

[H.A.S.C. No. 117-85]

HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
—
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**FISCAL YEAR 2023 DEFENSE BUDGET
REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY**
—

HEARING HELD
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**FISCAL YEAR 2023 DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST FROM
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 11, 2022.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Call the meeting to order. If people will take their seats, we'll go ahead and get started.

As I think most people are aware—but I'm making sure everybody knows—it is a hybrid hearing again. We have some here, some appearing virtually on the screen. I think we all know how that works these days.

The full committee hearing this morning is on the fiscal year 2023 defense budget request from the Department of the Navy.

We are pleased to have three witnesses today: the Honorable Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Michael Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations; and General David Berger, the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I thank you, gentlemen, all for being here.

These are incredibly challenging times, as we all know, and the main theme of what we're trying to do in the Pentagon is modernization—you know, catching up with the pace of warfare.

To a certain degree, warfare has always been about lethality, survivability, and information. It's just that all of those things are getting more complicated with the rapid pace of technology, and we are certainly learning lessons from the conflict in Ukraine and some of the other conflicts about what we truly need to be able to be successful and maintain the level of dominance that we want to on the military side.

And I want to compliment the Navy and the Marine Corps for stepping out and looking at the future and trying to modernize the force and begin to take those steps to get us to where we need to be on a whole series of systems.

It is a challenge because we have legacy systems and we have the future and how do we balance all of the needs and challenges in the world. As we have said on this committee many times, it's China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist threats.

Certainly, our focus right now is on Russia. But those other threats in that list have not gone away while we're dealing with Russia and Ukraine. In some ways they've become even more complicated. We want to make sure that we're modernizing the force as we move forward.

As many of you have heard, I am not as obsessed with numbers as others. I am obsessed with capability, and I'm very interested to hear today from the Navy about how they see the path towards building the capability that they need.

We could have 5,000 ships, but if they don't do what we need them to do it would really be no better than having 10. What are the capabilities that we're trying to build? And when I look at the systems that we're building going forward, the new attack submarines, the new "boomer" [ballistic-missile submarine] that's coming online, the *Arleigh Burke*-class destroyers, the frigate that we're building, the increase in the number of drones and, crucially, the improvement in missiles. I was out at Palmdale last week visiting some of our systems as they're being developed as we're trying to catch up, particularly in the hypersonic area.

That's where the future of warfare is, our ability to survive not just against China—and I think that's one popular sort of myth. It's, like, we're building towards, you know, being able to deter China.

It doesn't take much these days to be able to develop missile technology that can take out an aircraft carrier or a tank or even one of our more modern jet fighters. Some of our smaller adversaries can develop those capabilities as well.

It doesn't take much to be able to disrupt an information system. We have to make our information systems more secure and to make sure that that information can get to the warfighter that needs it when he or she needs it.

All of those things are important for all aspects of that fight. So hearing more about modernization on our Navy shipbuilding; it is a controversial issue.

As you know, we'd all love to have every single ship that we want right now today, but it takes time. So if you could walk us through the reasons behind the retirements and the ships that we're building to replace them, and, crucially, when we talk about the money that we're saving in the ships that we're retiring, tell us about what it's going to buy us. That money that it's saving is going towards a capability that's going to be crucial, going forward, we need to hear about what those specifics are.

I also want to compliment the Commandant for his leadership of the Marine Corps, modernizing the force there as well, recognizing that the best thing the Marine Corps brings to us is the ability to be an agile, mobile, lethal force, and you have to build a system to enable the Marine Corps to do that.

You know, the future of land warfare and tanks is not terribly bright. So we need to move on and build the force that's going to be able to fight the fight of the future, and I applaud your leadership in doing that.

Two last issues I want to touch on before I turn it over to Mr. Rogers. Number one is the sea-launched cruise missile. This has been a matter of some controversy. It has been proposed to not

build the sea-launched cruise missile. It's not actually a decision point right now in terms of whether or not we go forward with it.

But there's a general feeling, why wouldn't you want more missiles—isn't more better. What I am concerned about is the mission of the attack submarines. We're talking about putting nuclear missiles on attack submarines.

Now, as we all know, we have submarines that have nuclear missile capability and they are crucial to our force. We are modernizing that as we speak.

But it was determined back in the 1990s that the burden of the attack submarines also having to carry nuclear missiles, and it's not just a matter of swapping one missile out for the other.

If you're going to carry an actual nuclear missile, it is an entirely different mission that requires an entirely different system and an entirely different set of training. It is a major step, and the reason some of us don't support moving to that step is because—not because we don't want more missiles. We want the attack submarines to be able to do the job that they do right now to the best of their ability.

We don't want to impede that mission. But it's a balance. So we look forward to hearing your comments on that.

Lastly, the USS *George Washington* has been in the news with the number of suicides. Two hundred crew members were taken off of it. There have been widespread complaints about the living conditions onboard that ship.

And not just on that ship but, widely speaking, we are concerned on this committee about how our sailors and also service members just in general are being taken care of and how responsive, in this case, the Navy is to those needs and concerns when they are raised.

It does not seem to have worked well in this situation. We have lost lives, major disruption for the sailors who are serving, and as you all know and I'll say, you know, for all the equipment and all the—it's about the people.

The people are what make us the best military in the world. We have to take care of our people. It does not seem at the moment like we're doing that to the extent that we should. Definitely want to hear more about what we're doing to correct that situation, going forward.

With that, I thank you for being here and I turn it over to Mr. Rogers for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the witnesses for being here and for your service to our Nation.

It should be no surprise I remain very concerned about the President's budget proposal. Rather than keeping pace with the threat from China, the President's budget would let them lap us, and you don't need to look much farther than the request for the Department of the Navy as evidence.

The President is seeking to build a paltry eight battle force ships by fiscal year 2023. At the same time, he wants to retire 24. Six-

teen of these ships have years and, in some cases, decades of service life remaining.

The President's proposal would retire an LCS [litoral combat ship] commissioned just 3 years ago, two ESDs [expeditionary transfer docks] with over 30 years' service life remaining, and a cruiser that's about to complete a service life extension that cost us hundreds of millions of dollars.

In all, the taxpayers—in all, the taxpayer has spent billions on these ships but there's little if any return on that investment. Beyond the incredible waste of money, these retirements represent a huge loss of capability for the Navy and the Marine Corps.

That became crystal clear when the Commandant informed us that the Marine Corps needed at least 31 amphibious ships to meet its statutory requirements. Yet, the administration plans to slash the fleet from 32 to 24 over the next 2 years.

All of this invites a tremendous amount of risk and the risk won't be mitigated for years. That's because this administration has no plans to grow the fleet. Instead, they plan to steadily cut the fleet by 18 ships over the next 5 years.

Forget the 500-ship Navy. We're never going to see a 350-ship Navy. While the administration dithers, China is rapidly growing and modernizing its navy. It already controls the largest navy in the world. Our fleet of 298 ships was eclipsed years ago by a Chinese fleet of over 350 ships.

By 2030 the DOD [U.S. Department of Defense] predicts China will control over 460 ships. I don't understand how this administration can conclude that making the size of our fleet even smaller will somehow deter China.

I'm also concerned about the strike fighter gap. Last year the Navy insisted the strike fighter gap would close by 2025. This year, they're telling us it won't close it until 2031.

But that assumes Congress grants the Navy the relief it wants from statutory requirements to field an air wing for each deployed aircraft carrier. I would caution the Navy to not be very optimistic that we will grant such relief. That means Congress will have to step in again to fill yet another critical capability gap that this administration refuses to deal with.

Setting back our credible deterrent even further is the President's call to eliminate the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile [SLCM]. According to the DNI [Director of National Intelligence], China is fielding a full nuclear triad and is expected to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030, and they are developing delivery systems that will almost certainly include a sea-launched cruise missile.

Meanwhile, Russia has a 21-to-1 advantage over us in tactical nuclear weapons, including a bevy of nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles. In light of this growing threat, the recommendation to end SLCM is both shortsighted and dangerous.

It's clear that this budget fails to invest in the capabilities required to deter conflict and, if necessary, to win the next war. I refuse to support it.

We should be expanding and modernizing our naval capabilities. We absolutely should not go along with the administration's plan to cut these capabilities. I look forward to working with the major-

ity to pass a real defense budget that supports modernization and ensures credible deterrence.

Finally, I want to [assure] the Commandant we understand the importance of Force Design 2030 and continue to support its implementation. I look forward to further updates on the progress he's making to reorganize the Marine Corps and ensure its evolution into a 21st century fighting force.

Congress will continue our oversight of Force Design 2030. In the meantime, I want to thank the Commandant for all of his interactions with Congress on this plan.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Del Toro.

Could you get the microphone a little closer to you there and—I'm not sure if it's on.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CARLOS DEL TORO, SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Secretary DEL TORO. Good morning.

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members, it's an honor to be here alongside General Berger and Admiral Gilday to discuss the posture of the Department of the Navy.

I look forward to working with you to ensure that our sailors and Marines are equipped, trained, and prepared to the best of our abilities so that they can fulfill our vital role to provide combat ready forces in support of our joint force.

The United States requires a strong Navy and a Marine Corps. Our global economy and the self-determination of free nations everywhere depends on sea power. Our national security depends on sea power.

That's particularly true in the Indo-Pacific where Beijing's aggression threatens the rules-based international order that protects us all. To answer that challenge, your Navy and Marine Corps must have the power to maintain credible integrated deterrence by campaigning forward, forward; forward from the sea, on the shore, and in the air.

Thanks to the leadership of President Biden and Secretary Austin, this budget does provide the right balance of capacity, lethality, modernization, and readiness that we need to execute the National Defense Strategy.

We will invest these resources through the execution of a concise, clear, transparent strategy rooted in three guiding principles: first, to maintain and strengthen our maritime dominance so that we can deter potential adversaries and fight and win decisively; second, to empower our sailors and our Marines by fostering a culture of warfighting excellence founded on strong leadership, dignity, and respect; and third, strengthen our strategic partnerships across the joint force, across industry, and our international partners around the globe.

We are executing this strategy through the integrated visions of the Marine Corps Force Design 2030 and the Navy Navigation Plan. I strongly support these visions. I am committed to fielding the ready, capable, and modernized force required to ensure their success.

To maintain and strengthen maritime dominance, we have to be serious about fielding and maintaining the right capability to win wars.

That's why our budget strongly invests in a nimble network and survivable Navy with platforms like *Columbia*, DDG Flight III, with enhanced cyber and autonomous capabilities that enable our fleet to campaign forward in a distributed manner.

This budget invests in a truly expeditionary and persistent Marine Corps with the mobility and the readiness as a responding force wherever and whenever needed.

To ensure the combat readiness of our platforms well into the future we're more than doubling Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, SIOP, investments over the previous budget.

This budget invests in the climate resiliency of our force and facilities while continuing efforts to substantially reduce our impact on climate change. This budget also invests in facilities that promote the quality of life of our personnel and their families.

We owe it to our military families to ensure their safety and well-being at all times, and when we fall short, we look at our problems square in the eye and take actions to fix those problems.

We're investing in our efforts to recruit, retain, train, and promote the best from all of America and we are increasing funding for naval and cyber education and enhanced shipboard training, enabling sailors and Marines to build their careers wherever service takes them.

We appreciate the committee's interest in ensuring our forces have the right facilities to train, fight, and win, including the potential expansion of the Fallon Training Range Complex. We also appreciate the committee's efforts to include new tools within the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] to deter destructive behavior and prosecute sexual assault, domestic violence, and other offenses.

At every level of leadership we are determined to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment, hold offenders accountable, and create a safer, stronger, more inclusive Navy-Marine Corps team.

I want to close by noting the importance of strategic partnerships. From the joint force and our industrial base to our allies and partners around the world, I have seen our partnerships and alliance in actions from F-35B operations in the Indo-Pacific to NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] exercises in Norway and the Mediterranean.

But our most important partnership is with the American people. That's why I'm grateful for the oversight and the interest of this committee and I look forward to continuing to work with you.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Del Toro can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Gilday.

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL M. GILDAY, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral GILDAY. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers—

The CHAIRMAN. The light doesn't work that you can see. So you just push it once and then it's on.

Admiral GILDAY. Is that on? Perfect. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Good.

Admiral GILDAY. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity this morning to appear with Secretary Del Toro and General Berger.

For nearly eight decades, America's maritime superiority has guaranteed security and prosperity across the world's oceans and has played a unique and predominant role in ensuring that our Nation's most vital national interests remain intact.

Maintaining maritime superiority is fundamental to implementing the National Defense Strategy. Global competition is heating up, the pace of innovation is accelerating, and the environment of our naval forces sailing and flying every day is more transparent, it's more lethal, and it's more contested.

Everyone in this room is familiar with those trends, particularly China's massive investment in highly capable forces designed to deny our access to the seas.

Our Navy's role has never been more consequential or more expansive. America needs a combat-credible naval force that can protect our interests in peace and prevail in war, not just today but tomorrow in the long-term competition ahead of us.

Our budget submission reflects that imperative. It fully funds a *Columbia*-class submarine to ensure continuity for our Nation's most survivable strategic deterrent. It keeps our fleet ready to fight tonight, funding maintenance accounts, filling magazines with weapons, putting spare parts in storerooms, and giving our sailors the steaming days and the flying hours that they need to train and fight.

It modernizes our fleet by investing in weapons with increased range and speed, integrated systems to improve fleet survivability, and a resilient cyber-secure network infrastructure, and it invests in affordable capable capacity, building towards the goal of a larger distributed hybrid fleet on, under, and above the seas.

The investments in our shipbuilding account reflect the rigorous analysis that we have conducted with the Marine Corps over the past year and the capability requirements of our combatant and our fleet commanders.

We need to field a fleet today that is ready as we modernize for the future. This has forced us to make difficult decisions, including the decommissioning of platforms that do not bring the needed lethality to a high-end fight in contested seas.

While building capacity at the expense of readiness and modernization can sound like an attractive proposition, it is not one that I endorse. We have been there before and we have seen tragic results. I refuse to repeat it again.

We cannot field a fleet larger than one that we can sustain. At today's fiscal levels, quantity simply cannot substitute for quality, especially as our adversaries are building advanced warfighting systems.

Failing to modernize to meet those threats would erode America's maritime superiority at a time when the command at seas will shape the global strategic balance of power for the rest of this century.

The stakes in this competition are extremely high, and your sailors and Marines, Active and Reserve, uniformed and civilian, are committed to strengthening our naval power every single day.

Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I'm grateful for the committee's support to our Navy and Marine Corps team. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Gilday can be found in the Appendix on page 98.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
General Berger.

**STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. BERGER, USMC, COMMANDANT
OF THE MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS**

General BERGER. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the committee, as we sit here this morning with the backdrop of a war being waged in Ukraine and malign activities in the Indo-Pacific, I think it's a pretty good reminder that we don't have the luxury of building a joint force designed for one threat or one region or one form of warfare.

We have to be prepared, of course, for the full range of operations in places we might not expect and probably on timelines we did not anticipate, and that's why your Marine Corps' ability to respond to crises in any clime and place is essential to our national security.

Three years ago, as the leadership mentioned in the beginning, we embarked on an ambitious program of modernization to ensure that your Marine Corps continues to meet its statutory role as the Nation's force in readiness, and while China does remain the pacing challenge, our modernization efforts are theater agnostic.

In fact, earlier this year we deployed the first set of Force Design 2030 capabilities to the EUCOM [U.S. European Command] AOR [area of responsibility] and we established the first Marine littoral regiment in the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] AOR, and that is your Marine Corps modernizing at speed.

And with the bipartisan support of this committee, our modernization effort, I would assess, is on track and building momentum. Over the past 3 years, with your assistance we have literally self-funded \$17 billion worth of modernization.

Today, I'd like to offer you a brief update on three areas of significant progress over the past 12 months.

First, over the past year and a half we have conducted nine force-on-force exercises out at our combined arms live fire training center in Twentynine Palms, California.

What we have learned in those nine exercises has validated our initial assumptions. Smaller, more mobile, more distributed units employing 21st century combined arms—if they have organic ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and if they have loitering munitions—have a decisive advantage and they are more lethal than larger formations using traditional force structures and traditional warfighting concepts; findings, I would offer, that are entirely consistent for what we're seeing in Ukraine right now.

In less than 2 years, we formalized a concept for stand-in forces, built a capability that I believe has dramatically expanded what we can achieve in support of both land and maritime operations.

One of those stand-in forces, as we sit here this morning, is in Europe, and as the EUCOM commander previously testified a few weeks ago, that force is, in his words, “precious for effective deterrence.”

Second, we achieved some important operational milestones. This year we’ll deploy the first Amphibious Combat Vehicles with a MEU [Marine expeditionary unit] on an ARG [amphibious ready group]. And with this committee’s assistance and support, the accelerated fielding of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle—the ACV—has allowed us to accelerate the decommissioning, allowed us to retire its predecessor, the AAV [Assault Amphibious Vehicle], which was aging and that was years in advance, due to your support.

This year also marked the first deployment of our F-35Cs onboard a Navy aircraft carrier, our F-35Bs onboard a British aircraft carrier for the first time. That 7-month deployment onboard the HMS [Her Majesty’s Ship] *Queen Elizabeth*, I think demonstrated both significant progress in building interchangeability—not interoperability but interchangeability—with the U.K. [United Kingdom] but also our commitment to standing astride our allies and partners.

The MEU, enabled by amphibious ships, remains the crown jewel of our naval expeditionary forces. No naval vessel in our inventory is capable of supporting a more diverse set of missions than the amphibious warship.

Secretary Del Toro, the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], and I all agree that 31 L-class traditional amphibious warships is the minimum that the Nation needs, and your support for sustaining that minimum capacity is essential to national security.

And, finally, this past year, we published our plan to create a modern personnel system better aligned to the realities of what we face in the future.

That plan will better allow us to recruit, to develop, to retain, and align the talents of Marines with what the Marine Corps needs in the future, maximizing the performance of both.

But what the Marine Corps does for this Nation, that will not change. We remain America’s force in readiness, capable of diverse missions across the operational spectrum. But how we accomplish those missions is changing.

My role, to ensure that the members of this committee understand where we are headed and why, and how your support is critical to our collective success, and to that end, I welcome the opportunity this morning to continue working closely with the members and leadership of this committee and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Berger can be found in the Appendix on page 114.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you, General Berger. Thank you for your leadership in modernizing the force.

I know it hasn’t been easy. Tough decisions have had to have been made and I think you’re moving in the right direction. And for my part, I support the 31 amphibious ship requirement that you need. I mean, that’s central to what you’re trying to accomplish, and we will continue to work to make sure we achieve that.

Admiral Gilday, I want to drill down a little bit on what you said about, you know, being able to maintain the force, and let's talk about the ships that are being retired, some of them that are not that old.

But regardless of how old they are, the cost of operating them has been much higher than expected. They are not, frequently, ready for a variety of different mechanical problems and the capabilities, particularly when we're talking about the LCS and the missions that they were supposed to be able to do, they haven't been able to do.

Could you drill down on some of those specifics? Because it's easy to say, my gosh, why would you get rid of 10 ships? You know, they're sitting here. Why can't we use them?

Well, we can't use them, number one, because a lot of times they're not ready to do anything, number one. Number two, when they are they still break down. They're incredibly expensive and they don't have the capabilities that we expected.

So regardless of how old they are, that's a lot of money to be spent to get pretty close to nothing. Can you walk through some of those specifics for us?

Admiral GILDAY. Our entering argument is what can we afford so, in other words, you won't have a Navy bigger than one that we can sustain.

So in taking a look at our top line, we then stratified all of our platforms based on their return in the fight. So with respect to their lethality, with respect to sustainability, with respect to reliability, could we count on them to actually move the needle in a high-end fight with an adversary like China.

So that stratification caused ships down at the bottom, as an example, to drop out.

Older cruisers. So of the five cruisers that we have had in modernization, they are over 8 years in delay days out of shipyards and over a half a billion dollars above budget with respect to the modernization programs.

With respect to the weapon systems on those platforms, the older spy radars can't see the threat. So if they can't see it they can't shoot it down.

So in terms of reliability, three recent cruisers that we have deployed we either had to pull them in for repairs overseas with leaks below the waterline or we have had to pull them back into their homeports in the United States for leaking fuel tanks.

So there have been survivability, reliability, and lethality challenges with the cruisers that are near the end of their service life at 35 years.

We think that at this point we're putting—we're throwing good money after bad and the investment—the money that we save from those cruisers gets reinvested into readiness, into modernization, and into capacity, in that order.

The LCS ships. The primary reason why the nine LCS ships are on the retirement list has to do with an anti-submarine warfare system. That was the primary battery—main battery—of that ship. It did not work out technically.

So after about a year and a half study, I refuse to put an additional dollar against a system that would not be able to track a high-end submarine in today's environment.

With respect to the older LSDs [dock landing ships], the *Tortuga* is a really good example, she's 3 years delayed coming out of maintenance right now.

So these decisions we made, sir, again, centered around lethality, being able to actually move the needle in a fight, survivability, and reliability, and we have reinvested that money. Our proposal is to reinvest that funding into our top priorities: readiness, modernization, and lethality.

And if I could just continue for a moment to talk about that. So with respect to readiness, we're trying to maximize the domestic production lines for all high-end missiles—LRASM [Long Range Anti-Ship Missile], JASSM-ER [Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range], Maritime Strike Tomahawk, SM-6—so that the ships that we do send to sea actually have systems that matter—that matter from both a deterrence and from a fight—

The CHAIRMAN. If I could just put a fine point on that.

Admiral GILDAY. Sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Rather than spending money on ships that aren't capable and don't perform, you would like to spend it so the ships we do have actually have missiles that they can use, which seems to make sense to me.

And, look, Mr. Rogers is not wrong about the amount of money we have spent on these things. But throwing good money after bad, as you said, spending more money on them to not get what we need, that's not the solution to that problem.

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, and the cost of maintaining those numbers over quality, we're going to pay for that in terms of people. We're going to pay for it with less ammunition and magazines, fewer spare parts in storerooms.

We're going to pay for it with reduced maintenance, reduced flying hours, reduced steaming days, everything that will yield you a ready force today with—as some have mentioned, we won't—the size of the Navy, the shape of the Navy, is not going to change much within the next 5 years. Given the fact that we face a rising China, a very near threat, perhaps, in 2027 or sooner, the fleet that we field today has to be ready to take it on.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Just one quick thing back on our sea-launched cruise missile. Lest anyone have the wrong impression, we have sea-launched nuclear missiles, okay. They're just on the boomers, on the *Columbia*—*Ohio*-class, soon to be *Columbia*-class submarine. So it's not like we don't have the capability.

The question is whether or not we want to move that—sorry, add that capability to attack submarines who, by the way, actually have a mission that is unrelated to the nuclear mission that we want to make sure that they perform.

Just very quickly, one more time can you walk us through the concern about adding it to the attack submarines, understanding that, yeah, great, Chinese are developing, you know, sea-launched—sorry, submarine-launched nuclear weapons.

We have submarine-launched nuclear weapons. We're not walking away from that capability. We're talking about whether or not we want to add that to what our attack submarines already do.

So walk us through your reasoning.

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.

Having served—having served on a nuclear capable surface ship in the late 1980s, that mission does not come without a cost.

There is a significant amount of attention that has to be paid to any platform that carries that type of weapon in terms of training, in terms of sustainability, in terms of reliability, in terms of the force's readiness to be able to use, to be able to conduct that mission.

I'm not convinced yet that we need to make a \$31 billion investment in that particular system to close that particular gap.

I do think that it makes sense to me that we keep a small amount of money against R&D [research and development] to keep that warm, if you will, within the industrial base while we get a better understanding of the world we live in with two nuclear-capable peer competitors.

At the same time, the fact that we're about to put hypersonics into play this year with the Army in 2025 with the Navy, that's also a deterrent that we should factor in the conversation in terms of the investments that we're going to make, in my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, the—in response to the chairman's question, you framed it out of the box, that we're going to have to make decisions about what we can afford, given the top line. That's my problem. This is an arbitrary top line that is inadequate and you're trying to fit the number—and I know you've got to pick some number.

But what I ask for is what do you need, and let us worry about the number. Because the fact is Presidents propose budgets, Congress writes budgets, and we want to make sure we that we give you what you need to be successful as a Navy.

With that, let's talk a little about inflation. We're hearing from industry that significant inflationary increases in price and materials and commodities. For example, we have heard there's significant cost growth in the price of the next oiler the Navy has been budgeted for.

How is inflation currently impacting your service and are you concerned about the impacts of this record inflation for fiscal year 2023?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir, I am concerned. So with respect to unfunded requirements that inflation has exacerbated this year, potentially an additional \$2 billion for fuel alone.

I think—you mentioned the industrial base. So we will see increases in our military construction projects. We will see increases in our ship production, submarine production, airline production, aircraft production lines, due to inflation. It makes—makes sense.

On our sailors and on their families that's where we'll see an impact as well. A good example is basic allowance for housing, and although the 2023 budget proposes about a 2.4 percent increase in

housing allowance, that does not keep pace with the housing market that exists today and so that puts them under pressure.

The bottom line, sir, is that yes, inflation adds another stressor to this—to this budget as we try to field the most lethal, capable, effective Navy and Marine Corps today.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you.

Admiral, in your best professional military judgment, does the retirement of 24 ships in fiscal year 2023 and the accelerated reduction of 10 percent of our fleet's conventional strike capability in the next 5 years make our conventional deterrence stronger or weaker?

Admiral GILDAY. I don't think it puts us in a better place, sir. However, it's not just about numbers, and if I could briefly describe what this proposed budget yields under, on, and above the sea, it's fairly impressive.

Based on the support from this Congress, we have maximized the submarine industrial base with two SSNs [attack submarines] and an SSBN [ballistic-missile submarine] a year, and that set of headlights goes out to 2037.

With a high degree of confidence, that part of the industrial base probably better than any other sector in the Department of Defense is able to remain sighted on their investments in a workforce and infrastructure.

So we're fielding the world's best submarines and we're also investing in world-class weapons for those submarines. Our Navy SEALs [sea, air, and land forces] are pivoted from primarily counterterrorism focus to their frogman roots under the sea, and so we have that, again, as an added enhancement for the undersea piece.

On the surface, we're commissioning Flight III DDGs [*Arleigh Burke*-class of guided-missile destroyers], the new *Constellation*-class frigate. We're putting hypersonics on *Zumwalt*-class destroyers. We are investing in hypersonic weapons with SM-6, Maritime Strike Tomahawk. As I mentioned earlier, we're trying to max out those production lines.

In the air, by mid-century in 2020—mid-decade in 2025, half of our air wings will be fourth-, fifth-gen integrated. We are trying to maximize domestic production lines for LRASM and JASSM-ER, weapons with range and speed.

The unmanned capability that we have that we're fielding in our air wings right now to go IOC [initial operating capability] in 2025 is the MQ-25; extends the range of our air wings, allows us to free up strike fighters from that refueling role to do what they have been traditionally trained to do.

And, lastly, we're making investments with the help of Congress for the human weapon system. So in areas of training, live virtual constructive training, relevant learning, mental health. We're also making investments in cyber that are significant.

So when I take a look at what we are doing, given the top line that we have, it's significant in terms of not only deterrence but also to put us in a position to prevail and win.

Could we always use more? Absolutely. My unfunded list gets at some of that. But we are fielding a highly lethal capable force.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Admiral.

General Berger, the administration has proposed cutting the number of amphibious vessels from 32 to 24 ships. How does the reduction impact your ability to support operations in forcible entry options and do you support the reduction?

General BERGER. The study that the Secretary of the Navy commissioned this past fall, which was, I think, the second one since 2018, took a different—a little bit different tack, in answering your question, in that A, it was based on both the 2018 and the 2022 NDS [National Defense Strategy], and the problem was how many—the question from the Secretary is how many amphib ships do we need.

The second part is it took—used a more realistic availability goal. In other words, historically, where are we with amphib ship readiness and factor that in.

Not aspirationally, idealistically, but realistically. We need amphibious ships and Marines embarked on them to do, I think, three basic things.

One is to deter, to campaign. Deterrence underpins the strategy. Second, we have to be able to respond to crises and contingencies. And third, in a warfight, we have to be prepared to fight.

Thirty-one is the bare minimum and that assumes risk even at 31.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes and he's virtual.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we can.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good.

Good morning to our witnesses. Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General Berger, thank you for your testimony this morning and for your service to our country.

Let me begin by saying I'm very proud that our Nation's finest nuclear submarines are built right in the great State of Rhode Island, which I have the privilege of representing, and I'm glad to see such strong support for their construction and procurement as well as robust support in the necessary workforce development efforts in this year's budget request.

But let me just shift to another area right now and I want to focus on cyber. Many would agree this is the greatest national security threat that we face or one of them that we face in the 21st century.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Gilday, we met quite recently to discuss the state of Navy's cyber force and in that meeting you made clear that it's a priority for the Navy's leadership team.

Yet, we have—we have heard multiple concerns about the state of the Navy's cyber forces and the Secretary's 28 pages of written testimony for today's event, meant to reflect the highest priorities of the Navy, doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did touch upon cyber briefly but only to basically say that there's a team working on this.

Well, in the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into the, quote/unquote, "get well plan" that was directed at the Navy's cyber activities and I'm not sure that the plan which

aims to fix this supposedly urgent problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously.

So taking all this together, why should this committee believe that the Navy is prioritizing cyberspace operations?

Secretary DEL TORO. Thank you, Congressman, for that question, and let me reassure you that cyber is critically important to our national security in our Department of the Navy strategy. We actually have made major investments in fiscal year 2021, 2022, and 2023 in both capability and also with regards to policy and how we address cyber.

Right now in the Department of the Navy, for example, within the scope of our CIO [Chief Information Officer] he is embarking an entire new enterprise called Cyber Ready in order to be able to effectively make all our weapon systems cyber ready all the time as opposed to in a cyclic fashion, which has occurred in the past with regards to a complicated and really difficult ATO [authority to operate] process to be able to designate our systems cyber ready.

On the personnel side, we have also made major investments in cyber readiness of our force, training our officers. We have the first cyber curriculum at the United States Naval Academy. We're graduating cyber warriors, implementing them into our fleet and our force.

The Marine Corps has actually made tremendous advancements in terms of cyber readiness, and I'd like to, with your permission, allow the CNO and the Commandant to talk specifically to their own operational cyber readiness.

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, thanks for the question.

I think we're—our most recent conversation had to do with cyber readiness of our teams. Since that conversation, we have taken a deep dive in taking a look at the cyber readiness kill chain, if you will, all the way from recruiting talent to sustaining that talent on our cyber teams.

We found deficiencies with respect to the recruiting side. Doing a pretty good job in terms of getting talent, then matching up that talent against the right mission areas.

What we have instituted through working very closely with the University of Maryland behavioral scientists is we have developed a cyber aptitude test that allows us to take our entry level cyber sailors and to, essentially, pair them against the best, most appropriate skill sets that they can excel at.

We have—within the past month, we have increased our pass rate in an initial course down in Pensacola, Florida, from 40 to 50 percent to 80 percent by doing remedial training. So we put people, extra trainers, against that problem.

We're doing the same thing at Fort Mead. We have gone out to the fleet. We found 80 additional cyber operators that we felt could have better been used in the teams. We have moved those 80 operators to teams.

We have taken our cyber warrant officers that we created over the last 2 years—we have moved them back to their cyber teams in order to increase readiness. We have increased our—I'm increasing our retention bonuses, doubling them from 14—

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 151.]

The CHAIRMAN. I do apologize. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Wilson, who is also virtual, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Joe, you're still muted there. We don't—Joe, we don't have you. We're going to go to Mr. Lamborn and then we'll come back to you. We can't—we can't hear you.

Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LAMBORN. Yeah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Del Toro, it's great to see you again. During this hearing last year, your predecessor promised certain documents and emails related to the rumored—then rumored cancellation of the SLCM/N [nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile] program.

Last year's NDAA fenced a large amount of money until these documents and the analysis of alternatives for SLCM-N were provided to Congress. We have yet to receive any of this information despite the proposal in the Nuclear Posture Review to cancel SLCM-N and it being zeroed out of this year's proposed budget request.

When can we expect the Navy to comply with our directives and produce these documents?

Secretary DEL TORO. Congressman, I was not aware that those documents had not been provided to the Congress. However, I will promise you that I'll go back and ensure that we do provide the necessary documents that you have requested with—

Mr. LAMBORN. Please do. That's essential.

Secretary DEL TORO [continuing]. SLCM-N. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

Admiral Gilday, it's great to see you again and Admiral Joyner. I saw you both last month at Fallon TOPGUN [Navy Fighter Weapons School]. It's good to see you again.

This year, we have heard testimony from Chairman Milley, Admiral Grady, Admiral Richard, and General Wolters that their best military advice was to continue with the SLCM-N program, which we have been discussing here today. Do you believe that we should continue the program or at least the research and development that keeps it as a viable option for the future, should it be needed?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, I'm a proponent, as I stated, about keeping a modest amount of money against the R&D effort so that we don't lose that capability in the workforce and in our labs. It's actually proceeding at pace right now.

And then from that make informed decisions about whether or not we want to invest a significant amount of money in that capability, understanding what both of those nuclear-powered peers potentially bring to the table.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you.

Now, also, Admiral, I share the concern Ranking Member Rogers expressed about this administration not supporting SLCM-N. Some [who] have argued against continuing it imply that the Navy simply doesn't have the bandwidth to support it and it would be difficult to accomplish.

So let me ask you several yes or no questions to sort of set the stage for this issue. Currently—the Navy currently does handle nuclear weapons atop ballistic missiles, right?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMBORN. And the Navy has a decades-long history of handling a nuclear Tomahawk, which was retired less than a decade ago, correct?

Admiral GILDAY. So the nuclear Tomahawks were retired back in the late 1980s during the first President Bush administration. So it's been decades since we have actually had nuclear-tipped Tomahawks on those—on surface ships or our submarines.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you for that clarification. So if given the mission of certifying and carrying a SLCM-N, are you confident that the Navy would be up to the task if given that assignment?

Admiral GILDAY. Given the assignment, we would, sir. I think it would come, again, at a cost. I think it deserves some study in terms of how we're going to balance that, given other things that we're doing.

Remember, today, particularly when we talk about our submarine force, we're dealing with a higher end threat than we were—than we were back then. And so the missions that we're conducting are very intense and don't come without risk.

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. And as the chairman has mentioned, it's one of my and I think our committee's top priorities to accelerate our development and fielding of hypersonic capabilities.

My understanding is that the Navy is currently tracking deployment of Conventional Prompt Strike in 2025 on the DDG 1000 and on the *Virginia*-class submarine in 2028. Are these plans still on track and is there anything we can do to help maintain this progress?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, they're still on track. The continued support for those programs would be most appreciated. Also, in my unfunded list I have—requesting additional money for a program called HALO [Hypersonic Air Launched Offensive Anti-Surface], which would be an air-launched hypersonic missile that we would hopefully field in this decade.

Mr. LAMBORN. And I know the Air Force is working on ARRW [Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon], which is a similar capability.

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. Very similar.

Mr. LAMBORN. With adequate—and, lastly, with adequate funding, would it be possible to accelerate the deployment of Conventional Prompt Strike on subsurface vessels even by one hull sooner if you had that adequate funding?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, at this time, I would say no. So within the industrial base, we are really struggling to deliver *Virginia*-class Block IVs and Block Vs on time.

And so I would not pressurize that, if I could avoid it, by yet increasing—you know, accelerating the schedule for Conventional Prompt Strike, which right now is on track, as I said, for 2028 on the third Block V *Virginia*-class.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. A lot of questions about doing things and paying for things you aren't doing. I'd like to ask you a question about things that you are doing that you don't want to pay for and that is the decommissioning of the five Growler—

expeditionary Growler squadrons. We had this discussion a few days ago.

You're planning to save \$807 million over some period of time by decommissioning Active expeditionary squadrons, two of which are actually deployed—one in Germany, one in Japan.

And so can you cover for me again why you're planning to decommission the expeditionary squadrons and keep one of the carrier squadrons, and that's for the Secretary or for the admiral.

Secretary DEL TORO. Congressman, we have taken a hard look at the Growlers and I still have much to learn—much more to learn, actually, about these deployments that have been recently made.

But there's five squadrons. We have racked and stacked the investments that the CNO and I have had to make in the Navy, and this is a mission that played lower, essentially, than some of the other missions that we have to face right now in terms of major investments, specifically with regards to the high-end fight against China right now. And, therefore, the determination was made that in fiscal year 2024—in POM [Program Objective Memorandum] 2024, these squadrons would begin to decommission.

However, I think that there's still enough time between now and then for further analysis to determine if they all need to be decommissioned or if a portion of them needed to be decommissioned.

Mr. LARSEN. It seems worth looking at since you have actually deployed expeditionary squadrons since the—well, recently, and the other part is in your rationale you've said that if you need to fill the gap then you'll use a CVN [aircraft carrier] squadron—carrier-based squadrons.

That would assume that the carrier-based squadrons have the bandwidth to become expeditionary squadrons instead of being deployed to carrier-based squadrons. Have you considered the impact that would have on the carrier-based squadrons?

Secretary DEL TORO. I'll ask the CNO to expand. But my understanding is that those Growler squadrons on carriers are fully deployed and don't have excess—

Mr. LARSEN. They're pretty busy—

Secretary DEL TORO [continuing]. Capacity, basically, to support expeditionary—

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. Admiral.

Admiral GILDAY. That's correct, sir. We don't have excess capacity on our nine air wings right now to support that expeditionary mission.

Of our carrier air wings that go to sea, the Growler is the only type/model/series aircraft that we deployed in an expeditionary manner, as you mentioned, right now both to Europe and to Japan.

Right now they are making a difference in Europe. They absolutely are. As the Secretary mentioned, this is a POM 2024 decision that will end up getting revisited. So as we spoke the other day, part of the entering argument for the Navy is whether or not this mission—this expeditionary mission—is core to what we do as a naval service and what we bring to the joint force.

And so that's the heart of the debate within OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] as we take a look at this truly joint capability and whether or not that investment should continue.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. And as we discussed a few days ago, you know, I've been on the committee for 22 years and it's been a conversation for 22 years as well.

And the other aviation force in the Pentagon has yet to actually come up with a plan or make any sort of commitment to returning to this particular EW [electronic warfare] effort. So it just, you know, keeps going on and on and on.

So we have covered that. You know my attention is on that one. On the Triton program timeline, we discussed that as well and you stood up a second squadron also at Naval Air Station Whidbey Island.

But, as noted, we have built the building to support the operations but we don't have the actual platforms to support. Can you give us an idea of the timeline on the unmanned platforms?

Admiral GILDAY. Okay. Sir, the——

Mr. LARSEN. Sorry. You just turned yourself off. Yeah.

Admiral GILDAY. The timeline we're on right now is fiscal year 2027 to move the operators up to Whidbey, and so, essentially, we'd have two squadrons, one in Jacksonville, Florida, VUP-19 [Unmanned Patrol Squadron 19], and then establish VUP-11 in Whidbey.

We are still assessing based on our program of record with the number of aircraft that we have on whether or not we will split those aircraft on each coast. We're still evaluating that.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Well, the building is built, largely, and so just—we'll hopefully have a plan for the building other than having it sit empty for 3 years.

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. We're taking a look at the most efficient, effective way to use the resources we have. Your point is very well taken. The program of record has changed a bit since those initial plans were laid and those buildings were built. At a minimum——

The CHAIRMAN. And I'm sorry. The gentleman's time has expired.

Admiral GILDAY [continuing]. The operators are going to go—the operators will move up there.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to try Mr. Wilson again.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We're good.

Mr. WILSON. And I'm grateful to be with you, and I really appreciate the service of all of our witnesses today. What a difference they make on behalf of our country.

And, indeed, Admiral, you're correct. Your service has never been more consequential as we have the situation of Putin's war against the people—a mass murder in Ukraine.

With that in mind, too, I'm also very happy that I grew up in Charleston, South Carolina. I was a sea cadet. I saw firsthand the benefit of the Charleston Naval Base. I remember very much the *Nautilus* submarines going by the city of Charleston.

It was so important. And then I'm also grateful I'm a Navy dad. I have a Navy doctor son. A benefit of his foreign service in Italy at Naples, I now have three grandchildren that speak perfect Italian. So military service has great meaning.

Additionally, Commandant, I'm grateful that my late father-in-law and brother-in-law served as Marines. And then my predecessor, Chairman Floyd Spence of the Armed Services Committee, was the Navy Reserve commander in Columbia here in South Carolina.

And, finally, a point I want to make, over the years I have represented Parris Island Marine Corps Air Station in the district. With redistricting it's no longer in the district.

But I want each of you to know that our office—as I'm the only member of the Armed Services Committee from South Carolina. We want to work with Parris Island. We want to work with Marine Corps Air Station.

So I would hope that their commanders could get back in touch anytime with my legislative director, Drew Kennedy—202-225-2452—and we really want to work and back up the extraordinary facilities there at Parris Island Marine Corps Air Station.

With that in mind, General Gilday, I was fortunate to serve as—in the Army National Guard for 31 years and serving with the exceptional noncommissioned officers who we refer to as the Army's backbone.

The Navy's Get Real, Get Better call to action places heavy emphasis on type commanders, flag officers, and senior executive leaders.

In addition, the Chief of the Naval Operations change—"Charge of Command" letter gives targeted guidance to incoming commanders. This is really good. But it seems like there needs to be initiatives that only are targeted toward officers.

And so, Admiral, what leadership development programs are you tailoring towards junior and senior petty officers who are generally the individuals empowered to execute the commander's orders?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, Get Real, Get Better is not just intended for senior leaders in the Navy. It absolutely is aimed right down at the deck plates, and most importantly, we count on our chief petty officers to really lead on a day-to-day basis and make a fundamental difference in the quality of our warfighters from a training standpoint, from a morale standpoint, and so they're absolutely essential.

My Charge of Command, actually, although the word command then is taken by most to be aimed at commanders, it's aimed at everybody, officers and civilians, enlisted as well. And so I've received feedback from enlisted sailors, from chiefs, from officers, and civilians on that charge of command.

I actually sought their input when I developed it and I continue to receive their feedback as we implement it. And so that document has been folded into all of our leadership training programs at every level in the Navy, both officer and enlisted.

Mr. WILSON. Well, we just so appreciate the NCOs [noncommissioned officers] and what they mean. Gosh, and hey, particularly, I've seen the drill instructors how inspiring they are at Parris Island.

Another issue, Admiral, is the budget request for—there's no funding for the F-18 Super Hornets, and with the circumstance of the F-35C plans, what's the latest on trying to address the next generation of air dominance?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. In terms of closing our strike fighter gap, there's really two pieces of that. The first is the F-35; and so, hands down, it's the best aircraft in the world and we continue to believe in it, continue to invest in it. It has its challenges but we're also committed to working through those challenges.

With respect to the Super Hornets, what we're doing—because the Super Hornet line will actually be terminated here this year or within the next year, we are investing in our existing Super Hornets to increase their flight hours to 10,000 hours as well as upgrading all their combat systems. So, it—

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 151.]

The CHAIRMAN. And, again, I apologize. The gentleman's time has expired. I should have explained this. As the questions go, even if you're answering we try and move on to the next person. So when you see the clock go down, if you could wrap up, I'll not have to interrupt you.

Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the witnesses this morning.

I'd like to just note at the outset of my questions, number one, you know, the budget that came over for shipbuilding at, roughly, between \$28 and \$29 billion is the first time in 6 years that it's been higher than the prior year's enacted level and that is significant. We're not beginning our deliberations in this committee in a hole, and I certainly consider that significant.

Secondly, we also got a 30-year shipbuilding plan, which is the first time since 2019. It's the headlights, as Admiral Gilday said, you know, in terms of at least allowing us to sort of have a longer horizon to make judgments about, again, this year's fiscal year 2023.

Again, neither one of them are the Ten Commandments. You know, we're going to take an independent look at and we look forward to working with all three of you as we get closer to markup.

There's been a lot of talk this morning about decommissioning and divesting. One item which you have to kind of dig a little bit in terms of the documents that we have gotten that, actually, I think is an interesting sort of counter narrative, which is that for the attack submarine fleet, which we have been looking at a downward trough as the *Los Angeles*-class submarines are retired, we're actually now seeing some progress in terms of shallowing or reducing that trough with the service life extensions—again, the seven reactor cores that the Navy is going to install on the hulls that are still safe, and I know that takes a lot of work to evaluate that.

Portsmouth, I believe, is the site of the first of those. Admiral Gilday, can we maybe just sort of talk about how, again, there's not a knee-jerk opposition to older platforms. You are still trying to extract value where it makes sense.

Admiral GILDAY. Yeah. Absolutely, sir. Thanks. So as you mentioned, we're trying to take 7 of our 688 submarines that have a vertical launch capability and to actually invest in them to increase their service life. Probably get four or five additional deployments out of there.

So almost 40 additional deployments, potentially, out of those submarines, and because they're our most stealthy, most survivable strike platform, that is not insignificant against a rising China.

And so we want to double down on the submarine force and I think that's a very good astute observation in terms of where we are making smart investments in a legacy platform, if you will, that's still highly lethal.

Mr. COURTNEY. And to put that in perspective, the last shipbuilding plan that we had showed that the fleet was dropping to 42. The new documents that you've submitted shows that we actually hold the line at 46, and as you point out, that's significant because they, clearly, are the most survivable with all the missile threat that's out there.

You know, just sort of segueing from that, in terms of maintaining the new construction for attack submarines of two per year, as you point out, you know, we're running into some real challenges.

But I would just note that the budget that you sent over includes real money for workforce development and also supply chain development, which I've been doing these for a few years.

I never have seen, again, that sort of moving upstream into the industrial base to, you know, invest in real capacity, which is the people who build them and the facilities that—and the supply chain and the facilities where it's going to take place.

President Biden, last December, issued a defense production order, which sort of doubled down on that, which designated the submarine workforce as essential, which I—again, I can't think of another place in the defense budget where a President has ever designated that.

Secretary Del Toro, maybe you can talk about, again, that, you know, surgical emphasis in terms of making sure that, you know, the actual people that build them are going to have the support and the bodies to make that happen.

Secretary DEL TORO. Absolutely, Congressman. And you are correct that, you know, this administration, this President's commitment to the nuclear triad, actually, and to the investments in the submarine force are truly substantial in every possible way. And when you look at a \$28 billion investment across the entire shipbuilding budget it is significant and it is the first time that we have actually increased that since the last time it was enacted.

The 30-year shipbuilding plan is also a very serious attempt to take a look at what the Nation needs to meet the National Defense Strategy and to also take a look at it from the lens of what the future threats are as well, too, and what the future capacity for the shipbuilding industry is to support the type of shipbuilding that we want in this Nation.

As you suggest, part of that solution is working very closely with the industrial base to make sure that we have the right capacity, the right investments to reach those shipbuilding rates that we hope to reach.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Del Toro, I want to go to you. You said on April 5th that the U.S. Navy's budget should be driven by strategy and not

the strategy driving the budget. Do you agree that China remains a pacing threat as identified in our National Defense Strategy and by our INDOPACOM leaders and that the Navy's budget should, indeed, be driven by strategy?

Secretary DEL TORO. I do, Congressman, very much so. I think this President has made the commitments to ensuring that the budget meets the strategy, and as you read the National Defense Strategy it focuses in on China as the pacing threat and the ability to deter China while at the same time deterring aggression elsewhere around the world.

And the investments that have been made specifically in the Indo-Pacific have been very, very substantial over this last budget.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. Thank you.

Admiral Gilday, I certainly agree with the Secretary about strategy needing to drive the budget. Unfortunately, the budget that got sent over this year, I think, doesn't do that.

I have severe misgivings about the Navy shrinking by 16 ships. I think future platforms and capabilities that you project to arrive don't arrive in the next 5 years to the fleet.

I think that creates incredible vulnerabilities for the United States and opportunities for China. Worse still a 30-year shipbuilding plan that provides three different profiles. Only one of those profiles gets us to 355 ships. And by the way, China is at 355 today. They'll be at 420 by 2025.

So I wanted to get your perspective. I think this is a dangerous place for us to be. In your professional military judgment, do any of these shipbuilding profiles presented in the 30-year shipbuilding plan allow us to pace China as is required in the National Defense Strategy?

Admiral GILDAY. I think so, sir. My recommendation would be the third alternative if we're going to pursue one and if we had additional top line to do so. So this would have to—this would result in real growth, so above inflation, and our estimate with that alternative is about \$75 billion—conservatively, \$75 billion over the 30-year shipbuilding plan.

But that's what would be required. That would get us closer to our requirement but it wouldn't necessarily exactly meet the requirement because we're constrained to some degree by the industrial base.

Mr. WITTMAN. Right. Thank you, and I know what goes along with that is the sustainment tail, too. So maintenance, sailors, the whole nine yards.

General Berger, in a letter to myself and our chairman of Seapower and Projection Forces [Subcommittee], Joe Courtney—the one you sent to us on April the 7th—you stated the bottom line, in order to meet statutory requirements, the Marine Corps needs no fewer than 31 L-class ships and no fewer than 35 light amphibious warfare ships.

For this committee, could you confirm that this number, this 31 number, is, indeed, the floor and that the 35 number for LAWs [Light Amphibious Warships] is indeed the floor as you see what needs to happen for Force Design 2030?

General BERGER. I can, sir. Thirty-one is the floor, further broken down into 10 LHA [landing helicopter assault]/LHDs [landing

helicopter dock] and 21 LPD 17s [landing platform dock] are in Flight IIs. That's the combination.

As far as the Light Amphibious Warship, initially, I thought 35. It's hard to tell at this point because we don't have any. So, initially, the study that we have just completed, the Navy and Marine Corps together, says somewhere between 18 and 35 to be determined by, once fielded, what we learn from that and how they're employed, sir.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. I know recently that you've worked with the Navy on the upcoming amphibious ship study that looks to align the force structure assessment with the 2022 National Defense Strategy.

I wanted to get your perspective. Have any of the requirements, in your mind, through that process changed from where you see the Marine Corps not only today but where it needs to be in the future?

And in your professional military judgment, does the Marine Corps still require a fleet of no less than 31 ships even in light of all the things that may be forthcoming from that amphibious ship study?

General BERGER. [Audio malfunction.]

Mr. WITTMAN. So even if that study comes out and says something different than the 31 as the floor you're still very strongly behind 31 as the floor for L-class ships?

General BERGER. [Audio malfunction.]

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you very much for your testimony, for your leadership. A lot of issues ahead of us. A couple of them I want to focus on.

Logistics. The Russians are learning about logistical challenges. We certainly, if we're looking at the Pacific, there are significant logistical challenges. As I look at the shipbuilding plan, 350 or any number less than that or more than that, the logistical support is not in that—among those ships.

So the question for you gentlemen is how do you propose to meet the logistical challenges that exist in the Pacific, given the current shipbuilding plan?

Mr. Secretary, let's start with you.

Secretary DEL TORO. Absolutely, Congressman, and thank you for your support of our Navy and Marine Corps team and particularly your support of this particular issue in the Pacific, especially as it applies to the challenge we face in the Indo-Pacific via China.

I would argue that we have actually suffered in the area of logistics for quite some time. But my cup is half full. I think it's getting better, and when you take a look at the investments that are being made over the next 10 years, for example, with regards to sealift, with regards to the number of oilers that we're building and the number of other support ships that we're building, I think we're moving in the right direction.

And perhaps the CNO can further comment on the investments that we're about to make.

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, in this—sir, in this budget, we have five oilers over the course of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], and so it's easy to take your eye off supply ships but they're actually fundamental to everything we do, particularly when we think about what the Marine Corps brings to the fight with MLRs [Marine littoral regiments] and their work in the first island chain with their advanced expeditionary—

The CHAIRMAN. I'm sorry, Admiral. I don't think your microphone is on and our virtual folks can't hear if it's not.

Admiral GILDAY. I'm sorry, sir. I just mentioned that we have five—we have five *John Lewis*-class oilers in this budget fundamental to what we want to do with both the Navy and the Marine Corps.

One area that we haven't talked about is the experimentation we're doing with unmanned, particularly in the area of contested logistics, and in a theater kind of environment how can we better supply Marines ashore, ships that are forward, using unmanned whether it's unmanned in the air or unmanned on the sea.

We have been experimenting in the Middle East with not only concepts but actual platforms and we believe that there's a lot of promise there.

As the Secretary mentioned, sir, we are not taking our foot off the pedal with respect to an investment in supply ships, going forward.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to move on to another question.

General Berger, we have had a conversation about this. I would recommend to you that we could meet the needs of logistics, maybe that second half of the half full cup, by utilizing the Jones Act ships that are presently available, repurposing those that are essential so that they can meet some of the requirements, and others that could be made to be militarily useful. They're in the fleet. Treat this much as we treat the airline craft and provide the necessary support.

Might call it a national maritime security program. I'm going to spend a lot of time working with you gentlemen and this committee on this this year. So I'll let it go at that.

I do have another question. Shipyards. Admiral, how are we doing and, Mr. Secretary, how are we doing on our shipyards, the SIOP program, the 5-year versus the 20-year program?

Secretary DEL TORO. Yes, sir. Well, the good news is that there's major investments coming and there's actually a lot of progress that's being made even today, actually, up in Portsmouth, for example, with the completion of Dry Dock No. 1 and the ability now to be able to not have to worry about floating the submarines to actually get them in there.

And that's the beginning of much more to come. In my travels, I've actually visited all the four public shipyards and I visited all the private shipyards—many of the private shipyards as well, too—and I'm really excited about these investments that are going to be made.

As you know, it's a \$21 billion investment over the next 20 years. What I believe we owe the Congress, however, and owe you is a plan to better reflect the timeline and the POA&M [plan of action and milestones], basically, that's going to take effect over those 20

years. We have given you sort of the short story. I think we now need to do a better job in informing the Congress what the long story is going to be.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Tying the need—the immediate need—to the immediate repair and upgrade at the shipyards, I talk about a 5-year, 20 years. I don't know. Maybe some in this committee will be around 20 years from now. I won't.

So what are we going to do in the next 5 years? How does that tie into the immediate needs?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 151.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Scott is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I have a similar question to Mr. Garamendi's, but I'll be a little more specific with it.

Admiral Gilday, the Ready Reserve fleet—or Ready Reserve Force as I believe we call it today—I think we're all concerned about just how ready they are, no pun intended. But what is the Navy's plan for recapitalization of that fleet?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. We have an ongoing life extension program. We are funding life extensions on a double digit number of those ships. I don't have the specific number on the tip of my tongue.

As you're probably aware, we just purchased two used sealift vessels and they're up in Baltimore right now. We're going to provide enhancements to those ships and we're looking at purchasing another couple here in the near term and then another couple after that.

So we have been moving in a deliberate fashion, although at a conservative pace, but we think a deliberate pace, in order to refurbish that fleet. We're not ignoring it.

Mr. SCOTT. I want to—I very much support buying vessels that are out there in the private market and using them when they can be used and retrofitted. We have the potential, I think, as well for our hospital ships.

The *Mercy* and the *Comfort* were—are both approaching 50 years of age. The Navy has, in years gone past, proposed standing them down. What is the current plan for the *Mercy*, the *Comfort*, and the hospital fleet for the Navy?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, we're actually extending the life of both of those ships right now. They're both undergoing repairs or have been undergoing repairs. We are taking a look at providing a medical capability on two of the EPFs [expeditionary fast transports] that we're building.

And so instead of building a new hospital ship, we're taking a ship that—essentially, a large ship that is really multifunction—it's really a Swiss army knife—and we're putting a medical capability on there.

And so that is our quickest way to add capacity in that mission set.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. I'm certainly in favor of the mission and in favor of finding those efficiencies. So look forward to further discussion about that.

Mr. Del Toro, one of the questions that I have is as we stand down different systems inside the United States, I do not think we have done a very good job of going to our partners and other countries and asking them if they're interested in the assets that we're going to be retiring.

Do we have a program for that currently? Is that something that the Navy is looking at and that if we determine that we do not want an asset are we going to make that asset available to a partner nation?

Secretary DEL TORO. We actually do, Congressman, and actually we have used it very aggressively throughout the years. Actually, the number of ships in the program right now have dwindled down to about two or three capital ships, mostly our older frigates.

However, as we decide to and if the Congress approves to divest some of these ships, particularly the LCSs, I think there is very strategic opportunities to move some of those ships to our allies and partners, and we're already in some very preliminary discussions about, you know, where they could go, perhaps, and be best suited.

Mr. SCOTT. I think that you would find more support from several of the members on this committee if we knew what the actual plan was for the divestment of those assets and making sure that they're still going to be available in a fight even if they're not a U.S.-flagged—

Secretary DEL TORO. Yes, sir. And, of course, we have to do that with the permission of the Congress.

Mr. SCOTT. Sure. Are we coordinating with our partners in our procurement? In other words, when we talk about our NATO allies, if we determine that we need to procure, just say, eight destroyers over the course of the next 10 years for a NATO-based—

Secretary DEL TORO. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. Strategy, are we saying, you know, the Germans will have this many, the Brits will have this many, and the U.S. will build this many? Is our strategy coordinated on procurement?

Secretary DEL TORO. So there's a very robust discussions are always ongoing with regards to how we could actually interoperate and actually be interexchangeable as well, which includes the sharing of technologies with our allies and partners, and those discussions are quite robust with our NATO partners, with other partners in Asia as well, too. So we—

Mr. SCOTT I'm out of time. I do want to mention one thing. I'm very concerned about the demands of India on technology transfer to companies that they own. I want to just express that publicly. I'm very concerned about the demands of India on technology transfer.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 152.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

Secretary DEL TORO. And we watch that very closely—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Norcross is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here and service to our country.

The 30-year shipbuilding plan—it's great to see that and, certainly, Admiral, we appreciate your focus on the overall numbers, which I am less concerned about because I do not put one of our new modern aircraft carrier, which gets a number one, with a small rowboat, which would get a number one. It's about capacity and what they're able to do. So I'm more interested in what we have available. So I applaud your position on that.

I look at our *Virginia*- and *Columbia*-class is remarkable, moving forward. We certainly have some delays in it because of COVID [coronavirus disease] and supply chain, but really pleased with the way that's going. And the carriers, the backbone of so many of our strategies. The core to much of the decisions we're making revolve around the carrier and what it can do, and where it fits into particularly, in the China question.

A couple of quick questions here with the assets we're putting on that. So the strike fighter deficit is not predicted to close until 2030, 2031, somewhere in that area. We made decisions last year not to fund certain fighters because of what we believed the timeline would be.

This year, the FA-18s, Super Hornets, no requests there. The F-35Cs are less than we originally anticipated. The removal of the FA-18 service life modifications. All this is based on next generation of air dominance. We're putting all our eggs into that basket in terms of this decision.

Would you bring some clarity to us? We have a tendency in not delivering new programs on time. Yet, we're looking at not closing the gap till 2030, 2031, and the next-gen air dominance. Would you bring us up to speed on the air dominance next platform?

Secretary DEL TORO. So, Congressman, if I could just start the conversation and turn it over to the CNO and the Commandant for additional comment.

Without question, I think the consequences of COVID in particular has had a huge impact on our supply chain and that obviously has had an impact on the ability to deliver F-35s on time as well, too, with the originally intended capability that they would bring.

So this has unquestionably complicated the supply chain and being able to bring these additional F-35s in a timely fashion as well. So as we looked at Next Generation Air Dominance, I think it's very important to fully understand that platform before we actually fully commit to it.

We are making investments in R&D in a substantial way. But we—before we actually make a commitment to start buying them in great numbers, we have got to fully define the requirements associated with them, the technology that's going to go on them, and make sure that we can make that transition between F-35 and that next-generation fighter.

Mr. NORCROSS. Well, then let me ask you a question. If we're basing the retirements and not buying additional—the Hornets for an illustration—and we're not sure what our requirements, that means we're not sure of our timeframe. Yet, we're trading that gap in time.

So if we're not sure we're going to Next Generation Air Dominance, why are we trading these capabilities today?

Secretary DEL TORO. Well, the—I'll allow the CNO to comment, but the F-35, actually, as the CNO commented, is the most capable aircraft that we have.

Mr. NORCROSS. No question.

Secretary Del Toro [continuing]. And the hope would be that coming out of COVID the supply chain actually will improve, that the manufacturer will be able to start delivering those jets in greater numbers that we need so that we can actually close that gap quicker.

CNO, would you like to further comment?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, your question was—I want to make sure I get it right. It was really the strike fighter shortfall—

Mr. NORCROSS. Microphone.

Admiral GILDAY [continuing]. The strike fighter shortfall. So two levers to pull. One is F-35s, right. We wanted to buy a hundred over the FYDP. We're down to 69, I'm requesting an additional 6 in the unfunded list to bring us up to 75. We need more F-35s in order to help bring down that shortfall.

The other is the service life modernization on the existing Super Hornets to bring us up to 10,000 hours in each jet and a more capable aircraft. Right now, those turnaround times in those jets in industry is 18 months.

We think we're going to walk that down to 15 months within a year. The goal is to get it done in 12 months to help close that gap.

The MQ-25s, the unmanned right now on—that we're going to go IOC on 2025, that's the path forward for unmanned hybrid mix on an aircraft carrier. It's going well. That's one to watch. We want to make sure that that actually is successful before we put a lot of money into—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kelly is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. We really appreciate your service to our Nation in both capacity—both capacity for you, Mr. Secretary.

The first thing I want to talk about, I want to double tap what Mr. Norcross said. You guys owe us a 30-year ship plan. You've owed us that since I've been here, I think, and we can't understand what you want to do if you don't lay it out in writing what you're going to do. And we have asked and asked, and it's always it's going to be next year, next week, next month.

So when are we going to get the 30-year ship plan that is required by law?

Secretary DEL TORO. Congressman, thank you for your question.

So the administration has delivered the 30-year ship plan.

Mr. KELLY. Okay.

Secretary DEL TORO. And in that shipbuilding plan, you'll actually see the FYDP—the numbers as reflected in the FYDP—and then you'll see three alternatives. The first and second alternatives are very—

Mr. KELLY. Okay. If we delivered—because I got other things I want to get to. But it was a long time getting here and it's hard for us to plan when we don't have something to plan on.

The other thing I want to talk about is the strike fighter inventory shortage, the same thing that Mr. Norcross talked about. We are so heavy in divesting of things currently to get things in the future that may or may not exist and there's a sliding scale of risk to that, and I know you guys look at that and I appreciate that.

But we really have to be careful. We have to be able to fight tonight in the Pacific or in Africa or in South America or wherever we're called. We have to be able to fight tonight with what we have.

So we have to be real careful about investing in the future and divesting in the current until we know that we're going to have those systems.

So I know that you all are doing that. But I ask that you continue to do that.

And, General Berger, I know there's been a little bit of talk—not a little bit of talk, several talks about the new Marine Corps Force Design, and I don't want to go into that here because I don't have a side on that.

What I would ask is I would love to sit down sometime and to hear your side of the story, not what I read in the paper, and be able to discuss that so while I understand so I can be an advocate if that's where I stand or against it, but at least I'll know what I'm for or against. So I would love to do that, General Berger.

General BERGER. Happy to do that, sir.

Mr. KELLY. And then final questions, General Berger. You provided a letter to our Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee expressing your requirement of 31 L-class amphibious ships, which includes 10 LHA/LHDs, and 21 LPDs plus 35 Light Amphibious Warships.

Can you elaborate on the need for these ships and how they play into your Force Design 2030, and how much risk does the Marine Corps assume, given the Navy's plan to retire 4 LSDs, truncate the LPD by about 10 ships, and delay the LHA and LAW procurements?

General BERGER. The amphib ships that you refer to, sir, are not nice to have; they're essential. If we're going to achieve the objectives of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, we need those 31 ships plus the Light Amphibious Warships.

They're not nice to have. They're essential. They're essential to deter, campaign forward. They're essential to be able to respond to a crisis. They're essential in a warfight.

Mr. KELLY. I always love Marines. You guys are always straight answering. Thank you, General Berger.

Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, this year's budget request includes one LPD amphibious ship but indicates that this will be the last LPD procured. Moreover, this year's budget request requests to retire four LSDs before they reach the end of their expected service life.

What is the Navy's position on the requirement for L-class ships?

Secretary DEL TORO. Congressman, if I could start off. So Admiral Gilday talked about the LSDs and their age and the high cost of their repairs, which is why they're being recommended for decommissioning.

With regards to the LPD, the administration is very thankful for the support of the Congress. Right now we have got over \$2 billion in investments right now in an LHA and an LPD as well. When I came in as Secretary, I committed to trying to best define what the actual requirement is going to be for future L-class ships, both large and small as well, which is why we initiated the amphibious study. That will be—that will actually inform the national force structure assessment that's going on for 2024 based on the 2022 NDS.

And so by POM 2024 I think we'll have a very clear path forward about what the exact requirement is going to be for both departments.

Mr. KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

And just two more points I want to make—and we keep talking about these but we never fix them, or one we partially—is, number one, icebreakers. That issue is not going away. We need to figure out how to invest in icebreakers and adequate capacity to make sure that we don't continue to get further behind.

And then the second part of that is our hospital ships. I sat here and Austin Scott and I fought when they were going to divest of both hospital ships and they came in pretty handy during the COVID pandemic.

I just want to make sure that we're investing in that capability because it's both soft power and hard power.

And with that, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Moulton is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MOULTON. General Berger, if there is one thing I learned over four combat deployments in the Marine Corps infantry it is the value of speed and aggression.

Force Design 2030 is by far the most aggressive modernization strategy to meet the National Defense Strategy priorities of the next decade.

You're leading the way and you're preparing us for an incredibly more dangerous era of modern warfare. Now, our adversaries are modernizing quickly, too, particularly China. Now that said, change invites critics and you've received some criticism over this, and some legitimate questions have been raised.

So I want to make sure that you address some of these legitimate questions, so here are a few. You're divesting of critical capabilities—of existing capabilities like tanks and artillery that have been critical in the past.

You mentioned the Twentynine Palms exercises proved the Marines of today will be more lethal with updated tactics, loitering munitions. Will the Marine rifle platoon of 2030 be more lethal than the Marine rifle platoon of 2020?

General BERGER. It'll be lethal—more lethal long before 2030.

Mr. MOULTON. And why is that? What specific capabilities are you adding?

General BERGER. Capabilities in loitering munitions which are organic precision fires; the capabilities like the amphibious combat vehicle, the F-35, the CH-53K. But, primarily, I would focus on, aside from the hardware, the Marine, how we train them, how we recruit them, how we retain them.

Mr. MOULTON. Will those new capabilities, both the changes you're making to training and as well as the technical capabilities like loitering munitions, arrive soon enough? You're already divesting of tanks and artillery. How are you managing the balance between divestments and investments?

General BERGER. This is the value of a Marine air-ground task force. We can modernize at speed because in fires, organically, we have the capability to cover where we're modernizing or where we're short. We have the capability to cover it internally.

We'll field the first—we have fielded the first element, the first MLR, this year. Next year comes NMESIS [Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System]. The rest of the capabilities begin later this year, early next year. We're not waiting until 2030.

Mr. MOULTON. Admiral Gilday, is the Navy supportive of Force Design 2030, including the stand-in force concept, and how is the Navy preparing to support this concept and implementation?

Admiral GILDAY. We're doing it right now. So I talked to the NAVEUR [U.S. Naval Forces Europe] commander yesterday. His headquarters has about 30 Marines in their joint force maritime component cell. Their deputy commander is a Marine. There are Marine elements under his command in places like Estonia, Iceland, Norway today.

And so the concept of operations signed by his three-star fleet commander, the commander of U.S. Sixth Fleet, is also signed by the commander at II MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force]. If I go to Yokosuka, Japan, and talk to the Seventh Fleet commander, his concept of operations is also dual signed by the III MEF commander in Japan.

And so we're working side by side every day. That is where Navy-Marine Corps integration gets real is at the fleet level right now today. The stuff we're doing with unmanned experimentation is groundbreaking for both the Navy and the Marine Corps, and we continue—we will continue down that path.

Mr. MOULTON. Admiral, what has changed that will require two more years to begin procurement of the Light Amphibious Warships and what is the impact to Navy and Marine Corps operations in the Pacific because of that delay?

Admiral GILDAY. So, I—sir, I'm not sure I'd look at it as a delay. We need to get that right.

So, if we take a look at where we are with LCS, where we've been with *Zumwalt*, where we've been with the *Ford*-class aircraft carrier, we know, we know what wrong looks like in terms of stumbling. We don't want to stumble with LAWs.

So, when we come out of the box and we buy this ship in 2025, and then when we field it in 2028, we want to make sure that we're highly confident that we want to double down and scale it.

And so I would tell you sir, we haven't had the best track record of procurement as you're aware. We want to make sure that in this case, we get it right.

Mr. MOULTON. Well, I can tell you that for all three of you, it is incredibly important to this committee that you're all on the same page. And the fact that you arrived here this morning on the same page, with 31 amphibious ships, is a huge step in that direction.

General Berger, we don't have much time left. But, another concern with the stand-in force concept, pre-positioning forces on Pacific islands prior to hostilities, is a singular focus on the Indo-Pacific.

Is this strategy of limited relevance to the defense of the Republic of Korea, or Japan, or to contingencies outside PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]?

General BERGER. No, sir. It's not. It is theater-agnostic. It's paced against PLAN [People's Liberation Army Navy], but it's applicable anywhere on the globe.

Mr. MOULTON. Great. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So, we have a couple of challenges. One is that inflation, left unaddressed, could effectively cut the Defense Department and hollow it out by, by some estimates \$160 billion.

And then add onto that, the Navy is proposing to cut the fleet size over the course of the FYDP to about 280 ships at the end of the FYDP.

And the concern you're hearing from a lot of people is that that means we are going to be weakest at the worst possible moment. We'll be weakest when China is strongest.

So, if we go down that path of divest to invest, and I strongly suggest that we don't, for all the reasons that Mr. Wittman has addressed, and that I'm sure Representative Luria will eloquently address, then the Marine Corps, in particular, and stand-in forces in general, might actually give us our best shot at near-term conventional deterrence by denial.

And with that in mind, I'd like to follow up on Mr. Moulton's line of questioning, Commandant Berger, ask you to address some of the criticism you've received from retired Marine general officers head on.

The overall criticism seems to be that you are putting all your eggs in the basket of INDOPACOM. Mr. Moulton's question just addressed that.

But, at a higher level, yes or no, in the 2018 NDS produced by the Trump administration, and in the 2022 NDS produced by the Biden administration, these documents make focusing on China as our top threat, the clear DOD priority.

General BERGER. That's correct.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And similarly, were you ordered by our Nation's civilian leadership, to therefore focus on the Indo-Pacific when adjusting the Marine Corps due to the China threat?

General BERGER. As our primary theater by direction, yes, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Can you address then the criticism that you have not gone through the proper processes or war games, and experimentation to justify such far-reaching changes to the Marine Corps?

General BERGER. I'll leave the defense of that to Members of Congress and the previous Secretaries of Defense and Navy.

But, I know what I have done, which is asked for, and received, a lot of cooperation and support, and frankly guidance, from leader-

ship and members of this committee and other military committees, steering along the way; the full support of the Secretary of Defense, and each Secretary of the Navy, in terms of retaining the resources that were needed to modernize the Marine Corps. Because that, was the risk. That was the primary risk.

So, I am very confident that they understood the plan. They were active participants in the plan. And they have helped guide where the Marine Corps is going, including the members of this committee.

UNIDENTIFIED VOICE. And still understand the plan.

General BERGER. Yeah.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And when it comes to having, as Mr. Moulton talked about, small teams of Marines operating in the first island chain, operating within the PLA's [People's Liberation Army's] weapons' engagement zone, do you at present have the basing and access agreements that are necessary, particularly in the Northern Philippines and the Ryukyus, in order to realize your vision?

General BERGER. We do. Because the stand-in force is a combination of what's ashore, and what's aboard ship. Sometimes your best expeditionary advanced base is a ship.

So, the combination of what the Marine Corps has in terms of ashore capability, and embark capability, as part of the Naval Expeditionary Force, that's what you need at an inside force.

That's your best chance of deterring. That's your best chance at identifying what's going on in front of the joint force commander. That's your best chance of responding to a crisis.

Otherwise, you are fighting your way in blindly. Which we don't need—we don't need to be doing.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What about the criticism that these small teams of Marines armed perhaps with the NMESIS system, doing armed reconnaissance and a variety of other things, threatening PLA ships, will simply not be survivable?

That they're sitting ducks. And, you know, they're going to have to forage for food, or rely on the host nation population. Could you address that criticism?

General BERGER. Yes, sir. I think probably the best way to, to visualize that is we don't fight, of course, one ship, one person, one weapon system versus another. It's a system versus a system.

So, we're always going to fight as a joint force. And any assessment of an individual with one weapon system versus another counter system, is not accurate.

That's not how we operate. That's not how we fight.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And then—well, finally just a comment. Some of the pushback I've heard, is that well, you know, it's highly unlikely that China's going to try and invade Taiwan in the next 5 years. And therefore, why would we focus on this?

Well one, even if you felt that way, you would not be at liberty to ignore the civilian direction you've gotten, as you confirmed at the outset of my questions. And two, I just fundamentally disagree with that analysis.

I think, and even though we hope that China is rethinking, that Xi may be rethinking his lifelong ambition, because his junior partner, Putin, has encountered unexpected friction in Ukraine, the alternative could be true. Right?

He could be going to school on Russian failures, and expediting his timeline, and we have to account for that. And my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Carbajal is recognized.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all the witnesses that are here.

General Berger, this committee has been very focused on analyzing your Force Design 2030 initiative. In listening to all the perspectives, we have seen the very public debates in the press, but I want you to know that I support you and your modernization proposed Force Design 2030.

This will allow the Marine Corps to continue to be relevant, and have the increased capabilities and readiness to meet future challenges. And go figure, you're one of very few leaders in the Department who actually are saying, I could do it pretty much with existing resources.

I don't think I've met too many leaders in the DOD Department that come here looking at restructuring within existing resources. They always want more.

So, I commend you for your leadership. I commend you for the bold action you're taking. I think it's outstanding. I appreciate your transparency and continued engagement, as you don't shy away from tackling concerns and critiques head on.

Change is never easy, and deserves robust debate. But, that doesn't mean we should shy away from making difficult choices and progress. That's leadership.

With that, I want to ask about a specific critique to better understand your analysis and thinking. There are concerns that the initiative may face significant logistical challenges, since future Marine units are intended to be smaller and distributed.

How does this plan intend to address concerns with logistics, especially in contested environment? And how does your May 2022 update make progress on this question?

General BERGER. Congressman, I read a quote maybe a week and a half, 2 weeks ago, it's from General Shinseki. And he said, if you don't like change, you're going to like irrelevance a lot less. That's a pretty accurate statement today. It was accurate back then.

There are a number of warfighting functions, as the Marines in this room and other service member veterans know. My assessment is, of all the warfighting functions going forward, logistics is the pacing one.

Logistics is where we have to make up the most ground. Why? Because the theater that is our primary challenge is very vast. Logistics is just naturally going to be a challenge.

But second is the fact that we're going to face an environment where logistics is challenged all the way from the ship, or the island, all the way back to the factory. We have not faced that before.

That is our pacing challenge. So, how are we going to attack it? A couple of things. First, everything from air to subsurface, as the CNO mentioned, from the 53K to unmanned undersea vessels, we've got to employ it all.

Distribution for that forward force in a contested environment will not be easy. We can't approach it with the old way of large, bulky stores of munitions and parts that are piled up somewhere to be distributed. That will not work.

Very large maritime pre-positioning ships that do an administrative offload, not going to be the entire solution. We have to be able to distribute to sustain that force under pressure.

Smaller more distributed forces tied into the naval logistics system, not our own, tied into the naval logistic enterprise, is the key. Even things like the munitions themselves.

We chose to use the Naval Strike Missile in our ground-based air defense for a reason. It's a common munition between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Logistically, that makes sense.

Lastly, I'd say we have to go down the road of reducing—every step we can make in reducing our consumption of fuel matters.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, General. Admiral Gilday, I think it is safe to assume, we all agree that the strength and effectiveness of our Navy is dependent on the sailors who show up every day to serve our Nation. That is why I'm very concerned when we see the tragic impacts of when we fail our service members.

So, I want to focus for a minute on the USS *George Washington*. The information that has come to light about conditions on the ship, and access to mental health services after three suicides in 1 week, is alarming. Accumulating to 10 deaths in 10 months. Absolutely heartbreaking.

Before the Special Psychiatric Response Intervention Team was activated, what was the average wait time for a sailor assigned to the USS *George Washington*, to receive mental health appointments?

I hear it was up to 6 months. Can you touch on that, please?

The CHAIRMAN. He cannot, because he's got 1 second left. He's going to have to take that one for the record. But, we do, we do want that.

Admiral GILDAY. I will take that for the record. We actually have a mental health team onboard that includes a doctor, one psychiatrist. It includes behavioral health specialists, and includes three chaplains.

And so, I owe you a more detailed answer, sir. I'd be happy to—

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 152.]

The CHAIRMAN. In fact, for the overall committee, we want to have more discussion. If you could get us a detailed answer on how that, you know, situation on the *George Washington* has been handled by the Navy, and is being handled—

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That would be important for all of us. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GAETZ. Admiral Gilday, I come from Pensacola, a proud Navy town. And our community was rocked December of 2019 when a Saudi student opened fire, killed three sailors, injured others, injured members of our law enforcement.

And I've been to many briefings since then, in public and in private. And the picture emerges that definitely the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia was not doing enough, to send only their best people, as one might say.

They were not doing enough to monitor potential radicalization. And frankly, we weren't doing enough to ensure that that was happening.

What assurance can you give my constituents in Pensacola that we have improved?

Admiral GILDAY. So, sir, since that incident, under then Secretary of Defense Esper, significant changes were made in the screening process for all foreign students from any military, including our NATO allies, that come to the United States to train with us.

And so, I met as recently as yesterday, with a, with a senior leader from a partner nation who, who expressed concern about the amount of time it's taking to get his sailors into our country to train.

And I explained to him how important it was that we work together to go through this process very deliberately and methodically, so that we don't make any mistakes. And he accepted that.

But, we have—but we have—we have, leveraging the intelligence community and the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigations], made significant changes.

Mr. GAETZ. I really appreciate that. And as much as we want to host these missions, for the benefit of global security, we have to put the safety of our sailors, of our service members first.

And Admiral Gilday, there was in 2019 base-specific guidance for these Saudi students, wasn't there?

Admiral GILDAY. There was. Yes, sir.

Mr. GAETZ. And there also were specific rules for the installation regarding these students that were, that were there. Right?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GAETZ. And there were arrival packets for each of the Saudi students who arrived, with their specific information, such that we knew it. Right?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. They were assigned liaison officers with each of those students. They were assigned onboarding processes for each of those students. Yes, sir.

Mr. GAETZ. And on January 13, 2020, there was a memorandum issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, for continuous review for international military students. Right?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GAETZ. And there have been written policies and procedures off that memo subsequently. Right?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. There have been many changes.

Mr. GAETZ. And we've specifically required changes from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Right?

Admiral GILDAY. We have.

Mr. GAETZ. All these things are probably not that difficult to find. Right? Would you be willing to provide those things to my office that I've just asked for?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. I will provide a detailed briefing for you.

Mr. GAETZ. That is incredibly helpful and comforting. I know it's a work in process. I know the social media tools and the technologies change.

My one concern is that the first responders who were running in the direction of the bullets to save our sailors, they are in litigation now with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. And I posit no perspective on how courts will rule on those things. And certainly not asking you to do that.

But they've made a FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] request of the Navy for the things that I've just asked you to provide, and that you said would not be all that difficult to put our hands on, and that FOIA request has been pending since March 23.

And the correspondence from the Navy back, sort of says, well gosh, this is voluminous. You know, there may be other people who, you know, block our access to it.

And I just think that the Navy ought to stand up for our sailors and their family members, and the law enforcement that protects them.

And I want your assurance that the Navy will do everything possible to provide the documentation and evidence. Because the way this has to work in court, is that there's this JASTA [Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act] law, where there have to be specific elements pled.

And there has to be evidence for those elements, to unlock discovery. And some of these documents that these litigants are asking to get from the Navy, are necessary to sync jurisdiction in that matter.

So again, I won't ask you to opine on the status of litigation or the law. But just these things that seem pretty basic, I'm very grateful for your focus on it, and for your willingness to facilitate the delivery of those records.

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. We'll find out what constraints might be in the way here that are causing, that are causing—

Mr. GAETZ. I'm sorry, who might be in the way?

Admiral GILDAY. We'll—we will like take a look at what constraints may be inhibiting the release of those documents under that FOIA request.

But, I owe you a more detailed answer in terms of the—

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 152.]

Mr. GAETZ. I'm just used to this with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where they seem to have a lot of people sympathetic to their cause wandering around the Justice Department, and wandering around elsewhere.

And I take your sincerity here, that you are going to do everything possible to make sure that we resolve this, and that we get better going forward.

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, sir. We will.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Kim, who is appearing virtually, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Kim, do we have you?

Mr. KIM. Yes. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we do. You're up.

Mr. KIM. Thank you. Well, I'd like to start with Secretary Del Toro. I wanted to touch on a situation with, in the Navy SEALs, that has devastated one of our communities in New Jersey, the

death of Navy SEAL candidate Kyle Mullen, who passed away after completing the Hell Week portion of training.

I appreciate that the Naval Special Warfare Command out in Coronado had been conducting the investigation. They've been briefing us on some of the details as we've been going forward.

But I'll be honest, I'm still adamant that we need a full independent investigation through the inspector general, to get to the bottom of what happened. And to address any reforms that are needed going forward.

So, Mr. Secretary, I wanted to ask you if I have a commitment from you that you'll keep track of this investigation, so we know with confidence what took place. And that the reforms necessary, that you will push forward any reforms necessary to ensure that something like this doesn't happen again.

Secretary DEL TORO. Congressman, the safety of our people is paramount. And you have my commitment that I will continue to monitor this investigation as it plays itself out, and will take appropriate actions once the results of the investigations are revealed.

Mr. KIM. Thank you. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, because, you know, I think as we've heard from the family, as well as families of other candidates that were there at the time, you know, I think what has become clear, is that there appears to be some potential issues here when it comes to medical care, oversight, access to medical records, that isn't just about Kyle Mullen.

But just something that we want to look at more closely, to make sure that we're addressing these issues. You know, specifically when it comes to Kyle's case, not only was there not a doctor onsite at the time of his emergency, following his death, it had been increasingly difficult for his family to get information from the medical team.

So, there appears to be room for improvement in the Navy's medical observation systems during the training exercises. I wanted to ask, you know, if you have any thoughts on what changes you would suggest to ensure the safety of the recruits?

Are there any resources that you need from Congress to help accomplish this mission of that paramount safety of our service members that you talked about?

You know, what changes would you propose to the SEAL training regimen to ensure that the Navy does have enough health capacity to deal with this, especially when it comes to something as grueling as Hell Week?

Secretary DEL TORO. So Congressman, while the investigation is not complete, I assure you, we have already taken some preliminary steps to ensure, as one example, that medical providers are immediately available at all times, immediately after the exercises, the training is completed, as opposed to being on call.

And that's just one example.

Mr. KIM. Okay. Well look, I look forward to keeping that conversation going as we get more details of the—from the investigation. And hopefully a thorough discussion about what we can be doing going forward.

I'd like to just keep on this issue about military personnel, because I know we had talked a lot during this hearing about a lot

of the hardware, a lot of equipment you need to be able to push forward with the Navy.

But, one aspect of, that I keep hearing about, especially on the joint base in my district, is about childcare. And at this point, what we're hearing is about 22,000 children of Active service members are on a waitlist with the hopes of receiving care on base.

For our military families, not being able to access that childcare is now an issue of readiness, a challenge in terms of their ability to do their jobs.

You know, I'm proud that an effort in the NDAA and defense appropriations process to follow through on this effort, to expand the allowance cap that families can receive under the childcare fee assistance program by \$400 per month.

I wanted to ask you, from your perspective, from what you're seeing, how do you think this increase of childcare fee assistance program for the Navy will help our military families?

And what are the things that you're thinking about doing to help try and shorten this waitlist at Navy facilities, things that we can do to try to help our military families?

Secretary DEL TORO. Well, thank you, Congressman, for caring so much about this issue. And actually, the waitlist right now sits at about 6,700.

Over the past year we've actually been able to bring that down by 2,300. So, we have made significant progress this past year.

In this President's budget actually there is a proposal for \$56 million for an additional child development center [CDC] in Point Loma, California. And over the FYDP, there's actually monies that are being proposed in MILCON [military construction] for an additional 12 CDCs as well too, throughout the country.

And of course, the increase in the allotment for those that choose to go out into the economy, of \$200 is significant.

Mr. KIM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Bergman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BERGMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If my math is correct, and we always joke about math for Marines, a year from now, both you, Admiral Gilday, and you, General Berger, will be your final year of testimony before the committee before you—the passage of command.

Did I get that correct, in a 4-year tour?

General BERGER. Hopefully. Yes, sir.

Mr. BERGMAN. Well, as you look forward, we've talked a lot about, again, things, platforms, people. I noticed the last couple of years you've both made the recruiting numbers.

One quick question. Going forward, when you break down recruiting, officer and enlisted, where do you see the biggest challenges going forward as a group, officer or enlisted?

Just quickly either/or? Admiral.

Admiral GILDAY. I think we're going to be challenged this year to—I think we'll make our numbers in the Active force this year. But, if we do—

Mr. BERGMAN. Long term.

Admiral GILDAY [continuing]. It will be narrow.

So, long term, I think it's competing in those places where we have most, where we're most challenged, cyber——

Mr. BERGMAN. Officer or enlisted?

Admiral GILDAY. Both.

Mr. BERGMAN. Both. So, you're going to be challenged in both. General Berger.

General BERGER. I think probably enlisted more than officer. But, I—we are all really concerned about the shrinking demographics from which we're drawing out of America. Clearly headed in the wrong direction.

Mr. BERGMAN. The pool is shrinking.

General BERGER. Yes.

Mr. BERGMAN. And I heard others say, talk about, you know, different metrics; when we're recruiting young men and women, we're also recruiting their families, we're recruiting their influencers.

And if those families don't feel confident that we are, as a force, lethal, survivable, and sustainable, the propensity of those young men and women to want to become Marines or sailors, I believe we're going to have our challenge.

General Berger, you mentioned in your opening comments that over the last 3 years the Marine Corps has self-funded over \$17 billion in modernization. Do you feel as though that you've gotten a return on that investment with guarantees of other things?

Because you bought it up front. Are you getting that \$17 billion back, if you will, in whoever guaranteed you support?

General BERGER. I do. It's taken all of the support of Congress and the Pentagon leadership to do that. It wasn't quite \$17 that we were able to recoup. But, the balance, the less than \$2 billion in that balance is adjustments, economic adjustments and compliance issues.

That aside, every dollar that we have divested of, the Congress and the Pentagon leadership has allowed us to keep. And that has been the magic of it.

But, we are complete with that now. Just to be very clear. There is no more divestment for us to do. That last 3 years is what we had to do.

Mr. BERGMAN. Thank you. And Admiral Gilday, you mentioned about investing in LVCT, or live virtual constructive training. You already have it existing. You have a program of record that does that.

Is there within the Navy, because as we see in technology, one company may have the lead technology today, but there's competition in the marketplace.

Does the Navy look at something like live virtual constructive training and say, you know what, there are other entities out there that can provide us a better product at a cheaper cost, and is willing to move on from a contract that, it's a legitimate contract for a time. But yet, move onto something that is better and less expensive?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, there are dozens of vendors right now that actually are involved in that live virtual constructive training effort that is global, and involves nearly every sailor in the fleet.

And so, it's not just one company that has a lock on that technology and has us handcuffed with them forever. And so, there's

a lot of different spirals going on in LVC in different communities, whether it's information warfare, whether it's the Navy SEALs.

And so there's about—there's an awful lot of opportunity in that. That equates to competition.

Mr. BERGMAN. Okay. Thank you. And I've only got 17 seconds. General Berger, take this for the record, please.

Is there any evidence to suggest that in a non-mobilized environment, in other words, you've got your Reserve Component who's in a drilling Reserve status, that Reserve units, battalion squadrons, would be more ready and capable if operational control was changed from the RC [Reserve Component] to the AC [Active Component]?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 153.]

The CHAIRMAN. Sorry. Your time is expired, so—

Mr. BERGMAN. Okay. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That will have to be taken for the record. Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you. General Berger, a Foreign Policy Research Institute publication outlines that the new force design adds more capacity and greater range and precision to Marine forms of firepower, and a potential family of munitions for different missions and targets.

The ground launch missile systems will increase range significantly from 40 kilometers to 70 kilometers or more. And these regiments are expected to influence naval forces far from the shores they occupy, act as a forcing function to guide enemy vessels and formations into favorable naval engagements with friendly forces.

Will the need arise for MRLs [Marine littoral regiments] to field longer range hypersonic weapon systems?

General BERGER. Well, for the Marine Corps, it's too early to tell about hypersonics. But, your point about increased range, increased accuracy, in other words, long-range precision fires writ large, absolutely spot on.

I would just make sure that no one narrows it too narrow to just maritime, just naval targets. In other words, the force that's employing them, they're usable against either ground targets or maritime targets. Either one.

Ms. SHERRILL. Certainly. So that actually brings me to a different question.

So, in its report to Congress, USINDOPACOM requested \$408 million for the FY2022 [fiscal year 2022], and \$2.91 billion for FY2023 and 2027, for ground-based, long-range fires, highly survivable precision strike fires that can support the air and maritime maneuver from distances greater than 500 kilometers.

Clearly, the need for a survivable ground-based platform is essential to the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. In addition to anti-ship missiles, as you were just stating, the importance of a maneuverable and survivable platform that can deliver precision fires at great distances cannot be understated.

General Berger, I think you yourself stated that the U.S. Army is pursuing longer range, but much larger, heavier, bulkier systems that [inaudible]. But they're not either/or. We're going to need both. And you were talking about both the Army and the Marine Corps.

Looking forward to 2030, do you see the Marine Corps employing the smaller hypersonic or other long-range platforms the Army's currently developing?

General BERGER. It's hard to speculate. I would say if they're light enough, expeditionary enough for us to put aboard ship, to sustain ashore, with a small enough signature, perhaps.

But, the focus for us for survivability is maneuverability. The ability to stay hidden. The ability to displace. Size matters.

In other words, if they can detect you, and the battlefield that we're going to operate on, is going to be saturated with sensors. You have to operate within that spectrum.

Ms. SHERRILL. I'm going to sound like I'm beating a dead horse here. But, ground launch missile systems will generate a significant signature on adversary radar and early warning platforms. Which again, as you were alluding to, could lead to exposing the MRL, and alerting adversaries of the location of our friendly forces.

So, would a hypersonic platform with a smaller signature, that could conceal itself from radar with a low trajectory, better meet the intent of the MRL shore-to-ship precision fires and enhance the overall survivability of the MRL?

General BERGER. Yes, ma'am. I think potentially, absolutely. A pure ballistic trajectory, easy to do the math on. Find out where it came from, where it's going to land.

One of the big advantage of hypersonics is not just the speed, but the maneuverability of it. And the challenge in countering that, and even determining where it was fired from.

So, everything that you laid out, I think absolutely, that's the direction we're headed.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you, General. I appreciate it. And I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Banks is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BANKS. General Berger, how many Marines have been separated or discharged because of the COVID—COVID vaccine mandate?

General BERGER. I don't have the numbers this morning. But, it's approximately 2,000, Congressman.

Mr. BANKS. Do you believe the COVID vaccine mandate has impacted your recruiting efforts?

General BERGER. Not to date.

Mr. BANKS. But how many Marines have we separated?

General BERGER. Approximately 2,000 so far.

Mr. BANKS. Does the COVID vaccine mandate outweigh the importance of a fully manned Marine Corps?

General BERGER. I don't view them as binary choices. Readiness is our number one priority. Every Marine has to be fully medically prepared to deploy anywhere on the globe on short notice.

Mr. BANKS. General, are we above or below our recruiting goals in this fiscal year?

General BERGER. We are below recruiting goals this fiscal year.

Mr. BANKS. And are we offering signing bonuses to men and women to join the Marine Corps?

General BERGER. Signing bonuses, no. There are bonuses for specific specialties who are Marines who are already in. But, not signing bonuses for enlistees, no.

Mr. BANKS. Admiral Gilday, I understand we're offering minimum enlistment bonuses of \$25,000 for men and women to join the United States Navy.

How many sailors have we separated or discharged because of the COVID?

Admiral GILDAY. About 1,000, sir.

Mr. BANKS. One thousand?

Admiral GILDAY. About 1,000.

Mr. BANKS. Do we expect that number to grow?

Admiral GILDAY. We do.

Mr. BANKS. By exponentially more? A little bit more?

Admiral GILDAY. It's difficult to tell, sir. We have people that thought they were going to—that thought they were going to separate voluntarily, who have changed their mind.

Every—every week I see 100-plus people getting vaccinated.

Mr. BANKS. Is that a high or low signing bonus? I mean, it seems, it doesn't seem normal to me.

Admiral GILDAY. So, it's about half of what the Army's offering, to put it in perspective. It's the competitive market right now that we're in.

We're on glide slope as I mentioned earlier. I think if we make it in the Active side, we'll narrowly make it. It's a challenging environment.

Mr. BANKS. So, how do we justify separating sailors and Marines when our recruitment is so low, and offering unprecedented signing bonuses to attract new sailors and Marines?

Admiral GILDAY. So, number one, we have a valid order from the President. Number two, it is a readiness concern. I can't predict, I don't know if anybody can, what the next variant of COVID might look like, how it may affect us.

I know the challenges we faced on ships over the past 2 years. And so, I do have readiness concerns tied to those vaccinations, that we continue to toe the line and obey the order. Because I think it's—fundamentally, I think it's the right thing to do right now, given that as a threat to the readiness of the force.

Mr. BANKS. Admiral Gilday, I notice the new, your new reading list came out. I enjoy the reading list. I look forward to it every year.

Last year, as we discussed before, the list was very political. I notice this year the list isn't political. There are no books that preach political ideologies, or viewpoints, or talk about radical gender theories.

Was that a decision on your part to divert away from politics and make the reading list about naval leadership and history, and about the United States Navy?

Was that a decision on your part?

Admiral GILDAY. In both years I've actually received significant feedback from the fleet. I actually do listening sessions and get ideas.

And so it has been influenced by the fleet. I did want a smaller list this year. So, I went with a dozen books. But, I don't have a political agenda, sir. Or an axe to grind.

I'm just trying to—I'm just trying to share books that I've enjoyed, or take recommendations from others. I'd appreciate your feedback.

Mr. BANKS. Yeah. Again, I enjoy the list. I learn a lot about naval history and leadership when I read books on the list. But, I was surprised by the political nature of the list last year. It seems like a big difference between last year and this year.

Furthermore, the Naval Information Forces hosted the Inaugural Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Summit just a few weeks ago, in April. Your wife participated and spoke at the Summit.

How much—how much did that cost us, Admiral? And what did we get out of it? What did we get out of that Summit?

Admiral GILDAY. I don't know what the, I don't know what the cost of that Summit was, sir. I think there were, there's power—there's power in harnessing the differences among us, whether they be—

Mr. BANKS. What did we get out of it? What did we gain—what did we gain from the Summit? What are some takeaways from the Summit that justified the resources that—

Admiral GILDAY. I had not had a detailed readout of that particular gathering, sir.

Mr. BANKS. You're largely credited for the reason that we organized it and hosted it. I mean, the articles that come out of the Summit suggest that you're the reason that we hosted it.

I'm just wondering, I mean, how do you justify it? You haven't had a readout, but how do you justify it? What came out of it?

What's your answer?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, I get a readout of many conferences. I will seek a readout of this one. Usually I get something weeks later that gives me insights in terms of what—what the goods or others were, that, that were evident as a result of the conference.

I look—I look forward to get—

Mr. BANKS. For the record, can you give us the report when you get it, to tell us what good came from it? Justify it, justify to the taxpayers why we hosted it?

Admiral GILDAY. I'd be happy to share that with you, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 152.]

Mr. BANKS. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. VEASEY [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman from Maine, Mr. Golden, is now recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you. General, I was an enlisted O-3 NCO who fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, Gallagher talked about foraging and surviving off the land. And I will note, in the Hindu Kush in 2004, I ate enough goat and rice for a lifetime.

Now, in Afghanistan and Iraq, we really focused on shooting. On being agile and fast, and on delivering effective overpowering fire on the enemy. And we were good.

But I know there's room to get even more lethal and even better. My experience tells me that the Force Design 2030's focus on

screening and recon [reconnaissance], alongside lethality, is spot on.

Now, some critics of the small distributed unit strategy that you've talked about, have suggested that this isn't survivable. Essentially that you're asking Marines to do basically a suicide mission.

So, what is your level of confidence that your Marines are ready to carry out that mission? Because to do it, they need to be highly skilled hunter-killers.

So, are they there today? Are they ready to do it and survive it? We know it will be a tough mission, but what is your level of confidence in these small units' ability to get the job done?

General BERGER. I am very confident. And I know that from visiting units just like other service chiefs, and seeing the training that they're doing at the high end, against a very thinking adversary.

In other words, in a force-on-force sort of scenario. It's not canned. It's not fighting against a computer. You're fighting against another Marine that's trying to beat you. I'm very confident in them.

I think the focus on the first part of your question, the reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, it doesn't lower lethality. But, it doesn't do any good to be lethal if you can't find them. It doesn't do any good to be lethal if they find you first.

So, the—it doesn't diminish the lethality part. But, it does bring to the fore the importance, if it's a sensor-saturated environment, you need to be able to hide. And you need to be able to find them first and get the first round down range. And that first round's got to be accurate.

Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you, General. I'd love to have the opportunity to maybe visit and see some of the training taking place to ensure that small unit lethality is taking place. And see what these Marines are learning and capable of.

General Gilday, the FYDP calls for, to—I'm sorry, Admiral Gilday. Marine here. You know, old habits die hard.

The FYDP calls for two destroyers a year. So, why not a baseline of 10 for the multiyear? Because recently you spoke at a Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] dialog, and talked about your recent visit to BIW [Bath Iron Works], along with Senator Collins and myself.

And you noted at CSIS that BIW's at a rate of production of about one ship a year. But you also said that you wanted to see them get to one and a half, so that you could someday see three budget—three destroyers a year in future budgets.

But a nine-ship multiyear actually raises concerns that one of the yards might not have demand for even one ship a year over the period of time that it covers.

So, I agree with you that one and a half ships is definitely achievable. And BIW was just under one and a half ships recently, although they've now struggled a little bit with recruitment and retention in this tough labor market.

But we know it's critical for our national security that these yards make that investment in that future workforce, which is

going to be the workforce to build the DDG(X) [Next-Generation Guided-Missile Destroyer].

So, my opinion is that these yards need to see a positive signal from the Congress and Navy, and a 10-year ship multiyear with a 5-ship option demonstrates stability at 1 ship a year, while green-lighting an effort to get to that one and a half over time.

So, what's your thinking on the nine-plus-one proposal?

Admiral GILDAY. Yeah. So, sir, the nine-plus-one was a decision inside the Pentagon. And it's a decision that we're going to live by.

I think it's a, it is a clear signal for industry. I think specifically with respect to Bath, when I was up there and I talked about aspirationally giving them 1.5, I know that there's a mismatch between what the shipbuilding plan says right now, and what I asked them to shoot for.

I hope over time that we can get to three destroyers a year, and actually solidify that in the shipbuilding plan. And the reason I say that, is because particularly with respect to Bath, it's not lost on me the significant investment they made in infrastructure and workforce to support a *Zumwalt* program that never panned out.

And so, they are looking at us, and are questioning whether or not what we say is going to match what we do. So I think we owe it to them.

I intend to keep, as the Secretary also keeps, close tabs on industry so that we can set a demand signal that's both reasonable, and that puts us in a path of stable and predictable ship delivery for the Navy.

Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you. And I would just note for the committee, and we've talked a lot about this and how to develop that industrial base, getting to one and a half ships per year for the large surface combatants is a 5- to 7-, or 8-year project.

If you want to get to one and a half in the future, we've got to start that, we've got to start that process now.

Admiral GILDAY. Right.

Mr. GOLDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. Before recognizing Mr. Waltz, I want to, without objection, allow members to submit statements, records, whatever they want, five business—within five business days after the hearing.

Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask unanimous consent to submit this chart into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 141.]

Mr. WALTZ. Admiral, can you see the chart here?

General BERGER. Yes.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you. I think—I think it's very important for the American people to see visually the trend lines of what's going on with our Navy, and what's going on with the Chinese Navy.

And these are according to DOD and Congressional Research Service numbers. Yesterday the intelligence community briefed the Senate, the much talked about timeline. And we basically have 5

years, 2027, until the Chinese Communist Party believes they have overmatch in the Western Pacific.

Do you disagree with that assessment?

General BERGER. I do not.

Mr. WALTZ. Okay. Admiral.

Admiral GILDAY. I agree with the assessment.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Admiral. So, I think this is important. This here shows the size of the Chinese Navy. And this is the various shipbuilding plans we've received over the last, since 2015.

With—in blue here is the size of the U.S. Navy. And I think it's important for the American people to understand, that 2027 figure, it's right there. That's a 105-ship delta.

Now, I get it. We can have the capability, capacity debate. But I'm not buying that we can make up for a 105-ship delta that they can concentrate all in one ocean with short supply lines.

And the problem is, with your divestment strategy, we're at our lowest point at 2027, when they're at the highest point. And even when we come out of it, let's say, I mean, let's look at the Next Gen Air Dominance, 2031; future frigate, 2028; Ready Reserve fleet modernization, 2030.

I mean, that's all right around here. We still have these massive deltas. Gentlemen, I think we are being set up. And these budgets are setting us up to lose in a war with China.

And that is a disservice to the sailors that are going to be out there on old, broken-down ships, and outnumbered in 5 years. So, with this FYDP, what we're buying right now, is what we have to go to war.

Admiral GILDAY. That's right.

Mr. WALTZ. That's right.

Admiral GILDAY. And you're not going to change that significantly between now and 2027. And so our emphasis is, is to deliver for the Nation the most lethal, the most ready, the most capable Navy that we can, based on the resources that we have.

Mr. WALTZ. But, I don't think your plan gets us there, Admiral. I mean, just candidly.

Admiral GILDAY. Well, we did—

Mr. WALTZ. Because we're going, we're going backwards. And we've—so, first of all, those estimates, 2031 and 2028, those are best-case scenarios.

And this blue line's a best-case scenario. This is on your option three of the shipbuilding plan. But, we've seen from the *Ford*-class carrier, the Joint Strike Fighter, to LCS, that those estimates are often grossly off.

Admiral GILDAY. We're deploying the *Ford* class this year. So—

Mr. WALTZ. It's been around for 20 years. The office came in in 1997. So, the estimates are off, which means, look, at the end of the day, I think we have allowed this committee and the building to fall into a false choice of readiness versus modernization.

I think the real choice is, how much money should you be asking for to be ready to win? I don't want to, I don't want to pace. I want to overmatch. I want to win, in the next 5 years.

So, if you were given more money, Admiral, would you accelerate the Ready Reserve fleet modernization? Would you accelerate the frigates?

Would you accelerate much of what you're trying to do? And would you keep more cruisers? Not all of them, but would you keep more?

If you were—if this committee gave you more?

Admiral GILDAY. Given the window that we're looking at right now that you described, I would take you to my unfunded list. And if you take a look at the priorities on the unfunded list, it's for SM-6 missiles. It's for—it's for LRASM. It's for JASSM-ER.

It's for the most capable missiles in the world to put on our ships. And actually—

Mr. WALTZ. Why are they unfunded?

Admiral GILDAY. Why are they—I'm trying to maximize those production lines. So, I'm—

Mr. WALTZ. Right—

Admiral GILDAY [continuing]. I am—we're funding them inside the budget. We're trying to maximize those production lines. We are funding ships' maintenance to 98 percent.

We're trying to, we're trying to increase—

Mr. WALTZ. But Admiral, the problem is, all of those things that you described, and to the ranking member, are all aspirational. And that's, and that's not all your necessarily issue. I mean, you've had a lot of predecessors.

But, we are where we are now. And I think we need a drastic increase to be able to cover the gaps within the next 5 years.

Admiral GILDAY. We just talked about the industrial base. Right now, we've given a clear set of—we are maxing out the, the production lines for attack submarines and for SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines].

Two destroyers a year is what the industrial base can support right now.

Mr. WALTZ. What—just in the remaining time I have, for the record, can I—what investments do we need to make in the industrial base?

Rather than letting that limit you and the budget limit you, what investments can we make in the industrial base to close that gap?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 153.]

Admiral GILDAY. We're making over \$2 billion right now. And the—

Mr. WALTZ. It's not enough.

The CHAIRMAN. The time has expired.

Mr. WALTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And I suspect this conversation will continue now with Ms. Luria. So you will get your chance.

Ms. Luria is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. LURIA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am requesting unanimous consent to enter these documents in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

[The documents referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 142.]

Mrs. LURIA. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

So, Secretary Del Toro, what I have here is from the 2017 Strategic Readiness Review. I assume you are familiar with and you have read that document; it follows in the wake of the *McCain* and

Fitzgerald collisions. So, this chart shows the fleet strength from about 600 ships in the 1980s to about 300.

And it also shows a rapid rise in the percentage of the fleet that is deployed over that course of time. Do you agree that you see that blue line going up? It goes from about, say, 20 percent to about 35 percent.

[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 142.]

Mrs. LURIA. And this is a narrative that has been recently portrayed a lot across discussions of the fleet that we are actually, like, running the fleet into the ground, we are deploying ships more.

But, you know, then I forwarded to this year's budget book, which is the real thing that I want to dig into the meat of because I think it paints a rosier picture than actually exists. So, are you familiar with this? This is in the budget book that you submitted this year.

Secretary DEL TORO. Yes, I am.

Mrs. LURIA. So, right here in red, I have circled this, so, it says that as of March 17th the Navy has 298 ships. Of that, 128 are deployed.

[The graphic referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 143.]

Mrs. LURIA. Well, I thought that was curious because it is significantly higher than the average for the preceding or following year. So, I reached out, I received a list of those ships that were deployed on March 17th of this year.

So, I came to find in there some interesting things. Of that 128, 39 of them are ships that are forward deployed. And when I say that, they even include ships that are in port, in home port, ships that are in maintenance. The *Ronald Reagan*, for example, is included in that as well. So, all ships forward deployed, regardless of their operational status, all 8 minesweepers, every ship forward deployed.

And, in fact, also 39 of those 128 ships are also MSC [Military Sealift Command] ships, regardless of their underway status, or that they are deployed. MSC ships don't operate under the same OPTEMPO [operation tempo] requirements as the rest of the fleet.

And then the last, most puzzling thing that I found is that 13 of the 14 SSBNs [ballistic-missile submarines] are on this list.

So, I know it is above the classification level of this hearing, but I can say with all certainty that 13 or 14 SSBNs are not deployed or underway on any given day.

So then when we get down to the math, you subtract all of those things out, I came to find that there were actually only 37 ships which are rotational CONUS [continental United States]-based ships deployed on this day in your budget report. And that is about 20 percent. Which makes perfect sense. It makes perfect sense because the OFRP [Optimized Fleet Response Plan], the way the rotational forces work, seek to have about 20 percent of the ships deployed on any given day.

So, you know, going back to this chart in the 2017 Strategic Readiness Review, I think there has been a narrative that has been carried forward that talks about, you know, the amount that we

are employing and overworking the fleet, which I think when you dig into these numbers in fact this paints a rosier picture for the number of ships we actually have deployed today, as well as exaggerates—43 percent, you agree that's twice as much as actually the numbers show.

And then the next thing I went to also in this year's budget book were these two graphs. This is two parts of a 4-part graph series. But what it shows is our VLS [Vertical Launching System] cell capacity over time. It is broken down in this chart. It separates it between surface and subsurface.

[The graphs referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 144.]

Mrs. LURIA. If you were to look at this chart, you would think, wow, you know, we're pretty steady. And then we start going up on this chart between now and 2055.

But, this is a 0 to 12,000 scale. So, I mean, you can manipulate data to make things look flatter, depending on the scale you use. So, everything on the entire graph is between these two lines right here, and it doesn't combine the two. So, oh, there's a dip in SSGNs, but that is going to go back up.

So, I just decided out of curiosity's sake to change the scale, to put them on the same chart, and to look at the timeframe. And I drew that vertical line that Mr. Waltz did as well, where you have the Davidson window, which is the 2027 timeframe.

So, this is the same data, with both of those things combined, using your 30-year shipbuilding plan between now and 2035, which shows that we will lose 1,668 VLS cells in the Davidson window, as well as between now and 2035, 1,980 VLS cells.

So, again, you know, as a Member of Congress receiving this budget document that you have presented to us, I found that it really presented quite a rosy picture of the future of our VLS capacity, as well as the number of fleet—ships in the fleet that are being employed.

And there is a little bit of time remaining. And would you care to comment on why that is so different as has been displayed by myself and others on this committee throughout the hearing than what we actually see today?

Secretary DEL TORO. Well, Congresswoman, with my 26 seconds, and I would be happy to respond to the record as well, too. One can interpret data a thousand different ways.

I actually do know that today we actually have 81 total ships underway, for 27 percent of the fleet. And it is a very accurate accounting of how many ships we have today.

And I would be happy to present to you with this data.

With regards—

Mrs. LURIA. But why—

Secretary DEL TORO [continuing]. To the—

Mrs. LURIA [continuing]. Did you choose, Mr. Secretary, to use "deployed" versus "underway"?

And why from year to year in budget books can one not track the difference?

And if you go back to the 1980s, for example—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Mrs. LURIA [continuing]. The percentage is—

The CHAIRMAN. We will take the rest of that for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 153.]

Secretary DEL TORO. There are many variations of that.

The CHAIRMAN. And one of the things that I think we should get briefed on on the committee is, you know, we, we talk about how it is about capability, not about numbers. But we always see from the China, well, they've have got this number.

Well, how capable are their ships?

How many ships does China have deployed all around the world in any given moment?

That is a very low number, from what I understand. And the capability of their ships are not as great either. So, we can all, like, freak ourselves out about all the trillions of dollars a year apparently we have to spend on our defense budget. I think it would be helpful if we had a realistic understanding of our adversaries, and where they are at, and what we need to counter.

I watched a fascinating video the other day, economists pointing out that China is a net importer of both food and energy by a really large margin. They don't have the naval capability of protecting that energy and food that is coming in from all over the world because their ships can't get very far away from China and still operate.

So, let's have a reasonable picture about what we need to build and what we need to have. And I think it would be good to get more information on that and have a longer conversation on that, which we will attempt to find time to do.

Ms. McClain is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. McCLAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here.

The Navy, and it is in the same vein that we are all talking about, and, Chairman, you talk about capability and looking at the future. I think that is what we are all concerned about is capability, looking at the future, making sure that we are the leaders, that we are protected, that we are safe.

The general theme that I am sort of getting is there is a disparity between, or there is not a reconciliation of here is what we need to be safe, and here is where we are at. There seems to be some disparity.

The Navy has requested, is requesting legislative relief from the statutory requirement to support the carrier air wings. However, you have stated that you believe the Navy needs 12 carriers. In your assessment, how many aircraft carriers are needed to meet current and future, which I think is important, operational requirements?

So, I don't understand, if we are looking towards the future, why are we reducing our standards, so to speak.

Secretary DEL TORO. If I could start off and kick it over to you, CNO.

So, we are not reducing our standards, Congresswoman. We actually have 11 carriers that actually are being proposed all the way through 2039. Beyond that it goes to 12 carriers.

Mrs. McCLAIN. Okay. So, you are not requesting legislative relief from the statutory requirement. I read that wrong.

Secretary DEL TORO. Well, if I could just finish.

However, at any one given moment in time not all those carriers are available, which means not all those carrier wings need to be available to deploy on the carriers themselves.

And I will allow the CNO to expand on that.

Admiral GILDAY. So, nine is the right number. Nine is the right number, given the fact that we have 11 carriers.

So, you are always going to have two carriers that are going to be in drydock. So, you don't want to pay, you don't want to pay for the readiness for excess to need if—when, when we want to make sure that we're putting the right money in the right place at the right time. And so, to have a wing sitting around that you won't be able to, that you won't be able to deploy, it won't fly at the same—

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Well, so, I understand that, sir.

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. So, so I guess my second question is I thought you had stated that you believed the Navy needs 12.

Admiral GILDAY. Correct. Over time the analysis shows 12. That is correct.

And so, we would, and so we would scale our carrier air wings to meet that requirement when it is needed.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. When it is needed.

Admiral GILDAY. Correct.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. And what—well, I will get into that.

So in your assessment, how many aircraft carriers are needed to meet current and future operational requirements?

Admiral GILDAY. As the Secretary stated, at least 12.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Now.

Admiral GILDAY. We have 11 right now. The long—the stretch—

Mrs. MCCLAIN. That is where my confusion comes in is you need 12. We have 11, but we are prepared for 9.

Admiral GILDAY. So, if we had 12 we would be—if we had, if we—

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Well, let's start with, let's start with capability and what we need.

Admiral GILDAY. Okay.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. What is that answer: 12, 11, 9?

Secretary DEL TORO. So, the President's budget right now proposes 11 carriers through 2039.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. And I appreciate that.

My question is, and maybe I am not phrasing it correctly, what do we need? Not what is proposed but what do we physically need now to be prepared now and in the future? What is that number I am looking for?

Secretary DEL TORO. We need 11 carriers now.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. We need 11. And that, in your opinion, is plenty—good—

Secretary DEL TORO. To meet the—warfighting requirements. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Okay. Thank you.

So, based on China's current 2030 force projections, how many carriers and carrier air wings should the Navy be fielding?

So, I am looking at Mr. Smith. He is not Chairman Smith.

In comparison to our competition, what do we need, specifically China? Because it looks by all of our accounts that the Chinese trajectory, from what Mr. Waltz has shown as well, we have, you know, we have some disparity. I know those are naval, but we have disparity

So, in comparison to our competition, what do we need?

Secretary DEL TORO. So, the estimate is that we will need 11. China does not have nearly as many carriers as we have. And it is not just about a one-to-one capacity, it is about strategy. It is about a lot of the things that the chairman just previously spoke about as well, too. It is about geography, it is about how you employ strategy to defeat the enemy, it is about cyber, it is about space, a lot of others.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. So, in essence, less is more, working smarter versus harder, so to speak?

Secretary DEL TORO. Hypothetically, but both capacity and capability matter to be able to deliver the lethality that you have to deliver to your enemy at any given time.

Mrs. MCCLAIN. Okay, thank you.

Also, we know aircraft carriers cannot project power without the carrier air wing. Right? Several members of this committee believe that there is a great deal of risk in the Navy's current tactical air aviation plan.

The Next Generation Air Dominance schedule has slipped over the past few years. Fewer Super Hornets than initially planned are being inducted for service life modification and Block 3 upgrades.

F-35C procurement quantity has still not been reached, 24 aircraft per year. Right?

Last year the Navy suggested—and I am going to run out of time—that the striker fighter shortfall would be resolved by 2025, but now it doesn't look like it is going to be resolved till 2031.

Can you explain the disparity on that?

Secretary DEL TORO. So, the supply chain has a very negative effect on the ability to deliver F-35—

Mr. KAHELE [presiding]. The member's time has expired. We can take that for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.]

Mr. KAHELE The chair will now recognize himself for 5 minutes.

Mahalo, Secretary Del Toro, Admiral Gilday, and General Berger for appearing before this committee today. I am going to focus my questions on the number one issue on the minds of the people of Hawaii, and that is the closure of the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for including Red Hill in your testimony before this committee.

Last Friday, the Hawaii Department of Health issued an emergency order regarding the closure of Red Hill. It sets specific timelines that the Navy must comply with for the safe and expeditious defueling and closure of Red Hill.

On Monday of this week, the Navy waived its right to contest the State's order, effectively paving the way for Red Hill's permanent shutdown. It requires the Navy to provide the State with an inde-

pendent contractor's assessment on facilities operations by May 15th, a plan and implementation schedule to defuel by June 30th, and a plan for closure of the facility by November 1st.

Secretary Del Toro, in the interests of time I have three yes or no questions for you.

The first is, will the Navy be able to meet these three Department of Health deadlines: this Sunday for the NAVSUP [Naval Supply Systems Command] FLC [Fleet Logistics Center] Norfolk contract assessment report; June 30th for the defueling schedule; and 1 November for the closure plan?

Secretary DEL TORO. So, Congressman, that is to be determined. As you know, that there is language in the executive order that actually allows us to actually have further discussions on the exact timeliness of the dates.

Mr. KAHELE. Will the Navy be able to meet the SECDEF's [Secretary of Defense's] March 7th memo, which requires both yourself and the Director of the DLA [Defense Logistics Agency], to provide a defueling plan of action to the SECDEF by May 31st?

Secretary DEL TORO. I can't speak for the Director of the DLA, but the Navy will meet its requirement to the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. KAHELE. Excellent.

Finally, there are multiple ongoing investigations. The commander of PACFLT [U.S. Pacific Fleet] ordered a command investigation on November 29th, 9 days after the catastrophic leak. The PACFLT commander received that report, Admiral Paparo, on January 14th, and turned it over to the Pentagon.

In mid-March, the Pentagon ordered a supplemental investigation because the original report was insufficient.

When will the congressional delegation, the State of Hawaii, and the people of Hawaii, as well as our 100,000 military service members and their dependents that are on the Navy's water system, get to see and review the results, redacted or unredacted, of this command investigation?

Could you give me a timeline? Can you give the people of Hawaii a date?

Secretary DEL TORO. So, Congressman, that investigation has been completed. It is under review by the leadership of the Department of Defense. And it will be released in the next several weeks.

Mr. KAHELE. Several weeks?

Secretary DEL TORO. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAHELE. Okay. Just want to reemphasize it has been 6 months since the November 20th fuel leak. The full extent of this public health crisis and the environmental damage is still not yet known.

As recently as April 1st, a little over a month-and-a-half ago, there was another release of approximately 30 gallons of fuel and water mixture from a maintenance line connected to Tank 15 at Red Hill.

So, this is very, very important for the delegation and for the people of Hawaii. And I appreciate your promptness in this issue.

Secretary Del Toro, of the approximately 93,000 people on the Navy's water distribution system on Oahu, it is still not clear how many people have been affected by the May and November 2021 fuel spills. Secretary—Assistant Secretary Meredith Berger's memo

to you on March 29th, she mentioned that the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry conducted an expanded public health study that included all non-Federal civilians and DOD personnel served by the Navy's water system in their homes, their workplaces, their schools, and their childcare centers.

The preliminary analysis of this survey determined that 86 percent of the surveyed individuals exhibited symptoms consistent with acute petroleum exposure.

Can you elaborate at all on this study, and share any of this data with the public?

Secretary DEL TORO. Sir, that was a survey that was conducted. We, obviously, in our interest to protect our sailors, our Marines, their families, and all other individuals in the Department of Defense, also in the State of Hawaii, have ensured that we have had two surveys now: one conducted by the CDC [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention], another one by—conducted by the Navy to try to capture all the individuals that were impacted by this. And that survey result of 86 percent is reflective of the answers that were provided by individuals.

Mr. KAHELE. Okay. Last question.

The Navy's compromised water system is also currently contributing to a water shortage on the island of Oahu. The Red Hill well, and the nearby Aiea-Halawa well remain offline, disconnected from the Navy's water distribution system. Honolulu Board of Water Supply anticipates a water shortage this upcoming summer. It is calling for a 10 percent water reduction for urban Honolulu.

What is the status of the Red Hill and Aiea-Halawa wells? When can we get that back online?

And we can take that for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.]

Secretary DEL TORO. So, yes, sir. And I would like to comment real quickly.

As you know, sir, we have been testing the Red Hill. All indications right now are that it is safe. But that's a determination that has to be made by the Department of Health of Hawaii.

And we continue to work very closely with the Department of Health and other officials on Hawaii to come to that proper conclusion at the right moment in time.

Mr. KAHELE. Thank you so much.

The chairman would like to now recognize Mr. Jackson for 5 minutes.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you guys for being here today. I apologize. I had to step out; we had a little get-together with the King of Jordan. So I don't know exactly what has been asked, but I don't think anybody has asked my question yet because I am going to ask you about the V-22.

So, with you, General, I will start with.

The Marine Corps included funding for the MV-22 nacelle improvement on its unfunded priorities list for this fiscal year. I anticipate that Congress will provide full funding for that because we here on the committee recognize the game-changing capabilities that this aircraft provides.

Upgrading the current fleet is essential. But I think we should also look at expanding the current number of MV-22 aircraft.

General Berger, how important is it to improve the readiness of our platform such as the MV-22 when implementing Force Design 2030?

General BERGER. It is critical, as you pointed out. It's proven in combat and on every deployment since. It is one-of-a-kind in the world. We can't do our job without it.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, sir. I agree. And I will do whatever we can to help you on that front.

Admiral, I want to ask you a quick question.

As you know from your close coordination with NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration], much of the nuclear enterprise is in desperate need of modernization. When we look at the possible future conflict with China, the timeline keeps shifting further and further to the left. It has become clear that the platforms and capabilities that we are looking to field in the 2030s and the 2040s will be needed much sooner than we anticipated.

How important is the W-93 warhead program as we transition from *Ohio*-class submarines to *Columbia*-class submarines?

And further, from your perspective, how helpful would it be for Congress to accelerate funding for nuclear modernization in support of the sea leg of the triad?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, I would say that modernization is critical with respect to that weapon system. And right now we are on track.

I will—I will get back to you on whether or not we could actually physically accelerate that program.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 155.]

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

And then this just quick question here. This is kind of one of my—my areas that I am concerned about.

But anybody who has been to a HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hearing this year has heard me express my serious concerns about our medical readiness and some of the dangerous cuts being made to the military medical community.

Mr. Secretary, I just wanted to—there is a particular area of concern I have. I wanted to know what is the justification for cutting the position of the Medical Officer of the Marine Corps?

Secretary DEL TORO. Congressman, the justification has been an overall look across the balance of flag officers and SESes [Senior Executive Service] that we have in the Department of Defense. As you know, the Department of Defense has put—there is a cap on the number of flag officers that we are allowed to have. And so, we have had to downsize the number of flag officers and the number of SESes as well, too. That has been congressionally mandated. And it is our intent to meet the intent of the law.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, sir.

And I may be a little bit biased on this one in particular, but being a former Navy physician and spending time with the Marines, I feel like the making sure that we provide the absolute best leadership we can possibly provide for Navy medicine with regards to our support of the Marine Corps is really important to me. So,

I know that there is a finite number of flag and general officers, and you are operating within, within that framework.

But I would really like to try to find other ways to, or find a way to reestablish that position. I think it is really important.

Secretary DEL TORO. And we would be happy to work with you and the Congress on that issue, sir.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, sir.

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Mr. KAHELE. The chairman recognizes Ms. Jacobs for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Nice to see you all. Mr. Secretary, hope you enjoyed your recent time in San Diego with Tom Cruise, of all people.

You know, several of my colleagues have already highlighted the importance of the 30-year shipbuilding plan. I just want to reiterate how important that is and, you know, want to make sure we are thinking long-term. And thank you and the Department for delivering it this year after several delays.

So, over the years the Navy has seen several platforms come in over budget, such as the DDG, or underperform, such as the LCS. In addition to the unnecessary waste that this has forced on taxpayers, these mistakes have also had a direct impact on Navy's ability to meet its mission.

So, what is the Navy doing to ensure that this new 30-year plan will not repeat mistakes of the past?

And how are you and the Department incorporating lessons learned as we look to meet the challenges of the future?

Secretary DEL TORO. It is a great question, Congresswoman. And I have been deeply engaged on that issue since I became Secretary of the Navy.

It is obviously important for us to build these great platforms and these great capabilities. It is also equally important for industry to deliver these things on time and on cost. And so, we have spent an enormous amount of time in the Navy and the Marine Corps talking to our PEOs [program executive offices] about ensuring that we are providing proper oversight over the acquisition programs in order to be able to hold the builders accountable for what they have contracted with the Department of Defense to deliver on.

Equally important, I think it is important to control requirements creep on the part of the government, to ensure that when we agree to certain contracts we just don't continue to increase the requirements on those contracts, which adds a tremendous amount of additional costs to the individual contracts.

CNO, would you like to comment further on this topic?

Admiral GILDAY. Ma'am, thanks for the question on the shipbuilding plan.

I think a real key here is predictability and stability in the plan. And so, we have that for submarines out for the next 15, almost 20 years. We aspire to do the same thing for the surface force.

So, the Secretary has fought very hard to keep two destroyers a year in the shipbuilding plan this year. He has fought hard to keep an LPD in the plan for this year and, hopefully, to continue that line.

But to give industry in the surface build—on the surface production line the same kind of predictability that you have in the un-

dersea is what we are really trying to do, and to work closely with the Congress in order to follow through on that.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you. Representing San Diego, I will look forward to working very closely with you on that.

General Berger, last week I had the pleasure to visit with General Smith at I MEF. And one of the things we talked about was the health and deployability of the MEUs. And given that the 22nd MEU was unable to deploy on the updated timeline, what additional resources do you need to ensure the MEUs are deploying on time with proper manning, training, and equipment?

General BERGER. I can handle the Marine part and probably a tag team between me and Admiral Gilday.

The cycle is very predictable for the Marine expeditionary units. They have the lead time, they have the planning time that they need to prepare, and to train up, and to man.

So, I am very comfortable with the cycle of the Marines.

The ability of the team to marry up with the amphibious ships is where the center of your question is. Absolutely bare minimum number of days to work together. Prior to that, the ship's crew has to have dedicated time to do their preparation work.

So, in the end it is a function of the maintenance, the level of maintenance readiness of the amphibious ships. And part of the driver there—again, the admiral can speak clearer than I can—is how we have used them in the past and when we have extended them unplanned. All of that affects readiness now.

But I will turn it over to Admiral Gilday.

Admiral GILDAY. The first thing we have to do is actually do the maintenance on the ships. And so, there was a period of time when we did not. We took a holiday from doing that.

And as we get into a discussion about priorities and we talk about readiness, modernization, and capacity, if you want to—if you want to drive numbers you are going to pay for it with things like ship maintenance, ships' maintenance. That is not where we want to be. We have seen the second- and third-order effects of that, including the impact on getting the 22nd MEU out on time.

So, we are funding our maintenance accounts at 98 percent. We are trying to drive delay days down to zero. We were at 7,700 a couple years ago. We are down to 3,000 right now. We are not satisfied. We want to get that down to zero delay days so that in terms of how we generate forces, how we generate ships to go to sea, that you can on any given day have 100 percent assurance that the ships that are supposed to be out are actually out at sea.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you.

And for the record, since I am running out of time, would just love to hear what the Navy's doing to increase manning and when surface ships will be fully manned, given that a GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] report found that the surface fleet is 15 percent undermanned compared to required level.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 154.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. We will take that for the record.

Ms. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. BICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Secretary, General, and Admiral for being here today.

As you know, my hometown of Oklahoma City is home to the Navy, excuse me, Strategic Command Communications—sorry, Strategic Communications Wing 1, also known as TACAMO [Take Charge and Move Out], based at Tinker Air Force Base. TACAMO carries out a mission of critical national security, providing coms [communications] backbone for the nuclear arsenal.

Like many aircraft in the fleet, the E-6 aircraft used by TACAMO is aging and is in need of replacement. The Navy has requested \$554 million for RDT&E [research, development, test, and evaluation] for 2023 to start capitalization of the C-130J.

Given the differences in the aircraft specifications, the C-130J does not have the cruise speed, service ceiling, or the range of the E-6.

My question is what criteria did the Navy use to select the C-130J to replace the E-6?

Admiral GILDAY. Ma'am, that was a warfighting criteria driven by the commander of STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command], who actually, who actually is serviced by those aircraft. So, his command and control is contingent upon it.

So, that was a driver in terms of—in terms of determining what the replacement would look like and what it would actually be.

Mrs. BICE. I think I am concerned about the diminished capability of this replacement aircraft, given the long distances the Navy aircraft may need to travel to alert at sea, How can the Navy justify the significant shorter range of this aircraft, given the mission?

Admiral GILDAY. Ma'am, if I could, what I like to offer, not to be evasive, but is to offer you a classified briefing that compares the existing TACAMO with, with the platform that we intend to replace it with.

And also to talk about what we are doing to extend the service life of the existing platform so that you will understand completely what we are, what we are moving towards and why.

Mrs. BICE. I would very much appreciate that, Admiral.

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, ma'am.

Mrs. BICE. Thank you for that offer.

To follow up, can you talk about the Navy efforts to monitor, predict, and respond to supply chain threats? You all have talked a little bit in earlier questioning about supply chain. Do you have concerns that the vulnerabilities could impact readiness?

And do you have any specific needs to ensure the acquisition and maintenance processes have a reliable supply chain?

Secretary DEL TORO. So, this is a problem not just for the Department of the Navy but for the entire Department of Defense. And we are working very closely with the Department of Defense, particularly the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, and—to try to identify a greater number of supply chain vendors that can provide the necessary commodities and very specific equipment that is necessary, especially in the area of our subcontracting force.

You know, we see a lot of the shortages, not just in the prime vendors but, actually, in the subcontracting force.

And so, without going into details on our more highly classified programs, there is a great amount of effort being placed here to track exactly what those vulnerabilities are and to see what we can do to actually try to expand the supply chain in every possible way.

The Department of Defense is embracing our small business program very aggressively across the country to try to include a greater number of vendors to provide these necessary products across the board. So, there is a lot of effort going on, Congresswoman.

And we would be happy to provide you a brief with more specifics on those.

Mrs. BICE. Thank you for that, Mr. Secretary.

There has been noted concerns with the Navy's cybersecurity posture. It has been very clear to me in meetings that I have been in that workforce challenges continue to be a limiting factor in this space.

Do you find the pipeline for cyber force growth limited—limiting in order for the Navy to meet and sustain USCYBERCOM's [U.S. Cyber Command's] demands.

Secretary DEL TORO. So, this is an area that is extremely important to us, and we are putting a lot more attention to this here this year than ever before. The pipeline is an issue, of course. Cybersecurity jobs in the private sector are in high demand, and so recruiting people into this field is challenging. But I will give you an example of one thing that I think we are doing very creatively, in our community college program, for example, there is now a cyber track where our young enlisted sailors can actually apply to and start to build to become new cyber warriors, basically. So, we are trying to be as creative as we can. And perhaps our former 10th Fleet commander can address a few other issues.

Admiral GILDAY. Ma'am, we have, we have challenges just like industry does, just like NSA [National Security Agency] and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] do in terms of attracting talent. What we found is we haven't been doing a satisfactory job of managing that talent once, once they are in the Navy.

And so, some deep-dive efforts over the past couple of months have uncovered some shortfalls in terms of our—in terms of the way we are training people, the way that we are preventing their skills from atrophying is another example.

Not all of these fixes require that we lather it with a lot of money. Most of it is leadership and putting the right people in the right place.

Mrs. BICE. Right.

Admiral GILDAY. So——

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 154.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Mr. Carl is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CARL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing the best questions to be here at the end of this brief meeting.

Mr. Secretary, great to see you, as always, sir.

General, oorah!

Admiral, I got some questions for you real quick. We show a lack of medical capability. And I am intrigued by the shallow water, the

shallow draft capabilities of dedicated medical ships such as the EMS [Expeditionary Medical Ship].

How does the EMS capability fit into the warfighter and the HADR [humanitarian assistance and disaster relief] needs?

And how can having a better and more agile medical ship capability help our warfighters?

Admiral GILDAY. I see the—I see that—that ship is an opportunity. And so you are honestly limited only by your imagination in terms of the missions that you can actually put that vessel against.

So, one of the things that we are doing is investing in a medical capability on two of those vessels, so, essentially, to give us, to give us two additional hospital ships beyond *Mercy* and *Comfort*.

So that is something that after the initial two we can take a look at. We can see whether or not we should scale that further, whether or not that is satisfactory. But I think it allows us to close the capability gap rather quickly.

Mr. CARL. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

Admiral GILDAY. Sure.

Mr. CARL. Also, my next question is on the USS *Enterprise*, which was retired in 2012, decommissioned in 2017. And it has sat in storage at Hampton Roads since then. What is the schedule for the RFP [request for proposal] in order to appropriately dispose of this vessel?

Secretary DEL TORO. So, the RFP is actually being developed. And final determinations have not yet been made with regards to its—the approach. But it is currently being worked. And you should see that, I think, within the next month or two at the latest.

Mr. CARL. All right. Thank you, sir. We are hitting 100 percent here.

As many of my colleagues have discussed here, I would like to add for the record that this shipbuilding plan is not sufficient. And I do understand you started talking about capabilities, how important that is. And I would love sometime to get a briefing on that and expand my knowledge so I am not just looking at numbers.

Anyway, it is not significant to meet our threat, and especially in the Indo-Pacific.

Admiral, you originally spoke about a need for a 500-ship Navy. How can the Navy possibly justify a shipbuilding plan that not only does not meet the threats but falls short of what the specified outline of the Navy's needs are? Why are we making the fleet smaller rather than larger?

Admiral GILDAY. Sir, so, the shipbuilding plan itself doesn't truly capture those requirements in full. And the reason—the reason the alternatives don't is because the limiting factor besides funding is what the industrial base can actually produce over time.

And so, one of the things we have been talking about with the committee today is, potentially, as we offer industry a clear set of headlights in terms of our demand signal, that we actually see those improvements on the production line in places like Bath, Maine, and Pascagoula, Mississippi, so that we could actually produce more ships and actually put us in a better place with respect to closing down on those requirements.

Mr. CARL. Thank you, sir.

I watched a documentary last night on B-42s. B-42s they would turn out one an hour. They built all that: the plants, they drew the plans, they did everything in a 1-year period of time, Henry Ford did. America has the capabilities to build more. If there's a need, let's build them.

And I—and I call on you to let us know what you need to defend this country, because that is all of our goals, Republicans and Democrats, defend this country.

Mr. Chairman, I turn my time back over. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And those are all the questions we have for you, gentlemen.

Thank you very much for the hearing. Lots of challenges to work together. But I think the plan you have put together is—it gets us in the right direction. We need to work together to figure out what the budget is ultimately going to be and how we can cover these costs.

But I thank you very much for your work, your service, and for your time today.

And with that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MAY 11, 2022

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 11, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

THE HONORABLE CARLOS DEL TORO
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

ON DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY POSTURE

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MAY 11, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, Members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you alongside General Berger and Admiral Gilday to discuss the posture of the Department of the Navy (DON). I look forward to working with you to ensure that our Sailors and Marines are equipped, trained, and prepared to the best of our ability, so they can fulfill their vital role in support of the Joint Force, protecting our national security interests.

The United States requires a strong Navy and Marine Corps. The global economy, and the self-determination of free nations everywhere, depends on sea power. Thirty-one million American jobs and \$5.4 trillion in annual commerce rely on the sea lanes, and one third of all international commerce transits the South China Sea. Without a ready, and capable Navy and Marine Corps protecting the sea lanes and lines of communications, the global economy could easily halt.

The national and economic security of our nation depends on free and open access to the sea. And the rules-based international order that benefits us all requires a strong maritime force, campaigning forward alongside allies and partners to provide the sea control and integrated deterrence we need to counter strategic competitors, from Beijing, Moscow, and beyond.

As Secretary Austin stated in his testimony before this Committee, “Integrated deterrence means combining our strengths across all the warfighting domains to maximum effect to ward off potential conflict.” The Navy and Marine Corps Team offers forward maneuverable strengths in every domain that serve as a force multiplier within the Joint Force and alongside our allies and

international partners. We are determined to ensure the integrated all domain force required to ensure maximum effect for civilian and military leadership, across the range of military options.

Thanks to the leadership of President Biden and Secretary Austin, PB23 provides the right balance of capacity, lethality, modernization, and readiness needed to field the globally engaged and dominant naval force required by the National Defense Strategy. This budget will maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of each dollar entrusted to us by the American taxpayer, ensuring sufficient resources for today's challenges, while building future overmatch.

We will invest these resources through a concise, clear, and transparent strategy centered on three primary lines of effort:

1. Strengthen Maritime Dominance.
2. Empower Our People.
3. Expand Strategic Partnerships.

Admiral Gilday, General Berger, and I are executing these lines of effort as one fully integrated DON. The Navy [Navigation Plan](#) and Marine Corps [Force Design 2030](#) are complementary visions working together to ensure the distributed capacity, long range fires, amphibious mobility, and network of allies and partners our Sailors and Marines need to make mission.

Together, we are committed to working with you to ensure these plans are fully resourced, with vigorous oversight, to deliver maximum value to the American taxpayer, and to fulfill our sacred oath to protect the American people.

Strengthen Maritime Dominance

The security and freedom of the seas, and the resulting prosperity and security of our nation, did not happen on its own. It required significant investment and foresight by generations of legislative and executive leaders.

Two hundred and twenty-five years ago, Congressional funding led to the commissioning of *USS Constitution*. One hundred years ago, the Navy launched our country's first aircraft carrier, *USS Langley*. Eighty years ago, the Marine Corps began purchasing Higgins Boats. And seventy years ago, President Truman laid the keel for *USS Nautilus*, the first nuclear submarine.

Each of these investments yielded exponential returns, fueling the remarkable growth and global leadership of the United States during centuries of conflict and change. We stand at a similar inflection point today, where our national and economic security depend on the investments we make today to build and maintain our maritime dominance.

Just as our first frigates defended American shipping from foreign aggression, tomorrow's networked frigates and destroyers will define the future of sea control. Just as our early aircraft carriers provided the critical edge at Midway, *Ford*-class carriers will transform the forward posture of our Nation in the conflicts ahead.

Just as the Higgins Boats seized the shorelines from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, tomorrow's amphibious platforms will maintain our combat credibility throughout the Indo-Pacific. And just

as our undersea fleet maintained the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad for the last seven decades, our strategic future depends on delivering *Columbia*-class submarines, our top acquisition priority.

Sea power has always required foresight and investment, and the future of our Nation will be defined by the strategic choices we make today. The posture and availability of naval forces must always reflect the strategic needs of the Nation, providing effective options for the President and Secretary of Defense to counter every challenge.

The DON FY23 budget request delivers these forces through sustained investment and performance improvement, developing more lethal, networked capabilities and concepts, closely integrated between the services and with our Joint Force and government partners, as well as our allies and international partners.

Fleet Investments

The CNO's Navigation Plan refocuses our integrated all-domain naval power on the core functions of sea control and power projection through Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). DMO places a high priority on the long range fires and advanced connectivity that will result in a resilient, networked, and dispersed fleet, providing decision advantage and unified action in contested environments.

PB23 will invest in both manned and unmanned platforms to meet the strategic and operational demands of DMO, and will invest in the industrial capacity and capability to meet availability

and maintenance demands as required to defend the Nation. PB23 focuses on delivery and maintaining platforms that will provide the greatest combat capabilities and readiness across the fleet, while divesting in platforms that have less relevance in contested maritime environments where adversaries have advanced weapon systems. This budget provides funding for nine battle force ships in the coming year, including two *Virginia*-class attack submarines and two *Arleigh Burke* Flight III Destroyers, and also continues funding for the *Columbia*-class and *Ford*-class programs.

PB23 increases innovation and modernization efforts in Research and Development by 9% for the Navy and 6% for the Marine Corps. A \$2.7 billion investment in long range fires and hypersonic technologies will extend the lethality and capability of our platforms, and ensure maximum reach, survivability and decision space for our Sailors and Marines. With an increase of \$81 million for Operation Overmatch in FY23, the Navy will field a resilient, networked, and dispersed fleet, connected through the Naval Operational Architecture and Project Overmatch to provide decision advantage in contested environments. PB23 also commits \$1.2 billion of Research and Development funding to recapitalization of all portions of the undersea leg of the triad including the submarines, TACAMO, Trident D5, and our Nuclear Command, Control and Communications network.

To increase availability, improve maintenance, and maximize throughput for our warships, PB23 continues targeted shore investments designed to increase fleet readiness. I was honored to break ground on a new drydock facility at our public shipyard in Portsmouth last fall, and have visited each of the Navy's four public shipyards as Secretary. Each of these facilities provides critical

contributions to the availability and maintenance of our fleet, and each has modernization imperatives which are being addressed.

In order to improve naval maintenance production capacity at these facilities, the DON is fully committed to the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP), more than doubling SIOP investments over the previous budget, with over \$1.7 billion in funding for dry dock recapitalization, facility optimization, and capital equipment and modernization.

Expeditionary Capabilities

PB23 continues planning and design for the future Light Amphibious Warship (LAW). This budget provides for one Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD) and one Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA). Amphibious warships like the LHA and LPD are vital for the organic mobility and expeditionary persistence of our Marine Corps, and remain in high demand as a “Swiss Army Knife” for the Joint Force, meeting varying needs in dynamic situations. These ships provide the sealift necessary to deploy Marines for crisis response, contingency missions, humanitarian assistance, and integrated deterrence, supporting Marine Corps Aviation as well as diverse capabilities such as ISR/sensing, long range fires, and decoys.

The Joint Force needs a truly expeditionary and persistent Marine Corps - armed, agile, and postured – capable of operating persistently inside actively contested environments, and ready to respond in force at the speed of relevance. To answer these needs, the Marine Corps has put into motion an aggressive modernization of the Service through Force Design 2030, a transformational effort rooted in the anticipated challenges of the future operating environment.

I thank the Congress for its support of this transformation in the FY21 and FY22 authorization and appropriation bills. Your support is critical to the future readiness and lethality of the Marine Corps. Building on the cooperative efforts of all of our sea Services, the Marine Corps is reinvigorating the Fleet Marine principle to execute expeditionary warfighting concepts including Expeditionary Advanced Basing Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE).

Agile, smaller combined-arms warfighting units, such as the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are the 9-1-1 force for our Combatant Commanders in the most dynamic and volatile situations. For example, during the evacuation efforts at Kabul International Airport last August, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit was first on the ground, keeping the aviation lifeline open.

The ARG/MEU is able to support a variety of mission sets, from humanitarian assistance, to coordinated operations with our allies and partners, to agile and lethal response in the combat zone. All of this requires investment in organic mobility, from the fleet, to the field, to the air.

Accordingly, PB23 prioritizes and fully funds Marine Expeditionary Forces, and will advance the expeditionary vision of Force Design 2030 through aircraft like the CH-53K King Stallion, with rotary heavy lift capability unmatched across the Joint Force. Platforms like CH-53K and C-130J will play a key role in the rapid deployment of Marines and equipment wherever and whenever needed.

Air Wing of the Future

As we mark the centennial of American carrier aviation, naval aviators from both the Navy and Marine Corps are achieving exceptional results in the operational deployment of the F-35 Lightning.

From the short takeoff and nimble capabilities of the F-35B, to our unmatched, carrier-based, precision strike F-35C, the Joint Strike Fighter is having a transformational effect on the reach and capability of naval aviation. In the coming years, a combination of F-35 and Next Generation Air Dominance systems will provide even greater power projection from our carrier force. PB23 will procure additional F-35C and F-35B aircraft, and will also invest in the Navy's MQ-25 unmanned aerial refueling system and MQ-9 Reaper, a crucial enabler for the effectiveness, visibility, and maneuverability of Marines in the field.

We are taking a comprehensive approach to modernizing the Navy's Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs), which conduct depot level maintenance, repair, and overhaul of U.S. Navy aircraft, engines, components and support equipment. To build on the positive trend lines we have achieved in operational availability and readiness, PB23 includes an 11% increase in airframe, engine depot, and component funding. We continue to see positive results in aircraft availability, sustaining a mission-capable rate of 80 percent for F/A-18E/F Super Hornets for three consecutive fiscal years, and five additional airframes achieving 80 percent mission capability over the last 18 months.

Through the Performance to Plan (P2P) initiative we're using data-driven decision-making across the Navy to identify the root causes of maintenance delays and operational mishaps. This data-driven decision-making is integral to a "Get Real, Get Better" approach being applied across the Navy, demanding rigorous self-assessment, detailed analysis characterizing current performance, and providing opportunity to implement improvements. And in order to ensure every dollar is maximized to equip and prepare the warfighter, we are building on our financial statement audit success to improve our business systems, account for every asset, and leverage data as a strategic asset.

Sustaining Maritime Information Superiority

Modernization of our information technology infrastructure is a critical warfighting priority for the DON. As an information age naval force, every Navy and Marine Corps warfighting function and mission area is dependent on data and information to rapidly inform decision-making throughout the entire competition to conflict continuum. We are using data driven decision-making to achieve tangible savings while consistently working to become more effective and more efficient. For example, the Marine Corps has implemented Artificial Intelligence-enabled counter-intrusion systems aboard bases, and we will continue to explore the use of information technology to harden defenses and enable capabilities.

Effective use and management of data is key to our digital transformation, and will change how we will fight and win at every level. We are exploring the warfighting enabling capabilities of 5G expansion, and seeking additional ways to leverage new technology for distributed warfighting and unified command and control. Leaders in every functional unit and discipline

have been directed to set business systems modernization on an integrated path that is sufficiently resourced and supported across the DON.

Climate Readiness

The United States Navy and Marine Corps recognize the reality of global climate change and the need to prepare for its short and long term effects on operational capability, as well as our responsibility to mitigate our environmental impact.

To make our shore infrastructure more resilient to a changing climate, the Department is incorporating sea level rise modeling and modern facility standards into our new building designs. Navy and Marine Corps installations are adding a resilience component to their master plans and taking steps to ensure critical-mission infrastructure has access to reliable energy sources.

Reducing fuel consumption also reduces overall costs, not only related to end-point consumption, but also costs associated with transporting fuel and resources to protect those assets. New technologies are reducing fuel consumption, including hybridization for newer platforms. In addition, advanced batteries and synthetic fuels are the starting point for platforms that are smaller, more lethal, and more integrated into future battlefield networks.

PB23 resources \$719 million for climate-cognizant solutions including hybrid vehicles and propulsion system efficiencies. Reducing energy demand and fuel consumption through

advanced technology will enable warfighters to remain forward and self-sufficient for a longer period of time while also contributing to climate change goals.

Especially noteworthy are the regional challenges facing Naval forces in the Arctic, from the changing physical environment and greater access to sea routes and resources, to increased military activities by Arctic states, such as Russia, and non-Arctic states and their attempts to alter Arctic governance. Harsh operating conditions in the Arctic affect our meteorological forecast capability, hydrographic surveys, modeling, and sensors have the potential to impact sea lines of communications.

I have therefore directed a review of our current strategic document for the Arctic, the Arctic Blueprint, to ensure we are adequately preparing our forces for climate change within and through the region. The Navy is also engaging with our Arctic partners and allies through programs such as the Denmark Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative recently co-hosted by the President of the US Naval War College and Commandant of the Royal Danish Defense College.

Empowering Our People

Everywhere I've gone as Secretary of the Navy, I have been impressed with the professional dedication of every Sailor, Marine, and Civilian executing the many missions of the DON. Admiral Gilday, General Berger, and I are determined to ensure opportunities for every Sailor, Marine and civilian to advance and grow without barriers or discrimination. It all starts with a culture of warfighting excellence, where all are treated with dignity and respect.

Building the Future Force

To maintain a Fleet prepared to fight and win in long term strategic competition, we must continue to evaluate and improve our capability to attract, retain, and develop a talented and diverse workforce. We face an intensely competitive job market for talented workers, and a rapidly evolving tactical and technical landscape, driving us to modernize and enhance our entire talent management approach in order to succeed.

We are expanding opportunities for civilians with prior military service to contribute their unique experiences to our force through the Targeted Reentry Program. We are also expanding avenues for personnel to learn, operate, and innovate with partners from the private sector, across the Joint Force, and alongside our allies.

We are continuously identifying opportunities for personnel to develop their leadership skills throughout the ranks, promoting equal opportunity in every aspect of our force. For example, the Marine Corps Talent Management 2030 is focused on identifying the individual strengths of every Marine and matching these talents to the needs of the Corps.

Our mission demands leaders who possess the highest intellectual and warfighting capabilities to confront the many dangers of a complex world. We value critical thinking, creativity, communication, collaboration, and problem solving. The institutions of our naval education enterprise are developing leaders with the warfighting rigor, intellectual dynamism, and innovation to hold our strategic advantage against competitors and global adversaries. We are creating a continuum of learning through ready, relevant education, attuned to the battle rhythm of active duty service.

PB23 invests \$425 million in our naval education institutions, including the US Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War College, and Marine Corps University. This funding will expand access to the Naval Community College ensuring that all of our personnel have access to a high quality college education, no matter where their service takes them. We are investing in distance learning and increasing shipboard training and certification opportunities, while expanding opportunities for personnel to work and research alongside our industrial and academic partners.

We appreciate the Congress's interest in ensuring our naval forces have the right facilities to train, fight, and win. Specifically, we are grateful for the Congress's continued attention to the urgent need to expand the Fallon Training Range Complex, which is necessary to the readiness of every naval aviator and Navy SEAL. I have personally met with Tribal and local community leaders, as well as my counterparts across the Federal Government, and I am committed to finding a favorable solution for everyone involved.

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion

In order to meet the challenges of a complex world, we must continue to recruit, retain, train, and promote the best from all of America. We need a diverse force, so every child in America can see themselves wearing the uniform or working in our civilian ranks tomorrow, and every viewpoint is represented in our operations today, so that we can draw talent from all of America to build our warfighting advantage. This is a national security imperative, and a critical aspect of the DON's Diversity, Equity and Inclusion initiatives.

We have been reaching out across the Department, through efforts like Task Force One Navy, the Executive Diversity Advisory Council, the USMC Diversity Review Board and the Navy DEI Council to understand what is working, and where we fall short. We are looking at areas of under-representation in military and civilian occupations, and finding ways to build diversity, equity and inclusion efforts into our Navy and Marine Corps culture.

We are expanding recruitment efforts like our Junior Officer Diversity Outreach Program, to build recruitment networks in diverse and underrepresented communities. We are expanding and increasing awareness of career development and mentorship opportunities to help cultivate the next generation of diverse leadership through the ranks. And in accordance with the 2017 Women, Peace and Security Act, we are working with partner nations to expand the meaningful participation of women in defense around the world.

We continue to expand gender integration in Marine Corps recruit training and operational units, strengthening our entire force. Out in the fleet, women are leading as never before. In December,

I commissioned *USS Daniel Inouye*, under the command of Commander DonAnn Gilmore. In January, *USS Abraham Lincoln* Captain Amy Bauernschmidt became the first woman to command an aircraft carrier at sea. And in February, I was honored to preside over the change of command at *USS Constitution*, as Commander Billie Farrell became the first woman to command our Nation's flagship.

And many more outstanding women are on their way up the ranks. This semester at the U.S. Naval Academy, five of the six people chosen through a competitive process to serve on the staff of the Brigade Commander, the highest ranking midshipman, are women, including the Brigade Commander, herself.

From the E-Ring to the Air Wing, the deckplates to the field, our force is stronger today because of the many women and minorities in our ranks and leadership. But there is still more work to be done. We are working to reduce under-representation by examining our accession and promotion pipelines to recognize and value the service of all our enlisted and commissioned personnel. And our office of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion continues to identify areas for improvement and action. We look forward to working with the Committee to continue expanding opportunities for all Americans to serve and lead.

Destructive Behaviors

Leaders at all levels are expected to set the tone for a healthy climate and culture where destructive behaviors are never tolerated. Trust is at the heart of all our warriors do. Extremist

ideologies are a strategic threat to that trust and have no place within the Navy and Marine Corps.

Throughout 2021, DON representatives participated in the Secretary of Defense's Countering Extremist Activity Working Group to develop recommendations to address extremism in the ranks. Specific focus areas included military justice and policy, training and enhancing the insider threat program.

This budget requests \$240 million for Sexual Assault Prevention and Response activities – an 84% increase over FY22. We have focused our efforts on recognizing and preventing harmful behaviors in the first instance, and ensuring that leaders at every level have the training, skills, and tools available to ensure offenders are held appropriately accountable.

I appreciate the work of this Committee to include new tools within the FY22 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to deter misconduct and prosecute sexual assault, domestic violence, and other covered offenses. The Department of Navy is moving forward to create Offices of Special Trial Counsel, as required by the NDAA, and we welcome the meaningful change these offices will help enable. Trained and independent military prosecutors will capably oversee sensitive investigations of covered offenses and independently determine, based on the evidence, which cases are referred to trial by court-martial. They will be led by a senior judge advocate who will report directly to me.

DON leaders have circulated the “Watch List” throughout the force. This prevention tool details warning signs that increase the risk of sexual assault within a command, including sexual harassment, gender discrimination, lack of responsibility and intervention, workplace hostility, and lack of respect and unit cohesion. In conjunction with this training tool, we encourage leaders at every level to speak up and take action when they see these or other behaviors on the continuum of harm.

This fiscal year, we will begin hiring an integrated prevention workforce across the force to redouble our focus on early identification and prevention of harmful and destructive behaviors. I have also directed the DON to expedite the implementation of five recommendations of the Secretary of Defense’s Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military. These five accelerated recommendations focus on developing, educating, and promoting leaders dedicated to fostering command climates in which all individuals are treated with dignity and respect.

These changes will improve our ability to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment, hold offenders accountable, and create a safer, stronger and more inclusive Navy-Marine Corps team. I am releasing the DON “No Wrong Door” policy, ensuring victims receive professional care to the fullest extent practicable, regardless of where they initially seek support. This new policy will also serve to supplement existing efforts to further professionalize our workforce, prioritize the prevention of sexual harassment and eliminate collateral duty personnel with full time personnel. This “No Wrong Door” policy also recognizes that sexual assault, sexual harassment, and

domestic abuse exist on a continuum of harm. The DON's implementation efforts, led by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, are already underway.

Take Care of Our People

The DON is committed to ensuring the health, safety, and well-being for all members within our military community. We are reforming operating procedures and promotion practices to reward initiative, applied problem solving, and innovative thinking at every level. A top priority as we evaluate personnel practices are the needs and challenges of military families, particularly to ensure our policies respect the needs of single parent and dual service families.

The DON offers a variety of mental health and counseling resources, encouraging positive help-seeking behaviors and eliminating the stigma around mental health care among service members. The importance of this issue and the continued emphasis on suicide prevention has been highlighted in recent weeks as we mourn the loss of young Sailors aboard *USS George Washington*. We continue to emphasize suicide prevention efforts, breaking the silence, and increasing visibility and access to critical resources.

Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and customer service programs, we are responding to the needs of our warfighters and their families. For example, this budget increases Child and Youth Services funding by 38%, including \$56 million for a new Child Development Center at Point Loma, childcare data management system upgrades, and full funding for the Fee Assistance Program.

PB23 also includes significant funding for construction and oversight of family housing, including \$249 million for new family housing at Joint Region Marianas – Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and \$75 million for construction improvements to family housing in Yokosuka, Japan. PB23 also includes the funding necessary for DON to sustain our increased oversight as necessary to ensure Military Housing Privatization Initiative (MHPI) projects on Navy and Marine Corps bases provide quality housing and a positive living experience for Sailors, Marines and their families.

As demonstrated by recent quality issues at barracks buildings in Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bethesda in Maryland, the DON must also ensure that our unaccompanied housing is properly maintained and consistent with modern living standards. I have recently visited the barracks at NSA Bethesda to confirm that these quality issues have been appropriately addressed, and I am committed to improving our unaccompanied housing facilities and preventing future problems. PB23 also includes significant investment in unaccompanied housing, including \$101 million for phase II of a Navy barracks project at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and \$101 million for a Marine Corps Barracks Complex at Kadena, Japan.

Finally, I fully support the Secretary of Defense's decision to defuel and permanently close the Red Hill facility, and I take very seriously the DON's responsibility to make things right after fuel releases contaminated the drinking water system at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. I will continue to work closely with our federal interagency partners and the Hawaii Department of Health to protect the environment and support the military families and residents who have been impacted by fuel-contaminated water on Oahu, Hawaii.

COVID-19

With consistent personal and fleet discipline, vaccine distribution, and continued refinement of best practices, we have ensured a robust, proactive, and coordinated COVID-19 response across the DON. I particularly want to note the contributions of the 265,000 civilian employees across the DON, whose faithful service has continued through the many challenges brought on by the pandemic, continuing critical and essential roles to enable our force to continue making mission.

Guided by Health Protection Condition (HPCON) determinations and mission requirements, we continue to implement flexibilities to help minimize risk to our people and their families as we respond to evolving situations and ensure the continual readiness of our force. We are well positioned to emerge stronger than ever, as the pandemic has forced us to rethink and refine our recruitment, training, and personnel movements across the DON, as well as shipyard operations, deployments, and maintenance schedules, with efficiencies and applications of technology that can continue to benefit our operations and throughput long after COVID-19 is in our wake.

Strengthen Strategic Partnerships

Our partnerships provide an unmatched and irreplaceable advantage over every potential adversary. From our fellow Joint Force and government personnel, to our vital industrial base, to our global network of allies and partners, we will sustain, expand, and strengthen strategic partnerships by building seamless integration, communication, and collaboration with each of our partners at the same time that we cultivate new relationships.

Joint Force and Government

Across both services and throughout the DON, PB23 will invest in the readiness of integration-ready platforms to ensure continued freedom of action throughout the maritime domain, from amphibious and ground element equipment, to agile warships and submarines, to dominant aircraft carriers and air wings. Successful implementation of the concepts within the Navigation Plan and Force Design 2030 will be pursued through a unified, integrated effort at every echelon.

But our fully integrated naval force is only part of the formidable Joint Force team that stands united in the protection of the American people. Collaboration between Departments, from the Pentagon to the operational front line unit, is critical to the defense of the United States. We are constantly seeking opportunities to maximize the combined efficiency and effectiveness of our force in cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Space Force. For example, we continue to work with our fellow services on critical advanced research programs including hypersonic weapons. And worldwide, the Joint Strike Fighter program is yielding unprecedented reach and agility for the entire Joint Force.

We are also proud to serve alongside our fellow sea service, the United States Coast Guard. Building on Advantage at Sea, our Tri Service Maritime Strategy, we are continually seeking ways to leverage our combined capabilities, from ice breakers to coastal facilities to embarked personnel. For example, last year *USS Tulsa* and *USS Charleston* conducted missions with embarked Coast Guard detachments as part of the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. This joint effort improves our maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific to reduce illicit fishing, combat transnational crimes, and enhance regional security. PB23 will build on cooperative efforts like this to safeguard every part of the maritime domain.

We continue to work with the United States Strategic Command, the National Security Council and the United States Air Force to support the Strategic Deterrent Forces. We work closely with our Joint Force partners to ensure DON is fully integrated into the national command authority, and ensure the Navy's sea based strategic deterrent is ready at a moment's notice to defend our nation. We will continue to work closely with the Department of Energy and our National Laboratories, to ensure Navy is forward leaning with modernization and sustainment as we continue to invest in the future deterrent through programs like *Columbia* and TACAMO.

Community Partnerships

Across the United States and around the world, Navy and Marines Corps installations partner with the local communities that host us to pursue joint opportunities, collaborate on shared challenges and develop regional plans that enable military readiness while supporting community priorities.

Installation commanding officers are successfully using Intergovernmental Support Agreements to partner with a state or local governments to obtain installation support services, often at a considerable cost savings. Initiatives like the Defense Community Infrastructure Pilot program provide construction funds to states and communities to address deficiencies in community infrastructure that support military installations. And under the Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration (REPI) program, the DON is partnering with local governments and organizations and combining resources to enhance and preserve mission readiness and achieve mutually beneficial, sustainable communities near our installations and ranges.

Industry Partnerships

From the skilled shipwrights who transformed live southern oak into *USS Constitution's* "iron sides", to the over 2,000 suppliers and contractors contributing to the *Ford* class today, our industrial base has fueled the strength of our Navy and Marine Corps. The innovative platforms and technologies that are so essential to the Joint Warfighting Concept would not exist without the private sector's involvement.

Working alongside our vital industry partners, we are aligning our efforts to produce the right platforms and capabilities for the warfighter, and ensure maximum availability and throughput from design to production to maintenance. A robust, resilient, and nimble industrial base and supply chain is critical to the long term strength of our Navy and Marine Corps. Funding predictability and long term planning are key elements in ensuring the efficiency of our acquisitions and maintenance processes in partnership with a supply chain calibrated to deliver maximum value to the taxpayer and warfighter.

In order to ensure a strong and stable industrial base to meet our national security requirements, we must be clear and transparent as to our future needs and resource constraints, and fight requirements creep whenever possible. In turn, our partners must be transparent with us as well, managing costs, strengthening the workforce, and delivering platforms on-time and on-budget. Together, we must be good stewards of the taxpayer's money.

PB23 will strengthen our industrial base through targeted investments in supplier development, shipbuilder infrastructure, strategic outsourcing, and workforce development. This budget adds \$543 million for submarine industrial base investment and funds for a predictable build plan of two SSNs and two DDGs per year. It maintains a public shipyard workforce at 37,000 full time equivalent workers, and funds 45 private ship maintenance availabilities.

I have held multiple town hall meetings with industry partners to hear about their challenges when doing business with the DON, and seeking greater transparency and cooperation to pursue greater efficiency, innovation and teamwork. I have also made it clear that I expect DON suppliers and contractors to meet their small business commitments, and expand diversity, equity and inclusion efforts in their hiring and subcontracting, in order to expand the innovative private sector universe available to the DON to benefit the taxpayer and the warfighter.

Allies and Partners

As strategic competitors pursue confrontation and coercion, we respond with alliances and partnerships, standing alongside a global community of nations in defense of our common values. I have witnessed the bonds between our Sailors and Marines working alongside their

counterparts in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and elsewhere throughout the Indo-Pacific. I also saw the power of allied cooperation on recent trips to Europe, as I spoke with Marines preparing for Exercise COLD RESPONSE in Norway, and Sailors aboard *USS Harry S. Truman* carrying out tri-carrier maritime and air policing operations in the Mediterranean and North Aegean Sea alongside the Italian carrier *Cavour* and the French carrier *Charles DeGaulle*.

These activities demonstrate the strength of our integrated deterrence, and the agility of our combined forces. Last year, *USS Sullivans* transited the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Philippine Sea as part of the *HMS Queen Elizabeth* Carrier Strike Group, providing air defense and integrated operations alongside Royal Navy and Dutch destroyers, while also working with many allies and partners including Australia, France, Israel, Italy, New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and more.

HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group also featured United States Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 operating aboard the Royal Navy's flagship carrier. For seven months, the "Wake Island Avengers" operated ten F-35B Lightnings alongside eight Royal Air Force F-35Bs from the decks of *HMS Queen Elizabeth*. Our Marine aviators have also operated the F-35B from the decks of Italy's *Cavour* and Japan's *Izumo*, proving the capability of this aircraft for true allied deck hopping, when paired with United States amphibious ships for aircraft maintenance and sustainment.

PB23 will strengthen global alliances and partnerships with funding for joint operations and exercises around the world, including CARAT, MALABAR, and BALIKITAN in the Indo-

Pacific, NATO operations in the Mediterranean, and exercises in our own hemisphere like UNITAS. We will continue to strengthen military-to-military relationships with existing allies, leverage specialized allied experience in regional operations, and expand and deepen our partnerships with like-minded nations around the world.

We will continue to build opportunities for Sailors, Marines, and Civilians to train, learn, and operate side-by side with their counterparts in partner and allied forces, and operationally integrate with our allies and partners through shared warfighting concepts, continually campaigning forward to deter adversaries and protect the rules based international order.

Our Sailors, Marines and civilian personnel are warrior-diplomats for our nation. Their professionalism and dedication promotes the connections that strengthen our collective security and cultivate shared ideals that send the message that the United States is a friend worth having.

Conclusion

The most important partnership for our Navy and Marine Corps Team is with the American people. They entrust us with their hard earned tax dollars, as well as the lives and wellbeing of their sons and daughters, mothers and fathers, husbands and wives who serve in our ranks. We will not fail in our sacred responsibility to the American people, and all who serve in the cloth of our Nation.

On behalf of each of the brave Sailors, Marines, Civilians, and the families that serve at their side, I once again thank the leadership and membership of this Committee for your oversight, interest, and ongoing commitment to the defense of the United States of America. It is an honor to work with each of you, and I look forward to your questions.

Carlos Del Toro
Secretary of the Navy

The Honorable Carlos Del Toro was sworn in as the 78th Secretary of the Navy August 9, 2021. As Secretary, he is responsible for over 900,000 Sailors, Marines, reservists, and civilian personnel and an annual budget exceeding \$210 Billion. His priorities include securing the training and equipment successful naval operations demand and addressing the most pressing challenges confronting the US Navy and Marine Corps – China’s naval ambitions, climate instability, Covid’s ongoing impact, and strengthening a naval culture of inclusiveness and respect.

Born in Havana, Cuba, Del Toro immigrated to the U.S. with his family as refugees in 1962. Raised in the Hell’s Kitchen neighborhood of New York City, he attended public schools and received an appointment to the United States Naval Academy, where he earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering. Secretary Del Toro was commissioned as a Surface Warfare Officer upon his graduation in 1983.

His 22-year naval career included a series of critical appointments and numerous tours of duty at sea – including First Commanding Officer of the guided missile destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84); Senior Executive Assistant to the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and Special Assistant to the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget – where he helped manage the budgets of DOD, the U.S. Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the Peace Corps.

After retiring at the rank of Commander, Secretary Del Toro founded SBG Technology Solutions, Inc. in 2004. As its CEO and President, he supported defense programs across a host of immediate and long-term Department of Navy issue areas, including shipbuilding, AI, cybersecurity, acquisition programs, space systems, health, and training.

He holds a Masters in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, a Masters in Space Systems Engineering from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Masters in Legislative Affairs from George Washington University.

Secretary Del Toro and his wife have four children and a granddaughter.

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY,
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

ON THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

May 11, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the posture of the United States Navy. Moreover, on behalf of all our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, thank you for your continued leadership and support. With the funding authorized by Congress these last several years, we increased our readiness, modernized our capabilities, and kept our fleet deployed forward in the most critical regions of strategic competition.

Since the founding of our Republic, the U.S. Navy has played a critical part in defending and advancing national policy by delivering sea power far from American shores. Our Navy's role—and consequently, its composition—has steadily evolved to ensure American security and defend our interests around the world. From our humble beginnings as a small maritime force, fending off pirates and protecting American shipping, we have become a globally postured fleet that underwrites world stability by deterring war, upholding international law, and assuring access to the maritime domain.

Today, our Navy's mission has never been more consequential or expansive. We now face potential adversaries who are attempting to undermine the rules-based international order, aggressively modernizing their militaries, and fielding offensive warfighting capabilities at unprecedented speed and scale.

This is a critical decade. Peaceful, free, and open oceans are vital to America's and our allies' security and prosperity in the 21st century. As global challengers rise, we must strengthen America's naval power to protect and defend our national interests.

The Maritime Challenge to U.S. National Security

As a maritime nation, America's maritime superiority is a global imperative. Two expansive oceans connect us to our allies and trading partners. For all of us, our way of life depends upon free, open, and secure maritime areas. Sea control and power projection are essential to U.S. national security and long-term economic health. The People's Republic of China (PRC), our pacing threat, clearly recognizes this and has publically stated that it intends to grow its sphere of influence by challenging the United States' military access to the western Pacific.

Over the past two decades, the PRC has built a comprehensive sea-denial, anti-access system of sophisticated sensors and long-range precision weapons. Backed by a robust industrial base and the largest shipbuilding infrastructure in the world, the PRC has extensively modernized its military and tripled the size of the People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN). It is also building next-generation strategic missile submarines, erecting hundreds of new missile silos, and growing its cyber and space capabilities.

Under the cover of this anti-access umbrella, the PRC has embraced the use of "gray zone" activities to turn incremental gains into long-term strategic advantages. Using a multi-layered fleet of naval ships, maritime militia, and coast guard, the PRC is undermining international norms by staking illegal maritime claims, militarizing geographic features in the South and East

China Seas, and intimidating its neighbors regarding offshore resources. Additionally, the PRC is extending its global reach with its Belt and Road Initiative—leveraging predatory lending practices, aggressive mercantilism backed, and hard military power—to access critical maritime terrain, ports, and waterways.

Additional threats persist around the globe. Russia remains an acute threat, seeking to fracture NATO and reestablish its sphere of influence using a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military force. Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has shattered the post-Cold War peace in Europe. The support of like-minded nations for the brave citizens of Ukraine has reminded would-be aggressors of the global intensity of purpose to uphold a nation's inherent right to freedom. As the struggle continues, Russia is risking broader escalation with threats of nuclear attack, deployments of missile-carrying submarines close to American and allied shores, and sophisticated cyber-attacks. North Korea continues to develop both nuclear and missile programs; Iran's missile program is also concerning. All the while, violent extremist organizations remain persistent threats.

Other serious transboundary challenges, including climate change and emerging pathogens, are also increasing the complexity of the security environment. Strategic competitors and non-state actors are gaining access to cutting-edge commercial technologies and wielding them to disrupt America's interests and national security. Artificial intelligence, ubiquitous sensors, and long-range precision weapons are making contested spaces more transparent and more lethal, and these systems are proliferating globally at a rapid pace.

These are several of the many considerations shaping the future strategic environment. When examined together, they illustrate the complexity of 21st century security challenges, particularly in the maritime domain. In a rapidly changing world, a formidable naval force is crucial to effectively implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and protect American security and prosperity. The Nation cannot afford to have its Navy to pull back and cede influence at a time of rising tensions and challenges to freedom of the seas. Nor can it afford our fleet to lose its warfighting advantage.

Meeting the Challenge

Looking to the future, the U.S. Navy must continue to deploy our fleets forward to meet an unpredictable strategic environment. We must also modernize to field the most capable force possible against evolving threats. America needs a Navy capable of prevailing over any naval adversary to protect and sustain our interests worldwide and deter crises that could lead to war.

Together with the U.S. Marine Corps and Coast Guard, we must deliver integrated all-domain naval power to the Joint Force: the lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive fleet that the NDS requires. Specifically, in support of NDS and Department of Defense requirements:

- The Navy must **defend** the Homeland with an assured nuclear deterrent from beneath the sea to deter all forms of strategic attack.

- The Navy must be capable of controlling the seas to **deter** aggression against our allies and partners, and project power ashore as an integral part of the Joint Force.
- The Navy must be able to distribute and mass effects, integrate with the Joint Force across all domains, and **defeat** adversary forces in conflict.

To prevail in competition, crisis, and conflict, our naval forces must be *combat-credible*—measured by our ability to deliver lethal effects in contested and persistently surveilled battlespaces. We will deliver these forces by aligning our planning, resources, and investments with national policy end-state objectives:

Strengthening Integrated Deterrence. Integrated deterrence is backstopped by a safe, secure and effect nuclear deterrent. The Navy operates and maintains the most survivable leg of the nation’s nuclear triad. Our strategic submarines represent approximately 70% of America’s deployed nuclear arsenal. Synchronized with the retirement of *Ohio*-class ballistic missile submarines, we must deliver *Columbia*-class submarines on time, as we continue to modernize our nuclear command, control, and communications systems and supporting infrastructure. These efforts are essential to ensure the United States can deter nuclear coercion or nuclear employment in any scenario.

Deterrence also relies on forward-deployed, combat-credible conventional forces to control the seas and project power. These roles are central to integrated deterrence now and in the future. Employing a host of kinetic and non-kinetic effects launched from platforms on, under, and above the sea, conventional naval forces deploy globally to deter military aggression, support diplomacy, and give national leaders options to protect American interests across the spectrum of conflict. Should conflict arise, the Navy is consistently deployed forward to respond decisively, supporting the Joint Force to end hostilities on favorable U.S. terms.

The Navy also provides the first physical line of U.S. Homeland Defense, preventing potential adversaries from using the oceans to directly threaten America or our allies and partners. No other element of national power can fulfill this role across every domain, from the seabed to space.

Campaigning forward. Naval forces across the globe provide the United States strategic advantages in power projection, diplomacy, influence, and flexibility, without over reliance on access to overseas land bases. Our enduring, forward posture in support of the Joint Force guarantees our nation the ability to respond to crisis, blunt gray-zone incrementalism, and preserve a stable and secure global maritime order. The Navy’s global maneuverability supports diplomacy, reassures our allies, and generates favorable influence in key regions.

Our alliances and partnerships remain our key strategic advantage. They recognize U.S. naval forces as their on-scene partner for building combined maritime strength. Every day, the Navy operates forward alongside allies and partners through combined operations, theater security cooperation, and capacity-building initiatives. These activities strengthen interoperability, increase information sharing, and build capacity for resilient, integrated logistics. Working together—particularly with interoperable, critical-capability allies—we strengthen our ability to

prevail in conflict and further bolster integrated deterrence by demonstrating a united front against potential adversaries.

In September of last year, President Biden announced a trilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (known as AUKUS). The announcement launched an intensive 18-month consultation period among the three governments to seek an optimal pathway for delivering a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability to Australia at the earliest achievable date. The Navy is playing a key leadership role in developing this plan to ensure that our nation's preeminent expertise is applied to the nuclear-powered submarine initiative. We are focused on ensuring Australia understands the full scope of capabilities necessary to design, build, operate, and maintain a nuclear navy. AUKUS represents a tremendous strategic opportunity for the United States to expand our cooperation and collaboration with two of our closest allies, and we are on pace to respond to the President's tasking.

The Navy is also uniquely equipped to contest gray zone incrementalism by our adversaries. Gray zone aggression thrives with non-attribution. The best way to oppose these activities is to deny our adversaries anonymity with persistent domain awareness, the effective leveraging of intelligence, and the agile application of sea power. Together with whole-of-government partners, the Navy exposes malign behavior, imposes reputational costs, diminishes the effectiveness of propaganda, and galvanizes international resistance.

Building enduring warfighting advantages. Based on the PRC's current and long-term security challenge, the Navy must set a stable and sustainable trajectory to a larger and more capable force *now*. To ensure we remain adaptable and relevant, our future force design relies on six overarching imperatives to sustain our warfighting advantage, expand our options, and constrain those of our adversaries:

Expand **Distance**. Long-range precision fires across all domains—and platforms with greater reach—enable naval forces to strike hostile targets while increasing our survivability.

Leverage **Deception**. Deceptive measures—including stealth, concealment and maneuver, emissions control, and electronic warfare—degrade enemy surveillance and increase adversary uncertainty, enabling naval forces to operate effectively in contested seas.

Harden **Defense**. Integrating directed energy with hard-kill and soft-kill defensive systems disrupts attacks and keeps naval forces survivable when targeted by adversaries.

Increase **Distribution**. Distributing naval forces geographically and in all domains enables them to threaten an adversary from multiple attack axes. Smaller, lethal, and less costly platforms—including manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned—further complicate threat targeting, generate confusion, and pose dilemmas for our adversaries.

Ensure **Delivery**. Resilient logistics connecting the foundry to the fleet—enabled by secure communications and information technology—refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive distributed naval forces down to the last tactical mile.

Generate **Decision Advantage**. Naval forces will out-sense, out-decide, and out-fight any adversary by accelerating our decision cycles with secure, survivable, and resilient networks, accurate data, and artificial intelligence. Connecting sensors, weapons, and decision-makers across all domains enables naval forces to mass firepower and influence without massing forces.

These six force design imperatives enable Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), the Navy's foundational operating concept of our team-centric Fleet construct. Today's priority investments are delivering on these imperatives. For example:

- Investments in hypersonic weapons, space-based capabilities, unmanned tanking, and long-range precision fires deliver capabilities for effects at an expanded distance.
- Investments in undersea platforms, weapons, and systems, next-generation aircraft and surface platforms, cyber capabilities, counter-surveillance, and integrated weapons systems deliver increased deception and defense.
- Investments in smaller, lethal platforms, autonomous systems in all domains, artificial intelligence, resilient logistics, and integrated combat systems and networks enable a more distributed fleet, the delivery to sustain it, and expand our decision advantage against peer adversaries.

Accelerating America's Advantage at Sea

The Navy is implementing the 2022 NDS, preparing for the challenges ahead of us, and accelerating America's enduring advantage at sea. Within the scope of the President's FY23 Budget Request (PB-23), we are delivering a combat-credible Navy designed to deter conflict and help win our nation's wars as we maintain a global posture to assure our prosperity. To do this, we remain focused on four priorities: **Readiness, Capabilities, Capacity**, and our **Sailors**.

These four priorities are especially relevant because of today's fiscal environment. We face the simultaneous task of recapitalizing our strategic nuclear deterrent, our century-old dry dock facilities, and our strategic sealift capacity. These programs are all critical to our national defense. Meanwhile, Navy manpower, operations, and maintenance costs continue to grow above the rate of inflation. This means we must carefully invest in capabilities and capacity that offer the most significant payoff and warfighting value for strategic competition.

Based on these priorities, I have consistently said that the Navy's size—our capacity—ultimately will be dictated by the budget's top line. We will not field a fleet larger than we can sustain. We also will not grow the Navy at the expense of building the *Columbia*—our top acquisition priority. Nor will we increase capacity by failing to modernize and sacrificing our combat credibility.

The U.S. Navy cannot outpace an increasingly capable PRC by retaining platforms that are decreasingly relevant in modern naval warfare. While some of these platforms may have day-to-day utility in permissive environments, the Navy's first obligation is to deliver a ready, combat-credible fleet with the funding Congress appropriates. Simply maintaining the capabilities of

today's fleet will be insufficient to both preserve our long-term interests and protect America. Quantity is not synonymous with quality. We must modernize to maintain our maritime edge.

Therefore, our focus is on delivering *capable* capacity. America needs a modern strategic deterrent; greater numbers of undersea capabilities; more distributable surface combatants; a host of manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned platforms—under, on, and above the seas; and a resilient logistics enterprise to sustain our distributed naval force. Based on past and ongoing force structure analysis, it is my best military advice that the size of the Navy grows to a 500-ship hybrid fleet by 2045. Integrated with the Joint Force and interoperable with our allies and partners, this all-domain, hybrid fleet will ensure our maritime superiority.

Our Navigation Plan Implementation Framework supports these priorities, implementing lines of effort to deliver measurable outcomes, driving a new Force Design process to improve our agility, and energizing a fleet-wide movement to strengthen our learning culture. Our Navy is addressing the challenges we face with clarity, determination, and urgency. We made significant progress over the past two years, and we are continuing to press forward to deliver the readiness, the capabilities, the platforms, and the people necessary to protect the American people and our interests around the world.

Readiness

To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must prioritize readiness to keep combat-credible forces forward to deter conflict and protect the free and open system underpinning American security and prosperity. Our competitors are increasing their naval power every day, and their malign behavior and growing presence worldwide places an enormous demand on our forces. Moreover, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and ensuing global instability have provided a stark reminder of why the Navy must be ready to deploy globally in defense of U.S. interests. In FY21, the Navy-Marine Corps team executed more than 22,000 steaming days and more than one million flying hours. Because naval forces remain in high demand, PB-23 emphasizes critical aspects of our readiness.

The Navy continues to make readiness gains with increased shipboard manning, better maintenance performance, increased weapon inventories, more training for our crews, and enhanced spare parts availability. Sustained funding and systematic reforms throughout the fleet have enabled those readiness gains. Despite this momentum, we are not satisfied. Our focus remains on continuous improvement.

Deploying combat-credible forces starts with performing high-quality maintenance on time and in full. To this end, we are using data-driven reforms such as Performance-to-Plan (P2P), the Naval Sustainment System (NSS), and other initiatives to improve maintenance processes, increase operational availability, and save taxpayer dollars. We continue to see positive results with these methods, especially in our aviation community. By leveraging the power of the aviation Maintenance Operations Center (MOC), we sustained a mission-capable rate of 80% for our F/A-18E/F Super Hornets across three consecutive fiscal years. Additionally, we have seen

five more aircraft types achieve this high mission-capable rate as we have incorporated them into the MOC construct over the last 18 months. With more aircraft available, our aircrews are more ready to dominate the skies than at any point over the last decade.

We continue to take a similar, data-driven approach to improve surface ship maintenance, and we see positive results across the fleet. Since FY20, P2P-driven improvements—such as the goal of awarding contracts 120 days before the start of a maintenance availability, level loading ports through better prediction of workload, better availability planning, and improved long-lead-time material acquisition—have generated a 58% decrease in days of maintenance delay. PB-23 prioritizes private sector ship depot maintenance in line with enacted FY22 levels to provide industry with a stable and predictable demand signal. The Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) pilot, is seeing positive early results, including more efficient use of contracted ship maintenance throughout the entirety of the fiscal year, improved on-time delivery of long-lead time materials, and reduced impact of growth and new work. We are grateful for the support from Congress in continuing this budgetary authority.

Despite COVID-19, public shipyards have also seen improvements over the last two years, with fewer maintenance delay days and increased on-time completion percentages. However, submarine maintenance remains a pressing challenge. We are working hard to reduce submarine idle time at public shipyards by conducting thorough, early material condition assessments to reduce Days of Maintenance Delay and maximize operational availability. Through the Performance to Plan-Shipyard (P2P-SY) and Naval Sustainment System-Shipyard (NSS-SY) efforts, we continue to focus on achieving on-time maintenance availability completion. We are looking for opportunities to balance public and private sector workload and maintain a healthy industrial base for submarine maintenance and new construction. In addition, we are creating a Long Range (15-year) SSN Depot Maintenance Plan to improve workload forecasting in both the public and private sectors for FY23 and beyond.

Sustaining our platforms also requires critical investments in our infrastructure ashore. Our worldwide constellation of bases must be capable of sustaining and supporting our fleet at sea, including our public shipyards and aviation depots. The average age of U.S. naval shipyard facilities and related infrastructure is 61 years, while the average dry dock age is approaching 100 years. Our Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) provides a strategic roadmap for necessary investments in dry docks, capital equipment, and layout optimization of these vital national assets. PB-23 prioritizes SIOP, investing over \$1.7B in FY23, including funding for three major shipyard projects. Additionally, the Fleet Readiness Centers Infrastructure Modernization and Optimization Plan (FIOP) will ensure our industrial facilities are resilient and optimized to maintain both legacy and next-generation aircraft, and their associated weapon systems.

Our commitment to improving readiness also includes our information forces. We have established a dedicated team to improve our ability to generate and deploy forces for cyberspace operations. We are learning from other highly technical warfighting domains such as aviation and nuclear power to keep pace with cyber-force growth. This effort looks at all aspects of our

readiness to include recruiting, training, assignment, and retention. This comprehensive review sets a course for the Navy to meet and sustain United States Cyber Command's demand.

Readiness also extends to the training facilities that generate warfighting advantages. The modernization and expansion of the Fallon Range Training Complex (FRTC) is critical. As the capabilities and ranges of our platforms have grown, our training ranges have not. The FRTC is now far too small to allow carrier-based aircraft to adequately train for high-end conflict with precision-guided weapons, and it is too small for SEALs to conduct mobility maneuver training in a realistic tactical environment. Our Sailors need the most realistic training possible if they are going to defeat a strategic competitor. FRTC modernization will ensure that future generations of warfighters remain the most effective in the world. We understand the challenges associated with this project, and we are deeply committed to listening and working with every stakeholder towards a mutually acceptable modernization plan.

Capabilities

To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must modernize our capabilities to credibly deter war and, if necessary, win in conflict. Disruptive technologies are changing the potential applications and impacts of military activities from the seafloor to space. Artificial intelligence, machine learning, autonomy, quantum computing, and new communications technology are transforming the character of future warfare. Modern naval warfare demands integrated systems, resilient kill chains, better terminal defense, and a robust logistical footprint to support a more distributed force. Transitioning to these capabilities will increase our deterrence posture by expanding our ability to distribute our forces and mass effects.

As we build and put to sea a force able to deter and, if necessary, defeat a strategic competitor, we must prioritize capabilities that support Distributed Maritime Operations, or DMO—our previously mentioned foundational operating concept. Kinetic and non-kinetic effects must be distributed geographically—on, under, and above the seas—as well as in the information environment, the cyber domain, the electromagnetic spectrum, and in space. To operate effectively, platforms, sensors, and weapons must all operate and work together as one cohesive, integrated team. The teams are centered on our Numbered Fleet construct—our cross-domain contribution to the Joint Force. The Navy must empower these teams through secure, survivable, resilient, and common networks. Project Overmatch will deliver the Naval Operational Architecture (NOA), the Navy's contribution to Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) making major improvements in both resilience and capability to plan, coordinate and execute missions as a critical member of the Joint Force. PB-23 includes \$195M in FY23 and \$898M across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for core activities of Project Overmatch, which is an increase of \$122M in FY23. This increase represents a deliberate and executable investment to accelerate the delivery of NOA Increment 1 to carrier strike groups by next year.

Strategic competitors are continuing to develop sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that complicate our operations globally. Our PB-23 investments accelerate and enhance core Counter-Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (C-C5ISR) activities that generate warfighting advantage by degrading adversaries' understanding of the operational environment. In support of both offensive and defensive DMO, these investments integrate three Counter C5ISR&T tenets required to sustain operations in a contested environment with acceptable risk: (1) understand the risk of detection posed by adversary capabilities; (2) orchestrate actions to reduce naval units' targetability; (3) synchronize delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic effects.

As an example, to pace the growing air and missile defense threat set, the Navy developed and approved a strategy over the past budget cycle to deliver enhanced radar sensitivity and electronic warfare capabilities to our DDG Flt IIA ships. This strategy is called DDG Mod "2.0" and includes the back-fit installation of the Shipboard Electronic Warfare Improvement Plan (SEWIP) Block 3, adding enhanced capabilities to current SEWIP Block 2; a 24 Radar Module Assembly SPY-6 radar to replace SPY-1; and Aegis Baseline 10.

PB-23 also includes investments in developing and demonstrating conventional sea-based hypersonic strike weapon systems. The Navy Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Program Office and Army Hypersonic Project Office are using a common missile design and joint test opportunities to field non-nuclear hypersonic weapon systems. In 2021, we conducted two First Stage and one Second Stage Solid Rocket Motor static fires, marking the first successful tests of the newly developed missile. The CPS Program also completed an eight-shot Solid Slug Launch Test Campaign, which provided initial validation of the cold-gas launch approach for use on Navy platforms. Stable funding at the requested level will keep this critical capability on track to field on *Zumwalt*-Class DDGs followed by *Virginia*-class SSNs equipped with the Block V Virginia Payload Module.

We are incorporating other long-range, highly capable weapons into our magazines to improve lethality across domains. PB-23 sustains the production of the Blk-I/IA SM-6 and the modernized Blk-V Tomahawk Missile, and it funds the transition of the Maritime Strike Tomahawk to a Program of Record. Additionally, we are arming our submarines with better MK-48 Heavyweight Torpedoes and pursuing more advanced variants. We are also improving the effectiveness of our fighter aircraft, extending their all-domain reach with the Advanced Anti-radiation Guided Missile, AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. Altogether, the weapons procurement in PB-23 is our best capability insurance against near-term threat escalation while keeping us postured for the future.

In parallel, we are maturing multiple directed energy projects to improve overall fleet survivability in contested environments. We have successfully deployed three directed energy weapons systems in the 7th and 5th Fleets to support Counter-ISRT and Counter-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle missions. To reach our goal of "bottomless" magazines, we will need continued advancements and investments in directed energy, scaling and platforms with enough space,

weight, power, and cooling (SWAP-C). PB-23 funds \$262M across the FYDP to install the eighth Optical Dazzling Interdictor and provides continued funding for Solid State Laser-Technology Maturation, High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS), and the High Energy Laser Counter Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Project (HELICAP). Our future Navy surface combatants, such as FFG-62 and DDG(X), include SWAP-C reservations to accommodate such systems. We are taking a truly holistic view of this emerging portfolio to carefully incorporate directed energy into the fleet in an evolutionary way.

Capacity

To accelerate America's advantage at sea, the Navy will build a combat-credible, hybrid fleet, bolstered by mature, cost-effective unmanned technologies and operational concepts.

A new platform can take up to a decade to go through the planning process, receive authorization from Congress, and complete construction before joining the fleet. To keep up with the accelerating pace of innovation, the Navy must build future platforms with modernization in mind—hardware upgradeable and software updateable at the speed of innovation.

Our number one acquisition priority remains the on-time delivery of the *Columbia*-class ballistic missile submarine, which constitutes our nation's most secure and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent. Together with the Trident II D5LE2 Strategic Weapons System (SWS), *Columbia* will ensure the effectiveness and availability of the nation's Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent through the 2080s. With the *Ohio*-class submarines nearing the end of their service life, there is no further margin for delays in this once-in-a-generation program without impacting U.S. Strategic Command requirements. *Columbia* must be on patrol no later than October 2030. The first submarine began construction last year, with the second boat on track for procurement next fiscal year. We will continue to advocate for aggressive construction schedules and incorporate "lead ship learning" to guarantee on-time delivery of the entire class to ensure this national asset's capability in the decades ahead. *Columbia* will continue to grow substantially as a proportion of the total shipbuilding budget beginning in FY26, exceeding 25% when *Columbia* enters full-rate production.

Sea control and sea denial from beneath the waves are among our Navy's core advantages, and we refuse to yield any ground to the competition. PB-23 underscores our sustained support for procuring two *Virginia*-class submarines per year, and it invests in developing a follow-on attack submarine program, SSN(X), which will be key to sustaining our undersea advantage—setting the conditions for the warfighting advantage of our fleet.

Unmanned systems will play a key role in DMO. We released the Unmanned Campaign Framework in March 2021 to serve as the comprehensive strategy for a future wherein unmanned systems serve as an integral part of the Navy's warfighting team. U.S. 3rd Fleet executed Unmanned Integrated Battle Problem 2021 to integrate manned and unmanned capabilities in operational scenarios. To further operationalize the Campaign Plan, we established Task Force 59 (CTF-59) to accelerate unmanned and AI solutions, demonstrating the importance of warfighters and industry partners in operational experimentation with available

technologies. We intend to scale these lessons to 7th Fleet. We also continued work with partners and allies in events such as NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative Exercises and International Maritime Exercise 2022.

We completed MQ-25A “T1” aircraft in-flight refueling of Navy carrier-based aircraft and its first carrier demonstration and completed over 4000 hours and 46,000 nautical miles of USV operations. Additionally, we recently established the Unmanned Task Force, a cross-functional team focusing on rapid experimentation and solving operational problems to quickly inform acquisition strategies. The focus remains on enabling technologies to provide near-term capability, take an evolutionary approach, and lay the foundation for the future hybrid fleet.

This year, we celebrated the centennial of our aircraft carriers. They have proven to be the most survivable and versatile airfields in the world, and our nuclear-powered carriers will remain a cornerstone of the Navy’s conventional deterrence for decades to come. *USS Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78) achieved Initial Operating Capability in December 2021, completed flight deck certification, and is scheduled to deploy later this year. PB-23 supports procuring our follow-on aircraft carriers. CVN 79 construction is 85% complete and on track to deliver in FY24; CVN 80 construction is 12% complete and scheduled to deliver in FY28.

The sustained striking power and adaptability of our Carrier Air Wing is vital to controlling the seas and projecting power in contested environments. Today’s air wings are more capable than ever with the addition of the F-35C, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and the CMV-22B Osprey. Carrier Air Wing TWO recently completed a deployment with these capabilities, showcasing the cutting-edge lethality of naval airpower. PB-23 adds to our F-35 inventory to expand our fourth- and fifth-generation fighter mix, and it funds the unmanned MQ-25 Stingray, on track to deploy in 2026, which greatly extends the reach of our Carrier Air Wings into contested battlespaces.

We are also laying the groundwork for tomorrow’s air wing through the Next Generation Air Dominance portfolio. This highly networked sixth-generation family of systems will leverage manned-unmanned teaming to further advance the cross-domain lethality of our air wings in contested battlespaces. Delivering this capability is vital to outpace PRC fighter development.

Our future fleet design places emphasis on a balance of greater numbers of large and small surface combatants as the foundation of distributed operations. Our newest class, the *Constellation*-class frigate, is a versatile, multi-mission platform that will support operations across the spectrum of conflict. The future large surface combatant, DDG(X), will bring additional space, weight, and power to support evolving capabilities for a high-end fight. Together, these two ship classes will form the center of our cross-domain teams, bringing more lethality, survivability, and endurance to the fleet.

The Naval logistics enterprise continues to become increasingly agile and resilient to deliver the means to refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive distributed forces, ensuring the Joint Force stays combat credible against any adversary. Over the past two years, we have improved our afloat fuel distribution systems, introduced more secure digital systems for better logistics

planning and execution, and validated our Future Afloat Logistics Forces Initial Capabilities Document, which defines the capabilities and capacities needed to sustain naval forces. Adequate capacity is a continuing challenge and PB-23 pursues several platform solutions to close the gaps we have identified, including the continued construction of the John Lewis (T-AO 205) Class Fleet Replenishment Oiler Program, the Submarine Tender AS(X), and continued research and development to support the Next Generation Logistics Ship. Additionally, we are continuing to leverage the generous authorities Congress has provided us to renew our surge sealift capacity with used vessels, helping us meet combatant commander readiness requirements. We are grateful for this Committee's support.

Sailors

To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must invest in trained, resilient, and educated Sailors who can adapt faster than our adversaries in today's rapidly changing strategic environment. Our Sailors and civilians remain the true source of our naval power. We must continue to prioritize and care for them. From culture to training and education, to overall health and wellness, PB-23 supports the most important element of our Navy—our people.

History shows that the navy which adapts, learns, and improves the fastest gains an enduring warfighting advantage. The essential element in doing so is fostering a healthy ecosystem—a culture—that assesses, corrects, solves problems, and learns faster than the opposition. Our "Get Real, Get Better" movement will help us reduce the variability in performance between our best and worst performers. Get Real, Get Better will train and educate our leaders on the leadership behaviors required to create this culture, along with the supporting tools to solve our hardest problems. Focusing on our people, and their leaders, will further expand the asymmetric advantage that is the American Sailor.

Through the Ready Relevant Learning (RRL) initiative, we are providing Sailors with practical, accessible knowledge and skills that can adapt to the needs of the Navy. Today, RRL provides timely, relevant training using an agile, multi-path approach to ensure our operators have the knowledge they need on the deck plates to succeed in combat. RRL supplements our traditional brick-and-mortar schoolhouses with modern, multi-media, multi-platform solutions. Recently, we transitioned 8 enlisted ratings to this model and completed requirements development for 39 additional ratings. With the funds provided by PB-23, the Navy will advance the Career Long Learning Continuum effort, which is critical to the program goal of maintaining continuity and currency of individual training.

The Navy has prioritized the Fleet Training Wholeness initiative to integrate live platforms and simulators across our strike groups. This initiative funds Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) unit and strike group training. In the fleet, LVC continues to be a game-changer in training our combat leaders. From the pilot in the cockpit to the technician on the radar scope, LVC allows all domains to train together at unprecedented levels of integration and complexity. PB-23 builds upon the continued integration of live ranges, ships at sea, and aviation shore simulators, and includes funding to integrate aircraft and information warfare systems and capabilities into LVC

training. These investments are advancing our Sailors' tactical skills and proficiency against our most advanced competitors.

Building upon the momentum of the Navy's Culture of Excellence campaign, we will implement a holistic and prevention-based Total Sailor Fitness framework. This effort will maximize Sailor, unit, and organizational performance while improving Sailor trust, resilience, mental health, connectedness, and behavioral metrics. Our Warrior Toughness program enables better performance before, during, and after critical events, providing concepts and skills to develop peak performance and make Sailors more resilient and ready for the Fleet. We integrate these programs into the curricula of the Recruit Training Command, Officer Training Command, United States Naval Academy, and our NROTC units. As we drive forward with this Culture of Excellence, the Navy seeks to put the most combat-credible Sailors to sea—first-rate warriors who are willing and able to defend our Nation.

In addition, suicide prevention, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR), and Diversity, Equity and Inclusion remain pillars on which the Culture of Excellence will continue to build. As part of our suicide prevention efforts, the Sailor Assistance and Intercept for Life Program provides rapid assistance, ongoing risk management, coordination of care, and reintegration assistance for at-risk service members. Continued resourcing of this program saves lives. A full continuum of mental health and wellness support is also available worldwide, including at specialty and primary care clinics, Navy installation counseling centers, on the waterfront, embedded within the Fleet, and via virtual health platforms. Non-medical mental health services are available for Sailors and their family members through Fleet and Family Support Centers, Military and Family Life Counseling, and Military OneSource. Navy Chaplains provide confidential counseling and are essential in ensuring the spiritual readiness and resiliency of the Naval Force. There is "no wrong door" for our Sailors to get help.

The Navy is leveraging metric-based, sexual assault data to better understand sexual assault risk factors. This strengthens our SAPR programs with research-informed approaches to prevention programs and policies. We are also implementing recommendations from the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, using a deliberate, methodical approach to improve accountability, prevention, climate, culture, and victim care and support. These include addressing gaps in leader training to develop inclusive cultures that foster healthy command climates, providing sexual harassment victims with SAPR victim advocacy services, completing a SAPR Workforce Study to ensure unfettered support to sexual assault victims that phases out non-deployable collateral duty victim response personnel, and the phased hiring and integration of a primary prevention workforce.

The Navy is building a force that looks like the nation we serve. We benefit from our Sailors' talent, experience, and insights. Today, the Navy is more demographically diverse than ever before. As we strive to become a more diverse, equitable, and inclusive force, we have built on lessons learned from our findings in Task Force One Navy, implementing 36 task force recommendations, with 18 more in progress. We must actively include all perspectives to harness the creative power of diversity, accelerating the Navy's warfighting advantage.

To support our Sailors, increase productivity, and generate cost efficiencies, the Navy is modernizing its Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education Enterprise. Our Human Resources (HR) processes and operations have not fundamentally evolved in over 70 years. For too long, we have been managing our force with over 55 aging information technology systems, some of which are over 40 years old. These systems are not interoperable and do not provide a single authoritative data source. MyNavy HR Transformation is fixing this. We continue to make strides towards our Navy Personnel and Pay system rollout, which is an important foundational step for the overall transformation. By synchronizing and streamlining all aspects of personnel readiness, this overhaul will improve the lives of all Sailors and their families.

The Navy is a family, and our families serve along with us. Having witnessed the steadfast resilience of Navy families every day of my career, I have made it a daily practice to think about how to improve their lives. As all service members know, when we take care of them, they take care of us.

Conclusion

The U.S. Navy's mission has never been more essential for the preservation of American security and prosperity. Facing increasingly aggressive challengers, the Navy's priorities—Readiness, Capabilities, Capacity, and our Sailors—will help us maintain our combat credibility in contested seas.

We will need Congress's continued support. Since 2010, the Navy's buying power has not kept pace with inflation. "Must pay" once-in-a-generation strategic deterrence recapitalization and once-in-a-century shipyard infrastructure investments—along with rising readiness, labor, and material costs—are consuming larger shares of the Navy's budget. This loss in buying power has delayed modernization, reduced procurement, and constrained our ability to grow the force. To simultaneously modernize and build the capacity of our fleet, the Navy would need sustained budget growth at three-to-five percent above actual inflation. Short of that, we will prioritize capability over capacity. This will decrease the size of the fleet until we can deploy smaller, more cost-effective, and more autonomous force packages at scale.

The investments we make this decade will determine the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century. Ships, submarines, and aircraft are undoubtedly expensive instruments of national power, as are the associated costs of maintaining them at a high level of readiness. But history shows that without a powerful Navy, the price tag is much higher.

On behalf of more than 600,000 active and reserve Sailors and Navy Civilians, thank you for allowing me to testify today. I am grateful to this committee and to your colleagues in Congress for your steadfast commitment to the Navy. We look forward to sailing alongside you to sustain our advantage at sea.

Admiral Michael M. Gilday
Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral Mike Gilday is the son of a Navy Sailor. A surface warfare officer, he is a native of Lowell, Massachusetts and a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He holds master's degrees from the Harvard Kennedy School and the National War College.

At sea, he deployed with USS Chandler (DDG 996), USS Princeton (CG 59), and USS Gettysburg (CG 64). He commanded destroyers USS Higgins (DDG 76) and USS Benfold (DDG 65) and subsequently, commanded Destroyer Squadron 7, serving as sea combat commander for the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group.

As a flag officer, he served as commander Carrier Strike Group 8 embarked aboard USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), and as commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command and U.S. 10th Fleet. His staff assignments include the Bureau of Naval Personnel; staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and staff of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Joint assignments include executive assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and naval aide to the President.

As a flag officer, he served in joint positions as director of operations for NATO's Joint Force Command Lisbon; as chief of staff for Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO; director of operations, J3, for U.S. Cyber Command; and as director of operations, J3, for the Joint Staff. He recently served as director, Joint Staff.

He has served on teams that have been recognized with numerous awards and is the recipient of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal (four awards), Legion of Merit (three awards), Bronze Star, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with Combat "V," and the Combat Action Ribbon.

Gilday began serving as the 32nd Chief of Naval Operations August 22, 2019.

STATEMENT
OF
GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
AS DELIVERED TO CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES
ON
THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Introduction

Chair, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to present this annual report and share my perspective on the opportunities and challenges confronting your Marine Corps, the naval services, and the larger joint force. As recent events in Ukraine so clearly illustrate, our strategic adversaries and competitors are ready and willing to employ violence – at scale – to support their revisionist aims. They are willing to sow chaos, destroy cities, inflict mass casualties, and suffer casualties themselves to rewrite the international order – an order that has broadly and deeply benefitted humanity. To ensure the joint force remains able to deter, and if necessary, defeat these adversaries, we need to move at even greater speed to modernize the force.

As Commandant, I offer the Service's sincere thanks for the committee's support to our modernization efforts – anchored on Force Design 2030 and Talent Management 2030. Today, I respectfully ask you to recommit to our modernization program. Embracing change before a catastrophic event occurs takes both courage and foresight; thank you for demonstrating both. As I have stated in the past, the Marine Corps does not seek any additional resources for modernization. Rather, we seek your oversight and assistance in ensuring that the resources the Service generates through divestments, reorganization, and redesign are reinvested in our Corps' modernization priorities.

As I have previously testified, the suggestion that we have to choose between preparing to fight tonight, which we are ready to do, or preparing for some distant point in the future presents a false dichotomy. We must balance the very real and delicate resource tension between the force we employ today and the development of the force needed for the future. Our Nation can no longer afford to hold on to capabilities that do not create a relative advantage over our potential adversaries at the expense of capabilities that will keep us ahead of them – no matter how culturally significant or nostalgic to an individual service those capabilities may be.

We Will Remain “Most Ready When the Nation is Least Ready”

When defense leaders submitted their posture statements last spring, few of us would have predicted that a major conventional war in Europe – the largest since 1945 – was only a year away. Russia's brutal invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder that despite our best efforts, we can never know with certainty when, where, or how an adversary might precipitate conflict. Reflecting on this challenge in a related context, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said: “When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never

once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more—we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.”

Why does this matter? From the perspective of a service chief, it matters because we don’t have the luxury of building a joint force for one threat, one region, or one form of warfare. We must be prepared for the full range of operations in places we might not expect, and on timelines we did not anticipate. While this is true to some degree for all the services, it is especially so for the United States Marine Corps. Our history is footnoted by examples of our readiness to respond to crisis at a moment’s notice in “any clime and place.” This is essential to our identity as Marines, and part of our enduring value to the Nation. In these times of increasing complexity and uncertainty, the Nation needs one force, maintained at the highest levels of readiness that can respond to the crises that few saw coming. We are that force. Maintaining the entire joint force at heightened readiness levels is both unnecessary and unaffordable. Ensuring that the Marine Corps *does* is both strategically vital and fiscally prudent. As Marines, we have been, and will continue to be, “America’s 911 Force” – the Nation’s force-in-readiness.

Our ongoing efforts to modernize through Force Design 2030 (FD 2030) and Talent Management 2030 (TM 2030) will ensure the Marine Corps’ ability to meet our statutory role and be ready to respond to crises – across the Range of Military Operations – from active campaigning to conflict. While China, as the pacing threat, is critical to informing our force development efforts, the capabilities we seek are theater agnostic. The fact is, our current modernization efforts will enable us to operate, fight, and win in a more diverse set of scenarios and geographic regions than we can today. We are, and will remain, “most ready when the Nation is least ready” – a force in readiness prepared to respond to any crisis, anywhere, at any time.

Posture

Today, approximately 30,000 Marines are forward-deployed or forward-stationed, with hundreds more on watch at our embassies across the globe. However, in contrast to earlier periods, fewer of these forward deployed Marines are afloat in service to the Fleet. I remain committed to a robust forward posture to support campaigning and to expanding this forward presence through the employment of additional Marines aboard L-Class ships, Light Amphibious Warships, and other expeditionary vessels operated by the Fleet or our allies and partners.

L-Class Ships & Light Amphibious Warships (LAW)

L-Class Ships. For decades, the Navy and Marine Corps have demonstrated the power and versatility of Marine expeditionary forces embarked on amphibious ships. Operating as a combined arms team, Marines have come “from the sea” to support all manner of operations, to include: projecting combat power ashore, providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), reinforcing U.S. embassies, training allies and partners, and executing non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). No naval vessel in our inventory is capable of supporting a more diverse set of missions across the range of military operations than amphibious ships.

Amphibious ships provide platforms from which to base and employ a host of multi-domain capabilities – air, ground, surface, undersea, and cyber. Amphibious ships serve as mobile command posts, strike platforms, expeditionary maintenance facilities, search-and-rescue platforms, floating hospitals, sources of potable water and electricity for disaster response, transport and docking stations for smaller vessels, and locations where Marines can train with international partners without the requirement for host nation access. In the near future, amphibious ships with well decks will increasingly be used as mother ships for uncrewed vessels, carrying a wide variety of unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, mining, command and control, and military deception. Amphibious ships are also visible signs of U.S. reach and resolve, and because of their unique characteristics, can deploy to a region with a less escalatory posture than many traditional warships. Those unique characteristics include an ability to self-sustain embarked forces for weeks at sea without replenishment. Such resilience and persistence are a unique and vital capability for our combatant commanders.

Viewed through the lens of both the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies, big deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD), which carry F-35Bs, MV-22s, CH-53s, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and surface landing craft, are arguably the most versatile warships in our inventory. These ships, when paired with their embarked Marines, have the highest utility across the entire spectrum of conflict from building partner capacity to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to embassy reinforcement, to recovery operations, to strikes and raids against a peer or near peer adversary. This is the very epitome of campaigning forward from mobile sovereign platforms.

During his March 2022 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), the Commander of United States European Command (USEUCOM), General Tod Wolters, noted that his requirement for a 365-day Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) presence could not be met due to the limitations of the

current amphibious fleet inventory, and further characterized the MEU as “precious for effective deterrence.” A week later, Secretary Austin noted in his HASC testimony that, “Amphibs are important to us today. They will be important to us going forward.” I wholeheartedly agree with the conclusions of both leaders, as requested in the FY 2023 Budget. Our MEUs need them; our Fleets need them; and our combatant commanders need them. The National Defense Strategy cannot succeed without them.

Light Amphibious Warship (LAW). Distinct, yet complementary to traditional L-Class amphibious ships, the LAW is envisioned to be a small, amphibious warship purpose-built to provide tactical maneuver for Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), forward-deployed naval forces, and other expeditionary advanced base-enabling forces operating within contested environments. The LAW will be a maneuver asset, and as a shore-to-shore connector, is unique and critical to expeditionary littoral mobility. It will facilitate campaigning and will be capable of supporting diverse missions such as security cooperation, HA/DR, logistics support, and the launch and recovery of uncrewed systems for maritime domain awareness. While not optimized for any one threat or region, we envision the LAW as being of particular utility in the sort of maritime gray zone contests we see in the Indo-Pacific. This type of vessel would be well-suited as a platform for Marines countering threats posed by groups like the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), and because of its size and characteristics, could be employed with lower risk of escalation. The LAW will be an important asset to advancing our strategic interests by allowing us to more effectively counter our adversaries’ strategies, support and reinforce alliances and partnerships, and do so at a relatively low cost.

On 9 September 2021, the Secretary of the Navy commissioned the Amphibious Fleet Requirement Study (AFRS). The study directed a determination of the “required size and composition of the future amphibious warship fleet . . . needed to support combat operations, global presence, and safe and effective training.” The study found we should have a mix of traditional L-Class Amphibious Warfare Ships and Light Amphibious Warships. The study will be one of many factors considered by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense and the Administration as shipbuilding plans and future budget requests are formulated. In my military judgment we will need to employ a mixed fleet of no less than 31 traditional L-Class Amphibious Warfare Ships and 18-36 Light Amphibious Warships to enable us to carry out the NDS.

Naval Expeditionary Crisis Response Forces and Campaigning

While the traditional role of crisis response forces in disaster relief operations, such as those executed by the Expeditionary Strike Group centered on the *USS Bonhomme Richard* during *Operation Unified*

Assistance or via the *USS Essex* during *Operation Tomodachi*, is well-documented and well-understood, these operations are not always perceived as ones that create relative advantage in strategic competition and campaigning. They do. Our response to humanitarian crises and other natural disasters using expeditionary forces – quickly and decisively – demonstrates to our allies and partners that they are never alone when partnered with the U.S. Further, our ability to execute HA/DR operations from amphibious shipping – without a large logistical footprint ashore in support of U.S. forces – maximizes our flexibility and capability to respond while preserving resources best used for relief. In the strategic sense, the significance of this amphibious-based capability and its impact should not be underestimated. While our ability to “be there first” on the scene of a natural or man-made disaster is, of course, critical to the preservation of life, it is also a strategic imperative, affecting our bilateral relationships and matters like access and overflight, as well as our international standing. This is true in every region, but today is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific, where China aims to expand its regional influence through its own amphibious crisis response capabilities.

At the same time, it is important to recognize the criticality of campaigning with our allies and partners – in their regions – on a daily basis. Naval expeditionary forces operating forward and persistently provide combatant commanders with a sort of “escalation rheostat,” prepared to respond to crises – or prevent them – by employing capabilities that are credible across the range of military operations. Both our presence and the credibility of our forces reassure allies and partners.

Marine Rotational Force - Darwin (MRF-D)

In 2011, we established the Marine Rotational Force - Darwin (MRF-D) in the Northern Territory in partnership with the Australian government. Our rotational presence has grown from a company-sized element with limited capabilities to a MEU-sized Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF). Through our recurring presence, we have achieved a high level of mutual confidence and interoperability with the Australian Defence Force, to the point where Marines routinely operate from Australian amphibious ships. The training areas in the Northern Territory and other regions of Australia are some of the best in the world, and certainly the region, affording Marines an opportunity for high-end training alongside one of our closest allies. Additionally, our rotational presence in Australia has enabled Marine forces to engage and train with a range of international allies and partners in ways we did not predict when MRF-D was first established.

VMFA 211 Deployment Aboard HMS Queen Elizabeth

From April to December 2021, ten F-35Bs from Marine Corps Fighter Attack Squadron 211 (VMFA 211) deployed aboard the United Kingdom's aircraft carrier *HMS Queen Elizabeth*. This historic deployment – the first in which a Marine squadron completed a deployment aboard an allied vessel – represents the culmination of ten years of focused bilateral cooperation and demonstrates how far we have progressed in building U.S.-UK interoperability. Together with the UK's embarked F-35B squadron, VMFA 211 completed nearly 1300 sorties, flew in excess of 2200 hours, and executed 44 combat missions in support of *Operation Inherent Resolve*. The deployment also marked the first time an F-35B cross-decked from a foreign vessel to a U.S. vessel (*USS America*) to refuel and arm before a strike. During its approximately seven month deployment, which spanned three U.S. geographic combatant commands' areas of responsibility, VMFA 211 conducted exercises with 10 partner nations and flew from the flight decks of three allied ships: Japan's *JS Izumo*, Italy's *ITS Cavour*, and the *HMS Queen Elizabeth*. Finally, VMFA 211 was our first F-35B squadron to deploy as a 10-jet squadron in accordance with our FD 2030 goals and as outlined in my 2019 planning guidance.

Force Design 2030 and Stand-In Forces

As we further refined Force Design 2030 through wargaming, experimentation, and analysis, it became apparent that we required new thinking to address anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies, that our Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) needed additional operational flexibility, and that Marines operating with our MEUs and MLRs could be a substantial part of the solution. This new approach is reflected in *A Concept for Stand-In Forces*, which describes how forward-postured forces, operating in contested areas, and capable of transitioning rapidly from campaigning, to crisis, to conflict, and back again, can create strategic advantage for the joint force.

Stand-in Forces (SIF) are small, lethal, low signature, mobile forces that are relatively simple to maintain and sustain, and designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth. The enduring function of SIF is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle at every point on the competition continuum. That means SIF monitor a potential adversary's activity and track its forces and sensors at a level that facilitates targeting by the fleet or joint force. Below the threshold of conflict, SIF's tracking of adversary actions can help expose its malign behavior, which can contribute to deterrence. If armed conflict does erupt, SIF will have already gained and maintained contact with opposing forces in a posture that provides relative positional advantage, enabling the fleet and joint force to attack effectively first, seizing the initiative.

Winning the counter-reconnaissance fight means SIF make themselves difficult to find by maintaining a low signature, moving frequently and unpredictably, and using deception to impose costs on potential adversaries, forcing them to expend limited ISR resources. In the context of a naval campaign, it also means that SIF will help screen for the fleet and joint force, protecting it and increasing the fleet commander's freedom of action.

Beyond reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, SIF possess lethal capabilities for warfare at, on, below, or from the sea. For example, SIF can contest a chokepoint, sanitize a strait, or deny a specific area, presenting a surface behind which the fleet can maneuver. Area denial could also serve to canalize or "herd" an adversary into a maritime zone where the joint force enjoys relative advantage. Integrated with other elements of organic and joint capability, the SIF becomes both an enabler and a lethal executor of the joint force mission. In competition / campaigning, SIF provide capabilities that support new deterrence approaches like deterrence by detection, integrating the results of its reconnaissance with other elements of national power. In conflict, SIF serve as battle managers and provide long-range precision fires at the forward edge of a maritime defense-in-depth, enabling naval and joint forces to persist within contested areas rather than attempting to force access into them by fighting through an adversary's A2/AD defenses. Our ongoing experiments with SIF have focused on building a globally-relevant capability of value to all geographic combatant commanders, rather than more narrowly on a single potential threat or theater. While some view the SIF concept as Indo-Pacific focused, the fact is that some of our most aggressive experimentation is occurring in other theaters. For example, in his March 2022 HASC testimony, the USEUCOM Commander noted of his II MEF SIF capabilities: "a brown water force that can shoot, move, and communicate, and that is very, very expeditionary, is priceless for 21st century security."

Force Design 2030 and the Russo-Ukraine Conflict

It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the changing character of war based on the current conflict in Ukraine. Marines aim to be careful and humble students of the ongoing struggle, and resist temptations to declare that it validates or invalidates the foundational assumptions of FD 2030. With that said, we can draw some preliminary conclusions. First, winning the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance battle matters. If you are located on a modern battlefield saturated with sensors, you will be targeted. Signature management, maneuver, deception, and tempo are playing an increasingly important role on the modern battlefield. Second, loitering munitions, missiles and rockets are increasingly capable of rendering major weapons platforms vulnerable, whether MANPADS against helicopters, modern anti-armor systems against armor, or ground-based anti-ship missiles against surface

vessels. Finally, highly-trained and distributable small units able to create combined-arms effects continue to prove their worth on the modern battlefield. Assertions as to the waning utility of dismounted infantry are proving baseless.

Force Design 2030 and Close Combat Lethality

Generations of Marines have been educated and trained to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy through fire and maneuver. While the tactical tasks associated with that mission set have not changed, *how* we satisfy those tasks on a modern battlefield is changing. In addition, the weighting of the discrete tasks within that simple statement is changing, and we must change with it. “Locating,” for example, has become far more important on the modern battlefield. Marines within our three experimental infantry battalions, as well as those participating in force-on-force field exercises, are learning and fine-tuning their skills, integrating existing and emerging capabilities in a combined arms system that accounts for the ongoing changes we see on modern battlefields – changes witnessed since at least the 2006 Second Lebanon War. We will build upon the major investments made by the 37th Commandant in close combat lethality (e.g., investments in the Multi-purpose Anti-armor Anti-personnel Weapons Systems [MAAWS]) by adding loitering munitions, organic UAS, and additional Javelins to our infantry units. Finally, it is important to note that throughout the Force Design process, the focus has been, and remains, maneuver warfare in every dimension and combined arms in all domains, including space and cyber.

In the midst of this organizational change, it is also important to highlight those things that are not changing. When we consider ways to maximize our close combat lethality, two things that will never change are: (1) our commitment to growing and sustaining smart and tough small unit leaders – those Marines actually tasked with locating, closing with, and destroying the enemy; and (2) our commitment to what the 29th Commandant called *operational excellence* – the ability of a Marine to apply their training, leadership, and discipline with lethal proficiency. No new piece of equipment or warfighting concept can ever be as important. We have always maintained that the individual Marine is the most formidable weapon on the battlefield. We still do.

Force Design 2030 Prioritized Investments

MQ-9 & related sensors. We remain on-schedule to both modernize and increase the number of Marine Corps uncrewed aerial vehicle squadrons (VMU). In 2022, we will expand fielding of the MQ-9, immediately improving the Marine Corps’ capability to support both naval expeditionary forces and the joint force. Uncrewed aerial systems are ubiquitous on the modern battlefield, as recent global conflicts have powerfully demonstrated – whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Gaza, Yemen, Nagorno-Karabakh,

or Ukraine. Over the next two years, the Air Force will transfer ten MQ-9AER Block V aircraft to the Marine Corps, saving the Service approximately \$170 million in procurement costs, which can be invested into sophisticated sensors like *Skytower* or sonobuoy dispensing pods. These advanced sensors, employed from our MQ-9s, will radically improve our ability to conduct reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, and further reinforce our competitive advantages in undersea warfare.

F-35B/C. The F-35 is the most advanced fighter, strike, and sensor platform in the world. As the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) recently noted during testimony, “The importance of the F-35 cannot be overstated.” We remain convinced that low observable and very low observable, short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft like the F-35B provide combatant commanders a competitive warfighting advantage. Mindful of both cost per flight hour (CPFH) and cost per tail per year (CPTPY), I remain committed to working with the Joint Program Office to reduce costs for both acquisition and sustainment. The Marine Corps remains focused on accelerated transition to an all F-35 tactical aviation (TACAIR) fleet in order to stay in front of our pacing challenge. We have procured 176 of 353 F-35Bs and 48 of 67 F-35Cs to-date.

Organic Precision Fires – Infantry/Mounted (OPF-I/M). OPF-I/M will provide multiple echelons of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) with an organic, loitering, beyond line-of-sight, precision strike capability, profoundly enhancing the close-combat lethality of maneuver forces. We are currently investing \$2 billion in OPF across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), and expect the first systems to be fielded with our enhanced infantry battalions and new mobile reconnaissance units in Fiscal Year (FY) 2025. OPF-I will be employed at the low tactical level to allow Marines to rapidly engage the enemy beyond the range of direct fire weapons, while minimizing collateral damage and exposure to enemy direct and indirect fires. OPF-M will integrate a vehicle mounted, multi canister launch platform on our Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV), Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), and Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles (ULTV). On its own, OPF-M can strike targets at ranges beyond 40km. However, its lethality is amplified when employed with Group-2 UAS as part of our emerging “hunter-killer team” employment concept. Operating as a hunter-killer combination, our mounted units can deliver precision effects, as well as surveillance before, during, and after striking targets, at ranges previously reserved for the air wing. These combat-tested and combat-proven capabilities will redefine how small units close with and destroy an adversary. Once fully fielded, each infantry and mobile reconnaissance battalion will possess no fewer than four “hunter” UAS (potentially the Stalker VXE Block 30) and seven dedicated “killer” mounted launchers.

Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). In 1989, the 29th Commandant wrote in his posture statement that his number one priority was the procurement of an advanced amphibious vehicle to “replace our current amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), now approaching the end of its service life.” Thirty-three years later, we divested of the AAV and are now focused on accelerating the procurement of the ACV. It remains a “must-have” capability for our forces operating in the global littorals – especially in archipelagic environs across the Pacific. We remain committed to an approved acquisition objective (AAO) of 632 vehicles and have procured 267 to-date. We anticipate procuring another 74 in FY23.

Medium Range Missile (MMSL) Batteries. Due to the continued support of Congress, we remain on-schedule to reach initial operating capability (IOC) for one MMSL battery in the Pacific by 2023 (to be employed by 3d MLR). We remain focused on fielding 14 total MMSL batteries (142 total launchers) by FY30. These MMSL batteries – combining the Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) and ROGUE Fires – will be capable of firing the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) and Tactical Tomahawk, thereby holding adversary targets at-risk both afloat and ashore, further complicating their decision-making. This capability is just as relevant in the Western Pacific as it would be in eastern Ukraine, where shore-based fires have already been used to destroy enemy surface combatants.

Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). In addition to the investments made in Ground-Based Anti-Ship Missiles (GBASM), we have also begun investing in AGM-158C (LRASM) to further expand the range and lethality of our aviation-delivered fires. Marine aircraft equipped with LRASM, operating from both ship and shore, will thicken the existing network of fires, further distribute lethality across a theater, and enhance the credibility of our existing deterrent in any region.

CH-53K. The CH-53K provides the FMF and combatant commanders with an unmatched vertical heavy-lift capability to project, maneuver, and sustain combat forces. It remains the only fully marinized heavy-lift helicopter in development or production. The CH-53K can lift more, farther, and faster than any other rotary wing platform in the world. We declared CH-53K IOC on 22 April after fielding a four-plane detachment worth of aircraft, support equipment, and trained aircrew and maintainers. While we remain concerned by the continued growth of procurement costs, we have actions in place to try to mitigate growth. We are further concerned by the projection of the sustainment costs and the total cost of ownership, which may exceed \$390 million per aircraft. We are actively working with industry to reduce those costs and will continue that fight throughout the life of the weapon system. Still, a marinized, heavy-lift capability is an absolute “must have” for the joint force as the costs of maintaining the increasingly outmoded CH-53E inventory is prohibitive. To date, we have procured 40 aircraft.

Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD). GBAD includes multiple FD 2030 priority programs such as the Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) and Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC). MADIS will enable our low altitude air defense (LAAD) battalions to provide short-range air defense (SHORAD) for our maneuver forces and fixed facilities, to include against hostile aerial threats from UAS. MRIC – currently in development – is an air defense system for fixed sites, designed to counter large UAS (Groups 3 and 4), cruise missiles, and fixed/rotary wing aircraft. Based on on-going operations in Ukraine, and lessons learned from recent conflicts in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, we believe these GBAD programs to be essential for our Marine expeditionary forces.

FD 2030 Emerging Capabilities

Long-Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV). Just as our MQ-9AER and successor platforms will provide persistent surveillance and reconnaissance of competitors and strategically critical geography from the air, the Long-Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV) will do the same from a sea-based platform. It will also provide unique capabilities for undersea scouting and C2 enabling. The rapid evolution of long-range precision munitions allows for form factors that can be employed at sea or ashore, and will progressively increase deterrence options as they become available. Our plan is to home-station these capabilities in Guam, Japan, and Hawaii. In addition, UUVs deployed from our existing inventory of L-Class ships or from future Light Amphibious Warships can further reinforce our competitive advantages in undersea warfare, expand our battlespace awareness and that of our partners and allies, and when armed with torpedoes, further reinforce sea-denial operations in contested spaces.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)-Enabled Counter-Intrusion and Counter-UAS. For the past 18 months, we have conducted tests with AI-enabled counter-intrusion and counter-UAS systems aboard several of our bases and stations. The performance of these systems has exceeded all expectations. As a result, the Commander of Marine Corps Forces, Pacific submitted an urgent-needs statement requesting the capability be fielded at all bases and stations in the Pacific. Initially, this capability will be employed at fixed sites. However, in the near-to-mid-term we anticipate employing a mobile version of this small footprint, AI-enabled sensing platform. This will allow our stand-in forces – with allies, and partners – to better sense and make sense of the dynamic maritime and urban terrain where we operate.

Swarming UAS. Over the next 12 months, we will conduct a series of experiments at I MEF with AI-enabled swarming UAS and loitering munitions. While planning for this effort is in the early stages, we are confident this capability will create game-changing improvements to close-combat lethality for our

ground forces and will further realize the vision of the 31st Commandant's Hunter Warrior experiments from 1997-1998. Swarming UAS will extend the area of influence of every maneuver element, creating competitive warfighting advantages over our adversaries.

Unmanned Logistics System-Aerial (ULS-A) and Future Vertical Lift (FVL) Family of Systems (FOS).

The past five years of wargames have demonstrated that our logistics and sustainment capabilities will be targeted by near-peer competitors. As the ongoing conflict in Ukraine has poignantly illustrated, even traditional ground logistics resupply, executed over interior lines and relatively short distances, can be disrupted, with operational level effects. As we develop our new naval expeditionary units and expand our uncrewed aircraft capability, we will increasingly invest in uncrewed logistics aircraft such as the ULS-A Medium and ULS-A Large. This year we will invest \$32 million in ULS-A Medium (Group 3 UAS), which is capable of carrying 300-600 pounds of cargo a distance of 100NM, while developing plans to procure ULS-A Large. To date, the Air Force has the most mature understanding of this capability, and has experimented with an electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) aircraft that may satisfy our needs in the future. We are wrapping all these efforts together within our aviation enterprise's FVL (VTOL FOS) program, and have invested \$584 million over the FYDP.

Force Design 2030 Installations and Logistics

Our ability to sustain our tactical forces across time and space is a critical component of integrated deterrence. The pacing threat continues to erode our traditional warfighting advantages, particularly the ability to close and sustain our forces at times and places of our choosing. Unfortunately, most of our current logistics processes and procedures play right into their strengths. Because the operational environment is increasingly contested, our logistics efforts from the tactical edge all the way back to the homeland will have to fundamentally change. As we are witnessing in Ukraine, even a numerically superior force will struggle to sustain itself and protect supply routes against persistent attack and disruption. We cannot allow this occur.

As part of the broader logistics enterprise, we must improve the ability of our installations to provide the critical requirements that enable FMF readiness. We must have resilient infrastructure and services that provide the platforms necessary to enable delivery of capabilities from across the service enterprise. Because the environment is dynamic, we must have the means to protect our installations and organic industrial base from an increasingly complex range of operational, environmental, and climate-related threats. With the proliferation of the Mature Precision Strike Regime and expanding information-related

threats, we need to better leverage technology, specifically AI, to ensure we maintain the ability to defend ourselves from emerging and evolving threats such as those posed by small, unmanned aerial systems.

In the Pacific, we are experimenting with command and control and organizational proofs of concept so our installations and logistics units can make more effective, direct contributions to FMF warfighting capability. We will place our installations under an operational command structure to ensure they are more resilient to operational, environmental, and climate-related threats, and better postured to meet the needs of the FMF.

We are pursuing a range of material capabilities to diversify and modernize our logistics portfolio, aligned to a contested littoral environment. At the tactical level, we are currently testing and assessing several platforms that will enable us to transition from a battlefield maneuver and sustainment capability based on crewed aircraft and wheeled vehicles to a diverse collection of crewed and uncrewed air and ground platforms that are smaller, cheaper, and collectively result in a more resilient distribution network of platforms and connectors. In addition to our efforts to generate, store, and distribute renewable energy forward, these platforms will exploit rapidly moving technologies that the Department and our industry partners are pursuing to decrease our dependence on vulnerable fuel supply chains, while enabling us to deliver critical commodities via the naval and joint logistics enterprise across the vast distances of the Pacific, despite enemy sensing and targeting capabilities. The most visible platforms will be a family of uncrewed logistics air systems, the smallest of which are already in prototyping and live experimentation. Our experimentation is yielding exciting results that underscore the need to expand into large and medium uncrewed logistics systems. Additionally, we will begin exploring options to replace our ground logistics fleet with a smaller, lighter, fuel-efficient replacement for vehicles that have run long past sustainability. We are now exploring emerging technologies that we can leverage to deliver capable, yet affordable vehicles that reduce our reliance on fossil fuels. As a modest first step, we will lease 3,875 non-tactical electric vehicles this year, and likely expand our inventory of electric vehicles in the future.

As I have said numerous times over the last year, logistics is the pacing function, and the on-going conflict in Ukraine appears to validate that conclusion. As such, logistics provides the resources and sets the limits for what is operationally possible, even as logisticians attempt to extend those limits as far as possible.

Force Design and the Reserve Component

We recently established the Marine Innovation Unit (MIU) within our Reserve Component. The MIU's work will complement that of our Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) by accelerating advanced technology development. Reserve Marines in the grades of sergeant through colonel will be assigned to this unit on the basis of their expertise in areas like artificial intelligence, data science, human systems, advanced manufacturing, quantum computing, autonomy/robotics, space, supply chain management, cyber, synthetic biology, energy and materials sciences, and other technology fields. This initiative will allow us to tap into the diverse talent pool in Marine Corps Forces Reserve, and through its collaboration with MCWL, integrate research in multiple advanced disciplines into Force Design and related efforts.

Readiness

Though some aspects of our military require substantial change, we should be clear to acknowledge those foundational tenets which remain as relevant and operationally suitable today as they have been over the previous 70 years. In 1952, Members of Congress noted the Marine Corps "can prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and vigorous action during their incipient stages. The nation's shock troops must be the most ready when the nation is least ready...to provide a balanced force-in-readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war..." This role as the Nation's force-in-readiness, prepared to create strategic advantage via its ability to be quickest to respond to either crisis or conflict, and prepared to both prevent and contain conflict below the threshold of armed conflict, remains as valid today as it was when first articulated. I remain as committed to ensuring your Marine Corps can fulfill this vital role as those who preceded me.

But as I have previously noted, readiness and availability are not the same things. Ready forces are those that create competitive warfighting advantages. As we are witnessing in Ukraine, available Russian forces are being met by Ukrainian forces possessing competitive warfighting advantages. Prior to the commencement of hostilities, if one had asked for a relative combat power assessment based on each side's bench of ready (available) forces, that assessment would have been disproportionately skewed towards the Russians. As we have seen in Ukraine and in other recent conflicts, true readiness is a hypothesis to be tested and proven via employment in combat, and is not something that can be determined via availability alone.

Readiness and COVID 19 Update

As of 22 April 2022, 96% of the Active Component is fully vaccinated and 97% partially vaccinated. Within our Reserve Component, 91% are fully vaccinated and 92% partially vaccinated. 3,702 Marines asked for a religious accommodation and seven have been approved. 1,067 Marines have received approval for a medical or administrative exemption. As of 22 April, 1,978 Marines have been separated for a failure to comply with a lawful order.

Climate Readiness and Resilience

The Secretary of the Navy has directed the Navy and Marine Corps to develop plans for increasing our capability and capacity to mitigate both the near-term and long-term operational impacts of climate change. He has also set a goal of achieving net-zero carbon emissions at our bases and stations by 2040. For the Marine Corps, I view our climate-related mitigation efforts as crucial to increasing the Service's operational capability, capacity, and resilience in the face of serious environmental challenges, including extreme storms along the East Coast, rising oceans levels along the Carolina coast, and water scarcity at bases and stations in the Southwest. It also important to note that many of the communities surrounding our installations share our climate-related vulnerabilities. We believe that partnering with Federal agencies, states, localities, tribes, and territories on climate change related planning is critical to maximizing the impact of our collective mitigation efforts.

Talent Management 2030

Late last year we published *Talent Management 2030* (TM 2030), and in doing so, took a major step toward realizing the goals of Force Design 2030 and our larger service modernization effort. TM 2030 aims to create a personnel system that better harnesses, develops, and aligns the talents of individual Marines with the needs of the service to maximize the performance of both, improving both individual and unit readiness, capability, and lethality. The report details the deficiencies in our current manpower model and directs a series of reforms, initiatives, and changes that will fundamentally improve our service's organization, processes, and approach to personnel and talent management. TM2030 was informed by years of studies, reports, and other research, as well as the work of our sister services in the joint force. The influence of Congress is also evident throughout the report, and many of the most important initiatives described in its pages are the direct consequence of expanded authorities that Congress gave the services in the *John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019*.

The totality of changes described in TM2030 are significant. They are also essential, especially within the broader context of our ongoing Force Design 2030 effort. In short, the capabilities we are building as part of Force Design 2030, along with the complementary concepts of Stand-In Forces, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), cannot reach their full potential without a profound change to our personnel system. In that way, TM2030 should be viewed as a critical requirement to the success of our overall service modernization.

We plan to fully implement the changes described in TM2030 and transition from our current manpower system to a talent management system no later than 2025. Change of this magnitude requires the dedicated commitment and long-term support of both military and civilian leaders. While I believe we have most of the necessary authorities to fully implement TM2030, I will be sure to inform Congress if any challenges or obstacles arise for which we may need your assistance.

Among the more important changes, the implementation of TM2030 will adjust our decades-old recruiting-centric enlisted personnel model, placing more emphasis on retention. This change will raise the aggregate age of our Marines and create a more mature force, consistent with future warfighting requirements. We expect this will raise personnel costs, yet well within accepted norms. For example, today the average cost per Marine is \$73,800 per year (pay, housing, training, etc.). By comparison, the average cost of a Soldier is \$79,800, the average cost of an Airman is \$82,500, and the average cost of a Sailor is \$89,900. While we anticipate a cost increase in the short term, we also expect a cost savings over the long term as we reduce the number of recruiters, instructors, and other resources required to maintain a recruiting-centric enlisted personnel model. In the near term, the most visible sign of our shift towards a more mature retention-based force will be a drop in the annual recruiting mission by several thousand, and a congruent increase in retention.

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion

I remain committed to maintaining a total workforce that benefits from the whole of our Nation's vast human capital by recruiting, developing, and retaining Marines and civilians from all personal, cultural, and professional backgrounds. In practice, that means eliminating all structural, administrative, cultural, or other obstacles that might limit a Marine's ability to have a successful career. Capitalizing on the talents, knowledge, skills, abilities, experiences, and perspectives of every Marine will make our Corps stronger, more lethal, and more effective on the battlefield, today and tomorrow.

As a Corps, we have made great strides over the last five years in eliminating obstacles to the upward mobility of talented Marines from traditionally underrepresented demographics. One way to measure our progress is to examine the rate at which Marines from these backgrounds are selected to command battalions and squadrons at the O5/lieutenant colonel level, a key career milestone that indicates a Marine has potential for a significant leadership position within the Service. Five years ago, 19% of African American Marines screened for O5 command were selected. Since then, the average is 34% with a high of 44%. Five years ago, 3% of our battalions and squadrons were commanded by female Marines. Today that number has increased to 9%. In FY21, for the first time, a higher percentage of female Marines who screened for O5 command were selected than their male counterparts. We do not select our commanders based on gender, race, or any other marker, so the fact that Marines from these diverse backgrounds are being selected for O5 command indicates to me that we are making progress in reducing obstacles to the upward mobility of talent.

While there is evidence of some progress, there is also evidence we still have obstacles to eliminate. For example, we continue to experience a concerning lack of diversity within our TACAIR community. Despite a significant increase in the number of African American officers over the last four decades, we have the same number of African American TACAIR pilots today as we did in 1981. Last year we asked former NASA Administrator and Marine, Major General Charles Bolden (USMC, Ret.), to conduct a third-party review to examine the structural and systemic issues that might be leading to this outcome. His observations and conclusions were valuable, and I am confident his recommendations will help us to create a more equitable playing field.

Sexual Assault Prevention and Military Justice Reform

The eradication of sexual assault from our ranks has been a goal of every Marine Commandant for decades. Despite making progress in fostering a culture where reporting of sexual assault crimes has increased and where victims are more willing to communicate with their leadership, we have admittedly been unable to accomplish what we all seek – the elimination of sexual assault altogether. In 2021, there were 1,202 reported sexual assaults in the Marine Corps. We must consider any policies that could increase prevention and offender accountability, and reduce or eliminate retaliation or retribution against victims. I remain committed to timely implementation of the Independent Review Committee's (IRC) recommendations, as well as implementation of changes in the FY22 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that seek to improve the investigation, disposition, and litigation of victim-related crimes.

Parental Leave and Childcare

As part of TM2030, we will begin making several key updates to our parental leave program beginning in 2022. First, we are grateful to the Congress for the additional authorities to increase the duration of parental leave for primary and secondary caregivers; we have expanded our secondary caregiver leave and are working with OSD on the timely implementation of increased leave in cases of adoption or long-term foster care. Second, we are developing mechanisms by which primary and secondary caregivers can take additional parental leave – beyond the congressionally-authorized 12-weeks – if they agree to extend their service contracts. Third, we will implement a phased return to work program for the primary caregiver, allowing the caregiver to return to work gradually. Finally, and most importantly, we won't stop learning. We will carefully study the best practices of top performing American companies and institutions, always with an eye to enhancing our service parental leave programs as new research becomes available.

Increasing the availability of childcare remains a top priority for the Service. Unfortunately, persistent supply and demand imbalances have resulted in unacceptable wait times for our Marine families. The average wait time for childcare across our major bases and stations is 65 days. However, based on a number of actions taken this year, we anticipate a decrease in the average wait time by 50% over the next 12 months. Additionally, we increased funding for our Marine Family Care Programs by \$91 million, beginning in FY23 across the next five years. To provide a variety of options that fit a families' needs and to mitigate lengthy Child Development Center (CDC) waitlists, we also offer fee assistance for eligible Marines who are geographically remote, reside more than 15 miles from an installation, or are assigned to an installation with a lengthy CDC waitlist.

Barracks and Family Housing

In FY21, we renovated 13 barracks, and in FY22, we plan to renovate another 10 at a cost of \$93 million. We anticipate renovating a further 10 barracks in FY23 at a cost of \$112 million. This will leave 94 barracks for future renovation. The renovations completed in FY21 to FY23 will positively impact 3,780 Marines living in the barracks. In terms of family housing, our biggest challenge is related to ongoing efforts to renovate over 300 homes at MCAS Iwakuni, for which we recently issued a contract to renovate 44, to be completed by FY23. Additionally, we anticipate spending a further \$104 million in FY23 to further remediate housing deficiencies across our bases and stations.

Training Philosophy

In 1990, then Commandant Gray stated, “Training will reflect the fact the modern battlefield demands high levels of initiative and an ability to operate at a fast tempo in an atmosphere of uncertainty, confusion, and rapid change. Unit training will largely be free-play training in order to develop this ability. Individual training, starting with boot camp, will seek to develop independent action and initiative.” This guidance remains as relevant today as it was 32 years ago.

Training Ranges

The Marine Corps has no outdoor training spaces or ranges where ground units can operate in an electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) denied, degraded, or disrupted environment, and limited opportunities to replicate such an environment in simulation. Today, we are able to conduct some of this training at joint facilities, most notably in Alaska’s Joint Pacific Alaskan Range Complex (JPARC). However, we need to be able to train in a similar manner at all of our major training facilities. This is a critical shortfall of our existing training infrastructure in Arizona, California, Hawaii, and North Carolina. Additionally, we lack littoral maritime training ranges akin to our legendary Range 400 at the MAGTF Training Center in Twentynine Palms, California. As we modernize the force for naval expeditionary operations in contested environments, we will require a maritime training site with suitable seaward and landward ranges where we can train with the full range of our multi-domain weapon systems, to include uncrewed systems. Finally, we must remain mindful of the impacts of urbanization and community growth on our training capacity, especially in Hawaii.

Enhanced Infantry and Leader Training

In 1997, the 31st Commandant gave a speech at the National Press Club in which he articulated the need to transform our most valued Marine Corps asset – the Marine infantry non-commissioned officer (NCO). While most remember his characterization of the future “Three Block War” and the new importance of the “Strategic Corporal,” most forget the context of his argument. General Krulak described to his audience the Battle of Teutoburg Forest, during which the Roman pro-consul Quintilius Varus had his force of three legions ambushed and destroyed by an adversary he put down three years prior. As his force was collapsing around him, Varus was heard to say, “Ne cras, Ne cras” (Latin for “not like yesterday”). General Krulak’s prescient assumptions about the future of ground combat in urban areas has proven accurate time and again – whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, or Ukraine today.

Our continued force-on-force experimentation and training in support of FD 2030 further demonstrate that the future battlespace will not be like yesterday, and change is required – even among the elite

Marine infantry community. As a result, over the past year we have greatly expanded our infantry training by adding an additional six weeks to the program of instruction. This expansion provides our infantry Marines with the training necessary to employ networked communications, organic precision fires to include loitering munitions, and multi-domain ISR capabilities at the lowest tactical level. The result will be a more technically competent and tactically proficient infantry than has ever existed in the Marine Corps – prepared to operate, fight, and win on any modern battlefield. And, one with both the physical stamina and mental resilience required of all Marine infantry past and present. These changes are not limited only to our enlisted force. We have made significant improvements at our Infantry Officers Course (IOC) to expand practical applications via a new live-fire ambush, a new amphibious operations package, uncrewed aircraft systems integration instruction, and final live-fire exercise against a multi-domain threat. Through our continued wargaming and experimentation, it is perfectly clear that an elite infantry is a critical requirement to success on the future battlefield, and the changes that are occurring at IOC and at our Schools of Infantry are now producing that force.

Recruit Training

In the 2020 NDAA, Congress directed the Marine Corps to gender integrate training at both Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRDs) Parris Island and San Diego no later than Fiscal Year 2025 and Fiscal Year 2028, respectively. We are on pace to achieve those deadlines. Since enactment, we have trained 26 integrated companies at MCRD Parris Island and 3 at MCRD San Diego – a total of 11,121 male and female Marines who started their service and journeys together. At present, each MCRD company consists of five male platoons and one female platoon (5+1 model), although there are times when a four male platoon plus two female platoon model (4+2 model) has been employed to accommodate increased female recruit throughput.

Afghanistan

In August of last year, our collective mission in Afghanistan ended. During nearly 20 years of operations, 115,992 Marines served in Afghanistan; 5,101 Marines were wounded in action; an untold number sustained invisible and permanent emotional wounds; and 478 families became Gold Star Families after the loss of their Marine. We have a moral obligation to each of our Marines and their families to resist the temptation to push Afghanistan into our distant memory, and instead bring our experiences there into sharp focus in order to learn. Thousands of Marines, Sailors, Soldiers, and Airmen answered the call to serve in Afghanistan, and while the outcome there was not what any of them expected, their service was honorable and their courage real. We owe them a hard look at how the war was executed – what we got

right and what we got wrong. To that end, I fully endorse the nonpartisan Afghanistan War Commission and its aims to help us more completely understand the full scope of the conflict.

When reflecting on our experience in Afghanistan, we also cannot forget the significant contributions of our allies and partners. The U.S. military was fortunate to operate alongside patriots from dozens of allied and partner nations, and we will never forget the service and sacrifices of these brothers and sisters in arms.

Joint Chief Perspective

Trust and Confidence in the Military. I remain concerned with continued reports of the public's declining trust and confidence in the uniformed leadership of the armed services. I am old enough to remember when military service was not perceived in the positive light that it is today. I entered service within a decade after the collapse of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia and a year after the failed rescue attempt known as Desert One. Within two years of my commissioning, faith in the uniformed and civilian leadership of the military was further rocked by the tragedy of the suicide-bombing of the Marine Barracks in Beirut.

We must address negative perceptions of the military without hesitation. We must also remain mindful that the deeper we dig into the decisions of the past, particularly related to our campaigns in Afghanistan that such negative perceptions may grow. The long-term health of the Marine Corps, naval services, and entire joint force is dependent upon the cultivation and sustainment of a special bond of trust and confidence between the military and the public. We must ensure that Americans who wish to serve, and the families who support them in their service, trust their military and pursue their service "without any mental reservation." To that end, we must all make a concerted effort to speak with precision, encourage transparency, and welcome any and all oversight that would restore the public's confidence in the military.

Finally, I am increasingly concerned that in our shared desire to eliminate discrimination, harassment, sexual assault, extremism, and every other destructive act within the joint force that is contrary to the core values of all the services, we are unintentionally creating a harmful mental model and stereotype of the services as places where these are the norm vice the exception. The vast majority of young men and women across the joint force serve honorably, and are incredible representatives of their individual families and communities across the entire country. We must never allow the public to think for a moment that military service is anything other than the most honorable service one can provide to their

fellow citizens. The success of our all-volunteer force requires the special trust and confidence of the public. As you hold me and the other senior leaders accountable for all we do or fail to do, and rightfully seek to eliminate persistent behaviors inconsistent with our values, please continue to help me spread the word that military service is honorable service, and that you remain incredibly proud of the young men and women in uniform.

Wargaming and Transparency. In September 1964, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a wargame on Vietnam for uniformed and civilian leaders from the Department of Defense (DoD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Department of State (DoS). The wargame was intended to provide senior policy makers with an opportunity to re-examine our national strategic objectives and the strategy required to attain those objectives. For those passionate about wargaming, SIGMA II 64 is “Exhibit A” in the case for its importance. Once declassified, the wargame report provided clear evidence that senior uniformed and civilian leaders understood the situation in Vietnam much better than historians previously assumed.

The story of SIGMA II 64 illustrates the potential of wargames to increase the breadth and depth of our understanding, but more, it illustrates the damage that can result from a lack of transparency. The SIGMA II 64 wargame results were classified and tightly controlled, not shared widely or with those who maintain oversight responsibilities, like Congress. While it is impossible to know if our national leaders would have pursued a different course in Vietnam had the SIGMA II 64 results been more widely shared, it is certain that the debate would have been better informed.

As a joint force, we should make every effort to increase the frequency, sophistication, and scope of our wargames. In particular, we should look to expand the participation of our allies, partners, interagency teammates, and industry, whose collective insights are essential to a strategy which aims at integrated deterrence. At the same time, we must seek greater transparency. I encourage Congress and staff to participate in wargames, continue asking tough questions, and challenge us to be as transparent as possible.

Conclusion

As HASC Chairman Smith recently noted, “The Pentagon tends to reward conformity. As long as you check all the boxes and go up through the 15 layers of decision making, we’re all good, instead of you saw a problem and solved it.” This *has* to change, *is* changing, and can continue to change with your oversight and assistance. For some, the daily feed of images and intelligence from Ukraine has persuaded

them that a change in our availability-based model of readiness and our warfighting investments are required. I agree with these individuals. For others, the case for change has long since been made on 21st century battlefields with little if anything in common. I agree with those individuals as well. However, this does not mean that everything requires change, and that our forces are not ready today, to create advantage today, and to succeed today in whatever challenge confronts them. While the need to train and equip our Marines and Sailors with modern capabilities and equipment that create advantage is beyond dispute, what is also beyond dispute is that those individuals – the individual Marine and Sailor – are a source of competitive advantage for the service and for the larger joint force, and will always be the most important resource. Your Marines are ready today, just as they have always been. What they need is your continued support for resourcing, your continued policy oversight, and your continued faith and confidence. With those things, they will never fail.

General David H. Berger
Commandant of the Marine Corps

General David H. Berger assumed the duties of Commandant of the Marine Corps on July 11, 2019.

A native of Woodbine, Maryland, General Berger graduated from Tulane University and was commissioned in 1981. He commanded at every level – including a Reconnaissance Company; 3d Battalion, 8th Marines in Haiti during Operation SECURE TOMORROW; Regimental Combat Team 8 in Fallujah, Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.


As a General Officer, he commanded 1st Marine Division (Forward) in Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM; I Marine Expeditionary Force; U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific/Fleet Marine Forces Pacific; and Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

General Berger's staff and joint assignments include serving as Assistant Division Commander of 2d Marine Division; policy planner in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5; Chief of Staff for Kosovo Force (KFOR) Headquarters in Pristina, Kosovo; and Director of Operations in Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.

General Berger's formal military education includes the U.S. Army Infantry Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and U.S. Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. He holds multiple advanced degrees including a Master of International Public Policy from Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MAY 11, 2022





2017 Strategic Readiness Review

Figure 1-1: Depicts the overall ship count from 1985 to 2017 and the percentage of those ships that have maintained presence overseas, including forward deployed and rotational forces. As ship count decreased and the number of ships overseas stayed constant, the percentage of the Force deployed increased markedly over the past 30 years.



FY 2023 Navy Budget Highlight Book

Figure 1.2 – Operational Context



* FY22 and out represent end of fiscal year ship counts from the latest Shipbuilding Plan

43% of Battle Force Fleet Deployed

Figure 1. Key Naval Platform Metrics



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

5720
Ser DNS-36GC/22U113527
June 22, 2022

Sent via email to: [REDACTED]

Dear [REDACTED]:

This is an interim reference to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)/Privacy Act (PA) request dated March 25, 2021 in which you sought the following "specific documents, information, and materials in your possession and/or control related to, relied upon, and/or specifically cited in, the Department of the Navy Command Investigation Report related to the Fatal Shooting Incident at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida on 6 December 2019 ("the Report" to include specific items requested 1 through 44". Your request was received in our office on the same day and assigned case number DON-NAVY-2021-004946.

In the course of processing your FOIA request this office contacted the Commander, Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) to conduct a search of their local files for applicable records responsive to your subject FOIA request.

The NETC office has identified 18 records, totaling 816 pages, which are responsive to your subject FOIA request. Upon review of these records, it has been determined that 7 of the 18 records, a combined total of 198 pages contain instances of personally identifiable information (PII), such as the names, and email addresses, phone numbers and other identifiable personal information of individuals. These instances of PII are exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6), since release of this information would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of their personal privacy.

Next, it was determined that 2 of the 18 records, a combined total of 480 pages are released to you in their entirety.

In addition, it has been determined that 5 of the 18 records, totaling 113 pages contain information that falls under the purview of the Department of Defense, and, it was also determined that 3 of the 18 records, totaling 25 pages falls under the purview of the Department of the Air Force. Therefore, we have referred those records to those agencies for action and direct response to you. For your convenience, contact information for the Department of the Defense and Department of the Air Force are provided below:

Department of the Defense
Freedom of Information Division
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.osd-js-foia-requester-service-center@mail.mil

Department of the Air Force
 SAF/AAII (FOIA)
 1000 Air Force Pentagon
 Washington, DC 20330-1000
Usaf.pentagon.saf-aa.mbx.haf-foia-workflow@mail.mil

Please note, the 1 of the 3 records referred to the Department of the Air Force contain information that falls under the purview of the Department of the Navy as well as the Department of the Air Force. Upon review of the document it has been determined that the document contains instances of personally identifiable information (PII), such as the names, and signatures of individuals that belong to the Navy. Those instances of PII are exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6), since release of this information would result in a clearly unwarranted invasion of their personal privacy.

Lastly, we are still in the process of locating the offices that are most likely to hold responsive records with regards to Line Items #4-5; #8; #10; #12-#20; #22-#25; #27-#35; #37; #40-#44 referenced in your subject FOIA request. We will notify you in a separate correspondence of the results of our search and if applicable records are located.

Because portions of your request are partially denied, you are advised of your right to appeal this determination by writing to:

Office of the Judge Advocate General
 1322 Patterson Ave SE Ste 3000
 Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066

Your appeal must be postmarked within ninety (90) calendar days from the date of this letter. Please provide the appellate authority (see below) the following:

- a. A letter requesting an appeal that explains what you are appealing with any supporting arguments or reasons you think may be worthy of consideration;
- b. A copy of your initial request;
- c. A copy of the letter of denial.

Also, please provide me a copy of your appeal letter at:

usn.ncr.dns.mbx.don-foia-pa@us.navy.mil

There are two ways to file an appeal: through FOIAonline or by mail.

(1) Through FOIAonline. This will work only if you set up an account on FOIAonline before you make the request that you would like to appeal. To set up an account, go to FOIAonline (this is a website that will appear as the top hit if you search the internet for "FOIAonline"), click "Create Account" (a link located within the blue banner at the top in the upper right corner), enter your data into the field that subsequently appears, and click "Save" (at the bottom left of the screen). With your account thereby created, you will have the power to file an appeal on FOIAonline to any request you file on FOIAonline thereafter. To do so, locate your request (enter a keyword or the request tracking number in the "Search for" field on the "Search" tab), click on it, then the "Create Appeal" tab in the left-hand column. Complete the subsequent field, click "Save," and FOIAonline will submit your appeal.

(2) By mail. Address your appeal to:

The Judge Advocate General (Code 14)
1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000
Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066

In this instance, the fees associated with the processing of your request are waived, but this action is not indicative of how future requests will be handled.

For this determination, you have the right to seek dispute resolution services from either the DoD Navy Component FOIA Public Liaison, Mr. Chris Julka, at: Christopher.a.julka@navy.mil, via phone: (703) 697-0031; or by contacting the Office of Government Information Services at: (<https://ogis.archives.gov/>), (202) 741-5770, ogis@nara.gov.

Questions regarding the action this office has taken to process your request may be directed to our FOIA Service Center at (202) 685-0412 or via email at usn.ncr.dns.mbx.don-foia-pa@us.navy.mil.

Sincerely,

Gregory Cason

G. Cason
Deputy Director,
DON FOIA/PA Program Office

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MAY 11, 2022

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Admiral GILDAY. During the hearing, I mentioned, “within the past month we have increased our pass rate in an initial course down in Pensacola, Florida, from 40 to 50 percent to 80 percent by doing remedial training...” To amplify this with context, the Navy has not yet experienced the 80% pass rate results due to the length of the FORGE training pipeline, but is confident we will see improvement based on the positive results achieved by the other services since they implemented this process. The Marine Corps and Air Force have demonstrated successful models upon which the Navy will capitalize. Navy invested four qualified Interactive Operator (ION) instructors down in Pensacola, FL (ION) to improve traditionally poor pass rates and throughput of Sailors in Computer Network Operations Qualification Course (CNOQC) and Foundational Operator Readiness Growth and Enrichment (FORGE). The four ION instructors are teaching the Marine Corps Cyber Operation Readiness Curriculum (MCCORC), an ION mentoring course, which started in April 2022. Early mentorship and intervention leverages service best practices to increase pass rates and throughput in CNOQC and FORGE. During the hearing, I referred to finding additional cyber operators that could have been better used in the teams. To clarify, we found about 80 exploitation analysts (EA) that were assigned to Navy billets not coded with the EA Navy Enlisted Classifications (NEC). We have changed the Navy’s policy for distribution to ensure EAs are assigned to EA billets, with priority to CMF. [See page 15.]

General BERGER. The Marine Corps is developing Marines and Civilian Marines with the right skill sets and matching their skills to duties they desire and are suited to perform. In FY20, FY21 and FY22, the Marine Corps spent \$1.5M annually on recruiting, retention, and relocation. We are retaining our high performers by leveraging multiple retention tools, including: Cyber Excepted Service (CES) authorities, Total Local Market Supplement pay tables, cash awards, leadership development, education training and recognition. In particular, the use of CES authorities decreased employee turnover by 40% between FY21 and FY22. We are also recruiting individuals with critical skills by identifying and infusing talent through academia and programs such as National Security Agency’s, United States Cyber Command’s, and Marine Forces Cyber Command’s apprentice programs. On the uniformed side, we have also developed strategic partnerships with the Naval Academy and Naval Reserve Training Officer Programs to identify midshipman who meet the eligibility criteria for the cyber community and bring them on as interns for their summer training. In an effort to more effectively balance a lengthy training pipeline with the length of a Marine’s enlistment, a Marine who is selected for the cyber military occupational specialty, signs a five-year contract versus the typical four-year contract. [See page 15.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Admiral GILDAY. PEO (T) and PMA-265 concur with CNO comments with no additional position/information suggested from NAVAIR. Recommend any supplemental information/data be requested from N98 if needed on the CNO response to HASC. BLK III SLM first aircraft induct is Q1 FY23. First aircraft delivery is likely Q1 FY24. We should acknowledge and expect a 15 month turn-around time (best case) for FY23 inducts. [See page 21.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. The Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) continues to mature. With the tremendous support received from Congress and this committee, the program is advancing several initiatives across three lines of effort—dry dock modernization, optimization, and capital equipment. In Fiscal Year 2022, the second increment of industrial modeling will commence, which will inform project design and construction. Area Development Plans will be completed at each public shipyard across the Future Years Defense Program

utilizing the industrial modeling output. Additionally, funds will be utilized to begin project design for a Gerald R. Ford Class aircraft carrier-capable dry dock at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, award the construction contract for Dry Dock 8 Saltwater Upgrades at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, award several restoration and modernization projects, and purchase capital equipment to replace aged elements to revitalize maintenance shop capabilities. I am committed to keeping Congress informed of the progress of this once-in-a-century recapitalization of the four public shipyards, and will continue to provide updates to our 5-Year Plan each year with the President's Budget submission. [See page 26.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Secretary DEL TORO. Our Security Cooperation (SC) tools build coalition lethality, interoperability, and military advantage, and bring value or Return on Investment to Department of the Navy (DON) acquisition.

The DON develops partner capabilities through our tools of SC, including Foreign Military Sales and Cooperative and Building Partnership Capacity programs. Partner capability priorities reflect Chief of Naval Operations, Global Combatant Commanders, and Navy Component Commanders (NCC) guidance.

NCCs provide guidance formally through their Theater Campaign Plans, which help identify areas of "mutual interest" and develop combat capability and capacity of the coalition of U.S. forces, allies, and partner nations, which in turn contribute towards formulation of domestic acquisition strategy. [See page 27.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL

Admiral GILDAY. All emergent mental health referrals (i.e., for suicidal or homicidal patients) are seen and evaluated the same day. Prior to the Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) activation, the wait time to see the ship's psychologist was approximately four to six weeks for a new patient evaluation, and approximately two to three weeks for a follow-up appointment. After the arrival of the additional psychologist and licensed clinical social worker, the ship's psychologist's wait time for a new patient evaluation decreased to approximately three weeks, and to approximately two weeks for a follow-up appointment. The Defense Health Agency standard for referrals for specialty care services, which includes behavioral health services, is 28 days. As a point of comparison, the average wait time across all Navy Medical Forces Atlantic military treatment facilities is 15.51 days (approximately 2 weeks), while the average wait time across all Tricare network providers is 34.82 days (approximately 4–5 weeks). Comparing times for only the Portsmouth area, the average is 12.7 days (less than 2 weeks) at Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, while the average in the local Tricare network is 34.9 days (approximately 4–5 weeks). [See page 36.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ

Admiral GILDAY. On June 22, 2022 the DNS-H FOIA office responded to the constituent and the response letter was sent via email. We have attached this letter for reference as enclosure (1). [See page 38.]

[The letter referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 145.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BANKS

Admiral GILDAY. The total conference cost was \$105,000. The majority of the cost was from attendee travel and per-diem. 96 travelers out of 205 in attendance were on government orders for travel. The event was held in a government leased facility.

NAVIFOR leadership is in the process of taking action on the key takeaways to capitalize on what was learned from the event in order to effectively drive DEI action and accountability across the IWC Enterprise.

There were five key takeaways from the Summit:

First, organizations should develop a long-range training plan incorporating as many inclusive learning events as possible, driving to mitigate as many barriers to inclusion as possible.

Second, we still have a great deal to learn about DEI and how to operationalize inclusion. Simple techniques to operationalize inclusion were shared, these include: splitting teams in "micro teams" which enhances the team's ability to generate dif-

ferent perspectives and solutions, along with identifying the “smallest executable step” to test new ideas quickly.

Third, retaining our talent is critical; the Navy and IWC need to better understand why some people stay even though they face adversity. Discussing career milestones were of utmost importance and are critical points of inflection for our Officers, Sailors, and Civilian workforce; the Summit afforded those to hear from participants of the Navy’s Career Intermission Program (CIP). CIP, as discussed by the guest speakers, was successful in their experience, and allowed members to “off-ramp” temporarily to better address and handle personal issues.

Fourth, DEI is a complex problem that warrant all our combined resources to get it right. As individuals, we learned we have the power and charge to act on our own, however, we need to collaborate and tackle DEI across the IWC and Enterprise to make it successful.

Finally, the Summit was a call to action. In the words of one of our keynote speakers, we need to “go active, not passive!” [See page 45.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN

General BERGER. As Representative Bergman may remember from his days as the Commanding General, 4th Marine Air Wing (MAW), 4th MAW participates regularly in the 2nd MAW and 3d MAW Frag Conferences for scheduling aircraft support across the Marine Corps. The Frag conferences result in 4th MAW flying in support of the Marine Corps, supporting both Reserve and Active Component aviation requirements, at a frequency that places their squadrons in an operational status that far exceeds the normal 48 drill period and two week Annual Training. We believe that in certain cases, the Marine Corps can improve both logistical support and maintenance of both Reserve and Active squadrons by incorporating the Reserve squadron into an Active aircraft type-specific group.

The Reserve squadron will be co-located with the group headquarters, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALs), and Marine Wing Support Squadron as well as other like aircraft squadrons on a Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) maximizing supportability. We are conducting a proof of concept of Active/Reserve Component integration by incorporating VMM-774 into Marine Aircraft Group-26, an active duty group with all flying squadrons possessing only MV-22 Ospreys.

Access to MALs, simulators, and vast on site resources provided to the Reserve squadron at a MCAS vice being a tenant on another Service’s base will likely improve readiness and streamline Naval Supply Systems Command logistics nodes. The proof of concept is scheduled for FY23.

We are continuing to work the details for this proof of concept with VMM-774 still in transition from Naval Station Norfolk to MCAS New River. We can provide in progress reviews and a final assessment once the proof of concept period is complete. [See page 42.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ

Admiral GILDAY. Navy’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 budget request includes investments in critical efforts in several key areas including: supplier development of capability and capacity, strategic outsourcing of large scale fabrication and heavy manufacturing, shipbuilder infrastructure, technology innovation to include additive manufacturing, and government oversight of submarine quality and material. With the help of Congress, and working with local, state, and national organizations, we are continuing to identifying opportunities to increase productive capacity, and improve efficiencies across the shipbuilding workforce and in the supply chain. As opportunities are identified, we will continue to incorporate those recommendations into future budget requests. [See page 47.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. LURIA

Secretary DEL TORO. There is a reduction in the number of VLS cells and it’s a risk reward decision. The Navy had to make a value decision of what it’s going to take to get these older platforms with less capable combat systems forward versus what investments we need to make that deliver a more capable, more lethal Navy in the future. This is also in the context that the United States Navy fights from the seabed to space; our submarines, our surface ships, and our aviation assets all contribute to the fight in addition to those platforms hosting VLS cells. The new era of strategic competition requires a modernized, capable, global, forward, and

multi-domain Navy. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) underscores the need for the Department of Defense to move away from systems that provide less capability and do not significantly support our strategy and ability to win in a future fight. In the Fiscal Year 2023 budget, the Navy prioritized promising technologies that need to be fielded quickly and at-scale to be operationally relevant in the coming years to ensure that Navy meets Joint Force operational requirements, and made difficult choices to divest of ships that do not meaningfully support warfighting requirements.

Separately, we have various metrics for how the Navy is employed. Underway and deployed were chosen as they provide U.S. government and military leadership a snapshot of the U.S. Navy's ability to respond for contingency operations that are reactive in nature. For budgetary purposes, we utilize underway days and flight hours—data that pertains to the spending of appropriations in a deliberate manner for the generation of U.S. Navy readiness. [See page 52.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. BICE

Admiral GILDAY. Yes, like the other services and industry we are challenged funding sufficient capacity to meet and sustain our cyberforce. We remain committed to recruiting, retaining, and educating the best cyber workforce possible. Sailors are foundationally trained in Navy schools and Civilians are trained through Commercial Certification or by formal Education. At the tactical level, knowledge gaps are supplemented through government and commercial training. A key challenge is for training to keep pace with development. Navy has engaged with DOD CIO to provide in-depth, accurate information regarding cybersecurity work roles and the requirements to train and qualify personnel. The DOD Cyber Excepted Service (CES) is a mission-focused personnel program that supports the human capital lifecycle for civilian employees engaged in or in support of a cyber-related mission. CES is an enterprise wide approach for managing civilian cyber professionals across the DOD, offering flexibilities and incentives in recruitment, retention, and professional development. For the Cyber Mission Force (CMF), the USCYBERCOM-defined training pipeline throughput for all work roles and course availability are limiting factors for completing the qualifications and accelerating Navy CMF growth. Navy's Information Warfare Type Commander (NAVIFOR) is working closely with Fleet Cyber Command and USCYBERCOM to expand and align training opportunities to maximize throughput. [See page 61.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. Navy's principal focus on this issue remains unchanged and increasing manning levels across the surface fleet is a strategic objective for the Navy. We are using a variety of Force Management tools to attack this issue, including:

- Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay, Sea Duty Incentive Pay, and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
- Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea duty and curtailing shore duty tours).

We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the Perform to Plan—Human Resources process to address a wide range of issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary incentives, non-monetary incentives, and early advancement opportunities for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.

We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements. These efforts, combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and funding total ownership cost will ensure we have the Sailors to support the Navy that the Nation needs.

Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning, and other enablers such as Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to recruiting, training, retention, and improved talent management.

Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully and properly manned, with the right Sailor in the right place at the right time with the right training. The number of Sailors on operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have 10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017. [See page 59.]

General BERGER. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy. [See page 59.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCCLAIN

Secretary DEL TORO. The Department of the Navy's (DON) Next Generation Air Dominance effort remains on cost and on schedule. To reduce risk, the F/A-XX program is leveraging proven technologies to fill critical warfighting capability gaps. Iterative collaboration between government and industry teams has resulted in mature vendor concepts that balance advanced air dominance capabilities with long-term affordability.

The Navy's projected Strike Fighter Shortfall (SFSF) did increase since last year due to a reallocation of DON funding to priority programs in PB23, however the DON has the capacity to meet all operational and Combatant Commander requirements for training and deployments.

The DON has two primary levers to meter Strike Fighter Inventory Management (SFIM) moving forward. First, the DON is procuring new F-35C aircraft to increase the capability and lethality of the Carrier Air Wing (CVW). Second, the DON intends to maintain 4th generation capacity through our F/A-18E/F Service Life Modification (SLM) program which extends service life while inserting the same Block III capabilities of new production aircraft. SLM Block III aircraft can be delivered for approximately one third the cost of a new production F/A-18 Super Hornet. Both of these levers have margin for adjustment in the future.

In order to pace current and emerging threats, new procurement should focus on F-35C with Block 4 capabilities. The DON has requested six additional F-35C aircraft in the Fiscal Year 2023 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) in order to achieve the most lethal and capable CVW as soon as possible. As more F-35Cs enter the Fleet, the overall requirement for F/A-18E/F aircraft will decrease while the combat capability of the CVW will increase. [See page 54.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE

Secretary DEL TORO. The Navy's Red Hill Shaft and Aiea-Halawa wells are currently offline. Bringing them back online is under discussion with the state, the Environmental Protection Agency, and other stakeholders, and the solution and timeline are still under development.

For Red Hill Shaft, the Hawaii Department of Health (HDOH) issued an Emergency Order with a directive to bring the facility back online as a drinking water source. With a permitted capacity of about 4.7 million gallons per day, this is an important water source for the Navy and water security for Oahu. The Navy is programming, planning, and designing a military construction project to construct a drinking water treatment facility to address any concerns of lingering contamination of the source water at the Red Hill facility. HDOH's Safe Drinking Water Branch will be a key partner in permitting the drinking water treatment facility.

The Navy Aiea Halawa Shaft well was closed out of an abundance of caution after groundwater contamination was confirmed at the Red Hill Shaft. It will be reopened when it can be shown that pumping at this location does not pose a drinking water quality risk at this location or any other nearby wells (in particular, the Honolulu Board of Water Supply's Halawa Shaft). All available lines of evidence will be utilized in evaluating that risk, including water quality data from existing monitoring wells and new monitoring wells being drilled to characterize the extent of groundwater contamination and the effectiveness of groundwater remediation efforts, results of hydrogeological investigations, and installation of early-warning "sentinel" wells to detect any contamination possibly migrating toward drinking water sources. The highest priority groundwater monitoring wells are expected to be installed by the end of this calendar year. [See page 56.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON

Admiral GILDAY. Modernization of Sea Based Strategic Deterrence must include the COLUMBIA-Class, TRIDENT II D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2), and the nuclear

warhead-W93/Mk7. Without D5LE2, insufficient Strategic Missile assets exist to support the COLUMBIA-Class starting with COLUMBIA hull #9. Additionally, D5LE2 modernizes the flight vehicle to promote effectiveness in expected threat environments throughout the life of the COLUMBIA-Class. Congressional support for funding of D5LE2's requirements is critical and the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review emphasized this. The W93/Mk7 program is critical to maintaining the credibility of our strategic deterrent, specifically in meeting STRATCOM's requirements to address emerging and future anticipated threats. The W93/Mk7 program will improve the safety and surety of our deployed nuclear stockpile as well as life-cycle affordability. The W93/Mk7 program is particularly crucial because the Mk7 aeroshell will be the reentry vehicle for the United Kingdom's Replacement Warhead program. Without this aeroshell, the United Kingdom will be unable to maintain their sovereign nuclear deterrent capability since this will be the UK's sole nuclear warhead program, being developed concurrently but independent of W93. The Navy works closely with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to develop a schedule for the W93/Mk7 program to meet STRATCOM requirements for capabilities required to address emerging and future threats. Due to infrastructure and labor force limitations, we are unable to accelerate the W93/Mk7 program, even with accelerated funding, without displacing other critical NNSA efforts. [See page 57.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MAY 11, 2022

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written testimony for today's event—meant to reflect the highest priorities of the Navy—doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that "there's a team working on this."

In the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into the "get well" plan that was directed at Navy's cyber activities, and I am not certain that a plan which aims to fix a supposedly urgent problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy takes cyber seriously. Taken all together, why should this committee believe the Navy is prioritizing cyberspace operations?

Secretary DEL TORO. With respect to Navy Cyber Mission Force (CMF) "get well" plan, I directed CMF Readiness into the Navy's Performance to Plan Process (P2P). This process is chaired by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and has addressed some of our Navy's most challenging readiness issues, such as fighter aircraft availability. It is a data-driven process that derives the key factors for shortfalls in major programs across the Navy. This process is making sure we identify barriers and chokepoints so that as we move fast, we are deliberate in identifying places that add the most value to getting trained and qualified Sailors reporting to CMF on Day 1. In addition to this, we have taken these immediate steps to improve our readiness:

- Sending four Interactive On-Net (ION) operators to Pensacola, FL to recruit ION talent immediately after "A" school and to assess new talent and execute the Computer Network Aptitude Battery test, a screening tool to match the most qualified Sailors to the right training.
- Adopting the Marine Corps Cyber Operations Readiness Course preparatory training. Utilizing this course, USMC raised the pass rate from 50% in the Remote Interactive Operator Training course to 80% in FORGE. We expect to see similar results for Navy this year.
- Identifying near-term resources to support USCYBERCOM surge of FORGE courses to build more ION operators.
- Funding Force Generation/Cyber Qualification Team (CQT) classroom and IT space for continued Persistent Cyber Training Environment content development and CQT training to deliver individual, mission element, and team training at scale.
- Making cyber a key evaluation area and priority as part of our Navy's POM and Budget process. This has resulted in additional resources for cyber readiness.

Finally, we are committed to partnering and working closely with USCYBERCOM and the Department of the Navy Principal Cyber Advisor.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have been a big fan of the electromagnetic railgun program for a very long time, and was very disappointed to see that the Navy has opted to pause this program in FY23. This was an incredibly promising technology, and I anticipate the Department will look back on this decision with remorse. Why has the Navy paused the program, and how do you intend to leverage what was learned throughout the life of the program to inform other technological advances?

Secretary DEL TORO. The DON has accomplished all S&T objectives for Railgun launcher technologies including barrel life, energy storage, pulsed-power rep-rate operation, firing of Hypervelocity Projectiles (HVP), and demonstrating mega-amp current transfer for trainable mounts. The DON paused further investment in Railgun due to platform integration complexity, cost, and lack of a suitable Fire Control Architecture (FCA) for Integrated Air & Missile Defense missions on Navy surface combatants. The DON is putting Railgun "on the shelf" with a detailed technical data package and focusing S&T resources on developing a low-cost extensible FCA that could support a variety of precision kinetic interceptors, including HVP fired from 5" guns. A new Innovative Naval Prototype commencing in FY23 will focus on the FCA.

If gun-based defense with HVPs and 5" guns is feasible and effective in the future, the Navy may re-examine whether the higher launch velocity of Railgun

placed on future platforms would offer compelling advantages for expanded battle space and defeat of stressing maneuvering threats.

While developing the Railgun technologies, the DON worked with a national consortium of military and Department of Energy laboratories, as well as industry and academic partners. The team achieved significant scientific advancements in a number of areas that will benefit or lead to other technology applications. A few highlights include:

- Modeling and simulation of complex multi-physics phenomena
- Electrochemistry of metals under high dynamic pressure
- Advanced thermal protection systems for projectiles experiencing high aerothermal heating
- Novel techniques for refractory metal coatings
- Compact pulsed power systems
- Control systems with machine learning for enhanced real-time diagnostics
- Mega-ampere current transfer through flexible cables and sliding contacts
- Electromagnetic shielding from effects of high intensity dynamic magnetic fields
- Demonstration and certification of high energy density lithium battery technologies on a Naval facility
- Shock-resilient electronics at high launch acceleration (>30 kG)
- Projectile fired up to Mach 6 muzzle velocity

Mr. LANGEVIN. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written testimony for today's event—meant to reflect the highest priorities of the Navy—doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that "there's a team working on this."

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1. Sending four Interactive Operators (ION) to Pensacola, FL to:
 - a. Recruit ION talent immediately after "A" school
 - b. Assess new talent and execute Computer Network Aptitude Battery (CNAB) test, a screening tool to match the most qualified Sailors to the right training.
 - c. Adopted Marine Corps Cyber Operations Readiness Course (MCCORC) preparatory training. Utilizing this course, USMC raised the pass rate from 50% in RIOT to 80% in FORGE. Expect similar results for Navy this year.
2. Identify near term resources to support United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) surge of FORGE courses to build more IONs.
3. Funding Force Generation/Cyber Qualification Team (CQT) classroom and IT space for continued Persistent Cyber Training Environment (PCTE) content development and CQT training to deliver individual, mission element, and team training at scale.
4. Making cyber a key evaluation area and priority as part of our Navy's Program Objective Memorandum and Budget process. This has resulted in additional resources for cyber readiness. Finally, we are committed to partnering and working closely with USCYBERCOM. In July we will be hosting warfighter talks and will focus on cyberforce readiness.

Mr. LANGEVIN. We have heard multiple concerns about the state of the Navy's cyber forces, and the Secretary's 28 pages of written testimony for today's event—meant to reflect the highest priorities of the Navy—doesn't mention cyber once. Admiral Gilday's remarks did touch upon cyber briefly, but only to basically say that "there's a team working on this."

In the conduct of this committee's oversight, we have looked into the "get well" plan that was directed at Navy's cyber activities, and I am not certain that a plan which aims to fix a supposedly urgent problem by 2027 demonstrates that the Navy

takes cyber seriously. Taken all together, why should this committee believe the Navy is prioritizing cyberspace operations?

General BERGER. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN

Mr. LARSEN. In the recently published update to Force Design 2030, The Marine Corps listed 15 areas to prioritize for investments. Artificial intelligence is listed twice; as number 8, "Network Modernization, to include artificial intelligence and cloud technologies" and number 15, "Artificial Intelligence-enabled force protection."

What progress is the Marine Corps making in artificial intelligence development? How are you educating officers and enlisted of all ranks on the importance and usefulness of artificial intelligence?

General BERGER. In order to gain, maintain and hold targets at risk in contested communications environments, the Marine Corps, as the stand-in force, must be able to sense and make sense of the operating environment. Recent technological improvements in computing and advances in AI development operations have increased applicability of these tools and techniques to tactical environments. Given the increasing volume of information available and necessary to make sense of the environment, it is imperative that we use AI to triage incoming data streams and maximize the effectiveness of our limited human processing and analytic resources. To do this, we must establish automated data pipelines that support deployment of AI models and data processing both in the cloud and at the tactical edge. The characteristics of cloud computing (on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured service) make it well suited to support AI efforts when compared to legacy on-premises hosting alternatives which will not scale to support emerging technologies. This infrastructure is needed to ensure the transport and availability of data to the underlying machine learning (ML) algorithms enabling AI. The Development Security Operations capability will use modern software development practices to continually modify, enhance, and secure the cloud-hosted data that is being processed and feeding the AI/ML as well as the algorithms that process the data. We are building capacity to organically develop applications, ensuring we meet the Deputy Secretary of Defense's intent to modernize DOD software, as "the ability to securely and rapidly deliver resilient software capability is a competitive advantage that will define future conflicts." Our approach will ensure we can develop progressive web applications to weave together data from disparate sources, providing leaders data centrality with vital stores of actionable information. Through our organic software development capability, Commanders could develop or update algorithms at the speed of need, allowing for process optimization, catalyzing efficiencies in the kill chain, and increasing efficacy across every facet of their command and control. Both the private sector and government Science & Technology organizations are maturing ML models with targeting relevance and could provide utility to the Marine Corps. Technology transition is central to the Marine Corps' approach to generate rapid effects, while continuing to partner with other DOD Services and federal executive agencies.

Mr. LARSEN. How do you plan to update Professional Military Education at all ranks and MOS so Marines becomes familiar with Force Design 2030 history and intent at all levels of warfare (tactical, operational, and strategic)?

General BERGER. Since its publication in March 2020, Force Design (FD) 2030 implications have been incorporated and taught in both officer and enlisted resident and non-resident Professional Military Education (PME) courses. Marine Corps University (MCU) evaluates the ability of our joint forces to understand the strategic environment and think more critically about the challenges defined in FD2030 across PME and throughout all programs. Course Content Review Boards are conducted annually to ensure content is current, relevant, and consistent with the appropriate PME. University-level Curriculum Review Boards are the formal oversight mechanism to direct long-range strategic planning, coordination, and approval of academic programs and to evaluate academic curricula within the PME Continuum, ensuring adherence to mandated PME requirements, the needs of the Marine Corps, and applicable accreditation policies.

As of the Course Review Boards for Officers in 2020/2022 and Enlisted in 2021, FD2030 elements have been areas of focus within MCU, some examples include: curriculum adaptations that educate and train on force design in the context of pacing threat challenges in contested environments; incorporating an Expeditionary Warfare School Tactical Decision Game on Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations/Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment/local sea control, reinforcing

FD2030 concepts; Command and Staff College (CSC) students attend two classified briefs and two addresses from the Commandant on FD2030; CSC Distance Education Program students cover all aspects of FD2030 from concepts to acquisition programs, experimentation, naval integration, and pacing threats; School of Advanced Warfighting capstone exercise allows students to explore cross-domain deterrence, escalation, and contemporary warfighting, helping students visualize and describe how force design shapes contemporary competition; Marine Corps War College students cover FD2030 throughout the academic year, culminating with the capstone Global Wargame 2025 which evaluates Force Design; and the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare provides numerous educational opportunities to increase student familiarity with concepts and implications of FD2030 through wargaming, the annual Innovation Summit, and multimedia outreach.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

Mr. LAMBORN. What is the total number of COVID-19 exemption requests in the Navy? What is the number of religious exemption requests? How many exemption requests have been approved? How many religious exemption requests have been approved? How many are still pending decision?

Admiral GILDAY. The following table summarizes the Navy's COVID-19 vaccination exemptions as of May 9, 2022.

Exemption	Received	Approved or Authorized	Pending
Religious Accommodations	4,291	27	165
Medical Permanent	27	15	0
Medical Temporary	N/A	327	N/A

Data in the table includes Active Component and Selected Reserves (SELRES).

Mr. LAMBORN. What is the total number of COVID-19 exemption requests in the Marine Corps? What is the number of religious exemption requests? How many exemption requests have been approved? How many religious exemption requests have been approved? How many are still pending decision?

General BERGER. The Marine Corps tracks COVID-19 religious accommodation exemption requests and appeals from the time the request is submitted to Headquarters, Marine Corps. Exemptions under all other reasons are tracked once approved. Medical exemption requests are started by the member with a medical provider and commanders become aware only if the medical provider determines that exemption is appropriate. Administrative exemptions are temporary in nature and are usually related to a Marine's temporary duty that makes him or her unavailable for the first or second vaccination dose.

As of 27 May 2022:

- HQMC has received 3,719 religious accommodation requests.
- 499 Marines have an approved exemption requests:
 - o 396 Temporary Administrative
 - o 81 Temporary Medical
 - o 22 Permanent Medical
- 7 religious accommodation requests have been approved.
- 27 religious accommodation requests are pending initial decision and 1,093 are pending appeal decisions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

Mr. GARAMENDI. The 10 LSDs that the Navy proposes to divest over the FYDP have not hit the end of their initial 40-year expected service life. Some have more than 10 years left in their lifecycle during the year of divestment. The Navy notes that divestment is needed because ships are in poor material condition and require significant resources to continue to maintain and operate. Why are these ships in such poor condition, and why weren't they maintained over their lifecycle?

Secretary DEL TORO. Over the course of their lifecycle, these ships were maintained. The Navy has multiple processes and organizations across the enterprise to maintain the material readiness of the Fleet including depot-level maintenance and

modernization availabilities, intermediate-level maintenance, and, most importantly, the hard work of Sailors conducting preventive maintenance on these ships every day in the Fleet. However, as with any ship approaching its expected service life, it became increasingly costly to operate and maintain these ships. In some cases, the high demand for these ships and increased operations over their lifecycle contributed to a more rapid decline in material condition.

Mr. GARAMENDI. The choices made during the acquisitions process when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired. Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private expense in the past, resulting in “reduced mission readiness and surging sustainment costs” in some instances. How is the service improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?

Secretary DEL TORO. The Navy is improving how it acquires IP and technical data/computer software by conveying early on in the contract solicitation process and through increased attention during contract negotiations with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), the Navy’s requirements for operations, maintenance, installation, and training technical data/computer software, as well as long-term provisioning needs for the platform. The Navy is utilizing tabletop exercises and roundtable discussions with subject matter experts to bring understanding prior to negotiations to provide insight beyond historical IP barriers and introducing innovative ways to value and acquire, or provide access to, technical data/computer software. The Navy is ensuring access agreements have been made for some critical sub-vendor data and is requesting detail specifications from the OEM in order to allow second-source production of components without incurring non-recurring engineering costs.

The Navy will balance the cost of procuring technical data/computer software during the acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits by gaining an early understanding of the different types and amounts of IP and technical data/computer software necessary to conduct a vast majority of sustainment activities. Through implementation of acquisition strategies and plans that clearly align to sustainment activities in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2464, and ensuring consistent execution when contracting, the Navy will continue to institute strong and innovative approaches to value and obtain, or provide access to, IP and technical data/computer software necessary to sustain or increase platform mission capability and readiness.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Over the FYDP, despite L-class ships entering the fleet, divestments of LSDs (i.e., 10 over the FYDP) will drop the total number of L-class ships to 24/25, well under the stated Marine Corps requirement of 31. The Navy plans to only procure one LPD Flight II in FY2023 and then complete procurement of the LPD Flight II line. How is the Navy going to reach the L-class ship numbers listed in the shipbuilding plan (i.e., 31 ships by FY30/31) if there are no more L-class ships procured in the FYDP?

Admiral GILDAY. Traditional L-class amphibious ships are globally deployable, long-endurance ships focused on support to the Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) will provide maneuver, mobility and sustainment to the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR). Both types of ships are required to support the National Defense Strategy.

The Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023, delivered to the Congress in April 2022, reflects procurement of both traditional L-class ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD) as well as the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) that achieves an inventory of 31 ships in FY31, consisting of 26 traditional amphibious ships and five LAW.

The Marine Corps’ stated requirement for 31 amphibious ships refers to the traditional L-class ships in the Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARG) and does not include the LAW. The forthcoming Amphibious Fleet Requirement Study will set the requirement for traditional amphibious ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD) and inform POM24 force structure decisions.

Mr. GARAMENDI. The Navy has planned to only procure one LPD Flight II in FY2023 and then complete procurement of the LPD Flight II line. The Navy states it will begin assessment of a next-generation amphibious ship (i.e., LPD(X)) in FY23. How long will this assessment take? If there are delays to procuring a next-generation amphibious ship, what is the risk to maintaining the industrial base because of a potential gap in amphibious ships being built?

Admiral GILDAY. In FY2023, the Navy will begin a one-year Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) to determine the overarching requirements for the next amphibious ship.

The Navy recognizes the importance of workload stability for our nation's shipbuilders and their supply chains. The Navy further recognizes the need to involve our shipbuilders and industry partners early and often in both the transition to and design of new ship classes—and will apply these lessons learned as we develop the requirements and acquisition plans for the follow-on class to LPD Flight II.

The Navy is committed to making every effort to balance affordability and capability with industrial base stability and will reflect these commitments in future shipbuilding plans and budget submissions.

Mr. GARAMENDI. The 10 LSDs that the Navy proposes to divest over the FYDP have not hit the end of their initial 40-year expected service life. Some have more than 10 years left in their lifecycle during the year of divestment. The Navy notes that divestment is needed because ships are in poor material condition and require significant resources to continue to maintain and operate. Why are these ships in such poor condition, and why weren't they maintained over their lifecycle?

Admiral GILDAY. Over the course of their lifecycle, these ships were maintained. The Navy has multiple processes and organizations across the enterprise to maintain the material readiness of the Fleet including depot-level maintenance and modernization availabilities, intermediate-level maintenance, and most importantly, the hard work of Sailors conducting preventive maintenance on these ships every day in the Fleet. However, as with any ship approaching its expected service life, it became increasingly costly to operate and maintain these ships. In some cases, the high demand for these ships and increased operations over their lifecycle contributed to a more rapid decline in material condition.

Mr. GARAMENDI. The choices made during the acquisitions process when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired. Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private expense in the past, resulting in "reduced mission readiness and surging sustainment costs" in some instances. How is the service improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?

Admiral GILDAY. Answered by SECNAV.

Mr. GARAMENDI. The choices made during the acquisitions process when procuring new platforms affect the decades of sustainment that follows. One area that affects lifecycle sustainment is what intellectual property (IP) and technical data rights are acquired. Observers such as the GAO have said that DOD has not always been consistent in its acquisition and licensing of IP developed at private expense in the past, resulting in "reduced mission readiness and surging sustainment costs" in some instances. How is the service improving how it acquires IP and technical data? How will the service balance the cost of procuring IP or technical data during the acquisitions process with the long-term sustainment benefits?

General BERGER. The Marine Corps acquisition enterprise has been very deliberate in its approach to the procurement of technical data for precisely the reasons stated in the question. The decision to procure intellectual property associated with an acquisition program is arrived at on a case by case basis, however, the factors that go into that decision are largely consistent from program to program. The program manager must first consider the appropriate rights of the government based on the level of government funded development which is often contentious between the Government and the vendor. This will set the conditions for what data rights the Government must pay for and allow for the pricing of these rights. The Marine Corps has been very successful recently asserting the Government's right to key technical data, even when it required court action as was the case with the Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement program. More recently the program manager for the Advanced Combat Vehicle utilized contractual withholds to ensure the delivery of critical provisioning data necessary to support sustainment of that important platform.

Basic engineering data for provisioning, the data required to allow Defense Logistics Agency to stock the parts, is nearly always included as a deliverable in our larger programs. While the data required to repair the end item organically is also typically procured, the data to organically repair sub-components is determined through a deliberate Level of Repair Analysis, which drives the program's Product Support Strategy. This analysis takes into account a variety of factors including the complexity of the repair action vs. the skill level of the Military Occupational Specialty performing the maintenance action at each echelon of maintenance (organizational,

intermediate or depot), any special purpose tools and/or test equipment, maintenance facility requirements, repair cycle time, long lead time parts, the end item's anticipated service life, the cost of the repair part, the Government owned rights of the associated technical data, and the operational value of being able to make the repairs in the field. As we keep equipment in the inventory for longer and longer periods of time, Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Materiel Shortages and obsolescence becomes a greater consideration, and the lack of component level technical data can become an impediment to the procurement of repair parts. However, it is unlikely that procurement of a complete data package, at a considerable cost, at the time of end item procurement, would resolve this issue as the designs of our end items continue to evolve through their lifecycles due to changing requirements, evolving threats and capability enhancements. Finally, we will continue to aggressively acquire the rights that the Government is entitled to and where and when appropriate purchase additional data rights when the long term sustainment benefits justify the investment.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. SPEIER. Secretary Del Toro, the Navy's budget documents indicate that the Navy is pursuing public-private partnerships to expand child care for sailors in Norfolk. Would you elaborate on the Navy's plans for public-private partnerships for child care? How many children could potentially be served? And is the Navy considering using this approach in other regions with long wait lists, such as Hawaii, San Diego, and the Puget Sound region?

Secretary DEL TORO. The Navy had the first leased community military childcare facility with the Crown Child Development Center, in San Diego. The lease agreement with city of Coronado, signed in June 2020, is funded by Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC). This innovative approach was successful because it lined up Navy requirements with a former elementary school. Extension of the Coronado lease is under review with the potential to expand by an additional 60 spaces in FY23. This is an example of a successful partnership that the Navy is looking to replicate in other areas.

The Navy is continuing to seek partners in locations to include the Norfolk/Hampton Roads region, the Jacksonville/Mayport area, Naval Base Kitsap, and Naval Air Station Corpus Christi. Without knowing the scope of the partnership the Navy cannot estimate how many children could be served.

Navy CYP continues to explore all options to expand childcare offerings to include working with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Community and Family Policy) on their initiatives.

Ms. SPEIER. Secretary Del Toro, in May 2020, GAO published report GAO-20-61, which recommended that "The Secretary of the Navy should develop a plan, with clearly defined goals, performance measures, and timeframes, to guide and monitor the Navy's female active-duty service member recruitment and retention efforts. (Recommendation 3)." DOD concurred with this recommendation, and GAO says that the Navy estimated that it would complete this plan by December 2021. However, the GAO recommendation is still open because the plan has not yet been completed.

When does the Department of the Navy expect to complete the plan requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020 report on recruitment and retention of female service members?

What progress has the Navy Department made so far in addressing this recommendation?

What actions has the Navy taken, and what actions is the Navy planning to take, to improve recruitment and retention of female service members?

Secretary DEL TORO. 1. *When does the Department of the Navy expect to complete the plan requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020 report on recruitment and retention of female service members?*

The Navy's plan, requested in Recommendation 3 of GAO's May 2020 report on recruitment and retention of female service members, was completed in December 2021. Implementation of the plan is ongoing, guided by the Chief of Naval Operations' "CNO NAVPLAN", released 11 January 2021, and executed by release of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations' "Navigation Implementation Plan Framework".

2. *What progress has the Navy Department made so far in addressing this recommendation?*

The Navy has established the Office of Women's Policy; monitored representation in Navy Personnel Command staff; used diversity statistics in promotion board Record of Proceedings; tracked demographics of board membership and expanded post-board statistics to ensure Navy has a standardized, equitable, and transparent

promotion selection process; partnered with affinity groups, specifically the Sea Services Leadership Association to host the Joint Women's Leadership Symposium that targets the recruitment and retention of women in the Navy; and conducted Navy Community Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion conferences that addressed female retention and recruitment efforts. Recent examples include: NAVIFOR, CNAF, and CNSF DEI Conferences. After action reports based on attendee feedback informed actions taken/policy regarding female recruitment and retention, mentoring, and barrier analysis.

3. *What actions has the Navy taken, and what actions is the Navy planning to take, to improve recruitment and retention of female service members?*

Starting in Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, the Navy increased the aspirational goal from 25% to 30% for female accessions. This would increase female accessions by 1,500 for FY23. We currently have 20.5% women serving in both the active and Reserve components, an increase of 1% since release of GAO report. We are working to complete female officer and enlisted submarine integration for the SSBN platforms. At the end of FY 2021, 23 crews were integrated with officers and 10 crews with enlisted. Naval Special Warfare continues to synchronize recruiting and accession efforts with Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC), Recruit Training Command (RTC), and Naval Service Training Command (NSTC). All required NSW facility and supply preparation requirements have been met and Commander, Naval Special Warfare Center (COMNAVSPECWARCEN), is prepared for the arrival of female Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) and Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewman (SWCC) candidates. As of January 2021, NSW maintains four permanent billets for Women in Special Operations Forces (WISOF) cadre and the cadre are integrated into all phases of training and selections to normalize female presence, participation, and contributions, including SEAL Officer Assessment and Selections (SOAS). In 2021, the NSW Force Integration Officer was added to the SOAS cadre due to the need for additional female cadre presence and support.

Ms. SPEIER. ADM Gilday, GAO has found that the surface fleet is undermanned by about 15%, and we understand that about 5,000 sea billets in the forward-deployed fleet are unfilled, and in addition to these issues, sometimes billets that are filled have the improper fit. How will the Navy's proposed plan to decommission ships affect undermanning? Will the crews from the decommissioned ships be reallocated to remaining ships in the fleet to improve fit and fill? If Congress allows the Navy to proceed with its decommissioning proposal, by how much will manning improve in the next two years? What other actions is the Navy taking to address undermanning and improper fit?

Admiral GILDAY. Personnel onboard ships proposed to decommission will be rebilleted to meet their individual sea/shore rotation requirements as well as Fleet Readiness needs

Navy's principal focus on this issue remains unchanged and increasing manning levels across the surface fleet is a strategic objective for the Navy. We are using a variety of Force Management tools to attack this issue, including:

- Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay, Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP) and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
- Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea duty and curtailing shore duty tours).

We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the Perform to Plan—Human Resources process to address a wide range of issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary incentives, non-monetary incentives and early advancement opportunities for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.

We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements. These efforts—combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and funding total ownership cost will ensure we have the Sailors to support the Navy the Nation needs.

Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning and other enablers such as Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to recruiting, training, retention and improved talent management.

Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully and properly manned, with the right Sailor, in the right place, at the right time, with the right training. The number of Sailors on operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have 10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017.

Ms. SPEIER. ADM Gilday, the Army has fully implemented a Commander Assessment Program to improve the selection process for battalion and brigade commanders, using a suite of assessments including, most importantly, a behavioral interview and a survey of peers and subordinates about leadership behaviors. I am encouraged that Naval Special Warfare has also fully implemented a similar program for selecting commanders, and the Commandant has stated his intention to implement a similar commander assessment program across the Marine Corps. I understand that the U.S. Navy surface warfare and submarine communities are conducting pilots to test using a more thorough assessment before selecting commanders. Given repeated news about ship COs being relieved for climate issues and toxic leadership, it seems to me that a more thorough command selection process should be a high priority for the Navy.

What have been the results so far of the Navy's pilots of a commander assessment program?

Do you agree that the commander selection process in the Navy must be improved, and how do you intend to improve commander selection?

Would you commit to implementing an approach similar to the Army's commander assessment program across the entire Navy, including use of surveys of peers and subordinates about leadership behaviors, and accelerating implementation of such a program?

Admiral GILDAY. Navy is committed to implementing an approach similar to the Army's Commander Assessment Program (CAP). The Navy Leadership Assessment Program (NLAP) is this program and is currently in the testing and development phases across the Navy—within Type Commands (TYCOM) (e.g. Aviation, Surface, Submarines, and Naval Special Warfare) and other officer communities. Assessment and selection programs have proven beneficial in the Department of Defense Special Operations communities as well as the civilian corporate sector for decades. Assessment and selection programs save costs, increase retention, decrease incidents of misconduct, and increase productivity with data-driven decision making using valid and reliable assessments. NLAP is intended to augment the existing command selection process to inform leadership decision making and drive talent management. The continued development of NLAP will increase the Navy's likelihood of placing those who possess the right attributes for essential command positions and passing on those who are less suited (e.g., toxic, weak, ineffective officers and leaders). This will lead to better command environments and a better Navy culture as a whole.

Navy has completed pilots with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Commander, Naval Submarine Force (SUBFOR). Navy Personnel Command's Operational Psychologist was the primary consultant in the development of Navy Special Warfare's (NSW) NLAP during the initial pilots in early 2021 and has provided ongoing consultation as the program reaches maturity. Additional pilots are planned for this summer with Commander, Naval Surface Force (SURFOR), Commander, Naval Air Forces (AIRFOR), the Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) community, and the Human Resources (HR) community. Each pilot will include cognitive and non-cognitive assessments, interviews by trained operational psychologists, and a formal interview panel chaired by TYCOM and community commanders/leaders. NSW and SUBFOR have developed, and are validating, peer and subordinate surveys that will be piloted in each TYCOM and officer community NLAP pilot. Lessons learned from each pilot iteration enable refinement of the assessment process and validate the utility of the program. The Navy is moving forward at pace with NLAP.

Ms. SPEIER. ADM Gilday, during the hearing it was made clear that the Navy does not have the cyber force that it needs. I understand that the Navy is short of active-duty cyber officers in the grades of O-4 to O-6. Yet, I was briefed earlier this year that the Navy had not utilized the lateral-entry constructive credit authority to commission any active-duty cyber officers. This authority, created by Sec. 502 of the FY19 NDAA, was created to help the services address this problem by accessing experienced technical talent, including cybersecurity experts, from the private sector and commissioning them at an advanced rank. The Army has aggressively used these authorities to fill active-duty cyber security needs, and I understand that the Air Force is beginning to establish a direct commissioning program for active-duty cyber officers using this authority.

Why has the Navy failed to use the Sec. 502 authority to fill its active-duty cyber officer gaps, and does the Navy plan to begin using this authority, and what is the Navy's goal for number of accessions under this authority? If not, does the Navy face barriers to using this authority that require congressional action to correct, and

if so, please indicate what the Navy needs from Congress to successfully use this authority to meet the Navy's cybersecurity needs.

Admiral GILDAY. The Secretary of the Navy expanded the use of constructive service credit for active component cyber warfare engineers (CWE) and engineering duty officers (EDO).

For most officer communities, initial specialty training and qualifications earned in the junior officer grades offset the need and desire to direct commission individuals to ranks other than ensign. The Navy desires to use constructive service credit for CWEs and EDOs, but did not find individuals in fiscal year 2021 with advanced training, experience, and education that desire to join the Navy and meet military service-entry requirements.

While there is no specified constructive credit accession quota, there is no limit, percentage wise, for accessions to receive constructive credit if their education/experience meets all the requirements for constructive service credit.

Navy has no barriers utilizing constructive service credit when a candidate meets all requirements; therefore no Congressional action is requested.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. Is Navy and/or Marine Corps exploring directed energy counter-UAS solutions to include lasers and high power microwave technology?

Secretary DEL TORO. Directed Energy (DE) weapons include both High Energy Lasers (HEL) and High Power Microwaves (HPM) and offer a number of compelling attributes for military missions, including precision engagement and deep magazine. The Navy's primary interest is to use DE to enhance Area and Terminal Defense against Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) and enable more effective use of conventional weapons for both ship defense and offensive strike, as well as providing cost-effective solutions to swarm UAV and FAC-FIAC attack. In addition, both the Navy and Marine Corps are evaluating the potential utility of DE for counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (c-UAS).

The Navy has been maturing laser technologies while conducting rapid prototyping to accelerate DE fleet integration and operational experimentation, with 9 systems fielded on ships by 2023. Example Navy laser efforts with c-UAS implications include:

- Mk 5 Mod 0 High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) and Solid State Laser—Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) are high power lasers that can defeat unmanned aerial systems and counter fast-attack surface craft. SSL-TM was deployed on USS PORTLAND in 2021/2022 and HELIOS is being installed on USS PREBLE for deployment in 2023.
- AN/SEQ-4 Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN) is a low power laser to dazzle threat UAS sensors. Eight ODIN units are being installed and deployed on DDG51 combatants by 2023 to address urgent operational needs in 5th and 7th fleet.
- The Layered Laser Defense (LLD) project was a Navy partnership with Lockheed Martin which demonstrated tracking of UAS targets and defeat of a subsonic target drone (representing an ASCM threat) at the High Energy Laser System Test Facility (HELSTF) at White Sands Missile Range in February 2022.

For HPM, the focus of Navy and Marine Corps applications is for semi-fixed or mobile c-UAS capability that is scalable from tactical vehicles to various ship classes, low-cost, and effective across a wide variety of potential UAS threats. ONR is pursuing a number of technology approaches, including systems based on conventional vacuum tubes as well as solid-state transmitters that offer enhanced frequency agility.

Mr. SCOTT. Are you committed to opening the new National Museum of the U.S. Navy in the vicinity of the Washington Navy Yard and accessible to the general public in time for the U.S. Navy's 250th birthday on October 13, 2025?

Secretary DEL TORO. Per 10 U.S.C. § 8617, the Department of the Navy is in the process of entering into an agreement with the National Museum Development Foundation (NMDF) to support the development, design, construction, renovation, or operation of a multipurpose museum campus to house the National Museum of the United States Navy. Subject to compliance with environmental requirements, the Navy's goal is to hold a major milestone ribbon cutting and groundbreaking event for Phase 1 of the project on the Navy's Birthday in 2025.

Mr. SCOTT. Rear Admiral Kiril Mihaylov, Commander of the Bulgarian Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings, "The completely transformed security situation in the Black Sea region presents new tasks for the Bulgarian Navy that

require additional capabilities.” Is the United States Navy prepared to help the Bulgarian Navy with developing new naval capabilities?

Admiral GILDAY. The United States Navy is fully prepared to work with the Bulgarian Navy in developing new naval capabilities. Our Navy team is actively engaged with the Bulgarian Navy—a recent example being a 6–10 June 2022 NAVEUR-led assistance visit. Efforts include development of enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness and Undersea Awareness, as well as the refinement of additional capabilities requested by the Bulgarian Navy. Capabilities such as integrated Maritime Domain Awareness in the Black Sea lie squarely in our national interests. In order to develop this Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability, we need sustained (i.e., reliable and programmable) and sufficient (i.e., adequate to address the full spectrum of MDA) security cooperation funding with tightly aligned Title 10 and Title 22 funds.

Mr. SCOTT. Captain Giedrius Premeneckas, Commander-in-Chief, Lithuanian Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings, “Fulfilling the maritime state’s vital interests and being an equal NATO partner are the priorities of today to face future challenges and threats.” What is the United States Navy doing to help the Lithuanian Navy face future challenges and threats?

Admiral GILDAY. We have a significant security cooperation effort with the Lithuanian Navy. Its shared border with Kaliningrad, highlights the necessity that our maritime security efforts in Lithuania are part of a regional approach. Our significant U.S. Navy presence and a number of programs are designed to support the development of increased Lithuanian Navy capability and interoperability with allies and partners. These include Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives (SSCIs) to develop greater MDA, modernize their Mine Counter Measures Capability (MCM) and increase interoperability. We are aggressively pursuing operations, activities and investments to build a Navy capable of contributing to a regional approach that will not only counter Russian malign activity but increase long term regional security. In order to be successful, we need sustained (i.e., reliable and programmable) and sufficient (i.e., adequate to address the full spectrum of MDA) security cooperation funding with tightly aligned Title 10 (i.e., SSCI) and Title 22 funds.

Mr. SCOTT. Rear Admiral Rune Andersen, Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy, wrote in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings, “... we need to build a bridge to the future, and this includes figuring out the risks and opportunities offered by emerging and potentially disruptive technologies.” What plans does the U.S. Navy have to cooperate with the Royal Norwegian Navy on figuring out the risks and opportunities offered by emerging and potentially disruptive technologies?

Admiral GILDAY. Norway, the United States and 11 other countries are signatories of the Anti-Submarine Warfare London Technology Bridge Initiative to develop a deployable Anti-Submarine Warfare Barrier. This initiative will kick off this summer and drive specific challenges to industry. Additionally, Norway is a participating member in the Office of Naval Research led program for International Cooperative Engagement Program for Polar Research. This program includes research areas such as environmental monitoring, communications, navigation and ice hardening.

Mr. SCOTT. 2022 marks the 500th anniversary of the Royal Swedish Navy. What plans does the U.S. Navy to commemorate this historic anniversary of the Royal Swedish Navy?

Admiral GILDAY. U.S. Navy commemoration of the 500th Anniversary of the Swedish Navy included a port visit by four warships and the participation of the 6th FLEET Commander Vice Admiral Gene Black in the ceremony marking the event. All four ships then participated in Exercise BALTOPS, along with ships from the Swedish Navy and other NATO and partner nations. In addition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hosted the Swedish Minister of Defense aboard USS KEARSARGE in port Stockholm.

Mr. SCOTT. Commander Jihoon Yu, Republic of Korea Navy, and Erik French, wrote an article in the May 2022 issue of Proceedings entitled, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance as an Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnership: Traditionally land-based, the U.S.-ROK partnership should adopt a maritime focus for the modern era.” According to the authors, “A larger naval presence led by a higher-ranking U.S. naval commander would strengthen the relationship between the two navies.” Would permanently homeporting several U.S. surface combatants at the ROK naval base in Jeju enhance ties between the ROK Navy and the U.S. Navy?

Admiral GILDAY. The Navy is constantly assessing its force posture in regards to handling future security threats. Our current force posture in Northeast Asia provides the U.S. sufficient ability to respond to contingencies while sustaining a forward-deployed and ready naval force. There are presently no plans to permanently homeport any U.S. Navy surface combatants in the ROK naval base in Jeju or any

changes to the USN command structure in ROK. Annual reviews of USN force structure in company with USINDOPACOM posture reviews allows us to ensure our current laydown is tailored for today's security challenges.

Mr. SCOTT. Will the ROK Navy and the U.S. Navy conduct naval exercises farther from ROK shores, working alongside one another in blue-water environments along SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea? Moreover, will these exercises be focused on an expanding range of activities, beginning with simple passing-and-maneuver exercises and growing to encompass underway replenishment, interdiction, antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and surface warfare?

Admiral GILDAY. COMPACFLT intends to support the ROK Navy in expanding its operations throughout the USINDOPACOM AOR and encourages it to continue expanding its participation in naval exercises farther from ROK shores in support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. COMPACFLT also encourages the ROK Navy, under its Look South policy, to join in exercises or operations in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea; and we hope this will be realized in the coming year. In 2022, COMPACFLT has already been able to obtain ROK Navy participation in at least 5 exercises, occurring outside of the Korean Peninsula.

Mr. SCOTT. Is the Navy using the right processes, standards, and policies to build and deploy an unmanned fleet?

Admiral GILDAY. The Navy continues to drive the advancement of unmanned systems into the fleet architectures for today and the future. We remain committed to documenting, developing, and iterating the processes, standards, and policies based on our campaign of learning devoted to understanding the systems of systems approaches necessary to field new and emerging capabilities into robust fleet assets.

Our ongoing efforts in the development of Unmanned Maritime Autonomy Architecture (UMAA), Rapid Autonomy Integration Labs (RAIL), as well as U.S. and NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG) all support the balance of rigor and flexibility needed to advance unmanned systems (platforms and software) at scale and pace. The development of these architectures, standards, and processes continue to leverage industry partners at all stages to ensure we understand the needs of all our stakeholders from the fleet to our industry partners.

Mr. SCOTT. What concerns does Industry have with the Navy's ABS certification and MOSA for U.S. Shipbuilding?

Admiral GILDAY. Industry is concerned about both the draft status of the ABS certification process and the level of effort required to achieve the certification. Industry is currently engaging with the Navy and ABS to initiate the certification process for their concept designs to begin to mitigate those concerns and mature the process.

The Navy is primarily using a Modular Open Systems Approach for the development of the autonomy software across platforms using Unmanned Maritime Autonomy Architecture (UMAA) standards. Industry is heavily involved in the development of the UMAA standard and the integration/testing across U.S. Industry sees the value in an open architecture which allows parallel development of severable modules such that no single vendor/capability constrains the advancement of other modules by other industry partners.

Mr. SCOTT. What feedback can industry provide the Navy's request for owning the interfaces, data rights, and the highly reliable/sustainable systems?

Admiral GILDAY. For unmanned surface and undersea systems, the Navy is pursuing a government-owned autonomy software with applicable government-purpose data rights for critical interfaces to support validation of cybersecurity requirements, reduce overall programmatic and acquisition expenditures, increase the pool of potential software vendors outside traditional Department of Defense contractors, and increase the rate at which software can be reused and redeployed across a portfolio of unmanned maritime vehicles. This approach has been successfully adopted and accepted in other Navy advanced technology areas, for example, in both surface ship combat systems (AEGIS Weapon System and Ship Self-Defense System) and for Submarine Warfare Federated Tactical Systems. The Navy remains open to hearing and understanding industry's perspective and will continue to collaborate with industry to strike the right balance in government/industry data and configuration ownership.

Mr. SCOTT. Should industry and the government look at different development, test, and evaluation business models for autonomy?

Admiral GILDAY. The government has been pursuing a government-owned autonomy software baseline that supports the development, test, and evaluation of unmanned maritime vehicles. In the scope of this work, the government and industry are working together to support standards development for unmanned ships via the Unmanned Maritime Autonomy Architecture (UMAA). Based off industry feedback, the UMAA Standards Board has divided interface capability requirements into a stable set of core services and those services which are experimental in nature. The

set of core services address foundational elements for autonomous vessel mission accomplishment while the experimental services require additional testing, feedback, and validation from industry and government partners before transitioning into the set of core services. The industry and government collaboration on this shared effort has been critical for the overall success of unmanned maritime vehicles to date, and the Navy continues to explore further models that can satisfy all stakeholder's interests in the future.

Mr. SCOTT. Does NAVSEA have the necessary engineering and technical depth to evaluate and build these new unmanned ships?

Admiral GILDAY. Yes—the Navy has core expertise in the areas of shipbuilding, program management, and vehicle systems engineering. However, the Navy is leveraging expertise across industry, academia, and other government to evaluate and build new unmanned ships. A collaborative approach is critical for developing the standards and state-of-the-art systems required to field unmanned ships.

Mr. SCOTT. Are versatile, robotic submarines a potential game-changer in the Western Pacific?

Admiral GILDAY. In order for the United States Navy to retain our strategic maritime advantage, we must increase our capabilities to include faster decision making, tactical reach and endurance while minimizing risk to our personnel. The Navy recognizes that unmanned systems, autonomy and artificial intelligence play a key part in future Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) for all phases of military operations. As outlined in the Unmanned Campaign Framework, the Navy will continue to develop and expand its Fleet of unmanned vehicles to deliver affordable, scalable, lethal and connected capabilities.

Specifically, in the undersea domain, unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) serve as versatile autonomous platforms, operating in a dispersed manner and offering the flexibility the evolving threat environment demands. UUVs will go farther, deeper and endure longer in extremely harsh conditions in order to deter and deliver lethal and non-lethal effects. A hybrid fleet of manned/unmanned capabilities is necessary to execute the full range of undersea operations to both meet emerging security concerns, and provide persistent presence ensuring undersea dominance in our Future Fleet.

Mr. SCOTT. What can be done to expedite the deployment of an unmanned fleet?

Admiral GILDAY. The Navy has generated a cross-functional team (Unmanned Task Force) charged with identifying and pressing through barriers, solving near-term operational problems, and supporting the future hybrid force in concert with the Operational, Acquisition, and Research enterprises.

The current approach includes an aggressive campaign of learning with a focus on rapid and risk-worthy experimentation, as well as driving down limiting factors in order to field our future unmanned capabilities. A risk-appropriate approach to fielding small and disruptive systems today enables us to take an evolutionary approach to develop and scale the major investments of the hybrid fleet of tomorrow.

We, as a nation, will need to continue to execute the campaign of learning as a priority. We must remain dedicated to rigorous systems engineering efforts, grow our data and model based systems engineering capabilities, prove mature technology in land based testing environments, mature standards and policies in partnership with industry, demonstrate responsible fiscal agility, and experiment in forward operational environments with real time feedback. With a deliberate approach, we will expedite unmanned capabilities today and in the future.

Mr. SCOTT. How would you assess the ability of U.S. maritime vessels, from a destroyer to a carrier, to defend against Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) overflight and/or attacks? In which AORs have these threats been most prevalent on deployment?

Admiral GILDAY. The U.S. Navy has employed systems to find, fix, track, and aid in the assessment of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to determine the classification and identification of potential threats. Once a threat determination is made, depending on the class of ship, countermeasures can be employed to deny or defeat the UAS threat as appropriate. The Navy's operational approach to countering UAS at sea is to bin U.S. vessels by capability depending on their mission and operating area.

While most threats of weaponized UAS are in the Central and Indo-Pacific Combatant Command areas of operation, UAS technology is prevalent on a global scale. For state actors with significant UAS capabilities, Iran, Russia, and China all have credible UAS forces.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the Navy's strategy and timeline to competitively procure a live, virtual and constructive aviation training solution which will be joint, interoperable, and open to coalition partners? Has an independent Government Cost Estimate been conducted to verify Tactical Combat Training System (TCTS) II Base-

line estimates to deliver Synthetic Inject to Live—Live Virtual Constructive (SITL LVC) capability? When will the TCTS II program receive its NSA accreditation for its encryptor and Cross Domain solution? Does TCTS II have the capability to connect live aircraft to fleet simulators or the Next Generation Threat System?

Admiral GILDAY. 1. *What is the Navy's strategy and timeline to competitively procure a live, virtual and constructive aviation training solution which will be joint, interoperable, and open to coalition partners?*

- The TCTS II contract was awarded in 2017, following a full and open competition. TCTS II is the Joint selected program of record (PoR) for the USN, USMC, and USAF, enabling interoperability across the Services' training and test ranges. TCTS II provides critical LVC technologies, such as a National Security Agency (NSA) Type 1 encryptor, 4-channel multilevel security, an LVC capable waveform, and Synthetic Inject to Live (SITL) capabilities, and will achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in late 2022.
- The TCTS II program will incorporate additional LVC and SITL technologies developed by the joint test community and advanced technology demonstrations, with projected fielding updates to TCTS II systems in FY25. The program has received interest from coalition partners and is diligently working with Navy Security Programs Office and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions and Sustainment (OUSD (A&S)) Office of International Cooperation on exportability requirements for TCTS II.
- The Navy has identified Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) training as a critical warfighting enabler. Naval aviation is supporting the Navy's LVC NAVPLAN Implementation Framework (NIF) through multiple efforts, to include Naval Aviation Distributed Mission Training (NADMT), the Integrated Training Facility (ITF), Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE), and training range investments. Another key portion of the Navy's broader LVC environment includes the Tactical Combat Training System Increment II (TCTS II).

2. *Has an independent Government Cost Estimate been conducted to verify Tactical Combat Training System (TCTS) II Baseline estimates to deliver Synthetic Inject to Live Virtual Constructive (SITL LVC) capability?*

- Yes, Independent government cost estimates were conducted in support of TCTS II IOC capabilities at Milestone C in 2020. TCTS II's open systems architecture enables affordable incorporation of additional LVC capabilities. Government estimates on additional LVC and SITL technologies developed by the joint test community and advanced technology demonstrations were completed to support Navy budget plans.
 - TCTS II delivers SITL capabilities that allow mission operators to inject constructive threats into the secure, advanced training environment.
3. *When will the TCTS II program receive its NSA accreditation for its encryptor and Cross Domain solution?*
- The NSA certified the KOV-74 encryptor used by TCTS II in 2014. The program is updating the KOV-74 to the KOV-74A to allow Over-the-Network Keying capability, and updated NSA certification is on track to complete July 2022. Cross Domain Solution (CDS) certification will be issued in July 2022 after completion of the Site Based Security Assessment. The Navy Cross Domain Solution Office is the CDS certification agency.

4. *Does TCTS II have the capability to connect live aircraft to fleet simulators or the Next Generation Threat System?*

- Yes, TCTS II utilizes the Next Generation Threat System (NGTS) and can connect live aircraft to fleet simulators. Last year TCTS II, demonstrated its capability to connect to the NCTE, the USS Bainbridge (in training mode), and the Joint Semi Automated Forces (JSAF) system. In 2022, TCTS II demonstrated ability to connect to an E-2D fleet simulator, an F/A-18 fleet simulator, an F-35 effects-based simulator, the Link Inject to Live (SITL) system including NGTS, and Naval Aviation Distributed Training Center (NADTC) Atlantic.

Mr. SCOTT. The Navy Installations Command recently released a report on the use of fireboats during the Bonhomme Richard fire and noted that there was sufficient coverage in Navy ports. The Maritime Administration has a program to work with local fire departments in how to fight fires on board their ships in reduced lay-up, with minimal crew on board and not all ship systems operational. Has the Navy coordinated with the Maritime Administration to determine how to best use tug boats and fireboats, and how a true fireboat differs from conventional yard tugs?

Admiral GILDAY. The Navy is aware of MARAD's firefighting program to work with local fire departments to fight fires on board their ships in reduced lay-up, with minimal crew on board and not all ship systems operational. The Navy has organic waterborne firefighting capability in the form of civilian and contracted tugs to accommodate reduced crew size and ship condition. In addition to its organic capa-

bility, the Navy is able leverage local fire departments' capabilities via mutual aid agreements.

The Navy also understands the prime differences between fireboats and conventional yard tugs. Although some fireboats do have an increased pump capacity as compared to tugs, even this increased capacity does not address the underlying issue of their inability to fight fires internal to a vessel in order to stop a total loss. The Navy assesses that it is able to meet required firefighting capability through a combination of Government owned assets and tugs under contract with the Navy.

Mr. SCOTT. The Maritime Administration recently purchased two former U.S.-flagged roll-on/roll-off ships from American Roll-on/Roll-off Carriers (ARC) that were 24 years old for approximately \$50 million. At the same time, the Military Sealift Command and MARAD removed from service two of the oldest Large Medium Speed Ro/Ros converted in the 1990s and three former Maritime Prepositioning Ships. ARC's parent company, Wallenius, is now building replacement vessels in China. Is the Department of Defense plan for sealift recapitalization merely to buy used ships to replace larger and more numerous vessels in the surge fleet while at the same time subsidizing the Chinese shipyard program? Is there any plans that foresee the construction of new sealift vessels in U.S. shipyards?

Admiral GILDAY. The Department of the Navy is committed to the procurement of used commercial Roll-on/Roll-Off vessels as the fastest and most economical strategy to replace reserve sealift ships that are reaching the end of their planned service lives. 70% of these platforms are planned to be retired by 2040 and 10.6 million square feet of lift capacity will be recapitalized over the next 30 years. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) is executing the used-ship procurement line of effort that the Secretary of the Navy detailed in the March 2018 Report to Congress "Sealift That the Nation Needs." The Department's sealift recapitalization plan includes three separate, but related, efforts to: 1) extend the service life of the most viable sealift vessels, 2) purchase used vessels to replace surge sealift and 3) focus on new construction in U.S. shipyards to replace afloat prepositioning ship capabilities. In Q3FY22, MARAD purchased the first two used vessels from the Maritime Security Program (MSP). 10 U.S. Code 2218; National Defense Sealift Fund, prioritizes the purchase of MSP vessels over non-U.S. flagged foreign-built vessels. MSP vessels are the preferred vessels to replace retiring surge sealift because they are already U.S. flagged, American Bureau of Shipbuilding (ABS) classified, have proven military utility and meet required sealift Operational Requirement Document (ORD) square footage capacity.

Yes, there are plans that foresee the construction of new sealift vessels in U.S. shipyards. The Navy is developing capability requirements for new construction sealift T-AK/AKR ships, with lead ship procurements planned after 2027 to replace afloat pre-positioning ships which begin retiring in 2030. Navy would seek proposals from U.S. shipbuilders to construct these vessels.

Mr. SCOTT. A U.S. Navy officer told gCaptain [sic] that "The U.S. has less than 80 commercial ships in international service, while China has over 5,500 merchant ships sailing today." What happens if China issues Javelin type missiles to each commercial ship? What would happen if China issued a portable missile to each of the 122,034 Chinese seafarers serving on all types of ships?

Admiral GILDAY. The Javelin missile is a crew served anti-tank weapon that is optically sighted and possesses limited range. Equipping merchant ship crews with Javelin type missiles would have limited utility in maritime conflict although such missiles could potentially be useful against irregular threats such as pirates. Equipping over 120,000 merchant sailors with Javelin type missiles would require significant investments in terms of both the acquisition of the systems and the training of the crews to employ the weapons and would likely not be worth the costs in money and time. While arming PRC merchant ship crews with Javelin type missiles could be justified as necessary for self-defense against irregular threats such as pirates and thus not a violation of international law, there could be implications for insurance rates or access to commercial ports due concerns of the threat posed by armed merchant ship crews. This is why commercial shipping lines tend to not arm crew members, even when their ships sail in waters trafficked by pirates, such as the Gulf of Aden.

Mr. SCOTT. How many large commercial ships does China have? How difficult would it be for them to weaponize these ships?

Admiral GILDAY. According to commercial sources, the PRC has approximately 11,000 China-owned oceangoing commercial vessels of which approximately 7,000 are China-flagged oceangoing commercial vessels. However, ships that are Chinese owned but not Chinese flagged may have multi-national crews. There are also approximately 2,700 Hong Kong flagged merchant ships of all types. The 2016 Na-

tional Transportation Law permits all China owned merchant ships to be used by the People's Liberation Army.

The Chinese could put containerized missiles on merchant ships if they chose to do so. According to some sources the Chinese are designing and marketing a variant of the YJ-18 cruise missile that can be fired from shipping containers, similar to systems designed and marketed by Russia and Israel. However, arming merchant ships in this manner has implications under international law. Under the Hague Convention, arming merchant ships with weapons beyond those required to defend the ship against threats such as pirates or terrorists requires the ship to be:

- Placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the State whose flag it flies.
- Bear the external marks that distinguish the warships of their nationality.
- Under the command of a duly commissioned officer in the service of the State whose name is on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet
- Manned by a crew subject to military discipline.

If the Chinese were to covertly employ missile armed merchant ships in wartime, they would be guilty of Perfidy under the laws of armed conflict and they would forfeit their protected status as civilian vessels. Additionally, even employing a small number of merchant ships as missile shooters in wartime would make all Chinese-flagged container ships at sea or in port legally targetable given the inability of an adversary to accurately determine whether the ships have a containerized missile system onboard until the weapon system is employed.

Navy Recognition, China is Building Long-Range Cruise Missiles Launched from Ship Containers—<https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/naval-news/naval-news-archive/2019/april/6971-china-is-building-long-range-cruise-missiles-launched-from-ship-containers.html> US Naval War College, China's Container Missile Deployments Could Violate the Law of Naval Warfare—<https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2982&context=ils>

Mr. SCOTT. How many commercial mariners are enrolled in the Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, or Naval Academy?

Admiral GILDAY. There are no commercial mariners enrolled at the Naval War College, Naval Postgraduate School, or United States Naval Academy.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the status of the updates to the online Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships?

Admiral GILDAY. In September 2021, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) declared DANFS “severely out of date.” HASC also directed SECNAV to brief HASC by March 2022 on “efforts to update the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships” to include “at a minimum: (1) timeline; (2) scope of project; and (3) existing and proposed budget needed to update the Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships within five years.”

CURRENT STATUS: There are ~11,238 DANFS entries. Each entry represents the Navy's official history of a specific ship. Formerly published in hardback books, the entries are now available on the NHHHC website. 71% of these are complete; both new and/or updated. The other 29% require significant updates including 125 vessels which are missing entirely.

BACKGROUND: One of the driving factors behind Navy's decision to establish NHHHC was the need to address 60 years of systemic neglect of Navy's history and heritage assets. From 1971 until NHHHC was stood up in 2008—work on DANFS had stopped. In 2013 HASC made a request to Navy regarding the speed at which DANFS could be made current. CNO Greenert directed additional funding for DANFS be provided to NHHHC: \$2,160,000 per annum; \$10,800,000 total. However, from 2016 to 2021 NHHHC OPTAR was cut 71%—from ~\$19M to \$6.3M. As a result only \$1.7M of the additional \$10.8M in additional OPTAR for DANFS restoration made it to NHHHC. NHHHC reprogramed an additional \$3.04M in NHHHC CIVPERS towards the DANFS effort. The result was a 25% restoration of DANFS to Navy standards. Additional funding for DANFS was terminated in 2021 because of the 71% decline in OPTAR.

RESTORED FUNDING: CNO Gilday directed a funding increase for NHHHC across the FYDP to ensure NHHHC was mission capable. The DANFS restoration now has stable funding of ~\$500K per annum in OPTAR and ~\$264K in CIVPERS assigned to the project. This level of funding establishes a trajectory that allows NHHHC to have an additional 271 entries, approximately 6.6% of the total original backlog plus ~48 ships scheduled to be decommissioned, completed by 2028 for a total of 77.6% complete.

ESTIMATES TO ELIMINATE DANFS BACKLOG COAs: NHHHC has completed analysis of DANFS completion; starting with the current funding profile, for consideration by Navy Leadership and the POM process.

Five Year Plan: Current trajectory, based on restored funding levels, the following progress is planned for the next five years: (77.6% Complete)

- Elimination of all missing entries by the end of FY27.
- Completion of all entries for battleships and at least 50% of all carriers by end of FY27.
- Entries published for all ships scheduled to be decommissioned (~48 ships)

Five Year Plan: To complete DANFS updates and properly process additional ships as they decommission: (100% Completed)

- Proposed budget: \$6.3M–7.1M per annum (\$31.5M–35.5M total)/45 Additional Personnel
- Backlog eliminated by end of FY27.
- The challenge associated with a five year effort, in addition to the cost, is the physical limitations of the archives. The archives classified and unclassified spaces cannot support 45 additional people as currently configured.

Ten Year Plan: Elimination of DANFS backlog can be achieved in 10 years with an increase in personnel. Prioritization of work allows for ship histories with the highest demand to be completed first. (100% Completed)

- Estimated cost 2.1M–2.4M per annum/13 Additional Personnel
- Year 1: All Battleships completed.
- Year 2: All Missing ships, Carriers, and Cruisers completed
- Year 3–5: ~70% of all destroyers completed OR all Frigates, Submarines, Amphibious, and Misc. Combatant Vessels.
- Year 6–7: All Combatant and Amphibious vessels completed.
- Year 8–10: All Mine Warfare, Patrol, Auxiliary, and Miscellaneous vessels completed.
- Backlog complete.

Twenty Year Plan: Backlog reduction can be achieved within 20 years utilizing fewer personnel.

- Estimated cost 1.3M–1.5M per annum/8 Additional Personnel.

Mr. SCOTT. How can the U.S. Navy expect to collect and document its operations for use by future historians if the Naval History & Heritage Command's reserve unit is disestablished?

Admiral GILDAY. The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) will continue to be responsible for preserving, analyzing, and disseminating U.S. naval history and heritage. NHHC will work with the Director of the Navy Staff (DNS) to determine the most effective and efficient construct to fulfill the mission requirements of the Navy's historical programs. With respect to the Navy's responsibilities under 44 U.S. Code Chapter 31 and the supporting document SECNAV M-5210.1: DON Records Management Manual the Navy understands its mission:

- Establishes Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC) as the primary repository for almost all Navy records; OPNAV; Unit Histories/Deck Logs/Action Reports; Command Histories; & Historical Records/Program management.
- "At the conclusion of periods of crisis, contingency, or armed conflict, it is necessary to analyze fully the actions and reactions of both friendly and hostile forces across the full spectrum of the operation."
- "In order to accomplish this rigorous operations analysis, full and complete documentation of all phases of the operation, including all Intel, climatic, and other info available to a command, must be preserved and transferred to the activity designated to perform this analysis."
- "This analysis assesses the effectiveness of weapons/tactics, suggests improvements tested in actual combat, determines adjustments to force composition, and justifies future budget decisions."
- "At the conclusion of the operations, it is equally important that relevant Navy documentation be sent to the NHHC and Marine Corps documentation be sent to the Director of Marine Corps History so that the official histories and historical analysis can be prepared."

With respect to specific responsibilities regarding the execution of the mission OPNAVINST 5750.4E: Navy Historical Programs tasks:

- Director Navy Staff (DNS): "Responsibilities: DNS shall ensure that Navy organizations that produce, collect, analyze, or disseminate historically significant information implement appropriate procedures to preserve such information, especially that relating to lessons-learned from Navy exercises and combat operations." And
- Director Naval History and Heritage Command (DNHHC): "Responsibilities: NHHC Director shall assist the operational commands and the shore establishment in inculcating an understanding and appreciation of naval history and is responsible, as detailed in references (a) through (p), for the following aspects of the Navy's overall historical program:

(7) Deployment of historical documentation teams to fleet units and other Navy commands to collect historical records and information on significant Navy operations and activities.”

Action: NHHC has prepared four courses of action (COAs) for DNS consideration for the execution of the Navy’s mission requirements to document history in order to accomplish this rigorous operations analysis, full and complete documentation of all phases of the operation, including all intel, climatic, and other info available to a command, must be preserved and transferred to the activity designated to perform this analysis.

Action: DNS has established a working group to analyze the COAs and determine the most effective and efficient construct to fulfill the Navy’s mission requirements.

Mr. SCOTT. Is the Marine Corps prepared to help destroy electronic super-highways to allow resistance forces to survive and fight another day?

General BERGER. The Marine Corps remains prepared to enable the full spectrum of cyberspace operations. This includes the planning and direction of defensive cyberspace operations in support of Marine Corps, Joint and Coalition Forces, and, when authorized or directed, the ability to direct offensive cyberspace operations in support of Joint and Coalition Forces. This will ensure our ability to gain and exploit information in both the information and physical domains, while denying competitors those same advantages.

Mr. SCOTT. What are the current plans for the Maritime Pre-positioning Program in the Marine Corps? Will the Marines maintain two squadrons—one at Diego Garcia and another in the western Pacific? If the program is going to be phased down from 3 to 2 to 1 squadron, what does that mean for the depots at Blount Island and Albany?

General BERGER. To answer your first question, in order to balance FY23 funding reductions, combined with the existing funding shortfalls in FY21 and FY22, in response to current funding levels, the Navy identified a requirement to place five of our twelve Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships in Reduced Operating Status. Our long-term plan is for MPF Next Generation to recapitalize two squadrons of afloat lift.

Updated MPF Planning Guidance published in February 2022 aims to maximize capability afloat and divide the risk between INDOPACOM and Tri-COM. The updated guidance captures the Service decision to retain two squadrons with four ships in Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPSRON)—3 at Guam and a three-ship Crisis Response Force Package in MPSRON-2 at Diego Garcia.

Having reduced from three to two squadrons in 2011, a further reduction to one squadron will have limited impact to the Depot at Albany because MPF equipment represents a small fraction of the depot maintenance workload that flows through Albany. The vast majority of Albany’s depot maintenance workload comes from the entirety of the Marine Corps enterprise, our sister services, and other government agencies.

Further reduction from two squadrons to one will have slightly more impact to the Blount Island prepositioning support facility, which conducts field level maintenance and supply actions on MPF military equipment. With fewer MPF ships’ worth of military equipment to service at less frequent intervals, the contracted workforce at Blount Island Command will reduce commensurate with future workload. Potentially, some specialized skill sets may atrophy due to decreased volume and frequency of maintenance opportunities.

While Blount Island Command will experience impacts from the reduction to one MPF squadron, the need to maintain high readiness of the MPF program’s sole squadron will produce sufficient maintenance workload requiring a robust and capable prepositioning support facility at Blount Island Command.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL

Mr. CARBAJAL. Regarding the USS George Washington: Before the Special Psychiatric Response Intervention Team was activated, what was the average wait time for a sailor assigned to the USS George Washington to receive a mental health appointment? According to open-source reporting, some sailors assigned to the George Washington were met with a six-month wait period to see the ship’s psychologist. Since the Navy has deployed additional mental health resources to the ship, what is now the average wait time for a sailor to receive a mental health appointment? Does the Navy have a goal or metric of what is an acceptable wait time from the request for a mental health appointment to having the appointment?

Admiral GILDAY. All emergent mental health referrals (i.e., for suicidal or homicidal patients) are seen and evaluated the same day. Prior to the Special Psychiatric

Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) activation, the wait time to see the ship's psychologist was approximately four to six weeks for a new patient evaluation, and approximately two to three weeks for a follow-up appointment. After the arrival of the additional psychologist and licensed clinical social worker, the ship's psychologist's wait time for a new patient evaluation decreased to approximately three weeks, and to approximately two weeks for a follow-up appointment. The Military Health System (MHS) access to care standards are identified in 32 Code of Federal Register 199.17. The MHS access standard for specialty is within 28 days; however, the Defense Health Agency set an internal standard for the direct care system of 15 days. There is no standard in any healthcare system, including the MHS, for follow-up appointments because the number of days or months to a recommended follow-up appointment is based on the clinical judgement of the provider and the patient's condition.

As a point of comparison, the average wait time across all Navy Medical Forces Atlantic military treatment facilities is 15.51 days (approximately 2 weeks), while the average wait time across all Tricare network private sector care providers is 34.82 days (approximately 4–5 weeks). Comparing times for only the Portsmouth area, the average is 12.7 days (less than 2 weeks) at Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, while the average in the local Tricare private sector care network is 34.9 days (approximately 4–5 weeks).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KEATING

Mr. KEATING. In the Navy's Annual Long Range Plan, there is a large emphasis on investing in undersea procurement and warfighting. However, this is sometimes viewed exclusively through the prism of submarines. I'm particularly interested in unmanned underwater vehicles or UUVs. Depending on which Long Range Plan scenario one looks at, the number of desired unmanned vehicles varies greatly. Can you speak to the role unmanned systems have in both a modern and future Navy fleet?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. In order for the United States Navy to retain our strategic maritime advantage, we must increase our capabilities to include faster decision making, tactical reach, and endurance while minimizing risk to our personnel. The Navy recognizes that unmanned systems, autonomy, and artificial intelligence play a key part in future Distributed Maritime Operations for all phases of military operations. As outlined in the Unmanned Campaign Framework, the Navy will continue to develop and expand its Fleet of unmanned vehicles to deliver affordable, scalable, lethal, and connected capabilities.

Specifically, in the undersea domain, unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) serve as versatile autonomous platforms, operate in a dispersed manner, and offer the flexibility the evolving threat environment demands. UUVs will go farther, deeper, and endure longer in extremely harsh conditions in order to deter and deliver lethal and non-lethal effects. A hybrid fleet of manned/unmanned capabilities is necessary to execute the full range of undersea operations to both meet emerging security concerns and to provide persistent presence, ensuring undersea dominance in our Future Fleet.

Mr. KEATING. In the Navy's Annual Long Range Plan, there is a large emphasis on investing in undersea procurement and warfighting. However, this is sometimes viewed exclusively through the prism of submarines. I'm particularly interested in unmanned underwater vehicles or UUVs. Depending on which Long Range Plan scenario one looks at, the number of desired unmanned vehicles varies greatly. Can you speak to the role unmanned systems have in both a modern and future Navy fleet?

General BERGER. I defer to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON

Mr. BACON. After the fall of Kabul it has come to my attention that there has been little to no outreach to Gold Star families of those killed in the war, and they are struggling. Furthermore, I am concerned about the lack of long-term counseling services for Gold Star and Surviving families. What is the Navy, to include the Marine Corps strategy to address these issues?

Secretary DEL TORO. Outreach to Gold Star families is a commitment that the Navy and Marine Corps fulfills for the duration of Survivor requested support. At the initial Next-of-Kin (NOK) notification of a Service member's death, Casualty Assistance Calls Officers (CACO) are equipped with the knowledge necessary to con-

nect Survivor families with benevolent and philanthropic organizations capable of providing grief and bereavement counseling.

Once a CACO's immediate duties are complete, NOK are transitioned to the care of the Navy or Marine Corps Long Term Assistance Program (LTAP). LTAP representatives maintain contact with Survivors at a frequency requested by the Gold Star family to meet their long-term needs. LTAP serves as a permanent resource for NOK, ensuring they receive sustained, long-term assistance. LTAP not only assists with the receipt of death benefits and entitlements, but also connects family members to grief and bereavement counselors, support experts, and national Survivor networks as their needs evolve.

The Navy and Marine Corps maintain a partnership with the Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS). Once families agree to the release of their personal information, by completing an "Authorization for Disclosure of Personal Information," they are connected to representatives from TAPS. TAPS is a national non-profit 501(c)(3) Veterans Service Organization that provides families with a full range of peer-based emotional support, crisis response and intervention, casualty casework, and grief and trauma support. Their services are no cost and available 24/7.

The suicide bombing outside Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 26, 2021, resulted in the death of one Sailor and 11 Marines. LTAP representatives initiated contact with the Gold Star families of these Service members after each funeral. LTAP and TAPS representatives have provided continued support to the Gold Star families on a recurring basis, in accordance with each family's individual needs.

Mr. BACON. As we prepare for the real possibility of near peer conflict, what are we doing to ensure we have a seamless, easily replicated process for casualties in the case of a mass casualty scenario? Is the Navy aware of the FY22 NDAA casualty requirements and working group, and what is the Navy doing to be directly involved?

General BERGER. The Marine Corps Casualty Assistance Program has maintained an outstanding reputation in response to mass casualty events from initial reporting, notification, processing of benefits and entitlements, and long-term assistance. The staff at Headquarters Marine Corps, in concert with our affected and supporting units, ensure timely next of kin notifications, expeditious return of remains, and compassionate enduring assistance to our surviving family members. We are staffed and follow established procedures to effectively execute required casualty assistance for peacetime casualties.

We are working on a scalable Casualty Augmentation Requirement Plan that will enable the Marine Corps to surge with appropriately skilled and experienced individuals thereby improving our casualty-response capability and increasing overall capacity. Depending on its nature and scale, a mass casualty event will require capability and coordination with the Department of Defense, Department of Navy, and other stakeholders. We are also an active participant in the Casualty Assistance Reform Working Group directed by the FY22 NDAA. Our casualty subject matter experts, along with a selected Gold Star family member, represents the Marine Corps in this working group.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN

Ms. HOULAHAN. As we focus on China as a pacing challenge, we must ensure we are prepared for any actions necessary within the Pacific. With the Navy being below recruiting goals for this year, how does that impact short and long term readiness within the Pacific theater?

General BERGER. The Marine Corps has accomplished its fiscal year to date recruiting goal in what is arguably the most challenging year since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force. Nevertheless, the compounding effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, historic lows in youth propensity, labor shortages, rising inflation, and United States Military Entrance Processing Command's medical record modernization efforts have consistently slowed momentum, placing the remainder of the FY22 accessions mission at risk. We understand the pressures on recruiting/retention and focus end strength and assignment decisions on operational readiness. We do not forecast any degradation in our ability to support the Pacific theater.

Ms. HOULAHAN. What is the Navy doing beyond bonuses, to recruit and retain a diverse pool of skilled and capable individuals? What specific challenges does the Navy face with recruitment and retention and what policies and actions are you taking to address those challenges? What assistance do you require from Congress?

General BERGER. The Marine Corps is a diverse institution, and cultural, ethnic, gender, and socio-economic diversity remains a priority. Diverse accession success is a direct result of the hard work of our recruiting force in every zip code and benefits from our inclusive marketing, robust outreach, and partnerships efforts with diverse communities and organizations. Since 2009, diverse enlisted accessions have increased from 34% to 47%, while diverse officer accessions have increased from 16% to 35%. The Marine Corps remains committed to capitalizing on the knowledge, skills, abilities, performance, and potential of every Marine.

FY22 will prove to be the most challenging year in recruiting history. In addition to COVID-19, the growing disconnect and declining favorable view between the U.S. population and the military, labor shortages, high inflation, and a youth population that does not recognize the value of military service also continues to strain recruiting efforts and place the Marine Corps' accessions mission at risk.

The Marine Corps Diversity, Equity, & Inclusion Strategic Plan is a deliberate effort to examine the current state, envision outcomes, and set a path over the next five years with intermediate objectives that will help us as a Service further improve our diversity, equity, and inclusion. Recruiting and retaining high performing youth from all sectors of our nation will be imperative for the future fight.

Our end state is a transparent, collaborative, forward-leaning, data-driven, and commander-focused system which provides the individual Marine the opportunity to develop and use their abilities to effectively serve in order to provide a combat-ready Fleet Marine Force. We are updating our IT systems, leveraging AI, machine learning, and big data in surveys—with an end state of improving our retention policies, practices, and evaluation systems, among other initiatives, to compete in the competitive ecosystem of talent management.

To ensure future recruiting success, a whole-of-government approach is needed to gain influencer support of military service and expand the youth market. Additional considerations such as directed Department of Education support to make contact information available, funding of the Joint Advertising Market Research and Studies program for strategic community engagement campaigns, Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery support testing, and school/state incentives for students selecting military service, will have positive impacts on recruiting across the joint force.

We are asking for congressional assistance to make changes to Title 10, United States Code section 503 in order to open the aperture of usable information on potential recruits. This change would more closely align DOD marketing efforts with those of private industry and is fully supported by the Services and DOD. The information would be used to help identify prospective recruits, tailor our marketing efforts, better measure return on investment of our advertising efforts, and maximize customer relationship management by getting the right message to the right person at the right time.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN

Mr. BERGMAN. Is there any evidence to suggest that, in a non-mobility environment, that Reserve units (i.e. Battalions, Squadrons, etc.) would be more ready if Operational Control (OPCON) was moved from the Reserve Component (RC) to the Active Component (AC)?

General BERGER. As Representative Bergman may remember from his days as the Commanding General, 4th Marine Air Wing (MAW), 4th MAW participates regularly in the 2nd MAW and 3d MAW Frag Conferences for scheduling aircraft support across the Marine Corps. The Frag conferences result in 4th MAW flying in support of the Marine Corps, supporting both Reserve and Active Component aviation requirements, at a frequency that places their squadrons in an operational status that far exceeds the normal 48 drill period and two week Annual Training. We believe that in certain cases, the Marine Corps can improve both logistical support and maintenance of both Reserve and Active squadrons by incorporating the Reserve squadron into an Active aircraft type-specific group.

The Reserve squadron will be co-located with the group headquarters, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS), and Marine Wing Support Squadron as well as other like aircraft squadrons on a Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) maximizing supportability. We are conducting a proof of concept of Active/Reserve Component integration by incorporating VMM-774 into Marine Aircraft Group-26, an active duty group with all flying squadrons possessing only MV-22 Ospreys.

Access to MALS, simulators, and vast on site resources provided to the Reserve squadron at a MCAS vice being a tenant on another Service's base will likely im-

prove readiness and streamline Naval Supply Systems Command logistics nodes. The proof of concept is scheduled for FY23.

We are continuing to work the details for this proof of concept with VMM-774 still in transition from Naval Station Norfolk to MCAS New River. We can provide in progress reviews and a final assessment once the proof of concept period is complete.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ

Mr. WALTZ. Capacity is a capability within itself. In late April at the Center for Strategic and International Studies you stated that “We do need a bigger Navy, and you can’t just talk about capabilities without talking about size”, but the plan you presented to Congress doesn’t have us getting to the Congressionally mandated battle force size of 355 ships until 2043 with your most optimistic projections. One of your courses of action requests \$75 billion after the next 5 years to get to that number. In my opinion that is a decade and a half too late and insufficient considering the clear overmatch in capacity the Chinese will have in the Pacific. We clearly need a growth in industrial capacity and the capacity of the U.S. Navy’s battleforce. What resources do you and industry need to grow ship and submarine production and to keep the ships we do have underway more often by reducing days of delay due to maintenance?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. A healthy shipbuilding industrial base and supply chain are vital to meeting our National Defense Strategy. Expanding the capabilities of suppliers and shipyard infrastructure results in greater stability, cost savings, and improved efficiency to grow both ship and submarine production and repair capabilities. In cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation and industry partners, the Navy completed a review of the industrial base to identify areas which require investment to expand the capability and capacity of the enterprise in accordance with war fighting requirements. The Department of Navy’s Fiscal Year 2023 budget request includes investments in critical efforts in several key areas including: supplier development of capability and capacity, shipbuilder infrastructure, technology innovation, workforce development, and continued government oversight.

Additionally, the Navy is grateful for Congress’s continued support for the Navy’s Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP). SIOP is a critical enabler to improve Navy maintenance capabilities by expanding shipyard capacity and optimizing shipyard configuration. The Navy is also grateful to Congress for its ongoing support for the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN), pilot and expanding it to include both Pacific Fleet and Fleet Forces command. OPN-funded availabilities are helping to maintain positive momentum in execution of surface maintenance and ensuring ships deliver to the Fleet on time, with work completed in full. In partnership with the Office of Secretary of Defense, the Navy has also piloted several defense workforce programs in major maritime centers of gravity like Pennsylvania, Virginia, and New England targeted at the shipbuilding and ship repair workforce. These are pipeline programs focused on bringing highly skilled workers to our shipyards. Through collaboration and smart investments, the industrial base can adapt and grow to build and maintain the fleet the Nation needs.

Mr. WALTZ. The Navy is shuttering HSC-85 its last squadron that’s solely dedicated to supporting Naval Special Warfare. What is the rationale for divesting of a one-of-one capability? How do you plan to replace the unique capability that HSC-85 brings to the table?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. This divestiture is in alignment with Department of the Navy (DON) and Special Operations Command (SOCOM) strategic and operational priorities within fiscal guidance, and is critical to enabling funding of higher priority programs. While the squadron has highly trained aviators and some unique equipment, dedicated support to NSW and special operations training, readiness, and operations is not a core DON mission. SOCOM maintains its own aviation units dedicated to special operations support that are more capable than HSC-85. Additionally, the ending of the cost-share agreement between DON and SOCOM for the unit beyond Fiscal Year 2023 increased the financial burden on DON for providing support to SOCOM. Divesting of HSC-85 will make funds available for core DON missions and higher DON priorities.

The DON has four CONUS and one forward-deployed General Purpose Force HSC expeditionary squadrons that are capable of providing basic support to NSW training and readiness, and could be trained and equipped to provide similar dedicated capability as HSC-85 if prioritized over their current tasking. Re-tasking these

squadrons to dedicated support would require additional time, training, and equipment to meet requirements.

Mr. WALTZ. I understand that the Secretary of the Navy has certified that the LCS Independence variant's Mission Package along with Expeditionary Navy EOD Mine Countermeasure Companies provide a "like capability" for homeland defense compared to the Avenger class MCM, but what is the status of the LCS's minesweeping part of its MCM Mission Package? How long has that capability delayed? Do we not need the ability to sweep CONUS waters of mines in a contingency?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. The Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) provides minesweeping capability to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package (MP) as part of the Unmanned Minesweeping Module. UISS is comprised of an AN/SLW-2 MCM Unmanned Surface Vehicle that carries both an electromagnetic cable and a MK-104 acoustic generator.

UISS has successfully completed its Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase and is in Low Rate Initial Production. System-level UISS testing is complete. Minesweeping capability has been proven with IOT&E completion in June 2021, followed by completion of cybersecurity and underwater explosive shock testing in October 2021. UISS is expected to achieve Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in June 2022. IOC was originally planned for October 2019. A Congressional reduction of \$8.0M to Fiscal Year 2018 RDT&E delayed completion of development and testing one year, which was later compounded by required system fixes to address deficiencies noted from developmental testing and availability of LCS due to other Fleet operational priorities.

Mine countermeasures plans for Homeland Defense are focused on mine hunting, mine neutralization, and exploitation vice minesweeping.

Mr. WALTZ. With the Navy's request to decommission Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships are there any plans to utilize these vessels in future Fleet Training Sinking Exercises which would provide an opportunity for their hulls to serve as artificial reefs?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. The Navy's current disposition plans for all hulls planned for decommissioning in the Future Years Defense Program are reflected in the Navy's Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2023 (30-year Shipbuilding Plan). The plan for the Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship hulls identified for decommissioning in Fiscal Year 2023 is for all nine hulls placed in an out-of-commission, in-reserve (OCIR) status. Further, Navy policy requires Fleet Training Sinking Exercises be conducted at least 50 miles from land and in greater than 6000 feet of water making them not viable as artificial reefs. The Navy will continue to review, and disposition decisions may evolve as new information becomes available.

Mr. WALTZ. General Berger, Force Design 2030 is heavily reliant on light, maneuverable forces using both long range fires and asymmetric weapons like loitering munitions and man-portable systems to defeat the enemy. Considering the U.S. has burned through 1400 Stinger and 5500 Javelin missiles how vital is it to backfill that drawdown so that your forces have a robust supply of Javelins and Stingers to stand up the formations you envision in Force Design 2030?

General BERGER. The Defense Industrial Base (DIB) is primed to produce a new-start Man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD) that employs high technology-readiness-level components and utilizes rapid acquisition authorities. Obsolescence issues currently plague Stinger production, employment, and sustainment. Outdated manufacturing techniques combined with forty-year-old technology continue to drive up cost, extend delivery timelines, and produce missiles without any improvements to performance. Our logistics depots have utilized all available spare parts to repair Stinger field training systems, turning to cannibalization in order to deliver serviceable equipment. The DOD must take advantage of the current DIB posture. With proper leveraging of authorities, Services must begin fielding a replacement to Stinger missiles, launchers, and training systems by 2027. The Marine Corps remains engaged with the Army, who serves as the Stinger program lead, to drive progress towards a new-start MANPAD that is cheaper and more sustainable, reliable, capable, and rapid to deliver.

In regards to the Javelin missile system, it is critical that we backfill all of our equipment and ammunition stock with either a like capability or a modernized capability more suited for Force Design 2030. I am concerned with the production lead times, some as long as 48 months, that will impact our readiness over the long term. Much of what we have delivered to the Ukrainian Defense Forces has come from our training stocks so that we could preserve our short term warfighting capability. But when a Marine doesn't have equipment or munitions to train on in the exact manner in which he or she will fight, there are longer term risks that we incur from

training to retention to warfighting. So it's vital that we communicate with the DIB to identify not just our warfighting requirements, but also our training requirements, and work to meet them as soon as possible. Javelin is proving its worth in today's fight and we will be using the same warhead on some of our future munitions, so it will provide value for us now and into the future.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE

Mr. MORELLE. In early January, Defense News reported that ship maintenance and repairs are falling short of your expectations. And although, through various initiatives, the on-time completion rates for maintenance and repairs are improving, current timelines still negatively impact the readiness of your fleets. Are you able to discuss the contributing factors limiting the Navy's ability to get ships out of depot yards or repairs complete at rates you're comfortable with?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. The Navy's Performance to Plan (P2P) Surface forum was initiated with the overarching goal of improving maintenance outcomes and eliminating days of maintenance delay, and the Navy is collectively driving hard towards achieving the goal of zero days of maintenance delays. P2P is chaired by the VCNO and is taking a data-driven approach to targeting key levers or drivers that analysis indicates will have a direct impact on availability duration. Key lever modeling for P2P highlights Navy-controlled levers and allows for the team to prioritize, swarm, and escalate issues identified for barrier removal in an efficient fashion. The below table is a summary of the key drivers currently being targeted and the duration impacts that the Center for Naval Analysis predicts could be realized as these specific metrics continue to improve in the execution of maintenance availabilities.

Tier 2 Driver Section	Driver	Historical average (FY 14 to present)	Change this driver to...	Has this effect on duration*
Workload Demand vs Past Performance	T2: Workload Demand vs. Past Performance	106%**	101%	→ -2% duration
	T3: Workload Instability	17%**	12%	→ -4% duration
	T3: Work-Density	225 MD/Day	215 MD/Day	→ -1% duration
New Work	T2: % New Work (NW)	6%	1%	→ -4% duration
	T3: % NW Discovered by 40% Completion	79%	84%	→ -4% duration
Growth Work	T2: % Growth Work (GW)	21%	18%	→ -5% duration
	T3: % GW Discovered by 40% Completion	56%	61%	→ -5% duration
New & Growth Work	T4: Ave Contract Change Cycle Time (LOE2CC)	38 Days	28 Days	→ -1% duration
Contract Award	T2: On-time Contract Award	Late (46% on time)	On-time	→ -4% duration
Integrated Schedule	T2: Weekly IPS First Pass Yield	59%	69%	→ -1% duration

Data: SURFMEPP ACT 08/21, NMD 08/21, SMDI 08/21.

* Duration is measured as a % of planned duration, e.g. final duration of 360 vs. a plan of 300 is measured as 120%
 ** Workload metric analysis for CONUS NSA executing at least 100 MD/Day before SOA and <50% deviation in maximum number of avails in NSA

Examples of specific actions being taken to improve performance based on these identified levers include:

- Further effort to level load ports and better predict workload
- Moved contract award target to Availability-120 days (A-120) to allow more time for government and contractor planning/coordination/material procurement/schedule quality
- Reduce/limit amount of growth and new work
- Improved/more rapid identification of growth and new work prior to 40% of availability duration
- Efforts to improve quality of Integrated Production Schedule provided by the contractor
- Improved performance in ordering/receiving Long Lead Time Material prior to availability start
- Improved directed maintenance strategy
- Improved contract change cycle time through use of Level of Effort to Completion and Small Dollar Value Growth processes

Additionally, as the Navy continues to demonstrate improvement in the execution of the ship maintenance program, efforts such as the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN), pilot help to expand upon the positive momentum being realized and ensure ships deliver back to the Fleet on time, with work completed in full, and without the need for additional funding in successive fiscal years.

Mr. MORELLE. How has contracted proprietary lock-in, or “Vendor Lock,” impacted the Navy’s ability to efficiently repair their systems and platforms? How has “Vendor-Lock” impacted readiness for your department?

Secretary DEL TORO. Any time the Government has inadequate data rights or limited technical data, the ability to execute organic repairs or outsource the work to other vendors is significantly hindered. As a result, in each acquisition program, the Navy is thoughtfully analyzing and identifying key technical data rights required early in the program’s lifecycle in order to appropriately budget for and purchase the rights upfront (often priced in a competitive environment) to enable greater flexibility and organic capability to efficiently repair and sustain a system.

Mr. MORELLE. The Navy has significantly increased its budget for Project Overmatch, demonstrating a commitment to joint interoperability, command and control, and tactical network compatibility across DOD. How did the Joint All Domain Command and Control exercises between the Navy and Air Force work out? Any good news stories to share?

Admiral GILDAY. The Navy has requested an increased budget for Project Overmatch because of the critical importance of joint interoperability, command and control, and network compatibility. We have been working on refining our approach and transitioning technologies and concepts and are now ready to start increasing the scope and scale. Our Navy’s ability to establish and sustain sea control is dependent upon conducting Distributed Maritime Operations through a teamed manned/unmanned force that exploits Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML). Project Overmatch is tasked with delivering a Naval Operational Architecture (NOA) to connect and enable this future force. The NOA is the Naval (Navy and Marine Corps) contribution to the Joint Force’s Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) and we are working collaboratively with our Service partners on Implementation. We are on track to deliver Minimum Viable Product (MVP) on a Strike Group in FY23. Below are some of the good news stories from Overmatch:

- We take an active role supporting Joint Staff JADC2 cross-functional team, and serve as the joint networking lead of their operational planning team.
- Demonstrating sharing of tactically relevant software applications with the Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) team in our DEVSEC-OPS environment to allow for easier collaboration between command and control software tools. Additionally, Overmatch is working with the Army Future Command and the Marine Corps for additional software application exchange and co-development/sustainment opportunities.
- Our most recent quarter of engineering, integration, and Live, Virtual, and Constructive demonstrations provided Naval integration of relevant “mission threads” between Navy units and the simulated Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) with Expeditionary Advanced Base (Fires) element represented at Camp Pendleton.
- Naval participation in U.S. Army’s Project Convergence 2021 (PC21) resulted in substantive testing between multiple platforms using different waveforms in the live exercise which included Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. We will continue to grow that participation in the upcoming PC22, with added participation from Allies.
- Our engineering teams have been leading the coordination on a cross-service effort we call Joint Tactical Edge Networking (JTEN) to bring together the best of what each service is doing. Working with OSD, this grass-roots effort will integrate ongoing developments across all the services to enable interoperability.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS

Ms. JACOBS. A GAO report found that the surface fleet is 15% undermanned compared to required levels. The Navy routinely assigns fewer crewmembers to ships than are needed to safely operate them, and that inadequate training exacerbates sailor overwork and fatigue. How does the budget invest to fix these problems?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. The May 2021 GOA Report “Additional Efforts are Needed to Manage Fatigue, Reduce Crewing Shortfalls and Implement Training” recommended, among other things, the Navy revise its guidance and practices to measure sailor fatigue and address the factors causing fatigue, use required positions when reporting crew sizes and projecting personnel needs, and factor training time into sailor workload. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations.

The PB23 Fiscal Years Defense Plan (FYDP) continues the surface investment in ship manpower, adding additional billets to ships. An example is the phased addition of approximately 40 billets on each DDG. In addition there are various Surface

Training Advanced Virtual Environment (STAVE) initiatives that invest in schoolhouse and waterfront individual training.

The GAO report assumed an increase in workload for Sailors on ships due to additional training being conducted on ships, resulting in overwork and fatigue. However, the Navy STAVE program and PB23 investments are modernizing existing Surface Warfare courses of instruction at schoolhouse and waterfront locations where Sailors train away from their ships, avoiding the potential for overwork and fatigue.

Other STAVE examples include continued fielding of the Mariner Skills Training Program (MSTP), additional Aegis, Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) and Anti-Submarine Warfare SQQ-89, Virtual Operator Trainers (VOT), Virtual Maintenance Trainers (VMT) and Virtual Employment Trainers (VET) as well as enhanced rate training for various surface rates.

Ms. JACOBS. What is the Navy doing to increase manning, and when will surface ships be fully manned with the proper fit?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. The Navy's principal focus on this issue remains unchanged and increasing manning levels across the surface fleet is a strategic objective for the Navy. We are using a variety of force management tools to attack this issue, including:

- Financial incentives, such as Assignment Incentive Pay, Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP) and Incremental Sea Duty Incentive Pay.
- Policy levers, such as rating conversions, high-year tenure flexibility, and directed detailing (extending Sailors on sea duty and curtailing shore duty tours).

We continue to make effective and sustainable improvements to filling all funded surface fleet billets by seeking new and innovative ways to mitigate shortfalls in the surface fleet. Navy has adopted the Perform to Plan—Human Resources process to address a wide range of issues in the distribution process that currently limit our ability to close gaps in operational billets. For example, Navy is instituting the Detailing Marketplace Assignment Policy (DMAP), a new comprehensive set of personnel policies designed to improve Fleet manning. DMAP will replace the current Sea Shore Flow policy and provide monetary incentives, non-monetary incentives, and early advancement opportunities for Sailors who stay Navy and stay on sea duty.

We will continue to retain top talent through modernization efforts such as MyNavy Assignment, which better positions Navy to match skillsets to fill critical jobs in order to meet Fleet requirements. These efforts—combined with Navy's commitment to identifying and funding total ownership cost—will ensure we have the Sailors to support the Navy that the Nation needs.

Funding for key manpower accounts is vital for Fleet wholeness and improved readiness. Support for Talent Management initiatives, MyNavy HR Transformation, Ready Relevant Learning, and other enablers such as Marketing and Advertising and Special and Incentive pays is critical to recruiting, training, retention, and improved talent management.

Navy will continue to focus energy on ensuring the Fleet is fully and properly manned, with the right Sailor in the right place at the right time with the right training. The number of Sailors on operational sea duty is at the highest level since 2014. We now have 10,000 more Sailors at sea for all sea duty units than in 2017.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD

Mr. HORSFORD. When an individual flies across the ocean in an airliner or boards a cruise ship, they usually have easy access to high-speed satellite internet on their personal devices. Yet this has historically not been the case for Sailors deployed at sea. As the Navy continues to grapple with recruiting and retention challenges and remains unable to meet requirements for appropriate fit and fill for sea billets, I'm curious if this straightforward quality of life improvement could help retention efforts.

This capability exists and is fielded on warships today. Over the past two years, U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command have procured a turnkey satellite wireless internet capability that has successfully supported the deployments of 6 aircraft carriers and multiple smaller vessels. However, this capability is noticeably absent on ships assigned to Fleet Forces Command and in the Atlantic. Currently these trials are funded on a month-to-month, ship-by-ship basis, and there is no program of record for at-sea satellite wireless internet. The contractor currently supporting Pacific Fleet has proposed an annual contract that would dramatically expand regional coverage and significantly reduce costs from the current ship-by-ship model.

What lessons has the Navy learned from these trials in Pacific Fleet and Central Command and what is the Navy's plan to expand wireless internet access to Sailors across the fleet?

Secretary DEL TORO and Admiral GILDAY. There is currently no N2N6 Program of Record (POR) to support high-speed satellite internet for personal use. The pilot program for satellite wireless internet capability was spearheaded by Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), and fully funded using PACFLT Operating Target (OPTAR) funds. We are currently reviewing our Navy strategy for command SATCOM and learning from efforts such as the PACFLT pilots.

OPNAV N2N6's Commercial Satellite Broadband Program (CBSP) POR funds commercial satellite for Navy operational networks. Per Navy security instruction, Personal Electronic Devices (PEDs) are not authorized to connect to ships' operational networks. Sailors are authorized to use the ships' approved devices and operational network for personal use (i.e., access Facebook, email, etc.) when not impacting operational mission requirements. Availability of end-user device (i.e., workstation), security controls limiting or restricting access to shore-based websites, and competing demands for bandwidth utilization across ships' operational networks affect Sailors' personal use of the network. In Denied, Degraded, Intermittent, and Limited (DDIL) environments or due to Operational Security (OPSEC) concerns, personal use of ships' operation network may be restricted.

Prior to the 'Other 3 Billion' (O3B) pilot program by COMPACFLT, bandwidth controls were utilized to accomplish essential services. Prior to O3B install on USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT, the unclassified operational network utilization routinely stayed at greater than 98%, requiring implementation of bandwidth controls. Once O3B was online, the operational network utilization remained below 46%. In addition, the following services were now being performed or greatly enhanced by using O3B vice the operational network:

- Cyber security patches may take several days to a week to download or can error out during download via the operational network. Use of O3B to download patches was reduced from days to minutes.
- Public affairs video files of 300 to 400 MB were transferred within minutes vice setting bandwidth conditions for periods of 8+ hours.
- 1,949 peak hour users and 5,202 devices connected on Christmas in 2020 allowing Sailors to text and video chat with family members while underway for the first time.
- Provided constant communication from leadership to family members and live streaming a frocking ceremony with 30,000 viewers.
- When operational network was down or degraded, medical evacuations were coordinated via O3B exclusively.
- Use of Defense Travel System to process transaction would previous timeout, requiring refresh and delaying processes. O3B lessened the time and drastically reduced timeouts.
- Sailors were able to utilize O3B for online college and other web based training, not possible utilizing operational networks due to bandwidth requirements.
- O3B allowed operators to quickly address and track high priority material shipments inbound to the ship. Additionally, several departments utilized O3B to update test equipment and download maintenance programs, increased ability to maintain aircraft, support equipment and operational systems.

Additional research is required to identify true unit costs for implementing the capability to provide an at-sea, end-to-end, high-speed satellite internet wireless solution for personal devices across the Fleet.

