[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-85]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2023 DEFENSE BUDGET
REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 11, 2022
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TITT FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-852 WASHINGTON : 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Seventeenth Congress
ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland, SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
Chair C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
Brian Garrett, Staff Director
Jay Vallario, Professional Staff Member
Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Brooke Alred, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
WITNESSES
Berger, Gen David H., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S.
Marine Corps................................................... 8
Del Toro, Hon. Carlos, Secretary of the Navy, Department of the
Navy........................................................... 5
Gilday, ADM Michael M., USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Berger, Gen David H.......................................... 114
Del Toro, Hon. Carlos........................................ 69
Gilday, ADM Michael M........................................ 98
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Mr. Waltz chart:
US Shipbuilding Plan Progression Vs PLAN Growth............ 141
Mrs. Luria charts:
2017 Strategic Readiness Review............................ 142
FY 2023 Navy Budget Highlight Book......................... 143
Figure 1. Key Naval Platform Metrics....................... 144
Total VLS Cells: Surface Ships + SSGN...................... 144
Department of the Navy Letter regarding FOIA Request......... 145
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Banks.................................................... 152
Mr. Bergman.................................................. 153
Mrs. Bice.................................................... 154
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 152
Mr. Gaetz.................................................... 152
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 151
Dr. Jackson.................................................. 155
Ms. Jacobs................................................... 154
Mr. Kahele................................................... 155
Mr. Langevin................................................. 151
Mrs. Luria................................................... 153
Mrs. McClain................................................. 155
Mr. Scott.................................................... 152
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 153
Mr. Wilson................................................... 151
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 177
Mr. Bergman.................................................. 179
Mr. Carbajal................................................. 176
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 162
Mr. Horsford................................................. 184
Ms. Houlahan................................................. 178
Ms. Jacobs................................................... 183
Mr. Keating.................................................. 177
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 162
Mr. Langevin................................................. 159
Mr. Larsen................................................... 161
Mr. Morelle.................................................. 182
Mr. Scott.................................................... 168
Ms. Speier................................................... 165
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 180
FISCAL YEAR 2023 DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 11, 2022.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Call the meeting to order. If people will
take their seats, we'll go ahead and get started.
As I think most people are aware--but I'm making sure
everybody knows--it is a hybrid hearing again. We have some
here, some appearing virtually on the screen. I think we all
know how that works these days.
The full committee hearing this morning is on the fiscal
year 2023 defense budget request from the Department of the
Navy.
We are pleased to have three witnesses today: the Honorable
Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Michael Gilday,
Chief of Naval Operations; and General David Berger, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. I thank you, gentlemen, all for
being here.
These are incredibly challenging times, as we all know, and
the main theme of what we're trying to do in the Pentagon is
modernization--you know, catching up with the pace of warfare.
To a certain degree, warfare has always been about
lethality, survivability, and information. It's just that all
of those things are getting more complicated with the rapid
pace of technology, and we are certainly learning lessons from
the conflict in Ukraine and some of the other conflicts about
what we truly need to be able to be successful and maintain the
level of dominance that we want to on the military side.
And I want to compliment the Navy and the Marine Corps for
stepping out and looking at the future and trying to modernize
the force and begin to take those steps to get us to where we
need to be on a whole series of systems.
It is a challenge because we have legacy systems and we
have the future and how do we balance all of the needs and
challenges in the world. As we have said on this committee many
times, it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational
terrorist threats.
Certainly, our focus right now is on Russia. But those
other threats in that list have not gone away while we're
dealing with Russia and Ukraine. In some ways they've become
even more complicated. We want to make sure that we're
modernizing the force as we move forward.
As many of you have heard, I am not as obsessed with
numbers as others. I am obsessed with capability, and I'm very
interested to hear today from the Navy about how they see the
path towards building the capability that they need.
We could have 5,000 ships, but if they don't do what we
need them to do it would really be no better than having 10.
What are the capabilities that we're trying to build? And when
I look at the systems that we're building going forward, the
new attack submarines, the new ``boomer'' [ballistic-missile
submarine] that's coming online, the Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers, the frigate that we're building, the increase in
the number of drones and, crucially, the improvement in
missiles. I was out at Palmdale last week visiting some of our
systems as they're being developed as we're trying to catch up,
particularly in the hypersonic area.
That's where the future of warfare is, our ability to
survive not just against China--and I think that's one popular
sort of myth. It's, like, we're building towards, you know,
being able to deter China.
It doesn't take much these days to be able to develop
missile technology that can take out an aircraft carrier or a
tank or even one of our more modern jet fighters. Some of our
smaller adversaries can develop those capabilities as well.
It doesn't take much to be able to disrupt an information
system. We have to make our information systems more secure and
to make sure that that information can get to the warfighter
that needs it when he or she needs it.
All of those things are important for all aspects of that
fight. So hearing more about modernization on our Navy
shipbuilding; it is a controversial issue.
As you know, we'd all love to have every single ship that
we want right now today, but it takes time. So if you could
walk us through the reasons behind the retirements and the
ships that we're building to replace them, and, crucially, when
we talk about the money that we're saving in the ships that
we're retiring, tell us about what it's going to buy us. That
money that it's saving is going towards a capability that's
going to be crucial, going forward, we need to hear about what
those specifics are.
I also want to compliment the Commandant for his leadership
of the Marine Corps, modernizing the force there as well,
recognizing that the best thing the Marine Corps brings to us
is the ability to be an agile, mobile, lethal force, and you
have to build a system to enable the Marine Corps to do that.
You know, the future of land warfare and tanks is not
terribly bright. So we need to move on and build the force
that's going to be able to fight the fight of the future, and I
applaud your leadership in doing that.
Two last issues I want to touch on before I turn it over to
Mr. Rogers. Number one is the sea-launched cruise missile. This
has been a matter of some controversy. It has been proposed to
not build the sea-launched cruise missile. It's not actually a
decision point right now in terms of whether or not we go
forward with it.
But there's a general feeling, why wouldn't you want more
missiles--isn't more better. What I am concerned about is the
mission of the attack submarines. We're talking about putting
nuclear missiles on attack submarines.
Now, as we all know, we have submarines that have nuclear
missile capability and they are crucial to our force. We are
modernizing that as we speak.
But it was determined back in the 1990s that the burden of
the attack submarines also having to carry nuclear missiles,
and it's not just a matter of swapping one missile out for the
other.
If you're going to carry an actual nuclear missile, it is
an entirely different mission that requires an entirely
different system and an entirely different set of training. It
is a major step, and the reason some of us don't support moving
to that step is because--not because we don't want more
missiles. We want the attack submarines to be able to do the
job that they do right now to the best of their ability.
We don't want to impede that mission. But it's a balance.
So we look forward to hearing your comments on that.
Lastly, the USS George Washington has been in the news with
the number of suicides. Two hundred crew members were taken off
of it. There have been widespread complaints about the living
conditions onboard that ship.
And not just on that ship but, widely speaking, we are
concerned on this committee about how our sailors and also
service members just in general are being taken care of and how
responsive, in this case, the Navy is to those needs and
concerns when they are raised.
It does not seem to have worked well in this situation. We
have lost lives, major disruption for the sailors who are
serving, and as you all know and I'll say, you know, for all
the equipment and all the--it's about the people.
The people are what make us the best military in the world.
We have to take care of our people. It does not seem at the
moment like we're doing that to the extent that we should.
Definitely want to hear more about what we're doing to correct
that situation, going forward.
With that, I thank you for being here and I turn it over to
Mr. Rogers for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the witnesses for being here and for your service to our
Nation.
It should be no surprise I remain very concerned about the
President's budget proposal. Rather than keeping pace with the
threat from China, the President's budget would let them lap
us, and you don't need to look much farther than the request
for the Department of the Navy as evidence.
The President is seeking to build a paltry eight battle
force ships by fiscal year 2023. At the same time, he wants to
retire 24. Sixteen of these ships have years and, in some
cases, decades of service life remaining.
The President's proposal would retire an LCS [litoral
combat ship] commissioned just 3 years ago, two ESDs
[expeditionary transfer docks] with over 30 years' service life
remaining, and a cruiser that's about to complete a service
life extension that cost us hundreds of millions of dollars.
In all, the taxpayers--in all, the taxpayer has spent
billions on these ships but there's little if any return on
that investment. Beyond the incredible waste of money, these
retirements represent a huge loss of capability for the Navy
and the Marine Corps.
That became crystal clear when the Commandant informed us
that the Marine Corps needed at least 31 amphibious ships to
meet its statutory requirements. Yet, the administration plans
to slash the fleet from 32 to 24 over the next 2 years.
All of this invites a tremendous amount of risk and the
risk won't be mitigated for years. That's because this
administration has no plans to grow the fleet. Instead, they
plan to steadily cut the fleet by 18 ships over the next 5
years.
Forget the 500-ship Navy. We're never going to see a 350-
ship Navy. While the administration dithers, China is rapidly
growing and modernizing its navy. It already controls the
largest navy in the world. Our fleet of 298 ships was eclipsed
years ago by a Chinese fleet of over 350 ships.
By 2030 the DOD [U.S. Department of Defense] predicts China
will control over 460 ships. I don't understand how this
administration can conclude that making the size of our fleet
even smaller will somehow deter China.
I'm also concerned about the strike fighter gap. Last year
the Navy insisted the strike fighter gap would close by 2025.
This year, they're telling us it won't close it until 2031.
But that assumes Congress grants the Navy the relief it
wants from statutory requirements to field an air wing for each
deployed aircraft carrier. I would caution the Navy to not be
very optimistic that we will grant such relief. That means
Congress will have to step in again to fill yet another
critical capability gap that this administration refuses to
deal with.
Setting back our credible deterrent even further is the
President's call to eliminate the nuclear sea-launched cruise
missile [SLCM]. According to the DNI [Director of National
Intelligence], China is fielding a full nuclear triad and is
expected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030, and they are
developing delivery systems that will almost certainly include
a sea-launched cruise missile.
Meanwhile, Russia has a 21-to-1 advantage over us in
tactical nuclear weapons, including a bevy of nuclear-tipped
sea-launched cruise missiles. In light of this growing threat,
the recommendation to end SLCM is both shortsighted and
dangerous.
It's clear that this budget fails to invest in the
capabilities required to deter conflict and, if necessary, to
win the next war. I refuse to support it.
We should be expanding and modernizing our naval
capabilities. We absolutely should not go along with the
administration's plan to cut these capabilities. I look forward
to working with the majority to pass a real defense budget that
supports modernization and ensures credible deterrence.
Finally, I want to [assure] the Commandant we understand
the importance of Force Design 2030 and continue to support its
implementation. I look forward to further updates on the
progress he's making to reorganize the Marine Corps and ensure
its evolution into a 21st century fighting force.
Congress will continue our oversight of Force Design 2030.
In the meantime, I want to thank the Commandant for all of his
interactions with Congress on this plan.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Secretary Del Toro.
Could you get the microphone a little closer to you there
and--I'm not sure if it's on.
STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS DEL TORO, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Secretary Del Toro. Good morning.
Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished
members, it's an honor to be here alongside General Berger and
Admiral Gilday to discuss the posture of the Department of the
Navy.
I look forward to working with you to ensure that our
sailors and Marines are equipped, trained, and prepared to the
best of our abilities so that they can fulfill our vital role
to provide combat ready forces in support of our joint force.
The United States requires a strong Navy and a Marine
Corps. Our global economy and the self-determination of free
nations everywhere depends on sea power. Our national security
depends on sea power.
That's particularly true in the Indo-Pacific where
Beijing's aggression threatens the rules-based international
order that protects us all. To answer that challenge, your Navy
and Marine Corps must have the power to maintain credible
integrated deterrence by campaigning forward, forward; forward
from the sea, on the shore, and in the air.
Thanks to the leadership of President Biden and Secretary
Austin, this budget does provide the right balance of capacity,
lethality, modernization, and readiness that we need to execute
the National Defense Strategy.
We will invest these resources through the execution of a
concise, clear, transparent strategy rooted in three guiding
principles: first, to maintain and strengthen our maritime
dominance so that we can deter potential adversaries and fight
and win decisively; second, to empower our sailors and our
Marines by fostering a culture of warfighting excellence
founded on strong leadership, dignity, and respect; and third,
strengthen our strategic partnerships across the joint force,
across industry, and our international partners around the
globe.
We are executing this strategy through the integrated
visions of the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and the Navy
Navigation Plan. I strongly support these visions. I am
committed to fielding the ready, capable, and modernized force
required to ensure their success.
To maintain and strengthen maritime dominance, we have to
be serious about fielding and maintaining the right capability
to win wars.
That's why our budget strongly invests in a nimble network
and survivable Navy with platforms like Columbia, DDG Flight
III, with enhanced cyber and autonomous capabilities that
enable our fleet to campaign forward in a distributed manner.
This budget invests in a truly expeditionary and persistent
Marine Corps with the mobility and the readiness as a
responding force wherever and whenever needed.
To ensure the combat readiness of our platforms well into
the future we're more than doubling Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program, SIOP, investments over the previous
budget.
This budget invests in the climate resiliency of our force
and facilities while continuing efforts to substantially reduce
our impact on climate change. This budget also invests in
facilities that promote the quality of life of our personnel
and their families.
We owe it to our military families to ensure their safety
and well-being at all times, and when we fall short, we look at
our problems square in the eye and take actions to fix those
problems.
We're investing in our efforts to recruit, retain, train,
and promote the best from all of America and we are increasing
funding for naval and cyber education and enhanced shipboard
training, enabling sailors and Marines to build their careers
wherever service takes them.
We appreciate the committee's interest in ensuring our
forces have the right facilities to train, fight, and win,
including the potential expansion of the Fallon Training Range
Complex. We also appreciate the committee's efforts to include
new tools within the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
to deter destructive behavior and prosecute sexual assault,
domestic violence, and other offenses.
At every level of leadership we are determined to prevent
sexual assault and sexual harassment, hold offenders
accountable, and create a safer, stronger, more inclusive Navy-
Marine Corps team.
I want to close by noting the importance of strategic
partnerships. From the joint force and our industrial base to
our allies and partners around the world, I have seen our
partnerships and alliance in actions from F-35B operations in
the Indo-Pacific to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
exercises in Norway and the Mediterranean.
But our most important partnership is with the American
people. That's why I'm grateful for the oversight and the
interest of this committee and I look forward to continuing to
work with you.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Del Toro can be found
in the Appendix on page 69.]
The Chairman. Admiral Gilday.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Gilday. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers----
The Chairman. The light doesn't work that you can see. So
you just push it once and then it's on.
Admiral Gilday. Is that on? Perfect. Thank you.
The Chairman. Yes. Good.
Admiral Gilday. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank
you for the opportunity this morning to appear with Secretary
Del Toro and General Berger.
For nearly eight decades, America's maritime superiority
has guaranteed security and prosperity across the world's
oceans and has played a unique and predominant role in ensuring
that our Nation's most vital national interests remain intact.
Maintaining maritime superiority is fundamental to
implementing the National Defense Strategy. Global competition
is heating up, the pace of innovation is accelerating, and the
environment of our naval forces sailing and flying every day is
more transparent, it's more lethal, and it's more contested.
Everyone in this room is familiar with those trends,
particularly China's massive investment in highly capable
forces designed to deny our access to the seas.
Our Navy's role has never been more consequential or more
expansive. America needs a combat-credible naval force that can
protect our interests in peace and prevail in war, not just
today but tomorrow in the long-term competition ahead of us.
Our budget submission reflects that imperative. It fully
funds a Columbia-class submarine to ensure continuity for our
Nation's most survivable strategic deterrent. It keeps our
fleet ready to fight tonight, funding maintenance accounts,
filling magazines with weapons, putting spare parts in
storerooms, and giving our sailors the steaming days and the
flying hours that they need to train and fight.
It modernizes our fleet by investing in weapons with
increased range and speed, integrated systems to improve fleet
survivability, and a resilient cyber-secure network
infrastructure, and it invests in affordable capable capacity,
building towards the goal of a larger distributed hybrid fleet
on, under, and above the seas.
The investments in our shipbuilding account reflect the
rigorous analysis that we have conducted with the Marine Corps
over the past year and the capability requirements of our
combatant and our fleet commanders.
We need to field a fleet today that is ready as we
modernize for the future. This has forced us to make difficult
decisions, including the decommissioning of platforms that do
not bring the needed lethality to a high-end fight in contested
seas.
While building capacity at the expense of readiness and
modernization can sound like an attractive proposition, it is
not one that I endorse. We have been there before and we have
seen tragic results. I refuse to repeat it again.
We cannot field a fleet larger than one that we can
sustain. At today's fiscal levels, quantity simply cannot
substitute for quality, especially as our adversaries are
building advanced warfighting systems.
Failing to modernize to meet those threats would erode
America's maritime superiority at a time when the command at
seas will shape the global strategic balance of power for the
rest of this century.
The stakes in this competition are extremely high, and your
sailors and Marines, Active and Reserve, uniformed and
civilian, are committed to strengthening our naval power every
single day.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I'm
grateful for the committee's support to our Navy and Marine
Corps team. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday can be found in
the Appendix on page 98.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Berger.
STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Berger. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers,
distinguished members of the committee, as we sit here this
morning with the backdrop of a war being waged in Ukraine and
malign activities in the Indo-Pacific, I think it's a pretty
good reminder that we don't have the luxury of building a joint
force designed for one threat or one region or one form of
warfare.
We have to be prepared, of course, for the full range of
operations in places we might not expect and probably on
timelines we did not anticipate, and that's why your Marine
Corps' ability to respond to crises in any clime and place is
essential to our national security.
Three years ago, as the leadership mentioned in the
beginning, we embarked on an ambitious program of modernization
to ensure that your Marine Corps continues to meet its
statutory role as the Nation's force in readiness, and while
China does remain the pacing challenge, our modernization
efforts are theater agnostic.
In fact, earlier this year we deployed the first set of
Force Design 2030 capabilities to the EUCOM [U.S. European
Command] AOR [area of responsibility] and we established the
first Marine littoral regiment in the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-
Pacific Command] AOR, and that is your Marine Corps modernizing
at speed.
And with the bipartisan support of this committee, our
modernization effort, I would assess, is on track and building
momentum. Over the past 3 years, with your assistance we have
literally self-funded $17 billion worth of modernization.
Today, I'd like to offer you a brief update on three areas
of significant progress over the past 12 months.
First, over the past year and a half we have conducted nine
force-on-force exercises out at our combined arms live fire
training center in Twentynine Palms, California.
What we have learned in those nine exercises has validated
our initial assumptions. Smaller, more mobile, more distributed
units employing 21st century combined arms--if they have
organic ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
and if they have loitering munitions--have a decisive advantage
and they are more lethal than larger formations using
traditional force structures and traditional warfighting
concepts; findings, I would offer, that are entirely consistent
for what we're seeing in Ukraine right now.
In less than 2 years, we formalized a concept for stand-in
forces, built a capability that I believe has dramatically
expanded what we can achieve in support of both land and
maritime operations.
One of those stand-in forces, as we sit here this morning,
is in Europe, and as the EUCOM commander previously testified a
few weeks ago, that force is, in his words, ``precious for
effective deterrence.''
Second, we achieved some important operational milestones.
This year we'll deploy the first Amphibious Combat Vehicles
with a MEU [Marine expeditionary unit] on an ARG [amphibious
ready group]. And with this committee's assistance and support,
the accelerated fielding of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle--the
ACV--has allowed us to accelerate the decommissioning, allowed
us to retire its predecessor, the AAV [Assault Amphibious
Vehicle], which was aging and that was years in advance, due to
your support.
This year also marked the first deployment of our F-35Cs
onboard a Navy aircraft carrier, our F-35Bs onboard a British
aircraft carrier for the first time. That 7-month deployment
onboard the HMS [Her Majesty's Ship] Queen Elizabeth, I think
demonstrated both significant progress in building
interchangeability--not interoperability but
interchangeability--with the U.K. [United Kingdom] but also our
commitment to standing astride our allies and partners.
The MEU, enabled by amphibious ships, remains the crown
jewel of our naval expeditionary forces. No naval vessel in our
inventory is capable of supporting a more diverse set of
missions than the amphibious warship.
Secretary Del Toro, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations],
and I all agree that 31 L-class traditional amphibious warships
is the minimum that the Nation needs, and your support for
sustaining that minimum capacity is essential to national
security.
And, finally, this past year, we published our plan to
create a modern personnel system better aligned to the
realities of what we face in the future.
That plan will better allow us to recruit, to develop, to
retain, and align the talents of Marines with what the Marine
Corps needs in the future, maximizing the performance of both.
But what the Marine Corps does for this Nation, that will
not change. We remain America's force in readiness, capable of
diverse missions across the operational spectrum. But how we
accomplish those missions is changing.
My role, to ensure that the members of this committee
understand where we are headed and why, and how your support is
critical to our collective success, and to that end, I welcome
the opportunity this morning to continue working closely with
the members and leadership of this committee and I look forward
to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Berger can be found in
the Appendix on page 114.]
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you, General Berger. Thank
you for your leadership in modernizing the force.
I know it hasn't been easy. Tough decisions have had to
have been made and I think you're moving in the right
direction. And for my part, I support the 31 amphibious ship
requirement that you need. I mean, that's central to what
you're trying to accomplish, and we will continue to work to
make sure we achieve that.
Admiral Gilday, I want to drill down a little bit on what
you said about, you know, being able to maintain the force, and
let's talk about the ships that are being retired, some of them
that are not that old.
But regardless of how old they are, the cost of operating
them has been much higher than expected. They are not,
frequently, ready for a variety of different mechanical
problems and the capabilities, particularly when we're talking
about the LCS and the missions that they were supposed to be
able to do, they haven't been able to do.
Could you drill down on some of those specifics? Because
it's easy to say, my gosh, why would you get rid of 10 ships?
You know, they're sitting here. Why can't we use them?
Well, we can't use them, number one, because a lot of times
they're not ready to do anything, number one. Number two, when
they are they still break down. They're incredibly expensive
and they don't have the capabilities that we expected.
So regardless of how old they are, that's a lot of money to
be spent to get pretty close to nothing. Can you walk through
some of those specifics for us?
Admiral Gilday. Our entering argument is what can we afford
so, in other words, you won't have a Navy bigger than one that
we can sustain.
So in taking a look at our top line, we then stratified all
of our platforms based on their return in the fight. So with
respect to their lethality, with respect to sustainability,
with respect to reliability, could we count on them to actually
move the needle in a high-end fight with an adversary like
China.
So that stratification caused ships down at the bottom, as
an example, to drop out.
Older cruisers. So of the five cruisers that we have had in
modernization, they are over 8 years in delay days out of
shipyards and over a half a billion dollars above budget with
respect to the modernization programs.
With respect to the weapon systems on those platforms, the
older spy radars can't see the threat. So if they can't see it
they can't shoot it down.
So in terms of reliability, three recent cruisers that we
have deployed we either had to pull them in for repairs
overseas with leaks below the waterline or we have had to pull
them back into their homeports in the United States for leaking
fuel tanks.
So there have been survivability, reliability, and
lethality challenges with the cruisers that are near the end of
their service life at 35 years.
We think that at this point we're putting--we're throwing
good money after bad and the investment--the money that we save
from those cruisers gets reinvested into readiness, into
modernization, and into capacity, in that order.
The LCS ships. The primary reason why the nine LCS ships
are on the retirement list has to do with an anti-submarine
warfare system. That was the primary battery--main battery--of
that ship. It did not work out technically.
So after about a year and a half study, I refuse to put an
additional dollar against a system that would not be able to
track a high-end submarine in today's environment.
With respect to the older LSDs [dock landing ships], the
Tortuga is a really good example, she's 3 years delayed coming
out of maintenance right now.
So these decisions we made, sir, again, centered around
lethality, being able to actually move the needle in a fight,
survivability, and reliability, and we have reinvested that
money. Our proposal is to reinvest that funding into our top
priorities: readiness, modernization, and lethality.
And if I could just continue for a moment to talk about
that. So with respect to readiness, we're trying to maximize
the domestic production lines for all high-end missiles--LRASM
[Long Range Anti-Ship Missile], JASSM-ER [Joint Air-to-Surface
Standoff Missile-Extended Range], Maritime Strike Tomahawk, SM-
6--so that the ships that we do send to sea actually have
systems that matter--that matter from both a deterrence and
from a fight----
The Chairman. If I could just put a fine point on that.
Admiral Gilday. Sure.
The Chairman. Rather than spending money on ships that
aren't capable and don't perform, you would like to spend it so
the ships we do have actually have missiles that they can use,
which seems to make sense to me.
And, look, Mr. Rogers is not wrong about the amount of
money we have spent on these things. But throwing good money
after bad, as you said, spending more money on them to not get
what we need, that's not the solution to that problem.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, and the cost of maintaining those
numbers over quality, we're going to pay for that in terms of
people. We're going to pay for it with less ammunition and
magazines, fewer spare parts in storerooms.
We're going to pay for it with reduced maintenance, reduced
flying hours, reduced steaming days, everything that will yield
you a ready force today with--as some have mentioned, we
won't--the size of the Navy, the shape of the Navy, is not
going to change much within the next 5 years. Given the fact
that we face a rising China, a very near threat, perhaps, in
2027 or sooner, the fleet that we field today has to be ready
to take it on.
The Chairman. Thank you. Just one quick thing back on our
sea-launched cruise missile. Lest anyone have the wrong
impression, we have sea-launched nuclear missiles, okay.
They're just on the boomers, on the Columbia--Ohio-class, soon
to be Columbia-class submarine. So it's not like we don't have
the capability.
The question is whether or not we want to move that--sorry,
add that capability to attack submarines who, by the way,
actually have a mission that is unrelated to the nuclear
mission that we want to make sure that they perform.
Just very quickly, one more time can you walk us through
the concern about adding it to the attack submarines,
understanding that, yeah, great, Chinese are developing, you
know, sea-launched--sorry, submarine-launched nuclear weapons.
We have submarine-launched nuclear weapons. We're not
walking away from that capability. We're talking about whether
or not we want to add that to what our attack submarines
already do.
So walk us through your reasoning.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Having served--having served on a nuclear capable surface
ship in the late 1980s, that mission does not come without a
cost.
There is a significant amount of attention that has to be
paid to any platform that carries that type of weapon in terms
of training, in terms of sustainability, in terms of
reliability, in terms of the force's readiness to be able to
use, to be able to conduct that mission.
I'm not convinced yet that we need to make a $31 billion
investment in that particular system to close that particular
gap.
I do think that it makes sense to me that we keep a small
amount of money against R&D [research and development] to keep
that warm, if you will, within the industrial base while we get
a better understanding of the world we live in with two
nuclear-capable peer competitors.
At the same time, the fact that we're about to put
hypersonics into play this year with the Army in 2025 with the
Navy, that's also a deterrent that we should factor in the
conversation in terms of the investments that we're going to
make, in my opinion.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, the--in response to the chairman's question, you
framed it out of the box, that we're going to have to make
decisions about what we can afford, given the top line. That's
my problem. This is an arbitrary top line that is inadequate
and you're trying to fit the number--and I know you've got to
pick some number.
But what I ask for is what do you need, and let us worry
about the number. Because the fact is Presidents propose
budgets, Congress writes budgets, and we want to make sure we
that we give you what you need to be successful as a Navy.
With that, let's talk a little about inflation. We're
hearing from industry that significant inflationary increases
in price and materials and commodities. For example, we have
heard there's significant cost growth in the price of the next
oiler the Navy has been budgeted for.
How is inflation currently impacting your service and are
you concerned about the impacts of this record inflation for
fiscal year 2023?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, I am concerned. So with respect
to unfunded requirements that inflation has exacerbated this
year, potentially an additional $2 billion for fuel alone.
I think--you mentioned the industrial base. So we will see
increases in our military construction projects. We will see
increases in our ship production, submarine production, airline
production, aircraft production lines, due to inflation. It
makes--makes sense.
On our sailors and on their families that's where we'll see
an impact as well. A good example is basic allowance for
housing, and although the 2023 budget proposes about a 2.4
percent increase in housing allowance, that does not keep pace
with the housing market that exists today and so that puts them
under pressure.
The bottom line, sir, is that yes, inflation adds another
stressor to this--to this budget as we try to field the most
lethal, capable, effective Navy and Marine Corps today.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Admiral, in your best professional military judgment, does
the retirement of 24 ships in fiscal year 2023 and the
accelerated reduction of 10 percent of our fleet's conventional
strike capability in the next 5 years make our conventional
deterrence stronger or weaker?
Admiral Gilday. I don't think it puts us in a better place,
sir. However, it's not just about numbers, and if I could
briefly describe what this proposed budget yields under, on,
and above the sea, it's fairly impressive.
Based on the support from this Congress, we have maximized
the submarine industrial base with two SSNs [attack submarines]
and an SSBN [ballistic-missile submarine] a year, and that set
of headlights goes out to 2037.
With a high degree of confidence, that part of the
industrial base probably better than any other sector in the
Department of Defense is able to remain sighted on their
investments in a workforce and infrastructure.
So we're fielding the world's best submarines and we're
also investing in world-class weapons for those submarines. Our
Navy SEALs [sea, air, and land forces] are pivoted from
primarily counterterrorism focus to their frogman roots under
the sea, and so we have that, again, as an added enhancement
for the undersea piece.
On the surface, we're commissioning Flight III DDGs
[Arleigh Burke-class of guided-missile destroyers], the new
Constellation-class frigate. We're putting hypersonics on
Zumwalt-class destroyers. We are investing in hypersonic
weapons with SM-6, Maritime Strike Tomahawk. As I mentioned
earlier, we're trying to max out those production lines.
In the air, by mid-century in 2020--mid-decade in 2025,
half of our air wings will be fourth-, fifth-gen integrated. We
are trying to maximize domestic production lines for LRASM and
JASSM-ER, weapons with range and speed.
The unmanned capability that we have that we're fielding in
our air wings right now to go IOC [initial operating
capability] in 2025 is the MQ-25; extends the range of our air
wings, allows us to free up strike fighters from that refueling
role to do what they have been traditionally trained to do.
And, lastly, we're making investments with the help of
Congress for the human weapon system. So in areas of training,
live virtual constructive training, relevant learning, mental
health. We're also making investments in cyber that are
significant.
So when I take a look at what we are doing, given the top
line that we have, it's significant in terms of not only
deterrence but also to put us in a position to prevail and win.
Could we always use more? Absolutely. My unfunded list gets
at some of that. But we are fielding a highly lethal capable
force.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Admiral.
General Berger, the administration has proposed cutting the
number of amphibious vessels from 32 to 24 ships. How does the
reduction impact your ability to support operations in forcible
entry options and do you support the reduction?
General Berger. The study that the Secretary of the Navy
commissioned this past fall, which was, I think, the second one
since 2018, took a different--a little bit different tack, in
answering your question, in that A, it was based on both the
2018 and the 2022 NDS [National Defense Strategy], and the
problem was how many--the question from the Secretary is how
many amphib ships do we need.
The second part is it took--used a more realistic
availability goal. In other words, historically, where are we
with amphib ship readiness and factor that in.
Not aspirationally, idealistically, but realistically. We
need amphibious ships and Marines embarked on them to do, I
think, three basic things.
One is to deter, to campaign. Deterrence underpins the
strategy. Second, we have to be able to respond to crises and
contingencies. And third, in a warfight, we have to be prepared
to fight.
Thirty-one is the bare minimum and that assumes risk even
at 31.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5
minutes and he's virtual.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me
okay?
The Chairman. Yes, we can.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
Good morning to our witnesses. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral
Gilday, and General Berger, thank you for your testimony this
morning and for your service to our country.
Let me begin by saying I'm very proud that our Nation's
finest nuclear submarines are built right in the great State of
Rhode Island, which I have the privilege of representing, and
I'm glad to see such strong support for their construction and
procurement as well as robust support in the necessary
workforce development efforts in this year's budget request.
But let me just shift to another area right now and I want
to focus on cyber. Many would agree this is the greatest
national security threat that we face or one of them that we
face in the 21st century.
Mr. Secretary and Admiral Gilday, we met quite recently to
discuss the state of Navy's cyber force and in that meeting you
made clear that it's a priority for the Navy's leadership team.
Yet, we have--we have heard multiple concerns about the
state of the Navy's cyber forces and the Secretary's 28 pages
of written testimony for today's event, meant to reflect the
highest priorities of the Navy, doesn't mention cyber once.
Admiral Gilday's remarks did touch upon cyber briefly but only
to basically say that there's a team working on this.
Well, in the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have
looked into the, quote/unquote, ``get well plan'' that was
directed at the Navy's cyber activities and I'm not sure that
the plan which aims to fix this supposedly urgent problem by
2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously.
So taking all this together, why should this committee
believe that the Navy is prioritizing cyberspace operations?
Secretary Del Toro. Thank you, Congressman, for that
question, and let me reassure you that cyber is critically
important to our national security in our Department of the
Navy strategy. We actually have made major investments in
fiscal year 2021, 2022, and 2023 in both capability and also
with regards to policy and how we address cyber.
Right now in the Department of the Navy, for example,
within the scope of our CIO [Chief Information Officer] he is
embarking an entire new enterprise called Cyber Ready in order
to be able to effectively make all our weapon systems cyber
ready all the time as opposed to in a cyclic fashion, which has
occurred in the past with regards to a complicated and really
difficult ATO [authority to operate] process to be able to
designate our systems cyber ready.
On the personnel side, we have also made major investments
in cyber readiness of our force, training our officers. We have
the first cyber curriculum at the United States Naval Academy.
We're graduating cyber warriors, implementing them into our
fleet and our force.
The Marine Corps has actually made tremendous advancements
in terms of cyber readiness, and I'd like to, with your
permission, allow the CNO and the Commandant to talk
specifically to their own operational cyber readiness.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, thanks for the question.
I think we're--our most recent conversation had to do with
cyber readiness of our teams. Since that conversation, we have
taken a deep dive in taking a look at the cyber readiness kill
chain, if you will, all the way from recruiting talent to
sustaining that talent on our cyber teams.
We found deficiencies with respect to the recruiting side.
Doing a pretty good job in terms of getting talent, then
matching up that talent against the right mission areas.
What we have instituted through working very closely with
the University of Maryland behavioral scientists is we have
developed a cyber aptitude test that allows us to take our
entry level cyber sailors and to, essentially, pair them
against the best, most appropriate skill sets that they can
excel at.
We have--within the past month, we have increased our pass
rate in an initial course down in Pensacola, Florida, from 40
to 50 percent to 80 percent by doing remedial training. So we
put people, extra trainers, against that problem.
We're doing the same thing at Fort Mead. We have gone out
to the fleet. We found 80 additional cyber operators that we
felt could have better been used in the teams. We have moved
those 80 operators to teams.
We have taken our cyber warrant officers that we created
over the last 2 years--we have moved them back to their cyber
teams in order to increase readiness. We have increased our--
I'm increasing our retention bonuses, doubling them from 14----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 151.]
The Chairman. I do apologize. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. Wilson, who is also virtual, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Joe, you're still muted there. We don't--Joe, we don't have
you. We're going to go to Mr. Lamborn and then we'll come back
to you. We can't--we can't hear you.
Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Del Toro, it's great to see you again. During
this hearing last year, your predecessor promised certain
documents and emails related to the rumored--then rumored
cancellation of the SLCM/N [nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise
missile] program.
Last year's NDAA fenced a large amount of money until these
documents and the analysis of alternatives for SLCM-N were
provided to Congress. We have yet to receive any of this
information despite the proposal in the Nuclear Posture Review
to cancel SLCM-N and it being zeroed out of this year's
proposed budget request.
When can we expect the Navy to comply with our directives
and produce these documents?
Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, I was not aware that those
documents had not been provided to the Congress. However, I
will promise you that I'll go back and ensure that we do
provide the necessary documents that you have requested with--
--
Mr. Lamborn. Please do. That's essential.
Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. SLCM-N. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday, it's great to see you again and Admiral
Joyner. I saw you both last month at Fallon TOPGUN [Navy
Fighter Weapons School]. It's good to see you again.
This year, we have heard testimony from Chairman Milley,
Admiral Grady, Admiral Richard, and General Wolters that their
best military advice was to continue with the SLCM-N program,
which we have been discussing here today. Do you believe that
we should continue the program or at least the research and
development that keeps it as a viable option for the future,
should it be needed?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I'm a proponent, as I stated, about
keeping a modest amount of money against the R&D effort so that
we don't lose that capability in the workforce and in our labs.
It's actually proceeding at pace right now.
And then from that make informed decisions about whether or
not we want to invest a significant amount of money in that
capability, understanding what both of those nuclear-powered
peers potentially bring to the table.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Now, also, Admiral, I share the concern Ranking Member
Rogers expressed about this administration not supporting SLCM-
N. Some [who] have argued against continuing it imply that the
Navy simply doesn't have the bandwidth to support it and it
would be difficult to accomplish.
So let me ask you several yes or no questions to sort of
set the stage for this issue. Currently--the Navy currently
does handle nuclear weapons atop ballistic missiles, right?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. And the Navy has a decades-long history of
handling a nuclear Tomahawk, which was retired less than a
decade ago, correct?
Admiral Gilday. So the nuclear Tomahawks were retired back
in the late 1980s during the first President Bush
administration. So it's been decades since we have actually had
nuclear-tipped Tomahawks on those--on surface ships or our
submarines.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you for that clarification. So if
given the mission of certifying and carrying a SLCM-N, are you
confident that the Navy would be up to the task if given that
assignment?
Admiral Gilday. Given the assignment, we would, sir. I
think it would come, again, at a cost. I think it deserves some
study in terms of how we're going to balance that, given other
things that we're doing.
Remember, today, particularly when we talk about our
submarine force, we're dealing with a higher end threat than we
were--than we were back then. And so the missions that we're
conducting are very intense and don't come without risk.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And as the chairman has
mentioned, it's one of my and I think our committee's top
priorities to accelerate our development and fielding of
hypersonic capabilities.
My understanding is that the Navy is currently tracking
deployment of Conventional Prompt Strike in 2025 on the DDG
1000 and on the Virginia-class submarine in 2028. Are these
plans still on track and is there anything we can do to help
maintain this progress?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, they're still on track. The continued
support for those programs would be most appreciated. Also, in
my unfunded list I have--requesting additional money for a
program called HALO [Hypersonic Air Launched Offensive Anti-
Surface], which would be an air-launched hypersonic missile
that we would hopefully field in this decade.
Mr. Lamborn. And I know the Air Force is working on ARRW
[Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon], which is a similar
capability.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Very similar.
Mr. Lamborn. With adequate--and, lastly, with adequate
funding, would it be possible to accelerate the deployment of
Conventional Prompt Strike on subsurface vessels even by one
hull sooner if you had that adequate funding?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, at this time, I would say no. So
within the industrial base, we are really struggling to deliver
Virginia-class Block IVs and Block Vs on time.
And so I would not pressurize that, if I could avoid it, by
yet increasing--you know, accelerating the schedule for
Conventional Prompt Strike, which right now is on track, as I
said, for 2028 on the third Block V Virginia-class.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. A lot of questions about
doing things and paying for things you aren't doing. I'd like
to ask you a question about things that you are doing that you
don't want to pay for and that is the decommissioning of the
five Growler--expeditionary Growler squadrons. We had this
discussion a few days ago.
You're planning to save $807 million over some period of
time by decommissioning Active expeditionary squadrons, two of
which are actually deployed--one in Germany, one in Japan.
And so can you cover for me again why you're planning to
decommission the expeditionary squadrons and keep one of the
carrier squadrons, and that's for the Secretary or for the
admiral.
Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, we have taken a hard look
at the Growlers and I still have much to learn--much more to
learn, actually, about these deployments that have been
recently made.
But there's five squadrons. We have racked and stacked the
investments that the CNO and I have had to make in the Navy,
and this is a mission that played lower, essentially, than some
of the other missions that we have to face right now in terms
of major investments, specifically with regards to the high-end
fight against China right now. And, therefore, the
determination was made that in fiscal year 2024--in POM
[Program Objective Memorandum] 2024, these squadrons would
begin to decommission.
However, I think that there's still enough time between now
and then for further analysis to determine if they all need to
be decommissioned or if a portion of them needed to be
decommissioned.
Mr. Larsen. It seems worth looking at since you have
actually deployed expeditionary squadrons since the--well,
recently, and the other part is in your rationale you've said
that if you need to fill the gap then you'll use a CVN
[aircraft carrier] squadron--carrier-based squadrons.
That would assume that the carrier-based squadrons have the
bandwidth to become expeditionary squadrons instead of being
deployed to carrier-based squadrons. Have you considered the
impact that would have on the carrier-based squadrons?
Secretary Del Toro. I'll ask the CNO to expand. But my
understanding is that those Growler squadrons on carriers are
fully deployed and don't have excess----
Mr. Larsen. They're pretty busy----
Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. Capacity, basically, to
support expeditionary----
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Admiral.
Admiral Gilday. That's correct, sir. We don't have excess
capacity on our nine air wings right now to support that
expeditionary mission.
Of our carrier air wings that go to sea, the Growler is the
only type/model/series aircraft that we deployed in an
expeditionary manner, as you mentioned, right now both to
Europe and to Japan.
Right now they are making a difference in Europe. They
absolutely are. As the Secretary mentioned, this is a POM 2024
decision that will end up getting revisited. So as we spoke the
other day, part of the entering argument for the Navy is
whether or not this mission--this expeditionary mission--is
core to what we do as a naval service and what we bring to the
joint force.
And so that's the heart of the debate within OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense] as we take a look at this truly joint
capability and whether or not that investment should continue.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. And as we discussed a few days ago, you
know, I've been on the committee for 22 years and it's been a
conversation for 22 years as well.
And the other aviation force in the Pentagon has yet to
actually come up with a plan or make any sort of commitment to
returning to this particular EW [electronic warfare] effort. So
it just, you know, keeps going on and on and on.
So we have covered that. You know my attention is on that
one. On the Triton program timeline, we discussed that as well
and you stood up a second squadron also at Naval Air Station
Whidbey Island.
But, as noted, we have built the building to support the
operations but we don't have the actual platforms to support.
Can you give us an idea of the timeline on the unmanned
platforms?
Admiral Gilday. Okay. Sir, the----
Mr. Larsen. Sorry. You just turned yourself off. Yeah.
Admiral Gilday. The timeline we're on right now is fiscal
year 2027 to move the operators up to Whidbey, and so,
essentially, we'd have two squadrons, one in Jacksonville,
Florida, VUP-19 [Unmanned Patrol Squadron 19], and then
establish VUP-11 in Whidbey.
We are still assessing based on our program of record with
the number of aircraft that we have on whether or not we will
split those aircraft on each coast. We're still evaluating
that.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Well, the building is built, largely, and
so just--we'll hopefully have a plan for the building other
than having it sit empty for 3 years.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We're taking a look at the most
efficient, effective way to use the resources we have. Your
point is very well taken. The program of record has changed a
bit since those initial plans were laid and those buildings
were built. At a minimum----
The Chairman. And I'm sorry. The gentleman's time has
expired.
Admiral Gilday [continuing]. The operators are going to
go--the operators will move up there.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
The Chairman. We are going to try Mr. Wilson again.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We're good.
Mr. Wilson. And I'm grateful to be with you, and I really
appreciate the service of all of our witnesses today. What a
difference they make on behalf of our country.
And, indeed, Admiral, you're correct. Your service has
never been more consequential as we have the situation of
Putin's war against the people--a mass murder in Ukraine.
With that in mind, too, I'm also very happy that I grew up
in Charleston, South Carolina. I was a sea cadet. I saw
firsthand the benefit of the Charleston Naval Base. I remember
very much the Nautilus submarines going by the city of
Charleston.
It was so important. And then I'm also grateful I'm a Navy
dad. I have a Navy doctor son. A benefit of his foreign service
in Italy at Naples, I now have three grandchildren that speak
perfect Italian. So military service has great meaning.
Additionally, Commandant, I'm grateful that my late father-
in-law and brother-in-law served as Marines. And then my
predecessor, Chairman Floyd Spence of the Armed Services
Committee, was the Navy Reserve commander in Columbia here in
South Carolina.
And, finally, a point I want to make, over the years I have
represented Parris Island Marine Corps Air Station in the
district. With redistricting it's no longer in the district.
But I want each of you to know that our office--as I'm the
only member of the Armed Services Committee from South
Carolina. We want to work with Parris Island. We want to work
with Marine Corps Air Station.
So I would hope that their commanders could get back in
touch anytime with my legislative director, Drew Kennedy--202-
225-2452--and we really want to work and back up the
extraordinary facilities there at Parris Island Marine Corps
Air Station.
With that in mind, General Gilday, I was fortunate to serve
as--in the Army National Guard for 31 years and serving with
the exceptional noncommissioned officers who we refer to as the
Army's backbone.
The Navy's Get Real, Get Better call to action places heavy
emphasis on type commanders, flag officers, and senior
executive leaders.
In addition, the Chief of the Naval Operations change--
``Charge of Command'' letter gives targeted guidance to
incoming commanders. This is really good. But it seems like
there needs to be initiatives that only are targeted toward
officers.
And so, Admiral, what leadership development programs are
you tailoring towards junior and senior petty officers who are
generally the individuals empowered to execute the commander's
orders?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, Get Real, Get Better is not just
intended for senior leaders in the Navy. It absolutely is aimed
right down at the deck plates, and most importantly, we count
on our chief petty officers to really lead on a day-to-day
basis and make a fundamental difference in the quality of our
warfighters from a training standpoint, from a morale
standpoint, and so they're absolutely essential.
My Charge of Command, actually, although the word command
then is taken by most to be aimed at commanders, it's aimed at
everybody, officers and civilians, enlisted as well. And so
I've received feedback from enlisted sailors, from chiefs, from
officers, and civilians on that charge of command.
I actually sought their input when I developed it and I
continue to receive their feedback as we implement it. And so
that document has been folded into all of our leadership
training programs at every level in the Navy, both officer and
enlisted.
Mr. Wilson. Well, we just so appreciate the NCOs
[noncommissioned officers] and what they mean. Gosh, and hey,
particularly, I've seen the drill instructors how inspiring
they are at Parris Island.
Another issue, Admiral, is the budget request for--there's
no funding for the F-18 Super Hornets, and with the
circumstance of the F-35C plans, what's the latest on trying to
address the next generation of air dominance?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. In terms of closing our strike
fighter gap, there's really two pieces of that. The first is
the F-35; and so, hands down, it's the best aircraft in the
world and we continue to believe in it, continue to invest in
it. It has its challenges but we're also committed to working
through those challenges.
With respect to the Super Hornets, what we're doing--
because the Super Hornet line will actually be terminated here
this year or within the next year, we are investing in our
existing Super Hornets to increase their flight hours to 10,000
hours as well as upgrading all their combat systems. So, it----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 151.]
The Chairman. And, again, I apologize. The gentleman's time
has expired. I should have explained this. As the questions go,
even if you're answering we try and move on to the next person.
So when you see the clock go down, if you could wrap up, I'll
not have to interrupt you.
Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
the witnesses this morning.
I'd like to just note at the outset of my questions, number
one, you know, the budget that came over for shipbuilding at,
roughly, between $28 and $29 billion is the first time in 6
years that it's been higher than the prior year's enacted level
and that is significant. We're not beginning our deliberations
in this committee in a hole, and I certainly consider that
significant.
Secondly, we also got a 30-year shipbuilding plan, which is
the first time since 2019. It's the headlights, as Admiral
Gilday said, you know, in terms of at least allowing us to sort
of have a longer horizon to make judgments about, again, this
year's fiscal year 2023.
Again, neither one of them are the Ten Commandments. You
know, we're going to take an independent look at and we look
forward to working with all three of you as we get closer to
markup.
There's been a lot of talk this morning about
decommissioning and divesting. One item which you have to kind
of dig a little bit in terms of the documents that we have
gotten that, actually, I think is an interesting sort of
counter narrative, which is that for the attack submarine
fleet, which we have been looking at a downward trough as the
Los Angeles-class submarines are retired, we're actually now
seeing some progress in terms of shallowing or reducing that
trough with the service life extensions--again, the seven
reactor cores that the Navy is going to install on the hulls
that are still safe, and I know that takes a lot of work to
evaluate that.
Portsmouth, I believe, is the site of the first of those.
Admiral Gilday, can we maybe just sort of talk about how,
again, there's not a knee-jerk opposition to older platforms.
You are still trying to extract value where it makes sense.
Admiral Gilday. Yeah. Absolutely, sir. Thanks. So as you
mentioned, we're trying to take 7 of our 688 submarines that
have a vertical launch capability and to actually invest in
them to increase their service life. Probably get four or five
additional deployments out of there.
So almost 40 additional deployments, potentially, out of
those submarines, and because they're our most stealthy, most
survivable strike platform, that is not insignificant against a
rising China.
And so we want to double down on the submarine force and I
think that's a very good astute observation in terms of where
we are making smart investments in a legacy platform, if you
will, that's still highly lethal.
Mr. Courtney. And to put that in perspective, the last
shipbuilding plan that we had showed that the fleet was
dropping to 42. The new documents that you've submitted shows
that we actually hold the line at 46, and as you point out,
that's significant because they, clearly, are the most
survivable with all the missile threat that's out there.
You know, just sort of segueing from that, in terms of
maintaining the new construction for attack submarines of two
per year, as you point out, you know, we're running into some
real challenges.
But I would just note that the budget that you sent over
includes real money for workforce development and also supply
chain development, which I've been doing these for a few years.
I never have seen, again, that sort of moving upstream into
the industrial base to, you know, invest in real capacity,
which is the people who build them and the facilities that--and
the supply chain and the facilities where it's going to take
place.
President Biden, last December, issued a defense production
order, which sort of doubled down on that, which designated the
submarine workforce as essential, which I--again, I can't think
of another place in the defense budget where a President has
ever designated that.
Secretary Del Toro, maybe you can talk about, again, that,
you know, surgical emphasis in terms of making sure that, you
know, the actual people that build them are going to have the
support and the bodies to make that happen.
Secretary Del Toro. Absolutely, Congressman. And you are
correct that, you know, this administration, this President's
commitment to the nuclear triad, actually, and to the
investments in the submarine force are truly substantial in
every possible way. And when you look at a $28 billion
investment across the entire shipbuilding budget it is
significant and it is the first time that we have actually
increased that since the last time it was enacted.
The 30-year shipbuilding plan is also a very serious
attempt to take a look at what the Nation needs to meet the
National Defense Strategy and to also take a look at it from
the lens of what the future threats are as well, too, and what
the future capacity for the shipbuilding industry is to support
the type of shipbuilding that we want in this Nation.
As you suggest, part of that solution is working very
closely with the industrial base to make sure that we have the
right capacity, the right investments to reach those
shipbuilding rates that we hope to reach.
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Del Toro, I want to go to you. You said on April
5th that the U.S. Navy's budget should be driven by strategy
and not the strategy driving the budget. Do you agree that
China remains a pacing threat as identified in our National
Defense Strategy and by our INDOPACOM leaders and that the
Navy's budget should, indeed, be driven by strategy?
Secretary Del Toro. I do, Congressman, very much so. I
think this President has made the commitments to ensuring that
the budget meets the strategy, and as you read the National
Defense Strategy it focuses in on China as the pacing threat
and the ability to deter China while at the same time deterring
aggression elsewhere around the world.
And the investments that have been made specifically in the
Indo-Pacific have been very, very substantial over this last
budget.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday, I certainly agree with the Secretary about
strategy needing to drive the budget. Unfortunately, the budget
that got sent over this year, I think, doesn't do that.
I have severe misgivings about the Navy shrinking by 16
ships. I think future platforms and capabilities that you
project to arrive don't arrive in the next 5 years to the
fleet.
I think that creates incredible vulnerabilities for the
United States and opportunities for China. Worse still a 30-
year shipbuilding plan that provides three different profiles.
Only one of those profiles gets us to 355 ships. And by the
way, China is at 355 today. They'll be at 420 by 2025.
So I wanted to get your perspective. I think this is a
dangerous place for us to be. In your professional military
judgment, do any of these shipbuilding profiles presented in
the 30-year shipbuilding plan allow us to pace China as is
required in the National Defense Strategy?
Admiral Gilday. I think so, sir. My recommendation would be
the third alternative if we're going to pursue one and if we
had additional top line to do so. So this would have to--this
would result in real growth, so above inflation, and our
estimate with that alternative is about $75 billion--
conservatively, $75 billion over the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
But that's what would be required. That would get us closer
to our requirement but it wouldn't necessarily exactly meet the
requirement because we're constrained to some degree by the
industrial base.
Mr. Wittman. Right. Thank you, and I know what goes along
with that is the sustainment tail, too. So maintenance,
sailors, the whole nine yards.
General Berger, in a letter to myself and our chairman of
Seapower and Projection Forces [Subcommittee], Joe Courtney--
the one you sent to us on April the 7th--you stated the bottom
line, in order to meet statutory requirements, the Marine Corps
needs no fewer than 31 L-class ships and no fewer than 35 light
amphibious warfare ships.
For this committee, could you confirm that this number,
this 31 number, is, indeed, the floor and that the 35 number
for LAWs [Light Amphibious Warships] is indeed the floor as you
see what needs to happen for Force Design 2030?
General Berger. I can, sir. Thirty-one is the floor,
further broken down into 10 LHA [landing helicopter assault]/
LHDs [landing helicopter dock] and 21 LPD 17s [landing platform
dock] are in Flight IIs. That's the combination.
As far as the Light Amphibious Warship, initially, I
thought 35. It's hard to tell at this point because we don't
have any. So, initially, the study that we have just completed,
the Navy and Marine Corps together, says somewhere between 18
and 35 to be determined by, once fielded, what we learn from
that and how they're employed, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. I know recently that you've worked
with the Navy on the upcoming amphibious ship study that looks
to align the force structure assessment with the 2022 National
Defense Strategy.
I wanted to get your perspective. Have any of the
requirements, in your mind, through that process changed from
where you see the Marine Corps not only today but where it
needs to be in the future?
And in your professional military judgment, does the Marine
Corps still require a fleet of no less than 31 ships even in
light of all the things that may be forthcoming from that
amphibious ship study?
General Berger. [Audio malfunction.]
Mr. Wittman. So even if that study comes out and says
something different than the 31 as the floor you're still very
strongly behind 31 as the floor for L-class ships?
General Berger. [Audio malfunction.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you very much for your testimony, for your leadership. A lot of
issues ahead of us. A couple of them I want to focus on.
Logistics. The Russians are learning about logistical
challenges. We certainly, if we're looking at the Pacific,
there are significant logistical challenges. As I look at the
shipbuilding plan, 350 or any number less than that or more
than that, the logistical support is not in that--among those
ships.
So the question for you gentlemen is how do you propose to
meet the logistical challenges that exist in the Pacific, given
the current shipbuilding plan?
Mr. Secretary, let's start with you.
Secretary Del Toro. Absolutely, Congressman, and thank you
for your support of our Navy and Marine Corps team and
particularly your support of this particular issue in the
Pacific, especially as it applies to the challenge we face in
the Indo-Pacific via China.
I would argue that we have actually suffered in the area of
logistics for quite some time. But my cup is half full. I think
it's getting better, and when you take a look at the
investments that are being made over the next 10 years, for
example, with regards to sealift, with regards to the number of
oilers that we're building and the number of other support
ships that we're building, I think we're moving in the right
direction.
And perhaps the CNO can further comment on the investments
that we're about to make.
Admiral Gilday. Sir, in this--sir, in this budget, we have
five oilers over the course of the FYDP [Future Years Defense
Program], and so it's easy to take your eye off supply ships
but they're actually fundamental to everything we do,
particularly when we think about what the Marine Corps brings
to the fight with MLRs [Marine littoral regiments] and their
work in the first island chain with their advanced
expeditionary----
The Chairman. I'm sorry, Admiral. I don't think your
microphone is on and our virtual folks can't hear if it's not.
Admiral Gilday. I'm sorry, sir. I just mentioned that we
have five--we have five John Lewis-class oilers in this budget
fundamental to what we want to do with both the Navy and the
Marine Corps.
One area that we haven't talked about is the
experimentation we're doing with unmanned, particularly in the
area of contested logistics, and in a theater kind of
environment how can we better supply Marines ashore, ships that
are forward, using unmanned whether it's unmanned in the air or
unmanned on the sea.
We have been experimenting in the Middle East with not only
concepts but actual platforms and we believe that there's a lot
of promise there.
As the Secretary mentioned, sir, we are not taking our foot
off the pedal with respect to an investment in supply ships,
going forward.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to move on to another question.
General Berger, we have had a conversation about this. I
would recommend to you that we could meet the needs of
logistics, maybe that second half of the half full cup, by
utilizing the Jones Act ships that are presently available,
repurposing those that are essential so that they can meet some
of the requirements, and others that could be made to be
militarily useful. They're in the fleet. Treat this much as we
treat the airline craft and provide the necessary support.
Might call it a national maritime security program. I'm
going to spend a lot of time working with you gentlemen and
this committee on this this year. So I'll let it go at that.
I do have another question. Shipyards. Admiral, how are we
doing and, Mr. Secretary, how are we doing on our shipyards,
the SIOP program, the 5-year versus the 20-year program?
Secretary Del Toro. Yes, sir. Well, the good news is that
there's major investments coming and there's actually a lot of
progress that's being made even today, actually, up in
Portsmouth, for example, with the completion of Dry Dock No. 1
and the ability now to be able to not have to worry about
floating the submarines to actually get them in there.
And that's the beginning of much more to come. In my
travels, I've actually visited all the four public shipyards
and I visited all the private shipyards--many of the private
shipyards as well, too--and I'm really excited about these
investments that are going to be made.
As you know, it's a $21 billion investment over the next 20
years. What I believe we owe the Congress, however, and owe you
is a plan to better reflect the timeline and the POA&M [plan of
action and milestones], basically, that's going to take effect
over those 20 years. We have given you sort of the short story.
I think we now need to do a better job in informing the
Congress what the long story is going to be.
Mr. Garamendi. Tying the need--the immediate need--to the
immediate repair and upgrade at the shipyards, I talk about a
5-year, 20 years. I don't know. Maybe some in this committee
will be around 20 years from now. I won't.
So what are we going to do in the next 5 years? How does
that tie into the immediate needs?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 151.]
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have a similar
question to Mr. Garamendi's, but I'll be a little more specific
with it.
Admiral Gilday, the Ready Reserve fleet--or Ready Reserve
Force as I believe we call it today--I think we're all
concerned about just how ready they are, no pun intended. But
what is the Navy's plan for recapitalization of that fleet?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We have an ongoing life extension
program. We are funding life extensions on a double digit
number of those ships. I don't have the specific number on the
tip of my tongue.
As you're probably aware, we just purchased two used
sealift vessels and they're up in Baltimore right now. We're
going to provide enhancements to those ships and we're looking
at purchasing another couple here in the near term and then
another couple after that.
So we have been moving in a deliberate fashion, although at
a conservative pace, but we think a deliberate pace, in order
to refurbish that fleet. We're not ignoring it.
Mr. Scott. I want to--I very much support buying vessels
that are out there in the private market and using them when
they can be used and retrofitted. We have the potential, I
think, as well for our hospital ships.
The Mercy and the Comfort were--are both approaching 50
years of age. The Navy has, in years gone past, proposed
standing them down. What is the current plan for the Mercy, the
Comfort, and the hospital fleet for the Navy?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, we're actually extending the life of
both of those ships right now. They're both undergoing repairs
or have been undergoing repairs. We are taking a look at
providing a medical capability on two of the EPFs
[expeditionary fast transports] that we're building.
And so instead of building a new hospital ship, we're
taking a ship that--essentially, a large ship that is really
multifunction--it's really a Swiss army knife--and we're
putting a medical capability on there.
And so that is our quickest way to add capacity in that
mission set.
Mr. Scott. Okay. I'm certainly in favor of the mission and
in favor of finding those efficiencies. So look forward to
further discussion about that.
Mr. Del Toro, one of the questions that I have is as we
stand down different systems inside the United States, I do not
think we have done a very good job of going to our partners and
other countries and asking them if they're interested in the
assets that we're going to be retiring.
Do we have a program for that currently? Is that something
that the Navy is looking at and that if we determine that we do
not want an asset are we going to make that asset available to
a partner nation?
Secretary Del Toro. We actually do, Congressman, and
actually we have used it very aggressively throughout the
years. Actually, the number of ships in the program right now
have dwindled down to about two or three capital ships, mostly
our older frigates.
However, as we decide to and if the Congress approves to
divest some of these ships, particularly the LCSs, I think
there is very strategic opportunities to move some of those
ships to our allies and partners, and we're already in some
very preliminary discussions about, you know, where they could
go, perhaps, and be best suited.
Mr. Scott. I think that you would find more support from
several of the members on this committee if we knew what the
actual plan was for the divestment of those assets and making
sure that they're still going to be available in a fight even
if they're not a U.S.-flagged----
Secretary Del Toro. Yes, sir. And, of course, we have to do
that with the permission of the Congress.
Mr. Scott. Sure. Are we coordinating with our partners in
our procurement? In other words, when we talk about our NATO
allies, if we determine that we need to procure, just say,
eight destroyers over the course of the next 10 years for a
NATO-based----
Secretary Del Toro. Yes.
Mr. Scott [continuing]. Strategy, are we saying, you know,
the Germans will have this many, the Brits will have this many,
and the U.S. will build this many? Is our strategy coordinated
on procurement?
Secretary Del Toro. So there's a very robust discussions
are always ongoing with regards to how we could actually
interoperate and actually be interexchangeable as well, which
includes the sharing of technologies with our allies and
partners, and those discussions are quite robust with our NATO
partners, with other partners in Asia as well, too. So we----
Mr. Scott I'm out of time. I do want to mention one thing.
I'm very concerned about the demands of India on technology
transfer to companies that they own. I want to just express
that publicly. I'm very concerned about the demands of India on
technology transfer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 152.]
The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Secretary Del Toro. And we watch that very closely----
The Chairman. Mr. Norcross is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here and service to our country.
The 30-year shipbuilding plan--it's great to see that and,
certainly, Admiral, we appreciate your focus on the overall
numbers, which I am less concerned about because I do not put
one of our new modern aircraft carrier, which gets a number
one, with a small rowboat, which would get a number one. It's
about capacity and what they're able to do. So I'm more
interested in what we have available. So I applaud your
position on that.
I look at our Virginia- and Columbia-class is remarkable,
moving forward. We certainly have some delays in it because of
COVID [coronavirus disease] and supply chain, but really
pleased with the way that's going. And the carriers, the
backbone of so many of our strategies. The core to much of the
decisions we're making revolve around the carrier and what it
can do, and where it fits into particularly, in the China
question.
A couple of quick questions here with the assets we're
putting on that. So the strike fighter deficit is not predicted
to close until 2030, 2031, somewhere in that area. We made
decisions last year not to fund certain fighters because of
what we believed the timeline would be.
This year, the FA-18s, Super Hornets, no requests there.
The F-35Cs are less than we originally anticipated. The removal
of the FA-18 service life modifications. All this is based on
next generation of air dominance. We're putting all our eggs
into that basket in terms of this decision.
Would you bring some clarity to us? We have a tendency in
not delivering new programs on time. Yet, we're looking at not
closing the gap till 2030, 2031, and the next-gen air
dominance. Would you bring us up to speed on the air dominance
next platform?
Secretary Del Toro. So, Congressman, if I could just start
the conversation and turn it over to the CNO and the Commandant
for additional comment.
Without question, I think the consequences of COVID in
particular has had a huge impact on our supply chain and that
obviously has had an impact on the ability to deliver F-35s on
time as well, too, with the originally intended capability that
they would bring.
So this has unquestionably complicated the supply chain and
being able to bring these additional F-35s in a timely fashion
as well. So as we looked at Next Generation Air Dominance, I
think it's very important to fully understand that platform
before we actually fully commit to it.
We are making investments in R&D in a substantial way. But
we--before we actually make a commitment to start buying them
in great numbers, we have got to fully define the requirements
associated with them, the technology that's going to go on
them, and make sure that we can make that transition between F-
35 and that next-generation fighter.
Mr. Norcross. Well, then let me ask you a question. If
we're basing the retirements and not buying additional--the
Hornets for an illustration--and we're not sure what our
requirements, that means we're not sure of our timeframe. Yet,
we're trading that gap in time.
So if we're not sure we're going to Next Generation Air
Dominance, why are we trading these capabilities today?
Secretary Del Toro. Well, the--I'll allow the CNO to
comment, but the F-35, actually, as the CNO commented, is the
most capable aircraft that we have.
Mr. Norcross. No question.
Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. And the hope would be that
coming out of COVID the supply chain actually will improve,
that the manufacturer will be able to start delivering those
jets in greater numbers that we need so that we can actually
close that gap quicker.
CNO, would you like to further comment?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, your question was--I want to make sure
I get it right. It was really the strike fighter shortfall----
Mr. Norcross. Microphone.
Admiral Gilday [continuing]. The strike fighter shortfall.
So two levers to pull. One is F-35s, right. We wanted to buy a
hundred over the FYDP. We're down to 69, I'm requesting an
additional 6 in the unfunded list to bring us up to 75. We need
more F-35s in order to help bring down that shortfall.
The other is the service life modernization on the existing
Super Hornets to bring us up to 10,000 hours in each jet and a
more capable aircraft. Right now, those turnaround times in
those jets in industry is 18 months.
We think we're going to walk that down to 15 months within
a year. The goal is to get it done in 12 months to help close
that gap.
The MQ-25s, the unmanned right now on--that we're going
to-- go IOC on 2025, that's the path forward for unmanned
hybrid mix on an aircraft carrier. It's going well. That's one
to watch. We want to make sure that that actually is successful
before we put a lot of money into----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Kelly is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for being here today. We really appreciate your
service to our Nation in both capacity--both capacity for you,
Mr. Secretary.
The first thing I want to talk about, I want to double tap
what Mr. Norcross said. You guys owe us a 30-year ship plan.
You've owed us that since I've been here, I think, and we can't
understand what you want to do if you don't lay it out in
writing what you're going to do. And we have asked and asked,
and it's always it's going to be next year, next week, next
month.
So when are we going to get the 30-year ship plan that is
required by law?
Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, thank you for your
question.
So the administration has delivered the 30-year ship plan.
Mr. Kelly. Okay.
Secretary Del Toro. And in that shipbuilding plan, you'll
actually see the FYDP--the numbers as reflected in the FYDP--
and then you'll see three alternatives. The first and second
alternatives are very----
Mr. Kelly. Okay. If we delivered--because I got other
things I want to get to. But it was a long time getting here
and it's hard for us to plan when we don't have something to
plan on.
The other thing I want to talk about is the strike fighter
inventory shortage, the same thing that Mr. Norcross talked
about. We are so heavy in divesting of things currently to get
things in the future that may or may not exist and there's a
sliding scale of risk to that, and I know you guys look at that
and I appreciate that.
But we really have to be careful. We have to be able to
fight tonight in the Pacific or in Africa or in South America
or wherever we're called. We have to be able to fight tonight
with what we have.
So we have to be real careful about investing in the future
and divesting in the current until we know that we're going to
have those systems.
So I know that you all are doing that. But I ask that you
continue to do that.
And, General Berger, I know there's been a little bit of
talk--not a little bit of talk, several talks about the new
Marine Corps Force Design, and I don't want to go into that
here because I don't have a side on that.
What I would ask is I would love to sit down sometime and
to hear your side of the story, not what I read in the paper,
and be able to discuss that so while I understand so I can be
an advocate if that's where I stand or against it, but at least
I'll know what I'm for or against. So I would love to do that,
General Berger.
General Berger. Happy to do that, sir.
Mr. Kelly. And then final questions, General Berger. You
provided a letter to our Seapower and Projection Forces
Subcommittee expressing your requirement of 31 L-class
amphibious ships, which includes 10 LHA/LHDs, and 21 LPDs plus
35 Light Amphibious Warships.
Can you elaborate on the need for these ships and how they
play into your Force Design 2030, and how much risk does the
Marine Corps assume, given the Navy's plan to retire 4 LSDs,
truncate the LPD by about 10 ships, and delay the LHA and LAW
procurements?
General Berger. The amphib ships that you refer to, sir,
are not nice to have; they're essential. If we're going to
achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy, the
National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, we
need those 31 ships plus the Light Amphibious Warships.
They're not nice to have. They're essential. They're
essential to deter, campaign forward. They're essential to be
able to respond to a crisis. They're essential in a warfight.
Mr. Kelly. I always love Marines. You guys are always
straight answering. Thank you, General Berger.
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, this year's budget
request includes one LPD amphibious ship but indicates that
this will be the last LPD procured. Moreover, this year's
budget request requests to retire four LSDs before they reach
the end of their expected service life.
What is the Navy's position on the requirement for L-class
ships?
Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, if I could start off. So
Admiral Gilday talked about the LSDs and their age and the high
cost of their repairs, which is why they're being recommended
for decommissioning.
With regards to the LPD, the administration is very
thankful for the support of the Congress. Right now we have got
over $2 billion in investments right now in an LHA and an LPD
as well. When I came in as Secretary, I committed to trying to
best define what the actual requirement is going to be for
future L-class ships, both large and small as well, which is
why we initiated the amphibious study. That will be--that will
actually inform the national force structure assessment that's
going on for 2024 based on the 2022 NDS.
And so by POM 2024 I think we'll have a very clear path
forward about what the exact requirement is going to be for
both departments.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And just two more points I want to make--and we keep
talking about these but we never fix them, or one we
partially--is, number one, icebreakers. That issue is not going
away. We need to figure out how to invest in icebreakers and
adequate capacity to make sure that we don't continue to get
further behind.
And then the second part of that is our hospital ships. I
sat here and Austin Scott and I fought when they were going to
divest of both hospital ships and they came in pretty handy
during the COVID pandemic.
I just want to make sure that we're investing in that
capability because it's both soft power and hard power.
And with that, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Moulton is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Moulton. General Berger, if there is one thing I
learned over four combat deployments in the Marine Corps
infantry it is the value of speed and aggression.
Force Design 2030 is by far the most aggressive
modernization strategy to meet the National Defense Strategy
priorities of the next decade.
You're leading the way and you're preparing us for an
incredibly more dangerous era of modern warfare. Now, our
adversaries are modernizing quickly, too, particularly China.
Now that said, change invites critics and you've received some
criticism over this, and some legitimate questions have been
raised.
So I want to make sure that you address some of these
legitimate questions, so here are a few. You're divesting of
critical capabilities--of existing capabilities like tanks and
artillery that have been critical in the past.
You mentioned the Twentynine Palms exercises proved the
Marines of today will be more lethal with updated tactics,
loitering munitions. Will the Marine rifle platoon of 2030 be
more lethal than the Marine rifle platoon of 2020?
General Berger. It'll be lethal--more lethal long before
2030.
Mr. Moulton. And why is that? What specific capabilities
are you adding?
General Berger. Capabilities in loitering munitions which
are organic precision fires; the capabilities like the
amphibious combat vehicle, the F-35, the CH-53K. But,
primarily, I would focus on, aside from the hardware, the
Marine, how we train them, how we recruit them, how we retain
them.
Mr. Moulton. Will those new capabilities, both the changes
you're making to training and as well as the technical
capabilities like loitering munitions, arrive soon enough?
You're already divesting of tanks and artillery. How are you
managing the balance between divestments and investments?
General Berger. This is the value of a Marine air-ground
task force. We can modernize at speed because in fires,
organically, we have the capability to cover where we're
modernizing or where we're short. We have the capability to
cover it internally.
We'll field the first--we have fielded the first element,
the first MLR, this year. Next year comes NMESIS [Navy Marine
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System]. The rest of the
capabilities begin later this year, early next year. We're not
waiting until 2030.
Mr. Moulton. Admiral Gilday, is the Navy supportive of
Force Design 2030, including the stand-in force concept, and
how is the Navy preparing to support this concept and
implementation?
Admiral Gilday. We're doing it right now. So I talked to
the NAVEUR [U.S. Naval Forces Europe] commander yesterday. His
headquarters has about 30 Marines in their joint force maritime
component cell. Their deputy commander is a Marine. There are
Marine elements under his command in places like Estonia,
Iceland, Norway today.
And so the concept of operations signed by his three-star
fleet commander, the commander of U.S. Sixth Fleet, is also
signed by the commander at II MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force].
If I go to Yokosuka, Japan, and talk to the Seventh Fleet
commander, his concept of operations is also dual signed by the
III MEF commander in Japan.
And so we're working side by side every day. That is where
Navy-Marine Corps integration gets real is at the fleet level
right now today. The stuff we're doing with unmanned
experimentation is groundbreaking for both the Navy and the
Marine Corps, and we continue--we will continue down that path.
Mr. Moulton. Admiral, what has changed that will require
two more years to begin procurement of the Light Amphibious
Warships and what is the impact to Navy and Marine Corps
operations in the Pacific because of that delay?
Admiral Gilday. So, I--sir, I'm not sure I'd look at it as
a delay. We need to get that right.
So, if we take a look at where we are with LCS, where we've
been with Zumwalt, where we've been with the Ford-class
aircraft carrier, we know, we know what wrong looks like in
terms of stumbling. We don't want to stumble with LAWs.
So, when we come out of the box and we buy this ship in
2025, and then when we field it in 2028, we want to make sure
that we're highly confident that we want to double down and
scale it.
And so I would tell you sir, we haven't had the best track
record of procurement as you're aware. We want to make sure
that in this case, we get it right.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I can tell you that for all three of
you, it is incredibly important to this committee that you're
all on the same page. And the fact that you arrived here this
morning on the same page, with 31 amphibious ships, is a huge
step in that direction.
General Berger, we don't have much time left. But, another
concern with the stand-in force concept, pre-positioning forces
on Pacific islands prior to hostilities, is a singular focus on
the Indo-Pacific.
Is this strategy of limited relevance to the defense of the
Republic of Korea, or Japan, or to contingencies outside PACOM
[U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]?
General Berger. No, sir. It's not. It is theater-agnostic.
It's paced against PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy], but
it's applicable anywhere on the globe.
Mr. Moulton. Great. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, we have a
couple of challenges. One is that inflation, left unaddressed,
could effectively cut the Defense Department and hollow it out
by, by some estimates $160 billion.
And then add onto that, the Navy is proposing to cut the
fleet size over the course of the FYDP to about 280 ships at
the end of the FYDP.
And the concern you're hearing from a lot of people is that
that means we are going to be weakest at the worst possible
moment. We'll be weakest when China is strongest.
So, if we go down that path of divest to invest, and I
strongly suggest that we don't, for all the reasons that Mr.
Wittman has addressed, and that I'm sure Representative Luria
will eloquently address, then the Marine Corps, in particular,
and stand-in forces in general, might actually give us our best
shot at near-term conventional deterrence by denial.
And with that in mind, I'd like to follow up on Mr.
Moulton's line of questioning, Commandant Berger, ask you to
address some of the criticism you've received from retired
Marine general officers head on.
The overall criticism seems to be that you are putting all
your eggs in the basket of INDOPACOM. Mr. Moulton's question
just addressed that.
But, at a higher level, yes or no, in the 2018 NDS produced
by the Trump administration, and in the 2022 NDS produced by
the Biden administration, these documents make focusing on
China as our top threat, the clear DOD priority.
General Berger. That's correct.
Mr. Gallagher. And similarly, were you ordered by our
Nation's civilian leadership, to therefore focus on the Indo-
Pacific when adjusting the Marine Corps due to the China
threat?
General Berger. As our primary theater by direction, yes,
sir.
Mr. Gallagher. Can you address then the criticism that you
have not gone through the proper processes or war games, and
experimentation to justify such far-reaching changes to the
Marine Corps?
General Berger. I'll leave the defense of that to Members
of Congress and the previous Secretaries of Defense and Navy.
But, I know what I have done, which is asked for, and
received, a lot of cooperation and support, and frankly
guidance, from leadership and members of this committee and
other military committees, steering along the way; the full
support of the Secretary of Defense, and each Secretary of the
Navy, in terms of retaining the resources that were needed to
modernize the Marine Corps. Because that, was the risk. That
was the primary risk.
So, I am very confident that they understood the plan. They
were active participants in the plan. And they have helped
guide where the Marine Corps is going, including the members of
this committee.
Unidentified voice. And still understand the plan.
General Berger. Yeah.
Mr. Gallagher. And when it comes to having, as Mr. Moulton
talked about, small teams of Marines operating in the first
island chain, operating within the PLA's [People's Liberation
Army's] weapons' engagement zone, do you at present have the
basing and access agreements that are necessary, particularly
in the Northern Philippines and the Ryukyus, in order to
realize your vision?
General Berger. We do. Because the stand-in force is a
combination of what's ashore, and what's aboard ship. Sometimes
your best expeditionary advanced base is a ship.
So, the combination of what the Marine Corps has in terms
of ashore capability, and embark capability, as part of the
Naval Expeditionary Force, that's what you need at an inside
force.
That's your best chance of deterring. That's your best
chance at identifying what's going on in front of the joint
force commander. That's your best chance of responding to a
crisis.
Otherwise, you are fighting your way in blindly. Which we
don't need--we don't need to be doing.
Mr. Gallagher. What about the criticism that these small
teams of Marines armed perhaps with the NMESIS system, doing
armed reconnaissance and a variety of other things, threatening
PLA ships, will simply not be survivable?
That they're sitting ducks. And, you know, they're going to
have to forage for food, or rely on the host nation population.
Could you address that criticism?
General Berger. Yes, sir. I think probably the best way to,
to visualize that is we don't fight, of course, one ship, one
person, one weapon system versus another. It's a system versus
a system.
So, we're always going to fight as a joint force. And any
assessment of an individual with one weapon system versus
another counter system, is not accurate.
That's not how we operate. That's not how we fight.
Mr. Gallagher. And then--well, finally just a comment. Some
of the pushback I've heard, is that well, you know, it's highly
unlikely that China's going to try and invade Taiwan in the
next 5 years. And therefore, why would we focus on this?
Well one, even if you felt that way, you would not be at
liberty to ignore the civilian direction you've gotten, as you
confirmed at the outset of my questions. And two, I just
fundamentally disagree with that analysis.
I think, and even though we hope that China is rethinking,
that Xi may be rethinking his lifelong ambition, because his
junior partner, Putin, has encountered unexpected friction in
Ukraine, the alternative could be true. Right?
He could be going to school on Russian failures, and
expediting his timeline, and we have to account for that. And
my time has expired.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Carbajal is recognized.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all
the witnesses that are here.
General Berger, this committee has been very focused on
analyzing your Force Design 2030 initiative. In listening to
all the perspectives, we have seen the very public debates in
the press, but I want you to know that I support you and your
modernization proposed Force Design 2030.
This will allow the Marine Corps to continue to be
relevant, and have the increased capabilities and readiness to
meet future challenges. And go figure, you're one of very few
leaders in the Department who actually are saying, I could do
it pretty much with existing resources.
I don't think I've met too many leaders in the DOD
Department that come here looking at restructuring within
existing resources. They always want more.
So, I commend you for your leadership. I commend you for
the bold action you're taking. I think it's outstanding. I
appreciate your transparency and continued engagement, as you
don't shy away from tackling concerns and critiques head on.
Change is never easy, and deserves robust debate. But, that
doesn't mean we should shy away from making difficult choices
and progress. That's leadership.
With that, I want to ask about a specific critique to
better understand your analysis and thinking. There are
concerns that the initiative may face significant logistical
challenges, since future Marine units are intended to be
smaller and distributed.
How does this plan intend to address concerns with
logistics, especially in contested environment? And how does
your May 2022 update make progress on this question?
General Berger. Congressman, I read a quote maybe a week
and a half, 2 weeks ago, it's from General Shinseki. And he
said, if you don't like change, you're going to like
irrelevance a lot less. That's a pretty accurate statement
today. It was accurate back then.
There are a number of warfighting functions, as the Marines
in this room and other service member veterans know. My
assessment is, of all the warfighting functions going forward,
logistics is the pacing one.
Logistics is where we have to make up the most ground. Why?
Because the theater that is our primary challenge is very vast.
Logistics is just naturally going to be a challenge.
But second is the fact that we're going to face an
environment where logistics is challenged all the way from the
ship, or the island, all the way back to the factory. We have
not faced that before.
That is our pacing challenge. So, how are we going to
attack it? A couple of things. First, everything from air to
subsurface, as the CNO mentioned, from the 53K to unmanned
undersea vessels, we've got to employ it all.
Distribution for that forward force in a contested
environment will not be easy. We can't approach it with the old
way of large, bulky stores of munitions and parts that are
piled up somewhere to be distributed. That will not work.
Very large maritime pre-positioning ships that do an
administrative offload, not going to be the entire solution. We
have to be able to distribute to sustain that force under
pressure.
Smaller more distributed forces tied into the naval
logistics system, not our own, tied into the naval logistic
enterprise, is the key. Even things like the munitions
themselves.
We chose to use the Naval Strike Missile in our ground-
based air defense for a reason. It's a common munition between
the Navy and the Marine Corps. Logistically, that makes sense.
Lastly, I'd say we have to go down the road of reducing--
every step we can make in reducing our consumption of fuel
matters.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, General. Admiral Gilday, I think
it is safe to assume, we all agree that the strength and
effectiveness of our Navy is dependent on the sailors who show
up every day to serve our Nation. That is why I'm very
concerned when we see the tragic impacts of when we fail our
service members.
So, I want to focus for a minute on the USS George
Washington. The information that has come to light about
conditions on the ship, and access to mental health services
after three suicides in 1 week, is alarming. Accumulating to 10
deaths in 10 months. Absolutely heartbreaking.
Before the Special Psychiatric Response Intervention Team
was activated, what was the average wait time for a sailor
assigned to the USS George Washington, to receive mental health
appointments?
I hear it was up to 6 months. Can you touch on that,
please?
The Chairman. He cannot, because he's got 1 second left.
He's going to have to take that one for the record. But, we do,
we do want that.
Admiral Gilday. I will take that for the record. We
actually have a mental health team onboard that includes a
doctor, one psychiatrist. It includes behavioral health
specialists, and includes three chaplains.
And so, I owe you a more detailed answer, sir. I'd be happy
to----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 152.]
The Chairman. In fact, for the overall committee, we want
to have more discussion. If you could get us a detailed answer
on how that, you know, situation on the George Washington has
been handled by the Navy, and is being handled----
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
The Chairman [continuing]. That would be important for all
of us. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gaetz. Admiral Gilday, I come from Pensacola, a proud
Navy town. And our community was rocked December of 2019 when a
Saudi student opened fire, killed three sailors, injured
others, injured members of our law enforcement.
And I've been to many briefings since then, in public and
in private. And the picture emerges that definitely the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia was not doing enough, to send only their best
people, as one might say.
They were not doing enough to monitor potential
radicalization. And frankly, we weren't doing enough to ensure
that that was happening.
What assurance can you give my constituents in Pensacola
that we have improved?
Admiral Gilday. So, sir, since that incident, under then
Secretary of Defense Esper, significant changes were made in
the screening process for all foreign students from any
military, including our NATO allies, that come to the United
States to train with us.
And so, I met as recently as yesterday, with a, with a
senior leader from a partner nation who, who expressed concern
about the amount of time it's taking to get his sailors into
our country to train.
And I explained to him how important it was that we work
together to go through this process very deliberately and
methodically, so that we don't make any mistakes. And he
accepted that.
But, we have--but we have--we have, leveraging the
intelligence community and the FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigations], made significant changes.
Mr. Gaetz. I really appreciate that. And as much as we want
to host these missions, for the benefit of global security, we
have to put the safety of our sailors, of our service members
first.
And Admiral Gilday, there was in 2019 base-specific
guidance for these Saudi students, wasn't there?
Admiral Gilday. There was. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gaetz. And there also were specific rules for the
installation regarding these students that were, that were
there. Right?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gaetz. And there were arrival packets for each of the
Saudi students who arrived, with their specific information,
such that we knew it. Right?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. They were assigned liaison
officers with each of those students. They were assigned
onboarding processes for each of those students. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gaetz. And on January 13, 2020, there was a memorandum
issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, for
continuous review for international military students. Right?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gaetz. And there have been written policies and
procedures off that memo subsequently. Right?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. There have been many changes.
Mr. Gaetz. And we've specifically required changes from the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Right?
Admiral Gilday. We have.
Mr. Gaetz. All these things are probably not that difficult
to find. Right? Would you be willing to provide those things to
my office that I've just asked for?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. I will provide a detailed
briefing for you.
Mr. Gaetz. That is incredibly helpful and comforting. I
know it's a work in process. I know the social media tools and
the technologies change.
My one concern is that the first responders who were
running in the direction of the bullets to save our sailors,
they are in litigation now with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
And I posit no perspective on how courts will rule on those
things. And certainly not asking you to do that.
But they've made a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act]
request of the Navy for the things that I've just asked you to
provide, and that you said would not be all that difficult to
put our hands on, and that FOIA request has been pending since
March 23.
And the correspondence from the Navy back, sort of says,
well gosh, this is voluminous. You know, there may be other
people who, you know, block our access to it.
And I just think that the Navy ought to stand up for our
sailors and their family members, and the law enforcement that
protects them.
And I want your assurance that the Navy will do everything
possible to provide the documentation and evidence. Because the
way this has to work in court, is that there's this JASTA
[Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act] law, where there
have to be specific elements pled.
And there has to be evidence for those elements, to unlock
discovery. And some of these documents that these litigants are
asking to get from the Navy, are necessary to sync jurisdiction
in that matter.
So again, I won't ask you to opine on the status of
litigation or the law. But just these things that seem pretty
basic, I'm very grateful for your focus on it, and for your
willingness to facilitate the delivery of those records.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We'll find out what constraints
might be in the way here that are causing, that are causing----
Mr. Gaetz. I'm sorry, who might be in the way?
Admiral Gilday. We'll--we will like take a look at what
constraints may be inhibiting the release of those documents
under that FOIA request.
But, I owe you a more detailed answer in terms of the----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 152.]
Mr. Gaetz. I'm just used to this with the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where they seem to have a lot of people sympathetic to
their cause wandering around the Justice Department, and
wandering around elsewhere.
And I take your sincerity here, that you are going to do
everything possible to make sure that we resolve this, and that
we get better going forward.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. We will.
The Chairman. Gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Kim, who is
appearing virtually, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Kim, do
we have you?
Mr. Kim. Yes. Thank you.
The Chairman. Yes, we do. You're up.
Mr. Kim. Thank you. Well, I'd like to start with Secretary
Del Toro. I wanted to touch on a situation with, in the Navy
SEALs, that has devastated one of our communities in New
Jersey, the death of Navy SEAL candidate Kyle Mullen, who
passed away after completing the Hell Week portion of training.
I appreciate that the Naval Special Warfare Command out in
Coronado had been conducting the investigation. They've been
briefing us on some of the details as we've been going forward.
But I'll be honest, I'm still adamant that we need a full
independent investigation through the inspector general, to get
to the bottom of what happened. And to address any reforms that
are needed going forward.
So, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you if I have a
commitment from you that you'll keep track of this
investigation, so we know with confidence what took place. And
that the reforms necessary, that you will push forward any
reforms necessary to ensure that something like this doesn't
happen again.
Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, the safety of our people
is paramount. And you have my commitment that I will continue
to monitor this investigation as it plays itself out, and will
take appropriate actions once the results of the investigations
are revealed.
Mr. Kim. Thank you. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary,
because, you know, I think as we've heard from the family, as
well as families of other candidates that were there at the
time, you know, I think what has become clear, is that there
appears to be some potential issues here when it comes to
medical care, oversight, access to medical records, that isn't
just about Kyle Mullen.
But just something that we want to look at more closely, to
make sure that we're addressing these issues. You know,
specifically when it comes to Kyle's case, not only was there
not a doctor onsite at the time of his emergency, following his
death, it had been increasingly difficult for his family to get
information from the medical team.
So, there appears to be room for improvement in the Navy's
medical observation systems during the training exercises. I
wanted to ask, you know, if you have any thoughts on what
changes you would suggest to ensure the safety of the recruits?
Are there any resources that you need from Congress to help
accomplish this mission of that paramount safety of our service
members that you talked about?
You know, what changes would you propose to the SEAL
training regimen to ensure that the Navy does have enough
health capacity to deal with this, especially when it comes to
something as grueling as Hell Week?
Secretary Del Toro. So Congressman, while the investigation
is not complete, I assure you, we have already taken some
preliminary steps to ensure, as one example, that medical
providers are immediately available at all times, immediately
after the exercises, the training is completed, as opposed to
being on call.
And that's just one example.
Mr. Kim. Okay. Well look, I look forward to keeping that
conversation going as we get more details of the--from the
investigation. And hopefully a thorough discussion about what
we can be doing going forward.
I'd like to just keep on this issue about military
personnel, because I know we had talked a lot during this
hearing about a lot of the hardware, a lot of equipment you
need to be able to push forward with the Navy.
But, one aspect of, that I keep hearing about, especially
on the joint base in my district, is about childcare. And at
this point, what we're hearing is about 22,000 children of
Active service members are on a waitlist with the hopes of
receiving care on base.
For our military families, not being able to access that
childcare is now an issue of readiness, a challenge in terms of
their ability to do their jobs.
You know, I'm proud that an effort in the NDAA and defense
appropriations process to follow through on this effort, to
expand the allowance cap that families can receive under the
childcare fee assistance program by $400 per month.
I wanted to ask you, from your perspective, from what
you're seeing, how do you think this increase of childcare fee
assistance program for the Navy will help our military
families?
And what are the things that you're thinking about doing to
help try and shorten this waitlist at Navy facilities, things
that we can do to try to help our military families?
Secretary Del Toro. Well, thank you, Congressman, for
caring so much about this issue. And actually, the waitlist
right now sits at about 6,700.
Over the past year we've actually been able to bring that
down by 2,300. So, we have made significant progress this past
year.
In this President's budget actually there is a proposal for
$56 million for an additional child development center [CDC] in
Point Loma, California. And over the FYDP, there's actually
monies that are being proposed in MILCON [military
construction] for an additional 12 CDCs as well too, throughout
the country.
And of course, the increase in the allotment for those that
choose to go out into the economy, of $200 is significant.
Mr. Kim. Thank you.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Bergman
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If my math is
correct, and we always joke about math for Marines, a year from
now, both you, Admiral Gilday, and you, General Berger, will be
your final year of testimony before the committee before you--
the passage of command.
Did I get that correct, in a 4-year tour?
General Berger. Hopefully. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bergman. Well, as you look forward, we've talked a lot
about, again, things, platforms, people. I noticed the last
couple of years you've both made the recruiting numbers.
One quick question. Going forward, when you break down
recruiting, officer and enlisted, where do you see the biggest
challenges going forward as a group, officer or enlisted?
Just quickly either/or? Admiral.
Admiral Gilday. I think we're going to be challenged this
year to--I think we'll make our numbers in the Active force
this year. But, if we do----
Mr. Bergman. Long term.
Admiral Gilday [continuing]. It will be narrow.
So, long term, I think it's competing in those places where
we have most, where we're most challenged, cyber----
Mr. Bergman. Officer or enlisted?
Admiral Gilday. Both.
Mr. Bergman. Both. So, you're going to be challenged in
both. General Berger.
General Berger. I think probably enlisted more than
officer. But, I--we are all really concerned about the
shrinking demographics from which we're drawing out of America.
Clearly headed in the wrong direction.
Mr. Bergman. The pool is shrinking.
General Berger. Yes.
Mr. Bergman. And I heard others say, talk about, you know,
different metrics; when we're recruiting young men and women,
we're also recruiting their families, we're recruiting their
influencers.
And if those families don't feel confident that we are, as
a force, lethal, survivable, and sustainable, the propensity of
those young men and women to want to become Marines or sailors,
I believe we're going to have our challenge.
General Berger, you mentioned in your opening comments that
over the last 3 years the Marine Corps has self-funded over $17
billion in modernization. Do you feel as though that you've
gotten a return on that investment with guarantees of other
things?
Because you bought it up front. Are you getting that $17
billion back, if you will, in whoever guaranteed you support?
General Berger. I do. It's taken all of the support of
Congress and the Pentagon leadership to do that. It wasn't
quite $17 that we were able to recoup. But, the balance, the
less than $2 billion in that balance is adjustments, economic
adjustments and compliance issues.
That aside, every dollar that we have divested of, the
Congress and the Pentagon leadership has allowed us to keep.
And that has been the magic of it.
But, we are complete with that now. Just to be very clear.
There is no more divestment for us to do. That last 3 years is
what we had to do.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And Admiral Gilday, you mentioned
about investing in LVCT, or live virtual constructive training.
You already have it existing. You have a program of record that
does that.
Is there within the Navy, because as we see in technology,
one company may have the lead technology today, but there's
competition in the marketplace.
Does the Navy look at something like live virtual
constructive training and say, you know what, there are other
entities out there that can provide us a better product at a
cheaper cost, and is willing to move on from a contract that,
it's a legitimate contract for a time. But yet, move onto
something that is better and less expensive?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, there are dozens of vendors right now
that actually are involved in that live virtual constructive
training effort that is global, and involves nearly every
sailor in the fleet.
And so, it's not just one company that has a lock on that
technology and has us handcuffed with them forever. And so,
there's a lot of different spirals going on in LVC in different
communities, whether it's information warfare, whether it's the
Navy SEALs.
And so there's about--there's an awful lot of opportunity
in that. That equates to competition.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you. And I've only got 17 seconds.
General Berger, take this for the record, please.
Is there any evidence to suggest that in a non-mobilized
environment, in other words, you've got your Reserve Component
who's in a drilling Reserve status, that Reserve units,
battalion squadrons, would be more ready and capable if
operational control was changed from the RC [Reserve Component]
to the AC [Active Component]?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 153.]
The Chairman. Sorry. Your time is expired, so----
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you.
The Chairman [continuing]. That will have to be taken for
the record. Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. General Berger, a Foreign Policy
Research Institute publication outlines that the new force
design adds more capacity and greater range and precision to
Marine forms of firepower, and a potential family of munitions
for different missions and targets.
The ground launch missile systems will increase range
significantly from 40 kilometers to 70 kilometers or more. And
these regiments are expected to influence naval forces far from
the shores they occupy, act as a forcing function to guide
enemy vessels and formations into favorable naval engagements
with friendly forces.
Will the need arise for MRLs [Marine littoral regiments] to
field longer range hypersonic weapon systems?
General Berger. Well, for the Marine Corps, it's too early
to tell about hypersonics. But, your point about increased
range, increased accuracy, in other words, long-range precision
fires writ large, absolutely spot on.
I would just make sure that no one narrows it too narrow to
just maritime, just naval targets. In other words, the force
that's employing them, they're usable against either ground
targets or maritime targets. Either one.
Ms. Sherrill. Certainly. So that actually brings me to a
different question.
So, in its report to Congress, USINDOPACOM requested $408
million for the FY2022 [fiscal year 2022], and $2.91 billion
for FY2023 and 2027, for ground-based, long-range fires, highly
survivable precision strike fires that can support the air and
maritime maneuver from distances greater than 500 kilometers.
Clearly, the need for a survivable ground-based platform is
essential to the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. In addition to
anti-ship missiles, as you were just stating, the importance of
a maneuverable and survivable platform that can deliver
precision fires at great distances cannot be understated.
General Berger, I think you yourself stated that the U.S.
Army is pursuing longer range, but much larger, heavier,
bulkier systems that [inaudible]. But they're not either/or.
We're going to need both. And you were talking about both the
Army and the Marine Corps.
Looking forward to 2030, do you see the Marine Corps
employing the smaller hypersonic or other long-range platforms
the Army's currently developing?
General Berger. It's hard to speculate. I would say if
they're light enough, expeditionary enough for us to put aboard
ship, to sustain ashore, with a small enough signature,
perhaps.
But, the focus for us for survivability is maneuverability.
The ability to stay hidden. The ability to displace. Size
matters.
In other words, if they can detect you, and the battlefield
that we're going to operate on, is going to be saturated with
sensors. You have to operate within that spectrum.
Ms. Sherrill. I'm going to sound like I'm beating a dead
horse here. But, ground launch missile systems will generate a
significant signature on adversary radar and early warning
platforms. Which again, as you were alluding to, could lead to
exposing the MRL, and alerting adversaries of the location of
our friendly forces.
So, would a hypersonic platform with a smaller signature,
that could conceal itself from radar with a low trajectory,
better meet the intent of the MRL shore-to-ship precision fires
and enhance the overall survivability of the MRL?
General Berger. Yes, ma'am. I think potentially,
absolutely. A pure ballistic trajectory, easy to do the math
on. Find out where it came from, where it's going to land.
One of the big advantage of hypersonics is not just the
speed, but the maneuverability of it. And the challenge in
countering that, and even determining where it was fired from.
So, everything that you laid out, I think absolutely,
that's the direction we're headed.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, General. I appreciate it. And I
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Banks is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Banks. General Berger, how many Marines have been
separated or discharged because of the COVID--COVID vaccine
mandate?
General Berger. I don't have the numbers this morning. But,
it's approximately 2,000, Congressman.
Mr. Banks. Do you believe the COVID vaccine mandate has
impacted your recruiting efforts?
General Berger. Not to date.
Mr. Banks. But how many Marines have we separated?
General Berger. Approximately 2,000 so far.
Mr. Banks. Does the COVID vaccine mandate outweigh the
importance of a fully manned Marine Corps?
General Berger. I don't view them as binary choices.
Readiness is our number one priority. Every Marine has to be
fully medically prepared to deploy anywhere on the globe on
short notice.
Mr. Banks. General, are we above or below our recruiting
goals in this fiscal year?
General Berger. We are below recruiting goals this fiscal
year.
Mr. Banks. And are we offering signing bonuses to men and
women to join the Marine Corps?
General Berger. Signing bonuses, no. There are bonuses for
specific specialties who are Marines who are already in. But,
not signing bonuses for enlistees, no.
Mr. Banks. Admiral Gilday, I understand we're offering
minimum enlistment bonuses of $25,000 for men and women to join
the United States Navy.
How many sailors have we separated or discharged because of
the COVID?
Admiral Gilday. About 1,000, sir.
Mr. Banks. One thousand?
Admiral Gilday. About 1,000.
Mr. Banks. Do we expect that number to grow?
Admiral Gilday. We do.
Mr. Banks. By exponentially more? A little bit more?
Admiral Gilday. It's difficult to tell, sir. We have people
that thought they were going to--that thought they were going
to separate voluntarily, who have changed their mind.
Every--every week I see 100-plus people getting vaccinated.
Mr. Banks. Is that a high or low signing bonus? I mean, it
seems, it doesn't seem normal to me.
Admiral Gilday. So, it's about half of what the Army's
offering, to put it in perspective. It's the competitive market
right now that we're in.
We're on glide slope as I mentioned earlier. I think if we
make it in the Active side, we'll narrowly make it. It's a
challenging environment.
Mr. Banks. So, how do we justify separating sailors and
Marines when our recruitment is so low, and offering
unprecedented signing bonuses to attract new sailors and
Marines?
Admiral Gilday. So, number one, we have a valid order from
the President. Number two, it is a readiness concern. I can't
predict, I don't know if anybody can, what the next variant of
COVID might look like, how it may affect us.
I know the challenges we faced on ships over the past 2
years. And so, I do have readiness concerns tied to those
vaccinations, that we continue to toe the line and obey the
order. Because I think it's--fundamentally, I think it's the
right thing to do right now, given that as a threat to the
readiness of the force.
Mr. Banks. Admiral Gilday, I notice the new, your new
reading list came out. I enjoy the reading list. I look forward
to it every year.
Last year, as we discussed before, the list was very
political. I notice this year the list isn't political. There
are no books that preach political ideologies, or viewpoints,
or talk about radical gender theories.
Was that a decision on your part to divert away from
politics and make the reading list about naval leadership and
history, and about the United States Navy?
Was that a decision on your part?
Admiral Gilday. In both years I've actually received
significant feedback from the fleet. I actually do listening
sessions and get ideas.
And so it has been influenced by the fleet. I did want a
smaller list this year. So, I went with a dozen books. But, I
don't have a political agenda, sir. Or an axe to grind.
I'm just trying to--I'm just trying to share books that
I've enjoyed, or take recommendations from others. I'd
appreciate your feedback.
Mr. Banks. Yeah. Again, I enjoy the list. I learn a lot
about naval history and leadership when I read books on the
list. But, I was surprised by the political nature of the list
last year. It seems like a big difference between last year and
this year.
Furthermore, the Naval Information Forces hosted the
Inaugural Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Summit just a few
weeks ago, in April. Your wife participated and spoke at the
Summit.
How much--how much did that cost us, Admiral? And what did
we get out of it? What did we get out of that Summit?
Admiral Gilday. I don't know what the, I don't know what
the cost of that Summit was, sir. I think there were, there's
power--there's power in harnessing the differences among us,
whether they be----
Mr. Banks. What did we get out of it? What did we gain--
what did we gain from the Summit? What are some takeaways from
the Summit that justified the resources that----
Admiral Gilday. I had not had a detailed readout of that
particular gathering, sir.
Mr. Banks. You're largely credited for the reason that we
organized it and hosted it. I mean, the articles that come out
of the Summit suggest that you're the reason that we hosted it.
I'm just wondering, I mean, how do you justify it? You
haven't had a readout, but how do you justify it? What came out
of it?
What's your answer?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I get a readout of many conferences. I
will seek a readout of this one. Usually I get something weeks
later that gives me insights in terms of what--what the goods
or others were, that, that were evident as a result of the
conference.
I look--I look forward to get----
Mr. Banks. For the record, can you give us the report when
you get it, to tell us what good came from it? Justify it,
justify to the taxpayers why we hosted it?
Admiral Gilday. I'd be happy to share that with you, sir.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 152.]
Mr. Banks. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Veasey [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman from
Maine, Mr. Golden, is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. General, I was an enlisted O-3 NCO
who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, Gallagher talked about
foraging and surviving off the land. And I will note, in the
Hindu Kush in 2004, I ate enough goat and rice for a lifetime.
Now, in Afghanistan and Iraq, we really focused on
shooting. On being agile and fast, and on delivering effective
overpowering fire on the enemy. And we were good.
But I know there's room to get even more lethal and even
better. My experience tells me that the Force Design 2030's
focus on screening and recon [reconnaissance], alongside
lethality, is spot on.
Now, some critics of the small distributed unit strategy
that you've talked about, have suggested that this isn't
survivable. Essentially that you're asking Marines to do
basically a suicide mission.
So, what is your level of confidence that your Marines are
ready to carry out that mission? Because to do it, they need to
be highly skilled hunter-killers.
So, are they there today? Are they ready to do it and
survive it? We know it will be a tough mission, but what is
your level of confidence in these small units' ability to get
the job done?
General Berger. I am very confident. And I know that from
visiting units just like other service chiefs, and seeing the
training that they're doing at the high end, against a very
thinking adversary.
In other words, in a force-on-force sort of scenario. It's
not canned. It's not fighting against a computer. You're
fighting against another Marine that's trying to beat you. I'm
very confident in them.
I think the focus on the first part of your question, the
reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, it doesn't lower
lethality. But, it doesn't do any good to be lethal if you
can't find them. It doesn't do any good to be lethal if they
find you first.
So, the--it doesn't diminish the lethality part. But, it
does bring to the fore the importance, if it's a sensor-
saturated environment, you need to be able to hide. And you
need to be able to find them first and get the first round down
range. And that first round's got to be accurate.
Mr. Golden. Thank you, General. I'd love to have the
opportunity to maybe visit and see some of the training taking
place to ensure that small unit lethality is taking place. And
see what these Marines are learning and capable of.
General Gilday, the FYDP calls for, to--I'm sorry, Admiral
Gilday. Marine here. You know, old habits die hard.
The FYDP calls for two destroyers a year. So, why not a
baseline of 10 for the multiyear? Because recently you spoke at
a Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] dialog,
and talked about your recent visit to BIW [Bath Iron Works],
along with Senator Collins and myself.
And you noted at CSIS that BIW's at a rate of production of
about one ship a year. But you also said that you wanted to see
them get to one and a half, so that you could someday see three
budget--three destroyers a year in future budgets.
But a nine-ship multiyear actually raises concerns that one
of the yards might not have demand for even one ship a year
over the period of time that it covers.
So, I agree with you that one and a half ships is
definitely achievable. And BIW was just under one and a half
ships recently, although they've now struggled a little bit
with recruitment and retention in this tough labor market.
But we know it's critical for our national security that
these yards make that investment in that future workforce,
which is going to be the workforce to build the DDG(X) [Next-
Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer].
So, my opinion is that these yards need to see a positive
signal from the Congress and Navy, and a 10-year ship multiyear
with a 5-ship option demonstrates stability at 1 ship a year,
while green-lighting an effort to get to that one and a half
over time.
So, what's your thinking on the nine-plus-one proposal?
Admiral Gilday. Yeah. So, sir, the nine-plus-one was a
decision inside the Pentagon. And it's a decision that we're
going to live by.
I think it's a, it is a clear signal for industry. I think
specifically with respect to Bath, when I was up there and I
talked about aspirationally giving them 1.5, I know that
there's a mismatch between what the shipbuilding plan says
right now, and what I asked them to shoot for.
I hope over time that we can get to three destroyers a
year, and actually solidify that in the shipbuilding plan. And
the reason I say that, is because particularly with respect to
Bath, it's not lost on me the significant investment they made
in infrastructure and workforce to support a Zumwalt program
that never panned out.
And so, they are looking at us, and are questioning whether
or not what we say is going to match what we do. So I think we
owe it to them.
I intend to keep, as the Secretary also keeps, close tabs
on industry so that we can set a demand signal that's both
reasonable, and that puts us in a path of stable and
predictable ship delivery for the Navy.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. And I would just note for the
committee, and we've talked a lot about this and how to develop
that industrial base, getting to one and a half ships per year
for the large surface combatants is a 5- to 7-, or 8-year
project.
If you want to get to one and a half in the future, we've
got to start that, we've got to start that process now.
Admiral Gilday. Right.
Mr. Golden. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Before recognizing Mr.
Waltz, I want to, without objection, allow members to submit
statements, records, whatever they want, five business--within
five business days after the hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask unanimous
consent to submit this chart into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
141.]
Mr. Waltz. Admiral, can you see the chart here?
General Berger. Yes.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you. I think--I think it's very important
for the American people to see visually the trend lines of
what's going on with our Navy, and what's going on with the
Chinese Navy.
And these are according to DOD and Congressional Research
Service numbers. Yesterday the intelligence community briefed
the Senate, the much talked about timeline. And we basically
have 5 years, 2027, until the Chinese Communist Party believes
they have overmatch in the Western Pacific.
Do you disagree with that assessment?
General Berger. I do not.
Mr. Waltz. Okay. Admiral.
Admiral Gilday. I agree with the assessment.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Admiral. So, I think this is
important. This here shows the size of the Chinese Navy. And
this is the various shipbuilding plans we've received over the
last, since 2015.
With--in blue here is the size of the U.S. Navy. And I
think it's important for the American people to understand,
that 2027 figure, it's right there. That's a 105-ship delta.
Now, I get it. We can have the capability, capacity debate.
But I'm not buying that we can make up for a 105-ship delta
that they can concentrate all in one ocean with short supply
lines.
And the problem is, with your divestment strategy, we're at
our lowest point at 2027, when they're at the highest point.
And even when we come out of it, let's say, I mean, let's look
at the Next Gen Air Dominance, 2031; future frigate, 2028;
Ready Reserve fleet modernization, 2030.
I mean, that's all right around here. We still have these
massive deltas. Gentlemen, I think we are being set up. And
these budgets are setting us up to lose in a war with China.
And that is a disservice to the sailors that are going to
be out there on old, broken-down ships, and outnumbered in 5
years. So, with this FYDP, what we're buying right now, is what
we have to go to war.
Admiral Gilday. That's right.
Mr. Waltz. That's right.
Admiral Gilday. And you're not going to change that
significantly between now and 2027. And so our emphasis is, is
to deliver for the Nation the most lethal, the most ready, the
most capable Navy that we can, based on the resources that we
have.
Mr. Waltz. But, I don't think your plan gets us there,
Admiral. I mean, just candidly.
Admiral Gilday. Well, we did----
Mr. Waltz. Because we're going, we're going backwards. And
we've--so, first of all, those estimates, 2031 and 2028, those
are best-case scenarios.
And this blue line's a best-case scenario. This is on your
option three of the shipbuilding plan. But, we've seen from the
Ford-class carrier, the Joint Strike Fighter, to LCS, that
those estimates are often grossly off.
Admiral Gilday. We're deploying the Ford class this year.
So----
Mr. Waltz. It's been around for 20 years. The office came
in in 1997. So, the estimates are off, which means, look, at
the end of the day, I think we have allowed this committee and
the building to fall into a false choice of readiness versus
modernization.
I think the real choice is, how much money should you be
asking for to be ready to win? I don't want to, I don't want to
pace. I want to overmatch. I want to win, in the next 5 years.
So, if you were given more money, Admiral, would you
accelerate the Ready Reserve fleet modernization? Would you
accelerate the frigates?
Would you accelerate much of what you're trying to do? And
would you keep more cruisers? Not all of them, but would you
keep more?
If you were--if this committee gave you more?
Admiral Gilday. Given the window that we're looking at
right now that you described, I would take you to my unfunded
list. And if you take a look at the priorities on the unfunded
list, it's for SM-6 missiles. It's for--it's for LRASM. It's
for JASSM-ER.
It's for the most capable missiles in the world to put on
our ships. And actually----
Mr. Waltz. Why are they unfunded?
Admiral Gilday. Why are they--I'm trying to maximize those
production lines. So, I'm----
Mr. Waltz. Right----
Admiral Gilday [continuing]. I am--we're funding them
inside the budget. We're trying to maximize those production
lines. We are funding ships' maintenance to 98 percent.
We're trying to, we're trying to increase----
Mr. Waltz. But Admiral, the problem is, all of those things
that you described, and to the ranking member, are all
aspirational. And that's, and that's not all your necessarily
issue. I mean, you've had a lot of predecessors.
But, we are where we are now. And I think we need a drastic
increase to be able to cover the gaps within the next 5 years.
Admiral Gilday. We just talked about the industrial base.
Right now, we've given a clear set of--we are maxing out the,
the production lines for attack submarines and for SSBNs
[ballistic missile submarines].
Two destroyers a year is what the industrial base can
support right now.
Mr. Waltz. What--just in the remaining time I have, for the
record, can I--what investments do we need to make in the
industrial base?
Rather than letting that limit you and the budget limit
you, what investments can we make in the industrial base to
close that gap?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 153.]
Admiral Gilday. We're making over $2 billion right now. And
the----
Mr. Waltz. It's not enough.
The Chairman. The time has expired.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And I suspect this conversation will continue
now with Ms. Luria. So you will get your chance.
Ms. Luria is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am requesting unanimous
consent to enter these documents in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The documents referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 142.]
Mrs. Luria. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
So, Secretary Del Toro, what I have here is from the 2017
Strategic Readiness Review. I assume you are familiar with and
you have read that document; it follows in the wake of the
McCain and Fitzgerald collisions. So, this chart shows the
fleet strength from about 600 ships in the 1980s to about 300.
And it also shows a rapid rise in the percentage of the
fleet that is deployed over that course of time. Do you agree
that you see that blue line going up? It goes from about, say,
20 percent to about 35 percent.
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page
142.]
Mrs. Luria. And this is a narrative that has been recently
portrayed a lot across discussions of the fleet that we are
actually, like, running the fleet into the ground, we are
deploying ships more.
But, you know, then I forwarded to this year's budget book,
which is the real thing that I want to dig into the meat of
because I think it paints a rosier picture than actually
exists. So, are you familiar with this? This is in the budget
book that you submitted this year.
Secretary Del Toro. Yes, I am.
Mrs. Luria. So, right here in red, I have circled this, so,
it says that as of March 17th the Navy has 298 ships. Of that,
128 are deployed.
[The graphic referred to can be found in the Appendix on
page 143.]
Mrs. Luria. Well, I thought that was curious because it is
significantly higher than the average for the preceding or
following year. So, I reached out, I received a list of those
ships that were deployed on March 17th of this year.
So, I came to find in there some interesting things. Of
that 128, 39 of them are ships that are forward deployed. And
when I say that, they even include ships that are in port, in
home port, ships that are in maintenance. The Ronald Reagan,
for example, is included in that as well. So, all ships forward
deployed, regardless of their operational status, all 8
minesweepers, every ship forward deployed.
And, in fact, also 39 of those 128 ships are also MSC
[Military Sealift Command] ships, regardless of their underway
status, or that they are deployed. MSC ships don't operate
under the same OPTEMPO [operation tempo] requirements as the
rest of the fleet.
And then the last, most puzzling thing that I found is that
13 of the 14 SSBNs [ballistic-missile submarines] are on this
list.
So, I know it is above the classification level of this
hearing, but I can say with all certainty that 13 or 14 SSBNs
are not deployed or underway on any given day.
So then when we get down to the math, you subtract all of
those things out, I came to find that there were actually only
37 ships which are rotational CONUS [continental United
States]-based ships deployed on this day in your budget report.
And that is about 20 percent. Which makes perfect sense. It
makes perfect sense because the OFRP [Optimized Fleet Response
Plan], the way the rotational forces work, seek to have about
20 percent of the ships deployed on any given day.
So, you know, going back to this chart in the 2017
Strategic Readiness Review, I think there has been a narrative
that has been carried forward that talks about, you know, the
amount that we are employing and overworking the fleet, which I
think when you dig into these numbers in fact this paints a
rosier picture for the number of ships we actually have
deployed today, as well as exaggerates--43 percent, you agree
that's twice as much as actually the numbers show.
And then the next thing I went to also in this year's
budget book were these two graphs. This is two parts of a 4-
part graph series. But what it shows is our VLS [Vertical
Launching System] cell capacity over time. It is broken down in
this chart. It separates it between surface and subsurface.
[The graphs referred to can be found in the Appendix on
page 144.]
Mrs. Luria. If you were to look at this chart, you would
think, wow, you know, we're pretty steady. And then we start
going up on this chart between now and 2055.
But, this is a 0 to 12,000 scale. So, I mean, you can
manipulate data to make things look flatter, depending on the
scale you use. So, everything on the entire graph is between
these two lines right here, and it doesn't combine the two. So,
oh, there's a dip in SSGNs, but that is going to go back up.
So, I just decided out of curiosity's sake to change the
scale, to put them on the same chart, and to look at the
timeframe. And I drew that vertical line that Mr. Waltz did as
well, where you have the Davidson window, which is the 2027
timeframe.
So, this is the same data, with both of those things
combined, using your 30-year shipbuilding plan between now and
2035, which shows that we will lose 1,668 VLS cells in the
Davidson window, as well as between now and 2035, 1,980 VLS
cells.
So, again, you know, as a Member of Congress receiving this
budget document that you have presented to us, I found that it
really presented quite a rosy picture of the future of our VLS
capacity, as well as the number of fleet--ships in the fleet
that are being employed.
And there is a little bit of time remaining. And would you
care to comment on why that is so different as has been
displayed by myself and others on this committee throughout the
hearing than what we actually see today?
Secretary Del Toro. Well, Congresswoman, with my 26
seconds, and I would be happy to respond to the record as well,
too. One can interpret data a thousand different ways.
I actually do know that today we actually have 81 total
ships underway, for 27 percent of the fleet. And it is a very
accurate accounting of how many ships we have today.
And I would be happy to present to you with this data.
With regards----
Mrs. Luria. But why----
Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. To the----
Mrs. Luria [continuing]. Did you choose, Mr. Secretary, to
use ``deployed'' versus ``underway''?
And why from year to year in budget books can one not track
the difference?
And if you go back to the 1980s, for example----
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mrs. Luria [continuing]. The percentage is----
The Chairman. We will take the rest of that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 153.]
Secretary Del Toro. There are many variations of that.
The Chairman. And one of the things that I think we should
get briefed on on the committee is, you know, we, we talk about
how it is about capability, not about numbers. But we always
see from the China, well, they've have got this number.
Well, how capable are their ships?
How many ships does China have deployed all around the
world in any given moment?
That is a very low number, from what I understand. And the
capability of their ships are not as great either. So, we can
all, like, freak ourselves out about all the trillions of
dollars a year apparently we have to spend on our defense
budget. I think it would be helpful if we had a realistic
understanding of our adversaries, and where they are at, and
what we need to counter.
I watched a fascinating video the other day, economists
pointing out that China is a net importer of both food and
energy by a really large margin. They don't have the naval
capability of protecting that energy and food that is coming in
from all over the world because their ships can't get very far
away from China and still operate.
So, let's have a reasonable picture about what we need to
build and what we need to have. And I think it would be good to
get more information on that and have a longer conversation on
that, which we will attempt to find time to do.
Ms. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for being here.
The Navy, and it is in the same vein that we are all
talking about, and, Chairman, you talk about capability and
looking at the future. I think that is what we are all
concerned about is capability, looking at the future, making
sure that we are the leaders, that we are protected, that we
are safe.
The general theme that I am sort of getting is there is a
disparity between, or there is not a reconciliation of here is
what we need to be safe, and here is where we are at. There
seems to be some disparity.
The Navy has requested, is requesting legislative relief
from the statutory requirement to support the carrier air
wings. However, you have stated that you believe the Navy needs
12 carriers. In your assessment, how many aircraft carriers are
needed to meet current and future, which I think is important,
operational requirements?
So, I don't understand, if we are looking towards the
future, why are we reducing our standards, so to speak.
Secretary Del Toro. If I could start off and kick it over
to you, CNO.
So, we are not reducing our standards, Congresswoman. We
actually have 11 carriers that actually are being proposed all
the way through 2039. Beyond that it goes to 12 carriers.
Mrs. McClain. Okay. So, you are not requesting legislative
relief from the statutory requirement. I read that wrong.
Secretary Del Toro. Well, if I could just finish.
However, at any one given moment in time not all those
carriers are available, which means not all those carrier wings
need to be available to deploy on the carriers themselves.
And I will allow the CNO to expand on that.
Admiral Gilday. So, nine is the right number. Nine is the
right number, given the fact that we have 11 carriers.
So, you are always going to have two carriers that are
going to be in drydock. So, you don't want to pay, you don't
want to pay for the readiness for excess to need if--when, when
we want to make sure that we're putting the right money in the
right place at the right time. And so, to have a wing sitting
around that you won't be able to, that you won't be able to
deploy, it won't fly at the same----
Mrs. McClain. Well, so, I understand that, sir.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. McClain. So, so I guess my second question is I
thought you had stated that you believed the Navy needs 12.
Admiral Gilday. Correct. Over time the analysis shows 12.
That is correct.
And so, we would, and so we would scale our carrier air
wings to meet that requirement when it is needed.
Mrs. McClain. When it is needed.
Admiral Gilday. Correct.
Mrs. McClain. And what--well, I will get into that.
So in your assessment, how many aircraft carriers are
needed to meet current and future operational requirements?
Admiral Gilday. As the Secretary stated, at least 12.
Mrs. McClain. Now.
Admiral Gilday. We have 11 right now. The long--the
stretch----
Mrs. McClain. That is where my confusion comes in is you
need 12. We have 11, but we are prepared for 9.
Admiral Gilday. So, if we had 12 we would be--if we had, if
we----
Mrs. McClain. Well, let's start with, let's start with
capability and what we need.
Admiral Gilday. Okay.
Mrs. McClain. What is that answer: 12, 11, 9?
Secretary Del Toro. So, the President's budget right now
proposes 11 carriers through 2039.
Mrs. McClain. And I appreciate that.
My question is, and maybe I am not phrasing it correctly,
what do we need? Not what is proposed but what do we physically
need now to be prepared now and in the future? What is that
number I am looking for?
Secretary Del Toro. We need 11 carriers now.
Mrs. McClain. We need 11. And that, in your opinion, is
plenty--good----
Secretary Del Toro. To meet the--warfighting requirements.
Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. McClain. Okay. Thank you.
So, based on China's current 2030 force projections, how
many carriers and carrier air wings should the Navy be
fielding?
So, I am looking at Mr. Smith. He is not Chairman Smith.
In comparison to our competition, what do we need,
specifically China? Because it looks by all of our accounts
that the Chinese trajectory, from what Mr. Waltz has shown as
well, we have, you know, we have some disparity. I know those
are naval, but we have disparity
So, in comparison to our competition, what do we need?
Secretary Del Toro. So, the estimate is that we will need
11. China does not have nearly as many carriers as we have. And
it is not just about a one-to-one capacity, it is about
strategy. It is about a lot of the things that the chairman
just previously spoke about as well, too. It is about
geography, it is about how you employ strategy to defeat the
enemy, it is about cyber, it is about space, a lot of others.
Mrs. McClain. So, in essence, less is more, working smarter
versus harder, so to speak?
Secretary Del Toro. Hypothetically, but both capacity and
capability matter to be able to deliver the lethality that you
have to deliver to your enemy at any given time.
Mrs. McClain. Okay, thank you.
Also, we know aircraft carriers cannot project power
without the carrier air wing. Right? Several members of this
committee believe that there is a great deal of risk in the
Navy's current tactical air aviation plan.
The Next Generation Air Dominance schedule has slipped over
the past few years. Fewer Super Hornets than initially planned
are being inducted for service life modification and Block 3
upgrades.
F-35C procurement quantity has still not been reached, 24
aircraft per year. Right?
Last year the Navy suggested--and I am going to run out of
time--that the striker fighter shortfall would be resolved by
2025, but now it doesn't look like it is going to be resolved
till 2031.
Can you explain the disparity on that?
Secretary Del Toro. So, the supply chain has a very
negative effect on the ability to deliver F-35----
Mr. Kahele [presiding]. The member's time has expired. We
can take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 155.]
Mr. Kahele The chair will now recognize himself for 5
minutes.
Mahalo, Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General
Berger for appearing before this committee today. I am going to
focus my questions on the number one issue on the minds of the
people of Hawaii, and that is the closure of the Red Hill Bulk
Fuel Storage Facility.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for including Red Hill in your
testimony before this committee.
Last Friday, the Hawaii Department of Health issued an
emergency order regarding the closure of Red Hill. It sets
specific timelines that the Navy must comply with for the safe
and expeditious defueling and closure of Red Hill.
On Monday of this week, the Navy waived its right to
contest the State's order, effectively paving the way for Red
Hill's permanent shutdown. It requires the Navy to provide the
State with an independent contractor's assessment on facilities
operations by May 15th, a plan and implementation schedule to
defuel by June 30th, and a plan for closure of the facility by
November 1st.
Secretary Del Toro, in the interests of time I have three
yes or no questions for you.
The first is, will the Navy be able to meet these three
Department of Health deadlines: this Sunday for the NAVSUP
[Naval Supply Systems Command] FLC [Fleet Logistics Center]
Norfolk contract assessment report; June 30th for the defueling
schedule; and 1 November for the closure plan?
Secretary Del Toro. So, Congressman, that is to be
determined. As you know, that there is language in the
executive order that actually allows us to actually have
further discussions on the exact timeliness of the dates.
Mr. Kahele. Will the Navy be able to meet the SECDEF's
[Secretary of Defense's] March 7th memo, which requires both
yourself and the Director of the DLA [Defense Logistics
Agency], to provide a defueling plan of action to the SECDEF by
May 31st?
Secretary Del Toro. I can't speak for the Director of the
DLA, but the Navy will meet its requirement to the Secretary of
Defense.
Mr. Kahele. Excellent.
Finally, there are multiple ongoing investigations. The
commander of PACFLT [U.S. Pacific Fleet] ordered a command
investigation on November 29th, 9 days after the catastrophic
leak. The PACFLT commander received that report, Admiral
Paparo, on January 14th, and turned it over to the Pentagon.
In mid-March, the Pentagon ordered a supplemental
investigation because the original report was insufficient.
When will the congressional delegation, the State of
Hawaii, and the people of Hawaii, as well as our 100,000
military service members and their dependents that are on the
Navy's water system, get to see and review the results,
redacted or unredacted, of this command investigation?
Could you give me a timeline? Can you give the people of
Hawaii a date?
Secretary Del Toro. So, Congressman, that investigation has
been completed. It is under review by the leadership of the
Department of Defense. And it will be released in the next
several weeks.
Mr. Kahele. Several weeks?
Secretary Del Toro. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kahele. Okay. Just want to reemphasize it has been 6
months since the November 20th fuel leak. The full extent of
this public health crisis and the environmental damage is still
not yet known.
As recently as April 1st, a little over a month-and-a-half
ago, there was another release of approximately 30 gallons of
fuel and water mixture from a maintenance line connected to
Tank 15 at Red Hill.
So, this is very, very important for the delegation and for
the people of Hawaii. And I appreciate your promptness in this
issue.
Secretary Del Toro, of the approximately 93,000 people on
the Navy's water distribution system on Oahu, it is still not
clear how many people have been affected by the May and
November 2021 fuel spills. Secretary--Assistant Secretary
Meredith Berger's memo to you on March 29th, she mentioned that
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry conducted
an expanded public health study that included all non-Federal
civilians and DOD personnel served by the Navy's water system
in their homes, their workplaces, their schools, and their
childcare centers.
The preliminary analysis of this survey determined that 86
percent of the surveyed individuals exhibited symptoms
consistent with acute petroleum exposure.
Can you elaborate at all on this study, and share any of
this data with the public?
Secretary Del Toro. Sir, that was a survey that was
conducted. We, obviously, in our interest to protect our
sailors, our Marines, their families, and all other individuals
in the Department of Defense, also in the State of Hawaii, have
ensured that we have had two surveys now: one conducted by the
CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], another one
by--conducted by the Navy to try to capture all the individuals
that were impacted by this. And that survey result of 86
percent is reflective of the answers that were provided by
individuals.
Mr. Kahele. Okay. Last question.
The Navy's compromised water system is also currently
contributing to a water shortage on the island of Oahu. The Red
Hill well, and the nearby Aiea-Halawa well remain offline,
disconnected from the Navy's water distribution system.
Honolulu Board of Water Supply anticipates a water shortage
this upcoming summer. It is calling for a 10 percent water
reduction for urban Honolulu.
What is the status of the Red Hill and Aiea-Halawa wells?
When can we get that back online?
And we can take that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 155.]
Secretary Del Toro. So, yes, sir. And I would like to
comment real quickly.
As you know, sir, we have been testing the Red Hill. All
indications right now are that it is safe. But that's a
determination that has to be made by the Department of Health
of Hawaii.
And we continue to work very closely with the Department of
Health and other officials on Hawaii to come to that proper
conclusion at the right moment in time.
Mr. Kahele. Thank you so much.
The chairman would like to now recognize Mr. Jackson for 5
minutes.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you guys for being
here today. I apologize. I had to step out; we had a little
get-together with the King of Jordan. So I don't know exactly
what has been asked, but I don't think anybody has asked my
question yet because I am going to ask you about the V-22.
So, with you, General, I will start with.
The Marine Corps included funding for the MV-22 nacelle
improvement on its unfunded priorities list for this fiscal
year. I anticipate that Congress will provide full funding for
that because we here on the committee recognize the game-
changing capabilities that this aircraft provides.
Upgrading the current fleet is essential. But I think we
should also look at expanding the current number of MV-22
aircraft.
General Berger, how important is it to improve the
readiness of our platform such as the MV-22 when implementing
Force Design 2030?
General Berger. It is critical, as you pointed out. It's
proven in combat and on every deployment since. It is one-of-a-
kind in the world. We can't do our job without it.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I agree. And I will do
whatever we can to help you on that front.
Admiral, I want to ask you a quick question.
As you know from your close coordination with NNSA
[National Nuclear Security Administration], much of the nuclear
enterprise is in desperate need of modernization. When we look
at the possible future conflict with China, the timeline keeps
shifting further and further to the left. It has become clear
that the platforms and capabilities that we are looking to
field in the 2030s and the 2040s will be needed much sooner
than we anticipated.
How important is the W-93 warhead program as we transition
from Ohio-class submarines to Columbia-class submarines?
And further, from your perspective, how helpful would it be
for Congress to accelerate funding for nuclear modernization in
support of the sea leg of the triad?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would say that modernization is
critical with respect to that weapon system. And right now we
are on track.
I will--I will get back to you on whether or not we could
actually physically accelerate that program.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 155.]
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
And then this just quick question here. This is kind of one
of my--my areas that I am concerned about.
But anybody who has been to a HASC [House Armed Services
Committee] hearing this hear has heard me express my serious
concerns about our medical readiness and some of the dangerous
cuts being made to the military medical community.
Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to--there is a particular area
of concern I have. I wanted to know what is the justification
for cutting the position of the Medical Officer of the Marine
Corps?
Secretary Del Toro. Congressman, the justification has been
an overall look across the balance of flag officers and SESes
[Senior Executive Service] that we have in the Department of
Defense. As you know, the Department of Defense has put--there
is a cap on the number of flag officers that we are allowed to
have. And so, we have had to downsize the number of flag
officers and the number of SESes as well, too. That has been
congressionally mandated. And it is our intent to meet the
intent of the law.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.
And I may be a little bit biased on this one in particular,
but being a former Navy physician and spending time with the
Marines, I feel like the making sure that we provide the
absolute best leadership we can possibly provide for Navy
medicine with regards to our support of the Marine Corps is
really important to me. So, I know that there is a finite
number of flag and general officers, and you are operating
within, within that framework.
But I would really like to try to find other ways to, or
find a way to reestablish that position. I think it is really
important.
Secretary Del Toro. And we would be happy to work with you
and the Congress on that issue, sir.
Dr. Jackson. Thank you, sir.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Kahele. The chairman recognizes Ms. Jacobs for 5
minutes.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Nice to see you all. Mr. Secretary, hope you enjoyed your
recent time in San Diego with Tom Cruise, of all people.
You know, several of my colleagues have already highlighted
the importance of the 30-year shipbuilding plan. I just want to
reiterate how important that is and, you know, want to make
sure we are thinking long-term. And thank you and the
Department for delivering it this year after several delays.
So, over the years the Navy has seen several platforms come
in over budget, such as the DDG, or underperform, such as the
LCS. In addition to the unnecessary waste that this has forced
on taxpayers, these mistakes have also had a direct impact on
Navy's ability to meet its mission.
So, what is the Navy doing to ensure that this new 30-year
plan will not repeat mistakes of the past?
And how are you and the Department incorporating lessons
learned as we look to meet the challenges of the future?
Secretary Del Toro. It is a great question, Congresswoman.
And I have been deeply engaged on that issue since I became
Secretary of the Navy.
It is obviously important for us to build these great
platforms and these great capabilities. It is also equally
important for industry to deliver these things on time and on
cost. And so, we have spent an enormous amount of time in the
Navy and the Marine Corps talking to our PEOs [program
executive offices] about ensuring that we are providing proper
oversight over the acquisition programs in order to be able to
hold the builders accountable for what they have contracted
with the Department of Defense to deliver on.
Equally important, I think it is important to control
requirements creep on the part of the government, to ensure
that when we agree to certain contracts we just don't continue
to increase the requirements on those contracts, which adds a
tremendous amount of additional costs to the individual
contracts.
CNO, would you like to comment further on this topic?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, thanks for the question on the
shipbuilding plan.
I think a real key here is predictability and stability in
the plan. And so, we have that for submarines out for the next
15, almost 20 years. We aspire to do the same thing for the
surface force.
So, the Secretary has fought very hard to keep two
destroyers a year in the shipbuilding plan this year. He has
fought hard to keep an LPD in the plan for this year and,
hopefully, to continue that line.
But to give industry in the surface build--on the surface
production line the same kind of predictability that you have
in the undersea is what we are really trying to do, and to work
closely with the Congress in order to follow through on that.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. Representing San Diego, I will
look forward to working very closely with you on that.
General Berger, last week I had the pleasure to visit with
General Smith at I MEF. And one of the things we talked about
was the health and deployability of the MEUs. And given that
the 22nd MEU was unable to deploy on the updated timeline, what
additional resources do you need to ensure the MEUs are
deploying on time with proper manning, training, and equipment?
General Berger. I can handle the Marine part and probably a
tag team between me and Admiral Gilday.
The cycle is very predictable for the Marine expeditionary
units. They have the lead time, they have the planning time
that they need to prepare, and to train up, and to man.
So, I am very comfortable with the cycle of the Marines.
The ability of the team to marry up with the amphibious
ships is where the center of your question is. Absolutely bare
minimum number of days to work together. Prior to that, the
ship's crew has to have dedicated time to do their preparation
work.
So, in the end it is a function of the maintenance, the
level of maintenance readiness of the amphibious ships. And
part of the driver there--again, the admiral can speak clearer
than I can--is how we have used them in the past and when we
have extended them unplanned. All of that affects readiness
now.
But I will turn it over to Admiral Gilday.
Admiral Gilday. The first thing we have to do is actually
do the maintenance on the ships. And so, there was a period of
time when we did not. We took a holiday from doing that.
And as we get into a discussion about priorities and we
talk about readiness, modernization, and capacity, if you want
to--if you want to drive numbers you are going to pay for it
with things like ship maintenance, ships' maintenance. That is
not where we want to be. We have seen the second- and third-
order effects of that, including the impact on getting the 22nd
MEU out on time.
So, we are funding our maintenance accounts at 98 percent.
We are trying to drive delay days down to zero. We were at
7,700 a couple years ago. We are down to 3,000 right now. We
are not satisfied. We want to get that down to zero delay days
so that in terms of how we generate forces, how we generate
ships to go to sea, that you can on any given day have 100
percent assurance that the ships that are supposed to be out
are actually out at sea.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you.
And for the record, since I am running out of time, would
just love to hear what the Navy's doing to increase manning and
when surface ships will be fully manned, given that a GAO [U.S.
Government Accountability Office] report found that the surface
fleet is 15 percent undermanned compared to required level.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 154.]
The Chairman [presiding]. We will take that for the record.
Ms. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Secretary, General, and Admiral for being here today.
As you know, my hometown of Oklahoma City is home to the
Navy, excuse me, Strategic Command Communications--sorry,
Strategic Communications Wing 1, also known as TACAMO [Take
Charge and Move Out], based at Tinker Air Force Base. TACAMO
carries out a mission of critical national security, providing
coms [communications] backbone for the nuclear arsenal.
Like many aircraft in the fleet, the E-6 aircraft used by
TACAMO is aging and is in need of replacement. The Navy has
requested $554 million for RDT&E [research, development, test,
and evaluation] for 2023 to start capitalization of the C-130J.
Given the differences in the aircraft specifications, the
C-130J does not have the cruise speed, service ceiling, or the
range of the E-6.
My question is what criteria did the Navy use to select the
C-130J to replace the E-6?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, that was a warfighting criteria
driven by the commander of STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command],
who actually, who actually is serviced by those aircraft. So,
his command and control is contingent upon it.
So, that was a driver in terms of--in terms of determining
what the replacement would look like and what it would actually
be.
Mrs. Bice. I think I am concerned about the diminished
capability of this replacement aircraft, given the long
distances the Navy aircraft may need to travel to alert at sea,
How can the Navy justify the significant shorter range of this
aircraft, given the mission?
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, if I could, what I like to offer,
not to be evasive, but is to offer you a classified briefing
that compares the existing TACAMO with, with the platform that
we intend to replace it with.
And also to talk about what we are doing to extend the
service life of the existing platform so that you will
understand completely what we are, what we are moving towards
and why.
Mrs. Bice. I would very much appreciate that, Admiral.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you for that offer.
To follow up, can you talk about the Navy efforts to
monitor, predict, and respond to supply chain threats? You all
have talked a little bit in earlier questioning about supply
chain. Do you have concerns that the vulnerabilities could
impact readiness?
And do you have any specific needs to ensure the
acquisition and maintenance processes have a reliable supply
chain?
Secretary Del Toro. So, this is a problem not just for the
Department of the Navy but for the entire Department of
Defense. And we are working very closely with the Department of
Defense, particularly the Under Secretary for Acquisition and
Sustainment, and--to try to identify a greater number of supply
chain vendors that can provide the necessary commodities and
very specific equipment that is necessary, especially in the
area of our subcontracting force.
You know, we see a lot of the shortages, not just in the
prime vendors but, actually, in the subcontracting force.
And so, without going into details on our more highly
classified programs, there is a great amount of effort being
placed here to track exactly what those vulnerabilities are and
to see what we can do to actually try to expand the supply
chain in every possible way.
The Department of Defense is embracing our small business
program very aggressively across the country to try to include
a greater number of vendors to provide these necessary products
across the board. So, there is a lot of effort going on,
Congresswoman.
And we would be happy to provide you a brief with more
specifics on those.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you for that, Mr. Secretary.
There has been noted concerns with the Navy's cybersecurity
posture. It has been very clear to me in meetings that I have
been in that workforce challenges continue to be a limiting
factor in this space.
Do you find the pipeline for cyber force growth limited--
limiting in order for the Navy to meet and sustain USCYBERCOM's
[U.S. Cyber Command's] demands.
Secretary Del Toro. So, this is an area that is extremely
important to us, and we are putting a lot more attention to
this here this year than ever before. The pipeline is an issue,
of course. Cybersecurity jobs in the private sector are in high
demand, and so recruiting people into this field is
challenging. But I will give you an example of one thing that I
think we are doing very creatively, in our community college
program, for example, there is now a cyber track where our
young enlisted sailors can actually apply to and start to build
to become new cyber warriors, basically. So, we are trying to
be as creative as we can. And perhaps our former 10th Fleet
commander can address a few other issues.
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, we have, we have challenges just
like industry does, just like NSA [National Security Agency]
and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] do in terms of attracting
talent. What we found is we haven't been doing a satisfactory
job of managing that talent once, once they are in the Navy.
And so, some deep-dive efforts over the past couple of
months have uncovered some shortfalls in terms of our--in terms
of the way we are training people, the way that we are
preventing their skills from atrophying is another example.
Not all of these fixes require that we lather it with a lot
of money. Most of it is leadership and putting the right people
in the right place.
Mrs. Bice. Right.
Admiral Gilday. So----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 154.]
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Carl is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing the best
questions to be here at the end of this brief meeting.
Mr. Secretary, great to see you, as always, sir.
General, oorah!
Admiral, I got some questions for you real quick. We show a
lack of medical capability. And I am intrigued by the shallow
water, the shallow draft capabilities of dedicated medical
ships such as the EMS [Expeditionary Medical Ship].
How does the EMS capability fit into the warfighter and the
HADR [humanitarian assistance and disaster relief] needs?
And how can having a better and more agile medical ship
capability help our warfighters?
Admiral Gilday. I see the--I see that--that ship is an
opportunity. And so you are honestly limited only by your
imagination in terms of the missions that you can actually put
that vessel against.
So, one of the things that we are doing is investing in a
medical capability on two of those vessels, so, essentially, to
give us, to give us two additional hospital ships beyond Mercy
and Comfort.
So that is something that after the initial two we can take
a look at. We can see whether or not we should scale that
further, whether or not that is satisfactory. But I think it
allows us to close the capability gap rather quickly.
Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.
Admiral Gilday. Sure.
Mr. Carl. Also, my next question is on the USS Enterprise,
which was retired in 2012, decommissioned in 2017. And it has
sat in storage at Hampton Roads since then. What is the
schedule for the RFP [request for proposal] in order to
appropriately dispose of this vessel?
Secretary Del Toro. So, the RFP is actually being
developed. And final determinations have not yet been made with
regards to its--the approach. But it is currently being worked.
And you should see that, I think, within the next month or two
at the latest.
Mr. Carl. All right. Thank you, sir. We are hitting 100
percent here.
As many of my colleagues have discussed here, I would like
to add for the record that this shipbuilding plan is not
sufficient. And I do understand you started talking about
capabilities, how important that is. And I would love sometime
to get a briefing on that and expand my knowledge so I am not
just looking at numbers.
Anyway, it is not significant to meet our threat, and
especially in the Indo-Pacific.
Admiral, you originally spoke about a need for a 500-ship
Navy. How can the Navy possibly justify a shipbuilding plan
that not only does not meet the threats but falls short of what
the specified outline of the Navy's needs are? Why are we
making the fleet smaller rather than larger?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, so, the shipbuilding plan itself
doesn't truly capture those requirements in full. And the
reason--the reason the alternatives don't is because the
limiting factor besides funding is what the industrial base can
actually produce over time.
And so, one of the things we have been talking about with
the committee today is, potentially, as we offer industry a
clear set of headlights in terms of our demand signal, that we
actually see those improvements on the production line in
places like Bath, Maine, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, so that
we could actually produce more ships and actually put us in a
better place with respect to closing down on those
requirements.
Mr. Carl. Thank you, sir.
I watched a documentary last night on B-42s. B-42s they
would turn out one an hour. They built all that: the plants,
they drew the plans, they did everything in a 1-year period of
time, Henry Ford did. America has the capabilities to build
more. If there's a need, let's build them.
And I--and I call on you to let us know what you need to
defend this country, because that is all of our goals,
Republicans and Democrats, defend this country.
Mr. Chairman, I turn my time back over. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. And those are all the questions we
have for you, gentlemen.
Thank you very much for the hearing. Lots of challenges to
work together. But I think the plan you have put together is--
it gets us in the right direction. We need to work together to
figure out what the budget is ultimately going to be and how we
can cover these costs.
But I thank you very much for your work, your service, and
for your time today.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 11, 2022
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
May 11, 2022
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Admiral Gilday. During the hearing, I mentioned, ``within the past
month we have increased our pass rate in an initial course down in
Pensacola, Florida, from 40 to 50 percent to 80 percent by doing
remedial training. . .'' To amplify this with context, the Navy has not
yet experienced the 80% pass rate results due to the length of the
FORGE training pipeline, but is confident we will see improvement based
on the positive results achieved by the other services since they
implemented this process. The Marine Corps and Air Force have
demonstrated successful models upon which the Navy will capitalize.
Navy invested four qualified Interactive Operator (ION) instructors
down in Pensacola, FL (ION) to improve traditionally poor pass rates
and throughput of Sailors in Computer Network Operations Qualification
Course (CNOQC) and Foundational Operator Readiness Growth and
Enrichment (FORGE). The four ION instructors are teaching the Marine
Corps Cyber Operation Readiness Curriculum (MCCORC), an ION mentoring
course, which started in April 2022. Early mentorship and intervention
leverages service best practices to increase pass rates and throughput
in CNOQC and FORGE. During the hearing, I referred to finding
additional cyber operators that could have been better used in the
teams. To clarify, we found about 80 exploitation analysts (EA) that
were assigned to Navy billets not coded with the EA Navy Enlisted
Classifications (NEC). We have changed the Navy's policy for
distribution to ensure EAs are assigned to EA billets, with priority to
CMF. [See page 15.]
General Berger. The Marine Corps is developing Marines and Civilian
Marines with the right skill sets and matching their skills to duties
they desire and are suited to perform. In FY20, FY21 and FY22, the
Marine Corps spent $1.5M annually on recruiting, retention, and
relocation. We are retaining our high performers by leveraging multiple
retention tools, including: Cyber Excepted Service (CES) authorities,
Total Local Market Supplement pay tables, cash awards, leadership
development, education training and recognition. In particular, the use
of CES authorities decreased employee turnover by 40% between FY21 and
FY22. We are also recruiting individuals with critical skills by
identifying and infusing talent through academia and programs such as
National Security Agency's, United States Cyber Command's, and Marine
Forces Cyber Command's apprentice programs. On the uniformed side, we
have also developed strategic partnerships with the Naval Academy and
Naval Reserve Training Officer Programs to identify midshipman who meet
the eligibility criteria for the cyber community and bring them on as
interns for their summer training. In an effort to more effectively
balance a lengthy training pipeline with the length of a Marine's
enlistment, a Marine who is selected for the cyber military
occupational specialty, signs a five-year contract versus the typical
four-year contract. [See page 15.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Admiral Gilday. PEO (T) and PMA-265 concur with CNO comments with
no additional position/information suggested from NAVAIR. Recommend any
supplemental information/data be requested from N98 if needed on the
CNO response to HASC. BLK III SLM first aircraft induct is Q1 FY23.
First aircraft delivery is likely Q1 FY24. We should acknowledge and
expect a 15 month turn-around time (best case) for FY23 inducts. [See
page 21.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program (SIOP) continues to mature. With the tremendous
support received from Congress and this committee, the program is
advancing several initiatives across three lines of effort--dry dock
modernization, optimization, and capital equipment. In Fiscal Year
2022, the second increment of industrial modeling will commence, which
will inform project design and construction. Area Development Plans
will be completed at each public shipyard across the Future Years
Defense Program utilizing the industrial modeling output. Additionally,
funds will be utilized to begin project design for a Gerald R. Ford
Class aircraft carrier-capable dry dock at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard,
award the construction contract for Dry Dock 8 Saltwater Upgrades at
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, award several restoration and modernization
projects, and purchase capital equipment to replace aged elements to
revitalize maintenance shop capabilities. I am committed to keeping
Congress informed of the progress of this once-in-a-century
recapitalization of the four public shipyards, and will continue to
provide updates to our 5-Year Plan each year with the President's
Budget submission. [See page 26.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Secretary Del Toro. Our Security Cooperation (SC) tools build
coalition lethality, interoperability, and military advantage, and
bring value or Return on Investment to Department of the Navy (DON)
acquisition.
The DON develops partner capabilities through our tools of SC,
including Foreign Military Sales and Cooperative and Building
Partnership Capacity programs. Partner capability priorities reflect
Chief of Naval Operations, Global Combatant Commanders, and Navy
Component Commanders (NCC) guidance.
NCCs provide guidance formally through their Theater Campaign
Plans, which help identify areas of ``mutual interest'' and develop
combat capability and capacity of the coalition of U.S. forces, allies,
and partner nations, which in turn contribute towards formulation of
domestic acquisition strategy. [See page 27.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Admiral Gilday. All emergent mental health referrals (i.e., for
suicidal or homicidal patients) are seen and evaluated the same day.
Prior to the Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT)
activation, the wait time to see the ship's psychologist was
approximately four to six weeks for a new patient evaluation, and
approximately two to three weeks for a follow-up appointment. After the
arrival of the additional psychologist and licensed clinical social
worker, the ship's psychologist's wait time for a new patient
evaluation decreased to approximately three weeks, and to approximately
two weeks for a follow-up appointment. The Defense Health Agency
standard for referrals for specialty care services, which includes
behavioral health services, is 28 days. As a point of comparison, the
average wait time across all Navy Medical Forces Atlantic military
treatment facilities is 15.51 days (approximately 2 weeks), while the
average wait time across all Tricare network providers is 34.82 days
(approximately 4-5 weeks). Comparing times for only the Portsmouth
area, the average is 12.7 days (less than 2 weeks) at Naval Medical
Center Portsmouth, while the average in the local Tricare network is
34.9 days (approximately 4-5 weeks). [See page 36.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ
Admiral Gilday. On June 22, 2022 the DNS-H FOIA office responded to
the constituent and the response letter was sent via email. We have
attached this letter for reference as enclosure (1). [See page 38.]
[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 145.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS
Admiral Gilday. The total conference cost was $105,000. The
majority of the cost was from attendee travel and per-diem. 96
travelers out of 205 in attendance were on government orders for
travel. The event was held in a government leased facility.
NAVIFOR leadership is in the process of taking action on the key
takeaways to capitalize on what was learned from the event in order to
effectively drive DEI action and accountability across the IWC
Enterprise.
There were five key takeaways from the Summit:
First, organizations should develop a long-range training plan
incorporating as many inclusive learning events as possible, driving to
mitigate as many barriers to inclusion as possible.
Second, we still have a great deal to learn about DEI and how to
operationalize inclusion. Simple techniques to operationalize inclusion
were shared, these include: splitting teams in ``micro teams'' which
enhances the team's ability to generate different perspectives and
solutions, along with identifying the ``smallest executable step'' to
test new ideas quickly.
Third, retaining our talent is critical; the Navy and IWC need to
better understand why some people stay even though they face adversity.
Discussing career milestones were of utmost importance and are critical
points of inflection for our Officers, Sailors, and Civilian workforce;
the Summit afforded those to hear from participants of the Navy's
Career Intermission Program (CIP). CIP, as discussed by the guest
speakers, was successful in their experience, and allowed members to
``off-ramp'' temporarily to better address and handle personal issues.
Fourth, DEI is a complex problem that warrant all our combined
resources to get it right. As individuals, we learned we have the power
and charge to act on our own, however, we need to collaborate and
tackle DEI across the IWC and Enterprise to make it successful.
Finally, the Summit was a call to action. In the words of one of
our keynote speakers, we need to ``go active, not passive!'' [See
page 45.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
General Berger. As Representative Bergman may remember from his
days as the Commanding General, 4th Marine Air Wing (MAW), 4th MAW
participates regularly in the 2nd MAW and 3d MAW Frag Conferences for
scheduling aircraft support across the Marine Corps. The Frag
conferences result in 4th MAW flying in support of the Marine Corps,
supporting both Reserve and Active Component aviation requirements, at
a frequency that places their squadrons in an operational status that
far exceeds the normal 48 drill period and two week Annual Training. We
believe that in certain cases, the Marine Corps can improve both
logistical support and maintenance of both Reserve and Active squadrons
by incorporating the Reserve squadron into an Active aircraft type-
specific group.
The Reserve squadron will be co-located with the group
headquarters, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS), and Marine
Wing Support Squadron as well as other like aircraft squadrons on a
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) maximizing supportability. We are
conducting a proof of concept of Active/Reserve Component integration
by incorporating VMM-774 into Marine Aircraft Group-26, an active duty
group with all flying squadrons possessing only MV-22 Ospreys.
Access to MALS, simulators, and vast on site resources provided to
the Reserve squadron at a MCAS vice being a tenant on another Service's
base will likely improve readiness and streamline Naval Supply Systems
Command logistics nodes. The proof of concept is scheduled for FY23.
We are continuing to work the details for this proof of concept
with VMM-774 still in transition from Naval Station Norfolk to MCAS New
River. We can provide in progress reviews and a final assessment once
the proof of concept period is complete. [See page 42.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Admiral Gilday. Navy's Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 budget request
includes investments in critical efforts in several key areas
including: supplier development of capability and capacity, strategic
outsourcing of large scale fabrication and heavy manufacturing,
shipbuilder infrastructure, technology innovation to include additive
manufacturing, and government oversight of submarine quality and
material. With the help of Congress, and working with local, state, and
national organizations, we are continuing to identifying opportunities
to increase productive capacity, and improve efficiencies across the
shipbuilding workforce and in the supply chain. As opportunities are
identified, we will continue to incorporate those recommendations into
future budget requests. [See page 47.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA
Secretary Del Toro. There is a reduction in the number of VLS cells
and it's a risk reward decision. The Navy had to make a value decision
of what it's going to take to get these older platforms with less
capable combat systems forward versus what investments we need to make
that deliver a more capable, more lethal Navy in the future. This is
also in the context that the United States Navy fights from the seabed
to space; our submarines, our surface ships, and our aviation assets
all contribute to the fight in addition to those platforms hosting VLS
cells. The new era of strategic competition requires a modernized,
capable, global, forward, and multi-domain Navy. The National Defense
Strategy (NDS) underscores the need for the Department of Defense to
move away from systems that provide less capability and do not
significantly support our strategy and ability to win in a future
fight. In the Fiscal Year 2023 budget, the Navy prioritized promising
technologies that need to be fielded quickly and at-scale to be
operationally relevant in the coming years to ensure that Navy meets
Joint Force operational requirements, and made difficult choices to
divest of ships that do not meaningfully support warfighting
requirements.
Separately, we have various metrics for how the Navy is employed.
Underway and deployed were chosen as they provide U.S. government and
military leadership a snapshot of the U.S. Navy's ability to respond
for contingency operations that are reactive in nature. For budgetary
purposes, we utilize underway days and flight hours--data that pertains
to the spending of appropriations in a deliberate manner for the
generation of U.S. Navy readiness. [See page 52.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. BICE
Admiral Gilday. Yes, like the other services and industry we are
challenged funding sufficient capacity to meet and sustain our
cyberforce. We remain committed to recruiting, retaining, and educating
the best cyber workforce possible. Sailors are foundationally trained
in Navy schools and Civilians are trained through Commercial
Certification or by formal Education. At the tactical level, knowledge
gaps are supplemented through government and commercial training. A key
challenge is for training to keep pace with development. Navy has
engaged with DOD CIO to provide in-depth, accurate information
regarding cybersecurity work roles and the requirements to train and
qualify personnel. The DOD Cyber Excepted Service (CES) is a mission-
focused personnel program that supports the human capital lifecycle for
civilian employees engaged in or in support of a cyber-related mission.
CES is an enterprise wide approach for managing civilian cyber
professionals across the DOD, offering flexibilities and incentives in
recruitment, retention, and professional development. For the Cyber
Mission Force (CMF), the USCYBERCOM-defined training pipeline
throughput for all work roles and course availability are limiting
factors for completing the qualifications and accelerating Navy CMF
growth. Navy's Information Warfare Type Commander (NAVIFOR) is working
closely with Fleet Cyber Command and USCYBERCOM to expand and align
training opportunities to maximize throughput. [See page 61.]
______
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. Navy's principal focus on
this issue remains unchanged and increasing manning levels across the
surface fleet is a strategic objective for the Navy. We are using a
variety of Force Management tools to attack this issue, including:
Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay,
Sea Duty Incentive Pay, and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year
tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea
duty and curtailing shore duty tours).
We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to
filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative
ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the
Perform to Plan--Human Resources process to address a wide range of
issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to
close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the
Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set
of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will
replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary
incentives, non-monetary incentives, and early advancement
opportunities for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.
We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts
such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match
skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements.
These efforts, combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and
funding total ownership cost will ensure we have the Sailors to support
the Navy that the Nation needs.
Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and
improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy
HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning, and other enablers such as
Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to
recruiting, training, retention, and improved talent management.
Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully
and properly manned, with the right Sailor in the right place at the
right time with the right training. The number of Sailors on
operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have
10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017. [See
page 59.]
General Berger. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Secretary of the Navy. [See page 59.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCCLAIN
Secretary Del Toro. The Department of the Navy's (DON) Next
Generation Air Dominance effort remains on cost and on schedule. To
reduce risk, the F/A-XX program is leveraging proven technologies to
fill critical warfighting capability gaps. Iterative collaboration
between government and industry teams has resulted in mature vendor
concepts that balance advanced air dominance capabilities with long-
term affordability.
The Navy's projected Strike Fighter Shortfall (SFSF) did increase
since last year due to a reallocation of DON funding to priority
programs in PB23, however the DON has the capacity to meet all
operational and Combatant Commander requirements for training and
deployments.
The DON has two primary levers to meter Strike Fighter Inventory
Management (SFIM) moving forward. First, the DON is procuring new F-35C
aircraft to increase the capability and lethality of the Carrier Air
Wing (CVW). Second, the DON intends to maintain 4th generation capacity
though our F/A-18E/F Service Life Modification (SLM) program which
extends service life while inserting the same Block III capabilities of
new production aircraft. SLM Block III aircraft can be delivered for
approximately one third the cost of a new production F/A-18 Super
Hornet. Both of these levers have margin for adjustment in the future.
In order to pace current and emerging threats, new procurement
should focus on F-35C with Block 4 capabilities. The DON has requested
six additional F-35C aircraft in the Fiscal Year 2023 Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL) in order to achieve the most lethal and capable
CVW as soon as possible. As more F-35Cs enter the Fleet, the overall
requirement for F/A-18E/F aircraft will decrease while the combat
capability of the CVW will increase. [See page 54.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy's Red Hill Shaft and Aiea-Halawa wells
are currently offline. Bringing them back online is under discussion
with the state, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other
stakeholders, and the solution and timeline are still under
development.
For Red Hill Shaft, the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) issued
an Emergency Order with a directive to bring the facility back online
as a drinking water source. With a permitted capacity of about 4.7
million gallons per day, this is an important water source for the Navy
and water security for Oahu. The Navy is programming, planning, and
designing a military construction project to construct a drinking water
treatment facility to address any concerns of lingering contamination
of the source water at the Red Hill facility. HDOH's Safe Drinking
Water Branch will be a key partner in permitting the drinking water
treatment facility.
The Navy Aiea Halawa Shaft well was closed out of an abundance of
caution after groundwater contamination was confirmed at the Red Hill
Shaft. It will be reopened when it can be shown that pumping at this
location does not pose a drinking water quality risk at this location
or any other nearby wells (in particular, the Honolulu Board of Water
Supply's Halawa Shaft). All available lines of evidence will be
utilized in evaluating that risk, including water quality data from
existing monitoring wells and new monitoring wells being drilled to
characterize the extent of groundwater contamination and the
effectiveness of groundwater remediation efforts, results of
hydrogeological investigations, and installation of early-warning
``sentinel'' wells to detect any contamination possibly migrating
toward drinking water sources. The highest priority groundwater
monitoring wells are expected to be installed by the end of this
calendar year. [See page 56.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
Admiral Gilday. Modernization of Sea Based Strategic Deterrence
must include the COLUMBIA-Class, TRIDENT II D5 Life Extension 2
(D5LE2), and the nuclear warhead-W93/Mk7. Without D5LE2, insufficient
Strategic Missile assets exist to support the COLUMBIA-Class starting
with COLUMBIA hull #9. Additionally, D5LE2 modernizes the flight
vehicle to promote effectiveness in expected threat environments
throughout the life of the COLUMBIA-Class. Congressional support for
funding of D5LE2's requirements is critical and the 2022 Nuclear
Posture Review emphasized this. The W93/Mk7 program is critical to
maintaining the credibility of our strategic deterrent, specifically in
meeting STRATCOM's requirements to address emerging and future
anticipated threats. The W93/Mk7 program will improve the safety and
surety of our deployed nuclear stockpile as well as life-cycle
affordability. The W93/Mk7 program is particularly crucial because the
Mk7 aeroshell will be the reentry vehicle for the United Kingdom's
Replacement Warhead program. Without this aeroshell, the United Kingdom
will be unable to maintain their sovereign nuclear deterrent capability
since this will be the UK's sole nuclear warhead program, being
developed concurrently but independent of W93. The Navy works closely
with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to develop a
schedule for the W93/Mk7 program to meet STRATCOM requirements for
capabilities required to address emerging and future threats. Due to
infrastructure and labor force limitations, we are unable to accelerate
the W93/Mk7 program, even with accelerated funding, without displacing
other critical NNSA efforts. [See page 57.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 11, 2022
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of
the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written
testimony for today's event--meant to reflect the highest priorities of
the Navy--doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did
touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that ``there's a
team working on this.''
In the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into
the ``get well'' plan that was directed at Navy's cyber activities, and
I am not certain that a plan which aims to fix a supposedly urgent
problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously. Taken
all together, why should this committee believe the Navy is
prioritizing cyberspace operations?
Secretary Del Toro. With respect to Navy Cyber Mission Force (CMF)
``get well'' plan, I directed CMF Readiness into the Navy's Performance
to Plan Process (P2P). This process is chaired by the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations and has addressed some of our Navy's most challenging
readiness issues, such as fighter aircraft availability. It is a data-
driven process that derives the key factors for shortfalls in major
programs across the Navy. This process is making sure we identify
barriers and chokepoints so that as we move fast, we are deliberate in
identifying places that add the most value to getting trained and
qualified Sailors reporting to CMF on Day 1. In addition to this, we
have taken these immediate steps to improve our readiness:
Sending four Interactive On-Net (ION) operators to
Pensacola, FL to recruit ION talent immediately after ``A'' school and
to assess new talent and execute the Computer Network Aptitude Battery
test, a screening tool to match the most qualified Sailors to the right
training.
Adopting the Marine Corps Cyber Operations Readiness
Course preparatory training. Utilizing this course, USMC raised the
pass rate from 50% in the Remote Interactive Operator Training course
to 80% in FORGE. We expect to see similar results for Navy this year.
Identifying near-term resources to support USCYBERCOM
surge of FORGE courses to build more ION operators.
Funding Force Generation/Cyber Qualification Team (CQT)
classroom and IT space for continued Persistent Cyber Training
Environment content development and CQT training to deliver individual,
mission element, and team training at scale.
Making cyber a key evaluation area and priority as part
of our Navy's POM and Budget process. This has resulted in additional
resources for cyber readiness.
Finally, we are committed to partnering and working closely with
USCYBERCOM and the Department of the Navy Principal Cyber Advisor.
Mr. Langevin. I have been a big fan of the electromagnetic railgun
program for a very long time, and was very disappointed to see that the
Navy has opted to pause this program in FY23. This was an incredibly
promising technology, and I anticipate the Department will look back on
this decision with remorse. Why has the Navy paused the program, and
how do you intend to leverage what was learned throughout the life of
the program to inform other technological advances?
Secretary Del Toro. The DON has accomplished all S&T objectives for
Railgun launcher technologies including barrel life, energy storage,
pulsed-power rep-rate operation, firing of Hypervelocity Projectiles
(HVP), and demonstrating mega-amp current transfer for trainable
mounts. The DON paused further investment in Railgun due to platform
integration complexity, cost, and lack of a suitable Fire Control
Architecture (FCA) for Integrated Air & Missile Defense missions on
Navy surface combatants. The DON is putting Railgun ``on the shelf''
with a detailed technical data package and focusing S&T resources on
developing a low-cost extensible FCA that could support a variety of
precision kinetic interceptors, including HVP fired from 5" guns. A new
Innovative Naval Prototype commencing in FY23 will focus on the FCA.
If gun-based defense with HVPs and 5" guns is feasible and
effective in the future, the Navy may re-examine whether the higher
launch velocity of Railgun placed on future platforms would offer
compelling advantages for expanded battle space and defeat of stressing
maneuvering threats.
While developing the Railgun technologies, the DON worked with a
national consortium of military and Department of Energy laboratories,
as well as industry and academic partners. The team achieved
significant scientific advancements in a number of areas that will
benefit or lead to other technology applications. A few highlights
include:
Modeling and simulation of complex multi-physics
phenomena
Electrochemistry of metals under high dynamic pressure
Advanced thermal protection systems for projectiles
experiencing high aero-thermal heating
Novel techniques for refractory metal coatings
Compact pulsed power systems
Control systems with machine learning for enhanced real-
time diagnostics
Mega-ampere current transfer through flexible cables and
sliding contacts
Electromagnetic shielding from effects of high intensity
dynamic magnetic fields
Demonstration and certification of high energy density
lithium battery technologies on a Naval facility
Shock-resilient electronics at high launch acceleration
(>30 kG)
Projectile fired up to Mach 6 muzzle velocity
Mr. Langevin. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of
the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written
testimony for today's event--meant to reflect the highest priorities of
the Navy--doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did
touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that ``there's a
team working on this.''
In the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into
the ``get well'' plan that was directed at Navy's cyber activities, and
I am not certain that a plan which aims to fix a supposedly urgent
problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously. Taken
all together, why should this committee believe the Navy is
prioritizing cyberspace operations?
Admiral Gilday. With respect to Navy Cyber Mission Force (CMF)
``get well'' plan, I directed CMF Readiness into the Navy's Performance
to Plan Process (P2P). This process is chaired by the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations and has addressed some of our Navy's most challenging
readiness issues, such as fighter aircraft availability. It is a data-
driven process that derives the key factors for shortfalls in major
programs across the Navy. This process is making sure we identify
barriers and chokepoints so that as we move fast, we are deliberate in
identifying places that add the most value to getting trained and
qualified Sailors reporting to CMF on Day 1. In addition to this, we
have taken these immediate steps to improve our readiness:
1. Sending four Interactive Operators (ION) to Pensacola, FL to:
a. Recruit ION talent immediately after ``A'' school
b. Assess new talent and execute Computer Network Aptitude
Battery (CNAB) test, a screening tool to match the most qualified
Sailors to the right training.
c. Adopted Marine Corps Cyber Operations Readiness Course
(MCCORC) preparatory training. Utilizing this course, USMC raised the
pass rate from 50% in RIOT to 80% in FORGE. Expect similar results for
Navy this year.
2. Identify near term resources to support United States Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM) surge of FORGE courses to build more IONs.
3. Funding Force Generation/Cyber Qualification Team (CQT)
classroom and IT space for continued Persistent Cyber Training
Environment (PCTE) content development and CQT training to deliver
individual, mission element, and team training at scale.
4. Making cyber a key evaluation area and priority as part of our
Navy's Program Objective Memorandum and Budget process. This has
resulted in additional resources for cyber readiness. Finally, we are
committed to partnering and working closely with USCYBERCOM. In July we
will be hosting warfighter talks and will focus on cyberforce
readiness.
Mr. Langevin. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of
the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written
testimony for today's event--meant to reflect the highest priorities of
the Navy--doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did
touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that ``there's a
team working on this.''
In the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into
the ``get well'' plan that was directed at Navy's cyber activities, and
I am not certain that a plan which aims to fix a supposedly urgent
problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously. Taken
all together, why should this committee believe the Navy is
prioritizing cyberspace operations?
General Berger. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Secretary of the Navy.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. In the recently published update to Force Design 2030,
The Marine Corps listed 15 areas to prioritize for investments.
Artificial intelligence is listed twice; as number 8, ``Network
Modernization, to include artificial intelligence and cloud
technologies'' and number 15, ``Artificial Intelligence-enabled force
protection.''
What progress is the Marine Corps making in artificial intelligence
development? How are you educating officers and enlisted of all ranks
on the importance and usefulness of artificial intelligence?
General Berger. In order to gain, maintain and hold targets at risk
in contested communications environments, the Marine Corps, as the
stand-in force, must be able to sense and make sense of the operating
environment. Recent technological improvements in computing and
advances in AI development operations have increased applicability of
these tools and techniques to tactical environments. Given the
increasing volume of information available and necessary to make sense
of the environment, it is imperative that we use AI to triage incoming
data streams and maximize the effectiveness of our limited human
processing and analytic resources. To do this, we must establish
automated data pipelines that support deployment of AI models and data
processing both in the cloud and at the tactical edge. The
characteristics of cloud computing (on-demand self-service, broad
network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured
service) make it well suited to support AI efforts when compared to
legacy on-premises hosting alternatives which will not scale to support
emerging technologies. This infrastructure is needed to ensure the
transport and availability of data to the underlying machine learning
(ML) algorithms enabling AI. The Development Security Operations
capability will use modern software development practices to
continually modify, enhance, and secure the cloud-hosted data that is
being processed and feeding the AI/ML as well as the algorithms that
process the data. We are building capacity to organically develop
applications, ensuring we meet the Deputy Secretary of Defense's intent
to modernize DOD software, as ``the ability to securely and rapidly
deliver resilient software capability is a competitive advantage that
will define future conflicts.'' Our approach will ensure we can develop
progressive web applications to weave together data from disparate
sources, providing leaders data centricity with vital stores of
actionable information. Through our organic software development
capability, Commanders could develop or update algorithms at the speed
of need, allowing for process optimization, catalyzing efficiencies in
the kill chain, and increasing efficacy across every facet of their
command and control. Both the private sector and government Science &
Technology organizations are maturing ML models with targeting
relevance and could provide utility to the Marine Corps. Technology
transition is central to the Marine Corps' approach to generate rapid
effects, while continuing to partner with other DOD Services and
federal executive agencies.
Mr. Larsen. How do you plan to update Professional Military
Education at all ranks and MOS so Marines becomes familiar with Force
Design 2030 history and intent at all levels of warfare (tactical,
operational, and strategic)?
General Berger. Since its publication in March 2020, Force Design
(FD) 2030 implications have been incorporated and taught in both
officer and enlisted resident and non-resident Professional Military
Education (PME) courses. Marine Corps University (MCU) evaluates the
ability of our joint forces to understand the strategic environment and
think more critically about the challenges defined in FD2030 across PME
and throughout all programs. Course Content Review Boards are conducted
annually to ensure content is current, relevant, and consistent with
the appropriate PME. University-level Curriculum Review Boards are the
formal oversight mechanism to direct long-range strategic planning,
coordination, and approval of academic programs and to evaluate
academic curricula within the PME Continuum, ensuring adherence to
mandated PME requirements, the needs of the Marine Corps, and
applicable accreditation policies.
As of the Course Review Boards for Officers in 2020/2022 and
Enlisted in 2021, FD2030 elements have been areas of focus within MCU,
some examples include: curriculum adaptations that educate and train on
force design in the context of pacing threat challenges in contested
environments; incorporating an Expeditionary Warfare School Tactical
Decision Game on Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations/Littoral
Operations in a Contested Environment/local sea control, reinforcing
FD2030 concepts; Command and Staff College (CSC) students attend two
classified briefs and two addresses from the Commandant on FD2030; CSC
Distance Education Program students cover all aspects of FD2030 from
concepts to acquisition programs, experimentation, naval integration,
and pacing threats; School of Advanced Warfighting capstone exercise
allows students to explore cross-domain deterrence, escalation, and
contemporary warfighting, helping students visualize and describe how
force design shapes contemporary competition; Marine Corps War College
students cover FD2030 throughout the academic year, culminating with
the capstone Global Wargame 2025 which evaluates Force Design; and the
Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare provides numerous
educational opportunities to increase student familiarity with concepts
and implications of FD2030 through wargaming, the annual Innovation
Summit, and multimedia outreach.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. What is the total number of COVID-19 exemption
requests in the Navy? What is the number of religious exemption
requests? How many exemption requests have been approved? How many
religious exemption requests have been approved? How many are still
pending decision?
Admiral Gilday. The following table summarizes the Navy's COVID-19
vaccination exemptions as of May 9, 2022.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8852.076
.epsData in the table includes Active Component and Selected Reserves
(SELRES).
Mr. Lamborn. What is the total number of COVID-19 exemption
requests in the Marine Corps? What is the number of religious exemption
requests? How many exemption requests have been approved? How many
religious exemption requests have been approved? How many are still
pending decision?
General Berger. The Marine Corps tracks COVID-19 religious
accommodation exemption requests and appeals from the time the request
is submitted to Headquarters, Marine Corps. Exemptions under all other
reasons are tracked once approved. Medical exemption requests are
started by the member with a medical provider and commanders become
aware only if the medical provider determines that exemption is
appropriate. Administrative exemptions are temporary in nature and are
usually related to a Marine's temporary duty that makes him or her
unavailable for the first or second vaccination dose.
As of 27 May 2022:
HQMC has received 3,719 religious accommodation requests.
499 Marines have an approved exemption requests:
o 396 Temporary Administrative
o 81 Temporary Medical
o 22 Permanent Medical
7 religious accommodation requests have been approved.
27 religious accommodation requests are pending initial
decision and 1,093 are pending appeal decisions.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. The 10 LSDs that the Navy proposes to divest over
the FYDP have not hit the end of their initial 40-year expected service
life. Some have more than 10 years left in their lifecycle during the
year of divestment. The Navy notes that divestment is needed because
ships are in poor material condition and require significant resources
to continue to maintain and operate. Why are these ships in such poor
condition, and why weren't they maintained over their lifecycle?
Secretary Del Toro. Over the course of their lifecycle, these ships
were maintained. The Navy has multiple processes and organizations
across the enterprise to maintain the material readiness of the Fleet
including depot-level maintenance and modernization availabilities,
intermediate-level maintenance, and, most importantly, the hard work of
Sailors conducting preventive maintenance on these ships every day in
the Fleet. However, as with any ship approaching its expected service
life, it became increasingly costly to operate and maintain these
ships. In some cases, the high demand for these ships and increased
operations over their lifecycle contributed to a more rapid decline in
material condition.
Mr. Garamendi. The choices made during the acquisitions process
when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that
follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what
intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired.
Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been
consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private
expense in the past, resulting in ``reduced mission readiness and
surging sustainment costs'' in some instances. How is the service
improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service
balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the
acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy is improving how it acquires IP and
technical data/computer software by conveying early on in the contract
solicitation process and through increased attention during contract
negotiations with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), the Navy's
requirements for operations, maintenance, installation, and training
technical data/computer software, as well as long-term provisioning
needs for the platform. The Navy is utilizing tabletop exercises and
roundtable discussions with subject matter experts to bring
understanding prior to negotiations to provide insight beyond
historical IP barriers and introducing innovative ways to valuate and
acquire, or provide access to, technical data/computer software. The
Navy is ensuring access agreements have been made for some critical
sub-vendor data and is requesting detail specifications from the OEM in
order to allow second-source production of components without incurring
non-recurring engineering costs.
The Navy will balance the cost of procuring technical data/computer
software during the acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment
benefits by gaining an early understanding of the different types and
amounts of IP and technical data/computer software necessary to conduct
a vast majority of sustainment activities. Through implementation of
acquisition strategies and plans that clearly align to sustainment
activities in accordance with 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2464, and ensuring
consistent execution when contracting, the Navy will continue to
institute strong and innovative approaches to valuate and obtain, or
provide access to, IP and technical data/computer software necessary to
sustain or increase platform mission capability and readiness.
Mr. Garamendi. Over the FYDP, despite L-class ships entering the
fleet, divestments of LSDs (i.e., 10 over the FYDP) will drop the total
number of L-class ships to 24/25, well under the stated Marine Corps
requirement of 31. The Navy plans to only procure one LPD Flight II in
FY2023 and then complete procurement of the LPD Flight II line. How is
the Navy going to reach the L-class ship numbers listed in the
shipbuilding plan (i.e., 31 ships by FY30/31) if there are no more L-
class ships procured in the FYDP?
Admiral Gilday. Traditional L-class amphibious ships are globally
deployable, long-endurance ships focused on support to the Amphibious
Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Light Amphibious Warship
(LAW) will provide maneuver, mobility and sustainment to the Marine
Littoral Regiment (MLR). Both types of ships are required to support
the National Defense Strategy.
The Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for
Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, delivered to the
Congress in April 2022, reflects procurement of both traditional L-
class ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD) as well as the Light Amphibious Warship
(LAW) that achieves an inventory of 31 ships in FY31, consisting of 26
traditional amphibious ships and five LAW.
The Marine Corps' stated requirement for 31 amphibious ships refers
to the traditional L-class ships in the Amphibious Readiness Groups
(ARG) and does not include the LAW. The forthcoming Amphibious Fleet
Requirement Study will set the requirement for traditional amphibious
ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD) and inform POM24 force structure decisions.
Mr. Garamendi. The Navy has planned to only procure one LPD Flight
II in FY2023 and then complete procurement of the LPD Flight II line.
The Navy states it will begin assessment of a next-generation
amphibious ship (i.e., LPD(X)) in FY23. How long will this assessment
take? If there are delays to procuring a next-generation amphibious
ship, what is the risk to maintaining the industrial base because of a
potential gap in amphibious ships being built?
Admiral Gilday. In FY2023, the Navy will begin a one-year
Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) to determine the overarching
requirements for the next amphibious ship.
The Navy recognizes the importance of workload stability for our
nation's shipbuilders and their supply chains. The Navy further
recognizes the need to involve our shipbuilders and industry partners
early and often in both the transition to and design of new ship
classes--and will apply these lessons learned as we develop the
requirements and acquisition plans for the follow-on class to LPD
Flight II.
The Navy is committed to making every effort to balance
affordability and capability with industrial base stability and will
reflect these commitments in future shipbuilding plans and budget
submissions.
Mr. Garamendi. The 10 LSDs that the Navy proposes to divest over
the FYDP have not hit the end of their initial 40-year expected service
life. Some have more than 10 years left in their lifecycle during the
year of divestment. The Navy notes that divestment is needed because
ships are in poor material condition and require significant resources
to continue to maintain and operate. Why are these ships in such poor
condition, and why weren't they maintained over their lifecycle?
Admiral Gilday. Over the course of their lifecycle, these ships
were maintained. The Navy has multiple processes and organizations
across the enterprise to maintain the material readiness of the Fleet
including depot-level maintenance and modernization availabilities,
intermediate-level maintenance, and most importantly, the hard work of
Sailors conducting preventive maintenance on these ships every day in
the Fleet. However, as with any ship approaching its expected service
life, it became increasingly costly to operate and maintain these
ships. In some cases, the high demand for these ships and increased
operations over their lifecycle contributed to a more rapid decline in
material condition.
Mr. Garamendi. The choices made during the acquisitions process
when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that
follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what
intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired.
Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been
consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private
expense in the past, resulting in ``reduced mission readiness and
surging sustainment costs'' in some instances. How is the service
improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service
balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the
acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?
Admiral Gilday. Answered by SECNAV.
Mr. Garamendi. The choices made during the acquisitions process
when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that
follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what
intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired.
Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been
consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private
expense in the past, resulting in ``reduced mission readiness and
surging sustainment costs'' in some instances. How is the service
improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service
balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the
acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?
General Berger. The Marine Corps acquisition enterprise has been
very deliberate in its approach to the procurement of technical data
for precisely the reasons stated in the question. The decision to
procure intellectual property associated with an acquisition program is
arrived at on a case by case basis, however, the factors that go into
that decision are largely consistent from program to program. The
program manager must first consider the appropriate rights of the
government based on the level of government funded development which is
often contentious between the Government and the vendor. This will set
the conditions for what data rights the Government must pay for and
allow for the pricing of these rights. The Marine Corps has been very
successful recently asserting the Government's right to key technical
data, even when it required court action as was the case with the
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement program. More recently the program
manager for the Advanced Combat Vehicle utilized contractual withholds
to ensure the delivery of critical provisioning data necessary to
support sustainment of that important platform.
Basic engineering data for provisioning, the data required to allow
Defense Logistics Agency to stock the parts, is nearly always included
as a deliverable in our larger programs. While the data required to
repair the end item organically is also typically procured, the data to
organically repair sub-components is determined through a deliberate
Level of Repair Analysis, which drives the program's Product Support
Strategy. This analysis takes into account a variety of factors
including the complexity of the repair action vs. the skill level of
the Military Occupational Specialty performing the maintenance action
at each echelon of maintenance (organizational, intermediate or depot),
any special purpose tools and/or test equipment, maintenance facility
requirements, repair cycle time, long lead time parts, the end item's
anticipated service life, the cost of the repair part, the Government
owned rights of the associated technical data, and the operational
value of being able to make the repairs in the field. As we keep
equipment in the inventory for longer and longer periods of time,
Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Materiel Shortages and
obsolescence becomes a greater consideration, and the lack of component
level technical data can become an impediment to the procurement of
repair parts. However, it is unlikely that procurement of a complete
data package, at a considerable cost, at the time of end item
procurement, would resolve this issue as the designs of our end items
continue to evolve through their lifecycles due to changing
requirements, evolving threats and capability enhancements. Finally, we
will continue to aggressively acquire the rights that the Government is
entitled to and where and when appropriate purchase additional data
rights when the long term sustainment benefits justify the investment.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Ms. Speier. Secretary Del Toro, the Navy's budget documents
indicate that the Navy is pursing public-private partnerships to expand
child care for sailors in Norfolk. Would you elaborate on the Navy's
plans for public-private partnerships for child care? How many children
could potentially be served? And is the Navy considering using this
approach in other regions with long wait lists, such as Hawaii, San
Diego, and the Puget Sound region?
Secretary Del Toro. The Navy had the first leased community
military childcare facility with the Crown Child Development Center, in
San Diego. The lease agreement with city of Coronado, signed in June
2020, is funded by Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC). This
innovative approach was successful because it lined up Navy
requirements with a former elementary school. Extension of the Coronado
lease is under review with the potential to expand by an additional 60
spaces in FY23. This is an example of a successful partnership that the
Navy is looking to replicate in other areas.
The Navy is continuing to seek partners in locations to include the
Norfolk/Hampton Roads region, the Jacksonville/Mayport area, Naval Base
Kitsap, and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi. Without knowing the scope
of the partnership the Navy cannot estimate how many children could be
served.
Navy CYP continues to explore all options to expand childcare
offerings to include working with the Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy) on their
initiatives.
Ms. Speier. Secretary Del Toro, in May 2020, GAO published report
GAO-20-61, which recommended that ``The Secretary of the Navy should
develop a plan, with clearly defined goals, performance measures, and
timeframes, to guide and monitor the Navy's female active-duty service
member recruitment and retention efforts. (Recommendation 3).'' DOD
concurred with this recommendation, and GAO says that the Navy
estimated that it would complete this plan by December 2021. However,
the GAO recommendation is still open because the plan has not yet been
completed.
When does the Department of the Navy expect to complete the plan
requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020 report on recruitment
and retention of female service members?
What progress has the Navy Department made so far in addressing
this recommendation?
What actions has the Navy taken, and what actions is the Navy
planning to take, to improve recruitment and retention of female
service members?
Secretary Del Toro. 1. When does the Department of the Navy expect
to complete the plan requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020
report on recruitment and retention of female service members?
The Navy's plan, requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020
report on recruitment and retention of female service members, was
completed in December 2021. Implementation of the plan is ongoing,
guided by the Chief of Naval Operations' ``CNO NAVPLAN'', released 11
January 2021, and executed by release of the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations' ``Navigation Implementation Plan Framework''.
2. What progress has the Navy Department made so far in addressing
this recommendation?
The Navy has established the Office of Women's Policy; monitored
representation in Navy Personnel Command staff; used diversity
statistics in promotion board Record of Proceedings; tracked
demographics of board membership and expanded post-board statistics to
ensure Navy has a standardized, equitable, and transparent promotion
selection process; partnered with affinity groups, specifically the Sea
Services Leadership Association to host the Joint Women's Leadership
Symposium that targets the recruitment and retention of women in the
Navy; and conducted Navy Community Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
conferences that addressed female retention and recruitment efforts.
Recent examples include: NAVIFOR, CNAF, and CNSF DEI Conferences. After
action reports based on attendee feedback informed actions taken/policy
regarding female recruitment and retention, mentoring, and barrier
analysis.
3. What actions has the Navy taken, and what actions is the Navy
planning to take, to improve recruitment and retention of female
service members?
Starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, the Navy increased the
aspirational goal from 25% to 30% for female accessions. This would
increase female accessions by 1,500 for FY23. We currently have 20.5%
women serving in both the active and Reserve components, an increase of
1% since release of GAO report. We are working to complete female
officer and enlisted submarine integration for the SSBN platforms. At
the end of FY 2021, 23 crews were integrated with officers and 10 crews
with enlisted. Naval Special Warfare continues to synchronize
recruiting and accession efforts with Commander, Navy Recruiting
Command (CNRC), Recruit Training Command (RTC), and Naval Service
Training Command (NSTC). All required NSW facility and supply
preparation requirements have been met and Commander, Naval Special
Warfare Center (COMNAVSPECWARCEN), is prepared for the arrival of
female Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) and Special Warfare Combatant-craft
Crewman (SWCC) candidates. As of January 2021, NSW maintains four
permanent billets for Women in Special Operations Forces (WISOF) cadre
and the cadre are integrated into all phases of training and selections
to normalize female presence, participation, and contributions,
including SEAL Officer Assessment and Selections (SOAS). In 2021, the
NSW Force Integration Officer was added to the SOAS cadre due to the
need for additional female cadre presence and support.
Ms. Speier. ADM Gilday, GAO has found that the surface fleet is
undermanned by about 15%, and we understand that about 5,000 sea
billets in the forward-deployed fleet are unfilled, and in addition to
these issues, sometimes billets that are filled have the improper fit.
How will the Navy's proposed plan to decommission ships affect
undermanning? Will the crews from the decommissioned ships be
reallocated to remaining ships in the fleet to improve fit and fill? If
Congress allows the Navy to proceed with its decommissioning proposal,
by how much will manning improve in the next two years? What other
actions is the Navy taking to address undermanning and improper fit?
Admiral Gilday. Personnel onboard ships proposed to decommission
will be re-billeted to meet their individual sea/shore rotation
requirements as well as Fleet Readiness needs
Navy's principal focus on this issue remains unchanged and
increasing manning levels across the surface fleet is a strategic
objective for the Navy. We are using a variety of Force Management
tools to attack this issue, including:
Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay,
Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP) and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year
tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea
duty and curtailing shore duty tours).
We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to
filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative
ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the
Perform to Plan--Human Resources process to address a wide range of
issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to
close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the
Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set
of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will
replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary
incentives, non-monetary incentives and early advancement opportunities
for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.
We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts
such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match
skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements.
These efforts--combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and
funding total ownership cost will ensure we have the Sailors to support
the Navy the Nation needs.
Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and
improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy
HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning and other enablers such as
Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to
recruiting, training, retention and improved talent management.
Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully
and properly manned, with the right Sailor, in the right place, at the
right time, with the right training. The number of Sailors on
operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have
10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017.
Ms. Speier. ADM Gilday, the Army has fully implemented a Commander
Assessment Program to improve the selection process for battalion and
brigade commanders, using a suite of assessments including, most
importantly, a behavioral interview and a survey of peers and
subordinates about leadership behaviors. I am encouraged that Naval
Special Warfare has also fully implemented a similar program for
selecting commanders, and the Commandant has stated his intention to
implement a similar commander assessment program across the Marine
Corps. I understand that the U.S. Navy surface warfare and submarine
communities are conducting pilots to test using a more thorough
assessment before selecting commanders. Given repeated news about ship
COs being relieved for climate issues and toxic leadership, it seems to
me that a more thorough command selection process should be a high
priority for the Navy.
What have been the results so far of the Navy's pilots of a
commander assessment program?
Do you agree that the commander selection process in the Navy must
be improved, and how do you intend to improve commander selection?
Would you commit to implementing an approach similar to the Army's
commander assessment program across the entire Navy, including use of
surveys of peers and subordinates about leadership behaviors, and
accelerating implementation of such a program?
Admiral Gilday. Navy is committed to implementing an approach
similar to the Army's Commander Assessment Program (CAP). The Navy
Leadership Assessment Program (NLAP) is this program and is currently
in the testing and development phases across the Navy--within Type
Commands (TYCOM) (e.g. Aviation, Surface, Submarines, and Naval Special
Warfare) and other officer communities. Assessment and selection
programs have proven beneficial in the Department of Defense Special
Operations communities as well as the civilian corporate sector for
decades. Assessment and selection programs save costs, increase
retention, decrease incidents of misconduct, and increase productivity
with data-driven decision making using valid and reliable assessments.
NLAP is intended to augment the existing command selection process to
inform leadership decision making and drive talent management. The
continued development of NLAP will increase the Navy's likelihood of
placing those who possess the right attributes for essential command
positions and passing on those who are less suited (e.g., toxic, weak,
ineffective officers and leaders). This will lead to better command
environments and a better Navy culture as a whole.
Navy has completed pilots with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
and Commander, Naval Submarine Force (SUBFOR). Navy Personnel Command's
Operational Psychologist was the primary consultant in the development
of Navy Special Warfare's (NSW) NLAP during the initial pilots in early
2021 and has provided ongoing consultation as the program reaches
maturity. Additional pilots are planned for this summer with Commander,
Naval Surface Force (SURFOR), Commander, Naval Air Forces (AIRFOR), the
Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) community, and the Human Resources (HR)
community. Each pilot will include cognitive and non-cognitive
assessments, interviews by trained operational psychologists, and a
formal interview panel chaired by TYCOM and community commanders/
leaders. NSW and SUBFOR have developed, and are validating, peer and
subordinate surveys that will be piloted in each TYCOM and officer
community NLAP pilot. Lessons learned from each pilot iteration enable
refinement of the assessment process and validate the utility of the
program. The Navy is moving forward at pace with NLAP.
Ms. Speier. ADM Gilday, during the hearing it was made clear that
the Navy does not have the cyber force that it needs. I understand that
the Navy is short of active-duty cyber officers in the grades of O-4 to
O-6. Yet, I was briefed earlier this year that the Navy had not
utilized the lateral-entry constructive credit authority to commission
any active-duty cyber officers. This authority, created by Sec. 502 of
the FY19 NDAA, was created to help the services address this problem by
accessing experienced technical talent, including cybersecurity
experts, from the private sector and commissioning them at an advanced
rank. The Army has aggressively used these authorities to fill active-
duty cyber security needs, and I understand that the Air Force is
beginning to establish a direct commissioning program for active-duty
cyber officers using this authority.
Why has the Navy failed to use the Sec. 502 authority to fill its
active-duty cyber officer gaps, and does the Navy plan to begin using
this authority, and what is the Navy's goal for number of accessions
under this authority? If not, does the Navy face barriers to using this
authority that require congressional action to correct, and if so,
please indicate what the Navy needs from Congress to successfully use
this authority to meet the Navy's cybersecurity needs.
Admiral Gilday. The Secretary of the Navy expanded the use of
constructive service credit for active component cyber warfare
engineers (CWE) and engineering duty officers (EDO).
For most officer communities, initial specialty training and
qualifications earned in the junior officer grades offset the need and
desire to direct commission individuals to ranks other than ensign. The
Navy desires to use constructive service credit for CWEs and EDOs, but
did not find individuals in fiscal year 2021 with advanced training,
experience, and education that desire to join the Navy and meet
military service-entry requirements.
While there is no specified constructive credit accession quota,
there is no limit, percentage wise, for accessions to receive
constructive credit if their education/experience meets all the
requirements for constructive service credit.
Navy has no barriers utilizing constructive service credit when a
candidate meets all requirements; therefore no Congressional action is
requested.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Is Navy and/or Marine Corps exploring directed energy
counter-UAS solutions to include lasers and high power microwave
technology?
Secretary Del Toro. Directed Energy (DE) weapons include both High
Energy Lasers (HEL) and High Power Microwaves (HPM) and offer a number
of compelling attributes for military missions, including precision
engagement and deep magazine. The Navy's primary interest is to use DE
to enhance Area and Terminal Defense against Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles
(ASCM) and enable more effective use of conventional weapons for both
ship defense and offensive strike, as well as providing cost-effective
solutions to swarm UAV and FAC-FIAC attack. In addition, both the Navy
and Marine Corps are evaluating the potential utility of DE for
counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS).
The Navy has been maturing laser technologies while conducting
rapid prototyping to accelerate DE fleet integration and operational
experimentation, with 9 systems fielded on ships by 2023. Example Navy
laser efforts with c-UAS implications include:
Mk 5 Mod 0 High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-
dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) and Solid State Laser--Technology
Maturation (SSL-TM) are high power lasers that can defeat unmanned
aerial systems and counter fast-attack surface craft. SSL-TM was
deployed on USS PORTLAND in 2021/2022 and HELIOS is being installed on
USS PREBLE for deployment in 2023.
AN/SEQ-4 Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN) is a
low power laser to dazzle threat UAS sensors. Eight ODIN units are
being installed and deployed on DDG51 combatants by 2023 to address
urgent operational needs in 5th and 7th fleet.
The Layered Laser Defense (LLD) project was a Navy
partnership with Lockheed Martin which demonstrated tracking of UAS
targets and defeat of a subsonic target drone (representing an ASCM
threat) at the High Energy Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF) at White
Sands Missile Range in February 2022.
For HPM, the focus of Navy and Marine Corps applications is for
semi-fixed or mobile c-UAS capability that is scalable from tactical
vehicles to various ship classes, low-cost, and effective across a wide
variety of potential UAS threats. ONR is pursuing a number of
technology approaches, including systems based on conventional vacuum
tubes as well as solid-state transmitters that offer enhanced frequency
agility.
Mr. Scott. Are you committed to opening the new National Museum of
the U.S. Navy in the vicinity of the Washington Navy Yard and
accessible to the general public in time for the U.S. Navy's 250th
birthday on October 13, 2025?
Secretary Del Toro. Per 10 U.S.C. Sec. 8617, the Department of the
Navy is in the process of entering into an agreement with the National
Museum Development Foundation (NMDF) to support the development,
design, construction, renovation, or operation of a multipurpose museum
campus to house the National Museum of the United States Navy. Subject
to compliance with environmental requirements, the Navy's goal is to
hold a major milestone ribbon cutting and groundbreaking event for
Phase 1 of the project on the Navy's Birthday in 2025.
Mr. Scott. Rear Admiral Kiril Mihaylov, Commander of the Bulgarian
Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings, ``The completely
transformed security situation in the Black Sea region presents new
tasks for the Bulgarian Navy that require additional capabilities.'' Is
the United States Navy prepared to help the Bulgarian Navy with
developing new naval capabilities?
Admiral Gilday. The United States Navy is fully prepared to work
with the Bulgarian Navy in developing new naval capabilities. Our Navy
team is actively engaged with the Bulgarian Navy--a recent example
being a 6-10 June 2022 NAVEUR-led assistance visit. Efforts include
development of enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness and Undersea
Awareness, as well as the refinement of additional capabilities
requested by the Bulgarian Navy. Capabilities such as integrated
Maritime Domain Awareness in the Black Sea lie squarely in our national
interests. In order to develop this Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
capability, we need sustained (i.e., reliable and programmable) and
sufficient (i.e., adequate to address the full spectrum of MDA)
security cooperation funding with tightly aligned Title 10 and Title 22
funds.
Mr. Scott. Captain Giedrius Premeneckas, Commander-in-Chief,
Lithuanian Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings,
``Fulfilling the maritime state's vital interests and being an equal
NATO partner are the priorities of today to face future challenges and
threats.'' What is the United States Navy doing to help the Lithuanian
Navy face future challenges and threats?
Admiral Gilday. We have a significant security cooperation effort
with the Lithuanian Navy. Its shared border with Kaliningrad,
highlights the necessity that our maritime security efforts in
Lithuania are part of a regional approach. Our significant U.S. Navy
presence and a number of programs are designed to support the
development of increased Lithuanian Navy capability and
interoperability with allies and partners. These include Significant
Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCIs) to develop greater MDA,
modernize their Mine Counter Measures Capability (MCM) and increase
interoperability. We are aggressively pursuing operations, activities
and investments to build a Navy capable of contributing to a regional
approach that will not only counter Russian malign activity but
increase long term regional security. In order to be successful, we
need sustained (i.e., reliable and programmable) and sufficient (i.e.,
adequate to address the full spectrum of MDA) security cooperation
funding with tightly aligned Title 10 (i.e., SSCI) and Title 22 funds.
Mr. Scott. Rear Admiral Rune Andersen, Chief of the Royal Norwegian
Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings,'' . . . we need to
build a bridge to the future, and this includes figuring out the risks
and opportunities offered by emerging and potentially disruptive
technologies.'' What plans does the U.S. Navy have to cooperate with
the Royal Norwegian Navy on figuring out the risks and opportunities
offered by emerging and potentially disruptive technologies?
Admiral Gilday. Norway, the United States and 11 other countries
are signatories of the Anti-Submarine Warfare London Technology Bridge
Initiative to develop a deployable Anti-Submarine Warfare Barrier. This
initiative will kick off this summer and drive specific challenges to
industry. Additionally, Norway is a participating member in the Office
of Naval Research led program for International Cooperative Engagement
Program for Polar Research. This program includes research areas such
as environmental monitoring, communications, navigation and ice
hardening.
Mr. Scott. 2022 marks the 500th anniversary of the Royal Swedish
Navy. What plans does the U.S. Navy to commemorate this historic
anniversary of the Royal Swedish Navy?
Admiral Gilday. U.S. Navy commemoration of the 500th Anniversary of
the Swedish Navy included a port visit by four warships and the
participation of the 6th FLEET Commander Vice Admiral Gene Black in the
ceremony marking the event. All four ships then participated in
Exercise BALTOPS, along with ships from the Swedish Navy and other NATO
and partner nations. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff hosted the Swedish Minister of Defense aboard USS KEARSARGE in
port Stockholm.
Mr. Scott. Commander Jihoon Yu, Republic of Korea Navy, and Erik
French, wrote an article in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings entitled,
``The U.S.-ROK Alliance as an Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnership:
Traditionally land-based, the U.S.-ROK partnership should adopt a
maritime focus for the modern era.'' According to the authors, ``A
larger naval presence led by a higher-ranking U.S. naval commander
would strengthen the relationship between the two navies.'' Would
permanently homeporting several U.S. surface combatants at the ROK
naval base in Jeju enhance ties between the ROK Navy and the U.S. Navy?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is constantly assessing its force posture
in regards to handling future security threats. Our current force
posture in Northeast Asia provides the U.S. sufficient ability to
respond to contingencies while sustaining a forward-deployed and ready
naval force. There are presently no plans to permanently homeport any
U.S. Navy surface combatants in the ROK naval base in Jeju or any
changes to the USN command structure in ROK. Annual reviews of USN
force structure in company with USINDOPACOM posture reviews allows us
to ensure our current laydown is tailored for today's security
challenges.
Mr. Scott. Will the ROK Navy and the U.S. Navy conduct naval
exercises farther from ROK shores, working alongside one another in
blue-water environments along SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and South China
Sea? Moreover, will these exercises be focused on an expanding range of
activities, beginning with simple passing-and-maneuver exercises and
growing to encompass underway replenishment, interdiction,
antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and surface warfare?
Admiral Gilday. COMPACFLT intends to support the ROK Navy in
expanding its operations throughout the USINDOPACOM AOR and encourages
it to continue expanding its participation in naval exercises farther
from ROK shores in support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. COMPACFLT
also encourages the ROK Navy, under its Look South policy, to join in
exercises or operations in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea; and we
hope this will be realized in the coming year. In 2022, COMPACFLT has
already been able to obtain ROK Navy participation in at least 5
exercises, occurring outside of the Korean Peninsula.
Mr. Scott. Is the Navy using the right processes, standards, and
policies to build and deploy an unmanned fleet?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy continues to drive the advancement of
unmanned systems into the fleet architectures for today and the future.
We remain committed to documenting, developing, and iterating the
processes, standards, and policies based on our campaign of learning
devoted to understanding the systems of systems approaches necessary to
field new and emerging capabilities into robust fleet assets.
Our ongoing efforts in the development of Unmanned Maritime
Autonomy Architecture (UMAA), Rapid Autonomy Integration Labs (RAIL),
as well as U.S. and NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG) all
support the balance of rigor and flexibility needed to advance unmanned
systems (platforms and software) at scale and pace. The development of
these architectures, standards, and processes continue to leverage
industry partners at all stages to ensure we understand the needs of
all our stakeholders from the fleet to our industry partners.
Mr. Scott. What concerns does Industry have with the Navy's ABS
certification and MOSA for U.S. Shipbuilding?
Admiral Gilday. Industry is concerned about both the draft status
of the ABS certification process and the level of effort required to
achieve the certification. Industry is currently engaging with the Navy
and ABS to initiate the certification process for their concept designs
to begin to mitigate those concerns and mature the process.
The Navy is primarily using a Modular Open Systems Approach for the
development of the autonomy software across platforms using Unmanned
Maritime Autonomy Architecture (UMAA) standards. Industry is heavily
involved in the development of the UMAA standard and the integration/
testing across U.S. Industry sees the value in an open architecture
which allows parallel development of severable modules such that no
single vendor/capability constrains the advancement of other modules by
other industry partners.
Mr. Scott. What feedback can industry provide the Navy's request
for owning the interfaces, data rights, and the highly reliable/
sustainable systems?
Admiral Gilday. For unmanned surface and undersea systems, the Navy
is pursuing a government-owned autonomy software with applicable
government-purpose data rights for critical interfaces to support
validation of cybersecurity requirements, reduce overall programmatic
and acquisition expenditures, increase the pool of potential software
vendors outside traditional Department of Defense contractors, and
increase the rate at which software can be reused and redeployed across
a portfolio of unmanned maritime vehicles. This approach has been
successfully adopted and accepted in other Navy advanced technology
areas, for example, in both surface ship combat systems (AEGIS Weapon
System and Ship Self-Defense System) and for Submarine Warfare
Federated Tactical Systems. The Navy remains open to hearing and
understanding industry's perspective and will continue to collaborate
with industry to strike the right balance in government/industry data
and configuration ownership.
Mr. Scott. Should industry and the government look at different
development, test, and evaluation business models for autonomy?
Admiral Gilday. The government has been pursuing a government-owned
autonomy software baseline that supports the development, test, and
evaluation of unmanned maritime vehicles. In the scope of this work,
the government and industry are working together to support standards
development for unmanned ships via the Unmanned Maritime Autonomy
Architecture (UMAA). Based off industry feedback, the UMAA Standards
Board has divided interface capability requirements into a stable set
of core services and those services which are experimental in nature.
The set of core services address foundational elements for autonomous
vessel mission accomplishment while the experimental services require
additional testing, feedback, and validation from industry and
government partners before transitioning into the set of core services.
The industry and government collaboration on this shared effort has
been critical for the overall success of unmanned maritime vehicles to
date, and the Navy continues to explore further models that can satisfy
all stakeholder's interests in the future.
Mr. Scott. Does NAVSEA have the necessary engineering and technical
depth to evaluate and build these new unmanned ships?
Admiral Gilday. Yes--the Navy has core expertise in the areas of
shipbuilding, program management, and vehicle systems engineering.
However, the Navy is leveraging expertise across industry, academia,
and other government to evaluate and build new unmanned ships. A
collaborative approach is critical for developing the standards and
state-of-the-art systems required to field unmanned ships.
Mr. Scott. Are versatile, robotic submarines a potential game-
changer in the Western Pacific?
Admiral Gilday. In order for the United States Navy to retain our
strategic maritime advantage, we must increase our capabilities to
include faster decision making, tactical reach and endurance while
minimizing risk to our personnel. The Navy recognizes that unmanned
systems, autonomy and artificial intelligence play a key part in future
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) for all phases of military
operations. As outlined in the Unmanned Campaign Framework, the Navy
will continue to develop and expand its Fleet of unmanned vehicles to
deliver affordable, scalable, lethal and connected capabilities.
Specifically, in the undersea domain, unmanned undersea vehicles
(UUVs) serve as versatile autonomous platforms, operating in a
dispersed manner and offering the flexibility the evolving threat
environment demands. UUVs will go farther, deeper and endure longer in
extremely harsh conditions in order to deter and deliver lethal and
non-lethal effects. A hybrid fleet of manned/unmanned capabilities is
necessary to execute the full range of undersea operations to both meet
emerging security concerns, and provide persistent presence ensuring
undersea dominance in our Future Fleet.
Mr. Scott. what can be done to expedite the deployment of an
unmanned fleet?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy has generated a cross-functional team
(Unmanned Task Force) charged with identifying and pressing through
barriers, solving near-term operational problems, and supporting the
future hybrid force in concert with the Operational, Acquisition, and
Research enterprises.
The current approach includes an aggressive campaign of learning
with a focus on rapid and risk-worthy experimentation, as well as
driving down limiting factors in order to field our future unmanned
capabilities. A risk-appropriate approach to fielding small and
disruptive systems today enables us to take an evolutionary approach to
develop and scale the major investments of the hybrid fleet of
tomorrow.
We, as a nation, will need to continue to execute the campaign of
learning as a priority. We must remain dedicated to rigorous systems
engineering efforts, grow our data and model based systems engineering
capabilities, prove mature technology in land based testing
environments, mature standards and policies in partnership with
industry, demonstrate responsible fiscal agility, and experiment in
forward operational environments with real time feedback. With a
deliberate approach, we will expedite unmanned capabilities today and
in the future.
Mr. Scott. How would you assess the ability of U.S. maritime
vessels, from a destroyer to a carrier, to defend against Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) overflight and/or attacks? In which AORs have
these threats been most prevalent on deployment?
Admiral Gilday. The U.S. Navy has employed systems to find, fix,
track, and aid in the assessment of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to
determine the classification and identification of potential threats.
Once a threat determination is made, depending on the class of ship,
countermeasures can be employed to deny or defeat the UAS threat as
appropriate. The Navy's operational approach to countering UAS at sea
is to bin U.S. vessels by capability depending on their mission and
operating area.
While most threats of weaponized UAS are in the Central and Indo-
Pacific Combatant Command areas of operation, UAS technology is
prevalent on a global scale. For state actors with significant UAS
capabilities, Iran, Russia, and China all have credible UAS forces.
Mr. Scott. What is the Navy's strategy and timeline to
competitively procure a live, virtual and constructive aviation
training solution which will be joint, interoperable, and open to
coalition partners? Has an independent Government Cost Estimate been
conducted to verify Tactical Combat Training System (TCTS) II Baseline
estimates to deliver Synthetic Inject to Live--Live Virtual
Constructive (SITL LVC) capability? When will the TCTS II program
receive its NSA accreditation for its encryptor and Cross Domain
solution? Does TCTS II have the capability to connect live aircraft to
fleet simulators or the Next Generation Threat System?
Admiral Gilday. 1. What is the Navy's strategy and timeline to
competitively procure a live, virtual and constructive aviation
training solution which will be joint, interoperable, and open to
coalition partners?
The TCTS II contract was awarded in 2017, following a
full and open competition. TCTS II is the Joint selected program of
record (PoR) for the USN, USMC, and USAF, enabling interoperability
across the Services' training and test ranges. TCTS II provides
critical LVC technologies, such as a National Security Agency (NSA)
Type 1 encryptor, 4-channel multilevel security, an LVC capable
waveform, and Synthetic Inject to Live (SITL) capabilities, and will
achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in late 2022.
The TCTS II program will incorporate additional LVC and
SITL technologies developed by the joint test community and advanced
technology demonstrations, with projected fielding updates to TCTS II
systems in FY25. The program has received interest from coalition
partners and is diligently working with Navy Security Programs Office
and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and
Sustainment (OUSD (A&S)) Office of International Cooperation on
exportability requirements for TCTS II.
The Navy has identified Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC)
training as a critical warfighting enabler. Naval aviation is
supporting the Navy's LVC NAVPLAN Implementation Framework (NIF)
through multiple efforts, to include Naval Aviation Distributed Mission
Training (NADMT), the Integrated Training Facility (ITF), Navy
Continuous Training Environment (NCTE), and training range investments.
Another key portion of the Navy's broader LVC environment includes the
Tactical Combat Training System Increment II (TCTS II).
2. Has an independent Government Cost Estimate been conducted to
verify Tactical Combat Training System (TCTS) II Baseline estimates to
deliver Synthetic Inject to Live Virtual Constructive (SITL LVC)
capability?
Yes, Independent government cost estimates were conducted
in support of TCTS II IOC capabilities at Milestone C in 2020. TCTS
II's open systems architecture enables affordable incorporation of
additional LVC capabilities. Government estimates on additional LVC and
SITL technologies developed by the joint test community and advanced
technology demonstrations were completed to support Navy budget plans.
TCTS II delivers SITL capabilities that allow mission
operators to inject constructive threats into the secure, advanced
training environment.
3. When will the TCTS II program receive its NSA accreditation for
its encryptor and Cross Domain solution?
The NSA certified the KOV-74 encryptor used by TCTS II in
2014. The program is updating the KOV-74 to the KOV-74A to allow Over-
the-Network Keying capability, and updated NSA certification is on
track to complete July 2022. Cross Domain Solution (CDS) certification
will be issued in July 2022 after completion of the Site Based Security
Assessment. The Navy Cross Domain Solution Office is the CDS
certification agency.
4. Does TCTS II have the capability to connect live aircraft to
fleet simulators or the Next Generation Threat System?
Yes, TCTS II utilizes the Next Generation Threat System
(NGTS) and can connect live aircraft to fleet simulators. Last year
TCTS II, demonstrated its capability to connect to the NCTE, the USS
Bainbridge (in training mode), and the Joint Semi Automated Forces
(JSAF) system. In 2022, TCTS II demonstrated ability to connect to an
E-2D fleet simulator, an F/A-18 fleet simulator, an F-35 effects-based
simulator, the Link Inject to Live (SITL) system including NGTS, and
Naval Aviation Distributed Training Center (NADTC) Atlantic.
Mr. Scott. The Navy Installations Command recently released a
report on the use of fireboats during the Bonhomme Richard fire and
noted that there was sufficient coverage in Navy ports. The Maritime
Administration has a program to work with local fire departments in how
to fight fires on board their ships in reduced lay-up, with minimal
crew on board and not all ship systems operational. Has the Navy
coordinated with the Maritime Administration to determine how to best
use tug boats and fireboats, and how a true fireboat differs from
conventional yard tugs?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy is aware of MARAD's firefighting program
to work with local fire departments to fight fires on board their ships
in reduced lay-up, with minimal crew on board and not all ship systems
operational. The Navy has organic waterborne firefighting capability in
the form of civilian and contracted tugs to accommodate reduced crew
size and ship condition. In addition to its organic capability, the
Navy is able leverage local fire departments' capabilities via mutual
aid agreements.
The Navy also understands the prime differences between fireboats
and conventional yard tugs. Although some fireboats do have an
increased pump capacity as compared to tugs, even this increased
capacity does not address the underlying issue of their inability to
fight fires internal to a vessel in order to stop a total loss. The
Navy assesses that it is able to meet required firefighting capability
through a combination of Government owned assets and tugs under
contract with the Navy.
Mr. Scott. The Maritime Administration recently purchased two
former U.S.-flagged roll-on/roll-off ships from American Roll-on/Roll-
off Carriers (ARC) that were 24 years old for approximately $50
million. At the same time, the Military Sealift Command and MARAD
removed from service two of the oldest Large Medium Speed Ro/Ros
converted in the 1990s and three former Maritime Prepositioning Ships.
ARC's parent company, Wallenius, is now building replacement vessels in
China. Is the Department of Defense plan for sealift recapitalization
merely to buy used ships to replace larger and more numerous vessels in
the surge fleet while at the same time subsidizing the Chinese shipyard
program? Is there any plans that foresee the construction of new
sealift vessels in U.S. shipyards?
Admiral Gilday. The Department of the Navy is committed to the
procurement of used commercial Roll-on/Roll-Off vessels as the fastest
and most economical strategy to replace reserve sealift ships that are
reaching the end of their planned service lives. 70% of these platforms
are planned to be retired by 2040 and 10.6 million square feet of lift
capacity will be recapitalized over the next 30 years. The Maritime
Administration (MARAD) is executing the used-ship procurement line of
effort that the Secretary of the Navy detailed in the March 2018 Report
to Congress ``Sealift That the Nation Needs.'' The Department's sealift
recapitalization plan includes three separate, but related, efforts to:
1) extend the service life of the most viable sealift vessels, 2)
purchase used vessels to replace surge sealift and 3) focus on new
construction in U.S. shipyards to replace afloat prepositioning ship
capabilities. In Q3FY22, MARAD purchased the first two used vessels
from the Maritime Security Program (MSP). 10 U.S. Code 2218; National
Defense Sealift Fund, prioritizes the purchase of MSP vessels over non-
U.S. flagged foreign-built vessels. MSP vessels are the preferred
vessels to replace retiring surge sealift because they are already U.S.
flagged, American Bureau of Shipbuilding ABS) classified, have proven
military utility and meet required sealift Operational Requirement
Document (ORD) square footage capacity.
Yes, there are plans that foresee the construction of new sealift
vessels in U.S. shipyards. The Navy is developing capability
requirements for new construction sealift T-AK/AKR ships, with lead
ship procurements planned after 2027 to replace afloat pre-positioning
ships which begin retiring in 2030. Navy would seek proposals from U.S.
shipbuilders to construct these vessels.
Mr. Scott. A U.S. Navy officer told gCaptain [sic] that ``The U.S.
has less than 80 commercial ships in international service, while China
has over 5,500 merchant ships sailing today.'' What happens if China
issues Javelin type missiles to each commercial ship? What would happen
if China issued a portable missile to each of the 122,034 Chinese
seafarers serving on all types of ships?
Admiral Gilday. The Javelin missile is a crew served anti-tank
weapon that is optically sighted and possesses limited range. Equipping
merchant ship crews with Javelin type missiles would have limited
utility in maritime conflict although such missiles could potentially
be useful against irregular threats such as pirates. Equipping over
120,000 merchant sailors with Javelin type missiles would require
significant investments in terms of both the acquisition of the systems
and the training of the crews to employ the weapons and would likely
not be worth the costs in money and time. While arming PRC merchant
ship crews with Javelin type missiles could be justified as necessary
for self-defense against irregular threats such as pirates and thus not
a violation of international law, there could be implications for
insurance rates or access to commercial ports due concerns of the
threat posed by armed merchant ship crews. This is why commercial
shipping lines tend to not arm crew members, even when their ships sail
in waters trafficked by pirates, such as the Gulf of Aden.
Mr. Scott. How many large commercial ships does China have? How
difficult would it be for them to weaponize these ships?
Admiral Gilday. According to commercial sources, the PRC has
approximately 11,000 China-owned oceangoing commercial vessels of which
approximately 7,000 are China-flagged oceangoing commercial vessels.
However, ships that are Chinese owned but not Chinese flagged may have
multi-national crews. There are also approximately 2,700 Hong Kong
flagged merchant ships of all types. The 2016 National Transportation
Law permits all China owned merchant ships to be used by the People's
Liberation Army.
The Chinese could put containerized missiles on merchant ships if
they chose to do so. According to some sources the Chinese are
designing and marketing a variant of the YJ-18 cruise missile that can
be fired from shipping containers, similar to systems designed and
marketed by Russia and Israel. However, arming merchant ships in this
manner has implications under international law. Under the Hague
Convention, arming merchant ships with weapons beyond those required to
defend the ship against threats such as pirates or terrorists requires
the ship to be:
Placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and
responsibility of the State whose flag it flies.
Bear the external marks that distinguish the warships of
their nationality.
Under the command of a duly commissioned officer in the
service of the State whose name is on the list of the officers of the
fighting fleet
Manned by a crew subject to military discipline.
If the Chinese were to covertly employ missile armed merchant ships
in wartime, they would be guilty of Perfidy under the laws of armed
conflict and they would forfeit their protected status as civilian
vessels. Additionally, even employing a small number of merchant ships
as missile shooters in wartime would make all Chinese-flagged container
ships at sea or in port legally targetable given the inability of an
adversary to accurately determine whether the ships have a
containerized missile system onboard until the weapon system is
employed.
Navy Recognition, China is Building Long-Range Cruise Missiles
Launched from Ship Containers--https://www.navyrecognition.com/
index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2019/april/6971-china-is-
building-long-range-cruise-missiles-launched-from-ship-containers.html
US Naval War College, China's Container Missile Deployments Could
Violate the Law of Naval Warfare--https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2982&context=ils
Mr. Scott. How many commercial mariners are enrolled in the Naval
War College, Naval Postgraduate School, or Naval Academy?
Admiral Gilday. There are no commercial mariners enrolled at the
Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, or United States Naval
Academy.
Mr. Scott. What is the status of the updates to the online
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships?
Admiral Gilday. In September 2021, the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) declared DANFS ``severely out of date.'' HASC also
directed SECNAV to brief HASC by March 2022 on ``efforts to update the
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships'' to include ``at a
minimum: (1) timeline; (2) scope of project; and (3) existing and
proposed budget needed to update the Dictionary of American Naval
Fighting Ships within five years.''
CURRENT STATUS: There are 11,238 DANFS entries. Each entry
represents the Navy's official history of a specific ship. Formerly
published in hardback books, the entries are now available on the NHHC
website. 71% of these are complete; both new and/or updated. The other
29% require significant updates including 125 vessels which are missing
entirely.
BACKGROUND: One of the driving factors behind Navy's decision to
establish NHHC was the need to address 60 years of systemic neglect of
Navy's history and heritage assets. From 1971 until NHHC was stood up
in 2008--work on DANFS had stopped. In 2013 HASC made a request to Navy
regarding the speed at which DANFS could be made current. CNO Greenert
directed additional funding for DANFS be provided to NHHC: $2,160,000
per annum; $10,800,000 total. However, from 2016 to 2021 NHHC OPTAR was
cut 71%--from $19M to $6.3M. As a result only $1.7M of the additional
$10.8M in additional OPTAR for DANFS restoration made it to NHHC. NHHC
reprogramed an additional $3.04M in NHHC CIVPERS towards the DANFS
effort. The result was a 25% restoration of DANFS to Navy standards.
Additional funding for DANFS was terminated in 2021 because of the 71%
decline in OPTAR.
RESTORED FUNDING: CNO Gilday directed a funding increase for NHHC
across the FYDP to ensure NHHC was mission capable. The DANFS
restoration now has stable funding of $500K per annum in OPTAR and
$264K in CIVPERS assigned to the project. This level of funding
establishes a trajectory that allows NHHC to have an additional 271
entries, approximately 6.6% of the total original backlog plus 48
ships scheduled to be decommissioned, completed by 2028 for a total of
77.6% complete.
ESTIMATES TO ELIMINATE DANFS BACKLOG COAs: NHHC has completed
analysis of DANFS completion; starting with the current funding
profile, for consideration by Navy Leadership and the POM process.
Five Year Plan: Current trajectory, based on restored funding
levels, the following progress is planned for the next five years:
(77.6% Complete)
Elimination of all missing entries by the end of FY27.
Completion of all entries for battleships and at least
50% of all carriers by end of FY27.
Entries published for all ships scheduled to be
decommissioned ( 48 ships)
Five Year Plan: To complete DANFS updates and properly process
additional ships as they decommission: (100% Completed)
Proposed budget: $6.3M-7.1M per annum ($31.5M-35.5M
total)/45 Additional Personnel
Backlog eliminated by end of FY27.
The challenge associated with a five year effort, in
addition to the cost, is the physical limitations of the archives. The
archives classified and unclassified spaces cannot support 45
additional people as currently configured.
Ten Year Plan: Elimination of DANFS backlog can be achieved in 10
years with an increase in personnel. Prioritization of work allows for
ship histories with the highest demand to be completed first. (100%
Completed)
Estimated cost 2.1M-2.4M per annum/13 Additional
Personnel
Year 1: All Battleships completed.
Year 2: All Missing ships, Carriers, and Cruisers
completed
Year 3-5: 70% of all destroyers completed OR all
Frigates, Submarines, Amphibious, and Misc. Combatant Vessels.
Year 6-7: All Combatant and Amphibious vessels completed.
Year 8-10: All Mine Warfare, Patrol, Auxiliary, and
Miscellaneous vessels completed.
Backlog complete.
Twenty Year Plan: Backlog reduction can be achieved within 20 years
utilizing fewer personnel.
Estimated cost 1.3M-1.5M per annum/8 Additional
Personnel.
Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Navy expect to collect and document its
operations for use by future historians if the Naval History & Heritage
Command's reserve unit is disestablished?
Admiral Gilday. The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) will
continue to be responsible for preserving, analyzing, and disseminating
U.S. naval history and heritage. NHHC will work with the Director of
the Navy Staff (DNS) to determine the most effective and efficient
construct to fulfill the mission requirements of the Navy's historical
programs. With respect to the Navy's responsibilities under 44 U.S.
Code Chapter 31 and the supporting document SECNAV M-5210.1: DON
Records Management Manual the Navy understands its mission:
Establishes Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) as
the primary repository for almost all Navy records; OPNAV; Unit
Histories/Deck Logs/Action Reports; Command Histories; & Historical
Records/Program management.
``At the conclusion of periods of crisis, contingency, or
armed conflict, it is necessary to analyze fully the actions and
reactions of both friendly and hostile forces across the full spectrum
of the operation.''
``In order to accomplish this rigorous operations
analysis, full and complete documentation of all phases of the
operation, including all Intel, climatic, and other info available to a
command, must be preserved and transferred to the activity designated
to perform this analysis.''
``This analysis assesses the effectiveness of weapons/
tactics, suggests improvements tested in actual combat, determines
adjustments to force composition, and justifies future budget
decisions.''
``At the conclusion of the operations, it is equally
important that relevant Navy documentation be sent to the NHHC and
Marine Corps documentation be sent to the Director of Marine Corps
History so that the official histories and historical analysis can be
prepared.''
With respect to specific responsibilities regarding the execution
of the mission OPNAVINST 5750.4E: Navy Historical Programs tasks:
Director Navy Staff (DNS): ``Responsibilities: DNS shall
ensure that Navy organizations that produce, collect, analyze, or
disseminate historically significant information implement appropriate
procedures to preserve such information, especially that relating to
lessons-learned from Navy exercises and combat operations.'' And
Director Naval History and Heritage Command (DNHHC):
``Responsibilities: NHHC Director shall assist the operational commands
and the shore establishment in inculcating an understanding and
appreciation of naval history and is responsible, as detailed in
references (a) through (p), for the following aspects of the Navy's
overall historical program:
(7) Deployment of historical documentation teams to
fleet units and other Navy commands to collect
historical records and information on significant Navy
operations and activities.''
Action: NHHC has prepared four courses of action (COAs) for DNS
consideration for the execution of the Navy's mission requirements to
document history in order to accomplish this rigorous operations
analysis, full and complete documentation of all phases of the
operation, including all intel, climatic, and other info available to a
command, must be preserved and transferred to the activity designated
to perform this analysis.
Action: DNS has established a working group to analyze the COAs and
determine the most effective and efficient construct to fulfill the
Navy's mission requirements.
Mr. Scott. Is the Marine Corps prepared to help destroy electronic
superhighways to allow resistance forces to survive and fight another
day?
General Berger. The Marine Corps remains prepared to enable the
full spectrum of cyberspace operations. This includes the planning and
direction of defensive cyberspace operations in support of Marine
Corps, Joint and Coalition Forces, and, when authorized or directed,
the ability to direct offensive cyberspace operations in support of
Joint and Coalition Forces. This will ensure our ability to gain and
exploit information in both the information and physical domains, while
denying competitors those same advantages.
Mr. Scott. What is the current plans for the Maritime Pre-
positioning Program in the Marine Corps? Will the Marines maintain two
squadrons--one at Diego Garcia and another in the western Pacific? If
the program is going to be phased down from 3 to 2 to 1 squadron, what
does that mean for the depots at Blount Island and Albany
General Berger. To answer your first question, in order to balance
FY23 funding reductions, combined with the existing funding shortfalls
in FY21 and FY22, in response to current funding levels, the Navy
identified a requirement to place five of our twelve Maritime
Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships in Reduced Operating Status. Our long-
term plan is for MPF Next Generation to recapitalize two squadrons of
afloat lift.
Updated MPF Planning Guidance published in February 2022 aims to
maximize capability afloat and divide the risk between INDOPACOM and
Tri-COM. The updated guidance captures the Service decision to retain
two squadrons with four ships in Maritime Prepositioning Squadron
(MPSRON)--3 at Guam and a three-ship Crisis Response Force Package in
MPSRON-2 at Diego Garcia.
Having reduced from three to two squadrons in 2011, a further
reduction to one squadron will have limited impact to the Depot at
Albany because MPF equipment represents a small fraction of the depot
maintenance workload that flows through Albany. The vast majority of
Albany's depot maintenance workload comes from the entirety of the
Marine Corps enterprise, our sister services, and other government
agencies.
Further reduction from two squadrons to one will have slightly more
impact to the Blount Island prepositioning support facility, which
conducts field level maintenance and supply actions on MPF military
equipment. With fewer MPF ships' worth of military equipment to service
at less frequent intervals, the contracted workforce at Blount Island
Command will reduce commensurate with future workload. Potentially,
some specialized skill sets may atrophy due to decreased volume and
frequency of maintenance opportunities.
While Blount Island Command will experience impacts from the
reduction to one MPF squadron, the need to maintain high readiness of
the MPF program's sole squadron will produce sufficient maintenance
workload requiring a robust and capable prepositioning support facility
at Blount Island Command.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
Mr. Carbajal. Regarding the USS George Washington: Before the
Special Psychiatric Response Intervention Team was activated, what was
the average wait time for a sailor assigned to the USS George
Washington to receive a mental health appointment? According to open-
source reporting, some sailors assigned to the George Washington were
met with a six-month wait period to see the ship's psychologist. Since
the Navy has deployed additional mental health resources to the ship,
what is now the average wait time for a sailor to receive a mental
health appointment? Does the Navy have a goal or metric of what is an
acceptable wait time from the request for a mental health appointment
to having the appointment?
Admiral Gilday. All emergent mental health referrals (i.e., for
suicidal or homicidal patients) are seen and evaluated the same day.
Prior to the Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT)
activation, the wait time to see the ship's psychologist was
approximately four to six weeks for a new patient evaluation, and
approximately two to three weeks for a follow-up appointment. After the
arrival of the additional psychologist and licensed clinical social
worker, the ship's psychologist's wait time for a new patient
evaluation decreased to approximately three weeks, and to approximately
two weeks for a follow-up appointment. The Military Health System (MHS)
access to care standards are identified in 32 Code of Federal Register
199.17. The MHS access standard for specialty is within 28 days;
however, the Defense Health Agency set an internal standard for the
direct care system of 15 days. There is no standard in any healthcare
system, including the MHS, for follow-up appointments because the
number of days or months to a recommended follow-up appointment is
based on the clinical judgement of the provider and the patient's
condition.
As a point of comparison, the average wait time across all Navy
Medical Forces Atlantic military treatment facilities is 15.51 days
(approximately 2 weeks), while the average wait time across all Tricare
network private sector care providers is 34.82 days (approximately 4-5
weeks). Comparing times for only the Portsmouth area, the average is
12.7 days (less than 2 weeks) at Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, while
the average in the local Tricare private sector care network is 34.9
days (approximately 4-5 weeks).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING
Mr. Keating. In the Navy's Annual Long Range Plan, there is a large
emphasis on investing in undersea procurement and warfighting. However,
this is sometimes viewed exclusively through the prism of submarines.
I'm particularly interested in unmanned underwater vehicles or UUVs.
Depending on which Long Range Plan scenario one looks at, the number of
desired unmanned vehicles varies greatly. Can you speak to the role
unmanned systems have in both a modern and future Navy fleet?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. In order for the United
States Navy to retain our strategic maritime advantage, we must
increase our capabilities to include faster decision making, tactical
reach, and endurance while minimizing risk to our personnel. The Navy
recognizes that unmanned systems, autonomy, and artificial intelligence
play a key part in future Distributed Maritime Operations for all
phases of military operations. As outlined in the Unmanned Campaign
Framework, the Navy will continue to develop and expand its Fleet of
unmanned vehicles to deliver affordable, scalable, lethal, and
connected capabilities.
Specifically, in the undersea domain, unmanned undersea vehicles
(UUVs) serve as versatile autonomous platforms, operate in a dispersed
manner, and offer the flexibility the evolving threat environment
demands. UUVs will go farther, deeper, and endure longer in extremely
harsh conditions in order to deter and deliver lethal and non-lethal
effects. A hybrid fleet of manned/unmanned capabilities is necessary to
execute the full range of undersea operations to both meet emerging
security concerns and to provide persistent presence, ensuring undersea
dominance in our Future Fleet.
Mr. Keating. In the Navy's Annual Long Range Plan, there is a large
emphasis on investing in undersea procurement and warfighting. However,
this is sometimes viewed exclusively through the prism of submarines.
I'm particularly interested in unmanned underwater vehicles or UUVs.
Depending on which Long Range Plan scenario one looks at, the number of
desired unmanned vehicles varies greatly. Can you speak to the role
unmanned systems have in both a modern and future Navy fleet?
General Berger. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Secretary of the Navy.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. After the fall of Kabul it has come to my attention that
there has been little to no outreach to Gold Star families of those
killed in the war, and they are struggling. Furthermore, I am concerned
about the lack of long-term counseling services for Gold Star and
Surviving families. What is the Navy, to include the Marine Corps
strategy to address these issues?
Secretary Del Toro. Outreach to Gold Star families is a commitment
that the Navy and Marine Corps fulfills for the duration of Survivor
requested support. At the initial Next-of-Kin (NOK) notification of a
Service member's death, Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACO) are
equipped with the knowledge necessary to connect Survivor families with
benevolent and philanthropic organizations capable of providing grief
and bereavement counseling.
Once a CACO's immediate duties are complete, NOK are transitioned
to the care of the Navy or Marine Corps Long Term Assistance Program
(LTAP). LTAP representatives maintain contact with Survivors at a
frequency requested by the Gold Star family to meet their long-term
needs. LTAP serves as a permanent resource for NOK, ensuring they
receive sustained, long-term assistance. LTAP not only assists with the
receipt of death benefits and entitlements, but also connects family
members to grief and bereavement counselors, support experts, and
national Survivor networks as their needs evolve.
The Navy and Marine Corps maintain a partnership with the Tragedy
Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS). Once families agree to the
release of their personal information, by completing an ``Authorization
for Disclosure of Personal Information,'' they are connected to
representatives from TAPS. TAPS is a national nonprofit 501(c)(3)
Veterans Service Organization that provides families with a full range
of peer-based emotional support, crisis response and intervention,
casualty casework, and grief and trauma support. Their services are no
cost and available 24/7.
The suicide bombing outside Hamid Karzai International Airport in
Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 26, 2021, resulted in the death of one
Sailor and 11 Marines. LTAP representatives initiated contact with the
Gold Star families of these Service members after each funeral. LTAP
and TAPS representatives have provided continued support to the Gold
Star families on a recurring basis, in accordance with each family's
individual needs.
Mr. Bacon. As we prepare for the real possibility of near peer
conflict, what are we doing to ensure we have a seamless, easily
replicated process for casualties in the case of a mass casualty
scenario? Is the Navy aware of the FY22 NDAA casualty requirements and
working group, and what is the Navy doing to be directly involved?
General Berger. The Marine Corps Casualty Assistance Program has
maintained an outstanding reputation in response to mass casualty
events from initial reporting, notification, processing of benefits and
entitlements, and long-term assistance. The staff at Headquarters
Marine Corps, in concert with our affected and supporting units, ensure
timely next of kin notifications, expeditious return of remains, and
compassionate enduring assistance to our surviving family members. We
are staffed and follow established procedures to effectively execute
required casualty assistance for peacetime casualties.
We are working on a scalable Casualty Augmentation Requirement Plan
that will enable the Marine Corps to surge with appropriately skilled
and experienced individuals thereby improving our casualty-response
capability and increasing overall capacity. Depending on its nature and
scale, a mass casualty event will require capability and coordination
with the Department of Defense, Department of Navy, and other
stakeholders. We are also an active participant in the Casualty
Assistance Reform Working Group directed by the FY22 NDAA. Our casualty
subject matter experts, along with a selected Gold Star family member,
represents the Marine Corps in this working group.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
Ms. Houlahan. As we focus on China as a pacing challenge, we must
ensure we are prepared for any actions necessary within the Pacific.
With the Navy being below recruiting goals for this year, how does that
impact short and long term readiness within the Pacific theater?
General Berger. The Marine Corps has accomplished its fiscal year
to date recruiting goal in what is arguably the most challenging year
since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force. Nevertheless, the
compounding effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, historic lows in youth
propensity, labor shortages, rising inflation, and United States
Military Entrance Processing Command's medical record modernization
efforts have consistently slowed momentum, placing the remainder of the
FY22 accessions mission at risk. We understand the pressures on
recruiting/retention and focus end strength and assignment decisions on
operational readiness. We do not forecast any degradation in our
ability to support the Pacific theater.
Ms. Houlahan. What is the Navy doing beyond bonuses, to recruit and
retain a diverse pool of skilled and capable individuals? What specific
challenges does the Navy face with recruitment and retention and what
policies and actions are you taking to address those challenges? What
assistance do you require from Congress?
General Berger. The Marine Corps is a diverse institution, and
cultural, ethnic, gender, and socio-economic diversity remains a
priority. Diverse accession success is a direct result of the hard work
of our recruiting force in every zip code and benefits from our
inclusive marketing, robust outreach, and partnerships efforts with
diverse communities and organizations. Since 2009, diverse enlisted
accessions have increased from 34% to 47%, while diverse officer
accessions have increased from 16% to 35%. The Marine Corps remains
committed to capitalizing on the knowledge, skills, abilities,
performance, and potential of every Marine.
FY22 will prove to be the most challenging year in recruiting
history. In addition to COVID-19, the growing disconnect and declining
favorable view between the U.S. population and the military, labor
shortages, high inflation, and a youth population that does not
recognize the value of military service also continues to strain
recruiting efforts and place the Marine Corps' accessions mission at
risk.
The Marine Corps Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion Strategic Plan is a
deliberate effort to examine the current state, envision outcomes, and
set a path over the next five years with intermediate objectives that
will help us as a Service further improve our diversity, equity, and
inclusion. Recruiting and retaining high performing youth from all
sectors of our nation will be imperative for the future fight.
Our end state is a transparent, collaborative, forward-leaning,
data-driven, and commander-focused system which provides the individual
Marine the opportunity to develop and use their abilities to
effectively serve in order to provide a combat-ready Fleet Marine
Force. We are updating our IT systems, leveraging AI, machine learning,
and big data in surveys--with an end state of improving our retention
policies, practices, and evaluation systems, among other initiatives,
to compete in the competitive ecosystem of talent management.
To ensure future recruiting success, a whole-of-government approach
is needed to gain influencer support of military service and expand the
youth market. Additional considerations such as directed Department of
Education support to make contact information available, funding of the
Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies program for strategic
community engagement campaigns, Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery support testing, and school/state incentives for students
selecting military service, will have positive impacts on recruiting
across the joint force.
We are asking for congressional assistance to make changes to Title
10, United States Code section 503 in order to open the aperture of
usable information on potential recruits. This change would more
closely align DOD marketing efforts with those of private industry and
is fully supported by the Services and DOD. The information would be
used to help identify prospective recruits, tailor our marketing
efforts, better measure return on investment of our advertising
efforts, and maximize customer relationship management by getting the
right message to the right person at the right time.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN
Mr. Bergman. Is there any evidence to suggest that, in a non-
mobility environment, that Reserve units (i.e. Battalions, Squadrons,
etc.) would be more ready if Operational Control (OPCON) was moved from
the Reserve Component (RC) to the Active Component (AC)?
General Berger. As Representative Bergman may remember from his
days as the Commanding General, 4th Marine Air Wing (MAW), 4th MAW
participates regularly in the 2nd MAW and 3d MAW Frag Conferences for
scheduling aircraft support across the Marine Corps. The Frag
conferences result in 4th MAW flying in support of the Marine Corps,
supporting both Reserve and Active Component aviation requirements, at
a frequency that places their squadrons in an operational status that
far exceeds the normal 48 drill period and two week Annual Training. We
believe that in certain cases, the Marine Corps can improve both
logistical support and maintenance of both Reserve and Active squadrons
by incorporating the Reserve squadron into an Active aircraft type-
specific group.
The Reserve squadron will be co-located with the group
headquarters, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS), and Marine
Wing Support Squadron as well as other like aircraft squadrons on a
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) maximizing supportability. We are
conducting a proof of concept of Active/Reserve Component integration
by incorporating VMM-774 into Marine Aircraft Group-26, an active duty
group with all flying squadrons possessing only MV-22 Ospreys.
Access to MALS, simulators, and vast on site resources provided to
the Reserve squadron at a MCAS vice being a tenant on another Service's
base will likely improve readiness and streamline Naval Supply Systems
Command logistics nodes. The proof of concept is scheduled for FY23.
We are continuing to work the details for this proof of concept
with VMM-774 still in transition from Naval Station Norfolk to MCAS New
River. We can provide in progress reviews and a final assessment once
the proof of concept period is complete.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. Capacity is a capability within itself. In late April at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies you stated that ``We
do need a bigger Navy, and you can't just talk about capabilities
without talking about size'', but the plan you presented to Congress
doesn't have us getting to the Congressionally mandated battle force
size of 355 ships until 2043 with your most optimistic projections. One
of your courses of action requests $75 billion after the next 5 years
to get to that number. In my opinion that is a decade and a half too
late and insufficient considering the clear overmatch in capacity the
Chinese will have in the Pacific. We clearly need a growth in
industrial capacity and the capacity of the U.S. Navy's battleforce.
What resources do you and industry need to grow ship and submarine
production and to keep the ships we do have underway more often by
reducing days of delay due to maintenance?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. A healthy shipbuilding
industrial base and supply chain are vital to meeting our National
Defense Strategy. Expanding the capabilities of suppliers and shipyard
infrastructure results in greater stability, cost savings, and improved
efficiency to grow both ship and submarine production and repair
capabilities. In cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and industry partners,
the Navy completed a review of the industrial base to identify areas
which require investment to expand the capability and capacity of the
enterprise in accordance with war fighting requirements. The Department
of Navy's Fiscal Year 2023 budget request includes investments in
critical efforts in several key areas including: supplier development
of capability and capacity, shipbuilder infrastructure, technology
innovation, workforce development, and continued government oversight.
Additionally, the Navy is grateful for Congress's continued support
for the Navy's Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP).
SIOP is a critical enabler to improve Navy maintenance capabilities by
expanding shipyard capacity and optimizing shipyard configuration. The
Navy is also grateful to Congress for its ongoing support for the Other
Procurement, Navy (OPN), pilot and expanding it to include both Pacific
Fleet and Fleet Forces command. OPN-funded availabilities are helping
to maintain positive momentum in execution of surface maintenance and
ensuring ships deliver to the Fleet on time, with work completed in
full. In partnership with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Navy
has also piloted several defense workforce programs in major maritime
centers of gravity like Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New England
targeted at the shipbuilding and ship repair workforce. These are
pipeline programs focused on bringing highly skilled workers to our
shipyards. Through collaboration and smart investments, the industrial
base can adapt and grow to build and maintain the fleet the Nation
needs.
Mr. Waltz. The Navy is shuttering HSC-85 its last squadron that's
solely dedicated to supporting Naval Special Warfare. What is the
rationale for divesting of a one-of-one capability? How do you plan to
replace the unique capability that HSC-85 brings to the table?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. This divestiture is in
alignment with Department of the Navy (DON) and Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) strategic and operational priorities within fiscal
guidance, and is critical to enabling funding of higher priority
programs. While the squadron has highly trained aviators and some
unique equipment, dedicated support to NSW and special operations
training, readiness, and operations is not a core DON mission. SOCOM
maintains its own aviation units dedicated to special operations
support that are more capable than HSC-85. Additionally, the ending of
the cost-share agreement between DON and SOCOM for the unit beyond
Fiscal Year 2023 increased the financial burden on DON for providing
support to SOCOM. Divesting of HSC-85 will make funds available for
core DON missions and higher DON priorities.
The DON has four CONUS and one forward-deployed General Purpose
Force HSC expeditionary squadrons that are capable of providing basic
support to NSW training and readiness, and could be trained and
equipped to provide similar dedicated capability as HSC-85 if
prioritized over their current tasking. Re-tasking these squadrons to
dedicated support would require additional time, training, and
equipment to meet requirements.
Mr. Waltz. I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has
certified that the LCS Independence variant's Mission Package along
with Expeditionary Navy EOD Mine Countermeasure Companies provide a
``like capability'' for homeland defense compared to the Avenger class
MCM, but what is the status of the LCS's minesweeping part of its MCM
Mission Package? How long has that capability delayed? Do we not need
the ability to sweep CONUS waters of mines in a contingency?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Unmanned Influence Sweep
System (UISS) provides minesweeping capability to the Littoral Combat
Ship (LCS) Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package (MP) as part of
the Unmanned Minesweeping Module. UISS is comprised of an AN/SLW-2 MCM
Unmanned Surface Vehicle that carries both an electromagnetic cable and
a MK-104 acoustic generator.
UISS has successfully completed its Engineering and Manufacturing
Development Phase and is in Low Rate Initial Production. System-level
UISS testing is complete. Minesweeping capability has been proven with
IOT&E completion in June 2021, followed by completion of cybersecurity
and underwater explosive shock testing in October 2021. UISS is
expected to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in June 2022.
IOC was originally planned for October 2019. A Congressional reduction
of $8.0M to Fiscal Year 2018 RDT&E delayed completion of development
and testing one year, which was later compounded by required system
fixes to address deficiencies noted from developmental testing and
availability of LCS due to other Fleet operational priorities.
Mine countermeasures plans for Homeland Defense are focused on mine
hunting, mine neutralization, and exploitation vice minesweeping
Mr. Waltz. With the Navy's request to decommission Freedom-class
Littoral Combat Ships are there any plans to utilize these vessels in
future Fleet Training Sinking Exercises which would provide an
opportunity for their hulls to serve as artificial reefs?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Navy's current
disposition plans for all hulls planned for decommissioning in the
Future Years Defense Program are reflected in the Navy's Report to
Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023 (30-year Shipbuilding Plan). The plan for
the Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship hulls identified for
decommissioning in Fiscal Year 2023 is for all nine hulls placed in an
out-of-commission, in-reserve (OCIR) status. Further, Navy policy
requires Fleet Training Sinking Exercises be conducted at least 50
miles from land and in greater than 6000 feet of water making them not
viable as artificial reefs. The Navy will continue to review, and
disposition decisions may evolve as new information becomes available.
Mr. Waltz. General Berger, Force Design 2030 is heavily reliant on
light, maneuverable forces using both long range fires and asymmetric
weapons like loitering munitions and man-portable systems to defeat the
enemy. Considering the U.S. has burned through 1400 Stinger and 5500
Javelin missiles how vital is it to backfill that drawdown so that your
forces have a robust supply of Javelins and Stingers to stand up the
formations you envision in Force Design 2030?
General Berger. The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is primed to
produce a new-start Man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD) that
employs high technology-readiness-level components and utilizes rapid
acquisition authorities. Obsolescence issues currently plague Stinger
production, employment, and sustainment. Outdated manufacturing
techniques combined with forty-year-old technology continue to drive up
cost, extend delivery timelines, and produce missiles without any
improvements to performance. Our logistics depots have utilized all
available spare parts to repair Stinger field training systems, turning
to cannibalization in order to deliver serviceable equipment. The DOD
must take advantage of the current DIB posture. With proper leveraging
of authorities, Services must begin fielding a replacement to Stinger
missiles, launchers, and training systems by 2027. The Marine Corps
remains engaged with the Army, who serves as the Stinger program lead,
to drive progress towards a new-start MANPAD that is cheaper and more
sustainable, reliable, capable, and rapid to deliver.
In regards to the Javelin missile system, it is critical that we
backfill all of our equipment and ammunition stock with either a like
capability or a modernized capability more suited for Force Design
2030. I am concerned with the production lead times, some as long as 48
months, that will impact our readiness over the long term. Much of what
we have delivered to the Ukrainian Defense Forces has come from our
training stocks so that we could preserve our short term warfighting
capability. But when a Marine doesn't have equipment or munitions to
train on in the exact manner in which he or she will fight, there are
longer term risks that we incur from training to retention to
warfighting. So it's vital that we communicate with the DIB to identify
not just our warfighting requirements, but also our training
requirements, and work to meet them as soon as possible. Javelin is
proving its worth in today's fight and we will be using the same
warhead on some of our future munitions, so it will provide value for
us now and into the future.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
Mr. Morelle. In early January, Defense News reported that ship
maintenance and repairs are falling short of your expectations. And
although, through various initiatives, the on-time completion rates for
maintenance and repairs are improving, current timelines still
negatively impact the readiness of your fleets. Are you able to discuss
the contributing factors limiting the Navy's ability to get ships out
of deport yards or repairs complete at rates you're comfortable with?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Navy's Performance to
Plan (P2P) Surface forum was initiated with the overarching goal of
improving maintenance outcomes and eliminating days of maintenance
delay, and the Navy is collectively driving hard towards achieving the
goal of zero days of maintenance delays. P2P is chaired by the VCNO and
is taking a data-driven approach to targeting key levers or drivers
that analysis indicates will have a direct impact on availability
duration. Key lever modeling for P2P highlights Navy-controlled levers
and allows for the team to prioritize, swarm, and escalate issues
identified for barrier removal in an efficient fashion. The below table
is a summary of the key drivers currently being targeted and the
duration impacts that the Center for Naval Analysis predicts could be
realized as these specific metrics continue to improve in the execution
of maintenance availabilities.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8852.077
.epsExamples of specific actions being taken to improve performance
based on these identified levers include:
Further effort to level load ports and better predict
workload
Moved contract award target to Availability-120 days (A-
120) to allow more time for government and contractor planning/
coordination/material procurement/schedule quality
Reduce/limit amount of growth and new work
Improved/more rapid identification of growth and new work
prior to 40% of availability duration
Efforts to improve quality of Integrated Production
Schedule provided by the contractor
Improved performance in ordering/receiving Long Lead Time
Material prior to availability start
Improved directed maintenance strategy
Improved contract change cycle time through use of Level
of Effort to Completion and Small Dollar Value Growth processes
Additionally, as the Navy continues to demonstrate improvement in
the execution of the ship maintenance program, efforts such as the
Other Procurement, Navy (OPN), pilot help to expand upon the positive
momentum being realized and ensure ships deliver back to the Fleet on
time, with work completed in full, and without the need for additional
funding in successive fiscal years.
Mr. Morelle. How has contracted proprietary lock-in, or ``Vendor
Lock,'' impacted the Navy's ability to efficiently repair their systems
and platforms? How has ``Vendor-Lock'' impacted readiness for your
department?
Secretary Del Toro. Any time the Government has inadequate data
rights or limited technical data, the ability to execute organic
repairs or outsource the work to other vendors is significantly
hindered. As a result, in each acquisition program, the Navy is
thoughtfully analyzing and identifying key technical data rights
required early in the program's lifecycle in order to appropriately
budget for and purchase the rights upfront (often priced in a
competitive environment) to enable greater flexibility and organic
capability to efficiently repair and sustain a system.
Mr. Morelle. The Navy has significantly increased its budget for
Project Overmatch, demonstrating a commitment to joint
interoperability, command and control, and tactical network
compatibility across DOD. How did the Joint All Domain Command and
Control exercises between the Navy and Air Force work out? Any good
news stories to share?
Admiral Gilday. The Navy has requested an increased budget for
Project Overmatch because of the critical importance of joint
interoperability, command and control, and network compatibility. We
have been working on refining our approach and transitioning
technologies and concepts and are now ready to start increasing the
scope and scale. Our Navy's ability to establish and sustain sea
control is dependent upon conducting Distributed Maritime Operations
through a teamed manned/unmanned force that exploits Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML). Project Overmatch is tasked
with delivering a Naval Operational Architecture (NOA) to connect and
enable this future force. The NOA is the Naval (Navy and Marine Corps)
contribution to the Joint Force's Joint All Domain Command and Control
(JADC2) and we are working collaboratively with our Service partners on
Implementation. We are on track to deliver Minimum Viable Product (MVP)
on a Strike Group in FY23. Below are some of the good news stories from
Overmatch:
We take an active role supporting Joint Staff JADC2
cross-functional team, and serve as the joint networking lead of their
operational planning team.
Demonstrating sharing of tactically relevant software
applications with the Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System
(ABMS) team in our DEVSECOPS environment to allow for easier
collaboration between command and control software tools. Additionally,
Overmatch is working with the Army Future Command and the Marine Corps
for additional software application exchange and co-development/
sustainment opportunities.
Our most recent quarter of engineering, integration, and
Live, Virtual, and Constructive demonstrations provided Naval
integration of relevant ``mission threads'' between Navy units and the
simulated Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) with Expeditionary Advanced
Base (Fires) element represented at Camp Pendleton.
Naval participation in U.S. Army's Project Convergence
2021 (PC21) resulted in substantive testing between multiple platforms
using different waveforms in the live exercise which included Air
Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. We will continue to grow that
participation in the upcoming PC22, with added participation from
Allies.
Our engineering teams have been leading the coordination
on a cross-service effort we call Joint Tactical Edge Networking (JTEN)
to bring together the best of what each service is doing. Working with
OSD, this grass-roots effort will integrate ongoing developments across
all the services to enable interoperability.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
Ms. Jacobs. A GAO report found that the surface fleet is 15%
undermanned compared to required levels. The Navy routinely assigns
fewer crewmembers to ships than are needed to safely operate them, and
that inadequate training exacerbates sailor overwork and fatigue. How
does the budget invest to fix these problems?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The May 2021 GOA Report
``Additional Efforts are Needed to Manage Fatigue, Reduce Crewing
Shortfalls and Implement Training'' recommended, among other things,
the Navy revise its guidance and practices to measure sailor fatigue
and address the factors causing fatigue, use required positions when
reporting crew sizes and projecting personnel needs, and factor
training time into sailor workload. The Department of Defense concurred
with the recommendations.
The PB23 Fiscal Years Defense Plan (FYDP) continues the surface
investment in ship manpower, adding additional billets to ships. An
example is the phased addition of approximately 40 billets on each DDG.
In addition there are various Surface Training Advanced Virtual
Environment (STAVE) initiatives that invest in schoolhouse and
waterfront individual training.
The GAO report assumed an increase in workload for Sailors on ships
due to additional training being conducted on ships, resulting in
overwork and fatigue. However, the Navy STAVE program and PB23
investments are modernizing existing Surface Warfare courses of
instruction at schoolhouse and waterfront locations where Sailors train
away from their ships, avoiding the potential for overwork and fatigue.
Other STAVE examples include continued fielding of the Mariner
Skills Training Program (MSTP), additional Aegis, Ship Self Defense
System (SSDS) and Anti-Submarine Warfare SQQ-89, Virtual Operator
Trainers (VOT), Virtual Maintenance Trainers (VMT) and Virtual
Employment Trainers (VET) as well as enhanced rate training for various
surface rates.
Ms. Jacobs. What is the Navy doing to increase manning, and when
will surface ships be fully manned with the proper fit?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. The Navy's principal focus
on this issue remains unchanged and increasing manning levels across
the surface flet is a strategic objective for the Navy. We are using a
variety of force management tools to attack this issue, including:
Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay,
Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP) and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year
tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea
duty and curtailing shore duty tours).
We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to
filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative
ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the
Perform to Plan--Human Resources process to address a wide range of
issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to
close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the
Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set
of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will
replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary
incentives, non-monetary incentives, and early advancement
opportunities for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.
We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts
such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match
skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements.
These efforts--combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and
funding total ownership cost--will ensure we have the Sailors to
support the Navy that the Nation needs.
Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and
improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy
HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning, and other enablers such as
Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to
recruiting, training, retention, and improved talent management.
Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully
and properly manned, with the right Sailor in the right place at the
right time with the right training. The number of Sailors on
operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have
10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
Mr. Horsford. When an individual flies across the ocean in an
airliner or boards a cruise ship, they usually have easy access to
high-speed satellite internet on their personal devices. Yet this has
historically not been the case for Sailors deployed at sea. As the Navy
continues to grapple with recruiting and retention challenges and
remains unable to meet requirements for appropriate fit and fill for
sea billets, I'm curious if this straightforward quality of life
improvement could help retention efforts.
This capability exists and is fielded on warships today. Over the
past two years, U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central
Command have procured a turnkey satellite wireless internet capability
that has successfully supported the deployments of 6 aircraft carriers
and multiple smaller vessels. However, this capability is noticeably
absent on ships assigned to Fleet Forces Command and in the Atlantic.
Currently these trials are funded on a month-to-month, ship-by-ship
basis, and there is no program of record for at-sea satellite wireless
internet. The contractor currently supporting Pacific Fleet has
proposed an annual contract that would dramatically expand regional
coverage and significantly reduce costs from the current ship-by-ship
model.
What lessons has the Navy learned from these trials in Pacific
Fleet and Central Command and what is the Navy's plan to expand
wireless internet access to Sailors across the fleet?
Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday. There is currently no N2N6
Program of Record (POR) to support high-speed satellite internet for
personal use. The pilot program for satellite wireless internet
capability was spearheaded by Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT),
and fully funded using PACFLT Operating Target (OPTAR) funds. We are
currently reviewing our Navy strategy for command SATCOM and learning
from efforts such as the PACFLT pilots.
OPNAV N2N6's Commercial Satellite Broadband Program (CBSP) POR
funds commercial satellite for Navy operational networks. Per Navy
security instruction, Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs) are not
authorized to connect to ships' operational networks. Sailors are
authorized to use the ships' approved devices and operational network
for personal use (i.e., access Facebook, email, etc.) when not
impacting operational mission requirements. Availability of end-user
device (i.e., workstation), security controls limiting or restricting
access to shore-based websites, and competing demands for bandwidth
utilization across ships' operational networks affect Sailors' personal
use of the network. In Denied, Degraded, Intermittent, and Limited
(DDIL) environments or due to Operational Security (OPSEC) concerns,
personal use of ships' operation network may be restricted.
Prior to the `Other 3 Billion' (O3B) pilot program by COMPACFLT,
bandwidth controls were utilized to accomplish essential services.
Prior to O3B install on USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT, the unclassified
operational network utilization routinely stayed at greater than 98%,
requiring implementation of bandwidth controls. Once O3B was online,
the operational network utilization remained below 46%. In addition,
the following services were now being performed or greatly enhanced by
using O3B vice the operational network:
Cyber security patches may take several days to a week to
download or can error out during download via the operational network.
Use of O3B to download patches was reduced from days to minutes.
Public affairs video files of 300 to 400 MB were
transferred within minutes vice setting bandwidth conditions for
periods of 8+ hours.
1,949 peak hour users and 5,202 devices connected on
Christmas in 2020 allowing Sailors to text and video chat with family
members while underway for the first time.
Provided constant communication from leadership to family
members and live streaming a frocking ceremony with 30,000 viewers.
When operational network was down or degraded, medical
evacuations were coordinated via O3B exclusively.
Use of Defense Travel System to process transaction would
previous timeout, requiring refresh and delaying processes. O3B
lessened the time and drastically reduced timeouts.
Sailors were able to utilize O3B for online college and
other web based training, not possible utilizing operational networks
due to bandwidth requirements.
O3B allowed operators to quickly address and track high
priority material shipments inbound to the ship. Additionally, several
departments utilized O3B to update test equipment and download
maintenance programs, increased ability to maintain aircraft, support
equipment and operational systems.
Additional research is required to identify true unit costs for
implementing the capability to provide an at-sea, end-to-end, high-
speed satellite internet wireless solution for personal devices across
the Fleet.
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