[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-86]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES
MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE
DEFEAT PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MAY 11, 2022
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-651 WASHINGTON : 2023
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice MO BROOKS, Alabama
Chair ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
Will Braden, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Hill, VADM Jon A., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency.........
Karbler, LTG Daniel L., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and
Missile Defense Command and Joint Functional Component Command
for Integrated Missile Defense.................................
Plumb, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy....
Sawyer, John D., Acting Director, Contracting and National
Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office...
Shaw, Lt Gen John E., USAF, Deputy Commander, U.S. Space Command.
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 13
Hill, VADM Jon A............................................. 26
Karbler, LTG Daniel L........................................ 40
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces................... 15
Plumb, Hon. John F........................................... 17
Sawyer, John D............................................... 77
Shaw, Lt Gen John E.......................................... 64
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 97
Mr. Wilson................................................... 97
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Dr. DesJarlais............................................... 102
Mr. Horsford................................................. 103
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 102
Mr. Langevin................................................. 101
Mr. Turner................................................... 101
FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 11, 2022.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:59 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to
order. The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony
on the 2023 budget request for DOD [Department of Defense]
missile defense programs.
Our witnesses are Dr. John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Space Policy; Vice Admiral Hill, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency; Lieutenant General Karbler, Commander
of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense;
Lieutenant General John Shaw, Deputy Commander of the U.S.
Space Command; and Mr. John Sawyer, Acting Director of
Contracting and National Security Acquisitions for the
Government Accountability Office.
I suggest that I forgo my brilliant opening statement and
due to time pressure I would suggest that my ranking member
also forgo his opening statement due to time pressure.
Unfortunately, and I want to apologize to the witnesses, we
are not able to control the congressional schedule. But votes
are expected to start fairly shortly and could last for hours.
So ideally, we would have a very truncated public session, go
immediately to closed session. And I think that is much more
productive for at least the members who are here present.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, I agree totally with that
schedule. I'll submit mine for the record.
Mr. Cooper. Okay. We will submit our statements for the
record and we will submit the witnesses' statements for the
record and is it premature to suggest that we quickly go to
23----
[The prepared statements of Mr. Cooper, Mr. Lamborn, and
the witnesses can be found in the Appendix beginning on page
13.]
Staff member. Do you want to have no questions at all?
Mr. Cooper. Well, would Mr. DesJarlais like to ask a
question? Okay.
Mr. Langevin, I see that--Mr. Wilson? Is that okay with
you? I apologize for the truncated nature, but I don't want to
keep the witnesses here until 7, 8, or 9 o'clock tonight. These
are busy people.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one brief
question.
Mr. Cooper. Okay. Go ahead. Mr. Langevin, you are
recognized.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much. I thank our witnesses
for being here. So as we all know, directed energy [DE] weapons
such as lasers and high-powered microwaves can effectively
engage a variety of threats with speed, flexibility, precision,
on a whole cost-per-shot basis.
Despite this, the FY23 [fiscal year 2023] budget request
has cut all funding for a critical directed energy effort,
specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser, or DPAL, despite
its recent history of success and the proven value DE
technologies provide to our warfighters.
So for the record, I wanted to ask can you speak more to
MDA's [Missile Defense Agency's] development and pursuit of a
rapid prototype and demonstration of DPAL and most importantly,
please describe how valuable this asset would be in your
arsenal.
Mr. Cooper. Does the gentleman want this question for the
record or do you want a verbal answer to your question right
now?
Mr. Langevin. Well, if we could get that from Dr. Plumb,
that would be great.
Mr. Cooper. Dr. Plumb.
Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman Langevin. I'll just say I
fully agree that directed energy is part of our future
architecture and we need to be investing in it. As for the
specifics on DPALS and other laser or other directed energy
systems, my understanding is those have been transferred to R&E
[Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering].
Admiral Hill may have some additional pieces, but as you know,
I am keen on this particular issue and I do intend for that to
be a part of my deep dive as I get deeper into this position.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, this has got to be a
priority for us and I hope that it will continue to be so.
Last question, Mr. Chairman, and I will submit this for the
record, and if I can get it back in writing. So we face
conventional and asymmetric threats from our adversaries around
the globe on a daily basis and one of those emerging threats is
hypersonics. We have seen recent tests by China and North Korea
and have hypersonics in use on the battlefield by Russia
against the Ukrainian people.
Here at home and in this setting, well, since you are going
to get back to me, you can both probably get a classified
answer on this, can you discuss our layered defense against
hypersonic missiles?
I will submit that for the record, Mr. Chairman, given the
constraints on time and I will yield back. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 97.]
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island. I
understand that the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson,
has a question?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you for your service. We are going to miss you in Congress and
to be enterprising today facing the bizarre circumstance we
have of these votes. And I want to thank all of our witnesses
for being here today.
And for the record, I have got four quick questions. And
for Admiral Hill, that is that Israel faces the threat of
larger, more sophisticated rocket and missile arsenals in the
hands of terrorists. Additionally, in the last 3 weeks, there
have been a number of Hamas terrorist missile attacks from Gaza
against the people of Israel. To address this mounting threat,
Israel and the United States are working together to develop
and deploy a multi-tiered missile defense system. The U.S.-
Israel Memorandum of Understanding on the security assistance
provides for $500 million in funding for the annual defense
systems in cooperation with Israel.
Admiral Hill, you recently were in Israel to view the new
Elevated Sensor missile detection system. Can you update the
committee on the state of the U.S.-Israel missile defense
cooperation and the funding levels that are being brought forth
this year to include Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 97.]
Mr. Wilson. The next question, Admiral, would be in regard
to missile and rocket threats from Iran and its proxies, how
horrible this is across the Middle East. And we have had the
most recent attacks on our valued allies, the UAE [United Arab
Emirates] and Saudi Arabia. And we have seen that Iran has
targeted U.S. and allied forces in Syria and Erbil in Iraq.
In the wake of this, we have the cooperation of the Abraham
Accords and so what is being done of working together with our
Middle East allies?
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 97.]
Mr. Wilson. And then third, I am really grateful for the
extraordinary strategic and vital location of Guam and I hope
that the Department will continue in every effort to invest
$892 million for integrated air and missile defense system to
defend the terrific people of Guam against cruise, hypersonic,
and ballistic missiles.
And a final short question. I was truly grateful to learn
that our German allies are moving forward purchasing the Arrow
3 anti-missile defense shield from Israel. Assuming that Israel
procures the Arrow system 3 system, how will we integrate that
with our missile defense strategic and strategy in the European
theater particularly to hopefully address and defend the people
of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia? Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 97.]
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. I appreciate his kind
words about me and do any other members have questions they
would like to bring up now?
It appears that there are none, but it also appears that we
might have some room availability issues with the SCIF
[Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility]. So would the
gentleman from Tennessee like to ask something? I think it is
going to be another few minutes and they have already called a
vote, so we are really running into crunch time here.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, I will take a minute or two, if
that's okay.
Mr. Cooper. Okay.
Dr. DesJarlais. Admiral Hill, what is our current
capability to defend against hypersonic threats from our
adversaries, particularly threats posed to critical assets like
our aircraft carriers?
Admiral Hill. Is this question for the record or do you
want me to answer it now? Okay. Yes, sir.
So today, deployed with the aircraft carriers on destroyers
is the Sea-Based Terminal capability which was designed to
protect the carrier base against the advanced maneuvering
threat. That is the hypersonic defense today that is hard kill
and as you know, we are investing in PB23 [President's budget
for 2023] into the Glide Phase Interceptor to add a layered
defense capability.
We are leveraging all sensors available today. We are
bringing that data down to the ships through our command and
control battle management and communications.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. You requested additional funds for
the Glide Phase Interceptor in the MDA unfunded priorities
list. Can you describe how these funds would be used and would
they help accelerate the timeline?
Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. So when I think of an unfunded
priorities list, I think given another dollar where would I put
it? And the items that you see listed there specifically to
Glide Phase Interceptor is to risk-reduce key technology areas.
That is a new regime up in the glide phase and so seeker work,
propulsion work, the old thermal protection system issues, that
will help to de-risk the program.
Dr. DesJarlais. You mentioned earlier, and I don't know if
this was for the closed setting, so if it is, just let me know,
but you mentioned the successes we have had with the THAAD
[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] deployments overseas in
the Middle East and I was going to give you some time to tout
some of those successes if that was for an open setting or was
it for the closed?
Admiral Hill. We can talk about it in the open setting
because it has made its way into the press. But the United Arab
Emirates, one of our foreign military sales customers, has used
the U.S.-built THAAD system effectively in June--I am sorry, in
January of this year. And were successful in all those
engagements. Through some work with Central Command and with my
good friend General Karbler here, we now have access to that
data so that we can pour through it to see if there are any
improvements we need to make either to the system or to the
techniques, tactics, and procedures that the soldiers employ.
Thank you, sir.
Dr. DesJarlais. Very good. And I don't want to be greedy
with my time. I didn't know, Ranking Member.
Mr. Cooper. Sadly, it is looking like we've got plenty of
time now because it looks like with permission of the
witnesses, we will only do a brief opening session today and we
will reschedule to another day the closed session. So the
witnesses will be free to leave after this.
Dr. DesJarlais. I will yield back and then come back if we
have more time.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Lamborn has questions?
Mr. Lamborn. Yes, since we have a few minutes before we
head over to the floor for our votes and then we will see you
all, gentlemen, at another time for the classified portion.
But Admiral Hill, we discussed HBTSS [Hypersonic Ballistic
Tracking Space Sensor] in our office earlier today and you said
that hypersonic missile defense is one of your top three
priorities. How satisfied are you with the current plan for
HBTSS? And can you describe for the committee your vision of
the full architecture?
Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. Ranking Member Lamborn, thanks for
that question.
So the Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor has two
major roles. The first is to pick up the dim targets that
cannot be seen by the current architecture today; so from a
ballistic perspective, we are seeing changes there that make
that fight much more challenging. But when you get to the
advanced hypersonic threat which has a global maneuver
capability, we need the ability to see it from space, so global
coverage and that very close proximity from space to track
those sensors.
We are on track to take two interoperable prototype
satellites to space in March of 2023. We will put those in an
inclination where we can monitor tests in the INDOPACOM [U.S.
Indo-Pacific Command] region and we will collect that data as a
way to proof out the concept.
Did a lot of work on the ground to show that we can extract
those hot targets over a warm earth. Now it is about getting it
into space and pulling that data down. We are staying very
close to the Space Force as we make decisions on the overall
architecture and our vision is is that the HBTSS will be a part
of the overall constellation for dealing with that global
maneuvering threat.
Mr. Lamborn. And just as kind of an update, as much as you
can say here in open setting, are we getting closer to a
decision where we will find a contractor or contractors who
will help us with the defense against hypersonic vehicles?
Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. You are talking about defense
capability----
Mr. Lamborn. Yes.
Admiral Hill [continuing]. Beyond the terminal capability
that we have today? Yes, sir. We have a Other Transaction
Authority agreement in place with three separate companies that
are competing now. We are evaluating those concepts for a
downselect later this year; so we will go from the current
three down to the two, perhaps the one, depending on the
maturity of those different proposals. But it goes right back
to what Congressman DesJarlais asked which is how much de-
risking needs to be done?
We don't have a good sense yet, as we are going through
that work now and those evaluations, but if we see areas where
there are major risk areas that we want to help industry
overcome, that is what those investments will be tied to.
Mr. Lamborn. And General Shaw, lastly, what can you say as
far as the Space Force's role with hypersonics? When it comes
to testing and fielding we are behind our two near-peer
potential adversaries. So what can you say where we stand in
terms of catching up?
General Shaw. Congressman, thanks for the question. Again,
probably best targeted for the Space Force, but I will give my
best answer from U.S. Space Command.
We are interested in any capabilities that are going to
help us with any of these threats and as MDA has pursued this
particular program, HBTSS,the advantage of this is that we have
a perspective from space that is invaluable and will allow us
to get after a lot of these threats.
To get after the actual technologies themselves, I think
that we need to pursue every possibility to hold enemy at risk
from longer and longer ranges. I think that is where warfare is
taking us and hypersonics will play a role in that.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from Colorado. I think
the gentlelady from New York is recognized, if you have any
questions you would like to ask.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Cooper. I represent Fort
Drum, home to the 10th Mountain Division that has been
designated the third continental interceptor site. I know that
many of you have answered questions on this matter in front of
this committee beforehand.
My question today goes to Lieutenant General Karbler who
commands the 100th Ground Based Missile Defense Brigade, a
multi-component brigade made up of soldiers from the Active
Duty Army and Army National Guard forces. They are the 300
soldiers defending 300 million people.
As the designated third continental interceptor site, if
Fort Drum were to receive a missile defense unit, would the
force structure mirror that of the 100th GMD Brigade with a mix
of Active Duty and National Guard soldiers?
General Karbler. Congresswoman, thanks very much for the
question. I would hope that it would be a total force solution
to that. We have seen great success in our missile defense
element, soldiers in Colorado as well as in Alaska who help man
missile defense, and I see no reason why this wouldn't be a--
why we would not pursue a multi-COMPO [component] soldier
solution.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. My followup is a broader question.
So I have been very concerned that President Biden and his
administration and many House Democrats have asserted that
improved missile defense is provocative when unfortunately, the
U.S. has not taken any moves to dramatically alter the balance
of power in the nuclear and missile defense areas, yet all of
our adversaries are modernizing their offensive and defensive
strategic capabilities.
This question is for Dr. Plumb. How has the war in Ukraine,
Russia's nuclear threats, and the strengthening of the Russia-
China relationship, unfortunately, altered or updated this
administration's view on missile defense?
Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congresswoman. I will just say that the
classified Missile Defense Review has been released. There have
been some unclassified talking points. I am happy to just for
the record just put that we are committed to developing the
Next-Generation Interceptor with MDA and so improving our
missile defenses, that is both in capacity and in quality, is a
thing that the administration is, in fact, dedicated to.
The Ukraine issue you point out is an excellent one because
what we have seen there is that Russia is using missiles not
with the precision you might expect of a modern military, but
more as a broad area terror weapon in my opinion. And so the
need for missile defenses is only increased, in my opinion, at
least by watching that conflict play out.
Ms. Stefanik. And is that shared by the entire
administration, and by President Joe Biden? Why are we not
hearing that from the President of the United States?
Dr. Plumb. I can't speak for the President's view on this
specific issue. I will note that we have I think already
provided over $4.5 billion in drawdown equipment to Ukraine. We
have made very strong statements against Russia. We have
declared we will defend NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] every square inch. We have shipped about 1,400
Stingers, thousands and thousands of Javelins and other forms
of armaments, so I think my version of that would be that there
is a very strong response there and deep concern.
Ms. Stefanik. What is this administration's position on a
third continental interceptor site which has been designated in
the previous National Defense Authorizations Acts on a
bipartisan basis? What is the position of Joe Biden and the
Department of Defense about that third site, given the changing
and increasing threats around the world today?
Dr. Plumb. Yes, Congresswoman, the position remains the
same. There is no military requirement for that third site at
this time.
Ms. Stefanik. Given the increased threats from North Korea
and other adversaries around the world, again, and the need
that Congress has on a bipartisan basis asserted for a third
site, so the administration is just going to ignore Congress'
important role in making sure that we have robust missile
defense?
Dr. Plumb. Congresswoman, the United States and the
Department of Defense are both absolutely committed to a robust
missile defense program. That is in the Missile Defense Review.
That is in our efforts to improve missile defense of the
homeland through the Next-Generation Interceptor and the
service life extension of the GBI [Ground-Based Interceptor].
We are buying over-the-horizon radars to work on cruise missile
defense of the entire homeland, and there is literally billions
in the President's budget request including nearly $5 billion
for a more robust and resilient architecture to track ballistic
and hypersonic weapons.
Ms. Stefanik. And that includes making sure----
Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Stefanik. Right. Thank you.
Mr. Cooper. I would remind the gentlelady that I personally
have tried to work with you on the third missile site. I am
worried about the partisan tone of your questions. We have been
given the largest missile defense budget by President Biden and
his administration, I think at least in many, many years, if
not in history. You have the statements from Dr. Plumb. I think
that the aspersions you are trying to cast are misplaced.
I should remind you that President Trump, I think, did very
little if anything to help with the third missile site while he
was President. And I recall him trying to be like the best
friends, good buddies with both Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un.
Ms. Stefanik. Chairman Cooper, I would like to respond to
that. I would like you to give your leniency as chair to
respond to that.
Mr. Cooper. You have my permission.
Ms. Stefanik. Chairman Cooper, I appreciate the work that
you and this committee have done to work with my office and
other members to ensure that Fort Drum was as it should have
been, designated the third continental interceptor site. That,
in fact, designation happened during the Trump administration.
To say that there was no movement forward on investing in
robust missile defense during the Trump administration is
absolutely wrong.
As a Member of Congress, I can ask panelists or witnesses
any question that is pertinent to constituents in my district.
I will continue to do that in the oversight capacity. This
administration was clear that they do not support locating a
missile defense site at Fort Drum which puts them at odds with
the majority leader of the United States Senate. That would be
Senator Chuck Schumer who has made this a priority. So to get
that on record is an important answer for my constituents to
hear.
Again, we have a strong bipartisan working relationship on
this committee, but these panelists and the witnesses deserve
to answer tough questions. So I would push back on that and
with that, I yield back.
Mr. Cooper. Do any other members of the subcommittee have
questions?
Hearing none, it looks as if this public portion of the
hearing is adjourned, and we will try to reschedule--Mr.
Wilson?
Mr. Wilson. One final question for the record and that is
when I think of missile defense, I am so disappointed that our
NATO ally, Turkey, ally of 73 years, really 100 years, that
they are now dependent on Russian S-400s. And then India, the
world's largest democracy, additionally, S-400s. And it could
be off record, but I would like to know what we are doing to
try to work with these two very important allies of the United
States to do foreign military sales. Whatever can be done that
America being who they work with and not Putin. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman for his question. If
there are no other points to be made, I suggest that the public
portion of this hearing be adjourned and we try to reschedule
for a later date the classified portion of the hearing. I thank
the witnesses for participating, sorry for the unexpected
delay.
[Whereupon, at 2:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
May 11, 2022
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
May 11, 2022
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
May 11, 2022
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Admiral Hill and General Karbler. As directed by Section 1687 of
the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the Missile
Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the Department's executive agent for the
continuing development of capabilities to counter the evolving
hypersonic boost-glide vehicle threat. Since our adversaries are
seeking to develop and mature a diverse inventory and means of delivery
of hypersonic capabilities, I remain an advocate of multiple offensive
and defensive capabilities. We must continue to improve our ability to
address hypersonic threats at left-of-launch as well as during the
boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. Current and further
development of kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities provide us
the ability to address threats at left-of-launch while the SM-6 Sea-
Based Terminal missile provide us a terminal phase of flight
capability. With the support of Congress, MDA continues to pursue
improvements to the space sensor architecture, communications network,
and command and control capabilities. The continued development and
future fielding of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor
(HBTSS) and the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) demonstration efforts will
provide the Warfighter added capabilities to detect, track, and defeat
hypersonic threats. Finally, continued pursuit of non-kinetic
capabilities remain key to addressing future adversary threat
capabilities. [See page 2.]
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Admiral Hill. Our missile defense cooperation with Israel remains
strong as we continue the development and coproduction activities of
our joint United States--Israel missile defense systems. Under the 2016
United States--Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the United
States Government provides Israel $38 billion (B) for ten years (Fiscal
Year (FY) 2019-2028), of which $5B ($500 million (M)/year) is for
missile defense efforts. In accordance with this MOU, Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) executes several Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) and Coproduction agreements furthering our defense
cooperation with Israel. These efforts include the development,
coproduction, and fielding of the Arrow Weapon System and the David's
Sling Weapon System, in addition to Iron Dome Defense System (IDDS)
coproduction activities. For FY 2022, in addition to the $500M for our
RDT&E and coproduction activities, the United States Government
provided Israel an additional $1B of IDDS funding as a result of
Operation Guardian of the Walls. [See page 3.]
Admiral Hill. In addition to MDA's robust cooperation with Israel,
MDA has several Foreign Military Sales (FMS) activities with our Middle
East partners. These activities include active FMS cases with the UAE
and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense Weapon System. [Defer question to OSD and U.S. Central Command
for additional input.] [See page 3.]
Admiral Hill. The United States and Israel jointly develop Arrow-3
for the defense of Israel. In accordance with our joint international
agreement, this potential purchase by Germany is pending United States
Government approval [See page 3.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
May 11, 2022
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. As we know, directed energy weapons, such as lasers
and high-powered microwaves, can effectively engage a variety of
threats with speed, flexibility, precision, and on a low cost-per-shot
basis.
Despite this, the FY23 budget request has cut all funding for a
critical directed energy effort--specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali
Laser (DPAL)--despite its recent history of success, and the proven
value DE technologies provide to our warfighters.
Can you speak more to MDA's development and pursuit of a rapid
prototype and demonstration of DPAL, and most importantly, please
describe how valuable this asset would be in your arsenal?
Dr. Plumb. The Department fully supports the development of
directed energy solutions, which, along with other non-kinetic
capabilities, will have an increasingly important role in our future
missile defense architecture. In 2019, the Department consolidated
directed energy efforts at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) level, and the Department has
since issued a Directed Energy Roadmap in order to best utilize scarce
resources and leverage existing work across the Department. The total
amount requested by the Department for directed energy for Fiscal Year
2023 is nearly $1.1 billion and the total over the Future Year Defense
Program is over $3.4 billion. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
continues to collaborate closely with USD (R&E) and the Services on
missile defense-related directed energy efforts including the Diode-
Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) program. Congress appropriated $42M in FY21
and $6 million in FY22 for the DPAL program which MDA is now executing.
DPAL's shorter wavelength offers key advantages for higher laser
intensity on target and greater potential for scaling to the higher
powers required to defend against ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide
vehicles, and high-altitude hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles
at longer engagement ranges. To date, DPAL performance goals are being
met and power levels in the 100 kilowatt-class are anticipated to be
achieved prior to the end of Fiscal Year 2022. Additionally, in May
2022, MDA solicited industry to conduct six-month studies assessing
potential uses of DPAL technology in a future weapon system and to list
the cost and power levels required for such a capability. Once the
power scaling effort is complete, MDA plans to transition DPAL to
industry.
Mr. Langevin. As we know, directed energy weapons, such as lasers
and high-powered microwaves, can effectively engage a variety of
threats with speed, flexibility, precision, and on a low cost-per-shot
basis.
Despite this, the FY23 budget request has cut all funding for a
critical directed energy effort--specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali
Laser (DPAL)--despite its recent history of success, and the proven
value DE technologies provide to our warfighters.
Can you speak more to MDA's development and pursuit of a rapid
prototype and demonstration of DPAL, and most importantly, please
describe how valuable this asset would be in your arsenal?
Admiral Hill. USSPACECOM constantly pursues a more resilient,
persistent, and robust missile tracking/missile warning architecture
against emerging threats. However, for the specific timelines of
acquisition and initial operational capability, I will have to defer to
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations.
USSPACECOM will continue to engage with them to evaluate divergent
options based on this timeline. USSPACECOM stands ready to
operationally accept and integrate this capability into the fight as
soon as it comes available.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. I understand Missile Tracking/Missile Warning is the
Space Force's top priority. The types of the missiles that satellites
need to detect is changing, including the need to detect hypersonic
glide vehicles, and diversifying space architecture reduces the threat
of an attack. I also understand the Space Force FY23 budget requests
funding to field two Next Gen OPIR Polar satellites, and also starts
prototyping a more resilient and capable Missile Tracking/Missile
Warning architecture at Medium Earth Orbit and Low Earth Orbit. Can you
accelerate the operational fielding of this more resilient and capable
architecture so the two Next Gen OPIR Polar satellites are not
required?
General Shaw. USSPACECOM constantly pursues a more resilient,
persistent, and robust missile tracking/missile warning architecture
against emerging threats. However, for the specific timelines of
acquisition and initial operational capability, I will have to defer to
the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations.
USSPACECOM will continue to engage with them to evaluate divergent
options based on this timeline. USSPACECOM stands ready to
operationally accept and integrate this capability into the fight as
soon as it comes available.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. The previous Missile Defense Review decided to deploy
an additional twenty Ground-based Interceptors to stay ahead of the
rogue missile threat to our homeland. It seems that this decision will
not be to either refurbish 20 existing GBIs with 20 new systems, or to
deploy an additional 20 GBIs. Can you tell this committee what the
Administration's policy is on this issue, and when we can expect a
decision?
Dr. Plumb. The Department's priority is to defend the homeland and
deter attacks against the United States, and is committed to improving
the capability and reliability of the Ground Based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) system. The FY23 budget requests $2.8B for the development and
production of 20 new Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) and the service
life extension of our existing Capability Enhancement I fleet of Ground
Based Interceptors (GBI).
Mr. Lamborn. The Administration wants to move all of the Space
missions from the National Guard into the United States Space Force
(USSF) Single Component by FY2025. It is my understanding that one-
third of the Nation's Strategic Missile Warning in the U.S. is
performed by the National Guard. It is also my understanding that these
National Guard members will not transfer to the USSF Single Component.
How do you plan to assume these Strategic Missile Warning missions with
your current force structure? In your best military advice, should we
establish a Space National Guard in order to maintain this critical
strategic missile warning capability?
General Shaw. First, National Guard members are an invaluable part
of our team throughout our Headquarters and Components. We understand
the complexities associated with transitioning National Guard roles
into the U.S. Space Force without transferring personnel billets to
execute those roles. However, USSPACECOM cannot speak on behalf of the
U.S. Space Force on how to satisfy these operational roles with the
current operational staff. I would defer to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Air Force and Space Force, National Guard leadership,
and Chief of Space Operations to field this question.
Mr. Lamborn. We've seen some very drastic deployment dwell times
for soldiers working the missile defense mission. The demand for
missile defense is clearly not going to abate. What is the Department
doing to get these dwell times back to the realm of reasonable?
General Karbler. Army senior leadership is aware the Air Defense
Artillery (ADA) branch faces many complex and challenging issues
regarding not only ADA Soldier dwell time but also the overall health
of the ADA branch (Soldiers and families). In a positive development,
over the past 18 months, we have been successful in significantly
reducing our ADA posture in the U.S. Central Command theater. The Army
has also committed to standing up an additional 16th Patriot Battalion
which will increase our ADA inventory as well as Soldier dwell time.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS
Dr. DesJarlais. With rising North Korea missile tests and
provocations, it is imperative that we maintain a robust Homeland GMD
system while we wait for the Next Generation Interceptor to come
online. Can you assure the committee that the GMD system will remain at
44 ready-to-fire GBIs for the NORTHCOM commander? If not, what's your
plan to get it to 44? How low will ready to fire GBIs go, when, and for
how long?
Admiral Hill. The GMD Weapon System including the GBIs is
undergoing multiple reliability and availability upgrades to provide
the Warfighter the most capable system in the short-term while
providing a foundation for future integration of NGI. Consistent with
previous decisions on GBI emplacements and availability, the GBI
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and the new Launch Support System
(LSS) upgrade ensures assets and capability are maintained to address
changing threat and geopolitical environments. The daily/weekly
activities associated with these upgrades will adhere to established
USNORTHCOM processes for coordinating and approving all maintenance and
upgrade activities impacting system availability and capability. These
upgrades are critical investments to ensure the GMD system and GBIs
remain available in the future at the very high system readiness levels
to which the Warfighter is accustom. The attached plan is being
coordinated with USNORTHCOM along with options to accelerate the LSS
deployment. See the attached classified GBI Availability for current
and projected GBI Inventory, Emplacements, and Availabilities.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
Mr. Horsford. It's my understanding that the biggest risk to on-
time delivery of the Space Development Agency's Tranche 1 missile
tracking layer is the accelerated launch timeline and requirement to
use the National Security Space Launch program. Under NSSL, SDA will be
required to procure launches two years in advance, meaning they will
require funding in FY23 in order to launch Tranche 1 in FY25. Needless
to say, industry does not do business this way, and I'm concerned that
these extended timelines are unnecessary given SDA's unique model and
will put on-time delivery of these urgently needed systems at risk.
SDA will also be required to pay exorbitant amounts of money for
``mission assurance'', even though the average price per satellite in
the tracking layer is only $14 million dollars. We spend hundreds of
millions of dollars on mission assurance programs through launch
support services and launch vehicle procurement. I'm curious what we're
getting for all this extra spending other than adding significant
amounts of time to our launch timelines. The risk for the vehicles used
in the NSSL program is already incredibly low. Yet the enterprise is so
risk-averse that in some cases, we haven't put satellites on rockets
that we put American astronauts on. SDA satellites are uniquely cost-
effective, and this constellation is specifically designed to be robust
enough to absorb some loss, either during launch or as the result of
adversary action. For that reason, the requirement for SDA to procure
launches under NSSL seems unnecessary and wasteful.
Satellites launched by SDA as part of Tranche 0 were procured
commercially, outside of the NSSL program. Why are Tranche 1 launches
required to be procured under the NSSL program and do you see a benefit
to allowing SDA to continue to use commercial launches? What missile
defense use cases do you foresee where SDA or another agency may need
to launch vehicles into orbit on a timeline shorter than two years, and
what are their current options to do so within and outside of the NSSL
framework?
Dr. Plumb. SDA Tranche 1 launches are procured under the NSSL
program because the FY22 National Defense Authorizations Act Section
1601 stated it shall be the policy of the DOD and NRO to use the NSSL
program to the extent possible to procure launch services only from
launch service providers that can meet Federal requirements under the
requirements of phase two, and for the Secretary of Defense or Director
of National Intelligence, to notify the appropriate congressional
committees if a launch service will instead use an alternative launch
procurement approach that could be met using phase two contracts. The
NSSL Phase 2 contract, awarded to United Launch Alliance (ULA) and
SpaceX, meets federal and SDA Tranche 1 mission requirements, and has
mission acceleration options to can reduce the nominal 24months
commercial integration timeline if required, and achieves the best
overall value across all defense agency procured launches. The NSSL
Phase 2 contract launch providers are capable and proven providers whom
SDA can benefit from for assured access to space. SDA and other defense
agencies have the benefit of using a multiple variety of contract
vehicles offered across USSF AATS programs. These contract structures
have the benefits of assured access to space, commercial-like pricing,
and accelerated integration timelines. In addition to the NSSL Phase 2
contract, the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP) has contract vehicles
to facilitate small mass to orbit requirements and experimental launch
vehicle flights for possible missile defense use cases. RSLP is used
routinely by the Missile Defense Agency for their testing events.
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