[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 
                        [H.A.S.C. No. 117-85]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                         FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

                                   ON

                    FISCAL YEAR 2023 DEFENSE BUDGET

                      REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT

                              OF THE NAVY

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                              MAY 11, 2022

                                     
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TITT FORMAT] 

                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-852                      WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
                                  
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                      
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Brian Garrett, Staff Director
                Jay Vallario, Professional Staff Member
                Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                          Brooke Alred, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Berger, Gen David H., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S. 
  Marine Corps...................................................     8
Del Toro, Hon. Carlos, Secretary of the Navy, Department of the 
  Navy...........................................................     5
Gilday, ADM Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy     6

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Berger, Gen David H..........................................   114
    Del Toro, Hon. Carlos........................................    69
    Gilday, ADM Michael M........................................    98

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Mr. Waltz chart:
      US Shipbuilding Plan Progression Vs PLAN Growth............   141
    Mrs. Luria charts:
      2017 Strategic Readiness Review............................   142
      FY 2023 Navy Budget Highlight Book.........................   143
      Figure 1. Key Naval Platform Metrics.......................   144
      Total VLS Cells: Surface Ships + SSGN......................   144
    Department of the Navy Letter regarding FOIA Request.........   145

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Banks....................................................   152
    Mr. Bergman..................................................   153
    Mrs. Bice....................................................   154
    Mr. Carbajal.................................................   152
    Mr. Gaetz....................................................   152
    Mr. Garamendi................................................   151
    Dr. Jackson..................................................   155
    Ms. Jacobs...................................................   154
    Mr. Kahele...................................................   155
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   151
    Mrs. Luria...................................................   153
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   155
    Mr. Scott....................................................   152
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   153
    Mr. Wilson...................................................   151

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Bacon....................................................   177
    Mr. Bergman..................................................   179
    Mr. Carbajal.................................................   176
    Mr. Garamendi................................................   162
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   184
    Ms. Houlahan.................................................   178
    Ms. Jacobs...................................................   183
    Mr. Keating..................................................   177
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   162
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   159
    Mr. Larsen...................................................   161
    Mr. Morelle..................................................   182
    Mr. Scott....................................................   168
    Ms. Speier...................................................   165
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   180


FISCAL YEAR 2023 DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                           Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 11, 2022.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. Call the meeting to order. If people will 
take their seats, we'll go ahead and get started.
    As I think most people are aware--but I'm making sure 
everybody knows--it is a hybrid hearing again. We have some 
here, some appearing virtually on the screen. I think we all 
know how that works these days.
    The full committee hearing this morning is on the fiscal 
year 2023 defense budget request from the Department of the 
Navy.
    We are pleased to have three witnesses today: the Honorable 
Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Michael Gilday, 
Chief of Naval Operations; and General David Berger, the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps. I thank you, gentlemen, all for 
being here.
    These are incredibly challenging times, as we all know, and 
the main theme of what we're trying to do in the Pentagon is 
modernization--you know, catching up with the pace of warfare.
    To a certain degree, warfare has always been about 
lethality, survivability, and information. It's just that all 
of those things are getting more complicated with the rapid 
pace of technology, and we are certainly learning lessons from 
the conflict in Ukraine and some of the other conflicts about 
what we truly need to be able to be successful and maintain the 
level of dominance that we want to on the military side.
    And I want to compliment the Navy and the Marine Corps for 
stepping out and looking at the future and trying to modernize 
the force and begin to take those steps to get us to where we 
need to be on a whole series of systems.
    It is a challenge because we have legacy systems and we 
have the future and how do we balance all of the needs and 
challenges in the world. As we have said on this committee many 
times, it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational 
terrorist threats.
    Certainly, our focus right now is on Russia. But those 
other threats in that list have not gone away while we're 
dealing with Russia and Ukraine. In some ways they've become 
even more complicated. We want to make sure that we're 
modernizing the force as we move forward.
    As many of you have heard, I am not as obsessed with 
numbers as others. I am obsessed with capability, and I'm very 
interested to hear today from the Navy about how they see the 
path towards building the capability that they need.
    We could have 5,000 ships, but if they don't do what we 
need them to do it would really be no better than having 10. 
What are the capabilities that we're trying to build? And when 
I look at the systems that we're building going forward, the 
new attack submarines, the new ``boomer'' [ballistic-missile 
submarine] that's coming online, the Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers, the frigate that we're building, the increase in 
the number of drones and, crucially, the improvement in 
missiles. I was out at Palmdale last week visiting some of our 
systems as they're being developed as we're trying to catch up, 
particularly in the hypersonic area.
    That's where the future of warfare is, our ability to 
survive not just against China--and I think that's one popular 
sort of myth. It's, like, we're building towards, you know, 
being able to deter China.
    It doesn't take much these days to be able to develop 
missile technology that can take out an aircraft carrier or a 
tank or even one of our more modern jet fighters. Some of our 
smaller adversaries can develop those capabilities as well.
    It doesn't take much to be able to disrupt an information 
system. We have to make our information systems more secure and 
to make sure that that information can get to the warfighter 
that needs it when he or she needs it.
    All of those things are important for all aspects of that 
fight. So hearing more about modernization on our Navy 
shipbuilding; it is a controversial issue.
    As you know, we'd all love to have every single ship that 
we want right now today, but it takes time. So if you could 
walk us through the reasons behind the retirements and the 
ships that we're building to replace them, and, crucially, when 
we talk about the money that we're saving in the ships that 
we're retiring, tell us about what it's going to buy us. That 
money that it's saving is going towards a capability that's 
going to be crucial, going forward, we need to hear about what 
those specifics are.
    I also want to compliment the Commandant for his leadership 
of the Marine Corps, modernizing the force there as well, 
recognizing that the best thing the Marine Corps brings to us 
is the ability to be an agile, mobile, lethal force, and you 
have to build a system to enable the Marine Corps to do that.
    You know, the future of land warfare and tanks is not 
terribly bright. So we need to move on and build the force 
that's going to be able to fight the fight of the future, and I 
applaud your leadership in doing that.
    Two last issues I want to touch on before I turn it over to 
Mr. Rogers. Number one is the sea-launched cruise missile. This 
has been a matter of some controversy. It has been proposed to 
not build the sea-launched cruise missile. It's not actually a 
decision point right now in terms of whether or not we go 
forward with it.
    But there's a general feeling, why wouldn't you want more 
missiles--isn't more better. What I am concerned about is the 
mission of the attack submarines. We're talking about putting 
nuclear missiles on attack submarines.
    Now, as we all know, we have submarines that have nuclear 
missile capability and they are crucial to our force. We are 
modernizing that as we speak.
    But it was determined back in the 1990s that the burden of 
the attack submarines also having to carry nuclear missiles, 
and it's not just a matter of swapping one missile out for the 
other.
    If you're going to carry an actual nuclear missile, it is 
an entirely different mission that requires an entirely 
different system and an entirely different set of training. It 
is a major step, and the reason some of us don't support moving 
to that step is because--not because we don't want more 
missiles. We want the attack submarines to be able to do the 
job that they do right now to the best of their ability.
    We don't want to impede that mission. But it's a balance. 
So we look forward to hearing your comments on that.
    Lastly, the USS George Washington has been in the news with 
the number of suicides. Two hundred crew members were taken off 
of it. There have been widespread complaints about the living 
conditions onboard that ship.
    And not just on that ship but, widely speaking, we are 
concerned on this committee about how our sailors and also 
service members just in general are being taken care of and how 
responsive, in this case, the Navy is to those needs and 
concerns when they are raised.
    It does not seem to have worked well in this situation. We 
have lost lives, major disruption for the sailors who are 
serving, and as you all know and I'll say, you know, for all 
the equipment and all the--it's about the people.
    The people are what make us the best military in the world. 
We have to take care of our people. It does not seem at the 
moment like we're doing that to the extent that we should. 
Definitely want to hear more about what we're doing to correct 
that situation, going forward.
    With that, I thank you for being here and I turn it over to 
Mr. Rogers for his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 
the witnesses for being here and for your service to our 
Nation.
    It should be no surprise I remain very concerned about the 
President's budget proposal. Rather than keeping pace with the 
threat from China, the President's budget would let them lap 
us, and you don't need to look much farther than the request 
for the Department of the Navy as evidence.
    The President is seeking to build a paltry eight battle 
force ships by fiscal year 2023. At the same time, he wants to 
retire 24. Sixteen of these ships have years and, in some 
cases, decades of service life remaining.
    The President's proposal would retire an LCS [litoral 
combat ship] commissioned just 3 years ago, two ESDs 
[expeditionary transfer docks] with over 30 years' service life 
remaining, and a cruiser that's about to complete a service 
life extension that cost us hundreds of millions of dollars.
    In all, the taxpayers--in all, the taxpayer has spent 
billions on these ships but there's little if any return on 
that investment. Beyond the incredible waste of money, these 
retirements represent a huge loss of capability for the Navy 
and the Marine Corps.
    That became crystal clear when the Commandant informed us 
that the Marine Corps needed at least 31 amphibious ships to 
meet its statutory requirements. Yet, the administration plans 
to slash the fleet from 32 to 24 over the next 2 years.
    All of this invites a tremendous amount of risk and the 
risk won't be mitigated for years. That's because this 
administration has no plans to grow the fleet. Instead, they 
plan to steadily cut the fleet by 18 ships over the next 5 
years.
    Forget the 500-ship Navy. We're never going to see a 350-
ship Navy. While the administration dithers, China is rapidly 
growing and modernizing its navy. It already controls the 
largest navy in the world. Our fleet of 298 ships was eclipsed 
years ago by a Chinese fleet of over 350 ships.
    By 2030 the DOD [U.S. Department of Defense] predicts China 
will control over 460 ships. I don't understand how this 
administration can conclude that making the size of our fleet 
even smaller will somehow deter China.
    I'm also concerned about the strike fighter gap. Last year 
the Navy insisted the strike fighter gap would close by 2025. 
This year, they're telling us it won't close it until 2031.
    But that assumes Congress grants the Navy the relief it 
wants from statutory requirements to field an air wing for each 
deployed aircraft carrier. I would caution the Navy to not be 
very optimistic that we will grant such relief. That means 
Congress will have to step in again to fill yet another 
critical capability gap that this administration refuses to 
deal with.
    Setting back our credible deterrent even further is the 
President's call to eliminate the nuclear sea-launched cruise 
missile [SLCM]. According to the DNI [Director of National 
Intelligence], China is fielding a full nuclear triad and is 
expected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030, and they are 
developing delivery systems that will almost certainly include 
a sea-launched cruise missile.
    Meanwhile, Russia has a 21-to-1 advantage over us in 
tactical nuclear weapons, including a bevy of nuclear-tipped 
sea-launched cruise missiles. In light of this growing threat, 
the recommendation to end SLCM is both shortsighted and 
dangerous.
    It's clear that this budget fails to invest in the 
capabilities required to deter conflict and, if necessary, to 
win the next war. I refuse to support it.
    We should be expanding and modernizing our naval 
capabilities. We absolutely should not go along with the 
administration's plan to cut these capabilities. I look forward 
to working with the majority to pass a real defense budget that 
supports modernization and ensures credible deterrence.
    Finally, I want to [assure] the Commandant we understand 
the importance of Force Design 2030 and continue to support its 
implementation. I look forward to further updates on the 
progress he's making to reorganize the Marine Corps and ensure 
its evolution into a 21st century fighting force.
    Congress will continue our oversight of Force Design 2030. 
In the meantime, I want to thank the Commandant for all of his 
interactions with Congress on this plan.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Secretary Del Toro.
    Could you get the microphone a little closer to you there 
and--I'm not sure if it's on.

   STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS DEL TORO, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 
                     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

    Secretary Del Toro. Good morning.
    Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished 
members, it's an honor to be here alongside General Berger and 
Admiral Gilday to discuss the posture of the Department of the 
Navy.
    I look forward to working with you to ensure that our 
sailors and Marines are equipped, trained, and prepared to the 
best of our abilities so that they can fulfill our vital role 
to provide combat ready forces in support of our joint force.
    The United States requires a strong Navy and a Marine 
Corps. Our global economy and the self-determination of free 
nations everywhere depends on sea power. Our national security 
depends on sea power.
    That's particularly true in the Indo-Pacific where 
Beijing's aggression threatens the rules-based international 
order that protects us all. To answer that challenge, your Navy 
and Marine Corps must have the power to maintain credible 
integrated deterrence by campaigning forward, forward; forward 
from the sea, on the shore, and in the air.
    Thanks to the leadership of President Biden and Secretary 
Austin, this budget does provide the right balance of capacity, 
lethality, modernization, and readiness that we need to execute 
the National Defense Strategy.
    We will invest these resources through the execution of a 
concise, clear, transparent strategy rooted in three guiding 
principles: first, to maintain and strengthen our maritime 
dominance so that we can deter potential adversaries and fight 
and win decisively; second, to empower our sailors and our 
Marines by fostering a culture of warfighting excellence 
founded on strong leadership, dignity, and respect; and third, 
strengthen our strategic partnerships across the joint force, 
across industry, and our international partners around the 
globe.
    We are executing this strategy through the integrated 
visions of the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and the Navy 
Navigation Plan. I strongly support these visions. I am 
committed to fielding the ready, capable, and modernized force 
required to ensure their success.
    To maintain and strengthen maritime dominance, we have to 
be serious about fielding and maintaining the right capability 
to win wars.
    That's why our budget strongly invests in a nimble network 
and survivable Navy with platforms like Columbia, DDG Flight 
III, with enhanced cyber and autonomous capabilities that 
enable our fleet to campaign forward in a distributed manner.
    This budget invests in a truly expeditionary and persistent 
Marine Corps with the mobility and the readiness as a 
responding force wherever and whenever needed.
    To ensure the combat readiness of our platforms well into 
the future we're more than doubling Shipyard Infrastructure 
Optimization Program, SIOP, investments over the previous 
budget.
    This budget invests in the climate resiliency of our force 
and facilities while continuing efforts to substantially reduce 
our impact on climate change. This budget also invests in 
facilities that promote the quality of life of our personnel 
and their families.
    We owe it to our military families to ensure their safety 
and well-being at all times, and when we fall short, we look at 
our problems square in the eye and take actions to fix those 
problems.
    We're investing in our efforts to recruit, retain, train, 
and promote the best from all of America and we are increasing 
funding for naval and cyber education and enhanced shipboard 
training, enabling sailors and Marines to build their careers 
wherever service takes them.
    We appreciate the committee's interest in ensuring our 
forces have the right facilities to train, fight, and win, 
including the potential expansion of the Fallon Training Range 
Complex. We also appreciate the committee's efforts to include 
new tools within the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 
to deter destructive behavior and prosecute sexual assault, 
domestic violence, and other offenses.
    At every level of leadership we are determined to prevent 
sexual assault and sexual harassment, hold offenders 
accountable, and create a safer, stronger, more inclusive Navy-
Marine Corps team.
    I want to close by noting the importance of strategic 
partnerships. From the joint force and our industrial base to 
our allies and partners around the world, I have seen our 
partnerships and alliance in actions from F-35B operations in 
the Indo-Pacific to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] 
exercises in Norway and the Mediterranean.
    But our most important partnership is with the American 
people. That's why I'm grateful for the oversight and the 
interest of this committee and I look forward to continuing to 
work with you.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Del Toro can be found 
in the Appendix on page 69.]
    The Chairman. Admiral Gilday.

    STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL 
                     OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

    Admiral Gilday. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers----
    The Chairman. The light doesn't work that you can see. So 
you just push it once and then it's on.
    Admiral Gilday. Is that on? Perfect. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Yes. Good.
    Admiral Gilday. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank 
you for the opportunity this morning to appear with Secretary 
Del Toro and General Berger.
    For nearly eight decades, America's maritime superiority 
has guaranteed security and prosperity across the world's 
oceans and has played a unique and predominant role in ensuring 
that our Nation's most vital national interests remain intact.
    Maintaining maritime superiority is fundamental to 
implementing the National Defense Strategy. Global competition 
is heating up, the pace of innovation is accelerating, and the 
environment of our naval forces sailing and flying every day is 
more transparent, it's more lethal, and it's more contested.
    Everyone in this room is familiar with those trends, 
particularly China's massive investment in highly capable 
forces designed to deny our access to the seas.
    Our Navy's role has never been more consequential or more 
expansive. America needs a combat-credible naval force that can 
protect our interests in peace and prevail in war, not just 
today but tomorrow in the long-term competition ahead of us.
    Our budget submission reflects that imperative. It fully 
funds a Columbia-class submarine to ensure continuity for our 
Nation's most survivable strategic deterrent. It keeps our 
fleet ready to fight tonight, funding maintenance accounts, 
filling magazines with weapons, putting spare parts in 
storerooms, and giving our sailors the steaming days and the 
flying hours that they need to train and fight.
    It modernizes our fleet by investing in weapons with 
increased range and speed, integrated systems to improve fleet 
survivability, and a resilient cyber-secure network 
infrastructure, and it invests in affordable capable capacity, 
building towards the goal of a larger distributed hybrid fleet 
on, under, and above the seas.
    The investments in our shipbuilding account reflect the 
rigorous analysis that we have conducted with the Marine Corps 
over the past year and the capability requirements of our 
combatant and our fleet commanders.
    We need to field a fleet today that is ready as we 
modernize for the future. This has forced us to make difficult 
decisions, including the decommissioning of platforms that do 
not bring the needed lethality to a high-end fight in contested 
seas.
    While building capacity at the expense of readiness and 
modernization can sound like an attractive proposition, it is 
not one that I endorse. We have been there before and we have 
seen tragic results. I refuse to repeat it again.
    We cannot field a fleet larger than one that we can 
sustain. At today's fiscal levels, quantity simply cannot 
substitute for quality, especially as our adversaries are 
building advanced warfighting systems.
    Failing to modernize to meet those threats would erode 
America's maritime superiority at a time when the command at 
seas will shape the global strategic balance of power for the 
rest of this century.
    The stakes in this competition are extremely high, and your 
sailors and Marines, Active and Reserve, uniformed and 
civilian, are committed to strengthening our naval power every 
single day.
    Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I'm 
grateful for the committee's support to our Navy and Marine 
Corps team. I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday can be found in 
the Appendix on page 98.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General Berger.

   STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE 
                MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

    General Berger. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, as we sit here this 
morning with the backdrop of a war being waged in Ukraine and 
malign activities in the Indo-Pacific, I think it's a pretty 
good reminder that we don't have the luxury of building a joint 
force designed for one threat or one region or one form of 
warfare.
    We have to be prepared, of course, for the full range of 
operations in places we might not expect and probably on 
timelines we did not anticipate, and that's why your Marine 
Corps' ability to respond to crises in any clime and place is 
essential to our national security.
    Three years ago, as the leadership mentioned in the 
beginning, we embarked on an ambitious program of modernization 
to ensure that your Marine Corps continues to meet its 
statutory role as the Nation's force in readiness, and while 
China does remain the pacing challenge, our modernization 
efforts are theater agnostic.
    In fact, earlier this year we deployed the first set of 
Force Design 2030 capabilities to the EUCOM [U.S. European 
Command] AOR [area of responsibility] and we established the 
first Marine littoral regiment in the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command] AOR, and that is your Marine Corps modernizing 
at speed.
    And with the bipartisan support of this committee, our 
modernization effort, I would assess, is on track and building 
momentum. Over the past 3 years, with your assistance we have 
literally self-funded $17 billion worth of modernization.
    Today, I'd like to offer you a brief update on three areas 
of significant progress over the past 12 months.
    First, over the past year and a half we have conducted nine 
force-on-force exercises out at our combined arms live fire 
training center in Twentynine Palms, California.
    What we have learned in those nine exercises has validated 
our initial assumptions. Smaller, more mobile, more distributed 
units employing 21st century combined arms--if they have 
organic ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] 
and if they have loitering munitions--have a decisive advantage 
and they are more lethal than larger formations using 
traditional force structures and traditional warfighting 
concepts; findings, I would offer, that are entirely consistent 
for what we're seeing in Ukraine right now.
    In less than 2 years, we formalized a concept for stand-in 
forces, built a capability that I believe has dramatically 
expanded what we can achieve in support of both land and 
maritime operations.
    One of those stand-in forces, as we sit here this morning, 
is in Europe, and as the EUCOM commander previously testified a 
few weeks ago, that force is, in his words, ``precious for 
effective deterrence.''
    Second, we achieved some important operational milestones. 
This year we'll deploy the first Amphibious Combat Vehicles 
with a MEU [Marine expeditionary unit] on an ARG [amphibious 
ready group]. And with this committee's assistance and support, 
the accelerated fielding of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle--the 
ACV--has allowed us to accelerate the decommissioning, allowed 
us to retire its predecessor, the AAV [Assault Amphibious 
Vehicle], which was aging and that was years in advance, due to 
your support.
    This year also marked the first deployment of our F-35Cs 
onboard a Navy aircraft carrier, our F-35Bs onboard a British 
aircraft carrier for the first time. That 7-month deployment 
onboard the HMS [Her Majesty's Ship] Queen Elizabeth, I think 
demonstrated both significant progress in building 
interchangeability--not interoperability but 
interchangeability--with the U.K. [United Kingdom] but also our 
commitment to standing astride our allies and partners.
    The MEU, enabled by amphibious ships, remains the crown 
jewel of our naval expeditionary forces. No naval vessel in our 
inventory is capable of supporting a more diverse set of 
missions than the amphibious warship.
    Secretary Del Toro, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], 
and I all agree that 31 L-class traditional amphibious warships 
is the minimum that the Nation needs, and your support for 
sustaining that minimum capacity is essential to national 
security.
    And, finally, this past year, we published our plan to 
create a modern personnel system better aligned to the 
realities of what we face in the future.
    That plan will better allow us to recruit, to develop, to 
retain, and align the talents of Marines with what the Marine 
Corps needs in the future, maximizing the performance of both.
    But what the Marine Corps does for this Nation, that will 
not change. We remain America's force in readiness, capable of 
diverse missions across the operational spectrum. But how we 
accomplish those missions is changing.
    My role, to ensure that the members of this committee 
understand where we are headed and why, and how your support is 
critical to our collective success, and to that end, I welcome 
the opportunity this morning to continue working closely with 
the members and leadership of this committee and I look forward 
to your questions.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Berger can be found in 
the Appendix on page 114.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, General Berger. Thank 
you for your leadership in modernizing the force.
    I know it hasn't been easy. Tough decisions have had to 
have been made and I think you're moving in the right 
direction. And for my part, I support the 31 amphibious ship 
requirement that you need. I mean, that's central to what 
you're trying to accomplish, and we will continue to work to 
make sure we achieve that.
    Admiral Gilday, I want to drill down a little bit on what 
you said about, you know, being able to maintain the force, and 
let's talk about the ships that are being retired, some of them 
that are not that old.
    But regardless of how old they are, the cost of operating 
them has been much higher than expected. They are not, 
frequently, ready for a variety of different mechanical 
problems and the capabilities, particularly when we're talking 
about the LCS and the missions that they were supposed to be 
able to do, they haven't been able to do.
    Could you drill down on some of those specifics? Because 
it's easy to say, my gosh, why would you get rid of 10 ships? 
You know, they're sitting here. Why can't we use them?
    Well, we can't use them, number one, because a lot of times 
they're not ready to do anything, number one. Number two, when 
they are they still break down. They're incredibly expensive 
and they don't have the capabilities that we expected.
    So regardless of how old they are, that's a lot of money to 
be spent to get pretty close to nothing. Can you walk through 
some of those specifics for us?
    Admiral Gilday. Our entering argument is what can we afford 
so, in other words, you won't have a Navy bigger than one that 
we can sustain.
    So in taking a look at our top line, we then stratified all 
of our platforms based on their return in the fight. So with 
respect to their lethality, with respect to sustainability, 
with respect to reliability, could we count on them to actually 
move the needle in a high-end fight with an adversary like 
China.
    So that stratification caused ships down at the bottom, as 
an example, to drop out.
    Older cruisers. So of the five cruisers that we have had in 
modernization, they are over 8 years in delay days out of 
shipyards and over a half a billion dollars above budget with 
respect to the modernization programs.
    With respect to the weapon systems on those platforms, the 
older spy radars can't see the threat. So if they can't see it 
they can't shoot it down.
    So in terms of reliability, three recent cruisers that we 
have deployed we either had to pull them in for repairs 
overseas with leaks below the waterline or we have had to pull 
them back into their homeports in the United States for leaking 
fuel tanks.
    So there have been survivability, reliability, and 
lethality challenges with the cruisers that are near the end of 
their service life at 35 years.
    We think that at this point we're putting--we're throwing 
good money after bad and the investment--the money that we save 
from those cruisers gets reinvested into readiness, into 
modernization, and into capacity, in that order.
    The LCS ships. The primary reason why the nine LCS ships 
are on the retirement list has to do with an anti-submarine 
warfare system. That was the primary battery--main battery--of 
that ship. It did not work out technically.
    So after about a year and a half study, I refuse to put an 
additional dollar against a system that would not be able to 
track a high-end submarine in today's environment.
    With respect to the older LSDs [dock landing ships], the 
Tortuga is a really good example, she's 3 years delayed coming 
out of maintenance right now.
    So these decisions we made, sir, again, centered around 
lethality, being able to actually move the needle in a fight, 
survivability, and reliability, and we have reinvested that 
money. Our proposal is to reinvest that funding into our top 
priorities: readiness, modernization, and lethality.
    And if I could just continue for a moment to talk about 
that. So with respect to readiness, we're trying to maximize 
the domestic production lines for all high-end missiles--LRASM 
[Long Range Anti-Ship Missile], JASSM-ER [Joint Air-to-Surface 
Standoff Missile-Extended Range], Maritime Strike Tomahawk, SM-
6--so that the ships that we do send to sea actually have 
systems that matter--that matter from both a deterrence and 
from a fight----
    The Chairman. If I could just put a fine point on that.
    Admiral Gilday. Sure.
    The Chairman. Rather than spending money on ships that 
aren't capable and don't perform, you would like to spend it so 
the ships we do have actually have missiles that they can use, 
which seems to make sense to me.
    And, look, Mr. Rogers is not wrong about the amount of 
money we have spent on these things. But throwing good money 
after bad, as you said, spending more money on them to not get 
what we need, that's not the solution to that problem.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, and the cost of maintaining those 
numbers over quality, we're going to pay for that in terms of 
people. We're going to pay for it with less ammunition and 
magazines, fewer spare parts in storerooms.
    We're going to pay for it with reduced maintenance, reduced 
flying hours, reduced steaming days, everything that will yield 
you a ready force today with--as some have mentioned, we 
won't--the size of the Navy, the shape of the Navy, is not 
going to change much within the next 5 years. Given the fact 
that we face a rising China, a very near threat, perhaps, in 
2027 or sooner, the fleet that we field today has to be ready 
to take it on.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Just one quick thing back on our 
sea-launched cruise missile. Lest anyone have the wrong 
impression, we have sea-launched nuclear missiles, okay. 
They're just on the boomers, on the Columbia--Ohio-class, soon 
to be Columbia-class submarine. So it's not like we don't have 
the capability.
    The question is whether or not we want to move that--sorry, 
add that capability to attack submarines who, by the way, 
actually have a mission that is unrelated to the nuclear 
mission that we want to make sure that they perform.
    Just very quickly, one more time can you walk us through 
the concern about adding it to the attack submarines, 
understanding that, yeah, great, Chinese are developing, you 
know, sea-launched--sorry, submarine-launched nuclear weapons.
    We have submarine-launched nuclear weapons. We're not 
walking away from that capability. We're talking about whether 
or not we want to add that to what our attack submarines 
already do.
    So walk us through your reasoning.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Having served--having served on a nuclear capable surface 
ship in the late 1980s, that mission does not come without a 
cost.
    There is a significant amount of attention that has to be 
paid to any platform that carries that type of weapon in terms 
of training, in terms of sustainability, in terms of 
reliability, in terms of the force's readiness to be able to 
use, to be able to conduct that mission.
    I'm not convinced yet that we need to make a $31 billion 
investment in that particular system to close that particular 
gap.
    I do think that it makes sense to me that we keep a small 
amount of money against R&D [research and development] to keep 
that warm, if you will, within the industrial base while we get 
a better understanding of the world we live in with two 
nuclear-capable peer competitors.
    At the same time, the fact that we're about to put 
hypersonics into play this year with the Army in 2025 with the 
Navy, that's also a deterrent that we should factor in the 
conversation in terms of the investments that we're going to 
make, in my opinion.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, the--in response to the chairman's question, you 
framed it out of the box, that we're going to have to make 
decisions about what we can afford, given the top line. That's 
my problem. This is an arbitrary top line that is inadequate 
and you're trying to fit the number--and I know you've got to 
pick some number.
    But what I ask for is what do you need, and let us worry 
about the number. Because the fact is Presidents propose 
budgets, Congress writes budgets, and we want to make sure we 
that we give you what you need to be successful as a Navy.
    With that, let's talk a little about inflation. We're 
hearing from industry that significant inflationary increases 
in price and materials and commodities. For example, we have 
heard there's significant cost growth in the price of the next 
oiler the Navy has been budgeted for.
    How is inflation currently impacting your service and are 
you concerned about the impacts of this record inflation for 
fiscal year 2023?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, I am concerned. So with respect 
to unfunded requirements that inflation has exacerbated this 
year, potentially an additional $2 billion for fuel alone.
    I think--you mentioned the industrial base. So we will see 
increases in our military construction projects. We will see 
increases in our ship production, submarine production, airline 
production, aircraft production lines, due to inflation. It 
makes--makes sense.
    On our sailors and on their families that's where we'll see 
an impact as well. A good example is basic allowance for 
housing, and although the 2023 budget proposes about a 2.4 
percent increase in housing allowance, that does not keep pace 
with the housing market that exists today and so that puts them 
under pressure.
    The bottom line, sir, is that yes, inflation adds another 
stressor to this--to this budget as we try to field the most 
lethal, capable, effective Navy and Marine Corps today.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
    Admiral, in your best professional military judgment, does 
the retirement of 24 ships in fiscal year 2023 and the 
accelerated reduction of 10 percent of our fleet's conventional 
strike capability in the next 5 years make our conventional 
deterrence stronger or weaker?
    Admiral Gilday. I don't think it puts us in a better place, 
sir. However, it's not just about numbers, and if I could 
briefly describe what this proposed budget yields under, on, 
and above the sea, it's fairly impressive.
    Based on the support from this Congress, we have maximized 
the submarine industrial base with two SSNs [attack submarines] 
and an SSBN [ballistic-missile submarine] a year, and that set 
of headlights goes out to 2037.
    With a high degree of confidence, that part of the 
industrial base probably better than any other sector in the 
Department of Defense is able to remain sighted on their 
investments in a workforce and infrastructure.
    So we're fielding the world's best submarines and we're 
also investing in world-class weapons for those submarines. Our 
Navy SEALs [sea, air, and land forces] are pivoted from 
primarily counterterrorism focus to their frogman roots under 
the sea, and so we have that, again, as an added enhancement 
for the undersea piece.
    On the surface, we're commissioning Flight III DDGs 
[Arleigh Burke-class of guided-missile destroyers], the new 
Constellation-class frigate. We're putting hypersonics on 
Zumwalt-class destroyers. We are investing in hypersonic 
weapons with SM-6, Maritime Strike Tomahawk. As I mentioned 
earlier, we're trying to max out those production lines.
    In the air, by mid-century in 2020--mid-decade in 2025, 
half of our air wings will be fourth-, fifth-gen integrated. We 
are trying to maximize domestic production lines for LRASM and 
JASSM-ER, weapons with range and speed.
    The unmanned capability that we have that we're fielding in 
our air wings right now to go IOC [initial operating 
capability] in 2025 is the MQ-25; extends the range of our air 
wings, allows us to free up strike fighters from that refueling 
role to do what they have been traditionally trained to do.
    And, lastly, we're making investments with the help of 
Congress for the human weapon system. So in areas of training, 
live virtual constructive training, relevant learning, mental 
health. We're also making investments in cyber that are 
significant.
    So when I take a look at what we are doing, given the top 
line that we have, it's significant in terms of not only 
deterrence but also to put us in a position to prevail and win.
    Could we always use more? Absolutely. My unfunded list gets 
at some of that. But we are fielding a highly lethal capable 
force.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Admiral.
    General Berger, the administration has proposed cutting the 
number of amphibious vessels from 32 to 24 ships. How does the 
reduction impact your ability to support operations in forcible 
entry options and do you support the reduction?
    General Berger. The study that the Secretary of the Navy 
commissioned this past fall, which was, I think, the second one 
since 2018, took a different--a little bit different tack, in 
answering your question, in that A, it was based on both the 
2018 and the 2022 NDS [National Defense Strategy], and the 
problem was how many--the question from the Secretary is how 
many amphib ships do we need.
    The second part is it took--used a more realistic 
availability goal. In other words, historically, where are we 
with amphib ship readiness and factor that in.
    Not aspirationally, idealistically, but realistically. We 
need amphibious ships and Marines embarked on them to do, I 
think, three basic things.
    One is to deter, to campaign. Deterrence underpins the 
strategy. Second, we have to be able to respond to crises and 
contingencies. And third, in a warfight, we have to be prepared 
to fight.
    Thirty-one is the bare minimum and that assumes risk even 
at 31.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 
minutes and he's virtual.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay?
    The Chairman. Yes, we can.
    Mr. Langevin. Very good.
    Good morning to our witnesses. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral 
Gilday, and General Berger, thank you for your testimony this 
morning and for your service to our country.
    Let me begin by saying I'm very proud that our Nation's 
finest nuclear submarines are built right in the great State of 
Rhode Island, which I have the privilege of representing, and 
I'm glad to see such strong support for their construction and 
procurement as well as robust support in the necessary 
workforce development efforts in this year's budget request.
    But let me just shift to another area right now and I want 
to focus on cyber. Many would agree this is the greatest 
national security threat that we face or one of them that we 
face in the 21st century.
    Mr. Secretary and Admiral Gilday, we met quite recently to 
discuss the state of Navy's cyber force and in that meeting you 
made clear that it's a priority for the Navy's leadership team.
    Yet, we have--we have heard multiple concerns about the 
state of the Navy's cyber forces and the Secretary's 28 pages 
of written testimony for today's event, meant to reflect the 
highest priorities of the Navy, doesn't mention cyber once. 
Admiral Gilday's remarks did touch upon cyber briefly but only 
to basically say that there's a team working on this.
    Well, in the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have 
looked into the, quote/unquote, ``get well plan'' that was 
directed at the Navy's cyber activities and I'm not sure that 
the plan which aims to fix this supposedly urgent problem by 
2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously.
    So taking all this together, why should this committee 
believe that the Navy is prioritizing cyberspace operations?
    Secretary Del Toro. Thank you, Congressman, for that 
question, and let me reassure you that cyber is critically 
important to our national security in our Department of the 
Navy strategy. We actually have made major investments in 
fiscal year 2021, 2022, and 2023 in both capability and also 
with regards to policy and how we address cyber.
    Right now in the Department of the Navy, for example, 
within the scope of our CIO [Chief Information Officer] he is 
embarking an entire new enterprise called Cyber Ready in order 
to be able to effectively make all our weapon systems cyber 
ready all the time as opposed to in a cyclic fashion, which has 
occurred in the past with regards to a complicated and really 
difficult ATO [authority to operate] process to be able to 
designate our systems cyber ready.
    On the personnel side, we have also made major investments 
in cyber readiness of our force, training our officers. We have 
the first cyber curriculum at the United States Naval Academy. 
We're graduating cyber warriors, implementing them into our 
fleet and our force.
    The Marine Corps has actually made tremendous advancements 
in terms of cyber readiness, and I'd like to, with your 
permission, allow the CNO and the Commandant to talk 
specifically to their own operational cyber readiness.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, thanks for the question.
    I think we're--our most recent conversation had to do with 
cyber readiness of our teams. Since that conversation, we have 
taken a deep dive in taking a look at the cyber readiness kill 
chain, if you will, all the way from recruiting talent to 
sustaining that talent on our cyber teams.
    We found deficiencies with respect to the recruiting side. 
Doing a pretty good job in terms of getting talent, then 
matching up that talent against the right mission areas.
    What we have instituted through working very closely with 
the University of Maryland behavioral scientists is we have 
developed a cyber aptitude test that allows us to take our 
entry level cyber sailors and to, essentially, pair them 
against the best, most appropriate skill sets that they can 
excel at.
    We have--within the past month, we have increased our pass 
rate in an initial course down in Pensacola, Florida, from 40 
to 50 percent to 80 percent by doing remedial training. So we 
put people, extra trainers, against that problem.
    We're doing the same thing at Fort Mead. We have gone out 
to the fleet. We found 80 additional cyber operators that we 
felt could have better been used in the teams. We have moved 
those 80 operators to teams.
    We have taken our cyber warrant officers that we created 
over the last 2 years--we have moved them back to their cyber 
teams in order to increase readiness. We have increased our--
I'm increasing our retention bonuses, doubling them from 14----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 151.]
    The Chairman. I do apologize. The gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. Wilson, who is also virtual, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Joe, you're still muted there. We don't--Joe, we don't have 
you. We're going to go to Mr. Lamborn and then we'll come back 
to you. We can't--we can't hear you.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Del Toro, it's great to see you again. During 
this hearing last year, your predecessor promised certain 
documents and emails related to the rumored--then rumored 
cancellation of the SLCM/N [nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise 
missile] program.
    Last year's NDAA fenced a large amount of money until these 
documents and the analysis of alternatives for SLCM-N were 
provided to Congress. We have yet to receive any of this 
information despite the proposal in the Nuclear Posture Review 
to cancel SLCM-N and it being zeroed out of this year's 
proposed budget request.
    When can we expect the Navy to comply with our directives 
and produce these documents?
    Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, I was not aware that those 
documents had not been provided to the Congress. However, I 
will promise you that I'll go back and ensure that we do 
provide the necessary documents that you have requested with--
--
    Mr. Lamborn. Please do. That's essential.
    Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. SLCM-N. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday, it's great to see you again and Admiral 
Joyner. I saw you both last month at Fallon TOPGUN [Navy 
Fighter Weapons School]. It's good to see you again.
    This year, we have heard testimony from Chairman Milley, 
Admiral Grady, Admiral Richard, and General Wolters that their 
best military advice was to continue with the SLCM-N program, 
which we have been discussing here today. Do you believe that 
we should continue the program or at least the research and 
development that keeps it as a viable option for the future, 
should it be needed?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I'm a proponent, as I stated, about 
keeping a modest amount of money against the R&D effort so that 
we don't lose that capability in the workforce and in our labs. 
It's actually proceeding at pace right now.
    And then from that make informed decisions about whether or 
not we want to invest a significant amount of money in that 
capability, understanding what both of those nuclear-powered 
peers potentially bring to the table.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    Now, also, Admiral, I share the concern Ranking Member 
Rogers expressed about this administration not supporting SLCM-
N. Some [who] have argued against continuing it imply that the 
Navy simply doesn't have the bandwidth to support it and it 
would be difficult to accomplish.
    So let me ask you several yes or no questions to sort of 
set the stage for this issue. Currently--the Navy currently 
does handle nuclear weapons atop ballistic missiles, right?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. And the Navy has a decades-long history of 
handling a nuclear Tomahawk, which was retired less than a 
decade ago, correct?
    Admiral Gilday. So the nuclear Tomahawks were retired back 
in the late 1980s during the first President Bush 
administration. So it's been decades since we have actually had 
nuclear-tipped Tomahawks on those--on surface ships or our 
submarines.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you for that clarification. So if 
given the mission of certifying and carrying a SLCM-N, are you 
confident that the Navy would be up to the task if given that 
assignment?
    Admiral Gilday. Given the assignment, we would, sir. I 
think it would come, again, at a cost. I think it deserves some 
study in terms of how we're going to balance that, given other 
things that we're doing.
    Remember, today, particularly when we talk about our 
submarine force, we're dealing with a higher end threat than we 
were--than we were back then. And so the missions that we're 
conducting are very intense and don't come without risk.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And as the chairman has 
mentioned, it's one of my and I think our committee's top 
priorities to accelerate our development and fielding of 
hypersonic capabilities.
    My understanding is that the Navy is currently tracking 
deployment of Conventional Prompt Strike in 2025 on the DDG 
1000 and on the Virginia-class submarine in 2028. Are these 
plans still on track and is there anything we can do to help 
maintain this progress?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, they're still on track. The continued 
support for those programs would be most appreciated. Also, in 
my unfunded list I have--requesting additional money for a 
program called HALO [Hypersonic Air Launched Offensive Anti-
Surface], which would be an air-launched hypersonic missile 
that we would hopefully field in this decade.
    Mr. Lamborn. And I know the Air Force is working on ARRW 
[Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon], which is a similar 
capability.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Very similar.
    Mr. Lamborn. With adequate--and, lastly, with adequate 
funding, would it be possible to accelerate the deployment of 
Conventional Prompt Strike on subsurface vessels even by one 
hull sooner if you had that adequate funding?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, at this time, I would say no. So 
within the industrial base, we are really struggling to deliver 
Virginia-class Block IVs and Block Vs on time.
    And so I would not pressurize that, if I could avoid it, by 
yet increasing--you know, accelerating the schedule for 
Conventional Prompt Strike, which right now is on track, as I 
said, for 2028 on the third Block V Virginia-class.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. A lot of questions about 
doing things and paying for things you aren't doing. I'd like 
to ask you a question about things that you are doing that you 
don't want to pay for and that is the decommissioning of the 
five Growler--expeditionary Growler squadrons. We had this 
discussion a few days ago.
    You're planning to save $807 million over some period of 
time by decommissioning Active expeditionary squadrons, two of 
which are actually deployed--one in Germany, one in Japan.
    And so can you cover for me again why you're planning to 
decommission the expeditionary squadrons and keep one of the 
carrier squadrons, and that's for the Secretary or for the 
admiral.
    Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, we have taken a hard look 
at the Growlers and I still have much to learn--much more to 
learn, actually, about these deployments that have been 
recently made.
    But there's five squadrons. We have racked and stacked the 
investments that the CNO and I have had to make in the Navy, 
and this is a mission that played lower, essentially, than some 
of the other missions that we have to face right now in terms 
of major investments, specifically with regards to the high-end 
fight against China right now. And, therefore, the 
determination was made that in fiscal year 2024--in POM 
[Program Objective Memorandum] 2024, these squadrons would 
begin to decommission.
    However, I think that there's still enough time between now 
and then for further analysis to determine if they all need to 
be decommissioned or if a portion of them needed to be 
decommissioned.
    Mr. Larsen. It seems worth looking at since you have 
actually deployed expeditionary squadrons since the--well, 
recently, and the other part is in your rationale you've said 
that if you need to fill the gap then you'll use a CVN 
[aircraft carrier] squadron--carrier-based squadrons.
    That would assume that the carrier-based squadrons have the 
bandwidth to become expeditionary squadrons instead of being 
deployed to carrier-based squadrons. Have you considered the 
impact that would have on the carrier-based squadrons?
    Secretary Del Toro. I'll ask the CNO to expand. But my 
understanding is that those Growler squadrons on carriers are 
fully deployed and don't have excess----
    Mr. Larsen. They're pretty busy----
    Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. Capacity, basically, to 
support expeditionary----
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Admiral.
    Admiral Gilday. That's correct, sir. We don't have excess 
capacity on our nine air wings right now to support that 
expeditionary mission.
    Of our carrier air wings that go to sea, the Growler is the 
only type/model/series aircraft that we deployed in an 
expeditionary manner, as you mentioned, right now both to 
Europe and to Japan.
    Right now they are making a difference in Europe. They 
absolutely are. As the Secretary mentioned, this is a POM 2024 
decision that will end up getting revisited. So as we spoke the 
other day, part of the entering argument for the Navy is 
whether or not this mission--this expeditionary mission--is 
core to what we do as a naval service and what we bring to the 
joint force.
    And so that's the heart of the debate within OSD [Office of 
the Secretary of Defense] as we take a look at this truly joint 
capability and whether or not that investment should continue.
    Mr. Larsen. Yeah. And as we discussed a few days ago, you 
know, I've been on the committee for 22 years and it's been a 
conversation for 22 years as well.
    And the other aviation force in the Pentagon has yet to 
actually come up with a plan or make any sort of commitment to 
returning to this particular EW [electronic warfare] effort. So 
it just, you know, keeps going on and on and on.
    So we have covered that. You know my attention is on that 
one. On the Triton program timeline, we discussed that as well 
and you stood up a second squadron also at Naval Air Station 
Whidbey Island.
    But, as noted, we have built the building to support the 
operations but we don't have the actual platforms to support. 
Can you give us an idea of the timeline on the unmanned 
platforms?
    Admiral Gilday. Okay. Sir, the----
    Mr. Larsen. Sorry. You just turned yourself off. Yeah.
    Admiral Gilday. The timeline we're on right now is fiscal 
year 2027 to move the operators up to Whidbey, and so, 
essentially, we'd have two squadrons, one in Jacksonville, 
Florida, VUP-19 [Unmanned Patrol Squadron 19], and then 
establish VUP-11 in Whidbey.
    We are still assessing based on our program of record with 
the number of aircraft that we have on whether or not we will 
split those aircraft on each coast. We're still evaluating 
that.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. Well, the building is built, largely, and 
so just--we'll hopefully have a plan for the building other 
than having it sit empty for 3 years.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We're taking a look at the most 
efficient, effective way to use the resources we have. Your 
point is very well taken. The program of record has changed a 
bit since those initial plans were laid and those buildings 
were built. At a minimum----
    The Chairman. And I'm sorry. The gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Admiral Gilday [continuing]. The operators are going to 
go--the operators will move up there.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    The Chairman. We are going to try Mr. Wilson again.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. We're good.
    Mr. Wilson. And I'm grateful to be with you, and I really 
appreciate the service of all of our witnesses today. What a 
difference they make on behalf of our country.
    And, indeed, Admiral, you're correct. Your service has 
never been more consequential as we have the situation of 
Putin's war against the people--a mass murder in Ukraine.
    With that in mind, too, I'm also very happy that I grew up 
in Charleston, South Carolina. I was a sea cadet. I saw 
firsthand the benefit of the Charleston Naval Base. I remember 
very much the Nautilus submarines going by the city of 
Charleston.
    It was so important. And then I'm also grateful I'm a Navy 
dad. I have a Navy doctor son. A benefit of his foreign service 
in Italy at Naples, I now have three grandchildren that speak 
perfect Italian. So military service has great meaning.
    Additionally, Commandant, I'm grateful that my late father-
in-law and brother-in-law served as Marines. And then my 
predecessor, Chairman Floyd Spence of the Armed Services 
Committee, was the Navy Reserve commander in Columbia here in 
South Carolina.
    And, finally, a point I want to make, over the years I have 
represented Parris Island Marine Corps Air Station in the 
district. With redistricting it's no longer in the district.
    But I want each of you to know that our office--as I'm the 
only member of the Armed Services Committee from South 
Carolina. We want to work with Parris Island. We want to work 
with Marine Corps Air Station.
    So I would hope that their commanders could get back in 
touch anytime with my legislative director, Drew Kennedy--202-
225-2452--and we really want to work and back up the 
extraordinary facilities there at Parris Island Marine Corps 
Air Station.
    With that in mind, General Gilday, I was fortunate to serve 
as--in the Army National Guard for 31 years and serving with 
the exceptional noncommissioned officers who we refer to as the 
Army's backbone.
    The Navy's Get Real, Get Better call to action places heavy 
emphasis on type commanders, flag officers, and senior 
executive leaders.
    In addition, the Chief of the Naval Operations change--
``Charge of Command'' letter gives targeted guidance to 
incoming commanders. This is really good. But it seems like 
there needs to be initiatives that only are targeted toward 
officers.
    And so, Admiral, what leadership development programs are 
you tailoring towards junior and senior petty officers who are 
generally the individuals empowered to execute the commander's 
orders?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, Get Real, Get Better is not just 
intended for senior leaders in the Navy. It absolutely is aimed 
right down at the deck plates, and most importantly, we count 
on our chief petty officers to really lead on a day-to-day 
basis and make a fundamental difference in the quality of our 
warfighters from a training standpoint, from a morale 
standpoint, and so they're absolutely essential.
    My Charge of Command, actually, although the word command 
then is taken by most to be aimed at commanders, it's aimed at 
everybody, officers and civilians, enlisted as well. And so 
I've received feedback from enlisted sailors, from chiefs, from 
officers, and civilians on that charge of command.
    I actually sought their input when I developed it and I 
continue to receive their feedback as we implement it. And so 
that document has been folded into all of our leadership 
training programs at every level in the Navy, both officer and 
enlisted.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, we just so appreciate the NCOs 
[noncommissioned officers] and what they mean. Gosh, and hey, 
particularly, I've seen the drill instructors how inspiring 
they are at Parris Island.
    Another issue, Admiral, is the budget request for--there's 
no funding for the F-18 Super Hornets, and with the 
circumstance of the F-35C plans, what's the latest on trying to 
address the next generation of air dominance?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. In terms of closing our strike 
fighter gap, there's really two pieces of that. The first is 
the F-35; and so, hands down, it's the best aircraft in the 
world and we continue to believe in it, continue to invest in 
it. It has its challenges but we're also committed to working 
through those challenges.
    With respect to the Super Hornets, what we're doing--
because the Super Hornet line will actually be terminated here 
this year or within the next year, we are investing in our 
existing Super Hornets to increase their flight hours to 10,000 
hours as well as upgrading all their combat systems. So, it----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 151.]
    The Chairman. And, again, I apologize. The gentleman's time 
has expired. I should have explained this. As the questions go, 
even if you're answering we try and move on to the next person. 
So when you see the clock go down, if you could wrap up, I'll 
not have to interrupt you.
    Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all 
the witnesses this morning.
    I'd like to just note at the outset of my questions, number 
one, you know, the budget that came over for shipbuilding at, 
roughly, between $28 and $29 billion is the first time in 6 
years that it's been higher than the prior year's enacted level 
and that is significant. We're not beginning our deliberations 
in this committee in a hole, and I certainly consider that 
significant.
    Secondly, we also got a 30-year shipbuilding plan, which is 
the first time since 2019. It's the headlights, as Admiral 
Gilday said, you know, in terms of at least allowing us to sort 
of have a longer horizon to make judgments about, again, this 
year's fiscal year 2023.
    Again, neither one of them are the Ten Commandments. You 
know, we're going to take an independent look at and we look 
forward to working with all three of you as we get closer to 
markup.
    There's been a lot of talk this morning about 
decommissioning and divesting. One item which you have to kind 
of dig a little bit in terms of the documents that we have 
gotten that, actually, I think is an interesting sort of 
counter narrative, which is that for the attack submarine 
fleet, which we have been looking at a downward trough as the 
Los Angeles-class submarines are retired, we're actually now 
seeing some progress in terms of shallowing or reducing that 
trough with the service life extensions--again, the seven 
reactor cores that the Navy is going to install on the hulls 
that are still safe, and I know that takes a lot of work to 
evaluate that.
    Portsmouth, I believe, is the site of the first of those. 
Admiral Gilday, can we maybe just sort of talk about how, 
again, there's not a knee-jerk opposition to older platforms. 
You are still trying to extract value where it makes sense.
    Admiral Gilday. Yeah. Absolutely, sir. Thanks. So as you 
mentioned, we're trying to take 7 of our 688 submarines that 
have a vertical launch capability and to actually invest in 
them to increase their service life. Probably get four or five 
additional deployments out of there.
    So almost 40 additional deployments, potentially, out of 
those submarines, and because they're our most stealthy, most 
survivable strike platform, that is not insignificant against a 
rising China.
    And so we want to double down on the submarine force and I 
think that's a very good astute observation in terms of where 
we are making smart investments in a legacy platform, if you 
will, that's still highly lethal.
    Mr. Courtney. And to put that in perspective, the last 
shipbuilding plan that we had showed that the fleet was 
dropping to 42. The new documents that you've submitted shows 
that we actually hold the line at 46, and as you point out, 
that's significant because they, clearly, are the most 
survivable with all the missile threat that's out there.
    You know, just sort of segueing from that, in terms of 
maintaining the new construction for attack submarines of two 
per year, as you point out, you know, we're running into some 
real challenges.
    But I would just note that the budget that you sent over 
includes real money for workforce development and also supply 
chain development, which I've been doing these for a few years.
    I never have seen, again, that sort of moving upstream into 
the industrial base to, you know, invest in real capacity, 
which is the people who build them and the facilities that--and 
the supply chain and the facilities where it's going to take 
place.
    President Biden, last December, issued a defense production 
order, which sort of doubled down on that, which designated the 
submarine workforce as essential, which I--again, I can't think 
of another place in the defense budget where a President has 
ever designated that.
    Secretary Del Toro, maybe you can talk about, again, that, 
you know, surgical emphasis in terms of making sure that, you 
know, the actual people that build them are going to have the 
support and the bodies to make that happen.
    Secretary Del Toro. Absolutely, Congressman. And you are 
correct that, you know, this administration, this President's 
commitment to the nuclear triad, actually, and to the 
investments in the submarine force are truly substantial in 
every possible way. And when you look at a $28 billion 
investment across the entire shipbuilding budget it is 
significant and it is the first time that we have actually 
increased that since the last time it was enacted.
    The 30-year shipbuilding plan is also a very serious 
attempt to take a look at what the Nation needs to meet the 
National Defense Strategy and to also take a look at it from 
the lens of what the future threats are as well, too, and what 
the future capacity for the shipbuilding industry is to support 
the type of shipbuilding that we want in this Nation.
    As you suggest, part of that solution is working very 
closely with the industrial base to make sure that we have the 
right capacity, the right investments to reach those 
shipbuilding rates that we hope to reach.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Del Toro, I want to go to you. You said on April 
5th that the U.S. Navy's budget should be driven by strategy 
and not the strategy driving the budget. Do you agree that 
China remains a pacing threat as identified in our National 
Defense Strategy and by our INDOPACOM leaders and that the 
Navy's budget should, indeed, be driven by strategy?
    Secretary Del Toro. I do, Congressman, very much so. I 
think this President has made the commitments to ensuring that 
the budget meets the strategy, and as you read the National 
Defense Strategy it focuses in on China as the pacing threat 
and the ability to deter China while at the same time deterring 
aggression elsewhere around the world.
    And the investments that have been made specifically in the 
Indo-Pacific have been very, very substantial over this last 
budget.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Thank you.
    Admiral Gilday, I certainly agree with the Secretary about 
strategy needing to drive the budget. Unfortunately, the budget 
that got sent over this year, I think, doesn't do that.
    I have severe misgivings about the Navy shrinking by 16 
ships. I think future platforms and capabilities that you 
project to arrive don't arrive in the next 5 years to the 
fleet.
    I think that creates incredible vulnerabilities for the 
United States and opportunities for China. Worse still a 30-
year shipbuilding plan that provides three different profiles. 
Only one of those profiles gets us to 355 ships. And by the 
way, China is at 355 today. They'll be at 420 by 2025.
    So I wanted to get your perspective. I think this is a 
dangerous place for us to be. In your professional military 
judgment, do any of these shipbuilding profiles presented in 
the 30-year shipbuilding plan allow us to pace China as is 
required in the National Defense Strategy?
    Admiral Gilday. I think so, sir. My recommendation would be 
the third alternative if we're going to pursue one and if we 
had additional top line to do so. So this would have to--this 
would result in real growth, so above inflation, and our 
estimate with that alternative is about $75 billion--
conservatively, $75 billion over the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
    But that's what would be required. That would get us closer 
to our requirement but it wouldn't necessarily exactly meet the 
requirement because we're constrained to some degree by the 
industrial base.
    Mr. Wittman. Right. Thank you, and I know what goes along 
with that is the sustainment tail, too. So maintenance, 
sailors, the whole nine yards.
    General Berger, in a letter to myself and our chairman of 
Seapower and Projection Forces [Subcommittee], Joe Courtney--
the one you sent to us on April the 7th--you stated the bottom 
line, in order to meet statutory requirements, the Marine Corps 
needs no fewer than 31 L-class ships and no fewer than 35 light 
amphibious warfare ships.
    For this committee, could you confirm that this number, 
this 31 number, is, indeed, the floor and that the 35 number 
for LAWs [Light Amphibious Warships] is indeed the floor as you 
see what needs to happen for Force Design 2030?
    General Berger. I can, sir. Thirty-one is the floor, 
further broken down into 10 LHA [landing helicopter assault]/
LHDs [landing helicopter dock] and 21 LPD 17s [landing platform 
dock] are in Flight IIs. That's the combination.
    As far as the Light Amphibious Warship, initially, I 
thought 35. It's hard to tell at this point because we don't 
have any. So, initially, the study that we have just completed, 
the Navy and Marine Corps together, says somewhere between 18 
and 35 to be determined by, once fielded, what we learn from 
that and how they're employed, sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. I know recently that you've worked 
with the Navy on the upcoming amphibious ship study that looks 
to align the force structure assessment with the 2022 National 
Defense Strategy.
    I wanted to get your perspective. Have any of the 
requirements, in your mind, through that process changed from 
where you see the Marine Corps not only today but where it 
needs to be in the future?
    And in your professional military judgment, does the Marine 
Corps still require a fleet of no less than 31 ships even in 
light of all the things that may be forthcoming from that 
amphibious ship study?
    General Berger. [Audio malfunction.]
    Mr. Wittman. So even if that study comes out and says 
something different than the 31 as the floor you're still very 
strongly behind 31 as the floor for L-class ships?
    General Berger. [Audio malfunction.]
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank 
you very much for your testimony, for your leadership. A lot of 
issues ahead of us. A couple of them I want to focus on.
    Logistics. The Russians are learning about logistical 
challenges. We certainly, if we're looking at the Pacific, 
there are significant logistical challenges. As I look at the 
shipbuilding plan, 350 or any number less than that or more 
than that, the logistical support is not in that--among those 
ships.
    So the question for you gentlemen is how do you propose to 
meet the logistical challenges that exist in the Pacific, given 
the current shipbuilding plan?
    Mr. Secretary, let's start with you.
    Secretary Del Toro. Absolutely, Congressman, and thank you 
for your support of our Navy and Marine Corps team and 
particularly your support of this particular issue in the 
Pacific, especially as it applies to the challenge we face in 
the Indo-Pacific via China.
    I would argue that we have actually suffered in the area of 
logistics for quite some time. But my cup is half full. I think 
it's getting better, and when you take a look at the 
investments that are being made over the next 10 years, for 
example, with regards to sealift, with regards to the number of 
oilers that we're building and the number of other support 
ships that we're building, I think we're moving in the right 
direction.
    And perhaps the CNO can further comment on the investments 
that we're about to make.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, in this--sir, in this budget, we have 
five oilers over the course of the FYDP [Future Years Defense 
Program], and so it's easy to take your eye off supply ships 
but they're actually fundamental to everything we do, 
particularly when we think about what the Marine Corps brings 
to the fight with MLRs [Marine littoral regiments] and their 
work in the first island chain with their advanced 
expeditionary----
    The Chairman. I'm sorry, Admiral. I don't think your 
microphone is on and our virtual folks can't hear if it's not.
    Admiral Gilday. I'm sorry, sir. I just mentioned that we 
have five--we have five John Lewis-class oilers in this budget 
fundamental to what we want to do with both the Navy and the 
Marine Corps.
    One area that we haven't talked about is the 
experimentation we're doing with unmanned, particularly in the 
area of contested logistics, and in a theater kind of 
environment how can we better supply Marines ashore, ships that 
are forward, using unmanned whether it's unmanned in the air or 
unmanned on the sea.
    We have been experimenting in the Middle East with not only 
concepts but actual platforms and we believe that there's a lot 
of promise there.
    As the Secretary mentioned, sir, we are not taking our foot 
off the pedal with respect to an investment in supply ships, 
going forward.
    Mr. Garamendi. I want to move on to another question.
    General Berger, we have had a conversation about this. I 
would recommend to you that we could meet the needs of 
logistics, maybe that second half of the half full cup, by 
utilizing the Jones Act ships that are presently available, 
repurposing those that are essential so that they can meet some 
of the requirements, and others that could be made to be 
militarily useful. They're in the fleet. Treat this much as we 
treat the airline craft and provide the necessary support.
    Might call it a national maritime security program. I'm 
going to spend a lot of time working with you gentlemen and 
this committee on this this year. So I'll let it go at that.
    I do have another question. Shipyards. Admiral, how are we 
doing and, Mr. Secretary, how are we doing on our shipyards, 
the SIOP program, the 5-year versus the 20-year program?
    Secretary Del Toro. Yes, sir. Well, the good news is that 
there's major investments coming and there's actually a lot of 
progress that's being made even today, actually, up in 
Portsmouth, for example, with the completion of Dry Dock No. 1 
and the ability now to be able to not have to worry about 
floating the submarines to actually get them in there.
    And that's the beginning of much more to come. In my 
travels, I've actually visited all the four public shipyards 
and I visited all the private shipyards--many of the private 
shipyards as well, too--and I'm really excited about these 
investments that are going to be made.
    As you know, it's a $21 billion investment over the next 20 
years. What I believe we owe the Congress, however, and owe you 
is a plan to better reflect the timeline and the POA&M [plan of 
action and milestones], basically, that's going to take effect 
over those 20 years. We have given you sort of the short story. 
I think we now need to do a better job in informing the 
Congress what the long story is going to be.
    Mr. Garamendi. Tying the need--the immediate need--to the 
immediate repair and upgrade at the shipyards, I talk about a 
5-year, 20 years. I don't know. Maybe some in this committee 
will be around 20 years from now. I won't.
    So what are we going to do in the next 5 years? How does 
that tie into the immediate needs?
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 151.]
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have a similar 
question to Mr. Garamendi's, but I'll be a little more specific 
with it.
    Admiral Gilday, the Ready Reserve fleet--or Ready Reserve 
Force as I believe we call it today--I think we're all 
concerned about just how ready they are, no pun intended. But 
what is the Navy's plan for recapitalization of that fleet?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We have an ongoing life extension 
program. We are funding life extensions on a double digit 
number of those ships. I don't have the specific number on the 
tip of my tongue.
    As you're probably aware, we just purchased two used 
sealift vessels and they're up in Baltimore right now. We're 
going to provide enhancements to those ships and we're looking 
at purchasing another couple here in the near term and then 
another couple after that.
    So we have been moving in a deliberate fashion, although at 
a conservative pace, but we think a deliberate pace, in order 
to refurbish that fleet. We're not ignoring it.
    Mr. Scott. I want to--I very much support buying vessels 
that are out there in the private market and using them when 
they can be used and retrofitted. We have the potential, I 
think, as well for our hospital ships.
    The Mercy and the Comfort were--are both approaching 50 
years of age. The Navy has, in years gone past, proposed 
standing them down. What is the current plan for the Mercy, the 
Comfort, and the hospital fleet for the Navy?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, we're actually extending the life of 
both of those ships right now. They're both undergoing repairs 
or have been undergoing repairs. We are taking a look at 
providing a medical capability on two of the EPFs 
[expeditionary fast transports] that we're building.
    And so instead of building a new hospital ship, we're 
taking a ship that--essentially, a large ship that is really 
multifunction--it's really a Swiss army knife--and we're 
putting a medical capability on there.
    And so that is our quickest way to add capacity in that 
mission set.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. I'm certainly in favor of the mission and 
in favor of finding those efficiencies. So look forward to 
further discussion about that.
    Mr. Del Toro, one of the questions that I have is as we 
stand down different systems inside the United States, I do not 
think we have done a very good job of going to our partners and 
other countries and asking them if they're interested in the 
assets that we're going to be retiring.
    Do we have a program for that currently? Is that something 
that the Navy is looking at and that if we determine that we do 
not want an asset are we going to make that asset available to 
a partner nation?
    Secretary Del Toro. We actually do, Congressman, and 
actually we have used it very aggressively throughout the 
years. Actually, the number of ships in the program right now 
have dwindled down to about two or three capital ships, mostly 
our older frigates.
    However, as we decide to and if the Congress approves to 
divest some of these ships, particularly the LCSs, I think 
there is very strategic opportunities to move some of those 
ships to our allies and partners, and we're already in some 
very preliminary discussions about, you know, where they could 
go, perhaps, and be best suited.
    Mr. Scott. I think that you would find more support from 
several of the members on this committee if we knew what the 
actual plan was for the divestment of those assets and making 
sure that they're still going to be available in a fight even 
if they're not a U.S.-flagged----
    Secretary Del Toro. Yes, sir. And, of course, we have to do 
that with the permission of the Congress.
    Mr. Scott. Sure. Are we coordinating with our partners in 
our procurement? In other words, when we talk about our NATO 
allies, if we determine that we need to procure, just say, 
eight destroyers over the course of the next 10 years for a 
NATO-based----
    Secretary Del Toro. Yes.
    Mr. Scott [continuing]. Strategy, are we saying, you know, 
the Germans will have this many, the Brits will have this many, 
and the U.S. will build this many? Is our strategy coordinated 
on procurement?
    Secretary Del Toro. So there's a very robust discussions 
are always ongoing with regards to how we could actually 
interoperate and actually be interexchangeable as well, which 
includes the sharing of technologies with our allies and 
partners, and those discussions are quite robust with our NATO 
partners, with other partners in Asia as well, too. So we----
    Mr. Scott I'm out of time. I do want to mention one thing. 
I'm very concerned about the demands of India on technology 
transfer to companies that they own. I want to just express 
that publicly. I'm very concerned about the demands of India on 
technology transfer.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 152.]
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Secretary Del Toro. And we watch that very closely----
    The Chairman. Mr. Norcross is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, 
gentlemen, for being here and service to our country.
    The 30-year shipbuilding plan--it's great to see that and, 
certainly, Admiral, we appreciate your focus on the overall 
numbers, which I am less concerned about because I do not put 
one of our new modern aircraft carrier, which gets a number 
one, with a small rowboat, which would get a number one. It's 
about capacity and what they're able to do. So I'm more 
interested in what we have available. So I applaud your 
position on that.
    I look at our Virginia- and Columbia-class is remarkable, 
moving forward. We certainly have some delays in it because of 
COVID [coronavirus disease] and supply chain, but really 
pleased with the way that's going. And the carriers, the 
backbone of so many of our strategies. The core to much of the 
decisions we're making revolve around the carrier and what it 
can do, and where it fits into particularly, in the China 
question.
    A couple of quick questions here with the assets we're 
putting on that. So the strike fighter deficit is not predicted 
to close until 2030, 2031, somewhere in that area. We made 
decisions last year not to fund certain fighters because of 
what we believed the timeline would be.
    This year, the FA-18s, Super Hornets, no requests there. 
The F-35Cs are less than we originally anticipated. The removal 
of the FA-18 service life modifications. All this is based on 
next generation of air dominance. We're putting all our eggs 
into that basket in terms of this decision.
    Would you bring some clarity to us? We have a tendency in 
not delivering new programs on time. Yet, we're looking at not 
closing the gap till 2030, 2031, and the next-gen air 
dominance. Would you bring us up to speed on the air dominance 
next platform?
    Secretary Del Toro. So, Congressman, if I could just start 
the conversation and turn it over to the CNO and the Commandant 
for additional comment.
    Without question, I think the consequences of COVID in 
particular has had a huge impact on our supply chain and that 
obviously has had an impact on the ability to deliver F-35s on 
time as well, too, with the originally intended capability that 
they would bring.
    So this has unquestionably complicated the supply chain and 
being able to bring these additional F-35s in a timely fashion 
as well. So as we looked at Next Generation Air Dominance, I 
think it's very important to fully understand that platform 
before we actually fully commit to it.
    We are making investments in R&D in a substantial way. But 
we--before we actually make a commitment to start buying them 
in great numbers, we have got to fully define the requirements 
associated with them, the technology that's going to go on 
them, and make sure that we can make that transition between F-
35 and that next-generation fighter.
    Mr. Norcross. Well, then let me ask you a question. If 
we're basing the retirements and not buying additional--the 
Hornets for an illustration--and we're not sure what our 
requirements, that means we're not sure of our timeframe. Yet, 
we're trading that gap in time.
    So if we're not sure we're going to Next Generation Air 
Dominance, why are we trading these capabilities today?
    Secretary Del Toro. Well, the--I'll allow the CNO to 
comment, but the F-35, actually, as the CNO commented, is the 
most capable aircraft that we have.
    Mr. Norcross. No question.
    Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. And the hope would be that 
coming out of COVID the supply chain actually will improve, 
that the manufacturer will be able to start delivering those 
jets in greater numbers that we need so that we can actually 
close that gap quicker.
    CNO, would you like to further comment?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, your question was--I want to make sure 
I get it right. It was really the strike fighter shortfall----
    Mr. Norcross. Microphone.
    Admiral Gilday [continuing]. The strike fighter shortfall. 
So two levers to pull. One is F-35s, right. We wanted to buy a 
hundred over the FYDP. We're down to 69, I'm requesting an 
additional 6 in the unfunded list to bring us up to 75. We need 
more F-35s in order to help bring down that shortfall.
    The other is the service life modernization on the existing 
Super Hornets to bring us up to 10,000 hours in each jet and a 
more capable aircraft. Right now, those turnaround times in 
those jets in industry is 18 months.
    We think we're going to walk that down to 15 months within 
a year. The goal is to get it done in 12 months to help close 
that gap.
    The MQ-25s, the unmanned right now on--that we're going 
to-- go IOC on 2025, that's the path forward for unmanned 
hybrid mix on an aircraft carrier. It's going well. That's one 
to watch. We want to make sure that that actually is successful 
before we put a lot of money into----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Kelly is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
gentlemen, for being here today. We really appreciate your 
service to our Nation in both capacity--both capacity for you, 
Mr. Secretary.
    The first thing I want to talk about, I want to double tap 
what Mr. Norcross said. You guys owe us a 30-year ship plan. 
You've owed us that since I've been here, I think, and we can't 
understand what you want to do if you don't lay it out in 
writing what you're going to do. And we have asked and asked, 
and it's always it's going to be next year, next week, next 
month.
    So when are we going to get the 30-year ship plan that is 
required by law?
    Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, thank you for your 
question.
    So the administration has delivered the 30-year ship plan.
    Mr. Kelly. Okay.
    Secretary Del Toro. And in that shipbuilding plan, you'll 
actually see the FYDP--the numbers as reflected in the FYDP--
and then you'll see three alternatives. The first and second 
alternatives are very----
    Mr. Kelly. Okay. If we delivered--because I got other 
things I want to get to. But it was a long time getting here 
and it's hard for us to plan when we don't have something to 
plan on.
    The other thing I want to talk about is the strike fighter 
inventory shortage, the same thing that Mr. Norcross talked 
about. We are so heavy in divesting of things currently to get 
things in the future that may or may not exist and there's a 
sliding scale of risk to that, and I know you guys look at that 
and I appreciate that.
    But we really have to be careful. We have to be able to 
fight tonight in the Pacific or in Africa or in South America 
or wherever we're called. We have to be able to fight tonight 
with what we have.
    So we have to be real careful about investing in the future 
and divesting in the current until we know that we're going to 
have those systems.
    So I know that you all are doing that. But I ask that you 
continue to do that.
    And, General Berger, I know there's been a little bit of 
talk--not a little bit of talk, several talks about the new 
Marine Corps Force Design, and I don't want to go into that 
here because I don't have a side on that.
    What I would ask is I would love to sit down sometime and 
to hear your side of the story, not what I read in the paper, 
and be able to discuss that so while I understand so I can be 
an advocate if that's where I stand or against it, but at least 
I'll know what I'm for or against. So I would love to do that, 
General Berger.
    General Berger. Happy to do that, sir.
    Mr. Kelly. And then final questions, General Berger. You 
provided a letter to our Seapower and Projection Forces 
Subcommittee expressing your requirement of 31 L-class 
amphibious ships, which includes 10 LHA/LHDs, and 21 LPDs plus 
35 Light Amphibious Warships.
    Can you elaborate on the need for these ships and how they 
play into your Force Design 2030, and how much risk does the 
Marine Corps assume, given the Navy's plan to retire 4 LSDs, 
truncate the LPD by about 10 ships, and delay the LHA and LAW 
procurements?
    General Berger. The amphib ships that you refer to, sir, 
are not nice to have; they're essential. If we're going to 
achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy, the 
National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, we 
need those 31 ships plus the Light Amphibious Warships.
    They're not nice to have. They're essential. They're 
essential to deter, campaign forward. They're essential to be 
able to respond to a crisis. They're essential in a warfight.
    Mr. Kelly. I always love Marines. You guys are always 
straight answering. Thank you, General Berger.
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, this year's budget 
request includes one LPD amphibious ship but indicates that 
this will be the last LPD procured. Moreover, this year's 
budget request requests to retire four LSDs before they reach 
the end of their expected service life.
    What is the Navy's position on the requirement for L-class 
ships?
    Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, if I could start off. So 
Admiral Gilday talked about the LSDs and their age and the high 
cost of their repairs, which is why they're being recommended 
for decommissioning.
    With regards to the LPD, the administration is very 
thankful for the support of the Congress. Right now we have got 
over $2 billion in investments right now in an LHA and an LPD 
as well. When I came in as Secretary, I committed to trying to 
best define what the actual requirement is going to be for 
future L-class ships, both large and small as well, which is 
why we initiated the amphibious study. That will be--that will 
actually inform the national force structure assessment that's 
going on for 2024 based on the 2022 NDS.
    And so by POM 2024 I think we'll have a very clear path 
forward about what the exact requirement is going to be for 
both departments.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    And just two more points I want to make--and we keep 
talking about these but we never fix them, or one we 
partially--is, number one, icebreakers. That issue is not going 
away. We need to figure out how to invest in icebreakers and 
adequate capacity to make sure that we don't continue to get 
further behind.
    And then the second part of that is our hospital ships. I 
sat here and Austin Scott and I fought when they were going to 
divest of both hospital ships and they came in pretty handy 
during the COVID pandemic.
    I just want to make sure that we're investing in that 
capability because it's both soft power and hard power.
    And with that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Moulton is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Moulton. General Berger, if there is one thing I 
learned over four combat deployments in the Marine Corps 
infantry it is the value of speed and aggression.
    Force Design 2030 is by far the most aggressive 
modernization strategy to meet the National Defense Strategy 
priorities of the next decade.
    You're leading the way and you're preparing us for an 
incredibly more dangerous era of modern warfare. Now, our 
adversaries are modernizing quickly, too, particularly China. 
Now that said, change invites critics and you've received some 
criticism over this, and some legitimate questions have been 
raised.
    So I want to make sure that you address some of these 
legitimate questions, so here are a few. You're divesting of 
critical capabilities--of existing capabilities like tanks and 
artillery that have been critical in the past.
    You mentioned the Twentynine Palms exercises proved the 
Marines of today will be more lethal with updated tactics, 
loitering munitions. Will the Marine rifle platoon of 2030 be 
more lethal than the Marine rifle platoon of 2020?
    General Berger. It'll be lethal--more lethal long before 
2030.
    Mr. Moulton. And why is that? What specific capabilities 
are you adding?
    General Berger. Capabilities in loitering munitions which 
are organic precision fires; the capabilities like the 
amphibious combat vehicle, the F-35, the CH-53K. But, 
primarily, I would focus on, aside from the hardware, the 
Marine, how we train them, how we recruit them, how we retain 
them.
    Mr. Moulton. Will those new capabilities, both the changes 
you're making to training and as well as the technical 
capabilities like loitering munitions, arrive soon enough? 
You're already divesting of tanks and artillery. How are you 
managing the balance between divestments and investments?
    General Berger. This is the value of a Marine air-ground 
task force. We can modernize at speed because in fires, 
organically, we have the capability to cover where we're 
modernizing or where we're short. We have the capability to 
cover it internally.
    We'll field the first--we have fielded the first element, 
the first MLR, this year. Next year comes NMESIS [Navy Marine 
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System]. The rest of the 
capabilities begin later this year, early next year. We're not 
waiting until 2030.
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral Gilday, is the Navy supportive of 
Force Design 2030, including the stand-in force concept, and 
how is the Navy preparing to support this concept and 
implementation?
    Admiral Gilday. We're doing it right now. So I talked to 
the NAVEUR [U.S. Naval Forces Europe] commander yesterday. His 
headquarters has about 30 Marines in their joint force maritime 
component cell. Their deputy commander is a Marine. There are 
Marine elements under his command in places like Estonia, 
Iceland, Norway today.
    And so the concept of operations signed by his three-star 
fleet commander, the commander of U.S. Sixth Fleet, is also 
signed by the commander at II MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force]. 
If I go to Yokosuka, Japan, and talk to the Seventh Fleet 
commander, his concept of operations is also dual signed by the 
III MEF commander in Japan.
    And so we're working side by side every day. That is where 
Navy-Marine Corps integration gets real is at the fleet level 
right now today. The stuff we're doing with unmanned 
experimentation is groundbreaking for both the Navy and the 
Marine Corps, and we continue--we will continue down that path.
    Mr. Moulton. Admiral, what has changed that will require 
two more years to begin procurement of the Light Amphibious 
Warships and what is the impact to Navy and Marine Corps 
operations in the Pacific because of that delay?
    Admiral Gilday. So, I--sir, I'm not sure I'd look at it as 
a delay. We need to get that right.
    So, if we take a look at where we are with LCS, where we've 
been with Zumwalt, where we've been with the Ford-class 
aircraft carrier, we know, we know what wrong looks like in 
terms of stumbling. We don't want to stumble with LAWs.
    So, when we come out of the box and we buy this ship in 
2025, and then when we field it in 2028, we want to make sure 
that we're highly confident that we want to double down and 
scale it.
    And so I would tell you sir, we haven't had the best track 
record of procurement as you're aware. We want to make sure 
that in this case, we get it right.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, I can tell you that for all three of 
you, it is incredibly important to this committee that you're 
all on the same page. And the fact that you arrived here this 
morning on the same page, with 31 amphibious ships, is a huge 
step in that direction.
    General Berger, we don't have much time left. But, another 
concern with the stand-in force concept, pre-positioning forces 
on Pacific islands prior to hostilities, is a singular focus on 
the Indo-Pacific.
    Is this strategy of limited relevance to the defense of the 
Republic of Korea, or Japan, or to contingencies outside PACOM 
[U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]?
    General Berger. No, sir. It's not. It is theater-agnostic. 
It's paced against PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy], but 
it's applicable anywhere on the globe.
    Mr. Moulton. Great. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, we have a 
couple of challenges. One is that inflation, left unaddressed, 
could effectively cut the Defense Department and hollow it out 
by, by some estimates $160 billion.
    And then add onto that, the Navy is proposing to cut the 
fleet size over the course of the FYDP to about 280 ships at 
the end of the FYDP.
    And the concern you're hearing from a lot of people is that 
that means we are going to be weakest at the worst possible 
moment. We'll be weakest when China is strongest.
    So, if we go down that path of divest to invest, and I 
strongly suggest that we don't, for all the reasons that Mr. 
Wittman has addressed, and that I'm sure Representative Luria 
will eloquently address, then the Marine Corps, in particular, 
and stand-in forces in general, might actually give us our best 
shot at near-term conventional deterrence by denial.
    And with that in mind, I'd like to follow up on Mr. 
Moulton's line of questioning, Commandant Berger, ask you to 
address some of the criticism you've received from retired 
Marine general officers head on.
    The overall criticism seems to be that you are putting all 
your eggs in the basket of INDOPACOM. Mr. Moulton's question 
just addressed that.
    But, at a higher level, yes or no, in the 2018 NDS produced 
by the Trump administration, and in the 2022 NDS produced by 
the Biden administration, these documents make focusing on 
China as our top threat, the clear DOD priority.
    General Berger. That's correct.
    Mr. Gallagher. And similarly, were you ordered by our 
Nation's civilian leadership, to therefore focus on the Indo-
Pacific when adjusting the Marine Corps due to the China 
threat?
    General Berger. As our primary theater by direction, yes, 
sir.
    Mr. Gallagher. Can you address then the criticism that you 
have not gone through the proper processes or war games, and 
experimentation to justify such far-reaching changes to the 
Marine Corps?
    General Berger. I'll leave the defense of that to Members 
of Congress and the previous Secretaries of Defense and Navy.
    But, I know what I have done, which is asked for, and 
received, a lot of cooperation and support, and frankly 
guidance, from leadership and members of this committee and 
other military committees, steering along the way; the full 
support of the Secretary of Defense, and each Secretary of the 
Navy, in terms of retaining the resources that were needed to 
modernize the Marine Corps. Because that, was the risk. That 
was the primary risk.
    So, I am very confident that they understood the plan. They 
were active participants in the plan. And they have helped 
guide where the Marine Corps is going, including the members of 
this committee.
    Unidentified voice. And still understand the plan.
    General Berger. Yeah.
    Mr. Gallagher. And when it comes to having, as Mr. Moulton 
talked about, small teams of Marines operating in the first 
island chain, operating within the PLA's [People's Liberation 
Army's] weapons' engagement zone, do you at present have the 
basing and access agreements that are necessary, particularly 
in the Northern Philippines and the Ryukyus, in order to 
realize your vision?
    General Berger. We do. Because the stand-in force is a 
combination of what's ashore, and what's aboard ship. Sometimes 
your best expeditionary advanced base is a ship.
    So, the combination of what the Marine Corps has in terms 
of ashore capability, and embark capability, as part of the 
Naval Expeditionary Force, that's what you need at an inside 
force.
    That's your best chance of deterring. That's your best 
chance at identifying what's going on in front of the joint 
force commander. That's your best chance of responding to a 
crisis.
    Otherwise, you are fighting your way in blindly. Which we 
don't need--we don't need to be doing.
    Mr. Gallagher. What about the criticism that these small 
teams of Marines armed perhaps with the NMESIS system, doing 
armed reconnaissance and a variety of other things, threatening 
PLA ships, will simply not be survivable?
    That they're sitting ducks. And, you know, they're going to 
have to forage for food, or rely on the host nation population. 
Could you address that criticism?
    General Berger. Yes, sir. I think probably the best way to, 
to visualize that is we don't fight, of course, one ship, one 
person, one weapon system versus another. It's a system versus 
a system.
    So, we're always going to fight as a joint force. And any 
assessment of an individual with one weapon system versus 
another counter system, is not accurate.
    That's not how we operate. That's not how we fight.
    Mr. Gallagher. And then--well, finally just a comment. Some 
of the pushback I've heard, is that well, you know, it's highly 
unlikely that China's going to try and invade Taiwan in the 
next 5 years. And therefore, why would we focus on this?
    Well one, even if you felt that way, you would not be at 
liberty to ignore the civilian direction you've gotten, as you 
confirmed at the outset of my questions. And two, I just 
fundamentally disagree with that analysis.
    I think, and even though we hope that China is rethinking, 
that Xi may be rethinking his lifelong ambition, because his 
junior partner, Putin, has encountered unexpected friction in 
Ukraine, the alternative could be true. Right?
    He could be going to school on Russian failures, and 
expediting his timeline, and we have to account for that. And 
my time has expired.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Carbajal is recognized.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all 
the witnesses that are here.
    General Berger, this committee has been very focused on 
analyzing your Force Design 2030 initiative. In listening to 
all the perspectives, we have seen the very public debates in 
the press, but I want you to know that I support you and your 
modernization proposed Force Design 2030.
    This will allow the Marine Corps to continue to be 
relevant, and have the increased capabilities and readiness to 
meet future challenges. And go figure, you're one of very few 
leaders in the Department who actually are saying, I could do 
it pretty much with existing resources.
    I don't think I've met too many leaders in the DOD 
Department that come here looking at restructuring within 
existing resources. They always want more.
    So, I commend you for your leadership. I commend you for 
the bold action you're taking. I think it's outstanding. I 
appreciate your transparency and continued engagement, as you 
don't shy away from tackling concerns and critiques head on.
    Change is never easy, and deserves robust debate. But, that 
doesn't mean we should shy away from making difficult choices 
and progress. That's leadership.
    With that, I want to ask about a specific critique to 
better understand your analysis and thinking. There are 
concerns that the initiative may face significant logistical 
challenges, since future Marine units are intended to be 
smaller and distributed.
    How does this plan intend to address concerns with 
logistics, especially in contested environment? And how does 
your May 2022 update make progress on this question?
    General Berger. Congressman, I read a quote maybe a week 
and a half, 2 weeks ago, it's from General Shinseki. And he 
said, if you don't like change, you're going to like 
irrelevance a lot less. That's a pretty accurate statement 
today. It was accurate back then.
    There are a number of warfighting functions, as the Marines 
in this room and other service member veterans know. My 
assessment is, of all the warfighting functions going forward, 
logistics is the pacing one.
    Logistics is where we have to make up the most ground. Why? 
Because the theater that is our primary challenge is very vast. 
Logistics is just naturally going to be a challenge.
    But second is the fact that we're going to face an 
environment where logistics is challenged all the way from the 
ship, or the island, all the way back to the factory. We have 
not faced that before.
    That is our pacing challenge. So, how are we going to 
attack it? A couple of things. First, everything from air to 
subsurface, as the CNO mentioned, from the 53K to unmanned 
undersea vessels, we've got to employ it all.
    Distribution for that forward force in a contested 
environment will not be easy. We can't approach it with the old 
way of large, bulky stores of munitions and parts that are 
piled up somewhere to be distributed. That will not work.
    Very large maritime pre-positioning ships that do an 
administrative offload, not going to be the entire solution. We 
have to be able to distribute to sustain that force under 
pressure.
    Smaller more distributed forces tied into the naval 
logistics system, not our own, tied into the naval logistic 
enterprise, is the key. Even things like the munitions 
themselves.
    We chose to use the Naval Strike Missile in our ground-
based air defense for a reason. It's a common munition between 
the Navy and the Marine Corps. Logistically, that makes sense.
    Lastly, I'd say we have to go down the road of reducing--
every step we can make in reducing our consumption of fuel 
matters.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, General. Admiral Gilday, I think 
it is safe to assume, we all agree that the strength and 
effectiveness of our Navy is dependent on the sailors who show 
up every day to serve our Nation. That is why I'm very 
concerned when we see the tragic impacts of when we fail our 
service members.
    So, I want to focus for a minute on the USS George 
Washington. The information that has come to light about 
conditions on the ship, and access to mental health services 
after three suicides in 1 week, is alarming. Accumulating to 10 
deaths in 10 months. Absolutely heartbreaking.
    Before the Special Psychiatric Response Intervention Team 
was activated, what was the average wait time for a sailor 
assigned to the USS George Washington, to receive mental health 
appointments?
    I hear it was up to 6 months. Can you touch on that, 
please?
    The Chairman. He cannot, because he's got 1 second left. 
He's going to have to take that one for the record. But, we do, 
we do want that.
    Admiral Gilday. I will take that for the record. We 
actually have a mental health team onboard that includes a 
doctor, one psychiatrist. It includes behavioral health 
specialists, and includes three chaplains.
    And so, I owe you a more detailed answer, sir. I'd be happy 
to----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 152.]
    The Chairman. In fact, for the overall committee, we want 
to have more discussion. If you could get us a detailed answer 
on how that, you know, situation on the George Washington has 
been handled by the Navy, and is being handled----
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman [continuing]. That would be important for all 
of us. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Admiral Gilday, I come from Pensacola, a proud 
Navy town. And our community was rocked December of 2019 when a 
Saudi student opened fire, killed three sailors, injured 
others, injured members of our law enforcement.
    And I've been to many briefings since then, in public and 
in private. And the picture emerges that definitely the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia was not doing enough, to send only their best 
people, as one might say.
    They were not doing enough to monitor potential 
radicalization. And frankly, we weren't doing enough to ensure 
that that was happening.
    What assurance can you give my constituents in Pensacola 
that we have improved?
    Admiral Gilday. So, sir, since that incident, under then 
Secretary of Defense Esper, significant changes were made in 
the screening process for all foreign students from any 
military, including our NATO allies, that come to the United 
States to train with us.
    And so, I met as recently as yesterday, with a, with a 
senior leader from a partner nation who, who expressed concern 
about the amount of time it's taking to get his sailors into 
our country to train.
    And I explained to him how important it was that we work 
together to go through this process very deliberately and 
methodically, so that we don't make any mistakes. And he 
accepted that.
    But, we have--but we have--we have, leveraging the 
intelligence community and the FBI [Federal Bureau of 
Investigations], made significant changes.
    Mr. Gaetz. I really appreciate that. And as much as we want 
to host these missions, for the benefit of global security, we 
have to put the safety of our sailors, of our service members 
first.
    And Admiral Gilday, there was in 2019 base-specific 
guidance for these Saudi students, wasn't there?
    Admiral Gilday. There was. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Gaetz. And there also were specific rules for the 
installation regarding these students that were, that were 
there. Right?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Gaetz. And there were arrival packets for each of the 
Saudi students who arrived, with their specific information, 
such that we knew it. Right?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. They were assigned liaison 
officers with each of those students. They were assigned 
onboarding processes for each of those students. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Gaetz. And on January 13, 2020, there was a memorandum 
issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, for 
continuous review for international military students. Right?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Gaetz. And there have been written policies and 
procedures off that memo subsequently. Right?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. There have been many changes.
    Mr. Gaetz. And we've specifically required changes from the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Right?
    Admiral Gilday. We have.
    Mr. Gaetz. All these things are probably not that difficult 
to find. Right? Would you be willing to provide those things to 
my office that I've just asked for?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I will provide a detailed 
briefing for you.
    Mr. Gaetz. That is incredibly helpful and comforting. I 
know it's a work in process. I know the social media tools and 
the technologies change.
    My one concern is that the first responders who were 
running in the direction of the bullets to save our sailors, 
they are in litigation now with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
And I posit no perspective on how courts will rule on those 
things. And certainly not asking you to do that.
    But they've made a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] 
request of the Navy for the things that I've just asked you to 
provide, and that you said would not be all that difficult to 
put our hands on, and that FOIA request has been pending since 
March 23.
    And the correspondence from the Navy back, sort of says, 
well gosh, this is voluminous. You know, there may be other 
people who, you know, block our access to it.
    And I just think that the Navy ought to stand up for our 
sailors and their family members, and the law enforcement that 
protects them.
    And I want your assurance that the Navy will do everything 
possible to provide the documentation and evidence. Because the 
way this has to work in court, is that there's this JASTA 
[Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act] law, where there 
have to be specific elements pled.
    And there has to be evidence for those elements, to unlock 
discovery. And some of these documents that these litigants are 
asking to get from the Navy, are necessary to sync jurisdiction 
in that matter.
    So again, I won't ask you to opine on the status of 
litigation or the law. But just these things that seem pretty 
basic, I'm very grateful for your focus on it, and for your 
willingness to facilitate the delivery of those records.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We'll find out what constraints 
might be in the way here that are causing, that are causing----
    Mr. Gaetz. I'm sorry, who might be in the way?
    Admiral Gilday. We'll--we will like take a look at what 
constraints may be inhibiting the release of those documents 
under that FOIA request.
    But, I owe you a more detailed answer in terms of the----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 152.]
    Mr. Gaetz. I'm just used to this with the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, where they seem to have a lot of people sympathetic to 
their cause wandering around the Justice Department, and 
wandering around elsewhere.
    And I take your sincerity here, that you are going to do 
everything possible to make sure that we resolve this, and that 
we get better going forward.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We will.
    The Chairman. Gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Kim, who is 
appearing virtually, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Kim, do 
we have you?
    Mr. Kim. Yes. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Yes, we do. You're up.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you. Well, I'd like to start with Secretary 
Del Toro. I wanted to touch on a situation with, in the Navy 
SEALs, that has devastated one of our communities in New 
Jersey, the death of Navy SEAL candidate Kyle Mullen, who 
passed away after completing the Hell Week portion of training.
    I appreciate that the Naval Special Warfare Command out in 
Coronado had been conducting the investigation. They've been 
briefing us on some of the details as we've been going forward.
    But I'll be honest, I'm still adamant that we need a full 
independent investigation through the inspector general, to get 
to the bottom of what happened. And to address any reforms that 
are needed going forward.
    So, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you if I have a 
commitment from you that you'll keep track of this 
investigation, so we know with confidence what took place. And 
that the reforms necessary, that you will push forward any 
reforms necessary to ensure that something like this doesn't 
happen again.
    Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, the safety of our people 
is paramount. And you have my commitment that I will continue 
to monitor this investigation as it plays itself out, and will 
take appropriate actions once the results of the investigations 
are revealed.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, 
because, you know, I think as we've heard from the family, as 
well as families of other candidates that were there at the 
time, you know, I think what has become clear, is that there 
appears to be some potential issues here when it comes to 
medical care, oversight, access to medical records, that isn't 
just about Kyle Mullen.
    But just something that we want to look at more closely, to 
make sure that we're addressing these issues. You know, 
specifically when it comes to Kyle's case, not only was there 
not a doctor onsite at the time of his emergency, following his 
death, it had been increasingly difficult for his family to get 
information from the medical team.
    So, there appears to be room for improvement in the Navy's 
medical observation systems during the training exercises. I 
wanted to ask, you know, if you have any thoughts on what 
changes you would suggest to ensure the safety of the recruits?
    Are there any resources that you need from Congress to help 
accomplish this mission of that paramount safety of our service 
members that you talked about?
    You know, what changes would you propose to the SEAL 
training regimen to ensure that the Navy does have enough 
health capacity to deal with this, especially when it comes to 
something as grueling as Hell Week?
    Secretary Del Toro. So Congressman, while the investigation 
is not complete, I assure you, we have already taken some 
preliminary steps to ensure, as one example, that medical 
providers are immediately available at all times, immediately 
after the exercises, the training is completed, as opposed to 
being on call.
    And that's just one example.
    Mr. Kim. Okay. Well look, I look forward to keeping that 
conversation going as we get more details of the--from the 
investigation. And hopefully a thorough discussion about what 
we can be doing going forward.
    I'd like to just keep on this issue about military 
personnel, because I know we had talked a lot during this 
hearing about a lot of the hardware, a lot of equipment you 
need to be able to push forward with the Navy.
    But, one aspect of, that I keep hearing about, especially 
on the joint base in my district, is about childcare. And at 
this point, what we're hearing is about 22,000 children of 
Active service members are on a waitlist with the hopes of 
receiving care on base.
    For our military families, not being able to access that 
childcare is now an issue of readiness, a challenge in terms of 
their ability to do their jobs.
    You know, I'm proud that an effort in the NDAA and defense 
appropriations process to follow through on this effort, to 
expand the allowance cap that families can receive under the 
childcare fee assistance program by $400 per month.
    I wanted to ask you, from your perspective, from what 
you're seeing, how do you think this increase of childcare fee 
assistance program for the Navy will help our military 
families?
    And what are the things that you're thinking about doing to 
help try and shorten this waitlist at Navy facilities, things 
that we can do to try to help our military families?
    Secretary Del Toro. Well, thank you, Congressman, for 
caring so much about this issue. And actually, the waitlist 
right now sits at about 6,700.
    Over the past year we've actually been able to bring that 
down by 2,300. So, we have made significant progress this past 
year.
    In this President's budget actually there is a proposal for 
$56 million for an additional child development center [CDC] in 
Point Loma, California. And over the FYDP, there's actually 
monies that are being proposed in MILCON [military 
construction] for an additional 12 CDCs as well too, throughout 
the country.
    And of course, the increase in the allotment for those that 
choose to go out into the economy, of $200 is significant.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Bergman 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If my math is 
correct, and we always joke about math for Marines, a year from 
now, both you, Admiral Gilday, and you, General Berger, will be 
your final year of testimony before the committee before you--
the passage of command.
    Did I get that correct, in a 4-year tour?
    General Berger. Hopefully. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bergman. Well, as you look forward, we've talked a lot 
about, again, things, platforms, people. I noticed the last 
couple of years you've both made the recruiting numbers.
    One quick question. Going forward, when you break down 
recruiting, officer and enlisted, where do you see the biggest 
challenges going forward as a group, officer or enlisted?
    Just quickly either/or? Admiral.
    Admiral Gilday. I think we're going to be challenged this 
year to--I think we'll make our numbers in the Active force 
this year. But, if we do----
    Mr. Bergman. Long term.
    Admiral Gilday [continuing]. It will be narrow.
    So, long term, I think it's competing in those places where 
we have most, where we're most challenged, cyber----
    Mr. Bergman. Officer or enlisted?
    Admiral Gilday. Both.
    Mr. Bergman. Both. So, you're going to be challenged in 
both. General Berger.
    General Berger. I think probably enlisted more than 
officer. But, I--we are all really concerned about the 
shrinking demographics from which we're drawing out of America. 
Clearly headed in the wrong direction.
    Mr. Bergman. The pool is shrinking.
    General Berger. Yes.
    Mr. Bergman. And I heard others say, talk about, you know, 
different metrics; when we're recruiting young men and women, 
we're also recruiting their families, we're recruiting their 
influencers.
    And if those families don't feel confident that we are, as 
a force, lethal, survivable, and sustainable, the propensity of 
those young men and women to want to become Marines or sailors, 
I believe we're going to have our challenge.
    General Berger, you mentioned in your opening comments that 
over the last 3 years the Marine Corps has self-funded over $17 
billion in modernization. Do you feel as though that you've 
gotten a return on that investment with guarantees of other 
things?
    Because you bought it up front. Are you getting that $17 
billion back, if you will, in whoever guaranteed you support?
    General Berger. I do. It's taken all of the support of 
Congress and the Pentagon leadership to do that. It wasn't 
quite $17 that we were able to recoup. But, the balance, the 
less than $2 billion in that balance is adjustments, economic 
adjustments and compliance issues.
    That aside, every dollar that we have divested of, the 
Congress and the Pentagon leadership has allowed us to keep. 
And that has been the magic of it.
    But, we are complete with that now. Just to be very clear. 
There is no more divestment for us to do. That last 3 years is 
what we had to do.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And Admiral Gilday, you mentioned 
about investing in LVCT, or live virtual constructive training. 
You already have it existing. You have a program of record that 
does that.
    Is there within the Navy, because as we see in technology, 
one company may have the lead technology today, but there's 
competition in the marketplace.
    Does the Navy look at something like live virtual 
constructive training and say, you know what, there are other 
entities out there that can provide us a better product at a 
cheaper cost, and is willing to move on from a contract that, 
it's a legitimate contract for a time. But yet, move onto 
something that is better and less expensive?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, there are dozens of vendors right now 
that actually are involved in that live virtual constructive 
training effort that is global, and involves nearly every 
sailor in the fleet.
    And so, it's not just one company that has a lock on that 
technology and has us handcuffed with them forever. And so, 
there's a lot of different spirals going on in LVC in different 
communities, whether it's information warfare, whether it's the 
Navy SEALs.
    And so there's about--there's an awful lot of opportunity 
in that. That equates to competition.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you. And I've only got 17 seconds. 
General Berger, take this for the record, please.
    Is there any evidence to suggest that in a non-mobilized 
environment, in other words, you've got your Reserve Component 
who's in a drilling Reserve status, that Reserve units, 
battalion squadrons, would be more ready and capable if 
operational control was changed from the RC [Reserve Component] 
to the AC [Active Component]?
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    The Chairman. Sorry. Your time is expired, so----
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you.
    The Chairman [continuing]. That will have to be taken for 
the record. Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. General Berger, a Foreign Policy 
Research Institute publication outlines that the new force 
design adds more capacity and greater range and precision to 
Marine forms of firepower, and a potential family of munitions 
for different missions and targets.
    The ground launch missile systems will increase range 
significantly from 40 kilometers to 70 kilometers or more. And 
these regiments are expected to influence naval forces far from 
the shores they occupy, act as a forcing function to guide 
enemy vessels and formations into favorable naval engagements 
with friendly forces.
    Will the need arise for MRLs [Marine littoral regiments] to 
field longer range hypersonic weapon systems?
    General Berger. Well, for the Marine Corps, it's too early 
to tell about hypersonics. But, your point about increased 
range, increased accuracy, in other words, long-range precision 
fires writ large, absolutely spot on.
    I would just make sure that no one narrows it too narrow to 
just maritime, just naval targets. In other words, the force 
that's employing them, they're usable against either ground 
targets or maritime targets. Either one.
    Ms. Sherrill. Certainly. So that actually brings me to a 
different question.
    So, in its report to Congress, USINDOPACOM requested $408 
million for the FY2022 [fiscal year 2022], and $2.91 billion 
for FY2023 and 2027, for ground-based, long-range fires, highly 
survivable precision strike fires that can support the air and 
maritime maneuver from distances greater than 500 kilometers.
    Clearly, the need for a survivable ground-based platform is 
essential to the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. In addition to 
anti-ship missiles, as you were just stating, the importance of 
a maneuverable and survivable platform that can deliver 
precision fires at great distances cannot be understated.
    General Berger, I think you yourself stated that the U.S. 
Army is pursuing longer range, but much larger, heavier, 
bulkier systems that [inaudible]. But they're not either/or. 
We're going to need both. And you were talking about both the 
Army and the Marine Corps.
    Looking forward to 2030, do you see the Marine Corps 
employing the smaller hypersonic or other long-range platforms 
the Army's currently developing?
    General Berger. It's hard to speculate. I would say if 
they're light enough, expeditionary enough for us to put aboard 
ship, to sustain ashore, with a small enough signature, 
perhaps.
    But, the focus for us for survivability is maneuverability. 
The ability to stay hidden. The ability to displace. Size 
matters.
    In other words, if they can detect you, and the battlefield 
that we're going to operate on, is going to be saturated with 
sensors. You have to operate within that spectrum.
    Ms. Sherrill. I'm going to sound like I'm beating a dead 
horse here. But, ground launch missile systems will generate a 
significant signature on adversary radar and early warning 
platforms. Which again, as you were alluding to, could lead to 
exposing the MRL, and alerting adversaries of the location of 
our friendly forces.
    So, would a hypersonic platform with a smaller signature, 
that could conceal itself from radar with a low trajectory, 
better meet the intent of the MRL shore-to-ship precision fires 
and enhance the overall survivability of the MRL?
    General Berger. Yes, ma'am. I think potentially, 
absolutely. A pure ballistic trajectory, easy to do the math 
on. Find out where it came from, where it's going to land.
    One of the big advantage of hypersonics is not just the 
speed, but the maneuverability of it. And the challenge in 
countering that, and even determining where it was fired from.
    So, everything that you laid out, I think absolutely, 
that's the direction we're headed.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, General. I appreciate it. And I 
yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Banks is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Banks. General Berger, how many Marines have been 
separated or discharged because of the COVID--COVID vaccine 
mandate?
    General Berger. I don't have the numbers this morning. But, 
it's approximately 2,000, Congressman.
    Mr. Banks. Do you believe the COVID vaccine mandate has 
impacted your recruiting efforts?
    General Berger. Not to date.
    Mr. Banks. But how many Marines have we separated?
    General Berger. Approximately 2,000 so far.
    Mr. Banks. Does the COVID vaccine mandate outweigh the 
importance of a fully manned Marine Corps?
    General Berger. I don't view them as binary choices. 
Readiness is our number one priority. Every Marine has to be 
fully medically prepared to deploy anywhere on the globe on 
short notice.
    Mr. Banks. General, are we above or below our recruiting 
goals in this fiscal year?
    General Berger. We are below recruiting goals this fiscal 
year.
    Mr. Banks. And are we offering signing bonuses to men and 
women to join the Marine Corps?
    General Berger. Signing bonuses, no. There are bonuses for 
specific specialties who are Marines who are already in. But, 
not signing bonuses for enlistees, no.
    Mr. Banks. Admiral Gilday, I understand we're offering 
minimum enlistment bonuses of $25,000 for men and women to join 
the United States Navy.
    How many sailors have we separated or discharged because of 
the COVID?
    Admiral Gilday. About 1,000, sir.
    Mr. Banks. One thousand?
    Admiral Gilday. About 1,000.
    Mr. Banks. Do we expect that number to grow?
    Admiral Gilday. We do.
    Mr. Banks. By exponentially more? A little bit more?
    Admiral Gilday. It's difficult to tell, sir. We have people 
that thought they were going to--that thought they were going 
to separate voluntarily, who have changed their mind.
    Every--every week I see 100-plus people getting vaccinated.
    Mr. Banks. Is that a high or low signing bonus? I mean, it 
seems, it doesn't seem normal to me.
    Admiral Gilday. So, it's about half of what the Army's 
offering, to put it in perspective. It's the competitive market 
right now that we're in.
    We're on glide slope as I mentioned earlier. I think if we 
make it in the Active side, we'll narrowly make it. It's a 
challenging environment.
    Mr. Banks. So, how do we justify separating sailors and 
Marines when our recruitment is so low, and offering 
unprecedented signing bonuses to attract new sailors and 
Marines?
    Admiral Gilday. So, number one, we have a valid order from 
the President. Number two, it is a readiness concern. I can't 
predict, I don't know if anybody can, what the next variant of 
COVID might look like, how it may affect us.
    I know the challenges we faced on ships over the past 2 
years. And so, I do have readiness concerns tied to those 
vaccinations, that we continue to toe the line and obey the 
order. Because I think it's--fundamentally, I think it's the 
right thing to do right now, given that as a threat to the 
readiness of the force.
    Mr. Banks. Admiral Gilday, I notice the new, your new 
reading list came out. I enjoy the reading list. I look forward 
to it every year.
    Last year, as we discussed before, the list was very 
political. I notice this year the list isn't political. There 
are no books that preach political ideologies, or viewpoints, 
or talk about radical gender theories.
    Was that a decision on your part to divert away from 
politics and make the reading list about naval leadership and 
history, and about the United States Navy?
    Was that a decision on your part?
    Admiral Gilday. In both years I've actually received 
significant feedback from the fleet. I actually do listening 
sessions and get ideas.
    And so it has been influenced by the fleet. I did want a 
smaller list this year. So, I went with a dozen books. But, I 
don't have a political agenda, sir. Or an axe to grind.
    I'm just trying to--I'm just trying to share books that 
I've enjoyed, or take recommendations from others. I'd 
appreciate your feedback.
    Mr. Banks. Yeah. Again, I enjoy the list. I learn a lot 
about naval history and leadership when I read books on the 
list. But, I was surprised by the political nature of the list 
last year. It seems like a big difference between last year and 
this year.
    Furthermore, the Naval Information Forces hosted the 
Inaugural Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Summit just a few 
weeks ago, in April. Your wife participated and spoke at the 
Summit.
    How much--how much did that cost us, Admiral? And what did 
we get out of it? What did we get out of that Summit?
    Admiral Gilday. I don't know what the, I don't know what 
the cost of that Summit was, sir. I think there were, there's 
power--there's power in harnessing the differences among us, 
whether they be----
    Mr. Banks. What did we get out of it? What did we gain--
what did we gain from the Summit? What are some takeaways from 
the Summit that justified the resources that----
    Admiral Gilday. I had not had a detailed readout of that 
particular gathering, sir.
    Mr. Banks. You're largely credited for the reason that we 
organized it and hosted it. I mean, the articles that come out 
of the Summit suggest that you're the reason that we hosted it.
    I'm just wondering, I mean, how do you justify it? You 
haven't had a readout, but how do you justify it? What came out 
of it?
    What's your answer?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I get a readout of many conferences. I 
will seek a readout of this one. Usually I get something weeks 
later that gives me insights in terms of what--what the goods 
or others were, that, that were evident as a result of the 
conference.
    I look--I look forward to get----
    Mr. Banks. For the record, can you give us the report when 
you get it, to tell us what good came from it? Justify it, 
justify to the taxpayers why we hosted it?
    Admiral Gilday. I'd be happy to share that with you, sir.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 152.]
    Mr. Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Veasey [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman from 
Maine, Mr. Golden, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you. General, I was an enlisted O-3 NCO 
who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, Gallagher talked about 
foraging and surviving off the land. And I will note, in the 
Hindu Kush in 2004, I ate enough goat and rice for a lifetime.
    Now, in Afghanistan and Iraq, we really focused on 
shooting. On being agile and fast, and on delivering effective 
overpowering fire on the enemy. And we were good.
    But I know there's room to get even more lethal and even 
better. My experience tells me that the Force Design 2030's 
focus on screening and recon [reconnaissance], alongside 
lethality, is spot on.
    Now, some critics of the small distributed unit strategy 
that you've talked about, have suggested that this isn't 
survivable. Essentially that you're asking Marines to do 
basically a suicide mission.
    So, what is your level of confidence that your Marines are 
ready to carry out that mission? Because to do it, they need to 
be highly skilled hunter-killers.
    So, are they there today? Are they ready to do it and 
survive it? We know it will be a tough mission, but what is 
your level of confidence in these small units' ability to get 
the job done?
    General Berger. I am very confident. And I know that from 
visiting units just like other service chiefs, and seeing the 
training that they're doing at the high end, against a very 
thinking adversary.
    In other words, in a force-on-force sort of scenario. It's 
not canned. It's not fighting against a computer. You're 
fighting against another Marine that's trying to beat you. I'm 
very confident in them.
    I think the focus on the first part of your question, the 
reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, it doesn't lower 
lethality. But, it doesn't do any good to be lethal if you 
can't find them. It doesn't do any good to be lethal if they 
find you first.
    So, the--it doesn't diminish the lethality part. But, it 
does bring to the fore the importance, if it's a sensor-
saturated environment, you need to be able to hide. And you 
need to be able to find them first and get the first round down 
range. And that first round's got to be accurate.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, General. I'd love to have the 
opportunity to maybe visit and see some of the training taking 
place to ensure that small unit lethality is taking place. And 
see what these Marines are learning and capable of.
    General Gilday, the FYDP calls for, to--I'm sorry, Admiral 
Gilday. Marine here. You know, old habits die hard.
    The FYDP calls for two destroyers a year. So, why not a 
baseline of 10 for the multiyear? Because recently you spoke at 
a Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] dialog, 
and talked about your recent visit to BIW [Bath Iron Works], 
along with Senator Collins and myself.
    And you noted at CSIS that BIW's at a rate of production of 
about one ship a year. But you also said that you wanted to see 
them get to one and a half, so that you could someday see three 
budget--three destroyers a year in future budgets.
    But a nine-ship multiyear actually raises concerns that one 
of the yards might not have demand for even one ship a year 
over the period of time that it covers.
    So, I agree with you that one and a half ships is 
definitely achievable. And BIW was just under one and a half 
ships recently, although they've now struggled a little bit 
with recruitment and retention in this tough labor market.
    But we know it's critical for our national security that 
these yards make that investment in that future workforce, 
which is going to be the workforce to build the DDG(X) [Next-
Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer].
    So, my opinion is that these yards need to see a positive 
signal from the Congress and Navy, and a 10-year ship multiyear 
with a 5-ship option demonstrates stability at 1 ship a year, 
while green-lighting an effort to get to that one and a half 
over time.
    So, what's your thinking on the nine-plus-one proposal?
    Admiral Gilday. Yeah. So, sir, the nine-plus-one was a 
decision inside the Pentagon. And it's a decision that we're 
going to live by.
    I think it's a, it is a clear signal for industry. I think 
specifically with respect to Bath, when I was up there and I 
talked about aspirationally giving them 1.5, I know that 
there's a mismatch between what the shipbuilding plan says 
right now, and what I asked them to shoot for.
    I hope over time that we can get to three destroyers a 
year, and actually solidify that in the shipbuilding plan. And 
the reason I say that, is because particularly with respect to 
Bath, it's not lost on me the significant investment they made 
in infrastructure and workforce to support a Zumwalt program 
that never panned out.
    And so, they are looking at us, and are questioning whether 
or not what we say is going to match what we do. So I think we 
owe it to them.
    I intend to keep, as the Secretary also keeps, close tabs 
on industry so that we can set a demand signal that's both 
reasonable, and that puts us in a path of stable and 
predictable ship delivery for the Navy.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you. And I would just note for the 
committee, and we've talked a lot about this and how to develop 
that industrial base, getting to one and a half ships per year 
for the large surface combatants is a 5- to 7-, or 8-year 
project.
    If you want to get to one and a half in the future, we've 
got to start that, we've got to start that process now.
    Admiral Gilday. Right.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Before recognizing Mr. 
Waltz, I want to, without objection, allow members to submit 
statements, records, whatever they want, five business--within 
five business days after the hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask unanimous 
consent to submit this chart into the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 
141.]
    Mr. Waltz. Admiral, can you see the chart here?
    General Berger. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. I think--I think it's very important 
for the American people to see visually the trend lines of 
what's going on with our Navy, and what's going on with the 
Chinese Navy.
    And these are according to DOD and Congressional Research 
Service numbers. Yesterday the intelligence community briefed 
the Senate, the much talked about timeline. And we basically 
have 5 years, 2027, until the Chinese Communist Party believes 
they have overmatch in the Western Pacific.
    Do you disagree with that assessment?
    General Berger. I do not.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. Admiral.
    Admiral Gilday. I agree with the assessment.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Admiral. So, I think this is 
important. This here shows the size of the Chinese Navy. And 
this is the various shipbuilding plans we've received over the 
last, since 2015.
    With--in blue here is the size of the U.S. Navy. And I 
think it's important for the American people to understand, 
that 2027 figure, it's right there. That's a 105-ship delta.
    Now, I get it. We can have the capability, capacity debate. 
But I'm not buying that we can make up for a 105-ship delta 
that they can concentrate all in one ocean with short supply 
lines.
    And the problem is, with your divestment strategy, we're at 
our lowest point at 2027, when they're at the highest point. 
And even when we come out of it, let's say, I mean, let's look 
at the Next Gen Air Dominance, 2031; future frigate, 2028; 
Ready Reserve fleet modernization, 2030.
    I mean, that's all right around here. We still have these 
massive deltas. Gentlemen, I think we are being set up. And 
these budgets are setting us up to lose in a war with China.
    And that is a disservice to the sailors that are going to 
be out there on old, broken-down ships, and outnumbered in 5 
years. So, with this FYDP, what we're buying right now, is what 
we have to go to war.
    Admiral Gilday. That's right.
    Mr. Waltz. That's right.
    Admiral Gilday. And you're not going to change that 
significantly between now and 2027. And so our emphasis is, is 
to deliver for the Nation the most lethal, the most ready, the 
most capable Navy that we can, based on the resources that we 
have.
    Mr. Waltz. But, I don't think your plan gets us there, 
Admiral. I mean, just candidly.
    Admiral Gilday. Well, we did----
    Mr. Waltz. Because we're going, we're going backwards. And 
we've--so, first of all, those estimates, 2031 and 2028, those 
are best-case scenarios.
    And this blue line's a best-case scenario. This is on your 
option three of the shipbuilding plan. But, we've seen from the 
Ford-class carrier, the Joint Strike Fighter, to LCS, that 
those estimates are often grossly off.
    Admiral Gilday. We're deploying the Ford class this year. 
So----
    Mr. Waltz. It's been around for 20 years. The office came 
in in 1997. So, the estimates are off, which means, look, at 
the end of the day, I think we have allowed this committee and 
the building to fall into a false choice of readiness versus 
modernization.
    I think the real choice is, how much money should you be 
asking for to be ready to win? I don't want to, I don't want to 
pace. I want to overmatch. I want to win, in the next 5 years.
    So, if you were given more money, Admiral, would you 
accelerate the Ready Reserve fleet modernization? Would you 
accelerate the frigates?
    Would you accelerate much of what you're trying to do? And 
would you keep more cruisers? Not all of them, but would you 
keep more?
    If you were--if this committee gave you more?
    Admiral Gilday. Given the window that we're looking at 
right now that you described, I would take you to my unfunded 
list. And if you take a look at the priorities on the unfunded 
list, it's for SM-6 missiles. It's for--it's for LRASM. It's 
for JASSM-ER.
    It's for the most capable missiles in the world to put on 
our ships. And actually----
    Mr. Waltz. Why are they unfunded?
    Admiral Gilday. Why are they--I'm trying to maximize those 
production lines. So, I'm----
    Mr. Waltz. Right----
    Admiral Gilday [continuing]. I am--we're funding them 
inside the budget. We're trying to maximize those production 
lines. We are funding ships' maintenance to 98 percent.
    We're trying to, we're trying to increase----
    Mr. Waltz. But Admiral, the problem is, all of those things 
that you described, and to the ranking member, are all 
aspirational. And that's, and that's not all your necessarily 
issue. I mean, you've had a lot of predecessors.
    But, we are where we are now. And I think we need a drastic 
increase to be able to cover the gaps within the next 5 years.
    Admiral Gilday. We just talked about the industrial base. 
Right now, we've given a clear set of--we are maxing out the, 
the production lines for attack submarines and for SSBNs 
[ballistic missile submarines].
    Two destroyers a year is what the industrial base can 
support right now.
    Mr. Waltz. What--just in the remaining time I have, for the 
record, can I--what investments do we need to make in the 
industrial base?
    Rather than letting that limit you and the budget limit 
you, what investments can we make in the industrial base to 
close that gap?
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    Admiral Gilday. We're making over $2 billion right now. And 
the----
    Mr. Waltz. It's not enough.
    The Chairman. The time has expired.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. And I suspect this conversation will continue 
now with Ms. Luria. So you will get your chance.
    Ms. Luria is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am requesting unanimous 
consent to enter these documents in the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The documents referred to can be found in the Appendix 
beginning on page 142.]
    Mrs. Luria. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    So, Secretary Del Toro, what I have here is from the 2017 
Strategic Readiness Review. I assume you are familiar with and 
you have read that document; it follows in the wake of the 
McCain and Fitzgerald collisions. So, this chart shows the 
fleet strength from about 600 ships in the 1980s to about 300.
    And it also shows a rapid rise in the percentage of the 
fleet that is deployed over that course of time. Do you agree 
that you see that blue line going up? It goes from about, say, 
20 percent to about 35 percent.
    [The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 
142.]
    Mrs. Luria. And this is a narrative that has been recently 
portrayed a lot across discussions of the fleet that we are 
actually, like, running the fleet into the ground, we are 
deploying ships more.
    But, you know, then I forwarded to this year's budget book, 
which is the real thing that I want to dig into the meat of 
because I think it paints a rosier picture than actually 
exists. So, are you familiar with this? This is in the budget 
book that you submitted this year.
    Secretary Del Toro. Yes, I am.
    Mrs. Luria. So, right here in red, I have circled this, so, 
it says that as of March 17th the Navy has 298 ships. Of that, 
128 are deployed.
    [The graphic referred to can be found in the Appendix on 
page 143.]
    Mrs. Luria. Well, I thought that was curious because it is 
significantly higher than the average for the preceding or 
following year. So, I reached out, I received a list of those 
ships that were deployed on March 17th of this year.
    So, I came to find in there some interesting things. Of 
that 128, 39 of them are ships that are forward deployed. And 
when I say that, they even include ships that are in port, in 
home port, ships that are in maintenance. The Ronald Reagan, 
for example, is included in that as well. So, all ships forward 
deployed, regardless of their operational status, all 8 
minesweepers, every ship forward deployed.
    And, in fact, also 39 of those 128 ships are also MSC 
[Military Sealift Command] ships, regardless of their underway 
status, or that they are deployed. MSC ships don't operate 
under the same OPTEMPO [operation tempo] requirements as the 
rest of the fleet.
    And then the last, most puzzling thing that I found is that 
13 of the 14 SSBNs [ballistic-missile submarines] are on this 
list.
    So, I know it is above the classification level of this 
hearing, but I can say with all certainty that 13 or 14 SSBNs 
are not deployed or underway on any given day.
    So then when we get down to the math, you subtract all of 
those things out, I came to find that there were actually only 
37 ships which are rotational CONUS [continental United 
States]-based ships deployed on this day in your budget report. 
And that is about 20 percent. Which makes perfect sense. It 
makes perfect sense because the OFRP [Optimized Fleet Response 
Plan], the way the rotational forces work, seek to have about 
20 percent of the ships deployed on any given day.
    So, you know, going back to this chart in the 2017 
Strategic Readiness Review, I think there has been a narrative 
that has been carried forward that talks about, you know, the 
amount that we are employing and overworking the fleet, which I 
think when you dig into these numbers in fact this paints a 
rosier picture for the number of ships we actually have 
deployed today, as well as exaggerates--43 percent, you agree 
that's twice as much as actually the numbers show.
    And then the next thing I went to also in this year's 
budget book were these two graphs. This is two parts of a 4-
part graph series. But what it shows is our VLS [Vertical 
Launching System] cell capacity over time. It is broken down in 
this chart. It separates it between surface and subsurface.
    [The graphs referred to can be found in the Appendix on 
page 144.]
    Mrs. Luria. If you were to look at this chart, you would 
think, wow, you know, we're pretty steady. And then we start 
going up on this chart between now and 2055.
    But, this is a 0 to 12,000 scale. So, I mean, you can 
manipulate data to make things look flatter, depending on the 
scale you use. So, everything on the entire graph is between 
these two lines right here, and it doesn't combine the two. So, 
oh, there's a dip in SSGNs, but that is going to go back up.
    So, I just decided out of curiosity's sake to change the 
scale, to put them on the same chart, and to look at the 
timeframe. And I drew that vertical line that Mr. Waltz did as 
well, where you have the Davidson window, which is the 2027 
timeframe.
    So, this is the same data, with both of those things 
combined, using your 30-year shipbuilding plan between now and 
2035, which shows that we will lose 1,668 VLS cells in the 
Davidson window, as well as between now and 2035, 1,980 VLS 
cells.
    So, again, you know, as a Member of Congress receiving this 
budget document that you have presented to us, I found that it 
really presented quite a rosy picture of the future of our VLS 
capacity, as well as the number of fleet--ships in the fleet 
that are being employed.
    And there is a little bit of time remaining. And would you 
care to comment on why that is so different as has been 
displayed by myself and others on this committee throughout the 
hearing than what we actually see today?
    Secretary Del Toro. Well, Congresswoman, with my 26 
seconds, and I would be happy to respond to the record as well, 
too. One can interpret data a thousand different ways.
    I actually do know that today we actually have 81 total 
ships underway, for 27 percent of the fleet. And it is a very 
accurate accounting of how many ships we have today.
    And I would be happy to present to you with this data.
    With regards----
    Mrs. Luria. But why----
    Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. To the----
    Mrs. Luria [continuing]. Did you choose, Mr. Secretary, to 
use ``deployed'' versus ``underway''?
    And why from year to year in budget books can one not track 
the difference?
    And if you go back to the 1980s, for example----
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Mrs. Luria [continuing]. The percentage is----
    The Chairman. We will take the rest of that for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 153.]
    Secretary Del Toro. There are many variations of that.
    The Chairman. And one of the things that I think we should 
get briefed on on the committee is, you know, we, we talk about 
how it is about capability, not about numbers. But we always 
see from the China, well, they've have got this number.
    Well, how capable are their ships?
    How many ships does China have deployed all around the 
world in any given moment?
    That is a very low number, from what I understand. And the 
capability of their ships are not as great either. So, we can 
all, like, freak ourselves out about all the trillions of 
dollars a year apparently we have to spend on our defense 
budget. I think it would be helpful if we had a realistic 
understanding of our adversaries, and where they are at, and 
what we need to counter.
    I watched a fascinating video the other day, economists 
pointing out that China is a net importer of both food and 
energy by a really large margin. They don't have the naval 
capability of protecting that energy and food that is coming in 
from all over the world because their ships can't get very far 
away from China and still operate.
    So, let's have a reasonable picture about what we need to 
build and what we need to have. And I think it would be good to 
get more information on that and have a longer conversation on 
that, which we will attempt to find time to do.
    Ms. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all 
for being here.
    The Navy, and it is in the same vein that we are all 
talking about, and, Chairman, you talk about capability and 
looking at the future. I think that is what we are all 
concerned about is capability, looking at the future, making 
sure that we are the leaders, that we are protected, that we 
are safe.
    The general theme that I am sort of getting is there is a 
disparity between, or there is not a reconciliation of here is 
what we need to be safe, and here is where we are at. There 
seems to be some disparity.
    The Navy has requested, is requesting legislative relief 
from the statutory requirement to support the carrier air 
wings. However, you have stated that you believe the Navy needs 
12 carriers. In your assessment, how many aircraft carriers are 
needed to meet current and future, which I think is important, 
operational requirements?
    So, I don't understand, if we are looking towards the 
future, why are we reducing our standards, so to speak.
    Secretary Del Toro. If I could start off and kick it over 
to you, CNO.
    So, we are not reducing our standards, Congresswoman. We 
actually have 11 carriers that actually are being proposed all 
the way through 2039. Beyond that it goes to 12 carriers.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay. So, you are not requesting legislative 
relief from the statutory requirement. I read that wrong.
    Secretary Del Toro. Well, if I could just finish.
    However, at any one given moment in time not all those 
carriers are available, which means not all those carrier wings 
need to be available to deploy on the carriers themselves.
    And I will allow the CNO to expand on that.
    Admiral Gilday. So, nine is the right number. Nine is the 
right number, given the fact that we have 11 carriers.
    So, you are always going to have two carriers that are 
going to be in drydock. So, you don't want to pay, you don't 
want to pay for the readiness for excess to need if--when, when 
we want to make sure that we're putting the right money in the 
right place at the right time. And so, to have a wing sitting 
around that you won't be able to, that you won't be able to 
deploy, it won't fly at the same----
    Mrs. McClain. Well, so, I understand that, sir.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. McClain. So, so I guess my second question is I 
thought you had stated that you believed the Navy needs 12.
    Admiral Gilday. Correct. Over time the analysis shows 12. 
That is correct.
    And so, we would, and so we would scale our carrier air 
wings to meet that requirement when it is needed.
    Mrs. McClain. When it is needed.
    Admiral Gilday. Correct.
    Mrs. McClain. And what--well, I will get into that.
    So in your assessment, how many aircraft carriers are 
needed to meet current and future operational requirements?
    Admiral Gilday. As the Secretary stated, at least 12.
    Mrs. McClain. Now.
    Admiral Gilday. We have 11 right now. The long--the 
stretch----
    Mrs. McClain. That is where my confusion comes in is you 
need 12. We have 11, but we are prepared for 9.
    Admiral Gilday. So, if we had 12 we would be--if we had, if 
we----
    Mrs. McClain. Well, let's start with, let's start with 
capability and what we need.
    Admiral Gilday. Okay.
    Mrs. McClain. What is that answer: 12, 11, 9?
    Secretary Del Toro. So, the President's budget right now 
proposes 11 carriers through 2039.
    Mrs. McClain. And I appreciate that.
    My question is, and maybe I am not phrasing it correctly, 
what do we need? Not what is proposed but what do we physically 
need now to be prepared now and in the future? What is that 
number I am looking for?
    Secretary Del Toro. We need 11 carriers now.
    Mrs. McClain. We need 11. And that, in your opinion, is 
plenty--good----
    Secretary Del Toro. To meet the--warfighting requirements. 
Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay. Thank you.
    So, based on China's current 2030 force projections, how 
many carriers and carrier air wings should the Navy be 
fielding?
    So, I am looking at Mr. Smith. He is not Chairman Smith.
    In comparison to our competition, what do we need, 
specifically China? Because it looks by all of our accounts 
that the Chinese trajectory, from what Mr. Waltz has shown as 
well, we have, you know, we have some disparity. I know those 
are naval, but we have disparity
    So, in comparison to our competition, what do we need?
    Secretary Del Toro. So, the estimate is that we will need 
11. China does not have nearly as many carriers as we have. And 
it is not just about a one-to-one capacity, it is about 
strategy. It is about a lot of the things that the chairman 
just previously spoke about as well, too. It is about 
geography, it is about how you employ strategy to defeat the 
enemy, it is about cyber, it is about space, a lot of others.
    Mrs. McClain. So, in essence, less is more, working smarter 
versus harder, so to speak?
    Secretary Del Toro. Hypothetically, but both capacity and 
capability matter to be able to deliver the lethality that you 
have to deliver to your enemy at any given time.
    Mrs. McClain. Okay, thank you.
    Also, we know aircraft carriers cannot project power 
without the carrier air wing. Right? Several members of this 
committee believe that there is a great deal of risk in the 
Navy's current tactical air aviation plan.
    The Next Generation Air Dominance schedule has slipped over 
the past few years. Fewer Super Hornets than initially planned 
are being inducted for service life modification and Block 3 
upgrades.
    F-35C procurement quantity has still not been reached, 24 
aircraft per year. Right?
    Last year the Navy suggested--and I am going to run out of 
time--that the striker fighter shortfall would be resolved by 
2025, but now it doesn't look like it is going to be resolved 
till 2031.
    Can you explain the disparity on that?
    Secretary Del Toro. So, the supply chain has a very 
negative effect on the ability to deliver F-35----
    Mr. Kahele [presiding]. The member's time has expired. We 
can take that for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 155.]
    Mr. Kahele The chair will now recognize himself for 5 
minutes.
    Mahalo, Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General 
Berger for appearing before this committee today. I am going to 
focus my questions on the number one issue on the minds of the 
people of Hawaii, and that is the closure of the Red Hill Bulk 
Fuel Storage Facility.
    Mr. Secretary, thank you for including Red Hill in your 
testimony before this committee.
    Last Friday, the Hawaii Department of Health issued an 
emergency order regarding the closure of Red Hill. It sets 
specific timelines that the Navy must comply with for the safe 
and expeditious defueling and closure of Red Hill.
    On Monday of this week, the Navy waived its right to 
contest the State's order, effectively paving the way for Red 
Hill's permanent shutdown. It requires the Navy to provide the 
State with an independent contractor's assessment on facilities 
operations by May 15th, a plan and implementation schedule to 
defuel by June 30th, and a plan for closure of the facility by 
November 1st.
    Secretary Del Toro, in the interests of time I have three 
yes or no questions for you.
    The first is, will the Navy be able to meet these three 
Department of Health deadlines: this Sunday for the NAVSUP 
[Naval Supply Systems Command] FLC [Fleet Logistics Center] 
Norfolk contract assessment report; June 30th for the defueling 
schedule; and 1 November for the closure plan?
    Secretary Del Toro. So, Congressman, that is to be 
determined. As you know, that there is language in the 
executive order that actually allows us to actually have 
further discussions on the exact timeliness of the dates.
    Mr. Kahele. Will the Navy be able to meet the SECDEF's 
[Secretary of Defense's] March 7th memo, which requires both 
yourself and the Director of the DLA [Defense Logistics 
Agency], to provide a defueling plan of action to the SECDEF by 
May 31st?
    Secretary Del Toro. I can't speak for the Director of the 
DLA, but the Navy will meet its requirement to the Secretary of 
Defense.
    Mr. Kahele. Excellent.
    Finally, there are multiple ongoing investigations. The 
commander of PACFLT [U.S. Pacific Fleet] ordered a command 
investigation on November 29th, 9 days after the catastrophic 
leak. The PACFLT commander received that report, Admiral 
Paparo, on January 14th, and turned it over to the Pentagon.
    In mid-March, the Pentagon ordered a supplemental 
investigation because the original report was insufficient.
    When will the congressional delegation, the State of 
Hawaii, and the people of Hawaii, as well as our 100,000 
military service members and their dependents that are on the 
Navy's water system, get to see and review the results, 
redacted or unredacted, of this command investigation?
    Could you give me a timeline? Can you give the people of 
Hawaii a date?
    Secretary Del Toro. So, Congressman, that investigation has 
been completed. It is under review by the leadership of the 
Department of Defense. And it will be released in the next 
several weeks.
    Mr. Kahele. Several weeks?
    Secretary Del Toro. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Kahele. Okay. Just want to reemphasize it has been 6 
months since the November 20th fuel leak. The full extent of 
this public health crisis and the environmental damage is still 
not yet known.
    As recently as April 1st, a little over a month-and-a-half 
ago, there was another release of approximately 30 gallons of 
fuel and water mixture from a maintenance line connected to 
Tank 15 at Red Hill.
    So, this is very, very important for the delegation and for 
the people of Hawaii. And I appreciate your promptness in this 
issue.
    Secretary Del Toro, of the approximately 93,000 people on 
the Navy's water distribution system on Oahu, it is still not 
clear how many people have been affected by the May and 
November 2021 fuel spills. Secretary--Assistant Secretary 
Meredith Berger's memo to you on March 29th, she mentioned that 
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry conducted 
an expanded public health study that included all non-Federal 
civilians and DOD personnel served by the Navy's water system 
in their homes, their workplaces, their schools, and their 
childcare centers.
    The preliminary analysis of this survey determined that 86 
percent of the surveyed individuals exhibited symptoms 
consistent with acute petroleum exposure.
    Can you elaborate at all on this study, and share any of 
this data with the public?
    Secretary Del Toro. Sir, that was a survey that was 
conducted. We, obviously, in our interest to protect our 
sailors, our Marines, their families, and all other individuals 
in the Department of Defense, also in the State of Hawaii, have 
ensured that we have had two surveys now: one conducted by the 
CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], another one 
by--conducted by the Navy to try to capture all the individuals 
that were impacted by this. And that survey result of 86 
percent is reflective of the answers that were provided by 
individuals.
    Mr. Kahele. Okay. Last question.
    The Navy's compromised water system is also currently 
contributing to a water shortage on the island of Oahu. The Red 
Hill well, and the nearby Aiea-Halawa well remain offline, 
disconnected from the Navy's water distribution system. 
Honolulu Board of Water Supply anticipates a water shortage 
this upcoming summer. It is calling for a 10 percent water 
reduction for urban Honolulu.
    What is the status of the Red Hill and Aiea-Halawa wells? 
When can we get that back online?
    And we can take that for the record.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 155.]
    Secretary Del Toro. So, yes, sir. And I would like to 
comment real quickly.
    As you know, sir, we have been testing the Red Hill. All 
indications right now are that it is safe. But that's a 
determination that has to be made by the Department of Health 
of Hawaii.
    And we continue to work very closely with the Department of 
Health and other officials on Hawaii to come to that proper 
conclusion at the right moment in time.
    Mr. Kahele. Thank you so much.
    The chairman would like to now recognize Mr. Jackson for 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you guys for being 
here today. I apologize. I had to step out; we had a little 
get-together with the King of Jordan. So I don't know exactly 
what has been asked, but I don't think anybody has asked my 
question yet because I am going to ask you about the V-22.
    So, with you, General, I will start with.
    The Marine Corps included funding for the MV-22 nacelle 
improvement on its unfunded priorities list for this fiscal 
year. I anticipate that Congress will provide full funding for 
that because we here on the committee recognize the game-
changing capabilities that this aircraft provides.
    Upgrading the current fleet is essential. But I think we 
should also look at expanding the current number of MV-22 
aircraft.
    General Berger, how important is it to improve the 
readiness of our platform such as the MV-22 when implementing 
Force Design 2030?
    General Berger. It is critical, as you pointed out. It's 
proven in combat and on every deployment since. It is one-of-a-
kind in the world. We can't do our job without it.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I agree. And I will do 
whatever we can to help you on that front.
    Admiral, I want to ask you a quick question.
    As you know from your close coordination with NNSA 
[National Nuclear Security Administration], much of the nuclear 
enterprise is in desperate need of modernization. When we look 
at the possible future conflict with China, the timeline keeps 
shifting further and further to the left. It has become clear 
that the platforms and capabilities that we are looking to 
field in the 2030s and the 2040s will be needed much sooner 
than we anticipated.
    How important is the W-93 warhead program as we transition 
from Ohio-class submarines to Columbia-class submarines?
    And further, from your perspective, how helpful would it be 
for Congress to accelerate funding for nuclear modernization in 
support of the sea leg of the triad?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would say that modernization is 
critical with respect to that weapon system. And right now we 
are on track.
    I will--I will get back to you on whether or not we could 
actually physically accelerate that program.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 155.]
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
    And then this just quick question here. This is kind of one 
of my--my areas that I am concerned about.
    But anybody who has been to a HASC [House Armed Services 
Committee] hearing this hear has heard me express my serious 
concerns about our medical readiness and some of the dangerous 
cuts being made to the military medical community.
    Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to--there is a particular area 
of concern I have. I wanted to know what is the justification 
for cutting the position of the Medical Officer of the Marine 
Corps?
    Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, the justification has been 
an overall look across the balance of flag officers and SESes 
[Senior Executive Service] that we have in the Department of 
Defense. As you know, the Department of Defense has put--there 
is a cap on the number of flag officers that we are allowed to 
have. And so, we have had to downsize the number of flag 
officers and the number of SESes as well, too. That has been 
congressionally mandated. And it is our intent to meet the 
intent of the law.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.
    And I may be a little bit biased on this one in particular, 
but being a former Navy physician and spending time with the 
Marines, I feel like the making sure that we provide the 
absolute best leadership we can possibly provide for Navy 
medicine with regards to our support of the Marine Corps is 
really important to me. So, I know that there is a finite 
number of flag and general officers, and you are operating 
within, within that framework.
    But I would really like to try to find other ways to, or 
find a way to reestablish that position. I think it is really 
important.
    Secretary Del Toro. And we would be happy to work with you 
and the Congress on that issue, sir.
    Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.
    With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Kahele. The chairman recognizes Ms. Jacobs for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Nice to see you all. Mr. Secretary, hope you enjoyed your 
recent time in San Diego with Tom Cruise, of all people.
    You know, several of my colleagues have already highlighted 
the importance of the 30-year shipbuilding plan. I just want to 
reiterate how important that is and, you know, want to make 
sure we are thinking long-term. And thank you and the 
Department for delivering it this year after several delays.
    So, over the years the Navy has seen several platforms come 
in over budget, such as the DDG, or underperform, such as the 
LCS. In addition to the unnecessary waste that this has forced 
on taxpayers, these mistakes have also had a direct impact on 
Navy's ability to meet its mission.
    So, what is the Navy doing to ensure that this new 30-year 
plan will not repeat mistakes of the past?
    And how are you and the Department incorporating lessons 
learned as we look to meet the challenges of the future?
    Secretary Del Toro. It is a great question, Congresswoman. 
And I have been deeply engaged on that issue since I became 
Secretary of the Navy.
    It is obviously important for us to build these great 
platforms and these great capabilities. It is also equally 
important for industry to deliver these things on time and on 
cost. And so, we have spent an enormous amount of time in the 
Navy and the Marine Corps talking to our PEOs [program 
executive offices] about ensuring that we are providing proper 
oversight over the acquisition programs in order to be able to 
hold the builders accountable for what they have contracted 
with the Department of Defense to deliver on.
    Equally important, I think it is important to control 
requirements creep on the part of the government, to ensure 
that when we agree to certain contracts we just don't continue 
to increase the requirements on those contracts, which adds a 
tremendous amount of additional costs to the individual 
contracts.
    CNO, would you like to comment further on this topic?
    Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, thanks for the question on the 
shipbuilding plan.
    I think a real key here is predictability and stability in 
the plan. And so, we have that for submarines out for the next 
15, almost 20 years. We aspire to do the same thing for the 
surface force.
    So, the Secretary has fought very hard to keep two 
destroyers a year in the shipbuilding plan this year. He has 
fought hard to keep an LPD in the plan for this year and, 
hopefully, to continue that line.
    But to give industry in the surface build--on the surface 
production line the same kind of predictability that you have 
in the undersea is what we are really trying to do, and to work 
closely with the Congress in order to follow through on that.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. Representing San Diego, I will 
look forward to working very closely with you on that.
    General Berger, last week I had the pleasure to visit with 
General Smith at I MEF. And one of the things we talked about 
was the health and deployability of the MEUs. And given that 
the 22nd MEU was unable to deploy on the updated timeline, what 
additional resources do you need to ensure the MEUs are 
deploying on time with proper manning, training, and equipment?
    General Berger. I can handle the Marine part and probably a 
tag team between me and Admiral Gilday.
    The cycle is very predictable for the Marine expeditionary 
units. They have the lead time, they have the planning time 
that they need to prepare, and to train up, and to man.
    So, I am very comfortable with the cycle of the Marines.
    The ability of the team to marry up with the amphibious 
ships is where the center of your question is. Absolutely bare 
minimum number of days to work together. Prior to that, the 
ship's crew has to have dedicated time to do their preparation 
work.
    So, in the end it is a function of the maintenance, the 
level of maintenance readiness of the amphibious ships. And 
part of the driver there--again, the admiral can speak clearer 
than I can--is how we have used them in the past and when we 
have extended them unplanned. All of that affects readiness 
now.
    But I will turn it over to Admiral Gilday.
    Admiral Gilday. The first thing we have to do is actually 
do the maintenance on the ships. And so, there was a period of 
time when we did not. We took a holiday from doing that.
    And as we get into a discussion about priorities and we 
talk about readiness, modernization, and capacity, if you want 
to--if you want to drive numbers you are going to pay for it 
with things like ship maintenance, ships' maintenance. That is 
not where we want to be. We have seen the second- and third-
order effects of that, including the impact on getting the 22nd 
MEU out on time.
    So, we are funding our maintenance accounts at 98 percent. 
We are trying to drive delay days down to zero. We were at 
7,700 a couple years ago. We are down to 3,000 right now. We 
are not satisfied. We want to get that down to zero delay days 
so that in terms of how we generate forces, how we generate 
ships to go to sea, that you can on any given day have 100 
percent assurance that the ships that are supposed to be out 
are actually out at sea.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you.
    And for the record, since I am running out of time, would 
just love to hear what the Navy's doing to increase manning and 
when surface ships will be fully manned, given that a GAO [U.S. 
Government Accountability Office] report found that the surface 
fleet is 15 percent undermanned compared to required level.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 154.]
    The Chairman [presiding]. We will take that for the record.
    Ms. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 
Secretary, General, and Admiral for being here today.
    As you know, my hometown of Oklahoma City is home to the 
Navy, excuse me, Strategic Command Communications--sorry, 
Strategic Communications Wing 1, also known as TACAMO [Take 
Charge and Move Out], based at Tinker Air Force Base. TACAMO 
carries out a mission of critical national security, providing 
coms [communications] backbone for the nuclear arsenal.
    Like many aircraft in the fleet, the E-6 aircraft used by 
TACAMO is aging and is in need of replacement. The Navy has 
requested $554 million for RDT&E [research, development, test, 
and evaluation] for 2023 to start capitalization of the C-130J.
    Given the differences in the aircraft specifications, the 
C-130J does not have the cruise speed, service ceiling, or the 
range of the E-6.
    My question is what criteria did the Navy use to select the 
C-130J to replace the E-6?
    Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, that was a warfighting criteria 
driven by the commander of STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command], 
who actually, who actually is serviced by those aircraft. So, 
his command and control is contingent upon it.
    So, that was a driver in terms of--in terms of determining 
what the replacement would look like and what it would actually 
be.
    Mrs. Bice. I think I am concerned about the diminished 
capability of this replacement aircraft, given the long 
distances the Navy aircraft may need to travel to alert at sea, 
How can the Navy justify the significant shorter range of this 
aircraft, given the mission?
    Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, if I could, what I like to offer, 
not to be evasive, but is to offer you a classified briefing 
that compares the existing TACAMO with, with the platform that 
we intend to replace it with.
    And also to talk about what we are doing to extend the 
service life of the existing platform so that you will 
understand completely what we are, what we are moving towards 
and why.
    Mrs. Bice. I would very much appreciate that, Admiral.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you for that offer.
    To follow up, can you talk about the Navy efforts to 
monitor, predict, and respond to supply chain threats? You all 
have talked a little bit in earlier questioning about supply 
chain. Do you have concerns that the vulnerabilities could 
impact readiness?
    And do you have any specific needs to ensure the 
acquisition and maintenance processes have a reliable supply 
chain?
    Secretary Del Toro. So, this is a problem not just for the 
Department of the Navy but for the entire Department of 
Defense. And we are working very closely with the Department of 
Defense, particularly the Under Secretary for Acquisition and 
Sustainment, and--to try to identify a greater number of supply 
chain vendors that can provide the necessary commodities and 
very specific equipment that is necessary, especially in the 
area of our subcontracting force.
    You know, we see a lot of the shortages, not just in the 
prime vendors but, actually, in the subcontracting force.
    And so, without going into details on our more highly 
classified programs, there is a great amount of effort being 
placed here to track exactly what those vulnerabilities are and 
to see what we can do to actually try to expand the supply 
chain in every possible way.
    The Department of Defense is embracing our small business 
program very aggressively across the country to try to include 
a greater number of vendors to provide these necessary products 
across the board. So, there is a lot of effort going on, 
Congresswoman.
    And we would be happy to provide you a brief with more 
specifics on those.
    Mrs. Bice. Thank you for that, Mr. Secretary.
    There has been noted concerns with the Navy's cybersecurity 
posture. It has been very clear to me in meetings that I have 
been in that workforce challenges continue to be a limiting 
factor in this space.
    Do you find the pipeline for cyber force growth limited--
limiting in order for the Navy to meet and sustain USCYBERCOM's 
[U.S. Cyber Command's] demands.
    Secretary Del Toro. So, this is an area that is extremely 
important to us, and we are putting a lot more attention to 
this here this year than ever before. The pipeline is an issue, 
of course. Cybersecurity jobs in the private sector are in high 
demand, and so recruiting people into this field is 
challenging. But I will give you an example of one thing that I 
think we are doing very creatively, in our community college 
program, for example, there is now a cyber track where our 
young enlisted sailors can actually apply to and start to build 
to become new cyber warriors, basically. So, we are trying to 
be as creative as we can. And perhaps our former 10th Fleet 
commander can address a few other issues.
    Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, we have, we have challenges just 
like industry does, just like NSA [National Security Agency] 
and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] do in terms of attracting 
talent. What we found is we haven't been doing a satisfactory 
job of managing that talent once, once they are in the Navy.
    And so, some deep-dive efforts over the past couple of 
months have uncovered some shortfalls in terms of our--in terms 
of the way we are training people, the way that we are 
preventing their skills from atrophying is another example.
    Not all of these fixes require that we lather it with a lot 
of money. Most of it is leadership and putting the right people 
in the right place.
    Mrs. Bice. Right.
    Admiral Gilday. So----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 154.]
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Mr. Carl is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing the best 
questions to be here at the end of this brief meeting.
    Mr. Secretary, great to see you, as always, sir.
    General, oorah!
    Admiral, I got some questions for you real quick. We show a 
lack of medical capability. And I am intrigued by the shallow 
water, the shallow draft capabilities of dedicated medical 
ships such as the EMS [Expeditionary Medical Ship].
    How does the EMS capability fit into the warfighter and the 
HADR [humanitarian assistance and disaster relief] needs?
    And how can having a better and more agile medical ship 
capability help our warfighters?
    Admiral Gilday. I see the--I see that--that ship is an 
opportunity. And so you are honestly limited only by your 
imagination in terms of the missions that you can actually put 
that vessel against.
    So, one of the things that we are doing is investing in a 
medical capability on two of those vessels, so, essentially, to 
give us, to give us two additional hospital ships beyond Mercy 
and Comfort.
    So that is something that after the initial two we can take 
a look at. We can see whether or not we should scale that 
further, whether or not that is satisfactory. But I think it 
allows us to close the capability gap rather quickly.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
    Admiral Gilday. Sure.
    Mr. Carl. Also, my next question is on the USS Enterprise, 
which was retired in 2012, decommissioned in 2017. And it has 
sat in storage at Hampton Roads since then. What is the 
schedule for the RFP [request for proposal] in order to 
appropriately dispose of this vessel?
    Secretary Del Toro. So, the RFP is actually being 
developed. And final determinations have not yet been made with 
regards to its--the approach. But it is currently being worked. 
And you should see that, I think, within the next month or two 
at the latest.
    Mr. Carl. All right. Thank you, sir. We are hitting 100 
percent here.
    As many of my colleagues have discussed here, I would like 
to add for the record that this shipbuilding plan is not 
sufficient. And I do understand you started talking about 
capabilities, how important that is. And I would love sometime 
to get a briefing on that and expand my knowledge so I am not 
just looking at numbers.
    Anyway, it is not significant to meet our threat, and 
especially in the Indo-Pacific.
    Admiral, you originally spoke about a need for a 500-ship 
Navy. How can the Navy possibly justify a shipbuilding plan 
that not only does not meet the threats but falls short of what 
the specified outline of the Navy's needs are? Why are we 
making the fleet smaller rather than larger?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, so, the shipbuilding plan itself 
doesn't truly capture those requirements in full. And the 
reason--the reason the alternatives don't is because the 
limiting factor besides funding is what the industrial base can 
actually produce over time.
    And so, one of the things we have been talking about with 
the committee today is, potentially, as we offer industry a 
clear set of headlights in terms of our demand signal, that we 
actually see those improvements on the production line in 
places like Bath, Maine, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, so that 
we could actually produce more ships and actually put us in a 
better place with respect to closing down on those 
requirements.
    Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir.
    I watched a documentary last night on B-42s. B-42s they 
would turn out one an hour. They built all that: the plants, 
they drew the plans, they did everything in a 1-year period of 
time, Henry Ford did. America has the capabilities to build 
more. If there's a need, let's build them.
    And I--and I call on you to let us know what you need to 
defend this country, because that is all of our goals, 
Republicans and Democrats, defend this country.
    Mr. Chairman, I turn my time back over. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. And those are all the questions we 
have for you, gentlemen.
    Thank you very much for the hearing. Lots of challenges to 
work together. But I think the plan you have put together is--
it gets us in the right direction. We need to work together to 
figure out what the budget is ultimately going to be and how we 
can cover these costs.
    But I thank you very much for your work, your service, and 
for your time today.
    And with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                              May 11, 2022

=======================================================================

      

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Admiral Gilday. During the hearing, I mentioned, ``within the past 
month we have increased our pass rate in an initial course down in 
Pensacola, Florida, from 40 to 50 percent to 80 percent by doing 
remedial training. . .'' To amplify this with context, the Navy has not 
yet experienced the 80% pass rate results due to the length of the 
FORGE training pipeline, but is confident we will see improvement based 
on the positive results achieved by the other services since they 
implemented this process. The Marine Corps and Air Force have 
demonstrated successful models upon which the Navy will capitalize. 
Navy invested four qualified Interactive Operator (ION) instructors 
down in Pensacola, FL (ION) to improve traditionally poor pass rates 
and throughput of Sailors in Computer Network Operations Qualification 
Course (CNOQC) and Foundational Operator Readiness Growth and 
Enrichment (FORGE). The four ION instructors are teaching the Marine 
Corps Cyber Operation Readiness Curriculum (MCCORC), an ION mentoring 
course, which started in April 2022. Early mentorship and intervention 
leverages service best practices to increase pass rates and throughput 
in CNOQC and FORGE. During the hearing, I referred to finding 
additional cyber operators that could have been better used in the 
teams. To clarify, we found about 80 exploitation analysts (EA) that 
were assigned to Navy billets not coded with the EA Navy Enlisted 
Classifications (NEC). We have changed the Navy's policy for 
distribution to ensure EAs are assigned to EA billets, with priority to 
CMF.   [See page 15.]
    General Berger. The Marine Corps is developing Marines and Civilian 
Marines with the right skill sets and matching their skills to duties 
they desire and are suited to perform. In FY20, FY21 and FY22, the 
Marine Corps spent $1.5M annually on recruiting, retention, and 
relocation. We are retaining our high performers by leveraging multiple 
retention tools, including: Cyber Excepted Service (CES) authorities, 
Total Local Market Supplement pay tables, cash awards, leadership 
development, education training and recognition. In particular, the use 
of CES authorities decreased employee turnover by 40% between FY21 and 
FY22. We are also recruiting individuals with critical skills by 
identifying and infusing talent through academia and programs such as 
National Security Agency's, United States Cyber Command's, and Marine 
Forces Cyber Command's apprentice programs. On the uniformed side, we 
have also developed strategic partnerships with the Naval Academy and 
Naval Reserve Training Officer Programs to identify midshipman who meet 
the eligibility criteria for the cyber community and bring them on as 
interns for their summer training. In an effort to more effectively 
balance a lengthy training pipeline with the length of a Marine's 
enlistment, a Marine who is selected for the cyber military 
occupational specialty, signs a five-year contract versus the typical 
four-year contract.   [See page 15.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
    Admiral Gilday. PEO (T) and PMA-265 concur with CNO comments with 
no additional position/information suggested from NAVAIR. Recommend any 
supplemental information/data be requested from N98 if needed on the 
CNO response to HASC. BLK III SLM first aircraft induct is Q1 FY23. 
First aircraft delivery is likely Q1 FY24. We should acknowledge and 
expect a 15 month turn-around time (best case) for FY23 inducts.   [See 
page 21.]
                                 ______
                                 
            RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
    Secretary Del Toro  and Admiral Gilday. The Shipyard Infrastructure 
Optimization Program (SIOP) continues to mature. With the tremendous 
support received from Congress and this committee, the program is 
advancing several initiatives across three lines of effort--dry dock 
modernization, optimization, and capital equipment. In Fiscal Year 
2022, the second increment of industrial modeling will commence, which 
will inform project design and construction. Area Development Plans 
will be completed at each public shipyard across the Future Years 
Defense Program utilizing the industrial modeling output. Additionally, 
funds will be utilized to begin project design for a Gerald R. Ford 
Class aircraft carrier-capable dry dock at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, 
award the construction contract for Dry Dock 8 Saltwater Upgrades at 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, award several restoration and modernization 
projects, and purchase capital equipment to replace aged elements to 
revitalize maintenance shop capabilities. I am committed to keeping 
Congress informed of the progress of this once-in-a-century 
recapitalization of the four public shipyards, and will continue to 
provide updates to our 5-Year Plan each year with the President's 
Budget submission.   [See page 26.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Secretary Del Toro. Our Security Cooperation (SC) tools build 
coalition lethality, interoperability, and military advantage, and 
bring value or Return on Investment to Department of the Navy (DON) 
acquisition.
    The DON develops partner capabilities through our tools of SC, 
including Foreign Military Sales and Cooperative and Building 
Partnership Capacity programs. Partner capability priorities reflect 
Chief of Naval Operations, Global Combatant Commanders, and Navy 
Component Commanders (NCC) guidance.
    NCCs provide guidance formally through their Theater Campaign 
Plans, which help identify areas of ``mutual interest'' and develop 
combat capability and capacity of the coalition of U.S. forces, allies, 
and partner nations, which in turn contribute towards formulation of 
domestic acquisition strategy.   [See page 27.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
    Admiral Gilday. All emergent mental health referrals (i.e., for 
suicidal or homicidal patients) are seen and evaluated the same day. 
Prior to the Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) 
activation, the wait time to see the ship's psychologist was 
approximately four to six weeks for a new patient evaluation, and 
approximately two to three weeks for a follow-up appointment. After the 
arrival of the additional psychologist and licensed clinical social 
worker, the ship's psychologist's wait time for a new patient 
evaluation decreased to approximately three weeks, and to approximately 
two weeks for a follow-up appointment. The Defense Health Agency 
standard for referrals for specialty care services, which includes 
behavioral health services, is 28 days. As a point of comparison, the 
average wait time across all Navy Medical Forces Atlantic military 
treatment facilities is 15.51 days (approximately 2 weeks), while the 
average wait time across all Tricare network providers is 34.82 days 
(approximately 4-5 weeks). Comparing times for only the Portsmouth 
area, the average is 12.7 days (less than 2 weeks) at Naval Medical 
Center Portsmouth, while the average in the local Tricare network is 
34.9 days (approximately 4-5 weeks).   [See page 36.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ
    Admiral Gilday. On June 22, 2022 the DNS-H FOIA office responded to 
the constituent and the response letter was sent via email. We have 
attached this letter for reference as enclosure (1).   [See page 38.]
    [The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 145.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
    Admiral Gilday. The total conference cost was $105,000. The 
majority of the cost was from attendee travel and per-diem. 96 
travelers out of 205 in attendance were on government orders for 
travel. The event was held in a government leased facility.
    NAVIFOR leadership is in the process of taking action on the key 
takeaways to capitalize on what was learned from the event in order to 
effectively drive DEI action and accountability across the IWC 
Enterprise.
    There were five key takeaways from the Summit:
    First, organizations should develop a long-range training plan 
incorporating as many inclusive learning events as possible, driving to 
mitigate as many barriers to inclusion as possible.
    Second, we still have a great deal to learn about DEI and how to 
operationalize inclusion. Simple techniques to operationalize inclusion 
were shared, these include: splitting teams in ``micro teams'' which 
enhances the team's ability to generate different perspectives and 
solutions, along with identifying the ``smallest executable step'' to 
test new ideas quickly.
    Third, retaining our talent is critical; the Navy and IWC need to 
better understand why some people stay even though they face adversity. 
Discussing career milestones were of utmost importance and are critical 
points of inflection for our Officers, Sailors, and Civilian workforce; 
the Summit afforded those to hear from participants of the Navy's 
Career Intermission Program (CIP). CIP, as discussed by the guest 
speakers, was successful in their experience, and allowed members to 
``off-ramp'' temporarily to better address and handle personal issues.
    Fourth, DEI is a complex problem that warrant all our combined 
resources to get it right. As individuals, we learned we have the power 
and charge to act on our own, however, we need to collaborate and 
tackle DEI across the IWC and Enterprise to make it successful.
    Finally, the Summit was a call to action. In the words of one of 
our keynote speakers, we need to ``go active, not passive!''   [See 
page 45.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
    General Berger. As Representative Bergman may remember from his 
days as the Commanding General, 4th Marine Air Wing (MAW), 4th MAW 
participates regularly in the 2nd MAW and 3d MAW Frag Conferences for 
scheduling aircraft support across the Marine Corps. The Frag 
conferences result in 4th MAW flying in support of the Marine Corps, 
supporting both Reserve and Active Component aviation requirements, at 
a frequency that places their squadrons in an operational status that 
far exceeds the normal 48 drill period and two week Annual Training. We 
believe that in certain cases, the Marine Corps can improve both 
logistical support and maintenance of both Reserve and Active squadrons 
by incorporating the Reserve squadron into an Active aircraft type-
specific group.
    The Reserve squadron will be co-located with the group 
headquarters, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS), and Marine 
Wing Support Squadron as well as other like aircraft squadrons on a 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) maximizing supportability. We are 
conducting a proof of concept of Active/Reserve Component integration 
by incorporating VMM-774 into Marine Aircraft Group-26, an active duty 
group with all flying squadrons possessing only MV-22 Ospreys.
    Access to MALS, simulators, and vast on site resources provided to 
the Reserve squadron at a MCAS vice being a tenant on another Service's 
base will likely improve readiness and streamline Naval Supply Systems 
Command logistics nodes. The proof of concept is scheduled for FY23.
    We are continuing to work the details for this proof of concept 
with VMM-774 still in transition from Naval Station Norfolk to MCAS New 
River. We can provide in progress reviews and a final assessment once 
the proof of concept period is complete.   [See page 42.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Admiral Gilday. Navy's Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 budget request 
includes investments in critical efforts in several key areas 
including: supplier development of capability and capacity, strategic 
outsourcing of large scale fabrication and heavy manufacturing, 
shipbuilder infrastructure, technology innovation to include additive 
manufacturing, and government oversight of submarine quality and 
material. With the help of Congress, and working with local, state, and 
national organizations, we are continuing to identifying opportunities 
to increase productive capacity, and improve efficiencies across the 
shipbuilding workforce and in the supply chain. As opportunities are 
identified, we will continue to incorporate those recommendations into 
future budget requests.   [See page 47.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
    Secretary Del Toro. There is a reduction in the number of VLS cells 
and it's a risk reward decision. The Navy had to make a value decision 
of what it's going to take to get these older platforms with less 
capable combat systems forward versus what investments we need to make 
that deliver a more capable, more lethal Navy in the future. This is 
also in the context that the United States Navy fights from the seabed 
to space; our submarines, our surface ships, and our aviation assets 
all contribute to the fight in addition to those platforms hosting VLS 
cells. The new era of strategic competition requires a modernized, 
capable, global, forward, and multi-domain Navy. The National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) underscores the need for the Department of Defense to 
move away from systems that provide less capability and do not 
significantly support our strategy and ability to win in a future 
fight. In the Fiscal Year 2023 budget, the Navy prioritized promising 
technologies that need to be fielded quickly and at-scale to be 
operationally relevant in the coming years to ensure that Navy meets 
Joint Force operational requirements, and made difficult choices to 
divest of ships that do not meaningfully support warfighting 
requirements.
    Separately, we have various metrics for how the Navy is employed. 
Underway and deployed were chosen as they provide U.S. government and 
military leadership a snapshot of the U.S. Navy's ability to respond 
for contingency operations that are reactive in nature. For budgetary 
purposes, we utilize underway days and flight hours--data that pertains 
to the spending of appropriations in a deliberate manner for the 
generation of U.S. Navy readiness.   [See page 52.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. BICE
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, like the other services and industry we are 
challenged funding sufficient capacity to meet and sustain our 
cyberforce. We remain committed to recruiting, retaining, and educating 
the best cyber workforce possible. Sailors are foundationally trained 
in Navy schools and Civilians are trained through Commercial 
Certification or by formal Education. At the tactical level, knowledge 
gaps are supplemented through government and commercial training. A key 
challenge is for training to keep pace with development. Navy has 
engaged with DOD CIO to provide in-depth, accurate information 
regarding cybersecurity work roles and the requirements to train and 
qualify personnel. The DOD Cyber Excepted Service (CES) is a mission-
focused personnel program that supports the human capital lifecycle for 
civilian employees engaged in or in support of a cyber-related mission. 
CES is an enterprise wide approach for managing civilian cyber 
professionals across the DOD, offering flexibilities and incentives in 
recruitment, retention, and professional development. For the Cyber 
Mission Force (CMF), the USCYBERCOM-defined training pipeline 
throughput for all work roles and course availability are limiting 
factors for completing the qualifications and accelerating Navy CMF 
growth. Navy's Information Warfare Type Commander (NAVIFOR) is working 
closely with Fleet Cyber Command and USCYBERCOM to expand and align 
training opportunities to maximize throughput.   [See page 61.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Navy's principal focus on 
this issue remains unchanged and increasing manning levels across the 
surface fleet is a strategic objective for the Navy. We are using a 
variety of Force Management tools to attack this issue, including:
      Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay, 
Sea Duty Incentive Pay, and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
      Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year 
tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea 
duty and curtailing shore duty tours).
    We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to 
filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative 
ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the 
Perform to Plan--Human Resources process to address a wide range of 
issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to 
close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the 
Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set 
of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will 
replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary 
incentives, non-monetary incentives, and early advancement 
opportunities for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.
    We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts 
such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match 
skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements. 
These efforts, combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and 
funding total ownership cost will ensure we have the Sailors to support 
the Navy that the Nation needs.
    Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and 
improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy 
HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning, and other enablers such as 
Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to 
recruiting, training, retention, and improved talent management.
    Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully 
and properly manned, with the right Sailor in the right place at the 
right time with the right training. The number of Sailors on 
operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have 
10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017.   [See 
page 59.]
    General Berger. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Secretary of the Navy.   [See page 59.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCCLAIN
    Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy's (DON) Next 
Generation Air Dominance effort remains on cost and on schedule. To 
reduce risk, the F/A-XX program is leveraging proven technologies to 
fill critical warfighting capability gaps. Iterative collaboration 
between government and industry teams has resulted in mature vendor 
concepts that balance advanced air dominance capabilities with long-
term affordability.
    The Navy's projected Strike Fighter Shortfall (SFSF) did increase 
since last year due to a reallocation of DON funding to priority 
programs in PB23, however the DON has the capacity to meet all 
operational and Combatant Commander requirements for training and 
deployments.
    The DON has two primary levers to meter Strike Fighter Inventory 
Management (SFIM) moving forward. First, the DON is procuring new F-35C 
aircraft to increase the capability and lethality of the Carrier Air 
Wing (CVW). Second, the DON intends to maintain 4th generation capacity 
though our F/A-18E/F Service Life Modification (SLM) program which 
extends service life while inserting the same Block III capabilities of 
new production aircraft. SLM Block III aircraft can be delivered for 
approximately one third the cost of a new production F/A-18 Super 
Hornet. Both of these levers have margin for adjustment in the future.
    In order to pace current and emerging threats, new procurement 
should focus on F-35C with Block 4 capabilities. The DON has requested 
six additional F-35C aircraft in the Fiscal Year 2023 Unfunded 
Priorities List (UPL) in order to achieve the most lethal and capable 
CVW as soon as possible. As more F-35Cs enter the Fleet, the overall 
requirement for F/A-18E/F aircraft will decrease while the combat 
capability of the CVW will increase.   [See page 54.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
    Secretary Del Toro. The Navy's Red Hill Shaft and Aiea-Halawa wells 
are currently offline. Bringing them back online is under discussion 
with the state, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other 
stakeholders, and the solution and timeline are still under 
development.
    For Red Hill Shaft, the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) issued 
an Emergency Order with a directive to bring the facility back online 
as a drinking water source. With a permitted capacity of about 4.7 
million gallons per day, this is an important water source for the Navy 
and water security for Oahu. The Navy is programming, planning, and 
designing a military construction project to construct a drinking water 
treatment facility to address any concerns of lingering contamination 
of the source water at the Red Hill facility. HDOH's Safe Drinking 
Water Branch will be a key partner in permitting the drinking water 
treatment facility.
    The Navy Aiea Halawa Shaft well was closed out of an abundance of 
caution after groundwater contamination was confirmed at the Red Hill 
Shaft. It will be reopened when it can be shown that pumping at this 
location does not pose a drinking water quality risk at this location 
or any other nearby wells (in particular, the Honolulu Board of Water 
Supply's Halawa Shaft). All available lines of evidence will be 
utilized in evaluating that risk, including water quality data from 
existing monitoring wells and new monitoring wells being drilled to 
characterize the extent of groundwater contamination and the 
effectiveness of groundwater remediation efforts, results of 
hydrogeological investigations, and installation of early-warning 
``sentinel'' wells to detect any contamination possibly migrating 
toward drinking water sources. The highest priority groundwater 
monitoring wells are expected to be installed by the end of this 
calendar year.   [See page 56.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Admiral Gilday. Modernization of Sea Based Strategic Deterrence 
must include the COLUMBIA-Class, TRIDENT II D5 Life Extension 2 
(D5LE2), and the nuclear warhead-W93/Mk7. Without D5LE2, insufficient 
Strategic Missile assets exist to support the COLUMBIA-Class starting 
with COLUMBIA hull #9. Additionally, D5LE2 modernizes the flight 
vehicle to promote effectiveness in expected threat environments 
throughout the life of the COLUMBIA-Class. Congressional support for 
funding of D5LE2's requirements is critical and the 2022 Nuclear 
Posture Review emphasized this. The W93/Mk7 program is critical to 
maintaining the credibility of our strategic deterrent, specifically in 
meeting STRATCOM's requirements to address emerging and future 
anticipated threats. The W93/Mk7 program will improve the safety and 
surety of our deployed nuclear stockpile as well as life-cycle 
affordability. The W93/Mk7 program is particularly crucial because the 
Mk7 aeroshell will be the reentry vehicle for the United Kingdom's 
Replacement Warhead program. Without this aeroshell, the United Kingdom 
will be unable to maintain their sovereign nuclear deterrent capability 
since this will be the UK's sole nuclear warhead program, being 
developed concurrently but independent of W93. The Navy works closely 
with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to develop a 
schedule for the W93/Mk7 program to meet STRATCOM requirements for 
capabilities required to address emerging and future threats. Due to 
infrastructure and labor force limitations, we are unable to accelerate 
the W93/Mk7 program, even with accelerated funding, without displacing 
other critical NNSA efforts.   [See page 57.]

?

      
=======================================================================


              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 11, 2022

=======================================================================

      

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of 
the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written 
testimony for today's event--meant to reflect the highest priorities of 
the Navy--doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did 
touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that ``there's a 
team working on this.''
    In the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into 
the ``get well'' plan that was directed at Navy's cyber activities, and 
I am not certain that a plan which aims to fix a supposedly urgent 
problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously. Taken 
all together, why should this committee believe the Navy is 
prioritizing cyberspace operations?
    Secretary Del Toro. With respect to Navy Cyber Mission Force (CMF) 
``get well'' plan, I directed CMF Readiness into the Navy's Performance 
to Plan Process (P2P). This process is chaired by the Vice Chief of 
Naval Operations and has addressed some of our Navy's most challenging 
readiness issues, such as fighter aircraft availability. It is a data-
driven process that derives the key factors for shortfalls in major 
programs across the Navy. This process is making sure we identify 
barriers and chokepoints so that as we move fast, we are deliberate in 
identifying places that add the most value to getting trained and 
qualified Sailors reporting to CMF on Day 1. In addition to this, we 
have taken these immediate steps to improve our readiness:
      Sending four Interactive On-Net (ION) operators to 
Pensacola, FL to recruit ION talent immediately after ``A'' school and 
to assess new talent and execute the Computer Network Aptitude Battery 
test, a screening tool to match the most qualified Sailors to the right 
training.
      Adopting the Marine Corps Cyber Operations Readiness 
Course preparatory training. Utilizing this course, USMC raised the 
pass rate from 50% in the Remote Interactive Operator Training course 
to 80% in FORGE. We expect to see similar results for Navy this year.
      Identifying near-term resources to support USCYBERCOM 
surge of FORGE courses to build more ION operators.
      Funding Force Generation/Cyber Qualification Team (CQT) 
classroom and IT space for continued Persistent Cyber Training 
Environment content development and CQT training to deliver individual, 
mission element, and team training at scale.
      Making cyber a key evaluation area and priority as part 
of our Navy's POM and Budget process. This has resulted in additional 
resources for cyber readiness.
    Finally, we are committed to partnering and working closely with 
USCYBERCOM and the Department of the Navy Principal Cyber Advisor.
    Mr. Langevin. I have been a big fan of the electromagnetic railgun 
program for a very long time, and was very disappointed to see that the 
Navy has opted to pause this program in FY23. This was an incredibly 
promising technology, and I anticipate the Department will look back on 
this decision with remorse. Why has the Navy paused the program, and 
how do you intend to leverage what was learned throughout the life of 
the program to inform other technological advances?
    Secretary Del Toro. The DON has accomplished all S&T objectives for 
Railgun launcher technologies including barrel life, energy storage, 
pulsed-power rep-rate operation, firing of Hypervelocity Projectiles 
(HVP), and demonstrating mega-amp current transfer for trainable 
mounts. The DON paused further investment in Railgun due to platform 
integration complexity, cost, and lack of a suitable Fire Control 
Architecture (FCA) for Integrated Air & Missile Defense missions on 
Navy surface combatants. The DON is putting Railgun ``on the shelf'' 
with a detailed technical data package and focusing S&T resources on 
developing a low-cost extensible FCA that could support a variety of 
precision kinetic interceptors, including HVP fired from 5" guns. A new 
Innovative Naval Prototype commencing in FY23 will focus on the FCA.
    If gun-based defense with HVPs and 5" guns is feasible and 
effective in the future, the Navy may re-examine whether the higher 
launch velocity of Railgun placed on future platforms would offer 
compelling advantages for expanded battle space and defeat of stressing 
maneuvering threats.
    While developing the Railgun technologies, the DON worked with a 
national consortium of military and Department of Energy laboratories, 
as well as industry and academic partners. The team achieved 
significant scientific advancements in a number of areas that will 
benefit or lead to other technology applications. A few highlights 
include:
      Modeling and simulation of complex multi-physics 
phenomena
      Electrochemistry of metals under high dynamic pressure
      Advanced thermal protection systems for projectiles 
experiencing high aero-thermal heating
      Novel techniques for refractory metal coatings
      Compact pulsed power systems
      Control systems with machine learning for enhanced real-
time diagnostics
      Mega-ampere current transfer through flexible cables and 
sliding contacts
      Electromagnetic shielding from effects of high intensity 
dynamic magnetic fields
      Demonstration and certification of high energy density 
lithium battery technologies on a Naval facility
      Shock-resilient electronics at high launch acceleration 
(>30 kG)
      Projectile fired up to Mach 6 muzzle velocity
    Mr. Langevin. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of 
the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written 
testimony for today's event--meant to reflect the highest priorities of 
the Navy--doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did 
touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that ``there's a 
team working on this.''
    In the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into 
the ``get well'' plan that was directed at Navy's cyber activities, and 
I am not certain that a plan which aims to fix a supposedly urgent 
problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously. Taken 
all together, why should this committee believe the Navy is 
prioritizing cyberspace operations?
    Admiral Gilday. With respect to Navy Cyber Mission Force (CMF) 
``get well'' plan, I directed CMF Readiness into the Navy's Performance 
to Plan Process (P2P). This process is chaired by the Vice Chief of 
Naval Operations and has addressed some of our Navy's most challenging 
readiness issues, such as fighter aircraft availability. It is a data-
driven process that derives the key factors for shortfalls in major 
programs across the Navy. This process is making sure we identify 
barriers and chokepoints so that as we move fast, we are deliberate in 
identifying places that add the most value to getting trained and 
qualified Sailors reporting to CMF on Day 1. In addition to this, we 
have taken these immediate steps to improve our readiness:
    1.  Sending four Interactive Operators (ION) to Pensacola, FL to:
      a.  Recruit ION talent immediately after ``A'' school
      b.  Assess new talent and execute Computer Network Aptitude 
Battery (CNAB) test, a screening tool to match the most qualified 
Sailors to the right training.
      c.  Adopted Marine Corps Cyber Operations Readiness Course 
(MCCORC) preparatory training. Utilizing this course, USMC raised the 
pass rate from 50% in RIOT to 80% in FORGE. Expect similar results for 
Navy this year.
    2.  Identify near term resources to support United States Cyber 
Command (USCYBERCOM) surge of FORGE courses to build more IONs.
    3.  Funding Force Generation/Cyber Qualification Team (CQT) 
classroom and IT space for continued Persistent Cyber Training 
Environment (PCTE) content development and CQT training to deliver 
individual, mission element, and team training at scale.
    4.  Making cyber a key evaluation area and priority as part of our 
Navy's Program Objective Memorandum and Budget process. This has 
resulted in additional resources for cyber readiness. Finally, we are 
committed to partnering and working closely with USCYBERCOM. In July we 
will be hosting warfighter talks and will focus on cyberforce 
readiness.
    Mr. Langevin. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of 
the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written 
testimony for today's event--meant to reflect the highest priorities of 
the Navy--doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did 
touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that ``there's a 
team working on this.''
    In the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into 
the ``get well'' plan that was directed at Navy's cyber activities, and 
I am not certain that a plan which aims to fix a supposedly urgent 
problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously. Taken 
all together, why should this committee believe the Navy is 
prioritizing cyberspace operations?
    General Berger. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Secretary of the Navy.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
    Mr. Larsen. In the recently published update to Force Design 2030, 
The Marine Corps listed 15 areas to prioritize for investments. 
Artificial intelligence is listed twice; as number 8, ``Network 
Modernization, to include artificial intelligence and cloud 
technologies'' and number 15, ``Artificial Intelligence-enabled force 
protection.''
    What progress is the Marine Corps making in artificial intelligence 
development? How are you educating officers and enlisted of all ranks 
on the importance and usefulness of artificial intelligence?
    General Berger. In order to gain, maintain and hold targets at risk 
in contested communications environments, the Marine Corps, as the 
stand-in force, must be able to sense and make sense of the operating 
environment. Recent technological improvements in computing and 
advances in AI development operations have increased applicability of 
these tools and techniques to tactical environments. Given the 
increasing volume of information available and necessary to make sense 
of the environment, it is imperative that we use AI to triage incoming 
data streams and maximize the effectiveness of our limited human 
processing and analytic resources. To do this, we must establish 
automated data pipelines that support deployment of AI models and data 
processing both in the cloud and at the tactical edge. The 
characteristics of cloud computing (on-demand self-service, broad 
network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured 
service) make it well suited to support AI efforts when compared to 
legacy on-premises hosting alternatives which will not scale to support 
emerging technologies. This infrastructure is needed to ensure the 
transport and availability of data to the underlying machine learning 
(ML) algorithms enabling AI. The Development Security Operations 
capability will use modern software development practices to 
continually modify, enhance, and secure the cloud-hosted data that is 
being processed and feeding the AI/ML as well as the algorithms that 
process the data. We are building capacity to organically develop 
applications, ensuring we meet the Deputy Secretary of Defense's intent 
to modernize DOD software, as ``the ability to securely and rapidly 
deliver resilient software capability is a competitive advantage that 
will define future conflicts.'' Our approach will ensure we can develop 
progressive web applications to weave together data from disparate 
sources, providing leaders data centricity with vital stores of 
actionable information. Through our organic software development 
capability, Commanders could develop or update algorithms at the speed 
of need, allowing for process optimization, catalyzing efficiencies in 
the kill chain, and increasing efficacy across every facet of their 
command and control. Both the private sector and government Science & 
Technology organizations are maturing ML models with targeting 
relevance and could provide utility to the Marine Corps. Technology 
transition is central to the Marine Corps' approach to generate rapid 
effects, while continuing to partner with other DOD Services and 
federal executive agencies.
    Mr. Larsen. How do you plan to update Professional Military 
Education at all ranks and MOS so Marines becomes familiar with Force 
Design 2030 history and intent at all levels of warfare (tactical, 
operational, and strategic)?
    General Berger. Since its publication in March 2020, Force Design 
(FD) 2030 implications have been incorporated and taught in both 
officer and enlisted resident and non-resident Professional Military 
Education (PME) courses. Marine Corps University (MCU) evaluates the 
ability of our joint forces to understand the strategic environment and 
think more critically about the challenges defined in FD2030 across PME 
and throughout all programs. Course Content Review Boards are conducted 
annually to ensure content is current, relevant, and consistent with 
the appropriate PME. University-level Curriculum Review Boards are the 
formal oversight mechanism to direct long-range strategic planning, 
coordination, and approval of academic programs and to evaluate 
academic curricula within the PME Continuum, ensuring adherence to 
mandated PME requirements, the needs of the Marine Corps, and 
applicable accreditation policies.
    As of the Course Review Boards for Officers in 2020/2022 and 
Enlisted in 2021, FD2030 elements have been areas of focus within MCU, 
some examples include: curriculum adaptations that educate and train on 
force design in the context of pacing threat challenges in contested 
environments; incorporating an Expeditionary Warfare School Tactical 
Decision Game on Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations/Littoral 
Operations in a Contested Environment/local sea control, reinforcing 
FD2030 concepts; Command and Staff College (CSC) students attend two 
classified briefs and two addresses from the Commandant on FD2030; CSC 
Distance Education Program students cover all aspects of FD2030 from 
concepts to acquisition programs, experimentation, naval integration, 
and pacing threats; School of Advanced Warfighting capstone exercise 
allows students to explore cross-domain deterrence, escalation, and 
contemporary warfighting, helping students visualize and describe how 
force design shapes contemporary competition; Marine Corps War College 
students cover FD2030 throughout the academic year, culminating with 
the capstone Global Wargame 2025 which evaluates Force Design; and the 
Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare provides numerous 
educational opportunities to increase student familiarity with concepts 
and implications of FD2030 through wargaming, the annual Innovation 
Summit, and multimedia outreach.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. What is the total number of COVID-19 exemption 
requests in the Navy? What is the number of religious exemption 
requests? How many exemption requests have been approved? How many 
religious exemption requests have been approved? How many are still 
pending decision?
    Admiral Gilday. The following table summarizes the Navy's COVID-19 
vaccination exemptions as of May 9, 2022.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8852.076

.epsData in the table includes Active Component and Selected Reserves 
(SELRES).
    Mr. Lamborn. What is the total number of COVID-19 exemption 
requests in the Marine Corps? What is the number of religious exemption 
requests? How many exemption requests have been approved? How many 
religious exemption requests have been approved? How many are still 
pending decision?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps tracks COVID-19 religious 
accommodation exemption requests and appeals from the time the request 
is submitted to Headquarters, Marine Corps. Exemptions under all other 
reasons are tracked once approved. Medical exemption requests are 
started by the member with a medical provider and commanders become 
aware only if the medical provider determines that exemption is 
appropriate. Administrative exemptions are temporary in nature and are 
usually related to a Marine's temporary duty that makes him or her 
unavailable for the first or second vaccination dose.
    As of 27 May 2022:
      HQMC has received 3,719 religious accommodation requests.
      499 Marines have an approved exemption requests:
      o 396 Temporary Administrative
      o 81 Temporary Medical
      o 22 Permanent Medical
      7 religious accommodation requests have been approved.
      27 religious accommodation requests are pending initial 
decision and 1,093 are pending appeal decisions.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
    Mr. Garamendi. The 10 LSDs that the Navy proposes to divest over 
the FYDP have not hit the end of their initial 40-year expected service 
life. Some have more than 10 years left in their lifecycle during the 
year of divestment. The Navy notes that divestment is needed because 
ships are in poor material condition and require significant resources 
to continue to maintain and operate. Why are these ships in such poor 
condition, and why weren't they maintained over their lifecycle?
    Secretary Del Toro. Over the course of their lifecycle, these ships 
were maintained. The Navy has multiple processes and organizations 
across the enterprise to maintain the material readiness of the Fleet 
including depot-level maintenance and modernization availabilities, 
intermediate-level maintenance, and, most importantly, the hard work of 
Sailors conducting preventive maintenance on these ships every day in 
the Fleet. However, as with any ship approaching its expected service 
life, it became increasingly costly to operate and maintain these 
ships. In some cases, the high demand for these ships and increased 
operations over their lifecycle contributed to a more rapid decline in 
material condition.
    Mr. Garamendi. The choices made during the acquisitions process 
when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that 
follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what 
intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired. 
Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been 
consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private 
expense in the past, resulting in ``reduced mission readiness and 
surging sustainment costs'' in some instances. How is the service 
improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service 
balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the 
acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?
    Secretary Del Toro. The Navy is improving how it acquires IP and 
technical data/computer software by conveying early on in the contract 
solicitation process and through increased attention during contract 
negotiations with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), the Navy's 
requirements for operations, maintenance, installation, and training 
technical data/computer software, as well as long-term provisioning 
needs for the platform. The Navy is utilizing tabletop exercises and 
roundtable discussions with subject matter experts to bring 
understanding prior to negotiations to provide insight beyond 
historical IP barriers and introducing innovative ways to valuate and 
acquire, or provide access to, technical data/computer software. The 
Navy is ensuring access agreements have been made for some critical 
sub-vendor data and is requesting detail specifications from the OEM in 
order to allow second-source production of components without incurring 
non-recurring engineering costs.
    The Navy will balance the cost of procuring technical data/computer 
software during the acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment 
benefits by gaining an early understanding of the different types and 
amounts of IP and technical data/computer software necessary to conduct 
a vast majority of sustainment activities. Through implementation of 
acquisition strategies and plans that clearly align to sustainment 
activities in accordance with 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2464, and ensuring 
consistent execution when contracting, the Navy will continue to 
institute strong and innovative approaches to valuate and obtain, or 
provide access to, IP and technical data/computer software necessary to 
sustain or increase platform mission capability and readiness.
    Mr. Garamendi. Over the FYDP, despite L-class ships entering the 
fleet, divestments of LSDs (i.e., 10 over the FYDP) will drop the total 
number of L-class ships to 24/25, well under the stated Marine Corps 
requirement of 31. The Navy plans to only procure one LPD Flight II in 
FY2023 and then complete procurement of the LPD Flight II line. How is 
the Navy going to reach the L-class ship numbers listed in the 
shipbuilding plan (i.e., 31 ships by FY30/31) if there are no more L-
class ships procured in the FYDP?
    Admiral Gilday. Traditional L-class amphibious ships are globally 
deployable, long-endurance ships focused on support to the Amphibious 
Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Light Amphibious Warship 
(LAW) will provide maneuver, mobility and sustainment to the Marine 
Littoral Regiment (MLR). Both types of ships are required to support 
the National Defense Strategy.
    The Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for 
Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, delivered to the 
Congress in April 2022, reflects procurement of both traditional L-
class ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD) as well as the Light Amphibious Warship 
(LAW) that achieves an inventory of 31 ships in FY31, consisting of 26 
traditional amphibious ships and five LAW.
    The Marine Corps' stated requirement for 31 amphibious ships refers 
to the traditional L-class ships in the Amphibious Readiness Groups 
(ARG) and does not include the LAW. The forthcoming Amphibious Fleet 
Requirement Study will set the requirement for traditional amphibious 
ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD) and inform POM24 force structure decisions.
    Mr. Garamendi. The Navy has planned to only procure one LPD Flight 
II in FY2023 and then complete procurement of the LPD Flight II line. 
The Navy states it will begin assessment of a next-generation 
amphibious ship (i.e., LPD(X)) in FY23. How long will this assessment 
take? If there are delays to procuring a next-generation amphibious 
ship, what is the risk to maintaining the industrial base because of a 
potential gap in amphibious ships being built?
    Admiral Gilday. In FY2023, the Navy will begin a one-year 
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) to determine the overarching 
requirements for the next amphibious ship.
    The Navy recognizes the importance of workload stability for our 
nation's shipbuilders and their supply chains. The Navy further 
recognizes the need to involve our shipbuilders and industry partners 
early and often in both the transition to and design of new ship 
classes--and will apply these lessons learned as we develop the 
requirements and acquisition plans for the follow-on class to LPD 
Flight II.
    The Navy is committed to making every effort to balance 
affordability and capability with industrial base stability and will 
reflect these commitments in future shipbuilding plans and budget 
submissions.
    Mr. Garamendi. The 10 LSDs that the Navy proposes to divest over 
the FYDP have not hit the end of their initial 40-year expected service 
life. Some have more than 10 years left in their lifecycle during the 
year of divestment. The Navy notes that divestment is needed because 
ships are in poor material condition and require significant resources 
to continue to maintain and operate. Why are these ships in such poor 
condition, and why weren't they maintained over their lifecycle?
    Admiral Gilday. Over the course of their lifecycle, these ships 
were maintained. The Navy has multiple processes and organizations 
across the enterprise to maintain the material readiness of the Fleet 
including depot-level maintenance and modernization availabilities, 
intermediate-level maintenance, and most importantly, the hard work of 
Sailors conducting preventive maintenance on these ships every day in 
the Fleet. However, as with any ship approaching its expected service 
life, it became increasingly costly to operate and maintain these 
ships. In some cases, the high demand for these ships and increased 
operations over their lifecycle contributed to a more rapid decline in 
material condition.
    Mr. Garamendi. The choices made during the acquisitions process 
when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that 
follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what 
intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired. 
Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been 
consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private 
expense in the past, resulting in ``reduced mission readiness and 
surging sustainment costs'' in some instances. How is the service 
improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service 
balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the 
acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?
    Admiral Gilday. Answered by SECNAV.
    Mr. Garamendi. The choices made during the acquisitions process 
when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that 
follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what 
intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired. 
Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been 
consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private 
expense in the past, resulting in ``reduced mission readiness and 
surging sustainment costs'' in some instances. How is the service 
improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service 
balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the 
acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps acquisition enterprise has been 
very deliberate in its approach to the procurement of technical data 
for precisely the reasons stated in the question. The decision to 
procure intellectual property associated with an acquisition program is 
arrived at on a case by case basis, however, the factors that go into 
that decision are largely consistent from program to program. The 
program manager must first consider the appropriate rights of the 
government based on the level of government funded development which is 
often contentious between the Government and the vendor. This will set 
the conditions for what data rights the Government must pay for and 
allow for the pricing of these rights. The Marine Corps has been very 
successful recently asserting the Government's right to key technical 
data, even when it required court action as was the case with the 
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement program. More recently the program 
manager for the Advanced Combat Vehicle utilized contractual withholds 
to ensure the delivery of critical provisioning data necessary to 
support sustainment of that important platform.
    Basic engineering data for provisioning, the data required to allow 
Defense Logistics Agency to stock the parts, is nearly always included 
as a deliverable in our larger programs. While the data required to 
repair the end item organically is also typically procured, the data to 
organically repair sub-components is determined through a deliberate 
Level of Repair Analysis, which drives the program's Product Support 
Strategy. This analysis takes into account a variety of factors 
including the complexity of the repair action vs. the skill level of 
the Military Occupational Specialty performing the maintenance action 
at each echelon of maintenance (organizational, intermediate or depot), 
any special purpose tools and/or test equipment, maintenance facility 
requirements, repair cycle time, long lead time parts, the end item's 
anticipated service life, the cost of the repair part, the Government 
owned rights of the associated technical data, and the operational 
value of being able to make the repairs in the field. As we keep 
equipment in the inventory for longer and longer periods of time, 
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Materiel Shortages and 
obsolescence becomes a greater consideration, and the lack of component 
level technical data can become an impediment to the procurement of 
repair parts. However, it is unlikely that procurement of a complete 
data package, at a considerable cost, at the time of end item 
procurement, would resolve this issue as the designs of our end items 
continue to evolve through their lifecycles due to changing 
requirements, evolving threats and capability enhancements. Finally, we 
will continue to aggressively acquire the rights that the Government is 
entitled to and where and when appropriate purchase additional data 
rights when the long term sustainment benefits justify the investment.
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
    Ms. Speier. Secretary Del Toro, the Navy's budget documents 
indicate that the Navy is pursing public-private partnerships to expand 
child care for sailors in Norfolk. Would you elaborate on the Navy's 
plans for public-private partnerships for child care? How many children 
could potentially be served? And is the Navy considering using this 
approach in other regions with long wait lists, such as Hawaii, San 
Diego, and the Puget Sound region?
    Secretary Del Toro. The Navy had the first leased community 
military childcare facility with the Crown Child Development Center, in 
San Diego. The lease agreement with city of Coronado, signed in June 
2020, is funded by Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC). This 
innovative approach was successful because it lined up Navy 
requirements with a former elementary school. Extension of the Coronado 
lease is under review with the potential to expand by an additional 60 
spaces in FY23. This is an example of a successful partnership that the 
Navy is looking to replicate in other areas.
    The Navy is continuing to seek partners in locations to include the 
Norfolk/Hampton Roads region, the Jacksonville/Mayport area, Naval Base 
Kitsap, and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi. Without knowing the scope 
of the partnership the Navy cannot estimate how many children could be 
served.
    Navy CYP continues to explore all options to expand childcare 
offerings to include working with the Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy) on their 
initiatives.
    Ms. Speier. Secretary Del Toro, in May 2020, GAO published report 
GAO-20-61, which recommended that ``The Secretary of the Navy should 
develop a plan, with clearly defined goals, performance measures, and 
timeframes, to guide and monitor the Navy's female active-duty service 
member recruitment and retention efforts. (Recommendation 3).'' DOD 
concurred with this recommendation, and GAO says that the Navy 
estimated that it would complete this plan by December 2021. However, 
the GAO recommendation is still open because the plan has not yet been 
completed.
    When does the Department of the Navy expect to complete the plan 
requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020 report on recruitment 
and retention of female service members?
    What progress has the Navy Department made so far in addressing 
this recommendation?
    What actions has the Navy taken, and what actions is the Navy 
planning to take, to improve recruitment and retention of female 
service members?
    Secretary Del Toro. 1. When does the Department of the Navy expect 
to complete the plan requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020 
report on recruitment and retention of female service members?
    The Navy's plan, requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020 
report on recruitment and retention of female service members, was 
completed in December 2021. Implementation of the plan is ongoing, 
guided by the Chief of Naval Operations' ``CNO NAVPLAN'', released 11 
January 2021, and executed by release of the Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations' ``Navigation Implementation Plan Framework''.
    2. What progress has the Navy Department made so far in addressing 
this recommendation?
    The Navy has established the Office of Women's Policy; monitored 
representation in Navy Personnel Command staff; used diversity 
statistics in promotion board Record of Proceedings; tracked 
demographics of board membership and expanded post-board statistics to 
ensure Navy has a standardized, equitable, and transparent promotion 
selection process; partnered with affinity groups, specifically the Sea 
Services Leadership Association to host the Joint Women's Leadership 
Symposium that targets the recruitment and retention of women in the 
Navy; and conducted Navy Community Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion 
conferences that addressed female retention and recruitment efforts. 
Recent examples include: NAVIFOR, CNAF, and CNSF DEI Conferences. After 
action reports based on attendee feedback informed actions taken/policy 
regarding female recruitment and retention, mentoring, and barrier 
analysis.
    3. What actions has the Navy taken, and what actions is the Navy 
planning to take, to improve recruitment and retention of female 
service members?
    Starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, the Navy increased the 
aspirational goal from 25% to 30% for female accessions. This would 
increase female accessions by 1,500 for FY23. We currently have 20.5% 
women serving in both the active and Reserve components, an increase of 
1% since release of GAO report. We are working to complete female 
officer and enlisted submarine integration for the SSBN platforms. At 
the end of FY 2021, 23 crews were integrated with officers and 10 crews 
with enlisted. Naval Special Warfare continues to synchronize 
recruiting and accession efforts with Commander, Navy Recruiting 
Command (CNRC), Recruit Training Command (RTC), and Naval Service 
Training Command (NSTC). All required NSW facility and supply 
preparation requirements have been met and Commander, Naval Special 
Warfare Center (COMNAVSPECWARCEN), is prepared for the arrival of 
female Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) and Special Warfare Combatant-craft 
Crewman (SWCC) candidates. As of January 2021, NSW maintains four 
permanent billets for Women in Special Operations Forces (WISOF) cadre 
and the cadre are integrated into all phases of training and selections 
to normalize female presence, participation, and contributions, 
including SEAL Officer Assessment and Selections (SOAS). In 2021, the 
NSW Force Integration Officer was added to the SOAS cadre due to the 
need for additional female cadre presence and support.
    Ms. Speier. ADM Gilday, GAO has found that the surface fleet is 
undermanned by about 15%, and we understand that about 5,000 sea 
billets in the forward-deployed fleet are unfilled, and in addition to 
these issues, sometimes billets that are filled have the improper fit. 
How will the Navy's proposed plan to decommission ships affect 
undermanning? Will the crews from the decommissioned ships be 
reallocated to remaining ships in the fleet to improve fit and fill? If 
Congress allows the Navy to proceed with its decommissioning proposal, 
by how much will manning improve in the next two years? What other 
actions is the Navy taking to address undermanning and improper fit?
    Admiral Gilday. Personnel onboard ships proposed to decommission 
will be re-billeted to meet their individual sea/shore rotation 
requirements as well as Fleet Readiness needs
    Navy's principal focus on this issue remains unchanged and 
increasing manning levels across the surface fleet is a strategic 
objective for the Navy. We are using a variety of Force Management 
tools to attack this issue, including:
      Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay, 
Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP) and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
      Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year 
tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea 
duty and curtailing shore duty tours).
    We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to 
filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative 
ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the 
Perform to Plan--Human Resources process to address a wide range of 
issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to 
close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the 
Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set 
of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will 
replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary 
incentives, non-monetary incentives and early advancement opportunities 
for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.
    We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts 
such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match 
skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements. 
These efforts--combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and 
funding total ownership cost will ensure we have the Sailors to support 
the Navy the Nation needs.
    Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and 
improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy 
HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning and other enablers such as 
Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to 
recruiting, training, retention and improved talent management.
    Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully 
and properly manned, with the right Sailor, in the right place, at the 
right time, with the right training. The number of Sailors on 
operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have 
10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017.
    Ms. Speier. ADM Gilday, the Army has fully implemented a Commander 
Assessment Program to improve the selection process for battalion and 
brigade commanders, using a suite of assessments including, most 
importantly, a behavioral interview and a survey of peers and 
subordinates about leadership behaviors. I am encouraged that Naval 
Special Warfare has also fully implemented a similar program for 
selecting commanders, and the Commandant has stated his intention to 
implement a similar commander assessment program across the Marine 
Corps. I understand that the U.S. Navy surface warfare and submarine 
communities are conducting pilots to test using a more thorough 
assessment before selecting commanders. Given repeated news about ship 
COs being relieved for climate issues and toxic leadership, it seems to 
me that a more thorough command selection process should be a high 
priority for the Navy.
    What have been the results so far of the Navy's pilots of a 
commander assessment program?
    Do you agree that the commander selection process in the Navy must 
be improved, and how do you intend to improve commander selection?
    Would you commit to implementing an approach similar to the Army's 
commander assessment program across the entire Navy, including use of 
surveys of peers and subordinates about leadership behaviors, and 
accelerating implementation of such a program?
    Admiral Gilday. Navy is committed to implementing an approach 
similar to the Army's Commander Assessment Program (CAP). The Navy 
Leadership Assessment Program (NLAP) is this program and is currently 
in the testing and development phases across the Navy--within Type 
Commands (TYCOM) (e.g. Aviation, Surface, Submarines, and Naval Special 
Warfare) and other officer communities. Assessment and selection 
programs have proven beneficial in the Department of Defense Special 
Operations communities as well as the civilian corporate sector for 
decades. Assessment and selection programs save costs, increase 
retention, decrease incidents of misconduct, and increase productivity 
with data-driven decision making using valid and reliable assessments. 
NLAP is intended to augment the existing command selection process to 
inform leadership decision making and drive talent management. The 
continued development of NLAP will increase the Navy's likelihood of 
placing those who possess the right attributes for essential command 
positions and passing on those who are less suited (e.g., toxic, weak, 
ineffective officers and leaders). This will lead to better command 
environments and a better Navy culture as a whole.
    Navy has completed pilots with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
and Commander, Naval Submarine Force (SUBFOR). Navy Personnel Command's 
Operational Psychologist was the primary consultant in the development 
of Navy Special Warfare's (NSW) NLAP during the initial pilots in early 
2021 and has provided ongoing consultation as the program reaches 
maturity. Additional pilots are planned for this summer with Commander, 
Naval Surface Force (SURFOR), Commander, Naval Air Forces (AIRFOR), the 
Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) community, and the Human Resources (HR) 
community. Each pilot will include cognitive and non-cognitive 
assessments, interviews by trained operational psychologists, and a 
formal interview panel chaired by TYCOM and community commanders/
leaders. NSW and SUBFOR have developed, and are validating, peer and 
subordinate surveys that will be piloted in each TYCOM and officer 
community NLAP pilot. Lessons learned from each pilot iteration enable 
refinement of the assessment process and validate the utility of the 
program. The Navy is moving forward at pace with NLAP.
    Ms. Speier. ADM Gilday, during the hearing it was made clear that 
the Navy does not have the cyber force that it needs. I understand that 
the Navy is short of active-duty cyber officers in the grades of O-4 to 
O-6. Yet, I was briefed earlier this year that the Navy had not 
utilized the lateral-entry constructive credit authority to commission 
any active-duty cyber officers. This authority, created by Sec. 502 of 
the FY19 NDAA, was created to help the services address this problem by 
accessing experienced technical talent, including cybersecurity 
experts, from the private sector and commissioning them at an advanced 
rank. The Army has aggressively used these authorities to fill active-
duty cyber security needs, and I understand that the Air Force is 
beginning to establish a direct commissioning program for active-duty 
cyber officers using this authority.
    Why has the Navy failed to use the Sec. 502 authority to fill its 
active-duty cyber officer gaps, and does the Navy plan to begin using 
this authority, and what is the Navy's goal for number of accessions 
under this authority? If not, does the Navy face barriers to using this 
authority that require congressional action to correct, and if so, 
please indicate what the Navy needs from Congress to successfully use 
this authority to meet the Navy's cybersecurity needs.
    Admiral Gilday. The Secretary of the Navy expanded the use of 
constructive service credit for active component cyber warfare 
engineers (CWE) and engineering duty officers (EDO).
    For most officer communities, initial specialty training and 
qualifications earned in the junior officer grades offset the need and 
desire to direct commission individuals to ranks other than ensign. The 
Navy desires to use constructive service credit for CWEs and EDOs, but 
did not find individuals in fiscal year 2021 with advanced training, 
experience, and education that desire to join the Navy and meet 
military service-entry requirements.
    While there is no specified constructive credit accession quota, 
there is no limit, percentage wise, for accessions to receive 
constructive credit if their education/experience meets all the 
requirements for constructive service credit.
    Navy has no barriers utilizing constructive service credit when a 
candidate meets all requirements; therefore no Congressional action is 
requested.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. Is Navy and/or Marine Corps exploring directed energy 
counter-UAS solutions to include lasers and high power microwave 
technology?
    Secretary Del Toro. Directed Energy (DE) weapons include both High 
Energy Lasers (HEL) and High Power Microwaves (HPM) and offer a number 
of compelling attributes for military missions, including precision 
engagement and deep magazine. The Navy's primary interest is to use DE 
to enhance Area and Terminal Defense against Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles 
(ASCM) and enable more effective use of conventional weapons for both 
ship defense and offensive strike, as well as providing cost-effective 
solutions to swarm UAV and FAC-FIAC attack. In addition, both the Navy 
and Marine Corps are evaluating the potential utility of DE for 
counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS).
    The Navy has been maturing laser technologies while conducting 
rapid prototyping to accelerate DE fleet integration and operational 
experimentation, with 9 systems fielded on ships by 2023. Example Navy 
laser efforts with c-UAS implications include:
      Mk 5 Mod 0 High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-
dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) and Solid State Laser--Technology 
Maturation (SSL-TM) are high power lasers that can defeat unmanned 
aerial systems and counter fast-attack surface craft. SSL-TM was 
deployed on USS PORTLAND in 2021/2022 and HELIOS is being installed on 
USS PREBLE for deployment in 2023.
      AN/SEQ-4 Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN) is a 
low power laser to dazzle threat UAS sensors. Eight ODIN units are 
being installed and deployed on DDG51 combatants by 2023 to address 
urgent operational needs in 5th and 7th fleet.
      The Layered Laser Defense (LLD) project was a Navy 
partnership with Lockheed Martin which demonstrated tracking of UAS 
targets and defeat of a subsonic target drone (representing an ASCM 
threat) at the High Energy Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF) at White 
Sands Missile Range in February 2022.
    For HPM, the focus of Navy and Marine Corps applications is for 
semi-fixed or mobile c-UAS capability that is scalable from tactical 
vehicles to various ship classes, low-cost, and effective across a wide 
variety of potential UAS threats. ONR is pursuing a number of 
technology approaches, including systems based on conventional vacuum 
tubes as well as solid-state transmitters that offer enhanced frequency 
agility.
    Mr. Scott. Are you committed to opening the new National Museum of 
the U.S. Navy in the vicinity of the Washington Navy Yard and 
accessible to the general public in time for the U.S. Navy's 250th 
birthday on October 13, 2025?
    Secretary Del Toro. Per 10 U.S.C. Sec. 8617, the Department of the 
Navy is in the process of entering into an agreement with the National 
Museum Development Foundation (NMDF) to support the development, 
design, construction, renovation, or operation of a multipurpose museum 
campus to house the National Museum of the United States Navy. Subject 
to compliance with environmental requirements, the Navy's goal is to 
hold a major milestone ribbon cutting and groundbreaking event for 
Phase 1 of the project on the Navy's Birthday in 2025.
    Mr. Scott. Rear Admiral Kiril Mihaylov, Commander of the Bulgarian 
Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings, ``The completely 
transformed security situation in the Black Sea region presents new 
tasks for the Bulgarian Navy that require additional capabilities.'' Is 
the United States Navy prepared to help the Bulgarian Navy with 
developing new naval capabilities?
    Admiral Gilday. The United States Navy is fully prepared to work 
with the Bulgarian Navy in developing new naval capabilities. Our Navy 
team is actively engaged with the Bulgarian Navy--a recent example 
being a 6-10 June 2022 NAVEUR-led assistance visit. Efforts include 
development of enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness and Undersea 
Awareness, as well as the refinement of additional capabilities 
requested by the Bulgarian Navy. Capabilities such as integrated 
Maritime Domain Awareness in the Black Sea lie squarely in our national 
interests. In order to develop this Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
capability, we need sustained (i.e., reliable and programmable) and 
sufficient (i.e., adequate to address the full spectrum of MDA) 
security cooperation funding with tightly aligned Title 10 and Title 22 
funds.
    Mr. Scott. Captain Giedrius Premeneckas, Commander-in-Chief, 
Lithuanian Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings, 
``Fulfilling the maritime state's vital interests and being an equal 
NATO partner are the priorities of today to face future challenges and 
threats.'' What is the United States Navy doing to help the Lithuanian 
Navy face future challenges and threats?
    Admiral Gilday. We have a significant security cooperation effort 
with the Lithuanian Navy. Its shared border with Kaliningrad, 
highlights the necessity that our maritime security efforts in 
Lithuania are part of a regional approach. Our significant U.S. Navy 
presence and a number of programs are designed to support the 
development of increased Lithuanian Navy capability and 
interoperability with allies and partners. These include Significant 
Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCIs) to develop greater MDA, 
modernize their Mine Counter Measures Capability (MCM) and increase 
interoperability. We are aggressively pursuing operations, activities 
and investments to build a Navy capable of contributing to a regional 
approach that will not only counter Russian malign activity but 
increase long term regional security. In order to be successful, we 
need sustained (i.e., reliable and programmable) and sufficient (i.e., 
adequate to address the full spectrum of MDA) security cooperation 
funding with tightly aligned Title 10 (i.e., SSCI) and Title 22 funds.
    Mr. Scott. Rear Admiral Rune Andersen, Chief of the Royal Norwegian 
Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings,'' . . . we need to 
build a bridge to the future, and this includes figuring out the risks 
and opportunities offered by emerging and potentially disruptive 
technologies.'' What plans does the U.S. Navy have to cooperate with 
the Royal Norwegian Navy on figuring out the risks and opportunities 
offered by emerging and potentially disruptive technologies?
    Admiral Gilday. Norway, the United States and 11 other countries 
are signatories of the Anti-Submarine Warfare London Technology Bridge 
Initiative to develop a deployable Anti-Submarine Warfare Barrier. This 
initiative will kick off this summer and drive specific challenges to 
industry. Additionally, Norway is a participating member in the Office 
of Naval Research led program for International Cooperative Engagement 
Program for Polar Research. This program includes research areas such 
as environmental monitoring, communications, navigation and ice 
hardening.
    Mr. Scott. 2022 marks the 500th anniversary of the Royal Swedish 
Navy. What plans does the U.S. Navy to commemorate this historic 
anniversary of the Royal Swedish Navy?
    Admiral Gilday. U.S. Navy commemoration of the 500th Anniversary of 
the Swedish Navy included a port visit by four warships and the 
participation of the 6th FLEET Commander Vice Admiral Gene Black in the 
ceremony marking the event. All four ships then participated in 
Exercise BALTOPS, along with ships from the Swedish Navy and other NATO 
and partner nations. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff hosted the Swedish Minister of Defense aboard USS KEARSARGE in 
port Stockholm.
    Mr. Scott. Commander Jihoon Yu, Republic of Korea Navy, and Erik 
French, wrote an article in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings entitled, 
``The U.S.-ROK Alliance as an Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnership: 
Traditionally land-based, the U.S.-ROK partnership should adopt a 
maritime focus for the modern era.'' According to the authors, ``A 
larger naval presence led by a higher-ranking U.S. naval commander 
would strengthen the relationship between the two navies.'' Would 
permanently homeporting several U.S. surface combatants at the ROK 
naval base in Jeju enhance ties between the ROK Navy and the U.S. Navy?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy is constantly assessing its force posture 
in regards to handling future security threats. Our current force 
posture in Northeast Asia provides the U.S. sufficient ability to 
respond to contingencies while sustaining a forward-deployed and ready 
naval force. There are presently no plans to permanently homeport any 
U.S. Navy surface combatants in the ROK naval base in Jeju or any 
changes to the USN command structure in ROK. Annual reviews of USN 
force structure in company with USINDOPACOM posture reviews allows us 
to ensure our current laydown is tailored for today's security 
challenges.
    Mr. Scott. Will the ROK Navy and the U.S. Navy conduct naval 
exercises farther from ROK shores, working alongside one another in 
blue-water environments along SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and South China 
Sea? Moreover, will these exercises be focused on an expanding range of 
activities, beginning with simple passing-and-maneuver exercises and 
growing to encompass underway replenishment, interdiction, 
antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and surface warfare?
    Admiral Gilday. COMPACFLT intends to support the ROK Navy in 
expanding its operations throughout the USINDOPACOM AOR and encourages 
it to continue expanding its participation in naval exercises farther 
from ROK shores in support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. COMPACFLT 
also encourages the ROK Navy, under its Look South policy, to join in 
exercises or operations in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea; and we 
hope this will be realized in the coming year. In 2022, COMPACFLT has 
already been able to obtain ROK Navy participation in at least 5 
exercises, occurring outside of the Korean Peninsula.
    Mr. Scott. Is the Navy using the right processes, standards, and 
policies to build and deploy an unmanned fleet?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy continues to drive the advancement of 
unmanned systems into the fleet architectures for today and the future. 
We remain committed to documenting, developing, and iterating the 
processes, standards, and policies based on our campaign of learning 
devoted to understanding the systems of systems approaches necessary to 
field new and emerging capabilities into robust fleet assets.
    Our ongoing efforts in the development of Unmanned Maritime 
Autonomy Architecture (UMAA), Rapid Autonomy Integration Labs (RAIL), 
as well as U.S. and NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG) all 
support the balance of rigor and flexibility needed to advance unmanned 
systems (platforms and software) at scale and pace. The development of 
these architectures, standards, and processes continue to leverage 
industry partners at all stages to ensure we understand the needs of 
all our stakeholders from the fleet to our industry partners.
    Mr. Scott. What concerns does Industry have with the Navy's ABS 
certification and MOSA for U.S. Shipbuilding?
    Admiral Gilday. Industry is concerned about both the draft status 
of the ABS certification process and the level of effort required to 
achieve the certification. Industry is currently engaging with the Navy 
and ABS to initiate the certification process for their concept designs 
to begin to mitigate those concerns and mature the process.
    The Navy is primarily using a Modular Open Systems Approach for the 
development of the autonomy software across platforms using Unmanned 
Maritime Autonomy Architecture (UMAA) standards. Industry is heavily 
involved in the development of the UMAA standard and the integration/
testing across U.S. Industry sees the value in an open architecture 
which allows parallel development of severable modules such that no 
single vendor/capability constrains the advancement of other modules by 
other industry partners.
    Mr. Scott. What feedback can industry provide the Navy's request 
for owning the interfaces, data rights, and the highly reliable/
sustainable systems?
    Admiral Gilday. For unmanned surface and undersea systems, the Navy 
is pursuing a government-owned autonomy software with applicable 
government-purpose data rights for critical interfaces to support 
validation of cybersecurity requirements, reduce overall programmatic 
and acquisition expenditures, increase the pool of potential software 
vendors outside traditional Department of Defense contractors, and 
increase the rate at which software can be reused and redeployed across 
a portfolio of unmanned maritime vehicles. This approach has been 
successfully adopted and accepted in other Navy advanced technology 
areas, for example, in both surface ship combat systems (AEGIS Weapon 
System and Ship Self-Defense System) and for Submarine Warfare 
Federated Tactical Systems. The Navy remains open to hearing and 
understanding industry's perspective and will continue to collaborate 
with industry to strike the right balance in government/industry data 
and configuration ownership.
    Mr. Scott. Should industry and the government look at different 
development, test, and evaluation business models for autonomy?
    Admiral Gilday. The government has been pursuing a government-owned 
autonomy software baseline that supports the development, test, and 
evaluation of unmanned maritime vehicles. In the scope of this work, 
the government and industry are working together to support standards 
development for unmanned ships via the Unmanned Maritime Autonomy 
Architecture (UMAA). Based off industry feedback, the UMAA Standards 
Board has divided interface capability requirements into a stable set 
of core services and those services which are experimental in nature. 
The set of core services address foundational elements for autonomous 
vessel mission accomplishment while the experimental services require 
additional testing, feedback, and validation from industry and 
government partners before transitioning into the set of core services. 
The industry and government collaboration on this shared effort has 
been critical for the overall success of unmanned maritime vehicles to 
date, and the Navy continues to explore further models that can satisfy 
all stakeholder's interests in the future.
    Mr. Scott. Does NAVSEA have the necessary engineering and technical 
depth to evaluate and build these new unmanned ships?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes--the Navy has core expertise in the areas of 
shipbuilding, program management, and vehicle systems engineering. 
However, the Navy is leveraging expertise across industry, academia, 
and other government to evaluate and build new unmanned ships. A 
collaborative approach is critical for developing the standards and 
state-of-the-art systems required to field unmanned ships.
    Mr. Scott. Are versatile, robotic submarines a potential game-
changer in the Western Pacific?
    Admiral Gilday. In order for the United States Navy to retain our 
strategic maritime advantage, we must increase our capabilities to 
include faster decision making, tactical reach and endurance while 
minimizing risk to our personnel. The Navy recognizes that unmanned 
systems, autonomy and artificial intelligence play a key part in future 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) for all phases of military 
operations. As outlined in the Unmanned Campaign Framework, the Navy 
will continue to develop and expand its Fleet of unmanned vehicles to 
deliver affordable, scalable, lethal and connected capabilities.
    Specifically, in the undersea domain, unmanned undersea vehicles 
(UUVs) serve as versatile autonomous platforms, operating in a 
dispersed manner and offering the flexibility the evolving threat 
environment demands. UUVs will go farther, deeper and endure longer in 
extremely harsh conditions in order to deter and deliver lethal and 
non-lethal effects. A hybrid fleet of manned/unmanned capabilities is 
necessary to execute the full range of undersea operations to both meet 
emerging security concerns, and provide persistent presence ensuring 
undersea dominance in our Future Fleet.
    Mr. Scott. what can be done to expedite the deployment of an 
unmanned fleet?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy has generated a cross-functional team 
(Unmanned Task Force) charged with identifying and pressing through 
barriers, solving near-term operational problems, and supporting the 
future hybrid force in concert with the Operational, Acquisition, and 
Research enterprises.
    The current approach includes an aggressive campaign of learning 
with a focus on rapid and risk-worthy experimentation, as well as 
driving down limiting factors in order to field our future unmanned 
capabilities. A risk-appropriate approach to fielding small and 
disruptive systems today enables us to take an evolutionary approach to 
develop and scale the major investments of the hybrid fleet of 
tomorrow.
    We, as a nation, will need to continue to execute the campaign of 
learning as a priority. We must remain dedicated to rigorous systems 
engineering efforts, grow our data and model based systems engineering 
capabilities, prove mature technology in land based testing 
environments, mature standards and policies in partnership with 
industry, demonstrate responsible fiscal agility, and experiment in 
forward operational environments with real time feedback. With a 
deliberate approach, we will expedite unmanned capabilities today and 
in the future.
    Mr. Scott. How would you assess the ability of U.S. maritime 
vessels, from a destroyer to a carrier, to defend against Unmanned 
Aerial Systems (UAS) overflight and/or attacks? In which AORs have 
these threats been most prevalent on deployment?
    Admiral Gilday. The U.S. Navy has employed systems to find, fix, 
track, and aid in the assessment of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to 
determine the classification and identification of potential threats. 
Once a threat determination is made, depending on the class of ship, 
countermeasures can be employed to deny or defeat the UAS threat as 
appropriate. The Navy's operational approach to countering UAS at sea 
is to bin U.S. vessels by capability depending on their mission and 
operating area.
    While most threats of weaponized UAS are in the Central and Indo-
Pacific Combatant Command areas of operation, UAS technology is 
prevalent on a global scale. For state actors with significant UAS 
capabilities, Iran, Russia, and China all have credible UAS forces.
    Mr. Scott. What is the Navy's strategy and timeline to 
competitively procure a live, virtual and constructive aviation 
training solution which will be joint, interoperable, and open to 
coalition partners? Has an independent Government Cost Estimate been 
conducted to verify Tactical Combat Training System (TCTS) II Baseline 
estimates to deliver Synthetic Inject to Live--Live Virtual 
Constructive (SITL LVC) capability? When will the TCTS II program 
receive its NSA accreditation for its encryptor and Cross Domain 
solution? Does TCTS II have the capability to connect live aircraft to 
fleet simulators or the Next Generation Threat System?
    Admiral Gilday. 1. What is the Navy's strategy and timeline to 
competitively procure a live, virtual and constructive aviation 
training solution which will be joint, interoperable, and open to 
coalition partners?
      The TCTS II contract was awarded in 2017, following a 
full and open competition. TCTS II is the Joint selected program of 
record (PoR) for the USN, USMC, and USAF, enabling interoperability 
across the Services' training and test ranges. TCTS II provides 
critical LVC technologies, such as a National Security Agency (NSA) 
Type 1 encryptor, 4-channel multilevel security, an LVC capable 
waveform, and Synthetic Inject to Live (SITL) capabilities, and will 
achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in late 2022.
      The TCTS II program will incorporate additional LVC and 
SITL technologies developed by the joint test community and advanced 
technology demonstrations, with projected fielding updates to TCTS II 
systems in FY25. The program has received interest from coalition 
partners and is diligently working with Navy Security Programs Office 
and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and 
Sustainment (OUSD (A&S)) Office of International Cooperation on 
exportability requirements for TCTS II.
      The Navy has identified Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) 
training as a critical warfighting enabler. Naval aviation is 
supporting the Navy's LVC NAVPLAN Implementation Framework (NIF) 
through multiple efforts, to include Naval Aviation Distributed Mission 
Training (NADMT), the Integrated Training Facility (ITF), Navy 
Continuous Training Environment (NCTE), and training range investments. 
Another key portion of the Navy's broader LVC environment includes the 
Tactical Combat Training System Increment II (TCTS II).
    2. Has an independent Government Cost Estimate been conducted to 
verify Tactical Combat Training System (TCTS) II Baseline estimates to 
deliver Synthetic Inject to Live Virtual Constructive (SITL LVC) 
capability?
      Yes, Independent government cost estimates were conducted 
in support of TCTS II IOC capabilities at Milestone C in 2020. TCTS 
II's open systems architecture enables affordable incorporation of 
additional LVC capabilities. Government estimates on additional LVC and 
SITL technologies developed by the joint test community and advanced 
technology demonstrations were completed to support Navy budget plans.
      TCTS II delivers SITL capabilities that allow mission 
operators to inject constructive threats into the secure, advanced 
training environment.
    3. When will the TCTS II program receive its NSA accreditation for 
its encryptor and Cross Domain solution?
      The NSA certified the KOV-74 encryptor used by TCTS II in 
2014. The program is updating the KOV-74 to the KOV-74A to allow Over-
the-Network Keying capability, and updated NSA certification is on 
track to complete July 2022. Cross Domain Solution (CDS) certification 
will be issued in July 2022 after completion of the Site Based Security 
Assessment. The Navy Cross Domain Solution Office is the CDS 
certification agency.
    4. Does TCTS II have the capability to connect live aircraft to 
fleet simulators or the Next Generation Threat System? 
      Yes, TCTS II utilizes the Next Generation Threat System 
(NGTS) and can connect live aircraft to fleet simulators. Last year 
TCTS II, demonstrated its capability to connect to the NCTE, the USS 
Bainbridge (in training mode), and the Joint Semi Automated Forces 
(JSAF) system. In 2022, TCTS II demonstrated ability to connect to an 
E-2D fleet simulator, an F/A-18 fleet simulator, an F-35 effects-based 
simulator, the Link Inject to Live (SITL) system including NGTS, and 
Naval Aviation Distributed Training Center (NADTC) Atlantic.
    Mr. Scott. The Navy Installations Command recently released a 
report on the use of fireboats during the Bonhomme Richard fire and 
noted that there was sufficient coverage in Navy ports. The Maritime 
Administration has a program to work with local fire departments in how 
to fight fires on board their ships in reduced lay-up, with minimal 
crew on board and not all ship systems operational. Has the Navy 
coordinated with the Maritime Administration to determine how to best 
use tug boats and fireboats, and how a true fireboat differs from 
conventional yard tugs?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy is aware of MARAD's firefighting program 
to work with local fire departments to fight fires on board their ships 
in reduced lay-up, with minimal crew on board and not all ship systems 
operational. The Navy has organic waterborne firefighting capability in 
the form of civilian and contracted tugs to accommodate reduced crew 
size and ship condition. In addition to its organic capability, the 
Navy is able leverage local fire departments' capabilities via mutual 
aid agreements.
    The Navy also understands the prime differences between fireboats 
and conventional yard tugs. Although some fireboats do have an 
increased pump capacity as compared to tugs, even this increased 
capacity does not address the underlying issue of their inability to 
fight fires internal to a vessel in order to stop a total loss. The 
Navy assesses that it is able to meet required firefighting capability 
through a combination of Government owned assets and tugs under 
contract with the Navy.
    Mr. Scott. The Maritime Administration recently purchased two 
former U.S.-flagged roll-on/roll-off ships from American Roll-on/Roll-
off Carriers (ARC) that were 24 years old for approximately $50 
million. At the same time, the Military Sealift Command and MARAD 
removed from service two of the oldest Large Medium Speed Ro/Ros 
converted in the 1990s and three former Maritime Prepositioning Ships. 
ARC's parent company, Wallenius, is now building replacement vessels in 
China. Is the Department of Defense plan for sealift recapitalization 
merely to buy used ships to replace larger and more numerous vessels in 
the surge fleet while at the same time subsidizing the Chinese shipyard 
program? Is there any plans that foresee the construction of new 
sealift vessels in U.S. shipyards?
    Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy is committed to the 
procurement of used commercial Roll-on/Roll-Off vessels as the fastest 
and most economical strategy to replace reserve sealift ships that are 
reaching the end of their planned service lives. 70% of these platforms 
are planned to be retired by 2040 and 10.6 million square feet of lift 
capacity will be recapitalized over the next 30 years. The Maritime 
Administration (MARAD) is executing the used-ship procurement line of 
effort that the Secretary of the Navy detailed in the March 2018 Report 
to Congress ``Sealift That the Nation Needs.'' The Department's sealift 
recapitalization plan includes three separate, but related, efforts to: 
1) extend the service life of the most viable sealift vessels, 2) 
purchase used vessels to replace surge sealift and 3) focus on new 
construction in U.S. shipyards to replace afloat prepositioning ship 
capabilities. In Q3FY22, MARAD purchased the first two used vessels 
from the Maritime Security Program (MSP). 10 U.S. Code 2218; National 
Defense Sealift Fund, prioritizes the purchase of MSP vessels over non-
U.S. flagged foreign-built vessels. MSP vessels are the preferred 
vessels to replace retiring surge sealift because they are already U.S. 
flagged, American Bureau of Shipbuilding ABS) classified, have proven 
military utility and meet required sealift Operational Requirement 
Document (ORD) square footage capacity.
    Yes, there are plans that foresee the construction of new sealift 
vessels in U.S. shipyards. The Navy is developing capability 
requirements for new construction sealift T-AK/AKR ships, with lead 
ship procurements planned after 2027 to replace afloat pre-positioning 
ships which begin retiring in 2030. Navy would seek proposals from U.S. 
shipbuilders to construct these vessels.
    Mr. Scott. A U.S. Navy officer told gCaptain [sic] that ``The U.S. 
has less than 80 commercial ships in international service, while China 
has over 5,500 merchant ships sailing today.'' What happens if China 
issues Javelin type missiles to each commercial ship? What would happen 
if China issued a portable missile to each of the 122,034 Chinese 
seafarers serving on all types of ships?
    Admiral Gilday. The Javelin missile is a crew served anti-tank 
weapon that is optically sighted and possesses limited range. Equipping 
merchant ship crews with Javelin type missiles would have limited 
utility in maritime conflict although such missiles could potentially 
be useful against irregular threats such as pirates. Equipping over 
120,000 merchant sailors with Javelin type missiles would require 
significant investments in terms of both the acquisition of the systems 
and the training of the crews to employ the weapons and would likely 
not be worth the costs in money and time. While arming PRC merchant 
ship crews with Javelin type missiles could be justified as necessary 
for self-defense against irregular threats such as pirates and thus not 
a violation of international law, there could be implications for 
insurance rates or access to commercial ports due concerns of the 
threat posed by armed merchant ship crews. This is why commercial 
shipping lines tend to not arm crew members, even when their ships sail 
in waters trafficked by pirates, such as the Gulf of Aden.
    Mr. Scott. How many large commercial ships does China have? How 
difficult would it be for them to weaponize these ships?
    Admiral Gilday. According to commercial sources, the PRC has 
approximately 11,000 China-owned oceangoing commercial vessels of which 
approximately 7,000 are China-flagged oceangoing commercial vessels. 
However, ships that are Chinese owned but not Chinese flagged may have 
multi-national crews. There are also approximately 2,700 Hong Kong 
flagged merchant ships of all types. The 2016 National Transportation 
Law permits all China owned merchant ships to be used by the People's 
Liberation Army.
    The Chinese could put containerized missiles on merchant ships if 
they chose to do so. According to some sources the Chinese are 
designing and marketing a variant of the YJ-18 cruise missile that can 
be fired from shipping containers, similar to systems designed and 
marketed by Russia and Israel. However, arming merchant ships in this 
manner has implications under international law. Under the Hague 
Convention, arming merchant ships with weapons beyond those required to 
defend the ship against threats such as pirates or terrorists requires 
the ship to be:
      Placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and 
responsibility of the State whose flag it flies.
      Bear the external marks that distinguish the warships of 
their nationality.
      Under the command of a duly commissioned officer in the 
service of the State whose name is on the list of the officers of the 
fighting fleet
      Manned by a crew subject to military discipline.
    If the Chinese were to covertly employ missile armed merchant ships 
in wartime, they would be guilty of Perfidy under the laws of armed 
conflict and they would forfeit their protected status as civilian 
vessels. Additionally, even employing a small number of merchant ships 
as missile shooters in wartime would make all Chinese-flagged container 
ships at sea or in port legally targetable given the inability of an 
adversary to accurately determine whether the ships have a 
containerized missile system onboard until the weapon system is 
employed.
    Navy Recognition, China is Building Long-Range Cruise Missiles 
Launched from Ship Containers--https://www.navyrecognition.com/
index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2019/april/6971-china-is-
building-long-range-cruise-missiles-launched-from-ship-containers.html 
US Naval War College, China's Container Missile Deployments Could 
Violate the Law of Naval Warfare--https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2982&context=ils
    Mr. Scott. How many commercial mariners are enrolled in the Naval 
War College, Naval Postgraduate School, or Naval Academy?
    Admiral Gilday. There are no commercial mariners enrolled at the 
Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, or United States Naval 
Academy.
    Mr. Scott. What is the status of the updates to the online 
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships?
    Admiral Gilday. In September 2021, the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC) declared DANFS ``severely out of date.'' HASC also 
directed SECNAV to brief HASC by March 2022 on ``efforts to update the 
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships'' to include ``at a 
minimum: (1) timeline; (2) scope of project; and (3) existing and 
proposed budget needed to update the Dictionary of American Naval 
Fighting Ships within five years.''
    CURRENT STATUS: There are 11,238 DANFS entries. Each entry 
represents the Navy's official history of a specific ship. Formerly 
published in hardback books, the entries are now available on the NHHC 
website. 71% of these are complete; both new and/or updated. The other 
29% require significant updates including 125 vessels which are missing 
entirely.
    BACKGROUND: One of the driving factors behind Navy's decision to 
establish NHHC was the need to address 60 years of systemic neglect of 
Navy's history and heritage assets. From 1971 until NHHC was stood up 
in 2008--work on DANFS had stopped. In 2013 HASC made a request to Navy 
regarding the speed at which DANFS could be made current. CNO Greenert 
directed additional funding for DANFS be provided to NHHC: $2,160,000 
per annum; $10,800,000 total. However, from 2016 to 2021 NHHC OPTAR was 
cut 71%--from $19M to $6.3M. As a result only $1.7M of the additional 
$10.8M in additional OPTAR for DANFS restoration made it to NHHC. NHHC 
reprogramed an additional $3.04M in NHHC CIVPERS towards the DANFS 
effort. The result was a 25% restoration of DANFS to Navy standards. 
Additional funding for DANFS was terminated in 2021 because of the 71% 
decline in OPTAR.
    RESTORED FUNDING: CNO Gilday directed a funding increase for NHHC 
across the FYDP to ensure NHHC was mission capable. The DANFS 
restoration now has stable funding of $500K per annum in OPTAR and 
$264K in CIVPERS assigned to the project. This level of funding 
establishes a trajectory that allows NHHC to have an additional 271 
entries, approximately 6.6% of the total original backlog plus 48 
ships scheduled to be decommissioned, completed by 2028 for a total of 
77.6% complete.
    ESTIMATES TO ELIMINATE DANFS BACKLOG COAs: NHHC has completed 
analysis of DANFS completion; starting with the current funding 
profile, for consideration by Navy Leadership and the POM process.
    Five Year Plan: Current trajectory, based on restored funding 
levels, the following progress is planned for the next five years: 
(77.6% Complete)
      Elimination of all missing entries by the end of FY27.
      Completion of all entries for battleships and at least 
50% of all carriers by end of FY27.
      Entries published for all ships scheduled to be 
decommissioned (48 ships)
    Five Year Plan: To complete DANFS updates and properly process 
additional ships as they decommission: (100% Completed)
      Proposed budget: $6.3M-7.1M per annum ($31.5M-35.5M 
total)/45 Additional Personnel
      Backlog eliminated by end of FY27.
      The challenge associated with a five year effort, in 
addition to the cost, is the physical limitations of the archives. The 
archives classified and unclassified spaces cannot support 45 
additional people as currently configured.
    Ten Year Plan: Elimination of DANFS backlog can be achieved in 10 
years with an increase in personnel. Prioritization of work allows for 
ship histories with the highest demand to be completed first. (100% 
Completed)
      Estimated cost 2.1M-2.4M per annum/13 Additional 
Personnel
      Year 1: All Battleships completed.
      Year 2: All Missing ships, Carriers, and Cruisers 
completed
      Year 3-5: 70% of all destroyers completed OR all 
Frigates, Submarines, Amphibious, and Misc. Combatant Vessels.
      Year 6-7: All Combatant and Amphibious vessels completed.
      Year 8-10: All Mine Warfare, Patrol, Auxiliary, and 
Miscellaneous vessels completed.
      Backlog complete.
    Twenty Year Plan: Backlog reduction can be achieved within 20 years 
utilizing fewer personnel.
      Estimated cost 1.3M-1.5M per annum/8 Additional 
Personnel.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Navy expect to collect and document its 
operations for use by future historians if the Naval History & Heritage 
Command's reserve unit is disestablished?
    Admiral Gilday. The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) will 
continue to be responsible for preserving, analyzing, and disseminating 
U.S. naval history and heritage. NHHC will work with the Director of 
the Navy Staff (DNS) to determine the most effective and efficient 
construct to fulfill the mission requirements of the Navy's historical 
programs. With respect to the Navy's responsibilities under 44 U.S. 
Code Chapter 31 and the supporting document SECNAV M-5210.1: DON 
Records Management Manual the Navy understands its mission:
      Establishes Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) as 
the primary repository for almost all Navy records; OPNAV; Unit 
Histories/Deck Logs/Action Reports; Command Histories; & Historical 
Records/Program management.
      ``At the conclusion of periods of crisis, contingency, or 
armed conflict, it is necessary to analyze fully the actions and 
reactions of both friendly and hostile forces across the full spectrum 
of the operation.''
      ``In order to accomplish this rigorous operations 
analysis, full and complete documentation of all phases of the 
operation, including all Intel, climatic, and other info available to a 
command, must be preserved and transferred to the activity designated 
to perform this analysis.''
      ``This analysis assesses the effectiveness of weapons/
tactics, suggests improvements tested in actual combat, determines 
adjustments to force composition, and justifies future budget 
decisions.''
      ``At the conclusion of the operations, it is equally 
important that relevant Navy documentation be sent to the NHHC and 
Marine Corps documentation be sent to the Director of Marine Corps 
History so that the official histories and historical analysis can be 
prepared.''
    With respect to specific responsibilities regarding the execution 
of the mission OPNAVINST 5750.4E: Navy Historical Programs tasks:
      Director Navy Staff (DNS): ``Responsibilities: DNS shall 
ensure that Navy organizations that produce, collect, analyze, or 
disseminate historically significant information implement appropriate 
procedures to preserve such information, especially that relating to 
lessons-learned from Navy exercises and combat operations.'' And
      Director Naval History and Heritage Command (DNHHC): 
``Responsibilities: NHHC Director shall assist the operational commands 
and the shore establishment in inculcating an understanding and 
appreciation of naval history and is responsible, as detailed in 
references (a) through (p), for the following aspects of the Navy's 
overall historical program:
                (7) Deployment of historical documentation teams to 
                fleet units and other Navy commands to collect 
                historical records and information on significant Navy 
                operations and activities.''
    Action: NHHC has prepared four courses of action (COAs) for DNS 
consideration for the execution of the Navy's mission requirements to 
document history in order to accomplish this rigorous operations 
analysis, full and complete documentation of all phases of the 
operation, including all intel, climatic, and other info available to a 
command, must be preserved and transferred to the activity designated 
to perform this analysis.
    Action: DNS has established a working group to analyze the COAs and 
determine the most effective and efficient construct to fulfill the 
Navy's mission requirements.
    Mr. Scott. Is the Marine Corps prepared to help destroy electronic 
superhighways to allow resistance forces to survive and fight another 
day?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps remains prepared to enable the 
full spectrum of cyberspace operations. This includes the planning and 
direction of defensive cyberspace operations in support of Marine 
Corps, Joint and Coalition Forces, and, when authorized or directed, 
the ability to direct offensive cyberspace operations in support of 
Joint and Coalition Forces. This will ensure our ability to gain and 
exploit information in both the information and physical domains, while 
denying competitors those same advantages.
    Mr. Scott. What is the current plans for the Maritime Pre-
positioning Program in the Marine Corps? Will the Marines maintain two 
squadrons--one at Diego Garcia and another in the western Pacific? If 
the program is going to be phased down from 3 to 2 to 1 squadron, what 
does that mean for the depots at Blount Island and Albany
    General Berger. To answer your first question, in order to balance 
FY23 funding reductions, combined with the existing funding shortfalls 
in FY21 and FY22, in response to current funding levels, the Navy 
identified a requirement to place five of our twelve Maritime 
Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships in Reduced Operating Status. Our long-
term plan is for MPF Next Generation to recapitalize two squadrons of 
afloat lift.
    Updated MPF Planning Guidance published in February 2022 aims to 
maximize capability afloat and divide the risk between INDOPACOM and 
Tri-COM. The updated guidance captures the Service decision to retain 
two squadrons with four ships in Maritime Prepositioning Squadron 
(MPSRON)--3 at Guam and a three-ship Crisis Response Force Package in 
MPSRON-2 at Diego Garcia.
    Having reduced from three to two squadrons in 2011, a further 
reduction to one squadron will have limited impact to the Depot at 
Albany because MPF equipment represents a small fraction of the depot 
maintenance workload that flows through Albany. The vast majority of 
Albany's depot maintenance workload comes from the entirety of the 
Marine Corps enterprise, our sister services, and other government 
agencies.
    Further reduction from two squadrons to one will have slightly more 
impact to the Blount Island prepositioning support facility, which 
conducts field level maintenance and supply actions on MPF military 
equipment. With fewer MPF ships' worth of military equipment to service 
at less frequent intervals, the contracted workforce at Blount Island 
Command will reduce commensurate with future workload. Potentially, 
some specialized skill sets may atrophy due to decreased volume and 
frequency of maintenance opportunities.
    While Blount Island Command will experience impacts from the 
reduction to one MPF squadron, the need to maintain high readiness of 
the MPF program's sole squadron will produce sufficient maintenance 
workload requiring a robust and capable prepositioning support facility 
at Blount Island Command.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
    Mr. Carbajal. Regarding the USS George Washington: Before the 
Special Psychiatric Response Intervention Team was activated, what was 
the average wait time for a sailor assigned to the USS George 
Washington to receive a mental health appointment? According to open-
source reporting, some sailors assigned to the George Washington were 
met with a six-month wait period to see the ship's psychologist. Since 
the Navy has deployed additional mental health resources to the ship, 
what is now the average wait time for a sailor to receive a mental 
health appointment? Does the Navy have a goal or metric of what is an 
acceptable wait time from the request for a mental health appointment 
to having the appointment?
    Admiral Gilday. All emergent mental health referrals (i.e., for 
suicidal or homicidal patients) are seen and evaluated the same day. 
Prior to the Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) 
activation, the wait time to see the ship's psychologist was 
approximately four to six weeks for a new patient evaluation, and 
approximately two to three weeks for a follow-up appointment. After the 
arrival of the additional psychologist and licensed clinical social 
worker, the ship's psychologist's wait time for a new patient 
evaluation decreased to approximately three weeks, and to approximately 
two weeks for a follow-up appointment. The Military Health System (MHS) 
access to care standards are identified in 32 Code of Federal Register 
199.17. The MHS access standard for specialty is within 28 days; 
however, the Defense Health Agency set an internal standard for the 
direct care system of 15 days. There is no standard in any healthcare 
system, including the MHS, for follow-up appointments because the 
number of days or months to a recommended follow-up appointment is 
based on the clinical judgement of the provider and the patient's 
condition.
    As a point of comparison, the average wait time across all Navy 
Medical Forces Atlantic military treatment facilities is 15.51 days 
(approximately 2 weeks), while the average wait time across all Tricare 
network private sector care providers is 34.82 days (approximately 4-5 
weeks). Comparing times for only the Portsmouth area, the average is 
12.7 days (less than 2 weeks) at Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, while 
the average in the local Tricare private sector care network is 34.9 
days (approximately 4-5 weeks).
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
    Mr. Keating. In the Navy's Annual Long Range Plan, there is a large 
emphasis on investing in undersea procurement and warfighting. However, 
this is sometimes viewed exclusively through the prism of submarines. 
I'm particularly interested in unmanned underwater vehicles or UUVs. 
Depending on which Long Range Plan scenario one looks at, the number of 
desired unmanned vehicles varies greatly. Can you speak to the role 
unmanned systems have in both a modern and future Navy fleet?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. In order for the United 
States Navy to retain our strategic maritime advantage, we must 
increase our capabilities to include faster decision making, tactical 
reach, and endurance while minimizing risk to our personnel. The Navy 
recognizes that unmanned systems, autonomy, and artificial intelligence 
play a key part in future Distributed Maritime Operations for all 
phases of military operations. As outlined in the Unmanned Campaign 
Framework, the Navy will continue to develop and expand its Fleet of 
unmanned vehicles to deliver affordable, scalable, lethal, and 
connected capabilities.
    Specifically, in the undersea domain, unmanned undersea vehicles 
(UUVs) serve as versatile autonomous platforms, operate in a dispersed 
manner, and offer the flexibility the evolving threat environment 
demands. UUVs will go farther, deeper, and endure longer in extremely 
harsh conditions in order to deter and deliver lethal and non-lethal 
effects. A hybrid fleet of manned/unmanned capabilities is necessary to 
execute the full range of undersea operations to both meet emerging 
security concerns and to provide persistent presence, ensuring undersea 
dominance in our Future Fleet.
    Mr. Keating. In the Navy's Annual Long Range Plan, there is a large 
emphasis on investing in undersea procurement and warfighting. However, 
this is sometimes viewed exclusively through the prism of submarines. 
I'm particularly interested in unmanned underwater vehicles or UUVs. 
Depending on which Long Range Plan scenario one looks at, the number of 
desired unmanned vehicles varies greatly. Can you speak to the role 
unmanned systems have in both a modern and future Navy fleet?
    General Berger. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the 
Secretary of the Navy.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
    Mr. Bacon. After the fall of Kabul it has come to my attention that 
there has been little to no outreach to Gold Star families of those 
killed in the war, and they are struggling. Furthermore, I am concerned 
about the lack of long-term counseling services for Gold Star and 
Surviving families. What is the Navy, to include the Marine Corps 
strategy to address these issues?
    Secretary Del Toro. Outreach to Gold Star families is a commitment 
that the Navy and Marine Corps fulfills for the duration of Survivor 
requested support. At the initial Next-of-Kin (NOK) notification of a 
Service member's death, Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACO) are 
equipped with the knowledge necessary to connect Survivor families with 
benevolent and philanthropic organizations capable of providing grief 
and bereavement counseling.
    Once a CACO's immediate duties are complete, NOK are transitioned 
to the care of the Navy or Marine Corps Long Term Assistance Program 
(LTAP). LTAP representatives maintain contact with Survivors at a 
frequency requested by the Gold Star family to meet their long-term 
needs. LTAP serves as a permanent resource for NOK, ensuring they 
receive sustained, long-term assistance. LTAP not only assists with the 
receipt of death benefits and entitlements, but also connects family 
members to grief and bereavement counselors, support experts, and 
national Survivor networks as their needs evolve.
    The Navy and Marine Corps maintain a partnership with the Tragedy 
Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS). Once families agree to the 
release of their personal information, by completing an ``Authorization 
for Disclosure of Personal Information,'' they are connected to 
representatives from TAPS. TAPS is a national nonprofit 501(c)(3) 
Veterans Service Organization that provides families with a full range 
of peer-based emotional support, crisis response and intervention, 
casualty casework, and grief and trauma support. Their services are no 
cost and available 24/7.
    The suicide bombing outside Hamid Karzai International Airport in 
Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 26, 2021, resulted in the death of one 
Sailor and 11 Marines. LTAP representatives initiated contact with the 
Gold Star families of these Service members after each funeral. LTAP 
and TAPS representatives have provided continued support to the Gold 
Star families on a recurring basis, in accordance with each family's 
individual needs.
    Mr. Bacon. As we prepare for the real possibility of near peer 
conflict, what are we doing to ensure we have a seamless, easily 
replicated process for casualties in the case of a mass casualty 
scenario? Is the Navy aware of the FY22 NDAA casualty requirements and 
working group, and what is the Navy doing to be directly involved?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps Casualty Assistance Program has 
maintained an outstanding reputation in response to mass casualty 
events from initial reporting, notification, processing of benefits and 
entitlements, and long-term assistance. The staff at Headquarters 
Marine Corps, in concert with our affected and supporting units, ensure 
timely next of kin notifications, expeditious return of remains, and 
compassionate enduring assistance to our surviving family members. We 
are staffed and follow established procedures to effectively execute 
required casualty assistance for peacetime casualties.
    We are working on a scalable Casualty Augmentation Requirement Plan 
that will enable the Marine Corps to surge with appropriately skilled 
and experienced individuals thereby improving our casualty-response 
capability and increasing overall capacity. Depending on its nature and 
scale, a mass casualty event will require capability and coordination 
with the Department of Defense, Department of Navy, and other 
stakeholders. We are also an active participant in the Casualty 
Assistance Reform Working Group directed by the FY22 NDAA. Our casualty 
subject matter experts, along with a selected Gold Star family member, 
represents the Marine Corps in this working group.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
    Ms. Houlahan. As we focus on China as a pacing challenge, we must 
ensure we are prepared for any actions necessary within the Pacific. 
With the Navy being below recruiting goals for this year, how does that 
impact short and long term readiness within the Pacific theater?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps has accomplished its fiscal year 
to date recruiting goal in what is arguably the most challenging year 
since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force. Nevertheless, the 
compounding effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, historic lows in youth 
propensity, labor shortages, rising inflation, and United States 
Military Entrance Processing Command's medical record modernization 
efforts have consistently slowed momentum, placing the remainder of the 
FY22 accessions mission at risk. We understand the pressures on 
recruiting/retention and focus end strength and assignment decisions on 
operational readiness. We do not forecast any degradation in our 
ability to support the Pacific theater.
    Ms. Houlahan. What is the Navy doing beyond bonuses, to recruit and 
retain a diverse pool of skilled and capable individuals? What specific 
challenges does the Navy face with recruitment and retention and what 
policies and actions are you taking to address those challenges? What 
assistance do you require from Congress?
    General Berger. The Marine Corps is a diverse institution, and 
cultural, ethnic, gender, and socio-economic diversity remains a 
priority. Diverse accession success is a direct result of the hard work 
of our recruiting force in every zip code and benefits from our 
inclusive marketing, robust outreach, and partnerships efforts with 
diverse communities and organizations. Since 2009, diverse enlisted 
accessions have increased from 34% to 47%, while diverse officer 
accessions have increased from 16% to 35%. The Marine Corps remains 
committed to capitalizing on the knowledge, skills, abilities, 
performance, and potential of every Marine.
    FY22 will prove to be the most challenging year in recruiting 
history. In addition to COVID-19, the growing disconnect and declining 
favorable view between the U.S. population and the military, labor 
shortages, high inflation, and a youth population that does not 
recognize the value of military service also continues to strain 
recruiting efforts and place the Marine Corps' accessions mission at 
risk.
    The Marine Corps Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion Strategic Plan is a 
deliberate effort to examine the current state, envision outcomes, and 
set a path over the next five years with intermediate objectives that 
will help us as a Service further improve our diversity, equity, and 
inclusion. Recruiting and retaining high performing youth from all 
sectors of our nation will be imperative for the future fight.
    Our end state is a transparent, collaborative, forward-leaning, 
data-driven, and commander-focused system which provides the individual 
Marine the opportunity to develop and use their abilities to 
effectively serve in order to provide a combat-ready Fleet Marine 
Force. We are updating our IT systems, leveraging AI, machine learning, 
and big data in surveys--with an end state of improving our retention 
policies, practices, and evaluation systems, among other initiatives, 
to compete in the competitive ecosystem of talent management.
    To ensure future recruiting success, a whole-of-government approach 
is needed to gain influencer support of military service and expand the 
youth market. Additional considerations such as directed Department of 
Education support to make contact information available, funding of the 
Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies program for strategic 
community engagement campaigns, Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery support testing, and school/state incentives for students 
selecting military service, will have positive impacts on recruiting 
across the joint force.
    We are asking for congressional assistance to make changes to Title 
10, United States Code section 503 in order to open the aperture of 
usable information on potential recruits. This change would more 
closely align DOD marketing efforts with those of private industry and 
is fully supported by the Services and DOD. The information would be 
used to help identify prospective recruits, tailor our marketing 
efforts, better measure return on investment of our advertising 
efforts, and maximize customer relationship management by getting the 
right message to the right person at the right time.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
    Mr. Bergman. Is there any evidence to suggest that, in a non-
mobility environment, that Reserve units (i.e. Battalions, Squadrons, 
etc.) would be more ready if Operational Control (OPCON) was moved from 
the Reserve Component (RC) to the Active Component (AC)?
    General Berger. As Representative Bergman may remember from his 
days as the Commanding General, 4th Marine Air Wing (MAW), 4th MAW 
participates regularly in the 2nd MAW and 3d MAW Frag Conferences for 
scheduling aircraft support across the Marine Corps. The Frag 
conferences result in 4th MAW flying in support of the Marine Corps, 
supporting both Reserve and Active Component aviation requirements, at 
a frequency that places their squadrons in an operational status that 
far exceeds the normal 48 drill period and two week Annual Training. We 
believe that in certain cases, the Marine Corps can improve both 
logistical support and maintenance of both Reserve and Active squadrons 
by incorporating the Reserve squadron into an Active aircraft type-
specific group.
    The Reserve squadron will be co-located with the group 
headquarters, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS), and Marine 
Wing Support Squadron as well as other like aircraft squadrons on a 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) maximizing supportability. We are 
conducting a proof of concept of Active/Reserve Component integration 
by incorporating VMM-774 into Marine Aircraft Group-26, an active duty 
group with all flying squadrons possessing only MV-22 Ospreys.
    Access to MALS, simulators, and vast on site resources provided to 
the Reserve squadron at a MCAS vice being a tenant on another Service's 
base will likely improve readiness and streamline Naval Supply Systems 
Command logistics nodes. The proof of concept is scheduled for FY23.
    We are continuing to work the details for this proof of concept 
with VMM-774 still in transition from Naval Station Norfolk to MCAS New 
River. We can provide in progress reviews and a final assessment once 
the proof of concept period is complete.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. Capacity is a capability within itself. In late April at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies you stated that ``We 
do need a bigger Navy, and you can't just talk about capabilities 
without talking about size'', but the plan you presented to Congress 
doesn't have us getting to the Congressionally mandated battle force 
size of 355 ships until 2043 with your most optimistic projections. One 
of your courses of action requests $75 billion after the next 5 years 
to get to that number. In my opinion that is a decade and a half too 
late and insufficient considering the clear overmatch in capacity the 
Chinese will have in the Pacific. We clearly need a growth in 
industrial capacity and the capacity of the U.S. Navy's battleforce. 
What resources do you and industry need to grow ship and submarine 
production and to keep the ships we do have underway more often by 
reducing days of delay due to maintenance?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. A healthy shipbuilding 
industrial base and supply chain are vital to meeting our National 
Defense Strategy. Expanding the capabilities of suppliers and shipyard 
infrastructure results in greater stability, cost savings, and improved 
efficiency to grow both ship and submarine production and repair 
capabilities. In cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and industry partners, 
the Navy completed a review of the industrial base to identify areas 
which require investment to expand the capability and capacity of the 
enterprise in accordance with war fighting requirements. The Department 
of Navy's Fiscal Year 2023 budget request includes investments in 
critical efforts in several key areas including: supplier development 
of capability and capacity, shipbuilder infrastructure, technology 
innovation, workforce development, and continued government oversight.
    Additionally, the Navy is grateful for Congress's continued support 
for the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). 
SIOP is a critical enabler to improve Navy maintenance capabilities by 
expanding shipyard capacity and optimizing shipyard configuration. The 
Navy is also grateful to Congress for its ongoing support for the Other 
Procurement, Navy (OPN), pilot and expanding it to include both Pacific 
Fleet and Fleet Forces command. OPN-funded availabilities are helping 
to maintain positive momentum in execution of surface maintenance and 
ensuring ships deliver to the Fleet on time, with work completed in 
full. In partnership with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Navy 
has also piloted several defense workforce programs in major maritime 
centers of gravity like Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New England 
targeted at the shipbuilding and ship repair workforce. These are 
pipeline programs focused on bringing highly skilled workers to our 
shipyards. Through collaboration and smart investments, the industrial 
base can adapt and grow to build and maintain the fleet the Nation 
needs.
    Mr. Waltz. The Navy is shuttering HSC-85 its last squadron that's 
solely dedicated to supporting Naval Special Warfare. What is the 
rationale for divesting of a one-of-one capability? How do you plan to 
replace the unique capability that HSC-85 brings to the table?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. This divestiture is in 
alignment with Department of the Navy (DON) and Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM) strategic and operational priorities within fiscal 
guidance, and is critical to enabling funding of higher priority 
programs. While the squadron has highly trained aviators and some 
unique equipment, dedicated support to NSW and special operations 
training, readiness, and operations is not a core DON mission. SOCOM 
maintains its own aviation units dedicated to special operations 
support that are more capable than HSC-85. Additionally, the ending of 
the cost-share agreement between DON and SOCOM for the unit beyond 
Fiscal Year 2023 increased the financial burden on DON for providing 
support to SOCOM. Divesting of HSC-85 will make funds available for 
core DON missions and higher DON priorities.
    The DON has four CONUS and one forward-deployed General Purpose 
Force HSC expeditionary squadrons that are capable of providing basic 
support to NSW training and readiness, and could be trained and 
equipped to provide similar dedicated capability as HSC-85 if 
prioritized over their current tasking. Re-tasking these squadrons to 
dedicated support would require additional time, training, and 
equipment to meet requirements.
    Mr. Waltz. I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has 
certified that the LCS Independence variant's Mission Package along 
with Expeditionary Navy EOD Mine Countermeasure Companies provide a 
``like capability'' for homeland defense compared to the Avenger class 
MCM, but what is the status of the LCS's minesweeping part of its MCM 
Mission Package? How long has that capability delayed? Do we not need 
the ability to sweep CONUS waters of mines in a contingency?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Unmanned Influence Sweep 
System (UISS) provides minesweeping capability to the Littoral Combat 
Ship (LCS) Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package (MP) as part of 
the Unmanned Minesweeping Module. UISS is comprised of an AN/SLW-2 MCM 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle that carries both an electromagnetic cable and 
a MK-104 acoustic generator.
    UISS has successfully completed its Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development Phase and is in Low Rate Initial Production. System-level 
UISS testing is complete. Minesweeping capability has been proven with 
IOT&E completion in June 2021, followed by completion of cybersecurity 
and underwater explosive shock testing in October 2021. UISS is 
expected to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in June 2022. 
IOC was originally planned for October 2019. A Congressional reduction 
of $8.0M to Fiscal Year 2018 RDT&E delayed completion of development 
and testing one year, which was later compounded by required system 
fixes to address deficiencies noted from developmental testing and 
availability of LCS due to other Fleet operational priorities.
    Mine countermeasures plans for Homeland Defense are focused on mine 
hunting, mine neutralization, and exploitation vice minesweeping
    Mr. Waltz. With the Navy's request to decommission Freedom-class 
Littoral Combat Ships are there any plans to utilize these vessels in 
future Fleet Training Sinking Exercises which would provide an 
opportunity for their hulls to serve as artificial reefs?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Navy's current 
disposition plans for all hulls planned for decommissioning in the 
Future Years Defense Program are reflected in the Navy's Report to 
Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval 
Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023 (30-year Shipbuilding Plan). The plan for 
the Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship hulls identified for 
decommissioning in Fiscal Year 2023 is for all nine hulls placed in an 
out-of-commission, in-reserve (OCIR) status. Further, Navy policy 
requires Fleet Training Sinking Exercises be conducted at least 50 
miles from land and in greater than 6000 feet of water making them not 
viable as artificial reefs. The Navy will continue to review, and 
disposition decisions may evolve as new information becomes available.
    Mr. Waltz. General Berger, Force Design 2030 is heavily reliant on 
light, maneuverable forces using both long range fires and asymmetric 
weapons like loitering munitions and man-portable systems to defeat the 
enemy. Considering the U.S. has burned through 1400 Stinger and 5500 
Javelin missiles how vital is it to backfill that drawdown so that your 
forces have a robust supply of Javelins and Stingers to stand up the 
formations you envision in Force Design 2030?
    General Berger. The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is primed to 
produce a new-start Man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD) that 
employs high technology-readiness-level components and utilizes rapid 
acquisition authorities. Obsolescence issues currently plague Stinger 
production, employment, and sustainment. Outdated manufacturing 
techniques combined with forty-year-old technology continue to drive up 
cost, extend delivery timelines, and produce missiles without any 
improvements to performance. Our logistics depots have utilized all 
available spare parts to repair Stinger field training systems, turning 
to cannibalization in order to deliver serviceable equipment. The DOD 
must take advantage of the current DIB posture. With proper leveraging 
of authorities, Services must begin fielding a replacement to Stinger 
missiles, launchers, and training systems by 2027. The Marine Corps 
remains engaged with the Army, who serves as the Stinger program lead, 
to drive progress towards a new-start MANPAD that is cheaper and more 
sustainable, reliable, capable, and rapid to deliver.
    In regards to the Javelin missile system, it is critical that we 
backfill all of our equipment and ammunition stock with either a like 
capability or a modernized capability more suited for Force Design 
2030. I am concerned with the production lead times, some as long as 48 
months, that will impact our readiness over the long term. Much of what 
we have delivered to the Ukrainian Defense Forces has come from our 
training stocks so that we could preserve our short term warfighting 
capability. But when a Marine doesn't have equipment or munitions to 
train on in the exact manner in which he or she will fight, there are 
longer term risks that we incur from training to retention to 
warfighting. So it's vital that we communicate with the DIB to identify 
not just our warfighting requirements, but also our training 
requirements, and work to meet them as soon as possible. Javelin is 
proving its worth in today's fight and we will be using the same 
warhead on some of our future munitions, so it will provide value for 
us now and into the future.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. In early January, Defense News reported that ship 
maintenance and repairs are falling short of your expectations. And 
although, through various initiatives, the on-time completion rates for 
maintenance and repairs are improving, current timelines still 
negatively impact the readiness of your fleets. Are you able to discuss 
the contributing factors limiting the Navy's ability to get ships out 
of deport yards or repairs complete at rates you're comfortable with?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Navy's Performance to 
Plan (P2P) Surface forum was initiated with the overarching goal of 
improving maintenance outcomes and eliminating days of maintenance 
delay, and the Navy is collectively driving hard towards achieving the 
goal of zero days of maintenance delays. P2P is chaired by the VCNO and 
is taking a data-driven approach to targeting key levers or drivers 
that analysis indicates will have a direct impact on availability 
duration. Key lever modeling for P2P highlights Navy-controlled levers 
and allows for the team to prioritize, swarm, and escalate issues 
identified for barrier removal in an efficient fashion. The below table 
is a summary of the key drivers currently being targeted and the 
duration impacts that the Center for Naval Analysis predicts could be 
realized as these specific metrics continue to improve in the execution 
of maintenance availabilities.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8852.077

    .epsExamples of specific actions being taken to improve performance 
based on these identified levers include:
      Further effort to level load ports and better predict 
workload
      Moved contract award target to Availability-120 days (A-
120) to allow more time for government and contractor planning/
coordination/material procurement/schedule quality
      Reduce/limit amount of growth and new work
      Improved/more rapid identification of growth and new work 
prior to 40% of availability duration
      Efforts to improve quality of Integrated Production 
Schedule provided by the contractor
      Improved performance in ordering/receiving Long Lead Time 
Material prior to availability start
      Improved directed maintenance strategy
      Improved contract change cycle time through use of Level 
of Effort to Completion and Small Dollar Value Growth processes
    Additionally, as the Navy continues to demonstrate improvement in 
the execution of the ship maintenance program, efforts such as the 
Other Procurement, Navy (OPN), pilot help to expand upon the positive 
momentum being realized and ensure ships deliver back to the Fleet on 
time, with work completed in full, and without the need for additional 
funding in successive fiscal years.
    Mr. Morelle. How has contracted proprietary lock-in, or ``Vendor 
Lock,'' impacted the Navy's ability to efficiently repair their systems 
and platforms? How has ``Vendor-Lock'' impacted readiness for your 
department?
    Secretary Del Toro. Any time the Government has inadequate data 
rights or limited technical data, the ability to execute organic 
repairs or outsource the work to other vendors is significantly 
hindered. As a result, in each acquisition program, the Navy is 
thoughtfully analyzing and identifying key technical data rights 
required early in the program's lifecycle in order to appropriately 
budget for and purchase the rights upfront (often priced in a 
competitive environment) to enable greater flexibility and organic 
capability to efficiently repair and sustain a system.
    Mr. Morelle. The Navy has significantly increased its budget for 
Project Overmatch, demonstrating a commitment to joint 
interoperability, command and control, and tactical network 
compatibility across DOD. How did the Joint All Domain Command and 
Control exercises between the Navy and Air Force work out? Any good 
news stories to share?
    Admiral Gilday. The Navy has requested an increased budget for 
Project Overmatch because of the critical importance of joint 
interoperability, command and control, and network compatibility. We 
have been working on refining our approach and transitioning 
technologies and concepts and are now ready to start increasing the 
scope and scale. Our Navy's ability to establish and sustain sea 
control is dependent upon conducting Distributed Maritime Operations 
through a teamed manned/unmanned force that exploits Artificial 
Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML). Project Overmatch is tasked 
with delivering a Naval Operational Architecture (NOA) to connect and 
enable this future force. The NOA is the Naval (Navy and Marine Corps) 
contribution to the Joint Force's Joint All Domain Command and Control 
(JADC2) and we are working collaboratively with our Service partners on 
Implementation. We are on track to deliver Minimum Viable Product (MVP) 
on a Strike Group in FY23. Below are some of the good news stories from 
Overmatch:
      We take an active role supporting Joint Staff JADC2 
cross-functional team, and serve as the joint networking lead of their 
operational planning team.
      Demonstrating sharing of tactically relevant software 
applications with the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System 
(ABMS) team in our DEVSECOPS environment to allow for easier 
collaboration between command and control software tools. Additionally, 
Overmatch is working with the Army Future Command and the Marine Corps 
for additional software application exchange and co-development/
sustainment opportunities.
      Our most recent quarter of engineering, integration, and 
Live, Virtual, and Constructive demonstrations provided Naval 
integration of relevant ``mission threads'' between Navy units and the 
simulated Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) with Expeditionary Advanced 
Base (Fires) element represented at Camp Pendleton.
      Naval participation in U.S. Army's Project Convergence 
2021 (PC21) resulted in substantive testing between multiple platforms 
using different waveforms in the live exercise which included Air 
Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. We will continue to grow that 
participation in the upcoming PC22, with added participation from 
Allies.
      Our engineering teams have been leading the coordination 
on a cross-service effort we call Joint Tactical Edge Networking (JTEN) 
to bring together the best of what each service is doing. Working with 
OSD, this grass-roots effort will integrate ongoing developments across 
all the services to enable interoperability.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
    Ms. Jacobs. A GAO report found that the surface fleet is 15% 
undermanned compared to required levels. The Navy routinely assigns 
fewer crewmembers to ships than are needed to safely operate them, and 
that inadequate training exacerbates sailor overwork and fatigue. How 
does the budget invest to fix these problems?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The May 2021 GOA Report 
``Additional Efforts are Needed to Manage Fatigue, Reduce Crewing 
Shortfalls and Implement Training'' recommended, among other things, 
the Navy revise its guidance and practices to measure sailor fatigue 
and address the factors causing fatigue, use required positions when 
reporting crew sizes and projecting personnel needs, and factor 
training time into sailor workload. The Department of Defense concurred 
with the recommendations.
    The PB23 Fiscal Years Defense Plan (FYDP) continues the surface 
investment in ship manpower, adding additional billets to ships. An 
example is the phased addition of approximately 40 billets on each DDG. 
In addition there are various Surface Training Advanced Virtual 
Environment (STAVE) initiatives that invest in schoolhouse and 
waterfront individual training.
    The GAO report assumed an increase in workload for Sailors on ships 
due to additional training being conducted on ships, resulting in 
overwork and fatigue. However, the Navy STAVE program and PB23 
investments are modernizing existing Surface Warfare courses of 
instruction at schoolhouse and waterfront locations where Sailors train 
away from their ships, avoiding the potential for overwork and fatigue.
    Other STAVE examples include continued fielding of the Mariner 
Skills Training Program (MSTP), additional Aegis, Ship Self Defense 
System (SSDS) and Anti-Submarine Warfare SQQ-89, Virtual Operator 
Trainers (VOT), Virtual Maintenance Trainers (VMT) and Virtual 
Employment Trainers (VET) as well as enhanced rate training for various 
surface rates.
    Ms. Jacobs. What is the Navy doing to increase manning, and when 
will surface ships be fully manned with the proper fit?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Navy's principal focus 
on this issue remains unchanged and increasing manning levels across 
the surface flet is a strategic objective for the Navy. We are using a 
variety of force management tools to attack this issue, including:
      Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay, 
Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP) and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
      Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year 
tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea 
duty and curtailing shore duty tours).
    We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to 
filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative 
ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the 
Perform to Plan--Human Resources process to address a wide range of 
issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to 
close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the 
Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set 
of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will 
replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary 
incentives, non-monetary incentives, and early advancement 
opportunities for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.
    We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts 
such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match 
skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements. 
These efforts--combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and 
funding total ownership cost--will ensure we have the Sailors to 
support the Navy that the Nation needs.
    Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and 
improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy 
HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning, and other enablers such as 
Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to 
recruiting, training, retention, and improved talent management.
    Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully 
and properly manned, with the right Sailor in the right place at the 
right time with the right training. The number of Sailors on 
operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have 
10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. When an individual flies across the ocean in an 
airliner or boards a cruise ship, they usually have easy access to 
high-speed satellite internet on their personal devices. Yet this has 
historically not been the case for Sailors deployed at sea. As the Navy 
continues to grapple with recruiting and retention challenges and 
remains unable to meet requirements for appropriate fit and fill for 
sea billets, I'm curious if this straightforward quality of life 
improvement could help retention efforts.
    This capability exists and is fielded on warships today. Over the 
past two years, U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command have procured a turnkey satellite wireless internet capability 
that has successfully supported the deployments of 6 aircraft carriers 
and multiple smaller vessels. However, this capability is noticeably 
absent on ships assigned to Fleet Forces Command and in the Atlantic. 
Currently these trials are funded on a month-to-month, ship-by-ship 
basis, and there is no program of record for at-sea satellite wireless 
internet. The contractor currently supporting Pacific Fleet has 
proposed an annual contract that would dramatically expand regional 
coverage and significantly reduce costs from the current ship-by-ship 
model.
    What lessons has the Navy learned from these trials in Pacific 
Fleet and Central Command and what is the Navy's plan to expand 
wireless internet access to Sailors across the fleet?
    Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. There is currently no N2N6 
Program of Record (POR) to support high-speed satellite internet for 
personal use. The pilot program for satellite wireless internet 
capability was spearheaded by Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), 
and fully funded using PACFLT Operating Target (OPTAR) funds. We are 
currently reviewing our Navy strategy for command SATCOM and learning 
from efforts such as the PACFLT pilots.
    OPNAV N2N6's Commercial Satellite Broadband Program (CBSP) POR 
funds commercial satellite for Navy operational networks. Per Navy 
security instruction, Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs) are not 
authorized to connect to ships' operational networks. Sailors are 
authorized to use the ships' approved devices and operational network 
for personal use (i.e., access Facebook, email, etc.) when not 
impacting operational mission requirements. Availability of end-user 
device (i.e., workstation), security controls limiting or restricting 
access to shore-based websites, and competing demands for bandwidth 
utilization across ships' operational networks affect Sailors' personal 
use of the network. In Denied, Degraded, Intermittent, and Limited 
(DDIL) environments or due to Operational Security (OPSEC) concerns, 
personal use of ships' operation network may be restricted.
    Prior to the `Other 3 Billion' (O3B) pilot program by COMPACFLT, 
bandwidth controls were utilized to accomplish essential services. 
Prior to O3B install on USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT, the unclassified 
operational network utilization routinely stayed at greater than 98%, 
requiring implementation of bandwidth controls. Once O3B was online, 
the operational network utilization remained below 46%. In addition, 
the following services were now being performed or greatly enhanced by 
using O3B vice the operational network:
      Cyber security patches may take several days to a week to 
download or can error out during download via the operational network. 
Use of O3B to download patches was reduced from days to minutes.
      Public affairs video files of 300 to 400 MB were 
transferred within minutes vice setting bandwidth conditions for 
periods of 8+ hours.
      1,949 peak hour users and 5,202 devices connected on 
Christmas in 2020 allowing Sailors to text and video chat with family 
members while underway for the first time.
      Provided constant communication from leadership to family 
members and live streaming a frocking ceremony with 30,000 viewers.
      When operational network was down or degraded, medical 
evacuations were coordinated via O3B exclusively.
      Use of Defense Travel System to process transaction would 
previous timeout, requiring refresh and delaying processes. O3B 
lessened the time and drastically reduced timeouts.
      Sailors were able to utilize O3B for online college and 
other web based training, not possible utilizing operational networks 
due to bandwidth requirements.
      O3B allowed operators to quickly address and track high 
priority material shipments inbound to the ship. Additionally, several 
departments utilized O3B to update test equipment and download 
maintenance programs, increased ability to maintain aircraft, support 
equipment and operational systems.
    Additional research is required to identify true unit costs for 
implementing the capability to provide an at-sea, end-to-end, high-
speed satellite internet wireless solution for personal devices across 
the Fleet.

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