    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-76]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION
                                   __________

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                       ON

                          REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                         STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

        FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023
                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 APRIL 1, 2022

                     [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    48-628                     WASHINGTON : 2023

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                        RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman

    RICK LARSEN, Washington              TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
    MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    JIMMY PANETTA, California            DON BACON, Nebraska
    STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice   LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
        Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
    Vacancy

                    Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
                   Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
                               Will Braden, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Gallego, Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
    Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Green, VADM Collin P., USN, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special
      Operations Command.............................................     6
    Plumb, John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy..     5
    Rosenblum, Deborah G., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
      Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.............     3
    Williams, Rhys M., Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction
      Agency, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
      Sustainment....................................................     7

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Gallego, Hon. Ruben..........................................    25
        Green, VADM Collin P.........................................    51
        Plumb, John F................................................    37
        Rosenblum, Deborah G.........................................    27
        Williams, Rhys M.............................................    62

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Scott....................................................    75

                     REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY,

      POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR
                                FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
           Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                                 Washington, DC, Friday, April 1, 2022.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ruben Gallego
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
      ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
                               OPERATIONS

        Mr. Gallego. Welcome to the Subcommittee on Intelligence
    and Special Operations, countering weapons of mass destruction
    FY23 [fiscal year 2023] budget hearing.
        I am going to read a mandatory statement for our digital
    participants.
        Members who are joining remotely must be visible onscreen
    for the purpose of identity verification, establishing and
    maintaining a quorum, participating in the proceeding, and
    voting. Those members must continue to use the software
    platform's video while in attendance, unless they experience
    connectivity issues or other technical problems that render
    them unable to participate on camera.
        If a member experiences technical difficulties, they should
    contact the committee staff for assistance.
        Video members' participation will be broadcast in the room
    via the television and internet feeds.
        Members participating remotely must seek recognition
    verbally, and they are asked to mute their microphones when
    they are not speaking. Members who are participating remotely
    are reminded to keep the software platform's video function on
    the entire time they attend the proceeding.
        Members may leave and rejoin the proceeding. If members
    depart for a short while for reasons other than joining a
    different proceeding, they should leave the video function on.
    If members will be absent for a significant period or depart to
    join a different proceeding, they should exit the software
    platform entirely, and then rejoin it if they return. Members
    may use the software platform's chat feature to communicate
    with staff regarding technical or logistical support issues
    only.
        Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
    necessary, mute unrecognized members' microphones to cancel any
    inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
        Good morning. I want to thank our witnesses for joining us
    today.
        Dr. Deborah Rosenblum, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Threats; Dr. John Plumb,
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; Vice Admiral
    Collin Green, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations
    Command; and Dr. Rhys--I apologize if I said that incorrectly--
    Williams, Acting Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We
    appreciate your leadership and service to the Nation at this
    critical time in global security.
        The erosion of international norms regarding the use of
    chemical and biological weapons, coupled with emerging
    technology that creates the ability to weaponize synthetic
    drugs, requires us to think about weapons of mass destruction
    [WMDs] in new ways.
        While the United States is in full compliance with its
    obligations under both the Biological Weapons Convention and
    the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia and North Korea,
    according to the Department of State's 2021 Compliance Report,
    both maintain offensive biological weapons programs, and both
    have used such weapons against political opponents with near
    impunity.
        Vladimir Putin uses WMDs and the threat of WMDs to inflict
    terror on populations, as is happening right now in Ukraine and
    Europe. Russia is promoting dangerous disinformation, which
    falsely claims that the U.S. is secretly developing biological
    weapons in a Ukrainian laboratory. This effort appears to be
    part of Putin's plan to keep the door open to employing
    Russia's own illegal biological or chemical weapons in Ukraine
    through a false-flag operation.
        Today, I am interested in our witnesses assessing how the
    fundamental changes to the security environment in Europe are
    altering how we think about and plan to deter, detect, and
    mitigate threats from WMDs, and to what extent this planning is
    reflected in DOD's budget request.
        I am also interested in hearing about the progress towards
    the destruction of the remaining stockpile of lethal chemical
    agents and munitions, as required by the Chemical Weapons
    Convention deadline, September 30th, and the congressionally
    mandated deadline of December 31st. I know the Department has
    been working tirelessly to ensure those obligations are met.
        Dr. Rosenblum and Dr. Plumb, I understand you are holding
    the first-ever biodefense posture review. I appreciate the
    critical work you are doing in this area and look forward to
    hearing how the review is proceeding.
        Finally, it is essential that we understand how all this
    connects to the budget request. I am pleased to see healthy
    increases across this portfolio, especially the Cooperative
    Threat Reduction Program which, contrary to Putin's false
    propaganda, has been instrumental in dismantling weapons of
    mass destruction, and the Chemical and Biological Defense
    Program with investments in vaccines and therapeutics.
        I look forward to the discussion, and will now recognize
    Ranking Member Kelly for his opening remarks.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gallego can be found in the
    Appendix on page 25.]

         STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
     MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
                           SPECIAL OPERATIONS

        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your opening
    remarks and your leadership in organizing this morning's
    posture hearing.
        Today, we will hear from four experts across the countering
    weapons of mass destruction portfolio. And I want to thank each
    of you personally for meeting with me earlier this week and in-
    depth briefings, some in the SCIF [secure compartmented
    information facility], some open source. But I really
    appreciate that, and I think it will really facilitate this
    hearing.
        I am eager to get an update on the progress of the
    Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives program, especially the
    activities at the Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot
    Plant. This subcommittee is keenly interested in the
    certification of the Static Detonation Chamber and ensuring the
    activities stay on schedule.
        With regards to the threat environment, I look forward to
    getting an update on the capabilities of our adversaries, to
    include the usual bad actors of China, Russia, Iran, and North
    Korea, as well as the various terrorist organizations and
    networks.
        The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine continues to
    cause worry about the use of WMDs in the region, especially
    looking at their past history and some of the false-flag
    operations that they have conducted recently and in the past.
        Finally, I continue to be concerned about how the Biden
    administration's budget will affect our overall counter weapons
    of mass destruction preparedness. The ongoing use and threat of
    these weapons illuminate the direness of this problem. Failing
    to properly invest in these resources will have great
    consequences.
        I want to thank our witnesses in advance for their time
    today. I look forward to continuing the work with our counter
    WMD experts during the 117th Congress to ensure we are
    appropriately postured to meet and defeat the threats shaped by
    weapons of mass destruction.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly.
        We will now hear from witnesses, then move to the question-
    and-answer period.
        Dr. Rosenblum, you are now recognized.

       STATEMENT OF DEBORAH G. ROSENBLUM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
     DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you very much. Chairman Gallego,
    Ranking Member Kelly, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is truly a privilege to testify before you
    today on behalf of the Department of Defense.
        As the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
    Chemical, and Biologic Defense Programs, I am responsible, in
    close coordination with my fellow witnesses, for ensuring that
    the United States maintains its enduring technical advantages
    when countering weapons of mass destruction.
        In recent years, our adversaries have demonstrated the
    potential for chemical and biological weapons to achieve a
    broad range of effects--from small-scale assassinations to
    large population-scale effect. These offensive tools could also
    weaken and displace defensive forces, thereby, allowing
    adversaries to seize infrastructure, territory, or achieve a
    strategic advantage against the United States and our allies.
        At the same time, different sciences and technologies are
    converging to create revolutionary capabilities with
    transformative benefits to our society, but it also opens the
    door to the potential nefarious uses. This is uniquely true for
    chemical and biological threats. For example, engineered
    biologic weapons could be designed to evade our existing
    physical and medical defenses by making subtle changes.
        As a result, our deterrent and defensive postures must
    prepare for, and respond to, a broad spectrum of biological
    threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or
    deliberate. We can no longer rely on a static list of
    traditional agents to develop countermeasures against.
    Furthermore, the Department cannot presume that we will be able
    to provide the warfighter advanced warning or accurate pinpoint
    biological and chemical agent detection.
        Faced with these challenges, we must change the way we do
    business by strengthening the Department's defensive
    capabilities through bolder acquisition approaches, while also
    using our inherent science and technology advantages. The
    Department seeks to modernize and strengthen the U.S. deterrent
    and defensive capabilities to ensure the joint force can fight
    and win in WMD-contested environments.
        As the Department proposes a significant increase in
    chemical and biological defense across the FYDP [Future Years
    Defense Program], I would like to share three examples of how
    the Department will seek to deliver novel capabilities for the
    warfighter.
        First, because emerging biologic threats can circumvent
    traditional concepts of detection, we need to change the
    paradigm by integrating all available sensors and data
    collection as a network of networks to identify changes within
    the environment, rather than waiting for the onset of symptoms
    in our warfighter.
        Second, we must explore the concept of defending from
    within through preventive and post-exposure medical
    countermeasures.
        Third, we are working to enhance protection, while reducing
    the burden to our warfighter, by replacing heavy, bulky, and
    extremely hot individual protective equipment with novel types
    of materials and responsive technologies to create a next-
    generation protection.
        As I testify today about our adversaries' chemical weapons
    capabilities, I am proud to report we have destroyed 98 percent
    of chemical agents from the United States chemical weapon
    stockpile, and we are on track to complete the destruction of
    the entire United States legacy chemical weapons stockpile by
    the planned completion date of September 2023.
        On behalf of the Department, I would like to thank each of
    you for your continued partnership and support to strengthen
    our WMD deterrence and defensive capabilities. The threat we
    face today cannot be understated.
        I look forward to answering your questions in the later
    session. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Rosenblum can be found in
    the Appendix on page 27.]
        Mr. Gallego. And now, we would like to hear from Dr. Plumb.

    STATEMENT OF JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
                              SPACE POLICY

        Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member
    Kelly, members of the subcommittee. I, too, am honored to
    testify on the Department of Defense's countering weapons of
    mass destruction efforts today.
        The Department's CWMD mission is to dissuade, deter, and,
    when necessary, defeat actors of concern who threaten or use
    weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. and our interests.
    Mission success requires the expertise and collaboration across
    many DOD [Department of Defense] components, close coordination
    within the interagency and Congress, and strong international
    alliances and partnerships.
        Today, Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine underscores
    the importance of the CWMD mission. In a period of just a few
    weeks, we have seen the threat of nuclear weapons use; we have
    seen attacks on Ukrainian nuclear power plants; and we have
    seen an extensive Russian disinformation campaign on chemical
    and biological weapons development in Ukraine--pure lies. That
    is most likely a troubling pretext for possible Russian use of
    these weapons themselves.
        The DOD leverages its unique tools and expertise in support
    of a whole-of-government approach to mitigate the risk of
    global WMD proliferation and adversary pursuit of these
    advancements. Examples include supporting global norms under
    the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; remaining postured to
    conduct WMD interdictions and preparing our partners to do so;
    and implementing U.N. [United Nations] sanctions to impede
    illicit North Korean trade.
        The Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR]
    Program, which has evolved over the past 3 decades and works
    with more than 30 partner nations, is an important and proven
    tool to reduce the risk of WMD-related threats and prevent
    proliferation across the CBRN [chemical, biological,
    radiological, and nuclear] spectrum.
        And I would like to thank Congress, and this subcommittee
    in particular, for its continued support of the CTR
    [Cooperative Threat Reduction] program. This support has paid
    dividends to the U.S. and global security for over 30 years,
    and there is more to be done. I am pleased to note that the
    President's budget request for the CTR program is $342 million
    for fiscal year 2023.
        The Department continues to strengthen the capability of
    the joint force and our allies and partners to operate in
    chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear, and
    contaminated environments. We strive for increased
    interoperability and we encourage our partners and allies to
    share the collective burden of CBRN defense.
        But CBRN defense requires resources, and that is why the
    Department is seeking $630 million across the FYDP to help
    bolster EUCOM's [U.S. European Command's] CBRN defense
    capabilities and equipment. And interestingly--and I think a
    point worth making--is this budget request originated before
    Russia invaded Ukraine, but that crisis further highlights that
    EUCOM CBRN defense is a priority and we have to address it.
        Making investments to counter a shifting threat environment
    requires sound policy, and sound policy requires an
    understanding of where things stand. So, the Department--myself
    and Assistant Secretary Rosenblum--are undertaking our first-
    ever Biodefense Posture Review this year. This review will
    guide our biodefense-related activities and investments to
    support force protection, research and development, capability
    acquisition, and the required DOD expertise across the spectrum
    of biological threats.
        And this year, the Department will also begin refreshing
    our CWMD strategy. That strategy will be informed by the bio
    posture review, as well as the National Defense Strategy, the
    Secretary of Defense's guidance, and our assessment of the
    shifting threat environment.
        So, thank you again for the opportunity to testify today,
    for your continued support of the Department's CWMD mission,
    and I look forward to our discussion.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Plumb can be found in the
    Appendix on page 37.]
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
        I now recognize Vice Admiral Green.

    STATEMENT OF VADM COLLIN P. GREEN, USN, DEPUTY COMMANDER, U.S.
                       SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

        Admiral Green. Good morning, Chairman Gallego, Ranking
    Member Kelly, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
    the opportunity to represent the United States Special
    Operations Command [USSOCOM] today.
        On behalf of General Clarke, it is my privilege to join Dr.
    John Plumb, Ms. Deborah Rosenblum, and Dr. Rhys Williams at
    this hearing, and look forward to discussing how we work
    together to address some of the most critical national security
    challenges facing our country, our allies, and our partners.
        Weapons of mass destruction are a complex, transregional
    problem that continues to present a direct threat to U.S. and
    allied interests and requires the application of specialized
    expertise and authorities across the whole of government. I
    welcome discussion related to USSOCOM's role as the Defense
    Department's coordinating authority for counter-WMD; the unique
    challenges we face; the work we have done against both current
    and future WMD threats; and our priorities for the coming year.
        Over the past year, in concert with our partners within the
    Department and across the interagency, we contributed to the
    development of the National Defense and National Military
    Strategies; enhanced joint force resiliency through an
    implementation of WMD-focused ready assessments; improved
    global exercise and training by incorporating realistic
    nuclear, chemical, and biological threats into scenarios; and
    improved integration and information-sharing with the
    interagency, as well as our allies and partners.
        However, as Dr. Plumb and Ms. Rosenblum said, Russia's
    unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, and the potential use of
    weapons of mass destruction, demands a sense of urgency in
    making deterrent and defensive investments. To that end, next
    year, in coordination with our partners in OSD [Office of the
    Secretary of Defense], the Joint Staff, and the interagency, we
    will continue to advance joint force readiness; produce
    actionable CWMD assessments; and make recommendations for
    improvement, where needed.
        We will ensure the Department's plans address the evolving
    WMD threats. We will continue to accelerate information-sharing
    through close coordination with the intelligence community, and
    we will coordinate CWMD equities into globally integrated
    operations, activities, and investments.
        General Clarke and I would like to thank the members of
    this subcommittee for their support of this urgent national
    security priority. It is a privilege to work together with our
    colleagues to keep our country and allies safe from the threat
    of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We look forward
    to our continued collaboration with them, with Members of
    Congress, with our interagency and international partners, to
    ensure our safety and readiness now and into the future.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Green can be found in
    the Appendix on page 51.]
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
        Now, we have Dr. Williams.

    STATEMENT OF RHYS M. WILLIAMS, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
     REDUCTION AGENCY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION
                            AND SUSTAINMENT

        Dr. Williams. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly, and
    distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    invitation to testify today.
        This committee and its members have long provided
    outstanding support to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
    also known as DTRA. I look forward to offering you an update on
    our vital work in countering and deterring weapons of mass
    destruction and emerging threats.
        On behalf of the over 2,200 military and civilians, I am
    proud to appear today alongside Ms. Deborah Rosenblum,
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and
    Biological Defense Programs; Dr. John Plumb, Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Space Policy; and Vice Admiral Green,
    Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
        There are few greater challenges to U.S. national interests
    than those posed by weapons of mass destruction and emerging
    threats. DTRA takes pride in providing the technological, the
    operational, and intellectual capacity within the Department to
    meet these challenges. Our world-class workforce and
    unparalleled professional network, access, and credibility give
    us an unmatched advantage in enabling the Department of
    Defense, the U.S. Government, and international partners to
    detect, deter, and defeat weapons of mass destruction and
    emerging threats in all theaters.
        As both a defense agency and a combat support agency, and
    the principal counter weapons of mass destruction organization
    within the Defense Department, we serve as the linchpin between
    the Department's counter-WMD strategies and its practitioners.
    Through Ms. Rosenblum and Dr. Plumb, and their subordinate
    components, the agency receives guidance, priorities, and
    oversight in the areas of nuclear matters, chemical and
    biological defense, threat reduction, and arms control.
        At the same time, we support U.S. Special Operations
    Command role as the coordinating authority for counter weapons
    of mass destruction and work very closely with Vice Admiral
    Green's staff, as well as those of the other combatant
    commands--providing strategic, operational, and tactical
    planning and expertise, as well as embedded support of material
    and non-material counter weapons of mass destruction solutions.
        These dual roles provide a synergy that is key to the
    successful execution of our counter-WMD mission that supports
    the National Defense Strategy's vision of integrated
    deterrence. The work that we plan, program, and execute on
    behalf of the Department and its stakeholders ensures a safe,
    secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent; enables the
    joint force allies and partners to compete and win against
    adversaries. The National Defense Strategy highlights both of
    these lines of effort, as key enablers for integrated
    deterrence.
        DTRA is postured and ready to support Secretary Austin's
    goal of developing, combining, and coordinating the
    Department's strengths to maximum effect. In pursuit of this
    goal, we play a key role across the counter-WMD community.
        So, on behalf of DTRA's dedicated workforce, I thank you
    for your continued support of our critical work in safeguarding
    the lives and the interests of the United States, our allies,
    and our partners abroad.
        Thank you for your time today and the invitation to
    participate. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Williams can be found in the
    Appendix on page 62.]
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
        And I apologize for the construction. I am assuming it is
    contractors and not the Russians trying to drill in to listen
    to what is happening here.
        We are going to move to our question period.
        Dr. Rosenblum, we can start with you, and then move to
    anyone else who would like to comment.
        Russia's misinformation-disinformation campaigns touch on
    all three main categories of WMD--biological, chemical, and
    nuclear. How do we frame our efforts in ways that account for
    the likelihood that Russia will probably continue this
    behavior?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Thank you, Chairman, for that question.
        The Department remains very concerned about the ability to
    get accurate and transparent information out to the U.S.
    public, as well as, certainly, our allies and the rest of the
    world. So, one of the things that the Department has been
    doing--and this is particularly related to the public health
    laboratories in Ukraine that is being, tragically, used by the
    Russians as a potential for a false-flag operation--from the
    White House on down to the Department of Defense, as well as
    Department of State, as well as all of the vehicles that we
    have to be able to communicate accurate information out about
    this, and the work that has been underway, I can say to you,
    unequivocally, there are no offensive biologic weapons in the
    Ukraine laboratories that the United States has been involved
    with.
        Mr. Gallego. Without a doubt.
        Anyone else want to take the question or a crack at that?
        [No response.]
        Moving on then, Dr. Williams, the Cooperative Threat
    Reduction Program has unique authorities, like commingling
    funds from other nations for urgent threat reduction needs. Is
    CTR exercising these authorities actively? And can you share
    any recent examples?
        Dr. Williams. Thank you for that question, sir.
        Yes, sir, as you noted, the Cooperative Threat Reduction
    Program does have unique authorities within title 50,
    specifically. We do commingle funds that come in from other
    organizations. As a matter of fact, a recent amount of funding
    has come in from the United Kingdom for work in these
    particular areas.
        We have a very active program, as was said earlier, in over
    30 countries. Last year alone, we had 70 engagements across the
    Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, across all areas of
    responsibility in the combatant commands, closely coordinated,
    obviously, with Dr. Plumb and his office, where we receive
    those policy determinations on where to work within the agency.
        So, sir, it is a very active program, and it is one that,
    as Dr. Plumb said, has paid incredible dividends over the 30
    years that we have been working with this program. As a matter
    of fact, this year, we celebrated the 30th anniversary. It was
    a major milestone for the program.
        Thank you for the question, sir.
        Mr. Gallego. And to follow up, DTRA is focused on
    countering and deterring weapons of mass destruction. I am
    interested in hearing about the more advanced capabilities in
    countering and detecting chemical and biological threats, and
    specifically, actions you have taken to support what is
    happening in Ukraine. And obviously, if some of that has to
    stay during the classified briefing, we can do that, but
    anything that can be shared publicly would also be good to
    know.
        Dr. Williams. Thank you. Thank you for that question, sir.
        The agency is the science and technology portion of the
    Chemical and Biological Defense Program. It is operated under
    Ms. Rosenblum's authorities, as the Assistant Secretary for
    Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense.
        We work very closely, also, with the Army's Joint Program
    Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to provide
    cutting-edge capabilities for the joint force, as well as in
    close coordination with our partners and allies as well--
    everything from leading-edge detectors, capabilities to weave
    together new data in new ways. As Ms. Rosenblum said, data is a
    place where we can spend a considerable amount of time in terms
    of activities.
        And in terms of our activities in support of U.S. European
    Command, sir, in terms of those activities, we have had almost
    200 requests for support from not only European Command, but
    across the DOD and interagency.
        Sir, as you know, we run the 24/7/365 technical reachback
    capability that does modeling across the chem-bio-nuclear
    spectrum. And because of that, we have been asked questions
    that range from, if something was to happen to a Ukrainian
    nuclear power plant, where would the plume go, and across the
    board. It is something we actively are monitoring now, sir, and
    I am happy to answer a few more specifics in the closed
    session.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Doctor.
        I now yield to Ranking Member Kelly.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And as the Department balances the shift in resources
    between counter-VEO [violent extremist organizations] and great
    power competition, what are the most significant capability or
    resource and vulnerabilities to the countering weapons of mass
    destruction mission? Any of you all can take that, and if
    anybody needs to follow, you can.
        Admiral Green. Yes, Congressman, thank you for the
    question.
        So, as the coordinating authority, USSOCOM establishes a
    collaborative fora to understand the threat, identify gaps, and
    make recommendations. So, to your point, I think, much like any
    state or non-state actor, these pathways, understanding the
    pathways and understanding what runs through them, whether it
    is transnational organized crime, counterterrorism, or CWMD, I
    think we have got to collectively leverage our access and
    placement, our authorities, across the interagency, as well as
    DOD, but, more importantly, our allies and partners, to
    understand the threat left of bang.
        So, I think we are doing that well with regard to how we
    understand the threat. I would also say that the Secretary,
    rightfully, directed that we integrate CWMD into planning,
    resourcing, modernizing, and then, more importantly, training
    and exercising holistically. It is not just about money; it is
    about the holistic effort to get after it.
        Mr. Kelly. And I am just hoping to follow up. If there are
    any gaps or vulnerabilities in either resources or funding, I
    hope that you all--and I understand we probably can't answer
    that.
        And I think, Dr. Rosenblum, you were going to say
    something.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Ranking Member.
        What I was going to add--and I think we can get into much
    greater detail on the classified side of it--but, from looking
    at closing the gaps that we have across the WMD spectrum and
    the investments, the main thing that we are pivoting from is
    concerns that it would be a non-state actor who would be using
    those to, then, really looking at state-based threats and the
    depth of the science and technology that they have available to
    them. And we can get into greater detail in terms of the
    specificity, but that is a dramatic pivot from a threat
    perspective.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you.
        And then, in the PB submissions, the Presidential budget
    submissions for FY21 and '22, the Department drastically cut
    funds to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. Each time,
    Congress has reinstated this fund. Why is it important, Dr.
    Rosenblum, to fully fund this program?
        Ms. Rosenblum. The Cooperative Threat Program provides and
    plays a critical role in ensuring that our allies and partners,
    who we will operate on any kind of joint battlefield, has
    capabilities that are commensurate with those of the United
    States, so that we can work with them seamlessly. And that goes
    kind of a range of gamuts of things that we are doing
    throughout the world. But that is fundamentally the key purpose
    of that program and why it remains so vital to us.
        And as my colleague, Dr. Plumb--and I will ask him to
    elaborate on this--mentioned, that in the FY23 request, that
    there is a significant increase in that, as the administration
    recognizes the importance of this program.
        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, and you answered my question. I just
    want to make sure we understand the importance of fully funding
    that, and even the increase.
        Given the increased use of chemical weapons in Syria and
    the asymmetric use of nerve agents by North Korea and Russia,
    what can we do to deter further use of chemical or biological
    weapons? What are we doing to ensure that the international
    norms against the use of these weapons is not eroded? And what
    can we do to develop new standards to deal with the emerging
    chemical and biological threats? And that is for any of you.
        Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman Kelly. It is an important
    question.
        And I think the crisis in Ukraine and the blatant threats,
    really, by Russia of potential use of chemical and biological
    weapons, is opening everyone's eyes to how much of a problem
    this is. The deterrence issue is a challenge for this
    administration. I think the fact that the White House has used
    the megaphone of the United States of America to call this out
    is an important deterrent, right?
        I think we have been able to--and it is not just the
    administration side; it is working with the Congress, too--
    rally the entire NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
    alliance to kind of align against this, is useful. There is
    always this question of who, at least in the case of Russia,
    who is Putin really trying to communicate to? If he is trying
    to communicate with us, that is one thing. If he is trying to
    communicate with his own people, that is a different problem.
    So, we have this communication conflict that we really need to
    work on.
        On a readiness side, there is some argument to be made that
    better readiness and better training, as the admiral spoke to,
    helps deter. I don't personally believe it is--you know it is
    necessary, but not sufficient. But the more ready we are to
    engage in a zone like that, then perhaps the higher the
    threshold is for its use.
        Mr. Kelly. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gallego. Representative Larsen.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I have several questions that I know are going to have to
    be answered later. But I will ask them anyway to use my 5
    minutes, you know, because maybe there is a clue.
        First off, for Admiral, as we look at strategic competition
    and this issue of WMD, and the role of SOF [special operations
    forces], are there specific areas where your coordinating
    authorities are needing to change or are there specific roles
    that you are seeking to change within the special operations
    community to meet that strategic competition WMD response?
        Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for the question.
        You know, I think this is a wake-up call with regard to
    CWMD, much like CT [counterterrorism] was. So, I think the
    coordinating authority and the work that we have done here with
    my colleagues to recognize this threat, to plan for it, like I
    said, to modernize, and then, to train and exercise, frankly,
    you know, it is a holistic approach.
        But, from a special operations perspective, we bring
    capabilities to understand that threat, but so do the
    interagency, so do our allies and partners. So, I think it is
    all-hands-on-deck type of approach to understand this threat.
    It is a whole-of-population, it is a whole-of-government. I
    know those are cliches, but I really believe that this threat
    is serious enough, and I think this fora with the coordinating
    authority has brought recognition to it. And with money and,
    again, those other facets of how you get after it are critical.
        But I do believe special operations provides unique
    capabilities, but it can't be only a military understanding
    piece. There is a role for, again, allies and partners.
        Mr. Larsen. Yes. Well, on that point--and this might be for
    later--but, for any of you, what role will U.S. forces play in
    NATO's recent CBRN defense element that was activated in EUCOM?
    Can anyone answer that here? Okay, I will ask Dr. Rosenblum.
        I am sorry, I am making a mistake of 22 years; I know I
    have to ask a specific question to a specific----
        Ms. Rosenblum. No, no, no, absolutely. I would like to take
    that one for the record to get back to you.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay. Can you get back to me by noon?
        [Laughter.]
        Ms. Rosenblum. Sure.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Larsen. Okay. Got it.
        Oh, yes, Dr. Plumb, I am on the Aviation Subcommittee as
    well. And so, we are tangentially involved in this discussion
    about debris management, because we regulate the airspace from
    the ground until a rocket gets to space, and then, it gets into
    space.
        And I noted in your preparation, I think in your
    confirmation hearing, you had some discussion with the SASC
    [Senate Armed Services Committee] about the traffic debris
    management issue. Can you update us on where that is now? And
    is it a drag, right, because it is not resolved yet?
        Dr. Plumb. So, thanks, Congressman.
        In the SASC hearing on that, I was asked about the Office
    of Space Commerce and the need to--so, this is outside of FAA
    [Federal Aviation Administration]. This is actually a Commerce
    piece. Obviously, FAA has it on the way up and down----
        Mr. Larsen. Right.
        Dr. Plumb [continuing]. Which is also important.
        But the budget request is on the order of, I think, I want
    to say somewhere around $85 to $88 million, which is the right
    number. I had confirmed that since. So, I think that funding
    Office [of] Space Commerce at the right amount is going to give
    them that chance to get up-to-speed. Because you really have to
    fund not just an office, but you have got to get folks trained.
    You have got to get the software going. And so, there is, I
    think, a 3-year plan to kind of get it up and running. And I
    think we are where we need to be, which was not true last year.
    So, I think this is a good-news story.
        Mr. Larsen. Okay. And that is good to know. Again, as you
    said, what goes up does, in fact, sometimes come down.
        Dr. Plumb. Very often.
        Mr. Larsen. And the FAA needs to clear the airspace if it
    is coming down in places that----
        Dr. Plumb. Yes, and I think, just to pull on that for a
    second, I do know there is more work to be done on that as
    well. And I think there is some regulation space for that that
    we could talk about offline, if you would like.
        Mr. Larsen [presiding]. Yes, sure. Okay. Great.
        I am going to end there, and I will yield back the
    remainder of my time, and call on Mr. Scott, recognize Mr.
    Scott. He is off? Then, who would be next on that other side?
        Representative Bacon for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bacon. It is always good to be ready. Thank you, Mr.
    Chair.
        And thanks to all four of you for being here today.
        I have five questions. So, if I can't get through them, I
    hope I can get something on the second round here.
        But my first question is for Honorable Ms. Rosenblum. How
    would you say our strategy or doctrine has to change with two
    near-peer powers with nuclear weapons? We are used to one major
    power. Now we are headed in the direction of two. How do you
    see this changing our doctrine or strategy?
        Ms. Rosenblum. So, on that question, Mr. Congressman, I
    would like to take that more in the classified section.
        Mr. Bacon. Okay.
        Ms. Rosenblum. There is something that the nuclear posture
    review that I know has been released to Congress on a
    classified basis goes into that. I am happy to answer that
    question on that.
        But it certainly is something publicly that we have spoken
    about that is going to require the level of refinement and
    change to the strategy and to the doctrine----
        Mr. Bacon. Yes.
        Ms. Rosenblum [continuing]. Because the rate of
    escalation--sorry. The rate at which the Chinese are moving
    ahead with the modernization of their nuclear program is
    dramatic and unprecedented, and particularly across all legs of
    the triad, and will require a rethinking on that.
        Mr. Bacon. Instead of playing a two-person chess game, now
    we have three people playing chess on the same board.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Understood.
        Mr. Bacon. So, it changes it.
        Dr. Williams, a quick question for you. How would have
    having the Open Skies aircraft made an impact to DTRA and to
    our U.S. military leading up to Ukraine and after?
        Dr. Williams. Sir, I would say that the Open Skies process
    was one that was useful for the U.S. That said, obviously, the
    administration made the determination to end that. DTRA was the
    execution agency for the Open Skies mission, sir, and we are
    following the administration's priorities.
        Mr. Bacon. Understood. But would it have provided some
    useful information leading up to the invasion of Ukraine?
        Dr. Williams. I would just say, sir, all information is
    useful.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        It would be my position that it cost us not having this
    airframe leading up to the invasion, and I think we could have
    used it after the invasion as well.
        Back to Ms. Rosenblum, would you say the administration is
    fully committed to a full recap of the triad?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, Mr. Congressman, I can answer that in
    open session. It is absolutely committed to the
    recapitalization of the triad, as well as the nuclear command
    and control that goes with that, along with the Department of
    Energy infrastructure and all of their facilities that are
    required to make all of the warheads associated with the
    modernization.
        Mr. Bacon. That is great news, and I think you will have
    bipartisan support on that.
        I heard this week from a COCOM [combatant command]
    commander saying there was a need for low-yield nuclear
    weapons, or that it gave the commanders more options. As you
    know, Russia has invested heavily in this area and they have
    the escalate to de-escalate strategy. What is the
    administration's position on low-yield nuclear weapons?
        Dr. Plumb. If it is all right, Congressman, I will take
    that.
        Mr. Bacon. Sure.
        Dr. Plumb. So, first of all, I am aware of the comments you
    are referencing. I will say the W76----
        Mr. Larsen. If you could just get closer to the microphone?
        Dr. Plumb. I am sorry, is that better, Congressman?
        Mr. Bacon. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Larsen. Yes, thanks.
        Dr. Plumb. Okay. The W76-2, which is a low-yield warhead
    for a submarine-launched ballistic missile, remains deployed.
    So, that program continues. And so, from a deterrence
    standpoint of the ability to posture with a low-yield weapon, I
    think that covers that particular question. Of course, cards on
    the table, the SLCM-N, the submarine-launched cruise missile,
    which would be a tactical nuclear weapon by definition, that
    has been zeroed-out. And I think reasonable people can disagree
    if this is a thing that we should continue or not. But the
    modernization of the entire triad is firmly cemented in the
    budget and the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review], and the
    continuation of the W76-2 as well.
        Mr. Bacon. Thank you.
        I will just close with a comment. It was something I had
    the honor of talking about yesterday.
        We started about a 2-year process to do a surge capacity
    for pandemic bioweapons, have the surge capacity in the United
    States. And the military, or the DOD, in partnership with
    Health and Human Services, picked five sites, Omaha being one.
    It would be my request that the Department continue to fund
    this, put it in their budget request. The community is looking
    forward to partnering with DOD and HHS [U.S. Department of
    Health and Human Services] on this effort.
        And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Gallego [presiding]. Representative Sherrill.
        Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
        As the coordinating authority, Admiral Green, what
    recommendations are you providing to the Secretary of Defense
    regarding best modernizing the Department's ability to prepare
    and respond to the current threat, given Russia's previous use
    of chemical weapons in Syria and the threat of chemical weapons
    use and biological weapons use in Ukraine?
        Admiral Green. Yes, thanks, Congresswoman, for the
    question.
        So, my boss submits an annual assessment to the SECDEF
    [Secretary of Defense] through the Chairman. And the two things
    that he cited were we need to aggressively increase our
    capability and capacity to counter WMD, and that we needed to
    prevent the strategic surprise, which was to focus
    cooperatively on understanding the intel threat.
        But, with regard to modernization, I think we have got to
    leverage the authorities that you gave us, the Small Business
    Innovation Research, other transactional authorities, and
    middle-tier acquisition, to get after and partner with industry
    on things that can improve and modernize not only personal
    protective equipment, but detection and monitoring. And I
    think, as Ms. Rosenblum mentioned, we are getting after that.
    But I do believe we need to address that; we need to leverage
    those authorities a little bit more aggressively, and again,
    partner with industry on how we increase capability and
    capacity.
        Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
        And we spoke briefly about the CWMD senior leader seminars
    [SLS] that you are conducting with combatant commanders and,
    also, about the effectiveness of such seminars with preparing
    combatant commanders to address WMD threats from great power
    competitors in each theater. Are there common significant gaps
    that these seminars have identified across multiple combatant
    commands? And in your opinion, how can the Department modernize
    its WMD threat posture, and what steps can Congress take to
    move these modernization efforts along?
        Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for that question.
        And I think the most significant thing that this panel did
    in the last year is these senior leader seminars. We had one
    for EUCOM in February of 2021, and we just had one for
    INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] with Admiral Aquilino.
    And they were well attended by my colleagues here, as well as
    the interagency and our partners and allies.
        And I think that the key piece of those senior leader
    seminars was it war-gamed the vulnerabilities that we may have
    with regard to our plans, our resourcing, and frankly, again,
    our training and exercises. So, I think those were an
    invaluable product of these stakeholders here that you have
    before you today. And we will continue to do those.
        Specifically, the EUCOM one was done a year ago. And
    fortuitously, that has prepared us better for what we are
    dealing with today currently. And EUCOM implemented an
    implementation plan to get after some of the things that they
    needed to do, that they did do from then to now, with regard to
    those broader five things that I talked about that make us
    better postured today.
        But the SLS is a great venue that the coordinating
    authority, and again, my panel members, have implemented.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, and I look forward to getting into
    some more details in the closed session.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Gallego. Representative Franklin.
        Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I appreciate our witnesses being here today.
        As a former naval aviator that spent more time than I care
    to remember in MOPP [mission oriented protective posture] gear,
    and now here in Congress reading about the threat and
    understanding how significant it is, I used to always--the
    value in those exercises to me was just praying to God that it
    never happened. But you all don't have that luxury. You have
    got to deal with it, and it is a very real threat that I fear
    too often is back-burnered. It doesn't get the attention it
    needs. And I know that is not the only things that you have on
    your plates, but it is vitally important. And if it ever
    happens, it will probably be one of the worst things that has
    ever happened to the United States.
        But I do have a couple of questions. And, Admiral Green,
    you and I have had some conversations about the authorities and
    helping me understand how all of this shakes out, because it is
    a very complex problem set.
        But I understand SOCOM's coordinating authority on the
    front end. I am curious, though, who would be the coordinating
    authority in an actual event after the fact?
        Admiral Green. Well, the coordinating authority does not
    command; it doesn't convene. It recommends.
        Mr. Franklin. I understand. On your end, it is preparation
    of coordinating the operational plans. It is helping with the
    strategies. But if all that fails and we find ourselves with an
    actual event, who is, then, responsible? Because it seems very
    complex to me as to who takes charge then.
        Admiral Green. Yes, I would say simply it is the combatant
    commanders. I mean, they execute the campaigning day-in and
    day-out, and they own the contingency plans and the OPLANs
    [operations plans]. As we speak, General Wolters owns the EUCOM
    AOR [area of responsibility].
        So, this venue, the coordinating authority simply tries to
    support an understanding of the threat, identifying resourcing
    gaps, and then making recommendations across policy and force
    provider issues. But, ultimately, it is the combatant
    commanders.
        Mr. Franklin. Right. So, if we had a contaminated
    environment, obviously the COCOM is going to have to execute
    the battle plan and keep going forward, but how do we go
    about--who coordinates the mitigation efforts to allow them to
    continue to move forward? And whoever might want to answer
    that. It is just I have a hard time understanding how it
    unfolds after the fact.
        Ms. Rosenblum. So, that would be done, actually, on the
    ground operationally, but by the joint force right there. So,
    if you were to have a contaminated environment on, say, a
    logistics or a flow-through base that the United States or its
    allies were using, and were they to be contaminated, the forces
    immediately there on the base would be dealing with the--excuse
    me--to decontaminate--I apologize--that area and the equipment,
    in order for the force to be able to continue to proceed with
    its mission.
        Mr. Franklin. Okay. We saw with great success, I think,
    during this COVID [coronavirus disease] pandemic, with
    Operation Warp Speed, what DOD, in collaboration with DHS
    [Department of Homeland Security], has been able to do. I am
    interested to know what lessons we have learned from that; how
    we are going to perpetuate that going forward, so that we can
    be prepared for future things.
        And then, also, as we deal with adversaries like Russia and
    China, where the companies are either state-owned, or at least
    sponsored, and there is that collaborative effort just by
    design of how their governments function, they are working
    together in a lot of cross-purpose-type technologies. How are
    we, and how could we better, work with not only our other
    government agencies, like DHS, but on the civilian side with
    our pharmaceutical companies, with our biomedical research?
    What are we doing to get better at that?
        Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Congressman.
        On the first part of your question about how the pandemic
    has given us some lessons learned, I think on the highest level
    the takeaway is the Department can't afford to think about
    biothreats as a nation-state battlefield weapon, and has to
    include pandemic preparedness, as well as specific agent design
    preparedness. And so, the bio posture review that we are
    undertaking, Biodefense Posture Review, is looking at this from
    a whole spectrum, to include that part. And I think that is a
    big lesson that we have all--I don't know if it is learned or
    relearned.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, what I would just add to that,
    Congressman, is on the research, development, and acquisition
    side, one of the things that we are beginning to pivot away
    from is the focus on a singular agent, but, rather, the reality
    is that we are going to have to have more broad-spectrum kinds
    of both drugs as well as vaccines. And our continuous
    consultation, certainly, with the pharmaceutical industry is
    helping us with that. And I can go into further detail in the
    closed session as well.
        Mr. Franklin. Right. Thank you. And I yield back.
        Mr. Gallego. Representative Murphy.
        Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to everyone for being here with us. I look
    forward to the closed session as well.
        But I will just start with Admiral Green. Can you talk a
    little bit about how you are leveraging American innovation and
    small businesses to help assist in the mission of countering
    weapons of mass destruction? And what particular tools have
    enabled you to leverage that innovation and work with small
    businesses?
        Admiral Green. Yes, thanks for the question, and thanks for
    the conversation in your office.
        I mentioned we have leveraged those authorities, I think,
    more effectively in the CT world, in the counterterrorism
    world. And they are there, and we need to aggressively work
    with industry and leverage those authorities when it comes to
    this problem set.
        I would say that we have done some work with personal
    protective equipment that I can get into more detail in the
    classified session, but that is one example of where I think we
    have worked with industry to increase our capability and to
    harden our operators.
        I think Ms. Rosenblum--I think another area where I think
    it has a lot of promise is we have had an outside-in approach
    to protecting the operator--and I think she mentioned a little
    bit of an inside-out where we can protect with proven and
    tested pharmaceuticals to protect the operator. But I think
    those are areas where we can advance as well.
        But I acknowledge that we have got to get a little bit more
    aggressive with the authorities that you have given us and to
    seek modernization in partnership with industry.
        Ms. Rosenblum. If I may, Congresswoman, just to add that,
    working with small business is a very high priority for the
    administration, and we are very aware of the barriers to entry
    that that presents. And this is an area that we are trying to
    focus on, what the demand signal is from the Department, better
    understood by small business, and ways to more effectively
    integrate them into the advances that we are making to
    modernize against the whole WMD landscape.
        Mrs. Murphy. Great. Thank you for that.
        You know, Admiral Green, I know that pathway defeat or
    collecting intelligence on the supply chains used to develop
    the new WMDs is a critical part of SOCOM's CWMD mission. Are
    the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
    capabilities you need for successful pathway defeat sufficient?
    Are there specific deficits that we could address? And do you
    have the authorities you need to collect the necessary
    intelligence to complete your mission?
        Admiral Green. Yes, again, thanks for that question, and I
    appreciate the dialog I had in your office, because I have
    thought about it since we had that discussion.
        I think there is never enough ISR, but I think we have got
    to look at ISR, and my boss, frankly, he is looking at next-
    generation ISR and it involves open-source data, space, and
    cyber. And we may need to move away from reluctance on iron in
    airframes. But I think we have got to get creative.
        But I also think our allies and partners, you know, they
    need to harden themselves, and us included, with regard to
    research that our near-peer competitors do, whether it is
    intellectual rights or whether it is supply chains. So, I think
    ISR is a broad term, but I think we all play a part, and our
    allies and partners really can help with that.
        And we had a Five Eyes session in the last SLS which was
    extremely productive to listen to their thoughts and how we may
    be able to share intelligence better with them, so that we have
    a global look at this.
        Mrs. Murphy. And maybe, Ms. Rosenblum, you can follow up on
    that and talk a little bit about how you are coordinating with
    allies and partners on both understanding and countering WMD
    threats.
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Congresswoman, for
    that followup.
        In the research, development, and acquisition area, we have
    a number of bilateral working groups that we have, particularly
    with the Canadians, the U.K. [United Kingdom], as well as
    Australia, to not only understand where they are with their
    science and technology, and as well as advanced development
    programs, but also where some of their areas of concern are, so
    that we are able to address that from a procurement, materiel,
    medical countermeasures approach.
        Mrs. Murphy. Thank you very much, and I yield back.
        Mr. Gallego. Representative Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Rosenblum, I am going to ask you in a minute
    about the Wuhan Virological Institute in China. But, first, let
    me quote three sentences from your written statement.
        ``The Department of State's April 2021 Compliance Report
    voiced grave concerns about China, Iran, North Korea, and
    Russia's compliance with the Biological Weapons and Toxins
    Convention. The report assessed that both North Korea and
    Russia have offensive biological weapons programs.
    Additionally, the activities of China and Iran raise concerns
    about compliance. Chinese publications have described biology
    and biotechnology as a new domain of warfare and cite the
    aspiration to make China the world leader in genetic
    engineering, precision medicine, and brain sciences, among
    other scientific disciplines.''
        So, we have heard so much from different directions about
    the Wuhan Virological Institute. Was that any part of the
    Chinese effort, as you quote, to become preeminent in what they
    view as a possible new domain of warfare, biology and
    biotechnology?
        Ms. Rosenblum. Yes, thank you very much, Congressman, for
    that question.
        My statement was oriented on their approach much more
    broadly than what they may or may not be doing in Wuhan
    Institute. They have a premier biotechnology economy that they
    are continuing to grow openly and commercially with investments
    both in the United States as well as globally. So, my comments
    were not restricted just to what may or may not be going on in
    Wuhan.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. To drill down on that just a little bit
    more, though, I have heard reports that they were engaged in
    gain-of-function research, which, to me, I don't see any good
    that can come out of that. It takes viruses and makes them more
    transmissible or more deadly. Do you have any view or comment
    on that?
        Ms. Rosenblum. You know, with respect to whether gain-of-
    function research, which I am, in general, very familiar with
    in terms of its role in vaccines, related to Wuhan, I would
    want to take that as a question for the record.
        One other thing that I would like to explore is that there
    have been some concerns or questions about whether DTRA funding
    or other funding at the Department of Defense was used in
    support of the Wuhan Institute. And we took a hard look at
    that, and to my knowledge, there was no DOD funding provided to
    Wuhan Institute.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I am glad to clarify that.
        And lastly, are you involved in any other research
    concerning the possible connection of the origins of COVID to
    the Wuhan Virological Institute?
        Ms. Rosenblum. I am not.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Admiral Green, I would like to ask you a
    question on a different subject. As you know, the
    administration has decided to cancel and defund the nuclear
    capabilities, including the SLCM-N and the B83. Do you agree
    with that decision? Do you think that that was in accordance
    with your best military advice?
        Admiral Green. I will ask one of my colleagues to
    potentially comment on that. I am not familiar. I can take it
    for the record.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I guess, in SOCOM, maybe that wasn't
    your--I mean, these are Navy; one of those was a Navy program,
    but I thought, with your SOCOM role, you may or may not have
    familiarity with that.
        So, with that, given the fact that you have said that, I
    won't pursue any more on that issue.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Gallego. Well, thank you very much.
        Votes are about to be called right now, or at least in the
    next 10 minutes. So, what I propose, unless there are any other
    questions, is that we close this formal session, and then, we
    restart in the classified session after votes are called.
        Thanks then. Thank you, and thank you to the witnesses.
        [Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
    closed session.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                                 April 1, 2022

    =======================================================================

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 April 1, 2022

    =======================================================================

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 April 1, 2022

    =======================================================================

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

        Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass
    destruction?
        Ms. Rosenblum. As the senior advisor and technical expert to the
    Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for chemical and biological
    defense, my job is to provide the capabilities to ensure the Joint
    Service can deter or fight and win in a chemical or biologically-
    contaminated environment. The Department of Defense (DOD) considers
    pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl and its derivatives to be therapeutic
    drugs with legitimate medical uses when prescribed appropriately by
    medical authorities. However, an actor's misuse of a pharmaceutical
    chemical to threaten the lives and well-being of groups of humans is
    what makes fentanyl and other pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) a
    potential chemical weapons concern and a concern that DOD takes very
    seriously. The chemicals themselves are not inherently weapons of mass
    destruction, but actors can use them in ways that make them a chemical
    weapon. Regardless of whether it's considered a weapon of mass
    destruction or not, DOD is working to ensure the Joint Force can fight
    and win should a PBA be used near or against U.S. service members. To
    do so, the Department is committed to providing an integrated and
    layered defensive system that includes the understand, protect, and
    mitigate portfolios. The DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program
    (CBDP) program is working to better understand the PBA threat and DOD's
    ability to detect and mitigate PBA usage. The program is incorporating
    PBA-detection algorithms into detectors such as the Aerosol & Vapor
    Chemical Agent Detector, a man-portable system. Our PBA medical program
    includes evaluating FDA-approved drugs for operational use and
    developing novel medical countermeasures (MCMs) to enhance the
    protection and/or operational utility for the Warfighter. The Rapid
    Opioid Countermeasure System (ROCS) is a higher concentration Naloxone
    formulation DOD developed for use in an autoinjector. This will allow
    warfighters with no medical expertise to self-administer Naloxone if
    they are exposed to fentanyl or other PBAs that can be treated with
    Naloxone. In February 28, 2022, the FDA-approved the ROCS autoinjector
    and they were subsequently deployed to U.S. forces as part of the
    response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
        Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass
    destruction?
        Dr. Plumb. DOD considers pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl and its
    derivatives to be therapeutic drugs, which if prescribed appropriately
    by medical authorities have legitimate medical uses. However,
    pharmaceuticals could be weaponized and developed into a
    pharmaceutical-based agent (PBA), which the Department of Defense (DOD)
    takes seriously. There is concern that certain foreign governments are
    pursuing so-called incapacitating agents under the guise of riot
    control agents or medical research. We believe such activities
    undermine the international norm against chemical weapons use, and DOD
    supports efforts, such as those at the Organization for the Prohibition
    of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to create practical and normative barriers
    to impede the emergence of future threats.
        Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass
    destruction?
        Admiral Green. Fentanyl and its analogues are legitimate
    pharmaceuticals which if prescribed appropriately by medical
    authorities have legitimate medical uses. The Conference of States
    Parties of the CWC recently passed a decision that found that the
    aerosolized use of Central Nervous System Acting Chemicals (CNSACs),
    which would include chemicals such as fentanyl, was found inconsistent
    with the law enforcement exemption as a purpose not prohibited under
    the CWC. This means a majority of CWC-signatory nations now acknowledge
    that fentanyl and other CNSACs have properties that are dangerous when
    used outside a medical environment. They are also different than
    traditional riot control agents (RCAs)--with some having toxicities
    comparable to lethal nerve agents. DOD is concerned certain nation-
    state adversaries are pursuing PBAs as part of their offensive chemical
    warfare programs. The DOD requires preparedness to defend against any
    form of chemical weapon, regardless of toxicity, being developed,
    stockpiled, or used in a way intended to cause harm to humans, which
    can include fentanyls. Additionally, the DOD notes any explicit
    designation of fentanyl as a WMD has implications for numerous other
    U.S. Government agencies given fentanyl's use as both a legitimate
    pharmaceutical and illicit drug, and encourages consideration of these
    implications in any policy decisions.
        Mr. Scott. Is far forward, rapid, portable infection detection' a
    priority for our warfighters? If so, what resources are needed to
    accelerate this important program?
        Dr. Williams. DTRA engages in efforts to develop far forward,
    rapid, and portable infection diagnostic systems through executing the
    funding and mission for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program
    (CBDP) Science and Technology efforts. Through the CBDP science and
    technology funds, DTRA is investing in transformative wearable
    technologies to monitor and assess physiological changes within the
    Joint Force. Quickly identifying if a warfighter has been infected by a
    known or unknown biological hazard greatly enhances our ability to
    rapidly provide tailored medical countermeasures to prevent or reduce
    the onset of physiological effects as well as alert other forces to
    avoid or decontaminate the location where a hazard has been detected.
    As the science advances, we gain a more nuanced understanding of how
    physiological markers are changed by diseases and exposure to
    biological hazards. Wearable technologies could both alert when a
    biological hazard exists in the environment and identify if a service
    member has become infected up to 48 hours prior to the onset of
    symptoms. This type of early infection-warning system offers the
    warfighter a distinct advantage. These wearable technologies would also
    unencumber the warfighter by reducing the logistical burden of carrying
    and using agent-specific detection and diagnostic systems. The
    additional funding DTRA received through the CBDP to support the
    Department's biodefense mission is sufficient and will help accelerate
    efforts to provide the joint force with far forward diagnostic
    capabilities, enhance our ability to provide tailorable medical
    countermeasures, and alert decision makers to prevent further
    contamination.
        Mr. Scott. How is DTRA supporting small business R&D in point-of-
    care, rapid pathogen detection for warfighters?
        Dr. Williams. DTRA participates in and advertises applied research
    needs through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small
    Business Technology Transfer (STTR) Programs. In the past, some SBIR/
    STTR awards have addressed pathogen detection for the warfighter. DTRA
    also uses contracting mechanisms such as Other Transaction Authority
    (OTA) solicitations and Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) through which
    small businesses can propose and compete for funding and awards.
        Mr. Scott. Should fentanyl be considered a weapon of mass
    destruction?
        Dr. Williams. The DOD considers pharmaceuticals such as fentanyl
    and its derivatives to be therapeutic drugs, which if prescribed
    appropriately by medical authorities have legitimate medical uses.
    However, DTRA recognizes that fentanyl could be weaponized and
    developed into a pharmaceutical-based agent (PBA), and this informs the
    execution of our mission. DTRA supports research into the detection,
    impacts, and mitigation of fentanyl exposure to ensure our warfighters
    are able to execute their missions effectively and safely. These
    efforts include the evaluation of the magnitude, duration, and
    operational implications of both indoor and outdoor utilizations of
    fentanyl as an incapacitant. The effectiveness of current protective
    equipment has been validated along with an FDA-approved medical
    countermeasure in such concentrations that are relevant and life-saving
    in a battlefield environment. While DTRA efforts have focused on
    mitigating the effects of weaponized pharmaceutical-based agents (PBA)
    such as fentanyl, we also recognize fentanyl's legitimate medical and
    therapeutic uses.

                                      [all]