[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PUTIN'S PROXIES: EXAMINING RUSSIA'S
USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 21, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-104
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-801 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking
Columbia Minority Member
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts Jim Jordan, Ohio
Jim Cooper, Tennessee Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia Jody B. Hice, Georgia
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
Jamie Raskin, Maryland Michael Cloud, Texas
Ro Khanna, California Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Rashida Tlaib, Michigan Pete Sessions, Texas
Katie Porter, California Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
Cori Bush, Missouri Andy Biggs, Arizona
Shontel M. Brown, Ohio Andrew Clyde, Georgia
Danny K. Davis, Illinois Nancy Mace, South Carolina
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Scott Franklin, Florida
Peter Welch, Vermont Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Pat Fallon, Texas
Georgia Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland Byron Donalds, Florida
Jackie Speier, California Mike Flood, Nebraska
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark DeSaulnier, California
Jimmy Gomez, California
Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts
Russ Anello, Staff Director
Daniel Rebnord, Subcommittee Staff Director
Amy Stratton, Deputy Chief Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
Mark Marin, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on National Security
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Chairman
Peter Welch, Vermont Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin, Ranking
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Minority Member
Georgia Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Mark DeSaulnier, California Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida Mike Flood, Nebraska
Jackie Speier, California
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on September 21, 2022............................... 1
Witnesses
Kimberly Marten, Ph.D., Professor, Political Science Department,
Barnard College, Columbia University
Oral Statement................................................... 4
Catrina Doxsee, Associate Director, Transnational Threats
Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Oral Statement................................................... 6
Joseph Siegle, Ph.D., Director of Research, Africa Center for
Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Oral Statement................................................... 8
Written opening statements and statements for the witnesses are
available on the U.S. House of Representatives Document
Repository at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
No additional documents were submitted for this hearing.
PUTIN'S PROXIES: EXAMINING RUSSIA'S.
USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
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Wednesday, September 21, 2022
House of Representatives
Subcommittee on National Security
Committee on Oversight and Reform
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, and via Zoom, Hon.
Stephen F. Lynch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lynch, Welch, Johnson, DeSaulnier,
Speier, Grothman, Foxx, and Higgins.
Mr. Lynch. The subcommittee will now come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any time. I will now recognize
myself for an opening statement.
Good morning, everyone. Thank you, Dr. Siegle.
Today, the Subcommittee on National Security will examine
Russia's growing reliance on private military companies, or
PMCs, to further its strategic objectives and expand its
geopolitical influence around the world. Russian President
Vladimir Putin's unprovoked and unlawful war against Ukraine is
now entering its seventh month. Facing mounting casualties, a
severe manpower shortfall, and an enduring Ukrainian military
resistance backed by the United States and our allies, Russia
is reportedly leaning heavily on private military companies,
including the Wagner Group, to supplement its conventional
military forces in Ukraine.
Earlier this year, the Department of Defense estimated that
at least a thousand mercenary fighters had already deployed to
the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine to reinforce Russia's
frontline troop presence.
Beyond the borders of Ukraine, the past several years have
witnessed a marked increase in Russia's reported use of private
military companies to provide paramilitary capabilities and
personal security services in conflicts around the world,
ranging from Syria to Libya, Mali, Sudan, and the Central
African Republic, among others.
On paper, Russian law prohibits mercenary activity, but it
is clear that the Wagner Group and other Russian private
military companies operate as quasi state actors. According to
the U.S. Treasury Department, the Wagner Group serves as a,
quote, Russian Ministry of Defence proxy force, which is
financed by a Russian oligarch with close ties to Russian
President Putin.
Press reports also indicate that the Wagner Group entities
are closely tied to Russia's intelligence and security agencies
and have even established training camps in close proximity of
bases used by Russian special force brigades. Other lesser
known private military companies, including the anti-terror
group the Moran Security Group and the Slavonic Corps, are
similarly associated with Russia's Ministry of Defence or state
intelligence and security services.
Around the world, Russia's private military companies have
engaged in direct combat operations, propaganda and
disinformation campaigns, illicit finance activities, and the
exploitation of natural resources, all while under the guise of
a nonstate corporation and at the expense of human lives and
international law.
In the Central African Republic, the United Nations has
accused Russian private military companies of carrying out
systemic and grave human rights abuses and violations of
international law, including arbitrary detention, torture,
disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
Project, an international crisis monitoring organization,
Wagner operative in Mali have targeted civilians in more than
70 percent of the operations they have conducted there since
last year. The U.S. and the European Union have imposed
multiple rounds of severe financial sanctions against the
Wagner Group, its Russian oligarch financier, and several
associates and entities in relation to their operations in
Ukraine, destabilizing activities in Syria, and human rights
atrocities in Africa.
Considering that Russia will continue to rely on private
military companies to further its strategic objectives and
exert its influence abroad, it is imperative that we examine
whether there are additional actions the United States and our
international partners can take to degrade the capabilities of
the Wagner Group and other similar Russian-backed proxy
organizations.
Before I recognize our ranking member, I want to note that,
given some of the challenges associated with analyzing Russia's
use of private military companies in an unclassified setting,
I've also asked the Administration to provide subcommittee
members with a classified briefing on Russia's use of private
military companies, including in Ukraine, which we plan to
schedule in November. That would be in addition to the briefing
that we had yesterday in a classified setting.
With that, I look forward to today's discussion, and I now
yield to the distinguished ranking member from Wisconsin, Mr.
Grothman, for his opening statement.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you. First of all, I'd like to thank
you, Chairman Lynch, for having this.
Second, it occurs to me this is the first time in two years
I've been in a room without anybody wearing a mask. So, first
of all, it always makes me feel uncomfortable when I see so
many of the staff uncomfortable. So I think it was a big step
in the right direction and consistent with the most recent
science on the matter, so it makes me----
Mr. Lynch. [Inaudible.]
Mr. Grothman. I'd like to thank the witnesses for being
here in person or on the Zoom. I want to start by urging the
Chairman to ask one more time the administration to make
available for subcommittees in the future the witnesses that we
originally thought were going to be here today. Their
perspective would be interesting with regard to their
understanding of the role of private military companies and how
the U.S. is dealing with them.
The topic in front of us is important today. Russia and
President Putin's use of unaccountable mercenaries to avoid
accountability both at home and abroad is deplorable. We know
these groups have been deployed in the 1914 invasion of
Ukraine, in Syria, and across Africa. There have been numerous
reports that Russia has deployed PMCs during the most recent
war in Ukraine. And it is hard to judge what's going on there
without knowing a little bit more about this.
PMCs have a long running history of violating international
norms and rules of engagement and committing human rights
abuses. Although Russia denies being officially linked to the
PMCs, particularly in the Wagner Group, the connection's clear.
It would be illogical to believe these private companies just
happen to be deployed in areas around the world where Russia is
attempting to achieve geopolitical superiority.
The U.S. response to these groups has been largely ad hoc
and haphazard. It is vital the U.S. use its significant global
power and influence to shine light on Russia's use of PMCs,
highlight their flaws and failures, and implement a global
sanction regime.
Finally, I'd like to discuss the status of the war in
Ukraine. President Biden just requested another multibillion-
dollar aid package. While helping our allies is important, it
cannot come at the cost of ignoring those at home. It is
important, particularly given that we're spending $110 million
a day over the past year, that we get more information on
exactly just what is going on with these funds, a little more
oversight. We cannot simply just assume or assistance is being
used in the manner we intend.
We know our economy is in difficult shape. Americans need
help too.
With that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
today. And I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields back.
Before I introduce our witnesses, I want to quickly just
for the record welcome the gentleman from Nebraska,
Representative Flood, as our newest member of the subcommittee,
as this will be his first hearing with us. I know there are
several hearings going on right now. I look forward to his
robust participation and working with him further.
Now I will introduce our witnesses. First, we are joined by
Dr. Kimberly Marten, who is a professor of political science at
Barnard College at Columbia University. Dr. Marten specializes
in international relations and security, including Russian
security and foreign policy.
Next, we will hear from Ms. Catrina Doxsee, who is an
associate director for the Transnational Threats Project at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies. In this
position, Ms. Doxsee analyzes the irregular warfare activities
of countries like Iran, Russia, and China. And she has done
extensive examinations of operations of Russian private
military companies.
We will then hear from Joseph Siegle, Dr. Joseph Siegle,
who is here in person, who is the director of research at the
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a congressionally funded
research institution located at the National Defense
University. Dr. Siegle is an expert in Africa security issues,
the stabilization of fragile states, and how U.S. policies
toward Africa might generate greater stability on the
continent.
Dr. Marten and Dr. Doxsee please, please unmute yourselves.
And, Dr. Siegle, please stand so we can swear you in, which is
the custom of the committee. Would you all please raise your
right hand?
Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to
give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God?
Mr. Siegle. I do.
Ms. Doxsee. I do.
Ms. Marten. Yes, I do.
Mr. Lynch. Let the record show that the witnesses all
answered in the affirmative.
Thank you. You may be seated.
Without objection, your written statements will, of course,
be made part of the record.
With that. Dr. Marten, you are recognized for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF KIMBERLY MARTEN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, POLITICAL
SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Ms. Marten. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Grothman, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for giving
me the opportunity to testify about Russia's Wagner Group. My
written testimony contains much more detail. In the five
minutes I have here, I will summarize what the Wagner Group,
how it serves Russia's strategic interests, how the U.S. might
further hold it accountable for its war crimes, but why I do
not support labeling it a foreign terrorist organization.
The Wagner Group is not a legally established private
military company. It is arguably not a private military company
at all. PMCs remain illegal in Russia. Nor is it a true
mercenary group since it only serves at the behest of the
Russian state.
It is instead a contracting mechanism tied to Russia's
military intelligence agency, the GRU, for recruiting Russian
and pro-Russian veterans and now prisoners. In a country where
the lines between public and private are blurred, Putin's ally,
Yevgeny Prigozhin, is the contractor and recruiter. Everywhere
but Ukraine the contracts seem to be funded by foreign
countries. The Kremlin helps negotiate the contracts.
Analysts without security clearances have difficulty
following the details of Wagner Group activities. It is a
product of the GRU, so its actions are cloaked in secrecy and
disinformation campaigns. It is not always clear who is a
Wagner Group fighter versus a member of the Russian Special
Forces or a security contractor for another Russian entity.
Disinformation may also come from Russia's opponents, including
some U.S. allies, who have incentives to exaggerate or distort
Wagner's presence and activities. One purpose of the Wagner
Group, especially early on, was to give the Russian state
plausible deniability for its military presence on the ground
in locations where it was not supposed to be. By mid-2018,
though, the Wagner Group was tracked by journalists everywhere
it went, and plausible deniability was no longer really
maintained. Even Putin talked about Wagner. By summer 2022, the
Wagner Group was openly recruiting on Russian highway
billboards.
The Wagner Group has served several additional purposes for
the Russian state. It is used for military actions where Putin
does not want to risk the lives of ordinary Russian conscripts.
This has allowed the Kremlin to expand Russia's military
influence without unleashing public unhappiness about
casualties.
De facto partial mobilization in Russia today indicates
that this effort failed in Russian's invasion of Ukraine.
Wagner has also made Russia a key player in resolving
African civil wars at low cost for Moscow. Russian assistance
can be withdrawn at any time if Russian goals are not met,
making it similar to a Mafia protection racket holding its
beneficiaries hostage to Kremlin demand.
The geopolitical benefits to the Kremlin may eventually
include new military bases, for example, in Sudan and Libya,
which could interfere with U.S. and allied commercial and
military operations, but those have not yet been built.
Wagner is already under sanctions by the U.S. and the
European Union. And that limits where it can be deployed and
where Prigozhin can dock his planes and boats. The only
countries willing to contract Wagner Group's services or
conduct businesses with Prigozhin are those already under U.S.
and EU sanctions or willing to risk them.
The U.S. could increase the financial pressure by working
with its partners in Dubai to prevent the Wagner Group from
smuggling Sudanese gold into Dubai for remelting. New Russian
origin gold is now sanctioned internationally. A logical
extension would be to prevent false origin documents from being
provided for African gold mined under Wagner Group contracts.
Prigozhin and his firms were also indicted by the United States
for election interference. The prosecutors had to drop the case
when Prigozhin's lawyers demanded the release of classified
information. When this is combined with the difficulties
researchers have in separating truth from rumor about the
Wagner Group's activities, it suggests that further
accountability may require reconsidering current rules about
declassification of evidence.
Criminal indictments matter, even if they never lead to
convictions for foreign actors, because they limit the ability
of individuals to travel to any of the 116 countries with which
the U.S. has an extradition treaty. Indictments would have even
more impact if the U.S. were to amend the War Crimes Act of
1996 as proposed earlier this year in a bipartisan Senate bill
to allow universal jurisdiction, which would align the U.S.
with international practice. Currently, the War Crimes Act
applies only to perpetrators located in or extradited to the
United States who are themselves U.S. citizens or
servicemembers or whose victims are U.S. nationals. If the act
were amended, anyone could be indicted in the U.S. and be
subject to extradition and prosecution for war crimes or crimes
against humanity regardless of the nationality of the offender
or the victim. Asset forfeiture rules could be similarly
amended to allow compensation for war crimes victims.
But I do not agree with the proposal to label the Wagner
Group a foreign terrorist organization. Wagner Group fighters
are temporary Russian state contractors in a system that works
over time and geographic location. Wagner is not a permanent
entity. Even its name is unofficial and could be dropped.
Labeling it an FTO will not incentivize any changes in its
operations.
Because the Wagner Group is a tool of the Russian state,
labeling it an FTO would also carry a great deal of diplomatic
baggage, complicating any cooperation with Russia that the U.S.
might find useful in the future. The designation would also
blur the distinction between terrorism and war crimes.
Terrorism is commonly defined as violence committed by non-
state actors against noncombatants done for shock value to gain
attention or support for a political cause. That is not what
the Wagner Group does. Wagner commits plain old war crimes.
Blurring the two categories undercuts the strength of
international war crimes laws and makes terrorism a meaningless
term beyond the fact that its victims are noncombatants.
Instead, the U.S. should prosecute Wagner Group actions and
Russian actions more generally under existing and amended war
crimes laws, reserving the FTO label for true terrorist groups.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Ms. Doxsee, you're now recognized five minutes for your
testimony. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF CATRINA DOXSEE, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL
THREATS PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Doxsee. Good morning. And thank you again for convening
this important discussion. In my written statement, I provided
a brief overview of Russian private military companies,
examples of their activities, and some policy implications. I
would now like to take this opportunity to highlight the two
major points that I hope you will all will take away from the
conversation here today.
These are, first, that it's more accurate to view PMCs such
as the Wagner Group as opportunists rather than as masterminds;
and, second, Russian PMCs have a variety of weaknesses that the
U.S. and its partners are well-positioned to exploit.
First, I'll address the opportunistic nature of Russian PMC
deployments. Russia is not picky in choosing countries with
which to pursue security cooperation agreements, agreements
which are often facilitated by PMCs. For example,
representatives of all 54 African states attended the first
Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 2019, including 43 heads of
state. Moscow sought agreements with most attendees relatively
indiscriminately. Preparations are now underway for the second
Russia-Africa summit, which will be held this fall.
As Russia continues trying to expand its political
influence, military and intelligence collection capabilities,
and economic opportunities in Africa, it will likely continue
to cast its broad net and seize whatever opportunities arise.
This may present opportunities to displace or offer
alternatives to Russian assistance. Particularly as the U.S.
reinvigorates its own strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa.
It is also worth noting that the largest scale PMC
deployments in the region have been to countries with weak
governance, ongoing security challenges, and abundant natural
resources. This is not the result of some altruistic Russian
desire to resolve conflict and increase stability but rather is
tied to a desire to exploit those natural resources, for
instance, through mining concessions.
This leads to the second key takeaway, that Russian PMCs
have vulnerabilities and patterns of failure that the U.S. and
its partners are well equipped to exploit.
In my remaining time, I'll highlight three such weaknesses.
First, Russian PMCs have experienced various operational
failures, whether in the form of outright inability to perform
the tasks they were assigned, as occurred in Mozambique and to
an extent in Madagascar, or similarly an inability or
disinterest in facilitating long-term regional stability by
addressing the root causes of violence.
Second, Russian PMC activities frequently have negative
impact on host countries and their populations. As I mentioned,
this includes the exploitation of natural resources.
Additionally, in some cases, such as in Mali, Wagner's
activities have increased in stability and the threat of
terrorist violence.
PMCs have also violated local and international law,
including through widespread human rights abuses, such as
indiscriminate killings, rape, torture, and the armed
occupation of facilities, such as schools and hospitals. Such
actions have been widely documented by the U.N. Security
Council and various NGO's in places such as the Central African
Republic, and they have become increasingly common in other
countries, such as Wagner's latest deployment in Mali.
Transparency and information sharing about PMC failures and
detrimental effects can inform local actors of the true cost of
Russian partnerships and may make PMC agreements less appealing
in the future. There is also an opportunity to hold PMCs
accountable for their legal violations.
A third major vulnerability is the prominence and growing
monopoly of the Wagner Group, including the shadowy web of
entities linked to it.
Wagner's dominance makes it a clear target for sanctions
and other financial penalties. The U.S., EU, U.K., and others
have already taken commendable steps in this area, and an
expanded multilateral sanctions campaign against Prigozhin-
linked entities, particularly those involved in the
exploitation and laundering of natural resources, could impede
these profit-driven companies' ability to operate.
Ultimately, although PMCs are just one of many options in
Russia's irregular warfare toolkit, Moscow is likely to
continue using PMCs to further its geopolitical, military, and
economic goals until such time as the costs outweigh the
benefits. Therefore, to counter the spread of Russian influence
and to hold PMCs accountable, the U.S. and its partners should
take coordinated actions to raise the costs, risks, and
consequences of Russian PMC activity worldwide.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Dr. Siegle, you are now recognized for your testimony.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH SIEGLE, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, AFRICA
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Mr. Siegle. Good morning. I thank the chair, Representative
Lynch, as well as Ranking Member Grothman, for the invitation
to speak on today's panel about Russia's use of irregular
security forces. It is an honor to be here.
My remarks will draw primarily from Africa, which has been
the focus of my research of Russia's grand strategy. Russia has
deployed the paramilitary outfit the Wagner Group in at least a
half dozen African countries in recent years, making Africa one
of most active regions of Russia's mercenary deployments
globally. With many of its forces comprised of ex-Russian
defense intelligence troops working in alignment with Russian
foreign policy objective, Wagner operates more like an under-
the-radar special operations force than a private military
contractor.
In fact, the Wagner Group is not a legal registered entity
but an amalgamation of military, business, political, and
disinformation organizations linked to Russian Oligarch,
Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of President Vladimir Putin.
Russia uses Wagner to advance its strategic objectives in
Africa and elsewhere. This includes to secure access to
strategically important territory along the southern
Mediterranean and the Red Sea, to displace Western influence,
and to reshape the international order to one that is more
aligned with Moscow's transactional patronage base and
authoritarian model.
Borrowing from its Syria playbook, Moscow has swooped in
with irregular forces to prop up politically isolated
authoritarian leaders facing crises in Libya, Central African
Republic, Mali, Sudan, and elsewhere. These leaders are then
indebted to Russia, which assumes the role of regional power
broker.
That the entry point for Wagner's deployments is often
through an autocratic leader is not a coincidence, lacking
legitimacy or popularity, these leaders provide an easy mark
for Moscow to expand its influence quickly and cheaply. The
resulting partnership of an unaccountable regime hosting
unaccountable mercenaries is a recipe for instability. And, in
fact, while rationalized on security grounds, in every place
that Wagner has been deployed in Africa, it has left a wake of
instability for the citizens of the host country, including
documented allegations of human rights abuses.
Wagner deployments moreover do not happen in isolation, but
they are part of a package of tools deployed by Moscow to keep
its allies in power. These include disinformation, opaque arms-
for-resources deals, sanctions evasion, election meddling, and
political cover at the United Nations. Wagner deployments,
therefore, should be seen as a political tool, not just as a
security operation.
In considering how to mitigate the destabilizing effects
ever Wagner deployments, we should bear in mind that the United
States' diplomatic investment, trade, development, security,
and cultural ties with Africa are several orders of magnitude
greater than that of Russia. So, mitigating the effects of
Wagner's deployments must be nested within the United States'
broader Africa strategy, not as a singular end of its own.
So, within such a strategy, I would offer four priorities.
First, recognizing that Wagner is a tool to gain political
influence, the United States should further incentivize
democratic norms in Africa and elsewhere as the strongest
antidote to malign Russian influence. This also means
condemning coups an isolating coup-makers, denying Russia an
easy entry point for influence.
Second, the United States should work with partners to
invoke the legally binding African Convention for the
Elimination of Mercenaries, which prohibits African states from
allowing mercenaries on their territories. Designating Wagner a
mercenary force would identify them as an illegal entity, one
that should be banned from operating on the continent.
A third priority is to help strengthen African capacity to
counter Russian disinformation by enhancing African fact-
checking, social media forensics, digital literacy, and media
professionalism--proficiencies.
And a final priority is to increase the reputational and
financial costs on Russia for its malign actions by further
employing the United States' robust menu of legal and financial
tools to penalize Wagner and its enablers. While such actions
may not immediately curtail Russia's bad behavior, they do
increase the cost of doing business. And by giving heightened
attention to these issues, the United States can help Africa
become less of a permissive environment for Wagner deployments
at the expense of African stability, sovereignty, and
democracy, and this is in both African and U.S. interests.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Dr. Siegle.
The chair will now recognize himself for five minutes for
questions.
Dr. Marten, in your written testimony, you describe how the
Wagner Group has evolved from a shadowy paramilitary and
security force to now an overt contractor network that is
actively recruiting fighters to support Russia's invasion of
Ukraine.
In fact, just last week, a video emerged of someone who
appears to be Yevgeny Prigozhin, the alleged founder and
financier of the Wagner Group, speaking to prisoners in a
Russian penal colony trying to recruit them to fight in
Ukraine. In a statement following the video's release,
Prigozhin told the Russian people that the war in Ukraine will
be fought, quote, either by private military companies and
prisoners or your children; you need to decide for yourself,
close quote.
So it's clear that, while the Kremlin may have once been
able to claim a degree of plausible deniability about Wagner
Group's activity, those denials are becoming increasingly
implausible.
Let me ask, so the idea that Russian foreign mercenaries
would provide open support and security for, say, any regime in
Africa that contracts with Wagner Group, you would think that
that would undermine the legitimacy in the eyes of the people
of Mali or any other country on the African Continent; the
knowledge that foreign mercenaries are propping up these
leaders would be a way of undermining or making more
transparent and exposing this practice and thereby make it less
attractive to either African leaders or others who might use
those services. So is exposure and publicizing this practice
and this use and stopping it from operating in the shadows, is
that in fact a weapon against this?
Ms. Marten. Thank you for those very detailed and really
well-thought-out questions, Chairman Lynch.
One thing to keep in mind is that the Wagner Group and
Prigozhin have already acted to try to undermine the reputation
of France in both the Central African Republic and in Mali. And
so, what we are doing if we are fighting a disinformation
campaign is dealing with a legacy of colonialism in Africa and
a suspicion of other actors who might also come in to provide
security. And so that is one of the reasons why they might feel
that Russia--and I think that these actors are seen as Russian
on the ground in these areas--that Russia may provide an
alternative to what was a colonial history.
Something else to keep in mind is that there have been
rumors--I have not seen many facts to support them--that one of
Russia's intentions is to take fighters from the Central
African Republic who were trained by the Wagner Group who are
French speakers and who are dark-skinned and send them to Mali
as trainers because they might be more acceptable to the local
population there than having White-skinned Russians who do not
speak the local language and do not speak French.
And so I think that Russia is very clever in the way that
it is approaching things. I think the more that we can
publicize what the Wagner Group is doing, the better chance we
have of turning people against it. But I think people know what
the Wagner Group is doing and still see it as perhaps an
alternative to what the history has been in Africa, and so that
is what we are up against.
Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Dr. Siegle, I know you spent a lot of time on the African
question. Our committee was in Mali not that long ago, and
there appeared to be a transition going on where heretofore
French Special Forces were very active there, but, as Dr.
Marten pointed out, there's been a point of friction between
the current administration there in Mali and the French
Government, perhaps from the prior colonial history there.
What can you tell us about the Wagner Group's activities or
any other PMC operating on behalf of Russia in Mali and what
the future holds there?
Mr. Siegle. Well, I think Mali provides a very good example
of how Russia is using Wagner as a political tool. You know,
Russia disinformation in Mali started in 2018, 2019 and was
very--sorry about the feedback here. And it was very anti-
French, anti-West, pro-Russia, and it effectively built up a
lot of dissent against the city democratic-elected government.
The issue of colonialism in Mali has been there for 60 years.
It's not a new thing. But Russia used that leverage to try to
buildup antipathy toward the government. And it ultimately did
lead to protest and the military coup that brought the junta to
power, some of the leaders of which, it should be noted, were
trained in Russia. Russia was the first country to recognize
the military junta and quickly formed a close alliance and has
been the prime international backer of the junta since then. So
it wasn't a surprise when, a year later, the junta struck a
deal to bring in a thousand Wagner forces. As in other places,
they are not there as a security mechanism; they are there to
help keep the junta in power, protecting the junta and
controlling access to different natural resource locations.
The political dimension is playing out too in that, in the
face of an actively growing jihadi insurgency in Mali, the
junta has in fact agitated and alienated for the removal of
French forces. So we've seen the withdrawal of 4-to 5,000
French forces who have been fighting in Mali, as well as EU
forces, and now they are going after the United Nations
peacekeeping forces, a contingent of 15,000 forces. So we have
this hugely unstrategic dynamic of a country that's facing a
rapidly ramping up jihadist attack that's pushing out partners
that could help them fend this off. Really the only one who is
benefiting from this is Russia, who is displacing Western
influence, and it is really creating a vacuum in the Sahel that
could lead to another Afghanistan-style takeover by an
extremist group.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
I now yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin, our ranking
member, Mr. Grothman, for five minutes.
Mr. Grothman. Sure.
This is for whoever feels capable of answering the
question, I guess. As I understand it or as you just explained
that they recruit these people, billboards, prisons, wherever.
But do we have some feeling of who they are? How many are
ethnic Russians? How much are not? Are some of them Muslim?
And, just in general, how many people are members of the Wagner
Group?
Mr. Siegle. Is that directed at me or----
Mr. Grothman. Anybody who wants it. If you feel you are the
sharpest of the bunch, jump right in.
Ms. Marten. So I can't give you the overall number, but I
can tell you that the composition has changed very much over
time. There were rumors early on that there were no Muslims.
But then it became clear that there actually are Chechens that
have been involved with the Wagner Group. It is not just
Russians. It is also pro-Russian people who are citizens of
places like Serbia, Belarus, and eastern Ukraine. What they are
engaged in, what they are training in has varied over time. I
think 2022 was the first time we saw them recruiting from
prisons.
But we do know that Prigozhin has gone across Russian
territory to recruit tough guys who are, for example, fighting
in extreme fighting tournaments. And we also know that exactly
the type of training that they've had has varied with time. So,
for example, in Libya, we saw people who were not very well
trained at all, not very well disciplined. And we also saw
extraordinarily well-disciplined sharp shooters. And there also
appears to have been cases where the Wagner Group may have
engaged people who were veterans of the Russian Air Force to
engage in bombing raids. And so it has really varied over time
and space. There does not seem to be one component of exactly
what the Wagner Group is.
Mr. Grothman. Does one have any idea how many have been
killed or captured, say, in the last--and the overall number,
overall number of members of the Wagner Group and how many have
been killed or captured in the last five years?
Ms. Marten. If I may, again, I think that that's maybe a
question for people who have access to intelligence and
classified information.
Mr. Grothman. OK. I have another question. When they go
abroad, are they paid by those countries? I mean, when Russia's
in Mali, I mean, you know, if--or French troops are in Mali, I
assume they don't take money from Mali to be there. But if the
Wagner Group shows up, is the host country, if I can call it
that, expected to pay for them?
Mr. Siegle. In that case, yes. The understanding is that
they are paid about $11 million a month. It's not an official
contract, of course, but that's the understanding. They also--
in Mali and other places, there is an understanding that they
are--as part of the deal, they are giving access to natural
resource reserves.
Mr. Grothman. OK.
Mr. Siegle. So it is seen as a self-funding operation.
Mr. Grothman. We say they commit war crimes. Can you guys
give us some specific examples which might be good for causing
my colleagues to care or the public in general to care?
Mr. Siegle. Well, as my colleagues have pointed out as
well, the instances of Wagner abuses are becoming relatively
well publicized now. And in fact the United Nations has
conducted investigations that have specifically called out
Wagner and Russian forces for human rights abuses and war
crimes.
Mr. Grothman. Could you describe what those are?
Mr. Siegle. Well, in Moura, in Mali, earlier this year, the
Russians, working with the military junta, cordoned off the
village of Moura, separated out the men from other family
members and are alleged to have executed 300 men. So, in
Central Africa Republic, there are again allegations of
intimidation, extrajudicial killings, rape, and other forms of
intimidation against local communities.
Mr. Grothman. We hear that rape is something that Russian
soldiers do or have done in Ukraine. Is this a common thing
with the Wagner Group too?
Mr. Siegle. I can't speak more generally, and I welcome
input from either panelists, but rape has been specifically
called out for as part of their mode of operation in Central
African Republic in particular.
Mr. Grothman. OK. I will give you one more question, I
hope. This is something I kind of wonder about, and we of
course had a private briefing yesterday. All of you I am sure
follow what's going on in Ukraine. Do any of you know, do we
have a goal in Ukraine? Is there a point at which we feel this
will end or, when we accomplish such and such, it will end? Any
of the three of you under the impression of what our goal is
over there?
Mr. Siegle. Well, that's a much bigger question than here
what we are talking about with Wagner so I'll defer to my
colleagues to add to that. But obviously a much bigger geo or
strategic question there.
Mr. Grothman. I'm just a Congressman. I don't know exactly
what the end game is, but I will ask you guys. Do you have any
idea what the end game is? The other witnesses? No? You can say
no. Or you can say nothing, I guess.
Ms. Marten. I hesitate to speak on behalf of the
Administration so I don't think I'm competent to answer that
question.
Mr. Grothman. Nobody knows. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
California.
Welcome and you're recognized for five minutes. Thank you.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
shedding light on the PMCs, particularly the Wagner Group.
I want to followup on the ranking member's question and ask
all of you, are you of the impression that rape has become a
weapon of war? I'd like to ask each of you that.
Ms. Doxsee, would you just begin?
Ms. Doxsee. Yes. Thank you. So I think that we have seen
rape being used in a widespread way by PMCs such as the Wagner
Group. And I would call this out in two contexts. One is in the
context of warfare and combat operations. This is certainly
something that we've seen in Ukraine by Russian soldiers,
including some who have been identified as being affiliated
with the Wagner Group or other private military contractors.
It's something that's also been documented in locations such as
the Central African Republic.
But then the second category I would highlight is not just
rapes that are occurring during combat operations but also just
during the tenure in which PMCs are present in a country. So,
for example, in the Central African Republic, while we have
widespread documentation of human rights abuses by the U.N.
Security Council and NGO's, such as Human Rights Watch,
particularly after Wagner became engaged in direct combat
operations, if you dig into local reporting and conversations
with locals, particularly in the villages surrounding areas
such as Berengo, where Wagner established training bases early
on, from the time that Wagner troops arrived in the country,
local villages reported these Russian mercenaries coming into
their villages, kidnapping women, raping their wives and
daughters. And, to some extent, that's one way that we can sort
of have a harbinger of what's to come when Wagner arrives in a
country. These are the types of local crimes that Wagner and
other PMCs commit when they arrive in a country even before
thorough combat operations begin. And I think it is something
that we can certainly expect to see.
Ms. Speier. OK. Thank you.
Let me ask your other colleagues because I'm going to run
out of time here. Yes.
Ms. Marten. Hi, I think that's a great question. And I
should just point out that the Wagner Group in this sense is
not really acting any differently from Russian and regular
troops. And this actually goes back into deep history. It is
something that the Soviet Union did when-- it is very well
documented-- when it occupied Eastern Germany at the end of
World War II. So there is a long history of it, and it is not
unique to Wagner, but certainly Wagner is doing it.
Ms. Speier. And we can say pretty clearly that the Wagner
Group is proxy for the Russian Government. And we need to call
them out. Should we identify them as a terrorist group?
Ms. Marten. I think we need to keep separate the notions of
war crimes and terrorism, not even just for this case but more
broadly for U.S. interests. And I think if we were to instead
amend our War Crime Act from 1996 to allow more prosecutions
and more indictments to happen, that might be the best way to
approach this.
Ms. Speier. Dr. Marten, in a recent piece, yoargued that
PMCs like Wagner Group are out of control. How do yothink we
can hold Russia accountable for sexual violence that these
mercenaries commit?
Ms. Marten. It's both a war crime and it is a crime against
humanity. It is an example of torture, and so there are laws on
the books that we could expand so that it is not merely U.S.
citizens who are the victims or U.S. citizens who are the
perpetrators. And we could therefore hold Russia accountable in
those ways. And I think we could also convene war crimes
tribunal in which the Russian state as a whole was held
accountable for what was helping, similarly to what we did at
the close of World War II with the Nuremberg trials.
Ms. Speier. One of the things we found in the buildup of
the Ukrainian war by the Russians is that, when we declassified
information, it shed a great deal of light and it unified the
alliance to come together to support Ukraine.
Ms. Doxsee, how would yodeclassify intelligence about the
Wagner Group and other PMCs and making that information
publicly releasable, undermining Russia's ability to use them
as a proxy force?
Ms. Doxsee. I can't speak to information that we have
currently classified, but I think that, even with information
that's publicly available, there's wide evidence of these human
rights abuses, of the failures that Wagner has experienced in
countries like Mozambique, where they had outright combat
failures, not just because of their inability to repel the
local Islamist insurgency but because of fundamental planning
and operational failures, such as inexperience operating in
local terrain and the inability to even communicate with the
local troops in which they were embedded.
So I think there's a wide variety of open-source
information already about the direct harms that Wagner causes,
as well as the failures, the inability to actually achieve
their goals, that could certainly make them less appealing to
future countries who are considering agreements with them. And
I'm sure that this information is only supplemented by more on
the high side.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, I know I'm over my time. I have
just one last question. Do we know if there are any members of
the Wagner Group in the United States? Does anyone know? Yes.
Ms. Marten. I would say that that's highly unlikely just
because they would be afraid to travel to the United States,
but also because they are going to be very anti-American. They
are all very loyal to the Russian state, and so I think, at the
moment, they would not be attempting to cooperate with the
United States. Again, I think yowould need someone who had an
intelligence clearance to answer that question --
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for five minutes.
Mr. Higgins. I thank Chairman Lynch and Ranking Member
Grothman for holding today's hearing.
Russia is a brutal regime. It should be no surprise to us
that they are using private military companies and mercenaries
as part of their military standard operating procedures. While
the private use of private security groups has a long history
in our world, the Russian usage of groups like the Wagner Group
is common and horrific. Most private contractors they use for
security purposes, but Russia's tendency to allow and embrace
human rights violations and lack of responsibility certainly
calls for the world's attention. And it's appropriate that
Congress discusses this today.
As we've seen in the Middle East and Africa and now
Ukraine, Russia's reliance on PMCs shows two things. This is
what I'd like to get to-- Ms. Doxsee, I'm going to be asking
you questions, ma'am-- it shows two things that they are using
PMCs, mercenaries. One, the Russian military is not as
formidable as they would have the world believe; and, two, that
certainly regarding Ukraine, Russian soldiers commonly agree
that unprovoked aggression against Ukraine is wrong. So this
should be discussed deeply. We should look at ways to sanction
nations that utilize this type of military aggression, private
mercenaries unaccountable. And I look forward to working with
fellow members on the committee about this.
Ms. Doxsee, in looking through our panelists, I believe you
may be most capable of responding to this question. Ukraine is
mounting successful counter attacks. On many fronts, they are
pushing Russian forces back and regaining ground that they had
initially lost. And certainly, any reasonable observer would
argue that the Ukrainian people have fought the Russians to a
standstill. I have been to Ukraine and met with those people,
and they are incredibly focused on defending their country. And
they should be commended for that. They have driven the morale
of Russian troops down, down into a point where desertion is
common amongst the Russian troops, I'm advised. The combat
capabilities of the Russian troops, the weaknesses thereof,
have been exposed, and Russian capabilities continue to
deteriorate.
So, Ms. Doxsee, given all the facts that we're discussing
today, I'd like you to address for the committee and the world
that's watching, what is your opinion on how--like, what is the
situation with Russia's potential use of tactical nuclear
weapons in Ukraine? Given the fact that they've lost ground,
they've been pushed very hard, they are a brutal regime, what
are your thoughts there, ma'am?
Ms. Doxsee. Thank you, sir. And thank you for, you know,
highlighting both the commendable actions of the Ukrainian
people and the continued struggle and, frankly, security
concerns that we should all have regarding the ongoing conflict
in Ukraine.
I think that, you know, while certainly I cannot pretend to
know what happens inside Putin's brain--I don't think any of us
can--I think that we are certainly seeing Russia recognizing
the low morale amongst its troops, the risk even domestically
for continually having Russian troops on the front lines, and I
think this was one area where Russia's continued use of private
military contractors in Ukraine is also a way that we can get
insight into the Kremlin's mind-set around where things stand.
So, as my colleagues and I have mentioned, Moscow often
uses private military contractors such as the Wagner Group in
situations in which they want a force that's more expendable,
that they can't be held accountable for, not only on the
international stage but among their people at home.
We had stories during the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014
of villages in Russia where young men would suddenly be dropped
off dead, their bodies full of shrapnel, with no explanation as
to what happened to them and how they died. And the truth was
that they were private contractors, operating in Ukraine, but
because they were not officially Russian soldiers, the Kremlin
had no obligation to their families. And so we----
Mr. Higgins. I thank you for your response. It was very
thorough and insightful.
Mr. Chairman, I'll leave for your due consideration, sir,
the observation that an increased concentration of mercenaries
I fear could indeed signal preparatory events for the use of
tactical nukes in Ukraine. And I am thankful that you have
chaired this committee hearing today on this particular topic.
I yield, sir.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields. Thank you.
I am told that the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, may
be available for the next question.
All right. He's not on yet.
We will go to the gentlelady from North Carolina, Ms. Foxx,
for five minutes. Welcome.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for convening the hearing.
For Dr. Marten, how many Wagner Group contractors are
currently fighting in the war in Ukraine? Do we know?
Ms. Marten. Thank you for the question.
I am sure there are people who have intelligence clearances
who know the answer to that, but I would hesitate to guess
because it would just be guessing.
Ms. Foxx. OK. Well, I've been working on the War Crimes
Rewards Expansion Act, a bill to improve the U.S. State
Department's War Crimes Rewards Program so that it can offer
rewards for individuals wanted for war crimes or genocide under
U.S. law or another country's law. Is there evidence that
Wagner Group contractors are committing war crimes in Ukraine?
Ms. Marten. Yes, there is. I mean we have very credible
media reports of torture committed by the Wagner Group. And, as
some of the other witnesses have talked about, that is typical
of how the Wagner Group acts. So, for example, one of the
things we know they did in Libya was that, when they withdrew
from the areas that they had been occupying, they left booby
traps behind, IEDs in habitable areas that were actually
causing injuries among the people who were just going back to
their homes. So we know that everywhere it has been, the Wagner
Group has committed these war crimes. But, as I said earlier,
we also know that regular Russian forces have been committing
very similar war crimes.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
Again, Dr. Marten, as you noted in your opening testimony,
recent reporting indicates that the Wagner Group has been
recruiting convicted criminals to refill their ranks. Is this a
practice that the Wagner Group has utilized in the past? And is
it something other private military groups have done? And what
about the Russian military? We've heard this morning that
there's going to be a call up of 300,000 more troops for
Russia. So what do we know about where they are going to be
getting those troops? What kind of people are going to be
attracted into the army?
Ms. Marten. I think those are really good questions. The
evidence that we have is that the Wagner Group had started
recruiting in prisons in about March when it became clear that
the Russian military was facing difficulties that it had not
predicted in advance in its invasion of Ukraine. To my
knowledge, there is no evidence before March 2022 that Wagner
was doing this. We do have evidence that Prigozhin was going
around to various festivals in Russia and trying to recruit
people who weren't necessarily veterans but who were extreme
fighters. And so that personality type who may not have
veteran's experience have also been in the Wagner Group before.
I'm not sure it's clear whether the Russian military as a whole
has been recruiting in prisons or whether it has all been done
through the Wagner Group.
Ms. Foxx. Dr. Marten, also in your opening testimony, you
noted that the Wagner Group is not a legally established group
and that PMCs are illegal in Russia. Despite that fact, it has
been reported there have been statues built that commemorate
the service of military contractors and that contractors have
been awarded military medals. Can you explain how PMCs are
technically illegal in Russia but are still honored with
statues and medals?
Ms. Marten. Yes. Thank you for that question. It is
something that I explored in a 2019 article and in my earlier
congressional testimony on this subject in 2020. By keeping
these groups illegal, Putin gets to control which of his
network cronies are the ones who make a profit from their
activities. Any time that they do something that Putin doesn't
like he can say, ``Oh, you're being mercenaries,'' and throw
them in prison. He actually did that to an earlier group that
ended up morphing into the Wagner Group. And what that means is
that they are not really private military companies the way
that other countries have used private military companies. One
of the things that sets Russia apart is that it is one of the
only countries that has not signed the Montreux accords, which
were private military companies that are reputable, working
with states and working with nongovernmental organizations to
set up a code of conduct for how private military companies
should behave in the field. And what's really noteworthy is
that even China signed on to the Montreux accords, but Russia
chose not do so.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
Ms. Doxsee, in your report, you discuss increasing Russian
and international awareness of PMCs may be an effective tactic
to counter private military companies, PMCs. However, in that
same section of the report, you note that reporting on PMCs
comes with risks and discuss the murder of three Russian
journalists who were looking into the Wagner Group's
activities.
Considering the risk to journalists who report on the issue
and Putin's lack of transparency and use of propaganda to push
messages, how do you believe the Russian people can become more
informed on PMC operations?
Ms. Doxsee. Yes. So I think that's a really important
question, and it's one that puts a lot of these media
organizations in a lot of danger, such as the murder of the
journalist that we saw in the Central African Republic.
I would note that a lot of the information that we have
about PMC operations in many of these countries, notably
countries like Madagascar or Central African Republic, is
really the result of brave, independent journalists, many of
them Russians themselves, who have undertaken great personal
risk to bring these activities to light and to sort out what is
going on.
I think there's immeasurable importance of journalists on
the ground and journalists who are able to, you know, operate
in combat zones, operate under [inaudible] coming to light. And
I believe that, as they risk their lives to bring this
information out open, transparently into the light, we owe it
to them to continue to share that information and make those
risks worth it and really making clear the costs of working
with Russian PMCs and the costs that they impose on local
civilian populations.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back.
The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from
Georgia, Mr. Johnson, for five minutes. Welcome.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this very important and timely hearing. Private
military companies such as the Wagner Group, according to
Russian leaders, operate autonomously from the Russian state
while building military cooperation in foreign nations.
But instead of providing security that helps civilians
remain safe, multiple reports from the European Union, the
Department of state, and other U.S. agencies show that these
groups, these PMCs are responsible for increased violence,
primarily in sub-Saharan Africa but not limited to sub-Saharan
Africa.
Dr. Siegle, the Kremlin deployed groups like Wagner to
Africa in the name of regional stability and to help local
governments allegedly defend against insurgencies and terrorist
threats. The record shows that, instead of improved security,
however, Wagner forces have left behind a trail of human rights
atrocities and exacerbated violence in the Central African
Republic and led assaults on several towns and villages,
indiscriminately killing local civilians.
Are Wagner activities in the Central African Republic
reflective of their operations in other African nations, like
Mali and Sudan?
Mr. Siegle. Thank you for the question, Representative
Johnson. I think the short answer is yes. Wagner has been
operating with impunity in Africa, and that lack of
accountability allows it to undertake all kinds of human rights
abuses against civilian populations in Africa.
And, you know, they're doing it as a form of intimidation
and as a means of helping to prop up the proxies, the proxy
governments that Moscow is supporting.
Mr. Johnson. What would be the percentage of PMCs operating
in African nations versus the numbers of Russian troops,
military troops operating in Africa, in the continent? Is there
a ratio that you can point to or any information you can give
us, in terms of numbers?
Mr. Siegle. The vast majority of power that Russia is
projecting in Africa is through their use of these irregular
forces. They are not deploying very many statutory forces.
Really, we see some of that in Libya, but really it's
Wagner that is the key coercive tool that Russia is using. And,
you know, it varies from 1,000 to 2,500 in each context where
Russia is active. It may not seem like a lot, but in these
fragile countries, they can be a highly destabilizing force.
Mr. Johnson. Which country in Africa has the most Russian
PMCs on the ground?
Mr. Siegle. Well, again, we don't have exact numbers, but
the expectation or the understanding is there's about 2,300
Wagner forces in Central African Republic currently. And,
again, the numbers are fuzzy, but there's probably about the
same number operating in Libya.
Mr. Johnson. Uh-huh. What other countries in Africa have
relatively large numbers of Wagner Group storm troopers, if you
will?
Mr. Siegle. Well, in addition to those two countries, Mali
has about a thousand Wagner forces, and there are also Wagner
forces supporting the military junta in Sudan. I think those
are the four main countries.
But Wagner is also linked to having operations in
Mozambique, Madagascar, and then is using some of its
noncoercive tools in other African countries, you know, like
Burkina Faso, the Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Democratic
Republic of Congo. So there's an expectation that Russia is
looking to expand its influence in Africa and another half a
dozen countries.
Mr. Johnson. Was there something you wanted to add, Dr.
Marten?
Ms. Marten. No. I think that covers it very well. And to
keep in mind the distinction that Dr. Siegle raised between
those who are active fighters and those who are working with
Prigozhin on disinformation campaigns, who are a different
group of people and who, again, complicate the question of how
many Wagner Group forces are actually on the ground.
Also, in the Central African Republic, we know that there
were a few Russian active military servicemembers who were at
least originally deployed when the Wagner Group first went into
the Central African Republic in late 2017 and 2018.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Dr. Doxsee, anything you wanted to add?
Ms. Doxsee. Yes. I would just add on top of what my
colleagues on the panel have said that it's notable that, in
some of these deployments, in addition to having formal Russian
soldiers helping to facilitate action, there have also been,
for instance, GRU operatives in places like Madagascar helping
some of the political operations.
And I would also highlight that, while a lot of the focus
is typically on these large-scale and combat-focused
operations, Russia has also employed private military
contractors in much smaller numbers in some African countries
to simply facilitate things like arms transfers, training on
using that equipment.
We have reports in some countries, such as Nigeria, where
there maybe 10 or 15 PMC troops present really to help
facilitate those arms transfers and training operations. And so
that is another dynamic at play here where PMCs are not
conducting these large-scale combat operations necessarily in
all of these countries, but they are helping to continue to
forge this relationship with the Russian Government.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. And I
yield back.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The gentleman yields. I yield myself
five minutes for questioning.
Let me ask, since there's such well-documented cases of
intervention by the Wagner Group in all of these countries and
at least a half dozen have been named in addition to Ukraine,
all these countries in Africa, are there any ongoing actual
prosecutions of Wagner Group personnel or people associated
with them in any of these local countries, or are there any
cases of war crimes prosecutions happening in any international
forums? Dr. Siegle?
Mr. Siegle. Not to my knowledge. Again, there have been
some U.N. investigations that have named Wagner. But I think
this touches on part of the insidiousness of how they're
operating through these deals with autocratic governments or
military juntas.
There isn't any incentive at all on the part of the so-
called governments in these countries to actually prosecute
Wagner. You know, Wagner is operating on their behalf to keep
them in power. And so we have this, you know, perverse
arrangement where the host country is not taking an active role
in investigating it.
Mr. Lynch. All right. Dr. Marten or Ms. Doxsee, any
thoughts on that, any prosecutions that you might be aware of?
Dr. Marten?
Ms. Marten. One thing we have to keep in mind is that
Russia has a veto on the United Nations Security Council, and
so that means that it's going to very much limit the ability of
something that is done through the United Nations to engage in
prosecution.
And that might be a reason why the United States might be
interested in amending its own domestic War Crimes Act, giving
the United States more flexibility to engage in these kinds of
indictments and prosecutions, because it's going to be very
difficult for the international community to do so.
Mr. Lynch. Ms. Doxsee?
Ms. Doxsee. I'm not aware of any ongoing prosecutions along
these lines, but I would just highlight that there has been
substantial evidence compiled by bodies, such as the United
Nations, as well as NGO's, such as Human Rights Watch, that I
think more than substantiates action being taken. And I think
that's an important avenue for the U.S. and its allies to
consider.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. I am aware that, in Ukraine, there is
a prosecution for targeting killing. I'm not quite sure if
it's, you know, specifically to Wagner Group or I'm told, and
you've reinforced that, that some of these atrocities are being
conducted by Russian regular forces. So that's problematic as
well.
Is there--I mean, we've received in this committee as early
as yesterday, as recently as yesterday reports of widespread
atrocities in Ukraine. Is there--in your study of this, would
it be helpful to ask the administration to declassify some of
the information that right now is not available to the public
in an effort to, you know, put pressure on some of these
incumbent leaders in other countries and also put pressure on
these individuals if they were named and identified who are
associated with Wagner Group and some of these other private
military companies?
Are there specific things that this committee could do in
creating more transparency about these atrocities and the
conduct of Wagner Group and these other companies? Ms. Doxsee?
Ms. Doxsee. Yes. I would say, first, it's hard to say
without being familiar with the specific classified evidence,
of course, weighing the benefits of transparency with the risks
to intelligence sources and collection methods.
But I do think that one area in which the United States has
the ability and certainly can do more is having a mechanism to
have comprehensive information collection and distribution,
whether that's already open-source information or strategically
declassifying information to track data and to track
qualitative accounts of the violence and of the actions of
Russian private military companies, both to make that
transparent and for different agencies across the U.S.
Government to be able to access that information and act
accordingly.
I think one of the struggles that I've heard a lot about
from talking to individuals in the military, the intelligence
community, the State Department, one of the big struggles is
that we have many different areas of government that are
[inaudible] or those involved in intelligence collection, and
there's not a comprehensive approach to compiling, analyzing,
and acting upon this data.
And so, really, what's missing, in my view, is not
necessarily getting more evidence of their bad activities. We
have plenty of that in the open source. But it's really
building up that coordinated mechanism by which we can compile,
analyze, and act on that information in a unified way, both
across U.S. agencies and also with our partners
internationally.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
I did see briefly the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch.
You would be recognized if you're available. OK.
With that, I will yield to the gentleman, the ranking
member, the gentleman from Wisconsin for any further questions
and closing remarks.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you. One of the things that at least
I'm getting out of this hearing--and it's primarily Ms.
Doxsee's testimony--is the sheer number of countries that these
organizations are playing around in. And it's not just the
Wagner Group, right? They have other similar things.
You kind of wonder what they're doing and what progress
they're making. I notice, in your written testimony, you make
reference to something called the Dyck Advisory Group, which is
apparently playing around in South Africa, which I know is a
country filled with valuable minerals and such.
Do you want to elaborate on what's going on in South
Africa?
Ms. Doxsee. So thank you for flagging that. I would just
clarify that the Dyck Advisory Group is actually a South
African private military company rather than a Russian private
military company.
And the highlight there is that, after the Wagner Group
experienced substantial operational failures in Mozambique,
they were actually essentially fired by the local government
and replaced by the Dyck Advisory Group, which is not
affiliated with Russia and which has real experience in the
region.
They actually were initially underbid by the Wagner Group,
which is why Wagner got the contract in the first place, but I
think the government in Mozambique quickly learned that you get
what you pay for. Even though, on its surface, Wagner might
have a lower price tag than more experienced contractors like
the Dyck Advisory Group, that lower price tag comes with
inexperience, propensity to failure, and a variety of other
detrimental impacts that we've discussed on this panel today.
Mr. Grothman. OK. Your map here is a very nice map. I have
a hard time reading it; it's so small.
Am I right reading it to say that the three countries that
the Wagner Group is involved in in Europe are Ukraine, Belarus,
and Serbia? Is there anybody else?
Ms. Doxsee. Yes. Those are the three that we've detected
here.
Mr. Grothman. OK. And what are they----
Ms. Doxsee. And----
Mr. Grothman. Go ahead. Go ahead.
Ms. Doxsee. I just also wanted to flag that, of course, on
this map this documents countries in which Russian PMCs
operated during the five-year span from 2016 to 2021 and does
not reflect the scale of those operations.
So, of course, in a country like Ukraine, we obviously see
much larger scale operations than in some of the others noted.
Mr. Grothman. I was just going to comment on Serbia because
it kind of stands out. Do you want to comment on what's going
on in Serbia?
Ms. Doxsee. I don't have information in front of me to go
into extensive detail, but this was pulled from different open-
source tracking of countries in which PMCs operated to some
extent. In Serbia, there were much smaller presence and
operations than in some of these other countries such as
Ukraine.
Mr. Grothman. Are they--I know what's going on in Syria is
always of interest to this country. Could you comment on the
military situation there and how many? I take it that is the
Wagner Group in Syria. How many troops are there and what
success or influence they're having?
Ms. Doxsee. In terms of numbers, I would defer to
colleagues in the government who can speak to intelligence
estimates on the high side, but in countries like Syria,
similar to the use in Ukraine or even countries like Libya, the
PMC deployments have been much more along the lines of direct
combat operations and directly achieving Moscow's military
goals.
I think the one thing that's interesting is to see how
Russia has really evolved its PMC model from activities in
countries like Ukraine and Syria, where it really is about
combat objectives, to what we're seeing now increasingly
widespread in sub-Saharan Africa and even extending potentially
to other regions like Latin America, which is really this model
of targeting countries with weak governance and ongoing
security challenges and specifically aiming to get out of it
not only the geopolitical military intelligence gains but those
economic gains and really that access to natural resources.
And I kind of think of it as a version 2.0 of this PMC
model that they're increasingly honing in sub-Saharan Africa.
And, to that end, I would note that Russia's use of private
military companies is something that is evolving over time.
I've highlighted today many of the failures they've experienced
and many of their weaknesses, but they are certainly learning
from these different deployments, learning from things like
encounters with U.S. troops in Syria several years ago.
And so I think that it's important that the United States
and its partners continue to monitor and analyze what's going
on, particularly because these PMCs exhibit a variety of
vulnerabilities now, but if we were to wait 5, 10 years down
the line until they are posing an insurmountable challenge,
many of these vulnerabilities may have been ironed out, and
they may learn from their past failures.
Mr. Grothman. Yes. I think it was fairly well-publicized.
It was still probably not publicized enough. There was quite a
number I guess of--quite a number of Wagner troops killed in a
confrontation with American troops in Syria.
Is there anywhere else around the world where American
troops have literally fought these PMCs around the world?
Ms. Doxsee. So thank you for noting that. I think that is a
very important example of where we had U.S. troops engaged in
direct fire with PMC troops. I think one of the challenges
we're seeing is that, while that certainly grabbed headlines
and became more well-known, where we're seeing U.S. forces,
both military and intelligence, encountering PMCs now is often
in noncombat situations. So we have troops in places like sub-
Saharan Africa who are on the ground and seeing the impacts of
these PMC operations. They're seeing PMC troops carrying out,
you know, different influence operations, training operations.
And there is an ongoing question, even from talking to our
servicemembers, of what happens if we have a repeat of what
happened in Syria. What is their guidance in terms of engaging
with these Wagner or other PMC operatives that they often
witness in the field?
And, moreover, what happens when PMC presence starts to
threaten U.S. ability to collect intelligence, whether that's
HUMINT or SIGINT? What happens when PMC intelligence collection
starts to overlap or encroach on areas where the United States
and U.S. troops are present?
I think that that is one of those areas that's maybe less
flashy and less headline grabbing than direct combat and direct
fire, but I think that we are continuing to hit upon that
tension where U.S. servicemembers are coming into contact in
differing ways with Russian private military contractors in the
field, and the United States needs to be able to have a
comprehensive plan and direction to be able to give them.
Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields back.
In closing, first of all, I want to thank all our
witnesses. Thank you for your willingness to testify and for
informing our decisionmaking process.
I want to commend my colleagues for their participation
throughout this hearing and their important questions.
With that, without objection, all members will have five
legislative days within which to submit additional written
questions for the witnesses to the chair, which will be
forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
I ask that, if witnesses do receive such questions, please
respond as promptly as you are able.
Thank you all again for your attendance. This hearing is
now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]