Peter A. DeFazio
June 28, 2022.
The Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., Chair,
The Hon. Rick Crawford, Ranking Member,
House Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Payne and Ranking Member Crawford,
In light of the Subcommittee's June 14 Hearing on ``Examining Rail
Safety,'' which examined the state of freight rail safety and issues
pertinent to keeping rail operations, rail workers, and communities
safe, I am submitting a brief update on my testimony at your February
5, 2020 hearing titled, ``Tracking Toward Zero: Improving Grade
Crossing Safety and Addressing Community Concerns.''
Operation Lifesaver, which this year celebrates the 50th
anniversary of its founding in 1972, is a non-profit public safety
education and awareness organization dedicated to reducing collisions,
fatalities and injuries at highway-rail crossings and preventing
trespassing on or near railroad tracks. In 1986 the non-profit
Operation Lifesaver, Inc. national office, which I lead, was created to
help support and coordinate the efforts of state Operation Lifesaver
programs. Operation Lifesaver's authorized volunteers provide free
safety presentations to reach audiences of all ages across the U.S. and
beyond.
We are proud of our role in making communities safer through
virtual and in-person rail safety education. Our safety partners
include federal, state and local government agencies, highway safety
organizations and America's railroads. Together, we promote the three
E's--Education, Enforcement and Engineering--to help people make safe
choices around railroad tracks and trains.
Since OL's inception in 1972, collisions at railroad crossings have
dropped by more than 80 percent, from 12,000 annually to approximately
2,100 in 2021. But there is more work to do--every three hours in the
U.S., a person or vehicle is hit by a train.
Since I testified before you in February of 2020, Operation
Lifesaver has leveraged additional grants to:
Provide competitive funding for 41 state crossing safety
and trespass prevention campaigns totaling $756K from the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) including states that rank among the top
15 for grade crossing and trespass incidents.
Provide competitive funding for 36 state crossing safety
campaigns totaling $600K from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
including states that rank among the top 15 for grade crossing
incidents.
Provide competitive funding for transit rail safety
campaigns to 6 transit agencies in 4 states totaling $107K from the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA).
Provide competitive funding for 11 state crossing safety
and trespass prevention campaigns totaling $135K from OLI's private
funder, the Posner Foundation of Pittsburgh.
In all, these grants from 2020-2022 total approximately
$1.6 million, with an additional in-kind return from the 2020 and 2021
grants alone of more than $1.2 million to states and communities across
the U.S.
In addition to these ongoing grant programs, since 2020 Operation
Lifesaver has completely refreshed and updated our collateral materials
for drivers, pedestrians, professional drivers, outdoor enthusiasts,
students, and more. We also released new public service announcement
(PSA) campaigns aimed at drivers on low-clearance vehicles, shift
workers, mature drivers, college students and farm vehicle operators.
These materials and videos include actionable safety measures for
audiences to stay safe at crossings and along railroad rights-of-way.
Demand for Operation Lifesaver's Railroad Investigation and Safety
Course, or RISC, is growing. We have trained more than 190 instructors
to teach RISC both virtually and in person to law enforcement officers
and other first responders. Since RISC launched, a total of 260 classes
have been held with more than 4,200 students completing RISC as of the
first week of June 2022. RISC is accredited in 17 states under law
enforcement training programs: AZ, CA, CO, GA, IN, KS, LA, MN, MS, MO,
NE, NM, ND, OK, SC, TN and TX.
We also spearhead the annual observance of Rail Safety Week in
North America to focus attention on the importance of safe behaviors
around railroad tracks and trains. Our federal partners, private sector
partners and other rail safety advocates are vital to the success of
Rail Safety Week in reaching millions of people each year with the
safety message. This year, Rail Safety Week is September 19-25. I
invite you to join us to #STOPTrackTragedies across the U.S.
For Operation Lifesaver's 50th Anniversary, our partners at Amtrak
created and put into revenue service across the U.S. a beautiful
locomotive emblazoned with the Operation Lifesaver 50th Anniversary
Logo and the message, ``See Tracks? Think Train!'' as a moving
billboard reminding people to practice safe behaviors.
This year we also created an online Rail Safety Pledge for children
and adults with tips to stay safe. We urge everyone to take--and
share--the pledge.
Most recently, Operation Lifesaver was part of the Host Committee
for the June 8-10 International Level Crossing Awareness Day (ILCAD)
2022 Conference in Denver, along with the International Union of
Railways (UIC), Association of American Railroads, Federal Railroad
Administration, Mineta Transportation Institute and Colorado Railroad
Museum. The successful event drew over 150 participants from around the
world.
These are just a few of the ways that Operation Lifesaver, Inc.
continues in our role as a force multiplier, leveraging crucial federal
funds in states across the U.S. for greater impact. Together with our
rail safety partners, Operation Lifesaver is making a difference in
communities across the nation.
Thank you for your interest in Operation Lifesaver and its critical
rail safety education mission. I would be happy to answer any
additional questions the Subcommittee has about Operation Lifesaver
Inc. and state Operation Lifesaver programs.
Sincerely,
Rachel Maleh,
Executive Director, Operation Lifesaver, Inc.
Appendix
----------
Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Hon. Amit Bose, Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration
Question 1.a. Your testimony describes FRA's audits of conductor
certification programs, borne initially from concerns that railroads
were changing their longstanding approaches to training programs, and
continued as a result of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act
requirement.
What were the changes made to the training programs that caused the
initial concern?
Answer. FRA received reports of certain Class I railroads
significantly reducing the length of training for newly certified
railroad conductors. Those reports, coupled with a series of accidents
involving the severe on-duty injuries of railroad conductors, led FRA
to become concerned that such reductions in the length of new conductor
training were being made without sufficient justification. These
concerns provided the impetus for FRA to review submitted programs
involving railroads that made this sudden and unanticipated change.
Question 1.b. For the audits of the Class I railroads' conductor or
engineer certification programs that FRA has conducted so far, have any
Class I's program been found not to conform with the regulations?
Answer. To date, FRA has found 3 written certification programs
from Class I railroads (one locomotive engineer program and two
conductor programs) to be in non-conformance with 49 CFR parts 240 and
242 because they lacked sufficient detail, required by FRA's
regulations, to permit effective evaluation. FRA is working with the
railroads involved to ensure appropriate corrective actions are
implemented.
Question 2. While other safety metrics have largely plateaued in
recent years, the number of rail yard accidents has fluctuated but the
rate of yard accidents has increased for the calendar years 2013-2021.
Has FRA identified what may be causing this trend?
Answer. FRA notes that the rate of yard accidents has overall
increased slightly from 2013-2021. FRA suspects this increase may be
related to issues associated with railroads' implementation of Part 240
and 242 locomotive engineer and conductor certification programs and
programs of operational testing and inspections under 49 CFR Part 217.
FRA is currently evaluating this issue.
Question 3. Mr. Cothen's testimony describes the importance of
identifying the root cause of accidents but states that derailments
caused by mismanagement of in-train forces are being reported primarily
under `human factor' codes. This is true even when organizational
failures--such as making up a train that has little chance of operating
safely--underly the problem. He also indicated that mechanical codes
are applied to derailments that are caused by improper management of
in-train forces, sometimes questionably or sometimes because it's the
only code available.
What actions is FRA taking to ensure root causes of accidents are
properly identified and coded?
Answer. Accident and incident investigation is a key component of
FRA's safety program. FRA is conducting a comprehensive review of its
accident and incident reporting regulation (49 CFR part 225) and
accompanying guidance to ensure cause codes reflect the current
operating conditions. This effort will include reviewing and updating
mechanical and human factor cause codes. In the meantime, FRA has
modified its accident/incident investigation procedures to, when
appropriate, require a more detailed analysis into the root cause(s)
and contributing factors of certain accidents and incidents.
Question 4. Mr. Cothen's testimony identifies recurring risks
leading to preventable accidents and states that countervailing
pressures are necessary to correct course. He posits that your agency
must take a more active role in overseeing the railroads' management of
in-train forces.
What actions is your agency taking to require the railroads to
correct the organizational failures contributing to these preventable
risks and accidents?
Answer. FRA recognizes that where cars of different types and
weights are placed within a train impacts the in-train forces
experienced and that improper train make up may lead to an accident.
Outside of the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration's
train placement regulation (49 CFR Sec. 174.85), there is no Federal
regulation governing train make-up, but the rail industry's use of
distributed power (i.e., the practice of placing locomotives part way
through and/or at a train's rear) has significantly reduced the
occurrence of derailments from excessive in-train forces. However, FRA
continues to study train make up as it relates to train length. As part
of the study of freight trains longer than 7,500 feet the
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) requires, FRA will
continue to evaluate the impact of train makeup on rail safety and take
any action necessary to ensure proper management of in-train forces.
At the same time, FRA and industry are just beginning to implement
FRA's Risk Reduction Program (RRP) rule. RRP is a comprehensive,
system-oriented approach to safety that determines a railroad
operation's level of risk by identifying and analyzing applicable
hazards, and involves developing plans to mitigate, if not eliminate,
that risk. Additionally, recognizing that systemwide organizational
factors can either create or control safety risks, consistent with the
mandate of the IIJA, FRA has initiated a program of system-wide audits
on certain railroads. During an audit, FRA personnel from all safety
disciplines examine multiple aspects of the railroad and its operations
at the same time, exchanging information on an ongoing basis. By
leveraging information gathered in early stages to target subsequent
audit activities, FRA focuses on organizational factors that might not
otherwise come to light.
Question 5.a. In 2021, FRA initiated a program of comprehensive
system-wide safety audits of Class I railroads. Regular oversight is a
necessary and basic responsibility of any safety regulator. I applaud
you for this work. Once the audit is complete, correcting any
identified deficiency is critical to making the audit effective.
After completing these audits, how is FRA putting the findings to
good use?
Answer. Once the system audit is completed, FRA meets with the
audited railroad to discuss what corrective actions or mitigating
measures the railroad plans to take in response to the audit findings.
Depending on the circumstances, FRA may also take enforcement action
for any identified conditions not in compliance with Federal
regulations. FRA then monitors the railroad's progress implementing any
identified corrective actions or mitigating measures through data
analysis, inspections, periodic meetings, or other methods to assess
the degree to which the railroad has successfully mitigated the causes
of any adverse audit findings. In one instance, for example, FRA found
that some aspects of a railroad's Critical Incident Stress Plan, which
provides support to employees exposed to traumatic accidents, were not
effective. The railroad proposed to make changes in response to the FRA
audit recommendations, and FRA meets with the railroad on a periodic
basis to ensure the railroad continues to make progress. FRA will
continue to monitor accident/incident data and employee complaints and
engage with other stakeholders (including railroad employees and labor
organizations) to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective actions
and mitigating measures taken.
Question 5.b. Does FRA review whether the carriers comply with
their own train marshalling rules?
Answer. If FRA finds that the placement of cars in a train may have
been a causal factor in an accident or incident, FRA will evaluate the
make-up of the train from a train marshalling perspective. FRA
recognizes that where cars of different types and weights are placed
within a train impacts the in-train forces experienced and that
improper train make up may lead to an accident. Outside of the Pipeline
and Hazardous Material Safety Administration's train placement
regulation (49 CFR Sec. 174.85), there is no Federal regulation
governing train make-up, but the rail industry's use of distributed
power (i.e., the practice of placing locomotives part way through and/
or at a train's rear) has significantly reduced the occurrence of
derailments from excessive in-train forces. However, FRA continues to
study train make up as it relates to train length. As part of the study
of freight trains longer than 7,500 feet the Infrastructure Investment
and Jobs Act (IIJA) requires, FRA will continue to evaluate the impact
of train makeup, including railroads' own marshalling rules, on safety.
Questions from Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton to Hon. Amit Bose,
Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration
Question 1.a. Administrator Bose, many residents of the District of
Columbia have been negatively affected by train noise and vibration
near their homes.
What is the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) authority to
regulate train noise and vibration, and what steps has FRA taken to
reduce or mitigate train noise and vibration near homes?
Answer. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has primary
responsibility for setting noise emission standards for non-high speed
trains under the Noise Control Act of 1972 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 4901 et
seq.). In the 1970s, EPA established a noise emissions standard for
railroad operations, including moving and stationary locomotives and
car coupling operations. Under the Noise Control Act, FRA has the
primary responsibility to enforce these EPA noise emissions standards
and may take measurements when aware of a specific issue. See 49 CFR
part 210.
The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act authorizes the Secretary
of Transportation, in consultation with EPA, to prescribe regulations
governing railroad-related noise emissions for trains operating on the
general railroad system at speeds greater than 160 miles per hour (high
speed train noise emissions). FRA and EPA are currently coordinating to
develop appropriate regulations.
Generally, there are no federal regulations for vibrations caused
by railroads that affect communities. However, noise and vibrations
from train operations may indicate a railroad safety mechanical or
structural issue that FRA can address, such as a broken rail. Further,
when providing funds for railroad projects, FRA also assesses the
potential for noise and vibration impacts as part of compliance with
the National Environmental Policy Act.
Question 1.b. What are the most cost-effective methods to reduce or
mitigate train noise and vibration near homes, and does the FRA have
the authority to require railroads to implement such methods?
Answer. There are various forms of noise and vibration mitigation
methods (e.g., source controls, path controls, and receiver controls).
A source control method essentially modifies the source of the noise
(e.g., the equipment), while a path control method generally involves
the use of a sound barrier, and a receiver control method usually
involves building insulation. What method of mitigation is effective
and cost-effective in any particular circumstance would involve
extensive study, analysis, and engineering. Outside of regulating
certain aspects of train horn noise (49 CFR Part 222), as noted above,
FRA's authority as related to noise and vibrations from railroad
operations is limited to enforcing EPA noise emissions standards; FRA
has no authority to require railroads to implement specific noise
control methods.
Questions from Hon. Seth Moulton to Hon. Amit Bose, Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 1.a. From 2000 to the mid-2010s, per the above graphic,
the derailments per million train-miles dropped, from around 2.9 to
1.75. But that progress largely leveled off and beginning in 2016, we
saw year-over-year increases in the rate of train derailments per
million train-miles through 2019. According to this data, for 2021, we
sit at 2, still above the 2013 low. Coincident with this increase are
massive slashes in workforce by Class I's: between 2015 and 2021, total
workforce declined nearly one third. Putting these two statistics
together, we can see that rate of train derailments increased at
exactly the same moment Class I's began cutting their workforce.
What effect has precision scheduled railroading (PSR) had on the
number of workers employed by the Class I railroads?
Answer. PSR refers to the concepts documented in the 2005 book
written by E Hunter Harrison titled ``How We Work and Why: Running a
Precision Railroad.'' FRA is aware of the management concepts depicted
in this book and that some Class I railroads have implemented some of
the concepts. It is important to note that based on FRA's observations,
each railroad has implemented PSR in different ways. But FRA has not
conducted any formal analysis to determine which railroads adopted each
assortment of PSR concepts and to what degree each management concept
was executed.
FRA has, based on feedback from our field staff, monitored the
operating changes implemented by railroads and any resulting compliance
issues with our regulations. These operational changes have included
reductions in workforce (staff and supervisors), closing/consolidation
of yards, reductions in locomotive fleet size, and changes to
operations to minimize the idle time of railroad assets, including
longer trains.
It should be noted that FRA regulations do not limit railroads
making the above operational changes, but our regulations require
railroads to adequately train staff to ensure tasks are performed
safely.
For example, FRA's engineer and conductor certification
regulations (240/242) are performance regulations that require
railroads to provide extensive classroom and on the job training, in
order to ensure staff are able to safety perform their safety critical
tasks. These performance regulations also require supervisor monitoring
of the execution of these tasks.
PSR operational changes, such as reduction in workforce
(including reduction in the number of supervisors) and longer trains
(which requires additional training on in-train-forces), may require
adjustments to training courses to maintain the quality of training
provided by railroads to their employees. In some cases, FRA has
observed inadequate training and has taken appropriate action.
FRA has observed that the PSR changes are usually implemented very
quickly, and in some cases, these operational changes have not been
managed adequately. In these cases, a short term up-tick in safety
incidents has been observed, none of which have been serious incidents.
FRA has routinely addressed these incidents through its program of
focused inspections and enforcement.
FRA has provided the above information and details to the U.S.
Government Accountability Office as they perform a study on PSR
requested in May 2021 by T&I Chair DeFazio and T&I Rail and Pipelines
Subcommittee Chair Payne.
FRA has analyzed, by craft, available railroad industry employment
data (the Surface Transportation Board collects and maintains this
data). Although, FRA has not directly analyzed the effect PSR has had
on the number of workers employed by the Class I railroads, STB's data
indicates that a marked reduction in employment numbers correlates with
the COVID-19 pandemic. Accordingly, we cannot say for certain that the
current employment numbers can only be attributed to PSR.
Question 1.b. PSR is based on the preeminence of lowering operating
ratios. Railroads have made it clear that they are responding to
shareholder pressure in implementing it. How are today's Class I's
balancing safety, customer service, and stock performance?
Answer. PSR encompasses many aspects of safety and operations, and
is designed with railroads' goals of optimization and efficiency in
operation. FRA's mission is safety. As such, FRA is concerned with any
potential safety impacts of PSR, and accordingly, FRA has conducted an
analysis of the operational and process changes that seem to have
resulted from railroad's implementation of PSR, as detailed in the
previous question.
FRA's analysis, as referenced above, included a detailed review of
safety data over the last ten (10) years for Class I freight railroads.
Although this analysis did not identify any long-term impact on safety
within the timeframe of railroad's reported implementation of PSR, the
analysis did indicate that there may be short-term safety issues, such
as:
Changes in yard operations, from hump yards to flat
switching, has resulted in an increase in incidents; and
Changes in rules relating to mounting and exiting
equipment while moving also resulted in an increase in injuries.
In response to these findings, FRA initiated a series of focused
inspections to identify safety issues and engage with railroads to
address these safety issues. FRA is also performing system level audits
of railroads, which includes a detailed review of safety incidents and
accidents.
FRA also notes that the reduction in fleet size that seems to be a
result of PSR has led to the retirement of older mechanical equipment
as part of operational optimization.
Question 1.c. PSR includes the operation of longer and heavier
trains, so even holding steady on derailments per million train-miles
could result in more disruptive and devastating derailments. What are
Class I railroads doing to mitigate derailments and the effects of
those derailments on the surrounding communities?
Answer. All railroads, including Class I railroads, must comply
with all applicable rail safety regulations. Class I railroads have
successfully implemented positive train control (PTC), as mandated by
statute, and many Class I railroads are also undertaking voluntary
efforts to upgrade their PTC and other train control systems to provide
additional functionality not required by statute. In addition to the
safety benefits of PTC, the significant improvements in railroad
communications required by PTC also benefits, in some locations, the
communications between a locomotive and a train's end of train device
that is used to acuate the brakes from the rear of the train.
Class I railroads also work with local governments and first
responders to share information, train, and prepare for rail
emergencies. For example, the rail industry maintains the AskRail app
that provides first responders with immediate access to data about what
type of hazardous material is being transported in particular railcars
so responders can make informed decisions about emergency response,
should an accident occur.
Questions from Hon. Dina Titus to Hon. Amit Bose, Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration
Question 1.a. In Ms. Sanborn's testimony, she expresses displeasure
that the FRA denied her railroad's request for a waiver to reduce the
frequency of manual inspections where Automated Track Geometry
Measurement Systems (ATGMS) is in use.
Do the current regulations prohibit the use of ATGMS?
Answer. No. Current regulations do not prohibit or limit a
railroad's use of ATGMS or any other emerging inspection technology, as
long as it can run in conjunction with current regulations. Current
regulations prohibit railroads from decreasing visual track inspections
below the minimum of FRA's track safety standards regardless of their
use of ATGMS or any other track inspection technology.
Question 1.b. Is there anything standing in the way of the
railroads increasing the frequency with which they inspect tracks using
ATGMS?
Answer. From a regulatory perspective, no, there is nothing
standing in the way of the railroads increasing the frequency with
which they inspect tracks using ATGMS or any other inspection
technology. However, ATGMS cannot replace the visual inspections
required by FRA's regulations. FRA's track safety standards are the
minimum safety requirements, but railroads may adopt higher standards
of inspection and maintenance.
Questions from Hon. Brian K. Fitzpatrick to Hon. Amit Bose,
Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration
Question 1. Last December, the Biden Administration announced its
Trucking Action Plan to help that industry remedy its workforce
shortage and address the supply chain crisis. Similar shortages in the
rail industry are actively endangering and overburdening already
fatigued crews.
What, if any, specific steps are the Administration or the FRA
taking to address the rail workforce shortfall?
Answer. As Administrator Bose indicated in his recent Congressional
testimony, FRA has renewed its focus on the development of the rail
industry workforce. FRA believes that with the IIJA's unprecedented
investment into our Nation's rail infrastructure, as well as support
for continued innovation and technological advancements, it is critical
to ensure the industry's workforce is properly educated and trained.
Examples of FRA's actions include the publication of draft guidance for
grantees to ensure industry employee jobs are adequately protected from
potential adverse impacts of federally funded projects. In addition,
FRA's 2023 budget request outlines an FRA initiative to establish a
Railroad Workforce Development program with dedicated funding within
the Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvements program.
Question 2. In my district there are two frequently blocked rail
crossings (Bellevue and Woodbourne) that pose a danger to public
safety, cut off our communities from vital commercial services, and
severely impact our first responders' ability to respond to
emergencies. Collecting data on these interruptions is critical to
preventing them.
Has the FRA experienced any difficulty or delays in establishing
the Blocked Crossing Portal authorized by the Infrastructure Investment
and Jobs Act?
Answer. To date, FRA has not experienced any difficulties or delays
in establishing the Blocked Crossing Portal authorized by the IIJA. The
portal went live in late 2019, prior to the passage of the IIJA, and as
the IIJA requires, FRA is currently working to modify the portal to
collect data regarding the causes of blocked crossings. This
modification requires approval of the Office of Management and Budget
under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). Accordingly, FRA published the
required PRA public notices on April 1, 2022, and July 11, 2022 (87 FR
19176; 87 FR 41166). Before OMB can take action on the modification,
they must accept and consider public comment for thirty days after the
second Federal Register notice is published. Once approved by OMB, FRA
will implement the changes to the portal consistent with the IIJA.
Furthermore, FRA published a Request for Information on June 14, 2022,
requesting public comments on how FRA's engagement with affected
parties and changes to the portal and related operations can improve
the effectiveness of the portal.
Question from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Hon. Thomas B. Chapman, Member,
National Transportation Safety Board
Question 1. All seven of the Class I railroads have implemented
some form of precision scheduled railroading (PSR), which focuses on
driving profits to shareholders by reducing expenses such as important
capital assets and workers. By the end of 2021, the Class I railroads
(excluding Amtrak) cut the average size of their workforce by nearly
one-third compared to the average total in 2015, according to
employment data they report to the Surface Transportation Board.
During the September 2020 NTSB Board Meeting on the 2019 collision
of two CSX freight trains in Carey, Ohio, was there discussion about
safety impacts caused by the cuts to CSX's workforce?
Answer. The NTSB determined the probable cause of the Carey, Ohio,
collision was the failure of the striking train's engineer to respond
to the signal indications requiring him to slow and stop the train
because of his impairment due to the effects of alcohol. Contributing
to the collision was the design of the positive train control (PTC)
system, which allowed continued operation in restricted mode on the
main track.
Among the conclusions from the investigation, we found that CSX
Transportation's drug- and alcohol-testing programs, the shortcomings
of which were also documented in the Federal Railroad Administration's
(FRA's) audits of the programs, failed to deter the striking train
engineer's illegal use of marijuana and consumption of alcohol, which
impaired his performance while on duty and operating the train.
Specifically, the striking engineer had not been randomly tested for
drugs since 2009. In a May 2019 audit, the FRA indicated concern that,
overall, CSX's alcohol- and drug-testing program was not functioning at
an acceptable level of compliance and efficiency. FRA auditors observed
numerous instances where CSX field managers were unavailable to
schedule testing or did not schedule testing to ensure that random
selections were completed.
In addition, we found that CSX Transportation's PTC training
program did not include particular emphasis on using restricted mode
specific to its limitations enforcing restrictive signal aspects,
encroachment into an established work zone, and movement through an
improperly lined switch. Adequate training and managerial oversight are
essential for ensuring that rules and procedures for safely operating
PTC systems in restricted mode are followed correctly.
During the Board meeting to consider the Carey report, then-Member
and now NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy asked the investigator-in-charge
and the group chairman of operating practices, another investigator, if
precision scheduled railroading (PSR) had an impact on safety. The
investigator stated that PSR did have an impact on safety, specifically
citing training concerns given cuts in the number of CSX road
foreperson positions, because these employees might have provided
feedback on whether the PTC training program was effective and working
correctly.
In addition, Member Homendy cited a phone conversation that she and
staff from the NTSB's Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and Hazardous
Materials Investigations had with the FRA that indicated that workforce
cuts at CSX had resulted in lack of follow-up on scheduling random drug
testing because CSX was sending scheduling emails to people that were
no longer with the railroad.
Questions from Hon. Seth Moulton to Hon. Thomas B. Chapman, Member,
National Transportation Safety Board
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 1.a. From 2000 to the mid-2010s, per the above graphic,
the derailments per million train-miles dropped, from around 2.9 to
1.75. But that progress largely leveled off and beginning in 2016, we
saw year-over-year increases in the rate of train derailments per
million train-miles through 2019. According to this data, for 2021, we
sit at 2, still above the 2013 low. Coincident with this increase are
massive slashes in workforce by Class I's: between 2015 and 2021, total
workforce declined nearly one third. Putting these two statistics
together, we can see that rate of train derailments increased at
exactly the same moment Class I's began cutting their workforce.
What effect has precision scheduled railroading (PSR) had on the
number of workers employed by the Class I railroads?
Question 1.b. PSR is based on the preeminence of lowering operating
ratios. Railroads have made it clear that they are responding to
shareholder pressure in implementing it. How are today's Class I's
balancing safety, customer service, and stock performance?
Question 1.c. PSR includes the operation of longer and heavier
trains, so even holding steady on derailments per million train-miles
could result in more disruptive and devastating derailments. What are
Class I railroads doing to mitigate derailments and the effects of
those derailments on the surrounding communities?
Answers to Questions 1.a., 1.b., & 1.c. These are thoughtful
questions; however, we at NTSB do not consider ourselves well-
positioned to offer responses. As the federal agency tasked with
determining the probable cause of significant transportation accidents,
our focus is on the investigatory process and the factors contributing
to specific and often tragic events. With respect to identifying or
responding to broader industry trends, we defer to the FRA as the
regulator. Some elements of these questions might also be addressed to
the operators themselves.
Question from Hon. Dina Titus to Hon. Thomas B. Chapman, Member,
National Transportation Safety Board
Question 1. Your Safety Recommendation report following the Fort
Worth, Texas, and Draffin, Kentucky, derailments mentions that cars
positioned at the rear of a train have a lower probability of being
derailed which also lowers the probability of releasing hazardous
materials in the unfortunate event of a derailment.
Has the NTSB considered making recommendations to the FRA or PHMSA
regarding the positioning of cars carrying hazardous materials?
Answer. As a result of those investigations referenced in your
question, we recommended that the Association of American Railroads
(AAR), the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association
(ASLRRA), and the Renewable Fuels Association (RFA) develop and adopt
guidelines and recommended practices for the systematic placement of
the most vulnerable tank cars in high-hazard flammable trains, such as
unmodified US Department of Transportation-111 tank cars, in positions
of trains where they are least likely to derail or to sustain
mechanical damage from the effects of trailing tonnage or collision in
an accident (Safety Recommendation R-20-27). ASLRRA and the RFA have
implemented the recommendation, but it remains classified ``Open--
Unacceptable Response'' to the AAR.
Previously, we had recommended that the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) evaluate the risks posed to
train crews by hazardous materials transported by rail, determine the
adequate separation distance between hazardous materials cars and
occupied cars to ensure train crews are protected during both normal
operations and accident conditions, and collaborate with the FRA to
revise the regulations to reflect those findings (Safety Recommendation
R-17-1). That recommendation is currently classified ``Open--Acceptable
Response,'' as PHMSA has initiated a research project in coordination
with the John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to
address the issue. We understand that the Volpe Center is in the
process of finalizing a report. In the meantime, we recommended that
PHMSA require that all trains have a minimum of five buffer cars
between any crew-occupied equipment and cars carrying hazardous
materials, regardless of train length and consist (Safety
Recommendation R-17-2). PHMSA has responded that it does not plan to
take this interim action, and the recommendation is classified ``Open--
Unacceptable Response.''
Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Roy L. Morrison III,
Director of Safety, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
Division, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Question 1. Your testimony states that visual inspections conducted
by human track inspectors can identify track defects than cannot be
identified by autonomous track geometry measurement systems.
Have your members identified defects that were missed by automated
track inspection technology inspecting the same track? If so, can you
share an example?
Answer. BMWED has been collecting this information for several
years to be used in different settings. To provide the most
comprehensive answer, all the responses we have gathered have been
provided.
Section 1--Track inspection survey conducted from July 13, 2022,
to July 18, 2022
Section 2--Track inspectors' declarations used in BNSF Lawsuit
Section 3--Track Inspector Statements
This report is the most complete and up-to-date collection of this
data.
[Editor's note: The 106-page report is retained in committee
files.]vic
Questions from Hon. Dina Titus to Roy L. Morrison III, Director of
Safety, Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Question 1.a. With the rail workforce having been cut by one-third
in recent years, it gives me pause that railroads are requesting
waivers from the FRA to reduce manual track inspections.
Are there track defects that cannot be identified by Automated
Track Geometry Measurement Systems (ATGMS) or other automated track
inspections (ATI) technologies?
Answer. BMWED has broken this answer into two parts.
Section 1--Is a table created by BMWED using 49 CFR Part 213
Track Safety Standards Defect Codes Subpart A to F.
Section 2--Is real examples of FRA-reported Accidents from 2016-
September 2021. Using the same defect codes, BMWED broke the real work
FRA-reported accidents into those that ATI/ATGMS can detect and those
it does not.
Section 1:
Key: Y=Inspected for N=Not inspected for
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FRA Defects Human Visual ATI
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub Part B........................... Roadbed
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
213.33--Drainage....... Y...................... N
213.37--Vegetation..... Y...................... N
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub Part C........................... Track Geometry
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
213.53--Gauge.......... Y...................... Y
213.57--Curves, Y...................... Y
Elevations, and speed
limitations.
213.55--Track alinement Y...................... Y
213.59--Elevation of Y...................... Y
curved track; runoff.
213.63--Track surface.. Y...................... Y
213.65--Combined track Y...................... Y
alinement and surface
deviations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub Part D........................... Track Structure
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
213.103--Ballast; Y...................... N
general.
213.109--Crossties..... Y...................... N
213.113--Defective Y...................... N
rails.
213.115--Rail end Y...................... N
mismatch.
213.121--Rail joints... Y...................... N
213.122--Torch cut rail Y...................... N
213.123--Tie plates.... Y...................... N
213.127--Rail fastening Y...................... N
systems.
213.133--Turnouts and Y...................... N
track crossings
generally.
213.135--Switches...... Y...................... N
213.137--Frogs......... Y...................... N
213.139--Spring rail Y...................... N
frogs.
213.141--Self-guarded Y...................... N
frogs.
213.143--Frog guard Y...................... N
rails and guard faces;
gage.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subpart E............................ Track Appliances and Track-Related Devices
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
213.205--Derails....... Y...................... N
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Regulatory
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trespassers............ Y...................... N
Vandalism.............. Y...................... N
Track Obstructions..... Y...................... N
Right of Way........... Y...................... N
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table data consistent with industry raw data available in the Federal Register under ATI test raw data.
Editor's note: The color-coded key in the original document has been adjusted to accommodate a black and white
printing format.
Section 2: Actual FRA Reported Accidents
Non-Geo Detectable Track Caused Accident 2016-09/2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Type of Reportable Casualt
Specific causes: --------------------------------------------------------------
Cnt % Coll Der Othr Amount % Kld Nonf
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T002--Washout/rain/slide/etc. dmg--track......... 30 1.1 - 28 2 24,519,482 4.6 0 8
T099--Other roadbed defects...................... 9 0.3 1 8 - 1,234,563 0.2 0 1
T104--Disturbed ballast section.................. 1 0 - 1 - 905,230 0.2 0 0
T105--Insufficient ballast section............... 4 0.1 - 4 - 2,993,059 0.6 0 1
T201--Bolt hole crack or break................... 33 1.2 - 33 - 12,407,169 2.4 0 0
T202--Broken base of rail........................ 90 3.3 - 90 - 24,838,850 4.7 0 0
T203--Broken weld (plant)........................ 4 1 - 4 - 818,221 0.2 0 0
T204--Broken weld (field)........................ 21 0.8 - 21 - 15,327,381 2.9 0 6
T205--Defective or missing crossties............. 60 2.2 - 60 - 6,512,483 1.2 0 0
T206--Defect/missing spike--oth rail fastener.... 51 1.8 - 51 - 4,631,020 0.9 0 0
T207--Detail fracture--shelling/head check....... 261 9.5 1 258 2 69,816,123 13.2 0 2
T208--Engine burn fracture....................... 4 0.1 - 4 - 1,549,268 0.3 0 0
T210--Head and web sep (outside jt bar limit).... 98 3.6 - 97 1 14,351,128 2.7 0 1
T211--Head & web separation--in jt bar limit..... 14 0.5 - 14 - 3,412,978 0.6 0 0
T212--Horizontal split head...................... 27 1 - 27 - 2,948,232 0.6 0 0
T213--Joint bar broken (compromise).............. 8 0.3 - 8 - 2,863,309 0.5 0 0
T214--Joint bar broken (insulated)............... 2 0.1 - 1 1 71,867 0.0 0 0
T215--Joint bar broken (noninsulated)............ 11 0.4 - 11 - 5,635,261 1.1 0 2
T216--Joint bolts, broken, or missing............ 8 0.3 - 8 - 1,247,945 0.2 0 0
T217--Mismatched rail-head contour............... 15 0.5 - 15 - 1,046,549 0.2 0 7
T219--Rail defect with joint bar repair.......... 5 0.2 - 5 - 2,643,693 0.5 0 0
T220--Transverse/compound fissure................ 99 3.6 - 98 1 28,307,850 5.4 0 0
T221--Vertical split head........................ 102 3.7 - 102 - 23,500,880 4.5 0 1
T222--Worn rail.................................. 17 0.6 - 17 - 2,782,656 0.5 0 0
T223--Rail Condition--Dry rail, freshly ground... 2 0.1 - 2 - 31,606 0.0 0 0
T299--Other rail and joint bar defects........... 27 1 - 27 - 12,282,650 2.3 0 2
T301--Derail, defective.......................... 2 0.1 - 2 - 122,867 0.0 0 0
T303--Guard rail loose/broken or mislocated...... 16 0.6 - 16 - 685,590 0.1 0 0
T304--Railroad crossing frog, worn or broken..... 2 0.1 - 2 - 252,961 0.0 0 0
T305--Retarder worn, broken, malfunctioning...... 5 0.2 1 3 1 362,701 0.1 0 0
T306--Retarder yard skate defective.............. 1 0 - 1 - 45,259 0.0 0 0
T307--Spring/power swtch mech. malfunction....... 14 0.5 - 14 - 5,577,472 1.1 0 1
T308--Stock rail worn, broken, disconnected...... 11 0.4 - 11 - 5,480,032 1.0 0 0
T309--Switch (hand op) stand mechanism defect.... 18 0.7 - 18 - 1,439,620 0.3 0 0
T310--Swtch connect/operate rod broke/defect..... 9 0.3 - 9 - 478,598 0.1 0 0
T311--Switch damaged or out of adjustment........ 81 2.9 - 81 - 4,795,983 0.9 0 0
T312--Switch lug/crank broken.................... 6 0.2 - 6 - 1,368,739 0.3 0 0
T313--Switch out of adj. insuff. anchoring....... 12 0.4 - 12 - 1,166,285 0.2 0 1
T314--Switch point worn or broken................ 167 6.1 - 165 2 8,574,779 1.6 0 4
T315--Switch rod worn, bent, broken, etc......... 8 0.3 - 8 - 2,053,332 0.4 0 0
T316--Turnout frog (rigid) worn, or broken....... 14 0.5 - 14 - 481,623 0.1 0 0
T317--Turnout frog (self guarded)--worn/broken... 6 0.2 - 6 - 188,311 0.0 0 0
T318--Turnout frog (spring) worn, or broken...... 6 0.2 - 6 - 908,975 0.2 0 0
T319--Switch pt gap (btwn swt pt & stock rail)... 74 2.7 1 73 - 4,913,176 0.9 0 4
T399--Oth frog, switch, trk appliance defect..... 44 1.6 - 42 2 8,073,381 1.5 0 1
T402--Flangeway clogged.......................... 12 0.4 - 12 - 766,565 0.1 0 0
T403--Engineering design or constructi........... 35 1.3 1 33 1 3,804,717 0.7 0 0
T404--Catenary system defect..................... 80 2.9 - - 80 2,824,359 0.5 2 2
T499--Other way and structure defect............. 17 0.6 - 9 8 3,284,047 0.6 0 0
--------------------------------------------------------------
Total.......................................... 1643 ... 5 1537 101 324,328,825 ..... 2 44
Average........................................ ..... 1.2 .... ..... ..... ........... 1.2 ... ....
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Geo Detectable Track Caused Accident 2016-09/2021
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Type of Accident Reportable Damage Casualt
Specific causes: ----------------------------------------------------------------
Cnt % Coll Der Othr Amount % Kld Nonf
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T001--Roadbed settled or soft.................. 106 3.8 1 105 - 38,503,433 7.3 0 1
T101--Cross level of track irregular (joints).. 54 2.0 - 54 - 5,213,418 1.0 0 0
T102--Cross level track irreg. (not at joints). 73 2.6 - 72 1 15,652,469 3.0 0 1
T103--Deviate frm uniform top of rail profile.. 23 0.8 - 22 1 1,462,142 0.3 0 0
T106--Superelevation improper, excessive, etc.. 22 0.8 - 21 1 3,689,249 0.7 0 0
T107--Superelevation runoff improper........... 5 0.2 - 5 - 200,027 0.0 0 0
T108--Trk alignmnt irreg--not buckled/sunkink.. 54 2.0 - 54 - 25,232,743 4.8 0 0
T109--Track alignment irreg (buckled/sunkink).. 78 2.8 - 78 - 47,787,616 9.1 0 10
T110--Wide gage (defective/missing crossties).. 444 16.1 - 443 1 34,680,276 6.6 0 1
T111--Wide gage (spikes/other rail fasteners).. 142 5.2 1 140 1 17,198,157 3.3 0 0
T112--Wide gage (loose, broke, etc, gage rods). 17 0.6 - 17 - 1,065,358 0.2 0 0
T113--Wide gage (due to worn rails)............ 43 1.6 - 43 - 3,229,801 0.6 0 7
T199--Other track geometry defects............. 42 1.5 - 42 - 5,750,204 1.1 0 0
T401--Bridge misalignment or failure........... 11 0.4 - 8 3 3,901,921 0.7 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total........................................ 1114 ..... 2.0 1104 8 203,566,814 ..... 0 20
Average...................................... ..... 2.9 .... ..... ..... ........... 2.8 ... ....
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 1.b. What safety implications may occur due to less
frequent manual track inspections?
Answer:
Automated Track Inspection Machines and Human Track Inspections--
Reduction in Human Track Inspections Is Not Necessary for the Testing
or Use of Automated Track Inspection; and Reductions in Human
Inspections Are Dangerous
The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has written to the
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) complaining that the FRA has not
renewed or extended waivers and test programs that utilize automated
track inspection machines. AAR implies that the FRA is somehow impeding
the railroads' use of this technology and somehow depriving them of the
ability to operate this equipment. The railroads do not need waivers or
suspensions of regulations to test or use the track inspection
machines.
No current regulation prohibits the use of such equipment. The
waivers and suspensions of regulations sought by the railroads concern
the frequency of human track inspections that are required to ensure
track safety. The waivers and suspensions allow the railroads to reduce
human track inspections and to substitute machine inspections for human
inspections. While the machines can augment the work of human track
inspectors, they are not a substitute for inspections performed by a
person; and replacing these inspections with machine inspections makes
the railroads less safe, not safer.
The Track Safety Standards (TSS) ``prescribe minimum safety
requirements for railroad track that is part of the general railroad
system of transportation.'' The regulation at 49 CFR 213.233 mandates
specific minimum frequencies of human visual track inspections
depending on the track type. The regulation also requires immediate
remediation of track defects, which track inspectors can do, but not by
machines. Reduction of the regulatorily required human railroad
infrastructure inspections was not and is not ``necessary'' to increase
the use of any automated track inspection (ATI) technology. There is
nothing about the use of the automated equipment that precludes
continued human visual inspections required in Sec. 213.233. ATI
technology is not new. Most if not all of the American Class 1
railroads (referred to as Industry from this point forward) have been
using some form of this technology since the 1970s. This technology has
supplemented human track inspections for decades. But there is no
technology currently available to inspect for all the defects the FRA
Track Safety Standards require that a human inspector inspects.
TSS regulation Section 49 CFR 213.233 requires that railroad track
inspections must be performed by a person who is designated as
qualified to perform track inspections under 49 CFR 213.7, which, in
turn, requires that the person must demonstrate that he or she knows
and understands all requirements of Section 213.7 that apply to the
inspection of the track for which he or she is responsible. Track
Inspectors must be able to detect deviations from those requirements
and to prescribe and take appropriate and immediate remedial actions to
correct or safely compensate for deviations from TSS requirements. 49
CFR 213.233.
Under 213.233, the following items need to be inspected to perform
adequate track inspections: Roadbed (drainage and vegetation); Track
Geometry (track gauge, track alignment, curves; elevation and speed
limitations); Track Surface (combined track alignment and surface
deviations); Track Structure (ballast, crossties, defective rails, rail
end mismatch, continuous welded rail, rail joints, tie plates, rail
fastening systems, switches, and derails); Automotive or Railroad
crossings at grade; and Right of way (trespassers, suspicious items,
vandalism). A qualified Track Inspector is expected to look
simultaneously for all these sorts of track defects and to consider
whether deviations or deformities in these categories that might not
constitute defects on their own together include conditions that
require corrections.
It is important to note that although all the defects discovered
using ATI can be found by a Sec. 213.7 Qualified Human Track Inspector
using long-established visual track inspection techniques. Only
approximately a quarter of all Sec. 213 track defects found by Track
Inspectors are detected by using an ATI inspection system.
BMWED agrees that ATI improves track geometry defect detection
through means and methods that have far better reliability and accuracy
than human in-person visual inspections conducted by a person walking
or hi-railing track. Track geometry defects, particularly changes in
gauge, are one of the leading track causes of derailment in the US.
But, as we have explained, they are not the only types of track and
right-of-way defects that the railroads must use for screening. And
while a Track Inspector can immediately remedy some track defects, call
in local maintenance of way forces to repair a defect, or place a
``slow order'' on a track defect, use of a machine that reports data to
a remote location where it will be reviewed with a Track Inspector
later sent to check on the reported defect does not result in immediate
remediation of the defect. Therefore, the industry should voluntarily
adopt a higher ATI frequency than currently required while maintaining
TSS human visual frequency of inspection requirements. BMWED also feels
FRA should clearly state that increased ATI frequencies are to
supplement, not replace, the TSS human visual inspection frequencies.
U.S. railroads play a vital role in our nation's economy, and it is
crucial to keep that rail system moving safely. BMWED recognizes the
need for safe and reliable railroad infrastructure. We look forward to
working with FRA/DOT and the industry to find safe ways to improve the
inspection of our nation's railroad infrastructure.
Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Grady C. Cothen, Jr., Retired,
Transportation Policy Consultant
Question 1. Your whitepaper reviews a host of accidents, both minor
and fatal derailments; involving extremely heavy and long trains and
trains that are less heavy and long. You make a compelling case that
there are common, recurring issues leading to accidents.
As someone who spent decades at FRA working on rail safety, why are
you concerned by what you perceive as the Class I railroads' regression
of management of in-train forces?
Answer. The safety implications of this practice are, of course,
considerable. We risk a catastrophic accident involving release of
hazardous materials, among other scenarios reflected in the White Paper
provided to the Committee. Even the wreck clearance operations are
inherently dangerous for workers and disruptive to communities.
However, I believe the underlying concern is even more serious. It
appears that the major railroads are willing to undertake operations
that they know to be unnecessarily problematic for short-term gain.
With that said, the possibility presents itself that the entire march
toward safer and more productive rail transportation, which began with
the reforms of the late 1970s and the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, could
be reversed.
The Nation needs the railroads to grow markets, not shed traffic or
``collar'' cars. Shippers need the railroads to tailor service to
individual markets, as much as practical, not just put everything on a
virtual conveyor belt and hope for the best. Employees, both officers
and rank and file, need to know there is a future in this industry so
they will stay in their posts and do their best.
Railroads need to invest in their future, maintaining a state of
good repair and preparing their people, equipment and facilities for
the future. That future should not be a slimmed down network with long
trains lumbering through newly extended sidings that claimed capital
better spent elsewhere.
Question 2.a. During the hearing, Ms. Sanborn, representing Norfolk
Southern Corporation and AAR's Safety and Operations Management
Committee, stated that technologies have been developed that benefit
the handling of longer trains, citing the use of distributed power as
well as energy management systems, which she described as ``basically
cruise control systems that operate the train with an eye towards
managing in-train forces as well as speed and fuel efficiency.''
Are the Class Is railroads adhering to principles governing the
proper assignment or placement of locomotives in a train?
Answer. In the past several years there appear to have been
numerous instances of long and heavy trains operated without
locomotives placed properly in train (distributed power locomotives or
DPUs). This may not have been intended by the operations plan, but it
clearly happens.
Question 2.b. Do you have concerns related to the use of, or
reliance on, the train energy management systems that Ms. Sanborn
described as capable of managing in-train forces?
Answer. Train energy management systems have a very legitimate role
in guiding the use of motive power and dynamic (locomotive only)
braking to achieve reductions in fuel consumed (and emissions). Used
with Positive Train Control technology and advanced dispatch systems,
these systems can achieve ``train pacing'' that may further reduce fuel
consumption and emissions while distributing traffic efficiently over
the network. The Federal Railroad Administration was an early research
sponsor of one of the major energy management systems.
However, when use of train brakes (``air'' or ``power'' brakes)
becomes necessary, because of significant grades or undulating
territory, these systems are generally considered ineffective and, by
rule or through practice, are generally cut out. The problems arise
when the systems are relied upon inappropriately or to such an extent
that crews might become ``de-skilled'' in the management of in-train
forces. Longer and heavier trains make use of these systems more
attractive but also more difficult, particularly due to the vagaries of
data radio links among the locomotives in the train.
Suppliers and the railroads have ambitions to blend dynamic and
train braking under the control of train energy management systems.
This has been tested under ideal conditions but in my judgment will
prove very unreliable absent the adoption of electronically controlled
pneumatic brakes.
Question 3.a. You testified that derailments caused by poor
management of in-train forces are being reported primarily under
``human factor'' codes, with the implication that the employee made a
mistake. You stated that, for the most part, these actually are
organizational accidents driven by management decisions. You also
stated that other accidents involving management of in-train forces are
being reported as equipment-related failures, but that many of such
failures result from excessive buff and draft forces in poorly
assembled trains.
Please describe the importance of correctly capturing reportable
events.
Answer. If we can't measure a problem, we can't determine the
nature or scope of the problem or fashion an efficient remedy. One of
the issues with any response to the current problems will be an
evaluation of benefits and costs. In the safety arena, the first
benefits we look for are the accidents and casualties avoided. There
are often other benefits, of course, such as avoidance of negative
``externalities,'' but that is where we start.
Question 3.b. What can FRA, NTSB, and the railroads do to better
ensure the root cause of accidents/incidents involving in-train forces
are identified?
Answer. Many of the problems with current reporting are simply
gross factual errors, evident from the conflicts in the reported data.
My understanding is that FRA is already beginning to work on that
problem.
A second concern is the absence of ``cause codes'' and
supplementary narrative requirements that clearly reflect the specific
nature of failures in the functioning of new technology and practices.
The FRA has the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) as an
available tool to update the reporting system. The RSAC has taken on
tasks related to the Railroad Accident/Incident Reporting System in
recent years, but to the best of my knowledge not focusing on
management of in-train forces.
I am concerned that the NTSB still seems not to understand the
genesis of some of the problems we are seeing in the accident data. The
Board staff is dominated by aviation personnel who are schooled in
safety management. However, the assumptions underlying safety
management systems include a belief that a positive safety culture will
free up the flow of information and insights required to mitigate
risks. We have seen with the 737 MAX debacle that pursuit of profit can
poison the safety management process and even thwart a very advanced
regulatory model. The same sort of thing appears to be happening in the
railroad industry.
We can laud safety management and a positive safety culture all we
want, but that then requires that we be capable of understanding that
it requires safety to be the preeminent value of the enterprise. When
that condition is not present, its absence is often relevant to the
``underlying'' cause of organizational accidents. We can adjust the
``process'' all we want, but the foundation is still unsound.
The NTSB does important work, but it has been absent without leave
with respect to the PSR-driven issues of the past several years. Its
railroad staff needs to get out of the office between major
investigations, mingle with officers and employees, and take the
temperature of the industry. The new NTSB Chairman should be well
situated to make that happen.
Question 4. At the hearing, you stated that the immense safety
progress the Class I railroads had been making has stalled and further
progress has been arrested due to their commitment to precision
scheduled railroading (PSR). You spoke clearly about the need for
countervailing pressures in the form of safety regulations to
counteract the focus of PSR on rewarding shareholders.
Do you have recommendations for such countervailing pressures?
Answer. My White Paper lays out detailed recommendations regarding
legislative and regulatory action to address this need. The first step
for FRA is to require railroads to live by their own train make-up
rules. Then FRA needs to task the RSAC with writing regulations.
Ideally, the regulations would be built around industry standards and
capable of adjusting as technology and practices change. The agency
already knows a good bit about what draft and buff forces, and lateral/
vertical forces, are problematic. So, the physics should be the
starting point. Both the industry and FRA have train dynamics models
that can be used to test various train configurations over specific
routes. They need to be used before, and not just after the accident.
The Congress will have to back up these actions with a specific
statutory mandate. Absent that, the regulatory process will bog down.
If the industry believes it can delay the regulatory process and use
the courts to stymie necessary actions, industry may not participate
constructively in the regulatory process.
Question 5. According to research by the Congressional Research
Service, in 2020, the seven Class I railroads had combined debt of more
than $108 billion and combined annual interest expense of nearly $5
billion.
As someone who helped the freight railroads through bankruptcies
and economic deregulation, do you have concerns that the debt and
annual interest expense of the Class I railroads pose a risk to the
safety and vitality of the industry?
Answer. My ``back of the envelope'' looks at this question do give
me concerns. It appears that much of the long-term debt taken on in
recent years was used for cash distributions to investors, rather than
state of good repair or investments in new capital projects. This works
for a time in a period of high liquidity and very low interest rates.
However, as interest rates rise to more historically common levels,
refinancing and repayment could tax railroad cash flows, particularly
if the railroads have failed to grow their markets in the meantime.
Railroads are still ``affected with a public interest,'' a point
driven home by the ``Freight Rail Works'' commercials and other
industry statements. The worst outcome would be any future requirement
for public funds to bail out the industry, with the restrictions on
management discretion and innovation which that would logically entail.
I have suggested to FRA that the agency, perhaps in partnership
with STB staff, conduct forward-looking financial analysis directed at
this question. The analysts would need to frame ``pro forma'' cases
positing requirements for investment in state-of-good-repair,
assumptions for railroad traffic levels in various markets,
fluctuations in the actual cost of capital, sufficiency of cash flow
after repayment of debt obligations, and perhaps other factors.
Congress and the Executive will need early warning flags to trigger
action well before the situation is too far gone.
At a minimum, USDOT will need to be very careful in assuring that
any Federal infrastructure spending that goes directly or indirectly to
the major freight railroads is accompanied by appropriate undertakings
and assurances. Major freight railroads host Amtrak and commuter
service. They are required for national defense, and getting more
traffic off the highway and onto the railroads will be very important
as we address the climate challenge.
We should be looking for opportunities for public/private
partnerships that might involve, as an example, electrification of some
major freight routes. But there would be no logic in throwing public
investments into the freight railroad coffers if they will just be paid
out in excessive cash distributions. Money is fungible.
Questions from Hon. Seth Moulton to Grady C. Cothen, Jr., Retired,
Transportation Policy Consultant
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 1.a. From 2000 to the mid-2010s, per the above graphic,
the derailments per million train-miles dropped, from around 2.9 to
1.75. But that progress largely leveled off and beginning in 2016, we
saw year-over-year increases in the rate of train derailments per
million train-miles through 2019. According to this data, for 2021, we
sit at 2, still above the 2013 low. Coincident with this increase are
massive slashes in workforce by Class I's: between 2015 and 2021, total
workforce declined nearly one third. Putting these two statistics
together, we can see that rate of train derailments increased at
exactly the same moment Class I's began cutting their workforce.
What effect has precision scheduled railroading (PSR) had on the
number of workers employed by the Class I railroads?
Answer. The STB keeps detailed statistics on rail employment. It
seems to be generally accepted that pressure from financial markets has
led to a reduction in rail employment of about a third from 2015
forward. Some outsourcing of work has occurred, of course, but the
appearance to the outside observer is that many very useful management
and rank and file positions have been cut.
Question 1.b. PSR is based on the preeminence of lowering operating
ratios. Railroads have made it clear that they are responding to
shareholder pressure in implementing it. How are today's Class I's
balancing safety, customer service, and stock performance?
Answer. There are many opinions on this issue among close
observers, but I believe the better arguments are with those who say
stock performance is clearly elevated above other factors, including
future growth. It must be said that these are not decisions made by
traditional railroaders, but rather by arguably ``predatory'' private
equity that has gained footholds in the board rooms.
If poor management of in-train forces is a symptom of PSR, then PSR
is a symptom of the financialization of the American economy. We see
its effects all around us, of course, and yet we do not make the
changes in tax policy, or securities law, or even antitrust law, that
might begin to turn the proverbial battleship. It will take a long time
to turn, but for the future of our economy we need to begin.
Question 1.c. PSR includes the operation of longer and heavier
trains, so even holding steady on derailments per million train-miles
could result in more disruptive and devastating derailments. What are
Class I railroads doing to mitigate derailments and the effects of
those derailments on the surrounding communities?
Answer. As my prepared statement reflects, railroads have worked
constructively to reduce track caused accidents and certain equipment
caused accidents, as well. The operational hazards are less well
managed. These are events that, as much as possible, should be
prevented through sound operating practices and appropriate application
of technology.
Historically, railroads have been generous in providing training
for emergency responders in addressing railroad accidents. Hazardous
material training has been a forte for railroads and major shippers.
Others would need to address the extent to which this remains true
today, and to what extent.
Once an event occurs, railroads generally respond quickly to
mitigate effects to the extent feasible, clean up the derailment site,
compensate public entities and private parties that incur direct
expenses or losses, and work with shippers and local authorities on the
remediation of any environmental impacts. But secondary and tertiary
losses will occur that are never reimbursed. The latter are more
general ``societal costs'' that are difficult to quantify, as a whole.
Questions from Hon. Peter A. DeFazio to Cynthia M. Sanborn, Executive
Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Norfolk Southern
Corporation, and Chair, Safety and Operations Management Committee,
Association of American Railroads
Question 1. Your written testimony states the industry is concerned
that FRA will include crew scheduling issues in the scope of the
Fatigue Risk Management Program rulemaking. However, the 2008 Rail
Safety Improvement Act mandated that railroads consider scheduling
practices for employees that reduce fatigue and cumulative sleep loss
in fatigue management plans. Appropriately, this is reflected in the
final rule FRA published on June 13.
Will NS and the industry comply with the statute and FRA's final
rule and review scheduling practices as part of fatigue risk management
programs?
Answer. In the area of fatigue management, as in all other areas of
rail operations, railroads will act according to their obligations
under the relevant statutes and regulations. That said, railroads
continue to believe that the FRA should refrain from interjecting
itself into this matter and instead allow railroads to continue to
address scheduling as part of collective bargaining.
Norfolk Southern and other railroads want properly rested crews. It
is not in a railroad's best interest to have employees who are too
tired to perform their duties properly and safely. For that reason,
railroads have long been reviewing how they operate--including, when
practical, their scheduling systems--to keep fatigue to a minimum.
Experts agree that because factors that can result in fatigue are
multiple, complex, and frequently intertwined, there is no single
solution to the fatigue problem. That's why railroads work with their
employees and others to find innovative, scientifically based
countermeasures to fatigue-related problems. Countermeasures railroads
have adopted include:
Increasing the minimum number of hours off duty and
providing more predictable calling assignments and rest opportunities
between shifts, as well as devising systems (including web sites, e-
mails, and automated telephone systems) to improve communication
between crew callers and employees.
Allowing employees who have been off work more than 72
hours (e.g., on vacation) to begin their first shift in the morning
rather than the middle of the night.
Encouraging confidential sleep disorder screening and
treatment.
Offering fatigue education programs for employees and
their families. Education is critical, because the effectiveness of
fatigue initiatives depends on the actions of employees while off duty.
Not every countermeasure is appropriate for every railroad, or even
for different parts of the same railroad, because circumstances unique
to each railroad influence the effectiveness and practicality of
specific countermeasures.
As I noted in my testimony, scheduling is a complicated issue--
circumstances are different from one railroad to the next, and between
different parts of the same railroad. Many rail employees do work set
schedules, such as many of those holding yard or local switching
assignments. However, some rail employees, such as some train crews,
work flexible schedules that vary based on a variety of factors. These
include business levels, the time of the year, and the day of the week.
Numerous factors, including weather conditions, track maintenance,
accidents, unexpected employee illnesses, and dozens of other factors
can affect a given employee's work schedule, thus impacting the time
other employees will be needed.
Scheduling policies are typically an important topic within the
context of collective bargaining. In many cases, collective bargaining
agreements allow rail employees, especially those with the most
seniority, to largely determine for themselves when and how many hours
they work (subject to statutory hours of service maximums). These
employees' actions, in turn, affect how many hours, and when, less
senior employees work. This greatly complicates railroads' ability to
schedule crew assignments.
Question 2.a. Your written testimony highlights the introduction of
autonomous trucking as a major competitive change that railroads face.
And you state that railroads need to avail themselves of technology if
they want to compete against autonomous trucking.
Has NS considered autonomous train technologies?
Question 2.b. Would NS be able to furlough more employees if
autonomous train technologies are fully deployed?
Answer to Questions 2.a. & 2.b. Autonomous train technologies would
only be considered where safety would not be compromised and where they
make business sense. With an extremely complex system like Norfolk
Southern's, any transition to autonomous operations will be
evolutionary.
While Norfolk Southern cannot at this time predict the ultimate
level of automation we may achieve, it is clear that automated
technologies provide the opportunity to realize a safer railroad
through error reduction and minimization of safety risks.
Indeed, technology-assisted rail operations is first and foremost
about making rail operations safer. It can help reduce human error in a
locomotive cab; better identify defects in track and equipment; and
minimize the number of human beings in and around rail equipment--all
ways to reduce accidents and injuries.
That's why it's imperative that the federal government,
particularly the FRA, must be a partner with railroads to leverage the
advantages of technology to improve operations and enhance safety.
Today, among other things, that means permitting the industry to
operate with one-person crews, which will not degrade safety and will
help railroads remain competitive in the freight transportation
marketplace.
Railroads will realize risk and error reduction and the attendant
safety benefits even at less-than-fully autonomous levels of operation.
Railroads are already implementing semi-autonomous operations with the
assistance of positive train control (PTC) and are exploring a natural
expansion of that investment so that safety and efficiency can be
enhanced moving forward.
As technology plays increasing roles in rail operations in the
future, employees will clearly continue to be necessary, but their jobs
may be different in the future. Reducing the risk of human error
through technology must continue to be a goal if railroads are to see
further improvement in safety. Moreover, adoption of technologies will
not only create a safer workplace. It will also help prevent the loss
of railroad jobs that will inevitably result if railroads are not able
to compete with the other transportation modes that are embracing
autonomy.
Question 3. The number of rail yard accidents has fluctuated but
the rate of yard accidents has increased for the calendar years 2013-
2021.
Does the industry know what is causing or contributing to this
trend?
Answer. The number of yard accidents has fluctuated around an
average number, which continues to be a very small number of accidents
for the amount of work that occurs in yards. There can be more frequent
opportunity for accidents involved in switching and other yard
operations because that is where the train and railcar handling occurs.
The railroads are very cognizant that this potential exists and they
constantly work to reduce yard accidents. Railroads have every
incentive to avoid accidents in yard operations because each accident
costs resources at the yard, whether in damages, lading, or personnel
and time--including potential delays to our customers. The steady yard
accident count but increasing rate is due primarily to the headwinds of
decreasing train miles in the industry. The FRA rate is determined by
dividing the number of accidents by million train miles, and the train
miles for the industry have been steadily declining since 2013 for a
variety of reasons. The train miles have decreased almost 25% between
2013 and 2021, and the rate increased by about that same amount.
There is concern that proposed government policies, such as the
Surface Transportation's Board's proposals, will tend to increase
switching activities. Increased switching raises the risk exposure for
yard personnel, and as such, could contribute to increases in yard
incidents.
Question 4. When a Class I railroad has a reportable accident, how
does it determine when to conduct simulation analysis to determine the
root cause(s)?
Answer. When an accident occurs, railroads always want to know why
so that steps can be taken to make sure it doesn't happen again. When
the FRA or National Transportation Safety Board initiate an
investigation, they examine a variety of elements, including physical
evidence at the accident site, data on speed and train handling from
event recorders on locomotives, records of maintenance inspections,
employee training records, and so on. Railroads incorporate the lessons
learned from those investigations into their practices and procedures.
Railroads do much the same thing when they are investigating an
accident. On more complex investigations, a railroad might choose to
conduct modeling analysis to better understand the circumstances
associated with the accident.
Again, though, in all cases, railroads will do their best to
determine root causes and take steps to prevent reoccurrence.
Question 5. Do the Class I railroads review whether local-level
managers and crews are complying with the railroad's train marshalling
rules? Have there been accidents or incidents where it was determined
that these rules were not followed?
Answer. Today, train marshaling rules are generally incorporated
into computer systems that are used by rail personnel to build trains
in rail yards. Computer systems can also flag the improper placement of
cars picked up during a train's tour of duty. In the past, there have
been accidents associated with the makeup of trains. Railroads
incorporate this and other information regarding root causes of
accidents into their efforts to prevent accidents in the future.
Question 6. In 2019, former FRA Administrator Batory testified to
the Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials Subcommittee that
railroads participating in the Confidential Close Call Reporting System
(C3RS) program saw a 41% reduction and a 50% reduction in derailments
caused by human factors and run-through switches, respectively. His
testimony also stated that the program improved management-labor
collaboration on safety improvements and in several instances led to
more systemic corrective actions. As of February 2022, 21 passenger,
commuter, and Class II/III freight railroads participate in the
program; however, no Class I railroad participates currently. The
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) met in June 2022 and
considered a task statement to promote the C3RS program.
If such a task statement is adopted, will the Class I railroads
robustly participate in the collaborative RSAC process to consider
greater participation in the C3RS program?
Answer. Like other railroads, Norfolk Southern has a robust program
to identify the root causes of accidents and take steps to reduce
future occurrences. As part of this process, we typically gather and
analyze tremendous amounts of data and other information. In addition,
Norfolk Southern has its own close call reporting system. To date, is
has not been shown that a C3RS program would provide significant
additional benefits beyond those derived from our existing evaluation
and accident-prevention efforts.
Question from Hon. Grace F. Napolitano to Cynthia M. Sanborn, Executive
Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, Norfolk Southern
Corporation, and Chair, Safety and Operations Management Committee,
Association of American Railroads
Question 1. Ms. Sanborn, thank you for your response to my question
during the `Examining Freight Rail Safety' hearing and your commitment
to look further into the issue I raised regarding concerns from the
Association of State Railroad Safety Managers. Below is the portion of
their statement regarding railroads attempting to transfer maintenance
costs for grade crossing projects to local governments.\1\ As a major
advocate for grade crossing safety improvements, I have strong concerns
with these costs being passed onto taxpayers, which also has the effect
of delaying, canceling, or scaling back these important projects.
Having local governments pay for maintenance is a change from many
states' statutory requirements and the history of grade crossing
funding.
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\1\ ``Recently there have been attempts by some railroads to pass
through on-going maintenance costs to local municipalities when new or
upgraded devices are installed (at grade crossings). There have been
recent attempts by some railroads to assess annual maintenance fees to
the local applicant, payable to the railroad in perpetuity, and in some
cases, under threat of unilateral closure. The projects impacted by
these actions include crossings which are:
Upgraded with new signal equipment
Upgraded from a passive crossing to an active one
Opened where one did not previously exist
Altered in such a way that the railroad considers the
crossing project a new crossing
As a result, many projects which would be done to enhance grade
crossing safety, are stalling, or being canceled. In certain
circumstances, project scopes are being revised to eliminate the
upgrading, replacement, or installation of gates and lights so as not
to trigger the maintenance fee requirement. In so doing, aging crossing
equipment will continue to degrade and ultimately malfunction while
sourcing repair and replacement parts becomes more difficult. This
barrier to equipment enhancement compromises the safety of the
traveling public, to include pedestrians, bicyclists, etc. The actions
by some railroads to assign maintenance costs to local applicants has
reversed decades-long cost apportionment practices, as codified in many
state statutes, which placed the maintenance responsibility on the
railroad.
As many crossing projects are tied to Federal Highway
Administration funding via 23 USC Sec. 130, states are beginning to
have difficulty obligating these appropriated funds in a timely manner.
The risk of funds lapsing in any given fiscal year has become a real
impediment to their use. The strict guidelines governing the scoping
and use of Sec. 130 funds make it impossible to expand their
application to other safety priorities, further adding to the challenge
of fund obligation.''
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Can you please work with AAR to reverse course and ensure
railroads, including the Class I railroads, continue to pay for the
maintenance costs of these projects?
Answer. Norfolk Southern has long-standing master agreements with
some states that cover the allocation of maintenance costs of certain
grade crossing warning devices, which are sometimes reimbursed with
state or local funds. Norfolk Southern also requests reimbursement for
the cost of maintaining specialized equipment that supports the
operation of quiet zones, such as four-quadrant gates systems. And
Norfolk Southern typically seeks maintenance reimbursement for private
crossings per the terms of private crossing agreements. Norfolk
Southern does not seek reimbursement for maintenance costs unless
covered by agreement or as otherwise permitted by law.
Questions from Hon. Seth Moulton to Cynthia M. Sanborn, Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer, Norfolk Southern Corporation,
and Chair, Safety and Operations Management Committee, Association of
American Railroads
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 1.a. From 2000 to the mid-2010s, per the above graphic,
the derailments per million train-miles dropped, from around 2.9 to
1.75. But that progress largely leveled off and beginning in 2016, we
saw year-over-year increases in the rate of train derailments per
million train-miles through 2019. According to this data, for 2021, we
sit at 2, still above the 2013 low. Coincident with this increase are
massive slashes in workforce by Class I's: between 2015 and 2021, total
workforce declined nearly one third. Putting these two statistics
together, we can see that rate of train derailments increased at
exactly the same moment Class I's began cutting their workforce.
What effect has precision scheduled railroading (PSR) had on the
number of workers employed by the Class I railroads?
Answer. At a fundamental level, precision scheduled railroading is
about using assets in the most efficient manner possible without
sacrificing safety. The benefits associated with PSR--including reduced
circuity and improved velocity--will directly benefit our customers
through faster, more predictable transit times that require fewer
assets to move their shipments.
At Norfolk Southern, we respectfully disagree that PSR is to blame
for today's service challenges. Moreover, returning to operating models
of the past that are more resource intensive and less efficient would
be counterproductive and likely contribute to service inefficiencies.
Our competitors in the trucking industry are not moving backward;
they're not even standing still. They are consistently thinking of new
ways to leverage technology and to implement operational innovations
that will improve the customer experience and improve efficiency.
Railroads must do the same. If railroads are to stay competitive with
trucks, they cannot return to the old ways of doing things. If they do,
railroads' greatest advantage over truck--their ability to transport
enormous amounts of freight extremely efficiently--will begin to erode.
If that happens, over time there will be less freight on the railroad
and more on already overstressed highways.
Far from being out of step with the interest of our customers and
the public interest, a simplified, efficient railroad operation (which
is the goal of PSR) promotes network fluidity and a reliable service
product that's good for rail customers and the public alike.
Our goal at Norfolk Southern, and I suspect at other railroads too,
is to create a platform for growth for our customers through a safe and
efficient operation. I know it is tempting at a time when rail service
is under pressure to say there must be something wrong with our
operating model. But at times like these, when the pressure is
greatest, we must be very careful not to misdiagnose the problem. The
real problem right now is execution; the problem is not PSR as an
operating mode. At Norfolk Southern, we are devoting our energies to
putting the resources in place to solve that problem, rather than
returning to a way of doing things whose time has passed.
Question 1.b. PSR is based on the preeminence of lowering operating
ratios. Railroads have made it clear that they are responding to
shareholder pressure in implementing it. How are today's Class I's
balancing safety, customer service, and stock performance?
Answer. None of the three elements listed--safety, customer
service, or returning value to shareholders--has to come at the expense
of the others.
Safety is paramount. As I noted in my testimony, for Norfolk
Southern, pursuing safe operations is not optional, it's an imperative.
We know we have an obligation to operate safely for the benefit of our
employees, our customers, and the communities where we operate. That
means that if an operating practice is unsafe, we will change it. If an
employee acts in an unsafe manner, that will be addressed. If we are
bringing on new employees, we will not rush the process such that they
are not properly trained to be able to safely do the work we need them
to do. We work very hard to instill in our employees a high level of
safety awareness in everything they do. We also spend enormous amounts
of capital to expand and enhance the capacity and capability of our
network; virtually all of those investments directly or indirectly
improve safety in some way.
Moreover, an unsafe railroad cannot possibly provide optimal
customer service. Today, we know our customer service is not what our
customers want or deserve. Restoring service to where it should be is
crucial. That entails having the right number of employees, at the
right location, at the right time to meet demand safely and
efficiently.
Allocation of capital in the rail industry starts with investing in
track, signals, equipment, and technology that improve our ability to
safely meet our customers' needs. Put another way, the dollars we
generate are invested back into ourselves first. That said, railroads
have to be competitive in capital markets. Railroad shareholders must
be able to expect competitive returns one way or another, or they will
put their money in investments they think will offer such returns.
The bottom line is the ability to invest in our networks allows us
to improve safety, provide the levels of service that our customers
demand, and create the efficiencies we need to help ensure that our
economy is competitive in global markets.
Question 1.c. PSR includes the operation of longer and heavier
trains, so even holding steady on derailments per million train-miles
could result in more disruptive and devastating derailments. What are
Class I railroads doing to mitigate derailments and the effects of
those derailments on the surrounding communities?
Answer. Railroads are committed to the safe operation of all their
trains, no matter the length. Railroads have also adopted a variety of
new technologies to make their operations safer and more secure.
Railroads work hard to instill in their employees a high level of
safety awareness in everything they do, and they work diligently to
identify new operational enhancements, training, and other ways to
further improve safety.
Railroads take numerous steps to help ensure the safety of longer
trains. For example, railroads only run longer trains where the
infrastructure can safely handle them. In recent years, railroads have
upgraded track to enable it to handle longer, heavier trains. Railroads
have also spent tens of millions of dollars to add new sidings and
lengthen existing sidings on routes used for longer trains. The longer
sidings allow trains of various lengths to safely make way for other
trains.
Railroads employ sophisticated modeling tools that reliably predict
the performance of a change in a train's makeup before the train is put
into service. Railroads also review the past history of a route;
incorporate lessons learned for the most effective operation of trains
on that route; and perform supervised ``pilot runs.'' Railroads also
provide focused training to crews on any new changes.
Certain technologies have enabled railroads to operate longer
trains more safely. For example, ``distributed power'' is the placement
of one or more locomotives at points other than the front of a train.
These extra locomotives are connected by closed communications systems
to the head locomotive, operate in a coordinated fashion, and are all
under the control of the train's engineer. Distributed power
distributes a train's tension more evenly, reducing the chance that
couplers that connect cars together will break apart in longer trains.
Distributed power also can lead to better handling of longer trains on
hilly and curved terrain, and it allows quicker and more uniform
application of a train's air brake system. Advanced ``train builder''
algorithms can tell railroads exactly where to place locomotives and
blocks of freight cars within a train to maximize effectiveness.
Questions from Hon. Dina Titus to Jeremy Ferguson, President, Sheet
Metal, Air, Rail, Transportation-Transportation Division
Question 1. With the rail workforce having been cut by one-third in
recent years, it gives me pause that railroads are requesting waivers
from the FRA to reduce manual track inspections.
What safety implications may occur due to less frequent manual
track inspections?
Answer. Overall, the massive reduction of rail employees has
greatly diminished rail safety. BMWE would be better to answer the
specifics regarding autonomous track inspections. As operating
employees, we have a strong reluctance to trust these technologies that
were originally designed as a safety overlay to enhance worker safety.
We want and need human inspections. The railroads are aggressively
changing gears and want these technologies to replace workers. As train
operators we see technological failures with Positive Train Control
(PTC), Trip Optimizer (TO), End of Train Devices ETD daily. We would
not want to trust these faulty technologies with our lives.
Question 2. Does the FRA's Fatigue Risk Management Program rule,
released June 13th, adequately address worker fatigue? Are there
improvements that could be made?
Answer. We believe the FRA has the best of intentions with the
Fatigue Management rule. We applaud their efforts. The concern we have
is with the carrier's compliance with the rule. As of yet, the
railroads have not solicited our input about scheduled shifts, fatigue
mitigation or anything regarding improving fatigue. Not only that, but
they have also made things worse with their new availability policies
which allow employees to take no more than two days off a month without
facing discipline. If they take time off for being sick or fatigued,
they are disciplined. If you would like me to provide copies of the
various Availability Policies to you, I would be happy to do that. So,
while the rule is a good idea, it doesn't appear that the railroads
care one bit about fatigue.