[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
REVIEWING DHS'S TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM PREVENTION GRANT
PROGRAM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 14, 2022
__________
Serial No. 117-61
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-778 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas John Katko, New York
James R. Langevin, Rhode Island Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Clay Higgins, Louisiana
J. Luis Correa, California Michael Guest, Mississippi
Elissa Slotkin, Michigan Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey
Al Green, Texas Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
Eric Swalwell, California Andrew S. Clyde, Georgia
Dina Titus, Nevada Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida
Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey Jake LaTurner, Kansas
Kathleen M. Rice, New York Peter Meijer, Michigan
Val Butler Demings, Florida Kat Cammack, Florida
Nanette Diaz Barragan, California August Pfluger, Texas
Josh Gottheimer, New Jersey Andrew R. Garbarino, New York
Elaine G. Luria, Virginia Vacancy
Tom Malinowski, New Jersey
Ritchie Torres, New York
Hope Goins, Staff Director
Daniel Kroese, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Clerk
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
J. Luis Correa, California, Chairman
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Peter Meijer, Michigan, Ranking
Dina Titus, Nevada Member
Ritchie Torres, New York Dan Bishop, North Carolina
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (ex Diana Harshbarger, Tennessee
officio) John Katko, New York (ex officio)
Lisa Canini, Subcommittee Staff Director
Eric Heighberger, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Aaron Greene, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Peter Meijer, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Management, and Accountability:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. Kurt Braddock, PhD, Assistant Professor, American University:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Ms. Humera Khan, President and Founder, Muflehun:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Paul Kim, Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Chris A. Kelenske, Commander, Michigan State Police:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Appendix
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Kurt Braddock... 39
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Humera Khan..... 39
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Paul Kim........ 40
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Chris A.
Kelenske....................................................... 40
REVIEWING DHS'S TARGETED VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM PREVENTION GRANT
PROGRAM
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Tuesday, June 14, 2022
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Management,
and Accountability,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. J. Luis Correa
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Correa, Titus, Meijer, Bishop, and
Harshbarger.
Chairman Correa. The Subcommittee on Oversight, Management,
and Accountability will come to order.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the
subcommittee in recess at any point.
I want to start by thanking everyone for joining us today.
We are here to discuss a topic that is becoming all too
familiar to man of us and every part of this Nation, and that
is domestic terrorism.
From the hostage situation at a synagogue in Colleyville,
Texas earlier this year to the racially-motivated shooting at a
grocery store in Buffalo, New York, to just last month many,
many attacks have devastated our communities across the
country. In response, the Secretary of Homeland Security
recently launched a new urgent review to assess the
Department's capabilities to address this rising threat. We are
here today discuss one of those capabilities in depth.
A key piece of the Department of Homeland Security's
toolbox has been the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention
Grant Program, or TVTP. Since 2011 the Department has
identified the need to partner with local communities to
address the growing domestic terrorism threat. In 2016 DHS
launched the Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program, a
predecessor to current TVTP program. However, weak management
of that early grant program undermined Homeland Security's
ability to determine the effectiveness of the funding and
concerns about inherent anti-Muslim bias in some of that
program funded projects eroded trust with minority communities.
It is local community leaders who are in the best position to
know when and how to engage with a vulnerable individual, and
ensuring the Department maintains trust with local communities
has to be a top priority.
In 2020, DHS relaunched the grant program under the new
TVTP name, with a new public health-focused approach. Through
the TVTP grant funding, DHS supports the efforts of local
partners who seek to raise awareness about the domestic violent
extremism threat and develop community-based networks to
provide support to individuals who may be radicalizing to
violence before a crime is committed.
Our witnesses today represent four of the organizations
that have received TVTP grants in either the fiscal year 2020
or fiscal year 2021 grant cycles. Their projects, executed over
a period of 2 years, represent the wide variety of violence
prevention efforts that are funded by this program. DHS has
sought to support projects that implement promising practices
as well as those that propose to test new and innovative
solutions to terrorism prevention.
These projects fall into a number of categories including:
Enhancing threat assessment capabilities, challenging on-line
mobilization narratives, and establishing or enhancing local
prevention frameworks. The TVTP program has demonstrated some
promising early results but it is still relatively new and
although DHS has started the process to ensure an independent
review of the efficacy of projects funded in the 2020 grant
cycle, that review is not yet complete. Continued oversight of
this program will be necessary to ensure that the mistakes of
the past are not repeated today.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
how they have ensured the protection of privacy, civil rights,
and civil liberties in their work with individuals and local
communities, as well as how they plan to measure the impact of
their projects. It is of the utmost importance that we get this
right and do whatever we can to curb these horrifying attacks
we must do immediately.
[The statement of Chairman Correa follows:]
Statement of Chairman J. Luis Correa
June 14, 2022
We're here to discuss a topic that has hit all too close to home
for many of us in recent weeks.
From the hostage situation at a synagogue in Colleyville, Texas
earlier this year, to the racially-motivated shooting at a grocery
store in Buffalo, New York just last month, hate-fueled attacks have
devastated communities across the country. The increasingly frequent
acts of domestic violent extremism in places we used to think of as
safe, have us all asking what more we can do.
The Secretary of Homeland Security recently launched a new urgent
review to assess the Department's capabilities to address this rising
threat. We are here today to discuss one of those capabilities in
depth. A key piece of the Department of Homeland Security's toolbox has
been the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grant
program.
Since 2011, the Department has identified the need to partner with
local communities to address the growing domestic terrorism threat. In
2016, DHS launched the Countering Violent Extremism grant program, a
predecessor to the current TVTP program. However, weak management of
that early grant program undermined DHS's ability to determine the
effectiveness of the funding and concerns about inherent anti-Muslim
bias in some of the funded projects eroded trust with minority
communities.
It is local community leaders who are in the best position to know
when and how to engage with a vulnerable individual, and ensuring the
Department maintains trust with local communities must be a top
priority. In 2020, DHS relaunched the grant program under the new TVTP
name and with a new public health-focused approach.
Through the TVTP grant funding, DHS supports the efforts of local
partners who seek to raise awareness about the domestic violent
extremism threat and develop community-based networks to provide
support to individuals who may be radicalizing to violence before a
crime is committed.
Our witnesses today represent four of the organizations that have
received TVTP grants in either the fiscal year 2020 or fiscal year 2021
grant cycles. Their projects, executed over a period of 2 years,
represent the wide variety of violence prevention efforts that are
funded by this program. DHS has sought to support projects that
implement promising practices as well as those that propose to test new
and innovative solutions to terrorism prevention.
These projects fall into a number of categories including:
Enhancing threat assessment capabilities, challenging on-line
mobilization narratives, and establishing or enhancing local prevention
frameworks. The TVTP program has demonstrated some promising early
results but it's still relatively new and although DHS has started the
process to ensure an independent review of the efficacy of projects
funded in the fiscal year 2020 grant cycle, that review is not yet
complete. Continued oversight of this program will be necessary to
ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about how they
have ensured the protection of privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties in their work with individuals and local communities, as well
as how they plan to measure the impact of their projects. It is of the
utmost importance that we get this right and do whatever we can to curb
these horrifying attacks.
Chairman Correa. With that, I thank you again for joining
us today and the Chair would recognize the Ranking Member, if
he he is here. Is he here?
Mr. Meijer. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear and see
me?
Chairman Correa. Mr. Meijer, how are you? Welcome.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Correa. Ready for your comments, sir. Welcome.
Mr. Meijer. Coming to you live off the floor.
So, Chairman Correa, thank you for holding this important
subcommittee hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's
Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program. Thank
you so much to our witnesses for joining us today. I look
forward to hearing your testimony about experience they have
had with the program as grant recipients, and am particularly
interested in learning about what you found to be the most
effective and how you think this program might be able to
responsibly grow and benefit a larger number of communities in
the future.
Over the years the terrorism landscape has evolved and
while many grants focusing on terrorism prevention were created
as a result of the 9/11 attacks, the current threat landscape
has a combination of both international and domestic violence
concerns. We must address and evolve our approach so that it is
tackling these new and emerging threats and allocating Federal
dollars in the most effective way possible.
I believe that we must do all we can to protect our
communities and equip them with the tools they need to combat
and prevent targeted violence and terrorism in whatever form it
takes. The TVTP Grant Program is one such tools that can help
communities build and strengthen their resiliency capabilities
and prevent threats before they arise. Just last April I co-led
a letter to the House Appropriations Committee that was
focusing on all of these various funding streams, asking them
to increase funding in fiscal year 2022 for the Office of
Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, which is now off
operating as the Center for Preventative Partnerships and
Programs, and the TVTP threat program itself. This letter
highlighted the fact that in recent years more Americans have
been killed by domestic violence extremists than by
international terrorism. The number of terrorism investigations
conducted by the FBI has doubled since 2017.
While threats from foreign terrorist organizations remain
very real, these figures demonstrate that the landscape is
changing, so so too must our thinking.
Recently our country has experienced increased rates of
violence, ranging from heartbreaking mass shootings to an
attempted assassination of a sitting Supreme Court Justice. We
must do more to combat violence and address its root causes, no
matter the ideological motivation so that democracy is
protected. Violence of any kind is unaccepted and as elected
leaders it is our responsibility to find solutions that will
promote and protect the safety of those we represent.
The TVTP Grant Program has a great amount of potential to
enhance these important efforts. At the same time, I think it
is incumbent that we make sure this money is well spent. Simply
spending more taxpayer dollars will not fix the problem. We
must make sure that Federal grant dollars are spent
efficiently, with clear objectives, and measurable outcomes.
This grant program must be transparent and accountable to the
American people and it must ensure that civil liberties for all
Americans are protected.
As lead Republican on the Oversight, Management, and
Accountability Subcommittee, I remain committed to working with
my colleague, Chairman Correa, to help strengthen the security
of our local communities and to bolster and improve DHS
programs designed to achieve this goal. It is imperative that
we continue to advance bipartisan efforts to increase funding,
accessibility, and resources to programs that enhance the
safety and security of communities around this country.
Targeted violence and terrorism can occur anywhere at any time.
We must remain committed to empowering local leaders and local
law enforcement to strengthen this resiliency and ensure DHS
has the proper funding to support their efforts.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the
importance of the TVTP Grant Program, the ways in which they
have used these grant awards to protect their communities, and
any recommendations that they have to improve the program going
forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Meijer follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Peter Meijer
June 14, 2022
Chairman Correa, thank you for holding this important subcommittee
hearing on the Department of Homeland Security's Targeted Violence and
Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program, and thank you to our
witnesses for joining us today. I am looking forward to hearing
testimony about your experiences with the program as grant recipients,
and I am particularly interested in learning about what you found most
effective and how you think this program might be able to responsibly
grow and benefit a larger number of communities in the future.
Over the years, the terrorism landscape has evolved. While many
grants focusing on terrorism prevention were created as a result of the
9/11 attacks, the current threat landscape is filled with both
international and domestic threats. We must evolve our approach to
address these new and emerging threats and allocate Federal dollars in
the most effective manner possible.
I believe that we must do all that we can to protect our
communities and equip them with the tools they need to combat and
prevent targeted violence and terrorism--in whatever form it comes.
The TVTP Grant Program is one such tool that can help local
communities build and strengthen their resiliency capabilities and
prevent threats before they arise. Last April, I co-led a letter to the
House Appropriations Committee calling on them to increase funding in
fiscal year 2022 for the Office of Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention (OTVTP), now operating as the Center for Prevention Programs
and Partnerships (CP3), and the TVTP Grant Program.
This letter highlighted the fact that in recent years, more
Americans have been killed by domestic terrorism than by international
terrorists and that the number of domestic terrorism investigations
conducted by the FBI has doubled since 2017. While threats from Foreign
Terrorist Organizations remain very real, these figures demonstrate
that the landscape is changing, and so must our thinking.
Recently, our country has experienced increased rates of violence,
ranging from heartbreaking mass shootings to an attempted assassination
of a sitting Supreme Court Justice. We need to do more to combat
violence and address its root causes, no matter the ideological
motivation, to protect our democracy. Violence of any kind is
unacceptable, and as elected leaders, it is our responsibility to find
solutions that will promote and protect the safety of those we
represent. The TVTP Grant Program has a lot of potential to enhance
these important efforts.
At the same time, I want to make sure that this money is well
spent. Simply spending more taxpayer dollars will not fix the problem.
We must make sure that Federal grant dollars are spent efficiently--
with clear objectives, and measurable outcomes. This grant program must
be transparent and accountable to the American people, and it must
ensure that the civil liberties of all Americans are fully protected.
As lead Republican on the Oversight, Management, and Accountability
Subcommittee, I remain committed to working with Chairman Correa to
help strengthen the security of our local communities and to bolster
and improve DHS programs designed to achieve this goal. It is
imperative that we continue to advance bipartisan efforts to increase
funding, accessibility, and resources to programs that enhance the
safety and security of communities around the country.
Targeted violence and terrorism can occur anywhere, at any time. We
must remain committed to empowering our local leaders to strengthening
the resiliency in our communities and ensuring DHS has the proper
funding to support this effort. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses on the importance of the TVTP Grant Program, the ways in
which they've used these grant awards to protect their communities, and
any recommendations they have to improve the program going forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Ranking Member Meijer, I couldn't agree
with you more. The mission to protect American lives from
terrorism, very important mission. We have to make sure that
every taxpayer dollar we invest in this mission is optimal.
Thank you very much, sir.
Members are reminded that the committee will operate
according to the guidelines laid out by the Chairman and
Ranking Member in their February 3 colloquy regarding remote
procedures. Members are reminded they may submit statements for
the record.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Bennie G. Thompson
June 14, 2022
We are here today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's
Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grant program.
Although still relatively new, this grant program has become a key part
of the Department's strategy to address a rise in violent domestic
extremism incidents. Community spaces we all once considered safe--
schools, churches, grocery stores--have been repeatedly struck by
horrific and tragic violence in recent years. These attacks leave deep
and lasting scars on our communities, and our Government must do
everything in its power to put a stop to this violence.
Over the last decade, the Department of Homeland Security has
tracked the rising number of fatal domestic violent extremism attacks.
Perpetrators of these violent acts are often lone wolves and DHS has
found that there is no common motivating factor that unites them all,
making these attacks difficult to predict and prevent. In response to
these challenges, DHS has sought to support local programs to prevent
individuals from committing a violent act regardless of the motivating
ideology.
Through the TVTP grant program, the Department directly funds
State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments, nonprofits, and
institutions of higher education to help create or enhance violence
prevention networks. Known as local prevention frameworks, these
networks facilitate connections between community leaders to increase
awareness about the domestic violent extremism threat and provide
support services for vulnerable individuals who may be on the path
toward radicalizing to violence. These support services can take many
forms, from youth-resilience programs to media literacy and critical
thinking initiatives aimed at combating the pervasive appeal of
disinformation. The goal is to reach people who may have started down
the wrong path but have not yet committed a crime.
Identifying and working with these individuals is not something
that local law enforcement always has the capacity or authority to do.
That is why DHS has identified the need to support a whole-of-society
approach to violence prevention, with the goal of equipping faith
leaders, schoolteachers, and other community members with the tools
needed to provide meaningful support. Yet just as importantly, these
programs must ensure that the protections for privacy, civil rights,
and civil liberties that all Americans enjoy are not swept aside in the
name of prevention.
We must be aware of the limitations inherent in the goal of
preventing a crime before it happens. The DHS Office of Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties has worked closely with the Department's Center for
Prevention Partnerships and Programs, to ensure that both DHS and the
projects it funds are protecting already vulnerable individuals and
communities. But continued oversight from this committee and others
will be necessary.
I look forward to the completion of the Department's independent
review into the efficacy of these grant programs, and I am pleased we
have the opportunity today to delve more deeply into how some of these
projects have been designed and implemented. It is my hope that DHS
will stand as a leader in the fight against domestic violent extremism
and provide a light for local communities during their darkest hours.
Chairman Correa. Without objection, Members not on the
subcommittee shall be permitted to sit and question the
witnesses.
Now I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness, we
have Dr. Kirk Braddock, an assistant professor, School of
Communication at American University. His research focuses on
persuasive strategies used by violent extremist groups to
recruit and radicalize audiences targeted by their propaganda.
Dr. Braddock also explores how theories of communication,
persuasion, and social influence can be used to inform
practices meant to prevent radicalization among the vulnerable
audiences.
Second witness, Ms. Humera Khan, the president and founder
of the Muflehun, a think tank specializing in preventing
radicalization and domestic violent extremism. She has also
served as co-investigator for the Department of Defense's
Minerva Research Institute project on terrorist propaganda, as
well as strategic advisor to the U.N. Security Council managing
the countering violent extremism portfolio.
Our third witness, Mr. Paul Kim, a deputy district attorney
with the LA District Attorney's Office, where he has served for
over 25 years. Mr. Kim currently works with the hate crimes
unit within the organized crime division.
Our final witness is Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kelenske,
commander of field support bureau and deputy director of the
Michigan State Police. He is responsible for strategic
leadership for the emergency management and homeland security
division and intelligence operations division, which includes
the State of Michigan's Fusion Center.
Without objection, the witnesses' full statements will be
inserted in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his or her statement
for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Braddock.
Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF KURT BRADDOCK, PH D, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Braddock. Mr. Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer,
thank you for having me here today.
Members of the committee, thank you for having me to
testify in relation to DHS's Center for Prevention Programs and
Partnerships, formerly TVTP.
As Chairman Correa said, I am assistant professor of public
communication at American University where I am also a faculty
fellow at a research center focusing primarily on domestic
extremism and terrorism, called the Polarization and Extremism
Research Innovation Lab.
Between these two appointments, I work at the intersection
of communication and violent extremism, where I try to
understand how communication influences people to engage in
violent activities on behalf of ideologies that we see both
domestically and internationally.
My work in this area really stems from the events of
September 11, 2001, which really instilled in me a drive to
find ways and understand why people could engage in such evil
and find ways academically to protect Americans from this kind
of violence. To this end, for the last 20 years I have studied
violent Islamic Jihadists, violent extremists from the far left
and the far right, Irish Republican dissident groups, lone
actor terrorists, violent animal rights activists, single
issues terrorists, Christian extremists, and every other
extremist you can find.
I sit in front of you today to discuss my unique experience
with the CP3 Program. At present, this program, where my
research is intended to understanding disinformation and
conspiracies perpetuated by far-right extremists and their
intended audiences and, more importantly, how we can prevent
those audiences from engaging in violence in support of that
disinformation, those conspiracies. I focus on the far right in
this project because I know how important it is for the U.S.
Government to use its budgets efficiently, getting the most
value for every dollar spent.
To that end, I sought to develop a project that addresses
what all data show to be the most significant threat to
domestic American security at the moment, far-right violent
extremists. Stated most simply, I want to get you all the most
bang for your buck. I am glad to say that to date the project
has been a relative success, resulting in multiple deliverables
for CP3, as well as a large workshop attended by some of the
foremost experts in right-wing extremism and disinformation. I
hope that my work continues to be of use for DHS in this
regard.
From the outset of this project, CP3 program, formerly
TVTP, has been very enthusiastic and supportive of any research
that I have done. Personnel at CP3, some of which I will
mention by name later, have been in constant contact with me
throughout my work and have sought to help me address logistic
problems associated with my research at every turn.
One specific challenge that I ran into in the early goings
of the project was related to the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic, which limited to the degree to which I could meet
collaborators, research participants, or other colleagues fact-
to-face. Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic and the
limitations it put on my research, CP3 continued its support by
facilitating the completion of deliverables that can be worked
on without face-to-face contact. Some of these include the
development of training modules for stakeholders that helped
them build resilience to disinformation within their
communities, as well as training modules for those who would
train others to help build this resilience.
After COVID protocols were sufficiently lifted, we were
able to hold the in person workshop on understanding
disinformation and future threats, one of the themes of which
was a focus on LGBTQ+ communities, which as we saw just a
couple of days ago, does seem to be a target of the far right,
or at least some elements of it.
I understand my role here today will be to testify in more
detail about my experiences with CP3 to gauge its value for the
American people. To this end, I offer my full endorsement thus
far. Not only has the program funded a range of research that
addresses a variety of threats facing the country, it also
demands accountability. Very few research programs require
measures of program effectiveness to the degree that CP3 does.
Because of this, the field is rife with pundits that pose as
professional. Prominent media figures, twitter experts, and
backseat driver pundits have long commented on the
effectiveness of certain practices to reduce the risk of
violence, but have provided no evidence to this effect. CP3
doesn't allow for this kind of fast and loose commentary.
If only for CP3's demands for research accountability and
proof of intervention effectiveness, I believe the program
provides excellent value.
But before turning to your questions to provide further
detail about my project, I want to thank by name on the record
John Wilder of CP3. He has been my program manager and with my
project he has been a godsend on coordinating, organizing, and
demanding accountability on my part for why my project is being
effective.
With that, I look forward to your questions and I will also
apologize in advance if you hear my dog tapping around during
my testimony. I think he just wants to be part of the
Congressional record.
So thank you very much and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Braddock follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kurt Braddock
14 June 2022
Esteemed Members of the committee, thank you for having me here
today to testify in relation to the Department of Homeland Security's
Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships. My name is Dr. Kurt
Braddock and I am an assistant professor of public communication at
American University. I am also a faculty fellow at a research center at
American University called the Polarization and Extremism Research and
Innovation Lab. Between my appointments, I work at the intersection of
communication and violent extremism where I seek to understand how
different forms of communication influence individual decisions to
engage in illicit political violence. My work in this area was inspired
by the events of September 11, 2001, which instilled in me a drive to
protect my fellow Americans through my work. To this end, for the last
20 years, I have studied violent Islamic jihadists, violent extremists
from the far-left and the far-right, Irish republican dissident groups,
lone-actor terrorists, violent animal rights activists, religious
Christian extremists, and every other ideology you can imagine. I sit
in front of you today to discuss my experience with the Department of
Homeland Security and its CP3 program, which has funded a project I am
currently working on.
At present, I am working on a research project geared toward
understanding how disinformation and conspiracies perpetuated by far-
right extremists persuade their intended audiences, and more
importantly, how we can prevent those audiences from engaging in
violence in support of those conspiracies and disinformation. To date,
this project has been a success, resulting in several deliverables for
the CP3 program, including a large workshop on the world's foremost
experts in extremism and disinformation. I hope that my work continues
to be of use to the Department of Homeland Security, and in turn, the
country.
My experience with the CP3 program began when it was referred to as
the program for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention in 2020.
Prior to my being hired at American University, I began working on a
research proposal concerning the work I described above. I was made
aware that my research had been funded just before my official start
date at AU in the summer of 2020.
From the outset of the project, the CP3 program has been
enthusiastic and supportive of my research. Personnel at CP3 (some of
whom I will mention by name later) have been in constant contact with
me over my work and have sought to help me address logistic problems
associated with the research at every turn. One specific challenge I
faced in the implementation of my research was the impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic, which limited the degree to which I could meet
collaborators, research participants, or colleagues face-to-face.
Despite the challenges posed by the pandemic and the limitations it put
on the early part of my research, CP3 continued its support by
facilitating the completion of deliverables that could be worked on
without face-to-face contact. Some of these deliverables included the
development of training modules for stakeholders to build resilience to
disinformation in their communities, training modules with guidance on
teaching others about building this resilience, reviews of research
related to disinformation and far-right violent extremism, and finally,
after COVID protocols were sufficiently lifted, an in-person workshop
on understanding disinformation and future threats.
I understand that my role here today will be to testify in more
detail about my experiences with the CP3 program to gauge its value to
the American people. To this end, I offer my full endorsement. Not only
has the program funded a range of research that addresses a variety of
threats facing the country, it also demands accountability for that
research. Very few research programs require measures of program
effectiveness to the degree that CP3 does. Because of this, the field
is rife with pundits posing as professionals. Prominent media figures,
Twitter ``experts,'' and backseat driver pundits have long commented on
the effectiveness of certain practices to reduce the risk of
ideological violence, but have provided no evidence to back their
claims. The CP3 program does not allow for this kind-of fast-and-loose
commentary. For every question I ask, every experiment I design, every
bit of data I collect, I must demonstrate whether the intervention I am
testing is effective. This is a breath of fresh air in our field.
If only for CP3's demands for research accountability and proof of
intervention effectiveness, I believe the program provides excellent
value. Before turning to your questions to provide further detail, I
would like to thank, by name, John Wilder of CP3. He is the program
manager on my project, and has been a godsend on research coordination,
organization, and accountability.
With that, I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Braddock. Your dog's
comments on the Congressional record will be accepted without
objection.
Mr. Braddock. They are not worth it.
Chairman Correa. Thank you for your testimony.
Now I recognize Ms. Khan to summarize her statement in 5
minutes.
Welcome, Ms. Khan.
STATEMENT OF HUMERA KHAN, PRESIDENT AND FOUNDER, MUFLEHUN
Ms. Khan. Good afternoon, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member
Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for this opportunity to testify about the DHS Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program.
My name is Humera Khan and I am the president and co-
founder of Muflehun, and we are an independent resource center
at the nexus of society, security----
To prevent domestic terrorism and targeted violence in a
country, it is essential we focus on, No. 1, raising awareness
of the threat and using a public health approach as the
solution for violence prevention. But No. 2 is allocation of
resources by Federal, State, and local governments to mitigate
risk factors and enhance protective factors for primary
prevention of violence.
So Muflehun was actually the recipient of two DHS fiscal
year 2020 TVTP grants and that focus on these two areas. One
for an upstander training branded Tackle! to raise awareness,
and the second is an innovation grant called the Community
Resilience Early Warning System, CREWS, for primary prevention
of domestic terrorism and targeted violence.
CREWS is a data-informed platform to help mayors, county
executives, city managers, and locally-elected leaders
prioritize risk and protective factors specific to their
jurisdictions and to allocate budgets aligned with the need of
their local prevention frameworks. CREWS uses publicly-
available open-source data of society and community risk and
protective factors at the National, State, and local levels. It
does not use any individual level information, nor is there any
personally identifiable information, PII, in the platform.
So we are grateful to DHS for funding this innovative
approach and to our four pilot locations for their commitment
to protecting their communities. Our preliminary analysis has
focused on hate crimes and domestic terrorism, and over the
next few weeks we will be completing our initial analysis for
mass casualty shootings and school shootings.
After our analysis is finalized, and in partnership with
the stakeholders, we will be recommending priorities for
steering limited resources to build local prevention
frameworks. We will be conducting briefings and capacity-
building workshops at each pilot location to facilitate multi-
stakeholder partnerships based on their specific needs.
In 2020, Muflehun also got the TVTP grant for the Tackle!
Upstander training. That was implemented in partnership with
the American Jewish Committee, AJC. That training curriculum
includes awareness of the threat of targeted violence and
domestic terrorism and targeted violence, understanding how
hate and bigotry can incite violence, anti-Semitism, anti-
Muslim bigotry, and Black racism, and anti-Asian hate, the role
of communities in violence prevention and the role of engaged
upstanders in recognizing that individuals are experiencing
distress and knowing what to do in these situations. The
participants from 12 States included elected officials,
district attorneys, human rights commissioners, school safety
officers, superintendents, county emergency management
directors, and law enforcement.
So the implementation of our two TVTP grants over the last
18 months has resulted in several learnings, right. Based on
that we do recommend: No. 1, While the threats of domestic
terrorism and targeted violence continue to increase, $20
million of grant funding each year is stretched thin over our
whole country. It is inadequate. Grant funding levels should be
increased multiple-fold. No. 2, greater attention should be
given to increasing awareness levels by encouraging the scaling
of capacity-building programs such as Tackle! and other similar
initiatives. No. 3, the regional prevention coordinators are
one of the greatest assets of DHS. They are experienced
professionals, they are an invaluable resource for the grantees
and the local stakeholders alike. But there is not enough of
them; there need to be at least one RPC per State. No. 4, while
DHS is adding members to its team, there is still a gap for
more technically-qualified staff with subject-matter expertise
that is aligned with the public health approach. No. 5 is data-
informed analysis facilitates improved decision making. DHS
should utilize data in its selection of future grants by
matching data informed needs of geographic locations to the
proposed solutions at State and local levels.
So let me end by emphasizing that we must accelerate our
efforts with increased resource allocation, and not be
discouraged by the mistakes of the past. We cannot wait for
another Tree of Life Synagogue attack or Charleston's AME
church attack or Buffalo supermarket killings or the Uvalde
school massacre before we decide to allocate resources toward
primary prevention.
Thank you again for your attention and for the opportunity
to share Muflehun's experiences and perspective.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Khan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Humera Khan
June 14, 2022
Good afternoon, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for this
opportunity to testify about the DHS Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention Grant Program.
My name is Humera Khan and I am the president and co-founder of
Muflehun. Muflehun is an independent non-profit founded in 2010. We are
at the nexus of society, security, and technology, and serve as a
resource center for preventing and countering hate, extremism, and
violence, and for building resilience. Our mission is to facilitate a
world with justice for all by cultivating prosperity.
organization overview
Muflehun works with stakeholders to design contextualized solutions
to complex social challenges aimed at increasing social resilience. We
conduct research and analysis of current violent extremism challenges,
identifying root causes and developing relevant solutions; applying the
learnings from research to pilot programs to counter the threats faced
by society; sharing lessons with partner organizations and providing
support in their capacity building for adapting and delivering
localized versions of the programs; and regularly providing analyses
and learning to policy makers for improved macro-level decisions.
Our research and pilot programs feed into capacity building of
individuals, communities, Federal and local government agencies, multi-
lateral agencies and independent organizations, as well as institutions
involved in the efforts of preventing and countering violent extremism
or those influenced by any act of incurred or potential violent
extremism. Muflehun has designed and implemented multiple projects
providing capacity building to adapt and deliver localized solutions
and regularly provides analyses and learning to policy makers for
improved decisions domestically and internationally in more than 10
countries.
Muflehun has a special focus toward the increasing threats within
USA, drawing upon its rich subject-matter expertise and vast network of
resources, applying technology tools and methods to design relevant
solutions for the local challenges faced in society. We provide support
to Federal, State, and local governments in developing community
resilience frameworks, increasing the safety of the local populations.
background
Every few weeks, the news headlines announce another attack,
another shooting, another round of thoughts and prayers for the victims
and their families, another post-attack post-mortem revealing that
there were warning signs and red flags for years and yet help could not
be coordinated in a way to prevent the tragedy from occurring. This
oft-repeated cycle needs to stop.
To prevent domestic terrorism and targeted violence in our Nation
it is essential to focus on two main areas: (1) Raising awareness of
the threat and utilizing a public health approach as a solution for
violence prevention, and (2) the allocation of resources by Federal,
State, and local governance for primary prevention to mitigate risk
factors and enhance protective factors.
Muflehun was the recipient of two fiscal year 2020 Targeted
Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) grants from DHS that focused
on these two areas. One is for an upstander training titled Tackle!
designed to raise awareness, and the second is an innovation grant
titled the Community Resilience Early Warning System (CREWS) to
recommend resource allocations for primary prevention of domestic
terrorism and targeted violence. Following are brief overviews of the
projects funded by the DHS TVTP grants.
crews
In 2020, Muflehun received DHS TVTP grant No. EMW-2020-GR-00087 for
the Community Resilience Early Warning System (CREWS) to recommend
resource allocations for primary prevention of domestic terrorism and
targeted violence, namely hate crimes, mass casualty shootings, and
school shootings.
The challenge Muflehun took on in designing and implementing CREWS
was to apply a public health approach for primary prevention of these
threats of domestic terrorism and targeted violence without repeating
the failures of previous CVE efforts. The CREWS project is grounded in
decades of academic research, and uses data to inform our understanding
of mitigation of risk factors and enhancement of protective factors at
local governance levels. It was developed with the objective of
facilitating systemic change, and encouraging multi-stakeholder
partnerships and prevention frameworks.
CREWS is a data-informed platform to help mayors, county
executives, city managers and locally-elected leaders prioritize risk
and protective factors, specific to their jurisdictions, that need to
be addressed to prevent domestic terrorism and targeted violence, and
to allocate budgets aligned with the needs of their local prevention
frameworks.
CREWS uses publicly-available open-source data of societal and
community-level risk and protective factors at the National, State, and
local levels. It does NOT use any individual level information, nor is
there any Personal Identifiable Information (PII) in the platform. The
factors are identified from academic research conducted over the past
20 years, and are grouped into several categories: Economic, education,
health, public safety, community cohesion, social participation, and
influence of ideology. The machine-learning models are trained on 20
years of data including the years 2000-2019. Muflehun is working with
four pilot locations to apply the results of the data findings and
support the local government leaders in understanding how their
financial resources can be better utilized in developing local
prevention frameworks.
We are grateful to the DHS for investing in this innovative
approach in fiscal year 2020, and to our pilot locations for their
commitment to protecting their communities, and their willingness to
use data to understand how best to build resilience. Many thanks to the
Mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania and her office, the leadership of the
Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, Pennsylvania, the County
Executive of New Castle County, Delaware and his office, and the State
senator of the 3rd District of Connecticut for their bold leadership.
Our preliminary analysis has focused on hate crimes and on domestic
terrorism, and over the next few weeks we will be completing initial
analysis for mass casualty shootings and school shootings.
Our findings show that: (1) Each location has a unique combination
of risk factors and protective factors; what is a risk factor for one
location might not be contributing to increasing vulnerability at
another location. Examples of this are school spending and income
inequality which vary considerably across locations. The prioritized
resource allocation portfolio for each location will therefore
necessarily look very different (2) The combination of risk and
protective factors for each location change over time and analysis must
take recent trends into account (3) Some factors, such as drug overdose
deaths, mental illness rates and access to health resources, are
consistently amongst the top ten risk factors for domestic terrorism
and hate crimes across all the pilot locations, over the past 10 years
(4) Whereas there is considerable overlap in the risk and protective
factors for domestic terrorism and hate crime, they are not identical.
Local governments would be well-served to prioritize resource
allocation for factors that impact both domestic terrorism and hate
crimes for greater impact. Examples of this are cyberbully and school-
based bullying (5) Enhancing protective factors, rather than only
mitigating risk factors, should be part of the design of local
prevention frameworks.
These examples of early findings are only the first step in the
wealth of information that will be available from CREWS to share with
our pilot location partners.
After our analysis is finalized and in partnership with our
stakeholders, we will recommend priorities for steering limited
resources to facilitate comprehensive local prevention frameworks.
Before our project ends at the end of the year, we will be conducting
briefings and capacity-building workshops at each pilot location and
facilitating multi-stakeholder partnerships based on their specific
needs. Increasing the efficient utilization of limited resources to
build resilience against targeted violence and domestic terrorism is
essential for the safety of our Nation.
tackle
In 2020, Muflehun received DHS TVTP grant No. EMW-2020-GR-00093 to
implement an upstander training designed to raise awareness of the
threat of domestic terrorism and targeted violence, and to enhance the
ability of community leaders to identify and respond to individuals at
risk of mobilizing to violence.
The Tackle! Upstander Training was implemented in partnership with
American Jewish Committee (AJC) and its network of 24 regional offices
and 11 Muslim-Jewish Advisory Councils (MJACs) that build ties between
Jewish and Muslim leaders to work against hate, anti-Semitism, and
anti-Muslim bigotry.
The 8-hour training curriculum includes:
Awareness of the threat of targeted violence, domestic
violent extremism, and recruitment tactics
Understanding of how hate and bigotry can incite violence,
including narratives that ignite anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim
bigotry, anti-Black racism, and anti-Asian hate
Local prevention frameworks and the role of communities in
violence prevention
Understanding the role of engaged upstanders to recognize
when individuals are experiencing distress and broadcasting
their intent to move toward violence, and knowing what to do in
such situations.
The participants included elected officials, district attorneys,
human rights commissioners, school safety officers, principals, and
superintendents, town and county emergency management directors,
sheriffs, and law enforcement officers. We were also tremendously
fortunate that DHS Regional Prevention Coordinators (RPCs) joined each
of our cohorts for discussions and engagement with the participants
about existing local resources.
One hundred eighty leaders in 9 cohorts attended the virtual course
with 154 participants completing the full training (85 percent).
Participants were surveyed on their starting knowledge and post-
training to assess the change in their willingness and skills to be
engaged upstanders. The results inform our understanding of the dire
need for more awareness, the effectiveness of our Tackle! curriculum,
and suggestions for improvements:
When asked if participants had heard the terms domestic
terrorism and targeted violence, 94 percent indicated that they
knew of the terms however only 25 percent knew what the terms
actually meant.
When asked about using a public health approach for violence
prevention, a mere 22 percent knew the concept, with over 30
percent never having heard of it before.
After the Tackle! Training, 86 percent of the participants
agreed or strongly agreed that they had the skills to prevent
violence, an increase of 37 percent.
Similarly, post-training 73 percent were very likely to
engage with a friend or family member they were concerned
about, an increase of 21 percent.
Participants consistently stated the most helpful features
were ``case studies and real-life examples'' and requested
``more case scenarios with upstander interventions''
Given the low levels of awareness of the threat and how to respond
to it even by the very leaders who are entrusted to keep us safe, the
need to scale up awareness is imperative for the safety of our country.
To ensure sustainability of the Tackle! training beyond the DHS
TVTP grant, Muflehun and its partners have applied for support from
private foundations to continue to enhance the curriculum and provide
training in new locations.
learnings from the crews and tackle! projects
The implementation of our two DHS TVTP grants over the last 18
months has resulted in several learnings and recommendations which we
will briefly share:
1. While the threats of domestic terrorism and targeted violence
continue to increase, $20 million of grant funding each year,
stretched thin over our whole Nation, is woefully inadequate.
It is merely a drop in the bucket and what we need is a
firehose. We recommend that the grant funding levels should be
increased multiple fold.
2. Our experience in implementing the CREWS and Tackle! projects
has highlighted the low awareness levels of the threats of
domestic terrorism and targeted violence (and how to respond to
them) of our leaders who are entrusted to keep us safe. We
would request the House Homeland Security Committee to give
greater attention to increasing awareness levels by enouraging
the scaling of capacity building programs such as Tackle! and
other similar initiatives. Giant strides are required to build
the capacity of the local leaders; only baby steps have been
taken so far.
3. The DHS Regional Prevention Coordinators are one of the greatest
assets of DHS CP3. They are experienced professionals who
understand what is happening on the ground and are an
invaluable resource for the grantees and the local stakeholders
alike. Muflehun has worked closely with the Regional Prevention
Coordinators while implementing the CREWS and Tackle! projects
and has witnessed their support in developing local prevention
frameworks. But there is not enough of them; there need to be
at least one per State, and in more populated States, multiple
Regional Prevention Coordinators per State are required.
4. DHS CP3 has provided overview documents to encourage the
development and implementation of local prevention frameworks.
However, much more detailed guidelines are needed that factor
in the necessary sophistication and coordination required to
effectively design and implement these approaches. DHS should
incorporate the learning from its various grantees to
accelerate the in-depth understanding and process of developing
well-informed local prevention frameworks.
5. While DHS CP3 continues to add members to its team, there
remains an unfilled gap for more technically qualified staff
with subject-matter expertise that are aligned with the public
health approach that DHS is now taking toward preventing
domestic terrorism and targeted violence. Without the required
expertise and knowledge, there is a risk that essential
technical areas of developing local prevention frameworks will
remain unattended or previous mistakes from CVE might be
repeated.
6. Data-informed analysis facilitates improved decision making. Our
experience in implementing the CREWS project displays the
variation in the combination of needs for local prevention
frameworks. Muflehun recommends utilization of data by the DHS
TVTP Grants program in its selection of future grants by
matching the data-informed needs of geographic locations to the
proposed solutions at State and local levels.
conclusion
Let me end by emphasizing that DHS TVTP grant funded projects such
as CREWS and Tackle! are only the beginning of the long journey of
solutions ahead of us as a Nation. To make the required progress, we
must accelerate our efforts with increased resource allocation, and not
be discouraged by mistakes of the past. We need to learn and
continually improve our approaches to make our country safer by
tackling the public safety challenges upstream rather than intervening
only after they become threats to communities. We must not wait for
another Tree of Life Synagogue attack or Charleston AME church attack
or Sandy Hook School shooting, or Buffalo supermarket killings or the
Uvalde school massacre before we decide to allocate resources toward
primary prevention.
Thank you again for your attention and for the opportunity to share
Muflehun's experiences and perspectives. I look forward to answering
any questions you may have.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much, Ms. Khan.
I recognize Mr. Kim to summarize his statement in 5
minutes.
Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF PAUL KIM, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOS ANGELES
COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Mr. Kim. Thank you, Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer,
and distinguished Members of this committee.
My name is Paul Kim and I am a deputy district attorney at
the DA's Office here in Los Angeles County.
I am currently assigned to the hate crimes unit. I have
been assigned here for about 8 years. The hate crimes unit
vertically prosecutes all serious hate crimes that happen
within the County of Los Angeles, including any case that
involves great bodily injury or death, any case that is
committed by an organized hate group, and cases that are either
complex in nature or require a seasoned deputy district
attorney.
In this capacity, my primary role is I am a trial attorney.
My secondary role is I do community outreach. I work closely
with our partners, our community-based partners, ranging from
the Jewish groups to the AAPI groups, and including members of
the LGBTQ community as well.
During the time that I was prosecuting hate crime cases,
about 3 years ago I came across an issue. I had a defendant
that had committed a crime of violence against a member of the
LGBT community here in Long Beach. This had gone all the way up
to the very highest levels at my office and a disposition was
reached to include 200 hours of community service. Obviously
our goal was to try to raise the defendant's awareness when it
came to the LGBT community. When we reached out to one of our
partners, one of our stakeholders, I was immediately asked what
did this individual do. When I described what happened and I
described the nature of the injury, what was I was told by the
director was, Mr. Kim, this individual has committed an act of
violence and has seriously injured a member of our community.
We don't desire to have him participate doing any community
service with our members or on our property.
Now, this posed a problem. One of the things that we know
is that hate is not innate, it is something that is learned, it
is something that is acquired. Somewhere he learned to hate
this group of people because of whatever characteristic it is
that you are biased against. When we start with that point, and
we also consider the penal code, the California penal code
422.85, which suggests that whenever you place somebody on a
grant of probation, you should engage in some sort of cultural
sensitivity and awareness training. LA County didn't have an
anti-bias program.
One day, when I was doing community outreach with the
Museum of Tolerance, I was on a call with the LA City
Attorney's Office, who was working with the Museum of
Tolerance, who was also a TVTP awardee, on their one-to-one
program, which is a 15-hour coaching program. At that time I
met Michael Brown, who is the deputy director of field
operations, and I reached out to Mr. Brown after I heard his
talk and he mentioned that there was a grant available. So I
told him I would like to apply for the grant. I told him there
was a need in the county, specifically when it came to trying
to address the bias-motivated violence that caused the
individual to target whoever it was for whatever crime was
committed.
Mr. Brown encouraged me to apply. It was the first time I
had applied. It was in fact the first time that LADA had
applied for a Federal grant. We had previously applied for
local grants, State grants, but never a Federal grant. At this
point, I must echo Dr. Braddock, John Wilder is also my program
analyst and he has been incredibly helpful when it comes to
helping us get the basics of this program done.
The program is three-fold. No. 1, we want to focus on
counseling. One of our sub-recipients is Gateways Hospital and
Mental Health Center. They are going to have a clinician that
is going to be working for 80 hours, 40 individual and 40 hours
of group, trying to see if they can determine what the roots of
the bias animus are and where they came from.
Second, we are going to be working with a community-based
organization called Second Call. Second Call does re-entry for
former felons and they are going to be acting as professional
facilitators and they are going to be acting as coaches in
helping with the anti-bias portion of the program.
Finally, we are working with Three Strands to develop an
anti-bias program, an anti-bias curricula, that can be used for
any category of bias once it is created.
I think that the CP3 program is really amazing. I think
that what it is going to permit us to do is to develop two
things. No. 1, an offender-centric study--not a very large one,
but an offender-centric one, and, No. 2, the tools and the
modules that are necessary to try to address explicit bias.
I look forward to the questions and I thank you for
inviting me to participate.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kim follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Kim
REACCH is a program designed to reduce recidivism of bias-motivated
crimes in the Country of Los Angeles through a multidisciplinary
regimen that aims to foster understanding, empathy, and self-awareness,
and prevent future transgressions of bias-motivated crimes. In
recognition of the importance of DHS's public health approach to
violence prevention, this project will utilize substance abuse and
mental health treatment, functional impairment identification, anger
management and cognitive behavior restructuring, vocational and
educational training to address maladaptive behavior in general and
bias animus in particular. REACCH also aims to aid participants of the
program to begin the process of reconciliation with the victim or peer
victim group through letters of apology, direct interaction, and
community service. We have partnered with several community
organizations including Gateways, 2d Call, and 3Strands to holistically
recognize, analyze, and rectify the roots of bias animus, and have set
up both qualitative and quantitative measures to thoroughly evaluate
our method of reducing recidivism.
Chairman Correa. Mr. Kim, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Now I would like to recognize Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske
to summarize his statement for 5 minutes.
Welcome, Colonel.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS A. KELENSKE, COMMANDER, MICHIGAN STATE
POLICE
Mr. Kelenske. Thank you Chairman Correa, Ranking Member
Meijer, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee for
allowing me to discuss the Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention Grant Program.
My name is Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kelenske and I am the
deputy director in charge of the Field Support Bureau of the
Michigan State Police, or MSP. In this role, I oversee MSP's
Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division, as well as
the Intelligence Operations Division, among other areas. MSP
was awarded a grant of $451,255 from the fiscal year 2021 DHS
Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program and
today I will be discussing how we are using this important
Federal support.
Too many times in recent years we have experienced
incidents across our great Nation where individuals have
targeted others and committed acts of violence leading to far
too many senseless deaths. The Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention Grant is a tool that is helping us in Michigan to
hopefully prevent these incidents before they occur by
establishing a regional Behavioral Threat Assessment Management
Team and a State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program.
Our Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team consists
of multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional partners who
identify individuals who are on a pathway to violence and
intervene by providing them with productive alternative
outcomes.
The State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program includes law
enforcement, first responders, and private-sector partners
across Michigan who will enhance awareness and strengthen
collaboration and information sharing to aid in preventing
targeted acts of violence.
We recognize the need to develop behavioral threat
assessment management capability in our State to ensure
prevention frameworks are adopted that will allow local
stakeholders to participate in communications addressing
radicalization to violence. To address our behavioral threat
assessment management gap within the terrorism prevention and
targeted violence framework, we are developing one regional
concept Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team that
covers three counties. These three counties include the seat of
State government and the State capitol of Michigan, have a
combined total population of just under 500,000 people, and are
comprised of both urban and rural communities. This Behavioral
Threat Assessment Management Team will serve as a conduit to
identify persons of concern who pose a threat of targeted
violence, and then provide referrals to independent programs as
a form of prevention. This initial, multi-disciplinary team
that this grant is helping to create is comprised of
professionals from the local community who will collaborate to
increase communications, develop protocols, and work with
individuals who have risk factors of targeted violence and
terrorism.
Using our grant funds, we are hiring a specialist who will
be on-board within the next month who will be responsible for
developing and managing the team, providing intervention and
threat assessment training for team members, and for developing
team protocols. A critical success factor for this program is
having the funds to keep this specialist employed beyond the
grant period, as this would provide communities with the
coordination, training, and confidence to identify at-risk
individuals and respond with a coordinated community approach
for successful targeted violence intervention and prevention.
Future grant opportunities will help us to expand this
regional team concept State-wide. Additionally, through this
grant, and in partnership with Center for Prevention Programs
and Partnerships or CP3, we have recently begun to collaborate
with Michigan State University School of Medicine and the
National Policing Institute on a project that will train a
highly-skilled set of clinicians to be deployed across Michigan
who will supplement the regional behavioral threat assessment
teams by providing advanced care and safety or management plans
for those most at risk for becoming radicalized toward acts of
targeted violence.
We are also sensitive to the protection of privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties, which is why the privacy policy of
the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center will be adhered to
in all cases brought to the attention of the Behavioral Threat
Assessment Management team. Individuals associated with cases
that pose a public safety risk will be treated with the same
Constitutional protections as any other individual encountered
by law enforcement.
The goals of the Fusion Liaison Officer program are to
provide training to increase awareness of targeted violence
through outreach, community involvement, and intervention. As
part of this grant, we received funding for two part-time,
contract analysts to assist with the delivery of the Fusion
Liaison Officer training, which is in-person training provided
to law enforcement, first responders, and private-sector
personnel. This training seeks to increase awareness of the
risk factors and radicalization to violence process, strengthen
strategic partnerships, and bolster information and
intelligence sharing. To date, we have hired one of two part-
time contract analysts to assist the Fusion Liaison Officer
coordinator, finalized our educational materials, held a Joint
Community Awareness Briefing with our CP3 partners that
included 30 of our State intelligence members, and conducted 1
of the scheduled 10 training sessions. Once the initial
groundwork is complete and the program is established, the
Fusion Liaison Officer coordinator, who is a senior
intelligence analyst in the Michigan State Police, will be
capable of managing the program independently without the
sustainment of the contract analysts beyond the grant
performance period.
Thank you for your time and this opportunity to share our
experiences in Michigan. At this time I am happy to take any
questions you may have for me.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelenske follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris A. Kelenske
June 14, 2022
Thank you Chairman Correa, Ranking Member Meijer, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee for allowing me to discuss the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Targeted Violence and Terrorism
Prevention Grant Program. My name is Lieutenant Colonel Chris Kelenske,
and I am the deputy director in charge of the Field Support Bureau of
the Michigan State Police, or MSP. In this role, I oversee MSP's
Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division, as well as the
Intelligence Operations Division, among other areas. MSP was awarded a
grant of $451,255 from the fiscal year 2021, DHS Targeted Violence and
Terrorism Prevention Grant Program. Today I will be discussing how we
are using this important Federal support.
Too many times in recent years, we have experienced incidents
across our great Nation where individuals have targeted others and
committed acts of violence leading to far too many senseless deaths.
The Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention grant is a tool that is
helping us in Michigan to hopefully prevent these incidents before they
occur by establishing a regional Behavioral Threat Assessment
Management Team and a State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program.
Our Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team consists of
multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional partners who identify
individuals who are on a pathway to violence and intervene by providing
them with productive alternative outcomes.
The State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer program includes law
enforcement, first responders, and private-sector partners across
Michigan who will enhance awareness and strengthen collaboration and
information sharing to aid in preventing targeted acts of violence.
We recognize the need to develop behavioral threat assessment
management capability in our State to ensure prevention frameworks are
adopted that will allow local stakeholders to participate in
communications addressing radicalization to violence. To address our
behavioral threat assessment management gap within the terrorism
prevention and targeted violence framework, we are developing one
regional concept Behavioral Threat Assessment Management Team that
covers three counties. These three counties include the seat of State
government and the State capitol of Michigan, have a combined total
population of just under 500,000 people, and are comprised of both
urban and rural communities. This Behavioral Threat Assessment
Management Team will serve as a conduit to identify persons of concern
who pose a threat of targeted violence, and then provide referrals to
independent programs as a form of prevention.
This initial, multi-disciplinary team that this grant is helping to
create is comprised of professionals from the local community who will
collaborate to increase communications, develop protocols, and work
with individuals who have risk factors of targeted violence and
terrorism. Using our grant funds, we are hiring a specialist who will
be on-board within the next month who will be responsible for
developing and managing the team, providing intervention and threat
assessment training for team members, and for developing team
protocols.
A critical success factor for this program is having the funds to
keep this specialist employed beyond the grant period, as this would
provide communities with the coordination, training, and confidence to
identify at-risk individuals and respond with a coordinated community
approach for successful targeted violence intervention and prevention.
Future grant opportunities will help us to expand this regional team
concept State-wide.
Additionally, through this grant and in partnership with Center for
Prevention Programs and Partnerships or CP3, we have recently begun to
collaborate with Michigan State University School of Medicine and the
National Policing Institute on a project that will train a highly-
skilled set of clinicians to be deployed across Michigan who will
supplement the regional behavioral threat assessment teams by providing
advanced care and safety or management plans for those most at-risk for
becoming radicalized toward acts of targeted violence.
I want to mention that we are sensitive to the protection of
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, which is why the privacy
policy of the Michigan Intelligence Operations Center will be adhered
to in all cases brought to the attention of the Behavioral Threat
Assessment Management team. Individuals associated with cases that pose
a public safety risk will be treated with the same Constitutional
protections as any other individual encountered by law enforcement.
The goals of the Fusion Liaison Officer program are to provide
training to increase awareness of targeted violence through outreach,
community involvement, and intervention. As part of this grant, we
received funding for two part-time, contract analysts to assist with
the delivery of the Fusion Liaison Officer training, which is in-person
training provided to law enforcement, first responders, and private-
sector personnel. This training seeks to increase awareness of the risk
factors and radicalization to violence process, strengthen strategic
partnerships, and bolster information and intelligence sharing.
To date, we have hired one of two-part time contract analysts to
assist the Fusion Liaison Officer coordinator, finalized our
educational materials, held a Joint Community Awareness Briefing with
our DHS CP3 partners that included 30 of our State intelligence
members, and conducted 1 of the scheduled 10 training sessions.
Once the initial groundwork is complete and the program is
established, the Fusion Liaison Officer coordinator, who is a senior
intelligence analyst in the Michigan State Police, will be capable of
managing the program independently without the sustainment of the
contract analysts beyond the grant performance period.
Thank you for your time and this opportunity to share our
experiences in Michigan. At this time I am happy to take any questions
you may have for me.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske,
for your testimony.
I want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony as
well.
I will remind the subcommittee that we will each have 5
minutes to question the panel.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions and
my first question would go to Mr. Braddock and Ms. Khan. As you
know, this TVTP program is essentially a 2-year cycle. Fiscal
Year 2020 just coming to a close. So question, briefly, can you
tell me what your programs were able to achieve over the last 2
years?
Ms. Khan.
Ms. Khan. So we have two projects. I will count both of
them.
So for CREWS we have--let us see, we have four pilot
locations who are committed to trying out this new approach of
using data-informed analysis to support the primary prevention
of violence. We are very specifically working with them to help
understand the risk and protective factors for the allocation
of resources.
So this is about working with them to develop the
recommendations for their sites. Of course, all of this is
based on the fact that we have actually built out the CREWS
platform, which is bringing in open-source data from the last
20 years from multiple Government agencies to actually
understand what is playing out in terms of risk factors and
protected factors.
For Tackle! we have actually completed the Tackle! training
program and we have trained over 150 participants over 12
States. This is a virtual training. After the Tackle! training
we have found that 86 percent of our participants agreed or
strongly agreed that their self-perception is that they have
the skills to prevent violence. So this was actually an
increase of 37 percent just based on those 8 hours of training.
Then similarly we found that after the training, 73
percent, right, were actually willing to engage with a family
or friend that they were concerned about. That is an increase
of over 20 percent in that.
So we have--I mean for--so for Tackle! we have completed
all our grant requirements because we finished early. We
actually went above what we had promised. For CREWS it is on-
going and we have--and we are now--already sent the pilot
locations the initial results and we are working with them to
develop the recommendations and see how they are doing their
budgets and how they are building their partnerships.
Chairman Correa. Thank you.
Mr. Braddock.
Mr. Braddock. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So this project was designed as a two-phase project, the
first of which was meant to inform the second phase. Before I
describe exactly what we have achieved so far, let me describe
what the basis of the project is.
This project hinges on the idea of something called
attitudinal inoculation. The idea being that if you expose
somebody to a weakened form of an idea in the same way the body
is exposed to a weakened form of a virus, they can develop
resilience to that idea. Now, there is about 60 years of
research in communication science showing that this is an
effective means of helping people prevent being persuaded by
these sorts of ideas.
So the first phase of the project was meant to develop
deliverables and trainings that help people develop their own
inoculation messages. So in the years that we worked so far
there have been four major real outcomes.
No. 1, we have developed this literature base around
inoculation and disinformation that can be of use to
stakeholders. I know that literature is a boring word to
politicians and to practitioners. So we have made this a way
that is accessible to practitioners. One of the things I really
want to do with this work is to make sure it is easily
accessible and digestible by people that are going to use it.
So it has been boiled down to its basest element so that people
can understand it.
Second, we have developed a reading list for people so they
can look at this information. But the two major hallmarks of
the first phase are the trainings that have been undertaken and
the workshop that we have undertaken. The training, so far I
think we have conducted three. Two were we trained stakeholders
directly and I think we have trained probably 200 by now,
stakeholders from around the country in developing inoculation
messages for specific threats that they face in their
communities.
So although my focus for my project is on the far right and
disinformation specifically, different communities have
different kinds of threats that face them. So I want to be able
to train those communities to address those informational
threats that face them specifically. So we have trained several
individuals, 200 or so, in how to develop inoculation messages
for those specific threats.
For the project, going into phase two, we conducted this
workshop where we had about I guess 30 of the world's foremost
experts on right-wing extremism and disinformation and
identified some of the threats coming down the pipeline in
terms of disinformation and the kind of violence that might
come from the American far right, one of which, as I mentioned,
was the LGBTQ threat.
Building on that, we will be conducting an experiment where
we are testing inoculation against this very idea in areas
around the country where this idea is starting to percolate
based on searches and search engines that are completely
anonymized.
So we have achieved a lot of our foundational work,
conducted several trainings, we have identified these threats,
and the last step is to test inoculation based on the threats
we have identified.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Dr. Braddock.
I now recognize Ranking Member Meijer for 5 minutes of
questions.
Welcome, sir.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me?
Chairman Correa. Yes, yes. A for effort.
Mr. Meijer. But, you know, I really appreciate all the
witnesses' testimonies today. Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for holding this important hearing on the subject.
I will start with Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske. I appreciate
you coming in from Michigan today, from the great State of
Michigan, the greatest State of Michigan.
With all the grant funding that you have received, the
Michigan State Police, Michigan Intelligence Operations Center,
or MIOC, implemented their State-wide Fusion Liaison Officer
program. The goal of the program of course is to provide
training to law enforcement, first responders, and private-
sector partners across the State to enhance awareness and also
strengthen collaboration.
Now, since the implementation of this training, can you
share how the information sharing and collaboration has
improved between the key stakeholders in this space, what have
you found to be best practices in information sharing, and how
can other local communities implement similar processes to
strengthen collaboration?
Mr. Kelenske. Thank you for your question.
We have only been able to get one of the two part-time
contract analysts in place to date. The focus has been mostly
in the creation and updating of the educational materials for
the Fusion Liaison Officer trainings and then initial meetings
with State and Federal partners. We have numerous Fusion
Liaison Officer training sessions that will occur, with three
coming up actually in August and September. With the training
session we had and future trainings, we expand our targeted
violence and terrorism prevention ecosystem of stakeholders,
which by its very nature fosters information sharing and
collaboration through frequent discussions, interactions, and
our product distribution. Personnel in the sessions not only
get comfortable with Fusion Center and Fusion Liaison Officer
personnel who they provide information, but they understand the
process of the information sharing and benefits of
collaboration.
After our first FLO training, our Fusion Liaison Officer
training session, we did not see an increase in suspicious
activity reports, but we did see an increase in requests for
service. But we cannot say if this at this time is attributed
to the FLO training or some other factors, but we are going to
continue to look at these impacts from our training session as
we move forward.
With over 7,000 individuals, and that is law enforcement,
emergency management, our private-sector partners, who
currently receive our daily information bulletins from our
Fusion Center, and with the increased exposure to the FLO
program through our trainings, I am certain our information
sharing and collaboration will continue to flourish and
increase. We also look to our stakeholders to help us continue
to identify how we can improve our collaboration and
information sharing.
We also have more interaction with agencies and personnel
on the threat mitigation and targeted violence and terrorism
prevention through our biweekly meetings with State agencies
who are interested in behavioral threat assessment teams.
Additionally, by embedding our DHS CP3 coordinator into our
Fusion Center, we have more direct and quicker access to DHS
resources, as well as having our regional coordinator's
expertise in implementing targeted violence and terrorism
prevention programs.
Last, we have engaged with our renowned experts on this
topic from Michigan State University to collaborate with us and
to provide guidance as we move forward.
As far as your question on best practices, first and
foremost, providing actionable, relevant, and timely
information to stakeholders. Then build a network of multiple
disciplines that have regular meetings to engage with each
other, identify that essential reporting mechanism and how the
distribution of information should occur, discussing
appropriate interventions, as well as hold joint training
sessions that foster trust and demonstrates the effectiveness
of inter-agency and multi-disciplinary collaboration.
Then we continue to look at what has been done in Virginia,
North Carolina, and recently Florida, who has shown that
behavioral threat assessment management is a best path forward
with I believe it was a May 2007 study.
So we will continue to look at our partner States to see
what are the promising practices as we continue to move
forward, sir.
Mr. Meijer. This is the last question.
Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske, you know, you mentioned in
your testimony the importance to protecting privacy, civil
rights, civil liberties, throughout the work of behavioral
threat assessment management team.
You know, obviously, in the State of Michigan we saw the--
just in recent months the acquittal of four individuals who
were accused of participating in the kidnapping plot against
the Governor. It is in the realm of domestic violent extremism,
making sure we are protecting civil liberties, we are not
getting to the point, which has been alleged of conducting
entrapment operations. Now, some of that obviously is a little
bit more right-ward than kind-of the focus on the prevention
side, but could you provide more details into that process and
how your Department ensures that, you know, in the course of
doing their work they are also protecting, you know, civil
liberties, civil rights, and just the privacy of American
citizens more broadly?
Mr. Kelenske. Yes. I can provide a lot more information. I
believe we have our intelligence operations operation center
policy privacy, is a 6-page document that is posted on-line. I
can ensure that that gets sent to you. It is a public-facing
document. But we take that very serious. We look at that all
the time to ensure those protections are in place, as well as
an agency it is embedded in our official orders or policies to
ensure that all members continually have those protections at
the front of their mind. But I can provide you that document,
sir, or the link to that document if that is OK.
Mr. Meijer. I appreciate it, Lieutenant Colonel, and, Mr.
Chairman, with that I yield back.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Meijer.
I now recognize Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Braddock, I would like to ask a couple of questions of
you. One of the other witnesses at least related, how much have
you received in grants from DHS for this sort of research?
Mr. Braddock. This particular grant was $568,000 I believe,
and change. Somewhere in that realm.
Mr. Bishop. How about over the course of time? How much in
total from DHS?
Mr. Braddock. In terms of this grant or overall in my
personal research?
Mr. Bishop. Why don't you first do this grant and then
overall.
Mr. Braddock. This grant I think we are about halfway
through the money that we spent, and overall DHS just add
another $5,000 to it for a grant that I got in graduate school
for my dissertation.
Mr. Bishop. So about a half million, give or take a few
thousand? Is that what you are saying in total?
Mr. Braddock. Give or take. Yes, I would say somewhere
between $550,000 and $580,000.
Mr. Bishop. OK. One thing you said in your testimony, and I
saw it in the written testimony as well, is that you credit DHS
for its program here for the use of ``measures of program
effectiveness''. You say that is kind-of rare in the field.
Then you say ``because of this, the field is rife with pundits
posing as professionals''.
Mr. Braddock. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bishop. I take note of that because I am concerned
about that, especially with the recent hullabaloo about the
disinformation governance board and the like and the way I see
that.
But let me ask you about this, on May 16 you had a tweet
thread out there that I took a look at addressing what you call
stochastic terrorism.
Mr. Braddock. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bishop. Looking into it, it is a term that has been
bandied about the last 5 years or so. I mean it has been a
little earlier than that, but not much, but 5 years in active
use. You describe it as ``a form of incited terrorism whereby a
communicator has access to a platform and big audience''.
Mr. Braddock. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bishop. ``When the communicator uses coded language
that promoted violence within an audience of millions, at least
one is likely to interpret it as a call to arms''. Then you go
on to say--that is the end of your quote, but you say you
really can't predict who, when, or where, but as a matter of
probability, at least one person will view it that way and
might act on it.
Mr. Braddock. Correct.
Mr. Bishop. So that is what you described stochastic
terrorism as. Then you--I mean you distinguished that from
incitement, right? I mean the law already recognizes that if
you----
Mr. Braddock. Absolutely.
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Call for violence immediately,
that is incitement. That is not protected. But the line that
Brandonberg v. U.S. drew by the Supreme Court was it is not--
you can even talk about violence, calling for violence. You
can't call for immediate violence. That is incitement.
Otherwise it is protected, isn't that right?
Mr. Braddock. That is correct, yes.
Mr. Bishop. OK. So then you go on in that tweet thread and
you say in one that President Trump is a stochastic terrorist
with respect to the January 6 riot at the Capitol, right?
Mr. Braddock. Correct.
Mr. Bishop. OK. So he is a terrorist. Then you also say
that with respect to the 2019 El Paso Walmart mass shooting of
people of Hispanic descent, that President Trump was a
stochastic terrorist of that event, right?
Mr. Braddock. Right. Among others, yes.
Mr. Bishop. OK. Then you have a tweet here that says--ends
with this--it says--well, let me just pull it up--it says
Carlson is a danger to U.S. domestic security. You are talking
about Tucker Carlson, right?
Mr. Braddock. I am.
Mr. Bishop. Your conclusion is that Tucker Carlson is a
terrorist.
Mr. Braddock. Stochastic terrorist.
Mr. Bishop. OK.
Mr. Braddock. I distinguish between an activist terrorist,
someone who engages in violence, and a stochastic terrorist as
the inciter not meeting the legal definition for incitement.
Mr. Bishop. OK. It is not an inciter in law, but one in
your definition, a stochastic terrorist. I guess I will keep
using that term--it is hard to say stochastic. It is a
statistical term, right?
Mr. Braddock. I know, it is annoying. Yes, yes, it is a
statistics term that I didn't come up with. The term stochastic
terrorist came up--I think it emerged somewhere around 2011-
2012.
I actually had a discussion with somebody earlier--I just
did a podcast where I say I don't actually like the terms
stochastic terrorist because terrorism----
Mr. Bishop. I am not a big fan either.
Mr. Braddock [continuing]. Is an activity. What is that?
Mr. Bishop. I am not a big fan either.
Let me go on with that.
Mr. Braddock. Go for it. Yes, yes.
Mr. Bishop. So the word stochastic is when--you know, you
are familiar with the Chuck Schumer statements about Kavanaugh
and Gorsuch, you have released the whirlwind and you will pay
the price. You won't know what hit you if you go forward with
these awful decisions. Is Chuck Schumer a stochastic terrorist?
Mr. Braddock. I would say that one walks the line. There is
another one from the left--I forget who it was--that said it,
but somebody on the left a couple of--maybe it was last year--
talked about getting in the face and getting aggressive with
police, or something along those lines. I forget----
Mr. Bishop. Like Maxine Waters, how about that? Let us make
sure we show up wherever we have to show up and you push back
on them and you tell them they are not welcome anymore
anywhere. Is she a stochastic terrorist?
Mr. Braddock. I have made that argument.
Mr. Bishop. Is Joe Biden--after the attempt on Kavanaugh's
life said merely that evening that if--he went on late night
comedy and predicted a mini revolution if the Supreme Court
overturns Roe. Is President Biden a stochastic terrorist?
Mr. Braddock. I wouldn't think that meets the line, no. But
you mentioned a point earlier too where it all relates to data
and collecting data as to whether one connects to the other.
That is the research I am trying to conduct now. I am actually
not related to the project I am testifying on now, but another
research project I am working on is looking at the connection
between the two.
Something I think you are alluding to but I want to
distinguish is stochastic terrorism isn't illegal. Just because
the term is in it doesn't mean that it is illegal. Incitement
is illegal. That doesn't mean the phenomena doesn't exist.
Mr. Bishop. Well, that is what I am concerned about. I
don't know if the Chairman might indulge me a little bit since
it doesn't look like we have got a long train of people, but
let me just ask this.
Chairman Correa. Go ahead.
Mr. Bishop. The end of that tweet thread I was talking
about says one more thing, I am a firm believer that 1A--you
are referring to the First Amendment--is sacrosanct.
Mr. Braddock. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bishop. But there is a debate that needs to be had
about whether and how stochastic terrorism is allowed to occur.
Mr. Braddock. Sure.
Mr. Bishop. So you are talking about some restriction that
by your own definition is different than where the Supreme
Court is about what is protected by the First Amendment, aren't
you?
Mr. Braddock. It is not a legal restriction I am arguing
for. The arguments I make for against stochastic terrorism are
building of resilience against that particular strategic
communication because it is a strategic form of communication.
Although it is not legal incitement, it can be argued to relate
to the behaviors that take place later. Though it is not
illegal, it doesn't mean that we can't do counter persuasion
against it. It is a strategic communication device like any
other.
Mr. Bishop. So sort-of last line--last point that can take
me back to that tweet I showed you.
Mr. Braddock. Sure.
Mr. Bishop. Have you been paid taxpayer dollars by DHS to
study Tucker Carlson as a stochastic terrorist?
Mr. Braddock. No.
Mr. Bishop. OK. Has that been a feature of your research?
Have you researched Tucker Carlson?
Mr. Braddock. I mean informally. For my own edification I
have.
Mr. Bishop. Sufficient to the point that you are willing to
say on Twitter that he is a stochastic terrorist for the
Buffalo massacre, right?
Mr. Braddock. I am willing to say it on Congressional
record, yes.
Mr. Bishop. But you haven't researched to quantify anything
or to come up with a statistical relationship?
Mr. Braddock. There are researches--I haven't done that
argument----
Chairman Correa. Mr. Bishop, I am going to----
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
indulgence.
Chairman Correa. We are going to have a second set of
questions if you so wish.
But let me get to Ms.----
Mr. Braddock. Can I make one last statement, Chairman?
Chairman Correa. Go ahead, go ahead, go ahead. This is a
good discussion. Go ahead.
Mr. Braddock. No, it is.
Chairman Correa. Make your point.
Mr. Braddock. Mr. Bishop, these are the exact discussions
that I am talking about in that tweet thread that I want to
take place. The fact that these discussions can actually take
place and we can find where a line is, or if there is a line,
that debate needs to take place. This is what I enjoy about
these sorts of things.
It is not meant to be--it is not meant to mean that
somebody should be arrested for saying something, but these
sorts of words do have implications. We have 100 years of
research showing that words have implications. Even if they are
not legally actionable, they need to be talked about. These are
the discussions that I like to have with both sides.
Mr. Bishop. The Chairman has been very gracious to allow me
to go on.
Chairman Correa. Thank you.
Mr. Bishop. I look forward to maybe taking it up with you
for a little further--if I get another chance, Mr. Braddock.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. OK. You got it.
Mrs. Harshbarger, welcome. You get a little bit over 5
minutes. How is that? Go ahead.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Hi, I am good. I am good to go. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the panel for being here today.
You know, I have a question about how you measure the
program effectiveness. You know, from what I understand, DHS
defines targeted violence as any intentional act against a pre-
identified target based on that target's perceived identity or
affiliation that is intended to intimate, coerce, or generate
publicity about the perpetrator's grievance.
I guess my question to any of the panel is how do you
measure the program effectiveness and performance standards?
How do you integrate that into this TVTP grant program? How did
having a performance standard and accountability measure help
you evaluate your projects and improve the effectiveness of
your projects? Because how do you know something is successful
if you don't have outcomes and measures put in place to measure
that program?
That is to anyone on the panel.
Mr. Braddock. I will go very quickly, because I don't want
to take everybody's time here.
In mine there are several measures of effectiveness, the
primary one being the inoculation, actual treatments. You can
pre- and post-test people to see how they feel about a
particular topic before and after they receive the inoculation
treatments. That is the plan with the experimental phase of the
overall project.
In terms of the trainings that I have done and those sorts
of things, we have actually conducted surveys of people who
have gone through the trainings who have intentions about
inoculation, who understand it, who believe it would be useful
for their specific communities. We can actually do statistical
analyses of their responses to see whether there is improvement
in what they feel about the actual strategy moving forward.
Those have all shown positive improvement.
In terms of the second part, the--what I mentioned
earlier--the actual inoculation treatments, those are based on
controlled experimentation, which in social science is the gold
standard, but hard to come across. So there is several
different measures that I use. Again, one of the I think
cornerstones of the TVTP program is that it demands these kinds
of evaluations as we do these sorts of thing.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes. Absolutely.
Does anybody else have a comment for us?
Mr. Bishop. I thought you were trying to yield, Diane. I am
sorry.
Mrs. Harshbarger. No, it is OK, Dan.
Ms. Khan. So I was going to talk about for our programs we
actually use pre- and post-questionnaires and various feedback
and survey instruments very specifically to measure the shift
in knowledge and willingness to act based on information that
they have received. So, for example, for our Tackle! program
what we started off with is--and this is when you mentioned
actually the definitions of--who knows what the definitions
even mean. So we actually asked the participants that. It turns
out that 94 percent of the participants had heard the terms
domestic terrorism and targeted violence and yet only 25
percent knew what they meant.
Same thing we asked about public health approach, what is
that? Barely 20 percent knew of the concept and about 20
percent had never even heard of it before.
So you can imagine, right, that when we are talking about
what is targeted violence, what is domestic terrorism, what is
public health approach, mass majority of our participants had
no idea. These were the elected officials and the leaders who
are there to protect us. So there is this--for us it was this
huge awareness that--recognition that awareness is essential.
Without the awareness there is no way of actually doing
prevention or having a public health approach or any of this
stuff if people don't even know what it is they are trying to
do.
So that for us was important.
We also found through our training that after our
training--and I mentioned this earlier also--is that we found
after our training over 85 percent of the participants agreed
or strongly agreed that they now--there is a certain section of
skills to actually, to be upstanders and knowing what to do in
various types of situations and running through case studies
and role plays, and they found that they were actually ready to
do it. This was an increase of over 37 percent. That is a huge
increase because we are talking about, you know, 6 hours live
training, 2 hours on-line, right. So a total of 8 hours virtual
training. It is 1 day of training, which caused this huge
increase in their willingness and they actually--the skills of
that they had.
Then the other thing, which we were checking against is the
willingness to act. Because it is one thing to say oh, I know
what to do, but the question is, am I willing to do it? There
we also saw that after their training over about 75 percent--73
percent were willing to actually engage with friends and
family.
When we are talking about upstanders, right, in this case
we are not talking about here is a random stranger. This is not
about the DHS like see something, say something. When we are
talking about up upstanders, it is how can people who you know
within your own network recognize if an individual is going
through any sort of distress, is any crisis in their life, and
then how to get them help way before they actually are trying
to get toward violence. So for that, so you want the friends
and family, you want our own networks to be one of, hey,
something is happening but what to do about it. There we saw
that, again, post-training there was an increase. There was
almost a 20 percent increase.
So we did--yes, we are absolutely using metrics. We have
to----
Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, yes. I know that--did you want to
say something, sir? Mr. Kim.
Mr. Kim. Thank you, Representative Harshbarger, I did.
One of the things I think that is interesting about the
REACCH Program, which is--it stands for Reconciliation,
Education, and Counseling Crimes of Hate--is we are dealing
specifically with criminal defendants who are being placed on
probation and are going to be completing the program as a term
of probation.
I think there are two interesting things that we can talk
about here when we are talking about metrics. The easiest
metric is going to be whether or not they further offend. So we
are seeking to get permission to track them for 5 years to see
whether or not they commit offense and then, if they did commit
an offense, did they target the same group that they targeted
the first time. It is not so much recidivism in terms of global
recidivism, but targeted and selected recidivism that this
program is about. I do feel that having the ability to check
their criminal record is clear quantifiable empirical factor
that we can look at.
The other thing I would like to mention to this committee
is this program is making a deliberate effort to bring victim
reconciliation into the arena. When I say that, one of the
target participants that is going to be working with us, he was
White, he was with his wife, she was White, and they ended up
all over the National press because they came across an African
American man and his ethnic wife and they got out of the car
and they started saying things like only White lives matter.
This was all being recorded by the victim's wife. What is
interesting here is even though the court only has jurisdiction
over the defendant, the individual who struck the truck with
the shovel, after talking to him and his attorney and saying we
would like you to participate in this program, he and his wife
have both agreed to participate in victim reconciliation with
the victims. In this instance the victims, the man and his
wife, have agreed to sit down with the defendants--well, a
singular defendant. What is interesting I think there is, you
know, metrics--I mean when we try to make it quantifiable can
be very difficult, but qualitatively here, having the victim
and the defendant sit down to talk about what happened, for the
defendant to be given the opportunity to apologize and for the
victim to be given the opportunity to accept, goes way beyond
the defendant and the victim, it involves the entire community,
whether it is a Jewish community that is involved, whether it
is the African American community that is involved, whatever
community it is.
So I would like to point that out. Sometimes there are
qualitative factors that are difficult to measure, but they do
yield I think significant results.
Thank you for your question.
Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Mr. Kim.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much.
Any other Members that wish to ask their 5 minutes of
questions?
Seeing none, would you all be interested in a second run of
questions?
Mr. Bishop. I would, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. So would I. OK, let us move to a second
round. I will start with a set of questions. I am going to try
to hold to 5 minutes.
I am going to ask Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske a question
and thoughts if I may.
Lieutenant Colonel, you are running part of the Fusion
Center in Michigan. We here in Orange County, California also
have a Fusion Center and they do some great things, from cyber
to intel, trying to prevent some bad stuff from happening. One
of the concerns that I have heard from Fusion Centers is the
communication not be as good as it should be and that sometimes
communication is from the Feds now, but not--or I should say
from the bottom up and not from the bottom back to the Fusion
Centers.
Any thoughts?
Mr. Kelenske. I think we have seen over the years that the
communication ebbs and flows. I will say, we are--have been
doing this since right after 9/11 and we are light years ahead
of where we were. I think everyone would agree with that. But I
do feel that the communication is effective. We can always do
better.
I also think the communication between the Fusion Centers
throughout our Nation, to include the work that the National
Fusion Center Association is doing to keep everyone together is
also very, very good, sir.
We always can do better. Sometimes we are limited by the
information that gets pushed up to us that is down at the local
level. That is what kind-of delays some of the actions that we
take.
Chairman Correa. Can you elaborate on that specific point
please?
Mr. Kelenske. The last one, sir, about getting the
information pushed out?
Chairman Correa. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kelenske. Yes. So this is exactly why we want to get
our Fusion Liaison Officer program in place. Because that is
going to put people who are trained in the process of
identifying information that is relevant to the Fusion Centers
so then we can look at that information and say, yes, we need
to do further on this or, no, that is Constitutionally-
protected, there is nothing more to do here. But we have to get
that information pushed up to us, whether it is from our Fusion
Liaison Officers or through the general public, through the see
something, say something. In Michigan we have an OK to say
school tip line. That is what generates our suspicious activity
reports.
Chairman Correa. Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske, sir, if I may
interrupt you. You just said something interesting, which is if
you have information that is Constitutionally-protected, in the
context of a possible clear and present danger, how do you
resolve that issue?
Mr. Kelenske. Well, if it is a clear and present danger, I
guess I would question what is protected in that regard. A lot
of times--not a lot of times--sometimes we might get
information that somebody may not--they could even have just a
beef with their neighbor and they push that up to our Fusion
Center. That is not something for us to act on. That is very
different than information that we actually look at, has a
criminal nexus, and we need to look through more.
Chairman Correa. So in a situation where you do have that
balancing act of Constitutionally-protected activity versus the
possibility of something terrible coming to happen, you do have
a mechanism to resolve that and hopefully make the right
decision?
Mr. Kelenske. Yes. Our Fusion Center personnel, as well as
the Fusion Center personnel throughout our Nation, are trained
very well and very much understand what they can and can't do
based on the Code of Federal Regulations.
Chairman Correa. Now, you know, we look back at 9/11 and
because of the misinformation, the silos that we operated
before 9/11, Homeland Security was created to eliminate a lot
of those silos. You just said that things could always be
better. I guess my open question to you would be how do we make
sure we continue to improve on our communication? Because I am
bothered. You all do a great job. You have got thousands and
thousands of fact and data points and you have got to figure
out what this stuff means, but any thoughts on how we can
specifically improve on what you do within the Constitutional
confines of assuring that we prevent the next horrific thing
from happening?
Mr. Kelenske. Yes. I think we continue to leave egos at the
door and I think we continue the open dialog and collaboration
not only with local, State, and Federal partners, but also with
our private-sector and non-Governmental organizations, as well
as those that are responsible for overseeing civil rights,
civil liberties, and our Constitutional protections. We all
have to be engaged with each other.
Chairman Correa. Looks like my time expired.
So what I am going to do is hand it over to our Ranking
Member Meijer for 5 minutes of questions.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Meijer. Thank you, Chairman Correa. Again, I appreciate
the second round of questioning.
You know, I know Ms. Khan was talking about just over the
overall funding levels and some of those frustrations and
concerns, you know, that the money can only go so far.
Obviously some of the goals of grant programs are to kind-of
spur additional insights and information and hearings like one
we are having today where we can evaluate what potentially that
number needs to be.
But I guess, again, to Lieutenant Colonel Kelenske, you
know, the training that has been provided by the newly-created
Fusion Liaison Office program, how in your view has that helped
deter acts of terrorism or violent threats in your communities?
As a corollary, how would an increase in funding allow you to
more efficiently achieve the desired outcomes of your program?
Please, I would be curious to your thoughts.
Mr. Kelenske. It is a great question, sir.
We have only had the one initial training. I will say that
one individual I know of--and I am sure there may have been
others--from the initial training, did already provide
information to our field analysts to follow up on. This was a
result of providing not only the training but providing
attendees field analyst locations and contact information that
facilitates that reporting, collaboration, and investigation.
While nothing came from this report, it does demonstrate that
the training is providing an effective identification and
reporting process.
To your point, or your question on increased funding, that
allows us to appropriately resource gaps we continue to
identify as we move through this process. This could include
increasing staffing for tip lines and our watch desk personnel
or Fusion Liaison Officers at the local and State level, State-
wide implementation of our Behavioral Threat Assessment
Management teams from the local and State level--we at least
want one per State Police district--provide trainings for
additional skilled workers in mental health--that is a
continual gap--host more training sessions on preventing
targeted violence and terrorism prevention and increase
community engagement and education.
Once the Behavioral Threat Assessment Management team or
teams are in place, we also need to make sure that we have the
bandwidth to handle the requests for service effectively and
efficiently because we know with training and more community
engagement and education we will get more, or an increase in,
requests for service.
Mr. Meijer. Obviously the question of ultimate
responsibility in funding source between State and Federal is
something for us to kind-of discuss in a bit more detail in
other fora.
But, you know, I guess kind-of turning back to what Ms.
Khan was talking about earlier--and I would welcome if anyone
else wants to address this as well, more than happy--but what
we have heard from many in the community that are applying for
grants across the board, you know, not necessarily under DHS,
but that can be a very cumbersome process. I would just be
curious for your own experiences, how challenging was the
application for TVTP funding and how did you find that relative
to other, you know, grant processes that you have undertaken
throughout your other kind-of Federal interactions?
Ms. Khan. So from our perspective, the TVTP grant was
fairly standard. This is not very different from any other
Federal grant, even State-level grants. The requirements for
what you have to write is actually not too bad. So the process
itself, I think it just--there are instructions and you have to
follow it. Anytime you are applying for any Federal or any
government grant you have to follow the instructions. As long
as you are doing it--and they have like time lines, make sure
you do this 2 weeks ahead time, a week ahead. So as long as you
are following it, you are all good.
So I think there is just a place where you have to, you
know, dot your Is and cross your Ts because you are dealing
with the Government. I think it is not just that once the grant
process is easy, reality is that if you want to get the
funding, you have like 200 pages of compliance. But that is
just the Federal process and you have to make sure that all
your systems----
Mr. Meijer. I see a lot of heads nodding on the compliance
front, yes.
Ms. Khan. You see, it just is the fact of life when you are
dealing with any sort of Government money. It is no different
from anything else.
Mr. Meijer. OK.
Mr. Chairman, I see my time is close to expiring, so I
yield back.
Thank you again.
Chairman Correa. Thank you, Mr. Meijer.
Now I recognize Mr. Bishop for 5 minutes, sir--5 minutes.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let us go back, Mr. Braddock, to what we were talking
about, stochastic terrorism. I----
Mr. Braddock. Let us do it.
Mr. Bishop. Your paper says that--your testimony says at
present I am working on a research project geared toward
understanding how disinformation and conspiracies perpetuated
by far-right extremists persuade their intended audiences and
more importantly how we can prevent these audiences from
engaging in violence in support of these conspiracies and
disinformation.
Mr. Braddock. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bishop. So the concept of stochastic terrorism is part
of that theory, right?
Mr. Braddock. Not necessarily. Not necessarily.
Mr. Bishop. Has any of your research for DHS addressed the
concept of stochastic terrorism?
Mr. Braddock. No.
Mr. Bishop. OK. Let us talk about this just a little
further.
Mr. Braddock. Sure.
Mr. Bishop. So stochastic, from what I read, means random.
Mr. Braddock. Well, random, although guaranteed to occur.
Statistics means it--out of statistics it means it is random
where and when it will occur, but it will reliably occur.
The best way to explain it----
Mr. Bishop. Well, but the difference between--I mean if
something is random, it happens without regard to a causal
factor. But when you talk about stochastic terrorism, you are
attributing to a Donald Trump or a Tucker Carlson, they
caused----
Mr. Braddock. But what you said is not true. You can
attribute something to random. If you remember in biology class
or--biology class is the best example to use it. When I was in
biology class in high school you would take a petri dish and
you would sneeze into the petri dish and then you would close
the petri dish. Then 3 days later bacteria would grow
somewhere. You can't predict when and where, but it would grow
somewhere. That is attributable to the sneeze.
A better example, maybe not in biology class, is if you are
sitting on your front porch in North Carolina, right--North
Carolina, and you are looking out on the horizon. I know it
gets hot in North Carolina, I have been to Chapel Hill plenty
of times. You see dark clouds rolling in on your porch. You
know lightning is going to strike somewhere. You can't predict
when and where, but it is going to strike somewhere. That is
attributable to the heat meeting the cold.
Mr. Bishop. So, OK. So we are all far afield pretty much. I
will leave for the moment for somebody else who is watching to
decide whether there is a concept is different between
randomness and something caused by an efficient cause.
But let us leave that aside for one moment. Let me just get
a couple of more examples.
You said you had no hesitancy to conclude that President
Trump is a stochastic terrorist with respect to January 6 and
with respect to the El Paso shooter. You said that Tucker
Carlson is a stochastic terrorist with respect to the Buffalo
attack. But then you said you thought Chuck Schumer walked the
line when he said what he said about you won't know what hit
you when addressed it to Supreme Court Justices. Why does that
walk the line?
Mr. Braddock. Because I don't know what hit you, isn't as
direct as there are people replacing you in your country or
isn't as direct as we are going to walk down Pennsylvania
Avenue and then not walk down Pennsylvania Avenue with those
people.
Mr. Bishop. OK.
Mr. Braddock. These are implied directives.
Mr. Bishop. Let me keep going. Maxine Waters. I started
talking about that where she said wherever these people show
up, you push back on them, you tell them they are not welcome
anymore anywhere. That is not stochastic terrorism? Is that
what I understand?
Mr. Braddock. Did you ignore what I said earlier? I said
yes, that would be.
Mr. Bishop. Oh, you said Maxine Waters is a stochastic
terrorist? OK.
Mr. Braddock. I said these are incidents of stochastic
terrorism.
Mr. Bishop. How about this, Eric--well, let me ask you--I
am going to ask you one more. Eric Swalwell says the
Republicans won't stop with banning abortion, they want to ban
interracial marriage. Is he a stochastic terrorist?
Mr. Braddock. No. Not out of that quote.
Mr. Bishop. Nothing would inspire anybody to do anything?
Let me ask this, was Frank James, the guy in the Buffalo--and
New York subway who shot in the subway and I don't remember
what all else he did--was he inspired by stochastic terrorism
of say Black Lives Matter and critical race theorists?
Mr. Braddock. I am not familiar with the Frank James case.
You are going to have to explain to me what happened and the
quotes you are attributing to his actions.
Mr. Bishop. You are not aware of the Brooklyn subway attack
that just happened about 2 or 3 months ago?
Mr. Braddock. No, I am not familiar with it.
Mr. Bishop. All right. Let me see. OK. When Joe Biden
said--I think I may have done that one--Hillary Clinton on the
Dobbs leak. This decision will kill and subjugate women. What
an utter disgrace. Is that stochastic terrorism?
Mr. Braddock. There is no implied directive. If you can't
see the difference between mentioning something that will occur
and an implied directive, like we are going to walk down
Pennsylvania Avenue, one implies that there is some justifiable
motion toward an action. I could talk about the theory that
underpins why my argument is that these certain cases are
stochastic terrorism versus others aren't.
Mr. Bishop. Our time probably doesn't allow for that. I got
20 seconds.
Let me just try to get at it one other way. Is calling
Republicans White supremacists itself a form of stochastic
terrorism?
Mr. Braddock. No.
Mr. Bishop. Hmm. How about the----
Mr. Braddock. It is just like calling Democrats communists
and socialists isn't stochastic terrorism.
Mr. Bishop. All right. The woman who runs the account on
Twitter, Libs of TikTok, Washington Post identified her, said
she was a domestic terrorist. She has had a spate of death
threats as a consequence. Is Washington Post a stochastic
terrorist?
Mr. Braddock. Through identifying her? No. It has to be an
implied directive.
Chairman Correa. I will allow you that last one, Mr.
Bishop. We are out of time, but go ahead Dr. Braddock. Go ahead
and finish answering that one.
Mr. Braddock. I can do this all day, Mr. Chairman. But that
last one----
Chairman Correa. OK.
Mr. Braddock [continuing]. There needs to be an implied
directive toward what is happening.
Again, I am more than happy to send information to the
panel and to Mr. Bishop. Like I said, I like having these
conversations. I know it is kind-of a gotcha game, but I enjoy
having these conversations because ultimately it means less
violence from both sides.
But I will be happy to send some material----
Chairman Correa. Later--and after the hearing----
Mr. Braddock. I am sorry?
Chairman Correa. Dr. Braddock, after the hearing you are
more than welcome to supply written answers to any of the
questions that the Members may have.
Mr. Braddock. I really actually want to. For Mr. Bishop, I
know we don't have time, but I will send you the materials that
link implied messaging to actions so you have a better idea
where I am coming from because it is kind-of a lecture. I know
that Government time is valuable.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Dr. Braddock. Thank you.
Mr. Braddock. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Chairman Correa. I look forward to getting that
information.
Now, I am going to go back to--Ms. Titus has joined us, is
that correct? Ms. Dina Titus.
Ms. Titus. I am here, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Correa. Madam, how are you?
Ms. Titus. Oh, I am good. Thank you. I apologize for being
late. Today is election day in Nevada.
Chairman Correa. That is what I figured. I heard that you
were busy today so I want to give you 5 minutes if you can to
ask the panel of witnesses some questions.
Welcome, ma'am.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you.
As you know, we are currently involved in an increased
domestic threat environment and this is due to a number of
factors. But one thing that has been cited is the forthcoming
decision by the Supreme Court on abortion. So I wrote a letter,
I was joined by some Members of this committee and the Chairman
and Chairman Thompson, to the Secretary of Homeland Security
asking them to please remain vigilant and come up with a plan
to deal with this and kind-of get ahead of the game instead of
reacting.
But I would like to go back to Dr. Braddock to talk about
those some with his research to counter disinformation
campaigns. One of the big ones from some of the right-wing
groups is great replacement theory. That is being used in the
context of the abortion issue. So all those things kind-of come
together.
I wonder if you could talk about how we can prevent on-line
forums from perpetuating untruths or how can tackle the
situation if we are expecting a rise in dangerous attacks?
Could you just share some of your research or findings on those
kind of topics?
Mr. Braddock. Sure. Absolutely.
Mr. Bishop will like this, this applied to both the left
and the right. Inoculation is useful for any kind of ideology
in my research that advocates for violence. The idea is to
prevent ultimately violence that perpetuates from a violent
extremist ideology.
So I mentioned earlier kind-of what inoculation is,
attitudinal inoculation. It is a strategic counter-persuasive
strategy whereby there are two major elements to it. In one you
essentially warn a target who hasn't been exposed to an idea
before, or has been exposed to it minimally, that there is a
third actor out there that is third actor out there who is
trying to use them for their own devices and may try to get
them to engage in behaviors they might not otherwise engage in.
Being Americans especially, Americans very much value their
own autonomy, so when we think somebody is going to try to
persuade us, we really don't like it and we kind-of become
resolute in our beliefs and attitudes. That is what I really
like about it, is because you can approach people, and I have
approached people, and said listen, I may not agree with your
political points of view, that is OK. You can have whatever
beliefs and attitude you have, I just want to make sure you
don't engage in violence. There are people out there who would
have you engage in violence. That is step one.
Step two is to present them with counter-arguments against
what they are going to encounter.
Now, my research and 60 years of research in other context
has shown that when you do this, there are a couple of pretty
cool things that happen. No. 1, they experience what is called
reactance in response to that. So what they do--I guess the
best way to explain this is have you ever been in a store and
you just want to window shop and somebody comes up to you and
wants to sell you something, that weird gross feeling where you
want them to just go away, that is what they experience when
they encounter the propaganda. So they get angry and they
counter argue against it. That is No. 1.
No. 2 is that they attribute less credibility to the person
that might try to persuade them down the line. They think they
are less credible.
What I found in my research, and the most important thing
for me, is No. 3. They report significantly less intention to
support that group or that person with violence. They might
still ideologically believe whatever they want to believe, but
they report less intention to get violent on the back of it.
So I argue, and I have argued, that one of the key things
that we need with respect to disinformation, in the United
States and elsewhere, is some comprehensive media literacy in
schools to help kids understand when they are encountering
information that might be false. It is not their fault, it is
not school districts' fault, it is not the Government's fault
that we don't have this, it is just that digital technologies
have advanced so quickly and web 2.0 technologies, where people
can create their own content, has advanced so quickly we
haven't been able to keep up with it.
So we need to arm people who don't have the capacity for
identifying true versus false information from anywhere. They
don't have that capacity.We need to help them with that. I
think that inoculation, at least from the research that I have
shown thus far, would benefit that.
Now, there are boundaries around inoculation, like there is
with any counter-persuasion strategy or any communication
strategy, but that is what research is for. That is why we are
parsing it out.
Ms. Titus. The Department of Homeland Security is paying
attention to this? There are grants for this or? How can we
pursue that suggestion?
Mr. Braddock. I hope they are. They gave me more than a
half million dollars to research it, so I hope they are paying
attention. But----
Ms. Titus. I don't want your findings just to go on a shelf
somewhere.
Mr. Braddock. No, I am actually--that is one of the things
that--we mentioned John Wilder a couple of times, my program
manager. One of the things that we are very cognizant of is
this needs to reach the people that need to use it. So I have
conducted a couple of trainings already with people all around
the country, right wing, left wing, and everything in between
to help them develop inoculation messages in their communities
against the specific disinformation problems that they face.
From what I have learned from those individuals, after they
have undergone the training, they have reported back to me that
they intend on using it and they have talked about the
different kinds of disinformation they face. It is not just
coming from what my focus is on this project, being the right
wing, they see it coming from all over the place. They want to
help prevent people from being taken in by it and, most
importantly, engaging in violence on behalf of it.
I am interested in preventing violence. Beliefs and
attitudes, that is--people can believe whatever they want.
These inoculation trainings were meant to help people to help
others, prevent them from engaging in violence on behalf of any
kind of disinformation they encounter.
Ms. Titus. Very interesting.
Well, thank you very much for allowing me to come back, Mr.
Chairman. Learned a lot.
Chairman Correa. Thank you very much, ma'am. Good luck
today in your election.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Chairman Correa. Mrs. Harshbarger, are you there? Would you
like to ask 5 minutes of questions, ma'am? Going once, going
twice.
I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today and
the Members for their questions. That was a good hearing today.
Members of the committee may have additional questions for
the witnesses and we ask that you respond to those questions
expeditiously in writing.
The Chair reminds the Members that the committee record
will remain open for another 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank
you very much. Good afternoon to all.
[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Kurt Braddock
Question. Each of the grant projects you represent were funded as
part of the Department of Homeland Security's whole-of-society approach
to violence prevention, which emphasizes involvement from community
leaders across multiple disciplines. Cooperation from community
partners will be critical to ensuring these projects achieve the most
impact.
In the execution of your grant project, how have you worked to
ensure buy-in from the communities you're working in and partnering
with?
Answer. Thank you for your question; I am very pleased to respond
to someone from my home State.
One of the cornerstones of my project is the development and
implementation of attitudinal inoculation campaigns geared toward
preventing the assimilation of right-wing disinformation and/or violent
extremist ideologies based on that disinformation. Attitudinal
inoculation is based on the premise that if someone is warned about an
imminent effort to persuade them and are offered counter-arguments that
challenge those persuasive efforts, they will be better equipped to
become resilient to persuasive messages. For this project, participants
will be warned about potential exposure to right-wing extremist ideas
based on disinformation and provided counter-arguments to challenge it.
One of the benefits of this approach is that individuals are approached
as a potential ally rather than an adversary. In effect, participants
are told that we are aware that they are not dangerous--and that we
want to help prevent them from becoming dangerous. This is different
from many approaches to counter-radicalization which have been
ineffective due to their accusatory approach. Therein lies one of the
key factors that facilitates buy-in from vulnerable communities.
Many communities in which disinformation and extremism are
pervasive are skeptical of counter-radicalization messaging approaches
that assume imminent guilt on the part of program participants. Because
inoculation avoids assumptions of imminent violent activity on the part
of the target audience, I have found communities to be more accepting
of its tenets and the strategic efforts that feature its employment.
In addition to the conceptual elements of inoculation that make it
a more attractive option to communities than more traditional counter-
radicalization/counter-disinformation efforts, this specific research
program also includes--as a part of its deliverables package--a series
of training initiatives in which stakeholders in both the U.S.
Government and in vulnerable communities themselves are trained on how
to develop and implement attitudinal inoculation efforts specifically
tailored to their own audiences and disinformation problems. At
present, the research program has trained over 200 stakeholders. In the
next 3 months, we have training sessions planned to train several more
hundred. Expected stakeholders will include more Government officials
from across the intelligence community, as well as community leaders
who are in a unique position to not only identify vulnerable
individuals in their communities, but also implement their own
inoculation practices.
In sum, the research program associated with the money alotted to
American University promotes a counter-radicalization/counter-
disinformation strategy that is historically accepted by vulnerable
communities not only because of its conciliatory approach, but also
because it is amenable to training in which stakeholders can tailor the
approach to their respective contexts.
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Humera Khan
Question. Each of the grant projects you represent were funded as
part of the Department of Homeland Security's whole-of-society approach
to violence prevention, which emphasizes involvement from community
leaders across multiple disciplines. Cooperation from community
partners will be critical to ensuring these projects achieve the most
impact.
In the execution of your grant project, how have you worked to
ensure buy-in from the communities you're working in and partnering
with?
Answer. For our CREWS project (DHS TVTP grant No. EMW-2020-GR-
00087)
We are grateful to our pilot locations for their commitment
to protecting their communities, and their willingness to use
data to understand how best to build resilience.
To ensure local buy-in we engaged with and received written
commitment from all four pilot locations before we started our
analysis.
Many thanks to the Mayor of Scranton, Pennsylvania and her
office, the leadership of the Philadelphia Commission on Human
Relations, Pennsylvania, the County Executive of New Castle
County, Delaware and his office, and the State senator of the
3rd District of Connecticut for their bold leadership.
All model results are shared with the pilot locations, at
interim and final stages.
All recommendations will be co-developed with pilot
locations and their stakeholders.
We are providing training and workshops for all stakeholders
identified by the pilot locations.
For our Tackle! Upstander Training Project (DHS TVTP grant No. EMW-
2020-GR-00093)
To ensure local buy-in we partnered with the American Jewish
Committee (AJC). AJC Regional offices and their regional
Muslim-Jewish Advisory Councils co-hosted each of our
trainings. This resulted in attendance by diverse local
leadership across multiple sectors.
Overview information about the trainings was included in the
invitations so everyone who registered did so voluntarily, and
already knew what the curriculum would cover.
Several registrants invited their networks and colleagues to
further expand the diversity of professional sectors that
participated.
The participants included elected officials, district
attorneys, human rights commissioners, school safety officers,
principals, and superintendents, town and county emergency
management directors, sheriffs, and law enforcement officers.
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Paul Kim
Question. Each of the grant projects you represent were funded as
part of the Department of Homeland Security's whole-of-society approach
to violence prevention, which emphasizes involvement from community
leaders across multiple disciplines. Cooperation from community
partners will be critical to ensuring these projects achieve the most
impact.
In the execution of your grant project, how have you worked to
ensure buy-in from the communities you're working in and partnering
with?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Chris A. Kelenske
Question. In the execution of your grant project, how have you
worked to ensure buy-in from the communities you're working in and
partnering with?
Answer. Our buy-in comes from our holistic approach with Government
and private-sector partners. From the moment the Michigan State Police
received the grant award, we have actively engaged our partners to
ensure all voices and perspectives are being heard and applied to our
multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplined approach. We are working
with specific intent to ensure we do not produce a behavioral threat
assessment team built inside of a vacuum that doesn't account for the
knowledge and experiences that our community partners bring to the
conversation.
Training, outreach, and awareness with our Government and private-
sector partners will ensure they are aware of all available resources
and, more importantly, how to utilize and access those resources.
Additionally, ensuring our returned results are actionable, relevant,
and timely will build trust and legitimacy within the relationships
that we continue to foster and leverage.
At the end of the day our goal is to establish a team that
represents the communities we serve and provides value with helping to
identify concerning behavior and off-ramping individuals prior to
becoming radicalized and committing acts of targeted violence against
others.
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