[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                  PUTIN'S PROXIES: EXAMINING RUSSIA'S
                   USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

                                 OF THE

                   COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 21, 2022

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-104

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
      
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                       Available on: govinfo.gov,
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                   COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM

                CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of   James Comer, Kentucky, Ranking 
    Columbia                             Minority Member
Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts      Jim Jordan, Ohio
Jim Cooper, Tennessee                Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia         Jody B. Hice, Georgia
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois        Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin
Jamie Raskin, Maryland               Michael Cloud, Texas
Ro Khanna, California                Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland               Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York   Ralph Norman, South Carolina
Rashida Tlaib, Michigan              Pete Sessions, Texas
Katie Porter, California             Fred Keller, Pennsylvania
Cori Bush, Missouri                  Andy Biggs, Arizona
Shontel M. Brown, Ohio               Andrew Clyde, Georgia
Danny K. Davis, Illinois             Nancy Mace, South Carolina
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida    Scott Franklin, Florida
Peter Welch, Vermont                 Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr.,      Pat Fallon, Texas
    Georgia                          Yvette Herrell, New Mexico
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland           Byron Donalds, Florida
Jackie Speier, California            Mike Flood, Nebraska
Robin L. Kelly, Illinois
Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan
Mark DeSaulnier, California
Jimmy Gomez, California
Ayanna Pressley, Massachusetts

                      Russ Anello, Staff Director
              Daniel Rebnord, Subcommittee Staff Director
                    Amy Stratton, Deputy Chief Clerk

                      Contact Number: 202-225-5051

                  Mark Marin, Minority Staff Director
                              
                              ------                                

                   Subcommittee on National Security

               Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Chairman
Peter Welch, Vermont                 Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin, Ranking 
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr.,          Minority Member
    Georgia                          Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Bob Gibbs, Ohio
Kweisi Mfume, Maryland               Clay Higgins, Louisiana
Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Florida    Mike Flood, Nebraska
Jackie Speier, California
                        
                        
                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

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                                                                   Page
                                                                   
Hearing held on September 21, 2022...............................     1

                               Witnesses

Kimberly Marten, Ph.D., Professor, Political Science Department, 
  Barnard College, Columbia University
Oral Statement...................................................     4
Catrina Doxsee, Associate Director, Transnational Threats 
  Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Oral Statement...................................................     6
Joseph Siegle, Ph.D., Director of Research, Africa Center for 
  Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Oral Statement...................................................     8

Written opening statements and statements for the witnesses are 
  available on the U.S. House of Representatives Document 
  Repository at: docs.house.gov.

                           Index of Documents

                              ----------                              

No additional documents were submitted for this hearing.

 
                  PUTIN'S PROXIES: EXAMINING RUSSIA'S.
                   USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

                              ----------                              


                     Wednesday, September 21, 2022

                   House of Representatives
          Subcommittee on National Security
                          Committee on Oversight and Reform
                                                   Washington, D.C.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in 
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, and via Zoom, Hon. 
Stephen F. Lynch (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives Lynch, Welch, Johnson, DeSaulnier, 
Speier, Grothman, Foxx, and Higgins.
    Mr. Lynch. The subcommittee will now come to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any time. I will now recognize 
myself for an opening statement.
    Good morning, everyone. Thank you, Dr. Siegle.
    Today, the Subcommittee on National Security will examine 
Russia's growing reliance on private military companies, or 
PMCs, to further its strategic objectives and expand its 
geopolitical influence around the world. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin's unprovoked and unlawful war against Ukraine is 
now entering its seventh month. Facing mounting casualties, a 
severe manpower shortfall, and an enduring Ukrainian military 
resistance backed by the United States and our allies, Russia 
is reportedly leaning heavily on private military companies, 
including the Wagner Group, to supplement its conventional 
military forces in Ukraine.
    Earlier this year, the Department of Defense estimated that 
at least a thousand mercenary fighters had already deployed to 
the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine to reinforce Russia's 
frontline troop presence.
    Beyond the borders of Ukraine, the past several years have 
witnessed a marked increase in Russia's reported use of private 
military companies to provide paramilitary capabilities and 
personal security services in conflicts around the world, 
ranging from Syria to Libya, Mali, Sudan, and the Central 
African Republic, among others.
    On paper, Russian law prohibits mercenary activity, but it 
is clear that the Wagner Group and other Russian private 
military companies operate as quasi state actors. According to 
the U.S. Treasury Department, the Wagner Group serves as a, 
quote, Russian Ministry of Defence proxy force, which is 
financed by a Russian oligarch with close ties to Russian 
President Putin.
    Press reports also indicate that the Wagner Group entities 
are closely tied to Russia's intelligence and security agencies 
and have even established training camps in close proximity of 
bases used by Russian special force brigades. Other lesser 
known private military companies, including the anti-terror 
group the Moran Security Group and the Slavonic Corps, are 
similarly associated with Russia's Ministry of Defence or state 
intelligence and security services.
    Around the world, Russia's private military companies have 
engaged in direct combat operations, propaganda and 
disinformation campaigns, illicit finance activities, and the 
exploitation of natural resources, all while under the guise of 
a nonstate corporation and at the expense of human lives and 
international law.
    In the Central African Republic, the United Nations has 
accused Russian private military companies of carrying out 
systemic and grave human rights abuses and violations of 
international law, including arbitrary detention, torture, 
disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.
    According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
Project, an international crisis monitoring organization, 
Wagner operative in Mali have targeted civilians in more than 
70 percent of the operations they have conducted there since 
last year. The U.S. and the European Union have imposed 
multiple rounds of severe financial sanctions against the 
Wagner Group, its Russian oligarch financier, and several 
associates and entities in relation to their operations in 
Ukraine, destabilizing activities in Syria, and human rights 
atrocities in Africa.
    Considering that Russia will continue to rely on private 
military companies to further its strategic objectives and 
exert its influence abroad, it is imperative that we examine 
whether there are additional actions the United States and our 
international partners can take to degrade the capabilities of 
the Wagner Group and other similar Russian-backed proxy 
organizations.
    Before I recognize our ranking member, I want to note that, 
given some of the challenges associated with analyzing Russia's 
use of private military companies in an unclassified setting, 
I've also asked the Administration to provide subcommittee 
members with a classified briefing on Russia's use of private 
military companies, including in Ukraine, which we plan to 
schedule in November. That would be in addition to the briefing 
that we had yesterday in a classified setting.
    With that, I look forward to today's discussion, and I now 
yield to the distinguished ranking member from Wisconsin, Mr. 
Grothman, for his opening statement.
    Mr. Grothman. Thank you. First of all, I'd like to thank 
you, Chairman Lynch, for having this.
    Second, it occurs to me this is the first time in two years 
I've been in a room without anybody wearing a mask. So, first 
of all, it always makes me feel uncomfortable when I see so 
many of the staff uncomfortable. So I think it was a big step 
in the right direction and consistent with the most recent 
science on the matter, so it makes me----
    Mr. Lynch. [Inaudible.]
    Mr. Grothman. I'd like to thank the witnesses for being 
here in person or on the Zoom. I want to start by urging the 
Chairman to ask one more time the administration to make 
available for subcommittees in the future the witnesses that we 
originally thought were going to be here today. Their 
perspective would be interesting with regard to their 
understanding of the role of private military companies and how 
the U.S. is dealing with them.
    The topic in front of us is important today. Russia and 
President Putin's use of unaccountable mercenaries to avoid 
accountability both at home and abroad is deplorable. We know 
these groups have been deployed in the 1914 invasion of 
Ukraine, in Syria, and across Africa. There have been numerous 
reports that Russia has deployed PMCs during the most recent 
war in Ukraine. And it is hard to judge what's going on there 
without knowing a little bit more about this.
    PMCs have a long running history of violating international 
norms and rules of engagement and committing human rights 
abuses. Although Russia denies being officially linked to the 
PMCs, particularly in the Wagner Group, the connection's clear. 
It would be illogical to believe these private companies just 
happen to be deployed in areas around the world where Russia is 
attempting to achieve geopolitical superiority.
    The U.S. response to these groups has been largely ad hoc 
and haphazard. It is vital the U.S. use its significant global 
power and influence to shine light on Russia's use of PMCs, 
highlight their flaws and failures, and implement a global 
sanction regime.
    Finally, I'd like to discuss the status of the war in 
Ukraine. President Biden just requested another multibillion-
dollar aid package. While helping our allies is important, it 
cannot come at the cost of ignoring those at home. It is 
important, particularly given that we're spending $110 million 
a day over the past year, that we get more information on 
exactly just what is going on with these funds, a little more 
oversight. We cannot simply just assume or assistance is being 
used in the manner we intend.
    We know our economy is in difficult shape. Americans need 
help too.
    With that, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 
today. And I yield back.
    Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields back.
    Before I introduce our witnesses, I want to quickly just 
for the record welcome the gentleman from Nebraska, 
Representative Flood, as our newest member of the subcommittee, 
as this will be his first hearing with us. I know there are 
several hearings going on right now. I look forward to his 
robust participation and working with him further.
    Now I will introduce our witnesses. First, we are joined by 
Dr. Kimberly Marten, who is a professor of political science at 
Barnard College at Columbia University. Dr. Marten specializes 
in international relations and security, including Russian 
security and foreign policy.
    Next, we will hear from Ms. Catrina Doxsee, who is an 
associate director for the Transnational Threats Project at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. In this 
position, Ms. Doxsee analyzes the irregular warfare activities 
of countries like Iran, Russia, and China. And she has done 
extensive examinations of operations of Russian private 
military companies.
    We will then hear from Joseph Siegle, Dr. Joseph Siegle, 
who is here in person, who is the director of research at the 
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a congressionally funded 
research institution located at the National Defense 
University. Dr. Siegle is an expert in Africa security issues, 
the stabilization of fragile states, and how U.S. policies 
toward Africa might generate greater stability on the 
continent.
    Dr. Marten and Dr. Doxsee please, please unmute yourselves. 
And, Dr. Siegle, please stand so we can swear you in, which is 
the custom of the committee. Would you all please raise your 
right hand?
    Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to 
give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God?
    Mr. Siegle. I do.
    Ms. Doxsee. I do.
    Ms. Marten. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Lynch. Let the record show that the witnesses all 
answered in the affirmative.
    Thank you. You may be seated.
    Without objection, your written statements will, of course, 
be made part of the record.
    With that. Dr. Marten, you are recognized for your 
testimony.

   STATEMENT OF KIMBERLY MARTEN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, POLITICAL 
    SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

    Ms. Marten. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member Grothman, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for giving 
me the opportunity to testify about Russia's Wagner Group. My 
written testimony contains much more detail. In the five 
minutes I have here, I will summarize what the Wagner Group, 
how it serves Russia's strategic interests, how the U.S. might 
further hold it accountable for its war crimes, but why I do 
not support labeling it a foreign terrorist organization.
    The Wagner Group is not a legally established private 
military company. It is arguably not a private military company 
at all. PMCs remain illegal in Russia. Nor is it a true 
mercenary group since it only serves at the behest of the 
Russian state.
    It is instead a contracting mechanism tied to Russia's 
military intelligence agency, the GRU, for recruiting Russian 
and pro-Russian veterans and now prisoners. In a country where 
the lines between public and private are blurred, Putin's ally, 
Yevgeny Prigozhin, is the contractor and recruiter. Everywhere 
but Ukraine the contracts seem to be funded by foreign 
countries. The Kremlin helps negotiate the contracts.
    Analysts without security clearances have difficulty 
following the details of Wagner Group activities. It is a 
product of the GRU, so its actions are cloaked in secrecy and 
disinformation campaigns. It is not always clear who is a 
Wagner Group fighter versus a member of the Russian Special 
Forces or a security contractor for another Russian entity. 
Disinformation may also come from Russia's opponents, including 
some U.S. allies, who have incentives to exaggerate or distort 
Wagner's presence and activities. One purpose of the Wagner 
Group, especially early on, was to give the Russian state 
plausible deniability for its military presence on the ground 
in locations where it was not supposed to be. By mid-2018, 
though, the Wagner Group was tracked by journalists everywhere 
it went, and plausible deniability was no longer really 
maintained. Even Putin talked about Wagner. By summer 2022, the 
Wagner Group was openly recruiting on Russian highway 
billboards.
    The Wagner Group has served several additional purposes for 
the Russian state. It is used for military actions where Putin 
does not want to risk the lives of ordinary Russian conscripts. 
This has allowed the Kremlin to expand Russia's military 
influence without unleashing public unhappiness about 
casualties.
    De facto partial mobilization in Russia today indicates 
that this effort failed in Russian's invasion of Ukraine.
    Wagner has also made Russia a key player in resolving 
African civil wars at low cost for Moscow. Russian assistance 
can be withdrawn at any time if Russian goals are not met, 
making it similar to a Mafia protection racket holding its 
beneficiaries hostage to Kremlin demand.
    The geopolitical benefits to the Kremlin may eventually 
include new military bases, for example, in Sudan and Libya, 
which could interfere with U.S. and allied commercial and 
military operations, but those have not yet been built.
    Wagner is already under sanctions by the U.S. and the 
European Union. And that limits where it can be deployed and 
where Prigozhin can dock his planes and boats. The only 
countries willing to contract Wagner Group's services or 
conduct businesses with Prigozhin are those already under U.S. 
and EU sanctions or willing to risk them.
    The U.S. could increase the financial pressure by working 
with its partners in Dubai to prevent the Wagner Group from 
smuggling Sudanese gold into Dubai for remelting. New Russian 
origin gold is now sanctioned internationally. A logical 
extension would be to prevent false origin documents from being 
provided for African gold mined under Wagner Group contracts. 
Prigozhin and his firms were also indicted by the United States 
for election interference. The prosecutors had to drop the case 
when Prigozhin's lawyers demanded the release of classified 
information. When this is combined with the difficulties 
researchers have in separating truth from rumor about the 
Wagner Group's activities, it suggests that further 
accountability may require reconsidering current rules about 
declassification of evidence.
    Criminal indictments matter, even if they never lead to 
convictions for foreign actors, because they limit the ability 
of individuals to travel to any of the 116 countries with which 
the U.S. has an extradition treaty. Indictments would have even 
more impact if the U.S. were to amend the War Crimes Act of 
1996 as proposed earlier this year in a bipartisan Senate bill 
to allow universal jurisdiction, which would align the U.S. 
with international practice. Currently, the War Crimes Act 
applies only to perpetrators located in or extradited to the 
United States who are themselves U.S. citizens or 
servicemembers or whose victims are U.S. nationals. If the act 
were amended, anyone could be indicted in the U.S. and be 
subject to extradition and prosecution for war crimes or crimes 
against humanity regardless of the nationality of the offender 
or the victim. Asset forfeiture rules could be similarly 
amended to allow compensation for war crimes victims.
    But I do not agree with the proposal to label the Wagner 
Group a foreign terrorist organization. Wagner Group fighters 
are temporary Russian state contractors in a system that works 
over time and geographic location. Wagner is not a permanent 
entity. Even its name is unofficial and could be dropped. 
Labeling it an FTO will not incentivize any changes in its 
operations.
    Because the Wagner Group is a tool of the Russian state, 
labeling it an FTO would also carry a great deal of diplomatic 
baggage, complicating any cooperation with Russia that the U.S. 
might find useful in the future. The designation would also 
blur the distinction between terrorism and war crimes. 
Terrorism is commonly defined as violence committed by non-
state actors against noncombatants done for shock value to gain 
attention or support for a political cause. That is not what 
the Wagner Group does. Wagner commits plain old war crimes. 
Blurring the two categories undercuts the strength of 
international war crimes laws and makes terrorism a meaningless 
term beyond the fact that its victims are noncombatants.
    Instead, the U.S. should prosecute Wagner Group actions and 
Russian actions more generally under existing and amended war 
crimes laws, reserving the FTO label for true terrorist groups.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
    Ms. Doxsee, you're now recognized five minutes for your 
testimony. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF CATRINA DOXSEE, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL 
THREATS PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Ms. Doxsee. Good morning. And thank you again for convening 
this important discussion. In my written statement, I provided 
a brief overview of Russian private military companies, 
examples of their activities, and some policy implications. I 
would now like to take this opportunity to highlight the two 
major points that I hope you will all will take away from the 
conversation here today.
    These are, first, that it's more accurate to view PMCs such 
as the Wagner Group as opportunists rather than as masterminds; 
and, second, Russian PMCs have a variety of weaknesses that the 
U.S. and its partners are well-positioned to exploit.
    First, I'll address the opportunistic nature of Russian PMC 
deployments. Russia is not picky in choosing countries with 
which to pursue security cooperation agreements, agreements 
which are often facilitated by PMCs. For example, 
representatives of all 54 African states attended the first 
Russia-Africa summit in Sochi in 2019, including 43 heads of 
state. Moscow sought agreements with most attendees relatively 
indiscriminately. Preparations are now underway for the second 
Russia-Africa summit, which will be held this fall.
    As Russia continues trying to expand its political 
influence, military and intelligence collection capabilities, 
and economic opportunities in Africa, it will likely continue 
to cast its broad net and seize whatever opportunities arise. 
This may present opportunities to displace or offer 
alternatives to Russian assistance. Particularly as the U.S. 
reinvigorates its own strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa.
    It is also worth noting that the largest scale PMC 
deployments in the region have been to countries with weak 
governance, ongoing security challenges, and abundant natural 
resources. This is not the result of some altruistic Russian 
desire to resolve conflict and increase stability but rather is 
tied to a desire to exploit those natural resources, for 
instance, through mining concessions.
    This leads to the second key takeaway, that Russian PMCs 
have vulnerabilities and patterns of failure that the U.S. and 
its partners are well equipped to exploit.
    In my remaining time, I'll highlight three such weaknesses. 
First, Russian PMCs have experienced various operational 
failures, whether in the form of outright inability to perform 
the tasks they were assigned, as occurred in Mozambique and to 
an extent in Madagascar, or similarly an inability or 
disinterest in facilitating long-term regional stability by 
addressing the root causes of violence.
    Second, Russian PMC activities frequently have negative 
impact on host countries and their populations. As I mentioned, 
this includes the exploitation of natural resources. 
Additionally, in some cases, such as in Mali, Wagner's 
activities have increased in stability and the threat of 
terrorist violence.
    PMCs have also violated local and international law, 
including through widespread human rights abuses, such as 
indiscriminate killings, rape, torture, and the armed 
occupation of facilities, such as schools and hospitals. Such 
actions have been widely documented by the U.N. Security 
Council and various NGO's in places such as the Central African 
Republic, and they have become increasingly common in other 
countries, such as Wagner's latest deployment in Mali.
    Transparency and information sharing about PMC failures and 
detrimental effects can inform local actors of the true cost of 
Russian partnerships and may make PMC agreements less appealing 
in the future. There is also an opportunity to hold PMCs 
accountable for their legal violations.
    A third major vulnerability is the prominence and growing 
monopoly of the Wagner Group, including the shadowy web of 
entities linked to it.
    Wagner's dominance makes it a clear target for sanctions 
and other financial penalties. The U.S., EU, U.K., and others 
have already taken commendable steps in this area, and an 
expanded multilateral sanctions campaign against Prigozhin-
linked entities, particularly those involved in the 
exploitation and laundering of natural resources, could impede 
these profit-driven companies' ability to operate.
    Ultimately, although PMCs are just one of many options in 
Russia's irregular warfare toolkit, Moscow is likely to 
continue using PMCs to further its geopolitical, military, and 
economic goals until such time as the costs outweigh the 
benefits. Therefore, to counter the spread of Russian influence 
and to hold PMCs accountable, the U.S. and its partners should 
take coordinated actions to raise the costs, risks, and 
consequences of Russian PMC activity worldwide.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
    Dr. Siegle, you are now recognized for your testimony. 
Welcome.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH SIEGLE, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, AFRICA 
   CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

    Mr. Siegle. Good morning. I thank the chair, Representative 
Lynch, as well as Ranking Member Grothman, for the invitation 
to speak on today's panel about Russia's use of irregular 
security forces. It is an honor to be here.
    My remarks will draw primarily from Africa, which has been 
the focus of my research of Russia's grand strategy. Russia has 
deployed the paramilitary outfit the Wagner Group in at least a 
half dozen African countries in recent years, making Africa one 
of most active regions of Russia's mercenary deployments 
globally. With many of its forces comprised of ex-Russian 
defense intelligence troops working in alignment with Russian 
foreign policy objective, Wagner operates more like an under-
the-radar special operations force than a private military 
contractor.
    In fact, the Wagner Group is not a legal registered entity 
but an amalgamation of military, business, political, and 
disinformation organizations linked to Russian Oligarch, 
Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of President Vladimir Putin.
    Russia uses Wagner to advance its strategic objectives in 
Africa and elsewhere. This includes to secure access to 
strategically important territory along the southern 
Mediterranean and the Red Sea, to displace Western influence, 
and to reshape the international order to one that is more 
aligned with Moscow's transactional patronage base and 
authoritarian model.
    Borrowing from its Syria playbook, Moscow has swooped in 
with irregular forces to prop up politically isolated 
authoritarian leaders facing crises in Libya, Central African 
Republic, Mali, Sudan, and elsewhere. These leaders are then 
indebted to Russia, which assumes the role of regional power 
broker.
    That the entry point for Wagner's deployments is often 
through an autocratic leader is not a coincidence, lacking 
legitimacy or popularity, these leaders provide an easy mark 
for Moscow to expand its influence quickly and cheaply. The 
resulting partnership of an unaccountable regime hosting 
unaccountable mercenaries is a recipe for instability. And, in 
fact, while rationalized on security grounds, in every place 
that Wagner has been deployed in Africa, it has left a wake of 
instability for the citizens of the host country, including 
documented allegations of human rights abuses.
    Wagner deployments moreover do not happen in isolation, but 
they are part of a package of tools deployed by Moscow to keep 
its allies in power. These include disinformation, opaque arms-
for-resources deals, sanctions evasion, election meddling, and 
political cover at the United Nations. Wagner deployments, 
therefore, should be seen as a political tool, not just as a 
security operation.
    In considering how to mitigate the destabilizing effects 
ever Wagner deployments, we should bear in mind that the United 
States' diplomatic investment, trade, development, security, 
and cultural ties with Africa are several orders of magnitude 
greater than that of Russia. So, mitigating the effects of 
Wagner's deployments must be nested within the United States' 
broader Africa strategy, not as a singular end of its own.
    So, within such a strategy, I would offer four priorities. 
First, recognizing that Wagner is a tool to gain political 
influence, the United States should further incentivize 
democratic norms in Africa and elsewhere as the strongest 
antidote to malign Russian influence. This also means 
condemning coups an isolating coup-makers, denying Russia an 
easy entry point for influence.
    Second, the United States should work with partners to 
invoke the legally binding African Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenaries, which prohibits African states from 
allowing mercenaries on their territories. Designating Wagner a 
mercenary force would identify them as an illegal entity, one 
that should be banned from operating on the continent.
    A third priority is to help strengthen African capacity to 
counter Russian disinformation by enhancing African fact-
checking, social media forensics, digital literacy, and media 
professionalism--proficiencies.
    And a final priority is to increase the reputational and 
financial costs on Russia for its malign actions by further 
employing the United States' robust menu of legal and financial 
tools to penalize Wagner and its enablers. While such actions 
may not immediately curtail Russia's bad behavior, they do 
increase the cost of doing business. And by giving heightened 
attention to these issues, the United States can help Africa 
become less of a permissive environment for Wagner deployments 
at the expense of African stability, sovereignty, and 
democracy, and this is in both African and U.S. interests.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Dr. Siegle.
    The chair will now recognize himself for five minutes for 
questions.
    Dr. Marten, in your written testimony, you describe how the 
Wagner Group has evolved from a shadowy paramilitary and 
security force to now an overt contractor network that is 
actively recruiting fighters to support Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine.
    In fact, just last week, a video emerged of someone who 
appears to be Yevgeny Prigozhin, the alleged founder and 
financier of the Wagner Group, speaking to prisoners in a 
Russian penal colony trying to recruit them to fight in 
Ukraine. In a statement following the video's release, 
Prigozhin told the Russian people that the war in Ukraine will 
be fought, quote, either by private military companies and 
prisoners or your children; you need to decide for yourself, 
close quote.
    So it's clear that, while the Kremlin may have once been 
able to claim a degree of plausible deniability about Wagner 
Group's activity, those denials are becoming increasingly 
implausible.
    Let me ask, so the idea that Russian foreign mercenaries 
would provide open support and security for, say, any regime in 
Africa that contracts with Wagner Group, you would think that 
that would undermine the legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
of Mali or any other country on the African Continent; the 
knowledge that foreign mercenaries are propping up these 
leaders would be a way of undermining or making more 
transparent and exposing this practice and thereby make it less 
attractive to either African leaders or others who might use 
those services. So is exposure and publicizing this practice 
and this use and stopping it from operating in the shadows, is 
that in fact a weapon against this?
    Ms. Marten. Thank you for those very detailed and really 
well-thought-out questions, Chairman Lynch.
    One thing to keep in mind is that the Wagner Group and 
Prigozhin have already acted to try to undermine the reputation 
of France in both the Central African Republic and in Mali. And 
so, what we are doing if we are fighting a disinformation 
campaign is dealing with a legacy of colonialism in Africa and 
a suspicion of other actors who might also come in to provide 
security. And so that is one of the reasons why they might feel 
that Russia--and I think that these actors are seen as Russian 
on the ground in these areas--that Russia may provide an 
alternative to what was a colonial history.
    Something else to keep in mind is that there have been 
rumors--I have not seen many facts to support them--that one of 
Russia's intentions is to take fighters from the Central 
African Republic who were trained by the Wagner Group who are 
French speakers and who are dark-skinned and send them to Mali 
as trainers because they might be more acceptable to the local 
population there than having White-skinned Russians who do not 
speak the local language and do not speak French.
    And so I think that Russia is very clever in the way that 
it is approaching things. I think the more that we can 
publicize what the Wagner Group is doing, the better chance we 
have of turning people against it. But I think people know what 
the Wagner Group is doing and still see it as perhaps an 
alternative to what the history has been in Africa, and so that 
is what we are up against.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
    Dr. Siegle, I know you spent a lot of time on the African 
question. Our committee was in Mali not that long ago, and 
there appeared to be a transition going on where heretofore 
French Special Forces were very active there, but, as Dr. 
Marten pointed out, there's been a point of friction between 
the current administration there in Mali and the French 
Government, perhaps from the prior colonial history there.
    What can you tell us about the Wagner Group's activities or 
any other PMC operating on behalf of Russia in Mali and what 
the future holds there?
    Mr. Siegle. Well, I think Mali provides a very good example 
of how Russia is using Wagner as a political tool. You know, 
Russia disinformation in Mali started in 2018, 2019 and was 
very--sorry about the feedback here. And it was very anti-
French, anti-West, pro-Russia, and it effectively built up a 
lot of dissent against the city democratic-elected government. 
The issue of colonialism in Mali has been there for 60 years. 
It's not a new thing. But Russia used that leverage to try to 
buildup antipathy toward the government. And it ultimately did 
lead to protest and the military coup that brought the junta to 
power, some of the leaders of which, it should be noted, were 
trained in Russia. Russia was the first country to recognize 
the military junta and quickly formed a close alliance and has 
been the prime international backer of the junta since then. So 
it wasn't a surprise when, a year later, the junta struck a 
deal to bring in a thousand Wagner forces. As in other places, 
they are not there as a security mechanism; they are there to 
help keep the junta in power, protecting the junta and 
controlling access to different natural resource locations.
    The political dimension is playing out too in that, in the 
face of an actively growing jihadi insurgency in Mali, the 
junta has in fact agitated and alienated for the removal of 
French forces. So we've seen the withdrawal of 4-to 5,000 
French forces who have been fighting in Mali, as well as EU 
forces, and now they are going after the United Nations 
peacekeeping forces, a contingent of 15,000 forces. So we have 
this hugely unstrategic dynamic of a country that's facing a 
rapidly ramping up jihadist attack that's pushing out partners 
that could help them fend this off. Really the only one who is 
benefiting from this is Russia, who is displacing Western 
influence, and it is really creating a vacuum in the Sahel that 
could lead to another Afghanistan-style takeover by an 
extremist group.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
    I now yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin, our ranking 
member, Mr. Grothman, for five minutes.
    Mr. Grothman. Sure.
    This is for whoever feels capable of answering the 
question, I guess. As I understand it or as you just explained 
that they recruit these people, billboards, prisons, wherever. 
But do we have some feeling of who they are? How many are 
ethnic Russians? How much are not? Are some of them Muslim? 
And, just in general, how many people are members of the Wagner 
Group?
    Mr. Siegle. Is that directed at me or----
    Mr. Grothman. Anybody who wants it. If you feel you are the 
sharpest of the bunch, jump right in.
    Ms. Marten. So I can't give you the overall number, but I 
can tell you that the composition has changed very much over 
time. There were rumors early on that there were no Muslims. 
But then it became clear that there actually are Chechens that 
have been involved with the Wagner Group. It is not just 
Russians. It is also pro-Russian people who are citizens of 
places like Serbia, Belarus, and eastern Ukraine. What they are 
engaged in, what they are training in has varied over time. I 
think 2022 was the first time we saw them recruiting from 
prisons.
    But we do know that Prigozhin has gone across Russian 
territory to recruit tough guys who are, for example, fighting 
in extreme fighting tournaments. And we also know that exactly 
the type of training that they've had has varied with time. So, 
for example, in Libya, we saw people who were not very well 
trained at all, not very well disciplined. And we also saw 
extraordinarily well-disciplined sharp shooters. And there also 
appears to have been cases where the Wagner Group may have 
engaged people who were veterans of the Russian Air Force to 
engage in bombing raids. And so it has really varied over time 
and space. There does not seem to be one component of exactly 
what the Wagner Group is.
    Mr. Grothman. Does one have any idea how many have been 
killed or captured, say, in the last--and the overall number, 
overall number of members of the Wagner Group and how many have 
been killed or captured in the last five years?
    Ms. Marten. If I may, again, I think that that's maybe a 
question for people who have access to intelligence and 
classified information.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. I have another question. When they go 
abroad, are they paid by those countries? I mean, when Russia's 
in Mali, I mean, you know, if--or French troops are in Mali, I 
assume they don't take money from Mali to be there. But if the 
Wagner Group shows up, is the host country, if I can call it 
that, expected to pay for them?
    Mr. Siegle. In that case, yes. The understanding is that 
they are paid about $11 million a month. It's not an official 
contract, of course, but that's the understanding. They also--
in Mali and other places, there is an understanding that they 
are--as part of the deal, they are giving access to natural 
resource reserves.
    Mr. Grothman. OK.
    Mr. Siegle. So it is seen as a self-funding operation.
    Mr. Grothman. We say they commit war crimes. Can you guys 
give us some specific examples which might be good for causing 
my colleagues to care or the public in general to care?
    Mr. Siegle. Well, as my colleagues have pointed out as 
well, the instances of Wagner abuses are becoming relatively 
well publicized now. And in fact the United Nations has 
conducted investigations that have specifically called out 
Wagner and Russian forces for human rights abuses and war 
crimes.
    Mr. Grothman. Could you describe what those are?
    Mr. Siegle. Well, in Moura, in Mali, earlier this year, the 
Russians, working with the military junta, cordoned off the 
village of Moura, separated out the men from other family 
members and are alleged to have executed 300 men. So, in 
Central Africa Republic, there are again allegations of 
intimidation, extrajudicial killings, rape, and other forms of 
intimidation against local communities.
    Mr. Grothman. We hear that rape is something that Russian 
soldiers do or have done in Ukraine. Is this a common thing 
with the Wagner Group too?
    Mr. Siegle. I can't speak more generally, and I welcome 
input from either panelists, but rape has been specifically 
called out for as part of their mode of operation in Central 
African Republic in particular.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. I will give you one more question, I 
hope. This is something I kind of wonder about, and we of 
course had a private briefing yesterday. All of you I am sure 
follow what's going on in Ukraine. Do any of you know, do we 
have a goal in Ukraine? Is there a point at which we feel this 
will end or, when we accomplish such and such, it will end? Any 
of the three of you under the impression of what our goal is 
over there?
    Mr. Siegle. Well, that's a much bigger question than here 
what we are talking about with Wagner so I'll defer to my 
colleagues to add to that. But obviously a much bigger geo or 
strategic question there.
    Mr. Grothman. I'm just a Congressman. I don't know exactly 
what the end game is, but I will ask you guys. Do you have any 
idea what the end game is? The other witnesses? No? You can say 
no. Or you can say nothing, I guess.
    Ms. Marten. I hesitate to speak on behalf of the 
Administration so I don't think I'm competent to answer that 
question.
    Mr. Grothman. Nobody knows. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. Lynch. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 
California.
    Welcome and you're recognized for five minutes. Thank you.
    Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
shedding light on the PMCs, particularly the Wagner Group.
    I want to followup on the ranking member's question and ask 
all of you, are you of the impression that rape has become a 
weapon of war? I'd like to ask each of you that.
    Ms. Doxsee, would you just begin?
    Ms. Doxsee. Yes. Thank you. So I think that we have seen 
rape being used in a widespread way by PMCs such as the Wagner 
Group. And I would call this out in two contexts. One is in the 
context of warfare and combat operations. This is certainly 
something that we've seen in Ukraine by Russian soldiers, 
including some who have been identified as being affiliated 
with the Wagner Group or other private military contractors. 
It's something that's also been documented in locations such as 
the Central African Republic.
    But then the second category I would highlight is not just 
rapes that are occurring during combat operations but also just 
during the tenure in which PMCs are present in a country. So, 
for example, in the Central African Republic, while we have 
widespread documentation of human rights abuses by the U.N. 
Security Council and NGO's, such as Human Rights Watch, 
particularly after Wagner became engaged in direct combat 
operations, if you dig into local reporting and conversations 
with locals, particularly in the villages surrounding areas 
such as Berengo, where Wagner established training bases early 
on, from the time that Wagner troops arrived in the country, 
local villages reported these Russian mercenaries coming into 
their villages, kidnapping women, raping their wives and 
daughters. And, to some extent, that's one way that we can sort 
of have a harbinger of what's to come when Wagner arrives in a 
country. These are the types of local crimes that Wagner and 
other PMCs commit when they arrive in a country even before 
thorough combat operations begin. And I think it is something 
that we can certainly expect to see.
    Ms. Speier. OK. Thank you.
    Let me ask your other colleagues because I'm going to run 
out of time here. Yes.
    Ms. Marten. Hi, I think that's a great question. And I 
should just point out that the Wagner Group in this sense is 
not really acting any differently from Russian and regular 
troops. And this actually goes back into deep history. It is 
something that the Soviet Union did when-- it is very well 
documented-- when it occupied Eastern Germany at the end of 
World War II. So there is a long history of it, and it is not 
unique to Wagner, but certainly Wagner is doing it.
    Ms. Speier. And we can say pretty clearly that the Wagner 
Group is proxy for the Russian Government. And we need to call 
them out. Should we identify them as a terrorist group?
    Ms. Marten. I think we need to keep separate the notions of 
war crimes and terrorism, not even just for this case but more 
broadly for U.S. interests. And I think if we were to instead 
amend our War Crime Act from 1996 to allow more prosecutions 
and more indictments to happen, that might be the best way to 
approach this.
    Ms. Speier. Dr. Marten, in a recent piece, yoargued that 
PMCs like Wagner Group are out of control. How do yothink we 
can hold Russia accountable for sexual violence that these 
mercenaries commit?
    Ms. Marten. It's both a war crime and it is a crime against 
humanity. It is an example of torture, and so there are laws on 
the books that we could expand so that it is not merely U.S. 
citizens who are the victims or U.S. citizens who are the 
perpetrators. And we could therefore hold Russia accountable in 
those ways. And I think we could also convene war crimes 
tribunal in which the Russian state as a whole was held 
accountable for what was helping, similarly to what we did at 
the close of World War II with the Nuremberg trials.
    Ms. Speier. One of the things we found in the buildup of 
the Ukrainian war by the Russians is that, when we declassified 
information, it shed a great deal of light and it unified the 
alliance to come together to support Ukraine.
    Ms. Doxsee, how would yodeclassify intelligence about the 
Wagner Group and other PMCs and making that information 
publicly releasable, undermining Russia's ability to use them 
as a proxy force?
    Ms. Doxsee. I can't speak to information that we have 
currently classified, but I think that, even with information 
that's publicly available, there's wide evidence of these human 
rights abuses, of the failures that Wagner has experienced in 
countries like Mozambique, where they had outright combat 
failures, not just because of their inability to repel the 
local Islamist insurgency but because of fundamental planning 
and operational failures, such as inexperience operating in 
local terrain and the inability to even communicate with the 
local troops in which they were embedded.
    So I think there's a wide variety of open-source 
information already about the direct harms that Wagner causes, 
as well as the failures, the inability to actually achieve 
their goals, that could certainly make them less appealing to 
future countries who are considering agreements with them. And 
I'm sure that this information is only supplemented by more on 
the high side.
    Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, I know I'm over my time. I have 
just one last question. Do we know if there are any members of 
the Wagner Group in the United States? Does anyone know? Yes.
    Ms. Marten. I would say that that's highly unlikely just 
because they would be afraid to travel to the United States, 
but also because they are going to be very anti-American. They 
are all very loyal to the Russian state, and so I think, at the 
moment, they would not be attempting to cooperate with the 
United States. Again, I think yowould need someone who had an 
intelligence clearance to answer that question --
    Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you. And I yield back.
    Mr. Lynch. The gentlelady yields back.
    The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from 
Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for five minutes.
    Mr. Higgins. I thank Chairman Lynch and Ranking Member 
Grothman for holding today's hearing.
    Russia is a brutal regime. It should be no surprise to us 
that they are using private military companies and mercenaries 
as part of their military standard operating procedures. While 
the private use of private security groups has a long history 
in our world, the Russian usage of groups like the Wagner Group 
is common and horrific. Most private contractors they use for 
security purposes, but Russia's tendency to allow and embrace 
human rights violations and lack of responsibility certainly 
calls for the world's attention. And it's appropriate that 
Congress discusses this today.
    As we've seen in the Middle East and Africa and now 
Ukraine, Russia's reliance on PMCs shows two things. This is 
what I'd like to get to-- Ms. Doxsee, I'm going to be asking 
you questions, ma'am-- it shows two things that they are using 
PMCs, mercenaries. One, the Russian military is not as 
formidable as they would have the world believe; and, two, that 
certainly regarding Ukraine, Russian soldiers commonly agree 
that unprovoked aggression against Ukraine is wrong. So this 
should be discussed deeply. We should look at ways to sanction 
nations that utilize this type of military aggression, private 
mercenaries unaccountable. And I look forward to working with 
fellow members on the committee about this.
    Ms. Doxsee, in looking through our panelists, I believe you 
may be most capable of responding to this question. Ukraine is 
mounting successful counter attacks. On many fronts, they are 
pushing Russian forces back and regaining ground that they had 
initially lost. And certainly, any reasonable observer would 
argue that the Ukrainian people have fought the Russians to a 
standstill. I have been to Ukraine and met with those people, 
and they are incredibly focused on defending their country. And 
they should be commended for that. They have driven the morale 
of Russian troops down, down into a point where desertion is 
common amongst the Russian troops, I'm advised. The combat 
capabilities of the Russian troops, the weaknesses thereof, 
have been exposed, and Russian capabilities continue to 
deteriorate.
    So, Ms. Doxsee, given all the facts that we're discussing 
today, I'd like you to address for the committee and the world 
that's watching, what is your opinion on how--like, what is the 
situation with Russia's potential use of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Ukraine? Given the fact that they've lost ground, 
they've been pushed very hard, they are a brutal regime, what 
are your thoughts there, ma'am?
    Ms. Doxsee. Thank you, sir. And thank you for, you know, 
highlighting both the commendable actions of the Ukrainian 
people and the continued struggle and, frankly, security 
concerns that we should all have regarding the ongoing conflict 
in Ukraine.
    I think that, you know, while certainly I cannot pretend to 
know what happens inside Putin's brain--I don't think any of us 
can--I think that we are certainly seeing Russia recognizing 
the low morale amongst its troops, the risk even domestically 
for continually having Russian troops on the front lines, and I 
think this was one area where Russia's continued use of private 
military contractors in Ukraine is also a way that we can get 
insight into the Kremlin's mind-set around where things stand.
    So, as my colleagues and I have mentioned, Moscow often 
uses private military contractors such as the Wagner Group in 
situations in which they want a force that's more expendable, 
that they can't be held accountable for, not only on the 
international stage but among their people at home.
    We had stories during the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 
of villages in Russia where young men would suddenly be dropped 
off dead, their bodies full of shrapnel, with no explanation as 
to what happened to them and how they died. And the truth was 
that they were private contractors, operating in Ukraine, but 
because they were not officially Russian soldiers, the Kremlin 
had no obligation to their families. And so we----
    Mr. Higgins. I thank you for your response. It was very 
thorough and insightful.
    Mr. Chairman, I'll leave for your due consideration, sir, 
the observation that an increased concentration of mercenaries 
I fear could indeed signal preparatory events for the use of 
tactical nukes in Ukraine. And I am thankful that you have 
chaired this committee hearing today on this particular topic.
    I yield, sir.
    Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields. Thank you.
    I am told that the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, may 
be available for the next question.
    All right. He's not on yet.
    We will go to the gentlelady from North Carolina, Ms. Foxx, 
for five minutes. Welcome.
    Ms. Foxx. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 
for convening the hearing.
    For Dr. Marten, how many Wagner Group contractors are 
currently fighting in the war in Ukraine? Do we know?
    Ms. Marten. Thank you for the question.
    I am sure there are people who have intelligence clearances 
who know the answer to that, but I would hesitate to guess 
because it would just be guessing.
    Ms. Foxx. OK. Well, I've been working on the War Crimes 
Rewards Expansion Act, a bill to improve the U.S. State 
Department's War Crimes Rewards Program so that it can offer 
rewards for individuals wanted for war crimes or genocide under 
U.S. law or another country's law. Is there evidence that 
Wagner Group contractors are committing war crimes in Ukraine?
    Ms. Marten. Yes, there is. I mean we have very credible 
media reports of torture committed by the Wagner Group. And, as 
some of the other witnesses have talked about, that is typical 
of how the Wagner Group acts. So, for example, one of the 
things we know they did in Libya was that, when they withdrew 
from the areas that they had been occupying, they left booby 
traps behind, IEDs in habitable areas that were actually 
causing injuries among the people who were just going back to 
their homes. So we know that everywhere it has been, the Wagner 
Group has committed these war crimes. But, as I said earlier, 
we also know that regular Russian forces have been committing 
very similar war crimes.
    Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
    Again, Dr. Marten, as you noted in your opening testimony, 
recent reporting indicates that the Wagner Group has been 
recruiting convicted criminals to refill their ranks. Is this a 
practice that the Wagner Group has utilized in the past? And is 
it something other private military groups have done? And what 
about the Russian military? We've heard this morning that 
there's going to be a call up of 300,000 more troops for 
Russia. So what do we know about where they are going to be 
getting those troops? What kind of people are going to be 
attracted into the army?
    Ms. Marten. I think those are really good questions. The 
evidence that we have is that the Wagner Group had started 
recruiting in prisons in about March when it became clear that 
the Russian military was facing difficulties that it had not 
predicted in advance in its invasion of Ukraine. To my 
knowledge, there is no evidence before March 2022 that Wagner 
was doing this. We do have evidence that Prigozhin was going 
around to various festivals in Russia and trying to recruit 
people who weren't necessarily veterans but who were extreme 
fighters. And so that personality type who may not have 
veteran's experience have also been in the Wagner Group before. 
I'm not sure it's clear whether the Russian military as a whole 
has been recruiting in prisons or whether it has all been done 
through the Wagner Group.
    Ms. Foxx. Dr. Marten, also in your opening testimony, you 
noted that the Wagner Group is not a legally established group 
and that PMCs are illegal in Russia. Despite that fact, it has 
been reported there have been statues built that commemorate 
the service of military contractors and that contractors have 
been awarded military medals. Can you explain how PMCs are 
technically illegal in Russia but are still honored with 
statues and medals?
    Ms. Marten. Yes. Thank you for that question. It is 
something that I explored in a 2019 article and in my earlier 
congressional testimony on this subject in 2020. By keeping 
these groups illegal, Putin gets to control which of his 
network cronies are the ones who make a profit from their 
activities. Any time that they do something that Putin doesn't 
like he can say, ``Oh, you're being mercenaries,'' and throw 
them in prison. He actually did that to an earlier group that 
ended up morphing into the Wagner Group. And what that means is 
that they are not really private military companies the way 
that other countries have used private military companies. One 
of the things that sets Russia apart is that it is one of the 
only countries that has not signed the Montreux accords, which 
were private military companies that are reputable, working 
with states and working with nongovernmental organizations to 
set up a code of conduct for how private military companies 
should behave in the field. And what's really noteworthy is 
that even China signed on to the Montreux accords, but Russia 
chose not do so.
    Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
    Ms. Doxsee, in your report, you discuss increasing Russian 
and international awareness of PMCs may be an effective tactic 
to counter private military companies, PMCs. However, in that 
same section of the report, you note that reporting on PMCs 
comes with risks and discuss the murder of three Russian 
journalists who were looking into the Wagner Group's 
activities.
    Considering the risk to journalists who report on the issue 
and Putin's lack of transparency and use of propaganda to push 
messages, how do you believe the Russian people can become more 
informed on PMC operations?
    Ms. Doxsee. Yes. So I think that's a really important 
question, and it's one that puts a lot of these media 
organizations in a lot of danger, such as the murder of the 
journalist that we saw in the Central African Republic.
    I would note that a lot of the information that we have 
about PMC operations in many of these countries, notably 
countries like Madagascar or Central African Republic, is 
really the result of brave, independent journalists, many of 
them Russians themselves, who have undertaken great personal 
risk to bring these activities to light and to sort out what is 
going on.
    I think there's immeasurable importance of journalists on 
the ground and journalists who are able to, you know, operate 
in combat zones, operate under [inaudible] coming to light. And 
I believe that, as they risk their lives to bring this 
information out open, transparently into the light, we owe it 
to them to continue to share that information and make those 
risks worth it and really making clear the costs of working 
with Russian PMCs and the costs that they impose on local 
civilian populations.
    Ms. Foxx. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back.
    The chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from 
Georgia, Mr. Johnson, for five minutes. Welcome.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
holding this very important and timely hearing. Private 
military companies such as the Wagner Group, according to 
Russian leaders, operate autonomously from the Russian state 
while building military cooperation in foreign nations.
    But instead of providing security that helps civilians 
remain safe, multiple reports from the European Union, the 
Department of state, and other U.S. agencies show that these 
groups, these PMCs are responsible for increased violence, 
primarily in sub-Saharan Africa but not limited to sub-Saharan 
Africa.
    Dr. Siegle, the Kremlin deployed groups like Wagner to 
Africa in the name of regional stability and to help local 
governments allegedly defend against insurgencies and terrorist 
threats. The record shows that, instead of improved security, 
however, Wagner forces have left behind a trail of human rights 
atrocities and exacerbated violence in the Central African 
Republic and led assaults on several towns and villages, 
indiscriminately killing local civilians.
    Are Wagner activities in the Central African Republic 
reflective of their operations in other African nations, like 
Mali and Sudan?
    Mr. Siegle. Thank you for the question, Representative 
Johnson. I think the short answer is yes. Wagner has been 
operating with impunity in Africa, and that lack of 
accountability allows it to undertake all kinds of human rights 
abuses against civilian populations in Africa.
    And, you know, they're doing it as a form of intimidation 
and as a means of helping to prop up the proxies, the proxy 
governments that Moscow is supporting.
    Mr. Johnson. What would be the percentage of PMCs operating 
in African nations versus the numbers of Russian troops, 
military troops operating in Africa, in the continent? Is there 
a ratio that you can point to or any information you can give 
us, in terms of numbers?
    Mr. Siegle. The vast majority of power that Russia is 
projecting in Africa is through their use of these irregular 
forces. They are not deploying very many statutory forces.
    Really, we see some of that in Libya, but really it's 
Wagner that is the key coercive tool that Russia is using. And, 
you know, it varies from 1,000 to 2,500 in each context where 
Russia is active. It may not seem like a lot, but in these 
fragile countries, they can be a highly destabilizing force.
    Mr. Johnson. Which country in Africa has the most Russian 
PMCs on the ground?
    Mr. Siegle. Well, again, we don't have exact numbers, but 
the expectation or the understanding is there's about 2,300 
Wagner forces in Central African Republic currently. And, 
again, the numbers are fuzzy, but there's probably about the 
same number operating in Libya.
    Mr. Johnson. Uh-huh. What other countries in Africa have 
relatively large numbers of Wagner Group storm troopers, if you 
will?
    Mr. Siegle. Well, in addition to those two countries, Mali 
has about a thousand Wagner forces, and there are also Wagner 
forces supporting the military junta in Sudan. I think those 
are the four main countries.
    But Wagner is also linked to having operations in 
Mozambique, Madagascar, and then is using some of its 
noncoercive tools in other African countries, you know, like 
Burkina Faso, the Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Democratic 
Republic of Congo. So there's an expectation that Russia is 
looking to expand its influence in Africa and another half a 
dozen countries.
    Mr. Johnson. Was there something you wanted to add, Dr. 
Marten?
    Ms. Marten. No. I think that covers it very well. And to 
keep in mind the distinction that Dr. Siegle raised between 
those who are active fighters and those who are working with 
Prigozhin on disinformation campaigns, who are a different 
group of people and who, again, complicate the question of how 
many Wagner Group forces are actually on the ground.
    Also, in the Central African Republic, we know that there 
were a few Russian active military servicemembers who were at 
least originally deployed when the Wagner Group first went into 
the Central African Republic in late 2017 and 2018.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
    Dr. Doxsee, anything you wanted to add?
    Ms. Doxsee. Yes. I would just add on top of what my 
colleagues on the panel have said that it's notable that, in 
some of these deployments, in addition to having formal Russian 
soldiers helping to facilitate action, there have also been, 
for instance, GRU operatives in places like Madagascar helping 
some of the political operations.
    And I would also highlight that, while a lot of the focus 
is typically on these large-scale and combat-focused 
operations, Russia has also employed private military 
contractors in much smaller numbers in some African countries 
to simply facilitate things like arms transfers, training on 
using that equipment.
    We have reports in some countries, such as Nigeria, where 
there maybe 10 or 15 PMC troops present really to help 
facilitate those arms transfers and training operations. And so 
that is another dynamic at play here where PMCs are not 
conducting these large-scale combat operations necessarily in 
all of these countries, but they are helping to continue to 
forge this relationship with the Russian Government.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
    And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. And I 
yield back.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The gentleman yields. I yield myself 
five minutes for questioning.
    Let me ask, since there's such well-documented cases of 
intervention by the Wagner Group in all of these countries and 
at least a half dozen have been named in addition to Ukraine, 
all these countries in Africa, are there any ongoing actual 
prosecutions of Wagner Group personnel or people associated 
with them in any of these local countries, or are there any 
cases of war crimes prosecutions happening in any international 
forums? Dr. Siegle?
    Mr. Siegle. Not to my knowledge. Again, there have been 
some U.N. investigations that have named Wagner. But I think 
this touches on part of the insidiousness of how they're 
operating through these deals with autocratic governments or 
military juntas.
    There isn't any incentive at all on the part of the so-
called governments in these countries to actually prosecute 
Wagner. You know, Wagner is operating on their behalf to keep 
them in power. And so we have this, you know, perverse 
arrangement where the host country is not taking an active role 
in investigating it.
    Mr. Lynch. All right. Dr. Marten or Ms. Doxsee, any 
thoughts on that, any prosecutions that you might be aware of? 
Dr. Marten?
    Ms. Marten. One thing we have to keep in mind is that 
Russia has a veto on the United Nations Security Council, and 
so that means that it's going to very much limit the ability of 
something that is done through the United Nations to engage in 
prosecution.
    And that might be a reason why the United States might be 
interested in amending its own domestic War Crimes Act, giving 
the United States more flexibility to engage in these kinds of 
indictments and prosecutions, because it's going to be very 
difficult for the international community to do so.
    Mr. Lynch. Ms. Doxsee?
    Ms. Doxsee. I'm not aware of any ongoing prosecutions along 
these lines, but I would just highlight that there has been 
substantial evidence compiled by bodies, such as the United 
Nations, as well as NGO's, such as Human Rights Watch, that I 
think more than substantiates action being taken. And I think 
that's an important avenue for the U.S. and its allies to 
consider.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you. I am aware that, in Ukraine, there is 
a prosecution for targeting killing. I'm not quite sure if 
it's, you know, specifically to Wagner Group or I'm told, and 
you've reinforced that, that some of these atrocities are being 
conducted by Russian regular forces. So that's problematic as 
well.
    Is there--I mean, we've received in this committee as early 
as yesterday, as recently as yesterday reports of widespread 
atrocities in Ukraine. Is there--in your study of this, would 
it be helpful to ask the administration to declassify some of 
the information that right now is not available to the public 
in an effort to, you know, put pressure on some of these 
incumbent leaders in other countries and also put pressure on 
these individuals if they were named and identified who are 
associated with Wagner Group and some of these other private 
military companies?
    Are there specific things that this committee could do in 
creating more transparency about these atrocities and the 
conduct of Wagner Group and these other companies? Ms. Doxsee?
    Ms. Doxsee. Yes. I would say, first, it's hard to say 
without being familiar with the specific classified evidence, 
of course, weighing the benefits of transparency with the risks 
to intelligence sources and collection methods.
    But I do think that one area in which the United States has 
the ability and certainly can do more is having a mechanism to 
have comprehensive information collection and distribution, 
whether that's already open-source information or strategically 
declassifying information to track data and to track 
qualitative accounts of the violence and of the actions of 
Russian private military companies, both to make that 
transparent and for different agencies across the U.S. 
Government to be able to access that information and act 
accordingly.
    I think one of the struggles that I've heard a lot about 
from talking to individuals in the military, the intelligence 
community, the State Department, one of the big struggles is 
that we have many different areas of government that are 
[inaudible] or those involved in intelligence collection, and 
there's not a comprehensive approach to compiling, analyzing, 
and acting upon this data.
    And so, really, what's missing, in my view, is not 
necessarily getting more evidence of their bad activities. We 
have plenty of that in the open source. But it's really 
building up that coordinated mechanism by which we can compile, 
analyze, and act on that information in a unified way, both 
across U.S. agencies and also with our partners 
internationally.
    Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
    I did see briefly the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch. 
You would be recognized if you're available. OK.
    With that, I will yield to the gentleman, the ranking 
member, the gentleman from Wisconsin for any further questions 
and closing remarks.
    Mr. Grothman. Thank you. One of the things that at least 
I'm getting out of this hearing--and it's primarily Ms. 
Doxsee's testimony--is the sheer number of countries that these 
organizations are playing around in. And it's not just the 
Wagner Group, right? They have other similar things.
    You kind of wonder what they're doing and what progress 
they're making. I notice, in your written testimony, you make 
reference to something called the Dyck Advisory Group, which is 
apparently playing around in South Africa, which I know is a 
country filled with valuable minerals and such.
    Do you want to elaborate on what's going on in South 
Africa?
    Ms. Doxsee. So thank you for flagging that. I would just 
clarify that the Dyck Advisory Group is actually a South 
African private military company rather than a Russian private 
military company.
    And the highlight there is that, after the Wagner Group 
experienced substantial operational failures in Mozambique, 
they were actually essentially fired by the local government 
and replaced by the Dyck Advisory Group, which is not 
affiliated with Russia and which has real experience in the 
region.
    They actually were initially underbid by the Wagner Group, 
which is why Wagner got the contract in the first place, but I 
think the government in Mozambique quickly learned that you get 
what you pay for. Even though, on its surface, Wagner might 
have a lower price tag than more experienced contractors like 
the Dyck Advisory Group, that lower price tag comes with 
inexperience, propensity to failure, and a variety of other 
detrimental impacts that we've discussed on this panel today.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. Your map here is a very nice map. I have 
a hard time reading it; it's so small.
    Am I right reading it to say that the three countries that 
the Wagner Group is involved in in Europe are Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Serbia? Is there anybody else?
    Ms. Doxsee. Yes. Those are the three that we've detected 
here.
    Mr. Grothman. OK. And what are they----
    Ms. Doxsee. And----
    Mr. Grothman. Go ahead. Go ahead.
    Ms. Doxsee. I just also wanted to flag that, of course, on 
this map this documents countries in which Russian PMCs 
operated during the five-year span from 2016 to 2021 and does 
not reflect the scale of those operations.
    So, of course, in a country like Ukraine, we obviously see 
much larger scale operations than in some of the others noted.
    Mr. Grothman. I was just going to comment on Serbia because 
it kind of stands out. Do you want to comment on what's going 
on in Serbia?
    Ms. Doxsee. I don't have information in front of me to go 
into extensive detail, but this was pulled from different open-
source tracking of countries in which PMCs operated to some 
extent. In Serbia, there were much smaller presence and 
operations than in some of these other countries such as 
Ukraine.
    Mr. Grothman. Are they--I know what's going on in Syria is 
always of interest to this country. Could you comment on the 
military situation there and how many? I take it that is the 
Wagner Group in Syria. How many troops are there and what 
success or influence they're having?
    Ms. Doxsee. In terms of numbers, I would defer to 
colleagues in the government who can speak to intelligence 
estimates on the high side, but in countries like Syria, 
similar to the use in Ukraine or even countries like Libya, the 
PMC deployments have been much more along the lines of direct 
combat operations and directly achieving Moscow's military 
goals.
    I think the one thing that's interesting is to see how 
Russia has really evolved its PMC model from activities in 
countries like Ukraine and Syria, where it really is about 
combat objectives, to what we're seeing now increasingly 
widespread in sub-Saharan Africa and even extending potentially 
to other regions like Latin America, which is really this model 
of targeting countries with weak governance and ongoing 
security challenges and specifically aiming to get out of it 
not only the geopolitical military intelligence gains but those 
economic gains and really that access to natural resources.
    And I kind of think of it as a version 2.0 of this PMC 
model that they're increasingly honing in sub-Saharan Africa. 
And, to that end, I would note that Russia's use of private 
military companies is something that is evolving over time. 
I've highlighted today many of the failures they've experienced 
and many of their weaknesses, but they are certainly learning 
from these different deployments, learning from things like 
encounters with U.S. troops in Syria several years ago.
    And so I think that it's important that the United States 
and its partners continue to monitor and analyze what's going 
on, particularly because these PMCs exhibit a variety of 
vulnerabilities now, but if we were to wait 5, 10 years down 
the line until they are posing an insurmountable challenge, 
many of these vulnerabilities may have been ironed out, and 
they may learn from their past failures.
    Mr. Grothman. Yes. I think it was fairly well-publicized. 
It was still probably not publicized enough. There was quite a 
number I guess of--quite a number of Wagner troops killed in a 
confrontation with American troops in Syria.
    Is there anywhere else around the world where American 
troops have literally fought these PMCs around the world?
    Ms. Doxsee. So thank you for noting that. I think that is a 
very important example of where we had U.S. troops engaged in 
direct fire with PMC troops. I think one of the challenges 
we're seeing is that, while that certainly grabbed headlines 
and became more well-known, where we're seeing U.S. forces, 
both military and intelligence, encountering PMCs now is often 
in noncombat situations. So we have troops in places like sub-
Saharan Africa who are on the ground and seeing the impacts of 
these PMC operations. They're seeing PMC troops carrying out, 
you know, different influence operations, training operations.
    And there is an ongoing question, even from talking to our 
servicemembers, of what happens if we have a repeat of what 
happened in Syria. What is their guidance in terms of engaging 
with these Wagner or other PMC operatives that they often 
witness in the field?
    And, moreover, what happens when PMC presence starts to 
threaten U.S. ability to collect intelligence, whether that's 
HUMINT or SIGINT? What happens when PMC intelligence collection 
starts to overlap or encroach on areas where the United States 
and U.S. troops are present?
    I think that that is one of those areas that's maybe less 
flashy and less headline grabbing than direct combat and direct 
fire, but I think that we are continuing to hit upon that 
tension where U.S. servicemembers are coming into contact in 
differing ways with Russian private military contractors in the 
field, and the United States needs to be able to have a 
comprehensive plan and direction to be able to give them.
    Mr. Lynch. The gentleman yields back.
    In closing, first of all, I want to thank all our 
witnesses. Thank you for your willingness to testify and for 
informing our decisionmaking process.
    I want to commend my colleagues for their participation 
throughout this hearing and their important questions.
    With that, without objection, all members will have five 
legislative days within which to submit additional written 
questions for the witnesses to the chair, which will be 
forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
    I ask that, if witnesses do receive such questions, please 
respond as promptly as you are able.
    Thank you all again for your attendance. This hearing is 
now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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