    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    .
                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-86]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                       FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES

                          MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE

                                DEFEAT PROGRAMS

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                  MAY 11, 2022

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    48-651                      WASHINGTON : 2023

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                        JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
        Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                    Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                     Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                               Will Braden, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Hill, VADM Jon A., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency.........
    Karbler, LTG Daniel L., USA, Commander, U.S. Army Space and
      Missile Defense Command and Joint Functional Component Command
      for Integrated Missile Defense.................................
    Plumb, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
      Policy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy....
    Sawyer, John D., Acting Director, Contracting and National
      Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office...
    Shaw, Lt Gen John E., USAF, Deputy Commander, U.S. Space Command.

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    13
        Hill, VADM Jon A.............................................    26
        Karbler, LTG Daniel L........................................    40
        Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking
          Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...................    15
        Plumb, Hon. John F...........................................    17
        Sawyer, John D...............................................    77
        Shaw, Lt Gen John E..........................................    64

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Langevin.................................................    97
        Mr. Wilson...................................................    97

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Dr. DesJarlais...............................................   102
        Mr. Horsford.................................................   103
        Mr. Lamborn..................................................   102
        Mr. Langevin.................................................   101
        Mr. Turner...................................................   101

     FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES MISSILE DEFENSE AND MISSILE DEFEAT
                                    PROGRAMS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                               Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 11, 2022.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:59 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Cooper. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to
    order. The purpose of today's hearing is to receive testimony
    on the 2023 budget request for DOD [Department of Defense]
    missile defense programs.
        Our witnesses are Dr. John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for Space Policy; Vice Admiral Hill, Director of the
    Missile Defense Agency; Lieutenant General Karbler, Commander
    of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Joint
    Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense;
    Lieutenant General John Shaw, Deputy Commander of the U.S.
    Space Command; and Mr. John Sawyer, Acting Director of
    Contracting and National Security Acquisitions for the
    Government Accountability Office.
        I suggest that I forgo my brilliant opening statement and
    due to time pressure I would suggest that my ranking member
    also forgo his opening statement due to time pressure.
        Unfortunately, and I want to apologize to the witnesses, we
    are not able to control the congressional schedule. But votes
    are expected to start fairly shortly and could last for hours.
    So ideally, we would have a very truncated public session, go
    immediately to closed session. And I think that is much more
    productive for at least the members who are here present.
        Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, I agree totally with that
    schedule. I'll submit mine for the record.
        Mr. Cooper. Okay. We will submit our statements for the
    record and we will submit the witnesses' statements for the
    record and is it premature to suggest that we quickly go to
    23----
        [The prepared statements of Mr. Cooper, Mr. Lamborn, and
    the witnesses can be found in the Appendix beginning on page
    13.]
        Staff member. Do you want to have no questions at all?
        Mr. Cooper. Well, would Mr. DesJarlais like to ask a
    question? Okay.
        Mr. Langevin, I see that--Mr. Wilson? Is that okay with
    you? I apologize for the truncated nature, but I don't want to
    keep the witnesses here until 7, 8, or 9 o'clock tonight. These
    are busy people.
        Mr. Langevin. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one brief
    question.
        Mr. Cooper. Okay. Go ahead. Mr. Langevin, you are
    recognized.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you very much. I thank our witnesses
    for being here. So as we all know, directed energy [DE] weapons
    such as lasers and high-powered microwaves can effectively
    engage a variety of threats with speed, flexibility, precision,
    on a whole cost-per-shot basis.
        Despite this, the FY23 [fiscal year 2023] budget request
    has cut all funding for a critical directed energy effort,
    specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali Laser, or DPAL, despite
    its recent history of success and the proven value DE
    technologies provide to our warfighters.
        So for the record, I wanted to ask can you speak more to
    MDA's [Missile Defense Agency's] development and pursuit of a
    rapid prototype and demonstration of DPAL and most importantly,
    please describe how valuable this asset would be in your
    arsenal.
        Mr. Cooper. Does the gentleman want this question for the
    record or do you want a verbal answer to your question right
    now?
        Mr. Langevin. Well, if we could get that from Dr. Plumb,
    that would be great.
        Mr. Cooper. Dr. Plumb.
        Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman Langevin. I'll just say I
    fully agree that directed energy is part of our future
    architecture and we need to be investing in it. As for the
    specifics on DPALS and other laser or other directed energy
    systems, my understanding is those have been transferred to R&E
    [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering].
    Admiral Hill may have some additional pieces, but as you know,
    I am keen on this particular issue and I do intend for that to
    be a part of my deep dive as I get deeper into this position.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, this has got to be a
    priority for us and I hope that it will continue to be so.
        Last question, Mr. Chairman, and I will submit this for the
    record, and if I can get it back in writing. So we face
    conventional and asymmetric threats from our adversaries around
    the globe on a daily basis and one of those emerging threats is
    hypersonics. We have seen recent tests by China and North Korea
    and have hypersonics in use on the battlefield by Russia
    against the Ukrainian people.
        Here at home and in this setting, well, since you are going
    to get back to me, you can both probably get a classified
    answer on this, can you discuss our layered defense against
    hypersonic missiles?
        I will submit that for the record, Mr. Chairman, given the
    constraints on time and I will yield back. Thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 97.]
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from Rhode Island. I
    understand that the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson,
    has a question?
        Mr. Wilson. Yes, I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank
    you for your service. We are going to miss you in Congress and
    to be enterprising today facing the bizarre circumstance we
    have of these votes. And I want to thank all of our witnesses
    for being here today.
        And for the record, I have got four quick questions. And
    for Admiral Hill, that is that Israel faces the threat of
    larger, more sophisticated rocket and missile arsenals in the
    hands of terrorists. Additionally, in the last 3 weeks, there
    have been a number of Hamas terrorist missile attacks from Gaza
    against the people of Israel. To address this mounting threat,
    Israel and the United States are working together to develop
    and deploy a multi-tiered missile defense system. The U.S.-
    Israel Memorandum of Understanding on the security assistance
    provides for $500 million in funding for the annual defense
    systems in cooperation with Israel.
        Admiral Hill, you recently were in Israel to view the new
    Elevated Sensor missile detection system. Can you update the
    committee on the state of the U.S.-Israel missile defense
    cooperation and the funding levels that are being brought forth
    this year to include Iron Dome, David's Sling, and Arrow?
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 97.]
        Mr. Wilson. The next question, Admiral, would be in regard
    to missile and rocket threats from Iran and its proxies, how
    horrible this is across the Middle East. And we have had the
    most recent attacks on our valued allies, the UAE [United Arab
    Emirates] and Saudi Arabia. And we have seen that Iran has
    targeted U.S. and allied forces in Syria and Erbil in Iraq.
        In the wake of this, we have the cooperation of the Abraham
    Accords and so what is being done of working together with our
    Middle East allies?
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 97.]
        Mr. Wilson. And then third, I am really grateful for the
    extraordinary strategic and vital location of Guam and I hope
    that the Department will continue in every effort to invest
    $892 million for integrated air and missile defense system to
    defend the terrific people of Guam against cruise, hypersonic,
    and ballistic missiles.
        And a final short question. I was truly grateful to learn
    that our German allies are moving forward purchasing the Arrow
    3 anti-missile defense shield from Israel. Assuming that Israel
    procures the Arrow system 3 system, how will we integrate that
    with our missile defense strategic and strategy in the European
    theater particularly to hopefully address and defend the people
    of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia? Thank you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 97.]
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman. I appreciate his kind
    words about me and do any other members have questions they
    would like to bring up now?
        It appears that there are none, but it also appears that we
    might have some room availability issues with the SCIF
    [Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility]. So would the
    gentleman from Tennessee like to ask something? I think it is
    going to be another few minutes and they have already called a
    vote, so we are really running into crunch time here.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, I will take a minute or two, if
    that's okay.
        Mr. Cooper. Okay.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Admiral Hill, what is our current
    capability to defend against hypersonic threats from our
    adversaries, particularly threats posed to critical assets like
    our aircraft carriers?
        Admiral Hill. Is this question for the record or do you
    want me to answer it now? Okay. Yes, sir.
        So today, deployed with the aircraft carriers on destroyers
    is the Sea-Based Terminal capability which was designed to
    protect the carrier base against the advanced maneuvering
    threat. That is the hypersonic defense today that is hard kill
    and as you know, we are investing in PB23 [President's budget
    for 2023] into the Glide Phase Interceptor to add a layered
    defense capability.
        We are leveraging all sensors available today. We are
    bringing that data down to the ships through our command and
    control battle management and communications.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. You requested additional funds for
    the Glide Phase Interceptor in the MDA unfunded priorities
    list. Can you describe how these funds would be used and would
    they help accelerate the timeline?
        Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. So when I think of an unfunded
    priorities list, I think given another dollar where would I put
    it? And the items that you see listed there specifically to
    Glide Phase Interceptor is to risk-reduce key technology areas.
    That is a new regime up in the glide phase and so seeker work,
    propulsion work, the old thermal protection system issues, that
    will help to de-risk the program.
        Dr. DesJarlais. You mentioned earlier, and I don't know if
    this was for the closed setting, so if it is, just let me know,
    but you mentioned the successes we have had with the THAAD
    [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] deployments overseas in
    the Middle East and I was going to give you some time to tout
    some of those successes if that was for an open setting or was
    it for the closed?
        Admiral Hill. We can talk about it in the open setting
    because it has made its way into the press. But the United Arab
    Emirates, one of our foreign military sales customers, has used
    the U.S.-built THAAD system effectively in June--I am sorry, in
    January of this year. And were successful in all those
    engagements. Through some work with Central Command and with my
    good friend General Karbler here, we now have access to that
    data so that we can pour through it to see if there are any
    improvements we need to make either to the system or to the
    techniques, tactics, and procedures that the soldiers employ.
    Thank you, sir.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Very good. And I don't want to be greedy
    with my time. I didn't know, Ranking Member.
        Mr. Cooper. Sadly, it is looking like we've got plenty of
    time now because it looks like with permission of the
    witnesses, we will only do a brief opening session today and we
    will reschedule to another day the closed session. So the
    witnesses will be free to leave after this.
        Dr. DesJarlais. I will yield back and then come back if we
    have more time.
        Mr. Cooper. Mr. Lamborn has questions?
        Mr. Lamborn. Yes, since we have a few minutes before we
    head over to the floor for our votes and then we will see you
    all, gentlemen, at another time for the classified portion.
        But Admiral Hill, we discussed HBTSS [Hypersonic Ballistic
    Tracking Space Sensor] in our office earlier today and you said
    that hypersonic missile defense is one of your top three
    priorities. How satisfied are you with the current plan for
    HBTSS? And can you describe for the committee your vision of
    the full architecture?
        Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. Ranking Member Lamborn, thanks for
    that question.
        So the Hypersonic Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor has two
    major roles. The first is to pick up the dim targets that
    cannot be seen by the current architecture today; so from a
    ballistic perspective, we are seeing changes there that make
    that fight much more challenging. But when you get to the
    advanced hypersonic threat which has a global maneuver
    capability, we need the ability to see it from space, so global
    coverage and that very close proximity from space to track
    those sensors.
        We are on track to take two interoperable prototype
    satellites to space in March of 2023. We will put those in an
    inclination where we can monitor tests in the INDOPACOM [U.S.
    Indo-Pacific Command] region and we will collect that data as a
    way to proof out the concept.
        Did a lot of work on the ground to show that we can extract
    those hot targets over a warm earth. Now it is about getting it
    into space and pulling that data down. We are staying very
    close to the Space Force as we make decisions on the overall
    architecture and our vision is is that the HBTSS will be a part
    of the overall constellation for dealing with that global
    maneuvering threat.
        Mr. Lamborn. And just as kind of an update, as much as you
    can say here in open setting, are we getting closer to a
    decision where we will find a contractor or contractors who
    will help us with the defense against hypersonic vehicles?
        Admiral Hill. Yes, sir. You are talking about defense
    capability----
        Mr. Lamborn. Yes.
        Admiral Hill [continuing]. Beyond the terminal capability
    that we have today? Yes, sir. We have a Other Transaction
    Authority agreement in place with three separate companies that
    are competing now. We are evaluating those concepts for a
    downselect later this year; so we will go from the current
    three down to the two, perhaps the one, depending on the
    maturity of those different proposals. But it goes right back
    to what Congressman DesJarlais asked which is how much de-
    risking needs to be done?
        We don't have a good sense yet, as we are going through
    that work now and those evaluations, but if we see areas where
    there are major risk areas that we want to help industry
    overcome, that is what those investments will be tied to.
        Mr. Lamborn. And General Shaw, lastly, what can you say as
    far as the Space Force's role with hypersonics? When it comes
    to testing and fielding we are behind our two near-peer
    potential adversaries. So what can you say where we stand in
    terms of catching up?
        General Shaw. Congressman, thanks for the question. Again,
    probably best targeted for the Space Force, but I will give my
    best answer from U.S. Space Command.
        We are interested in any capabilities that are going to
    help us with any of these threats and as MDA has pursued this
    particular program, HBTSS,the advantage of this is that we have
    a perspective from space that is invaluable and will allow us
    to get after a lot of these threats.
        To get after the actual technologies themselves, I think
    that we need to pursue every possibility to hold enemy at risk
    from longer and longer ranges. I think that is where warfare is
    taking us and hypersonics will play a role in that.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman from Colorado. I think
    the gentlelady from New York is recognized, if you have any
    questions you would like to ask.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Chairman Cooper. I represent Fort
    Drum, home to the 10th Mountain Division that has been
    designated the third continental interceptor site. I know that
    many of you have answered questions on this matter in front of
    this committee beforehand.
        My question today goes to Lieutenant General Karbler who
    commands the 100th Ground Based Missile Defense Brigade, a
    multi-component brigade made up of soldiers from the Active
    Duty Army and Army National Guard forces. They are the 300
    soldiers defending 300 million people.
        As the designated third continental interceptor site, if
    Fort Drum were to receive a missile defense unit, would the
    force structure mirror that of the 100th GMD Brigade with a mix
    of Active Duty and National Guard soldiers?
        General Karbler. Congresswoman, thanks very much for the
    question. I would hope that it would be a total force solution
    to that. We have seen great success in our missile defense
    element, soldiers in Colorado as well as in Alaska who help man
    missile defense, and I see no reason why this wouldn't be a--
    why we would not pursue a multi-COMPO [component] soldier
    solution.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. My followup is a broader question.
    So I have been very concerned that President Biden and his
    administration and many House Democrats have asserted that
    improved missile defense is provocative when unfortunately, the
    U.S. has not taken any moves to dramatically alter the balance
    of power in the nuclear and missile defense areas, yet all of
    our adversaries are modernizing their offensive and defensive
    strategic capabilities.
        This question is for Dr. Plumb. How has the war in Ukraine,
    Russia's nuclear threats, and the strengthening of the Russia-
    China relationship, unfortunately, altered or updated this
    administration's view on missile defense?
        Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congresswoman. I will just say that the
    classified Missile Defense Review has been released. There have
    been some unclassified talking points. I am happy to just for
    the record just put that we are committed to developing the
    Next-Generation Interceptor with MDA and so improving our
    missile defenses, that is both in capacity and in quality, is a
    thing that the administration is, in fact, dedicated to.
        The Ukraine issue you point out is an excellent one because
    what we have seen there is that Russia is using missiles not
    with the precision you might expect of a modern military, but
    more as a broad area terror weapon in my opinion. And so the
    need for missile defenses is only increased, in my opinion, at
    least by watching that conflict play out.
        Ms. Stefanik. And is that shared by the entire
    administration, and by President Joe Biden? Why are we not
    hearing that from the President of the United States?
        Dr. Plumb. I can't speak for the President's view on this
    specific issue. I will note that we have I think already
    provided over $4.5 billion in drawdown equipment to Ukraine. We
    have made very strong statements against Russia. We have
    declared we will defend NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization] every square inch. We have shipped about 1,400
    Stingers, thousands and thousands of Javelins and other forms
    of armaments, so I think my version of that would be that there
    is a very strong response there and deep concern.
        Ms. Stefanik. What is this administration's position on a
    third continental interceptor site which has been designated in
    the previous National Defense Authorizations Acts on a
    bipartisan basis? What is the position of Joe Biden and the
    Department of Defense about that third site, given the changing
    and increasing threats around the world today?
        Dr. Plumb. Yes, Congresswoman, the position remains the
    same. There is no military requirement for that third site at
    this time.
        Ms. Stefanik. Given the increased threats from North Korea
    and other adversaries around the world, again, and the need
    that Congress has on a bipartisan basis asserted for a third
    site, so the administration is just going to ignore Congress'
    important role in making sure that we have robust missile
    defense?
        Dr. Plumb. Congresswoman, the United States and the
    Department of Defense are both absolutely committed to a robust
    missile defense program. That is in the Missile Defense Review.
    That is in our efforts to improve missile defense of the
    homeland through the Next-Generation Interceptor and the
    service life extension of the GBI [Ground-Based Interceptor].
    We are buying over-the-horizon radars to work on cruise missile
    defense of the entire homeland, and there is literally billions
    in the President's budget request including nearly $5 billion
    for a more robust and resilient architecture to track ballistic
    and hypersonic weapons.
        Ms. Stefanik. And that includes making sure----
        Mr. Cooper. The gentlelady's time has expired.
        Ms. Stefanik. Right. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper. I would remind the gentlelady that I personally
    have tried to work with you on the third missile site. I am
    worried about the partisan tone of your questions. We have been
    given the largest missile defense budget by President Biden and
    his administration, I think at least in many, many years, if
    not in history. You have the statements from Dr. Plumb. I think
    that the aspersions you are trying to cast are misplaced.
        I should remind you that President Trump, I think, did very
    little if anything to help with the third missile site while he
    was President. And I recall him trying to be like the best
    friends, good buddies with both Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un.
        Ms. Stefanik. Chairman Cooper, I would like to respond to
    that. I would like you to give your leniency as chair to
    respond to that.
        Mr. Cooper. You have my permission.
        Ms. Stefanik. Chairman Cooper, I appreciate the work that
    you and this committee have done to work with my office and
    other members to ensure that Fort Drum was as it should have
    been, designated the third continental interceptor site. That,
    in fact, designation happened during the Trump administration.
    To say that there was no movement forward on investing in
    robust missile defense during the Trump administration is
    absolutely wrong.
        As a Member of Congress, I can ask panelists or witnesses
    any question that is pertinent to constituents in my district.
    I will continue to do that in the oversight capacity. This
    administration was clear that they do not support locating a
    missile defense site at Fort Drum which puts them at odds with
    the majority leader of the United States Senate. That would be
    Senator Chuck Schumer who has made this a priority. So to get
    that on record is an important answer for my constituents to
    hear.
        Again, we have a strong bipartisan working relationship on
    this committee, but these panelists and the witnesses deserve
    to answer tough questions. So I would push back on that and
    with that, I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Do any other members of the subcommittee have
    questions?
        Hearing none, it looks as if this public portion of the
    hearing is adjourned, and we will try to reschedule--Mr.
    Wilson?
        Mr. Wilson. One final question for the record and that is
    when I think of missile defense, I am so disappointed that our
    NATO ally, Turkey, ally of 73 years, really 100 years, that
    they are now dependent on Russian S-400s. And then India, the
    world's largest democracy, additionally, S-400s. And it could
    be off record, but I would like to know what we are doing to
    try to work with these two very important allies of the United
    States to do foreign military sales. Whatever can be done that
    America being who they work with and not Putin. Thank you very
    much.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman for his question. If
    there are no other points to be made, I suggest that the public
    portion of this hearing be adjourned and we try to reschedule
    for a later date the classified portion of the hearing. I thank
    the witnesses for participating, sorry for the unexpected
    delay.
        [Whereupon, at 2:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================
                                A P P E N D I X

                                  May 11, 2022

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                  May 11, 2022

    =======================================================================
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                  May 11, 2022

    =======================================================================

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Admiral Hill and General Karbler. As directed by Section 1687 of
    the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, the Missile
    Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the Department's executive agent for the
    continuing development of capabilities to counter the evolving
    hypersonic boost-glide vehicle threat. Since our adversaries are
    seeking to develop and mature a diverse inventory and means of delivery
    of hypersonic capabilities, I remain an advocate of multiple offensive
    and defensive capabilities. We must continue to improve our ability to
    address hypersonic threats at left-of-launch as well as during the
    boost, midcourse, and terminal phases of flight. Current and further
    development of kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities provide us
    the ability to address threats at left-of-launch while the SM-6 Sea-
    Based Terminal missile provide us a terminal phase of flight
    capability. With the support of Congress, MDA continues to pursue
    improvements to the space sensor architecture, communications network,
    and command and control capabilities. The continued development and
    future fielding of the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor
    (HBTSS) and the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) demonstration efforts will
    provide the Warfighter added capabilities to detect, track, and defeat
    hypersonic threats. Finally, continued pursuit of non-kinetic
    capabilities remain key to addressing future adversary threat
    capabilities.   [See page 2.]
                 RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
        Admiral Hill. Our missile defense cooperation with Israel remains
    strong as we continue the development and coproduction activities of
    our joint United States--Israel missile defense systems. Under the 2016
    United States--Israel Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the United
    States Government provides Israel $38 billion (B) for ten years (Fiscal
    Year (FY) 2019-2028), of which $5B ($500 million (M)/year) is for
    missile defense efforts. In accordance with this MOU, Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA) executes several Research, Development, Test and
    Evaluation (RDT&E) and Coproduction agreements furthering our defense
    cooperation with Israel. These efforts include the development,
    coproduction, and fielding of the Arrow Weapon System and the David's
    Sling Weapon System, in addition to Iron Dome Defense System (IDDS)
    coproduction activities. For FY 2022, in addition to the $500M for our
    RDT&E and coproduction activities, the United States Government
    provided Israel an additional $1B of IDDS funding as a result of
    Operation Guardian of the Walls.   [See page 3.]
        Admiral Hill. In addition to MDA's robust cooperation with Israel,
    MDA has several Foreign Military Sales (FMS) activities with our Middle
    East partners. These activities include active FMS cases with the UAE
    and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the Terminal High Altitude Area
    Defense Weapon System. [Defer question to OSD and U.S. Central Command
    for additional input.]   [See page 3.]
        Admiral Hill. The United States and Israel jointly develop Arrow-3
    for the defense of Israel. In accordance with our joint international
    agreement, this potential purchase by Germany is pending United States
    Government approval   [See page 3.]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                  May 11, 2022

    =======================================================================

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Mr. Langevin. As we know, directed energy weapons, such as lasers
    and high-powered microwaves, can effectively engage a variety of
    threats with speed, flexibility, precision, and on a low cost-per-shot
    basis.
        Despite this, the FY23 budget request has cut all funding for a
    critical directed energy effort--specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali
    Laser (DPAL)--despite its recent history of success, and the proven
    value DE technologies provide to our warfighters.
        Can you speak more to MDA's development and pursuit of a rapid
    prototype and demonstration of DPAL, and most importantly, please
    describe how valuable this asset would be in your arsenal?
        Dr. Plumb. The Department fully supports the development of
    directed energy solutions, which, along with other non-kinetic
    capabilities, will have an increasingly important role in our future
    missile defense architecture. In 2019, the Department consolidated
    directed energy efforts at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)) level, and the Department has
    since issued a Directed Energy Roadmap in order to best utilize scarce
    resources and leverage existing work across the Department. The total
    amount requested by the Department for directed energy for Fiscal Year
    2023 is nearly $1.1 billion and the total over the Future Year Defense
    Program is over $3.4 billion. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
    continues to collaborate closely with USD (R&E) and the Services on
    missile defense-related directed energy efforts including the Diode-
    Pumped Alkali Laser (DPAL) program. Congress appropriated $42M in FY21
    and $6 million in FY22 for the DPAL program which MDA is now executing.
    DPAL's shorter wavelength offers key advantages for higher laser
    intensity on target and greater potential for scaling to the higher
    powers required to defend against ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide
    vehicles, and high-altitude hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles
    at longer engagement ranges. To date, DPAL performance goals are being
    met and power levels in the 100 kilowatt-class are anticipated to be
    achieved prior to the end of Fiscal Year 2022. Additionally, in May
    2022, MDA solicited industry to conduct six-month studies assessing
    potential uses of DPAL technology in a future weapon system and to list
    the cost and power levels required for such a capability. Once the
    power scaling effort is complete, MDA plans to transition DPAL to
    industry.
        Mr. Langevin. As we know, directed energy weapons, such as lasers
    and high-powered microwaves, can effectively engage a variety of
    threats with speed, flexibility, precision, and on a low cost-per-shot
    basis.
        Despite this, the FY23 budget request has cut all funding for a
    critical directed energy effort--specifically the Diode-Pumped Alkali
    Laser (DPAL)--despite its recent history of success, and the proven
    value DE technologies provide to our warfighters.
        Can you speak more to MDA's development and pursuit of a rapid
    prototype and demonstration of DPAL, and most importantly, please
    describe how valuable this asset would be in your arsenal?
        Admiral Hill. USSPACECOM constantly pursues a more resilient,
    persistent, and robust missile tracking/missile warning architecture
    against emerging threats. However, for the specific timelines of
    acquisition and initial operational capability, I will have to defer to
    the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations.
    USSPACECOM will continue to engage with them to evaluate divergent
    options based on this timeline. USSPACECOM stands ready to
    operationally accept and integrate this capability into the fight as
    soon as it comes available.
                                     ______

                        QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
        Mr. Turner. I understand Missile Tracking/Missile Warning is the
    Space Force's top priority. The types of the missiles that satellites
    need to detect is changing, including the need to detect hypersonic
    glide vehicles, and diversifying space architecture reduces the threat
    of an attack. I also understand the Space Force FY23 budget requests
    funding to field two Next Gen OPIR Polar satellites, and also starts
    prototyping a more resilient and capable Missile Tracking/Missile
    Warning architecture at Medium Earth Orbit and Low Earth Orbit. Can you
    accelerate the operational fielding of this more resilient and capable
    architecture so the two Next Gen OPIR Polar satellites are not
    required?
        General Shaw. USSPACECOM constantly pursues a more resilient,
    persistent, and robust missile tracking/missile warning architecture
    against emerging threats. However, for the specific timelines of
    acquisition and initial operational capability, I will have to defer to
    the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Space Operations.
    USSPACECOM will continue to engage with them to evaluate divergent
    options based on this timeline. USSPACECOM stands ready to
    operationally accept and integrate this capability into the fight as
    soon as it comes available.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
        Mr. Lamborn. The previous Missile Defense Review decided to deploy
    an additional twenty Ground-based Interceptors to stay ahead of the
    rogue missile threat to our homeland. It seems that this decision will
    not be to either refurbish 20 existing GBIs with 20 new systems, or to
    deploy an additional 20 GBIs. Can you tell this committee what the
    Administration's policy is on this issue, and when we can expect a
    decision?
        Dr. Plumb. The Department's priority is to defend the homeland and
    deter attacks against the United States, and is committed to improving
    the capability and reliability of the Ground Based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) system. The FY23 budget requests $2.8B for the development and
    production of 20 new Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) and the service
    life extension of our existing Capability Enhancement I fleet of Ground
    Based Interceptors (GBI).
        Mr. Lamborn. The Administration wants to move all of the Space
    missions from the National Guard into the United States Space Force
    (USSF) Single Component by FY2025. It is my understanding that one-
    third of the Nation's Strategic Missile Warning in the U.S. is
    performed by the National Guard. It is also my understanding that these
    National Guard members will not transfer to the USSF Single Component.
    How do you plan to assume these Strategic Missile Warning missions with
    your current force structure? In your best military advice, should we
    establish a Space National Guard in order to maintain this critical
    strategic missile warning capability?
        General Shaw. First, National Guard members are an invaluable part
    of our team throughout our Headquarters and Components. We understand
    the complexities associated with transitioning National Guard roles
    into the U.S. Space Force without transferring personnel billets to
    execute those roles. However, USSPACECOM cannot speak on behalf of the
    U.S. Space Force on how to satisfy these operational roles with the
    current operational staff. I would defer to the Office of the Secretary
    of Defense, the Air Force and Space Force, National Guard leadership,
    and Chief of Space Operations to field this question.
        Mr. Lamborn. We've seen some very drastic deployment dwell times
    for soldiers working the missile defense mission. The demand for
    missile defense is clearly not going to abate. What is the Department
    doing to get these dwell times back to the realm of reasonable?
        General Karbler. Army senior leadership is aware the Air Defense
    Artillery (ADA) branch faces many complex and challenging issues
    regarding not only ADA Soldier dwell time but also the overall health
    of the ADA branch (Soldiers and families). In a positive development,
    over the past 18 months, we have been successful in significantly
    reducing our ADA posture in the U.S. Central Command theater. The Army
    has also committed to standing up an additional 16th Patriot Battalion
    which will increase our ADA inventory as well as Soldier dwell time.
                                     ______

                      QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS
        Dr. DesJarlais. With rising North Korea missile tests and
    provocations, it is imperative that we maintain a robust Homeland GMD
    system while we wait for the Next Generation Interceptor to come
    online. Can you assure the committee that the GMD system will remain at
    44 ready-to-fire GBIs for the NORTHCOM commander? If not, what's your
    plan to get it to 44? How low will ready to fire GBIs go, when, and for
    how long?
        Admiral Hill. The GMD Weapon System including the GBIs is
    undergoing multiple reliability and availability upgrades to provide
    the Warfighter the most capable system in the short-term while
    providing a foundation for future integration of NGI. Consistent with
    previous decisions on GBI emplacements and availability, the GBI
    Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and the new Launch Support System
    (LSS) upgrade ensures assets and capability are maintained to address
    changing threat and geopolitical environments. The daily/weekly
    activities associated with these upgrades will adhere to established
    USNORTHCOM processes for coordinating and approving all maintenance and
    upgrade activities impacting system availability and capability. These
    upgrades are critical investments to ensure the GMD system and GBIs
    remain available in the future at the very high system readiness levels
    to which the Warfighter is accustom. The attached plan is being
    coordinated with USNORTHCOM along with options to accelerate the LSS
    deployment. See the attached classified GBI Availability for current
    and projected GBI Inventory, Emplacements, and Availabilities.
                                     ______

                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
        Mr. Horsford. It's my understanding that the biggest risk to on-
    time delivery of the Space Development Agency's Tranche 1 missile
    tracking layer is the accelerated launch timeline and requirement to
    use the National Security Space Launch program. Under NSSL, SDA will be
    required to procure launches two years in advance, meaning they will
    require funding in FY23 in order to launch Tranche 1 in FY25. Needless
    to say, industry does not do business this way, and I'm concerned that
    these extended timelines are unnecessary given SDA's unique model and
    will put on-time delivery of these urgently needed systems at risk.
        SDA will also be required to pay exorbitant amounts of money for
    ``mission assurance'', even though the average price per satellite in
    the tracking layer is only $14 million dollars. We spend hundreds of
    millions of dollars on mission assurance programs through launch
    support services and launch vehicle procurement. I'm curious what we're
    getting for all this extra spending other than adding significant
    amounts of time to our launch timelines. The risk for the vehicles used
    in the NSSL program is already incredibly low. Yet the enterprise is so
    risk-averse that in some cases, we haven't put satellites on rockets
    that we put American astronauts on. SDA satellites are uniquely cost-
    effective, and this constellation is specifically designed to be robust
    enough to absorb some loss, either during launch or as the result of
    adversary action. For that reason, the requirement for SDA to procure
    launches under NSSL seems unnecessary and wasteful.
        Satellites launched by SDA as part of Tranche 0 were procured
    commercially, outside of the NSSL program. Why are Tranche 1 launches
    required to be procured under the NSSL program and do you see a benefit
    to allowing SDA to continue to use commercial launches? What missile
    defense use cases do you foresee where SDA or another agency may need
    to launch vehicles into orbit on a timeline shorter than two years, and
    what are their current options to do so within and outside of the NSSL
    framework?
        Dr. Plumb. SDA Tranche 1 launches are procured under the NSSL
    program because the FY22 National Defense Authorizations Act Section
    1601 stated it shall be the policy of the DOD and NRO to use the NSSL
    program to the extent possible to procure launch services only from
    launch service providers that can meet Federal requirements under the
    requirements of phase two, and for the Secretary of Defense or Director
    of National Intelligence, to notify the appropriate congressional
    committees if a launch service will instead use an alternative launch
    procurement approach that could be met using phase two contracts. The
    NSSL Phase 2 contract, awarded to United Launch Alliance (ULA) and
    SpaceX, meets federal and SDA Tranche 1 mission requirements, and has
    mission acceleration options to can reduce the nominal 24months
    commercial integration timeline if required, and achieves the best
    overall value across all defense agency procured launches. The NSSL
    Phase 2 contract launch providers are capable and proven providers whom
    SDA can benefit from for assured access to space. SDA and other defense
    agencies have the benefit of using a multiple variety of contract
    vehicles offered across USSF AATS programs. These contract structures
    have the benefits of assured access to space, commercial-like pricing,
    and accelerated integration timelines. In addition to the NSSL Phase 2
    contract, the Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP) has contract vehicles
    to facilitate small mass to orbit requirements and experimental launch
    vehicle flights for possible missile defense use cases. RSLP is used
    routinely by the Missile Defense Agency for their testing events.

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