[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-71]
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSTURE
TO SUPPORT THE WARFIGHTERS
AND POLICY MAKERS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 17, 2022
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-627 WASHINGTON : 2023
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona, Chairman
RICK LARSEN, Washington TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
JIM COOPER, Tennessee DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
FILEMON VELA, Texas SAM GRAVES, Missouri
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey DON BACON, Nebraska
JIMMY PANETTA, California LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida, Vice C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
Chair
Shannon Green, Professional Staff Member
Patrick Nevins, Professional Staff Member
Will Braden, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Gallego, Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 1
Kelly, Hon. Trent, a Representative from Mississippi, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations.... 2
WITNESSES
Berrier, LTG Scott D., USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Moultrie, Ronald S., Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and Security, U.S. Department of Defense....................... 3
Nakasone, GEN Paul M., USA, Director, National Security Agency/
Chief, Central Security Service, and Commander, U.S. Cyber
Command........................................................
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Berrier, LTG Scott D......................................... 25
Gallego, Hon. Ruben.......................................... 19
Moultrie, Ronald S........................................... 20
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Bacon.................................................... 100
Mr. Kelly.................................................... 97
Mr. Scott.................................................... 97
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSTURE TO SUPPORT THE WARFIGHTERS AND POLICY
MAKERS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 17, 2022.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:33 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ruben Gallego
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
Mr. Gallego. Good afternoon. I call to order the hearing of
the Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee. I need to do some formalities
first.
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Finally, I have designated a committee staff member to, if
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inadvertent background noise that may disrupt the proceedings.
Thank you.
I would like now to welcome today's witnesses. Mr. Ronald
Moultrie, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security; General Paul Nakasone, Director of the National
Security Agency, Chief of the Central Security Service, and
Commander of USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command]; and Lieutenant
General Scott Berrier, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency.
I am pleased to see each of you today. This hearing takes
place during a very perilous time. Russia's invasion of Ukraine
just shows how crucial it is to maintain strong democratic
alliances and partnerships. It also reinforces the importance
of the work being done by the defense intelligence enterprise
from exposing Russia's destructive disinformation to working
with our allies and partners to share critical intelligence and
ensuring our intelligence apparatus is agile so we can respond
to the needs of each combatant commander.
Russia's unprovoked assault on Ukraine's sovereignty
threatens the world order and presents a dangerous level of
aggression. As the situation in Europe unfolds, I am also
concerned about China's threatening posture toward Taiwan, the
threats we face from Iran and its proxies, and North Korea's
persistent testing of ballistic missiles.
We also continue to face threats from extremist groups who
would, given the opportunity, strike us on our own homeland. We
can only effectively combat these challenges with close
collaboration with allies and partners, especially through our
intelligence partnerships.
I am interested in hearing today how the defense
intelligence enterprise is implementing reforms that this
subcommittee [included in] the FY22 NDAA [fiscal year 2022
National Defense Authorization Act] to ensure that we are
better postured to quickly provide releasable intelligence to
combatant commanders to combat malign disinformation and
support DOD [Department of Defense] messaging and influence
operations.
In the interest of time, I ask the witnesses to keep their
opening remarks brief so that we will have more time for the
closed session.
With that, I will now turn this over to Ranking Member
Kelly for any opening remarks. In the meantime, I will try to
get----
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallego can be found in the
Appendix on page 19.]
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSISSIPPI, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Mr. Kelly. In the interest of brevity, first of all,
Lieutenant General Berrier, General Nakasone, Mr. Moultrie,
Secretary Moultrie, I thank you all for being here. Thank you
for what you do for America every day.
This is one of the most important posture hearings that I
think that we have. I won't have a lot to say in the open
session. I think the things we need to say are not for
political purpose or those things.
I look forward to the closed session when you guys can tell
us what you need to do the things that America needs you to do,
and thank you and all the men and women who serve under you for
their service.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member Kelly. We will now
hear from our witnesses and then move to question and answer
session. Immediately following one round of questions, we will
reconvene for the classified session which will take place in
Rayburn 2212.
I will recognize Mr. Moultrie.
STATEMENT OF RONALD S. MOULTRIE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Moultrie. Thank you, Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member
Kelly, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a
privilege to testify on the current posture of the defense
intelligence and security enterprise in addressing the threats
facing the United States of America, its allies, and partners.
The Department of Defense's intelligence and security
professionals work every day to address the current and future
threats facing our Nation. On behalf--on their behalf, I wish
to thank the members of this subcommittee for your continued
support and partnership.
I am joined in my testimony today by General Nakasone and
General Berrier. They will provide you a more comprehensive
picture of how we support our warfighters as well as
characterize the challenges we all face.
The Department of Defense trusts the intelligence community
to respond to the threats that we will all hear about.
General Berrier.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Moultrie can be found in the
Appendix on page 20.]
General Berrier. Chairman Gallego, Ranking Member Kelly,
distinguished members, I do have a statement here and I can
forgo the statement if you would like to get to questions.
[The prepared statement of General Berrier can be found in
the Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Gallego. General, we will skip to questions.
General Nakasone. Chairman, I will forgo my statement as
well.
[General Nakasone did not submit a separate prepared
statement for the record.]
Mr. Gallego. Great. Thank you. Appreciate [inaudible] all
of our witnesses.
Thank you, and this is to all of our witnesses. I am
interested in hearing about progress made to implement the FY22
reforms to better support combatant commanders' need for
releasable intelligence. Given the situation in Ukraine, I will
ask two sets of questions.
First, could you share specific examples of intelligence
sharing to combat disinformation such as exposing Russia's
false flags and intelligence sharing that could literally save
lives?
Second, I would like to learn more about our intelligence
sharing with Ukraine. Are we able to share intelligence in real
time or near real time with Ukrainians and are they able to
communicate with the U.S. and what do those communication
channels look like?
If you can answer as much as possible now, we can also
follow up in greater detail in the classified session.
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Chairman Gallego, I would prefer to
answer questions on the intelligence that we are sharing in
terms of false flag and what we are doing in terms of near real
time intelligence in closed session.
I would say that the intelligence that we are sharing and
the work that we are doing to support the Ukrainian Government
is making a difference. It is accurate, it is timely, and it is
actionable. And so we think that we are supporting them in such
a way that they are pleased with what we are providing. And I
will forgo the rest of my comments until we get into closed
session, sir.
General Nakasone. Mr. Chairman, if I might--I will defer
the specifics to closed session, but I think when we consider
what the intelligence community writ large and our defense
intelligence establishment has been able to do here, I would
characterize it like this. Our ability to share intelligence is
for a number of different consumers. First of all, the sharing
of intelligence to build a coalition. Secondly, the sharing of
intelligence to ensure that we shine a light on disinformation
operations which you referred to before. And the third piece is
how do we share information that is relevant, that is
actionable, that is able to be utilized by the Ukrainians? All
three of those areas I would tell you, I have never seen it
better in the 35 years that I have spent in uniform.
General Berrier. Chairman, I would say where we are at is--
it is revolutionary in terms of what we have been able to do
and I can provide great detail in terms of the how and what we
are sharing in the closed session.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. General Berrier, how is DIA
[Defense Intelligence Agency], as the functional manager for
open source intelligence for DOD, ensuring efforts are
synchronized and coordinated to avoid duplicative data
purchases?
General Berrier. Chairman, the Open Source Intelligence
Center assigned to DIA is working that very, very hard with the
intelligence community. As you probably know, the CIA [Central
Intelligence Agency] is the community manager for open source.
DIA has been designated as the defense intelligence enterprise
open source functional manager. We are taking that role on now
and we are devising our way through really how we organize
ourselves for the sharing of the information, the tools that we
will use, the training in the tradecraft. And a big part of
this is making sure that across the defense intelligence
enterprise we are not getting ripped off for the data that we
are purchasing, and putting a structure in place to allow us to
understand what that data is, catalog it, and be able to
understand who is paying for what.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. General Nakasone, as you know, the
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] requires that certain
conditions be met prior to ending the dual hat of the commander
of U.S. Cyber Command also serving as the director of NSA
[National Security Agency]. There seems to be a natural
partnership between the organizations, but I want to get your
view on the future of the dual hat relationship. Is it
realistic to expect either organization to operate
independently?
General Nakasone. So Chairman, if I might, I am approaching
4 years in the job and so I will reflect on my experiences. At
the end of the day, this is a policy decision that obviously
will be made by others. But my best military advice, as it was
when I first came to the job and after 3-plus years in it, is
the fact that through elections, through problems with Iran,
through ransomware, and now with Russia/Ukraine, what the dual
hat has allowed us to do is been able to take and be able to
focus efforts from the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber
Command on very, very difficult problems--influence,
ransomware, strategic competition--in one domain in cyberspace.
We both operate there and being able to have action, being able
to [have a] unity effort, and being able to have agility is
what the dual hat has been able to allow me to do over the past
3-plus years.
Mr. Gallego. Sounds like a pretty good endorsement for me.
Ranking Member Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Just really quick and Chairman Gallego asked
this question, so it is more of a comment because you answered
the question, General Berrier and General Nakasone, but open
source is really important. Sometimes we just don't want to
disclose how we know stuff and if it is open source, then we
don't have to. A lot of times if it comes from the U.S.
Government people tend to doubt it, but if it is from some
other source other than the U.S. Government, it adds more
credibility to it. And there are a lot of open source, and I
have talked to several of those these weeks.
What I would like for you guys to do is what ways can--
rather than contracting with a company to do certain things,
can we not buy what we need when we need it? I.e., if we
[inaudible] right now, are there satellite companies that can
tell us, you know, how many bushels of corn are in Ukraine? Can
they tell us the refugee flow? Can they do a lot of other
things that we don't have to do, especially with some of the
false flag information that Russia has been putting out? Can we
go to those and say hey, we want to buy this information and
have them put it out?
General Berrier. Ranking Member Kelly, that is a great
question and as we try to organize ourselves within the defense
intelligence enterprise side of this, I think those are the
questions we need to ask ourselves and pursue those strategies
to be smarter, better, faster as we do this.
Mr. Kelly. Because I see open source, a lot of times it
just adds credibility then rather than the other. And I guess
the second question is I would have said in my opening comments
that I had some, what extent are we able to collect meaningful
intelligence over the horizon in Afghanistan? And also, are
there open source things that can help us with that information
that we can also use?
General Berrier. Ranking Member, I would prefer to discuss
the over-the-horizon mission in a closed session and there are
open sources that we can use to help us in Afghanistan.
Mr. Kelly. And then the final question, just a general
sense, we will discuss this more in the closed hearing, but
overall, just for the public to see that they have to know we
are going to closed session to talk about all of the important
things. Overall, what does our budget look like or what does
that look like? What is your request going to look like and
what things, in a general sense, can you talk about here?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Ranking Member Kelly. Our budget, I
think, is going to reflect the President's priorities. It will
really focus on how we are focusing the enterprise on
integrated deterrence; how we are still campaigning against our
pacing challenges, China; and also how we are trying to build
what I would call decisive information advantage to ensure that
our policy makers, as well as our warfighters, have the
information that they need to do the mission that is required
of them every day, sir.
General Nakasone. And Ranking Member, I would add to that,
for us at the National Security Agency, as we look at it, we
look at a budget that is going to be able to support us in
competition, be able to support us in crisis, be able to
support us in conflict because as a global power, we will be in
many, many different phases of this throughout the next and
many years to come.
Mr. Kelly. I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Ranking Member. Representative
Scott is next.
Mr. Scott. I am sorry. I assumed it would go back to a
Democrat. I do want to tell you I personally believe the
intelligence back in December was the best collection job that
I have seen in my 10 years in Congress with regard to Russia's
plans for the Ukraine. And I do think and I know it was a big
decision to declassify and to share it with the world. I do
think that the world has benefitted from the declassifying and
the sharing of that information so that they were prepared
for--at least they expected it, maybe if we weren't prepared
for it.
Under Secretary Moultrie, I have asked our different
commanders for the various areas of responsibility to look at
what a 5 percent and a 10 percent reduction in the global food
supply means for the geopolitical stability around the world. I
want to point out to you particularly that the Ukraine is
responsible for putting 50 million metric tons of corn and
wheat into the export markets. They are the largest supplier of
food to the World Food Program.
If you look at what is happening in--there is tremendous
civil unrest in Sri Lanka today which is 4,000 miles away from
the Ukraine. I do think that the Defense Intelligence Agency
needs to do an analysis of what a 5 percent and a 10 percent
reduction in the global food supply looks like in the different
areas of responsibility.
Russia is saying they are not going to export. They are the
second-largest exporter of wheat in the world, if I am not
mistaken, behind Ukraine. And you look at the whole Black Sea
trade area, the food supply that comes through that area is
effectively shut down. Belarus and Russia are the number two
and number three potash suppliers which [is a] fertilizer for
the world's crops.
And I kind of feel like Vladimir Putin has started World
War III with regard to the global food supply and the
geopolitical unrest that is going to come from that. And
certainly, much respect for President Zelensky and the
Ukrainian people for the fight they are putting up and I hope
they keep fighting and I hope we keep giving them all of the
intel they need and weapons that they would need to put up that
good fight. But I am very worried about what this means for
other areas of the world as well.
So we will be looking for that information from you as time
pushes forward, but I do think that the U.N. [United Nations]
is expecting tremendous political instability because of the
food supply.
With that, I will save the remainder of my questions for a
closed door, but I look forward to seeing that.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Scott.
Representative Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. I did have some questions, too, on
maybe the cost of sharing all this intelligence, but we will
wait for the next closed thing.
But I do have a couple of questions for General Nakasone. I
have a cyber defense bill that directs the Federal Government
to do more to help defend private industry and our
infrastructure. It passed out of committee unanimously. I know
we have things like CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
Security Agency]. We have got the FERC [Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission]. But is there a bigger role for Cyber
Command and NSA to help out in our private sector? The reason I
say that, we had JBS attacked. We had the Colonial Pipeline
attacked. And these folks can't go up against the intelligence
services of Russia. They need your expertise. But your
thoughts, sir?
General Nakasone. So in terms of our role at the National
Security Agency, I think, Congressman, you are well aware that
one of our two missions is cybersecurity. Our focus has been
outside of the United States foreign intelligence and being
able to bring the insights of what cyber adversaries are doing
outside of our country to be able to inform what is going on in
the inside of our country. We have a responsibility as part of
the defense industrial base to ensure the protection of that.
As you are well aware, 16 different sectors in our critical
infrastructure, that is the one DOD is focused on. But for us,
in general, I think the secret sauce that we bring at NSA is
clearly what our adversaries are doing outside of the country
and then being able to share it more broadly with obviously the
interagency and the private sector.
Mr. Bacon. Am I really down to 33 seconds?
Mr. Gallego. No. Go. Sorry about that.
Mr. Bacon. Something happened here. That was the fastest 5
minutes I ever came across.
I would like to bring up another thing that was a big issue
and I got elected in 2016 and swore the oath in 2017. There was
a push to separate Cyber Command and NSA, make two different
four-star headquarters. I always opposed it because being an
old ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] Air
Force guy, I know how important NSA is to the Cyber Command
mission. They are very much integrated. And if you had two
four-stars going different directions, you'd have a
dysfunctional situation. So is that discussion pretty much off
the table now? Because I think--I like the way it is set up
now.
General Nakasone. So again, Congressman, that is really a
discussion on the policy level that does come up at times. And
I know that I have answered questions before a number of
committees on that, but again, that is still something that is
being considered.
Mr. Bacon. Well, for what it is worth, I will oppose it and
I hope the Congress does. You need unified direction and I
think your leadership of both of those organizations provide
that unified direction.
So, maybe I should have asked Mr. Moultrie that question,
but sir, do you have any comments?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, sir. I would say that from a Department
of Defense perspective, we certainly recognize the value of the
dual hat role that General Nakasone has played for the last 4
years and the role of Cyber Command and NSA over the last 12
years plus.
I believe that the dual hat will be looked at again, just
by this administration just to ensure that we understand what
the value-added is, but also what the impacts are. So that
discussion is still ongoing within the Department today. We
understand that there is sentiment on both sides to really not
do any harm, but I believe that it will be looked at. I think
it will be an objective look and we will make sure we brief
that out to you, sir.
Mr. Bacon. If I may just elaborate a little more. I mean,
these cyber teams, the core of them are NSA folks. So if you
have two four-stars with different visions and different
direction, I don't see how you keep a unified direction for the
cyber team? But that is just my 2 cents of being down at the O-
5, O-6, O-7 level when I was in.
One last question is for General Berrier and General
Nakasone. I flew the RC-135s, traditional ISR aircraft. There
is a push among some to go to all fifth-gen [generation] type
of collection capabilities, penetrating ISR? But we know day in
and day out, we do not penetrate China's air space and we don't
penetrate Russia's air space, right? So we still need some of
that traditional ISR because that is what is the bulk of our
collection.
So I guess my question is, are we keeping the right balance
between the traditional ISR and penetrating ISR and do you see
a need to maintain some of these older platforms?
General Berrier. Congressman, with my Army hat on coming
out of the G-2 job, there is this balance between ISR in
competition and ISR in conflict. And certainly, as we are
seeing this play out inside Ukraine, we would never fly those
platforms into an envelope where they could get shot down or
engaged. But certainly in competition, I think there is value
for ISR platforms that can collect on the periphery and
actually analyze and process that information.
General Nakasone. Congressman, I would offer as the SIGINT
[signals intelligence] functional manager for the defense
intelligence establishment here, we need to have a variety of
platforms, whether or not they are from space, whether or not
they are airborne, whether or not they are terrestrial. All of
these obviously stitched together for a very, very complex and
very, very important look on what our adversaries are doing in
many parts of the world.
So, I know the Chief of Staff of the Air Force is looking
at a number of different platforms, but you know, from my
perspective, having a wide variety of these platforms is really
important for us to do our mission.
Mr. Bacon. So you still keep a high priority for the RC-
135?
Mr. Gallego. Mr. Bacon.
General Nakasone. So I thank you Congressman----
Mr. Bacon. It said a minute left.
Mr. Gallego. I rolled over from your last one. Thank you.
We can take that in the briefing.
Representative Murphy.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses for being here today with us.
You know, one of the areas that I have been particularly
interested in during my time in Congress is the use of deep
fakes. We see them used here domestically, but also by our
adversaries overseas. I secured some--I've requested--sorry, I
secured some report language in the FY20 Intel Authorization
Act on just getting a sense of how our adversaries have
weaponized these deep fakes as a tool to shape the information
environment.
And in fact, even recently, I saw that the Russians
produced a deep-fake video of President Zelensky urging
Ukrainians to stop fighting and that was broadcast on Ukrainian
television yesterday. So we are seeing the use of it and the
deployment of it quite broadly.
And so my question for you, General Nakasone, is how have
you seen in your time that technology evolve? Where do you
think it is headed? And then do you feel like our intelligence
community is prepared or how are you preparing for the
evolution of that threat?
General Nakasone. So Congresswoman, I think you identified
one of those key areas that I have seen over the past 3 years
in this job which is the growth of influence operations by our
adversaries. Deep fakes are the ability to use video and in
some form or fashion that is intended to send a message is one
of those ways.
So how are we doing it? At the National Security Agency, we
are working very, very closely with our Research Directorate to
understand the anomalies, understand the technology,
understanding the key pieces of what we can determine what is
real and what is fake.
But the other point really is that it goes to Ranking
Member Kelly's point which is this is also an area where we are
partnering very, very closely with the private sector that has
done some very, very leading work that we have been able to
obviously have discussions with them on that. So this is an
area that we continue to watch very, very carefully, act very,
very rapidly in, and I think we will have a number of different
areas that we probably can discuss in closed session as well.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you, General. And Mr. Moultrie, I am a
polyglot myself and I know that when I was in the private
sector I often read open source information in language to get
a full sense of what is going on and get the context of what is
going on in a country or in a conflict.
I was wondering, you know, language, foreign language
skills are clearly a tool that is important to the defense
intelligence community and it is going to be increasingly, I
think, an important part, especially as we look at great power
competition. And so we are not just talking about Mandarin, but
we are also talking about Tagalog, Indonesian, you know, other
languages like that. It will be necessary for us to have it to
be able to work with our partners, as well as to understand our
adversaries.
I was wondering, you know, do you consider the defense
intelligence enterprise's existing foreign language
capabilities to be sufficient for today's great power
competition? And if not, what are some areas in which we need
to invest more? How do we get more analysts and operators who
are proficient in foreign language?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Congresswoman, in terms of language, it
is one of the more important things that we do and I will talk
more about it--I would like to talk more about it in closed
session.
When we look at the capabilities that we talk about here,
regardless of the domain that we are talking about, whether it
be space, whether it be ground, whether it be ISR, or whether
it be cyber, our language capabilities are just absolutely
essential.
So we actually are looking at it and as you said, the
various languages, the competition languages, whether it be
Mandarin or Russian or other languages that we are concerned
about, regional languages such as Farsi or Urdu or Pashtu,
those languages are all extremely important to us. There are
some things that we are doing that are underway right now to
help us not only gauge what we will need today, but what we
will also need for the future. I would like to talk about that
in more depth in closed session. Thank you.
Mrs. Murphy. Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Representative Murphy.
Representative Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Maybe this can be
answered in this session, this question. I understand the
sensitivity around all the other things certainly.
But Secretary Moultrie, your office plays a critical role
in the defense intelligence enterprise. Understanding the
growth in your office in recent years, the GAO [Government
Accountability Office] did a report last year in May citing
several challenges with the oversight including governance
bodies not operating as intended and so on. You know all of the
issues.
Can you discuss a little bit what is being done to address
those challenges that GAO identified and provide more active--
to provide more active and effective oversight of the defense
intelligence enterprise?
Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Congressman Larsen. The GAO report that
you referenced, sir, from May of 2021 was something that we
took to heart. We've looked at it and we've decided that we
need to move out, we need to move out aggressively on it.
So what we are doing are four things, sir. We are looking
at the roles, responsibilities, and functions in our
organization, ensuring that we understand clearly what those
components are.
And then we are trying, number two, to match what our
people are actually doing to the roles that they should be
doing to ensure that they are doing what we need to do to
measure what is occurring within the defense intelligence and
security enterprise, I'll add.
Thirdly, metrics. We need to make sure that we have metrics
to see if we are adding value in terms of our oversight and
governance role.
And then lastly, the people piece of this. Just ensuring
that we have the right skill level, that we have the right
backgrounds and focus on this are something that we are doing.
We are being assisted in this by some independent analysis
being done by IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses], independent
analysis coming out of Princeton. And we hope to have something
back to you and to this committee in full by the fall of this
year, sir.
Mr. Larsen. That is great. Thanks. Related to
Representative Murphy's questions about the kind of folks that
you need, you mentioned language and maybe you have to answer
in closed session, but in terms of subject matter or certain
expertise, maybe on the technical side, what kind of work do
you need to do to recruit folks into that part of the
enterprise?
Mr. Moultrie. Congressman, the skill sets that our
individuals need on the language side and analytic side run the
gamut from being able to understand military operations, being
able to understand economic issues, being able to understand
diplomatic issues.
And so you can imagine that everything that we talk about,
whether it be in our government and how we are moving
economically, how we are looking at research, we have to
understand that in some 100-plus languages around the world.
And we have to understand that to the extent that our
adversaries may talk about it. It is a daunting challenge and
finding those skills, it is something that we have to compete
for. So that is something that we are focused on. I will talk
about that more in closed session, but it is a top priority of
the intelligence community's and the defense intelligence
enterprise's and we are working that jointly across not just
the defense intelligence enterprise, but across the IC
[intelligence community] and the interagency.
Mr. Larsen. Okay, thanks. And finally, perhaps for General
Nakasone, some of us--certainly I have been tracking the--
strategic support forces in the Chinese PLA [People's
Liberation Army] where cyber warfare as well as EW [electronic
warfare] rests, and so on. Maybe this is an answer for the next
session, but since it is being reorganized, kind of really
stood up over the last several years, but really more traction
over the last couple of years, whether or not you have seen an
increased sophistication as opposed to just an increased
investment from the PLA?
General Nakasone. So Congressman, as you can well imagine,
we track this very carefully and very closely. I would like to
take this up in closed session just to talk about scope and
scale [of] sophistication in what we are seeing, because I do
think it probably can answer your question more fully.
Mr. Larsen. That is great. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Representative Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
for being here today.
Pivoting off or pivoting on to languages, Mr. Moultrie, can
you explain what role the Defense Language Institute plays in
some of this training that you talked about, please?
Mr. Moultrie. Well, Congressman, as a graduate of the
Defense Language Institute some 40-plus years ago, and my wife
is also a graduate--both Russian linguists, I might add--I can
tell you it plays a critical role and so we see it more so
today than we ever have, if you will.
When you look at what is going on in the Ukraine, having
those individuals--you know, one of the challenges that we
have, we appear to have, is focusing on the problem of today
and not focusing on the problem that we might have tomorrow.
So the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
has played a key role. It is a place that I have tried to visit
every year. I am planning to go out there again this year. They
are that training ground for defense intelligence and security
where we get the nation's best, most trained language.
And I am proud to say, as, you know, a person that has gone
back there frequently, it is light years ahead of where it was
when I was there. Individuals were doing in 12 weeks what I was
doing in 36 weeks. It plays a key role and we want to make sure
we are supporting it and we are going to do that across the
enterprise, not just within the defense intelligence
enterprise, but also personnel readiness and both with the
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and
others in the Department of Defense.
Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. And did I mention it is in my
congressional district?
Mr. Moultrie. I know that, sir. Absolutely.
Mr. Panetta. And thank you and I look forward to hosting
you out there. If you do come out there, please let me know. I
would be happy to host you as well.
Mr. Moultrie. Will do, sir.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you. General Nakasone, just quickly, it
seems that information operations sub-components appear to be
fractured across the defense apparatus. And despite the
forthcoming doctrine for operations in the information
environment, there doesn't seem to be a jointly recognized idea
on what information operations should prioritize.
Do you believe that establishing a sub-unified combatant
command for information operations within USCYBERCOM could
allow for joint information operations training and execution?
General Nakasone. So Congressman, I am not sure it is a fit
or a solution that is built to a sub-unified command. Here is
what I do believe. We use information operations in every cyber
mission that we do. It is that important to what is going on to
be able to communicate a message to an adversary.
What I would say is we need more information operations-
trained personnel that come to our command. That is one of the
areas that I am working very, very closely with the services. I
know my own service and other services have taken this on very
seriously, but I think that is what we have to get to first is
let's get more trained information operation specialists. Let's
integrate them into our teams and instead of building a
separate command, let's make sure that we understand that
information operations spans an entire spectrum of what we need
to do.
Mr. Panetta. It sounds like you have a good idea. Do you
have any more information on that plan as to what you can do to
how you can improve training our forces to jointly employ
information operations and operations in the information
environment?
General Nakasone. What I would like to do, Congressman, if
I can is give you some very specific examples in closed session
because I think this will clearly indicate the importance of
what we are applying to it, and what the services have been
providing and what we need more of.
Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. Thank you. Gentlemen, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, and this concludes the open
session. We will be moving directly over to 2212 for a
classified session. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 5:07 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 17, 2022
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 17, 2022
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 17, 2022
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
Mr. Kelly. Project Maven was created in 2017 to automate the
identification of data collected through imagery and full motion video
and ultimately improve the speed and accuracy of our targeting. Five
years since its inception, and with a pending transfer to NGA for
ownership and oversight, has Project Maven reached full operational
capability?
Can you provide an overview of the remaining milestones for Project
Maven to reach full operational capability and be fielded to
operational units across DOD?
Has Project Maven been used as the primary geospatial analysis and
target identification tool in any settings outside of training
exercises?
Has Project Maven developed operational algorithms to identify the
conventional military weapons and equipment of our near-peer
adversaries?
Mr. Moultrie. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. What is DIA's backlog of Russian language military books
and journals that need to be translated? What resources in terms of
dollars, personnel, and equipment would be needed to clear this
backlog?
General Berrier. DIA does not have a backlog of Russian language
military books or journals to be translated.
Mr. Scott. What is DIA's backlog of Chinese language military books
and journals that need to be translated? What resources in terms of
dollars, personnel, and equipment would be needed to clear this
backlog?
General Berrier. DIA does not have a backlog of Chinese language
military books or journals to be translated.
Mr. Scott. Is there a need for additional Coast Guard attaches
especially if the U.S. Coast Guard was better resourced in terms of
dollars and personnel?
General Berrier. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
Mr. Scott. What can be done to enhance Foreign Military
Exploitation (FME)?
General Berrier. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
Mr. Scott. What shortfalls exist in the collection, evaluation,
analysis, and interpretation of foreign medical, bio-scientific, and
environmental information?
General Berrier. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
Mr. Scott. The field of DIA History is vast and so much remains
unwritten. What are the gaps in DIA's historical literature because
earlier studies were inadequate or are outdated, or because topics have
been more or less ignored?
General Berrier. (U) Background on DIA History efforts and some
existing challenges:
(U) Although there are numerous early histories of DlA,
they focus on the organizational structure of the Agency and not its
capacity to achieve its roles and missions.
(U) DIA's many missions and global footprint mean its
historians struggle to develop true expertise in every mission area.
(U) Virtually no organizations within DIA create their
own histories or metrics of success that are accessible for study (the
MARC's recent ``Year in Review'' is one excellent exception that we
hope to see more of).
(U) DIA organizations have a high turnover rate, with
military personnel assignments lasting approximately two years, and the
rotation of DIA civilians for purposes of professional development.
(U) DIA records are not well organized and a large-scale
digitization effort is just beginning, making historical research a
challenging task.
(U) The level ofresources and support provided to DIA's
History Branch has varied over the decades. In a few periods, a single
or couple of historians have been responsible for the entire mission of
the branch. Note that the History branch activities extend beyond
writing history products and include supporting a range of other
missions.
(U) Establishment of the new DIA Museum has required
significant resources since 2016 and produced video and podcast series
such as ``The Historians'' and ``DIA Connections.''
(U) Many DIA History products are published only on an
internal DIA platform (The Daily, The Communique, workforce emails) and
are not publicly available on DIA.mil. Limited resources have hindered
History Branch's ability to write in-depth histories. For example,
historical writing requires substantive investigation and time.
Consequently, DIA has not yet been able to address gaps in historical
writing, particularly on subjects since 9/11.
(U) Some significant gaps that History Branch hopes to study as soon as
possible, include:
(U) 1980s Latin American operations, including drug
interdiction
(U) Mission Services support functions--Logistics, Facilities, Human
Resources and Equal Opportunity:
(U) War in Afghanistan/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF;
2001-2021)
(U) War in Iraq/Operation Iraqi Freedom and NEW DAWN
(OIF, NEW DAWN; 2003-2011) (Note: an extensive survey of DIA in OIF/NEW
DAWN is nearing completion.)
(U) 2002 Operation Enduring Freedom--Horn of Africa
(U) 2002--Insurgency in the Maghreb
(U) 2003-2010--War in Darfur--support to African Union
and United Nations
(U) 2004-2007, 2012-2013--Central African Republic Bush
Wars--support to MINURCAT (UN Mission in the Central African Republic
and Chad) and MICOPAX (Mission for the consolidation of peace in the
Central African Republic) CEEAC/ECCAS (Economic Community of Central
African States)
(U) Various African missions:
(U) 2007--Operation Enduring Freedom--Trans Sahara
(U) 2008--Djiboutian-Eritrean border conflict
(U) 2009--Boko Haram's armed rebellion against Nigeria's
government
(U) 2008--South Ossetia War, in which Russia invaded
Georgia; and NCMI predicted the invasion
(U) 2008-2009 Gaza War
(U) The rise and fall of ISIS over many waypoints, 2006
to 2017:
(U) 2006--Islamic State of Iraq forms from Al Qaeda in
Iraq
(U) 2010--Baghdadi takes control of the group
(U) 2013--Baghdadi relocates to Syria, and re-names the
group Islamic State of lraq and Syria
(U) 2014--ISIS takes control of Raqqa, Syria, which
becomes its de-facto capital; ISIS takes control of Mosul and the Mosul
Dam in Iraq; ISIS declares caliphate; Baghdadi named caliph.
(U) 2015--Iraqi forces regain Iraq's largest oil refinery
from ISIS; Kurdish forces regain Sinjar, Iraq; SECDEF Carter announces
U.S. special operation forces supporting Iraqi and Kurdish fighters in
Iraq; last ISIS stronghold in Aleppo province falls.
(U) 2016--Iraqi forces retake Ramadi; Iraqi troops regain
Fallujah, Iraq; operation to retake Mosul begins.
(U) 2017--Syrian troops retake Palmyra; U.S.-backed
coalition announces offensive to retake Raqqa; Iraq reclaims mosque in
Mosul, and the Iraqi Prime Minister claims that the caliphate has
fallen and declares Mosul fully liberated.
(U) Lastly, there are some DIA studies that would benefit from
significant updating, including:
(U) DIA budgets
(U) DIA chartered missions
(U) DIA leaders and mission priorities
Mr. Scott. If you had to create a recommended reading list just for
the field of counterintelligence, what books would you recommend?
General Berrier. (U) Below is an unclassified reading list compiled
by DIA counterintelligence (Cl) analysts, which can provide insight
into the field of counterintelligence. Although not exhaustive, the
list provides a great introduction and background into
counterintelligence.
(U) A Wilderness of Mirrors: Intrigue, Deception, and Secrets that
Destroyed Two of the Cold War's Most Important Agents--David C Martin
(U) Rise and Kill First: Secret History of Israel's Targeted
Assassinations--Ronen Bergman
(U) Active Measures: Secret History of Disinformation and
Political Warfare--Thomas Rid
(U) The Year of Armageddon: The Pope and the Bomb--Gordon Thomas
(U) Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer--Victor Cherkashin
(U) Merchants of Treason--Thomas B. Allen, Norman Polmar
(U) The Angel: the Egyptian Spy that Saved Israel--Uri Bar Joseph
(U) Red Sea Spies--Raffi Berg
(U) To Catch A Spy--James Olson
(U) Talking to Strangers: What We Should Know About People We
Don't Know--Malcolm Gladwell;
General
(U) The Great Game: The Myth and Reality of Espionage--Frederick
Hitz
(U) Spies: The Secret Agents Who Changed the Course of History--
Ernest Volkman
(U) A Century of Spies--Jeffrey Richelson
(U) Spycraft: The Secret History of the CIA's Spytechs from
Communism to Al-Qaeda--Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton
Background on US Intelligence Agencies
(U) For the President's Eyes Only--Christopher Andrew
(U) Roosevelt's Secret War--Joseph Persico
(U) The Agency--John Ranelagh
(U) Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and CIA--Mark Riebling
(U) Inside the CIA--Ronald Kessler
Background on Foreign Intelligence Agencies
(U) The Sword and the Shield--the Mitrokhin Archive--Christopher
Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin
(U) KGB--Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky
(U) Every Spy a Prince--Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman
(U) Chinese Intelligence Operations--Nicholas Eftimiades
(U) Her Majesty's Secret Service: The Making of the British
Intelligence Community Christopher Andrew
(U) Venona--John Haynes and Harvey Klehr
(U) The Haunted Wood--Allen Weinstein
(U) The New Nobility--Andrei Soldatov
(U) The Charm School--Nelson Demille
Major Spy Cases
(U) Breaking the Ring--[the Walker family case] John Barron
(U) The Rosenberg File--Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton
(U) Perjury--[the Alger Hiss case] Allan Weinstein
(U) Confessions of a Spy--[the Ames case] Pete Earley
(U) Spy--[the Robert Hanssen case] David Wise
(U) Triple Agent: the al-Qaeda Mole who Infiltrated the CIA--Joby
Warrick
(U) Widows: Four American Spies, the Wives They Left Behind, and
the KGB's Crippling of American Intelligence--William R. Corson, Susan
B. Trento, and Joseph J. Trento
Biographies and Memoirs
(U) Spymaster--Clarence Ashley
(U) The Main Enemy--Milt Bearden
(U) Anthony Blunt--[British art historian and Soviet spy; a member
of the ``Cambridge Five''] Miranda Carter
(U) Witness--Whittaker Chambers
(U) Cold Warrior--[on James Angleton] Thomas Mangold
(U) Red Spy Queen--[on Elizabeth Bentley] Kathryn Olmstead
(U) A Secret Life: the Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the
Price He Paid to Save His Country--Benjamin Weiser
(U) Alger Hiss's Looking Glass Wars--Edward White
(U) The Double-Cross System--John Cecil Masterman
Mr. Scott. Could you give us DIA's best estimate of how many
precision-guided weapons Hezbollah now has in its arsenal? How do you
assess the status of Iran's efforts to provide Hezbollah with
indigenous manufacturing capability for PGMs? How big of a threat do
you see this Iranian precision-guided missile project being to U.S.
interests and what will you do to thwart it in Lebanon and elsewhere?
General Berrier. [The information is classified and retained in the
committee files.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BACON
Mr. Bacon. The FY22 Department of Defense appropriations bill
includes $62.1 to fully fund the top FY22 unfunded priority of
``Hardening Department of Defense Networks''--which was also fully
authorized in the FY22 NDAA. Some of these funds are intended to enable
full, DOD Information Network-wide deployment of Internet Operations
Management (IOM) capability. Does Jt Force Headquarters DOD Information
Network (JFHQ-DODIN) have the concept of operations and associated
planning material to enable swift operationalization of this capability
once procured, and what is the expected implementation timeline for
deployment of IOM?
General Nakasone. (U) The funding provided for Internet Operational
Management (IOM) aligns to my command's priority to consistently
modernize our ability to command and control in cyberspace at speed. I
am grateful for this additional funding to accelerate the adoption of
this capability and to enable an enhanced understanding of our public
internet-facing DODIN cyberspace terrain.
JFHQ-DODIN has already begun detailed planning required to
implement this capability across the DODIN and to ensure we achieve
sustained operational effectiveness. Once procured, full implementation
is expected within 12-24 months.
[all]