[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE:
ASSESSING PUTIN'S MALIGN INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
July 20, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-134
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
or http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-797PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman
BRAD SHERMAN, California MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey PETER MEIJER, Michigan
ANDY KIM, New Jersey NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SARA JACOBS, California RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina YOUNG KIM, California
JIM COSTA, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and
International Economic Policy
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas MARK GREEN, Tennessee, Ranking
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan Member
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
JUAN VARGAS, California MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Rouvinski, Dr. Vladimir, Professor and Director,
Interdisciplinary Research Center, Icesi University, Cali,
Colombia....................................................... 8
Marten, Dr. Kimberly, Professor of Political Science, Barnard
College........................................................ 18
Rondeaux, Ms. Candace, Director, Future Frontlines, New America.. 35
Ellis, Mr. R. Evan, Research Professor, Latin American Studies,
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.............. 43
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 75
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 76
Hearing Attendance............................................... 77
OPENING STATEMENT
Opening statement for the record from CHairman Sires............. 78
RUSSIA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE:
ASSESSING PUTIN'S MALIGN INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Wednesday, July 20, 2022
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Civilian Security, Migration and
International Economic Policy
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., via
Webex, Hon. Albio Sires (chairman of the subcommittee)
presiding.
Mr. Sires [presiding]. Good afternoon, everyone.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for
your patience.
This hearing entitled, ``Russia in the Western Hemisphere:
Assessing Putin's Malign Influence in Latin America and in the
Caribbean'' will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a
recess of the committee at any point.
And all members will have 5 days to submit statements,
extraneous material, and questions for the record subject to
the length limitations in the rules. To insert something into
the record, please have your staff email the previously
mentioned address of contact for Subcommittee staff.
As a reminder to members joining remotely, please keep your
video function on at all times, even when you are not
recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and
unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute yourself after
you finish speaking.
Consistent with H.Res. 8, and the accompanying regulation,
staff will only mute members and witnesses, as appropriate,
when they are not under recognition, to eliminate background
noise.
I see that we have a quorum, and I now recognize myself for
opening remarks.
Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you to our witnesses
for testifying before our committee today.
The world has watched in horror as Putin's war rages on in
the Ukraine. His willingness to sacrifice countless lives, in
his selfish pursuit of regional dominance, has caused a
humanitarian crisis that will long outline the conflict.
Nonetheless, several Latin American governments have
expressed apathy or even explicit support for the Russian
invasion. Even as the shocking images of civilian graves and
flattened cities capture our attention and animosity, we must
pay attention to Putin's influence in our own backyard.
Russia has steadily shored up its presence in Latin America
and the Caribbean, threatening democratic aspirations and
developing goals. Putin has found close friends in the region's
most cruel dictatorships, including the leaders of Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Cuba, and has made overtures to U.S. allies,
such as Brazil and Argentina.
As I have said many times before during my tenure in
Congress, the United States must not pivot away from Latin
America, because Putin is eager to step in. We must also be
careful not to conflate Russia and China's actions or share of
influence in the region. While China funds infrastructure and
creates financial ties with our neighbors, Russia has to use
more creative methods to garner influence.
One strategy been to spread misinformation by broadcasting
Spanish language Kremlin propaganda through R-T and Sputnik.
Russia also sells arms and artillery that only its engineers
can maintain and provides critical intelligence support,
fostering security interdependence that is difficult to
unravel.
Finally, Russia has painstakingly constructed a global
sanctions evasion network, undermining the coercive power of
the U.S. financial restrictions intended to modify the behavior
of human rights abusers around the world.
The Russian government's actions are supported by other
non-State actors, including cyber operatives. In the wake of
Putin's attack on Ukraine, the Russian-based hackers group
Conti announced full support for the Kremlin's actions and that
they would attack those who responded to the invasion.
The results of Putin's project have been outstanding.
Venezuelan dictator Nicolaàs Maduro, Nicaragua's Daniel
Ortega, and Miguel Diaz-Canel of Cuba have amplified Russian
talking points on the invasion of Ukraine. All three have
welcomed Russian security personnel to train their own forces
and engage in military exercises and granted Russian access to
cybersecurity and intelligence networks, and prioritized their
bilateral relationship with the Kremlin, at the expense of
regional institutions like the Organization of American States.
Russia's support has empowered client regimes to step up
surveillance, election rigging, and political persecution,
dealing a blow to the efforts of pro-democracy actors. This
trend of Russian interference cannot be expected to diminish in
the coming years. Putin will continue to seek and support like-
minded authoritarian partners who maintain power by suppressing
opposition. Russian disinformation will continue to inflame
political polarization and civil disorder. Countless regional
objectives from climate change mitigation to anti-corruption
will be obstructed in favor of Russian priorities.
Today's hearing will allow us to come together to examine
these steps we can and must take to combat Russian malign
influence in the Western Hemisphere. We are presented with an
opportunity to have an in-depth, constructive conversation on
the impact of Russian overtures to our neighbors in the
Caribbean and in Latin America.
It is my sincere hope that all members here today will
engage in a good-faith effort to further our policy response in
a way that best serves U.S. interests and the principles of our
Nation that we stand for.
Our witnesses have prepared detailed testimony that I
believe will be very valuable to this Subcommittee work.
Once again, I thank you all for being here today, and I
look forward to a productive hearing.
I will now recognize Ranking Member Green for his opening
remarks.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman Sires, my friend from New
Jersey, for holding this important hearing.
And thank you to our witnesses for being with us today.
Today's hearing on Russia's malign influence in the Western
Hemisphere is increasingly pertinent, in light of Putin's
invasion of Ukraine. Since the beginning of the invasion,
Putin's influence has only grown in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Many governments on all sides of the ideologic spectrum
have failed to address Russia's invasion of Ukraine. for
instance, El Salvador was one of the countries that abstained
from a U.N. vote condemning Russia's invasion, and Mexico's
President has consistently telegraphed his neutrality. Worse,
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela shamelessly supported Putin
ahead of the invasion. Even more concerning today, no country
has implemented sanctions against Putin, his cronies, or
Russia's war machine. This is truly disappointing.
One of the ways in which Russia exercises its malign
influence in the region is through its Spanish language version
of Russia Today, also known as RT. This propaganda outlet
operates in almost every Latin American and Caribbean country.
In addition to Moscow-controlled Sputnik News, RT spreads anti-
American disinformation and false flag narratives to justify
Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
Russia has also turned to the region in an effort to dodge
Western sanctions. The U.S. intelligence community's 2022
Annual Threat Assessment States that Russia has, quote,
``Expanded its engagement with Venezuela, supported Cuba, and
used arms sales and energy agreements to try to expand access
to markets and natural resources in Latin America, in part, to
offset some of the effects of sanctions.'' End quote.
Russia has even gone so far as to threaten the possibility
of sending military assets to Latin America, if the United
States and our allies do not halt our assistance to Ukraine.
This is unacceptable.
In its 2022 Posture Statement, SOUTHCOM asserts that Russia
is among the secondary external threats in the Western
Hemisphere, with China being the primary threat. SOUTHCOM
States that Russia, and I quote, ``intensifies this instability
through its ties with Venezuela, entrenchment in Cuba and
Nicaragua, and extensive disinformation operations.'' End
quote.
The oppressive regimes of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua
are, without doubt, the largest sources of instability in the
region, and they all have Russian and Chinese ties. In fact,
the U.S. Commander of NORTHCOM recently revealed that our
neighbor Mexico has the largest number of Russian intelligence
officers.
Meanwhile, our southern border remains wide open. Congress
cannot stand idly by while the Russian and the Chinese regimes
ramp up their malign activities in the region. For too long,
the Western Hemisphere has taken a back seat in U.S. foreign
policy. We have seen the disastrous consequences of this--from
China's debt-trap diplomacy to Taiwan's growing diplomatic
isolation, to Russia's arms sales and military engagement, to
rising instability and surging migration.
The absence if American leadership in our hemisphere has
created a vacuum, and this vacuum has been filled by Russia and
China. Congress must act. The Administration must act.
As a House Armed Services Committee member, I am proud of
securing several of my key priorities in the House-passed
Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA. One of these priorities includes my
amendment requiring a Department of Defense report addressing
Russia's malign activity in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Uncovering these activities will help policymakers better
address them and will shed light on Russia's hostile actions.
As ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, I
introduced a bipartisan piece of legislation, the Western
Hemisphere Nearshoring Act, with the assistance of Chairman
Sires and his staff. This legislation would offer Latin America
and Caribbean countries an alternative to China's debt-trap
diplomacy and Russia's backhanded deals.
By nearshoring manufacturing jobs from China to our
hemisphere, we can reduce our region's dependence on China and
increase economic opportunity. It is a big step toward re-
engaging with our southern neighbors economically, politically,
and diplomatically.
And I want to take a moment and thank the State Department
for their bipartisan assistance in writing this legislation. I
ask all of my colleagues to cosponsor this common-sense
legislation and would respectfully urge Chairman Meeks to
schedule the bill for markup soon.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, it is unthinkable that in a
region where nearly every single country was a signator in the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, we are witnessing so many
democratic partners ignoring Russia's human rights violations.
The charter solidified the region's commitment to democratic
norms and principles. Our partners cannot continue to ignoring
Putin's malign and destabilizing behavior.
Again, I want to deeply thank Chairman Sires for holding
this important hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today.
Thank you and I yield.
Mr. Sires. Dr. Vladimir Rouvinski? Have I got that right?
STATEMENT OF DR. VLADIMIR ROUVINSKI, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR,
INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH CENTER, ICESI UNIVERSITY, CALI,
COLOMBIA
Dr. Rouvinski. Good afternoon, Chairman.
Mr. Sires. Dr. Rouvinski, you have got a lot of stuff here
that is all good. Let me read it here.
Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sires. Dr. Rouvinski is a professor at the Department
of Political Studies and Director of the Laboratory for
Politics and International Relations at Icesi University in
Cali, Colombia, in addition to coordinating the Pacific
Alliance Studies Program.
He graduated from Irkutsk State University in Russia and
earned his PhD from Hiroshima University in Japan. His primary
area of expertise is Russian relations with the nations of
Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to several
publications on the topic, Dr. Rouvinski has also held research
positions at the Wilson Center, Florida International
University, and Georg Eckert Institute in Germany.
Dr. Rouvinski, we welcome you to the hearing. I ask the
witness to please limit your testimony to five minutes.
You are recognized for 5 minutes. Without objection, your
prepared written Statement will be made a part of the record.
Dr. Rouvinski, you are recognized for your testimony
[audio malfunction]. Can you hear me?
Dr. Rouvinski. Yes.
Mr. Sires. Dr. Rouvinski, can you hear me?
Dr. Rouvinski. Yes, I can. Thank you so much.
Mr. Sires. We have a problem with your audio. Can you turn
it on? Is it on? There you go.
Dr. Rouvinski. Yes. Can you hear me?
Mr. Sires. Yes.
Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you so much for this opportunity,
Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, and distinguished members
of the Subcommittee. It is truly a privilege for me to address
you today on the issues related to Russia's engagement in the
Western Hemisphere.
And in today's testimony, I would like to summarize the key
points of my written Statement, and I will focus on the long-
term objectives of Russia in this part of the world, Moscow's
preferred modus operandi, in addition to evaluating the impact
of the war in Ukraine on Russia's relationship with Latin
America. And I will offer some policy recommendations on
mitigating Russia's malign influence in the region.
Let me begin by explaining why Latin America matters to
Russia. Putin's war in Ukraine reconfirmed that Russia's ruling
elites consider the territory of the former Soviet Union as the
most important geographical area for Moscow outside Russia's
borders. At the same time, Moscow views the entire Western
Hemisphere as the U.S. crucial area of security, political,
economic, and social concern. And from this perspective,
Putin's strategy toward Latin America and the Caribbean is
guided mostly by the logic of reciprocity, which has multiple
manifestations in Russia's foreign policy.
First, it is an opportunity for Putin's government to show
that Russia can respond reciprocally to the U.S. support to the
governments that have decided to advance their independent
domestic and foreign policy agenda in Russia's neighboring
countries. That is why, in Latin America, under the rule of
Vladimir Putin, Russia prioritized strengthening political
relations with the former Soviet allies, like Cuba and
Nicaragua, in addition to those regimes in the Western
Hemisphere in which narratives have been openly anti-American,
like Venezuela. For the last 20 years, Russia has been using
various means to support its allies in Latin America--arms
trade; limited, but timely financial assistance; diplomatic
backing in the United Nations and other multilateral forums,
and facilitating sanctions evasion.
Second, another pillar of Russia's Latin American policy is
strategic communication via an extensive network of government-
controlled media outlets, such as RT in Spanish, RT Actualidad,
and Sputnik news agency, Sputnik Mundo, as were mentioned today
already. RT Actualidad and Sputnik Mundo's narratives not only
emphasize the role of Russia as a global player, but they also
always stress that the United States resists the process of
Russia regaining so-called ``due place'' in the international
arena and opposes building a new multipolar order with the
participation of Latin American partners. Moreover, most of the
programs aired by RT misinform viewers regarding the policies
of the United States in Latin America on such sensitive issues
as migration, liberal democracy, and economic and social
issues.
As a result of the implementation of Putin's strategy, as
the war in Ukraine was unfolding, many Latin American leaders
experienced difficulties finding a way to distance themselves
from Russia. The lack of consensus among important Latin
American nations on the Russian war in Ukraine benefited Moscow
by offering the Kremlin an opportunity to claim that the United
States and the Western powers failed to achieve isolation of
Russia in the international arena.
However, at the same time, in many other aspects, I believe
that the continuation of Russia's strategy toward the region is
facing today severe challenges. One of them is the
significantly reduced capacity of Moscow to offer attractive
incentives for foreign trade and economic cooperation for Latin
American countries, including Putin's traditional allies, like
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, because of the war-related
costs and the impact of the economic sanctions on Russia.
The other is the decreasing capacity to continue providing
political backing in the international arena to some Latin
American nations, as well as to engage them in diplomatic
activities, since the government of Vladimir Putin has to cope
with the growing international isolation of Russia itself.
Against this background, I think that the Russian war in
Ukraine's impact on Latin America offers the United States
opportunities. One of them is to review the previous approaches
to deal with the political regimes that serve as Russia's
gateway to the region.
Since Moscow's capacity to provide economic and political
support to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba has significantly
diminished, they may be willing to adopt new strategies in
their bilateral relations with the United States. This is
particularly evident, I believe, in the case of Venezuela,
where a limited U.S. engagement in the energy sector could
become a game-changer and eventually reduce other threats to
security in the region, including illegal drug trafficking and
the refugee crisis.
Besides, the reactivation of the oil sector will likely
alleviate the living conditions of ordinary Venezuelans and
pave the way for a possible power transition in Venezuela.
Similarly, this step would improve U.S. energy security and
directly benefit U.S. companies.
In the case of other Latin American nations, it is
essential to keep in mind that one of the factors that allowed
Russia to advance its Latin American policy is the use of the
narrative of building a new world order, which allegedly could
benefit Latin America, combined with the perception held by
many Latin Americans that the region is no more a priority for
the United States.
In this context, I think that introducing a coordinated
U.S.-Latin American communication strategy emphasizing the
value of shared U.S.-Latin American interests, combined with,
for example, high-level public events, will make it more
difficult for Russia to continue exploiting anti-American
sentiments here.
On top of that, broad information coverage of U.S.-Latin
American cooperation in cybersecurity, countering transnational
organized crime, and offsetting, for example, illegal,
unreported, and unregulated fishing, would help stress the
value of ``having Americans as friends'' for Latin America, for
both elites and ordinary Latin Americans.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the war in
Ukraine showed that the regime of Vladimir Putin seeks not to
help build new world order, but to carry out an expansionist
agenda of Russian contemporary political elites. That is why an
information strategy that aims to challenge the Russian
narrative, combined with public diplomacy and strengthened
civil society, could seize opportunities for successful
disinformation campaigns regularly conducted by Moscow through
their government-controlled media outlets and Russian
embassies.
I thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to share my
views, and I look forward to the questions.
[The prepared statement of dr. Rouvinski follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
I will now introduce Dr. Kimberly Marten. Dr. Marten is a
professor of political science at Barnard College, specializing
in international relations, international security, and Russia.
She is on the faculty and executive committee member of
Columbia's Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and East
European Studies, and Saltzman Institute of War and Peace
Studies.
She holds a degree from Harvard and Stanford and earned the
Marshall Shulman Prize for her 1993 book Engaging the Enemy:
Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation. Her many
publications have analyzed Russia's private military activities
in Africa, Russia-NATO relations, and Russian intelligence
operations under Putin. She is a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, and the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, and is a founding member of PONARS-Eurasia.
Dr. Marten, we welcome you to the hearing.
I ask the witness to please limit your testimony to 5
minutes, and without objection, your prepared written
statements will be made part of the record.
Dr. Marten, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. KIMBERLY MARTEN, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, BARNARD COLLEGE
Dr. Marten. Thank you so much, Chairman Sires.
Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, and distinguished
members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to
testify and to share my analysis of Russia's military and
economic interest and influence in Latin America and the
Caribbean.
My written testimony includes a lot more detailed
information and examples. In the 5 minutes I have here, I will
summarize my overall conclusions and provide my policy
recommendations.
Since 2014, Russia has explicitly tried to undermine U.S.
interest and influence among its Latin American and Caribbean
neighbors in direct payback for Washington's support of
Ukraine. President Putin tries to attract any country that
feels slighted by the United States, while taking advantage of
lingering historical fears about U.S. and Western imperialism.
He also seeks to entangle Russian State security interests with
private commercial deals for us network cronies and cooperates
with global organized crime in doing so.
Yet, Russian efforts in the Western Hemisphere have faced
real limits, including growing competition from China. Russia's
malign activities near U.S. borders and along the sea lanes
that support U.S. defense and commerce must be closely
monitored, but we must not overreact to what is often more
rhetoric than reality. Russia's presence lacks the deep
ideological roots of the cold war Era. Russia has also faced
reputational concerns about its reliability as a partner,
aggravated by its COVID vaccine diplomacy mistakes. Russian
weaknesses provide an opportunity for U.S. diplomacy to chip
away at Russian influence.
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have airports and seaports
that are reliable transit hubs for the Russian military in
Latin America, but their distance from Russia and proximity to
the overwhelming military and intelligence presence of
USSOUTHCOM forces leaves any Russian forces in the region
vulnerable to eavesdropping and harassment.
Despite recent Russian statements promising significant
security cooperation with countries in the region, Moscow's
achievements are limited. It has no permanent military bases
there. It does have two small facilities in Nicaragua, a
counternarcotics training center operated by the Russian
Interior Ministry and a civilian satellite communications
tracking base that may also gather local intelligence against
the United States and its allies. There is also a helicopter
training center that uses flight simulators in Venezuela.
Russia often sends military personnel to the region,
including to support its long-term weapons contracts, leaving
hundreds of Russian military specialists on the ground. Their
presence in Venezuela in 2019 may have helped deter U.S.
intervention against Nicolas Maduro.
Despite a major push to sell new weapons in the region,
Russia has struggled to find buyers. The U.S. and Europe remain
the dominant regional weapons suppliers, and in 2018 the United
States warned its clients they would be cut out of future deals
if they bought weapons from Russia. Only four countries in the
region have received weapons from Russia since 2014 and none
since 2017.
Russia regularly carries out small-scale military and naval
exercises in the region, and Nicaragua's renewal this year of
its annual training plan with Russia raised concerns. But this
has been going on for 10 years; it is not new, and does not
involve any increased Russian presence in the country.
We do know that Russia's military intelligence agency, the
GRU, has a large presence in Mexico, as Chairman Sires
mentioned. This is disturbing because the GRU has led many
malign operations in recent years, including election
interference and assassination campaigns.
Overall, U.S. forces have to prepare for worst-case
scenarios, including some kind of Russian military distraction
campaign in the Western Hemisphere, as the Ukraine war
continues. Putin has certainly surprised the world elsewhere,
but it seems unlikely that he would risk violent escalation
near U.S. borders unless he believed that his regime faced an
immediate existential threat from Washington.
Leaders with authoritarian or leftist populist leanings who
are suspicious of the United States have won democratic
elections, sparking concerns about possible avenues for Russian
influence. Russia has recently gained diplomatic and rhetorical
support from Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, but support for
Russia in each of these countries is shallow and politically
contested. Their economic ties to Moscow are relatively small
and are becoming increasingly inconvenient because of U.S. and
global SWIFT banking sanctions on Russia which have forced them
to find more expensive workarounds.
Given these Russian efforts and their limits, here are my
policy recommendations:
The United States must carefully observe Russian military
activities in the Western Hemisphere and be prepared to react
in the event of escalation.
The United States must stay diplomatically engaged. As of
last week, there are 13 U.S. Ambassadorial posts vacant in the
region.
We can offer democratic States trade and investment
alternatives to Russia, such as encouraging Brazil's adoption
of high-tech alternatives to its fertilizer imports from
Russia.
We can also offer trade and investment incentives to
encourage human rights and democratization efforts among the
region's autocratic regimes, while wooing them away from
Russia, such as recent initiatives to gradually reduce
sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector.
In the end, the United States must avoid overreacting to
Russian rhetoric and recognize that it may be China, not
Russia, that most threatens U.S. leadership in the region in
coming years.
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marten follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Dr. Marten.
I will now introduce Ms. Candace Rondeaux. Ms. Rondeaux is
the director of the Future Frontlines program at the New
America Foundation. She is also a Professor of Practice at the
Center on the Future of War in the School of Politics and
Global Studies at Arizona State University.
Additionally, she lectures on conflict studies at Elliott
School of International Affairs at George Washington University
and serves on Tulane University's Emergency and Security
Studies Advisory Board. She writes regularly for World Politics
Review and the Daily Beast on the intersection of emerging
tech, political violence, and geopolitical competition.
Her previous experience includes working at the U.S.
Institute of Peace, the Office of the U.S. Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and The Washington
Post. She also holds a degree from Sarah Lawrence College, New
York University, and Princeton.
Ms. Rondeaux, we welcome you to the hearing.
I ask the witness, please limit your testimony to 5
minutes, and without objection, your prepared written
statements will be made part of the record.
Ms. Rondeaux, you are recognized for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MS. CANDACE RONDEAUX, DIRECTOR, FUTURE FRONTLINES,
NEW AMERICA
Ms. Rondeaux. Thank you, Chair Sires, Ranking Member Green,
and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for opportunity to
submit my testimony and appear before you today.
A year ago, if you had asked most Americans what they knew
about the Wagner Group and how Russian mercenaries fit into
Russia's military strategy, I think many would probably say
they have no idea. The fact that Russia has deployed
mercenaries to fight its battles abroad is now almost common
knowledge. The Wagner Group's reported involvement in
atrocities in Ukraine, and in recent months elsewhere, has
understandably brought newfound attention to atrocities linked
to Russian mercenaries and operatives in other parts of the
world, where Russia has sought to exert influence in places
like Africa and the Middle East.
However, what is less well-known is that Russian
mercenaries operate much closer to home in Latin America.
Strategically speaking, covert Russian mercenary operations,
real and imagined, are critical for Russia's strategy for
sanctions evasion and for managing the risks of conflict
escalation in places where Russian forces and entities engage
in clear violations of international law.
Their area of operations encompasses any part of the world
where Kremlin-controlled State companies in the fossil fuel,
mining, and arms industries have struck deals with local
governments and warlords. Tactically speaking, Russian
mercenaries run reconnaissance operations; they provide
targeting intelligence, military training, logistical support,
backstop proxy militias, and Russian military missions in key
global hotspots.
In the Western Hemisphere, one of those hotspots is
Venezuela. In 2019, some 400 Russian mercenaries were deployed
to Caracas to provide training and support for the Venezuelan
military.
Not coincidentally, it is also one of the biggest areas of
investment in the world for Rosneft, Russia's leading State-
owned oil company. Rosneft--and by association, the Russian
government--have for years also been one of the largest
guarantors of Venezuelan debt. From 2014 to 2019, Rosneft was
among the biggest stakeholders in joint oil production projects
run by the PDVSA, Venezuela's national oil company.
That changed, however, in April 2020, when Rosneft abruptly
cut its longstanding ties with PDVSA and sold its stake in
Venezuelan oil ventures, due to U.S. sanctions against the
Venezuelan government. At the time, Rosneft announced that it
would be transferring its entire stake to PDVSA, to another
largely unknown Russian State-backed firm known as
Roszarubezhneft.
The new manager manages Russia's distressed Venezuelan
energy assets, Nikolai Rybchuk, happened to be a former
Spetsnaz special forces officer with next to no experience in
the energy industry, but plenty of experience fighting
alongside paramilitaries in places like Angola.
Fast forward to March of this year, a month after Russia's
invasion of Ukraine and only days after the United States and
EU imposed sanctions on Russian oil, it appears Russia's stake
in Venezuelan oil has once again changed hands to another
Russian company called Petromost. Just a quick check of the
information about Petromost company records and archived web
pages reveals that Petromost is actually a front company for
the security arm of Rosneft.
This shell game business is business as usual for Rosneft
and for Russia. Russia has consistently denied that it has
hired guns working in Venezuela and other places in Latin
America and the Western Hemisphere, but deniability is rather
the point of the mythology surrounding the Wagner Group and
Russian mercenaries.
On paper, many of the deals Russia makes with strongmen
like Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro can be traced back to the
owners of Russian front companies who have ties to the Kremlin.
But, in practice, it is Russia's present Vladimir Putin and the
Presidentially appointed heads of State-owned companies like
Rosneft, Rostec, Russia's State arms company, and others, who
reap the benefits of Russian mercenary operations.
The Wagner Group is not a private military security company
in the classic sense, and comparisons with U.S. firms like
Blackwater are a complete misnomer. In fact, the most apt
comparison to the Wagner Group and Russian military networks is
not Blackwater, but Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel.
For decades, the Sinaloa Cartel has operated like a hybrid
terrorist organization--setting up front companies, evading law
enforcement, and killing anyone who is perceived as getting in
the way of the cartel's illicit trade. Like the Sinaloa Cartel,
Russian mercenaries rely on a web of legal and black market
relationships to traffic in illicit goods and trade with
sanctioned companies and individuals, while their chief
financiers in Russia launder the money on those deals.
The only difference between the Sinaloa Cartel and Russian
military contractors is that, while the businesses involved in
Sinaloa are all ostensibly private, in the Russian case they
are nominally private on paper. In the Russian case, security
agencies such as the FSB and GRU, and other organs of the
Russian State, are involved in every aspect of the military
cartels' operations--from recruitment to deployment to the
battlefield.
The United States and EU have sanctioned the Wagner Group
and individuals suspected of being involved in Russian
mercenary operations, but it is not entirely clear what effect
those moves have had on constraining Russia's deployments of
mercenary contingents. More recently, some experts have called
for the United States to designate the Wagner Group as a
foreign terrorist organization, a move that would prohibit
provision of material support to Russian mercenaries going
forward.
Given the lack of substantive and effective policy action
on the problem dealing with Russian mercenaries to date,
designating the Wagner Group a terrorist organization sounds
like a great idea, but one problem is that the Wagner Group
doesn't exist, and that to do so, the United States is going to
need to change its approach and understanding of the threat
posed by Russian mercenary operations.
If the United States wants to get a better handle on this
challenge, it is going to need to do two things: learn the
problem set and right-size the strategy for managing it.
The first step on that path to learning the problem set is
to treat it for what it is: a Russian State-backed, organized
crime cartel that often operates like a terrorist group.
The second step is not that different from the measures we
have seen the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies
take in the past when dealing with organizations like Al-Qaeda
and ISIS, or like the Sinaloa Cartel. With concerted effort,
the shell companies that make up this covert network of Russian
mercenaries and their operatives and clients can also be traced
through bills of lading, customs and trade data, and other open
sources that are publicly available to anyone who cares to
explore them.
To do that, however, the United States will need to
establish the institutional architecture needed for the United
States and its allies to share continual streams of real-time
intelligence on the movements of Russian mercenary operations
and contingents around the world, but particularly in the
Western Hemisphere. It will also mean the U.S. national
security agencies involved in this effort need to be thinking
creatively about broadening information-sharing beyond the
traditional intelligence agency and law enforcement routes.
In the longer term, it will also require high-level
diplomatic efforts to persuade U.S. partners around the world
that Russia's continued ability to evade sanctions and profit
from the illicit provision of embargoed goods and services will
only aid Putin's regime.
To make progress on all of the above, you are going to need
to work hard. And this may seem like a tall order from a
Washington point of view, but it is the only way to get grips
on the problem of Russia's aggression.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rondeaux follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Ms. Rondeaux. Thank you very much.
I will now introduce our final witness, Dr. Evan Ellis. Dr.
Ellis is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, with a focus
on the region's relationships with China and other non-Western
Hemisphere actors, as well as transnational organized crime and
populism in the region.
He has published over 360 works, including five books, and
previously served on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning
Staff, with the responsibility for Latin America and the
Caribbean, as well as the International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement issues.
Dr. Ellis is a senior associate in the Americas Program at
the Center for Strategic & International Studies and has been
awarded the Order of Military Merit Jose Maria Cordova by the
government of Colombia.
Dr. Ellis, we welcome you to the hearing.
And I ask witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5
minutes. Without objection, your prepared written statements
will be made part of the record.
Dr. Ellis, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MR. R. EVAN ELLIS, RESEARCH PROFESSOR, LATIN
AMERICAN STUDIES, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES
INSTITUTE
Mr. Ellis. Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green,
distinguished Subcommittee members, I am honored to share my
analysis with you today. I will summarize my written testimony.
To begin, Russia has demonstrated its intent and its
capability, although limited, to conduct military activities
oriented against the United States and our partners in the
Western Hemisphere. Its key vehicle for doing so has been anti-
U.S. authoritarian regimes; specifically, Venezuela, Nicaragua,
and Cuba.
Recent examples of such Russian threat projection include a
pact to increase military cooperation with Venezuela and
sending a Russian team of snipers to an upcoming military
competition in Venezuela in August. Russia has also supported
Venezuelan forces headed to the State of Apure; provided and
maintained S-300 air defense systems in Venezuela, and sent at
least 100 military trainers and technicians, as well as the
just-mentioned Wagner Group mercenaries to Venezuela.
Russia has also sent its nuclear-capable Tu-160 Backfire
bombers to Venezuela on multiple occasions--in September 2008,
October 2013, and December 2018. It has deployed warships to
Venezuela in 2008, and it has threatened to establish a
military base on La Orchila Island off the coast of Venezuela.
Since 2006, Russia has sold Venezuela $11.4 billion in military
goods.
In Nicaragua, the Ortega regime authorized 230 Russian
troops, as previously mentioned, plus aircraft, ships, and
weapons to operate in the country. As with Venezuela, Russia
has deployed its nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Nicaragua on
multiple occasions.
Russian military aircraft has also repeatedly violated
Colombian airspace from Nicaragua, as well as from Venezuela,
including incursions in October-November 2013, in August 2019,
in April 2020, in July 2020, and again, in April 2021.
Russia has also provided the Ortega dictatorship with an
array of military equipment, including tanks, armored vehicles,
helicopters, fighters, transport aircraft, antiaircraft guns,
patrol craft, and missile boats, among others.
Russia has set up ground stations for its GLONASS satellite
system in Nicaragua's Nejapa Lagoon. It has established a
training facility, as noted, in Managua, which in its first
year alone conducted 12 courses, giving Russia access to 236
security personnel from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, the
Dominican Republic, as well as Nicaragua.
Russia is conducting information warfare activities, as
noted, oriented toward increasing polarization and decreasing
confidence in democratic institutions in the Western
Hemisphere. It is leveraging social media, as noted, such as
Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and WhatsApp, complementing
activities by its State disinformation platforms, Russia Today
and Sputnik. Colombia has accused Russia of attempting to
interfere in its own elections.
Support for Russia by other regimes has also been
troubling. This includes, as is noted, Argentina's Alberto
Fernandez, who offered his country as Putin's gateway into
Latin America, as well as Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who
called NATO's military aid to Ukraine immoral.
Brazil's attempt, recently announced, to purchase, quote,
``as much Russia oil as possible'' undermines United States and
allied efforts to resist Russia's aggression in the Ukraine.
Russia's activities in the region also highlight the
dangers to U.S. strategic interests posed by anti-U.S.
authoritarian regimes close to our homeland. These regimes--
specifically, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba--have served as
Russia's principal enablers for projecting their threats into
the region.
The good news is also noted by my colleagues. It is in the
short term Russia's ability to operate in the hemisphere is
limited by a narrow set of friends and sectors, as well as the
resources Russia is spending in the Ukraine, Western sanctions,
and the damage of Russian behavior, not only to its political
reputation, but also to the appeal of Russia as an arms
provider. Yet, it is important to recall that these limits are
temporary.
Russia's commercial interaction, of course, with the region
is minimal. These focus on its agricultural purchases and sales
if nitrate-based fertilizer, as well as petroleum activities,
although Russia also has some activities in mining, nuclear
construction, and space sectors.
Military sales and interactions remain Russia's most
important engagement tool, including with U.S. partners such as
Peru, Brazil, and Mexico. These partners have Russian equipment
in inventory, institutional relationships, and may, frankly, be
open to deepening those relationships with possible near-term
changes to our partners' political direction.
The detailed recommendations that I provide in my written
testimony I would summarize as follows:
No. 1, heightened intelligence to identify and preempt
near-term Russian moves in the region. Importantly, SOUTHCOM is
often the last in line in the allocation of such resources.
Two, enhanced containment of entrenched anti-U.S. regimes
through, first of all, sustained sanctions and, second,
enhanced security support to the neighbors threatened by them;
specifically, Colombia, Guyana, and Costa Rica, among others.
Third, helping democrats within at-risk regimes across the
hemisphere to succeed in order to avoid the occurrence of more
anti-U.S. regimes which would host Russian aggression. Doing so
requires resources, in which I would call out the possibility
of nearshoring and Representative Green's nearshoring bill, as
well as attention and better fact-based messaging on the
perils, not only of engaging with Russia, but as well as
authoritarian populism.
Additional resources, regulatory flexibility for U.S.
defense engagement in the region, and finally, a public
strategy for responding to Russia, as well as other challenges
in the hemisphere.
Thank you and the committee for your time today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ellis follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Dr. Ellis.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes to begin asking
questions.
Dr. Rouvinski, you outlined the growth of Russian influence
across the region, but I would like to discuss Nicaragua first.
I was proud to sponsor the RENACER Act, which requires a public
report on purchases and agreements entered into by the
Nicaraguan government related to the military and intelligence
sector. Unfortunately, this report has not been released,
despite Daniel Ortega demonstrated openness to military
cooperation with Russia.
In each of your views, are we doing enough? Are we
prioritizing enough what is going with Russia in some of these
countries? Is there more that the U.S. Government can do? Can
anybody talk a little about that. Dr. Rouvinski, what else can
we do to stop this?
Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much, Chairman, for your
comments and for sharing your view.
I think the United States has a window of opportunities
now, precisely because of some of the factors that we have been
discussing with my colleagues because of the limited capacity
that Russia has now.
And I believe, in the case of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega did
not recognize these two separate republics in Ukraine, Donetsk
and Luhansk, and this is very different from what he did back
in 2008, when he was the first one to recognize Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, two separate republics in Georgia, and did
actually a great help to Vladimir Putin because nobody
supported Russia back then.
He did not do this at this time, and I think one of the
reasons is because Daniel Ortega became accustomed to be
rewarded by Russia for doing such kind of things. And Russia
has very limited capacities now. From this perspective, I think
the renewable of the permission for the Russian groups to
arrive in Nicaragua is actually a signal that Daniel Ortega is
sending to Moscow, expecting that he might be rewarded for
doing this.
So, once again, I think there is a window of opportunity
for the United States perhaps to see if these diminishing
capacities of Russia will provide new opportunities to review
the policy toward these allies of Vladimir Putin. Because they
definitely are well aware that Russia has very, very diminished
opportunities now.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Can anyone else answer that? Dr. Ellis?
Mr. Ellis. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So, for me, three key points.
No. 1, I think Nicaragua and the RENACER Act, as well as
our response to Venezuela, emphasizes the value of containment.
I think there are situations in which we may not be able to
introduce near-term change to authoritarian regimes. However,
there is still a value in containing them because that
restricts their ability to engage with Russia and other threat
actors.
I think No. 2 is recognizing the importance of supporting
the neighbors that are threatened--again, in the case of
Nicaragua, realizing the burden that Costa Rica is bearing.
And I think No. 3 is just recognizing the very dire straits
that a number of countries in the region are in, doubling down
to provide democratic solutions to allow regimes in the region
to avoid radicalization and authoritarian paths which would
proliferate the types of regimes that we do not like to see in
Nicaragua, in Venezuela, and elsewhere.
Mr. Sires. Anyone else?
[No response.]
One of the things that really burns me up about Nicaragua
is the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, the amount of
money that they gave Nicaragua just over the
[inaudible] after in Nicaragua where all those people have
been in jail, and we are
[audio malfunction] against them. And yet, the IMF gave
them something like $340 million just before the election.
Obviously, I do not know if they keep track of the money, but I
wish they would say where the money went to, because that is
just not acceptable, since we are one of the biggest
contributors to the IMF in terms of money that we give the IMF.
Now, Ranking Member Green is recognized for questions.
Congressman Green, you are recognized.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I really want to say, first off, to all of our witnesses
today, this has just been fantastic testimony, and I thank each
of you for what you shared. I looked at your written statements
prior. They are detailed. I just am very grateful for your
efforts today.
In March 2022, General Glen VanHerck, the Commander of
NORTHCOM, testified before the Senate that Mexico is among the
top countries worldwide with regard to the number of Russian
intel guys--basically, spies--operating in its territory. How
should the United States view these activities in respect to
our relationship with Mexico and Russia's relationship with
Mexico? And I throw that out there to anyone. Perhaps, Mr.
Ellis, yes, please.
Mr. Ellis. Yes, Ranking Member Green, thank you very much.
I think, first of all, of course, this is something that
has historically been the case all the way back to the cold
war, the presence of Russian intelligence operatives, Soviet
operatives, in Mexico, but it certainly illustrates Russia's
recognition of the strategic value of Mexico that close to the
U.S. border.
I think it also illustrates, you know, without implicating
any Mexican knowledge or collusion in this, first, the
difficult foreign policy, and we have seen an increasing turn
to the left, not only with AMLO, but also before Mr. Obrador,
as well as some of the very real concerns of activity by a
variety of different groups, especially the expanding power of
Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generacion and other cartels.
There is really just a sea of opportunity for Russian
illicit actors, as well as others, to swim in desperately close
to our U.S. shore. And I certainly welcome more attention to
where things are at with the governability of the Mexican
regime and its relationship and the posture of AMLO toward the
United States, and the importance of our cooperation on
security affairs that directly affect the United States through
ties of economic, migration, family, and security.
Mr. Green. Yes, sir, go ahead.
Dr. Rouvinski. I agree with Dr. Evan Ellis about the
importance of paying closer attention to this kind of
activities. I am afraid many Latin Americans, Latin American
governments, have been reluctant to pay sufficient attention to
what Russia's intelligence services have been doing this part
of the world.
For example, in Colombia, they eventually managed to
identify some of these activities, intelligence activities, but
until then, Russian diplomats--better to say Russian
intelligence officials--were using the cover of diplomatic
posts while almost openly doing such kind of activities
everywhere.
And it is also very important to take into consideration
the difference, for example, to European countries in Latin
America Russian diplomatic posts, and Russia has stable
diplomatic relations with all Latin American and Caribbean
countries and they have embassies and consulates throughout the
entire region. So, these diplomatic posts have been, actually,
doing a lot of things that do not exactly correspond to what
the diplomatic activities are. They have been involved in
intelligence. They have been involved in disinformation,
especially taking into account the fact that in some of the
countries the access to RT Actualidad and Sputnik News had been
reduced. So, they now reinforce their diplomatic posts to
continue this disinformation campaign. So, I think it is
important to pay attention to this.
Thank you.
Mr. Green. So, maybe perhaps in writing, if the two of you
would send what you think our recommended actions should be,
that would be helpful. And I will let you respond in writing to
my office, and we will get that into the record.
Real quickly, because I am almost out of time--anyone can
take this question on--I am a little concerned about Russia is
doing in Nicaragua with the global positioning system, the
observation satellite. Can someone address that briefly?
Perhaps Dr. Ellis?
Mr. Ellis. Well, while it is a legitimate facility to
relate to GLONASS, it also creates other electronic capture
opportunities and opportunities for Russian space personnel
with Nicaraguans to operate in the region for other purposes.
And so, even though it is legitimate, it does open up the door
for certain risks, especially ELINT type of risks.
Mr. Green. It is an ISR platform, is basically what you are
saying?
Mr. Ellis. For capture, as well as for the personnel that
allows it to work in the region under the cover of that
facility.
Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time, but I know Ms.
Marten wanted to answer that. Is it OK if she does?
You are muted, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sires. How is that?
You are recognized.
Mr. Green. Go ahead, Ms. Marten
Dr. Marten. Thank you.
I would just agree with what the previous speaker said and
add that the Nicaraguan facility is different from the
Brazilian facilities, which are open to use by scientists. The
one in Nicaragua is closed. It probably is engaged in local
spying activity from the installation, as well as things that
are related to space-based intelligence collection, just
because it is dominated by Russia in an area that is very close
to the U.S. embassy.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Now, I recognize Congressman Levin.
Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I really
appreciate it.
And I want to echo Congressman Green's comments about the
terrific testimony here, and I want to thank everybody for
participating, and you and Ranking Member Green for holding the
hearing in the first place.
It is critical that we better understand how Russia is
influencing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as we
seek to pursue policies that enable democratization, equity,
stability, and justice globally.
Dr. Rouvinski, your testimony suggested that Russia's war
in Ukraine and its aftermath provides strategic openings to
limit Russian influence in several Latin American countries
that have historically close ties with Russia.
In 2019, the Government Accountability Office issued a
report on the impacts of sanctions in Venezuela in a response
to a request by the House Foreign Affairs Committee and me. The
report found that, among other things, Venezuela's economy
deteriorated steadily for nearly a decade and that decline
worsened after the United States levied new sanctions in 2015.
In what ways would increased diplomacy with Venezuela and
easing sanctions drive a wedge between Russia and Venezuela?
Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much for the question.
I think, first of all, it is important to take into
consideration that Venezuela has been Russia's most important
gateway to Latin America. The Chavista regime provided Russia
with plenty of opportunities to engage all other nations as
well here in this part of the world.
But I think, for the regime of Nicolas Maduro now, the
opportunities that were provided by Russia, first of all, back
in Venezuela and international organizations; second, to help
to avoid the U.S. sanctions and, basically, acting as a
middleman. They now cease to exist because of the difficulties
experienced by Russia itself.
So, I think, from this perspective, there is an opportunity
that the adjusted policy that may allow, of course, not to
recognize Nicolas Maduro as a legitimate president because he
doesn't have any legitimacy; this is the authoritarian regime,
but it may help to make the conditions for ordinary Venezuelans
a little bit easier and, also, perhaps also to stop any
possibilities for Russia to further engagement, which, again,
are quite limited.
And the last, but not least important, I think it is
necessary to take into account the changes in many other Latin
American nations. We have a new government here in Colombia
that is most likely to change its policy toward Venezuela. So,
I think the United States has to take into account these
changes and elaborate a new approach to the----
Mr. Levin. Good. Yes, sounds so wise.
Dr. Marten, your testimony notes that Russia's influence in
the region exists, but is limited, and that there are steps the
United States can and should take to further counter Russian
influence, such as increasing diplomatic ties and filling
Ambassadorial posts.
When the United States hosted the Summit of the Americas, I
joined my colleagues in writing a letter to the Biden
Administration urging that the summit be inclusive of countries
like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, noting that the summit was
a moment for the region to come together to address Russia's
war in Ukraine, among other global challenges.
Do you think our continued isolation of these countries
helps to maintain Russia's influence over them, and how might
lifting the embargo or restaffing the embassy in Cuba, for
example, benefit the U.S. interests of keeping Russian
influence at bay?
Dr. Marten. Thank you very much for that question.
I think it is not only Russian influence that we have to be
concerned about, but Chinese influence.
Mr. Levin. Right.
Dr. Marten. And the evidence is, in recent years, China is
gaining more influence in both Cuba and Venezuela, for example.
And so, it is both that we have to worry about.
Just on the question of Venezuela, in particular,
Venezuela, now its assets that are located in Russia it cannot
access. And so, that means that it has lost things there. And
there is evidence that Venezuelan oil is now a competitor
against Russian oil in Asia, as Russian oil has turned away
from the European market. And so, those are just some ways
where economics matters in terms of what is happening.
But I would just point out that, in each of these cases,
the real personal ties between these leaders and Putin are
relatively weak. They are really for political motives and for
economic motives, not for deep ideological motives. And that
means that, if we have the opportunity to exchange economic
benefits for movement toward democratization and away from
human rights problems in these countries, we should seize the
moment when Russia is so disabled to have an effort to really
win back some of the influence that we had in the region before
Russia became so involved in past years, especially around 5 to
10 years ago.
Mr. Levin. And that would help with China, too.
OK, my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to the
witnesses very, very much. I yield back.
Mr. Sires. Congressman Pfluger, you are recognized.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing me
and for holding this hearing.
In recent years, we have seen China and Russia rapidly
expand their influence throughout Latin America. Russia has
propped up authoritarian regimes both in Venezuela and Cuba,
and obviously, the PRC has been discussed on this particular
hearing. The Belt and Road Initiative has been used to expand
their aspirations, the Chinese aspirations, of undercutting our
own national security initiatives and economic interests in
this region.
And I completely agree with Ranking Member Green and
appreciate the bipartisan nature of the nearshoring efforts.
But when you look at the brazen display of soft power by both
countries, I think it should alarm every single member of this
committee and should be the sense of Congress that we do take
every action possible.
The steps I have taken recently to address the malign
influence of Russia is working with Representative Panetta on
introducing legislation that would require the DOD to examine
in great detail how Russia is using PMCs across the globe to
achieve their strategic objectives, and the direct or indirect
threats that Russian PMCs present to our interest in
identifying whether or not sanctions on these groups are
actually impeding or having a positive effect on deterring
their behavior.
I am proud to see that this legislation has made its way
through the NDAA and was passed in the House version. I hope it
is included in the Conference Report this year. But this
information is going to be vital to understanding these
emerging threats.
I will start with Dr. Ellis. Thank you for your service and
thank you to all the witnesses today.
Dr. Ellis, how would you characterize the Russian PMC
activities and their objectives in Latin America and the
Caribbean?
Mr. Ellis. Sir, first of all, thank you for the question. I
am a U.S. Army civilian.
But, across the board, I see a variety of different
companies. When we talk about the Wagner Group companies,
obviously, I think there is a mixture of support for private
interest to oligarchs that my colleague had mentioned, as well
as support to strategic objectives, oftentimes, when Russia
wants to avoid directly committing military forces, and yet, at
the same time, we see that Russia has also directly committed
military forces in places like Venezuela.
So, you know, the thing that I think is also important to
recognize is there is a synergy that was alluded to between
Chinese activity and Russian that I think it is important for
the committee to recognize. Specifically, that China oftentimes
does not want to be tainted with anti-U.S. activities or the
anti-U.S. work of the regimes. And yet, Chinese money, in
pursuit of its own interests, enables those regimes to survive.
It lent over $64 billion to Venezuela, over $13 billion to
Ecuador under Rafael Correa, et cetera, et cetera.
But then, in turn, that has given those regimes the open
door to engage with Russia in ways directly threatening the
United States. China, then, benefits from those threats without
being tainted by that. So, I think it is important to
understand the synergies between the Chinese and the Russian
threats, as well as the direct Russian activities, both
directly military and through Wagner Group and other companies
such as that.
Mr. Pfluger. Well, thank you for that. And that is very
disturbing, as we look at those synergies, to see this axis
forming where it is right at our doorstep, and we have to
compete with it.
Let me just open it up here, because I know that you all
have kind of talked about some of the military activities. And
my question was originally going to be focused on Russia, but
because of this synergy discussion here, which I think is
great, I will open it up to anybody. But do you guys see an
escalation of sorts happening in Latin America because of the
involvement of the United States and our allies with Ukraine?
And specifically, with regards to military activity or more
equipment, just more activity in general?
Yes, go ahead.
Ms. Rondeaux. Thank you, Representative Pfluger.
I wanted to comment on your question earlier as well
regarding PMCs and their activity in Latin America. It is
encouraging to hear that there is legislation pending calling
for the DOD to do more research, do more work, to understand
how these networks operate.
I just would also add, it would be probably pretty useful
for other civilian agencies to engage, simply because they have
a set of capacities that may not be available to the DOD, or
there may be some limitations in terms of the kinds of research
that can be done openly on certain DOD systems. So, I just want
to put that out there.
There has been a lot of discussion today in this
conversation, and in conversations that we have recently had in
other contexts in Congress, about what to do about Russia's
malign influence vis-a-vis PMCs generally. And I would say one
thing that I think is overlooked, when we talk about more need
for more intelligence, is the fact that today we have a real
deficit in our intelligence agencies in terms of the Russia
specialists. People who speak Russian, who understand the
region, who understand the military-industrial complex are
dwindling. And that capability, the anemia within the
interagency vis-a-vis our understanding of Russia generally has
been one reason why we find ourselves now, 8 years on, in a
situation where there is a serious crisis in terms of
containing the threat from Russia in not just Ukraine, but
other parts of the world. So, I just wanted to make that
comment.
Mr. Pfluger. Thank you so much.
Unfortunately, my round has expired on this round of
questioning, but I do represent Goodfellow Air Force Base,
which is the DOD's largest intelligence training base. So, I am
going to take this back directly to the base as an opportunity.
And I appreciate all the witnesses.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sires. Congressman Castro, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony
today.
And before I begin with my questions, I want to emphasize
that, as we discuss Russia, and to a larger extent, China's
influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, that we also keep
in mind the role the United States should play in strengthening
our relationships, our own relationship, with countries in the
region. And our engagement cannot and should not be solely
reactive. In fact, if you look back on history, when we have
been only reactive, usually, we have made poor decisions.
And so, our engagement has to be sustained. It has to be
cooperative and collaborative. Countries in Latin America and
the Caribbean will continue partner with Russia and China if
there is no better alternative that the United States is
offering to them. The United States must work to become the
better partner, the better choice, for assistance and support,
especially during these difficult times.
And with that context in mind, I want to direct my first
question to two witnesses, Dr. Marten and Dr. Rouvinski. The
Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to unprecedented inflation
around the world--with rising food and energy prices
particularly impacting Latin America, as seen by recent
protests. In response to the economic recession of COVID-19 and
the invasion of Ukraine, recent elections in the region point
to increasing frustration and anti-incumbency sentiments, as
demonstrated by Chile, Colombia, and Honduras.
So, my question is, my first question, how can the United
States engage with these countries, particularly new
Administrations, to make us a preferred partner in recovery
from economic fallout from the war and COVID-19?
Dr. Marten. Thank you so much for the question. Oh, sorry.
Mr. Castro. Please, please.
Dr. Marten. Oh, OK. Thank you so much for the question.
One thing that I would say that we could do that is
different from what Russia is able to do, and from what China
is able to do, is to focus on high-tech questions that will
simultaneously serve our objections in trying to limit climate
change or to mitigate climate change. And one of those examples
we are seeing in Brazil right now, which is very much dependent
on Russian fertilizer, is an effort to get away from
traditional fertilizer use by thinking of high-tech
alternatives. And that is something where Silicon Valley would
really have an advantage over both Russia and China.
And so, I think the more that we can be creative in our
thinking and look to our own strengths, the more possibilities
that we might have.
Mr. Castro. All right. Please.
Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you so much for this question.
I think in Latin America, if we see the numbers, still,
there is a lot of people who like to see the United States
engage with Latin America. The numbers, actually, that Russia
and China operate, or we see the support for Russia and China
in Latin America, are much smaller.
And I think the United States has all the opportunities,
first of all, to show that actually Latin America and the
United States have many, many common interests. I think the
United States somewhat fails in comparison with the strategic
communication advanced by Russia because there are many things
happening. There is a lot of good stuff happening between the
United States and Latin America, but, simply, this kind of
information does not reach many Latin Americans. It is absent
in the media.
So, I think if the United States, in cooperation with Latin
American partners, can design, or at least to strengthen, the
existing opportunities, it will help a lot to show that,
actually, there is much more that unites Latin America and the
Caribbean and the United States than divides them. I think this
is the most important.
Thank you.
Mr. Castro. Well, thank you. And as a followup to that----
Dr. Rouvinski. Yes?
Mr. Castro [continuing]. I would love to know your thoughts
as well on role of vaccine diplomacy, or so-called vaccine
diplomacy, given that a large number of countries in Latin
America have been mainly distributing Russia's Sputnik V and
Sputnik Light vaccines.
Please, I have only got about 35 seconds left. Please.
Dr. Marten. Yes. Russia really failed in the opportunity it
had with the Sputnik V vaccine because it, first, had delivery
delays, and then, it failed to get World Health Organization
approval for its vaccine because it was not able to provide the
scientific backup concerning its safety and effectiveness.
And so, I think that that was a real opportunity that the
United States maybe could have done more on, and that we
certainly can do more on now, by working on our own strengths
in international health issues and international vaccine
issues, to show that we are a good partner.
Mr. Castro. Well, thank you.
With that, my time is up, and, Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman.
Congressman Vargas, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the opportunity to speak here. I hope you can hear me and see
me.
One of the things that I found interesting--first of all, I
want to thank all the witnesses. I, too, was very impressed
with their testimony today, both written and oral.
One of the things I learned is the limited capacity of
Russia in the area. So, I went ahead and took a look, as you
were speaking, to the GDP of these countries. So, the USA,
according to the World Bank, in 2022, our GDP will be about
$20.94 trillion. Russia's GDP will be $1.483 trillion. China's
will be $14.72 trillion. Now, obviously, we have a lot of
capacity. We have a lot of ability because of the size of our
economy and the influence that we do have and should have.
Now, with us trying to contain Russia, as I think we
should, there is a lot more that we can do in Latin America,
and that we should be doing. So, I will ask, again, following
what Mr. Castro said, I agree with him that there is so much
more.
Dr. Marten, what else can we do? I mean, one of the things
that did annoy me, just to be frank, every vaccine that we had
for COVID should have had the American flag on it. We should
have had the American flag, and everyone should have known, you
know, when we send a vaccine out, that that is coming from the
United States of America; we are your friends. I think we blew
it in that. I think we were right, you know, to be generous in
it, but I think we blew it in not putting our flag on it. But
what else can we do?
Dr. Marten. Thank you for the question.
I think it would be important to make sure that all of our
leading diplomatic roles in the region are filled, because I
think Ambassadors have a unique role in being able to help
business people from the United States in their efforts to make
inroads in new places and new sectors. And I think it sends a
message that the United States cares about those countries and
is making them a priority. And so, I think the more that our
diplomatic representatives can work with U.S. businesses to
create new opportunities, the more chance we will have of
replacing the Russian influence.
Mr. Vargas. I have to say, one of the things that I think
that we do do well is we send our young people. My 18-year-old
daughter just graduated from high school, and she is with
Amigos de las Americas. She is in Latin America right now. It
is her second year doing this. My older daughter did it for 5
years all throughout Latin America, and they love us. I mean,
they cannot get enough of these young kids and, you know, the
spirit that they bring of America.
And I think that there is so much more that we can do, and
we should do. I mean, I think that most countries are anxious.
But, yes, go ahead, Dr. Marten. Your hand was up.
Dr. Marten. Just really quickly, Russia has really failed
in that because it has been withdrawing its young people from
the West. And so, I think you are absolutely right that the
presence of our young people in different countries is
something that is really an unofficial Ambassador role that is
important.
Mr. Vargas. Yes, I think we should encourage that and do
more of that.
You know, again, one of the things that concerns me is
China. I do see--and I travel around Latin America quite a bit
myself--China is very involved in Latin America, and they do
have resources. As I noted, their economy is big and they are
investing. I mean, obviously, they create the debt trap and
they do all sorts of other nefarious things, but they do have
the capacity to be there.
I have to say, too, it seems from this Ukrainian war, which
is such a criminal act, that the Russians are also very
incompetent. I mean, they are showing their incompetence here
and their backwardness, even in the way they fight.
So, obviously, I think it is a good idea that we focus on
them, but not to lose the focus on China, because I think China
is doing even more nefarious things.
I do not know; does anyone have a comment on that?
Yes, Doctor, I see your hand up. Mr. Ellis, I believe. Dr.
Ellis?
Mr. Ellis. Yes, sir. Thank you. And I think I want to pull
together some very important threads that you brought up.
No. 1, that Russia, because of its lack of resources,
really is not going to be able to come substantially to the aid
of its close partners that are looking to it--Venezuela, Cuba,
Nicaragua. As a matter of fact, Latin America only exported
about $6 billion to Russia last year by comparison to over $140
billion to China. So, Latin America will, clearly, look much
more to China as a market and for resources.
What that means is that Russia only has two options. One is
that its ability to act in the region will probably center more
around threats, which is why I focused on the intelligence to
projecting short-term, limited threats designed against the
United States.
But, No. 2, those, basically, anti-U.S. regimes will be
driven to focus more on China for those resources, and we have
to give them options against doing that.
And then, finally, there is a whole basket of regimes
because of COVID-19, as well as the inflationary effects of
Russia's Ukrainian invasion, that are facing severe fiscal
constraints and the inability to cover at-risk populations. And
so, my big concern is that many of those States which may be
left or right, but are still, basically, democratic, that we
help to ensure that those struggles that are going on in places
like Peru, or where things are going with Chile, potentially,
later in the year with the Boric Administration, et cetera, or
where things could go with Colombia--to make sure that those
States, that we help them to succeed economically through
things like investment, through things like nearshoring,
through things like fiscal support, to help them avoid that
anti-U.S. path that comes from radicalization, which will
proliferate the problems that we face. And to me, in that way,
our economic engagement helps keep China at bay, as well as
keeping Russia at bay.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
My time has expired, and I appreciate you very much. I
yield back, sir.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Congressman Vargas.
I have a question before I do the closing. And if any other
members wish to ask a second question, please feel free to do
so.
My question is this: I would love to hear a comment
[audio malfunction].
Mr. Vargas. We lost the chairman for a second here.
Mr. Sires. Well----
Mr. Vargas. OK, I wanted to make sure.
Mr. Sires. Well, wait a second.
It is notable that countries where Russia has the most
influence have the worst human rights records, from political
imprisonments to attacks on independent journalists to shutting
down humanitarian NGOs.
I look at, specifically, with respect to Cuba, the
[inaudible] Administration
[inaudible]. The Cuban government is
[audio malfunction].
Excuse me? Oh, my video is
[inaudible]. Did you hear the question? Can you just nod if
you heard the question? I guess not. Hello? Can you just raise
your hand if you can hear me? Can you hear me? Oh, I do not
like this. Can anybody hear me? Can you hear me?
Mr. Price. Congressman, can you repeat the question,
potentially, for the witnesses?
Mr. Sires. Well, how do we get it back?
Mr. Price. Sorry for the delay, everyone, to check issues.
Mr. Sires. Can you hear me?
Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, we hear you seldomly. You break
up almost all the time. It is very, very difficult to hear.
Ever so often, a word or two, but not strung together in any
sort of syntax that think anybody can understand.
Mr. Sires. Well, I can hear clearly. Can you hear me
clearly now? Yes. All right. We will try this again.
It is notable to me that the countries where Russia has the
most influence have the worst human rights records--from
political imprisonment to attacks on independent journalists,
to shutting down humanitarian NGO's. Just recently, Cuba had a
demonstration where people went to the streets. They are giving
kids 10 years' prison for demonstrating.
How do we inform other countries that this is what Russia
really offers? How do we do that? I mean, you have got to be
blind not to see what Russia offers. They have really nothing
but, you know, devastation to offer.
Can each of you in order just say a little bit of something
about it before we close? Candace----
Ms. Rondeaux. Thank you, Chair Sires. I will just briefly
comment.
All of this testimony today has, I think, provoked a lot of
thinking about what is needed to resource the effort to combat
Russia's influence in Latin America and other parts of the
world. And I think, again, I would just repeat that investment
in the architecture, the institutional architecture, in order
to support that effort is going to be very key, not just the
engagement piece and all the kind of tactical and strategic
things that have been described by my colleagues here.
Clearly, during the cold war, there was an enormous amount
of investment in education of specialists in Russian affairs,
as well as specialists who could be sort of a bridge between
specialists in the area of military security affairs and, also,
diplomacy in all kinds of regions of the world, including in
Latin America.
I would note that, also, during the cold war, Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty were extremely important in
influencing outcomes in Eastern Europe and Europe writ large
for sure. We do not see anything comparable to that today in
terms of investment in the infrastructure needed to actually
have influence over these outcomes. Particularly in the Western
Hemisphere, there is no comparable body like RFE or RL. And I
think that that certainly is a deficit that probably should be
addressed relatively soon, if you want to get to grips with the
disinformation campaign and the ways in which RT and Sputnik
are managing to influence opinion in the area.
But I would just repeat again, it is all nice and well and
good to name all the different things that need to be done, but
you have to have the people and the resources to do it. And
right now it is not there.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Dr. Marten, can you comment on that?
Dr. Marten. I agree with Candace Rondeaux completely. I
have noticed the deficit of funding for people who specialize
in Russian studies. And also, what we really need to do is tell
people in Spanish and Portugese language broadcasts exactly
what Putin and his regime have done in terms of their
corruption and their violence. And so, I agree completely that
what we need to do is answer back.
And let me just add one more thing from a previous
question, the question about whether sanctions against the
Wagner Group work. I think they do. I think they limit the
geographic regions where Wagner can be deployed. And as Candace
Rondeaux has noted in her previous work, there are people who
are employed by Wagner who are also employed by Rosneft, the
oil industry, but they are different people. They are doing
different things, and Wagner is much worse than Rosneft. And
so, I think by having sanctions against Wagner, we are limiting
the really nefarious actions of Russia. I am more familiar with
Africa, obviously, than Latin America, but I think it applies
there as well.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Dr. Ellis?
Mr. Ellis. Yes. So, first of all, I think, in general, most
of the States that are siding strongly with Russia--Venezuela,
Nicaragua, et cetera--as you pointed out, themselves do not
have free presses and are notable violators. I think the States
that we find in the middle--Brazil, Argentina--we have options
to encourage more the thinking about democracy.
But, in addition to the fact that I think we need more
forceful not only resources, but a communications strategy that
would come from the State Department and public diplomacy from
GFC and other entities like that.
But I think, in addition to that, we need to rebuild the
messaging: you know, what is the value of a democracy? What is
the value of free markets? And to get our own partners in the
region to be repeating it. I mean, to me, it was a shame that
at the Summit of the Americas this idea of, you know, we are no
longer just a--we started out as a club of democracies, but we
lost the idea. It is a club; you get to show up just because
you are in the hemisphere. And so, we need to get our partners
to be willing to stand up for democracy because they believe
that there is value in it for them, as a way to develop and
have benefit for their societies. And we need to seek people in
Latin America to seek that clear benefit as well.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Dr. Rouvinski?
Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much.
We completely agree with my colleagues today, but I would
like to add just two specific points.
I think one of the ways to expose the nature of Russia's
authoritarian regime, and severe violation of human rights
committed by Russia, not only in Ukraine, but also in Russia
itself, is through investigative journalism. The investigative
journalism has been very effective in Europe, for example, to
exposing the corruption, the other wrongdoings by those regimes
that are friendly to Russia. And we do know there has been very
important academic research on this topic in Latin America, but
there has been no investigative journalists' reports on that
kind of relations between Russia and those regimes.
And last, but not least, civil society. This is very
important, the support of the civil society in democratic
countries of Latin America that actually are the key allies for
the democratic forces in this part of the world.
Thank you.
Mr. Sires. This has been a very informative hearing, and I
thank the witnesses for your comments. I really enjoyed this
hearing.
And I want to thank my colleagues that joined us for this
important hearing.
And now, we will go to closing, and thank you again to our
witnesses and the members for joining us on this important
hearing.
Over the last decade, Putin has sought to increase his
influence in the Western Hemisphere through a variety of
techniques, including arms sales, trade, and propaganda. By
remaining engaged with our neighbors in the region, we can
counter that influence.
Today's hearing should be just one part of a comprehensive
strategy to protect U.S. interests and support principles that
now we all value. I look forward to working with my colleagues
to build on the discussion that we had today with
[audio malfunction].
The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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OPENING STATEMENT FROM CHAIRMAN SIRES
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