[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-76]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
ON
REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS
FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 1, 2022
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-628 WASHINGTON : 2023
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey SAM GRAVES, Missouri
JIMMY PANETTA, California DON BACON, Nebraska
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
Chair C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
Vacancy
Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
Will Braden, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Gallego, Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations.... 3
WITNESSES
Green, VADM Collin P., USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 6
Plumb, John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.. 5
Rosenblum, Deborah G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs............. 3
Williams, Rhys M., Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment.................................................... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Gallego, Hon. Ruben.......................................... 25
Green, VADM Collin P......................................... 51
Plumb, John F................................................ 37
Rosenblum, Deborah G......................................... 27
Williams, Rhys M............................................. 62
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Scott.................................................... 75
REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY,
POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2023
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
Washington, DC, Friday, April 1, 2022.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ruben Gallego
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
Mr. Gallego. Welcome to the Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Special Operations, countering weapons of mass destruction
FY23 [fiscal year 2023] budget hearing.
I am going to read a mandatory statement for our digital
participants.
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may use the software platform's chat feature to communicate
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only.
Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for joining us
today.
Dr. Deborah Rosenblum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Threats; Dr. John Plumb,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Vice Admiral
Collin Green, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations
Command; and Dr. Rhys--I apologize if I said that incorrectly--
Williams, Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We
appreciate your leadership and service to the Nation at this
critical time in global security.
The erosion of international norms regarding the use of
chemical and biological weapons, coupled with emerging
technology that creates the ability to weaponize synthetic
drugs, requires us to think about weapons of mass destruction
[WMDs] in new ways.
While the United States is in full compliance with its
obligations under both the Biological Weapons Convention and
the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia and North Korea,
according to the Department of State's 2021 Compliance Report,
both maintain offensive biological weapons programs, and both
have used such weapons against political opponents with near
impunity.
Vladimir Putin uses WMDs and the threat of WMDs to inflict
terror on populations, as is happening right now in Ukraine and
Europe. Russia is promoting dangerous disinformation, which
falsely claims that the U.S. is secretly developing biological
weapons in a Ukrainian laboratory. This effort appears to be
part of Putin's plan to keep the door open to employing
Russia's own illegal biological or chemical weapons in Ukraine
through a false-flag operation.
Today, I am interested in our witnesses assessing how the
fundamental changes to the security environment in Europe are
altering how we think about and plan to deter, detect, and
mitigate threats from WMDs, and to what extent this planning is
reflected in DOD's budget request.
I am also interested in hearing about the progress towards
the destruction of the remaining stockpile of lethal chemical
agents and munitions, as required by the Chemical Weapons
Convention deadline, September 30th, and the congressionally
mandated deadline of December 31st. I know the Department has
been working tirelessly to ensure those obligations are met.
Dr. Rosenblum and Dr. Plumb, I understand you are holding
the first-ever biodefense posture review. I appreciate the
critical work you are doing in this area and look forward to
hearing how the review is proceeding.
Finally, it is essential that we understand how all this
connects to the budget request. I am pleased to see healthy
increases across this portfolio, especially the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program which, contrary to Putin's false
propaganda, has been instrumental in dismantling weapons of
mass destruction, and the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program with investments in vaccines and therapeutics.
I look forward to the discussion, and will now recognize
Ranking Member Kelly for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallego can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your opening
remarks and your leadership in organizing this morning's
posture hearing.
Today, we will hear from four experts across the countering
weapons of mass destruction portfolio. And I want to thank each
of you personally for meeting with me earlier this week and in-
depth briefings, some in the SCIF [secure compartmented
information facility], some open source. But I really
appreciate that, and I think it will really facilitate this
hearing.
I am eager to get an update on the progress of the
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, especially the
activities at the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot
Plant. This subcommittee is keenly interested in the
certification of the Static Detonation Chamber and ensuring the
activities stay on schedule.
With regards to the threat environment, I look forward to
getting an update on the capabilities of our adversaries, to
include the usual bad actors of China, Russia, Iran, and North
Korea, as well as the various terrorist organizations and
networks.
The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine continues to
cause worry about the use of WMDs in the region, especially
looking at their past history and some of the false-flag
operations that they have conducted recently and in the past.
Finally, I continue to be concerned about how the Biden
administration's budget will affect our overall counter weapons
of mass destruction preparedness. The ongoing use and threat of
these weapons illuminate the direness of this problem. Failing
to properly invest in these resources will have great
consequences.
I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time
today. I look forward to continuing the work with our counter
WMD experts during the 117th Congress to ensure we are
appropriately postured to meet and defeat the threats shaped by
weapons of mass destruction.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
We will now hear from witnesses, then move to the question-
and-answer period.
Dr. Rosenblum, you are now recognized.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS
Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you very much. Chairman Gallego,
Ranking Member Kelly, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is truly a privilege to testify before you
today on behalf of the Department of Defense.
As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biologic Defense Programs, I am responsible, in
close coordination with my fellow witnesses, for ensuring that
the United States maintains its enduring technical advantages
when countering weapons of mass destruction.
In recent years, our adversaries have demonstrated the
potential for chemical and biological weapons to achieve a
broad range of effects--from small-scale assassinations to
large population-scale effect. These offensive tools could also
weaken and displace defensive forces, thereby, allowing
adversaries to seize infrastructure, territory, or achieve a
strategic advantage against the United States and our allies.
At the same time, different sciences and technologies are
converging to create revolutionary capabilities with
transformative benefits to our society, but it also opens the
door to the potential nefarious uses. This is uniquely true for
chemical and biological threats. For example, engineered
biologic weapons could be designed to evade our existing
physical and medical defenses by making subtle changes.
As a result, our deterrent and defensive postures must
prepare for, and respond to, a broad spectrum of biological
threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or
deliberate. We can no longer rely on a static list of
traditional agents to develop countermeasures against.
Furthermore, the Department cannot presume that we will be able
to provide the warfighter advanced warning or accurate pinpoint
biological and chemical agent detection.
Faced with these challenges, we must change the way we do
business by strengthening the Department's defensive
capabilities through bolder acquisition approaches, while also
using our inherent science and technology advantages. The
Department seeks to modernize and strengthen the U.S. deterrent
and defensive capabilities to ensure the joint force can fight
and win in WMD-contested environments.
As the Department proposes a significant increase in
chemical and biological defense across the FYDP [Future Years
Defense Program], I would like to share three examples of how
the Department will seek to deliver novel capabilities for the
warfighter.
First, because emerging biologic threats can circumvent
traditional concepts of detection, we need to change the
paradigm by integrating all available sensors and data
collection as a network of networks to identify changes within
the environment, rather than waiting for the onset of symptoms
in our warfighter.
Second, we must explore the concept of defending from
within through preventive and post-exposure medical
countermeasures.
Third, we are working to enhance protection, while reducing
the burden to our warfighter, by replacing heavy, bulky, and
extremely hot individual protective equipment with novel types
of materials and responsive technologies to create a next-
generation protection.
As I testify today about our adversaries' chemical weapons
capabilities, I am proud to report we have destroyed 98 percent
of chemical agents from the United States chemical weapon
stockpile, and we are on track to complete the destruction of
the entire United States legacy chemical weapons stockpile by
the planned completion date of September 2023.
On behalf of the Department, I would like to thank each of
you for your continued partnership and support to strengthen
our WMD deterrence and defensive capabilities. The threat we
face today cannot be understated.
I look forward to answering your questions in the later
session. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenblum can be found in
the Appendix on page 27.]
Mr. Gallego. And now, we would like to hear from Dr. Plumb.
STATEMENT OF JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
SPACE POLICY
Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member
Kelly, members of the subcommittee. I, too, am honored to
testify on the Department of Defense's countering weapons of
mass destruction efforts today.
The Department's CWMD mission is to dissuade, deter, and,
when necessary, defeat actors of concern who threaten or use
weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. and our interests.
Mission success requires the expertise and collaboration across
many DOD [Department of Defense] components, close coordination
within the interagency and Congress, and strong international
alliances and partnerships.
Today, Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine underscores
the importance of the CWMD mission. In a period of just a few
weeks, we have seen the threat of nuclear weapons use; we have
seen attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants; and we have
seen an extensive Russian disinformation campaign on chemical
and biological weapons development in Ukraine--pure lies. That
is most likely a troubling pretext for possible Russian use of
these weapons themselves.
The DOD leverages its unique tools and expertise in support
of a whole-of-government approach to mitigate the risk of
global WMD proliferation and adversary pursuit of these
advancements. Examples include supporting global norms under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; remaining postured to
conduct WMD interdictions and preparing our partners to do so;
and implementing U.N. [United Nations] sanctions to impede
illicit North Korean trade.
The Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR]
Program, which has evolved over the past 3 decades and works
with more than 30 partner nations, is an important and proven
tool to reduce the risk of WMD-related threats and prevent
proliferation across the CBRN [chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear] spectrum.
And I would like to thank Congress, and this subcommittee
in particular, for its continued support of the CTR
[Cooperative Threat Reduction] program. This support has paid
dividends to the U.S. and global security for over 30 years,
and there is more to be done. I am pleased to note that the
President's budget request for the CTR program is $342 million
for fiscal year 2023.
The Department continues to strengthen the capability of
the joint force and our allies and partners to operate in
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear, and
contaminated environments. We strive for increased
interoperability and we encourage our partners and allies to
share the collective burden of CBRN defense.
But CBRN defense requires resources, and that is why the
Department is seeking $630 million across the FYDP to help
bolster EUCOM's [U.S. European Command's] CBRN defense
capabilities and equipment. And interestingly--and I think a
point worth making--is this budget request originated before
Russia invaded Ukraine, but that crisis further highlights that
EUCOM CBRN defense is a priority and we have to address it.
Making investments to counter a shifting threat environment
requires sound policy, and sound policy requires an
understanding of where things stand. So, the Department--myself
and Assistant Secretary Rosenblum--are undertaking our first-
ever Biodefense Posture Review this year. This review will
guide our biodefense-related activities and investments to
support force protection, research and development, capability
acquisition, and the required DOD expertise across the spectrum
of biological threats.
And this year, the Department will also begin refreshing
our CWMD strategy. That strategy will be informed by the bio
posture review, as well as the National Defense Strategy, the
Secretary of Defense's guidance, and our assessment of the
shifting threat environment.
So, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today,
for your continued support of the Department's CWMD mission,
and I look forward to our discussion.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Plumb can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
I now recognize Vice Admiral Green.
STATEMENT OF VADM COLLIN P. GREEN, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Green. Good morning, Chairman Gallego, Ranking
Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to represent the United States Special
Operations Command [USSOCOM] today.
On behalf of General Clarke, it is my privilege to join Dr.
John Plumb, Ms. Deborah Rosenblum, and Dr. Rhys Williams at
this hearing, and look forward to discussing how we work
together to address some of the most critical national security
challenges facing our country, our allies, and our partners.
Weapons of mass destruction are a complex, transregional
problem that continues to present a direct threat to U.S. and
allied interests and requires the application of specialized
expertise and authorities across the whole of government. I
welcome discussion related to USSOCOM's role as the Defense
Department's coordinating authority for counter-WMD; the unique
challenges we face; the work we have done against both current
and future WMD threats; and our priorities for the coming year.
Over the past year, in concert with our partners within the
Department and across the interagency, we contributed to the
development of the National Defense and National Military
Strategies; enhanced joint force resiliency through an
implementation of WMD-focused ready assessments; improved
global exercise and training by incorporating realistic
nuclear, chemical, and biological threats into scenarios; and
improved integration and information-sharing with the
interagency, as well as our allies and partners.
However, as Dr. Plumb and Ms. Rosenblum said, Russia's
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, and the potential use of
weapons of mass destruction, demands a sense of urgency in
making deterrent and defensive investments. To that end, next
year, in coordination with our partners in OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense], the Joint Staff, and the interagency, we
will continue to advance joint force readiness; produce
actionable CWMD assessments; and make recommendations for
improvement, where needed.
We will ensure the Department's plans address the evolving
WMD threats. We will continue to accelerate information-sharing
through close coordination with the intelligence community, and
we will coordinate CWMD equities into globally integrated
operations, activities, and investments.
General Clarke and I would like to thank the members of
this subcommittee for their support of this urgent national
security priority. It is a privilege to work together with our
colleagues to keep our country and allies safe from the threat
of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We look forward
to our continued collaboration with them, with Members of
Congress, with our interagency and international partners, to
ensure our safety and readiness now and into the future.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Green can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
Now, we have Dr. Williams.
STATEMENT OF RHYS M. WILLIAMS, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
AND SUSTAINMENT
Dr. Williams. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to testify today.
This committee and its members have long provided
outstanding support to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
also known as DTRA. I look forward to offering you an update on
our vital work in countering and deterring weapons of mass
destruction and emerging threats.
On behalf of the over 2,200 military and civilians, I am
proud to appear today alongside Ms. Deborah Rosenblum,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
Biological Defense Programs; Dr. John Plumb, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; and Vice Admiral Green,
Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
There are few greater challenges to U.S. national interests
than those posed by weapons of mass destruction and emerging
threats. DTRA takes pride in providing the technological, the
operational, and intellectual capacity within the Department to
meet these challenges. Our world-class workforce and
unparalleled professional network, access, and credibility give
us an unmatched advantage in enabling the Department of
Defense, the U.S. Government, and international partners to
detect, deter, and defeat weapons of mass destruction and
emerging threats in all theaters.
As both a defense agency and a combat support agency, and
the principal counter weapons of mass destruction organization
within the Defense Department, we serve as the linchpin between
the Department's counter-WMD strategies and its practitioners.
Through Ms. Rosenblum and Dr. Plumb, and their subordinate
components, the agency receives guidance, priorities, and
oversight in the areas of nuclear matters, chemical and
biological defense, threat reduction, and arms control.
At the same time, we support U.S. Special Operations
Command role as the coordinating authority for counter weapons
of mass destruction and work very closely with Vice Admiral
Green's staff, as well as those of the other combatant
commands--providing strategic, operational, and tactical
planning and expertise, as well as embedded support of material
and non-material counter weapons of mass destruction solutions.
These dual roles provide a synergy that is key to the
successful execution of our counter-WMD mission that supports
the National Defense Strategy's vision of integrated
deterrence. The work that we plan, program, and execute on
behalf of the Department and its stakeholders ensures a safe,
secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent; enables the
joint force allies and partners to compete and win against
adversaries. The National Defense Strategy highlights both of
these lines of effort, as key enablers for integrated
deterrence.
DTRA is postured and ready to support Secretary Austin's
goal of developing, combining, and coordinating the
Department's strengths to maximum effect. In pursuit of this
goal, we play a key role across the counter-WMD community.
So, on behalf of DTRA's dedicated workforce, I thank you
for your continued support of our critical work in safeguarding
the lives and the interests of the United States, our allies,
and our partners abroad.
Thank you for your time today and the invitation to
participate. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Williams can be found in the
Appendix on page 62.]
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
And I apologize for the construction. I am assuming it is
contractors and not the Russians trying to drill in to listen
to what is happening here.
We are going to move to our question period.
Dr. Rosenblum, we can start with you, and then move to
anyone else who would like to comment.
Russia's misinformation-disinformation campaigns touch on
all three main categories of WMD--biological, chemical, and
nuclear. How do we frame our efforts in ways that account for
the likelihood that Russia will probably continue this
behavior?
Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Chairman, for that question.
The Department remains very concerned about the ability to
get accurate and transparent information out to the U.S.
public, as well as, certainly, our allies and the rest of the
world. So, one of the things that the Department has been
doing--and this is particularly related to the public health
laboratories in Ukraine that is being, tragically, used by the
Russians as a potential for a false-flag operation--from the
White House on down to the Department of Defense, as well as
Department of State, as well as all of the vehicles that we
have to be able to communicate accurate information out about
this, and the work that has been underway, I can say to you,
unequivocally, there are no offensive biologic weapons in the
Ukraine laboratories that the United States has been involved
with.
Mr. Gallego. Without a doubt.
Anyone else want to take the question or a crack at that?
[No response.]
Moving on then, Dr. Williams, the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program has unique authorities, like commingling
funds from other nations for urgent threat reduction needs. Is
CTR exercising these authorities actively? And can you share
any recent examples?
Dr. Williams. Thank you for that question, sir.
Yes, sir, as you noted, the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program does have unique authorities within title 50,
specifically. We do commingle funds that come in from other
organizations. As a matter of fact, a recent amount of funding
has come in from the United Kingdom for work in these
particular areas.
We have a very active program, as was said earlier, in over
30 countries. Last year alone, we had 70 engagements across the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, across all areas of
responsibility in the combatant commands, closely coordinated,
obviously, with Dr. Plumb and his office, where we receive
those policy determinations on where to work within the agency.
So, sir, it is a very active program, and it is one that,
as Dr. Plumb said, has paid incredible dividends over the 30
years that we have been working with this program. As a matter
of fact, this year, we celebrated the 30th anniversary. It was
a major milestone for the program.
Thank you for the question, sir.
Mr. Gallego. And to follow up, DTRA is focused on
countering and deterring weapons of mass destruction. I am
interested in hearing about the more advanced capabilities in
countering and detecting chemical and biological threats, and
specifically, actions you have taken to support what is
happening in Ukraine. And obviously, if some of that has to
stay during the classified briefing, we can do that, but
anything that can be shared publicly would also be good to
know.
Dr. Williams. Thank you. Thank you for that question, sir.
The agency is the science and technology portion of the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program. It is operated under
Ms. Rosenblum's authorities, as the Assistant Secretary for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense.
We work very closely, also, with the Army's Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to provide
cutting-edge capabilities for the joint force, as well as in
close coordination with our partners and allies as well--
everything from leading-edge detectors, capabilities to weave
together new data in new ways. As Ms. Rosenblum said, data is a
place where we can spend a considerable amount of time in terms
of activities.
And in terms of our activities in support of U.S. European
Command, sir, in terms of those activities, we have had almost
200 requests for support from not only European Command, but
across the DOD and interagency.
Sir, as you know, we run the 24/7/365 technical reachback
capability that does modeling across the chem-bio-nuclear
spectrum. And because of that, we have been asked questions
that range from, if something was to happen to a Ukrainian
nuclear power plant, where would the plume go, and across the
board. It is something we actively are monitoring now, sir, and
I am happy to answer a few more specifics in the closed
session.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Doctor.
I now yield to Ranking Member Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And as the Department balances the shift in resources
between counter-VEO [violent extremist organizations] and great
power competition, what are the most significant capability or
resource and vulnerabilities to the countering weapons of mass
destruction mission? Any of you all can take that, and if
anybody needs to follow, you can.
Admiral Green. Yes, Congressman, thank you for the
question.
So, as the coordinating authority, USSOCOM establishes a
collaborative fora to understand the threat, identify gaps, and
make recommendations. So, to your point, I think, much like any
state or non-state actor, these pathways, understanding the
pathways and understanding what runs through them, whether it
is transnational organized crime, counterterrorism, or CWMD, I
think we have got to collectively leverage our access and
placement, our authorities, across the interagency, as well as
DOD, but, more importantly, our allies and partners, to
understand the threat left of bang.
So, I think we are doing that well with regard to how we
understand the threat. I would also say that the Secretary,
rightfully, directed that we integrate CWMD into planning,
resourcing, modernizing, and then, more importantly, training
and exercising holistically. It is not just about money; it is
about the holistic effort to get after it.
Mr. Kelly. And I am just hoping to follow up. If there are
any gaps or vulnerabilities in either resources or funding, I
hope that you all--and I understand we probably can't answer
that.
And I think, Dr. Rosenblum, you were going to say
something.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Ranking Member.
What I was going to add--and I think we can get into much
greater detail on the classified side of it--but, from looking
at closing the gaps that we have across the WMD spectrum and
the investments, the main thing that we are pivoting from is
concerns that it would be a non-state actor who would be using
those to, then, really looking at state-based threats and the
depth of the science and technology that they have available to
them. And we can get into greater detail in terms of the
specificity, but that is a dramatic pivot from a threat
perspective.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you.
And then, in the PB submissions, the Presidential budget
submissions for FY21 and '22, the Department drastically cut
funds to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Each time,
Congress has reinstated this fund. Why is it important, Dr.
Rosenblum, to fully fund this program?
Ms. Rosenblum. The Cooperative Threat Program provides and
plays a critical role in ensuring that our allies and partners,
who we will operate on any kind of joint battlefield, has
capabilities that are commensurate with those of the United
States, so that we can work with them seamlessly. And that goes
kind of a range of gamuts of things that we are doing
throughout the world. But that is fundamentally the key purpose
of that program and why it remains so vital to us.
And as my colleague, Dr. Plumb--and I will ask him to
elaborate on this--mentioned, that in the FY23 request, that
there is a significant increase in that, as the administration
recognizes the importance of this program.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, and you answered my question. I just
want to make sure we understand the importance of fully funding
that, and even the increase.
Given the increased use of chemical weapons in Syria and
the asymmetric use of nerve agents by North Korea and Russia,
what can we do to deter further use of chemical or biological
weapons? What are we doing to ensure that the international
norms against the use of these weapons is not eroded? And what
can we do to develop new standards to deal with the emerging
chemical and biological threats? And that is for any of you.
Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman Kelly. It is an important
question.
And I think the crisis in Ukraine and the blatant threats,
really, by Russia of potential use of chemical and biological
weapons, is opening everyone's eyes to how much of a problem
this is. The deterrence issue is a challenge for this
administration. I think the fact that the White House has used
the megaphone of the United States of America to call this out
is an important deterrent, right?
I think we have been able to--and it is not just the
administration side; it is working with the Congress, too--
rally the entire NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
alliance to kind of align against this, is useful. There is
always this question of who, at least in the case of Russia,
who is Putin really trying to communicate to? If he is trying
to communicate with us, that is one thing. If he is trying to
communicate with his own people, that is a different problem.
So, we have this communication conflict that we really need to
work on.
On a readiness side, there is some argument to be made that
better readiness and better training, as the admiral spoke to,
helps deter. I don't personally believe it is--you know it is
necessary, but not sufficient. But the more ready we are to
engage in a zone like that, then perhaps the higher the
threshold is for its use.
Mr. Kelly. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gallego. Representative Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I have several questions that I know are going to have to
be answered later. But I will ask them anyway to use my 5
minutes, you know, because maybe there is a clue.
First off, for Admiral, as we look at strategic competition
and this issue of WMD, and the role of SOF [special operations
forces], are there specific areas where your coordinating
authorities are needing to change or are there specific roles
that you are seeking to change within the special operations
community to meet that strategic competition WMD response?
Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for the question.
You know, I think this is a wake-up call with regard to
CWMD, much like CT [counterterrorism] was. So, I think the
coordinating authority and the work that we have done here with
my colleagues to recognize this threat, to plan for it, like I
said, to modernize, and then, to train and exercise, frankly,
you know, it is a holistic approach.
But, from a special operations perspective, we bring
capabilities to understand that threat, but so do the
interagency, so do our allies and partners. So, I think it is
all-hands-on-deck type of approach to understand this threat.
It is a whole-of-population, it is a whole-of-government. I
know those are cliches, but I really believe that this threat
is serious enough, and I think this fora with the coordinating
authority has brought recognition to it. And with money and,
again, those other facets of how you get after it are critical.
But I do believe special operations provides unique
capabilities, but it can't be only a military understanding
piece. There is a role for, again, allies and partners.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Well, on that point--and this might be for
later--but, for any of you, what role will U.S. forces play in
NATO's recent CBRN defense element that was activated in EUCOM?
Can anyone answer that here? Okay, I will ask Dr. Rosenblum.
I am sorry, I am making a mistake of 22 years; I know I
have to ask a specific question to a specific----
Ms. Rosenblum. No, no, no, absolutely. I would like to take
that one for the record to get back to you.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Can you get back to me by noon?
[Laughter.]
Ms. Rosenblum. Sure.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Got it.
Oh, yes, Dr. Plumb, I am on the Aviation Subcommittee as
well. And so, we are tangentially involved in this discussion
about debris management, because we regulate the airspace from
the ground until a rocket gets to space, and then, it gets into
space.
And I noted in your preparation, I think in your
confirmation hearing, you had some discussion with the SASC
[Senate Armed Services Committee] about the traffic debris
management issue. Can you update us on where that is now? And
is it a drag, right, because it is not resolved yet?
Dr. Plumb. So, thanks, Congressman.
In the SASC hearing on that, I was asked about the Office
of Space Commerce and the need to--so, this is outside of FAA
[Federal Aviation Administration]. This is actually a Commerce
piece. Obviously, FAA has it on the way up and down----
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Dr. Plumb [continuing]. Which is also important.
But the budget request is on the order of, I think, I want
to say somewhere around $85 to $88 million, which is the right
number. I had confirmed that since. So, I think that funding
Office [of] Space Commerce at the right amount is going to give
them that chance to get up-to-speed. Because you really have to
fund not just an office, but you have got to get folks trained.
You have got to get the software going. And so, there is, I
think, a 3-year plan to kind of get it up and running. And I
think we are where we need to be, which was not true last year.
So, I think this is a good-news story.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. And that is good to know. Again, as you
said, what goes up does, in fact, sometimes come down.
Dr. Plumb. Very often.
Mr. Larsen. And the FAA needs to clear the airspace if it
is coming down in places that----
Dr. Plumb. Yes, and I think, just to pull on that for a
second, I do know there is more work to be done on that as
well. And I think there is some regulation space for that that
we could talk about offline, if you would like.
Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Yes, sure. Okay. Great.
I am going to end there, and I will yield back the
remainder of my time, and call on Mr. Scott, recognize Mr.
Scott. He is off? Then, who would be next on that other side?
Representative Bacon for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. It is always good to be ready. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
And thanks to all four of you for being here today.
I have five questions. So, if I can't get through them, I
hope I can get something on the second round here.
But my first question is for Honorable Ms. Rosenblum. How
would you say our strategy or doctrine has to change with two
near-peer powers with nuclear weapons? We are used to one major
power. Now we are headed in the direction of two. How do you
see this changing our doctrine or strategy?
Ms. Rosenblum. So, on that question, Mr. Congressman, I
would like to take that more in the classified section.
Mr. Bacon. Okay.
Ms. Rosenblum. There is something that the nuclear posture
review that I know has been released to Congress on a
classified basis goes into that. I am happy to answer that
question on that.
But it certainly is something publicly that we have spoken
about that is going to require the level of refinement and
change to the strategy and to the doctrine----
Mr. Bacon. Yes.
Ms. Rosenblum [continuing]. Because the rate of
escalation--sorry. The rate at which the Chinese are moving
ahead with the modernization of their nuclear program is
dramatic and unprecedented, and particularly across all legs of
the triad, and will require a rethinking on that.
Mr. Bacon. Instead of playing a two-person chess game, now
we have three people playing chess on the same board.
Ms. Rosenblum. Understood.
Mr. Bacon. So, it changes it.
Dr. Williams, a quick question for you. How would have
having the Open Skies aircraft made an impact to DTRA and to
our U.S. military leading up to Ukraine and after?
Dr. Williams. Sir, I would say that the Open Skies process
was one that was useful for the U.S. That said, obviously, the
administration made the determination to end that. DTRA was the
execution agency for the Open Skies mission, sir, and we are
following the administration's priorities.
Mr. Bacon. Understood. But would it have provided some
useful information leading up to the invasion of Ukraine?
Dr. Williams. I would just say, sir, all information is
useful.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
It would be my position that it cost us not having this
airframe leading up to the invasion, and I think we could have
used it after the invasion as well.
Back to Ms. Rosenblum, would you say the administration is
fully committed to a full recap of the triad?
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, Mr. Congressman, I can answer that in
open session. It is absolutely committed to the
recapitalization of the triad, as well as the nuclear command
and control that goes with that, along with the Department of
Energy infrastructure and all of their facilities that are
required to make all of the warheads associated with the
modernization.
Mr. Bacon. That is great news, and I think you will have
bipartisan support on that.
I heard this week from a COCOM [combatant command]
commander saying there was a need for low-yield nuclear
weapons, or that it gave the commanders more options. As you
know, Russia has invested heavily in this area and they have
the escalate to de-escalate strategy. What is the
administration's position on low-yield nuclear weapons?
Dr. Plumb. If it is all right, Congressman, I will take
that.
Mr. Bacon. Sure.
Dr. Plumb. So, first of all, I am aware of the comments you
are referencing. I will say the W76----
Mr. Larsen. If you could just get closer to the microphone?
Dr. Plumb. I am sorry, is that better, Congressman?
Mr. Bacon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, thanks.
Dr. Plumb. Okay. The W76-2, which is a low-yield warhead
for a submarine-launched ballistic missile, remains deployed.
So, that program continues. And so, from a deterrence
standpoint of the ability to posture with a low-yield weapon, I
think that covers that particular question. Of course, cards on
the table, the SLCM-N, the submarine-launched cruise missile,
which would be a tactical nuclear weapon by definition, that
has been zeroed-out. And I think reasonable people can disagree
if this is a thing that we should continue or not. But the
modernization of the entire triad is firmly cemented in the
budget and the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], and the
continuation of the W76-2 as well.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
I will just close with a comment. It was something I had
the honor of talking about yesterday.
We started about a 2-year process to do a surge capacity
for pandemic bioweapons, have the surge capacity in the United
States. And the military, or the DOD, in partnership with
Health and Human Services, picked five sites, Omaha being one.
It would be my request that the Department continue to fund
this, put it in their budget request. The community is looking
forward to partnering with DOD and HHS [U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services] on this effort.
And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego [presiding]. Representative Sherrill.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
As the coordinating authority, Admiral Green, what
recommendations are you providing to the Secretary of Defense
regarding best modernizing the Department's ability to prepare
and respond to the current threat, given Russia's previous use
of chemical weapons in Syria and the threat of chemical weapons
use and biological weapons use in Ukraine?
Admiral Green. Yes, thanks, Congresswoman, for the
question.
So, my boss submits an annual assessment to the SECDEF
[Secretary of Defense] through the Chairman. And the two things
that he cited were we need to aggressively increase our
capability and capacity to counter WMD, and that we needed to
prevent the strategic surprise, which was to focus
cooperatively on understanding the intel threat.
But, with regard to modernization, I think we have got to
leverage the authorities that you gave us, the Small Business
Innovation Research, other transactional authorities, and
middle-tier acquisition, to get after and partner with industry
on things that can improve and modernize not only personal
protective equipment, but detection and monitoring. And I
think, as Ms. Rosenblum mentioned, we are getting after that.
But I do believe we need to address that; we need to leverage
those authorities a little bit more aggressively, and again,
partner with industry on how we increase capability and
capacity.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
And we spoke briefly about the CWMD senior leader seminars
[SLS] that you are conducting with combatant commanders and,
also, about the effectiveness of such seminars with preparing
combatant commanders to address WMD threats from great power
competitors in each theater. Are there common significant gaps
that these seminars have identified across multiple combatant
commands? And in your opinion, how can the Department modernize
its WMD threat posture, and what steps can Congress take to
move these modernization efforts along?
Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for that question.
And I think the most significant thing that this panel did
in the last year is these senior leader seminars. We had one
for EUCOM in February of 2021, and we just had one for
INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] with Admiral Aquilino.
And they were well attended by my colleagues here, as well as
the interagency and our partners and allies.
And I think that the key piece of those senior leader
seminars was it war-gamed the vulnerabilities that we may have
with regard to our plans, our resourcing, and frankly, again,
our training and exercises. So, I think those were an
invaluable product of these stakeholders here that you have
before you today. And we will continue to do those.
Specifically, the EUCOM one was done a year ago. And
fortuitously, that has prepared us better for what we are
dealing with today currently. And EUCOM implemented an
implementation plan to get after some of the things that they
needed to do, that they did do from then to now, with regard to
those broader five things that I talked about that make us
better postured today.
But the SLS is a great venue that the coordinating
authority, and again, my panel members, have implemented.
Thank you.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, and I look forward to getting into
some more details in the closed session.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Representative Franklin.
Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate our witnesses being here today.
As a former naval aviator that spent more time than I care
to remember in MOPP [mission oriented protective posture] gear,
and now here in Congress reading about the threat and
understanding how significant it is, I used to always--the
value in those exercises to me was just praying to God that it
never happened. But you all don't have that luxury. You have
got to deal with it, and it is a very real threat that I fear
too often is back-burnered. It doesn't get the attention it
needs. And I know that is not the only things that you have on
your plates, but it is vitally important. And if it ever
happens, it will probably be one of the worst things that has
ever happened to the United States.
But I do have a couple of questions. And, Admiral Green,
you and I have had some conversations about the authorities and
helping me understand how all of this shakes out, because it is
a very complex problem set.
But I understand SOCOM's coordinating authority on the
front end. I am curious, though, who would be the coordinating
authority in an actual event after the fact?
Admiral Green. Well, the coordinating authority does not
command; it doesn't convene. It recommends.
Mr. Franklin. I understand. On your end, it is preparation
of coordinating the operational plans. It is helping with the
strategies. But if all that fails and we find ourselves with an
actual event, who is, then, responsible? Because it seems very
complex to me as to who takes charge then.
Admiral Green. Yes, I would say simply it is the combatant
commanders. I mean, they execute the campaigning day-in and
day-out, and they own the contingency plans and the OPLANs
[operations plans]. As we speak, General Wolters owns the EUCOM
AOR [area of responsibility].
So, this venue, the coordinating authority simply tries to
support an understanding of the threat, identifying resourcing
gaps, and then making recommendations across policy and force
provider issues. But, ultimately, it is the combatant
commanders.
Mr. Franklin. Right. So, if we had a contaminated
environment, obviously the COCOM is going to have to execute
the battle plan and keep going forward, but how do we go
about--who coordinates the mitigation efforts to allow them to
continue to move forward? And whoever might want to answer
that. It is just I have a hard time understanding how it
unfolds after the fact.
Ms. Rosenblum. So, that would be done, actually, on the
ground operationally, but by the joint force right there. So,
if you were to have a contaminated environment on, say, a
logistics or a flow-through base that the United States or its
allies were using, and were they to be contaminated, the forces
immediately there on the base would be dealing with the--excuse
me--to decontaminate--I apologize--that area and the equipment,
in order for the force to be able to continue to proceed with
its mission.
Mr. Franklin. Okay. We saw with great success, I think,
during this COVID [coronavirus disease] pandemic, with
Operation Warp Speed, what DOD, in collaboration with DHS
[Department of Homeland Security], has been able to do. I am
interested to know what lessons we have learned from that; how
we are going to perpetuate that going forward, so that we can
be prepared for future things.
And then, also, as we deal with adversaries like Russia and
China, where the companies are either state-owned, or at least
sponsored, and there is that collaborative effort just by
design of how their governments function, they are working
together in a lot of cross-purpose-type technologies. How are
we, and how could we better, work with not only our other
government agencies, like DHS, but on the civilian side with
our pharmaceutical companies, with our biomedical research?
What are we doing to get better at that?
Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman.
On the first part of your question about how the pandemic
has given us some lessons learned, I think on the highest level
the takeaway is the Department can't afford to think about
biothreats as a nation-state battlefield weapon, and has to
include pandemic preparedness, as well as specific agent design
preparedness. And so, the bio posture review that we are
undertaking, Biodefense Posture Review, is looking at this from
a whole spectrum, to include that part. And I think that is a
big lesson that we have all--I don't know if it is learned or
relearned.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, what I would just add to that,
Congressman, is on the research, development, and acquisition
side, one of the things that we are beginning to pivot away
from is the focus on a singular agent, but, rather, the reality
is that we are going to have to have more broad-spectrum kinds
of both drugs as well as vaccines. And our continuous
consultation, certainly, with the pharmaceutical industry is
helping us with that. And I can go into further detail in the
closed session as well.
Mr. Franklin. Right. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Representative Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to everyone for being here with us. I look
forward to the closed session as well.
But I will just start with Admiral Green. Can you talk a
little bit about how you are leveraging American innovation and
small businesses to help assist in the mission of countering
weapons of mass destruction? And what particular tools have
enabled you to leverage that innovation and work with small
businesses?
Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for the question, and thanks for
the conversation in your office.
I mentioned we have leveraged those authorities, I think,
more effectively in the CT world, in the counterterrorism
world. And they are there, and we need to aggressively work
with industry and leverage those authorities when it comes to
this problem set.
I would say that we have done some work with personal
protective equipment that I can get into more detail in the
classified session, but that is one example of where I think we
have worked with industry to increase our capability and to
harden our operators.
I think Ms. Rosenblum--I think another area where I think
it has a lot of promise is we have had an outside-in approach
to protecting the operator--and I think she mentioned a little
bit of an inside-out where we can protect with proven and
tested pharmaceuticals to protect the operator. But I think
those are areas where we can advance as well.
But I acknowledge that we have got to get a little bit more
aggressive with the authorities that you have given us and to
seek modernization in partnership with industry.
Ms. Rosenblum. If I may, Congresswoman, just to add that,
working with small business is a very high priority for the
administration, and we are very aware of the barriers to entry
that that presents. And this is an area that we are trying to
focus on, what the demand signal is from the Department, better
understood by small business, and ways to more effectively
integrate them into the advances that we are making to
modernize against the whole WMD landscape.
Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you for that.
You know, Admiral Green, I know that pathway defeat or
collecting intelligence on the supply chains used to develop
the new WMDs is a critical part of SOCOM's CWMD mission. Are
the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
capabilities you need for successful pathway defeat sufficient?
Are there specific deficits that we could address? And do you
have the authorities you need to collect the necessary
intelligence to complete your mission?
Admiral Green. Yes, again, thanks for that question, and I
appreciate the dialog I had in your office, because I have
thought about it since we had that discussion.
I think there is never enough ISR, but I think we have got
to look at ISR, and my boss, frankly, he is looking at next-
generation ISR and it involves open-source data, space, and
cyber. And we may need to move away from reluctance on iron in
airframes. But I think we have got to get creative.
But I also think our allies and partners, you know, they
need to harden themselves, and us included, with regard to
research that our near-peer competitors do, whether it is
intellectual rights or whether it is supply chains. So, I think
ISR is a broad term, but I think we all play a part, and our
allies and partners really can help with that.
And we had a Five Eyes session in the last SLS which was
extremely productive to listen to their thoughts and how we may
be able to share intelligence better with them, so that we have
a global look at this.
Mrs. Murphy. And maybe, Ms. Rosenblum, you can follow up on
that and talk a little bit about how you are coordinating with
allies and partners on both understanding and countering WMD
threats.
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Congresswoman, for
that followup.
In the research, development, and acquisition area, we have
a number of bilateral working groups that we have, particularly
with the Canadians, the U.K. [United Kingdom], as well as
Australia, to not only understand where they are with their
science and technology, and as well as advanced development
programs, but also where some of their areas of concern are, so
that we are able to address that from a procurement, materiel,
medical countermeasures approach.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you very much, and I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Representative Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rosenblum, I am going to ask you in a minute
about the Wuhan Virological Institute in China. But, first, let
me quote three sentences from your written statement.
``The Department of State's April 2021 Compliance Report
voiced grave concerns about China, Iran, North Korea, and
Russia's compliance with the Biological Weapons and Toxins
Convention. The report assessed that both North Korea and
Russia have offensive biological weapons programs.
Additionally, the activities of China and Iran raise concerns
about compliance. Chinese publications have described biology
and biotechnology as a new domain of warfare and cite the
aspiration to make China the world leader in genetic
engineering, precision medicine, and brain sciences, among
other scientific disciplines.''
So, we have heard so much from different directions about
the Wuhan Virological Institute. Was that any part of the
Chinese effort, as you quote, to become preeminent in what they
view as a possible new domain of warfare, biology and
biotechnology?
Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Congressman, for
that question.
My statement was oriented on their approach much more
broadly than what they may or may not be doing in Wuhan
Institute. They have a premier biotechnology economy that they
are continuing to grow openly and commercially with investments
both in the United States as well as globally. So, my comments
were not restricted just to what may or may not be going on in
Wuhan.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. To drill down on that just a little bit
more, though, I have heard reports that they were engaged in
gain-of-function research, which, to me, I don't see any good
that can come out of that. It takes viruses and makes them more
transmissible or more deadly. Do you have any view or comment
on that?
Ms. Rosenblum. You know, with respect to whether gain-of-
function research, which I am, in general, very familiar with
in terms of its role in vaccines, related to Wuhan, I would
want to take that as a question for the record.
One other thing that I would like to explore is that there
have been some concerns or questions about whether DTRA funding
or other funding at the Department of Defense was used in
support of the Wuhan Institute. And we took a hard look at
that, and to my knowledge, there was no DOD funding provided to
Wuhan Institute.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I am glad to clarify that.
And lastly, are you involved in any other research
concerning the possible connection of the origins of COVID to
the Wuhan Virological Institute?
Ms. Rosenblum. I am not.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Admiral Green, I would like to ask you a
question on a different subject. As you know, the
administration has decided to cancel and defund the nuclear
capabilities, including the SLCM-N and the B83. Do you agree
with that decision? Do you think that that was in accordance
with your best military advice?
Admiral Green. I will ask one of my colleagues to
potentially comment on that. I am not familiar. I can take it
for the record.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I guess, in SOCOM, maybe that wasn't
your--I mean, these are Navy; one of those was a Navy program,
but I thought, with your SOCOM role, you may or may not have
familiarity with that.
So, with that, given the fact that you have said that, I
won't pursue any more on that issue.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Well, thank you very much.
Votes are about to be called right now, or at least in the
next 10 minutes. So, what I propose, unless there are any other
questions, is that we close this formal session, and then, we
restart in the classified session after votes are called.
Thanks then. Thank you, and thank you to the witnesses.
[Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 1, 2022
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 1, 2022
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 1, 2022
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass
destruction?
Ms. Rosenblum. As the senior advisor and technical expert to the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for chemical and biological
defense, my job is to provide the capabilities to ensure the Joint
Service can deter or fight and win in a chemical or biologically-
contaminated environment. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers
pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl and its derivatives to be therapeutic
drugs with legitimate medical uses when prescribed appropriately by
medical authorities. However, an actor's misuse of a pharmaceutical
chemical to threaten the lives and well-being of groups of humans is
what makes fentanyl and other pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) a
potential chemical weapons concern and a concern that DOD takes very
seriously. The chemicals themselves are not inherently weapons of mass
destruction, but actors can use them in ways that make them a chemical
weapon. Regardless of whether it's considered a weapon of mass
destruction or not, DOD is working to ensure the Joint Force can fight
and win should a PBA be used near or against U.S. service members. To
do so, the Department is committed to providing an integrated and
layered defensive system that includes the understand, protect, and
mitigate portfolios. The DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program
(CBDP) program is working to better understand the PBA threat and DOD's
ability to detect and mitigate PBA usage. The program is incorporating
PBA-detection algorithms into detectors such as the Aerosol & Vapor
Chemical Agent Detector, a man-portable system. Our PBA medical program
includes evaluating FDA-approved drugs for operational use and
developing novel medical countermeasures (MCMs) to enhance the
protection and/or operational utility for the Warfighter. The Rapid
Opioid Countermeasure System (ROCS) is a higher concentration Naloxone
formulation DOD developed for use in an autoinjector. This will allow
warfighters with no medical expertise to self-administer Naloxone if
they are exposed to fentanyl or other PBAs that can be treated with
Naloxone. In February 28, 2022, the FDA-approved the ROCS autoinjector
and they were subsequently deployed to U.S. forces as part of the
response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass
destruction?
Dr. Plumb. DOD considers pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl and its
derivatives to be therapeutic drugs, which if prescribed appropriately
by medical authorities have legitimate medical uses. However,
pharmaceuticals could be weaponized and developed into a
pharmaceutical-based agent (PBA), which the Department of Defense (DOD)
takes seriously. There is concern that certain foreign governments are
pursuing so-called incapacitating agents under the guise of riot
control agents or medical research. We believe such activities
undermine the international norm against chemical weapons use, and DOD
supports efforts, such as those at the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to create practical and normative barriers
to impede the emergence of future threats.
Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass
destruction?
Admiral Green. Fentanyl and its analogues are legitimate
pharmaceuticals which if prescribed appropriately by medical
authorities have legitimate medical uses. The Conference of States
Parties of the CWC recently passed a decision that found that the
aerosolized use of Central Nervous System Acting Chemicals (CNSACs),
which would include chemicals such as fentanyl, was found inconsistent
with the law enforcement exemption as a purpose not prohibited under
the CWC. This means a majority of CWC-signatory nations now acknowledge
that fentanyl and other CNSACs have properties that are dangerous when
used outside a medical environment. They are also different than
traditional riot control agents (RCAs)--with some having toxicities
comparable to lethal nerve agents. DOD is concerned certain nation-
state adversaries are pursuing PBAs as part of their offensive chemical
warfare programs. The DOD requires preparedness to defend against any
form of chemical weapon, regardless of toxicity, being developed,
stockpiled, or used in a way intended to cause harm to humans, which
can include fentanyls. Additionally, the DOD notes any explicit
designation of fentanyl as a WMD has implications for numerous other
U.S. Government agencies given fentanyl's use as both a legitimate
pharmaceutical and illicit drug, and encourages consideration of these
implications in any policy decisions.
Mr. Scott. Is far forward, rapid, portable infection detection' a
priority for our warfighters? If so, what resources are needed to
accelerate this important program?
Dr. Williams. DTRA engages in efforts to develop far forward,
rapid, and portable infection diagnostic systems through executing the
funding and mission for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program
(CBDP) Science and Technology efforts. Through the CBDP science and
technology funds, DTRA is investing in transformative wearable
technologies to monitor and assess physiological changes within the
Joint Force. Quickly identifying if a warfighter has been infected by a
known or unknown biological hazard greatly enhances our ability to
rapidly provide tailored medical countermeasures to prevent or reduce
the onset of physiological effects as well as alert other forces to
avoid or decontaminate the location where a hazard has been detected.
As the science advances, we gain a more nuanced understanding of how
physiological markers are changed by diseases and exposure to
biological hazards. Wearable technologies could both alert when a
biological hazard exists in the environment and identify if a service
member has become infected up to 48 hours prior to the onset of
symptoms. This type of early infection-warning system offers the
warfighter a distinct advantage. These wearable technologies would also
unencumber the warfighter by reducing the logistical burden of carrying
and using agent-specific detection and diagnostic systems. The
additional funding DTRA received through the CBDP to support the
Department's biodefense mission is sufficient and will help accelerate
efforts to provide the joint force with far forward diagnostic
capabilities, enhance our ability to provide tailorable medical
countermeasures, and alert decision makers to prevent further
contamination.
Mr. Scott. How is DTRA supporting small business R&D in point-of-
care, rapid pathogen detection for warfighters?
Dr. Williams. DTRA participates in and advertises applied research
needs through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small
Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Programs. In the past, some SBIR/
STTR awards have addressed pathogen detection for the warfighter. DTRA
also uses contracting mechanisms such as Other Transaction Authority
(OTA) solicitations and Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) through which
small businesses can propose and compete for funding and awards.
Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass
destruction?
Dr. Williams. The DOD considers pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl
and its derivatives to be therapeutic drugs, which if prescribed
appropriately by medical authorities have legitimate medical uses.
However, DTRA recognizes that fentanyl could be weaponized and
developed into a pharmaceutical-based agent (PBA), and this informs the
execution of our mission. DTRA supports research into the detection,
impacts, and mitigation of fentanyl exposure to ensure our warfighters
are able to execute their missions effectively and safely. These
efforts include the evaluation of the magnitude, duration, and
operational implications of both indoor and outdoor utilizations of
fentanyl as an incapacitant. The effectiveness of current protective
equipment has been validated along with an FDA-approved medical
countermeasure in such concentrations that are relevant and life-saving
in a battlefield environment. While DTRA efforts have focused on
mitigating the effects of weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents (PBA)
such as fentanyl, we also recognize fentanyl's legitimate medical and
therapeutic uses.
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