[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 117-64]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

               FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             MARCH 1, 2022
                             


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
 

                                     
                        ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 48-659             WASHINGTON : 2023 


                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
    Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                           Will Braden, Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                               WITNESSES

Baker, Hon. Sasha, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 
  Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. 
  Department of Defense..........................................     4
Dickinson, GEN James H., USA, Commander, United States Space 
  Command........................................................     7
Richard, ADM Charles A., USN, Commander, United States Strategic 
  Command........................................................     6
VanHerck, Gen Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States Northern 
  Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command...........     8

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Baker, Hon. Sasha............................................    32
    Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    31
    Dickinson, GEN James H.......................................    76
    Richard, ADM Charles A.......................................    44
    VanHerck, Gen Glen D.........................................    99

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Langevin.................................................   127

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Cooper...................................................   131
    Mr. Garamendi................................................   135
    Mr. Lamborn..................................................   131
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   135
    Ms. Stefanik.................................................   136
    Mr. Waltz....................................................   137
               FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                            Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 1, 2022.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:37 p.m., in 
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
     TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. Good afternoon.
    I would like to begin by welcoming our distinguished panel 
of witnesses who will be testifying in both open and closed 
session.
    We have the Honorable Sasha Baker, Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy; Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of 
U.S. Strategic Command, who joins us virtually from STRATCOM 
headquarters; General James Dickinson, Commander of U.S. Space 
Command; and General Glen VanHerck, Commander of U.S. Northern 
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
    The war in Ukraine is a tragic reminder of the importance 
of our work, which, as I have always said, is arguably the most 
important and technical of any committee in the House. Vladimir 
Putin's recent announcement that he was placing his nuclear 
forces on alert made clear to the world the risks of 
miscalculation.
    The written testimony today is voluminous, but I will ask 
the witnesses to shorten their verbal remarks to 5 minutes to 
make time for questioning. And I am hopeful that we can keep 
the open session as brief as possible, so we will have more 
time in closed session.
    We read much in the testimony about new concepts, test 
beds, labs, initial operating capability, and other jargon. But 
what America and the world needs right now is the capability to 
defend the free world.
    That means not just keeping up with commercial industry 
advances, but getting the Pentagon to be years ahead of 
industry. We must have the capability to meet and beat any 
competitor.
    Lord knows, our defense budgets are the envy of the world. 
We need to get our money's worth with capabilities that are 
also the envy of the world.
    Although our witnesses today are not responsible for 
development of space systems, they are responsible for 
operating our deployed capabilities and establishing 
requirements for what we will need in the future.
    I am thankful that we are finally moving forward to a more 
resilient, diversified space architecture, rather than simply 
replacing the aging big juicy targets currently on orbit.
    There is much more work to be done, however, and our 
strategic posture must remain the top priority for the 
Department of Defense.
    I am thankful that the Biden administration has stressed 
continuity with past strategic policy and the urgency of 
maintaining our nuclear posture.
    We will move immediately to closed session upon conclusion 
of the open hearing.
    And I yield now to the ranking member, Mr. Lamborn.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the 
Appendix on page 31.]

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO, 
        RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's 
hearing.
    The backdrop of this hearing, as we all know, is Russia's 
ongoing invasion of Ukraine, which will be on the top of our 
minds for all of us here today.
    Thank you to our witnesses--Secretary Baker, Admiral 
Richard, General Dickinson, and General VanHerck--for taking 
the time to be before us today.
    In this forum a year ago, we all lamented the degree to 
which the global security environment was deteriorating.
    Admiral Richard, I recall that you went to great lengths 
giving your best military advice as to how we must deter two 
nuclear peer adversaries at the same time. It was a sobering 
hearing.
    And just 10 months since that hearing, the global security 
environment has become exponentially worse. China and Russia 
are seeking to exploit our weaknesses, and we can't let our 
guard down.
    As Russian forces massed on the Ukrainian border, Putin 
oversaw a strategic nuclear forces exercise designed to 
intimidate Europe and the United States. In his words, the 
intent was to threaten, quote, ``consequences you have never 
faced in your history,'' unquote, ``for anyone who tries to 
interfere with us,'' quote/unquote.
    The next day, as Ukrainian troops valiantly repelled 
Russian advances, Putin directed the elevation in the readiness 
posture of his nuclear forces.
    Russia is being run by a despot, detached from reality, 
with up to 2,000 nuclear warheads that are not accountable 
under the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty.
    Russia may be willing to say, quote, ``A nuclear war cannot 
be won, so it must never be fought,'' unquote, but I would 
remind my colleagues, Putin also said he had, quote, ``no 
intention of invading Ukraine,'' unquote.
    Since last year, the strategic threat posed by China has 
also metastasized. We all know that China intends to have at 
least 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030; they conducted a 
hypersonic fractional orbital bombardment test that surprised 
the world; and they have constructed new ICBM [intercontinental 
ballistic missile] fields that are sprouting like weeds.
    These new ICBM fields, along with new Chinese road-mobile 
systems and hypersonic delivery systems, significantly increase 
the number of targets STRATCOM must hold at risk, and they 
complicate the detection and warning problem for our missile 
defense capabilities.
    And with everything else going on, North Korea launched a 
ballistic missile last week. It barely even made the news, but 
there is press reporting that the test had applications for a 
space-launched capability.
    If true, this represents a significant threat to our 
homeland, and the Missile Defense Review, which is coming out 
soon, must continue the longstanding commitment to outpace the 
North Korean threat to the homeland and get the Next Generation 
Interceptor to initial operating capability as soon as 
possible.
    And to complicate matters further, China and Russia have 
demonstrated ability and intent to weaponize and militarize 
space. Russia's recent anti-satellite weapon test generated 
debris that threatens human lives on orbit and shows that space 
is no longer free from threat and militarization.
    China's demonstration of space warfare concepts is equally 
disturbing, as they recently demonstrated the capability to 
engage and remove satellites from their operational orbits.
    The open demonstrations of these abilities are intended as 
a direct warning to the West.
    Secretary Baker, given these dynamics, I can't see how the 
Nuclear Posture Review could recommend anything less than the 
current nuclear triad modernization plan.
    If President Biden sheds or does away in any way with 
nuclear capabilities, as has been reported, I predict 
bipartisan opposition in the House and Senate that will 
override it and continue to fund these systems. This includes 
the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, or SLCM-N, the B83 
gravity bomb, [and] the W76-2 warhead.
    Not doing so will cause allies to question our strategic 
deterrent. That cannot happen, especially now.
    And lastly, any weakening or changes in the U.S. nuclear 
declaratory policy must be expressly taken off the table. 
Europe is embroiled in the largest war since World War II, and 
Ukraine faces an existential threat. We cannot risk dividing 
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] at this precarious 
time.
    So I implore you, listen to our allies and maintain this 
current strong, American-led strategic deterrence posture. We 
can no longer attack our deterrence problems in isolation, and 
it is vital that we provide to this Nation the viable options 
needed to deter or defeat our adversaries across strategic 
domains.
    Thank you again to all of our witnesses for joining us.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
    The first witness is Secretary Baker.

   STATEMENT OF HON. SASHA BAKER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR POLICY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
             FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Ms. Baker. Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member 
Lamborn, and distinguished members of this committee. I 
respectfully request that my written statement be taken for the 
record, and I will just do brief opening remarks.
    Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
    Ms. Baker. Thank you.
    The Department acknowledges the challenging moment we are 
in as we witness the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Such actions 
highlight Russia as an acute threat, even as the Department 
continues to pace to the People's Republic of China.
    Further, the United States faces a challenging security 
environment amid intensifying strategic competition, rapidly 
evolving domains of conflict, novel military capabilities, and 
the growing assertiveness of our competitors.
    Deterrence is challenged by competitors' gray zone 
operations below the threshold of conflict, combined with 
increasingly complex escalation dynamics, which erode strategic 
stability.
    We must diligently calibrate our strategic posture--which 
is underwritten by our nuclear, missile defense, space, and 
hypersonic-strike capabilities--to these developments.
    The forthcoming 2022 National Defense Strategy will detail 
the Department's strategic approach. At the core of the NDS 
lies integrated deterrence, and this is a framework for working 
seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum 
of conflict, in close collaboration with all instruments of 
national power, our allies, and our partners.
    As such, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the Missile 
Defense Review will be nested within the NDS.
    We recognize that we face an urgent imperative to sustain 
and strengthen U.S. deterrence, and we must bring together all 
available tools of national power to do so.
    Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority 
mission. Our nuclear posture continues to be the backbone of 
our strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring 
aggression against the United States, our allies, and our 
partners.
    Potential U.S. adversaries are modernizing, diversifying, 
and expanding their strategic capabilities, resulting in 
growing risks.
    The PRC's [People's Republic of China's] ongoing ambitious 
expansion of their nuclear forces is a growing factor in how we 
assess our nuclear posture. The PRC is investing in a triad, 
implementing a launch-on-warning posture with advanced command 
and control architecture, and increasing its stockpile.
    Russia's modernization of its nuclear, missile, space, and 
hypersonic capabilities, coupled with its highly aggressive 
military behavior witnessed in its attack against Ukraine, also 
pose a distinct and pressing challenge.
    North Korea remains a persistent threat and continues to 
develop nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems that 
threaten its region and increase risk to the U.S. homeland.
    Iran's pursuit of nuclear activities continues to be of 
deep concern.
    This year, the Department will release the 2022 Nuclear 
Posture Review. As directed by the President, the NPR has 
examined opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons 
while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 
deterrent and a credible extended deterrent.
    In order to do so, we will continue to sustain and 
modernize U.S. nuclear capabilities, and as we develop and 
implement integrated deterrence, nuclear weapons will continue 
to serve a unique role in our defense strategy.
    Missile defenses contribute to tailored U.S. deterrence 
strategies and extended deterrence to prevent attacks from 
states like North Korea on the U.S. homeland and to protect our 
allies, partners, and U.S. forces abroad.
    We are seeking a layered and interoperable approach to 
address the growing number and type of missile threats, from 
the unmanned systems proliferated by Iran to the higher end 
hypersonic threats.
    The MDR [Missile Defense Review] will provide a framework 
for U.S. missile defense priorities and a strategy for missile 
defense within integrated deterrence. It will also outline how 
the United States is integrating missile defense with its 
allies and partners in order to strengthen international 
cooperation against shared threats.
    In space, the PRC remains our primary long-term competitor, 
seeking to exploit our reliance on space-based systems and 
challenge our position.
    Russia remains a key U.S. competitor in the space domain as 
well, as it similarly seeks to undermine and exploit the U.S. 
in space.
    Iran is continuing to pursue a space program which could 
shorten the pathway to long-range missile capability.
    We are focused on ensuring the capabilities and the 
architecture to deter, deny, and, if necessary, defeat hostile 
actions in space, recognizing that assured access to space is 
critical for our approach across all domains.
    The development of U.S. hypersonic strike weapon systems, 
all strictly non-nuclear, is a Department priority. The 
combination of their speed, maneuverability, and altitude 
provides clear and distinct operational advantages.
    The Department is working to identify and invest in the 
optimal mix of high and low ammunitions for deterrence and to 
ensure we achieve our objectives in conflict.
    We are also developing the concepts of operations to employ 
these systems that address and minimize destabilization risks.
    Transparency and dialogue with Congress remain critical to 
the evolution of this capability. I would like to thank you for 
the support of the Department across all of these domains.
    And with that, I will look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Baker can be found in the 
Appendix on page 32.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Secretary Baker.
    Now Admiral Richard.

  STATEMENT OF ADM CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                    STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

    Admiral Richard. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn, 
distinguished committee members, first I want to offer my 
appreciation for the flexibility to allow me to testify 
virtually with my fellow panelists.
    Due to those unfolding events over the weekend, I felt it 
prudent for me to remain at my headquarters here in Omaha. And 
in particular, given the ongoing, historically significant 
crisis in Ukraine, I am going to defer all questions relative 
to Russia and a number related to our own forces to the closed 
session.
    But before I begin, I want to thank Secretary Austin and 
Chairman Milley for their continued support to the strategic 
deterrence and strategic defense of the Nation, as well as 
their overall leadership under some very trying conditions.
    And, ladies and gentlemen, right up front, what I want to 
assure you is, is that my command, as always, is ready to 
execute our strategic deterrence mission.
    Chairman Milley rightly stated that we are experiencing one 
of the largest shifts in global geostrategic power the world 
has ever witnessed. Today, we face two nuclear-capable near 
peers who have the capability to unilaterally escalate a 
conflict to any level of violence, in any domain, worldwide, 
with any instrument of national power, and that is historically 
significant.
    Last fall, I formally reported to the Secretary of Defense 
the PRC's strategic breakout. Their expansion and modernization 
in 2021 alone is breathtaking. And the concern I expressed in 
my testimony last April has now become a reality.
    I have previously emphasized our need to be able to deter 
two adversaries at the same time. That need is now an 
imperative.
    I have said this before, and I think it is worth repeating: 
Every operational plan in the Department of Defense, and every 
other capability we have, rests on an assumption that strategic 
deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, is holding. 
And if strategic or nuclear deterrence fails, no other plan and 
no other capability in the Department of Defense will work as 
designed.
    The Nation's nuclear forces underpin integrated deterrence 
and enable the U.S. and our allies [and] partners, to confront 
aggressive and coercive behavior.
    The strategic security environment is now a three-party 
nuclear near-peer reality. Our existing nuclear forces are the 
minimum required to achieve our national strategy. We must 
modernize and recapitalize the Nation's nuclear triad, nuclear 
command and control, nuclear complex and supporting 
infrastructure, to meet Presidential objectives.
    And while modernization must be the priority, please make 
no mistake, STRATCOM's forces are ready today.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Richard can be found in 
the Appendix on page 44.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral.
    Now we will hear from General Dickinson.

  STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED 
                      STATES SPACE COMMAND

    General Dickinson. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. 
And thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn, and 
members of the HAS [House Armed Services] Subcommittee on 
Strategic Forces.
    As always, I am honored today to represent the 
approximately 18,000 men and women of the United States Space 
Command. We are a diverse team that values the honorable 
service of everyone within our ranks.
    This month, we honor the contributions of the women on our 
team, as U.S. Space Command acknowledges and celebrates Women's 
History Month.
    Today, we remain hard at work building the command toward 
full operational capability. We are steadily filling out our 
headquarters. Its composition reflects our joint combined and 
partnered approach to executing our critical mission.
    As of this month, we have approximately a thousand members 
assigned to our headquarters, with 339 Active Duty from all 
services, 227 from the Department of the Air Force civilians, 
323 contractors, 44 representatives from the interagency, and 
39 Reserve Component personnel from the Guard and Reserve. We 
are glad to have them all on our team.
    Responding to the threats that U.S. and allied interests in 
space demands the capabilities and expertise of every one of 
our team members. We are prepared to execute our Unified 
Command Plan missions and responsibilities, yet acknowledge 
that the challenges from our competitors in the domain are 
substantial and growing.
    China remains our pacing challenge. PLA [People's 
Liberation Army] developments is directed to creating a joint, 
versatile, power-projecting, professional, and lethal force for 
the international stage, and the space layer is critical to 
their build-out.
    In 2021, the PRC increased on-orbit assets by 27 percent. 
Their recent counterspace capability demonstrations include the 
DN-1 and the DN-2 direct ascent anti-satellite test and the 
hypersonic glide vehicle test.
    In January, the recently launched SJ-21 space debris 
mitigation satellite docked with a defunct PRC satellite and 
moved it to an entirely different orbit. This activity 
demonstrated potential dual-use capability in SJ-21 interaction 
with other satellites.
    U.S. Space Command is committed to deterring the use of 
these types of capabilities for nefarious purposes within the 
framework of the Department of Defense's integrated deterrence 
initiative, and, if called upon, we are capable of providing 
options to protect and defend against such threats.
    Key to all of this is U.S. and allied space superiority, 
informed through space domain awareness, or SDA, capabilities. 
SDA helps us analyze, not just identify, what is occurring in 
space, which, when combined with information from our 
intelligence agencies, helps develop an understanding of why 
things are happening in space.
    SDA remains my top mission priority for U.S. Space Command. 
SDA provides the backbone of U.S. Space Command's strategy for 
accomplishing our mission. That strategy sets the conditions to 
deter, first, and, when called upon, to defend space 
capabilities and deliver combat power to the United States and 
its allies.
    Our strategy has three main areas of focus. One is 
countering competitor influence; two, strengthening 
relationships and attracting new partners; and three, building 
and maintaining a cooperative advantage.
    With continued support from Congress, U.S. Space Command 
will do all of that and more.
    So on behalf of the most critical asset in our command, the 
soldiers, Marines, sailors, airmen, guardians, civilians, and 
families of U.S. Space Command, thank you, Chairman Cooper and 
Ranking Member Lamborn and the members of this committee, for 
your support of our mission to conduct operations in, from, and 
to space.
    I am submitting my statement for the record, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found 
in the Appendix on page 76.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General Dickinson. Without 
objection, your statement will be submitted in full for the 
record.
    Now we will hear from General VanHerck.

  STATEMENT OF GEN GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED 
 STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE 
                            COMMAND

    General VanHerck. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn, 
and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear today. It is my honor to represent the 
men and women of the United States Northern Command [NORTHCOM] 
and North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] as we 
defend the United States and Canada in an increasingly 
complicated and dynamic environment.
    I am also pleased to appear with Admiral Richard, General 
Dickinson, and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ms. 
Baker to discuss the vital importance of integrated deterrence, 
especially as it relates to the homeland defense mission.
    NORTHCOM and NORAD face the most dynamic and strategically 
complex environment in their respective histories. Both 
commands face multiple simultaneous challenges from strategic 
competitors who have openly declared their intent to hold our 
homelands at risk in an effort to advance their own interests.
    Today, strategic competitors, rogue nations, [and] nonstate 
actors possess the ability to strike institutions and critical 
infrastructure in the United States and Canada.
    To put it bluntly, our country is already under attack 
every day in the information space and in the cyber domain. Our 
competitors, especially Russia and China, are spreading 
disinformation, actively sowing division and internal discord 
with the intent to undermine the foundation of our Nation, our 
democracy, and other democracies around the world. We are 
seeing this play out today with Russia's invasion in Ukraine.
    Meanwhile, those same competitors have invested heavily in 
conventional precision-strike capabilities and advanced 
delivery platforms, which Russia is currently displaying to the 
world.
    In pursuit of their regional objectives, Russia and China 
intend to hold targets in the homeland at risk below the 
nuclear threshold in order to limit decision space for our 
senior leaders by threatening national critical infrastructure 
and by undermining our will and disrupting and delaying our 
ability to project power forward in a crisis.
    I want to be clear: I believe the strategic deterrent is 
the foundation of homeland defense. I also believe it is 
necessary for the United States to maintain a reliable and 
effective nuclear triad.
    At the same time, I am concerned that our reliance on 
deterrence by cost imposition, is currently overweighted and 
does not adequately account for the conventional capabilities 
our competitors have already fielded. This overreliance 
increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation because it 
limits our national leaders' options in crisis and in conflict.
    Our competitors' advanced conventional capabilities make it 
necessary to move forward to a model of integrated deterrence 
that employs all elements of national influence, leverages 
allies and partnerships, [and] provides leaders with a wide 
range of timely deterrence options.
    We must continually demonstrate to our potential aggressors 
that they will not be successful in achieving their objectives 
by demonstrating homeland readiness, responsiveness, 
resiliency, and displaying a range of kinetic and non-kinetic 
capabilities to defend the homeland and respond to any 
potential threat or aggression.
    USNORTHCOM's support of civil authorities and security 
cooperation relationships with allies and partners are critical 
to that effort, as is NORAD's mission to provide warning and 
defend the approaches to North America.
    The reality is that this strategic environment is the new 
normal. North America is and will be continually challenged day 
to day and in crisis. Our operating model that assumed we could 
project power globally from a safe and secure homeland is 
eroding and has been eroding for more than a decade.
    In order to provide national leaders with timely and 
informed options that they need to achieve favorable outcomes, 
we must improve our ability to detect and track potential 
threats anywhere in the world while delivering data to decision 
makers as rapidly as possible wherever they might be.
    In pursuit of those goals, NORTHCOM and NORAD are focused 
on four strategic principles in our homeland defense design.
    All-domain awareness. That is from undersea to on-orbit and 
everything in between, including cyber.
    Information dominance. That is the use of advanced 
capabilities, such as machine learning and artificial 
intelligence, to analyze and process data much sooner and 
deliver that data, what I call decision superiority, to key 
decision makers in a timely manner.
    And finally, global integration. No problem is regional 
anymore. They are all all-domain and global.
    These principles are vital elements to integrated 
deterrence, and they are critical to our Nation's ability to 
deterring competition, deescalate in crisis, and, if necessary, 
defeat in conflict.
    I continue to work closely with my fellow commanders, 
including Admiral Richard and General Dickinson, the services, 
the Department, and all of our interagency and international 
partners, to defend our Nation.
    I would like to thank the committee and all that you have 
done to support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and our 
guardians. The FY [fiscal year] 2022 National Defense 
Authorization continues to advance our national defense 
priorities and the mission of Northern Command and NORAD.
    However, today's strategic environment calls for sustained, 
sufficient, and predictable funding in order to prevail, while 
persistently operating under a continuing resolution has 
accelerated the erosion of our Nation's competitive advantage 
over the last decade.
    I join my fellow commanders, service chiefs, and the 
Secretary in expressing our concerns and need to arrest this 
degradation by passing the fiscal year 2022 omnibus and 
restoring normal order to the appropriations process as a 
matter of national security.
    Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General VanHerck can be found in 
the Appendix on page 99.]
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General VanHerck. Let me just add an 
amen to what you just said.
    I would ask all members to keep questions as brief as 
possible during open session so that we can rapidly move to 
closed session. I just have a few questions for Secretary 
Baker.
    I think, Madam Secretary, you would agree that if a major 
nuclear power were to suddenly double the lethality of their 
nuclear component, that would be a significant development, 
right?
    Ms. Baker. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I agree.
    Mr. Cooper. It might even be what Admiral Richard calls a 
strategic breakout. So it is a truly alarming development.
    And I don't know what is in the Nuclear Posture Review that 
is coming up, but my guess is we are not going to advocate 
anything like doubling U.S. nuclear capability, right?
    Ms. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. Unfortunately, I am 
not at liberty to talk about the details of the NPR.
    Mr. Cooper. I would be willing to bet that we are not going 
to advocate that. So that is fine.
    But there was a Washington Post article that appeared last 
October that troubles me because it claims, citing a national 
lab director who is retired, that the United States has just 
doubled the lethality of its nuclear arsenal. And there has 
been no denial from the Pentagon.
    Now, I checked into it to see if this claim was true or 
not, and it seems, by all authorities, to not be true. We have 
not doubled the lethality of our nuclear capabilities. So the 
continuing Pentagon silence troubles me.
    And I know that some folks like to appear 10 feet tall even 
if they are not. But this doesn't seem to fit with clear and 
honest communications on nuclear matters.
    So perhaps the Pentagon wants to discount The Post as a 
source. I can understand that. But the continuing silence, to 
me, is nearly deafening. And I would hate for a near-peer 
adversary to mistake the Post article for something approaching 
truth and using that as an excuse to accelerate their nuclear 
development, when, in fact, we haven't done a thing, really.
    So I just want to get this on the record so that we can 
have clearer communications with the world.
    Ms. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with the Post 
article that you referenced, but certainly we will dig into it. 
And I agree with you that when it comes to our nuclear posture 
and our nuclear capabilities we ought to be as transparent as 
we can be wherever we can be.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Richard, I will just jump right in for the sake of 
time.
    I think it would be a mistake to discard any of our nuclear 
capabilities in light of our two near peers and the nuclear 
buildups and posturing that they are currently displaying.
    If the United States were to just jettison any of these 
three following things--the nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise 
Missile, the B83 gravity bomb, or the W76-2 low-yield 
submarine-launched missile--in the upcoming Nuclear Posture 
Review, what kind of message would that send to our adversaries 
and our allies?
    Admiral Richard. Ranking Member, if you would, given that 
that is a discussion of our own capabilities, I would like to 
defer my answer to that to the closed session, please, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Let me ask another question then.
    Is it your best military advice that our missile defenses 
are matching the growing People's Republic--Democratic Republic 
of North Korea threat?
    Admiral Richard. So, Ranking Member, my best military 
advice here is that that very question is at the core of the 
Missile Defense Review. It is a question of what is our 
national policy in terms of what we expect to do from our 
missile defenses.
    My best military advice was applied inside the Missile 
Defense Review, and I think it would be best for that process 
to complete to give you the formal Department answer on that, 
sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. General Dickinson, reliable space-launch 
options are critical to the continued success of the National 
Security Space Launch program and for assured United States 
access to space.
    Can you outline the strategic advantages that we have by 
having launch options on both coasts? And what are we doing to 
protect these national missions, given the fact that we have 
adversaries who are trying to challenge our ability to operate 
freely in space?
    General Dickinson. So, Ranking Member Lamborn, so if I 
understand your question correctly, it is about responsive 
launch as well as how we protect those types of capabilities.
    Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. And having east coast and west coast 
options.
    General Dickinson. Certainly. So, I think, from a 
perspective of--from a combatant commander's perspective, 
having many different options available to us is very 
important.
    In other words, not just relying on one type of capability 
in this case, relying on the ability to rapidly or quickly 
respond to any events that we might have on orbit with the 
capability to put something else up in orbit to provide us 
resiliency and, quite frankly, redundancy.
    Having them geographically separated obviously has some 
survivability benefits to that, so east coast, west coast. It 
also lets us--allows us to deploy in different orbital regimes 
and in different slots, if you will. And so from that 
perspective, I support that.
    I think it is part of a layered resiliency type of concept 
where we rely on that, plus other things, to make sure that we 
have resiliency in space.
    And it was mentioned, I believe by Chairman Cooper in his 
opening remarks, about a resilient space architecture, and that 
is very important, that we have that. That is part of it.
    The other piece, in my mind, is having a constellation of 
satellites for different types of functions, whether it be 
communications or ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance] or missile warning, that provide us redundancy 
and resiliency through numbers of satellites as opposed to just 
a few.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    General VanHerck, can you elaborate as to how China is 
developing its hypersonic capabilities in this open context? 
And how does that compare with our own progress?
    General VanHerck. Ranking Member Lamborn, they are 
aggressively pursuing hypersonic capability tenfold to what we 
have done as far as testing within the last year or so, 
significantly outpacing us with their capabilities.
    Ours, we are picking up in the Department. I am confident 
we will see, when the budget comes out, we will see additional 
resources applied into the hypersonic area, as well as in 
threat warning and attack assessment for those capabilities.
    Thank you for the opportunity.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    And, Secretary Baker, I imagine that the Department is 
diligently consulting with our allies and partners these days 
as Russia invades Ukraine and is threatening veiled threats--or 
maybe not so veiled threats--on nuclear action.
    In these conversations, have you found a single NATO ally 
that is advocating for us to change or weaken our nuclear 
declaratory policy?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, yes, of course we are consulting 
closely with our partners and allies on a daily, if not more 
regular basis.
    The substance of those conversations is largely about the 
current ongoing events in Ukraine. But, no, I can't say that I 
have found an ally who is urging us to reduce our nuclear 
deterrence.
    Mr. Lamborn. Or our declaratory policy----
    Ms. Baker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn [continuing]. In particular.
    Ms. Baker. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
    Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    General Dickinson, U.S. space officials noted recently that 
Russia will employ counterspace capabilities, like jamming and 
spoofing of the Global Positioning System, GPS, and 
communication satellites in support of its Ukraine invasion.
    In addition, the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] 
director urged military and commercial space operators to 
prepare for possible cyber attacks from Russia.
    These warnings are deeply concerning to me as I represent 
Vandenberg Space Force Base, home to the U.S. Space Command's 
Combined Space Operations Center, CSpOC, which provides GPS 
navigation and space-based data that supports U.S. European 
Command and partners and critical to our command and control of 
space forces.
    With this increased threat of cyber attacks and 
counterspace capabilities, how is USSPACECOM [U.S. Space 
Command] working to sustain GPS and critical communications 
networks that support coalition partners?
    General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman, for that 
question.
    So at U.S. Space Command we prepare for that every day. 
That is part of what we do throughout the command that you 
mentioned, the CSpOC at Vandenberg Space Force Base. Those 
guardians and warriors out there do that each and every day, 
ensuring that our global positioning satellites are state of 
the art and are operational, to include satellite 
communications that we provide, as well as missile warning.
    And so we continue to do that each and every day. We take 
very active measures to make sure that we are protecting 
ourselves and defending ourselves from cyber attacks.
    So, in my mind, we are in a position right now where I am 
very comfortable with our strategic posture for the space 
enterprise, in support of not only European Command, General 
Tod Wolters over there, but also the other combatant commands 
around the world.
    So with our global mission, that is what we do each and 
every day.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    To continue, General Dickinson, the space enterprise has 
increasingly become a contested domain, as Russia and China 
continue to develop and field space capabilities.
    In this contested space environment, do you have enough 
resources to assure U.S. access and superiority in the space 
domain?
    And two, how are you leveraging commercial capabilities to 
fill current and future capability gaps?
    General Dickinson. So our relationship with the commercial 
industry is advancing and developing and maturing very quickly. 
We have had a number of commercial companies, I think we are up 
over a hundred that we work with right now, what we call our 
Commercial Integration Cell, that is out at Vandenberg Space 
Force Base, so much so that we are developing a new framework 
for our integration with the commercial industry.
    And we are doing that right now at U.S. Space Command, 
because we are finding that our commercial partners can bring a 
lot of capability very quickly to what we do each and every 
day.
    And that starts with satellite communications. That has 
really been kind of our older relationship that we have had for 
many years. But now it is expanding into space domain awareness 
that gives us commercial type of products that we can use from 
the commercial perspective. And that is actually out in 
Colorado Springs where the headquarters is right now, and I 
think we have had Ranking Member Lamborn there.
    So, in other words, the integration of commercial 
capabilities within U.S. Space Command helps us with what we 
were just describing in terms of providing resiliency as well 
as redundancy in some of the things that we need and 
capabilities we provide.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    And I will just remind us that to be able to achieve that 
commercial framework enhancement, we need to continue to invest 
in the infrastructure of those ranges, to be able to achieve 
these goals. So that is something I have been also advocating 
for.
    Secretary Baker and Admiral Richard, we all saw President 
Putin's unwarranted escalation of the Ukrainian crisis by 
ordering Russian nuclear forces to be put on high alert.
    What steps are you all taking within the coalition to 
manage this unprovoked escalation?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I would just say in this open 
session, we are assessing President Putin's directive.
    At this time, as the Secretary said, I believe last night, 
we are comfortable with our strategic defensive posture. And I 
will turn to, maybe Admiral Richard if he wants to add anything 
to that.
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, one, that is part of why I am 
in Omaha, is a part of our ability to assess and be satisfied 
in terms of our defensive posture.
    I am satisfied with the posture of my forces. I have made 
no recommendations to make any changes. And part of that is 
because right now, all I will say in open session, is the 
Nation's nuclear command and control is in its most defended, 
most resilient lineup that it has ever been in, in its history.
    And I will be happy to go into more detail as to why I say 
that, as well as more discussion of what we see and what we are 
doing about it, in closed session, sir.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    I am out of time, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Brooks.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Richard, always good to see someone from the 
Tennessee Valley up there.
    As you mentioned in your opening statement, in September 
2021 you stated China to be in a, quote, ``strategic 
breakout,'' end quote.
    In February 2021, you wrote in an essay titled ``Forging 
21st-Century Strategic Deterrence'' that you expected China's 
nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double, if not triple 
or quadruple, over the next decade.
    We have all been paying close attention to the conflict in 
Eastern Europe and Russia's recent movement toward a more 
aggressive nuclear posture.
    With what we know about these two adversarial powers, is it 
in the best interest of the United States national security to 
make changes to our nuclear declaratory policy?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, you know I have testified to 
that effect several times in the past, and it remains my best 
military advice that changes would not have benefit to a 
strategic deterrent, but would have a negative effect, a 
significant negative effect on our assurance of our allies.
    Mr. Brooks. More specifically, how would a change away from 
strategic ambiguity affect our allies, and what message does it 
send to our adversaries?
    Admiral Richard. Well, it certainly does not help and has a 
very negative effect on the assurance of those allies. And 
bottom line, in terms of any potential adversary, I don't think 
fundamentally they are going to believe one way or the other 
what our policy is any more than we do in some cases.
    Again, that is my best military advice, and that is being 
addressed as a part of the Nuclear Posture Review. I know my 
place in the chain of command, and we are ready to execute 
whatever decisions are reached.
    Over.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Admiral Richard.
    General Dickinson, good to see you again.
    In your opening statement, you outlined China's intentions 
to obtain superiority in space. We know China has various 
abilities to conduct attacks on our satellites, including laser 
blinding, high-powered microwaves, radio frequency jammers, and 
ground-based missiles that can reach satellites in low Earth 
orbit.
    Can you describe the problems we face and the challenges of 
responding to such attacks?
    General Dickinson. So thank you for the question, 
Congressman. Good to see you as well.
    For U.S. Space Command, what we are working on right now is 
all those events that you just described, our ability to 
understand what those events are, and our awareness of those 
events.
    So one of the priorities--or ``the'' priority within the 
U.S. Space Command right now--is building out the capability to 
do space domain awareness so that I am able to understand, 
interpret, and characterize what is happening on orbit. And we 
are doing that through a couple of means.
    One is, we are looking at what our terrestrial-based radars 
can see in space. Some of those are the traditional ones that 
we have known about for many, many years and have used those. 
Others are ones that we hadn't used before in that role as 
doing space domain awareness. In other words, looking up and 
seeing what they can see.
    So we, over the last 2 years, have done a lot of 
integration of those nontraditional space domain awareness 
sensors in order to understand better what is going on in the 
space domain. And that was highlighted for us when we had the 
Nudol test a couple of months ago where we were able to 
characterize for the National Command Authority what we saw in 
space.
    So, in other words, battlespace awareness is key to what I 
am doing right now, to make sure that I can understand what is 
happening.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
    And this one will be for General VanHerck. Hopefully, I can 
get the question in quick enough for you to answer.
    The Missile Defense Agency [MDA] launched the Next 
Generation Interceptor [NGI] program to protect the United 
States against potential ballistic missile threats stemming 
from North Korea and Iran.
    How is NORTHCOM continuing to work with MDA to ensure the 
NGI program remains on schedule and will meet the need of the 
combatant command when it is delivered in the 2029 timeframe?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, thanks for the question.
    I routinely meet and talk with Vice Admiral Jon Hill from 
MDA and stress the importance of staying on time with delivery 
in 2028, if not sooner. They have structured the competition to 
reward fielding quicker and faster to meet those demand 
signals.
    I would like to reiterate, I am comfortable with where we 
are today in my capability to defend against the rogue actor 
that we are designed to defend against.
    Capacity and capability going forward could be challenged, 
and that is why it is crucial that we keep the NGI on time or 
bring it forward even sooner than 2028.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the meeting.
    And, Admiral, Generals, thank you for being here.
    My first question goes to Admiral Richard.
    Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev said a nuclear war 
cannot be won and must never be fought. Is that your view?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, absolutely.
    Mr. Garamendi. Did your organization authorize and pay for, 
or authorize and then secondly pay for, a ``Guide to Nuclear 
Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition,'' a document 
written by Louisiana Tech Research Institute?
    Admiral Richard. Sir, if you would like, I will take that 
question for the record. I don't know off the top of my head.
    Mr. Garamendi. It was distributed--apparently this was 
distributed to all of your commanders in your force.
    Admiral Richard. Certainly not under my direction, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Then you have no knowledge of this?
    Admiral Richard. No, not from memory. But I would be happy 
to go look into it for you, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. I would be happy for you to do that. And you 
believe that this was not distributed to the 30,000 people in 
the nuclear----
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, I don't know the document you 
are referring to. So I regret that maybe I should have, but I 
don't know the document you are referring to. I would be happy 
to go look into it.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, I will await your prompt investigation 
of it. It is a fascinating document, and apparently it was 
distributed to most everybody in your organization, and it 
essentially says that we can win a nuclear war. Food for 
thought.
    So do you believe we can win a limited nuclear war?
    Admiral Richard. Actually, Congressman, I think my job is 
to deter limited use of nuclear weapons.
    Mr. Garamendi. And you have no opinion upon the question I 
just asked you?
    Admiral Richard. My job----
    Mr. Garamendi. Can we win a nuclear----
    Admiral Richard. My job is to deter limited nuclear use, 
and if deterrence fails, to restore that deterrence.
    Mr. Garamendi. I think we probably ought to get to a 
classified. I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here today.
    Admiral Richard, I know you have indicated that you would 
like to speak further about the B83 nuclear-capable hypersonic 
weapons and the W76-2 low-yield in a closed setting.
    In light of the conversation, if you wouldn't care to share 
with the committee, can you explain how the W76-2 strengthens 
our nuclear deterrent and what gap in the U.S. deterrent does 
this capability fill?
    Admiral Richard. Fundamentally, Congressman, what that 
enables us to do is to deter limited low-yield and/or 
combinations of that threats from our opponents. I will go into 
more detail in the classified session, sir.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And both Russia and China have 
warfighting plans that utilize low-yield weapons, correct?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, better if I answer that in a 
closed session.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, I will move on.
    General Dickinson, I know you're eager to get the permanent 
location for U.S. Space Command settled. Can you discuss 
briefly how this long, drawn-out process has affected your 
ability to reach full operational capability and what it would 
mean if you had to restart, for a third time, a search for a 
permanent location?
    General Dickinson. So thank you, Congressman.
    When I look at declaring IOC [initial operating capability] 
about a year ago, last August 2021, that was a milestone within 
the command, as we were able to have enough of the experts that 
I need on the team to be able to generate those types of 
strategic effects that we saw when we were able to characterize 
the Nudol event a couple of months ago. So we are on our way to 
full operational capability.
    Where I see it right now is, I am looking forward to the 
results and the conclusion of both the DOD [Department of 
Defense] IG [Inspector General] evaluation that has been done 
as well as the GAO [Government Accountability Office] audit 
that has been--that is ongoing.
    Those two assessments, I am confident that they will be 
done soon, and I look forward to the final basing decision, 
whatever that might come out of that process.
    And so for me, it is about the decision. I have got to have 
a decision. Once I have a decision, then I can do the 
appropriate planning to make sure that I have got the right 
types of people in the organization to bring me to where I am 
today, which is IOC, to full operational capability.
    And really, just based on the challenges that we are 
articulating from the Chinese in the space domain, we need to 
do that sooner rather than later.
    Dr. DesJarlais. All right. Thank you. I will look forward 
to continuing these discussions in closed setting.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. DesJarlais.
    Mr. Morelle.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you to the panel for being here and for your 
service to the country.
    I just want to talk briefly about the mission of the 
Stockpile Stewardship Program, which this committee has 
continued to support, and specifically its science efforts to 
ensure a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent.
    These programs already make stockpile management and 
modernization successful. I am very proud that my district is 
home to the NNSA-funded [National Nuclear Security 
Administration] Laboratory for Laser Energetics at the 
University of Rochester, which plays a unique role of both 
conducting world-class stewardship science and training the 
next generation of scientists that support the readiness of 
your important, critical mission.
    I am concerned, I remain concerned that NNSA does not 
request adequate resources for the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program considering our reliance, now and in the foreseeable 
future, on science to ensure the safety and readiness of our 
deterrent force.
    So I wondered if any of you could comment on the importance 
of these science programs to the mission that you have before 
you.
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, I am probably the most 
appropriate person to answer that question. I think you know I 
am required by law annually to do an assessment of the 
stockpile, and as recently as late last November certified the 
safety, security, and effectiveness of our Nation's nuclear 
weapons stockpile.
    That Stockpile Stewardship Program that you talked about is 
a key element of the ability to make that certification, which, 
fundamentally, this is about confidence in the stockpile. That 
is fundamentally what it comes down to.
    But that is not the only element that goes into this, 
right? In order to have that confidence, in addition to a 
Stockpile Stewardship Program, you have to have a flexible and 
responsive stockpile itself, which requires us to modernize 
those weapons, and you have to have a resilient and adaptive 
infrastructure, all of which require adequate funding to NNSA.
    Of course, we are statutorily obligated, as a part of the 
Nuclear Weapons Council, to do an assessment on the budget as a 
whole, as well as some individual pieces. That process is 
ongoing. In fact, we are very close to our annual 
certification.
    I would offer that the relationship between NNSA and DOD, 
or DOE [Department of Energy] and DOD writ large, [has] never 
been better. We are at a high water mark with regard to that, 
intend to keep it that way. And then you will see a formal 
answer from the Department as to the adequacy of NNSA's budget 
shortly.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you. If I could, Admiral--thank you for 
the response--regarding the People's Republic of China, during 
last year's posture hearing you stated that it is important to 
look at what they do, not what they say, and where they are 
going, and not where they are.
    That is almost prophetic, considering last August the PRC 
successfully conducted a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile 
test that traveled around the world. And the PRC simply 
dismissed it as a routine spacecraft experiment, as I remember. 
This demonstrated intercontinental capability. It is obviously 
deeply concerning to all of us.
    Do you believe that the U.S. current investments in the 
ongoing nuclear modernization programs will provide sufficient 
capabilities for the U.S. to remain a credible strategic 
deterrent to our enemies and to our allies?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, of course, I am awaiting to 
see what the budget looks like, just like everybody else is. I 
am confident that it will in the main.
    But there is an important point here that you bring up 
about China, and it applies to others as well, which is, we 
don't know the end point of where China is going in terms of 
the capabilities it is developing and the capacities that it is 
developing.
    And while I am very confident we are going to wind up with 
a very good strategy, I think it will need to be a question 
that we continue to ask ourselves.
    As we see where China goes, as we see where others go, what 
are the overall capability and capacity that the United States 
requires in order to execute that strategy against a changing 
threat? And we are going to have to ask that question much more 
frequently than we have in the past.
    Over.
    Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Admiral.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Morelle.
    Ms. Cheney. Ms. Cheney, are you still with us?
    If not, who is next on the list?
    Oh, she is coming? Okay, okay.
    Ms. Cheney.
    Ms. Cheney. Thanks. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. I will reserve my 
questions for the classified session. Thank you.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. I appreciate your consideration.
    Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me 
okay? Very good.
    I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today.
    If I could, Ms. Baker, I will start with you.
    Can you update us on the status of the testing 
infrastructure for hypersonic programs of record?
    Ms. Baker. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the question.
    I can assure you and assure the committee that we have made 
substantial investments in the test infrastructure, both air 
and ground, in order to accommodate hypersonic testing and 
other advanced technology testing that we anticipate will be 
coming down the road. Happy to get you more detail on that if 
that is of interest.
    Mr. Langevin. It is of interest. I am particularly 
interested in the wind tunnel. Is that part of the 
infrastructure upgrade you are talking about, or is that 
outside of your purview?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I would--just to make sure I get my 
facts straight, I will take that for the record and happy to 
get back to you with a little bit more detail.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 127.]
    Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you.
    Are there any additional investments required beyond those 
mentioned in the science and technology or testing and 
infrastructure MILCON [military construction] unfunded 
requirements submissions?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, this is something that we have 
looked at over the course of the National Defense Strategy and 
NPR, MDR process, and we are working closely with our 
colleagues, other components of OSD [Office of the Secretary of 
Defense], to make sure that what is included in the budget 
request--the forthcoming budget request reflects that need.
    Mr. Langevin. Good. Well, you are going to have substantial 
support from the Hill to upgrade that infrastructure given the 
fact that we are behind right now on developing hypersonic 
weapons.
    So, Admiral Richard, I will turn to you. Electromagnetic 
spectrum operations underpin nearly every aspect of U.S. 
military operations from command and control to electronic 
warfare to sensing and seeing. Certainly our adversaries, 
however, recognize the U.S. military's historical advantage and 
seek to deny the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Russia, 
in particular, has invested heavily in this area, as we have 
seen leading up to the recent conflict in Ukraine.
    The Department of Defense obviously absolutely must be 
structured to ensure dominance in this area. In fact, the 2021 
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] required that 
STRATCOM transfer its responsibilities for electromagnetic 
spectrum operations to another entity within the Department of 
Defense.
    Can you please provide an update on the status of these 
efforts and share your thoughts on where in the Department 
these critical functions should rest?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, one, I am pleased to see that 
my Department has finally understood the importance of us being 
able to operate in electromagnetic spectrum, and I was very 
pleased to see the Department release the electromagnetic 
spectrum superiority plan, which has a detailed implementation 
plan that we are executing.
    One of my direct responsibilities inside that is to stand 
up a two-star, directly reporting to me, organization designed 
to be the operational proponent. And so, before those 
responsibilities--STRATCOM's responsibilities transfer 
anywhere, which is still an open question, I think it is my 
responsibility to get the operational house in order--basically 
fix it--and then have it in a position where we might consider 
transferring it to another combatant command.
    Fundamentally, my job here is to be the operational 
proponent to make sure the standards are correct, to make sure 
certifications are correct, and then to make sure that the 
operational implications of the programmatic decisions we make 
are considered. I am going to fix it first, and then we will 
figure out if anybody else needs to have it.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. We look 
forward to the outcome of you fixing it and see where that 
lands, and then where it will go from there. So I will be 
following that closely, but thank you for your answer.
    General Dickinson, I have long said that we will never 
fight another war without the involvement of cyber, and the 
same is true for space.
    Can you discuss the cyber resilience of our space 
architecture?
    General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman, for that 
question.
    So the cyber resiliency, what is unique about the U.S. 
Space Command is, as we formed and organized ourselves, we 
started out by embedding cybersecurity right from the very 
beginning. So, when I look at the command right now, we just 
established our JCC, or our Joint Cyber Center, within the 
command, that is responsible for looking at the systems within 
the architecture that we need to defend. So that was starting 
point number one.
    The second piece is our relationship with USCYBERCOM [U.S. 
Cyber Command] and General Nakasone and his team, which has 
embedded a small element within U.S. Space Command and vice 
versa. I have inserted or established a cadre within his 
command as well. And, when we look at the service componency 
across U.S. Space Command, two of my five service components 
are dual-hatted as both space as well as cyber.
    So, given all of that synergy, if you will, with cyber, we 
are taking it--we have taken a very deliberate look at how do 
we protect our space architecture from cyber activity.
    So I am confident right now that we are making great 
strides in that regards and that we are, in fact, as I believe 
as Admiral Richard said, at our highest posture at this point.
    Mr. Langevin. I am encouraged by that answer. Thank you, 
General.
    And my time has expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Dickinson, good to see you, Ms. Baker.
    Quick question for you on Space Guard. I don't think there 
is a full appreciation for how valuable the Guard is to the 
current mission. Just a couple of quick data points.
    Alaska provides 80 percent of the 24/7 combat mission-ready 
space warfighters for the upgraded early warning radar; New 
York provides a surge capacity to the NRO's Ops Center; Ohio, 
direct support in the Combined Space Ops Center; Florida, a 
State that I am proud to come from, they provide a rapid 
mobility surge to war space electronic warfare capability.
    My understanding is that the White House would like to move 
all of these missions into U.S. Space Force by 2025. I think 
you would--would you agree, General Dickinson, that the Guard 
brings a significant private-sector capability as kind of a 
bridging function? And obviously they are more cost effective, 
or at least they are less expensive than their Active Duty 
counterparts.
    Would you agree with both of those assertions?
    General Dickinson. Congressman, thank you for that 
question.
    I am a big proponent and fan of the Reserve Component in 
general, both the National Guard and the Reserves. What you 
just stated in terms of the talent and the expertise that they 
bring from the civilian sector is powerful.
    And, as U.S. Space Command stood up 2 years ago, we 
actually had over 140 Reserve Component, Guard and Reserves, 
show up at the front door and say, I want to be part of U.S. 
Space Command. It has been that Reserve Componency that was in 
the command at the beginning and exists today that gives us 
that combat capability that allows us to act quick.
    Mr. Waltz. That is great. And I know, in the case of 
Florida in particular, coming from the big space companies, 
putting on that uniform, serving, and then going back and forth 
to the private sector has certainly been valuable.
    Would you support absorbing those missions in the Active 
Duty Space Guard and requesting the funding for that force 
structure?
    General Dickinson. As I said, Congressman, I think the 
Guard brings and the Reserves bring a lot of capability to us, 
and----
    Mr. Waltz. Just in the interest of time, General--sorry--
Ms. Baker, any comments there?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, I think the question of the Space 
Guard is a little bit out of my policy job jar, so I will defer 
to General Dickinson----
    Mr. Waltz. No worries. I think it is worth noting that the 
Guard Bureau has aligned the Space Guard forces under a 
National Guard Bureau space directorate for a relatively, in 
the big picture of things, de minimis cost. And my 
understanding is that directorate can be converted into Space 
National Guard, we established in the House version of the FY 
2022 NDAA. Look forward to getting that across the finish line 
this Congress.
    On tactically responsive launch, General, Congress has 
supported this effort. There was a successful demonstration. 
The ability to rapidly reconstitute degraded systems from our 
relatively limited launch sites, I think you would agree, was 
important. In fact, some have said it is key to deterring near-
peer competitors.
    But, despite this, neither the requirements nor funding for 
this important responsive space launch mission area have been 
identified by the Space Command or the Department.
    Do you expect that to happen in the near future?
    General Dickinson. Congressman, that is part of the 
requirements and the concepts that we are looking at at U.S. 
Space Command now, in terms of how to build that resilient 
architecture in space.
    Mr. Waltz. Do you see this tactically responsive launch as 
a key component? Do you expect to request funding towards it?
    General Dickinson. I see that as a capability--a--one of 
the capabilities that we should have in order to do that rapid 
replenishment of capabilities on order, in addition to 
constellations that have many satellites in it that constitute 
the--make a constellation, if you will.
    Mr. Waltz. Couldn't agree more, and I think, as we move 
towards a resilient architecture, we have to be prepared if we 
start losing assets. How are we going to rapidly replace them?
    Just in the limited time remaining in the public session--
oh, I think we lost the Admiral. I didn't--wasn't expecting 
that, and I think I will reserve my time, then, for the----
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Waltz.
    Mr. Panetta.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Classified session.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just briefly so we can get on to the classified session. I 
am aware that the Joint All-Domain Command and Control, JADC2, 
is key to integrating missile defense systems, as is 
harmonizing our efforts with allies and partners. But I am also 
aware of how challenging missile defense roles can be, 
especially if they are broken up under the unified command 
plan.
    That being said, I was just wondering, General Dickinson or 
General VanHerck, can you just kind of give a description of 
how we are trying to improve interoperability among the 
combatant commands, as well as our allies and our communication 
networks in order to bolster our missile defense systems?
    General VanHerck. Congressman, I will take that question. 
This is General VanHerck.
    There is multiple efforts ongoing to improve collaboration 
and coordination. I will talk about one that I am currently 
doing that we just finished and we are going to start again. A 
little information----
    Mr. Panetta. Hold on.
    Mr. Chairman, can you tell Mr. DesJarlais to mute himself?
    Mr. Cooper. Mr. DesJarlais, can you mute your microphone, 
please?
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Please continue, General.
    General VanHerck. Thank you. So the one that we are working 
on at our headquarters, it involves all 11 combatant commands. 
It is called Global Information Dominance Experiment. And it is 
about taking data and information from all domains, from global 
sensors around the world, to include allies and partners, to 
include the missile defense capabilities that you mentioned, 
and sharing them through a cloud and utilizing machine learning 
and artificial intelligence to process it in a real time.
    And that gives you the ability to collaborate amongst the 
various functions, to include intelligence, operations, and 
logistics, to be able to develop a picture, develop options, 
and evaluate whether those options are realistic.
    The Deputy Secretary has done an outstanding job by 
providing forces at each combatant command and funding to 
additionally work on integrating these capabilities across the 
combatant commands, her AIDA [Artificial Intelligence and Data 
Acceleration] effort.
    And so we are proudly partnering with the Department and 
all the commands to get after what you are talking about.
    Mr. Panetta. Outstanding.
    General Dickinson, do you have anything to add to that?
    General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman.
    I would just add that Glen has done a great job in terms of 
inclusiveness on some of these experiments that we have done 
that he just outlined. And it is equally as important that we 
are incorporated or integrated into those efforts in terms of 
missile warning as well as space domain awareness.
    So, as we move forward, one of the priorities for U.S. 
Space Command is to make sure that we have digital superiority, 
and part of that is being able to integrate those very complex 
mission areas so that we have one common operating picture that 
we can all look at in order to make decisions and 
recommendations to the national-level leadership.
    Mr. Panetta. Great.
    Gentlemen and ma'am, thank you very much for your service 
and your time today.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Panetta.
    Mr. Horsford.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Dickinson, it is good to see you. I appreciated the 
opportunity yesterday to discuss the importance of a tactically 
responsive space launch capability with you. And, as the 
combatant commander responsible for the space domain, your 
perspective is invaluable as the joint force works to field 
this capability. I am glad to be working with Congressman 
Waltz, and I know we led a letter requesting the funding. So 
look forward to working with you on that.
    I wanted to talk about the Nuclear Posture Review and test 
readiness, though. From 1951 to 1992, nearly 928 explosive 
nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada National Security 
Site [NNSS], which is located in my congressional district. 
Since the test moratorium went into effect in 1992, NNSS has 
continued to play a vital role in maintaining the safety and 
reliability of the nuclear deterrent through NNSA's Stockpile 
Stewardship Programs.
    Today, scientists at NNSS use advanced methods to conduct 
subcritical experiments that ensure the readiness of the 
nuclear stockpile. These experiments are safe to the public and 
the environment and provide decision makers the information and 
data needed to have no doubt in the readiness of our nuclear 
deterrent.
    The fiscal year 2022 NDAA included $135 million to further 
expand Stockpile Stewardship Programs through construction in 
an NNSS U1a complex providing high-skilled, high-paying jobs to 
the community and a highly advanced scientific capability to 
the NNSA.
    Every expert and commander that I have discussed the issue 
with has agreed that the experiments conducted at NNSS and 
across the NNSA enterprise provide an extremely high degree of 
[confidence] in the nuclear stockpile.
    However, I understand that NNSA still has a requirement to 
be able to conduct an explosive nuclear test within 12 months 
if ordered to do so by the President. I remain deeply concerned 
that any such test would not only be belligerent and 
unnecessary, but likely conducted at NNSS. Even the remote risk 
of such a test is unacceptable to my constituents.
    The Trump administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review 
stated that the United States will not seek ratification of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and that we will not 
resume nuclear explosive testing, unless necessary, to ensure 
the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
    So, Secretary Baker, do you agree that current methods of 
stockpile stewardship ensure the safety and effectiveness of 
the nuclear arsenal, and will the ongoing Nuclear Posture 
Review reverse the Trump administration's opposition to 
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?
    Ms. Baker. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    Let me just say that I think the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program is one of the remarkable successes of our nuclear 
architecture over the last 30 years. The work that is done in 
terms of scientific analysis to allow Admiral Richard to have 
that assurance of our nuclear enterprise is absolutely 
essential.
    It is the policy of this administration to support efforts 
to bring into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is 
also the policy of this administration that we will not change 
our unilateral moratorium on testing.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
    Admiral Richard, as the combatant commander responsible for 
the nuclear deterrent, are you [confident] that NNSA's 
stockpile stewardship programs will continue to provide you 
certainty that the nuclear deterrent is safe and effective?
    Admiral Richard. Congressman, as you know, I am required to 
formally report that assessment in writing. And, last fall, as 
a part of my overall stockpile assessment, I did, in writing, 
state that I saw no conditions necessitating consideration of a 
return to testing.
    But what I would offer is that stockpile stewardship alone 
is not all that is necessary to make sure that we have 
confidence that we don't need to go do a test to restore that 
confidence.
    It is not only stockpile stewardship. I have great 
confidence in that program. But you have to have a flexible and 
modernized inventory stockpile, which requires NNSA to hold to 
its requirements with the programs, and you have to have a 
flexible and responsive infrastructure, which is also 
necessary.
    So, as long as NNSA continues to meet DOD requirements, 
then I will have that confidence. If not, it would require 
revisiting.
    Over.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Horsford.
    Mr. Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, I defer my questions for the 
classified session.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you. I appreciate the gentleman's 
consideration.
    Mr. Khanna.
    Mr. Khanna. Mr. Chairman, I defer my questions.
    Mr. Cooper. I also welcome your consideration.
    Then we will move post haste to the classified session.
    This portion of the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 1, 2022

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 1, 2022

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     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
    
    
    
    

      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 1, 2022

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             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

    Ms. Baker. The Department of Defense, specifically the Test 
Resource Management Center (TRMC), is making significant investments to 
accelerate the delivery of hypersonic weapons to the warfighter through 
enhancing test capabilities and throughput for both ground and flight 
testing. Ground test improvements in wind tunnel facilities located in 
Tennessee, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Indiana, and Arizona will assist 
us in testing hypersonic aerodynamics, aerothermal materials, and 
hypersonic propulsion systems. These investments are being made to 
support future hypersonic programs of record and are being executed by 
the TRMC under the purview of the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering. [See page 20.]



      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 1, 2022

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER

    Mr. Cooper. The GAO has reported that the DOD and DOE face 
challenges mitigating risk to U.S. nuclear deterrence efforts. What 
steps have or should be taken to improve risk management and 
prioritization across the nuclear forces portfolio?
    Ms. Baker. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of 
Energy (DOE) have long implemented policies and procedures to mitigate 
risk to nuclear modernization programs, including a joint process for 
managing program-level risks at a program level for each nuclear weapon 
life extension program. DOD and DOE are working now to set up a process 
that will leverage the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), an existing 
governance body that has both DOD and DOE/National Nuclear Security 
Administration representatives, to develop an enterprise-level nuclear 
deterrent risk management strategy that will identify, prioritize, and 
recommend actions across the nuclear portfolio, and monitor the overall 
health of the nuclear deterrent as we sustain current capabilities and 
transition to modernized systems and infrastructure. This framework and 
resulting actions will be informed by ongoing assessment of the 
security environment and early identification of potential risks, with 
the goal of enhancing senior leader visibility and framing options for 
risk mitigation.
    Mr. Cooper. How has Russia's recent aggression in Ukraine affected 
the administration's plan to pursue strategic stability dialogue with 
Russia?
    Ms. Baker. The U.S. froze participation in the Strategic Stability 
Dialogue in February following Russia's brutal and premeditated 
invasion of Ukraine. There are no plans to resume the Strategic 
Stability Dialogue with Russia at this time. The last meeting to take 
place in the format of the Strategic Stability Dialogue, an 
extraordinary session working toward de-escalation, occurred on January 
10, 2022.
    Mr. Cooper. The GAO has reported that the DOD and DOE face 
challenges mitigating risk to U.S. nuclear deterrence efforts. What 
steps have or should be taken to improve risk management and 
prioritization across the nuclear forces portfolio?
    Admiral Richard. [Answer provided to the committee and available 
upon request from Member offices.]
    Mr. Cooper. It seems that USSTRATCOM no longer sees missile defense 
as a component of strategic deterrence as the command looks to transfer 
all missile defense gap analysis and integrated prioritization 
responsibilities to the Joint Staff and USSPACECOM. Should USSTRATCOM 
rid itself of the current responsibilities it has with regards to 
prioritization of missile defense capabilities, how do you envision 
your Command being able to balance missile defense requirements in the 
context of strategic deterrence?
    Admiral Richard. [Answer provided to the committee and available 
upon request from Member offices.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
    Mr. Lamborn. Last year, you testified that STRATCOM supported 
development of the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to address 
regional deterrence challenges. You testified, ``Without this 
capability adversaries may perceive an advantage at lower levels of 
conflict that may encourage limited nuclear use.'' Is it still your 
best military advise that the United States pursue development of the 
SLCM-N? Can you elaborate the risks the United States would accept if 
we do not acquire the SLCM-N?
    Admiral Richard. (U) Yes. Throughout the Nuclear Posture Review 
process, I recommended continued pursuit of the SLCM-N.
    (U) As I discussed, the risk of not doing so may not adequately 
deter an adversary from limited nuclear use. The SLCM-N would enhance 
deterrence by denying adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited 
nuclear employment could prove advantageous in regional aggression 
against the United States, its Allies, and partners. That is, the SLCM-
N is designed to ensure that an opponent does not believe there is a 
threshold below which they could employ nuclear weapons, ultimately 
leaving the United States only with disproportionate, unusable response 
options.
    (U) Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory 
convinces me a deterrence and assurance gap exists. To address this 
gap, a low-yield, non-ballistic capability to deter and respond without 
visible generation is necessary to provide a persistent, survivable, 
regional capability to deter adversaries, assure Allies, provide 
flexible options, as well as complement existing capabilities. Such a 
capability with these attributes should be re-examined in the near 
future.
    Mr. Lamborn. In 2020, the U.S. Navy deployed the W76-2 low-yield 
warhead on some of our Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles in 
order to fill a gap in U.S. capabilities that can deter limited nuclear 
employment. How might the removal of the W76-2 from our deployed 
nuclear forces impact our ability to deter Russian and Chinese limited 
nuclear capabilities?
    Admiral Richard. (U) The W76-2 low-yield warhead has been critical 
in maintaining deterrence during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Further, 
it is currently the only persistent and survivable low-yield capability 
in our inventory.
    (U) The W76-2 warhead addresses, in part, an exploitable deterrence 
gap by denying adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear 
employment could provide a useful advantage in regional aggression 
against the United States, its Allies and partners; thus, making 
nuclear weapon employment less likely. More specifically, the W76-2 
warhead provides a prompt response option able to penetrate adversary 
defenses, requires no host nation support, and offers additional 
diversity in platforms, range, and survivability. Lastly, the W76-2 
promotes nonproliferation by assuring our Allies and partners. These 
advantages would be lost should the W76-2 be removed from our forces.
    Mr. Lamborn. Last year, you explained that you're opposed to 
adoption of a nuclear declaratory policy of No First Use because 
``[y]ou will remove a level of ambiguity now that has a deterring 
effect.'' Why is it in the U.S. best interest to keep the existing 
declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity?
    Admiral Richard. (U) Calculated ambiguity enhances the President's 
flexibility to shape United States actions to the specifics of the 
conflict. This flexibility complicates an adversary's decision 
calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Further, the United States and our 
Allies and partners face the potential of strategic attacks from 
multiple vectors, and calculated ambiguity enhances deterrence and 
assurance from these extreme threats.
    (U) During the NPR process our allies were unanimous in 
recommending that no changes be made to weaken or otherwise remove the 
strategic ambiguity in our nuclear declaratory policy, which is 
indicative of the assurance it provides.
    Mr. Lamborn. The 2018 NPR announced that the B83 gravity bomb would 
be sustained to remain in the stockpile beyond its planned retirement 
date. According to previous testimony, ``the B83-1 is needed to meet 
current policy guidance and Operation Plan objectives. Adversaries 
protect much of what they value most in hard and deeply buried 
facilities, and adversaries continue to grow this class of targets. The 
B-83-1 is the best weapon in denying this sanctuary to adversaries.'' 
Admiral Richard, how might retiring the B83, instead of sustaining it, 
impact STRATCOM's ability to hold at risk hard and deeply buried 
targets?
    Admiral Richard. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Mr. Lamborn. In response to concerns over China's nuclear buildup, 
critics argue that the United States will still have thousands of more 
nuclear weapons than China, implying that our full force of about 3,700 
nuclear warheads is available to you. Admiral Richard, can you please 
walk us through in what ways you are limited from deploying the full 
nuclear arsenal?
    Admiral Richard. (U) The United States does not deter one adversary 
at a time; rather the nation must simultaneously deter two nuclear-
capable near-peer adversaries as well as North Korea. It follows that a 
one-for-one stockpile comparison is misleading.
    (U) Further, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) 
provides a ceiling on the United States and Russia of 1550 accountable 
warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and accounted 
for on deployed heavy bombers. As this limit cannot be exceeded, the 
majority of our nuclear weapons remain in storage as part of the 
stockpile.
    (U) Likewise, New START limits both parties to 700 deployed ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; and to 800 deployed and non-
deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy 
bombers.
    (U) China has no treaty constraints, such as New START, regarding 
the deployment of its nuclear weapons or its nuclear delivery systems.
    (U) Regardless of any treaty limits, there are capacity limits on 
our platforms that would prevent the use of our available weapons. 
Further, the ongoing maintenance and modernization of our stockpile 
precludes the use of all our weapons.
    Mr. Lamborn. After New START was signed in 2010, Obama 
administration officials assured Congress that the treaty enables the 
U.S. to maintain an upload capacity for strategic delivery systems to 
hedge against ``a serious deterioration in the international security 
environment.'' Admiral, would you consider China's strategic breakout 
and Russia's invasion into Ukraine backed by nuclear threats to 
constitute ``a serious deterioration in the international security 
environment''? If so, do you agree that this would imply the U.S. needs 
to take a look at uploading more warheads to our deployed forces?
    Admiral Richard. (U) Yes, I would characterize these actions as a 
serious deterioration in the international security environment.
    (U) I agree we should evaluate uploading more warheads to our 
deployed forces. Recognizing New START constraints, uploading is 
currently the primary hedge option available.
    (U) More generally, we must make threat-informed decisions to 
provide strategic deterrence now and well into the future. Likewise, 
our strategic capability, capacity, and posture must evolve with the 
threat to achieve our National strategy. We have the minimum 
capabilities needed to address today's threats. Going forward, we must 
evaluate more frequently what additional capability, capacity, and 
posture are required from our strategic forces-based on how the threat 
is evolving and where it is going.
    Mr. Lamborn. It was recently reported that by the end of the decade 
Russia may double its stockpile of about 2,000 non-strategic nuclear 
weapons that it incorporates into its warfighting doctrine. China also 
deploys hundreds of dual-capable missiles capable of striking out to 
the second island chain in the Indo-Pacific. In comparison, U.S. non-
strategic nuclear capabilities are extremely limited. Can the U.S. 
deter Russian and Chinese regional nuclear capabilities by bolstering 
its conventional forces alone? What changes can the U.S. make to its 
nuclear posture to ensure a strong deterrent threat against limited 
nuclear use?
    Admiral Richard. (U) No. We cannot deter Russian and Chinese 
regional nuclear capabilities by bolstering conventional forces alone.
    (U) We must make threat-informed decisions to provide strategic 
deterrence now and well into the future. Likewise, our strategic 
capability, capacity, and posture must evolve with the threat to 
achieve our National strategy. We have the minimum capabilities needed 
to address today's threats. Going forward, we must evaluate more 
frequently what additional capability, capacity, and posture are 
required from our strategic forces-based on how the threat is evolving 
and where it is going.
    (U) At a minimum, we must continue to invest in modernizing our 
strategic forces by recapitalizing the triad, Nuclear Command, Control, 
and Communications, weapons complex, and supporting infrastructure in 
order to maintain a viable, flexible, and full spectrum strategic 
deterrent force that is ready and able to pace the threat.
    (U) Additionally, Russia's war in Ukraine and China's nuclear 
trajectory demonstrate that we have a deterrence and assurance gap 
against the threat of limited nuclear employment. To help close this 
gap, pursuing a low-yield, non-ballistic capability that does not 
require visible generation should be re-examined in the near future 
along with other measures to address this.
    Mr. Lamborn. Last year, you explained that in light of China's 
nuclear expansion, ``For the first time in history, the nation is 
facing two potential strategic peer, nuclear-capable adversaries at the 
same time, who must be deterred differently.'' However, the design of 
the current U.S. nuclear posture dates to around 2010, when Russia was 
our only peer nuclear competitor. How might having to deter two nuclear 
peers at once impact our deterrence requirements? In your best military 
advice, should the United States consider changes to the size and 
posture of its nuclear forces in order to account for the doubling of 
peer nuclear threats?
    Admiral Richard. (U) As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, we 
will deter through safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces, country-
specific strategies, extended deterrence, and an integrated deterrence 
approach that incorporates conventional and other non-nuclear 
capabilities.
    (U) We must make threat-informed decisions to provide strategic 
deterrence now and well into the future. Likewise, our strategic 
capability, capacity, and posture must evolve with the threat to 
achieve our National strategy. We have the minimum capabilities needed 
to address today's threats. Going forward, we must evaluate more 
frequently what additional capability, capacity, and posture are 
required from our strategic forces-based on how the threat is evolving 
and where it is going.
    (U) At a minimum, we must continue to invest in modernizing our 
strategic forces by recapitalizing the triad, Nuclear Command, Control, 
and Communications, nuclear weapons complex, and supporting 
infrastructure in order to maintain a viable, flexible, and 
fullspectrum strategic deterrent force that is ready and able to pace 
the threat.
    (U) Additionally, Russia's war in Ukraine and China's nuclear 
trajectory demonstrate that we have a deterrence and assurance gap 
against the threat of limited nuclear employment. To help close this 
gap, pursuing a low-yield, non-ballistic capability that does not 
require visible generation should be re-examined in the near future 
along with other measures to address this.
    Mr. Lamborn. According to the Pentagon's 2021 China Military Power 
Report, China seeks to move at least some of its forces to a Launch on 
Warning posture, a capability that the U.S. and Russia already possess. 
Admiral Richard, why might a Chinese Launch on Warning capability be 
dangerous or increase risk of conflict with the U.S.?
    Admiral Richard. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Mr. Lamborn. To the extent possible in an unclassified format, can 
you please characterize the activities conducted at the Lop Nur and 
Novay Zemlya tests sites and how Russia and China likely use 
supercritical tests and experiments to modernize their deterrents?
    Admiral Richard. (U) I refer you to NNSA for a more in-depth and 
authoritative response regarding the types of tests Russia and China 
are conducting and how these tests and experiments could be used to 
modernize their respective deterrents.
    (U) Any advanced nuclear testing has the potential to support 
development of new nuclear technology, or confirm certain 
characteristics of existing capability.
    (U) China's possible preparations to operate its Lop Nur test site 
year-round include extensive excavation at the site, use of explosive 
containment chambers, blocking data flow from International Monitoring 
System stations, and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing 
activities. With respect to the Novaya Zemlya Central Test Site 
(NZCTS), the Intelligence Community assesses Russia has likely used 
NZCTS to conduct nuclear weapons tests, some of which have created 
nuclear yield.
    Mr. Lamborn. At what point will STRATCOM have more Chinese targets 
to hold at risk that Russian?
    Admiral Richard. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Mr. Lamborn. What is STRATCOM's estimate for the size of the 
Russian active nuclear warhead stockpile number in 2030? What is 
STRATCOM's estimate for the size of Russia's non-strategic nuclear 
warhead stockpile in 2030?
    Admiral Richard. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Mr. Lamborn. There have been concerns raised about the confusion 
and overlap of authorities between the United States Space Force and 
United States Space Command. How is USSPACECOM working to ensure that 
the U.S. Space Force is able to operate within the full scope of its 
title 10 authorities? What are the JISTs doing that couldn't be 
facilitated by service planners provided by the service component to 
reduce redundancy in overseas billets?
    General Dickinson. We designed USSPACECOM's Joint Integrated Space 
Teams (JIST) to integrate space into all Combatant Commands 
Headquarters, especially into the front end of operations, 
intelligence, planning, and executing, through education, integration, 
advocacy, and communication of all space-related activities that 
pertain to our Unified Command Plan-assigned roles and 
responsibilities, both in USSPACECOM's supporting, and supported 
functions. As an example, our JIST intelligence professionals link the 
USSPACECOM J2 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center to the other 
combatant commands. Given the United States Space Force (USSF) is a 
close and critical partner of USSPACECOM, we work diligently to ensure 
that we are not duplicating efforts. In support of this effort, 
USSPACECOM and USSF signed a ``Joint Space Integration Terms of 
Reference'' on 17 September 2021 to codify and differentiate the roles 
and responsibilities of the JISTs and the Space Force Service 
Components supporting other combatant commands. Overall, JISTs 
synchronize across combatant commands and enable globally integrated 
deterrence and other operations, while combatant command service 
components integrate capability inside their theater of operations.
    Mr. Lamborn. Last year I sponsored an amendment to establish a 
Space National Guard. Has there been any progress within the Department 
of Defense to stand up the Space National Guard? Is USSPACECOM involved 
in these discussions?
    General Dickinson. National Guard and Reserve members are an 
invaluable part of our team, with representatives throughout our 
Headquarters, and within our Components. The industry experience that 
National Guard members bring to the command is invaluable. For 
specifics on how best to organize a future space oriented multi-
component force, and the results reflected in the subject report 
legislated in the FY22 National Defense Authorization Act, I would 
defer to the Secretary of the Air Force. Additionally, the Secretary of 
the Air Force and Chief of Space Operations are better suited to 
describe the organization of the U.S. Space Force.
    Mr. Lamborn. What are the expected results of the Warfighter Talks 
with the Space Force that your posture statement discusses? Is there a 
document, agreement, or standard operating procedure for the two 
organizations to understand lanes in the road?
    General Dickinson. The nation's newest Combatant Command, United 
States Space Command, and newest branch of the Armed Forces, United 
States Space Force, are critical partners in deterring conflict in 
space, and protecting and defending U.S. and allied interests in the 
domain. In July 2021, we held our first warfighter talks with two 
primary goals: (1) Identify opportunities ``to continue to leverage the 
unique service and combatant command relationship between these space 
domain-focused organizations'' to achieve seamless integration in 
delivering superior space combat power to deter and defeat adversaries, 
and (2) to deconflict respective activities in operational and 
strategic support to the other combatant commands. Based on the outcome 
of those discussions, we signed a Joint Space Integration Terms of 
Reference (TOR) which aimed to drive continued collaboration in 
optimizing the integration of space capabilities in support of 
Combatant Commands' theater plans and globally integrated operations. 
This year's talks, planned for July 2022, will build on the momentum 
gained with this TOR as we continue clarifying how our organizations 
will execute our mutual supporting, but different roles and 
responsibilities.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
    Mr. Langevin. Can you update us on the status of the testing 
infrastructure for hypersonic programs of record? Are there any 
additional investments required beyond those mentioned in the Science 
and Technology or Testing and Infrastructure MILCON unfunded 
requirement submissions?
    Ms. Baker. As of today, all current unfunded requirements are 
captured in the Science and Technology/Test and Evaluation Military 
Construction (MILCON) unfunded requirements submissions. As the 
Department advances hypersonic developments, the TRMC is continually 
analyzing emerging requirements to forecast future needs.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
    Mr. Garamendi. There was only one bidder for the GBSD contract and 
competition would have helped drive billions of dollars in lifecycle 
savings (according to Air Force General Timothy Ray). How is the DOD 
ensuring that there is competition within the National Security Space 
Launch program in Phase III and in the nuclear and space arenas 
generally? How is DOD planning on maximizing competition and removing 
barriers to entry for new technology areas like additive manufacturing?
    Ms. Baker. Sustainable competition is a cornerstone of the 
Department's acquisition approach to ensure delivery of cost-effective 
capabilities. Nuclear modernization and space launch strategies are 
constantly evolving to adopt new technologies and opportunities to gain 
cost-savings while supporting the defense industrial base. Analysis 
shows the current launch market can support a limited number of medium-
toheavy launch providers. The DOD is currently working with industry in 
public-private partnerships like the National Security Space Launch 
(NSSL) program, which ensures the DOD has multiple competitive options 
for launch by facilitating the growth and sustainability of a robust 
U.S. space industrial base and encouraging competition among launch 
providers and suppliers to lower the costs and associated risks. NSSL 
seeks to develop capabilities like additive manufacturing and others 
through organizations like AFWerx, SpaceWerx, AFVentures, and the Space 
Enterprise Consortium (SpEC). In combination, these initiatives present 
a holistic approach to leveraging the commercial space industry across 
the entire marketspace to ensure a competitive edge for the U.S. and 
its allies in space. The ability to conduct rapid, responsive, and 
reliable launches of national security payloads is integral to 
executing DOD missions. These initiatives ensure the DOD has multiple 
competitive options for launch by facilitating the growth and 
sustainability of a robust U.S. space industrial base and encouraging 
competition among launch providers and suppliers to lower the costs and 
risks associated with these endeavors.
    Mr. Garamendi. What is the administration's strategy for pursuing 
future strategic arms control dialogue with Russia and China?
    Ms. Baker. One of the first actions of the Biden Administration was 
to agree with Russia to an extension of the New START Treaty, and 
express a desire to pursue arms control discussions as an element of 
the bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue. Due to Russia's recent 
actions in Ukraine, the United States suspended the Strategic Stability 
Dialogue, but we will be prepared to resume dialogue when conditions 
are right. With regard to China, we are laying the groundwork for 
broader arms control engagements by prioritizing efforts to reduce 
strategic risks and strengthen guardrails in the bilateral 
relationship. These efforts require a willing partner, however, and we 
are working with allies and partners to highlight the importance of 
pursuing strategic stability and risk reduction with Beijing.
    Mr. Garamendi. Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander, United 
States Strategic Command, signed the forward of a book published in 
2020 by the Louisiana Tech Research Institute entitled, Guide to 
Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition. The Guide 
states that it is ``about educating airmen'' within the strategic 
deterrence sphere. Instead of being a true educational tool, however, 
it is laced with faulty assumptions and logic, promotes the perception 
that a nuclear war can be won, minimizes the devastation that would 
ultimately come from a conflict, and endorses questionable policy. Who 
commissioned this Guide? Who paid for it? How widely was it distributed 
within Strategic Command? Why is the command implicitly endorsing a a 
one-sided version of deterrence?
    Admiral Richard. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) contracted 
with Louisiana Tech Research Institute (LTRI) to produce the guide as a 
response to the limitations of operating AFGSC's ``Global Near-Peer 
Competition Concepts and Applications Workshop'' under COVID 
restrictions. LTRI published the article in October 2020 with funding 
obtained through an Air Force Partnership Intermediary Agreement. 
However, AFGSC subsequently obtained a ``Zoom for Gov'' license to 
conduct the training live in a virtual environment. AFGSC did not use 
the guide for the workshop.
    Lt Gen Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM), wrote the Foreword at the request of the editor. 
USSTRATCOM had no further involvement and did not commission or pay for 
the guide. Additionally, USSTRATCOM did not distribute the ``Guide to 
Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great Power Competition'' in the 
command or to its forces.
    Mr. Garamendi. The Trump administration proposed an additional 
nonstrategic nuclear weapon, a nuclear-capable Sea-Launched Cruise 
Missile. This is a weapon system that even a former Acting Secretary of 
Navy recommended not developing and it could blur the line between 
conventional and nuclear warfare because it would be challenging to 
determine what warhead is actually on a cruise missile once launched. 
Will the DOD keep it in its arsenal?
    Admiral Richard. (U) The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review cancelled the 
nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile program. However, Russia's 
war in Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory demonstrate that we have 
a deterrence and assurance gap against the threat of limited nuclear 
employment. To address this gap, a low-yield, non-ballistic capability 
to deter and respond without visible generation is necessary to provide 
a persistent, survivable, regional capability to deter adversaries, 
assure Allies, provide flexible options, as well as complement existing 
capabilities. Such a capability with these attributes should be re-
examined in the near future.
    (U) It should be noted that the United States deployed the Tomahawk 
Land-Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM-N) for 25 years before it was 
retired.
    Mr. Garamendi. Is the DOD going to continue to request funding for 
the B83-1?
    Admiral Richard. [Answer provided to the committee and available 
upon request from Member offices.]
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
    Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Baker, do you think that bolstering our missile 
defense and nuclear deterrent is provocative to our adversaries?
    Ms. Baker. No. Both capabilities are core elements of the 
Department's integrated deterrence strategy which influences adversary 
decision-making by introducing doubt and uncertainty, providing options 
to decision-makers tailored to the scope and scale of possible threats, 
and ultimately deterring potential conflict. Within the framework of 
integrated deterrence, missile defense and nuclear capabilities are 
complementary, along with other strategic and non-strategic 
capabilities.
    Ms. Stefanik. Admiral Richard, what role do you envision for 
nonstrategic or theater nuclear forces in U.S. deterrence posture?
    What specific capabilities and attributes do you believe will be 
required to deter limited nuclear employment by U.S. adversaries?
    Admiral Richard. (U) All nuclear weapons are strategic. Any 
adversary use of nuclear weapons, regardless of location or yield, 
would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, create the 
potential for uncontrolled escalation, and would have strategic 
effects. As the Nuclear Posture Review states, the roles of nuclear 
weapons are to deter strategic attacks on the United States and assure 
Allies and partners.
    (U) Our current capabilities are the minimum essential to prevail 
against the unprecedented challenges that the Nation, our Allies, and 
partners face.
    (U) Russia's recent behavior, especially its recent invasion of 
Ukraine, underscore the continued importance of U.S. nuclear forces, to 
include Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA), to NATO's deterrence and defense 
posture. Although primarily under U.S. European Command purview, we 
must continue working with our NATO allies to ensure that B61-12 life 
extension program and DCA transition are efficiently and expeditiously 
completed.
    (U) However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's nuclear 
trajectory convinces me that a deterrence and assurance gap exists. To 
address this gap, a low-yield, non-ballistic capability to deter and 
respond without visible generation is necessary to provide a 
persistent, survivable, regional capability to deter adversaries, 
assure Allies, provide flexible options, as well as complement existing 
capabilities. Such a capability with these attributes should be re-
examined in the near future.
    Ms. Stefanik. General Dickinson, with your mission as the global 
sensor manager, are the current array of ground and space-based sensors 
adequate to warn the homeland of an imminent cruise missile attack?
    General Dickinson. The preponderance of our existing space and 
terrestrial sensors were designed to provide warning for ballistic 
missiles, and cruise missiles do not ``fly'' on a ballistic trajectory. 
Some of our sensors are constrained by environmental factors such as 
clouds, fog, smoke, dust, and other variables, while others are 
constrained by physical limitations like the curvature of the earth. We 
are working with STRATCOM, who currently has the missile defense 
mission, and other combatant commands on integrating all sensors within 
the DOD's air warning, missile warning, and missile defense portfolios 
to improve our space domain awareness. This will improve our capacity 
to detect imminent attacks, and will contribute to integrated 
deterrence by raising the cost calculus of our competitors.
    Ms. Stefanik. General VanHerck, what are some ways we can improve 
homeland defenses against cruise missiles and submarine launched cruise 
and ballistic missiles from Russia or other adversaries?
    General VanHerck. First, the designation of a single lead 
integrator, as directed by the 2017 NDAA, for acquisition and fielding 
of cruise missile defense capability is imperative to success. I am 
actively working to get the Department to comply with the law. Next, 
defense against cruise missiles begins with domain awareness, being 
able to detect threats to North America. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are 
working with the Department, and the Canadian Department of National 
Defence, to add significant improvements in this regard. My number #1 
priority is the fielding of Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR). If/When 
fully integrated into our command and control systems, OTHR will be a 
game-changing technology in my ability to detect and track advanced 
cruise missile threats while also providing maritime and space domain 
awareness. With domain awareness, and policy directing what critical 
infrastructure to defend and what threats to defend against, then 
cruise missile defenses can be built to provide a credible and 
effective deterrent to cruise missile attacks against the homelands. 
With respect to ballistic missiles, I am confident in my current 
capability to provide ballistic missile defense (BMD) of the homeland 
against a limited attack from rogue actors like North Korea. As you are 
aware, the homeland BMD architecture is not designed to counter 
ballistic threats from peer adversaries, we rely on our strategic 
nuclear deterrent for those countries.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
    Mr. Waltz. Considering the strategic deterrence challenge that 
China and Russia pose, the Sea Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear would 
provide a regionally present, sea-based, survivable option to fill a 
gap in America's nuclear deterrence capabilities and allied assurance 
commitments. The United States must adjust its force posture in some 
way to respond to the drastic change in the nuclear threat; however, 
former Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Harker had directed the Navy to 
defund the SLCM-N for FY 2023. Why is the Department leaning towards 
ceding strategic leverage and ending development of a vital weapons 
system in our strategic deterrence?
    Ms. Baker. As an outgrowth of the Nuclear Posture Review, the 
Secretary of Defense has made a recommendation to the President on the 
future of the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile program, which 
is reflected in the President's budget for FY2023. SLCM-N was cancelled 
given the deterrence contribution of the W76-2 and other capabilities, 
and its estimated cost in light of other nuclear modernization 
priorities. The Nuclear Posture Review affirmed the need to deter 
limited nuclear use by adversaries. The United States applies tailored 
deterrence strategies and maintains a variety of nuclear capabilities 
to address this need.
    Mr. Waltz. If China and Russia continue to develop intermediate 
range nuclear weapons and we unilaterally pause the development of 
SLCM-N, what other weapon systems are available to fill the strategic 
gap in the absence of SLCM-N?
    Ms. Baker. Other systems for deterring limited nuclear attack 
include the W76-2 low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile 
warhead, the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), U.S. and Allied dual-
capable aircraft equipped with U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs, and the 
future long-range stand-off (LRSO) weapon.
    Mr. Waltz. There have been several high-profile hypersonic missile 
test failures and a noted lack of progress on the developmental 
hypersonic weapon systems. In July of last year, the second test of the 
Air Launched Rapid Response Weapon failed at igniting its solid rocket 
motor. Not exactly failure of cutting-edge technology but failing at 
the basics. A third try at the test in December and the missile did not 
even leave the wing of the B-52 carrying it. What is causing our 
hypersonics programs to fail at the basics of testing new designs? Are 
the failures indicative of structural problems that our defense 
industrial base has at rapidly developing and fielding new weapons 
systems?
    Admiral Richard. (U) The determination of what constitutes testing 
failure or success in these advanced developmental hypersonic weapon 
systems lies with the respective Service program managers. Further, 
they are ideally positioned to assess industrial base concerns. I would 
refer you to these subject matter experts for testing failure root 
cause analysis.
    (U) The Department is developing hypersonic strike capabilities to 
meet an immediate requirement for a highly responsive, long-range, non-
nuclear strike capability to address distant, defended, and time-
critical threats.
    (U) Rapid development and testing of new technologies introduces 
new challenges, and we the Department must be allowed to learn through 
both successful and ``failed'' tests. Failures help identify causes, 
make modifications and incorporate lessons learned to speed development 
and move rapidly through testing to production and fielding.
    (U) Several conventional hypersonic flight tests are planned this 
year including all-up round testing supporting Army, Navy, and Air 
Force programs. I am encouraged by the joint Army/Navy development 
program which will field the Nation's first operational hypersonic 
weapon system next year and optimistic Air Force is effectively 
addressing past test failures.
    Mr. Waltz. What additional resources does the Department need to 
not only to pace the hypersonic threat posed by weapon systems that are 
being operationally fielded by Russia and the CCP, but leap ahead of 
where their programs currently stand?
    Admiral Richard. (U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering is spearheading a ``Leap Ahead'' effort to 
examine the trade space of advanced technologies beyond what is 
currently planned to be fielded by the United States or our potential 
adversaries. This office is best situated to address questions on 
additional resourcing needs.
    Mr. Waltz. Considering the strategic deterrence challenge that 
China and Russia pose, the Sea Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear would 
provide a regionally present, sea-based, survivable option to fill a 
gap in America's nuclear deterrence capabilities and allied assurance 
commitments. The United States must adjust its force posture in some 
way to respond to the drastic change in the nuclear threat; however, 
former Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Harker had directed the Navy to 
defund the SLCM-N for FY 2023. Why is the Department leaning towards 
ceding strategic leverage and ending development of a vital weapons 
system in our strategic deterrence?
    Admiral Richard. (U) I acknowledge the decisions made by our 
national policy-makers and defer to them for the reasons why the SLCM-N 
was cancelled. The threats that drove the need for the SLCM-N did not 
vanish, and lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis have demonstrated 
the need for the attributes of this capability. I look forward to 
follow-on activities that will determine how these threats will be 
addressed in the future.(U) Throughout the NPR process, I recommended 
continued pursuit of the SLCM-N. The current situation in Ukraine and 
China's nuclear trajectory convinces me that a deterrence and assurance 
gap exists. To address this gap, a low-yield, non-ballistic capability 
to deter and respond without visible generation is necessary to provide 
a persistent, survivable, regional capability to deter adversaries, 
assure Allies, provide flexible options, as well as complement existing 
capabilities. Such a capability with these attributes should be 
reexamined in the near future.
    Mr. Waltz. If China and Russia continue to develop intermediate 
range nuclear weapons and we unilaterally pause the development of 
SLCM-N, what other weapon systems are available to fill the strategic 
gap in the absence of SLCM-N?
    Admiral Richard. (U) The threats that drove the need for the SLCM-N 
did not vanish. The lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis show that 
certain scenarios, previously judged as unlikely, are far more probable 
than previously thought.
    (U) While the addition of the W76-2 low yield warhead (and the Long 
Range Stand-Off weapon (LRSO) in 2030) is an important asset for 
strengthening the preservation of credible deterrence against limited 
nuclear use in regional aggression, Russia's current invasion in 
Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory convinces me that a deterrence 
and assurance gap exists. To best address this gap, a low-yield, non-
ballistic capability to deter and respond without visible generation is 
necessary to provide a persistent, survivable, regional capability to 
deter adversaries, assure Allies, provide flexible options, as well as 
complement existing capabilities. Such a system with these attributes 
should be re-examined in the near future.
    Mr. Waltz. A key component to a resilient space architecture is 
ensuring the continuing availability, diversity, responsiveness, and 
resilience of launch locations here on Earth. What steps do you believe 
the Department should take to leverage the growing number of U.S. 
spaceports, and how can the Department work to leverage mobile, 
responsive launch providers?
    General Dickinson. Assured access to space remains a top national 
security priority. Robust launch infrastructure and responsive launch 
capabilities are essential to our assured use of space. We are 
fortunate to have our U.S. Space Force service component, and its 
subordinate field command, Space Systems Command, focused on developing 
indigenous military responsive launch capabilities, while also 
fostering industry's development of the same. Prior congressional 
action and direction in support of tactically responsive space launch, 
small satellite constellations, and hybrid space architectures serve to 
inform this development. We appreciate the continued support from 
Congress in developing these capabilities, especially in providing the 
necessary resources to our service components to accomplish their 
responsive spacelift organize, train, and equip responsibilities.
    Mr. Waltz. Several of our international partners and allies are 
starting to build requirements and identify funding for the responsive 
launch/responsive space mission area; but, despite several years of 
Congressional support for it, we've yet to see the same attention paid 
by the Department of Defense. How is USSPACECOM working with our 
partners to develop interoperable responsive space missions and CONOPs, 
and how might we expect these to flow back into the Department's own 
planning?
    General Dickinson. U.S. Space Command, as well as our allies and 
partners, need a responsive space and launch capability. I applaud U.S. 
Space Force and Congressional efforts to grow the U.S. launch base 
overall, as well as add a time-sensitive launch capability known as 
Tactically Responsive Launch. Efforts to date have focused on bringing 
timelines down to less than 12 months, but we need to push industry 
farther. In a conflict which may not last longer than weeks or months, 
a 12 month timeline is still not tactically relevant. We need to be 
targeting days, not months. Additionally, we appreciate the $50M 
authorized in the FY22 NDAA for 2 responsive launch, and are looking 
forward to hopefully seeing the subsequent appropriation. We must have 
the ability to rapidly augment, reconstitute, and replenish our 
critical space capabilities. The recent Russian Anti-satellite test 
makes this even more urgent. I've recently commissioned a study on 
Tactically Responsive Space to determine where we can incorporate this 
into the overall space architectures in order to improve our 
warfighting capabilities. This will set the demand signal that helps 
shape future technical investments and eventual programs of record. We 
continue to engage with allies and partners in bilateral and 
multilateral forums including the most recent U.S. Space Command 
Commander's Conference to identify gaps and develop the requirements to 
protect the space domain. As this coordination advances, we expect it 
to shape our plans and our global posture to enable us to fight with 
our allies and levy requirements to the services that enable that fight 
such as responsive launch As we progress with our own understanding of 
what is required and subsequently outline our path forward, we will be 
closely synchronized with our allies and partners in the areas of 
technology, CONOPs, and interoperability.