    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-64]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                   FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 MARCH 1, 2022

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                            ______

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
     48-659             WASHINGTON : 2023

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                        JIM COOPER, Tennessee, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California           MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts          JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California, Vice  MO BROOKS, Alabama
        Chair                            ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    RO KHANNA, California                SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    JOSEPH D. MORELLE, New York          LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming
    JIMMY PANETTA, California            MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida
    STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada

                    Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                     Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                               Will Braden, Clerk
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
    Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     2

                                   WITNESSES

    Baker, Hon. Sasha, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
      Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S.
      Department of Defense..........................................     4
    Dickinson, GEN James H., USA, Commander, United States Space
      Command........................................................     7
    Richard, ADM Charles A., USN, Commander, United States Strategic
      Command........................................................     6
    VanHerck, Gen Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States Northern
      Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command...........     8

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Baker, Hon. Sasha............................................    32
        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    31
        Dickinson, GEN James H.......................................    76
        Richard, ADM Charles A.......................................    44
        VanHerck, Gen Glen D.........................................    99

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Langevin.................................................   127

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Cooper...................................................   131
        Mr. Garamendi................................................   135
        Mr. Lamborn..................................................   131
        Mr. Langevin.................................................   135
        Ms. Stefanik.................................................   136
        Mr. Waltz....................................................   137
                   FISCAL YEAR 2023 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 1, 2022.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:37 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jim Cooper
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
         TENNESSEE, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Cooper. Good afternoon.
        I would like to begin by welcoming our distinguished panel
    of witnesses who will be testifying in both open and closed
    session.
        We have the Honorable Sasha Baker, Deputy Under Secretary
    of Defense for Policy; Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of
    U.S. Strategic Command, who joins us virtually from STRATCOM
    headquarters; General James Dickinson, Commander of U.S. Space
    Command; and General Glen VanHerck, Commander of U.S. Northern
    Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command.
        The war in Ukraine is a tragic reminder of the importance
    of our work, which, as I have always said, is arguably the most
    important and technical of any committee in the House. Vladimir
    Putin's recent announcement that he was placing his nuclear
    forces on alert made clear to the world the risks of
    miscalculation.
        The written testimony today is voluminous, but I will ask
    the witnesses to shorten their verbal remarks to 5 minutes to
    make time for questioning. And I am hopeful that we can keep
    the open session as brief as possible, so we will have more
    time in closed session.
        We read much in the testimony about new concepts, test
    beds, labs, initial operating capability, and other jargon. But
    what America and the world needs right now is the capability to
    defend the free world.
        That means not just keeping up with commercial industry
    advances, but getting the Pentagon to be years ahead of
    industry. We must have the capability to meet and beat any
    competitor.
        Lord knows, our defense budgets are the envy of the world.
    We need to get our money's worth with capabilities that are
    also the envy of the world.
        Although our witnesses today are not responsible for
    development of space systems, they are responsible for
    operating our deployed capabilities and establishing
    requirements for what we will need in the future.
        I am thankful that we are finally moving forward to a more
    resilient, diversified space architecture, rather than simply
    replacing the aging big juicy targets currently on orbit.
        There is much more work to be done, however, and our
    strategic posture must remain the top priority for the
    Department of Defense.
        I am thankful that the Biden administration has stressed
    continuity with past strategic policy and the urgency of
    maintaining our nuclear posture.
        We will move immediately to closed session upon conclusion
    of the open hearing.
        And I yield now to the ranking member, Mr. Lamborn.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM COLORADO,
            RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today's
    hearing.
        The backdrop of this hearing, as we all know, is Russia's
    ongoing invasion of Ukraine, which will be on the top of our
    minds for all of us here today.
        Thank you to our witnesses--Secretary Baker, Admiral
    Richard, General Dickinson, and General VanHerck--for taking
    the time to be before us today.
        In this forum a year ago, we all lamented the degree to
    which the global security environment was deteriorating.
        Admiral Richard, I recall that you went to great lengths
    giving your best military advice as to how we must deter two
    nuclear peer adversaries at the same time. It was a sobering
    hearing.
        And just 10 months since that hearing, the global security
    environment has become exponentially worse. China and Russia
    are seeking to exploit our weaknesses, and we can't let our
    guard down.
        As Russian forces massed on the Ukrainian border, Putin
    oversaw a strategic nuclear forces exercise designed to
    intimidate Europe and the United States. In his words, the
    intent was to threaten, quote, ``consequences you have never
    faced in your history,'' unquote, ``for anyone who tries to
    interfere with us,'' quote/unquote.
        The next day, as Ukrainian troops valiantly repelled
    Russian advances, Putin directed the elevation in the readiness
    posture of his nuclear forces.
        Russia is being run by a despot, detached from reality,
    with up to 2,000 nuclear warheads that are not accountable
    under the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty.
        Russia may be willing to say, quote, ``A nuclear war cannot
    be won, so it must never be fought,'' unquote, but I would
    remind my colleagues, Putin also said he had, quote, ``no
    intention of invading Ukraine,'' unquote.
        Since last year, the strategic threat posed by China has
    also metastasized. We all know that China intends to have at
    least 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030; they conducted a
    hypersonic fractional orbital bombardment test that surprised
    the world; and they have constructed new ICBM [intercontinental
    ballistic missile] fields that are sprouting like weeds.
        These new ICBM fields, along with new Chinese road-mobile
    systems and hypersonic delivery systems, significantly increase
    the number of targets STRATCOM must hold at risk, and they
    complicate the detection and warning problem for our missile
    defense capabilities.
        And with everything else going on, North Korea launched a
    ballistic missile last week. It barely even made the news, but
    there is press reporting that the test had applications for a
    space-launched capability.
        If true, this represents a significant threat to our
    homeland, and the Missile Defense Review, which is coming out
    soon, must continue the longstanding commitment to outpace the
    North Korean threat to the homeland and get the Next Generation
    Interceptor to initial operating capability as soon as
    possible.
        And to complicate matters further, China and Russia have
    demonstrated ability and intent to weaponize and militarize
    space. Russia's recent anti-satellite weapon test generated
    debris that threatens human lives on orbit and shows that space
    is no longer free from threat and militarization.
        China's demonstration of space warfare concepts is equally
    disturbing, as they recently demonstrated the capability to
    engage and remove satellites from their operational orbits.
        The open demonstrations of these abilities are intended as
    a direct warning to the West.
        Secretary Baker, given these dynamics, I can't see how the
    Nuclear Posture Review could recommend anything less than the
    current nuclear triad modernization plan.
        If President Biden sheds or does away in any way with
    nuclear capabilities, as has been reported, I predict
    bipartisan opposition in the House and Senate that will
    override it and continue to fund these systems. This includes
    the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, or SLCM-N, the B83
    gravity bomb, [and] the W76-2 warhead.
        Not doing so will cause allies to question our strategic
    deterrent. That cannot happen, especially now.
        And lastly, any weakening or changes in the U.S. nuclear
    declaratory policy must be expressly taken off the table.
    Europe is embroiled in the largest war since World War II, and
    Ukraine faces an existential threat. We cannot risk dividing
    NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] at this precarious
    time.
        So I implore you, listen to our allies and maintain this
    current strong, American-led strategic deterrence posture. We
    can no longer attack our deterrence problems in isolation, and
    it is vital that we provide to this Nation the viable options
    needed to deter or defeat our adversaries across strategic
    domains.
        Thank you again to all of our witnesses for joining us.
        And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn.
        The first witness is Secretary Baker.

       STATEMENT OF HON. SASHA BAKER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
     DEFENSE FOR POLICY, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
                 FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Ms. Baker. Thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member
    Lamborn, and distinguished members of this committee. I
    respectfully request that my written statement be taken for the
    record, and I will just do brief opening remarks.
        Mr. Cooper. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Baker. Thank you.
        The Department acknowledges the challenging moment we are
    in as we witness the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Such actions
    highlight Russia as an acute threat, even as the Department
    continues to pace to the People's Republic of China.
        Further, the United States faces a challenging security
    environment amid intensifying strategic competition, rapidly
    evolving domains of conflict, novel military capabilities, and
    the growing assertiveness of our competitors.
        Deterrence is challenged by competitors' gray zone
    operations below the threshold of conflict, combined with
    increasingly complex escalation dynamics, which erode strategic
    stability.
        We must diligently calibrate our strategic posture--which
    is underwritten by our nuclear, missile defense, space, and
    hypersonic-strike capabilities--to these developments.
        The forthcoming 2022 National Defense Strategy will detail
    the Department's strategic approach. At the core of the NDS
    lies integrated deterrence, and this is a framework for working
    seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum
    of conflict, in close collaboration with all instruments of
    national power, our allies, and our partners.
        As such, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the Missile
    Defense Review will be nested within the NDS.
        We recognize that we face an urgent imperative to sustain
    and strengthen U.S. deterrence, and we must bring together all
    available tools of national power to do so.
        Nuclear deterrence is the Department's highest priority
    mission. Our nuclear posture continues to be the backbone of
    our strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring
    aggression against the United States, our allies, and our
    partners.
        Potential U.S. adversaries are modernizing, diversifying,
    and expanding their strategic capabilities, resulting in
    growing risks.
        The PRC's [People's Republic of China's] ongoing ambitious
    expansion of their nuclear forces is a growing factor in how we
    assess our nuclear posture. The PRC is investing in a triad,
    implementing a launch-on-warning posture with advanced command
    and control architecture, and increasing its stockpile.
        Russia's modernization of its nuclear, missile, space, and
    hypersonic capabilities, coupled with its highly aggressive
    military behavior witnessed in its attack against Ukraine, also
    pose a distinct and pressing challenge.
        North Korea remains a persistent threat and continues to
    develop nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems that
    threaten its region and increase risk to the U.S. homeland.
        Iran's pursuit of nuclear activities continues to be of
    deep concern.
        This year, the Department will release the 2022 Nuclear
    Posture Review. As directed by the President, the NPR has
    examined opportunities to reduce the role of nuclear weapons
    while maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    deterrent and a credible extended deterrent.
        In order to do so, we will continue to sustain and
    modernize U.S. nuclear capabilities, and as we develop and
    implement integrated deterrence, nuclear weapons will continue
    to serve a unique role in our defense strategy.
        Missile defenses contribute to tailored U.S. deterrence
    strategies and extended deterrence to prevent attacks from
    states like North Korea on the U.S. homeland and to protect our
    allies, partners, and U.S. forces abroad.
        We are seeking a layered and interoperable approach to
    address the growing number and type of missile threats, from
    the unmanned systems proliferated by Iran to the higher end
    hypersonic threats.
        The MDR [Missile Defense Review] will provide a framework
    for U.S. missile defense priorities and a strategy for missile
    defense within integrated deterrence. It will also outline how
    the United States is integrating missile defense with its
    allies and partners in order to strengthen international
    cooperation against shared threats.
        In space, the PRC remains our primary long-term competitor,
    seeking to exploit our reliance on space-based systems and
    challenge our position.
        Russia remains a key U.S. competitor in the space domain as
    well, as it similarly seeks to undermine and exploit the U.S.
    in space.
        Iran is continuing to pursue a space program which could
    shorten the pathway to long-range missile capability.
        We are focused on ensuring the capabilities and the
    architecture to deter, deny, and, if necessary, defeat hostile
    actions in space, recognizing that assured access to space is
    critical for our approach across all domains.
        The development of U.S. hypersonic strike weapon systems,
    all strictly non-nuclear, is a Department priority. The
    combination of their speed, maneuverability, and altitude
    provides clear and distinct operational advantages.
        The Department is working to identify and invest in the
    optimal mix of high and low ammunitions for deterrence and to
    ensure we achieve our objectives in conflict.
        We are also developing the concepts of operations to employ
    these systems that address and minimize destabilization risks.
        Transparency and dialogue with Congress remain critical to
    the evolution of this capability. I would like to thank you for
    the support of the Department across all of these domains.
        And with that, I will look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Baker can be found in the
    Appendix on page 32.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Secretary Baker.
        Now Admiral Richard.

      STATEMENT OF ADM CHARLES A. RICHARD, USN, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        Admiral Richard. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn,
    distinguished committee members, first I want to offer my
    appreciation for the flexibility to allow me to testify
    virtually with my fellow panelists.
        Due to those unfolding events over the weekend, I felt it
    prudent for me to remain at my headquarters here in Omaha. And
    in particular, given the ongoing, historically significant
    crisis in Ukraine, I am going to defer all questions relative
    to Russia and a number related to our own forces to the closed
    session.
        But before I begin, I want to thank Secretary Austin and
    Chairman Milley for their continued support to the strategic
    deterrence and strategic defense of the Nation, as well as
    their overall leadership under some very trying conditions.
        And, ladies and gentlemen, right up front, what I want to
    assure you is, is that my command, as always, is ready to
    execute our strategic deterrence mission.
        Chairman Milley rightly stated that we are experiencing one
    of the largest shifts in global geostrategic power the world
    has ever witnessed. Today, we face two nuclear-capable near
    peers who have the capability to unilaterally escalate a
    conflict to any level of violence, in any domain, worldwide,
    with any instrument of national power, and that is historically
    significant.
        Last fall, I formally reported to the Secretary of Defense
    the PRC's strategic breakout. Their expansion and modernization
    in 2021 alone is breathtaking. And the concern I expressed in
    my testimony last April has now become a reality.
        I have previously emphasized our need to be able to deter
    two adversaries at the same time. That need is now an
    imperative.
        I have said this before, and I think it is worth repeating:
    Every operational plan in the Department of Defense, and every
    other capability we have, rests on an assumption that strategic
    deterrence, and in particular nuclear deterrence, is holding.
    And if strategic or nuclear deterrence fails, no other plan and
    no other capability in the Department of Defense will work as
    designed.
        The Nation's nuclear forces underpin integrated deterrence
    and enable the U.S. and our allies [and] partners, to confront
    aggressive and coercive behavior.
        The strategic security environment is now a three-party
    nuclear near-peer reality. Our existing nuclear forces are the
    minimum required to achieve our national strategy. We must
    modernize and recapitalize the Nation's nuclear triad, nuclear
    command and control, nuclear complex and supporting
    infrastructure, to meet Presidential objectives.
        And while modernization must be the priority, please make
    no mistake, STRATCOM's forces are ready today.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Richard can be found in
    the Appendix on page 44.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Admiral.
        Now we will hear from General Dickinson.

      STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
                          STATES SPACE COMMAND

        General Dickinson. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
    And thank you, Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn, and
    members of the HAS [House Armed Services] Subcommittee on
    Strategic Forces.
        As always, I am honored today to represent the
    approximately 18,000 men and women of the United States Space
    Command. We are a diverse team that values the honorable
    service of everyone within our ranks.
        This month, we honor the contributions of the women on our
    team, as U.S. Space Command acknowledges and celebrates Women's
    History Month.
        Today, we remain hard at work building the command toward
    full operational capability. We are steadily filling out our
    headquarters. Its composition reflects our joint combined and
    partnered approach to executing our critical mission.
        As of this month, we have approximately a thousand members
    assigned to our headquarters, with 339 Active Duty from all
    services, 227 from the Department of the Air Force civilians,
    323 contractors, 44 representatives from the interagency, and
    39 Reserve Component personnel from the Guard and Reserve. We
    are glad to have them all on our team.
        Responding to the threats that U.S. and allied interests in
    space demands the capabilities and expertise of every one of
    our team members. We are prepared to execute our Unified
    Command Plan missions and responsibilities, yet acknowledge
    that the challenges from our competitors in the domain are
    substantial and growing.
        China remains our pacing challenge. PLA [People's
    Liberation Army] developments is directed to creating a joint,
    versatile, power-projecting, professional, and lethal force for
    the international stage, and the space layer is critical to
    their build-out.
        In 2021, the PRC increased on-orbit assets by 27 percent.
    Their recent counterspace capability demonstrations include the
    DN-1 and the DN-2 direct ascent anti-satellite test and the
    hypersonic glide vehicle test.
        In January, the recently launched SJ-21 space debris
    mitigation satellite docked with a defunct PRC satellite and
    moved it to an entirely different orbit. This activity
    demonstrated potential dual-use capability in SJ-21 interaction
    with other satellites.
        U.S. Space Command is committed to deterring the use of
    these types of capabilities for nefarious purposes within the
    framework of the Department of Defense's integrated deterrence
    initiative, and, if called upon, we are capable of providing
    options to protect and defend against such threats.
        Key to all of this is U.S. and allied space superiority,
    informed through space domain awareness, or SDA, capabilities.
    SDA helps us analyze, not just identify, what is occurring in
    space, which, when combined with information from our
    intelligence agencies, helps develop an understanding of why
    things are happening in space.
        SDA remains my top mission priority for U.S. Space Command.
    SDA provides the backbone of U.S. Space Command's strategy for
    accomplishing our mission. That strategy sets the conditions to
    deter, first, and, when called upon, to defend space
    capabilities and deliver combat power to the United States and
    its allies.
        Our strategy has three main areas of focus. One is
    countering competitor influence; two, strengthening
    relationships and attracting new partners; and three, building
    and maintaining a cooperative advantage.
        With continued support from Congress, U.S. Space Command
    will do all of that and more.
        So on behalf of the most critical asset in our command, the
    soldiers, Marines, sailors, airmen, guardians, civilians, and
    families of U.S. Space Command, thank you, Chairman Cooper and
    Ranking Member Lamborn and the members of this committee, for
    your support of our mission to conduct operations in, from, and
    to space.
        I am submitting my statement for the record, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found
    in the Appendix on page 76.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General Dickinson. Without
    objection, your statement will be submitted in full for the
    record.
        Now we will hear from General VanHerck.

      STATEMENT OF GEN GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
     STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
                                COMMAND

        General VanHerck. Chairman Cooper, Ranking Member Lamborn,
    and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear today. It is my honor to represent the
    men and women of the United States Northern Command [NORTHCOM]
    and North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] as we
    defend the United States and Canada in an increasingly
    complicated and dynamic environment.
        I am also pleased to appear with Admiral Richard, General
    Dickinson, and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ms.
    Baker to discuss the vital importance of integrated deterrence,
    especially as it relates to the homeland defense mission.
        NORTHCOM and NORAD face the most dynamic and strategically
    complex environment in their respective histories. Both
    commands face multiple simultaneous challenges from strategic
    competitors who have openly declared their intent to hold our
    homelands at risk in an effort to advance their own interests.
        Today, strategic competitors, rogue nations, [and] nonstate
    actors possess the ability to strike institutions and critical
    infrastructure in the United States and Canada.
        To put it bluntly, our country is already under attack
    every day in the information space and in the cyber domain. Our
    competitors, especially Russia and China, are spreading
    disinformation, actively sowing division and internal discord
    with the intent to undermine the foundation of our Nation, our
    democracy, and other democracies around the world. We are
    seeing this play out today with Russia's invasion in Ukraine.
        Meanwhile, those same competitors have invested heavily in
    conventional precision-strike capabilities and advanced
    delivery platforms, which Russia is currently displaying to the
    world.
        In pursuit of their regional objectives, Russia and China
    intend to hold targets in the homeland at risk below the
    nuclear threshold in order to limit decision space for our
    senior leaders by threatening national critical infrastructure
    and by undermining our will and disrupting and delaying our
    ability to project power forward in a crisis.
        I want to be clear: I believe the strategic deterrent is
    the foundation of homeland defense. I also believe it is
    necessary for the United States to maintain a reliable and
    effective nuclear triad.
        At the same time, I am concerned that our reliance on
    deterrence by cost imposition, is currently overweighted and
    does not adequately account for the conventional capabilities
    our competitors have already fielded. This overreliance
    increases the risk of miscalculation and escalation because it
    limits our national leaders' options in crisis and in conflict.
        Our competitors' advanced conventional capabilities make it
    necessary to move forward to a model of integrated deterrence
    that employs all elements of national influence, leverages
    allies and partnerships, [and] provides leaders with a wide
    range of timely deterrence options.
        We must continually demonstrate to our potential aggressors
    that they will not be successful in achieving their objectives
    by demonstrating homeland readiness, responsiveness,
    resiliency, and displaying a range of kinetic and non-kinetic
    capabilities to defend the homeland and respond to any
    potential threat or aggression.
        USNORTHCOM's support of civil authorities and security
    cooperation relationships with allies and partners are critical
    to that effort, as is NORAD's mission to provide warning and
    defend the approaches to North America.
        The reality is that this strategic environment is the new
    normal. North America is and will be continually challenged day
    to day and in crisis. Our operating model that assumed we could
    project power globally from a safe and secure homeland is
    eroding and has been eroding for more than a decade.
        In order to provide national leaders with timely and
    informed options that they need to achieve favorable outcomes,
    we must improve our ability to detect and track potential
    threats anywhere in the world while delivering data to decision
    makers as rapidly as possible wherever they might be.
        In pursuit of those goals, NORTHCOM and NORAD are focused
    on four strategic principles in our homeland defense design.
        All-domain awareness. That is from undersea to on-orbit and
    everything in between, including cyber.
        Information dominance. That is the use of advanced
    capabilities, such as machine learning and artificial
    intelligence, to analyze and process data much sooner and
    deliver that data, what I call decision superiority, to key
    decision makers in a timely manner.
        And finally, global integration. No problem is regional
    anymore. They are all all-domain and global.
        These principles are vital elements to integrated
    deterrence, and they are critical to our Nation's ability to
    deterring competition, deescalate in crisis, and, if necessary,
    defeat in conflict.
        I continue to work closely with my fellow commanders,
    including Admiral Richard and General Dickinson, the services,
    the Department, and all of our interagency and international
    partners, to defend our Nation.
        I would like to thank the committee and all that you have
    done to support our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and our
    guardians. The FY [fiscal year] 2022 National Defense
    Authorization continues to advance our national defense
    priorities and the mission of Northern Command and NORAD.
        However, today's strategic environment calls for sustained,
    sufficient, and predictable funding in order to prevail, while
    persistently operating under a continuing resolution has
    accelerated the erosion of our Nation's competitive advantage
    over the last decade.
        I join my fellow commanders, service chiefs, and the
    Secretary in expressing our concerns and need to arrest this
    degradation by passing the fiscal year 2022 omnibus and
    restoring normal order to the appropriations process as a
    matter of national security.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I
    look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General VanHerck can be found in
    the Appendix on page 99.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, General VanHerck. Let me just add an
    amen to what you just said.
        I would ask all members to keep questions as brief as
    possible during open session so that we can rapidly move to
    closed session. I just have a few questions for Secretary
    Baker.
        I think, Madam Secretary, you would agree that if a major
    nuclear power were to suddenly double the lethality of their
    nuclear component, that would be a significant development,
    right?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I agree.
        Mr. Cooper. It might even be what Admiral Richard calls a
    strategic breakout. So it is a truly alarming development.
        And I don't know what is in the Nuclear Posture Review that
    is coming up, but my guess is we are not going to advocate
    anything like doubling U.S. nuclear capability, right?
        Ms. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. Unfortunately, I am
    not at liberty to talk about the details of the NPR.
        Mr. Cooper. I would be willing to bet that we are not going
    to advocate that. So that is fine.
        But there was a Washington Post article that appeared last
    October that troubles me because it claims, citing a national
    lab director who is retired, that the United States has just
    doubled the lethality of its nuclear arsenal. And there has
    been no denial from the Pentagon.
        Now, I checked into it to see if this claim was true or
    not, and it seems, by all authorities, to not be true. We have
    not doubled the lethality of our nuclear capabilities. So the
    continuing Pentagon silence troubles me.
        And I know that some folks like to appear 10 feet tall even
    if they are not. But this doesn't seem to fit with clear and
    honest communications on nuclear matters.
        So perhaps the Pentagon wants to discount The Post as a
    source. I can understand that. But the continuing silence, to
    me, is nearly deafening. And I would hate for a near-peer
    adversary to mistake the Post article for something approaching
    truth and using that as an excuse to accelerate their nuclear
    development, when, in fact, we haven't done a thing, really.
        So I just want to get this on the record so that we can
    have clearer communications with the world.
        Ms. Baker. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with the Post
    article that you referenced, but certainly we will dig into it.
    And I agree with you that when it comes to our nuclear posture
    and our nuclear capabilities we ought to be as transparent as
    we can be wherever we can be.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
        Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Richard, I will just jump right in for the sake of
    time.
        I think it would be a mistake to discard any of our nuclear
    capabilities in light of our two near peers and the nuclear
    buildups and posturing that they are currently displaying.
        If the United States were to just jettison any of these
    three following things--the nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise
    Missile, the B83 gravity bomb, or the W76-2 low-yield
    submarine-launched missile--in the upcoming Nuclear Posture
    Review, what kind of message would that send to our adversaries
    and our allies?
        Admiral Richard. Ranking Member, if you would, given that
    that is a discussion of our own capabilities, I would like to
    defer my answer to that to the closed session, please, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Let me ask another question then.
        Is it your best military advice that our missile defenses
    are matching the growing People's Republic--Democratic Republic
    of North Korea threat?
        Admiral Richard. So, Ranking Member, my best military
    advice here is that that very question is at the core of the
    Missile Defense Review. It is a question of what is our
    national policy in terms of what we expect to do from our
    missile defenses.
        My best military advice was applied inside the Missile
    Defense Review, and I think it would be best for that process
    to complete to give you the formal Department answer on that,
    sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. General Dickinson, reliable space-launch
    options are critical to the continued success of the National
    Security Space Launch program and for assured United States
    access to space.
        Can you outline the strategic advantages that we have by
    having launch options on both coasts? And what are we doing to
    protect these national missions, given the fact that we have
    adversaries who are trying to challenge our ability to operate
    freely in space?
        General Dickinson. So, Ranking Member Lamborn, so if I
    understand your question correctly, it is about responsive
    launch as well as how we protect those types of capabilities.
        Mr. Lamborn. Yeah. And having east coast and west coast
    options.
        General Dickinson. Certainly. So, I think, from a
    perspective of--from a combatant commander's perspective,
    having many different options available to us is very
    important.
        In other words, not just relying on one type of capability
    in this case, relying on the ability to rapidly or quickly
    respond to any events that we might have on orbit with the
    capability to put something else up in orbit to provide us
    resiliency and, quite frankly, redundancy.
        Having them geographically separated obviously has some
    survivability benefits to that, so east coast, west coast. It
    also lets us--allows us to deploy in different orbital regimes
    and in different slots, if you will. And so from that
    perspective, I support that.
        I think it is part of a layered resiliency type of concept
    where we rely on that, plus other things, to make sure that we
    have resiliency in space.
        And it was mentioned, I believe by Chairman Cooper in his
    opening remarks, about a resilient space architecture, and that
    is very important, that we have that. That is part of it.
        The other piece, in my mind, is having a constellation of
    satellites for different types of functions, whether it be
    communications or ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance] or missile warning, that provide us redundancy
    and resiliency through numbers of satellites as opposed to just
    a few.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
        General VanHerck, can you elaborate as to how China is
    developing its hypersonic capabilities in this open context?
    And how does that compare with our own progress?
        General VanHerck. Ranking Member Lamborn, they are
    aggressively pursuing hypersonic capability tenfold to what we
    have done as far as testing within the last year or so,
    significantly outpacing us with their capabilities.
        Ours, we are picking up in the Department. I am confident
    we will see, when the budget comes out, we will see additional
    resources applied into the hypersonic area, as well as in
    threat warning and attack assessment for those capabilities.
        Thank you for the opportunity.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
        And, Secretary Baker, I imagine that the Department is
    diligently consulting with our allies and partners these days
    as Russia invades Ukraine and is threatening veiled threats--or
    maybe not so veiled threats--on nuclear action.
        In these conversations, have you found a single NATO ally
    that is advocating for us to change or weaken our nuclear
    declaratory policy?
        Ms. Baker. Congressman, yes, of course we are consulting
    closely with our partners and allies on a daily, if not more
    regular basis.
        The substance of those conversations is largely about the
    current ongoing events in Ukraine. But, no, I can't say that I
    have found an ally who is urging us to reduce our nuclear
    deterrence.
        Mr. Lamborn. Or our declaratory policy----
        Ms. Baker. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn [continuing]. In particular.
        Ms. Baker. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back to you.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you.
        Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        General Dickinson, U.S. space officials noted recently that
    Russia will employ counterspace capabilities, like jamming and
    spoofing of the Global Positioning System, GPS, and
    communication satellites in support of its Ukraine invasion.
        In addition, the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office]
    director urged military and commercial space operators to
    prepare for possible cyber attacks from Russia.
        These warnings are deeply concerning to me as I represent
    Vandenberg Space Force Base, home to the U.S. Space Command's
    Combined Space Operations Center, CSpOC, which provides GPS
    navigation and space-based data that supports U.S. European
    Command and partners and critical to our command and control of
    space forces.
        With this increased threat of cyber attacks and
    counterspace capabilities, how is USSPACECOM [U.S. Space
    Command] working to sustain GPS and critical communications
    networks that support coalition partners?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman, for that
    question.
        So at U.S. Space Command we prepare for that every day.
    That is part of what we do throughout the command that you
    mentioned, the CSpOC at Vandenberg Space Force Base. Those
    guardians and warriors out there do that each and every day,
    ensuring that our global positioning satellites are state of
    the art and are operational, to include satellite
    communications that we provide, as well as missile warning.
        And so we continue to do that each and every day. We take
    very active measures to make sure that we are protecting
    ourselves and defending ourselves from cyber attacks.
        So, in my mind, we are in a position right now where I am
    very comfortable with our strategic posture for the space
    enterprise, in support of not only European Command, General
    Tod Wolters over there, but also the other combatant commands
    around the world.
        So with our global mission, that is what we do each and
    every day.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        To continue, General Dickinson, the space enterprise has
    increasingly become a contested domain, as Russia and China
    continue to develop and field space capabilities.
        In this contested space environment, do you have enough
    resources to assure U.S. access and superiority in the space
    domain?
        And two, how are you leveraging commercial capabilities to
    fill current and future capability gaps?
        General Dickinson. So our relationship with the commercial
    industry is advancing and developing and maturing very quickly.
    We have had a number of commercial companies, I think we are up
    over a hundred that we work with right now, what we call our
    Commercial Integration Cell, that is out at Vandenberg Space
    Force Base, so much so that we are developing a new framework
    for our integration with the commercial industry.
        And we are doing that right now at U.S. Space Command,
    because we are finding that our commercial partners can bring a
    lot of capability very quickly to what we do each and every
    day.
        And that starts with satellite communications. That has
    really been kind of our older relationship that we have had for
    many years. But now it is expanding into space domain awareness
    that gives us commercial type of products that we can use from
    the commercial perspective. And that is actually out in
    Colorado Springs where the headquarters is right now, and I
    think we have had Ranking Member Lamborn there.
        So, in other words, the integration of commercial
    capabilities within U.S. Space Command helps us with what we
    were just describing in terms of providing resiliency as well
    as redundancy in some of the things that we need and
    capabilities we provide.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        And I will just remind us that to be able to achieve that
    commercial framework enhancement, we need to continue to invest
    in the infrastructure of those ranges, to be able to achieve
    these goals. So that is something I have been also advocating
    for.
        Secretary Baker and Admiral Richard, we all saw President
    Putin's unwarranted escalation of the Ukrainian crisis by
    ordering Russian nuclear forces to be put on high alert.
        What steps are you all taking within the coalition to
    manage this unprovoked escalation?
        Ms. Baker. Congressman, I would just say in this open
    session, we are assessing President Putin's directive.
        At this time, as the Secretary said, I believe last night,
    we are comfortable with our strategic defensive posture. And I
    will turn to, maybe Admiral Richard if he wants to add anything
    to that.
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, one, that is part of why I am
    in Omaha, is a part of our ability to assess and be satisfied
    in terms of our defensive posture.
        I am satisfied with the posture of my forces. I have made
    no recommendations to make any changes. And part of that is
    because right now, all I will say in open session, is the
    Nation's nuclear command and control is in its most defended,
    most resilient lineup that it has ever been in, in its history.
        And I will be happy to go into more detail as to why I say
    that, as well as more discussion of what we see and what we are
    doing about it, in closed session, sir.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        I am out of time, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Brooks.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Richard, always good to see someone from the
    Tennessee Valley up there.
        As you mentioned in your opening statement, in September
    2021 you stated China to be in a, quote, ``strategic
    breakout,'' end quote.
        In February 2021, you wrote in an essay titled ``Forging
    21st-Century Strategic Deterrence'' that you expected China's
    nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double, if not triple
    or quadruple, over the next decade.
        We have all been paying close attention to the conflict in
    Eastern Europe and Russia's recent movement toward a more
    aggressive nuclear posture.
        With what we know about these two adversarial powers, is it
    in the best interest of the United States national security to
    make changes to our nuclear declaratory policy?
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, you know I have testified to
    that effect several times in the past, and it remains my best
    military advice that changes would not have benefit to a
    strategic deterrent, but would have a negative effect, a
    significant negative effect on our assurance of our allies.
        Mr. Brooks. More specifically, how would a change away from
    strategic ambiguity affect our allies, and what message does it
    send to our adversaries?
        Admiral Richard. Well, it certainly does not help and has a
    very negative effect on the assurance of those allies. And
    bottom line, in terms of any potential adversary, I don't think
    fundamentally they are going to believe one way or the other
    what our policy is any more than we do in some cases.
        Again, that is my best military advice, and that is being
    addressed as a part of the Nuclear Posture Review. I know my
    place in the chain of command, and we are ready to execute
    whatever decisions are reached.
        Over.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Admiral Richard.
        General Dickinson, good to see you again.
        In your opening statement, you outlined China's intentions
    to obtain superiority in space. We know China has various
    abilities to conduct attacks on our satellites, including laser
    blinding, high-powered microwaves, radio frequency jammers, and
    ground-based missiles that can reach satellites in low Earth
    orbit.
        Can you describe the problems we face and the challenges of
    responding to such attacks?
        General Dickinson. So thank you for the question,
    Congressman. Good to see you as well.
        For U.S. Space Command, what we are working on right now is
    all those events that you just described, our ability to
    understand what those events are, and our awareness of those
    events.
        So one of the priorities--or ``the'' priority within the
    U.S. Space Command right now--is building out the capability to
    do space domain awareness so that I am able to understand,
    interpret, and characterize what is happening on orbit. And we
    are doing that through a couple of means.
        One is, we are looking at what our terrestrial-based radars
    can see in space. Some of those are the traditional ones that
    we have known about for many, many years and have used those.
    Others are ones that we hadn't used before in that role as
    doing space domain awareness. In other words, looking up and
    seeing what they can see.
        So we, over the last 2 years, have done a lot of
    integration of those nontraditional space domain awareness
    sensors in order to understand better what is going on in the
    space domain. And that was highlighted for us when we had the
    Nudol test a couple of months ago where we were able to
    characterize for the National Command Authority what we saw in
    space.
        So, in other words, battlespace awareness is key to what I
    am doing right now, to make sure that I can understand what is
    happening.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
        And this one will be for General VanHerck. Hopefully, I can
    get the question in quick enough for you to answer.
        The Missile Defense Agency [MDA] launched the Next
    Generation Interceptor [NGI] program to protect the United
    States against potential ballistic missile threats stemming
    from North Korea and Iran.
        How is NORTHCOM continuing to work with MDA to ensure the
    NGI program remains on schedule and will meet the need of the
    combatant command when it is delivered in the 2029 timeframe?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, thanks for the question.
        I routinely meet and talk with Vice Admiral Jon Hill from
    MDA and stress the importance of staying on time with delivery
    in 2028, if not sooner. They have structured the competition to
    reward fielding quicker and faster to meet those demand
    signals.
        I would like to reiterate, I am comfortable with where we
    are today in my capability to defend against the rogue actor
    that we are designed to defend against.
        Capacity and capability going forward could be challenged,
    and that is why it is crucial that we keep the NGI on time or
    bring it forward even sooner than 2028.
        Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.
        Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the meeting.
        And, Admiral, Generals, thank you for being here.
        My first question goes to Admiral Richard.
        Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev said a nuclear war
    cannot be won and must never be fought. Is that your view?
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, absolutely.
        Mr. Garamendi. Did your organization authorize and pay for,
    or authorize and then secondly pay for, a ``Guide to Nuclear
    Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition,'' a document
    written by Louisiana Tech Research Institute?
        Admiral Richard. Sir, if you would like, I will take that
    question for the record. I don't know off the top of my head.
        Mr. Garamendi. It was distributed--apparently this was
    distributed to all of your commanders in your force.
        Admiral Richard. Certainly not under my direction, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. Then you have no knowledge of this?
        Admiral Richard. No, not from memory. But I would be happy
    to go look into it for you, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. I would be happy for you to do that. And you
    believe that this was not distributed to the 30,000 people in
    the nuclear----
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, I don't know the document you
    are referring to. So I regret that maybe I should have, but I
    don't know the document you are referring to. I would be happy
    to go look into it.
        Mr. Garamendi. Well, I will await your prompt investigation
    of it. It is a fascinating document, and apparently it was
    distributed to most everybody in your organization, and it
    essentially says that we can win a nuclear war. Food for
    thought.
        So do you believe we can win a limited nuclear war?
        Admiral Richard. Actually, Congressman, I think my job is
    to deter limited use of nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Garamendi. And you have no opinion upon the question I
    just asked you?
        Admiral Richard. My job----
        Mr. Garamendi. Can we win a nuclear----
        Admiral Richard. My job is to deter limited nuclear use,
    and if deterrence fails, to restore that deterrence.
        Mr. Garamendi. I think we probably ought to get to a
    classified. I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
        Mr. DesJarlais.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here today.
        Admiral Richard, I know you have indicated that you would
    like to speak further about the B83 nuclear-capable hypersonic
    weapons and the W76-2 low-yield in a closed setting.
        In light of the conversation, if you wouldn't care to share
    with the committee, can you explain how the W76-2 strengthens
    our nuclear deterrent and what gap in the U.S. deterrent does
    this capability fill?
        Admiral Richard. Fundamentally, Congressman, what that
    enables us to do is to deter limited low-yield and/or
    combinations of that threats from our opponents. I will go into
    more detail in the classified session, sir.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And both Russia and China have
    warfighting plans that utilize low-yield weapons, correct?
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, better if I answer that in a
    closed session.
        Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Well, I will move on.
        General Dickinson, I know you're eager to get the permanent
    location for U.S. Space Command settled. Can you discuss
    briefly how this long, drawn-out process has affected your
    ability to reach full operational capability and what it would
    mean if you had to restart, for a third time, a search for a
    permanent location?
        General Dickinson. So thank you, Congressman.
        When I look at declaring IOC [initial operating capability]
    about a year ago, last August 2021, that was a milestone within
    the command, as we were able to have enough of the experts that
    I need on the team to be able to generate those types of
    strategic effects that we saw when we were able to characterize
    the Nudol event a couple of months ago. So we are on our way to
    full operational capability.
        Where I see it right now is, I am looking forward to the
    results and the conclusion of both the DOD [Department of
    Defense] IG [Inspector General] evaluation that has been done
    as well as the GAO [Government Accountability Office] audit
    that has been--that is ongoing.
        Those two assessments, I am confident that they will be
    done soon, and I look forward to the final basing decision,
    whatever that might come out of that process.
        And so for me, it is about the decision. I have got to have
    a decision. Once I have a decision, then I can do the
    appropriate planning to make sure that I have got the right
    types of people in the organization to bring me to where I am
    today, which is IOC, to full operational capability.
        And really, just based on the challenges that we are
    articulating from the Chinese in the space domain, we need to
    do that sooner rather than later.
        Dr. DesJarlais. All right. Thank you. I will look forward
    to continuing these discussions in closed setting.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. DesJarlais.
        Mr. Morelle.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And thank you to the panel for being here and for your
    service to the country.
        I just want to talk briefly about the mission of the
    Stockpile Stewardship Program, which this committee has
    continued to support, and specifically its science efforts to
    ensure a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent.
        These programs already make stockpile management and
    modernization successful. I am very proud that my district is
    home to the NNSA-funded [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] Laboratory for Laser Energetics at the
    University of Rochester, which plays a unique role of both
    conducting world-class stewardship science and training the
    next generation of scientists that support the readiness of
    your important, critical mission.
        I am concerned, I remain concerned that NNSA does not
    request adequate resources for the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program considering our reliance, now and in the foreseeable
    future, on science to ensure the safety and readiness of our
    deterrent force.
        So I wondered if any of you could comment on the importance
    of these science programs to the mission that you have before
    you.
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, I am probably the most
    appropriate person to answer that question. I think you know I
    am required by law annually to do an assessment of the
    stockpile, and as recently as late last November certified the
    safety, security, and effectiveness of our Nation's nuclear
    weapons stockpile.
        That Stockpile Stewardship Program that you talked about is
    a key element of the ability to make that certification, which,
    fundamentally, this is about confidence in the stockpile. That
    is fundamentally what it comes down to.
        But that is not the only element that goes into this,
    right? In order to have that confidence, in addition to a
    Stockpile Stewardship Program, you have to have a flexible and
    responsive stockpile itself, which requires us to modernize
    those weapons, and you have to have a resilient and adaptive
    infrastructure, all of which require adequate funding to NNSA.
        Of course, we are statutorily obligated, as a part of the
    Nuclear Weapons Council, to do an assessment on the budget as a
    whole, as well as some individual pieces. That process is
    ongoing. In fact, we are very close to our annual
    certification.
        I would offer that the relationship between NNSA and DOD,
    or DOE [Department of Energy] and DOD writ large, [has] never
    been better. We are at a high water mark with regard to that,
    intend to keep it that way. And then you will see a formal
    answer from the Department as to the adequacy of NNSA's budget
    shortly.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you. If I could, Admiral--thank you for
    the response--regarding the People's Republic of China, during
    last year's posture hearing you stated that it is important to
    look at what they do, not what they say, and where they are
    going, and not where they are.
        That is almost prophetic, considering last August the PRC
    successfully conducted a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile
    test that traveled around the world. And the PRC simply
    dismissed it as a routine spacecraft experiment, as I remember.
    This demonstrated intercontinental capability. It is obviously
    deeply concerning to all of us.
        Do you believe that the U.S. current investments in the
    ongoing nuclear modernization programs will provide sufficient
    capabilities for the U.S. to remain a credible strategic
    deterrent to our enemies and to our allies?
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, of course, I am awaiting to
    see what the budget looks like, just like everybody else is. I
    am confident that it will in the main.
        But there is an important point here that you bring up
    about China, and it applies to others as well, which is, we
    don't know the end point of where China is going in terms of
    the capabilities it is developing and the capacities that it is
    developing.
        And while I am very confident we are going to wind up with
    a very good strategy, I think it will need to be a question
    that we continue to ask ourselves.
        As we see where China goes, as we see where others go, what
    are the overall capability and capacity that the United States
    requires in order to execute that strategy against a changing
    threat? And we are going to have to ask that question much more
    frequently than we have in the past.
        Over.
        Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Admiral.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Morelle.
        Ms. Cheney. Ms. Cheney, are you still with us?
        If not, who is next on the list?
        Oh, she is coming? Okay, okay.
        Ms. Cheney.
        Ms. Cheney. Thanks. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. I will reserve my
    questions for the classified session. Thank you.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you. I appreciate your consideration.
        Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me
    okay? Very good.
        I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today.
        If I could, Ms. Baker, I will start with you.
        Can you update us on the status of the testing
    infrastructure for hypersonic programs of record?
        Ms. Baker. Yes, Congressman. Thank you for the question.
        I can assure you and assure the committee that we have made
    substantial investments in the test infrastructure, both air
    and ground, in order to accommodate hypersonic testing and
    other advanced technology testing that we anticipate will be
    coming down the road. Happy to get you more detail on that if
    that is of interest.
        Mr. Langevin. It is of interest. I am particularly
    interested in the wind tunnel. Is that part of the
    infrastructure upgrade you are talking about, or is that
    outside of your purview?
        Ms. Baker. Congressman, I would--just to make sure I get my
    facts straight, I will take that for the record and happy to
    get back to you with a little bit more detail.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 127.]
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you.
        Are there any additional investments required beyond those
    mentioned in the science and technology or testing and
    infrastructure MILCON [military construction] unfunded
    requirements submissions?
        Ms. Baker. Congressman, this is something that we have
    looked at over the course of the National Defense Strategy and
    NPR, MDR process, and we are working closely with our
    colleagues, other components of OSD [Office of the Secretary of
    Defense], to make sure that what is included in the budget
    request--the forthcoming budget request reflects that need.
        Mr. Langevin. Good. Well, you are going to have substantial
    support from the Hill to upgrade that infrastructure given the
    fact that we are behind right now on developing hypersonic
    weapons.
        So, Admiral Richard, I will turn to you. Electromagnetic
    spectrum operations underpin nearly every aspect of U.S.
    military operations from command and control to electronic
    warfare to sensing and seeing. Certainly our adversaries,
    however, recognize the U.S. military's historical advantage and
    seek to deny the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Russia,
    in particular, has invested heavily in this area, as we have
    seen leading up to the recent conflict in Ukraine.
        The Department of Defense obviously absolutely must be
    structured to ensure dominance in this area. In fact, the 2021
    NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] required that
    STRATCOM transfer its responsibilities for electromagnetic
    spectrum operations to another entity within the Department of
    Defense.
        Can you please provide an update on the status of these
    efforts and share your thoughts on where in the Department
    these critical functions should rest?
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, one, I am pleased to see that
    my Department has finally understood the importance of us being
    able to operate in electromagnetic spectrum, and I was very
    pleased to see the Department release the electromagnetic
    spectrum superiority plan, which has a detailed implementation
    plan that we are executing.
        One of my direct responsibilities inside that is to stand
    up a two-star, directly reporting to me, organization designed
    to be the operational proponent. And so, before those
    responsibilities--STRATCOM's responsibilities transfer
    anywhere, which is still an open question, I think it is my
    responsibility to get the operational house in order--basically
    fix it--and then have it in a position where we might consider
    transferring it to another combatant command.
        Fundamentally, my job here is to be the operational
    proponent to make sure the standards are correct, to make sure
    certifications are correct, and then to make sure that the
    operational implications of the programmatic decisions we make
    are considered. I am going to fix it first, and then we will
    figure out if anybody else needs to have it.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. We look
    forward to the outcome of you fixing it and see where that
    lands, and then where it will go from there. So I will be
    following that closely, but thank you for your answer.
        General Dickinson, I have long said that we will never
    fight another war without the involvement of cyber, and the
    same is true for space.
        Can you discuss the cyber resilience of our space
    architecture?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman, for that
    question.
        So the cyber resiliency, what is unique about the U.S.
    Space Command is, as we formed and organized ourselves, we
    started out by embedding cybersecurity right from the very
    beginning. So, when I look at the command right now, we just
    established our JCC, or our Joint Cyber Center, within the
    command, that is responsible for looking at the systems within
    the architecture that we need to defend. So that was starting
    point number one.
        The second piece is our relationship with USCYBERCOM [U.S.
    Cyber Command] and General Nakasone and his team, which has
    embedded a small element within U.S. Space Command and vice
    versa. I have inserted or established a cadre within his
    command as well. And, when we look at the service componency
    across U.S. Space Command, two of my five service components
    are dual-hatted as both space as well as cyber.
        So, given all of that synergy, if you will, with cyber, we
    are taking it--we have taken a very deliberate look at how do
    we protect our space architecture from cyber activity.
        So I am confident right now that we are making great
    strides in that regards and that we are, in fact, as I believe
    as Admiral Richard said, at our highest posture at this point.
        Mr. Langevin. I am encouraged by that answer. Thank you,
    General.
        And my time has expired. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Waltz.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dickinson, good to see you, Ms. Baker.
        Quick question for you on Space Guard. I don't think there
    is a full appreciation for how valuable the Guard is to the
    current mission. Just a couple of quick data points.
        Alaska provides 80 percent of the 24/7 combat mission-ready
    space warfighters for the upgraded early warning radar; New
    York provides a surge capacity to the NRO's Ops Center; Ohio,
    direct support in the Combined Space Ops Center; Florida, a
    State that I am proud to come from, they provide a rapid
    mobility surge to war space electronic warfare capability.
        My understanding is that the White House would like to move
    all of these missions into U.S. Space Force by 2025. I think
    you would--would you agree, General Dickinson, that the Guard
    brings a significant private-sector capability as kind of a
    bridging function? And obviously they are more cost effective,
    or at least they are less expensive than their Active Duty
    counterparts.
        Would you agree with both of those assertions?
        General Dickinson. Congressman, thank you for that
    question.
        I am a big proponent and fan of the Reserve Component in
    general, both the National Guard and the Reserves. What you
    just stated in terms of the talent and the expertise that they
    bring from the civilian sector is powerful.
        And, as U.S. Space Command stood up 2 years ago, we
    actually had over 140 Reserve Component, Guard and Reserves,
    show up at the front door and say, I want to be part of U.S.
    Space Command. It has been that Reserve Componency that was in
    the command at the beginning and exists today that gives us
    that combat capability that allows us to act quick.
        Mr. Waltz. That is great. And I know, in the case of
    Florida in particular, coming from the big space companies,
    putting on that uniform, serving, and then going back and forth
    to the private sector has certainly been valuable.
        Would you support absorbing those missions in the Active
    Duty Space Guard and requesting the funding for that force
    structure?
        General Dickinson. As I said, Congressman, I think the
    Guard brings and the Reserves bring a lot of capability to us,
    and----
        Mr. Waltz. Just in the interest of time, General--sorry--
    Ms. Baker, any comments there?
        Ms. Baker. Congressman, I think the question of the Space
    Guard is a little bit out of my policy job jar, so I will defer
    to General Dickinson----
        Mr. Waltz. No worries. I think it is worth noting that the
    Guard Bureau has aligned the Space Guard forces under a
    National Guard Bureau space directorate for a relatively, in
    the big picture of things, de minimis cost. And my
    understanding is that directorate can be converted into Space
    National Guard, we established in the House version of the FY
    2022 NDAA. Look forward to getting that across the finish line
    this Congress.
        On tactically responsive launch, General, Congress has
    supported this effort. There was a successful demonstration.
    The ability to rapidly reconstitute degraded systems from our
    relatively limited launch sites, I think you would agree, was
    important. In fact, some have said it is key to deterring near-
    peer competitors.
        But, despite this, neither the requirements nor funding for
    this important responsive space launch mission area have been
    identified by the Space Command or the Department.
        Do you expect that to happen in the near future?
        General Dickinson. Congressman, that is part of the
    requirements and the concepts that we are looking at at U.S.
    Space Command now, in terms of how to build that resilient
    architecture in space.
        Mr. Waltz. Do you see this tactically responsive launch as
    a key component? Do you expect to request funding towards it?
        General Dickinson. I see that as a capability--a--one of
    the capabilities that we should have in order to do that rapid
    replenishment of capabilities on order, in addition to
    constellations that have many satellites in it that constitute
    the--make a constellation, if you will.
        Mr. Waltz. Couldn't agree more, and I think, as we move
    towards a resilient architecture, we have to be prepared if we
    start losing assets. How are we going to rapidly replace them?
        Just in the limited time remaining in the public session--
    oh, I think we lost the Admiral. I didn't--wasn't expecting
    that, and I think I will reserve my time, then, for the----
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Waltz.
        Mr. Panetta.
        Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Classified session.
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just briefly so we can get on to the classified session. I
    am aware that the Joint All-Domain Command and Control, JADC2,
    is key to integrating missile defense systems, as is
    harmonizing our efforts with allies and partners. But I am also
    aware of how challenging missile defense roles can be,
    especially if they are broken up under the unified command
    plan.
        That being said, I was just wondering, General Dickinson or
    General VanHerck, can you just kind of give a description of
    how we are trying to improve interoperability among the
    combatant commands, as well as our allies and our communication
    networks in order to bolster our missile defense systems?
        General VanHerck. Congressman, I will take that question.
    This is General VanHerck.
        There is multiple efforts ongoing to improve collaboration
    and coordination. I will talk about one that I am currently
    doing that we just finished and we are going to start again. A
    little information----
        Mr. Panetta. Hold on.
        Mr. Chairman, can you tell Mr. DesJarlais to mute himself?
        Mr. Cooper. Mr. DesJarlais, can you mute your microphone,
    please?
        Mr. Panetta. Thank you. Please continue, General.
        General VanHerck. Thank you. So the one that we are working
    on at our headquarters, it involves all 11 combatant commands.
    It is called Global Information Dominance Experiment. And it is
    about taking data and information from all domains, from global
    sensors around the world, to include allies and partners, to
    include the missile defense capabilities that you mentioned,
    and sharing them through a cloud and utilizing machine learning
    and artificial intelligence to process it in a real time.
        And that gives you the ability to collaborate amongst the
    various functions, to include intelligence, operations, and
    logistics, to be able to develop a picture, develop options,
    and evaluate whether those options are realistic.
        The Deputy Secretary has done an outstanding job by
    providing forces at each combatant command and funding to
    additionally work on integrating these capabilities across the
    combatant commands, her AIDA [Artificial Intelligence and Data
    Acceleration] effort.
        And so we are proudly partnering with the Department and
    all the commands to get after what you are talking about.
        Mr. Panetta. Outstanding.
        General Dickinson, do you have anything to add to that?
        General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman.
        I would just add that Glen has done a great job in terms of
    inclusiveness on some of these experiments that we have done
    that he just outlined. And it is equally as important that we
    are incorporated or integrated into those efforts in terms of
    missile warning as well as space domain awareness.
        So, as we move forward, one of the priorities for U.S.
    Space Command is to make sure that we have digital superiority,
    and part of that is being able to integrate those very complex
    mission areas so that we have one common operating picture that
    we can all look at in order to make decisions and
    recommendations to the national-level leadership.
        Mr. Panetta. Great.
        Gentlemen and ma'am, thank you very much for your service
    and your time today.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Panetta.
        Mr. Horsford.
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Dickinson, it is good to see you. I appreciated the
    opportunity yesterday to discuss the importance of a tactically
    responsive space launch capability with you. And, as the
    combatant commander responsible for the space domain, your
    perspective is invaluable as the joint force works to field
    this capability. I am glad to be working with Congressman
    Waltz, and I know we led a letter requesting the funding. So
    look forward to working with you on that.
        I wanted to talk about the Nuclear Posture Review and test
    readiness, though. From 1951 to 1992, nearly 928 explosive
    nuclear tests were conducted at the Nevada National Security
    Site [NNSS], which is located in my congressional district.
    Since the test moratorium went into effect in 1992, NNSS has
    continued to play a vital role in maintaining the safety and
    reliability of the nuclear deterrent through NNSA's Stockpile
    Stewardship Programs.
        Today, scientists at NNSS use advanced methods to conduct
    subcritical experiments that ensure the readiness of the
    nuclear stockpile. These experiments are safe to the public and
    the environment and provide decision makers the information and
    data needed to have no doubt in the readiness of our nuclear
    deterrent.
        The fiscal year 2022 NDAA included $135 million to further
    expand Stockpile Stewardship Programs through construction in
    an NNSS U1a complex providing high-skilled, high-paying jobs to
    the community and a highly advanced scientific capability to
    the NNSA.
        Every expert and commander that I have discussed the issue
    with has agreed that the experiments conducted at NNSS and
    across the NNSA enterprise provide an extremely high degree of
    [confidence] in the nuclear stockpile.
        However, I understand that NNSA still has a requirement to
    be able to conduct an explosive nuclear test within 12 months
    if ordered to do so by the President. I remain deeply concerned
    that any such test would not only be belligerent and
    unnecessary, but likely conducted at NNSS. Even the remote risk
    of such a test is unacceptable to my constituents.
        The Trump administration's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
    stated that the United States will not seek ratification of the
    Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and that we will not
    resume nuclear explosive testing, unless necessary, to ensure
    the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
        So, Secretary Baker, do you agree that current methods of
    stockpile stewardship ensure the safety and effectiveness of
    the nuclear arsenal, and will the ongoing Nuclear Posture
    Review reverse the Trump administration's opposition to
    ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?
        Ms. Baker. Congressman, thank you for the question.
        Let me just say that I think the Stockpile Stewardship
    Program is one of the remarkable successes of our nuclear
    architecture over the last 30 years. The work that is done in
    terms of scientific analysis to allow Admiral Richard to have
    that assurance of our nuclear enterprise is absolutely
    essential.
        It is the policy of this administration to support efforts
    to bring into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is
    also the policy of this administration that we will not change
    our unilateral moratorium on testing.
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
        Admiral Richard, as the combatant commander responsible for
    the nuclear deterrent, are you [confident] that NNSA's
    stockpile stewardship programs will continue to provide you
    certainty that the nuclear deterrent is safe and effective?
        Admiral Richard. Congressman, as you know, I am required to
    formally report that assessment in writing. And, last fall, as
    a part of my overall stockpile assessment, I did, in writing,
    state that I saw no conditions necessitating consideration of a
    return to testing.
        But what I would offer is that stockpile stewardship alone
    is not all that is necessary to make sure that we have
    confidence that we don't need to go do a test to restore that
    confidence.
        It is not only stockpile stewardship. I have great
    confidence in that program. But you have to have a flexible and
    modernized inventory stockpile, which requires NNSA to hold to
    its requirements with the programs, and you have to have a
    flexible and responsive infrastructure, which is also
    necessary.
        So, as long as NNSA continues to meet DOD requirements,
    then I will have that confidence. If not, it would require
    revisiting.
        Over.
        Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Horsford.
        Mr. Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, I defer my questions for the
    classified session.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you. I appreciate the gentleman's
    consideration.
        Mr. Khanna.
        Mr. Khanna. Mr. Chairman, I defer my questions.
        Mr. Cooper. I also welcome your consideration.
        Then we will move post haste to the classified session.
        This portion of the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
    closed session.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 1, 2022

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 1, 2022

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         [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                 March 1, 2022

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                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Ms. Baker. The Department of Defense, specifically the Test
    Resource Management Center (TRMC), is making significant investments to
    accelerate the delivery of hypersonic weapons to the warfighter through
    enhancing test capabilities and throughput for both ground and flight
    testing. Ground test improvements in wind tunnel facilities located in
    Tennessee, Maryland, New York, Ohio, Indiana, and Arizona will assist
    us in testing hypersonic aerodynamics, aerothermal materials, and
    hypersonic propulsion systems. These investments are being made to
    support future hypersonic programs of record and are being executed by
    the TRMC under the purview of the Office of the Under Secretary of
    Defense for Research and Engineering. [See page 20.]

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 1, 2022

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER

        Mr. Cooper. The GAO has reported that the DOD and DOE face
    challenges mitigating risk to U.S. nuclear deterrence efforts. What
    steps have or should be taken to improve risk management and
    prioritization across the nuclear forces portfolio?
        Ms. Baker. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of
    Energy (DOE) have long implemented policies and procedures to mitigate
    risk to nuclear modernization programs, including a joint process for
    managing program-level risks at a program level for each nuclear weapon
    life extension program. DOD and DOE are working now to set up a process
    that will leverage the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), an existing
    governance body that has both DOD and DOE/National Nuclear Security
    Administration representatives, to develop an enterprise-level nuclear
    deterrent risk management strategy that will identify, prioritize, and
    recommend actions across the nuclear portfolio, and monitor the overall
    health of the nuclear deterrent as we sustain current capabilities and
    transition to modernized systems and infrastructure. This framework and
    resulting actions will be informed by ongoing assessment of the
    security environment and early identification of potential risks, with
    the goal of enhancing senior leader visibility and framing options for
    risk mitigation.
        Mr. Cooper. How has Russia's recent aggression in Ukraine affected
    the administration's plan to pursue strategic stability dialogue with
    Russia?
        Ms. Baker. The U.S. froze participation in the Strategic Stability
    Dialogue in February following Russia's brutal and premeditated
    invasion of Ukraine. There are no plans to resume the Strategic
    Stability Dialogue with Russia at this time. The last meeting to take
    place in the format of the Strategic Stability Dialogue, an
    extraordinary session working toward de-escalation, occurred on January
    10, 2022.
        Mr. Cooper. The GAO has reported that the DOD and DOE face
    challenges mitigating risk to U.S. nuclear deterrence efforts. What
    steps have or should be taken to improve risk management and
    prioritization across the nuclear forces portfolio?
        Admiral Richard. [Answer provided to the committee and available
    upon request from Member offices.]
        Mr. Cooper. It seems that USSTRATCOM no longer sees missile defense
    as a component of strategic deterrence as the command looks to transfer
    all missile defense gap analysis and integrated prioritization
    responsibilities to the Joint Staff and USSPACECOM. Should USSTRATCOM
    rid itself of the current responsibilities it has with regards to
    prioritization of missile defense capabilities, how do you envision
    your Command being able to balance missile defense requirements in the
    context of strategic deterrence?
        Admiral Richard. [Answer provided to the committee and available
    upon request from Member offices.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
        Mr. Lamborn. Last year, you testified that STRATCOM supported
    development of the sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) to address
    regional deterrence challenges. You testified, ``Without this
    capability adversaries may perceive an advantage at lower levels of
    conflict that may encourage limited nuclear use.'' Is it still your
    best military advise that the United States pursue development of the
    SLCM-N? Can you elaborate the risks the United States would accept if
    we do not acquire the SLCM-N?
        Admiral Richard. (U) Yes. Throughout the Nuclear Posture Review
    process, I recommended continued pursuit of the SLCM-N.
        (U) As I discussed, the risk of not doing so may not adequately
    deter an adversary from limited nuclear use. The SLCM-N would enhance
    deterrence by denying adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited
    nuclear employment could prove advantageous in regional aggression
    against the United States, its Allies, and partners. That is, the SLCM-
    N is designed to ensure that an opponent does not believe there is a
    threshold below which they could employ nuclear weapons, ultimately
    leaving the United States only with disproportionate, unusable response
    options.
        (U) Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory
    convinces me a deterrence and assurance gap exists. To address this
    gap, a low-yield, non-ballistic capability to deter and respond without
    visible generation is necessary to provide a persistent, survivable,
    regional capability to deter adversaries, assure Allies, provide
    flexible options, as well as complement existing capabilities. Such a
    capability with these attributes should be re-examined in the near
    future.
        Mr. Lamborn. In 2020, the U.S. Navy deployed the W76-2 low-yield
    warhead on some of our Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles in
    order to fill a gap in U.S. capabilities that can deter limited nuclear
    employment. How might the removal of the W76-2 from our deployed
    nuclear forces impact our ability to deter Russian and Chinese limited
    nuclear capabilities?
        Admiral Richard. (U) The W76-2 low-yield warhead has been critical
    in maintaining deterrence during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Further,
    it is currently the only persistent and survivable low-yield capability
    in our inventory.
        (U) The W76-2 warhead addresses, in part, an exploitable deterrence
    gap by denying adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear
    employment could provide a useful advantage in regional aggression
    against the United States, its Allies and partners; thus, making
    nuclear weapon employment less likely. More specifically, the W76-2
    warhead provides a prompt response option able to penetrate adversary
    defenses, requires no host nation support, and offers additional
    diversity in platforms, range, and survivability. Lastly, the W76-2
    promotes nonproliferation by assuring our Allies and partners. These
    advantages would be lost should the W76-2 be removed from our forces.
        Mr. Lamborn. Last year, you explained that you're opposed to
    adoption of a nuclear declaratory policy of No First Use because
    ``[y]ou will remove a level of ambiguity now that has a deterring
    effect.'' Why is it in the U.S. best interest to keep the existing
    declaratory policy of calculated ambiguity?
        Admiral Richard. (U) Calculated ambiguity enhances the President's
    flexibility to shape United States actions to the specifics of the
    conflict. This flexibility complicates an adversary's decision
    calculus, thus enhancing deterrence. Further, the United States and our
    Allies and partners face the potential of strategic attacks from
    multiple vectors, and calculated ambiguity enhances deterrence and
    assurance from these extreme threats.
        (U) During the NPR process our allies were unanimous in
    recommending that no changes be made to weaken or otherwise remove the
    strategic ambiguity in our nuclear declaratory policy, which is
    indicative of the assurance it provides.
        Mr. Lamborn. The 2018 NPR announced that the B83 gravity bomb would
    be sustained to remain in the stockpile beyond its planned retirement
    date. According to previous testimony, ``the B83-1 is needed to meet
    current policy guidance and Operation Plan objectives. Adversaries
    protect much of what they value most in hard and deeply buried
    facilities, and adversaries continue to grow this class of targets. The
    B-83-1 is the best weapon in denying this sanctuary to adversaries.''
    Admiral Richard, how might retiring the B83, instead of sustaining it,
    impact STRATCOM's ability to hold at risk hard and deeply buried
    targets?
        Admiral Richard. [The information is classified and retained in the
    committee files.]
        Mr. Lamborn. In response to concerns over China's nuclear buildup,
    critics argue that the United States will still have thousands of more
    nuclear weapons than China, implying that our full force of about 3,700
    nuclear warheads is available to you. Admiral Richard, can you please
    walk us through in what ways you are limited from deploying the full
    nuclear arsenal?
        Admiral Richard. (U) The United States does not deter one adversary
    at a time; rather the nation must simultaneously deter two nuclear-
    capable near-peer adversaries as well as North Korea. It follows that a
    one-for-one stockpile comparison is misleading.
        (U) Further, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
    provides a ceiling on the United States and Russia of 1550 accountable
    warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
    deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and accounted
    for on deployed heavy bombers. As this limit cannot be exceeded, the
    majority of our nuclear weapons remain in storage as part of the
    stockpile.
        (U) Likewise, New START limits both parties to 700 deployed ICBMs,
    SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; and to 800 deployed and non-
    deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable heavy
    bombers.
        (U) China has no treaty constraints, such as New START, regarding
    the deployment of its nuclear weapons or its nuclear delivery systems.
        (U) Regardless of any treaty limits, there are capacity limits on
    our platforms that would prevent the use of our available weapons.
    Further, the ongoing maintenance and modernization of our stockpile
    precludes the use of all our weapons.
        Mr. Lamborn. After New START was signed in 2010, Obama
    administration officials assured Congress that the treaty enables the
    U.S. to maintain an upload capacity for strategic delivery systems to
    hedge against ``a serious deterioration in the international security
    environment.'' Admiral, would you consider China's strategic breakout
    and Russia's invasion into Ukraine backed by nuclear threats to
    constitute ``a serious deterioration in the international security
    environment''? If so, do you agree that this would imply the U.S. needs
    to take a look at uploading more warheads to our deployed forces?
        Admiral Richard. (U) Yes, I would characterize these actions as a
    serious deterioration in the international security environment.
        (U) I agree we should evaluate uploading more warheads to our
    deployed forces. Recognizing New START constraints, uploading is
    currently the primary hedge option available.
        (U) More generally, we must make threat-informed decisions to
    provide strategic deterrence now and well into the future. Likewise,
    our strategic capability, capacity, and posture must evolve with the
    threat to achieve our National strategy. We have the minimum
    capabilities needed to address today's threats. Going forward, we must
    evaluate more frequently what additional capability, capacity, and
    posture are required from our strategic forces-based on how the threat
    is evolving and where it is going.
        Mr. Lamborn. It was recently reported that by the end of the decade
    Russia may double its stockpile of about 2,000 non-strategic nuclear
    weapons that it incorporates into its warfighting doctrine. China also
    deploys hundreds of dual-capable missiles capable of striking out to
    the second island chain in the Indo-Pacific. In comparison, U.S. non-
    strategic nuclear capabilities are extremely limited. Can the U.S.
    deter Russian and Chinese regional nuclear capabilities by bolstering
    its conventional forces alone? What changes can the U.S. make to its
    nuclear posture to ensure a strong deterrent threat against limited
    nuclear use?
        Admiral Richard. (U) No. We cannot deter Russian and Chinese
    regional nuclear capabilities by bolstering conventional forces alone.
        (U) We must make threat-informed decisions to provide strategic
    deterrence now and well into the future. Likewise, our strategic
    capability, capacity, and posture must evolve with the threat to
    achieve our National strategy. We have the minimum capabilities needed
    to address today's threats. Going forward, we must evaluate more
    frequently what additional capability, capacity, and posture are
    required from our strategic forces-based on how the threat is evolving
    and where it is going.
        (U) At a minimum, we must continue to invest in modernizing our
    strategic forces by recapitalizing the triad, Nuclear Command, Control,
    and Communications, weapons complex, and supporting infrastructure in
    order to maintain a viable, flexible, and full spectrum strategic
    deterrent force that is ready and able to pace the threat.
        (U) Additionally, Russia's war in Ukraine and China's nuclear
    trajectory demonstrate that we have a deterrence and assurance gap
    against the threat of limited nuclear employment. To help close this
    gap, pursuing a low-yield, non-ballistic capability that does not
    require visible generation should be re-examined in the near future
    along with other measures to address this.
        Mr. Lamborn. Last year, you explained that in light of China's
    nuclear expansion, ``For the first time in history, the nation is
    facing two potential strategic peer, nuclear-capable adversaries at the
    same time, who must be deterred differently.'' However, the design of
    the current U.S. nuclear posture dates to around 2010, when Russia was
    our only peer nuclear competitor. How might having to deter two nuclear
    peers at once impact our deterrence requirements? In your best military
    advice, should the United States consider changes to the size and
    posture of its nuclear forces in order to account for the doubling of
    peer nuclear threats?
        Admiral Richard. (U) As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, we
    will deter through safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces, country-
    specific strategies, extended deterrence, and an integrated deterrence
    approach that incorporates conventional and other non-nuclear
    capabilities.
        (U) We must make threat-informed decisions to provide strategic
    deterrence now and well into the future. Likewise, our strategic
    capability, capacity, and posture must evolve with the threat to
    achieve our National strategy. We have the minimum capabilities needed
    to address today's threats. Going forward, we must evaluate more
    frequently what additional capability, capacity, and posture are
    required from our strategic forces-based on how the threat is evolving
    and where it is going.
        (U) At a minimum, we must continue to invest in modernizing our
    strategic forces by recapitalizing the triad, Nuclear Command, Control,
    and Communications, nuclear weapons complex, and supporting
    infrastructure in order to maintain a viable, flexible, and
    fullspectrum strategic deterrent force that is ready and able to pace
    the threat.
        (U) Additionally, Russia's war in Ukraine and China's nuclear
    trajectory demonstrate that we have a deterrence and assurance gap
    against the threat of limited nuclear employment. To help close this
    gap, pursuing a low-yield, non-ballistic capability that does not
    require visible generation should be re-examined in the near future
    along with other measures to address this.
        Mr. Lamborn. According to the Pentagon's 2021 China Military Power
    Report, China seeks to move at least some of its forces to a Launch on
    Warning posture, a capability that the U.S. and Russia already possess.
    Admiral Richard, why might a Chinese Launch on Warning capability be
    dangerous or increase risk of conflict with the U.S.?
        Admiral Richard. [The information is classified and retained in the
    committee files.]
        Mr. Lamborn. To the extent possible in an unclassified format, can
    you please characterize the activities conducted at the Lop Nur and
    Novay Zemlya tests sites and how Russia and China likely use
    supercritical tests and experiments to modernize their deterrents?
        Admiral Richard. (U) I refer you to NNSA for a more in-depth and
    authoritative response regarding the types of tests Russia and China
    are conducting and how these tests and experiments could be used to
    modernize their respective deterrents.
        (U) Any advanced nuclear testing has the potential to support
    development of new nuclear technology, or confirm certain
    characteristics of existing capability.
        (U) China's possible preparations to operate its Lop Nur test site
    year-round include extensive excavation at the site, use of explosive
    containment chambers, blocking data flow from International Monitoring
    System stations, and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing
    activities. With respect to the Novaya Zemlya Central Test Site
    (NZCTS), the Intelligence Community assesses Russia has likely used
    NZCTS to conduct nuclear weapons tests, some of which have created
    nuclear yield.
        Mr. Lamborn. At what point will STRATCOM have more Chinese targets
    to hold at risk that Russian?
        Admiral Richard. [The information is classified and retained in the
    committee files.]
        Mr. Lamborn. What is STRATCOM's estimate for the size of the
    Russian active nuclear warhead stockpile number in 2030? What is
    STRATCOM's estimate for the size of Russia's non-strategic nuclear
    warhead stockpile in 2030?
        Admiral Richard. [The information is classified and retained in the
    committee files.]
        Mr. Lamborn. There have been concerns raised about the confusion
    and overlap of authorities between the United States Space Force and
    United States Space Command. How is USSPACECOM working to ensure that
    the U.S. Space Force is able to operate within the full scope of its
    title 10 authorities? What are the JISTs doing that couldn't be
    facilitated by service planners provided by the service component to
    reduce redundancy in overseas billets?
        General Dickinson. We designed USSPACECOM's Joint Integrated Space
    Teams (JIST) to integrate space into all Combatant Commands
    Headquarters, especially into the front end of operations,
    intelligence, planning, and executing, through education, integration,
    advocacy, and communication of all space-related activities that
    pertain to our Unified Command Plan-assigned roles and
    responsibilities, both in USSPACECOM's supporting, and supported
    functions. As an example, our JIST intelligence professionals link the
    USSPACECOM J2 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center to the other
    combatant commands. Given the United States Space Force (USSF) is a
    close and critical partner of USSPACECOM, we work diligently to ensure
    that we are not duplicating efforts. In support of this effort,
    USSPACECOM and USSF signed a ``Joint Space Integration Terms of
    Reference'' on 17 September 2021 to codify and differentiate the roles
    and responsibilities of the JISTs and the Space Force Service
    Components supporting other combatant commands. Overall, JISTs
    synchronize across combatant commands and enable globally integrated
    deterrence and other operations, while combatant command service
    components integrate capability inside their theater of operations.
        Mr. Lamborn. Last year I sponsored an amendment to establish a
    Space National Guard. Has there been any progress within the Department
    of Defense to stand up the Space National Guard? Is USSPACECOM involved
    in these discussions?
        General Dickinson. National Guard and Reserve members are an
    invaluable part of our team, with representatives throughout our
    Headquarters, and within our Components. The industry experience that
    National Guard members bring to the command is invaluable. For
    specifics on how best to organize a future space oriented multi-
    component force, and the results reflected in the subject report
    legislated in the FY22 National Defense Authorization Act, I would
    defer to the Secretary of the Air Force. Additionally, the Secretary of
    the Air Force and Chief of Space Operations are better suited to
    describe the organization of the U.S. Space Force.
        Mr. Lamborn. What are the expected results of the Warfighter Talks
    with the Space Force that your posture statement discusses? Is there a
    document, agreement, or standard operating procedure for the two
    organizations to understand lanes in the road?
        General Dickinson. The nation's newest Combatant Command, United
    States Space Command, and newest branch of the Armed Forces, United
    States Space Force, are critical partners in deterring conflict in
    space, and protecting and defending U.S. and allied interests in the
    domain. In July 2021, we held our first warfighter talks with two
    primary goals: (1) Identify opportunities ``to continue to leverage the
    unique service and combatant command relationship between these space
    domain-focused organizations'' to achieve seamless integration in
    delivering superior space combat power to deter and defeat adversaries,
    and (2) to deconflict respective activities in operational and
    strategic support to the other combatant commands. Based on the outcome
    of those discussions, we signed a Joint Space Integration Terms of
    Reference (TOR) which aimed to drive continued collaboration in
    optimizing the integration of space capabilities in support of
    Combatant Commands' theater plans and globally integrated operations.
    This year's talks, planned for July 2022, will build on the momentum
    gained with this TOR as we continue clarifying how our organizations
    will execute our mutual supporting, but different roles and
    responsibilities.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
        Mr. Langevin. Can you update us on the status of the testing
    infrastructure for hypersonic programs of record? Are there any
    additional investments required beyond those mentioned in the Science
    and Technology or Testing and Infrastructure MILCON unfunded
    requirement submissions?
        Ms. Baker. As of today, all current unfunded requirements are
    captured in the Science and Technology/Test and Evaluation Military
    Construction (MILCON) unfunded requirements submissions. As the
    Department advances hypersonic developments, the TRMC is continually
    analyzing emerging requirements to forecast future needs.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
        Mr. Garamendi. There was only one bidder for the GBSD contract and
    competition would have helped drive billions of dollars in lifecycle
    savings (according to Air Force General Timothy Ray). How is the DOD
    ensuring that there is competition within the National Security Space
    Launch program in Phase III and in the nuclear and space arenas
    generally? How is DOD planning on maximizing competition and removing
    barriers to entry for new technology areas like additive manufacturing?
        Ms. Baker. Sustainable competition is a cornerstone of the
    Department's acquisition approach to ensure delivery of cost-effective
    capabilities. Nuclear modernization and space launch strategies are
    constantly evolving to adopt new technologies and opportunities to gain
    cost-savings while supporting the defense industrial base. Analysis
    shows the current launch market can support a limited number of medium-
    toheavy launch providers. The DOD is currently working with industry in
    public-private partnerships like the National Security Space Launch
    (NSSL) program, which ensures the DOD has multiple competitive options
    for launch by facilitating the growth and sustainability of a robust
    U.S. space industrial base and encouraging competition among launch
    providers and suppliers to lower the costs and associated risks. NSSL
    seeks to develop capabilities like additive manufacturing and others
    through organizations like AFWerx, SpaceWerx, AFVentures, and the Space
    Enterprise Consortium (SpEC). In combination, these initiatives present
    a holistic approach to leveraging the commercial space industry across
    the entire marketspace to ensure a competitive edge for the U.S. and
    its allies in space. The ability to conduct rapid, responsive, and
    reliable launches of national security payloads is integral to
    executing DOD missions. These initiatives ensure the DOD has multiple
    competitive options for launch by facilitating the growth and
    sustainability of a robust U.S. space industrial base and encouraging
    competition among launch providers and suppliers to lower the costs and
    risks associated with these endeavors.
        Mr. Garamendi. What is the administration's strategy for pursuing
    future strategic arms control dialogue with Russia and China?
        Ms. Baker. One of the first actions of the Biden Administration was
    to agree with Russia to an extension of the New START Treaty, and
    express a desire to pursue arms control discussions as an element of
    the bilateral Strategic Stability Dialogue. Due to Russia's recent
    actions in Ukraine, the United States suspended the Strategic Stability
    Dialogue, but we will be prepared to resume dialogue when conditions
    are right. With regard to China, we are laying the groundwork for
    broader arms control engagements by prioritizing efforts to reduce
    strategic risks and strengthen guardrails in the bilateral
    relationship. These efforts require a willing partner, however, and we
    are working with allies and partners to highlight the importance of
    pursuing strategic stability and risk reduction with Beijing.
        Mr. Garamendi. Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander, United
    States Strategic Command, signed the forward of a book published in
    2020 by the Louisiana Tech Research Institute entitled, Guide to
    Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great-Power Competition. The Guide
    states that it is ``about educating airmen'' within the strategic
    deterrence sphere. Instead of being a true educational tool, however,
    it is laced with faulty assumptions and logic, promotes the perception
    that a nuclear war can be won, minimizes the devastation that would
    ultimately come from a conflict, and endorses questionable policy. Who
    commissioned this Guide? Who paid for it? How widely was it distributed
    within Strategic Command? Why is the command implicitly endorsing a a
    one-sided version of deterrence?
        Admiral Richard. Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) contracted
    with Louisiana Tech Research Institute (LTRI) to produce the guide as a
    response to the limitations of operating AFGSC's ``Global Near-Peer
    Competition Concepts and Applications Workshop'' under COVID
    restrictions. LTRI published the article in October 2020 with funding
    obtained through an Air Force Partnership Intermediary Agreement.
    However, AFGSC subsequently obtained a ``Zoom for Gov'' license to
    conduct the training live in a virtual environment. AFGSC did not use
    the guide for the workshop.
        Lt Gen Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM), wrote the Foreword at the request of the editor.
    USSTRATCOM had no further involvement and did not commission or pay for
    the guide. Additionally, USSTRATCOM did not distribute the ``Guide to
    Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Great Power Competition'' in the
    command or to its forces.
        Mr. Garamendi. The Trump administration proposed an additional
    nonstrategic nuclear weapon, a nuclear-capable Sea-Launched Cruise
    Missile. This is a weapon system that even a former Acting Secretary of
    Navy recommended not developing and it could blur the line between
    conventional and nuclear warfare because it would be challenging to
    determine what warhead is actually on a cruise missile once launched.
    Will the DOD keep it in its arsenal?
        Admiral Richard. (U) The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review cancelled the
    nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile program. However, Russia's
    war in Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory demonstrate that we have
    a deterrence and assurance gap against the threat of limited nuclear
    employment. To address this gap, a low-yield, non-ballistic capability
    to deter and respond without visible generation is necessary to provide
    a persistent, survivable, regional capability to deter adversaries,
    assure Allies, provide flexible options, as well as complement existing
    capabilities. Such a capability with these attributes should be re-
    examined in the near future.
        (U) It should be noted that the United States deployed the Tomahawk
    Land-Attack Missile-Nuclear (TLAM-N) for 25 years before it was
    retired.
        Mr. Garamendi. Is the DOD going to continue to request funding for
    the B83-1?
        Admiral Richard. [Answer provided to the committee and available
    upon request from Member offices.]
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
        Ms. Stefanik. Ms. Baker, do you think that bolstering our missile
    defense and nuclear deterrent is provocative to our adversaries?
        Ms. Baker. No. Both capabilities are core elements of the
    Department's integrated deterrence strategy which influences adversary
    decision-making by introducing doubt and uncertainty, providing options
    to decision-makers tailored to the scope and scale of possible threats,
    and ultimately deterring potential conflict. Within the framework of
    integrated deterrence, missile defense and nuclear capabilities are
    complementary, along with other strategic and non-strategic
    capabilities.
        Ms. Stefanik. Admiral Richard, what role do you envision for
    nonstrategic or theater nuclear forces in U.S. deterrence posture?
        What specific capabilities and attributes do you believe will be
    required to deter limited nuclear employment by U.S. adversaries?
        Admiral Richard. (U) All nuclear weapons are strategic. Any
    adversary use of nuclear weapons, regardless of location or yield,
    would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict, create the
    potential for uncontrolled escalation, and would have strategic
    effects. As the Nuclear Posture Review states, the roles of nuclear
    weapons are to deter strategic attacks on the United States and assure
    Allies and partners.
        (U) Our current capabilities are the minimum essential to prevail
    against the unprecedented challenges that the Nation, our Allies, and
    partners face.
        (U) Russia's recent behavior, especially its recent invasion of
    Ukraine, underscore the continued importance of U.S. nuclear forces, to
    include Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA), to NATO's deterrence and defense
    posture. Although primarily under U.S. European Command purview, we
    must continue working with our NATO allies to ensure that B61-12 life
    extension program and DCA transition are efficiently and expeditiously
    completed.
        (U) However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's nuclear
    trajectory convinces me that a deterrence and assurance gap exists. To
    address this gap, a low-yield, non-ballistic capability to deter and
    respond without visible generation is necessary to provide a
    persistent, survivable, regional capability to deter adversaries,
    assure Allies, provide flexible options, as well as complement existing
    capabilities. Such a capability with these attributes should be re-
    examined in the near future.
        Ms. Stefanik. General Dickinson, with your mission as the global
    sensor manager, are the current array of ground and space-based sensors
    adequate to warn the homeland of an imminent cruise missile attack?
        General Dickinson. The preponderance of our existing space and
    terrestrial sensors were designed to provide warning for ballistic
    missiles, and cruise missiles do not ``fly'' on a ballistic trajectory.
    Some of our sensors are constrained by environmental factors such as
    clouds, fog, smoke, dust, and other variables, while others are
    constrained by physical limitations like the curvature of the earth. We
    are working with STRATCOM, who currently has the missile defense
    mission, and other combatant commands on integrating all sensors within
    the DOD's air warning, missile warning, and missile defense portfolios
    to improve our space domain awareness. This will improve our capacity
    to detect imminent attacks, and will contribute to integrated
    deterrence by raising the cost calculus of our competitors.
        Ms. Stefanik. General VanHerck, what are some ways we can improve
    homeland defenses against cruise missiles and submarine launched cruise
    and ballistic missiles from Russia or other adversaries?
        General VanHerck. First, the designation of a single lead
    integrator, as directed by the 2017 NDAA, for acquisition and fielding
    of cruise missile defense capability is imperative to success. I am
    actively working to get the Department to comply with the law. Next,
    defense against cruise missiles begins with domain awareness, being
    able to detect threats to North America. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are
    working with the Department, and the Canadian Department of National
    Defence, to add significant improvements in this regard. My number #1
    priority is the fielding of Over the Horizon Radar (OTHR). If/When
    fully integrated into our command and control systems, OTHR will be a
    game-changing technology in my ability to detect and track advanced
    cruise missile threats while also providing maritime and space domain
    awareness. With domain awareness, and policy directing what critical
    infrastructure to defend and what threats to defend against, then
    cruise missile defenses can be built to provide a credible and
    effective deterrent to cruise missile attacks against the homelands.
    With respect to ballistic missiles, I am confident in my current
    capability to provide ballistic missile defense (BMD) of the homeland
    against a limited attack from rogue actors like North Korea. As you are
    aware, the homeland BMD architecture is not designed to counter
    ballistic threats from peer adversaries, we rely on our strategic
    nuclear deterrent for those countries.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
        Mr. Waltz. Considering the strategic deterrence challenge that
    China and Russia pose, the Sea Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear would
    provide a regionally present, sea-based, survivable option to fill a
    gap in America's nuclear deterrence capabilities and allied assurance
    commitments. The United States must adjust its force posture in some
    way to respond to the drastic change in the nuclear threat; however,
    former Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Harker had directed the Navy to
    defund the SLCM-N for FY 2023. Why is the Department leaning towards
    ceding strategic leverage and ending development of a vital weapons
    system in our strategic deterrence?
        Ms. Baker. As an outgrowth of the Nuclear Posture Review, the
    Secretary of Defense has made a recommendation to the President on the
    future of the nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile program, which
    is reflected in the President's budget for FY2023. SLCM-N was cancelled
    given the deterrence contribution of the W76-2 and other capabilities,
    and its estimated cost in light of other nuclear modernization
    priorities. The Nuclear Posture Review affirmed the need to deter
    limited nuclear use by adversaries. The United States applies tailored
    deterrence strategies and maintains a variety of nuclear capabilities
    to address this need.
        Mr. Waltz. If China and Russia continue to develop intermediate
    range nuclear weapons and we unilaterally pause the development of
    SLCM-N, what other weapon systems are available to fill the strategic
    gap in the absence of SLCM-N?
        Ms. Baker. Other systems for deterring limited nuclear attack
    include the W76-2 low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile
    warhead, the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), U.S. and Allied dual-
    capable aircraft equipped with U.S. B61 nuclear gravity bombs, and the
    future long-range stand-off (LRSO) weapon.
        Mr. Waltz. There have been several high-profile hypersonic missile
    test failures and a noted lack of progress on the developmental
    hypersonic weapon systems. In July of last year, the second test of the
    Air Launched Rapid Response Weapon failed at igniting its solid rocket
    motor. Not exactly failure of cutting-edge technology but failing at
    the basics. A third try at the test in December and the missile did not
    even leave the wing of the B-52 carrying it. What is causing our
    hypersonics programs to fail at the basics of testing new designs? Are
    the failures indicative of structural problems that our defense
    industrial base has at rapidly developing and fielding new weapons
    systems?
        Admiral Richard. (U) The determination of what constitutes testing
    failure or success in these advanced developmental hypersonic weapon
    systems lies with the respective Service program managers. Further,
    they are ideally positioned to assess industrial base concerns. I would
    refer you to these subject matter experts for testing failure root
    cause analysis.
        (U) The Department is developing hypersonic strike capabilities to
    meet an immediate requirement for a highly responsive, long-range, non-
    nuclear strike capability to address distant, defended, and time-
    critical threats.
        (U) Rapid development and testing of new technologies introduces
    new challenges, and we the Department must be allowed to learn through
    both successful and ``failed'' tests. Failures help identify causes,
    make modifications and incorporate lessons learned to speed development
    and move rapidly through testing to production and fielding.
        (U) Several conventional hypersonic flight tests are planned this
    year including all-up round testing supporting Army, Navy, and Air
    Force programs. I am encouraged by the joint Army/Navy development
    program which will field the Nation's first operational hypersonic
    weapon system next year and optimistic Air Force is effectively
    addressing past test failures.
        Mr. Waltz. What additional resources does the Department need to
    not only to pace the hypersonic threat posed by weapon systems that are
    being operationally fielded by Russia and the CCP, but leap ahead of
    where their programs currently stand?
        Admiral Richard. (U) The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
    for Research and Engineering is spearheading a ``Leap Ahead'' effort to
    examine the trade space of advanced technologies beyond what is
    currently planned to be fielded by the United States or our potential
    adversaries. This office is best situated to address questions on
    additional resourcing needs.
        Mr. Waltz. Considering the strategic deterrence challenge that
    China and Russia pose, the Sea Launched Cruise Missile-Nuclear would
    provide a regionally present, sea-based, survivable option to fill a
    gap in America's nuclear deterrence capabilities and allied assurance
    commitments. The United States must adjust its force posture in some
    way to respond to the drastic change in the nuclear threat; however,
    former Acting Navy Secretary Thomas Harker had directed the Navy to
    defund the SLCM-N for FY 2023. Why is the Department leaning towards
    ceding strategic leverage and ending development of a vital weapons
    system in our strategic deterrence?
        Admiral Richard. (U) I acknowledge the decisions made by our
    national policy-makers and defer to them for the reasons why the SLCM-N
    was cancelled. The threats that drove the need for the SLCM-N did not
    vanish, and lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis have demonstrated
    the need for the attributes of this capability. I look forward to
    follow-on activities that will determine how these threats will be
    addressed in the future.(U) Throughout the NPR process, I recommended
    continued pursuit of the SLCM-N. The current situation in Ukraine and
    China's nuclear trajectory convinces me that a deterrence and assurance
    gap exists. To address this gap, a low-yield, non-ballistic capability
    to deter and respond without visible generation is necessary to provide
    a persistent, survivable, regional capability to deter adversaries,
    assure Allies, provide flexible options, as well as complement existing
    capabilities. Such a capability with these attributes should be
    reexamined in the near future.
        Mr. Waltz. If China and Russia continue to develop intermediate
    range nuclear weapons and we unilaterally pause the development of
    SLCM-N, what other weapon systems are available to fill the strategic
    gap in the absence of SLCM-N?
        Admiral Richard. (U) The threats that drove the need for the SLCM-N
    did not vanish. The lessons learned from the Ukraine crisis show that
    certain scenarios, previously judged as unlikely, are far more probable
    than previously thought.
        (U) While the addition of the W76-2 low yield warhead (and the Long
    Range Stand-Off weapon (LRSO) in 2030) is an important asset for
    strengthening the preservation of credible deterrence against limited
    nuclear use in regional aggression, Russia's current invasion in
    Ukraine and China's nuclear trajectory convinces me that a deterrence
    and assurance gap exists. To best address this gap, a low-yield, non-
    ballistic capability to deter and respond without visible generation is
    necessary to provide a persistent, survivable, regional capability to
    deter adversaries, assure Allies, provide flexible options, as well as
    complement existing capabilities. Such a system with these attributes
    should be re-examined in the near future.
        Mr. Waltz. A key component to a resilient space architecture is
    ensuring the continuing availability, diversity, responsiveness, and
    resilience of launch locations here on Earth. What steps do you believe
    the Department should take to leverage the growing number of U.S.
    spaceports, and how can the Department work to leverage mobile,
    responsive launch providers?
        General Dickinson. Assured access to space remains a top national
    security priority. Robust launch infrastructure and responsive launch
    capabilities are essential to our assured use of space. We are
    fortunate to have our U.S. Space Force service component, and its
    subordinate field command, Space Systems Command, focused on developing
    indigenous military responsive launch capabilities, while also
    fostering industry's development of the same. Prior congressional
    action and direction in support of tactically responsive space launch,
    small satellite constellations, and hybrid space architectures serve to
    inform this development. We appreciate the continued support from
    Congress in developing these capabilities, especially in providing the
    necessary resources to our service components to accomplish their
    responsive spacelift organize, train, and equip responsibilities.
        Mr. Waltz. Several of our international partners and allies are
    starting to build requirements and identify funding for the responsive
    launch/responsive space mission area; but, despite several years of
    Congressional support for it, we've yet to see the same attention paid
    by the Department of Defense. How is USSPACECOM working with our
    partners to develop interoperable responsive space missions and CONOPs,
    and how might we expect these to flow back into the Department's own
    planning?
        General Dickinson. U.S. Space Command, as well as our allies and
    partners, need a responsive space and launch capability. I applaud U.S.
    Space Force and Congressional efforts to grow the U.S. launch base
    overall, as well as add a time-sensitive launch capability known as
    Tactically Responsive Launch. Efforts to date have focused on bringing
    timelines down to less than 12 months, but we need to push industry
    farther. In a conflict which may not last longer than weeks or months,
    a 12 month timeline is still not tactically relevant. We need to be
    targeting days, not months. Additionally, we appreciate the $50M
    authorized in the FY22 NDAA for 2 responsive launch, and are looking
    forward to hopefully seeing the subsequent appropriation. We must have
    the ability to rapidly augment, reconstitute, and replenish our
    critical space capabilities. The recent Russian Anti-satellite test
    makes this even more urgent. I've recently commissioned a study on
    Tactically Responsive Space to determine where we can incorporate this
    into the overall space architectures in order to improve our
    warfighting capabilities. This will set the demand signal that helps
    shape future technical investments and eventual programs of record. We
    continue to engage with allies and partners in bilateral and
    multilateral forums including the most recent U.S. Space Command
    Commander's Conference to identify gaps and develop the requirements to
    protect the space domain. As this coordination advances, we expect it
    to shape our plans and our global posture to enable us to fight with
    our allies and levy requirements to the services that enable that fight
    such as responsive launch As we progress with our own understanding of
    what is required and subsequently outline our path forward, we will be
    closely synchronized with our allies and partners in the areas of
    technology, CONOPs, and interoperability.