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**ENGAGEMENT WITH ALLIES
AND PARTNERS**

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ENGAGEMENT WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 1, 2022.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:59 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. I call the hearing to order.

Welcome, our witnesses and members. This is a hybrid hearing. We have some members participating remotely, so I have to read this statement.

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Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceeding.

So thank you for joining us.

Today, the full committee's hearing is on engagement with allies and partners. We have two witnesses with us this morning: the

Honorable Mara Karlin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities from DOD [U.S. Department of Defense], and the Honorable Jessica Lewis, who is Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Department of State.

Well, thank you very much. I appreciate you being here. To some degree, the topic is self-explanatory. So I'll try not to go on too long in my opening statement, except to say that partners and allies are absolutely crucial to everything that we're doing in the world.

Certainly, in this moment, we understand that as well as we ever have. In our efforts to stop Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine, to make sure that Putin does not succeed in this, we could not possibly do it on our own, clearly and obviously, and the stronger our partnerships are in the world, the better able we are to bring pressure against Russia and to support Ukraine in this effort. And this applies across the board to the global challenges that we face.

There has been a lot of talk in the last few years about how we're pivoting from one threat to another. You know, we have the discussion what is the greatest threat we face—let's, you know, pick one and focus on it. China is the popular one to focus on.

But I think on this committee, we all recognize that the threat list is pretty clear—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorist threats.

I'll give a prize, by the way, to anyone who comes up with the mnemonic for that so we can just sum it up in a quick little acronym.

But that's it. And when you ask the question, okay, which one of these threats worries you the most, that depends on the day, okay. There's no way we can say, okay, well, those two, they aren't really a big problem.

They're all there and they all have the potential to rise to the top in any given moment. As powerful as we are as a nation, as strong as our military and our economy are, we could not possibly meet all of those threats on our own.

The way to meet those threats is through allies and partnerships, and through a rules-based international order, which is the entire point of what we have been trying to set up since the end of World War II, and the thing that, right now, Vladimir Putin both threatens most profoundly but also is making it clear why it is so important for nations of the world to join in that effort.

So to do that, we need to work on partnerships and we have been, and I think the Biden administration has done an excellent job in the year-plus that they've been in office of reaching out to allies and trying to build those partnerships.

And then that comes in a variety of different forms. Certainly, we have, you know, reengaged with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], worked more closely with Europe to build up that partnership. But also, in Asia, we have the Quad, as it is now being called, with India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S. working together on a variety of different issues.

Now, the AUKUS agreement, which brought us closer with Australia and the United Kingdom, was another way to partner. On a number of different issues we've looked for ways to work more closely with India.

Partnership is crucial to us meeting those national security objectives and connected to that, of course, is building partner capacity—the better off our partners are to help us with national security threats, to help us with development assistance, the more hands we have to accomplish the goals and tasks that we are looking to accomplish.

So I think this is an incredibly important hearing just in general, but particularly now as we are directly confronted with a threat that requires a global response, that requires allies and partners to work together, it drives home why that issue is so important.

So I look forward to the testimony and the questions and answers. And with that, I yield to Ranking Member Rogers, for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM ALABAMA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really appreciate you organizing this hearing today and I appreciate the witnesses being here, taking the time to prepare. I know it takes a lot of effort.

Given Putin's war of choice, now is an especially important time for us to focus on how we provide security assistance to our allies and partners.

Security assistance, cooperation, and partnership programs run the full gamut from training to lethal aid. It enhances our diplomatic efforts to promote peace, it strengthens our global presence, and it improves our ability to defend ourselves and our allies.

These programs have proven successful in countering terrorism and positioning us to prevail in the great power competition.

In countries around the globe, security system enables—assistance enables us to effectively confront malign influence of China and Russia. There is no greater example of the potential of these programs than what we see in Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the assistance provided by Ukraine—to Ukraine by this administration hasn't reached its full potential. It's been too little too late. This crisis began unfolding back in October.

At that time, Senator Inhofe and I implored Secretary Austin to send anti-air and anti-ship capabilities to Kyiv. Our hope was that the administration would take that threat from Putin seriously and publicly airlift Javelins, Harpoons, and Stingers as deterrence.

For months, Ukrainians pleaded with us to send them these systems. But the White House chose not to act. They were more concerned about provoking Putin than defending democracy in Ukraine.

It took until January of this year for the first shipments to arrive in Ukraine and according to public press reports, it was only a couple of days ago that the administration finally agreed to send Stingers, after Germany, Finland, and the Baltics. As I said, it's been too little too late.

We're seeing the horror of Putin's war play out in front of us. My colleagues and I sounded the alarm that Ukraine needed more lethal aid months ago. We sponsored legislation to provide that aid.

So I implore the Speaker to bring the NYET [Never Yielding Europe's Territory] Act up for a vote as soon as possible.

With Ukraine under attack, it is now more important than ever to reinforce our NATO allies, especially those on the Eastern Front.

Romania, Poland, and the Baltic States need advanced integrated air defense assets, missile systems like the HIMARS [High Mobility Artillery Rocket System] and the ATACMS [Army Tactical Missile System] and enhanced permanent U.S. troop presence. And they need it yesterday.

China is acting now—is watching now as how we respond to this crisis. Now is not the time for equivocation. This administration needs to stand up to Putin. The security of our Nation and our allies are at stake.

Thank you again to our witnesses for joining us this morning. I look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement from Ranking Member McCaul.

With that, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Hearing no objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Karlin, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARA E. KARLIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR STRATEGY, PLANS, AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. KARLIN. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.

I respectfully submit my written statement for the record and will provide brief opening remarks.

I appreciate the invitation to testify before you today on the Department of Defense's approach to engagement with our allies and our partners through security cooperation.

The United States is at a pivotal moment with our allies and partners in meeting the challenges of today and tomorrow. Together, we face unprecedented challenges to our security, including the People's Republic of China's global ambitions to rival the United States, and Russian aggression that threatens the territorial integrity of Europe today in Ukraine.

All the while, we battle historic transnational threats like climate change and a global pandemic. One of the most important ways that we will meet these challenges is by renewing a U.S. strategic advantage: our unmatched network of allies and partners.

Security cooperation is an important tool that helps key allies and partners strengthen their defense and enhances our ability to rely on one another in a time of need.

The forthcoming National Defense Strategy will emphasize how the Department will strengthen these alliances and partnerships to advance national security through integrated deterrence.

As Secretary Austin has underscored, integrated deterrence is working across domains and the spectrum of conflict, knit closely with the rest of the government and our allies and partners on the most critical security challenges.

The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact a comprehensive engagement plan means more than training and equipping.

We aim to help partners with not only specific capabilities but also with institutional integrity and an ability to promote our shared values, notably the promotion and protection of human rights and good governance and legitimacy of the security sector.

Resilient partnerships thrive when values and deeds align. Security cooperation aims to uphold that approach. To be sure, the degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality, including transparency and effectiveness of security cooperation and assistance.

A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise is collaboration to ensure the policy and strategic alignment of security cooperation. That includes the Department of Defense and the Department of State, as demonstrated by today's hearing.

Internal to the Department of Defense, we are tightening our alignment as well. We recently brought the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the umbrella of the Assistant Secretary for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy to facilitate better collaboration and coordination within the Department of Defense and with our external partners.

We also formed a new Office for Global Partnerships, which deliberately integrates humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and human rights with the existing processes related to security cooperation.

We are emphasizing the centrality of these areas of defense cooperation in a way that benefits allies and partners in need. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire team is focused on embracing it.

The Department's focus on security cooperation has evolved over time, and it has greatly benefitted from congressional reforms.

Five years ago, Congress enacted unprecedented legislation empowering the Department to support allies and partners through a consolidated range of title 10, U.S. Code, security cooperation authorities designed to advance U.S. interests and with full coordination of the Department of State.

In doing so, the message was clear. Security cooperation should be deliberate and holistic. It should evolve based on consistent learning and reflect the values the United States stands for.

Today, our cooperation with allies and partners includes military-to-military engagements, capacity building, education and training activities, humanitarian assistance activities, and robust exercises with key partners.

While the Department has implemented these reforms through meaningful improvements to security cooperation, more remains to be done.

To seize the opportunity for further change, we are focusing on three priority areas: prioritizing who and what we invest in, focusing on sustainable impact, and adopting a holistic integrated approach to how we execute security cooperation programs.

I began by sharing with you how the U.S. network of alliances and partnerships is a strategic advantage that competitors cannot match.

I conclude by sharing that this advantage is not a given. It requires active involvement by the entire U.S. Government, listening to partners' concerns and contexts, and taking a thoughtful and deliberate approach to how we employ our resources to meet our priorities.

This is facilitated by good strategy, good policy, and close partnership among the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and Congress.

I appreciate your leadership on this critical issue and I thank you for the opportunity to share our vision for engagement with allies and partners through security cooperation. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Karlin can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Lewis.

STATEMENT OF HON. JESSICA LEWIS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. LEWIS. Good morning.

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be here today. I'm going to give my oral statement and ask that my written statement be submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I'm just going to tell you to pull the microphone a little bit closer to you with my microphone off. So it is—yeah, that's good. Thanks. Go ahead.

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you. I'm here to speak with you about the importance and value of security cooperation and security assistance and the vital role these functions play as tools of foreign policy in our relationships with partners and allies.

I sit before you to discuss these matters at a time when that proposition is being tested and displayed as at few points in history as the bombs rain down on the hospitals and schools of Kyiv, as the Russian tanks roll through the Ukrainian countryside, as we see before our eyes the sights of war in the European theater that we had imagined had been retired to history.

I can say that I am proud of the support the United States have provided to Ukraine in and in advance of their time of need and proud of the remarkable courage of the Ukrainian armed forces and the Ukrainian people as they wield our assistance to push back on Russia's unforgivable assault.

And our support to Ukraine demonstrates the wide arrays of tools that State and the Department of Defense can bring to a partner's security sector.

Since assuming office last January, this administration has provided over \$1 billion to Ukraine's defensive capabilities, including through foreign military financing, the DOD Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and other program lines.

Through the Multinational Joint Commission, we work with Ukraine and our allies to identify military requirements and match

funding streams to support the needed defensive capabilities, ranging from radars to Javelins.

Through the Excess Defense Articles program we have delivered to Ukraine armed Coast Guard cutters to create asymmetric maritime capability in the Black Sea.

In addition, through our programs such as the International Military Education and Training authority, we have supported the development of a cadre of professional and Western-looking mid- and senior-level Ukrainian officers, and through a series of exercises the Defense Department has strengthened the interoperability of our forces and Ukraine's tactical and operational capabilities.

Then, as the threat from Russia sharpened, we have used the Presidential Drawdown Authority an unprecedented three times in the space of 6 months, including this weekend's \$350 million package, the largest Presidential drawdown package in U.S. history, to provide urgently needed ammunition, Javelin anti-tank missiles, and the Stinger man-portable air defense systems to Ukraine.

At the same time, we continue to expeditiously process and approve requests for deliveries of U.S. origin material, military equipment to Ukraine from our allies and partners, which is the theme of this hearing, under our Third Party Transfer authority.

As the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, or PM, the mission—this mission is at the core of my responsibilities. PM is on the front lines of this effort that links diplomacy and defense to bolster U.S. national security.

My team works closely with the Department of Defense, with Congress, and the U.S. defense industry to deliver tools and training that supports our foreign policy, strengthens our allies' and partners' abilities to provide for their defense, and contributes meaningfully to the stability of the rules-based international order.

Day to day the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs oversees approximately \$7 billion in security sector assistance programs annually, which accounts for roughly 20 percent of the Department of State and USAID's [United States Agency for International Development's] total annual assistance.

This assistance includes foreign military financing, an appropriated grant assistance program through which partners are able to procure U.S.-origin defense capabilities almost entirely by buying into the Defense Department procurement process; and International Military Education and Training that enables foreign military personnel to study beside their U.S. counterparts.

In addition, the bureau concurs on behalf of the Secretary of State with multiple Department of Defense security cooperation authorities totaling approximately \$9 billion annually as required by law.

And we share this burden of security challenge—of security with our allies and partners and we work together to address the challenges around the world.

These tools, Mr. Chairman, apply not only in times of crisis but help us shape a world that is less susceptible to such threats.

As we turn as well to the pacing threat from the PRC [People's Republic of China] and its model of autocracy poses to the rules-based order, we can look to security cooperation and security assistance as a key element of our response.

For decades, for example, we have worked to strengthen our security cooperation with key allies such as Japan and South Korea, while creating new partnerships with countries like Vietnam and while working hand in glove with Taiwan to strengthen that brave island's defense and deterrence. And this administration intends to deepen and expand that cooperation in the months and years ahead.

Over the years, commitments like these have created new opportunities for interoperability, new allies to deter aggressive behavior, and new partners to help meet global challenges.

Real partnership means bearing burdens together with everyone doing their part because no single nation can afford to carry that weight alone.

So I thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. The Department of State would not be able to achieve the level of security cooperation we have without our key partners: the Department of Defense, the interagency, our foreign partners, and you, the United States Congress.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lewis can be found in the Appendix on page 68.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Karlin, as you mentioned in your remarks, I think one of the big advantages that we have in terms of, you know, building alliances, what we have to offer the world is security assistance.

We're better at it than most people who—or any other country that could offer it, both in terms of the quality of the equipment, the training we provide, and we have a number of programs, as you know, that, you know, enable defense cooperation and providing defense equipment.

At the same time, there's increasing pressure, depending on the countries that we're helping. You know, throughout Africa, you know, there's been, you know, people we have helped who have then led coups against the government.

Certainly, right now in the Middle East there's particular focus on, you know, Saudi Arabia and the UAE [United Arab Emirates] where we have built partnerships with them. The war in Yemen has put pressure on our government to back off and not provide that security assistance. In the Philippines we have had that problem as well.

Now, we attempt to balance that. We have the Leahy law that, you know, requires, you know, respecting human rights. I'm just wondering, how do we strike that balance?

And I'm particularly focused on the UAE. The situation in Yemen is very, very complex. But, at a minimum, at this point, we have slow-walked some of our weapon sales that were supposed to go to UAE because of those concerns.

How do you see us balancing that? Because what I'm fearful of right now is a lot of countries, and the UAE is at, you know, the top of that list—we saw that they were one of the countries that abstained in the vote against Russia—they're hedging their bets, and if it doesn't come from us, they're going to go to Russia and China.

How do we avoid losing those folks while we're concerned about what else they might be doing—concerns about human rights, concerns about conflict in the region?

You know, how does the DOD look at balancing those concerns, and I'd be interested in Ms. Lewis' comments about that as well.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Chairman.

In your opening remarks, you had talked about how we can't do this on our own and I think that is spot on. Indeed, we shouldn't do it on our own.

It works so much better, as we're seeing in Ukraine, of course, today, when we have knit together a cohort of countries to really ensure effective security cooperation.

What's different about when the United States gives security cooperation, as you know, is that we have some real standards. We don't support corruption. We don't support transactional relationships.

What we try to do is emphasize the rule of law. We try to emphasize human rights. All in line with our values, because at the end of the day, frankly, that makes militaries more effective and that's in all of our interests.

So as we work closely with the UAE, in particular, we work with them on their—on protecting their territory, defending their territory.

But as with all countries, it's important that we have frank conversations about how and in what ways we think they can be more effective at what they're trying to do. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Lewis.

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you. First of all, I'd like to concur with Dr. Karlin on the importance of providing our security assistance and working very closely together with our allies and partners around the world, and as you mentioned, we have to really continue to balance those concerns with our deep and strong relationships as we work with countries.

Also, on UAE specifically, we remain committed to providing the F-35s and the MQ-9s. We are having regular discussions with the UAE on—

The CHAIRMAN. If I may—we remain committed to that.

Ms. LEWIS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't seem to ever happen and they're starting to notice.

Ms. LEWIS. We are talking to them on a regular basis. They know that we are committed, and we are making sure that they have all of the information they need to move forward with those, and at the same time, making sure that they are also complying with the commitments that they made as part of that process and we're continuing that discussion with them.

I would also note, and I think Dr. Karlin mentioned this, that the UAE is really facing enhanced threats from the Houthis inside Yemen, and we have also remained committed to partnering with them as they manage that problem and that challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And one last question.

The cooperation between the Department of Defense and Department of State and also development assistance, if you could talk a little bit about how well you work together.

I mean, this was a big focus, you know, certainly, coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan, but in the counterterrorism effort across Africa, you know, across Asia and the Middle East.

You know, it's not just security assistance that we provide. We also want to make sure that we're providing development assistance and to do that we need, certainly, State and DOD working together but, you know, a number of other agencies.

You mentioned the rule of law being important. Department of Justice is involved in that. Certainly, when we're talking about health care, that's where you get into USAID. How well do you think that partnership is working the sort of intergovernmental approach here to go forward?

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you, Chairman.

I think the level of cooperation is really unprecedented and for a lot of that I have to thank Congress because the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, one of the big priorities as, I think, we all saw in it was to ensure that we were talking as often as possible, talking from the earliest stages of which countries and programs would we prioritize, how would we design them, how would we look at execution, and then how would we do assessment, monitoring, and evaluation, and that goes beyond kind of more traditional security cooperations to involve things like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

It really is a close-knit partnership that involves extremely regular dialogues, which I think has resulted in a more healthy and productive approach to this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. LEWIS. May I just add that I think, as we look at our foreign policy—the foreign policy of the United States—we need diplomacy, we need development and, obviously, we need to have our security assistance deeply involved as well.

And I have to say, you know, having been here for 4 months that I am truly impressed with the deep cooperation at every level, from the action officer all the way up to the most senior levels of the Department, as well as with USAID, as we look at how to counter the threats that the U.S. faces.

But also, as you point out, if we're going to solve these problems, we have to work hand in glove. One of the things I'm very focused on is security sector governance, and part of that is because of the issues that you have just raised.

We need to make sure that ministries of defense know how to procure in ways that combat corruption. We need to be talking about our American values in terms of democracy, human rights.

So—and we have to work hand in glove on all of those programs with USAID and other pieces of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.

Mr. Rogers.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity. I am the uglier version of Mr. Rogers.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. So Mr. Wittman. I apologize.

Mr. WITTMAN. That's okay, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

Ms. Lewis, Dr. Karlin, thank you so much for joining us today.

I want to go directly to what I see as a divergence in what's happening in the world as it relates to larger spheres of influence, the United States and China specifically.

As we watch China work to expand their spheres of influence what we see is a very transactional effort that they take.

They go to countries, they engage them, they build a road for them, they build a building, and in exchange for that either have an agreement for certain resources in the country, promising economic development, and that never quite occurs.

We see Chinese nationals come in and do the work, all these things, and the country afterwards goes, well, where's the benefit to this country?

Now, for years through USAID we did many of the same intended things but in a much, much different way. The Chinese with their One Belt, One Road Initiative, too, are looking to tie countries together but also to isolate.

I think there's a great opportunity there for us in many areas of the world to build or redevelop relationships, especially in countering the Chinese effort and how they do things through opportunism and through exploitive means with these other countries and I think those countries are starting to see it.

But in many instances, we haven't had the best record in what we have done to develop relationships with other countries.

So my question to this is, what do we do—twofold. What do we do to counter the Chinese efforts as they look to establish these relationships?

I argue they're transactional. And what do we do to create longer term relationships and what do we do—and how do we do it in areas that are incredibly important like Southeast Asia, like Indonesia and Micronesia and Malaysia, those areas that we know are, unfortunately, I think, moving towards the influence of China because they're watching how things are unfolding?

And do you think it begins with developing deeper economic relationships that would then lead to strategic relationships?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much. I think, Ranking Member, that you are spot on when you were talking about these—this transactional approach that the Chinese take, and I would add to that that is fomenting dependencies.

It encourages corruption. It undermines the institutions and the rule of law, and it's, as you know so well, it's just a completely diametrically opposed approach to what we do, and frankly, to what's good for that country and good for that country's people.

And so regarding your first question on kind of how we counter it, I think it's twofold. One is to shine a spotlight. Make sure that all the countries see what's happening and understand what's going on and why that's not in their long-term interest.

The second thing I would say is help them understand why our model is different, why our model of strengthening their institutions, of institutional capacity building, strengthening advisors within their ministry of defense, showing them that that alternative model, ensuring that they can sustain the materiel we give them and it doesn't break down quickly.

So that's how I would answer your first question.

On your second question in the longer term—and I'll defer to Assistant Secretary Lewis on the foreign policy elements of it—but it would seem to me that a more holistic approach, a more whole-of-government approach, does have an outsized effect.

I would just note on Southeast Asia, we're seeing some really positive steps for some of these. I think part of it is because of our—the relationships are getting closer. Part of it is, I think, that they're seeing this approach the Chinese are taking and the faults within it.

But just to take one example, in Indonesia, the chief of defense spent 8 years studying in the United States. He's trying to professionalize their military. He wants to heighten institutional capacity building with us.

So I think we're seeing some positive case studies that we really do need to build on.

Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. Ms. Lewis.

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you. I fully concur with Dr. Karlin, and I really appreciate you asking this question.

I think this is a central focus of our work right now, and we do need to—and I completely believe that not only does the United States have the best military equipment available, but what you get when you purchase from the United States is the total package.

That's what Dr. Karlin was referring to. You get the training. You get the deep relationships with us. We work with you on maintenance on all of the pieces. And as you point out, we're not coming in and you end up debt-laden and, you know, asking for minerals on the side.

And so—and I think we have focused on that. We need to focus on that both in the region itself, but I also think in Africa, in Latin America as well. And so this is a center of our focus at the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. And the gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Langevin is recognized.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me okay?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we got you. Go ahead, Jim.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Let me begin.

First, I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today. Very insightful.

Dr. Karlin, if I could start with you. Over the last week, we have seen an uptick in Chinese aggression against Taiwan, as much as the world has had its eyes on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Can you discuss the importance of activities like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative or the Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative in supporting and assuring our allies?

Mr. LARSEN [presiding]. Before they answer—this is the chair—Jim Langevin, if you could just try to be a little more clearer, directly into your microphone it would be helpful for us in the room. Thanks.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you. I'll pull it closer.

Mr. LARSEN. Did the witnesses get the question?

Dr. KARLIN. Congressman, if you don't mind, I actually only got about half of it and I'd hate to miss some of it. If you don't—

Mr. LARSEN. All right. Let's do everyone a favor and start the clock over at 5 minutes. Can we do that? I'm going to do that.

[Laughter.]

Mr. LARSEN. Love it when Adam's not here. So start the clock over at 5 minutes, and Representative Langevin, go ahead again.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you.

The question is for Dr. Karlin. Are you hearing more clear now?

Dr. KARLIN. Much better, sir.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Over the last week, we have seen an uptick in Chinese aggression against Taiwan, as much of the world's attention and eyes has been focused on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Can you discuss the importance of activities like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative or the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative in supporting and assuring our allies?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman, and thanks for your patience on the technical side.

We have absolutely seen this uptick by the Chinese around Taiwan over the last week but also even over the last few months, and I would say we are watching it very closely. We are talking to our allies and partners about it and looking at what steps that we need to take as well, because it's problematic, it is unhelpful, and it is also unsafe.

More broadly, you had cited, Congressman, these holistic initiatives, like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, the security cooperation initiative as it relates to Ukraine.

I might even add to that list things like the European Deterrence Initiative that Congress had pulled together a few years ago. What's really nice about these efforts is they ensure that we're taking a holistic approach to how we are dealing with a challenge.

Just to take one of those examples, when we look at the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, that has resulted in billions of dollars of support to Ukraine since the 2014 Russian invasion. It's also been helpful in working with Ukraine on some necessary defense reforms that they have needed to make.

So, overall, I think these efforts help us as we approach challenges in a more holistic way. Thank you.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you.

And, Dr. Karlin, if I could continue with you. You know, we understand that the concept of integrated deterrence will play a large role in the upcoming National Defense Strategy and I've long believed that no war will ever be fought again without the inclusion of cyber.

So how will cyber be incorporated into, in quotes, "integrated deterrence" both in our plans and strategies and alongside our allies?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you, Congressman. That is absolutely an area that we are looking closely at. It is really easy to take a traditional approach to conflicts and think, as we are looking at responses, what's the ground element, what's the maritime element, for example.

And we know that there are newer and different domains that we have got to account for. Cyber is a perfect example. Space is another one.

And so what's nice about the concept of integrated deterrence is it forces us to baseline looking across the different domains, looking across the spectrum of conflict, and doing that in partnership with our colleagues across the government and also with our closest allies and partners.

So this is fundamental to how, I think, we need to think about future contingencies and future concepts of operations. Thank you.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. My next question—I'll start with Ms. Lewis and then if we have time, Dr. Karlin can chime in as well. But technological cooperation with our allies and partners is critical to our success abroad.

However, we have seen various interoperability issues hindering us and our allies from quickly and effectively working together.

So what are we—what efforts are we making to ensure that we are in lockstep with our allies and partners and they are with us when it comes to our technological capabilities?

Ms. LEWIS. Well, first of all, thank you for raising this very important question, and we are focused on this—

Mr. LARSEN. Could you pull the microphone closer, please.

Ms. LEWIS. Yeah. Second time I'm having that problem.

We will—what I was saying is we are singularly focused on this question of interoperability and I know both here—both at the State Department and the Defense Department, and as we work with our partners and allies, we are looking at providing them with systems where they can work with our military and sometimes that also includes upgrading systems that they already have.

So we have worked across Europe and then with other close allies to make sure that we are moving forward with upgrading all of their equipment when necessary and, again, providing them with what they need.

On the tech side, I think I will say that we do always have to be careful as we are supplying and working with our partners to make sure that we are protecting our own technology and that, you know, is something we also work on at the same time as we work on interoperability. Thank you.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Thank you. I think my time is just about up. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the witnesses being here today.

Dr. Karlin, in the midst of Putin's war, I regret your focus on climate change based on extremist science is particularly bizarre today as the Biden policies of destroying energy jobs in America led to the United States purchase of Putin oil to finance the mass murder that's going on today in Ukraine. And now to focus additionally on electric cars with Chinese batteries by this extremist philosophy to finance the largest military buildup in peacetime in world history, which will empower the Chinese Communist Party against American families.

Getting real, instead of diverting to the environmental extremism, we need to face the existential threat of Putin today and the Chinese Communist Party maybe later today.

In light of that, to address what we're doing now, I was grateful to introduce the Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022.

This was to streamline the process of lending military equipment in defense of civilian populations in Ukraine. It's very ironic that when I was in St. Petersburg, I discovered that the lend-lease policy was largely responsible for saving Russians in the Nazi siege of Leningrad, and now we have a program that could save the Ukrainians in the siege of Kyiv by Putin.

With this particular program, is there any effort and what can be done to promote lend-lease, to promote the law that I proposed, and what can be done even without the law?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. I am not familiar with this exact law that you cite.

But I would note, broadly, that we have had a steady drumbeat of assistance and support to Ukraine, to the legitimate government of Ukraine, and to helping its military as it, quite literally, is engaging in the fight today.

We have focused that assistance, which has come together quite astonishingly quickly. I think Assistant Secretary Lewis has noted that the level of that support has been unprecedented in Presidential Drawdown Authority and we're really trying to tailor that to the needs that Ukraine's military has today and to systems that we know they are already trained on that they can employ.

Thank you.

Mr. WILSON. And, additionally, it's been cited—again, I'm really grateful. The leadership—President Donald Trump is the person who provided the first Javelin missiles to defend the people of Ukraine, and then flash forward, who would imagine how successful; now Germany is providing Javelin missiles after initially saying they wouldn't even allow the Javelin missiles of Estonia to cross their country.

And so, indeed, President Vladimir Zelensky has unified the world to defend the people of Ukraine. With that in mind, have—has the United States provided Harpoon missiles to the Zelensky government?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. You noted Germany's unprecedented move, and I will just say I think it's extraordinary to see what our European allies have been doing to support Ukraine, particularly over the last few days. It's quite literally unprecedented.

In terms of the support that we have been giving Ukraine, particularly through the Presidential drawdowns, since September there's been a wide range of support including Stinger missiles, Javelin missiles, anti-tank rocket systems, grenade launchers, more than 2,000 tons of ammunition, including mortar and artillery rounds, small arms, machine guns. It is, indeed, a lengthy list of capabilities.

Mr. WILSON. And I'm glad to see the change in policy because when I was in Kyiv in December, the plan was to provide \$40 mil-

lion after the invasion. And so, thank goodness, again, President Zelensky has been so successful.

Additionally, Ms. Lewis, back on Taiwan, we have the agreements that we have with INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] to provide defense, and on the very day that Putin invaded Ukraine there were military flights by the Chinese against Taiwan.

We need to be providing every and any item that could be provided of the most advanced equipment to protect the 23 million people of Taiwan. What is being done diplomatically to do this?

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you for the question, Congressman.

And I agree that we need to make it absolutely clear that our support for Taiwan is rock solid. We have provided \$18 billion to them in security assistance and we are going to continue to do that.

We are working on—with them on making sure that they have the appropriate asymmetric defense capabilities and we will continue to do so.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, and peace through strength. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Just for the record, 2017 U.S. imports of Russian crude and petroleum products was 3.84 percent in 2017 as a total, up to 6.87 percent in 2020, and it's increased last year. It's going to take a little while for us to turn off the momentum that started in 2017 with Russian crude oil imports.

Having said that, I want to move on to the actual situation we're talking about, and ask Ms. Karlin what details you can provide to this committee about the DOD's portion of the recent \$6.4 billion requests from the administration to support Ukraine and Europe?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. My understanding is that much of that focuses on the force posture changes and the costs that are inherent in those—the operating costs—given that, of course, while we have had a very sizable force posture in Europe, I think it's been about 80,000 or so. We have—

Mr. LARSEN. About 93,000 or so. Yeah.

Dr. KARLIN. I'm sorry, sir?

Mr. LARSEN. It's higher than that. Go ahead.

Dr. KARLIN. So it has since surged, of course. So now we have got about 100,000 either in Europe or in European waters. And so my understanding is most of that request really looks at those operating costs and then a chunk of it is looking at replenishment of stocks since we have now done kind of the third—the unprecedented Presidential drawdown.

So this would help fill some of the materiel that the military services have then been able to facilitate the transfer of to Ukraine.

Thank you.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. If Russia manages to control Ukraine so it's—so that Ukraine is no longer an independent, sovereign country, what DOD tools exist to support making Ukraine an independent sovereign country again that has control over its own borders?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. Of course, it should not go without saying that what we are seeing in Ukraine right now is completely a decision by President Putin.

Mr. LARSEN. It is a decision by Putin. There's only one president responsible for this invasion. That's President Putin. So the question I have is what DOD tools exist to support making Ukraine an independent, sovereign country? If we can just get to that.

Dr. KARLIN. Of course. Thank you very much.

Mr. LARSEN. We can give speeches up here, too. I don't really want the speeches.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. What we're doing is trying to ensure our commitment to NATO is rock solid. That has been critical to our force posture.

As it relates to Ukraine specifically, we're doing all we can to support the legitimate government of Ukraine and its military right now as it, frankly, is engaging in such a critical fight. And we understand this is a dynamic situation, one that we, of course, closely with our colleagues at the Department of State are monitoring closely.

Mr. LARSEN. If there's not a legitimate government in Ukraine at some point in the near future, what DOD tools exist to support the legitimate leadership of Ukraine?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you, Congressman. While I understand it is a dynamic situation, as I noted, we're focused on supporting the legitimate government. I'm a little wary of getting into hypotheticals right now.

But I can very much assure you we're looking at a wide range of scenarios, cognizant that further developments may warrant a relook. And I know that that is an effort that we will want to do very closely with our State Department colleagues, of course, but in particular, very closely with Congress, whose support for Ukraine has just been extraordinary throughout this period.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, I know it's something we don't want to contemplate too much openly. But I do want to contemplate that we have to have options that we have to consider from the congressional side to be supportive.

So if you're thinking about additional—the use of existing authorities or additional authorities, at least within the DOD, it'd be helpful to keep us informed of that as you move along.

Dr. KARLIN. Absolutely, Congressman.

Mr. LARSEN [presiding]. Yeah. Thanks. With that, I'll yield back and I recognize the actual ranking member as opposed to the pretend ranking—kind of tricked us all when Rob sat down.

Mike Rogers for as much time as Adam used.

Mr. ROGERS. I thank the gentleman. I only have one question and I hope you all can answer it. You know, the President has announced that he's sending additional U.S. troops over to join our NATO allies in the Eastern European Front NATO countries to help with those people fleeing Ukraine—the refugees.

We have been talking about sending additional permanent—permanently stationed troops to Romania and Poland and in the Baltics prior to the invasion, and my question is does the administration support this result that after this invasion that we make those

troop presence—make that troop presence permanent in those Eastern European Front countries?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman.

Obviously, we are following the situation really closely. As you might recall, last August or so, September or so, Secretary Austin released his Global Posture Review, which looked closely at our posture in Europe and largely saw that it was about right.

We recognize this dynamic situation now requires us to give it another fine tooth look to see what's necessary to ensure that we have got deterrence of Russia and that we can absolutely 150 percent say that NATO is safe and secure.

So we're looking at what sort of troop presence, whether it's rotational or permanent, is necessary, given this current security environment, both in the near term and, frankly, in the long term.

Thank you.

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Well, I do think that it would send a great message to our NATO allies that we are serious about what the President said in his public address a few days ago when he said we were absolutely going to do everything in our power to protect our NATO allies—their borders.

I think the best way to demonstrate this is to enhance our position there. We do need an additional brigade in Romania on the Black Sea. I'd like to see the Stryker Brigade that's moved there temporarily made permanent.

Poland has agreed to pay for basing if we would establish a permanent base there. I think that's an obvious that we should do. But also the Baltics are very vulnerable. So I do hope that you all will look at establishing permanent basing in those areas.

And with that, I yield back.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. The chair recognizes Mr. Courtney for 5 minutes.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses this morning.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I'd ask that two items be admitted to the record: an article from Reuters, which shows that Canadian oil exports actually shattered records in recent weeks.

So the notion that there's pipeline, you know, interference in terms of Canadian oil is, clearly, not being—is not in conformance with the data. Also, oilprice.com just reported yesterday or a couple days ago that the U.S. rig count has grown for the 18th straight week.

So the notion that the Biden administration is suppressing oil and gas or that Canadian oil is not coming into the U.S., as both of these industry journals indicate is, in fact, not correct.

Mr. LARSEN. Without objection.

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. COURTNEY. When we talk about ways to help our allies in the situation in Ukraine, I think, you know, one—and it's not strictly under the Department of Defense, but the approach that the administration took in terms of sharing intelligence over the last, really, 2 or 3 months is very, I think, distinctive in terms of that, you know, we did not sort of try and really pick and choose which allies we're going to get information or even the world, for that matter.

And I just wonder if you could maybe spend a minute, Dr. Karlin, just sort of talking about the thinking behind that approach and why it really helped, I think, blunt any false flag operations or any other misinformation in terms of the lead-up.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. I do think this was an unprecedented effort to shine the spotlight on Russia's plans and Russians—Russia's behavior, and no doubt we'll want to study its impact for years and years.

It was extraordinary to watch the work of the intelligence community and just how quickly they were able to do this declassification when necessary or to make material releasable to our allies and partners.

I don't believe that a day has gone by since early December where either in the Defense Department or the State Department there hasn't been a discussion with an ally or partner on what we are seeing, what we're understanding, and trying to share that.

That's been useful in ensuring that we have a common threat picture. It's also, I think, been useful to the world, to our public, so that they understand contrary to when we have seen Russian disinformation in the past, like in 2014—no kidding—who is exactly to blame for what's going on and that is solely President Putin. Thank you.

Mr. COURTNEY. That helped in terms of making sure there was no daylight with our allies in terms of everyone's understanding of what, in fact, was going on. Is that right?

Ms. LEWIS. One hundred percent. And I think we have really seen NATO, Europe, our allies and partners around the world come together and speak with a united voice against what Putin is doing inside Ukraine. And I think this effort—again, I have to join Dr. Karlin in commending the intelligence community for the unbelievable work they did, A, in producing the intelligence, informing policymakers such as yourselves, and then making sure that it was accessible to our allies and partners so that they understood what was going on.

I know at the State Department that this has been a key part of the conversation that we have had on, literally, a daily basis.

Mr. COURTNEY. You know, as long as we're talking about unprecedented efforts by the administration, I'd like to just spend a second on AUKUS, which, again, is, obviously, the crown—it's sharing technology that, arguably, is the crown jewels—nuclear propulsion technology, which we have done with only one other country back in 1958 with the U.K. [United Kingdom].

And, again, I would just note that the public opinion polls in Australia after that agreement was announced were over 60 percent approval and very little opposition, which I think has really gone a long way in terms of reasserting the fact that we're serious about that alliance with that country.

But could you also just comment for a second on the fact that there's other aspects than just submarines and that there's other ways that AUKUS is going to strengthen our bonds, and also that it's not exclusive just to the three countries?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. I really appreciate that you brought up AUKUS, which is this historic effort to

knit together our country, Australia, and United Kingdom with a serious robust technological security partnership.

The undersea piece is probably the first one. I think it's the one so many of us have focused on, but it's very much expanding, looking into key areas like artificial intelligence and quantum as just two of them. And I think, frankly, this unprecedented effort is critical to Indo-Pacific security.

I think when we look at, you know, our relationship with Australia, just to take that as, obviously, one that is historic, Australia has fought next to the U.S. military, I think, in just about every conflict over the last 100 years or so.

As we see how we can get into the most sensitive technological cooperation, I think it just puts us in a very different ball game. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.

Dr. DesJarlais.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.

I'll start with Dr. Karlin. In your opening statement, I was pleased to hear your emphasis on the importance of integrated deterrence and, as you know, the foundation of integrated deterrence is our nuclear deterrent.

As the Biden administration undertakes its Nuclear Posture Review, have you solicited input from our European allies in your preparation for the NPR?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. Indeed, we have and we have done it at a wide variety of levels from the Secretary of Defense all the way down to the desk officer.

We have done it closely with our colleagues at the State Department and at the White House, and we have really done all we can to ensure we're hearing from our European allies and also, I would note, our close allies in the Indo-Pacific—South Korea, Japan, and Australia. Thank you.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. What are you hearing from them in terms of the nuclear declaratory policy? That seems to be a hot topic and there seems to be indication that there may be a weakening of the no first use in terms of the Biden administration. What are our allies saying in regards to that?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman.

In this wide variety of discussions, we have heard a lot from our closest allies and they—the importance that they also put on extended deterrence, as we do.

We have talked to them a lot and heard their thoughts on our need to have a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, and we have ensured throughout these conversations that we are getting their inputs and that as decisions will be made by the President, of course, that we are in close discussions with them. Above all, I would just underscore that our extended deterrence commitments remain ironclad. Thank you.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. I personally have had members of countries such as Poland reach out to me stressing the importance of not adopting a no first use declaratory policy, and I know that

that's been in the talks, considering Russian strategic nuclear exercises.

I think that it's important that we do the right thing there and I think that—the impression I get from our allies is that they would not want us to have a no first use declaratory policy.

So I would just add that. Also, there's been mention of dropping our low-yield nuclear weapons program, and do you have any insight on that?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. I would say the Nuclear Posture Review, which has been a really rigorous interagency effort since, gosh, July or August or so, has really looked holistically at our nuclear capabilities, tried to tie them to our understanding of threat scenarios, the impact they have on deterrence, or the impact that they have on assurance.

And I think that once final decisions are made on that you'll see that, and once those decisions are made, I'd be more than willing to sit down and speak with you or your staff about this. Thank you.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Thank you.

Let's shift to China. We have kind of nibbled around this a little bit today. Obviously, what's going on with Russia and Ukraine we have to keep our eye on China and Taiwan. You know, we have seen Chinese military planes regularly probe Taiwanese airspace, accompanied by overt threats from Beijing towards Taipei.

Would you say that the current allocation of security cooperation resources is appropriate to the level of threat that Taiwan faces?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. We're actually looking at this exact issue right now to ensure that how we allocate security cooperation is in line with our National Defense Strategy, which we are in the throes of wrapping up.

We have got to ensure that it is aligned to our biggest concerns and that includes Indo-Pacific security as a top priority.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. For both you and Ms. Lewis, I understand that Taiwan has made requests to the administration for access to foreign military financing dollars. It is apparent to me that if any country has needed this funding, it's Taiwan. What has been the cause for the delay and would congressional action help expedite this request?

Ms. LEWIS. Well, first of all, I really want to thank you for the question because I do think we need to continue to focus on China and Taiwan even at this moment where we are, understandably, looking at what's happening inside Ukraine.

And I think as you may know, we have provided over \$18 billion of foreign military sales to Taiwan since 2017. We are always looking at ways to enhance that and improve their capabilities.

We're particularly focused, as I mentioned before, on building the asymmetric capabilities of Taiwan and we are working with them on a regular basis to do so.

We're always happy to continue to work with your office and other Members of Congress with additional ideas and ways that we can do so effectively.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you both. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gallego is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GALLEG0. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for joining us today.

I want to start by offering my thoughts to the people of Ukraine as Russia continues to launch an unprovoked and wholly unjustifiable invasion in Ukraine. I want to make myself very clear that the United States stands with Ukraine. Champions of freedom and democracy around the world stand with Ukraine, and Russia will not go unpunished, as the Biden administration is demonstrating.

Ms. Karlin—Dr. Karlin, I apologize—thank you for your testimony. In your written remarks you described the way the Department approaches security cooperation with states on Russia's and China's periphery differs from how it's employed elsewhere.

One of my proudest accomplishments in Congress was leading the effort last year to authorize the Baltic Security Initiative, a security cooperation program providing targeted support to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

As Russia continues to directly threaten European security, how do you see security cooperation with the Baltic States, going forward?

What more do you think the Department can and should do through security cooperation vehicles to support our most vulnerable NATO allies at the time—at this time of heightened tensions?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman.

We absolutely want to ensure that our security cooperation programs are tailored to the needs of that country and also to how and in what ways we might want that country to think about the use of its military.

And those front line partners, whether in Europe or in Asia, are going to inevitably have different needs and different requirements. We are in very consistent deep talks with the Baltic States to ensure that they're getting the support that they need, and what is, I think, just so notable about this time period is not just the security cooperation kind of discreetly but, more broadly, the force posture changes that we have seen as well where we're seeing NATO members, really left and right, putting their troops in one another's territory.

So I think those conversations have gone very smoothly to date. That is not least, I think, because of the efforts that you have made in ensuring that they are getting the prioritized assistance, and over these coming weeks and months, I think it will be important that we take this concept further to ensure that they are receiving what they need.

I think, you know, just to take those countries as examples, we see capacity. We see capability. We see political will. We see appropriate context.

We see countries that follow the rule of law and human rights. So a lot of the criteria that we think about, they really do follow in spades. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEG0. Thank you.

And Dr. Karlin, I believe it's essential that we have greater flexibility in providing this crucial support to our Baltic allies.

As you know, section 333 of the title 10, U.S. Code, is the Department's primary authority for training and equipping to build partner capacity. What is your assessment of 333? Are there other

further steps that the Department should take to make the best use of it?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman, and my colleague may want to add on this topic as well.

But I would say the reforms that Congress put in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act really brought together this patchwork of authorities. They enabled greater focus on collaboration between State and DOD and also this push on assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

I think we're seeing that flexibility, on the whole, is largely in a good place. To the extent that it is possible, however, to get funding that lasts beyond 1 year, those longer term programs, what's nice about that is we can design them more holistically. We can ensure that temporally there's enough bandwidth to execute them on time. Thank you.

Ms. LEWIS. Congressman, thank you for raising the Baltics and thank you for the hard work that you and many others have done. And I do think the Baltic Security Initiative has been incredibly important in increasing the funding that those countries receive.

I also think it's notable that those countries often work together as they look to band together, literally, to increase their security and I would also—it would be remiss of me not to mention the unbelievable support they have also provided to Ukraine at this time and I think we all owe them thanks for that.

On your second question, in terms of security cooperation and security assistance writ large, I echo Dr. Karlin that we believe that the way that we work together is incredibly important to both the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

I would also add, on the State Department side a lot of our funding is earmarked, and so we would look for additional flexibility, particularly to be able to respond to situations exactly like we find ourselves in in Ukraine so that we can both help continue to support Ukraine but also the eastern flank states, including the Baltics, moving forward. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GAETZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our partnerships have value but they also have costs, Dr. Karlin. Saudi Arabia is a country that still tolerates anti-Semitic madrassas. They throw gay people off of buildings. They murder their critics.

The Saudi consulate in LA [Los Angeles] gave material support to 9/11 hijackers, who were predominantly Saudi, and we trained some of their pilots in my community in Pensacola and one of the people we were training killed three of my constituents because he was radicalized by al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula.

What comfort can I give my constituents that the Department is doing everything possible and putting pressure on our partners to ensure they're doing everything possible so that the people involved in our training programs don't pose a threat to our force?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman.

I'll focus just on the part of who we train and Assistant Secretary Lewis may want to give the broader picture.

We have a whole lot of very serious vetting procedures in place to ensure that the individuals—the units we're working with are following the rule of law, are upholding human rights, and when we see something is not happening as it should, we immediately pause and study so that we can understand what's going on and if we have concerns about our assistance and how it is being employed.

Mr. GAETZ. Ms. Lewis, do we have confidence that that process that failed, you know, in this particular case in Pensacola has been improved upon since then?

Ms. LEWIS. Yes, and let me take a bit of a step back, first of all, to say I appreciate you raising the question and I know how important this is to both you and the entire community.

So thank you for raising it. And I know that both the State Department and the Department of Defense are always committed to doing everything we can to make sure that we're protecting our communities here at home.

But yes, we have worked hand in glove with the Department of Defense to improve, and we'll continue to do so, vetting in all of our programs. I think one of the key pieces that we look at is making sure that these programs are there to strengthen and deepen our relationships with these countries and at the same time that they do make sure that we have the right people coming to them. So happy to continue—

Mr. GAETZ. Yeah. I would greatly appreciate, for the record, if there's a way for either of you to extend those remarks on specific ways that there might have been improvements subsequent to that terrorist attack in my community.

And speaking of less than fully helpful Gulf monarchies, Ms. Lewis, what is the administration's reaction to the UAE abstaining in the Security Council? They lobbied so hard to get the seat on the Security Council and here, this highly consequential conflict, they seem to be less than entirely cooperative with our position.

Ms. LEWIS. Well, and I'm—appreciate the question, and I think that as we look at the relationship with the UAE, we have a robust relationship with them. To just take a step back, as you know, we have—UAE has recently faced threats from the Houthis and we have been supporting them—

Mr. GAETZ. And we have helped them.

Ms. LEWIS. Exactly.

Mr. GAETZ. Why won't they help us?

Ms. LEWIS. I think we are having a robust conversation with them, asking them to continue to work with us in this situation on Ukraine.

Mr. GAETZ. Is the administration disappointed with the abstention?

Ms. LEWIS. I think the administration has asked all of our friends and partners and allies to support us.

Mr. GAETZ. Yeah, but this is a specific one because like you say, we have helped them with the Houthis. We have sold them a bunch of stuff. The chairman wants to accelerate the delivery of F-35s to them. And I'm just wondering, are we disappointed that they abstained?

Ms. LEWIS. I think we have concerns about that, and we are working with them and talking to them about that, moving forward.

Mr. GAETZ. Are you confident in a change in position in the UAE, given that we're now seeing reports that Putin is targeting civilians in Kyiv?

Ms. LEWIS. I'm not comfortable speaking for another country on what they may or may not do, but I think you're raising legitimate questions about moving forward. I know that they're—while we have been here, I think, there are votes potentially or discussions happening right now in the United Nations, and I will continue—

Mr. GAETZ. Like, what's the timeframe—the window of time that the State Department evaluates as, like, the essential window to get the UAE off the sidelines, given their position on the Security Council?

Do you think that this has to happen in the next week for it to be effective or do you think we can have sort of a long drawn out dance of the veils with the Emiratis?

Ms. LEWIS. I think that as we look at this relationship with the Emiratis, as we do with all of our relationships with our partners, our allies, and our friends, we have to both be able to work together on the critical security issues that we share and also raise concerns when we do have them.

Mr. GAETZ. Final point. Do you think a reason they abstained is because they haven't gotten the MQ-9s and the F-35s yet?

Ms. LEWIS. In my view, we have worked very closely with them and are continuing those conversations on the MQ-9—

Mr. GAETZ. But do you think that's a factor in the abstention?

Ms. LEWIS. I'm not able to speak for another country on their thinking, but I do know we are—we continue to be committed on both the MQ-9s and the F-35s.

Mr. GAETZ. Maybe we shouldn't be. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, Secretary Lewis and Secretary Karlin, for being here.

This hearing on the importance of allies and partners is coming at a critical time. The strength and resolve of our alliances and relationships are being tested more than they have been in decades.

I want to thank President Biden and his administration for the commitment to address the Russian invasion of Ukraine in close coordination and collaboration with not only NATO allies but partners across the world.

While the tragic situation in Ukraine is far from over, we have seen a great value of being unified economically, diplomatically, and militarily. A go-at-it-alone strategy would be ineffective. My thoughts are with the Ukrainian people and stand in solidarity with Ukraine's effort to repel Putin's invasion.

Secretary Karlin, when we discuss U.S. security assistance provided to our allies and partners, often it focuses on the sale and export of defense articles.

However, the tangible assistance is limited if the receiving nation doesn't have the institutional knowledge and personnel ready to fully operate and maintain the assets. How does the partner na-

tion's ability to maintain U.S.-provided security assistance factor into the scope of capabilities provided?

What have you found most effective at improving operational and maintenance capabilities with partner nations?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman, and I couldn't agree more with your initial comments about the unity that we have seen and how crucial that has been for effectiveness.

This issue of maintaining and sustaining equipment that is given to allies and partners is crucial. We have a really robust program in place and use monitoring program to ensure that the materiel that we have given our allies and partners is being accounted for so that the right folks have that materiel.

More broadly, we spend a lot of time working with them on the procedures needed for sustainment. What we don't want is for them to have a situation where they have some sort of platform or asset but they haven't really taken good care of it, and therefore, are not—are not ready and able to use it.

So it's crucial. I would also say, frankly, it's one of the top points that we emphasize in the utility of this partnership. We don't want them to have an airfield full of planes without spare parts that don't fly.

That's not in their interest. It's not in our interest, at the end of the day. So it really is crucial to how we approach security cooperation. Thank you.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Dr. Karlin.

Secretary Lewis, while I know each partner nation has unique political dynamics and security needs, is there a particular tool capability that the U.S. provided or provides to partner allies through security assistance programs in addition to what was just mentioned—through security assistance programs that has been most effective at advancing the State Department's foreign policy objectives?

Ms. LEWIS. Well—and thank you for that question—I actually think one of the amazing things about our cooperation is that we really do have a range of tools that, I think, working together with any given country can move our foreign policy objectives forward. So we have arms transfers, which I think is what people talk about the most frequently, where we're providing other countries with the capabilities that they need and that match our foreign policy goals.

We also have other programs like International Military Education and Training programs where we really bring together and bring into our training programs the senior military leadership and future leaders. That, I think, is incredibly important.

I have been focused on and really am delving into the question of security sector governance. So this is the concept of how can we work not only to provide capabilities but also to increase the effectiveness of, for example, ministries of defense; how can we provide training so that when countries are procuring, the system is designed to make sure there isn't corruption, that when they're designing their training programs that they're taking a look at things like human rights, international law.

All of these tools have to come together. And I would also be remiss to mention that it's not only our security cooperation and security assistance, but we have to work hand in glove with our di-

plomacy but also with our colleagues at the U.S. Agency for International Development as they also work on things like writ large rule of law in a country that then feeds into our work.

And so I look forward to working with you and your staff as we continue to address these important issues.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I'm out of time. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here today.

What's going on in Ukraine has just been heartbreaking, to see what's happening to the Ukrainian citizens. Today, we're seeing reports of mass murders, indiscriminate killing, really, war crimes, and my perception of what has happened is the security order has changed. It's probably going to be changed for decades.

What Putin is really saying is might makes right. I'm a bully. You can't stop me. And so—and the only country that can do that is America standing up with our allies.

I've only had, really, one feedback—constructive criticism of the administration leading up to this. I think we should have sold or given Ukraine more advanced air defense and anti-shipping capabilities. They could surely have used that this past week. And then once the invasion occurred, I thought the sanctions were a little slow.

But now, I think, we're in a pretty darn good spot, except for what I would like to see is also go after energy. The fact that America is going to be giving Russia today \$70 million to purchase oil—their oil exports to us—and we're going to do that every single day, is propping up their economy and it's propping up their ability to wage war.

So, hopefully, we take on the energy exports of Russia as well. I'm also the co-chair of the Baltic Security Caucus. I know my colleague talked about this briefly.

But the number one feedback we do hear from them is they would like to have U.S. troops permanently assigned in the Baltics for deterrence. Have we considered that and is that an option, from your perspective? Thank you.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman, and I couldn't agree more with you on your diagnosis of the situation that we are seeing around Ukraine. I think it is, indeed, heartbreaking and I think we will feel and see the effects of it for years to come.

And that actually does get to the Baltic security piece. Thank you for your leadership on that one. As you may know, Secretary Austin has made multiple trips, in fact, to the Baltics in—just over the last few months, in fact.

When we're looking at our permanent posture in countries, we're really trying to take into account a wide variety of criteria, and I think, given the changes that we have seen in the security environment right now, it's incumbent on us to step back and look at how things have changed.

So when Secretary Austin announced the Global Posture Review results last fall, I think we had seen our posture in Europe was about right and now we need to step back and see what's changed

and what does that look like, whether that's rotational, whether that's permanent, whether it's different types of units or capabilities. Thank you.

Ms. LEWIS. Just to add, and first of all, I really want to thank you for your remarks. I do think it is heartbreaking what's happening and I think the security order has changed and that we all need to come together at this incredible moment in history, and, again, watching the Ukrainians fight for their country has truly been inspirational, I think, for all of us.

On your question on the Baltic security, as I mentioned before, they have just been—they have also been extraordinary.

Mr. BACON. They've led.

Ms. LEWIS. Really, and they probably understand the threat better than most, given the map. And, as I mentioned before, we really appreciate the congressional leadership on this front.

I think the Baltic Security Initiative has allowed us to provide additional funding to them. I also think one of their strengths is that they work together as they look at capabilities, moving forward, and we are going to continue to work with them on that from the State Department side of the house.

Mr. BACON. You may want to consider putting air defense units, U.S.-run, you know, whether it's longer range air defense or a variety, because I think you got to protect your long-range air defense with short-range.

Maybe we'll put some air defense capabilities there with U.S. forces. But having a U.S. flag there, a permanent one, is a deterrence. The Russians will know they're not just going into the Baltics.

Of course, they're a NATO country, but they are attacking U.S. forces when they do so, and I think it would have a—I think it would have a reassuring effect for the Baltics who are very small, as you know, about 5 million people.

So my second question—and there's only about a minute left—is Taiwan. What can we be doing now with Taiwan weapons-wise to strengthen deterrence? What kind of capabilities can we be giving them?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you, Congressman. I'll briefly say, as I think you know, we have done about \$18 billion in assistance to them since 2017. Right now, we're working very closely in line with the Taiwan Relations Act to ensure that they're getting the asymmetric capabilities that they need that are really tailored to the threat that they face, a threat that as we know and as the Chinese keep trying to remind us, is growing each day. Thank you.

Mr. BACON. Thank you. Again, anti-shipping and anti-air capabilities seemed to be the coin of the realm for what the Taiwanese would need as well.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes, and he's virtual.

Bill? Mr. Keating.

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. He does not appear to be responding. Mr. Keating?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Crow is recognized while we try to get a hold of Bill.

Mr. CROW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both of you for coming. This has been a very productive and illuminating discussion and I appreciate your approach to these things.

To kind of expand the discussion out a little bit, you know, we have these various alliances in different forms and structures. The EU [European Union] appears to be stepping up and looking more seriously at taking on a more military role, which, of course, has been a subject of discussion for some time.

Obviously, we have NATO. We have the Quad. We have AUKUS. We have these formal and less formal relationships. What do we need in Asia and INDOPACOM and do we need something more formal for those that don't fall within Quad, don't fall within AUKUS, to engage them more substantively?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. And just to tie to your first piece on the EU, I think what we have seen them doing is pretty notable vis-a-vis Ukraine, and to the extent we can ever get more European capacity and capability that is a good thing wherever it is.

On the Indo-Pacific, I think two pieces really stand out, outside of AUKUS, of course. One is how we can better knit together Southeast Asia. A lot of that work—obviously, ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] is really important in that, and I would say we're seeing with our Southeast Asian partners increasing concern about the changing threat picture.

The other piece is that Quad in Asia, so how we're better able to bring together those countries. We have these really strong bilateral alliances there, as you know.

Any effort we can bring to get them all to cooperate in a multilateral fashion is better, and I think—I'm optimistic then when we are sitting here 5 years from now we'll have a really positive story to paint on the progress of these alliances and, in particular, on the investments of a lot of these countries in their militaries, which is, on the whole, on a really positive trajectory.

Mr. CROW. Thank you. And, Ms. Lewis, I have a slightly different question for you that I wanted you to lead on, and Dr. Karlin spoke about this earlier.

But a critical part of our value proposition here and what really differentiates us is the fact that we do look at anti-corruption. We tie in humanitarian aid, foreign aid, which really, I think, is a huge value added.

Yet, that remains very compartmented, right, and very siloed within the U.S. Government. It is very slow. It's not always tied together. Do we need different authorities?

Do we need to restructure the way State Department and DOD work together with USAID and others to be fast, to be nimble, and to really bring that value added in the way that we need to in the 21st century?

Ms. LEWIS. Well, thank you for that question because I think it gives us an opportunity to talk about the future and where we want to go. I think at this point and in this moment what we need to do is to continue the good work we're doing and expand on it.

And I mentioned security sector governance a few minutes ago and I think this is actually a very good example of where the different pieces of the government come together and it really hits on the points that you're talking about.

So if we're working in a country, we want to be able to be sure that, for example, that as USAID is working on—with ministries of defense on things like rule of law that, concurrently, we are also in our training working with the ministry of defense on making sure that there's training provided on things like international law, the law of war, preventing civilian casualties, human rights; and then at the same time as we do our training through our International Military Education and Training program that those are being reinforced as we deepen and strengthen our ties.

So, for me, it isn't an authorities question. It's really, are we doing that effective coordination, working with each other. I think right now the coordination is good. We can always continue to improve it, and would be happy to continue this conversation with you.

Mr. CROW. I guess—I appreciate what you said about the authorities, right. The authority exists. You can do it. But as we all know, culture, parochialism within the executive branch, other issues, prevent that from happening.

So, I guess, for the record—you know, we're running low on time here—but it'd be really good for us to know, as legislators, whether there are things that we can proactively do that would help you all with that mind set shift, that cultural shift, that's really necessary to achieve that, because this is, like, a huge cruise ship, right, and turning it around or changing direction, obviously, very hard for you all.

We want to be a partner in that and we want to help you, and if there's things that we can do proactively and legislatively or from an appropriations perspective to accomplish that, I know there's a bunch of us who'd be very interested in helping.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Moore is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MOORE. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member. I join the chorus of my colleagues emphasizing the relevance and importance of this critical hearing. Thank you for being here.

Our NATO alliance faces the greatest geopolitical crisis in nearly two decades. I don't think I'm overstating that. China continually bullies neighbors on the Indo-Pacific. Our adversaries' nefarious activities spread beyond their borders as Russia and China seek to expand influence both here and at home—at home and abroad.

Right now, more than ever, the United States must aggressively initiate, cultivate, and expand partnerships and alliances. It's crucial to both of your roles and in the DOD to be able to do that.

With very few exceptions, when given the choice potential allies will choose the United States as their preferred partner over peer competition. Having just recently returned from Israel, that's never more apparent than their appreciation and willingness to engage in our—in partnerships with us.

They—many allies have even had a dialogue and they've voiced the desire to purchase more equipment and expressed frustration at how long the process takes.

So a question for either or both of you to respond. Beyond the reforms mandated by the fiscal year 2017 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], how can we accelerate security assistance to qualified nations, considering our new geopolitical reality?

Ms. LEWIS. Congressman, thank you for the question.

And, first of all, I'd like to say I fully agree with what you started with, at the moment that we're in in time and the importance of focusing both on Russia and China and our alliances that we need to strengthen and deepen them as we work on that.

In terms of your question on speeding up the process, really, I look at this as a four-legged stool. We usually say three-legged but in this case four-legged stool.

We start working with our partners at the Department of Defense who really have to engage in a complicated technical process with the countries and the companies involved—if there are companies involved—on the exact details and exactly what capabilities this partner may need, and that does take some time.

It is important work. These are very sophisticated systems that we are providing to other countries.

Then it comes to the State Department where we provide a view from—a review from a foreign policy perspective, which, generally, we're able to move relatively quickly, depending on the challenges.

And then we come to Congress and you also are a partner in the—moving these forward. And then, finally, we have the companies that are producing the defense articles.

I will say that one challenge we're facing right now is that, unfortunately, due to COVID [coronavirus disease], a number of our countries are facing challenges on production timelines.

I know that's something that I've been in regular conversations with them about as they're trying to improve that and get these incredibly important capabilities out to our partners, allies, and friends.

That is something we also need to continue to work on in terms of shortening the timeframe and moving forward. Thank you.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. I absolutely concur with all of Assistant Secretary Lewis' great points in terms of our efforts to try to speed this up. I think in doing so it's also really important that we make sure we're not just taking kind of an Excel spreadsheet approach to our assistance and, in particular, that we are taking a meaningful effort to understand what impact are our programs having.

Are they meeting the objectives, operational and/or strategic, that we have outlined. So we're really trying hard to measure that and that is not least thanks to Congress putting it into the 2017 NDAA that you had cited, sir.

Mr. MOORE. That [inaudible] very well into my next question. The question is, to what extent do you feel our approach has met its intended goal, and particularly about counterterrorism?

The DOD made a decision to expand beyond legacy security assistance authorities, like foreign military sales, and pursue comprehensive partnerships to train and equip foreign partners. To

what extent do you feel these have been effective? Is there an area of improvement here?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much. You're absolutely right that we have really seen a shift, particularly in the post-9/11 era, in how we have thought about security assistance, and on the whole, I think a lot of these efforts have been really quite effective where we have seen a number of our allies and partners help deal with terrorist threats around the world and doing so in appropriate ways, doing so in ways that are upholding the rule of law and following human rights.

So I think that has been an important innovation, as one might call it, in our approach to security assistance. And I think we have also been able to see, particularly as, say, you know, the ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] threat metastasizes across Africa, it's been important that these relationships continue to evolve so that we're working with partners to ensure we're all understanding how the threat network is changing and how we can most effectively continue to get after it because, unfortunately, it does not appear that—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. I apologize.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keating, we're going to give you one more shot. Are you with us? I see that smile. There we go.

Mr. KEATING. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You are—you are recognized for 5 minutes. Go ahead.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank the witnesses for their work in coordination with our allies and partners, which brings me to an important question, I think.

What is the extent of your coordination and cooperation in regard to trade and other agencies, particularly the areas of the supply chain?

We're seeing now in Russia with export controls—we will see the devastating effect it will have not only on their economy as a whole but also on their security and their military.

In the same time, we have seen with the pandemic the effects of supply chain shortages to our country. So with your two departments, are we also coordinating on issues of trade and the supply chain? Could you comment on the extent to which you're doing that?

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you for that question and, actually, this just came up in the previous question, and I think you're right that we really are at a unique time both in terms of the question of the supply chain due to COVID but then also the issues that you raised that we're going to see related to the Russia context.

We have been in close contact, particularly with the companies that we work very, very closely with, on their supply chain issues as it relates to COVID.

As I'm sure you're aware, defense articles are incredibly complicated, sophisticated, and it takes a lot of work to produce them, and we need to work closely with the supply chain to make sure that that's working effectively.

So the short answer to your question is yes, we have been in touch with the companies. Obviously, we're in touch with the other

departments when relevant to see if there's anything they can do to be helpful.

I do think this is going to continue to be an ongoing challenge, even as the companies work hard to get the situation moving more quickly.

Mr. KEATING. Yeah. I think—at all—are you doing anything with the Commerce Department at all in that regard? Because I see the need to integrate this more because our weapons are relying on semiconductor chips, other technological material.

So without those kind of securities, you know, it poses a great threat to our assets. So are you in contact with those agencies directly or would you anticipate making that more meaningful in the future?

Ms. LEWIS. I know that the State Department is regularly in contact with the Department of Commerce on a whole range of issues, including depending where they fall weapon sales, and we will continue to do so.

I think it is—you raise a very important issue and we will make sure that we continue to coordinate with them and even expand that coordination.

Mr. KEATING. Lastly, too, I'd just like, on the record, given all the comments I've heard in the last few days from Members of Congress, one interruption to the supply chain, one part of our security is dealing with the climate change issue—you know, increased instability, the effects of migration, the infrastructure damage.

Look at Tyndall Air Force [Base] and the devastating damage there in Florida, as well as Camp Lejeune, the threats to Guam and the Marshall Islands. I could go all around the world with this.

Can you just comment on the importance of partnering with our allies and friends on the issue of climate change? It is, indeed, a security issue. Would you comment on that?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. It is absolutely one that we are watching closely, whether it is seeing how climate change is affecting the security environment for our allies or our partners or our competitors. But also, as you're noted in—noting in citing Tyndall Air Force Base, it also affects our own forces in particular and their ability to maneuver.

So it is something we look at closely and that we regularly engage in discussions with our closest allies and partners. Thank you.

Mr. KEATING. I mean, lastly, it's quite obvious we can't do this alone, an issue like that, and that's, indeed, should be a priority for our engagement with our allies and partners.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back, with time left.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Green is recognized for 5 minutes.

Dr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate you putting this hearing together and for the opportunity to discuss alliances and partnerships around the world.

Given the incredible events—heinous events—of the past week unfolding in Ukraine, I'm proud to be joining with my colleagues to work on developing our response to Vladimir Putin's naked greed and aggression.

In order to do that, though, America must have clear and united response to this invasion of a sister democracy. During my recent

visit to Ukraine and discussion with Polish and Baltic allies at NATO headquarters en route to Kyiv, military and civilian leaders alike directly linked a lack of American leadership in Afghanistan to Putin's misguided attempt to test the West's resolve, and I'll quote one of those NATO representatives who said, "Where we are today is because of weakness in August." We all knew what he meant. American leadership is indispensable.

It's crystal clear. President Biden's failure to send timely lethal aid in the past year, though, has been a continuation of that weakness.

American leadership is essential, leading and engaging with our partners around the world. The stair-stepped approach to sanctions implementation has only emboldened Putin. It's time for genuine resolve.

America cannot tolerate an iron curtain falling upon the people of Eastern Europe for a second time in our living memory. The torch of freedom that burned so brightly under American, British, and NATO leadership just four decades ago must not be allowed to go out.

We must join the Ukrainian people in our boldness, our determination to face down any threat to our freedoms and interests around the world. We must reclaim our heritage of standing firm with friends against tyranny. We must lead.

Vladimir Putin thought he was claiming the mantle of Peter the Great in rebuilding a Russian Empire. But as the Ukrainian people have shown him to be, he is nothing more than a petty tyrant. His attempts to conquer and subjugate the proud people of Ukraine, divide the West, and supplant American leadership around the world have failed.

From the streets of Kyiv to the smallest villages in Ukraine, patriots are standing up against this invasion. NATO and our freedom-loving partners around the globe are more united than in decades, and the world is rejecting the leadership of autocrats in Russia and China.

I look forward to hearing more from you guys as we further support and add our cooperation in historical alliances and NATO and develop stronger bonds of friendship with our allies in the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific, such as India, to prevent any further escalations from the tyrants plaguing our world.

My first question is about, specifically, India, and what are we doing to help persuade India regarding the S-400 and parts that they're purchasing for the aircraft they bought from Russia, specifically?

Ms. LEWIS. First, I really want to thank you, I think, for your comments on Ukraine and, particularly, recognizing the fight that the Ukrainians are literally carrying out as we speak.

Dr. GREEN. Pretty awesome.

Ms. LEWIS. It is. It is extraordinary, and I think also what you mentioned about the world more united than we have seen in decades, and I think that is a tribute to our allies and partners and, frankly, to the Ukrainians themselves.

But to get to your more specific question, we have been working closely with India, as you know. Had regular conversations about them—with them about the Russian purchases, and we are looking

to create a whole relationship with them where they are looking towards us as they move forward with additional purchases.

And I think as we also look at things like the Quad and the deepening relationships that we're having there, that will help move us forward with them. I really believe that this—particularly as they see the threat from China right now, I think it has really helped move them forward in understanding the need to shift this relationship.

Dr. GREEN. If I could jump in there, though, I have a particular interest in India just because I think the geopolitics of the world they're just so incredibly important. I appreciate Secretary Blinken, especially, in the efforts he's made with the Quad.

But I'm seeing posts—I follow political leaders in India and I'm seeing posts like, can we trust America? Look what they did in Afghanistan. These are elected officials in India's government.

So, I mean, what options are we giving them for alternatives to Russian stuff and how are we communicating to them that we're reliable?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. It's an issue that like you, I think, is a real priority.

In fact, about two decades ago, my first Pentagon job was being the India desk officer under President Bush and that's when we really shifted to this dramatically different relationship, which, as you know, was geostrategically important and has—

The CHAIRMAN. And I apologize. We're going to have to cut it off there. The gentleman's time has expired.

Dr. GREEN. Perhaps in writing then.

Dr. KARLIN. I'd be delighted. Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 82.]

Dr. GREEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Slotkin is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you. Thanks for being here. And for those who don't know, happy paczki day. That's a big holiday in Michigan. I have paczkis over here for anyone who wants them. It's like a Polish jelly doughnut that we all celebrate with.

So—okay. They're over here, guys.

[Laughter.]

Ms. SLOTKIN. Okay. So I guess, you know, what is going on between Russia and Ukraine is so incredibly unbelievable to watch, both the Russian decision and calculus to do this, the Ukrainian resistance, which is formidable, and then the way that it has galvanized the international community.

And I will say that over multiple administrations, Democrat and Republican, we have tried to minimize, basically since the Cold War, friction with Putin and with Russia in the hopes that it wouldn't exacerbate a problem—it wouldn't inspire retribution for the Russians.

And I guess I just feel like that era is over, that all of our attempts to minimize friction didn't mean anything and he went ahead and made this move, and I think it's a sea change for how both the Defense Department and the State Department should think about our presence in Europe, our assistance to Europe.

And so I guess I just want to clarify a couple of things. What is the official administration position on letting in countries like Kosovo, Bosnia, potentially, Georgia, Finland, and Sweden into NATO? Very quickly.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you. Couldn't agree more, Congresswoman, that we're in a different ball game right now and we all need to step back and assess that.

I would say regarding new members of NATO, there's not kind of an effort to fast-track folks. But there is an effort to work with those who are interested and who meet the necessary requirements.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Right. I know. But that's been our process before, and I would offer that if the answers that we're getting—and I say this as someone who was in your exact positions testifying in front of this committee in 2014 when they put little green men into Eastern Ukraine.

If we are using the same metrics and same assessments from before this conflict as we will be afterwards, then we're not—we're missing the moment here, and I'd ask you to come back to this committee maybe in another month's time and just tell us how you've changed your thinking.

And I would strongly advocate that we seriously consider a different approach to letting folks into NATO and not slow roll those who we're just trying to drag out, and I've done it myself.

Number two, the build-up in the Baltics. Couldn't agree more with my colleagues who have talked about putting more force in right now, and I guess I would just make that as a point as opposed to a question, that we need to be doing more and, obviously, China is watching everything that we do.

But I know we're right in the middle of this. It's still a very fresh and new event. But for any administration to go through this, we have to completely reevaluate deterrence and how we reestablish it and I'd ask that we have folks come back to the committee to present on that.

On the assistance, we get really confusing messages about what is being provided and when by not just us but also our allies. We were told in a briefing yesterday that EU members were providing aircraft. Now we're seeing online that no one's providing aircraft.

If you all could come up with a routine where we would get maybe a regular update, just something that a staffer could put together, so we know what's true and what's not true, and the final mile of making sure that assistance gets in the hands of the Ukrainians, not just shipped and it sits somewhere but it gets there, because we know that's going to be more complicated.

I guess, lastly, I was wondering if someone could give us your sense of how this plays out in Ukraine over the next week and a half. I know that's not your specialty.

But we're in the middle of this crisis. People are watching. Can you tell us what you think is going to happen? We heard it privately but I'd like to say publicly—hear publicly what the Defense Department thinks is going to happen over the next week and a half.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you. And we can absolutely look at getting you those materials that you requested on the aid. I would just say

our European allies are doing so much that folks are working on, on keeping track of it—so thank you for that—over this next week and a half.

I think what we have seen is the Ukrainian military is fighting so incredibly hard. I mean, the political will they have demonstrated is extraordinary, and I think that we have seen it has been a lot more and a lot harder than Putin and his military would have expected.

I would continue to expect that they will do all they can. Assistance, as you know, is flowing to them and I think that they will try to continue to push back this invasion to the extent possible.

Unfortunately, as you probably saw this morning, in particular, we have seen that the Russian military is prioritizing just increasingly horrific approaches, in particular, indiscriminate bombing. Thank you.

Ms. SLOTKIN. I would just say you have an absolutely unique moment where the U.S. Congress has bipartisan agreement on giving you what you need and we're not getting an ask. Ask us for things and we will help—

The CHAIRMAN. And I'm sorry, the gentlelady's time has expired, and I think that is a very reasonable request to get that very focused ask for what it is you want us to do.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 82.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lamborn is recognized.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Right now there is sitting in the docket here in our House business a \$6.5 billion dollar aid package for Ukraine. Two and a half billion of that is humanitarian. And yet, we're not doing anything.

What I've heard is that we're going to wait a week and deal with it in a week from now. In the next week, aren't there civilians who are going to be dying in Ukraine?

Aren't their soldiers who are taking up arms who are going to die? Isn't there property that's going to be destroyed? Isn't there going to be hunger in Ukraine? Why in the world can we wait a week to deal with this?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. In particular, I would say that we have been pushing a lot of assistance to Ukraine and to its military and are looking very closely at the humanitarian situation in particular, and we look forward to cooperating as much as possible over these coming days and weeks on this situation.

Mr. LAMBORN. Ms. Slotkin is exactly right. There's bipartisan support. We could have passed this last night on a voice vote. It's wrong for us to wait a week to do this. Do you have any influence?

Can you talk to anybody and say, let's bring this up today—let's get this going? There are people dying in Ukraine right now. There's a 40-mile convoy of Russian tanks and armor going to Kyiv.

Ms. LEWIS. Congressman, I think you raise a very important point about the urgency of the current situation, and while, obviously, I can't comment on specific legislation or timing here, I can tell you that at the State Department and the Defense Department we are committed to moving forward expeditiously.

As you may know, over the past year we have provided a billion dollars of assistance to Ukraine on the security side, additional on the humanitarian side, and just over the past 6 months we have used three Presidential Drawdown Authorities, which is this ability that we have to move items from the Defense Department to Ukraine, including the largest package ever in the history of the United States, which is the most recent one we did of \$350 million, and we will continue to do so.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I would like you both to go back and tell people at the White House that they need to do something to get our leadership off the dime. They're doing nothing here in the House. We could be sending this money to Ukraine, and people are literally dying and will die in the next week needlessly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Back to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I will say lest someone gets the wrong idea, while, certainly, you know, the House can pass what it's passed, there is a ton of money that is flowing out of the United States of America right now to help the people of Ukraine.

Fortunately, as we all know, it does not require congressional action to do all of that. In fact, part of the brief yesterday was the administration explaining that they were using executive action to send weapons and to send humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

So it is completely wrong to say that we're doing nothing. I mean, it's not even in the neighborhood of being true. We're doing a lot. However——

Mr. LAMBORN. Mr. Chairman, no one said we're doing nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Sir, I thought that's exactly what you said just a second ago.

Mr. LAMBORN. No. I said there's a \$6.5 billion package that——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, reclaiming my——

Mr. LAMBORN.—we're doing nothing on and we could be passing it.

The CHAIRMAN. Reclaiming my time. And you did, at one point, said—and said we're sitting here doing nothing. You were referring to Congress. I grant that. But Congress is part of the whole large picture here and we have given money to the administration. They are doing that.

Now, we can look at it and see are there things that the administration can't do on the executive side that requires us to then approve more money, and I get that's perfectly fine and we need to look at that and do that.

But I just want to make perfectly clear to anyone watching this, the United States Government writ large in the last couple of weeks is sending money, is sending weapons, is sending arms. You were in the brief yesterday when you heard that.

So let's be clear on that, that that is happening. And now, you know, Congress needs to look at whether or not we need to send more money, whether or not we need to give them authority to do that, and that's, perhaps, why we're waiting to make sure that we do this right.

But while we're waiting to pass congressional legislation, it is not the case that nothing is happening. It is happening. If nothing was happening, then I would be right there with you to say we got to

pass it yesterday. It's a matter of combining those things. I just want to make sure we understand that.

Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Lewis, as the chairman said at the opening of this, we do security and defense aid better than anyone in the world here in the United States, and so what I'm wondering is where do we stand on development aid?

Not everybody wants a new F-18. Some states want a new road or bridge, and we have really seen China capitalize on that.

And as Dr. Karlin stated, they've done that in a way that we are really diametrically opposed to. So if the prevalence—if the pervasive nature of Chinese influence and infrastructure is anything to go by, we seem to be losing ground in countries across the world, including not just across Africa but in Europe and South America, to China.

What can we do specifically to begin to rectify this?

Ms. LEWIS. Well, thank you very much for the question, and I think the question of how we compete with China across the world is really at top of mind, and I also want to commend you because I think you're raising it's not just in the region.

It's how we're competing across the world. So while my piece of the State Department handles the security assistance, which is what you mentioned, in terms of providing arms transfers and security assistance to the ministries of defense, and training as well, we do work hand in glove with USAID and other pieces of the State Department which are focused closely on the issues that you raise.

And I think, as you point out, China has really focused in their Belt and Road Initiative on things like building infrastructure. I would note that countries often end up in a terrible debt cycle from that, which is truly disturbing, and not in their long-term interest or, frankly, in the interest of our foreign policy.

So I think we have to—from my piece of the State Department, we have to work together and one of the things that I've been talking about here is something that I've been very focused on, which is security sector governance and I think it gets to a little bit of what you're talking about.

When we're working with countries, we need to make sure that we're working on infrastructure but that we're also working on justice, making sure they are complying with international law, that they're taking care of their own citizens.

I think that bringing those American values as well to our assistance is critically important. Would be happy to work with you and your team as we continue to look at ways to do this better and to expand our work across the world.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you. And also, as we look forward to supplying Ukraine with defense aid, do we have plans in place to ensure that as Russia encircles different areas as the invasion continues, we still have supply lines open to get that aid to our Ukrainian friends?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much. We're looking absolutely hard at that. As the conflict continues, we want to ensure that all of the

good materiel that they need is getting into their hands. So I can assure you that that's a real priority.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you, and I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mrs. BICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing today and thank you for our witnesses.

Like my colleagues on this committee, I have been closely monitoring Russia's ongoing, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine over the past few days as it continues to worsen significantly overnight.

Putin's widespread assault against an innocent country is an atrocious act which has jeopardized the stability of Europe and peace across the globe.

I'm glad to see the U.S.-imposed sanctions are starting to have real impacts on Russia as the ruble hit a record low and the key interest rates have more than doubled overnight.

But more must be done. The Ukrainian people are fiercely defending their homeland and we should take every action to ensure they have the tools needed to withstand this violent attack and I look forward to working with my colleagues on the committee to do that very thing.

A couple of—a couple of things I want to throw out here. First of all, Ms. Lewis, can you talk about the State Department's efforts to help stem our allies' collective imports of Russian oil and gas?

Ms. LEWIS. First of all, thank you for the question, and, again, wholeheartedly agree with your opening comments about what's happening inside Ukraine, particularly today.

While I don't actually work on the question of oil and gas myself, I do know that the State Department and in coordination with other departments is working on that across the board and looking at a whole range of options there.

I'm happy to take that back and provide you with more information.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 82.]

Mrs. BICE. Okay. Thank you. I want to follow up with, you know, certainly, regional partnerships are incredibly important and to prevent Chinese aggression what are we doing specifically to help in that area to stem the potential issue that could—we could be facing with Taiwan?

Looking at countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Australia, how are we working together with them to create some sort of partnership or alliance should China pose a threat to Taiwan in the future?

Ms. LEWIS. Thank you very much. It's an issue that absolutely we are profoundly concerned about. So there are a couple pieces.

One piece, of course, is just our support to Taiwan—\$18 billion since 2017 or so—and really helping ensure that the materiel they're buying is tied to the asymmetric approach that we think is probably best for them to take, given the threat.

With all of the countries you mentioned, we're putting forth a ton of effort to strengthen their military, its capacity and its capability. We're looking hard at our force posture in Japan and Australia,

those two that you cited. We have been making some good steps on that.

So there's the bilateral piece and then, of course, multilaterally. To the extent that we can try to tie East Asia tighter together with Australia, that's an important step.

You had mentioned the Philippines—so I would say Southeast Asia, as well, where—just to call it the Philippines for a moment—we're seeing some really positive progress on the human rights front with their military, which is pretty heartening. Thank you.

Mrs. BICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Escobar is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses for your work and for your testimony at this hearing.

Our hearts are with the Ukrainian people, who are literally fighting for their lives, their country, and their values, and who are living through a nightmare because of an unprovoked attack by Vladimir Putin.

We have been horrified by the war crimes as well as the unfolding humanitarian crisis. I want to begin by expressing my immense gratitude to President Biden for doing the hard work of rebuilding critical alliances, for rallying NATO, ensuring that we had a strong coalition of support for Ukraine.

After the prior administration alienated our allies and gave cover to our enemies, it was no doubt a difficult task to unite our friends once again. I'm proud that the United States currently has an administration committed to the transatlantic relationship and to leading the globe in defense of democracy with strength and integrity.

I also, for our witnesses, I want to echo what my colleague, Representative Slotkin, mentioned in her advocacy for a different approach to letting countries into NATO. We need that different approach immediately and we, indeed, need to meet this moment with urgency.

I have the honor and privilege of representing El Paso, Texas, which is home to Fort Bliss, America's second largest military installation and largest joint mobilization force generation installation in the Army.

The U.S. and her allies must continue to rally against the threats that we're seeing across the globe and work cohesively to deter and defend one another against aggression from adversaries.

For Ms. Lewis, I want to kind of shift the focus a little bit more broadly. Many of the biggest purchasers of U.S. weapons, like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey, the Philippines, also tend to be willing to violate human rights and disperse weapons to groups not friendly to the United States.

I'd like to know how are human rights factored into U.S. policies on arms sales and other forms of security assistance, and what is the State Department doing to strengthen its ability to evaluate risks in weapons transfers?

Ms. LEWIS. First of all, I also appreciate your opening comments on Ukraine and the serious situation that they are facing today.

To turn to the question on human rights—and this is a critical question for us at the State Department—I think, as you know, the President has said that he wants to make human rights at the cen-

ter of our foreign policy and that means that when we work with partners, friends, and allies where there may be concerns about human rights that I believe we both need to strengthen and deepen those relationships and, at the same time, raise those concerns.

In terms of how we specifically work on human rights, you may be aware that we are currently working on the updates to our conventional arms transfer policy, which is the policy that governs across the interagency all of our work in this area. And I think when that does come out you will see a renewed focus on human rights as part of that policy. So I think that's step one.

In addition, in terms of the State Department, we really work hand in glove with our colleagues at the Bureau—the DRL Bureau [Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor], which is the bureau in charge of human rights, to make sure that as we look at these arms transfers, human rights is taken into account and considered.

Finally, in addition, as we work with our partners in terms of our education—military education and training programs, we also have specific programs designed to help with civilian casualty mitigation, and then we work in conjunction with a whole wide range of programs from the State Department and USAID on human rights writ large.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you.

Dr. Karlin, I have a question for you but I'm out of time.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jackson is recognized for 5 minutes.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rogers, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today.

NATO is a partnership which is vital to deterring aggression and responding when dictators and terrorists bring evil to this world. I just returned from the Munich Security Conference, and it's clear to me that our allies do not see us as the leaders that we have traditionally been.

The weapons and resources that we're providing are important, but we need to strengthen these partnerships and continue to invest properly in critical NATO training, like the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program, which is hosted in my district at Sheppard Air Force Base.

In 2017, President Trump took action to restore NATO to being the global force for good that it once was. He forced delinquent members to start paying their dues, ultimately accounting to hundreds of billions of dollars in helping NATO prepare for aggression like we are currently seeing from Russia.

Ukraine's defense of its sovereign territory has been admirable and inspiring. Yet many don't realize that it was the Trump administration that helped Ukraine to prepare for this.

Under President Trump, security assistance and defense articles were sent to Ukraine to give them the capability to defend themselves and that is exactly what they are doing as we speak.

Prior to last year, our allies knew the United States had their back. But now I'm concerned that we are losing that trust and confidence of these same allies.

When I was at the Munich Security Conference, we had some very candid conversations with many of our strongest allies, trying to reassure them that the United States would not leave them behind.

Dr. Karlin and Ms. Lewis, what have you been hearing from our allies and partners about whether or not they can trust the United States to be a leader on the global stage and is there anything more that we can be doing to reassure our partners?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman, and thank you for your focus on this issue. I really appreciate your initial comments about speaking with our allies. I think we have spent a lot of time with our allies.

In fact, I noted earlier that, particularly over the last 3 months as we have seen this intelligence, I don't think a day has gone by where there hasn't been an ally or partner discussion on this topic with the Department of Defense or the Department of State.

And I think we have seen that come to fruition. We have seen allied unity, which seems pretty—almost unprecedented, if not actually unprecedented. We have also seen allies giving a lot of support to Ukraine and to one another.

So it seems to me that we are at a special moment for the alliance and a special moment for leadership and I think we want to do all we can to encourage that because, at the end of the day, we're just so much more effective when we can be together. Thank you.

Ms. LEWIS. Well, first of all, I fully support Dr. Karlin's comments and I really appreciate what you raised in terms of NATO and the importance of NATO at this critical moment.

I think, from my perspective as the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, on a daily basis—minute-to-minute basis—often overnight, we are literally working with our partners to make sure that the vital equipment and defense items that Ukraine needs, that it is getting those items.

I have to tell you, I—you know, certainly, in my time here I have never seen NATO and Europeans come together, and like, as I said, we are—one of the tools that we have in our toolbox is something called—it sounds like a technical term, but it's very important—it's third party transfers.

What this means is if the United States has provided a system to another country and they want to transfer it to a third country, they have to ask first, which is a good thing. But in this case, we have been literally flooded with the Europeans coming to us and saying, we have this, we know the Ukrainians need it, can you move quickly to make that happen. I think it's extraordinary.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you, Ms. Lewis. I'm going to [inaudible]—because I have one more thing I want to throw in there—it's a little bit of a plug for my district, to be honest with you.

But the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program is in my district in the world's only internationally manned and managed pilot training program. Fifty percent of all U.S. Air Force pilots come from this program, and partner nations such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway send all of their fighter pilots through this training program in Wichita Falls.

We need to make sure—I mean, it’s really important that we’re given the resources and the weapons that we need, but we need to make sure that we are investing and prioritizing NATO training as well and, specifically, these NATO pilots that we’re training for potential war with Russia or China. It would be a mistake, I think, not to take opportunity to try to prioritize some of this training as well.

Dr. Karlin, what is the value of the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Programs to the Department of Defense and in what ways does DOD seek to expand and build on this program, moving forward?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. While I can’t speak to this specific program, what I can tell you is you’re hitting all of the key issues that are vital to NATO—how are we training one another, how are we working on interoperability so that we can do exercises together and so, God forbid, if we have to deal with a contingency we can do so together.

Dr. JACKSON. Thank you. I believe my time is up. I yield back. Thank you both.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Khanna is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this hearing and thank you for your leadership in Munich and working with the speaker and the administration to rally our NATO allies in a strong response to Putin’s invasion, unconscionable aggression, and now reports of war crimes.

I wanted to focus on the Wagner Group, which has laid, according to some reports, the groundwork for Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine. It’s a brutal group, as many of you know, and has been identified by the Treasury Department as a designated Russian Ministry of Defense proxy force.

There’s been reports that it’s done Russia’s bidding in Syria, Libya, and parts of Africa. I’d like to hear from both of the witnesses on what the Pentagon and the State Department know about the logistics chains that support the Wagner Group.

Are they involved at all right now in Ukraine, and what is being done about addressing the Wagner Group?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman, for bringing up this important issue.

I think we have seen efforts by the Wagner Group in various places and they have been profoundly worrisome. I think you put it quite well in your opening statement in terms of their relationships and their focus.

In this forum, I don’t believe I can speak about some of the operational efforts that they have undertaken. But I’d be more than willing to do so separately.

Suffice to say—I think it is safe to say that they do not have the security and stability of various regions as their top priority.

Ms. LEWIS. If I may add—

Mr. KHANNA. Please.

Ms. LEWIS [continuing]. And I’m very glad that we’re getting to have a conversation about the Wagner Group here in this forum, and I think when we look at what they have done across the globe—and I am very concerned, particularly in Africa, as they

really are exploiting insecurity as a catalyst and they're using that destabilization in very, very dangerous ways.

I believe that the Russian government considers chaos as a strategic asset and it raises the costs of the involvement for strategic competitors.

So I think you are right to be focused on this topic. We continue to be focused on it around the world, and happy to continue the conversation with you, as Dr. Karlin said, on more specifics in another setting.

Mr. KHANNA. I appreciate that. Are any of our allies supporting the Wagner Group that we know of or are we making every effort to make sure that anyone we're allied with or selling weapons to is not in any way aiding the Wagner Group?

Dr. KARLIN. Congressman, I can't say offhand that any are coming to mind. But we can take that back and look into it. I think, on the whole, most of our allies and partners have seen this group for what it is.

Mr. KHANNA. Okay. If you could just make sure that—I mean, I don't want to throw out any names and reporting and cast an aspersion that may not be true. But there've been some reports that some of our partners may be supporting some of these groups, and if you could just make sure that the United States should make clear, obviously, anyone we're submitting—shipping arms to should not in any way be linked to the Wagner Group and I assume that's U.S. policy. Is that correct?

Dr. KARLIN. Congressman, we could absolutely take that back and get you a response—a written response—on that one. As I said, I'm not familiar with any allies.

We can look at partners as well. And if we are seeing it, frankly, then we'll want to highlight it to them since we do not see this as a group that foments stability or security. Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you very much. I appreciate both witnesses and, I guess, would, you know, reiterate my concern on this group's activity, their blatant violation of human rights and say that I am very supportive of the Department of State and Department of Defense doing anything possible to stop them and make sure that they're not getting funding or arms.

Mr. Chair, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Banks is recognized.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Karlin, Germany's reliance on Nord Stream 2 hindered their response to support Ukraine. It took a military invasion, a threat of a nuclear attack, and persistent calls from allies for Germany to support Ukraine with a thousand anti-tank weapons and 500 surface-to-air missiles.

Dr. Karlin, why was Germany hesitant to defend a sovereign nation from invasion that's just 400 miles away from their own border?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman.

While I can't speak to the thinking in Berlin, what I can say is that we have seen an extraordinary change by Germany's government in recent days.

They, as you probably know, had a law that they wouldn't support countries in active conflict. That has completely changed. We have been pushing them for a very long time to invest more in their military.

That is completely changing. Indeed, the trajectory that Germany is currently on, given these recent events, is extraordinary and I think it will have outsized effects for European security. Thank you.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you. Should the U.S. change our military-to-military relationship with Germany after they hesitated to act against Russian aggression or if they—if we see a pattern of this in the future?

Dr. KARLIN. Congressman, I think we would want to take a broader look at our relationship. Germany, for example, also hosts tens of thousands of U.S. troops and plays an important role in European security in other ways. I think, particularly, given the steps that we have seen, this is a crucial relationship. It's crucial not just for European security, frankly, but for global security. Thank you.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you.

Ms. Lewis, the U.K., Poland, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium—they all committed weapons and equipment to Ukraine before Germany did. Why do you think Germany waited so long to send weapons to Ukraine?

Ms. LEWIS. Again, first of all, thank you for the question.

And as Dr. Karlin said, I can't speak to the exact mind set there, but I do want to take a moment to note what you mentioned here, which is the extraordinary effort we have seen across Europe and now, obviously, including Germany.

I think, as I mentioned before, the part of the State Department I work in we oversee those transfers from—of U.S.-origin equipment from one country to another, and I think across the board this has been an extraordinary effort and we're happy to continue to work with all of the countries who are close by and able to provide Ukraine with what it needs.

Mr. BANKS. So no thoughts or no discussions at the State Department about why Germany followed instead of leading the rest of these countries?

Ms. LEWIS. I'm not aware of any discussions.

Mr. BANKS. Okay.

Ms. Lewis, Germany is Russia's largest trading partner in Europe. Six thousand German companies do business in Russia. Is it time for us to rethink our alliance to ensure that our allies share our national security goals?

For instance, should we consider an alliance of democracies that share a strong desire to counter Russia and China?

Ms. LEWIS. Well, I think that, across the board, we do have partners and allies and friends and alliances where we are working together to counter Russia. To take a step back out of the space that I work in particularly, which is related to security assistance, we have seen Europe coming together really in an unprecedented way, with sanctions, looking at, as I just discussed, arms transfers, condemnation of Russia's actions, and I think we need to continue to work with all of them to make sure that we work—we move forward hand in glove.

I think us being united is really what, in some ways, Russia fears most and I think that is the message that we need to carry forward.

Mr. BANKS. All right. Thank you.

Dr. Karlin, at a Center for New American Security forum last December, you said, quote, "Our thinking on deterrence has declined a bit," end quote, since the 1990s after the Soviet Union disintegrated, you were referring to.

In light of the conflict with Ukraine, I'm concerned that the Biden administration isn't taking deterrence seriously enough. How are we supporting and improving Taiwan's military to ensure that we are not—that they are not the next target for an invasion?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman. I would just say post-Cold War and post-9/11, I do think we didn't focus on deterrence as much. Secretary Austin's emphasis on integrated deterrence I think is pushing us in a slightly different place, and I think Taiwan is a perfect example.

As you know, we are cooperating very closely in line with the Taiwan Relations Act to help Taiwan build its military with defensive capabilities, and in particular to do so with the asymmetric capabilities they need to counter what is unfortunately an ever growing threat. Thank you.

Mr. BANKS. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Jacobs is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses. I want to note that a couple of my colleagues have raised the issue of respecting human rights in our security assistance and making sure that it aligns with our values, including you, Mr. Chair, and I wanted to follow up on a couple of specific programs.

In particular, I'm concerned that there are certain security cooperation authorities that are not subject to Leahy vetting, like section 127(e) and 1202 programs.

So, Assistant Secretary Karlin, could you clarify whether either of these programs are currently subject to Leahy vetting?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for raising this, Congresswoman. We absolutely prioritize Leahy vetting. My understanding is that ensuring that our partners are following human rights is a key priority in everything that we do.

So while I cannot speak at this moment as to whether or not Leahy vetting exactly applies, I can promise you that we are looking at how and in what ways our partners and allies are appropriately following human rights.

And if they're violating them, then that means we need to have a relook and have a different kind of conversation. And if there are any specifics that you'd like me to take back, I'm more than willing to do so either now or, of course, separately.

Ms. JACOBS. Perfect. Well, I will look forward to working with you to get in writing some more clarification on that question of Leahy vetting and those two programs, and how we're making sure we're not providing security assistance to units that are committing gross human rights violations.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

Ms. JACOBS. I want to turn now to the Sahel. We have seen a proliferation of coups over the past year, almost all of which have involved militaries that have been trained by the United States including Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso.

How has the development impacted State and DOD thinking on who we provide security assistance to? Many of these countries had issues with human rights violations in the past, particularly in Burkina Faso and Mali, and lacked robust security sector governance and democratic progress. That made this kind of challenge predictable.

In fact, when I worked at the State Department five or so years ago, we were working on security sector governance in some of these countries because we knew it was a problem.

So what signals are we sending about our values when we provide security assistance, despite these challenges, and what does this say about our stabilization and good governance efforts in the region, more broadly?

What tools are underutilized to better address these challenges, and how do we make sure, moving forward, our security assistance is leading towards what we want, which is secure and democratically governed and human rights abiding governments?

Ms. LEWIS. Well, thank you for the question.

And I am very committed and I think it's important that you raise this question of security sector governance, and I think you're right, that as we work with countries we need to make sure that we're looking at this across the board whether it comes to human rights, whether it comes to making sure that—and I keep coming back to this but I think it's important—that procurement systems are set up in ways that keep corruption from happening.

And so I think across the board we need to do that in every country we're working in. I think you raise legitimate concerns about what's going on in Africa.

We are watching that very, very closely, and we always want to be promoting democracy and making sure that any training that happens in our programs supports that effort. And I would be happy to continue to work with you as we continue to look at these questions.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for raising this really important issue. I think the end state you outline of our goals of the security cooperation is exactly right—secure, democratically governed.

I wholly align myself with Assistant Secretary Lewis' comments, and I would say the examples you cited are profoundly worrisome and when we see those occur, we do need to immediately step back and study why that did occur. Oftentimes, of course, it's due to kind of much bigger political reasons within a country.

But, ultimately, that doesn't really provide a country with more security or stability. Thank you.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you, and I will look forward to working with you both on making sure that we are having a coherent, cohesive strategy on our security sector programs, especially in Africa, to make sure that we're not perpetuating and feeding into these

challenges and adverse incentive structures for these governments that we're partnering with.

And with that, Mr. Chair, I'll yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Horsford.

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for testifying today.

In the past weeks, we have seen the vital role alliances play in effectively countering and responding to the destabilizing actions of rogue states like Russia. We have also seen the extraordinary value of long-term capacity building with our partners through the deployment of advisors and regular multilateral training events.

The training U.S. advisors have provided to our Ukrainian allies over the past years have made them a far more lethal fighting force, and added unique capabilities to their armed forces, such as the effective employment of Javelin missiles.

I believe these types of training missions and military-to-military partnerships are foundational to strong and resilient alliances and are also one of the most cost effective mission sets conducted by the Department of Defense.

As the Department continues to address the pacing threat of China in the Indo-Pacific, I hope that these exercises and missions will receive the attention and funding they deserve. U.S. Army Pacific is well positioned to build and maintain strong relationships with strategically vital nations in the Indo-Pacific through exercises like Pacific Pathways.

These exercises are mutually beneficial. They benefit the host nation militarily, economically, and diplomatically, and also allow the United States and allied nations to place combat power forward to deter aggression.

Secretary Karlin, how do exercises like Pacific Pathways allow the joint force to build capacity and trust with partners in the Indo-Pacific, counter China's influence, and preposition forces to deter China's—Chinese aggression against Taiwan?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman, and I just want to say how much I appreciate your emphasis on training and exercises. I think, oftentimes, when we speak about security cooperation folks focus on the materiel piece.

But as you absolutely note, the training is crucial to ensure they know how to use the materiel, but also the exercises and those are really helpful for a couple of reasons.

First of all, they're really good for our forces. They have our forces test things out.

Second of all, they're useful for interoperability, helping us figure out with our allies and partners who does what, how do we do that.

And third of all, I would emphasize, they're pretty useful for deterrence and reassurance. You highlighted China. I think it is quite clear that China is watching these exercises.

They watch when they grow in sophistication and, in particular, they watch when our allies and partners grow ever more capable. Thank you.

Mr. HORSFORD. So how would increased funding for these exercises contribute to U.S. strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much. Looking at resources, of course, it would really matter how they get best distributed. I could

imagine that certain exercises could be made larger or other countries could perhaps be invited into them or they might be longer.

I'd probably want to look at kind of how and in what ways those are used. But as you underscore, exercises are really critical both to our partners' capacity and also to our own. Thank you.

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you.

With the reduction of forces in Central Command following the end of our mission in Afghanistan, I'm curious if regionally aligned forces like the 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade could be better applied to U.S. strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific.

Again, Secretary Karlin, as part of the Global Posture Review, how has the Department reprioritized these specialized partner-building forces to increase capacity in the Indo-Pacific?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman.

The security force assistance brigades [SFABs] are pretty new. They were only started a couple years ago, and I think we have seen them really have an outsized effect in various regions.

I think, particularly going forward, we need to think about where they're best placed and how they can best rotate. But I would say offhand, we have seen them in Africa play a helpful role.

I have to assume that, as you say, the Indo-Pacific is one as well. So it's really a matter of looking at kind of all the tools in our toolkit.

But these SFABs, they've been a really positive innovation by the U.S. Army. Thank you.

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Panetta is recognized.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both to the witnesses for being here, obviously, talking about the important topics of our allies but also the way we work with our allies in order to deal with the situations at hand, be it in Ukraine or be it with China.

I want to hit on my California colleague's questions on the Wagner Group. I think that's very fascinating, to be honest with you. Especially what's going on in Mali and the fact that it was Mali where they had Operation Barkhane and the French were in there, as well as 15,000 Blue Helmets of the United Nations were there as well.

Unfortunately, the French have decided to leave based on the fact that Mali has decided to, I guess, contract with the Wagner Group for certain security purposes. I set that up with that, basically, talking about hybrid warfare and how we are working with our allies in dealing with hybrid warfare, basically, before we have to send troops in.

And so if you could just give us an overview of the resources that we are doing in working with our allies to counter hybrid warfare but also the challenges.

Do our allies have some of the technology, some of the capacity, to deal with those types of challenges that we're dealing with when it comes to hybrid warfare?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman.

I share your profound concerns about the Wagner Group, and as the French are relooking their role across the Sahel, we're really

working closely with them to understand how and in what ways we're understanding the terrorist threat there.

I'm really happy that you brought up hybrid or gray-zone warfare. Unfortunately, we've seen a lot of examples of it over the last few years, and in terms of allied cooperation, I think the most important piece is, frankly, how we counter disinformation.

That's important because it sort of has the first-level impact of how we understand the threat and how they understand the threat.

You know, what we have seen, I think, masterfully over these last few months is that Russia has really not been able to flood the system with effective disinformation because each time they try to do so we and our allies are immediately pushing information about here's what's happening, here's who's doing it.

When we can have that common threat picture it just makes it a lot easier for us to then deal with these hybrid challenges.

Mr. PANETTA. So, basically, countering it with the truth is what you're saying?

Dr. KARLIN. A thousand percent, and countering it early and countering it often. So that as we saw, I think, in 2014, the Russians managed to shape the narrative and seep in a lot of doubt about what was going on. That made it hard for the U.S. response. It made it hard for our allied response.

And I think part of what we see is so different with 2022's tragedy in Ukraine compared to 2014 is that there is zero doubt about what happened and who is to blame for what happened, and I think that's helped result in just this unprecedented effort of allied unity and response.

Mr. PANETTA. Next level beyond disinformation, what would it be?

Dr. KARLIN. Beyond disinformation—I think another way of dealing with gray-zone or hybrid conflict is really showing how our militaries can cooperate and, in particular, actually, per the earlier question, in terms of exercises.

So gray-zone is an attempt to kind of hit just below the threshold to test us out or to test our allies and partners out, and to the extent our competitors see, say, through our exercises that those efforts aren't actually going to work, that they are not going to achieve their objectives, then they're going to be a whole lot less likely to try them.

Thank you.

Mr. PANETTA. Great. Great. Thank you, Doctor. Thank you. Mr.—I could stretch this out.

[Laughter.]

Mr. PANETTA. I yield back.

Mr. KIM [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.

I'm going to recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Dr. Karlin, I wanted to just kind of start by asking you how do you think we're doing when it comes to allies and partners? You know, what kind of grade do you give ourselves now?

Just trying to get a sense of your baseline, because I was looking through your testimony, thinking through what it is we can improve. But I'm just curious where you think we're starting from right now.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman Kim.

I'm a little bit of a hard grader so I would probably give us a B+ or so. In particular, I think we have made a lot of important changes in how we do security cooperation. A lot of that is tied, frankly, to Congress—to the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which forced us to cooperate a whole lot deeper—Department of State, Department of Defense.

It really streamlined a patchwork of authorities and, above all, it really pushed us to do meaningful assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. So we don't just focus on inputs and outputs but are we meeting our operational and strategic objectives.

So I think we're on a very positive trajectory compared to where I might say we are 5, 10, 15 years ago. Thank you.

Mr. KIM. Now, you know, you rightfully pointed out that, obviously, two of the biggest challenges that we face, going forward, one China, one Russia, right now we're obviously faced with this global challenge when it comes to Russia.

We have seen NATO and our European partners really step up in big ways. But I'm curious how you would assess our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. What has been their response to what we have seen with Russia?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much, Congressman, and Assistant Secretary Lewis may wish to add to this.

In particular, I would say, our Indo-Pacific allies and partners and China are watching this very, very closely. They're watching the steps that we take and they're also watching just the extraordinary unprecedented steps that a lot of our European allies are taking.

What I've seen, in particular, among our Asian allies and partners is a real focus on the economic piece and how they can be helpful on that front vis-a-vis the Russia conflict. Thank you.

Ms. LEWIS. And, really, I just would add that I agree with Dr. Karlin. I do think, as we look at our partners in Asia and allies and partners and friends, that they have seen the united front against Russian aggression.

I think that sends a very clear message. I think that what we are consistently hearing is that they are strongly in support of what NATO, Europe, and the United States are doing.

Mr. KIM. Would you say that the response by our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific has been equivalent to what we have seen from our European partners?

Ms. LEWIS. I don't want to sort of measure one or the other. I think our European partners are literally physically closer and so are able to respond in real time in the ways that folks who are further away—

Mr. KIM. Many of our Asia-Pacific partners are very close to Russia as well.

Ms. LEWIS. That's true. They're closer—I am thinking more specifically in terms of the role that I play, which is that we work on these third party transfers where we're able to help make sure that equipment—U.S.-origin equipment—that's inside other countries in Europe is able to be transferred to Ukraine.

Mr. KIM. The reason I just kind of mentioned this is that I'm trying to get a sense of how things would play out, you know, if we

were to see a crisis emerge much more squarely within the Indo-Pacific.

I think we have seen NATO, who's an organization that's been tested, an organization that's had its mission changed a couple of times.

But, obviously, we have a much more kind of diffuse situation in the Indo-Pacific in terms of different types of structures that are there.

So I guess my question to you is when we—if we were to see something much more squarely in the Indo-Pacific, whether that's about China in the future, how confident are you that we would see our partners there step up and to the level that we might be seeing with the Europeans right now?

I'm just kind of curious what your assessment of that level of health is of that partnership.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for that. I think what we have seen is a strengthening of our allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific in recent years, and also with our Europeans. So just two examples I'd quickly offer are AUKUS and then the Indo-Pacific Quad.

I think as China has engaged in increasingly problematic behavior, they're all growing closer together and growing increasingly worried.

So I think we're on a very positive trajectory to recognize and then to deal with this growing challenge. I will, at least, be very curious to watch how, as this conflict further unfolds in Europe, our Indo-Pacific allies and partners—what lessons are they taking from it.

I think Assistant Secretary Lewis was spot on when she said they see the power of unity and how effective it is. Thank you.

Mr. KIM. Great. Thank you so much. I'm going to hand it over to Congresswoman Chrissy Houlahan for 5 minutes.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate you guys hanging in there. I've been out and in and you've had to be there the entire time.

I have so many questions that I actually don't know where to start. One of my questions has to do with Article 5 and it has to do with cyber incursions, and what defines a triggering mechanism in terms of cyber incursions, assuming attribution, where we would assume that we were defending NATO allies, either ourselves or otherwise.

I'm watching the news go by and I'm seeing that there's all kinds of shenanigans going on in the cyberspace, some of them coming from industry, to be honest, and what—I worry because I understand that we have pretty emphatically said there will be no boots on the ground and there will be no American response.

But I do feel as though we're in a different world now with cyber issues and want to understand if there's been a great deal of thought put to what that would look like, what would be the triggering mechanism for that.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for raising this. And I would just broadly say NATO has made great strides in thinking about the cyber domain and thinking about how and in what ways escalation differs in that domain and how it can play off of others.

And I think it was just under a year or so ago that NATO effectively said, we have got to think about cyber the way we are thinking about those other domains.

So I can assure you that is a very hot topic of conversation and I think, unfortunately, we're getting some case studies to test out what that will really look like. But at a minimum, what is really nice compared to 5, 10 years ago is there is some profound focus here on it and a desire by a lot of our NATO allies to invest in cyber capabilities, cyber resilience.

Assistant Secretary Lewis may want to add to that a little bit.

Ms. LEWIS. No. Look, I agree 100 percent with what Dr. Karlin said, and I do appreciate you raising the issue because this is one that may—unfortunately, may be before us shortly.

I do think there have been a lot of discussions about what is the best way to evaluate this, moving forward. I also think that as the Department of Defense continues to focus on hybrid warfare it's not only a relevant question related to NATO and Article 5, but really, as we look across the world and for ourselves as well, I have been pleased so far that we have been able to come up with good answers with our allies and partners.

But we're going to continue to need to work on those definitions and responses.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Yeah, and I think that what worries me is that we don't have a plan. We'll know it when we see. It's going to become sort of a case study in action, as near as I can tell, when we have to make decisions, I think, on the fly about what merits some sort of threat to us or to our allies, and that concerns me.

This activation of the NATO Response Force is kind of related in the sense that it's a profound, pivotal moment in our history. And speaking about case studies, is there a plan to make sure that we're documenting and capturing the lessons that we're learning from this activation and possible employment of this response? And are we making sure that we can learn lessons—historic lessons—from what's happening right now?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for raising this point. NATO is actually in the throes of building its strategic concept for future contingencies, and as they are doing that, which happens on a quite rare basis, they're absolutely going to look at what's occurring now—the activation, as you noted, which is just incredibly important, and trying to understand what effect has that had, what's gone well, what do we need to improve on for the future. Thank you.

Ms. HOULAHAN. My other questions have to do with INDOPACOM and China, and I was hoping to ask if you feel as though with all of the movement that's going on in the European theater if you're at all worried about readiness in INDOPACOM.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much. As you know, we can't just keep our eye on one theater and so we're not. In fact, the Navy just did a freedom of navigation operation quite recently in the Indo-Pacific, in the last few days or so.

So we are absolutely trying to ensure that the kind of geopolitical challenge that we see China has continued to have is one that we are focusing on while also very much accounting for the profound sea change, I think, challenge that we're seeing from Russia.

Ms. HOULAHAN. Ms. Lewis.

Ms. LEWIS. Yeah, agree, and I think one of the real challenges we have is keeping—dealing with Russia but at the same time keeping our eye on what's going on with China.

I know we have had a robust discussion of Taiwan, but just emphasizing that, once again, you know, under the guidance of the Taiwan Relations Act we are making sure that they're prepared as well and have focused on security assistance to them that makes them prepared from an asymmetric perspective.

Ms. HOULAHAN. I think I've run out of time. I appreciate that, and I yield back to the chair. Thank you.

Mr. KIM. Thank you, Congresswoman, for self-regulating your time there. Thank you.

[Laughter.]

Mr. KIM. I'm going to turn it over to Congresswoman Stephanie Murphy. Over to you.

Mrs. MURPHY. Thanks so much, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Karlin, I know that section 333 of title 10 provides primary authority to the Department to train and equip partners to build the capacity of military forces in nine specific areas.

And I serve on the subcommittee that oversees Special Ops Command and, as you may know, one of SOCOM's [U.S. Special Operations Command's] core activities is the military information support operations.

Can you help me understand if MISO is covered under one of these nine areas and, if so, how are we using section 333 to build partner capacity in MISO?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for raising this issue. I cannot right now speak to MISO being included in this but I pledge to come back to you as soon as possible in writing on that exact issue.

I would just say, writ large, the way in which we engage in MISO has to be responsible, not least to ensure that it is effective.

Mrs. MURPHY. I think I would really appreciate the response on that. I think the SOCOM—the special ops community has been using MISO to some great effect and, really, some interesting innovations, and especially as we look at how information is a key part of how our adversaries engage in conflict it will be important for us to better build this capacity and have partners and allies who also have the ability to conduct MISO.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

Mrs. MURPHY. Ms. Lewis, you know, I'm a Member of Congress from Florida and so I'm particularly interested in security cooperation with countries in the Western Hemisphere.

Can you tell me a bit more about our security cooperation activities in Latin America and the Caribbean? Which partner nation forces are we training and equipping, and more broadly, how would you judge the efficacy of our efforts in building capacity in this AOR [area of responsibility]?

Ms. LEWIS. Well, thank you very much for the question. I had a real focus on Latin America early in my career and so I'm always happy to get to discuss it again in this format. I think the—we have provided security assistance to the region over many years.

I think most recently we have focused very much on Colombia. I'm sure you've been aware of, really, the transformation that happened in Colombia, to a great extent, obviously, a real tribute to the Colombians themselves, who were dealing with an incredibly difficult insurgency in their own country, a drug war at the same time.

And so I think that is always at top of mind in terms of continuing our support for them, moving forward. And then throughout the rest of the region we have a whole range of programs.

There are some countries where, due to the situation in their—with their current government, we're not able to work with them anymore. But we look to build and strengthen that partnership throughout the region. And happy to continue working with you and your staff as you focus on this from your perspective in Florida.

Mrs. MURPHY. And do you think that our partnership capacity building and our presence in the region has had an impact on our ability to position for great power competition in the region?

Ms. LEWIS. You know, I'm actually very glad you raised this. I was lucky enough to just get—meet with our SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] commander, who's extraordinary, and she's very focused on this question.

I think that we often—when we think specifically about China, we often think about, you know, the Indo-Pacific and sometimes we think about Africa, but I think it's very important that we need to look at what's happening there as well.

My view is it's not just a question of security cooperation or security assistance or how we're postured, but it is also the relationships that we need to develop in that region. I think, as we have talked about, China often uses small investments to get big leverage.

My view is that they often do that in ways that, really, actually are detrimental to the countries that they're purporting to assist or help. And so I think this needs to be a renewed area of focus in the Western Hemisphere, as we move forward, and I know that across the interagency we are committed to doing that.

Mrs. MURPHY. Thank you.

And, Mr. Chair, I yield back. And I'll note that I'm one-upping Ms. Houlahan by yielding back 30 seconds.

[Laughter.]

Mr. KIM. Thank you. Thank you. We appreciate it greatly. I'm told not to get too comfortable in this chair, so we'll keep this going.

I'm going to turn it over to Congresswoman Speier.

Over to you for 5 minutes.

[No response.]

Mr. KIM. Congresswoman Speier, can you hear us?

Ms. SPEIER. I can't. Let me just see.

Mr. KIM. We can hear you know.

Ms. SPEIER. You can hear me? Okay. Great.

Thank you both for your outstanding presentations this morning. I'd like to ask Dr. Karlin a question. First of all, let me say how impressed I am with your credentials, with your time you've spent

in five different administrations and defense work. So your work is really very valuable.

I'm concerned about the security cooperation agreements that we have because, on the one hand, it is intended to convey our values, our priorities, and our foreign policy objectives to both allies and adversaries.

Between 2018 and 2020, the country of Azerbaijan received \$120 million dollars in section 333 partner capacity building funds despite its authoritarian government and armed aggression towards its democratic neighbor, Armenia. In contrast, Armenia received zero dollars during that same period.

So, Secretary Karlin, you testified that the Department seeks to, quote, "cultivate security partners who can appropriately and effectively be regional security anchors, especially during crisis."

Given the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in which Azerbaijan initiated it and it cost thousands of lives and hundreds of thousands of people being displaced, I mean, I don't think anyone could argue that Azerbaijan has lived up to that ideal.

So has that war in 2020 caused the Department to reevaluate whether Azerbaijan is a worthy partner of the U.S. and if not, why not?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for your opening remarks and for your kind words.

I'll offer some thoughts and Assistant Secretary Lewis may wish to add a bit as well on this one. But, in particular, that conflict you cite is—it was indeed a horrific one and it is one that we have looked closely at, I would say not only given what our partners have been involved with but also because of how that conflict played out and, in particular, it's a real case study in drone warfare.

When we are having—when we have these security cooperation relationships it is really important that we closely monitor how and in what ways such assistance is being used and then we have very frank conversations with our partners if we think that that is not being used in appropriate or effective ways.

Let me turn to Assistant Secretary Lewis, who I think may want to add a bit on this one. Thank you.

Ms. LEWIS. Yes. And thank you, Dr. Karlin, and thank you for the question. I'd certainly echo the comments that she made.

When it comes to the State Department side of the house, we don't actually provide foreign military financing to either country, but we are providing assistance on conventional weapons destruction, which we do so equally, as you may be aware.

That's because that program is specifically designed to prevent civilians from being killed or injured by conventional weapons.

And so we—that is the program we have continued.

Ms. SPEIER. Well, I guess I'm still not following whether or not there's been any repercussions to Azerbaijan as a result of their aggression to Armenia.

They used Turkey and their drones to create havoc and injury and killings in the region, and I'm not—I guess I'm not hearing from you that there's been any penalty for that.

Ms. LEWIS. I think—first of all, I very much appreciate the concerns that you're raising about what happened during that conflict,

and I think the State Department has been following those very closely.

I think in terms of the specific programs that we work on here, we aren't providing any foreign military funding—excuse me, any more—any foreign military financing to Azerbaijan.

And so in this case, the only program that we have continuing there is the one for conventional weapons destruction.

Ms. SPEIER. So, Dr. Karlin, what kind of repercussions have they endured as a result of their actions, since they've received \$120 million dollars from the U.S. Government?

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you very much for highlighting this, Congresswoman.

If it would be possible, might I suggest that I submit to you a written statement with more detail on this specific one to ensure that we're really meeting the intent of your important question?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 81.]

Ms. SPEIER. All right. I appreciate that. Thank you. I yield back.

Dr. KARLIN. Thank you.

Mr. KIM. Great. Thank you.

Well, look, we're going to start to wrap up here. Before I do so, I ask unanimous consent that the statement of Representative Meeks be included in the record.

Hearing none, it is so ordered.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 75.]

Mr. KIM. I just want to say thank you so very much for taking the time to talk with us. I know there's a lot going on right now that you all are responding to.

But I think it was very helpful for us to be able to have this chance to be able to take a step back and look forward in terms of where we're trying to get towards what objectives we're trying to achieve.

I know you have other conversations up on the Hill that you need to get to so I will let you go.

We are so adjourned. Thank you everyone.

[Whereupon, at 12:52 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 1, 2022

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 1, 2022

UNCLASSIFIED

**Statement of Dr. Mara E. Karlin
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities
Before the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
“Engagement with Allies and Partners”
March 1, 2022
Rayburn House Office Building, Room 2118**

Introduction

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on the Department of Defense’s approach to engagement with our allies and partners through security cooperation. The United States is at a pivotal moment to ensure the trust of our allies and build relationships with our partners to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. Along with our allies and partners, we confront unprecedented challenges to our security, including the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) global ambitions to rival the United States and Russian aggression that threatens the territorial integrity of Europe, while we also battle historic transnational threats of climate change and a global pandemic.

One of the most important ways that we will rise to meet these challenges is by renewing a U.S. strategic advantage—our unmatched network of allies and partners. Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. The forthcoming National Defense Strategy will emphasize how the Department will strengthen these alliances and partnerships to advance national security through integrated deterrence. As Secretary Austin underscores, integrated deterrence is integrating our efforts across domains and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that the Department closely cooperates with the rest of the government and our allies and partners on the most critical security challenges. Security cooperation is an important tool that helps key allies and partners strengthen their defense and enhances our ability to rely on one another in a time of need.

The Department of Defense has learned from large scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and equipping. Resilient partnerships thrive when values and deeds align; security cooperation aims to uphold that approach. Key planning assumptions, such as understanding power dynamics in fragile states and ensuring the technology and capability we provide can be absorbed, maintained, and sustained by the recipient without capture or commitment are the basics; to fully realize our shared interests, assistance must align with our strategic objectives and include foundational aspects. On the last point, we aim to help partners with not only specific capabilities, but also with institutional integrity and an ability to promote our shared values, notably the promotion and protection of human rights, and good governance and legitimacy of the security sector.

To be sure, the degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality, including transparency and effectiveness of security cooperation and assistance. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes as well as from programs that did not have the desired impact, including in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. We are building a learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measuring program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to

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confront painful lessons head-on, and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly prioritizing programs that are strategic and setting appropriately limited expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our partners and allies bring and collectively work together to meet our shared objectives.

A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise is the collaboration among the offices involved in the policy and strategic alignment of security cooperation, including the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Defense Security Cooperation University, and the Institute for Security Governance, all of which oversee implementation. As a part of our most recent reorganization, we brought DSCA under the umbrella of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in Policy to facilitate better collaboration and coordination within DOD and with external partners. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire team is focused on embracing it.

The Department's Approach to Security Cooperation

The Department's thinking on security cooperation has evolved over time and greatly benefited from Congressional reforms that streamlined our authorities. Five years ago, Congress enacted unprecedented legislation empowering the Department to support allies and partners through a consolidated range of Title 10 U.S. Code security cooperation authorities designed to advance U.S. interests and with full coordination of the Department of State.

In doing so, the message was clear – security cooperation should be deliberate and holistic. It should evolve based on consistent learning and reflect the values the United States stands for. Today our cooperation with partners includes military-to-military engagements, planning and training with foreign forces, support to operations, capacity building, education and training activities, humanitarian assistance activities, and robust exercises with key partners.

While the Department has implemented these reforms through meaningful improvements to security cooperation, more remains to be done. To seize the opportunity for meaningful change, we are focusing on three priority areas: prioritizing who and what we invest in; focusing on sustainable impact; and adopting a holistic, integrated approach to how we execute security cooperation programs.

Who and What We Invest In

I'll begin with who and what we will invest in. First, we will focus our global assets and resources to safeguard the most pressing concerns held by allies and partners who play critical roles in our shared security. The Department's invigorated focus on tailored allied and partner roles is one of the hallmarks of our evolving approach.

The way we approach security cooperation with states on the PRC's and Russia's periphery fundamentally differs from how we employ security cooperation elsewhere. Here, our approach emphasizes building resilience and capability to counter coercive or revisionist activity.

By contrast, when we look to the rest of the world, the Department wants to cultivate select security partners who can appropriately and effectively be regional security anchors, especially during crises.

By leveraging these approaches, we will be able to identify, export, and implement those capabilities that shape the strategic calculus and allow us increased operational flexibility. Whether the vehicle is

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Title 10 security cooperation, State's foreign military sales, or co-development, we will work to provide critical capabilities with allies and partners in a way that makes a real difference. This requires employing the full security cooperation toolkit including engagement tools, capacity building, planning, training, exercising, professional military education, and our regional centers in each area of responsibility.

Sustainable Impact

For each of these investments, we will emphasize the tangible change that will happen as a result of our efforts, and keep our focus on a sustained impact that outlasts the particular investment. This requires robust assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. We will no longer be satisfied with measuring inputs or outputs, but rather we will take a longer view of the way our partners can sustain capabilities we provide. To this end, we are adopting rigorous learning, encouraging our workforce and partners to identify past pitfalls to draw out what success looks like in security cooperation and tailor it to the partner's context. This learning will be supported by objectives that ensure our efforts are specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and anchored in a time frame, ensuring the partner's sustainability of our programs. With the forthcoming National Defense Strategy, the Department will be explicit in theater prioritization and provide further insight on investing in our allies and partners.

The Department of Defense has also instituted a robust strategic evaluation agenda focused on making public key findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We are working every day to find ways to quantify, interpret, and evaluate return on investment with our security cooperation dollars. Currently, strategic evaluations span the effectiveness of maritime security, institutional capacity building, the State Partnership Program, the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip (CTEF), and State's International Professional Military Education.

Integrated Approach to How We Do Business

Third, we recognize that how we do business matters in achieving impact. We will employ an integrated approach to partnership that includes longer-term thinking and a whole-of-government effort to achieve sustained and resilient partnership, consideration of the elements within our control and our partner's control that will determine whether the investment is effective, and consideration of external threats and third parties that may compromise the investment.

Security cooperation programs often fall short when they do not take into account higher order questions of mission, organizational structure, and personnel. We are building our tools to address these issues with partners by improving our institutional capacity and our dialogue with partners, and making tough choices when partners are not willing to make critical changes. This is especially relevant for sustainability: for ensuring that our partnerships are resilient to shocks and stresses and can endure well past the day when we are consistently investing in them.

We continue to invest in the professionalization of our security cooperation workforce by requiring increasingly rigorous training. We are investing in the concept of institutionalizing the defense diplomacy role the Department's defense representatives in embassies play, ensuring that the partnerships they promote are consistent with our national security interests and values.

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What ultimately sets apart the United States in an environment of strategic competition are the values we represent. Our ability to maintain and continue to set a high bar for human rights, gender equity and equality, humanitarian affairs, and rule of law—including civilian oversight of the military—is a critical tool we can leverage to help our partners meet their goals and advance those shared values. In particular, we prioritize human rights vetting and compliance with the Leahy law. Doing so is both a moral and strategic imperative.

We also take our responsibility in the humanitarian sector very seriously, as we play an important supporting role in the interagency in supporting civil authorities in countries facing crises. Whether it is managing crisis response capacity building under the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, Assistance and Civic Aid (OHDACA) account, employing Foreign Disaster Relief, or maintaining Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), the Department is committed to supporting our partners' efforts to provide humanitarian services to their civilian populace. During our recent reorganization within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), we have merged the offices of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs and Security Cooperation to form a new Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships. This shift deliberately integrated humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and human rights with the existing processes related to security cooperation to emphasize the centrality of these areas of defense cooperation that benefit allies and partners in need. Women, Peace and Security; civilian protection and atrocity prevention; and respect for the rule of law also fall into this issue set. This integration will help us look more holistically at the needs and challenges our partners and their diverse populations face, particularly when those needs can spiral into crises that spill outside the country's borders.

Of course, none of this is possible without close collaboration with our interagency partners. We rely heavily on our colleagues at the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to achieve the effects we need to achieve, whether supplementing and coordinating security programs through structured diplomatic and military engagement, or ensuring that security cooperation fits into broader foreign policy goals of preventing conflict and maintaining international peace and security.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I began by sharing with you how the U.S. network of alliances and partnerships is a strategic advantage that competitors cannot match. I conclude by sharing that this advantage is not a given. It requires active involvement by the entire U.S. Government, listening to partners' concerns and contexts, and taking a thoughtful and deliberate approach to how we employ our resources to meet our priorities. We must carefully make cross-regional, cross-priority tradeoffs in order to leverage our strategic advantage most effectively. That is facilitated by good strategy, good policy, and close partnership between the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and Congress. I appreciate your leadership on this critical issue and thank you for the opportunity to share our vision for engagement with allies and partners through security cooperation.

Dr. Mara Karlin**Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities**

Dr. Karlin was sworn in as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategies, Plans, and Capabilities on August 17, 2021.

Prior to taking on this role, Dr. Karlin served as the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and she served on the policy team for the Biden-Harris Transition. Karlin was Director of Strategic Studies and an Associate Professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. Previously, she served in national security roles for five U.S. secretaries of defense, advising on policies spanning strategic planning, defense policy and budgeting, future conflicts, and regional security affairs.

She started her government career as a civil servant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and has received the Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award. She is the author of two books on defense policy and military history.

**OPENING STATEMENT TO
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY JESSICA LEWIS
MARCH 1, 2022**

I am here to speak with you about the importance and value of security cooperation and security assistance, and the vital role these functions play in our relationships with partners and allies. It is precisely for this reason that security assistance is fundamentally a tool of foreign policy.

As the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs – “PM” – this mission is at the core of my responsibilities. PM is on the front lines of this effort that links diplomacy and defense to bolster U.S. national security. My team works closely with the Department of Defense, Congress, and the U.S. defense industry to deliver tools and training that supports our foreign policy, strengthens our allies’ and partners’ abilities to provide for their defense, and contributes meaningfully to the stability of the rules-based international order. Day to day, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs oversees approximately \$7 billion in security sector assistance programs annually – which accounts for roughly 20 percent of the Department of State’s and USAID’s total annual assistance. This assistance includes Foreign Military Financing, an appropriated grant assistance program through which partners are able to procure U.S.-origin defensive capabilities, almost entirely by ‘buying into’ the DOD procurement process; and, International Military Education and Training that enables foreign military personnel to study beside their U.S. counterparts. In addition, the Bureau concurs on behalf of the Secretary of State with multiple Department of Defense security cooperation authorities totaling approximately \$9 billion annually – as required by law. In all of this, we are guided by the goals set down in law, such as those in the opening lines of the Arms Export Control Act: that “an ultimate goal of the United States continues to be a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.”

At its core, consistent with the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), security assistance and arms transfers are tools of foreign policy that must be contextualized not only by partner defensive requirements, but by questions of security sector governance, regional balance, technology transfer, and human rights, among other wide-ranging considerations. And as tools of foreign policy, the authorities for arms transfers and many of the military assistance authorities are rightly vested in the Department of State where our Secretary, under the FAA and AECA, is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs as well as for the continuous supervision and general direction of arms sales and transfers.

Security cooperation as a tool of diplomacy

We share the burden of security with our allies and partners and work together to address the challenges around the world. This is true whether it is fighting alongside each other’s forces,

countering terrorist and international criminal threats, participating in international peacekeeping operations, or building accountable institutions capable of maintaining security, the rule of law, governance, and justice. U.S. security sector assistance regularly rises to the occasion to meet these challenges and can yield serious benefits.

President Biden has promised that the United States will always lead with diplomacy – not military force. This commitment is shaped by difficult lessons learned, of which we have been reminded in recent months, and I believe that security assistance is always most effective when it delivered as part of a broader strategy that includes diplomacy and development.

Foreign policy and national security priorities

What is the real-world context for security cooperation and assistance? As President Biden's interim National Security Strategy states, *“our world is at an inflection point. Global dynamics have shifted. New crises demand our attention. And in this moment of accelerating global challenges...one thing is certain: we will only succeed in advancing American interests and upholding our universal values by working in common cause with our closest allies and partners, and by renewing our own enduring sources of national strength.”*

As I testify here before the House Armed Services Committee, the President's words ring true. We must lead with diplomacy first to strengthen our allies and stand with them, work with like-minded partners, and use our collective strength to advance shared interests and deter common threats, like the current crisis Russia has manufactured in Ukraine. Engaging with our allies and partners on these issues is the only way we can hope to meet the challenges of the 21st Century and outpace our challengers.

Close international security cooperation is needed now more than ever. We are living in a time when no global challenge can be met by any one nation acting alone – not even one as powerful as the United States. That is where the role of the State Department comes in. We relish our job as diplomats to engage around the world to build that enduring cooperation with other nations, because security cooperation is first and foremost a tool of diplomacy.

In order to protect our national security, the United States must lead and sustain a stable and open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules. This means not only defending the underlying sources of American strength, but also promoting a rules-based international order that prevents adversaries from directly threatening our allies.

The Biden-Harris Administration has said time and again that America's alliances are our valuable asset, and we must constantly revitalize our ties with our allies and partners. The United States is as committed to fostering partnerships with our traditional, and decades old, allies in Europe and Asia, as well as new alliances in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. These partnerships and alliances bring to bear a global network of like-minded states dedicated to advancing the banner of democratic freedoms and differentiates us from our adversaries, who seek to advance their own malign interests by co-opting and cajoling countries who are vulnerable to such advances.

Over the years, commitments like these have created new opportunities for interoperability, new allies to deter aggressive behavior, and new partners to help meet global challenges. Real partnership means bearing burdens together, with everyone doing their part – because no single nation can afford to carry the weight alone.

There is no better example of this than our response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine. While the United States will not send the American military to fight Russia in Ukraine, we have supplied the Ukrainian military with significant lethal and non-lethal training and equipment to bolster its ability to counter Russian aggression. As the President said in his recent remarks "we are ready with diplomacy — to be engaged in diplomacy with Russia and our Allies and partners to improve stability and security in Europe as a whole."

And our support to Ukraine demonstrates the wide array of tools that State and DOD can bring to a partner's security sector. In the first year of this Administration alone, we have delivered over \$650 million to Ukraine's defensive capabilities, including through Foreign Military Financing, the DoD Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, and other program lines. Through the Multinational Joint Commission (MJC) we work with Ukraine and our Allies to identify military requirements and match funding streams to support needed defense capabilities, ranging from radars to Javelins. Through the Excess Defense Articles program, we have delivered to Ukraine armed Coast Guard Cutters to create an asymmetric maritime capability in the Black Sea. In addition, through programs such as our International Military Education and Training (IMET) authority, we have supported the development of a cadre of professional and Western-looking mid- and senior-level Ukrainian officers, and through a series of exercises, DOD has strengthened the interoperability of our forces and Ukraine's tactical and operational capabilities. Then, as the threat from Russia sharpened in the past months, we have used the Presidential Drawdown Authority to provide urgently needed ammunition and anti-tank missiles, while exercising the Third Party Transfer authority to facilitate the delivery of U.S.-origin military technology from NATO Allies.

This has been enabled through an underlying set of government-to-government agreements that enable technology sharing, information sharing, and the presence of U.S. forces throughout NATO territory.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we have deployed the panoply of capabilities and authorities at our disposal for a partner whose needs are clear and urgent. Not only do we offer our support to reassure our allies and partners in the face of geopolitical threats --our security assistance and cooperation tangibly bolsters regional stability by enhancing the border security, maritime security, counterterrorism, and conventional weapons destruction capabilities of our partners.

These tools, Mr. Chairman, apply not only in times of crisis, but help us shape a world that is less susceptible to such threats. As we turn, as well, to the pacing threat the PRC and its model of autocracy pose to the rules-based order, we can look to security cooperation and security assistance as a key element of our response. For decades, for example, we have worked to strengthen our security cooperation with key allies such as Japan and South Korea while creating new partnerships with countries like Vietnam, and while working hand-in-glove with Taiwan to strengthen that brave island's defense and deterrence – and this Administration intends to deepen and expand that cooperation in the months and years ahead.

In doing so, we must also recognize that Security Assistance is just one piece of the puzzle: it must be accompanied, as appropriate, by other political and economic reforms or assistance if it is to be sustainable. For this reason, I am making Security Sector Governance (SSG) a focus of my tenure in PM.

SSG is the transparent, accountable, and legitimate management and oversight of security policy and practice. Importantly, this means both that security forces are subordinate to legitimate civilian authority, and that civilian leaders do not use security forces for personal or political gain. These standards, Mr. Chairman, are not just key to ensuring that partner forces are capable, reliable, and legitimate, but also reflect core American values that we – unlike our adversaries – advance through our security assistance and cooperation.

It's critical for State and DoD to lead on understanding the governance of the security sector in the countries we engage. It is not enough to build defense institutions in tandem with "train and equip" missions; partners' institutional capacity to absorb and sustain U.S. training and equipment must be the pacesetter. It's also why security cooperation must be integrated into a broader political strategy that advances our foreign policy interests and addresses the underlying drivers of insecurity.

It is in the national security interest of the United States to cooperate with other countries to face the challenges of the 21st Century and outpace every challenger. We must continue to engage in international institutions, or else we risk leaving a void likely to be filled by others who may not share our values and interests.

Conclusion

Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished members of the committee for the opportunity to testify before you today on the key topic of security cooperation, as it pertains to our engagement with allies and partners. The Department of State would not be able to achieve the level of security cooperation we have without our key partners: the Department of Defense and the interagency, our foreign partners, and you, the United States Congress. Security cooperation is first and foremost a tool of diplomacy and foreign policy, and that tool is stronger when the American people support it.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Jessica Lewis**Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs**

Prior to joining the State Department, Jessica Lewis served as Democratic Staff Director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Previously, from 2007 – 2014, she was the National Security Advisor and Foreign Policy Advisor, and then Senior National Security Advisor, to Senate Majority/Minority Leader Harry Reid. Earlier, Lewis was the Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Robert Menendez and, before that the Democratic Staff Director for the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Ranking Member Robert Menendez. She also worked as Manager, New Initiative Development, and as Manager, Net Corps America, at the Organization of American States. Lewis received an MPA degree from Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, an MAT degree from Johns Hopkins University, and a BA degree from Haverford College.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 1, 2022

CHAIR GREGORY W. MEEKS

HASC Full Committee Hearing: “Engagement with Allies and Partners”

Statement for the Record

3-1-2022

Thank you, Chairman Smith and thank you to our distinguished witnesses, Assistant Secretary of Defense Karlin and Assistant Secretary Lewis, for testifying today on this important topic. U.S. security assistance and engagement with allies and partners has never been more critical and I appreciate the chance to engage with you here today in parallel to our ongoing oversight efforts on the Foreign Affairs Committee.

As we consider the range of threats to the U.S. and our partners and allies across the globe, ensuring our security engagement with those states is effective and aligns with our laws and democratic principles is vital. As we convene here today, U.S. support to Ukraine and our NATO allies is a critical bulwark against Russia’s unprovoked aggression and heinous military incursion into Ukraine’s sovereign territory.

In East Asia, U.S. assistance to our partners in the Pacific region represents a key arena of global competition and alliance maintenance as we work to ensure China’s expansionist aims and undemocratic model are met with a coordinated and integrated regional diplomatic and defense strategy.

In the Middle East, U.S. partner engagement seeks to deter Iran, and ensure the threat of ISIS and affiliated extremist groups don’t re-emerge to terrorize civilians and repeat the barbarous acts of years past while adhering to U.S. legal frameworks and our democratic values as a nation. Here, Congress, and the Foreign Affairs Committee specifically, has played an important role in both monitoring and acting legislatively to ensure these objectives are maintained. Finally, a unique and significant feature of the way in which the U.S. pursues partner engagement and security assistance is the cross-cutting nature of our approach – combining diplomatic, defense and development priorities across the agencies of the federal government to ensure a holistic approach to achieving our policy goals.

Considering these areas and objectives, we cannot remove ourselves from the context of the preceding years in which the previous Administration sought to undermine and systematically circumvent statutory provisions and skirt routine Congressional oversight in pursuing security arrangements with partners and allies. Such actions not only sought to further remove the executive from Congressional scrutiny and appropriate transparency but also pursued transactional security goals which ran contrary to respect for internationally recognized human rights and, in some cases, existing U.S. law.

That is why, along with the changing nature of the conflicts and security threats we face today, we must balance these priorities as we as a country are uniquely positioned to do. It is a balance we can and must achieve as it distinguishes us from our adversaries, who seek to undermine the

international order and recast the world in their oppressive autocratic mold.

As the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee with jurisdiction over security assistance and certain processes and programs by which we as a country implement these goals, I am committed to ensuring our security assistance policies follow the full gamut of U.S. laws governing such programs. I am committed to ensuring our assistance policies are in line with basic human rights, as well as international humanitarian law. I am also committed to ensuring a holistic, balanced interagency process whereby the State Department maintains an equal and significant role in evaluating and approving proposed arms transfers and security assistance programs, and where Congress is fully apprised and consulted on all such matters as is required by statute and existing practice.

In closing, I again appreciate Chairman Smith for holding this hearing, our witnesses for their time here today and service to our country and will continue to work to ensure the effectiveness of our security assistance programs worldwide as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Statement for the Record – March 1, 2022
Representative Michael McCaul

“I thank Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Rogers for convening this timely hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on “Engagement with Allies and Partners.” Today, amidst the presence of our enemies, Ukrainian soldiers and civilians stand shoulder to shoulder to protect and defend their desire to live a peaceful and democratically free existence. This is a desire we and our partners and allies share. From Kharkiv, to Kyiv, to Saint Petersburg, and major cities across the world a battle cry fueled by a true passion and desire to live freely, speak freely, and think freely is silencing the cacophonous mutterings of a tyrant.

Today, we are unified in our desire to provide all that we can to Ukrainians who have taken up arms, some for the very first time, to fight for a peaceful and democratically free existence. But our unified call to support Ukrainians in the face of active war brought on by a tyrant is disordered. This tyrant made clear, his intentions, when he first seized control over Crimea in 2014.

Yet, since 2014, we maintained our assistance levels to Ukraine. We even saw certain NATO allies, despite a pledge to commit to one’s territorial defense, choose to decrease national defense spending in lieu of other national priorities. Putin’s penchant for war became apparent beginning in March 2021 as he began to prepare a noose around Ukraine. We heard repeatedly, from President Zelensky, the need for more lethal assistance, anti-aircraft, anti-tank missiles, small arms and ammunition. For nearly a year, this Administration withheld much needed and available lethal assistance out of fear of provoking Putin. This policy decision gravely undermined the deterrent against a renewed Russian full-scale invasion at the cost of innocent Ukrainian lives. The noose is tightened around Ukraine, and our capacity to provide lethal assistance continues to wane. We can only look towards fortifying the tips of the Ukrainian trident that leads this fight with generations of Ukraine’s strength, grit, and the will to live freely.

Our support to partners through security assistance around the globe, particularly through the Department of State is not intended to be reactive. Rather, our security assistance is intended as proactive steps, consistent with our national security interests, to prepare our partners and allies for peace. When a war is underway, our ability to support allies through security assistance is restricted by logistical and security challenges, and high costs.

Similarly, as we shore up the defenses of our allies and partners in Europe with a war waging along their borders, we must remain committed to restoring and strengthening our own defenses at home and abroad. This will require a full accounting of lethal and non-lethal assistance we have delivered urgently to meet the needs of our partners and allies.

What the world has witnessed these past six days is that in darkness, the will of man is greater than any army and any tyrant. Ukrainians have reminded the world of that. We must continue to support allies and partners who share our same interests. We must continue to support Ukraine.”

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MARCH 1, 2022

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Dr. KARLIN. The outbreak of intensive fighting in 2020 underscored the continuing need to avoid providing offensive or potentially destabilizing weaponry to either side. The Administration has consistently called for both Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint and to find comprehensive solutions to all outstanding issues. The Department of Defense carefully assesses its bilateral security cooperation with Azerbaijan to ensure that it will not hamper efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and will not be used for offensive purposes against Armenia. Azerbaijan has been a dependable security partner with regard to counterterrorism and our operations in Afghanistan. Improving Azerbaijan's maritime and border security is in our national interest because Azerbaijan's borders with Iran and the Caspian Sea are areas of concern for potential movement of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and other illegal trafficking. [See page 58.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KHANNA

Dr. KARLIN. The Department of Defense does not supply weapons or other military equipment through security cooperation programs or direct sales to any country where the Wagner Group is operating at the behest of the host government. In our engagements with allies and partners, we make every effort to ensure that they understand the risks of working with Russia in general, and the Wagner Group specifically, and we make clear that engaging with or supporting Wagner puts the defense relationship in jeopardy. [See page 45.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW

Ms. LEWIS. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) appreciates the Committee's offer to help and Representative Crow's observations on the value of a holistic approach to security sector assistance (SSA) that integrates broader efforts to counter corruption and enhance civilian security through improved access to justice, democratic governance, human rights, accountability, the inclusion of women and civil society, and humanitarian assistance. As we have learned from Afghanistan and Iraq: security sector governance (SSG) is not just a moral concern but directly affects our partners' military capabilities and performance. PM is exploring ways we can operationalize a governance-centered approach with DOD, including breaking down stovepipes, identifying new opportunities for institutional capacity-building, and developing a common operating picture of the risks posed by weak governance and elite capture of the security sector.

While "joint formulation" is the gold standard, the Department is significantly outmatched by DOD when it comes to staffing and resources. Despite managing roughly the same share of SSA, DOD's Security Cooperation workforce is more than 20,000 strong, versus State's pol-mil workforce in the low hundreds. This mismatch is arguably the chief limiting factor in our ability to ensure SSA's alignment with foreign policy outcomes.

Beyond staffing, one of the biggest changes that could help us is the authority to fund domestic personal services contractors with Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds to enable more direct management and improve oversight of SSA, rather than relying largely on DOD as our implementer, which could achieve significant cost-savings and accelerate implementation. As we continue to develop a cadre of State SSA experts serving overseas, legislative relief could also enable State to assign non-military personnel (e.g., political officers) to priority embassy Offices of Security Cooperation currently staffed by military officers reporting to the geographic combatant commander.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shown us we can deliver military assistance quickly in a crisis with existing authorities (e.g., Presidential Drawdown Authority). However, we believe legislative reform would help make SSA more responsive to foreign policy goals, including democracy, rights, and governance. We also hope to work

with Congress to request SSA appropriations on a more regional, global, and/or functional basis, with fewer directives. We appreciate the FY 2022 Omnibus had fewer FMF earmarks. Past bilateral directives have limited our ability to respond to emerging priorities and to promote competition among program proposals. They also risk creating inertia in SSA programming regionally-focused FMF programs like the Countering Russian Influence Fund allow Congress to maintain meaningful oversight of SSA while allowing the Department greater flexibility to address evolving priorities and fund the highest-quality programming proposals. [See page 30.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SLOTKIN

Dr. KARLIN. Since August 2021, the United States has committed more than \$2.3 billion in security assistance to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces, with President Biden approving the latest \$300 million security assistance package on April 1, 2022. The Biden Administration is fully committed to helping Ukraine defend itself against continued Russian aggression and, working closely with Congress, is providing unprecedented levels of assistance.

To date, at least 30 of our Allies and partners around the world have answered the call to support Ukraine, providing critical assistance. The Department of Defense, through U.S. European Command, continually works with our Allies and partners to ensure that we are providing the right systems and equipment for the Ukrainians and that our assistance reaches Ukraine in the most expedient ways possible; the systems the Ukrainians are currently using are having a great effect against the invading Russian forces. We will continue to consult closely with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense to ensure our assistance meets Ukraine's needs. We will also continue to coordinate with our Allies and partners to assist Ukraine's people and its Armed Forces in defending their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We thank Congress for its unwavering commitment to the people of Ukraine and for your continued support of the Department of Defense. [See page 37.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. GREEN

Dr. KARLIN. The whole of the U.S. Government is continuing to engage India at the highest levels to underscore the importance of a strong collective response to condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine, including to call for an immediate Russian withdrawal and ceasefire. We have seen an evolution in India's public message, including following a Quad Leaders' call several weeks ago. Prime Minister Modi has also spoken with both President Putin and President Zelensky multiple times since the launch of Russia's invasion to encourage an end to the fighting. Along with our colleagues at the State Department, we will continue to engage India on these issues and urge India to leverage its relationship with Russia in a constructive way.

As two of the world's largest democracies, the United States and India share a commitment to ensuring that the Indo-Pacific region stays on a path toward freedom. Our defense cooperation with India, which has made significant strides over the past decade, remains critical to sustaining a favorable balance of power in the region. As we watch closely Russia's deepening strategic ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), we will continue to work closely with India and maintain open channels of communication on how this nexus threatens our shared interests.

We have urged India—as we do with all of our allies and partners—to avoid transactions with Russia and to continue diversifying away from its procurement of Russian arms. I remain encouraged by India's diversification of defense equipment over the past decade, including the over \$20 billion of U.S.-origin defense equipment it has purchased since 2008. The Department of State is the lead on all Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44) (CAATSA) matters, and waivers are considered a case-by-case basis. [See page 35.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. BICE

Ms. LEWIS. While the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs does not work specifically on the issue related to imports of Russian oil and gas, the State Department is advancing efforts to accelerate Europe's diversification of energy supplies away from Russia and to secure the world from Putin's attempts to weaponize Russian oil and gas exports. Given the importance of natural gas in Europe's energy mix, the United States has engaged major producers at home and around the world to support temporarily surging natural gas output and to allocate these volumes to European buyers. U.S. liquified natural gas exports to Europe during January nearly

doubled compared to the average in late 2021. The State Department is engaging major buyers and suppliers to ensure flexibility in existing contracts and manage storage to enable diversion to Europe. [See page 40.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS

Ms. LEWIS. As a general matter, we understand section 127e programs are not subject to DOD Leahy vetting requirements because the activities are operational in nature, rather than U.S.-provided training or assistance. We understand however, section 127e, programs and their associated members undergo extensive vetting through an established process that involves DOD human rights vetting and counterintelligence (CI) screening of every recipient of section 127e, support. We defer to DOD for the details of their vetting process. [See page 48.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. MURPHY

Dr. KARLIN. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has notified one MISO-related program under Section 333 for Mongolia. MISO could be considered for more capacity building under Section 333 in the counterterrorism mission area.

With every Section 333 program, human rights and rule of law training and complementary institutional capacity building is required by law. This aids in the responsible absorption, sustainment, and employment of training or equipment provided to foreign partners by the United States.

Various DOD entities audit the effectiveness of their programs. Specifically, for Section 333, DSCA conducts monitoring and evaluation during and after program implementation to ensure effectiveness and compliance with U.S. regulations. [See page 55.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 1, 2022

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Ms. SPEIER. How extensive is U.S. end-use monitoring in security cooperation, and what is the Department's response if units trained and equipped by the U.S. misuse equipment, especially in regard to security cooperation frameworks as large and complex as what we had in Afghanistan?

Dr. KARLIN. Partner end-use monitoring (EUM) commitments for all security cooperation assistance are required by Section 505 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. §2314). In the context of U.S. grant assistance, the U.S. Government concludes bilateral Section 505 agreements to establish the legally required EUM commitments. All partner nations (PNs) obtaining defense articles pursuant to these authorities are required to provide end-use assurances and to provide physical protection and storage of military equipment, to the same standards as the U.S. Government.

The Golden Sentry Program, managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), is tasked with monitoring our PN's compliance with these requirements. The Department of Defense (DOD) does not determine whether to investigate potential violations, but forwards information regarding potential violations to the Department of State (DOS). DOS is responsible for investigating potential misuse of U.S.-provided defense articles, information, or services.

The EUM Program is segregated into two parts, Routine End-Use Monitoring (REUM) and Enhanced End-Use Monitoring (EEUM). Items subject to REUM do not contain sophisticated U.S. technology. These items may include ammunition, standard firearms, protective vests/helmets, vehicles, and supplies. Items subject to EEUM are those that the Military Services, interagency technology release approval process, or the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy have determined require additional physical security and accountability assurances due to advanced technology features. These items include certain missiles, guided munitions, night vision devices, communications security (COMSEC) equipment and EEUM-designated unmanned aerial systems (UAS) platforms.

Routine items are inventoried prior to shipment, upon arrival at the PN's location, and further inventory tracking is done by general observations in conjunction with other security cooperation functions after delivery. Items subject to EEUM are inventoried prior to shipment and again upon arrival at the PN's location. From that point on, the Golden Sentry Program is required to conduct annual "serial number" inventories and physical security inspections of storage sites containing EEUM-designated equipment. This inventory is conducted by the Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) located in country and verified by DSCA via the Security Cooperation Information Portal (SCIP) or during EUM compliance assessment visits.

Any potential unauthorized third-party transfer or potential "misuse" violations are immediately reported to DOS for action. DOS may request DSCA gather additional factual information concerning alleged misuse or unauthorized third-party transfer. DOS may also opt to communicate directly with the PN to investigate circumstances around the potential violation, and work towards incident closure. Potential EUM concerns are typically resolved with the PN's voluntary cooperation to address U.S. government concerns or deficiencies.

In Afghanistan, as in any war zone, DOD's ability to conduct end-use monitoring of DOD-funded equipment was constrained by poor security conditions, which prevented U.S. forces' ability to visit specific storage locations. EUM requirements were considered when the U.S. Government approved the release of those items to the PN. DOD transfers to the Afghan forces were mostly limited to REUM items. The only items requiring EEUM were night vision devices, laser guidance systems, and Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID) tower computers and components. DOD mitigated the risk of loss and misuse of EEUM items by providing them only to the elite Afghan special forces and aviation units that had U.S. advisory support.

Ms. SPEIER. What lessons can the Department share from the collapse of the Afghan Security Forces, despite our two decade security cooperation partnership? Can these lessons be incorporated into our security assistance implementation going forward?

Dr. KARLIN. The Department of Defense (DOD) will support the efforts of the commission Congress established in Section 1094 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2022, which “shall conduct a thorough study of all matters relating to combat operations, reconstruction and security force assistance activities, intelligence activities, and diplomatic activities of the United States pertaining to [sic] Afghanistan during the period beginning June 1, 2001, and ending August 30, 2021.” In addition, DOD has directed an After Action Review of DOD operations in Afghanistan for the period between the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement and U.S. forces’ withdrawal in August 2021. Also, in compliance with Section 1323, “Study of Certain Security Cooperation Programs,” of the NDAA for FY 2022, DOD is contracting with a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) for a comprehensive assessment of the strategic and operational lessons collected from the war in Afghanistan that can be applied to existing and future security cooperation (SC) programs.

Without detailing specifics that would pre-judge the findings and recommendations of these reviews, DOD’s experience in conducting SC in Afghanistan reinforced the importance of conducting rigorous assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) of SC activities to include baseline assessments, design documents, and regular evaluation. DOD has already begun to implement these best practices to align with requirements in 10 U.S.C. 383 (Section 383). These lessons are outlined in an independent evaluation of the Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) program, which the Department will release on [opendefense.gov](https://www.opendefense.gov) in accordance with Section 383.

DOD’s and NATO’s efforts with the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) were unique in many respects, and there may be limitations on the applicability of lessons learned to other SC activities. In particular, in Afghanistan, DOD supported all components of partner ground, air, and police forces that were engaged in sustained combat operations; combat losses of personnel and equipment had to be continually resupplied to maintain a basic fighting capability while DOD simultaneously implemented long-term capacity building efforts. Other DOD SC activities are more narrowly tailored, and with limited exceptions are focused on building select capacity and capability rather than sustaining combat operations of a partner nation’s entire security force.

Ms. SPEIER. Assistant Secretary Lewis, how does this close coordination that we are seeing with our allies and partners regarding Ukraine provide us with a comparative advantage over our adversaries, and Russia in particular?

Ms. LEWIS. The close coordination among the extensive group of our allies and partners not only demonstrates a commitment to support Ukraine, but also shows the overwhelming opposition to Russia’s blatant aggression and its attempt to circumvent the international rules-based order. The combined diplomatic, intelligence, military, economic, and humanitarian support to Ukraine clearly disadvantages Russia and re-affirms the relevance and effectiveness of the shared values among the United States and its allies.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

Mr. SCOTT. If better resourced in terms of funding, people, and platforms, how can the U.S. Coast Guard play a greater role in theater security cooperation?

Dr. KARLIN. The United States interfaces regularly with the maritime security forces of partner nations, particularly in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Southern Command areas of responsibility. These interactions can and do involve critical capacity building efforts and efforts to improve partners’ ability to perform maritime domain awareness and interdiction, when necessary. The Coast Guard plays an important role in these interactions and will continue to do so.

Mr. SCOTT. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program is a highly successful program in my view. What recommendations do you have for NGB to improve this highly successful program?

Dr. KARLIN. We agree wholeheartedly and we share your enthusiasm for the State Partnership Program (SPP). On April 1, DOD released findings from an independent strategic evaluation on [opendefense.gov](https://www.opendefense.gov) covering SPP’s outcomes from 2014–2019. This assessment, monitoring, and evaluation effort meets the requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 383 for the Secretary of Defense to make available evaluation findings for the public to increase transparency and accountability for security cooperation programs. The Department is considering recommendations and lessons learned from this evaluation, to include assessing the capacity for new SPPs, and how much growth the SPP can handle annually while sustaining existing partnerships. Addi-

tionally, the Department is developing projections and priorities for program growth, plans for aligning appropriate State National Guards to pair with forecasted growth, and frameworks to leverage the SPP as a unique and specialized security cooperation program. Finally, the Department is continuing to improve the quality of the security cooperation workforce to ensure it has the capacity to perform its mission including the ability to leverage the SPP with other authorities to achieve DOD objectives. The Department continues to implement our Security Cooperation Workforce Certification Program, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 384.

Mr. SCOTT. The delay in approving requests for weapons for our allies and partners has caused some angst among our Allies and Partners. Should there be a new crisis type Foreign Military Sales (FMS) mechanism where Allies and Partners are able to quickly procure equipment from the U.S. for Ukraine assistance or to quickly equip in the light of crisis? So far there is no such a mechanism.

Dr. KARLIN. We have demonstrated tremendous responsiveness to the crisis in Ukraine. We have done this by providing more than \$2.3 billion in security assistance to Ukraine, including more than \$1.6 billion since Russia's further invasion. Partners and allies have also provided a considerable amount of aid to Ukraine. Much of the urgent assistance was provided from DOD stocks using Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) or from partner and ally inventory, neither of which is sustainable for the long-term. As a result, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, under the direction of the Deputy Secretary, are working to identify opportunities to increase production capacity, create a steady demand to suppliers, and build a reserve of critical munitions.

Mr. SCOTT. How can the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps enhance their maritime security cooperation workforce and formalize operations in this domain so that the Navy and Marine Corps can develop the partnerships they need to deter and defeat great power adversaries?

Dr. KARLIN. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to create a professional workforce development program and career paths for the thousands of DOD civilian and military employees supporting security cooperation programs and activities. Since then, DSCA has elevated security cooperation as a profession through the Security Cooperation Workforce Certification Program and has provided the DOD security cooperation workforce the education and training it needs to help the DOD strengthen alliances and build partnerships using our security cooperation toolkit. As of April 4, 2022, the Department of the Navy reported to DSCA 2,125 positions in the security cooperation workforce with 1,958 of those positions currently filled, of which 183 are U.S. Marine Corps personnel. Security Cooperation Workforce members perform a broad range of security cooperation functions: working directly with partners in the Department's U.S. Embassy presence in Security Cooperation Offices around the world, serving on Combatant Command staffs as advisors and planners, and serving within the Department of the Navy security cooperation implementing organizations as Foreign Military Sales case and training planners.

However, the Department of the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps also leverage tactical or operational personnel or forces to conduct security cooperation activities and to serve in various other capacities. I would defer to my colleagues in both the Department of the Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps to speak to how they have operationalized maritime security efforts.

Mr. SCOTT. What plans, if any, do you have to streamline the technology security and foreign disclosure (TS&FD) policy and international agreement process?

Dr. KARLIN. We are working to ensure technology and information release decisions both align to the National Defense Strategy and the need to protect the U.S. warfighter's technological edge. We also have streamlined the technology security and foreign disclosure process by establishing anticipatory disclosure policies for new technologies. This allows us to provide the necessary weapons systems to our partners in a timelier manner, due to the "technology release pre-approval" being in place in advance of request. The Department continues to improve training and education associated with international agreements, including through Defense Acquisition University programs.

Mr. SCOTT. Should the State Department and Defense Department make it a goal to send personnel to each War College operated by the Armed Forces of our allies and partners? What allied and partner war colleges presently have no U.S. students?

Dr. KARLIN. Although I defer to my colleagues in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness for matters related to enrollment and participation in partner War Colleges, interoperability is an important goal for U.S. alliances and partnerships, and engagement and interactions at the career-level,

whether military-to-military exchanges, or liaison agreements, foster the best outcomes with regard to the ability of the U.S. military to work hand-in-hand with partner military forces to achieve long-term outcomes with regard to security and partnership.

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military history when it comes to engagement with Allies and Partners? What enhancements to military history are needed to increase the role it plays in theater security cooperation?

Dr. KARLIN. Military history is an essential component of military education and training. Military history is a part of how we enable partner military forces to foster regional and global security, especially in contested environments. The Department seeks to impart knowledge and lessons from history in our community and with our partners.

Mr. SCOTT. If better resourced in terms of funding, people, and platforms, how can the U.S. Coast Guard play a greater role in theater security cooperation?

Ms. LEWIS. Theater Security Cooperation is a critically important part of the military strategy of the United States that supports mutual security interests of the U.S. and its partners, develops partners' capabilities in multinational operations. While I would defer to U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) headquarters to more fully address specific matters of resourcing, the USCG, like other uniformed services, plays a significant role in security cooperation by their participation in multinational exercises, subject matter expert exchanges, making port visits, and other activities that help to enhance partners' capabilities.

Mr. SCOTT. The National Guard's State Partnership Program is a highly successful program in my view. What recommendations do you have for NGB to improve this highly successful program?

Ms. LEWIS. We share your enthusiasm for the State Partnership Program (SPP). The Department of State's formal role in the program is limited to providing the Secretary's concurrence with new partnerships and with quarterly activities that incorporate security forces or disaster and emergency response governmental organizations. However, we are in constant communication with DOD counterparts on SPP activities. With DOD, we foresee future SPP partnerships focused on critical regions such as the Indo-Pacific and engagements better aligned with State-funded security assistance activities. We will continue to consult with the National Guard Bureau as it considers future partnerships and at which embassies to place bilateral affairs officers.

Mr. SCOTT. The delay in approving requests for weapons for our allies and partners has caused some angst among our Allies and Partners. Should there be a new crisis type Foreign Military Sales (FMS) mechanism where Allies and Partners are able to quickly procure equipment from the U.S. for Ukraine assistance or to quickly equip in the light of crisis? So far there is no such a mechanism.

Ms. LEWIS. The Department is working closely with the Department of Defense to ensure FMS cases are processed promptly and effectively, including addressing changes to the DOD processes. Cooperation with DOD is vital, because FMS uses DOD's contract procurement system. 95% of all FMS transactions the State Department considers are approved within 48 hours. In about 5% of cases, significant foreign policy issues may require additional consideration by the Department and Congress. In some cases, delays in production for in-demand systems after FMS case approval also set back delivery timelines.

However, as demonstrated in the context of Ukraine, there are other mechanisms, such as the Presidential Drawdown Authority and Third-Party Transfers of U.S.-origin equipment from other partners, which can enable quick provision of urgently needed defense articles to allies and partners. The articles, in these cases, are in stock and often immediately available for delivery. Additionally, partners have the choice to purchase some types of military systems via the Direct Commercial Sales process, in which the Department authorizes U.S. industry to sell directly to foreign purchasers who may have unique requirements outside of DOD's procurement needs.

Mr. SCOTT. How can the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps enhance their maritime security cooperation workforce and formalize operations in this domain so that the Navy and Marine Corps can develop the partnerships they need to deter and defeat great power adversaries?

Ms. LEWIS. The stability and security of the U.S. and partner nations relies upon each party's ability to work together to confront common security challenges. While I would defer to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps headquarters to speak to their ongoing efforts to enhance their maritime domain security cooperation workforce, I would note that continuous execution of military exercises, port visits, subject matter expert exchanges, and real-world operations are certainly key components to such an endeavor.

Mr. SCOTT. What plans, if any, do you have to streamline the technology security and foreign disclosure (TS&FD) policy and international agreement process?

Ms. LEWIS. The TS&FD process is intended to preserve the U.S. technological edge and protect critical technology. The Department continues to believe this is a priority and is working with the Department of Defense to find ways to streamline the TS&FD without compromising technology security. The Department is examining options to increase funding resources to address critical needs to keep pace with emerging threats and technologies as well as looking into other areas where improvements can be made.

Mr. SCOTT. Should the State Department and Defense Department make it a goal to send personnel to each War College operated by the Armed Forces of our allies and partners? What allied and partner war colleges presently have no U.S. students?

Ms. LEWIS. While the Department of State does send State personnel to U.S. War and Staff Colleges, we do not send State personnel to foreign war colleges.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GAETZ

Mr. GAETZ. What specific vetting procedures are in place to ensure military foreign exchange program students do not pose a threat to the people of the United States? What changes, if any, were made to these vetting procedures after the 2019 terrorist attack on NAS Pensacola? What policies, procedures, and methods are in place to ensure the home nation of military foreign exchange program students are properly vetting their own people before sending them to the United States?

Dr. KARLIN. A. Fiscal Year 2021, which was enacted partly in response to the 2019 terrorist attack on NAS Pensacola, DOD implemented biographic and biometric vetting for international military students (IMS) seeking unescorted physical access (known as “credentialed recurring access (CRA),”) to a DOD installation or facility in the United States in association with training or education lasting more than 14 days, as well as for accompanying family members (AFM) who accompany them to the United States during that training or education. As required by Section 1090, DOD also has procedures in place to biographically vet certain immediate family members of both IMS and AFM regardless of whether they accompany the IMS or AFM to the United States. These procedures largely align with the vetting procedures of U.S. Service members and civilians traveling to a Defense base. The vetting of IMS and AFM generally occurs prior to their travel to the United States, and is automatically repeated every 90 days through a “continuous review” process while in the United States for training on a DOD installation.

To accomplish the biographic vetting, DOD reuses the information already collected by the Department of State (DOS) for the A-2 visa application, where one is needed, avoiding duplicative collection by both DOD and DOS. DOD supplements this information with additional data to improve the accuracy, thoroughness, and efficiency of the vetting. Vetting is conducted against DOD, DOS, Intelligence Community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation data holdings. DOD notifies DOS of any IMS or AFM denied through this vetting process.

B. Immediately following the attack, DOD reviewed its security policies and procedures regarding foreign nationals attending military education and training on DOD installations and facilities in the United States. In addition to the policies focused on international military students (IMS), the review also accounted for family members that may accompany the student to the United States.

After that review, DOD began to strengthen IMS vetting to better align it with the vetting DOD applies to its own personnel. In early 2020, DOD began applying the Expedited Screening Protocol (ESP) vetting process to certain subsets of the IMS populations.

In December 2020 the then-Acting USD(I&S) signed out procedures expanding the ESP vetting process to nearly all IMS and AFM. These procedures were implemented through a multi-tranche process starting in April 2021 and reaching full implementation in April 2022. Although this vetting is to determine the IMS's (or AFM's) fitness for credentialed (unescorted) recurring access to DOD installations in the United States rather than their eligibility for a visa or for admission to the United States, DOD notifies DOS and DHS of IMS and AFM denials to inform their decisions as well.

This DOD security vetting applies to foreign military nationals who are selected, nominated, or accepted for training or education at a DOD installation or facility in the United States lasting longer than 14 days, and the family members accompanying them to the United States, who will receive CRA to those locations. Per-

sonnel from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are exempt by law if they have a security clearance which is reciprocally accepted by the United States.

In addition to the vetting-related security enhancements, DOD also took several other steps to strengthen security policies related to IMS:

1. Limited Access: IMS and AFM are limited to accessing only the installations and facilities directly associated with the education or training or necessary for those IMS and AFM to access authorized benefits.
2. Privately-Owned Firearms Prohibition: IMS/AFM sign an agreement that they will not transport, possess, store or use privately-owned firearms and non-official ammunition in the United States during their training.
3. Insider Threat Program: IMS receive Insider Threat training upon arrival at the DOD schoolhouse where they will be based, and are incorporated into DOD's Counter-Insider Threat program.
4. Conduct Expectations Commitment: IMS sign an agreement that they and their AFM will comply with Expectations of Conduct established by U.S. military base/installation and U.S. civilian authorities.
5. Travel Reporting: IMS are required to notify their schoolhouse of any international travel and any non-duty domestic travel more than 250 miles from the training location.

C. In early 2020, when the Department informed partners and allies about the creation of the DOD Security Vetting process, it emphasized that partners and allies should conduct thorough screening of their candidate students before nominating them for training or education in the United States. When possible, DOD works with our interagency partners to develop releasable notifications regarding IMS or AFM we deny through DOD security vetting. This helps our allies and partners improve their security posture by identifying potential risks in their populations.

Mr. GAETZ. What specific vetting procedures are in place to ensure military foreign exchange program students do not pose a threat to the people of the United States? What changes, if any, were made to these vetting procedures after the 2019 terrorist attack on NAS Pensacola? What policies, procedures, and methods are in place to ensure the home nation of military foreign exchange program students are properly vetting their own people before sending them to the United States?

Ms. LEWIS. Following the terrorist attack, Congress passed Section 1090 of the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Action. As a result, the Department of Defense established and executed a vetting program for all International Military Students (IMS) attending training in the United States, and their accompanying family members (AFM). The Department of State works closely with DOD to complete this vetting, in addition to the standard suite of screening and vetting we conduct on all visa applicants prior to adjudication and throughout the validity of an applicant's visa.

Vetting of IMS and AFM includes:

1. Security Vetting: An initial security vetting of IMS and their AFM through the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency's (DCSA) Expedited Screening Center (ESC).
 - This vetting occurs prior to their arrival in the United States and is required before IMS are issued an Invitational Travel Order (ITO).
 - This vetting is conducted based on information from:
 - detailed biographic and biometric information collected from the IMS and AFM and
 - the information they provide through their Department of State visa application (or the appropriate substitute if no visa is issued).
2. Continuous Review (CR): While the IMS/AFM retain CRA, re-vetting occurs every 90 days through an ESC process referred to as "Continuous Review."
3. Publicly Available Electronic Information (PAEI) Monitoring: As part of CR, IMS/AFM have their publicly available electronic information monitored. IMS/AFM sign a document prior to arrival in the U.S. acknowledging that this will occur.
4. Privately-Owned Firearms: IMS/AFM sign an agreement that they will not transport, possess, store or use privately-owned firearms and non-official ammunition in the U.S.
5. Conduct Expectations: IMS sign an agreement that they and their AFM will comply with Expectations of Conduct established by U.S. military base/installation and U.S. civilian authorities.
6. Insider Threat Training: IMS receive Insider Threat Training upon arrival at the DOD schoolhouse where they will be based.
7. Travel Reporting: IMS are required to report to the DOD Schoolhouse if they will travel outside a 250-mile radius from their official location on personal travel the is not on their ITO. In addition to the partner nation's own internal security

vetting, we will continue to rely on the IMS vetting process to ensure DOD bases and facilities are protected.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ

Mr. WALTZ. What is the administration doing to detect and intercept Iranian weapon shipments to the Houthis? How many U.S. intercepts of Iranian-origin weapons heading to Yemen occurred in 2021 compared to the previous two years?

Dr. KARLIN. DOD supports efforts to address the unlawful transport of weapons from Iran to the Houthis in Yemen, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2216, which prohibits the supply, sale, or transfer of weapons to the Houthis. As part of standard maritime security operations conducted consistent with international law, U.S. Navy visit, board, search, and seizure teams have discovered and seized illicit weapons intended for the Houthis. The number of these interceptions has remained relatively consistent from 2019 through 2021.

Mr. WALTZ. Are the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE sharing technical information on Iranian weapons, especially the rockets, missiles, and drones that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis each operate?

Dr. KARLIN. The United States shares relevant information about Iranian weapons with our partners.

Mr. WALTZ. What is the administration doing to detect and intercept Iranian weapon shipments to the Houthis? How many U.S. intercepts of Iranian-origin weapons heading to Yemen occurred in 2021 compared to the previous two years?

Ms. LEWIS. The United States remains committed to using an array of tools to prevent and disrupt Iranian weapons-related procurement and shipments, including shipments to the Houthis. The United States designated targets involved in Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC–QF) funding of the Houthis in multiple rounds of sanctions in June 2021 and February 2022, for example.

In May and December 2021, the U.S. Navy and partner forces interdicted dhows carrying Iran-origin weapons intended for the Houthis, including hundreds of heavy machine guns and sniper rifles, dozens of advanced, Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles, several hundred rocket-propelled grenade launchers and optical sights for weapons, and thousands of assault rifles. In 2019, the United States intercepted a dhow bound for the Houthis in Yemen that contained sophisticated components of anti-ship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, air defense missiles, and anti-tank missiles from Iran. And in 2020, U.S. and partner forces intercepted two dhows containing Iranian weapons bound for the Houthis in Yemen.

Mr. WALTZ. Are the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and UAE sharing technical information on Iranian weapons, especially the rockets, missiles, and drones that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis each operate?

Ms. LEWIS. Yes. The Administration would be happy to provide more detail on this matter in a classified setting.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON

Dr. JACKSON. A challenge that the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program faces is helping a foreign service member's spouse move with them to the United States and provide adequate employment for the spouse. Is there anything that DOD or the State Department can do to improve this process? Further, are there any authorities lacking that would help improve this process?

Dr. KARLIN. The ability of a NATO service member's spouse to work is byproduct of their visa type (as determined by the Department of State (DOS)), immigration status, and whether there is a reciprocal work agreement with their country. NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk is in the best position to work with DOS and other federal entities to identify the rules or regulations that impact NATO spouses.

Dr. JACKSON. A challenge that the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training Program faces is helping a foreign service member's spouse move with them to the United States and provide adequate employment for the spouse. Is there anything that DOD or the State Department can do to improve this process? Further, are there any authorities lacking that would help improve this process?

Ms. LEWIS. Employment opportunities for the spouses of foreign military members who are present in the United States is an important issue, and we hear similar concerns from U.S. military servicemember's spouses stationed overseas. We work closely with our NATO Allies and the Department of Defense to address the issue of spouse employment, whether they are foreign military spouses who may be located in Wichita County, Texas or U.S. military spouses stationed in Europe. In par-

ticular, we work closely with the Department of Defense on any issues related to implementation of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) where it impacts spouse employment. We would like for foreign military dependents to be afforded the same opportunities as U.S. military dependents located abroad.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KAHELE

Mr. KAHELE. Dr. Karlin, in your opening remarks, you stated “The Department of Defense has also instituted a robust strategic evaluation agenda focused on making public key findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We are working every day to find ways to quantify, interpret, and evaluate return on investment with our security cooperation dollars. Currently, strategic evaluations span the effectiveness of maritime security, institutional capacity building, the State Partnership Program, the Counter-ISIL Train and Equip (CTEF), and State’s International Professional Military Education. How are you measuring these programs’ success?”

Dr. KARLIN. DOD considers a number of factors when evaluating security cooperation (SC) effectiveness. Although these factors can vary depending upon the country, SC activity, context, and evaluation objective, some common factors include how well the SC activity contributes to objectives at both the strategic and operational levels, what DOD planning or execution factors contributed to these outcomes, and what partner nation factors may have contributed to these outcomes.

For example, in measuring the success of our maritime SC initiatives, evaluators focused on measures related to partners’ capacity and capability to conduct maritime operations, including partners’ use and maintenance of vessels and associated equipment and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) equipment; sustainment plans and execution; response times to maritime incidents; the development of a National Maritime Strategy; and the political will to commit resources and personnel to improving maritime security. Evaluators also focused on more strategic measures such as how SC affected partner relationships with the United States and changes in the security environment during the evaluation period.

Mr. KAHELE. Dr. Karlin, it was a pleasure to meet you at the Reagan National Defense Forum last December. I sent you a letter last month about the upcoming NDS and look forward to your feedback.

As you stated in your testimony, the forthcoming NDS will emphasize how DOD will strengthen alliances and partnerships to advance national security through integrated deterrence. I completely agree that the full spectrum of views should be considered when the NDS is being drafted. For example, stakeholders ranging from the Missile Defense Agency to the Department of Energy should be at the policy-making table to provide strategic clarity on our nation’s missile defense infrastructure and energy security.

Would you please share your thoughts on how there can be more strategic clarity on our nation’s missile defense infrastructure in support of homeland defense? As a member representing Hawaii’s second congressional district, I think there is a lot of confusion over the future of the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii. For the past two fiscal years under Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden, the Department of Defense has zeroed out the HDR-H in the President’s budget proposal. For this upcoming fiscal year, I understand that it will likely be zeroed out again. This is one example where organizations outside (MDA) AND within DOD (INDOPACOM, OSD, CAPE) need to get on the same page. In my opinion, there is clearly an increasing threat posed by North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear missiles, and whether it is from the NORTHCOM Commander or the MDA Director, everyone says that the HDR-H is the best-programmed solution to enable a credible, in-depth, under layer defense for our forces in Hawaii.

Will you please share your thoughts on how there can be more strategic clarity on our nation’s missile defense infrastructure?

Dr. KARLIN. The Department remains committed to ensuring Hawaii’s continued protection from long-range missile threats, and the defense of Hawaii remains a high priority mission for the Department.

The Department recently initiated a broader study on the defense of Hawaii and will assess options to address the evolving threat. This analysis is intended to inform potential investment options for future budget cycles.

The Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii (HDR-H) was conceived to work in tandem with the Long Range Discrimination Radar and the Pacific Radar, the latter of which no longer has a viable path forward. Additionally, the cancellation of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle gave rise to plans for the Next Generation Interceptor, which can enhance the defense of Hawaii even in the absence of HDR-H.

Mr. KAHELE. For the last several years Congress has supported “tactically responsive space launch” as one key element of a more responsive and resilient space architecture. The idea is to be able to rapidly launch and deploy space systems on operational timelines or in a time of crisis, much like the other military services deploy rapid air, sea, and land-based combat capability; this serves as both a deterrent to adversary action against our space systems, and as an operational advantage in the event conflict extends to space. Our international NATO partners are leaning in on responsive space. For example, the Netherlands just called out responsive space in its new space defense strategy: the UK is looking at responsive launch capabilities from its soil, as are the Australians, and the Dutch. The Germans have stood up a “Responsive Space Cluster Competence Center,” and NATO is looking into responsive space capabilities. Meanwhile, the United States has talked at length about deepening our cooperation with partners and allies in the national security space domain.

Dr. Karlin, how does the administration intend to enable and facilitate joint NATO responsive space missions leveraging allied investments in launch infrastructure and commercially-developed turnkey satellite missions?

Dr. KARLIN. The Department of Defense continues to explore and leverage opportunities for enhanced space cooperation with NATO Allies and partner nations. NATO military space operations depend on NATO members’ sovereign military space resources, such as provision of satellite communications bandwidth, which NATO purchases from the United States and other NATO members. Although NATO does not own space assets, it is in the process of integrating space into its operational planning, where it will be able to account for the responsive launch capabilities and other space infrastructure of NATO members that it may be able to leverage.

Mr. KAHELE. Ms. Lewis, as a guardsman and the co-chair of the National Guard and Reserve Caucus, I am a strong advocate of the State Partnership Program. I spoke with the Hawaii TAG a couple weeks ago, and I was told that General Hokanson is envisioning a five-State engagement with Taiwan. Do you have an update on the status of this program and can you comment on the importance of creating this State Partnership with Taiwan?

Ms. LEWIS. We share your enthusiasm for the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program (SPP). While no formal partnership exists between any state’s National Guard component and Taiwan, the program is expanding upon engagements between multiple states’ National Guard components and Taiwan’s armed forces that have already proven successful. The lack of a formal partnership does not hinder SPP’s ability to bring to bear unique National Guard component capabilities and units from all 54 state and territories. We expect the newly created All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency to benefit from exchanges with and exposure to the best selection of units and capabilities our citizen-soldiers and airmen can share with Taiwan.

