[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-68]

                      NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

                      AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES

                       IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 9, 2022


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]





                            ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 48-961              WASHINGTON : 2023


                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
               Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
                       Forrest McConnell, Counsel
                          Brooke Alred, Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Aquilino, ADM John C., USN, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.     6
LaCamera, GEN Paul J., USA, Commander, United Nations Command; 
  Commander, United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces 
  Command; and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea......................     7
Ratner, Hon. Ely S., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-
  Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense...........     5

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Aquilino, ADM John C.........................................    67
    LaCamera, GEN Paul J.........................................   101
    Ratner, Hon. Ely S...........................................    57

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Letter from Mr. Garamendi and Mr. Waltz......................   117
    INDOPACOM clarification......................................   119

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Kahele...................................................   124
    Mr. Khanna...................................................   124
    Mrs. Luria...................................................   124
    Mr. Moulton..................................................   123
    Mr. Scott....................................................   123
    Mr. Wittman..................................................   123

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Carbajal.................................................   135
    Mr. Carl.....................................................   147
    Mr. Courtney.................................................   128
    Mr. Crow.....................................................   139
    Mr. Gallagher................................................   137
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   151
    Ms. Jacobs...................................................   141
    Mr. Kahele...................................................   146
    Mr. Kelly....................................................   135
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   127
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   127
    Mr. Moore....................................................   149
    Mrs. Murphy..................................................   150
    Mr. Panetta..................................................   150
    Mr. Scott....................................................   129
    Ms. Speier...................................................   128
    Ms. Strickland...............................................   147
    Mr. Turner...................................................   127
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   140
 NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE INDO-
                             PACIFIC REGION

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 9, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith 
(chairman of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. I am going to go ahead and call the meeting 
to order.
    The full committee meets today on the national security 
challenges and the U.S. military activities in the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    Three witnesses today: the Honorable Dr. Ely Ratner, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Affairs; 
Admiral John Aquilino, the Commander for U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command, and General Paul LaCamera, the Commander for United 
Nations Command/Combined Forces/U.S. Forces Korea.
    I realize at yesterday's hearing I did not read our little 
hybrid statement, which is very tempting, by the way, because 
everything seemed to go just fine, even though I didn't read 
it. But I will read it this morning.
    We have a hybrid hearing. We have some members appearing 
remotely and other members here. So, members who are joining 
remotely must be visible on screen for the purposes of identity 
verification, establishing and maintaining a quorum, 
participating in the proceeding, and voting.
    Those members must continue to use the software platform's 
video function while in attendance, unless they experience 
connectivity issues or other technical problems that render 
them unable to participate on camera. If a member experiences 
technical difficulties, they should contact the committee staff 
for assistance.
    Video of members' participation will be broadcast in the 
room and via the television internet feeds. Members 
participating remotely must seek recognition verbally, and they 
are asked to mute their microphones when they are speaking--
when they are not speaking. Sorry.
    Members who are participating remotely are reminded to keep 
the software platform's video function on the entire time they 
attend the proceeding. Members may leave and rejoin the 
proceeding. If members depart for a short while for reasons 
other than joining a different proceeding, they should leave 
the video function on. If members will be absent for a 
significant period or depart to join a different proceeding, 
they should exit the software platform entirely, and then 
rejoin it if they return. Members may use the software 
platform's chat feature to communicate with staff regarding 
technical or logistical support issues only.
    Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if 
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any 
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
    Thank you.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here. I look 
forward to their testimony and questions and answers.
    The Indo-Pacific region is a crucially important region to 
the national security of the United States and to the peace and 
stability of the world. Obviously, we have learned that the 
entire world is a challenge. With Russia's unprovoked and 
devastating invasion of Ukraine, we have been reminded that we 
can't just focus on one part of the world, but the Indo-Pacific 
region is clearly one of the most important parts of the world. 
I think it will be important as we go through all of these 
hearings from all the different regions, how interconnected 
everything is.
    It is not just great power competition, we're dealing with 
Russia, we're dealing with China. Russia and China, as we know, 
are actively engaged in many parts of the world. And the 
competition here really is to build broad support amongst 
partners, and that is a global endeavor to basically show that 
partnering with the U.S. and the West is the better option for 
frankly all countries than partnering with Russia and China. 
And the Indo-Pacific region gives us an outstanding opportunity 
to do that.
    It has been described as the pacing threat. However you 
want to put it, China is, without question, the country most 
capable of competing with the U.S. in terms of their economic 
strength, in terms of their growing military strength, in terms 
of their global reach.
    Now we all want a world where China and the U.S. peacefully 
coexist, and that is what we are working towards. But, over the 
course of the last decade at least, it has become clear that 
President Xi in China intends something more combative than 
that. They are trying to push us out and advance an 
authoritarian way of looking at the world that has very little 
respect for human rights or anything other than the blunt force 
of what they want economically.
    We need to compete against that. We need to convince the 
world to go in a different direction, and to do that, we need a 
robust presence in the Indo-Pacific region. It is just that 
simple.
    And our military is a huge part of that. We have important 
defense relationships, certainly, with Japan and South Korea, 
but with a number of other countries as well. We must maintain 
and strengthen those relationships, and we must attempt to be a 
balancing force to keep the peace in Asia.
    Obviously, nowhere is that more important than on Taiwan. 
The belligerent language that China has been putting out 
recently is very, very dangerous. We could easily see a China-
Taiwan situation in the same way we now see a Russia-Ukraine 
situation. We need to constantly remind China that that is not 
the way global powers are supposed to behave. Whatever dispute 
differences they have with Taiwan, they should be resolved 
peacefully, not through the use of military force.
    But a big part of making sure that happens is to have an 
adequate deterrence. It is to build partnerships and have a 
presence in the region that lets China know that that is not an 
acceptable or doable option. And that requires us to have a 
robust presence.
    I am particularly interested this morning in, well, two big 
things. One, how are our relationships and partnerships going 
in the region? I think that is incredibly important. India, in 
particular; you know, it is the largest democracy in the world, 
but a country that has had a history in the past of being 
closer to Russia in many ways than to us, but is now moving in 
our direction. If we can enhance that relationship and 
strengthen it, I think that makes the world a better and more 
peaceful place.
    And then, second, this committee has been briefed 
repeatedly over the course of the last 6 or 7 years about 
everything that China has done in their military modernization 
to try to counter us, to basically put our systems and our 
forces at risk, and to in essence push us out of the region.
    We have known about that for some time. I know that we are 
working on how to adjust to that; how to change our force 
structure to better deal with what China has done. We need to 
put meat on those bones. What is it we are doing? What is it we 
need to be doing? What are the most important things to fund?
    To me, it comes down to two words as a starting point, and 
that is information and survivability. China is very focused on 
improving their command-and-control information systems and, 
also, equally focused on making ours vulnerable--well, not 
making ours vulnerable--on taking ours down, on being able to 
basically blind us and shut us down by shutting down our 
communication systems and our information systems. How are we 
improving that?
    On survivability, it is the platforms that can get into the 
region and survive--with China's missile technology, with their 
cyber technology, and their ability to shut down our 
information systems. And as we have talked about ad nauseam on 
that committee, this comes down a lot to innovation and new 
technology. And it is readily acknowledged that the Pentagon is 
not as good at that as they should be. Let's just put it that 
way. We have got to be able to find new technologies; make the 
best use out of them; figure out how to make them applicable 
faster, quicker, and better--something we are really focused 
on.
    So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this 
morning on those topics and others.
    And with that, I will yield to the ranking member, Mr. 
Rogers.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I would be remiss if I didn't acknowledge the entrance 
of one of our former colleagues, Ms. Bordallo of Guam. Good to 
see you again.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do thank the witnesses for 
being here and the time that it took to prepare for this.
    The conflict between the Chinese Communist Party and 
American democracy will be one of the greatest tests this 
Nation has ever faced. A modernized military, well-armed 
allies, and a lethal Taiwan are essential to countering China. 
But we also need operational concepts that are executable.
    Over the past year, members of this committee have asked 
questions about INDOPACOM's [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's] 
ability to carry out its operational requirements. To date, we 
have gotten few answers to serious questions about contested 
logistics; few answers on accelerating new infrastructure; and 
few answers on delivering new technology to the battlefield.
    To make matters worse, the Secretary [of Defense] announced 
Monday his intention to close the massive Red Hill fuel depot 
within a year. Red Hill has serious problems, but the Secretary 
closed Red Hill without laying out the resources needed to 
replace that capacity. That is extremely shortsighted. Now the 
response from the Department has been the same. The answer is 
just one policy announcement away, and that is unacceptable.
    What I would like to hear from each of you today is exactly 
how you will employ new operational concepts, build new 
systems, and ensure logistic support at new operating locations 
throughout the Indo-Pacific. But, most importantly, I want to 
know how you intend to do that in the next 5 years.
    We all know China is not going to give us 10 or 20 years to 
prepare for conflict. We simply cannot procrastinate any 
further. The issues like Red Hill present an opportunity to 
modernize beyond the World War II logistics model. But I am 
deeply worried about the cycle of indecision and 
procrastination at the Pentagon. And I am also worried about 
getting this important work done in the timeframe that we have 
to act.
    This committee has tried to provide the Department the 
capabilities it needs to deter China and ensure we prevail if 
conflict arises, but we can't move with purpose if the 
Department can't define its requirements. We have tried to nail 
those down in the PDI. Congress created the Pacific Deterrence 
Initiative to highlight and expedite the most essential 
capabilities, but the Pentagon kneecapped the PDI process last 
year with poor guidance and unclear plans. I hope the DOD 
[Department of Defense] can rectify that in this year's budget 
submission.
    On top of all this, we have tasked General LaCamera with 
holding off North Korea. In any other year, North Korea's 
repeated missile test would be front-page news. General, you so 
happened to pick a very busy time to start trying to deal with 
your challenges over there. The South Koreans are essential 
allies, and deepening our defense cooperation with them makes 
us all safer. And we want to know what you need to secure the 
Korean Peninsula in the coming decade.
    This committee is ready to make bold investments in our 
defense. I hope to hear today that the Department is ready to 
do the same.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Ratner.

STATEMENT OF HON. ELY S. RATNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
 FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Ratner. Well, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today, and it is a privilege 
to be here with Admiral Aquilino and General LaCamera.
    As you know, the Indo-Pacific is the priority theater for 
the Department of Defense and we remain committed to upholding 
a free and open regional order. At the same time, the region 
faces mounting security challenges, particularly from the 
People's Republic of China, the PRC, which has adopted a more 
coercive and assertive approach to advancing its authoritarian 
interests. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missile programs also constitute a serious threat to 
the United States and our allies and partners.
    Mr. Chairman, Secretary Austin has described the PRC as the 
Department's top pacing challenge. This prioritization will be 
reflected in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy and FY23 
[fiscal year 2023] budget, as we continue to update our 
concepts, capabilities, and force posture to defend the 
homeland, deter aggression, and prepare to prevail in conflict.
    We are prioritizing capabilities relevant to the China 
challenge, to enable a joint force that is lethal and able to 
strike adversary forces and systems at range; resilient and 
able to gain information advantage and maintain command and 
control through adversary disruptions; survivable and agile in 
the face of adversary attacks that seek to reduce combat power 
and mobilization speed; and able to provide the logistics and 
sustainment needed for operations in a highly contested 
environment. Alongside these capabilities, we are building a 
combat-credible force posture in the Indo-Pacific, working 
toward a more distributed, lethal, and resilient forward 
posture essential to addressing the full suite of challenges we 
face in the region.
    We are also doubling down on one of our greatest strategic 
advantages: our network of allies and partners. As I look 
across the region, I see our defense ties growing at a rapid 
pace. With the U.S.-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of 
regional peace, we are deepening our defense cooperation with 
the Japan Self-Defense Forces, optimizing our alliance force 
posture, and integrating the alliance into a broader regional 
security network of like-minded nations.
    We are also continuing to strengthen the U.S.-ROK [Republic 
of Korea] alliance--the linchpin of peace and stability on the 
Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region--remaining 
focused on enhancing deterrence and alliance readiness.
    The U.S.-Australia alliance is also surging forward with 
considerable momentum. Last year, we announced several new 
initiatives to substantially deepen force posture cooperation 
in land, air, and maritime domains, and we announced the 
historic AUKUS Trilateral Security Partnership with the United 
Kingdom and Australia.
    We recognize the importance of our alliances with the 
Philippines and Thailand as well, as we are proud of the work 
we have done to revive the Visiting Forces Agreement with the 
Philippines and the steps we are taking to strengthen our 
security cooperation with our Thai allies.
    Likewise, we are seeing historic progress in our major 
defense partnership with India, as we continue to integrate and 
operationalize our day-to-day defense cooperation and 
logistics, enhance information-sharing, and grow our bilateral 
cooperation in emerging domains, such as space and cyberspace.
    And we have been working throughout Southeast Asia to 
strengthen capabilities and improve our interoperability with 
partners, including Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Timor-Leste.
    We are also bringing our partners together with colleagues 
across the U.S. Government to elevate the Quad [Quadrilateral 
Security Dialogue] as a premier regional grouping, while we 
remain committed to ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations] centrality.
    Consistent with our commitment to our One China policy, the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six 
Assurances, we are focused on maintaining peace and stability 
in the Taiwan Strait.
    With the PRC as the Department's pacing challenge, Taiwan 
is the pacing scenario, and we aim to deter and deny PRC 
aggression through a combination of Taiwan's own defenses, its 
partnership with the United States, and growing support from 
like-minded democracies.
    Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close by thanking 
all of you for your strong, bipartisan support for the Indo-
Pacific. It is my firm belief that this bipartisanship is one 
of our most powerful assets in rising to the China challenge 
and should be nurtured and treated as such.
    Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner can be found in the 
Appendix on page 57.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Admiral Aquilino.

 STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-
                        PACIFIC COMMAND

    Admiral Aquilino. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
and the distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 
also allowing me to appear today and have a conversation, and I 
really, truly appreciated our closed session yesterday. Thank 
you for that.
    I also would like to thank all of you for your dedicated 
support to the Indo-Pacific Command, our service members, and 
their families.
    The People's Republic of China is the most consequential 
strategic competitor that the United States has faced. They are 
executing a dedicated campaign that utilizes all forms of 
national power in an attempt to uproot the rules-based 
international order to the benefit of themselves and at the 
expense of all others.
    Russia also presents some serious risks. As evident from 
their unprovoked and unjustified attack on the Ukraine, Russia 
has no regard for international law, its own commitments, or 
any principles that uphold global peace.
    Similarly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the 
DPRK, as well as violent extremist organizations, also pose 
acute threats to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific 
region.
    To address these threats, Secretary Austin has articulated 
clear priorities: defend the homeland, deter our adversaries, 
and strengthen our allies and partners. These priorities are 
advanced through integrated deterrence, which is the 
Department's approach to preventing conflict through the 
synchronization of all elements of national power, coordinated 
with the joint force across all domains, together with our 
allies and partners.
    INDOPACOM's mission is to prevent conflict through the 
execution of integrated deterrence, and should deterrence fail, 
we must be prepared to fight and win. ``Seize the Initiative'' 
describes INDOPACOM's approach to accomplishing these missions. 
This approach requires the joint force to think, act, and 
operate differently by realigning our posture, advancing our 
warfighting capabilities, in order to provide the President and 
the Secretary with options across the entire spectrum of 
competition, crisis, or conflict.
    Effective deterrence requires significant investment to 
defend the homeland, protect the joint force, operate in 
contested space, and provide all-domain battlespace awareness 
with an integrated fires network that synchronizes the joint 
force.
    These initiatives are incorporated into the theater 
campaign plan. They are facilitated and supported by agile 
logistics, a robust experimentation program, as well as 
exercises and constant collaboration with our allies and 
partners to promote peace in the region.
    We must take concerted efforts to increase our resilience 
and strengthen our capabilities through sustained investments, 
utilizing predictable budgets, a strong industrial base, and 
reliable supply chains.
    I am optimistic we will see a strategy-based FY23 budget 
that takes the appropriate initial steps to address key 
adversarial challenges and increase our warfighting advantages. 
The resources we commit now and in the future will preserve a 
free and open Indo-Pacific, strengthen our deterrence posture, 
and provide us the ability to fight and win, should deterrence 
fail.
    Thanks to the committee, and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Aquilino can be found in 
the Appendix on page 67.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General LaCamera.

   STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL J. LaCAMERA, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
  NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
   COMBINED FORCES COMMAND; AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA

    General LaCamera. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear with you today.
    I appreciate your leadership and dedication in supporting 
our total force and our families who work with our Korean 
allies and United Nations Sending States in order to maintain a 
stable and secure environment on the Korean Peninsula.
    I would also like to thank President Biden, Secretary 
Austin, and General Milley for their continued leadership and 
support, along with Admiral Aquilino, the functional combatant 
commanders who support us, my fellow component commanders, and 
my interagency colleagues. It is easy to stand on freedom's 
frontier with this tremendous support.
    Finally, I want to thank our Korean hosts and their 
professional military.
    I am pleased to update you on the great work done by our 
dedicated personnel who serve in the Republic of Korea. They 
are professionally executing the missions of the United Nations 
Command, Combined Forces Command, and the United States Forces 
Korea.
    The United States-Republic of Korea alliance was forged in 
the crucible of battle. While the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea continues to pose multiple threats to the region and 
international security, this alliance remains the linchpin of 
regional stability and has prevented a resumption of the 
hostilities that shredded peace on the Korean Peninsula some 72 
years ago. It remains ironclad, and our service members, along 
with the Republic of Korea military, are trained and ready to 
respond to a provocation or crisis, if called upon.
    Our three commands--United Nations Command, Combined Forces 
Command, and the United States Forces Korea--must remain 
vigilant, prepared, and ready. Under one commander, these three 
commands are empowered to maintain a stabilized security 
environment for the Republic of Korea, our regional allies, and 
our partners.
    We have international legitimacy through the United Nations 
Command, whose mission is to enforce the 1953 Armistice 
Agreement, coordinate U.N. [United Nations] Sending State 
contributions, and execute assigned functions, directed by the 
United States National Authorities through the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, to preserve peace and security on the Korean Peninsula.
    We are proud of the combined teamwork of the U.S.-Korean 
alliance. The Combined Forces Command is the combined 
warfighting headquarters representing the U.S.-Korea Bilateral 
Military Partnership. Formed in 1978, it is a unique entity 
that takes policy direction and missions from the Combined 
Military Committee, and is governed by, and subject to, 
binational decisionmaking and consensus.
    We maintain our strong U.S. commitment to Korea. U.S. 
Forces Korea is the premier joint force committed to defending 
the security of the Republic of Korea. It is disciplined, 
trained, and ready to fight tonight, respond in crisis, and win 
in conflict.
    Central to meeting any threats is resourcing the 
strengthening of our force and best possible care of our 
families. I am grateful for your support and leadership in 
these no-fail tasks.
    I know you are aware of South Korea's powerful economic, 
military, and technical standings. No doubt, you are aware of 
their social impact. All of this is part of the hard work, 
discipline, and dedication of the Korean people--all done under 
the security umbrella of the U.S.-Korea alliance.
    The Republic of Korea is an incredible ally, and it is a 
privilege to move into the future together with them in the 
Land of the Morning Calm. I am honored to command and serve 
this dedicated multinational combined and joint force in one of 
the most significant, dynamic regions of the world. Those who 
serve there are committed, capable, and well-supported. The 
force is postured to deter aggression, protect U.S. interests, 
and, if needed, defeat any adversary.
    As long as the threat persists, the U.S.-Korean alliance 
remains vigilant, determined, and steadfast in defense of the 
Korean Peninsula and across the region. As the commander of 
these incredible service members, I appreciate this committee's 
continued support to fully prepare them to fight and win on the 
most dangerous piece of ground--the last 100 meters of land, 
sea, and air.
    Under one flag. Katchi kapshida, we go together. Fight 
tonight.
    Thank you for the opportunity to provide an opening 
statement. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General LaCamera can be found in 
the Appendix on page 101.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    One programming note before we get going with questions. 
There are going to be votes at some point. It is my intention 
to continue the hearing through the votes, because it would be 
impossible if we had to take that delay. There is about a half-
hour, probably 40 minutes, between the two votes. So, we are 
just going to rotate people in and out, and we will figure out 
how we are going to do that. But we are going to keep going.
    General LaCamera, so we talked a little bit about the 
alliances and the different pieces out there. First of all, I 
know South Korea has, I think, just completed their elections, 
as we are sitting here, or in the middle of them at any rate. 
So, curious how that is going, if you have heard.
    But how do you see South Korea, not just in terms of North 
Korea, though I want to hear about that as well, fitting into 
the larger partnership? We have talked about the Quad that we 
have developed with Japan, Australia, and India, and other 
partners. How does South Korea view the competition with China 
in the region? And how can we best use them as a partner and an 
ally in the region for that?
    And then, I would be curious to get your sort of latest 
take on what North Korea is thinking with their latest missile 
tests and how you evaluate that threat at the moment.
    General LaCamera. Thank you, Chairman.
    I think the challenge with the Republic of Korea is, you 
know, the first thing they will tell you is their economic 
partner is China; their security partner is the United States. 
And that can be a little bit concerning because, as we go 
forward, the concern is always, are they or the North Koreans--
and really, to your second question--are they trying to drive a 
wedge between us, the United States, and the Republic of Korea, 
as a way of winning without fighting?
    THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] was a perfect 
example in 2017, where they put some economic pressure on the 
Republic of Korea. We have seemed to come out of that. We have 
that up and running, and we continue to move forward.
    I look at the Republic of Korea and, quite frankly, the 
United Nations Sending States and the ROK-U.S., or the 
Australian alliance or Japanese alliance, as opportunities to 
get the Koreans off the peninsula to do some additional 
training, as training becomes a little bit restricted, but also 
to expose them to other militaries.
    When it comes to DPRK, I think he is focused solely 
internally on protecting his regime, and that is what this 
nuclear testing and the ROK--the missiles is really about 
protecting his position in the world.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And, Dr. Ratner and Admiral Aquilino, when it comes to the 
big question of how we present a legitimate deterrence to China 
in the region, given what they have done in the last decade. 
And I know it is no one thing. But if you could sort of sum up 
how we need to change our military capability, in terms of 
where we should spend our money, what programs we should put 
the highest priority on, what are the capability or 
capabilities that we most need to get better at and develop to 
counter what China has done?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I will go first, if 
it is okay with Dr. Ratner.
    First of all, I think we must look through the PRC issue as 
not just today, right? So, it is a short-term problem, it is a 
medium-term problem, and it is a long-term problem.
    So, I can tell you what we are doing today as it applies to 
adjusting our posture. Both the places we operate from, the 
amount and position of forces, where we put it is important. 
That power in a place that matters with the right capabilities 
today is the deterrent factor. Combine that with the exercising 
operations with our allies and partners, presents a pretty good 
deterrent force today.
    On the capabilities side, in the mid and longer term, I 
appreciate the Department's support for some of the asks. And I 
highlighted a couple of them in my statement, right? So, the 
ability to operate in contested space consistently and 
survivably, as you highlighted in your statement. The ability 
to have persistent battlespace awareness of all things going 
on.
    The Chairman. I guess we kind of know that part. The 
question is, what does that mean? Okay? So, to do that, we need 
to build this and not build that; we need to develop this 
technology; we need to develop that technology. What is going 
to survive in that environment? What do we need to put our 
money in, so that that happens?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes. Integrated and resilient, 
sustainable ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance] capabilities; a network that links all of that 
together and displays it for all forces on the battlefield in a 
consistent way; and then, ultimately, the ability to close 
those kill chains with the correct weapons and fires.
    The Chairman. Yes. Thank you.
    Dr. Ratner.
    Dr. Ratner. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add is, in 
addition to the capabilities that Admiral Aquilino mentioned, 
we are working to update operational concepts. As you know, 
with the Joint Warfighting Concept, a more distributed force 
posture, and then, building our allies and partners into our 
deterrence frameworks as well.
    The Chairman. So, basically, we need to make sure we don't 
have a few big, rich targets? We need to have, you know, sort 
of redundancy; spread-out, survivable systems. So that, no 
matter what China does, we can continue to communicate and 
continue to operate?
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, I would say the characteristics of the 
force that I described in my opening statement are the ones 
that drive the capabilities investments--lethality, resilience, 
sustainability, survivability, and being agile and responsive, 
exactly as you describe, Mr. Chairman, in your opening 
statement.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, I never did get the answer to the chairman's 
question. Who won the election, or do we know the results?
    General LaCamera. When I came in here, Congressman, it is 
too close to call right now.
    Mr. Rogers. Sounds familiar. We have had that problem 
around here for a while.
    You talked about the stepped-up testing by North Korea. How 
does a maturing North Korean missile capability affect your 
posture?
    General LaCamera. Ballistic missile defense is a top 
priority, protection, making sure that--Admiral Aquilino just 
brought it up--on the ISR typically, we say ISR is one noun, 
but, to me, it is three verbs, and making sure that we can see 
into what he is doing. And can we get after a kill web to 
interdict, prevent it from striking South Korea or striking any 
U.S. interests in the region.
    Mr. Rogers. Do you have adequate ISR, in your opinion?
    General LaCamera. Currently, I do. The challenge right now 
is placement and access, given the Comprehensive Military 
Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK.
    Mr. Rogers. When you look at your posture and your 
responsibilities, what is the one thing that we could help you 
most with in addressing capability issues? And one of the 
things that I am always mindful of is the huge number of rocket 
launchers he has near Seoul and how you would defend against 
that onslaught.
    General LaCamera. Yeah, there is two threats to that. There 
is the conventional threat, his artillery, long-range artillery 
that can range Seoul from the north; and then his theater 
ballistic missile capability that he is developing.
    So, it is the Patriot-THAAD and making sure that we have 
the redundancy and the resiliency and the number of arrows. But 
to me, it is more than just trading arrows for arrows. We have 
got to make sure that we can get after the entire kill web, to 
be able to get into his systems. And I can provide a much 
better description of this in a secure environment.
    Mr. Rogers. I understand. Well, we need to know because we 
want to give you what you need. So, get it to us in whatever 
fashion you need to.
    Dr. Ratner, we need to convince our allies and partners 
that we are in the Pacific for the long haul. I think that we 
on this committee genuinely mean that. How can we build that 
credibility in the region, in your view?
    Dr. Ratner. Thank you, sir.
    I think there are a few elements we can do to ensure that 
the region believes that we are going to be there for the long 
haul. Primarily, many of those occur outside the military 
domain, and certainly the jurisdiction of the Defense 
Department, in terms of active diplomacy and an active trade 
and investment strategy and leadership in the region. That is 
probably the most important thing we could do.
    But from a military perspective, I think maintaining our 
forward posture, continuing to invest in our alliances, and 
working with partners on issues that are important to them, not 
just issues that are important to us, is the right formula.
    Mr. Rogers. Great.
    And, Admiral, closing Red Hill is going to impact your 
operations. Can you tell me, or tell this committee, how you 
intend to address that closure?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, sir. Absolutely.
    As we looked and developed options for senior leader 
decisions with regard to Red Hill, again, we had three criteria 
that we had to make sure we were getting right. No. 1, clean 
water for the people of Hawaii, service members and their 
families. No. 2, we had to be able to meet the war plan and the 
warfighting requirements. And then, third, we obviously always 
look at costs and ensure we are good stewards of the taxpayers' 
money.
    We developed a plan that actually goes in alignment with 
how we talked about a more distributed plan, both forward and 
land-based, combined with a sea-based component, to allow for a 
more distributed, survivable, resilient network of fuels, as 
well as meeting all the security and the strategic fuel reserve 
requirements. So, as we looked at this, I think we are actually 
going to be in a better place and we meet all three 
requirements, as I laid out.
    Mr. Rogers. What timeframe is going to be needed to make 
this transition?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, I think we will go in 
coordination with all of the members that are working this. 
That is the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], the Hawaii 
Department of Health, and the Department of Defense. We will go 
as fast as safe allows. We have to make sure the facility is 
safe to transfer that fuel into the places we are going to send 
it, but we are certainly not waiting. As soon as we can get it 
done, we will be ready to move, and as soon as we are able to 
contract some of those other facilities, as well as the sea-
based option.
    Mr. Rogers. So, you are not closing Red Hill until you have 
this new capability in place?
    Admiral Aquilino. We will close Red Hill, I think the 
Secretary's announcement was within the year. And that just 
allows us to be able to distribute that fuel with the contract 
requirements, the sea-based requirements, and the need to put 
it in the correct spots.
    Mr. Rogers. That is my point, though. I want to make sure 
that you are going to be able to fuel your OPLANs [operation 
plans] when you close that place.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir, we will be able to do it, and 
we will be able to do it fairly quickly.
    Mr. Rogers. Great.
    That is all I have, Mr. Chairman, sir.
    The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thanks, Chair.
    Admiral, earlier this year, the Army began developing and 
testing a tactical cloud system that would be deployed in the 
Indo-Pacific region. Can you in this setting explain why that 
would be important for the Indo-Pacific?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, first of all, the ability to make sure that our data is 
safe/secure in a cyber environment is critical. So, that is one 
portion of it. Additionally, it is going to help to support one 
of our primary initiatives called a Mission Partner 
Environment, which is the ability in a cyber-safe environment 
to share information with all of our partners; to be able to 
coordinate events, operations, exercises through a single 
communication mechanism. So, really, it kind of comes down to 
the ability to defend our information and our data.
    Mr. Larsen. Yes. So, I want to build out from that for Dr. 
Ratner. Because this gets to the importance of the tyranny of 
distance, but also closing that through secure communications 
among friends and allies.
    Building that, sort of using that hub-and-spoke model that 
we used post-World War II to build out our friends and 
alliances in the Pacific, how are we going to assess what 
countries earn their way into this communication network, into 
this one, as well as any others that we are trying to set up in 
that region?
    Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Congressman Larsen.
    And Admiral Aquilino may want to say another word on some 
of the communications networks that he is looking to build in 
the region.
    I will just say we are in careful analysis and consultation 
with our partners on their information security, both assessing 
them, helping them improve and clean up their networks, and 
moving in ways that are deliberate and ensure that we are not 
building that network so fast that it is going to be 
compromised. So, this is something we take quite seriously. PRC 
penetration of networks throughout the region is quite severe, 
and it is something we need to manage.
    Mr. Larsen. Admiral.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, thanks, sir.
    So, we are, obviously, concerned about everyone's 
networks--and our and all of our allies and partners. This 
Mission Partner Environment allows us to work together with 
them to be able to develop the maximum security that we have 
access to, and then align it with all of our partners. So, it 
is really kind of two wins here in this objective.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Let me take one more step on this 
conversation. Dr. Ratner alludes to it, what China, the PRC is 
doing in the last several years--we have talked about this 
earlier last year, perhaps on a call--to reorganize the PLA 
[People's Liberation Army] to include their strategic support 
forces [SSF], which are both networking and space, including 
cyber and EW [electronic warfare], and a variety of other 
things.
    So, on this point, not to tell us what is in the budget, 
because in 22 years I realize that would be a waste of time to 
ask you before the budget got here. Could you generally say 
perhaps that the budget investment reflects the need to be 
responsive to the development of the SSF and what it is doing, 
and how the PLA is using the strategic support forces, as well 
as getting ahead of that? As well as doing the investments, 
regardless of whether or not the SSF existed?
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, Congressman.
    Without getting into details about the budget, I can assure 
you that the Department is very focused on these issues. We had 
an opportunity earlier this week to do a tabletop exercise with 
members of this committee, in which we focused specifically on 
some of these areas, including space and cyber.
    And you will see in the Secretary's concept of integrated 
deterrence, which Admiral Aquilino mentioned, part of the 
rationale there is that we, ourselves, need to be integrating 
across domains, including space and cyber, as we think about 
this competition.
    Mr. Larsen. [Inaudible] there. Just a little time left. If 
you can share this, given Putin's unprovoked invasion of 
Ukraine, have you seen a change in Russian force posture in 
their east?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, absolutely. In preparation, they pushed out 20 ships 
and submarines, as we can count. They placed them in defensive 
positions. They postured other forces to be able to defend 
their eastern flank. So, we absolutely have seen a change, and 
we continue to monitor those, like we do every day.
    Mr. Larsen. All right. Thanks.
    I will ask the question, and take it for the record, but it 
has to do with India's ambivalent role right now relative to 
U.S. security interests with regards to the Ukraine. And I will 
develop something specific for the record.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, in your written comments, you reference the United 
Kingdom and joint exercises that were held with both the United 
States and others. And you also mentioned the F-35. I want to 
read to you the provision that is here, and I have two 
questions with you.
    One is, could you tell us about the partner nations that 
are outside INDOPACOM that are assisting in the area and, also, 
the role of the F-35? You state that the U.K. [United Kingdom] 
has ``demonstrated its immense capacity to project combat power 
into the region . . . the Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Task 
Group which included embarked U.K. and U.S. Marine Corps F-35Bs 
. . .'' So, I am assuming we both had F-35s; that there were 
escort ships from both the Netherlands and the United States. 
And then, you also cite the acquisition by the Republic of 
Korea for the F-35A. Could you tell us of your work with other 
partner nations and the role of the F-35 in the area?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, the importance of the F-35 can't be overstated, right? 
So, when we talked in the beginning, the PRC has developed a 
set of systems of systems in an attempt to keep the United 
States out of the Pacific. The F-35 from the air domain is 
critical to be able to operate in that contested space. That 
fifth-generation airplane with the highest technology 
available----
    Mr. Turner. You are referencing China's J-20?
    Admiral Aquilino. I am referencing our F-35.
    Mr. Turner. But, I mean, when you are talking about China, 
also, as a peer threat in the area, that you are looking to 
their equipment as an additional need for the F-35?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes. Absolutely, sir. So, they have just 
begun production of their J-20, their first fifth-generation 
airplane, which ups the ante. And again, with the technology 
and the capability of the F-35, that is why it is so critical. 
As it applies to being able to operate in that contested space, 
the technologies that come with that airplane allow it to 
happen.
    Mr. Turner. And then, joint exercises, you reference the 
U.K. and Netherlands.
    Admiral Aquilino. So, when we talk about integrated 
deterrence, that is a pretty good example of one operation that 
we have done. The U.K., as you know, has built, and has now 
deployed, one of their aircraft carrier strike groups. We did 
an operation with seven nations, four big-deck ships--the 
Japanese provided one of their large-deck DDHs [helicopter-
carrying destroyer]. The Queen Elizabeth was there and, as 
well, was the Ronald Reagan and the USS Carl Vinson. That was 
combined with all of our domain capabilities in the form of 
bombers, ground forces, cyber capabilities, space capabilities, 
and worked together with seven nations--the Netherlands, 
Australians, Canadians.
    Again, I think the friends and partners outside of the 
region also understand the importance of the region, and we see 
them operate with us, hopefully, more frequently. The French 
come to the region. You most recently read about the Germans 
deploying to the Pacific. I am hoping and working to get more 
of that. And with those partners, we operate with them all the 
time.
    Mr. Turner. Well, my next question relates to exercises 
and, also, with the Republic of Korea. General, you mentioned 
trying to get people out of the area because of restrictions 
with respect to exercises.
    As part of our 2021 NDAA [National Defense Authorization 
Act], we required, as part of the Pacific deterrence, an actual 
plan to be provided to us by your command, Admiral. And in it, 
it listed exercises as one of the primary focus and goals. It 
also, unfortunately, includes information that your funding was 
cut for exercises in 2022.
    I am aware that there have been, I believe, some 
overconcerns about issues of provocation of exercises, when it 
is one of your primary goals, of exercises, and we know our 
partners that are in the region need exercises to be effective.
    What are we doing to ensure that we are able to conduct 
exercises in the region and that we are investing 
appropriately, and we are ensuring that the Republic of Korea 
has the ability to exercise without an overconcern of being 
provocative in the region? And I will let all three of you 
answer that one.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, for the exercises, we do over 120 exercises every year. 
COVID [coronavirus disease] has impacted some of those. We have 
scaled some down. We have reduced or we have postponed some 
because of the COVID piece. But bottom line is we haven't 
reduced any of those exercises. As a matter of fact, when I met 
with the chiefs of defense across the region most recently in 
July, what we have agreed to is actually to try to expand those 
into more mini----
    Mr. Turner. Mr. Secretary, do you have concerns about 
exercises in the region?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I do share----
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. 
If you can finish in about 10 seconds? Thank you.
    Dr. Ratner. I would say I share Admiral Aquilino's view. I 
do have concerns about the readiness of our forces on the 
Korean Peninsula, and I know that is something we are working 
on.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The chair recognizes Representative Courtney for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Rick. And thank you to the 
witnesses for being here today.
    Dr. Ratner, David Ignatius, who has been sort of covering 
foreign policy and military policy for quite a few years, made 
the observation that, in terms of hard power, the AUKUS 
alliance with Australia and Britain is the most important 
strategic move in decades. And again, congratulations to the 
administration for helping make that come together.
    The response in Australia, as you and I have discussed, is 
very positive; 60 percent approval in public opinion polls. The 
government announced just a few days ago that they are moving 
forward for an eastern--a navy base on the eastern side of 
Australia to complement Stirling, which is on the western side 
near Perth. So they clearly, it is all-in and that is a long-
term, that is a long-game commitment that is there.
    And I know Admiral Caldwell at Naval Reactors is hard at 
work with the transition. It's a big job to figure out the 
industrial base challenge, which is huge. But in the meantime, 
I mean, there is another piece of this, which is helping the 
Australian navy sort of make this transformation. And it seems 
to me, and a number of us, that having joint training at the 
Nuclear Power School in South Carolina for Australian sailors 
and officers would be--you know, we have to do it, and why 
don't we start? I mean, it is a good, visible, tangible way to 
really show our allies and the world that this is real, that it 
is not just a press release back in September.
    I don't know if--you are nodding, Admiral Aquilino. What 
are your thoughts on that?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, it really is an important 
step forward. I do concur with that. But I do want to remember 
that the submarine piece is one portion of it, right? So, we 
are cooperating in other domains to expand our capabilities and 
capacities with the Australians and the Brits in the form of 
space and cyber, in the form of being able to develop posture 
and operate from there. And I am going to be in Australia the 
week after next with really great partners, General Nakasone 
and General Dickinson, to start on that space and cyber 
improvement.
    On the submarine piece, as you know, they are studying the 
best way to go forward. Big decisions, and they want to go 
about it methodically. I spoke to Admiral Caldwell last night. 
We are on the same page. As soon as they are ready to start, 
Admiral Caldwell is ready to support with regard to the start 
of schooling, and then we have options to be able to bridge, 
right? How do we operate together, Australians on U.S., British 
submarines? We are going to work through that. Safety is 
clearly a concern from Admiral Caldwell. But we are doing 
everything possible to move this as fast as possible.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, that is good to hear. And again, I 
think, certainly, this committee is going to want to do 
everything to enable the success of that in terms of whether 
there are ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations] 
issues or whether there is, again, McMahon Act issues in terms 
of just clearing any legal obstacles.
    Admiral, you talked about, again, the pivot away from Red 
Hill, and the at-sea component I think sort of spotlights the 
importance of sealift. Again, in a few hours we are going to 
vote on an omnibus which adds 10 U.S.-flag ships to the fleet, 
bringing it about to 90. And again, these are not new 
construction. These are used ships that are going to be U.S. 
flagged and with a stipend enabled to do that. But, I mean, it 
still seems like it is still a big enterprise to have that 
disbursement, which I do think makes sense.
    I mean, can you talk about sealift in terms of just--it is 
sometimes overlooked in the grand strategy discussions.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. It is critical to the approach 
and the position to be able to be more distributed in many 
different locations, both ashore and at sea. You are talking 
about the sea-based component of that.
    And I thank the committee for the support for the TSP 
[Tanker Security Program]. A great partner, General Van Ovost, 
and her command identified in a previous study that there was 
risk with regard to the number and access to U.S.-flag tankers. 
This is a great step to start in that direction. And again, I 
believe it will contribute to the result and the way forward on 
Red Hill. So, it is really important across all sealift, not 
just fuel.
    Mr. Courtney. Can you comment on what sealift means in 
terms of the North Korean Peninsula?
    General LaCamera. Yes, Congressman.
    In [inaudible], when I had this conversation, you know, 
when does strategic movement become operational maneuver, and 
at what point is he responsible for delivering to a certain 
point, and then, I have got to secure it, bringing it in? You 
know, there is tremendous capacity on the peninsula right now 
for the Korean people, but we are going to rely on Japan to 
bring supplies in and forces, and we are going to rely on 
sealift and airlift to build our combat power for any crisis or 
conflict.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Ratner, in the last NDAA, I offered language, and 
the committee supported it, asking for a report on asymmetrical 
defensive capabilities on the part of Taiwan--ground-based 
anti-ship cruise missiles, ground-based cruise missiles, and 
anti-ship mines. And I believe that that got caught up in a 
larger report request that the Secretary is supposed to produce 
for this committee. And is that coming along satisfactory? 
Because the importance of these reports is so that we can make 
sure our industry partners are producing these kinds of 
armaments sufficiently and, secondly, that they are getting 
into the hands of our Taiwanese partners and friends. So, will 
that report be forthcoming soon?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I will have to check on the exact 
timing of that report. As you know, I was before this committee 
probably about 6 weeks ago and did an in-depth classified 
briefing on Taiwan, in particular, and we discussed each of 
these capabilities in-depth. The Department is extremely 
focused on ensuring we can get these in the hands of the 
Taiwans as quickly as possible, and I would be happy, in 
advance of the report, to provide your office with any 
additional information.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Fantastic. Thank you so much.
    Admiral Aquilino, There is a lot of concern by many of us 
about hypersonic weapons and how China, Russia, and even North 
Korea, are doing what they can in this area. What are your 
concerns about their progress, and what do we need to do better 
on our part?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, the real concern is the speed and pace at which they 
are showing up, as you articulated. So, that is the issue. We 
have security challengers that are working towards capabilities 
that are challenging. We are getting after it through--my 
number one unfunded request, as articulated, was a defense of 
Guam system to get right after this issue.
    Now, it is complex. We are coordinating with the 
Department. But we need to be able to defend both our people, 
right?--defend the homeland is the Secretary's number one 
priority--as well as the forces, and where we place them, to be 
able to operate.
    Mr. Lamborn. Now, you mentioned Guam. And you said in your 
posture statement that Guam's strategic importance is difficult 
to overstate. Can you elaborate on that, please?
    Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, Congressman.
    The area in the Indo-Pacific is expansive, half the globe, 
and a lot of it water. So, to be able to posture forces in 
places that matter, with the right capabilities, we have 
focused on Guam as a strategic hub, as you would expect.
    Senator--or excuse me--Governor Guerrero is a wonderful 
partner and a patriot. And as you know, it is about $11 billion 
worth of construction, as we work through posturing of our 
forces that will end up on Guam. So, we have to protect it.
    Mr. Lamborn. And lastly, can you enlighten us regarding the 
Department's progress--and this is for Secretary Ratner--the 
Department's progress in prioritization of missile defense 
funding for Guam?
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, Congressman. The Department is currently 
in the final stages of the Missile Defense Review, which will 
lay out strategy and priorities. And that should be forthcoming 
alongside the National Defense Strategy, hopefully in the 
coming weeks.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    That is all I have for now, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back 
to you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Question: Just 2 days ago, U.K.'s Foreign Minister, Liz 
Truss, said to Parliament there in London that the reason that 
India abstained in the U.N. recently on the vote about Russian 
aggression was both economic- and defense-oriented. Could you 
enlighten any of us as to why, what areas of defense she could 
have been alluding to? And what is your opinion on how India's 
inability to vote at the U.N. in favor of condemning Russia for 
the aggression, how that could be defense-oriented on their 
part?
    Dr. Ratner. Sure. Thank you, Congressman. I can start on 
that. And there was a reference earlier to this issue as well.
    What I would just start by saying is that, from the U.S. 
perspective, I think India is an absolutely essential partner, 
as we think about our strategy in the Indo-Pacific, both in 
terms of how we are building coalition partners as well as 
dealing with potential adversaries.
    We recognize that India has a complicated history and 
relationship with Russia, that the majority of their weapons 
they buy from the Russians. The good news is that they are in a 
multiyear process of diversifying their arms purchases away 
from Russia. That is going to take some time, but they are 
clearly committed to doing that, including increasing the 
indigenization of their own defense industry. And that is 
something we should support. So, I think in terms of the 
overall relationship, and in terms of their relationship with 
Russia, the trendlines are moving in the right direction.
    Mr. Keating. All right. You know, China has mentioned its 
investment, advancing their own technology. I am particularly 
interested in unmanned underwater technology that they might 
have. Can you talk to us about what they are doing, and what 
you think we should be doing, to expand our footprints in this 
kind of technology?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, Congressman.
    As we have watched, this is the largest military buildup 
that we have seen since World War II coming out of the PRC. And 
that includes all domains. It also includes all types of 
technologies. Congressman Moulton and I had a conversation 
yesterday about some of those.
    So, we shouldn't be surprised to see them advancing their 
unmanned capabilities in all domains, and we continue to watch 
it. We would have to have additional conversations at a 
classified level.
    Mr. Keating. But is it an area that we, ourselves, are 
stepping up the game on?
    Admiral Aquilino. We absolutely are. As you know, we have 
been leading the path for unmanned. I think I saw the CNO 
[Chief of Naval Operations] last week talked about a fleet that 
includes both manned and unmanned. As you know, we already 
operate Global Hawks, Predators, and other types of unmanned 
domains. So, it is an opportunity for us that we have to 
continue to explore and expand.
    Mr. Keating. Okay. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for 
having this important hearing, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank our witnesses for joining us today.
    Admiral Aquilino, I want to go to you and go back a year 
when Admiral Davidson was here, as your predecessor. And he 
talked about the erosion of strategic deterrence in that region 
and how incredibly important that is to make sure we keep the 
Chinese at bay.
    I know that you spoke about the battle force as it exists 
today with a PLA Navy of approximately 350 ships and 
submarines, and more than 130 of those are major surface 
combatants. You also spoke about them having a fleet of 420 
battleships by 2025, and I will add that DOD says that, by 
2030, the PLA Navy probably has about 460 ships.
    That is very, very different than the course that we are on 
with the number of ships that we have. And it is not just the 
number of ships that we are building, but it is also the ``A 
sub o,'' as you know, operational availability for the ships 
that we have. Many times, maintenance availability is extended 
or time at sea extended. So, we are wearing our ships out 
faster because we are double-pumping them on deployments.
    From your perspective, if we are unable to accelerate the 
fielding of new vessels and maintaining the vessels that we 
have, to have a high level of A sub o, operational 
availability, what do you think will be the primary risks going 
forward in the next 5 years in INDOPACOM?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, you know, you highlight one of the challenges and 
things we are watching very closely, is the expansion and 
growth in both capability and capacity of the security 
challengers in the region as it compares to ours.
    So, let me start by saying, we still have the world's 
greatest navy. We need to maintain and keep that advantage, and 
there's a variety of ways that you can get to it. The CNO, 
again, just the other day, talked about the unmanned capacity 
and how does that plug in.
    With regard to the A sub o, through the Global Force 
Management system, we are operating through a supply-based 
model. That supply-based accounts for the sustainability in the 
near-, mid-, and long-term aspects. So, we have operated in 
that construct, and we have to continue to watch the capability 
and capacity differences.
    Mr. Wittman. To take that a step further, not just U.S. 
capability and capacity and presence in the Asia-Pacific, but 
also the ability for us to leverage much more in-depth 
relationships with friends and allies in the region. That is a 
big place, lots of things to do. If we don't have friends that 
can help us in certain ways, our risk calculus becomes much, 
much more complex in order to place that risk on the Chinese.
    Give me your perspective about what you think that we need 
to be doing. And I would love to hear Dr. Ratner's thoughts on 
this. But how we work with allies to a greater extent, like 
Japan, like Vietnam, like Australia. And we know AUKUS, and you 
talked about that agreement. But I wanted to get a sense about 
how do we do that.
    And then, how do we get to the point where we are not just 
having that relationship on paper, but that has to be 
manifested in how we operationalize that agreement. How do we 
jointly not only operate, but train together at the highest 
levels, so that if something does happen, it is not, well, 
let's figure out how we communicate, and those sorts of things? 
Give me your perspective on that.
    Admiral Aquilino. I concur. So, you don't surge trust, and 
you don't just come together and operate. But what we are 
trying to do, again, over 120 exercises a year. And all of the 
chiefs got together. In our discussions, the intent was, hey, 
we need to increase complexity of these to be able to be 
interoperable, interdependable.
    Some examples. We just finished Keen Edge with the 
Japanese. My partner, General Yamazaki, and I met every day for 
10 days, in coordination with our forces. Really important, 
very high end.
    As we sit here today right now, the Army and the Marine 
Corps are both on the ground in the Philippines and in Thailand 
to do Cobra Gold and Balikatan. Those relationships are solid.
    We are about to do RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] in a couple 
of months, the largest maritime exercise on the planet. I think 
over 27 nations coming together, and again, we have increased 
the complexity every year of that. So, those are the big ones.
    On the small front, every day we come together, if we come 
in contact with our allies and partners, the direction I have 
given the team is we are going to ensure we can quickly come 
together, be instantly interoperable, and then, work together 
at any point at anytime. That is the approach we have taken.
    Mr. Wittman. Dr. Ratner.
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I will just say we obviously have 
a very wide spectrum of partners, some of which we operate at a 
very high level; others which have less----
    The Chairman. And I do apologize. The gentleman's time has 
expired. We try to move on. I should have said that upfront. 
Even if you are still in the middle of a question, 5 minutes is 
the limit, and we move on to the next member. So, we will have 
to take that last piece of it for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    The Chairman. Mr. Kim is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kim. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Ratner, I wanted to talk to you about allies and 
partners. It is something that you have raised, all of you have 
raised, in terms of the importance of what is happening in the 
Indo-Pacific. We have seen in the European theater right now 
what allies and partners means when it comes to response to 
Ukraine. And I feel like it is an important moment to take a 
step back and gauge what allies and partners means in the Indo-
Pacific, especially when it comes to a counterweight against 
the PRC.
    Dr. Ratner, you were just talking about India, for 
instance. You talked about the Quad. You talked about some of 
the challenges there when it comes to India's relationship with 
Russia; that you feel like that is moving in a better 
direction.
    I guess I just want to point blank ask you, do you assess 
that India is the reliable partner that we need? Is there any 
concerns on your end about the Quad, about India moving forward 
in terms of their actions when we would need them in the 
future?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I perceive the U.S.-India defense 
relationship is one with incredible momentum. We are going to 
hold our highest, most senior-level engagement with them in 
early April. That is a two plus two with Secretary Blinken, 
Secretary Austin, and their counterparts. And that meeting will 
discuss a number of activities that not only are unprecedented, 
but are the kinds of things that would have been unimaginable 
10 years ago or even 5 years ago.
    So, obviously, there are challenges with the relationship 
with India, but I think they are manageable, and we are moving 
forward very rapidly in deepening the partnership.
    Mr. Kim. Yes, I see those partnerships strengthening our 
ability to communicate, have that dialog, do exercises. But I 
guess what I would like to just get a sense of from you is, 
what does it mean for the allies and partners under duress? 
What does it mean to have this tested?
    So, in the event of some type of conflict with China, I 
wanted to ask you, what specifically are the objectives? What 
would we want to see come to fruition when it comes to our 
allies and partners? How do we test and assess what that would 
look like under those types of strain that we see right now in 
Europe?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, it is, obviously, a very context-
dependent question. In the case of India, we have seen a test 
case of this in the last several years, when the Indians were 
facing aggression from China on the Line of Actual Control, 
where the United States rapidly provided capabilities and 
intelligence. And in the context of trying to improve trust in 
the nature of the defense relationship, that was a defining 
moment. So, this is about them being ready to support our 
efforts, but also us being ready to support theirs. And these 
are exactly, precisely the kind of conversations that we are 
having at a political-military level with a number of our 
closest partners.
    Mr. Kim. With the military, or with the arrangements that 
we have when it comes to our partnerships in the Pacific--
AUKUS, Quad--am I correct that, and I just want to double-check 
on this, that none of these have any military requirements in 
the case that any of the other members get attacked, something 
that would be more akin to what we have with NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization]? Is that correct?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, neither the Quad nor AUKUS is a 
mutual defense treaty, but we do have mutual defense treaties 
bilaterally in the Indo-Pacific that are akin to NATO.
    Mr. Kim. So, when we are talking about some of the 
situations that may occur, the one that we have talked about 
the most is about Chinese aggression upon Taiwan. I wanted to 
just ask what your confidence level is that the partners and 
the allies that we have in the Indo-Pacific, as of now, would 
step up in the way that we would need?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, again, that varies from partner to 
partner, but I am confident that some of our closest partners 
would be with us in a Taiwan contingency.
    Mr. Kim. So, in terms of the overall, I guess, trajectory 
and the health of our partnerships in the region, how would you 
grade it? I would like to just get a sense of your baseline 
right now and where we are trying to get towards.
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, strengthening our alliance and 
partnerships has been an absolute centerpiece of the Biden-
Harris administration. And in the Indo-Pacific, I think we have 
made considerable strides, including building upon some of the 
progress that was made during the Trump administration. And 
again, when I look around the region, partner after partner 
after partner, I see relationships that are stronger than they 
have ever been and that are on an upward trajectory.
    Mr. Kim. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Dr. Ratner, I want to start with you. I mean, the 
illegal fishing from China is not limited to the INDOPACOM. It 
goes all the way around AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command]. General 
Townsend has suggested that the illegal fishing in Africa was 
going to lead to political unrest. Is their illegal fishing, is 
that about money or is that because they need the fish to feed 
their people?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I think it is both an industrial 
interest as well as protein for their citizens.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. I want to point out to you that--and I 
hope the Biden administration is paying attention to this; I 
hope we are all paying attention to this--Ukraine exports 50 
million metric tons--50 million metric tons--of corn and wheat. 
Over a fourth of that goes into the Indo-Pacific region and 
Asia.
    And I think that we need to be doing some type of analysis 
on what the political and economic disruptions look like when 
that food is no longer hitting the global supply. They would 
normally be planting their crops right now. I think it is 
unlikely, obviously, based on what Russia has done, that that 
food supply comes to the global network, for lack of better 
terminology. And I do think that all of our areas of 
responsibility need to be looking at what a reduction in food 
supply means for their particular areas.
    There are two primary sources of belligerence in this world 
right now. They are Russia and China. Admiral, at the end of 
World War II, the Soviet Union claimed that they owned the 
Kuril Islands. Those islands, my understanding is, belong to 
Japan. This dispute has been going on for 77 years. It is not 
one that is talked about much, but I do think it is important 
that, as we try to resolve these issues on territories, that we 
talk about all of them.
    Can you speak to what the United States can do to assist 
our Japanese ally, again, in that territory? Is this sovereign 
Russian territory, as the Russians claim, or do these islands 
belong to Japan?
    Admiral Aquilino. Sir, I am going to defer that first part 
to Secretary Ratner because I believe the United States doesn't 
take a policy or a position on those, who owns what, right? 
What we would like to do is ensure that any of those disputes 
are taken peacefully and in accordance with international law.
    But there are multiple disputes, as you highlighted. The 
Kurils are only one. The Japanese are also worried about the 
Senkaku Islands to the south. And there are hundreds of 
disputes throughout the South China Sea. So, the position is to 
ensure a peaceful resolution of those disputes, in accordance 
with international law. I don't know if Secretary Ratner has 
anything else.
    Mr. Scott. Well, let me move to another area then. China is 
responsible for the majority, if not an extremely significant 
portion, of the fentanyl that is coming into the world. Dr. 
Ratner, what is the Biden administration doing to stop the 
Chinese in the fentanyl that is coming into the world that 
seems to be unrestricted by the Chinese government?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, that is outside the purview of the 
Defense Department, but I will be sure to get you an answer on 
that question from the relevant departments and agencies.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    Mr. Scott. All right.
    Germany and other countries have been resistant to 
increasing their defense spending. Japan is one of our allies 
that spends about 1.3 percent of its GDP [gross domestic 
product] on defense. Are we seeing countries like Japan, based 
on the recent aggression from Russia and the conduct of China, 
are we seeing them move to increase their defense spending the 
way we have seen Germany and others recognize the current 
threats?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, we will see. I know there are 
current discussions on that ongoing in Tokyo. These are, 
obviously, sensitive issues for them, given some of their 
constitutional issues, and otherwise. But, clearly, they are 
seized of the mounting threat and challenge from the PRC.
    Mr. Scott. I think as we see increased spending from those 
that share our interests and our values, as Americans, I think 
we need to make sure that we are coordinating with them, so 
that we get the most for the dollars that are spent.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my 
time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Khanna is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Ratner, could you briefly describe the United States 
role in the 1962 border conflict between China and India under 
President Kennedy?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I will have to get back to you on 
the precise history on that.
    Mr. Khanna. The gist of it is that President Kennedy and 
the United States supported India in that conflict.
    And then, when there was the border conflict in June of 
2020, when China violated the Line of Control, could you 
briefly describe the United States role at that point?
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, Congressman, I wasn't in the seat at the 
time, but, as I recently mentioned, the United States did 
rapidly provide certain intelligence and capabilities.
    Mr. Khanna. Did Russia do anything to protect India when 
China was violating the Line of Control, to your knowledge?
    Dr. Ratner. Not to my knowledge.
    Mr. Khanna. And did Russia, to your knowledge, do anything 
to protect India in 1962, when China violated the Line of 
Control?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I would be happy to get back to 
you on that.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Khanna. To my knowledge, they didn't. And so, both 
times when there has been a border dispute with India and 
China, it is the United States, actually, that has come to 
India's defense.
    And so, I guess I am perplexed why--and I say this as an 
Indian-American--why India has abstained three times from the 
Security Council and is unwilling to condemn Putin's unprovoked 
aggression into Ukraine. Do you have a view on this? And has 
this been raised at the highest levels with the Indian 
government?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I know we have been engaging with 
Indian leadership about this issue. And as I mentioned earlier 
in response to a question, we are aware that India has a long 
history and complicated economic and security partnership with 
the Russians. They receive a majority of their weapons from 
Russia, historically, and that is something they have been 
working hard to wean themselves from. But I would defer to them 
to speak on their own exact decisionmaking on this.
    Mr. Khanna. So, there is 60 percent of weapons from Russia, 
but I guess let me ask you this: Do you think the United States 
or Russia are more likely to come to India's defense if the 
Chinese were to invade beyond the Line of Control?
    Dr. Ratner. The United States, Congressman.
    Mr. Khanna. Has that point been made to India?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, we are in deep strategic 
conversations about the future of our partnership with India. 
Like I said, we have our most senior-level dialog with the 
Indians next month, in which Secretary Austin and Secretary 
Blinken will have an opportunity to speak with their 
counterparts about these critical issues.
    Mr. Khanna. What is the plan for India to get off the 60 
percent reliance on Russian arms, and how fast can that happen, 
if they wanted to switch to getting weapons from the United 
States or European allies?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, again, this is obviously a 
sovereign decision for the Indians. What we are encouraging 
them to do is to purchase more American capabilities, as you 
mentioned; work with other third parties, Europeans and others, 
and improve their own indigenization of their own defense 
sector. So, those trends together are already underway.
    If you look over the last several years, I think the 
trendlines are moving in the right direction.
    Mr. Khanna. How quickly could----
    Dr. Ratner. I don't have an answer for a particular day on 
the calendar as to when they achieve a certain benchmark.
    Mr. Khanna. But, putting aside what their own 
decisionmaking is, how quickly could it happen if they said, 
``We want to switch as fast as possible.'' I mean, what would 
you say is a reasonable rate of reducing Russian dependence? I 
mean, could we get that number down 10 percent every year? Or 
what is a reasonable target, if they said they wanted to do it?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I would be happy to get you a more 
precise answer to that question. I think it depends a lot on 
the nature of the specific capability, from munitions all the 
way up to much higher end capabilities.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 124.]
    Mr. Khanna. I appreciate that.
    I will just conclude by saying that I think it is obvious 
that the United States would stand against Chinese aggression 
on the Line of Control, far more than Russia or Putin would; 
and that we really need to press India to not be as dependent 
on Russian defense and to be willing to condemn Putin's 
aggression in Ukraine, just like we would condemn Chinese 
aggression beyond the Line of Control.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. DesJarlais is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Ratner, let's shift our attention to the tension 
between the Chinese and Taiwan. As we know, the world is 
watching Ukraine and Russia conflict as we speak. And last 
October, President Biden made headlines when asked whether the 
United States would come to Taiwan's defense if China attacked, 
and the President replied in the affirmative and said that we 
have a commitment to do that. Is this the Department's official 
position on the perspective of the Taiwan-China conflict?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, the Department's position is that 
the United States policies have not changed in terms of our One 
China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint 
Communiques, and the Six Assurances, as the foundation of our 
policy.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. A lot of people seem to have mixed 
feelings about what exactly the United States should be doing 
in Ukraine; what is our commitments there. Contrast our 
response in Ukraine to what it would look like in China. As we 
know, China has been unpredictable and probably expedited in 
most of what we have predicted about their capabilities and 
their advancement of their military forces.
    So, with that in mind, if we see an unfortunate escalation 
in that region, what would Americans expect to see in our 
response there versus what they see in our response to Ukraine 
at this point?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, we could spend all day talking 
about the differences and similarities between Ukraine and 
Taiwan, and there are some of both. What I will say is, when I 
look at the conflict in Ukraine, the lessons that I draw, 
number one, are the importance of Taiwan developing its own 
capabilities and that's something--and its own defenses and 
deterrence. And that is something we are working with them on.
    The power of the unity of the West and the international 
community coming together around this kind of aggression is an 
important signal to potential aggressors in the Pacific and, 
also, some of the economic measures that the United States and 
others have been willing to take to raise costs on Russia in 
this instance is also an important lesson.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Admiral, on that same line, what can 
we do to learn from, if there were mistakes in Ukraine, what 
can we learn from that? And how can we better prepare 
deterrence to China from attacking Taiwan in terms of, what do 
you need for defense and what can we do better?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, similar to what Secretary Ratner articulated, right, 
this is a real wakeup. There was some surprise over in Europe. 
I think that, number one, we have to look at this and say, hey, 
this could happen. And I have a sense of urgency to execute the 
missions the Secretary has assigned, which is to prevent this 
conflict.
    But it just goes back to what we talked about before. So, 
there are some posture initiatives. We need to be more forward. 
We need to be more robust. So, the posture, positioning, and 
the credible capability forward is the best way today.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Do we need to enhance their defense 
capabilities now?
    Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, sir, in accordance with the 
Taiwan Relations Act, and that is something that we are doing 
at every opportunity,
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Admiral, let me finish with the 
disturbing aspects of China's modernization, and specifically, 
hypersonics. Going into the NDAA cycle, what do you need and 
what should we be focusing on in terms of research and 
development, in terms of us fielding both offensive and 
defensive hypersonic weapons and capabilities?
    Admiral Aquilino. So, the Guam defense system is the number 
one priority, as I have put forward in my unfunded list most 
recently, Congressman. That is on the defensive side.
    But, to your point, right, in order to deter, there is both 
a defensive component and an offensive component. So, some of 
our long-range capabilities in the form of hypersonics are also 
critical to ensure that we have both of those capabilities to 
deter.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I have just a few seconds. I will 
just note that my first question, Dr. Ratner, on what would it 
look like didn't get answered. And I understand that is a 
complicated question to answer, if a conflict did arise in 
Taiwan. But just to prepare our country for what it will look 
like, is the defense of Taiwan different than what we are doing 
for Ukraine?
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, Mr. Congressman, I think it would be 
different.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. I will yield back.
    Mr. Larsen [presiding]. The gentleman yields back.
    Before I recognize Representative Moulton, a reminder there 
is a vote on the floor of the House; 4,000 people left to vote. 
It is a motion to adjourn. We will just continue through the 
vote, per the chair's instructions.
    The chair recognizes Representative Moulton for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Aquilino, do you agree with the Marine Corps 
expeditionary basing strategy to maintain pressure on China in 
the Pacific?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman, I do. So, as a part of 
deterrence against that competitor, it will take the entire 
joint force. I credit both the Commandant as well as the Chief 
of Staff of the Army to adjust their form, so the Marine 
littoral regiment concept to be able to be expeditionary, 
forward, and provide support from the land component----
    Mr. Moulton. Do you think the Navy has adequately resourced 
it?
    Admiral Aquilino. The Department of the Navy? I know the 
Commandant is moving very quickly. There are some capabilities 
we would like faster.
    Mr. Moulton. The Marine Corps would disagree. The Marine 
Corps feels that you don't have enough amphibious shipping 
devoted to this. And the reason is because, when the Navy does 
their planning for this, they have used a readiness factor of 
80 percent availability. The Marine Corps looks at historic 
operational availability, which is more like 63 percent. I 
guess it has been about 43 percent, literally half the planning 
number that you used in the past year. So, I am not sure how we 
square the wheel here.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    I will go back to the CNO and the Commandant and see where 
they believe they are. The initial setup of the littoral or the 
Marine littoral regiment is self-deployable via C-130 as they 
work through the----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    Mr. Moulton. I understand, Admiral.
    Dr. Ratner, how do you plan to help resolve this 
disagreement? Because it is pretty fundamental. We don't need 
to leave Marines stranded on Pacific Islands because we don't 
have enough shipping.
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, Congressman, it is an important point. I 
agree with Admiral Aquilino that these are important 
capabilities. I know they are beginning to stand up the first--
--
    Mr. Moulton. Yes, but my question is, how do you plan to 
resolve the dispute? This seems like a pretty fundamental 
disagreement if we don't have enough ships.
    Dr. Ratner. I think, Congressman, I would be happy to get 
back to you in the context of the FY23 budget and the 
capabilities----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page123.]
    Mr. Moulton. Okay.
    Admiral Aquilino, just going back to you, 20 years ago, 
China had the largest land army in the world. It was a Cold War 
relic. And in fact, we barely paid it any mind because we 
weren't concerned about its effectiveness, and we probably took 
some solace in the fact that China was spending so much money 
to maintain it.
    In the last decade and a half, they have radically 
transformed their military. And rather than making massive 
investments in a land army, they actually cut it. They are 
making massive investments in artificial intelligence, quantum 
computing, drones. If your kids have drones, they were probably 
invented and manufactured in China. They clearly lead us in a 
lot of these areas.
    Do you believe that the Navy is transforming itself quickly 
enough to meet this rapidly transforming threat?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    As I articulated before, I have a sense of urgency, and we 
absolutely need to move faster. I do believe the Navy has been 
focused on the PRC as the primary challenger, but there are 
some things that certainly could move faster.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, Admiral, I sincerely appreciate that 
answer, because I think there haven't been enough leaders like 
yourself in the Navy who have acknowledged that you really do 
need to move more quickly.
    If the Chinese attack us with an AI [artificial 
intelligence]-enabled force, an autonomous weapon system of 
some sort, and we meet that with an American manned 
alternative, who do you expect to win? I know this is a highly 
theoretical question, but I am curious of your view on these--
--
    Admiral Aquilino. My view is the United States.
    Mr. Moulton. You are aware that, in a recent DARPA [Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency] simulation, an AI-enabled F-
16 beat one of the Air Force's top F-16 pilots five to nothing? 
Now maybe Navy pilots are that much better, but that is not a 
good statistic.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir, I have heard of that, but I am 
unfamiliar with the details of the scenario or as it applied.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, I think we all need to be familiar with 
these details because this is the fight of the future. And if 
the Chinese beat us because they are more willing to invest in 
autonomous capabilities, and it proves that the autonomous 
capabilities are more effective than our manned force, as much 
as we love our manned force, we are going to be on the losing 
side of that equation.
    Dr. Ratner, I am curious of your view on this situation, 
this matter.
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, Congressman, I would just note that the 
Department in the FY22 [fiscal year 2022] budget made its 
largest ever investment in research and development and testing 
and evaluation on these advanced capabilities.
    Just last month, in this area----
    Mr. Moulton. What percentage of the budget is that, Dr. 
Ratner?
    Dr. Ratner. I don't know the percentage off the top of my 
head. I would be happy to get you that and----
    Mr. Moulton. It would be interesting to compare it to the 
percentage that China is investing in these capabilities, to 
understand if we are, in fact, transforming our force quickly 
enough.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The chair recognizes for 5 minutes Representative Kelly of 
Mississippi.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    My first question--and I was dealing with an approps 
[appropriations] bill today, and we are in March already--can 
you guys tell me the true impacts that these continuing CRs 
[continuing resolutions] that we do every time have had on your 
ability to maintain readiness? And what equipment do you have 
or don't have? Specifically, in this current fiscal year, what 
deprivations has it caused you?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    So, in my statement I articulated the need for predictable 
and sustained budgets. Again, with China being a near-, mid-, 
and far-term problem, it is even more critical. There is a ton 
of loss of buying power as it applies to the CRs. Those impacts 
are well known.
    From my perspective, though, it also prohibits any new 
starts. So, when I talk about the Guam defense system, Mission 
Partner Environment, and our ability to link our ranges, those 
are three top priorities that we are just unable to start on, 
based on that impact.
    Mr. Kelly. And, General, real quickly?
    General LaCamera. It is the same, sir. I mean, we have had 
challenges with some maintenance issues, repair parts, and new 
starts.
    Mr. Kelly. I am going to keep stomping my foot until some 
of these people around here listen to me and understand the 
disastrous consequences it has for our Department of Defense, 
especially, and all of our agencies, but especially the 
Department of Defense.
    I want to talk a little bit about fleet management, and 
especially when we are talking about our merchant fleet and the 
ability to resupply in that region. Having flown and gone to 
that region, it is a long haul, which makes the logistical 
chain really, really tough.
    What things, if you could ask, what do we need in our 
merchant fleet to get fuels, supplies, troops, equipment, all 
those things, to make sure that we can have a steady flow of 
equipment to maintain any type of defense, whether that be in 
Korea or in Taiwan or Japan, or any of our allies in the 
region?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    Again, the distributed nature of the posture we are talking 
about, working with our allies and partners to be able to set 
up places that provide for exercise and interoperability, as 
well as logistic support, is critical across this broad area.
    Additionally, on the airlift side, we need to ensure that 
we can both sustain it, refuel it, and keep it deliverable. 
Sealift, the TSP programs that Congressman Courtney talked 
about before was really a good first step, looking at the 
refueling piece. We need to look through that lens for all 
logistics capabilities.
    Mr. Kelly. I think we have a tendency to hand-wave getting 
there, and a hand-wave--and, General, I am an Army guy. So, we 
always forget that we have to [inaudible] in the assembly area 
to get to the LD [line of departure], and we don't really plan 
on that. And then, we miss the LD by 2 hours because we didn't 
plan on that. And I think our logistical chain to that region 
specifically, guys, we have got to pay attention on the left 
side of war, not on the right side of war. Otherwise, we will 
find out what the Russians are finding out, a very hard way 
right now. People who win logistics win wars.
    My next question is--and either of you all--do we have the 
right ships, and types of ships and numbers of ships, to do an 
Indo-Pacific plan? Do we have the right ships, combat ships, to 
execute this?
    Admiral Aquilino. As I said before, sir, absolutely. We 
have the right ships, but I am concerned about the growing 
capacity of the competitors in the region. So, we will have to 
continue to look at that.
    Mr. Kelly. And then, I guess my final thing is, just 
double-tapping, Dr. Ratner, on Mr. Khanna, and we don't agree 
on a lot, but we do agree on this. We are a much better ally 
for India, and I hope the administration and everyone who is 
working--and I know they are--will work as hard as we can to 
convince them that we are their best ally, and we will be their 
friend in a time of need. And so, whatever we can do to hurry 
that along.
    What other allies in the region, Admiral, are we not 
exercising that we could exercise better, that we could make a 
better ally? Whether that is Vietnam or the Philippines, that 
we used to have great relationships, not so much right now, 
what other countries in the region can we get some bang for?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, thanks.
    You know, we engage with all of them. But, clearly, really, 
we ought to focus or put specific focus on the five mutual 
defense treaty alliances. We are doing a lot with those teams, 
right? Those are relationships that are critically important, 
as well as the other multinational relationships that are in a 
region. So, we work with ASEAN, much trilateral relationship 
with the U.S.-Japan-Korean is extremely important, as we have 
identified the Quad and AUKUS. So, continuing to strengthen 
those and looking for others.
    Mr. Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mrs. Luria is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
    I will start with Admiral Aquilino. My first series of 
questions is really rapid-fire, short-answer questions, because 
I want to be able to spend the most time on the last question.
    So, yesterday, the Director of National Intelligence 
testified that Russia does not want a direct conflict with the 
United States. So, in your opinion, if Ukraine was a NATO 
member, do you think Russia would have attacked Ukraine?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congresswoman, again, I think that is a 
better question for General Wolters, as it is out of my AOR 
[area of responsibility].
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. So, then, this is not necessarily an 
opinion question, but does the President have the authority to 
put service members on the ground in Ukraine or establish a no-
fly zone without coming to Congress for authorization?
    Admiral Aquilino. Again, Congressman, some of that is a 
policy issue, but I would defer that to General Wolters.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. In your military opinion, is it easier to 
repel or stop an invasion in progress, rather than to come back 
later and try to expel an occupying force?
    Admiral Aquilino. Boy, I wish I could give you a yes or no. 
This one is really complex, right--the environment, the 
adversary, the capabilities. I will tell you my opinion is it 
would be very difficult to remove a force.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. And do you think that China wants a 
direct conflict with the United States?
    Admiral Aquilino. Everything that has been articulated by 
China is that they would prefer, or that they are working 
towards, a peaceful resolution across the strait. That said, I 
also believe they said they haven't ruled out the use of force. 
And again, while I don't have the ability to inject their 
calculus, my task has been to be ready, should they choose the 
latter.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. And so, with regards to Taiwan, does the 
ability to act quickly to deter an invasion make a difference 
to you, as the combatant commander?
    Admiral Aquilino. It absolutely does, which is why the 
posture that we have talked about is so important for forces in 
the region.
    Mrs. Luria. So, if China invaded Taiwan, how long do you 
think Congress would take to authorize the use of military 
force? And put that in the context of it is 140 nautical miles 
across the strait. Do you think they could do it within the 
time necessary for you to react?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congresswoman, again, I never would 
volley a question to the chairman. But, based on that question, 
on how fast Congress would react, I----
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. In my estimate, in my 3-plus years here, 
I think we could not act that quickly.
    So, do you think China believes that the United States will 
defend Taiwan with U.S. forces, if they were to use force 
against Taiwan?
    Admiral Aquilino. I think I would take that for a 
classified conversation.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. So, under the Taiwan Relations Act and 
the War Powers Act, does the President have the authority to 
intervene with U.S. forces, if it happened today, during an 
invasion of Taiwan, without seeking the authorization of 
Congress?
    Admiral Aquilino. I am going to defer that one as a policy 
question to Secretary Ratner.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 124.]
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, perhaps we can follow up on that 
because I wanted to get to sort of the last part of this.
    So, this has been a debate that I think has been elevated 
recently. So, if the United States changed its policy of 
strategic ambiguity towards Taiwan to a policy of strategic 
clarity, and guaranteed that it would come to the defense of 
Taiwan to maintain the status quo, would this be a deterrent to 
China?
    Admiral Aquilino. I think, as this conversation continues, 
if I were to look at the alternative between strategic 
ambiguity and strategic clarity, there are some who believe it 
would be a deterrent and there are some that will believe it 
would be an accelerant. I think it is worthwhile of a deep, 
thoughtful conversation, as we look at that option. I think 
there are pros and cons to both, but we ought to look very 
closely.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. And then, I know you didn't fully answer 
the earlier question, and this was the part I wanted to get to. 
If China thinks that the United States will come to the defense 
of Taiwan--and you described there are sort of two camps in the 
strategic clarity/strategic ambiguity--can you explain like why 
would it be viewed as a provocative act for us to just be 
clear, to provide clarity, to say that the United States will 
come to the defense of Taiwan to maintain the status quo? Can 
you explain the people who would see it as provocative, that 
camp and their thought process?
    Admiral Aquilino. I would say that, based on the One China 
policy, and the PRC's articulation of the importance, in the 
academic world, any movement towards the independence of Taiwan 
would be viewed very strongly by the PRC.
    Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, I just want to reiterate in my last 
few seconds I think this is a very important debate. I think it 
is a debate that we need to be having now, because, as I 
highlighted, the shortness of distance----
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Aquilino, if the President came to 
you and said, ``You know, [inaudible], my top national security 
concern is preventing a PLA invasion of Taiwan, and I think it 
is going to happen in the next 5 years, but I am having trouble 
understanding how and whether the bureaucracy is executing my 
top priority. So, I need your help developing some metrics to 
help me understand if we are making progress, things that I 
could ask every morning when I get the PDB [President's Daily 
Brief], whether we are doing X, Y, and Z,'' what would those 
top measurable metrics be? What would you recommend the 
President do in that scenario?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, thanks. Boy, that is really 
complex and we try to do it all the time, right? The assessment 
of where you sit is really complex, and there is a ton of 
variables.
    First, I would articulate, are we postured in the right 
places with the right credible force to be able to respond 
quickly, and then, to dominate in all those domains? So, I 
would kind of do that type of measurement.
    Mr. Gallagher. But things we can measure. I mean, I am 
talking--it doesn't need to be complex. It could be missiles; 
it could be ships; it could be Taiwan's own investments. What 
are the most important things the President needs to be 
tracking to gauge our progress on deterring a PLA invasion of 
Taiwan?
    Admiral Aquilino. Again, I don't want to make it--well, 
first of all, it is really complex, as I see it, right? I just 
can't say, ``X missiles compared to Y missiles, and we are 
good,'' right? It is the capability of those missiles. It is 
the survivability. It is the ability to get to where they need 
to go to launch. It is the ability to understand the target 
sets that you are going after.
    So, that is why I go back to, it would be a comparison of 
how do I execute compared to the challenge in each domain would 
give me a decent sense, and we try to do that all the time.
    Mr. Gallagher. Well, you mentioned, your first response was 
basing or access. Could you talk, then, a little bit about it? 
I mean, as I look at your AOR, I see a lot of U.S.-flag 
possessions--Midway, Wake, territories of American Samoa, 
Northern Marianas. If we were to invest in hardening these 
possessions and territories, how would that contribute to your 
ability to deter a PLA invasion of Taiwan?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, it would absolutely allow us to 
both move further forward, right, west of the International 
Date Line--I have to be in place with the right capabilities to 
be effective. Second, it gets to the agile logistics piece that 
many of the members brought up, right--the ability to sustain 
forward such a long way from home.
    And it is one of our asymmetric advantages. We are seeing 
it play in the Ukraine, right? There is nobody else in the 
world that can do what we have done. If you look at what would 
happen in the Middle East, it is a critical advantage, and we 
have to continue to mold it. That posture directly contributes 
to that.
    Mr. Gallagher. Well, you see, we started to simplify a 
complex reality. Because, presumably, we in DOD and the 
President could measure the extent to which we are hardening 
our existing possessions or getting access agreements where we 
don't currently have them. And in terms of that latter issue, 
what is at the top of your priority list in terms of where you 
need access that we don't currently have?
    Admiral Aquilino. It is not necessarily where we don't 
have; it is where we might want to expand. Again, I start with 
the five treaty allies, which are critically important. So, 
Japan, we are in a very good place with Japan, and we have to 
maintain those places. The Philippines, critically strategic 
terrain, and we need to expand in the Philippines. We are 
expanding in Australia, as Secretary Ratner talked about. 
Thailand, also important; we have logistic support there from 
our ally.
    New places. India, we are working towards logistic support 
in India and additional cooperation that has been articulated. 
Singapore, we have three ships there and a logistics site. So, 
to continue to sustain those and expand is the focus.
    Mr. Gallagher. I think another thing we could measure, 
quite easily actually, is what the Taiwans are buying and 
investing in. We talked a little bit about asymmetric defense. 
Two questions: What do you want them to buy, and would a 
security assistance program, similar to what we have in 
Ukraine, beyond foreign military sales, help you accomplish 
your mission of defending Taiwan from a PLA invasion?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. And, first, I left out Korea 
before--only because I don't want to step on my buddy General 
LaCamera's toes, but a critical treaty ally.
    On the capability piece, I'm truly encouraged, right? The 
people of Taiwan bought 100 Harpoon systems. The focus there, 
we need to get them there quickly.
    The other capabilities that Secretary Ratner talked about, 
we need to make sure we have programs and ability. Whatever 
mechanisms that can be delivered to produce those and deliver 
them more quickly under the current environment would be 
helpful.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Kahele is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kahele. Mahalo, Mr. Chairman, and Dr. Ratner, Admiral 
Aquilino, General LaCamera, for appearing here today.
    I would like to thank, personally, Admiral Aquilino for 
calling me 2 days ago to share the decision by Secretary Austin 
to defuel and permanently shut down the Red Hill Bulk Fuel 
Storage Facility in Hawaii.
    Admiral Aquilino, real simple, do I have your commitment to 
work with myself and the Hawaii congressional delegation to 
ensure that Red Hill is safely defueled within the timeline set 
forth by Secretary Austin?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you for that commitment.
    I would like to jump now, Admiral Aquilino, to your 
testimony, specifically, developing regional partnerships. You 
just answered a question from my colleague about sustaining 
that posture forward. And I understand you were just in Palau 
earlier this year. As you know, Compact negotiations with Palau 
and our other Freely Associated States and our allies there 
have stagnated. These nations are a critical part of U.S. 
national security policy, and our Compacts with them address 
economic assistance very important to these nations. Continuing 
that assistance is not only important as a national security 
matter, in light of the region's competing geopolitical 
realities, but also as a moral matter, in light of our shared 
history and the continued role that these nations continue to 
play in our national defense.
    So, Admiral Aquilino, given Palau's strategic importance to 
our country, how important is it that these agreements are 
expeditiously completed before they expire? And secondly, what 
is the DOD's position on investing in their critical 
infrastructure, such as the Compact Road, which has fallen into 
disrepair?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    As you and I have talked about before, the agreement or the 
Compact of the free association team is really important. I do 
want to highlight that the lead for that event is the State 
Department, and supported by Department of the Interior. It has 
got a DOD representative on it.
    But it is critical. These are areas that we have deep 
people-to-people ties, and we are responsible for the defense 
of those nations. So, we need to work through these. They 
become--renegotiation needs to be done in 2023. DOD is 
supporting that event, but it would be critical to get those 
agreements worked through as soon as possible.
    Mr. Kahele. Any thoughts on the investment in critical 
infrastructure? Is it advisable to improve runways in Palau, in 
Peleliu, in Angaur, as well as their very, very important 
deepwater seaport for the U.S. military?
    Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely. And as a part of the posture 
improvements and distribution we have talked about, there are 
many of those that are on our list. Matter of fact, the Marine 
Corps, along with the Navy Seabees, actually extended one of 
runways in Palau, based on our own capabilities to start some 
of that work. So, some of it is in MILCON [military 
construction]; others we can do with other funds appropriated. 
And we continue to work to improve those places.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you for that answer.
    Dr. Ratner, the White House's 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy 
document highlights the importance of building connections 
within and beyond the region through people-to-people 
exchanges. What are some of the soft power support systems and 
institutions that can help support this INDOPACOM national 
security requirement?
    Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Congressman.
    I would defer to the State Department and other agencies on 
specific programs, but we are certainly looking to build 
economic linkages, people-to-people linkages, youth exchanges, 
and other areas.
    Mr. Kahele. You know, in Hawaii, Dr. Ratner, the East-West 
Center is uniquely postured to expand exactly what you talked 
about, the people-to-people exchanges that are necessary to 
build capacity and expertise in the region and its challenges. 
Do you believe that the DOD can dedicate more resources to 
these types of professional exchanges, and that within the 
Pacific Island region, that this would be warranted?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I would be happy to get back to 
you specifically on the resourcing question. But, as a matter 
of policy and strategy, it is certainly in our interest to 
strengthen and maintain those types of relationships.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 124.]
    Mr. Kahele. All right. Thank you and mahalo.
    Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And everyone, thank you for your service and dedication.
    Dr. Ratner, I am very concerned as a friend of India. India 
is the world's largest democracy. America is the oldest 
democracy. My father served there in the Flying Tigers during 
World War II. So, I developed a great fondness for the people 
of India, the success of Indian-Americans. And so, it has 
become shocking that such a great country has abstained on the 
issues of the mass murder in Ukraine.
    And I am concerned. A lot of this is because of foreign 
military sales and the different technicalities and whatever. 
What is being done to address issues to make sure, as has 
already been previously brought up by Democrats and Republicans 
of their fondness for India, that we are not their main support 
of military, which is in the interest of the people of India 
and the people of the Indo-Pacific.
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman Wilson, we have had a chance to 
talk about this a little bit this morning. My response would be 
that I share your view of the importance of the U.S.-India 
relationship 100 percent. And we understand and recognize that 
they have a long, complicated history and security partnership 
with the Russians, but that they have been systematically 
diversifying away from that. And we have been engaging with 
them on that question, looking for them to purchase more U.S. 
systems, more European systems, and develop their own 
indigenous capabilities as well. And I think the trendlines are 
moving in the right direction.
    Mr. Wilson. And it just seems so unnatural. The 
relationship with Prime Minister Narendra Modi should be with 
the United States, not in any way associated by way of 
abstention with a megalomaniac, Putin, in Putin's war. Again, I 
saw our colleagues, Democrats and Republicans, appalled that 
there would be abstention by the great country of India.
    Additionally, I appreciate the questions from Congressman 
Gallagher concerning the defense of Taiwan. My father served, 
Flying Tigers, in Kunming, Chengdu, Zhejiang, and had a great 
affection for the people of China. And out of that, I have such 
an appreciation. And my concern is for Chinese lives, Taiwanese 
lives. We have got to build up the defenses. I like the concept 
of a porcupine--that it would just be not in the interest of 
the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] to attack Taiwan.
    And he was talking about the different levels of equipment, 
and you did, too. And I appreciate that which is being 
purchased. Should we also look into a lend-lease, just as 
America provided lend-lease to stop the Nazis' siege of 
Leningrad, which was successful for the people of Russia--that 
some of them have forgotten--but a lend-lease, as being 
proposed for Ukraine to defend Kyiv from Russian or Putin 
aggression? Should we look for lend-lease to expedite the 
providing of military equipment to Taiwan?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, we are currently in the process of 
evaluating all tools and authorities possible to expedite the 
provision of the necessary asymmetric capabilities to the 
Taiwans, precisely to reinforce the kind of deterrence that you 
are talking about.
    Mr. Wilson. And, General LaCamera, I had the extraordinary 
opportunity, due to Congressman Curt Weldon, in 2003. I am the 
only person left who had been on that delegation to DPRK, the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea, to 
Pyongyang.
    And the comparison of Seoul, if you ever want the greatest 
comparison between free market capitalism and socialist 
totalitarianism, obviously, it is the Korean Peninsula. Gosh, 
the success of South Korea. But I saw the Potemkin village, 
sadly, the horror of people subject to totalitarianism. And, of 
course, this is a dictatorship that had been set up for the Kim 
family by Joseph Stalin, and now we are in the third 
generation.
    I share the concern of Congressman Turner and others about 
the artillery capability, particularly against Seoul. And how 
could this be addressed?
    General LaCamera. Well, thanks, Congressman.
    Part of it will be addressed in close air support, if the 
fight kicks off, and how we would strike against it. But he has 
not just got the long-range artillery; he is developing other 
capabilities that give them really a 360-threat to the 
peninsula right now, which is concerning.
    Mr. Wilson. And I share the concern about the great 
territory of Guam. So, please, every way you can----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Gallego is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.
    My question is for Mr. Ratner--Dr. Ratner, I should say. In 
your written remarks, you largely touch on the conventional 
capabilities that China is developing. But I have increasing 
concern about the threat in the gray zone. If we draw any 
lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is that we need to 
ensure allies and partners are too prickly for an adversary or 
competitor to swallow. And I would kind of discuss this about 
irregular warfare, and I think it is very crucial training.
    Do you believe the Department has the authorities, though, 
it needs for special operations forces to collaborate with 
allies and partners in irregular warfare? And where can we 
further deepen or expand irregular warfare programs with allied 
partners and forces in the Indo-Pacific?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, maybe I will defer to Admiral 
Aquilino to talk a little bit about some of the work we are 
doing with partners currently in the region.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah. Thanks, Congressman.
    As you know, we do many JCETs [Joint Combined Exchange 
Trainings]. The Special Operations Command is extremely 
valuable. The SOCPAC [Special Operations Command Pacific] 
commander is in many, many countries working to improve 
training capability and to support their special operations 
forces. At this point, I don't believe I need additional 
authorities.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. So, you don't believe you need 
additional authorities? Well, just to be more specific, do we 
have the authority or the capability for us to do joint 
training with Vietnam, for example?
    Admiral Aquilino. We do, to do our JCETs exercises and 
training, absolutely.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. Admiral, you describe the Seize the 
Initiative as the first step in building enduring advantages. 
And I would argue the maintaining of robust defense 
intelligence posture in the Indo-Pacific region must be one of 
those priorities. I look forward to leading a CODEL 
[congressional delegation] to the region next month to conduct 
oversight of defense intelligence equities. To the extent that 
you can share your perspective in this unclassified forum, what 
do you see as the biggest intelligence gaps in the region? And 
what steps should we take to deepen intelligence cooperation 
with allies and partners from Northeast Asia to the Freely 
Associated States?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. I hope you will come 
through Hawaii on your travel, and I look forward to meeting 
you and hosting you in person.
    Obviously, as I talked about before, this persistent 
battlespace awareness is enabled by an all-domain ISR. And from 
what we have watched over the past 20 years, we never have 
enough. So, any capabilities--whether they be current, 
terrestrial, undersea, on the sea, above the sea, in space, or 
cyberspace--that delivers that persistent battlespace awareness 
are desirable.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. Thank you, Admiral.
    And then, General, I wanted to ask you about the Pacific 
Deterrence Initiative. As you know, this effort is designed to 
strengthen our presence in a region, our infrastructure, and 
our logistics and maintenance capabilities. It also is meant to 
enhance our exercise and security cooperation. How do you 
envision United States Forces Korea contributing to this 
initiative? And what role do you think the Republic of Korea 
itself can play in furthering the goals of PDI?
    General LaCamera. Thank you, Congressman.
    Our contribution or the PDI for the defense of the Korean 
Peninsula, for me, is our ability to train with allies and 
partners. We have talked about Cobra Gold, Balikatan, Talisman 
Sabre, RIMPAC, and our ability or my ability to get Korean 
forces and U.S. forces integrated as a combined element working 
with our allies and partners in the region.
    Mr. Gallego. Excellent. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
    The Chairman. Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to submit for the record a letter from the 
committee noting its concern about the lack of progress in the 
negotiations with Micronesia, Marshall Islands, the Republic of 
Palau, and the renewal of the Compacts of Free Association, 
particularly that there has not been a negotiator named yet. 
And we have had a lot of discussion about how critical that is 
to you, Admiral Aquilino and Dr. Ratner. But where is the 
negotiator? This is, obviously, a joint effort with Commerce 
and Interior and the Department. This is a letter to the White 
House, to the President, I would like to submit for the record, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Hearing no objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 117.]
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
    General LaCamera, let me just--we have had a lot of 
discussion about allies, and I think we are moving in the right 
direction; I am worried we are not moving in the right 
direction fast enough.
    The threat briefs in terms of what China is prepared to do, 
and overlaid with our pathway to get there to deter it, are off 
in terms of the timeline. But, in the event of a conflict, 
General, what is the government of South Korea--and I 
understand the votes are being counted, but, generally 
speaking, they have had a common position--is the government of 
South Korea prepared to allow U.S. forces to operate from South 
Korean territory in the defense of Taiwan, in your opinion?
    General LaCamera. I think it would depend on if there was a 
threat to the Korean Peninsula.
    Mr. Waltz. So, minus a threat to the Korean Peninsula, a 
threat to Taiwan, which would probably necessitate, from the 
Chinese perspective, attacks on Japan, are we going to be able 
to use those forces, 30,000 that are there, plus the associated 
air assets, from South Korean territory?
    General LaCamera. Well, Congressman, my best military 
advice would be, what is the threat to the Korean Peninsula and 
what can we afford? You know, we still require combat power to 
secure the peninsula. So, I think it would be a discussion with 
the South Korean government, with Admiral Aquilino, with the 
Secretary of Defense, on what our obligations are on the 
peninsula and what is needed for the Taiwan fight.
    Mr. Waltz. It sounds like a non-answer, General.
    General LaCamera. To me, it is a hypothetical. I don't know 
the incoming government, what----
    Mr. Waltz. Are we incorporating into our planning use of 
those forces, potentially, obviously with the acquiesce of the 
South Korean government?
    General LaCamera. Are we?
    Mr. Waltz. Uh-hum.
    General LaCamera. I have not been told----
    Mr. Waltz. Can Admiral Aquilino count on your forces in the 
case of that fight, when we are talking about forces forward?
    General LaCamera. Admiral Aquilino can count on me to 
execute my mission of protecting the Korean Peninsula.
    Mr. Waltz. Yes.
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I would recommend taking this into 
a classified setting. I think we could give you a more fulsome 
answer to that question.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. That would be great, and I wish we could 
have talked about that yesterday. However, I do think that we 
do need to take a public posture and with the new South Korean 
government on what we are prepared to do, and what they are 
prepared to do.
    And an associated question there is, is China going to lean 
on the North Korean government to ramp up tensions and to tie 
those forces down in a Taiwan Strait scenario?
    Dr. Ratner, we talked about Harpoons, and currently, the 
Harpoons are due to be delivered 2025, I believe. Is that 
sufficient? I mean, by the time they are delivered, and then, 
they actually have the training and the operational capability, 
we are looking at 2026, 2027 to have a full capability? Is that 
sufficient? And what is the Department going to do to 
accelerate that timeline?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I wish they were arriving there 
yesterday. So, I think as soon as we could get them there is 
better. And I can assure you we are turning over every rock to 
see how we can accelerate the provision of these capabilities.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay.
    Dr. Ratner. We have dedicated personnel working across the 
Department, across the Security Cooperation department, and in 
discussions with partners about how we might be able to do 
that.
    Mr. Waltz. How can this committee help you do that?
    Dr. Ratner. I will get back to you on that, Congressman.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. Taiwanese need Harpoons.
    Dr. Ratner. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. As you said, yesterday, I agree. The Ukrainians 
needed Harpoons. That would have made a big difference in the 
defense of Odessa and Mariupol right now. We didn't, I don't 
think, do what we could to get those to them, and we are seeing 
the ramifications of that. I would hate to be having this 
conversation in 2025 or 2026----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Slotkin. Great.
    Thank you, gentlemen. And sorry that we have been coming in 
and out with votes.
    You know, I was in Taiwan over Thanksgiving. You guys have 
sponsored some really useful classified briefings and tabletop 
exercises that I have participated in. And it just keeps coming 
to me clearer and clearer that, while we have military options, 
and it is our job to prepare to counter China when, and if, we 
ever, God forbid, have a conflict, that we are just not using 
the other levers of American power; namely, economic power, our 
cultural power, just a whole bunch of other things.
    And I don't want the Pentagon to feel like they are the 
lead foot in the debate and the engagement with China. So, tell 
me, when are we going to have a strategy that you all can fit 
under?
    Dr. Ratner, help us understand how we are going to leverage 
the other things. Because, as you have seen, we are watching 
things play out with Russia right now in Ukraine. No one wants 
to see Taiwan be the next Ukraine, but it is not just about you 
all and the stick. So, what is the plan and the strategy?
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, Congresswoman, I fully agree with you that 
this needs to be a whole-of-government approach. And I think, 
as Beijing is looking at the crisis in Ukraine, the conflict in 
Ukraine, it is important that they are seeing the kinds of 
economic measures that the United States is taking and the 
degree to which our diplomatic and economic and military 
actions are being done in concert with such a large group of 
countries from around the world. So, I fully agree that the 
full toolkit should be brought to bear here.
    Ms. Slotkin. But we are going to see it, we're going to see 
the strategy and it is going to lay it out, and it is going to 
be--I mean, we had a whole strategy around the Soviet Union, 
right? Containment was our whole-of-government strategy, and 
the Defense Department was part of it, but it wasn't the only 
part. I am looking for that equivalent strategy on China. The 
country is looking for that equivalent strategy on China. I 
represent autoworkers that have been laid off for the better 
part of the last year because of a 14 cent microchip that they 
can't get. So, when are we going to see the global strategy 
that we are going to understand, simple, about what our plan is 
vis-a-vis China?
    Dr. Ratner. So, my hope, Congresswoman Slotkin, is that the 
National Security Strategy will be out before too long. That 
is, obviously, not something that the Defense Department can 
control, and the National Defense Strategy as well will provide 
both the public and a classified version of how we are getting 
after this particular challenge.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay.
    Dr. Ratner. There are other efforts underway along the 
lines of what you are describing that are currently classified, 
and we can speak about in a different setting.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. Yeah, I would just say that the public 
strategy--the public needs to understand this issue, right? 
They are watching what is going on in Russia-Ukraine and 
wondering when is the next shoe going to drop with China and 
are we prepared.
    To that end, we know that cyberattacks, attacks on our 
infrastructure, that those kinds of sort of short-of-
traditional-conventional-war steps are things that we just have 
to assume the Chinese are thinking about, if we get into 
conflict. And the average American has been on the receiving 
end of some kind of ransomware attack, cyberattack, and they 
don't understand what the government is doing to protect them. 
I know that is largely Homeland Security, but can you talk 
about cyber threats from China and what we are doing, in an 
unclassified setting, I know, to show the American people that 
we are protecting them when they are on the front lines?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    So, that responsibility, as it applies to DOD, is in 
CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] Commander General Nakasone, and he is 
a great partner that we coordinate with all the time. So, for 
the DOD critical infrastructure, he is taking steps and he has 
got teams every day watching the defense of the global 
information grid and to ensure militarily. And as you 
articulated, the civilian aspect of that is done via Homeland 
Security.
    Ms. Slotkin. Right. So, I would offer--because I understand 
that is not your mission, right? But it is going to be part of 
warfare; it is already part of warfare. And we are the Defense 
Department here. We are the Armed Services Committee. So, I 
would offer I would love to see a briefing on this, classified 
or unclassified, with the Department of Homeland Security 
sitting right next to you all. It probably wouldn't hurt to get 
the State Department in there. But something that shows the 
American people that, while we know we are the best fighting 
force in the world and we are going to kick some butt abroad, 
we are also coordinated when it comes to protecting back home. 
Just a gratuitous comment.
    But, with that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Banks is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I apologize, I had to step out to go cast a procedural 
vote. So, I missed a little bit of the testimony so far today.
    But I did want to ask, immediately, Dr. Ratner, it seems 
that we have established today that the threat of a Chinese 
invasion into Taiwan is more than ever before. I mean, is that 
fair to say?
    Dr. Ratner. I think there is a mounting threat of 
aggression from the PRC.
    Mr. Banks. More than before? More than ever before?
    Dr. Ratner. With the capability that they have today, yes.
    Mr. Banks. Yes, that is the message today, more than ever--
--
    Dr. Ratner. They have conducted acts of aggression in the 
past. So, I wouldn't say, ``more than ever before.''
    Mr. Banks. More than in recent years?
    Dr. Ratner. Yes.
    Mr. Banks. Okay.
    Dr. Ratner. The threat is----
    Mr. Banks. Fair enough.
    Admiral, would you say that Taiwan is safer in 2022 than, 
say, just pulling something out of the hat, summer of 2019?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, thanks.
    I think they are seeing exactly what we are seeing, which 
is this increased aggression. I don't know how to measure 
whether they are safer or not. I think there is a growing 
concern, based on what they have watched the PRC execute over 
the last number of years.
    Mr. Banks. But we are here today because this increased 
aggression has--it is increasing; it is growing. It is more of 
a threat than it was before.
    In August 2019, Jake Sullivan debated Michael Pillsbury 
from the Hudson Institute and he said, quote, ``When it comes 
to the issue of Taiwan, 30 months into the Trump 
administration, it is more likely for the U.S. to be dragged 
into a war with China than 30 months ago. The Trump policy 
toward China is fundamentally not productive.'' End quote.
    Today, coincidentally, we are 14 months into the Biden 
administration, of which Mr. Sullivan is acting as President 
Biden's National Security Advisor. Admiral, are we less likely 
today to be dragged into a war with China over Taiwan as 
compared to 2019?
    Admiral Aquilino. Sir, once again, I see increasing desire 
to build up and continue to grow their military capabilities. 
President Xi Jinping, in a public statement, said he wanted his 
forces modernized by 2027, but he didn't articulate what he 
would do with them or when he would do it. But, from where I 
sit, my responsibility is to ensure we are ready, should that 
occur.
    Mr. Banks. So, Dr. Ratner, what has changed? What has 
changed between the summer of 2019 and where we sit today? What 
is the fundamental difference in our foreign policy today that 
has led to an increased aggression, as the Admiral defined it, 
in China's posture toward Taiwan? What is different? Why now?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, I don't attribute Xi Jinping's 
growing aggression and assertiveness to the United States.
    Mr. Banks. You don't? Okay. Well, what has changed? What 
has changed? Why now? Why not then, if it doesn't have anything 
to do with the United States?
    Dr. Ratner. I would be happy to share that assessment in a 
classified setting. His capabilities are growing and his 
patience seems to be decreasing.
    Mr. Banks. But you don't have an explanation for the 
American people about why?
    Admiral Aquilino. Well, if I could jump in, Congressman?
    Mr. Banks. Admiral, please.
    Admiral Aquilino. So, again, this is about what the PRC has 
done, not what anyone else has done, right? They have taken 
lives on the Indian Line of Actual Control. They have 
discounted their agreement as it applied to Hong Kong. They 
have locked up a million Muslims in Xinjiang. So, their 
actions, the PRC actions--not U.S. actions, not any other 
nation's actions--are the things that give us concern. I think 
that is what you were getting to.
    Mr. Banks. What I am getting at is that Jake Sullivan said 
that this was more likely to happen on Donald Trump's watch 
because of Donald Trump's foreign policy. But, instead, Dr. 
Ratner, you conceded that the threat is more real today than it 
has been at any point in recent years.
    Let me move on.
    Dr. Ratner. And it will be, it will be, regardless of----
    Mr. Banks. Let me move on. North Korea restarted missile 
tests in 2021 after a 4-year pause in testing. In 2022, North 
Korea conducted a record number of missile tests. Last 
Saturday, it conducted the ninth missile test this year. In 
addition, recent satellite images have shown North Korea seems 
to be building up nuclear testing. General, what factors do you 
think led North Korea to resume these provocative behaviors 
since 2021, after a rather long hiatus?
    General LaCamera. KJU [Kim Jong-un] claims it is because of 
sanctions and that we haven't come to the table. I think it is 
more internal for him. I think it is fairly complicated when 
you think of the Moon administration is on a transition. And I 
think, as we just talked about with China, I think he defers to 
China, but he is also looking for it to be autonomous. So, 
while this threat is to the south and to the U.S.----
    [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    The Chairman. I am sorry, but the gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. Panetta is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Gentlemen, obviously, thanks to all three of you for being 
here and appreciate your patience, as well as your testimony 
and the information you are providing us.
    The other night I had a good conversation with a 
representative of Taiwan. And obviously, we were talking about 
Ukraine, and we were talking about how inspired we are by the 
Ukrainian people and how their population is all in on this, 
obviously.
    Obviously, then, that pivoted to the people of Taiwan and 
talking about the national guard and the conscription services 
that they have there. Obviously, that is something that I think 
is going to play an important part, if there is any sort of 
invasion by the PRC.
    That being said, is there anything that we can do, is there 
anything that the Taiwanese should do, in order to increase the 
capacity, increase the will of the national guard or those who 
are under conscription service in regards to what they can do 
to be more involved in their service or in their will to 
respond to a PRC attack?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    I believe--well, I know for a fact--that this is an 
initiative that is being developed and implemented to ensure 
that there is a robust, whether you want to call it national 
guard, reserve force, or capability outside of the uniformed 
service to be able to defend their nation. So, it is very 
important, and they are working diligently to develop that 
system.
    Mr. Panetta. Are we involved in any way in helping them in 
that?
    Admiral Aquilino. As a part of the Taiwan Relations Act, we 
contribute to the support of their defense, and that includes 
both weapons, via FMS [foreign military sales] capabilities 
that we've talked about, but also through services and 
training, yes.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you.
    And, Admiral, you talked about--and I think it was in your 
questioning, in the question and answers to the chairman--you 
said, number one, we need a more integrated and sustainable 
ISR. Go into that a little bit, please. And how can we create a 
more robust exchange of our ISR with our allies?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, thanks, Congressman.
    Again, this persistent understanding in real time of the 
battlespace is critical, via contributions from all domains, 
with the ability to share it with our allies and partners 
through what I articulated through this Mission Partners 
Environment. My number two funding priority, as you should have 
seen in my unfunded list. When you combine those together, 
those deliver a very strong capability, as it applies to both 
deterrence, and then, should deterrence fail, to be able to 
fight and win.
    Mr. Panetta. Dr. Ratner, anything to say on that?
    Dr. Ratner. Nothing to add. I support exactly what Admiral 
Aquilino articulated.
    Mr. Panetta. [Inaudible].
    Gentlemen, moving on to the violent extremist [VE] threat 
in the Philippines and in Indonesia, after our withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, did we see any uptick in either rhetoric or in 
capabilities by any VE groups in that area? And then, 
subsequent to that, can you give an assessment of the VE groups 
at this point?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman.
    As you articulated, specifically, in the southern 
Philippines, where we have helped our partner nation there to 
ensure they don't have a terrorist problem, those efforts 
continue, but I have not seen an uptick since the recent 
decision to depart Afghanistan.
    That said, we are concerned about foreign fighter flow. The 
SOCPAC Commander has been tasked to ensure that we maintain 
vigilance, but I haven't seen a change as of now.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you. And in Indonesia, anything, 
Admiral?
    Admiral Aquilino. Again, it is the area; we are always 
concerned about any increase in violent extremist 
organizations, and we continue to work with the Indonesians and 
support them, as they also watch this issue.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you. Gentlemen, thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Ms. Houlahan [presiding]. The chair now recognizes Mr. 
Johnson for his 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thank you all for being here.
    In 2019, the U.S. Transportation Command conducted a no-
notice readiness exercise to test the organic surge fleet 
capacity to quickly mobilize for war. Out of 61 ships, just 27 
were ready for sea after 120 hours. These vessels are over 40 
years old and readiness rates are likely declining further as 
they age, obviously.
    Previously, the Department has indicated that it plans to 
rely on contract shipping to supplement logistics needs. So, 
the question is, do you think that international shipping 
companies now will risk access to the Chinese market to support 
the United States in a conflict? I suppose that is for Dr. 
Ratner.
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, this is Admiral Aquilino. If 
I could throw in here first.
    Mr. Johnson. Sure.
    Admiral Aquilino. First of all, I thanked Congressman 
Courtney and the committee for the support to the TSP program. 
Completely effective.
    I also endorse General Van Ovost's and Admiral Mewbourne's 
ability to go ahead and prove to us whether or not the system 
can respond. I think we highlighted some challenges that we 
have to fix. In my conversations with the CNO, he is working 
towards increased sealift, the sustainability of the readiness. 
But all of those that come together help us to realize the 
distributed nature and the agile logistics that we need.
    So, I don't know if I want to go hypothetically at your 
question. What I would say is we are doing the right things to 
ensure that those capabilities are ready/available when we need 
them.
    Mr. Johnson. That is good.
    Dr. Ratner, would you add anything to that?
    Dr. Ratner. I would just say, Congressman, we have received 
a number of questions during the hearing today, and yesterday 
in the classified setting, about these questions of logistics 
and contested logistics. It is an area of focus for the 
Department and one that you will be seeing reflected in both 
the National Defense Strategy and the FY23 budget.
    Mr. Johnson. Very good.
    Let me move on to something else. And I suppose any of the 
three of you could respond to this.
    But each of us, we all regularly see now the condemnation 
of Putin by Western governments in the media certainly now, but 
our exposure to the perspectives of the Indo-Pacific nations is 
more limited here. So, do you have insights for us on how 
Putin's invasion of Ukraine has affected Indo-Pacific 
perspectives on the American-led international order and the 
West's resolve to confront aggression in the Pacific? And I am 
chiefly interested in the nations of India, Thailand, Vietnam, 
and other developing partners, but, also, obviously, would love 
to hear about our treaty allies, South Korea and the 
Philippines.
    And I apologize if you all tread some of this ground 
already. Many of us have multiple hearings this morning. So, we 
are bouncing in and out.
    But would any of you want to jump in on that?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman, I would.
    Again, I can't tell you at this point what the PRC has 
learned from watching the European issue. But what I would say 
is, I think I am seeing the right lessons that we would like to 
learn. Number one, you know, the investment of blood in order 
to prosecute this illegal event. Second, the international 
condemnation and the unwillingness to accept it. And third, the 
drastic economic impacts to the people. Those are the right 
lessons, should this switch over to the Indo-Pacific region. 
And I think I would leave it there.
    General LaCamera. Yes, Congressman, General LaCamera.
    I can tell you that Ukraine asked the ROK for military and 
non-combat items, and they are providing $10 million in 
humanitarian assistance. And this economic impact is calling 
the Russians now an unfriendly nation; the ROK is. So, there is 
$12.5 billion in energy resources from Russia to the Republic 
of Korea. So, it is having an impact on Korea.
    Mr. Johnson. Let me ask one more question. And I will 
direct this to Dr. Ratner. I am not sure how much time I have 
left.
    But I am just curious--and I guess we all are interested in 
knowing--what investments we need to make in our allies and 
partners to protect against vulnerabilities that China may 
exploit in an effort to prevent them from offering us support 
in a conflict. And what specific investments in our defense 
industrial base, for example, can we make that would 
simultaneously reduce the dependence of our allies and partners 
on Chinese technology and manufacturing and finance, and also 
enhance our readiness?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, time is running out here before 
the chairman cuts me off. I will just say we are engaged in 
multiple discussions with allies and partners specifically on 
the types of asymmetric capabilities that we think they need to 
best deter and deny PRC coercion and aggression.
    Mr. Johnson. Very good.
    I will yield back. Appreciate it.
    The Chairman [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Ms. Houlahan is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you, gentlemen. I really appreciate the chance to 
ask a couple of questions.
    One of my questions has to do with Sino-Russian 
relationships, and just in my brief reading, understanding that 
there have been multiple statements made between the two 
states, multiple exercises, and cooperation of various forms, 
but that the large, and sort of the short, of it is that we 
don't see a real formal alliance, so to speak, at this point in 
time. What would it look like if we were seeing a more formal 
alliance gel? What sort of signals or indications would we be 
seeing that could or should alarm us?
    Admiral, I was hoping you might be able to comment on that.
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    It has previously been described as a marriage of 
convenience. There are issues on both sides as to whether or 
not they trust each other. But we need to look very closely at 
what is happening right now and see if that has changed at all. 
That would be very concerning if those two authoritarian 
nations delivered or developed or went into something that 
looked like a treaty alliance.
    So, we are watching it very closely. Again, we are on day 
14 of this thing in Europe, and we are watching it to try to 
understand what does that translate into.
    Ms. Houlahan. And, Dr. Ratner, you were shaking your head. 
What does that mean, would translate into? What are we looking 
for? Are there formal treaties or something else?
    Dr. Ratner. I think probably not a formal treaty in the 
short term, but, as Admiral Aquilino said, we are watching very 
closely. At a minimum, I think we have seen Beijing's tacit 
support for Russian aggression in Ukraine. We have seen 
diplomatic support that they are providing. At home, they are 
censoring criticism of Vladimir Putin and support for Ukraine. 
So, we see what they are doing domestically politically.
    In terms of the questions you had about what it would look 
like at an enhanced level, I think if we saw China taking steps 
to support or try to route around some of the sanctions or give 
economic support to Russia, as the rest of the international 
community was trying to apply pressure, that would be extremely 
concerning. And if they provided any military support in 
capabilities or otherwise, that would be extremely concerning.
    Ms. Houlahan. Uh-hum. And, General, anything to add there?
    General LaCamera. Yes. What I call it is third-party 
intervention and influence on the Korean Peninsula. So, I don't 
separate Korea, DPRK, China, Russia; I think there will be some 
kind of impact in any kind of hostilities on the peninsula that 
we are paying attention to.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you.
    And my next question is somewhat related. The DOD has been 
trying over time to rebalance the global allocation of 
intelligence and surveillance and reconnaissance assets to 
USINDOPACOM. How is that going and what are the gaps that still 
exist? If you, Admiral, might be able to elaborate on that?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    So, the theme that we have watched over the last 20 years 
is there is never enough ISR. The globe is a big place, and we 
have multiple areas that we keep tracks on.
    What I would say is, as we shift towards a focus to the 
Indo-Pacific, some of those resources have come to the Indo-
Pacific, but we are still not meeting the total requirement. We 
are not meeting the total requirement anywhere.
    What I will tell you is the Secretary has not pulled any 
assets from the Indo-Pacific, based on what is needed into 
Ukraine. So, again, the Department's focus in the right 
theater, but, boy, it is a complex world.
    Ms. Houlahan. Uh-hum. And, General, in your area, is there 
any gaps still in ISR that you would like to talk about?
    [Laughter.]
    General LaCamera. Most of it is in placement and access, 
given the comprehensive military agreement between the North 
and the South, and just our ability to collect over DPRK. We 
cannot fly our eyes directly over. So, we rely on the other the 
ends to develop the intelligence picture.
    Ms. Houlahan. And with my last minute, my question regards 
the Philippines and the strategic importance of the Philippines 
amidst a lot of political uncertainty that you all mentioned 
yesterday. How are you viewing that, and what can we be doing 
to, I guess, firm up our relationship with the Philippines in 
the face of uncertainty?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    Again, the Secretary went to the Philippines not long ago. 
And as you know, we were having issues with the visiting force 
agreement, and he got that problem corrected. So, the trend is 
in the right direction. We are doing more with them. We can 
continue to develop that posture there through our EDCA 
[Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement] sites. We are building 
out Basa Air Base to practice training with them; Fort 
Magsaysay. So, it is on the right trend. We need to continue 
and expand those initiatives.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Bergman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to 
everybody.
    You know, this late in the hearing, pretty much most of the 
questions have been asked. So, rather than duplicate that just 
for the sake of saying it has not been said until I have said 
it, I would like to kind of dig down a little deeper on the ISR 
piece that Representative Houlahan just indicated.
    Do you--``you'' as in the Department of Defense--are you 
truly taking advantage of all of the capabilities that are out 
there, let's say, in, well, we use the term COTS, commercial-
off-the-shelf? Are there any opportunities for increased 
robustness in ISR using things like, you know, again, already 
existing systems?
    I will give you one example. Like SeaGuardian MQ-9B, that 
is just one example. Because we have got a lot of challenges, 
and you cannot have too much visibility. Any comments?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman.
    We are certainly experimenting with anything that could 
provide additional capability. I will give you an example of a 
Saildrone with an ISR suite. So, through our experimentation 
program, we are working to deliver those maybe capabilities 
that haven't been applied militarily and figuring out how they 
deliver a warfighting outcome, those that are promising, we 
will work to accelerate and get in.
    But, on the ISR side, it is all domains, whether it be 
undersea, on the sea, above the sea, space, and cyberspace. But 
we are trying to do that and take those opportunities to 
deliver an advantage.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Well, I think, if you will, for the 
safety and security of not only the American people, but all of 
our allies around the world, we cannot waste time and money 
through our research labs trying to get just a little bit extra 
edge, when something that already exists will be good enough.
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield back the 
remainder of my time. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes. Are you with us 
there, Jim? Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman. Sorry about that.
    The Chairman. Okay. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate your 
testimony here today.
    If I could start with Admiral Aquilino, can you talk about 
the role of information operations in INDOPACOM? It seems that 
there are a variety of information-related capabilities that 
are critical to our ability to compete in the region. How is 
INDOPACOM doing in the information domain, and how could 
Congress help?
    Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, thanks.
    So, as part of the Seize the Initiative objectives that we 
have talked about, and through this lens of ``think, act, and 
operate differently,'' it is certainly an area we have to get 
better at. Through the processes we developed, all of our 
operations are now integrated with the information space to 
ensure that we have the correct messaging--what we want to say 
when we want to say it, or whether we don't want to say 
something. So, we agree with you with regard to the importance, 
and we are working to try to strengthen that.
    Additionally, on the special operations side, there are 
certain components that have, I would articulate, increased 
capabilities, and we are working to pull those in.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    General LaCamera, so there is, clearly, a crisis unfolding 
across the world daily, it seems. And I am conscious of the 
fact that our ongoing focus on the invasion of Ukraine may pull 
our attention from North Korea. But, General, can you please 
take a few minutes or so and discuss with us the most pressing 
needs on the Korean Peninsula that we simply cannot ignore?
    General LaCamera. Yes, thanks, Congressman.
    For me, the top priority is maintaining the alliance with 
the Republic of Korea. And then, combat readiness is number 
two.
    We have got an exercise program with focus mainly on 
command post exercises, but we need to make sure that we are 
training at the tactical level all the way up through the 
operational level. Based on the changes in the terrain, based 
on the changes of the enemy, and based on the changes of 
friendly capabilities, we're in the process of rewriting our op 
[operational] plan for the defense of the peninsula.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    And let me turn to Dr. Ratner. In your posture statement, 
you mentioned that we are growing our cooperation in cyberspace 
with India and the Quad. Can you expand on this work more 
specifically? And has this cooperation been successful, and 
have there been any roadblocks to getting it done?
    Dr. Ratner. Congressman, the vast majority of that work is 
classified. But I will just say we are working with the 
Indians, both to ensure that we are able to communicate better 
in classified settings and information related to space, cyber, 
and intelligence, and we are also working with them to help 
them better defend their own networks.
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. And, Admiral Aquilino, can you 
highlight some of the initiatives to advance cyber with our 
partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific region?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman.
    As a part of the AUKUS agreement, again, if we look at 
that, everybody wants to talk about submarines, but it is 
really about advancing or improving our advanced capabilities. 
Cyber and space are clearly two of those.
    We are working directly with Australia. And next week, 
again, I will be going there with General Nakasone and General 
Dickinson, along with the Chief of Defense, General Campbell, 
to frame and continue to move our capabilities forward. And we 
do that wherever we can safely and securely with our high-end 
allies and partners.
    Mr. Langevin. Thanks.
    Then, Dr. Ratner and Admiral Aquilino, China plans to 
complete their modernization goals by 2035, and they continue 
to develop their capabilities across space, cyber, and nuclear 
domains. In this unclassified setting, can you generally 
explain how these modernization efforts compare to our own?
    Admiral Aquilino. Again, thanks, Congressman.
    One update. So, President Xi Jinping has accelerated that 
timeline for his forces, and he has asked for modernization by 
2027. That is concerning. Again, we still have the greatest 
military on the planet. We need to understand his acceleration, 
the capabilities he is developing, and not only stay on par, 
but exceed and generate overmatch in all those areas.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mrs. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you all for being here today.
    Historically, India has had significant ties economically 
with Russia. New Delhi has been an expansive market for Russian 
oil and gas sales, and last year, Russia delivered the S-400 
air defense system to India. In December 2021, the two plus two 
meeting between India and Russia, India made it clear that the 
future of the relationship was dependent on Russian investing 
in ``Make in India'' projects.
    My questions for the admiral and doctor is, India clearly 
wanted to maintain its relationship with Russia, by its 
actions. However, now that Russia has invaded Ukraine, do you 
see the scenario where India will have to take a side in that 
conflict and distance itself from Moscow, and become more 
aligned with the Quad nations? Or do you see maybe India 
attempt to stay neutral? I am just curious on your thoughts on 
that.
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, I would say, Congresswoman, a few of the 
other members of the committee have asked similar questions. I 
think we recognize that India has a long and complicated 
economic and security relationship with Russia. The majority of 
their weapon purchases come from Russia. But they have also 
been systematically diversifying away from Russian systems for 
years now in a way that we view as a positive trajectory.
    I would also note that, at that December summit that you 
cited, there were very few announcements on new purchases. That 
was quite notable. And just last week, Prime Minister Modi 
joined the leaders of the Quad summit, including President 
Biden, for a leaders' call to talk about some of their shared 
priorities.
    So, I agree it is complicated, but the trendlines are 
moving in the right direction.
    Mrs. McClain. Yes, don't you wish it was easy sometimes?
    So, you are confident in your opinion that you see it 
scaling back, the dependency in the relationship?
    Dr. Ratner. India, on its own accord, as a sovereign 
decision, has been diversifying its arms purchases and 
development, including their own digitization and making some 
substantial purchases from the United States as well. So, I 
think the trendlines are in the right direction. And the 
importance of this relationship I think could not be 
overstated, and we ought to keep our eyes on that important 
fact.
    Mrs. McClain. Agreed.
    Sir.
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, ma'am. Again, we are seeing the 
right actions with regard to foreign military sales, the 
capabilities that they desire, and the leaning towards the 
United States, as Secretary Ratner said. That is key.
    Military to military, we operate together much more 
frequently. They have asked for capabilities support and help 
in areas that they haven't before, based on what I believe is a 
common security challenge in the form of the PRC.
    So, as this plays out, again, India gets to make its own 
decisions, but I would articulate the same; that from my lane 
in the mil-to-mil [military-to-military] piece, it is going in 
the right direction.
    Mrs. McClain. Wonderful. Thank you, sir.
    With that, I will yield my time back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to the witnesses.
    The good news is I believe I may be the last Rep 
[Representative] to question.
    [Laughter.]
    So, first of all, I want to say that I appreciated Mr. 
Langevin's comments and focus on cyber. As a member of the CITI 
[Cyber, Innovative Technologies, and Information Systems] 
Subcommittee, I think that that is something that we are 
looking at. I want to make sure that you all are engaging with 
CYBERCOM on a regular basis to foster a relationship there, 
because it will become more and more, I think, important, as we 
move forward.
    My question is somewhat specific to my congressional 
district, which is the Oklahoma City Metro Area, and 
specifically, close to Tinker Air Force Base. And this is 
really directed at the admiral. A significant share of 
investment in weapon systems acquisition and modernization is 
now focused on deterring China, which makes your input in 
operational threats and capability especially important. I do 
understand that JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] is 
in the process of reviewing the requirements for a number of 
programs, including the next arterial refueler, KC-Y. Can you 
tell me a little bit about INDOPACOM's engagement and possible 
input into the process?
    Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman.
    So, as it applies to the continued assessment of being able 
to execute our mission, air-to-air refueling is identified in 
every event as critical, not only in INDOPACOM, across all the 
combatant commanders, to include the strategic commander, 
especially with all the things that are in Tinker that are 
under his realm.
    So, we identify the requirements. We have to continue to 
ensure we have the capacity to execute all of our war plans. 
So, I do have input and it is a critical focus area.
    Mrs. Bice. Excellent.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    At this point, we have nobody else here in line to ask 
questions. So, that is a fancy way of saying we are done.
    I do want to thank the gentlemen for their testimony.
    This is going to be a huge year, FY23. As we have seen, the 
world has clearly changed and our national security is going to 
be even more complicated than it was before. So, I look forward 
to working with all of you to make sure you have the tools you 
need to defend our interests.
    And I thank you very much for your testimony.
    And with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 9, 2022

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                             March 9, 2022

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 9, 2022

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             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

    Dr. Ratner. Australia and the United States have forged a strong 
military-to-military relationship through shared experiences in peace 
and combat that extends over 100 years and includes operations most 
recently in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.
    Australia and the United States already train and operate at high 
levels through current U.S deployments like Marine Rotational Force 
Darwin (MRF-D) and Enhanced Air Cooperation (EAC), and major exercises 
such as TALISMAN SABRE, RIM OF THE PACIFIC, and LARGE SCALE EXERCISE.
    Additionally, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
have personnel exchange programs that embed highly qualified personnel 
in host nation tactical units and headquarters. These exchanges provide 
the personnel and their militaries with improved understanding of each 
others' services and cultures, build partnerships and relationships 
that strengthen our alliances, and improve coalition operations.
    AUKUS is the next step to continue enhancing our ability to operate 
at the highest levels through the development of the Royal Australian 
Navy's nuclear powered submarine program and the trilateral development 
of advanced capabilities.   [See page 21.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Dr. Ratner. Since the People's Republic of China (PRC) controlled 
fentanyl-related substances as a class in 2019, the primary source 
country of fentanyl entering the United States is Mexico. However, the 
majority of the precursor chemicals used in the synthesis of fentanyl 
come from the PRC. We continue to press the PRC at the highest levels 
to enhance oversight of its chemical industry, improve information 
sharing, strengthen customs enforcement, and implement and enforce 
``know your customer'' standards to restrict sales of narcotics-related 
precursor chemicals. We are also working closely with our international 
partners to echo these requests in their engagements with the PRC and 
to support U.S. proposals for addressing diversion of precursor 
chemicals in multilateral forums. In March, members of the United 
Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, including the PRC, voted to 
support a U.S. proposal to internationally control three fentanyl 
precursor chemicals, and adopted by consensus a U.S.-sponsored 
resolution on addressing the diversion of uncontrolled chemicals and 
designer precursors. The Department of State provides funding for the 
International Narcotics Control Board's (INCB) Databank on Precursor 
Chemicals, which supports real-time international law enforcement 
cooperation to prevent diversion and illicit manufacture of precursor 
chemicals and remains an important tool in helping meaningfully disrupt 
narcotics flows.   [See page 24.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
    Dr. Ratner. DOD's President's Budget request for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2023 includes $1.1 billion for one America class amphibious assault 
ship (LHA) and $1.7 billion for one Flight II San Antonio class 
amphibious transport dock (LPD). These ships will sustain the ability 
of amphibious forces to conduct expeditionary warfare. These 
investments form part of the $27.9 billion shipbuilding request in 
DOD's FY 2023 President's budget request, which procures the mix of 
surface and subsurface ships with the capabilities required to respond 
to a range of contingencies from strategic deterrence to crisis 
response.   [See page 28.]
    Admiral Aquilino. As the Geographic Combatant Commander, I 
establish the requirements to support Operational Plans. The services 
take my requirements and ensure their forces are trained and equipped 
to meet my operational requirements. I am confident in the Navy's and 
Marine Corp's abilities to meet my requirements. For the actual 
readiness rates, I defer to the services, mainly the Chief of Naval 
Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps to discuss specific 
details regarding readiness and availability of the fleet.   [See page 
28.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA
    Dr. Ratner. We remain encouraged by India's diversification of 
defense equipment over the past decade, including the more than $20 
billion of U.S.-origin defense equipment it has purchased since 2008. 
We also are strengthening U.S.-India defense cooperation across a range 
of domains. This includes working closely with India to deepen our 
bilateral industrial cooperation on co-production and co-development of 
defense articles, through projects such as the Defense Trade and 
Technology Initiative (DTTI). This will need to be a prolonged, 
deliberate effort that cannot happen overnight. As India ramps up its 
domestic defense industry, it will be able to phase out legacy Russian 
systems with equipment made in India or purchased from partners and 
allies.   [See page 26.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
    Dr. Ratner. The Taiwan Relations Act provision relating to 
consultation with Congress reflects the constitutional processes that 
would be involved in the introduction of U.S. armed forces by the 
President into an armed conflict.
    These same constitutional processes are reflected in our mutual 
defense treaties with allies in the region that provide for the United 
States acting with allies to meet a common danger ``in accordance with 
our constitutional provisions and processes.''
    A U.S. response to a conflict in Taiwan would involve engagement 
between the President and Congress, which could take place when the 
facts of the situation are known and, in this respect, would be no 
different than the involvement of U.S. armed forces in a conflict 
anywhere in the world.   [See page 32.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
    Dr. Ratner. People-to-people exchanges are a critical part of the 
Department and U.S. government's toolkit for engaging the Indo-Pacific 
region. The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 
is a particularly valuable soft power resource for the Department, 
which facilitates training, education, and the development of strong 
networks between defense professionals in the Indo-Pacific region. We 
also work closely with the Department of State in leveraging the U.S. 
Government's full suite of tools--including the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) program--to build people-to-people ties 
and professional development between the U.S. Department of Defense and 
our allies and partners.   [See page 36.]



      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 9, 2022

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                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. The National Guard possess a unique international 
engagement capability they can leverage with the dual professions of 
its members as well as access to state resources. For example, in the 
State of Rhode Island our National Guard was paired with Timor-Leste in 
2020 under the National Guard State Partnership Program. As you 
mentioned in your written statement, Timor-Leste is an emerging 
partner. The State Partnership Program continues to grow in strategic 
relevance because it provides a low cost-efficient way to build 
stronger, enduring relationships, and military capacity with partner 
nations. What is your vision for incorporating the State Partnership 
Program into your Operations, Activities, and Investments (OAIs) 
strategy?
    Admiral Aquilino. The State Partnership Program (SPP) provides a 
unique opportunity to expand cooperation with countries that share 
common interests with the U.S. and support their capacity across a 
range of activities, including humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief. The relationships cultivated through the SPP typically last for 
decades. SPP engagements are developed in coordination with my country 
directors and the Security Cooperation Office.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. Admiral Aquilino, in your testimony before the 
committee you stated ``The resources we commit now and in the future 
will preserve a free and open Indo-pacific and strengthen our posture 
and provide us with the ability to fight and win should deterrence 
fail.''
    How does this administration's continued inaction on renegotiating 
the Compacts of Free Association with the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of Palau 
impact your ability to fight today should deterrence fail?
    If an agreement was signed tomorrow, as opposed to 2 or 3 years 
from now, would INDOPACOM be in a better position? If so, please 
explain how our collective defense would benefit if this open question 
was resolved.
    Admiral Aquilino. These important agreements strengthen our 
security relationships throughout the Pacific and mitigate competitors' 
influence. However, as a Combatant Commander, the status of the compact 
negotiations does not impact my readiness or ability to plan. The 
historically good relationships we've enjoyed with these nations have 
allowed us to maintain a credible forward military presence that 
continues to this day and promotes regional stability.
    I support interagency efforts to speedily conclude the negotiation 
of the Compact Agreements.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Austin has stated that one of his top 
priorities is to strengthen our allies and partners. In order to deter 
Chinese aggression, Taiwan requires a variety of capabilities including 
anti-ship missiles, anti-ship mines, and torpedoes. How dependent is 
Taiwan on U.S. armaments, and how are we increasing our efforts to 
provide them with additional equipment? Does Taiwan have any research 
and development or procurement efforts to self-develop these kinds of 
defensive weapons?
    Dr. Ratner. Taiwan maintains its own indigenous defense industry 
which produces a number of capabilities employed by the Taiwan Armed 
Forces. As part of the U.S. Government's provision of defense articles 
and services to Taiwan, DOD is examining additional ways to expand 
cooperation. Acquisition and Sustainment (A&S), for example, is working 
to identify areas of mutual interest where the United States and Taiwan 
can expand technical cooperation on critical defense capabilities, 
including under the very recently signed Agreement Between the American 
Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative 
Office in the United States for Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation Projects. Moreover, relevant U.S. departments and agencies 
are working with industry to identify means of partnering with Taiwan's 
domestic defense industry in mutually beneficial ways.
    Mr. Lamborn. Secretary Austin has stated that one of his top 
priorities is to strengthen our allies and partners. In order to deter 
Chinese aggression, Taiwan requires a variety of capabilities including 
anti-ship missiles, anti-ship mines, and torpedoes. How dependent is 
Taiwan on U.S. armaments, and how are we increasing our efforts to 
provide them with additional equipment? Does Taiwan have any research 
and development or procurement efforts to self-develop these kinds of 
defensive weapons?
    Admiral Aquilino. Defensive armaments enhance the ability of the 
Taiwan Armed Forces to deter, delay, or deny military aggression, 
including assistance provided by the United States consistent with the 
Taiwan Relations Act. This requires a balanced mix of both Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) and capabilities indigenously developed by Taiwan. 
To enable deterrence, it is imperative for the U.S. Government to 
deliver FMS cases to Taiwan on schedule. For its part, Taiwan must 
prepare through a well-resourced and thoughtfully executed budget that 
focuses on the right investments, including research and development, 
to prepare for contingency operations.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
    Mr. Courtney. In line with your concept of distributed logistics, 
and especially in light of the Red Hill closure, do you believe that 
the 10 vessels authorized under the Tanker Security Program will be 
enough? If you require greater sealift capacity in the INDOPACOM AOR, 
how many additional vessels do you need?
    Admiral Aquilino. The Tanker Security Program (TSP) provides 
assured access to U.S.-Flag Tankers but does not eliminate the risk 
associated with the U.S.-Flag tanker gap. We believe 10 TSP vessels 
that can be available at a moment's notice to provide support to our 
mobile logistics fleet is a good start. However, I concur with the FY20 
NDAA tanker study which states an additional 10 TSP vessels would 
mitigate risk in the contested environment.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
    Ms. Speier. Admiral Aquilino, I have long been concerned by 
crushing OPTEMPO and its impact on service members and their families. 
At a recent hearing on suicide prevention in the military, witnesses 
testified that stress related to excessive OPTEMPO is a key 
environmental factor that contributes to servicemember suicide. A 
February GAO report included focus groups with sailors who were working 
80-100 hour weeks and losing colleagues to behavioral health issues 
related to the stress of overwork. Last year, Chairman Milley testified 
to this committee that he agreed that OPTEMPO has been too high, and 
that he was making changes to the Global Force Management and Request 
For Forces processes to reduce OPTEMPO. What have been the results of 
these changes in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility, and what efforts 
have you made to reduce OPTEMPO to sustainable levels and ensure that 
deployments are for truly high priority needs and not ``nice-to-do'' 
missions?
    Admiral Aquilino. I take this matter seriously and am working to 
balance OPTEMPO--for the well-being of our service members and their 
families--with the need to safeguard national security. Any deployments 
that will result in Service ``redline'' breaks or violations to the 
SecDef's Deployment to Dwell (D2D) Policies are highlighted in the 
SecDef Orders Book prior to any deployment decision. The Directed 
Readiness Tables have controlled OPTEMPO significantly by creating bins 
that ``fence'' force deployment availability to ensure there are forces 
available to respond to crisis. Within USINDOPACOM, historical data 
analysis shows we are diligent about abiding by Service ``redlines'', 
the SecDef's D2D ratios, and the Directed Readiness effort.
    Ms. Speier. General LaCamera, I am alarmed by the increase in 
suicides by service members, particularly at remote installations like 
Alaska, where twice as many soldiers died by suicide in 2021 compared 
to the previous year. A major problem is insufficient behavioral health 
providers. Soldiers in Alaska told me that they wait 2 months for an 
appointment. I have learned that Korea has the same problem with 
inadequate staffing for behavioral health across the board, and 
particularly for substance misuse counselors. What are you doing to 
increase access to behavioral health care for service members in Korea? 
How will you increase the number of providers? What are you doing to 
leverage telehealth to fill the unmet need? And what resources or 
authorities do you need from Congress to address this behavioral health 
crisis?
    General LaCamera. Behavioral health (BH) resources currently do not 
meet requirements for Service Members or their families in Korea. 
Shortfalls are largely the result of BH provider availability, position 
fill rates, and laws and policies concerning alternative resources such 
as tele-behavioral health. The entire health care team in the Pacific 
are pursuing several avenues of approach to improve access to care. Due 
to the assessed deficit in behavioral health care, we are attempting to 
close the gap through multiple means. Some initiatives in Korea include
      The Military and Family Life Counseling (MFLC) Program, 
which is managed through DOD Military Community and Family Policy, 
supports both 7th Air Force and 8th Army Service Members and their 
families with non-medical counseling. MFLCs are integrated into 
behavioral health clinics as augmenting resources to improve access and 
non-clinical options, particularly for Service Members seeking care for 
life related stressors that do not meet criteria for a behavioral 
health diagnosis. Since June 2021, MFLC staffing has increased by 14 
personnel (13/31 in JUN 21 to 27/34 in FEB 22) increasing overall 
staffing by more than 50%. This increase in MFLCs has increased our 
capacity but does not fill all our needs.
      We are also educating leaders and Soldiers of the 
availability of other support counseling services to include the Army 
Wellness Center and established remote services such as Military 
OneSource to provide 24/7 virtual assistance.
      Additionally, we are adding options for service members 
to receive treatment from local behavioral health facilities in the 
Tricare network. Although limited, there are civilian behavioral health 
clinics in the community that are Tricare affiliated and can generally 
provide care within 7 days for conditions requiring individual and 
family therapy. Services providing medication management is limited in 
the community.
      Finally, we are in the initial discussions with civilian 
mental health organizations for the establishment of an on-post 
Behavioral Health care clinic to provide accessible mental health care 
for Tricare beneficiaries and active-duty service members.
    These measures are helping to meet some of the need; however, BH 
provider availability and position fill rates continue to be a concern. 
The difficulties with recruiting qualified applicants overseas have 
contributed to unfilled requirements and open positions.
    Tele-behavioral health (TBH) is a bridging strategy to increase 
access to care, however, TBH services are currently limited here in 
Korea. Due to contractual rules with the Tricare Overseas contract, we 
are unable to use civilian TBH options that are located outside of the 
Republic of Korea. Routine scheduled TBH appointments from military 
Medical Treatment Facilities such as Tripler Army Medical Center and 
Madigan Army Medical Center are limited, and appointment wait time is 
approximately 2 weeks.
    Discussions with MEDCOM are ongoing to increase availability of BH 
care and mitigate provider shortages in Korea. Areas of focus are:
      TRICARE Overseas Program policies surrounding 
opportunities for TBH as well as the ones related to on-installation 
civilian care;
      Options to enable Tricare beneficiaries to receive TBH 
services from TBH providers located in CONUS;
      Options to enable on-installation civilian behavioral 
health clinics staffed by providers from the U.S.; and
      The feasibility of using government contracted behavioral 
health providers to mitigate provider gaps due to challenges filling DA 
civilian BH provider hiring actions.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. Do you require American conventional hypersonic weapons 
to close warfighting operational gaps not covered by existing 
conventional weapons? If so, what operational gaps, in priority order, 
must hypersonic weapons be able to close?
    In the operational capability gaps you identify, what technologies 
or capabilities must hypersonic weapons possess to close those gaps?
    Admiral Aquilino. Hypersonic weapons are required to close 
warfighting operational gaps, especially well-defended targets that 
would require large amounts of existing conventional weapons to target. 
Hypersonics enable a ``kick down the door'' strategy that makes other 
less-exquisite weapons more effective. I need hypersonics to engage: 
(1) rapidly relocatable systems, such as Integrated Air Defense Systems 
(2) heavily defended deep targets; and (3) highly capable surface 
combatants. Hypersonic weapons require an in-flight target update 
capability, seekers to engage mobile targets, and warheads suitable for 
maritime targets.
    Mr. Scott. Are you concerned with the pace of American hypersonic 
development and technology demonstrations to date?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, I am concerned about the pace of hypersonic 
weapons development, technology demonstrations, and fielding timelines. 
Our adversaries continue to aggressively pursue these weapons which 
place our forces and facilities at risk. We need to focus on 
capabilities that give us an asymmetric and qualitative advantage 
against our adversaries along with sufficient, demonstrated quantities 
to serve as a meaningful deterrence to aggression.
    Mr. Scott. What would you like to see from the S&T and acquisition 
communities to accelerate advanced capability development and 
transition to the forces operating in your AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. Rapid acquisition funding to resource limited 
numbers of prototypes in sufficient quantities would assist in 
providing an immediate operational capability in the Indo-Pacific AOR.
    Mr. Scott. Given the current and forecasted threat environment, has 
the Department programmed the appropriate number of rounds to meet 
INDOPACOM requirements? If not, what is the appropriate number and what 
is limiting the total rounds currently planned (technical maturity, 
unit cost, number of launchers, etc.)?
    Admiral Aquilino. No, it does not meet our requirements; however, 
the theater requirements are classified. That information is detailed 
in INDOPACOM's Sec. 1242 Independent Assessment as required by the FY22 
NDAA, and in the provided Anti-Surface munitions brief mandated by 
House Report 117-118 accompanying the FY22 NDAA.
    Mr. Scott. Given the unique potential ranging capabilities of the 
Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) and Army Long Range Hypersonic 
Weapon (LRHW) compared to other DOD hypersonic efforts, what 
operational or technical capabilities do you require from those 
weapons?
    Admiral Aquilino. CPS and LRHW provide essential strike capability 
against long-range and defended targets, however we need to consider 
the optimal mix of capabilities (i.e. ARRW, HACM, SM-6) that takes 
advantage of employment diversity to enable the Joint Force Commander 
to mass fires for movement and maneuver. The optimal mix of 
capabilities must be able to engage threats to U.S. territory and have 
a range greater than adversary long range fires. Technical capabilities 
must include a resilient Beyond Line of Sight data link for in-flight 
updates, a seeker for moving targets, and precision navigation 
capability in the event of GPS jamming or GPS denial.
    Mr. Scott. Did you recommend the use of hospital ships or an ARG to 
support relief in Tonga? If not, why not? If you did, were you 
overruled and if so, by whom? Do you believe the PRC response to the 
disaster has damaged U.S. interests versus our response?
    Admiral Aquilino. No, we did not recommend a hospital ship or ARG. 
In support of USAID's request for life saving and ISR capabilities, 
USINDOPACOM was a first responder, deploying USS SAMPSON and an 
embarked aviation detachment to provide search and rescue and natural 
disaster recovery assistance to Tonga. No additional DOD assistance was 
requested by the host nation or France, Australia, and New Zealand 
(FRANZ) leadership in their role as the response on-scene commander. 
Tonga was very appreciative of U.S. assistance.
    Mr. Scott. Do you intend to advocate for inspections (including of 
active PRC bases) in Antarctica during this Antarctic summer? What is 
the United States doing to counter China's militarization of the 
continent and failure to abide by the Antarctic Treaty? How do they 
feel about the lack of inspections of China's station in Kunlun? What 
is INDOPACOM's current capacity with the special C-130s to support 
inspections?
    Admiral Aquilino. Inspections, led by the Department of State, are 
an important feature of the Antarctic Treaty System to ensure all 
nations use the continent for peaceful purposes and protect its fragile 
ecosystem. I support verifying the PRC is meeting its commitments to 
the international community in Antarctica, like the prohibition on 
military uses. The LC-130 provides a unique capability to support 
logistics in Antarctica, including scientific activities or State 
Department led inspection activities.
    Mr. Scott. How do you assess the intent behind the Chinese lease on 
the airstrip on Kiribati's Kanton Island, 1200 miles from Hawaii? 
What's the purpose? What threat does it pose to U.S. facilities and 
interests, including Hawaii?
    Admiral Aquilino. China's investments around the world, and 
especially in the Indo-Pacific, generally have three objectives. One, 
to expand economic access and opportunities; two, to expand Chinese 
presence and influence across all instruments of national power; and 
three, to correspondingly reduce U.S. influence and access across those 
same domains. The Chinese lease does not increase the threat to U.S. 
facilities. However, along with our regional partners, we are 
monitoring and engaged to understand the evolving situation.
    Mr. Scott. How damaging it is that the Compacts of Free Association 
haven't been completed? If it's in the Indo-Pacific Strategy, why has 
no progress been made for a year? How concerned are you about China 
filling the vacuum in RMI, FSM, Palau? Without the access granted by 
the COFAs, how damaging is it to existing O-plans?
    Admiral Aquilino. These important agreements strengthen our 
security relationships throughout the Pacific and mitigate competitors' 
influence. However, as a Combatant Commander, the status of the compact 
negotiations does not impact my readiness or ability to plan. The 
historically good relationships we've enjoyed with these nations have 
allowed us to maintain a credible forward military presence that 
continues to this day and promotes regional stability.
    I support interagency efforts to speedily conclude the negotiation 
of the Compact Agreements.
    Mr. Scott. What are your unfunded priorities for bolstering U.S. 
ties with Vanuatu, Tonga, Papua/New Guinea and the Solomons?
    Admiral Aquilino. Three USINDOPACOM unfunded priorities--Military 
Construction ($47.3M), Fusion Centers ($3.3M), and the Asia Pacific 
Regional Initiative ($10.3M)--support improved ties with the Pacific 
Islands including Vanuatu, Tonga, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands.
    Mr. Scott. As currently configured, can the the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve support a war in the Pacific?
    Admiral Aquilino. The Petroleum War Reserve Stock (PWRS) in the 
Pacific theater is sized to meet the most demanding contingency at each 
military installation of Defense Fuel Support Points until a supply 
chain can be established. PWRS is sized, acquired, managed, and 
positioned to achieve the greatest practical flexibility and 
responsiveness to a full spectrum of regional contingencies.
    Mr. Scott. With the necessary funding, resources, personnel and 
platforms, what more can the United States Coast Guard do to deter IUU 
fishing in the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. The Coast Guard has an enduring and specialized 
role in Oceania, Southeast Asia, and the greater Indo-Pacific to 
preserve the free-flow of commerce, protect natural resources, and 
enhance regional stability. The FY23 President's Budget expands the 
Coast Guard's current operations in the region in order to advance the 
National Defense Strategy by growing capacity for operations, engaging 
in maritime governance activities, and participating in meaningful 
engagements. Additional Coast Guard presence in the USINDOPACOM AOR 
will enable increased partner nation proficiency, self-sustainment, and 
local expertise necessary to deter Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
(IUU) fishing practices in the region.
    Mr. Scott. Captain Kenneth Andrus, U.S. Navy, wrote an article for 
the October 2021 issue of Proceedings entitled,''Transform Navy Medical 
Operational Support.''
    According to Captain Andrus, ``The speed and lethality of new 
weaponry and the minimal warning of open conflict with adversaries such 
as the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will not allow the luxury 
of months of preparation for combat casualty care that the Medical 
Corps has had in the past three decades.'' Do you agree with this 
assessment?
    Admiral Aquilino. We agree that indications and warning for a near 
peer conflict in the Pacific may be of short duration, requiring a 
ready posture in theater and a ``Fight Now'' mind set. U.S. Pacific 
Fleet is using a planning factor of days to medically augment the Fleet 
and enable maneuver for a high end fight. The joint force incorporates 
OCONUS military treatment facilities as prepositioned medical forces in 
theater for contingencies. The short window for preparation highlights 
themes of prepositioning of medical capabilities, supplies, and 
equipment in theater to minimize response times.
    Mr. Scott. What shortfalls exist, if any, in the following areas of 
mass casualty care in your AOR? They include at-sea evacuation, medical 
regulation, medical unit augmentation, authorized medical allowance, 
medical resupply, blood products, shore casualty receiving/personnel 
processing, joint host-nation support, and the number of operating and 
treatment rooms required for a worst-case scenario?
    Admiral Aquilino. Near peer conflict in the Pacific and distributed 
maritime operations will result in a large number of casualties that 
will exceed a unit's ability to hold and treat. Anti-access and area 
denial combined with dynamic force employment from remote medical 
facilities will result in significant challenges to patient movement. 
As a result, we continue to analyze and refine our plans and exercises 
to incorporate patient movement, mass casualties at sea, prolonged 
maritime care, medical resupply, and the distribution of blood 
products.
    Mr. Scott. Should the United States Coast Guard bring back anti-
submarine warfare as a mission? If the U.S. Coast Guard did bring back 
ASW as a mission, what would the impact be on the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. The Coast Guard contributes unique and 
complimentary capabilities to the Joint Force across both geographic 
and functional combatant commands, and plays a critical role in the 
gray zone. While the Coast Guard performed anti-submarine operations 
during WWII, the Service currently does not possess anti-submarine 
capabilities but the demand for the Coast Guard is unprecedented and 
continues to work overtime across all of its 11 statutory missions.
    Mr. Scott. Is the United States Navy prepared for mine warfare as 
much as it should be in the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM needs a robust set of offensive and 
defensive mining capabilities. Current minelaying capabilities have not 
been significantly modernized since the 1980s and are largely 
inadequate against a peer adversary. However, research and development 
for new capabilities is underway and, if fully funded, can reconstitute 
a credible minelaying capability to deter peer adversaries. I 
identified $50M for the Powered Quickstrike Mine and $45M for the 
Hammerhead Mine in my FY23 Unfunded Priorities Report.
    Mr. Scott. What are the advantages of High-Power Microwave 
technology in the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. The directed-energy community has several 
prototypes in use and development with counter-UAS and counter-cruise 
missile applicability. These systems will strengthen future base 
defenses, complimenting other kinetic and non-kinetic systems.
    Mr. Scott. Scott Savitz wrote a December 2021 article in 
Proceedings entitled, ``Blockship Tactics to Trap Enemy Fleets.'' 
According to Saitz, ``Blockships have tremendous cost-effective 
potential for thwarting adversary forces. An old rust bucket of a ship, 
costing tens of millions of dollars, can trap an enemy fleet costing 
many times that. The installation of jammers, sensors, netting, booby 
traps, or other devices is unlikely to dramatically change this cost 
differential, and all these systems involve minimal development risk. 
Given ever-improving autonomous navigational technology, this tactic 
does not even require U.S. personnel to enter harm's way. By using 
blockships, a navy could transform an adversary's prized fleet into a 
useless set of fixed targets just when it is most critically needed.'' 
Should the United States initiate a blockship program to counter 
potential threats?
    Admiral Aquilino. No, other methods--like stand-off maritime 
mining--could accomplish similar objectives with greater flexibility 
and responsiveness.
    Mr. Scott. Could U.S. Navy and Coast Guard officers benefit from 
increased attendance at International Maritime Organization Polar Code 
courses? Should the U.S. Navy expand its coordination with partner 
nations, especially those with the most Antarctic experience?
    Admiral Aquilino. Increased opportunities to attend International 
Maritime Organization Polar Code courses could benefit U.S. Navy and 
Coast Guard officers as an avenue for additional professional 
development and understanding. We advance the Nation's interests by 
working with our network of allies and partners across domains and 
theaters, including to those with Antarctic experience.
    USINDOPACOM also supports Operation Deep Freeze, a joint service, 
on-going Defense Support to Civilian Authorities activity in support of 
the National Science Foundation (NSF). The NSF manages the United 
States Antarctic Program (USAP) and Joint Task Force-Support Forces 
Antarctica (JTF-SFA) provides Department of Defense support to the NSF 
and the USAP through ODF. This mission provides U.S. forces valuable 
Antarctic experience including strategic inter-theater airlift, 
tactical deep field support, aeromedical evacuation support, search and 
rescue response, sealift, seaport access, bulk fuel supply logistics, 
and port cargo handling. Mission support consists of active duty, Guard 
and Reserve personnel from the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Army, and Coast 
Guard as well as Department of Defense civilians and attached non-DOD 
civilians.
    Mr. Scott. Is there any lessons that can be learned from our allies 
and partners that would make our FMS program more resilient, agile, and 
redundant?
    Admiral Aquilino. FMS is a unique tool only available from the U.S. 
that can be a decisive factor for our allies and partners. However, 
slow contracting timelines, long delivery schedules, and lack of 
flexibility in terms of tailoring the equipment to customer 
requirements are frustrations that are only aggravated by the COVID 
pandemic. Our more sophisticated customers balance FMS with Direct 
Commercial Sales and often seek hybrid cases that offer more 
flexibility and resiliency. Designing technology release into our more 
complex systems is also highly desired by partners as it shortens the 
release timeline and creates more opportunity for international 
customers. Crafting additional payment options, particularly for 
customers that don't qualify for dependable undertaking, is crucial as 
we seek to supplant Russia and China alternatives that are low cost and 
offer attractive financing options.
    Mr. Scott. Will Taiwan be invited to RIMPAC 2022?
    Admiral Aquilino. No, Taiwan is not invited to RIMPAC 2022. 
USINDOPACOM is committed to helping Taiwan implement asymmetric defense 
concepts and acquire corresponding capabilities, and we presently judge 
that other engagement opportunities would better enable asymmetric 
defense capabilities.
    Mr. Scott. Have recent deployments reinforced your belief that 
fifth generation fighters, like F-35, are ``needed to win''?
    Admiral Aquilino. Fifth generation fighter deployments like the one 
that took place on the HMS Queen Elizabeth re-affirms the need for 
these types of aircraft in the Pacific. Fifth generation fighters 
provide the capability to operate within areas that 4th generation 
fighters can no longer freely utilize. Our adversaries continue to 
refine their anti-access/area denial systems, and fifth generation 
fighters are one way we can continue to compete in that area.
    Mr. Scott. China's advanced air defenses and fighter capabilities 
are rapidly increasing in capability and capacity. These capabilities 
are pushing 4th generation aircraft to greater stand-off ranges, often 
beyond the targeting ranges of their weapons and sensors. Can you 
explain the importance of stand-in capabilities, such as 5th generation 
aircraft, and what advantages they provide if a war with Communist 
China were to occur?
    Admiral Aquilino. Stand-in capabilities are essential against a 
peer adversary. Fifth generation fighters provide persistent targeting 
coverage while being survivable in a high threat environment. Fifth 
generation fighters also provide the ability to engage mobile targets 
that challenge stand-off weapons due to time-of-flight. These platforms 
also assure allies and demonstrate our commitment to their defense by 
providing the ability to fight from stand-off ranges.
    Mr. Scott. The F-35 has a unique ability to collect and fuse 
information, then share that information with numerous platforms across 
multiple domains, making it a critical node in advanced kill webs. 
Could you please explain the importance of this capability as it 
relates to Joint All Domain Operations involving joint U.S. and allied 
forces?
    Admiral Aquilino. The F-35 is a forward-edge sensor with lethal 
ability and, as such, serves as a vital node to the kill and sensing 
webs. Future success in war against a peer adversary will be determined 
through information dominance and dissemination; the F-35 is a key 
enabler for joint and combined forces to track, coordinate, and engage 
enemy targets in a time and manner the enemy cannot effectively 
counter.
    Mr. Scott. Many of our key allies in the Indo-Pacific region are 
participants in the F-35 program. In your opinion, has the F-35 program 
had a positive impact on both military and diplomatic relations with 
these key allies?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, F-35 partnerships throughout the Indo-
Pacific are paying tremendous dividends by creating common 
infrastructure across the region that enhances posture, enables more 
complex training, and enhances information sharing. Partnering with 
likeminded countries on military capabilities, like the F-35, 
reinforces our commitment to the region and lays the foundation for 
continued cooperation and a more fully integrated defense.
    Mr. Scott. What are the operational and security risks in having 
only one strategic tanker in the Air Force's inventory given the vast 
size of the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. One strategic tanker will limit the ability to 
maintain air dominance in the AOR, especially within the first and 
second island chain, given the vast size of the region. We can reduce 
risk by establishing forward refueling hubs; however, the limitation or 
reduction to one tanker platform will add significant risk to mission 
and plan execution.
    Mr. Scott. Why is it important for NATO allies like Lithuania to be 
a strong supporter of Taiwan and not back down because of threats from 
Communist China?
    Admiral Aquilino. The PRC utilizes a variety of coercive measures 
against countries over which it has leverage to intimidate and deter 
others from taking similar actions. When these countries effectively 
resist PRC coercion, often with assistance from allies and partners, 
they demonstrate to the PRC these tactics do not work. Support for 
Taiwan from allies and partners, including NATO members, is important 
because it raises the risk for Beijing that the Taiwan issue may become 
a multilateral issue--something Beijing wants to avoid at all costs. 
This was well demonstrated when NATO partners (U.S., U.K., France, 
Spain, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia) participated 
in Taiwan's Open Parliament Forum in December 2021, exemplifying how 
NATO partners can continue to support Taiwan despite ongoing PRC 
pressure.
    Mr. Scott. Communist China can easily integrate innovation like 
autonomy into their military complex through ``civilian-military 
fusion. Meanwhile, we struggle to develop and adapt technologies used 
during the era of COIN in the Middle East to the needs of peer combat. 
How has China used emerging technologies, particularly autonomy to 
strengthen its hand in the region? How does INDOPACOM plan to adapt 
Artificial Intelligence models trained on decades of ISR data specific 
to the CENTCOM domain to the INDOPACOM domain? Does INDOPACOM have 
enough data to understand your area of operations? How can virtual 
simulation and synthetic data generation help prepare and ensure U.S. 
readiness in the Asian theater to deploy critical autonomous 
capabilities?
    Admiral Aquilino. China has mature AI and 5G-enabled surveillance 
systems that they export throughout the AOR. They advertise ``safety'' 
and ``security'' as selling points of the systems. China is the top 
manufacturer and exporter of commercial drones (with autonomy 
features).
    USINDOPACOM is closely engaged with OSD, DARPA, JAIC, and other 
organizations responsible for developing new AI capabilities. For 
example, USINDOPACOM is currently working closely with the USD(I) MAVEN 
program to identify technical requirements to support USINDOPACOM's 
objectives.
    USINDOPACOM's Stormbreaker will support this effort by generating 
synthetic data in support of machine learning. Additionally, the 
Pacific Multi-Domain Training and Experimentation Capability will 
support live, virtual, and constructive training and experimentation 
with new warfighting concepts by integrating emerging technology 
throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
    Additionally, USINDOPACOM established a Chief Data Office (CDO) to 
build AI expertise within the command. As the CDO matures, we will be 
better postured to establish our processes and procedures for data 
requirements.
    Mr. Scott. Assessments show that Chinese hypersonic missiles will 
push aircraft carriers thousands of miles from Chinese territory. Naval 
aviation assets will need to operate at unsustainable ranges for humans 
and in contested, communications-denied environments. Increased 
autonomy will be needed to project U.S. power and deter potential 
Chinese aggression. Yet, I am deeply concerned U.S. military 
departments will be unable to deploy autonomous systems effectively in 
the near term. Development of next generation vehicles (OMFV, Skyborg, 
UUVs) have significant delays and cost-overruns.
    How does INDOPACOM plan to win in a potential future conflict 
before modernization programs have delivered new air, ground, and 
maritime platforms? Does INDOPACOM see a benefit in recapitalizing 
certain legacy ground, sea and air platforms and making them more 
survivable, autonomous, or lethal? Is there a need to recapitalize on 
existing ``legacy'' ISR platforms, like the MQ-9 Reaper and the Joint 
AI Center's Smart Sensor project, to ensure they can operate 
autonomously in GPS and C2 denied environments?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, this is a valid approach that should be 
carefully considered on a case by case basis. Recapitalizing legacy 
platforms with survivability enhancements can extend their useful 
lifespan and fill gaps, especially in the near term. USINDOPACOM works 
closely with the Strategic Capabilities Office to look at new and 
innovative ways to repurpose existing legacy platforms to make them 
effective in an evolving threat environment.
    Mr. Scott. The entire U.S. Coast Guard is a high-demand, low-
density platform. What additional U.S. Coast Guard resources could you 
use in theater?
    General LaCamera. The Coast guard historically provides seaport 
security and convoy escort in contested areas. Here in the Republic of 
Korea, both of these missions are supported by our capable Republic of 
Korea counterparts. If additional capacity is needed, the U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG) could provide augmentation to host nation forces executing 
these missions, especially in support of U.S. NEO. Ensuring 
unrestricted access to sea lines of communication (SLOCs), queue 
routes, harbors and seaports is vital to the delivery of forces and 
sustainment during contingency operations.
    The last time a USCG Cutter visited the ROK was in 2019, before the 
start of the COVID pandemic. Ideally, we would like to incorporate the 
USCG into the alliance planning and begin executing joint combined 
operations and exercises again soon.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
    Mr. Carbajal. The testimony highlights China's investment in its 
space and counter-space programs. In its recently released white paper 
``China's Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,'' the Chinese government 
outlines the important of space in its overall national strategy.
    China's launch rates more than doubled in the last 5 years compared 
to the previous 5 years. Space launch and American competitiveness in 
space is something I am very focused on, especially with Vandenberg 
Space Force Base in my district, which why I am concerned with how 
China intends to employ its space capabilities.
    What is the extent of your engagement with partner nations on 
issues and concerns related to space? What aspects of space policy and 
engagement do you think needs more attention in the AOR?
    Dr. Ratner. Within the Department of Defense, my office works 
closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy and 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Space and Missile Defense to engage 
allies and partners on space cooperation, including building a shared 
understanding of the threats we face in space. We have standing space 
engagements with our key allies in the Indo-Pacific region, such as 
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, as well as 
allies and partners across Europe, Africa, and in Latin America. These 
engagements focus on cooperation efforts in key space mission areas and 
aim to increase resilience in the space domain through coordinated 
efforts.
    The Department is currently working on the ongoing development of 
responsible behaviors in the space domain. It is critical that we 
continue engaging our allies and partners, specifically in the Indo-
Pacific region, on norms of behavior that contribute to the safety, 
stability, security, and long-term sustainability of space activities 
in order to increase the cost of irresponsible behavior in the space 
domain.
    Mr. Carbajal. The testimony highlights China's investment in its 
space and counter-space programs. In its recently released white paper 
``China's Space Program: A 2021 Perspective,'' the Chinese government 
outlines the important of space in its overall national strategy.
    China's launch rates more than doubled in the last 5 years compared 
to the previous 5 years. Space launch and American competitiveness in 
space is something I am very focused on, especially with Vandenberg 
Space Force Base in my district, which why I am concerned with how 
China intends to employ its space capabilities.
    What is the extent of your engagement with partner nations on 
issues and concerns related to space? What aspects of space policy and 
engagement do you think needs more attention in the AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. We coordinate with USSPACECOM to strengthen our 
alliances and enhance emerging partnerships by increasing the frequency 
of space-related combined operations, exercises, and training with 
Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. We also support 
USSPACECOM's execution of Global Sentinel, participate in Space Force's 
Schriever Wargames, and integrate space into our exercises, like 
Talisman Saber, Keen Edge, and Cobra Gold. USINDOPACOM and the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency are also building partner capacity with 
Thailand to contribute to regional multi-domain capability by 2027, 
supported by $600K in FY23 Title 10 funding and USSPACECOM expertise. 
Similar initiatives will be evaluated in FY24 for other emerging 
partners like India, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
    Mr. Kelly. The Administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy, published in 
February of this year, states that the United States needs to focus on 
targeted spending and relationship building with allies in the region. 
In 2016, India was designated as a ``Major Defense Partner,'' but 
nearly 60% of its military equipment has been purchased from Russia. 
While developing a more robust partnership with the Quad (India, Japan, 
Australia, U.S.), what are we doing to enhance interoperability with 
India since they are the newest ally in the region?
    a. Since we have been working strongly with Japan and Australia for 
some time now, what integration or interoperability challenges do we 
face when improving our partnership with India as a member of the Quad?
    b. Is there anything else we could be doing to aid in either the 
expansion of programs or funding needed to improve India's defense 
capabilities as our strategic partner in the region, and reducing their 
reliance on Russian military equipment?
    Dr. Ratner. Over the course of the last year, we have deepened and 
broadened the scope of U.S.-India defense cooperation across several 
domains--including in space and cyberspace. To continue strengthening 
our interoperability, we will prioritize a few promising areas of 
cooperation. These include deepening information-sharing and mutual 
logistics operations; growing our defense trade and technology 
relationship; and expanding high-end cooperation in the maritime 
domain, including in the Indian Ocean region and in Southeast Asia. 
Navy-to-Navy cooperation remains the most mature aspect of our defense 
ties and given shared challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, there is 
potential for even more growth. Going forward, we seek to build 
interoperability between our two militaries and identify new 
opportunities for cooperation in support of India's role as a net 
security provider in the region.
    a. India is a critical partner and member of the Quad. Over the 
past couple of years, the Quad partners have continued to deepen 
interoperability through joint exercises such as MALABAR. Through a 
wide range of shared activities, such as space cooperation, technology 
cooperation, and vaccine production, the Quad partners are working 
closely together to sustain a free and open Indo-Pacific, including in 
support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nation's (ASEAN) 
centrality in the region. The Quad partners are also continuing to 
deepen interoperability through joint exercises such as MALABAR. These 
cooperative activities, however, do not reflect a formal alliance 
structure. Rather, they reflect the partners' abiding commitment to 
ensuring the durability of shared principles such as the rule of law 
and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
    b. As noted above, we are strengthening U.S.-India defense 
cooperation across a range of domains. This includes working closely 
with India to deepen our bilateral industrial cooperation on co-
production and co-development of defense articles, through initiatives 
such as the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI). We have 
urged India--as we do with all of our allies and partners--to avoid 
transactions with Russia and to continue diversifying away from its 
procurement of Russian arms. We remain encouraged by India's 
diversification of defense equipment over the past decade, including 
the over $20 billion of U.S.-origin defense equipment it has purchased 
since 2008.
    Mr. Kelly. Do the unmanned aerial systems (UAS) of near-peer 
adversaries pose a threat to U.S. forces and installations in the 
INDOPACOM AOR in a competitive peacetime environment? In your opinion, 
is the capability and capacity of currently deployed systems sufficient 
to meet your requirement for detection, tracking, identification, and 
defeat of adversary UAS? If not, what steps is INDOPACOM taking 
together with the services and USSOCOM to address any capability gaps 
or capacity shortfalls?
    Admiral Aquilino. America's potential adversaries are investing 
heavily in a range of UAS for reconnaissance and surveillance, target 
acquisition, and with an increasing capability to conduct non-lethal 
and lethal attacks. I believe existing airspace control measures are 
struggling to keep pace with the rate of UAS technological innovation 
and proliferation which could threaten U.S. forces and installations. 
Over the past several years, USINDOPACOM has participated in counter 
UAS technology field demonstrations, experiments, and workshops to help 
technology developers build operationally suitable prototypes for land, 
sea and air defense against UAS attacks.
    Additionally, USINDOPACOM has informed the requirements and 
acquisition communities of needs to address capability and capacity 
gaps in this dynamic threat space. Continued Departmental, Combat 
Support Agency, and Service Laboratory support will enable USINDOPACOM, 
USSOCOM, and the other Combatant Commands to collaborate on closing 
these gaps. Undoubtedly, this effort will be ongoing as the 
requirements to detect, track, identify, and defeat adversary UAS 
platforms evolve with technology advancements and human ingenuity.
    Mr. Kelly. In the recent transition from the continuing war on 
Countering Violent Extremism to Strategic Competition, global 
requirements are continuously shifting in the face of today's 
geopolitical realities. With additional focus and demands being placed 
on USINDOPACOM in response to this increasingly dynamic transition are 
you positioned to meet operational requirements outlined in the NDS and 
national military strategy, and particularly in relation to 
expeditionary warfare and USMC`s 2030 vision?
    Admiral Aquilino. Though USINDOPACOM has quickly evolved its 
exercises, operations, and activities to deliver integrated deterrence 
in the Indo-Pacific in line with strategic guidance, the command is 
limited due to a consolidated footprint of bases and misallocated 
forces. Much of the Joint Force assigned to USINDOPACOM is not postured 
to respond to critical threats and strategic competition within the 
Indo-Pacific region. I have outlined a prioritized set of activities 
and resources required to implement the NDS within the Indo-Pacific 
region via my Section 1242 Independent Assessment--available in a 
classified document and unclassified executive summary. If realized, 
the capabilities and requirements described in my Independent 
Assessment will allow the U.S. to maintain or restore the comparative 
military advantage with respect to the PRC.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
    Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Aquilino, 1 year ago, your predecessor 
famously warned about potential Chinese action against Taiwan within 
the decade. Since then, and particularly in light of the Russian 
invasion of Ukraine, in your professional judgement, has the threat to 
Taiwan become even more urgent?
    Admiral Aquilino. While I think it is still premature to assess how 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine will affect the cross-Strait situation, 
the PRC's relentless pressure campaign against Taiwan and preparations 
for possible military action does not suggest the potential for action 
has subsided. President Xi Jinping articulated a shift in his military 
modernization target date from 2035 to 2027, and the PRC has been 
meeting timelines ahead of initial target dates. The mission I've been 
given is to be prepared for that; so while I can't predict the exact 
date, I know we need to be ready now.
    Mr. Gallagher. Security assistance has paid enormous dividends so 
far in helping the Ukrainians defend their homeland against the Russian 
invasion. How would similar security assistance to Taiwan, beyond 
Foreign Military Sales, contribute to both Taiwan and America's 
security?
    Admiral Aquilino. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, 
USINDOPACOM uses Title 10 Grant Aid Assistance (Section 332, Section 
333, and Section 1263 Authorities) to help Taiwan implement asymmetric 
defense concepts and capabilities. USINDOPACOM has active Significant 
Security Cooperation Initiative (SSCI) projects that complement Foreign 
Military Sales procurements for materiel capabilities critical to 
enhancing the ability of the Taiwan Armed Forces to deter, delay, or 
deny military aggression. These projects provide support equipment, 
training, and advising. Additionally, USINDOPACOM is coordinating other 
SSCI projects to address a holistic approach to self-defense through 
strengthening reserve force capacity, civil-military crisis response, 
and cybersecurity.
    Mr. Gallagher. When it comes to joint warfighting, what benefits 
would there be to preemptively integrating allies like Japan and 
Australia into structures in peacetime, such as a reconstituted Joint 
Task Force 519 or an equivalent to help coordinate contingency response 
in INDOPACOM?
    Admiral Aquilino. I have spent the vast majority of my time 
strengthening and enhancing our relationships with allies and 
partners--our #1 asymmetrical advantage. Over the past year, I have 
participated in treaty events with our five bilateral treaty allies and 
conducted multiple mini & multi-lateral engagements all focused on 
increasing interoperability. AUKUS, the QUAD, and engagements with 
ASEAN are instrumental to these efforts. Additionally, I regularly 
engage with Chiefs of Defense to discuss areas of increased 
collaboration, and we have implemented a robust joint and combined 
exercise program with the focus of increasing our interoperability, so 
that in times of crisis, we are ready to respond. I am confident in 
USINDOPACOM and our allies' and partners' ability to work together to 
confront any contingency response.
    Mr. Gallagher. How important are long-ranged, ground-based fires 
for your command? What would be the strategic impact if that capability 
were to be delayed by budget cuts or otherwise foreclosed?
    Admiral Aquilino. Long-range ground-based fires are critical to 
USINDOPACOM's ability to execute operations from established, 
expeditionary, and dispersed locations throughout the AOR. They enable 
us to hold critical capabilities at risk while allowing freedom of 
maneuver inside anti-access/area denial regions. If delayed, the 
capability gap will increase, reducing USINDOPACOM's effectiveness at 
deterring increasingly modern competitors, and ultimately placing U.S. 
and partner forces at greater risk in the future.
    Mr. Gallagher. How do you envision Marine littoral regiments, 
especially those equipped with long-range fires, contributing to the 
execution of your operational plans?
    Admiral Aquilino. The ability to maneuver among small islands and 
establish Expeditionary Advanced Bases throughout the INDOPACOM Area of 
Operations provides significant combat capability. In particular, the 
Marine Littoral Regiment's organic long-range precision fires 
capability has the potential to create a counter-Anti Access/Area 
Denial bubble, complicating the calculus of the adversary.
    Mr. Gallagher. Which U.S. territories and possessions in the 
INDOPACOM AOR are the most strategically underutilized? How can we, 
Congress, help DOD maximize these places' military utility for 
deterring PLA malign activity and in a worst case, responding to PLA 
armed aggression in the AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. The Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands 
(CNMI), in general, is the most strategically underutilized territory 
in the INDOPACOM AOR. While our infrastructure in CNMI supports some 
training and exercises, it is not sufficient to support large-scale, 
continuous operations. While Guam is critical to our contingency plans, 
CNMI could provide important additional operating locations in the 
region as alternatives to Guam. Congress' support to ongoing DOD 
posture investments in CNMI would help strengthen our military 
capability in the region to deter and respond to the PLA.
    Mr. Gallagher. Andersen AFB has in recent years invested to improve 
its ability to load munitions and aircraft and turn higher sortie 
rates. What other basing facilities across the INDOPACOM AOR would 
benefit from Congressional appropriations for expansion and hardening 
of munitions storage and loading facilities? How would you rank order 
those locations in terms of priority?
    Admiral Aquilino. My priorities are improvements to: 1) Guam 
Cluster (Yap, Palau, Tinian); 2) Philippine Cluster (Basa); and 3) 
Australia Cluster (Tindal, Darwin, Baucau).
    Mr. Gallagher. If the USAF, USN, and USMC were each appropriated an 
additional $5 billion per year for munitions procurement, what would 
you like to see them spend it on? Can potentially use the response to 
inform supply chain conversations and find ways for Congress to better 
facilitate higher-rate procurement of key systems such as SM-6 Block 
IB, LRASM, Tomahawk ASM, JASSM-XR etc.
    Admiral Aquilino. Integrated Fires is a critical capability for the 
Indo-Pacific Theater to improve Joint Force lethality, which I've 
highlighted in my Section 1242 Independent Assessment. I recommend each 
of these services procure additional LRASM, TLAM, and SM-6 1B missiles.
    Mr. Gallagher. What options does the DOD have to replace the 
reserves held in the strategically vital Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage 
Facility? How quickly can replacement fuel storage options be brought 
online at an equivalent aggregate volume level across the INDOPACOM AOR 
and how can Congress help you facilitate rapid incorporation of these 
assets and capabilities?
    Admiral Aquilino. Since the announcement of permanently closing Red 
Hill, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has been working to establish a 
contractor-owned/contractor-operated facility on Oahu. DLA has recently 
announced entering into a contract with PAR Hawaii Refining LLC for one 
year with one-year-option period which can be further expanded as 
necessary. USINDOPACOM is also working closely with DLA to acquire 
additional contract storage capability in Guam and Subic. Another 
option is storage afloat which can provide USINDOPACOM mobile logistics 
capability to bridge potential gaps in fuel distribution. This can come 
in the form of medium-range tankers, coastal tankers, and off-shore 
support vessels. At this time, DLA and United States Transportation 
Command (USTRANSCOM) are in the preliminary stages of planning and 
coordination to contract tanker vessels. I appreciate Congress's 
support in transitioning to these new assets and capabilities.
    Mr. Gallagher. What ``off the shelf'' construction capabilities 
could potentially be paired with military personnel and assets to 
maximize our Rapid Airfield Damage Repair capabilities and thus 
complicate the PRC target set and campaign planning? How can Congress 
help you facilitate this?
    Admiral Aquilino. There are a number of mature Government-Off-The-
Shelf and Commercial-Off-The Shelf solutions that enable military 
personnel to repair runway surfaces with logistically-friendly tools 
and methods. Congress can assist by funding the President's Budget 
Request that includes resourcing for ``off-the-shelf'' solutions for 
Rapid Airfield Damage Repair capabilities. A prime example of a joint 
effort addressing a portion of the problem set is the recently 
completed Expedient and Expeditionary Airfield Damage Repair (E-ADR) 
Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) co-funded by the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, 
United States Transportation Command, and Air Force Installation and 
Mission Support Center. The E-ADR/JCTD investigated, designed, and 
developed expeditionary capabilities for runway repair and demonstrated 
them in operationally-relevant environments with uniformed personnel 
across the services. Furthermore, a number of commercial solutions from 
both large and small-scale equipment manufacturers were included in the 
assessments and exhibited great promise (some examples include modular 
attachments for commonly found tracked loaders and logistically-lean 
crater backfill methods).
    Mr. Gallagher. How, if at all, is INDOPACOM working with partners 
in Taiwan to facilitate the following items? (1) backup electricity 
generation, (2) dispersion and hardening of fuel inventories sufficient 
for 45 days, (3) distributed food stockpiles sufficient for 45 days, 
(4) hardening of Taiwan municipal water supply infrastructure to 
maximize continuity during PRC blockade and or bombardment efforts, and 
(5) hardening of Taiwan telecommunications infrastructure, including 
satellite internet access to mitigate potential PRC efforts to cut the 
island off by interdicting subsea fiber optic cables
    Admiral Aquilino. Through the American Institute in Taiwan, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Joint Staff, 
USINDOPACOM actively supports Taiwan's efforts to prioritize resilient 
and distributed capabilities that are crucial for both natural 
disasters and self-defense scenarios.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
    Mr. Crow. According to a 2018 USGS study, several U.S. military 
installations in the Pacific, such as the one on Kwajalein Atoll, that 
host critical missile tracking and defense capabilities, could be 
decimated by rising sea levels by 2035.
    1. Can you please provide an update on measures DOD is taking to 
mitigate the impacts of climate change on these important installations 
in the Pacific?
    Dr. Ratner. The Department is currently incorporating climate 
considerations into policies and decision-making at all levels to 
ensure the Joint Force can operate under changing climate conditions, 
maintain important operational capabilities, and protect and enhance 
the natural and man-made systems essential to the Department's 
operations. As the National Defense Strategy makes clear, China is the 
Department's pacing challenge, so these imperatives are particularly 
important in the Indo-Pacific region. DOD has developed several tools 
to incorporate the impact of climate change into assessment of, and 
future planning for, installations, including at Pacific locations like 
the Kwajalein Atoll and Guam. For the past several years, the 
Department has been assessing climate hazards, as described in the DOD 
Installation Exposure to Climate Change at Home and Abroad report. That 
report includes information on installation exposure and on resilience 
measures the Department is taking to reduce vulnerabilities through a 
mix of management, temporary, structural, non-structural, and nature-
based measures. The DOD Climate Assessment Tool, or DCAT, is also being 
used to inform development of an ``all hazards'' assessment for 
installations, which will be incorporated subsequently into 
installation master plans and military construction projects. In 
addition to the DCAT, the DOD Regional Sea Level (DRSL) database 
provides projected regionalized sea level scenarios at three future 
time horizons (2035, 2065, and 2100) for 1,774 coastal and tidally 
influenced DOD sites worldwide. DRSL information is now incorporated 
into DOD's installation master planning and civil engineering design 
criteria for coastal locations. As these assessments progress, they 
will produce more detailed information to support further development 
of climate hazard reduction measures at important installations in the 
Pacific and elsewhere around the world.
    Mr. Crow. According to a 2018 USGS study, several U.S. military 
installations in the Pacific, such as the one on Kwajalein Atoll, that 
host critical missile tracking and defense capabilities, could be 
decimated by rising sea levels by 2035.
    2. If these installations are greatly impacted by rising sea levels 
to the point of degraded operational capacity, how will that affect our 
missile defense posture in the Pacific and ability to protect the 
homeland?
    Dr. Ratner. The Department has postured considerable missile 
defense capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region, such as missile 
defense and domain awareness assets in the Marshall Islands, Palau, and 
the U.S. territory of Guam. We also conduct developmental missile 
defense testing in the region. The loss of such assets would be 
detrimental to our national defense.
    Mr. Crow. According to a 2018 USGS study, several U.S. military 
installations in the Pacific, such as the one on Kwajalein Atoll, that 
host critical missile tracking and defense capabilities, could be 
decimated by rising sea levels by 2035.
    3. Does DOD have the funding, resources, and authorities required 
to ensure these strategic missile detection and tracking ground station 
sites are resilient to the effects of climate change?
    Dr. Ratner. The Department has the necessary authorities, but 
because of the remote location and harsh climate, construction is more 
costly than what normal expectations would suggest. Currently, the 
construction cost index for Kwajalein is 3.72. That means construction 
of similar buildings on Kwajalein will cost nearly four times what the 
same building would cost in continental United States.
    Mr. Crow. According to a 2018 USGS study, several U.S. military 
installations in the Pacific, such as the one on Kwajalein Atoll, that 
host critical missile tracking and defense capabilities, could be 
decimated by rising sea levels by 2035.
    2. If these installations are greatly impacted by rising sea levels 
to the point of degraded operational capacity, how will that affect our 
missile defense posture in the Pacific and ability to protect the 
homeland?
    Admiral Aquilino. Regional and national security aspects of rising 
sea levels in the Indo-Pacific are a real concern. While Kwajalein is 
an important research and testing site, there are currently no missile 
defense systems on Kwajalein. USINDOPACOM is reinforcing 
infrastructure, increasing resilience at our own facilities, and 
assisting partner nations to do the same. In coordination with allies 
and partners, we have established the Community for Indo-Pacific 
Climate Security (CIPCS), comprised of military and civil sector 
experts to address climate impacts on security. In the specific case of 
missile defense, none of our missile defense facilities have been 
identified as being at risk to rising sea levels by 2035.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. What is the viability of transferring some of the U.S. 
Navy's inventory of sea mines, such as the Quickstrike ER, to the 
Taiwanese? If those sea mines are not transferable or easily used by 
the Taiwanese, is there a way for the United States to facilitate the 
Foreign Military Sale of modern sea mine systems from other partner 
nations, such as the Italian MN103 MANTA?
    Dr. Ratner. Owing to inactive production lines, limited U.S. 
inventory, and Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TSFD) 
constraints, we are seeking to assist Taiwan develop its defensive 
naval mining capabilities through other means. These include technical 
assistance, subject matter expert exchanges, and operator-to-operator 
engagements.
    Regarding the Italian MN103 MANTA, DOD would defer to Taiwan 
regarding whether this capability meets Taiwan's operational needs. 
More broadly, DOD and interagency partners encourage other third 
parties who are committed to cross-Strait peace and stability to 
develop more fulsome security and defense relations with Taiwan.
    Mr. Waltz. Is it possible to include Taiwan in the development of 
the XLUUV Orca system or its associated Clandestine Delivered Mine 
(CDM)?
    Dr. Ratner. I will defer to the U.S. Navy regarding cooperation on 
this program. More broadly, DOD is examining ways to increase technical 
cooperation with Taiwan on capabilities of mutual interest. Moreover, 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. Pacific Fleet regularly engage the 
Taiwan Navy on technical and operational issues critical to Taiwan's 
security.
    Mr. Waltz. What resources does the Department of Defense need to 
accelerate the fulfillment of the Foreign Military Sale of the Harpoon 
anti-ship missile to the Taiwanese? Is it possible to expand the number 
of Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems (HCDSs) beyond 100 launchers?
    Dr. Ratner. DOD has sought consistently to accelerate production 
and delivery of the Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile (CDCM) 
system to Taiwan. The current schedule accounts for all known 
efficiencies, but we continue to look for additional ways to get this 
capability to Taiwan as fast as possible.
    Regarding additional launchers, DOD defers to Taiwan regarding any 
operational requirements over and above its current Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) case.
    Mr. Waltz. What is the viability of transferring some of the U.S. 
Navy's inventory of sea mines, such as the Quickstrike ER, to the 
Taiwanese? If those sea mines are not transferable or easily used by 
the Taiwanese, is there a way for the United States to facilitate the 
Foreign Military Sale of modern sea mine systems from other partner 
nations, such as the Italian MN103 MANTA?
    Admiral Aquilino. I will provide more detail in a classified 
response, but what I can say here is that the United States adheres to 
the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six 
Assurances as the legal framework for making defense articles and 
services available to Taiwan. Other partners may have a different 
policy.
    Mr. Waltz. What resources does the Department of Defense need to 
accelerate the fulfillment of the Foreign Military Sale of the Harpoon 
anti-ship missile to the Taiwanese? Is it possible to expand the number 
of Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems (HCDSs) beyond 100 launchers?
    Admiral Aquilino. Accelerating the production and delivery of 
Harpoon anti-ship missiles to Taiwan is absolutely crucial for 
enhancing the ability of the Taiwan Armed Forces to deter, delay, or 
deny military aggression. However, the delivery timelines are dependent 
on the suppliers. USINDOPACOM continues to explore options with 
suppliers, through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, to shorten 
the timelines. Taiwan can choose to increase the number of systems by 
amending the case.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
    Ms. Jacobs. China has been undertaking a significant, long-term 
military modernization effort. In what areas have they made the most 
progress? And in what areas have they fallen behind publicly stated 
goals?
    Dr. Ratner. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has fielded, and is 
further developing, capabilities to provide options for the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) to dissuade, deter, and/or defeat, as 
necessary, third-party intervention during a large-scale, theater 
campaign such as a Taiwan contingency. In addition to strike, air and 
missile defense, anti-surface and anti-submarine capabilities 
improvements, the PRC is focusing on information, cyber, and space and 
counterspace operations. The PLA's focus on an integrated approach to 
the cyber domain using advanced technologies likely will lead to the 
PLA improving its ability to conduct cyber operations over the next 
several years.
    In 2020, the PLA assessed that they achieved their 2020 goal of 
``generally achieving mechanization,'' its new 2027 goal stresses the 
need for the PLA to ``accelerate the integrated development of 
mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization, while boosting 
the speed of modernization in military theories, organizations, 
personnel and weapons and equipment.'' Upon the announcement of the 
goal, a PLA spokesperson added, ``China's national defense strength 
does not match its economic growth, and is not compatible with China's 
international standing and its strategic security needs.''
    Ms. Jacobs. I want to talk about some of the lessons DOD can learn 
from Ukraine, but I want to be specific. As we all have seen, in a 
short amount of time the Ukrainian military's performance has greatly 
improved since its initial clash with Russia over Crimea. I assume a 
lot of this is due to the training our Special Forces have provided 
since 2014. So my question is what specifically has the U.S. learned 
about how to properly stand up a partner force. What SOF training has 
proven the most helpful to Ukraine in its defense of their homeland and 
what lessons can we apply to other partner forces in Asia who might 
also need to one day repel an outside superior force? What do you think 
we could have done better in Ukraine and have those lessons similarly 
been applied?
    Dr. Ratner. Prior to conflict, the Department of Defense programs 
strengthened Ukraine's ability to understand Russian activities and 
develop the operational skills and organizational structure to counter 
Russian aggression. Specifically, DOD training improved the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and 
particularly the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (UKRSOF), such 
that they are better able to plan, coordinate, and implement complex 
operations at the tactical and operational level. Moreover, U.S. 
Special Operations Forces (USSOF) have helped UKRSOF restructure itself 
such that it can better integrate and plan with NATO Allies and other 
partners. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the need to 
develop operational skills and organizational structures for these 
types of activities in vulnerable areas prior to conflict.
    Additionally U.S., allied, and partner Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) were actively engaged in bilateral medical training with 
Ukrainian forces. Medical care capable of addressing combat casualties 
provides motivation and hope to a fighting force, especially a force 
resisting aggression. For example, the same Tactical Combat Casualty 
Care (TCCC) training, which has proven invaluable in the treatment of 
U.S. casualties, was provided for Ukrainian forces. There is 
opportunity for the DOD, other U.S. departments and agencies, and 
partners to build resiliency of a nation's population in future crises 
or conflicts through similar medical training initiatives.
    Ms. Jacobs. What are we doing and what more needs to be done to 
accelerate full interoperability of these partner forces with their 
U.S. counterparts? Are we conducting enough joint training exercises? 
Are all the comms with our allies both secure and compatible?
    Dr. Ratner. The United States continues to deepen our alliances and 
bilateral defense cooperation with Australia, Japan, and the Republic 
of Korea through training and exercises; cooperation on integrated air 
and missile defense; joint research, development, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) on capabilities; and other defense engagements and cooperative 
efforts. In South and Southeast Asia, DOD is also focused on enhancing 
interoperability through major training exercises like Cobra Gold with 
Thailand, Balikatan with the Philippines, and Garuda Shield with 
Indonesia, and complementing that training with security assistance to 
improve partners' communications capabilities and interoperability.
    Ms. Jacobs. The State Department has assessed that Burma's civilian 
government was deposed in a military coup. U.S. military-to-military 
relations with Burma were already extremely limited due to gross 
violations of human rights conducted by Burma's military. What does our 
military-to-military engagement with Burma look like? Is our engagement 
impacted by the coup determination? And, if so, what conditions or 
factors would be used to determine the scope and scale of engagement 
going forward?
    Dr. Ratner. The Department of Defense has prohibitions on military-
to-military engagements with Burma, including but not limited to 
prohibiting contact with members of the Burmese military, Burmese 
participation in U.S. military exercises or multilateral military-to-
military engagements, and intelligence sharing. The coup determination 
did not significantly impact U.S. military-to-military engagement with 
Burma, and future engagement will depend on factors such as the 
cessation of military violence in the country, sincere efforts to 
restore democratic governance, and the establishment of an inclusive 
and representative civilian government, and the promotion of 
accountability for atrocities committed by the junta.
    Ms. Jacobs. Are we actually selling the equipment Taiwan needs to 
defend itself? My concern is not about the amount of FMF and FMS we 
provide to Taiwan, but the type of platforms it is used for. Taiwan 
needs redundancy for radar and sensors. Others have pointed to the need 
for rapid attack boats armed with anti-ship missiles. More broadly, it 
is clear that the focus for Taiwan must be on defeating an attempt at 
an amphibious invasion. Shouldn't that be emphasized over additional F-
16 sales?
    Dr. Ratner. We continue to work with Taiwan to define its defense 
requirements in line with the cross-Strait threat. As part of this 
effort, we have emphasized the importance of capabilities that can be 
massed in larger numbers and distributed in a manner that best enables 
island defense. This includes short-range air defense, anti-ship 
missiles, defensive naval mining, and decentralized and redundant 
command and control. Nevertheless, we understand Taiwan's need to 
maintain some conventional capabilities that are best suited for 
steady-state activities, and will continue to support maintenance and 
sustainment of such previously provided capabilities.
    Ms. Jacobs. As we have seen in Ukraine, wars are often not won or 
lost by who has the shiniest toys, but in fact who has the best long 
term plan for logistics. In light of that fact, what is the U.S. doing 
to shore up gaps that might arise in our supply chain should a conflict 
break out in Asia? Do you have enough fuel tankers and vertical lift 
assets so that all of our forward deployed forces can not just be 
combat ready but survive a prolonged campaign? I want you to be 
specific, given our current posture what percentage of U.S. forces 
currently in the INDOPACOM AOR could we adequately supply for a fight 
which lasted longer than 6 months?
    Dr. Ratner. DOD's President's Budget request for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2023 makes significant investments in key industrial base sectors such 
as microelectronics, casting and forging, batteries and energy storage, 
kinetic capabilities, and strategic and critical minerals. Importantly, 
DOD increased Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III funding to $660 
million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, bolstering the supply chain for 
defense-critical components such as critical chemicals for missiles and 
munitions; hypersonics components; secure, hardened microelectronics; 
and rare earths processing. To complement DPA investments, the FY 2023 
President's Budget request includes a further $1.1 billion to secure a 
robust supply chain for DOD microelectronics; $231 million for 
hypersonics; $150 million for munitions components, including critical 
chemicals and materials; and $48 million for supply chains for casted 
and forged parts.
    In addition, on October 3, 2022, the President Signed a waiver 
authorizing the use of DPA Title III authorities to increase the 
production capacity of materials critical to supporting the national 
defense against adversarial aggression. This will enable the Program to 
execute the $600 million appropriated to it through the Ukraine 
Supplemental Appropriations Act to mitigate industrial base constraints 
for missile production and expand domestic capacity for strategic and 
critical minerals. The waiver will also allow the Program to 
expediently respond to potential future conflicts in Asia.
    The FY 2023 President's Budget request also includes $13 billion 
for the Air Force for rapid global mobility as a core function. This 
includes procurement of 15 KC-46s--the world's most capable aerial 
refueling platform--which significantly increases the range, 
flexibility, and capability of the Air Force while reducing risk to 
force in a near-peer conflict. The Air Force also continues to fine-
tune its fleet of tactical and strategic airlift capabilities provided 
by specific C-130 configurations and the C-17. The Navy's budget 
includes $2.3 billion for five KC-130J Super Tankers and ten CH-53K 
King Stallions, and $794.719 million for one John Lewis-class fleet 
oiler (T-AO). The Navy also plans to procure two used sealift vessels. 
The Army's budget includes $897 million for 53 UH-60 Black Hawk utility 
helicopters, and $199 million for six CH-47 Chinook heavy lift 
helicopters.
    These investments are part of DOD's continuing, long-term 
investments in logistics assets that DOD relies upon to sustain its 
forces over the course of an extended conflict.
    Ms. Jacobs. China has been undertaking a significant, long-term 
military modernization effort. In what areas have they made the most 
progress? And in what areas have they fallen behind publicly stated 
goals?
    Admiral Aquilino. I would highlight three areas where China has 
made significant progress. First, the PLA continues to field large 
numbers of modern weapons and systems such as fighters, warships, and 
missiles. Second, the PRC is showing progress in developing and 
fielding advanced technologies like hypersonics and smart systems. And 
third, the PRC is rapidly expanding its space and counter-space 
capabilities. I do not believe the PLA has met its goals for joint 
command and control or integration; still lacks realism in training and 
exercises; struggles to incorporate key enablers like logistics into 
operations and exercises; and remains behind plan in building 
professional education for the force, most notably for NCOs and 
soldiers.
    Ms. Jacobs. I want to talk about some of the lessons DOD can learn 
from Ukraine, but I want to be specific. As we all have seen, in a 
short amount of time the Ukrainian military's performance has greatly 
improved since its initial clash with Russia over Crimea. I assume a 
lot of this is due to the training our Special Forces have provided 
since 2014. So my question is what specifically has the U.S. learned 
about how to properly stand up a partner force. What SOF training has 
proven the most helpful to Ukraine in its defense of their homeland and 
what lessons can we apply to other partner forces in Asia who might 
also need to one day repel an outside superior force? What do you think 
we could have done better in Ukraine and have those lessons similarly 
been applied?
    Admiral Aquilino. I'll let the EUCOM Commander address U.S. 
training activities with Ukraine, but I think what we're seeing 
illustrates the value of enhancing partnerships and developing credible 
civil-military defense capabilities. In the Indo-Pacific, we have a 
very strong program aimed at building partner capacity to strengthen 
self-defense capability and to contribute to regional and international 
stability. This network of strong alliances and partnerships are a key 
U.S. asymmetric advantage that our security challengers do not possess. 
Because these relationships are based on shared values and people-to-
people ties, they provide significant advantages such as long-term 
mutual trust, understanding, respect, interoperability, and a common 
commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.
    Ms. Jacobs. What are we doing and what more needs to be done to 
accelerate full interoperability of these partner forces with their 
U.S. counterparts? Are we conducting enough joint training exercises? 
Are all the comms with our allies both secure and compatible?
    Admiral Aquilino. ``Full interoperability'' will remain elusive 
given wide ranging technologies--even within the U.S. inventory--and 
the desire by partner nations to diversify sourcing to enhance 
resilience and strategic flexibility. We are working closely with 
allies and partners to increase the complexity of exercises, not 
necessarily adding more, as we already conduct more than 120 exercises 
a year in INDOPACOM. The most important areas for developing as much 
interoperability between U.S. and partner forces are in the warfighting 
functions of secure command and control, intelligence and information 
sharing, and protection of critical ally/partner capabilities, 
infrastructure, and force protection. Interoperability in these 
functions is critical to progress in the areas of maneuver, fires and 
sustainment capabilities.
    USINDOPACOM is partnering through major exercises with Japan, 
Philippines, Australia, and Thailand by improving Combined and Joint 
interoperability via the Pacific Multi-Domain Training Experimentation 
Capability (PMTEC) and Mission Partner Environment (MPE). Establishing 
secure and compatible communications to share operational information 
and intelligence with our allies and partners, is one of my priorities, 
specifically through MPE. Through these efforts, we can better train 
together and achieve integrated deterrence by incorporating allies and 
partners into our warfighting concepts.
    Ms. Jacobs. There is significant strategic and operational 
discussion with respect to the relevance and therefore utility of land 
forces throughout the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR). 
Legitimate questions revolve around the value of land forces and their 
current, even projected, capabilities against potential adversaries and 
the inherent risk associated with how, when, and where they might be 
positioned, their relative lack of operational mobility, and their 
logistical vulnerability. What is your assessment of relevance and 
utility of land forces across the spectrum of competition and conflict 
in your AOR? In conflict, how should we consider the value and 
management of risk associated with how land forces might be 
operationally positioned, employed, and sustained over time and long 
distances?
    Admiral Aquilino. The presence of capable and lethal land forces 
with the capability to strike air and naval forces are a powerful 
deterrent and critical to my ability to protect our national interests. 
Often, presence equals deterrence and we have two critical components 
to our land forces--USMC Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) and Army 
Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTF). These complementary forces will be 
able to operate in austere locations in contested environments and 
include organic lift. The MLR and MDTF offer USINDOPACOM relevant 
capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. They will also be 
integral in building partner capacity by developing allies' 
capabilities to work across domains and operate jointly.
    MLRs and MDTFs will face challenges in logistics. Both the Army and 
USMC are working to shore up their ability to provide logistical 
support from maritime sources while operating in the littorals. We will 
also need to work with our allies and partners to ensure the required 
access in the right location for elements to support the MLR and MDTF.
    Ms. Jacobs. Are we actually selling the equipment Taiwan needs to 
defend itself? My concern is not about the amount of FMF and FMS we 
provide to Taiwan, but the type of platforms it is used for. Taiwan 
needs redundancy for radar and sensors. Others have pointed to the need 
for rapid attack boats armed with anti-ship missiles. More broadly, it 
is clear that the focus for Taiwan must be on defeating an attempt at 
an amphibious invasion. Shouldn't that be emphasized over additional F-
16 sales?
    Admiral Aquilino. The U.S. Government has been readjusting FMS to 
Taiwan to emphasize self-defense capabilities that deter, delay, or 
deny military aggression. For example, HIMARS launchers, ATACMS 
missiles, Harpoon coastal defense cruise missiles, and MQ-9B unmanned 
aerial systems are FMS cases in the past 18 months that provide a 
joint, layered self-defense capability. The Field Information 
Communications System and Patriot sustainment FMS cases in the previous 
months also enhance the survivability and resiliency of Taiwan's 
command and control in self-defense.
    Ms. Jacobs. As we have seen in Ukraine, wars are often not won or 
lost by who has the shiniest toys, but in fact who has the best long 
term plan for logistics. In light of that fact, what is the U.S. doing 
to shore up gaps that might arise in our supply chain should a conflict 
break out in Asia? Do you have enough fuel tankers and vertical lift 
assets so that all of our forward deployed forces can not just be 
combat ready but survive a prolonged campaign? I want you to be 
specific, given our current posture what percentage of U.S. forces 
currently in the INDOPACOM AOR could we adequately supply for a fight 
which lasted longer than 6 months?
    Admiral Aquilino. When it comes to scenarios of protracted conflict 
such as the one described, the logistics requirement is no longer 
simply theater-specific. As we are observing first hand with the 
current crisis, a protracted conflict requires extensive amounts of 
support from the whole of government, domestic industrial base, as well 
as our allies and partners. To answer your question on percentage of 
the force we can adequately supply, I would offer that we can supply 
all of them. However, this requires an extensive amount of globally 
allocated military and commercial assets that are not necessarily 
resident in the Pacific, which could result in delays if not mitigated. 
To overcome this challenge, we are working diligently with commercial 
industry and our allies and partners to pre-position essential 
resources throughout the theater thus shortening our supply lines.
    Fuel tankers during peacetime are designed to sustain U.S. forces 
based on daily operational requirements. The DOD needs to rapidly 
acquire and employ tankers to be able to sustain combat forces in a 
prolonged conflict. One way to fill this gap is through the Tanker 
Security Program in which commercial tankers are incentivized to 
guarantee their vessels will be made available to the DOD during crises 
or contingencies. Another program that would enhance readiness is the 
renewal of the Voluntary Tanker Agreement (VTA) program. VTA 
establishes an emergency preparedness program for accessing tankers and 
formal capability between the government and the tanker industry.
    Ms. Jacobs. China has been undertaking a significant, long-term 
military modernization effort. In what areas have they made the most 
progress? And in what areas have they fallen behind publicly stated 
goals?
    General LaCamera. [The information is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
    Ms. Jacobs. I want to talk about some of the lessons DOD can learn 
from Ukraine, but I want to be specific. As we all have seen, in a 
short amount of time the Ukrainian military's performance has greatly 
improved since its initial clash with Russia over Crimea. I assume a 
lot of this is due to the training our Special Forces have provided 
since 2014. So my question is what specifically has the U.S. learned 
about how to properly stand up a partner force. What SOF training has 
proven the most helpful to Ukraine in its defense of their homeland and 
what lessons can we apply to other partner forces in Asia who might 
also need to one day repel an outside superior force? What do you think 
we could have done better in Ukraine and have those lessons similarly 
been applied?
    General LaCamera. As the conflict in Ukraine continues, we will 
continue to draw on lessons learned and apply those lessons to further 
integrated deterrence in Northeast Asia. The Ukrainian conflict 
reinforces the advantage of close, if not, in-person partnership, as 
well as utilizing a multi-lateral Special Operation Forces (SOF) 
approach to assisting a partner force. While the strategic context is 
different in Northeast Asia, SOF adds value through a multi-domain 
approach to standing up or reinforcing an existing partner force. That 
multi-domain approach is best applied through consistent partnership 
with Irregular Warfare capabilities as a centerpiece.
    Applied to Northeast Asia, U.S. SOF support must be tailored to the 
capabilities required in the region, seeking asymmetric advantage 
against adversaries, and reinforcing broader theater and conventional 
campaigns. Specific to the Korean peninsula, we focus on realistic 
combined training across the spectrum of potential missions in crisis 
and conflict, from logistics support to SOF, unconventional warfare, 
reconnaissance, and raids on high value targets. We also seek to ensure 
that our partners understand the value of Civil Affairs and military 
information support operations integration into operations through all 
phases.
    I would defer to SOCEUR/EUCOM for their expert perspective on any 
specific lessons for improvement relative to Ukraine.
    Ms. Jacobs. What are we doing and what more needs to be done to 
accelerate full interoperability of these partner forces with their 
U.S. counterparts? Are we conducting enough joint training exercises? 
Are all the comms with our allies both secure and compatible?
    General LaCamera. We continue to work with our allies and partners 
to develop and implement solutions that enable us to communicate 
effectively and efficiently in operations ranging from armistice to 
armed conflict. While some of our communications platforms with our 
Republic of Korea (ROK) and United Nations partners are secure and 
compatible, additional work is needed to achieve true technical 
interoperability. To address this, there are four working groups at 
different levels that meet regularly focused on interoperability 
concerns.
    A large ongoing effort is that CENTRIXS-K, the primary 
communications network for coalition forces in Korea, is being 
transitioned to the Mission Partner Enterprise (MPE). MPE is the 
framework that the U.S. uses to establish networks and communicate with 
mission partners. Once in place in Korea, MPE will improve our ability 
to communicate with the ROK and our other coalition allies.
    To address other communication security concerns, the U.S. 
Department of Defense Chief Information Office and the ROK Minister of 
National Defense (MND) are working to agree to an established 
cybersecurity standard that will apply to all interconnected systems to 
ensure integrity of sensitive and classified information exchanges. 
Similar to how the United States uses Risk Management Framework to 
address cybersecurity concerns of networked systems, the U.S. and ROK 
agreement on a standard will help improve the security and 
interoperability of systems in the future.
    Joint Combined training opportunities provide us the single 
greatest method to enhance interoperability with our key alliance 
partners. At the highest level, during the bi-annual, theaterwide, 
joint Combined Command Post Training (CCPT), all commanders and staff 
work to become proficient in all aspects of planning, intelligence, and 
execution of defense plans including facets of interoperability over a 
two-week period. However, outside of CCPT and small unit level 
training, we are not doing enough joint training with our ROK Allies. 
While we do conduct as many joint training events as possible, in 
recent years' restrictions designed to reduce tensions on the 
peninsula, shrinking training areas and the continued presence of COVID 
have limited joint training events. The current level of joint training 
is not sufficient to develop true interoperability.
    Ms. Jacobs. Are we actually selling the equipment Taiwan needs to 
defend itself? My concern is not about the amount of FMF and FMS we 
provide to Taiwan, but the type of platforms it is used for. Taiwan 
needs redundancy for radar and sensors. Others have pointed to the need 
for rapid attack boats armed with anti-ship missiles. More broadly, it 
is clear that the focus for Taiwan must be on defeating an attempt at 
an amphibious invasion. Shouldn't that be emphasized over additional F-
16 sales?
    General LaCamera. Determinations on platforms being provided to 
Taiwan are not within my authorities as the Commander of UNC/CFC/USFK. 
The Commander INDOPACOM or the Office of the Secretary of Defense may 
be better able to address this issue.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
    Mr. Kahele. Do you support a DOD investment in a water treatment 
facility and water quality testing facility at Red Hill? Does it make 
sense to have a permanent water quality testing facility at Red Hill so 
that we don't have to constantly ship samples to the mainland?
    Dr. Ratner. I join the Secretary in his commitment to address the 
incident at Red Hill by remediating environmental impacts, restoring 
safe drinking water, and caring for affected military families and the 
people of Hawaii. While the question about the water treatment and 
testing facilities is outside of my area of responsibility, it is my 
understanding that the Navy has made or plans to make investments in 
both technologies, including the procurement high-precision lab 
equipment to establish an on-island, independent water testing 
capability at the University of Hawaii.
    Mr. Kahele. The Red Hill WAI Act also requires the Navy to 
reimburse the Honolulu Board of Water Supply and the Hawaii State 
Departments of Health and Education for the enormous expenses incurred 
as a result of Red Hill fuel spills. These expenses include drilling 
new drinking water wells and monitoring wells. Dr. Ratner, do you 
believe that DOD is responsible for reimbursing the State for costs 
associated with the Red Hill water crisis?
    Dr. Ratner. I am unfamiliar with the Red Hill WAI Act, and I defer 
to our legal team on what specific responsibilities DOD has to 
reimburse the state for costs. While outside of my area of 
responsibility, it is my understanding that the Navy is in discussions 
with the Hawaii Department of Health (DOH) about the scope of 
reimbursement to DOH for expenses incurred in response to the release 
of fuel from the Red Hill facility.
    Mr. Kahele. The White House's 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy document 
highlights the importance of ``building connection within and beyond 
the region'' through people-to-people exchange. Dr. Ratner, what are 
some of the soft power support systems and institutions that can help 
support this INDOPACOM national security requirement? In Hawaii, the 
East West Center (EWC) is uniquely postured to do just that. Dr. 
Ratner, do you believe that DOD can dedicate more resources to people-
to-people exchanges in the Indo-Pacific region?
    Dr. Ratner. People-to-people exchanges are a critical part of the 
Department and U.S. government's toolkit for engaging the Indo-Pacific 
region. The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 
is a particularly valuable soft power resource for the Department, 
which facilitates training, education, and the development of strong 
networks between defense professionals in the Indo-Pacific region. We 
also work closely with the Department of State in leveraging the U.S. 
Government's full suite of tools--including the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) program--to build people-to-people ties 
and professional development between the U.S. Department of Defense and 
our allies and partners.
    Mr. Kahele. I appreciate that DOD is giving Hawaii the attention it 
deserves related to the Red Hill water contamination crisis. Given what 
is happening at Red Hill, I am hearing from constituents who have 
relatives or friends in Okinawa that the U.S. military also 
contaminated the local water supply there. The U.S. military has 
allegedly been allowing PFOS and other harmful chemicals to go into 
Okinawa's main streams, springs and water supplies, thereby 
contaminating local farmlands and making the water undrinkable. What is 
DOD doing to address the water contamination issues caused by the U.S. 
military in Okinawa?
    Admiral Aquilino. All drinking water provided to the people of 
Okinawa meets Government of Japan (GOJ) drinking water standards, which 
are more stringent than the EPA health advisory level for 
Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS).
    U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) considers PFAS contamination the most 
important environmental issue currently under discussion between USFJ 
and GOJ, particularly in the groundwater wells affecting Kadena Air 
Base that may have been caused in part by DOD Aqueous Film Forming Foam 
(AFFF) systems. USFJ and the GOJ are cooperatively working to identify 
the cause of high PFAS levels at wells and surface water sites near 
U.S. military bases on Okinawa (Kadena, Camp Hansen, and Futenma) and 
taking steps to ensure continued safe drinking water for all while 
dramatically reducing the risk of future PFAS pollution as a result of 
mishaps.
    To these ends, USFJ and the GOJ have established the PFAS Technical 
Working Group, under the authority of the USG/GOJ Joint Committee, to 
bilaterally address PFAS issues in Japan. Additionally, USFJ is moving 
forward unilaterally to upgrade and replace legacy AFFF firefighting 
systems to systems with significantly lower levels of PFAS while still 
meeting military firefighting specifications.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARL
    Mr. Carl. The nature of the Indo-Pacific requires a steadfast and 
robust logistics backbone in order to get supplies and service members 
across thousands of miles of ocean and to facilitate movements within 
the theater. As you mention in your testimony, the Global Posture 
Review stresses the importance of enhancing our infrastructure in Guam, 
Australia, and the Pacific Islands. This task will also require strong 
logistics and supply chains. The closure of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel 
Storage Facility will also impact the logistics and supply chains 
throughout the AOR (Area of Responsibility). What do you see as 
critical for improving our logistic and supply chains in the Indo-
Pacific and for the enhancement of our infrastructure throughout the 
region?
    Admiral Aquilino. Aside from increased military posture in the form 
of permanent infrastructure, it is vital that the Joint Force begin to 
integrate intra-theater distribution platforms and capabilities as well 
as logistics decision tools and networks. Understanding the massive 
amount of multimodal lift--air, maritime, and last-tactical-mile land 
movement associated with deploying and sustaining combat power--it is 
paramount that we capitalize on all available distribution platforms. 
This requires an extensive joint logistics command and control network 
to ensure operational efficiency and joint force priorities. 
Furthermore, the current resource pool of distribution platforms in 
either domain are limited and aging, which necessitates investment, 
overhaul, and sustainment.
    In regards to fuel posture, the joint force must have access to 
various locations throughout the theatre to ensure a redundant and 
resilient supply chain. This notion is supported by the Institute for 
Defense Analysis study published in 2020. Increasing capacity and 
capability in Guam, Australia, and other Pacific islands will provide 
resiliency and survivability to our logistics network. Additionally, 
investing in fuel infrastructure postured west of the International 
Date Line and east of the PRC weapon engagement zone provides service 
components the ability to transition from competition to crisis in an 
effective manner. We need to invest not only in infrastructure, but 
also in capabilities that will ensure we can rapidly contract and 
acquire strategic sealift vessels to carry dry and liquid cargo to 
sustain the joint force during contingencies.
    Mr. Carl. Can you explain how fully equipped naval medical ships, 
like the EPF and EMS can contribute to maximizing deterrence and 
distributed lethality in the Indo-Pacific as well as important 
partnership building exercises throughout the region?
    Admiral Aquilino. Future wars are likely to take place in contested 
environments, where success will depend in part on how quickly the 
Joint Force can build and then reconstitute warfighting readiness once 
attacked. Fully equipped medical ships that can rapidly treat service 
members and enable them to rejoin the fight or help evacuate them for 
future treatment will be critical in ensuring high rates of personnel 
readiness.
                                 ______
                                 
                 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STRICKLAND
    Ms. Strickland. As the United States Government continues to focus 
on the Indo-Pacific, I have heard some argue that we need to better 
align U.S.-based forces with particular theaters. I think that it is a 
compelling argument for service members to have more expertise in a 
particular region, as we see with the need for Arctic Warriors in 
Alaska, while still maintaining opportunities for people to advance in 
their careers. Can you tell me more about the current debate and what 
your views are?
    If the Department moved to a regional alignment U.S.-based forces, 
how would this be implemented? What role would the services play in 
regional alignments?
    Obviously, as we are seeing in Ukraine, there will be crises that 
happen that will increase demand on U.S. servicemembers. How would the 
Department align urgent needs with the need to maintain regional 
expertise?
    Dr. Ratner. DOD has robust global force management processes that 
balance mission requirements, readiness, competing demands, and force 
availability. As a part of these processes, DOD considers what 
skillsets or capabilities are required to support certain missions. In 
some circumstances, DOD trains and equips forces for a specific 
skillset that has regional relevance, such as language skills or the 
ability to operate in certain geographic conditions. Additionally, 
other forces routinely operate in certain regions and develop region-
specific expertise, such as Marines in Okinawa training across 
Southeast Asia and Soldiers in Germany training across Eastern Europe. 
As DOD continues to support these forces and their role in military-to-
military relationships and interoperability, our top priority is 
maintaining the readiness and flexibility required to provide the 
Secretary the ability to respond to a wide range of potential global 
crises.
    Ms. Strickland. We are seeing in Ukraine the significant logistical 
questions by the Russian military which is even starker because Ukraine 
is Russia's neighbor. Given the ongoing concerns about the tyranny of 
distance, how are you going to ensure that we don't face the same 
logistics challenges in the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Dr. Ratner. In accordance with the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, DOD's FY 2023 President's Budget request 
includes Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) investments to 1) 
modernize and strengthen U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region; 2) 
improve logistics, maintenance capabilities, and prepositioning of 
equipment, munitions, fuel, and material; 3) improve infrastructure 
west of the International Date Line to enhance responsiveness and 
resilience of U.S. forces; and 4) build the defense and security 
capabilities, capacity, and cooperation of allies and partners. These 
four categories of PDI investments comprise $3.8 billion of the total 
$6.1 billion PDI request for in FY 2023, and complement the significant 
Air Force, Navy, and Army investments in logistics assets and 
capabilities that ensure the Joint Force's ability to supply and 
sustain its forces in conflict.
    Ms. Strickland. As the United States Government continues to focus 
on the Indo-Pacific, I have heard some argue that we need to better 
align U.S.-based forces with particular theaters. I think that it is a 
compelling argument for service members to have more expertise in a 
particular region, as we see with the need for Arctic Warriors in 
Alaska, while still maintaining opportunities for people to advance in 
their careers. Can you tell me more about the current debate and what 
your views are?
    If the Department moved to a regional alignment U.S.-based forces, 
how would this be implemented? What role would the services play in 
regional alignments?
    Obviously, as we are seeing in Ukraine, there will be crises that 
happen that will increase demand on U.S. servicemembers. How would the 
Department align urgent needs with the need to maintain regional 
expertise?
    Admiral Aquilino. As a Combatant Commander, I view it from the 
standpoint of needing to be prepared for full-spectrum conflict with 
forces that are adaptable to a wide range of environments. I am 
confident that I can meet my current requirements with the forces I 
have assigned to me.
    If the Department moved to a regional alignment of U.S.-based 
forces, successful implementation by the services would need to ensure 
combatant commanders retained the ability to direct planning, training, 
and integration to better prepare for the transition from steady state 
and to crisis and contingency operations.
    In practice, the Services' Talent Management and Game Plan 
Marketplaces develop, hire, and retain talent with regional experience. 
This approach capitalizes on Service Members' recent and relevant 
regional experience by selecting and placing them, sequentially, in 
positions of increasing responsibility while continuing to develop and 
utilize their regional expertise.
    Presently, there is insufficient capacity to ``fence'' regional 
expertise in the event of a major crisis. Every unit in the DOD 
participated in CENTCOM operations in some capacity. Without a 
substantive increase in end strength, maintaining regional expertise is 
untenable.
    Ms. Strickland. We are seeing in Ukraine the significant logistical 
questions by the Russian military which is even starker because Ukraine 
is Russia's neighbor. Given the ongoing concerns about the tyranny of 
distance, how are you going to ensure that we don't face the same 
logistics challenges in the INDOPACOM AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. We are working with USTRANSCOM, the Defense 
Logistics Agency, the Joint Logistics Enterprise, and greater 
department to ensure the tyranny of distance in this theater is 
overcome by resilient and redundant logistical support. The USINDOPACOM 
Theater Posture Plan ensures logistics are postured to provide support 
at the point and time of need.
    Ms. Strickland. As our focus moves to China, I don't want to forget 
our treaty allies including Korea. In December, Secretary Austin met 
with Minister of Defense Suh in the Security Consultative Meeting 
(SCM). During the SCM the Minister and the Secretary emphasized that 
continuous training opportunities are important to maintain readiness. 
Right now, our joint forces do far too much training outside of the 
peninsula which is a significant cost burden and sometimes results in 
truncated training times. I know that there have been extensive 
discussions between our respective governments on the development of a 
combined multi-purpose live-fire training complex. Given how important 
this training complex is to maintaining readiness, can you give us a 
status update on this complex? Any idea when construction may begin?
    General LaCamera. USFK and ROK MND are still committed to continued 
cooperation toward the development of a combined joint multi-purpose 
live-fire training complex (CJMPLFC), however, there has been no 
progress on the development of the CJMPLFC. This delay is due to 
ongoing noise abatement negotiations with civilian protestors and the 
ROK, due to the range's proximity to civilian populations. After the 
ROK government was unable to make progress with the protesters, they 
enlisted the services of the Anti-Corruption Civil Right Commission 
(ACRC). The ACRC immediately called for a stop of all AH-64 gunnery 
training until further notice as a negotiation tactic. Recently, the 
ROK government commissioned a study to develop a concept for U.S. 
forces range operations and this year, USFK forces participated in 
noise abatement tests at Korean live fire ranges to provide data for 
the ROK study, using MI Abrams, Bradleys, and AH-64 helicopters. While 
there has been little progress in the development of a new range, the 
ROK is making some progress to increase training on the peninsula.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOORE
    Mr. Moore. Much emphasis has been placed on the importance of our 
QUAD and AUKUS alliances in addition to those with Japan and South 
Korea. However other partners in the South and Central Pacific such as 
France, the Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of 
Micronesia are also critical to our supremacy in the region. I am very 
concerned China is actively working to flip many Pacific Island 
Nation's recognition from Taiwan to China, thus potentially enabling a 
larger Chinese Pacific military presence. How are you able to 
effectively secure these waters in peace as well as war, and what are 
you doing to oppose Chinese coercion and military encroachment in the 
South and Central Pacific?
    Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM coordinates closely with allies and 
partners in the region, especially Australia, New Zealand and France, 
to support a consolidated approach toward regional security in the 
south and central Pacific. This includes participation in multilateral 
coordination mechanisms such as the Pacific Quadrilateral and the FVEY 
plus Japan and France multilateral. USINDOPACOM also works closely with 
the U.S. Interagency to stay engaged with Pacific Island nations 
without militaries. ``Soft power'' mechanisms are the primary DOD 
counter to PRC influence in the region including infrastructure 
development, assistance to Maritime Domain Awareness, and providing 
training opportunities to government personnel (i.e. medical, 
administrative, HA/DR, etc.).
    Mr. Moore. Since your testimony last year, the F-35 has 
successfully completed multiple deployments to the Pacific region, most 
notably the combined U.S.-U.K. deployment aboard the HMS Queen 
Elizabeth and the U.S. Navy deployment aboard the USS Carl Vinson. Have 
recent deployments reinforced your belief that 5th generation fighters, 
like F-35, are ``needed to win?
    Admiral Aquilino. Fifth generation fighter deployments like the one 
that took place on the HMS Queen Elizabeth re-affirms the need for 
these types of aircraft in the Pacific. Fifth generation fighters 
provide the capability to operate within areas that 4th generation 
fighters can no longer freely utilize. Our adversaries continue to 
refine their anti-access/area denial systems, and fifth generation 
fighters are one way we can continue to compete in that area.
    Mr. Moore. As we know, China's advanced air defenses and fighter 
capabilities are rapidly increasing in capability and capacity. These 
capabilities are pushing 4th generation aircraft to greater stand-off 
ranges, often beyond the targeting ranges of their weapons and sensors. 
Can you explain the importance of stand-in capabilities and what 
advantages they provide if an engagement with China were to occur?
    Admiral Aquilino. Stand-in capabilities are essential against a 
peer adversary. Fifth generation fighters provide persistent targeting 
coverage while being survivable in a high threat environment. Fifth 
generation fighters also provide the ability to engage mobile targets 
that challenge stand-off weapons due to time-of-flight. These platforms 
also assure allies and demonstrate our commitment to their defense by 
providing the ability to fight from stand-off ranges.
    Mr. Moore. I had the privilege of spending years of my life on the 
Korean Peninsula and greatly value the stalwart partner we have in 
South Korea. As you are aware, Kim Jong Un has recently outlined a set 
of ambitious nuclear modernization plans for North Korea, discussing 
developments in reentry vehicles, ICBMs and tactical nuclear weapons. 
Recent testing confirms this. Many believe that Russia would not have 
invaded Ukraine had it not de-nuclearized and that this crisis will 
only embolden North Korea's nuclear ambitions. Does our approach to 
North Korea shift in light of recent events?
    General LaCamera. [The information is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. PANETTA
    Mr. Panetta. During his testimony, Admiral Aquilino referred to 
Taiwan as a ``Nation'' during an exchange with Rep Panetta on U.S. 
support to Taiwan's National Guard. Can you please clarify our 
relationship with Taiwan and whether or not this was a mis-speak? 
Please consider the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), three Joint 
Communiques, and the Six Assurances in your response.
    Admiral Aquilino. During my testimony, I mistakenly referred to 
Taiwan as a ``nation'' during an exchange regarding support to Taiwan's 
National Guard. I immediately recognized I misspoke and submitted a 
clarification for the record at the conclusion of the hearing. As 
indicated in my written testimony and in other exchanges with the 
Committee members, USINDOPACOM conducts military activities in 
accordance with the U.S. One-China policy, as guided by the Taiwan 
Relations Act, three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six 
Assurances.
    [The clarification referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 
119.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY
    Mrs. Murphy. China announced that its defense budget would grow by 
7.1 percent at the annual Two Sessions, which is currently underway. 
Was this budgetary increase in line with your expectations, and what 
capabilities do you expect the PLA to invest in with this increase?
    Dr. Ratner. This year's People's Republic of China (PRC) budget 
continues more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and 
sustains the PRC's position as the second-largest military spender in 
the world after the United States. Moreover, the PRC's published 
military budget omits several major categories of expenditures and its 
actual military related spending is higher than what it states in its 
official budget. This budget will support the PLA's ambitions to 
implement the 14th Five-Year Plan, which will also serve the 2027 goal 
to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, 
informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC's armed forces.
    Mrs. Murphy. Xi Jinping, as Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission, promoted a record number of PLA officers to the rank of 
general in 2019, breaking longstanding military convention in the 
process. Some analysts have ascribed these movements to Xi's efforts to 
increase the number of full-generals and place only totally loyal 
officers in key posts. How have such structural reforms within the PLA, 
including Xi's internal anti-corruption drive, affected PLA readiness?
    Dr. Ratner. Despite recent turnover, disruptions to the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) readiness remains minimal. The PLA will continue 
to pursue ambitious modernization objectives, implement major 
organizational reforms, and improve its combat readiness in line with 
the goals and timelines announced by Xi in 2017 and 2020.
    Mrs. Murphy. Our relationship with the freely associated states of 
Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia is an enduring American 
advantage in the Pacific. The Pacific Islands were mentioned 10 times 
in the President's recently released Indo-Pacific Strategy. How has our 
failure to renegotiate the compacts of free association in a timely 
manner affected operational planning and overall readiness in your AOR?
    Admiral Aquilino. These important agreements strengthen our 
security relationships throughout the Pacific and mitigate competitors' 
influence. However, as a Combatant Commander, the status of the compact 
negotiations does not impact my readiness or ability to plan. The 
historically good relationships we've enjoyed with these nations have 
allowed us to maintain a credible forward military presence that 
continues to this day and promotes regional stability.
    I support interagency efforts to speedily conclude the negotiation 
of the Compact Agreements.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. I've recently heard from Pacific Air Forces that 
their top acquisition requests include accelerated F-15EX fielding and 
the rapid procurement of the E-7 Wedgetail or a similar system. I agree 
with their assessment and strongly support both programs. I hope to see 
them prioritized in the upcoming budget request. As the combatant 
commander, I'm curious how these acquisition priorities influence your 
overall strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
    Are you confident that your current forces could gain and maintain 
air superiority in the Indo-Pacific if required; and how would 
accelerated F-15EX procurement and the acquisition of a next-generation 
AWACS capability better posture you to meet the Chinese threat?
    Admiral Aquilino. The E-7 is needed to replace the E-3, and 
directly contributes to the stand-in fight due to its superior radar 
system. When combined with the Royal Australian Air Force's E-7 force, 
the joint/combined force is able to command and control the air domain 
throughout the vast Pacific theater. To strengthen this capability even 
further, it is imperative the U.S. and Australia work together to 
increase E-7 capability as quickly as possible. To supplement the E-7, 
the F-15EX directly contributes to the stand-off capability as an 
airborne stand-off weapons delivery platform.
    I am confident our current forces could gain air superiority, but 
may struggle to maintain it based on PRC's massive military buildup and 
our own modernization efforts, which often come at the expense of 
current capacity. Accelerating F-15EX procurement, long range weapon 
development, and increasing land-based air defenses will contribute to 
re-gaining the necessary edge to maintain air superiority where and 
when it is needed.
    Mr. Horsford. In last week's hearing with Secretary Karlin, we 
discussed the strategic importance of multi-lateral training events 
like Pacific Pathways, and the vital role they play in guaranteeing 
persistent access in the Indo-Pacific. We agreed that these exercises 
are mutually beneficial and allow the U.S. and allied nations to place 
combat power forward to deter aggression. I strongly believe that these 
exercises not only improve readiness, but are one of the most cost-
effective ways to present a more complex strategic challenge to the 
Chinese.
    Do you intend to request increased funding for the Pacific Pathways 
exercise in FY23, and if so, how would this increased funding allow 
U.S. Army Pacific to guarantee and optimize persistent access in the 
1st and 2nd island chains?
    Admiral Aquilino. U.S. Army Pacific, as the lead for Operation 
Pathways (redesigned and renamed from the former Pacific Pathways), 
requested an additional $104M for FY23 to provide persistent access in 
the Indo-Pacific as part of INDOPACOM's FY23 Unfunded Priorities Report 
submission. Operation Pathways optimizes persistent access in the First 
and Second Island Chain in a phased operation enabling a sustainable, 
strategic path through Army and Joint multilateral exercises from 
October 2022 to September 2023, while our overall approach to 
campaigning improves our ability to deter conflict.
    Mr. Horsford. I'm curious about the role ``2805'' unspecified minor 
construction authorities enable the Air Force to implement its Agile 
Combat Employment strategy.
    Do you require expanded 2805 authorities to rapidly execute the 
military construction projects necessary for the implementation of the 
Agile Combat Employment doctrine?
    Admiral Aquilino. Yes, using existing authorities in support of 
Agile Combat Employment (ACE) doctrine across the Pacific is 
challenging. Average cost factors in the Indo-Pacific are often between 
2-3 times the cost of comparable U.S. contract or troop labor projects 
in other locations due to logistical challenges present in the area of 
responsibility. Operating in remote locations drives up construction 
costs in all aspects--including material, equipment, and workforce 
mobilization--and operating under current authorities in 10 U.S.C. 2805 
can impose limitations.