[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 117-47]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING
ON
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 17, 2021
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
48-533 WASHINGTON : 2023
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
JIM COOPER, Tennessee VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey SAM GRAVES, Missouri
ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
FILEMON VELA, Texas MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine, Vice Chair JIM BANKS, Indiana
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
SARA JACOBS, California JERRY L. CARL, Alabama
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Sean Falvey, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces......... 3
WITNESSES
Stefany, Frederick J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Research, Development and Acquisition, Department of the Navy;
VADM James W. Kilby, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, Department of the
Navy; and LtGen Eric M. Smith, USMC, Commanding General, Marine
Corps Combat Development Command, and Deputy Commandant for
Combat Development and Integration, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps.......................................................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 41
Stefany, Frederick J., joint with VADM James W. Kilby and
LtGen Eric M. Smith........................................ 46
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 44
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 85
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 17, 2021.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:20 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Courtney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION
FORCES
Mr. Courtney. Good morning.
The subcommittee is now in session and meets this morning
to hear testimony from the Department of the Navy on the fiscal
year 2022 budget.
We have one member who is joining us remotely, Mr. Langevin
up in Rhode Island, and I think he knows the drill in terms of
announcing himself and waiting to ensure that the audio is
picked up. So I think I am going to skip the ``FedEx''
statement at the beginning here.
So before us today to discuss the Navy's request for fiscal
year 2022, we have three witnesses who are no strangers to our
subcommittee.
We welcome you all back this morning.
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisition, Mr. Jay Stefany; Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities,
Vice Admiral James Kilby; and Commanding General, Marine Corps
Combat Development Command, Lieutenant General Eric Smith.
Thank you all again for joining us this morning.
The 2022 budget for the platforms and capabilities under
our panel's jurisdiction cover a wide range of priorities on
and below the seas and will be a critical component of the 2022
fiscal budget and the National Defense Authorization Act
[NDAA].
I think it is always important as we get started to know
the past in order to understand the present, and I want to take
a moment to review the journey that we took last year with the
Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget.
As the Congressional Research Service [CRS] reported last
April, the prior administration sent Congress a $19.9 billion
shipbuilding budget that requested an 18 percent cut from the
previous year and in its Future Years Defense Plan, the FYDP,
that accompanied the budget, projected a shipbuilding budget
for fiscal year 2022 of only $21.1 billion.
Just to use that as a metric, the budget that was submitted
this year on May 28, 2021, by the administration, it actually
is $22.6 billion, which is 7 percent higher than last year's
budget submission.
And I share this not as a partisan statement. To the
contrary, that record is a reminder that this subcommittee last
year, as in prior years, has been an independent body that even
with constrained top lines like the one we are wrestling with
this year has revised Navy budgets.
That, in fact, is our constitutional duty. Article I,
section 8, clause 13 clearly states that it is Congress that
has the authority to provide and maintain a Navy. And last year
we exercised that power when we rejected the proposed cut of a
Virginia-class submarine and enacted a final shipbuilding
budget of $23.2 billion, well above the $19 billion request and
actually still above this year's request from the
administration.
So just like last year, we have a tough job ahead of us.
This budget has some positive elements, and it has some issues
that we have to solve.
As I told the Acting Secretary of the Navy and CNO [Chief
of Naval Operations] 2 days ago, the absence of a Future Years
Defense Plan and a 30-year shipbuilding plan adds a higher
degree of difficulty to our work.
And in the absence of those multiyear documents, I want to
say to our witnesses at the outset today that my colleagues and
staff expect and know we will receive clear testimony and
follow-up answers to questions, which will be many, in the
compressed schedule that we face.
Shipbuilding and ship maintenance, as we all know, is a
long game, and the decisions we make today will have longer
lasting consequences than many other parts of the Defense
Department's budget.
As I said, there are some positive elements in the budget
submission. In contrast to recent budgets over the last few
years, the Navy's budget plan strongly supports our undersea
fleet. The budget before us includes stable, two-per-year
production cadence for the Virginia-class submarine program and
continued investment in the Navy's number one acquisition
program--namely, the Columbia-class ballistic submarine
program--and also long overdue private sector submarine
maintenance projects.
Together, this budget makes the strongest investment in the
stability and growth of our undersea capabilities and
industrial base since the 1980s.
As Admiral Gilday forcefully testified on Tuesday this
week, our undersea advantage over both China and Russia is our
most powerful tool of deterrence, and we cannot let the size of
that fleet falter. This budget accomplishes that goal.
That said, I remain concerned about some other specific
changes and trade-offs reflected in the budget. Once again, our
panel is tasked with making sense of an unexpected cut in
steady rate production of the DDG-51-class destroyer program. I
am deeply concerned that sudden course change will disrupt the
stability of the industrial base, undermines confidence in
multiyear procurement agreements, and threatens our ability to
meet our defense strategy.
At the same time, the budget proposes an increase in ship
retirements, nearly double the number of new ship construction
proposed, including an increase in the retirement of cruisers
planned for modernization.
Cruiser modernization is an issue which this subcommittee
has grappled with for many, many years. I hope our witnesses
today will provide more detailed insight into the analysis
behind this proposal and how it fits into the Navy's overall
efforts to meet its operational requirements.
Whatever the ultimate goal of the size of our fleet, the
basic fundamentals of successful shipbuilding remain the same:
stable and predictable requirements that industry can plan
towards and rely on, steady rate production that facilitates
effective workforce development and cost reduction, and
underlying long-term strategy that the Navy, Congress, and
industry can work from.
Unfortunately, too many recent budgets have fallen short of
some of these fundamentals only to rely on Congress to fill the
gaps. This is the second year in a row, under two different
administrations, that the Navy has presented a budget that
removes a planned major combatant vessel only to list it as
their number one unfunded requirement. That is not a trend that
any of us here on this committee relishes or wants to see
becoming the new normal, and this would be the third year.
Our subcommittee has a well-earned record for bipartisan
scrutiny of shipbuilding budgets to provide this continuity and
insight, regardless of which party holds the White House. I am
confident that we will act again this year in a similar way and
ensure that we make prudent and needed adjustments to build on
the final proposal.
With that, I turn to my good friend and ranking member from
Virginia, Mr. Rob Wittman, for opening remarks that he may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Chairman Courtney. Again,
thanks for your leadership and for your staunch direction in
what we need to pursue as far as shipbuilding.
I want to thank our three witnesses for joining us today.
Gentlemen, if we are truly sincere about preparing for a
maritime conflict with a great power, we should all grade
President Biden's Navy budget as unacceptable. I give it a D-
minus. With proposing eight battle force ships, of which two
are tugboats, we are going backwards, not forwards. This is not
the proper attempt to deter a global conflict.
I think what is most perplexing to me is the lack of vision
and the desire by senior Biden officials to mark time while the
lethargic Biden Secretary of the Navy nomination process
continues. We are already 6 months into this administration. We
are only informed this week of the administration's intent to
nominate a Secretary of the Navy.
It has been said that Emperor Nero fiddled while Rome
burned. In this case, President Biden is fiddling while the
Navy is metaphorically burning. We have no strategic direction,
no plan to dissuade China, and no budget to adequately prepare
for maritime conflict. The administration has even refused to
deliver a 5-year budget plan and a 30-year shipbuilding plan on
time, as required by law.
Secretary Hicks recently indicated that this budget request
was developed with a clear-eyed approach on how to deter
military aggression when it comes to China. I am not sure what
she was looking at, but it is clear that she overlooked the
Navy.
While the administration is fiddling, the budget request is
recommending that we divest 15 battle force ships, including 7
cruisers. The seven cruisers alone have more missile capacity
than the entire British fleet.
I want to say that again: Those seven cruisers alone have
more missile capacity than the entire British fleet.
We have already spent hundreds of millions of dollars on
ensuring these cruisers are returned to the fleet, yet now we
find we are going to retire them.
While this administration is fiddling, the administration
indicates they cannot afford a second destroyer, a critical
platform to deter maritime conflict. And while we are retiring
other surface combatants, we are saying we are going to
exacerbate that by now not building an additional destroyer.
While this administration is fiddling, the budget
underfunds critical investments in Tomahawk missiles,
heavyweight torpedoes, and sonobuoys.
While this administration is fiddling and stymied with
inaction, the Navy is prepared to give up on over $700 million
in smart acquisition savings available by procuring four
amphibious ships.
President Trump established a maritime conflict as a key
budget priority and prepared a plan to deliver this capability.
President Trump's plan envisioned discrete cuts throughout the
defense budget to fund 12 battle force ships he proposed for
construction in fiscal year 2022.
The Biden administration arrives, wants to take more time
to study the future maritime conflict, and throws out the
tremendous work done by our witnesses today.
Undoubtedly, the Biden team will reach the same conclusion
as their predecessors--or maybe they already have reached their
own conclusions and are now building an assessment tailored to
prove the current conditions correct.
Frankly, this is a waste of time and not only is
unacceptable, but is dangerous and imperils our national
security.
It is time to stop fiddling. We need to be visionary and to
allow the industrial base to rightsize to deliver efficiently
for our national security needs. We need to be steely-eyed in
dissuading conflict and delivering adequate resources to enable
this plan. And we need to be brave enough to balance cross-
service resources to deliver credible power relevant to the
future conflict.
We have so much work on this budget request to make it even
mildly prepared for dissuading future conflict, and I look
forward to working with my colleagues to correct this dangerous
naval trajectory.
Finally, I want to be clear: I do not lay any of this blame
at the feet of our witnesses today or by the stellar leadership
of our subcommittee chairman or by any member of this
committee. Every single one of you has been focused on what we
need as a Nation to do what is necessary to deter conflict.
I believe that everyone are great Americans who are in a
difficult position of defending a lackluster budget developed
in part by folks who have never had to testify before this
subcommittee.
Again, I appreciate the chairman for holding this important
hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
And we will now turn to the witnesses.
It is my understanding, Mr. Stefany, you are going to
provide a statement for the three witnesses. Is that correct?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, one statement for all three of us.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION,
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; VADM JAMES W. KILBY, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS AND
CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; AND LTGEN ERIC M. SMITH,
USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
COMMAND, AND DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND
INTEGRATION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
Mr. Stefany. And thank you, Representative Wittman, for the
comments for the three of us. We appreciate that.
Chairman Courtney, Ranking Member Wittman, distinguished
members of the subcommittee, on behalf of myself, Vice Admiral
Kilby, Lieutenant General Smith, we thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to address the
Department of Navy's fiscal year 2022 budget request for
seapower capabilities.
We would like to thank this subcommittee for your
leadership and support for the Navy and the Marine Corps
programs that support our forward-deployed naval forces.
As a maritime Nation, our economic prosperity and security
are linked to the world's oceans. The Navy and Marine Corps
team are the Nation's maritime force, forward deployed each and
every day, protecting the vital interests of our Nation,
supporting our allies and partners, and providing a credible
and visible deterrent to our strategic competitors.
Our goal is to prevent conflict. But should deterrence
fail, we are ready to answer the call to fight and to win.
In the year-plus since the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United
States, our Navy-Marine Corps team and our industry partners
have delivered 7 new ships, with 3 more deliveries planned for
later this year, as well as over 100 boats, crafts, and
vehicles, and maintaining our current fleet.
We have awarded the frigate design since last time we met
with you, and we have under construction the first of the
Columbia-class SSBN [nuclear ballistic missile] submarines, a
truly heroic effort across our entire acquisition and
sustainment community in very trying times. And I want to
recognize all members of the community.
The Department of the Navy's 2022 budget balances the
readiness, capabilities, capacity, and people to advance key
Department priorities. As Secretary Austin highlighted in his
recent testimony to the Appropriations Committee, the budget
also reflects difficult funding decisions necessary to ensure
we have the right mix of capabilities the Nation needs most and
supports investment in a modern future force that can deliver
integrated, all-domain naval power.
While difficult decisions were required, I would like to
highlight some of the areas we were able to increase our
investment in the fiscal year 2022 budget request.
The Department's top priority is recapitalization of the
Navy's portion of the nuclear triad; then meeting readiness
needs to field a credible, non-nuclear deterrent ready to fight
tonight; followed by investments in modernizing our force for
tomorrow's fleet; and then finally, building the capacity of
the Navy, congruent with the budget controls. This ensures that
we do not create a hollow force while sustainably growing the
fleet.
To that end, we continue to fully fund our number one
procurement program, the Columbia submarine, to the independent
cost estimate, which will ensure our timely delivery of all
ships in the class to meet STRATCOM's [U.S. Strategic
Command's] requirements.
We are also investing in land-based test facilities for the
frigate and for our unmanned surface vessel programs, and we
are requesting advanced procurement funding to smooth the ramp-
up of construction to two frigates per year, just outside of
this year.
Although a different mix of ships, this budget does propose
the same number of ships as last year and supports the
capability required to enable distributed maritime operations.
To ensure we have a whole force, the fiscal year 2022
budget invests additional funding in ship and aviation
maintenance, and you will see an increase in our funding for
SIOP [Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program], the
shipyard optimization modeling and planning efforts, that will
lead to major SIOP projects in the near future.
With a focus on developing a Navy force capable of
distributed maritime operations, as outlined in our CNO's
Navigation Plan and the Commandant's Force Design, this budget
provides the necessary R&D [research and development]
investments to start development of new capabilities with our
industry partners, such as the follow-on to the Virginia-class
attack submarine, the next-generation tactical aircraft, and
the future large surface combatant. It also increases our
development efforts that we started previously on hypersonic
and directed energy weapons.
Finally, the budget invests in key enablers to support
distributed operations, such as Project Overmatch, which is a
seamless network that will leverage demonstrated progress in
command and control in all domains and facilitate the manned
and unmanned teaming required for future warfare.
We thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
subcommittee today and for the strong support that this
subcommittee has always provided to our sailors and our
Marines.
And with that, we look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, Admiral
Kilby, and General Smith can be found in the Appendix on page
46.]
Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Mr. Stefany. And,
again, I am going to ask just one or two questions and make
sure the other members get a chance to participate fully.
Admiral Kilby, as is obvious, the proposal to decommission
seven cruisers, as in the past year--as I said, this is not our
first rodeo in terms of dealing with this issue on the
subcommittee--is something that has obviously resulted in a lot
of pushback and commentary.
When the budget came out, within a couple of days, as is
normal, the unfunded priorities list came over from the Navy,
as did all the other branches. To me, it was noticeable that,
on the one hand, restoring the DDG was number one on the list,
but there was nothing in that unfunded priorities list [UPL]
regarding restoring the cruisers.
And I was wondering if you could just kind of give us an
explanation of just the thinking behind the decommissioning
proposal, particularly in terms of the question of missile tube
capability.
What does that mean in terms of air defense command for the
cruisers' role in terms of accompanying our carriers and where
the DDG construction process sort of fits into that, and
whether we are creating a gap? I mean, that is fundamentally
the question I think we have to figure out here in terms of
that proposal.
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
Short answer, we are not creating a gap for the function of
the air and missile defense commander. We have looked at that
and mapped it out, and we will continue to pace the arrival of
Flight III, which will assume that responsibility for our
strike groups because of the capabilities it brings to the
cruisers.
To me, it is more than just VLS [vertical launching system]
cells. It is what is the sensor that a ship brings, what are
the capabilities of that combat system, and what is the
confidence and reliability we have in that hull to get
underway.
In 2017, I was the strike group commander for the Carl
Vinson strike group. My air and missile defense command ship
was the Lake Champlain.
She missed roughly one-third of the deployment because of
maintenance things, not because her radar was down, not because
her combat system wasn't capable, not because she didn't have a
full magazine, but she had tank top cracking that required her
to get that fixed to be safely underway.
Vella Gulf missed a month of her previous deployment and
has missed 2\1/2\ months of her current deployment.
So all of that, in my mind, has to go into the mix when we
factor the availability and reliability of those ships. Those
missile tubes will only count if they are underway alongside
the carrier.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
So, again, you are going back to the air defense command.
In terms of the analysis that you conducted, I mean, you are
obviously sort of feathering in the new DDG-51s with the new
radars in terms of making sure that that function is going to
be covered. Is that correct?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir, that is correct. That will have
the latest combat system, which is Aegis Baseline 10. It will
have the Air and Missile Defense Radar, which is a much more
capable and less maintenance-intensive radar than the SPY
radar. And that is a natural fit for where the threat is going
and what we want that air and missile defense commander to do
for that strike group.
It will be commanded by a captain, not a commander. Our
destroyers now are commanded by commanders, and that is
generally their first command unless they had O-4 [lieutenant
commander] command. And our air and missile defense command
ships are captained by a captain, so that is their second
command or their major command. So they bring an experience set
and a crew that has been trained and is more senior to execute
that function.
I don't want to dismiss the value of 122 missile cells or
an Aegis cruiser. I am an Aegis cruiser guy. I have done four
of my six ships on Aegis cruisers. I love them. But our average
age of our cruisers is 32 years. They were built for 30 years.
Four of our ships are over 34 years.
So I am really trying to look at the most valuable ship
that we can fund, the most valuable program within our budget
to make our force equal across all functions--air, surface, and
subsurface--to align to the threats as we see them, sir.
Mr. Courtney. And speaking of budget, so if, again, there
was a decision made at the Appropriations Committee or HASC
[House Armed Services Committee] to restore the cruisers that
you are proposing to decommission, that carries a price tag
with it.
Can you sort of walk us through what that would result in,
in terms of having to find offsets in a constrained budget?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. So trying to keep a complex
problem simple.
If we were to retain the seven cruisers that are in the
budget to be decommissioned in 2022--that is five from previous
budget and Hue City and Anzio in this budget--it would be
roughly $5 billion across the FYDP.
If we were to retain those ships for 2 years, all seven
ships, that is roughly $2.78 billion.
The cost to modernize Hue City and Anzio alone is $1.5
billion, approximately.
So that is the rough breakdown of figures for those ships.
Mr. Courtney. Great.
Well, thank you. I know there is going to be probably a lot
more discussion this morning on that issue.
And with that, I will turn it over to my friend, Mr.
Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to start with Secretary Stefany.
Am I correct that the law does require a 30-year
shipbuilding plan and a 5-year defense plan?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, you are.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Then I am just curious as to why
President Biden hasn't provided that to us at this point?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. I can tell you this on the two parts
you brought up.
Part one, the 5-year future defense plan, that that is the
direction we have gotten from the Department, that we are not
to provide. I cannot tell you why, the logic there.
On the 30-year shipbuilding plan, we do plan to still
provide that to you. My understanding is the final signature,
or chops, on it were yesterday. And my hope would be tomorrow,
maybe Monday at the latest, you will get that plan, sir.
Mr. Wittman. I think it is unfortunate and regrettable that
we won't get a Future Years Defense Plan.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Vice Admiral Kilby, Admiral Davidson indicated
earlier this year that he thought that conflict with China
would occur, instead of in the 2030s, probably within the next
6 years.
If Congress were to support the retirement of 15 battle
force ships in fiscal year 2022, is this going to hurt or help
our ability to deter this conflict that is seeming to be sooner
than later?
Admiral Kilby. On the surface, I would just say the air and
missile defense commander role from cruisers is covered. For
the 15 battle force ships, more is better, obviously, as long
as we can count and be confident that those ships will be
underway with us. So that is my one caveat there.
I have questions about the cruiser, and that is why we put
them in the budget as laid in today.
Mr. Wittman. And if there are issues about availabilities,
it seems like to me the big issue there is maintenance
availabilities. So we have shipyards that need to be getting
ships in and out on time. So it seems like to me it shouldn't
be retiring old ships, it should be maintaining the ones that
we have got in order to have that availability.
Let me do this. I want to ask you on some things on cruiser
retirement.
How many missile tubes are provided by the seven cruisers
the administration is proposing to decommission?
Admiral Kilby. It is 122 missile cells per ship, sir, so
times 7. I will do the math, but it is roughly----
Mr. Wittman. 910.
Admiral Kilby [continuing]. 910.
Mr. Wittman. Got you.
Admiral Kilby. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
What percentage of the Navy's entire surface fires are
provided by those seven cruisers.
Admiral Kilby. A large percentage of those ships, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Got you.
All right. How many large unmanned surface vessels are
required to replace the strike capacity offered by the seven
cruisers? And what is the timeframe to deliver the replacement
capability?
Admiral Kilby. I would say, at a rough estimate, double the
number of large unmanned surface vessels [LUSVs] in our current
instantiation, because they are going to have 64 cells, so it
would be double that.
And the timeline is yet to be determined, because we have
got to go through the confidence, as we have talked about in
previous hearings, to field that capability. So that is land-
based testing, all of the things we need to do to be confident
in that search. So it won't be in the timeline that these
cruisers could serve.
Mr. Wittman. So 28 LUSVs and a long period of time. I think
the best case scenario--best case, if everything goes according
to plan--probably 15 years.
Admiral Kilby. Sir, just to clarify.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Admiral Kilby. I think if it is 7 cruisers, it is 14 LUSVs.
Mr. Wittman. Fourteen LUSVs.
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. All right.
How much money has been invested in the last 5 years in
these cruisers to extend their service life?
Admiral Kilby. A significant amount of money, and it is
costing more than we thought it would be.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Admiral Kilby. So initially it was $2.4 billion, but,
again, we are adding a lot of money to do that, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Got you.
Are we able to provide sufficient cruisers and destroyers
to the combatant commanders today to meet their OPLANs
[operation plans] while retiring the seven cruisers? And is
that going to help or hurt our ability to project power?
Admiral Kilby. I believe we are providing the number--let
me be clear. The combatant commanders want more than the Navy
has to give them.
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
Admiral Kilby. I don't want to be Pollyannish about that.
We are providing manned strike groups to meet the demand
signal as apportioned by our global force management cycle to
satisfy our combatant commanders.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Lieutenant General Smith, my first question to you is
simple. Is the amphibious force forcible entry capability today
what is needed as a joint force to defeat China?
General Smith. Sir, if I understand the question, is it
still a requirement for the joint force?
Mr. Wittman. Uh-huh.
General Smith. Absolutely, sir. JFEO, joint forcible entry
operation, absolutely vital to the combatant commander, yes,
sir.
Mr. Wittman. Do you see this as a needed capability into
the next decade?
General Smith. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. We all know the backbone of the force is being
able to generate two MEB, or two Marine expeditionary brigade,
lift. The administration appears ready to walk away from that,
to have that forcible entry capability and the supporting
infrastructure. Some projections have our amphibious fleet down
to 26 ships.
Tell me, what is the Commandant's red line as far as the
bottom line for total number of amphibious force ships?
General Smith. Sir, straight answer up front is the
requirement, based on a study that Admiral Kilby, my friend
Jim, and I did together, was you need 31 traditional amphibious
ships in the appropriate mix, which is 10 big decks--LHA/LHD
[landing helicopter assault]/[landing helicopter dock]--and 21
LSD [dock landing ship]/LPD [landing platform dock].
The low end of that study is 28, and the difference in
those 3 is that you pass--there is additional risk in arrival
times. Added into that, sir, is 35 light amphibious warships.
And that includes, sir, that is based on a single MEB, Marine
expeditionary brigade, forcible entry.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Smith. And our expeditionary units that are out
always, and our forward-deployed naval force in Japan.
Mr. Wittman. Last question. Do you believe that it is
essential and critical that the contract for the one LHD and
the three LPDs be executed? And if it is not, do you believe
that creates unacceptable risk for the Marine Corps?
General Smith. Sir, I do believe that the multiship is a
good thing. It saves dollars and it ensures that those
amphibious ships, which in the case of the big deck amphibs,
sir, are strategic assets, are available for the combatant
commander. Otherwise, sir, we are passing risk on to the
combatant commanders.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
Now up next is Mr. Langevin, who is joining us from Rhode
Island.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me
okay?
Mr. Courtney. Loud and clear.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today and
for your service to our Nation.
I will start with this for Mr. Stefany.
So a Navy memo recently revealed that the Navy may have to
choose between funding a new destroyer, attack submarine, or
fighter jet in the future.
Mr. Stefany, how would funding the Columbia-class submarine
through the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund improve that
situation?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
The short answer is, if the funding came out of the Navy
and had to go into that fund, then it doesn't change anything.
But if it was a separate funding source that would go into that
National Sea-Based Fund, then, obviously, we would have more
resources in the Navy to fund those three major upgrade
programs that we need to do for the warfighters.
Mr. Langevin. I certainly think that is the direction we
need to go, and I agree not taking it just out of the Navy, it
is got to be new money.
Admiral Kilby, so we are looking for ways to boost our
missile launching capability on ships. Considering the railgun
can deepen a ship's magazine and allow the Navy to shift more
resources to offense, has the Navy considered how the railgun
can help with this problem?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. We have worked mightily since 2005
to bring the railgun to fruition. So far it has not proved to
be what we want to continue to invest in.
There is a challenge technologically there. It certainly
has great promise if we could close the fire control loop in a
meaningful way and use it as an anti-ship missile defense
piece. That is complex right now, and we don't believe there is
a path to do that now.
Certainly, the concept of an electromagnetic railgun is
very virtuous because it allows me at a cheaper level to do as
you suggest, reserve my VLS launching capacity with my high-end
missiles for offense and I can defend my ship with a cheaper,
more renewable magazine.
But there are a couple of complex technological things I
have to do, other than close the fire control loop, and that is
satisfy and solve the energy storage problem, as well as the
barrel wear on the electromagnetic railgun, to make it an
enduring capability for our ships.
Mr. Langevin. Well, I will just point out that I think that
some of the alternatives that you are considering are just as
challenging and costly as well. I think it is a mistake to be
abandoning railgun.
Admiral Kilby, using currently available air defense
weapons, how well could Navy ships defend against a large
number of missiles and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]? And
what side has the cost advantage?
Admiral Kilby. Right now, sir, because of the way the
threat is advancing, we have to use very expensive missiles
like the SM [Standard Missile]-6, and we are developing an SM-2
Block III Charlie, which is an active seeker, SM-6-like, that
is required for those advanced threats. So that is an expensive
way to attrite the adversary.
The CNO, in his CNO NAVPLAN [Navigation Plan], charged us
to get after directed energy in particular--I call that
[inaudible] defense for that ship--so I can better and with
more confidence defend that ship and reserve that magazine for
other things.
But there are challenges, as you point out, with directed
energy, and we have got to work our way through those
challenges to have a laser with enough power to provide anti-
ship cruise missile defense, as well as electronic warfare and
point defense systems.
So it is a family of systems to create this capability you
suggest to build confidence and not use those high-end weapons.
But we are at the wrong end of the cost curve with our most
expensive weapons, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Agreed.
Before my time runs out, Mr. Stefany, your written
testimony mentions that the Navy is investing in cyber
protection in this PB [President's budget]. But it looks like
the major cyber accounts have relatively flat funding. Where
are you making these investments?
Mr. Stefany. Sir, I will need to get the specific line
items back to you. But it is really in the process of
certifying what we call the CMMC [Cybersecurity Maturity Model
Certification] process and investing in our industrial base
with them and getting them certified to be able to meet our
cyber requirements.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. I would ask for a written, more
detailed response because I am not seeing it.
Mr. Stefany. Yeah. Happy to do that, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Langevin. I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Jim.
Next up is Mr. Gallagher from Wisconsin.
Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Kilby, the budget plans to reduce
Navy Active and Reserve end strength by 2,529 sailors, if I am
correct. That is a big reduction in a short period of time.
What is the plan for end strength over the FYDP?
Admiral Kilby. So I think we pace our end strength with our
platform requirement, sir. So that is a manning generation to
drive that. So in general we are, I think, going to see a
slight increase, but right now it is level based on what you
laid out here and the demand signal for those sailors.
But we need to invest in the pipe to make those sailors, so
if we can, in fact, grow our Navy, we can receive those sailors
and train them and send them to our ships. So there is a cost
to do that as well, and I think we are in a position to do
that.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, just so I understand this whole FYDP
situation, Mr. Stefany, did you suggest you are not going to
give us a FYDP at all or just for the time being?
Mr. Stefany. The direction we have for 2022 is not at all.
The first FYDP will be with the 2023 budget that will come over
in the February timeframe.
Mr. Gallagher. How does that work, though? I mean, if we
passed a law in 1989, when I was 5 years old, that says you
have to provide us with a FYDP, and then you don't provide us
with a FYDP, you are saying the direction you have been given
is to break the law and not provide a FYDP. It just seems like
an odd thing.
Mr. Stefany. I guess I can't answer the logic. It came down
to us that way, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, I would hope--I mean, if nothing else,
please go back to the building and suggest it would be nice if
we got a FYDP as quickly as possible. It would help us analyze
a lot of these things, I think. But I will move on from the
FYDP, ``F up,'' as it were, and move on to the frigate.
You mentioned the frigate in your comments. I think we all
want it delivered on time and on budget. I understand the need
for combat systems changes, but given that the plan was a
proven design, I asked the same question of the CNO: Will you
commit to, in your capacity, minimizing changes to existing
hull and machinery on that platform?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, absolutely, sir. That is part of the
acquisition strategy, minimize change--actually eliminate
change--if we can, and deliver 10 ships. The 10 ships in our
contract are all identical, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. And then I will just go across the board
here.
Former INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] Commander
Admiral Davidson suggested in open testimony to Congress
recently that he is concerned about a potential PLA [People's
Liberation Army] invasion of Taiwan within the next 6 years. So
not in 20 years, not in 10 years, but within the next 6 years.
I will just start with Admiral Kilby and go sort of from
left to right, my left to right.
Do you share Admiral Davidson's concern?
Admiral Kilby. I do share his concern. But I am also
looking towards the future, because I don't have a crystal ball
and I don't know when that conflict is going to occur.
So I want to transition the force, I want to invest in
technologies that are going to pace the adversary and have a
capable Navy going forward, which requires some research and
development now in order to match what we are seeing from an
intelligence perspective.
Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Stefany.
Mr. Stefany. Yes. As soon as 6 years? Certainly agree with
that and share that view.
And to Admiral Kilby's point, we have to find that sweet
spot of investing and making sure that our current fleet will
still be very viable 5, 6, 7 years from now, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. And General Smith.
General Smith. Sir, I agree with that assessment. But I
would also add our job is to fight tonight.
Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
General Smith. Or tomorrow morning. So I am always looking
as if tomorrow morning is the fight.
Mr. Gallagher. Well, I think the concern here is that the
Davidson window is closing. Every day we sort of punt on
fielding a deterrence by denial posture, in the first island
chain in particular, but in INDOPACOM more generally, is a day
where we lose time and where the PLA, and the PLA Navy [PLAN]
in particular, gain an advantage.
So I just would encourage you in communicating with us to--
I mean, let's figure out how we can operate on a 2025 timeline,
not a 2045 timeline going forward.
FYDP is a 5-year defense plan, the acronym, if I am
remembering correctly. Another thing the FYDP would help with
is planning on a 5-year time horizon.
So thank you. I yield my 15 seconds.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
I would just note that these statutory requirements for
multiyear plans, sometimes they are more honored in the breach
than in the observance.
The first year of the last administration, we ran into the
same absence of a FYDP. And as the nuns who taught me said, two
wrongs don't make a right. I think it is really--particularly
when we are talking about transition type of plans, is that you
have got to have more than a 1-year set of headlights.
And so hopefully maybe we can follow up, as we did last
year, in terms of the absence of a 30-year plan to really just
say there is a reason why that is in law and that it is really
to help everybody.
So, in any case, with that little speech, I will now yield
to Mr. Golden.
Mr. Golden. Thank you.
This past December, Congress passed the fiscal year 2021
NDAA, which included section 21, I know you are familiar with,
which says that the Secretary of the Navy may not deviate from
the large surface combatant requirements, including the 2016
Navy Force Structure Assessment, until the Secretary certifies
in writing that the Navy can mitigate the reduction in multi-
mission large surface combatant requirements, including anti-
air and ballistic missile defense capabilities, due to having a
reduced number of DDG-51 destroyers with the advanced SPY-6
[radar].
It also requires a report on the detrimental impacts to the
large surface combatant industrial base and a plan to mitigate
such impacts if the fiscal year 2021 Future Years Defense
Program is implemented as proposed, a review of the benefits to
the Navy fleet of the SPY-6 radar aboard the DDG Flight III, as
well as an analysis of impacts to the warfighting capabilities
of the fleet should the number of such destroyers be reduced.
I have your certification here, sir. You provide the
certification without any explanation whatsoever on how the
Navy will mitigate the impact of the reduction to anti-air and
ballistic missile defense capabilities. It is almost as if it
is a cut-and-paste of the certification requirement from the
bill itself under a new award document with a signature at the
end.
In the accompanying report, the Navy says it does not
foresee negative impacts to the large surface combatant
industrial base.
I am telling you today that it will have a negative impact.
You mentioned the backlog. Any backlog at Bath Iron Works
was on its way to being gone until a very recent COVID outbreak
at the yard earlier this year. You know our shipbuilders have
been building ships for the Navy during this pandemic, putting
themselves at risk, and they are proud to do that for our
Nation's sailors. They are proud of our sailors.
Bath Iron Works will be on pace to produce two DDG-51
Flight III per year by the end of this year. This backlog
referenced to justify this reduction won't even exist by the
end of this Congress.
BIW has been hiring thousands of young shipbuilders each
year because the Navy has been driving them to hit the 2-year
mark. So this cut looks like you have been driving them towards
a cliff that leads to layoffs, about 500 layoffs, and that is a
negative impact.
You did discuss the benefit of the SPY-6 coming online. In
regards to providing an analysis of impacts to the warfighting
capability of the fleet should the number of destroyers be
reduced, you didn't address it.
The most recent defense appropriation noted that the
committee believes that the lack of a predictable, stable
acquisition strategy for large surface combatants undercuts
naval maritime superiority and injects risk into the industrial
base.
The committee provided an additional advanced procurement
amount for an additional DDG Flight III destroyer in fiscal
year 2022. Collectively, these provisions communicated
congressional intent that the Navy reverse its negative
procurement trend of the DDG Flight III and strongly
recommended a three-ship procurement in this fiscal year.
Last December, the Navy gave us a late shipbuilding plan,
saying it would procure two DDG-51 Flight IIIs in fiscal year
2022. The ink is barely dry on the paper and we have received
this budget request for just one.
We can't even count on 6 months of consistency, one of
several reasons why Congress is concerned about the
shipbuilding industrial base and our naval superiority.
This proposed budget puts the large surface combatant
workforce at risk at a time when we should be developing it to
fill the gap of a bathtub effect caused by prior boom and bust
budgets. This puts the future DDG(X) [Next Generation Guided-
Missile Destroyer] workforce at risk and will have a negative
impact on the ability of the Navy to deliver capabilities
necessary to meet its operational needs by the end of this
decade.
I think that this is a failure bearing national security
implications.
Admiral Kilby, the Navy recommends the decommissioning of
the Ticonderoga cruisers while simultaneously slowing and
reducing the acquisition of the DDG-51 Flight III with its new
combat system, SPY-6 radar, and the ability to house and
perform the role of air and missile defense at a higher level.
Your first Flight III with the SPY-6 radar arrives in 2025.
You are cutting a ship to be delivered in 2027. The math is
concerning.
How can we afford such an early reduction of this new radar
capability on the Flight III?
Admiral Kilby. Sir, the decision to not procure the Flight
III is an affordability decision. It is not anything else. It
is a high regret for the Navy. As indicated, it is number one
on our UPL. The benefits of an AMDR [Air and Missile Defense
Radar] are undeniable, as I tried to lay out in an earlier
response. We have to have that radar.
Mr. Golden. Thank you, I agree.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Jared.
Next up is Mr. Carl. The floor is yours.
Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ranking Member Wittman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for coming back and sharing your
thoughts and your wisdom with us. I learn so much in these
meetings. As a freshman, that is important.
Vice Admiral, this committee has heard all about the impact
of the Chinese soft power, as it is referred to, going around
the world, especially in South America in our own backyard.
Now we see the Chinese with a COVID vaccine which is not
reliable but being distributed through the region.
Thankfully, our government, we have agreed to donate
roughly 500 million doses to countries around the world.
Now, the two medical ships that we have that we rely most
on are the, if I have this correct--correct me if I am wrong--
is USNS [U.S. Naval Ship] Mercy and Comfort, and we spend about
$100 million a year just in maintenance on those two. And I
also understand that they are converted oil tankers. Is that
correct?
Admiral Kilby. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Carl. And they are extremely slow, extremely slow.
My question to you, sir, is this. Could a smaller, faster,
more agile medical ship be used by the Navy to help distribute
this vaccine this very day and combat these Chinese soft powers
that are taking place around the world?
Admiral Kilby. Thanks for the question, sir.
So in previous committees we have talked about increasing
our logistical base for our ships to support distributed
maritime operations, which is our operating concept. And at a
high level, that means I am going to distribute my force more
than I have in the past in order to create dilemmas for our
adversaries.
Incumbent on that is increasing our ability to handle our
ships if we take damage. So one of those concepts is this thing
called Role 2 care, and we are working to instantiate it on an
EPF [expeditionary fast transport] platform, and that wouldn't
have all the capability of Mercy or Comfort, which is Role 3
care, but it would be able to extract a higher density or
number of casualties should we need to, and that includes
sailors and Marines.
So to me, we are going to need to increase our ability to
do that from a force design perspective and look at replacing
the Mercy and Comfort with another surrogate capability
potentially that could provide that Role 3 care in the future.
Mr. Carl. Could we use it right now down in Central and
South America getting in and out of the shallow waters?
Admiral Kilby. I believe we could, sir.
Mr. Carl. Thank you.
I yield my time back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Carl.
Next up is Mrs. Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
And I am going to make a slight change today. I am actually
going to focus on the Marine Corps first and have a question,
General, about the expeditionary advanced base operations, the
EABO.
I am very intrigued by this concept and where the concept
came from. Could you provide some insight? Was this a
capability that USINDOPACOM requested? In other words, did
INDOPACOM say, ``We need to come up with an island-hopping
strategy to achieve the following goals''? Did it come from the
Joint Staff? Was it generated from a bright young officer
within the Marine Corps?
Can you give me a little bit of background on how you
developed this strategy?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am, I can. It is actually a little
bit of all of the above.
INDOPACOM clearly has indicated they need the ability to--
well, it started truly with our distributed maritime
operations.
If you are going to enable our fleet commanders and do sea
denial--which is what we do, that is who we are as a naval
force--that is a piece of it. How do you contest the sea from
the shore? That is one of the genesis or part of the genesis.
INDOPACOM clearly has a need for us to do distributed
maritime operations. And I can tell you that EABO,
expeditionary advanced base operations, was going on--General
Berger has emphasized it--it was going on even before.
When General Berger was in my seat and I was in III MEF
[Marine Expeditionary Force], we were doing long-range raids,
long-range seizures of terrain for a short period of time to
refuel F-35Bs and do strike. We were doing that under a guy
named Colonel ``Bams'' Brodie, an F-18 pilot, who was the 31st
MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] commander back 4 years ago.
So it is a combination of all of the above, ma'am.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you for that insight.
And did you establish a timeframe, like, ``We want to
achieve this capability by a certain time and on a certain
scale''?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am. What we know is that the
Commandant's direction to me is that by 2023 I have to provide
an initial operating capability to Lieutenant General Steven
Rudder, who is the commander of Marine Forces Pacific, all
stop. By 2023 that initial capability is in his hands or I have
failed.
Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
And so to me it sounds like you developed a strategy, and
from that strategy you then came up with requirements--these
are the things the Marine Corps would need in order to
accomplish that and with the timeline. And out of that
ultimately resulted in the request in the budget that we are
seeing because your request reflects the things that will allow
you to achieve this strategy and this new type of operations.
Would you say that that is correct?
General Smith. Ma'am, correct statement; concept, and then
you get down to the specifics of specific requirements to meet
that concept which supports that strategy, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, I appreciate you clarifying that.
And I know that we are going to do a second round, so I
might not get through the next part in this first round. But,
Admiral Kilby, I was going to shift to you.
Just to start the scene setter here, in 2005 the PLAN had
216 ships to our 291, so that was an advantage of 75. Fast
forward to 2020, they have 333 ships to our 296. That is an
advantage of 37. So, in fact, that is a swing of 112 ships in
this 4-year period. And people say that China and the PLAN is a
pacing threat. Well, when I hear pacing, I think like a pace
car, we are keeping up with them.
Would you assess, are we keeping up with them today? Is
that still an accurate term, to call them a pacing threat?
Admiral Kilby. They are a pacing threat. I would say
shortly we are not keeping up with them.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
And I wanted to next highlight the fact that another thing
I have said is that I think we lost a generation of
shipbuilding.
In 2007's Navy budget submission you wrote that new
platforms, such as CVN-21 [Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft
carrier], DDG(X), CG(X) [Next Generation Cruiser], LCS
[littoral combat ship], Virginia-class SSN [attack submarine],
LPD-17, LHA(R), and the MPS [maritime prepositioning ship]
family of ships, will comprise our next generation of battle
force ships.
So of those eight classes of ships, half have either been
failures or abandoned. We did not pursue the CG(X). We find
ourselves today with cruisers that are over 30 years in age,
which could severely impact our O&M [operation and maintenance]
budget.
And because the LCS is not fully mission capable and we got
rid of the frigate--we are just now starting to replace the
frigate--the same is also true for the DDG--for the DD(X).
So for the past 20 years, we have lost a generation of
building these surface combatants.
And I think I will dovetail off what Mr. Gallagher said. In
Congress what we want is a plan. And moreover what we want is
to stop overstating and underdelivering. So every budget we
have a plan. Every 30-year shipbuilding plan is, in my
assessment, not really a 30-year shipbuilding plan because
years 1 to 5 are constantly changing.
So I am really running out of time, and I think I will
pause until the next round of questions to continue my next
line.
Mr. Courtney. Actually, if, Admiral, you want to quickly
respond or do you want to reserve on the second round to that?
Admiral Kilby. I acknowledge Rep. Luria's statements. She
is accurate. I feel the force design for the future will set us
up for a better path.
FFG(X) [Next Generation Guided Missile Frigate] is not a
revolutionary ship. It has got all of many common elements that
are on our platforms today. It will have a smaller AMDR radar.
So I think, while I acknowledge what you said about LCS and
the Zumwalt class, we are on a path to not have so many new
technologies on new platforms.
DDG(X) is going to take the combat system from the Flight
III and put it on a ship that has got margin and reserve to
grow into the future. So it is not such a tremendous leap.
I am not trying to ignore what happened in the past. I
acknowledge what you said. But the force designs have more
smaller surface combatants, frigates, which are roughly
equivalent in combat power, not in magazine capability, to a
Flight IIA. It is an important part of distributed maritime
operations. And to create a DDG(X) that has got the reserve to
add some of the things that Representative Langevin intimated I
think is equally important.
Mrs. Luria. Well, Admiral Kilby, thank you for that.
Mr. Courtney. We will continue. We will continue.
Mrs. Luria. Yes. I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Great.
Mr. Brown, the floor is yours.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you
convening this meeting.
I want to thank all of our panelists for presenting and
making yourself available to answer questions.
I, too, want to pick up a little bit on something that Mr.
Gallagher mentioned. He referenced his birth year of 1984. I
just wanted to point out that is the year that I graduated
college. But I also want to acknowledge that since that time he
has far surpassed me in terms of acquiring and accumulating
academic degrees.
So with that out of the way, let me turn to the business at
hand.
So we consistently hear about the rising threats presented
by China and the increasing significance, global significance,
of INDOPACOM. Last year, the U.S. Navy deployed two MQ-4C
Tritons to Guam as part of an early operational capability, and
it is my understanding that initial reports were positive.
My question for you, Admiral Kilby, can you discuss the
benefits that Triton has been providing in its Western Pacific
operations and its alignment to the future maritime
surveillance needs in INDOPACOM more broadly?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
So Triton is providing benefit from an ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] perspective. We want to get
to an increased capability on that platform, which is called
IFC-4 [Integrated Functional Capability-4] or multi-int
[intelligence], and that allows me to do things that I can with
an EP-3 [aircraft] now, in addition to what we are seeing from
the Triton now.
So our budget focuses on delivering that capability, that
multi-int capability, which is some additional SIGINT [signals
intelligence] capabilities and other things which will make
that ship even more capable.
But as we talked about in March at the unmanned campaign
hearing, this development of this hybrid force of which the MQ-
4 is a part of that is building confidence in understanding our
ability to execute these unmanned platforms.
So I think the capability is undeniable. It is beneficial.
And it is especially beneficial in a Phase Zero operation,
where I am trying to maintain SA, or situational awareness, on
greater areas of the ocean.
Mr. Brown. Well, thank you.
Mr. Stefany, given Admiral Kilby's previous statements and
his statement today, and in light of the increasing need for
maritime capabilities, what was the rationale for the break in
Triton production in this budget? And how is the Navy
mitigating potential disruptions to the supply chain?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
So the break in this year's budget was to allow the new
capability that Admiral Kilby mentioned, that IFC-4, to get
fully developed so we can install it in the aircraft coming off
the line at Northrop Grumman, you know, have the new capability
right in those aircraft as they come off the line.
There are 10 aircraft that have been funded, that are under
contract, that are in various stages of being built. And so
taking a pause for a year would allow us to get those aircraft
to have the new capability in them as they come off the line.
As long as we restart in 2023, I do not believe there will
be a large impact on the production line at Northrop Grumman.
So that is part of our 2023 deliberation, is how many and
what kind of profile going forward we will be budgeting for in
2023 and out, sir.
Mr. Brown. And just a quick follow-up.
So I appreciate your assessment that you don't think there
will be a large or major disruption in the supply chain. But it
seems like implicit in what you are saying is that there will
be a disruption.
Is there anything that the Navy has considered, anything
that the Navy is doing to mitigate impacts, albeit small, as
you are suggesting, to the supply chain?
Mr. Stefany. Sir, I do not know the specifics. Our program
manager is working every day with the company on that. But I
can get you some specifics on the lower level things we are
working on in the supply chain for you, sir.
Mr. Brown. Great. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the 23 seconds remaining of
my time.
Mr. Courtney. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
Next up is Ms. Jacobs from California.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you all for being here.
My first question is for Admiral Kilby.
I represent San Diego, and my background is in foreign
policy and national security, so I think our maritime mission
is incredibly important. And I echo my colleagues' calls for a
plan, and I will look forward to reading it when you will
provide it.
But I specifically wanted to follow up on my colleague
Congresswoman Luria's questions around shipbuilding. As she
said, we have seen a lot of delays, we have seen a lot of
failures.
And I am wondering what the larger systemwide problem is
and why shipbuilding has proven so challenging for the Navy,
and, more importantly in my mind, what lessons we have learned
that we can apply to new programs, especially, if they get to
be proven unmanned vessels, which the Navy plans to make a
significant part of the future fleet growth as we move forward
so we don't continue to have these same challenges.
Admiral Kilby. Thanks, ma'am. I will start and I will ask
Secretary Stefany to add on to anything that I don't cover
adequately. Part of the answer--I want to go back to what I
discussed briefly with Rep. Luria is that we make our designs a
little more simple.
Just a quick history lesson. When we created the Aegis-
class cruiser, we used a Spruance-class hull, and we introduced
a new combat system and superstructure on that ship. Shortly
thereafter, we introduced a new hull for the Arleigh Burke
destroyer, which has proven to be remarkably successful, our
most successful shipbuilding plan and shipbuilding class in the
history of the United States Navy. But we didn't change the
combat system. We took the combat system and evolved some
sensors, but we really focused on a new plant, a new ship, a
new hull form. And we are trying to return to that logic, and I
will just dovetail that to Flight III as I discussed. We want
to take the combat system from a Flight III destroyer, and
introduce it into a DDG(X) hull. So I think that will help us
because we are not introducing so many new things at once.
To the frigate program, we are taking a proven hull design,
and we are putting largely government-furnished equipment on
that hull to achieve that capability. So I think those types of
things are more executable perhaps than a new class with an
exquisite new propulsion system and a new combat system.
So I will just ask Secretary Stefany to join in that
conversation. Before I yield, though, we talked in an unmanned
hearing in March about redundancy and simplicity to achieve
something. So, it could be for an unmanned surface vessel, I
increase the number of engines I have to achieve that
reliability as opposed to creating a new propulsion system for
that ship. That might be a more reasonable path for us to
pursue.
Sir.
Mr. Stefany. Thanks, Jim. I appreciate that.
So a couple other items, ma'am. Completing the design,
having it very mature before we start construction. In previous
programs, some of the ones that we have not done well on, we
have started--you know, 20, 30 percent on design and then
moving out. We are trying to get into that 70, 80 percent
complete before we start building. Evolutionary, try to build
off what we already know. Commercial, where we can, use a
commercial product or a commercial design, has really paid off
for us in the past. So those are some of the practices we are
trying to incorporate in the ships--in the unmanned craft as we
go forward
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And just on the unmanned, I
remain concerned about the COLREGs [Collision Regulations], but
we can go into that at another time.
I will turn quickly to General Smith. I, earlier this week,
talked with Sergeant Major Black and asked him about force
design. I know we have gone over it a lot already in this
hearing, but I wanted to ask, in particular, how the Marine
Corps plans to navigate the fact that we need to be able to
project force now with the fact that we need to be able to face
challenges in the Pacific area in the future and how you are
balancing those real and ongoing current threats with the
future investments that we need to make?
General Smith. Yes, ma'am. Very briefly, I would echo what
my shipmate, Jim Kilby, said earlier that there is near-term
risk that we are investing in some longer-term capabilities
that we must have against a pacing threat we don't have now. In
order to generate the resources for that, we divest of things
that we cannot get to the fight immediately. So in all candor,
ma'am, what happens is, you have to have those Marine
expeditionary units. That is your fight tonight forward-
deployed force. The ARG MEUs, the amphibious ready groups,
Marine expeditionary units that are forward deployed, those
three-ship units that are out there. Navy-Marine teams ready to
do humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and to strike if
required.
That is your mitigation factor, and in all candor, it is
done on the back of a bunch of young lance corporals and a
bunch of young sailors. That is who is absorbing the risk right
now until we get where we have to go.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And in my last 2 seconds, I will
just say that my office and I remain concerned about the cuts
to the naval audit unit that I know came up in the full
committee hearing, but Mr. Chair, I will yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Ms. Jacobs. So now we
have completed the first run-through. We are going to do a
second round. And, again, thank you to the witnesses for your
patience.
Mr. Stefany, just to sort of follow up the question and
maybe Admiral Kilby you can join in in terms of how we sort of
overcome the problems of the past, which, again, I think
everyone is being very upfront and, you know, no one is trying
to deny that there has been issues in the past.
I mean, I would say one of the most impressive examples of
lessons learned is the Columbia program, you know. As of last
year, the design completion was over 85 percent and, I mean,
they are cutting steel, and they are starting to do prototypes,
but in terms of, you know, when full production begins,
comparing Columbia to the last SSBN program, the Ohio, the
design completion was about 20 percent.
Again, I live in Connecticut. I talk to the folks in the
yard. I hear the stories. I mean, they had major problems back
then. And we, again, I think are in a much better place with
the design completion, again, as we are on the eve of
construction. We have also--there are some new technologies in
the Columbia. There is going to be a life-of-ship reactor,
which is going to mean no refuelings for this program, which is
a real cost saver for the taxpayer, and more efficiency that is
going to be included with that and there is an electric
propulsor system, which is new.
On the other hand, there is a lot of lessons learned from
Virginia which are being incorporated into Columbia. So we are
not reinventing the wheel in terms of every aspect of the
submarine. I don't know if you wanted to just sort of talk
about that because I do think--frankly, we have to do this. The
timing for replacement of Ohio is knife edge, and the cost
requires us to pursue every efficiency possible.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. Couple of points. Columbia, our goal
was 83 percent design complete before we started construction,
and you point out we had 85 percent, right, so we had a goal
that we had never actually achieved before, and we exceeded it,
and put the effort in in Columbia to make sure that we held
that till we started building the ship.
Some of the prototyping, some of the unique features to
make the ships more affordable in the overall life, we actually
prototyped--construction prototyped those before we actually
put them into the design of the ship itself. So I think that
will pay off going forward.
Some of the things like--like you mentioned Virginia, sir,
one of the things we did learn is we had some life-of-the-ship
components that we did not test beforehand and we are finding
out they aren't really lasting the life of those Virginia
submarines. So we are actually proving out that our--if we have
a new idea, or a new way of sustaining the vessel, that we want
to prove it out first. So those are some key things.
To Rep. Gallagher, don't change anything once we start.
That is another key to Columbia. We are holding tight and not
making changes now that we have started construction. So those
are just some of the major lessons we have learned to not
repeat past sins, so to speak, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Great. And I would note that this
subcommittee participated in this process when we created the
National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund [NSBDF], which, again, much
to our exasperation, has not been fully embraced by the
Pentagon. Nonetheless, the multiyear authorities which NSBDF
includes, again, I think, we have seen from both Congressional
Budget Office and CRS [Congressional Research Service],
impressive feedback about efficiencies in savings that those
authorities have allowed.
And it is my understanding we are going to, maybe, take up
some more this year in the budget to, again, keep the good
momentum moving forward. Is that correct?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. We absolutely appreciate those
authorities. It does--administratively, getting the money into
the fund is a problem, but once it is in there, we are taking
advantage of those authorities. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney. Well, we are on standby to help move that and
fix that issue. Real quick on sealift, you know, the budget
talked a bit about sort of opportunities for more used vessels
that can help deal with what I think everyone on this
subcommittee agrees is, you know, a concerning aging fleet that
is out there right now. You know, we have not gotten actually
that analysis, and I really would ask that the Navy, please,
share us with that.
I would also note that, you know, again, this subcommittee
sort of led the way in terms of the National Security Multi-
Mission Vessel construction program, which is now happening in
Philadelphia, which is using sort of a different contracting
model, which we think is going to be a real potential exciting
opportunity to, again, fix some of the problems that Mrs. Luria
talked about in terms of, you know, just the clunkiness of our
acquisition programs, and I see that as transferable to
sealift.
So can you talk about what is the Navy's view of new-build
sealift?
Mr. Stefany. So I will start with that last point first and
work backwards, sir. I was actually with the Shipbuilders
Council of America yesterday and talked about that very point
of can we buy ships like a commercial company would buy ships
and not buy through the normal FAR [Federal Acquisition
Regulation]-type regulations. That would streamline the
process, save a lot of money, and if it is a commercial ship
anyway, which is what sealift would be, why not do that?
So I am committed to at least look in and see if that is a
possibility for whatever new we buy. As far as the used, we are
buying, as you are aware, two from last year and then this
year's budget proposes five more used ships for the Ready
Reserve Force, and we will be using--we are using that same
concept for buying those through the Maritime Administration
that, of course, they used to buy the ships you are talking
about up in Philly shipyard. So that having a commercial entity
go out and buy those used ships and convert them to U.S.
standards and then deliver them back to us.
As far as the overall study, I will have to ask Admiral
Kilby to let you know where that analysis is, sir.
Admiral Kilby. Yeah. We will just take that for action to
get you that report, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Admiral Kilby, I want to go to you, and today is the
anniversary of the collision involving USS Fitzgerald and the
loss of seven sailors. And it still continues to haunt me today
where there was lack of leadership on the part of a number of
folks in Navy leadership, on folks in the surface warfare
community. And I still don't believe that we are at the point
where we have adequately addressed all of the issues that were
identified with that.
In fact, I want to go to the GAO [Government Accountability
Office] report that came out earlier this month where they
said, their words, it said: Sailors are not receiving adequate
sleep. And they further stated: Sailors' fatigue poses a
considerable risk to the safe and effective operation of Navy
ships.
In fact, just today, the GAO issued a report that said: By
a factor of four to one, SWOs [surface warfare officers]
believe specialized career paths would better prepare them for
their duties than the current generalist path. The SWO
community is screaming for change.
Tell me, what is the Navy going to do in relation to those
calls and the continued need, I believe, to address issues
within the surface warfare community?
Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. First off, we all share your
feelings about Fitzgerald and McCain. I was in Hawaii coming
back from deployment when ships that were left behind for my
strike group were called to support Fitzgerald. We have done a
lot of work, we feel, to professionalize and increase our
mariner skill training. Some of those investments are still
underway in Norfolk and San Diego, and will prove to be
sufficient.
I think the initial data that we are seeing for our
training is proving to be sufficient as far as JOOD [junior
officer of the deck] training and OOD [officer of the deck]
training. And that goes all the way up to the chain of command
where there are sailors, or officers, who previously had
screened for a command, did not make it through the
shiphandling trainer, and were removed from the command bank.
So to me those are all significant, positive steps.
I can't speak for the study, but I just can tell you on my
personal experience, I have never been in the same department
twice--engineering, combat systems, operations. So I have
worked in every department except supply. And in the balance,
my own personal opinion for me is, it prepared me to be a
better commanding officer. Now, I am not saying that is the
answer; I am just telling you that is my experience.
So we will have to go review the proposal here and
understand the impact on our training and our system, but I
wanted to share my own personal anecdote, because when I was
initial commanding officer, that is new to me. I am new to
being the captain. And when people are coming and making
reports, I had some context because I had worked in those
departments and I thought it prepared me better. So I think
that is probably on the other side of the ledger from the
proposals here.
I don't understand, or I don't have experience in exposure
to the data that says a factor of four to one says that we
should be specialists. So I need to take a look up on that and
come back to you.
Mr. Wittman. I think that is incredibly important. I think
there are a whole litany of issues that need to be addressed--
career path, retention, very specifically female SWO officer
retention. Also, reciprocity as far as SWO training and what it
can relate to as somebody separates or retires, especially SCTW
[Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers] certification, so somebody can go into the merchant
mariner realm. And when we talk about the Ready Reserve fleet,
you know, one of the issues is not just ships; it is mariners
to run those ships. I think all those things are critically
important to consider.
Secretary Stefany, can you tell me, what is the penalty
associated with not entering into a production contract for the
second destroyer in fiscal year 2022?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. The contract, multiyear contract we
have in place has a penalty of $33 million in either contracts,
whether it is Bath or Ingalls, it would be a $33 million
penalty for what we call breaking that multiyear contract, sir.
Mr. Wittman. So not only will we be I think damaging the
workforce as Mr. Golden pointed out, but also we will be
suffering a penalty, a monetary penalty, where those dollars
could be used, I think, in a much, much better way rather than
paying a penalty.
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this on the amphibious ship buy.
What is the anticipated savings by executing the block buy with
the LHD and the three LPDs?
Mr. Stefany. So we just recently finished negotiations with
the shipyard Ingalls and the saving is about 7.1 percent, or
around $700 million, sir.
Mr. Wittman. One last question. The Commandant has
suggested a light amphibious warfare ship to provide the
opportunity for the Marine Corps to execute the Commandant's
Planning Guidance and what he wants is a smaller ship,
something that can move around. The debate has always been
should it be built to a military standard, should it be built
to a commercial ship standard?
Can you tell me what does the Navy believe about this? Do
you believe it should be built to a combat ship standard or a
commercial ship standard?
Mr. Stefany. Sir, is that question for me?
Mr. Wittman. Yeah. I want you and then Lieutenant General
Smith and Vice Admiral Kilby.
Mr. Stefany. Okay. I believe the other point the Commandant
wanted was an affordable ship as well, so I think a commercial
standards with specific Navy features is the way we need to go
for this ship, and what those features are needs to be worked
out with the Marine Corps.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
General Smith.
General Smith. Sir, very briefly, Admiral Kilby and I sit
on the requirements evaluation team for that [inaudible]. So we
are in lockstep. There is zero daylight between Jim and myself
on that. It needs to be something that is, as Secretary Stefany
said, affordable, so we can get it in numbers, and it has to be
something that looks like everything else that is out there.
You need to protect the cargo, meaning the Marines and the
sailors that are on it for a limited period of time in order to
be able to evacuate them.
That is the purpose of that ship. I know that is not a
loved sentiment, but that cargo is precious to us, so it has to
go off, but it has to be affordable in large numbers, sir, and
it has to look like everything else. And I would pass to my
shipmate.
Admiral Kilby. I am in agreement with Eric. My
recollection, sir, may be imperfect here is that the law was
born from the INFSA [Integrated Naval Force Structure
Assessment] study the Navy and the Marine Corps did when we
were responding to force design, which was acknowledgement that
we needed a different platform to support the EAB
[expeditionary advanced base] concept.
So--but Eric's right. We have been lockstep on this. My
analogy, though trite, is if I am buying F-150 truck, I want to
buy a custom truck; I don't want to buy an Eddie Bauer truck.
Because if I take the Eddie Bauer off road, I might damage it,
but the custom is built to do that and that is what I wanted--
how I want to treat this amphibious warship, because I need to
support those Marines.
Similarly, I need to look at survivability, which could be
let's make sure that that ship if, regrettably, if it takes
damage, I can get the most important cargo off that ship, which
is the Marines and sailors that are on it.
So that is all going into the mix, as well as what does
that ship look like. So there is a lot of conversation now as
Eric and I get together with the Marine and Navy team to kind
of refine the top-level requirements to understand what we need
the ship to do.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Vice Admiral Kilby.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
Next up is Mr. Golden.
Mr. Golden. Thank you. I guess I will give this one to both
of you, and bear with me because I am kind of thinking it
through. You know, up at Bath Iron Works, I have spent a lot of
time up there getting to know the workers, touring that yard,
and learning about the past several years.
One of the difficulties I think up there has been the DDG-
1000 [Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer], which I know you
are very familiar with. They put a lot of work into changing
the way they did things, changing the way they built things,
reorganizing the yard, learning some new skills or how to do
them a little bit differently, and even acquiring new tools to
do the work with.
They devoted a big part of their experienced workforce to
that while hiring younger guys who were kind of staying on the
Flight like IIA, and then all of a sudden the whole thing gets
a big change package on them and disrupts the whole thing, and
now they got to move these guys back. They got to reorganize
their yard again. Really threw them for a loop and all over a
weapon system, essentially, that hasn't--we don't have one or,
therefore, a mission set with the Zumwalt.
I see that the Navy now has an acquisition out to try and
get a hypersonic on these ships, and I assume that the Navy is
finding that they bring some unique capabilities, some good
capabilities.
So, one, how are we going to get something good out of
these three Zumwalts? But secondly, what are you going to learn
from it as you think about the DDG(X) and talking about the
DDG(X)? Why don't you feel like you already have a hull?
Perhaps the deck is a problem. You can scrap that. You got a
big hull that you can pack a lot of power into. You have got an
integrated power system and you are looking at putting
hypersonics on it.
How can we ensure that this doesn't happen again, so that
when you do make the move to the DDG(X), we don't see this kind
of back and forth, but, rather, get a successful change?
Admiral Kilby. So I will start and then ask Secretary
Stefany to come in. One, an important point is, this
introduction of CPS [Conventional Prompt Strike] on DDG-1000,
right, that ship has the capacity to allow us to introduce that
weapon system, and not only that, its design of the launching
system is virtually the same as the Virginia-class submarine.
So we will get a benefit by installing that on DDG-1000, a two-
fold benefit.
One, we will take that ship that, as you point out, was
designed with another weapon system that didn't prove to be
fruitful for us, and we are repurposing it for an effect that I
think is significant, especially in the Pacific AOR [area of
responsibility]. And, we will reduce risk on our way to install
that capability on the Virginia class. So I think that is,
first and foremost, important to get all we can out of those
ships.
Second point, we are doing a lot of work and have been
doing a lot of work at Carderock, and some of the staff members
have been exposed to that work, and DDG-1000 hulls or variants
of those hulls are in the mix to make sure we get the right
hull form to do what we need to do.
As you point out, Rep. Golden, one of the key tenets is
this integrated power system, which will allow us to install
some of the weapon systems Rep. Langevin referred to, right? So
I am now having not an electrical distribution system and a
propulsion system, but a single system that gives me margin to
do that in the future.
So I don't think it is all gone away. I think that is all
in the mix and we are considering all those options.
So, Secretary Stefany.
Mr. Stefany. On DDG-1000, I will point out that that ship
was a whole new hull form, a whole new propulsion plant, and
had 10 technologies that we had never done before that were
being brought into that ship. So the lesson learned from there
is, as Admiral Kilby has mentioned before for DDG(X) or
whatever comes after DDG-51, we will not put them all in one,
not have a new hull form or new propulsion plant and a whole
new combat system all at once, but we will evolve and keep, at
least initially for the first few hulls, the combat system the
same and then evolve to the new combat system needs of the
future that the current DDG-51 just can't accommodate because
of power. And, so, a stepped approach is how we are, I believe,
we are going to keep the cost and the risk within----
Mr. Golden. Let me just say, we're proud of the work that
the shipbuilders did, they got it done. You know, I guess, part
of what I am interested in is, what can we do productively
working together, this committee and the Navy and both of the
yards, to figure out in advance what are we going to put on
this thing for weapons systems and make sure that it is a
successful transition? I hope that is a conversation that we
can have.
Mr. Stefany. So I think the best part is to get both
companies with us in the conversation up front on day one and,
I believe, both the companies are now involved and that is the
most important thing for us to do.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Golden.
Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. I think we had a really--for the navalists
on the committee, we have had a really interesting week. And if
I could attempt to summarize, well, at least what I have
learned, it seems like, particularly with the testimony we had
2 days ago and what really came out in Representative Luria's
questioning to the CNO and others was, since at least 2004 we
have been playing this sort of divest-to-invest game, or making
this argument that, well, we are going to buy future capability
even though we can't really make the math work for present
capacity. And so on the committee--and I have only been here 5
years--kind of feel a little bit like, you know, Charlie Brown
and you guys are Lucy with the football and we keep getting it
pulled out from under us and putting all our eggs in the basket
of some sort of future, magical third offset thing is going to
solve all our problems for us. But now we are starting to see
all these signals from the environment, right?
You know, the PLA has a bigger battle force navy than we
have, right? They are being more aggressive. They just had a
historic number of aircraft threaten Taiwan. And now we find
ourselves in what I have called the Davidson window struggling
with this tradeoff between the capacity demands of the present
and sort of the promise of future capability. And I think to
the extent you are hearing frustration on the committee, that
is really it. And if we are operating on a 6-year time
horizon--it is actually not just a matter, Lieutenant General
Smith, of being able to fight now, it is what are we doing now
to deter that fight from happening, to prevent the worst-case
scenario. And it is useful to plan against the Taiwan scenario,
because it is, in some ways, the most dangerous course of
action.
So, recognizing we are not going to solve this problem
right now, and that we are just at the beginning of this
conversation, I would just be curious--and I will pick on the
Marine Corps because I am a Marine--what is the Marine Corps
doing now, today, to deter the PLA from attempting an invasion
of Taiwan? What are we doing to get into the OODA [observe,
orient, decide, act] loop of all the generals and the admirals
and the party officials that are looking at that and thinking,
you know, in a couple weeks, we got the 100th anniversary of
the founding of the party, America seems divided, Russians seem
to have gotten away with invading a country, this might
actually be a pretty good time to test limits. What are we
doing today to deter?
General Smith. Sir, what III MEF, III Marine Expeditionary
Force, Lieutenant General Clardy would tell you is we are out
there every single day with 31st MEU and III Marine
Expeditionary Force. So it's 20,000 Marines west of the date
line, 27,000, give or take, in the Pacific. And to your--
exercising, demonstrating, reassuring allies and partners. To
your point about the divest/invest, I hear you, sir, that----
Mr. Courtney. Is your microphone on?
General Smith. How is that, sir?
Mr. Courtney. That's much better.
General Smith. So, sir, General Clardy and III MEF is
absolutely out there exercising, demonstrating daily, allies
and partners, using those 27,000 Marines in the Pacific, again,
20,000 west of the date line.
To your point, sir, about we have to get there, the things
that we are trying to invest in now, sir, are done; they are
proven. The MQ-9 Reaper with pods on it that enable you to pass
data across the expansive Pacific, done. We own that--two
systems now. The Naval Strike Missile fired off the back of a
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, done; successfully tested in the
last few months. The Organic Precision Fires-Mounted where we
are able to kill moving vehicles, in this hearing I will say in
excess of 80 kilometers, in replacement for the tank, done;
five for five test shots. So those things are available now,
sir. Now, it is just a matter of getting them at scale through
production into the hands of the warfighter.
Mr. Gallagher. How critical would your concept of a light
amphibious warship be to that deterrence by denial posture? How
would it support the Marine littoral regiments?
General Smith. Sure. Vital, sir, because we are, in fact,
the deterrence force along with our forward-deployed naval
partners. We are the conventional deterrent. That light
amphibious warship provides ambiguity for us; i.e., sir, when
there is limited, unambiguous warning from an adversary, those
vessels can go with those assets I just described and get--
because they are beachable--anywhere in 4 days throughout that
region, and now you have to respect those small 75 Marine units
to enable distributed maritime operations. Those things are
vital, sir.
Mr. Gallagher. Yeah. So I guess I will just close by
saying, I understand we have to think long term and we have to
make smart long-term investments, and think about future
capability, but I just think we are--and I am not suggesting I
have the answer, but I think we are going to need to get real
creative real fast in terms of fixing our problem within the
Davidson window, and deterring what could be a disastrous
situation that would completely destroy our deterrent posture
globally, not just in the first island chain, but globally.
I yield back.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
Mrs. Luria.
Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you and I will start by echoing Mr.
Gallagher's sentiment. I have said it many times. I think when
you have a Battle Force 2025, because of this immediate
concern, threat deterrent that we need in the Pacific, and, you
know, very encouraged by the idea of the LAWs [light amphibious
warships]. I think that the idea that we came up with the idea
for a capability that can bring the fight forward, can go after
some of the vulnerabilities of the Chinese in the theater is
very important, and I want to, a little bit in the weeds, go
back to try to understand, again, the genesis of this.
Quite simply, is there a document that was generated? Is
there a process by which PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] and/
or the Joint Staff translated this requirement forward in order
to then lead to the acquisition process and, i.e., the requests
that you have in this budget? How do we do more of this? What
process is there that allows us to quickly operationalize a
concept to actually delivery?
General Smith. Very briefly, because I know your time is
short. Our previous Commandant, General Neller, said this is
what we are going to do. He issued out a document that said,
begin to do this. Our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab issued a
tentative manual for expeditionary advanced base operations.
That is out now for review. Start with this and modify it. But
the demand signal, really, ma'am, does come--nothing in a
formal document, but it comes in our daily interactions with
INDOPACOM through Marine Forces Pacific. It comes through those
headquarters and say that COCOM [combatant command] has
delivered a demand signal, what can you do for me?
Mrs. Luria. So the demand signal through the GFM process,
the global force management process, or future capabilities?
How is the combatant commander, how is Admiral Davidson, now
Admiral Aquilino, communicating to you as the services that are
going to acquire capabilities that are requested through this
budget, how is that being communicated into a process where
that actually results in us buying something new, like the LAWs
in order to help in the theater?
General Smith. That certainly, ma'am, comes through their
prioritized lists of things that they care about, they wish to
have. It also just comes through literally, ma'am, daily
interactions from the service components that are part of
INDOPACOM saying this is what my boss just referenced; rather
than wait on a formal process, I need this. Then the service
chief with his title 10 authority says, this is what I want you
to go look at and we take off looking for that. And in our case
I think we found it.
Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, thank you for that feedback and
perhaps an additional conversation I can continue with your
staff. So I just was, again, thinking about what the combatant
commander wants, needs, demands, and over the course of
preparing for this week's multiple hearings, I noticed in the
2006 budget submission, it was stated that the fleet response
plan construct was going to go from 24 months to 27 months and
out of that, that would generate six carrier strike groups
within 30 days, and two additional carrier strike groups within
60 days. So that would be a six-plus-two construct. And that
was as recent as 2006.
And then the next year, it said six carrier strike groups
in 30 days and one additional CSG [carrier strike group] with
an additional 60 days, so we got to six plus one. And in 2010,
it was just referred to multiple CSGs in the timeline, and at
that point we went from 27 to 32 months. We got to a three plus
two. Now we are at 36 months and it is arguable, you know, what
carrier strike group presence we could generate in the Pacific
within the timeline we would need for the TPFDD [Time Phased
Force Deployment Data].
So we just continue to say that all of these things we are
doing are getting after this problem, but if you just look at
this history, this is 15 years of timeframe where we have
reduced our operating cycle time, we have reduced our
capability to provide our major assets, like carrier strike
groups, on station in the Western Pacific to meet a potential
conflict there.
And so I just thought wrapping this up and wrapping up kind
of a week of Navy hearings, you know, every single time through
this we keep hearing that there are going to be benefits, we
are going to do things, we are going to change things, we are
going to divest to invest, but we never see those benefits
materialize.
In fact, this is 15 years of actually seeing less force
generation possible to deal with this conflict, and no one ever
goes back and says, ``Hey, you said this would fix the problem,
but it didn't.'' So just kind of wanted to wrap up the time I
have today by saying, you know, that that is just what I am
trying to do. I am just trying to point out that, you know,
many courses of time before I or anyone on this dais was here,
it feels as though the Navy has continued to come forward with
these similar claims, and it is not very compelling, this
divest-to-invest strategy.
And I know that my time is expired.
And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Courtney. Actually, I mean, we are really at the tail
end. If any of the witnesses wanted to respond to that, we have
got time.
Admiral Kilby. Yeah. I acknowledge, Rep. Luria, your
points, and all the work you did to lay that out. A couple of
comments. Admiral Davidson, when he was Fleet Forces Command,
really his predecessor, Admiral Gortney, created OFRP
[Optimized Fleet Response Plan], instantiated it, and then
distributed maritime operations, which is a way to get after
this threat. And I would say that the--my view of the Navy is
we have been focused on China since the 2008-2009 timeframe
with the inset--the inception of the DF-21.
So the things that we have invested in, like an SM-6IB,
like a maritime strike Tomahawk, might not be there if we
hadn't had that foresight of several years ago to get after
that so we can deliver those weapons by the 2025, 2026
timeframe, because it takes a long time to make a new weapon
system. And those are significant and really focused on that
adversary. But your point is well taken.
I guess I would harken back to we have got to be--my belief
is, this is a Kilby belief, we've got to be disciplined on the
use of our Navy. So when we do request for forces, and we use
up carriers and extend them, we are dipping into that well and
we are paying--we are using today's resource not husbanding it
tomorrow because we are shortening the maintenance
availabilities, we are compressing things.
So we have to be clear-headed and clear-minded about that
with the assets we have. The goal of this budget was to create
the most impactful force we could within the budget we had. And
so I don't want to come off as viewing cruisers as not
valuable. They are valuable. In the decision process we made to
try to maintain those investments on those capabilities, we had
to make some very hard choices. And in that is the nonfunding
of the DDG--Flight III DDG in 2022.
So I think you bring up a lot of great points, ma'am, and
we have got to continue this understanding of got to fund
Columbia, which is expensive to do it right, to get to all the
performance you laid out, Rep. Courtney. We have got to fund
readiness, because if we don't have a ready force, we don't
have a force. And that includes the maintenance, the training,
the supply, all those elements that make it up.
And then the capabilities are equally important, and then
capacity is also a part of that, because capacity and
capability equal lethality. So it is complex. But I think you
bring up great points, and we, in this budget, try to create
the most impactful mix, the most valuable mix given the
resources we had.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you for that very
thoughtful exchange, but, again, we get the final word when we
do the markup. So we look forward to continuing this
discussion. What is that? To be continued.
Mr. Golden actually made one last request to have a quick
question, I think to Lieutenant General Smith; then I think we
are going to wrap it up here.
Mr. Golden, the floor is yours.
Mr. Golden. Thank you to the chair and ranking member for
graciously entertaining me and to all three of you as well. I
am sure everyone is anxious to get going, and I got to get 3
miles in before I get back to the district.
So I just wanted to talk a little bit more about some of
what you were talking about with Representative Luria, General.
You were talking about sea denial capability as part of this
redesign and I have also heard you and the Commandant talk
about reconnaissance being the eyes and ears, the sensing
capabilities that you are looking to bring forward.
When you think about sea denial capabilities in this
redesign, is that something that you really see as, like, the
reconnaissance, the eyes and the ears in support of sea denial
activities carried out by the Navy, or is that actually also an
offensive capability that you are looking to bring?
General Smith. Sir, it is both.
Mr. Golden. So, for example, seizing a strategically
important shipping lane and locking it down?
General Smith. Sir, absolutely.
Mr. Golden. Containing an adversary inside of a cordoned
area?
General Smith. Yes, sir. And most importantly, sir, as that
inside force who can sense and make sense, because we are
there. We see it with our reconnaissance assets. I can pass
that data back to Navy ships, to passing F-35As. I can pass
that to anyone who has long-range precision fires, and I can
act on it myself with those precision fires that I bring with
me. So it is both of those things, sir.
And, frankly, sir, the deterrent piece, when I am there
with an ally and partner who now understands I have got
capability to deter that adversary in war, probably a little
tighter relationship in peacetime.
Mr. Golden. Yep. Absolutely. Forgive me if I am asking the
wrong question. I don't know that there is a right answer, but
as you think about all of this, would you say that the
cornerstone of your ability to conduct this mission that has
been envisioned is the squad, the platoon, the company, or the
battalion?
General Smith. Not a trite statement, it is the Marine. It
is always the individual Marine. And it is the training and the
recruitment of the right individuals, the training of them, the
fostering, the mentoring, the coaching, the teaching, so that
they will do what you did, sir, in Afghanistan, and go into
harm's way willingly, but it is the individual Marine, sir.
Mr. Golden. So down at the squad level?
General Smith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Golden. Just a few more quick questions. Just wanted to
make sure myself and also the committee and the Appropriations
Committee understand just as you are looking at fiscal year
2023, and that guidance, that requirement you have been given
by the Commandant, I know you won't let him down. What in this
budget is important not just for fiscal year 2023, but for the
next big step that you have to take in this redesign?
General Smith. Sir, the thing that we actually, that we
must have, we have to have the long-range precision fires
because of the long lead time of those missile systems, both
the Naval Strike Missile and the Tomahawks. People down in
Tucson at Raytheon are busting their backsides fighting through
COVID. We cannot--we can't offer time to the adversary. If you
wait till we are finished and then begin to procure, you are
giving them a 2-year gift, and we can't do it.
Mr. Golden. You need funding for it.
So you have talked about the Reaper, the missile, the
precision fires. I know you are looking for mobility, the
amphib ship. Don't give me the Marines make do with less answer
and [inaudible] need to think outside the box, but what is the
next thing that is out there? What keeps you up at night that
you wish you had if we could give you everything?
General Smith. Sir, here is what keeps me up at night, and
I hate to say this, sir, it is not a thing; it is a prospect.
It is the prospect of a humanitarian assistance disaster
relief, for example, happening in that region where I used to
command--Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines--and the first
thing that arrives is a Chinese amphib, not a United States
amphib with Marines and sailors aboard. That is what keeps me
up at night, sir.
Mr. Golden. You want the amphib. I will just say--and we
don't have to work it all out right now, obviously, but I would
be interested to, you know, talk more about it--what keeps me
up at night is I think about the squad or the company out there
or the individual Marine doing a mission like this out on an
island in a strait taking on a pretty big mission. It is comms
[communications]. You know, the infantryman always laughs about
comms. It always goes wrong. It is always the reason why things
don't go according to plan. So do you have the comms capability
on both sides, Navy and Marines, to go out there and carry this
out? Do you have what you need right now? And if you do, have
you tested it out and do you know that it works?
General Smith. We have some, sir, but it is not sufficient
when an adversary--a pacing adversary decides to enter into the
jamming and the deception game. We do have a pretty robust
package, sir, and that is one of the elements of our force
design package. And I will pass to Admiral Kilby. We do have
some pretty robust resilient comms, sir, but they are not
enough against a pacing threat and we are trying to double down
to harden them and to make them more resilient when we are
knocked off of the larger grid so we have a joint force
maritime component command communications network.
And with your forbearance, I would pass to my shipmate for
what the Navy has invested heavily in.
Admiral Kilby. Couple quick comments. One, the value of a
naval service is that we can be mobile, and we can create our
own network from a strike group, or an ESG [expeditionary
strike group], or a SAG [surface action group], if we have an
elevated platform and a comms relay. So that is a value
proposition that we should recognize.
The second piece is this thing called Project Overmatch. So
that is using technology today in a different manner to make
our comms more robust and resilient, and that is a significant
effort for the Navy.
So you will see that burgeoning in 2022, but more robustly
in the future and it is a key to not only the Navy, but the
unmanned portion of the Navy in the future that we get that
right.
Mr. Golden. Thank you, gentlemen. I would just say, please,
think about that, invest in it, and make sure you ask for what
you need. The comms is key.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Mr. Golden. So I
think we have done our two rounds. Again, I want to thank the
witnesses for your patience and look forward to working with
you in the future.
And with no further ado, this subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 17, 2021
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 17, 2021
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 17, 2021
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. I'm very happy with how enthusiastically the Navy has
embraced directed energy in the future with the upcoming Directed
Energy Campaign Plan and future ship classes getting designed to
accommodate the technology. Looking at the current fleet, I saw the
HELIOS on the unfunded priority list. What is the Navy doing to field
directed energy systems today? When will we see a budget that
prioritizes the fielding of high energy lasers in quantities that are
relevant to the fight? Before my time runs out, Mr. Stefany, your
written testimony mentions that the Navy is investing against cyber
protection in this PB, but it looks like the major cyber accounts have
relatively flat funding. Where are you making these investments?
Mr. Stefany. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
[all]