[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-72]

  NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 30, 2022


                                     
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                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
48-615                    WASHINGTON : 2023                     

                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                    ADAM SMITH, Washington, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
RICK LARSEN, Washington              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee                MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JACKIE SPEIER, California            VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona               MO BROOKS, Alabama
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California        ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland,          SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
RO KHANNA, California                TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts    MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MATT GAETZ, Florida
ANDY KIM, New Jersey                 DON BACON, Nebraska
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania       JIM BANKS, Indiana
JASON CROW, Colorado                 LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan             JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey           MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas              MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine               MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia, Vice      STEPHANIE I. BICE, Oklahoma
    Chair                            C. SCOTT FRANKLIN, Florida
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California              RONNY JACKSON, Texas
KAIALI'I KAHELE, Hawaii              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington       BLAKE D. MOORE, Utah
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                PAT FALLON, Texas
JIMMY PANETTA, California
STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                     Paul Arcangeli, Staff Director
                       Barron YoungSmith, Counsel
                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                      Natalie de Benedetti, Clerk


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     3
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                               WITNESSES

Wallander, Celeste, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of 
  Defense........................................................     4
Wolters, Gen Tod D., USAF, Commander, U.S. European Command......     6

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Wallander, Celeste...........................................    55
    Wolters, Gen Tod D...........................................    74

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Crow.....................................................   101
    Mr. Larsen...................................................   101
    Mr. Rogers...................................................   101
    Mr. Turner...................................................   101
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   101

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Cooper...................................................   117
    Mr. Crow.....................................................   111
    Mr. Horsford.................................................   115
    Dr. Jackson..................................................   114
    Ms. Jacobs...................................................   114
    Mr. Kelly....................................................   110
    Mr. Morelle..................................................   113
    Mr. Scott....................................................   105
    Ms. Sherrill.................................................   112
    Mr. Smith....................................................   105
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   112

  NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES AND U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 30, 2022.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Smith (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
       WASHINGTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. I call the committee to order. Good morning. 
This morning's full committee hearing is on the ``National 
Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activities in Europe.''
    We are joined by two witnesses, Dr. Celeste Wallander, 
who's the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs for the Department of Defense, and General Tod 
Wolters, who is the U.S. Air Force commander for the U.S. 
European Command.
    Welcome both of you. Before we get started with that, 
tomorrow will be the last day of work in this committee for 
Paul Arcangeli, who I think most of you know, who is our staff 
director, has been our staff director for 12 years I think now, 
and has been on the committee for 18. And I really want to 
thank Paul for his service to this committee.
    As most of us know, he's also a veteran of the U.S. Army, 
did bomb disposal in the Army before coming to work for the 
government, and we are all going to miss him terribly, me more 
so than anybody else.
    He has done a fantastic job for this committee. But mostly 
I'm very happy for him. It's a good move. It's been an ever so 
slightly stressful job for the last few years. So, it's a 
terrific move. Also, Paul is recently married. So big, big time 
for him, and very happy for where he's headed. But I just--I 
can't say enough about the job that he's done for this 
committee. [Applause.]
    We are constantly told in this committee about how we pass 
our bill every year going on, I think, 61--62, 61, something 
like that, and certainly there are a lot of people who 
contribute to that process but nobody more so in the last, you 
know, 10 years than Paul.
    He understands, you know, what this committee is all about, 
the fact that we work in a bipartisan manner, the fact that we 
are here to serve the people who serve our country. We do our 
job so that they can do theirs better and he knows how to bring 
people together, and I think that's the thing that I've been 
most impressed about by the way Paul approaches his job, is he 
knows it is about people and about relationships.
    He cares deeply and personally about everybody involved in 
this process, makes us feel included and makes us all better at 
what we do. He has helped build a culture here that enables us 
to do our job better. And, personally, I'm sure I could have 
done this job without him. I don't think I could have done it 
well.
    When I first got this job, I was in a little bit over my 
head. But Paul was not, and he took the time and the patience 
to sort of guide me and educate me about that, and also to be a 
good personal friend, to understand that it's not just about 
the job, it's about what's going on in everybody's lives and 
you have to understand that if you're going to get the best out 
of people and be most supportive of them.
    I could go on at great length. But Paul means a lot to me. 
He will be missed. But, again, I want to emphasize this is not 
a sad day. We are very happy for him. He has served this 
country well.
    He is going to go on to other things in his life and do 
those every little bit as well, I'm sure. And, mostly, I just 
want to thank him for everything he's done for this committee, 
for this Congress, and this country. So, thank you, Paul. We 
appreciate your service and good luck.
    It is an incredibly important hearing that we have this 
morning, as you all know. There's always a lot going on in the 
world that is of concern to this committee and of concern to 
the United States defense policy.
    But Europe is the central focus right now because of 
Russia's brutal, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and all the 
implications that flow from that. So, I really look forward to 
the testimony from our witnesses today about the situation.
    There are a number of different aspects to it. Certainly, 
we want to get the latest--the update on what's happening in 
Ukraine. I think that the President and others have stated our 
policy clearly.
    We need to protect Ukraine. Well, basically, there's three 
key pieces to it. We need to do everything we possibly can to 
support Ukraine in their fight against Russian aggression.
    We need to make sure that we don't stumble into a wider war 
with potentially catastrophic consequences for the entire 
globe. We do not want a war with Russia, and we have to be 
cautious about how we approach this to make sure that we don't 
do that. And lastly, we want to make sure that this is a 
strategic failure for Putin.
    A number of people are, you know, asking the question, how 
does this end? I think the honest question is nobody really 
knows. But how it should end is with Russia, basically, going 
back where they came from and Ukraine being the sovereign 
democracy that it is and was and should always be. That's how 
it should end.
    Now, that's easier said than done. But I think that goal as 
our overall policy should be the central focus. So, we want to 
know what's going on in Ukraine. We want to specifically know 
what we can do to be supportive.
    The Ukrainians have fought incredibly bravely and better 
than I think just about anybody expected. We have to give them 
the help they need to continue that process.
    Then, of course, there are broader implications beyond 
Ukraine. You know, what is our policy in Europe? What are we 
going to do to shore up defenses in Eastern Europe? Without 
question, NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] is more 
important now than it has been for a very, very long time and, 
in particular, in Eastern Europe.
    I met yesterday with Romanian members of the senate. They 
are very concerned. They want our support. As you know, Poland, 
the Baltics, all of the countries in Eastern Europe and 
throughout Europe are concerned.
    We need to have an adequate posture in Europe to deter 
Russia from any further aggression. We want to hear how you're 
going to put together the plans for that.
    While at the same time, I want to thank both of our 
witnesses today for the leadership that has brought NATO 
together to a greater extent than it has been in a long time. I 
think the whole world was surprised, the degree to which our 
alliance joined together and in unity responded to this Russian 
invasion, through our support for Ukraine, support for economic 
sanctions.
    I think we have learned beyond any shadow of a doubt that 
alliances matter, okay--that ``America first'' isn't going to 
get you very far if you don't have friends and allies and 
people who can work with you in the world to meet the 
challenges that we face.
    I want to know how we're going to build upon that, going 
forward. And then, lastly, budget was released 2 days ago now, 
I think. How does that affect what you're trying to do? What 
are the keys?
    What is the most important thing that you need to be able 
to provide that adequate deterrence in Europe? Not the most 
important thing, but what is the package that is going to be 
necessary to give us the support necessary? What's most 
important in the budget? How are we going to make that work?
    This is an incredibly important theater and very timely 
moment to have this hearing. So, I look forward to our 
witnesses' testimony and the questions and answers from 
members.
    And with that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Rogers.

 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I concur with your 
observations, and I also concur with your celebration of our 
staff director, and I would note that he has Alabama roots, 
which makes him even cooler and will be missed.
    But I want to thank our witnesses and express my 
appreciation for your service to our country and your 
preparation for this hearing. We're a month into Putin's 
catastrophic invasion of Ukraine.
    The Russian offensive appears to be stalled. If Russian 
casualties don't exceed 10,000, they soon will. The Ukrainians 
are starting to retake ground. The time to double down is now.
    But I'm concerned that's not going to happen. Time and time 
again, this administration has been petrified of Putin, too 
afraid that commonsense actions to support our partners and 
allies may be deemed escalatory.
    As a result, they were way too slow to get aid to Ukraine. 
We should have started back in Thanksgiving with visible 
aggressive deliveries of lethal aid to Ukraine. Instead, the 
White House wasted months.
    The first Presidential Drawdown package didn't start 
flowing to Ukraine until January of this year. But there 
weren't any Stingers. U.S. Stingers didn't make it to Ukraine 
until a week after the invasion. Poland's MiG-29 offer was 
embraced by the State Department, only to be rejected by the 
White House. Slovakia is willing to provide S-300s to Ukraine, 
but the Defense Department can't find suitable backfill. It's 
been going on for 2 weeks, and there are still no coastal 
defense cruise missiles, even though Mariupol is being 
flattened from the sea.
    And these are just a few examples. There are a dozen more. 
Dithering needs to end. We need to flip the script and make 
Putin afraid of escalating against the West.
    Here's what I'd like to hear from our witnesses today. I'd 
like to hear that our policy in Ukraine is to win. That means 
giving the Ukrainians the resources to drive out every last 
Russian on Ukrainian soil. I'd like to hear that we have 
identified a backfill for the Slovak S-300 and it's on its way 
to Bratislava as we speak.
    I'd like to hear that we have a plan to get coastal defense 
cruise missiles to Ukraine. I'd like to hear that we're ramping 
up production of Stingers and Javelin command launch units. We 
also need to dramatically ramp up production of small tactical 
UAS [unmanned aerial system] systems like Switchblade and get 
more of these systems into Ukrainian hands.
    Finally, I'd like to hear that we're going to reinforce our 
allies with permanent bases in Poland, Romania, and the 
Baltics. I've been pressing for more dispersed forces in Europe 
for years. We owe it to our allies and our partners, especially 
those on the eastern front. Nothing less than our full forceful 
support will do.
    Finally, General, I know that your time at EUCOM [U.S. 
European Command] is supposed to come to an end in the next 
couple of months. It's my hope that Secretary Austin sees fit 
to extend your time a little bit so that you can help see us 
through this crisis. I don't want to make your wife mad, but we 
need you.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Rogers. So, I really think that having a transition at 
EUCOM right now is not in the best interest of our country.
    And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Wallander.

STATEMENT OF CELESTE WALLANDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 
                            DEFENSE

    Dr. Wallander. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and 
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today on policy matters related to the 
U.S. European Command area of responsibility in my capacity as 
Assistant Secretary of State of Defense for International 
Security Affairs.
    Before I begin, I would like to express my appreciation for 
the continued support from Congress and this committee in 
shaping and resourcing the Department of Defense's efforts in 
this region. It is an honor to appear alongside General 
Wolters, who is an outstanding partner.
    This time last year, the focus of this hearing was 
strategic competition and how that was shaping our world. But 
today, what we see is no longer a mere theory of strategic 
competition.
    Instead, we see Russia engaging in an unconscionable and 
illegal use of force against Ukraine in the most violent act of 
aggression in Europe since World War II.
    The United States condemns Russia's unprovoked attack 
against Ukraine in the strongest possible terms and deplores 
the tragic loss of life, enormous human suffering, and 
indiscriminate destruction caused by Russia's actions. Russia's 
full-scale invasion threatens not only Ukraine but also poses 
the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades.
    We must continuously assess our posture in Europe to 
address the evolving strategic landscape while maintaining the 
critical role of our alliance in securing shared interests and 
values in the region and avoiding escalation with a nuclear 
power.
    The Department has three priorities regarding Russia's 
invasion of Ukraine.
    First, we aim to bolster Ukraine's ability to defend its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity for which Congress' 
assistance is vital.
    Second, we seek to maintain unity with our NATO allies and 
our partners.
    Finally, we will continue to deter any Russian aggression 
against--and defend every inch of--allied territory. To those 
ends, we will continue to provide defensive security assistance 
to help the Ukrainian people as they defend their country.
    With thanks to Congress, the United States has committed 
more than $4 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since 
2014, with more than $2 billion since August 2021 alone.
    I am proud to say that with the leading role from the 
United States, the global response to Russia's aggression has 
been remarkable, with unprecedented sanctions and a wide range 
of global humanitarian and security assistance flowing to 
Ukraine.
    There have been notable reversals of long-held restrictions 
to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine and meet NATO's 
benchmark of 2 percent defense spending, as in the case of 
Germany.
    Simply put, Russia's attempts to divide the United States 
from its allies and partners have failed miserably. After 
Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014, the United States, with 
the support of Congress, embarked on substantial changes to our 
posture in Europe.
    This involved infrastructure improvements, building partner 
capacity, increased rotational presence, more exercises and 
training with allies, and enhanced prepositioned equipment and 
stocks.
    We also focused on expanding our access, basing, and 
overflight permissions in Europe, and increased security 
assistance funding, especially on NATO's eastern flank. All of 
these moves have come into play during this crisis, validating 
our investments and preparations.
    In the last 2 months, we have swiftly repositioned forces 
already in Europe, extended specific rotational forces in 
theater, and deployed significant additional capabilities. 
These adjustments included placing the entire U.S. commitment 
to the NATO Response Force on heightened readiness, 
repositioning forces to multiple eastern flank allies, 
extending or bolstering maritime forces already in the EUCOM 
AOR [area of responsibility], and deploying additional air, 
ground, space, and cyberspace capabilities.
    With these recent deployments and extensions, the United 
States now has approximately 100,000 military personnel either 
stationed in or deployed to Europe and its waters. We are also 
working with allies to ensure that NATO is prepared for modern 
challenges and able to deter aggression from any adversary.
    Allies have deployed defensive land and air forces in the 
eastern flank and maritime assets across the NATO area. For the 
first time in history, NATO has activated its defense plans and 
deployed the NATO Response Force in a deterrence and defense 
role.
    The People's Republic of China--the PRC--is also active in 
the EUCOM AOR and we know that the PRC and Russia collaborate 
across a variety of arenas, including joint military exercises.
    This is an element of strategic competition that the United 
States is monitoring closely. This work is only possible with 
consistent congressional backing and stable funding.
    Congressional support for the U.S. forces deployed in the 
EUCOM AOR as well as funding for defense initiatives across 
Europe and security assistance for Ukraine, have been and will 
continue to be critical to achieving U.S. national security 
objectives.
    Russia's actions have brought to light the stark contrast 
between our democratic values and our rules-based international 
system that the United States leads and Russia's autocratic 
violent vision.
    The Department of Defense, in conjunction with other U.S. 
Government departments and agencies, NATO allies and partners, 
and in close consultation with Congress, will continue to work 
for a secure and stable Europe.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I appreciate 
your continued support to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
Marines, guardians, and civilians in the Department of Defense 
who work every day in the service of the American people.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander can be found in 
the Appendix on page 55.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General Wolters.

STATEMENT OF GEN TOD D. WOLTERS, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN 
                            COMMAND

    General Wolters. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, 
distinguished members of the committee, and Paul, on behalf of 
the men, women, and families who serve our Nation, we extend 
our thanks for your steadfast support.
    It remains a privilege to serve alongside these dedicated 
patriots and all of our allies and partners. It's also an honor 
to testify with Assistant Secretary of Defense Celeste 
Wallander. She's a tremendous force multiplier for our entire 
team.
    And appearing with us is our EUCOM Command Chief Phil 
Easton. He's a force of nature at our headquarters in 
Stuttgart, Germany, and he leads from the front with respect to 
treating people with dignity and respect.
    We're fully aligned with the Department of Defense 
priorities to defend the Nation, take care of our people, and 
succeed through teamwork. Every day, we work to generate peace 
with our allies and partners by strengthening the deterrence 
and defense of the Euro-Atlantic.
    This is a pivotal moment in Europe with generational 
implications. When testifying before this committee last year, 
Russia was already on the path to further intimidate and 
threaten Ukraine, while testing the will and resolve of the 
transatlantic alliance. Russia's premeditated and unprovoked 
invasion of Ukraine has galvanized our allies and global 
partners.
    We admire the courage and tenacity of the Ukrainian armed 
forces and citizens, and we so respect their sovereign 
democracy. In the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO remains the 
cornerstone of deterrence and defense.
    As we face the largest conflict in Europe in three 
generations, our transatlantic alliance has responded in all 
warfighting domains. In the air, NATO has established an air 
defense architecture along the eastern flank that includes 
contributions from 11 separate allies.
    On land, allies continue to deploy additional forces to 
enhance its forward presence from Tallinn in the north to Sofia 
in the south. At sea, our standing maritime forces are infused 
with additional capabilities to ensure freedom of navigation 
spanning from the Arctic to the south to the Aegean.
    Aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean dramatically 
increased the inherent air combat capability in NATO's air 
defense architecture along the entire eastern flank. NATO's 
capabilities in space and cyberspace are more closely 
integrated than at any other time in the alliance's history.
    The sum of these modern multi-domain capabilities 
underwrites the security of NATO's Article 5 guarantee. A 
protagonist of our commitment to NATO begins with our efforts 
in the United States European Command. Our primary mission is 
to compete, deter, and prepare to respond to aggression with 
the full weight of the NATO alliance.
    Our investments in military-to-military relationships, 
training, and readiness build unity, resolve, and combat 
credible deterrence.
    USEUCOM [U.S. European Command], with support from forces 
in the continental United States, has sparked the allies to 
enhance posture along the eastern flank, rapidly deploying 
three brigades of European-based and CONUS [continental United 
States]-based combat forces, a carrier strike group, and 
fourth- and fifth-generation fighters.
    This effort is America's effort with soldiers, sailors, 
Marines, airmen, guardians, and Defense Department civilians 
from all 50 States and territories, some based in Europe, 
others rotating into Europe from across the Nation.
    This build is enabled by years of focused investment 
through the European Reassurance and Deterrence Initiatives, as 
this committee well knows, commonly referred to as ERI and EDI. 
These enhancements, including facilities, prepositioned 
equipment, rotational deployments, and all-domain exercises, 
has improved our speed and agility.
    As a brief example, thanks to EDI and ERI, we were able to 
deploy the entirety of an armored brigade combat team from 
Georgia in the United States to Germany in just 1 week. That 
level of speed is unmatched globally.
    On behalf of the men and women of European Command, we 
thank Congress and the American people for their contributions 
in this effort.
    The capabilities the Department has brought to bear in 
response to this acute security environment have required 
critical partnerships with USTRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation 
Command], USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command], USSTRATCOM [U.S. 
Strategic Command], and the intelligence community. These 
partners are vital to establishing and sustaining our current 
deterrence and defense posture.
    We are witnessing a generational moment, a historic 
demonstration of unity and will, and an unprecedented effort by 
allies to strengthen defense while simultaneously helping those 
in need.
    Just an example, but it's a very critical one, we have seen 
Germany commit to meet the alliance 2 percent benchmark and we 
expect other allies will follow and redouble efforts to 
adequately invest in defense to generate peace.
    From Turkey in the southeast to Norway, Sweden, and Finland 
in the north, in air, land, sea, space, and cyber, our allies 
and partners are committing.
    Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, thank you again for 
this opportunity and I look forward to taking your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Wolters can be found in 
the Appendix on page 74.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    General Wolters, I think one of the central questions is 
the issue that the ranking member raised about what we can 
provide for Ukraine and, you know, I think part of it is that 
balance between giving Ukraine the help and not spreading to a 
wider war. And certainly, before the war began the issue of 
what we should give to Ukraine was informed by that, deterrence 
versus provocation, and I would say that a concern about giving 
Russia an excuse and provoking them is the reason some of those 
weapons weren't provided.
    It's the same reason that President Trump did not provide 
those weapons either, as we were trying to walk our way through 
that.
    But now that the war has begun, how do you balance that 
risk? I mean, do we take Mr. Rogers' approach and basically say 
we don't care what Putin does? You know, we should, I don't 
know, send troops and tanks and whatever we can in and 
basically fight in Ukraine?
    Or what is the proper way you think to strike that balance 
and what are you concerned or are you concerned about how 
Russia might respond to a given action and would they spread 
the war to Poland, to the Baltics, conceivably even to U.S. 
assets in the region? How do you balance that risk?
    General Wolters. Chairman, as a military commander, my 
first answer is: constantly. The conditions change second by 
second, day by day, week by week, and I bear the 
responsibility, number one, to ensure that we don't forget, as 
military commanders, that nations have the inherent right to 
gift whatever they would prefer from a multi-domain--excuse me, 
from a unilateral, bilateral, multilateral perspective.
    Secondly, I have to take into account military mission 
effectiveness coupled with strategic miscalculation, and one 
day is different than the next, and depending upon the 
conditions we have to adjust.
    The Chairman. So just--sorry. So, do you think they're--did 
you--how would you specify the risk of Russia escalating and 
how do you think about that? I know it's something you think 
about. What's the risk there and what might we do that could 
provoke it and what would it look like?
    General Wolters. It depends, and the risk that we have to 
gauge is the risk that Russia first imposes upon Ukraine. So, 
we have to be smart about imaging our way through Ukraine's 
military perspective and then taking into account what the 
allies and partners can contribute, and we're always concerned 
about the force protection disposition of the Ukrainian armed 
forces and the Ukrainian citizens and, obviously, the 
populations on the periphery. But all of that has to come into 
our cross-check.
    The Chairman. Outside of Ukraine is what I'm trying to get 
at. Is there a--I mean, is there a risk that if we, you know, 
get more engaged that Russia would spread the war, and if so, 
how would they spread the war and to where?
    General Wolters. There's always a risk and they obviously 
are capable of utilizing all domains and their whole-of-
government capabilities. So as a military mission planner, I've 
got to take into account all of those branches and sequels and, 
obviously, as a NATO commander, I am most concerned about the 
eastern periphery of Europe as it connects to Russia.
    The Chairman. Okay. So, but we can, in fact, provide a lot 
of weapons to Ukraine within that manageable risk and I think 
we are doing that. What's most important to your mind in terms 
of what weapons we need to get into Ukraine right now to help 
them?
    And I agree with Mr. Rogers, the goal here is to push the 
Russians out and win the fight. What are the most important 
weapons Ukrainians need right now to make that happen?
    General Wolters. I can go deeper in a classified session, 
Chairman. But what I can say is those capabilities that are 
anti-armor, anti-tank, and surface-to-air missiles are very, 
very important. They have been effective in the campaign, and I 
suspect in the near future they will continue to be effective.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 
correct the record in saying that President Zelensky has never 
asked for American troops to come and fight on Ukrainian soil 
nor have I. We want them to get everything they ask for that 
they need to win this war and that's my position.
    The DOD [Department of Defense] Comptroller announced 
yesterday, and I was surprised to hear, that they were zero 
changes made to the President's budget based on the Ukrainian 
invasion. Is that accurate, Dr. Wallander?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I am--I have not seen that 
reference. I apologize. I can't validate whether that is true. 
I can take that question back to get you a solid----
    Mr. Rogers. I just can't imagine we wouldn't be adjusting 
the budget to reflect what's happening in Eastern Europe right 
now.
    Dr. Wallander. Yes.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 101.]
    Mr. Rogers. You heard me say in my opening remarks that 
Slovakia has offered S-300s, which are desperately needed by 
Ukraine. But all they've asked for is us to backfill. Why has 
it taken 2 weeks for us to not get them something? Tell me the 
cavalry is on the way.
    Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman. We are working with 
Slovakia to identify the requirements for meeting their needs. 
I can speak in general--I just can speak in greater detail 
during the classified session.
    But we are working on this, and meanwhile, we have focused 
on getting countries that hold Soviet legacy systems, including 
S-300 systems, that have spare parts, missiles, different parts 
of that S-300 system who are willing to send that to Ukraine.
    So, we have not simply been waiting for a resolution of 
that offer but have been working on getting the Ukrainians what 
they need right now.
    Mr. Rogers. And when is that going to be?
    Dr. Wallander. That is ongoing and we can talk in greater 
detail in the classified session.
    Mr. Rogers. Okay. Well, I would urge that you continue to 
keep this committee updated on your progress, at least on a 
weekly basis.
    General Wolters, you and I have talked many times over the 
last couple of years about the need for the redistribution of 
our troops in the European Command and to establish permanent 
basing in Poland, Romania, and in the Baltics.
    What is your best military advice as to whether or not 
permanent U.S. forces in Poland, Romania, and the Baltics will 
help reassure NATO and deter Russia?
    General Wolters. Congressman, it's got to change and, 
certainly, this is an opportunity as a result of this senseless 
act on behalf of Russia to reexamine the permanent military 
architecture that exists not only in Eastern Europe but in our 
air policing activity in aviation and in our standing naval 
maritime groups.
    And as you well know, we're in the process of establishing 
eight very coherent minimum battalion-sized battle groups in 
Eastern Europe that have all the appropriate enablers that are 
coupled in with all the air policing assets and all the 
standing naval maritime groups so that we can more 
comprehensively defend in the east and do so in the north all 
the way back to the Atlantic Ocean, extending back into the 
Mediterranean.
    And in so doing, the NATO nations that are committing that 
I alluded to in my opening comments, they're going to be part 
of the equation and they're very willing to do so to change the 
presence from a rotational to a more permanent, and I think it 
will continue to grow and we're working very hard with the 
North Atlantic Council to do just that.
    Mr. Rogers. And I think that's an important point. You 
know, I talked earlier about Ukrainians not asking us to put 
troops there. They haven't asked us to give them anything.
    They're willing to pay for the stuff they're asking for. 
They just want us to get it to them. And in Poland, the Polish 
government's offered to pay for us to establish a permanent 
base there. Everybody wants a base, but that's the first time 
I've ever heard of a country willing to pay for it.
    So, I do hope that we see that happen. The rotational troop 
presence is not adequate. It needs to be permanent, and I think 
that, going back to the chairman's opening statements, the best 
way that we can solidify and enhance our relationship with our 
NATO allies is to have that permanent basing there to show that 
we are committed to this relationship.
    Lastly, on the Switchblade, that's one system that I've 
examined, and it seems to be something that would be effective.
    Dr. Wallander, are you familiar with that system?
    Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman, and we have, like you, 
been focused on its capabilities and received the message loud 
and clear from our Ukrainian colleagues that this is required.
    We have committed 100 Switchblade tactical unmanned aerial 
systems to be delivered in the most recent package of 
Presidential Drawdown. So, we have taken--we have heard the 
Ukrainians and we take that very seriously.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Of course, we should all remember 
we also passed a $13.4 billion supplemental out of Congress 
signed by the President specifically to deal with Ukraine.
    Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our 
witnesses for your testimony today. Let me begin, well, with 
both of you. I have a question on cyber related.
    The Russian Federation, obviously, has continued to 
leverage cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns against 
Ukraine, Europe, and the United States. Though we have not yet 
seen the level of cyber activity that we had anticipated from 
Russia, we still have to be ready for it.
    How are you preparing your cyber defenses for the potential 
cyberattacks from the Russian Federation, and I also want to 
know how you're helping us to bolster the cyber defenses of our 
European partners and NATO, to the degree that we can talk 
about this in open session.
    General Wolters. Congressman, first and foremost, we went 
to the basics with respect to cyber employment, and as you well 
know, a great cyber offense starts with a great cyber defense.
    So, I know that General Nakasone and team were very, very 
aggressive with respect to assisting the Ukrainian government 
and the Ukrainian department of defense to improve their 
network hygiene and network defense and those efforts started 
in the November/December timeframe.
    And the same considerations were given to those European 
nations on the periphery, and we can talk in more detail in a 
separate session, but that good defense has been very, very 
helpful and I think it reveals in some of the challenges that 
Russia has faced with respect to their cyber offense against 
the Ukraine and against the European nations on the periphery.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    And Dr. Wallander, our National Defense Strategy calls for 
us to utilize the concept of integrated deterrence. I believe, 
certainly, cyber is a critical part of our deterrence 
capabilities in coordination with other deterrence methods.
    In this unclassified setting, to the degree to which you 
can, how are we working further with NATO to utilize our cyber 
capabilities, particularly within the context of the European 
Deterrence Initiative?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, thank you for your question, 
because integrated deterrence does include the cyber domain, 
and the United States has worked closely with allies to improve 
their resilience, to monitor networks, to share information, 
and that work is ongoing because the challenge of Russian 
activity in the cyber domain is persistent.
    That element of the--deterrence is not only about 
capabilities in the NATO context. It is about the multinational 
nature of the alliance; and the commitment to defend one 
another and combine together the efforts of NATO allies in the 
cyber domain sent a very strong, credible message to Russia 
that helps to reinforce that deterrent message.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Yeah, incredibly important to 
leverage those capabilities wherever possible and working with 
our partners and allies to strengthen those capabilities.
    Dr. Wallander, first of all, I want to commend both 
President Biden and the Biden administration, the Department of 
Defense, and our European partners and allies for supporting 
Ukraine and really stepping up to the challenge in this 
historic crisis that's caused by the Russian Federation, and I 
agree with the chairman's comments that we need to make sure 
that Russia is pushed back and that Ukraine stays free and 
independent.
    In your view, are there any further ways that Congress can 
help provide better support to Ukraine? I know we have talked 
about this already but, you know, further ability to elaborate 
on any thoughts you may have and have there been any barriers 
that we can overcome to help you get through? And what about 
when it comes to humanitarian assistance as well?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you for that question, Congressman, 
and I want to reiterate our gratitude for not only the scale of 
the assistance that the Congress has provided in budget support 
but the speed with which Congress took this as a priority so 
that we're able to support Ukraine.
    This fight is--because of the courage and the capability of 
Ukrainian military forces and citizens, this fight is going to 
extend. And so, looking forward, first of all, we do have--in 
addition to the option of Presidential Drawdown, we have the 
Ukrainian Security Assistance Initiative and we're looking at 
what that next set of package should contain with an eye 
towards not just days and weeks but months of sustainment, 
perhaps longer, for the Ukrainian military and Ukrainian 
people.
    I would, you know, defer to Department of Treasury and 
Commerce. But, clearly, the Ukrainian government, in addition 
to security assistance, needs humanitarian assistance and 
economic assistance now that it's clear that this fight is 
going to continue for some time into the future.
    So, we look forward to working with you on a broad multi-
agency support for Ukraine.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Wilson is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of you 
for being here today. What a time in history, and many of us 
never anticipated a land war in Europe ever again. But that's 
where we are and to face it.
    And Putin did one thing totally unintentional. He has 
unified Republicans and Democrats. You will see that, together, 
we agree with President Biden, that we're in a long-term 
conflict between autocracy, which is ruled by gun, or 
democracy, ruled by law. And so, we need to be together and 
that's why I'm really grateful that--working together with--
myself with Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur.
    The issue that has come up is the delay in providing the 
equipment to the people of Ukraine. How brave they are standing 
up to the Russian military.
    And as Congresswoman Kaptur pointed out yesterday, there 
are--there is body armor awaiting in a storage area in Chicago 
for the U.S. Department of Commerce to approve delivery. That's 
absurd. We need both of you with the positions you have to act 
quickly.
    And then, particularly, I'm grateful, Secretary Wallander, 
that you've been the president of the U.S. Russia Foundation. 
So, you have such a knowledge of Russia.
    And along with that, as Ranking Member Mike Rogers 
indicated, we should have months ago been providing the 
military equipment to the people of Ukraine.
    In fact, I appreciate that Mark Levin has revealed that in 
August in the Kremlin website there was an essay by Vladimir 
Putin that, really, in the tradition of ``Mein Kampf''--Adolf 
Hitler--he says the historical unity of Russians and 
Ukrainians. That's not what he means. What he means--the unity 
means no existence of the country of Ukraine.
    And so, hopefully, particularly, General, for you, I hope 
the intelligence is provided as to how we can best protect the 
people of Ukraine. And with that in mind, for each of you, what 
are the weaknesses that you see in Russian military and/or 
their diplomatic efforts?
    What can we do to exploit those weaknesses? Hey, try to 
bring to the people of Russia that they are being betrayed by 
Putin? The young people of their country--he is just putting it 
at risk of imminent death, only for oil, money, power.
    Madam Secretary.
    Dr. Wallander. Well, on the political-military front and 
the weaknesses, the Russian narrative--and you yourself have, 
you know, pointed to how absurd and non-plausible the Russian 
claims as a pretext for the invasion of Ukraine are to the 
international community--so the work of the United States, 
closely with allies and partners, to expose what the Russians 
were preparing to do, the pretexts in which--and the absolutely 
without foundation pretexts has galvanized the international 
community more rapidly than any, really, expected, in contrast 
to the experience in 2014 when they invaded Crimea.
    So, I think that has been a key element of the weakness in 
a political-military sense that has enabled us to pull together 
the unity on sanctions, on assistance to Ukraine, and on 
diplomatic isolation of the Russian leadership.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
    And General.
    General Wolters. Congressman Wilson, I think it goes back 
to the point you just made at the beginning, and as a military 
commander, I want to do everything I can to strengthen our 
support to Ukraine armed forces based off where they are in the 
midst of their campaign. And from a whole-of-government 
perspective with respect to what nations do to include the 
U.S., everything that we're doing in the information 
environment needs to continue and it needs to strengthen.
    Mr. Wilson. And I--Secretary, indeed, it's so impressive to 
see NATO unified--21 countries. As the co-chair of the EU 
[European Union] Caucus to see 27 countries--unprecedented--of 
the European Union providing military assistance, and then we 
need your influence, too.
    There are two countries that should be doing more--Israel, 
which in a destabilized world, they've already had three 
attacks in the last week--murderous attacks: another country, 
India, the world's largest democracy.
    Instability in the world will lead to catastrophe for the 
terrific people of India, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi and 
their wonderful government needs to understand that they need 
to be standing with democracies, standing with Ukraine.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Larsen is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
    Dr. Wallander, I want to pull back a little bit. It's going 
to be a lot of Ukraine questions. This is more of a NATO policy 
question. NATO is looking to launch something called DIANA, 
which is their tech accelerator, and I just wanted to get your 
view on the Department's view of the Defense Innovation 
Accelerator of the North Atlantic.
    It's a NATO project, kind of--it's a mash-up, if you will, 
like our DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] and 
DIU [Defense Innovation Unit] and a few other things. Can you 
just quickly update us on where the Department is on that?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I don't have details on where 
the status of that project is here. I can get--you know, would 
get back to you with details. But what I do know is that as 
NATO allies have recognized not just the scale of the threat 
that Russia poses to European security, but the multi-domain 
challenges that both Russia and China pose to global security 
and, certainly, also to NATO, the willingness to cooperate more 
in the area of technology, going forward, has deepened and has 
strengthened, and this project is an opportunity to advance 
that.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 101.]
    Mr. Larsen. All right. Thanks. I just wanted to make sure 
it's on the record and not lose this opportunity to ask that.
    General Wolters, I want to follow up on something that 
Representative Wilson brought up and it's kind of just to show 
how international affairs is local affairs.
    In Washington State, we have about 100,000 Ukrainian/
Ukrainian-Americans. My district is, like, 16th out of 435 in 
terms of number of Ukrainian/Ukrainian-Americans in the 
country. It's always a surprise for people to hear that. And 
so, we asked them--asked the community some questions about 
what they wanted to ask, and this gets to Representative 
Wilson's question about aid and personal protective equipment 
and the ability to deliver that to the civilian population in 
Ukraine.
    Can you be--can you give us some detail on how that is 
happening?
    General Wolters. Congressman, we at USEUCOM have two 
centers with approximately 100 individuals that continue to 
iterate in the military dimension with Ukrainian liaison 
officers that are working both the security assistance items in 
the military dimension and the humanitarian assistance items, 
and it's an iterative process and it's based off supply and 
demand and extends with feelers into Ukraine at the ministerial 
level and at the CHOD [chief of defense] level to make sure the 
right stuff goes in at the right time to deliver the 
appropriate effect in the campaign based off access to get in 
and access to get out.
    It's not perfect, by any means, but it continues to improve 
over time, and we'll continue to iterate and make sure that we 
continue to connect with those interlocutors at the Ukrainian 
level to ensure that they get the right gear as quickly as we 
possibly can.
    Mr. Larsen. Is there an issue with moving it into Poland or 
into Romania now, if you will, and then so it's there instead 
of in the U.S.?
    General Wolters. Sir, it's by, with, and through Poland, 
and it's by, with, and through Romania. I can talk a little bit 
more in a classified setting. But there are challenges. But at 
the end of the day, we always communicate with the host nation 
to make sure that we're doing the right thing.
    Mr. Larsen. Right. Yeah, sure. And to go even more local, 
but it's obviously a national issue, the Growler mission is 
located in NAS [Naval Air Station] Whidbey Island and there was 
news yesterday, a couple days ago, that we're sending a 
national mission squadron to Germany, and I presume there's a 
CVN [aircraft carrier] squadron already on the Truman in the 
Aegean Sea as well.
    And this might be a classified answer to a question, but 
can you give us some idea about either mission--maybe starting 
with the mission--the national mission into Germany?
    General Wolters. I can elaborate more in a separate 
setting, but what I can say is you're right. They're coming.
    Mr. Larsen. Okay. I look forward to that. What do I do with 
my last minute, Mr. Chairman?
    I'll yield--I'll yield it back. Thank you. That's fine. I 
yield.
    The Chairman. And a programming note. I know some 
classified stuff has come up. So, the plan is we're going to be 
here until 12:30, 12:45-ish and then we'll start our classified 
brief at 1:00. Give you a brief break in there.
    Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, I appreciate your statements about Ukraine and, 
specifically, you said, you know, we want to strengthen our 
support for Ukraine, and I know that your efforts to do so are 
incredibly important.
    I want to talk to you about the sharing of intelligence. 
There was a great deal of concern initially when the conflict 
began that the United States had actionable intelligence, 
intelligence that could assist the Ukrainians in having ability 
to defend their country, and that there was delays in getting 
that intelligence to Ukraine.
    Are you comfortable now with the speed at which our ability 
is to share that information with Ukraine and do you think 
that, as looking to strengthening our support for Ukraine, are 
there gaps or areas that we need to address?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I'm comfortable, but I want 
it to speed up and I always will say that even if it occurs in 
1 second. I want it tomorrow to be in a half a second.
    And as you well know, the DNI's [Director of National 
Intelligence's] participation and the NSA's [National Security 
Agency's] participation at the very start of this campaign were 
revolutionary and as SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] 
what I needed most to do was get that data to the nations to 
get the NAC [North Atlantic Council] to be convinced soonest to 
make the appropriate moves based off the disposition in the 
periphery of Ukraine.
    Good or bad, it's better than I've ever seen, and we 
achieved consensus from a NATO body quicker than we ever have 
in the past and it was a result of the intelligence sharing. 
But it needs to continue to get faster.
    Mr. Turner. General, that's a great point. I know 
everyone's always frustrated with the speed of sharing because 
you can--and also, you know, there has to be some assessment as 
whether or not the intelligence is important and whose hands 
does it need to get into and, of course, dealing with Ukraine, 
you're dealing with an area where there's a conflict.
    General, are there restrictions on geography in Ukraine? As 
we look to Ukraine and, you know, the Donbas region areas of 
conflict and trying to help Ukraine, are you seeing instances 
where we're tying our own hands, where there are limitations 
geographically within their own country, where the United 
States is unwilling to share information with Ukraine about 
what Russia is doing in its own country?
    General Wolters. Sir, I haven't seen that. It's just access 
to some of the far eastern cities, and as you well know, that's 
a challenge for humanitarian assistance as well as intelligence 
sharing, and as we image our way through this campaign and we 
provide our best military advice to our Ukraine counterparts, 
we continue to make them aware of this very issue and they are 
iterating in an attempt to improve.
    Mr. Turner. And what do you mean by access to the far east 
cities?
    General Wolters. Just the tyranny of time and distance over 
land, going from Eastern Europe to the Mariupol region.
    Mr. Turner. But your ability to generate intelligence isn't 
limited by space.
    General Wolters. It is not, but just getting that data into 
the right receptor.
    Mr. Turner. Got it. Got it. Got it.
    Dr. Wallander, I want to thank you for your--on page 12 of 
your report that you included the issue of the Balkans in 
reference to the Dayton Peace Accords.
    I do think that that is an area where we have continued to 
have vulnerabilities. We have kind of ignored the issue of 
Republic of Srpska; the ability for Russia to destabilize the 
area, I think needs our increased attention and I appreciate 
that you continue in your European focus to look at that as an 
issue.
    I have a question for you, though, about Ukraine. We do 
hear that--of the number of refugees and the individuals who've 
been displaced in Ukraine, the number of refugees who have left 
Ukraine.
    But we're also hearing reports of individuals being taken 
against their will from Russia--from--excuse me, from Ukraine 
to Russia. But we're not hearing much from the White House 
about that. What can you confirm for us about individuals being 
taken from Ukraine against their will to Russia?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I've seen the reports that you 
refer to as well and they are very concerning. I don't have 
anything that--any independent information that I can confirm 
here, but we--I can get back to you on what we are able----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 101.]
    Mr. Turner. Great. I would really appreciate that.
    General, we had good news of Germany returning to the F-35 
where they had initially indicated they were not going to be 
part of the F-35 family. Finland has agreed to become part of 
the F-35 and now Canada has made its announcement. Great 
effects of Russia's aggressiveness.
    Tell us strategically how you think that the number of 
nations that are now committing to the F-35 will affect the 
strategic capabilities of NATO and our partners as we--as they 
face Russia.
    General Wolters. They'll deliver and evince a tremendous 
improvement in our strategic ability in indications and 
warnings, command and control, and mission command, as already 
demonstrated by U.S. F-35s that are contributing in the assure 
and deter mission at this time. And we anticipate----
    The Chairman. And I do apologize. The gentleman's time has 
expired.
    Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both 
witnesses this morning.
    And to General Wolters, again, I went and reread your bio. 
I mean, you have been showing amazing leadership, not just 
since the invasion of Ukraine but going back to when you took 
the helm in 2019.
    Again, for a lot of us in this committee, we remember in 
2020 that there were efforts to cut U.S. troop levels in 
Germany and eliminate the rotation of Marines up in Norway, and 
your steadfast, you know, I think adherence to duty in terms of 
the value of NATO has been certainly validated over the last 
months or so and, again, I just want to publicly thank you for 
your great service.
    You mentioned in your remarks about how the U.S. recognizes 
our allies', you know, great collaboration but also their own 
sovereign ability to gift resources. Last Saturday, the 
Ukrainian foreign minister publicly stated that, you know, 
based on his conversations with officials in Washington and 
Poland, he stated that the U.S. has no objections to the 
transfer of aircrafts--MiGs--from Poland to Ukraine and he went 
on to say, as far as we can conclude the ball is now on the 
Polish side.
    Again, this was Saturday. So, this was just a couple of 
days ago. And, again, there's a lot of high interest, 
certainly, back home in my district with a large Ukrainian 
population.
    Can you just clarify for me just--and for, I think, a lot 
of us, you know, what is the state of play in terms of, you 
know, the decision-maker to get that, I think, critical 
platform to the Ukrainian air force?
    General Wolters. Well, sir, at the national level I would 
suspect it's the prime minister or the president that 
ultimately makes that decision, given the potential for 
strategic miscalculation, and that's what I've seen in practice 
so far.
    And in a different setting, I can get into some of the more 
tactical level details that weigh into the decision. But, 
again, it goes back to the military mission effectiveness 
weighed against strategic miscalculation to make sure you take 
into account the protection of the citizens of Ukraine as well 
as the citizens on the periphery.
    So, all those variables have to come into play. But you 
just described accurately where I believe the situation 
currently sits, and nations still continue to look at this 
issue and they will still continue to examine it and we'll 
still provide our best military advice, and we'll do so based 
off conditions in the environment at the time.
    Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. I think, again, your answer 
was very edifying in terms of getting clarity on that and, 
again, I think the Ukrainian pilots have done just magnificent 
work and if there's ways that we can get them more jets, I 
think that would certainly be much--you know, beneficial--be 
very beneficial.
    You know, we've heard, again, some of the back and forth 
regarding the speed with which material is getting into 
Ukraine.
    Dr. Wallander, you and I spoke offline a little bit about a 
sometimes-overlooked combatant command, which is TRANSCOM [U.S. 
Transportation Command], and I just wonder if you could just 
kind of give a general sense of just the speed and efficiency 
with which General van Ovost and her team is proceeding to get 
materiel into, you know, NATO and, ultimately, to Ukraine.
    Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman. I mean, it is pretty 
extraordinary, especially since the U.S. has been able to focus 
on the option of Presidential Drawdown to be able to pull the 
kinds of capabilities that the Ukrainians have been 
prioritizing from U.S. stocks, and then through EUCOM, all 
credit to General Wolters and his team, working with TRANSCOM, 
in some cases to move from the moment of approval to actual 
delivery of those capabilities within days and, certainly, you 
know, within weeks.
    So, it's been an extraordinary effort by the U.S. military 
and it's made a difference on the battlefield for Ukrainian 
forces fighting Russia.
    Mr. Courtney. As General Omar Bradley once said, strategy 
is for amateurs. Logistics is for professionals. And I think 
TRANSCOM has really risen to the task and shown that they are 
true professionals.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin [presiding]. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Wallander, I have a question for you first and 
these questions are based on the limited information we have 
been given out so far on the Nuclear Posture Review.
    We have seen three paragraphs. We haven't seen the full 
review. But even with that, there are some serious concerns 
that I have, based on that language.
    It seems that the declaratory policy of the use of nuclear 
weapons has been narrowed, that it will be only to deter 
nuclear attack and there's no mention of deterring nonnuclear 
strategic attack or to achieve any other U.S. objectives. And 
to me, the more limit that we have on our range of action, that 
gives more freedom of action to potential adversaries.
    So, is that a limitation for sure and, if so, did you have 
any conversations with allies or partners about this narrowing 
of our policy?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, thank you.
    To your second question first, the U.S. has consulted with 
allies on the Nuclear Posture Review, previewing some of its 
outcomes.
    My understanding--I wasn't in those consultations 
personally myself, but the reports I have is that allies were 
very satisfied and did not have concerns about the content of 
the Nuclear Posture Review--the language.
    The Nuclear Posture Review language does not apply 
exclusively to nuclear attack but extends to extreme 
circumstances that would require the United States to defend 
allies and partners. I'm misquoting the precise language, but 
there is absolutely a provision that is continuity with 
previous posture review statements.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, on that we can continue our 
conversation after we see the full review--that would be very 
helpful--when that comes out.
    General Wolters, I have a question for you based also on 
the limited information we have on the NPR [Nuclear Posture 
Review]. Admiral Richard has said that the nuclear-armed sea-
launched cruise missile [SLCM-N] is intended to deny potential 
adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear 
employment would provide an advantage over the United States, 
its allies, and partners.
    So, if we're going to limit the--or do away with the future 
of funding for the SLCM-N, to me, that goes against what 
Admiral Richard has said about it. Do you agree with what 
Admiral Richard said about the utility of the SLCM-N?
    General Wolters. I do, Congressman, and I know his words 
were attempting to drive home the fact that having multiple 
options exacerbates the challenge for the potential enemies 
against us.
    Mr. Lamborn. Exactly. Exactly. So, it would be your best 
military advice that we continue the development of that 
particular option?
    General Wolters. It would, and I agree with Admiral 
Richard.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. And a follow-up question, 
General Wolters. The proposed budget of the Biden 
administration would retire the B-83 gravity bomb. As you 
recall, a decision was made a few years ago to keep it in 
effect until other capabilities would supplement that 
capability. Were you asked for your best military advice about 
retaining the B-83 capability?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I was not on that particular 
issue. I'm only familiar with it as a result of what's coming 
next and I know that Admiral Richard is making sure that 
there's no gap. But that's as far as I can go with that one.
    Mr. Lamborn. So, can you comment on your best military 
advice about using the B-83 currently to deter aggression in 
your AOR?
    General Wolters. Again, it's--I would concur with the 
utilization of that to complicate the challenges of the enemy 
against us as long as there's not another system that is in 
place, and I know that's part of the issue with the transition.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. That's all I have for now, Mr. 
Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Garamendi is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    [No response.]
    Mr. Langevin. Mr. Garamendi is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We might add to 
that question that you just raised, Mr. Lamborn, what is the 
cost of keeping all of this and what are the options that may 
have a higher priority.
    But that's not my question. We often hear here the word 
multi-domain. One of the things we occasionally hear is that 
information is a powerful weapon, and the question arises about 
information for the Russian people about what is actually 
happening in Ukraine.
    So, my question to both of you is what is the status of our 
information efforts to enlighten the Russian people about what 
their leader is doing to their brothers and sisters in Ukraine? 
So, let's start with Ms. Wolters.
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, information in 
the hands of the Russian government has been a weapon. It's 
been a weapon that they've been less successful in deploying to 
the effect they seek and that is precisely because, as you 
point to, the U.S. allies in the global community have 
ourselves utilized information, which in our case is true 
information--facts, not disinformation--to set the record 
straight, and the impact--I'll just say the impact of that 
information is made clear by the efforts that the Russian 
government makes to try to prevent that information getting to 
the Russian people, and they're not completely successful but 
it is an ongoing struggle to get that information.
    Mr. Garamendi. Completely missed my point. What is the 
Department of Defense doing, and larger, what is the U.S. 
government doing to bring information to the Russian people? 
That is, to get information past the censorship that Putin has 
employed in his country?
    So, specifically, what are you doing?
    Dr. Wallander. So, we can talk about--in greater detail in 
the session this afternoon. I would defer to that setting.
    Mr. Garamendi. General Wolters, is the answer the same from 
you at this hearing?
    General Wolters. Sir, I can elaborate more in a closed 
session. But what I can say is in the military dimension here 
at USEUCOM we have a large program that targets that very issue 
in Ukraine and with the nations on the periphery.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, I then will await the classified 
hearing. With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Mr. Wittman is now recognized for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our 
witnesses for joining us today.
    General Wolters, I want to expound upon the point that's 
been made about the timeliness of getting these munitions and 
supplies to the Ukrainians, and we know that's particularly 
important as we are working to get those thousands of Stinger 
missiles and Javelins to the forces there.
    There is, I think, sometimes a lack of clarity about how 
that's being accomplished and what the urgency is with that. 
But I wanted to get your assessment on the demand signal from 
Ukraine.
    Where is that? Is it being met? Is the demand signal going 
to get greater? And what about from our European allies that 
are helping send weapons there and what we're going to do to 
help backfill some of that?
    We had an earlier question in those areas. And have you 
evaluated the potential operational availability of things like 
MANPADS [man-portable air defense systems] in Ukraine and look 
at all the different aspects that are there about what we can 
do to help Ukraine in many different ways?
    I argue that the tide is potentially starting to turn in 
what the Ukrainians are able to do to the Russians. The 
Russians right now are limited in their maneuver, which is a 
big advantage for the Ukrainians.
    The problem is, is that we're at one of those tipping 
points that if we really don't go all in to help them, then 
they won't have a chance to defeat the Russians.
    I think defeat--defeating the Russians, which wasn't on the 
table, I would say, 35 days ago, is on the table now. So, give 
me your perspective on the demand signal and the backfill for 
our allies and what we have, going forward?
    General Wolters. Well, Congressman, we actually want to 
connect the dots for the demand signal and the input, and with 
the input process, there are human beings that are involved in 
that input process and protecting that their livelihood is very 
important.
    So, the mode of delivery, the diversification of those 
modes of delivery and, obviously, the end game is getting the 
right stuff to the right soldier at the right time and all 
those variables have to come into the equation.
    And I will tell you that with each passing day, we iterate 
with this with greater thinking, greater alliance involvement, 
and greater connective tissue with our counterparts inside of 
Ukraine, and that process has to continue, and it has to be 
looked at every second of the day because as the campaign 
changes over time, what's good for yesterday might not be 
what's good for tomorrow. So, all that has been taken into 
account.
    Congressman, it's not perfect and I hope, when you get a 
chance to come visit us, that you'll be able to visit some of 
the troops that are involved in this process and they're 
targeting this very issue.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Wolters. I look forward to 
that visit.
    Dr. Wallander, Stingers are a tremendously capable weapons 
platform. The challenge is they're circa 1960s weapons 
platform. We're using them at an extraordinary rate. So, the 
question then becomes what are we doing, going forward, to 
replenish our short-range air defense system?
    Those short-range tactical weapons incredibly important, 
but we're going to have a big hole in our inventory. So, the 
question is is what can we do to replenish those stockpiles? Is 
it smart to replenish them with a circa 1960s weapon? Are we 
doing anything in the long term for short-range air defense 
systems?
    So, give us your perspective on what we're going to do with 
that because that does--while helping Ukraine today does create 
a challenge for us in the months and years to come.
    Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman, you've absolutely 
identified a challenge that we've--we're grappling with at the 
Department of Defense, and also many of our allies and partners 
who've generously made contributions to Ukraine are asking 
questions also about replenishing their stock.
    The Under Secretary for A&S--Acquisition and Sustainment--
is leading an effort in the Department to look at the defense 
industrial base, to look at our authorities, and to look at 
funding in order to address exactly this challenge. It's just 
beginning, but I think you'll begin to hear about this because 
it is something we have to address.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good.
    I mentioned Stingers. That's one part of it. But there are 
a lot of different moving parts, as General Wolters talked 
about, in things that are going into theater, parts that are 
moving around.
    Give me your perspective on where the future challenges are 
not just with Stingers but other parts of our inventory. And 
then are there lessons that we are learning about logistics in 
this whole effort to be able to supply our friends in Ukraine 
and help our allies in Europe get resupplied?
    As General Eisenhower once said--he said tactics are for 
amateurs; logistics are for professionals, and we want to make 
sure we understand the logistics chain on this.
    Dr. Wallander. Well, from a--I'll just speak narrowly from 
a policy perspective. We do--we are doing an assessment of the 
needs because we're hearing from individual allies and partners 
about their concerns.
    We want to bring a comprehensive assessment to Congress and 
work with you exactly on thinking forward and not just running 
after the problem.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
    Ms. Speier is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    [No response.]
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. I think we'll come back to Ms. Speier.
    Mr. Norcross is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate it. And 
fascinating discussion, certainly, from our industrial base and 
the idea of the Stingers, what we are using from our strategic 
reserves, what other NATO countries are supplying.
    But incredibly important that we understand that for every 
Stinger that is leaving our inventory, it keeps us in a more 
precarious situation because, as we know, the line is not hot 
now and what it's going to take. Certainly agree with Mr. 
Wittman is do we want to recreate the old ones or move into new 
ones and that's a discussion we're looking forward to.
    But, General Wolters, I wanted to talk to you about the 
invasion. I think by virtually all estimates that Russia is not 
doing anywhere near what we expected them to do in Ukraine.
    When we look at that, did Russia overestimate their 
ability? Did we look at their capabilities thinking they would 
do better? Or is it the Ukrainian response? If you could give 
some clarity on there. Have we overestimated what Russia has 
outside of their nuclear stockpile, their conventional forces?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I think we have fair 
agreement in the hardware, software, and human capacity. I 
think what we have to take into account is the fact that it's a 
little bit of both.
    The will and determination of the Ukrainian citizens--
there's 44 million Ukrainians and every single one of them is 
contributing; and then you just take a look at the capability 
of the Russian military and they are certainly challenged.
    And as we all know we all had plans, and when the invasion 
starts, what you thought was going to happen typically doesn't 
happen and you have to go to alternate COAs [courses of 
action], and that's a test of the flexibility at the strategic 
level all the way down to the tactical level of the military. 
And I contend that Russia has been challenged in that area and 
that reflects in their overall performance.
    Mr. Norcross. So, had we overestimated? And outside of the 
Ukrainian resistance and what they're doing in the fight, have 
we overestimated their technical abilities, particularly with 
the Russian armor?
    General Wolters. We may have, Congressman, and I think once 
we get to the post-conflict phase we need to go back to these 
very areas and make sure that we conduct a comprehensive all-
domain after-action review and find out where our 
miscalculations were in our forecast.
    Mr. Norcross. Well, rather--absolutely. I have to agree 
with that, that what implications that will mean for our force 
structure and what we're working on, certainly, in the European 
theater.
    But thank you for that insight, and I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Norcross.
    Mr. Scott is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Doctor and General, thank you for being here. I know we 
have had a lot of discussion about the Ukraine lately. I think 
the world owes President Zelensky and the Ukraine a great thank 
you.
    I fall into the category of Vladimir Putin had no 
intentions of stopping with Ukraine. The Russians have been 
across the border in both Georgia and Moldova for a number of 
years. Georgia and Moldova have recently officially applied to 
the European Union for admission.
    Could the two of you speak to that particular issue and 
what that means for European security, and if you expect Russia 
to be more aggressive towards those countries because of that 
application?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman, for highlighting 
that while even as we're focused on Ukraine, there are other 
countries in the Euro-Atlantic space that are vulnerable to 
Russian coercion and influence.
    Moldova and Georgia have long suffered unresolved conflicts 
that Russia uses to keep its own corrupt influence inside those 
countries and to prevent--to try to prevent their Euro-Atlantic 
aspirations.
    But as you note, it hasn't. The people of those countries 
do continue to hold those aspirations and their leaderships 
continue to work on democracy, rule of law, anti-corruption, 
and the Russian invasion of Ukraine just highlights the 
importance of sustaining those--the United States sustaining 
those efforts, along with our European allies and partners.
    Mr. Scott. I think it's just important to note that, 
assuming Ukraine--the Ukrainians win and are able to force the 
Russians out, Russia is still across the border in other 
countries and we need to restore those territorial--the 
integrity of those territorial boundaries as well before the 
world believes that this Russian aggression is over.
    I do think, and I've mentioned this a couple of times, I do 
think that we, as the United States, and NATO needs to be 
developing a Black Sea strategy because of the importance of 
the trade that comes out of that region for the world.
    And I don't mean to sound like a broken record but the raw 
materials for fertilizer, the amount of wheat and grain that 
comes out of that part of the world, it's very concerning to me 
that transit is shut down, and while the Montreux Agreement 
guarantees freedom of passage for civilian or commercial 
vessels during peacetime, my understanding is that that is shut 
down now.
    Is that correct, that civilian vessels and commercial 
vessels because of the conflict are not transiting in and out, 
whether it be because of insurance costs or other reasons?
    General Wolters. Congressman, to your first point, I 
couldn't agree more about comprehensive defense with respect to 
all of the regions in Europe and what we do in the Black Sea 
and what we do in the Baltics and what we do in the North Sea.
    We can't just get myopically focused on today with what's 
taking place with Ukraine and Russia. We have to image our way 
through the next 5 or 10 years and we're doing that.
    With respect to the Black Sea, there is still small travel 
back and forth with small commercial vessels for the 
appropriate reasons.
    But Turkey is the owner of the Montreux declaration, and I 
would just characterize what they're doing in this arena as 
very, very picky with who goes through and they're doing that 
for justifiable purposes to make sure that they, too, can 
protect against strategic miscalculations. But we need to get 
back in the Black Sea and it needs to occur sooner rather than 
later.
    Mr. Scott. Well, countries like Georgia can't export or 
import without access to the Black Sea and I just--I think we 
need to be paying attention to the other countries as well as 
Ukraine.
    One thing I would mention to you, the--and I think that 
what has happened in Europe has kind of reinforced this with 
the committee--every year, the DOD--I'll pick on the Air Force 
on this one--comes to us with a list of weapons that they want 
to stand down.
    They have for the last 10 years come to us and said, we 
want to stand down a certain number of A-10s. It has long been, 
I believe, the belief of the majority of the committee that 
before we stand down a weapon system that weapon system should 
be offered to countries that share our interests and our 
values.
    General, do you think that the DOD will take a stronger 
look at sharing those weapon systems with others who share our 
interests and our values instead of simply standing them down 
as we push forward?
    General Wolters. I think they will, Congressman.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you both. I yield.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
    Ms. Speier is now recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I, too, want to add my 
congratulations to Paul for his extraordinary service to this 
committee. It's been a pleasure to work with him.
    To our two presenters today, thank you for joining us. Part 
of the conversation today has, I think, underscored the fact 
that we are united both on the Republican and Democratic side.
    But there appears to be this interest in wanting to keep 
poking at the President, and I just want to say, once again, 
that the former President wanted to remove 20,000 troops from 
Germany and was talking about America first as our whole 
policy.
    What we recognize now that it's a united front and that 
NATO's relationship is critical and that we have seen them come 
together.
    General Wolters, you referenced yesterday that there 
probably was a gap in our intelligence gathering relative to 
Russia's prowess. Do you have any more that you can share with 
us about that?
    When I think about the fact that they only spend $69 
billion on their military, we spend $740 billion, seems like we 
should have recognized that they're not up to the task when it 
comes to training and maintaining their weapon systems.
    General Wolters. Congresswoman Speier, there could be a 
gap, and I think what we owe our citizens is once we get into a 
post-conflict environment is to go back and examine that very 
issue to make sure if there is in fact a gap, we rectify it.
    But at this point, I agree with you that there was a degree 
of miscalculation and it's evidenced by the performance of the 
Russian military up to this point, and I think we need to be 
prepared to take a really good look at it.
    Ms. Speier. Do you think that the light air strikes that 
they have actually undertaken has something to do with the fact 
that they're probably not maintaining their fleet?
    General Wolters. I think they're not maintaining their 
fleet of aircraft to the same level of excellence that we do in 
the United States.
    Ms. Speier. Dr. Wallander, we met with Ukrainian members of 
parliament yesterday. Not only are they--is Russia taking 
busloads of people hostage to Russia, they've taken, evidently, 
2,000 children who have been orphaned as a result of this war 
that they engaged in.
    What are we doing to amplify that internationally? To call 
them into question and to recognize the parallels to what was 
going on in World War II?
    Dr. Wallander. Congresswoman, we have seen these reports as 
well and they are both shocking and very concerning. My 
understanding is the State Department is tracking reports of 
these kinds of atrocities and violation--potential violations 
of international law and is working with allies and partners 
globally to track those and to press Russia to cease in the 
activities and to lay the groundwork for holding Russia 
accountable in order to reverse what Russia is doing but also 
make sure that the world doesn't forget.
    Ms. Speier. Well, I hope that we declassify information 
that we have in this regard. We have to amplify the gross 
actions by Russia.
    Dr. Wallander, we have seen evidence of Russia using the 
so-called vacuum bomb in Ukraine, which is--indiscriminately 
targets nearby civilians by literally sucking the air out of 
their lungs.
    I'm concerned that we draw attention to that, that you are 
able to confirm if, in fact, they're using that. I presume that 
those would be, you know, crossing the line and akin to the use 
of chemical and biological and tactical nuclear weapons. Can 
you comment on that?
    Dr. Wallander. We clearly see a change in Russian tactics 
towards more aggressively targeting civilian infrastructure, 
civilian human life, and indiscriminate use of weapons, 
artillery, missiles and the--I believe you're referring to the 
TOS-1A. Yes.
    Ms. Speier. But are we--I think we have a responsibility to 
amplify what we know they're doing that is so heinous, and with 
that, I yield back.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Ms. Speier.
    Mr. DesJarlais is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Wolters, I'm becoming increasingly concerned about 
what appears to be intel [intelligence] community failures over 
the past year. We were told that Afghanistan nationals would 
hold for at least 6 months, and we were told that Ukraine would 
probably fall in only a few days. I'm not sure we gamed a 
scenario.
    The intel community did a great job in predicting the 
invasion, the amount of troops, the number of tanks, but here 
we are on day 34 or 35 and I don't think it was gamed beyond, 
you know, the initial 2 to 3 days.
    In Congress, we rely on these assessments to allocate 
resources and weapon systems. How concerned are you about what 
appears to be intel failures and what do we do to correct 
those, moving forward, with looming threats such as China-
Taiwan?
    General Wolters. Congressman, just to be fair, and I know 
you know this as a commander, that the world of a 21st century 
intel officer is very difficult. I often ask our intel 
professionals what is so and so thinking, and as we all know, a 
threat is defined as capability and intent and part of that 
intent is what one human being is thinking.
    And given the structure of how Russia operates, it's very 
difficult to determine where President Putin's head was the 
entire time.
    But I think what we owe each other is once we get the facts 
about how this unfolded and what was said and what was 
accomplished, we need to go back and take a look at our soft 
areas and make sure we fix those.
    And I agree with you. We have had some tremendous work 
conducted by the intelligence community. This one has been 
baffling as a result of Russia's challenges, and the spirit of 
the Ukrainian citizens and their contributions were probably 
areas that we need to examine one more time to make sure that 
we're aware of their contributions to the outcome of a 
campaign.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah. And I'm grateful the way NATO has 
stepped up and, in many ways, led after this conflict 
transpired. Just 3 or 4 years ago, President Trump was accused 
of trying to destroy NATO by asking them to meet their GDP 
assessments.
    It seemed to be pretty prophetic, and now in the face of 
the current conflict and threat these countries are stepping 
up. You mentioned Germany. It's good to see them do that after, 
essentially, free riding the U.S. security guarantees for more 
than a decade and cozying up to Russia economically.
    How do we prevent a backslide in the event that this turns 
out the way we want and how do we keep our NATO allies on 
board?
    General Wolters. Better communication from senior military 
leaders like myself to the North Atlantic Council, to go back 
over and over again and describe to them what their 
contributions when it comes to hardware and software and people 
are doing with respect to our ability to better defend our NATO 
turf.
    And the more we do it, the more we maintain the positive 
campaign momentum in this area and the more we figure out how 
all this contributes to keeping the citizens more safe. It'll 
keep the countries interested, and their level of involvement 
will continue to increase.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I've been disappointed in the President's 
almost schizophrenic messaging before and during this conflict. 
Initially, sanctions were the deterrence and now we have 
learned that sanctions were never meant to deter.
    He had mentioned here recently that we would respond in 
kind to a chemical weapons attack and that, you know, the 
mention of sending MiGs has been brought up several times today 
but it, apparently, was too provocative. But, apparently, 
bringing up a regime change was not too provocative.
    So how is this mixed messaging from the President and the 
White House affecting your ability to conduct operations on the 
ground, and what effect is it having on relationship with our 
allies?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I'll just tell you that the 
alliance unity in NATO is as powerful as I've ever seen it and 
my suspicion is that trend is going to continue. So, in that 
arena, no effect.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And I had one more thing that maybe 
we can talk about in a classified setting. But I'm pleased to 
hear of your support for the sea-launched cruise missile, and I 
guess I would just ask, if Russia did decide to use nuclear 
weapons is it your assessment that they would most likely use 
the low-yield variety and what are the limits of fallout and 
damage from that?
    General Wolters. I'd prefer to address that in a separate 
venue. But what I can tell you is, as a military commander, I 
have to be prepared for Russia to exercise all options and 
that's just one of them.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I look forward to further discussion. Thank 
you both.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Mr. Gallego is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Wallander, thank you for your testimony. I was glad to 
see you highlighted the Baltic Security Initiative in your 
written remarks. As you know, this initiative provides targeted 
defense assistance to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, our three 
key Baltic allies.
    Securing an authorization for the Baltic Security 
Initiative last year was one of my proudest moments in Congress 
and I'm pleased that $180 million was included in the omnibus 
spending package.
    In your written remarks, you also mentioned the Department 
is dedicating funding to this initiative each year. Would you 
share your perspective on the Baltic Security Initiative and 
how you envision it moving forward?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Our Baltic allies 
were among the first and clearest in understanding the 
challenge that Russia poses not only to their security but to 
European security, and they have led, I think it's fair to say, 
a lot of the thinking in NATO about the requirements for 
effective deterrence. And the early iterations of the European 
Reassurance Initiative and all that you mentioned have focused 
on creating that rotational presence that General Wolters 
referred to in his opening remarks and in making--and making 
sure that those forward presence include not just forces but 
the enablers required to make that deterrence effective.
    And the Baltic countries have done a great job of 
cooperating with one another through the Baltic Security 
Initiative in order to make that credibility coherent and sort 
of greater than the sum of its parts.
    They are interested in sustaining multi-allied 
contributions and I think that the American ability to elevate 
the importance of NATO allies continuing to support on a 
multinational basis is something that signals to those 
countries and their citizens that this is an all-of-alliance 
effort.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Are there any particular areas 
where you'd like to see the United States deepen cooperation 
with Baltic States and do you think there's more that we can 
and should be doing to support our Baltic allies?
    Dr. Wallander. I'll mention the focus on sharing and 
helping build resilience in cybersecurity which, again, they 
were leading voices on the importance, having experience 
themselves. But they are front line. The Russian government 
does, and hackers do, target Russian-speaking populations in 
those countries.
    So, I think highlighting the importance of cyber resilience 
and their best practices in helping the rest of us learn would 
be something we need to focus on in the next stages as well.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    General Wolters, I want to ask you about the threat that 
Russia poses in the gray zone. As I've said before, if we draw 
any lessons from the ongoing war in Ukraine it is that we need 
to ensure our allies and partners are too prickly for any 
adversary or competitor to swallow. That's why irregular 
warfare training is so crucial.
    Recognizing that we are in this unclassified setting, what 
insights can you share about how EUCOM is approaching this 
challenge? Are there additional steps we should be taking to 
bolster irregular warfare capabilities throughout EUCOM?
    General Wolters. Congressman, you should exercise, train, 
and act in competition as closely mirrored to how you 
anticipate acting in crisis and conflict, and many of our 
operations, activities, and investments over the course of the 
last several years that you're very familiar with in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, have focused on that very issue, and in so 
doing, taking into account all domains.
    You'll improve your ability to gain in the deterrence arena 
with respect to activities in the competition phase, and then 
as the flip--if the switch is flipped and we wind up in 
conflict or crisis, you're in a position to where the muscle 
memory is correct and you perform better. And that's exactly 
where we have been since 2016 as we kicked off the EFP 
[Enhanced Forward Presence] battle groups in the Baltics.
    And each one of those ops centers that support those 
battalion-sized battle groups over time has grown more aware of 
activities in the gray zone and have become more effective in 
what we can do with respect to all-domain deterrence.
    Mr. Gallego. And, General, and that's--it's not just 
limited to the Baltic regions. I think we have seen that 
irregular warfare is--both can serve as a deterrent but also, 
obviously, as a, you know, defensive--to be able to create 
defensive capability for all of our partners in Europe. So, I 
just want to kind of emphasize that.
    Last question. There was--Dr. Wallander, you said that 
Switchblades were approved. Have they been sent to Ukraine?
    Dr. Wallander. Those are in the package that is in process 
of being delivered.
    Mr. Gallego. And in the process of being delivered as in 
the actual package being delivered, not as in, like, the 
theoretical wording of the package?
    Dr. Wallander. Yeah, and we can't get into operational 
details in this session, but we can talk in greater detail in 
the next session.
    Mr. Gallego. Okay. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Gallagher is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
    General Wolters, Commandant Berger has written about future 
Marine expeditionary advanced bases operating potentially in 
EUCOM that could provide ground and aerial sensing, EW 
[electronic warfare], cyber effects, long-range fires to 
counter Russia. How would Marines with those capabilities 
affect your options as a combatant commander?
    General Wolters. They dramatically enhance our options, 
Congressman, and, as you know, we have Exercise Cold Response 
ongoing as we speak and the Commandant just paid a good visit, 
and what we're seeing out of II MEF [II Marine Expeditionary 
Force] and what we're seeing out of the--out of the MAW [Marine 
Aircraft Wing] is doing exactly just what you alluded to. A 
brown-water force that can shoot, move, and communicate and is 
very, very expeditionary is priceless for 21st century 
security.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, is this some of the stuff we have heard 
about, 2d Marine Division potentially working in cooperation 
with the 6th Fleet to do ASW [anti-submarine warfare] 
operations, sensing operations? Could you elaborate on that a 
little bit?
    General Wolters. All of that is ongoing in all domains, and 
the guidance as we embrace Cold Response--it's an exercise 
that's proceeding as we speak--is to get all of us to stretch 
our left and right buoys, and you can't succeed if you just 
occupy one domain and attempt to achieve effects in one domain.
    So, the Marines are doing a fantastic job of leading from 
the front and showing the rest of us how to do it right, 
especially in the brown-water environment.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, you, as the combatant commander, see a 
lot of promise in these experimental efforts?
    General Wolters. Absolutely.
    Mr. Gallagher. On a similar note, as the size of our 
amphibious fleet has diminished over the years, EUCOM no longer 
receives a MEU [Marine expeditionary unit] 365 days a year for 
24/7 active crisis response.
    If the inventory supported it, would you benefit from 
having a MEU that was enabled by both tactical aviation and 
Group 5 UAS [unmanned aerial systems] that's capable of 
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance and would be on 
station 365 days a year?
    General Wolters. I would, Congressman. But as you well know 
as a commander, you never get everything that you want. But 
certainly, those capabilities are precious for effective 
deterrence.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. On a different note, in the 
months leading up to February 24th--the invasion of Ukraine by 
Russia--did you consider it part of your mission to deter a 
Russian invasion of Ukraine?
    General Wolters. Yes.
    Mr. Gallagher. And what were you doing in order to deter 
the Russian invasion of Ukraine?
    General Wolters. Improving our NATO security disposition in 
all regions and in all domains, not just isolated on the 
periphery and inside of Ukraine.
    Mr. Gallagher. So you, as the combatant commander, felt you 
were part of a interagency effort intended to deter Vladimir 
Putin from invading Ukraine?
    General Wolters. That's correct. Deter and dissuade.
    Mr. Gallagher. Deter and dissuade. And then on February 
24th, Vladimir Putin, of course, invaded Ukraine. Correct?
    General Wolters. Correct.
    Mr. Gallagher. Now, you could argue they invaded Crimea in 
2014. He had, you know, infiltrated the Donbas before that. 
But, nonetheless, in light of that fact, which is, indeed, a 
fact, would it be fair to say that deterrence failed in 
Ukraine?
    General Wolters. Number one, I would say that NATO's 
solidarity remained and NATO's ability to effectively deter 
remained, and I can't argue with your conclusion.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, deterrence failed to--in Ukraine. 
Specifically, integrated deterrence failed in Ukraine. And I 
don't bring that up to score a partisan point.
    I just think it's worth understanding why that happened, 
particularly as we now have anonymous senior Pentagon officials 
bragging to the Washington Post about the success of integrated 
deterrence in Ukraine.
    Now, it may be true that right now NATO is as unified as 
it's been in decades. I celebrate that fact. And the fact that 
Russia has not expanded its war into NATO territory is a good 
thing.
    But it is also a low bar for geopolitical success, and the 
fact remains, as you have just confirmed, that we attempted to 
deter an invasion of Ukraine, largely using nonmilitary 
instruments of national power, and that attempt failed.
    Now, it may be true that nothing could have deterred Putin 
from doing this. We'll never know. That's a counterfactual. But 
integrated deterrence as conceptualized by the Pentagon and as 
implemented in the specific case of Ukraine, as a matter of 
fact, failed.
    And I yield my second.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I, too, wanted to 
extend my thanks to Paul for his many years of service. I had 
gotten to know him over the years and he's just a quality, 
professional individual, and I just hate to see him go. But 
congratulate him on this next phase in his life.
    The war in Ukraine is reshaping the future of U.S.-Russia 
relations. I am very supportive of the steps the United States 
and the international community have taken to hold Putin and 
Russia as accountable and isolate him and his oligarchs from 
the global economy.
    However, one of the areas of mutual interest had been the 
extension of the New START treaty [Treaty on Measures for the 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms] 
to 2026. We must not forget about the potential for arms 
control agreements to lessen the threat of nuclear conflict.
    Dr. Wallander, how will the ongoing crisis impact future 
arms control opportunities with Russia and, perhaps, even one 
step further, China?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, thank you for highlighting the 
importance of arms control as an instrument of security policy.
    Arms control can serve national security policy by 
enforcing and reinforcing constraints and restraints, and 
especially constraints on dangerous weapons, especially in the 
nuclear enterprise.
    Russia has shown no indications that it doesn't value that 
treaty and continue to comply with it, and the United States 
will continue to focus on making sure that Russia complies, and 
we continue to have the arms control dialogue with Russia on 
that treaty.
    I can't really speak to Chinese strategic thinking on this. 
But I think that the message to China is not only that the U.S. 
values arms control and lives by it, but when Russia has 
violated arms control treaties the United States has called it 
out.
    So, the importance of compliance, I think, is a clear 
message both to Russia and to China.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    The Department made it clear it did not support Poland's 
proposal to transfer MiG-29s to the Ukraine military due to 
existing effectiveness of anti-tank weapons and air defense 
systems, in addition to the concern Russia can mistake this 
transfer as escalatory.
    Countering Russia's air capabilities is critical for not 
only military operations but to protect civilians. I am the 
first to say that we must do everything in our power to not 
escalate the situation, which is why I have expressed my 
concern with calls for establishing a NATO-enforced no-fly zone 
over Ukraine.
    However, the MiG-29--if the MiG-29 proposed transfer was 
deemed unacceptable due to the risk and we sadly continue to 
see civilians being targeted, a question for both witnesses: 
What can the international community do to bolster Ukrainian 
capabilities to counter Russia's air power and protect 
civilians?
    Dr. Wallander. So, the air defense and anti-air 
capabilities that Ukraine possesses has been deploying to good 
effect and which has been a major focus of U.S. and other 
country provisions of security assistance has enabled the 
Ukrainian forces to prevent Russia from achieving air 
superiority, from holding back Russian air operations, which 
not only protects Ukrainian military formations but, as you 
note, helps to prevent attacks on civilians.
    It doesn't prevent all of them. General Wolters can speak 
to that in more detail. But it has played a role.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    General Wolters.
    General Wolters. Congressman, just as you said, we have to 
continue to iterate as the campaign progresses and make sure 
that process-wise for supply and demand to the Ukrainian armed 
forces they get what they need for campaign effectiveness. And 
what they may need tomorrow is different than what it was last 
week, and if we're not prepared to adjust and iterate to 
support that, we won't be as effective as we can be to help 
save lives on Ukrainian territory.
    And that's a process that we're continuing to work on, and 
we have to make sure that we maintain a strong dialogue. But we 
also bear the responsibility to guard against the strategic 
miscalculation that you alluded to.
    So, we can't rest for 1 second. We have got a lot of work 
to do out in front of us to make sure that the Ukrainian armed 
forces are getting the right gear at the right time based off 
where they are in the campaign.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I'm out of time.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Wallander, we're not sending the 82nd Airborne into 
Ukraine, right?
    Dr. Wallander. Correct.
    Mr. Gaetz. And regime change in Russia is not the policy of 
the United States, is it?
    Dr. Wallander. Correct.
    Mr. Gaetz. And, God forbid, if the Russians use chemical 
weapons, we would not respond by using chemical weapons against 
the Russian people, right.
    Dr. Wallander. Correct.
    Mr. Gaetz. So why does the President keep speaking out 
against U.S. policy?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, the President has made clear 
that he has not changed U.S. policy on regime change.
    Mr. Gaetz. But why does he speak against it?
    Dr. Wallander. That he is appalled by the horrors as, I 
think, we all are of what Russia----
    Mr. Gaetz. We're all appalled. We're all----
    Dr. Wallander [continuing]. Is wreaking in Ukraine.
    Mr. Gaetz. But how could it not confuse our allies and our 
fellow Americans to have the President saying the exact 
opposite of what you just correctly defined as U.S. policy?
    Dr. Wallander. My understanding from allies is that they 
value U.S. leadership. They are confident in American 
commitment to the NATO alliance and particular the President's 
words that the United States will deter Russian attack against 
NATO and defend every inch of NATO territory.
    Mr. Gaetz. That's all fascinating, but it doesn't get to 
the question of speaking directly against our policies. Does 
the Department of Defense assess that the President is likely, 
going forward, to speak against U.S. policy on other matters?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I can't speak to that. I don't 
believe that there's any such assessment.
    Mr. Gaetz. Maybe should--I mean, do we have a plan in place 
for the next moment, right? I mean, because this didn't happen 
once. It didn't happen twice. It happened three times on, like, 
highly consequential stuff like regime change and chemical 
weapons and sending our service members into Ukraine.
    And so, I sort of wonder whether or not we have to have 
contingency plans for a President who seems to be a little 
confused on those matters. And you're saying there is no such 
contingency plan?
    Dr. Wallander. I'm telling you, Congressman, that the 
Department of Defense leadership is focused on sustaining and 
advancing American national security policy of this 
administration.
    Mr. Gaetz. Is the Department of Defense leadership 
frustrated by the President's statements against U.S. policy?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I think that is an 
inappropriate characterization of the Defense Department's 
commitment.
    Mr. Gaetz. It's not a characterization. It's a question.
    Is the Department leadership frustrated? I'm not 
characterizing. I'm trying to--I'm trying to ascertain how hard 
this job must be to get our force posture aligned, to get our 
information operations that Mr. Garamendi asked about in line, 
when you've got a President who seems to be misaligned on these 
key questions.
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I can only speak for myself. I 
think it's appropriate and it's--you have the right to ask the 
question.
    Mr. Gaetz. Were you frustrated?
    Dr. Wallander. And so, speaking for myself, I am----
    The Chairman. I'm sorry. You can't badger the witness. If 
you ask a question you got to give her at least 5 seconds to 
say something before you interrupt.
    Mr. Gaetz. Sure.
    The Chairman. Go ahead.
    Dr. Wallander. I am not frustrated. I feel privileged and 
honored to serve the American people and to serve this 
President and this administration.
    Mr. Gaetz. Are you aware of any other officials at the 
Department that are frustrated by this President's 
misstatements of policy?
    Dr. Wallander. I am not.
    Mr. Gaetz. General Wolters, hypersonic weapon systems have 
been used for the first time in this conflict, and the 
committee has received a number of briefings regarding how far 
behind our country is in some of these capabilities.
    How should EUCOM think about hypersonics from--really, from 
a defensive capability, seeing what we have seen on the 
battlefield?
    General Wolters. Congressman, that's a great question, and 
it's all about strategic speed and posture, and every day I've 
got to find a way to adjust our indications and warnings [IW] 
and adjust our command and control and feedback to accommodate 
not just a Mach 1 target but a target that can operate at Mach 
4.5, and if we're not doing this in 2022, we're getting way 
behind.
    So, the efforts are there. We find out what the 
capabilities are. We find out what their locations are. We 
examine the different courses of action of where these systems 
can be utilized, and now we have to adjust fire with our IW 
systems and our ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance] to make sure that we have the best probability 
of capturing a potential strike. And if we're not adjusting 
every second of the day we're making a mistake, and it's a 
constant adjustment in EUCOM as well as SACEUR.
    Mr. Gaetz. Speaking of those adjustments--because I only 
have a moment left--will we see an adjustment in the 
President's proposed budget or to accommodate our updated 
thinking about hypersonics now that we have seen them used in 
Europe?
    General Wolters. Congressman, we will.
    Mr. Gaetz. Very helpful. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm glad my colleague 
is acknowledging who the President of the United States 
actually is.
    I met yesterday with several members of the--of Ukraine's 
parliament, who also emphasized the fact that they are mothers 
as well. And these courageous women were telling a story that 
the soldiers--the Russian soldiers that have been captured or 
killed had protective devices and equipment on them to counter 
chemical warfare or biological weapons as well, and they were 
concerned, given the fact that also Putin has lied about 
Ukraine's having access to biological or chemical weapons and 
that could be used as a false flag as well for their use.
    Can you comment in this setting to the best of your ability 
just to address that issue that they brought up to me?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, we similarly have noted the 
efforts on the part of Russian disinformation operations--
classic--to lay the pretext for a potential false flag about 
chemical--the lies about Ukraine having biological weapons and 
chemical weapons.
    So, we have been tracking it closely and share your 
concern. It would be beyond outrageous for Russia to step over 
that bound and we share your concern and focus on that issue.
    Mr. Keating. General Wolters, I don't know--they didn't 
describe what particular equipment they had but do you think 
that their concern is justified?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I think the fix in this area 
is get the truth out at speed so that you can make a 
difference, and we are dramatically improving our ability to 
sense what is said and to respond quickest and in the 
information domain to arrest the false flags that occur.
    That's the change that we need to make, and we are making, 
and I see a higher degree of effectiveness in this campaign 
than I've witnessed before and it's just because we have drawn 
on some pretty severe lessons learned from previous 
engagements.
    Mr. Keating. Yeah. I have a concern, too, that--we talked 
about strategic miscalculation, but I'm also concerned with 
public reports about the level of communication between the 
Russians and our own Chair of the Joint Chiefs.
    These things are in place even in the worst times of war 
for deconfliction, and similar kind of miscalculations or--that 
can occur. Does that seem to be a concern?
    Is there anything--is it true to the extent you can talk to 
the--in the setting--about the deteriorating level of 
communication at the highest level of the military, which is 
always there as a safeguard?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I can comment about the 
SACEUR responsibilities that I have to communicate with my 
counterpart in Russia for the purpose of safety deconfliction.
    The attempts have been made constantly over the course of 
the last 90 days. At some point, as we approach closer to the 
campaign that they initiated without us knowing, those 
conversations broke off.
    And I won't speak for the Chairman, but I know he's done 
the same and he's been very, very aggressive with respect to 
seeking that conversation with his counterpart for the purpose 
of safety deconfliction and, unfortunately, those conversations 
haven't occurred.
    Mr. Keating. That's distressing.
    Dr. Wallander, on sanctions, you know, we talked a lot 
about sanctions in this war and their effectiveness with the 
Ukraine, you know, withstanding so much themselves on the 
ground. Nothing compares to what they're doing.
    But these sanctions we're all giving--our European allies 
are, you know, taking some of the pain. We are as well. But the 
sanctions are doing more than just affecting the economy.
    I think they have a strategic effect on Russia's military 
capability as well--things like semiconductors, chips, and 
everything. Can you talk to the effectiveness of some of the 
sanctions on what they're doing to Russia's military 
capability?
    Dr. Wallander. So, Congressman, you rightly point to not 
just the financial sanctions but the restrictions on 
technology.
    Those restrictions will have an effect over time, and my 
understanding from the sanctions package that was chosen is 
that it was designed both to have the effect over time and to 
target precisely Russia's future capabilities so that its 
ability to launch these kinds of military operations against 
its neighbors is severely impacted.
    Mr. Keating. Well, thank you both for your service. I'd 
like to thank Paul for his service, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bacon is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for you both 
being here. Appreciate your leadership.
    And I was with General Wolters'--some of his recently 
retired peers last night and they were singing your praises. 
So, thank you for what you're doing and NATO.
    My main feedback to the administration since, like, 
December, January, and February, is that we were being told, 
yes, Russia has decided to attack, and a lot of the emphasis 
was what we're going to do after the invasion.
    I always felt like we should have put more emphasis on the 
deterrence side of that, and I recommended long-range air 
defenses. I recommended anti-shipping missiles. But I was told 
that that would be provocative. And I think that put us behind 
the eight ball once the invasion occurred.
    And now the Ukrainians are asking for MiG-21s, Su-25s, and 
we're resisting that and we're saying that we need to do long-
range air defenses instead. Now, I do agree that long-range air 
defenses have been very effective against the Russian air 
force.
    But it doesn't do much for the convoys, the tanks, and we 
got to be able to provide the Ukrainians the ability to hit 
those 5,000 or so armored vehicles.
    And I still--it brings me to my question, the Switchblade. 
I think it's a very capable system, but a hundred is not 
enough.
    Do you--would you agree that if they've got thousands of 
these vehicles we're going to have to rate--increase that 
ability to go after these convoys, these tanks, the armored 
vehicles. So that would be my question to General Wolters.
    General Wolters. Congressman, I'm convinced that when we 
get the first set of Switchblades in there'll be an immediate 
request from the Ukrainians for more. So, no argument here.
    Mr. Bacon. It seems imperative that we give them the 
ability to hit these convoys and trucks 20, 30, 40 miles back. 
You know, the Javelins are more in the close-in fight, and I 
think that they could have a tipping point impact.
    My next question involves the F-35. To General Wolters 
again, how important is the F-35 delivery to you and NATO, 
whether it's U.S. or to allies?
    General Wolters. It's critical, Congressman, and we can 
talk more in a classified setting, and I know you're familiar 
with a lot of this.
    But the U.S. F-35As, the four that we have right now, are 
in use and they've been very effective doing some elegant ISR 
activities, and it just reveals to us how much greater 
capability we're going to have once we get our full fleet on 
board.
    And as you well know, the disposition of the NATO nations 
with respect to the F-35 is dramatically growing and our hope 
is--we have a hundred on the continent right now and we 
anticipate in 2030 growing to 550, and that's a good fleet.
    Mr. Bacon. I'm concerned that the President's budget for at 
least the American buy, it's being reduced and I--and we're 
going to have to figure out how to do nuclear modernization 
plus provide these kind of capabilities. I know it's hard to 
balance all that. But I think there's a real cost if we do 
reduce our F-35 buy.
    My third point is more of a comment. I'm on the Baltic 
Security Caucus, co-chair with my colleague, Ruben Gallego, and 
they do say their number one request is permanent U.S. 
presence. And I know you've heard that before. I just want to 
also foot stomp that.
    And also, there's a request for air defense capabilities to 
the Baltics and the MLRS [Multiple Launch Rocket System], and I 
just wanted to make that for the record there.
    My final question really deals with Russian energy and its 
impact on our bases in Europe. Ramstein, Spangdahlem, the new 
hospital, rely on Russian gas. I think that's unacceptable. How 
do we build this resilience into the U.S. bases so we're not 
dependent on Russian gas? And that question to either one of 
you.
    General Wolters. Congressman, I'll take a shot at that 
first.
    As you well know, the Central European Pipeline goes to 
certain nations. We'll continue to work ways to try to expand 
that to the max extent practical, and Europe itself gets 40 
percent of their natural gas from Russia.
    We, in DOD, as you also well know, over the course of the 
last decade and a half have worked on the--on stock reserve 
with respect to petrol and stock reserve with respect to 
generators.
    And in critical infrastructures like the new hospital and 
the current hospital, those have to be available so that we can 
appropriately sustain, and that's very expensive and a tough 
way to do business. But we have to continue to look at ways to 
take that Central European Pipeline and get it out to as many 
folks as possible.
    Mr. Bacon. I've been preaching this concern now for about 3 
years because if Russia turns off their energy and Ramstein is 
so pivotal to what we're doing that the--it doesn't just make 
sense. So, we got to come up with a better resilience plan.
    So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and I thank you 
both for your leadership.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Kim is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I want to thank the two 
of you for coming over here.
    And I don't want to retread too much of what's been asked 
and what will continue to be asked about Ukraine. But I did 
want to just point out my strong urgence to the administration 
to really follow through on the priority lists that the 
Ukrainians are providing us in terms of what security defenses 
are there and for us to take that close look, including on the 
jets, including on the long-range air defense systems and 
things of that nature.
    You know, I think at this stage in the conflict, especially 
when we're seeing this--our own administration highlighting the 
war crimes that are happening against the Ukrainian people that 
we recognize that, you know, some of this equipment, it's not 
offensive capabilities if their country is being invaded.
    You know, these are defensive capabilities that are trying 
to address this. In that kind of capacity, it's not quite 
escalatory in that same way if we're thinking about this as 
that defensive effort.
    So, I just wanted to say that. But look, I know you're 
getting lots of questions on that. What I also wanted to just 
raise is, I know that we have had so many conversations lately 
with our NATO partners about this new era of NATO and what this 
means, going forward, this new posture that we have. I was with 
many of you at the Munich Security Conference when we were 
talking about that just before the war started.
    So as there's this greater solidarity within NATO, I guess 
I wanted to ask you--and I'll start with Dr. Wallander--when we 
look at this threat that NATO is facing and the investments and 
the increased investments that countries are saying that 
they're willing to make, what is that looking like right now in 
terms of the conversations?
    Obviously, there's the security threats that we face with 
Russia right now, and that's important and that's something 
that we need to posture towards.
    But what we also recognize is that, you know, the next 
great threat to NATO may not necessarily come in the form of 
tanks rolling across, you know, Eastern Europe.
    You know, we have had a lot of concerns about cyber, about 
space, about hypersonics, and, honestly, in this room, we have 
talked a lot more about just the greater threat when it comes 
to China and the Chinese government, going forward, even more 
so than we have of Russia.
    So, I guess I wanted to ask, when we're having those 
conversations with our NATO partners about this new mission, 
this new era of NATO, how is that factoring into the broader 
effort? Are we making sure that we're looking at this 
comprehensively across the topography of threats that we face?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, and the answer 
is yes. The Russian aggression has galvanized--and China's 
failure to stand on the right side of history and calling 
Russia out for its aggression, and reports that China may be 
entertaining the thought of helping Russia cope with the 
effects of sanctions and some of the restrictions has really 
galvanized European leaderships and publics to understand that 
China is a global challenge and threat, not just one in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and that China, like Russia, extends its 
malign influence through corruption, through some questionable 
commercial and economic means, and through cyber as well.
    And so, working with NATO and the EU, it is possible now, I 
think, to elevate U.S.-European cooperation on the global 
challenge that China poses and that those conversations are 
happening even as we speak.
    Mr. Kim. Okay. Well, that's good to hear.
    And General, I'd love your thoughts on this as well 
because, you know, as we are talking about NATO, obviously, 
yes, there is immediate concern about NATO's role when it comes 
to this European threat.
    But what we have also known is that, yes, the transatlantic 
alliance and the effort there is focused on Europe as well but 
there's a global role for NATO as well, and that's, certainly, 
something that we have in mind when it comes to even the Indo-
Pacific area.
    So, I'd love your thoughts, just kind of building off of 
Dr. Wallander, your conversations with NATO partners and 
whether or not they understand that gravity of not just 
thinking about this in terms of Russia but more broadly as 
well.
    General Wolters. NATO is very engaged in that area. The 
Secretary General will host a Leaders Summit at the end of June 
in Spain, and he will introduce with the leaders the NATO 2030 
Strategy, and it touches on this very issue by making sure that 
we look inside and outside of our area of responsibility in our 
European continent to grasp all of the issues that could impact 
security for Europe, and obviously the focus on China is part 
of that.
    And the SEC GEN [Secretary General] has been very, very 
loud about that and I'm pleased to report that the NATO 2030 
Strategy will take that into account.
    Mr. Kim. Okay. Well, thank you so very much. I think it's 
just so important that we think about this in that strategic 
plan, not just about, you know, the challenge and the threat 
right at our door, but also thinking about what's down the 
road--you know, what might be coming next.
    So, thank you for your attention to that.
    The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
    Mr. Banks is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General, in layman's terms, can you explain what a 
escalation avoidance strategy actually means?
    General Wolters. Do not enter into World War III.
    Mr. Banks. But what does it mean specifically? I mean, 
what--define it. How does it--how does it apply in this case?
    General Wolters. Every action has a reaction and if that 
reaction gets you closer toward sparking and starting World War 
III, you need to go back and readjust what your activity is.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. On March 25, USNI [U.S. Naval Institute] 
News reported the--that the president of Latvia, President 
Levits, argued that if NATO had reacted more strongly in 2008 
to Russian aggression against neighboring Georgia and the 
Kremlin's 2014 annexation of Crimea, Moscow wouldn't now have 
invaded Ukraine.
    Additionally, he stated that--he said that the appeasement 
tactics, quote, ``are not fruitful.''
    General, has a U.S. escalation avoidance strategy with 
Russia prevented Russian aggression in Ukraine?
    General Wolters. Ensuring that you have NATO unity has 
ensured greater peace across the European continent. With 
respect to your question as it applies to Ukraine and Russia, 
Russia gets a vote on this, and Russia is responsible for their 
invasion.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. General, why did Putin decide to invade 
Ukraine right now?
    General Wolters. I think he felt like he had----
    Mr. Banks. I mean, why not anytime between 2014 and 2022? 
Why didn't he invade or why did he invade now?
    General Wolters. I think he felt like he had popular 
support of the citizens of Russia. I also felt like he was 
attempting to take advantage of fissures that could have 
appeared in NATO as a result of the post-Afghanistan 
environment. And I also think it has to do with his age and his 
efficacy. And all those combined together put him in a position 
to where he elected to go at this time.
    But the overriding variable, in my view, is the fact that 
he believes that he has popular support with his citizens.
    Mr. Banks. Russia's invasion has heightened concerns about 
NATO's ability to defend NATO member states, particularly, the 
Baltic States from a possible Russian military attack.
    What is your assessment for NATO member states' willingness 
and capacity to respond to an intentional or inadvertent attack 
on a NATO member state?
    General Wolters. We have changed and will continue to 
change our military posture not just in Eastern Europe but in 
all quadrants, and that activity, as you are well aware, is 
ongoing, and the degree of cooperation from the nations is as 
strong as we have seen.
    Mr. Banks. The Washington Post reported on March 11th that 
President Zelensky pleaded for the MiG-29 transfer while having 
support from a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers, including 
many of us in this room.
    The Biden administration, citing assessments from senior 
American military commanders in Europe, has said the additional 
aircraft would offer only minimal value to Ukraine, given the 
contested nature of its airspace. Do you still agree with that 
assessment?
    General Wolters. I do, Congressman.
    Mr. Banks. Russia is bombarding Ukrainian civilians. 
Ukraine obviously needs equipment for air defense. What 
equipment should the U.S. or NATO provide Ukraine for it to 
defend itself from Russian aerial attacks?
    General Wolters. I'd like to address this more in a 
classified setting. But it goes directly to your point about 
defining what the problem actually is in the battlespace and 
targeting that problem.
    Mr. Banks. Understood, and I look forward to those answers 
in a classified setting.
    The Trump administration was the first administration to 
provide Ukraine with Javelins and significantly increased 
lethal aid to the Baltic States. Why is the U.S. or its NATO 
partners not supplying more anti-aircraft defense systems to 
Ukraine?
    General Wolters. Sir, again, in a classified setting I can 
give you the contributions per nation in this particular area 
and I think it might clear the air a little bit about what is 
actually going to the Ukrainians.
    Mr. Banks. General, is NATO too concerned with escalation 
to more effectively support Ukraine?
    General Wolters. NATO is very concerned about effectively 
supporting Ukraine and also very concerned about ensuring that 
we manage escalation appropriately.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Kim [presiding]. I will now recognize Ms. Slotkin from 
Michigan.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you to both of you for being here. I 
know we're in hour two here--two and a half--and I can't think 
of two better people to come and talk to us about these issues 
right now, both of you.
    You know, many of us are very affected by this Ukrainian 
parliamentary delegation that's here in town that was sent to 
kind of advocate.
    I met with them this morning and their position is that in 
contrast to what the media is reporting about the negotiations 
between the Ukrainians and the Russians, that the Russians are 
not at all being benevolent about pulling back from cities, 
that, in fact, anywhere they're announcing they're pulling back 
are areas where the Ukrainians are kicking them out.
    Can you speak to that? Is that a correct characterization? 
Do we see anything that connotes any kind of pullback by the 
Russians at all in the name of peace?
    General Wolters. Congresswoman, some small maneuvering of 
forces, I believe for the purpose of adjusting the campaign to 
go into a different geographical region; and as a military 
commander, as you well know, I can't trust anything with 
respect to a potential foe.
    So, we continue to remain vigilant in all areas and we 
certainly anticipate that this area will be readdressed by the 
Russians in the near future.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. We were also told that a new list of 
equipment and support requests was transmitted to the 
Department of State and Department of Defense.
    Are you two aware of this request and, either way, who in 
the Department of Defense is the senior-most person responsible 
for metering out the new request from the Ukrainian government?
    Dr. Wallander. We have a request from the ministry of 
defense as recently as yesterday. I do not know if it's the 
same list as the one you were handed. I'm guessing it is.
    The responsibility for security assistance assessment is 
managed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
including my chain of command, and it is something we work on 
every day.
    Ms. Slotkin. Is there a unit or a task force or some 
emergency group that's been stood up at the Pentagon that's 
specifically looking for the Soviet-era weapons that the 
Ukrainians have so desperately asked us for? And if so, who is 
the head of that unit?
    Dr. Wallander. That would be my--led by my office and in 
cooperation with other components of DOD, including DSCA 
[Defense Security Cooperation Agency], Joint Staff, 
intelligence community, and diplomatic outreach.
    Ms. Slotkin. So, there is a--there is a task force or 
something that's set up or it's housed in your office?
    Dr. Wallander. It's housed in our office.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. Can you just give us the official 
position? You've heard a bunch of us ask about the equipment, 
the planes--the Soviet-era planes. What is the official 
position of the Department of Defense on providing or helping 
to facilitate NATO--excuse me, Russian-made aircraft that the 
Ukrainians have asked for?
    Dr. Wallander. The official policy is that countries that 
wish to donate, that have those Soviet legacy aircraft, it's 
their sovereign decision. We ask those countries, if they're 
NATO allies, to consider the potential escalation dynamics and 
that balancing of risk that General Wolters has explained so 
well. And we are listening to the Ukrainians carefully on what 
they need and working to fulfill their requests as diligently 
as we are able.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. Just a couple of additional questions.
    Dr. Wallander, you've talked about watching the China-
Russia relationship and, obviously, I think, for a lot of us 
here it's very interesting to think about what China is 
learning from all of this.
    We know that there's been some military cooperation 
exercises--those kinds of things. We know there's been talks 
between the Russians and the Chinese. Have you seen any 
evidence, classified or otherwise--just yes or no--that the 
Chinese are working with the Russians on nonconventional 
military means, so cyberattack in particular?
    Dr. Wallander. No.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. Have you seen any other evidence that 
the Chinese are aiding and abetting the Russians other than 
sort of the kind of conversations that they've been having and 
sort of the basic supplies that they've been providing, things 
like MREs [Meals Ready-to-Eat]?
    Dr. Wallander. No.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. And then, lastly, I would just say, you 
know, I think there's a lot of interest in sort of the future 
of NATO with Finland and Sweden making noises about being 
interested, with other countries like North Macedonia trying to 
get in.
    Just very briefly, is there any plan to change the 
criteria, to think differently about how fast NATO membership 
goes, knowing that it's typically a very slow process?
    Dr. Wallander. I'm not aware of any assessment to change 
the timeline. The criteria remain the same and the membership 
is driven by the desire and the requests of potential new 
allies.
    Ms. Slotkin. Appreciate it. I think North Macedonia is the 
one that we hope will be broken in sooner rather than later for 
a whole bunch of reasons.
    But thanks very much for your time. I yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you.
    Mr. Waltz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I just want to build on the comments of some of my 
colleagues, and I think we need to recognize, and we need to do 
so in a very clear-eyed way, that deterrence did fail, the fact 
that we have cities that are now leveled.
    It's notable that NATO is now unified. It's notable that 
Germany is reversing its long-held positions, whether it's on 
energy or on its defense spending. But we have 4 million 
refugees and cities that are leveled because deterrence failed.
    So just to be clear, General Wolters, you agree deterrence 
failed?
    General Wolters. Reference to the perimeters that you just 
talked about, no argument.
    Mr. Waltz. I mean, saying that our Asian allies are unified 
after Taipei is leveled, we need to apply these lessons and 
these failures and lessons learned on what failed up front.
    I think on top of the lack of response 2018; lack of 
response in 2014; we now had New START, which is the Russians' 
top priority, extended cleanly with, really, nothing in return; 
lack of response to the Colonial Pipeline; the lifting of 
sanctions on Nord Stream 2; not to mention the Germans' and 
others' posture beforehand. And I think part of that when I was 
out on a visit was the continual message that we heard out in 
Kyiv was that the weapons that the Ukrainians were asking for 
as recently as December would have been too escalatory, 
including the Stingers.
    General, would it have made a difference if the Ukrainians 
had had Stingers months ago, had the opportunity to train on 
them and had them on day one--would that have made an 
operational difference in their ability to fight?
    General Wolters. Congressman, it could have, and as we 
talked about before in our discussions yesterday, as we always 
do in the military, which you're very familiar with, we have 
got to go back and scrub this from cradle to grave and make 
sure in every potential soft spot we look where some of the 
flaws are and make corrections, and that may very well be one 
of the areas. I don't know.
    Mr. Waltz. I mean, in fact, we were told that we couldn't--
the United States couldn't give--this committee was told that 
we couldn't give them Stingers because we didn't have any 
export variants, only to find out 8 weeks later it was 
literally three screws and a component that had to be taken 
off. And I think we owe that to the Ukrainians and we owe that 
honest assessment to ourselves.
    In the same vein, we talk about how sanctions are biting on 
the Russian logistics system. Would it have been effective if 
we had had those sanctions 6 months ago in place and more 
effective now?
    General Wolters. It could have been, and we need to scrub 
that as well.
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. Just switching to the Black Sea, which we 
talked about as well, do we currently have any U.S. ships in 
the Black Sea?
    General Wolters. We do not.
    Mr. Waltz. When were--when did those--I believe it was two 
DDGs [guided-missile destroyers]--when did they move out?
    General Wolters. It was in the January timeframe.
    Mr. Waltz. Preinvasion?
    General Wolters. Preinvasion.
    Mr. Waltz. That was a policy decision to vacate the Black 
Sea?
    General Wolters. It was.
    Mr. Waltz. Dr. Wallander, what was the policy decision to 
essentially cede an ocean or cede the Black Sea--excuse me--to 
the Russian navy?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I was not in office at the 
time, but I owe you an answer and I will get back to you with 
an answer of the assessment.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 101.]
    Mr. Waltz. Okay. But your assessment now, we are not 
putting any force structure in now to--I mean, literally, as 
Russian ships are bombarding Mariupol, and by the way, we 
didn't give Harpoons because those could have been too 
escalatory.
    So, let's speak to the now. But I would appreciate an 
answer. I mean, what I understood is the policy decision was 
that ships in the Black Sea would be too escalatory and we 
didn't want to provoke the Russians.
    I think we're seeing a theme here that we need to be very, 
very careful of as we move forward and that a fear of 
escalation could actually invite the escalation from the other 
side.
    But in terms of the ships now and are--General, are we 
flying over the Black Sea now with any military assets?
    General Wolters. We are, Congressman.
    Mr. Waltz. Directly over? Or not on the periphery but 
actually----
    General Wolters. We are overflying the Black Sea with 
unmanned aerial systems and in the southern portion with manned 
systems and commercial.
    Mr. Waltz. Great. Last question. In terms of training the 
Ukrainians outside of Ukraine, are we conducting any training 
of the Ukrainians outside of Ukraine?
    General Wolters. We are not, Congressman. There is some 
advising taking place with liaison officers to ensure that we 
can get the----
    Mr. Waltz. Right. Why--Dr. Wallander, as a policy matter 
why are we not training them?
    Dr. Wallander. I am not aware of any requests from the 
Ukrainians to train outside. So, I'm----
    Mr. Waltz. Ukrainians don't want to be trained on the 
weapon systems that we're providing them?
    Dr. Wallander. I believe the Ukrainians are fighting in the 
country at this time. I am not aware of any requests. But I owe 
you a good answer on whether we have received such requests.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 102.]
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I will let people know we're breaking at 12:30. So, if we 
don't get to your questions in the public session, we are 
having classified session at 1 o'clock.
    We'll prioritize people who were not able to ask a question 
here in the classified section. But at 12:30 we turn into a 
pumpkin. We give these folks a break before we then do the 
classified session at 1:00. So, we'll get to as many as we can 
before then.
    With that, Ms. Sherrill is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I echo many of 
the chairman's comments on Paul Arcangeli. I'm sorry to see him 
go.
    General Wolters, with the establishment of a Theater Fires 
Command in Europe, will the Army looked to deploy more ground-
based surface-to-surface indirect fire assets such as the ERCA 
[Extended Range Cannon Artillery] to the European theater, 
especially given that, currently, Russian artillery outranges 
ours?
    General Wolters. Congresswoman, that's a possibility, and I 
hearken back to post-conflict with what is taking place right 
now after we have a deep scrub with respect to an after-action 
review.
    This will be one of the areas that we address. But the 
theater fires construct is exactly what we need and we're 
excited about going forward with that.
    Ms. Sherrill. So, in that vein, will these systems--do you 
expect they'll meet the needs of--these type of systems meet 
the needs of the Theater Fires Command or are you going to look 
towards more ground-based extended-range hypersonic projectiles 
such as the SLRC [Strategic Long Range Cannon]?
    General Wolters. We'll look at as many domains as we 
possibly can to use those capabilities and, again, we'll be 
able to fine-tune our focus once we have a post-conflict scrub 
on this particular area. But, again, as many domains as 
possible is better when it comes to deterrence and defense.
    Ms. Sherrill. And can you speak a little bit more about 
that, about the importance of having an all-weather surface-to-
surface precision fires capability in EUCOM?
    General Wolters. Congresswoman, I'll just state that having 
those capabilities that impact as many domains as possible that 
have the ability to range with precision complicates the task 
for a potential enemy against us. So, it dramatically improves 
your deterrence posture and that's all positive.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And further, regarding the ongoing 
war in Ukraine, we have seen multiple reports regarding the 
Russian military's logistical challenges with stopped convoys, 
abandoned vehicles, and stranded forces, all leading to a loss 
of combat power that's proving deadly to Russian forces on the 
ground.
    Although EUCOM is taking steps to guarantee infrastructure 
that would allow for freedom of maneuver throughout the AOR, 
what steps are we taking to ensure logistical efforts will be 
successful in a contested environment, particularly with fuels 
and/or power sources? Are we looking at new fuels or power 
sources for--to make sure that we maintain our logistics in 
theater?
    General Wolters. We are, Congresswoman, and it first starts 
with the independence that we must possess for the basics. 
That's electricity and gas, and it goes back to some of the 
previous discussions that we have had.
    As you know, we stock additional gas and we stock 
additional generators for the purpose of having expeditionary 
services to go to in the event that certain systems are shut 
down and we need to continue to advance that independence with 
all the areas that you alluded to, and that is actually part of 
future plans.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And then, you know, with respect 
to our preparation and supporting the Ukrainians, under the 
previous administration we know President Trump withheld 
Javelins, contrary to the expectations of this committee. Are 
the Javelins proving to be important in the fight now against 
the Russians for the Ukrainians?
    General Wolters. Yes, Congresswoman.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    And as we're looking towards how we are going to move 
forward united with our NATO and EUCOM partners, Dr. Wallander, 
have you seen this administration working incredibly hard in 
close support with our NATO allies?
    Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congresswoman.
    Ms. Sherrill. And has that been an important part of our 
fight against the--to make sure that we are isolating the 
Russians from the world community?
    Dr. Wallander. It's been vital to isolating Russia, helping 
Ukraine, and sending a credible message to Russia.
    Ms. Sherrill. And as we're looking to support the 
Ukrainians, have we done so in--with our NATO allies and have 
we gotten the Ukrainians much of what they need to be as 
successful as they have been currently in this fight against 
Russia?
    Dr. Wallander. We have been coordinating and communicating 
with NATO allies [inaudible] their willingness and we have been 
communicating many of the requirements that the Ukrainians 
convey to us so that allies that have those capabilities and 
are willing to provide them are able to do so.
    Ms. Sherrill. Well, thank you very much. I was in Ukraine 
meeting with President Zelensky shortly before the Russian 
invasion, and much of what he asked for--the Stingers, the 
Javelins, and the support for ammo on the ground--I see that we 
have provided him, and it seems as if it's been very successful 
for the Ukrainian people in their fight against Russia.
    So, thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Franklin is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Wolters, to follow up on Representative Waltz's 
questions, I'm still a little confused about the messaging on 
what we're doing in Poland. A week ago, the national security 
adviser said we were doing no training.
    Then President Biden said we were. And then yesterday, a 
senior administration official said that U.S. troops help 
Ukrainian forces in Poland load weapons the West gives them. As 
they do so, they provide verbal instruction on how to use the 
weaponry like anti-aircraft missiles but don't lead Ukrainian 
forces through physical drills. Very mixed messaging. It's 
confusing to all of us.
    Did anyone in the White House coordinate any of those 
statements with you as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe?
    General Wolters. No, Congressman.
    Mr. Franklin. I'm not asking you to elaborate in this 
setting, specifically, what we may or may not be doing with 
Ukrainian soldiers. I'll defer that to a classified session.
    What is your military advice on publicly talking 
specifically about how we train the Ukrainians?
    General Wolters. Can you quantify that? I'm having a hard 
time grasping what the question is.
    Mr. Franklin. Well, should we be talking publicly about 
what we're doing specifically on the ground tactically with our 
allies?
    General Wolters. Not publicly, Congressman.
    Mr. Franklin. So, General, I think we have witnessed a 
change in defensive tactics during this invasion of Ukraine 
that few really expected, and we have all seen decimated 
Russian armor columns and the takedown of relatively 
sophisticated fighters by cheap and plentiful weapons.
    I know there will be a lot for tacticians to chew on in our 
war colleges when the war ends. But it already looks clear that 
the 20th century tactics of mass land warfare aren't as 
effective today as they were when Eastern Europe was last 
invaded during World War II.
    Do you think the Ukrainian strategy of low-cost high-volume 
kinetic weapons is a feasible strategy for future conflicts 
against competitor nations?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I'm not familiar with all the 
parameters of the so-called Ukrainian strategy. But I will tell 
you that one of the things that makes a huge difference is 
what's in the heart of the citizens and their support for the 
military activities. And I think after this is all said and 
done, when we go back and take a look at what transpired, that 
is one of the areas that has made a big difference, certainly 
up to this point, and we still have a long ways to go.
    Mr. Franklin. Well, clearly, and we have all been just 
amazed at the tenacity of the Ukrainian fighters and I think 
there's a lot to be said for the training that we have 
conducted side by side with those allies, not just the 
Ukrainians, and also the high impact of relatively low-cost 
things like drones, Stingers, Javelins. You know, it doesn't 
matter how many tanks you have if they can be taken out pretty 
simply with low-tech weapons.
    Do you think the calculus of investing in high-value high-
tech long-build-time systems will or should shift in the DOD to 
favor more nimble and expendable systems?
    General Wolters. Congressman, I think that's going to be 
one of the areas that we have to take a deep look at, and that, 
mixed with capabilities that are less elegant, need to be 
factored into this discussion and we have to be willing to 
listen very closely about what we have learned and then we'll 
make adjustments.
    Mr. Franklin. Finally, last question. Do you see the 
possibility of amending our current offensive and defensive 
strategies with the lessons we're learning in Ukraine and, if 
so, what might those look like? And I know it's early to be 
making those kinds of assessments.
    General Wolters. I think we have to always be willing to 
adapt to change and listen to every possible input in every 
part of any conflict, and this is one of the areas that no 
matter how insignificant we think some issue may be we have got 
to pay attention to it. And I think if we're a good learning 
organization, which the Department certainly is, we'll take all 
that into account as we press forward.
    But, yes, we have to learn from what unfolded in this 
particular conflict. We still have a long ways to go, though.
    Mr. Franklin. Thank you, General, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Crow is recognized. When he's done, we're going to take 
our break at 12:30. We'll reconvene at 1 o'clock upstairs for 
the classified portion of the hearing.
    Mr. Crow is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to both of 
you for coming in today.
    I wanted to start by just addressing a comment that one of 
my colleagues made earlier about concerns about intelligence 
failures. And General Wolters, you had said that you guys would 
conduct an assessment of where you were soft and areas where 
you can improve, which I appreciate.
    But, you know, I sit on both the Armed Services and the 
Intel Committee, and I have to say we nailed it. Starting back 
last fall, we started to determine what was happening.
    We were ringing the alarm bells and we engaged in an 
unprecedented public engagement and private engagement with our 
allies, with the international community, releasing, 
declassifying information, getting the Ukrainians prepared to 
address this.
    You know, this is, in my view, one of our generation's 
finest intelligence successes and something that I think we 
should talk more about. And I just wanted to say that, and I 
hope you all agree because, yes, we can always improve and 
that's the military mindset, General Wolters, which I 
appreciate.
    There's always room for improvement. That's why we do AARs 
[after-action reviews]. But I think it's important to say that 
the intelligence community and the military did an exceptional 
job and I want to point that out.
    So, starting with Dr. Wallander, I've been in regular 
communication with Ukrainian military and civilian leadership 
and they have provided me with a document that's entitled ``The 
Urgent Needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a Priority 
Order,'' and it lists 17 items and it goes into extreme detail.
    I wanted to ask both of you, have you received and are you 
familiar with this list?
    Dr. Wallander. Yes.
    Mr. Crow. And General Wolters?
    General Wolters. Yes.
    Mr. Crow. And is the Department of Defense looking at this 
list in a detailed way and going down these requests?
    Dr. Wallander. Yes.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 101.]
    Mr. Crow. And is the Department of Defense prepared to 
either in a classified or non-classified setting or on the 
record provide this committee with an analysis of all these 
requests and either what we're able to comply with or what 
we're not, and if we're not, the reasons why we're not?
    Dr. Wallander. Yes.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you. And then kind of broadening out in 
terms of our security cooperation, a couple weeks ago there was 
this issue of the providing of MiGs through Poland that 
occurred and the administration came out and, I think, General 
Wolters, you made it clear that you thought that providing 
fighter jets would not be appropriate at this time.
    And yet we continue to hear from Ukraine that this would 
this would be not, you know, a game changer, necessarily, but 
an important element to Ukraine--to Ukraine's defense, that it 
would allow them to project power, particularly in the south 
and the east, to Mariupol and other places where they cannot, 
allow them to cut off supply lines.
    So, I'm trying to--and they also told me that they're 
rebuilding their airfields. They have airfield capability. They 
have logistics system support capability.
    They have pilots that are able to fly it and they can 
support it and that would make a difference. And it strikes me 
that Ukrainians are not going to ask necessarily for something 
they can't use, in most instances, because they're fighting for 
their survival.
    So, could you both tell me where are we on the fighter jet 
issue? Is that something that we are taking a fresh look at, 
number one.
    And number two, this issue of escalation--does the 
administration draw a line at vehicles--at aircraft and 
vehicles? Is that determined to be too escalatory and we're 
only going to provide things short of that?
    Dr. Wallander, start with you.
    Dr. Wallander. I don't believe that the position of the 
Department of Defense, both the policy side and military best 
advice, has changed on the assessment, although I defer to 
General Wolters.
    Mr. Crow. On the fighter jets?
    Dr. Wallander. On the general issue that you raised about 
have we changed our position on that. Yes.
    Mr. Crow. Okay.
    Dr. Wallander. And on the issue of ruling out certain kinds 
of vehicles, I think it is capabilities driven rather than 
particular kinds of vehicles. But we can pursue this and get 
into more detail in the next session.
    General Wolters. And, Congressman, I'll just add, good 
departments allow commanders to provide best military advice. I 
continue to assess, and I do know with Secretary Austin he 
expects me, if I deem so, to provide best military advice to 
change courses, and at this time that is not my best military 
advice with respect to the aircraft. And I can elaborate on 
that a little bit more in a classified setting.
    Mr. Crow. So just before we go into classified setting, 
though, so I understand, so it's your best military advice that 
the United States or its allies should not provide fighter jets 
to Ukraine at this time. Is that accurate?
    General Wolters. It is my best military advice that the 
U.S. doesn't and it's also my best military advice that we 
allow nations to independently make their decision about what 
they would like to offer the Ukrainians. I don't want to thwart 
any of that.
    Mr. Crow. Okay. Well, we're out of time and we'll follow up 
on--in a classified setting. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Appreciate that. Very 
thorough.
    We will continue in a half hour in 2212 with our classified 
portion.
    We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee proceeded in 
closed session.]


      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 30, 2022

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 30, 2022

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 30, 2022

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              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

    Dr. Wallander. (U) The president's budget was finalized before 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but in our continued efforts to ensure 
that we impose costs on Russia for its brutal, unprovoked aggression, 
we will work with Congress to secure the necessary funding using the 
legislative process to obtain supplemental appropriations.   [See page 
10.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
    Dr. Wallander. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) strongly 
supports NATO's efforts to leverage centers of innovation to meet 
NATO's requirements, and believes that DIANA is an initiative that 
could result in adoption of innovative technologies in which the United 
States should participate. DOD continues to work with the U.S. 
Interagency and NATO International Staff to establish the necessary 
legal and fiscal authorities and outline executable governance and 
implementation plans for DIANA to ensure the United States and the 
Allies can effectively participate and receive outlined benefits.   
[See page 15.]
                                 ______
                                 
               RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
    Dr. Wallander. (U) The Department's leadership, including Secretary 
Austin, are in regular contact with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense and 
the Ukrainian Embassy addressing the needs of Ukraine's military and 
coordinating with Ukraine and our allies and partners for the delivery 
of new weapons that meet Ukraine's priority requirements.
    (U) The Department of Defense, receives regular correspondence from 
Ukrainian counterparts, including updated lists of requirements. Our 
security assistance reflects our dialogue with Ukrainian leadership on 
their prioritized capability requirements.   [See page 49.]
                                 ______
                                 
              RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
    Dr. Wallander. (U) We are aware of the disturbing reports of forced 
deportations and other circumstances where civilians are being moved 
into Russia or resettled against their will. We have also seen 
disturbing and credible reports that many civilians are being interned 
in so-called ``filtration camps'' and that some are disappearing after 
such internment. We defer to the White House for comment.   [See page 
17.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Dr. Wallander. (U) Leading up to the invasion, the United States 
and our allies and partners worked diligently to create space for 
diplomacy to discourage further escalation with Ukraine. This included 
assessing the effects of military posture in Europe and taking 
appropriate action to allow for the potential for diplomacy to take 
root. Now it is clear that Russia was negotiating in bad faith. Russia 
alone provoked war in Ukraine, and Russia escalated its so-called 
grievances into a full-scale, unjustified invasion.
    (U) As for providing Harpoons to Ukraine, the issue is not fear of 
escalation with Russia, but rather a technical issue. The United States 
does not have a readily available shore-based anti-ship missile 
suitable for Ukraine. Our ship-based Harpoons are not compatible with 
any platform that Ukraine currently operates. However, we continue to 
explore anti-ship missile options, in coordination with our allies and 
partners, in an effort to meet Ukraine's capability needs.
    (U) We at the Department of Defense aim to bolster Ukraine's 
defense against Russia's invasion, and to respond agilely to Ukraine's 
needs, including coastal defense. More broadly, we will continue to 
adapt our approach in bolstering Ukraine, imposing costs on Russia, 
while avoiding a direct military conflict.   [See page 44.]
    Dr. Wallander. (U) As of March 30, the Department of Defense is not 
training Ukrainian forces due to their need to focus on repelling 
Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion.   [See page 45.]


      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 30, 2022

=======================================================================

      

                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

    Mr. Smith. Dr. Wallander, does the Department of Defense have an 
assessment of whether the proposed FMS recapitalization of Turkey's F-
16 fleet would pose the same types of security risks that led DOD to 
oppose possession of the F-35 and the S-400 by the same country? If so, 
what are the findings of that assessment/would a recapitalization of 
Turkey's F-16 fleet pose the same risk? And will you provide that 
assessment to the committee?
    Dr. Wallander. While we continue to press Turkey not to retain the 
S-400 air defense system, Turkey has significant modernization and 
acquisition requirements for its air force, and we support these 
efforts in general in order to support NATO and U.S. security 
objectives. As NATO Allies, the United States and Turkey have 
longstanding and deep bilateral defense ties. Turkey has vocally 
supported Ukraine's territorial integrity, condemned Russia's actions, 
and is making significant contributions to Ukrainian security. Turkey 
has NATO's second largest military, hosts hundreds of U.S. forces at 
key sites to support NATO and regional operations, and contributes to 
NATO operations. Such missions include NATO Mission in Kosovo and the 
NATO Mission in Iraq, as well as serving as a framework nation for the 
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Further, Turkey was a critical 
enabler of U.S. and international noncombatant evacuation efforts out 
of Afghanistan in August 2021. Turkey's continued NATO 
interoperability--including the generational connectivity via industry 
and military training and education that comes with major defense 
cooperation initiatives--remains a priority. DOD continues to evaluate 
the risk posed by Turkey's continued possession of the S-400 and 
assesses the risk differently for the recapitalization of Turkey's 
existing F-16 fleet than that which required Turkey's removal from the 
F-35 program. We can provide further details in a closed briefing.
    Mr. Smith. Dr. Wallander, Section 1243 of the FY 20 NDAA required a 
yearly Future-Years Plan for EDI with the release of each defense 
budget, and a yearly End of Fiscal Year report each November 30, about 
how EDI funds have been used over the fiscal year. Can OSD commit to 
the committee that DOD will provide both of these reports this year 
(accompanying the FY23 budget request, and in November 2022) and each 
year thereafter?
    Dr. Wallander. The Department is aware of the NDAA 20 Section 1243 
requirement and Congress' interest in the matter and is actively 
working to provide a coordinated response in the near future
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. How does EUCOM plan to adapt artificial intelligence 
models trained on decades of ISR data specific to the CENTCOM domain to 
the European theater? Do you have enough data to understand your area 
of operations?
    General Wolters. Artificial Intelligence (AI) modeling programs 
like the Defense Department's Maven and National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency's (NGA) Watchmen enhance and enrich USEUCOM's 
existing intelligence and mission support, notably in named areas of 
interest and matching equipment to the environment. USEUCOM and its 
components benefit from access to NGA's long-term geospatial 
intelligence archives, and efforts to ensure agreements with commercial 
vendors allow AI sharing with theater partners.
    Mr. Scott. How can virtual simulation and synthetic data generation 
help prepare and ensure U.S. readiness in the European theater to 
deploy critical autonomous capabilities?
    General Wolters. Virtual simulations and synthetic data generation 
can provide opportunities to test applications and tools to modernize 
situational awareness, spur development of tailorable Common 
Intelligence Picture applications, and enable predictive analytic 
capabilities to better support the Joint Force Commander's decision 
making process.
    While current autonomous capabilities are nascent, USEUCOM will 
continue to experiment and test emerging autonomous capabilities in 
events like NATO's Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exercise, which 
in 2021 brought 28 NATO and Partner nations together across 10 time 
zones and 5 networks to speed interoperability and convergence of a 
combat-ready force.
    Mr. Scott. I am deeply concerned that the U.S. military will be 
unable to deploy autonomous systems effectively in the near term. 
Development of next generation vehicles (OMFV, Skyborg, UUVs) have 
significant delays and cost-overruns. How does EUCOM plan to win in a 
potential future conflict before modernization programs have delivered 
new air, ground, and maritime platforms? Does EUCOM see a benefit in 
recapitalizing certain legacy platforms that exist in the hundreds 
already and making them more survivable, autonomous, or lethal?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from having platforms, whether 
legacy or next generation, that are interoperable with our Allies and 
Partners, and welcomes decisions the Services make to equip our forces 
with survivable, autonomous, and lethal systems with speed and agility.
    Mr. Scott. Is there a need to recapitalize on existing ``legacy'' 
ISR platforms, like the MQ-9 Reaper and the Joint AI Center's Smart 
Sensor project, to ensure they can operate autonomously in GPS and C2 
denied environments?
    General Wolters. Yes, USEUCOM relies on MQ-9 sensors to provide 
long-loiter, daily Indications and Warning in GPS and C2 denied 
environments. Russia has demonstrated capability and intent to jam 
unmanned aerial system GPS and C2 electromagnetic signals, and until 
the services are able to deploy tailored capabilities to meet current 
and future needs, recapitalizing ``legacy'' ISR platforms are 
necessary. Recapitalization of legacy systems and investment in 
augmenting technologies like Smart Sensor also serve to move sensor 
data exploitation to the edge, which accelerates the targeting cycle.
    Mr. Scott. What additional, if any, NATO Centres of Excellence 
(COEs) are needed?
    General Wolters. NATO has 27 active Centres of Excellence (COEs), 
with three currently being accredited. As the need arises, NATO's 
Supreme Allied Commander--Transformation, in coordination with Deputy 
Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment and Supreme Allied 
Commander, will identify areas for future COE development based on 
political guidance and defense planning roadmaps.
    Mr. Scott. What is the Land Component Command (LCC) C2 architecture 
that you envision for the new force structure on NATO's Eastern Front? 
Are you considering redeploying a Divisional Coordination Element to 
Romania?
    General Wolters. Prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 
LANDCOM's role in NATO Command Structure was as a proponent for Land 
Warfare, without an operational command relationship to NATO forces. 
However, during Russia's invasion of Ukraine, NATO LANDCOM served as 
Joint Force Command-Naples' Land Component Commander, and LANDCOM was 
instrumental in facilitating the development of the Battalionsized 
battle group construct across the Eastern Flank of SACEUR's AOR.
    NATO is implementing a number of NAC-approved Policy and Plans 
concepts driven by the new deterrence and defense concept, including 
most recently NATO's New Force Model. These initiatives will likely 
lead to additional changes in LANDCOM's Roles, Missions, and Functions. 
Incidentally, we are also considering offering the Commander, USAREUR-
AF as the Commander of NATO's LANDCOM, ``dualhatting'' these positions 
in a similar way as the other U.S. Component commanders are currently. 
This, too, would impact the future use of LANDCOM in operational and 
strategic roles across competition, crisis and conflict.
    The nearer and longer-term NATO and U.S. posture changes are being 
developed as the situation on the ground in Ukraine evolves. We have 
proposed the permanent establishment of eight battle groups along the 
Eastern flank. These battle groups will require division-level command 
and control capabilities. NATO has already established a Multi-National 
Division Headquarters in Romania, but because this capability was 
established before the war in Ukraine at a lower level of ambition, it 
will require some growth. The full extent of its capabilities will be 
determined by NATO's political guidance regarding NATO's long-term 
posture. As the headquarters is fleshed out, the U.S. support to it 
will be addressed properly.
    Mr. Scott. What C-RAM, counter-UAS, and air defense systems are 
needed to bolster the defense of the Aegis Ashore facility in Deveselu, 
Romania?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM and NATO assess Aegis Ashore in Romania is 
adequately defended and at low risk for attack from Russia. The 
facility is focused solely on the Iranian missile threat and has 
limited or no capability against Russia's threats. We work together 
with Romania to assess Deveselu's threat, and ensure appropriate force 
protection levels are maintained at all times against any potential 
threat.
    Mr. Scott. Should we expect the U.S. to deepen defense cooperation 
with the nation of Georgia in the aftermath of Russia's February 2022 
invasion of Ukraine? Should the United States accelerate the delivery 
of defensive weapons to Georgia?
    General Wolters. Georgia is a friend and key strategic partner of 
the U.S., and USEUCOM has a long and productive military-to-military 
relationship with Georgian Defense Forces. The new Georgia Defense and 
Deterrence Enhancement Initiative (GDDEI) is a bilateral multi-year 
security cooperation initiative designed to build on the progress 
achieved under the Georgia Defense Response Plan, enabled by Congress' 
designation of additional FY22 Section 333 Build Partner Capacity 
funds. Together with Georgia, we evaluate future security cooperation 
needs to modernize, increase alignment, and strengthen our posture in 
the Euro-Atlantic region.
    Mr. Scott. Is there a need for a crisis-type Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) mechanism to accelerate the procurement and/or delivery of needed 
platforms and weapons to Allies and partner nations in the event of a 
crisis like the Russo-Ukrainian War?
    General Wolters. Defense articles available in U.S. stock are 
delivered to partners immediately upon congressional notification. The 
Defense Production Act can help reduce production timelines for new 
equipment, and working together with industry to spur production 
timelines may further accelerate procurement.
    Mr. Scott. Prepositioning of weapons and equipment in the Baltics 
would allow Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to fight until the rest of 
NATO including U.S. forces arrive in the region Given how difficult it 
is to deliver equipment and ammunition to Ukraine during this war, 
shouldn't prepositioning of ammunition and weapons be set up in the 
Baltics now?
    General Wolters. We closely examine our prepositioning requirements 
based on operational requirements. At this time, we have not identified 
a need to preposition equipment in the Baltic States, but continue to 
regularly train and exercise in the region to ensure we have a complete 
understanding of capabilities and requirements.
    Mr. Scott. How much would it cost to deploy a missile defense 
system in Georgia to protect every square inch of Georgian soil? How 
soon could this be achieved if properly resourced?
    General Wolters. We work closely with Georgia on key capability 
needs, and while we have not received a formal request from Georgia to 
study this question, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is 
better suited to provide insight on resourcing requirements.
    Mr. Scott. Does the United States need a Black Sea Strategy? What 
would a robust and effective Black Sea Strategy entail? How important 
is this strategically important region to the United States?
    General Wolters. The Black Sea region is a major focus of USEUCOM's 
strategy for peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. We work 
closely with the Department of Defense, Joint Staff, and other 
interagency partners to calibrate and align our activities with 
national goals. Russia's premeditated and unprovoked attacks in the 
Black Sea region underscore its strategic importance to the United 
States, NATO Alliance, and the world.
    Mr. Scott. What was your assessment of Russian Air Force 
capabilities prior to February 24. 2022? What do you think we missed in 
our assessment and what are we learning about the future of Russian air 
power?
    General Wolters. Prior to 24 February, we assessed Russia's Air 
Force would struggle to achieve operational goals in a non-permissive 
environment against a near-peer adversary. Russia's premeditated and 
unprovoked attack on Ukraine has failed to effectively suppress 
Ukrainian air defenses, resulting in significant combat losses and 
forcing Russia's reliance on long range cruise missiles for strikes 
into Central and Western Ukraine. As a result, Russia may seek to 
reinvigorate its training program, specifically addressing precision 
guided munitions use, joint operations, and suppression of enemy air 
defenses.
    Mr. Scott. 2022 is a crucial year for major transatlantic strategy 
developments with the publication of the National Security Strategy by 
the United States, NATO's Strategic Concept, and the European Union's 
Strategic Compass. Do you feel confident that these important 
strategies are aligned, and if not, is there a way to revisit the 
publication dates of each of these to ensure they are aligned and we 
provide maximum opportunities for convergence?
    General Wolters. Under the NATO Military Strategy, NATO's Concept 
for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic ensures NATO adapts 
continuously to meet the challenges and complexities of our dynamic 
security environment. In concert with the U.S. National Security 
Strategy, in military-to-military channels, we continue improving our 
posture, transparency, alignment, and speed of response. Through these 
strategic concepts, investments, and pursuing a robust array of 
operations, missions, and activities, we demonstrate our combined 
ability to deter and defend the Alliance. We do not assess a need to 
revisit publication dates.
    Mr. Scott. Do you support permanently basing a NATO mechanized/
armor division in the Baltics?
    General Wolters. Together with NATO, USEUCOM continually assesses 
force posture and conditions along the Eastern Flank to recommend the 
right mix of permanent and rotational forces.
    Mr. Scott. Should NATO upgrade the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions 
``Air Policing'' missions to ``Air and Missile Defense Missions'' in 
order to combine ground, air and ship AMD capabilities to ensure 
President Biden's goal of not allowing Russia to cross one inch of 
allied territory?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM stands united with NATO's efforts to 
protect the Eastern Flank. Together with our Allies, we will assess 
force posture and conditions in the Black Sea region to assure 
deterrence and defense of every inch of Allied territory.
    Mr. Scott. Do you support increasing the number of Standing NATO 
Maritime Groups (SNMGs) to ensure NATO can cover the patrolling 
requirements of the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean 
patrolling requirements? Why are we not even maximizing NATO's maritime 
presence in the Black Sea within these Treaty limits?
    General Wolters. NATO's robust maritime structure patrols the 
Baltic Sea, Aegean Sea, and Eastern Mediterranean together with USEUCOM 
patrols in the Black Sea region that are consistent with the Montreux 
Convention and international law. Through our expansive array of 
operations, missions, and activities with Allies and Partners, we 
collectively demonstrate readiness and deterrence. With dedicated, 
persistent Carrier Strike Group and amphibious presence, USEUCOM can 
assure a lethal and agile theater posture. The addition of two U.S. 
multi-warfare destroyers would further enhance our seapower capability 
from the Mediterranean, to the Black Sea, and up to the Arctic.
    Mr. Scott. How can the United States work with Romania to enhance 
regional deterrence? Should Romania consider building or buying diesel 
submarines to give NATO a new and effective deterrent tool?
    General Wolters. Romania is a strong and reliable Ally, and a 
regional leader in military modernization, purchasing F-16s, Patriot 
air defense systems, and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket system 
(HIMARS). Romania's naval modernization plan includes procuring four 
Corvettes, but diesel submarines are not a current national or NATO 
need. USEUCOM will continue working with Romania to enhance their 
modern military capabilities including providing rotational U.S. forces 
to enhance training, strengthen our bilateral relationship, and provide 
deterrent capability against Russia's aggression on NATO's Eastern 
Flank.
    Mr. Scott. Despite being constitutionally neutral, why is Moldova 
key to regional security dynamics in the Black Sea?
    General Wolters. Moldova's geostrategic location and proximity to 
the Black Sea make it a crucial actor in regional security dynamics. 
Russia maintains a 1,500 strong ``peacekeeping'' force on Moldovan 
territory, impeding Moldova's development and integration with Western 
economic and security structures. As Europe's poorest country, Moldova 
is especially vulnerable to Russian malign influence and aggression. An 
economically prosperous Moldova, with a capable military, would 
contribute to regional stability and security while impeding Russian 
influence and ability to project power in the Black Sea region.
    Mr. Scott. Captain Kenneth Andrus, U.S. Navy, wrote an article for 
the October 2021 issue of Proceedings entitled,''Transform Navy Medical 
Operational Support.'' According to Captain Andrus, ``The speed and 
lethality of new weaponry and the minimal warning of open conflict with 
adversaries such as the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will not 
allow the luxury of months of preparation for combat casualty care that 
the Medical Corps has had in the past three decades.'' Do you agree 
with this assessment?
    General Wolters. We must adapt continuously to meet the challenges 
and complexities of our dynamic security environment, and USEUCOM 
continues to improve our posture, transparency, alignment and speed of 
response, including combat casualty care. The Defense Health Agency 
(DHA) will establish the Defense Health Agency Regions in Europe and 
the Indo-Pacific this year, and USEUCOM and its components will work 
together with DHA to ensure our service members have access to fully 
trained and capable medical care in peacetime, as well as times of 
crisis or conflict.
    Mr. Scott. What shortfalls exist, if any, in the following areas of 
mass casualty care in your AOR: They include at-sea evacuation, medical 
regulation, medical unit augmentation, authorized medical allowance, 
medical resupply, blood products, shore casualty receiving/personnel 
processing, joint host-nation support, and the number of operating and 
treatment rooms required for a worst-case scenario?
    General Wolters. During steady state operations, Landstuhl Regional 
Medical Center (LRMC) is the primary receiving facility for mass 
casualty care and maintains robust blood supplies. Other military 
treatment facilities throughout USEUCOM are able to respond to mass 
casualties on a smaller scale. USEUCOM has robust plans to augment 
capacity and capability at these facilities, and can leverage existing 
relations with host nation medical facilities and networks.
    USEUCOM has adequate Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) capacity for small 
casualties, but would require augmentation for mass casualty events 
with multiple critical patients. We are able to respond medically to a 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) incident, but would 
require additional resources to manage decontamination and long-term 
patient care.
    Mr. Scott. Should the United States Coast Guard bring back anti-
submarine warfare as a mission? If the U.S. Coast Guard did bring back 
ASW as a mission, what would the impact be on the EUCOM AOR?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM welcomes ASW capability on any platform in 
our theater. ASW capability enhances our operational readiness and 
assures our Allies and Partners. USEUCOM periodically incorporates 
Coast Guard vessels throughout Europe, and would leverage every 
capability those ships bring into theater.
    Mr. Scott. The entire U.S. Coast Guard is a high demand, low 
density platform. What additional U.S. Coast Guard resources could you 
use in theater?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM periodically incorporates Coast Guard 
vessels throughout Europe, and would leverage every capability those 
ships bring into theater.
    Mr. Scott. Could U.S. Navy and Coast Guard officers benefit from 
increased attendance at International Maritime Organization Polar Code 
courses?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM periodically incorporates Coast Guard 
vessels throughout Europe, and would leverage every capability those 
ships bring into theater.
    Mr. Scott. Is the United States prepared to respond to disasters 
and fully participate in the High North with SAR capability, 
environmental disaster mitigation, scientific research, and other 
activities?
    General Wolters. Yes, through our maritime component Naval Forces 
Europe (NAVEUR), we are capable of responding to mass casualties at sea 
and we are bound to render aid and rescue at sea. The U.S. Coast Guard 
is the nation's leader in Arctic operations and coordinates with 
international partners in the region, and we defer to the Department of 
Homeland Security to provide details of its activities.
    Mr. Scott. Does the United States lack the capabilities to advance 
U.S. security interests in the Arctic?
    General Wolters. Under a whole-of-government approach, USEUCOM 
joint forces maintain near persistent North Atlantic and Arctic 
presence. Collaborating with our European defense counterparts, we work 
to enhance interoperability and proficiency, while demonstrating 
collective resolve to ensure the Atlantic and Arctic oceans remain open 
and free to facilitate commerce between Europe, North America, and 
other international markets.
    Mr. Scott. Should the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard prioritize 
personnel exchanges with partner navies and coast guards operating in 
the High North? If so, why?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from Service-initiated personnel 
exchanges, and welcomes opportunities to enhance transparency and 
alignment with Partner nations. In 2021, the U.S. Coast Guard 
participated in Canada's Operation Nanook--an annual sovereignty and 
warfare exercise in the Arctic. Continued work with Allies and Partners 
is integral to protecting our enduring interests, protecting mariners 
and the environment, and upholding the rules-based international order.
    Mr. Scott. What are the steps the United States Marine Corps can 
take now and in the near future to develop operational capacity in the 
Arctic?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from the U.S. Marine Corps' 
strong relationship with Norway, and burgeoning relationships with 
Sweden and Finland, demonstrated through events like Exercise Cold 
Response in Norway and Archipelago Endeavor in Sweden. USEUCOM welcomes 
all Service efforts supporting a secure and stable Arctic region where 
U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. Homeland is defended, 
and nations can work cooperatively to address shared challenges.
    Mr. Scott. What are the steps the United States Air Force can take 
now and in the near future to develop operational capacity in the 
Arctic?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from the U.S. Air Force's efforts 
to build a foundational Department of the Air Force Arctic Strategy. 
USEUCOM welcomes all Service efforts supporting a secure and stable 
Arctic region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. 
Homeland is defended, and nations can work cooperatively to address 
shared challenges.
    Mr. Scott. What are the steps the United States Army can take now 
and in the near future to develop operational capacity in the Arctic?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from the U.S. Army's efforts to 
assess needs for operational capability and capacity in the Arctic. 
USEUCOM welcomes all Service efforts supporting a secure and stable 
Arctic region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. 
Homeland is defended, and nations can work cooperatively to address 
shared challenges.
    Mr. Scott. What are the steps the United States Navy can take now 
and in the near future to develop operational capacity in the Arctic?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM benefits from the U.S. Navy's near 
persistent presence across the North Atlantic and Arctic, and is ready 
to receive two additional destroyers in FY24 and FY26 to boost U.S. 
presence across USEUCOM's maritime domain. USEUCOM welcomes all Service 
efforts supporting a secure and stable Arctic region where U.S. 
national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. Homeland is defended, and 
nations can work cooperatively to address shared challenges.
    Mr. Scott. What additional resources are needed to defend the 
Suwalki Gap?
    General Wolters. The V Corps completed certification and assumed 
oversight of U.S. rotational forces in Poznan, Poland in October 2021. 
The 4,500 rotational forces, combined with Poland's investments in 
NATO-interoperable defense system modernization are well suited to 
provide deterrence and defense of this vital NATO Ally.
    Mr. Scott. How would you rate the preparations being made by 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to organize the territorial defense of 
their respective countries?
    General Wolters. USEUCOM encourages investment in Baltic defense 
through NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence and Baltic Air Policing 
missions. In the face of Russia's aggression, each of these states 
contributes to their own defense, seeks to enhance integrated air and 
missile defense with additional NATO-interoperable long-range fires 
capability, and have expanded efforts to control the maritime domain in 
their littoral. We are thankful for Congressional support through 
Significant Security Cooperation Initiative funds to execute a three 
phased approach to acquire, install, integrate, and enhance Baltic 
regional air defense.
    Mr. Scott. What is the relationship between the Baltic Defence 
College and the war colleges in the United States? How can this 
partnership between the war colleges be enhanced? What are the unfunded 
priorities of the Baltic Defence College?
    General Wolters. The U.S. Services send students to the Baltic 
Defence College (BDC) annually and the U.S. Army provides instructors 
for the BDC's Joint Command General Staff Course. USEUCOM also supports 
the curriculum with guest speakers, and in return benefits from the 
BDC's insight in reforming Eastern European professional military 
education systems.
    Mr. Scott. Is the U.S. Military sending enough U.S. officers to the 
Allied and partner war colleges in your AOR? Is there any war colleges 
that should have greater U.S. attendance?
    General Wolters. The U.S. Services coordinate and fund service 
member attendance at Allied and Partner war colleges, and would be best 
suited to provide specific information regarding expanding 
participation.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KELLY
    Mr. Kelly. Provide a detailed explanation of the plans for DOD's 
portion of the $13.6B appropriation for Ukraine:
      $3.028 billion for European Command operations mission 
support, the deployment of personnel to the region, and intelligence 
support.
      $3.5 billion to replenish U.S. stocks of equipment sent 
to Ukraine through drawdown. What equipment is being provided that will 
be replenished? What equipment has been deemed excess and will be 
provided? Provide timeline to deliver this equipment.
    Describe the process to execute the $650M in FMF for Ukraine and 
other countries. Is there an expedited process? What happens to the 
Ukrainians Letter of Request, once submitted?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) The United States is providing Ukraine the 
equipment it needs most immediately to defend itself through 
Presidential Drawdown Authority, including anti-air and anti-armor 
capabilities, Unmanned Aerial Systems, grenade launchers, small arms, 
ammunition, body armor, and helmets. The Department of Defense remains 
committed to delivering this equipment as quickly as possible.
    (U) The Department of Defense intends to utilize the $3.5 billion 
in funds to replenish these stocks.
    (U) The Department of Defense works very closely with the 
Department of State on Foreign Military Financing, but I will defer to 
our colleagues at State to describe the process.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CROW
    Mr. Crow. I am concerned about strategically important EUCOM 
military installations' such as Landstuhl and Ramstein AFB's reliance 
on Russian supplied energy. What steps is EUCOM taking to deleverage 
reliance on Russian energy? What role can renewable energy sources fit 
into installation energy consumption?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) The United States is committed to imposing costs 
on Russia for its unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, as the 
President has made clear. This includes ensuring that oil and gas 
cannot be used as a tool of coercion by Russia in order to pressure the 
United States and its allies and partners. We will continue to 
encourage our allies and partners to diversify their energy sources to 
ensure that Russia cannot use energy as leverage or evasion of costs 
for its invasion of Ukraine.
    (U) Strategic installations, such as Landstuhl and Ramstein, source 
operational fuel from western refineries and are not dependent on 
Russian crude oil. USEUCOM, along with other U.S. Government 
departments and agencies, work diligently to encourage and support our 
European allies and partners to decouple from Russian power grids. 
USEUCOM will conduct a forum to discuss short- and long-term solutions 
for energy alternatives.
    Mr. Crow. If the U.S. or NATO provided fighter aircraft such as the 
MIG-29s to Ukraine for use in the conflict, what's your assessment of 
their impact and Russia's response?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) The United States remains committed to 
bolstering Ukraine's ability to defend itself against Russia's 
unprovoked and unjustifiable war. The best way to support Ukrainian 
defense is by providing them the weapons and the systems that they need 
most to defeat Russian aggression.
    (U) The Ukrainian Armed Forces, are defending their country with 
great skill and bravery and we will continue to look for ways to help 
them. Our support to Ukraine must balance the risk that the steps we 
take or decisions we make could lead to an escalation of the conflict.
    (U) As we have always said, it is a nation's sovereign decision to 
decide what kind of security assistance it will send to Ukraine.
    (U) However, we believe that the provision of MiG-29s provides 
little increased capabilities.
    (U) The United States does not have MiG-29 or other fighter 
aircraft that Ukraine is able to operate.
    (U) We also assess that adding aircraft to the Ukrainian inventory 
is not likely to significantly change the effectiveness of Ukrainian 
Air Force relative to the Russians. Russia still has significant air 
and surface-to-air capabilities in and around Ukraine that will 
continue to hold the Ukrainian Air Force at risk and minimize its 
effectiveness.
    (U) We believe that our current focus on anti-armor, air defense, 
lethal unmanned air platforms, and artillery systems are much better 
suited to support the current needs of the Ukrainian military, and we 
will continue to pursue those options.
    (U) The Department of Defense, along with allies and partners and 
in consultation with Ukraine, will continue to evaluate the conditions 
of the battlefield and ensure Ukraine gets the capabilities that will 
provide the greatest impact. This includes coordinating with our allies 
and partners to enhance Ukraine's air defense capabilities, which has 
made a tremendous difference on the battlefield.
    Mr. Crow. I am concerned about strategically important EUCOM 
military installations' such as Landstuhl and Ramstein AFB's reliance 
on Russian supplied energy. What steps is EUCOM taking to deleverage 
reliance on Russian energy? What role can renewable energy sources fit 
into installation energy consumption?
    General Wolters. Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and Ramstein Air 
Base source operational fuel from western refineries and are not 
reliant on Russian crude oil. We also maintain multiple options to 
source fuel from the continental U.S., if required, to mitigate fuel 
supply risks. USEUCOM continues to support our lead Federal agencies 
(State, Energy and USAID) on European Energy Security and Independence 
efforts, including the Baltic 2025 agreement to decouple from Russia's 
power grids. USEUCOM conducts forums to discuss short and long term 
energy system solutions and alternatives to enhance energy security for 
NATO Allies and EU Partners.
    Mr. Crow. If the U.S. or NATO provided fighter aircraft such as the 
MIG-29s to Ukraine for use in the conflict, what's your assessment of 
their impact and Russia's response?
    General Wolters. Ukraine maintains a credible air defense 
capability that includes both ground based air defense systems and 
fighter aircraft. One of USEUCOM's top priorities is helping Ukraine 
maintain its air defense capability through the rapid provision of air 
defense materiel and training. The provision of any new combat 
platforms requires significant training, sustainment, and integration. 
USEUCOM completed an assessment of Ukraine's air defense system in late 
2021, which informs our current activities.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. Do you believe further sanctions, such as prohibiting 
U.S. Government contracts to businesses in the supply chain of Putin's 
war machine, would further cripple their ability to carry-on offensive 
operations and air and missile strikes?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) As Secretary Austin noted recently, the United 
States seeks to weaken Russia and make it harder for Russia to threaten 
its neighbors. Since the beginning of the invasion, Russia has lost 
equipment, munitions, and forces, so Russia is indeed weaker than it 
was on February 23. The sanctions and trade restrictions placed on 
Russia by the United States and our allies and partners have made it 
even harder for Russia to replace key capabilities in the future that 
will make it harder for Russia to threaten its neighbors. The United 
States will continue to impose costs on Russia for its unprovoked, 
unjustified war.
    Mr. Waltz. Last week, several news outlets reported that Russia's 
largest tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod, had halted production 
because of lack of component parts supplied from other countries. How 
are sanctions on the supply chain affecting Russia's ability to 
maintain their armored vehicles already deployed?
    General Wolters. We see logistics challenges for Russia on the 
battlefield, compounded by equipment and personnel casualties. The 
Departments of State and Commerce are best suited to provide details on 
the impact export control sanctions have on Russia's supply chain.
    Mr. Waltz. Do you believe further sanctions, such as prohibiting 
U.S. Government contracts to businesses in the supply chain of Putin's 
war machine, would further cripple their ability to carry-on offensive 
operations and air and missile strikes?
    General Wolters. Under a whole-of-government approach, USEUCOM 
supports any action that further weakens Russia's military objectives 
and allows Ukraine to maintain its sovereignty. The Departments of 
State and Treasury are best suited to provide specifics regarding 
sanctions policy and implementation.
    Mr. Waltz. Russia has an estimated 2 million personnel in its 
reserves. some who have already been deployed to Ukraine. Are you aware 
of any difficulties or obstacles Russia is experiencing in mobilizing 
more of their reserves to support the invasion? Do you have any 
estimates as to the combat readiness of the remaining Russian reserve 
force?
    General Wolters. Russia has activated some specific types of 
reserves intended to maintain higher readiness, such as the standing 
Armament Equipment Storage and Repair Bases and District Training 
Centers. Historically, when mobilizing reservists, no more than 20% 
arrive at the assigned muster locations, likely creating staff 
shortfalls and inconsistent readiness across the reservist force due to 
training deficiencies. As a result, less ready reservist formations 
will likely serve in rear area support roles or as occupational forces 
along static front lines.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
    Ms. Sherrill. Please indicate the following with respect to each 
individual U.S. military installation within the United States European 
Command:
    --The name and location of the installation;
    --The installation's total non-transportation energy consumption, 
expressed in megawatt hours (MwH);
    --The installation's total transportation energy consumption in 
metric consumed and cost;
    A breakdown of your answer to no. 1 by:
    --energy fuel type (e.g., coal, natural gas, oil, geothermal, 
solar, other renewable energy),
    --volumes (e.g., mcf, but alternatively BTU estimate)
    --sources (e.g., on-base generation, purchase from local utility, 
etc.), and cost
    --Identify the local energy supplier for oil and gas; and
    --Estimate the volume of Russian natural gas and oil consumed.
    General Wolters. Department of Defense (DOD) Installations in 
Europe rely on host nation energy providers for power generation and 
heating; the source fuel suppliers are difficult to precisely 
determine. No bulk petroleum products supporting operational U.S. DOD 
forces are procured through Russian sources. All bulk operational fuels 
(JP-8, JP-5, F-76 and thermally stable jet propellant) are procured, 
capitalized, and stored by Defense Logistics Agency Energy to support 
peacetime and contingency requirements, with resupply conducted via 
tanker vessels from refineries in Greece and Spain or pipeline 
connections from refineries in Spain, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. In some situations there is a reliance on host nation fuel 
support for exercises or fuel support from vendors who meet the 
contract solicitations concerning the source of fuel products which 
require vendors to not acquire petroleum from Russian sources.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MORELLE
    Mr. Morelle. I have monthly meetings with Ukrainian community 
leaders within my district and, despite my assurances that that the U.S 
and NATO are working hard to help, they are not convinced and strongly 
believe that should Ukraine fall so will other former Soviet bloc 
nations and nations desiring to be a part of NATO. Do you predict 
similar outcomes if Ukraine doesn't win this War? If yes, how do we 
deter Russia from invading other nations?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) I do not believe that Ukraine will fall given 
the skill and bravery with which its armed forces and people are 
fighting. We are doing everything we can to help Ukraine defend its 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to strengthen Ukraine's hand 
on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. This is also the most 
effective way to deter Russia from invading other nations.
    Mr. Morelle. Over the last eight years, Ukraine has been the 
leading recipient of U.S. military aid in Europe. Since 2014, the 
United States has committed billions of dollars in security assistance 
to Ukraine to help protect their sovereignty. How did eight years of 
security assistance support to Ukraine fail to deter the Russian 
Federation's invasion?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) The security assistance and support on defense 
reforms provided by the United States to Ukraine over the last eight 
years was a key factor to help Ukraine mount the fierce resistance we 
have witnessed to repel Russia's forces. Continued security assistance 
from the United States and our allies and partners will be instrumental 
for Ukraine to continue defending its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.
    Mr. Morelle. What should have we done differently? Any lessons 
learned that we can use to prevent the Russian Federation from invading 
other sovereign nations?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) Russia's invasion is brazen, unprovoked attack 
that has caused significant degradation of its military capabilities. 
It is also suffering reputational cost to its military image and self-
confidence that could cause Moscow to reconsider any similar action in 
the future.
    (U) Further, the invasion had the effect of unifying and 
galvanizing world attitudes against Russian behavior. Such unity was 
probably unanticipated in the Kremlin and it will have to contend with 
this global opposition to Russian aggression in the future. Such unity 
between the United States and our Allies is our greatest strength. We 
have been in lockstep with our Allies and partners as we shared 
intelligence at an unprecedented rate, coordinated our sanctions, and 
bolstered our Allied defense together.
    (U) The lessons learned in this fight are Russia's to bear, as it 
has learned that Ukraine is much more militarily capable than it 
anticipated. And the United States and its NATO allies are more united.
    (U) We don't know how the rest of this war will unfold, but we do 
know that a sovereign, independent Ukraine will emerge stronger than an 
aggressive Russia. And our support for Ukraine will continue.
    Mr. Morelle. President Zelensky and my local community have 
frequently requested U.S. and NATO establish a no-fly zone. 
Understanding the nuances and inherent responsibilities the U.S and 
NATO would have in enforcing a no-fly zone, can you explain the 
strategic risks and the tactical responsibilities the U.S. and our 
Allies would have if a no-fly zone was established?
    General Wolters. Under a whole-of-government approach, USEUCOM 
continues to support Ukraine with humanitarian aid and resources. 
Enforcing a no-fly zone over Ukraine risks bringing NATO forces into 
direct conflict with Russia. The risk for escalation would be difficult 
to control and place the 1 billion citizens that we have sworn to 
protect in extreme danger. We seek to avoid this outcome at all costs. 
Allies continue to provide strong support for Ukraine in many other 
ways.
    Mr. Morelle. What impact will the outcome of this war have on the 
challenges the PRC presents to the Indo-Pacific?
    General Wolters. China is observing this pivotal moment in Europe, 
noting how Russia's premeditated and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has 
galvanized our Allies and global partners. China is also observing the 
effects of integrated deterrence, utilizing all instruments of national 
power through a whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance response. The 
United States has demonstrated that, through strong military-to-
military relationships, we are able to respond decisively and rapidly 
to deter adversaries from aggression and build unity, resolve, and 
combat-credible deterrence.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. JACOBS
    Ms. Jacobs. Ms. Wallander, when will the Department send Congress 
the EDI spending reports that are required under the FY 2020 NDAA? 
Furthermore, why have these reports not been provided to Congress, 
especially due to the fact EUCOM has provided the reports to the DOD?
    Dr. Wallander. The Department is aware of the NDAA 20 Section 1243 
requirement and Congress' interest in the matter and is actively 
working to provide a coordinated response in the near future
    Ms. Jacobs. General Wolters, will you provide us with an overview 
of the U.S. mission in Poland that is handling refugee flows out of 
Ukraine? a. What is the setup, what forces are involved, what are they 
doing, and what is the situation on the ground?
    General Wolters. Under a whole-of-government approach, USEUCOM is 
prepared to support a Department of State led military assisted 
departure if required. Task Force Dragon, approximately 4,700 forces 
and enablers, is conducting bilateral training with Allies and remains 
prepared to rapidly support transport of American citizens across 
border crossing points if conditions warrant.
    Ms. Jacobs. General Wolters, thank you for your service, and the 
leadership that you have provided in support of the Ukrainian people. 
It is critical for oversight on what we are spending not only in 
support of Ukraine but the entire EUCOM area. I and many other members 
of Congress are concerned with the lack of reporting on the European 
Deterrence Initiative (EDI). General Wolters, yesterday's hearing 
Senator Warren asked you a question regarding EUCOM's annual long-term 
EDI spending reports. I want to confirm that EUCOM has sent the reports 
to the DOD.
    General Wolters. Yes, USEUCOM has provided the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense all required information to support congressional 
reporting requirements. Years of focused investment through the 
European Deterrence Initiative have proven invaluable in our efforts 
after Russia's premeditated and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. These 
enhancements, including facilities, prepositioned equipment, rotational 
deployments, and all-domain exercises improve our speed and agility. We 
thank Congress and the American people for their contributions to this 
effort.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
    Dr. Jackson. Dr. Wallander, how is Russia responding to our 
military build-up in Europe and how is Russia responding to U.S. 
sanctions?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) Russia is stating its predictable rhetorical 
opposition to our military build-up as if it did not start the largest 
ground invasion and territorial grab in Europe since 1945. The force 
presence in Europe is to assure our NATO Allies of our Article 5 
commitment and to make it clear to Russia that we intend to defend 
NATO. Flatly stated, if Russia did not launch its unprovoked invasion 
of Ukraine, U.S. force presence in Europe would not be where it is 
today.
    (U) With regard to sanctions, Putin has publicly commented that the 
sanctions have failed, citing Russia's ability to withstand 
``unprecedented pressure'' on the Russian Ruble without it collapsing. 
However, with the reports of many western companies leaving Russia, and 
estimates that 10 percent of the tech workforce is projected to leave 
Russia before the end of May, we know the sanctions have not failed but 
are indeed isolating Russia and hurting it economically.
    Dr. Jackson. General Wolters, do you anticipate troop levels in 
Europe needing to remain over 100,000 moving forward, or do you believe 
we will be able to return to the previous numbers from this time last 
year?
    General Wolters. In close consultation with our Allies and 
Partners, we adapt continuously to meet the challenges and complexities 
of our dynamic security environment. Together, we continue improving 
our posture, transparency, alignment, and speed of response. We are 
laser focused and united in having the right posture to defend NATO.
    Dr. Jackson. I want to focus on some of the training that goes on 
for American and NATO fighter pilots at the Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot 
Training Program in my district at Sheppard Air Force Base.
    This is the world's only internationally manned and managed flying 
training program.
    It produces combat pilots for the NATO alliance, which will be used 
to defend against Russian aggression, like the kind we are currently 
witnessing in Ukraine.
    General Wolters, you probably flew the T-38 when you went through 
pilot training as a young Lieutenant.
    Even at that time, there is a possibility that your trainer was 
already a few decades old, yet today in 2022, future fifth and sixth 
generation pilots are training on that same T-38 fighter trainer.
    Many of our NATO partners that train at Sheppard Air Force Base are 
also part of the F-35 program.
    Just this week, Canada announced that they selected the F-35 as 
their new fighter jet.
    Having American and NATO pilots training on the T-38 and then 
jumping into an F-35 seems to be a real gap in the fighter pilot 
training pipeline.
    General Wolters, how critical is it to ensure our American and NATO 
fighter pilots begin training on the new T-7A Red Hawk? How will these 
partnerships help with our ability to combat Russian aggression?
    General Wolters. The Euro-NATO Jet Pilot Training Program has been 
instrumental in developing skilled and agile pilots for a combat-
credible Alliance. We welcome Ally and Partner investments in Fifth 
generation platforms, and support training on advanced systems in 
peacetime to enable speed and agility in conflict.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HORSFORD
    Mr. Horsford. The Black Sea has long served as a strategic center 
of gravity for Russia, and a potential flashpoint between NATO and 
Russia. It is bordered by three NATO members, including Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey, and has been the site of increased Russian 
aggression and belligerence well before the invasion of Ukraine. 
Following Putin's 2014 invasion of Crimea, Russia began to install 
sophisticated weapons onto the Crimean Peninsula meant to threaten 
freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. I am concerned that if Putin's 
invasion of additional port cities and regions along Ukraine's Black 
Sea coast is successful, this problem will only worsen. Earlier this 
month, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nuland stated that 
she was in favor of a regular rotational maritime presence in the Black 
Sea. She also testified that the U.S. had, ``not taken appropriate 
account of what it meant when Putin seized Crimea and then began 
putting all kinds of advanced weaponry on it. And that gave him the 
capacity to close aspects of the Black Sea in a way that we cannot 
tolerate. And we need to get back to that business.''
    Despite this, it's my understanding that no NATO warships have 
conducted patrols in the Black Sea since January. I am deeply concerned 
by the message this sends to our NATO allies, including Romania and 
Bulgaria, regarding our commitment to freedom of navigation in the 
Black Sea.
    In my discussion with the Turkish Ambassador earlier this week we 
discussed Turkey's implementation of Article 19 of the Montreux 
Convention. He indicated that while Turkey had successfully blocked a 
significant number of Russian warships from transiting the Turkish 
Straits and entering the Black Sea, no other nations had requested 
passage since the conflict began. Because of Russia's well-documented 
history of belligerent and illegal naval activity, I understand if 
there is a reluctance to introduce NATO warships into the Black Sea due 
to deconfliction challenges and the potential for escalation. However, 
I want to confirm that since no NATO country is a belligerent in this 
conflict, NATO warships retain the option to access the Black Sea if 
desired, consistent with the Montreux Convention.
    Why is NATO not currently conducting maritime patrols in the Black 
Sea, and does NATO retain the ability to transit warships through the 
Turkish Straits into the Black Sea?
    Has the U.S. or any NATO country requested or discussed warship 
passage through the Turkish Straits since 21 February 2022? If so, what 
was Turkey's response? Has Turkey given any indication that they would 
not allow NATO warships into the Black Sea?
    Does EUCOM plan to forward-deploy coastal defense cruise missiles 
or similar capabilities to NATO countries bordering the Black Sea in 
order to maintain an effective deterrent against the Black Sea Fleet?
    What is the administration's Black Sea strategy?
    Dr. Wallander. Following Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, 
the Turkish cabinet decided to close the Dardanelles and Bosphorus 
straits to all military vessels citing the Montreux Convention, which 
states that passage of warships should be wholly at the discretion of 
the Turkish Government when it feels itself to be threatened with 
imminent danger of war. In a February 28 press conference, Foreign 
Minister Cavusoglu announced that all governments, riparian and non-
riparian, were advised not to send warships through the Straits. 
Turkish President Erdogan confirmed the statement adding the measure 
was taken to prevent the Russia-Ukraine conflict from escalating 
further. Since the announcement, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey have 
continued to conduct Black Sea maritime patrols. Additionally, Black 
Sea and non-Black Sea Allies continue to fly Black Sea air policing 
missions and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. 
Turkey has continued to indicate its desire to limit the passage of 
warships through the Straits while the conflict is ongoing. The USEUCOM 
Commander consults with Allies regularly on deterrence and defense 
requirements across his area of responsibility. The nature and results 
of those consultations are classified. We also continue to engage with 
our other Black Sea NATO Allies and partners. This includes bolstering 
DOD's presence in Black Sea littoral Allies Romania and Bulgaria, where 
the United States deployed Stryker units in early 2022 and regularly 
contributes to air policing.
    Mr. Horsford. Has EUCOM or DOD seen any indications of increased 
Russian readiness for an explosive nuclear test, and if so, what steps 
has the command taken in conjunction with STRATCOM to deter such a 
test?
    What actions would NATO and the U.S. Government take in the event 
of a Russian explosive nuclear test?
    Dr. Wallander. (U) In line with the goals of the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT), the United States continues to observe its zero-
yield nuclear explosive testing moratorium, and would condemn any 
nuclear tests that violate Russia's obligations under the CTBT. The 
Department of Defense, along with the interagency, plans and prepares 
for the full range of contingencies.
    Mr. Horsford. The Black Sea has long served as a strategic center 
of gravity for Russia, and a potential flashpoint between NATO and 
Russia. It is bordered by three NATO members, including Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey, and has been the site of increased Russian 
aggression and belligerence well before the invasion of Ukraine. 
Following Putin's 2014 invasion of Crimea, Russia began to install 
sophisticated weapons onto the Crimean Peninsula meant to threaten 
freedom of navigation in the Black Sea. I am concerned that if Putin's 
invasion of additional port cities and regions along Ukraine's Black 
Sea coast is successful, this problem will only worsen. Earlier this 
month, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nuland stated 
that she was in favor of a regular rotational maritime presence in the 
Black Sea. She also testified that the U.S. had, ``not taken 
appropriate account of what it meant when Putin seized Crimea and then 
began putting all kinds of advanced weaponry on it. And that gave him 
the capacity to close aspects of the Black Sea in a way that we cannot 
tolerate. And we need to get back to that business.''
    Despite this, it's my understanding that no NATO warships have 
conducted patrols in the Black Sea since January. I am deeply concerned 
by the message this sends to our NATO allies, including Romania and 
Bulgaria, regarding our commitment to freedom of navigation in the 
Black Sea.
    In my discussion with the Turkish Ambassador earlier this week we 
discussed Turkey's implementation of Article 19 of the Montreux 
Convention. He indicated that while Turkey had successfully blocked a 
significant number of Russian warships from transiting the Turkish 
Straits and entering the Black Sea, no other nations had requested 
passage since the conflict began. Because of Russia's well-documented 
history of belligerent and illegal naval activity, I understand if 
there is a reluctance to introduce NATO warships into the Black Sea due 
to deconfliction challenges and the potential for escalation. However, 
I want to confirm that since no NATO country is a belligerent in this 
conflict, NATO warships retain the option to access the Black Sea if 
desired, consistent with the Montreux Convention.
    Why is NATO not currently conducting maritime patrols in the Black 
Sea, and does NATO retain the ability to transit warships through the 
Turkish Straits into the Black Sea?
    Has the U.S. or any NATO country requested or discussed warship 
passage through the Turkish Straits since 21 February 2022? If so, what 
was Turkey's response? Has Turkey given any indication that they would 
not allow NATO warships into the Black Sea?
    Does EUCOM plan to forward-deploy coastal defense cruise missiles 
or similar capabilities to NATO countries bordering the Black Sea in 
order to maintain an effective deterrent against the Black Sea Fleet?
    What is the administration's Black Sea strategy?
    General Wolters. NATO forces are not currently conducting maritime 
activities in the Black Sea, but are able to do so, consistent with the 
Montreux Convention.
    No, the United States has not submitted a Montreux Convention 
notification since 21 February 2022. Turkey is a key NATO Ally, and has 
given no indication to counter the Montreux Convention.
    In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the 
Joint Staff, USEUCOM retains the ability to flexibly deploy a variety 
weapons systems to meet its objectives. We constantly assess our 
posture to optimally meet mission requirements, including areas 
bordering the Black Sea.
    We defer to the White House for specific policy-related questions. 
Forces in USEUCOM maintain the right to operate within the Black Sea 
under international law, and support Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Georgia, and Ukraine, our NATO Allies and key Partners along the Black 
Sea littoral.
    Mr. Horsford. Public reporting has highlighted the ongoing success 
of Ukrainian defense forces in utilizing Bayrakter TB2 remotely piloted 
aircraft against Russian forces. I'm curious to hear your assessment of 
the effectiveness of these platforms and better understand why the 
Russians have been unable to achieve air superiority over Ukraine. We 
have been told for years that aircraft like the MQ-9 Reaper would not 
have a role to play in high-end conflict, and yet today we see the MQ-
9's far less-capable Turkish cousin being used with devastating effect 
against one of the most capable militaries in the world.
    What is your best estimate of how many Bayrakter TB2 aircraft have 
been employed by Ukraine against Russian forces, how many have been 
lost to Russian anti-aircraft systems, and what losses have these 
platforms inflicted on Russian forces?
    Why has Russia been unable to gain air-superiority over Ukraine, 
and how has the Ukrainian use of RPAs against high-value targets 
contributed to this outcome?
    General Wolters. Ukraine had at least 20 operational TB-2s 
airframes prior to Russia's premeditated and unprovoked invasion. TB-2s 
were likely responsible for the destruction of 2 Russian command posts, 
at least 10 Russian air defense systems, more than 30 military 
vehicles, 6 artillery systems, and 2 Russian logistic trains. Russia's 
inability to achieve air superiority in Ukraine is most likely due to 
limited pilot proficiency. While Russia has sufficient modern 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) equipment, years of suspect 
training and failure to prioritize near-peer combat tasks limits using 
their technology to its fullest extent. Ukrainian TB-2 effectiveness is 
likely a symptom, not a cause, of Russia's inability to achieve 
airspace superiority.
    Mr. Horsford. What is EUCOM's perspective on the importance of 
fielding active protection systems like Trophy on both the pre-
positioned armored stocks in EUCOM and rotational armored brigades 
deploying to Europe?
    General Wolters. Active Protection Systems (APS) are critical to 
mitigate risks against increasingly sophisticated and lethal Anti-Tank 
threats, and more effective than adding armor to ground-fighting 
systems. The increasing weight of our tanks limits tactical and 
operational mobility, requires heavy equipment transportation, and are 
incompatible with tactical bridging loads. One of the two armored 
brigade combat teams in the Army's prepositioned stock program is 
equipped to accept the Trophy system if required in the future. U.S. 
Army Forces Europe is also working to outfit the Stryker Brigade Combat 
Team with Trophy. Light-weight prepositioned tanks that provide both 
soft and hard kill features provide maximum flexibility for future 
needs.
    Mr. Horsford. Has EUCOM or DOD seen any indications of increased 
Russian readiness for an explosive nuclear test, and if so, what steps 
has the command taken in conjunction with STRATCOM to deter such a 
test?
    What actions would NATO and the U.S. Government take in the event 
of a Russian explosive nuclear test?
    General Wolters. We don't assess Russia is preparing for an 
explosive nuclear test, and haven't observed changes of concern in 
Russia's nuclear posture.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
    Mr. Cooper. General Wolters, regarding a future nuclear sea-
launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), has USEUCOM evaluated the costs and 
benefits of the operational deployment of such a capability? Has 
USEUCOM, for example, considered trade-offs that would be associated 
with allocating missile tubes on Virginia-class submarines to nuclear-
armed missiles and assigning dual-capable Virginia-class submarines to 
nuclear missions? Given the high demand for Virginia-class submarines 
in both USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM, do you have concerns about the 
deployment of SLCM-N potentially weakening conventional deterrence and 
warfighting capability?
    General Wolters. We defer to the Services on matters of weapons 
acquisition, research, and development.

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