[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


.                                   
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-86]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                   FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES

                      MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE

                            DEFEAT PROGRAMS

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                              MAY 11, 2022



[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
48-651                      WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                           Will Braden, Clerk
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                               WITNESSES

Hill, VADM Jon A., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency.........
Karbler, LTG Daniel L., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and 
  Missile Defense Command and Joint Functional Component Command 
  for Integrated Missile Defense.................................
Plumb, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
  Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy....
Sawyer, John D., Acting Director, Contracting and National 
  Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office...
Shaw, Lt Gen John E., USAF, Deputy Commander, U.S. Space Command.

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    13
    Hill, VADM Jon A.............................................    26
    Karbler, LTG Daniel L........................................    40
    Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking 
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...................    15
    Plumb, Hon. John F...........................................    17
    Sawyer, John D...............................................    77
    Shaw, Lt Gen John E..........................................    64

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Langevin.................................................    97
    Mr. Wilson...................................................    97

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Dr. DesJarlais...............................................   102
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   103
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   102
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   101
    Mr. Turner...................................................   101
 
 
 FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT 
                                PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                           Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 11, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:59 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to 
order. The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony 
on the 2023 budget request for DOD [Department of Defense] 
missile defense programs.
    Our witnesses are Dr. John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Space Policy; Vice Admiral Hill, Director of the 
Missile Defense Agency; Lieutenant General Karbler, Commander 
of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Joint 
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense; 
Lieutenant General John Shaw, Deputy Commander of the U.S. 
Space Command; and Mr. John Sawyer, Acting Director of 
Contracting and National Security Acquisitions for the 
Government Accountability Office.
    I suggest that I forgo my brilliant opening statement and 
due to time pressure I would suggest that my ranking member 
also forgo his opening statement due to time pressure.
    Unfortunately, and I want to apologize to the witnesses, we 
are not able to control the congressional schedule. But votes 
are expected to start fairly shortly and could last for hours. 
So ideally, we would have a very truncated public session, go 
immediately to closed session. And I think that is much more 
productive for at least the members who are here present.
    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, I agree totally with that 
schedule. I'll submit mine for the record.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay. We will submit our statements for the 
record and we will submit the witnesses' statements for the 
record and is it premature to suggest that we quickly go to 
23----
    [The prepared statements of Mr. Cooper, Mr. Lamborn, and 
the witnesses can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 
13.]
    Staff member. Do you want to have no questions at all?
    Mr. Cooper. Well, would Mr. DesJarlais like to ask a 
question? Okay.
    Mr. Langevin, I see that--Mr. Wilson? Is that okay with 
you? I apologize for the truncated nature, but I don't want to 
keep the witnesses here until 7, 8, or 9 o'clock tonight. These 
are busy people.
    Mr. Langevin. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one brief 
question.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay. Go ahead. Mr. Langevin, you are 
recognized.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much. I thank our witnesses 
for being here. So as we all know, directed energy [DE] weapons 
such as lasers and high-powered microwaves can effectively 
engage a variety of threats with speed, flexibility, precision, 
on a whole cost-per-shot basis.
    Despite this, the FY23 [fiscal year 2023] budget request 
has cut all funding for a critical directed energy effort, 
specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser, or DPAL, despite 
its recent history of success and the proven value DE 
technologies provide to our warfighters.
    So for the record, I wanted to ask can you speak more to 
MDA's [Missile Defense Agency's] development and pursuit of a 
rapid prototype and demonstration of DPAL and most importantly, 
please describe how valuable this asset would be in your 
arsenal.
    Mr. Cooper. Does the gentleman want this question for the 
record or do you want a verbal answer to your question right 
now?
    Mr. Langevin. Well, if we could get that from Dr. Plumb, 
that would be great.
    Mr. Cooper. Dr. Plumb.
    Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman Langevin. I'll just say I 
fully agree that directed energy is part of our future 
architecture and we need to be investing in it. As for the 
specifics on DPALS and other laser or other directed energy 
systems, my understanding is those have been transferred to R&E 
[Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering]. 
Admiral Hill may have some additional pieces, but as you know, 
I am keen on this particular issue and I do intend for that to 
be a part of my deep dive as I get deeper into this position.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, this has got to be a 
priority for us and I hope that it will continue to be so.
    Last question, Mr. Chairman, and I will submit this for the 
record, and if I can get it back in writing. So we face 
conventional and asymmetric threats from our adversaries around 
the globe on a daily basis and one of those emerging threats is 
hypersonics. We have seen recent tests by China and North Korea 
and have hypersonics in use on the battlefield by Russia 
against the Ukrainian people.
    Here at home and in this setting, well, since you are going 
to get back to me, you can both probably get a classified 
answer on this, can you discuss our layered defense against 
hypersonic missiles?
    I will submit that for the record, Mr. Chairman, given the 
constraints on time and I will yield back. Thank you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 97.]
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island. I 
understand that the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, 
has a question?
    Mr. Wilson. Yes, I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank 
you for your service. We are going to miss you in Congress and 
to be enterprising today facing the bizarre circumstance we 
have of these votes. And I want to thank all of our witnesses 
for being here today.
    And for the record, I have got four quick questions. And 
for Admiral Hill, that is that Israel faces the threat of 
larger, more sophisticated rocket and missile arsenals in the 
hands of terrorists. Additionally, in the last 3 weeks, there 
have been a number of Hamas terrorist missile attacks from Gaza 
against the people of Israel. To address this mounting threat, 
Israel and the United States are working together to develop 
and deploy a multi-tiered missile defense system. The U.S.-
Israel Memorandum of Understanding on the security assistance 
provides for $500 million in funding for the annual defense 
systems in cooperation with Israel.
    Admiral Hill, you recently were in Israel to view the new 
Elevated Sensor missile detection system. Can you update the 
committee on the state of the U.S.-Israel missile defense 
cooperation and the funding levels that are being brought forth 
this year to include Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow?
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 97.]
    Mr. Wilson. The next question, Admiral, would be in regard 
to missile and rocket threats from Iran and its proxies, how 
horrible this is across the Middle East. And we have had the 
most recent attacks on our valued allies, the UAE [United Arab 
Emirates] and Saudi Arabia. And we have seen that Iran has 
targeted U.S. and allied forces in Syria and Erbil in Iraq.
    In the wake of this, we have the cooperation of the Abraham 
Accords and so what is being done of working together with our 
Middle East allies?
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 97.]
    Mr. Wilson. And then third, I am really grateful for the 
extraordinary strategic and vital location of Guam and I hope 
that the Department will continue in every effort to invest 
$892 million for integrated air and missile defense system to 
defend the terrific people of Guam against cruise, hypersonic, 
and ballistic missiles.
    And a final short question. I was truly grateful to learn 
that our German allies are moving forward purchasing the Arrow 
3 anti-missile defense shield from Israel. Assuming that Israel 
procures the Arrow system 3 system, how will we integrate that 
with our missile defense strategic and strategy in the European 
theater particularly to hopefully address and defend the people 
of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia? Thank you.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 97.]
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. I appreciate his kind 
words about me and do any other members have questions they 
would like to bring up now?
    It appears that there are none, but it also appears that we 
might have some room availability issues with the SCIF 
[Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility]. So would the 
gentleman from Tennessee like to ask something? I think it is 
going to be another few minutes and they have already called a 
vote, so we are really running into crunch time here.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, I will take a minute or two, if 
that's okay.
    Mr. Cooper. Okay.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Admiral Hill, what is our current 
capability to defend against hypersonic threats from our 
adversaries, particularly threats posed to critical assets like 
our aircraft carriers?
    Admiral Hill. Is this question for the record or do you 
want me to answer it now? Okay. Yes, sir.
    So today, deployed with the aircraft carriers on destroyers 
is the Sea-Based Terminal capability which was designed to 
protect the carrier base against the advanced maneuvering 
threat. That is the hypersonic defense today that is hard kill 
and as you know, we are investing in PB23 [President's budget 
for 2023] into the Glide Phase Interceptor to add a layered 
defense capability.
    We are leveraging all sensors available today. We are 
bringing that data down to the ships through our command and 
control battle management and communications.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. You requested additional funds for 
the Glide Phase Interceptor in the MDA unfunded priorities 
list. Can you describe how these funds would be used and would 
they help accelerate the timeline?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. So when I think of an unfunded 
priorities list, I think given another dollar where would I put 
it? And the items that you see listed there specifically to 
Glide Phase Interceptor is to risk-reduce key technology areas. 
That is a new regime up in the glide phase and so seeker work, 
propulsion work, the old thermal protection system issues, that 
will help to de-risk the program.
    Dr. DesJarlais. You mentioned earlier, and I don't know if 
this was for the closed setting, so if it is, just let me know, 
but you mentioned the successes we have had with the THAAD 
[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] deployments overseas in 
the Middle East and I was going to give you some time to tout 
some of those successes if that was for an open setting or was 
it for the closed?
    Admiral Hill. We can talk about it in the open setting 
because it has made its way into the press. But the United Arab 
Emirates, one of our foreign military sales customers, has used 
the U.S.-built THAAD system effectively in June--I am sorry, in 
January of this year. And were successful in all those 
engagements. Through some work with Central Command and with my 
good friend General Karbler here, we now have access to that 
data so that we can pour through it to see if there are any 
improvements we need to make either to the system or to the 
techniques, tactics, and procedures that the soldiers employ. 
Thank you, sir.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Very good. And I don't want to be greedy 
with my time. I didn't know, Ranking Member.
    Mr. Cooper. Sadly, it is looking like we've got plenty of 
time now because it looks like with permission of the 
witnesses, we will only do a brief opening session today and we 
will reschedule to another day the closed session. So the 
witnesses will be free to leave after this.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I will yield back and then come back if we 
have more time.
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. Lamborn has questions?
    Mr. Lamborn. Yes, since we have a few minutes before we 
head over to the floor for our votes and then we will see you 
all, gentlemen, at another time for the classified portion.
    But Admiral Hill, we discussed HBTSS [Hypersonic Ballistic 
Tracking Space Sensor] in our office earlier today and you said 
that hypersonic missile defense is one of your top three 
priorities. How satisfied are you with the current plan for 
HBTSS? And can you describe for the committee your vision of 
the full architecture?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. Ranking Member Lamborn, thanks for 
that question.
    So the Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor has two 
major roles. The first is to pick up the dim targets that 
cannot be seen by the current architecture today; so from a 
ballistic perspective, we are seeing changes there that make 
that fight much more challenging. But when you get to the 
advanced hypersonic threat which has a global maneuver 
capability, we need the ability to see it from space, so global 
coverage and that very close proximity from space to track 
those sensors.
    We are on track to take two interoperable prototype 
satellites to space in March of 2023. We will put those in an 
inclination where we can monitor tests in the INDOPACOM [U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command] region and we will collect that data as a 
way to proof out the concept.
    Did a lot of work on the ground to show that we can extract 
those hot targets over a warm earth. Now it is about getting it 
into space and pulling that data down. We are staying very 
close to the Space Force as we make decisions on the overall 
architecture and our vision is is that the HBTSS will be a part 
of the overall constellation for dealing with that global 
maneuvering threat.
    Mr. Lamborn. And just as kind of an update, as much as you 
can say here in open setting, are we getting closer to a 
decision where we will find a contractor or contractors who 
will help us with the defense against hypersonic vehicles?
    Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. You are talking about defense 
capability----
    Mr. Lamborn. Yes.
    Admiral Hill [continuing]. Beyond the terminal capability 
that we have today? Yes, sir. We have a Other Transaction 
Authority agreement in place with three separate companies that 
are competing now. We are evaluating those concepts for a 
downselect later this year; so we will go from the current 
three down to the two, perhaps the one, depending on the 
maturity of those different proposals. But it goes right back 
to what Congressman DesJarlais asked which is how much de-
risking needs to be done?
    We don't have a good sense yet, as we are going through 
that work now and those evaluations, but if we see areas where 
there are major risk areas that we want to help industry 
overcome, that is what those investments will be tied to.
    Mr. Lamborn. And General Shaw, lastly, what can you say as 
far as the Space Force's role with hypersonics? When it comes 
to testing and fielding we are behind our two near-peer 
potential adversaries. So what can you say where we stand in 
terms of catching up?
    General Shaw. Congressman, thanks for the question. Again, 
probably best targeted for the Space Force, but I will give my 
best answer from U.S. Space Command.
    We are interested in any capabilities that are going to 
help us with any of these threats and as MDA has pursued this 
particular program, HBTSS,the advantage of this is that we have 
a perspective from space that is invaluable and will allow us 
to get after a lot of these threats.
    To get after the actual technologies themselves, I think 
that we need to pursue every possibility to hold enemy at risk 
from longer and longer ranges. I think that is where warfare is 
taking us and hypersonics will play a role in that.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from Colorado. I think 
the gentlelady from New York is recognized, if you have any 
questions you would like to ask.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Cooper. I represent Fort 
Drum, home to the 10th Mountain Division that has been 
designated the third continental interceptor site. I know that 
many of you have answered questions on this matter in front of 
this committee beforehand.
    My question today goes to Lieutenant General Karbler who 
commands the 100th Ground Based Missile Defense Brigade, a 
multi-component brigade made up of soldiers from the Active 
Duty Army and Army National Guard forces. They are the 300 
soldiers defending 300 million people.
    As the designated third continental interceptor site, if 
Fort Drum were to receive a missile defense unit, would the 
force structure mirror that of the 100th GMD Brigade with a mix 
of Active Duty and National Guard soldiers?
    General Karbler. Congresswoman, thanks very much for the 
question. I would hope that it would be a total force solution 
to that. We have seen great success in our missile defense 
element, soldiers in Colorado as well as in Alaska who help man 
missile defense, and I see no reason why this wouldn't be a--
why we would not pursue a multi-COMPO [component] soldier 
solution.
    Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. My followup is a broader question. 
So I have been very concerned that President Biden and his 
administration and many House Democrats have asserted that 
improved missile defense is provocative when unfortunately, the 
U.S. has not taken any moves to dramatically alter the balance 
of power in the nuclear and missile defense areas, yet all of 
our adversaries are modernizing their offensive and defensive 
strategic capabilities.
    This question is for Dr. Plumb. How has the war in Ukraine, 
Russia's nuclear threats, and the strengthening of the Russia-
China relationship, unfortunately, altered or updated this 
administration's view on missile defense?
    Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congresswoman. I will just say that the 
classified Missile Defense Review has been released. There have 
been some unclassified talking points. I am happy to just for 
the record just put that we are committed to developing the 
Next-Generation Interceptor with MDA and so improving our 
missile defenses, that is both in capacity and in quality, is a 
thing that the administration is, in fact, dedicated to.
    The Ukraine issue you point out is an excellent one because 
what we have seen there is that Russia is using missiles not 
with the precision you might expect of a modern military, but 
more as a broad area terror weapon in my opinion. And so the 
need for missile defenses is only increased, in my opinion, at 
least by watching that conflict play out.
    Ms. Stefanik. And is that shared by the entire 
administration, and by President Joe Biden? Why are we not 
hearing that from the President of the United States?
    Dr. Plumb. I can't speak for the President's view on this 
specific issue. I will note that we have I think already 
provided over $4.5 billion in drawdown equipment to Ukraine. We 
have made very strong statements against Russia. We have 
declared we will defend NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] every square inch. We have shipped about 1,400 
Stingers, thousands and thousands of Javelins and other forms 
of armaments, so I think my version of that would be that there 
is a very strong response there and deep concern.
    Ms. Stefanik. What is this administration's position on a 
third continental interceptor site which has been designated in 
the previous National Defense Authorizations Acts on a 
bipartisan basis? What is the position of Joe Biden and the 
Department of Defense about that third site, given the changing 
and increasing threats around the world today?
    Dr. Plumb. Yes, Congresswoman, the position remains the 
same. There is no military requirement for that third site at 
this time.
    Ms. Stefanik. Given the increased threats from North Korea 
and other adversaries around the world, again, and the need 
that Congress has on a bipartisan basis asserted for a third 
site, so the administration is just going to ignore Congress' 
important role in making sure that we have robust missile 
defense?
    Dr. Plumb. Congresswoman, the United States and the 
Department of Defense are both absolutely committed to a robust 
missile defense program. That is in the Missile Defense Review. 
That is in our efforts to improve missile defense of the 
homeland through the Next-Generation Interceptor and the 
service life extension of the GBI [Ground-Based Interceptor]. 
We are buying over-the-horizon radars to work on cruise missile 
defense of the entire homeland, and there is literally billions 
in the President's budget request including nearly $5 billion 
for a more robust and resilient architecture to track ballistic 
and hypersonic weapons.
    Ms. Stefanik. And that includes making sure----
    Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Stefanik. Right. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. I would remind the gentlelady that I personally 
have tried to work with you on the third missile site. I am 
worried about the partisan tone of your questions. We have been 
given the largest missile defense budget by President Biden and 
his administration, I think at least in many, many years, if 
not in history. You have the statements from Dr. Plumb. I think 
that the aspersions you are trying to cast are misplaced.
    I should remind you that President Trump, I think, did very 
little if anything to help with the third missile site while he 
was President. And I recall him trying to be like the best 
friends, good buddies with both Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un.
    Ms. Stefanik. Chairman Cooper, I would like to respond to 
that. I would like you to give your leniency as chair to 
respond to that.
    Mr. Cooper. You have my permission.
    Ms. Stefanik. Chairman Cooper, I appreciate the work that 
you and this committee have done to work with my office and 
other members to ensure that Fort Drum was as it should have 
been, designated the third continental interceptor site. That, 
in fact, designation happened during the Trump administration. 
To say that there was no movement forward on investing in 
robust missile defense during the Trump administration is 
absolutely wrong.
    As a Member of Congress, I can ask panelists or witnesses 
any question that is pertinent to constituents in my district. 
I will continue to do that in the oversight capacity. This 
administration was clear that they do not support locating a 
missile defense site at Fort Drum which puts them at odds with 
the majority leader of the United States Senate. That would be 
Senator Chuck Schumer who has made this a priority. So to get 
that on record is an important answer for my constituents to 
hear.
    Again, we have a strong bipartisan working relationship on 
this committee, but these panelists and the witnesses deserve 
to answer tough questions. So I would push back on that and 
with that, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Do any other members of the subcommittee have 
questions?
    Hearing none, it looks as if this public portion of the 
hearing is adjourned, and we will try to reschedule--Mr. 
Wilson?
    Mr. Wilson. One final question for the record and that is 
when I think of missile defense, I am so disappointed that our 
NATO ally, Turkey, ally of 73 years, really 100 years, that 
they are now dependent on Russian S-400s. And then India, the 
world's largest democracy, additionally, S-400s. And it could 
be off record, but I would like to know what we are doing to 
try to work with these two very important allies of the United 
States to do foreign military sales. Whatever can be done that 
America being who they work with and not Putin. Thank you very 
much.
    Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman for his question. If 
there are no other points to be made, I suggest that the public 
portion of this hearing be adjourned and we try to reschedule 
for a later date the classified portion of the hearing. I thank 
the witnesses for participating, sorry for the unexpected 
delay.
    [Whereupon, at 2:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
     
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                            A P P E N D I X

                              May 11, 2022
     
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                              May 11, 2022

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                              May 11, 2022

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             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Admiral Hill and General Karbler. As directed by Section 1687 of 
the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the Department's executive agent for the 
continuing development of capabilities to counter the evolving 
hypersonic boost-glide vehicle threat. Since our adversaries are 
seeking to develop and mature a diverse inventory and means of delivery 
of hypersonic capabilities, I remain an advocate of multiple offensive 
and defensive capabilities. We must continue to improve our ability to 
address hypersonic threats at left-of-launch as well as during the 
boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. Current and further 
development of kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities provide us 
the ability to address threats at left-of-launch while the SM-6 Sea-
Based Terminal missile provide us a terminal phase of flight 
capability. With the support of Congress, MDA continues to pursue 
improvements to the space sensor architecture, communications network, 
and command and control capabilities. The continued development and 
future fielding of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor 
(HBTSS) and the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) demonstration efforts will 
provide the Warfighter added capabilities to detect, track, and defeat 
hypersonic threats. Finally, continued pursuit of non-kinetic 
capabilities remain key to addressing future adversary threat 
capabilities.   [See page 2.]
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
    Admiral Hill. Our missile defense cooperation with Israel remains 
strong as we continue the development and coproduction activities of 
our joint United States--Israel missile defense systems. Under the 2016 
United States--Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the United 
States Government provides Israel $38 billion (B) for ten years (Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2019-2028), of which $5B ($500 million (M)/year) is for 
missile defense efforts. In accordance with this MOU, Missile Defense 
Agency (MDA) executes several Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation (RDT&E) and Coproduction agreements furthering our defense 
cooperation with Israel. These efforts include the development, 
coproduction, and fielding of the Arrow Weapon System and the David's 
Sling Weapon System, in addition to Iron Dome Defense System (IDDS) 
coproduction activities. For FY 2022, in addition to the $500M for our 
RDT&E and coproduction activities, the United States Government 
provided Israel an additional $1B of IDDS funding as a result of 
Operation Guardian of the Walls.   [See page 3.]
    Admiral Hill. In addition to MDA's robust cooperation with Israel, 
MDA has several Foreign Military Sales (FMS) activities with our Middle 
East partners. These activities include active FMS cases with the UAE 
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense Weapon System. [Defer question to OSD and U.S. Central Command 
for additional input.]   [See page 3.]
    Admiral Hill. The United States and Israel jointly develop Arrow-3 
for the defense of Israel. In accordance with our joint international 
agreement, this potential purchase by Germany is pending United States 
Government approval   [See page 3.]

    
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                              May 11, 2022

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Mr. Langevin. As we know, directed energy weapons, such as lasers 
and high-powered microwaves, can effectively engage a variety of 
threats with speed, flexibility, precision, and on a low cost-per-shot 
basis.
    Despite this, the FY23 budget request has cut all funding for a 
critical directed energy effort--specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali 
Laser (DPAL)--despite its recent history of success, and the proven 
value DE technologies provide to our warfighters.
    Can you speak more to MDA's development and pursuit of a rapid 
prototype and demonstration of DPAL, and most importantly, please 
describe how valuable this asset would be in your arsenal?
    Dr. Plumb. The Department fully supports the development of 
directed energy solutions, which, along with other non-kinetic 
capabilities, will have an increasingly important role in our future 
missile defense architecture. In 2019, the Department consolidated 
directed energy efforts at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) level, and the Department has 
since issued a Directed Energy Roadmap in order to best utilize scarce 
resources and leverage existing work across the Department. The total 
amount requested by the Department for directed energy for Fiscal Year 
2023 is nearly $1.1 billion and the total over the Future Year Defense 
Program is over $3.4 billion. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) 
continues to collaborate closely with USD (R&E) and the Services on 
missile defense-related directed energy efforts including the Diode-
Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) program. Congress appropriated $42M in FY21 
and $6 million in FY22 for the DPAL program which MDA is now executing. 
DPAL's shorter wavelength offers key advantages for higher laser 
intensity on target and greater potential for scaling to the higher 
powers required to defend against ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide 
vehicles, and high-altitude hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles 
at longer engagement ranges. To date, DPAL performance goals are being 
met and power levels in the 100 kilowatt-class are anticipated to be 
achieved prior to the end of Fiscal Year 2022. Additionally, in May 
2022, MDA solicited industry to conduct six-month studies assessing 
potential uses of DPAL technology in a future weapon system and to list 
the cost and power levels required for such a capability. Once the 
power scaling effort is complete, MDA plans to transition DPAL to 
industry.
    Mr. Langevin. As we know, directed energy weapons, such as lasers 
and high-powered microwaves, can effectively engage a variety of 
threats with speed, flexibility, precision, and on a low cost-per-shot 
basis.
    Despite this, the FY23 budget request has cut all funding for a 
critical directed energy effort--specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali 
Laser (DPAL)--despite its recent history of success, and the proven 
value DE technologies provide to our warfighters.
    Can you speak more to MDA's development and pursuit of a rapid 
prototype and demonstration of DPAL, and most importantly, please 
describe how valuable this asset would be in your arsenal?
    Admiral Hill. USSPACECOM constantly pursues a more resilient, 
persistent, and robust missile tracking/missile warning architecture 
against emerging threats. However, for the specific timelines of 
acquisition and initial operational capability, I will have to defer to 
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations. 
USSPACECOM will continue to engage with them to evaluate divergent 
options based on this timeline. USSPACECOM stands ready to 
operationally accept and integrate this capability into the fight as 
soon as it comes available.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Mr. Turner. I understand Missile Tracking/Missile Warning is the 
Space Force's top priority. The types of the missiles that satellites 
need to detect is changing, including the need to detect hypersonic 
glide vehicles, and diversifying space architecture reduces the threat 
of an attack. I also understand the Space Force FY23 budget requests 
funding to field two Next Gen OPIR Polar satellites, and also starts 
prototyping a more resilient and capable Missile Tracking/Missile 
Warning architecture at Medium Earth Orbit and Low Earth Orbit. Can you 
accelerate the operational fielding of this more resilient and capable 
architecture so the two Next Gen OPIR Polar satellites are not 
required?
    General Shaw. USSPACECOM constantly pursues a more resilient, 
persistent, and robust missile tracking/missile warning architecture 
against emerging threats. However, for the specific timelines of 
acquisition and initial operational capability, I will have to defer to 
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations. 
USSPACECOM will continue to engage with them to evaluate divergent 
options based on this timeline. USSPACECOM stands ready to 
operationally accept and integrate this capability into the fight as 
soon as it comes available.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. The previous Missile Defense Review decided to deploy 
an additional twenty Ground-based Interceptors to stay ahead of the 
rogue missile threat to our homeland. It seems that this decision will 
not be to either refurbish 20 existing GBIs with 20 new systems, or to 
deploy an additional 20 GBIs. Can you tell this committee what the 
Administration's policy is on this issue, and when we can expect a 
decision?
    Dr. Plumb. The Department's priority is to defend the homeland and 
deter attacks against the United States, and is committed to improving 
the capability and reliability of the Ground Based Midcourse Defense 
(GMD) system. The FY23 budget requests $2.8B for the development and 
production of 20 new Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) and the service 
life extension of our existing Capability Enhancement I fleet of Ground 
Based Interceptors (GBI).
    Mr. Lamborn. The Administration wants to move all of the Space 
missions from the National Guard into the United States Space Force 
(USSF) Single Component by FY2025. It is my understanding that one-
third of the Nation's Strategic Missile Warning in the U.S. is 
performed by the National Guard. It is also my understanding that these 
National Guard members will not transfer to the USSF Single Component. 
How do you plan to assume these Strategic Missile Warning missions with 
your current force structure? In your best military advice, should we 
establish a Space National Guard in order to maintain this critical 
strategic missile warning capability?
    General Shaw. First, National Guard members are an invaluable part 
of our team throughout our Headquarters and Components. We understand 
the complexities associated with transitioning National Guard roles 
into the U.S. Space Force without transferring personnel billets to 
execute those roles. However, USSPACECOM cannot speak on behalf of the 
U.S. Space Force on how to satisfy these operational roles with the 
current operational staff. I would defer to the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense, the Air Force and Space Force, National Guard leadership, 
and Chief of Space Operations to field this question.
    Mr. Lamborn. We've seen some very drastic deployment dwell times 
for soldiers working the missile defense mission. The demand for 
missile defense is clearly not going to abate. What is the Department 
doing to get these dwell times back to the realm of reasonable?
    General Karbler. Army senior leadership is aware the Air Defense 
Artillery (ADA) branch faces many complex and challenging issues 
regarding not only ADA Soldier dwell time but also the overall health 
of the ADA branch (Soldiers and families). In a positive development, 
over the past 18 months, we have been successful in significantly 
reducing our ADA posture in the U.S. Central Command theater. The Army 
has also committed to standing up an additional 16th Patriot Battalion 
which will increase our ADA inventory as well as Soldier dwell time.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS
    Dr. DesJarlais. With rising North Korea missile tests and 
provocations, it is imperative that we maintain a robust Homeland GMD 
system while we wait for the Next Generation Interceptor to come 
online. Can you assure the committee that the GMD system will remain at 
44 ready-to-fire GBIs for the NORTHCOM commander? If not, what's your 
plan to get it to 44? How low will ready to fire GBIs go, when, and for 
how long?
    Admiral Hill. The GMD Weapon System including the GBIs is 
undergoing multiple reliability and availability upgrades to provide 
the Warfighter the most capable system in the short-term while 
providing a foundation for future integration of NGI. Consistent with 
previous decisions on GBI emplacements and availability, the GBI 
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and the new Launch Support System 
(LSS) upgrade ensures assets and capability are maintained to address 
changing threat and geopolitical environments. The daily/weekly 
activities associated with these upgrades will adhere to established 
USNORTHCOM processes for coordinating and approving all maintenance and 
upgrade activities impacting system availability and capability. These 
upgrades are critical investments to ensure the GMD system and GBIs 
remain available in the future at the very high system readiness levels 
to which the Warfighter is accustom. The attached plan is being 
coordinated with USNORTHCOM along with options to accelerate the LSS 
deployment. See the attached classified GBI Availability for current 
and projected GBI Inventory, Emplacements, and Availabilities.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. It's my understanding that the biggest risk to on-
time delivery of the Space Development Agency's Tranche 1 missile 
tracking layer is the accelerated launch timeline and requirement to 
use the National Security Space Launch program. Under NSSL, SDA will be 
required to procure launches two years in advance, meaning they will 
require funding in FY23 in order to launch Tranche 1 in FY25. Needless 
to say, industry does not do business this way, and I'm concerned that 
these extended timelines are unnecessary given SDA's unique model and 
will put on-time delivery of these urgently needed systems at risk.
    SDA will also be required to pay exorbitant amounts of money for 
``mission assurance'', even though the average price per satellite in 
the tracking layer is only $14 million dollars. We spend hundreds of 
millions of dollars on mission assurance programs through launch 
support services and launch vehicle procurement. I'm curious what we're 
getting for all this extra spending other than adding significant 
amounts of time to our launch timelines. The risk for the vehicles used 
in the NSSL program is already incredibly low. Yet the enterprise is so 
risk-averse that in some cases, we haven't put satellites on rockets 
that we put American astronauts on. SDA satellites are uniquely cost-
effective, and this constellation is specifically designed to be robust 
enough to absorb some loss, either during launch or as the result of 
adversary action. For that reason, the requirement for SDA to procure 
launches under NSSL seems unnecessary and wasteful.
    Satellites launched by SDA as part of Tranche 0 were procured 
commercially, outside of the NSSL program. Why are Tranche 1 launches 
required to be procured under the NSSL program and do you see a benefit 
to allowing SDA to continue to use commercial launches? What missile 
defense use cases do you foresee where SDA or another agency may need 
to launch vehicles into orbit on a timeline shorter than two years, and 
what are their current options to do so within and outside of the NSSL 
framework?
    Dr. Plumb. SDA Tranche 1 launches are procured under the NSSL 
program because the FY22 National Defense Authorizations Act Section 
1601 stated it shall be the policy of the DOD and NRO to use the NSSL 
program to the extent possible to procure launch services only from 
launch service providers that can meet Federal requirements under the 
requirements of phase two, and for the Secretary of Defense or Director 
of National Intelligence, to notify the appropriate congressional 
committees if a launch service will instead use an alternative launch 
procurement approach that could be met using phase two contracts. The 
NSSL Phase 2 contract, awarded to United Launch Alliance (ULA) and 
SpaceX, meets federal and SDA Tranche 1 mission requirements, and has 
mission acceleration options to can reduce the nominal 24months 
commercial integration timeline if required, and achieves the best 
overall value across all defense agency procured launches. The NSSL 
Phase 2 contract launch providers are capable and proven providers whom 
SDA can benefit from for assured access to space. SDA and other defense 
agencies have the benefit of using a multiple variety of contract 
vehicles offered across USSF AATS programs. These contract structures 
have the benefits of assured access to space, commercial-like pricing, 
and accelerated integration timelines. In addition to the NSSL Phase 2 
contract, the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP) has contract vehicles 
to facilitate small mass to orbit requirements and experimental launch 
vehicle flights for possible missile defense use cases. RSLP is used 
routinely by the Missile Defense Agency for their testing events.

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