    [House Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 117-47]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES HEARING

                                       ON

                             DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

       FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 JUNE 17, 2021

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    48-533                    WASHINGTON : 2023

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES

                      JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut, Chairman

    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey          SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland           TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
    FILEMON VELA, Texas                  MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin
    JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine, Vice Chair   JIM BANKS, Indiana
    ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia            JACK BERGMAN, Michigan
    SARA JACOBS, California              JERRY L. CARL, Alabama

                  Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
                   David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
                               Sean Falvey, Clerk

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.................     1
    Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces.........     3

                                   WITNESSES

    Stefany, Frederick J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
      Research, Development and Acquisition, Department of the Navy;
      VADM James W. Kilby, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
      Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities, Department of the
      Navy; and LtGen Eric M. Smith, USMC, Commanding General, Marine
      Corps Combat Development Command, and Deputy Commandant for
      Combat Development and Integration, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
      Corps..........................................................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Courtney, Hon. Joe...........................................    41
        Stefany, Frederick J., joint with VADM James W. Kilby and
          LtGen Eric M. Smith........................................    46
        Wittman, Hon. Robert J.......................................    44

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Langevin.................................................    85

    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST FOR SEAPOWER AND
                               PROJECTION FORCES

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
                               Washington, DC, Thursday, June 17, 2021.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:20 a.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Courtney
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
    CONNECTICUT, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION
                                 FORCES

        Mr. Courtney. Good morning.
        The subcommittee is now in session and meets this morning
    to hear testimony from the Department of the Navy on the fiscal
    year 2022 budget.
        We have one member who is joining us remotely, Mr. Langevin
    up in Rhode Island, and I think he knows the drill in terms of
    announcing himself and waiting to ensure that the audio is
    picked up. So I think I am going to skip the ``FedEx''
    statement at the beginning here.
        So before us today to discuss the Navy's request for fiscal
    year 2022, we have three witnesses who are no strangers to our
    subcommittee.
        We welcome you all back this morning.
        Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
    Development and Acquisition, Mr. Jay Stefany; Deputy Chief of
    Naval Operations for Warfighting Requirements and Capabilities,
    Vice Admiral James Kilby; and Commanding General, Marine Corps
    Combat Development Command, Lieutenant General Eric Smith.
        Thank you all again for joining us this morning.
        The 2022 budget for the platforms and capabilities under
    our panel's jurisdiction cover a wide range of priorities on
    and below the seas and will be a critical component of the 2022
    fiscal budget and the National Defense Authorization Act
    [NDAA].
        I think it is always important as we get started to know
    the past in order to understand the present, and I want to take
    a moment to review the journey that we took last year with the
    Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget.
        As the Congressional Research Service [CRS] reported last
    April, the prior administration sent Congress a $19.9 billion
    shipbuilding budget that requested an 18 percent cut from the
    previous year and in its Future Years Defense Plan, the FYDP,
    that accompanied the budget, projected a shipbuilding budget
    for fiscal year 2022 of only $21.1 billion.
        Just to use that as a metric, the budget that was submitted
    this year on May 28, 2021, by the administration, it actually
    is $22.6 billion, which is 7 percent higher than last year's
    budget submission.
        And I share this not as a partisan statement. To the
    contrary, that record is a reminder that this subcommittee last
    year, as in prior years, has been an independent body that even
    with constrained top lines like the one we are wrestling with
    this year has revised Navy budgets.
        That, in fact, is our constitutional duty. Article I,
    section 8, clause 13 clearly states that it is Congress that
    has the authority to provide and maintain a Navy. And last year
    we exercised that power when we rejected the proposed cut of a
    Virginia-class submarine and enacted a final shipbuilding
    budget of $23.2 billion, well above the $19 billion request and
    actually still above this year's request from the
    administration.
        So just like last year, we have a tough job ahead of us.
    This budget has some positive elements, and it has some issues
    that we have to solve.
        As I told the Acting Secretary of the Navy and CNO [Chief
    of Naval Operations] 2 days ago, the absence of a Future Years
    Defense Plan and a 30-year shipbuilding plan adds a higher
    degree of difficulty to our work.
        And in the absence of those multiyear documents, I want to
    say to our witnesses at the outset today that my colleagues and
    staff expect and know we will receive clear testimony and
    follow-up answers to questions, which will be many, in the
    compressed schedule that we face.
        Shipbuilding and ship maintenance, as we all know, is a
    long game, and the decisions we make today will have longer
    lasting consequences than many other parts of the Defense
    Department's budget.
        As I said, there are some positive elements in the budget
    submission. In contrast to recent budgets over the last few
    years, the Navy's budget plan strongly supports our undersea
    fleet. The budget before us includes stable, two-per-year
    production cadence for the Virginia-class submarine program and
    continued investment in the Navy's number one acquisition
    program--namely, the Columbia-class ballistic submarine
    program--and also long overdue private sector submarine
    maintenance projects.
        Together, this budget makes the strongest investment in the
    stability and growth of our undersea capabilities and
    industrial base since the 1980s.
        As Admiral Gilday forcefully testified on Tuesday this
    week, our undersea advantage over both China and Russia is our
    most powerful tool of deterrence, and we cannot let the size of
    that fleet falter. This budget accomplishes that goal.
        That said, I remain concerned about some other specific
    changes and trade-offs reflected in the budget. Once again, our
    panel is tasked with making sense of an unexpected cut in
    steady rate production of the DDG-51-class destroyer program. I
    am deeply concerned that sudden course change will disrupt the
    stability of the industrial base, undermines confidence in
    multiyear procurement agreements, and threatens our ability to
    meet our defense strategy.
        At the same time, the budget proposes an increase in ship
    retirements, nearly double the number of new ship construction
    proposed, including an increase in the retirement of cruisers
    planned for modernization.
        Cruiser modernization is an issue which this subcommittee
    has grappled with for many, many years. I hope our witnesses
    today will provide more detailed insight into the analysis
    behind this proposal and how it fits into the Navy's overall
    efforts to meet its operational requirements.
        Whatever the ultimate goal of the size of our fleet, the
    basic fundamentals of successful shipbuilding remain the same:
    stable and predictable requirements that industry can plan
    towards and rely on, steady rate production that facilitates
    effective workforce development and cost reduction, and
    underlying long-term strategy that the Navy, Congress, and
    industry can work from.
        Unfortunately, too many recent budgets have fallen short of
    some of these fundamentals only to rely on Congress to fill the
    gaps. This is the second year in a row, under two different
    administrations, that the Navy has presented a budget that
    removes a planned major combatant vessel only to list it as
    their number one unfunded requirement. That is not a trend that
    any of us here on this committee relishes or wants to see
    becoming the new normal, and this would be the third year.
        Our subcommittee has a well-earned record for bipartisan
    scrutiny of shipbuilding budgets to provide this continuity and
    insight, regardless of which party holds the White House. I am
    confident that we will act again this year in a similar way and
    ensure that we make prudent and needed adjustments to build on
    the final proposal.
        With that, I turn to my good friend and ranking member from
    Virginia, Mr. Rob Wittman, for opening remarks that he may
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the
    Appendix on page 41.]

      STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
        VIRGINIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
                           PROJECTION FORCES

        Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Chairman Courtney. Again,
    thanks for your leadership and for your staunch direction in
    what we need to pursue as far as shipbuilding.
        I want to thank our three witnesses for joining us today.
        Gentlemen, if we are truly sincere about preparing for a
    maritime conflict with a great power, we should all grade
    President Biden's Navy budget as unacceptable. I give it a D-
    minus. With proposing eight battle force ships, of which two
    are tugboats, we are going backwards, not forwards. This is not
    the proper attempt to deter a global conflict.
        I think what is most perplexing to me is the lack of vision
    and the desire by senior Biden officials to mark time while the
    lethargic Biden Secretary of the Navy nomination process
    continues. We are already 6 months into this administration. We
    are only informed this week of the administration's intent to
    nominate a Secretary of the Navy.
        It has been said that Emperor Nero fiddled while Rome
    burned. In this case, President Biden is fiddling while the
    Navy is metaphorically burning. We have no strategic direction,
    no plan to dissuade China, and no budget to adequately prepare
    for maritime conflict. The administration has even refused to
    deliver a 5-year budget plan and a 30-year shipbuilding plan on
    time, as required by law.
        Secretary Hicks recently indicated that this budget request
    was developed with a clear-eyed approach on how to deter
    military aggression when it comes to China. I am not sure what
    she was looking at, but it is clear that she overlooked the
    Navy.
        While the administration is fiddling, the budget request is
    recommending that we divest 15 battle force ships, including 7
    cruisers. The seven cruisers alone have more missile capacity
    than the entire British fleet.
        I want to say that again: Those seven cruisers alone have
    more missile capacity than the entire British fleet.
        We have already spent hundreds of millions of dollars on
    ensuring these cruisers are returned to the fleet, yet now we
    find we are going to retire them.
        While this administration is fiddling, the administration
    indicates they cannot afford a second destroyer, a critical
    platform to deter maritime conflict. And while we are retiring
    other surface combatants, we are saying we are going to
    exacerbate that by now not building an additional destroyer.
        While this administration is fiddling, the budget
    underfunds critical investments in Tomahawk missiles,
    heavyweight torpedoes, and sonobuoys.
        While this administration is fiddling and stymied with
    inaction, the Navy is prepared to give up on over $700 million
    in smart acquisition savings available by procuring four
    amphibious ships.
        President Trump established a maritime conflict as a key
    budget priority and prepared a plan to deliver this capability.
    President Trump's plan envisioned discrete cuts throughout the
    defense budget to fund 12 battle force ships he proposed for
    construction in fiscal year 2022.
        The Biden administration arrives, wants to take more time
    to study the future maritime conflict, and throws out the
    tremendous work done by our witnesses today.
        Undoubtedly, the Biden team will reach the same conclusion
    as their predecessors--or maybe they already have reached their
    own conclusions and are now building an assessment tailored to
    prove the current conditions correct.
        Frankly, this is a waste of time and not only is
    unacceptable, but is dangerous and imperils our national
    security.
        It is time to stop fiddling. We need to be visionary and to
    allow the industrial base to rightsize to deliver efficiently
    for our national security needs. We need to be steely-eyed in
    dissuading conflict and delivering adequate resources to enable
    this plan. And we need to be brave enough to balance cross-
    service resources to deliver credible power relevant to the
    future conflict.
        We have so much work on this budget request to make it even
    mildly prepared for dissuading future conflict, and I look
    forward to working with my colleagues to correct this dangerous
    naval trajectory.
        Finally, I want to be clear: I do not lay any of this blame
    at the feet of our witnesses today or by the stellar leadership
    of our subcommittee chairman or by any member of this
    committee. Every single one of you has been focused on what we
    need as a Nation to do what is necessary to deter conflict.
        I believe that everyone are great Americans who are in a
    difficult position of defending a lackluster budget developed
    in part by folks who have never had to testify before this
    subcommittee.
        Again, I appreciate the chairman for holding this important
    hearing, and I yield back the balance of my time.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
    Appendix on page 44.]
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
        And we will now turn to the witnesses.
        It is my understanding, Mr. Stefany, you are going to
    provide a statement for the three witnesses. Is that correct?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, one statement for all three of us.
        Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, the floor is yours.

     STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
        OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION,
    DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; VADM JAMES W. KILBY, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF
         OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFIGHTING REQUIREMENTS AND
    CAPABILITIES, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; AND LTGEN ERIC M. SMITH,
       USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT
       COMMAND, AND DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND
              INTEGRATION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

        Mr. Stefany. And thank you, Representative Wittman, for the
    comments for the three of us. We appreciate that.
        Chairman Courtney, Ranking Member Wittman, distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, on behalf of myself, Vice Admiral
    Kilby, Lieutenant General Smith, we thank you for the
    opportunity to appear before you today to address the
    Department of Navy's fiscal year 2022 budget request for
    seapower capabilities.
        We would like to thank this subcommittee for your
    leadership and support for the Navy and the Marine Corps
    programs that support our forward-deployed naval forces.
        As a maritime Nation, our economic prosperity and security
    are linked to the world's oceans. The Navy and Marine Corps
    team are the Nation's maritime force, forward deployed each and
    every day, protecting the vital interests of our Nation,
    supporting our allies and partners, and providing a credible
    and visible deterrent to our strategic competitors.
        Our goal is to prevent conflict. But should deterrence
    fail, we are ready to answer the call to fight and to win.
        In the year-plus since the COVID-19 pandemic hit the United
    States, our Navy-Marine Corps team and our industry partners
    have delivered 7 new ships, with 3 more deliveries planned for
    later this year, as well as over 100 boats, crafts, and
    vehicles, and maintaining our current fleet.
        We have awarded the frigate design since last time we met
    with you, and we have under construction the first of the
    Columbia-class SSBN [nuclear ballistic missile] submarines, a
    truly heroic effort across our entire acquisition and
    sustainment community in very trying times. And I want to
    recognize all members of the community.
        The Department of the Navy's 2022 budget balances the
    readiness, capabilities, capacity, and people to advance key
    Department priorities. As Secretary Austin highlighted in his
    recent testimony to the Appropriations Committee, the budget
    also reflects difficult funding decisions necessary to ensure
    we have the right mix of capabilities the Nation needs most and
    supports investment in a modern future force that can deliver
    integrated, all-domain naval power.
        While difficult decisions were required, I would like to
    highlight some of the areas we were able to increase our
    investment in the fiscal year 2022 budget request.
        The Department's top priority is recapitalization of the
    Navy's portion of the nuclear triad; then meeting readiness
    needs to field a credible, non-nuclear deterrent ready to fight
    tonight; followed by investments in modernizing our force for
    tomorrow's fleet; and then finally, building the capacity of
    the Navy, congruent with the budget controls. This ensures that
    we do not create a hollow force while sustainably growing the
    fleet.
        To that end, we continue to fully fund our number one
    procurement program, the Columbia submarine, to the independent
    cost estimate, which will ensure our timely delivery of all
    ships in the class to meet STRATCOM's [U.S. Strategic
    Command's] requirements.
        We are also investing in land-based test facilities for the
    frigate and for our unmanned surface vessel programs, and we
    are requesting advanced procurement funding to smooth the ramp-
    up of construction to two frigates per year, just outside of
    this year.
        Although a different mix of ships, this budget does propose
    the same number of ships as last year and supports the
    capability required to enable distributed maritime operations.
        To ensure we have a whole force, the fiscal year 2022
    budget invests additional funding in ship and aviation
    maintenance, and you will see an increase in our funding for
    SIOP [Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program], the
    shipyard optimization modeling and planning efforts, that will
    lead to major SIOP projects in the near future.
        With a focus on developing a Navy force capable of
    distributed maritime operations, as outlined in our CNO's
    Navigation Plan and the Commandant's Force Design, this budget
    provides the necessary R&D [research and development]
    investments to start development of new capabilities with our
    industry partners, such as the follow-on to the Virginia-class
    attack submarine, the next-generation tactical aircraft, and
    the future large surface combatant. It also increases our
    development efforts that we started previously on hypersonic
    and directed energy weapons.
        Finally, the budget invests in key enablers to support
    distributed operations, such as Project Overmatch, which is a
    seamless network that will leverage demonstrated progress in
    command and control in all domains and facilitate the manned
    and unmanned teaming required for future warfare.
        We thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
    subcommittee today and for the strong support that this
    subcommittee has always provided to our sailors and our
    Marines.
        And with that, we look forward to your questions. Thank
    you.
        [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, Admiral
    Kilby, and General Smith can be found in the Appendix on page
    46.]
        Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Mr. Stefany. And,
    again, I am going to ask just one or two questions and make
    sure the other members get a chance to participate fully.
        Admiral Kilby, as is obvious, the proposal to decommission
    seven cruisers, as in the past year--as I said, this is not our
    first rodeo in terms of dealing with this issue on the
    subcommittee--is something that has obviously resulted in a lot
    of pushback and commentary.
        When the budget came out, within a couple of days, as is
    normal, the unfunded priorities list came over from the Navy,
    as did all the other branches. To me, it was noticeable that,
    on the one hand, restoring the DDG was number one on the list,
    but there was nothing in that unfunded priorities list [UPL]
    regarding restoring the cruisers.
        And I was wondering if you could just kind of give us an
    explanation of just the thinking behind the decommissioning
    proposal, particularly in terms of the question of missile tube
    capability.
        What does that mean in terms of air defense command for the
    cruisers' role in terms of accompanying our carriers and where
    the DDG construction process sort of fits into that, and
    whether we are creating a gap? I mean, that is fundamentally
    the question I think we have to figure out here in terms of
    that proposal.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
        Short answer, we are not creating a gap for the function of
    the air and missile defense commander. We have looked at that
    and mapped it out, and we will continue to pace the arrival of
    Flight III, which will assume that responsibility for our
    strike groups because of the capabilities it brings to the
    cruisers.
        To me, it is more than just VLS [vertical launching system]
    cells. It is what is the sensor that a ship brings, what are
    the capabilities of that combat system, and what is the
    confidence and reliability we have in that hull to get
    underway.
        In 2017, I was the strike group commander for the Carl
    Vinson strike group. My air and missile defense command ship
    was the Lake Champlain.
        She missed roughly one-third of the deployment because of
    maintenance things, not because her radar was down, not because
    her combat system wasn't capable, not because she didn't have a
    full magazine, but she had tank top cracking that required her
    to get that fixed to be safely underway.
        Vella Gulf missed a month of her previous deployment and
    has missed 2\1/2\ months of her current deployment.
        So all of that, in my mind, has to go into the mix when we
    factor the availability and reliability of those ships. Those
    missile tubes will only count if they are underway alongside
    the carrier.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
        So, again, you are going back to the air defense command.
    In terms of the analysis that you conducted, I mean, you are
    obviously sort of feathering in the new DDG-51s with the new
    radars in terms of making sure that that function is going to
    be covered. Is that correct?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir, that is correct. That will have
    the latest combat system, which is Aegis Baseline 10. It will
    have the Air and Missile Defense Radar, which is a much more
    capable and less maintenance-intensive radar than the SPY
    radar. And that is a natural fit for where the threat is going
    and what we want that air and missile defense commander to do
    for that strike group.
        It will be commanded by a captain, not a commander. Our
    destroyers now are commanded by commanders, and that is
    generally their first command unless they had O-4 [lieutenant
    commander] command. And our air and missile defense command
    ships are captained by a captain, so that is their second
    command or their major command. So they bring an experience set
    and a crew that has been trained and is more senior to execute
    that function.
        I don't want to dismiss the value of 122 missile cells or
    an Aegis cruiser. I am an Aegis cruiser guy. I have done four
    of my six ships on Aegis cruisers. I love them. But our average
    age of our cruisers is 32 years. They were built for 30 years.
    Four of our ships are over 34 years.
        So I am really trying to look at the most valuable ship
    that we can fund, the most valuable program within our budget
    to make our force equal across all functions--air, surface, and
    subsurface--to align to the threats as we see them, sir.
        Mr. Courtney. And speaking of budget, so if, again, there
    was a decision made at the Appropriations Committee or HASC
    [House Armed Services Committee] to restore the cruisers that
    you are proposing to decommission, that carries a price tag
    with it.
        Can you sort of walk us through what that would result in,
    in terms of having to find offsets in a constrained budget?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. So trying to keep a complex
    problem simple.
        If we were to retain the seven cruisers that are in the
    budget to be decommissioned in 2022--that is five from previous
    budget and Hue City and Anzio in this budget--it would be
    roughly $5 billion across the FYDP.
        If we were to retain those ships for 2 years, all seven
    ships, that is roughly $2.78 billion.
        The cost to modernize Hue City and Anzio alone is $1.5
    billion, approximately.
        So that is the rough breakdown of figures for those ships.
        Mr. Courtney. Great.
        Well, thank you. I know there is going to be probably a lot
    more discussion this morning on that issue.
        And with that, I will turn it over to my friend, Mr.
    Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to start with Secretary Stefany.
        Am I correct that the law does require a 30-year
    shipbuilding plan and a 5-year defense plan?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir, you are.
        Mr. Wittman. Okay. Then I am just curious as to why
    President Biden hasn't provided that to us at this point?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. I can tell you this on the two parts
    you brought up.
        Part one, the 5-year future defense plan, that that is the
    direction we have gotten from the Department, that we are not
    to provide. I cannot tell you why, the logic there.
        On the 30-year shipbuilding plan, we do plan to still
    provide that to you. My understanding is the final signature,
    or chops, on it were yesterday. And my hope would be tomorrow,
    maybe Monday at the latest, you will get that plan, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. I think it is unfortunate and regrettable that
    we won't get a Future Years Defense Plan.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. Vice Admiral Kilby, Admiral Davidson indicated
    earlier this year that he thought that conflict with China
    would occur, instead of in the 2030s, probably within the next
    6 years.
        If Congress were to support the retirement of 15 battle
    force ships in fiscal year 2022, is this going to hurt or help
    our ability to deter this conflict that is seeming to be sooner
    than later?
        Admiral Kilby. On the surface, I would just say the air and
    missile defense commander role from cruisers is covered. For
    the 15 battle force ships, more is better, obviously, as long
    as we can count and be confident that those ships will be
    underway with us. So that is my one caveat there.
        I have questions about the cruiser, and that is why we put
    them in the budget as laid in today.
        Mr. Wittman. And if there are issues about availabilities,
    it seems like to me the big issue there is maintenance
    availabilities. So we have shipyards that need to be getting
    ships in and out on time. So it seems like to me it shouldn't
    be retiring old ships, it should be maintaining the ones that
    we have got in order to have that availability.
        Let me do this. I want to ask you on some things on cruiser
    retirement.
        How many missile tubes are provided by the seven cruisers
    the administration is proposing to decommission?
        Admiral Kilby. It is 122 missile cells per ship, sir, so
    times 7. I will do the math, but it is roughly----
        Mr. Wittman. 910.
        Admiral Kilby [continuing]. 910.
        Mr. Wittman. Got you.
        Admiral Kilby. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. Sure.
        What percentage of the Navy's entire surface fires are
    provided by those seven cruisers.
        Admiral Kilby. A large percentage of those ships, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. Got you.
        All right. How many large unmanned surface vessels are
    required to replace the strike capacity offered by the seven
    cruisers? And what is the timeframe to deliver the replacement
    capability?
        Admiral Kilby. I would say, at a rough estimate, double the
    number of large unmanned surface vessels [LUSVs] in our current
    instantiation, because they are going to have 64 cells, so it
    would be double that.
        And the timeline is yet to be determined, because we have
    got to go through the confidence, as we have talked about in
    previous hearings, to field that capability. So that is land-
    based testing, all of the things we need to do to be confident
    in that search. So it won't be in the timeline that these
    cruisers could serve.
        Mr. Wittman. So 28 LUSVs and a long period of time. I think
    the best case scenario--best case, if everything goes according
    to plan--probably 15 years.
        Admiral Kilby. Sir, just to clarify.
        Mr. Wittman. Yes.
        Admiral Kilby. I think if it is 7 cruisers, it is 14 LUSVs.
        Mr. Wittman. Fourteen LUSVs.
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. Okay. All right.
        How much money has been invested in the last 5 years in
    these cruisers to extend their service life?
        Admiral Kilby. A significant amount of money, and it is
    costing more than we thought it would be.
        Mr. Wittman. Okay.
        Admiral Kilby. So initially it was $2.4 billion, but,
    again, we are adding a lot of money to do that, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. Got you.
        Are we able to provide sufficient cruisers and destroyers
    to the combatant commanders today to meet their OPLANs
    [operation plans] while retiring the seven cruisers? And is
    that going to help or hurt our ability to project power?
        Admiral Kilby. I believe we are providing the number--let
    me be clear. The combatant commanders want more than the Navy
    has to give them.
        Mr. Wittman. Sure.
        Admiral Kilby. I don't want to be Pollyannish about that.
        We are providing manned strike groups to meet the demand
    signal as apportioned by our global force management cycle to
    satisfy our combatant commanders.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good.
        Lieutenant General Smith, my first question to you is
    simple. Is the amphibious force forcible entry capability today
    what is needed as a joint force to defeat China?
        General Smith. Sir, if I understand the question, is it
    still a requirement for the joint force?
        Mr. Wittman. Uh-huh.
        General Smith. Absolutely, sir. JFEO, joint forcible entry
    operation, absolutely vital to the combatant commander, yes,
    sir.
        Mr. Wittman. Do you see this as a needed capability into
    the next decade?
        General Smith. Absolutely, yes, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. We all know the backbone of the force is being
    able to generate two MEB, or two Marine expeditionary brigade,
    lift. The administration appears ready to walk away from that,
    to have that forcible entry capability and the supporting
    infrastructure. Some projections have our amphibious fleet down
    to 26 ships.
        Tell me, what is the Commandant's red line as far as the
    bottom line for total number of amphibious force ships?
        General Smith. Sir, straight answer up front is the
    requirement, based on a study that Admiral Kilby, my friend
    Jim, and I did together, was you need 31 traditional amphibious
    ships in the appropriate mix, which is 10 big decks--LHA/LHD
    [landing helicopter assault]/[landing helicopter dock]--and 21
    LSD [dock landing ship]/LPD [landing platform dock].
        The low end of that study is 28, and the difference in
    those 3 is that you pass--there is additional risk in arrival
    times. Added into that, sir, is 35 light amphibious warships.
    And that includes, sir, that is based on a single MEB, Marine
    expeditionary brigade, forcible entry.
        Mr. Wittman. Yes.
        General Smith. And our expeditionary units that are out
    always, and our forward-deployed naval force in Japan.
        Mr. Wittman. Last question. Do you believe that it is
    essential and critical that the contract for the one LHD and
    the three LPDs be executed? And if it is not, do you believe
    that creates unacceptable risk for the Marine Corps?
        General Smith. Sir, I do believe that the multiship is a
    good thing. It saves dollars and it ensures that those
    amphibious ships, which in the case of the big deck amphibs,
    sir, are strategic assets, are available for the combatant
    commander. Otherwise, sir, we are passing risk on to the
    combatant commanders.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
        Now up next is Mr. Langevin, who is joining us from Rhode
    Island.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me
    okay?
        Mr. Courtney. Loud and clear.
        Mr. Langevin. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony today and
    for your service to our Nation.
        I will start with this for Mr. Stefany.
        So a Navy memo recently revealed that the Navy may have to
    choose between funding a new destroyer, attack submarine, or
    fighter jet in the future.
        Mr. Stefany, how would funding the Columbia-class submarine
    through the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund improve that
    situation?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
        The short answer is, if the funding came out of the Navy
    and had to go into that fund, then it doesn't change anything.
    But if it was a separate funding source that would go into that
    National Sea-Based Fund, then, obviously, we would have more
    resources in the Navy to fund those three major upgrade
    programs that we need to do for the warfighters.
        Mr. Langevin. I certainly think that is the direction we
    need to go, and I agree not taking it just out of the Navy, it
    is got to be new money.
        Admiral Kilby, so we are looking for ways to boost our
    missile launching capability on ships. Considering the railgun
    can deepen a ship's magazine and allow the Navy to shift more
    resources to offense, has the Navy considered how the railgun
    can help with this problem?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. We have worked mightily since 2005
    to bring the railgun to fruition. So far it has not proved to
    be what we want to continue to invest in.
        There is a challenge technologically there. It certainly
    has great promise if we could close the fire control loop in a
    meaningful way and use it as an anti-ship missile defense
    piece. That is complex right now, and we don't believe there is
    a path to do that now.
        Certainly, the concept of an electromagnetic railgun is
    very virtuous because it allows me at a cheaper level to do as
    you suggest, reserve my VLS launching capacity with my high-end
    missiles for offense and I can defend my ship with a cheaper,
    more renewable magazine.
        But there are a couple of complex technological things I
    have to do, other than close the fire control loop, and that is
    satisfy and solve the energy storage problem, as well as the
    barrel wear on the electromagnetic railgun, to make it an
    enduring capability for our ships.
        Mr. Langevin. Well, I will just point out that I think that
    some of the alternatives that you are considering are just as
    challenging and costly as well. I think it is a mistake to be
    abandoning railgun.
        Admiral Kilby, using currently available air defense
    weapons, how well could Navy ships defend against a large
    number of missiles and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]? And
    what side has the cost advantage?
        Admiral Kilby. Right now, sir, because of the way the
    threat is advancing, we have to use very expensive missiles
    like the SM [Standard Missile]-6, and we are developing an SM-2
    Block III Charlie, which is an active seeker, SM-6-like, that
    is required for those advanced threats. So that is an expensive
    way to attrite the adversary.
        The CNO, in his CNO NAVPLAN [Navigation Plan], charged us
    to get after directed energy in particular--I call that
    [inaudible] defense for that ship--so I can better and with
    more confidence defend that ship and reserve that magazine for
    other things.
        But there are challenges, as you point out, with directed
    energy, and we have got to work our way through those
    challenges to have a laser with enough power to provide anti-
    ship cruise missile defense, as well as electronic warfare and
    point defense systems.
        So it is a family of systems to create this capability you
    suggest to build confidence and not use those high-end weapons.
    But we are at the wrong end of the cost curve with our most
    expensive weapons, sir.
        Mr. Langevin. Agreed.
        Before my time runs out, Mr. Stefany, your written
    testimony mentions that the Navy is investing in cyber
    protection in this PB [President's budget]. But it looks like
    the major cyber accounts have relatively flat funding. Where
    are you making these investments?
        Mr. Stefany. Sir, I will need to get the specific line
    items back to you. But it is really in the process of
    certifying what we call the CMMC [Cybersecurity Maturity Model
    Certification] process and investing in our industrial base
    with them and getting them certified to be able to meet our
    cyber requirements.
        Mr. Langevin. Okay. I would ask for a written, more
    detailed response because I am not seeing it.
        Mr. Stefany. Yeah. Happy to do that, sir.
        [The information referred to was not available at the time
    of printing.]
        Mr. Langevin. I yield back.
        Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Jim.
        Next up is Mr. Gallagher from Wisconsin.
        Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Kilby, the budget plans to reduce
    Navy Active and Reserve end strength by 2,529 sailors, if I am
    correct. That is a big reduction in a short period of time.
    What is the plan for end strength over the FYDP?
        Admiral Kilby. So I think we pace our end strength with our
    platform requirement, sir. So that is a manning generation to
    drive that. So in general we are, I think, going to see a
    slight increase, but right now it is level based on what you
    laid out here and the demand signal for those sailors.
        But we need to invest in the pipe to make those sailors, so
    if we can, in fact, grow our Navy, we can receive those sailors
    and train them and send them to our ships. So there is a cost
    to do that as well, and I think we are in a position to do
    that.
        Mr. Gallagher. Well, just so I understand this whole FYDP
    situation, Mr. Stefany, did you suggest you are not going to
    give us a FYDP at all or just for the time being?
        Mr. Stefany. The direction we have for 2022 is not at all.
    The first FYDP will be with the 2023 budget that will come over
    in the February timeframe.
        Mr. Gallagher. How does that work, though? I mean, if we
    passed a law in 1989, when I was 5 years old, that says you
    have to provide us with a FYDP, and then you don't provide us
    with a FYDP, you are saying the direction you have been given
    is to break the law and not provide a FYDP. It just seems like
    an odd thing.
        Mr. Stefany. I guess I can't answer the logic. It came down
    to us that way, sir.
        Mr. Gallagher. Well, I would hope--I mean, if nothing else,
    please go back to the building and suggest it would be nice if
    we got a FYDP as quickly as possible. It would help us analyze
    a lot of these things, I think. But I will move on from the
    FYDP, ``F up,'' as it were, and move on to the frigate.
        You mentioned the frigate in your comments. I think we all
    want it delivered on time and on budget. I understand the need
    for combat systems changes, but given that the plan was a
    proven design, I asked the same question of the CNO: Will you
    commit to, in your capacity, minimizing changes to existing
    hull and machinery on that platform?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, absolutely, sir. That is part of the
    acquisition strategy, minimize change--actually eliminate
    change--if we can, and deliver 10 ships. The 10 ships in our
    contract are all identical, sir.
        Mr. Gallagher. And then I will just go across the board
    here.
        Former INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] Commander
    Admiral Davidson suggested in open testimony to Congress
    recently that he is concerned about a potential PLA [People's
    Liberation Army] invasion of Taiwan within the next 6 years. So
    not in 20 years, not in 10 years, but within the next 6 years.
        I will just start with Admiral Kilby and go sort of from
    left to right, my left to right.
        Do you share Admiral Davidson's concern?
        Admiral Kilby. I do share his concern. But I am also
    looking towards the future, because I don't have a crystal ball
    and I don't know when that conflict is going to occur.
        So I want to transition the force, I want to invest in
    technologies that are going to pace the adversary and have a
    capable Navy going forward, which requires some research and
    development now in order to match what we are seeing from an
    intelligence perspective.
        Mr. Gallagher. Mr. Stefany.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes. As soon as 6 years? Certainly agree with
    that and share that view.
        And to Admiral Kilby's point, we have to find that sweet
    spot of investing and making sure that our current fleet will
    still be very viable 5, 6, 7 years from now, sir.
        Mr. Gallagher. And General Smith.
        General Smith. Sir, I agree with that assessment. But I
    would also add our job is to fight tonight.
        Mr. Gallagher. Yeah.
        General Smith. Or tomorrow morning. So I am always looking
    as if tomorrow morning is the fight.
        Mr. Gallagher. Well, I think the concern here is that the
    Davidson window is closing. Every day we sort of punt on
    fielding a deterrence by denial posture, in the first island
    chain in particular, but in INDOPACOM more generally, is a day
    where we lose time and where the PLA, and the PLA Navy [PLAN]
    in particular, gain an advantage.
        So I just would encourage you in communicating with us to--
    I mean, let's figure out how we can operate on a 2025 timeline,
    not a 2045 timeline going forward.
        FYDP is a 5-year defense plan, the acronym, if I am
    remembering correctly. Another thing the FYDP would help with
    is planning on a 5-year time horizon.
        So thank you. I yield my 15 seconds.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
        I would just note that these statutory requirements for
    multiyear plans, sometimes they are more honored in the breach
    than in the observance.
        The first year of the last administration, we ran into the
    same absence of a FYDP. And as the nuns who taught me said, two
    wrongs don't make a right. I think it is really--particularly
    when we are talking about transition type of plans, is that you
    have got to have more than a 1-year set of headlights.
        And so hopefully maybe we can follow up, as we did last
    year, in terms of the absence of a 30-year plan to really just
    say there is a reason why that is in law and that it is really
    to help everybody.
        So, in any case, with that little speech, I will now yield
    to Mr. Golden.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you.
        This past December, Congress passed the fiscal year 2021
    NDAA, which included section 21, I know you are familiar with,
    which says that the Secretary of the Navy may not deviate from
    the large surface combatant requirements, including the 2016
    Navy Force Structure Assessment, until the Secretary certifies
    in writing that the Navy can mitigate the reduction in multi-
    mission large surface combatant requirements, including anti-
    air and ballistic missile defense capabilities, due to having a
    reduced number of DDG-51 destroyers with the advanced SPY-6
    [radar].
        It also requires a report on the detrimental impacts to the
    large surface combatant industrial base and a plan to mitigate
    such impacts if the fiscal year 2021 Future Years Defense
    Program is implemented as proposed, a review of the benefits to
    the Navy fleet of the SPY-6 radar aboard the DDG Flight III, as
    well as an analysis of impacts to the warfighting capabilities
    of the fleet should the number of such destroyers be reduced.
        I have your certification here, sir. You provide the
    certification without any explanation whatsoever on how the
    Navy will mitigate the impact of the reduction to anti-air and
    ballistic missile defense capabilities. It is almost as if it
    is a cut-and-paste of the certification requirement from the
    bill itself under a new award document with a signature at the
    end.
        In the accompanying report, the Navy says it does not
    foresee negative impacts to the large surface combatant
    industrial base.
        I am telling you today that it will have a negative impact.
        You mentioned the backlog. Any backlog at Bath Iron Works
    was on its way to being gone until a very recent COVID outbreak
    at the yard earlier this year. You know our shipbuilders have
    been building ships for the Navy during this pandemic, putting
    themselves at risk, and they are proud to do that for our
    Nation's sailors. They are proud of our sailors.
        Bath Iron Works will be on pace to produce two DDG-51
    Flight III per year by the end of this year. This backlog
    referenced to justify this reduction won't even exist by the
    end of this Congress.
        BIW has been hiring thousands of young shipbuilders each
    year because the Navy has been driving them to hit the 2-year
    mark. So this cut looks like you have been driving them towards
    a cliff that leads to layoffs, about 500 layoffs, and that is a
    negative impact.
        You did discuss the benefit of the SPY-6 coming online. In
    regards to providing an analysis of impacts to the warfighting
    capability of the fleet should the number of destroyers be
    reduced, you didn't address it.
        The most recent defense appropriation noted that the
    committee believes that the lack of a predictable, stable
    acquisition strategy for large surface combatants undercuts
    naval maritime superiority and injects risk into the industrial
    base.
        The committee provided an additional advanced procurement
    amount for an additional DDG Flight III destroyer in fiscal
    year 2022. Collectively, these provisions communicated
    congressional intent that the Navy reverse its negative
    procurement trend of the DDG Flight III and strongly
    recommended a three-ship procurement in this fiscal year.
        Last December, the Navy gave us a late shipbuilding plan,
    saying it would procure two DDG-51 Flight IIIs in fiscal year
    2022. The ink is barely dry on the paper and we have received
    this budget request for just one.
        We can't even count on 6 months of consistency, one of
    several reasons why Congress is concerned about the
    shipbuilding industrial base and our naval superiority.
        This proposed budget puts the large surface combatant
    workforce at risk at a time when we should be developing it to
    fill the gap of a bathtub effect caused by prior boom and bust
    budgets. This puts the future DDG(X) [Next Generation Guided-
    Missile Destroyer] workforce at risk and will have a negative
    impact on the ability of the Navy to deliver capabilities
    necessary to meet its operational needs by the end of this
    decade.
        I think that this is a failure bearing national security
    implications.
        Admiral Kilby, the Navy recommends the decommissioning of
    the Ticonderoga cruisers while simultaneously slowing and
    reducing the acquisition of the DDG-51 Flight III with its new
    combat system, SPY-6 radar, and the ability to house and
    perform the role of air and missile defense at a higher level.
        Your first Flight III with the SPY-6 radar arrives in 2025.
    You are cutting a ship to be delivered in 2027. The math is
    concerning.
        How can we afford such an early reduction of this new radar
    capability on the Flight III?
        Admiral Kilby. Sir, the decision to not procure the Flight
    III is an affordability decision. It is not anything else. It
    is a high regret for the Navy. As indicated, it is number one
    on our UPL. The benefits of an AMDR [Air and Missile Defense
    Radar] are undeniable, as I tried to lay out in an earlier
    response. We have to have that radar.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you, I agree.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Jared.
        Next up is Mr. Carl. The floor is yours.
        Mr. Carl. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Ranking Member Wittman.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for coming back and sharing your
    thoughts and your wisdom with us. I learn so much in these
    meetings. As a freshman, that is important.
        Vice Admiral, this committee has heard all about the impact
    of the Chinese soft power, as it is referred to, going around
    the world, especially in South America in our own backyard.
        Now we see the Chinese with a COVID vaccine which is not
    reliable but being distributed through the region.
        Thankfully, our government, we have agreed to donate
    roughly 500 million doses to countries around the world.
        Now, the two medical ships that we have that we rely most
    on are the, if I have this correct--correct me if I am wrong--
    is USNS [U.S. Naval Ship] Mercy and Comfort, and we spend about
    $100 million a year just in maintenance on those two. And I
    also understand that they are converted oil tankers. Is that
    correct?
        Admiral Kilby. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Carl. And they are extremely slow, extremely slow.
        My question to you, sir, is this. Could a smaller, faster,
    more agile medical ship be used by the Navy to help distribute
    this vaccine this very day and combat these Chinese soft powers
    that are taking place around the world?
        Admiral Kilby. Thanks for the question, sir.
        So in previous committees we have talked about increasing
    our logistical base for our ships to support distributed
    maritime operations, which is our operating concept. And at a
    high level, that means I am going to distribute my force more
    than I have in the past in order to create dilemmas for our
    adversaries.
        Incumbent on that is increasing our ability to handle our
    ships if we take damage. So one of those concepts is this thing
    called Role 2 care, and we are working to instantiate it on an
    EPF [expeditionary fast transport] platform, and that wouldn't
    have all the capability of Mercy or Comfort, which is Role 3
    care, but it would be able to extract a higher density or
    number of casualties should we need to, and that includes
    sailors and Marines.
        So to me, we are going to need to increase our ability to
    do that from a force design perspective and look at replacing
    the Mercy and Comfort with another surrogate capability
    potentially that could provide that Role 3 care in the future.
        Mr. Carl. Could we use it right now down in Central and
    South America getting in and out of the shallow waters?
        Admiral Kilby. I believe we could, sir.
        Mr. Carl. Thank you.
        I yield my time back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Carl.
        Next up is Mrs. Luria.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
        And I am going to make a slight change today. I am actually
    going to focus on the Marine Corps first and have a question,
    General, about the expeditionary advanced base operations, the
    EABO.
        I am very intrigued by this concept and where the concept
    came from. Could you provide some insight? Was this a
    capability that USINDOPACOM requested? In other words, did
    INDOPACOM say, ``We need to come up with an island-hopping
    strategy to achieve the following goals''? Did it come from the
    Joint Staff? Was it generated from a bright young officer
    within the Marine Corps?
        Can you give me a little bit of background on how you
    developed this strategy?
        General Smith. Yes, ma'am, I can. It is actually a little
    bit of all of the above.
        INDOPACOM clearly has indicated they need the ability to--
    well, it started truly with our distributed maritime
    operations.
        If you are going to enable our fleet commanders and do sea
    denial--which is what we do, that is who we are as a naval
    force--that is a piece of it. How do you contest the sea from
    the shore? That is one of the genesis or part of the genesis.
        INDOPACOM clearly has a need for us to do distributed
    maritime operations. And I can tell you that EABO,
    expeditionary advanced base operations, was going on--General
    Berger has emphasized it--it was going on even before.
        When General Berger was in my seat and I was in III MEF
    [Marine Expeditionary Force], we were doing long-range raids,
    long-range seizures of terrain for a short period of time to
    refuel F-35Bs and do strike. We were doing that under a guy
    named Colonel ``Bams'' Brodie, an F-18 pilot, who was the 31st
    MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] commander back 4 years ago.
        So it is a combination of all of the above, ma'am.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you for that insight.
        And did you establish a timeframe, like, ``We want to
    achieve this capability by a certain time and on a certain
    scale''?
        General Smith. Yes, ma'am. What we know is that the
    Commandant's direction to me is that by 2023 I have to provide
    an initial operating capability to Lieutenant General Steven
    Rudder, who is the commander of Marine Forces Pacific, all
    stop. By 2023 that initial capability is in his hands or I have
    failed.
        Mrs. Luria. Thank you.
        And so to me it sounds like you developed a strategy, and
    from that strategy you then came up with requirements--these
    are the things the Marine Corps would need in order to
    accomplish that and with the timeline. And out of that
    ultimately resulted in the request in the budget that we are
    seeing because your request reflects the things that will allow
    you to achieve this strategy and this new type of operations.
        Would you say that that is correct?
        General Smith. Ma'am, correct statement; concept, and then
    you get down to the specifics of specific requirements to meet
    that concept which supports that strategy, yes, ma'am.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, I appreciate you clarifying that.
        And I know that we are going to do a second round, so I
    might not get through the next part in this first round. But,
    Admiral Kilby, I was going to shift to you.
        Just to start the scene setter here, in 2005 the PLAN had
    216 ships to our 291, so that was an advantage of 75. Fast
    forward to 2020, they have 333 ships to our 296. That is an
    advantage of 37. So, in fact, that is a swing of 112 ships in
    this 4-year period. And people say that China and the PLAN is a
    pacing threat. Well, when I hear pacing, I think like a pace
    car, we are keeping up with them.
        Would you assess, are we keeping up with them today? Is
    that still an accurate term, to call them a pacing threat?
        Admiral Kilby. They are a pacing threat. I would say
    shortly we are not keeping up with them.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you.
        And I wanted to next highlight the fact that another thing
    I have said is that I think we lost a generation of
    shipbuilding.
        In 2007's Navy budget submission you wrote that new
    platforms, such as CVN-21 [Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft
    carrier], DDG(X), CG(X) [Next Generation Cruiser], LCS
    [littoral combat ship], Virginia-class SSN [attack submarine],
    LPD-17, LHA(R), and the MPS [maritime prepositioning ship]
    family of ships, will comprise our next generation of battle
    force ships.
        So of those eight classes of ships, half have either been
    failures or abandoned. We did not pursue the CG(X). We find
    ourselves today with cruisers that are over 30 years in age,
    which could severely impact our O&M [operation and maintenance]
    budget.
        And because the LCS is not fully mission capable and we got
    rid of the frigate--we are just now starting to replace the
    frigate--the same is also true for the DDG--for the DD(X).
        So for the past 20 years, we have lost a generation of
    building these surface combatants.
        And I think I will dovetail off what Mr. Gallagher said. In
    Congress what we want is a plan. And moreover what we want is
    to stop overstating and underdelivering. So every budget we
    have a plan. Every 30-year shipbuilding plan is, in my
    assessment, not really a 30-year shipbuilding plan because
    years 1 to 5 are constantly changing.
        So I am really running out of time, and I think I will
    pause until the next round of questions to continue my next
    line.
        Mr. Courtney. Actually, if, Admiral, you want to quickly
    respond or do you want to reserve on the second round to that?
        Admiral Kilby. I acknowledge Rep. Luria's statements. She
    is accurate. I feel the force design for the future will set us
    up for a better path.
        FFG(X) [Next Generation Guided Missile Frigate] is not a
    revolutionary ship. It has got all of many common elements that
    are on our platforms today. It will have a smaller AMDR radar.
        So I think, while I acknowledge what you said about LCS and
    the Zumwalt class, we are on a path to not have so many new
    technologies on new platforms.
        DDG(X) is going to take the combat system from the Flight
    III and put it on a ship that has got margin and reserve to
    grow into the future. So it is not such a tremendous leap.
        I am not trying to ignore what happened in the past. I
    acknowledge what you said. But the force designs have more
    smaller surface combatants, frigates, which are roughly
    equivalent in combat power, not in magazine capability, to a
    Flight IIA. It is an important part of distributed maritime
    operations. And to create a DDG(X) that has got the reserve to
    add some of the things that Representative Langevin intimated I
    think is equally important.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, Admiral Kilby, thank you for that.
        Mr. Courtney. We will continue. We will continue.
        Mrs. Luria. Yes. I yield back.
        Mr. Courtney. Great.
        Mr. Brown, the floor is yours.
        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you
    convening this meeting.
        I want to thank all of our panelists for presenting and
    making yourself available to answer questions.
        I, too, want to pick up a little bit on something that Mr.
    Gallagher mentioned. He referenced his birth year of 1984. I
    just wanted to point out that is the year that I graduated
    college. But I also want to acknowledge that since that time he
    has far surpassed me in terms of acquiring and accumulating
    academic degrees.
        So with that out of the way, let me turn to the business at
    hand.
        So we consistently hear about the rising threats presented
    by China and the increasing significance, global significance,
    of INDOPACOM. Last year, the U.S. Navy deployed two MQ-4C
    Tritons to Guam as part of an early operational capability, and
    it is my understanding that initial reports were positive.
        My question for you, Admiral Kilby, can you discuss the
    benefits that Triton has been providing in its Western Pacific
    operations and its alignment to the future maritime
    surveillance needs in INDOPACOM more broadly?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir.
        So Triton is providing benefit from an ISR [intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance] perspective. We want to get
    to an increased capability on that platform, which is called
    IFC-4 [Integrated Functional Capability-4] or multi-int
    [intelligence], and that allows me to do things that I can with
    an EP-3 [aircraft] now, in addition to what we are seeing from
    the Triton now.
        So our budget focuses on delivering that capability, that
    multi-int capability, which is some additional SIGINT [signals
    intelligence] capabilities and other things which will make
    that ship even more capable.
        But as we talked about in March at the unmanned campaign
    hearing, this development of this hybrid force of which the MQ-
    4 is a part of that is building confidence in understanding our
    ability to execute these unmanned platforms.
        So I think the capability is undeniable. It is beneficial.
    And it is especially beneficial in a Phase Zero operation,
    where I am trying to maintain SA, or situational awareness, on
    greater areas of the ocean.
        Mr. Brown. Well, thank you.
        Mr. Stefany, given Admiral Kilby's previous statements and
    his statement today, and in light of the increasing need for
    maritime capabilities, what was the rationale for the break in
    Triton production in this budget? And how is the Navy
    mitigating potential disruptions to the supply chain?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
        So the break in this year's budget was to allow the new
    capability that Admiral Kilby mentioned, that IFC-4, to get
    fully developed so we can install it in the aircraft coming off
    the line at Northrop Grumman, you know, have the new capability
    right in those aircraft as they come off the line.
        There are 10 aircraft that have been funded, that are under
    contract, that are in various stages of being built. And so
    taking a pause for a year would allow us to get those aircraft
    to have the new capability in them as they come off the line.
        As long as we restart in 2023, I do not believe there will
    be a large impact on the production line at Northrop Grumman.
        So that is part of our 2023 deliberation, is how many and
    what kind of profile going forward we will be budgeting for in
    2023 and out, sir.
        Mr. Brown. And just a quick follow-up.
        So I appreciate your assessment that you don't think there
    will be a large or major disruption in the supply chain. But it
    seems like implicit in what you are saying is that there will
    be a disruption.
        Is there anything that the Navy has considered, anything
    that the Navy is doing to mitigate impacts, albeit small, as
    you are suggesting, to the supply chain?
        Mr. Stefany. Sir, I do not know the specifics. Our program
    manager is working every day with the company on that. But I
    can get you some specifics on the lower level things we are
    working on in the supply chain for you, sir.
        Mr. Brown. Great. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the 23 seconds remaining of
    my time.
        Mr. Courtney. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
        Next up is Ms. Jacobs from California.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        And thank you all for being here.
        My first question is for Admiral Kilby.
        I represent San Diego, and my background is in foreign
    policy and national security, so I think our maritime mission
    is incredibly important. And I echo my colleagues' calls for a
    plan, and I will look forward to reading it when you will
    provide it.
        But I specifically wanted to follow up on my colleague
    Congresswoman Luria's questions around shipbuilding. As she
    said, we have seen a lot of delays, we have seen a lot of
    failures.
        And I am wondering what the larger systemwide problem is
    and why shipbuilding has proven so challenging for the Navy,
    and, more importantly in my mind, what lessons we have learned
    that we can apply to new programs, especially, if they get to
    be proven unmanned vessels, which the Navy plans to make a
    significant part of the future fleet growth as we move forward
    so we don't continue to have these same challenges.
        Admiral Kilby. Thanks, ma'am. I will start and I will ask
    Secretary Stefany to add on to anything that I don't cover
    adequately. Part of the answer--I want to go back to what I
    discussed briefly with Rep. Luria is that we make our designs a
    little more simple.
        Just a quick history lesson. When we created the Aegis-
    class cruiser, we used a Spruance-class hull, and we introduced
    a new combat system and superstructure on that ship. Shortly
    thereafter, we introduced a new hull for the Arleigh Burke
    destroyer, which has proven to be remarkably successful, our
    most successful shipbuilding plan and shipbuilding class in the
    history of the United States Navy. But we didn't change the
    combat system. We took the combat system and evolved some
    sensors, but we really focused on a new plant, a new ship, a
    new hull form. And we are trying to return to that logic, and I
    will just dovetail that to Flight III as I discussed. We want
    to take the combat system from a Flight III destroyer, and
    introduce it into a DDG(X) hull. So I think that will help us
    because we are not introducing so many new things at once.
        To the frigate program, we are taking a proven hull design,
    and we are putting largely government-furnished equipment on
    that hull to achieve that capability. So I think those types of
    things are more executable perhaps than a new class with an
    exquisite new propulsion system and a new combat system.
        So I will just ask Secretary Stefany to join in that
    conversation. Before I yield, though, we talked in an unmanned
    hearing in March about redundancy and simplicity to achieve
    something. So, it could be for an unmanned surface vessel, I
    increase the number of engines I have to achieve that
    reliability as opposed to creating a new propulsion system for
    that ship. That might be a more reasonable path for us to
    pursue.
        Sir.
        Mr. Stefany. Thanks, Jim. I appreciate that.
        So a couple other items, ma'am. Completing the design,
    having it very mature before we start construction. In previous
    programs, some of the ones that we have not done well on, we
    have started--you know, 20, 30 percent on design and then
    moving out. We are trying to get into that 70, 80 percent
    complete before we start building. Evolutionary, try to build
    off what we already know. Commercial, where we can, use a
    commercial product or a commercial design, has really paid off
    for us in the past. So those are some of the practices we are
    trying to incorporate in the ships--in the unmanned craft as we
    go forward
        Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And just on the unmanned, I
    remain concerned about the COLREGs [Collision Regulations], but
    we can go into that at another time.
        I will turn quickly to General Smith. I, earlier this week,
    talked with Sergeant Major Black and asked him about force
    design. I know we have gone over it a lot already in this
    hearing, but I wanted to ask, in particular, how the Marine
    Corps plans to navigate the fact that we need to be able to
    project force now with the fact that we need to be able to face
    challenges in the Pacific area in the future and how you are
    balancing those real and ongoing current threats with the
    future investments that we need to make?
        General Smith. Yes, ma'am. Very briefly, I would echo what
    my shipmate, Jim Kilby, said earlier that there is near-term
    risk that we are investing in some longer-term capabilities
    that we must have against a pacing threat we don't have now. In
    order to generate the resources for that, we divest of things
    that we cannot get to the fight immediately. So in all candor,
    ma'am, what happens is, you have to have those Marine
    expeditionary units. That is your fight tonight forward-
    deployed force. The ARG MEUs, the amphibious ready groups,
    Marine expeditionary units that are forward deployed, those
    three-ship units that are out there. Navy-Marine teams ready to
    do humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and to strike if
    required.
        That is your mitigation factor, and in all candor, it is
    done on the back of a bunch of young lance corporals and a
    bunch of young sailors. That is who is absorbing the risk right
    now until we get where we have to go.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And in my last 2 seconds, I will
    just say that my office and I remain concerned about the cuts
    to the naval audit unit that I know came up in the full
    committee hearing, but Mr. Chair, I will yield back.
        Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Ms. Jacobs. So now we
    have completed the first run-through. We are going to do a
    second round. And, again, thank you to the witnesses for your
    patience.
        Mr. Stefany, just to sort of follow up the question and
    maybe Admiral Kilby you can join in in terms of how we sort of
    overcome the problems of the past, which, again, I think
    everyone is being very upfront and, you know, no one is trying
    to deny that there has been issues in the past.
        I mean, I would say one of the most impressive examples of
    lessons learned is the Columbia program, you know. As of last
    year, the design completion was over 85 percent and, I mean,
    they are cutting steel, and they are starting to do prototypes,
    but in terms of, you know, when full production begins,
    comparing Columbia to the last SSBN program, the Ohio, the
    design completion was about 20 percent.
        Again, I live in Connecticut. I talk to the folks in the
    yard. I hear the stories. I mean, they had major problems back
    then. And we, again, I think are in a much better place with
    the design completion, again, as we are on the eve of
    construction. We have also--there are some new technologies in
    the Columbia. There is going to be a life-of-ship reactor,
    which is going to mean no refuelings for this program, which is
    a real cost saver for the taxpayer, and more efficiency that is
    going to be included with that and there is an electric
    propulsor system, which is new.
        On the other hand, there is a lot of lessons learned from
    Virginia which are being incorporated into Columbia. So we are
    not reinventing the wheel in terms of every aspect of the
    submarine. I don't know if you wanted to just sort of talk
    about that because I do think--frankly, we have to do this. The
    timing for replacement of Ohio is knife edge, and the cost
    requires us to pursue every efficiency possible.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. Couple of points. Columbia, our goal
    was 83 percent design complete before we started construction,
    and you point out we had 85 percent, right, so we had a goal
    that we had never actually achieved before, and we exceeded it,
    and put the effort in in Columbia to make sure that we held
    that till we started building the ship.
        Some of the prototyping, some of the unique features to
    make the ships more affordable in the overall life, we actually
    prototyped--construction prototyped those before we actually
    put them into the design of the ship itself. So I think that
    will pay off going forward.
        Some of the things like--like you mentioned Virginia, sir,
    one of the things we did learn is we had some life-of-the-ship
    components that we did not test beforehand and we are finding
    out they aren't really lasting the life of those Virginia
    submarines. So we are actually proving out that our--if we have
    a new idea, or a new way of sustaining the vessel, that we want
    to prove it out first. So those are some key things.
        To Rep. Gallagher, don't change anything once we start.
    That is another key to Columbia. We are holding tight and not
    making changes now that we have started construction. So those
    are just some of the major lessons we have learned to not
    repeat past sins, so to speak, sir.
        Mr. Courtney. Great. And I would note that this
    subcommittee participated in this process when we created the
    National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund [NSBDF], which, again, much
    to our exasperation, has not been fully embraced by the
    Pentagon. Nonetheless, the multiyear authorities which NSBDF
    includes, again, I think, we have seen from both Congressional
    Budget Office and CRS [Congressional Research Service],
    impressive feedback about efficiencies in savings that those
    authorities have allowed.
        And it is my understanding we are going to, maybe, take up
    some more this year in the budget to, again, keep the good
    momentum moving forward. Is that correct?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. We absolutely appreciate those
    authorities. It does--administratively, getting the money into
    the fund is a problem, but once it is in there, we are taking
    advantage of those authorities. Thank you.
        Mr. Courtney. Well, we are on standby to help move that and
    fix that issue. Real quick on sealift, you know, the budget
    talked a bit about sort of opportunities for more used vessels
    that can help deal with what I think everyone on this
    subcommittee agrees is, you know, a concerning aging fleet that
    is out there right now. You know, we have not gotten actually
    that analysis, and I really would ask that the Navy, please,
    share us with that.
        I would also note that, you know, again, this subcommittee
    sort of led the way in terms of the National Security Multi-
    Mission Vessel construction program, which is now happening in
    Philadelphia, which is using sort of a different contracting
    model, which we think is going to be a real potential exciting
    opportunity to, again, fix some of the problems that Mrs. Luria
    talked about in terms of, you know, just the clunkiness of our
    acquisition programs, and I see that as transferable to
    sealift.
        So can you talk about what is the Navy's view of new-build
    sealift?
        Mr. Stefany. So I will start with that last point first and
    work backwards, sir. I was actually with the Shipbuilders
    Council of America yesterday and talked about that very point
    of can we buy ships like a commercial company would buy ships
    and not buy through the normal FAR [Federal Acquisition
    Regulation]-type regulations. That would streamline the
    process, save a lot of money, and if it is a commercial ship
    anyway, which is what sealift would be, why not do that?
        So I am committed to at least look in and see if that is a
    possibility for whatever new we buy. As far as the used, we are
    buying, as you are aware, two from last year and then this
    year's budget proposes five more used ships for the Ready
    Reserve Force, and we will be using--we are using that same
    concept for buying those through the Maritime Administration
    that, of course, they used to buy the ships you are talking
    about up in Philly shipyard. So that having a commercial entity
    go out and buy those used ships and convert them to U.S.
    standards and then deliver them back to us.
        As far as the overall study, I will have to ask Admiral
    Kilby to let you know where that analysis is, sir.
        Admiral Kilby. Yeah. We will just take that for action to
    get you that report, sir.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Admiral.
        Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Vice Admiral Kilby, I want to go to you, and today is the
    anniversary of the collision involving USS Fitzgerald and the
    loss of seven sailors. And it still continues to haunt me today
    where there was lack of leadership on the part of a number of
    folks in Navy leadership, on folks in the surface warfare
    community. And I still don't believe that we are at the point
    where we have adequately addressed all of the issues that were
    identified with that.
        In fact, I want to go to the GAO [Government Accountability
    Office] report that came out earlier this month where they
    said, their words, it said: Sailors are not receiving adequate
    sleep. And they further stated: Sailors' fatigue poses a
    considerable risk to the safe and effective operation of Navy
    ships.
        In fact, just today, the GAO issued a report that said: By
    a factor of four to one, SWOs [surface warfare officers]
    believe specialized career paths would better prepare them for
    their duties than the current generalist path. The SWO
    community is screaming for change.
        Tell me, what is the Navy going to do in relation to those
    calls and the continued need, I believe, to address issues
    within the surface warfare community?
        Admiral Kilby. Yes, sir. First off, we all share your
    feelings about Fitzgerald and McCain. I was in Hawaii coming
    back from deployment when ships that were left behind for my
    strike group were called to support Fitzgerald. We have done a
    lot of work, we feel, to professionalize and increase our
    mariner skill training. Some of those investments are still
    underway in Norfolk and San Diego, and will prove to be
    sufficient.
        I think the initial data that we are seeing for our
    training is proving to be sufficient as far as JOOD [junior
    officer of the deck] training and OOD [officer of the deck]
    training. And that goes all the way up to the chain of command
    where there are sailors, or officers, who previously had
    screened for a command, did not make it through the
    shiphandling trainer, and were removed from the command bank.
    So to me those are all significant, positive steps.
        I can't speak for the study, but I just can tell you on my
    personal experience, I have never been in the same department
    twice--engineering, combat systems, operations. So I have
    worked in every department except supply. And in the balance,
    my own personal opinion for me is, it prepared me to be a
    better commanding officer. Now, I am not saying that is the
    answer; I am just telling you that is my experience.
        So we will have to go review the proposal here and
    understand the impact on our training and our system, but I
    wanted to share my own personal anecdote, because when I was
    initial commanding officer, that is new to me. I am new to
    being the captain. And when people are coming and making
    reports, I had some context because I had worked in those
    departments and I thought it prepared me better. So I think
    that is probably on the other side of the ledger from the
    proposals here.
        I don't understand, or I don't have experience in exposure
    to the data that says a factor of four to one says that we
    should be specialists. So I need to take a look up on that and
    come back to you.
        Mr. Wittman. I think that is incredibly important. I think
    there are a whole litany of issues that need to be addressed--
    career path, retention, very specifically female SWO officer
    retention. Also, reciprocity as far as SWO training and what it
    can relate to as somebody separates or retires, especially SCTW
    [Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
    Seafarers] certification, so somebody can go into the merchant
    mariner realm. And when we talk about the Ready Reserve fleet,
    you know, one of the issues is not just ships; it is mariners
    to run those ships. I think all those things are critically
    important to consider.
        Secretary Stefany, can you tell me, what is the penalty
    associated with not entering into a production contract for the
    second destroyer in fiscal year 2022?
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. The contract, multiyear contract we
    have in place has a penalty of $33 million in either contracts,
    whether it is Bath or Ingalls, it would be a $33 million
    penalty for what we call breaking that multiyear contract, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. So not only will we be I think damaging the
    workforce as Mr. Golden pointed out, but also we will be
    suffering a penalty, a monetary penalty, where those dollars
    could be used, I think, in a much, much better way rather than
    paying a penalty.
        Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this on the amphibious ship buy.
    What is the anticipated savings by executing the block buy with
    the LHD and the three LPDs?
        Mr. Stefany. So we just recently finished negotiations with
    the shipyard Ingalls and the saving is about 7.1 percent, or
    around $700 million, sir.
        Mr. Wittman. One last question. The Commandant has
    suggested a light amphibious warfare ship to provide the
    opportunity for the Marine Corps to execute the Commandant's
    Planning Guidance and what he wants is a smaller ship,
    something that can move around. The debate has always been
    should it be built to a military standard, should it be built
    to a commercial ship standard?
        Can you tell me what does the Navy believe about this? Do
    you believe it should be built to a combat ship standard or a
    commercial ship standard?
        Mr. Stefany. Sir, is that question for me?
        Mr. Wittman. Yeah. I want you and then Lieutenant General
    Smith and Vice Admiral Kilby.
        Mr. Stefany. Okay. I believe the other point the Commandant
    wanted was an affordable ship as well, so I think a commercial
    standards with specific Navy features is the way we need to go
    for this ship, and what those features are needs to be worked
    out with the Marine Corps.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good.
        General Smith.
        General Smith. Sir, very briefly, Admiral Kilby and I sit
    on the requirements evaluation team for that [inaudible]. So we
    are in lockstep. There is zero daylight between Jim and myself
    on that. It needs to be something that is, as Secretary Stefany
    said, affordable, so we can get it in numbers, and it has to be
    something that looks like everything else that is out there.
    You need to protect the cargo, meaning the Marines and the
    sailors that are on it for a limited period of time in order to
    be able to evacuate them.
        That is the purpose of that ship. I know that is not a
    loved sentiment, but that cargo is precious to us, so it has to
    go off, but it has to be affordable in large numbers, sir, and
    it has to look like everything else. And I would pass to my
    shipmate.
        Admiral Kilby. I am in agreement with Eric. My
    recollection, sir, may be imperfect here is that the law was
    born from the INFSA [Integrated Naval Force Structure
    Assessment] study the Navy and the Marine Corps did when we
    were responding to force design, which was acknowledgement that
    we needed a different platform to support the EAB
    [expeditionary advanced base] concept.
        So--but Eric's right. We have been lockstep on this. My
    analogy, though trite, is if I am buying F-150 truck, I want to
    buy a custom truck; I don't want to buy an Eddie Bauer truck.
    Because if I take the Eddie Bauer off road, I might damage it,
    but the custom is built to do that and that is what I wanted--
    how I want to treat this amphibious warship, because I need to
    support those Marines.
        Similarly, I need to look at survivability, which could be
    let's make sure that that ship if, regrettably, if it takes
    damage, I can get the most important cargo off that ship, which
    is the Marines and sailors that are on it.
        So that is all going into the mix, as well as what does
    that ship look like. So there is a lot of conversation now as
    Eric and I get together with the Marine and Navy team to kind
    of refine the top-level requirements to understand what we need
    the ship to do.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Vice Admiral Kilby.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Wittman.
        Next up is Mr. Golden.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you. I guess I will give this one to both
    of you, and bear with me because I am kind of thinking it
    through. You know, up at Bath Iron Works, I have spent a lot of
    time up there getting to know the workers, touring that yard,
    and learning about the past several years.
        One of the difficulties I think up there has been the DDG-
    1000 [Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer], which I know you
    are very familiar with. They put a lot of work into changing
    the way they did things, changing the way they built things,
    reorganizing the yard, learning some new skills or how to do
    them a little bit differently, and even acquiring new tools to
    do the work with.
        They devoted a big part of their experienced workforce to
    that while hiring younger guys who were kind of staying on the
    Flight like IIA, and then all of a sudden the whole thing gets
    a big change package on them and disrupts the whole thing, and
    now they got to move these guys back. They got to reorganize
    their yard again. Really threw them for a loop and all over a
    weapon system, essentially, that hasn't--we don't have one or,
    therefore, a mission set with the Zumwalt.
        I see that the Navy now has an acquisition out to try and
    get a hypersonic on these ships, and I assume that the Navy is
    finding that they bring some unique capabilities, some good
    capabilities.
        So, one, how are we going to get something good out of
    these three Zumwalts? But secondly, what are you going to learn
    from it as you think about the DDG(X) and talking about the
    DDG(X)? Why don't you feel like you already have a hull?
    Perhaps the deck is a problem. You can scrap that. You got a
    big hull that you can pack a lot of power into. You have got an
    integrated power system and you are looking at putting
    hypersonics on it.
        How can we ensure that this doesn't happen again, so that
    when you do make the move to the DDG(X), we don't see this kind
    of back and forth, but, rather, get a successful change?
        Admiral Kilby. So I will start and then ask Secretary
    Stefany to come in. One, an important point is, this
    introduction of CPS [Conventional Prompt Strike] on DDG-1000,
    right, that ship has the capacity to allow us to introduce that
    weapon system, and not only that, its design of the launching
    system is virtually the same as the Virginia-class submarine.
    So we will get a benefit by installing that on DDG-1000, a two-
    fold benefit.
        One, we will take that ship that, as you point out, was
    designed with another weapon system that didn't prove to be
    fruitful for us, and we are repurposing it for an effect that I
    think is significant, especially in the Pacific AOR [area of
    responsibility]. And, we will reduce risk on our way to install
    that capability on the Virginia class. So I think that is,
    first and foremost, important to get all we can out of those
    ships.
        Second point, we are doing a lot of work and have been
    doing a lot of work at Carderock, and some of the staff members
    have been exposed to that work, and DDG-1000 hulls or variants
    of those hulls are in the mix to make sure we get the right
    hull form to do what we need to do.
        As you point out, Rep. Golden, one of the key tenets is
    this integrated power system, which will allow us to install
    some of the weapon systems Rep. Langevin referred to, right? So
    I am now having not an electrical distribution system and a
    propulsion system, but a single system that gives me margin to
    do that in the future.
        So I don't think it is all gone away. I think that is all
    in the mix and we are considering all those options.
        So, Secretary Stefany.
        Mr. Stefany. On DDG-1000, I will point out that that ship
    was a whole new hull form, a whole new propulsion plant, and
    had 10 technologies that we had never done before that were
    being brought into that ship. So the lesson learned from there
    is, as Admiral Kilby has mentioned before for DDG(X) or
    whatever comes after DDG-51, we will not put them all in one,
    not have a new hull form or new propulsion plant and a whole
    new combat system all at once, but we will evolve and keep, at
    least initially for the first few hulls, the combat system the
    same and then evolve to the new combat system needs of the
    future that the current DDG-51 just can't accommodate because
    of power. And, so, a stepped approach is how we are, I believe,
    we are going to keep the cost and the risk within----
        Mr. Golden. Let me just say, we're proud of the work that
    the shipbuilders did, they got it done. You know, I guess, part
    of what I am interested in is, what can we do productively
    working together, this committee and the Navy and both of the
    yards, to figure out in advance what are we going to put on
    this thing for weapons systems and make sure that it is a
    successful transition? I hope that is a conversation that we
    can have.
        Mr. Stefany. So I think the best part is to get both
    companies with us in the conversation up front on day one and,
    I believe, both the companies are now involved and that is the
    most important thing for us to do.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Golden.
        Mr. Gallagher.
        Mr. Gallagher. I think we had a really--for the navalists
    on the committee, we have had a really interesting week. And if
    I could attempt to summarize, well, at least what I have
    learned, it seems like, particularly with the testimony we had
    2 days ago and what really came out in Representative Luria's
    questioning to the CNO and others was, since at least 2004 we
    have been playing this sort of divest-to-invest game, or making
    this argument that, well, we are going to buy future capability
    even though we can't really make the math work for present
    capacity. And so on the committee--and I have only been here 5
    years--kind of feel a little bit like, you know, Charlie Brown
    and you guys are Lucy with the football and we keep getting it
    pulled out from under us and putting all our eggs in the basket
    of some sort of future, magical third offset thing is going to
    solve all our problems for us. But now we are starting to see
    all these signals from the environment, right?
        You know, the PLA has a bigger battle force navy than we
    have, right? They are being more aggressive. They just had a
    historic number of aircraft threaten Taiwan. And now we find
    ourselves in what I have called the Davidson window struggling
    with this tradeoff between the capacity demands of the present
    and sort of the promise of future capability. And I think to
    the extent you are hearing frustration on the committee, that
    is really it. And if we are operating on a 6-year time
    horizon--it is actually not just a matter, Lieutenant General
    Smith, of being able to fight now, it is what are we doing now
    to deter that fight from happening, to prevent the worst-case
    scenario. And it is useful to plan against the Taiwan scenario,
    because it is, in some ways, the most dangerous course of
    action.
        So, recognizing we are not going to solve this problem
    right now, and that we are just at the beginning of this
    conversation, I would just be curious--and I will pick on the
    Marine Corps because I am a Marine--what is the Marine Corps
    doing now, today, to deter the PLA from attempting an invasion
    of Taiwan? What are we doing to get into the OODA [observe,
    orient, decide, act] loop of all the generals and the admirals
    and the party officials that are looking at that and thinking,
    you know, in a couple weeks, we got the 100th anniversary of
    the founding of the party, America seems divided, Russians seem
    to have gotten away with invading a country, this might
    actually be a pretty good time to test limits. What are we
    doing today to deter?
        General Smith. Sir, what III MEF, III Marine Expeditionary
    Force, Lieutenant General Clardy would tell you is we are out
    there every single day with 31st MEU and III Marine
    Expeditionary Force. So it's 20,000 Marines west of the date
    line, 27,000, give or take, in the Pacific. And to your--
    exercising, demonstrating, reassuring allies and partners. To
    your point about the divest/invest, I hear you, sir, that----
        Mr. Courtney. Is your microphone on?
        General Smith. How is that, sir?
        Mr. Courtney. That's much better.
        General Smith. So, sir, General Clardy and III MEF is
    absolutely out there exercising, demonstrating daily, allies
    and partners, using those 27,000 Marines in the Pacific, again,
    20,000 west of the date line.
        To your point, sir, about we have to get there, the things
    that we are trying to invest in now, sir, are done; they are
    proven. The MQ-9 Reaper with pods on it that enable you to pass
    data across the expansive Pacific, done. We own that--two
    systems now. The Naval Strike Missile fired off the back of a
    Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, done; successfully tested in the
    last few months. The Organic Precision Fires-Mounted where we
    are able to kill moving vehicles, in this hearing I will say in
    excess of 80 kilometers, in replacement for the tank, done;
    five for five test shots. So those things are available now,
    sir. Now, it is just a matter of getting them at scale through
    production into the hands of the warfighter.
        Mr. Gallagher. How critical would your concept of a light
    amphibious warship be to that deterrence by denial posture? How
    would it support the Marine littoral regiments?
        General Smith. Sure. Vital, sir, because we are, in fact,
    the deterrence force along with our forward-deployed naval
    partners. We are the conventional deterrent. That light
    amphibious warship provides ambiguity for us; i.e., sir, when
    there is limited, unambiguous warning from an adversary, those
    vessels can go with those assets I just described and get--
    because they are beachable--anywhere in 4 days throughout that
    region, and now you have to respect those small 75 Marine units
    to enable distributed maritime operations. Those things are
    vital, sir.
        Mr. Gallagher. Yeah. So I guess I will just close by
    saying, I understand we have to think long term and we have to
    make smart long-term investments, and think about future
    capability, but I just think we are--and I am not suggesting I
    have the answer, but I think we are going to need to get real
    creative real fast in terms of fixing our problem within the
    Davidson window, and deterring what could be a disastrous
    situation that would completely destroy our deterrent posture
    globally, not just in the first island chain, but globally.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Gallagher.
        Mrs. Luria.
        Mrs. Luria. Well, thank you and I will start by echoing Mr.
    Gallagher's sentiment. I have said it many times. I think when
    you have a Battle Force 2025, because of this immediate
    concern, threat deterrent that we need in the Pacific, and, you
    know, very encouraged by the idea of the LAWs [light amphibious
    warships]. I think that the idea that we came up with the idea
    for a capability that can bring the fight forward, can go after
    some of the vulnerabilities of the Chinese in the theater is
    very important, and I want to, a little bit in the weeds, go
    back to try to understand, again, the genesis of this.
        Quite simply, is there a document that was generated? Is
    there a process by which PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] and/
    or the Joint Staff translated this requirement forward in order
    to then lead to the acquisition process and, i.e., the requests
    that you have in this budget? How do we do more of this? What
    process is there that allows us to quickly operationalize a
    concept to actually delivery?
        General Smith. Very briefly, because I know your time is
    short. Our previous Commandant, General Neller, said this is
    what we are going to do. He issued out a document that said,
    begin to do this. Our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab issued a
    tentative manual for expeditionary advanced base operations.
    That is out now for review. Start with this and modify it. But
    the demand signal, really, ma'am, does come--nothing in a
    formal document, but it comes in our daily interactions with
    INDOPACOM through Marine Forces Pacific. It comes through those
    headquarters and say that COCOM [combatant command] has
    delivered a demand signal, what can you do for me?
        Mrs. Luria. So the demand signal through the GFM process,
    the global force management process, or future capabilities?
    How is the combatant commander, how is Admiral Davidson, now
    Admiral Aquilino, communicating to you as the services that are
    going to acquire capabilities that are requested through this
    budget, how is that being communicated into a process where
    that actually results in us buying something new, like the LAWs
    in order to help in the theater?
        General Smith. That certainly, ma'am, comes through their
    prioritized lists of things that they care about, they wish to
    have. It also just comes through literally, ma'am, daily
    interactions from the service components that are part of
    INDOPACOM saying this is what my boss just referenced; rather
    than wait on a formal process, I need this. Then the service
    chief with his title 10 authority says, this is what I want you
    to go look at and we take off looking for that. And in our case
    I think we found it.
        Mrs. Luria. Okay. Well, thank you for that feedback and
    perhaps an additional conversation I can continue with your
    staff. So I just was, again, thinking about what the combatant
    commander wants, needs, demands, and over the course of
    preparing for this week's multiple hearings, I noticed in the
    2006 budget submission, it was stated that the fleet response
    plan construct was going to go from 24 months to 27 months and
    out of that, that would generate six carrier strike groups
    within 30 days, and two additional carrier strike groups within
    60 days. So that would be a six-plus-two construct. And that
    was as recent as 2006.
        And then the next year, it said six carrier strike groups
    in 30 days and one additional CSG [carrier strike group] with
    an additional 60 days, so we got to six plus one. And in 2010,
    it was just referred to multiple CSGs in the timeline, and at
    that point we went from 27 to 32 months. We got to a three plus
    two. Now we are at 36 months and it is arguable, you know, what
    carrier strike group presence we could generate in the Pacific
    within the timeline we would need for the TPFDD [Time Phased
    Force Deployment Data].
        So we just continue to say that all of these things we are
    doing are getting after this problem, but if you just look at
    this history, this is 15 years of timeframe where we have
    reduced our operating cycle time, we have reduced our
    capability to provide our major assets, like carrier strike
    groups, on station in the Western Pacific to meet a potential
    conflict there.
        And so I just thought wrapping this up and wrapping up kind
    of a week of Navy hearings, you know, every single time through
    this we keep hearing that there are going to be benefits, we
    are going to do things, we are going to change things, we are
    going to divest to invest, but we never see those benefits
    materialize.
        In fact, this is 15 years of actually seeing less force
    generation possible to deal with this conflict, and no one ever
    goes back and says, ``Hey, you said this would fix the problem,
    but it didn't.'' So just kind of wanted to wrap up the time I
    have today by saying, you know, that that is just what I am
    trying to do. I am just trying to point out that, you know,
    many courses of time before I or anyone on this dais was here,
    it feels as though the Navy has continued to come forward with
    these similar claims, and it is not very compelling, this
    divest-to-invest strategy.
        And I know that my time is expired.
        And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Courtney. Actually, I mean, we are really at the tail
    end. If any of the witnesses wanted to respond to that, we have
    got time.
        Admiral Kilby. Yeah. I acknowledge, Rep. Luria, your
    points, and all the work you did to lay that out. A couple of
    comments. Admiral Davidson, when he was Fleet Forces Command,
    really his predecessor, Admiral Gortney, created OFRP
    [Optimized Fleet Response Plan], instantiated it, and then
    distributed maritime operations, which is a way to get after
    this threat. And I would say that the--my view of the Navy is
    we have been focused on China since the 2008-2009 timeframe
    with the inset--the inception of the DF-21.
        So the things that we have invested in, like an SM-6IB,
    like a maritime strike Tomahawk, might not be there if we
    hadn't had that foresight of several years ago to get after
    that so we can deliver those weapons by the 2025, 2026
    timeframe, because it takes a long time to make a new weapon
    system. And those are significant and really focused on that
    adversary. But your point is well taken.
        I guess I would harken back to we have got to be--my belief
    is, this is a Kilby belief, we've got to be disciplined on the
    use of our Navy. So when we do request for forces, and we use
    up carriers and extend them, we are dipping into that well and
    we are paying--we are using today's resource not husbanding it
    tomorrow because we are shortening the maintenance
    availabilities, we are compressing things.
        So we have to be clear-headed and clear-minded about that
    with the assets we have. The goal of this budget was to create
    the most impactful force we could within the budget we had. And
    so I don't want to come off as viewing cruisers as not
    valuable. They are valuable. In the decision process we made to
    try to maintain those investments on those capabilities, we had
    to make some very hard choices. And in that is the nonfunding
    of the DDG--Flight III DDG in 2022.
        So I think you bring up a lot of great points, ma'am, and
    we have got to continue this understanding of got to fund
    Columbia, which is expensive to do it right, to get to all the
    performance you laid out, Rep. Courtney. We have got to fund
    readiness, because if we don't have a ready force, we don't
    have a force. And that includes the maintenance, the training,
    the supply, all those elements that make it up.
        And then the capabilities are equally important, and then
    capacity is also a part of that, because capacity and
    capability equal lethality. So it is complex. But I think you
    bring up great points, and we, in this budget, try to create
    the most impactful mix, the most valuable mix given the
    resources we had.
        Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you for that very
    thoughtful exchange, but, again, we get the final word when we
    do the markup. So we look forward to continuing this
    discussion. What is that? To be continued.
        Mr. Golden actually made one last request to have a quick
    question, I think to Lieutenant General Smith; then I think we
    are going to wrap it up here.
        Mr. Golden, the floor is yours.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you to the chair and ranking member for
    graciously entertaining me and to all three of you as well. I
    am sure everyone is anxious to get going, and I got to get 3
    miles in before I get back to the district.
        So I just wanted to talk a little bit more about some of
    what you were talking about with Representative Luria, General.
    You were talking about sea denial capability as part of this
    redesign and I have also heard you and the Commandant talk
    about reconnaissance being the eyes and ears, the sensing
    capabilities that you are looking to bring forward.
        When you think about sea denial capabilities in this
    redesign, is that something that you really see as, like, the
    reconnaissance, the eyes and the ears in support of sea denial
    activities carried out by the Navy, or is that actually also an
    offensive capability that you are looking to bring?
        General Smith. Sir, it is both.
        Mr. Golden. So, for example, seizing a strategically
    important shipping lane and locking it down?
        General Smith. Sir, absolutely.
        Mr. Golden. Containing an adversary inside of a cordoned
    area?
        General Smith. Yes, sir. And most importantly, sir, as that
    inside force who can sense and make sense, because we are
    there. We see it with our reconnaissance assets. I can pass
    that data back to Navy ships, to passing F-35As. I can pass
    that to anyone who has long-range precision fires, and I can
    act on it myself with those precision fires that I bring with
    me. So it is both of those things, sir.
        And, frankly, sir, the deterrent piece, when I am there
    with an ally and partner who now understands I have got
    capability to deter that adversary in war, probably a little
    tighter relationship in peacetime.
        Mr. Golden. Yep. Absolutely. Forgive me if I am asking the
    wrong question. I don't know that there is a right answer, but
    as you think about all of this, would you say that the
    cornerstone of your ability to conduct this mission that has
    been envisioned is the squad, the platoon, the company, or the
    battalion?
        General Smith. Not a trite statement, it is the Marine. It
    is always the individual Marine. And it is the training and the
    recruitment of the right individuals, the training of them, the
    fostering, the mentoring, the coaching, the teaching, so that
    they will do what you did, sir, in Afghanistan, and go into
    harm's way willingly, but it is the individual Marine, sir.
        Mr. Golden. So down at the squad level?
        General Smith. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Golden. Just a few more quick questions. Just wanted to
    make sure myself and also the committee and the Appropriations
    Committee understand just as you are looking at fiscal year
    2023, and that guidance, that requirement you have been given
    by the Commandant, I know you won't let him down. What in this
    budget is important not just for fiscal year 2023, but for the
    next big step that you have to take in this redesign?
        General Smith. Sir, the thing that we actually, that we
    must have, we have to have the long-range precision fires
    because of the long lead time of those missile systems, both
    the Naval Strike Missile and the Tomahawks. People down in
    Tucson at Raytheon are busting their backsides fighting through
    COVID. We cannot--we can't offer time to the adversary. If you
    wait till we are finished and then begin to procure, you are
    giving them a 2-year gift, and we can't do it.
        Mr. Golden. You need funding for it.
        So you have talked about the Reaper, the missile, the
    precision fires. I know you are looking for mobility, the
    amphib ship. Don't give me the Marines make do with less answer
    and [inaudible] need to think outside the box, but what is the
    next thing that is out there? What keeps you up at night that
    you wish you had if we could give you everything?
        General Smith. Sir, here is what keeps me up at night, and
    I hate to say this, sir, it is not a thing; it is a prospect.
    It is the prospect of a humanitarian assistance disaster
    relief, for example, happening in that region where I used to
    command--Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines--and the first
    thing that arrives is a Chinese amphib, not a United States
    amphib with Marines and sailors aboard. That is what keeps me
    up at night, sir.
        Mr. Golden. You want the amphib. I will just say--and we
    don't have to work it all out right now, obviously, but I would
    be interested to, you know, talk more about it--what keeps me
    up at night is I think about the squad or the company out there
    or the individual Marine doing a mission like this out on an
    island in a strait taking on a pretty big mission. It is comms
    [communications]. You know, the infantryman always laughs about
    comms. It always goes wrong. It is always the reason why things
    don't go according to plan. So do you have the comms capability
    on both sides, Navy and Marines, to go out there and carry this
    out? Do you have what you need right now? And if you do, have
    you tested it out and do you know that it works?
        General Smith. We have some, sir, but it is not sufficient
    when an adversary--a pacing adversary decides to enter into the
    jamming and the deception game. We do have a pretty robust
    package, sir, and that is one of the elements of our force
    design package. And I will pass to Admiral Kilby. We do have
    some pretty robust resilient comms, sir, but they are not
    enough against a pacing threat and we are trying to double down
    to harden them and to make them more resilient when we are
    knocked off of the larger grid so we have a joint force
    maritime component command communications network.
        And with your forbearance, I would pass to my shipmate for
    what the Navy has invested heavily in.
        Admiral Kilby. Couple quick comments. One, the value of a
    naval service is that we can be mobile, and we can create our
    own network from a strike group, or an ESG [expeditionary
    strike group], or a SAG [surface action group], if we have an
    elevated platform and a comms relay. So that is a value
    proposition that we should recognize.
        The second piece is this thing called Project Overmatch. So
    that is using technology today in a different manner to make
    our comms more robust and resilient, and that is a significant
    effort for the Navy.
        So you will see that burgeoning in 2022, but more robustly
    in the future and it is a key to not only the Navy, but the
    unmanned portion of the Navy in the future that we get that
    right.
        Mr. Golden. Thank you, gentlemen. I would just say, please,
    think about that, invest in it, and make sure you ask for what
    you need. The comms is key.
        Mr. Courtney. Great. Well, thank you, Mr. Golden. So I
    think we have done our two rounds. Again, I want to thank the
    witnesses for your patience and look forward to working with
    you in the future.
        And with no further ado, this subcommittee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 June 17, 2021

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 June 17, 2021

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 June 17, 2021

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                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

        Mr. Langevin. I'm very happy with how enthusiastically the Navy has
    embraced directed energy in the future with the upcoming Directed
    Energy Campaign Plan and future ship classes getting designed to
    accommodate the technology. Looking at the current fleet, I saw the
    HELIOS on the unfunded priority list. What is the Navy doing to field
    directed energy systems today? When will we see a budget that
    prioritizes the fielding of high energy lasers in quantities that are
    relevant to the fight? Before my time runs out, Mr. Stefany, your
    written testimony mentions that the Navy is investing against cyber
    protection in this PB, but it looks like the major cyber accounts have
    relatively flat funding. Where are you making these investments?
        Mr. Stefany. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]

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