[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                   RUSSIA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE:
 ASSESSING PUTIN'S MALIGN INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                 WESTERN HEMISPHERE, CIVILIAN SECURITY,
              MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                             July 20, 2022
                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-134
                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
        
              [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]        
        

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 
                       or http://www.govinfo.gov
                       
                              ___________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
48-797PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                       
                       
                      
                      
                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                  GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York, Chairman

BRAD SHERMAN, California             MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Ranking 
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey                  Member
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia	     CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida	     STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
KAREN BASS, California		     SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts	     DARRELL ISSA, California
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island	     ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
AMI BERA, California		     LEE ZELDIN, New York
JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas		     ANN WAGNER, Missouri
DINA TITUS, Nevada		     BRIAN MAST, Florida
TED LIEU, California		     BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania	     KEN BUCK, Colorado
DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota	     TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee
ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota		     MARK GREEN, Tennessee
COLIN ALLRED, Texas		     ANDY BARR, Kentucky
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan		     GREG STEUBE, Florida
ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia	     DAN MEUSER, Pennsylvania
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania	     AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey	     PETER MEIJER, Michigan
ANDY KIM, New Jersey		     NICOLE MALLIOTAKIS, New York
SARA JACOBS, California		     RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KATHY MANNING, North Carolina	     YOUNG KIM, California
JIM COSTA, California		     MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida
JUAN VARGAS, California		     JOE WILSON, South Carolina
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas
BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois

                                                                          
                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

               Brendan Shields, Republican Staff Director
                                 ------                                

 Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and 
                     International Economic Policy

                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey, Chairman

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas                MARK GREEN, Tennessee, Ranking 
ANDY LEVIN, Michigan                     Member
VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas		     AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
JUAN VARGAS, California		     MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida

                                     
                                     
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Rouvinski, Dr. Vladimir, Professor and Director, 
  Interdisciplinary Research Center, Icesi University, Cali, 
  Colombia.......................................................     8
Marten, Dr. Kimberly, Professor of Political Science, Barnard 
  College........................................................    18
Rondeaux, Ms. Candace, Director, Future Frontlines, New America..    35
Ellis, Mr. R. Evan, Research Professor, Latin American Studies, 
  U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute..............    43

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    75
Hearing Minutes..................................................    76
Hearing Attendance...............................................    77

                           OPENING STATEMENT

Opening statement for the record from CHairman Sires.............    78

 
                   RUSSIA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE:
 ASSESSING PUTIN'S MALIGN INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

                        Wednesday, July 20, 2022

                          House of Representatives,
                Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
                   Civilian Security, Migration and
                      International Economic Policy
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:36 p.m., via 
Webex, Hon. Albio Sires (chairman of the subcommittee) 
presiding.
    Mr. Sires [presiding]. Good afternoon, everyone.
    Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and for 
your patience.
    This hearing entitled, ``Russia in the Western Hemisphere: 
Assessing Putin's Malign Influence in Latin America and in the 
Caribbean'' will come to order.
    Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a 
recess of the committee at any point.
    And all members will have 5 days to submit statements, 
extraneous material, and questions for the record subject to 
the length limitations in the rules. To insert something into 
the record, please have your staff email the previously 
mentioned address of contact for Subcommittee staff.
    As a reminder to members joining remotely, please keep your 
video function on at all times, even when you are not 
recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for muting and 
unmuting themselves, and please remember to mute yourself after 
you finish speaking.
    Consistent with H.Res. 8, and the accompanying regulation, 
staff will only mute members and witnesses, as appropriate, 
when they are not under recognition, to eliminate background 
noise.
    I see that we have a quorum, and I now recognize myself for 
opening remarks.
    Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you to our witnesses 
for testifying before our committee today.
    The world has watched in horror as Putin's war rages on in 
the Ukraine. His willingness to sacrifice countless lives, in 
his selfish pursuit of regional dominance, has caused a 
humanitarian crisis that will long outline the conflict.
    Nonetheless, several Latin American governments have 
expressed apathy or even explicit support for the Russian 
invasion. Even as the shocking images of civilian graves and 
flattened cities capture our attention and animosity, we must 
pay attention to Putin's influence in our own backyard.
    Russia has steadily shored up its presence in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, threatening democratic aspirations and 
developing goals. Putin has found close friends in the region's 
most cruel dictatorships, including the leaders of Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, and Cuba, and has made overtures to U.S. allies, 
such as Brazil and Argentina.
    As I have said many times before during my tenure in 
Congress, the United States must not pivot away from Latin 
America, because Putin is eager to step in. We must also be 
careful not to conflate Russia and China's actions or share of 
influence in the region. While China funds infrastructure and 
creates financial ties with our neighbors, Russia has to use 
more creative methods to garner influence.
    One strategy been to spread misinformation by broadcasting 
Spanish language Kremlin propaganda through R-T and Sputnik. 
Russia also sells arms and artillery that only its engineers 
can maintain and provides critical intelligence support, 
fostering security interdependence that is difficult to 
unravel.
    Finally, Russia has painstakingly constructed a global 
sanctions evasion network, undermining the coercive power of 
the U.S. financial restrictions intended to modify the behavior 
of human rights abusers around the world.
    The Russian government's actions are supported by other 
non-State actors, including cyber operatives. In the wake of 
Putin's attack on Ukraine, the Russian-based hackers group 
Conti announced full support for the Kremlin's actions and that 
they would attack those who responded to the invasion.
    The results of Putin's project have been outstanding. 
Venezuelan dictator Nicolaàs Maduro, Nicaragua's Daniel 
Ortega, and Miguel Diaz-Canel of Cuba have amplified Russian 
talking points on the invasion of Ukraine. All three have 
welcomed Russian security personnel to train their own forces 
and engage in military exercises and granted Russian access to 
cybersecurity and intelligence networks, and prioritized their 
bilateral relationship with the Kremlin, at the expense of 
regional institutions like the Organization of American States.
    Russia's support has empowered client regimes to step up 
surveillance, election rigging, and political persecution, 
dealing a blow to the efforts of pro-democracy actors. This 
trend of Russian interference cannot be expected to diminish in 
the coming years. Putin will continue to seek and support like-
minded authoritarian partners who maintain power by suppressing 
opposition. Russian disinformation will continue to inflame 
political polarization and civil disorder. Countless regional 
objectives from climate change mitigation to anti-corruption 
will be obstructed in favor of Russian priorities.
    Today's hearing will allow us to come together to examine 
these steps we can and must take to combat Russian malign 
influence in the Western Hemisphere. We are presented with an 
opportunity to have an in-depth, constructive conversation on 
the impact of Russian overtures to our neighbors in the 
Caribbean and in Latin America.
    It is my sincere hope that all members here today will 
engage in a good-faith effort to further our policy response in 
a way that best serves U.S. interests and the principles of our 
Nation that we stand for.
    Our witnesses have prepared detailed testimony that I 
believe will be very valuable to this Subcommittee work.
    Once again, I thank you all for being here today, and I 
look forward to a productive hearing.
    I will now recognize Ranking Member Green for his opening 
remarks.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Chairman Sires, my friend from New 
Jersey, for holding this important hearing.
    And thank you to our witnesses for being with us today.
    Today's hearing on Russia's malign influence in the Western 
Hemisphere is increasingly pertinent, in light of Putin's 
invasion of Ukraine. Since the beginning of the invasion, 
Putin's influence has only grown in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
    Many governments on all sides of the ideologic spectrum 
have failed to address Russia's invasion of Ukraine. for 
instance, El Salvador was one of the countries that abstained 
from a U.N. vote condemning Russia's invasion, and Mexico's 
President has consistently telegraphed his neutrality. Worse, 
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela shamelessly supported Putin 
ahead of the invasion. Even more concerning today, no country 
has implemented sanctions against Putin, his cronies, or 
Russia's war machine. This is truly disappointing.
    One of the ways in which Russia exercises its malign 
influence in the region is through its Spanish language version 
of Russia Today, also known as RT. This propaganda outlet 
operates in almost every Latin American and Caribbean country. 
In addition to Moscow-controlled Sputnik News, RT spreads anti-
American disinformation and false flag narratives to justify 
Putin's invasion of Ukraine.
    Russia has also turned to the region in an effort to dodge 
Western sanctions. The U.S. intelligence community's 2022 
Annual Threat Assessment States that Russia has, quote, 
``Expanded its engagement with Venezuela, supported Cuba, and 
used arms sales and energy agreements to try to expand access 
to markets and natural resources in Latin America, in part, to 
offset some of the effects of sanctions.'' End quote.
    Russia has even gone so far as to threaten the possibility 
of sending military assets to Latin America, if the United 
States and our allies do not halt our assistance to Ukraine. 
This is unacceptable.
    In its 2022 Posture Statement, SOUTHCOM asserts that Russia 
is among the secondary external threats in the Western 
Hemisphere, with China being the primary threat. SOUTHCOM 
States that Russia, and I quote, ``intensifies this instability 
through its ties with Venezuela, entrenchment in Cuba and 
Nicaragua, and extensive disinformation operations.'' End 
quote.
    The oppressive regimes of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua 
are, without doubt, the largest sources of instability in the 
region, and they all have Russian and Chinese ties. In fact, 
the U.S. Commander of NORTHCOM recently revealed that our 
neighbor Mexico has the largest number of Russian intelligence 
officers.
    Meanwhile, our southern border remains wide open. Congress 
cannot stand idly by while the Russian and the Chinese regimes 
ramp up their malign activities in the region. For too long, 
the Western Hemisphere has taken a back seat in U.S. foreign 
policy. We have seen the disastrous consequences of this--from 
China's debt-trap diplomacy to Taiwan's growing diplomatic 
isolation, to Russia's arms sales and military engagement, to 
rising instability and surging migration.
    The absence if American leadership in our hemisphere has 
created a vacuum, and this vacuum has been filled by Russia and 
China. Congress must act. The Administration must act.
    As a House Armed Services Committee member, I am proud of 
securing several of my key priorities in the House-passed 
Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA. One of these priorities includes my 
amendment requiring a Department of Defense report addressing 
Russia's malign activity in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Uncovering these activities will help policymakers better 
address them and will shed light on Russia's hostile actions.
    As ranking member of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, I 
introduced a bipartisan piece of legislation, the Western 
Hemisphere Nearshoring Act, with the assistance of Chairman 
Sires and his staff. This legislation would offer Latin America 
and Caribbean countries an alternative to China's debt-trap 
diplomacy and Russia's backhanded deals.
    By nearshoring manufacturing jobs from China to our 
hemisphere, we can reduce our region's dependence on China and 
increase economic opportunity. It is a big step toward re-
engaging with our southern neighbors economically, politically, 
and diplomatically.
    And I want to take a moment and thank the State Department 
for their bipartisan assistance in writing this legislation. I 
ask all of my colleagues to cosponsor this common-sense 
legislation and would respectfully urge Chairman Meeks to 
schedule the bill for markup soon.
    In closing, Mr. Chairman, it is unthinkable that in a 
region where nearly every single country was a signator in the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, we are witnessing so many 
democratic partners ignoring Russia's human rights violations. 
The charter solidified the region's commitment to democratic 
norms and principles. Our partners cannot continue to ignoring 
Putin's malign and destabilizing behavior.
    Again, I want to deeply thank Chairman Sires for holding 
this important hearing, and I look forward to hearing from our 
witnesses today.
    Thank you and I yield.
    Mr. Sires. Dr. Vladimir Rouvinski? Have I got that right?

 STATEMENT OF DR. VLADIMIR ROUVINSKI, PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR, 
  INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH CENTER, ICESI UNIVERSITY, CALI, 
                            COLOMBIA

    Dr. Rouvinski. Good afternoon, Chairman.
    Mr. Sires. Dr. Rouvinski, you have got a lot of stuff here 
that is all good. Let me read it here.
    Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Sires. Dr. Rouvinski is a professor at the Department 
of Political Studies and Director of the Laboratory for 
Politics and International Relations at Icesi University in 
Cali, Colombia, in addition to coordinating the Pacific 
Alliance Studies Program.
    He graduated from Irkutsk State University in Russia and 
earned his PhD from Hiroshima University in Japan. His primary 
area of expertise is Russian relations with the nations of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to several 
publications on the topic, Dr. Rouvinski has also held research 
positions at the Wilson Center, Florida International 
University, and Georg Eckert Institute in Germany.
    Dr. Rouvinski, we welcome you to the hearing. I ask the 
witness to please limit your testimony to five minutes.
    You are recognized for 5 minutes. Without objection, your 
prepared written Statement will be made a part of the record.
    Dr. Rouvinski, you are recognized for your testimony
    [audio malfunction]. Can you hear me?
    Dr. Rouvinski. Yes.
    Mr. Sires. Dr. Rouvinski, can you hear me?
    Dr. Rouvinski. Yes, I can. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Sires. We have a problem with your audio. Can you turn 
it on? Is it on? There you go.
    Dr. Rouvinski. Yes. Can you hear me?
    Mr. Sires. Yes.
    Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you so much for this opportunity, 
Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, and distinguished members 
of the Subcommittee. It is truly a privilege for me to address 
you today on the issues related to Russia's engagement in the 
Western Hemisphere.
    And in today's testimony, I would like to summarize the key 
points of my written Statement, and I will focus on the long-
term objectives of Russia in this part of the world, Moscow's 
preferred modus operandi, in addition to evaluating the impact 
of the war in Ukraine on Russia's relationship with Latin 
America. And I will offer some policy recommendations on 
mitigating Russia's malign influence in the region.
    Let me begin by explaining why Latin America matters to 
Russia. Putin's war in Ukraine reconfirmed that Russia's ruling 
elites consider the territory of the former Soviet Union as the 
most important geographical area for Moscow outside Russia's 
borders. At the same time, Moscow views the entire Western 
Hemisphere as the U.S. crucial area of security, political, 
economic, and social concern. And from this perspective, 
Putin's strategy toward Latin America and the Caribbean is 
guided mostly by the logic of reciprocity, which has multiple 
manifestations in Russia's foreign policy.
    First, it is an opportunity for Putin's government to show 
that Russia can respond reciprocally to the U.S. support to the 
governments that have decided to advance their independent 
domestic and foreign policy agenda in Russia's neighboring 
countries. That is why, in Latin America, under the rule of 
Vladimir Putin, Russia prioritized strengthening political 
relations with the former Soviet allies, like Cuba and 
Nicaragua, in addition to those regimes in the Western 
Hemisphere in which narratives have been openly anti-American, 
like Venezuela. For the last 20 years, Russia has been using 
various means to support its allies in Latin America--arms 
trade; limited, but timely financial assistance; diplomatic 
backing in the United Nations and other multilateral forums, 
and facilitating sanctions evasion.
    Second, another pillar of Russia's Latin American policy is 
strategic communication via an extensive network of government-
controlled media outlets, such as RT in Spanish, RT Actualidad, 
and Sputnik news agency, Sputnik Mundo, as were mentioned today 
already. RT Actualidad and Sputnik Mundo's narratives not only 
emphasize the role of Russia as a global player, but they also 
always stress that the United States resists the process of 
Russia regaining so-called ``due place'' in the international 
arena and opposes building a new multipolar order with the 
participation of Latin American partners. Moreover, most of the 
programs aired by RT misinform viewers regarding the policies 
of the United States in Latin America on such sensitive issues 
as migration, liberal democracy, and economic and social 
issues.
    As a result of the implementation of Putin's strategy, as 
the war in Ukraine was unfolding, many Latin American leaders 
experienced difficulties finding a way to distance themselves 
from Russia. The lack of consensus among important Latin 
American nations on the Russian war in Ukraine benefited Moscow 
by offering the Kremlin an opportunity to claim that the United 
States and the Western powers failed to achieve isolation of 
Russia in the international arena.
    However, at the same time, in many other aspects, I believe 
that the continuation of Russia's strategy toward the region is 
facing today severe challenges. One of them is the 
significantly reduced capacity of Moscow to offer attractive 
incentives for foreign trade and economic cooperation for Latin 
American countries, including Putin's traditional allies, like 
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, because of the war-related 
costs and the impact of the economic sanctions on Russia.
    The other is the decreasing capacity to continue providing 
political backing in the international arena to some Latin 
American nations, as well as to engage them in diplomatic 
activities, since the government of Vladimir Putin has to cope 
with the growing international isolation of Russia itself.
    Against this background, I think that the Russian war in 
Ukraine's impact on Latin America offers the United States 
opportunities. One of them is to review the previous approaches 
to deal with the political regimes that serve as Russia's 
gateway to the region.
    Since Moscow's capacity to provide economic and political 
support to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba has significantly 
diminished, they may be willing to adopt new strategies in 
their bilateral relations with the United States. This is 
particularly evident, I believe, in the case of Venezuela, 
where a limited U.S. engagement in the energy sector could 
become a game-changer and eventually reduce other threats to 
security in the region, including illegal drug trafficking and 
the refugee crisis.
    Besides, the reactivation of the oil sector will likely 
alleviate the living conditions of ordinary Venezuelans and 
pave the way for a possible power transition in Venezuela. 
Similarly, this step would improve U.S. energy security and 
directly benefit U.S. companies.
    In the case of other Latin American nations, it is 
essential to keep in mind that one of the factors that allowed 
Russia to advance its Latin American policy is the use of the 
narrative of building a new world order, which allegedly could 
benefit Latin America, combined with the perception held by 
many Latin Americans that the region is no more a priority for 
the United States.
    In this context, I think that introducing a coordinated 
U.S.-Latin American communication strategy emphasizing the 
value of shared U.S.-Latin American interests, combined with, 
for example, high-level public events, will make it more 
difficult for Russia to continue exploiting anti-American 
sentiments here.
    On top of that, broad information coverage of U.S.-Latin 
American cooperation in cybersecurity, countering transnational 
organized crime, and offsetting, for example, illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing, would help stress the 
value of ``having Americans as friends'' for Latin America, for 
both elites and ordinary Latin Americans.
    In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the war in 
Ukraine showed that the regime of Vladimir Putin seeks not to 
help build new world order, but to carry out an expansionist 
agenda of Russian contemporary political elites. That is why an 
information strategy that aims to challenge the Russian 
narrative, combined with public diplomacy and strengthened 
civil society, could seize opportunities for successful 
disinformation campaigns regularly conducted by Moscow through 
their government-controlled media outlets and Russian 
embassies.
    I thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to share my 
views, and I look forward to the questions.
    [The prepared statement of dr. Rouvinski follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
    I will now introduce Dr. Kimberly Marten. Dr. Marten is a 
professor of political science at Barnard College, specializing 
in international relations, international security, and Russia. 
She is on the faculty and executive committee member of 
Columbia's Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and East 
European Studies, and Saltzman Institute of War and Peace 
Studies.
    She holds a degree from Harvard and Stanford and earned the 
Marshall Shulman Prize for her 1993 book Engaging the Enemy: 
Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation. Her many 
publications have analyzed Russia's private military activities 
in Africa, Russia-NATO relations, and Russian intelligence 
operations under Putin. She is a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, and the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, and is a founding member of PONARS-Eurasia.
    Dr. Marten, we welcome you to the hearing.
    I ask the witness to please limit your testimony to 5 
minutes, and without objection, your prepared written 
statements will be made part of the record.
    Dr. Marten, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF DR. KIMBERLY MARTEN, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL 
                    SCIENCE, BARNARD COLLEGE

    Dr. Marten. Thank you so much, Chairman Sires.
    Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, and distinguished 
members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to 
testify and to share my analysis of Russia's military and 
economic interest and influence in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
    My written testimony includes a lot more detailed 
information and examples. In the 5 minutes I have here, I will 
summarize my overall conclusions and provide my policy 
recommendations.
    Since 2014, Russia has explicitly tried to undermine U.S. 
interest and influence among its Latin American and Caribbean 
neighbors in direct payback for Washington's support of 
Ukraine. President Putin tries to attract any country that 
feels slighted by the United States, while taking advantage of 
lingering historical fears about U.S. and Western imperialism. 
He also seeks to entangle Russian State security interests with 
private commercial deals for us network cronies and cooperates 
with global organized crime in doing so.
    Yet, Russian efforts in the Western Hemisphere have faced 
real limits, including growing competition from China. Russia's 
malign activities near U.S. borders and along the sea lanes 
that support U.S. defense and commerce must be closely 
monitored, but we must not overreact to what is often more 
rhetoric than reality. Russia's presence lacks the deep 
ideological roots of the cold war Era. Russia has also faced 
reputational concerns about its reliability as a partner, 
aggravated by its COVID vaccine diplomacy mistakes. Russian 
weaknesses provide an opportunity for U.S. diplomacy to chip 
away at Russian influence.
    Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela have airports and seaports 
that are reliable transit hubs for the Russian military in 
Latin America, but their distance from Russia and proximity to 
the overwhelming military and intelligence presence of 
USSOUTHCOM forces leaves any Russian forces in the region 
vulnerable to eavesdropping and harassment.
    Despite recent Russian statements promising significant 
security cooperation with countries in the region, Moscow's 
achievements are limited. It has no permanent military bases 
there. It does have two small facilities in Nicaragua, a 
counternarcotics training center operated by the Russian 
Interior Ministry and a civilian satellite communications 
tracking base that may also gather local intelligence against 
the United States and its allies. There is also a helicopter 
training center that uses flight simulators in Venezuela.
    Russia often sends military personnel to the region, 
including to support its long-term weapons contracts, leaving 
hundreds of Russian military specialists on the ground. Their 
presence in Venezuela in 2019 may have helped deter U.S. 
intervention against Nicolas Maduro.
    Despite a major push to sell new weapons in the region, 
Russia has struggled to find buyers. The U.S. and Europe remain 
the dominant regional weapons suppliers, and in 2018 the United 
States warned its clients they would be cut out of future deals 
if they bought weapons from Russia. Only four countries in the 
region have received weapons from Russia since 2014 and none 
since 2017.
    Russia regularly carries out small-scale military and naval 
exercises in the region, and Nicaragua's renewal this year of 
its annual training plan with Russia raised concerns. But this 
has been going on for 10 years; it is not new, and does not 
involve any increased Russian presence in the country.
    We do know that Russia's military intelligence agency, the 
GRU, has a large presence in Mexico, as Chairman Sires 
mentioned. This is disturbing because the GRU has led many 
malign operations in recent years, including election 
interference and assassination campaigns.
    Overall, U.S. forces have to prepare for worst-case 
scenarios, including some kind of Russian military distraction 
campaign in the Western Hemisphere, as the Ukraine war 
continues. Putin has certainly surprised the world elsewhere, 
but it seems unlikely that he would risk violent escalation 
near U.S. borders unless he believed that his regime faced an 
immediate existential threat from Washington.
    Leaders with authoritarian or leftist populist leanings who 
are suspicious of the United States have won democratic 
elections, sparking concerns about possible avenues for Russian 
influence. Russia has recently gained diplomatic and rhetorical 
support from Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, but support for 
Russia in each of these countries is shallow and politically 
contested. Their economic ties to Moscow are relatively small 
and are becoming increasingly inconvenient because of U.S. and 
global SWIFT banking sanctions on Russia which have forced them 
to find more expensive workarounds.
    Given these Russian efforts and their limits, here are my 
policy recommendations:
    The United States must carefully observe Russian military 
activities in the Western Hemisphere and be prepared to react 
in the event of escalation.
    The United States must stay diplomatically engaged. As of 
last week, there are 13 U.S. Ambassadorial posts vacant in the 
region.
    We can offer democratic States trade and investment 
alternatives to Russia, such as encouraging Brazil's adoption 
of high-tech alternatives to its fertilizer imports from 
Russia.
    We can also offer trade and investment incentives to 
encourage human rights and democratization efforts among the 
region's autocratic regimes, while wooing them away from 
Russia, such as recent initiatives to gradually reduce 
sanctions on the Venezuelan oil sector.
    In the end, the United States must avoid overreacting to 
Russian rhetoric and recognize that it may be China, not 
Russia, that most threatens U.S. leadership in the region in 
coming years.
    Thank you for your time.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Marten follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Dr. Marten.
    I will now introduce Ms. Candace Rondeaux. Ms. Rondeaux is 
the director of the Future Frontlines program at the New 
America Foundation. She is also a Professor of Practice at the 
Center on the Future of War in the School of Politics and 
Global Studies at Arizona State University.
    Additionally, she lectures on conflict studies at Elliott 
School of International Affairs at George Washington University 
and serves on Tulane University's Emergency and Security 
Studies Advisory Board. She writes regularly for World Politics 
Review and the Daily Beast on the intersection of emerging 
tech, political violence, and geopolitical competition.
    Her previous experience includes working at the U.S. 
Institute of Peace, the Office of the U.S. Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and The Washington 
Post. She also holds a degree from Sarah Lawrence College, New 
York University, and Princeton.
    Ms. Rondeaux, we welcome you to the hearing.
    I ask the witness, please limit your testimony to 5 
minutes, and without objection, your prepared written 
statements will be made part of the record.
    Ms. Rondeaux, you are recognized for your testimony.

STATEMENT OF MS. CANDACE RONDEAUX, DIRECTOR, FUTURE FRONTLINES, 
                          NEW AMERICA

    Ms. Rondeaux. Thank you, Chair Sires, Ranking Member Green, 
and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for opportunity to 
submit my testimony and appear before you today.
    A year ago, if you had asked most Americans what they knew 
about the Wagner Group and how Russian mercenaries fit into 
Russia's military strategy, I think many would probably say 
they have no idea. The fact that Russia has deployed 
mercenaries to fight its battles abroad is now almost common 
knowledge. The Wagner Group's reported involvement in 
atrocities in Ukraine, and in recent months elsewhere, has 
understandably brought newfound attention to atrocities linked 
to Russian mercenaries and operatives in other parts of the 
world, where Russia has sought to exert influence in places 
like Africa and the Middle East.
    However, what is less well-known is that Russian 
mercenaries operate much closer to home in Latin America. 
Strategically speaking, covert Russian mercenary operations, 
real and imagined, are critical for Russia's strategy for 
sanctions evasion and for managing the risks of conflict 
escalation in places where Russian forces and entities engage 
in clear violations of international law.
    Their area of operations encompasses any part of the world 
where Kremlin-controlled State companies in the fossil fuel, 
mining, and arms industries have struck deals with local 
governments and warlords. Tactically speaking, Russian 
mercenaries run reconnaissance operations; they provide 
targeting intelligence, military training, logistical support, 
backstop proxy militias, and Russian military missions in key 
global hotspots.
    In the Western Hemisphere, one of those hotspots is 
Venezuela. In 2019, some 400 Russian mercenaries were deployed 
to Caracas to provide training and support for the Venezuelan 
military.
    Not coincidentally, it is also one of the biggest areas of 
investment in the world for Rosneft, Russia's leading State-
owned oil company. Rosneft--and by association, the Russian 
government--have for years also been one of the largest 
guarantors of Venezuelan debt. From 2014 to 2019, Rosneft was 
among the biggest stakeholders in joint oil production projects 
run by the PDVSA, Venezuela's national oil company.
    That changed, however, in April 2020, when Rosneft abruptly 
cut its longstanding ties with PDVSA and sold its stake in 
Venezuelan oil ventures, due to U.S. sanctions against the 
Venezuelan government. At the time, Rosneft announced that it 
would be transferring its entire stake to PDVSA, to another 
largely unknown Russian State-backed firm known as 
Roszarubezhneft.
    The new manager manages Russia's distressed Venezuelan 
energy assets, Nikolai Rybchuk, happened to be a former 
Spetsnaz special forces officer with next to no experience in 
the energy industry, but plenty of experience fighting 
alongside paramilitaries in places like Angola.
    Fast forward to March of this year, a month after Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine and only days after the United States and 
EU imposed sanctions on Russian oil, it appears Russia's stake 
in Venezuelan oil has once again changed hands to another 
Russian company called Petromost. Just a quick check of the 
information about Petromost company records and archived web 
pages reveals that Petromost is actually a front company for 
the security arm of Rosneft.
    This shell game business is business as usual for Rosneft 
and for Russia. Russia has consistently denied that it has 
hired guns working in Venezuela and other places in Latin 
America and the Western Hemisphere, but deniability is rather 
the point of the mythology surrounding the Wagner Group and 
Russian mercenaries.
    On paper, many of the deals Russia makes with strongmen 
like Venezuela's Nicolas Maduro can be traced back to the 
owners of Russian front companies who have ties to the Kremlin. 
But, in practice, it is Russia's present Vladimir Putin and the 
Presidentially appointed heads of State-owned companies like 
Rosneft, Rostec, Russia's State arms company, and others, who 
reap the benefits of Russian mercenary operations.
    The Wagner Group is not a private military security company 
in the classic sense, and comparisons with U.S. firms like 
Blackwater are a complete misnomer. In fact, the most apt 
comparison to the Wagner Group and Russian military networks is 
not Blackwater, but Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel.
    For decades, the Sinaloa Cartel has operated like a hybrid 
terrorist organization--setting up front companies, evading law 
enforcement, and killing anyone who is perceived as getting in 
the way of the cartel's illicit trade. Like the Sinaloa Cartel, 
Russian mercenaries rely on a web of legal and black market 
relationships to traffic in illicit goods and trade with 
sanctioned companies and individuals, while their chief 
financiers in Russia launder the money on those deals.
    The only difference between the Sinaloa Cartel and Russian 
military contractors is that, while the businesses involved in 
Sinaloa are all ostensibly private, in the Russian case they 
are nominally private on paper. In the Russian case, security 
agencies such as the FSB and GRU, and other organs of the 
Russian State, are involved in every aspect of the military 
cartels' operations--from recruitment to deployment to the 
battlefield.
    The United States and EU have sanctioned the Wagner Group 
and individuals suspected of being involved in Russian 
mercenary operations, but it is not entirely clear what effect 
those moves have had on constraining Russia's deployments of 
mercenary contingents. More recently, some experts have called 
for the United States to designate the Wagner Group as a 
foreign terrorist organization, a move that would prohibit 
provision of material support to Russian mercenaries going 
forward.
    Given the lack of substantive and effective policy action 
on the problem dealing with Russian mercenaries to date, 
designating the Wagner Group a terrorist organization sounds 
like a great idea, but one problem is that the Wagner Group 
doesn't exist, and that to do so, the United States is going to 
need to change its approach and understanding of the threat 
posed by Russian mercenary operations.
    If the United States wants to get a better handle on this 
challenge, it is going to need to do two things: learn the 
problem set and right-size the strategy for managing it.
    The first step on that path to learning the problem set is 
to treat it for what it is: a Russian State-backed, organized 
crime cartel that often operates like a terrorist group.
    The second step is not that different from the measures we 
have seen the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
take in the past when dealing with organizations like Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS, or like the Sinaloa Cartel. With concerted effort, 
the shell companies that make up this covert network of Russian 
mercenaries and their operatives and clients can also be traced 
through bills of lading, customs and trade data, and other open 
sources that are publicly available to anyone who cares to 
explore them.
    To do that, however, the United States will need to 
establish the institutional architecture needed for the United 
States and its allies to share continual streams of real-time 
intelligence on the movements of Russian mercenary operations 
and contingents around the world, but particularly in the 
Western Hemisphere. It will also mean the U.S. national 
security agencies involved in this effort need to be thinking 
creatively about broadening information-sharing beyond the 
traditional intelligence agency and law enforcement routes.
    In the longer term, it will also require high-level 
diplomatic efforts to persuade U.S. partners around the world 
that Russia's continued ability to evade sanctions and profit 
from the illicit provision of embargoed goods and services will 
only aid Putin's regime.
    To make progress on all of the above, you are going to need 
to work hard. And this may seem like a tall order from a 
Washington point of view, but it is the only way to get grips 
on the problem of Russia's aggression.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Rondeaux follows:]

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    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Ms. Rondeaux. Thank you very much.
    I will now introduce our final witness, Dr. Evan Ellis. Dr. 
Ellis is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the 
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, with a focus 
on the region's relationships with China and other non-Western 
Hemisphere actors, as well as transnational organized crime and 
populism in the region.
    He has published over 360 works, including five books, and 
previously served on the Secretary of State's Policy Planning 
Staff, with the responsibility for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as the International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement issues.
    Dr. Ellis is a senior associate in the Americas Program at 
the Center for Strategic & International Studies and has been 
awarded the Order of Military Merit Jose Maria Cordova by the 
government of Colombia.
    Dr. Ellis, we welcome you to the hearing.
    And I ask witnesses to please limit your testimony to 5 
minutes. Without objection, your prepared written statements 
will be made part of the record.
    Dr. Ellis, you are recognized.

   STATEMENT OF MR. R. EVAN ELLIS, RESEARCH PROFESSOR, LATIN 
   AMERICAN STUDIES, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC STUDIES 
                           INSTITUTE

    Mr. Ellis. Chairman Sires, Ranking Member Green, 
distinguished Subcommittee members, I am honored to share my 
analysis with you today. I will summarize my written testimony.
    To begin, Russia has demonstrated its intent and its 
capability, although limited, to conduct military activities 
oriented against the United States and our partners in the 
Western Hemisphere. Its key vehicle for doing so has been anti-
U.S. authoritarian regimes; specifically, Venezuela, Nicaragua, 
and Cuba.
    Recent examples of such Russian threat projection include a 
pact to increase military cooperation with Venezuela and 
sending a Russian team of snipers to an upcoming military 
competition in Venezuela in August. Russia has also supported 
Venezuelan forces headed to the State of Apure; provided and 
maintained S-300 air defense systems in Venezuela, and sent at 
least 100 military trainers and technicians, as well as the 
just-mentioned Wagner Group mercenaries to Venezuela.
    Russia has also sent its nuclear-capable Tu-160 Backfire 
bombers to Venezuela on multiple occasions--in September 2008, 
October 2013, and December 2018. It has deployed warships to 
Venezuela in 2008, and it has threatened to establish a 
military base on La Orchila Island off the coast of Venezuela. 
Since 2006, Russia has sold Venezuela $11.4 billion in military 
goods.
    In Nicaragua, the Ortega regime authorized 230 Russian 
troops, as previously mentioned, plus aircraft, ships, and 
weapons to operate in the country. As with Venezuela, Russia 
has deployed its nuclear-capable Tu-160 bombers to Nicaragua on 
multiple occasions.
    Russian military aircraft has also repeatedly violated 
Colombian airspace from Nicaragua, as well as from Venezuela, 
including incursions in October-November 2013, in August 2019, 
in April 2020, in July 2020, and again, in April 2021.
    Russia has also provided the Ortega dictatorship with an 
array of military equipment, including tanks, armored vehicles, 
helicopters, fighters, transport aircraft, antiaircraft guns, 
patrol craft, and missile boats, among others.
    Russia has set up ground stations for its GLONASS satellite 
system in Nicaragua's Nejapa Lagoon. It has established a 
training facility, as noted, in Managua, which in its first 
year alone conducted 12 courses, giving Russia access to 236 
security personnel from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, the 
Dominican Republic, as well as Nicaragua.
    Russia is conducting information warfare activities, as 
noted, oriented toward increasing polarization and decreasing 
confidence in democratic institutions in the Western 
Hemisphere. It is leveraging social media, as noted, such as 
Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and WhatsApp, complementing 
activities by its State disinformation platforms, Russia Today 
and Sputnik. Colombia has accused Russia of attempting to 
interfere in its own elections.
    Support for Russia by other regimes has also been 
troubling. This includes, as is noted, Argentina's Alberto 
Fernandez, who offered his country as Putin's gateway into 
Latin America, as well as Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who 
called NATO's military aid to Ukraine immoral.
    Brazil's attempt, recently announced, to purchase, quote, 
``as much Russia oil as possible'' undermines United States and 
allied efforts to resist Russia's aggression in the Ukraine.
    Russia's activities in the region also highlight the 
dangers to U.S. strategic interests posed by anti-U.S. 
authoritarian regimes close to our homeland. These regimes--
specifically, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba--have served as 
Russia's principal enablers for projecting their threats into 
the region.
    The good news is also noted by my colleagues. It is in the 
short term Russia's ability to operate in the hemisphere is 
limited by a narrow set of friends and sectors, as well as the 
resources Russia is spending in the Ukraine, Western sanctions, 
and the damage of Russian behavior, not only to its political 
reputation, but also to the appeal of Russia as an arms 
provider. Yet, it is important to recall that these limits are 
temporary.
    Russia's commercial interaction, of course, with the region 
is minimal. These focus on its agricultural purchases and sales 
if nitrate-based fertilizer, as well as petroleum activities, 
although Russia also has some activities in mining, nuclear 
construction, and space sectors.
    Military sales and interactions remain Russia's most 
important engagement tool, including with U.S. partners such as 
Peru, Brazil, and Mexico. These partners have Russian equipment 
in inventory, institutional relationships, and may, frankly, be 
open to deepening those relationships with possible near-term 
changes to our partners' political direction.
    The detailed recommendations that I provide in my written 
testimony I would summarize as follows:
    No. 1, heightened intelligence to identify and preempt 
near-term Russian moves in the region. Importantly, SOUTHCOM is 
often the last in line in the allocation of such resources.
    Two, enhanced containment of entrenched anti-U.S. regimes 
through, first of all, sustained sanctions and, second, 
enhanced security support to the neighbors threatened by them; 
specifically, Colombia, Guyana, and Costa Rica, among others.
    Third, helping democrats within at-risk regimes across the 
hemisphere to succeed in order to avoid the occurrence of more 
anti-U.S. regimes which would host Russian aggression. Doing so 
requires resources, in which I would call out the possibility 
of nearshoring and Representative Green's nearshoring bill, as 
well as attention and better fact-based messaging on the 
perils, not only of engaging with Russia, but as well as 
authoritarian populism.
    Additional resources, regulatory flexibility for U.S. 
defense engagement in the region, and finally, a public 
strategy for responding to Russia, as well as other challenges 
in the hemisphere.
    Thank you and the committee for your time today.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Ellis follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Dr. Ellis.
    I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes to begin asking 
questions.
    Dr. Rouvinski, you outlined the growth of Russian influence 
across the region, but I would like to discuss Nicaragua first. 
I was proud to sponsor the RENACER Act, which requires a public 
report on purchases and agreements entered into by the 
Nicaraguan government related to the military and intelligence 
sector. Unfortunately, this report has not been released, 
despite Daniel Ortega demonstrated openness to military 
cooperation with Russia.
    In each of your views, are we doing enough? Are we 
prioritizing enough what is going with Russia in some of these 
countries? Is there more that the U.S. Government can do? Can 
anybody talk a little about that. Dr. Rouvinski, what else can 
we do to stop this?
    Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much, Chairman, for your 
comments and for sharing your view.
    I think the United States has a window of opportunities 
now, precisely because of some of the factors that we have been 
discussing with my colleagues because of the limited capacity 
that Russia has now.
    And I believe, in the case of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega did 
not recognize these two separate republics in Ukraine, Donetsk 
and Luhansk, and this is very different from what he did back 
in 2008, when he was the first one to recognize Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, two separate republics in Georgia, and did 
actually a great help to Vladimir Putin because nobody 
supported Russia back then.
    He did not do this at this time, and I think one of the 
reasons is because Daniel Ortega became accustomed to be 
rewarded by Russia for doing such kind of things. And Russia 
has very limited capacities now. From this perspective, I think 
the renewable of the permission for the Russian groups to 
arrive in Nicaragua is actually a signal that Daniel Ortega is 
sending to Moscow, expecting that he might be rewarded for 
doing this.
    So, once again, I think there is a window of opportunity 
for the United States perhaps to see if these diminishing 
capacities of Russia will provide new opportunities to review 
the policy toward these allies of Vladimir Putin. Because they 
definitely are well aware that Russia has very, very diminished 
opportunities now.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Can anyone else answer that? Dr. Ellis?
    Mr. Ellis. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So, for me, three key points.
    No. 1, I think Nicaragua and the RENACER Act, as well as 
our response to Venezuela, emphasizes the value of containment. 
I think there are situations in which we may not be able to 
introduce near-term change to authoritarian regimes. However, 
there is still a value in containing them because that 
restricts their ability to engage with Russia and other threat 
actors.
    I think No. 2 is recognizing the importance of supporting 
the neighbors that are threatened--again, in the case of 
Nicaragua, realizing the burden that Costa Rica is bearing.
    And I think No. 3 is just recognizing the very dire straits 
that a number of countries in the region are in, doubling down 
to provide democratic solutions to allow regimes in the region 
to avoid radicalization and authoritarian paths which would 
proliferate the types of regimes that we do not like to see in 
Nicaragua, in Venezuela, and elsewhere.
    Mr. Sires. Anyone else?
    [No response.]
    One of the things that really burns me up about Nicaragua 
is the IMF, the International Monetary Fund, the amount of 
money that they gave Nicaragua just over the
    [inaudible] after in Nicaragua where all those people have 
been in jail, and we are
    [audio malfunction] against them. And yet, the IMF gave 
them something like $340 million just before the election. 
Obviously, I do not know if they keep track of the money, but I 
wish they would say where the money went to, because that is 
just not acceptable, since we are one of the biggest 
contributors to the IMF in terms of money that we give the IMF.
    Now, Ranking Member Green is recognized for questions. 
Congressman Green, you are recognized.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I really want to say, first off, to all of our witnesses 
today, this has just been fantastic testimony, and I thank each 
of you for what you shared. I looked at your written statements 
prior. They are detailed. I just am very grateful for your 
efforts today.
    In March 2022, General Glen VanHerck, the Commander of 
NORTHCOM, testified before the Senate that Mexico is among the 
top countries worldwide with regard to the number of Russian 
intel guys--basically, spies--operating in its territory. How 
should the United States view these activities in respect to 
our relationship with Mexico and Russia's relationship with 
Mexico? And I throw that out there to anyone. Perhaps, Mr. 
Ellis, yes, please.
    Mr. Ellis. Yes, Ranking Member Green, thank you very much.
    I think, first of all, of course, this is something that 
has historically been the case all the way back to the cold 
war, the presence of Russian intelligence operatives, Soviet 
operatives, in Mexico, but it certainly illustrates Russia's 
recognition of the strategic value of Mexico that close to the 
U.S. border.
    I think it also illustrates, you know, without implicating 
any Mexican knowledge or collusion in this, first, the 
difficult foreign policy, and we have seen an increasing turn 
to the left, not only with AMLO, but also before Mr. Obrador, 
as well as some of the very real concerns of activity by a 
variety of different groups, especially the expanding power of 
Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generacion and other cartels.
    There is really just a sea of opportunity for Russian 
illicit actors, as well as others, to swim in desperately close 
to our U.S. shore. And I certainly welcome more attention to 
where things are at with the governability of the Mexican 
regime and its relationship and the posture of AMLO toward the 
United States, and the importance of our cooperation on 
security affairs that directly affect the United States through 
ties of economic, migration, family, and security.
    Mr. Green. Yes, sir, go ahead.
    Dr. Rouvinski. I agree with Dr. Evan Ellis about the 
importance of paying closer attention to this kind of 
activities. I am afraid many Latin Americans, Latin American 
governments, have been reluctant to pay sufficient attention to 
what Russia's intelligence services have been doing this part 
of the world.
    For example, in Colombia, they eventually managed to 
identify some of these activities, intelligence activities, but 
until then, Russian diplomats--better to say Russian 
intelligence officials--were using the cover of diplomatic 
posts while almost openly doing such kind of activities 
everywhere.
    And it is also very important to take into consideration 
the difference, for example, to European countries in Latin 
America Russian diplomatic posts, and Russia has stable 
diplomatic relations with all Latin American and Caribbean 
countries and they have embassies and consulates throughout the 
entire region. So, these diplomatic posts have been, actually, 
doing a lot of things that do not exactly correspond to what 
the diplomatic activities are. They have been involved in 
intelligence. They have been involved in disinformation, 
especially taking into account the fact that in some of the 
countries the access to RT Actualidad and Sputnik News had been 
reduced. So, they now reinforce their diplomatic posts to 
continue this disinformation campaign. So, I think it is 
important to pay attention to this.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Green. So, maybe perhaps in writing, if the two of you 
would send what you think our recommended actions should be, 
that would be helpful. And I will let you respond in writing to 
my office, and we will get that into the record.
    Real quickly, because I am almost out of time--anyone can 
take this question on--I am a little concerned about Russia is 
doing in Nicaragua with the global positioning system, the 
observation satellite. Can someone address that briefly? 
Perhaps Dr. Ellis?
    Mr. Ellis. Well, while it is a legitimate facility to 
relate to GLONASS, it also creates other electronic capture 
opportunities and opportunities for Russian space personnel 
with Nicaraguans to operate in the region for other purposes. 
And so, even though it is legitimate, it does open up the door 
for certain risks, especially ELINT type of risks.
    Mr. Green. It is an ISR platform, is basically what you are 
saying?
    Mr. Ellis. For capture, as well as for the personnel that 
allows it to work in the region under the cover of that 
facility.
    Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time, but I know Ms. 
Marten wanted to answer that. Is it OK if she does?
    You are muted, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Sires. How is that?
    You are recognized.
    Mr. Green. Go ahead, Ms. Marten
    Dr. Marten. Thank you.
    I would just agree with what the previous speaker said and 
add that the Nicaraguan facility is different from the 
Brazilian facilities, which are open to use by scientists. The 
one in Nicaragua is closed. It probably is engaged in local 
spying activity from the installation, as well as things that 
are related to space-based intelligence collection, just 
because it is dominated by Russia in an area that is very close 
to the U.S. embassy.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    Now, I recognize Congressman Levin.
    Mr. Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I really 
appreciate it.
    And I want to echo Congressman Green's comments about the 
terrific testimony here, and I want to thank everybody for 
participating, and you and Ranking Member Green for holding the 
hearing in the first place.
    It is critical that we better understand how Russia is 
influencing countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, as we 
seek to pursue policies that enable democratization, equity, 
stability, and justice globally.
    Dr. Rouvinski, your testimony suggested that Russia's war 
in Ukraine and its aftermath provides strategic openings to 
limit Russian influence in several Latin American countries 
that have historically close ties with Russia.
    In 2019, the Government Accountability Office issued a 
report on the impacts of sanctions in Venezuela in a response 
to a request by the House Foreign Affairs Committee and me. The 
report found that, among other things, Venezuela's economy 
deteriorated steadily for nearly a decade and that decline 
worsened after the United States levied new sanctions in 2015.
    In what ways would increased diplomacy with Venezuela and 
easing sanctions drive a wedge between Russia and Venezuela?
    Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much for the question.
    I think, first of all, it is important to take into 
consideration that Venezuela has been Russia's most important 
gateway to Latin America. The Chavista regime provided Russia 
with plenty of opportunities to engage all other nations as 
well here in this part of the world.
    But I think, for the regime of Nicolas Maduro now, the 
opportunities that were provided by Russia, first of all, back 
in Venezuela and international organizations; second, to help 
to avoid the U.S. sanctions and, basically, acting as a 
middleman. They now cease to exist because of the difficulties 
experienced by Russia itself.
    So, I think, from this perspective, there is an opportunity 
that the adjusted policy that may allow, of course, not to 
recognize Nicolas Maduro as a legitimate president because he 
doesn't have any legitimacy; this is the authoritarian regime, 
but it may help to make the conditions for ordinary Venezuelans 
a little bit easier and, also, perhaps also to stop any 
possibilities for Russia to further engagement, which, again, 
are quite limited.
    And the last, but not least important, I think it is 
necessary to take into account the changes in many other Latin 
American nations. We have a new government here in Colombia 
that is most likely to change its policy toward Venezuela. So, 
I think the United States has to take into account these 
changes and elaborate a new approach to the----
    Mr. Levin. Good. Yes, sounds so wise.
    Dr. Marten, your testimony notes that Russia's influence in 
the region exists, but is limited, and that there are steps the 
United States can and should take to further counter Russian 
influence, such as increasing diplomatic ties and filling 
Ambassadorial posts.
    When the United States hosted the Summit of the Americas, I 
joined my colleagues in writing a letter to the Biden 
Administration urging that the summit be inclusive of countries 
like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, noting that the summit was 
a moment for the region to come together to address Russia's 
war in Ukraine, among other global challenges.
    Do you think our continued isolation of these countries 
helps to maintain Russia's influence over them, and how might 
lifting the embargo or restaffing the embassy in Cuba, for 
example, benefit the U.S. interests of keeping Russian 
influence at bay?
    Dr. Marten. Thank you very much for that question.
    I think it is not only Russian influence that we have to be 
concerned about, but Chinese influence.
    Mr. Levin. Right.
    Dr. Marten. And the evidence is, in recent years, China is 
gaining more influence in both Cuba and Venezuela, for example. 
And so, it is both that we have to worry about.
    Just on the question of Venezuela, in particular, 
Venezuela, now its assets that are located in Russia it cannot 
access. And so, that means that it has lost things there. And 
there is evidence that Venezuelan oil is now a competitor 
against Russian oil in Asia, as Russian oil has turned away 
from the European market. And so, those are just some ways 
where economics matters in terms of what is happening.
    But I would just point out that, in each of these cases, 
the real personal ties between these leaders and Putin are 
relatively weak. They are really for political motives and for 
economic motives, not for deep ideological motives. And that 
means that, if we have the opportunity to exchange economic 
benefits for movement toward democratization and away from 
human rights problems in these countries, we should seize the 
moment when Russia is so disabled to have an effort to really 
win back some of the influence that we had in the region before 
Russia became so involved in past years, especially around 5 to 
10 years ago.
    Mr. Levin. And that would help with China, too.
    OK, my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to the 
witnesses very, very much. I yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Congressman Pfluger, you are recognized.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing me 
and for holding this hearing.
    In recent years, we have seen China and Russia rapidly 
expand their influence throughout Latin America. Russia has 
propped up authoritarian regimes both in Venezuela and Cuba, 
and obviously, the PRC has been discussed on this particular 
hearing. The Belt and Road Initiative has been used to expand 
their aspirations, the Chinese aspirations, of undercutting our 
own national security initiatives and economic interests in 
this region.
    And I completely agree with Ranking Member Green and 
appreciate the bipartisan nature of the nearshoring efforts. 
But when you look at the brazen display of soft power by both 
countries, I think it should alarm every single member of this 
committee and should be the sense of Congress that we do take 
every action possible.
    The steps I have taken recently to address the malign 
influence of Russia is working with Representative Panetta on 
introducing legislation that would require the DOD to examine 
in great detail how Russia is using PMCs across the globe to 
achieve their strategic objectives, and the direct or indirect 
threats that Russian PMCs present to our interest in 
identifying whether or not sanctions on these groups are 
actually impeding or having a positive effect on deterring 
their behavior.
    I am proud to see that this legislation has made its way 
through the NDAA and was passed in the House version. I hope it 
is included in the Conference Report this year. But this 
information is going to be vital to understanding these 
emerging threats.
    I will start with Dr. Ellis. Thank you for your service and 
thank you to all the witnesses today.
    Dr. Ellis, how would you characterize the Russian PMC 
activities and their objectives in Latin America and the 
Caribbean?
    Mr. Ellis. Sir, first of all, thank you for the question. I 
am a U.S. Army civilian.
    But, across the board, I see a variety of different 
companies. When we talk about the Wagner Group companies, 
obviously, I think there is a mixture of support for private 
interest to oligarchs that my colleague had mentioned, as well 
as support to strategic objectives, oftentimes, when Russia 
wants to avoid directly committing military forces, and yet, at 
the same time, we see that Russia has also directly committed 
military forces in places like Venezuela.
    So, you know, the thing that I think is also important to 
recognize is there is a synergy that was alluded to between 
Chinese activity and Russian that I think it is important for 
the committee to recognize. Specifically, that China oftentimes 
does not want to be tainted with anti-U.S. activities or the 
anti-U.S. work of the regimes. And yet, Chinese money, in 
pursuit of its own interests, enables those regimes to survive. 
It lent over $64 billion to Venezuela, over $13 billion to 
Ecuador under Rafael Correa, et cetera, et cetera.
    But then, in turn, that has given those regimes the open 
door to engage with Russia in ways directly threatening the 
United States. China, then, benefits from those threats without 
being tainted by that. So, I think it is important to 
understand the synergies between the Chinese and the Russian 
threats, as well as the direct Russian activities, both 
directly military and through Wagner Group and other companies 
such as that.
    Mr. Pfluger. Well, thank you for that. And that is very 
disturbing, as we look at those synergies, to see this axis 
forming where it is right at our doorstep, and we have to 
compete with it.
    Let me just open it up here, because I know that you all 
have kind of talked about some of the military activities. And 
my question was originally going to be focused on Russia, but 
because of this synergy discussion here, which I think is 
great, I will open it up to anybody. But do you guys see an 
escalation of sorts happening in Latin America because of the 
involvement of the United States and our allies with Ukraine? 
And specifically, with regards to military activity or more 
equipment, just more activity in general?
    Yes, go ahead.
    Ms. Rondeaux. Thank you, Representative Pfluger.
    I wanted to comment on your question earlier as well 
regarding PMCs and their activity in Latin America. It is 
encouraging to hear that there is legislation pending calling 
for the DOD to do more research, do more work, to understand 
how these networks operate.
    I just would also add, it would be probably pretty useful 
for other civilian agencies to engage, simply because they have 
a set of capacities that may not be available to the DOD, or 
there may be some limitations in terms of the kinds of research 
that can be done openly on certain DOD systems. So, I just want 
to put that out there.
    There has been a lot of discussion today in this 
conversation, and in conversations that we have recently had in 
other contexts in Congress, about what to do about Russia's 
malign influence vis-a-vis PMCs generally. And I would say one 
thing that I think is overlooked, when we talk about more need 
for more intelligence, is the fact that today we have a real 
deficit in our intelligence agencies in terms of the Russia 
specialists. People who speak Russian, who understand the 
region, who understand the military-industrial complex are 
dwindling. And that capability, the anemia within the 
interagency vis-a-vis our understanding of Russia generally has 
been one reason why we find ourselves now, 8 years on, in a 
situation where there is a serious crisis in terms of 
containing the threat from Russia in not just Ukraine, but 
other parts of the world. So, I just wanted to make that 
comment.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you so much.
    Unfortunately, my round has expired on this round of 
questioning, but I do represent Goodfellow Air Force Base, 
which is the DOD's largest intelligence training base. So, I am 
going to take this back directly to the base as an opportunity.
    And I appreciate all the witnesses.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Sires. Congressman Castro, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
    And thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony 
today.
    And before I begin with my questions, I want to emphasize 
that, as we discuss Russia, and to a larger extent, China's 
influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, that we also keep 
in mind the role the United States should play in strengthening 
our relationships, our own relationship, with countries in the 
region. And our engagement cannot and should not be solely 
reactive. In fact, if you look back on history, when we have 
been only reactive, usually, we have made poor decisions.
    And so, our engagement has to be sustained. It has to be 
cooperative and collaborative. Countries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean will continue partner with Russia and China if 
there is no better alternative that the United States is 
offering to them. The United States must work to become the 
better partner, the better choice, for assistance and support, 
especially during these difficult times.
    And with that context in mind, I want to direct my first 
question to two witnesses, Dr. Marten and Dr. Rouvinski. The 
Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to unprecedented inflation 
around the world--with rising food and energy prices 
particularly impacting Latin America, as seen by recent 
protests. In response to the economic recession of COVID-19 and 
the invasion of Ukraine, recent elections in the region point 
to increasing frustration and anti-incumbency sentiments, as 
demonstrated by Chile, Colombia, and Honduras.
    So, my question is, my first question, how can the United 
States engage with these countries, particularly new 
Administrations, to make us a preferred partner in recovery 
from economic fallout from the war and COVID-19?
    Dr. Marten. Thank you so much for the question. Oh, sorry.
    Mr. Castro. Please, please.
    Dr. Marten. Oh, OK. Thank you so much for the question.
    One thing that I would say that we could do that is 
different from what Russia is able to do, and from what China 
is able to do, is to focus on high-tech questions that will 
simultaneously serve our objections in trying to limit climate 
change or to mitigate climate change. And one of those examples 
we are seeing in Brazil right now, which is very much dependent 
on Russian fertilizer, is an effort to get away from 
traditional fertilizer use by thinking of high-tech 
alternatives. And that is something where Silicon Valley would 
really have an advantage over both Russia and China.
    And so, I think the more that we can be creative in our 
thinking and look to our own strengths, the more possibilities 
that we might have.
    Mr. Castro. All right. Please.
    Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you so much for this question.
    I think in Latin America, if we see the numbers, still, 
there is a lot of people who like to see the United States 
engage with Latin America. The numbers, actually, that Russia 
and China operate, or we see the support for Russia and China 
in Latin America, are much smaller.
    And I think the United States has all the opportunities, 
first of all, to show that actually Latin America and the 
United States have many, many common interests. I think the 
United States somewhat fails in comparison with the strategic 
communication advanced by Russia because there are many things 
happening. There is a lot of good stuff happening between the 
United States and Latin America, but, simply, this kind of 
information does not reach many Latin Americans. It is absent 
in the media.
    So, I think if the United States, in cooperation with Latin 
American partners, can design, or at least to strengthen, the 
existing opportunities, it will help a lot to show that, 
actually, there is much more that unites Latin America and the 
Caribbean and the United States than divides them. I think this 
is the most important.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Castro. Well, thank you. And as a followup to that----
    Dr. Rouvinski. Yes?
    Mr. Castro [continuing]. I would love to know your thoughts 
as well on role of vaccine diplomacy, or so-called vaccine 
diplomacy, given that a large number of countries in Latin 
America have been mainly distributing Russia's Sputnik V and 
Sputnik Light vaccines.
    Please, I have only got about 35 seconds left. Please.
    Dr. Marten. Yes. Russia really failed in the opportunity it 
had with the Sputnik V vaccine because it, first, had delivery 
delays, and then, it failed to get World Health Organization 
approval for its vaccine because it was not able to provide the 
scientific backup concerning its safety and effectiveness.
    And so, I think that that was a real opportunity that the 
United States maybe could have done more on, and that we 
certainly can do more on now, by working on our own strengths 
in international health issues and international vaccine 
issues, to show that we are a good partner.
    Mr. Castro. Well, thank you.
    With that, my time is up, and, Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you, Congressman.
    Congressman Vargas, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate 
the opportunity to speak here. I hope you can hear me and see 
me.
    One of the things that I found interesting--first of all, I 
want to thank all the witnesses. I, too, was very impressed 
with their testimony today, both written and oral.
    One of the things I learned is the limited capacity of 
Russia in the area. So, I went ahead and took a look, as you 
were speaking, to the GDP of these countries. So, the USA, 
according to the World Bank, in 2022, our GDP will be about 
$20.94 trillion. Russia's GDP will be $1.483 trillion. China's 
will be $14.72 trillion. Now, obviously, we have a lot of 
capacity. We have a lot of ability because of the size of our 
economy and the influence that we do have and should have.
    Now, with us trying to contain Russia, as I think we 
should, there is a lot more that we can do in Latin America, 
and that we should be doing. So, I will ask, again, following 
what Mr. Castro said, I agree with him that there is so much 
more.
    Dr. Marten, what else can we do? I mean, one of the things 
that did annoy me, just to be frank, every vaccine that we had 
for COVID should have had the American flag on it. We should 
have had the American flag, and everyone should have known, you 
know, when we send a vaccine out, that that is coming from the 
United States of America; we are your friends. I think we blew 
it in that. I think we were right, you know, to be generous in 
it, but I think we blew it in not putting our flag on it. But 
what else can we do?
    Dr. Marten. Thank you for the question.
    I think it would be important to make sure that all of our 
leading diplomatic roles in the region are filled, because I 
think Ambassadors have a unique role in being able to help 
business people from the United States in their efforts to make 
inroads in new places and new sectors. And I think it sends a 
message that the United States cares about those countries and 
is making them a priority. And so, I think the more that our 
diplomatic representatives can work with U.S. businesses to 
create new opportunities, the more chance we will have of 
replacing the Russian influence.
    Mr. Vargas. I have to say, one of the things that I think 
that we do do well is we send our young people. My 18-year-old 
daughter just graduated from high school, and she is with 
Amigos de las Americas. She is in Latin America right now. It 
is her second year doing this. My older daughter did it for 5 
years all throughout Latin America, and they love us. I mean, 
they cannot get enough of these young kids and, you know, the 
spirit that they bring of America.
    And I think that there is so much more that we can do, and 
we should do. I mean, I think that most countries are anxious.
    But, yes, go ahead, Dr. Marten. Your hand was up.
    Dr. Marten. Just really quickly, Russia has really failed 
in that because it has been withdrawing its young people from 
the West. And so, I think you are absolutely right that the 
presence of our young people in different countries is 
something that is really an unofficial Ambassador role that is 
important.
    Mr. Vargas. Yes, I think we should encourage that and do 
more of that.
    You know, again, one of the things that concerns me is 
China. I do see--and I travel around Latin America quite a bit 
myself--China is very involved in Latin America, and they do 
have resources. As I noted, their economy is big and they are 
investing. I mean, obviously, they create the debt trap and 
they do all sorts of other nefarious things, but they do have 
the capacity to be there.
    I have to say, too, it seems from this Ukrainian war, which 
is such a criminal act, that the Russians are also very 
incompetent. I mean, they are showing their incompetence here 
and their backwardness, even in the way they fight.
    So, obviously, I think it is a good idea that we focus on 
them, but not to lose the focus on China, because I think China 
is doing even more nefarious things.
    I do not know; does anyone have a comment on that?
    Yes, Doctor, I see your hand up. Mr. Ellis, I believe. Dr. 
Ellis?
    Mr. Ellis. Yes, sir. Thank you. And I think I want to pull 
together some very important threads that you brought up.
    No. 1, that Russia, because of its lack of resources, 
really is not going to be able to come substantially to the aid 
of its close partners that are looking to it--Venezuela, Cuba, 
Nicaragua. As a matter of fact, Latin America only exported 
about $6 billion to Russia last year by comparison to over $140 
billion to China. So, Latin America will, clearly, look much 
more to China as a market and for resources.
    What that means is that Russia only has two options. One is 
that its ability to act in the region will probably center more 
around threats, which is why I focused on the intelligence to 
projecting short-term, limited threats designed against the 
United States.
    But, No. 2, those, basically, anti-U.S. regimes will be 
driven to focus more on China for those resources, and we have 
to give them options against doing that.
    And then, finally, there is a whole basket of regimes 
because of COVID-19, as well as the inflationary effects of 
Russia's Ukrainian invasion, that are facing severe fiscal 
constraints and the inability to cover at-risk populations. And 
so, my big concern is that many of those States which may be 
left or right, but are still, basically, democratic, that we 
help to ensure that those struggles that are going on in places 
like Peru, or where things are going with Chile, potentially, 
later in the year with the Boric Administration, et cetera, or 
where things could go with Colombia--to make sure that those 
States, that we help them to succeed economically through 
things like investment, through things like nearshoring, 
through things like fiscal support, to help them avoid that 
anti-U.S. path that comes from radicalization, which will 
proliferate the problems that we face. And to me, in that way, 
our economic engagement helps keep China at bay, as well as 
keeping Russia at bay.
    Mr. Vargas. Thank you.
    My time has expired, and I appreciate you very much. I 
yield back, sir.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you very much, Congressman Vargas.
    I have a question before I do the closing. And if any other 
members wish to ask a second question, please feel free to do 
so.
    My question is this: I would love to hear a comment
    [audio malfunction].
    Mr. Vargas. We lost the chairman for a second here.
    Mr. Sires. Well----
    Mr. Vargas. OK, I wanted to make sure.
    Mr. Sires. Well, wait a second.
    It is notable that countries where Russia has the most 
influence have the worst human rights records, from political 
imprisonments to attacks on independent journalists to shutting 
down humanitarian NGOs.
    I look at, specifically, with respect to Cuba, the
    [inaudible] Administration
    [inaudible]. The Cuban government is
    [audio malfunction].
    Excuse me? Oh, my video is
    [inaudible]. Did you hear the question? Can you just nod if 
you heard the question? I guess not. Hello? Can you just raise 
your hand if you can hear me? Can you hear me? Oh, I do not 
like this. Can anybody hear me? Can you hear me?
    Mr. Price. Congressman, can you repeat the question, 
potentially, for the witnesses?
    Mr. Sires. Well, how do we get it back?
    Mr. Price. Sorry for the delay, everyone, to check issues.
    Mr. Sires. Can you hear me?
    Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, we hear you seldomly. You break 
up almost all the time. It is very, very difficult to hear. 
Ever so often, a word or two, but not strung together in any 
sort of syntax that think anybody can understand.
    Mr. Sires. Well, I can hear clearly. Can you hear me 
clearly now? Yes. All right. We will try this again.
    It is notable to me that the countries where Russia has the 
most influence have the worst human rights records--from 
political imprisonment to attacks on independent journalists, 
to shutting down humanitarian NGO's. Just recently, Cuba had a 
demonstration where people went to the streets. They are giving 
kids 10 years' prison for demonstrating.
    How do we inform other countries that this is what Russia 
really offers? How do we do that? I mean, you have got to be 
blind not to see what Russia offers. They have really nothing 
but, you know, devastation to offer.
    Can each of you in order just say a little bit of something 
about it before we close? Candace----
    Ms. Rondeaux. Thank you, Chair Sires. I will just briefly 
comment.
    All of this testimony today has, I think, provoked a lot of 
thinking about what is needed to resource the effort to combat 
Russia's influence in Latin America and other parts of the 
world. And I think, again, I would just repeat that investment 
in the architecture, the institutional architecture, in order 
to support that effort is going to be very key, not just the 
engagement piece and all the kind of tactical and strategic 
things that have been described by my colleagues here.
    Clearly, during the cold war, there was an enormous amount 
of investment in education of specialists in Russian affairs, 
as well as specialists who could be sort of a bridge between 
specialists in the area of military security affairs and, also, 
diplomacy in all kinds of regions of the world, including in 
Latin America.
    I would note that, also, during the cold war, Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty were extremely important in 
influencing outcomes in Eastern Europe and Europe writ large 
for sure. We do not see anything comparable to that today in 
terms of investment in the infrastructure needed to actually 
have influence over these outcomes. Particularly in the Western 
Hemisphere, there is no comparable body like RFE or RL. And I 
think that that certainly is a deficit that probably should be 
addressed relatively soon, if you want to get to grips with the 
disinformation campaign and the ways in which RT and Sputnik 
are managing to influence opinion in the area.
    But I would just repeat again, it is all nice and well and 
good to name all the different things that need to be done, but 
you have to have the people and the resources to do it. And 
right now it is not there.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Dr. Marten, can you comment on that?
    Dr. Marten. I agree with Candace Rondeaux completely. I 
have noticed the deficit of funding for people who specialize 
in Russian studies. And also, what we really need to do is tell 
people in Spanish and Portugese language broadcasts exactly 
what Putin and his regime have done in terms of their 
corruption and their violence. And so, I agree completely that 
what we need to do is answer back.
    And let me just add one more thing from a previous 
question, the question about whether sanctions against the 
Wagner Group work. I think they do. I think they limit the 
geographic regions where Wagner can be deployed. And as Candace 
Rondeaux has noted in her previous work, there are people who 
are employed by Wagner who are also employed by Rosneft, the 
oil industry, but they are different people. They are doing 
different things, and Wagner is much worse than Rosneft. And 
so, I think by having sanctions against Wagner, we are limiting 
the really nefarious actions of Russia. I am more familiar with 
Africa, obviously, than Latin America, but I think it applies 
there as well.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Dr. Ellis?
    Mr. Ellis. Yes. So, first of all, I think, in general, most 
of the States that are siding strongly with Russia--Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, et cetera--as you pointed out, themselves do not 
have free presses and are notable violators. I think the States 
that we find in the middle--Brazil, Argentina--we have options 
to encourage more the thinking about democracy.
    But, in addition to the fact that I think we need more 
forceful not only resources, but a communications strategy that 
would come from the State Department and public diplomacy from 
GFC and other entities like that.
    But I think, in addition to that, we need to rebuild the 
messaging: you know, what is the value of a democracy? What is 
the value of free markets? And to get our own partners in the 
region to be repeating it. I mean, to me, it was a shame that 
at the Summit of the Americas this idea of, you know, we are no 
longer just a--we started out as a club of democracies, but we 
lost the idea. It is a club; you get to show up just because 
you are in the hemisphere. And so, we need to get our partners 
to be willing to stand up for democracy because they believe 
that there is value in it for them, as a way to develop and 
have benefit for their societies. And we need to seek people in 
Latin America to seek that clear benefit as well.
    Mr. Sires. Thank you.
    Dr. Rouvinski?
    Dr. Rouvinski. Thank you very much.
    We completely agree with my colleagues today, but I would 
like to add just two specific points.
    I think one of the ways to expose the nature of Russia's 
authoritarian regime, and severe violation of human rights 
committed by Russia, not only in Ukraine, but also in Russia 
itself, is through investigative journalism. The investigative 
journalism has been very effective in Europe, for example, to 
exposing the corruption, the other wrongdoings by those regimes 
that are friendly to Russia. And we do know there has been very 
important academic research on this topic in Latin America, but 
there has been no investigative journalists' reports on that 
kind of relations between Russia and those regimes.
    And last, but not least, civil society. This is very 
important, the support of the civil society in democratic 
countries of Latin America that actually are the key allies for 
the democratic forces in this part of the world.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Sires. This has been a very informative hearing, and I 
thank the witnesses for your comments. I really enjoyed this 
hearing.
    And I want to thank my colleagues that joined us for this 
important hearing.
    And now, we will go to closing, and thank you again to our 
witnesses and the members for joining us on this important 
hearing.
    Over the last decade, Putin has sought to increase his 
influence in the Western Hemisphere through a variety of 
techniques, including arms sales, trade, and propaganda. By 
remaining engaged with our neighbors in the region, we can 
counter that influence.
    Today's hearing should be just one part of a comprehensive 
strategy to protect U.S. interests and support principles that 
now we all value. I look forward to working with my colleagues 
to build on the discussion that we had today with
    [audio malfunction].
    The committee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX
                                
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                 OPENING STATEMENT FROM CHAIRMAN SIRES

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